Abstract

The Politics of Classification in Global Development

Lindsay R. Dolan

Many scholars primarily view international organizations as vehicles used by powerful states to distribute resources. However, this view trivializes the profound influence of their day-to-day operations on the world. This dissertation argues that that the classification systems developed by these bureaucracies significantly affect how classified countries are treated by many influential elites in the global economy. Focusing on the domain of development, I show that whether a country is categorized as a developing country has major effects on high-stakes decisions such as aid, investment, and credit and democracy ratings.

Why do international observers rely so heavily on these blunt categories? I propose two mechanisms by which classifications influence elite behavior: Elites may use classifications cognitively as heuristic devices that simplify decision-making processes or strategically as a way of justifying their behaviors to external audiences. I then show with cross-national data from 1987 to 2015 that a country’s World Bank income classification correlates with the rewards it receives from actors who are susceptible to one or both of these mechanisms. Specifically, I find that becoming a middle income country causes a country to lose aid but receive better ratings of its creditworthiness and democracy. These findings are echoed in interviews with stakeholders in the graduation processes of several countries within a World Bank system. I test the micro-foundations of my theory with experimental data by inviting an elite sample of development professionals and students to participate in a hypothetical aid allocation activity. By randomizing the information included on
the country profiles and the participation incentives, I show both that a classification effect exists and that, in the case of donors, it is primarily driven by the strategic mechanism. Coupled with the observational findings, which illustrate that classifications affect investors and raters with no such strategic incentives, this suggests that both mechanisms are essential to understanding who uses classifications.

How do these dynamics affect the experiences and behaviors of classified countries and groups within those countries? I argue that classifications produce winners and losers, who strategically respond to their classifications when able and informed. In particular, being categorized as a more developed country punishes non-governmental organizations and those they represent, while business interests and individual leaders benefit materially and socially. I illustrate these patterns through dozens of interviews with representatives from civil society, the business community, and government in Nepal and Botswana, two countries that are currently or have previously “graduated” from the UN’s Least Developed Country category. Moreover, I provide qualitative and quantitative evidence that countries use a variety of strategies to attempt to change their classifications, and they do so in both directions. For example, I show that countries manipulate their data as they approach significant thresholds that separate categories, and while some seek to accelerate their transition, others try to hinder it.

This project identifies and explains a relatively unexamined power of international organizations in a context where its deployment significantly affects outcomes for developing countries. Classifications affect the highest level of interactions in ways that are felt by the poorest in society. As numerous countries begin to graduate from their developing country statuses, these findings are especially relevant for ongoing policy debates about how international organizations spread their understandings of development. Far from merely describing the world, these bureaucrats shape it in profound ways.
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List of Acronyms

CDP  Committee for Development Policy
CGD  Center for Global Development
DAC  Development Assistance Committee
FCAS Fragile and Conflict Affected State
FDI  foreign direct investment
GNI  gross national income
HIC  High Income Country
HIPC Highly Indebted Poor Country
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDA  International Development Association
IGO  intergovernmental organization
IIR  Institutional Investor ratings
IMF  International Monetary Fund
IO   international organization
IR   international relations
LDC  Least Developed Country
LIC  Low Income Country
LMIC Lower-Middle Income Country
MCC  Millennium Challenge Corporation
MIC  Middle Income Country
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>official development assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>purchasing power parity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDR</td>
<td>Special Drawing Rights</td>
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<td>UMIC</td>
<td>Upper-Middle Income Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>UN Conference on Trade and Development</td>
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<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>WDI</td>
<td>World Development Indicators</td>
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Chapter 1

Introduction

It is 2015 and commuters in Washington, DC, walk by a new series of billboard ads, prominently featuring a Starbucks-style disposable coffee cup with a World Bank logo. The caption reads, “$2.86 per day is NOT middle income. Raise the MIC!” The message of this cryptic image is that the World Bank’s income classification system should be changed. The World Bank currently defines a Middle Income Country (MIC) as one in which a person earns at least $2.86 per day, about the same as a cup of coffee in a cosmopolitan city and, in the view of this campaign, far too low to be considered middle income. The Raise the MIC group, which has also organized petitions and protests in addition to the ads, argues that this low threshold allows needy countries to be perceived as no longer poor, which limits the assistance they are able to obtain in the international community.¹ The organizers publicly call on the World Bank to reform their classification system.

A year later, officials of the Commonwealth Secretariat schedule a private meeting with the World Bank Development Economics Group.² The Commonwealth Secretariat is an intergovernmental organization representing many of the United Kingdom’s former colonies, including those

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¹In their words, “the World Bank income classification scale sends a global message that is distorting the reality and does not accurately reflect the income level of the majority of people in these countries.” Letter addressed to Jim Yong Kim, president of the World Bank, co-signed by 520 organizations. http://raisethemic.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/World-Bank-Packet.pdf

²Meeting titled “The World Bank Income Classification System: Is it Time for Change?” and held June 23, 2016, at the Center for Global Development in Washington, DC. Author’s notes.
in the Caribbean. Countries such as Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Jamaica, and others share an experience common to many small island states: Despite significant development challenges and vulnerability to environmental and economic shocks, they are classified as “middle income” by virtue of their small populations. The purpose of this meeting? Caribbean representatives hope to convey to the World Bank that lending decisions should be based on more nuanced criteria than this simplistic label, which fails to capture the needs of their countries. Much to their surprise, World Bank officials are already familiar with these challenges and reply that, for these reasons, they never use these classifications to allocate grants or loans. While they also advise that these classifications should not be used for the purpose of awarding funds, they acknowledge that they are powerless to stop other international institutions and powerful donors from engaging in this practice.

Why are so many objecting to a fairly technical classification system found in the World Bank bureaucracy? Are their concerns valid, and conversely, do others actually benefit from these labels? Why did the World Bank begin classifying countries, and does this system achieve its intended objectives?

In answering these questions, I will illustrate that seemingly benign bureaucratic classifications can carry powerful political consequences. Specifically, I will show that how international organizations define and categorize countries’ levels of development itself changes their development trajectories. This is true not only of the World Bank’s classification system but also of others maintained by organizations like the United Nations (UN). Highlighting these dynamics in the domain of development, I claim that classifications are a great and often overlooked tool by which international organizations shape the world.
1.1 The Argument

This dissertation argues that classifications do not just describe the world — they change it in material ways. My study focuses on the classifications that international organizations use to characterize a country’s level of development. I will present statistical evidence that when countries move into categories indicating a higher level of development (an event often celebrated as a success by national newspapers), those countries receive significantly less foreign aid from a variety of international financiers. But they also enjoy new privileges in the global economy, for example, improvements in evaluations of their creditworthiness and democracy. Moreover, these effects exist even when there is no real change in the country’s economic or political situation; rather, it has been reclassified for mundane technical reasons. In other words, classifications are self-fulfilling prophecies that partially create the realities they describe.

To explain these dynamics, I start by examining the interactions between international organizations and a group of actors I call international observers. By international observers, I mean the many actors (both state and non-state) who knowingly participate in the global economy. These are the actors who consume classifications and use them, consciously or unconsciously, when they make decisions of import for developing countries. International observers could be countries, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, private investors, or even the mass public, when their behaviors in the aggregate affect the welfare of other countries. International organizations, in turn, produce the classifications that international observers consume.

Why would international observers rely on the classifications produced by international organizations? I develop two theoretical mechanisms by which classifications may be of use to so many audiences. First, classifications can cognitively simplify complex and often contradictory information about a country. Evidence from psychology suggests that people will eagerly and implicitly resort to labels to make inferences about objects, even when there is plenty of better
1.1. The Argument

information available elsewhere. But even actors who are purely rational may nonetheless consciously and strategically use classifications in their decision-making. According to the second mechanism, these actors use classifications to publicly justify their decisions, especially when they are responsible for allocating scarce political resources.

International observers can be susceptible to one, both, or neither mechanism. For the purposes of my argument, I examine the international observers whose behaviors are of greatest consequence to developing countries—donors, investors, and raters. I use knowledge about the career concerns and the organizational structures of these actors to generate predictions about which mechanism(s) they may or may not be susceptible to. I use this to develop observable implications regarding how each of these actors would make decisions that reflect the classifications countries receive. I generate and test these predictions in the domain of development, showing that bureaucrats in international organizations have great ability to influence economic interactions in ways that materially affect the lives of millions living in poverty. The broader theoretical claim, however, is that classifications of any type will be most likely to influence the behaviors of actors most susceptible to cognitive biases and strategic incentives. This suggests who will be most likely to consume a given classification system.

How international observers use classifications to make decisions will have important consequences for a different group of actors, which I call affected parties. Governments of classified countries, for example, are clearly affected when their classifications are used to determine eligibility for international programs. But affected parties can also include groups and non-political entities who are affected by the way their country is perceived. For example, firms, non-governmental organizations, and even the mass public may experience the effects of their country’s label as they interact with the global economy. How these parties are specifically affected will depend on how particular international observers use classifications. Sometimes these behaviors will result in privileges for countries receiving a particular label, while at other times they will result in punishments.

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4 See Fearon (1994).
Some groups may feel a disproportionate share of the benefits, while others may disproportionately feel the burdens. As with any political economy, classifications produce both winners and losers.

Affected parties therefore engage in strategic behaviors to influence their classifications. They do this in one of three ways: First, they can take advantage of any opportunities within a classification system for them to petition for a specific label. Second, they can lobby to reform the entire classification system in such a way that will result in their preferred designation. Third, when all else fails, they might resort to covert ways of securing their desired category. For example, I present evidence that countries actually manipulate their data to engineer their classifications. Importantly, and breaking with previous work, I show that while some affected parties prefer improvements in their rankings, others work for the reverse. This is consistent with my argument that classifications carry complex and multifaceted distributive consequences.

Finally, international observers’ sensitivity to classifications empowers international organizations to behave strategically. International organizations themselves are political actors. Their political goals could result from the agenda of their most powerful state backers as well as that of the bureaucrats working within the organization. Regardless of where these goals come from, international organizations can achieve them by deploying classifications that will coordinate the behaviors of relevant international observers. Of course, international organizations may be forced to compromise in their pursuits if they face sufficiently great pressure from affected parties lobbying on their own behalf.

While I focus on the domain of development, my argument addresses broader questions about international organizations and how they structure the global economy. I argue that international organizations have significant ability to shape the world through ideas and narratives, and they promote those ideas and narratives using devices like classifications. A longstanding constructivist tradition in international relations holds that beliefs matter. My cognitive-strategic theory helps to explain why and when they do, and I test this theory using cross-national statistical analysis, an elite survey experiment, and dozens of in-depth interviews. In so doing, I explain how established
1.2. The Rise of Classifications in Global Development

Indicators, rankings, and ratings are an increasingly important component of global governance. Private authorities and international institutions now produce a broad range of metrics, claiming to measure levels of corruption, respect for human rights, democracy, debt sustainability and other features of interest. Their widely acknowledged influence has made these numbers a popular target of political scrutiny. For example, Chile’s outgoing president Michelle Bachelet in 2018 criticized the World Bank for a decline in her country’s ranking in the “Doing Business” report. In a Twitter post, she claimed “Rankings provided by international institutions should be trustworthy, because they have an impact on a country’s investment and development.” Diplomatic incidents over performance assessments like these are increasingly common and have not gone unnoticed by social scientists.

This attention to numbers is just the most recent manifestation of social science’s preoccupation with knowledge and power. For Foucault, these concepts are inseparable: through the creation,

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5 See Cooley and Snyder (2015) for a review. Rankings and ratings, they argue, have proliferated since the 1980s (10).

acquisition, and management of knowledge, authorities are able to assign identities and coerce subjects accordingly. Scott (1998) builds on this tradition in his discussion of the origins of the modern state. He argues that states extended their bureaucratic reach by making their populations “legible” to the state through censuses, mapping, and records. Once the state could measure and manage its population, it could call them “citizens” and subject them to its authority. Numbers exaggerate these dynamics because they conceal the origins of their power. As Merry (2011, 584) explains, “Numerical measures produce a world knowable without the detailed particulars of context and history. ... This knowledge is presented as objective and often as scientific. The interpretations lurk behind the numbers but are rarely presented explicitly.” In other words, the more an indicator appears to be technical and systematic, the less it is possible to challenge its claim to authority, and the more powerful it is.

It is no wonder that ratings, rankings, and indicators have earned the scrutiny of political scientists. Recent works have called attention to the significance of “global benchmarking,” “ratings and rankings organizations,” “global power assessments,” and “scorecard diplomacy.” Covering indicators across a range of issue areas, these works investigate the origins of raters’ authority, measurement issues in the production of indicators, and how these metrics shape political interactions. Many of these accounts reveal that indicators have been intentionally developed or deployed to exert social pressure on rated countries to comply with international norms. They often rely on data that may seem objective but actually reflects important political biases. Graded countries, perceiving the benefits of desirable scores, labels, or groupings, respond by adopting policies targeted at changing their scores or petitioning the ratings organizations to amend them.

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7See Foucault (1978).
8See Broome and Quirk (2015).
9See Cooley and Snyder (2015).
10See Kelley and Simmons (2016).
11See Kelley (2017). See also Davis et al. (2012). Still others investigate the validity of the numbers going into these political figures. See Andreas and Greenhill (2010); Jerven (2013).
12See Cooley and Snyder (2015, 24) for a helpful framework for thinking about this literature.
13See Kelley and Simmons (2015); Kelley (2017); Morse (2017).
14See Bush (2017).
15See, for example, Cooley and Snyder (2015); Kelley and Simmons (2015); Buntaine et al. (2017); Carnegie and
1.2. The Rise of Classifications in Global Development

Yet despite scholarship’s increasing awareness of the politicization of these metrics, we lack a theory to explain why they occur. We know that indicators are powerful, but why? In Büthe (2012)’s conceptual model of indicators, he introduces the idea that there exists both a supply and demand for indicators. Some actors demand certain metrics, and others produce them. My argument builds on this insight by exploring why various actors demand indicators and how this helps us understand what kind of indicators will be supplied. In brief, I claim that indicators affect actors who are susceptible to cognitive biases and/or who must justify their behaviors to external audiences. This explanation for why indicators change behaviors is essential for moving this literature from the descriptive observation that indicators matter to theoretical predictions about which indicators matter and what their consequences will be.16 Not all indicators are powerful, and no single indicator is all-powerful. This theory equips scholars to study indicators with greater precision and equips practitioners to design effective indicators that achieve their desired objectives.

My argument is about classifications, which are a type of indicator. Davis et al. (2012, 7) point out four notable features of an indicator: “1) the significance of the name of the indicator and the associated assertion of its power to define and represent a phenomenon such as ‘the rule of law’; (2) the ordinal structure enabling comparison and ranking and exerting pressure for ‘improvement’ as measured by the indicator; (3) the simplification of complex social phenomena; and (4) the potential to be used for evaluative purposes.” Classifications are indicators that are particularly extreme on the third feature: simplification. While a classification could be made on the basis of multiple criteria, the result reduces an object’s identity to its inclusion inside or outside a group, usually on the basis of thresholds. Cooley and Snyder (2015, 16) point out that classifications are often the high-profile complements to numerical indicators and that “in many cases, it is the classification or labeling of their country by ratings and rankings organizations that state officials find more objectionable than the country score itself.” While country scores may have been the focus during the information boom of the 1980s and 1990s, today’s world of big data makes information the most

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16I am grateful to Melissa Lee for pushing me on this point.
valuable in the aggregate, when it is effectively summarized. In short, there are too many numbers to focus on any one, and there is widespread respect for the simple output of a complex algorithm. Classifications are therefore especially appealing because they digest these numbers. My study of classifications highlights political dynamics that, while true of indicators more generally, are especially powerful in the current information environment.\footnote{Other studies find that investors’ risk perceptions are influenced by a country’s affiliation with other countries. See Gray (2013); Brooks et al. (2015). While these findings exhibit similar decision-making processes to those I will describe, these categories are not classifications because they are not officially defined and maintained. However, these results underscore what a power international organizations have to create categories by embedding classifications in their institutions.}

In particular, my argument focuses on classifications in the domain of development. While international agencies classify many objects, ranging from hurricanes to commodities to democracies, I focus on classifications of development for three reasons. First, there are several different classification systems, which allows me to compare between them. In addition to receiving a World Bank income classification, states may belong to the Least Developed Country (LDC) category, the Fragile and Conflict Affected State (FCAS) category, the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) category, and others.\footnote{While I focus on classifications, there is also a proliferation of indicators in the domain of global development. Although investigating the origins of this trend is beyond the scope of my study, this proliferation has occurred at the same time as donors have pushed for results-based aid and have created metrics to assess aid effectiveness. See Birdsall and Savedoff (2010). Honig and Weaver (2018) argue that the culture of the elite development community so strongly values performance indicators that they have taken costly steps to improve the transparency of their aid projects, despite relatively little demand for these indicators.} Second, many countries are expected to change categories within a decade and many high-profile “graduations” have already occurred (e.g. India).\footnote{See Moss and Leo (2011); Morris and Gleave (2015).} This not only makes my study highly policy relevant but also allows me to observe within-country variation as countries transition between categories.

A third reason to focus on development is to mitigate alternative explanations for the power of classifications. Many recent studies of indicators have argued that international organizations design indicators that measure desirable behaviors to create social pressure to perform well on these metrics. These indicators could take the form, for example, of scorecards or blacklists.\footnote{See Kelley (2017); Morse (2017).} But
these studies focus on measuring certain behaviors that governments decide to either engage or not engage in, such as acts of corruption or adopting certain laws. This means that a country’s inclusion or exclusion from the list is quite a clear signal of its type to the international community, and there is therefore a rational basis for why these indicators are so important to a country’s international reputation or status.\textsuperscript{21} In contrast, a country’s level of development, while related to its behaviors, is a much murkier signal of that government’s quality. It is difficult to imagine that international organizations can successfully incentivize specific behaviors with classifications that capture such a distantly related outcome, and it is also challenging to justify the power of these classifications on a rational basis. I therefore need to dig deeper to understand where these classifications get their influence. In so doing, I uncover additional mechanisms by which indicators more broadly (including performance assessments) may cause such strong effects.

1.3 International Organizations as Narrators

Indicators and classifications can come from many different sources. Some are produced by non-governmental organizations, such as Transparency International or Freedom House, who use them to monitor or “name and shame” certain behaviors.\textsuperscript{22} Others are produced by governments, who similarly align their metrics with their diplomatic goals.\textsuperscript{23} Still others are produced by private authorities, such as credit raters, whose independence and expertise give them a profitable business model.\textsuperscript{24}

I focus on classifications that are produced by international organizations (IOs). Of all the previous producers mentioned, we might expect IOs (also known as intergovernmental organiza-

\textsuperscript{21}An extensive literature in international relations explores the various signaling behaviors states engage in to cultivate their reputations or statuses. See Bordo and Rockoff (1996); Büthe and Milner (2008); Tomz (2007); Towns (2010); Hyde (2011); Bush (2011); Carnegie and Dolan (2018). Indicators are argued to be, simply, ways of measuring the behaviors that states undertake.

\textsuperscript{22}See Büthe (2012).

\textsuperscript{23}See Kelley and Simmons (2015); Kelley (2017).

\textsuperscript{24}See Abdelal and Blyth (2015).
tions (IGOs))\(^{25}\) to be the most restrained in the indicators they create. Unlike non-governmental organizations (NGOs), IGOs are answerable to state actors and often rely on them for funding. It is therefore more challenging for an IGO than a NGO to rate a country poorly, since an IGO can face diplomatic consequences. Moreover, IGOs must represent a broader spectrum of views than do individual governments. While a country might choose to create an indicator on a topic relevant to its interests (as the U.S. did with human trafficking), IGOs represent governments with sometimes competing interests, making it less likely that they find an issue of sufficient importance to many that deserves the creation of an indicator. Finally, unlike private authorities, they lack a profit motive to do so. As a result, we might expect the classifications resulting from IGOs to be particularly innocuous, making this study a hard test for the claim that these indicators are highly political.

Academic scholarship has been slow to identify classification as an important instrument of IO power. In their work on IOs, Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore called classification “one of bureaucracy’s greatest sources of power,” but we still have little understanding of its usefulness, its limitations, or its deployment.\(^{26}\) My theory provides a novel framework for explaining this particular power of IOs.

My argument relates to one of the central debates in the IO literature about whether IOs are powerful in their own right. For decades, scholars contended that IOs were rationally designed by states to carry out their interests, trivializing the possibility that IOs could wield power independently of states. In this account, states are rational actors who strategically create rule structures in IOs that subsequently bind the agents within those institutions to doing the bidding of states.\(^{27}\)

Many goals require coordination among states, who come together out of pure self-interest.\(^{28}\) This

\(^{25}\)I use international organizations and intergovernmental organizations interchangeably. While I generally refer to them as IOs, I refer to them as IGOs in this paragraph for clarity.

\(^{26}\)More fully, the authors assert, “An elementary feature of bureaucracies is that they organize information and knowledge. ...The ability to classify objects, to shift their very definition and identity, is one of bureaucracy’s greatest sources of power.” Barnett and Finnemore (1999, 711).

\(^{27}\)According to Koremenos et al. (2001), “states use international institutions to further their own goals, and they design institutions accordingly.”

\(^{28}\)See Keohane (1984).
“rational design” approach does allow for the possibility that IOs veer from state preferences, but this is primarily explained as the result of incomplete contracting: Governments (principals) might delegate certain activities to IOs (agents), but they cannot possibly do so with complete precision. Since agents will always have some degree of independence from principals, it is possible that IOs will have some leeway to ignore the preferences of governments and instead advance their own interests.\textsuperscript{29} In a rational design framework, governments are willing to accept this inefficiency as simply the price of forming collective institutions. While IO bureaucrats may sometimes get the opportunity to exercise discretion, this approach primarily sees IOs merely as vehicles through which powerful states exercise power.\textsuperscript{30}

Recently, however, bureaucrats have played a primary rather than a secondary role in scholars’ accounts of IOs. Many contend that “organizational culture” drives many decisions and activities in IOs, far beyond the mild discretion afforded to these bureaucrats in a rational choice setting.\textsuperscript{31} Instead, these bureaucrats are thought to have considerable power to set the agenda of the institution, and their beliefs and worldviews matter enormously for its undertakings.\textsuperscript{32} For example, Chwieroth (2009) highlights the autonomy of International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff to deliberate over norms surrounding capital controls and to incorporate these norms into policy decisions.\textsuperscript{33} Other work suggests that bureaucrats are even involved in the founding of new IOs and design them in ways to insulate them from political pressures.\textsuperscript{34}

Rational design theorists and organizational culture theorists tend to focus on different instruments by which IOs actually exercise power. Rational design arguments often highlight the ways in which states use IOs to channel valuable material resources. Numerous works demonstrate “pol-

\textsuperscript{29}See Hawkins et al. (2006).
\textsuperscript{30}Many prominent theorists even claim that IOs are epiphenomenal and merely reflect the underlying distribution of power. See Waltz (1979); Mearsheimer (1994); Carr (1964). This line of argumentation is more extreme than the rational design school because it does not afford any opportunity for independent IO activity whatsoever, whereas the rational design school accepts that some independence may occur after IO inception. I focus on theories of rational design, which are much more pervasive in the contemporary IO literature.
\textsuperscript{31}See Nelson and Weaver (2016) for a review.
\textsuperscript{33}See also Woods (2006); Phillips (2009); Abdelal (2008); Autesserre (2014); Nelson (2017).
\textsuperscript{34}See Johnson (2014).
itics at work” in the disbursement of aid and lending to recipients with greater representation on the Boards of these institutions. By illustrating these political biases, many scholars interpret this evidence as support for the idea that states have great control over IOs, whether through their institutional design or because IOs are epiphenomenal. Other rational design scholars argue that IOs exert influence through enacting and enforcing laws and rules that bind state behavior — of course, states consent to these laws and rules in order to overcome their inability to coordinate absent international institutions. But organizational culture theorists privilege other tools used by IOs, focusing instead on the powers of bureaucratic procedures and beliefs. For these scholars, IOs affect the world by consulting with country representatives, developing worldviews, and defining and applying procedures. It is in the day-to-day operations, when IO bureaucrats interpret situations and judge how to handle them, where IOs exercise the greatest amounts of power.

This dissertation focuses on one kind of bureaucratic procedure through which IOs exercise power: classification. Although classifications are rarely integral to an IO’s mission or identity, they are frequently the byproduct of its day-to-day activities and operations. Bureaucrats must judge how to handle many types of situations, and classifications are often useful for systematizing these procedures. Classifications therefore reflect and make concrete the IO’s worldview. Although understanding how classifications emerge is also relevant, my argument primarily seeks to explain the power of these classifications after they come into existence. I show that these classifications

35 For examples of empirical works on distributive politics in development institutions, see Kuziemko and Werker (2006); Dreher et al. (2009); Kaja and Werker (2010); Kaya (2015); Kersting and Kilby (2016).
36 See Keohane (1984); Koremenos et al. (2001); Dai (2007).
37 I distinguish these from the laws and rules described previously. The laws and rules described above apply to states, and IOs serve to create and enforce those laws and rules. When I discuss bureaucratic procedures, I refer to matters of operating procedure that guide how IOs institutionally respond to those they deal with.
38 See Barnett (2003); Chwieroth (2009); Autesserre (2014).
39 In this section, I have just argued that scholars’ beliefs about who controls IOs often relate to their beliefs about how IOs exercise power in the world. It is important to recognize that these are two distinct questions and there is nothing inherently binding these beliefs. A counter-example comes from Nelson (2017), who argues that IOs do more business with countries whose officials share the neoliberal ideology of IMF bureaucrats. In this way, he argues both that organizational culture matters and that bureaucrats influence how the IMF makes material lending decisions. I am not aware of any counter-examples of rational design theorists who argue that IOs primarily exercise power through their worldviews and operating procedures. Perhaps the reason why we do not observe more instances of this logic is that it is much easier for principals (states) to monitor how agents (IOs) spend money or enforce observable laws than it is for them to monitor bureaucratic procedures and beliefs.
1.3. International Organizations as Narrators

are useful to many more audiences than just the bureaucrats of an IO. When they are widely used, the worldview that classifications embody becomes highly influential. In this way, classifications allow the beliefs and ideas of an IO to proliferate beyond its walls.\textsuperscript{40}

I contend that classifications make IOs powerful narrators. Far more than just distributing resources, IOs actually shape how countries are treated by other influential economic and political actors. They do this by creating useful devices that reflect how their institution interprets and intervenes in the world. Classifications are more than just pieces of data — they tell a story about data rather than present data. Classifications organize or distill information, but in so doing, they identify certain features as more important or essential than others and are therefore information-reducing rather than information-increasing. Political economists and economic sociologists have previously argued that narratives and ideas play a causal role in motivating economic behavior.\textsuperscript{41} Innovations in financial models affect the strategies used by investors, narratives about the Great Depression shaped consumer and investor behavior during the 2008 financial crisis, and economic ideas about embedded liberalism facilitated institutional change in recent decades.\textsuperscript{42} According to MacKenzie (2006), economic models are an “engine not a camera,” driving behaviors rather than summarizing them. In international relations (IR), Wendt (1992) makes a similar argument by asserting that international anarchy — a core assumption used by many realist scholars of IR to explain state behavior — is itself a social construct and motivates states’ behavior only insofar as they believe it does. In other words, narratives and ideas about how the world operates can be self-fulfilling and can themselves cause the phenomena they describe. I argue that classifications are an example of this dynamic. Development classifications, in particular, tell a story about what

\textsuperscript{40}The core of my argument relates to how IOs exercise power. As noted in fn. 39, I believe this is a conceptually distinct question from the question of who controls IOs. But the two questions are highly relevant to one another. While it is theoretically possible that states could exert influence via the classifications espoused by their IOs, in practice, bureaucrats are likely to bear much more responsibility for designing and maintaining classifications, as it would be difficult for states to monitor this process. I therefore see my argument as providing additional evidence for organizational culture theories, in which IO bureaucracies are independently powerful. However, if classifications were to become a salient and politically controversial issue, it is reasonable to expect that state actors might at this point reclaim some control. I will return to this issue in the conclusion, where I explore the dynamics of the producers.

\textsuperscript{41}See Rodrik (2013).

\textsuperscript{42}See Shiller (2017); Blyth (2002).
constitutes development and coordinate the behavior of international actors; consequently, gradu-
ations from Low Income Country (LIC) status are often celebrated by national news outlets as
markers of success. Most important, I suggest that IO bureaucrats are often the narrators and have
the power to influence international politics.

It is a particularly timely moment to study the narrative functions of global development in-
stitutions. Observers note that, because of the low interest rate environment and new sources of
finance, the primary role of the World Bank has shifted from lending to facilitating international
agreements and providing expertise, affairs that are more germane to its bureaucracy.\footnote{See Ravallion (2016); Clemens and Kremer (2016).} Moreover, as new donors such as China and the Middle East have entered the picture, many argue that previ-
ously established Western development norms are being threatened.\footnote{See Brautigam (2011); Walz and Ramachandran (2010).} International organizations hoping to promote a particular vision of development may find great utility in producing classifica-
tions that advance their worldview, while new and competitive institutions representing emerging
players may begin to develop their own competitor systems.

1.4 Winners and Losers from Classifications

When a country is classified by an international organization, for example as a “Failed State” or a
“Low Income Country,” this label becomes an important component of that country’s international
reputation or status. I use the terms reputation and status interchangeably to refer to a general pub-
lic perception of a country’s performance across a variety of processes and outcomes.\footnote{Note that I avoid using “reputation” to mean a country’s credibility in following through on its commitments or promises. This specific definition is common in the IR literature (see e.g. Tomz (2007)), but I avoid this usage for the reasons described in Kelley (2017, 34).} Status is a
country’s standing or rank in the international system, and it is inherently positional, social, and de-
determined by international consensus.\footnote{See Dafoe et al. (2014).} Classifications help to coordinate international perceptions
of a country and define its status concretely. As Kelley (2017, 51) argues, “[T]heir comparative na-
ture makes grades particularly well suited to elicit reputational concerns. Comparisons can shape and reinforce social identities. ... When states are grouped they can compare themselves with others — a fundamental status exercise.” The fact that many classifications are awarded on the basis of numbers and indices adds to their appearance as objective measures of status.\(^{47}\)

While IR scholarship has long agreed on the relevance of status for understanding international politics, the idea that status is found in economic or governance indicators is a relatively recent one. Security scholars have primarily been responsible for investigations of status, from early writings on the importance of relative gains\(^{48}\) to power transition theories predicting that states go to war when their social standing is threatened\(^{49}\) to current studies of status and war.\(^{50}\) But status has received relatively little attention in international political economy.\(^{51}\) As global conflict has declined and global interconnectedness has increased in recent decades, it is essential to understand how status manifests itself in global governance. My project joins Kelley (2017) in arguing that indicators trigger states’ concerns about their reputations.

In previous works, scholars have assumed that countries uniformly seek improvements in their status. Kelley (2017, 38-43) mentions several reasons why states desire status and therefore desire better performance on indicators. These include instrumental benefits (such as better terms in a loan or investment), international legitimacy (solidifying the international community’s belief in a government’s sovereignty), domestic popularity (when citizens care about how their governments are perceived), or even personal social standing (leaders want to be respected too).

But I will show that some actors actually prefer a lower status or standing. This is because high status frequently entails added international responsibilities or requirements to meet more challenging international standards. For example, countries categorized as Least Developed Countries by the UN are excused from paying dues and also receive certain exemptions in the World Trade

\(^{47}\)See Andreas and Greenhill (2010); Merry (2011); Kelley (2017).

\(^{48}\)See Carr (1964); Morgenthau (1973).


\(^{50}\)See Schweller (1999); Wohlforth (2009); Larson and Shevchenko (2010); Larson et al. (2014); Renshon (2016a,b).

\(^{51}\)For an exception arguing that states reject foreign aid in order to improve their international status, see Carnegie and Dolan (2018).
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

Organization. Lower rankings not only excuse countries from some of these commitments but also evoke international sympathy, often carrying with it material benefits. I will argue that publics are more willing to support foreign aid to countries that are perceived as needy, and these countries may also attract private donors, volunteers, and missionaries. Although some countries may seek improvements in their status, I illustrate that others sometimes seek the opposite, highlighting a new and different kind of status-seeking behavior.

In so doing, I also contribute to a literature on the distortions that result from eligibility cutoffs. Many social welfare and aid programs institute eligibility criteria — be they for people, groups, or countries — and studies point to many programs where candidates appear to understate their incomes or overstate their needs in order to benefit. In tax policy, this is called “secondary evasion,” and researchers can detect it, for example, when they see many more Americans than they would statistically expect reporting incomes just below the cutoff for the Earned Income Tax Credit. \(^{52}\) Scholars have noted that identity groups similarly mobilize to benefit from affirmative action policies. According to Vincentnathan (1996, 490), in the 1980s, certain castes in India petitioned to be included among the “most backwards castes” in order to take advantage of government benefits. Germane to my case, existing evidence supports the idea that countries also engage in these behaviors. Kerner et al. (2015) show that there are also many more countries than they would statistically expect reporting incomes just below the cutoff for the most generous World Bank grants. While these distortions are not surprising to economists, it is hard to make sense of them in light of political scientists’ widespread assumption that status is always desirable. As scholars begin to connect indicators to status in international politics, it is essential to understand how states balance these behaviors alongside their social statuses.

A final contribution of my argument is to show that international status interacts with domestic politics. Existing theories of international status have tended to focus on interstate relations. For example, Renshon (2016b) argues that states initiate violent conflict when they are dissatisfied

\(^{52}\)See Andrew and Edward (2005).
with the status they receive in the international system. States are the primary actors in this theory, and their preferences for status and status-seeking activities are driven by their interactions with other states. But I will show that when a country gains status, not everyone in that country benefits equally, and many (often marginalized) groups lose. In this way, status can be seen as a distributive good that benefits domestic populations unevenly. This insight is essential for understanding status-seeking behavior: It suggests that states will be more driven by status when the “winners” from status are politically influential and “losers” have little political voice.

While developing and testing a theory of status is beyond the scope of this project, it is impossible to ignore the tight relationship between classifications and status. My contributions here are threefold: to provide further evidence of this tight relationship, to illustrate heterogeneity in preferences over status, and to show that status is a distributive good with winners and losers both cross-nationally and sub-nationally.

1.5 To Classify or Not to Classify?

The classifications featured in this book have attracted considerable criticism and controversy. Some want the classification systems to be reformed, others defend them, and others think they should be abolished altogether. Many researchers have offered their well-informed and expert opinions about how these systems should operate.

This project, however, is not about how classifications should operate but rather how they do operate. My argument explains why this pervasive and powerful tool of governance is so powerful, even when existing theories predict it would not be. In explaining this puzzle, I outline the political economy of classifications and show which actors benefit and lose by them. My goal is to help scholars to understand this important and often overlooked feature of international politics.

But doing so offers instructive lessons for the actors who themselves participate in this political economy of classifications, and especially for the policymakers who produce them. My theory
suggests that classifications are unlikely to go away — if the present ones were to be abolished, persistent demand for classifications would just cause new ones to take their place. Moreover, classifications are inherently political, and it is dangerous to believe that any classification could ever be truly objective. But bearing these limitations in mind, a theory of classifications can at least empower policymakers to design classifications that most effectively achieve their intended objectives and avoid unintended consequences. For example, as I will show in Chapter 3, the World Bank’s income classification system was never intended for a mass audience. But had the designers been exposed to the lessons of this dissertation, perhaps they would have been alert to the consequences of classification and would have designed the system differently.

1.6 Method and Plan of Dissertation

The dissertation proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, I offer a new theory to account for the power of classification. This theory primarily seeks to explain why international observers are influenced by classifications. In brief, I argue that the international observers who are susceptible to cognitive biases or who must justify behaviors to external audiences will be the most likely to use classifications in their decision-making. I apply this theory to the domain of global development, generating predictions that classifications will influence the behaviors of donors, investors, and raters. I also explore several other observable implications of my theory regarding the experiences of the affected parties and which classifications will produce the strongest effects.

Chapter 3 situates development classifications in historical perspective. What are the various systems IOs use to classify developing countries? Where did they come from? I address these questions with special attention paid to the World Bank’s classification systems and the UN’s Least Developed Country category. This chapter highlights in a preliminary way that while classifications are not always used as intended by their designers, their design and consequences are both

\[\text{\footnotesize This is also implied by Büthe (2012)’s conceptual model of indicators.}\]
often politicized.

One of the benefits of studying multiple classification systems is that their different designs present distinct research opportunities. Chapter 4 takes a quantitative approach to systematically testing my hypotheses in the context of the World Bank’s income classification system. In this system, countries are categorized only on the basis of their national income statistics and whether they fall above or below certain arbitrary thresholds. This presents ideal conditions for statistically measuring what happens when countries cross these thresholds, even if there has not been great or meaningful change in their real levels of development. Exploiting the exogeneity of thresholds separating categories and applying a difference-in-differences strategy, I show with cross-national data from 1987 to 2015 that a country’s World Bank income classification correlates with its treatment by actors who are susceptible to cognitive biases or accountable to external audiences. I also point to similar dynamics taking place in the World Bank’s lending categories. Dozens of interviews with stakeholders in World Bank “graduation” processes between these lending categories confirm that influential donors use them in their decision-making. In sum, this chapter provides macro-level quantitative and qualitative evidence that classifications shape the behaviors of international observers.

The empirical findings in Chapter 4 support the claim that classification effects matter, but they are not able to speak to why. To this end, I explore the mechanisms proposed by my theory in Chapter 5 by fielding a survey experiment to an elite sample of development-minded participants. In the study, participants are asked to allocate a hypothetical aid budget across several profiles of real countries, and they do so many times. I show that participants who see countries’ classifications exhibit distinctive patterns of allocation that favor lower income countries. But to speak to mechanisms, I introduce one last manipulation, in which a randomly selected group of participants are informed that their decisions will be evaluated by an outside judge, triggering the strategic mechanism. While I show that cognitive effects do exist, this strategic mechanism accounts for much of the total classification effect observed.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

After illustrating the effects of classifications on international observers, I turn to the experiences and behaviors of affected parties in Chapter 6. First, I show that classifications produce winners and losers at the sub-national level. Unlike the World Bank’s income classification system, the UN’s Least Developed Country category involves extensive deliberations when countries are recommended to “graduate” from the category. This creates many opportunities for various stakeholders to form opinions and express them. To learn these opinions, I interviewed a variety of stakeholders from government, the business community, and civil society in one current candidate for graduation (Nepal) and one country that has already graduated (Botswana). My findings suggest that while government and business interests win from this graduation process, NGOs and those they represent suffer. Having established that these distributional consequences exist, I use the second part of the chapter to describe the strategic responses affected parties undertake. In particular, I provide quantitative evidence that countries actually manipulate their national income statistics in order to obtain different income classifications from the World Bank.

Chapter 7 concludes by discussing the implications of my argument for global development, international organizations, and theories of status. In this chapter, I return to some of the themes explored in Chapter 3’s narrative of classification systems to consider the perspective of the international organizations who classify developing countries. Are these organizations strategic in how they classify developing countries? I offer some preliminary discussion on this point and raise questions for future study.
Chapter 2

Theoretical Framework

Why would classifications produced by an international organization influence the behavior of influential actors in the international economy? Although prominent donors, investors, and raters have expert information available to them, I provide evidence that they nonetheless rely on simple labels to assess developing countries. The goal of this chapter is to understand why.

The theoretical framework features two mechanisms by which classifications can affect the decision-making processes of these elites. First, classifications can affect actors for cognitive reasons. Even highly informed elite decision-makers are cognitively constrained, and classifications serve as “heuristic” devices that can simplify a complex array of information. Second, classifications can be used strategically by actors. Even if actors are not susceptible to cognitive biases, they may nonetheless use a third-party’s classification system to justify the impartiality of their decisions to external audiences. The mechanisms are neither complements nor substitutes but are independent of each other; an actor could be susceptible to one, both, or neither of these two mechanisms.

By examining how susceptible a particular actor is to cognitive biases or audience effects, we can predict how much that actor will rely on classifications. In general, an actor susceptible to both mechanisms may be especially sensitive to classifications, while they will be relatively useless for
an actor vulnerable to neither. In applying this theory to development classifications, I examine how these mechanisms do or do not inform the behavior of international observers whose activities are particularly important for developing countries: donors, investors, and raters. Donors, who are susceptible to strategic and cognitive mechanisms, will exhibit a strong classification effect; investors and raters, who are susceptible only to the cognitive mechanism, will also exhibit a classification effect.

These behaviors carry important implications for the countries receiving these labels and for various groups within them. For example, if donors reduce their aid to countries newly perceived as developed, this could negatively affect poor or marginalized populations. But firms in these countries may enjoy greater business as a result of their new reputation. Since classifications set in motion these far-reaching effects, we would also expect that the international organizations producing classifications will design them strategically to achieve their intended objectives.

2.1 The Actors

I argue that classifications create a political economy in which three groups of actors participate. Figure 2.1 depicts their interactions. The first group of actors are the producers of classifications, that is, the institutions and individuals who devise and maintain classification systems. While many actors produce indicators or classifications, this project focuses on international organizations for the reasons described in the introduction. The second group of actors are those that consume the classifications produced by international organizations. I use the term international observers to refer to the constellation of elite political and economic actors whose behaviors shape a country’s development trajectory. These can include, for example, powerful states, donor governments, development banks, private investors, ratings agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and others. The behaviors of these different international observers carry important distributive consequences, both for countries and for groups within countries. Some international observers, such
2.1. The Actors

Figure 2.1: The political economy of classifications

as donors and NGOs, aim to benefit marginalized or poor populations with their resources. Other international observers, such as private investors, may allocate their capital in a way that is more likely to accrue to elite populations. The last group of actors featured in my theoretical framework is therefore these affected parties. Because affected parties can win or lose from classifications, they may apply political pressure to producers to secure classifications that benefit their interests.

The core of my theoretical framework, and the focus of this chapter, explains why classifications influence international observers. It is not obvious why highly informed, elite international observers should use classifications in their decision-making. I therefore offer a cognitive and a strategic explanation for this phenomenon. Understanding these mechanisms leads to predictions about which international observers are susceptible to classifications. The different relationships international observers have with affected parties will determine the outcomes experienced by those affected parties. While I cannot provide a comprehensive account of the distributional effects of classifications, an observable implication of my theory is that classifications will create winners and losers, based on the specific behaviors of the international observers who use the classifications. An additional observable implication is that producers will design classifications strategically to achieve their objectives. While this chapter will show how these claims follow from
my theory, I reserve discussion of the actual strategies used by affected parties and producers for Chapter 6.

### 2.2 The Puzzle of Classifications

A classification is a category with formal membership criteria. In some cases, an object’s classification is awarded on the basis of an automatic process. Hurricane classification typifies this approach to classification: The Saffir-Simpson scale classifies storms as “Tropical Storms” or “Categories 1-5” on the basis of wind speed and a series of pre-defined, fixed thresholds. Storms are only graded to be hurricanes when their wind speed exceeds a particular threshold; no other feature of a storm, no matter how dangerous, can cause it to be so labeled. The scale is institutionally maintained by the National Hurricane Center, and while the thresholds themselves have been revised, they are done so systematically rather than on an ad hoc basis. In other cases, an object’s classification is made deliberatively, taking into account unique features of the object being categorized. For example, the United Nations maintains a Register of Conventional Arms, categorizing weapons into eight groups, which range from Battle Tanks to Missiles.\(^1\) While the agency formally defines each category, disagreements in interpretation of those definitions are frequent, inviting the need for contextual assessment of many weapons.\(^2\) Nonetheless, there exists a formal process for this deliberation, resulting in an official classification. Whether objects are graded automatically or deliberatively, they receive a classification that is formally defined and awarded by an official institution. Consider, in contrast, categories for which membership is determined informally. The term “PIGS” became popular in the 1990s as a means of talking about Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain — southern European countries with growing debt vulnerability. In the intervening decades, the label has been modified to include Ireland or Italy (“PIIGS”) and even Great Britain (“PIIGGS”).

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\(^1\)See [https://www.unroca.org/categories](https://www.unroca.org/categories).

This label would not qualify as a classification because there exist no formal inclusion criteria or deliberative process.

My argument, in short, is that classifications matter, and that they matter independently of the criteria they employ. Take, for example, a focus of this project, the World Bank income classification system under fire from the “Raise the MIC” campaign. In 2013, Bangladesh was classified as a Low Income Country (LIC) because its national income per capita was $900, below the threshold of $1,045 that separates LICs and Lower-Middle Income Countries (LMICs). (Malawi, at $270, was also included in this category.) In 2014, however, its income was $1,080, above the threshold and qualifying it as a LMIC, a category which also included Armenia at $3,810. Like wind speeds and hurricanes, no information other than a country’s national income per capita is used to determine its income classification. The very same national income data used to classify economies is widely available through the World Development Indicators, and, as I explain in greater detail in Chapter 4, the thresholds separating the categories were arbitrarily selected. Consequently, an international observer can arguably learn much more by looking at Bangladesh’s raw income per capita than she can by looking at its classification, by which metric Bangladesh graduates from Malawi’s category to Armenia’s in a single year. Nonetheless, I will show that international observers are often sensitive to these classifications, even when they know the underlying information that determine them.

Some scholars of international organizations may find it unsurprising that classifications influence the behaviors of international observers. After all, regulatory agencies regularly classify goods and behaviors to enable consumers to make informed decisions without being technical experts about their health, safety, or environmental consequences. These classifications summarize technical information that may be publicly available but difficult for a non-expert consumer to synthesize or comprehend. Indeed, technical expertise is a leading explanation for the empowerment of private regulatory authorities; governments are willing to stomach policy uncertainty in ex-
change for the value of costly expertise. Similarly, the provision of technical expertise is among the many collective action problems international organizations are thought to address, leading many to argue that states rationally design institutions to further their independent and mutual interests. Classifications could be rationally important if they communicate technical information to non-experts.

But not all classifications communicate expert information. Some of the most prevalent classification systems are highly simple and can be easily reproduced using publicly available data. While one could argue that the classification still communicates expert information about how a particular concept should be measured, in many domains like democracy or development, the categories being defined are themselves contested concepts. Even if defining them also requires expertise, it is impossible to create these categorizations devoid of political influences. Moreover, an explanation centered on technical expertise cannot explain why classifications shape the behavior of actors who are also expert in the topic being measured. As I will show, development classifications do affect the behavior of actors with deep contextual and economic knowledge about the countries being measured, who would be both able to and better served to identify the most relevant features of development for their purposes. The technical expertise or information explanation therefore falls short.

Others who approach the study of institutions from a rational design perspective could view classifications as rules that states agree to in order to coordinate their behaviors. According to regime theory, as developed in Keohane (1984), international organizations are rationally formed by self-interested states who wish to change the international environment in ways that allow them to cooperate. In particular, institutions provide clusters of norms and rules that states follow in order to reduce transaction costs and improve the predictability of decision-making. In the long run, following these “rules of thumb” results in long-term efficiency gains that are far greater than

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3See Mattli and Büthe (2005); Mattli and Woods (2009).
4See Abbott and Snidal (1998); Koremenos et al. (2001); Porter (2003).
5See Büthe (2012); Bush (2017) for examples, with special attention on the Freedom House Freedom in the World index.
2.2. The Puzzle of Classifications

The immediate gains to be had by ignoring a rule in a particular case. Furthermore, Keohane (1984) points out that governments are “boundedly rational” — that is, they are complex organizations incapable of processing infinite information — which exaggerates the efficiency gains to be had from following these rules. In this account, institutional rules exist in equilibrium; they arise in response to self-interested states’ demands for long-term coordination, and for that reason states tend to follow them.

Although I will argue that classifications coordinate behaviors, this account also falls short in understanding their power. In Keohane’s framework, states empower institutions to create rules that allow them to coordinate, which serves their interests; they follow the rules for the same reasons they, in part, consented to them. But classification systems do not often come from state demands — they come from the bureaucrats within international organizations. As I will show in Chapter 3, while some of these bureaucrats appear to have entrepreneurially designed classification systems that achieve intended ends, others create classification systems with wholly unintended but large consequences. Regardless, these classification systems typically arise in international organizations decades after their inception, suggesting they are less important to states than the core rules and laws critical to the design of many institutions. Indeed, while it is understandable why states would want to coordinate their behaviors in the form of laws and rules, it is less clear what is gained by coordinating their beliefs about concepts such as democracy or development. In fact, in the aid landscape, overly coordinated behaviors are actually problematic: when donors “herd” around preferred recipients, other recipients are neglected.⁶ The rational design account seems better suited to understanding why states follow institutional rules than to why they pay attention to institutional classifications.

But the broader intuitions of regime theory are highly relevant and critical to my argument. In particular, I share Keohane’s view that states are boundedly rational. In his account, bounded rationality exaggerates behaviors that can be explained by rational means, but bounded rationality

⁶See Frot and Santiso (2011); Galiani et al. (2015).
is even more central to my account, since I have just shown how the rational design of institutions does not adequately explain the power of classifications. For this reason, one of my central mechanisms will be a cognitive mechanism, and I will argue that cognitive biases affect not only states but also important non-state actors. While I will also introduce a strategic mechanism that can account for the classification effect, this mechanism will involve a different rational logic than Keohane’s argument about the design of institutions. Instead, I will argue that actors use classifications in their decisions to rationally justify their decisions to external audiences.

In articulating these two mechanisms, my theory not only generates predictions for which actors rely on classifications but also, in a more limited sense, yields insights about what kinds of classification systems are likely to be selected. All else equal, international organizations will promote classification systems that they believe will be the most powerful. In brief, my theory suggests that the simplest systems that are most easily understood by mass audiences will dominate. But international organizations are also, to some extent, vulnerable to political pressure from groups with interests in receiving a particular classification. One implication of my argument is that classification systems, by coordinating many international behaviors, have distributive consequences for both countries and particular groups within those countries. While I am unable to comprehensively map the political economy of these consequences and interactions, I can show that certain groups and states win and lose from classifications, and those groups will try to influence their classifications and classification systems strategically. International organizations will therefore try to promote simple and intuitive classification systems that satisfy the preferences of powerful states or interests. This sheds light on questions that are integral to regime theory: If classifications are just rules, and rules are just coordinating devices, which rules will be selected? Which equilibrium prevails?
2.3 Why Classifications Work

In what follows, I offer a theoretical framework to account for the disproportionate power these classifications acquire. In brief, I lay out a cognitive mechanism by which classifications act as heuristic devices to simplify decision-making and a strategic mechanism by which actors use classifications produced by a third-party actor to demonstrate the impartiality of their decisions. Separating these mechanisms improves our ability to explain variation in how classifications are used and builds on existing scholarship seeking to understand indicators. Büthe (2012)'s conceptual model shows that the “users” of an indicator encompass a broader audience than just the “rule-demanders,” the group that demands an indicator from a private authority. By explaining what kinds of indicators are likely to affect which actors, my theory speaks to the composition of an indicator’s group of users (“international observers” in my model), which in turn has implications for the kinds of indicators that will be supplied.

2.3.1 Cognitive Mechanism

Extensive research in behavioral economics has documented that many decision-makers are susceptible to cognitive biases that sway their decisions in irrational ways. One important finding from this literature is that people lack the ability to process abundant information and behave rationally, and they turn to shortcuts or “heuristics” to assist in their decision-making.7 People often cope with uncertainty and complexity by distilling a judgment or decision to simpler elements. Specifically, individuals may use categories to make inferences about less familiar cases based on the other cases they known in a category.8 In this way, heuristics are effort-reducing. Studies show that categories cause individuals to think units are more similar within group and more dif-

7See Simon (1955); Conlisk (1996); Kahneman (2011).
8These are known as representativeness heuristics. See Fiske and Taylor (2013).
ferent between group.\textsuperscript{9} Many developing countries may be especially unfamiliar to international observers, making the heuristic all the more valuable. These practices can lead to stereotype bias, as people can later activate learned categories when confronted with an evaluation or decision. At this point, people tend to explain away information that is inconsistent with the held stereotype, while latching on to reinforcing information.\textsuperscript{10} Data about developing countries often presents a mixed picture, but heuristics will facilitate international observers’ propensities to explain away inconsistencies. Other political scientists have investigated the relevance of heuristics to international economic behavior, with evidence showing that peer country groupings influence sovereign lending practices.\textsuperscript{11}

Cognitive psychology has also shown the existence of a “halo effect,” which could amplify the heuristic effects of classifications. Social psychologists have amassed evidence that an individual’s opinions about an actor’s attribute A are influenced by information about that actor on unrelated attribute B. For example, evidence shows that people who are thought to be more attractive are often perceived as being more competent or intelligent.\textsuperscript{12} If actors in the international community are also susceptible to this bias, classifications could affect international perceptions on more dimensions than just that which they seek to measure. For instance, countries that graduate in a development classification might also more easily persuade observers that they are democratic or respect human rights.

Evidence from economics suggests these cognitive biases could affect the behavior of even elite, highly informed actors. Previous works have pointed to the role of euphoria and positive affect in how investors evaluate risk and returns, and these cognitive factors have been partially blamed for financial crises.\textsuperscript{13} According to Steinbruner (1974), decision-makers actually work

\textsuperscript{9}Tajfel and Wilkes (1963) conduct an experiment in which individuals are asked to estimate the lengths of four short lines labeled “A” and four long lines labeled “B.” The group who saw the “A” and “B” labels estimated the within-group lengths to be more similar than the group who did not see the labels. See also Taylor (1981); Wilder (1986) for social psychological studies of categorizations and intergroup bias.

\textsuperscript{10}See Fiske and Taylor (2013, 296).

\textsuperscript{11}See, for example, Gray (2013); Gray and Hicks (2014); Brooks et al. (2015); Brazys and Hardiman (2015).

\textsuperscript{12}For a review, see Greenwald and Banaji (1995).

\textsuperscript{13}See Aspara and Tikkanen (2010); Kindleberger (2005) in addition to Gray (2013); Brooks et al. (2015).
to avoid exposing themselves to all relevant information in order to make it possible to navigate complex problems, group decision-making dynamics, and conditions of uncertainty.\textsuperscript{14} At the same time, it is possible that elite actors have more informed priors that are less sensitive to the heuristics I describe. Moreover, decisions that are filtered through more institutionalized processes with more veto players could be subject to greater, rather than less, rational scrutiny.\textsuperscript{15} Psychological research shows that asking individuals to justify their treatment of cases reduces the effects of implicit bias.\textsuperscript{16} Consequently, to a great extent, whether or not elite actors are susceptible to the cognitive biases documented in the mass population remains an empirical question.

\subsection{2.3.2 Strategic Mechanism}

Even actors who are not susceptible to cognitive biases could nonetheless rely on classifications for strategic reasons. When actors are responsible for making contentious distributive decisions that will produce backlash from those who are adversely affected, using a classification developed by a third party allows them to evade accusations of being partisan or political in their decisions. This logic has previously been used to explain why governments delegate regulatory powers to independent agencies. Weaver (1986) notes that one way legislators often avoid blame is to “cede discretion to the president or an independent agency for making politically costly decisions” (375).\textsuperscript{17} Similarly, if political actors incorporate classifications formally or informally into their allocative decisions, they can credibly demonstrate their impartiality to any supporters who demand it. Since an actor’s own classification system will never be perceived as credibly impartial, the actor prefers

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{14}These organizational conditions that exacerbate cognitive biases have been especially scrutinized in security studies. See Jervis (2006) for an example.
  \item \textsuperscript{15}Indeed, one of the most prevalent critiques of psychological theories of international relations is that these theories rarely offer an argument for how individual-level psychological traits explain behavior at the state level of analysis. For example, in their critique of the research on status inconsistency, Dafoe et al. (2014) argue, “international relations (IR) studies that used this as their theoretical foundation did not typically contain any theory that explained why we should expect individual-level results linking inconsistency to “violent” or “dysfunctional” behavior to translate directly to world politics.” (388)
  \item \textsuperscript{16}See Taylor (1981).
  \item \textsuperscript{17}See also Fiorina (1982); Mattli and Büthe (2005); Flinders and Buller (2006); Landwehr and Böhm (2011).
\end{itemize}
this approach to spending valuable time and resources on a proprietary system.¹⁸

This argument is related to but distinct from an existing explanation for the influence of “private authority” in world politics. Green (2013, 42-43) defines “private authority” as “situations in which non-state actors make rules or set standards that others in world politics adopt.” One explanation for the influence of private authority centers on the independence and neutrality of that authority. For this reason, Green’s definition specifically excludes international organizations “since they comprise state representatives who are responsible for taking or delegating decisions” and therefore are not neutral. While this is true in an objective sense, multilateral organizations are more widely trusted by the public than governments, especially to carry out development.¹⁹ Indeed, the perception of the classifier’s neutrality (particularly as compared to the perception of the classification user’s neutrality) is sometimes more important than the neutrality itself.²⁰

The strategic mechanism is most likely to affect the least autonomous actors, especially those that are agents in a principal-agent relationship. The more an actor must produce evidence of her strong performance in order to receive funding or avoid punishment, the more that actor must prioritize the appearance of her behavior over making the most informed decision. Conversely, an autonomous actor who reports to no one can behave optimally, no matter how it looks to an outside audience. The strategic mechanism is therefore most strongly present in relationships of institutional delegation.

¹⁸These resources are not insignificant: The World Bank data group has received much criticism regarding its classification system. See Fantom and Serajuddin (2016).

¹⁹Milner (2006) presents data from the Eurobarometer illustrating that Europeans had greater confidence in multilateral institutions than in their governments to give effective aid. Kaya and Walker (2014) present more recent survey data from Europe indicating that Europeans have greater overall confidence in international organizations than in their governments. Although it is possible that public trust in international organizations is waning (Bearce and Scott, 2018), it is not clear that the gap between trust in international organizations and domestic governments is waning.

²⁰Sinclair (2005) and Bush (2017) argue that credit ratings agencies and Freedom House respectively have been awarded positions of private authority but are not the neutral, technical agencies they purport to be.
2.4 Empirical Expectations

In this section, I apply the theoretical framework to the case of development classifications. First, I select the international observers whose behaviors are most important for developing countries: donors, investors, and raters. For each class of observers, I analyze how susceptible we would expect them to be to either or both the cognitive and strategic mechanism. This results in an expectation for each about the existence and magnitude of a “classification effect.” While my theoretical framework is itself agnostic about the direction of this effect, I draw on existing literature and a survey of experts to predict in what direction each class of actors would adjust their behavior after observing a classification. Second, taking the predicted behaviors of international observers, I outline the downstream consequences we would expect to see of those predicted behaviors on the experiences and actions of affected parties. These serve as additional observable implications of my theory. Third, in light of the two mechanisms, I explore which classifications are likely to produce the strongest classification effects.

2.4.1 How International Observers Use Classifications

I investigate observers whose behaviors have profound effects on the economic and political trajectories of developing countries: donors, investors, and raters. I select donors and investors because they are two of the three largest sources of external finance for developing economies.\footnote{See UNCTAD (2017). The third source of external finance is from remittances, but since I do not expect migrant workers abroad to be affected by classifications, I do not include this outcome in my study.} For decades, donors have played a crucial role in correcting market failures by supplying finance to developing countries. International targets to increase official development assistance (ODA) to .7% of national income suggest how greatly this aid is valued.\footnote{http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/the07odagnitarget-ahistory.htm} Increasingly, though, the development community recognizes the importance to developing countries of foreign direct investment (FDI), that is, the ownership of enterprises in developing economies by foreign firms. While academic
research finds mixed results on the effectiveness of FDI as a development strategy, it is widely prioritized by international organizations and countries.\textsuperscript{23} For instance, the 2002 Monterrey Consensus states, “Private international capital flows, particularly foreign direct investment, along with international financial stability, are vital complements to national and international development efforts. Foreign direct investment contributes toward financing sustained economic growth over the long term.”\textsuperscript{24} Private investors are thought to be so important to development that donor governments dedicate development finance, such as the United States (U.S.’) Overseas Private Investment Corporation, toward facilitating their investments in poor countries.\textsuperscript{25} I also select raters because their assessments are often the gateway through which developing countries can access both the forms of external finance described above as well as international bond and loan markets. Democracy ratings, and especially those produced by Freedom House, are widely cited ingredients in aid and investment decisions.\textsuperscript{26} To survive in a global economy, developing countries must concern themselves with the way they are perceived by these actors.

However, important differences among these actors mean that they are not likely to be uniform in their sensitivity to either of my hypothesized mechanisms. I proceed by discussing each of these actors in turn: Given findings in the literature about the decision-making processes of each of these actors, I discuss which mechanisms are likely to transmit any classification effect and what the direction of that classification effect is likely to be.

**Donors**

Donor agencies are especially sensitive to the strategic mechanism, as they must justify their allocation decisions to the legislatures (and, by extension, mass publics) that determine their budgets. Donor agencies often try to emphasize their impartiality in their concern for development. Mil-

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{23}See, for example, Kosack and Tobin (2006).
\textsuperscript{25}See https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/070716_Moss_Testimony.pdf for a description of the importance of OPIC to U.S. development goals.
\textsuperscript{26}See Blanton and Blanton (2007); Büthe and Milner (2008); Bush (2017).
\end{footnotesize}
2.4. Empirical Expectations

...ner (2006), for example, argues that bilateral donors finance multilateral agencies, who are more trusted by the mass public to carry out development, in an effort to reassure their funders that they are providing needs-based aid. This aim was also behind the founding of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), which was intended to be an apolitical aid instrument for the U.S. government. Consistent with my argument, MCC has developed an eligibility and allocation rubric that relies heavily on democracy measures produced by Freedom House, an external agency.\textsuperscript{27} This allows MCC to avoid any appearance of making partisan decisions in its development assistance. Particularly in the present political environment in which donor publics often feel aid could be better spent at home, even bilateral donors with expressly political objectives may need to illustrate the impoverishment of their recipients to maintain support for funding aid.\textsuperscript{28} Donors are often evaluated by the proportion of aid given to countries categorized as developing. For example, the first page of every “peer review” conducted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) of donor countries shows a pie chart depicting the donor’s allocation of aid by income group and Least Developed Country (LDC) status.\textsuperscript{29} In this way, international organizations (IOs) can influence the behavior of states indirectly by shaping the standards the mass public and, by extension, legislators use to evaluate their governments.\textsuperscript{30} Additionally, this logic potentially explains why researchers have observed frequently counterproductive “herding” behavior among donors, who duplicate rather than complement the assistance provided by other donors.\textsuperscript{31}

Some donors are more susceptible than others. For example, Honig (2019) illustrates that while some agencies receive considerable control over their operations, others are highly restricted...

\textsuperscript{27}See Bush (2017).
\textsuperscript{28}For evidence connecting financial crises to reductions in aid, see Heinrich et al. (2016). Research on public opinion in donor countries finds that humanitarian, altruistic, and sometimes paternalistic concerns can motivate individuals to support foreign aid or immigration despite countervailing nationalist incentives (Paxton and Knack, 2012; Newman et al., 2013; Bechtel et al., 2014; Baker, 2015). This research suggests that emphasizing the relative need of aid beneficiaries will improve support for foreign aid.
\textsuperscript{29}See e.g. https://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/OECD\%20Australia\%20FinalONLINE.pdf.
\textsuperscript{30}Similar arguments have been made about IOs in the context of military interventions. See Chapman (2009).
\textsuperscript{31}See Frot and Santiso (2011); Galiani et al. (2015).
by unpredictable and contingent sources of funding. These latter “insecure agencies,” which are extensively monitored and evaluated, are more likely to prioritize the appearance of success over prudence in development interventions. Given their institutional design, I would expect these non-autonomous agencies to rely more heavily on classifications, since they must perpetually justify their decisions and behaviors. Classifications can also provide a useful way for aid agencies to signal their excellent performance to audiences, such as domestic constituencies or even to their peers. When aid agencies face scrutiny from either of these audiences about the impartiality of their decisions, they will be more likely to use classifications.

Turning to the cognitive mechanism, there is a weaker but non-trivial argument that donors could be susceptible to cognitive biases. Of all the observers involved in my study, donors are the most expert on the topic being described by a classification. This expertise could serve to reduce their cognitive bias, as they may be more attentive to the nuances that must be taken into account when considering classifications. While there have been a number of studies documenting cognitive biases and stereotypes in the mass public’s preferences over aid allocation, to my knowledge, no studies document these biases in elite decision-makers. This lack of empirical evidence means that I do not rule out the possibility that donors could exhibit a cognitive bias, despite their relative expertise. Testing this claim empirically will be one of the contributions of this project.

Given the strategic and cognitive reasons for donors’ sensitivity to classifications, I expect that higher classifications will result in lower levels of aid, as a country is perceived as less needful of assistance. Lumsdaine (1993) argues that the majority of foreign aid serves the humanitarian interest of a donor public in improving conditions of poverty. While subsequent empirical research reveals that donors’ strategic interests and concerns about governance in recipient countries also

32 Similarly, democratic donors have greater strategic incentives to use classifications in their decision-making, as they must justify these behaviors to domestic audiences.

33 Honig (2019) argues that aid agencies try to improve their performance on the Aid Transparency Index out of concern for their social reputation in the donor community. It is possible that aid agencies wish to show each other, not their funders, that they benefit the neediest. This possibility still follows the strategic logic in the sense that donors use classifications to signal to audiences.

34 Napier et al. (2016) use an experiment to measure how maps cognitively change aid allocation decisions made by college students, but the study has not yet been fielded on an elite sample.
2.4. Empirical Expectations

Table 2.1: Predicted mechanisms and hypotheses (by observer)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanism</th>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Donors</th>
<th>Investors</th>
<th>Raters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive</td>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donors</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...Donors facing scrutiny</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓ ✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investors</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Ø</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raters</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Ø</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Higher classifications...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H1A: ↓ aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H1B: ↓↓ aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2A: ↑ percieved creditworthiness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2B: ↑ FDI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

...even with no real change.

condition allocation behavior, ceteris paribus, donor countries will be more likely to give aid to needier recipients.\(^{35}\) Because aid is a scarce resource, I do not expect donors to contribute more to a country perceived as more developed.

**Hypothesis 1A.** Higher classifications will decrease the amount of aid a country receives. This effect will be transmitted through both cognitive and strategic mechanisms.

**Hypothesis 1B.** Classifications will most strongly affect aid from donors facing scrutiny from external audiences.

**Investors**

Lacking capital, many developing countries depend heavily on foreign investment. This investment can occur through two channels: portfolio investment (namely, sovereign lending) — in which investors lend to national governments and retain no control over how the money is used — or FDI — in which investors (often firms) directly invest their capital in a host country and maintain control over its management. While their decision processes may differ, both types of investors must assess the riskiness of a prospective investment. National governments could default on a loan and lose the investor’s principal. Additionally, host governments could choose to violate the property rights of a foreign firm in their country and render an investment unprofitable. Investors therefore take into account many political factors that could influence this risk, including elections...

\(^{35}\)See Alesina and Dollar (2000); Neumayer (2005).
However, risk is challenging to measure objectively, and existing research supports the idea that investors’ risk perceptions are prone to cognitive biases. The very discipline of behavioral economics grew in order to explain “irrational exuberance” in financial markets and did so by documenting investors’ propensities for overconfidence and loss aversion, even in the face of real penalties and losses. Investors’ beliefs, however irrational, in turn have enormous bearing on the functioning of the global economy. One of the cognitive biases scholars have observed in investors is their use of heuristics. In particular, investors heavily depend on peer country groupings to assess the riskiness of a potential borrower. Even at the management level, canonical economic models fail to explain the decisions of managers to internationalize their firms. Of particular interest is the possibility that conceptions of “foreignness” and “distance” influence decisions more than can be explained objectively. These studies suggest ample cause for concern that investors may be cognitively predisposed to rely on the salient peer country groupings that follow from classification systems.

Investors are less susceptible, however, to the strategic mechanism. This results from a profit motivation, which is conventionally viewed as the primary determinant of their behavior. First and foremost, investors seek to deliver a return on their investments. If they were to sacrifice profit in the pursuit of social goals, this would violate their commitments to shareholders. Investors, therefore, should not be concerned with the appearance of their decisions to an external audience. One challenge to this view stems from the observation that human rights violations deter FDI. Some argue that multi-national corporations are, in fact, punished by consumers for exploiting

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36 See Mosley (2003); Bernhard and Leblang (2006); Tomz (2007).
37 For a summary of the discipline, see Shiller (2015); Thaler (2015).
40 See Aharoni (2010); Maitland and Sammartino (2015).
41 See Williams and Grégoire (2015).
42 See, for example, Grieder (1998).
43 See Blanton and Blanton (2007); Barry et al. (2013).
workers and investing in countries known to violate human rights.\textsuperscript{44} Even if this were to be the case, it is not clear how this logic would translate from the domain of human rights to the domain of development; if anything, these same audiences that punish human rights violators would be more likely to support a firm’s investment in a country needing outside capital to create jobs. Moreover, the connection between human rights records and FDI can still be explained by investors’ self-interest: human rights violations signal a government’s willingness to ignore the law, which heightens political risk for investing firms. Since investors are accountable only for delivering a return on their investments and not for the fairness implications of their decisions, any classification effects they exhibit cannot be explained by the strategic mechanism.

If classifications have the cognitive effects I anticipate, then I expect the direction to be positive. Investors will likely view higher levels of development as signs of stability and will be more likely to invest in countries that are perceived as more developed. An extensive literature on the determinants of FDI suggests that there exists a “developed nation discount.” Investors are attracted by the high levels of industrialization, human capital, stable political environments, and democratic domestic institutions.\textsuperscript{45} Although these factors are conceptually distinct from development, they are frequently correlated with a country’s national income level, and many studies illustrate that investors overlook these factors for countries that are viewed as developed.\textsuperscript{46} This behavior is especially consistent with the well-documented “halo effect,” whereby observers associate unrelated positive or unrelated negative characteristics. An investor susceptible to cognitive biases may assume that a country experiencing a higher level of development may also be more democratic and politically stable.

\textbf{Hypothesis 2A.} Higher classifications will improve investors’ confidence in a country’s creditworthiness. This effect will be transmitted through only the cognitive mechanism.

\textbf{Hypothesis 2B.} Higher classifications will result in greater FDI. This effect will be transmitted

\textsuperscript{44}See Spar (1998); Barry et al. (2013).

\textsuperscript{45}See, for example, Chan and Mason (1991); Noorbakhsh et al. (2001); Jensen (2006); Büthe and Milner (2008); Biglaiser and Staats (2010).

\textsuperscript{46}See Mosley (2003, 2005); Blonigen and Wang (2005); Wibbels (2006).
through only the cognitive mechanism.

**Raters**

As argued in the introduction, ratings issued by prominent organizations in the global economy are increasingly important for how states are treated in the global economy. Countries routinely protest how they are scored on various metrics precisely because these numbers empower them to pursue more diverse economic strategies — indeed, this is the motivation for this project. But one possibility that has not yet been considered is the inter-dependency of ratings. Ratings are treated as separate evaluations by independent authorities of certain attributes. Is it possible, though, that raters also rely heavily on each other in their deliberations? To answer this question, I draw on existing knowledge about the practices of raters to assess their susceptibility to the cognitive or the strategic mechanisms.

While there are no direct studies (to my knowledge) of cognitive biases in raters, there is certainly evidence that the methodologies of some raters permit these biases to influence ratings. Although ratings agencies like to create the appearance of objectivity, in practice, some approaches allow for highly subjective opinions to determine a rating. Bradley (2015, 37-38) describes, for example, the coding criteria of Freedom House, a prominent rater of democracy and the focus of this study:

> Each main question is fleshed out in subquestions to guide scorers, although even these subquestions are highly general and subjective in nature. In 2011, for instance, a main question for ‘Functioning of Government’ included ‘Is the government free from pervasive corruption?’ ... The subquestions illuminate some aspects of the main question but are hardly designed to lead to comprehensive or verifiable results. ... In addition, the actual, question-by-question breakdown of data — not to mention the

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2.4. Empirical Expectations

scorers’ identities, scorecards, or rationales is not publicly available.\textsuperscript{48}

Ratings agencies may vary on this dimension, as some agencies using more objective and falsifiable criteria than others. But where raters do not take measures to institutionally counteract these biases, they may infiltrate the resulting ratings. In the Freedom House case, Bush (2017) illustrates that the ratings consistently favor countries that vote with the United States at the UN. While this is evidence of a political bias, cognitive biases can operate in a similar way.

Although raters are accountable to external audiences, I do not expect them to use classifications as a signaling device, as donors do. Like donors, raters are sometimes agents in a principal-agent relationship. They may rely on a certain organization or interest group for funding, and there are clear incentives for them to adopt ratings that promote their principal’s interests.\textsuperscript{49} Other raters may be independent, using their indicators to advance their own ideological objectives or brand name.\textsuperscript{50} But regardless of which career concern motivates raters, it is never in their strategic interest to use a classification produced by another rater. Doing so concedes the relevance of their competitors’ indicators and undermines their own. Recall that in the case of donors, classifications were valuable precisely because they allow donors to publicly show that their aid benefits countries that are labeled “developing” by a third-party. Conversely, a public admission that a rater made use of a third-parties categorization backfires because it weakens the distinctiveness of the rater’s own product. Raters should therefore never be strategically incentivized to use these classifications, even if they are accountable to external audiences.

If a classification effect exists, then, I attribute it to a cognitive mechanism. Evidence of such a classification effect would be especially concerning, as it suggests interdependencies between ratings organizations. Such interdependencies could make it especially challenging for countries

\textsuperscript{48}This codebook is itself the product of reforms within Freedom House, which originally awarded ratings on an even more tenuous basis. In the late 1980s, when the founder of Freedom House faced criticism for his use of numbers, he defended his ratings by arguing that they are awarded on the basis of “holistic judgment.” Raymond Gastil, quoted in Bradley (2015, 39).
\textsuperscript{49}See Pistor (2012).
\textsuperscript{50}See Espeland and Sauder (2012).
to break out of their perceptions and change their scores.

In terms of direction, I expect a classification effect to bias ratings upwards rather than downwards. The halo effect suggests that individual raters will likely reward countries perceived as more developed with higher scores on other dimensions. In no circumstance do I expect these scores to be inversely correlated.

**Hypothesis 3.** Higher classifications will improve a country’s subjectively-determined ratings on other dimensions, such as democracy scores. This effect will be transmitted through only the cognitive mechanism.

Because the directions associated with each of these hypotheses are based on assumptions that follow from existing literature, rather than following directly from my proposed theory, I also surveyed a group of experts about their beliefs regarding the existence of and directions of classification effects. Overall, respondents expected classifications to have effects in directions that are consistent with the extant literature. (Details and results are available in Appendix A.)

Taken together, these hypotheses, if confirmed, suggest which actors more broadly are likely to use classifications in their analysis and decision-making. If support is found, it sheds light on the composition of the “users” in Büthe (2012)’s conceptual model of indicators. Specifically, those actors who are susceptible to cognitive biases or must justify politically sensitive decisions to an external audience will be the most likely users of a given classification system.

### 2.4.2 The Distributive Effects of Classifications

Above, I hypothesize that classifications will influence the amount of aid a country receives as well as investors’ and raters’ perceptions of its economy. In this section, I explore how these outcomes will be experienced by affected parties, the groups within and governments of classified countries. While some groups and countries may be highly attuned to flows of foreign aid, other groups and countries may pay greater attention to investor and rater perceptions. In other words, these outcomes create different winners and losers. If classifications powerfully drive these outcomes,
then affected parties may try to change their classifications as a means of achieving their political and economic goals, to the extent they are able. By illustrating which actors may be affected by these important outcomes and how they may respond to classifications, I develop additional observable implications of the above theoretical framework.

Foreign aid is an important source of funding for NGOs. Donors often choose to hire NGOs as contractors to implement aid projects to take advantage of their local knowledge and, sometimes, to bypass the state.\(^{51}\) Losing this foreign assistance, then, can severely restrict NGOs’ activities. In Uganda and Kenya, legal bills threatening to reduce the amount of foreign funding NGOs can accept have been met with vigorous opposition.\(^{52}\) Studies show that these grants are essential to NGO survival.\(^{53}\) Even if NGOs are acting on behalf of others rather than in the interests of their own survival, they represent populations that have often been marginalized or neglected by their governments and so also benefit from foreign assistance. While these individuals may be unaware of who actually funds aid projects in their area,\(^{54}\) leaders in NGOs (especially larger NGOs and umbrella organizations) may be better informed and able to make this connection. In this way, I expect NGOs to experience the negative repercussions of losing foreign aid. To the extent that they associate these aid losses with classifications and are able to influence their country’s classifications, I expect them to seek lower classifications.

**Hypothesis 4A.** Higher classifications will have a negative effect on NGOs.

**Hypothesis 4B.** NGOs will seek lower classifications, when possible.

The private sector, however, benefits from the willingness of foreign firms to invest in and do business in their country. As such, these firms should greatly value their country’s international

\(^{51}\) See Murrell (2002); Dietrich (2013).

\(^{52}\) See Kelli Rogers, “Kenyan CSOs, NGOs to fight proposed foreign funding restrictions,” *Devex*, November 14, 2013. https://www.devex.com/news/kenyan-csos-ngos-to-fight-proposed-foreign-funding-restrictions-82297

\(^{53}\) See Burger and Owens (2013).

\(^{54}\) See Dietrich et al. (2018). Of course, it is also important to note that foreign aid is often redirected away from the poor and toward electorally valuable constituencies. See Jablonski (2014); Briggs (2015). To the extent that this occurs, the poor may not receive sufficient aid to experience a steep loss following a country’s classification. This makes it less likely that I would observe an effect of classifications on NGO experiences or behaviors, suggesting that any evidence I find in support of these hypotheses makes an even stronger case for my argument.
reputation. It is widely believed that international investors depend heavily on a country’s ratings when choosing where to invest their capital. Increases in investment and improvements in ratings, predicted in hypotheses 2 and 3, will largely benefit the business community. I therefore expect firms to experience greater business as result of higher classifications and that they will pressure their governments to seek higher classifications.

**Hypothesis 5A.** Higher classifications will have a positive effect on firms.

**Hypothesis 5B.** Firms will seek higher classifications, when possible.

Governments of countries may also experience gains and losses as the result of different classifications, but the net effects are ambiguous. On the one hand, governments may also suffer as the result of losing foreign aid if such assistance is integral to their budget support or (perversely) if they rely on using foreign aid to buy votes. On the other hand, governments too can benefit from improvements in perceptions of their country. Materially, these improvements can allow the government to borrow on more favorable terms. Socially, leaders may enjoy greater standing in diplomatic and professional relationships. To fully explain how governments experience classifications and act on them would require a complete theory of their preferences and action sets, which is beyond the scope of this project. Nonetheless, evidence of any strategic behavior at all on the part of governments is consistent with my argument: governments do experience the distributive effects of classifications and seek classifications that are consistent with their overall political and economic strategies, whatever those strategies may be.

**Hypothesis 6.** Dissatisfied classified governments will try to influence their country’s classification.

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55 See Jayasuriya (2011).
56 See Kelley (2017).
2.4. Empirical Expectations

2.4.3 Which Classifications Prevail

If classifications operate via a cognitive and a strategic mechanism, then we would also expect some classifications to be more powerful than others. According to both mechanisms, classifications derive their power from their simplicity. Cognitively, they are most helpful when they allow an international observer to quickly intuit a country’s level of development without too much detail. Strategically, international observers also want them to be simple enough to be understood by a less-informed principal, such as a legislator or in the eyes of the mass public. Even if technical classifications conceivably more meaningfully capture the concept of interest, simpler classification systems will be the most widely used and will therefore produce the strongest effects. Moreover, insofar as international organizations themselves wish to produce classifications with the strongest effects, they will strategically gravitate toward these simple classification schemes to maximize their influence.

**Hypothesis 7A.** Intuitive classifications will produce stronger effects than technical classifications.

**Hypothesis 7B.** Producers will design intuitive rather than technical classification systems.

While these hypotheses follow from my theoretical framework, I am not able to directly test them with the evidence I present in subsequent chapters. My empirical strategy uses different research methods to assess the impacts of different classification systems. While this benefits my argument by showing consistency in results across multiple empirical approaches, it restricts my ability to directly compare the magnitude of the effects of the different systems. This limits my ability to test hypothesis 7A. Furthermore, there is a limited sample of existing classification systems and a great deal of path dependency in which classification systems prevail. This weakens any inferences I can make about hypothesis 7B. Nonetheless, I include these hypotheses here to outline a full set of observable implications for all the various actors involved in my theoretical framework. Given the policy relevance of these hypotheses, I discuss them briefly in the next chapter, describing the landscape and history of these systems, and again in the conclusion.
2.5 Summary

The proposed theoretical framework — consisting of a cognitive and a strategic mechanism — explains why classifications influence the behaviors of international observers. Actors who are susceptible to cognitive biases or who must justify their behaviors to external audiences will be most inclined to use classifications. I applied this framework to the case of development to hypothesize how classifications would affect donors, investors, and raters. I predict that higher development classifications will result in less aid but more investment and better ratings for the classified countries. I will test these hypotheses in Chapters 4 and 5. My argument also entails observable implications at the domestic level regarding the experiences and behaviors of NGOs, firms, and governments. I will provide evidence to support these predictions in Chapter 6. Finally, the proposed mechanisms also suggest that intuitive classifications will carry the strongest effects and will be selected by producers. While a systematic test of this hypothesis is outside the scope of this project, I conclude by considering the implications of my work for those responsible for producing and maintaining classifications.
Chapter 3

Classification Systems in Global Development

In 2016, the World Bank announced that it would no longer use the terms “developing” and “developed” countries in the new edition of its flagship dataset, *The World Development Indicators*.¹ This announcement made waves precisely because development practitioners are so attentive to how they talk about the group of countries they seek to advance. The term “developing world” was itself a preferred alternative to its predecessor, “the Third World,” which eventually became seen as pejorative. Now, the “developing world” appears to be experiencing a similar fate. When I worked in Washington, D.C., a media consultant once corrected my pronunciation of “developed and developing” to “developed and develop-ing,” a practice he saw as progressive and increasingly normal among development practitioners who are now uncomfortable with the term “developing.”

How we talk about developing countries is increasingly contested. This is true not only of these colloquial terms but also the formal labels that are officially maintained and assigned. In this chapter, I introduce the array of classifications that international organizations designate to developing countries. In particular, I describe how the World Bank classifies countries and how the

CHAPTER 3. CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS IN GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT

United Nations (UN) categorizes the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). I use these cases not only to introduce the reader to the systems explored in this book but also to emphasize two themes that are relevant for its argument. First, classifications are not always used as their creators intended. Second, seemingly technocratic contestation over classifications may belie political motivations and entail political consequences. I conclude this chapter by discussing why these classifications, among many, have gained such power and deserve special attention.

3.1 A Proliferation of Development Classifications

In their survey of development classifications, Fialho and Bergeijk (2017) argue that these classifications have proliferated in recent decades. While in 1985, there were only four development classifications, there were 17 in 2013, including the Least Developed Country category, Low/Middle/High Income Countries, the Human Development Index, the Small and Vulnerable Economies, and others. A complete list appears in Table 3.1. Each of these categories is maintained by a prominent international organization and groups a different set of countries.

While all of these categories aim to identify the countries that require special attention, differences in their approaches cause them to disagree in their selections. According to Fialho and Bergeijk (2017, 101), the average category shares about 40-50% membership with an average other category. Even membership in seemingly obvious categories such as the Small Island Developing States varies between official categories. For example, non-island economies Belize, Suriname, and Guyana are sometimes classified as Small Island Developing States.

Disagreement and duplication partly stem from the subjective nature of defining development. As in academia, there are extensive debates about what constitutes development, what causes it, and what hinders it; these debates also drive how technocrats choose to define development within their respective institutions. When ideas about development change, new categories may be in-

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2See Fialho and Bergeijk (2017).
### Table 3.1: The proliferation of development classifications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Created</th>
<th>Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Least Developed Countries (LDC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>World Bank income level categories (LIC/LMIC/UMIC/HIC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>World Bank’s small island exception list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Human Development Index (LHD/MHD/HHD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>UNCTAD’s unofficial list of Small Island Developing States (SIDS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>UNDESA's list of SIDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>UN-OHRLLS’ list of SIDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001/2002</td>
<td>Low Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>after 2002</td>
<td>Fragile States (FS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Transit Developing Countries (TDC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Graduating LDCs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Structural Weak, Vulnerable, and Small Economies (SWVSE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>UNESCO’s list of SIDS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Fialho and Bergeijk (2017)

vented. New classification systems can also result as organizations compete for relevance or as affected parties propose systems that benefit them more than do existing ones. While explaining the proliferation of classifications is not the main question of my book, these existing explanations from Fialho and Bergeijk (2017) comport with my argument: International organizations exercise great power through classifications, which define contested concepts in ways that influence the decisions of global elites.

It is also helpful to consider the variety across and not just the number of classification systems. Some have organized the universe of classifications by separating the analytical from the operational systems.\(^3\) For example, the World Bank’s income classification system was designed to help scholars and practitioners understand trends in development, while the LDC category was designed to be used in policy. Perhaps since these classifications have entirely different aims, they should be evaluated according to the goals they seek to advance. But others argue that “distinguishing among

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\(^3\)See Fantom and Serajuddin (2016).
the various motivations that give origin to classifications may be of limited relevance. Experience has shown that even classifications initially formulated for analytical purposes only end up being used to set guidelines for international action.” This perspective is much more consistent with my theoretical framework, which describes how and why classifications are used, not how they should be used.

Others instead organize the list by separating country-based classifications from issue-based classifications. For example, the Human Development Index aims to describe a country’s level of development writ large, whereas the Highly Indebted Poor Countries and the Small Island Developing States point to specific development barriers (debt and geography, respectively). Some propose that issue-based classifications avoid the dangers of country-based classifications: When a country overcomes a specific impediment and exits a list, it will not lose the assistance it receives on other dimensions. But this argument too rests on the faulty assumption that classifications are used as they are intended to be used. While countries may be labeled Highly Indebted Poor Countries based on their debt levels, this does not mean that users of the category infer only a country’s debt level and nothing more from its categorization.

This book is about how classifications are used in practice, not about how they are designed to be used or should be used. Some of the classifications on this list are more powerful than others, and my theoretical framework sheds light on why. In what follows, I describe two widely recognizable development classification systems that will drive the empirical results throughout this book. Even the histories of these systems reinforce my argument that descriptive use often differs from prescribed use and illustrate the political power of technocracies.

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4 See Alonso et al. (2014, 4).
5 See Alonso et al. (2014).
3.2 Departing from Intended Use: The World Bank Classification Systems

Countries are often referred to as “low income” or “middle income” countries to convey their levels of development. Speaking about Obama’s trade policy, the *Los Angeles Times* mentions a “particularly acute problem for Vietnam, a low-income country which would be a major beneficiary of the agreement.” A piece on Narendra Modi’s illiberal policies mentions “the longevity of Indian democracy, a lower middle income country even after four decades of high economic growth.” The *Christian Science Monitor* points out that “Mexico has transitioned to a middle-income country thanks in part to growing economic integration with the US.” These are just a few recent and prominent examples of a widely used vocabulary.

These labels result from an official classification system maintained by the World Bank. The World Bank’s income classification system separates countries into Low Income Countries (LICs), Lower-Middle Income Countries (LMICs), Upper-Middle Income Countries (UMICs), and High Income Countries (HICs) on the basis of their gross national income (GNI) per capita. A series of GNI per capita thresholds separate the categories, and no other indicators are used to determine a country’s classification. Figure 3.1 illustrates that a country’s classification is an exact function of its GNI per capita. Each year on July 1, the World Bank Development Economics Group updates the thresholds in real terms to account for inflation and releases the set of country classifications made on this basis, usually resulting in waves of headlines about which countries have ascended to middle income status. Not only are these terms part of mainstream vocabulary, but also the categories are used in the official policies of many influential actors. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS,

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9See, for example, “Cambodia’s Economic Status Raised to Lower-Middle Income,” *Phnom Penh Post*, July 5, 2016.
TB, and Malaria, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), Gavi, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) all incorporate these income classifications into their eligibility criteria.\textsuperscript{10}

What is most surprising about the significance of this classification system is that it was never intended to be used in this way. The current system has been in place since 1989, when it was devised for exclusively analytical purposes to facilitate World Bank research. With the first decade of data from the \textit{World Development Indicators (WDI)} at their fingertips, World Bank researchers wished to document and visualize trends and patterns in development, and categorizing countries helped them to do this.\textsuperscript{11} After selecting GNI per capita as the main indicator of national wealth, they devised the classification system by selecting a series of thresholds that would distinguish categories. For these thresholds, researchers identified several figures from World Bank policies that had previously existed but were already defunct. The LIC ceiling, distinguishing LICs from LMICs, is based on a cutoff introduced in the 1970s called the “civil works preference” cutoff, below which countries received preferences in civil works procurement bids in Bank-financed projects because they were not thought to be competitive enough. The threshold separating LMICs from UMICs was based on a different operational threshold no longer in use: the cutoff used by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) to assess 15-year versus 17-year repayment terms, categories that have since been collapsed. Finally, the UMIC/HIC threshold was simply set at $6,000, and no rationale has ever been found for this number.\textsuperscript{12} In other words, these thresholds were arbitrary at their adoption, and they are even more arbitrary now. Even if the thresholds were originally adopted to favor certain countries, they could not strategically sort countries today, since the thresholds have remained the same for decades. Given the arbitrariness of these categories, the World Bank has never used these classifications for operational (lending)\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{10}See Fantom and Serajuddin (2016).
\textsuperscript{12}One individual who was present at this meeting asserted that it was adopted because it was a good, round number. Author’s notes from meeting at the Center for Global Development in Washington, D.C., June 23, 2016.
3.2. Departing from Intended Use: The World Bank Classification Systems

Figure 3.1: The World Bank analytical income classification system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIC</th>
<th>LMIC</th>
<th>UMIC</th>
<th>HIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$1,005</td>
<td>$3,955</td>
<td>$12,235</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GNI per capita (Atlas method, 2016 USD, FY18 cutoffs)

Note: Figure indicates the thresholds used to classify countries as “low income countries,” “lower middle income countries,” “upper middle income countries,” and “high income countries.” Thresholds are revised each year only to account for inflation and are released annually on July 1, along with the revised classifications assigned to each country. This particular set of thresholds was published on July 1, 2017. Source: World Bank.

For its operational purposes, the World Bank instead makes use of a second, less widely-known classification system, which helps it to determine what kinds of assistance countries can qualify to receive from the World Bank. Various arms of the World Bank offer countries different kinds of assistance, ranging from the grants and concessional loans countries can receive through the International Development Association (IDA) to the non-concessional loans they can receive from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Since the resource pool of IDA is limited, the World Bank defines eligibility for this category of assistance, and it uses a similar but not identical approach to the analytical income classification system. As in the analytical system, countries are classified on the basis of their GNI data (although according to different thresholds), but assessments of their creditworthiness and other factors are also taken into account when determining whether countries will have access to IDA, IBRD, or both lending arms. After these case-specific evaluations are made, countries are categorized as “IDA-only” countries, which require the most development assistance, “Blend” countries, which receive IDA financing but also begin taking on non-concessional loans from IBRD, and “IBRD” countries, which do not require

13 Founded to correct market failures, the World Bank offers subsidized loans to developing countries through the IBRD and the IDA. Intended to help re-build Europe after World War II, the IBRD provides countries with flexible loans at favorable rates, but they are non-concessional, meaning that the IBRD is financially self-sustaining and does not rely on donors to subsidize borrowing by its members. In contrast, IDA, which is financed through replenishments from donor countries, serves the World Bank’s poorest clients by providing concessional finance and grants to countries lacking creditworthiness.
any concessional assistance. However, unlike the analytical income classification system, these categories are not widely known beyond the aid and development policy community.

Comparing the two systems, it is evident that the analytical income classification system is much simpler and more intuitive than the operational lending categories within the World Bank. This is partially because the designers of these systems expected that the lending categories, which would be used in World Bank decisions, would be more consequential, so they wanted a category to reflect a more nuanced understanding of a country’s level of development. However, it was the analytical income classification system that attracted widespread attention. In fact, this book will argue that it gained in popularity partially because of its simplicity and intuitive appeal, highlighting an important trade-off classifiers face between developing systems that reflect expert judgment and systems that will appeal to a mass audience.

The lesson from the World Bank’s two classification systems is that classifications are not always used as they are intended to be used. It therefore makes little sense to distinguish classification systems by their intended use. This case illustrates that, once created, it is much more important to understand how a classification is used than how it should be used. The theoretical framework of this project helps us to do this by explaining the conditions under which classification systems are used by which actors.

### 3.3 Proceduralizing Politics: The UN’s Least Developed Countries Category

Not all classification systems have benign origins. In contrast to the World Bank, which designed one classification system for internal analytical use and one for internal operational use, the United Nations developed a classification system that was always aimed for external operational use. Because of this, the process of developing the Least Developed Country category was intensely po-

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14 This point is also made by Alonso et al. (2014).
3.3. Proceduralizing Politics: The UN’s Least Developed Countries Category

Policy in a way that the World Bank’s processes were not.

The idea behind the LDC category originated at a meeting of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964, when member countries felt that international policy needed to recognize the unique challenges faced by the least developed countries. At this time, UNCTAD tasked an internal working committee called the Committee for Development Planning (now the Committee for Development Policy) with examining these challenges and determining criteria for the creation of a list of countries deserving special attention.\(^\text{15}\) As Fialho (2012) describes, the ensuing deliberations produced significant political conflict. Many countries, especially those from Latin America and the broader G-77, objected to their exclusion from the list (757, 761). These more advanced developing countries advocated for a larger list with more general criteria. In contrast, developed countries wished to maintain a shorter list, particularly as the benefits that would be conferred upon its members were yet to be defined (762). Finally, specific developed countries advocated for criteria that would include their former colonies on the list. In particular, France lobbied on behalf of Francophone African countries for criteria that would benefit them (756, 761). By 1971, the Committee for Development Policy (CDP) had assembled a list of countries on the basis of GDP per capita, the share of manufacturing in gross domestic product, and the adult literacy rate. However, to accommodate various political interests, exceptions were permitted and there was great room for discretion in considering outlier cases (760). Fialho concludes, “serving national interests seemed more important than striving for a bias-free agreement on LDC identification criteria” (763). Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, inclusion on the LDC list was made on an ad hoc basis. Although the three criteria guided assessments, there were no systematic reviews of the list and many decisions were either deferred or made on the basis of whether the CDP determined there was sufficient data available.\(^\text{16}\)

The CDP introduced sweeping reforms in 1991, resulting in a more technical approach to classifying LDCs. Reforms included systematic triennial (instead of ad hoc) reviews of all countries,

\(^{15}\) See Alonso et al. (2014).
\(^{16}\) See Alonso et al. (2014, 8).
clear guidelines for graduating countries from the LDC category, and a revision of the three criteria. These criteria have also been subsequently refined after 1991, but generally, the CDP has always sought to include an income criterion, a human development criterion, and an economic and environmental risk criterion. Today, the CDP uses GNI per capita, the Human Assets Index, and the Economic Vulnerability Index. The Human Assets Index, measuring human capital like education and health, and the Economic Vulnerability Index, measuring a country’s exposure to macroeconomic or environmental shocks, both contain multiple sub-indices. When the CDP reviews the LDCs every three years, they also review a set of thresholds on each of the three dimensions to determine eligibility for inclusion in and graduation from the category. To be eligible to graduate from being a “Least Developed Country” to being a “developing country,” countries must either achieve graduation thresholds on at least two of the three indicators or they can meet double the income criterion and be eligible on the basis of income alone (see Figure 3.2). After being found eligible in two consecutive triennial reviews and on the basis of the recommendation of UN committees in consultation with the governments in question, countries graduate three years later. A different set of thresholds on the same three criteria determines countries’ inclusion in the category.\footnote{See Alonso et al. (2014).}

The CDP has also worked to systematize the special treatment LDCs receive. LDCs receive preferential market access to developed countries through the World Trade Organization, can access certain foreign aid to boost their trade capacity, and are granted leniency in meeting certain international obligations. The CDP hopes to expand this array of benefits and, to this end, has conducted its own investigation into why the category has not seen even greater uptake by international actors.\footnote{See Lenzi (2017).} At the same time, what limited benefits exist do not appear to be accessed by LDCs. Even though LDCs often protest the possibility of graduating from the category, they rarely take the minimal steps required to access their special terms. To address this problem, the UN has even organized workshops in LDCs to inform their officials of the benefits to which they are
3.3. Proceduralizing Politics: The UN’s Least Developed Countries Category

Figure 3.2: Thresholds for graduating from the UN Least Developed Country category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Eligible</th>
<th>Ineligible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GNI per capita (3 year average)</td>
<td>$1,242</td>
<td>$2,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Assets Index</td>
<td>66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Vulnerability Index</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Countries are eligible to graduate when they meet any 2 of 3 criteria OR the income-only criterion for two consecutive tri-annual reviews.

Note: Figure indicates the three criteria, and the thresholds for each, used to determine a country’s eligibility for graduation from the UN’s LDC category. For the income criterion, the UN uses the same GNI per capita figures used by the World Bank but calculates a 3-year average. The Human Assets Index (higher is better) is a composite index of: the percentage of population undernourished, the under-five mortality rate, the gross secondary enrollment ratio, and the adult literacy rate. The Economic Vulnerability Index (higher is worse) is a composite index of: population, remoteness, merchandise export concentration, share of agriculture and forestry and fisheries in GDP, share of population in low elevated coastal zones, victims of natural disasters, instability of agricultural production, and instability of exports of goods and services. A separate set of criteria exists to assess a country’s inclusion in the criteria. Source: UN Committee on Development Policy.

This suggests that LDCs must care about categories for bigger reasons than just the technical material benefits with which they are associated.

Interestingly, the push for systematizing these procedures came at end of the Cold War and also at the same time as the World Bank developed its income classification system. There are a few possible explanations for this coincidence. As Fialho (2012, 753-754) notes, during the Cold War, developing (Third World) countries were fairly clearly the group that was left after accounting for advanced democracies (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and communist countries (Warsaw Pact). But when these alliances no longer organized the world, institutions had to consider a more rigorous way of identifying those countries in need of development. Alternatively, it could be the case that international institutions no longer needed to use categories for political purposes and could afford to adopt more technocratic approaches to crafting them.

Today, debates and decisions about classifications are highly technical. In fact, most of the literature critiquing classification systems is published by the creators of other classification sys-

19Author’s interview with Namsuk Kim, March 22, 2016.
tems or academic economists. Because of this, arguments for or against certain systems are made primarily by experts pointing to relatively obscure details.\(^{20}\) For example, UN economists criticize the World Bank’s income classification system on the following grounds: it should employ an internationally representative deflator rather than the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) deflator to estimate GNI per capita; it should use purchasing power parity (PPP)-adjusted GNI per capita data; and it should adopt relative rather than absolute thresholds to preserve its significance over time.\(^ {21}\) In response, World Bank economists argue that PPP-adjusted GNI per capita data would be biased by data availability and relative thresholds would limit the comparability of its classification over time, although they concur that an alternative deflator can be considered.\(^ {22}\) It is not my aim to weigh in on the merits of any of these arguments, and as a social scientist, I agree that these are important factors to consider in devising a classification system. But as my argument is about how classifications are constructed and subsequently used, I include these examples in order to highlight that contestation over classifications is primarily engineered by technocrats.

What remains to be seen is whether this systematization truly reduces political bias or merely disguises it. At the very least, this book shows that these classification systems entail significant political consequences, and the costs are largely born by populations who are less able to challenge the technical basis on which they are appraised. Scholars of other indicators have pointed to many instances in which indicators were used to advance explicitly political goals.\(^ {23}\) This section illustrates that development classifications have not been immune to this tendency. It also raises questions that I will return to in the conclusion concerning who wields power in international organizations. Whatever their motivations may be, technocrats clearly play an important role in shaping how we think about developing countries. This is consistent both with Barnett and Finnemore (1999)’s work on the power of bureaucracies in international organizations and with MacKenzie (2006)’s work on economic models, which claims that they are an “engine, not a cam-

\(^{20}\)In addition to the below cited examples, see Nielsen (2011); Harttgen and Klasen (2013); Guillaumont (2010).

\(^{21}\)See Alonso et al. (2014).

\(^{22}\)See Fantom and Serajuddin (2016).

\(^{23}\)See, for example, Cooley and Snyder (2015); Bush (2017); Kelley (2017).
era.” But given the political consequences and incentives for classifying developing countries, it is also important to consider the possibility that this technocratization simply conceals political goals.

3.4 Why These Classifications?

Of many development classifications, why does this book focus on the World Bank’s classifications and the UN’s LDC category?

One answer to this question is that these particular systems present a unique set of research opportunities. The World Bank’s analytical income classification system is especially well suited to quantitative statistical analysis. Because this system is predicated on a relatively volatile variable — national income — there is a great deal of movement across the thresholds separating the various categories.\textsuperscript{24} This creates a unique empirical opportunity to statistically quantify the effects of these classifications in a large data set, made possible by the fact that the system has not been changed at all since 1989. In contrast, only seven countries have ever graduated from the LDC category, and three of them were in 2015. This limits the ability to conduct quantitative analysis because there are insufficient opportunities to observe countries’ experiences under different classifications. However, the deliberation involved in these graduations offers considerable qualitative evidence, as international organizations and country experts carefully assess the expected effects of each of these graduations. Similarly, graduations from IDA to IBRD are also made on the basis of more subjective assessments, and by studying this system also, I can examine variation within two systems that are both produced by the World Bank. Consequently, studying these particular classifications permits a multi-method approach that applies both quantitative and qualitative evidence to document the significance of classifications.

A second reason to focus on these systems is their policy relevance. Each of these systems

\textsuperscript{24}Several, though fewer, countries have “graduated” from IDA-only to “Blend” and subsequently IBRD status, and some have “reverse graduated.”
is currently undergoing internal review or external scrutiny. As described in the introduction, the World Bank’s analytical income classification system has been heavily criticized for ignoring poverty in middle income countries. Meanwhile, Executive Directors within the World Bank are evaluating proposed reforms to the IDA graduation procedures, as large and influential countries are scheduled to transition from IDA into IBRD. The UN is experiencing its first wave of several significant candidates for LDC graduation, a departure from decades without many graduations at all, causing it and others to critically evaluate this process. In fact, many of the studies cited in this chapter were conducted for the explicit purpose of evaluating the fitness of these categories and whether they require reform. These policy debates result in no small part from massive shifts in the global economic landscape. Global changes in the demography of poverty are causing many countries, which continue to experience high levels of poverty or inequality, to cross relevant thresholds. Selecting classification systems currently undergoing review or reform both increases the policy relevance of my research (it is important to understand what political consequences these transitions will entail) and generates more evidence to test my hypotheses (many actors are engaged in a vocal debate about whether and how these systems should be reformed).

But perhaps the biggest reason to focus on these classifications is the salience of the World Bank’s income classification system and the UN’s LDC category. Figure 3.3 illustrates this in a cursory way using Google Ngrams to show how frequently classifications appear in the corpus of Google Books. Most of the classifications mentioned in Table 3.1 were not sufficiently frequent to appear in Google Ngrams, but these ones did. The phrase “Least Developed Country” is clearly most frequent, followed by the sum of the phrases “middle income” and “low income,” hailing from the World Bank’s system. Because my theory concerns the behaviors of a whole network of global elites, it is logical to study the classifications used most often by this group, justifying my focus on these categories.

Of course, the deeper question is why these two classifications are more salient than others.

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\(^{25}\)See Moss and Leo (2011); Morris and Gleave (2015).
3.4. Why These Classifications?

Why are Small Island Developing States or Low Income Countries Under Stress entirely absent from the (common) vocabulary used to identify and discuss developing countries? Any answer to this question first must acknowledge the role of path dependence, the idea that certain conventions or systems are quite sticky. To some extent, the salience of a classification in this year is driven by its salience in the previous year. As a classification becomes embedded in thoughts and policies, it becomes increasingly difficult to switch to a new one. In this way, my study is especially limited by the small-N problem: It is hardly fair to characterize the universe of classifications to be even as high as 17 when just a few classifications have been part of the mainstream vocabulary for decades. This makes it especially hard to tell whether anything we learn about these classifications generalizes to all the potential classifications that never came into existence. It is for this reason that I am particularly cautious about drawing empirical inferences about which classifications are more powerful than others. Moreover, because I apply different empirical strategies to study each classification, it is challenging to compare them head-to-head with the goal of seeing whether one has different effects than the other.

But the theoretical framework does shed light on these important questions. Specifically, hy-

\[\text{Note: Google Ngram.}\]

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26See David (1985); Pierson (2000).
hypothesis 7 expects simpler and more intuitive classifications to have greater influence than more technical or complex classifications. While I cannot truly test this hypothesis for the reasons described above, a few comments from various bureaucrats in these organizations suggest its plausibility. A report by the World Bank Development Economics Group about the income classifications mentions in its conclusion that, “Users stress the need for transparent, easily understood methodologies.” A UN Development Programme country director in Nepal echoed this sense that simplicity drove demand for classifications, despite his objections to the accuracy of the category. He claimed,

Why not petition for dropping these categories? They don’t mean anything. ... If we have to have a meaningful classification, it would have to be a wise formula including inequality reduction. Even the HDI [Human Development Index] doesn’t include this, although it’s better than the World Bank system. The way out is disaggregating everything but then it loses value. You want to use data to hit people’s attention, but if you make them read five pages of data rather than one slide, then you can’t do that. So you need the classification.

In sum, widespread demand for heuristics has been met with a proliferation of development classifications, and those that have harnessed popular attention have also used intuitive and simplified approaches. Not all of these classifiers necessarily even wanted this, as the case of the World Bank’s income classification system illustrates. But others did, and the variety of classification systems in existence suggests a competition between international organizations over the right to define development and change the world. The following chapters illustrate that, regardless of intent, they did just that.

27 See Fantom and Serajuddin (2016, 32).
28 Author’s interview with Mr. Renaud Meyer, Country Director, UN Development Programme Nepal, July 12, 2017, Kathmandu, Nepal.
Chapter 4

Measuring the Classification Effect

Do classifications shape the behaviors of international observers? Which international observers make use of classifications in their decisions? This chapter answers these questions by showing that classifications affect how donors, investors, and raters perceive and treat developing countries. Specifically, my evidence speaks to the power of the World Bank’s classification systems, and I make use of both quantitative and qualitative approaches.

4.1 Statistical Tests of the Classification Effect

The aim of this study is to illustrate systematic relationships between a country’s classification in a given year and the way it is perceived and treated in the global economy. To do so quantitatively requires a large data set with sufficient variation in the classifications countries receive cross-nationally and over time. Fortunately, the World Bank analytical income classification system exhibits this necessary variation and is ideal for this quantitative analysis. In what follows, I describe in detail how this system provides a unique empirical opportunity to measure the effects of classifications. I show that when countries pass from low to lower-middle and upper-middle income country categories, they receive less aid but better ratings of their creditworthiness and
democracies.

4.1.1 The World Bank Income Classification System

As described in the previous chapter, the World Bank has classified countries as Low Income Countries (LICs), Lower-Middle Income Countries (LMICs), Upper-Middle Income Countries (UMICs), and High Income Countries (HICs) since 1989. It does so on the basis of only one variable: gross national income (GNI) per capita. In 1989, the World Bank established official GNI per capita cutoffs that would separate these categories, and each year it updates those cutoffs only to account for inflation. This consistency is essential to my empirical strategy: It means that a country’s “treatment” as LIC in 1992 is the same as another country’s “treatment” as a LIC in 2007. I am therefore able to pool my data and exploit within-country variation over time.

One approach to estimating these relationships would be to regress my outcomes of interest on a country’s World Bank income classification in a given year. However, this naive approach would not adequately show this relationship, since international observers could be influenced directly by the factors that determine a country’s classification and not at all by the classification itself. Helpfully, these factors can be directly controlled for in the case of the World Bank’s system. Since there is only one factor determining a country’s classification and no role for subjective assessments, simply controlling for GNI per capita will account for all variation in outcomes that can be explained by income. What remaining variation can be explained by a country’s position relative to these thresholds captures the classification effect. Subsequent analysis addresses endogeneity in this relationship. Before outlining these models, I begin by introducing my data.

4.1.2 Data

To test my hypotheses, I combine data on a variety of economic outcomes with the classifications countries received from the World Bank and the indicators used to determine those classifications.
4.1. Statistical Tests of the Classification Effect

Since the World Bank began its current classification system in 1989, my sample includes all country-years that ever received classifications during the period 1987 to 2015, excluding countries that have been continually classified as HICs since before 1989.¹

The main explanatory variables are historical data on GNI per capita and the historical thresholds that were used to classify countries in each year. I obtained the original GNI data that were used to classify countries at their time of classification from the World Bank Development Economics Data Group.² It is important to note that this figure can differ significantly from the estimate of GNI that can be obtained by downloading the most current World Development Indicators (WDI) online. This is because income estimates are often revised over time on the basis of updated economic assumptions, new population data, and other causes. I use the historical income data and the historical thresholds, which is the best way of approximating how a country was perceived at the time of its classification, regardless of how it would be classified ex post on the basis of contemporary data. The historical thresholds are available online from the World Bank.³

Dependent variables include aid, foreign direct investment (FDI), creditworthiness, and democracy ratings. In keeping with the literature, I measure Aid as net disbursements of official development assistance (ODA) as reported by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and I impute zeroes for missing values.⁴ I use both a behavioral and a perceptual measure of investment. I use logged net annual inward FDI flows from UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)’s Handbook of Statistics.⁵ This measures how firms behave with respect to classified countries. I also use a perceptual measure of the classified countries’ Credit-
worthiness using the biannual country risk ratings published in the investment journal *Institutional Investor*. These ratings range from 0 to 100 and are the most widely available continuous indicator of creditworthiness.\(^6\) The *Institutional Investor* ratings (IIR) “are based on information provided by senior economists and sovereign-risk analysts at leading global banks and money management and securities firms. They have graded each country on a scale of zero to 100, with 100 representing those countries that have the least chance of default. ... The individual credit responses are weighted using a formula that gives more importance to responses from institutions with greater worldwide exposure and more sophisticated country analysis systems.” Because these ratings are compiled using surveys, I treat them as a proxy for how investors perceive these countries. I obtained the IIR by scanning and transcribing the tables published in March and September issues of the U.S. edition, 1987-2012.\(^7\) Since income classifications are released on July 1, I operationalize this variable by taking the mean of the September rating and the March rating from the following year, resulting in a single rating for a fiscal year, and for my baseline model, I impute zeroes for missing values to capture the poor reputation associated with being unrated. To measure the decisions of professional raters, I use Freedom House’s political rights score measuring *Democracy*, treating it as a perceptual rather than a latent variable. I flip the score so that higher levels refer to higher scores on political rights, from 1 to 7. Summary statistics appear in Appendix Table B.1.

### 4.1.3 Estimation Strategy

The main challenge to identifying the effect of classifications is that international observers could be influenced by the determinants of a country’s classification rather than by the classification itself. Fortunately, since the World Bank uses exact, public, and arbitrary cutoffs in GNI per capita to determine classifications, these factors can be controlled for directly. My main specification

\(^6\)The creditworthiness ratings cover more countries than do formal credit ratings. This is especially true of developing countries in which I am most interested. Many countries are included in the IIR before they receive a formal credit rating. For works comparing various measures of creditworthiness, see Vij (2005); Oetzel et al. (2001); Ratha et al. (2011).

\(^7\)I thank Jamie Park for her research assistance.
4.1. Statistical Tests of the Classification Effect

regresses outcomes of interest on both a dummy variable indicating that a country’s GNI per capita surpasses a relevant cutoff and also on the continuous GNI per capita variable, which conceivably directly shapes observers’ perceptions of the country independent of its classification. Controlling for this variable allows me to estimate the effect of the classification itself, $\beta$. The functional form for this specification is:

$$Y_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_{Above \ cutoff_{i,t-1}} + \delta \log(GNIpc)_{i,t-1} + \gamma X_{i,t-1} + \mu_i + \tau_t + \epsilon$$  \hspace{1cm} (4.1)

where $Y$ is an outcome, $X$ represents a vector of covariates, and $t$ denotes the year or period of analysis. Country and period/year fixed effects are used, and I cluster standard errors by country. A similar specification is used by Knack et al. (2014), who study the effect of crossing the operational cutoff on aid allocations.\(^8\) I evaluate the effect of different cutoffs within the same classification system in separate models, as different categories within the same classification system could understandably produce effects of various magnitudes or directions. In order to improve comparability across outcomes, I standardize all dependent variables.

The unit of analysis differs between Aid and other regressions. In keeping with Knack et al. (2014), Aid is aggregated into three-year periods corresponding with the International Development Association (IDA) replenishment cycles of the World Bank, a grouping which reflects the natural decision-making timeline of most donors and also smooths an otherwise volatile variable.\(^9\) In Aid regressions, I restrict the sample to just those countries that have ever benefited from IDA during the time frame. This is because countries that have never benefited from IDA are unlikely to exhibit any change in their aid receipts, so their inclusion only serves to reduce my power. Since all countries may receive FDI, creditworthiness scores, and democracy ratings, I use samples of all

\(^8\)Despite using the same empirical model, the results I present in the next section will differ from those reported in Knack et al. (2014). This is because my sample includes two additional periods (data through 2015) that were not available at the time the authors conducted their analysis. A complete replication of the paper and more detailed explanation of our different findings appears in Appendix B.1.2.

\(^9\)All variables are aggregated using means, while income variables and the cutoff dummy are taken from the final year in each period.
Many factors shape economic perceptions of countries. I therefore include several controls that are thought to influence the views and decisions of a variety of global economic elites. Larger countries are more likely to receive aid and attract international attention, so I control for the country’s logged population. A country’s level of democracy is known to influence the behavior of donors, investors, and credit raters, so I include lagged values of the Freedom House Political Rights score as a control in these regressions (but not when it is the dependent variable). Any actor participating in a financial transaction with a country must also take into account the country’s financial assets. I therefore include logged gross capital formation, which has been found by Vij (2005) to be one of the biggest predictors of the IIR rating.

I include these controls primarily to improve the precision of my coefficient estimates rather than to address bias in my coefficient estimates. This is because there are very few variables that would be systematically correlated with my main explanatory variable: whether a country is above the LIC or the LMIC threshold. I acknowledge, however, in Chapter 6, that sometimes a country may try to influence its position above or below important thresholds by manipulating its GNI per capita data. This is a relevant and important consideration, since it suggests that a country’s position above or under a threshold may not be (as-if) random. However, this is most threatening to the inferences I make if international observers are able to see that governments manipulate their data. But if international observers prefer blunt categories to raw GNI per capita data, it is hardly likely that they look deep enough to question the raw GNI per capita data itself. If international observers are blind to data manipulation, then their evaluations of governments should not reflect their judgments of these behaviors. A further concern arises if some types of governments are more likely to manipulate their data than others, and these characteristics are observable, even if data manipulation is not. I address this concern by controlling for democracy, as existing studies...

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\[10\] See, for example, Alesina and Dollar (2000); Li and Resnick (2003). Knack et al. (2014) also control for logged population and Freedom House. In addition, they include the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment score, but these data are not publicly available, and the authors report that their results are robust to dropping this control.
4.1. Statistical Tests of the Classification Effect

claim that “juking the stats” is more common in authoritarian regimes.\textsuperscript{11}

4.1.4 Results

The main results appear in Table 4.1. Consistent with the hypotheses, certain classifications affect the aid a country is able to attract from foreign donors, investors’ perceptions of its creditworthiness, and ratings of its democracy, although its FDI inflows do not exhibit any effect. I proceed by discussing each of these results in turn.

Overall, the income classification system affects a country’s ability to attract aid, but these effects only appear when countries become “upper-middle income.” Model 1 of Table 4.1 illustrates that “upper-middle income” countries experience a decline in their aid by a quarter of a standard deviation as a result of their label, even when raw GNI is taken into account. However, there is no detectable difference between “low income” and “lower-middle income” countries in the aggregate development assistance countries receive. This suggests that contrary to the concerns of countries approaching “middle-income country” status, donors do not appear to penalize countries for their growth until those countries have advanced into “upper-middle income” status, but when they do, the effect is sizable.

I find that classifications have a stronger hold over donors with a greater need to signal their commitments to development. As a first cut, I separate the results by bilateral and multilateral donors. Multilateral institutions are widely perceived as more impartial than bilateral institutions, so only bilateral institutions should have a need for classifications as a signaling device.\textsuperscript{12} As expected, Table 4.2 finds that this result is primarily driven by bilateral donors; multilateral assistance is not significantly affected by any country category. Interestingly, the effects are even stronger for the non-traditional donors than they are for traditional donors, even though non-traditional donors are widely thought to ignore need in their foreign aid policy.\textsuperscript{13} One interpretation of this finding

\textsuperscript{11}See Magee and Doces (2015) and Wallace (2016).
\textsuperscript{12}See Milner (2006).
\textsuperscript{13}“Traditional” donors are those that are members of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC).
### Table 4.1: The effects of classifications on behavior of donors, investors, and raters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Aid</th>
<th>(2) FDI inflows</th>
<th>(3) Creditworthiness</th>
<th>(4) Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Above LIC ceiling</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above LIC ceiling ((t-1))</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.170**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.063)</td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.151</td>
<td>-0.121</td>
<td>-2.719</td>
<td>-1.669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.124)</td>
<td>(4.078)</td>
<td>(3.841)</td>
<td>(4.421)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covariates</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country F.E.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period F.E.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period</td>
<td>3-Year</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>3,062</td>
<td>2,148</td>
<td>3,204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.886</td>
<td>0.833</td>
<td>0.916</td>
<td>0.828</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **B. Above LMIC ceiling** |         |                 |                      |              |
| Above LMIC ceiling \((t-1)\) | -0.246** | -0.032          | 0.111*              | 0.027        |
|                   | (0.107) | (0.048)         | (0.064)              | (0.069)      |
| Constant          | 4.374   | 0.032           | -3.661               | -2.805       |
|                   | (4.874) | (4.123)         | (3.944)              | (4.445)      |
| Covariates        | ✓       | ✓               | ✓                    | ✓            |
| Country F.E.      | ✓       | ✓               | ✓                    | ✓            |
| Period F.E.       | ✓       | ✓               | ✓                    | ✓            |
| Period            | 3-Year  | Year            | Year                 | Year         |
| Observations      | 632     | 3,062           | 2,148                | 3,204        |
| R²                | 0.887   | 0.833           | 0.917                | 0.827        |

Standard errors in parentheses
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

**Note:** The table reports coefficients from OLS regressions of the outcome on a dummy variable coded 1 if a country is above the cutoff, controlling for GNI per capita. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Covariates include lagged values of log population, log gross capital formation, and Freedom House political rights score, and they include country and either year or period fixed effects. The Freedom House political rights score is inverted so that positive values are more democratic, and this covariate is omitted when it is the dependent variable. In the aid regressions, the sample is restricted to countries that have ever benefited from IDA after 1987. All dependent variables have been standardized for ease of comparison.
could be that non-traditional donors have a reputation for using aid as political instruments, and so they have greater need of classifications to overcome this stigma. However, this conclusion should be interpreted with caution, as my data only reflects the aid given by non-traditional donors who report their statistics to the OECD, a non-random sample of potentially more transparent non-traditional donors.\textsuperscript{14}

I further examine the importance of the strategic mechanism in Figure 4.1. I estimate the classification effect separately by each individual donor and plot them in order of effect sizes. Since I observed earlier that aid was most strongly affected by the LMIC ceiling, I am primarily interested in these effects, which appear in Panel B. Unsurprisingly, the strongest negative effects are for Gavi and the Global Fund, two donors who formally include the World Bank classifications in their eligibility policies.\textsuperscript{15} These cases are useful because they are far more likely to be explained by the strategic than the cognitive mechanism: Institutionalizing an eligibility policy requires great deliberation and justification, tempering cognitive biases but amplifying any audience effects. What is especially interesting is that these same cases actually do respond to the LIC ceiling as well (Panel A), but the effect is opposite to my original predictions. These strategically-motivated donors actually reward countries for becoming LMICs but punish them when they become UMICs. These results also partially suggest that the original null finding of LIC graduation on aid may obscure important heterogeneity: For example, Germany and Sweden do give less aid to countries once they become LICs. In Panel B, we see many donors, such as Scandinavian donors, exhibiting the classification effect. While these findings should be subjected to multiple comparisons corrections before drawing inferences about any individual donor’s behavior, these results suggest important heterogeneity in the responses of donors and their susceptibility to the two mechanisms.

I find mixed results regarding the sensitivity of investors to classifications. On the one hand, private investors do not appear to change their decisions to directly invest in foreign countries based

\textsuperscript{14}These include: Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkey, and the UAE.

\textsuperscript{15}While they exhibit the strongest effects, these donors provide a relatively small amount of overall aid, so they do not drive the overall finding in Table 4.1.
Table 4.2: The effects of classifications on aid by type of donor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Above LIC ceiling</th>
<th>(1)DAC</th>
<th>(2)Non-DAC</th>
<th>(3)Multilateral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Above LIC ceiling (t-1)</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
<td>0.141</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.548</td>
<td>12.545*</td>
<td>2.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covariates</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country F.E.</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period F.E.</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period 3-Year</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>0.882</td>
<td>0.630</td>
<td>0.879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Above LMIC ceiling</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above LMIC ceiling (t-1)</td>
<td>-0.339**</td>
<td>-0.426***</td>
<td>-0.165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.340</td>
<td>14.984**</td>
<td>2.940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covariates</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country F.E.</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period F.E.</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period 3-Year</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>0.884</td>
<td>0.633</td>
<td>0.880</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: The table reports coefficients from OLS regressions of the outcome on a dummy variable coded 1 if a country is above the cutoff, controlling for GNI per capita. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Covariates include lagged values of log population, log gross capital formation, and Freedom House political rights score. The sample is restricted to countries that have ever benefited from IDA after 1987. All dependent variables have been standardized for ease of comparison.
Figure 4.1: The effects of classifications by individual donors

(a) LIC Ceiling

(b) LMIC Ceiling

Note: Each observation represents the effect of classifications on the official development assistance of a single donor, noted on the x-axis. Each observation comes from a different regression and observations are ordered by coefficient size. Donors in blue (Gavi, the Global Fund, and the European Community) include the World Bank’s classifications as part of their eligibility policies.
CHAPTER 4. MEASURING THE CLASSIFICATION EFFECT

on their classifications. Model 2 of Table 4.1 shows that graduating to “lower-middle income” and later “upper-middle income” country status does not affect a country’s net FDI inflows. However, surveys of sovereign risk analysts reveal that classifications affect their perceptions of the creditworthiness of countries. Model 3 of Table 4.1 shows that becoming “upper-middle income” is associated with a bump in a country’s creditworthiness score, and this result is significant at the .1 level. This specification likely understates the effect at this threshold, as it imputes zeroes for all country-years with no rating. Table 4.3 presents the results without these imputations, in other words, using only the data for countries that received a creditworthiness score. In this specification, the coefficient size on graduating to “upper-middle income” status doubles and becomes significant at the .05 level. However, graduating to “lower-middle income” status also becomes significant yet produces a negative rather than a positive effect. This is because countries are more likely to be rated when they become “lower-middle income,” as shown in Model 3 of Table 4.3. This finding too suggests the importance of the income classifications, as being rated itself communicates an improvement in a country’s standing.\textsuperscript{16} Despite the fact that sovereign lending involves careful analysis of economic fundamentals, these results suggest that even senior analysts responsible for these decisions are biased by how a country is classified.

Finally, raters of democracy also exhibit a classification bias. Countries that reach “lower-middle income” status have systematically higher Freedom House ratings than their “low income” counterparts, and the result is statistically significant at the .05 level. This result should be surprising for two reasons: This rating aims to capture democracy rather than development, and raters claim to follow rigorous coding procedures. The presence of a classification effect even in these evaluations of a dimension separate from economic development is consistent with the widely documented “halo effect,” by which units sharing one characteristic are assumed to share other characteristics. However, these classifications appear to more powerfully influence Freedom House

\textsuperscript{16}However, the decision to include a country on the survey is made by the \textit{Institutional Investor} magazine, not by the sovereign risk analysts they invite to participate in the survey. This decision, is therefore, not indicative of investors’ perceptions but rather the magazine’s.
### 4.1. Statistical Tests of the Classification Effect

#### Table 4.3: The effects of classifications on credit ratings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>With imputations</td>
<td>Without imputations</td>
<td>Any rating (0-1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Above LIC ceiling</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above LIC ceiling ((t-1))</td>
<td>0.053 (0.059)</td>
<td>-0.156*** (0.055)</td>
<td>0.185* (0.104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.719 (3.841)</td>
<td>14.489*** (5.496)</td>
<td>-10.678 (6.992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covariates</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country F.E.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year F.E.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>2,938</td>
<td>2,148</td>
<td>3,202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.851</td>
<td>0.916</td>
<td>0.768</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### B. Above LMIC ceiling

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>With imputations</td>
<td>Without imputations</td>
<td>Any rating (0-1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above LMIC ceiling ((t-1))</td>
<td>0.111* (0.064)</td>
<td>0.197** (0.077)</td>
<td>0.054 (0.094)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.661 (3.944)</td>
<td>13.820** (5.546)</td>
<td>-12.039* (7.066)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covariates</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country F.E.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year F.E.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>2,938</td>
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<td>3,202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.851</td>
<td>0.917</td>
<td>0.767</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

**Note:** The table reports coefficients from OLS regressions of the outcome on a dummy variable coded 1 if a country is above the cutoff, controlling for GNI per capita. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Covariates include lagged values of log population, log gross capital formation, and Freedom House political rights score. All dependent variables have been standardized for ease of comparison.
ratings at the lower end of the income spectrum; no difference is detected between “lower-middle” and “upper-middle” income countries.

These results are robust to several alternative specifications. One concern is that including Freedom House as a control variable in the aid, FDI, and creditworthiness regressions introduces endogeneity, since I have demonstrated that the classifications influence this measure. In Appendix Tables B.5-B.8, I show that my results are robust to dropping this control as well as all controls. The aid results also do not change by using yearly rather than periodic observations. Finally, Appendix B.1.4 presents the results from an alternative model, which uses change scores and holds changes in GNI per capita constant to identify the effect of crossing a cutoff. This model focuses on explaining year-to-year variation in how observers react to a single country’s change in category, omitting the country-to-country variation in how observers react to countries just above and just below a threshold. The results from this exercise are similar to those yielded by the baseline model.

4.1.5 Discussion

With some exceptions, the classification effects I measure are consistent with those predicted by my theory. I found strong support for hypothesis 1A: Donors are susceptible to the income classifications. Donors are significantly more likely to prefer allocating aid to LMICs than to UMICs. Curiously, there is little evidence of donor flight following a country’s graduation from LIC to LMIC status. This is possibly because some donors actually increase aid to countries as they become LMICs, contrary to my predictions. This may be because there is a growing emphasis on effective aid in the development community, leading some donors (such as the US) to privilege giving aid to places where it will make a difference over the places with greatest need. Such behaviors may obscure my ability to observe a classification effect. An alternative possibility is that publicity about the challenges LMICs face has succeeded in mitigating the classification effect at this threshold, while UMICs receive no such attention. Both of these explanations are consistent with the strategic story I outline, as donors must justify their allocation of a scarce resource across
a pool of competitive applicants based on norms in the development community. Furthermore, the heterogeneity in classification effects by donor is consistent with hypothesis 1B: Donors facing greater skepticism from domestic publics or peer institutions have greater strategic need to use classifications. Bilateral donors, both traditional and non-traditional, use classifications more than multilateral donors.

With respect to hypothesis 2, I found more evidence that classifications affect the perceptions (2A) than the behaviors (2B) of investors. When a country crosses the LMIC ceiling, it is more likely to be perceived as creditworthy by sovereign risk analysts who are responsible for deciding to lend to a country. However, classifications do not produce any observable change in FDI. One interpretation of these findings is that classifications shape a country’s reputation as a borrower but not its reputation for creating a stable business environment, but it is hard to imagine that these two features are unrelated in the minds of investors. Another interpretation is that while investors’ perceptions change, the effect is not large enough to induce changes in behaviors. One existing study finds no observed relationship between the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business ranking and FDI.17 This is noteworthy because this ranking should rationally influence FDI in a way that income classifications should not; if the Ease of Doing Business ranking does not drive FDI, then it is much less surprising that income classifications do not either. According to this interpretation, even the cognitive effects of classifications on investor behavior are minimal. Yet another interpretation of these findings is that these reflect the evaluations of different types of investors: firm owners responsible for FDI may differ from sovereign risk analysts. These findings could also be explained if firm owners do, in fact, respond to classifications, but in opposite directions. If some investors are attracted to the high rewards associated with LICs while others are attracted to the low risk associated with MICs, then classification effects could exist but cancel each other out. My study is not able to distinguish between these. Nonetheless, a conclusion that investors do not exhibit a cognitive bias simply speaks to the limitations of the classification effect.

17See Jayasuriya (2011).
I find strong evidence in favor of hypothesis 3: Countries with higher classifications are significantly more likely than countries with lower classifications to receive favorable democracy scores. In particular, when a country crosses the LIC ceiling, it receives a higher democracy rating. It is plausible that I would observe this effect in the case of Freedom House’s political rights score, where there is substantial room for the subjective views of raters to enter their judgments. These results therefore add to scholarly concerns about the use of Freedom House ratings to measure democracy.

Taken together, my findings suggest that the cognitive mechanism likely accounts for at least some portion of the classification effect. This is because the strategic mechanism is unable to account for the effects I detected in raters’ behavior. It is not possible given this design to explain what portion of the aid findings are attributable to a cognitive versus a strategic mechanism, although the heterogeneity in donors’ behavior is consistent with the existence of the strategic mechanism. Distinguishing these mechanisms in the case of donors’ behavior is the primary goal of Chapter 5.

4.2 Classification Experiences

In order to learn about how countries experience these transitions between categories, I carried out several interviews of elites based in Washington, D.C., from June to August 2016. These interviews were designed to be theory-building: They contributed to the theoretical framework, which I then tested systematically above, but I present them here to illustrate examples of the patterns described above in the experiences of specific graduating countries. To this end, I created a sample of countries, and for each country I interviewed elites who would be able to speak to its experience. This approach treats countries as unitary actors — that is, a whole country experiences

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18See Bradley (2015).
19For a countervailing perspective, see Bush (2017).
4.2. Classification Experiences

a classification in the same way and pursues a coherent goal. While I often interviewed multiple individuals about a country, I consider these to be multiple data points about a single (country) observation. This is in contrast to the design of the interviews in Chapter 6, which seek to unpack the separate experiences and preferences of various groups and individuals within a country.

In order to anchor my interviews in policy issues of relevance to interviewees, I focused these conversations on proposed changes to policy regarding graduation from the World Bank’s grant and concessional loans program, the International Development Association (IDA). As explained in Chapter 3, graduation discussions begin when a country crosses a GNI per capita cutoff known as the “operational cutoff.” This triggers an assessment of the country’s creditworthiness; if it is found creditworthy, it begins also borrowing from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) on harder terms. The country can continue borrowing from both banks for a few years as a “Blend” country, but every three years when donors convene, they will evaluate whether to graduate the country from IDA so it only borrows from the IBRD. IDA graduation policy reform is currently one of the most pressing issues within the World Bank because so many populous and geopolitically important countries are expected to soon graduate to Blend or IBRD status, challenging the resource constraints of the IBRD. Furthermore, my conversations occurred during a year of one of these donor meetings (known as replenishments), so the topic provided a natural context for discussing these dynamics. While conversations focused on IDA graduation, mentions of other classifications also arose in conversations.

I constructed a group of all recent and upcoming IDA graduates, which appears in Appendix Table B.10. For each case country, I sought to interview representatives from the graduating country to the World Bank, officials at the World Bank who worked with the graduating country, and representatives from donor countries who had interacted with the graduating country (either Executive Directors of the World Bank or Deputies to IDA replenishment meetings). Often, officials in these latter categories had experiences with multiple graduating countries. I tried to maximize

20This cutoff is about $200 higher than the threshold separating low and lower-middle income countries. It is also updated each year to account for inflation.
CHAPTER 4. MEASURING THE CLASSIFICATION EFFECT

Table 4.4: Cases and donor perspectives represented in World Bank interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Recent graduates</th>
<th>Blends</th>
<th>IDA-only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Bhutan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>India</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kyrgyz Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Zambia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.5: Sources for information by country group in World Bank interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Recent graduate</th>
<th>Blend</th>
<th>IDA-only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IDA Deputy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Directors Offices</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Desk Staff</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

this by focusing my energies on the interviewees that had experiences with the greatest number of countries. While this means that the countries I learned about are not a random sample of all recent and upcoming IDA graduates, it allowed me to learn about the greatest number of graduation experiences given the limited availability of highly expert interviewees.

The resulting eighteen interviews included perspectives from four IDA Deputies (or Advisors to IDA Deputies), six Executive Directors (or Advisors to Executive Directors), seven Country Desk Officials, and an IBRD Credit Risk Officer. We discussed the cases or interests of four donor countries, four recent graduates (IBRD-only), three Blend countries (two currently under consideration for graduation), and seven IDA-only countries above the operational threshold. The specific cases we discussed are reported in Table 4.4. Many cases arose in multiple conversations, and conversations frequently drew on the interviewee’s knowledge of several cases. Therefore, Table 4.5 presents a summary of the various sources who spoke to various cases.

Consistent with hypothesis 1A, many countries associated IDA graduation with losses in aid, even and especially from outside the World Bank. Several interviewees reported that graduating from IDA caused them to lose access to other sources of aid. One of the current candidates for graduation, Vietnam, has already reported losing access to bilateral funds as a result of its can-
4.2. Classification Experiences

didacy.\textsuperscript{21} The same has occurred for previous graduates Armenia and Georgia. A former World Bank official from Georgia stated that one donor backed out of a trust fund and cited Georgia’s loss of IDA status as its reason for doing so. Furthermore, following Armenia’s and Georgia’s 2014 graduation, Georgia nearly lost its regional hub because it was viewed as less important to World Bank operations.\textsuperscript{22} A World Bank Board official representing Armenia and Georgia noted that during 2016 negotiations over graduation policy reform, a proposal for access to an additional source of financing called IDA+ for recently graduated countries was withdrawn because “IDA is for the poorest countries.”\textsuperscript{23} Even the countries that have not yet become categorized as Blend anticipate this dynamic. One advisor spoke of Zambian officials’ concern about losing access to aid, particularly after crossing the LMIC/UMIC threshold.\textsuperscript{24} In summary, one advisor stated, “Proposed IDA graduation reforms do not address the issue of perception of countries as IDA and non-IDA by the donor community.”\textsuperscript{25} The perception that donors coordinate on World Bank classifications was widespread; one IDA deputy stated, “we all know it goes on.”\textsuperscript{26}

In the donor community, several pieces of evidence are consistent with the strategic mechanism. Many donors formally tie eligibility for their assistance to the World Bank analytical income classification system. Even though the World Bank has never attached any material benefits to these categories, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB, and Malaria,\textsuperscript{27} the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC),\textsuperscript{28} and Gavi,\textsuperscript{29} all include income classifications in their eligibility policies. Médecins Sans Frontières notes that MICs are often excluded from voluntary license agreements with pharmaceutical companies and are therefore penalized in tiered pricing schemes, limiting

\textsuperscript{21} Author’s interview with IDA deputy, July 22, 2016, Washington, DC.
\textsuperscript{22} Author’s interview with former advisor to Executive Director, August 2, 2016, Washington, DC.
\textsuperscript{23} Author’s interview with advisor to Executive Director, August 3, 2016, Washington, DC. The recent graduates were Angola, Armenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Georgia.
\textsuperscript{24} Author’s interview with advisor to Executive Director, July 21, 2016, Washington, DC.
\textsuperscript{25} Author’s interview with former advisor to Executive Director, August 2, 2016, Washington, DC.
\textsuperscript{26} Author’s interview with IDA deputy, July 22, 2016, Washington, DC.
\textsuperscript{27} http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/core/eligibility/Core_EligibilityAndCounterpartFinancing_Policy_en/
\textsuperscript{28} https://www.mcc.gov/resources/doc/report-candidate-country-fy-2016
\textsuperscript{29} http://www.gavi.org/support/apply/countries-eligible-for-support/
the provision of vaccines to countries with some of the highest rates of HIV/AIDS. To rely on classifications as heuristics is one thing; to formally commit to using them as a matter of policy demands a higher level of scrutiny and defense, making it less likely that cognitive biases account for these behaviors. Furthermore, while representatives of donor governments are disincentivized to be candid about strategic incentives for their allocations, some nonetheless are. As one U.S. Treasury official commented, “When we can show that most of our aid is benefiting Least Developed Countries (LDCs) or fragile and conflict-affected states, this helps our numbers.” This logic is consistent with hypothesis 1B, as it implies that the need to show numbers drives the use of classifications.

While these discussions laid the basis for my predictions about donors, they were less useful for developing predictions about the behaviors of investors and raters for two reasons. First, a graduation from IDA to IBRD entails a formal (subjective) evaluation of creditworthiness by the World Bank. An IDA officer formerly in charge of assessing the creditworthiness of IDA graduates for IBRD lending noted that countries often pursue IDA graduation as a “stamp of approval” because it helps reduce their borrowing costs on the open market. While consistent with my findings, this relationship could alternatively be explained by the private information contained in classifications like these lending categories. In other words, I cannot rule out alternative explanations in this case. Second, World Bank lending categories are not widely known beyond the world of development finance. While donors will be familiar with the meaning of these categories, it is less likely that other audiences would know the difference between IDA-only, Blend, and IBRD labels. In this way, the World Bank lending categories are an example of an issue-specific classification that will have limited reach, the opposite of the kind of classification described in hypothesis 7.

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31 Author’s interview with U.S. Treasury official, August 5, 2016, Washington, DC.
32 Author’s interview with IBRD credit risk officer, July 26, 2016, phone interview.
In sum, this chapter has provided observational evidence to support my claims that classifications drive the behaviors of international observers. I showed using cross-national data that countries receive less aid but more favorable ratings of their creditworthiness and democracies when they become MICs according to the World Bank. These patterns also characterized the experiences of several countries who have graduated from the World Bank’s IDA group to its IBRD group, as I learned during my interviews with a variety of stakeholders in this process. In the next chapter, I focus on the aid results, where my observational evidence cannot decisively determine whether the mechanism at work is a cognitive or strategic one. I will offer experimental evidence to illustrate that donors are especially sensitive to a strategic mechanism.
Chapter 5

Cognitive or Strategic? Testing the Mechanism

In the previous chapter, I showed that classifications have dramatic real-world consequences. When countries break out of development country categories, they receive less aid but better credit and democracy ratings. This observational evidence is valuable because it shows that classifications actually matter for relevant decision-makers. However, it can only say so much about why these classifications are so important. In the theoretical framework, I argued that investors and raters have no strategic incentives to employ classifications, so any classification effect must result from a cognitive mechanism for these actors. Donors, on the other hand, have great strategic incentive to use classifications, so it is not clear whether the effects of classifications on aid are caused by this strategic mechanism or whether they are also caused by cognitive biases.

The aim of this chapter is to unpack why donors use classifications in their decision-making. To do this, I invite individuals attending a side meeting of the United Nations (UN) focused on sustainable development to allocate a hypothetical foreign aid budget across several country profiles. I randomly manipulate the information provided to them about these countries, including their income classifications. I find that classifications cause individuals to disproportionately allocate
aid to lower income countries, even holding constant the identity of the countries. To distinguish between the two proposed mechanisms, I also randomly manipulate the strategic incentives participants face. Nearly all of the classification effect I observe is driven by these strategic incentives. In other words, among donor elites, the strategic mechanism is more likely than the cognitive mechanism to drive distortions in aid allocation. Overall, this experimental evidence shows that the classification effect occurs on the micro-level and not just the macro-level.

In what follows, I present the experimental design, which randomly manipulates whether participants are exposed to classifications and whether their decisions will be evaluated by a non-expert actor. In addition, I exploit a unique quirk in historical World Bank data in order to randomly assign the specific classifications associated with individual countries, all while avoiding deceiving participants. Next, I describe the sample of 232 individuals who participated in this UN-sponsored meeting on sustainable development. I claim that surveying this well-informed, educated, and experienced sample is a strong second-best alternative to surveying those individuals actually responsible for allocating aid. Finally, I present and discuss my results. I show that classifications change aid allocation behavior, but only for individuals who are strategically incentivized to consider how their actions will be judged by a non-expert actor.

5.1 Experimental Design

To test how and why classifications influence aid allocation decisions, I embed into a survey an experimental activity in which I randomize the information provided to participants and the strategic incentives that influence their decisions.

The experimental participants are invited to allocate a hypothetical foreign aid budget across five country profiles. Participants complete this task several times (“rounds”) and are paid a fixed wage (the aid budget does not come from their wages). Each set of profiles includes data on gross national income (GNI) per capita, the indicator used to directly determine whether a country is clas-
sified as a Lower-Middle Income Country (LMIC) or a Upper-Middle Income Country (UMIC). To avoid priming respondents to consider only national income, I also include some other relevant statistics for each of the five countries. The objective of this experiment is to understand how participants’ allocation decisions are influenced by the presence of classifications and to test whether this relationship can be explained through a cognitive or a strategic mechanism.

5.1.1 Treatment Conditions

Participants are randomly assigned to one, both, or neither of two treatment conditions in a factorial design. In the Classifications treatment, participants see countries’ classifications on the five profiles. In the Judges treatment, participants are also informed that their decisions will be evaluated by a “judge,” who will determine whether their allocation decisions deserve to be rewarded with a bonus. As I will describe, these two treatment conditions permit me to (1) identify a “classification effect” and (2) measure what part of this effect is driven by cognitive psychology versus strategic behavior.

Classifications

The first treatment identifies the effect of a classification system on a participant’s allocation. All participants see the same information about countries when they receive a set of five profiles: GNI per capita, gross domestic product growth, the percent of the population that is undernourished, and the maternal mortality ratio.\(^1\) Profiles are presented along a number line of GNI per capita (see Figure 5.1). For a randomly selected group of participants, the threshold separating one income classification from the next is also plotted on the number line, and the sides of the number line are shaded and labeled to indicate the various countries’ classifications (see Panel A). A partic-

\(^1\)These statistics were selected because they reflect various measures of a country’s need and because they have relatively little missing data. Since they are not the focus of this experiment, these data are presented to all subjects regardless of treatment condition. In other words, while these statistics are also likely to influence participants’ allocations, they will have equal influence for treatment and control groups.
Participant is assigned to the same classification treatment for the duration of the experiment to avoid interference between rounds.

Figure 5.1: Examples of profiles including and excluding classifications

(a) Treatment

(b) Control

Note: To avoid any psychological tendencies associated with colors, I additionally randomize whether blue and yellow are on either left or right of the treatment graphic.

Under the logic of randomization, any observed differences in the allocation behaviors of par-
Participants assigned to the classification condition may be attributed to the classifications themselves. The classifications themselves convey no new information, and by placing the classifications along a number line, the graphics illustrate that classifications are simply a construct of GNI per capita. While the graphics do feature GNI per capita more prominently than the other included statistics, this is true of both treatment and control groups and thus cannot bias the results.

Judges

The second treatment is designed to identify the mechanism by which a classification effect operates. I hypothesized that two such mechanisms could be at work: a cognitive mechanism, whereby classifications simplify information for the decision-maker, and a strategic mechanism, whereby classifications serve as useful tool by which decision-makers can signal their impartiality to an audience. The classifications treatment, in isolation, could operate only via the cognitive effect. To create strategic incentives for a participant to use classifications, the second treatment introduces a “judge” who can punish or reward a participant for her allocation decisions. The judge is not herself a strategic player in the experiment — what is important is the information about the judge that I give to participants, as this is what will shape their decisions. Participants learn that “[t]he judge will be an intern (i.e an entry-level staffer) in the office of a politician (i.e. a congressperson/MP) in a major donor country. The judge is NOT an expert on development.” Participants in this treatment condition are also informed that if they are randomly selected to receive a prize, then they will only receive this prize if the judge approves of their allocation decisions. Because a participant’s expected payout is contingent on the evaluation of the judge, this relationship imitates the real-world relationship between an aid agency (the participant) and any funder or observer of the aid agency, such as a legislature, median taxpayer, or international citizen (the judge). By comparing the treatment effect of classifications for the participants being assessed by judges to the treatment effect of classifications for the participants with no such incentives, I can isolate the cognitive and strategic mechanisms.
5.1. Experimental Design

The judges treatment works by altering the participant’s utility function, comprising the fixed sitting fee ($F$) and personal bonuses ($B$). This can be described as follows:

\[ U = F + p \times B \]  \hspace{0.5cm} (5.1)

where $p$ is the probability that a participant is randomly selected to receive a bonus. The judges treatment manipulates $p$.

In the control condition, $p$ is a random variable, ensuring that participants’ earnings are unaffected by their behavior in the game. They are not materially rewarded for allocating aid one way or another and receive a fixed sitting fee.

In the judges treatment condition, however, allocation portfolios are the result of both random chance as well as the decision of a judge. In other words, $p$ decreases (because a participant’s allocation must be both randomly selected and also approved by the judge) by an amount capturing the preferences of the judge. This requires participants to take into account the way their allocation appears to an external judge if they want to receive a bonus. Participants are informed that judges will make their decisions after the conclusion of the experiment, so they have no opportunity to learn the preference of the judge. Instead, they must guess what a judge will be looking for in their allocation decisions. This is itself the treatment.

**Factorial Design**

Crossing the classifications and judges treatments (1) demonstrates the classification effect and (2) tests whether the effect can be attributed to the strategic versus the cognitive mechanism. The overall classification effect is captured by comparing allocations made by participants in the Classifications group to those in the No Classifications group. For the subset of participants in the No Judges group, the classification effect is entirely cognitive because there are no strategic incentives to use the classifications to signal. For the subset of participants in the Judges group, both the cog-
Cognitive and strategic effects may be at work. Table 5.1 illustrates the estimands identified through the factorial design.

### 5.1.2 Identification Strategy

To operationalize my measure of individuals’ allocation behavior, I measure participants’ allocations to countries near the threshold separating two categories in the classification system. In the World Bank income classification system, the threshold separating LMICs and UMICs is currently a GNI per capita of $4,035.\(^2\) In every set of five profiles, I provide participants with profiles of

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\(^2\)I select the threshold separating LMICs and UMICs because this is the threshold that produced the strongest results in my observational data, and I want to use the experiment to understand that. An alternative is to look at the difference between Low Income Countries (LICs) and LMICs, but my early research suggests that participants tend to
5.1. Experimental Design

two countries well below this threshold, two countries well above it, and one country near the threshold. I expect classifications to primarily affect allocations to the middle country, whose need is perceived to be the most ambiguous. Specifically, I expect the classifications treatment to cause a middle country to receive less aid when it is above the threshold and more aid when it is below the threshold. In contrast, participants assigned to the control condition who are unaware of the existence of a threshold should not alter their allocation behavior to this middle country depending on whether it is above or below the threshold.

Since participants are unlikely to be influenced by differences in GNI per capita on the scale of $50-$100, any observed difference in their allocations to the middle country based on its position above or below the threshold should only be caused by the participant’s exposure to the existence of a threshold. However, given the limited number of real country profiles that fall within this tight window, it is impossible to rule out the possibility that country-specific characteristics of the countries below the threshold and above the threshold make them more or less desirable recipients. While in expectation these differences should be equally distributed across the threshold, the limited sample of possible profiles increases the possibility that these effects dominate.

To address this concern, I circulate two versions of each middle country profile and randomize whether the participant sees a version in which the country is just-above or just-below the threshold. This eliminates any country-specific characteristics that could systematically distinguish the just-above from the just-below countries.

However, lying about a country’s classification or national income violates the experimental norm of no deception. Fortunately, I can ensure that the information I am providing participants is honest by exploiting a unique feature of World Bank data: National income figures are frequently revised over time. National income estimates are revised when national statistics offices or the World Bank change their statistical assumptions or incorporate new information. These revisions occur quite frequently and can sometimes be extreme. (For example, a rebasing exercise caused feel that LICs and LMICs both require lots of aid; it is only higher in the income distribution where it is plausible that countries could no longer require aid.)
the figure reported in the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) for Kenya’s GNI per capita in 2011 to change from $820 to $1020.) The World Bank Database Archives contain all published versions of the WDI, which allow me to see all the figures that have ever been published about a country’s income in a given year. I select which figures are most appropriate for me to report for participants and inform the Agents that data are sourced from the World Bank, accessed various dates, 2011-2017.

For example, Paraguay’s 2013 GNI per capita exhibits important variation. In November 2014, the WDI reported that Paraguay’s 2013 GNI per capita was $4,040. In September 2015, however, the WDI revised its estimate: Paraguay’s 2013 GNI per capita was now thought to be $4,190. In 2013, the threshold separating LMICs from UMICs was $4,125. This meant that the revision to the World Bank estimate resulted in a number that would have resulted in a different classification for Paraguay in 2013.

I select recent country-years whose data revisions have been quite small in magnitude but have caused a country-year to cross the threshold separating LMICs and UMICs. Once the country-years are selected, I then select the two GNI figures that are (a) closest to the threshold and (b) most symmetric in their distance to the threshold from either side. I am able to identify nine such instances, leaving me with nine middle country profiles that can be randomly assigned to just-above or just-below the threshold in that year. This produces four different versions of the graphic that participants can see, as shown in Figure 5.2. (Additional information about the selection of these profiles as well as the the two well-above and two well-below profiles, is available in Appendix C.)

Each participant sees each of the nine country profiles just once, so she never sees both the just-above and just-below versions for a given country. In sum, participants are randomly assigned to the Classifications and Judges conditions, which persist for the duration of the experiment, but each of their rounds is individually randomly assigned to either the Just-Above or Just-Below condition. An illustration of this appears in Table 5.2.

My primary research question is whether participants allocate more to just-below countries
5.1. Experimental Design

Figure 5.2: Complete treatment possibilities

(a) No Classifications / Just Above

(b) Classifications / Just Above

(c) No Classifications / Just Below

(d) Classifications / Just Below

Note: To avoid any psychological tendencies associated with colors, I additionally randomize whether blue and yellow are on either left or right of the treatment graphic.
Table 5.2: Identification strategy: “just-below” randomization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classifications</th>
<th>Treatment</th>
<th>Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treatment</td>
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<td>•◦•◦</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judges</td>
<td>••◦◦◦</td>
<td>•◦◦•</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>•◦◦•◦</td>
<td>•◦•◦</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>•◦••</td>
<td>•◦••</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>◦•◦••</td>
<td>◦•◦◦</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>◦◦•••</td>
<td>◦◦••</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Solid dots indicate rounds in which the participant sees a “just below” middle country; empty dots indicate “just above.”

than just-above countries when they are exposed to classifications, but allocate similarly to just-below and just-above countries when they are not exposed to classifications. I use a difference-in-differences estimator to analyze my data at the round level of analysis:

\[ Y_{ij} = \alpha + \gamma C_i + \lambda JB_j + \delta (C_i \ast JB_j) + \mu_j + \rho_j + \epsilon_{ij} \]  

(5.2)

where \( Y \) is a participant’s allocation to the threshold country, \( j \) is round, \( i \) is participant, \( C \) is the classifications treatment, \( JB \) is whether the middle country in the round is just-below the threshold, \( \mu \) is country identity fixed effects and \( \rho \) is round order fixed effects. (Standard errors are clustered at the participant level, since the classifications treatment is assigned at this level.) In this regression, \( \delta \) identifies the strictest effect of classifications, since it refers to the interaction of the country being just-below with the classification system in effect. In other words, this estimand identifies the amount that a participant will give a country only if that country falls strictly below the threshold. \( \gamma \) also causally identifies the classification effect, although a less strict one. This estimand captures
the overall effect of seeing classifications on a participant’s allocation to the threshold country, regardless of whether that country technically falls just above or just below the threshold. I will refer to $\delta$ as a strict classification effect and $\gamma$ as a general classification effect.

While I conduct this analysis for the full sample, the results are most instructive when calculated for the sub-samples of participants assigned to the Judges and No Judges treatment conditions. The cognitive effect of classifications is measured by $\delta$ and $\gamma$ for those participants assigned to the No Judges (control) group. For those participants assigned to the Judges (treatment) group, $\delta$ and $\gamma$ reflect the participant’s strategic incentives in addition to any cognitive biases, so these represent the total classification effect. Implicitly, the strategic effect of classifications is the difference in treatment effects between the two sub-samples.\(^3\)

### 5.2 Protocol

The experiment was embedded in a survey fielded to those individuals who registered for the International Conference on Sustainable Development.\(^4\) This event is held annually in September and is an official side meeting of the UN General Assembly meetings, taking place at the same time. Held at Columbia University, the agenda includes addresses by world leaders and development partners as well as poster presentations of student research on sustainable development. Registered participants come from the private sector, civil society, government, and also many students enrolled in development master’s programs.

The survey was fielded online using Qualtrics during the period September 15-19, 2017. I obtained the e-mail addresses of registered participants and e-mailed each participant a link to the study a few days before the conference took place. Alternatively, participants could take the

\(^3\)I prefer this approach to an estimation using triple interactions because it is substantially easier to interpret.
\(^4\)I thank ICSD for graciously allowing me to conduct this study. In particular, Cheyenne Maddox was extremely helpful and I greatly appreciate her efforts. I also thank enumerators Don Casler and Ricky Clark for their research assistance. I thank the Columbia Experimental Laboratory for the Social Sciences for helping me to pilot this experiment in their lab before fielding at ICSD.
survey during coffee breaks on computers provided at the conference site. The survey was e-mailed to 2,188 registered participants and 232 completed the survey (10.6% response rate).

Study participants were compensated with gift cards and vouchers to eateries near the conference venue, valued at $5-$10. In addition, study participants were informed that during the survey they would have the opportunity to win a prize of a subscription to their choice of a news or research periodical, with values up to $300. For those participants who were assigned to the No Judges treatment condition, they were informed that a randomly selected participant would receive this prize. For those participants who were assigned to the Judges treatment condition, they were informed that a randomly selected participant would receive this prize, provided that his or her allocation decisions were approved by a judge.

The complete study materials — including exact instructions, treatment and question texts, and screenshots — appear in Appendix C.

Randomization effectively took place through simple random assignment. Using R, I generated a directory containing 2,188 folders (as many as I had registered participants), each containing 9 uniquely and randomly generated graphics. The 2,188 folders were randomly assigned to the Classifications and Judges treatments, blocked by ID number, so that 2 folders were associated with each of the 4 possible crossed treatment conditions for every set of 8 folders. Within each set of 8, half of the images depicting classifications showed yellow on right and blue on left, while the other half showed the reverse.

Each folder contained 9 graphics, all reflecting the same treatment condition assigned to the folder. Each set of 9 graphics was independently generated using simple random assignment. First, I randomized the order of the 9 threshold countries. Second, I randomized whether the respondent would see 4 just-below and 5 just-above profiles or 5 just-below and 4 just-above profiles. Third, I randomized which of the 9 threshold countries would be just-below and which would be just-above. This determined which year of data from the WDI each round would pull from. Fourth, I randomized an order for each of the 4 remaining sets of 9 countries each, ensuring that each
5.3. Sample

The survey attracted a highly educated and diverse sample of individuals interested in and knowledgeable about global development. Although this is not a group of decision-makers in donor agencies, this is a good second-best group to proxy for their beliefs and behaviors. Figure 5.3 reports descriptive statistics to make this point. The average participant is 28 years old and has received or will soon receive a master’s degree. As shown in Panel B, about a third of the sample is currently enrolled in a graduate program in a development-related field. These are the kinds of degree programs that many individuals working in development themselves attended. Nearly another third of the sample is currently employed in research, the private sector, non-governmental

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5 The countries used for this exercise appear in Appendix Table C.1.

6 Because of the variation in the base year, there were a few cases in which the GNI per capita ordering of the countries changed from their respective groupings. Data availability constrained my ability to address this problem in the design, so I instead include a dummy variable for whether this situation occurred in all my analysis.
organizations (NGOs), government, or development partners. Professionals from these domains attending a development conference are the peers that aid agencies frequently work with. In Panel C, over half of the sample reports working on development-related issues, and for about a fifth, they have worked in development for over five years.

It is worth acknowledging, though, that a sizable portion of the sample is less experienced in development. Panel B shows that the remaining third are undergraduates or graduate students of issues unrelated to development, and Panel C shows that half of the sample reports no experience working on development issues. Although this last group are the most unlike decision-makers in donor agencies, these students have been sufficiently motivated to attend a conference on the topic, so they are at least a better proxy for an aid agency than a mass sample. In fact, the sample as a whole demonstrates impressive knowledge of development. 74 percent correctly identified that a GINI coefficient is a measure of inequality, and 56 percent correctly identified DFID as the aid agency of the United Kingdom.

The sample is internationally diverse. Respondents represent 48 different countries, with the largest delegations from the US (40%), India (9%), China (7%), Nigeria (4%), Japan (4%), Germany (3%), and Colombia (3%). International respondents were either representing their countries at the UN General Assembly meetings or sufficiently invested in development to pay to travel to an international conference.

While it would be ideal to survey those actually responsible for allocating aid, doing so is a costly imposition on expert time and resources. The sample of attendees at a side meeting of the UN focused on sustainable development is a strong second-best sample. Despite the presence of students, the sample is remarkably educated, professional, and knowledgeable about development issues. Anecdotally, many participants approached the research team at the conference wishing to extend the conversation, and they frequently offered informed insights and opinions about foreign aid and about development in these countries.
5.3. Sample

Figure 5.3: Descriptive statistics

(a) Level of education completed

(b) Occupation

(c) Years of experience in development

(d) Knowledge about development

Note: The two questions measuring respondents’ knowledge of development (Panel D) were: “What does a GINI coefficient measure?” (Inequality / Democracy / State fragility / Corruption / Don’t know) and “DFID is an aid agency of which national government?” (UK / France / Germany / Japan / Don’t Know)
5.4 Results

I find robust evidence of a classification effect, and my results suggest that these effects are primarily driven by the strategic rather than the cognitive mechanism. As a first cut at the data, I plot respondents’ allocation decisions to the threshold country by the various treatment conditions. The classification effect is apparent in Figure 5.4, which shows the difference between participants’ allocations to the threshold country when it is randomly assigned to be just above or just below the threshold. Any separation between the colors of the distribution is evidence of a classification effect. Reassuringly, participants who are not assigned the classification treatment condition do not appear to modify their allocation decision on the basis of a country’s position with respect to the threshold. This is logical because these participants are unaware of a threshold separating just above and just below countries, and differences in GNI per capita on the small scale of $50-$100 should not matter for their decisions. However, we do see differences in the colored distributions for those participants who see classifications, and this is most observable for those who are also assigned to the judges treatment condition. This graphical evidence supports the claim that classifications cause changes in allocation decisions and suggests that the strategic mechanism dominates the cognitive mechanism in this sample. It is also helpful to see the distribution of the allocation decisions in these graphics. Since the distribution of the raw variable is skewed right, I use the logged version in the following analysis, which results in a more normal distribution of the data (see Figure 5.5).

I present the statistical results in Table 5.3. First, I look for overall evidence of the classification effect in the full sample. In Model 1, I regress the log allocation to the middle country on the participant’s classification treatment status (identifying the “general” classification effect, or $\gamma$), whether the threshold country in a round was just above or just below, and the interaction between the two (the “strict” classification effect, or $\delta$). Model 2 also includes fixed effects for the identity of the threshold country and the order of the round, as pre-specified. The full sample exhibits a
Figure 5.4: Effects on allocation to threshold country

Note: Plots depict participants’ allocations to the threshold country, which is randomly assigned to be either just above or just below the threshold (depicted in colors). Where the colors of the distribution separate, this is evidence of a classification effect. As shown above, this separation is noticeable only for those participants in the classifications treatment condition (where participants see the threshold separating just above and just below countries) and most strongly for those also assigned to the judges treatment condition.
statistically significant general classification effect: Seeing classifications reduced a participant’s allocation to the threshold country, regardless of its position on either side of the threshold. This suggests that classifications helped my respondents to benchmark their overall allocations, and they chose to redirect their funds away from this threshold country. (As I will show later, they redirected funds toward the well-below countries.) There is no evidence, however, of the strict classification effect in the full sample. While classifications shaped overall behavior, the threshold country’s technical position on either side of the line did not influence how much money it received from participants.

Next, I investigate whether the classification effect appears to be driven more by a cognitive or by a strategic mechanism. I do this by splitting my sample according to whether a participant was in the Judges treatment condition or not. Models 3 and 4 of Table 5.3 show the results from the control group, who were not incentivized to consider how their allocations would appear to an external audience. In other words, any effect I might observe must be entirely driven by the cognitive
5.4. Results

Table 5.3: Strong and weak effects of classifications treatment (by judges treatment)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Allocation to threshold country (logged)</th>
<th></th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
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<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
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<td>0.201</td>
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<td>(δ)</td>
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<td>(0.126)</td>
<td>(0.117)</td>
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<td>−0.027</td>
<td>−0.032</td>
<td>−0.299***</td>
<td>−0.250**</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(γ)</td>
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<td>(0.077)</td>
<td>(0.106)</td>
<td>(0.108)</td>
<td>(0.109)</td>
<td>(0.109)</td>
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<td>−0.002</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
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<td>(0.070)</td>
<td>(0.072)</td>
<td>(0.094)</td>
<td>(0.080)</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Round F.E.?</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by participant

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

mechanism. But this group did not exhibit any kind of classification effect, strict or general. These null results undermine the idea that participants are cognitively biased by these classifications. Indeed, the effects I observed in the full sample appear to be entirely driven by those participants assigned to the Judges treatment. In Models 5 and 6, I show an even more pronounced and robust general classification effect. Furthermore, I find suggestive evidence of even a strict classification effect. Although the general classification effect depresses overall allocation to the middle country, the positive coefficients on the interactive term suggest that a country’s position just below the threshold actually does increase the allocation it receives, and only when a participant is aware of the relevant threshold. Although these results are not significant at conventional levels, p-values of .11 (Model 5) and .36 (Model 6) indicate that these patterns might be confirmed with additional data.

Moving the focus away from just the threshold country, I find similar patterns in participants’
overall allocation behavior. Figure 5.6 plots the overall allocation behavior of participants. Panel A again suggests that there exists a classification effect. The Loess curve indicating the allocation behavior of participants in the classifications treatment is skewed right to the curve of those participants in the control group. This indicates that the classifications treatment caused respondents to prefer allocating to countries at the lower end of the income spectrum. In Panel B, again, I separate this behavior based on a participant’s assignment to the judges treatment. Again, the effects are more pronounced for individuals who received this treatment. In other words, informing participants that they would be evaluated by a judge exaggerated the effects of classifications on their giving behavior.

Figure 5.6: Effects on overall allocation

(a) Pooled

(b) By judges treatment

Note: Figures plot Loess curves indicating the distribution of participant’s (raw) allocation to all countries. The blue curves reflect the allocations made by participants in the classifications treatment, while the red curves reflect the allocations made by those participants who did not see classifications. Panel A reports the allocation behavior of the full (pooled) sample, while Panel B separates the sample by the judges treatment status.

I model the patterns observed in Figure 5.6 by regressing the skewness of each participant-round’s allocation profile on her assignment to the classifications and the judges treatments. Skew-

7The following analyses were not pre-specified.
ness is a measure of the asymmetry of a distribution, that is, whether a distribution appears to lean left or right. The patterns illustrated in Figure 5.6 suggest that participants’ allocation decisions are positively skewed, which means that the right tail of the distribution is much longer than the left tail. Skewness is a statistic, and it can be calculated given any vector of observed values. For the purposes of my inquiry, I construct this vector simply as follows: Given a participant’s allocation \( c_1 \) to the country in the first position, \( c_2 \) to the country in the second position, \( \ldots \), \( c_5 \) to the country in the fifth position, the vector includes \( c_1 \) 1’s, \( c_2 \) 2’s, \( \ldots \), and \( c_5 \) 5’s. This vector allows me to calculate, albeit somewhat bluntly, the skewness of a participant’s allocation decision in a given round. In Table 5.4, I regress this measure on each participant’s treatment status. Consistent with the patterns observed above, Model 1 illustrates that the classifications treatment increases the skewness of participants’ allocations, and the result is statistically significant at the .1 level. In Model 2, I interact the two treatments to test whether those participants in the judges treatment behave differently. Although the graphical evidence above points to differences driven by the judges treatment, Model 2 does not find statistically significant differences between these groups. Evidence that judges exaggerate the classification effect on overall allocation behavior should therefore be interpreted with caution. However, these findings could also result from the modeling assumptions involved in this blunt calculation of skewness.

5.5 Discussion

These experimental findings provide further evidence that classifications influence donors’ decisions to allocate to developing countries. Whereas the previous chapter illustrated these dynamics at the macro-level, this chapter shows that they also occur at the micro-level. Due to the implausibility of surveying a sufficient number of actual aid allocators to make these inferences, I turned to a second-best sample of individuals participating in a side meeting of the UN focused on sustainable development. This sample is significantly more educated, professionalized, and knowledgeable
CHAPTER 5. COGNITIVE OR STRATEGIC? TESTING THE MECHANISM

Table 5.4: Effects of classifications on overall allocation behavior

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Skewness</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TreatClass*TreatJudge</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>(0.092)</td>
</tr>
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<td>TreatJudge</td>
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<td>Observations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Threshold Country F.E.?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Round F.E.?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by participant
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

about development issues than a mass sample, and one day they could well be actually involved in these real-world decisions. It is therefore a noteworthy finding that classifications guide even their decisions.

The experimental approach is able to shed greater light on the mechanisms underpinning the classification effect. I show that the classification effect only appears when participants are informed they will be judged by a non-expert. In contrast, participants with no strategic incentives to deviate from what they consider to be an optimal allocation do not appear to respond to classifications. This suggests very little, if any, cognitive bias for this highly-informed, elite sample. This is instructive considering the observational findings that classifications drive aid allocation behavior in the real world. If decision-makers in aid agencies behave like those in my sample, then this project suggests that they use classifications strategically rather than cognitively.

These patterns also appear in some of the reflections submitted by participants. When asked whether they felt a non-expert would agree with their decisions, some participants who saw classifications replied positively, noting the labels and “color coding of the charts.” Responses empha-
5.5. Discussion

sized the importance of simplicity in their decisions. As one participant noted, “everyone knows main or principal characteristics and generalities that help to allocate resources and know if a country is poor, rich or middle income.” Conversely, others felt that non-experts would disagree with their decisions because their decisions reflected a level of complexity beyond the average person. One participant (who did not receive the Judges treatment) argued, “This was a difficult exercise because by leaving out the full context, it gives the impression that you find the issues in one country more problematic than another - in reality, an aid agency can still try to address issues of inequality/policy/governance, etc. in a middle income country without giving much aid.” Several participants in the Classifications / No Judges condition voiced similar sentiments, having deliberated carefully about their aid allocation decisions. Even some participants who were strategically incentivized to consider the preferences of the judge expressed concern that a non-expert would disagree with their decisions, for example, “because some did involve giving money to countries considered upper middle.” But even if this participant appeared willing to ignore these preferences in order to allocate aid as s/he saw fit, the statistical results suggest that the preferences of the non-expert were quite important for the decisions made by most participants.

While the experiment does provide evidence of a classification effect, it is worth noting that these effects may be less extreme than I anticipated. Specifically, I distinguished between a “strict” classification effect — how much aid a specific country receives if and only if it receives a specific label — and a “general” classification effect — how aid is allocated across a variety of countries in the presence of classifications. I found robust evidence of a general classification effect. While there is some evidence of a strict classification effect too, these results are not statistically significant at conventional levels. It is possible that additional data collection may strengthen these findings, given how slight these effects are likely to be and the relatively small sample size of this experiment. For now, however, I apply caution to avoid overstating the effects of classifications. While classifications certainly change general allocation behavior, it is not yet confirmed that they drive sharp discontinuities at thresholds separating the different categories.
Taken together, the evidence in Chapters 4 and 5 substantiates widespread concern that developing country classifications distort the allocation of foreign aid. I provided both observational macro-level evidence and experimental micro-level evidence that countries receive less foreign aid as they graduate from low and lower-middle income country status. I also argued that, in the case of foreign aid, these results occur due to a strategic mechanism: Donors consider how their allocation decisions look to an external audience, and they skew their allocations in favor of countries that are widely perceived to be developing. In the next chapter, I look at these issues from the perspective of countries that are themselves classified. How do they experience these losses in foreign aid? Conversely, do they experience any benefits? Finally, who wins and loses within these countries, and do these affected parties try to influence their own classifications?
Chapter 6

How Winners and Losers Respond to Classifications

This project is fundamentally about whether and why international observers rely on classifications in their decisions. The preceding chapters address these questions by offering evidence of the direct effects of classifications on the behaviors of these international observers (hypotheses 1-3). But if classifications are so powerful, then I would also expect certain countries and groups to experience these effects indirectly and, in turn, to try to influence their classifications to the extent they are able (hypotheses 4-6). In this chapter, I further support my argument by investigating the experiences and strategic responses of the affected parties.

Specifically, I explore how non-governmental organizations (NGOs), firms, and governments experience their country’s classification. In prior chapters, I have treated classified countries as unitary actors that receive aid, investment, and ratings. This chapter challenges this assumption by focusing on various groups within a country that win and lose based on its classification. To this end, I carried out dozens of interviews during separate fieldwork trips to Nepal and Botswana, two cases that allow me to observe how these various groups experience a country’s graduation out of a developing country category. I find that NGOs suffer due to losses in aid while firms anticipate
benefits from this improvement in their country’s status. Both the predictions and the findings about the material preferences of governments are ambiguous, since classifications produce diverse and sometimes countervailing effects. However, many leaders in governments also noted the effects of classifications on their social status. While this relationship was not predicted by my theoretical framework, I explore its significance for the political economy of classifications. Taken together, these findings illustrate that classifications and status are distributive goods that create winners and losers at the sub-national level.

Next, I provide evidence that classified countries and groups attempt to influence their classifications. I outline three methods by which affected parties do this — reforming the system, lobbying for specific classifications, and gaming the system — and offer examples of each behavior. In particular, I draw on a novel source of data on revisions to statistics to show that countries actually try to change their numbers in an attempt to engineer their classifications. While some countries appear to seek higher classifications, others appear to seek lower classifications.

Indeed, while my theoretical framework offers clear predictions about the effects on NGOs and firms, the prediction about the experiences and preferences of governments is ambiguous. Whether a country seeks a higher or a lower classification should depend on how much that country values aid relative to improved investment or borrowing opportunities. However, testing this theory would involve imposing assumptions about how the diverse interests of government officials and various domestic groups are aggregated into a unitary foreign policy. Since this preference aggregation process is not obvious, I leave it to future research to explain which objectives states pursue, using this space primarily to explain how they can manipulate classifications and that they do.

6.1 The Distributive Effects of Classifications

This section makes the case that classifications are a distributive good, benefiting some and punishing others. Previous work tends to make two assumptions: (1) classified countries are unitary
actors and (2) improvements in a country’s rank or indicator are uniformly good.¹ But in a globalized world, many sub-national groups interact directly with elites in foreign countries through business or development-oriented relationships. How those foreign elites perceive a country’s level of development can therefore not only affect how they interact with its government but also with these sub-national groups. Moreover, since classifications cause a diverse web of effects, it is not obvious that improvements in a country’s rank are always beneficial. Especially when considering the perspective of various groups within a classified country, some may well lose considerably.

Focusing on the case at hand, I draw on evidence from dozens of qualitative interviews to show that higher classifications punish NGOs but potentially benefit firms. (These findings support hypotheses 4 and 5 respectively.) My findings also suggest the importance of social status for the government leaders who are responsible for obtaining these classifications, illustrating that these distributive consequences are not only material.

### 6.1.1 Research Design — Interviews in Nepal and Botswana

There is relatively little existing evidence of how domestic constituencies experience their country’s international reputation. Although my theoretical framework produces general empirical expectations for these relationships, I began this section of the project with few expectations about the specific ways in which international reputation would affect the day-to-day experiences of these groups. I therefore adopted a qualitative approach to gathering evidence on these topics by interviewing relevant individuals about these issues. This required narrowing the scope of my inquiry to a small number of country cases, where I could spend several weeks conducting fieldwork in each.²

I wanted my conversations with respondents to be concrete. Asking individuals broad questions about their country’s reputation or status would likely confuse them or result in vague state-

¹See, for example, Kelley (2017).
²In particular, I thank Nishchal Pandey, Chedza Mogae, and Joel and Julia Newman for facilitating my fieldwork.
mments. But I wanted to learn about specific ways that they had experienced classifications. To this end, I chose to anchor my interviews by focusing on countries’ graduations from the United Nations (UN)’s Least Developed Countries (LDCs) category. Unlike the World Bank’s income classification system, this category is not automatically determined: Countries become “pre-eligible” to graduate on the basis of certain indicators, but the decision to graduate the country results from several years of consultations between the UN and the eligible country. Several features of this process make the UN LDC graduation process a rich focus for my qualitative interviews. First, these deliberations provide many actors with an opportunity to form preferences and voice them. This generates rich evidence of how these different actors experience and consider classifications. Second, this process means that LDC graduation is a salient policy issue for many countries. While countries cannot change the income classifications they receive from the World Bank, they do have some say in their LDC graduation. I found that most individuals in the policy community in my case study countries were therefore quite familiar with the most minute details of this graduation process. Third, focusing on a graduation process allowed me to observe over-time variation in a country’s classification, or at least what individuals expected to change as a result of graduation. Asking individuals to consider the two counterfactuals for their country provided richer insight than would asking individuals just to consider how their country had fared.

Focusing on graduations from the LDC category substantially narrowed the universe of cases. This is because, to date, there are few LDC graduates or graduating countries, and most of them are small island states where dynamics are likely not generalizable to other countries (see Table 6.1). Conversations about LDC graduation are most salient in a country currently undergoing the process, so I chose to select one country where graduation is currently on the table. Of the five countries that met the criteria in 2015, Nepal had the largest economy and would likely be most generalizable to future cases. However, because interviewees in Nepal would be able to offer only their predictions for the effects of graduation, I also included a country that previously graduated. Of the available options, Botswana was the largest economy and offered the best opportunity to
6.1. The Distributive Effects of Classifications

study the long-term effects of graduation.

Table 6.1: Past and future LDC graduates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Graduates (year of graduation)</th>
<th>First met criteria in 2015 (criteria met)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana (1994)</td>
<td>Bhutan (Income, HAI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maldives (2011)</td>
<td>Sao Tome and Principe (Income, HAI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa (2014)</td>
<td>Solomon Islands (Income, HAI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea (2017)</td>
<td>Timor-Leste (Income only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu (2020)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola (2021)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As briefly described in Chapter 3, countries graduate from the UN’s LDC category in a several years-long process. Countries are routinely assessed by the UN on the basis of three indicators: gross national income (GNI) per capita, the Human Assets Index, and the Economic Vulnerability Index. The UN maintains a graduation threshold on each of these numerical indicators, and a country becomes “pre-eligible” to graduate when it meets this graduation threshold in two of three indicators. Alternatively, countries can become “pre-eligible” on the basis of only GNI per capita if they exceed twice the graduation threshold. These conditions must be met in two consecutive triennial reviews before a country can make preparations to graduate three years later, pending the recommendation of various committees at the UN.

Nepal is a current graduation candidate. It became pre-eligible in 2015, when it passed the Human Assets Index and Economic Vulnerability Index thresholds, but it has still not met the income criterion (see Figure 6.1, Panel A). But regardless of its income, if these indicators are consistent in its 2018 review, it will have the opportunity to pursue graduation three years later, in 2021. This final graduation decision will be made on the basis of the longstanding conversation between Nepal and the UN. By most measures, Nepal has demonstrated notable improvement in development outcomes in recent decades, although these successes experienced a setback in the form of the 2015 earthquake. The country became a democracy at the end of the Cold War but has yet to experience political stability: Since the 2006 conclusion of its civil war, governments
continue to form and dissipate extremely quickly. Neighboring India and China, Nepal is deeply exposed to power politics and the global economy. It exports textiles and tourism and relies on remittances from Nepali migrants in the Middle East as a primary source of income. Characterizing development in Nepal is therefore a challenging task.

Botswana, which graduated from the LDC category in 1994, enjoys a widespread international reputation as a “success story.” Botswana is often praised for its prudent management of diamonds, which were discovered in the 1980s and were wisely re-invested in education and health facilities. Unlike its neighbors, the country has enjoyed uninterrupted civil peace since independence, and it even avoided the apartheid regime that characterized South Africa. Botswana’s graduation from the LDC category is cited as a prominent indicator of these positive trends. Having graduated decades ago, it surpasses the income criterion by orders of magnitude and faces absolutely no risk of reverse graduating. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that Botswana’s Economic Vulnerability Index actually fails to meet the graduation threshold. Again, it should be stressed that there is no risk of reverse graduation for Botswana, especially since the LDC inclusion process imposes even stricter criteria than the LDC graduation process, but this illustrates that even the performance of graduates on these criteria can be mixed. Other indicators, which are irrelevant for the LDC categorization, also raise alarms about Botswana’s performance. The country has one of the world’s highest GINI coefficients (a measure of inequality) and HIV/AIDS infection rates. This divergence between Botswana’s label and its reality made it an appealing environment in which to study the domestic consequences of classifications.

The goal of these interviews was to understand how classified countries experience the graduation process and how these classifications affect the experiences of domestic groups. To this end, I constructed an interview sample in each country consisting of government officials, leaders in civil society and in business communities, and policy experts. With government officials, I aimed to

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4Sir Seretse Khama, the founder of modern Botswana and its first president, controversially married Ruth Williams, a white woman, creating an international incident that led to his temporary exile from the British protectorate.
6.1. The Distributive Effects of Classifications

Figure 6.1: Nepal’s and Botswana’s performances on LDC indicators (2015)

(a) Relative to graduation criteria

(b) Relative to inclusion criteria
understand the graduation process from their perspective: In what capacities were they consulted about graduation, or did they seek it out? Did they believe a decision to graduate was warranted? Was the government eager to graduate, or did it prefer to avoid graduation? I interviewed leaders in civil society to understand how they believed it would affect the day-to-day operations of NGOs and the welfare of the marginalized populations they represent. Although I interviewed some small, local NGOs, I focused my sample on larger networks of NGOs, which were more familiar with graduation policy and how it would affect a variety of organizations. I also recruited leaders in the business community to my study. For example, I spoke with members of Chambers of Commerce or business consulting firms who were involved in internationally oriented business ventures. These individuals helped me to understand how the country’s reputation factored into the global dealings of its firms. Finally, I interviewed policy experts, often in think tanks or universities, who were able to speak to these interactions as a whole. A description of the interview protocol and questionnaire appears in Appendix D.

The breakdown of interviews in the two countries appears in Table 6.2. Important differences between the two cases lead to a somewhat different balance of interviewees in each country. For example, there are simply many more government officials and experts involved in the contemporary case of Nepal than in the historical case of Botswana, although I did manage to speak with retired officials who recalled the process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government officials</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experts</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business community</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>20</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I chose not to interview members of the mass public. Although graduation does make national headlines, the mass public are generally uninformed about these dynamics, even if they are
affected by them. While my theoretical framework includes a space for those affected by classifications to exert political pressure, there is variation in how informed affected parties are about the relationship between classifications and their experiences. As I was familiarizing myself with the cases of Botswana and Nepal, it became clear to me that only elite actors are sufficiently aware of these dynamics to act on them. This does not negate the importance of understanding the effects of classifications on the mass public — these effects are quite real — but their interests will be represented only indirectly by elite actors in civil society who seek to improve the welfare of citizens. (These dynamics are analogous to those surrounding trade policy: Firms with specific interests can organize to erect trade barriers, even though they result in higher prices for consumers, because these penalties are diffusely spread among a less aware population.) As such, interviewing the mass public in classified countries would not yield useful evidence, even if these individuals were significantly affected by classifications.

### 6.1.2 Findings

In what follows, I describe how LDC graduation affected various groups within Botswana and Nepal. If hypothesis 4 is correct, then I would expect to observe NGOs voicing negative views of graduation and experts or officials acknowledging the negative consequences of graduation for marginalized groups. If hypothesis 5 is correct, then I would expect to observe business interests voicing positive views of graduation and experts or officials noting the positive consequences of graduation for investment. I find evidence consistent with both hypotheses. In addition, my interviews point to the importance of social status to political leaders, a factor which should be incorporated into future theory on this topic.

Representatives from NGOs expressed deep discomfort with Botswana’s status as an LDC graduate. Despite having left the category over two decades ago in 1994 and being widely considered a poster child for development success, Botswana tops global rankings in inequality and HIV prevalence. For this reason, several interviewees expressed skepticism regarding the value
CHAPTER 6. HOW WINNERS AND LOSERS RESPOND TO CLASSIFICATIONS

of the income classification system or the LDC category. As one civil society leader stated, “The media account of Botswana is not what’s on the ground, and international NGOs are prejudiced by the label. They look at Botswana and see a wealthy country, but they don’t see the needs of the neediest.” Many agreed not only that the label is inaccurate but also that Botswana’s outstanding international reputation has actually played a role in contributing to the country’s political and economic stagnation by concealing its problems and deterring foreign donors.

The concept of donor flight is well-known in Botswana. According to one economist with decades of experience in the country, Botswana managed to delay the departure of donors for some time after Botswana became a MIC by arguing that the government used resources effectively, but the LDC graduation again highlighted Botswana’s success and made it more challenging to justify continued assistance. Many countries closed their embassies, which had primarily existed for the purposes of bilateral aid. Development agencies from Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Norway all pulled out, and the United States Agency for International Development ceased supporting the salaries of technical officers in the government. One civil society leader mentioned that his organization was recently rejected for funding by the Gates Foundation, which stated that it was trying to dedicate more funding for Africa. He commented, “Botswana isn’t Africa enough for the Gates Foundation. You can’t talk to any international donor and say you’re from Botswana. It’s perceived as too wealthy.”

The dearth of international support for Botswana creates problems not because Botswana needs external resources but because it has crippled the development of a robust civil society that can hold the government to account. Most (although not all) acknowledge that Botswana is relatively more

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5. Author’s interview with Mr. Oscar Motsumi, Executive Secretary, Botswana Network of AIDS Service Organizations (BONASO), August 8, 2017, Gaborone, Botswana.
6. Author’s interview with Dr. Keith Jefferis, Managing Director, Econsult Botswana, August 10, 2017, Gaborone, Botswana.
7. Author’s interview with Ms. Alice Mogwe, Director, Ditshwanelo Botswana Centre for Human Rights, August 10, 2017, Gaborone, Botswana. Author’s interview with Dr. Jay Salkin, Director of Research, Bank of Botswana, August 9, 2017, Gaborone, Botswana.
8. Author’s interview with Mr. Oscar Motsumi, Executive Secretary, Botswana Network of AIDS Service Organizations (BONASO), August 8, 2017, Gaborone, Botswana.
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successful than other developing countries and that there are sufficient resources in the country to address its problems. But one civil society leader pointed out, “Developing buildings and infrastructure is not congruent with developing people. Organizations like the World Bank and the African Development Bank say we have enough resources to develop our people, but that aspect of development is not happening. This is why NGOs must complement the work of the government. But how do NGOs generate funding? They ask for money from donors. Unfortunately, because of Botswana’s classification, most bilateral agreements that we used to have no longer exist.”

But civil society organizations primarily rely on the government for funding, and as one leader pointed out, “they don’t bite the hands that feeds them. You see NGOs leaning more and more toward the government, which limits the advocacy agenda.” What limited international funding exists for Botswana exists only for organizations focused on HIV/AIDS and LGBTI issues, what one interviewee called “the international development community’s flavor of the month.” While this dynamic exists in all aid recipient countries, it is exaggerated in a country like Botswana, where a claim for international assistance must be based on a specific thematic objective as opposed to general need. It is no surprise that most civil society organizations work on these issues or attempt to anchor their own agenda on these issues. But as a result, marginalized groups falling outside these bounds are neglected. For example, an initiative to serve people with disabilities under the office of the President, while well-intentioned, is judged by observers to be significantly outdated, yet there are no NGOs actively holding government to account on this issue.

Similar themes emerged in Nepal, where many respondents associated its planned graduation with aid losses that punish the poor. One director of a research institute with experience in the National Planning Commission and Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Nepal argued that Nepal’s LDC

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9 Author’s interview with Ms. Cindy Kelemi, Executive Director, Botswana Network on Ethics, Law, and HIV/AIDS, August 15, 2017, Gaborone, Botswana.

10 Author’s interview with Mr. Oscar Motsumi, Executive Secretary, Botswana Network of AIDS Service Organizations (BONASO), August 8, 2017, Gaborone, Botswana.

11 Author’s interview with Ms. Alice Mogwe, Director, Ditshwanelo Botswana Centre for Human Rights, August 10, 2017, Gaborone, Botswana.

12 Author’s interview with Ms. Cindy Kelemi, Executive Director, Botswana Network on Ethics, Law, and HIV/AIDS, August 15, 2017, Gaborone, Botswana.
status was vital to the assistance it was able to secure from European donors. In particular, he cited the recent closing of the Danish embassy in Kathmandu as evidence of the perception that Nepal no longer needed assistance: “They argued that their priority had shifted to poor African countries that needed their support. If we cannot brand ourselves as a country in need of development, we will lose these things.” 13 Another think tank director pointed to the importance of the special treatment and duty-free access Nepal receives in the World Trade Organization as result of its LDC status, arguing that if Nepal graduates, “the international community should know that it doesn’t reflect a real structural transformation, and they should continue to offer these benefits to us.” 14 The leader of a widely-respected Nepali NGO grounded his expectation of donor flight in reports he had heard from his colleagues in Vietnam, who encountered aid losses after Vietnam graduated from Low Income Country (LIC) status: “Why should aid agencies give money to them when there are so many other countries that need aid?” 15 As the UN Development Programme Country Director in Nepal commented, “Nepal has so much more to gain by being the focus of development partners rather than trying to signal to the rest of the world, ‘Oh we can go it alone.’” 16 The expectation of donor flight has led one development consultant who works with NGOs in Nepal to encourage his clients to diversify their sources of funding away from traditional donors. 17 Indeed, momentum for Nepal’s LDC graduation has slowed, and the new cohort of government officials I spoke with are ambivalent about the prudence of pursuing LDC graduation in 2022.

Conversely, respondents involved with the business community in Nepal anticipated significant perks of graduation. One World Bank country economist for Nepal spoke of the “positive psychological effect” Nepal’s graduation from the LDC category would have on private investment, which

13 Author’s interview with Dr. Nishchal Pandey, Executive Director, Center for South Asian Studies, June 22, 2017, Kathmandu, Nepal.
14 Author’s interview with Dr. Posh Raj Pandey, Executive Director, South Asia Watch on Trade, Economics, and the Environment, July 20, 2017, Kathmandu, Nepal.
15 Author’s interview with Mr. Gyan Adhikari, Executive Director, Rural Reconstruction Nepal, July 11, 2017, Kathmandu, Nepal.
16 Author’s interview with Mr. Renaud Meyer, UN Development Programme Country Director, July 12, 2017, Kathmandu, Nepal.
17 Author’s interview with development consultant, June 23, 2017, Kathmandu, Nepal.
he viewed as beneficial to a country with insufficient public investment. An expert with former government experience agreed, anticipating that graduation would improve investor confidence in Nepal. He cited multiple instances, including the puzzling departure of a hydroelectric multinational corporation and the unwillingness of European insurers to cover domestic airlines in Nepal, in which he believed Nepal’s status as an LDC had undermined international confidence in its capability, since in both cases there was a rational economic basis for investment in Nepal. Both respondents felt that while graduation would not change the underlying fundamentals of the Nepali economy, it could psychologically reassure private foreign investors.

Evidence from Botswana’s business community is mixed. Botswana’s outstanding reputation, according to the theory, should attract significant amounts of FDI. But Botswana has tried to attract FDI for decades without much success, except in the sectors of mining, banking, and retail. Batswana officials attributed this failure to difficulties in obtaining work permits and outdated immigration policies that make it challenging for foreign firms to operate. This evidence suggests that classifications are not enough to shift investor behaviors, although given its lack of economic diversification, Botswana is perhaps a very hard test of this. Despite this, business consultants did note the uncanny effect that LDC graduation had on Botswana’s performance on ratings, allowing Botswana to “punch above its weight in international affairs.” Consistent with hypothesis 5, business consultants were aware of the importance of Botswana’s reputation, but they also pointed out its costs. One consultant noted, “It produces the assumption that we don’t need to change

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19 Author’s interview with Dr. Nishchal Pandey, Executive Director, Center for South Asian Studies, June 22, 2017, Kathmandu, Nepal.
20 Even respondents with precise technical knowledge of the criteria involved in LDC graduation cited irrelevant accomplishments that graduation would signal, such as overcoming civil war, increasing mobile phone coverage, and better governance. This is further evidence to support a cognitive mechanism behind the findings described in Chapter 4. One respondent generalized to say that Nepal’s graduation would signal that “we are a normal country,” the most general possible halo. Author’s interview with Dr. Nishchal Pandey, Executive Director, Center for South Asian Studies, June 22, 2017, Kathmandu, Nepal.
21 Author’s interview with Dr. Jay Salkin, Director of Research, Bank of Botswana, August 9, 2017, Gaborone, Botswana.
22 Information in this paragraph based on author’s interview with Dr. Keith Jefferis, Managing Director, Econsult Botswana, August 10, 2017, Gaborone, Botswana.
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anything. Change is already hard. It makes it more difficult when the rest of the world says you’re wonderful.”

Their concern was that Botswana’s classification is too sticky: It may have been merited in the 1970s and 1980s as the result of prudent management of diamond reserves, but now it permits the government to avoid necessary economic and policy reforms. Others applied a similar logic when criticizing the government for regressing in transparency and civil liberties. To be sure, continued failure to match Botswana’s reputation with reality will likely eventually attract global attention, but reputations are sticky, and Botswana’s elevated status arguably permits early backsliding to go unnoticed. As one respondent summarized, “Nobody wants to rock the boat and point out that for the last 10 years, Botswana has been on a downward spiral.” In sum, although business interests in Botswana did not necessarily embrace its international reputation as those in Nepal did, their concerns themselves illustrate how powerful these reputations are.

My evidence shows that classifications and graduations are intensely politicized in both Botswana and Nepal, but it is important to note that these politics take place at the highest levels of government and policy. Information about the importance of classifications is not widespread. Even though one of the main benefits of LDC categorization is special treatment in the World Trade Organization, even the chairman of the Export Council of Nepal and the Export Committee of the Nepal Chamber of Commerce was not familiar with the LDC category or its benefits. In contrast, a small but vocal group of elites push at the highest levels for Nepal’s graduation, even and especially if aid losses occur. One director of an economic think tank argued, “Nepal has always projected itself as a poor country as a means of rent-seeking. They know the right story to tell you, one that feeds into the business of development. Nepalis must change their mindset from poverty.

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23 A similar sentiment was expressed by Diamond Hub coordinator Mmetla Masire in a national newspaper: “We must stop gloating about international ratings which are saying we have the best run economy in Africa and face the reality because we are on the ground and know what is happening.” The Patriot, November 19, 2014.

24 Botswana, coded a dictatorship by the DD approach, has been ruled by the Botswana Democratic Party since independence, although its previous presidents have been globally recognized for their commitments to democracy.

25 Author’s interview with Mr. Oscar Motsumi, Executive Secretary, Botswana Network of AIDS Service Organizations (BONASO), August 8, 2017, Gaborone, Botswana.

26 Author’s interview, July 14, 2017, Kathmandu, Nepal.
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brokers to prosperity catalysts."\(^{27}\) As a result, one expert concluded that if the UN recommends graduation, “our politicians will happily accept that decision and tell people it was their achievement. Civil society and the business community aren’t aware enough to mobilize so politicians get to claim an accomplishment in the news.”\(^{28}\) In other words, graduation’s consequences are likely to be born by an unaware constituency unless they are organized by specific political interests.

Therefore, despite these important sub-national consequences of graduation, a country’s decision to pursue or avoid graduation will most prominently reflect the views of its elites and leaders. I was struck by how important a motivator social status was to these leaders. I spoke with the Vice Chairman of Nepal’s National Planning Commission who was responsible for first committing Nepal to pursuing graduation in the 13th National Plan (2013-2016). This plan was drafted shortly after Nepal chaired an international meeting in Istanbul in which LDCs collectively aimed for a 50 percent graduation rate within the next decade. He summarized his experience at this meeting:

> I had a chance to talk to many leaders of LDCs, and we would ask each other: How long do you want to be called an LDC? Do you ever want to graduate or shall we just continue being LDCs forever? Because LDCs, you know, they are thought to have lazy people and want to depend on donors, and donors are just tired of providing for them. If anyone is going to develop, it has to come from us. We had very strong feelings that we wanted to send a message to the developed world that we could take care of ourselves. Well, Nepal was signatory to this message at the International Conference of LDCs. After this, I became Vice Chairman of the National Planning Commission. And I prepared the 13th plan and included that objective to do whatever was necessary to get out of LDC status by 2022. When I turned to the government to get that document approved, I said: Let us tell the world that we are capable of graduating and will

\(^{27}\)Author’s interview with Mr. Sujeev Shakya, Chairman, Nepal Economic Forum, July 18, 2017, Kathmandu, Nepal.

\(^{28}\)Author’s interview with Dr. Posh Raj Pandey, Executive Director, South Asia Watch on Trade, Economics, and the Environment, July 20, 2017, Kathmandu, Nepal.
no longer be part of the LDC community.\textsuperscript{29}

For whatever reason, government officials’ support for Nepal’s graduation has recently waned. Even their language, though, reflects a desire to avoid looking needy. They carefully avoid voicing concerns about aid in their rationales, instead critiquing graduation protocol on technical grounds. A current member of the National Planning Commission responsible for the most recent national plan argued that the indicators used did not accurately capture development in a landlocked country like Nepal, concluding, “We see little point in endorsing this technical process when its criteria are unhinged from reality.”\textsuperscript{30} Instead, government officials intimate that Nepal should delay its graduation until it can graduate on all three criteria, otherwise graduation would not be “meaningful.”\textsuperscript{31} At the same time, government officials are quick to dismiss the concerns of “NGO activists who think the sky will fall when we graduate because of the loss of aid. NGOs of course survive on portraying Nepal as a helpless country. But look at the earthquake rescue money from the government relative to what we received from abroad — it’s miniscule.”\textsuperscript{32} The concept of a “meaningful graduation” is one that exists nowhere else, but it pervades the current discussion of the issue and saves face for a government wishing to avoid the penalties associated with aid. In sum, whether or not Nepal ultimately chooses to graduate, these interviews with various members of the National Planning Commission illustrate that social status may be an important component of its decisions. On the topic of Nepal’s LDC graduation, one consultant commented, “When the country graduates, politicians will get the credit. They are working for their own interests, not the people. Leaders want to travel to foreign countries and receive the international credibility associated with being a developing country, not an LDC.”\textsuperscript{33}

As in most issues in international political economy, classifications have consequences and

\textsuperscript{29}Author’s interview with Dr. Rabindra Kumar Shkaya, Former Vice Chairman of the National Planning Commission, July 20, 2017, Kathmandu, Nepal.
\textsuperscript{30}Author’s interview with member of National Planning Commission, July 9, 2017, Kathmandu, Nepal.
\textsuperscript{31}NPC Vice-Chairman Govinda Raj Pokharel in The Kathmandu Post, April 2015.
\textsuperscript{32}Author’s interview with member of National Planning Commission, July 9, 2017, Kathmandu, Nepal.
\textsuperscript{33}Author’s interview with international NGO consultant, July 23, 2017, Kathmandu, Nepal.
causes at the domestic level of analysis. This qualitative evidence from Nepal and Botswana, with some caveats, supports my claims that a country’s international reputation produces winners (business interests) and losers (NGOs and those they represent) sub-nationally. However, these groups may not always be informed or organized enough to act on their interests. This affords disproportional influence to powerful individuals and leaders, who may seek graduation for social reasons as well as material ones. It is beyond the scope of this work to understand the complex process of preference formation, information asymmetry, and collective action that determines a country’s foreign policy toward classifications. Instead, I use this evidence simply to further substantiate that classification effects exist and to argue that international reputation is a distributive good that can be modeled in this manner. Recognizing this is an important step in the literature on status and reputation in international political economy and in international relations more generally.

6.2 Responding to Classifications

Having illustrated that classifications produce winners and losers, I now show that winners and losers strategically respond to their classifications. Although these affected parties often have no control over the classifications they receive, there are a few methods by which they may try to influence the labels they are awarded: reforming the system, lobbying for classifications, and gaming the system. In what follows, I provide specific examples of how affected parties have deployed each of these strategies to change their classifications. This evidence supports my empirical expectations that, where able, classified groups and countries will attempt to influence their classifications (hypotheses 4B, 5B, and 6).

6.2.1 Reforming the System

One method by which affected parties can respond strategically is to try to reform the classification system itself. Their proposed reforms would systematically affect how all classifications
are awarded, but are presumably pursued by specific groups or countries who believe that these reforms will specifically benefit them.

The Raise the MIC movement described in the introduction is a noteworthy example of this approach. This movement is organized by the AIDS Healthcare Foundation and claims to represent the interests of NGOs working to fight poverty around the world. Specifically, the group argues that the Middle Income Country label is a primary obstacle for NGOs trying to obtain foreign aid from the Global Fund and discounted vaccine prices from pharmaceutical companies. Although these concerns are most relevant for HIV/AIDS affected populations, the movement has been endorsed by hundreds of health, education, clean water, and human rights NGOs in middle income countries. These NGOs are often primarily funded by foreign donors and may even be at odds with their governments, making it unlikely that their interests will be represented following a country’s “graduation.”

A global coalition of NGOs pushing for policy change at the World Bank is evidence consistent with hypothesis 4B.

Even the particular choice of strategy adopted by the Raise the MIC movement itself points to the power of classifications: The Raise the MIC movement primarily seeks change on the part of the classifying organization and not the users of the classification. While the group also lobbies the Global Fund (a user) directly, most of its resources are spent lobbying the World Bank (a producer) to publicly and unequivocally clarify that its classifications are not intended to influence funding or pricing. According to the movement, this “would indicate to the Global Fund that they need to change the system... [and] would give more ammunition to civil society to pressure drug companies to lower their prices in middle income countries.” This logic suggests that the movement recognizes the widespread legitimacy of the World Bank to define a classification and that the pressure applied by civil society will only succeed when backed by the World Bank’s endorsement. That the World Bank receives the brunt of the blame for other actors’ use of a classification

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34 Author’s interview with Denys Nazarov, Associate Director of Global Policy, AIDS Healthcare Foundation, April 7, 2017, phone interview.
35 Author’s interview with Denys Nazarov, Associate Director of Global Policy, AIDS Healthcare Foundation, April 7, 2017, phone interview.
suggests that the blame-avoiding strategies employed by classification users are successful.

6.2. Responding to Classifications

6.2.2 Lobbying for Classifications

Alternatively, affected parties may lobby classifiers to award them a specific label, without changing the classification procedure. This strategy can therefore only be applied when a classifier is able to incorporate subjective evaluations into decisions about a country’s classification.

Where these conditions hold, countries do try to make their cases to those responsible for classifications. One example comes from the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) grants and loans program. Although graduation from IDA is triggered when national income crosses a threshold, the decision to graduate is not automatic. This creates opportunities for countries to push for or, in this case, avoid their graduations. Countries routinely protest their scheduled graduations to influential donors using back-door conversations. One deputy from a donor country to IDA noted that, at a 2016 replenishment meeting, he was approached by representatives from both Vietnam and Sri Lanka who wished to delay the graduations of their respective countries from IDA.\(^{36}\) Conversely, some countries exploit this discretion to lobby for or accelerate graduation processes. Bangladesh, for example, has negotiated with the UN so that it can graduate from the LDC category ahead of schedule in time for its 50 year anniversary in 2021.\(^{37}\) Yet other categories allow countries to opt out of categorizations, as in the case of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). The Kyrgyz Republic, in addition to others, has declined to take advantage of the HIPC program, despite its eligibility, because of “the authorities’ and civil society’s assessment that being classified as a Highly Indebted Poor Country.

\(^{36}\)Author’s interview with IDA deputy, July 22, 2016, Washington, DC. In the case of IDA graduation, whatever improved credit countries can privately access as a result of graduation is far outweighed by the losses in borrowing volumes they experience within the World Bank. Currently the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) faces significant capital constraints due to the low interest rate environment and is unable to accommodate the volumes of lending demanded by recent IDA graduates. Moreover, the “blend” status allows countries to access both IDA and IBRD, so prolonging their time at this status is nearly always advantageous.

\(^{37}\)Author’s interview with UN official, May 9, 2017, New York, NY.
was unfavorable.”38 These anecdotes support hypothesis 6 by illustrating that dissatisfied countries lobby for specific classifications, whatever their preferences over those specific classifications may be.

### 6.2.3 Gaming the System

When affected parties cannot achieve their goals through either reforming the system or working within the system, some may try to game the system. This strategy is most pertinent when a classification is mechanically determined by data, with no role for subjective evaluation or country preference. This is true of the World Bank’s income classification system, in which countries can only change categories when their national income statistics cross important thresholds. In this section, I provide evidence that countries actually change their data in order to obtain preferred classifications.

The idea that countries manipulate national economic statistics is not new. Recent evidence finds that that national governments “juke the stats” to appear more successful.39 Using the gross domestic product figures reported in the World Development Indicators, Magee and Doces (2015) and Wallace (2016) provide evidence that gross domestic product growth rates reported by authoritarian regimes are inflated when benchmarked against growth rates of measures that are harder to manipulate — nighttime lights and electricity, respectively.40 These works argue that all regimes have an incentive to report rosy economic data to improve the odds of re-election or reappointment and reduce the possibility of collective action from below but that democracies have institutional checks that make this impossible. Authoritarian regimes may not be the only ones interested in manipulating figures; Sandefur and Glassman (2013) argue that pay-for-performance incentives from international donors encourage aid recipients to inflate their vaccination rates. Conversely, it

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38 Author’s interview with country manager, August 2, 2016, phone interview.
39 See Wallace (2016).
40 Hollyer et al. (2011) provide the basis for these tests by showing that authoritarian regimes are less likely to provide data; the subsequent works have then examined the bias of the provided data.
is possible that international organizations are complicit in statistical manipulation: Dreher et al. (2008) and Lang and Presbitero (2017) find evidence of bias in IMF growth and inflation statistics and debt sustainability analyses, which favor countries that are aligned with prominent shareholders.

Some studies even show that statistical manipulation takes place at relevant thresholds. Previous works especially germane to my study have used the McCrary statistical density test to demonstrate systematic underreporting of GNI per capita in an attempt to remain below the World Bank’s operational threshold. These tests, however, are misleading for two reasons. First, they cannot illustrate heterogeneous strategies. I have argued that the classifications are associated with both costs and benefits, suggesting that certain countries may prefer to be under-classified, while others may prefer to be over-classified. If countries try to move in different directions, these effects could cancel each other out and present the illusion of continuity, or small discontinuities may underestimate the extent of manipulation occurring in both directions. Second, these tests will underestimate strategic behavior if some attempts fail. For example, if a country close to a threshold tries to jump just over it but fails, it can easily appear to be a country that looks like a country that tried to slide just under the threshold. Since countries are operating in a tight range, it is likely that failures are not uncommon.

To overcome these limitations, I test whether countries are more likely to revise their national income figures as they approach an important threshold. Revision to national income data can occur for many benign reasons, but if countries revise their income data to influence their classifications, then we would expect these revisions to be strategically timed as countries try to avoid or accelerate crossing certain cutoffs. This approach avoids any assumptions about whether figures are revised upwards or downwards, and it measures countries’ attempts rather than their successes.

In what follows, I describe the unique “time machine” data that supports this exercise and present

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41 Kerner et al. (2015) observe significantly more observations just below the operational threshold in the historical data from the World Bank Atlas, but not in the revised figures currently found in the World Development Indicators (WDI).
the results.

As previously mentioned, the GNI figures that were used at the time of a country’s classification sometimes differ from the current version of those historical estimates. These differences are not inconsequential: In 288 country-years, a country received a different classification than the one it would have received on the basis of our current estimate of its GNI in that year.\textsuperscript{42} Fortunately, the World Bank makes all previous versions of the WDI available for download, allowing me to detect at what point in time substantial revisions to GNI are made.

Figure 6.2 illustrates the unique variation reported in this “time machine” data set. As an example, this graph plots Kenya’s income over time according to every version of World Bank data that has ever been published, with each version in a different color. Wherever there is vertical distance between colored lines, ex post estimates of Kenya’s national income have been revised in a version of the WDI indicated by the color. In these examples, the estimates diverge dramatically in the 2010s, when the country rebased and revised its estimates of previous years ex post. The fact that different colors of lines straddle the cutoff separating LICs and LMICs indicates that Kenya would have been classified differently had researchers known what we know now.

Intuitively, my objective is to calculate the magnitude of the revisions reported in each of the versions of the WDI (the area between one colored line and the colored line from the previous version of the WDI) and to relate that magnitude to the country’s distance from a threshold. To operationalize this, I start by calculating, for each version of the WDI, how much a country’s estimates of the previous three years of GNI differed from its estimates of those same years as reported by the previous version of the WDI. Mathematically, I define a revision for each version as the following:

$$ThreeYrRevision_{i,j} = (GNI_{i,j} - GNI_{i-1,j}) + (GNI_{i,j-1} - GNI_{i-1,j-1}) + (GNI_{i,j-2} - GNI_{i-1,j-2})$$

(6.1)

\textsuperscript{42}Descriptive statistics on these “misclassifications” are available in Table E.1 in Appendix E.
where $i$ denotes a version of the WDI and $j$ denotes the year described by the data. Since my “treatment,” a country’s distance to the threshold, is measured only annually and I am interested only in the total amount of revision carried out in a single year, I take the sum of all revisions reported in all versions in a given year. To match the data and classification schedule of the World Bank, I aggregate by fiscal year, beginning in July. Intuitively, this is a measure of the total dollars a country added or subtracted to its estimates of its GNI in the three most recent years. Since these are the years that will most likely be affected in a country’s attempts to engineer its GNI for the present year, they are a good basis for a proxy for a country’s revision activity in a given year. Finally, because this paper highlights reasons why countries may choose to either seek or avoid certain classifications, I remain agnostic about the direction of the revision by taking the absolute value, resulting in the following measure of revision activity:

$$\text{ThreeYrRevisionAbs}_j = |\sum_{i} \text{ThreeYrRevision}_{i,j}|$$ (6.2)
With this measure defined, I proceed to investigate whether a country’s revision activity increases as it approaches an income classification cutoff. To do so, I make use of the analytic tools developed for regression discontinuity designs, which allow me to test whether data just before and just after a cutoff exhibit significantly different patterns. Regression discontinuities are typically employed in the service of causal identification. In these designs, an author makes use of a situation in which some “treatment” or intervention occurs only after a certain threshold is met. If this threshold is truly arbitrary, and if actors do not behave strategically, then in expectation, units that have just met and have just failed to meet the threshold should be similar. Using this design, a researcher will test whether outcomes for units just above and just below the threshold are significantly different, and if they are, this may be causally attributed to the intervention. My use of this design differs, since I am using it to illustrate that units’ behavior is strategic.

Specifically, I estimate the size of the jump in revision activity at the discontinuity of the threshold through the use of local linear regression.\(^{43}\) This approach models linear relationships on either side of the threshold and estimates the difference between them. Since regression discontinuities model the difference only in the neighborhood of the cutpoint, distant observations are omitted. Selection of the bandwidth within which observations are included, therefore, is an important modeling decision. There is some debate in the literature whether bandwidths should be selected through a data-driven process or through researcher discretion; I simply estimate the results at several reasonable bandwidths to demonstrate the sensitivity of the results.\(^{44}\) In order to cluster standard errors by country, I use block bootstrapping, since there are fewer than 50 clusters within these bandwidths. Using the form

\(^{43}\)For methodological reasons to use local linear regression instead of the use of higher-order polynomials, see Skovron and Titiunik (2015).
\(^{44}\)See Calonico et al. (2014).
6.2. Responding to Classifications

\[ Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta \text{AboveCutoff}_{it} + \delta \text{DistanceToCutoff}_{it} + \gamma \text{AboveCutoff}_{it} \times \text{DistanceToCutoff}_{it} + \epsilon_{it} \]  

(6.3)

I estimate \( \beta \), which is equivalent to the size of the jump at the discontinuity.

Revisions to GNI increase as countries approach the LIC ceiling and significantly fall as soon as they have passed the cutoff. This trend is visually apparent in Figure 6.3. Panel A plots the absolute value of revisions to GNI, positive and negative, while in Panel B, positive and negative revisions to GNI are plotted separately. It is clear that some countries add to their GNI as they near the cutoff, while others subtract from it, suggesting heterogeneous strategies in response to the cutoff. Point estimates appear in Table 6.3, Panel A. The data-driven Imbens-Kalyanaraman bandwidth is estimated to be 24. This proximity to the threshold is so close as to possibly obviate the need for strategic behavior, so I prefer bandwidths of 50, 100, and 150, which are far enough out for data manipulation to be helpful in making the difference one way or the other. The third specification, using the bandwidth of 100, suggests that countries revise their GNI per capita by about $70 more just before the cutpoint, and the effect is statistically significant at conventional levels. While the other specifications are not statistically significant at conventional levels, with p-values between .1 and .2, the overall results are similarly negative. This is cautious evidence that countries are more likely to revise their GNI just before the LIC cutoff although the results are sensitive to the selection of bandwidth. These findings are also robust to dropping the outlier cases that are evident in Figure 6.3 (see Appendix E). In contrast, there is clearly no elevated GNI revision just before reaching the ceiling of the LMIC category. Results from Table 6.3, Panel B are slightly positive but extremely imprecise, suggesting that there is no systematic relationship between data revisions and this cutoff.

This evidence supports hypothesis 6 by illustrating that some national governments attempt to change their classifications by manipulating their data, but they do not all seek the same changes.
Figure 6.3: Revisions to GNIpc increase as a country approaches the LIC ceiling

Note: Figure plots the magnitude of revisions to recent national income estimates against the distance between a country’s most recent current estimate and the LIC ceiling. Revisions to national income data increase as a country approaches this ceiling. The figure plots the raw data, with each point representing a country-year observation. Loess smoothing lines fitted using bandwidths of 100. The extreme outlier just below the LIC ceiling is Bhutan, which rebased its economy in 2005. See Appendix E for robustness checks removing outliers. Source: World Development Indicators Archives.

Table 6.3: Discontinuities in revisions to national income data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. LIC/LMIC Discontinuity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above cutoff</td>
<td>−205.01</td>
<td>−107.68</td>
<td>−69.89**</td>
<td>−28.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bandwidth</td>
<td>175.55</td>
<td>75.46</td>
<td>31.49</td>
<td>23.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. LMIC/UMIC Discontinuity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above cutoff</td>
<td>16.06</td>
<td>71.52</td>
<td>−0.358</td>
<td>88.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bandwidth</td>
<td>114.97</td>
<td>119.64</td>
<td>87.62</td>
<td>67.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Note: Estimates come from a local linear regression of the outcome on the above-cutoff indicator, the running variable (GNIpc distance to the cutoff), and the interaction. Model 1 uses the data-driven IK bandwidth. All standard errors are calculated using block bootstrapping, clustered by country.
6.3 Summary

This analysis, both qualitative and quantitative, illustrates that classifications create winners and losers who, in turn, respond strategically. Interviews with members of civil society, the business community, and government officials in Nepal and Botswana revealed that classifications create a complex domestic political economy. As expected in hypothesis 4, higher classifications punish NGOs and those they represent so much that NGOs have collectively tried to reform the classification system of the World Bank. I also found some evidence to support hypothesis 5: Business interests in Nepal pursued graduation in hopes that it would attract investment, although Botswana’s experience suggests that this may not succeed.

It is beyond the scope of this book to account for how these domestic preferences aggregate to the international level. Only highly elite actors are informed about the importance of classifications, although the Raise the MIC movement serves as a reminder that these elite actors can nonetheless organize smaller actors too. But given the elite nature of these politics, it is clear that leaders have an outsize role in determining how a country will pursue or avoid certain classifications. To this end, a meaningful finding of my study is the importance of social status to these leaders’ decision-making processes. Future work should incorporate these social motivations to understanding how countries handle the labels they receive from classifying organizations.

Even if it is possible to aggregate domestic preferences into a unitary preference held by a country, it is clear that countries hold diverse preferences over their classifications. Evidence of data manipulation supported hypothesis 6 by illustrating that countries tried to manipulate their data, but it also revealed that countries manipulated in both directions. While some countries prefer higher classifications, others prefer lower classifications. Future work can draw on both material
and social factors to explain this important heterogeneity in an important aspect of a country’s foreign economic policy.

In sum, the studies presented in this chapter successfully test the observable implications of my theoretical framework at the domestic level. The findings, however, also suggest important questions about international status and lay the groundwork for building theories to answer those questions.
Chapter 7

Conclusion

Far from simply describing the world, classifications structure it in tangible ways. When international organizations officially designate certain countries as “developing,” this changes the way those countries are perceived and treated by influential elites around the world. The actions of these international observers strongly affect the outcomes experienced by classified countries and groups within those countries. These dynamics are not overlooked by affected parties, who sometimes try to change their classifications to improve their situations. By illustrating this political economy of classifications — existing between international organizations, international observers, and affected parties — I show that classifications constitute a significant power of international organizations, wielded through their bureaucracies.

As I argued in the introduction, this power of international organizations is not widely understood. Although Barnett and Finnemore (1999) identified it in a preliminary way, existing theories do not explain why global economic and political actors pay so much attention to these classifications. Rather than providing private or expert information, these categories actually reduce information about labeled countries. It is surprising that actors responsible for high-stakes decisions do not develop their own criteria, tailored to their particular purposes. I answered this puzzle with the theoretical framework proposed in Chapter 2, which sought to explain why international
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION

organizations are able to shape the behaviors of international observers. Specifically, I claimed that categories operate through a cognitive and a strategic mechanism. International observers are most likely to use classifications when they are susceptible to cognitive biases and when they must justify sensitive decisions to an external audience. I applied this theoretical framework in order to generate hypotheses about how development classifications would affect the behaviors of donors, investors, and raters. I predicted that higher classifications would result in less aid but greater investment and improved ratings. All of these effects would be driven by the cognitive mechanism, except for aid from donors, who are sensitive to the strategic mechanism as well. Given these hypotheses, I developed additional observable implications for how affected parties would experience and respond to their classifications as well as which classifications would be most likely to produce these dynamics.

While my empirical strategy limited my ability to systematically test why some classifications are more powerful than others, Chapter 3 spoke to this question by exploring the history and landscape of development classifications. Paying special attention to the World Bank’s income classification systems and the United Nations (UN)’s Least Developed Country (LDC) category, I argued that these systems ascended in importance partly due to their simplicity and broad, intuitive appeal. The stories of how these systems emerged and evolved also illustrate important lessons about classifications. First, classifications are not always used as they are intended to be used. Any organization creating or maintaining a classification must consider who will use the classification system for cognitive or strategic reasons, and not just who should use it. Second, classifications often have political origins and consequences. It is not clear whether the increasingly technical debates over classifications reflect genuine academic disagreements or simply serve to conceal political motivations. Regardless, it is evident that these technical models drive political and economic realities.

The main evidence to support this last claim came in Chapter 4. Exploiting arbitrary thresholds used by the World Bank’s income classification system, I showed that when a country moves up in
its development classification, it receives less aid and improved creditworthiness and democracy ratings. These effects take place even when there is no real change in a country’s level of development. I also supported my argument with qualitative evidence from interviews with stakeholders involved in the cases of graduations from the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) lending category to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) lending category. Although I did not observe the predicted effect on foreign direct investment, these patterns largely support the hypotheses predicted by the theoretical framework, bolstering my argument that international organizations influence international observers via classifications.

A limitation of the observational evidence presented in Chapter 4 is its inability to speak to the two proposed mechanisms. This is of greatest concern in the case of donors, who could be susceptible to both a cognitive mechanism or a strategic mechanism. To separate these mechanisms, I used an experimental approach, described in Chapter 5. Elite participants in a hypothetical aid allocation activity changed their allocation behavior when exposed to countries’ categories, even while they all received the same information. This effect was present only for the randomly selected group of participants who were told that their allocation decisions would be reviewed by a judge. In other words, a sample that is educated about and interested in development exhibited a strong strategic classification effect but not a cognitive classification effect. An additional contribution of this approach is to illustrate the micro-foundations of the relationships observed in the previous chapter.

Having explained the relationship between international organizations and international observers, Chapter 6 turned to the affected parties. Drawing on interviews with dozens of stakeholders in Nepal (an upcoming graduate) and Botswana (a future graduate), I showed that higher classifications can punish non-governmental organizations and those they represent, while benefiting business interests. In addition, the interviews suggested that many political leaders are motivated by social status considerations. Future work should explore how status relates to material considerations and how these competing preferences aggregate into a country’s foreign economic policy
with respect to its classification. Most important, and contrary to the claims of previous scholars, not all countries want to improve their country’s status. When countries or groups do wish to change their classifications, for better or for worse, they are sometimes able to do this by reforming the system, lobbying for classifications, or gaming the system. I presented quantitative evidence that countries try to game the system by revising their national income statistics as they approach meaningful cutoffs. While future theory can work to explain variation in the preferences and strategies used by these affected parties, results presented here serve to substantiate my core claim that classifications are a powerful tool international organizations may deploy, either intentionally or unintentionally, to affect outcomes and behaviors in the international economy.

7.1 Implications for International Organizations

An important implication of my argument is that international organizations exercise tremendous power through bureaucratic devices such as classifications. These mundane devices are often overlooked in the study of international financial institutions, a literature in which scholars often prefer to focus on the political economy of lending and grants.¹ These studies frequently demonstrate that powerful countries use international institutions as a vehicle for channeling resources to politically aligned countries. But I show that we need to look deeper than dollars: Bureaucratic procedures, by coordinating the behaviors of many global actors, can also have distributive consequences. But shining a spotlight on the importance of classifications does not satisfactorily answer the question of who wields this power and to what ends.

One possibility is that classifications are the product of political patrons, using seemingly technical classifications to advance their material interests. One organizer of the Raise the MIC movement expressed sentiments aligning with this view when he argued that the World Bank’s avoids revising its classification system because of the self-serving interests of the World Bank’s major

¹See, for example, Kuziemko and Werker (2006); Dreher et al. (2009); Kaja and Werker (2010); Kaya (2015); Kersting and Kilby (2016).
7.1. Implications for International Organizations

donors. He argued,

[T]here is a limited pool of resources for aid. My opinion is that this methodology of basing aid levels on income levels gives donor countries justification to give less because in reality the need is much greater than the amount of resources that is out there. ... [O]f course the United States and ... western European countries have the bulk of the voting power, so they don’t want to change the system because it would open up the eligibility and the need for more resources.\(^2\)

Fialho and Bergeijk (2017) make a similar argument about the founding of the UN’s LDC category, claiming that developed countries advocated for criteria that would produce a smaller list of countries to which special treatment would be offered, as well as for criteria that would benefit the group of countries to which they had the strongest ties.

But an alternative possibility is that classifications are the product of committed economists, dedicated to refining the principles by which they understand development and explain development to the world. As explained in Chapter 3, the World Bank explains its reluctance to modify the system because of the effects it would have on reclassified countries. The Development Economics Group stated that they rejected many proposed alternatives because “countries would be reclassified based on a change of method, rather than as a result of economic growth,” an impact that would be acceptable if the classifications were purely analytical, but which concerned them given operational usage of the classifications.\(^3\) They also claim that preserving the classification system in its original form allows users to track development over time, something no other classification can do.\(^4\) Finally, they defend their unwillingness to incorporate measures of poverty or inequality into the classification system due to limitations on data availability or quality. Only gross national income per capita is readily available for all countries on a yearly basis with comparable quality,

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\(^2\)Author’s interview with Denys Nazarov, Associate Director of Global Policy, AIDS Healthcare Foundation, April 7, 2017, phone interview.

\(^3\)Fantom and Serajuddin (2016), p. 6.

which is why the World Bank argues it is the optimal basis for cross-country panel comparisons of countries over time.\textsuperscript{5} These public defenses suggest very plausible and purely technical reasons to maintain the system in its present form, regardless of any ulterior motivations.

Classifications could even be the tools of organizations seeking to extend their relevance and reach. This explanation, like the last one, also makes bureaucrats the primary actors within international organizations, but it claims that these bureaucrats are motivated not by their commitment to ideas but by their commitment to their organization.\textsuperscript{6} Fialho and Bergeijk (2017) have argued that the proliferation of development classifications has partly resulted from competition between organizations for dominance in the development space. Just recently, the UN’s Committee for Development Policy released a report encouraging international organizations to make more extensive use of its LDC category (appeals which, if successful, will exaggerate the effects I have described in this paper).\textsuperscript{7} This action underscores that international organizations are concerned with their own importance and survival.

This project is not designed to adjudicate between these explanations. But it does illustrate that technocrats have an important role in driving distributive outcomes, no matter what their motivations are. Future work examining these international financial institutions must acknowledge the influential role played by bureaucracies and the ideas they codify.

\subsection*{7.2 Implications for Global Development}

Another contribution of this argument is to extend insights from economic sociology to the domain of development. Especially in financial economics, many have argued that economic models are “an engine, not a camera,” moving and not just describing markets.\textsuperscript{8} I argue that similar dynamics

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{5}Fantom and Serajuddin (2016), p. 16.}  
\textsuperscript{6}See Barnett and Finnemore (1999); Johnson (2014).  
\textsuperscript{8}See MacKenzie (2006). See also Blyth (2002); Shiller (2017).}
exist in the economy experienced by developing countries, where ideas about what development is powerfully shape development outcomes themselves.

In particular, my argument suggests a new interpretation of the phenomenon widely known as the “middle income trap.” This phrase is commonly used to describe the situation many countries face when they develop enough to reach middle income status but then plateau, never graduating to high income status. While economists have pointed to many real structural impediments to explain this pattern, my argument suggests that the Middle Income Country (MIC) category may also be partially responsible: Perhaps the stagnation results from the changes that take place in how international observers treat countries when they become classified as middle income. If, for example, foreign aid helps a low income country to reach middle income status but then falls off, then it is no wonder that improvements in the country’s position do not continue. As my project has illustrated, the effects of classifications are too numerous and multifaceted to expect this reductionist story to explain the full picture, but the intuition remains that the classification effect could partly account for the middle income trap.

This is especially important to consider because numerous countries are scheduled to graduate from these developing country categories. Already, 75% of the world’s poor live in MICs, and this proportion will increase over time. Current projections indicate that, by 2025, half of today’s low income countries will be middle income countries who will become eligible for graduation from the IDA lending category. The UN expects that 16 of its 48 LDCs will graduate by 2025. These numbers are unprecedented: for example, recall that only 5 countries have completed the graduation process since the founding of the LDC category. This suggests that the political dynamics I described in this dissertation are about to affect a much larger group of countries.

Some may feel that international organizations should stop classifying altogether, but this pre-

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9 See Eichengreen et al. (2013); Kharas and Kohli (2011); Felipe et al. (2012). See also “The Middle-Income Trap,” The Economist, March 27, 2012.
10 See Sumner (2012).
11 See Moss and Leo (2011); Morris and Gleave (2015).
12 See UNCTAD (2016).
scription is infeasible. Classifications are just one way that international organizations develop and disseminate ideas and narratives. It is impossible to strip international organizations of these normative underpinnings, and without classifications, they would influence discourse in other ways. Furthermore, the cognitive and strategic mechanisms suggest that there will always be a demand for classifications. Even if international organizations could coordinate to stop supplying them, this does not prevent other actors from satisfying this demand.

Another reading of my argument is that international observers should stop using classifications. Consistent with this approach, one of the asks made by the Raise the MIC movement is for the World Bank to make clear that their classifications should not be used to set foreign aid levels or justify price differentiation.\footnote{Author’s interview with Denys Nazarov, Associate Director of Global Policy, AIDS Healthcare Foundation, April 7, 2017, phone interview.} This could make a difference on the margin, perhaps clarifying for some users who are confused about what the categories entail. To some extent, it may reduce the cognitive effects of classifications by calling users’ attention to the biases that result when classifications are used incorrectly. But it does very little to address the strategic incentives to use classifications, in particular, those of donors. An alternative approach would be to petition donors directly to illustrate the dangers of herding their allocative behaviors around these thresholds. Since donors do have an interest in advancing development, it is possible that awareness of these dynamics will be sufficient for them to change their approaches to allocating aid. It would be more effective, however, to do this while also making aid agencies more independent.\footnote{See Honig (2019).} The less that aid agencies must justify their behaviors to their funders, the less they will need to distort their behaviors.

The most meaningful policy implications of my argument concern the classifiers themselves. Classifiers have little control over who will or will not use their classifications, but my argument shows that they can at least anticipate the user base of their classification. When an international organization decides to produce a classification, it should consider the audiences who may rely on
it for cognitive or strategic reasons. Designing simpler, more intuitive classifications will likely attract a broader user base, while more complex or technical classifications will be more likely to be used by specific audiences. In this way, international organizations can try, to the best of their abilities, to design classifications that appeal only to the audiences they intend. Additionally, classifying organizations should consider actual and not just intended audiences when considering revisions to their systems. These recommendations will reduce unintended consequences, such as those that resulted from the unanticipated popularity of the World Bank income classifications. Conversely, international organizations can also apply my theoretical framework to develop classifications that will become widely used, should they wish to promote their ideas to a broad audience. Choosing classifications with fewer categories and intuitive names will strengthen the cognitive appeal, and they can especially market their classifications to actors who can build these systems into their operational policies and justifications of their actions in external reviews.

In sum, when international organizations consider graduating or reverse graduating a country from a particular grouping or classification, they should take into consideration the expected response of external actors when estimating the impact of such a move. Moreover, international organizations should plan for the politicization of any classification they introduce, as my project illustrates that global development institutions, intentionally or unintentionally, affect how developing countries are perceived and treated in the international economy.

### 7.3 Implications for Theories of Status

A last contribution of this project is to the broader international relations literature on status. While scholars typically assume that states are motivated by seeking improved status, I show that some-
times states actually seek lower status. This is especially true at the sub-national level; even if a
government pursues higher status, this may conceal the preferences of marginalized populations
who would prefer the sympathy to the reverence of international audiences. Future work must
seek to understand this heterogeneity in preferences, both at the country level as well as within
countries, and how these various preferences aggregate to international behaviors.

These novel observations about status politics may result, in part, from my unusual selection
of issue area. Status has largely been studied in the context of international security and military
conflict, and rare studies of status in international political economy typically focus on more de-
veloped economies and emerging markets. In contrast, I show that status politics are at work in
the foreign economic policies of developing countries. Future work should explore the other tools
these countries use to attain or eschew international status.

International organizations are able to change the world through the way they define and clas-
sify developing countries. These effects are felt by national governments, NGOs, businesses,
marginalized populations, and even leaders, whose social statuses are connected to those of their
countries. Because of these diverse and nuanced effects, bureaucrats in international organizations
have great power to design classifications that achieve their goals, but must also avoid unintended
consequences of this tool. As growth dynamics prompt the graduations of many developing coun-
tries, it is an ideal time to carefully consider how structures in global governance can, will, and
should mediate these seismic changes.
Bibliography


Appendices
Appendix A

Expert Survey

While my theory predicts which classifications influence which actors, it does not actually predict the direction of the effects. To derive directional predictions would demand developing additional theories for the costs and benefits each actor faces for allocating aid or investment to one country over another, or rating a country a certain way. While the directions of my hypotheses are intuitive and consistent with previous findings, there are sometimes plausible reasons to believe effects could occur in the opposite direction. In fact, Knack et al. (2014) begins with competing hypotheses regarding donor behavior: Donors could add to the countries they observe other donors funding, or they could do the opposite in an attempt to compensate for the behavior of others.

Prior to conducting my analysis, I conducted a brief survey of experts at the Center for Global Development (CGD) to solicit their priors not only on where the effects would be but also on the direction. CGD is one of the most actively involved think tanks in International Development Association (IDA) graduation policy reform and many of the fellows have decades of experience in multilateral organizations working to promote development through aid, investment, finance, and governance initiatives.1 To sufficiently define my research question for them, I presented respondents with a list of the outcomes I would be examining, potential explanations for any effects, and

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1While all staff were invited to participate in the survey, I subset my sample to only my 17 respondents who reported 3 or above on a 5-point scale when asked about their expertise/familiarity with IDA graduation policy.
potential explanations for null effects.

The results appear in Table A.1. First, the surveyed experts expressed mostly uniform beliefs about the direction of any potential effect of crossing a threshold. The group tended to believe that threshold crossings would decrease aid, increase investment, and improve credit ratings, democracy ratings, and the incumbent’s chances of being re-elected. This provides me with a helpful basis for judging whether any of my effects are surprising or counter-intuitive.

Second, there was substantial variation in beliefs about which classifications would produce effects, and which outcomes would be affected. Taken together, my respondents thought classification effects were more likely to exist for aid and foreign direct investment (FDI) than for ratings and re-election probabilities. They also thought classification effects were more likely to exist on the operational category change (graduating from IDA) rather than the analytical one (crossing the Low Income Country (LIC) ceiling). But even within each outcome and each classification system, there was significant variation among experts in their beliefs about which classifications would matter and whose behaviors they would affect. At the very least, this underscores that the expected effects of classification are not obvious and that better theories and evidence are needed to understand this phenomenon.

Table A.1: Survey of expert priors from CGD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect of:</th>
<th>Crossing LIC ceiling</th>
<th>Graduating from IDA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-  +     null</td>
<td>-  +    null</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid</td>
<td>10 (.59) 1 (.06) 6 (.35)</td>
<td>14 (.82) 0 3 (.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>0 12 (.71) 5 (.29)</td>
<td>1 (.06) 13 (.76) 3 (.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit rating</td>
<td>0 8 (.47) 9 (.53)</td>
<td>0 12 (.71) 5 (.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ratings (e.g. democracy)</td>
<td>0 4 (.24) 13 (.76)</td>
<td>0 5 (.29) 12 (.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob. of incumbent re-election</td>
<td>0 4 (.24) 13 (.76)</td>
<td>1 (.06) 6 (.35) 10 (.59)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N=17. Table reports count, with frequency in parentheses.

---

2This survey question is not exactly comparable to my results, since I asked experts about the category change from IDA-only or Blend to IBRD-only status, not about crossing the operational cutoff. Nonetheless, it is a good proxy for the perceived importance of operational categories.
Appendix B

Cross-National Analysis

B.1 Quantitative

B.1.1 Descriptive Statistics
### Table B.1: Table of summary statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GNI per capita</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>3619.85</td>
<td>8253.43</td>
<td>60.00</td>
<td>20390.00</td>
<td>3867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>409.59</td>
<td>198.32</td>
<td>60.00</td>
<td>1020.00</td>
<td>1290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LM</td>
<td>1799.29</td>
<td>817.30</td>
<td>430.00</td>
<td>4050.00</td>
<td>1423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UM</td>
<td>5812.16</td>
<td>2388.77</td>
<td>1700.00</td>
<td>12550.00</td>
<td>878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>21036.67</td>
<td>23462.91</td>
<td>6260.00</td>
<td>20390.00</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| ODA Disbursements (All donors) |        |        |       |         |     |
| All   | 395.02 | 667.59 | -959.96| 11428.02| 3846|
| L     | 651.80 | 863.64 | 11.84  | 11428.02| 1290|
| LM    | 379.36 | 576.99 | -943.15| 5509.01 | 1423|
| UM    | 151.30 | 344.10 | -959.96| 3441.78 | 877 |
| H     | 23.11  | 92.22  | -460.26| 559.30  | 256 |

| FDI (percentage of GDP) |        |        |       |         |     |
| All   | 3.95   | 7.31   | -101.37| 161.83  | 3703|
| L     | 3.32   | 6.91   | -7.29  | 90.46   | 1238|
| LM    | 3.50   | 5.22   | -32.29 | 62.30   | 1351|
| UM    | 4.98   | 5.47   | -39.69 | 36.88   | 861 |
| H     | 5.93   | 17.07  | -101.37| 161.83  | 253 |

| Creditworthiness (IIR) |        |        |       |         |     |
| All   | 33.63  | 17.68  | 4.95  | 84.60  | 2370|
| L     | 20.47  | 9.48   | 4.95  | 63.10  | 791 |
| LM    | 31.84  | 12.32  | 7.20  | 76.20  | 888 |
| UM    | 47.03  | 14.90  | 14.85 | 82.35  | 556 |
| H     | 67.30  | 11.95  | 23.40 | 84.60  | 135 |

| Freedom House PR score (flipped) |        |        |       |         |     |
| All   | 4.33   | 2.02   | 1.00  | 7.00   | 3723|
| L     | 3.22   | 1.68   | 1.00  | 7.00   | 1285|
| LM    | 4.50   | 1.86   | 1.00  | 7.00   | 1350|
| UM    | 5.31   | 1.87   | 1.00  | 7.00   | 858 |
| H     | 5.83   | 2.08   | 1.00  | 7.00   | 230 |

| Logged population |        |        |       |         |     |
| All   | 15.49  | 2.10   | 9.19  | 21.03  | 3864|
| L     | 16.07  | 1.62   | 11.58 | 20.94  | 1287|
| LM    | 15.40  | 2.17   | 10.85 | 21.01  | 1423|
| UM    | 15.06  | 2.39   | 9.19  | 21.03  | 878 |
| H     | 14.59  | 1.99   | 10.30 | 18.78  | 276 |

| Logged gross capital formation |        |        |       |         |     |
| All   | 21.46  | 2.91   | 0.00  | 29.20  | 3519|
| L     | 20.06  | 3.49   | 0.00  | 26.66  | 1206|
| LM    | 21.74  | 2.15   | 0.00  | 28.51  | 1234|
| UM    | 22.53  | 2.30   | 17.44 | 29.20  | 832 |
| H     | 23.21  | 1.88   | 19.01 | 26.93  | 247 |
B.1.2 Replication of Knack et al. (2014)

Knack et al. (2014) look at the effect of crossing the operational cutoff on aid disbursements from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). They use data from 1987-2010 for all countries that either were eligible to graduate from the International Development Association (IDA) or crossed the operational cutoff during this period and group country-years into three-year periods that correspond with the IDA replenishment cycles. When aggregating to a period, they take the income and threshold observation for the final year in the period, and for all other variables they take the mean of the three observations in the period.

There are three main differences between their model and data and mine:

1. They include Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) index as a control. This is a score the World Bank awards to countries to evaluate economic policies, and this index is an important component in the formula that determines allocation of IDA, although it is not used in eligibility decisions. While the CPIA's modern equivalent the IDA Resource Allocation Index (IRAI) is available publicly after 2006, the CPIA before 2006 is private data. Nonetheless, in correspondence with the authors, they confirmed that their results are robust to dropping this control.

2. The Knack et al. data end in 2010, which is the last year of the IDA15 replenishment cycle. My data end in 2015, which allows me to create observations for IDA16 and IDA17 as well.

3. There are minor differences in the observations included in the sample, mostly due to data availability. These observations are reported in Table B.2.

In Table B.3, I replicate the main results of the Knack et al. paper on the data provided to me by the authors and on my data. Model 1 is the benchmark result reported in Knack et al., although without the CPIA control. Even without this control, the result is significant: crossing the operational cutoff causes total ODA to decrease. When I run the same model on my own data set
### B.1. Quantitative

#### Table B.2: Differences in included observations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In Knack et al. only</th>
<th>In Dolan only</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan—14</td>
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<td>Albania—10</td>
<td>Congo, Rep.—9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Angola—10</td>
<td>Honduras—9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Maldives—9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>Sao Tome and Principe—14</td>
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<td>South Africa—15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Kitts and Nevis—9</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Kitts and Nevis—10</td>
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<tr>
<td>St. Kitts and Nevis—11</td>
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<td>St. Lucia—10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Lucia—11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vincent and the Grenadines—9</td>
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<tr>
<td>St. Vincent and the Grenadines—10</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>St. Vincent and the Grenadines—11</td>
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<td>Zimbabwe—13</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Zimbabwe—14</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

166
in Model 2, I obtain very similar results, even though I am missing observations that appear in the first column of Table B.2. In Model 3, I expand the sample to include the observations that appear in the second column of Table B.2. These are the observations that meet the criteria for inclusion in the Knack sample, but were not in the Knack data set. The results continue to hold.

In Model 4, however, I include two additional replenishment cycles for which data are now available. In practice, this extends the sample from 2010 to 2016. (I continue to include my observations from Model 2.) Adding more recent data causes the result to disappear entirely.

Table B.3: Replication using alternative samples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Log ODA from all donors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above operational cutoff (0-1)</td>
<td>−0.21**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GNI per capita (lagged)</td>
<td>−0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log pop (lagged)</td>
<td>−0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political rights (1-7, lagged)</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>25.43***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country F.E.?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period F.E.?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data source</td>
<td>Knack et al.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent of sample</td>
<td>Thru IDA15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations included thru IDA15</td>
<td>Both+Knack</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Given that Knack et al.’s results replicate perfectly but are highly sensitive to the inclusion of data published after their study, I also investigate some of their other findings, which are relevant
for my argument. The authors also investigate the effects of the other thresholds that are included in my study: the Low Income Country (LIC) ceiling, the historical cutoff, and the Lower-Middle Income Country (LMIC) ceiling. They do so by including these other dummies in the regression alongside the operational cutoff and find that each of these three other thresholds is not significant.

In Table B.4, I replicate their analysis on their sample (my data) and on my extended sample. None of the other thresholds have any significance in the sample ending with IDA15. However, the results change remarkably when we include observations through IDA17. Although the LIC ceiling remains insignificant, the historical cutoff approaches significance, and the LMIC ceiling is highly significant. These results hold regardless of whether the operational cutoff dummy is also included.

Evidently, how donors respond to these thresholds changes over time. One possible explanation for this is that the graduation process has become increasingly flexible in its application over time. In other words, there are more countries that cross the operational cutoff but do not change lending categories. If observers respond to lending categories, then the “treatment” of crossing the operational cutoff may attenuate. An alternative explanation is that other donors are less susceptible to the bias than they once were.
Table B.4: Replication using other cutoffs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Log ODA from all donors</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above operational cutoff (0-1)</td>
<td>-0.26**</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>-0.29***</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.28***</td>
<td>-0.18**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above LIC ceiling (0-1)</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above his cutoff (0-1)</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above LMI ceiling (0-1)</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GNI per capita (lagged)</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.19*</td>
<td>-0.23**</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log pop (lagged)</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political rights (1-7, lagged)</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.01)</td>
<td>(6.79)</td>
<td>(6.78)</td>
<td>(5.54)</td>
<td>(6.94)</td>
<td>(6.92)</td>
<td>(6.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country F.E.?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period F.E.?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent of sample</td>
<td>Thu IDA15</td>
<td>Thu IDA17</td>
<td>Thu IDA17</td>
<td>Thu IDA15</td>
<td>Thu IDA17</td>
<td>Thu IDA17</td>
<td>Thu IDA15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
### B.1.3 Robustness Checks

Table B.5: Robustness to alternative measure of FDI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) FDI inflows (levels)</th>
<th>(2) FDI inflows (perc. of GDP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Above LIC ceiling</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above LIC ceiling ($t-1$)</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
<td>(0.142)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>−0.121</td>
<td>5.217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.078)</td>
<td>6.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Covariates</strong></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country F.E.</strong></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Period F.E.</strong></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Period</strong></td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observations</strong></td>
<td>3,062</td>
<td>3,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R²</strong></td>
<td>0.833</td>
<td>.340</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**B. Above LMIC ceiling**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Above LMIC ceiling ($t-1$)</td>
<td>−0.032</td>
<td>−0.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>5.579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.123)</td>
<td>(5.933)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Covariates</strong></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country F.E.</strong></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Period F.E.</strong></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Period</strong></td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observations</strong></td>
<td>3,062</td>
<td>3,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R²</strong></td>
<td>0.833</td>
<td>.340</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01

**Note:** The table reports coefficients from OLS regressions of the outcome on a dummy variable coded 1 if a country is above the cutoff, controlling for GNI per capita. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Covariates include lagged values of log population, log gross capital formation, and Freedom House political rights score. The Freedom House political rights score is inverted so that positive values are more democratic. All dependent variables have been standardized for ease of comparison.
Table B.6: Robustness to dropping Freedom House control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aid</td>
<td>FDI inflows</td>
<td>Creditworthiness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Above LIC ceiling</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above LIC ceiling (t-1)</td>
<td>−0.013</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>.069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.733</td>
<td>−0.475</td>
<td>−3.244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.308)</td>
<td>(4.027)</td>
<td>(3.864)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F.H. Covariate</td>
<td>Ø</td>
<td>Ø</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Covariates</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country F.E.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period F.E.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period</td>
<td>3-Year</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>3,137</td>
<td>3,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.884</td>
<td>0.834</td>
<td>0.851</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **B. Above LMIC ceiling** |       |       |       |
| Above LMIC ceiling (t-1) | −0.233** | −0.024 | 0.124* |
|                   | (0.109) | (0.047) | (0.064) |
| Constant          | 3.891 | −0.395 | −4.367 |
|                   | (5.086) | (4.068) | (3.986) |
| F.H. Covariate    | Ø     | Ø     | Ø     |
| Other Covariates  | ✓     | ✓     | ✓     |
| Country F.E.      | ✓     | ✓     | ✓     |
| Period F.E.       | ✓     | ✓     | ✓     |
| Period            | 3-Year| Year  | Year  |
| Observations      | 645   | 3,137 | 3,018 |
| R²                | 0.885 | 0.834 | 0.851 |

Standard errors in parentheses
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: The table reports coefficients from OLS regressions of the outcome on a dummy variable coded 1 if a country is above the cutoff, controlling for GNI per capita. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Covariates include lagged values of log population and log gross capital formation. All dependent variables have been standardized for ease of comparison.
## B.1. Quantitative

Table B.7: Robustness to dropping all covariates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aid</td>
<td>A. Above LIC ceiling</td>
<td>B. Above LMIC ceiling</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(t-1)</td>
<td>(t-1)</td>
<td>(t-1)</td>
<td>(t-1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above LIC ceiling</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>-0.261***</td>
<td>-0.061</td>
<td>0.127**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.063)</td>
<td>(0.089)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.064)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.698***</td>
<td>-3.424***</td>
<td>-2.076***</td>
<td>-1.291***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.429)</td>
<td>(0.236)</td>
<td>(0.251)</td>
<td>(0.296)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covariates</td>
<td>∅</td>
<td>∅</td>
<td>∅</td>
<td>∅</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country F.E.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period F.E.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period</td>
<td>3-Year</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>712</td>
<td>3,400</td>
<td>3,279</td>
<td>3,487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.892</td>
<td>0.811</td>
<td>0.842</td>
<td>0.828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. Above LIC ceiling</td>
<td>B. Above LMIC ceiling</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(t-1)</td>
<td>(t-1)</td>
<td>(t-1)</td>
<td>(t-1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above LIC ceiling</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.129**</td>
<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.062)</td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
<td>(0.063)</td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.526***</td>
<td>-3.390***</td>
<td>-1.987***</td>
<td>-1.450***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.342)</td>
<td>(0.256)</td>
<td>(0.254)</td>
<td>(0.303)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covariates</td>
<td>∅</td>
<td>∅</td>
<td>∅</td>
<td>∅</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country F.E.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period F.E.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period</td>
<td>3-Year</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>712</td>
<td>3,400</td>
<td>3,279</td>
<td>3,487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.894</td>
<td>0.811</td>
<td>0.843</td>
<td>0.828</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Note: The table reports coefficients from OLS regressions of the outcome on a dummy variable coded 1 if a country is above the cutoff, controlling for GNI per capita. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. In the aid regressions, the sample is restricted to countries that have ever benefited from IDA after 1987. All dependent variables have been standardized for ease of comparison.
### Table B.8: Robustness to yearly observations of aid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aid</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Above LIC ceiling</td>
<td>−0.022</td>
<td>−0.019</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.063)</td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above LIC ceiling (t-2)</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.151</td>
<td>4.914</td>
<td>1.537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.124)</td>
<td>(4.211)</td>
<td>(3.735)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covariates</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country F.E.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year F.E.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period</td>
<td>3-Year</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>1,852</td>
<td>1,764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.886</td>
<td>0.852</td>
<td>0.859</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Above LMIC ceiling

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aid</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above LMIC ceiling (t-1)</td>
<td>−0.246**</td>
<td>−0.176**</td>
<td>−0.134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.107)</td>
<td>(0.087)</td>
<td>(0.088)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above LMIC ceiling (t-2)</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>4.374</td>
<td>5.982</td>
<td>2.328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.874)</td>
<td>(4.080)</td>
<td>(3.703)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covariates</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country F.E.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year F.E.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period</td>
<td>3-Year</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>1,852</td>
<td>1,764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.887</td>
<td>0.853</td>
<td>0.859</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table reports coefficients from OLS regressions of the outcome on a dummy variable coded 1 if a country is above the cutoff, controlling for GNI per capita. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Covariates include lagged values of log population, log gross capital formation, and Freedom House political rights score. All dependent variables have been standardized for ease of comparison.
B.1.4 Alternative Model: Graduations

The baseline specification uses levels and holds gross national income (GNI) per capita constant to identify the effect of being above a cutoff; an alternative approach is to use change scores and hold changes in GNI per capita constant to identify the effect of crossing a cutoff. This specification focuses on explaining year-to-year variation in how observers react to a single country’s change in category, omitting the country-to-country variation in how observers react to countries just above and just below a threshold.

To operationalize this, I take as my dependent variable the standardized difference between the outcome in year $t$ and in year $t-1$. I regress this change score on two dummy variables indicating whether the country crossed the threshold from below (graduated) or above (reverse graduated) since the previous year, and also the change in GNI per capita since the previous year. The main estimands of interest are the coefficient on the graduation and reverse graduation terms. Consistent with the main results, changes in income and classification are lagged by a year, so they take place between year $t-2$ and year $t-1$ to produce changes in the outcome variable between year $t-1$ and year $t$. I continue to include year fixed effects but remove country fixed effects since change scores account for this.

\[
Y_{i,t} - Y_{i,t-1} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Graduated}_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 \text{Reverse graduated}_{i,t-1} + \delta (\log(\text{GNIpc})_{i,t-1} - \log(\text{GNIpc})_{i,t-2}) + \tau_t + \epsilon
\]  

(B.1)

The results appearing in Table B.9 suggest interesting similarities and differences with those reported in the baseline specification. Consistent with the previous results, no threshold crossing produces observable changes in net inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) (column 2). Also consistent with the previous results, graduating from LMIC to Upper-Middle Income Country (UMIC) significantly improves perceptions of the country’s creditworthiness, and the effect is
### APPENDIX B. CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS

Table B.9: Effects of graduations and reverse graduations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Aid</th>
<th>(2) FDI inflows</th>
<th>(3) Creditworthiness</th>
<th>(4) Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. LIC to LMIC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduated</td>
<td>−0.048</td>
<td>−0.035</td>
<td>−0.056</td>
<td>−0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
<td>(0.172)</td>
<td>(0.169)</td>
<td>(0.090)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reverse graduated</td>
<td>0.140</td>
<td>0.185</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>−0.216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.180)</td>
<td>(0.200)</td>
<td>(0.248)</td>
<td>(0.222)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GNIpc change</td>
<td>−0.142</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>1.320***</td>
<td>0.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.148)</td>
<td>(0.137)</td>
<td>(0.180)</td>
<td>(0.161)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>−0.202***</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>−0.317***</td>
<td>−0.135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
<td>(0.094)</td>
<td>(0.096)</td>
<td>(0.132)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covariates</td>
<td>∅</td>
<td>∅</td>
<td>∅</td>
<td>∅</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country F.E.</td>
<td>∅</td>
<td>∅</td>
<td>∅</td>
<td>∅</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period F.E.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period</td>
<td>3-Year</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Year</td>
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<td>1,994</td>
<td>3,277</td>
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<tr>
<td>R²</td>
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<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.188</td>
<td>0.011</td>
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B. LMIC to UMIC

<table>
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<th>(1) Aid</th>
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<th>(3) Creditworthiness</th>
<th>(4) Democracy</th>
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<td>Graduated</td>
<td>0.090</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>0.365**</td>
<td>0.235*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.222)</td>
<td>(0.101)</td>
<td>(0.181)</td>
<td>(0.141)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.118)</td>
<td>(0.189)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.249)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Log GNIpc change</td>
<td>−0.185*</td>
<td>−0.023</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.133)</td>
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<td>(0.184)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>0.032</td>
<td>−0.314***</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.094)</td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
<td>(0.133)</td>
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<td>3,277</td>
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<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.190</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

**Note:** Dependent variables are change scores between year $t$ and year $t-1$ and are standardized for ease of comparison. Independent variables (graduation indicators and change in GNI per capita) refer to the transition between year $t-1$ and year $t-2$. In the aid regressions, the sample is restricted to countries that have ever benefited from IDA after 1987. Since change scores are used for the dependent variable, no imputations are made in the creditworthiness variable.
larger and more significant than in the baseline specification (column 3). This suggests that the variation we observed in the baseline specification is primarily driven by credit raters reacting to news of a country’s graduation as a positive signal, rather than comparing countries side-by-side. Column 4 shows results that differ from the baseline model but are also consistent with Hypothesis 3: In these results, crossing the LMIC threshold but not the LIC threshold influences democracy scores. In contrast with the baseline model, neither graduation produces a reaction from donors. This suggests that the previous findings are better explained by donors allocating scarce resources in favor of lower-income countries, rather than reacting to changes in country classifications. This explanation in fact supports the strategic logic, which is rooted in the idea that donors must defend the allocation of scarce resources.

B.2 Qualitative
## APPENDIX B. CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS

Table B.10: Recent and upcoming IDA graduates

<table>
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Appendix C

Experimental Analysis

C.1 Recruitment E-mail

Researchers from Columbia University want to know what you think about foreign aid!

We will be offering free food and coffee at eateries near the ICSD conference to every individual who completes our 15 minute survey.

Choose EITHER a $5 Starbucks gift card OR a free prepared salad from Sweetgreen, redeemable during Monday's lunch break. Both Starbucks and Sweetgreen are just across the street from Lerner Hall. The survey also includes the chance to win your choice of subscriptions to Financial Times, The New York Times, Foreign Affairs, or JSTOR.

Researchers will also be available at ICSD to administer the survey in person.
Thank you for your interest in our survey. Your participation in this study will improve research on foreign aid. This survey should take about 15 minutes to complete. As a token of our appreciation, we will be offering free food and coffee at the ICSD conference to every individual who completes our survey.

You may select either a $5 gift card to Starbucks (redeemable anytime at any location) or a voucher for a free salad from Sweetgreen (redeemable across the street from ICSD during Monday's lunch break). These gifts can only be claimed in person at ICSD. You can select your gift at that time. Both Starbucks and Sweetgreen are just across the street from Lerner Hall.

Also, participation in the study qualifies you for the chance to win a year's subscription to your choice of: Financial Times, The New York Times, Foreign Affairs, or JSTOR. Winners will be notified by e-mail later in the fall.

Please note that you may only take the survey once. Any subsequent surveys taken by the same individual will be discarded.

By participating in this survey, you are taking part in a research study on foreign aid. This research is being conducted by researchers at Columbia University. If you have questions, please e-mail the lead researcher Allison Carnegie at allison.carnegie@columbia.edu. This study is approved by the Columbia University Morningside Institutional Review Board (IRB) under protocol #AAAR2516. If at any time you have questions or concerns about your rights or welfare as a research subject, contact the Columbia University Morningside IRB at 1-212-851-7040 or 1-212-851-7044 (fax) or e-mail askirb@columbia.edu. You do not have to participate in this survey and you may stop at any time, however, only participants with completed surveys will receive the rewards described above.

Please click "Next" if you understand this and are ready to get started!
Please read the following instructions carefully.

- Each round, you will allocate a hypothetical $100 across five different countries.
- You can take as much time as you need to carefully consider which countries require the most assistance.
- We will ask you to play 9 rounds.
- There is no minimum amount you must give each country (it's okay to give $0 to one or some countries) and the maximum amount you can give any one country is $100.
- You must allocate $100 each round.
- We will provide you with some information from the World Bank to help you in your decisions.
- We will show you the gross national income (GNI) per capita, the gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate, the percentage of the population that is undernourished, and the maternal mortality ratio (number of deaths per 100,000 births).

Let's try an example. Please click "Next" to see an example of the exercise.

PAGE 4 — CLASSIFICATIONS (TREATMENT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lower Middle Income</th>
<th>Upper Middle Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI per capita: $1790</td>
<td>GNI per capita: $6800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth: 4.7%</td>
<td>GDP growth: 1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undernourished: 48%</td>
<td>Undernourished: 5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMR: 231 per 100k</td>
<td>MMR: 140 per 100k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI per capita: $3780</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth: 1.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undernourished: 12.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMR: 54 per 100k</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI per capita: $3120</td>
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<td>GDP growth: 5.9%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMR: 231 per 100k</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI per capita: $4280</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth: 2.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Undernourished: NA%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMR: 127 per 100k</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gross National Income (GNI) per capita (Atlas method, 2014)
C.2. Survey Instrument

After reviewing the profiles above, carefully find each country's name in the list below and in the box next to it, record your desired allocation.

- El Salvador: 0
- Zambia: 0
- Tonga: 0
- South Africa: 0
- Timor-Leste: 0
- Total: 0

This is an example round only. Your answers to this question will be discarded.

Here are your instructions again, if you need to review them.

- Each round, you will allocate a hypothetical $100 across five different countries.
- You can take as much time as you need to carefully consider which countries require the most assistance.
- We will ask you to play 9 rounds.
- There is no minimum amount you must give each country (it's okay to give $0 to one or some countries) and the maximum amount you can give any one country is $100.
- You must allocate $100 each round.
- We will provide you with some information from the World Bank to help you in your decisions.
- We will show you the gross national income (GNI) per capita, the gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate, the percentage of the population that is undernourished, and the maternal mortality ratio (# of deaths per 100,000 births).

[NOTE: ORDER OF COUNTRIES LISTED IN RESPONSE BOX IS RANDOMIZED.]
[NOTE: PLACEMENT OF YELLOW/BLUE ON LEFT/RIGHT IS RANDOMIZED.]

PAGE 4 — NO CLASSIFICATIONS (CONTROL)

- Zambia
  - GNI per capita: $1790
  - GDP growth: -4.7%
  - Undernourished: 48%
  - MMR: 231 per 100k

- El Salvador
  - GNI per capita: $3780
  - GDP growth: 1.4%
  - Undernourished: 12.6%
  - MMR: 54 per 100k

- South Africa
  - GNI per capita: $6900
  - GDP growth: 1.6%
  - Undernourished: 5%
  - MMR: 140 per 100k

- Timor-Leste
  - GNI per capita: $1320
  - GDP growth: 5.9%
  - Undernourished: 27.9%
  - MMR: 231 per 100k

- Tonga
  - GNI per capita: $4380
  - GDP growth: 2.1%
  - Undernourished: NA
  - MMR: 127 per 100k

Gross National Income (GNI) per capita (Atlas method, 2014)
After reviewing the profiles above, carefully find each country's name in the list below and in the box next to it, record your desired allocation.

El Salvador 0
Zambia 0
Tonga 0
South Africa 0
Timor-Leste 0
Total 0

This is an example round only. Your answers to this question will be discarded.

Here are your instructions again, if you need to review them.

- Each round, you will allocate a hypothetical $100 across five different countries.
- You can take as much time as you need to carefully consider which countries require the most assistance.
- We will ask you to play 9 rounds.
- There is no minimum amount you must give each country (it's okay to give $0 to one or some countries) and the maximum amount you can give any one country is $100.
- You must allocate $100 each round.
- We will provide you with some information from the World Bank to help you in your decisions.
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[NOTE: ORDER OF COUNTRIES LISTED IN RESPONSE BOX IS RANDOMIZED.]

PAGE 5 — NO JUDGES (CONTROL)

Great job! One last note before we get started:

- As you know, by participating in this study, you may be randomly selected to win a subscription to your choice of Financial Times, The New York Times, Foreign Affairs, or JSTOR.

Let's get started. Please click "Next" for the first round.

PAGE 5 — JUDGES (TREATMENT)

Great job! One last note before we get started:

- As you know, by participating in this study, you may be randomly selected to win a subscription to your choice of Financial Times, The New York Times, Foreign Affairs, or JSTOR.

- If you are randomly selected, you will only receive the subscription if a judge approves of the allocation decisions you make in this survey.
- The judge will be an intern (i.e. an entry-level staffer) in the office of a politician (i.e. a congressperson/MP) in a major donor country. The judge is NOT an expert on development.
- The judge will see the same graphics that you see and your allocation decisions. The judge will NOT see your name, e-mail, or any other information about you.
- If the judge does not approve of the decisions you make in this survey, you will not receive the subscription.

Let's get started. Please click "Next" for the first round.
C.2. Survey Instrument

PAGES 6-14 — SAME AS PAGE 4 WITH UNIQUELY GENERATED GRAPHICS

PAGE 15

The aid allocation part of the survey is now complete. We would now like to ask you just a few questions about yourself.

What is your age?

What is your gender?
- Female
- Male
- Other

What is the highest level of education you have received?
- Doctoral degree
- Masters degree
- Bachelor degree
- High school degree
- Other
- Prefer not to say

How would you describe your current professional position?
- I work for a government
- I work for a development partner or international organization
- I work for a NGO/CSO
- I work for a think tank/university
- I work in the private sector
- I am a graduate student studying development-related issues
- I am a graduate student studying issues unrelated to development
- I am an undergraduate student
- Other
- Prefer not to say

Please mark any professional positions you have previously held.
- I have worked for a government
- I have worked for a development partner or international organization
- I have worked for a NGO/CSO
- I have worked for a think tank/university
- I have worked in the private sector
- Other
- None of the above
- Prefer not to say
**APPENDIX C. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS**

**How many years of professional experience do you have in international development?**
- None
- 1-4
- 5-9
- 10-14
- 15-20
- 20 or more years
- Prefer not to say

**Which statement do you agree with more?**
- In general, it is most important to do what you think is best, regardless of what you have promised others you would do
- In general, it is most important to do what you have promised others you would do, regardless of what you think is best

**What does a GINI coefficient measure?**
- Corruption
- State fragility
- Inequality
- Democracy
- Don't know

**DFID is an aid agency of which national government?**
- UK
- Japan
- France
- Germany
- Don't know

**What is your race?**
- White/Caucasian
- African American
- Hispanic
- Asian
- Native American
- Pacific Islander
- Other
- Prefer not to say

**What country are you from?**

---

**Notes:**

- None
- 1-4
- 5-9
- 10-14
- 15-20
- 20 or more years
- Prefer not to say

- In general, it is most important to do what you think is best, regardless of what you have promised others you would do
- In general, it is most important to do what you have promised others you would do, regardless of what you think is best

- Corruption
- State fragility
- Inequality
- Democracy
- Don't know

- UK
- Japan
- France
- Germany
- Don't know

- White/Caucasian
- African American
- Hispanic
- Asian
- Native American
- Pacific Islander
- Other
- Prefer not to say
C.2. Survey Instrument

How would you describe your political views?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very liberal</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>Somewhat liberal</th>
<th>Neither liberal nor conservative</th>
<th>Somewhat conservative</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Very conservative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Below are two real statements and their real authors. Please mark if you believe the statement contains a grammatical error. You can mark **both** statements, **neither** statement, or **just one** statement.

Only respondents who answer this question correctly will be entered into our lottery to receive a subscription prize.

Neither the State Department nor the United Nations know why this is the case, but experts have speculated that many Syrian Christians are moving to Lebanon.

Check here if there is a grammatical error in this statement.

Though the terminology and process is (wildly, needlessly) complex, the advice is simple for anyone wanting to borrow $25,000: Take out federal student loans from the government.

Check here if there is a grammatical error in this statement.

[NOTE: ORDER OF MOST RESPONSE ITEMS IS RANDOMIZED.]

PAGE 16
You are on the last page of the survey. We would like to just ask you a few questions about how you approached this activity.

Please briefly describe how you made your allocation decisions in this activity.

What factors did you consider in your allocation decisions? (Check any that apply.)

- Whether a country is "Lower Middle Income" or "Upper Middle Income"
- A country's GNI per capita
- How many people in a country are undernourished
- A country's strategic importance
- How my allocation decisions would be judged by others
- Whether a country is in Africa
- A country's population
- A country's level of democracy
- Whether a country is a small island state
- A country's GDP growth
- None of these factors
- Other factors

Do you think a person who knows very little about development would agree with your decisions? Why or why not?

- No

- Yes

C.3 Randomization Checks
### Table C.1: Countries used to generate graphics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position (in terms of GNIpc)</th>
<th>1st</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>3rd (Threshold)</th>
<th>4th</th>
<th>5th</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Micronesia</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Tuvalu</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiribati</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table C.2: Random assignment to treatment conditions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classifications</th>
<th>Treatment</th>
<th>Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Judges</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table C.3: Balance tests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classifications</th>
<th>Judges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>overall mean</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female (0-1)</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>28.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (1-4)</td>
<td>2.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development experience (1-6)</td>
<td>1.77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table C.4: Manipulation check

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(0-1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TreatClass</td>
<td>0.256***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.064)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. Participants</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual Std. Error</td>
<td>0.485 (df = 230)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F Statistic</td>
<td>15.983*** (df = 1; 230)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Appendix D

Sub-National Analysis

Below are the template questionnaires that guided the interviews in Nepal and Botswana. These questions served as a departure point rather than as a script for conversations. Generally speaking, I posed all of the questions to government officials and to policy experts, who would be able to speak about (if only generally) the various effects of graduation on different groups. When speaking with representatives from civil society and the business community, I focused only on the questions most relevant for those groups.

In all interviews, I began by grounding our conversation in key facts about the country’s status. In most cases, respondents were already familiar with these facts, but they served to establish my credibility and refresh participants’ memories about the details. I carefully avoided priming my respondents in any way to think positively or negatively about graduation. All respondents were asked about both challenges and opportunities in graduation.

D.1 Nepal Interviews

I’d like to start by establishing three facts about LDC graduation.

- Nepal met the eligibility criteria on 2 indicators (Human Assets and Economic Vulnerability) in 2015. If it meets these criteria again in 2018, it will be eligible to graduate in 2022.
• Graduation does not follow automatically from eligibility. The CDP must consult with Nepal and make a recommendation for graduation.

• According to the most recent plan of the National Planning Commission, Nepal intends to seek graduation in 2022.

1. Based on your experiences, to what extent do you approve or disapprove of Nepal’s commitment to graduating from the LDC category, and why? (Members of NPC! (NPC!):

   • What are the main reasons for the NPC’s commitment to seeking graduation?
   • Although Nepal is eligible to graduate, some NPC representatives have argued that such a graduation would not be “meaningful” unless Nepal met the income criterion. What is the reason for this?)

2. What are the main benefits that Nepal is likely to experience as a result of its graduation?

3. What are the main challenges that Nepal is likely to experience as a result of its graduation?

4. What groups are most likely to benefit from Nepal’s graduation, and what groups are most likely to lose?

5. I’d like to ask you four short questions about graduation from the LDC category. Would you say that graduating from the “LDC” category will (increase/decrease/will not affect)...

   • Nepal’s ability to attract foreign aid from multilateral and bilateral donors?
   • Nepal’s ability to attract foreign investment?
   • ratings of Nepal’s creditworthiness?
   • ratings of Nepal’s democracy?

6. Nepal needs to obtain a per capita income of $1,025 to be classified by the World Bank as a “lower-middle income country.” Many have argued that this threshold should be raised so that countries like Nepal will have to demonstrate greater economic success before they are called “middle-income countries.” Based on your experiences, to what extent do you approve or disapprove of this idea, and why?

D.2 Botswana Interviews

Botswana is one of the few countries that have graduated from the UN’s “Least Developed Country” category, and it did so in 1994. It has been classified by the World Bank as a “Middle Income Country” since before then.
D.2. Botswana Interviews

1. What benefits, if any, have these graduations brought to Botswana (or particular groups within Botswana)?

2. Have these graduations created any obstacles for Botswana (or for particular groups within Botswana)?

3. I’d like to ask you four short questions about Botswana’s experience as a LDC graduate and Middle Income Country in the global economy.

   ● Would you say that being a LDC graduate and Middle Income Country has (increased/decreased/has not affected) Botswana’s ability to attract foreign aid from multilateral and bilateral donors?

   ● Would you say that being a LDC graduate and Middle Income Country has (increased/decreased/has not affected) Botswana’s ability to attract foreign investment?

   ● Would you say that being a LDC graduate and Middle Income Country has (increased/decreased/has not affected) ratings of Botswana’s creditworthiness?

   ● Would you say that being a LDC graduate and Middle Income Country has (increased/decreased/has not affected) ratings of Botswana’s democracy?
Revisions to gross national income (GNI) are frequently significant enough to influence a country’s classification. I compare the classifications that countries received based on the best available estimates at the time with the estimates that they would have received given our estimates today. In Table E.1, I find 288 country-years spanning dozens of countries are “misclassified,” that is, the classifications they received would have been incorrect given the current state of knowledge. This alone is not sufficient evidence of manipulation, as such revisions could be perfectly benign, but it does point to the significance of income revisions in determining classifications.

Table E.1: “Mis”-classifications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>De facto</th>
<th>Ex post</th>
<th>Country-years</th>
<th>Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Underestimated economies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>LM</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LM</td>
<td>UM</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UM</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>228</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overestimated economies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LM</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UM</td>
<td>LM</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>UM</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table E.2: Discontinuities in revisions to national income data (removing outliers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIC/LMIC Discontinuity</th>
<th>Absolute revisions to GNIpc in previous 3 years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above cutoff</td>
<td>−69.89**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(31.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outliers removed?</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Estimates come from a local linear regression of the outcome on the above-cutoff indicator, the running variable (GNIpc distance to the cutoff), and the interaction. All models use a bandwidth of 100. All standard errors are calculated using block bootstrapping, clustered by country.