Classifying Christians: Ethnography, Discovery, and the Limits of Knowledge in Late Antiquity

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ABSTRACT

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This dissertation investigates the ways in which early Christian authors produced ethnography and articulated their ethnographic interests. I analyze the paradigms and techniques Christian writers (150-450 C.E.) used to array, historicize, and polemicize ethnographic “data.” A study of late antique heresiological literature (orthodox treatises about heretics) demonstrates how the rituals, doctrinal beliefs, customs, and historical origins of heretics functioned to map and delimit the composition of the Christian world and the world at large. In a late antique world, polemical and didactic ethnography evidences the coincident attraction and repulsion of discovery and exploration. Oscillating between ancient ethnographic precedents and contemporary ethnographic theory, I argue that the Christianization of ethnography and ethnographic paradigms evidences not totalizing aspirations of authority but a far less secure epistemological and textual timidity: writing and knowing heretics was an endeavor fraught with conceptual incertitude. The heresiologists explicitly ponder the effects and implications of the epistemological limits of ethnographic investigation, the representative capacity and permanence of language, and the unmanageability of ethnographic knowledge.

In a late antique world defined by remarkable religious and political change, polemical and didactic ethnography evidences the coincident attraction and repulsion of discovery and exploration. Oscillating between ancient ethnographic precedents and contemporary
ethnographic theory, I argue that the Christianization of ethnography and ethnographic paradigms evidences not totalizing aspirations of authority but a far less secure epistemological and textual timidity: writing and knowing heretics and monks was an endeavor fraught with conceptual incertitude. The heresiologists and monastic writers explicitly ponder the effects and implications of the epistemological limits of ethnographic investigation, the representative capacity and permanence of language, and the unmanageability of ethnographic knowledge. My contribution to the burgeoning field of ancient ethnography not only points toward the enduring and potent legacy of Christianity in shaping the language and themes of centuries of ethnographic investigation—opening new lines of inquiry between anthropology and religious studies—but it also demonstrates how Christian authors actively contemplated the limits and danger of investigations of the natural and supernatural worlds.
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appreciation for all that you have enabled me to do with my life, I dedicate the ensuing pages to your beneficence and generosity over the past years. I love you both.
For my parents, whose support for me has been unwavering

*The end of a matter is better than the beginning of it*

—Ecclesiastes 7:8
Introduction: Ancient Ethnography and the Ethnographic Disposition: Writing Knowledge and Constructing Worlds

The author Nicander too gave an account of the nature of beasts and reptiles. And other authors described the qualities of roots and plants—Dioscorides the Wood-Cutter, Pamphilus, King Mithridates, Callisthenes, Philo, Iolaus of Bithynia, Heraclidas of Tarentum, Cratenus the Root-Collector, Andrew, Bassus the Tulian, Niceratus, Petronius, Niger, Diodotus, and certain others. In the same way I, in trying to reveal the roots and beliefs of the sects, am not describing them in order to harm those who care to read (my description). Those authors made a diligent effort, not to point evil out, but to frighten people and ensure their safety, so that they would recognize the dreadful, dangerous beasts and be safe and escape them by God’s power, by taking care not to engage with such deadly creatures if they encountered them, and were menaced by their breath or bite, or by the sight of them. And at the same time, from the same concern, the same authors prescribed remedies made from roots and plants, to counteract the evil of these serpents.

-Epiphanius of Salamis

For those of us who study the ancient world, ethnography is an enticing yet elusive subject. In contrast to the modern concept, which denotes both a practice (fieldwork) and a

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genre of writing, in the ancient Mediterranean no conventions governed the discipline or
genre. Indeed, few ancient authors undertook anything approximating modern fieldwork.
While Greeks and Romans wrote endlessly about foreign dress, myths, dietary habits, histories,
cosmologies, and religious customs, they “wrote peoples” in counterpoint (both positively and
negatively) to their own cultural norms and conventions. Building upon the work of myriad
classicists, ancient historians, religionists, and anthropologists, my project posits that ancient
ethnography, and even ethnographic stereotyping, attests a complex set of negotiations
between the process of understanding the surrounding world, inventorying its contents, and
articulating a position within it. Discovery and travel were not singularly triumphant
endeavors, but rather highly perilous and disruptive efforts. Because ancient ethnography
primarily functioned descriptively, through chronicling, stylizing, and essentializing foreign
customs, it moved to study the world as it underwent change, to orient a people within their
evolving social and cultural surroundings. This dissertation aims to assess the conceptual
paradigms and epistemological implications of ancient ethnography within the context of late
antique Christianity. I investigate the ways in which early Christian authors produced
ethnography and articulated their ethnographic interests. I analyze the paradigms and
techniques Christian writers (150-450 C.E.) used to array, historicize, and polemicize Christian
ethnographic “data.” A study of late antique heresiological literature (orthodox treatises about
heretics) demonstrates how the rituals, doctrinal beliefs, customs, and historical origins of
heretics functioned to map and delimit the composition of the Christian world and the world
at large. Heretics were invaluable yet highly unstable theoretical playthings through which
Christian authors navigated and systematized the diversity of the human world. Just as the

Princeton University Press, 2009), 152-188.
Christian ethnographic gaze contemplates the differences of the peoples of the world, Christian ethnographic turn is not just ethnography by Christians but ethnography of Christians.

I further argue that ancient ethnography entails far more (and it does so far more complexly) than an anachronistic repackaging or reframing of the discourse on self and other (all in service of exploring the process by which identities were formed). This is not to deny that identity formation lies at the core of much of ethnographic writing—that is undoubtedly true—but merely to suggest that ethnography cannot simply be reduced to the charge of anachronism or as yet another study, albeit from a different perspective, of “the other.” To the extent that ancient writers enveloped the persona of an ethnographer, whether armchair or fieldworker, they did more, as I hope to demonstrate with the case of late antique Christian authors, than simply regurgitate stereotypes, provide moral warnings, or parrot imperial propaganda. In thinking about heresiology ethnographically, we are compelled to ask how ancient writers reflect about the textualization of peoples, both foreign and domestic; how they distill and essentialize communities into textual form; how the writing and the editing processes impose not only a self-reflexivity, but also an epistemological showdown, in which the capacity to know the world of Christianity and the architect of the world of Christianity become fleeting possibilities. The contemplative and theoretical impact of the ethnographic disposition ponders the effects, consequences, and parameters of lived and stylized human behavior in the context of writing communities of people. The two lines of implicit inquiry I shall reference throughout the body of this dissertation track relatedly to matters of textual representation and epistemological potentiality. How do ancient ethnographic texts—and in particular Christian ethnographic works—maneuver fissures within their scholastic and
“scientific” edifices and how do their authors contemplate their capacities to comprehend the natural and unnatural world? What are the epistemological limits of Christian ethnography? To think with and through ethnography is to invite a scrutiny not simply of another or even oneself, but to contemplate openly about the representative capacity of language and texts. It is the functional application and usage of this ethnographic knowledge of—what work it achieves conceptually and practically for the authors who use it—that I wish to unpack: what, in essence, are the effects, both stated and unstated, of writing ethnographically?

*Ethnicity, Ethnography, and Early Christianity*

Jonathan Hall’s pioneering work, *Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity*, harnessed the contributions of modern anthropology to argue that ancient Greek notions of ethnicity were not ultimately essentialist, racial, or biological categorizations, but rather emerged out of dynamic processes of engagement with ethnography, geography, material culture, and language.3 Arguing against both primordialists who contend that ethnicity is a natural unit of human history and instrumentalists who hold that the symbolic universe engendered through claims of shared ethnicity serves to further economic or political ends, Hall argues that,

“ethnic identity is *socially constructed and subjectively perceived*” (Hall’s emphasis). In order to parse the distinction between a definition of ethnicity and the experiential aspects of ethnicity, Hall enumerates two related, though different facets of ethnicity: *criteria* and *indicia*. He explains:

The criteria of ethnicity are the definitional set of attributes by which membership in an ethnic group is ultimately determined. They are the result of a series of conscious and socially embedded choices, which attach significance to certain criteria from a universal set while ignoring others (though in practice this will usually concern a putative notion of descent, as will be seen). The indicia, on the other hand, are the operational set of distinguishing attributes which people tend to associate with particular ethnic groups once the criteria have been established.

The definition of ethnic identity, then, is not correlated with physical attributes, religious customs, or dietary habits; rather it is a function of conceptual and ascriptive boundaries.

Hall’s reading of the evidence leads him to conclude that there are three *criteria* of ethnicity: they are “a putative subscription to a myth of common descent and kinship, an association with a specific territory and a sense of shared history.” Taken together, territory, kinship, and history were used to construct a tradition of shared ethnic heritage: the discourse of ἔθνος signified these constitutive elements of Greekness.

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6 Although indicia may appear to be the hallmarks (i.e. criteria) of ethnicity, they are, in fact, the outward signifiers of an already established definition of ethnic identity. Indicia become associated with ethnic identity only insofar as they are more readily identifiable.


8 Greekness, as Hall explains in *Hellenicity*, which began as an ethnic designation in the seventh and eighth centuries B.C.E., “shifted from an ethnic to broader cultural criteria in the course of the fifth century” (7). In the wake of the Persian Wars, the reinvention of Hellenicity in cultural terms, a principally Athenian endeavor, enabled cultural movement and shifting: “the figure of the barbarian in Attic tragedy articulates a discourse of alterity that invites self-speculation among the spectators as to the nature of Hellenicity” (176). Dichotomies provoke self-conceptualization.
In the study of early Christianity, Adolf von Harnack famously argued that Tertullian and Pseudo-Cyprian’s deployment of the locution tertium genus compelled him to ask “whether Christianity was a new genus of religion in a theological or philosophical dialectic with paganism.” David Olster, writing almost a century later, reframes the question to wonder, “whether early Christians thought of themselves as a new genus or genos or ethnos in an ethnographic dialogue with classical assumptions about nation or...race, which better renders the classical connotations.” Olster’s effort to recast the implications of the Christian invocation of “third race,” however, collapses the distinction between race/nation/ethnicity and ethnography. The latter, he notes, is a generic formulation of everything related to the former: “the rhetoric of ‘third race’ was drawn from ethnography, a common and much employed genre within classical literature, whose topoi were common throughout contemporary, non-Christian literature.” While Olster does offer his own criteria of race, however briefly, they are immaterial to my point here. I wish to stress that theorizations about race or determinations of ethnic criteria are not, as I will explain below, equivalent to ethnography or ethnographic writing. Ethnography is not the generic form of ethnic reasoning (or conversely, ethnic reasoning is not the content of ethnography).

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12 Olster’s stable genre of classical ethnography, as we shall see below, necessitates myriad qualification. Written before the publication of Hall’s groundbreaking research, Olster assumes that ethnography investigates or depicts the constitutive facets of race: “from Herodotus to Strabo to Tacitus, classical ethnographers identifies a race by language, geographic location, cult center, and those idiosyncratic laws and customs (including religion) that the race had received from a god or a (generally mythical) progenitor or lawgiver” (14).
The abundant work on ethnicity and race in early Christian literature—from Denise Buell, Caroline Johnson-Hodges, Philippa Townsend, Gay Byron, and Aaron Johnson, among others—has largely championed the concepts of ethnic reasoning and ethnic argumentation. This terminological emphasis evidences, I think, Hall’s rightful influence over the terms of scholastic analysis. In identifying criteria of ethnicity, Hall’s work has expanded the capacity of scholars to identify moments in which ancient authors embraced, modified, and interpreted anew the vocabulary and elements of ethnic identity. Aaron Johnson, for instance, in his

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incisive reading of Eusebius of Caesarea’s *Preparatio evangelica*, construes ethnic argumentation as a process of identity formation that explicitly utilizes the language of oppositional ethnicity. As he explains, “The apologetic method of the PE—what I designate ‘ethnic argumentation’—centers upon a construal of the *ethnê* (or nations) of the world and upon the construction of Christianity as an *ethnos* which stands as a stark alternative to those other *ethnês*. And while much scholarly energy has been devoted to contrasting ethnicity and religion—the degree to which they coexisted, excluded, or reinterpreted one another—ethnography does not, I argue, presuppose a rigid distinction between ethnicity, race, and religion. Ethnography exists above and apart from these second-order category instantiations.\(^{17}\)


In its most capacious and heuristic sense, beyond the narrowly construed etymological notion of writing foreign peoples and lands (writing ἐθνὸς), ethnography, conceptually, constitutes writing about any and all groups or communities and moments of communal habitation: military triumphs, celebratory banquets, ritual gatherings, brigands, magicians, pirates, and philosophical parties (among other groups) all rightfully belong within the gaze of the ethnographic author. Ethnography is neither the study of ethnicity, nor an effort to parse its criteria: it is the study of the ways in which population groups of religious, political, military, and ethnic orientation were written and categorized as cultural entities. Ethnographic writing does not, necessarily, participate in the development of the criteria or definition of ethnicity. While it is possible to infer from texts with ethnographic interests (or from texts that might reasonably be called ethnographic) what may have constituted the components of ancient ethnicity, ethnography, both as a historical and heuristic category, captures more than criteria of ethnicity. In asking “whether, or to what extent, early Christians abandoned such criteria (and indicia) of identity, and how they challenged them, and changed,” Philippa Townsend correctly distinguishes modes of identification from

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19 Even if we offer a more capacious sense of corporate identity, the failure to identify indigenous ethnography remains pervasive. Insofar as ethnography operates as a means of assessing differentiation, the internal application of ethnographic analysis functions as causal and explanatory model of human diversity. In that sense, late antique efforts to describe monastic habits and customs surely fall within the parameters of ancient ethnographic writing. John Cassian, Evagrius Ponticus, Socrates, Theodoret of Cyrrhus, and Sozomen all note regional differences among the monks. This didactic or aspirational ethnography is yet another manifestation of the Christian ethnographic project.
methods of definition. But precise attention to the evolving standards of definitional
ethnicity, additions and subtractions alike, does not fundamentally alter the distinction I am
proposing. The process of writing people is not a delimitation of criteria; it is more than the
language of kinship alone. It represents the writing of customs, habits, and practices of groups
(and even individuals in the modern sense of anthropology), while its authors ponder how
these habits reflect broader theoretical, political, and social exigencies.

If we think of ethnography as an effort to translate reality into writing and, inversely,
to use rhetoric to construct reality, it encompasses a multifaceted process of analysis, which
necessitates the collection of data—from social discourse, travel, or recapitulation of sources—and the organization, systemization, and theorization of its discoveries. Though not a
disciplinary practice or a scientific genre in the modern sense, as Greg Woolf has cogently
explained, ancient ethnographic writing nonetheless draws upon procedures of knowledge
acquisition and the rhetoric, as the opening quote from Epiphanius illustrates, of “scientific”
exactitude. The analysis of ethnography hinges on the representative capacity of authors and

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21 Even though the expression ethnography did not exist in the ancient discourse, it was a manifestly real
preoccupation insofar as authors from across the Mediterranean concerned themselves with the customs and
habits of all sorts of peoples. To the extent that ethnicity cordons off certain types of groups (by delimiting
criteria of shared history, territory, and kinship), ethnography, as a contemporary field of inquiry and as a
heuristic designation for ancient groups, signals a far more capacious perspective. The facets of group
membership need not be elaborated as irreducible criteria for the ethnographic impulse to be discernible. The
force and effects of writing peoples transcends, as it were, the specificity of terms (ἦθος and γένος) and the
threefold criteria of ethnicity. Moreover, the etymological correlation between έθνη and ethnography, fails to
measure the non-ethnically oriented ways in which people or groups existed and were written (even in cases
where they are described as έθνος or γένος, it does not necessarily follow that these terms denote race or
ethnicity).

1998), who fallaciously argued that, “early ethnography is marked by a scientific objectivity and unprejudiced
characterization of alien modes that are a pleasure to behold” (12). Rosalind Thomas, Herodotus in Context, has
argued, quite persuasively, that ethnography comfortably falls within ancient notions of science insofar as it was
an effort to comprehend and order the world in all its natural, human, and geographical diversity. Epiphanius
quite telling naturalizes the heretics into the very fabric of the world and world history, which enables his
texts. Ethnographic writing, both in its modern and ancient guises, is an authorial orientation that provokes questions about the capacity of language and texts to represent and communicate human difference and identity. It is not simply that ethnographic subjectivity belies its purported objectivity, but that the ethnographic impulse exposes the conceptual fissures within language and text. Ethnography is a mode of inquiry, and the textualization of people is its method of representation. In *Hellenicity*, Hall’s follow-up work to *Ethnic Identity*, he outlines the difference between cultural groups and ethnic groups in terms of limiting factors:

If cultural identity can be defined as the conscious reification of ideas, beliefs, values, attitudes and practices, selectively extracted from the totality of social existence and endowed with a particular symbolic signification for the purposes of creating exclusionary distinctiveness, then ethnicity is a specific type of cultural identity, alongside other subvarieties such as linguistic identity, religious identity, occupational identity, and so forth. What distinguishes it from these other types of cultural identity is the fact that the symbols upon which it draws revolve around notions of fictive kinship and descent, common history and a specific homeland.  

Hall’s criteria of ethnicity may be right or they may be wrong— parsing their propriety is not my interest here—but they do not encompass the totality of ethnographic writing in the ancient world. Ethnography, I have argued, consists in writing about the subvarieties of cultural indicators that Hall identifies, not only those limited, strictly speaking, to the criteria of ethnicity. It embraces indicia and criteria alike, and, in many ways, reveals the authorial quest to write, interpret, and produce culture and cultural systems.

While the parallels between heretics and nations further evidences the diffusive impact of thinking ethnically within early Christian literature, the exploration, systemization, and theorization of Christianity’s diversity encompasses more than claims of Christianity’s investigation to proceed with a certain scholastic cachet. To classify and describe the heretics is no simple feat; it parallels the efforts of early ancient scientific authors.

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ethnicity, its ethnic character, its ethnic criteria, and the tension, real or not, between ethnic and religious identity. Like the philosophical schools of Diogenes Laertius’ *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* and the Jewish sects of Josephus’ *Jewish War* and *Antiquities*, the heresies are emblematic of certain traditions of knowledge, custom, and culture. But unlike the Sadducees or Platonists who exist comfortably within their circumscribed milieux, the heretics serve as exponents and reflections of the Christian narrative of the history and theorization of human diversity. Heresiology poses the relationship between human diversity and Christian diversity directly: the differences and variety within the world of Christianity and the world writ large have been recast as interdependent phenomena. The history of human difference parallels and even becomes the history of sectarianism. Emanating from one another and suffusing to become part and parcel of a singular Christian history, the heretics, like the nations, were treated as creatures of custom, susceptible to the piercing eye of Christian (polemical) ethnographers. In exploring how Christians wrote their indigenous peoples, the heretics, I am explicitly casting heresiology as a textual endeavor that seeks to rationalize the topography, customs, and wonders of its external and internal environments.

As the heresiologists investigate the diversity of Christian sectarianism across the Mediterranean, they produce a textual world driven by their own interests, observations, and preoccupations. The study of Christian plurality articulates the conditions of a distinctly

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Christian world. In writing while scrutinizing this world, the heresiologists translate the microscopic, the minutiae of the habits and customs of particular Christian peoples, into the macroscopic, broader extrapolations about human nature, human diversity, and human behavior. They parse the value of social and intellectual discourse, the very lifeblood of ethnography, and how cross-cultural contact fits into an ideological system built upon exclusive truth. And the discovery and allure of knowledge and the implications of obtaining it and seeking it, produce authorial self-reflection about the heresiologists’ own capacity to comprehend the world around them in texts. The overarching aim of this study is to trace how the ethnographic impulse, embedded within certain strands of early Christian discourse informed and affected Christian representations of history, theorizations of religious diversity and change, and the organization and hierarchization of Christian systems and theories of knowledge. My argument is that even as polemical works of ethnography, heresiologies grapple with the implications of authorial reflexivity and the epistemological confines of representation. I trace how the Christian authors framed their texts ethnographically by amassing data, marshaling their discoveries, fashioning explanatory models, and theologizing and negotiating their own authorial abilities. Heresiology is the Christian application of ethnographic interests and techniques. 26 This dissertation analyzes how Christians harnessed the vernacular of ethnography, the process of describing and classifying peoples, to advance theories of human difference and the boundaries of human knowledge.

26 Hervé Inglebert, whose immense and invaluable work, describes, traces, and presents how various genres were Christianized over the course of Late Antiquity. He treats geography, historiography, cosmography, and ethnography. Chapter II, “La Christianisation De L’Ethnographie” focuses primarily on the legacy of Genesis 10 (from Jewish sources down to Isidore of Seville). His analysis, which belabors genealogical and chronological techniques, separates the heretics into the realm of history. Inglebert’s rationale stems, so it seems, from his argument that ancient ethnography was always an external process or endeavor (unlike modern anthropology, which strives to see cultures or peoples in their own terms). There is no room in his scheme for indigenous ethnography. I reject this argument. It is clear, as Inglebert’s work shows, the formal and methodological consonances between the writing of the heretics and the writing of the nations.
In the most rudimentary or, indeed, purely etymological sense, ethnography is the writing of peoples (ἔθνος, if we take it as a designation of peoplehood, community, or ethnicity). It names the aggregate process by which peoples are rendered in the written word. While the idea of ethnography, conditioned by a certain investigative fervor is a manifestly real preoccupation in the Greco-Roman world, the term ethnography and its academic disciplinary origins date to nineteenth century. Its use within the study of the ancient world as a generic or historical designation follows most decidedly from the work of the historian...
Felix Jacoby. Writing in the early twentieth century, Jacoby undertook anew the task of collecting, arranging, editing, and commentating upon the abundant fragments from ancient historians authors works were lost or incomplete. In the wake of Carl Müller’s chronologically arranged—and in Jacoby’s mind problematical—Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum (Fragments of the Greek Historians) and Geographici Graeci Minores (Minor Greek Geographers), Jacoby’s project, Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker (The Fragments of the Greek Historians) advocated an organizational schema of these prose writers by development of literary style and genre. To justify his arrangement of the fragments by genre, Jacoby elaborated an integrated theory of Greek prose writing. In its earliest stages, he contended, prose writing was a composite endeavor or, put inversely, indistinguishable by genre. Genealogy, mythography, ethnography, and geography were all part and parcel of historiography. This integrative model of historiography (vis-à-vis Müller’s strict bifurcation of historical and geographical writing) presented a more capacious aspect to historical writing, which Jacoby argued never fully dissipated. Despite the differentiation and evolution of style and genre over time—with Hecataeus of Miletus as Jacoby’s prime example of the origins of ethnography, genealogy, history, and geography, the latter two of which would be united by

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29 Some fragments are simply references to the author, his birthplace, or the title and/or content of his work. Other more substantive fragments include actual citations and/or substantial discussion (and naturally disagreement) about the author’s claims, project, conclusions, argument, etc.

Herodotus—Jacoby insisted that the various ancient genres remained essentially interdependent and forever interrelated.\(^\text{31}\)

In the third part of his larger project, *Geschichte von Städten und Völkern* (History of States and Peoples), which Jacoby broadly framed under the categories of “Horographie” (local history) and “Ethnographie” (writings about other peoples), we find three further divisions or typologies of authorship.\(^\text{32}\) First, are those who wrote about different cities (*verschiedene Städte*);\(^\text{33}\) second, those about individual cities (*einzelle Städte*, with a supplemental volume on Athens alone);\(^\text{34}\) and finally there are those concerning individual countries (*einzelle Länder*).\(^\text{35}\)

The fragments reference and represent an array of authors from various historical periods, including Apollodoros of Artamita’s (and his *Parthika*), Philo of Byblos (and his *Phoenician*

\(^{31}\) Felix Jacoby, “Über die Entwicklung der griechischen Historiographie.” For a recapitulation of Jacoby in more modern guise see Oswyn Murray, “History,” in Greek Thought: A Guide to Classical Knowledge, ed. Jacques Brunschwig and Geoffrey E.R. Lloyd, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1996), 328-337. See also Katherine Clark, Between Geography and History: Hellenstic Constructions of the Roman World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 56-66. On Hecataeus, see Lucio Bertelli, “Hecataeus: From Genealogy to Historiography,” in The Historian’s Craft in the Age of Herodotus, ed. Nino Luraghi (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 67-95; Thomas Braun, “Hecataeus’ Knowledge of the Western Mediterranean,” in Greek Identity in the Western Mediterranean: Papers in Honour of Brian Shefton, ed. Kathryn Lomas (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 287-347. For Jacoby, the various strands of historical writing began as indistinguishable endeavors and even as they slowly emerged as distinct genres (with Herodotus and Hecataeus) they were forever interrelated and, in essence, never really distinct. Moreover, unlike the distinction that can be parsed between degrees or levels of geographic comprehensiveness—between geography (the study of the earth), chorography (the study of a region), and topography (the study of a place)—there exists no such terminological differentiation between ethnographic description at the margins and ethnography at the core.

\(^{32}\) See Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker*. Part I, Genealogie und Mythographie, vol. a (New York: Brill, 1995), VII-X. Also, the title page of *Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker*. Part 3, Geschichte von Staedten und Voelkern (Horographie und Ethnographie), vol. a (Leiden: Brill, 1940), 6. As far as I can tell, no one has linked Jacoby’s project with the rise of the scholastic discipline of anthropology.


\(^{35}\) Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker*. Part III, vol. c (Leiden: Brill, 1958). He calls IIIC, “die der Barbarenländer enthalten,” in Part III, vol. a, 6. For an extremely useful comparative guide, see Appendices I and II, “Table of Historians” and “Name and Nationality,” from John Marincola, Authority and Tradition in Ancient Historiography (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 267-275, in which he presents a massive table of historians, their works (including the historical periods about which they wrote) and a discussion of the ways in which historians signaled their nationality and identity.
History), Isidors of Charax (and a preserved title, the Description of Parthia, τῆς Παρθίας Περιηγητικός), Androstenes of Thasos (and his Sailing Along the Indian Coast, Ἰνδικής Παράπλους), Megasthenes (and his Indika), and Dionysos of Rhodes and his Topographical Histories (Ἂστοριας τοπικάς). Jacoby’s belief in the essential unity of Greek historiography has not gone unchallenged. While his refusal to present ethnography as a tradition of writing fully outside the shadow of historiographical writing has likewise triggered serious contestation, Jacoby’s work remains quintessential precisely because it thrust the designation ethnography into the vernacular of the study of the ancient world. The vexing problems

36 Apollodoros of Artamita wrote his Parthika between 130 B.C.E. and 20 B.C.E. See José Miguel Alonso-Núñez, “Un historien entre deux cultures: Apollodore d’Artémida,” in Mélanges Pierre Lévêque. Vol. II: Anthropologie et société, ed. Marie-Madeleine Mactoux and Evelyne Geny (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1989), 1-6; and Valeri P. Nikonorov, “Apollodorus of Artemita and the Date of his Parthica Revisited,” Electrum 2 (1998): 107-22. For the fragments, see FrGrHist IIIC 779 F1-8 (pp. 773-776). On Philo of Byblos, who was active in the late first and early second centuries C.E., see Harold W. Attridge and Robert A. Oden, Philo of Byblos: Phoenician History, Introduction, Critical Text, Translation, Notes (Washington D.C.: Catholic Biblical Association 1981); and Albert I. Baumgarten, The Phoenician History of Philo of Byblos: A Commentary (Leiden: Brill, 1981). For the fragments, see FrGrHist IIIC 790 T1-4; F1-57 (pp. 802-824). Isidors of Charax, who wrote, it seems, in the last decades of the first century B.C.E., is a highly enigmatic figure, known only from a fragment of Pliny the Elder. For a few general comments on Isidors, see William Woodthorpe Tarn, The Greeks in Bactria and India (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1966) 53-55. Androstenes of Thasos was an early Hellenistic author, who explored the Persian Gulf and the coast of the Indian Ocean. See Jan Resto, The Arabs in Antiquity: Their History from the Assyrians to the Umayyads (New York: Routledge, 2003), 269-273; and G.W. Bowersock, “Tylos and Tyre: Bahrain in the Graeco-Roman World,” in Bahrain Through the Ages: The Archaeology, ed. Shaikha Hay Ali Al Khalifa and Michael Rice (New York: Routledge, 1986), 399-406. For the fragments, see FrGrHist IIIC 781 T1-3; F1-19 (pp. 777-785). For the fragments, see FrGrHist IIIC 711 T1-4; F1-5 (pp. 592-596). Megasthenes was another early Hellenistic author and traveler (his prime period of writing was the late 4th C.B.C.E.). The extant evidence suggests he did, in fact, travel through India, spending considerable time at the court of Sandrakottos at Palimbothra. See A.B. Bosworth, “The Historical Setting of Megasthenes’ Indica,” Classical Philology 91 (1996) 113-27; and idem, “Arrian, Megasthenes and the Making of Myth,” in Mitos en la literatura griega helenística e imperial, ed. J.A. López Férez (Madrid: Ediciones Clásicas 2003), 299-320. For the fragments, see FrGrHist IIIC 714 T1-7; F1-34 (pp. 603-639). Knowledge of Dionysios of Rhodes is considerably limited by the fact that fragmentary evidence about various authors named Dionysius considerably complicates the picture. There is Dionysios the Periegete who produced a description of the world in Hadrianic times, Dionysios the Samian, who wrote a ten-volume history of education, and Dionysios of Byzantium, who was a geographical writer of the second century C.E.

within and surrounding the very idea of ancient ethnography begin, for better or worse, with Jacoby.

In the decades since the publication of Jacoby’s work, numerous scholars have presented incisive criticisms and augmentations of his underlying thesis. While it would be impossible to survey and summarize these abundant criticisms and augmentations, it is nonetheless important to enumerate how scholars have conceptualized ethnography as one of the “basic types of historical writing,” a tradition of writing about foreign lands, and a hybridized form of various methodological and textual conventions. Ethnography entailed surveying, categorizing, and theorizing this manifold diversity, and, in turn, articulating a relational position to and even apart from it. Emma Dench, refining the work of Jacoby, situates ethnography in relation to history, as “a feature of ancient historical discourse,” and frames the totality of ethnography as relating to matters both minute and grandiose:

...when ancient historians engage in traditions of delineating the lands and customs of “other people,” they are drawn into rhetoric and practices that came to be regarded in antiquity as quintessentially historical. These include the assertion of the authority of the writer and his text, claims of veracity and the superiority of the account to that of predecessors. They also include interest in historical change, causation, and explanation (not least of imperial rule), patterns of the rise and fall of individuals and powers, and broadly didactic

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40 See Richard F. Thomas, *Lands and Peoples in Roman Poetry: The Ethnographic Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge Philological Society, 1982). Thomas argues for an ethnographic tradition, which began with Homer and was later Latinized by the Romans. The formal structure of ethnography hews to five elements of detail: (1) physical geography of an area; (2) Climate; (3) Agricultural or natural resources; (4) origins and habits of the natives; (5) Social, political, and military organization. Thomas’ rather crude formulation has not held up well to scrutiny, though he is certainly right to flag certain thematic tendencies. And while scholars debate the veracity of the locution “ethnographic tradition,” there is no reason or evidence to suggest any such rigid criteria of form or content.
concerns such as the provision of vicarious experience and case studies of exemplary behavior.\(^{41}\)

Underlying much if not all of ancient ethnographic writing is an expansive and reflective disposition, what Dench calls the ancient ethnographic gaze: “the characterization of ‘other peoples’ particularly with reference to their customs, practices, and the behavior that typifies them and/or their lands.”\(^{42}\) The particularities of peoples not only vibrantly color the historical narrative, but they illustrate how minutiae shape and govern the course of history, cosmology, geography, and religious systems. Ethnography functions as an intellectual feedback loop, in which ideology shapes interpretive strategies, the collection of data, and the consequent analysis even as new data and its collection shape ethnographic values and those same interpretive strategies. Because ethnography does not simply describe the world as it is—it is a process of representation—it creates an imagined sense of where the world has been, where it is now, and where it will go through the language of custom, habit, origins, discovery, and exchange.\(^{43}\) The capacity of ethnography to explain the differences within the world, foreshadow history, and justify conquest and expansion is an immensely powerful ideological and textual tool.\(^{44}\)


\(^{42}\) Dench, “Ethnography and History,” 496.

\(^{43}\) See Jerry H. Bentley, *Old World Encounters: Cross-Cultural Contacts and Exchanges in Pre-Modern Times* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Woolf, *Tales of the Barbarians*, 8-31, posits the creation of middle ground, a space of (potential) coexistence and exchange: “If Roman expansion brought fewer transformative technologies, and nothing like the biological carnage that followed the Columbian Exchange, it did create a world profoundly disrupted by contact yet not, for a long while, intensively assimilated by the invaders. From at least the middle second century BCE traders operated in parts of Spain, Gaul and Africa, far beyond the areas controlled by Roman arms...there is some point in thinking of the Roman West, especially during the republican empire, as a middle ground on which many different kinds of people met, not always in situations where one side was clearly the master” (18).

Following in the lineage of ancient historians who disputed and augmented Jacoby’s historiographic thesis, James Rives outlines an ethnographic tradition through a discussion of the interplay between form and content.\(^4\) In the introduction to his translation and commentary on Tacitus’ *Germania*, Rives contends that the ethnographic tradition originated with Hecataeus of Miletus’ now lost *Periegesis* or *Periodos Ges* (“a leading around the world”), which presented the peoples and places of the Mediterranean world through the prism of an extended journey.\(^4\) Rives’s demarcation of tradition does not, however, posit an explicitly evolutionary progression (i.e. stages) of the ethnographic tradition; it offers, instead, a descriptive account of the broad forms of ethnography in the ancient world. In the wake of Hecataeus’ textual legacy, three distinct ethnographic modalities or typologies emerged (Rives calls them strands, which then became precedents).\(^4\) First, there was, what Rives calls, the periegetic tradition, which in actuality encompasses two related generic forms: the more technical *periplous* narrative (“sailing around”) and the less formal, more expansive *periegesis* (“leading around”).\(^4\) As a “coastal sailing itinerary,” the periplous was “primarily for the


\[^4\] As Scott Fitzgerald Johnson, “Travel, Cartography, and Cosmology,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Late Antiquity*, ed. Scott Fitzgerald Johnson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 562-3, explains, “the technical periplous genre “provided the framework for sea captains, explorers, and other travelers to publish, at the least, a basic record of ports along sea or river routes or, at the most, an encyclopedic work containing many disparate types of information” (562-3). For my purposes, the distinction is largely immaterial and, indeed, much of the scholarship
assistance of sailors, but as it tended to include topographical features and characteristics of the local inhabitants, the *periplous* soon took on geographical, commercial, and ethnographic overtones.” Guided by the genre’s essential function as guidebook, its authors invariably looked beyond the narrowly potamological and included descriptions of territories, topographies, peoples, customs, myths, cities, and monuments, among various other types of knowledge. Notable works include the anonymous *Periplus of the Erythraean Sea*, Arrian of Nicomedia’s *Periplus of the Euxine Sea*, Pseudo-Skylax’s *Periplus*, and the fragmentary *periplus* of Pytheas of Massila.

By contrast, the *periegesis* narrative was a verbal map of the known world that explicitly extended beyond the confines of waterways and travel routes. As Scott Fitzgerald Johnson explains, “in form, it is a literary description of the known world, often in verse.” Though Hecataeus’ now lost text originated the tradition, its most influential illustrations remain the

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Periegesis of Dionysius Periegetes and Pausanias’ Description of Greece (Ἐλλάδος περιήγησις). In each case, we are led through a tour of peoples and places and supplied with bountiful geographical and ethnographic information, while an overarching “map” schematized the entirety of known world; these text oriented and described a world of minute particularity and massive scope. Consider a generic kin, Pomponius Mela’s Chorography, written around 44 CE. The text identifies itself as “a description of the known world” and served primarily to name the myriad peoples and places of the οἰκουμένη (the known world). As a tour through Africa, Asia, and Europe, it frequently describes (and comments upon) the customs and traditions of particular peoples, but those comments are brief and buried under pages and pages of chorographical detail. In the case of both the periplus and periegetic narratives, however much the detail, form, and structure varied, these texts captured the seemingly endless depths of the world’s diverse configurations of peoples and places. And, above all else, as


“geographical studies, practical handbooks for merchants, and literary compositions providing old and new information,” there were invariably ethnographic details aplenty.59

In the second iteration of the tradition, ethnographic description was decoupled from the periegetic framework, and authors wrote monographs about a particular people. Tacitus’ Germania, an extremely short treatise devoted exclusively to Germania and the Germani, is the earliest extant Latin ethnography.60 There are lost ethnographic works too, including Megasthenes’ treatise on India and Alexander Polyhistor’s Indica, Aigyptiaca, On Bithynia, On Illyria, and Peri Ioudaion.61 The third tradition of Rives’ brief survey of ethnographic literature adheres to the rubric of historiography. The periegetic framework of the more geographically oriented texts was replaced with a historically focused overlay or, in the words of Charles Fornara, it “was the interpolation of ethnography into a history. Ethnographic tracts appear as digressions from the exposition of res gestae.”62 Herodotus’ Histories considers the Egyptians,

59 Rives, “Introduction,” in Germania, 13. There was no bright line between geography and ethnography in the ancient world. Both Elizabeth Rawson, “Geography and Ethnography,” in Intellectual Life in the Late Roman Republic, and Katherine Clarke, Between Geography and History, make this point abundantly clear.

60 As Rives, “Introduction” in Germania, importantly notes, however, the second part of the work (28-46) covers the individual tribes of Germania, which is clearly reminiscent of the periegetic tradition. As Rives explains, “In the early first century AD the historian Velleius Paterculus promised an ethnographic work on the Pannonians and Dalmatians (2.96.3), although there is no evidence that he ever wrote it, while a little later the younger Seneca apparently composed treatises on India and Egypt that have not survived (Pliny NH 6.60, Serv. Aen. 6.154 and 9.30). Otherwise, there is no indication that any Latin author before Tacitus devoted an entire monograph to a particular land or people” (13-14). On Tacitus and ethnography, see also Ellen O’Gorman, “No Place Like Rome: Identity and Difference in the Germania of Tacitus,” in Oxford Readings in Classical Studies: Tacitus, ed. Rhiannon Ash (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 95-118.


Scythians, Libyans, and Persians; Caesar’s *Gallic Wars* describes the Gauls and Germani (6.11-28); Diodorus Siculus’ *Universal History* discusses Arabia, Greece, Egypt, India, Scythia, Mesopotamia, and North Africa; Sallust’s *Jugurtha* incorporates ethnographic details about the Numidians; and Tacitus’ *Agricola* halts his narrative to describe the Britons. In each case, these histories evidence the utility and allure of ethnographic detail in service to the particularities of universal, political, military, and geographical historical narrative. The historical narrative “treat[ed] ethnography as an excursus within a longer historical composition.”

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Owing to the fact that most ethnographic material was routinely subsumed within larger narratives, many scholars remain reluctant to identify a formally structured genre or tradition of ancient ethnography. Even so-called independent expressions of ethnography or the ethnographic monographs—Hellanicus of Lesbos’s *Aigyptiaka* and *Persika*, Xanthus the Lydian’s *Lydiaka*, Manetho’s *Aegyptiaca*, Berossus’s *Babyloniaka*, and the lost texts described by Jacoby—were brimming with historical and geographical details. As Rives explains,

“This tradition gained considerable momentum from the conquests of Alexander the Great, which brought Greeks into direct and regular contact with a huge range of peoples. As a result, there was a steady stream of ethnographic writers from the Ionian Megasthenes, who in the early third century BC composed a celebrated account of Indian (FGrH 715), down to the indefatigable Cornelius Alexander ‘Polyhistor’, ‘the very learned’, who in Rome during the last century BC composed works on Bithynia, Egypt, Libya, and India, among others (FGrH 273).”


687a T1-3; F1-11 (pp. 412-4).


71 For Manetho, see Gerald P. Verbrugghe and John M. Wickersham, *Berossos and Manetho, Introduced and Translated: Native Traditions in Ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2001), 95-212; and John Dillery, “The First Egyptian Narrative History: Manetho and Greek Historiography,” *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 127 (1999): 93-116; and idem, “Greek Historians of the Near East: Clio’s ‘Other’ Sons,” in Marincola, 221-230. For the fragments, see FGrHist IIIC 609 T1-14; F1-28 (pp. 5-112).


73 Rivers, “Introduction,” *Germania*, 13. If, as Rives hypothesizes, treatises of independent ethnography may have seemed historical to their readers, the notion of an independent ethnographic tradition remains muddied and
And while Rives concedes that the “larger historical component” of these texts “may even have overshadowed the ethnographic framework,” I remain sympathetic to the general position that ethnographic writing was a real preoccupation of ancient authors. How we construe that impulse to write peoples may differ, but the central objective remains consistent. From historiographical and historical narratives to philosophical treatises to accounts of war, travelogues, astrological texts, dramas, geographies, and national or problematic. But the diffusion of ethnography across genres need not preclude an effort to trace its discursive, methodological, and rhetorical emphases.


75 Herodotus, Histories (The Persian Wars) (A.D. Godley, LCL 117-120); Livy, History of Rome (B.O. Foster, LCL 114, 133, 172, 191, 233; Evan T. Sage, LCL 295, 301, 313, 332; Frank Gardner Moore, LCL 355, 367, 381; Alfred C. Schlesinger, LCL 396, 404); Ammianus Marcellinus, History (J.C. Rolfe, LCL 300, 315, 331); Tacitus, Histories (Clifford H. Moore, LCL 111, 249); Polybius, Histories (W.R. Paton, LCL 128, 137, 138, 159, 160, 161); Dioodorus Siculis, Library of History (C.H. Oldfather, LCL 279, 303, 340, 375, 384; 399 Russel M. Geer, LCL 377, 390; Charles L. Sherman, LCL 389; Francis R. Walton, LCL 409, 423; Bradford C. Welles, LCL 422); and Pliny’s Natural History (H. Rackham, LCL 330, 352-3, 370-1, 394; W.H.S. Jones, LCL 392-3, 418; D.E. Eichholz, LCL 419).


77 Caesar, The Gallic War (H.J. Edwards, LCL 72); Caesar (Aulus Hirtius?), African War and Spanish War (A.G. Way, LCL 402); Sallust, War with Jugurtha (J.C. Rolfe, LCL 116); Josephus, The Jewish War (H. St. J. Thackeray, LCL 203, 210, 487); Appian, Roman History (Horace White, LCL 2-3).

78 Pausanias, Description of Greece (W.H.S. Jones, LCL 93, 188, 272, 297; R.E. Wycherley, LCL 298); Philostratus, Life of Apollonius of Tyana (Christopher P. Jones, LCL 16-17, 458); Homer, The Odyssey (A.T. Murray, LCL 104-5); Arrian, Indica; Apollonius Rhodius, Argonautica (William H. Race, ed., LCL 1); Xenophon, Anabasis (Carleton L. Brownston, LCL 90); Arrian, Anabasis of Alexander (P.A. Brunt, LCL 236, 269).


80 Aeschylus, Persians (Alan H. Sommerstein, LCL 145) Euripides, Trojan Women (David Kovacs, LCL), Phoenician Women (David Kovacs, LCL 11); Aristophanes, Acharnians (Jeffrey Henderson, LCL 178).

religious histories, the diverse array of texts from the ancient world attesting an ethnographic impulse foregrounds the difficulty in isolating an ethnographic tradition. The diversity of motivations, techniques, formulations, and conclusions that constitute and inform the writing of peoples signifies that ethnography was and remains very much a constellation of preoccupations, born of and in the ancient and modern moments respectively. It is easier perhaps to identity ethnographic interests, tropes, and implications, which emerge as moments, digressions, and even monographs, than it is to speak of an ancient genre, a neatly traceable tradition, or a formal style embedded within historiographical and geographical texts.

In corralling works together under the rubric or title “ethnography,” we can observe how works that display the textual flavor of ethnography—considerations of territory, climate, topography, wonder, agriculture, religious customs, social practices, dress, eating habits, origins, governmental structure—present, organize, and interpret their findings. The diversity of ways in which peoples were written pushes us toward a more capacious (and heuristic) understanding of ethnography and ethnographic writing. The scope of “writing peoples” compels us to observe the multiplicity of authorial objectives and rhetorics encapsulated in the textual construction. We are better served by treating ethnography as a dispositional orientation, which implicates and shapes the expression of history, geography, theology, and literature, even as these thematic interests molded the very techniques of ethnographic

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83 Richard F. Thomas, Lands and Peoples in Roman Poetry: The Ethnographic Tradition.

84 This also reduces the need to settle on a multi-pronged, battle-tested, irreducible definition of ethnography.
writing. I follow the work of Emma Dench, Greg Woolf, and James Rives, among the others, which has demonstrated that ancient ethnographic writing, and even ethnographic stereotyping, entailed a web of negotiations in the effort to comprehend the surrounding world in all its complexity and diversity. And like them, in using ethnography as a textual marker, I am intentionally implicating a wide array of ethnographic typologies and functions. What I call an ethnographic disposition, similar to Dench’s notion of an ethnographic gaze, encapsulates the process and effects of writing people and defining cultural systems. I am less determined than they are to define its perimeters narrowly—only ἔθνη can be written ethnographically—or to align it with a distinctly historical project. In tracing how ethnography was written Christianly (how Christians developed their own ethnographic vernacular), we see how the heretics upended and reinforced certain ethnographic tropes, aspirations, and dangers.

Investigating Ethnography

If we think about ethnography as a multi-faceted process in which information about a particular people is collected and then theorized, the ethnographic disposition encapsulates the underlying rationale behind these methodological and theoretical decisions. In analyzing the process of textual construction, we are posing two interrelated questions about the authorial method: what were the sources with which one wrote ethnographically? And how was the information contained therein obtained? When an author explicitly states the methods and sources of his ethnographic inquiry (and in many cases we are left merely to infer), it tends to follow one of three lines: autopsy, witnesses (from testimony and
conversation), and the recycling (and reinterpretation) of textual precedents. Writers such as Herodotus, Lucian, Caesar, Pausanias, and Josephus, to name but a few, underscore their personal travels and involvement in the events, places, and peoples they identify and describe. Historiographers, ethnographers, and geographers alike wrap themselves in the credibility of autopsy: “I have been. I have seen. I know.” Josephus’ avowedly historiographical method, like Herodotus’ preferred process of assembling information, emphasizes, though not at the exclusion of alternative modes of inquiry, his first-hand knowledge of events of the Jewish War. In contrast to the Greeks, who have written histories without visiting the pertinent sites and, furthermore, have put together “a few hearsay reports” (ἐκ παρακουσμάτων ὀλίγα συνθέντες), Josephus stands as an insider of customs and a witness to history: “I, on the contrary, have written a veracious account, at once comprehensive and detailed, of the war, having been present in person at all the events I was in command of those whom we call Galilaeans, so long as resistance was possible.”

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86 See Stephen Greenblatt, *Marvelous Possessions: The Wonder of the New World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991): “Travel in Herodotus is linked with the insistent claim to personal experience, the authority of the eyewitness. It is possible to imagine a history based upon extensive travel that does not overtly make this claim but rather suppresses it in the name of an alternative conception of history, such as that articulated brilliantly by Thucydides. That is, we have to understand Herodotus’ references to his travels less as an autobiographical fact that as a discursive choice. We have, after all, no way of verifying Herodotus’ travels, any more than we do Mandeville’s; we are dealing rather with what Michel de Certeau calls the text’s utterative markings and modalities. The most characteristic of the markings is an appeal to the narrator’s own presence: ‘I have heard,’ ‘I say,’ ‘I write,’ and above all ‘I have seen.’” (123).

In other cases, writers draw on the testimony of witnesses to help bolster their narratives. In briefly recounting the history of Lydia, for example, Herodotus describes a protracted war between the Lydians, then ruled by Alyattes, and the Milesians. During the course of battle (in the twelfth year), the Lydians inadvertently set fire to the temple of Athene at Assesus (they had intended merely to burn crops), which, Herodotus notes, was thought to have inflicted upon Alyattes a protracted and incurable illness. Seeking a remedy, the Lydians ventured to the oracle at Delphi, but “Apollo refused to give an answer until the Lydians had rebuilt Athene’s temple.”

The details and context of the story need not concern us. What does need emphasizing is Herodotus’ immediate point of clarification: “I know this first hand, for I heard it from the Delphians; the Milesians, however, have something to add to the story.”

Unspecified testimony, from unknown witnesses or simply “what I have heard,” to quote Pausanias, similarly guide an author’s writing about events, peoples, and places. Diodorus Siculus’ introduction to his discussion of the Ethiopians in his Universal History illustrates quite nicely the piecemeal nature of writing ethnographically in a work of history:

Concerning the historians (τῶν συγγραφέων), we must distinguish among them, to the effect that many have composed works on both Egypt and Ethiopia, of

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89 Herodotus, Histories, I.20 (Godley, 22). He continues, “They say that Periander, son of Cypselus, who was a very close friend of Thrasybulus, king of Miletus at that time, got to know of what the Delphic Priestess had said to Alyattes’ messengers, and had thereupon sent to tell Thrasybulus all about it, knowing that to be forewarned is to be forearmed.”

90 Fornara’s insistence that ethnography embraces a less rigorous standard of evidentiary admittance—a willingness to report “the wondrous”—assumes that ethnography and historiography are readily distinguishable genres. It would postulate that Herodotus’ methodological rigor consciously oscillated as he moves from ethnographer to historian? Or would it? It seems implausible to maintain such a distinction for at least two reasons. As I have discussed already, arguments about an independent tradition of ethnography remain muddled and unclear. Moreover, the claim that ethnography embraces and reports the improbable presupposes as it insists on the fundamental difference between the two. Fornara’s claim assumes that a figure such as Herodotus could and did distinguish his ethnographic writing from his historiographical writing, which would mean that Herodotus consciously suspended his historiographical dicta when writing ethnographically.
whom some have given credence to false reports and others have invented many tales out of their own minds for the deflection of their readers, and so may justly be distrusted. For example, Agatharchides of Cnidus in the second Book of his work on Asia, and the compiler of geographies, Artemidorus of Ephesus, in his eighth Book, and certain others whose homes were in Egypt, have recounted most of what I have set forth above and are, on the whole, accurate in all they have written. Since we ourselves, during the time which we crossed over into Egypt, associated with many of its priests and conversed with not a few ambassadors from Ethiopia as well who were then in Egypt; Carefully inquiring from them about each matter, and putting to the test the reports of the historians, we have prepared accounts in accordance with what they most fully agree.91

Textual precedents will be scrutinized—and drawn upon freely—and individual reporting will serve to augment previous findings.92 To the extent that ethnographers, like historiographers and geographers, drew upon textual precedent, they made textual choices and judgments, which create, intentionally or not, textual correctives and overtly inter-textual histories.93 This


92 Because there is no evidence that writing people required an especially rigorous program of travel and observation, though this was true in certain cases (Caesar, Pausanias, Herodotus, Pytheas of Massalia, among others), reliance upon earlier sources was a routine component of ethnographic writing. Tacitus, we know, garnered much of his data about the Germans from Pliny the Elder’s now lost treatise, History of the German Wars. Unlike contemporary ethnographers who now venture into the field to observe their subjects “first hand”—though the power of “being there” for anthropology or sociology was by no means a disciplinary constant (think Durkheim, Frazer, or Benedict)—ancient writers wrote freely of peoples with whom they seemingly had no personal contact at all. On the use of libraries to produce ancient ethnography, see Woolf, Tales of the Barbarians, 66-79. Because much ethnography was written with second-order data (in consultation with the libraries of Rome and Alexandria or by reading the works one possessed of various historians, geographers, and ethnographers), it seems apposite to think of our ancient authors as the forbearers of armchair or uncritical anthropologists. I am not, however, suggesting that the methodological or procedural “rules” of ancient ethnography were standardized, explicated, or vastly different from historiographical writing. Nor am I arguing that ethnographic authors deployed especially rigorous or especially lax conventions of research and writing. But there is no evidence, I think, to suggest ethnographers were especially lax in their evidentiary disposition. To the extent that ethnography and geography were often pieces of a larger historiographical narrative, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to erect a strict methodological wall between them. In cases where ethnography stands alone—Tacitus, Arrian, Manetho, Berossus—the inclusion of wonderment seems to me no different than the wondrous, mythological observations of Herodotus, Livy, Ammianus, or a so-called ancient historian.

93 Fornara, it is worth noting, insisted that each of the genres of historical writing was circumscribed “by its own rules, often unstated conventions, and particular focus.” Ethnography traded on a different set of conventions, which Fornara argues suspend the rules of history writing. He explains: “The laws of evidence and obedience to truth were at least in theory mandatory in history. Ethnography permitted the publication of the unconfirmed report of even the improbable. The physis, the nature, of ethnography was historia in the original sense: “inquiry” into what was “worthy of relation,” “marvelous,” “deserving to be heard.” Whether something was true or likely
ancient tendency toward armchair ethnography—the interpretation peoples via textual rather than experiential knowledge—ties the ethnographic disposition, in part, to the process of the inter-textual reading and knowledge production. Ancient ethnographic analysis was, in many instances, doubly interpretive: one had to reinterpret the findings of an author, who had already situated his data within his narrative.

Ancient ethnography encompasses not only the collection of data, but also its theorization, which rationalizes the puzzles of the natural world and the people within it. Reflections on the practices, habits, and phenotypes of peoples—the facets of microscopic or particularistic investigation—engender theorization and disquisition on the causes, conditions, and factors of human diversity (the macroscopic explanations of this microscopic “data”). The transformation of minutiae into grander historiographical arguments serves not only to illuminate the observable differences among the people of the world, but to regularize those differences in accordance with natural and supernatural phenomena. All of this “scientific” or ideological ordering depends upon a chain of ethnographic knowledge. To organize and arrange ethnographic “data,” meant to posit the causes and effects of human diversity. And

to be true was secondary to the fact that it was a logos told by an informant. Perfectly just men living on the periphery of the world (Herodotus), man-eating ants (Onesicritus), fish living underground (Polybius)—all were grist for the mill” (The Nature of History in Ancient Greece and Rome, 15). Greg Woolf, by contrast, has posited that, “ethnographic knowledge...is that knowledge we gain of one another in conversation, specifically in dialogues conducted across a gradient of unfamiliarity” (Tales of the Barbarians, 17). While the methodological distinction hinges on a decidedly historical reading of these texts—the extraction of realia is presupposed by certain methodological liberties or propensities—I do not conceptualize my project as fundamentally historical or driven by the veracity of ethnographic description. To the extent that ethnographers did or did not suppress the strictures of historiographical writing—a premise I find faulty—it does not fundamentally change my reading of ethnography in Christian Late Antiquity or even among Greco-Roman authors. But the constellation of sources and procedures shared in writing history and ethnography—for Woolf concedes that historiography similarly relies upon autopsy—encourages us to distinguish the history and ethnography as a composite, multi-faceted endeavor. Just as the wondrous alone—pace Fornara—does not signal ethnographic instincts, methodology—in all its variation—is not the determinative indicator of ethnographic writing or of the ethnographic disposition. It is the full procedural gamut of ethnographic writing—from collection of knowledge to the application of said knowledge—that molds its form and function. And, as we shall see, unpacking those components or facets of writing people reveals the ethnographic disposition or the underlying assumptions and theoretical underpinnings of textual representation.
interpretive paradigms or schemes were utilized and developed alongside data pools not only to try to explicate the causes and forces of the diversity of human behavior, customs, habits, and appearance, but to systematize and categorize the peoples of the observable world.

Greg Woolf, in his Tales of the Barbarians, discusses the paradigms by which the ethnographic parts were worked into a whole or, at the very least, the process by which the whole was explained in terms of its parts. In his discussion of ancient ethnography, Woolf has identified two dominant explanatory paradigms of ancient ethnography: genealogy and geography (the latter of which included sub-types such as climatology and cosmology and astrology). The ordering of ethnographic knowledge, whereby a people was located either with respect to location (within a larger cosmological framework) or identified via a genealogical tree, offers a paradigm through which to explain human diversity and “to map ethnic groups.” And while the quest to locate origins (either spatially or genetically) and thus to explain the cultural, religious, and geographical heterogeneity of the world represents but one dimension of the larger project of arraying ethnographic “data,” the ancient preoccupation with validating ancestral lineage guides much of the ethnographic tradition.

Genealogy served as a tangible measure of cultural and ethnic priority (and, in certain

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94 Greg Woolf, Tales of the Barbarians, 32-58. For geography see Woolf, 44-51; climatology, 44-48; astrology, 48-51. As Wolf explains, “genealogy and geography each offered general explanatory frameworks within which ethnographic data might be made to make sense. ‘Might’ is, in fact, too weak. All ethnographers need paradigms to enable them to interpret their harvest of oral testimony and observations…Paradigms also contribute to the structuring of knowledge when it is encoded in text. Ethnography, after all, literally means ‘writing people.’ As a discipline of recording it always involves the translation of people into texts. Paradigms operate in some way like master narratives, and in other rather like sets of generic conventions” (36). On ethnography as conditioned by its allegorical possibilities (i.e. ethnography as a genre and practice of multiple meanings and multiple readings) see James Clifford, “On Ethnographic Allegory,” in Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography, ed. James Clifford and George E Marcus (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 98-121.

95 Woolf, Tales of the Barbarians, 40.
instances, superiority). Drawing upon the traditional appeal to genealogies, dating back to Homer, Woolf posits that it was possible to coalesce a line of descendants around a lone figure’s individual eponym, if it was “located sufficiently far back in mythic times.” Another of the genealogical functions of ancient ethnography, specifically what he identifies as the process of “situating particular individuals or families at the centre of an ethnic history,” holds the potential both to distance and bind together specific population groups. Genealogies, indeed, evidence proximity as much as they report distance. Ties of fictive kinship prove functional tools by which communities are drawn together. Here, again, texts represent ideas that were, in all likelihood, historically vapid. But, as our authors knew, as much as representation becomes a weapon by which alliances can be forged or hostility explained, it likewise brought to bear unintended or unforeseen problems of philosophical import. In venturing to discover and circumscribe the known and unknown worlds, ethnography filled gaps in knowledge and clarified claims about the peoples and places of the world. But the collection of evidence of peoples’ ways of life, by autopsy and with the aid of


97 Woolf, Tales of the Barbarians, 41.

98 Woolf, Tales of the Barbarians, 41.

99 Woolf is quite adamant that ethnography has been overly defined by its capacity to define and distance an “other,” when in fact it possesses the very same ability to bind “a world of strangers” (41).

100 This is a point also stressed in Erich S. Gruen’s, Rethinking the Other in Antiquity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).

101 See Gruen, Rethinking the Other in Antiquity, 253-307; and Christopher P. Jones, Kinship Diplomacy in the Ancient World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).
textual precedents engendered problematic questions and realizations about the causes of human difference, the impossibility of cultural translation, the falsity of authorial objectivity, and the scope of ethnographic knowledge. There are certain methodological, philosophical, and textual assumptions that inform the ethnographic writing process, others that become implicated in the writing process, and still more that emerge only from writing people. Indeed, as much as inquiry requires ethnographic exempla, ethnographic writing begs and begets further inquiry and explanatory models.

Reading Heresiology in Context

Because the terms of Christian religiosity were diverse and diffuse and institutional structures and traditions were seemingly negotiable and even inchoate, the history of early Christianity evidences both the rhetorical efforts by which boundaries between sects were constructed and the actual imposition of ecclesiastical and political barriers to institutional and communal development. Heresiology was an effort by particular members of the still nascent Christian community to elaborate and solidify claims of tradition by specifying the terms and vernacular of Christian principles, practices, and theology. As Christians spread

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themselves across the Mediterranean preaching the good news of Christ and as peoples assumed the mantle of Christianity in different ways and in different environments, theological and ecclesiastical diversity became increasingly endemic to Christian culture. With the number of Christians multiplying, disputes over the finer points of theological doctrine, ecclesiastical governance and authority, Christian epistemology, exegesis, ritual observation, and canonical inclusion, to name but a few areas of contention, naturally followed. With each new church, the purported unanimity within the nascent Christian church was subjected to new potentialities of fissure and dissolution. Paul himself, as his epistles clearly demonstrate, struggled to maintain order among the communities he visited and wrote.


Communities forgot, disputed, or ignored his instructions about Christ’s gospel.\textsuperscript{107} Writing from the middle of the second century onward, these compilers of descriptions and refutations of heretics birthed a new genre: heresiology. The heresiologists devise and order a Christian epistemological system, which thrusts two competing realities into forced contention with each other: knowledge of the heretical world and the exclusive truth of orthodox Christianity. The heresiologists’ codification of differences of praxis and theology, from cosmology to Christology to dietary practices and clothing preferences, became metrics of heresy—as a name and thus a charge—and the tools by which Christians could try to excise and limit the profusion of diversity.\textsuperscript{108}

Nearly a century and a half after the apostle Paul, in the preface to his five-book refutation of heresies, Irenaeus, bishop of Lyons (ca.130-202), enumerates the principal hazard of the heretics. Though frequently referenced by its shorter title, \textit{Adversus Haereses},\textsuperscript{109} the fourth-century bishop Eusebius of Caesarea reports a fuller and more precise heading for Irenaeus’s work: “Exposé and Overthrow of What is Falsely Called Knowledge.”\textsuperscript{110}


\textsuperscript{109} Even in antiquity the text was known by its shortened title. Eusebius, \textit{Historia Ecclesiastica} 2.13.5, 3.28.6; Basil \textit{Liber de Spiritu sancto} 29.72; Jerome \textit{De viris illustribus} 35; Maximus, \textit{Scholia in Pseduo-Dionysius Areopagita, De ecclesiastica hierarchia} 7, and Photius, \textit{Bibliothecae codices}. 120.

(gnosis), sadly absent from the abridged title, is not simply the corrective target of Irenaeus’
treatise (though the gravest offenders, the “Gnostics” are far from his only target);\textsuperscript{111} rather, it
guides and structures the intellectual trajectory of the entire heresiological project: to survey
theologically and polemically the οἰκουμένη that is Christian, assert the inerrant succession of
apostolic knowledge, and delimit human claims of knowledge about the intricacies of Scripture
and God himself.\textsuperscript{112} In elaborating even the most minute of heretical customs and doctrines—
from baptismal rituals and intricate cosmologies to dietary habits and alternative scriptural
interpretations—the heresiologists exhibit not only their so-called mastery over the
formidable bastion that is the world of Christian heresy, they confront how the procession,
production, and ordering of knowledge underscores and alters the very foundations of
Christianity and the Christian world.

Precisely because the heretics “believe differently about the same things as time passes
and never have a stable doctrine, because they wish rather to be sophists of words than
disciples of the truth”\textsuperscript{113} Via their addenda and excisions, the heretics, so the heresiologists

\textsuperscript{111} Though often described as an anti-Gnostic text Irenaeus (and his fellow heresiologists) traces and ventures far
more deeply into the world of sectarian Christianity. That is to say, Irenaeus contests a wide swath of “heretical”
opinions, some of which are not categorized as so-called Gnostics. The world of heresy is occupied by an
abundance of distinct opinions, cosmologies, habits, and theological doctrines. On The Gnostics, see Brakke, The
Gnostics; Karen L. King, What is Gnosticism? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003); Michael Allen
Williams, Rethinking “Gnosticism”: An Argument for Dismantling a Dubious Category (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1999); and Nicola Denzey Lewis, Introduction to “Gnosticism”: Ancient Voices, Christian Worlds (New York: Oxford

\textsuperscript{112} See W.C. van Unnik, “Theological Speculation and Its Limits,” William R. Schoedel, “Enclosing, not Enclosed: The
Early Christian Doctrine of God,” and Richard Norris, “The Transcendence and Freedom of God: Irenaeus, the

\textsuperscript{113} Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses III.24.2 (Contre les hérésies, Livres III, ed. and trans. Adelin Rousseau and Louis
et al. in St. Irenaeus of Lyons: Against the Heresies, Books 1, 2, and 3. ACW 55, 65 and 64 (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press,
Heresy and Identity in Late Antiquity, ed. Eduard Iricinschi and Holger M. Zellentin (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck,
2008), 28–49.
Irenaeus charges, they massage it, augment it, recast it, and ultimately threaten its untrammeled facilitation through generations of Christians (of course, the heretics saw it differently). In holding themselves as exponents of (an alternative) system of truth, the heretics craftily “speak the same language” as (orthodox) Christians, though they “intend different meanings.” Their treachery, however, as Irenaeus diagnoses it, attests an underlying and more perilous condition: they persist and metastasize “under the pretense of knowledge.” Their so-called knowledge—while revealing detailed cosmologies, alternative scriptures, a multiplicity of deities, the impetus of creation, the divisions within the soul, the process of redemption, and the metaphysical principles of the universe—imports a grandiose claim of privileged authority into their schematization of a cosmic narrative. In supplanting the primacy of the God of the Bible and his Word, the creative and enlightening powers behind the creation of the universe and thus the human race, the heretics embark upon a massive restructuring of revealed truth. Reorienting the truths of the apostolic age not only disrupted claims of ecclesiastical authority and the regulated transmission of knowledge, it also perpetuated an open and unfixed conceptualization of tradition.

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115 Irenaeus, Adv. haer. I. Pr. 1.8-9 (Rousseau and Doutreleau, 1:2:19).

116 After having surveyed the Valentinian’s cosmological system, Irenaeus summarizes their claims in the context of knowledge and scripture. “Such is their system which neither the prophets preached, nor the Lord taught, nor the apostles handed down. They boast rather loudly of knowing more about it than others do, citing it from non-scriptural works; and, as people say, they attempt to braid ropes of sand. They try to adapt to their own sayings in a manner worthy of credence, either the Lord’s parables, or the prophets’ sayings, or the apostles’ words, so that their fabrication might not appear to be without witness. They disregard the order and the connection of the Scriptures and, as much as in them lies, they disjoint the members of the Truth” (Adv. haer. I.8.1-11 [Rousseau and Doutreleau, 1:2:112]).
While a number of Christian writers singled-out specific heretics for withering criticism (Arius, Marcion, Nestorius, Mani, Jovinian, to name but the most glaring), only a few late antique authors ventured to survey and refute the entirety of the heretical world. It is these expansive texts that I consider here as the exemplars of heresiological literature. They include Hippolytus of Rome’s (ca. 170-236) *Refutatio Omnium Haeresium*, Irenaeus of Lyons’ (ca. 150-202?) *Adversus Haereses*, Tertullian’s *De Praescriptione Haereticorum*, Epiphanius of Salamis’ *Panarion*, Augustine of Hippo’s *De Haeresibus*, and Theodoret of Cyrrhus’ *Haereticarum Fabularum Compendium*. Epitomized by the *Panarion* of Epiphanius of Salamis (ca. 315-403), heresiology has proven itself a rather mundane object of study. Before the discovery of the Nag Hammadi Codices in 1945, heresiologists were largely unverifiable sources and treated as historical authorities. The narrative of the ecclesiastical historians—orthodoxy, the true and rightful inheritor of the apostolic legacy, combated the derivative, strayed impostors of Christianity, the heretics—was more or less embraced. The descriptions of the heretics collected in the heresiologies only bolstered the narrative of an apostolic Christian tradition struggling to contain those who sought to amend, corrupt, and therefore destroy it. Since the pioneering

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117 Athanasius wrote against Arius, Terullian against Marcion and Valentinus, Jerome against Jovinian, Augustine against Faustus (and the Manicheans more generally); and Cyril against Nestorius, among others.


119 See, Walter Bauer, *Orthodoxy and Heresy in Earliest Christianity*, ed. Robert A. Kraft and Gerhard Krodel and trans. Philadelphia Seminar on Christian Origins. 2nd ed. (Mifflintown, PA: Sigler Press, 1996). Bauer describes the “ecclesiastical” position as threefold. First, Jesus reveals the true Word of God to his disciples, who, next, traverse the world and introduce the “unadulterated gospel.” In the process, however, of proselytizing seeds of doubt are sowed (by the devil, of course), who blinds genuine Christians to the ways of the truth. “The development [of becoming a Christian] takes place in the following sequence: unbelief, right belief, wrong belief. There is scarcely the faintest notion anywhere that unbelief might be changed directly into what the church calls false belief. No, where there is heresy, orthodoxy must have preceded” (xxiii).

work of Walter Bauer and the increasingly sophisticated scholarly works on heresy in all its myriad forms and guises, the very notion of orthodoxy and heresy have been qualified, questioned, dismantled, reassembled, and dismantled again. Orthodoxy is no longer treated as an a priori ecclesiastical phenomenon—with heresy as its theological or satanic corruption—but rather it is seen as a process through which theologians, ecclesiastics, and emperors crafted its constitution and anathematized those who defied it or threatened its coherence. And yet even as specific instances and contexts of heresy have benefited from the abandonment of old assumptions and skillfully moved beyond them, from Virginia Burrus’s discussion of Priscillian in The Making of a Heretic to Caroline Humfress’s treatment of orthodoxy in the legal context, Orthodoxy and the Courts in Late Antiquity, the heresiologists themselves remain largely outside the reach of reevaluation and rehabilitation. If the study of heresy has progressed by leaps and bounds, the heresiologists still lag behind.

These are texts, scholars frequently noted, of rote stylization and polemic. They are tired screeds, largely devoid of sophistication and nuance. Theodoret of Cyrrhus’s Compendium remains a peripheral text (without a critical edition), Augustine’s list of heresies is perhaps his


least studied text, and one of his sources, Philaster of Brescia’s *Compendium of the Heresies*, is almost universally ignored. In an aptly titled article “How to Read Heresiology,” the historian Averil Cameron bemoans this state of affairs, and offers both to trace this failure and outline a series of theoretical and historical paths forward. Cameron frames this scholarly maltreatment around the general predicament of a post-Enlightenment mentality, impassive to the tendentious and static stereotyping of heresiological authors, and as a particular failing of Byzantine scholarship and its Eastern canon (in contrast to the relatively well-studied Western medieval heresiologists). She further contends that scholars have failed to comprehend the myriad complexities within these texts due in large measure to the unfortunately simple and mechanical foundation laid by Epiphanius’ *Panarion*. Insofar as the production of heresiological literature reflects banal generalizations about the need to dispel error and articulate the topography of true Christianity, heresiologists leave in their wake an almost rote polemical dispute between two mutually exclusive yet dependent theological categories. The judgment that these texts lack sophistication, combined with a textual complexion consisting of prolix description of (often indecipherable) cosmologies, disgusting religious practices, hermeneutical variance, feigned scholarship, frequent tirades, staid categorization, and, in the case of Epiphanius, lengthy citations from his heresiological forbearers, theological allies, and the work of heretics themselves, leaves few interested in studying these texts as anything but compilatory wastelands of polemic. Heresiology, despite its encyclopedic aspirations, is

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124 Theodoret of Cyrrhus, in his largely unstudied magnum opus, presents not cited material to aid his refutation, but simply acknowledges that his predecessors have successfully dismantled the heresy in question.

mired as much by the simplicity of its own dichotomous worldview as by its perceived lack of “imaginative content.”  

Cameron contends that this notoriously unattractive genre, shaped by “a poetics of [its] own,” harbored a web of interrelated (and understudied) rhetorical, theological, political, ecclesiastical, and scholastic agendas, wherein the production of heresy and heresiological literature should be read “as part of Byzantine pedagogy and the Byzantine sociology of knowledge.” Like Pausanias who guides his reader through the Greek world and like Diogenes Laertius who guides his readers through the known philosophical parties, heresiology offers its readers an intellectual map of the sectarian world. Mapping the world of heresy demonstrated the scholastic reach of Christian writers, which facilitated their pivot from recording and refutation toward the elaboration of orthodox opinion as honed by but distinctive from the surrounding milieu of heretics, Jews, and pagans. The deliberate forging of an intellectual tradition of heresiology, what Cameron calls a “traditio haereticorum,” exhibits both how error was schematized and classified as well as how the genre itself evolved, rhetorically and formally, over centuries. The relationship between relatively static content and a plurality of textual forms merits particular attention. Styling this bounty of heretical knowledge as a handbook, a universal history, an encyclopedia, or a dialogue nuances the

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126 Cameron, “How to Read Heresiology,” 473.

127 Cameron, “How to Read Heresiology,” 472.

128 Cameron, “How to Read Heresiology,” 484.


130 Cameron, “How to Read Heresiology,” 477.
seemingly routine nature of the genre by drawing us to understand the interplay between its theological and literary ambitions.\footnote{Though Cameron’s analysis derives much of its insight and applicability from tracing methods and modes of textual variation and evolution over the course of nearly a millennium’s worth of Byzantine sources, reading heresiology necessitates moving beyond an analysis of the rote polemic to investigate how theological argumentation influences history, to understand the intellectual space occupied by these texts, and to appreciate its stylistic complexities, classificatory techniques, and epistemological theorizations. By emphasizing the manner in which heresiological texts articulated more than merely incorrect practices and the superiority of correct doctrine, scholars have begun to uproot the tendency to view these texts as unskilled polemic.}

\textit{Heresiology as Ethnography}

In an oft-cited remark, Clifford Geertz, long ago observed that, “doing ethnography is like trying to read (in the sense of ‘construct a reading of’) a manuscript.”\footnote{Clifford Geertz, “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture,” in \textit{The Interpretation of Cultures} (New York: Perseus, 1973), 10.} “Foreign, faded, full of ellipses, incoherencies, suspicious emendations, and tendentious commentaries,” the manuscript like the ethnography is defined by its layers of content and polyvalent structure.\footnote{Clifford Geertz, “Thick Description,” 10.} Insofar as they are analogous pools of “data,” rife with meaning and symbolism, both are acts of interpretation and documents that invite (or even necessitate) still more interpretation (acts of reinterpretation). In \textit{doing} ethnography, the anthropologist or sociologist dissolves, translates, and interprets seemingly foreign opacity in search of cultural and social knowledge and explanation. In much the same way that the manuscript presents itself as a textual relic with strata of meaning, my reading of heresiology as a Christianized mode of ethnography posits a similar effort to interpret the layers of heresy’s meaning and its ever-diversifying
presence within the world of Christian culture. By using the work of their predecessors, the heresiologists of the later Roman Empire, Theodoret, Augustine, Philaster, and Epiphanius strive to coalesce the heretical world. In writing about and explaining their own internal differences, the heresiologists deployed, and in some cases simply invented, ancient paradigms of ethnography in order to classify, array, understand, and ultimately defeat the Christian plurality around them. Concurrently, Christian writers framed the plurality of opinions and groups endemic to their own Christian world as the underlying explanation of the manifest diversity within the known world. Christian investigation of itself conceptualized the internal

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134 In his *The Life and Miracles of Thekla: A Literary Study* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), Scott Fitzgerald Johnson describes the relationship between ancient (non-Christian) compilatory texts and those produced under the banner of Christianity. In contextualizing his analysis of paradoxography, Johnson foregrounds heresiological literature as an illustration of the Christian production of literary compendia. He cautions, however, against reading heresiology as evidence of the process of Christianization. Indeed, both Theodoret and Epiphanius, he tells us, produced other compilatory texts. Epiphanius wrote a texts *On Weights and Measures*, “which tries to define what biblical words for weights and measures mean in contemporary terms,” while Theodoret produced the *Eranistes* (a tripartite dialogue between “Orthodoxos” and “Eraenistes”), each section of which culminates in compiled supporting material from late antique ecclesiastics (193; see the forthcoming article of Andrew Jacobs, “Epiphanius of Salamis and the Antiquarian’s Bible,” in the *Journal of Early Christian Studies* for a useful analysis of intellectual eclecticism in late antiquity). The *florilegia* serves as a repository of theological evidence (used, most obviously, to counter heretical opinions). Theodoret also wrote a collection of philosophical opinions in his *Remedy for Hellenic Maladies*. Johnson summarizes his findings: “On the basis of the broad literary corpora of Epiphanius and Theodoret—two of the most virulent heresiologists of late antiquity—it could be said that the technique of literary compilation was not a tool of ‘christianization,’ as argued by Hervé Inglebert, as much as it was simply a common means of literary expression, shared by writers of different religious commitments. In fact, what is most distinctive of the catalogue or compilation form in late antiquity is that it was not religiously affiliated at all, but was suitable for scientific, medical, scholarly textbooks, as well as (when the occasion arose) polemical and religious discourse” (194-5). Johnson’s analysis, however, assumes that the appropriation of a pre-existent genre—and its non-Christian ubiquity—fails to evidence the Christian turn in late antique literature. I would argue first that heresiology, as a compilatory text, was a decidedly Christian project (Johnson’s argument against Inglebert appears to collapse, oddly enough given the introduction of his fourth chapter, form and content). Though heresiology obviously draws on literary precedents, it uses those precedents to advance a particularly Christian worldview and ideology. It is this novel blending of form and content that produces a Christian effect. While heresiological literature did not signal the birth of classificatory literature or even of Christian compendia, its deployment of language of philosophy, science, and medicine in compilatory perpetuated the terms of Christian theological and literary discourse. I argue, in fact, that heresiology was a tool of Christianization in its absorption of ethnographical techniques to explain the totality of human difference and posit a Christian edifice to world history and diversity. At the same time, heresiology was an overt attempt to think through the internal diversity of the Christian world in the language of ethnography, science, medicine, and polemic. To label this literary appropriation, adaptation, and augmentation Christianization is not to suggest that heresiology was an illustration of increased Christian power (a historical claim about the demographic and/or political rise of Christianity); rather, it refers to the production of a literay tradition that utilized familiar forms to present Christian cultural preoccupations and interests (the articulation of the Christian perspective on ethnography, geography, etc.).
diversity of the Church into a larger disquisition on the nature and causes of all human
diversity. Christian authors engulfed the Church and its intellectual traditions in a polemical
project of ethnography: write the peoples of Christianity in order to contest and control them.

Though the task of the heresiologist is explicitly polemical and coordinated within an
ideological framework of mutual exclusivity, it fits comfortably, I argue, within the realm of
ancient ethnographic discourse. Heresiological literature functions as an expression of a
Christian ethnographic disposition, which, above all else, negotiates and performs the
immensely difficult task of representing peoples in textual form. In line with Geertz’s
metaphor of manuscript reading, Christian heresiologists peeled back \textit{and} erected layers of
meaning, symbols, and language to explicate their understanding of the known world and
elaborate a Christian narrative of sacred history. To that end, the heresiological project is itself
ethnographic—the exploration and interpretation of a festering diversity—and the rhetoric
deployed in pursuing that goal hones the ethnographic reach and scope of Christian
knowledge of its cultural and religious environs.\textsuperscript{135} It is not simply or even that Christian
authors were imitating ethnographic and geographic techniques and tropes from earlier Greek
and Roman authors, many of whom they likely had never read; instead, I argue that Christian
ethnographers wrote about Christianity as if it were a world, an expansive geography in need

\textsuperscript{135} The great historian of the later Roman Empire, A.H.M Jones famously asked, in an article from 1959“Were the
Although Jones answered firmly in the negative, it is nonetheless clear from the extant evidence that the
heresiologists explicitly invoked the language of ethnic reasoning in their delineation of the nature, origin, and
identity of the heretics. But beyond that limited vernacular, the facets of ethnographic writing incorporate more,
much more, than a rote delineation of the qualities or criteria of nationhood. There is a far more complicated
negotiation surrounding the authorial capacity to represent peoplehood or even moments of social experience.
The ethnographic mark of heresiology turns as much on its descriptions of peoples as it does on the author’s gaze
upon the structure and capacity of his text to contain and define a field of knowledge. How, in essence, did the
heresiologists articulate their authorial selves and engage in their authorial ability? Even the seemingly flat-
footed writings of the heresiologists, which intertwine investigation and self-defensive postulations, are
reflections of a world, real and imagined, marked by seemingly intractable human differences.
of exploration, classification, and investigation, which feeds a loop of ethnographic discourse and exchange.  

Reports about the customs and habits of heretics, as ways of schematizing and classifying the diversity of the Christian world and as representations of diverse ways of life, become meditations on the seemingly limitless but yet severely limited capacity of Christian authors to know, comprehend, and codify the history of sectarianism. Ethnographic writing encompassed a way of seeing the world, of enumerating and negotiating the cultural, social, political, and intellectual space occupied by a people and its traditions. It reflects and encapsulates the tension between comprehension of and rule over the known world (and discovering more and more peoples along the way) and claims to comprehend and rule the entire world. By writing people one considers their microscopic or particular ways of life, behavior, etc., while also aligning these particularities with causes and effects or macroscopic theories and paradigms of ancient ethnographic discourse. Indeed, the heresiologists attempted not simply to deny their objects of study the title “Christian,” but, more importantly, they theorized with the heretics about the relationship between human difference, knowledge (its acquisition, study, and contemplation), and the epistemological limits governing the textualization of an ever-diversifying world. Heresiological literature evinces that the Christian οἰκουμένη is mired in division, strife, and contestation; to survey its

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136 Averil Cameron’s deft argument in Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire: The Development of Christian Discourse (Berkley: University of California Press, 1992), that Christian writers were, in essence, fashioning a world for themselves throughout late antiquity undergirds much of my own thinking. It may be unnecessary to insist that reality was in fact made via texts, but it is certainly true, as I hope this dissertation will demonstrate, that the monastic and heresiological writers constructed a textual world of monks and heretics that was built upon and negotiated ethnographic knowledge and tradition. As Cameron notes, “Out of the framework of Judaism, and living as they did in the Roman Empire and in the context of Greek philosophy, pagan practice, and contemporary social ideas, Christians built themselves a new world. They did so partly through practice—the evolution of a mode of living and a communal discipline that carefully distinguished them from their Jewish and pagan neighbors—and partly through a discourse that was itself constantly brought under control and disciplined” (21). I shall address the Christian creation of a language of ethnography in chapter one, while the question of control and discipline shall be considered in chapters four and five.
contents is not simply to describe its inhabitants, but to articulate its possibility, its potential to be whole. What lingers, to borrow Emma Dench’s observation about ancient Roman ethnography, is that the spread of Christianity feeds a self-reflective ethnographic process. Christianity, through its writers and preachers, emerges as its own ethnographical subject, bringing the gaze inward to trace its own history and its own foreignness in order to bracket its defects and articulate its essence. In itemizing the nature of the heretics, having arranged them genealogically, chronologically, or typologically, as the case may be, the heresiologists attempt to impose order on their heterodox objects via claims to an ethnographic authority and a parsing of the rectitude and expansiveness of Christian knowledge.

“The making of ethnography is artisanal, tied to the worldly work of writing,” writes James Clifford in his introductory piece to the essays that constitute Writing Culture. He further identifies no less than six ways in which “ethnographic writing is determined:” contextually (by environment), rhetorically (by expressive conventions), institutionally (within and against traditions, powers), generically (the distinctiveness of the ethnographic genre), politically (who represents whom and how), and historically (the ever-changing conventions of ethnography). While the “the inscription of coherent ethnographic fictions,” or the discursive, poetic, and performative qualities of ethnographic writing, foregrounds the productive process of ethnography, the making and making up, the conditions around and under which ethnography writing proceeds sharpen its questions, form, subject, and

137 Emma Dench, Romulus’ Asylum, 61-69.
method. The facets or contingencies that govern our own histories in our own times determine the reception and the writing of ethnography in ways beyond our control. For Clifford, language and ethnographic language in particular are only partially the property of their authors. The production of ethnography entails more than interpretation, representation, and translation; it engenders a system of relationships between subject and object, informants and author, and reader and author, which, in turn, cultivate phenomenological and epistemological consonance and dissimilitude. In contemporary anthropological work, the principal techniques of collecting “data,” for instance, have been subjected to similarly trenchant criticism, insofar as the ethnographer’s privileging of autopsy, the visualization of culture, comes at the expense of the other senses. Watching firsthand even as she is from afar, the anthropologist claims to stand outside and apart from her object of study, objectifying it as she gazes. The emphasis on the visual (as opposed to the sonorous) feeds “the taxonomic imagination of the West...constituting cultures as if they were theaters of memory, or spatialized arrays.” The performative spectacle of ethnography, the fantastical and the ordinary alike, is bound, authoritatively, to the phenomenological experience of autopsy, translated and transformed by the words of the ethnographic page.

In emphasizing the discursive components of ethnography (over and against the visualist tendencies), Clifford thrusts expressive speech and the anthropologist’s own voice to the fore of the ethnographic experience. The once automatic authority ascribed to the anthropologist (with respect to his object of study) has slowly frayed in the wake of the

complex and ongoing critiques of representation itself. As the classic ethnographies of the early and mid-twentieth century distinguished between authorial subjectivity and textual objectivity, the former was understood to be a stylistic flourish, not a determinative feature. The ethnography was the reportage by an author but not of the author. Clifford, however, insists upon a renewed focus on the means by which cultural texts are produced, not simply interpreted:

An interest in the discursive aspects of cultural representation draws attention not to the interpretation of cultural 'texts' but to their relations of production. Divergent styles of writing are, with varying degrees of success, grappling with these new orders of complexity—different rules and possibilities within the horizon of a historical movement....It is enough to mention here the general trend toward a specification of discourses in ethnography: who speaks? who writes? when and where? with or to whom? under what institutional and historical constraints?

The ethnographers’ role in the ethnography itself, her having written it and her having, to some extent, produced the data, exposes the dilemma of ethnographic description: writing peoples is always representative and interpretive. It is never free from the inclinations and preconceptions of its author. Ethnography instances not the passive chronicling of customs and habits, but the active imposition of political power, ideological control, and authorial inclinations. In serving the interests of its author, ethnography necessarily translates peoples into the vernacular of its author and her culture.


In his *Works and Lives: The Anthropologist as Author*, Geertz likewise analyzes the complexities undergirding the production of ethnographic texts. He describes the problem in terms of signature (how the author or author-function is “made manifest in the text”) and in terms of discourse (what is it that the author authors?). Signature has cast a long shadow over ethnographic writing precisely because it has framed the problem not in terms of narrative but in terms of epistemology, viz. “how to prevent subjective views from coloring objective facts.” Geertz continues:

> The clash between the expository conventions of author-saturated texts and those of author-evacuated ones that grows out of the particular nature of the ethnographic enterprise is imagined to be a clash between seeing things as one would have them and seeing things as they really are.

Though he finds the subjective anxieties of author-ization to be overstated, anthropologists, he laments, have too often conceived the problem of ethnographic description in terms of “the mechanics of knowledge” surrounding fieldwork. The self/other dilemma of fieldwork was prioritized over those of self/text process (the former somehow naturally solved the latter). He diagnoses the problem of authorial discourse, through Foucault’s “What is an Author,” which hones a distinction between authors and writer, and Roland Bathes’ “From Work to Text,” which navigates the terrain between writers of texts and founders of discursivity. For Geertz, the lasting impact of literary acumen follows, in some sense, from the distinction between the multiplicity of ongoing productions within a text (between “language as praxis or

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language as means”). And although the distinction between writing and authoring may lack, for Geertz, intrinsic value, it nonetheless signals the tension between the practicalities of textual representation in the service of information (the text as a physical object with knowledge) and consciousness about the vernacular of knowledge production. Process and product are linked together as inseparable facets of ethnographic writing.

Anthropology, in Geertz’s estimation, is trapped “mule-like” between its scientific aspirations and its literary explication. Framed in terms of signature and discourse the problem becomes a negotiation of uncertainty: “the uncertainty that appears in signature terms as how far, and how, to invade one’s text appears in discourse terms as how far, and how, imaginatively to compose it.” While heresiology is an extreme example of tendentious textual representation, the genre firmly remains a prolonged engagement with the struggle to capture people in the written word, even when those words are divorced from objectivity, facts, and accuracy. Fraudulently writing peoples is not without a sense of peril, exasperation, and impossibility. Though the heresiologists express no hesitation to write themselves into their text, its “scientific” bona fides is explicit: Epiphanius’ literally constructs his text as a Panarion or medicine chest for the disease of heresy. But the invocation of discourse, as Geertz identifies it, denotes the problem of literary composition, which in turn generates an amassment of epistemological quandaries:

Confronted, in the academy, by a sudden explosion of polemical prefixes (neo-, post-, meta-, anti-) and subversive title forms (After Virtue, Against Method, Beyond Belief), anthropologists have had added to their “Is it decent?” worry (Who are


we to describe them, emphasis Geertz) an “Is it possible?” one (Can Ethiopian love be sung in France?), with which they are even less prepared to deal. How you know you know is not a question they have been used to asking in other than practical, empiricist terms: What is the evidence? How was it collected? What does it show? How words attach to the world, texts to experience, works to live, is not one they have been used to asking at all.154

The representative capacity of language, as we shall see, in the context of writing and interpreting people is not a new problem. In that sense, I want to take seriously the various rhetorical maneuvers of the heresiologists, which they signal authorial fears, hopes, and dilemmas. Though organizationally, contextually, and stylistically distinct, the heresiological works of Irenaeus, Hippolytus, Tertullian, Epiphanius, Augustine, and Theodoret of Cyrrhus all reflect the authors’ efforts to delineate their own roles as ethnographers and caretakers of the Christian tradition. Although the ideological rigidity of Christianity—the imposition of a discourse of truth—resists certain ethnographic needs, the danger of knowledge in a radically changing world is framed not just as an institutional problem but as a conceptual one: what can be known?

The pervasive rhetoric of travel, discovery, and peoplehood connotes an imaginative sense of ethnographic exposition.155 In conjunction with its overtly polemical tone and

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154 Geertz, Works and Lives, 135. I am not collapsing the distinction between modern ethnography and ancient (polemical) ethnography; though they are related, as I argue, they are also governed by divergent mentalities, presuppositions, and norms. I want, instead, to explore the ways in which reading ethnography in the modern moment has informed and illuminated my reading of a particular type of ancient literature, which I have chosen to describe as ethnographic. This introduction—and the dissertation as a whole—is an endeavor to reminiscence by reading ancient and modern “ethnographies” alongside one another, rather than of mapping similarities and parallels. In consolidating my remarks on ancient ethnography, ethnicity, and heresiology, I will explain my reading of Christian ethnographic texts in light of contemporary ethnography and ethnographic theorization. I neither posit an exact equivalence between ancient (or ancient Christian) and modern ethnography, nor do I systematically catalogue their differences. Instead, I will emphasize a group of discursive problems and questions within modern ethnographic thinking and use them to “think with” the ancient sources I discuss.

character, my reading of “heresiology as ethnography” demonstrates that, while writing heretics was configured within the rhetoric of an emerging orthodox Christianity (analogous to the moralizing or civilizing discourse in Greco-Roman ethnography), the ethnographic process was equally perilous due to its inevitable finitude and limits. The genre interrogates the value of social discourse, attempts to define and parse the limits of Christian knowledge, and organizes the world of heresy, all while reflecting on the very nature of writing itself. In searching for information about the heresies, while trying to understand and even justify their place within a world governed by the Christian God, heresiology often became a grander disquisition on the processes by which the world itself, and its divine architect, can and could be comprehended and systematized. Understanding heresy was a gateway into explicating the expansiveness and limits of human comprehension of both natural and divine phenomena. The particularities of heretical habits were the microcosms of a larger macroscopic vision and history of the Christian world, and this polemical ethnography encapsulates the tension between knowing, knowing too much, and the very capacity to know at all. But there remains an unpredictable, even elusive quality, to heresiologies, which indicates their literary complexity. While the stated justification for these massive compilations of evidence and commentary is altogether obvious, their findings and the implications of those findings impose a series of uncalculated conceptual and theoretical hazards. Despite its superficial protestations, heresiology is an epistemological vortex, impossible both in its conceit and execution.

*Outlining the Project: Structure and Chapters*
In expounding the development of a Christian language of ethnography (and a language of Christian ethnography), I start with texts that illustrate Christian comprehension and the contested grounds of ethnographic analysis. I then pause, in chapter III, to outline the rhetorical edifices of heresiological literature, before turning to the final two chapters about ethnographic limits, textualization, and subject-object distinction. The ensuing chapters are organized thematically rather than chronologically (though, in cases where texts work in thematic dialogue with each other, I do treat them chronologically). I have chosen a thematic structure because it most clearly captures my interest in the constructive and deconstructive aspects (i.e. highly destabilizing quality) of ethnographic knowledge. Rather than trace a diachronic style or genre, which may fallaciously suggest a single genealogy or systematic process of thought, I have configured this dissertation to show (1): how ethnography functioned within heresiological literature (how it organized or disorganized sects); and (2): how the production of Christian ethnography engulfs the heresiologists in a series of literary and textual paradoxes.

In producing a history or narrative of sectarianism, heresiological literature reveals an indigenous ethnographic project, which foregrounds the processes, results, and consequences of protracted internal investigation. I begin my analysis, in chapter one, with a discussion of the language of ethnography in heresiological literature. I focus primarily on Hippolytus of Rome and his polemic against (what he deems to be) fallacious models of human diversity. For Hippolytus, the heretics’ embrace of astrological determinism and cosmological mythography contests the ethnographic aspirations of a comprehensive and thoroughly Christian theory of the world’s creation, diversity, and human difference. Insofar as the heretics and heresiologists spar in broadly ethnographic terms—through competing macroscopic theories
of human behavior—they define their differences via an attempt to impose a fixed history and order upon the world.

In chapter two, I trace the ways in which the heresiologists organized the internal diversity of the Christian Church (in conjunction with the diversity of the known world). Diffused with the language of exposition, tireless discovery, and fact-finding, heresiological texts present themselves as purifying and utilitarian ventures into the abyss of heretical machination. The ethnographic impulses of Epiphanius of Salamis and Theodoret of Cyrrhus strive to map the Christian world by schematizing its geographical, theological, and intellectual character, while distancing an orthodox center (Rome or Constantinople) from a heretical periphery. As verbal maps of theological heterogeneity, these two authors attempt to classify a disorganized and chaotically evolving world. It is altogether telling that the very first line of Irenaeus’s *Adversus haereses*, parroting 1 Timothy 1:4, condemns the heretics for their introduction of false words and endless genealogies (*verba falsa et genealogias infinitas*). There is one true genealogy, and it resides within the catholic church. Epiphanius and Theodoret amplify (and complicate) Irenaeus’ observation by deploying a multiplicity of paradigms—genealogies of knowledge, periodized histories of sectarianism, and typological orderings—to array their ethnographic “data” within a coherent narrative of sectarian origins.

In chapter three, I outline the rhetorics of heresiological ethnography. Even as they seek to delve into the intricacies of their theological enemies, Jewish, Christian, and pagan alike, the heresiologies articulate a pervasive discomfort with the potentialities of dialectic and social exchange within a diversified, increasingly Christian world. The intellectual scope and ethnographic claims of heresiological literature evolve in tension with the avowed polemic of

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156 Irenaeus, *Adversus haereses* I, Pr. 1 (Rousseau and Doutreleau, 1:2:18; altered from Unger). The Greek text (taken from Epiphanius’ citation of Irenaeus) is compatible with the Latin: *λόγους ψευδείς καὶ γενεαλογίας ἀπεράντους*. 
these texts. Just as the heresiologists emphasize their mastery and comprehension of the heretical world, they do admit a deep ambivalence about the value of inquiry and ethnographic investigation. The inculcation of knowledge—traditions of pedagogy—and the formal investigation and expression of scholarly knowledge—notions of scholasticism—emerge as two expressions or intellectual sites fraught with potential danger. The scholastic reach of Augustine’s mind becomes as dangerous as that of the hubristic Gnostics. How, then, do you negotiate the permissiveness of theological exposition in service of Christian truth? Even the seeming straightforwardness of the Irenaeus’ or Theodoret’s process of naming, differentiating, classifying, hierarchizing, and prescribing its heresies, belies the ethnographic impulse of Christianity to transform knowledge about the Christian world into an epistemological system, wherein the world itself is now governed by Christian knowledge and understanding.

In chapters four and five, I turn to a discussion of epistemological boundaries of ethnographic writing and thinking. In chapter four, I juxtapose Epiphanius’ Panarion with the ethnographic writings of Pomponius Mela and Pliny the Elder. Surveying and organizing the heretical world forces the heresiologists, like Pliny and Pomponius, to contemplate the extent to which they can comprehend the totality of Christian world around them (it is not simply a question of expressing new knowledge, but of obtaining the full gamut of knowledge of the

157 Jeremy Schott’s work, Christianity, Empire, and the Making of Religion in Late Antiquity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), argues that the tension between pagan polemic and Christian apologetics is conditioned by its imperial context. The Christian adaptation and appropriation of universal history, ethnography, and interpretive strategies signals the figurative or rhetorical conquest of ethnographic territory and therefore knowledge. Schott contends that this scholastic move served to disrupt the pagan political and intellectual triumph and create for Christianity and Christians a transcendent ideological system. Apologetics harnessed tools to build and wield its comprehension and control over a diverse world of pagan opinion. I have incorporated many of Schott’s findings into my own work—transferring his framework to heresiological and monastic literature—and drawing out the lingering tension between comprehension and epistemological impossibility. Building on various ethnographic and geographic texts, I place much more emphasis on the limits of scholastic and ethnographic appropriation. It is the ethnographic implications of discovery and knowledge collection that interest me.
Christian world). The macroscopic theorization from microscopic details induces a chain of inquiries beyond the paradigmatic organization of the heresies. Although genealogy, demonology, and astrology provide conceptual models by which diversity can be routinized or explained, the theorization of heresy’s causes neither thwarts its persistent impact nor concretizes the comprehensiveness of the heresiological project. Heresy’s conceptual infinitude only enervates the control of its orthodox advocates. I demonstrate that Epiphanius not only admits this loss of control, but, in some sense, embraces it. There is no attempt to hide the fissures within his knowledge; it reflects his humanity and humility.

In chapter five, I turn to Augustine’s largely ignored De Haeresibus to illustrate how he confronts not only the textual possibilities and limitations of epistemological representation, but also their theoretical capacity to comprehend their heretical environs. Through intertextual reading, tireless research, and personal experience, the heresiologists edit the works of their antecedents and contemporaries. By adding heretics to bring totals in line, heresiologies function as polemical palimpsests of ethnographic knowledge. But while the heresiologists insist on their expansive and unlimited knowledge of the heretics, they readily admit to falling short. Their texts are totalizing in aspiration, perhaps, but not in practice or even in theory. Instead, heresiological texts despite all their bluster, gusto, and bravado attest a stark conversation about the capacity of texts to represent and circumscribe ethnographic phenomena. Ethnography, as Paul Veyne argues, encapsulates the tension between totality and partiality, comprehension and ignorance, and the insurmountable gap between human nature and the natural world.  

Ethnographic data holds the potential to inspire as much as puzzle and to fracture as much as unify. It is these twin tensions that I explore below.

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Chapter I: Contesting Ethnography: Heretical Models of Human and Cosmic Plurality

Unlike the travel text, however, which is, as such texts are by nature, one damn thing after another, the ethnographic text has a thesis, the thesis in fact that Lévi-Strauss has pursued for the quarter century or so since: namely, ‘the ensemble of a people’s customs has always its particular style; they form in systems.’

-Clifford Geertz

Averil Cameron’s now canonical book, *Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire: The Development of Christian Discourse*, built upon the insights of Michel Foucault and post-structuralist analysis, explores the various ways in which Christian writers developed and honed “an organized system of thought and expression.” Though not a singular language or discourse, as the messy history of late antique Christian so ably illustrates, Christian authors produced languages of Christian education, scholasticism (writing and books), historiography, suffering and violence, and law, among myriad others, to illustrate and advance Christian

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2 Averil Cameron, *Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire: The Development of Christian Discourse* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 6. Cameron’s analysis, in many ways, is bound to the imperial turn in late antique Christianity. She argues that Christian writers positioned themselves over time to take full advantage of the rise of Christianity within the imperial apparatus of the later Roman Empire. While there is certainly some truth to her suggestion that empire was always lurking in the background, I am less persuaded by and interested in this notion of Christianity’s development of a totalizing discourse (in light of imperial circumstances). Though many of the rhetorics I mention above insist upon/derive from Christianity’s changed fortunes (post-Constantine), I will argue that Christian authors’ formation of an ideology of control (via these multiple discourses) was always less stable than it appeared. My point is not that Christian texts failed to establish their control—that was true in many cases and untrue in others—but that their authors actively and explicitly reflected upon these shortcomings and challenges. Christian writers were conscious of the limits of their own textual endeavors.
theological, political, and intellectual interests. The diversity of these writings—what
Cameron calls the “elasticity” of early Christian discourse—demonstrates the struggle not only
to fashion coherent and standardized narratives and opinions about Christian history and
tradition, but also to emphasize the evolution and potential of the Christian intellectual
 tableau. Christianity was growing in the world as its adherent were writing its texts and

3 On the Christian language of suffering and violence, see, for instance, Glen W. Bowersock, Martyrdom and Rome
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Catherine Chin, Grammar and Christianit y in the Latin Roman World (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
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Late Antiquity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Daniel Boyarin, “The Christian Invention of
Christianitatin more broadly, see Daniel Boyarin, Border Lines: The Partition of Judaeo-Christianity (Philadelphia:
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Haven: Yale University Press); Hervé Inglebert, Interpretatio Christiana: Les mutations des savoirs (cosmographie,
géographie, ethnographie, histoire) dans l’Antiquité chrétienne 30–630 après J.-C (Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes,
2001); Raymond Van Dam, Becoming Christian: The Conversion of Roman Cappadocia (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2003); and Peter Brown, Authority and the Sacred: Aspects of the Christianisation of the Roman
World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). One could also point to the Christian interpretations of
sexuality and gender, marriage, family, asceticism, burial rites, among scores of other practices, institutions, and
opinions.
writing it into texts. The process of creating rhetorics of Christianity was not simply an exercise in culture making or religious formation, but a protracted endeavor to create the conditions and language of a decidedly Christian world and worldview. As Cameron notes:

Out of the framework of Judaism, and living as they did in the Roman Empire and in the context of Greek philosophy, pagan practice, and contemporary social ideas, Christians built themselves a new world (emphasis mine). They did so partly through practice—the evolution of a mode of living and a communal discipline that carefully distinguished them from their Jewish and pagan neighbors—and partly through a discourse that was itself constantly brought under control and disciplined.4

I wish to suggest that the effort to construct this textual world hinged on the Christian appropriation and reinterpretation of ancient ethnographic writing. The process of creating this “intellectual and imaginative universe” was, at its most basic level, an exercise in ethnographic reasoning: it was a process of organizing and classifying the contents of the known world into a Christian worldview.5 The project of world-making necessitated knowledge of human particularity (microscopic ethnography)—how peoples behaved, thought, presented and organized themselves—and human universality (macroscopic ethnography)—how humanity became differentiated by geography, language, phenotype, and culture.6 Insofar

4 Cameron, Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire, 21.

5 Elizabeth Castelli, Martyrdom and Memory, has rightly championed the idea of early Christian culture making, by which she means the forging of a Christian framework for producing culture via the collective memory of suffering and martyrdom. Memorialization served as a prism through which cultural legacies could be molded and massaged to serve a particular project of identity formation. Building on the work of Castelli and Cameron, I contend in this dissertation that one facet of late antique Christianity was the project of world making. Though world-making and culture making can and did operate in tandem, world-making functioned to contextualize and support notions of Christian identity. Making the world Christian not only framed the burgeoning power of Christian identity, it also fed the process by which identity became bound to a reading of the outside world. With the notion of world making, as one fundamental aspect of ethnographic writing, I am gesturing at a conceptual endeavor related to culture making, but bigger and grander. Christian identity was being formed in conjunction with a deeper desire to read the entire world’s content and history as part and parcel of a Christianizing gaze.

6 If Christianity can be said to have developed a discourse for itself (in various manifestations and to various ends) heresiology serves very much as the science (in the Foucauldian sense) of heresy. To, follow, then, the analysis Foucault offers in his Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), heresiology perpetuates and produces a structural form (the catalogue) that encompasses a field of knowledge.
as Christian writers constructed and theorized a textual world by explaining the relationship between micro-customs and macro-forces in order to propound a narrative of human history, evolution, and difference, their texts attempted to present the world as eternally and irrevocably Christian.

In the process of describing and refuting the heretics, heresiologists frequently homed in on their opponents’ appropriation of the opinions and practices of the Greek philosophers, the biblical nations, most notably Assyria, Persia, and Babylonia, and even Celtic and Druidic traditions, among other supposedly un-Christian practices and customs. Heresiologies, in essence, catalogued the foreign traditions and arts that had come to reside, by the will of heretics, within certain “Christian” circles. By association, these hybridized Christians (i.e., false Christians from the perspective of the heresiologist)—part Christian, part Druidic philosopher; part Christian, part numerologist; part Christian, part diviner—became exemplars of corrupt and fallacious intellectual pedigrees. While I shall dwell at some length on the “orthodox” Christian deployment of ethnographic models to explain sectarian proliferation later in this chapter (with reference to Hippolytus of Rome and Epiphanius of Salamis), I shall

And in that very process, it crosses the threshold of epistemologization, wherein a discursive formation (and its attendant claims, norms, coherence) “exercise a dominant function (as a model, a critique, or a verification) over knowledge” (186–7). As he goes on to explain, “at this level, scientificty does not serve as a norm: in this archaeological history, what one is trying to uncover are discursive practices in so far as they give rise to a corpus of knowledge, in so far as they assume the status and role of a science. To undertake a history of the sciences at this level is not to describe discursive formations without regard to epistemological structures; it is to show how the establishment of a science, and perhaps its transition to formalization, have come about in a discursive formation, and in modifications to its positivity…. The analysis of discursive formations, of positivities, and knowledge in their relations with epistemological figures and with the sciences is what has been called, to distinguish it from other possible forms of the history of the sciences, the analysis of the episteme. This episteme may be suspected of being something like a world-view, a slice of history common to all branches of knowledge, which imposes on each one the same norms and postulates, a general stage of reason, a certain structure of thought that the men of a particular period cannot escape—a great body of legislation written once and for all by some anonymous hand” (190–1).

7 Hippolytus, for example, identifies the following peoples and arts that have found their way into the customs and beliefs of the Christian heretics: astrology, numerology, mystery cults, cosmogony, divination, Pythagoras, Epicurus, Thales, Empedocles, Heraclitus, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, Archelaus, Parmenides, Leucippus, Democritus, Xenophanes, Echphantus, Hippo, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Egyptians, Jews, Chaldeans, Brahman, Druids, Pyrrhioned, Arithmeticians, Stoics, and magicians.
begin my discussion of the Christianization of ethnography by elaborating the heresiologists’
engagement with, or rather refutation of, competing sectarian theories of ethnographic
difference. Some of these infiltrating traditions—astrology, divination, philosophy, typology,
and mythology—offered rationalizations of human diversity as measured by behavioral,
dispositional, ritualistic, and phenotypical difference. As I shall demonstrate below, the
heretics, according to the heresiologists, internalized and manipulated ethnographic
observations and theories of grand design to bolster and support their own particularized
theological doctrines and cosmologies.

Heresiological literature thus engaged with ethnographic theorization as both a force
to be harnessed positively, in the advancement of a Christian interpretive model of the world,
as well as a force to be contested, when contrarian theories of intellectual and theological
opponents were deemed sufficiently disruptive and problematic to necessitate rejoinder. It is
this two-fold process, the protracted oscillation between cooption and rejection of
ethnographic techniques and styles, that I explore in this chapter. Both sides of this prolonged
struggle, so it seems, advocated and coopted analytical trajectories that explained the nature,
causes, and implications of human diversity. In conceptualizing the contestation between

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8 On paradigms of ethnographic analysis, see Woolf, Tales of the Barbarians, 32-58, which I summarize in my
Introduction, 28-30.

9 The majority of our knowledge about the various heretical parties in the ancient Mediterranean comes from the
hands of so-called “orthodox” writers (the winners, if you will). That is, few texts from the hands of so-labeled
heretics survive. The discovery of the Nag Hammadi texts in 1945, however, is a clear exception as are the diverse
and various Manichaean texts. Denise Kimber Buell, Why This New Race: Ethnic Reasoning in Early Christianity, 126-
137, has looked at the theme of ethnic reasoning in the Tripartite Tractate and Gospel of Philip, two texts from the
Nag Hammadi Codices. In her dissertation, “Another Race? Ethnicity, Universalism, and the Emergence of
Christianity,” (PhD Dissertation, Princeton University, 2009), Philippa Lois Townsend likewise investigates the
rhetoric of ethnicity and universalism with respect to Manichaeism (she identifies what she calls ethno-religious
language in Manichaean texts), 142-207, as well as the Gospel of Judas, 249-268. David Brakke, The Gnostics, 70-74,
also discusses Gnostic usage of kinship and ethnic language. In each of these cases, however, we should not forget
that the language of ethnography is not to be equated with the language of ethnicity. At the same time, however,
it is important to take note of the ebb and flow of rhetorics of universalism, particularism, and genealogical
association.
orthodoxy and heresy as a fundamentally ethnographic endeavor, I focus on their competing efforts to comprehend and order their surroundings in distinctly Christian terms. Ethnography was a fertile ground on which Christians wrote not only their identities, but also their conceptualization of the world and cosmos. I begin my treatment of Christian ethnography with a discussion of the heretics’ deployment of two particular paradigms of macroscopic ethnography: astrology (or astrological determinism) and mythography (or mythographical cosmology). In each case, I argue, the heretics apply (fallaciously, in the eyes of the heresiologist) ethnographic knowledge and analysis to map the contours of their cosmic worldview. They strive, in other words, to understand the world through the development of their own language of Christian knowledge.

Rejecting Paradigms: Hippolytus, Astrology, and Heretical Master Narratives

Hippolytus of Rome, an ecclesiastical leader of the late second and early third centuries, wrote a ten-book refutation of the heresies known in Latin as Refutatio Omnium Haeresium and in Greek as Ὅ κατὰ πασῶν αἱρέσεων ἔλεγχος. In elaborating the intellectual trajectory of heretical practices and opinions, Hippolytus, as I will demonstrate below, infuses his heresiological treatise with an ethnographic substratum of explanatory mettle. While he

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10 The Greek edition I have used for Hippolytus is: Refutatio Omnium Haeresium, ed. Miroslav Marcovich (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1986). I have followed (with alterations) the translation in ANF. Hippolytus’ reign as ecclesiastical leader and his complicated and disputed episcopacy in Rome has been the subject of much scholarly attention. For the purposes of my argument, whether Hippolytus was ever in Rome is somewhat immaterial (as is the theory of multiplicity of authors) the biography is quite large. I have altered the translation from the Ante-Nicene Fathers often in order to clarify the text and update the language. The following offer exhaustive, if not always convincing, treatments of the various questions pertaining to the historical and authorial Hippolytus: Allen Brent, Hippolytus and the Roman Church in the Third Century: Communities in Tension before the Emergence of a Monarch-Bishop (New York: Brill, 1995); J.A. Cerrato, Hippolytus between East and West: The Commentaries and the Provenance of the Corpus (New York: Oxford, 2002); David G. Dunbar, “The Problem of Hippolytus of Rome,” Journal of Evangelical Theological Studies 25 (1982): 63-74; and Marcovich, ed., Hippolytus, 8-17.
enumerates the multitudinous forces that engendered Christian heresy, the bishop exerts considerable energy combating alternative models for organizing human difference and creation. Moreover, undergirding his analysis of heretical etiology and heretical plurality is his narrative of supposed “true” Christianity, which posits a continual tradition from Jesus and the apostles into his contemporary world.\footnote{Hippolytus concludes his heresiological treatise with a two-fold exercise in ordering the universe, its history, and theology. He first tackles the so-called Jewish Chronology (Ref. X.30-31 [Marcovich, 405-408]), which is a highly condensed history of the Jews, and then offers a theological vision (covering cosmology, creation, anthropology, etc.) of the Christian God and his creation (Ref. X.32-33 [Marcovich, 408-414]). His final remarks, moreover, encapsulate the universalizing aspirations of his text. “Such is the true doctrine in regard of the divine nature, O men, Greeks and Barbarians, Chaldeans and Assyrians, Egyptians and Libyans, Indians and Ethiopians, Celts, and you Latins, who [so often] lead [your] armies [to victory], and all you that inhabit Europe, and Asia, and Libya. And to you I become an advisor, inasmuch as I am a disciple of the benevolent Logos, and [am myself] humane, in order that you may hasten and by us may be taught who the true God is, and [what] is His well-ordered creation...Do not devote your attention to the fallacies of artificial discourses, nor the vain promises of plagiarizing heretics, but to the venerable simplicity of unassuming truth” (Ref. X.34.1-2 [Marcovich, 415]). I shall return to this passage later in this chapter.} Hippolytus, like nearly all of his heresiological kin, explicitly juxtaposes his narrative of true Christianity against the lineage of heretical deviation and error. In case of both the unbroken chain of orthodoxy and the fragmented proliferation of heresy continuation, his text propounds its vision of the makeup of the Christian world on the terms of ethnographic discourse. In the course of his treatise Hippolytus marshaled the effects of ethnographic writing—genealogy, methodology, classification, etc.—to solidify his narrative and likewise frame his opponents’ history, birth, and practice in ethnographic language. In challenging certain theorizations about human difference, Hippolytus used his heresiology to propound his own theory of human diversity. The ethnographic disposition emerges both in contestation with and in relation to the heretics’ own claims to “read” the world via astrology, numerology, and mythography. To illustrate the contested ethnographic ground of heresiology, I have chosen to discuss two of the most illustrative examples of the heretics’ own theorization of human diversity: the cases of astrological determinism (the relationship between the stars and human behavior, phenotypes, and orientation) and...
cosmological mythography (the relationship between myth, cosmology, and the human being). In each case, Hippolytus’ description and disapprobation of these alternative models is framed within a conceptual vernacular that seeks to establish the Christian state of the world and the human position within it. Ethnography now serves to color and explain the world of Christianity.

In Book IV of his Refutation of the All the Heretics, Hippolytus cites and summarizes the far-reaching claims and practical procedures of the astrological arts as delineated by the second-century physician and Pyrrhonian skeptic Sextus Empiricus (ca. 160-210 C.E) in his Against the Mathematicians (Adversus mathematicos). Alongside the numerical theorists who “suppose that they interpret life” (το ζην διακρίνειν νομιζόντων) and the magicians who harness “the powers of secret knowledge” (ἀπορρήτων ματημάτων...τὰς δυνάμεις), the astrologers present themselves as fonts of an exclusive knowledge of the future. By deriving and fixing the horoscope as well as mapping the sidereal (lit. of the stars) influences over territories and “nations” (astrogeography or ethnographic astrology), the astrologers purport to understand the causes of human biological and dispositional diversity as well as the fate

12 Technically, Μάθηματικός means mathematician or astrologer. Bury’s title, Against the Professors, is somewhat misleading. Sextus is known as the ancient skeptic (literally, inquirer), par excellence. His Against the Professors targets six intellectual movements for their promulgation of systems of knowledge that do not, from Sextus’ viewpoint, attain philosophical truth. His treatise attacks six arts or disciplines on skeptical (Pyrrhonian) grounds: the grammarians, rhetoricians, geometricians, arithmeticians, astrologers, and musicians. The six-part treatise is generally referenced by its broader title, Against the Professors or Mathematicians (abbreviated as M) with corresponding numbers attached to each of the subjects. His treatise against the astrologers, for example, is usually described as M 5. For the outlines of Sextus Empiricus’ biography and philosophical thinking, see Alan Bailey, Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonian Scepticism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) and Luciano Floridi, Sextus Empiricus: The Transmission and Recovery of Pyrrhonism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). For a precise concordance of Hippolytus’s reliance on Sextus’ Against the Astrologers (Against the Professors, Book V), see Marcovich, ed., Hippolytus, 18-31. Hippolytus quotes Sextus verbatim at IV.I.2-17=Math. V.37-39, 44; IV.III.1-52=Math. V.50-61; IV.IV.1-37=Math. V.64-70; IV.V.18-28=Math. V.88-89; IV.V.30-41=Math. V.92-93. He follows him at IV.VI.1-5 (Math. V.95-6); IV.VI.5-7 (Math. V.102); IV.VI.7-13 (Math. V.97-98). I have followed the text and translation of Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors, vol. 4, ed. and trans. R.G. Bury, Loeb Classical Library 382 (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 1949).

13 Hippolytus, Ref. IV.15.1, 34.1 (Marcovich, 109, 122).
trajectory of human life.⁴ For nearly thirty chapters of Book IV, Hippolytus evaluates the practices of the astrologers, outlining and refuting their essential claim of accurate prognostication and sidereal determination of human disposition and physiology via a recapitulation of Sextus’ own text. Though he insists that the art of the Chaldeans is unstable and untrustworthy sui generis, the falsity of their practice has now found a home within the Christian (or anti-Christian from Hippolytus’ perspective) intellectual world. He rails against the proximate ascendancy of “those who have cultivated the art, becoming disciples of the Chaldeans...having changed the names [merely],” and “have from this source concocted their heresy.”¹⁵ Hippolytus’ refutation strives to contain the burgeoning influence of astrology within the domain of Christian tradition: “we will prove that the astrological arts are incoherent, intending thereafter to invalidate also the Peratic system (a type of Gnostic Christianity) as a branch growing out of an unstable root” (τὴν ἀστρολογικὴν ἐπιδείξομεν ἀσύστατον, ἀυθίς μέλλουσας καὶ τὴν Περατικὴν ἀκυροῦν, ὡς κλάδον ἑκ ῥίζης ἀσύστάτου πεφυκυίαν).¹⁶ Astrology’s infiltration into the lexicon of Christian dogma and cosmology tarnishes the so-called genealogical purity of Christian truth by undermining the claims of Christian knowledge about the world and God. The Peratists, as Hippolytus argues, “deriving their doctrine from astrologers, act despitefully towards Christ” by importing an alternative

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⁴ Fixing the horoscope refers to genethlialogical astrology, while chorographical or mundane astrology applies to “the study of the influence of the stars on cities or regions of the world” (Tamsyn Barton, Ancient Astrology [New York: Routledge, 1994], 180). I will address this distinction in more detail when I discuss (below) Ptolemy and his Tetrabiblos.


¹⁶ Hippolytus, Ref. IV.2.3 (Marcovich, 93; altered from ANF); For Hippolytus on the Peratae see Refutation IV.2.12-18 (Marcovich, 93).
narrative of human destiny and design into Christianity. But before we can explore Hippolytus’ discussion in any detail, we must briefly consider the ethnographic implications of ancient astrological discourse.

Tamsyn Barton and Greg Woolf situate Greco-Roman astrological discourse, as evidenced in the works of Manilius, the first-century C.E. astrological poet, and Ptolemy, the second-century C.E. mathematician, astronomer, and astrologer at the nexus of cosmological, geographical, imperial, and ethnographic theorization. Manilius’ *Astronomica*, a poetic study of astrology and its effect over microcosmic reality, propounded a system of cosmic-terrestrial interdependence, whereby a study of sidereal phenomena enabled humans to garner knowledge of the cosmos and utilize it to various effects, both global and particular. As the opening section of the poem proclaims, Manilius traverses the study of the heavens “to mark

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17 Hippolytus, *Ref*. V.13.1 (Marcovich, 174). In clinging to the teachings of the astrologers, the Peratics abandon their fealty to Christ: “For I shall set down, in contrast with the previously mentioned Chaldaic art of the astrologers, some of the Peratic treatises, from which, by means of comparison, there will be an opportunity of perceiving how the Peratic doctrines are those confessedly of the astrologers, not of Christ” (*Ref*. V.13.13 [Marcovich, 177]). In addition, the heretics who allegorize Aratus’ *Phaenomena* translate, with the aid of Scripture, its astrological findings into a Christian cosmology, polluting and corrupting Scripture and ensnaring the minds of those stunned by their wondrous findings but fail to grasp the broader machinations: “wherefore I desire that no one, astonished by similar wonders of those who interpret the aspect of heaven, should, like the owl, be taken captive” (*Ref*. IV.46.5 [Marcovich, 131]). In urging followers of the heretics “to retrace their course to the serene haven of the truth,” Hippolytus abuts this imminent desire for a return to truth with a dismantling of the heretics’ system of Christian knowledge (*Ref*. IV.46.2-3 [Marcovich, 130]).


how it controls the birth of all living beings through its sign.” Manilius, as a “hard” astrologer, someone who ascribes causative (not merely associative) control to the stars, propounds a system that cedes all-encompassing power to determine the fate of humankind. As an explanatory mechanism for the course of history, the governance of the home and the city, the paths of war, filial relations, among other conditions, institutions, and historical phenomena, Manilius’ treatise theorizes, if ambiguously, the ethnographic impulse embedded within ancient astrological discourse: “the ethnic and national differences among the peoples of the earth are due to the fact that different signs of the zodiac dominate different regions, crucially influencing the appearance and lifestyle of their inhabitants.”

According to Manilius, the chorographic division of the world into three continents, Libya, Asia, and Europe, each identified and categorized by an overarching quality (the serpentine Libya, the wealthy Asia, and Europe for its heroes and cities) correlates with zodiacal governance:

These then are the boundaries which land and sea are to be summoned to observe, for the creator has divided the world into portions, distributing it among the individual signs. To each guardian power he has given a special region of the world to rule, bestowing also the peoples and mighty cities proper to them, wherein the signs should claim their predominant influences. And just as the human frame is apportioned among the signs and the protection they afford, though collectively extending over the whole body, is in addition


21Volk, *Manilius and His Intellectual Background*, “In his system, the heavenly bodies do not only signal fate, but themselves bring about the manifold events that befal human beings, as is apparent already from the poet’s announcement of his topic as conscia fati | sidera diuersos hominum uariantia casus (‘the stars, knowledgeable of fate, which govern the diverse fortunes of men’ [Astr. 1.1–2]), 61.

22Volk, *Manilius and His Intellectual Background*, 102. See Manilius, *Astr.* 4.696–806 (Goold, 276–286). The most thorough treatment of Manilius’ astrogeography (or ethnographic astrology) is found in Godefroid De Callataÿ, “La géographie zodiacale de Manilius (Astr. 4, 744–817), avec une note sur l’Énéide virgilienne,” *Latomus* 60 (2001): 35–66. Manilius details the distinguishing features of the various peoples and lands of the known world. As Callataÿ observes, the poet is especially interested in charting the differences between nations via an elaboration of dissimilarities of skin color, vocal intonation, language, customs, agricultural practices, and animal husbandry.
exercised separately over the limbs allocated among them...so in like manner do
different signs lay claim to different lands. For this reason the human race is so
arranged that its practices and features vary: nations are fashioned with their
own particular complexions; and each stamps with a character of its own the
like nature and anatomy of the human body which all share.\textsuperscript{23}

While the signs of the zodiac comport with territories they govern (owing, as Tamsyn Barton
notes, to “myth of other analogical associations”\textsuperscript{24})—the Bull is appropriate for Scythia, Asia,
and the Arabs; the Crab for Ethiopia; Capricorn for Germany, etc.—Woolf insists that, “the
relationship between signs and peoples are left vague.”\textsuperscript{25} On account of this ambiguity (the
unspecified degree to which astrology or sidereal movement exclusively governs or
determines ethnic or national difference), Woolf further posits that the astrological
determinism of the Astromonica functions as “an additional set of factors” within ancient
ethnographic discourse.\textsuperscript{26} In other words, astrology does not supplant—instead, it
complements—alternative ethnographic paradigms such as climatic determinism or ancestral
genealogy.\textsuperscript{27} Manilius is clearly following in a philosophical (Pre-Socratic, Platonic,
Aristotelian, Stoic, etc.) tradition of harnessing the explanatory capacity of cosmology to
elucidate the observable phenomena of the natural world.\textsuperscript{28} And, moreover, because the

\textsuperscript{23} Manilius, Astr. 4.696-714 (Goold, 276-8).

\textsuperscript{24} Barton, Ancient Astrology, 181.

\textsuperscript{25} Manilius, Astr. 4.725a (Goold, 280). Woolf, Tales of the Barbarians, 50: “Libra rules over Italy, Gaul and Germany
under Capricorn. Libra is appropriate because the balance represents the fact that it measures all things, because
the equal length of days and nights makes it the normalized centre, because Rome raises and depresses the
fortunes of peoples placed in the scales. Capricorn is appropriate for Germany because it is a hybrid of man and
best (like all barbarians) and because it is ambiguous between land and see, like Germany itself with its tides.” See

\textsuperscript{26} Woolf, Tales of the Barbarians, 50 (emphasis his).

\textsuperscript{27} Woolf, Tales of the Barbarians, 50.

\textsuperscript{28} On the intersection of cosmology, astrology, and philosophy, consult Barton, Ancient Astrology, 32-63; and David
E. Hahm, The Origins of Stoic Cosmology (Athens, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1977); and, above all else, Otto
Neugebauer, A History of Ancient Mathematical Astronomy, especially vol. 2.
universe itself is “formed by the diverse elements of nature—air and fire, earth and stretched-out sea,” cosmology conditions the study of geography, ethnography, and climatology. While the Astronomica is unsystematic on the point of detailed ethnographic causation, Manilius’ concluding remarks on the ethnographic reasoning of astrologically-related physiology construct an explicitly causal parallelization between the structure of the heavens (what Volk terms the macrocosm) and geographical and humanistic organization (two different iterations of microcosm). This conceptual broadening of the governing capacity and force of the cosmic horoscope is punctuated by two concurrent causalities: first, that “thus is the world for ever distributed among the twelve signs, and from the signs, and from the signs themselves must the laws prevailing among them be applied to the areas they govern,” and second that, “every man shun or seek a place to live in, so hope for loyalty or be forewarned of peril, according to the character which has come down to earth from high heaven.” As Volk tersely explains it, “on earth as it is in heaven, man is ruled by the stars, not only through his horoscope, but also in terms of his dwelling place and country of origin.” The world of men, as it were, follows the order of the stars.

At one particular juncture in his poem, having just outlined the geographical distribution of the signs (each sign “rules” a particular region, “wherein the signs should claim

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29 Manilius, Astr. 1.248–9 (Goold, 22-24). See Volk, Manilius and His Intellectual Background, 61 n.8: “Manilius appears to vacillate between considering the stars themselves to be independent agents and regarding them as the mere tools of such diverse superior powers as the universe, god, nature, and fate (cf. the quotation that follows in the text with those in the next fn.). However, this does not constitute a contradiction, since, in the poet’s pantheistic cosmos, mundus (‘universe’), deus (‘god’), natura (‘nature’), and fatum (‘fate’) to some extent function as synonyms, and the starry sky can likewise be referred to as mundus and thus be identified with the cosmos as a whole.”

30 Volk, Manilius and His Intellectual Background, 102-103, 212-215, 221-223.

31 Manilius, Astr. 4.4.815-7 (Goold, 286-88).

32 Volk, Manilius and His Intellectual Background, 102-3.
their predominant influence”), Manilius coordinates the physiology of human difference with climatological and geographical forces.33

The Ethiopians stain the world and depict a race of men steeped in darkness; less sun-burnt are the natives of India; the land of Egypt, flooded by the Nile, darkens bodies more mildly owing to the inundation of its fields: it is a country nearer to us and its moderate climate imparts a medium tone. The Sun-god dries up with dust the tribes of Africans amid their desert lands.34

Shortly thereafter, the above example (along with other naturalistic phenomena) is streamlined into a fairly straightforward theory: “the signs shine upon the special regions to which they have been allocated and imbue with their climate (suo aere) the peoples that lie beneath.”35 There is a correspondence, then, between astrological determinism and climatological determinism. Moreover, while Manilius had offered an explicit “assignation of zodiac signs to zones,” which could implicate climatological effects, the vast majority of his treatise explains the relationship between zodiacs and zones in mythological terms (the worshippers of Aries, for instance, follow from the myth of the golden fleece).36 Here, we glimpse Woolf’s notion of complementary ethnographic theories in action simultaneously. By contrast, Ptolemy’s astrological text theorizes the relationship between peoples and the stars in fixed ethnological and climatological terms. Ptolemy’s Tetrabiblos, according to Tamsyn Barton, propounded the most complicated and systematic theorization of the intersection of astrology, climatology, physiognomy, and ethnography.37 Indeed, the totality of the second

33 Manilius, Astr. 4.700 (Goold, 278).
34 Manilius, Astr. 4.723-729 (Goold, 280).
35 Manilius, Astr. 4.742-3 (Goold, 278).
36 Manilius, Astr. 4.743-935 (Goold, 280-296).
37 Tamsyn Barton, Ancient Astrology, 182-3. See also her Power and Knowledge: Astrology, Physiognomics, and Medicine under the Roman Empire (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 84, 92–94, and 120–122. For more on Ptolemy, astrology, and ethnography, see Benjamin Isaac, The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity (Princeton:
book of his *Tetrabiblos* is an investigation of geographical (or ethnographic) astrology. The book begins by explaining the distinction between the two main parts (μέρη) or branches of astrology, the first of which governs territories and/or countries (and shall be the focus of Book II) and the second of which governs the individual (Book III):

Since, then, prognostication by astronomical means is divided into two great and principal parts, and since the first and more universal (γενικωτέρου) is that which relates to whole races, countries, and cities (ὁλα έθνη και χώρας και πόλεις λαμβανόμενου), which is called general (καθολικόν), and the second and more specific is that which relates to individual men, which is called genethliialogical, we believe it fitting to treat first of the general division, because such matters are naturally swayed by greater and more powerful causes than are particular events.38

The distinction between mundane and genethliialogical astrology—the former applies to corporate or national character, events, and effects, while the latter claims predictive determination over individual character by way of fixing the horoscope at birth—illustrates the bipartite dominion of the astrological arts. Neither the nation nor the individual is beyond the reach of its explanatory and deterministic capacity: astrology provides answers and systemization.

Following Polemo of Laodicea, the second-century sophist, Ptolemy articulates a tripartite division of the world: “the demarcation of national characteristics (έθνικων ἰδιωμάτων τα...διαιρεῖσθαι) is established in part by entire parallels and angles, through their position relative to the ecliptic and the sun” and includes the northern parallels, the southern

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parallels, and the central region. Those who are “far removed from the zodiac” in the “more northern parallels” inhabit a cooler climate and are themselves cooled (white in complexion, for example). Similarly, “the southernmost of them are in general more shrewd and inventive, and better versed in knowledge of things divine because their zenith is close to the zodiac and to the planets revolving about it.” And, of course, those who exist in the middle, between the extremes, “share in the equable temperature of the air, which varies, to be sure, but has not violent changes from heat to cold. They are therefore medium in coloring, of moderate stature, in nature equable, live close together, and are civilized in their habits (καὶ τοῖς ἤθεσιν ἠμέροι τυγχάνουσι).” Ptolemy’s text, however, moves beyond this tripartite schema and introduces a four-fold world, each quarter of which is ruled by a triad of zodiacal signs. The north-western quadrant of the world, which is governed by Aries, Leo, and Sagittarius, consists of the territories Britain, Galatia (Transalpina), Germany, Bastarnia, Gaul (Cisalpina), Apulia, Sicily, Tyrrhenia, Celtica, and Spain. The nations of this quarter have a general similarity—they are “independent, liberty-loving, fond of arms, industrious, very warlike...cleanly, and magnanimous,” and yet they are distinguished by their familiarity and/or proximity to one of the three zodiacal signs of the region. Because, then, Britain is more familiar with Aries, they “are fiercer, more-headstrong, and bestial” (ἀγριώτεροι καὶ οὐθαδέστεροι καὶ θηριώδεις), while the Sicilians, following Leo, “are more masterful,

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39 Ptolemy, *Tetrabiblos* II.2 (Robbins, 120).
40 Ptolemy, *Tetrabiblos* II.2 (Robbins, 122).
41 Ptolemy, *Tetrabiblos* II.2 (Robbins, 124).
42 Ptolemy, *Tetrabiblos* II.2 (Robbins, 124).
43 Ptolemy, *Tetrabiblos* II.3 (Robbins, 128).
44 Ptolemy, *Tetrabiblos* II.3 (Robbins, 134).
benevolent, and co-operative.”45 In detailing ethnic characters, Ptolemy explicitly intrudes into the domain of the ethnographers and the physiognomists (the study of the relationship between outward appearance and inward character); astrology, he contends, provided a systematic explanation of human diversity via an analysis of climatological and cosmological principles. Climatic determinism (as a mode of geographical and cosmological ethnography) is, in fact, embedded within Ptolemy’s work (as well as in the Astronomica’s descriptions).46 Ptolemy conjoined ethnographic difference with climatological phenomena, which were, in turn, bound by cosmological principles.

Though, as Woolf notes, “the mechanisms of explanation, in which the planets as well as the zodiacal constellations” differ between Manilius and Ptolemy, they both ascribe the ethnic stereotypes of various nations to astrological and broader cosmological patterns.47 In creating a hierarchical dependence between the realm of the cosmos and the world of men, astrology postulated a system of governance over the entire universe and its human participants. Whether at the level of the individual or the nation—genethliological or mundane—astrology sought to organize the world by measurable, observable rules and regulations. The universe, despite its seeming infinitude and diversity, and the humans within it can be arrayed by the fixed and perpetual patterns of the stars. The state of the world—its

45 Ptolemy, Tetrabiblos II.3 (Robbins, 134).

46 On climatological and environmental determinism (the influence of nature (physis) on human difference and behavior) in ancient literature, see Jonathan Hall, Hellenicity: 196-198; Benjamin Isaac, The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity, 55-109 (Isaac discusses the following authors: Herodotus, Pseudo-Hippocrates, Xenophon, Polybius, Vitruvius, Posidonius, Aristotle, Vegetius, Cicero, Livy, Strabo, Lucan, Pliny, Tacitus, Seneca, Caesar, Ptolemy); and Rosalind Thomas, Herodotus in Context: Ethnography, Science and the Art of Persuasion (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 75-101. The notable texts are the late fifth-century pseudo-Hippocratic treatise, Airs, Waters, Places and Herodotus’ Histories, even though the latter privileges an investigation of culture over against environmental factors.

47 Woolf, Tales of the Barbarians, 51.
geography, ethnography, climatology, etc.—is organized and comprehended at the
macroscopic and microscopic levels through an investigation of the heavens.

For Hippolytus, the astrologically inclined heretics not only pollute Christian teaching,
via admixture with Chaldean and Greco-Roman error, they also undermine Christian notions
of authority, knowledge, and sacred history. With the power of the horoscope, astrologers
“could be seen as an independent means of discovering the future.”48 The astrological arts
emphatically bound human fate to the power of the stars and seemed to produce an all-
embracing schematization of causal determination for both individuals and nations. Not
only did the art of astrology disrupt notions of human free will, it also lessened the
omnipotence of the Christian God, who became subservient and secondary to the position of
the stars. The depreciation of God’s omnipotence further included theories of astrological
control over the particularities of human difference. The heretics embraced, by association, an
organizational model of human diversity that was untenable for Christian writers and the
Christian interpretation of scripture and sacred history.49 The astrologers’ inclusion of a
systematic theory of human difference—a way of explaining both personal and communal
characteristics throughout the world—garnered the attention of Hippolytus, who offered a
sweeping and extremely detailed, though entirely borrowed, response. By engaging with the

48 Barton, Ancient Astrology, 72.

49 On Christianity’s complex attitude toward astrology, see Tamsyn S. Barton, Power and Knowledge, 62-69; Barton, Ancient Astrology, 71-85; and Wolfgang Hübner, Zodiacus Christianus: Jüdisch-christliche Adaptionem des Tierkreises von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart (Königstein: Beiträge zur Klassischen Philologie, 1983). While astrology was most commonly linked with heretical thinking within the Christian intellectual tradition, authors as diverse as Sidonius Apollinaris, Origen, and Terullian (among others) seem to have allowed room for the astrologers to practice their skill and conceded that they had (or once had) wisdom and even wisdom of the future. Perhaps the most problematic hurdle for Christians to explain was the presence of the Magi in the Gospel of Matthew. Because the association between magi and astrology was altogether obvious, the Christian interpretations to undo the astrological presence were diverse and multifold. See Barton, Ancient Astrology, 76. A nice summarization of Augustine’s position, for instance, can be found in Thomas O’Loughlin, “The Development of Augustine the Bishop’s Critique of Astrology,” Augustinian Studies 30:1 (1999): 83-103.
ethnographic theory of astrological determinism—the theory that the positions of the zodiac causally conditioned human phenotypes, personalities, and attitudes—Hippolytus affixes his heresiological reasoning to a debate, in part, over the terms of ethnographic and macroscopic theorization.

Hippolytus’s plan of attack against the astrologers focuses on the known particulars of their “τέχνη,” what Sextus terms “a method of attack at close quarters/at first causes/origins,” rather than a broadly construed conceptual denial of the celestial impact upon the terrestrial or the impossibility of a singularly fatalistic or pre-determined mode of existence. To dispel the authoritative prescience of the astrological art and the knowledge it claims to receive uniquely, Hippolytus forswears the very possibility of fixing the horoscope (“it is impossible to fix the horoscope”), which demolishes the entire astrological enterprise: “for from this are derived the rest of the cardinal points.” First, the obtainment of a horoscope depends upon the astrologers’ knowledge of the precise moment of an individual’s generation, whether from the moment of conception or physical birth (the two possible points from which the horoscope can be dated). Having dismissed the possibility of affixing the moment of conception, Hippolytus, quoting from Sextus verbatim, proceeds to frame the ascertainment of birth

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50 Hippolytus, Ref. IV.2.3 (Marcovich, 93); Sextus, Math. V.49 (Bury, 342). See also Augustine, De Haeresibus LXX.1.13-21 in S. Aurelii Augustini Pars XIII, ed. R. Vander Plaetse and C. Beukers, CCSL 46 (Brepols: Turnhout, 1969), 334.

51 Hippolytus, Ref. IV.3. Tamsyn Barton, Power and Knowledge, describes quite succintly the two “basic lines of argument against astrology” from the second century B.C. to the Byzantine period. First, it is asked how it can be asserted that the physical or mental characteristics of a person depend on the configuration of the stars at birth or conception, when in fact the same bodily or mental traits are to a large extent found in all the members of one people, and, alternatively, the instances in which large numbers of people die at the same time, though they were born at different times, are brought up. The case of the destinies of twins serves frequently to illustrate the converse: How can two people under the same astral influence turn out so differently? Second, there are attacks on what the writers represent as the principles of astrogography, insofar as it is concerned with astral influence on the inhabitants of particular regions...The apologists engage even less than their predecessors with the theory and practice of ‘scientific’ or savant astrology, though with better excuse that such research was seen as highly compromising” (65).

52 Sextus, Math. V.55-67 (Bury, 344-350).
moment as equally fraught. Aside from wondering what exactly constitutes the moment of birth—“when the fetus begins to incline towards the orifice, or when it may project a little, or when it may be borne to the ground?”—Hippolytus defies any astrologer (via the midwife or the attendant) to pinpoint the moment of any of these three states of birth. But even if one granted them the ability to mark the moment of the child’s existence from physical birth or conception, the second fallacious link of the horoscope’s chain obviates the first. By the clanging of a metallic rim/gong, what Sextus calls the horologe, word of the child’s birth is transmitted to the astrologer who “from an elevated place is contemplating the stars.” But, as Hippolytus reminds his readers, just as there is a temporal lag between the descent of the axe and the tree’s fall, so too does time elapse between the moment the gong is struck and the sound reaches the astrologer. And in the interim, the position of the stars has changed. Thirdly, it is not at all easy, Hippolytus insists, to read the constellations of the sky, least of all because the position of the “rising star” will cohere with the horizontal position of the observer: “in one place its declination will be supposed to be the horoscope, and in another the ascension the horoscope....”

Each of the three steps in fixing the horoscope are described, scrutinized, and summarily dismissed. Having recounted and refuted the procedures undergirding the determination of the horoscope, Hippolytus next considers the astrologers’ predictive effective claims. Sextus Empiricus had distinguished two methods the Chaldeans deployed “in

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53 Hippolytus, Ref. IV.4.1 (Marcovich, 95).
54 Hippolytus, Ref. IV.4.4 (Marcovich, 96).
55 Hippolytus, Ref. IV.5.1 (Marcovich, 97). The tripartite process of affixing the horoscope merely agglomerates a series of exigent potentialities into an enervated mess of impossibility.
making their forecasts of the ‘effects.’”\(^{56}\) The first, which he terms the simpler effects, “are those which occur by reason of the Sign or the simple power of a star—as, for instance, that ‘this particular star when it is in this particular Sign produces men of such and such a kind.’”\(^{57}\)

The causal paradigm correlates a single sidereal position with an individual’s disposition or character. The second, “more exact” paradigm examines a series of sidereal arrangements (a star’s position in the horoscope, the mid-heaven, and the anti-mid-heaven) to ascertain the precise anthropological effects. The difference lay in the degree of methodological sophistication, not in the effect’s claims; both astrological modes claim the same findings. Since it bears no relevance to his central contention against the folly of astrological anthropology or ethnography, Hippolytus reports that they proffer “an account concerning the action of the zodiacal signs, to which they say that the things (being) generated (therein) are assimilated” (οἷς φασὶ προσομοιοῦθαι τὰ ἀποτικτόμενα).\(^{58}\)

A few chapters later in the Book IV, he returns to a discussion of astrological determinism and the portentous “art of divination” (μετωποσκοπικὴ μαντεία).\(^{59}\) Though Hippolytus uses yet a second term to categorize all forms of Greek speculation (μεριμνητῆς or those with an anxious mind), the anxiety of the astrologers corresponds precisely to the Chaldean art:

There are some who ascribe to the stars figures that mold the ideas and dispositions of men, assigning the reason of this to births [that have taken place] under particular stars; they thus express themselves: those who are born under Aries will be of the following kind: long head, red hair, contracted eyebrows, pointed forehead, eyes grey and lively, drawn cheeks, long-nosed,

\(^{56}\) Sextus, \textit{Math.} V.41 (Bury, 340).

\(^{57}\) Sextus, \textit{Math.} V.41 (Bury, 340).

\(^{58}\) Hippolytus, \textit{Ref.} V.6.1 (Marcovich, 98; altered from ANF).

\(^{59}\) Hippolytus, \textit{Ref.} V.15.3 (Marcovich, 110).
expanded nostrils, thin lips, tapering chin, wide mouth. These, he says, will partake of the following nature: cautious, subtle, perspicuous, prudent, indulgent, gentle, over-anxious, persons of secret resolves, fitted for every undertaking...they, in the majority of cases, end their days in a foreign land.\textsuperscript{60}

Hippolytus includes descriptive biological and dispositional accounts for each of the twelve signs of the zodiac. The text, unfortunately, is corrupt at the point at which Hippolytus ventures to conclude his foray into the deterministic holdings of the astrological signs. And while his consideration of the astrological arts owes to its prevalence among certain Christian sects, Hippolytus is nonetheless adamant that the astrologers propose a fundamentally flawed model to account for human diversity. As he reminds his readers, the claims of “sidereal influences themselves” are easily refuted:\textsuperscript{61}

For those who have been born at the same time do not spend the same life, but some, for example, have been made kings, and others have grown old in fetters. There has been born none equal, at all events, to Alexander the Macedonian, though many were brought forth along with him throughout the earth; [and] none equal to the philosopher Plato. Wherefore the Chaldean, examining the time of the birth in any particular latitude, will not be able to say accurately, whether a person born at this time will be prosperous.\textsuperscript{62}

While Hippolytus never himself systematically or concretely links astrology as a causative factor in ethnographic reasoning, he explicitly invokes, again quoting Sextus, the impossible confluence of ethnography, geography, and astrology. In other words, he posits that astrology, in a move beyond what Woolf had suggested with respect to Manilius, is not merely insufficiently capable of mapping the known world (that is, to function in lieu of geographic or

\textsuperscript{60} Hippolytus, \textit{Ref.} IV.15.4 (Marcovich, 110).

\textsuperscript{61} Hippolytus, \textit{Ref.} IV.5.4 (Marcovich, 97).

\textsuperscript{62} Hippolytus, \textit{Ref.} IV.5.4 (Marcovich, 97); Sextus, \textit{Math.} V.88 (Bury, 360). The passages are nearly identical, save for some minor stylistic variations.
genealogical models), but its incapacity derives from its utter fraudulence. While Hippolytus directs his ire against genethliatical astrology—the fixity of individual identity and life by means of the horoscope (instead of a more corporatized, mundane, astrology)—he is still contesting a model for explaining human difference, both phenotypically and dispositionally. The debate over astrology’s diminution of God’s power is not simply about fate and free will, rather, it engages the core of Christianity’s explanatory capacity: how do we conceptualize the natural world and how do we understand the human position within it? Astrology, both individually and communally, hews to a false narrative and false powers. The principle at stake is one of macroscopic theorization. Hippolytus is telling a story of Christianity’s control over the contours of the world, its nature, its sectarianism, and the human condition. In order to produce his own genealogical narrative, built around Genesis and other sources, he must clear away competing thought systems.

Indeed, since the qualities of the individual born under Virgo are in no way related to the zodiac’s name, the ethnographic determinism of the entire paradigm collapses under scrutiny:

For, according to them, it is not possible for an Ethiopian to be born in Virgo; otherwise he would allow that such a one is white, with long straight hair and the rest. But I am rather of opinion, that the ancients imposed the names of received animals upon certain specified stars, for the purpose of knowing them better, not from any similarity of nature.

Unlike Hippolytus, who merely glosses the fraudulence, Empiricus clarifies the process by noting three orders of distinction: (1) heavenly and earthly creatures are fundamentally incompatible; (2) merely because the stars that compose the sign of Leo happen to look like a Lion does not necessitate a physical or biological relation between the cosmic shape and the human figure; (3) it is entirely possible that the name Leo was chosen simply “for the sake of clearness in exposition,” since the description of some of the zodiacs seems a forced resemblance (Sextus, Math. V.98 [Bury, 364-66]). As Sextus further remarks, “so it is not reasonable that life is ordered according to the motions of the stars; or if it is reasonable, certainly it is beyond our comprehension” (Sextus, Math. V.95 [Bury, 364]).

For the same passage from Sextus, Math.V.102 (Bury, 366-8): “And again, if he who has the Virgin for horoscope is straight-haired, bright-eyed, and white-skinned, it must follow that none of the Ethiopians has the Virgin for

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64 For the same passage from Sextus, Math.V.102 (Bury, 366-8): “And again, if he who has the Virgin for horoscope is straight-haired, bright-eyed, and white-skinned, it must follow that none of the Ethiopians has the Virgin for
What is striking about Hippolytus’ argument here is the terms on which it proceeds and its larger import for his text as a whole. Indeed, the entirety of his *Refutatio* explicitly analogizes the theorizations and practices of the Celtic Druids, Babylonian astrologers, Assyrian numerologists, Indian Brahmans, Jewish prophets, and Greek philosophers with the now burgeoning world of Christian heresy. Not only do the heresies readily and freely appropriate from these cultural elites, but they also function as their intellectual kin. The heretics are the most recent illustration of diversity within the known world. By proposing a precise intellectual and conceptual correspondence between these two categories of knowledge practitioners, Hippolytus fashions a world that is now marked by its Christian, and indeed, heretical character. At the same time, the substance of his argument turns upon an analysis of the macroscopic facets of ethnographic theorization. His refutation of a particular heretical appropriation—the incorporation of astrological knowledge into Christian tradition—becomes a debate about the legitimacy of certain paradigms for understanding the nature and causes of human diversity. And while Hippolytus eventually offers his own model for understanding human diversity, built upon certain biblical precedents, most notably Genesis 11, his text blurs the distinction between heretical etiologies and human, cultural, religious, and ethnic etiologies. In rejecting the work of the astrologers and astrologically inclined heretics, Hippolytus conceives his heresiology as a text that tries to identify and thus explain the root causes of philosophical, religious, and ethnic diversity of thought, practice, and custom. Astrological determinism does not tell the story of human difference that Hippolytus himself wishes to articulate. The task of explaining the rise of the heretics emerges as an altogether natural outgrowth of Christian efforts to categorize and organize the intellectual and cultural horoscope, else they will be granting that an Ethiopian is white, bright-eyed and straight-haired, which is of all things the most absurd.”
world around them. Even in dismissing certain principles of knowledge, we see clear evidence here of the textual mechanisms by which Christians appropriated and applied the logic, techniques, and paradigms of ancient ethnographic discourse. In contesting heretical theories of human difference, Hippolytus is engaged in a dispute over macroscopic ethnography: he is thinking ethnographically.

_Etiologies Transformed: Hereticizing Mythology, Cosmology, and Human Behavior_

Although the primary avenues of errancy down which the heretics travel were philosophical, astrological, and genealogical (both intellectually and biologically), Book V of the _Elenchos_ posits another source of these doctrinal machinations. The book begins with a brief explanation of its contents: it will enumerate the heresies of the Naasseni, the Peratae, the Sethians, and the tenets of a certain Justinus. And while the charge leveled against the Naasseni concerns their dependence on the philosophical systems of the Phrygians, Thracians, Assyrians, and Egyptians, the opinions offered by the heresiarch Justinus are of a curiously different kind; they proceed, contends Hippolytus, “from the marvelous tales of Herodotus the historiographer” (ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν Ἡροδότου τοῦ ἱστοριογράφου τερατολογιῶν). Having abandoned the holy books, Justinus is accused of appropriating the “legendary accounts prevalent among the Greeks” (τὰ παρ’ Ἑλληνικαὶ μυθενόμενα διηγούμενα) and using them as models for his own doctrinal positions on “the generation of the universe” (εἰς τὴν τῶν ὀλων

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65 As does each extant book with the lone exception of Book IV.

66 Hippolytus, _Ref_. V.5 (Marcovich, 140).
γέννησιν), angelology, and anthropology.\(^{67}\) Hippolytus, expressing a familiarity with Justinus’ now lost book \textit{Baruch}, expounds that the heretic transposed the legendary account of Heracles’ sexual relations with the half-woman, half-serpent Echidna,\(^{68}\) mother of Agathyrsus, Gelonus, and Scythes, into an allegory of cosmic creation and arrangement and the role of Christ in that process. In the \textit{Histories} itself, Heracles’ sexual encounter with Echidna is one of three accounts Herodotus offers to trace the origins of the Scythian land and its inhabitants. Purportedly conveyed by the Greeks of Pontus, the legend posits that Scythes, the youngest child of Heracles’ sexual encounter with Echidna, received the right to stay “in the country now called Scythia,” because he alone possessed the skill to draw the bow of Heracles and don his father’s vessel-tipped girdle.\(^{69}\) And “from Scythes [son] of Heracles,” reports the Halicarnassian, “is born the whole line of the kings of Scythia (τοὺς αἰεὶ βασιλέας γινομένους Σκυθέων).\(^{70}\) Though Herodotus himself places stock in the third of the three traditions of Scythia—that the Scythians fled Asia on account of their conflict with the Massagetae and displaced the Cimmerians from their ancestral land (which is renamed Scythia)—and rejects the myth of Heracles and Echidna, Hippolytus explicitly glosses the story’s latter half (and its larger

\(^{67}\) Hippolytus, Ref. V.23.1; 25.4 (Marcovich, 198; 200).

\(^{68}\) Though she is described without the proper name Echidna in both Hippolytus’s summary and in Herodotus’ \textit{Histories}, both texts employ the adjective ἐχίδναν/ἐχίδνης to describe this hybrid creature.


\(^{70}\) Herodotus, \textit{Hist.} IV.10 (Godley, 208).
context), excising the narration’s relevance for the foundation of the Scythians’ ancestral line, in order to begin his discussion of Justinus’ heretical appropriation straightaway.\(^71\)

Though Hippolytus brackets Justinus’ cosmological narrative with condemnatory rhetoric and a meager and dismissive refutation, he recounts the narrative itself without overtly polemicizing its content.\(^72\) What the presbyter lists is a complex and at times confounding sequence of events, in which Justinus uses the hierarchy of the creative agents of the universe to uncover the true condition of humanity and its creators. Embedded within Justinus’ admixture of Herodotus, sacred oaths, and other non-scriptural material is a history of the universe and its creation, the origins of Christianity, and an etiology of sexual and marital practices, which Justinus elucidates through his concomitantly literal and allegorical exegesis of the cosmological narrative. The universe, according to Justinus, is governed by three unbegotten principles: the Good One known as Priapus, the Father called Elohim, who lacks foresight and is invisible (ἀπρόγνωστος < καὶ ἄγνωστος>, and the female named Edem, who is of two minds and two bodies—the cosmological equivalent of the serpentine Echidna.\(^73\)

Ensnared by each other, Edem and Elohim copulate and produce twenty-four angels (twelve paternal and twelve maternal). The angels in toto represent paradise, which is depicted as the conjugal joy of Edom and Elohim, and each is fashioned allegorically as a tree of the garden in

\(^{71}\) Herodotus, *Hist.* IV.11 (Godley, 210). Hippolytus, *Ref.* V.25.4 (Marcovich, 200). “But after these details, a lengthy account [follows] from Herodotus, farewell, however, to it for now” (μακρὸς δὲ ὁ μετὰ ταῦτα μύθος Ἡροδότῳ, χαρέτω δὲ τὸ νῦν).

\(^{72}\) Cf. the polemical commentary one finds embedded in Epiphanius’ descriptions. Hippolytus tends to bracket the doctrines he outlines from his refutation of them. Of course, since Hippolytus remains our lone extant source about Justinus and his opinions, it may well be that the very style and content of Hippolytus’s retelling is explicitly misleading and implicitly polemical.

\(^{73}\) Hippolytus, *Ref.* V.26.1 (Marcovich, 200).
Paradise. The angels receive “the most beautiful earth,” which is, “from the parts [of Edem] above the groin of human form and from gentle parts” (ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπὲρ βουβώνα ἀνθρωποειδῶν καὶ ἡμέρων χωρίων), out of which they fashion mankind (τὸν ἀνθρώπον); the lower parts of Echidna, those resembling a snake, generate the animal kingdom. Elohim, having completed the creation, ascends “to the elevated parts of heaven,” where he discovers the Good One, the Lord above him, who charges him to stay in the highest reaches, assigning Edem reign over the earth. The maternal angels are then divided into four principles, and each principle is represented as a river of the οἰκουμένη. The angels, who manage (διέπουσιν) the world with a satrap-like authority as agents of Edem, alternating their rule, release the evils of famine and disease upon the world in accordance with the will of Edem. Heartbroken by her separation from Elohim, Edem further orders the angel Babel (also known as Venus) “to cause adulteries and dissolutions of marriages among men,” so that humanity can experience her own marital pains. Baruch, one of Elohim’s angels, is sent to paradise to insist that man ignore Naas (the

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74 Baruch, the third of the paternal angels, is the tree of life. Naas, the third of the maternal angels, is the tree of knowledge of good and evil.

75 Hippolytus, Ref. V.26.7 (Marcovich, 202).

76 In the process of creation, Edem bestowed a soul upon Adam and Eve, while Elohim gave them a spirit. Hippolytus, Ref. V.26.9 (Marcovich, 202).

77 Hippolytus, Ref. V.26.14 (Marcovich, 204).

78 Pheison, Geōn, Tigris, and Euphrates (Φεισόν καὶ Γεών καὶ Τίγρις καὶ Εὐφράτης). Hippolytus, Ref. V.26.11 (Marcovich, 203).

79 Hippolytus, Ref. V.26.11 (Marcovich, 203). “And when Pheison holds sway over places, famine, distress, and affliction prevail in that part of the earth, for the arrangements of these angels is miserly. Similarly also there belong to each part of the four, according to the power and nature of each, evil times and hosts of diseases. And continually, according to the dominion of each fourth part, this stream of evil, just like a current of rivers, careers, according to the will of Edem, uninterruptedly around the world. And from some cause of this description has arisen the necessity of evil” (Ref. V.26.13 [Marcovich, 203].

80 Hippolytus, Ref. V.26.20 (Marcovich, 204–5). Naas is tasked with punishing “the spirit of Elohim, the one which is in men (V.26.20)” in order that Elohim through the spirit might be punished for having deserted his spouse, in violation of the agreements entered into between them” (V.26.21).
malicious maternal angel), who has sexually debauched both Adam and Eve (introducing adultery, again, and sodomy). Baruch implores Adam and Eve to refrain from eating of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, which represents Naas himself. While through punishment and transgression Naas repeatedly chastens humanity’s spirit (and by fiat Elohim), Baruch insists that humanity must follow the remaining eleven (paternal) angels of Edem, “who possess passions, but are not guilty of transgression.”

Justinus’ morality play, wherein the rise of vices and virtues is attached to cosmic fighting and the introduction of the cause of evil (bound, so it seems, to the spirit of the Father within humans), serves as background to the process by which the Good One attempts to redirect the gaze of humanity toward himself. Naas perpetually thwarts Baruch’s efforts to convince generations of supposed divine adherents (Moses and the biblical prophets, most notably) to follow the precepts of Elohim and to return to the Good One. As this cyclical game of instruction and disruption persists, Elohim chooses Heracles, an uncircumcised prophet, to free the spirit of the Father from wickedness imposed by its maternal angelic captives. The twelve labors of Heracles are allegorized as divinely sanctioned efforts to defeat the angels of the spirit’s captivity. Having “divest[ed] him of his power,” the maternal angels ultimately foil Heracles’ efforts to propel the commands of Baruch into the earthly world below. It is only during the reign of Herod that Baruch finds a prophet who can resist the enticements of the angels. Jesus, son of Joseph and Mary, obeyed Baruch and directed humanity to the exalted Father and Priapus. Naas, enraged at Jesus’ faithfulness to the Father and his message, “caused

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81 Hippolytus, Ref. V.26.7 (Marcovich, 202).
82 Hippolytus, Ref. V.26.22 (Marcovich, 205).
83 Hippolytus, Ref. V.26.28 (Marcovich, 206-7).
him to be crucified.” Justinus further asserts, according to Hippolytus, that a number of Greek legends (Leda and the swan, Ganymede and the eagle, Danae and gold) are all allegorized tales of the cosmological events he has just enumerated. Inasmuch as Hippolytus charges Justinus with borrowing from Herodotus, Justinus holds the opposite: he enlightens the truth of Greek μῦθος.

Although Hippolytus’ condensed version of Justinus’ narrative lacks the ethnogenic details of Epiphanius’ Panarion, it operates, as we shall see momentarily, much the same as Epiphanius’ history of heresy. The account functions as an allegorical mechanism by which Greek legends can be subsumed within and explained by a (heretical) Christian cosmology. The systematic attempts of the pseudo-Gnostic Justinus (τὰ Ἰουστίνου τοῦ ψευδογνωστικοῦ ἐπιχειρήματα) to meld together heresy and legend, are decried by Hippolytus as an interpretive paradigm that blurs the genealogical and epistemological divisions he erects between revealed Christian opinion and the philosophical, astrological, and mythological conjecture of the nations. The implication, despite Hippolytus’s mostly temperate rhetoric, is that the philosophers (as the theological representatives par excellence of the nations) have no standing in the genealogy of Christian knowledge; that is, as both a source to be used and (potentially) to be elucidated, the philosophical reflections of the Greeks, Romans, Babylonians, Druids, and Indians exist wholly apart from the traditions of the Christian οἰκουμένη; the theological pursuits of the nations fundamentally fail to accord with an Adamic (in the case of Epiphanius) or Noahide (in the case of Hippolytus) lineage of divine knowledge.

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84 Hippolytus, Ref. V.26.31 (Marcovich, 207).
85 Hippolytus, Ref.V.28.1 (Marcovich, 210).
As with philosophy, Greek legends are likewise disruptive and corrupting barriers to the stability and succession of the Christian epistemological boundaries, insofar as Justinus’ ability to read the truth out of Greek legends posits a meaningful relationship between the two categories or kinds of knowledge. Knowledge and its proper transmission erect and define the genealogical distinction between Christians and the nations, philosophers, astrologers, arithmeticians, mythologizers, and heretics.

The heretics, furnished with their derivative opinions—even if those opinions serve to illuminate the true meaning of “antecedent” sources, tales, legends, etc.—further unsettle the ordering of Christian knowledge by introducing their own books (as repositories of prophecies, legends, exegesis, cosmologies) and founding their own schools (as pedagogical institutions), which generate an alternative history and experiential reality of Christian tradition. To allay his fears of widespread adoption of heretical opinions, Hippolytus similarly proposes that his readers ignore the heretics altogether. In making the case for blissful ignorance, the presbyter invokes the travails of Odysseus, who fended off the seductive and destructive voices of the Sirens by filling his companions’ ears with wax and binding himself to the mast of his ship.

With an overtly Christian emendation, Hippolytus marshals Odysseus’s shrewdness and resolve to promulgate his dictum: “And my counsel to my readers is to adopt a similar

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87 On Callixtus’s founding of a school see Hippolytus, Ref. IX.12.20, 25 (Marcovich, 354, 356). Irenaeus states that Valentinus founded a school and Cerdon had one as well (Adv. haer. I.27.2; 1.11.1, [Contre les hérésies, Livres I, ed. and trans. Adelin Rousseau and Louis Doutreleau, SC 264 [Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1979], 1:2:350; 1:2:167-170]). On schools in the Panarion, see Epiphanius 44.1.2; 46.2.4 (Epiphanius, ed. Karl Holl and Jürgen Dummer, GCS 31 [Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1980], 2:189-90, 2:206). On the heretics’ own books, see Hippolytus, Ref. V.14, 15, 22-24, 27; VII.37; VIII.19; IX.13, 15, 17 (Marcovich, 177-180, 181, 198-199, 208-209; 320; 338-9; 357-359, 360-1, 362-3). On the books of the heretics in Epiphanius see Pan. 26.8.1; 30.15.1; 38.2.4; 39.5.1; 40.2.1, 40.7.5; 45.4.1; 53.1.3; 62.2.4 (Holl, 1:284, 352; Holl and Dummer, 2:66-67, 75, 82, 88, 202, 315).

88 I shall return to the figure of Odysseus in the conclusion.
tactic...to smear their ears with wax and sail through the tenets of the heretics, not even
listening to those [opinions] easily capable of enticing (them) toward pleasure, like the sweet-
toned song of the Sirens, or, by binding oneself to the Cross of Christ, obeying faithfully, not to
be distracted....”

The Greek legends, so it seems, have a Christian use after all. With both
rewritten mythography and applied astrology, Hippolytus’ fear of the heretics emerges as a
deep disquietude over alternative theories of organizing the universe and the people within it.
The Christian conceptualization of the world, its macroscopic ordering and its microscopic
materialization, remains firmly under attack by the hereticization of ethnographic knowledge.

Hippolytus’ Master Narrative: The Birth of Heresy and Intellectual Genealogy

Genealogy possesses a prominent hold over and function within heresiological
literature, where writers use it paradigmatically to illustrate the deviation of the Christian
heresies, the succession of orthodox Christianity, the antiquity and history of the church, and
the proliferation of heterodox traditions. For Hippolytus, genealogy was the tool by which he
could narrate the Christian vision of the world in all its detail and division, while also
explaining the corrupting influence of the heresies. In his Refutatio, the rise of the nations (and
their genealogy) explicitly attested the antiquity of “a nation of worshippers (the pious) of

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90 Hippolytus, Ref. VII.13.3 (Marcovich, 280).
91 For more on the genealogical and procreative language of early Christian authors see Denise Kimber Buell, Why
This New Race, 63-93; Denise Kimber Buell, Making Christians: Clement of Alexandria and the Rhetoric of Legitimacy
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Caroline E. Johnson Hodge, If Sons, Then Heirs: A Study of Kinship and
Ethnicity in the Letters of Paul (New York, Oxford University Press, 2007); Aaron Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument in
Eusebius’ Praeparatio Evangelica (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Susanna Elm, “The Polemical Use of
Rebecca Lyman, “A Topography of Heresy: Mapping the Rhetorical Creation of Arianism,” in Arianism after Arios:
Essays on the Development of Fourth Century Trinitarian Conflicts, ed. Michel R. Barnes and Daniel H. Williams
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1993), 45-64.
God” (τὸ τῶν θεοσεβῶν γένος) “more ancient than all Chaldeans, Egyptians, <and> Greeks.”

Christians, by becoming “friends of God,” had already grafted themselves onto the lineage of this nation of worshippers, the antediluvian devotees of God. The nation of worshippers (both before Noah and after Christ) was defined both positively and negatively: by its piety, on the one hand, and by not positing, on the other, overly complicated cosmologies, investing in astrological symbols and arithmetic equations, or philosophizing incessantly about the nature of God. The nations (τὰ ἔθνη), in contrast, who all trace their ancestry back to Javan, son of Japheth, not only remained affixed to a more recent (νεώτερα) pedigree, as descendants of rather than precursors to Noah, they were likewise “related” by their devotion “to questions of philosophy” (τὰ περὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἀπασχοληθέντα). Though Hippolytus never causally linked philosophy, astrology, idolatry, or magic with the emergence of the nations as Epiphanius explicitly did (as we shall see below), it is clear that he nonetheless defines and organizes the nations by their shared interest in cosmological and philosophical speculation. The “inability to find consensus concerning the deity” among the nations, which included the opinions of the natural, moral, and dialectical philosophers of Greece and the theological reflections of the Persian, Egyptian, Babylonian, and Indian sages and astrologers (among others), further

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91 Hippolytus, Ref. X.30.8 (Marcovich, 407).

92 Hippolytus, Ref. X.31.6 (Marcovich, 408). Hippolytus explicitly circumvents his own call to explain the divine devotion of those who existed before Noah.

93 Hippolytus, Ref. X.31.4-5 (Marcovich, 408). “How would the worshippers of God not be of greater antiquity than all the Chaldeans, Egyptians, and Greeks, of whose father was born from this Japeth [receiving] the name Javan, from whom [also came] the Greeks and Ionians (πῶς οὐ προγενέστεροι ἦσαν οἱ θεοσεβεῖς πάντων Χαλδαίων, Αἰγυπτίων, Ελλήνων—ὡς πατὴρ ἐκ τοῦτο <τοῦ> ἱερεθ γεννᾶται, <τὸ> δόμωμα ἰωύαν, ἐξ οὐ ἔλληνες καί Ἰωνεῖς).

94 Hippolytus, Ref. X.31.5-6 (Marcovich, 409). Their novelty, it is implied, also obviates the validity of their philosophical opinions.
illustrates the disorder of their epistemological relationship with God. \(^95\) As with the Christian heretics, diversity of opinion attested divine alienation. \(^96\) Because philosophy operated as a barrier to understanding the truths of divinity and creation, Hippolytus ventured to explain God’s creative power in order “to elucidate those causes [of creation], which the Greeks, failing to understand, supposed in boastful rhetoric to be the parts of creation, while being ignorant of the creator.” \(^97\) The Greeks’ inability to grasp the truths of creation left them perpetually excluded from the lineage of the nation of worshippers. \(^98\) To join this ancient γένος (race/nation/clan), then, required instruction in God’s nature and creation, a lesson Hippolytus explicitly undertakes at the very end of his treatise. \(^99\) He appeals to the Greeks, Barbarians, Chaldeans, Assyrians, Egyptians, Libyans, Indians, Ethiopians, Celts, and Latins as their advisor, \(^100\) a spiritual mentor of sorts, urging them to spurn the “fallacies of artificial discourse” and the “vain promises of plagiarizing heretics,” and instead embrace the truth and join the nation of worshippers of God. \(^101\)

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\(^{97}\) Hippolytus, Ref. X.32.5 (Marcovich, 410).

\(^{98}\) See Hippolytus, Ref. IV.43; X.6-8 (Marcovich, 127-129; 342-3).

\(^{99}\) Hippolytus, Ref. X.31.6 (Marcovich, 408).

\(^{100}\) In the Prooemium, Hippolytus describes himself as leading an investigation in “expounding the tenets of the several schools with minuteness,” which was begun and transmitted by the apostles (Ref. Pro. 5; Marcovich, 55). “But,” he continues, “we, as their successors, and as participators in this grace, high-priesthood, and office of teaching, as well as being reputed guardians of the Church, must not be found deficient in vigilance, or disposed to suppress correct doctrine” (Ref. Pro. 6 [Marcovich, 55]).

\(^{101}\) Hippolytus Ref. X.34.2 (Marcovich, 415-6).
The heretics, according to the Roman presbyter, are in truth imitators of the Greek philosophers and not practitioners or participants in the tradition of Christian truth. And though Epiphanius will charge the philosophical sects with sowing the seeds of idolatry, impiety, and godlessness, Hippolytus, who expends great energy and space elucidating the philosophical doctrines of Plato, Pythagoras, Aristotle, Empedocles, and Thales, among others, only haphazardly details the errors and confusion among them. In Book I of his *Refutation of all heresies*, for example, he surveys Greek, Druidic, Indian, and Babylonian philosophical doctrines with relative care and dispassion, never polemizing or even contesting their validity; he simply narrates their opinions programmatically. Though as the text unfolds he

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102 Debates about the true identity of Hippolytus, author of the *Elenchos* abound. Though they are largely irrelevant to the argument I am making here, I remain unconvinced by J.A. Cerrato, *Hippolytus between East and West: The Commentaries and the Provenance of the Corpus* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) that Hippolytus was a scion of the East. See also the massive work of Allen Brent, *Hippolytus and the Roman Church in the Third Century: Communities in Tension before the Emergence of a Monarch-Bishop* (New York: Brill, 1995).

103 Thales, Pythagoras, Empedocles, Heraclitus, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, Archelaus, Parmenides, Leucippus, Democritus, Xenophanes, Epyntus, Hippo, Socrates, Archelaus, Plato, Chrysippus, Zeno, Pyrrho the Brahmins among the Indians, the Druids among the Celts, and Hesiod all receive treatment. Though it may be implied, Hippolytus never outright suggests that Greek philosophical opinions were genealogically conditioned. The Prooemium of the work gestures explicitly at the errancy of the philosophers, though, again, it is contextualized and explained as an exercise of intellectual facilitation. There are instances in which Hippolytus challenges the philosophers directly—the riddles of Plato, for instance—but his ire is not homed toward the Greek philosophical tradition. He is content to push them aside, if only to focus his attention firmly on heterodox Christians.

104 In the introduction to his critical edition of the Greek text, Marcovich explains that Book I—later referenced by Hippolytus himself as Τὰ Φιλοσοφούμενα (Ref. IX.8.2 [Marcovich, 343])—would come to exist independently as a *Synopsis of Greek Philosophy*. “It is not surprising,” explains Marcovich, “that this succinct and handy *Synopsis of Greek Philosophy* had been early separated from the rest of the *Elenchos*, most probably to serve as a textbook in philosophy. As a consequence, Book I has its own textual transmission” (1). For the doxographical record of Hippolytus see Jaap Mansfeld, *Heresiography in Context*; and Catherine Osborne, *Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy: Hippolytus of Rome and the Presocratics* (London: Duckworth, 1987). The nearest literary kin may be the multi-volume work of Diogenes Laertius, whose *Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers* showcases a markedly similar compulsion to chronicle and classify, which then reveals and posits expansive questions about the genesis, history, definition, and character of philosophy itself (Diogenes Laertius, *Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers* I.1-21, vol. 1., ed. and trans. R.D. Hicks, Loeb Classical Library 184 [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925, 2-22]. See also James Warren, “Diogenes Laërtius, Biographer of Philosophy,” in *Ordering Knowledge in the Roman Empire*, ed. James König and Tim Whitmarsh [New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007], 133-149; and Allen Brent “Diogenes Laërtius and the Apostolic Succession,” *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 44.3 [1993]: 367-389). Some Greek authors, explains Diogenes, ascribe the origins of philosophy to the barbarians. Dispassionately outlining the evidence of those advocates who trace “the different forms [philosophy] assumed in different countries”—Persians with Magi, Babylonians/Assyrians with Chaldeans, Indians with Gymnosophists, and Celts/Gauls with
would add words of displeasure, bafflement (reading Mt. 10:5 as signifying that Christians “should not attend to the futile doctrines of the Gentiles” and linking the novelty of the nations with philosophical speculation), or outright disagreement, the harshness of his rhetoric is channeled almost exclusively toward the heretics.105 His detailing of philosophical opinions clearly emphasizes less the specific invalidity of those philosophical systems and doctrines and instead serves primarily to illustrate the theological and genealogical deviation of the heresiarchs. As the opening lines of the Proem argue, investigating the details and varieties of philosophical opinion reflects the derangement and danger of the heretics: “for even [the philosophers’] incoherent tenets must be received as reliable, on account of the excessive madness of the heretics (ὑπερβάλλουσαν τῶν αἱρετικῶν μανίαν).”106 The theological ignorance, philosophical speculation, and astrological misguidance of the nations, inasmuch as

Druids—Diogenes neither directly disputes the truthfulness of the evidence nor contests its specific claims (Lives I.6 [Hicks, 6-8]). Instead, he simply asserts that, “these authors forget that the achievements which they attribute to the barbarians belong to the Greeks, with whom not merely philosophy but the human race itself began” (Lives I.3 [Hicks, 4]). For Diogenes philosophy has a precisely Greek genealogy, the origins of which are traced via successional lists (διαδοχαὶ) to the Ionian school of Thales, a Milesian, and the Italian line begun by Pythagoras (Lives I.13-14 [Hicks, 14]). The genetic purity of the philosophical tradition, elaborated with biographical and doxographical details, compels his fellow Greeks (who incidentally supply the entirety of Diogenes’ information about the barbarians’ philosophies) to reclaim the primacy of their own philosophical icons within a Greek intellectual narrative (See Warren, “Diogenes Laërtius,” 141-142). Though on occasion philosophers who are unattested in the succession lists of the prologue disrupt his genetic thesis, the structure of philosophical succession via instruction remains integral to his mapping the history of philosophy (Lives I.13-15 [Hicks, 14-16]. Here Diogenes enumerates the successive lines of the Ionian and Italian schools [without any doctrinal elaboration]. But, as Warren observes, “the Cyrenaics, the Megarians, Empedocles, Pyrrho, Timon, and the Pyrrhonists and those philosophers Diogenes himself labels ‘scattered’ or ‘ungrouped’ [οἱ σποράδην (8.91, 9.20)], Xenophanes and Heraclitus, do not appear in these lists but all figure in the Lives” [141-142]).

105 Hippolytus, Ref. V.23.1 (Marcovich, 198). A prime example of this tendency to criticize the philosophers dismissively and cursorily can be found in Book V. As Hippolytus begins his discussion of the Naasseni, he recapitulates the theme of philosophical dependence, inserting a brief assertion of the value of these philosophical opinions: “For from philosophers the heresiarchs deriving start-points, [and] like cloggers patching together, according to their own particular interpretation, the blunders of the ancients, have advanced them as novelties to those that are capable of being deceived, as we shall prove in the following books” (Ref. V.6.2, [Marcovich, 140]).

106 Hippolytus, Ref. Prooemium 1 (Marcovich, 54; altered from ANF). For more on the madness of the heretics see Hippolytus, Ref. IX.12, 17 on the Elchasaites (Marcovich, 350-6, 362-3). For the madness of the astrologers, to whom the heretics happily affix themselves, see Ref. IV.15.4 (Marcovich, 110).
they are tepidly contested, are juxtaposed rather strikingly with the irrationality and contagion of the heretics. For Hippolytus, the philosophers garner attention in their capacity as a resource for heretical leaders, who, in turn, duplicitously and secretly despoil the teachings of Christ by altering the “evangelical and saving doctrine” of true Christianity. The heretics not only alter apostolic teachings, but they appropriate and refashion the “novel” opinions of the philosophers under the guise of Christian truth. And although Hippolytus expends the first two books of his Elenchos detailing the opinions of the philosophers and astrologers, the substance of their opinions is, in some sense, immaterial to his argument. It is the very idea of introducing anything foreign into the realm of Christian truth that destroys the tradition of the nation of worshippers. In fashioning themselves as teachers and purveyors of Christian truth, the heretics “act despitefully” toward the legacy and tradition of the disciples, which Hippolytus guards as a successor of the apostles.

In deriving their opinions from the philosophers, the heresiarchs attach themselves to a distinctly different theological and intellectual tradition. “Being parts of astrological discovery and the arithmetical arts of the Pythagoreans” (ὅντα μέρη ἀστρολογικῆς ἑφευρέσεως καὶ ἀριθμητικῆς Πυθαγορείου) the doctrines of the heresies are “invalid and far removed from the knowledge that is in accordance with religion” (ὄντα ἄκυρα καὶ μακρὰν τῆς κατὰ

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107 The association between illness and heresy reaches its apex under Epiphanius of Salamis and his Panarion or medicine chest. The text articulates itself as a balm to the disease of heresy. I shall discuss his usage of this rhetoric in chapters two and four.


109 Hippolytus, Ref. VII.31.8; Pro. 6 (Marcovich, 314, 55).
Hippolytus begins and ends his *Elenchos* with the same underlying proposition: the heresies have grafted themselves onto the historically later and (theologically inadequate) opinions of the philosophers, astrologers, and arithmeticians, who belong to an entirely different genealogy of knowledge. Hippolytus’ capacious definition of philosophy similarly cordons off the pedagogical contributions of the nations. Truth owes nothing to the “wisdom of the Greeks,” the doctrinal tenets of the Egyptians, the incoherent fallacies and curiosities of the Chaldeans, nor anything to the astonishment and demonism of the Babylonians. The uncovering of the heretics’ dependence upon the philosophers—Basilides upon Aristotle, Marcus upon Pythagoras, Marcion upon Empedocles, the Docetists from the Sophists, Monoïmus from Pythagoras, Noetus from Heraclitus—upends the very idea of being Christian. Precisely because the philosophical theories of Pythagoras and Plato, who

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110 Hippolytus, Ref. VI.52.1 (Marcovich, 272; altered from ANF).

111 Buell, *Making Christians*, again observes this phenomenon with respect to Clement of Alexandria. She argues that “Clement’s contention that some Christians such as Valentinus and Basilides distort some original Christian truth and unity proceeds from his allegation that so-called heretics have broken or distorted the genealogy of Christian knowledge. Clement claims that other Christians, such as Marcion, Prodikos, and “those like them” (toi homoioi), did not understand the true tradition that they had in fact received, and hence distorted and added to it, thereby producing heresy in the name of continuing the tradition (*Strom. 7.103.6-7*). He can accuse them of being prideful dissenters from one true unified stream of Christian tradition” (88).

112 Hippolytus, Ref. X.5.1-2 (Marcovich, 380). “But the definition of the truth is constituted after the manner in which every true definition is, namely, as simple and unadorned. A definition such as this, provided it is made manifest, will of itself refute error. And although we have very frequently propounded demonstrations about it, and with sufficient fullness elucidated for those willing to learn the rule of the truth; yet even now, after having discussed all the opinions put forward by the Greeks and heretics, we have decided it not be at all events unreasonable to introduce, as a sort of finishing stroke to the nine books of the present work, this demonstration throughout the tenth book” (*Ref. X.5.1-2* [Marcovich, 380]).

113 Hippolytus, Ref. VII.14-21, 24 (Marcovich, 280-8, 293-4).

114 Hippolytus, Ref. VI.52 (Marcovich, 272-6).

115 Hippolytus, Ref. VII.29-31 (Marcovich, 304-314).

116 Hippolytus, Ref. VIII.11 (Marcovich, 330).

117 Hippolytus, Ref. VIII.15 (Marcovich, 335).

118 Hippolytus, Ref. IX.7-10 (Marcovich, 342-349).
“derived [their] tenets originally from the Egyptians, and introduced their novel opinions among the Greeks,” were appropriated by the heretical leader Valentinus, Hippolytus charges that his heresy and its line of succession existed and operated outside the successive tradition of Christianity\textsuperscript{119}: “And from this [system of Pythagoras and Plato], not from the gospels, Valentinus, as we have proved, has collected the [materials of] heresy—I mean his own [heresy]—and may therefore justly be reckoned a Pythagorean and Platonist, not a Christian.”\textsuperscript{120} Once the philosophical veneer of the heresies has been revealed, their disciples and devotees become nothing more than mere gentiles (ἐθνικόι), “naked and shameful, (γυμνοὶ καὶ ἀσχήμονας),” whom Christ “will in no way profit.”\textsuperscript{121} Though Hippolytus explicitly gestures at the association between the heretics and pagan intellectual culture—the latter of which corrupts and is corrupted by the heretics—his text does not cover a systematically thorough narrative of this doctrinal cross-pollination. It is telling, indeed, that Epiphanius, to whom the genre of heresiology is most commonly associated, seized on the insights of Hippolytus (and Irenaeus of Lyons) to offer a far broader analysis of the history and genealogy of sectarianism. In the process of amplifying and expanding Hippolytus’ inchoate and implicit theory of heretical origins, Epiphanius situates the diversification of heresy within a universal narrative of pious orientation and the rise of corporate identity.

\textit{Conclusion: Contesting Contours and Uniting Humanity}

\textsuperscript{119} Hippolytus, Ref. VI.21.3 (Marcovich, 229).

\textsuperscript{120} Hippolytus, Ref. VI.29.1 (Marcovich, 237; altered from ANF).

\textsuperscript{121} Hippolytus, Ref. Pro. 11; VII.19.9; VII.19.9 (Marcovich, 56, 286; altered from ANF).
Of the multiplicity of grounds on which Christians honed their history, models of
creation and, by extension, theories of human difference emerged as an especially fraught site
of contestation. Although the heresiologists chastised the heretics for any number of
perceived transgressions, I have highlighted astrology and cosmography (and/or
mythography) to illustrate the macroscopic ethnographic hue of heresiological literature.
Clearing away the brush of fallacious heretical theorization enabled the heresiologists, most
especially Epiphanius, to elaborate a unified theory of human history as a history of
sectarianism, in which human and sectarian difference become conjoined phenomena.
Heresiological texts, in contesting certain heretical theories and expounding other “orthodox”
schematizations, harness the power of the ethnographic to rationalize the world in distinctly
Christian terms. The corollary to the purported universalism of Christianity (or, in an earlier
guise, Rome) is a supreme discomfort with the shared humanity of all the world’s people. Paul
Veyne explains the phenomenon:

The ancients knew that, in theory, humanity was one, but they did not want to
know it. How long had they known it? How long had men thought that all
humans belonged to one and the same species—Greeks and barbarians, free men
and slaves? Classical philology has constructed an entire hagiographical novel
on that question. It praises Cicero or Seneca for speaking of the ‘common
society of the human race’ (Cicero De finibus 3.19.62); it honors the Stoics for
their so-called universalism; at times it affirms that, before those philosophers,
the Greeks held the slave or the barbarian to be nonhuman; it sees in Terences’
famous “homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto” (“I am a man, I count nothing
human foreign to me”) one of the great moments in history. Such is the tenacity
of the idealistic—or rather the academic—illusion that confounds the reality of
history with the image of that reality in the mirror of classical texts. 122

By insisting on the unity of humankind, Christianity articulated a shared human nature even
as it works to thrust outward and rationalize oppositional parties. Macroscopic ethnography
paradigms facilitated the development of a master narrative of human unity in which the

stages of human evolution and devolution were explained through the language of heresy. And while the desire to situate heresy within an ethnographic narrative of human fracture signals the potential for Christian reunification, it also asserts a literary routinization of knowledge about the world at large.

In turning to the work of Epiphanius and Theodoret in the next chapter, I contend that heresiology functions as an ethnographic map of heresy and humanity by blurring the distinction between the two. Heresiology was no mere repository of heretical knowledge: its seeming narrowness encompassed a much wider intellectual and cultural perspective. By projecting an ordered, comprehensive systemization into the history and heterogeneity of the known world, the heresiologists give it an irrepressible Christian structure. Heresiologists composed a portrait of a decidedly Christian world, written in the language of heresy, in which ethnographic knowledge supplies the very conditions and terms for human consolidation and unification. To explain heresy is to explain humanity’s and necessarily Christianity’s fall and rise.
Chapter II: Christianized Ethnography: Paradigms and Languages of Heresy

In the eighteenth century, the continuity of nature is a requirement of all natural history, that is, of any effort to establish an order in nature and to discover general categories within it, whether they be real and prescribed by obvious distinctions or a matter of convenience and quite simply a pattern produced by our imagination. Only continuity can guarantee that nature repeats itself and that structure can, in consequence, become character.

-Michel Foucault

If the primary aim of heresiological literature was didactic (polemical didacticism, as was often the case), the process of theological instruction via description and disputation of contrarian opinion took the form of classificatory literature. Later heresiologists in particular, those texts of the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh centuries, demonstrated their knowledge

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2 On classification in late antique Christianity, see Philip Wood, “Classification in a Christian Empire,” in We have no king but Christ: Christian Political Thought in Greater Syria on the Eve of the Arab Conquest (c. 400-585) (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 21-37 and Scott Fitzgerald Johnson, The Life and Miracles of Thekla: A Literary Study (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 171-220. Johnson’s analysis in Chapter Four pertains to paradoxography or literary collections and miscellanies. As he explains, “first attested in the third century BC, paradoxography was closely associated with the ethnographic current of ancient historical writing and was, consequently, associated with Herodotus and somewhat at odds with the political history of Thucydides and Xenophon” (174). He discusses the work of Callimachus of Cyrene (Collection of Wonders from the Whole Earth Arranged by Locality) and Antigonus (Collection of Marvelous Researches), and traces the genre’s various preoccupations and emphases (as guided tours through the wonders of the world). He also demonstrates, moreover, the influence of paradoxography on later literary collections can be seen in the works of Pliny the Elder, Aulus Gellius, Athenaeus, and various Christian writers, including Clement, Origen, Jerome, and Eusebius. On the banality of heresiological literature, see Frances Young, “Did Epiphanius Know What He Meant by Heresy?,” Studia Patristica 17.1 (1982): 199-205, and Averil Cameron’s response in “How to Read Hesioriology,” Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies 33:3 (2003): 471-492. On heresiology’s utility as a source of philosophical data see Jaap Mansfeld, Heresiography in Context: Hippolytus’ Elenchos as a Source of Greek Philosophy (New York: Brill, 1992).
through catalogues of heretics. At the same time, heresiology’s content not only probed the most minute details of heretical opinion and praxis, the ethnographic “data” of early Christian writers, but the genre also harnessed this burgeoning knowledge to contemplate the genesis of Christian and human difference. Heresiology mapped, as it were, two interdependent and fluid facets of Christian knowledge: the particular habits and customs of the heretics and the causative mechanisms of this diversity. The impulse to produce a seemingly exhaustive, though trope-laden, account of sects and heresies is a decisive act of (re)presentation that binds the utility of heretical information to an array of loftier intellectual pursuits: the exposition of universal and ecclesiastical histories, the ordering of classes of knowledge, the defining of the parameters of Christian pedagogy, and the production of Christian ethnographic language.

To that end, heresiology is best thought of as an instantiation of intellectual mapping, much like uncritical ethnography of medieval and early modern Europe (and at times, the parallels with critical ethnography of the twentieth century), wherein the world is organized by a decidedly Christian orientation. Heresiology charts an intellectual world that is built

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3 See Brent D. Shaw, “Who Were the Circumcellions?” in Vandals, Romans and Berbers: New Perspectives on Late Antique North Africa, ed. A.H. Merrills (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 227-258. I shall return to the subject of heresiological form, namely the list, in Chapter five when I discuss Augustine’s vastly underappreciated De Haeresibus.

4 On encyclopedia and heresiology, see Richard Flower, “Genealogies of Unbelief: Epiphanius of Salamis and Heresiological Authority” in Unclassical Traditions. Volume II: Perspectives from East and West in Late Antiquity, ed. Christopher Kelly, Richard Flower and Michael Stuart Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 76-87. While much of Flower’s article is persuasive—and offers an incisive reading of Epiphanius, which complements my own—he does fail to expound the very complex notion of encyclopedism in antiquity (he assumes its existence and generic integrity). Indeed, the very idea has long been subject to scrutiny. The debate is particularly acute in the Byzantine tradition, which attests the largest corpus of so-called encyclopedias. For the contours of the debate, see the recent volume by Peter Van Deun and Caroline Macé, eds., Encyclopedic Trends in Byzantium? Proceedings of the International Conference held in Leuven, 6-8 May 2009. Orientalia Lovaniensia analecta 212 (Leuven: Peeters, 2011).

5 One of the most intriguing implications for Christianized ethnography concerns its capacity to expand the scope of sacred history and missionary activity. Ethnographic analysis enabled Christians to claim a wider theological
upon cosmological, theological, geographical, ecclesiastical, ritualistic, and exegetical principles. By situating the rise and spread of Christianity within a discourse of ethnographic investigation, wherein Christian authors strove to survey the contents of their own world, they concurrently contemplated and theorized about the very merits and possibility of doing so. The problem of human and religious diversity is thus framed as both a theoretical question—how did the world become so diverse, and how did Christianity itself become so diverse (and what are the parallels between the two)—and a practical matter, an analysis of customs “on the ground,” insofar as they represent habituated and entrenched diversity.

As I will argue in this chapter, heresiology of Epiphanius of Salamis collapsed (or simply analogized) the distinction between ethnic or cultural diversity, on the one hand, and religious diversity, on the other; thus the history of Christianity became the history of the world and the world’s manifest and multifold divisions. The process of organizing the multitude of diversity within the world and elucidating its origins, causes, and contours revealed the textual and epistemological limits of the human efforts to rationalize and comprehend these differences. In coordinating their understandings of human diversity in terms of Christian diversity (and vice versa), Christian heresiologists posit that diversity is symptomatic of an endemic epistemological hubris (emerging out of a newly oriented communalized world), which persistently disrupts the divine-human relationship. The Christian aspiration to construct the foundation and contours of an increasingly Christian world finds an especially salient

encapsulation in the production and perpetuation of heresiological writing. While the heretics were portrayed by the heresiologists as deviations from a normative theological and apostolic center, they served a vital function in the narrative of Christian ascension. Not only were heretics emblems of temptation and trial, but they also became the conceptual playthings around which Christian ethnographic writing and theorization of the world’s diversity were coordinated. In this chapter, I am concerned with the Christian interpretation and deployment of macroscopic theories of ethnographic analysis: how Christian writers engaged the genesis and perpetuation of heresy in explicitly ethnographic terms. The capacity of ethnographic analysis to create and advance a comprehensive system of the world—to articulate a worldview—held enormous potential for Christian authors of late antiquity. To theorize the Christian world and to make the world Christian was a thoroughly ethnographic endeavor.

To make my argument I have chosen to juxtapose the work of Epiphanius of Salamis and Theodoret of Cyrrhus precisely insofar each of them advances a model of heretical origins that traces their progressive development. Epiphanius, as we shall see, proposes a periodized history of sectarianism, which situates the contemporary Christian dilemma of heretical profusion in a global genealogical history of ethnogenesis. Beginning with Adam, the Cypriot bishop enumerates an elaborate pre-Christian history of sectarianism in which the problem of

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6 See, for example, Gillian Clark, “City of Books: Augustine and the World as Text,” in Klingshirn and Safran, 117-140.

7 As I noted in the Introduction, this observation was first surmised in the groundbreaking work of Walter Bauer. More recent scholarship has demonstrated not only the fluidity and constructedness of the categories orthodoxy and heresy, but also the plurality of conceptual and discursive prisms through which the binary was expressed. For an excellent summary of the current state of the field, see Eduard Iricinschi and Holger M. Zellentin, “Making Selves and Marking Others: Identity and Late Antique Heresiologies,” in Heresy and Identity in Late Antiquity, ed. Eduard Iricinschi and Holger M. Zellentin (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 1-27. The point here is that the language of heresy and orthodoxy melded with a variety of Christian interests, so that they become embedded within debates and discussions about gender, law, ecclesiology, scholasticism, exegesis, etc.
Christian heresy is but the most recent outgrowth of a far more entrenched historical phenomenon. Theodoret, by contrast, eschews any "pre-Christian" past, and instead offers a model that begins with Simon Magus and follows a typological structure: the devil produced ages of heresy that were organized around particular doctrinal cores. Heresy’s ever-shifting disposition is thus a reflection of its demongenic lineage, whereby the heresies were created anew after the forces of orthodoxy vanquished their predecessors. The devil adapted his plan of attack by producing new types of heretical opponents to contest orthodox supremacy.

While the specific trajectories of these two models are distinct, they each theorize heresy as process of progressive evolution and adaptation. Epiphanius and Theodoret both map the stages of heretical manifestation in the world. It is the heresiological periodization of ethnographic knowledge that I trace in this chapter.

A Periodized History of Heresy: The Panarion, Genealogy and Geography

In a missive requesting the advice of Epiphanius (ca. 315-403), the former Palestinian abbot and current bishop of Salamis in Cyprus, the archimandrites Acacius and Paul of Chalcis and Beroea (in Syria) relate the need for additional instruction regarding heretical Christians.\(^8\)

The monks explain that they are writing Epiphanius in hopes of expanding their minimal

knowledge of the world of heresy into a fuller and more precise portrait with the bishop’s help and instruction: “we have heard names assigned to the sects (ἀἱρέσεως) by your Honor,” and thus “we are asking your Reverence to tell us explicitly the heresy (αἵρεσιν) held by each of these cults (θρησκείας).” It is Epiphanius’ “fame” (φήμη) and his righteousness as a pedagogical paragon that inspire the abbots to solicit the opinions of the Cypriote bishop: “for not we alone, but all who hear of you, confess that the Savior has raised you up in this generation as a new apostle and herald, a new John, to proclaim the things that ought to be observed by those who have undertaken this course.” Through this apostolic analogy, Epiphanius emerges as the Christian voice of his era. He garners a highly particularized authority of tradition and is empowered, by biblical standards, to act as a herald of au courant heresiological knowledge. Moreover, Acacius’ and Paul’s solicitation to transfer knowledge of the heresies from one corner of the Christian world to another actually serves to arrest them in a state of ritualization. With fast and prayer, they await the spiritually transformative potency of Epiphanius’ instruction. By partaking of Epiphanius’ knowledge, “the load of our transgressions,” write the monks, “is lightened when we are filled with your spiritual utterances.” The spiritual and experiential import of knowledge furnishes Epiphanius with a scholastic, theological, and authorized mandate to catalogue the world of heresy.

Epiphanius commences his project of enumerating, ordering, describing, and refuting the heresies of the world with a brief reply to his monastic interlocutors. The pedagogical utility of his text, emphasized by the call of the monks and the response of the bishop, sets the

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9 Epiphanius, Pan.: Letter of Acacius and Paul 1.9 (Holl, 1:154).
10 Epiphanius, Pan.: Letter of Acacius and Paul 1.7 (Holl, 1:154).
11 Epiphanius, Pan.: Letter of Acacius and Paul 1.6 (Holl, 1:154).
12 Epiphanius, Pan.: Letter of Acacius and Paul 1.8 (Holl, 1:154).
conceptual order for his therapeutic elaboration. His rejoinder, which takes the form of the first of two proems, is an altogether lopsided affair. It begins with a succinct description of his overarching textual purpose—“I am going to tell you the names of the sects and expose their unlawful deeds like poisons and toxic substances”—and then segues into an entirely uncommon feature of ancient literature: a table of contents. Here, Epiphanius explains the precise plan of his work: there are three volumes with seven sections into which the eighty sects have been arranged. “The saving dispensation of our Lord Jesus Christ divides” his table of contents into two broad classes of heresy: twenty pre-Christian sects and sixty Christian sects. In these prefatory remarks, most of the heresies are simply named (and, in some cases, Epiphanius lists multiple names for a single group), though a small number of sects are

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13 Παναριόν (Panarion) translates as medicine chest. The text, in Epiphanius’ rationalization, functions as a remedy for the disease of heresy. Indeed, the entire text is framed typologically as medicinal. See J. Rebecca Lyman, “Epiphanius on Orthodoxy,” in Orthodoxy, Christianity, History, ed. Susanna Elm, Éric Rebillard, and Antonella Romano (Rome: École Française de Rome, 2000), 149-161. From the title to the pervasive metaphors of poisonous reptiles and insects, Epiphanius insists on the antidotal utility of his work. As he explains at the conclusion of his second Proem: “my work too has been compiled as a defense against them [sects] and for your safety, to reveal the appearance of the dreadful serpents, and their poisons and deadly bites. And to correspond with these I shall give as many arguments, like antidotes, as I can in short compass—one or two at most—to counteract their poison and, after the Lord, cure anyone who wants to be cured, if he has fallen, willingly or inadvertently, into these snake-like teachings of the sects” (Pan. Pro. II.3.4-5 [Holl, 1:171-2]).

14 Epiphanius, Pan. Prooemium I.1.2 (Holl, 1:155). On the subject of ancient tables of contents, see Andrew M. Riggsby, “Guides to the Wor(l)d,” in Ordering Knowledge in the Roman Empire, ed. Jason König and Tim Whitmarsh (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 88-107. By Riggsby’s definition—“a ‘table of contents’...is a summary of the contents of a work by means of listing its contents in abbreviated form and in the order of the text” (88)—Epiphanius’ Proem I surely qualifies.


16 As will become clear in Chapter three, Epiphanius’ accounting practices strain even the most forgiving of critics. There are eighty sects in total—a number that is derived from Song of Songs 6:8—with four “foundational” (or mother) sects, Barbarism, Scythianism, Hellenism, and Judaism (see Colossians 3:11) generating sixteen (sub)sects. Hellenism includes four philosophical schools (Pythagoreans/Peripatetics, Platonists, Stoics, and Epicureans). The Samaritan sect (itself derived from Judaism) also contains four sects: Gorothenes, Sebuaeans, Essenes, and Dositheans. Finally, Judaism itself holds seven sects (Scribes, Pharisees, Sadducees, Hemerobaptists, Ossaeans, Nasaraeans, and Herodians). The remaining sixty sects emerge in the aftermath of Christ.
identified by specific characteristics. The Alogi, the thirty-first Christian sect (or fifty-first overall), for example, are distinguished in the prologue by their rejection of the Gospel and Revelation of John. Having numbered, named, and ordered the sects once already in Proem I, Epiphanius begins this enumeration yet again—“in this one of my summaries”—in order to direct his “scholarly readers” to the precise volume and section of each heretical entry.

Imbued with both utilitarian, ideological, and scholastic heft, none to the necessary exclusion of the others, the table of contents of Proem I mirrors the essential form and content of Epiphanius’ prolonged heresiological discourse itself: this is a list, which blossoms to become a polemicized ethnography of sectarianism and its complex history. In the case of the Panarion, however, the table of contents serves to define the precise parameters and vision of the text. Epiphanius conceptualizes his text as a formal imposition of ordered knowledge and design. The text thus orders two contents at once: it provides a tightly arranged account of heresy and heretical origins just as it orders the entirety of world through an ethnography of heresy.

In contrast to his heresiological predecessors—Irenaeus of Lyons, who began his Adversus haereses by describing and refuting the Valentinians before circling back to attribute the root of all heresy to the magician Simon Magus, and Hippolytus of Rome who opens his Refutation of All the Heretics in classical Greece with the doctrines of the natural, moral, and

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17 He alludes to this reality in his Proem I, when he observes the multiplicity of names ascribed to a single sect. He elaborates on this point in his valedictory remarks De Fide 6.4-5: “And so, as I have said, the sects I have listed in succession are eighty concubines. But no one need be surprised if each of them is given different names in every country. What is more, we must observe that each sect in turn has frequently divided into many parts on its own and taken different names. This is no surprise; it is the way things are” (Epiphanius, De Fide: 6.4-5, ed. Karl Holl and Jürgen Dummer, GCS 37 [Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1985], 3:502).

18 Epiphanius, Pan. Pro. 1.4.5 (Holl, 1:158).

19 The first Proem repeats itself insofar as Epiphanius first lists each of the eighty heresies by name before he returns to explain the precise division of the volumes and sections and again names the sects. Text breaks down in the following structural pattern, as outlined in Pro. 1.5.2-5.9: Vol. I, sec. 1.: twenty sects; Vol. I, sec. 2: thirteen sects; Vol. I, sec. 3: thirteen sects; Vol. II, sec. 1: eighteen sects; Vol. II, sec. 2: five sects; Vol. III, sec. 1: seven sects; Vol. III, sec. 1: seven sects; Vol. III, sec. 2: four sects.
dialectical philosophers—Epiphanius situates heresy in a protracted and far grander narratological sequence.\(^\text{20}\) Already in the skeletal ordering and numbering of the heresies in Proem I of his Panarion, Epiphanius unveiled his intention to tell an exhaustive tale of all the world’s heresies, beginning with “their mothers.”\(^\text{21}\) In Proem II he further amplifies his intention to offer an “account and discussion of faith and unbelief, of correct views and divergent views” by situating his narrative in the context of “the world’s creation and what followed it.”\(^\text{22}\) Firmly rejecting the claim that heresy began only in the apostolic age or with the Greek philosophers, the Panarion frames its study of sectarianism with a sweeping history of the world, proposing four successive “generations” (γενεαί) or ages of heresy.\(^\text{23}\) This introductory narrative, as we shall see, imposes a particular context and Christian structure on the programmatic enumeration of the eighty heresies. Epiphanius articulates his vision of the world by creating a master narrative in which the history of the world and sectarian division become manifestations of an intellectual genealogy and ethnogenic innovation. Narrated in the second Proem of the Panarion, the bishop uses genealogical, geographical, and ethnogenic reasoning within the same narrative of sectarianism’s birth and growth. By beginning in the pre-Christian past (or the past that was not yet manifestly Christian), Epiphanius traces the history of heresy from Adam down into his own day with the “Christian” Massalians. In the


\(^{21}\) Epiphanius, Panarion Pro. I.5.2 (Holl, 1:159).

\(^{22}\) Epiphanius, Pan. Prooemium II.1.1 (Holl, 1:169).

\(^{23}\) Epiphanius, Pan. 8.3.1 (Holl, 1:188).
process, he subsumes the history of the world under a history of religion and religious deviation.  

“For by offering a schooling” in universal history, as Diodorus Siculus expresses in the opening lines of his Bibliotheca historica (Library of History), the historians “provide their readers, through such a presentation of events, with a most excellent kind of experience.”  

While preserving and narrating the past serves to heighten and sharpen readers’ abilities to understand the circumstances surrounding their own present and future, for Epiphanius the present age is conceptualized as an effort to reclaim humanity’s largely dormant Adamic past. As an experiential and theological template for the present, the past contextualizes and explains the underlying situation of the contemporary Catholic Church; the Church’s contests with her sectarian opponents (i.e., Christian heretics) belongs to Epiphanius’ decidedly Christian narrative of religious history, which he articulates as the uninterrupted history of heresy. The past, then, is not some long-forgotten relic, but a continuously lived contest between the truth of Christianity and the falsity of her opponents.  

His account imposes an order upon a disordered and contentiously experienced world by arraying its data in accordance with scriptural dicta. His text “expresses the omnipresent sign of divine

24 Epiphanius, Pan 80.1.1-11.7 (Holl and Dummer, 3:484-496).


providence” and infuses both ethnographic project with a thoroughly Christian analytical apparatus. It is the commands of the apostle Paul and the Song of Songs that, above all else, mold the structure of his universal story.

Following Galatians 3:28 and Colossians 3:11, Epiphanius correlates the Barbarian, Scythian, Hellene, and Jew of Paul’s epistles (or deutero-epistle, in the case of Colossians) with the four foundational or mother heresies: “From Adam until Noah, Barbarism. From Noah until the tower, and until Serug two generations after the tower, the Scythian superstition. After that, from the tower, Serug and <Terah> until Abraham, Hellenism. From Abraham on, the true religion which is associated with this same Abraham—Judaism, (named) for his lineal descendant Judah.” As ages of human development, each of the four eras introduced and inscribed particular religious beliefs and conduct, which over time (after the age of Scythianism) ossified into cultural ethics and ethnic sensibilities. The first two ages, Barbarism and Scythianism, hew to the general framework of the biblical narrative of Genesis, with the apocryphal book of Jubilees added to refine the account’s details. Adam’s disobedience sowed


28 “There is no longer Jew or Greek, there is no longer slave or free, there is no longer male and female; for all of you are one in Christ Jesus” (Gal. 3:28). “In that renewal, there is no longer Greek and Jew, circumcised and uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian, slave and free; but Christ is all and in all” (Col. 3:11).


30 *Jubilees* 5:28; 7:1, 17; 10:15 at Epiphanius, *Pan.* 2.1 (Holl, 1:174). The author of *Jubilees* (Ch. 11) explains idolatry’s genesis (specifically the worship of molten images) as the product of the contestation between the sons of Noah for power and “political” authority. Erecting their own kingdoms and cities, the sons of Noah wage war against each other and in the process erect molten images to worship. The text ascribes this development to the sons of Noah (not to any one son), though it does take place during the age of Seroh/Serug’s birth. The consequences of idolatry are likewise discussed at length during Terah’s lifetime, but he is not expressly charged with sewing the initial seeds of idolatry (Jub. 11:14-17; 12:1-8, 12-14). Epiphanius has modified the narrative of Jubilees at *Pan.* 3.1-5 (Holl, 1:176-77), which may reflect a general familiarity with the text (rather than exact knowledge or a copy of
the initial seeds of human wickedness, which were further nurtured by Cain’s fratricide.\textsuperscript{31} In the lifetime of Jared, the great-grandson of Seth and fifth generation after Adam, “came sorcery, witchcraft, licentiousness, adultery, and injustice.”\textsuperscript{32} The age of Hellenism (the third mother heresy) also bears responsibility for the introduction of sorcery and witchcraft, while the practices of astrology and magic are ascribed to Nimrod, who sits squarely on the edge of the Scythian and Hellenic ages.\textsuperscript{33} It is worth noting that the comprehensive narrative of Epiphanian’s pre-Christian history is neither wholly precise nor entirely consistent.\textsuperscript{34} There is an ambiguity of language and a repetition of cultural developments, which assign the identical religious and cultural practices and particularities to different ages and individuals.

Wickedness, for example, is introduced among the human race on at least three occasions:

\begin{quote}

the text). At \textit{Pan}. 39.6.1 (Holl and Dummer, 2:76), during his discussion of the Sethians, Epiphanian invokes \textit{Jubilees} (or “The Little Genesis”) to refute their claim that Seth, descendent of Adam, was endowed by the Mother with the seed of power and was the original source of human righteousness. Seth’s descendants were thus held to be pure (untarnished by blood dispute of Cain and Abel) and the true descendants of the divine power. For the cosmic ethnography of \textit{Jubilees} see James M. Scott, “On Earth as in Heaven: The Apocalyptic Vision of World Geography from Urzeit to Endzeit according to the Book of Jubilees,” in \textit{Geography and Ethnography: Perceptions of the World in Pre-Modern Societies}, ed. Kurt Raaflaub and Richard J.A. Talbert (Malden, M.A.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 182-196.

\textsuperscript{31} See Epiphanius, \textit{Pan}. 1.3 (Holl, 1:172).

\textsuperscript{32} Epiphanian, \textit{Pan}. 1.3 (Holl, 1:172). The text, however, introduces an unresolved ambiguity with respect to the precise moment of each particular error’s emergence: “but now in the time of Jared and afterward, [came] sorcery, witchcraft, licentiousness, adultery, and injustice” (νῦν δὲ ἐν χρόνοις τοῦ Ἱάρεδ καὶ ἐπέκεινα φαρμακεία καὶ μοιχεία, μοιχεία τε καὶ ἀδίκια, Epiphanian, \textit{Pan}. 1.3 [Holl, 1:172]). “But now (νῦν δὲ),” the contemporary situation of Jared, stands alongside the vague pronouncement “and afterward (καὶ ἐπέκεινα).” At this point in his text, Epiphanian leaves the exact arrival of the religious errors unspecified.

\textsuperscript{33} Epiphanian, \textit{Pan}. 3.11 (Holl, 1:178-9).

\textsuperscript{34} Not only are the same errors introduced on multiple occasions (at various junctures in the history of the world), but the historical organization of cultural, ethnic, religious, and national priority and interaction is largely unelaborated. In his discussion of Hellenism, for example, Epiphanian explains that “Hellenism began with the Egyptians, Babylonians and Phrygians, and then made a hash of men’s ways” (Epiphanian, \textit{Pan}. 3.11 [Holl, 1:178-9]). Hellenism, then, is the term he deploys for the spread of the opinions of the nations (in the biblical sense of the term).
with Adam, Cain, and Jared.\textsuperscript{35} Though this history of human error may tax our ability to pinpoint precisely the culpable party (or parties), the general schema remains perfectly clear: each age produced certain anthropological, theological, and religious errata.

Epiphanius is explicit that among the earliest generations of Adam, “there was no difference of opinion yet, no people that was at all different, no name for a sect, and no idolatry either,” yet he likewise asserts that “everyone served as a law to himself and conformed to his own opinion.”\textsuperscript{36} This seeming tension between uniformity and individuality, coherence of opinion and lawlessness, is resolved in the bishop’s discussion of the age of Scythianism, where he expounds that it was only prior to the destruction of the tower at Babylon that individuals lacked any signs of distinctive ethnic, religious, or cultural identity. Under the first two ages of humanity, the world was inhabited only by “men” of a single language and speech, who comported themselves either with godliness or ungodliness.\textsuperscript{37} In affirming or rejecting natural law, the lone correlative of godliness, men did not, according to Epiphanius, foment sectarian divisions; they were simply behaving obediently or disobediently.\textsuperscript{38} During the age of humanity’s division into seventy-two distinct peoples (and the allotment of land and bestowal of languages), Rheu, of Noah’s stock, bore Serug, who introduced idolatry into human consciousness with paintings and portraits.\textsuperscript{39} Serug’s

\textsuperscript{35} Epiphanius, \textit{Pan.} 1.3 (Holl, 1:172). In his condensed narrative of Jesus earthly ministry, the bishop explains that it is from wickedness (to truth) that the nations must be rescued (\textit{Pan.} 3.5 [Holl, 1:231]).

\textsuperscript{36} Epiphanius, \textit{Pan.} 1.9 (Holl, 1:172).

\textsuperscript{37} Epiphanius, \textit{Pan.} 2.3 (Holl, 1:174).

\textsuperscript{38} “And there was nothing on earth, no sect, no opinion clashing with another one, but only ‘men’ were spoken of, ‘one speech and one language’ (Gen. 11:1). There were only ungodliness and godliness, the natural law and the natural error of each individual’s will, not learned from teaching or writings. There was no Judaism, no Hellenism, no other sect at all” (Epiphanius, \textit{Pan.} 2.3 [Holl, 1:174]).

\textsuperscript{39} Epiphanius, \textit{Pan.} 3.4 (Holl, 1:177). Around this time autocracy, astrology, and magic—debasements ascribed to Nimrod—also spread throughout the world.
grandson, Terah, went further still, making “images with clay and pottery.” The age of idolatry is marked by the bishop as the era of Hellenism, though, in fact, “Hellenism began with the Egyptians, Babylonians and Phrygians,” who exported their errors throughout the world. The rites and mysteries of the Greeks, he reports, “were brought to [them] by Cadmus, and by Inachus himself,” which then flourished into distinct heresies “during the lifetime of Epicurus, Zeno the Stoic, Pythagoras and Plato.” The process of transporting error occupies much of Epiphanius’ attention in his discussion of the fourth and final of the mother heresies, Judaism. Originally known as Abramians, these ancestral worshippers of God were defined by the piety of their namesake. Their lineal descendants ultimately became the Jews (though they were not called Jews until the time of David) and were held by God’s choice as “the true religion and circumcision.” The age of Judaism, however, as it moved further away from its Abrahamic ideal, was vitiated by the Jews’ misinterpretation of divine legislation. The pedagogical import of biblical Law, though “giving its precepts physically,” held a spiritual hope, a hope the Jews had perilously failed to grasp. For Christians the Lord Jesus Christ, the ultimate pedagogue, illuminated the truth of God’s Law, replacing its types and symbols with spiritual truths. The Jews’ continued adherence to the “legal” obligation of circumcision upended their divinely sanctioned status.

This periodized narrative, framed in Euhemeristic terms, as Jeremy Schott has sharply observed, wherein mythological figures are accorded historical agency as human inventors of

40 Epiphanius, Pan. 3.5 (Holl, 1:177).
41 Epiphanius, Pan. 3.11; 4.2.6; 4.2.7 (Holl, 1:178-9; 182).
42 Epiphanius, Pan. 8.5.1 (Holl, 1:190).
43 Epiphanius, Pan. 8.5.4 (Holl, 1:190).
44 Epiphanius, Pan. 8.6.5-7.4 (Holl, 1:192-193).
civilizing or barbarizing tendencies, articulates the etiology of sectarianism as a history of culture. Each mother heresy functioned, in Epiphanius’ schema, as a cultural or devotional unit, which marked ethical, ethnic, and religious geneeses, progressions, and deviations.

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45 Jeremy Schott, “Heresiology as Universal History in Epiphanius’ Panarion,” Zeitschrift Fuer Antikes Christentum 10.3 (2006): 546-563. See also Walter Ameling, “Ethnography and Universal History in Agatharchides,” in East & West: Papers in Ancient History Presented to Glen W. Bowersock, ed. T. Corey Brennan and Harriet I. Flower (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 2008), 13-59; Jonathan M. Hall, “Land and Peoplehood: The Ethnogenesis of the Hellenes,” in Hellenicity: Between Ethnicity and Culture (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2002), 125-171. On the history of culture in early Christianity, see Arthur J. Droge, Homer or Moses? Early Christian Interpretations of the History of Culture (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1989) and Frances M. Young, Biblical Exegesis and the Formation of Christian Culture (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Schott outlines the two prevailing (and opposing) models of human development in antiquity, primitivists and anti-primitivists. The former, epitomized by Hesiod, the Stoics, and Ovid, located humanity’s apex in its earliest stages. For the primitivists, humanity’s golden age was interrupted and ultimately disrupted by technological and artistic advancement. The anti-primitivists, represented by Lucretius, Diodorus, and Protargos, argued that primitive humans lived in a state of rampant anarchy; they inhabited a lawless, cultureless swirl of disorder. Cultural and technological developments, borne out of philosophy, religion, political necessity, etc., engendered a civilizing process that lifted human beings out of their natural state of discord. Schott then argues that Epiphanius represents a modified third position: “Like the anti-primitivists, Epiphanius felt that most ancient humans lived in a state of anarchy, without the rule of law. On the other hand, he does not join the anti-primitivists in their progressive attitude toward the civilizing process. Rather, his view of civilization is resoundingly negative (554).” While it is quite explicit in the Panarion that as the ages unfold, the state of humanity declines insofar as it drifts further afield from its Christian faith, Epiphanius never explicitly registers dislike or disapproval of the age of Barbarism. He does explain that the flood destroyed it—for justifiable reasons—but he comes to praise Adam in De Fide as the paradigm of religiositas. Other biblical luminaries (Abel, Seth, Enosh, Enoch, Methuselah, Noah and Eber, and Abraham are all praised as emblems of a pre-Christian piety) are similarly held up as models of piety. If a dichotomy between ancient theories of primitivism and anti-primitivism can be said to exist, Epiphanius operates within an entirely different paradigm. For him, it is neither about reviving a golden age nor is it about overcoming the barrenness of the earliest age through technological and artistic advancements. It is about rekindling or revitalizing the faith of the generations borne by a particular line of successors, who themselves, he admits, are not free from moral or religious culpability. Though his periodized history of heresy is told as a universal history, it fundamentally serves to chart the thread of orthodoxy, which has been eclipsed by the repeated introduction of religious deviance. The history Epiphanius produces does not, it seems to me, fall within the paradigms Schott elaborates (his suggestion of a third way obscures the lens through which Epiphanius articulates his history of humanity). For a detailed study of the idea of progress in early Christian literature see Wolfram Kinzinger, Novitas Christiana: die Idee des Fortschritts in der Alten Kirche bis Eusebius (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1994).

46 To the extent that the language of heresy is gendered (the ages of heresy are feminized as mothers), men, by contrast, lead all the sectarian parties, save heresy forty-nine, the Quintillianists or Priscillianists or Pepuzians (or the Priscillianists). The mothers birthed almost exclusively male progeny. Epiphanius attack against them emphasizes their contravention of apostolic gender norms: “Even though it is because of Eve that they ordain women to the episcopate and presbyterate, they should listen to the Lord when he says, ‘Thy resort shall be to thine husband, and he shall rule over thee’ (Gen. 3:16). And they have overlooked the command of the apostle, ‘I suffer not a woman to speak, or to have authority over a man,’ (1 Tim. 2:12) and again, ‘the man is not of the woman, but the woman of the man,’ (1 Cor. 11:8) and, ‘Adam was not deceived, but Eve, deceived first, fell into condemnation’” (1 Tim. 2:14; Pan. 49.3.1-3; [Holl and Dummer, 2:243-44]). I am not suggesting that women are largely absent from the Panarion: far from it. Indeed, Virginia Burrus has incisively explored the relationship between women, heresy, and orthodoxy: “The Heretical Woman as Symbol in Alexander, Athanasius, Epiphanius, and Jerome,” Harvard Theological Review 84.3 (1991): 229-248 and “Equipped for Victory: Ambrose and the
Barbarism and Scythianism, on the one hand, had precise beginnings and ends—they were historically closed—while Hellenism and Judaism, on the other, remained ambiguously open, as the Greek philosophical schools and the Jews endured into the era of Christianity. The former, while introducing certain base human errors, affixed errancy to the disobedience of natural law, while the divided world of Hellenism and Judaism marked the introduction of an ethnic, or in Schott’s parlance, ethnogenic linkage between cultural development/decay and human religiosity. There is a further distinction between the ages of Barbarism and Scythianism, on the one hand, and Hellenism and Judaism, on the other. The former operated as ages of individuals, while the latter emerge in a world already divided by ethno-communities. The world has become marked by its particularization and communalization.

Although both Judaism and Hellenism proliferated during the post-Babylon reign of nations, the former, defined by the practice of circumcision, oriented only the nation of Israel, while the latter broadly signified the practice of idolatry. In the case of Hellenism, moreover, Epiphanius intimates that the making of gods facilitated, reinforced, and perhaps even engendered the process of human division that comprised the post-Babylon world. He argues:

And after [Scythianism] people made gods of wretched despots, or sorcerers who had deceived the world, by honoring their tombs. And much later they made Cronus, and Zeus, Rhea, Hera and the rest of them into gods, and then they made gods by worshipping Acinaces—and the Scythian Sauromatians made gods by worshipping Odrysus and the ancestor of the Thracians, from whom the

Gendering of Orthodoxy,” *Journal of Early Christian Studies* 4.4 (1996): 461-475. It is, however, striking that while women are among the followers of heretics, they are rarely the leaders of heretical movements.

Barbarism began with Adam and ended with the great deluge, and Scythianism began after the flood and ended with the construction and destruction of the tower at Babylon. And while in his discussion of Abraham, Epiphanius recapitulates his narrative thus far, declaring that the age of Hellenism lasted from Serug until Abraham, the sects of Hellenism (the philosophical schools of Stoics, Platonists, Pythagoreans, and Epicureans) have survived. The implication seems to be that mother heresies may pass, while their descendants endure.

Phrygian people are derived. This is why Thracians are named for the person called Thera, who was born during the building of the tower.  

Tracking the genesis of heresy exposes the historical-theological correlation between peoplehood and ancestral worship (or religious errancy) and the formation of and/or perpetuation of communal identities. The causative conditions of sectarianism quite clearly rest on the production of individualized deviant opinions and the now communalized world, which continually germinate and fissure via pedagogical transmission. There is now an ineradicable outlet—the nation or the very construct of bounded community—in which individualized error can be housed and spread. With the advent of the nation, individual opinion—doctrinal fallacies, above all else—now had a forum for their germination and immortalization. Thinkers of all varieties, from philosophers, astrologers, numerologists, prophets, etc., harnessed the phenomena of community to advance their enlightened ideologies. And, if communal incorporation failed, they simply created a new one. Ancestral worship, then, was the logical outcome of a world marked by human division and diversity.

During his presentation of the age of Hellenism, Epiphanius ascribes the introduction of idolatry, the point at which sectarianism emerges, to the excessive freedom of human intellect:

Peleg was the father of Reu, and Reu was the father of Serug, which means ‘provocation’; and, as I have been taught, idolatry and Hellenism began among men with him. It was not with carved images yet or with reliefs in stone, wood or silver-plated substances, or made of gold or any other material, that the human reason invented evil for itself and, with its freedom, reason and intellect, invented transgression instead of goodness, but only with paintings and portraits.

49 Epiphanius, Pan. 3.9-10 (Holl, 1:178).

50 Epiphanius, Pan. 3.4 (Holl, 1:177).
Unbridled reason and intellectual speculation bred the very notion of evil and in so doing fomented alternative systems of worship. The introduction of idols not only signifies an end to the exclusive relationship between humanity and the singular divinity, but it marks the emergence of a sustained history, with its soon-to-be multifold divisions, of religious deviation. While ungodliness had existed from the beginning among the peoples of Barbarianism and Scythianism, the idolatry of the Hellenistic era ruptured the religious history and lineage of humanity in an unprecedented manner. Human reason had moved beyond the rejection of natural law to the active production, by its excessive curiosity and rationality, of ethnogenically aligned traditions of sectarian adherence. Though Epiphanius’ account of the rise of idolatry concerns only pre-Christian intellectual hubris (and the process by which reason precipitates humanity’s separation from the goodness of natural law), the intellectual corruption of religious truth is the driving force of his world history—it clouds the Jewish sects, the Hellenistic schools, and the Christian heresies as well.

Indeed, it is the transmission of error in a world divided that propels this narrative of heresy’s emergence, and Epiphanius aims to expose its agents. Teaching and craft underlie and perpetuate the production of errant epistemological conceptualizations. It was the “historians and chronicles,” whose importation and dissemination of Egyptian imposture—heathen mythology—gave rise to the magical rites.\footnote{Epiphanius, Pan. 3.11 (Holl, 1:178-9).} The philosophical schools, which were born of the Greeks’ mysteries and rites, “devise[d] a concordant 
\textit{science} (ὁμοστοιχὸν γνώσιν) of idolatry, impiety and godlessness.”\footnote{Epiphanius, Pan. 4.2.8 (Holl, 1:183).} Idolatry, having set in motion a progression of fallacies, wherein the creation of false deities invited the theistic speculations of the philosophical schools,
introduced new practices of devotion and further waylaid the path of the godly. The Stoics with their “promise of knowledge” emphasized fate as the driving force within the universe, exasperated Epiphanius.53 “If it is fate,” he reasoned, “that equips the educated and intelligent, no one should learn from a teacher.”54 Reaffirming his distaste for the scholastic frauds of the Hellenic era, Epiphanius chastises the “poets, prose authors, historians, astronomers” and all the others who “made men’s opinion giddy and confused” (ἐσκότωσαν καὶ ἔθολωσαν) by planting fallacious arguments and introducing errant doctrines.55 Even in later generations, the keenness of the Jews and Samaritans to reject idolatry and their desire “to know the one God,” despite their having received the wisdom of the law, was displaced by a lack of “interest in more precise information.”56 In contrast stands the pre-sectarian religiosity of men, which was “not learned from teaching or writings,” but operated by faith apart from any institutional, national, philosophical, or pedagogical instruction.57 The professionalism of knowledge not only stymies the unfolding of religious truth, it actively indoctrinates generations into systems of competing falsehoods. By creating a formal (i.e. legitimate) space

53 Epiphanius, Pan. 5.2.4 (Holl, 1:184).

54 Epiphanius, Pan. 5.3.2 (Holl, 1:185). The tension between fate and instruction as articulated by Epiphanius parallels Christian debates about the intersection of faith and instruction. The second chapter of this dissertation analyzes this tension in the context of ancient attitudes toward pedagogy and the process of ordering types and classes of knowledge (i.e. knowledge of the divine, human knowledge, learned knowledge, innate knowledge, etc.). How “social discourse” functions within and in service of heresiology is a particularly vexing and important query, to which I shall turn next.

55 Epiphanius, Pan. 8.2.1 (Holl, 1:187).

56 Epiphanius, Pan. 9.2.3 (Holl, 1:198).

57 Epiphanius, Pan. 2.3 (Holl, 1:174).
and process in which erroneous errors could be taught, the Greek philosophical tradition asserts and preserves its grip on the minds of men.\textsuperscript{58}

\textit{The Sects as the New Nations of the World}

After the Jews had been expelled from the land of Israel—as a result of the Babylonian captivity—“the elders approached Nebuchadnezzar in Babylon and begged that some of his own subject be sent to Israel as settlers, to keep the country from becoming an uninhabited wasteland.”\textsuperscript{59} The king complied with the request and sent “four groups of his own people (τῶν ἰδίων τέσσαρα γένη), called the Cuthaeans, Cudaeans, Sepharraeans and Anagogavaeans,” to Samaria “with their idols.”\textsuperscript{60} The land, however, was far from hospitable to these new settlers; they were continuously ravaged by the attacks of wild beasts. While requesting aid from the king, the four nations insisted that, “no nation could settle there unless it kept the law of God of heaven, given through Moses.” And so, Nebuchadnezzar heeded their pleas and sent a copy of the Law and also “Ezra, as a teacher of the Law, to teach the Law of Moses to the Assyrians who had settled in Samaria—the Cuthaeans and <the> others.”\textsuperscript{61} This, the bishop tells us, explains the genesis of the Samaritans. He further notes the impact of this intersection of national identity and legal opinion in the history of sectarianism: “it is an amazing coincidence

\textsuperscript{58} I shall return to the rhetoric of Christian anti-intellectualism in the next chapter when I discuss Christian opinion about dialectic, debate, and exchange.

\textsuperscript{59} Epiphanius, \textit{Pan}. 8.8.5 (Holl, 1:195).

\textsuperscript{60} Epiphanius, \textit{Pan}. 8.8.6 (Holl, 1:195).

that, to correspond with the four nations, four sects have also arisen in that very nation—I mean first, the sect of Essenes; second, of Gorothenes; third, of Sebuaeans; and fourth, of Dositheans.” When Epiphanius finally offers to enumerate the underlying causes of sectarianism, having just explained the rise of divisive opinions within Israel during the exilic and post-exilic periods, he embraces the metaphor of ethnogenesis:

Here I can begin my treatment of the subject of sectarianism (ἐνεπεβεβη ἀρχή μοι γίνεται τῆς τοῦ ἐπιγγέλματος κατὰ αἵρεσεων πραγμάτειας), and I shall briefly explain how it arose. How else but in the same way in which tribes arose from the proliferation of the different languages, various nations emerged to correspond with each tribe and clan, every nation chose its own king to head it, and the result was the outbreak of wars, and conflicts between clashing nations... So too at this time we have been discussing. Since there had been a change in Israel’s one religion, and the scripture of the Law had been transferred to other nations—I mean to Assyrians, the ancestors of the colonist Samaritans—the division of Israel’s opinion also resulted. And then error arose, and discord began to sow seed from the one true religion in many counterfeit beliefs, as each individual thought best, and thought that he was proficient in the letter (of scripture) and could expound it to suit himself.

Here, we have all the pieces of Epiphanius’ sectarian puzzle coming together in an explicit formulation: nations (i.e. communities) + individualized opinion = sectarianism and the proliferation of error. Even if Epiphanius’ aim with his historicized schema was to mark off ethical or religious deviation as ethnically or culturally particularist, while simultaneously asserting that the principles of Christianity existed apart from these errant preoccupations, the narrative history of sectarianism inculcates an ethnographic ordering not only of the temporal (i.e. bad) world but of the Christian tradition itself. In the context of heresiology, the appeal to study heresy’s roots and describe them in expressly generative language reveals not simply a kinship with the language of ethnography, but a persistent frame of reference for the

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62 Epiphanius, Pan. 9.1 (Holl, 1:195).

63 Epiphanius, Pan. 9.1-9.4 (Holl, 1:196-7).
totality of his undertaking.\textsuperscript{64} The text imposes a vision of sectarianism and religious genesis that forecasts and elucidates the longue durée proliferation of ethnographic and heretical division.

For Epiphanius, geographical, genealogical, and ethnogenic ordering are all affixed to the same narrative of sectarianism’s birth and growth, which concludes that history is in fact dominated by the unceasing ascent of self-made (heterodox) innovation. Thus even as he mimics his predecessors’ genealogy of Christian heresy—it always begins with Simon Magus—and parrots specific details they possess, he simultaneously expands the genre’s capacity to comprehend the world of religious opinion by constructing a religious history of the “world” alongside its historical twin, the birth of sectarianism. Christian heresies produce or sow the same ethnic particularities and epistemological claims as Hellenic and Jewish sects.\textsuperscript{65} They are defined by deviant conduct and fallacious opinions, all of which hearken back to the emergence of divisive opinions among nations, philosophers, Samaritans, and Jews. Although the history of the world, having just entered the era of (manifest) Christianity, has been recalibrated, the Christian heresies graft onto this previously articulated ethnogenic and ethnographic schematization because its sectarian proponents continue to occupy the same historical and theological space as the heresies of yore. The process of error has not ceased, nor had its essential contents; the Panarion builds a successive chain of heterodoxy, beginning

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\item \textsuperscript{64} Cf. Tertullian’s \textit{De Praescriptione Haereticorum} 4 (\textit{Traité de la prescription contre les hérétiques}, ed. R.F. Refoulé, SC 46, [Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1957], 92-3), which conceptualizes heresies as a divinely ordained test for the resolve of the true followers of Christ. For Tertullian, the mere existence of heresies serves a precise divine function. Epiphanius, in contrast, maintains that heresy is a natural human phenomenon, insofar as it shapes and guides the contours of history. The current state of the world—the proliferation of heresy—is not altogether unparalleled. The relative stakes, however, have changed precisely because the opportunity has arisen for humanity to return to its Adamic state of being. Since the world has now undergone the transformative experience of Christ’s gospel, humanity possesses the opportunity to reforge its unity and univocality.

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with the unstoppable force of Hellenic error. The ethnogenic mapping of the pre-Christian world has been supplanted by the rise of Christianity, wherein the Christian heresies function, in some sense, as the new nations of the world.\textsuperscript{66}

Because the history of the world is an iterative cycle of orthodox and sectarian contestation, surveying and classifying the Christian sects by their ritualistic customs, cosmologies, modes of biblical interpretation, Trinitarian formulations evince the Christian interpretation and exposition of ethnographic investigation.\textsuperscript{67} The history of the world in the \textit{Panarion} traces the struggle to reclaim the untarnished Adamic legacy, to free humanity from the excesses of the idolaters, philosophers, Jews and Christian heretics.\textsuperscript{68} Though the human creation of deities (idols) aptly foreshadows the reproductive propensity of the Christian heresies, it exposes how error produces a schematized narrative both of the past and the present, in which uncovering and ordering its contents becomes the prevailing occupation of the heresiologist. In combining the tradition of apostolic succession and the Hellenic and Jewish heresies with the genealogy of the nations in Genesis 10, Epiphanius organizes the “entire” history of the world as a history of religious exploits, governed by his knowledge of


\textsuperscript{67} Young Kim, “Epiphanius of Cyprus and the Geography of Heresy,” in \textit{Violence in Late Antiquity}, ed. H.A. Drake (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006), 235-252, studies the geographical distribution of the heresies of the \textit{Panarion}. Like most of the scholarship on the geography of heresy, he takes a decidedly literal view of the matter (i.e. locating each of the heresies within a fixed geographical location). See also Thomas Robinson, \textit{The Bauer Thesis Examined: The Geography of Heresy in the Early Christian Church} (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 1988). Averil Cameron, “How to Read Heresiology,” explores the conceptual possibilities and limitations of heresiological literature. She suggests that the scholarly neglect of the genre owes much to Epiphanius, whose \textit{Panarion} was judged to be inarticulate, solipsistic, and altogether unsophisticated. In addition to mounting a spirited defense of Epiphanius, Cameron indicates that a more capacious study of the geography of heresy (one less interested in the facts of geographical dispersal) would be extremely valuable. In the next section of this chapter, I will argue that Epiphanius, Theodoret, and Hippolytus employed the conceptual and metaphorical language of geography and travel (topographical surveying) to articulate Christian attitudes of triumph and conquest.

\textsuperscript{68} Epiphanius’ censure of heretical invention, articulated earlier by Hippolytus and Irenaeus, their introduction of novel interpretations, full books of alternative scripture, and misguided rituals, reflects the same underlying concern: unrestrained curiosity, intellectual and reasoned pursuits produce transgression, chaos, and error.
truth and threatened by the altogether natural perpetuation of ignorance and falsity. The generation of culturally specific idols (and their corresponding deities) and the failure to comprehend the true meaning of divine (or even natural) law disrupt the linear, though periodized, progression of godliness evidenced by Adam, Abraham, and other biblical luminaries; the rise of heresy obscures the orthodox line of Christianity.\textsuperscript{69} The rise of Christian sectarianism follows a historical pattern, conditioned by the errors of human intellect. When Epiphanius characterizes the Melchizedekians as “inflated by a more excessive imposture/arrogance of thought” (περισσοτέρα ἀλαζονεία ἐννοίας ἀρθέντες), he has, in fact, provided an encapsulation of the heresiologists’ most basic charge against the totality of the sectarian world.\textsuperscript{70} Those who depart from the knowledge inscribed by Scripture and entrusted to the ecclesiastical hierarchy are stripped, via genealogical exclusion, of the designation Christian.\textsuperscript{71} In his attack on this same sectarian offshoot, Epiphanius explicitly appeals to the language of tradition and succession in defense of orthodoxy, words which could easily have been uttered by Irenaeus himself: “apostolic traditions, holy scriptures and successions of teachers have made our boundaries and foundations for the upbuilding of our faith, and God’s truth has been protected in every way.”\textsuperscript{72}

\textsuperscript{69} Although the thrust of Epiphanius’ argument throughout his narrative of the four ages of heresy demonstrates the processes by which human error or disobedience produced multiple types of false worship and behavior, he concurrently tracks the epitomes of piety, juxtaposing godliness and ungodliness as mutually operative categories (from the very beginning of human history until the present age). The kernel of faith begins with Adam who, notwithstanding his transgression against God, symbolizes the apex of human piety. Adam and his entire generation are elevated before God to “royal rank and status” (“a generation in Christ is called a ‘queen,’”) on account of Adam’s knowledge of the divine. (De Fide 4.1 [Holl and Dummer, 3:499]).

\textsuperscript{70} Epiphanius, Pan. 55.9.1 (Holl and Dummer, 2:336).

\textsuperscript{71} For instance, see Pan. 21.1.1, 2.1, 7.2; 27.3.3, 4.1; 29.1.2, 6.6, 7.1 (Holl, 1:238, 239, 245; 304, 304; 321, 328, 329).

\textsuperscript{72} Epiphanius, Pan. 55.3.8 (Holl and Dummer, 2:329).
Since the church is the lone offspring of its “mother,” co-opting (or Christianizing) the language of Song of Songs 6:9, it stands singularly apart from all the heretics, “the concubines” (παλλακαί) who came before and would come after the incarnation.\footnote{Epiphanius, \textit{De Fide} 5.6, 6.1 (Holl and Dummer, 3:501). “And later he shows how all of them will find her the most honored of them all, the mistress of them all, and his only \textit{choice}, the one whose children are the king’s heirs and legitimate children. For they are ‘children of the promise’ and not ‘children of the bondmaid’ or the concubine, or of the others whose description is endless” (\textit{De Fide} 7.2 [Holl and Dummer, 3:502-3]).} But, as the Cypriote bishop explains, the heretics, both Christian and pre-Christian, “have not been entire strangers to the covenant and inheritance.”\footnote{Epiphanius, \textit{De Fide} 6.1 (Holl and Dummer, 3:501).} The very fact that “a faith which exhibited the character of Christianity and an unbelief which exhibited the character of ungodliness and transgression” persisted into the age of Scythianism suggests that mapping onto the genealogy of godliness (i.e. Christianity or the faith of Christianity) was an affirmative \textit{choice} “until the time I have just mentioned.”\footnote{Epiphanius, \textit{Pan.} 2.7 (Holl, 1:175). The ambiguous locution “until the time I have just mentioned” (ἐώς τοῦ προδεδηλωμένου χρόνου) could mean either until the time of Abraham or of Noah; the text is hopelessly vague on this point.} Christianity was genealogical insofar as the generations of descendants were clearly arranged by the piety of their leading devotees, and yet a decision to disobey the law of nature (an act of ungodliness) excised one from the tree of faith. In the era of Christ, the same choice confronts those who are divorced from the pious lineage of Adam and Abraham. Epiphanius’ typological reading of Abraham’s children with Keturah and Hagar reveals that those born outside the true lineage, nonetheless, “received gifts,” which “were a type of the good things to come, for the conversion of the gentiles to the faith and truth.”\footnote{Epiphanius, \textit{De Fide} 7.3, 7.4 (Holl and Dummer, 3:503).} Abraham’s children by Keturah received gifts of wealth (taken from raids in Damascus and
Samaria), which would ultimately be returned to Christ (“to gain their share of the same hope”), since the magi were descendants of Keturah:

And do you see how the truth has expressions and consequences? The sects too are concubines, and their children have received gifts, though the concubines have only received the name, and have only been called by Christ’s name and received their few texts from the sacred scripture, so that they can/should understand the truth by these if they want (ἐὰν θέλωσιν). But if they do not wish to (understand) but return to Herod (for they are told not to return to Herod, but to go to their country by another way)—and if they do not do as they are told, the gifts are without purpose for them, just as their coming would have done the magi no good if they had returned to Herod. For these same sects debase the teachings of God’s oracles in a way that resembles Herod’s.⁷⁷

As genealogy often produces “a ranked order of relationships” (an expression of spatial and “genetic” difference), as with the tradition enumerated by Diogenes Laertius, with Epiphanius, indebted to the procreative and hierarchized models of the Christian tradition, epitomized by the writings of Irenaeus, Clement, and Hippolytus, his Panarion holds the capacity to reunify a once coherent humanity as it traces the sources of that disruption.⁷⁸ Because the truth “was plainly revealed in the world at Christ’s coming,” access to the genealogy of true knowledge is no longer shrouded by darkness of sectarian opinion.⁷⁹

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⁷⁷ Epiphanius, De Fide 8.4-5 (Holl and Dummer, 3:504). I have modified Williams’ translation here.

⁷⁸ Woolf, Tales of the Barbarians, 41. A recent article by Young Richard Kim prefers to think about the Panarion as a form of collective biography, “Reading the Panarion as Collective Biography: The Heresiarch as Unholy Man,” Vigiliae Christianae 64 (2010): 382-413. See also, Patricia Cox Miller, “Strategies of Representation in Collective Biography: Constructing the Subject as Holy,” in Greek Biography and Panegyric in Late Antiquity, eds., Tomas Hägg and Philip Rousseau (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 209-254. Kim’s reading has much insight to offer, but it fails, I think, to situate the collective biography within the larger textual framework. I have argued in this chapter that Epiphanius conceptualizes the heresiological venture in a far grander narrative than a mere doxographical biography or genealogy. It is the master narrative—the macroscopic theorization—that sets the text apart.

⁷⁹ Epiphanius, De Fide 6.8 (Holl and Dummer, 3:502).
As I noted in the Introduction, ethnographic paradigms of genealogy function as much to create unification as they do to engender separation. With Epiphanius we see his master narrative embellish these twin organizational operations of ethnographic analysis. For him, orthodoxy is the counterpoint to this history of heresy, even as it finds itself suffering from the very disease it seeks to destroy. The second Proem’s exposition of cultural and ethnic origins and the main text’s description and denunciation of heretical Christian beliefs and practices exist as a persistent, though surmountable, foil and disruption to the ancient succession of “Christian” generations. Epiphanius’ history of heresy expounds the history of the world, charted through an investigation of religious knowledge (or lack thereof), and the relationship between the rise of disparate opinions and the coalescence of those opinions into nations, sects, schools, or heresies. The presentation of a history of heresy, which is also a history of the world and of Christianity itself—as it existed from the very beginning of creation—unfolds as “a style of sociological writing that will describe whole cultures (knowable worlds) from a specific temporal distance and with a presumption of their transience.” The bishop presents a worldview that imposed an impending summation for humanity at large. “The world’s time periods are no longer counted by lineages,” he writes, since the genealogies of the present and the measure of time are ultimately “summed up in one unified whole,” the “unshakeable stay” of the church. Truth and orthodoxy, for Epiphanius, remain totally bound to the language, both implicit and explicit, of genealogical argumentation. The process of excising heresies hinges on an appeal to a multiplicity of

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80 This point is stressed both by Greg Woolf, Tales of the Barbarians and Erich S. Gruen, Rethinking the Other in Antiquity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), though the latter does not explicitly use the framework of ethnography, his overall point is the same as Woolf’s.


82 Epiphanius, De Fide 5.4 (Holl and Dummer, 3:501).
strictures, which utilizes the (genealogical) legacy of Jewish and Hellenistic error and the
genealogical inheritance of the Church itself. Appealing, again, to the metaphor of the Song of
Solomon, Epiphanius announces the eventual triumph of Christianity (the dove as the symbol
of the Church) by parsing a distinction between those who ultimately come around to the
church and those who do not:

‘But one,’ he says, ‘is my dove, my perfect one: the daughter of her mother, elect
for her that bore her.’ And later he shows how all of them will find her the most
honored of them all, the mistress of them all, and his only choice, the one whose
children are the king’s heirs and legitimate children. For they are ‘children of
the promise’ and not ‘children of the bondmaid’ or the concubine, or of the
others whose description is endless.83

The force of Epiphanius’ genealogy of piety (or of divine knowledge), elaborated in Proem II,
drives his historical theory, viz. that the history of the world is, in fact, a history of (orthodox!)
Christianity. Genealogy, geography, pedagogy, and scholasticism have been subsumed within a
larger argument about the history of religion and the Christian history of the world.

Despite the progression of this seemingly unbroken line of proto-Christians, no age of
humanity fully bore its potential; no era was known by its unerring piety. Every age of
humanity remained tainted by its errors, even the age of Christianity. If a dichotomy between
ancient theories of primitivism (a return to the golden age of humanity) and anti-primitivism
(betterment by technological and artistic progression) can be said to exist, Epiphanius shatters
the paradigm completely. For him, it is neither about reviving a golden age nor is it about
overcoming the barrenness of the earliest age with technological or artistic advancements. It
is about rekindling or revitalizing the faith of the generations borne by a particular line of
successors, who themselves were not free from error. Insofar as they lived in the past, their
history, as told in the Bible, was the recourse to rescue the downfall of the present.

83 Epiphanius, De Fide 7.1-2 (Holl and Dummer, 3:502-3).
Perhaps the most interesting ideological parallel is found in Aelius Aristides’ oration Regarding Rome, delivered before the imperial court in 155 C.E., in which he exalts the empire of the Romans through a comparative history of empire, an elaboration of Rome’s civil and military policy, and its beneficent administration.\textsuperscript{84} A devotee of Asclepius, the orator posits that Rome’s empire was not in fact unforeseen. While Homer had proclaimed the eventual empire of the Romans in his Iliad, Hesiod, on the other hand, Aristides posits, “would not as now describe the generations of man by beginning with the golden race.”\textsuperscript{85} Instead:

When he had made this beginning, in his discussion of the final race of iron, he would not say that their destruction would occur, ‘when they were born with gray temples’. But he would say that the iron race would perish on the earth when your leadership and empire were established, and then he would grant Justice and Reverence to return to mankind, and he would have pitied those born before you.\textsuperscript{86}

For Aristides it is the return of principled governance, epitomized by Rome’s just and equitable rule, that nullifies the disorder of the human race. It is the end of an age, hastened by a


\textsuperscript{86} Aelius Aristides, To Rome 106 (Keil, 2:123; Behr, trans., Aelius, 2:97).
reinfusion of a proper values, institutional structures, and legal norms, that recommit humanity to a pathway of stability and enculturation.\footnote{87}{The rise of Rome and its expansive governance inaugurates a certain unification and harmony among the world’s peoples: “And the whole inhabited world, as it were attending a national festival, has laid aside its old dress, the carrying of weapons, and has turned, with full authority to do so, to adornments and all kinds of pleasures. And all the other sources of contention have died out in the cities, but this single rivalry holds all of them, how each will appear as fair and charming as possible. Everything is full of gymnasiums, fountains, gateways, temples, handicrafts, and schools” (To Rome 97 [Keil, 2:120; Behr, trans., Aelius, 2:94-5]). On the role of ethnography and geography in forging the Roman imperial world, see Emma Dench, Romulus’ Asylum, 55-61, Katherine Clarke, Between Geography and History, 294-336, and Claude Nicolet, Space, Geography, and Politics in the Early Roman Empire, trans. Hélène Leclerc (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), 1-56.}

Like the Romans before them, the learned men of orthodox Christianity had become, in Aelius’ phrasing, “universal geographers for all men by opening up all the gates of the inhabited world (ἀπασι περιηυνται κοινοι γεγόνατε, ἀναπετάσαντες ἀπάσας τῆς οἰκουμένης τὰς πύλας) ...and by assigning universal laws for all men and by stopping practices which formerly were pleasant to read about, but were intolerable if one should actually consider them...and by organizing the whole inhabited world like a single household (καὶ συντάξαντες ὠσπερ ἕνα οἶκον ἀπασαν τὴν οἰκουμένην).”\footnote{88}{Aelius Aristides, To Rome 102 (Keil, 2:121; Behr, trans. Aelius Aristides, 2:95-96).} The ethnographic gaze—the wide lens through which the world is reoriented and translated—has become the vernacular, as we have seen, of the coalescing catholic church. The tarnish of the age of Barbarism did not dispel Epiphanius’ longing for a world free of sectarian opinion, a world he insists is immanently Christian and bound to the very experience of being human. Aristides insists that the reign of Rome provides precisely such order over against a corruptibly divisive world: “before your empire everything was in confusion, topsy-turvy, and completely disorganized (ἀνω και κάτω συνετετάρακτο και εἰκῆ ἐφέρετο), but that when you took charge, the confusion and faction (ταραχαὶ καὶ στάσεις) ceased and there entered in universal order (τάξις δὲ πάντων) and a glorious light in life and
government and the laws came to the fore and the altars of the gods were believed in.”

While Rome’s ordering is entirely novel according to Aristides, for Epiphanius the Church, as bound by Nicene orthodoxy, recalls a distant past free from division and bound to the simplicity of faith in God and the laws of nature. To that end, the age of Barbarism symbolizes the potential of the age of Christianity to perfect the divine plan: to uproot the sectarian divisions of the Christian age through the revealed truth of Christ and to return to an antediluvian way of life.

Epiphanius, having refined the inchoate ethnogenic and sectarian theorizations of Hippolytus, broadens the conceptual and epistemological scope of heresiological literature. The *Panarion* is not simply an attempt to organize the world of Christianity; it organizes the world as a whole by its latent Christianity. What was only hinted at in Hippolytus—the sectarian taint of philosophical schools and astrological speculation—has become a paradigmatic exposition on the very nature of human religiosity. The *Panarion*’s project is encapsulated perfectly and eerily in a single line from Aelius’ oration: “And it can be said in medical terms that the inhabited world was, as it were, ill at the start and has now recovered (ἐπιστημόνως τε ἔξεστιν εἴπεῖν οὖν πεπονηκυῖαν ἐκ ρηχῆς νακεκομίσθαι τὴν οἰκουμένην).” The healing capacity of Rome to rectify and regulate a straying world has been recast in the language of heresiological ethnography. In Epiphanius’ thinking the church functions as the temporal and theological summation point because it nullifies the counting of successive generations. In unifying all peoples under the genealogy of Christ, the line of Adam and Abraham, the church thus offers all peoples, nations, and places the choice to resubmit (reattach) themselves to the one true God. All time, having been previously “divided into the sixty-two generations up until Christ” now existed in the single body of the church: “all things

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80 *Aelius Aristides, To Rome* 103 (Keil, 2:121-2; Behr, trans. *Aelius Aristides*, 2:96).

are completed in [the church], whether they are times and seasons, years and intervals of
generations, and whether the age counts its dates by emperors, consuls, Olympiads or
governorships.” The secession of lineages “will make it evident that the end of the age is
separate from time, and will be over at the transition to the age to come.” And as the age of
Christianity has burgeoned, the atemporal finality of Christ lingered over the linear
progression of sacred time toward a decisive eschatological moment. Although the heresies of
Judaism and Hellenism endured, it was simply a matter of time (or the very undoing of time
itself) before the epochs of sectarian opinion would be a remnant of an earthly past.

Theodoret of Cyrrhus’ Master Narrative: A Typological Ordering of Heresy

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91 Epiphanius, *De Fide* 5.5 (Holl and Dummer, 3:501).

92 Epiphanius, *De Fide* 5.4 (Holl and Dummer, 3:501). For a parallel development, see the outstanding work of
Kathleen Davis, *Periodization and Sovereignty: How Ideas of Feudalism and Secularization Govern the Politics of Time*
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), who argues, in a close analysis of Bede’s *The Reckoning of
Time and his Ecclesiastical History of the English People* (alongside Amitav Gosh’s *In an Antique Land*), that the political
theology of time is a negotiation between incarnational time and political time, 103-131.

93 Similar to apocalyptic temporality and its rigidly defined ages and kingdoms, which function as the theological
counterweight to the eventual revelation of messianic deliverance, Epiphanius’ history of the church as told in his
*De Fide* counts the generations between Adam and Christ in order to plot what was only suggested in his universal
history of sectarianism: an exegesis of the biblical precedent for the unerring lineage of Christianity. Because, as
the bishop reports, “the number of each thing in scripture is unalterable, and...nothing which is assigned a
number can be without value or be reduced to number in the scripture for no good reason” the sixty-two
generations in Matthew’s genealogy and the sixty generations (or “queens”) of the Song of Songs signify not only
the biblical succession of the church but a fundamental reordering of the very measure of human history (*De Fide*
3.5 [Holl and Dummer, 3:499]). But “since no one has reported or arranged the numbers by generation any
further, because the number of this sort of thing has been sealed and closed by the number of the queens, which
is counted up to the incarnation itself,” the post-incarnation era ceases to be measured generationally and the
“later authors, or rhetoricians, annalists or historians” instead counted by the “successions and times of the
emperors” (*De Fide* 5.2, 5.3 [Holl and Dummer, 3:500-501]). Epiphanius, in fact, appeals to the succession of the
consuls during the years of Jesus’ life to prove the unerring truth of scripture and to thwart the speculative
opinions of the sectarianists. See, also, the successive reigns of consuls, from Augustus and Silanus onward, deployed
in his attack against the Alogi, who reject the teaching of John’s Gospel and his Revelation the succession of
consulships (*Pan.* 51.22.24 [Holl and Dummer, 2:290-1]). Epiphanius also provides a succession list of the Jerusalem
episcopate at *Pan.* 66.20.1-20.3 (Holl and Dummer, 3:44-47) in order to disprove the utter falsity of Mani’s
prophecies.
In the middle of the fifth century—in the wake of the Council of Chalcedon in 451—Theodoret, bishop of the Syrian city of Cyrrhus, composed four books, known as the Compendium Against Heretical Fables (Αἱρετικῆς Κακομυθίας Ἐπιτομή or Haereticarum fabularum Compendium), along with a fifth book, The Compendium of Divine Doctrines (Θείων δογμάτων Ἐπιτομή or Divinorum decretorum Epitome).⁹⁴ Taken together, the text is known as The Discernment of Lies and Truth (Ψεύδους καὶ ἀληθείας διάγνωσις or Falsi verique distinctio).⁹⁵ With descriptions of fifty-seven heresies and twenty-nine chapters on orthodox doctrine, this

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⁹⁵ Theodoret, Haer. Preface (Migne, 340B). On Theodoret generally, see Theresa Urbainczyk, Theodoret of Cyrrhus: The Bishop and the Holy Man (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002); István Pássztori-Kupán, Theodoret of Cyrus (New York: Routledge, 2006; Ian Tompkins, "The Relations between Theodoret of Cyrrhus and His City and Its Territory, with Particular Reference to the Letters and Historia Religiosa (D.Phil. diss., University of Oxford, 1993). For an analysis of Theodoret and the web of connection and conflict in Roman Syria, see Adam Schor, Theodoret’s People: Social Networks and Religious Conflict in Late Roman Syria (Berekely: University of California Press, 2011). On Chalcedon, see Frances M. Young, From Nicaea to Chalcedon: A Guide to the Literature and Its Background (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983). For two intriguing essays on Theodoret’s own identity, see Fergus Millar, “Theodoret of Cyrrhus: A Syrian in Greek Dress?” in From Rome to Constantinople: Studies in Honour of Averil Cameron, ed. Hagit Amirav and Bas ter Haar Romeny (Leuven: Peeters, 2007), 105–125 and Philip Rousseau, “Knowing Theodoret: Text and Self,” in The Cultural Turn in Late Ancient Studies, ed. Dale Martin and Patricia Cox Miller (Duke University Press: Durham, NC: 2005), 278–97. Helen Sillett has treated the largely unstudied Discernment of Lies and Truth in her essay, “Orthodoxy and Heresy in Theodoret of Cyrus’ Compendium of Heresies,” in Orthodoxy, Christianity, History, 261–273. Much of what she writes about Theodoret is apt and entirely plausible, but I disagree wholeheartedly with her characterization of late antique heresiology. She asserts, as is customary with the study of heresiology, that by the fourth and fifth centuries the genre had become a banal, rote exercise. This once “vibrant, engaged” genre “settled into a flatter form, and the intellectual energy which fueled the earlier works was less readily apparent. Dialogue had been replaced by monologue, and no longer was refutation the principal aim of heresiology. The falseness of doctrines was presumed evident, and did not inspire elaborate demonstration. Heresiologies were now encyclopedic epitomes, cataloging the history of heresy through brief descriptions and labels” (270). Broadly speaking, my project aims to upend this dubious and shortsighted reading. Indeed, Sillett’s account here grossly mischaracterizes the genre’s evolution, complexity, discomfort, and purport. She fails to consider the elaborate literary qualities embedded in heresiological texts, and, more importantly, to consider how they negotiate the very capacity of human knowledge. Moreover, Sillett is certainly mistaken that the genre evolved from dialogue to monologue in the fourth and fifth centuries. As far as I know, none of the extant heresiological texts are dialogic; they are all monologues. I will argue in the Chapter three that the heresiologists, in particular Tertullian, expressly contest the value of philosophical or theological dialogue. It is a concern from the very beginning not the fourth century. Sillett is also mistaken to assert that the heresies Theodoret discusses were already entirely known by the middle of the fifth century (and thus his text is but a rehearsal of sorts). First, it is also worth noting that even into the fifth century, Christian ecclesiastics wrote, as the case of Quodvultdeus beseeching Augustine demonstrates, in search of answers and in need to guidance on the subject of heresy. It is not a problem that has been altogether solved. Second, the heresies were not, as I will demonstrate in chapter three, entirely known. The genre persists because the problem endures. I have generally followed, though modified inaccuracies and necessary clarifications, the translation by G.M. Cope, “An Analysis of the Heresiological Method of Theodoret of Cyrus in the ‘Haereticarium Fabularum Compendium’” (PhD diss., Catholic University of America, 1990).
bipartite heresiological treatise organizes heresy not explicitly by genealogy but by doctrinal
consonance among the sectarian parties. Theodoret subsumes the genealogical paradigm,
promoted by Hippolytus and Epiphanius under a typological (i.e., theological doctrinal)
genealogy. His treatment of the heresies in Books I and II defines and organizes them in
relation to doctrinal lineages. His master narrative imposes a typological ordering upon the
heretical world that seeks to rationalize the consistently evolving scope and substance of
heretical inquiry. It is a model that strives to illuminate change among the heretics. The first
book, as the bishop explains, arrays all those heresies that “invented another creator,” “denied
one beginning of the whole universe,” and said “that the Lord appeared among men by
illusion.” The second book collects the heresies that hold the opposite, viz. that the universe
has a singular beginning, but “they address the Lord as a mere man.” “The core point of
comparison between the two main heretical groups,” as Helen Sillett has pointedly phrased it,
“is Christology, and the errors made by the inadequate simultaneous expression of humanity
and the divinity of Christ.” In Theodoret’s telling, the heretics progressed in history by
theological variation: each stage of heretical attack was organized around an overarching
doctrinal type. As one stage failed, a new type emerged to assume the reins.

While Theodoret naturally inaugurates his discussion of the heresies with Simon
Magus, in his Compendium Simon does not operate as the lone heretical seed of all the known

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96 Sillett concedes that the language of kinship and inheritance does, in fact, exist in the text, but she fails to note its prominence. I will discuss this oversight below. See also Averil Cameron, “How to Read Heresiology,” 478. For a related application of Theodoret’s typological inclinations, see Derek Krueger, “Typological Figuration in Theodoret of Cyrrhus’s Religious History and the Art of Postbiblical Narrative,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 5.3 (1997): 393-419.

97 Theodoret, Haer. Preface (Migne, 337C).

98 Theodoret, Haer. Preface (Migne, 337D).

heretics; instead, he begets only the first of the two major Christological lineages: the invention of a divine hierarchy.\(^\text{100}\) Simon is juxtaposed quite directly with Ebion, the initiant of Book II, as a second foundational figure in shaping the contours of the history of heresy. And in each case, their pedigrees would ultimately be supplanted by future heretical variants, which tried to eradicate orthodox Christianity precisely because previous generations of heretics had failed. At Book III, the typology relaxes its bifurcated grip over the text and, instead, we find a collection of heretical miscellany. Six unrelated heresies are named, which emerged contemporaneously with the two Christological categories of Books I and II, defined as, “those who have sprouted between those former heresies (or more remote, temporally speaking) and these latter heretics (or nearer, temporally), who were the fathers of diverse doctrines” (τοὺς μεταξὺ τούτων κάκεινων...βεβλαστηκότας, οἱ διαφόρων δογμάτων πατέρες ἐγένοντο).\(^\text{101}\) The Nicolatians, Montanists, followers of Noetus of Smyrna, Quartodecimans, followers of Novatus, and those hewing to Nepos exhibit an assortment of theological errors, ranging from polygamy to paschal dating, unrelated to the overarching typologies of either Simon or Ebion. The six are allied by temporal chance, having fallen in the midst of Theodoret’s larger typological classification: “these teachings sprang up between those denying the humanity of our God and Savior and calling a mere man the one who is eternal God. And the majority of

\(^{100}\) Augustine enumerates the Simonians first, but does not describe Simon as the root of all heresy (though that may be his assumption). Hippolytus mentions Simon Magus in passing, noting that his successors, took him as their beginning. But the explicit language of Simon as the root of all heresy is noticeably absent in Theodoret’s heresiological treatise.

\(^{101}\) Theodoret, Haer. Preface (Migne, 337D; altered from Cope). Also at Haer. III. Pro. (Migne, 338A): Ἐπειδὴ τὰς ἐναντίας ἄλληλαις αἱρέσεις ἐν τοῖς προτέρους βιβλίους πεποίηκαμεν δήλας, φέρε δὴ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας, αἱ μεταξὺ τούτων κάκεινων ἐβλάστησαν τοὺς ἀγνοοῦντας διδάξωμεν. “Since we have made clear in earlier books that the heresies are in opposition to each other, Come now, and we will teach those who are ignorant [about] the other heresies, which sprouted between the remote and the more recent.”
them languished as soon as they sprang forth, and remained dried up.”

The strict binary typology is broken as time passes, but it follows a pattern foretold by scripture. The parable of the tares (Matthew 7:15-20) forewarns of wolves in sheep’s clothing (the heretics), which will be identified by their (bad) fruits (i.e., teachings): “these ill-blowing and all-abominable doctrines are sufficient to demonstrate their shared father.” As the heretics fulfill their divinely ordained role in threatening the rise of Christianity (with the aid of common people, leaders, generals, and kings) their departure from truth, again, following the divine plan, ultimately convicts and defeats them. Like the heretics of Books I and II, the six heretics here have withered in defeat, and fled from Christian strongholds. In Theodoret’s telling, these theological temptations only serve to steady and strengthen the Church’s foundations.

In the first four books of the Compendium, genealogy still operates as a tool by which Theodoret arranges the heretics within a broader typological framework. Simon brings forth eight named heretical offshoots: the Cleobians, Dosithians, Gorteni, Masbothei, Adrianistians, Eutychetians, and Cainites. At other junctures, the language of succession (διαδεξάμενος from διαδέχομαι—to take up [the word], to succeed, or receive) is deployed to emphasize doctrinal heredity (not simply doctrinal parallelization or sequential ordering) or theological paternity. Simon is described as the precursor to Menander, who then served as teacher to Saturnilus and Basilides. Prodicus is labeled the successor to Carpocrates, and Valentinus is

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102 Theodoret, Haer. III.6 (Migne, 408D-409A).

103 Theodoret, Haer. III. Pro. (Migne, 401A). Ἰκανά μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὰ καθ’ ἐαυτὰ τὰ δυσαγή καὶ παμμίαρα δόγματα τὸν οἰκείον ἐπιδείξαι πατέρα.

104 See also Theodoret, Haer. I. Pro.; II. Pro. (Migne, 341 C; 384B-385C).

105 Theodoret, Haer. III. Pro. (Migne, 401A).

said to have received “his starting point” from the first six heresies named (Simon, Menander, Saturnilus, Basilides, Carpocrates, and Prodicus), and he ultimately bears the heresy of Secundus. At the turn of the twenty-third chapter, Theodoret refines his genealogical typology, declaring that the twenty-two heretics from Menander to Florinus, in fact, all “began from Simon” and “brought forth doctrines similar to one another, naming Aeons, and emanations of Aeons, and other emanations of emanations.”107 Book II does not explicitly follow a genealogy of knowledge or chain of intellectual inheritance until the fourth chapter, whereupon Theodotus is said to have “held these same [doctrinal] opinions with Artemon” but “led a different faction,” which then germinates the Melchezidecians.108 While the consonance between Theodotus and Artemon is ambiguous (is it shared either by coincidence or by inheritance), it is clear that Theodotus is the seed from which the Melchezidecians arise; they “are a division of these Theodotians.”109 The Elcesaites, moreover, “collected myths from various heresies,” evidencing further intellectual dependence among and between the heretical factions.110 And in Book IV, the fourth chapter concerns the “Pasthyrians and others derived from the heresy of Arius.”111 Polemon is noted to have taken “his starting point from the writings” of Apollinaris.112 In the chapter three, Theodoret describes the heresy of Aetius and his student Eunomius as an intensified offshoot of Arius: this sect “clearly increased the

107 Theodoret, Haer. I.23 (Migne, 372C-D).
108 Theodoret, Haer. II.5 (Migne, 392A).
109 Theodoret, Haer. II.6 (Migne, 392D).
110 Theodoret, Haer. II.7 (Migne, 393A).
111 Theodoret, Haer. IV.4 (Migne, 421C).
112 Theodoret, Haer. IV.9 (Migne, 428A).
blasphemies of Arius.” Not only did they spread the essential theological message of Arius (thus carrying on his intellectual lineage), but also, like any living organism, they mutated and adapted to the challenges of orthodoxy.

A heresiological system ordered by typology does not, as we see, necessarily dissolve genealogical relations; it can and does use and even illuminate them, while also emphasizing doctrinal similarity over against generative causation. The Compendium is not altogether dissimilar from the Panarion in the way that both use generative-kinship connections between the heresies to complement their broader schematizations: a universal genealogy of heresy writ large for Epiphanius and a theological typology of heresy for Theodoret. Though shaped by their different emphases, both Epiphanius and Theodoret employ the same language of classification (the micro-tools by which their narratives unfold). Epiphanius describes most of the heresies as a successor to the previous sect, and the succession itself, generally, follows one of two patterns: a temporal succession (the ambiguous “successor,” in which chronology is the driving structure) or an actual genealogical (intellectual) descent. As we noted above, the language of succession, though not dominant for Theodoret, does organize almost the entirety of Book I and various heresies throughout Books II, III, and IV. To that end, many of the heresies in the Compendium progress along an organizational trajectory markedly similar to that used in the Panarion. As the macro-frameworks of the Panarion and the Compendium

113 Theodoret, Haer. IV.3 (Migne, 417A).

114 Epiphanius reports, for example, that Noetus “arose in his turn after Bardesanes, though not many years ago; it was about 130 years before our time” (Pan. 57.1.1 [Holl and Dummer, 2:343]). The Purists (Pan. 59.1.1-13.9 [Holl and Dummer, 2:363-379]) arose after the Valesians, but the Angelics (Pan. 60.1.1-2-6 [Holl and Dummer, 2:379-80]) are decoupled from the previous narrative. The sixty-first sect, the Apostolics (Pan. 61.1.1-8.5 [Holl and Dummer, 2:380-389]), are again described only as coming “after.” In each case, the succession is never explicitly described with the language of generative causation, but merely as temporally connected or successive. There are similarly ambiguous consonances between sects, such as the fact that Sebellius (the leader of sect 62) taught “very similarly to the Noetians,” but doctrinal concordance does not necessarily identify a genealogical relationship (Pan. 62.1.2 [Holl and Dummer, 2:389]).
organizationally diverge, they conceptually gesture toward the same conclusion. In both the
case of typology and genealogy, the schematic function is to rationalize the disorder of the
heretical world. In the *Panarion*, the universal genealogy turns the error of idolatry into a
causative devolution by which heresy is defined out of the tradition and outside the space of
Christian knowledge. Like Epiphanius’ *De Fide*, the *Compendium of Divine Doctrines* articulates the
lineage of piety down into the Catholic Church, Theodoret tailors his treatise toward
orthodoxy and, specifically, toward a refinement of its theological constitution.

In the *Compendium* the emphasis on doctrine serves to trace the evolving proximity of
heretical pestilence, which then builds the foundation for the imperative of his fifth book on
orthodoxy:

> Now I call upon those who are reading [this], to examine each of the heretical
doctrines in comparison with the teaching of the truth. For on account of this, I
wrote the fifth book. For it shall be seen, on the one hand, that the fifth book
follows the sayings of the divine spirit, while the other books are the invention
of all-depraved thought.¹¹⁵

By fomenting ecclesiastical purges and synodic battles, the doctrinal history of heresy
conversely maps Theodoret’s discussions of orthodox doctrine. The utility of doctrinal heresy
is precisely what propels and nurtures Theodoret’s typological model. It is the formation of
Church doctrine via the interaction between heretical and orthodox theology that undergirds
the typological paradigm, which brings into relief the necessity of coherent orthodox opinion:

> Therefore, since we proved the shame of the lies and we stripped the heretical
fables bare, their impiety became evident, and carry joylessness and incredulity
to them, come let us compare them to the Gospel teaching. We made plain the
difference between light and darkness, between the peak of health and the
difficulty of sickness. For it is not (possible) to find a likeness that they agree
with the proposed comparison. For even the darkness, even if it also leaves
behind the light, nevertheless produces the necessary utility for me. For the
night brings about a respite for those who work during the day. And sickness

¹¹⁵ Theodoret *Haer*. Preface (Migne, 340B; altered from Cope).
has become profitable for many. For having recognized the Savior and Creator through this, and having proclaimed the expulsion of evils, they who obtained what they asked turned their attention to virtue.\textsuperscript{116}

While protreptic language here is unmistakable, Theodoret’s argument posits a cosmic struggle between two forces, those of light and darkness. The contestation between the forces of the demonic and those of God not only creates the seemingly chaotic history of Christianity, it also serves as the foundation around which Theodoret can seek to impose order upon and comprehend systematically the ebb and flow between the devolution and evolution of Christianity’s standing throughout the world. His treatise expounds a theory of heresy that rationalizes the persistent and enduring threat of contrarian opinion by way demonic intrusion. In essence, it grounds abstract notions of Christian temptation in a demonogenic narrative.

Theodoret argues that heresies arose from the work of the “wholly-evil demon, the destroyer of mankind” who, having lost “the roots...of polytheistic error, and himself being stripped bare of subjects,” “invented different concepts of the insidious attacks.”\textsuperscript{117} In the preface to the second book of his *Compendium* (the typology conditioned by Ebion, which emphatically declares Christ’s humanity), he explains the perpetuation of heresies as an unyielding effort by demonic forces to disrupt the ship of truth. The demon, unwed to principles consistency, steadily works his way through a bounty of heresies, jettisoning what fails and refining what succeeds:

But these [heretics of Book I] were only a few who would be easily counted, and these, dispersed in some of the cities, were surrounded by the thrusting opprobrium for Valentinus, Marcion, and followers of Mani, probably by refutation of those who are now entrusted to maintain the churches but are unable to convert the small remains of the impious heresies. And the demon,

\textsuperscript{116} Theodoret, *Haer. V. Pro.* (Migne, 441A-B; altered from Cope).

\textsuperscript{117} Theodoret, *Haer. I. Pro.* (Migne, 341B).
hostile to God, could not take satiety of war against the godly; but again he sends others to war against the truth, with teachings in complete opposition to the previously described heretical beliefs.\textsuperscript{118}

The heresies of yore, having failed to counteract the forces of light, belong to the annals of history. They have been summarily exposed, counted, and demolished. And although the trope of demonic lineage persistently lingers over the discourse of heresy, Theodoret has fashioned a heresiological master narrative that explains typological succession by means of demonic plotting.\textsuperscript{119} In Theodoret’s telling, demonic intercession is not, then, some haphazard or sporadic occurrence, but a persistent and regulated effort to alter the contours of Christian history. Theodoret’s heresiology thus marshals this cosmic struggle to explain the state of the Christian world. Fourth and fifth-century heresies—the enduring contestations generated by Arius, Nestorius, Eutyches, the Donatists, and Apollinaris, among others—reveal a worsening, adaptive demonic plot. Having been thwarted by God’s apostles and future generations of orthodoxy, who have stamped out the infamous opinions of Simon and Ebion’s legacy, the demonic power resumes its plan with new knowledge:

But the Father of lies, whom the Lord reasonably called a murderer (for he always lays plots for the souls of men), contrived different devices of plots. For after understanding, as it seems, the things said concerning the God of the Universe on the part of the disciples of that one (i.e. Valentinus), to be wholly foul, so the message of their explanation did not hold plausibility. For some, on the one hand, said that the naked divinity appeared, and others, on the other hand, said that the human nature devoid of divinity performed the [divine] economy. He, the devil, mixed another impiety, devoid of the hyperbole of the former view.\textsuperscript{120}

\textsuperscript{118} Theodoret, \textit{Haer.} II. Pro. (Migne, 388B; altered from Cope).


\textsuperscript{120} Theodoret, \textit{Haer.} IV. Pro. (Migne, 412B).
Realizing the implausibility of its Valentinian creation, the Evil One marshals subtler, more conniving blasphemies to challenge the pillars of truth. While heretical diversity had been used previously (by Irenaeus, Hippolytus, Tertullian, Epiphanius, and Augustine) to evidence the heresies’ incompatibility with the singular apostolic succession or Catholic truth, for Theodoret the diversity is an outward sign or remnant of previous demonic attempts, which have failed.

Even in the instances in which heresy possessed a demonogenic lineage, the heresiologists ascribe heresy’s longevity, again, to the susceptibility of the human mind; heresy’s very livelihood hinges on the innate weakness of human existence. As Theodoret declares, while interpreting II Timothy, the apostle “Paul” “proves both the freedom of the will and the autonomy of the mind, which easily changes one’s inclination to whatever one wants.”

Heresy is a phenomenon bound to and by human frailty. Similarly, during his refutation of the Sethians, Epiphanius supplements his periodized history of the heresy with a brief comment about culpability. After enumerating the various languages and peoples that arose in the aftermath of the tower’s destruction, the bishop ascribes the total contents of his universal narrative to the handiwork of the devil:

Why is it, then, that these people have told their lies, interpolating their own mythology, imagining and dreaming of unreal things as though they were real, and banishing what is real from their own minds? But the whole thing is an idea of the devil which he has engendered in human souls. It is amazing to see how he deceived man into many offenses and dragged him down to transgression, to fornication, adultery and incontinence, to madness of idols and gluttony, and

121 See also the Introduction to Book II of his treatise.

122 Theodoret, Haer. II. Pro. (Migne, 385 A). Δείκνυσι δὲ καὶ τὸ τῆς γνώμης αὐθαίρετον, καὶ τὸν νοῦν αὐτοκράτορα ὄντα, καὶ ῥαδίως τὴν οἰκείαν μετατιθέναι ῥοπῆν ἐφ’ ὅπερ ἄν ἐθέλη δυνάμενον.
any number of such things—but never before Christ’s coming ventured to say a blasphemous word against his own Master or mediate open rebellion.\textsuperscript{123}

As the instrumental realization of the demonic or divine plans, men and women emerge as the agents and markers of heresy in history.\textsuperscript{124} Just as “the all-wise God of the universe entrusted the [gospel’s] cultivation of the barren world to a few men,” the demon chose “men worthy of his own operation...placing on them like a mask the title of Christians.”\textsuperscript{125} He sowed the seeds of wickedness (“planted the tares”) before the gospel had been established—“immediately after those [Apostles] began to cultivate and to scatter the seeds of piety”—“he presented the noxious drug of falsehood to humankind.”\textsuperscript{126} But heresy’s persistence as a force at once natural and supernatural, caught between the world of men and the world of demons, exposes an important disjuncture within the rhetorical edifice of heresiology: the rationalization of heresy as a necessary source of temptation presupposes the human ability to comprehend it and triumph over it. Heresy’s oscillation between natural and supernatural force, I contend, frames the epistemological fortitude and intellectual heft of the heresiologists in terms of an evolving, yet always tenuous, command of heresiological sources and tradition.\textsuperscript{127}

\textsuperscript{123} Epiphanius, \textit{Pan.} 39.9.1–3 (Holl and Dummer, 2:78–79). See also \textit{Pan.} 77.1.1–3 (Holl and Dummer, 3:416): “Though it is painful to me in the anticipation, another doctrine different from the faith sprang up directly after these. I cannot tell why, but in as to make sure that the devil would not leave <the church untroubled>, for he is constantly disturbing the human race and, as it were, warring on it, by putting his bitter poisons into its choice food. And as though he were dumping its bitterness into honey, <he is introducing the heresy> even through people who are admired for their exemplary lives and always renowned for their orthodoxy. For this is the work of the devil, who envied our father Adam at the beginning and is the enemy of all men—as certain wise men have said, envy is always the opponent of great success. And so, not to leave me and God’s holy church untroubled but constantly in an uproar and under siege, he devil planted certain occasions for this trouble even through persons of importance.”

\textsuperscript{124} See Theodoret \textit{Haer.} I. Pro. (Migne, 341B–C); II. Pro. (384C–388B); II.11 (397B–C); III. Pro. (Migne, 400B–401A).

\textsuperscript{125} Theodoret, \textit{Haer.} I. Pro. (Migne, 341B).

\textsuperscript{126} Theodoret, \textit{Haer.} I. Pro. (Migne, 341C).

\textsuperscript{127} I shall return to this point in chapters four and five.
Sillett has posited a plausible historical explanation to account for Theodoret’s typological arrangement, in which the *Compendium* is best understood as “a literary response to” the Nestorian controversies of 431 and 451. Theodoret, having watched as Cyril and Nestorius waged synodal and doctrinal war against each other, interprets the vicissitudes of Christological contestation as an ever-encroaching demonically generated force precisely “because heresy looked, to the bishops involved, a lot like orthodoxy.” The ever-shifting theological landscape thus necessitates a *discernment* of truth and lies. Instead of contesting the heresies as he describes them, Theodoret thrusts a systematic counter-text upon them. His typological ordering, hastened by the Christological controversies of the fifth century—and the ensuing ecclesiastical messes—reflects the increasing fluidity between orthodoxy and heresy as narratives within ecclesiastical governance. Of Nestorius, Theodoret notes that he used “every instrument...continually undertaking his craft, in guise of orthodoxy.” Although the process by which the demon deploys his tricks in the name of God predates Nestorius—“for he undertook to attack everyone by the blasphemous fellowship of his name”—the current crises of the fifth century illustrate the demon’s progression and evolution. What was once easily discerned as outside the fold now requires far more exacting scrutiny and investigation.

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130 Theodoret, *Haer.* IV.12 (Migne, 433A). Although the process by which the demon deploys his tricks in the name of God predates Nestorius (see the Prologue of Book II), the current crises of the fifth century illustrate the demon’s progression. What was once easily discernible as belonging outside the fold now required far more exacting scrutiny.

In each successive generation, the heresies become more entrenched, hew closer to the line of orthodoxy, and become more difficult to discern.

Inasmuch as Theodoret’s heresiological text directly confronts the problem of embedded heresy by augmenting heretical descriptions with orthodox instruction, it follows Irenaeus, Hippolytus, and Epiphanius, all of whom situate the articulation of orthodoxy—or doctrinal truth—as their textual codas. In writing on twenty-nine subjects, ranging from abstinence to judgment, Theodoret’s treatise offers the most systematic juxtaposition between heresy and orthodoxy. Moreover, his text ventures beyond simple disputes over Christology and the proximate events of the fifth century’s theological controversies: it includes theological delineations of cosmology, demonology, anthropology, creation, resurrection, parousia (among others), alongside practical considerations such as second marriage, repentance, virginity, and abstinence. Even with its typology framework, the Discernment remains styled and shaped by the language of its heresiological predecessors. And as the typological genealogies of Simon and Ebion recede the text becomes an amalgam of heretical miscellanies, ordered only by a demonic machinations. Theodoret’s text is an exemplar of the genre’s structural capacity to adapt itself, to look backward and forward, as the persistence of heresy necessitates a consistent explanation even as the heresies become increasingly diverse, versatile, and resilient.

**Conclusion: Christianizing the World**

While the effects of erroneous opinions and practices are strikingly obvious in Epiphanius’ condensed history of the world, what has remained largely overlooked by scholars
is the degree to which he and the other heresiologists thrust a process of ethnographic reasoning (well beyond the procreative language of genealogies) to the fore of his Christian corrective. I have tried to illustrate in these two chapters how the investigation of heresy’s origins—and its ethnic or national character—prefigures and ultimately structures the taxonomy of the character and quality of Christian heresy. In elucidating the history and impact of cultural and religious progression and devolution, offering a typological theory of heretical diversification, and contesting alternative theories of cosmic and human classification, heresiology binds its analysis of sectarianism to a worldview that coalesces systematicity or macroscopic theorization with the production and evolution of heretical opinions. Having reached the epoch of Christianity, the interaction of theological opinions now shapes the history of the world. The ethnography of heresy at once narrows the order of the world to its Christian aegis and yet defines the world by its Christian (theological) governance.

In the fifth book of his Confessions, Augustine (the subject of chapter V), challenges the Manichaean interest in astrology and astrological prediction. Although he attributes their errant obsession to the now commonplace heretical hubris—“they become lost in their own ideas and claim to be wise, attributing to themselves things which belong to you”—there is a secondary supposition to Augustine’s attack.132 “The person,” he observes, “with a scientific knowledge of nature is not pleasing to you on that ground alone.”133 Understanding the laws of nature without also knowing God is a hollow and meaningless discovery. Augustine insists that

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133 Augustine, Confess. V.IV.7.1-2 (Skutella and Verheijen, 60; Chadwick, trans., 75).
any knowledge of the natural world apart from God is a false knowledge. More than that, however, the world of nature not only evidences God, but it must be in accordance with the norms of Christianity. Naturalistic phenomenology “becomes an obstacle [for the self-identified Christian] if he thinks his view of nature belongs to the very form of orthodox doctrine, and dares obstinately to affirm something he does not understand.” In other words, the natural world—its foundations and manifestations—must exist in harmony with or in mystery from orthodox doctrine. The natural world, which includes the profusion of peoples across its lands, is not an entity to be feared; rather, it must be brought within the discourse of Christianity. Heresiology functions as an unabashed illustration of this effort to make the world manifestly and exhaustively Christian. Through an analysis of the disharmony within Christianity (and the world more broadly), the heresiological genre works backward (from dissonance to consonance) to extrapolate theories of human diversity. The ethnographic impulse of heresiology emerges out of a desire to impose a fixed order on its world. Christianity can, above all else, explain the conditions, both past and present, of the world.

134 Augustine, Confess. V.IV.7.3-16 (Skutella and Verheijen, 60; Chadwick, trans., 75-6).
135 Augustine, Confess. V.V.9.22-24 (Skutella and Verheijen, 61; Chadwick, trans., 77).
Chapter III: Knowledge Fair and Foul: The Rhetoric of Heresiological Inquiry

What is crooked cannot be made straight, and what is lacking cannot be counted. I said to myself, “I have acquired great wisdom, surpassing all who were over Jerusalem before me; and my mind has had great experience of wisdom and knowledge.” And I applied my mind to know wisdom and to know madness and folly. I perceived that this also is but a chasing after wind. For in much wisdom is much vexation, and those who increase knowledge increase sorrow.

-Qoheleth 1:15-18

While “precise knowledge” (ἡ ἀκρίβεια, lit. exactness) as Epiphanius of Salamis observed, “guides man, to protect him from error about either part of the truth,” heresiological literature illustrates the inadequacies and tensions within textual efforts to expound what one must know and do and refrain from doing to be a Christian.¹ Embedded within the **ethnographic impulse** of the early Christian authors—the impulse to describe, classify, and polemicize with systematic lists and etiologies of peoples, doctrines, belief systems, etc.—is an acute awareness about the rectitude and propriety of inquiry, social discourse, and scholastic fervor.² Precisely because the heresiologists characterized their heretical opponents as perpetually theologically probing and epistemologically restless, curiosity and investigation

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² Greg Woolf’s *Tales of the Barbarians: Ethnography and Empire in the Roman West* (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 8–31, posits a definition of ethnographic knowledge that is oriented around exchange (on a middle ground): “ethnographic knowledge, I take it, is that knowledge we gain of one another in conversation, specifically in dialogues conducted across a gradient of unfamiliarity. Conversations of this kind must have taken place long before the archaic period. Presumably they increased in frequency as the Mediterranean world and its hinterlands became more and more closely interconnected by trade and settlement, conquest and migration” (17).
were symbols of Christian contradiction. Theological, scriptural, and ethnographic inquiries were not neutral endeavors of pastoral protection. Even in the lands of the most learned ecclesiastics, inquiry was emblematic of the corrosive heretical mentality. As a symptom of scholastic indulgence, theological liberality, and epistemological hubris, heresy exposed not only the delicate balance between pious and impious knowledge, but also the threat posed by irresolution and probing to the discourse of Christian surety. The heresiologists' awareness of the potential pitfalls of discovery and dialogue emphasizes that these Christian authors found themselves negotiating the ambiguous effects of Christian didacticism, scholasticism, and inquiry. By affirming that social discourse and scholastic investigation were tied to an overarching concern about the dangers of collection and codification, the heresiologists knowingly pursued their ethnographic agendas on treacherous rhetorical, epistemological, and theological terrain.

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3 Inquiry encourages exchange and openness, which created the space for individual choice. Heresy, by its very etymology, was an affirmative act of subversion. The word itself, as Tertullian explains, derives from the Greek for choice (αἵρεσις), which emblemizes the arrogance of a self-determined and appropriated rationality to augment the teachings of the gospel of Christ (Praescr. 6.2 [Traité de la prescription contre les hérétiques, ed. Refoulé, 95]). The heretic secures his own self-condemnation—“if they are heretics, they cannot be Christians, since the names which they accept come not from Christ, but from the heretics whom they follow of their own choice”—in the very choice to expand and thus adulterate the apostolic and scriptural traditions of Christianity (Praescr. 37.2 [Traité de la prescription contre les hérétiques, ed. Refoulé, 139]). For Tertullian, even an angel who claims to have received revelatory knowledge from the divine—and therefore to augment the apostolic tradition—should be anathematized from the church (Praescr. 6.5 [Traité de la prescription contre les hérétiques, ed. Refoulé, 95]). See Marcel Simon, “From Greek Hairesis to Christian Heresy,” in Early Christian Literature and the Classical Intellectual Tradition, ed. William R. Schoedel and Robert L. Wilken (Paris: Éditions Beauchesne, 1979). 101-116.

4 On the importance of consensus in late antiquity as an outgrowth of the military, economic, and political crises of the third century, see Richard Lim, Public Disputation, Power and Social Order in Late Antiquity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 24-30. The rise of the Constantine endowed Christians with newfound privileges and benefits: “the nomen Christianum,” as Lim calls it held enormous financial, political, and ecclesiastical power (26). To that end, clarity of voice within the city served the needs of the bishop and his city. The relationship between a local city and its imperial benefactors necessitated consensus within the city itself: “diffused discussions and disputing, with individuals applying their powers of persuasion in a freewheeling way, were potentially dire threats to the shaky bond between center and periphery” (28). The threat of heretical movements, most pronouncedly Manichaeanism in the post-Constantinian era, threatened to disrupt the stability of imperial networks of ecclesiastical patronage.
If the binary between orthodoxy and heresy was a (rhetorical) distinction between order, coherence, and constancy, on the one hand, and restlessness, volatility, and persistence, on the other, inquiry emerged as the conceptual ground on which the distinction was pressed and elaborated. In this chapter, I array the heresiologists’ rhetorical and theological ruminations about their texts’ participation in and perpetuation of a Christian discourse of uncertainty and doubt. Although the task of describing and refuting the heretics was unquestionably justified on account of pastoral, theological, and ecclesiastical needs, the vehemence with which it was undertaken concealed the complexity and peril of its scholastic genealogy, pedagogical implications, and ethnographic ordering. The heresiologists’ cognizance of the fractious potentiality of their texts encapsulates their fears about ethnographic inquiry as a means of erroneously sanctioning an unrestricted investigation of the world and all its inscrutable diversity. Heresiology’s overarching epistemological and scholastic framework transformed the polemical ethnographic project of mapping heresy (and its eventual refutation) into a referendum on the relevance and legitimacy of knowledge acquisition as both an investigative process and a tangible end result. The process of elaborating an ethnographic model of heresy, having used geographical, genealogical, and typological paradigms to explain Christian difference, balanced the destabilizing facets of heresiological knowledge against the stabilizing duties of ecclesiastical authority.

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thought necessarily included an appraisal of the value of study and learning as extensions of an already delimited Christian epistemology.

In explicitly foreclosing both the method and conclusions of the (dialogic) philosophical method (embraced by the heretics), Tertullian, the prolific North African Christian author, pushed to demolish any genealogical consonance between the heretics and their Christian ethnographers. There was simply no room for any associative harmony. But by theorizing the legitimacy of inquiry and, in turn, recounting their own laborious scholasticism, the heresiologists navigated the treacherous terrain of intellectual elitism by humbling themselves and their task. While heresiology aimed to assert Christian control over and within the known world, the heresiologists’ tempered this rhetoric of mastery by emphasizing their toil on behalf of their Christian congregants. Richard Lim’s remarks about Augustine’s management of his authority, humility, and scholastic language, pertain equally to the heresiologists’ pursuits:

As a priest and later bishop, Augustine regarded his own pastoral care of his fellow Christians who, in his view, could not be trusted to hold their own in discussions with heretics, as a primary concern. For this reason, among others, he was to write in ways that demonstrate more authority with a corresponding diminution in the amount of intellectual openness he was willing to grant himself in discussing matters of faith and belief.  

As types of ethnographic theorists, the heresiologists persistently asked how one knows, when one knows, when one knows too much, and when one must cease from knowing. Theorizing knowledge, both as an end in itself and as an investigative process, shaped the formation of a Christian scholastic and pastoral tradition in which the barriers to, limits of, and utility for information were meticulously constructed and arrayed.

7 Richard Lim, “Christians, Dialogues and Patterns of Sociability in Late Antiquity,” in Goldhill, 161. See Rapp on pragmatic ecclesiastical authority, Holy Bishops in Late Antiquity, 23-55.
In his *Rule Against the Heretics* (*De praescriptione haereticorum*), Tertullian (ca. 160-220 C.E.), theorized the theological function and repercussions of heresy within a broader discussion of the Christian impulse to inquire assiduously. Unlike the heresiological works of Irenaeus, Epiphanius, Theodoret, Augustine, and Hippolytus, Tertullian’s text largely abstains from an analysis of particular heretical opinions. Even Tertullian’s claim late in the text to offer “a description of the heretics’ way of life” (*conversatio haereticae descriptionem*) serves largely to meld various heresies into a single, generic mass of error and earthly interests. And although other works by the Carthaginian—most notably *Adversus Marcionem*, *Adversus Hermogenem*,

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9 Tertullian, *Praescr*. 41.1 (Refoulé, 146). The heretics are hasty with their ordinances, liberal in their acquisition of converts, and, most significantly, corrupters of established truth.
Adversus Praxean, and Adversus Valentinianos—offer detailed descriptions and refutations of particular heretical holdings, De praescriptione presented a composite characterization of the essence of heretical identity. Within this amalgamated heretical disposition, Tertullian postulated an intellectual division between Christian and heretics by folding their identities into a referendum on the associative and substantive danger of inquiry.

Tertullian enumerated the incontestable diktat incumbent upon all those who call themselves Christian: if the human experience within the world was to be grasped and maximized, it must be guided by the principle that “Christ laid down one definite system of truth,” which it then became necessary for all the nations to “believe without qualification.”

Insofar as men and women possessed an obligation to “seek in order that they may be able to


11 Tertullian, Praescr. 9.3 (Refoulé, 102).

12 Tertullian, Praescr. 9.3 (Refoulé, 102). The contestation over epistemological expansiveness—the production, transmission, refinement, and delimitation of knowledge as it relates to the advent and rise of Christianity—reflects the heresiologists’ insistence that the system of knowledge produced by the gospel of Christ functions to humble and close the human mind to alternate systems of truth. It is altogether fitting, then, given the cataloguing impulse of the Panarion, that Epiphanius begins his history of heresy with a juxtaposition of epistemological entreaties. His appeal to God, Jesus Christ, and the Holy Spirit stands alongside “the Greek authors, poets, and chroniclers” who invoke a Muse “when they undertook some work of mythology” (Pan. Prooemium II.11 [Holl, 1:170]; Jas. 3:15 as cited by Epiphanius at Pan. Pro. II.1.3 [Holl, 1:169]). The praxis of entreaty, at once perpetuated and supplanted by Epiphanius, illustrates both the shift toward the Christian vernacular of the religious as it also instances the hierarchical distinctions of knowledge within the Christian universe.
believe,” the corollary to that process of inquiry was an acknowledgment of epistemological finitude: for “there cannot be indefinite seeking of that which has been taught as the one (unius) and definitive (certi) thing.” The association Tertullian posited between philosophers and heretics presages the hazards of heresiological ethnography that later iterations of the genre negotiated. Unlike Augustine, whose disfavor for the dialogic form reflected (among various other reasons) his determination that it was ill-equipped for the ecclesiastical necessities of mass communication, Tertullian’s treatise did not theorize dialectic as a distinctly ecclesiastical problem. Instead, he posited that dialogue was a symptom of a more troubling heretical disease. Insofar as he theorized the consequences of knowing the theological, heretical, and scriptural landscape of Christianity, he feared the destabilizing qualities of engagement, inquiry, and exchange. The refutation of the heretics constituted more than theological and ecclesiastical wrestling over differences of opinions: it inaugurated an ethnographic feedback loop of persistent and protracted discovery and discourse.

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13 Tertullian, Praescr. 9.3, 9.4 (Refoulé, 102; altered from Greenslade).

14 This is the avenue of inquiry I pursue in chapters four and five, giving specific attention to the heresiologies of Epiphanius, Theodoret, and Augustine.

15 On late antique Christian appraisals and usage of dialogue, see Catherine Conybeare, The Irrational Augustine (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 1-60; Gillian Clark, “Can We Talk? Augustine and the Possibility of Dialogue?,” Richard Miles, “‘Let’s (not) Talk about It:’ Augustine and the Control of Epistolary Dialogue;” and Richard Lim, “Christians, Dialogues and Patterns of Sociability in Late Antiquity,” in Goldhill, 117-134, 135-150, and 151-172. While Clark argues the problem of dialogue (both as a genre and as a means of communication) derives from Augustine’s ecclesiastical duties, she notes that even before he had become a bishop Augustine showed distaste for dialogue. He questioned its utility for seeking answers to complex questions. The turn toward sermons (or preaching in its various guises) was a magnification of his public responsibilities. In addition, she argues, implausibly, I think, that that actual social engagement with heretics could have undermined the authorial or ecclesiastical voice: “sympathetic understanding could be quoted against him; and if he did not convincingly defeat the opposition, his audience might not accept beliefs that in his judgment were lethal” (125). Of course, texts could just as easily be used against a bishop or learned Christian. Indeed, as I have already shown, the heresiologists ably marshaled their opponents’ words against them. As an especially elite and generally private mode of communication, dialogue not only necessitated an intellectually astute audience to follow its trajectory, it failed, if its lack of usage by late antique Christians is evidence, as a means of mass communication. For Lim, while dialogue remained a privilege of the elite, it failed to engage the masses of Christians across the empire. Moreover, dialogue held the potential to accentuate problematically the paideia and intellectualism of Christian ecclesiastics.
In Tertullian’s text, the Christian tradition, represented by its theological principles, texts, rituals, practices, and apostolic succession, stands cordoned off from additions of any kind.16 The parallel Tertullian drew between the heretics and the philosophers served to demarcate the genealogy of Christian tradition and praxis and to posit a dispositional distinction between those Christians who were restless and those who were satisfied.17 The ascertainment of knowledge flowed from Aristotle’s teachings on the value of relentless inquiry and what he termed “fruitless questionings” (quaestiones infructuosae).18:

Wretched Aristotle! He who establishes dialectic for these men, the art which destroys as much as it builds, crafty in its opinions, forced in its conjectures, stubborn in its arguments, maker of struggles, annoying even to itself, retracing everything, it will have treated nothing in its entirety.19

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16 The treatise begins by dismissing those who express astonishment at the very existence of the heretics, since, Tertullian explains, the heresies were divinely foretold in scripture (Matt 7:15; 24:4, 11, 24; 1 Cor. 11:19) as a phenomenological test: “for their purpose is that by holding a trial, faith would still possess approval” (Praescr. 1.1 [Traité de la prescription contre les hérétiques, ed. Refoulé, 88]). The prevalence of heresy serves to uncover the specter of devotion, exposing those Christians—“a bishop or deacon, a widow, a virgin or a teacher, or even a martyr”—who lapse into heresy and forfeit their faithfulness (Praescr. 3.5 [Refoulé, 90]). For faith, Tertullian insists, is not tested by persons but persons by faith. Tertullian, like his heresiological predecessors and successors, is offering a scriptural and theological rationalization of heretics in the world. However much they are opposed to the teachings of God, the heretics ultimately serve the divine will.

17 The Gnostics, Epiphanius’ twenty-sixth heresy (Pan. 26.1.1-19.6 [Holl, 1:275-300), exemplify the elasticity and precariousness of theological speculation and restless inquiry. Unlike the heresiologists who argued that the totality of Christian knowledge would only arrive in the kingdom of God, the Gnostics were seemingly impatient; they devised systems to obtain higher orders of knowledge in the here and now. Moreover, these heretics, dissatisfied by the limited revelations of the divine, supplanted scripture with new books and prophecies. They likewise sought to transcend the limits of the holy books with exegeses that produced elaborate cosmologies, sanctioned particular ritualistic conduct, and established alternative theories of the anthropological condition. As Epiphanius tells it, in writing “nonsensical books” (a Gospel of Perfection, a Gospel of Eve, Questions of Mary, Apocalypses of Adam) and narrating fantastical stories, the Gnostics “yoke themselves to Nicolaus’ sect for the sake of ‘knowledge,’ not only ‘pervert[ing] their converts’ minds, but ‘enslav[ing] their bodies and souls to fornication and promiscuity’” (Pan. 26.1.3, 3.3 [Holl, 1:275]).

18 Tertullian, Praescr. 7.7 (Refoulé, 98).

19 Tertullian, Praescr. 7.6 (Refoulé, 97; altered from Greenslade). On Tertullian’s pagan education, see Barnes, Tertullian, 187-210 (for his philosophical tendencies, see especially 205-210). On his appropriation, modification, and rejection of Platonic and Stoic notions of the soul, see Nasrallah, An Ecstasy of Folly, 101-127.
In asking, famously, “What has Jerusalem to do with Athens, the Church with the Academy, the Christian with the heretic,” Tertullian adamantly insisted upon the theological futility of protracted investigation about scripture, Christ, theodicy, divinity, cosmology. Insofar as the geographical locus of Christianity (Jerusalem) attested further dichotomies of institution and identity, Tertullian postulated a clash of worldviews through this tripartite schematization. He sought to recast the intellectual underpinnings of the Greco-Roman world through the language and strictures of Christian knowledge. Tertullian’s recalibration of these three geographical, religious, and institutional symbols inaugurated the transformative era of Christianity: the terms of academic culture have been recast through the lens and dicta of Christian discourse.

The endeavor to expand one’s epistemological horizon fallaciously operates as if knowledge was an end in itself effectuated through various intellectual, ethnographic, and experiential processes. For Tertullian and the Christianity he circumscribed, the search for knowledge was located in Christ, who made wisdom “freely accessible to all believers, irrespective of rank or birth.” As Richard Lim describes it, “Tertullian championed a paradoxical and radically inward-looking faith,” which could be known through the precedents of Scripture (and not via the dialectical pursuits of the Greek philosophers): Our instruction is from the portico of Solomon, who himself had taught that the Lord must be sought in simplicity of heart. There is no use for those who had advanced a Stoic or a Platonic or a dialectic Christianity. After Jesus Christ there is no need for our curiosity, and after the Gospel no need of inquiry (Nobis curiosisate opus non est post Christum Iesum nec inquisitione post euangelium; emphasis mine). When

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21 Richard Lim, Public Disputation, 10.

22 Richard Lim, Public Disputation, 10.
we believe, we desire nothing beyond believing. For this we believe from the beginning, that there is nothing we ought to believe beyond [this].

Tertullian’s claim that Christ’s gospel halted the need for further inquiry (about the nature of God, etc.) contested more than just the dialectical propensity of the Greek philosophers. In fact, the compulsion among Christians, heterodox and orthodox alike, to discuss, exchange, study, and debate theological doctrine and scriptural minutiae hewed to the very words of scripture. The heretics’ appeal to the scriptural mantra “search, and you shall find” (quaerite et inuenietis at Matt. 7:7 and Luke 11:9), pushed Tertullian to develop an exegetical strategy to limit the scope of Jesus’ dictum. By insisting on a literal interpretation of the verses, Tertullian proposed a defensible means to delimit the boundaries of Christian inquiry.

De Praescriptione accorded the misinterpretation of the scriptural injunction “to search Persistently” to a combination of a priori misassumptions and the neglect of the contextual and circumstantial conditions surrounding Jesus’ injunction. In the first place, Tertullian explained, the dictum was promulgated before Jesus had revealed himself to be the Christ (and before Peter had proclaimed him to be the Son of God). “When, thus far he had not been recognized, he still had to be sought,” it was altogether appropriate to encourage curiosity and investigation since the revelation of Christ was still unfolding. In addition, the command to seek “applies only to the Jews” (in Iudaeos competere) for the Jews alone possessed the bounty of textual material (the law and prophets) through which they could and should have found Christ. Because the Jews dwelt in God’s house, having been vouchsafed the promise by the

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23 Tertullian, Praescr. 7.10-13 (Refoulé, 98-9; altered from Greenslade).

24 See the latter half of Dunn’s “Tertullian’s Scriptural Exegesis,” 147-155.

25 Tertullian, Praescr. 8.4 (Refoulé, 99; altered from Greenslade).

26 Tertullian, Praescr. 8.7 (Refoulé, 100). See Dunn, “Scriptural Interpretation,” 149.
God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, they were implored by Jesus to search its contents anew.27 “The nations, however, were never in God’s house. They were...always outside (foris semper).”28 Because the apostles had not yet received the command “to go to the nations, who will be taught and baptized,” the gentiles remained in a state of ignorance about the messianic claims of Jesus of Nazareth.29 There was no knowledge basis from which they could seek and thus find.30

Tertullian further contested the locution’s dangerously open-ended sanction of inquiry by proposing exegetical regulations to restrict its applicability. According to the him, exegesis was governed by the rules of reason (disciplina rationis interpretentur) only if it attended to the specifics of matter, time, and limit (what, when, and for how long).31 Tertullian thus bound the validity of investigation to the experience of spiritual fulfillment, so that “what you must seek is what Christ taught, (seeking) for such a time, assuredly, as you do not apprehend it, until, indeed, you do find it.”32 The principle was rather clear: belief in or knowledge of Christ nullified the necessity of further theological or epistemological exploration. Tertullian’s

27 Tertullian, Praescr. 8.4 (Refoulé, 99).
28 Tertullian, Praescr. 8.9 (Refoulé, 99; altered from Greenslade).
29 Tertullian, Praescr. 8.14 (Refoulé, 101; altered from Greenslade).
30 Tertullian’s insistence, however, that “search and you shall find” belonged to a particularly Jewish context, which excluded the nations, seemingly obviated the universality of the Christian gospel. Anticipating the objection, Tertullian conceded but qualified the implication of his argument: “Indeed, all the words of the Lord were ordained for everyone. They came to us through the ears of the Jews; and most were directed at (these) peoples; thus they establish not a property of admonition for us but an example” (Praescr. 8.16 [Refoulé, 101]). To counter his critics, Tertullian proposed to exegete the verse as if it were a universal maxim, through which he identified the principal misunderstandings and mischaracterizations of those who appealed to Matthew 7:7 and Luke 11:19 in order to justify their epistemological fervor.
31 “As to matter, that you consider what it is you must seek; as to time when you must seek; as to limit how long you must seek” Tertullian, Praescr. 10.1 (Refoulé, 103). On the lack of systematicity in Tertullian’s exegesis, see J.H. Waszink, “Tertullian’s Principles and Methods of Exegesis,” in Schoedel and Wilken, 17-32.
32 Tertullian, Praescr. 10.2 (Refoulé, 103; altered from Greenslade).
position proclaimed the pedagogical fulfillment of Christ: “acceptance of the faith debars any prolongation of seeking and finding.” The sheer bounty of teachings available from the heretics, philosophers, and nations, a concerned Tertullian warns, engenders the possibility and likelihood of endless but worthless searching. The necessity of exposure again confronts the dangers of discovery, engagement, and legitimization.

Inasmuch as Marcion, Valentinus, Ebion, Simon, and Apelles universally appealed to Matthew 7:7, they inculcated an epistemological worldview in which spiritual fulfillment and stability were continually challenged and disrupted: “therefore I shall be nowhere as I encounter ‘seek and you shall find’ everywhere” (ero itaque nusquam dum ubique convenio quae rite et invenietis). Tertullian quite explicitly feared that an open-ended call to seek would legitimate a destabilizing and corrosive mentality among his fellow Christians. A principle that embraced investigation as a scriptural mandate would transplant the disposition already fully embodied by the heretics—since the heretics are the emblems of unadulterated, limitless exploration—into the traditions of Tertullian’s vision of Christian tradition:

33 Tertullian, Praescr. 10.4 (Refoulé, 103). See also Irenaeus, Adv. haer. II.27.1-2 (Contre les hérésies, Livres II, ed. and trans. Adelin Rousseau and Louis Doutreleau, SC 294 [Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1982], 2:2:264-6): “But to combine things that are not expressed openly or placed under our eyes with the explanations of parables, explanations that anyone excogitates at will, is unreasonable. It would result in no one’s having a Rule of the Truth. On the contrary, as many interpreters of the parables as there would be, just so many truths would be seen at war with each other and setting up contradictory opinions, as is the case with the questions of the pagan philosophers. According to that reasoning, then, man would always be in search without ever finding, because he had rejected the very method of investigation.” The translations of Irenaeus are from Dominic J. Unger, et al. in St. Irenaeus of Lyons: Against the Heresies, Books 1, 2, and 3. ACW 55, 65 and 64 (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1992, 2012, 2012). For books IV and V, I have followed ANF. On Irenaeus’ notion of the rule of truth, see Eric Osborn, Irenaeus of Lyons (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 143-161.

34 The false knowledge—or knowledge so-called—of various heresies, the Gnostics, the Simonians, the Secundians, the Marciosians, the Nicolatians—amasses its power from its claim to fill this epistemological lacuna of Scripture; it supplants and supersedes the transcendent knowledge the church ascribes to the God of scripture. As Irenaeus warns, the heretic “imagines that he has acquired not a partial, but a universal knowledge of all that exists” (Irenaeus, haer. II. 28.9 [Rousseau and Doutreleau, 2:2:290]). Their theological promiscuity, as Hippolytus, Epiphanius, Irenaeus, and Theodoret all observe, triggers a far wider avalanche of promiscuous, indiscriminate conduct.

35 Tertullian, Praescr. 10.9 (Refoulé, 104; altered from Greenslade).
For if they are still seeking, they have still found nothing certain, and for that reason whatever they appear to hold in the interim, they expose their own doubts, as long as they are seeking. Therefore, you, who are seeking in the same manner, looking to those who themselves also are seeking, the doubter to the doubters, the hesitator to the hesitators, blind, you must be led, by the blind into the ditch.\textsuperscript{36}

To wander astray philosophically, exegetically, cosmologically, or ritualistically (i.e. the various manifestations of the call to seek) was no mere act of impunity if it occurred under the conditions of established belief. To seek \textit{while believing} was an act of outright desertion, and “therefore in deserting my faith, I am found to be a denier (\textit{ita fidem meam deserens, negator invenior}).”\textsuperscript{37} To embrace a life of ceaseless scrutiny—a yearning to interpret scripture endlessly, try to ascertain the contours of heaven, and to posit a description of the transcendent Godhead—was to participate in a culture of heresy that eschewed humility and feared of God.\textsuperscript{38}

Having already expressed distaste for dialectic, Tertullian marshaled scripture yet again to broaden the scope of his earlier argument against debate by positing yet another reason by which inquiry and dialogue were to be forsworn. He adduced the precedent of Titus 3:10, which forbade extended contestation even for corrective purposes:

\begin{quote}
[Titus] forbids us to enter into investigations, to attach our ears to novel remarks, or to associate with a heretic ‘after one reproof,’ not after discussion.\textsuperscript{39} He forbade discussion, designating reproof as the reason to meet with a heretic, and only one correction because the heretic is not a Christian. He is to have no right to a second censure, like a Christian, before two or three witnesses, since he is to be censured for the very reason that forbids discussion with him.\textsuperscript{40}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{36} Tertullian, \textit{Praescr.} 14.7-8 (Refoulé, 107-8; altered from Greenslade).

\textsuperscript{37} Tertullian, \textit{Praescr.} 11.3 (Refoulé, 104; altered from Greenslade).

\textsuperscript{38} Tertullian, \textit{Praescr.} 43.3-4 (Refoulé, 150).

\textsuperscript{39} The text of the Epistle to Titus refers to a first and second correction: “After a first and second admonition, have nothing more to do with anyone who causes divisions, since you know that such a person is perverted and sinful, being self-condemned” (3:10). For some unknown reason, Tertullian’s description of Titus omits reference to the second approbation.

\textsuperscript{40} Tertullian, \textit{Praescr.} 16.1-3 (Refoulé, 109-110; altered from Greenslade).
Because the heretics reject books of the Bible (or, conversely, add to them) and/or adduce false exegesis (adulter sensus), the very groundwork for holding conversation evaporates into nothing. Tertullian reasons that ceding oneself to the exercise of learned debate served only to embolden and legitimize the irrationality of the heretics and to induce those who waver in the faith to draw erroneous conclusions. An observer, watching such a dispute, “sees that you have accomplished nothing, the rival party being allowed equal rights of denial and affirmation and an equal status. As a result he will go away from the argument even more uncertain than before, not knowing which to count as heresy.” In giving the heretics equal standing, Christians foundered even before they made their case. Insofar as dialogue posited a degree of cultural symmetry between participants, it functioned as a space of legitimation. As Richard Lim explains, “the very capacity to participate as an informed interlocutor in a literary or philosophical symposium was the preserve of a cultured man who has mastered the elaborate codes necessary for such a performance....Conversely, the ideal dialogue could not

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42 Tertullian, Praescr. 18.2 (Refoulé, 111).

43 The futility of protracted discussion between Christians and their heretical interlocutors centers round the authority of scripture, specifically the heretics’ claim to be proper exegetes of Scripture (Praescr. 18–19, 23). The falsification scripture by itself, however, captures only the superficial level of the contestation. Tertullian reasons it is the very claim to scripture that requires delineation: “It follows that we must not appeal to Scripture and we must not contend on ground where victory is impossible or uncertain or not certain enough. Even if a biblical dispute did not leave the parties on a par, the natural order of things would demand that one point should be decided first, the point which alone calls for discussion now, namely, who hold the faith to which the Bible belongs, and from whom, through whom, when and to whom was the teaching delivered by which men become Christians?” (Praescr. 19.1–2 [Refoulé, 111]). He secures his argument with the recollections of and appeals to the innate truth of the apostolic tradition, its foundation in scripture (particularly the incontrovertible writings of Paul), and its historical precedence over falsehood. In asking who owns Scripture, Tertullian recounts the production of an apostolic tradition in which churches were set up across the Mediterranean and “from which other churches afterwards borrowed the transmission of the faith and the seeds of doctrine and continue to borrow them every day” (Praescr. 20.5 [Refoulé, 112–3]). Cf. T. P. O’Malley, Tertullian and the Bible: Language-Imagery-Exegesis (Nijmegen and Utrecht: Dekker and van de Vegt, 1967), 130–134. The proper ownership of Scripture, as an apostolic claim, definitively jettisons the need to ask questions out of curiosity or interest.
operate if the interlocutors did not share this common outlook.”

And while the presence of strangers within dialogues, Lim goes on to explain, served to emphasize “the overall solidarity of the (other) participants” (a role the heretics have played throughout the history of Christianity), the stranger’s participation within the dialogue incorporated them into a sacred cultural milieu. By participating in disputations and engagements with the heretics, Christians unknowingly sanctioned the heretics’ connection to a tenuous (third-century) Christian intellectual and cultural space and in the very process bound themselves to the philosophical pedigree of dialectic.

Tertullian’s offensive against the inclination to seek additional instruction and to ask additional questions culminated in the elaboration of a rule of faith (regula fidei), the enumeration of what it was Christians qua Christians defended (quid defendamus). The regula functioned as a dictation of the inarguable tenets of Christianity and as the metric through which Tertullian’s demarcation of valid avenues of theological and heresiological inquiry could be parsed. The rule expressed the singularity of God, who created the world through his Word (who is also called his Son), which the patriarchs and prophets attested. The Word “was brought down by the Spirit and Power of God the Father into the Virgin Mary, was made flesh

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44 Lim, “Christians, Dialogues and Patterns of Sociability in Late Antiquity,” in Goldhill, 163.

45 Lim, “Christians, Dialogues and Patterns of Sociability in Late Antiquity,” in Goldhill, 167.

46 Richard Lim, Public Disputation, demonstrates the dialectical reputations of Manichaeism, 88-92, and the Anomoeans, 119-130.

47 Tertullian, Praescr. 13.1 (Refoulé, 106).

in her womb, was born of her and lived as Jesus Christ.” Jesus preached a new law, worked miracles, issued a new promise of the kingdom of heaven, and was crucified on the third day, after which he rose again and took his place at the right hand of the Father. Christ, Tertullian explained, would return to pass judgment on humanity, at which time he bestowed eternal life upon his followers and cast his disbelievers into an everlasting fire. The contours of this rule of faith operated to circumscribe the invalidity of all questions—“this rule...raises no questions among us (haec regula...nullas habet apud nos quaestiones)”—“except those which the heresies introduce and which make heretics.” Heretics contested the rule, not Christians. The propriety of epistemological investigations hung on the supposition that “when the forma of the rule remains in its proper order, you may seek as much as you like.” Curiosity could be indulged and areas of obscurity, darkness, and confusion could be illuminated but only if they existed apart from or in total harmony with the uncontestable principles of Christian truth. In demanding that theological inquiry be pursued in accord with the rule of faith (both in terms of content and obtainment), the epistemological deference Tertullian proposed served to recalibrate the lens through which inquiry was to be gauged. The rule foreclosed unnecessary

49 Tertullian, Praescr. 13.3 (Refoulé, 106).
50 Tertullian, Praescr. 13 (Refoulé, 106-7).
51 Tertullian, Praescr. 13.6 (Refoulé, 106-7; altered from Greenslade).
52 Tertullian, Praescr. 14.1 (Refoulé, 107; altered from Greenslade).
53 Although the seemingly straightforward act of affixing theological inquiry to bedrock truths established by and in the regula shaped Tertullian’s assessment of the limits and propriety of inquisition, centuries of vigorous and violent debate obviously attest otherwise. The controversies surrounding figures such as Origen, Arius, Pelagius, Donatus, Jovinian, Priscillian, Nestorius, among innumerable others, illustrate the persistent presence of debate and disagreement over the meaning of scripture, the nature of sin, Christology, Trinitarianism, etc. For discussions of the wide-ranging theological, ecclesiastical, political, and discursive implications of these controversies, see, for example, Elizabeth A. Clark, The Origenist Controversy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Virginia Burrus, The Making of a Heretic: Gender, Authority, and the Priscillianist Controversy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995; Rowan Williams, Arius: Heresy and Tradition (London: SCM, 2001); R.P.C. Hanson, The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God: The Arian Controversy 318-381 (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic
speculation just as it demanded, as Tertullian’s treatise ably illustrated, efforts to defend its inviolability.

For Tertullian, the regula remained fixed not to abstract theological debates or principles, but to the lived tradition of the churches, where the bishops, leaders, and teachers shepherded communities of Christ’s devotees.\textsuperscript{54} Because “no one is able to be instructed from where he is destructed” (\textit{nemo unde instrui potest unde destruitur}), history and tradition supplied the requisite answers for those who inquired.\textsuperscript{55} When Tertullian implored his fellow Christians who actively sought knowledge to pursue their queries “in our own territory, from our own friends, and on our own business,”\textsuperscript{56} he naturally appealed to the great cities of the apostolic tradition:

Come now, if you are ready to exercise your curiosity better in the business of your own salvation, run through the apostolic churches, where the very thrones of the apostles preside to this day over their districts, where the authentic letters of the apostles are still recited, bringing the voice and face of each one of them to mind. If Achaea is nearest you, you have Corinth. If you are not far from Macedonia, you have Philippi and Thessalonica. If you can go to Asia, you have Ephesus. If you are close to Italy, you have Rome, the nearest authority for us also.\textsuperscript{57}

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\textsuperscript{54} As the inheritors of the philosophers, the heretics compounded the danger of inquiry insofar as they gathered strength and confidence from the mere exercise of exchange and scriptural debate. By suggesting that, “the apostles did not know everything” or that, though knowing everything, “they did not hand everything on to everybody,” the heretics proposed “that the men whom the Lord gave to be teachers were ignorant” (\textit{Praescr.} 22.2-3 [Refoulé, 115, 116]. This challenge to the fullness of apostolic knowledge, tradition, and transmission created the intellectual vacuum that the heretics’ theological, cosmological, and exegetical pursuits would fill.

\textsuperscript{55} Tertullian, \textit{Praescr.} 12.4 (Refoulé, 105; altered from Greenslade).

\textsuperscript{56} Tertullian, \textit{Praescr.} 12.4 (Refoulé, 105).

\textsuperscript{57} Tertullian, \textit{Praescr.} 36.1-2 (Refoulé, 137).
In Tertullian’s eyes, the apostolic cities were depicted as safe houses of Christian piety, even if they were also sites of heretical prominence.\(^58\) By virtue of their history, they purportedly offered a protective environ for those propelled by a desire to know, to learn, and inquire.

Although Tertullian’s invocation of the uninterrupted truth of the apostolic tradition is hardly a novel move in early Christian literature,\(^59\) it imagined and, indeed justified, a space in which

\(^{58}\) This is one important implication of Walter Bauer’s thesis in *Orthodoxy and Heresy in Earliest Christianity*. Not only were the so-called great cities of apostolic Christianity (Rome, Antioch, Alexandria, Corinth, and Ephesus, among others) characterized by substantial and early theological and ecclesiastical division and strife, heresy was not, historically speaking, a derivative of orthodoxy. Tertullian, in fact, knows the problem of persistent error can be gleaned from Paul’s epistles. The heretics appealed to the evidence of 1 Corinthians and Galatians. Tertullian argued, however, that Paul’s reprobation of the earliest Christian cities did not evidence, as the heretics contended, that the churches had gone astray from the beginning (or that they were marked by unrelenting contestation). Instead the Pauline epistles demonstrated that these churches were summarily corrected and “today mix with those churches reproved in the privileges of a single tradition [of teaching]” (*Præscr. 27.6 [Refoulé, 124]*). Orthodoxy, as Bauer tirelessly demonstrated, did not always precede heresy. In many places, such as Edessa, Antioch, and Ephesus “heresy” was the first “version” of Christianity to arrive. Bauer writes of Edessa, for example, “in the picture that the representatives of the church sketch, it is precisely the detail about a great apostasy from the true faith that is seen to be incorrect—in any event, it is not true of Edessa. Here it was by no means orthodox, but rather heresy, that was present at the beginning. Christianity was first established in the form of Marcionism, probably imported from the West and certainly not much later than the year 150” (28-29).

\(^{59}\) Epiphanius argued in his medicine chest that the heretics’ augmentation of the scriptural canon (via addenda and excision) bespeaks a deeper epistemological orientation. The fifty-first heresy of his *Panarion*, for example, is termed the *Alōgi* (or those who are dumb, literally “A-λογοι”), on account of their rejection of the Gospel of John and his Revelation—“as they do not accept the Word which John preaches” (*Pan. 51.3.1 [Holl and Dummer, 2:250]*). “Sectarians like these,” the bishop notes, “are confounded by the truth and accuracy of the sacred scriptures, especially by the agreement of the four Gospels” (*Pan. 51.21.14 [Holl and Dummer, 2:280]*)). Their inability to comprehend the unity of Scripture reveals their underlying condition: “these people too have hated the sureness of the Gospel, since they are of the earth and angry with the heavens” (*Pan. 51.1.3 [Holl and Dummer, 2:249]*)). Because the heretics adulterate the true teaching handed down by the apostles, they are progenitors of an alternative and distinctively human intellectual pedigree: “the truth properly resides at one time in Valentinus, at another in Marcion, at another in Cerinthus, then afterwards in Basilides...(Irenaeus, *Adv. haer. III.2.1 [Contre les hérésies, Livres III*, ed. and trans. Adelin Rousseau and Louis Doutreleau, SC 211 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1974), 3:2:26]).” Scripture, Irenaeus insisted, had laid out the principles of Christian belief and practice, and Christian identity was conceived as an act of adherence. Commitment to the comprehension provided by the apostolic succession of knowledge protected and perpetuated Christian truth and tradition: “True knowledge is [that which consists in] the doctrine of the apostles, and the ancient constitution of the Church throughout all the world, and the distinctive manifestation of the body of Christ according to the successions of the bishops, by which they have handed down that Church which exists in every place, and has come even unto us, being guarded and preserved without any forging of Scripture, by a very complete system of doctrine, and neither receiving addition nor [suffering] curtailment [in the truths which she believes]; and [it consists in] reading [the word of God] without falsification, and a lawful and diligent exposition in harmony with the Scriptures, both without danger and without blasphemy; and [above all, it consists in] the pre-eminent gift of love, which is more precious than knowledge, more glorious than prophecy, and which excels all the other gifts” [*Adv. haer. IV.33.8 [Contre les hérésies, Livres IV*, ed. and trans. Adelin Rousseau, SC 100 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1965), 4:2:818-820]). By contrast, the heretics, Irenaeus submitted that, “that the truth was not delivered by means of written documents, but “*vivam vocem*” (*Adv. haer. III.2.1 [Rousseau and Doutreleau, 3:2:26]*)). Consequently, the heretics
Christians could indulge their curiosity if properly defined and expressed. The regulation of pedagogical illumination fell to frater aliqui, “who as a teacher is bestowed with the grace of knowledge (gratia scientiae), someone consorting among the learned, someone who is curious like you and still seeking (aliqui tecum curiosus tamen quaerens).”  

I would argue that Tertullian’s failure to articulate the qualifications of these learned teachers attests the inherent treacherousness of sanctioning any space, no matter how sacred, storied, or apostolic, as a legitimate site of Christian inquiry. The distinction between instruction and destruction, the light and darkness of a still nascent Christian world, became decidedly murkier when Christians felt an obligation to seek answers to their questions.

While Tertullian acknowledged the permissibility of inquiries borne by curiosity (assuming they were directed to a trusted teacher and did not contest the rule of faith), he also indicated that inquiry, by its very design, was impossible to regulate and control. The approbation to learn in a particular environment (with, potentially, a particular teacher) was strategically qualified when Tertullian counseled a simpler solution: “in the end, it is better to be ignorant lest you will have come to know what you should not because you have (already) known what you should.”  

‘Faith,’ scripture tells the Christian, ‘has saved you’ (lit. makes your conceptualized wisdom as untethered to tradition since, “they object to tradition, saying that they themselves are wiser not merely than the presbyters, but even than the apostles, because they have discovered the unadulterated truth” (Adv. haer. III.2.2 [Rousseau and Doutreleau, 3:2:26–28]).

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60 Tertullian, Praescr. 14.2 (Refoulé, 107; altered from Greenslade). For a useful discussion of Tertullian’s attitude toward ecclesiastical authority and leadership, see Allen Brent, “Tertullian on the Role of the Bishop,” in Still and Wilhite, 165–185.

61 Tertullian, Praescr. 12.4 (Refoulé, 105).

62 This trope is also attested in John Chrysostom’s On the Incomprehensible Nature of God, where, as Richard Lim illustrates, the bishop exhorted those weaker-minded Christians not to engage with peoples who questioned and prodded the divine nature but simply to flee: “Wherefore I exhort, flee from their madness” (Διὸ παραίνω ἑγεῖν αὐτῶν τὴν μανίαν [Daniélou, 90]). For the text of De incomprehensibili natura Dei see Jean Chrysostome: Sur l’Incompréhensibilité de Dieu, ed. Ferdinand Cavallera, Jean Daniélou, and Robert Flacelière (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1951], which is a reprint of Migne PG 48:701–812. See, also, Richard Lim, Public Disputation, 171–177, esp. 173.
salvation for you; Luke 18:42), not the practice of scripture...learning derives from curiosity and wins glory only from its zealous pursuit of scholarship. Let curiosity give place to faith, and glory to salvation.”63 Tertullian’s proposal that faith must supplant curiosity encapsulates the disjuncture he proposes between the constancy of belief and the precarious mutability and malleability of inquiry:64 the heretics’ “endless searching exhibits their hesitation/uncertainty (dubitationem suam ostendunt quamdiu quaerunt).”65 By casting learning as a predilection for epistemological fluidity, Tertullian combatted the encroaching domain of heretical inquiry by forswearing its value altogether. Fear of the effects (and associative connotations) of inquiry demanded cessation of all potentially disruptive practices and habits.

Although the rejection of inquiry suited the project of an orthodox community of Christians determined to deny any philosophical pedigree, the task of refuting the heretics exposed the “double bind” of paideia.66 If, as Tertullian famously quipped, the philosophers

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63 Tertullian, Praescr. 14.2-3 (Refoulé, 107; altered from Greenslade). The social contagion of the heresies most preoccupies the legalists of late antiquity, who denounce the individual heretic, whose impostures “weaken the concept of God,” but preserve his right to be a heretic unto himself. A law from August of 379 encapsulates, almost completely, the myriad dangers Tertullian ascribes to heretical factions: “All heresies are forbidden by both divine and imperial laws and shall forever cease. If any profane man by his punishable teachings should weaken the concept of God, he shall have the right to know such noxious doctrines only for himself but shall not reveal them to others to their hurt. If any person by a renewed death should corrupt bodies that have been redeemed by the venerable baptismal font, by taking away the effect of that ceremony which he repeats, he shall know such doctrines for himself alone, and he shall not ruin others by his nefarious teaching. All teachers and ministers alike of this perverse superstition shall abstain from the gathering places of a doctrine already condemned, whether they defame the name of bishop by the assumption of such priestly office, or, that which is almost the same, they belie religion with the appellation of priests, or also if they call themselves deacons, though they may not even be considered Christians” (CTh 16.5.5). The law, of course, permits individuals to remain heretics, even if the theological language wishes to render them extinct, only after they have served their soteriological function. Still, however, I am drawn to the parallel between the language of heresiology and the legal discourse of late antiquity. The existential incompatibility of heresy with sacral order infuses the laws of late antiquity with the ideological exclusivism of Christianity at the social level, though the laws, in their details, apply abstractly to the very notion of heresy.

64 We saw this image invoked in Hippolytus, Refutatio Omnium Haeresium VII.13.3, ed. Miroslav Marcovich (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1986), 280, where Odysseus’ difficulties with the sirens are deployed as a model of resistance.

65 Tertullian, Praescr. 14.7 (Refoulé, 108; altered from Greenslade).

66 On Christian efforts both to own and disown their claims to paideia, see Peter Brown, Power and Persuasion in Late Antiquity: Towards a Christian Empire (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1992), 35-70 and Richard Lim,
were “the patriarchs of the heretics” (*patriarchis haereticorum*), the rhetorical and philosophical training that empowered Christian authors to elaborate critiques of Greco-Roman culture and their heretical offspring simultaneously established an intellectual bond between them. The threat of a perceived cultural symmetry between these three classes of “professional” inquirers (philosophers, heretics, and heresiologists) threatened to collapse the carefully calibrated discourses of Christian pedagogy, authority, and ministry.\(^6^7\) Contesting the heretics, insofar as it fell to an ecclesiastical or learned class, threatened to endow the heresiologists with the specter of an elite or “set-apart status,” which always carried the taint of heresy.\(^6^8\) Precisely because factionalization and fallacious exegesis belonged to a genealogy of a professionalized knowledge—“where was Marcion then, the ship-owner of Pontus, the student of Stoicism? Were was Valentinus then, the disciple of Plato”—the creation of a protective class of inquirers, the heresiologists, necessitated rhetorical and pastoral bulwarks against the onslaught of inquiry.\(^6^9\) However much heresy was rationalized as an inevitable facet of the history of Christianity, its continued presence posed a twin dilemma for its opponents. On the one hand, the heretics, as Tertullian insisted in line after line of his treatise, *embodied* the desire to inquire assiduously. They were inquiry personified. And yet, on the other, their very existence demanded inquiry, research, and refutation. The presence of the heretics denied Tertullian’s imagined foreclosure. Widespread ignorance, despite Tertullian’s best hopes, was


\(^{68}\) Richard Lim, “Christians, Dialogues and Patterns of Sociability in Late Antiquity,” in Goldhill, 168.

\(^{69}\) Tertullian, *Praescr.* 30.1 (Refoulé, 126). Tertullian explicitly feared that any endorsement of the arts of discovery would functionally sanction the very same disposition that engendered the spread and perpetuation of doctrinal error.
neither a plausible nor compelling strategic vision. As Augustine surmised two centuries later, “it is a big help for the heart of the believer to know what one should not believe, even if one cannot refute it with skillful argumentation.”70 How, then, did Christians manage these conflicting compulsions? How did they conceptualize and articulate their textual investigation, research, and discoveries?

_The Rhetorics of Heresiological Inquiry: Mastery_

Very near the start of his remarks on Mani and the Manichaeans, Epiphanius pauses briefly to justify his foray into the life and world of this well-known heretic. Emphasizing his willingness to toil anew over well-trodden ground in the name of truth, the bishop burdens himself with introducing his subject “from the very beginning.”71 He declares straight away that he has “been at pains to convey [the minutest facts of Mani’s family, most especially the means by which his master accrued his wealth] in full detail for your information, so that those who care to read this will not go uninformed even of the remote causes of every affair.”72

The claim that the heresiologist can acquire and present complete knowledge of any one heretic and, indeed, survey the totality of the heretical world—“to omit nothing about the divisions, splits, differences and schisms which have arisen in the world” ( índα μή τι παραλείπω τῶν εἰς διαίρεσις τε καὶ τομᾶς καὶ εἰς διαστάσεις καὶ εἰς σχίσματα ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ


71 Epiphanius, _Pan._ 66.2.1 (Holl and Dummer, 3:17).

72 Epiphanius, _Pan._ 66.2.1 (Holl and Dummer, 3:17).
The most salient articulation of the syllogistic structure of heresiological discourse comes not from the hand of any of the heresiologists, but from the fourth-century monastic writer, John Cassian. Having spent seemingly endless pages systematically describing the causes and effects of human vice, Cassian defends his protracted discussion with an appeal to comprehension. The resulting formulation is not only a succinct encapsulation of the pedagogical and diagnostic principles of theological anthropology and asceticism, but an apt summary of the substructures of heresiological inquiry. John writes: “Let this not strike anyone as superfluous or irksome. For unless the different kinds of wounds have been explained and the origins and causes of the diseases have been investigated, the appropriate medical remedy will not be able to be administered to the sick and the means of maintaining perfect health will not be able to be passed on to the well.”

In the case of heresiology and asceticism, the effectiveness of refutation and the endurance of self-mastery necessitate an exhaustive investigation of the causes, conditions, sources, and roots of the adversarial elements, passions, and parties.

73 Epiphanius, *Pan*. 70.15.6 (Holl and Dummer, 3:249). For parallel comments see also *Pan*. 8.7.4 25.14.4-5; 25.17.1-3; 32.3.1; 48.15.1; 52.1.6; 60.2.1; 66.2.1-2; 69.42.1; 77.19.6; *De Fide* 12.5. Cf. *Pan*. 26.9.1-2. Andrew Jacobs, *Remains of the Jews* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 44-55, offers an informative and sophisticated reading of the *Panarion* as a work built upon totalizing discourse. Though Jacobs’s emphasis is on the figure of the Jews, in particular the story of Joseph of Tiberias (embedded within the chapter on the Ebionites), his analysis, as he himself explains, pertains to the development of “a Christian ideology of knowledge and mastery” (54). Building upon the work of Terry Eagleton’s *Ideology: An Introduction* (London: Verso, 1991), Jacobs stresses the naturalizing or self-evident hue of Epiphanius’ story (alongside the works of Eusebius of Caesarea and Cyril of Jerusalem). It is the very act of collecting, organizing, and wielding knowledge, a comprehensively conceived knowledge, that generates and sustains the authority of Jacobs’s fourth-century Christian authors.

74 John Cassian, *Institutes* VII.XIII in *Iohannis Cassiani De institutis coenobiorum et De octo principalium vitiorum remediis libri XII*, ed. Michael Petschenig, CSEL 17 (Vienna: C. Geroldi Filium, 1888), 137; Boniface Ramsey, trans., *John Cassian: The Institutes* (New York: Newman Press, 2000), 175. The value of knowledge about the passions derives from the fact that its transmitters, the elders, had wrestled with the very same passions; they taught from experience. Moreover, the passage emphasizes that insight into the techniques by which the passions are subdued belongs only to some, “those who are toiling and striving to attain the summit of perfection” (VII.XIII, Ramsey, 175). Again, we see a parallel with heresiological discourse: the task of researching and refuting the heretics rightfully falls to those learned ecclesiastics who undertake the task precisely so that others can be spared the experience. And, as I discussed in the previous chapter, Tertullian’s fears of heretical contamination similarly hierarchizes the openness of Christian education by delimiting certain fields and methods of inquiry.
Insofar as diagnosis necessarily precedes prescription, the successful administration of the heresiological balm is predicated on an incisive examination of the underlying and overarching conditions of the disease of heresy. The genre’s utility turns on its conferral of an effective theological cure. And the success of this textual curative is explicitly bound to its scope of inquiry and grasp of knowledge.

The language of each of Epiphanius’ eighty sectarian sections not only emphasizes, as we saw in chapter two, the medicinal annihilation of his poisonous foes, but it reiterates the exhaustive scope and unequivocal tone of his refutation. To accomplish his task, to “make these shocking disclosures for the readers’ correction,” Epiphanius stresses his exhaustive investigation in which the results serve both to champion his journey and to overwhelm his readers.75 Having slain Ptolemy and his followers, he uses the triumphant occasion to announce his text’s insatiable ambition to discover all the heresies in the world:

Since I have achieved your disgrace through the things I have said, I am going over the imposture of the others—calling on God as the aid of my meager ability—so that I may discover the hypothesis/supposition of every people (παρ’ ἑκάστῳ ἐθνεῖ), which they have [all] wickedly invented, and make a spectacle of it.76

Epiphanius uncovers the full spectrum of the “nations” heretical world, presenting his object of study, tellingly, in the language of ἑθνη (“nations”): the task is functionally analogous to the geographical and ethnographic treatises of Pliny, Appian, Strabo, Diodorus Siculus, Herodotus, Tacitus, and Pomponius Mela, which uncover the diversity of the known world and translate its significance through the language of cultural hierarchization, ideological dominance, and

75 Epiphanius, Pan. 48.15.3 (Holl and Dummer, 2:240). Having incorporated the diverse, though related, musings of the heretics, the text equalizes their erroneous suppositions with disdain and mockery.

76 Epiphanius, Pan. 33.8.11 (Holl, 1:459).
foreign exoticism. His remarks about the Tascodrugians, also known as the Montanists or Phrygians, epitomize the authorial compulsion with which he conceptualizes his task: “I promised to withhold nothing about any sect I know, but to disclose what I have learned by word of mouth, and from treatises, documents, and persons who truly confirmed my notion...I give all the facts, as I said, with accuracy, about each sect.” Richard Flower has recently argued that the content and form of heresiological literature function jointly as an overwhelming display of knowledge wherein amassment and its exhibition augment claims of authority, even as it reveals a remarkable degree of scholastic dependence and intensifies the genre’s authorial claims. The incessant beating of the drum of mastery only raises the textual stakes: the heresiologist crafts his rhetorical structure and thus lives by its implications. And in the case of the Pneumatomachi it is sufficiently demonstrative that Epiphanius’ commentary on the forty-eighth heresy simply gestures toward the enormous bounty of texts that reside at his ready rather than cite them explicitly and exhaustively.

77 See, for instance, François Hartog’s *The Mirror of Herodotus: The Representation of the Other in the Writing of History*, trans. Janet Lloyd (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 209-259, which calls attention to the rhetoric of otherness— inversion, comparison, analogy, translation, naming, classifying, describing, etc.—as the technical strategy of ethnographic analysis. My emphasis, following Woolf’s *Tales of the Barbarians*, 32-58, has been to consider the ethnographic paradigms by which the heretics are classified. This chapter seeks to investigate the textual, rhetorical, and philosophical implications of organizing knowledge, and to emphasize how easily the ideological grip on the world fades as the realities of human diversity and textual limitations mount.

78 Epiphanius, Pan. 48.15.1-3 (Holl and Dummer, 2:240).

79 On authority in the *Panarion* see, Richard Flower, “Genealogies of Unbelief: Epiphanius of Salamis and Heresiological Authority” in *Unclassical Traditions. Volume II: Perspectives from East and West in Late Antiquity*, ed. by Christopher Kelly, Richard Flower and Michael Stuart Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011): 70-87. It is important to note, however, that authority is referenced and described in ambiguous, largely abstract terms. Its referent remains unelaborated. This chapter argues that the abstract notion of authority ascribed quite generally to the heresiologists underemphasizes the nuance and qualifications evident in their texts.

80 Even though he insists that his referential excisions reflect a desire to keep his remarks taut and orderly (lest he should “burden the readers,” Pan.74.14.1, however superficially false the suggestion, Epiphanius performs his self-described mastery of the relevant material against the seventy-fourth heresy as he reins it in. In other words, to the extent that the excisions are performed they are hardly omissions at all.
Hippolytus and Irenaeus also tout their respective mastery over the heretical realm, accentuating not only the detail and precision of their refutations, but also the effort with which they have applied themselves to expose the heresies. At the very outset of Book I of his *Adversus Haereses*, Irenaeus stresses the clarity and concision of his descriptions of the heresies, while a few chapters later he trumpets the countervailing “orthodox” parlance of apostolicity and doctrinal pedigree.\(^{81}\) Irenaeus cleverly transfigures the language of the gospels into an heresiological maxim by condensing the genre’s investigatory polemic and its pedagogical aspirations into a lone citation from scripture: “*For nothing is covered that will not be revealed, and nothing hidden that will not be known.*”\(^{82}\) Plenary exposure—its acquisition and transmission—becomes the overarching theme of Irenaeus’ tractate, as its full title, “Exposé and Overthrow of What is Falsely Called Knowledge” (Ἐλέγχου καὶ ἀνατροπῆς τῆς ψευδωνύμου γνώσεως), conveys.\(^{83}\) Irenaeus, in fact, pinpoints inexact comprehension of the heretics’ doctrines—the remedy for which he is eager to supply—as the essential misstep of earlier effort to trammel the theological divergences of the Valentinians:

> It is necessary, however, that he who flies to turn back/convert to them to know accurately rules or arguments. For it is not possible for anyone, who does not know the disease of those who are not well, to cure those who are sick. This was the reason that my predecessors—much superior men to myself, too—had been unable, however, to refute sufficiently (*satis potuerunt contradicere*) the Valentinians, because they were ignorant of these men’s rules; which we have with all diligence transmitted to you in the first book in which we have also shown that their doctrine is a recapitulation of all the heretics. For which reason also, in the second, we have had, as in a mirror, a sight of their complete destruction (*totius eversionis*). For they who oppose these men (the Valentinians) by the right method, do thereby oppose all who are of an evil mind; and they


who overthrow them, do in fact overthrow every kind of heresy (*evertunt omnem haeresim*).\(^{84}\)

Having endeavored to relate more or less descriptively the particularities of the heretics (“with all diligence/care”) in Book I, Irenaeus turns in Book II to the task of refutation proper, wherein he contests the implications of Gnostic cosmologies and the layers of divine workmanship, as he also reaffirms the omnipotence of God as the lone creator and governing force of the universe.\(^{85}\) When he explicitly and systematically adds the weight of Scripture to his tractate in Book III, he emphasizes that commitment to the full expository cycle of heresiology—description, refutation, and scriptural ballast—ensures its effectiveness:

“Therefore, recall what we said in the first two books; and if you add to the following, you will have from us a most complete refutation of all the heresies, and you will resist them confidently and more insistently.”\(^{86}\) In framing his protracted work as an effort to “furnish you [the reader] with the complete work of the exposure and refutation of knowledge, falsely so-called,” Irenaeus does more than simply make exposure and refutation analytic corollaries of one another; he renders heresy a phenomenon that is situational and particularistic yet governed by a universal nucleus of error.\(^{87}\) Writing heresiology serves not only to denounce the errors of the heretics, whatever the specific nature of their fallacious opinions, it also

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\(^{84}\) Irenaeus, *Adv. haer.* IV.Pr.2.11-25 (Rousseau, 4:2:382-4). Similar themes are stressed at I.10.3.49-92 (Rousseau and Doutreleau, 1:2:160-166).


devises an essential ontology and history of heresy that can encompass it fully and irrefutably.\(^8\) 

The universal applicability and potency of Irenaeus’ refutation derives in large measure from his fabrication of a shared heretical ontology and disposition. The Valentinians, Simonians, Marcionites, Marcosians, Ebionites, Encratites, Barbeliotes, Ophites, Cainites, Nicolaitans, followers of Ptolemaeus, Colorbasus, Menander, Saturninus, and Basilides, Carpocrates, Cerinthus, and Cerdo, all share a self-determined sense of epistemological superiority and pride.\(^9\) From the perspective of the heresiologist, they excise, supplement, deny, misinterpret, and augment Scripture at will; they perform exotic and base rituals; and they opine fanciful doctrines, all of which derive from their belief that they exclusively hold an intimate knowledge of divine truth.\(^9\) “Truth,” as Tertullian mocks heretical reasoning, “was

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\(^8\) Hippolytus commences Book V of his *Refutatio* with an overview of the Naasseni, which argues that their divisions evidence unity; it is his aim to prove that the Naasseni simply repackaged the opinions of the Gnostics. He explains: “In the remainder [of our work], the opportunity invites us to approach the treatment of our proposed subjects, and to begin from those who have presumed to celebrate a serpent, the originator of the error [under discussion], through certain expressions devised by the energy of his own [ingenuity]. The priests, then, and champions of the system have been first those who have been called Naaseni, being so denominated from the Hebrew language, for the serpent is called *naas*. Subsequently, however, they have styled themselves Gnostics, alleging that they alone have sounded the depths of knowledge. Now, from the system of these [speculators], many, detaching parts, have constructed a heresy which, though with several subdivisions, is essentially one, and they explain precisely the same [tenets]; though conveyed under the guise of different opinions, as the following discussion, according to its progresses, will prove” (*Ref. V.6.3-4* [Marcovich, 141-3]). I have followed the translation from ANF.


\(^{90}\) “‘Seek and you shall find,’ [the heretics] constantly remind us. The quality of their faith can be determined from the type of their conduct. Discipline is an index to doctrine” (*Tertullian, Praescr.* 43.2 [Refoulé, 150]). As an outgrowth of theological rationalization and exegetical processes, heretical customs and habits likewise illustrate Epiphanius’ continual struggle to define knowledge and isolate human hubris. In his treatment of Simon Magus, the bishop reports that the father of Christian heresy instituted a series of μυστήρια, which entailed offering to the Father a mixture of dirt, semen, and menstrual emissions. In the eyes of the Simonians, “these are mysteries of life and the fullest knowledge” (γνώσεως <τε> τῆς τελειοτάτης) (*Epiphanius, Pan.* 21.4.2 [Holl, 1:243]).\(^{90}\) “But for anyone,” immediately corrects the bishop, “to whom God has given understanding, knowledge is above all else, a matter of regarding [these mysteries] as abomination instead, and death rather than life” (*Epiphanius, Pan.* 21.4.2 [Holl, 1:243]): “Whoever arises to acquire for himself knowledge from God, it is possible, then, above all else to regard [these mysteries] as brutal conduct instead, and as death rather than life. Anyone for whom it is possible to have acquired knowledge from God, is to regard these mysteries as brutal conduct instead, and to regard death as
waiting for some Marcionite or a Valentinian to set her free” (*Aliquos Marcionitas et Valentinianos liberanda veritas expectabat*). It was the shared hubris of the heretics that permitted them to efface with ease and eloquence the traditions of Jesus, and to be classified, however paradoxically, as a homogeneous amalgam. Indeed, the rhetorical crux of heresiological literature transposed the heretics’ diversity into an expression of utter uniformity of purpose, effect, and origin. Irenaeus, as he articulates Christianity’s Rule of Truth, announces the sweeping potentiality of his treatise:

> Since, therefore, the exposé and refutation of all the heretical sects is different and multiform, and since we have resolved to give an answer to every one according to its own standards, we have deemed it necessary first of all to give an account of their source and root, in order that you may know their most sublime Profundity, and understand the tree from which such fruits come forth.

In divulging the theological and ritualistic particularities of various heretical parties, Irenaeus identifies for his readers the analytical tool, what I have called an ethnographic paradigm, by which the heresies could be arranged, organized, and situated for refutation. As we saw in chapter one, the commonality he and other heresiologists imputed to the heretical world stems, in large part, from the perpetuation of a genealogical narrative of successive heresies.

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91 Tertullian, *Praescr.* 29.2 (Refoulé, 125).

92 As I argued in chapter one, this is a central component of Epiphanius’ periodized history of heresy; following the book of Jubilees, heresy emerges as a deviation (the drifting mindset of unbridled reason) from the natural and unified state of human existence (*Pan.* 3.4-5).

the origins of which begins with Simon Magus. As the history of heresy explained the lineage of theological and epistemological hubris, its investigators underscored the potency of their rhetorical response in terms of a broad but unified effort of textual containment. Irenaeus’ knowledge of the Valentinians, like Hippolytus’ study of the Naasseni, imposed and enacted a systematic refutation that was applicable to “every kind of heresy.” As Irenaeus himself succinctly puts it, “since we have disproved the followers of Valentinus the entire crowd of heretics is refuted.” The world of heresy was elaborated and constructed by the earliest generation of heresiologists to facilitate quite simply and straightforwardly their complete mastery of it. But, as we shall see, as the heretical plurality swelled numerically and geographically, the techniques of heretical commonality slowly cracked under the pressure of the conceptual and practical demands of the genre’s all-encompassing ethnographic outlook.

Hippolytus similarly commences his *Refutatio* with an unwavering commitment to a plenary investigation, exposition, and refutation of the heresies. He first concentrates his analysis, as we saw in chapter one, upon the heretics’ intellectual forbearers, the Greek philosophers. The relationship between these intellectual kin necessitates and thus justifies the expansive scope and dogged exposition of his ensuing inquiry: “One must not dismiss any (Οὐδένα) tale/speech/story/fable (μῦθον)” of these philosophers, since the madness of the heresies twists and contorts even the most banal of philosophical doctrines. The failure of

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95 Irenaeus, *Adv. haer.* IV, Pr.2.24-5 (Rousseau, 4:2:384) and Hippolytus, *Ref.* V.6.4 (Marcovich, 141) each ascribe the same singularity to the heretical plurality.


97 Hippolytus, *Ref.* Prooemium 1.1 (Marcovich, 54; altered from ANF).
adumbration is doubly destructive both because it enables the heretics to escape scrutiny (a sin of omission, anachronism notwithstanding) and it is an entirely preventable dereliction of duty. The theological gravity of the heresies is exacerbated by the failure, on the part of Christian leaders, to apprehend their aggregation of philosophical resources (and thus to understand the intellectual material by which the heretics fashion themselves). Hippolytus, indeed, summons the motivation for his divine commission from an abiding fear of omission. Precisely because dismissing knowledge imperils his readership, Hippolytus announces his desire to chronicle in full the heresies and their intellectual kinsmen, the philosophers, astrologers, diviners, arithmeticians, magicians, Brahmans, Druids, and Chaldaeans. Thus, the starting point and underlying proposition of Hippolytus’ investigation is its presentation of everything known of the world of philosophy, astrology, and foreign wisdom: “...we have chosen to leave behind nothing of the doctrines belonging to the nations (προηρήμεθα μηδὲν τῶν παρ’ ἑθνοῦς δογμάτων καταλιπέτα) on account of the gossipy villainies of the heretics.”

98 For Hippolytus on the Greek philosophers, see Ref. Prooemium I.23 (Marcovich 54-86); for Brahmans, see Ref. I.24 (Marcovich, 86-88); for Druids, see Ref. I.25 (Marcovich, 88); for Chaldeans, see Ref. IV.1-8 (Marcovich, 92-101); for arithmeticians, see Ref. IV.14-15 (Marcovich, 105-110); for diviners, see Ref. IV.35-37 (Marcovich, 123-125); for magicians, see Ref. IV.28-34 (Marcovich, 115-123); for Persians and Babylonians, see Ref. IV.43 (Marcovich, 127-129); and for Egyptians, see Ref. IV.44-44 (Marcovich, 127-130).

99 Hippolytus, Ref. IV.7.4 (Marcovich, 99; altered from ANF). The substance of this formulation is repeated at IX.31.2, “πᾶσι τε ἰνθρώποις ἐρωτίσθην ἐν Βίῳ <οῦ> μικρὸν καταλιπόντες” (Marcovich, 378). For the rhetoric of lack of omission (and the positively phrased totality of comprehension) see Ref. Prooemium 5 (οὐδὲν σωπήσωμεν); IV.5.6 (οὐδὲ τοῦτο παραλείψωμεν); IV.6.1 (οὐδὲ τοῦτον παραλείψωμεν); IV.42.2 (πρὸς τὸ μὴ καταλιπέται); IV.43 (οὐδὲ μηδεμίαν δόξαν...παραλείπεται); IV.51.1 (δοκεῖ μηδὲν τοῦτο παραλιπέται); V.28.1 (μηδένα τα καταλιπέταν ἄνε/λεγκτον καταλιπέται); VI.6.1 (οὐδὲ μίαν ἔλεγκτον καταλιπέται); VII.27.7 (Ἰηνα δὲ μηδὲν...παραλείπομεν); VII.31.8 (οὐδὲ μηδὲν <ἔλεγκτον> καταλείπεται); VII.38.6 (μηδὲν παραλιπεῖν ἔλεγκτον); IX.6.1 (μηδὲν γε ἄνελεγκτον καταλιπόντος); IX.17.3 (μηδὲ ταύτα παραλείπομεν); IX.17.3 (τὰ τὸ πρὸ ἡμῶν οὐκ ἐσωπήσωμεν); X.30.5 (μηδὲ τοῦτο παραλιπόντες); IX.17.3 (Ἰηνα διὰ πάντων ὢμεν πεπορευθέντοι μηδὲν <τε> ἀνεκδηγήτον καταλείπομεν); IX.31.1 (μηδὲν τε ἄπολεγκτεν...ἀναπόδεικτον); IX.31.2 (διὰ πάντων οὖν <τούτων> διαδραμόντες καὶ μετὰ πολλοῦ πόνου ἐν ταῖς ἑνένας Βίβλοις τὸ πάντα δόγματα ἐξειπότες).
Immersed in the world of philosophical and heretical opinions, Hippolytus embraces the labor of his work if it ensures a clearer and fuller revelation of the prized secrets of the heretics:

Since, however, reason compels us to enter into the vast depth of narrative, we did not consider being silent, but (in) exposing the doctrines of all these [groups] in detail, we shall keep nothing hidden. Now it seems necessary, even if the inquiry will become longer, not to resist labor; for we shall not leave behind a small cure for human life against error, when all are made to behold openly, the secret rites of these men, and the secret orgies which, as their controllers/regulators, they impart to the initiated alone.¹⁰⁰

And because the seriousness of heretical error—the soteriological or existential threat (“for human life!”) posed by the heretics—countenances a comprehensive refutation and its necessary descriptive antecedent, Hippolytus finds himself energized and enraptured even as he “labor[s] with entirety of body and soul (πάση ψυχῇ καὶ σώματi ἐργαζόμενοι).”¹⁰¹ His intellectual procession is an act of intellectual empowerment and performance. When Hippolytus near the very end of his Refutation of all the Heretics, introduces the chronology of Genesis 10 to reassert the antiquity of the Christians, he bypasses a full enumeration of the rise of seventy-two nations of Genesis 11.¹⁰² Having provided a full list of the nations in other books, Hippolytus digresses to explain that he is driven to tedious tasks by a desire to acquire and reveal knowledge: “in keeping with our manner, we wanted to display to those who love to learn the affection which we have for the divinity, and the indubitable knowledge concerning

¹⁰⁰ Hippolytus, Ref. Prooemium 5.27 (Marcovich, 55; altered from ANF). The language of secrecy is a recurrent theme of the Refutatio. For the cognates of κρύπτω see I.24.2; V.7.1; VI.9.5, 6, 7; X.12.1; for ἀρρητός (and cognates) see Prooemium 1, 2, 5; IV.28.6, 34.1, 42.2; V.7.1, 7.4, 7.19, 7.22, 7.34, 7.36, 8.5, 8.7, 8.9, 8.26, 8.27, 8.40, 9.1, 12.1, 17.13, 24.1; VI.6.1, 38.2, 40.2, 41.4, 44.3, 46.1, 46.4, 49.5, 50.1; VII.27.4, 25.4, 26.1; IX.15.2, 17.1; X.5.1. On secrecy in the Panarion see: 21.6.2; 24.5.4, 5.5; 25.2.5; 27.2.4, 6.9; 30.3.8, 5.7, 9.5; 31.10.13, 21.4; 35.1.7; 40.1.6; 49.3.1; 61.7.4; 66.3.6; 71.1.3; 73.38.2. Irenaeus, Adv. haer. I.2.2, 5.6, 7.2, 9.3, 11.13, 16.3, 18.1, 20.2; II.2.4, 4.2, 14.1, 18.6, 21.2; III.5.1, 14.1, 15.2.

¹⁰¹ Hippolytus, Ref. Prooemium 6.39 (Marcovich, 55; altered from ANF).

¹⁰² Hippolytus, Ref. X.30.1-8 (Marcovich, 405-7).
the truth, which through toil we have acquired.” In a sense, Hippolytus simply cannot restrain himself. The will to perform, affixed to his textual labor, emphasizes anew the knowledge he has already provided.

The labor and pain expended by the heresiologists to discern even the most minute of details emerge as emblems of honor and the fulfillment of their commission: “the endeavor is, then, full of toil and requiring much inquiry. We shall not, however, be lacking (in exertion); for afterwards it will bring joy” (Ἐστι μὲν οὖν πόνου μεστὸν τὸ ἐπιχειρούμενον καὶ πολλῆς δεόμενον ἱστορίας, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐνδεήσομεν· οὗτος γὰρ εὕφρανεῖ). To cement his textual achievement, Hippolytus analogizes his accomplishment to four images of victory: the athlete who secures the champion’s crown, the captain who successfully navigates the rough seas, the prophets whose predictions are realized, and the shepherd who tends his flock and reaps its fruit thereafter. Hippolytus’ polemical project thus describes its will to victory as it realizes its expository triumph over against the enemy of error. Textual labor, in short, demonstrates theological and intellectual triumph. Epiphanius similarly contends that the crown of victory follows those who have demonstrated willingness to travail and battle: “for to receive the crown afterwards and continue happy with the crown, the contestant must first engage in the contest, and the toil and other struggles of the contest. Not that the crown comes last; it is

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103 Hippolytus, Ref. X.30.5 (Marcovich, 406; altered from ANF).

104 Hippolytus, Ref. Prooemium 10.59-60 (Marcovich, 56; altered from ANF).

105 Hippolytus, Ref. Prooemium 10.59-64 (Marcovich, 56). Epiphanius imagines himself as a field laborer in his opening remarks against the Secundians, though the imagery signals toil rather than triumph (Pan. 32.1.1 [Holl, 1:438]). And the image of the crown (οτεφάγου at Proo. 10.61) is repeated at 9.17.4.

there before the bout but is awarded afterwards, for the joy and gladness of him who has
worked for it.”

Theodoret of Cyrrus conveys the orthodox triumph over heresy with reference to a
series of territorial liberations. The Prologue of Book II of his Compendium proudly proclaims
(of far older heresies) that “cities and rural areas” alike were emancipated from the tares “of
Simon, Menander, Cleobius, Dositheus, Gortheus, Adrianus, Satornilus, Basilides, Isidore,
Carpocrates, Epiphanes, and others.” He further specifies the geographical contours of
heretical liberation in Book III: “The East was totally freed from the Montanists, and the
Novatians, and the Quartodecimans and also Egypt and Libya were freed, and the West was
liberated from these. Only a small portion of Asia and Pontus still have their tares.”

And although the work of the heresiologists remains ongoing, the metaphorical images of crowned
victory and the territorial retreat of certain heretical parties indicate orthodoxy’s exultant

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107 Epiphanius, Pan. 80.11.4 (Holl and Dummer, 3:495).

108 In stressing the metaphor of geography throughout, I have not sought to ignore the evidence of the very real
geography of heresy. Much as Walter Bauer’s pioneering work on heresy organized its investigation of orthodoxy
and heresy, first, by location (Edessa, Egypt, Greece, Asia Minor, and Rome), the geographical particularities and
diffusion of ecclesiastical and theological contestation has weighed heavily on the field. On geography in
Epiphanius, including charts of geographical situation of the named heresies, see Young Kim, “Epiphanius of
Cyprus and the Geography of Heresy,” in Violence in Late Antiquity: Perceptions and Practices, ed. H.A. Drake
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006), 235–251. See also, Thomas Robinson, The Bauer Thesis Examined: The Geography of
Heresy in the Early Christian Church (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen, 1988). On Priscillianism in Gaul and Spain, see Burrus,
The Making of a Heretics. On the geographical variation of the responses to Priscillian see 79–101. On Africa and the
Donatists, see: R. A. Markus, “Christianity and Dissent in Roman North Africa: Changing Perspectives in Recent
Brent Shaw, “African Christianity: Disputes, Definitions and ‘Donatists,’” in Orthodoxy and Heresy in Religious
Mellen, 1992), 5–34; Brent Shaw, Sacred Violence: African Christians and Sectarian Hatred in the Age of Augustine
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011); W.H.C. Frend, The Donatist Church: A Movement of Protest in Roman North
de Fortunatus, Faustus et Felix avec saint Augustin (Paris: Institut d’études augustiniennes, 1970); François Decret,
L’Afrique manichéenne (IVe-Ve siècles): étude historique et doctrinale, 2 vols. (Paris: Institut d’études augustiniennes,
1978); James Rives, Religion and Authority in Roman Carthage from Augustus to Constantine (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1995); Claude Lepelley, Aspects de l’Afrique romaine: les cités, la vie rurale, le Christianisme (Bari: Edipuglia, 2001).

109 Theodoret, Haereticarum Fabularum Compendium II. Prologue (Patrologia Graeca 83: 336-556, ed. J.P. Migne,
[Migne, 388A-B]).

110 Theodoret, Haer. III.6 (Migne, 409A).
incursion into the rhetorical and geographical worlds of heresy. Heresiology is a triumph of both words and deeds.

In combating heresy with the language and evidence of triumph (rhetoric and reality), the heresiologists devise all manner of exposition and theorization to concretize their supreme achievement. Their acquisition of heretical knowledge—and their willingness to launch themselves into the murky and dangerous waters of heresy—legitimizes their reputation as the true apostolics of their particular historical moments. As an agent of the Godhead, Hippolytus is tasked to persevere against the enemies of God in order “to make for [his] divine benefactor a worthy return.”111 In casting his treatise as preparation and assurance of the inevitability of Christ’s return, Hippolytus conceives heresiology as an indispensible and obligatory component of the Christianization of the world and its future consummation in the image and will of Christ. As he finds himself mired in the tiring domain of the Elchasaites (in Book IX), Hippolytus longs to steady the trajectory of his inquiry: “I shall move on to a demonstration of the doctrine (λόγου) of truth, lest...we, piously pushing forward toward the kingdom’s crown and believing the truth, be disoriented.”112 It is telling that the image of the athlete’s crown (στέφανος at Proo. 10.61) now signals the ultimate triumph of the impending kingdom of God. Victory over the heretics is but a small step toward the larger eschatological victory that is yet to come. And while Hippolytus will shortly counteract the disruptive potency of “contests against all the heretics” (ἀγώνα τοῦ κατὰ πασῶν αἱρέσεων) with appeal to the fixity of doctrinal truth, he is acutely aware of the power of the heretics to confound and


112 Hippolytus, Ref. IX.17.4 (Marcovich, 363; altered from ANF).
bewilder.\textsuperscript{113} As their texts become lasting and authoritative codifications of falsity, the authors of heresiology perceive their paradoxical contribution to the stabilization of the heretical world. In their reflections on the peril of textual permanence and exposure, the heresiologists try to contain the damage of a textual endeavor whose very purpose is a necessary contradiction. The proposition is to devise rhetorical maneuvers to constrain the effects of discovery, while also fortifying the theological intention and intellectual vigor of the heresiologists themselves.

\begin{center}
\textit{The Rhetorics of Heresiology: Danger and Fear}
\end{center}

But even within the recurrent emphasis on masterful, comprehensive knowledge, there is an acknowledgment of the latent effects of knowing and writing the heretics. While the allure of discovery and the indispensability of information drive the heresiological inquiry, the repulsion and fear of potentially uncontrollable and deeply ruinous knowledge injects a strain of caution, hesitancy, and deliberation into the investigatory process. During his prolonged discussion of the Gnostics, Epiphanius offers the most salient and succinct articulation of the dissociative underpinnings of heresiological writing:

\begin{quote}
And I am afraid that I may be revealing the whole of this potent poison, like the face of some serpent’s basilisk, to the harm of the readers, rather than to their correction. Truly it pollutes the ears—the blasphemous assembly of great audacity, the gathering and the interpretation of its dirt, the mucky perversity of the scummy obscenity.\textsuperscript{114}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{113} Hippolytus, Ref. IX.17.4 (Marcovich, 363; altered from ANF).

\textsuperscript{114} Epiphanius, Pan. 26.3.5 (Holl, 1:279). See also Pan. 26.4.5 (Holl, 1:281).
Epiphanius’ remarks qualify the manifestly advantageous consequences and implications of representing the heretics in texts. Precisely because the heresiologists’ explication and identification of the heretics vivify their theological opinions and ritualistic practices, the rhetorical hesitancy of the Panarion captures the tension between heresiology as a conceptual endeavor oriented around creative destruction and the apprehension that heresiology, instead, facilitates and fortifies destructive creation(s).\footnote{In Epiphanius see, Pan. 9.5.1, 26.3.5, 9.1, 14.4, 17.1; 27.4.5; 29.2.1; 50.1.9; 66.43.5-6; 76.7.7; De Fide 1.4; and Theodoret, Haer. I. Preface; II. Preface; IV.3.} Caught between the compulsion to identify the particularities of their opponents’ positions and the fear that doing so emboldened these very same teachers, the heresiologists frequently embraced the tension as an illustration of their intellectual proficiency and skill. Insofar as incomplete disclosure and insubstantial comprehension undercut heresiology’s potency, as Irenaeus and Hippolytus had warned, plenary investigation and precise identification were the requisite and indisputable significations of the genre’s theological triumph.\footnote{On destruction and demolition in Epiphanius, see Pan. 14.3.1; 25.7.3; 27.8.4.4; 31.29.4, 30.1, 33.2; 37.8.10; 40.4.1; 41.3.5; 42.10.5; 44.4.2; 63.68.1; in Theodoret see Haer. I.Preface, I.26; Hippolytus, Ref. V.13.1; V.I.8.4, 16.6.} Only a truly comprehensive and meticulous analysis of heresy could awaken such an alarming fear. And the fear of memorializing and nourishing the pernicious teachings of the heretics—the corollaries of assiduous research—not only accentuated heresiology’s intellectual and rhetorical fixations, but it also attested the authorial labor and achievement.\footnote{For an incisive discussion of the effects of erasure and memorializing the immemorial in late antiquity, see Charles W. Hendrick Jr, History and Silence: Purge and Rehabilitation of Memory in Late Antiquity (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000), 89-130. Though the subject is damnatio memoriae (attack or repression of memory), specifically with regard to Virius Nicomachus Flavianus, it holds great potential for conceptualizing the textualization of the heresies. The abolition of memory is not about full erasure, instead, it aimed to create “gestures that served to dishonor the record of the person and so, in an oblique way, to confirm memory” (93). The heresies, too, are never fully erased, however much the heresiologists boast, both because it was conceptually impossible (for reasons we shall see later in this chapter) and because they were not supposed to be erased. Insofar as they were divinely foretold and served a specific theological and soteriological purpose, they were markers or defining moments in the history of Christianity. Perhaps the fear constantly invoked by the heresiologists is a relative of...}
Given the theological and institutional ramifications of heretical discourse, a timbre of ambivalent caution was a seemingly straightforward technique by which to impose intellectual distance between writer and object.\textsuperscript{118} The vacillations of the heresiologists acknowledge and preemptively avert the jarring impact of enumerating heretical opinions and practices. While the anodyne language of wavering obligation and fear may well have functioned as rhetorical inoculation, a repudiation of the supposition that their work would effectively though unintentionally serve the interests of the heretics,\textsuperscript{119} the concomitant allure and danger posed by the heretics buoyed the heresiologists’ self-styled rhetoric of unimpeachable expertise and onerous self-sacrifice. The language of full-fledged engagement is precisely the strategic disposition Epiphanius heralds as he concludes his remarks on the Gnostic sect: “So here too...I have not avoided the subject, but have shown what this one of the sects which came my way is

\textsuperscript{118} The genre also propounds a barrier between author and reader. Although Tertullian advocated a wholesale withdrawal from debate and dialogue with the heretics, he did permit, if vaguely, those who desired to a Christian education to attach themselves to qualified pedagogues or to journey to the great centers of apostolicity. If heresiology functioned to broaden the availability of knowledge of the diversifying and regenerative problem of heresy—to be employed by the local teachers Tertullian had recommended—its progenitors imagined a privileged barrier between those who sought the knowledge and those who compiled it. The heresiologists’ insistence that Christians, writ large, disengage from interaction and discussion with the heretics limited its production and ensured its precise and controlled development. The burden of writing heresiology fell to those with the proper intellectual fortitude and skill, as the letters of Acacius and Paul (to Epiphanius) and Quodvultdeus (to Augustine) illustrate. The material these texts compiled, as its authors and requesters imply, was too immense and too hazardous for just any Christian to bear, even a highly educated Christian.\textsuperscript{118} In fashioning a textual style that reflected and reinterpreted aspects of ethnographic writing, the heresiologists positioned themselves as the noble, learned, and exclusive emissaries of this highly dangerous and impactful web of knowledge. To the extent that the Epiphanius and Augustine were celebrated simply by agreeing to write heresiologies, the attending labor denoted that the discipline was the province of a lone few. In revealing the errors of the heresies and in denying them their desired secrecy, the heresiologists bore an inquiry that prioritized and demonstrated dedication to the needs of the larger Christian community. The dutiful veneer that pervades the heresiological project further differentiated the relative position of the author, reader, and textual object.

\textsuperscript{119} In case the ensuing and protracted refutations of the heretics were not sufficiently compelling to prove allegiance to the orthodox camp! On this argument, see Theodoret, \textit{Haer.} I.11 (Migne, 361B).
like. And I could speak plainly of it because of things which I did not do—heaven forbid!—but which <I knew> by learning them in exact detail from persons who were trying to convert me to this and did not succeed.”

As a reflection either of genuine angst or mere rhetorical opportunism, the emphases on danger, fear, and reluctance served, in point of fact, to accentuate the investigative reach of the heresiologists’ palliative. The hazardous potential of textualizing the heresies becomes a self-aggrandizing restatement of the heresiologists’ determination to expose fully and assiduously. Only by plumbing the deepest recesses of heretical opinions and practices do the heresiologies come to acquire their jointly destructive and constructive knowledge. Precisely because the danger of these texts was a collateral but necessary function of their expansive and plenary inquiry, their destructive force actually illustrated and compounded the genre’s procedural successes. Manifested danger revealed scholastic progress. Insofar as masterful comprehension actualized and magnified fear of the heretics, the genre built its effectiveness by championing heresy’s danger.

In negotiating their roles as defenders of the Church and as ethnographers and surveyors of the Christian oikouμενη, the heresiologists embellished a textual tradition designed to edify, nurture, and heal. On account of their dogged investigatory skills, they fashioned the tools by which Christians could identify the diverse array of heretics throughout the Roman Empire. And although the danger of over-intellectualization and the fear of

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120 Epiphanius, Pan. 26.18.1–2 (Holl, 1:298).

121 On detection and the heretics, see Pan. 25.5.4; 26.3.2; 29.9.1, 23.2; 31.9.4, 33.2; 36.6.8; 37.1.1; 41.2.1; 42.15.2; 43.1.6, 2.1, 2.7; 44.2.4; 46.14.4; Hippolytus, Ref. IX.13.6; X.5.1. While thinking heretically seems to have been permissible in some unregulatable sense—a law from the latter half of the fourth century proclaims that, “if any profane man by his punishable teachings should weaken the concept of God, he shall have the right to know such noxious doctrines only for himself but shall not reveal them to other to their hurt” (CTh 16.5.5)—it remained firmly illegal to publicize heretical inclinations in any way, shape, or form. Later laws closed this rather glaring loophole. See, Laurette Barnard, “The Criminalization of Heresy in the Later Roman Empire: A Sociopolitical Device?” The Journal of Legal History 16 (1995): 121-146; and Caroline Humfress, Orthodoxy and the Courts in Late Antiquity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
excessive research remained ingrained within the edifice of heresiology, the rhetoric of humility, service, and toil functioned to counteract the offending scholastic connotations. And as much as the reticent tone of heresiology presaged the unintended consequences of its discoveries and the fear of heretical legitimation, it ultimately prioritized another more triumphant set of possibilities: the precision and heft of heresiology would enable/empower Christians across the Mediterranean to pursue and defeat the heretics around them. Instead of fearing knowledge of the heretics, the Panarion compelled its readers to contemplate their lives as mired in the filth of heresy: “for perhaps, if I reveal this pitfall, like the ‘pit of destruction,’ to the wise, I shall arouse fear and horror in them, so that they will not only avoid this crooked serpent and basilisk…but stone it too, so that it will not even dare to approach anyone.”¹²²

Alongside each sect’s coda, in which Epiphanius celebrated his achievement, he articulated a hope that the remedy provided by his Panarion would function as an offensive enabler—a call to arms, so to speak—against the heretics.¹²³ Arraying the symptoms of heresy’s disease in the language of peril, contagion, and terror served, however conjecturally, to transform the rhetorical world of the Panarion into the lived (and ideally more livable) world of the fourth century. The two-fold ethnographic project of the heresiology—the description/contestation of the heretics’ worldviews and the delineation/refutation of their customs, habits, and opinions—extrapolated the lived conditions of Christian dissension from the abstract theorization of their genesis and perpetuation. Epiphanius’ rhetorical posture declared and amplified his dutiful role as pedagogue, caretaker, and catalyst of Christianity’s growth and safety. His task was to make the abstract musings of the heretics an intolerable condition of

¹²² Epiphanius, Pan. 26.3.9 (Holl, 1:280).

¹²³ See, for example, Epiphanius, Pan. 26.18.4-5; 32.7.7-9; 34.22.2 (Holl, 1:299; 447; Holl and Dummer, 2:38).
the quotidian Christian experience. By this metric, the fear of knowing heresy paled in comparison to the fear of ignorance of living in or alongside it.

Conclusion: Ending Dialogue and Chasing Heresy

“A sound and safe and religious and truth-loving mind,” Irenaeus posited, “...will readily apply itself to the things God placed within the power of men and granted to our knowledge. It will make progress in them because by daily exercise it will make easy for itself the acquisition of knowledge.”\textsuperscript{124} Although entirety of scriptures preaches “clearly and unambiguously—so they can equally be heard by all,” owing to the power to apprehend bestowed upon humanity by God, the rampant dissension among Christians over customs, exegesis, and doctrine depict the struggle for Christian and human unity.\textsuperscript{125} Lamenting that Scripture induces men to overindulge their curiosities to adduce the definitive causes of natural phenomena and to test the truths of scripture (Matthew 10:29 and 10:30 serve as his prime examples), Irenaeus repeatedly emphasizes the limits of human rationality and its capacity to comprehend the fullness of God and his created order. He bemoans the fact that the heretics’ eagerness to rationalize every facet of the natural world propels him to “extol [their] own mind[s] above the greatness of the Creator.”\textsuperscript{126} By deluding themselves into

\textsuperscript{124} Irenaeus, Adv. haer. II.27.1 (Rousseau and Doutreleau, 2:2:264).

\textsuperscript{125} According to Irenaeus, apprehension of the divine creation is realized through human observation and scripture: the things of God/knowledge of God are “the things that come under our eyes and are expressed in the Sacred Scriptures clearly and unambiguously by the words themselves” (II.27.1 [Rousseau and Doutreleau. 2:2:264]). Here I have followed AN

\textsuperscript{126} Irenaeus, Adv. haer. II.26.3 (Rousseau and Doutreleau, 2:2:262).
conceptualizing wisdom and knowledge as the product of inquiry, they collapse the fundamental distinction between humanity and divinity.\textsuperscript{127}

For Irenaeus, the acquisition of knowledge has become a game of sorts,\textsuperscript{128} which engenders dangerous and unsettling repercussions:

These [heretics], while seeking to explain the scriptures and parables, introduce another, great God above the God who is Creator of the world. Thus, they do not solve the difficulties. How can they? Rather, they attach a greater difficulty to a smaller one and so tie a knot that cannot be untied. They make a collection of foolish discourse that might come to this knowledge, [namely], to know that the Lord indeed came to the baptism of the truth at the age of thirty, but without learning this (i.e., the meaning of baptism), they impiously scorn the very God who is the Creator and who sent the Lord for the salvation of humankind.\textsuperscript{129}

Irenaeus fears the supra-textual deities and the ensuing denaturation of plenary and transcendent divine wisdom not simply it disrupts the epistemological hierarchy of the human-divine bond, but also because it undercuts the mystery of divinity and the divine creation. When the inquirer believes that “the more that he occupies himself with questions of this sort, and the more he thinks that he thinks that he has found more than others,” he substitutes his own understanding of the created world in place of the transcendent will of the divine.\textsuperscript{130} Irenaeus, as with Tertullian, frames the entire exercise of investigating scriptural and exegetical truth as emblematic of the misplaced inclination, endemic to the human condition,

\textsuperscript{127} Irenaeus, \textit{Adv. haer.} II.26.3-4; 27.1-3 (Rousseau and Doutreleau, 2:2:260-268).


\textsuperscript{129} Irenaeus, \textit{Adv. haer.} II.10.2 (Rousseau and Doutreleau, 2:2:88).

\textsuperscript{130} Irenaeus, \textit{Adv. haer.} II.26.3 (Rousseau and Doutreleau, 2:2:262). I shall return to the parallel I see between knowledge of the divine and knowledge of the heretics in chapter five. Richard Lim, however, in his \textit{Public Disputation}, 149-181, flags the relationship between curiosity and disputation in the late fourth and early fifth centuries (his analysis pertains mostly to the work of the Cappadocian fathers and John Chrysostom). For Chrysostom, an ideology of mystification about the divine presence imposed stringent inquisitional limitations. Investigating the divine being (or essence) served as the test case for an overindulgent inquiry. The solution or source of satisfaction was not questioning but common prayer.
to seek uselessly. For both authors, an assiduously inquisitive mentality invariably contests the upper boundaries of human knowledge.¹³¹ And to ask or interpret *ad infinitum* is to become a heretic.¹³²

But while debates over the legitimacy of inquiry signified an appreciation of the dangers of certain types of knowledge and methods of inquiry, the heresiologists’ rhetorical oscillation between hesitation and mastery, fear and triumph, humility and exaltation assumed the capacity to undertake and complete the task. Insofar as the question of *should* heresiology be written feeds into assertions about *what* heresiology contains, and *how* its authors created it, the rhetoric of heresiology reflected issues of pastoral responsibility, dialogical legitimation, heretical (and philosophical) association, and authorial achievement. The fears of the heresiologists considered not knowledge of too little, but knowledge of too much. It was not the fear of failure, but the fear of success that oriented and informed the rhetorical posturing of heresiological inquiry. It is to this very problem—the relationship between ethnographic writing and textual comprehension and closure—that I turn to in the next two chapters.

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Chapter IV: Known Unknowns: Ethnographical Limits and the Peril of Discovery

We need topographers to give us exact descriptions of the places where they have been. But because they have this advantage over us, that they have seen the Holy Land, they claim the additional privilege of telling us news about all the rest of the world. I would have everyone write about what he knows and no more than he knows, not only on this, but on all other subjects. One man may have some special knowledge at first-hand about the character of a river or a spring, who otherwise knows only what everyone else knows. Yet to give currency to this shred of information, he will undertake to write on the whole science of physics. From this fault may great troubles spring.

-Michel de Montaigne

In this chapter, I explore the conceptual and discursive ruminations of the heresiologists as they struggle to survey and manage the ever-expanding heretical world. Instead of reading these works as attestations of theological, ecclesiastical, and scholastic authority garnered through the workings of rhetorical totalization, I approach them as

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expressions of an ethnographic disposition, which captures a Christian world mired in the epistemological, theological, and textual dilemma of heresy’s sustained growth. The totalizing veneer of heresiological exposition signals not simply imperial controls, but it encapsulates the fundamental unknowability of heresy in all its guises. Like ancient ethnographic writers who were caught in the clutches of a rhetoric of expansion that admitted its own inadequacies, the heresiologists’ invocations of mastery and hegemony or discovery and conquest do not, in fact, evidence intellectual or theological triumph; they reveal the epistemological deficiencies of classification, which foreground the struggles embedded within the quest for heresiological knowledge and tools of textual closure. In fashioning a discourse of territorial expansion and cultural exportation, the heresiological discovery of new peoples and places reveals the gaps within, as much as it evidences and concretizes, ethnographic ambitions of mastery, control, and conquest.

The limits of heresiology as a genre persist as they produce philosophical rumination and introspection about the ability of authors to see, comprehend, and regulate the world around them, and as they entrench the finitude of intellectual ambition and the textual incompletions of polemical ethnography. Rather than dismiss the rhetorical posturing of these moments of authorial angst, I contend these moments cement the conceptual parallel between heresiology and ethnography. The point is not that the heresiologists were authorial failures of skill and intellect, but rather that they reflect upon their ignorance and the limits of their

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3 The very same concern attends literature about Rome’s rise and geographical and cultural expansion. And, as we shall see later in this very chapter, the issues of containment and mapping are problematic elements of the ideology of triumph. On this last point see the incisive observations of Paul Veyne, “Humanitas: Romans and Non-Romans,” in The Romans, ed. Andrea Giardina, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 342–369; Claude Nicolet, Space, Geography, and Politics in the Early Roman Empire, trans. Hélène Leclerc (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991); and Emma Dench, Romulus’ Asylum (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 55–61. The problem persists throughout Western history as ancient texts themselves create intellectual disruption, as is clearly demonstrated in the excellent study of Anthony Grafton, April Shelford, and Nancy Siraisi, eds., New Worlds, Ancient Texts: The Power of Tradition and the Shock of Discovery (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).
texts in decidedly ethnographic terms evoking the explorations of geographers, chorographers, and travelers across the centuries and Mediterranean. Above all else, the reflections of the heresiologists are not simply stylistic or rhetorical; they are reflections on the ability of authors to describe and control in texts the world around them, the disjuncture between the human and divine conditions, and the potential of ethnographic excursion. Heresiological texts exhibit not a discourse of an orthodox Christian tradition over against heresy, but a process in which the possibility of knowing is debated alongside knowing the truth of Christianity and studying the heretical opinions. The rhetorical hesitation registered by Epiphanius, Tertullian, Hippolytus, and Irenaeus—the fear that explaining heresy will spawn heresy—belie the overriding impulse to reveal the fruits of their armchair ethnography, the spectacle of unfurling the mass of data they have compiled. Bracketed by an appeal to expose, on the one hand, and to combat and cure, on the other, writings that study and refute the doctrines of the heretics and their disciples present an epistemological negotiation of ethnography and polemic, wherein discovering the secrets and mysteries of the heretics reflects the equivocal desire to know the world that is Christian and the firm desire to expand the Christian world.

Even as the heresiologists paraded and proclaimed their comprehension of an inferior intellectual contagion they concurrently endeavored to regulate and regularize the phenomenon of heresy within an increasingly expansive Christian world. While they promoted and performed their toil for the sake of Christians throughout the world, the results of which demonstrated their textual mastery, the lingering intractability of the heresies muddles the claims of victory. In the second half of this chapter, I explore the self-conscious qualifications Epiphanis appends to his ethnographic foray. Careful evaluation of the full
rhetorical scope of the heresiologies reveals less an unvarnished conquest than it does a nuanced and, indeed, tenuous grasp of the burgeoning cast of heretical characters. Attending the discursive comprehension and subjugation of the heresiologists is, as we shall see, an admission of the textual and conceptual limitations of heresiology itself. As the form and content of the genre garner the heresiologists’ scrutiny, fault lines of ethnographic representation and imposition readily emerge and harden. The heresiologists do not simply register (or feign) their nervousness about the protracted exposition and, by implication, promotion of heretical doctrine, they advance a far more striking realization: their texts are as much chasms of Christian knowledge as they are instantiations of it.

**Ethnographic Effects: Discovery, Comprehension, and the Unknowable**

In forging territorial models of their surroundings, ancient geographical writers, as Claude Nicolet has argued, used the auspices of science and exactitude to represent and thus create the world in their own political and ideological terms. Geographical and ethnographic discourse created a hierarchy of lands, peoples, and societies in which the world and its contents were not only rationalized and ordered but moralized and appraised. The intellectual mapping of cultures by means of discovery magnified the world’s diversity, wonderment, and mystery:

> Like all sciences, it moves cumulatively: all sorts of progress, some empirical and others theoretical, slowly create a body of knowledge, more or less imperfect and more or less accepted by society. But concerning geography, the

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4 Claude Nicolet, *Space, Geography, and Politics in the Early Roman Empire*, 1-84.

frontier between the known and the unknown is first of all traced on a territory, in a space: the world is still a partly unexplored piece of land. Whence the fundamental notions, according to the concepts of that time, of the known and unknown world, of the inhabited or inhabitable earth. Geography—knowledge and representation of the earth—is still at the stage of voyages and discoveries: “inaccessible” spaces still remain. As for what is known, or rather surveyed, the first stage of understanding passes through different descriptive methods: such and such a thing in such and such a location, before or after such and such a thing—which is little else than an imaginary voyage.6

Whereas geography mapped lands, ethnography mapped peoples: the two, taken together, organized the spatial and human contents of the world at large. Ancient travelogues (and travel writing more broadly) served as imaginative tools through which reality was projected into the written world.7 In traversing and translating foreign and domestic environments, ancient authors described the world—and thus create a world—as they saw it, wished it, and even feared it to be. Ethnography, like geography, negotiates the push and pull, the exhilaration and fear of discovery and new knowledge. To trace this paradox of ethnography, I begin with a discussion of the Chorography of Pomponius Mela. Written in the first century, shortly after the death of Augustus Caesar, Mela’s Chorography is a circumnavigation (or periplus, as I explained in the introduction) of the known world: it takes its readers on a tour of the world, accentuating “anthropological curiosities, natural phenomena, supernatural phenomena, and the lay of the land.”8 And although Mela used his literary map to display his

6 Claude Nicolet, Space, Geography, and Politics in the Early Roman Empire, 3.


ethnographical, mythological, and geographical knowledge, he also discovers, as his text progresses, the impassible and unknowable facets of the natural world. How does one describe and absorb the unknown?

To ponder the effects of prolonged exposure to the most foreign of circumstances and customs is, as Pomponius Mela’s *Chorography* demonstrates, an obvious opportunity to erect distance and thus difference between the imperial center, Rome (in Mela’s case), and the peoples and places of the periphery.¹ By emphasizing certain habitual and moral distinctions between geographical regions and peoples, Mela, like Polybius, Augustus, Pliny, Strabo, Tacitus, among others, blankets the imperial world in a ranked system of cultural classification and writes the world through the language and perspective of Rome.¹⁰ As his *Chorography* or

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Description of the World commences, Pomponius Mela binds the substantive focus of his inquiry—the study of ethnographic and geographic diversity—to the burdens of authorship and personal expenditure:

A description of the known world is what I set out to give, a difficult task and one hardly suited to eloquence, since it consists chiefly in names of peoples and places and in their fairly puzzling arrangement. To trace this arrangement completely is a time-consuming, rather than a welcome, subject, but nevertheless a very worthwhile thing to consider and understand. It repays the effort of those who give it attention—at least by the very act of contemplating it, if not by the richness of this supplicant’s natural talent.¹¹

When Mela signals straight away the labyrinth of the world’s diversity, his bemoaning the drudgery involved in understanding it only underscores his ambition to comprehend this globalized heterogeneity fully. To that end, his foray into topographical and geographical detail begins by defining the shape of the world and demarcating the three major contents—Asia, Europe, and Africa—by territory and waterways. Broadly identifying the scope of his inquiry, Mela next ventures “to describe [our world’s] coastlines and regions with greater precision.”¹² As he maps the various regions of the world, Mela juxtaposes his routinized tour of rivers, oceans, and lands with brief but quintessential ethnographical details. The emphasis


on microcosm—at the expense of macroscopic unity—reflects chorography’s preoccupation with, what we might call, synchronic geography of the minutiae. Because “the goal of regional cartography (χωρογραφικόν),” according to the second-century Greek geographer Claudius Ptolemaeus (Ptolemy), “is an impression of a part, as when one makes an image of just an ear or an eye,” it dwells on the particularity without devising an overarching coherence for the whole of the world. Regional cartography “sets out individual localities, each one independently and by itself, registering practically everything down to the least thing therein (for example, harbors, towns, districts, branches of principal rivers, and so on),” but does not “show the known world as a single and continuous entity, its nature and how it is situated.”

The chorographical effect, then, is to present a loose confederation of particularized data, which follows a narrative journey, even if the narrative itself reveals disparate, unaligned, and contradictory details. Despite its thematic congruity, the genre lacks conceptual systematicity.

In Book III, for instance, having moved to a discussion of the lands off the coast of northern Europe, Pomponius arrives at the isle of Britain. The island, he report, is a fertile and generous habitat for sheep, though its terrain is less suitable for human needs. The land does maintain people, “but they all are uncivilized” (sed sunt inculti omnes). Removed, as they are, from the umbrella of civilization, the Britons lack knowledge of “other kinds of wealth, being

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14 Ptolemy, Geo. I.1.5-11 (Nobbe, 3 [Berggren and Jones, 57]).

15 Mela, Chor. III.51 (Silberman, 82).
wealthy only in sheep and land.”¹⁶ Like many a foreign peoples, they are a population defined by a “strong desire to rule and a strong drive to expand their holdings.”¹⁷ Despite Mela’s less than avid affinity for the Britons, their incivility and ignorance served a critical function within the Roman imperial project of conquest and domination.¹⁸ The ever-growing sphere, both literal and metaphorical, of Roman occupation has made the dispositional nature of these northern Islanders firmly known and readily comprehensible. Mela explains:

Next, as to what kind of place Britain is and what kind of people it produces, information that is more certain and better established will be stated. The reason is that—lo and behold!—the greatest princeps is opening the long-closed island, and as conqueror of previously unsubdued and previously unknown peoples (*nec indomitarum modo ante se verum ignotarum quoque gentium victor*), the princeps brings with them the proof of his own accomplishments, since he will reveal in his triumph as much as he has laid claim to in war.¹⁹

The fact that the Britons had been brought into the known realm—that is, fully exposed as a people—tightened the pronouncement of the historian Polybius, who had written his *Histories* to demonstrate the means by which Rome had succeeded “in subjecting nearly the whole inhabited world to their sole government—a thing unique in history.”²⁰ The incivility and

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¹⁷ Mela, *Chor.* III.52 (Silberman, 82).


¹⁹ Mela, *Chor.* III.49. (Silberman, 81).

ignorance of the Britons—and their Irish neighbors, it should be added—no longer remained objects of speculation and feared enemies of the imagination. Their cultural leanings had been specified and fixed. As Rome expanded its frontiers, the monstrous peoples of the North, the British and Irish, and those from the south, in and around the Nile, ethnographic writing served to stabilize the cultural periphery in texts. Textual recollections of exploration purported to identify and, in fact, tame the once unknown and savage. Increased knowledge of the Britons demystified their savagery, and inaugurated, so Mela tells his readers, a process of triumphal civilizing. A report from Book 6 of Pliny’s *Natural History*, though it omits any hints

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21 In the *Natural History*, as Trevor Murphy demonstrates, Pliny emphasizes not only the ever-increasing influence of the Roman Empire (Aelius Gallus, for instance, brought military force to the South of Arabia, whereas Augustus “only had a glimpse of Arabia” (Pliny, *Natural History* VI.XXXXI.160, ed. and trans. H. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library 352 [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1942], 458). Pliny further lists a series of towns, previously unknown, that were destroyed by Gallus. Murphy explains the import: “In case of these towns [Negrana, Nestus, Nesca, Magusus, Caminacus, Labaetia, Bariba, and Caripeta], we learn of their presence in the world only after the *Natural History* tells us they no longer exist—their destruction is the necessary precondition of our being informed. That such complete information should be available to the *Natural History* is a consequence of the spread of Roman authority, which has opened up the orbis terrarum to expeditions such as that of Aelius Gallus. The reader can go anywhere he likes, and the encyclopedia’s intent is to show him what it will look like when he gets there” (130). See also, Gian Biago Conte, *Genres and Readers: Lucretius, Love Elegy, Pliny’s Encyclopedia*, trans. Glenn W. Most (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).

22 Cf. Greg Woolf, “Ethnography and Empire,” in *Tales of the Barbarians*, 59–88, who argues that, “Roman expansion…did not set an imperial vision at the heart of ethnographic writing. At best it gave a new importance to some interpretive issues already present in earlier histories and geographies cast on a grand scale” (78). Woolf’s argument rests on partitioning the historical impact of empire as a facilitator ethnographic writing from the rhetorical quest (and difficulty) to map and control the world in texts. Woolf is certainly right to note that empire did not magically create a New World; the real (i.e. felt) impact of imperial expansion on ethnographic writing is a question very much open to debate. Woolf, to seize a particularly telling example, notes that failure to know in imperial ethnographers was not evidence of inability to know. He writes, “scattered references to Keltoi, Tartessians, Tyrrenhians, and even Romans can be collected from fifth- and fourth-century texts. If they were
of Hellenization or Romanization in the uncivilized island of Ceylon (Sri Lanka), similarly captures the enduring power of discovery: “Ceylon, under the name of the Land of the Counterlanders, was long considered to be another world; but the epoch and the achievements of Alexander the Great supplied clear proof of its being an island.”

23 By communicating the intellectual fruits of geographical expansion, ethnography widened the center’s powerful hold over the rest of the world.24 As the center moved from Greece to Rome and then to the Christian Church, each stage of cross-cultural expansion reified peoples at the periphery, both geographically and theologically, through rampant translation, transplantation, and appropriation. Ethnography proved an essential element of the ideological process by which cross-cultural inquiry became determined by the transcendent aspirations of the reigning power.25

marginalized within historical writing it was not because they were either unknown or unknowable. It was simply that the great narratives of Greek and Roman imperial histories had not yet touched them” (66). My argument is that heresy represents a fundamentally new ethnographic problem precisely because it obviates territorial demarcations. The known world is no longer separable from the unknown world. I shall draw out this argument more fully in the next section of this chapter. At the same time, however, it is important to emphasize that Woolf’s proposition too readily ignores the salience of rhetorical claims for empire. The ways in which ethnographic writing represents and creates a world of its own certainly evidences the genre’s dispositional structures. The fact that the narratives had yet to reach an already known people attenuates the imperial edifice of the text’s rhetorical domain. The rhetorical limits and reach of ethnographic discovery present an important conceptual problem of writing and producing texts. Woolf undervalues the ways in which ethnography—both in its ancient and modern guises—constantly disrupts the security of the senses and the representative capacity of writing.


25 For more perspectives on acculturation and dominance, see the full collection of essays in Jane Webster and Nicolas Cooper, eds., *Roman Imperialism: Post-Colonial Perspectives*. The art historical and archaeological perspective is expertly presented by Jas’ Elsner, *Imperial Rome and Christian Triumph: The Art of the Roman Empire* AD 100-450
The Journey of Heresiology

Jeremy Schott has persuasively argued that the ethnographic and philosophical proficiency of Christian apologetic literature functioned in tandem with other textual ventures such as universal history as a tool of social control and categorization. For Schott, Greek and Roman philosophers of the early empire wielded the fruits of cross-cultural exchange (and exploitation) as demonstrations and validation of a broader universal philosophy that strengthened the cultural asymmetry between Greek and Roman philosophical tradition and knowledge, on the one hand, and the peripheral intellectual pursuits of non-Greeks and non-Romans, on the other. In this way, barbarian wisdom was made valuable by Greek interpretation. Ethnography—which Schott reads as method of intellectual collection,


26 Jeremy Schott, Christianity, Empire, and the Making of Religion in Late Antiquity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 166. It is worth noting here the corresponding interests of the sixth-century Christian Topography by the monk Cosmas, known often as Cosmas Indicopleustes (literally the Indian traveler or voyager). Cosmas not only claims to survey the entire earth more completely and thoroughly than his pagan predecessors, he frames his endeavor as an opportunity to refute Greek and Roman models of cosmography, geography, and ethnogenesis and to articulate a Christian theorization of the world and its contents following Scripture (supplemented with his own first-hand observations). Cosmas’ articulation of the terms of Christian ethnographic (among other analytical pursuits) discourse is both intellectually constructive and destructive: that is, the text binds its analysis of the surrounding world to a two-fold project of refutation and (positive) enumeration. Christian world making, in other words, did not exist in a vacuum. It reacted and adapted to competing vernaculars and theories of the world’s creation, diversity, and particularities.

27 Schott’s first chapter, “Philosophers, Apologists, and Empire,” 15-51, discusses the historical, ethnographic, and geographical propensities of philosophical rumination and the tension between so-called “ethnic histories” (of Hecataeus of Abdera, Manetho, Philo of Byblos, Artapanus, Eupolemus, and Josephus) and the desired synchronicity of an overarching “historico-ethnographic” narrative, as evidenced most pronouncedly by the Historical Library of Diodorus Siculus. Ethnographic details and cultural particularity held profound philosophical resonance precisely because they held the potential to structure a unified philosophical system out of a seemingly diverse mess of plurality. As much as the philosophical juxtaposition of cross-cultural wisdom, served to destabilize rigid categories of identity (the closeness of Egyptian and Greek traditions, for instance), barbarian wisdom ultimately became an occasion to assert and champion the univocity of the universalizing Greek vernacular. The allegorical exegesis of the Stoics (Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Cornutus), and the metaphysical interpretative strategies of the Platonists (Plutarch and Numenius of Apamea) lessened cultural
discovery, and appropriation—served to schematize the diversity of the world into a single system of philosophical order. Following the philosophical, ethnographic, and geographic musings of various Greek authors, Christian apologists similarly articulated a transcendent or ecumenical system of thought as it qualified and dismantled the dichotomy between Greeks and barbarians. In their appeal to the metaphorical and literal vernacular of geography and ethnography, Christian apologetical authors positioned themselves at the conjunction of a new homologous knowledge (in contrast to the ethnic plurality of paganism) of overreaching incorporation. The production of this Christian intellectual pedigree, built upon a recasting of the Greek philosophical tradition, supplied the means by which knowledge and thus control were facilitated and amassed. Schott explains that the notional boundaries of Christian discourse produced layers of comprehension and difference:

Terms like *Christanismos*, *Hellenismos*, *ethne*, *gentes*, and *nationes*, as well as a host of heresiological appellatives, served as signifiers in a science of local and global control. Working within such a system of knowledge, bishops and imperial officials living well inside the borders of Roman territory could find themselves on the frontier between Christians and others. The discourse of apologetics distinction by positing the vernacular of Greek philosophical traditions as the new (singular) medium of interpretation. This reading strategy, in effect, transposed the conquest of territory into a realm of intellectual culture and books: “the ecumenical drive of late ancient philosophers was suspended within an in contact with the political conditions of its possibility. By reading barbarian texts in Greek and interpreting them for a Greek readership (emphasis Schott), these philosophers were engaged in a process of intellectual despoliation homologous to the Roman conquest of peoples and territory” (27). For more on this process of Hellenizing ethnic histories and universalizing tendencies, see Daniel Richter, “Plutarch on Isis and Osiris: Text, Cult, and Cultural Appropriation.” *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 131 (2001): 191-216; Raoul Mortley, *The Idea of Universal History from Hellenistic Philosophy to Early Christian Historiography* (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 1996); Arnaldo Momigliano, “The Origins of Universal History,” in *On Pagans, Jews, and Christians* (Hanover, NH: Wesleyan University Press, 1987), 31-57; Rebecca Preston, “Roman Questions, Greek Answers: Plutarch and the Construction of Identity,” in *Being Greek Under Rome*, ed. Simon Goldhill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 86-119; Thomas Schmidt, “Plutarch’s Timeless Barbarians and the Age of Trajan,” in *Sage and Emperor: Plutarch, Greek Intellectuals, and Roman Power in the Time of Trajan*, ed. Philip Stadler and Luc Van der Stockt (Louvain: Louvren University Press, 2002), 57-71; Richard Alston, “Conquest by Text: Juvenal and Plutarch on Egypt,” 99-109.

28 Jeremy Schott, *Christianity, Empire, and the Making of Religion in Late Antiquity*, 166.
provided a system of knowledge that structured contact between Christians and the ethne.\(^{29}\)

Just as apologetics erected and refined the terms and expanse of imperial domination and comprehension, heresiologies, as I have noted in the previous sections of this chapter, embrace the same maneuvers and rhetoric of ethnographic writing and representation. As complementary and parallel sites of ethnographic investigation, apologetics and heresiology frame the range of their knowledge as evidence of intellectual depth, skill, and intellectual jurisdiction.

Having painstakingly enumerated his Panarion, Epiphanius of Salamis’s concluding remarks transpose his survey of the eighty heresies into a theological postscript concerning the exclusive truth of the catholic church. As this ecumenical epilogue, entitled De Fide, commences, the bishop recollects his experience writing the Panarion to brandish his accomplishments and to attest the intellectual pedigree of his inquiry. Imagining the classification of the heretics as an act of prolonged and treacherous discovery, De Fide solidifies the ethnographic perspective of heresiology by casting the text’s production in the symbolic language of travel and return:

> We have discussed the various, multiform, and much divided teachings of the crooked counsels of our opponents, have distinguished them by species and genus and, by God’s power, have exposed them as stale and worthless. We have sailed across the shoreless sea of the blasphemies of each sect, with great difficulty crossed the ocean of their shameful, repulsive mysteries, (2) given the solutions to their <hosts> of problems, and passed their wickedness by. And we have approached calm lands of the truth, after negotiating every rough place, enduring every squall, foaming, and tossing of billows, (3) and, as it were, seeing

the swell of the sea, and its whirlpools, its shallows none too small, and its place full of dangerous beasts, and experiencing them through words.\textsuperscript{30}

The taxonomic endeavor of the heresiologist, here explicitly articulated as a system of natural classification ordered by genus and species, is conceived as an ethnographic excursion of theological exigency and immense toil. Travel, as the metaphor of textual production, begets an intellectual and spiritual exhaustion that is the expected consequence of an ethnographic effort to stabilize the structure and content of the Christian world. Having sailed across the sea of heresy and contended with “the perils of the deep,” Epiphanius and his travel companions (his readers and the Catholic Church, more broadly) “recover from all our fear, distress, and illness, as we inhale the mainland breezes with the utmost relief, as we have come to safety and won our way to the calm harbor.”\textsuperscript{31}

The consequence of this theological journey, despite all its uncertainty and injury, is to cherish the safe refuge of orthodoxy. When Epiphanius reconnects with the orthodoxy symbolized in the city of Jerusalem—the journey into darkness has led inexorably to “the holy Jerusalem and Christ’s virgin and bride, the firm foundation and rock, our holy mother”—he immediately relishes the restorative power of the Lord’s sanctuary, both for its physical and spiritual sustenance: “for we have always been in need of him and in every part of these Sects,


\textsuperscript{31} Epiphanius, \textit{De Fide} 1.5, 1.4 (Holl and Dummer, 3:497).
in our continual encounters with their obscurities.” As the theological embodiment of holy Jerusalem, orthodoxy blossoms into a vivid metropolis, the wonder and glory of which are made manifest to the faithful and concealed from the unbelievers. Although the settled comforts of Jerusalem rehabilitate the exhausted voyager, the travel itself remained an endeavor emblazoned in his mind; its disruptive capacity did not end with Epiphanius’ metaphorical expedition. Just as Epiphanius, the wearied traveler, rightly celebrates his textual triumph and safe return, De Fide fully exposes and enumerates the illusory controls of heresiology’s ethnographic aspirations. If, as James Clifford has argued, dislocation engenders inquiry—“Theory’ is a product of displacement, comparison, a certain distance. To theorize, one leaves home”—the voyage into the violent waters of heresy quite naturally begets reflection about the destabilizing effects of exploration.

While the language of rhetorical mastery substantiates certain authorial pretensions of the heresiologists, geographers, and ethnographers, it also unmasks the more profound conceptual perplexity of ethnographic writing and research. To the extent that Christian heresiology is reflexively identified as a site of ecclesiastical (or theological) authority and imperial control, the genre’s proponents, in point of fact, usefully complicate this outlook by

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32 Epiphanius, De Fide 2.2 (Holl and Dummer, 3:497).
33 Epiphanius, De Fide, 2.9 (Holl and Dummer, 3:498).
34 James Clifford, “Notes on Travel and Theory,” Inscriptions 5 (1989), 177. On the philosophical, ritualistic, and epistemological evolutions of theoria, see the excellent study of Andrea Wilson Nightingale, Spectacles of Truth in Classical Greek Philosophy: Theoria in Its Cultural Context (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Nightingale explains, began as a journey (undertaken by the theoreo) to witness spectacles, momentous events, and sacred objects. The journey or theoria, which incorporated the totality of the experience from the journey away, the sacred viewing, and return home, emphasized the effects of seeing ritual and sacredness. During the classical era, philosophical inquiry, led by Plato, began to model itself in the image of the theoria: the philosophers engaged in activity that enabled them to journey into the universe, the gods, and world around them and see truths. For my purposes, Nightingale’s most useful analysis (63-68) falls in what she calls the domain of “theoria as cultural practice,” specifically a “journey to foreign lands to see the world” (40, 63). In seeing the world, the theoreo acquires knowledge and wisdom. Theoria could be, as Herodotus so persistently illustrates, a fundamentally ethnographic experience.
drawing out the internal tensions and constraints within the rhetorical edifice of totalization. This analytical strain, I argue, permeates the suppositional fabric of ancient ethnography itself. Even as ethnography erected structures of transcendent knowledge, which defined the periphery in terms of the center and elaborated new interpretive mechanisms of knowledge, it also communicated in categorical language the underlying limitations of authorial projects of universalizing scope. In emphasizing the ways in which ancient ethnographic texts ponder and articulate the constraints of writing and knowing about peoples, I am proposing to reevaluate the ideological implications of ethnographic writing. As both a mode of writing and manner of thinking, ethnography exists at the intellectual conjunction of ambition and constraint: how much can we know? The ethnographic disposition, as I outlined in the Introduction, is oriented around dissociative binaries: triumph and failure, on the one hand, and control and disruption, on the other. Ancient ethnographers define the problem of textual comprehension and representation not through a distinction between objectivity and subjectivity, as much of contemporary anthropological discourse does, but through the rhetorical and conceptual impression that the myriad diversity of the world is unquantifiable, truly unknowable, and outside the realm of textual capacity.\footnote{On contemporary ethnography and the tension between objective and subjective analysis, see Clifford Geertz, \textit{Works and Lives: The Anthropologist as Author} (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988); Loring Danforth, \textit{The Death Rituals of Rural Greece} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982); Bronislaw Malinowski, \textit{A Diary in the Strict Sense of the Term} (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989); James Clifford, \textit{On Ethnographic Self-Fashioning: Conrad and Malinowski,\textquotedblright} in \textit{Reconstructing Individualism}, ed. T.C. Heller (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), 140-162; James Clifford and George E. Marcus, eds., \textit{Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); Paul Rabinow, \textit{Reflections on Fieldwork} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); Vincent Crapanzano, \textit{Tuhami: Portrait of a Moroccan} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Kevin Dwyer, \textit{Moroccan Dialogues: Anthropology in Question} (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982); J.-P. Dumont, \textit{The Headman and I: Ambiguity and Ambivalence in the Fieldworking Experience} (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978).} I call this the epistemological paradox of ethnography, whereby the campaign for maximal knowledge not only amplifies the deep, pervasive cleavages within the textual conceit of ethnographic writing, but also exposes the authorial inability to manage this newfound cultural, ethnic, and religious data. The discoveries of
voyages, both real and imagined, do not simply produce invaluable knowledge, they become lasting evidence of the struggle, past, present, and future, to fix control over a diverse and diversifying world. Insofar as the world is simply beyond the command and control of texts, ethnography perpetuates the textual bind of this epistemological hole.

The epistemological and textual rifts of ethnography begin with the seemingly benign relationship between discovery and knowledge: the amassing of knowledge, as much as it is a consequence of imperial ambition, necessitates structural mechanisms (ethnographic paradigms, in this case) to array it. Increased knowledge of the world—in other words, an enlarged οἰκουμένη (the known world)—introduces more human diversity into the ethnographic equation. Additional knowledge not only begets further lines of inquiry, it demands ways to incorporate this newly acquired information into existing models and/or the development of new configurations to counteract the disruptive potential of unregulated data. Ancient ethnographic texts, despite their effort to comprehend and systematize the world around them, reveal quite explicitly an enervated control over the classificatory effects of their inquiries. Indeed, to return to my opening example, as his Chorography unfolds, the world Mela describes slowly exposes the fault lines in his seemingly expert grasp of its contents and contours.  

36 This is the argument that Greg Woolf advances in Chapter II, “Explaining the Barbarians,” of his Tales of the Barbarians. Ethnographic knowledge, in essence, requires explanatory and organizational models. See also, Elizabeth Rawson, “Geography and Ethnography,” in her Intellectual Life in the Late Republic (London: Duckworth, 1985), 250-266.

37 This motif of textual fracture within Mela’s Chorography is expertly traced by Rhiannon Evans, “Ethnography’s Freak Show: The Grotesques at the Edges of the Roman Earth,” Ramus 28.1 (1999): 54-73. While I draw heavily upon Evans’ analysis, I have chosen to emphasize the impact of textual instability within the broader context of the ancient ethnographic disposition. Ian Wood, “‘The Ends of the Earth’: The Bible, Bibles, and the Other in Early Medieval Europe,” in The Calling of the Nations: Exegesis, Ethnography, and Empire in a Biblical-Historic Present (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 200-216, discusses the place of missionizing in a Christian geography of the world and its outer limits. With attention to Bede and Adam of Bremen, Wood analyzes not only the differing functions of missionary history (the former used it to perpetuate a sacred history, while the latter appealed to it to emphasize ecclesiastical/jurisdictional power), but the starkly divergent “readings” of the ends of the earth.
It is in the *Chorography’s* Africa, a site of profound cultural and anthropological tension, that the textual constraints of ethnographic analysis emerge most emphatically. Africa, so Mela informs his readers, was highly fertile, yet largely uninhabited. He reports that it was, “inhabited by people socialized according to our custom,” while in the interior of the continent “the scarcely human and rather brutish Goat-Pans, Blemyes, Gamphasantes, and Satyrs possess, rather than inhabit, the land. They roam freely everywhere, with no houses and no fixed abode.” The Romanized north of the country, which bears the marks of Roman civilization, slowly recedes as readers make their way inland (to the southern and western parts of the continent). The nomadic peoples of the interior are known for their “rather uncouth way of life.” The people “beyond the desert” are further marked off from the norms of the Roman gaze. The Trogodytae (cave-dwellers) “own no resources, and rather than speak, they make a high-pitched sound. They creep around deep in caves and are nurtured by serpents.” The Augliae worship the spirits of the dead (the Manes, in the Roman vernacular), while the Gamphasantes forswear clothing and weapons. And, as Pomponius rounds out his description of the peoples of Africa, he introduces the most extreme illustrations of the periphery: “the Blemyes lack heads; their face is on their chest. The Satyrs have nothing human except their superficial appearance. The form of the Goat-Pans is celebrated in their name. So much for Africa.”

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38 Mela, *Chor.* I.21 (Silberman, 7).
39 Mela, *Chor.* I.33, I.23 (Silberman, 10, 8).
40 Mela, *Chor.* I.42 (Silberman, 13).
41 Mela, *Chor.* I.43 (Silberman, 13).
42 Mela, *Chor.* I.44 (Silberman, 13).
43 Mela, *Chor.* I.48 (Silberman, 14).
As the inverse of the norms that defined Roman culture, the African tribes become spectacles of the grotesque and monstrous. Their inhumanity, which blurred the distinction between the categories of human/animal and male/female, enabled Mela to construct an anthropological counterpart—a domain of oddity and contravention—to the normative weight of Roman cultural values. As Rhiannon Evans describes it, “as the least well-known part of the known world, Africa’s interior functions especially well as a stage for playing out fears about the unexplored reaches of the third continent. It is the Counterworld in Our World, the mirror of the oikoumene.” But by constructing this realm of inversion in such jarringly oppositional terms, Pomponius Mela inaugurates the first of a series of cracks in the structural integrity of ethnographic investigation. Africa became an ethnographic paradox precisely because these “freaks” of nature, in consuming (and yet repelling) the ethnographic gaze, unhinged the simplicity and coherence of Roman taxonomic discourse. The chaos and disorder of the world itself was codified in Mela’s text, as he, too, struggled to contain his subversive discoveries.

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46 Evans, “Ethnography’s Freak Show,” 60.
While the uncivilized were dispersed throughout the world in Gaul, Britain, Ireland, Scythia, and India, the monstrous peoples of the *Chorography* had been confined to the plains of inland Africa. In narrowing the territorial scope of his fascinations and projected imaginings, Pomponius encloses or at the very least seeks to manage the temptation and insatiability of the ethnographic gaze. To limit the geographical scope of the abnormality is a ploy to control the disruptive potential of knowledge born of reckless fascination. But Africa endured as a fixture of the ethnographic gaze insofar as it remained beyond the bounds of absolute understanding. Indeed, for all the talk of inhumanity, Africa itself, Pomponius reports, remained unknowingly imprecise:

Moreover, nothing noteworthy meets those who follow the shores eastward. Everything is a wasteland, defined by desolate mountains, and more a riverbank than an oceanfront. After that, there is a huge tract without inhabitants. For quite a long time it was uncertain whether there was sea beyond and whether the earth had a periphery, or whether, with the seawaters eliminated, Africa extended without end.47

Strabo’s description of Africa in his *Geography* similarly emphasizes the mystery of its interior regions: “since several deserts intervene, we do not know all these regions. Similarly the regions above Ammon and the oases as far as Aethiopia are likewise unknown. Neither can we tell the boundaries either of Aethiopia or of Libya, nor yet accurately even those of the country next to Aegypt, much less of that which borders on the Ocean”48 And when Pliny, having already described countless peoples and places throughout Africa, ventures into the desolate recesses of the country, the ethnographic imagination is awakened:

The rest of the country is uninhabited. Then come regions that are purely imaginary: towards the west are the Nigroi, whose king is said to have only one eye, in his forehead; the Wild-beast-eaters, who live chiefly on the flesh of

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47 Mela, Chor. III.89 (Silberman, 91-2).

panthers and lions; the Eatalls who devour everything; the Man-eaters, whose
diet is human flesh; the Dog-milkers who have dogs’ heads; the Artabatitae, who
have four legs, and rove about like wild animals; and then the Hesperioi, the
Perosi and the people we have mentioned as inhabiting the border of
Mauretania.49

Ignorance prompts the imagination, which creates culture and peoplehood in order to
complete the (imperial) ethnographic map. The desire for totality breeds imaginative
speculation. The opportunity to mold and define that which was previously unknown
understandably holds great ideological potential. Geographic, ethnographic, and encyclopedic
contemplation serves the interest of imperial domination. But lurking beneath the comforts of
creation reside the unanticipated knots not only of error, but also of theoretical misjudgment.
Ethnography, as I am arguing here, lulls its proponents into a false sense of authorial security,
which slowly reveals itself as the known world in texts enlarges to include less reconcilable
knowledge.

Complicating this seemingly straightforward cycle by which discovery begets
knowledge and knowledge facilitates certain rhetorical postures, is an increasingly vivid sense
that knowledge of the world beyond Rome is, in fact, as likely to disrupt the imperial controls
of texts as to support them. Ethnography’s reach for the unknown, though it fed the appetite
for discovery and identification, ultimately elevated the tricky necessities of textual borders.
The periphery holds the very real potential, as Mela’s text so pronoucnedly illustrates, to mire
the authorial comprehension of the known world in a muddle of epistemological and
rhetorical imbalance. The puzzle that comprises the contours of the universe—with its various
borders, coasts, interiors, inhabitants, climates, and topographies—is exacerbated at the very

49 Pliny, *Natural History* VI.XXXV.195 (H. Rackham, 482).
start of the treatise when Pomponius outlines his narrative plan. Describing the shape of the whole world, he reflects briefly on its grand divisions:

In the same way, the earth also is divided from east to west into two halves, which they term hemispheres, and it is differentiated by five horizontal zones. Heat makes the middle zone unlivable, and cold does so to the outermost seasons, but not at the same time. The Antichthones inhabit one [zone], we the other. The chorography of the former zone is unknown because of the heat of the intervening expanse, and the chorography of the latter is now to be described.\(^5\)

Mela, by necessity, jettisons any consideration of this unknowable zone in an effort “to impose limits on the known world, to package the \textit{oikoumene} in a readable and therefore knowable form.”\(^5\) But, as Evans, has rightly stressed, “the hermetic seal of this bounded region is rent twice in Mela’s commentary.”\(^5\) The radical disjuncture between the two worlds, the one firmly knowable (the \textit{οἰκουμένη}) and the other altogether concealed, slowly recedes as the existence of an alternative hemisphere becomes too enticing and, indeed, useful to resist. Mela first marshals it to explain the otherwise inscrutable flooding of the Nile.\(^5\) And when this anti-world arises again in Book III, the reference only exacerbates its enigmatic character: “Taprobane (Sri Lanka) is said to be either a very large island or the first part of the second world, but because it is inhabited, and because no one reportedly has circumnavigated it, the

\(^5\) Mela, \textit{Chor.} I.3 (Silberman, 2).
\(^5\) Evans, “Ethnography’s Freak Show,” 68.
\(^5\) Evans, “Ethnography’s Freak Show,” 68.

\(^5\) See also Pliny V.IX.51 (H. Rackham, 256): “The sources from which the Nile rises have not been ascertained, proceeding as it does through scorching deserts for an enormously long distance and only having been explored by unarmed investigators, without the wars that have discovered all other countries.” While the sources of the Nile elude Pliny’s comprehension, he not only fails to resort to Mela’s enigmatic counterworld in order to propose an explanation, he links conquest to discovery. Indeed, it is conquest that makes all the other countries known! The puzzlement produced by the causes and effects of the Nile extend back into the text of Herodotus, who observed at Book II.28 and II.34 that the river’s sources were altogether mysterious.
latter interpretation is as good as true."54 The intrusion of the counterworld into the realm of
the inhabited world irrevocably disturbs the neatly delimited structure of the upper
hemisphere. If, in fact, the anti-world explains the natural laws of oikouμένη, the two regions
are fundamentally inseparable domains. To the extent that the lower hemisphere remains
unexplored, its explanatory potential remains elusive, while its force of disruption is firmly
fixed. Mela has created an immensely powerful yet powerfully unknowable force of exposition.
The imperial ambition of the Roman world is now defined by the struggle to constrain and
comprehend the permeating counterworld. The distinction between the known world and the
unknown world has been obviated.

While Mela may tell us little about the real geographical features of the ancient Roman
world, his journey through the terrain of the known world reveals the conjoined peril and
opportunity of imagined ethnography.55 Like the hybrid peoples of inner Africa, the world as a
mass of particularities and complexity defies tidy classification and disrupts the conjunction of
imperial affectation and textual manipulation. As Evans lucidly summarizes the matter:

For the Roman geographer, there is a tension between the attempts to close
down, secure, and contain the world in text, and the intrusion of the so-called
‘outlandish’—the world outside those limits is always creeping in. This text
emphasizes the disorientation of the Roman onlooker faced with the zones of
the world which remain unseen, unmapped, and, more unnervingly,
unmappable—we can perhaps imagine them as blanks in Agrippa’s map of
imperial domination. What Mela’s world shows is a fear of boundaries
dissolving, structures slipping and the Other World seeping into Our World.56

54 Mela, III.70 (Silberman, 87).

55 Much of the work on Mela has focused on his failures, omissions, and devotion to the oddities of the world. The
appraisals are not altogether kind. See G Georg Wissowa, "Die Abfassungszeit der Chorographia des Pomponius
Edges of the Earth, 150; William H. Stahl, Roman Science: Origins, Development and Influence to the Later Middle Ages

56 Evans, “Ethnography’s Freak Show,” 69.
As much as discovering the previously unknown bolstered the triumphalist posture of Roman cultural and military might, it denoted the conceptual problem of a world of seemingly unknowable in scope, detail, and design. Ideological desires became conceptual impossibilities (and conceptual impossibilities accentuated practical possibilities), transforming the supposed power of ethnography into a self-deceiving trap of exalted fascination. The ethnographic orientation was not exclusively defined by its capacity to interpret and control, but by an equally profound disquietude about the capacity of authors and texts to identify and delimit fully the peoples and contours of the natural world. The Chorography captures, as I have argued, Mela’s inability to control the unpredictability of ethnographic investigation and knowledge acquisition. As a reflection of the scholastic trappings of an ideology driven by an unyielding fascination with the unknown and grotesque, the unyielding desire to accrue more knowledge (and organize the world accordingly) reveals the conceptually unsettled foundations of ancient ethnographic writing.\footnote{See also Carey’s, “The Problem of Totality,” Journal of the History of Collections 12.1 (2000): 1-13. Much like the heresiologists who “feared” the effects of exhaustive exposure of the heretics, Pliny, too, as a compiler and cataloguer of the natural world, fears the results of plenary inclusion. Pliny’s timidity stems from the fact that encyclopedic narratives necessarily include both the best and worst of the world. For Pliny, the requirement to include knowledge of luxuria, the great “perversion of reason (ratio) and Nature,” disrupts his stabilized taxonomy of civilization (Carey, Pliny’s Catalogue of Culture, 76). “The problem of totality,” is that it is both a manifestly fraudulent aspiration and deeply destructive one. These two poles of classification, as I have argued, are conceptually interdependent facets of ethnographic discourse.}

The Ethnographic Bind of Heresiology

As I have argued from the very beginning of this work, the task of writing peoples, in its Greek, Roman, and Jewish iterations (from Homer and Philo to Celsus and Ammianus) is also the elemental enterprise of Christian heresiology. And, as I shall detail below, this
ethnographic parallel between Christians and their intellectual predecessors existed both at the level of macroscopic theorization and microscopic detail. I have labored to identify the intellectual correlation between ethnography and heresiology as each schematized and conceptualized human difference, questioned the merits of social discourse, and demonstrated rhetorical command over their objects and objectives. But having outlined the epistemological gymnastics underlying ethnography’s drive to explore and explain—the inability to stabilize the world—I have only casually gestured at the parallel concerns within heresiology’s conceptual framework. In this section, I wish to delineate the specific ways in which the textual apprehensions of heresiology mirror Pomponius Mela’s own quandaries of ethnographic fascination. And although the ethnographic structure of heresiology is cast in the language of biblical design (or, we might say, determined by the binding authority of Scripture), the tension between severe delimitation of form and content, on the one hand, and expansive and all-encompassing knowledge, on the other, disturbs the simplicity of Scripture’s ethnographic perspective. When, in his concluding paean to the holy Catholic Church, Epiphanius revisits his text’s organizational paradigm—an allegorical reading of the Song of Songs—he offers a detailed account of its broader ethnographic implications. In an effort to inventory the sectarian realm and emphasize the unification of its Catholic opposition, the bishop brings the weight of Scripture’s infallible precision to organize the analytical scope of the Panarion’s flood of knowledge. And though Epiphanius prizes his investigative skills and techniques, his Panarion delimits heresy not by phenomenological or observational data but by

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58 Epiphanius, *De Fide* 6.1-13.7 (Holl and Dummer, 3:501-14). The majority of *De Fide*, in fact, is devoted to enumerating the additional sects of the world. As I discuss below, Epiphanius himself is acutely aware of the problem the scriptural dictum of Song of Songs 6:8 has created. He puts his best rhetorical spin on the conceptual problem—one which Pliny also contemplated, without, of course, the force of Scripture—but the effect remains in place: the world of heresy is incalculable.
textual fiat. Reiterating, first, the textual precedent, the bishop then considers its broader ramifications for his ethnography:

‘There are threescore queens, and fourscore concubines, and maidens without number, but one is my dove, my perfect one’ (Song of Songs 6:8)—adding the two ‘my’s.’ For she is his ‘dove’ and his ‘perfect one,’ since the others are said to be and are not, while she herself is named twice. He did not say, ‘They are my eighty concubines,’ of the others. He awarded the queens their honorable connection with him through the glorious name; but he declared that the concubines have no connection with him at all. When I note their numbers I am obliged to investigate the passage by the anagogical method of spiritual interpretation, so as not to pass them by. I am not speaking of trivialities, but truly comparing words with their true spiritual senses, by means of the true scriptures. For it is plain that the number written of each thing in scripture is unalterable (ὅτι μὲν γὰρ καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς γεγραμμένος ἀπαράβατός ἐστιν ύποθέσεως), neither can that which is set in number be useless, nor can it be measured in scripture for no effect.  

As a textual restraint upon the ethnographic gaze, Scripture’s power of foreclosure attests heresiology’s new fixation: numbering the heretics. In contrast to early heresiological treatises of Hippolytus and Irenaeus, which contemplated the philosophical and astrological borrowings of the heretics in fairly haphazard structural narratives, the genre now becomes a systematic catalogue of heretical parties. Heresiology is no longer a matter of qualitative

59 Epiphanius, De Fide 3.2-5 (Holl and Dummer, 3:498-9), ὅτι μὲν γὰρ καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς γεγραμμένος ἀπαράβατός ἐστιν ύποθέσεως καὶ οὔτε δύναται τὸ ἐν ἀριθμῷ καταταξαμένον ἐκλογὴν τί εἶναι οὔτε εἰς ἀργότητα ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπιμετρεῖται «δῆλον». Not only are the numbers of Scripture unerring, precision provides a means by which his inquiry can be foreclosed. What is interesting to note is that Epiphanius eschews any opinion that holds Scripture’s enumerations to be without value and utility. Scriptural numbers reflect an unerring specificity of purpose, which cannot be dismissed or tampered with. The number eighty is fixed. It is also worth noting that the text of Song of Songs invited considerable ethnic (or racial) analysis among early Christian authors. In Symbolic Blackness and Ethnic Difference in Early Christian Literature, Gay Byron discusses Origen’s interpretation of the Canticle of Canticles and its racialization of virtue and vice (the relationship between blackness and sin), 72-74; 109-115. On this point, see also Aaron Johnson, “The Blackness of Ethiopians: Classical Ethnography and Eusebius’s Commentary on the Psalms,” Harvard Theological Review 99.2 (2006), 165-186, esp. 170-172.

60 This is an important facet of my argument in chapter five, where I discuss the relationship between ethnography, editing, and listing. Augustine’s De Haeresibus is the primary focal point there because the bishop performs his editing of sources and knowledge for the benefit of his readers. His text is no mere compilation, as many have seen fit to suggest. It is a much more complicated effort to grapple with the problem of ethnographic problems of investigative distance.

61 On the evolution of heresiology, see Brent Shaw, “Who were the Circumcellions,” in Vandals, Romans and Berbers, ed. A.H. Merrills (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 227-258; J. Rebecca Lyman, “Epiphanius on Orthodoxy,” in
identification alone; it has become a repository of quantification. The very fact that heresiology now fastidiously tallies heretical parties confirms the radically widened topography of the Christian world. Systematicity now orients heresiology.

Sorcha Carey’s work on Pliny’s *Natural History* identifies a parallel (and antecedent) scholastic effort to catalogue the impossible, but she contends that Pliny’s battle with the infinite actually functions to secure his claims of totality.62 Writing of the incalculable number of sculptures in Rhodes, Olympia, Delphi, and Athens, Pliny asks: “what mortal could recount them all, or what value can be felt in such information? Still it may give pleasure just to allude to the most remarkable and to name the artists of celebrity, thought it would be impossible to enumerate the total number of works of each inasmuch as Lysippus is said to have executed 1500 works of art.”63 The impossibility of the task elevates Pliny’s performance; his struggles evince his exceptional genius: “he can do the impossible—count the uncountable and more besides.”64 As Carey argues, the evidence of omission reflects Pliny’s judicious editorial hand, and it insulates him from the charge of failure. The very need to edit brandishes his credibility as a man after the entirety:

If elsewhere his aim to describe the entire world necessitated omitting certain things, then here too, Pliny impresses us with his skill at juggling irreconcilable opposites. The material for discussion is endless, and yet Pliny is still able to dazzle us with an array of facts and figures—the thousands of statues in a range of Greek cities; the hundreds of statues made by Lysippus alone. A consummate master of his material, equally at home with infinity and totality, Pliny artfully

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presents his omissions as an expression of authorial concern for both his reader’s pleasure and the quality of the knowledge he includes in his work.\footnote{Carey, \textit{Pliny's Catalogue of Culture}, 22.} In much the same way, a diverse world holds the potential to be decoded and fathomed. Textual and geographical exploration proves an invaluable means by which authors accrued rhetorical ballast. Like Pomponius Mela, who used the counterworld to explain the natural laws of the known world, Epiphanius ventured into the world of the youths not only to magnify the grandiloquence of the lone truth housed within the Church, but, more tellingly, to confirm the verisimilitude of Song of Songs 6:8.

The eighty concubines the \textit{Panarion} names and refutes denote only a small portion of the total volume of known heresies. In an acknowledgement of his text’s necessary limits, the bishop rightfully wonders, “who can count the variety of this world?”\footnote{Epiphanius, \textit{De Fide} 9.2 (Holl and Dummer, 3:504).} There are, in fact, “young girls without number,” which denote “the further philosophies all over the world.”\footnote{Epiphanius, \textit{De Fide} 9.1 (Holl and Dummer, 3:504).} Forty-four Greek philosophies are added to the \textit{Panarion's} tally,\footnote{Epiphanius, \textit{De Fide} 10.2 (Holl and Dummer, 3:497).} along with the seventy-two “repulsive philosophies of the Indian nation” (only the gymnosophists, Brahmans, Pseudo-brahmans, corpse-eaters, practitioners of obscenity, “and those who are past feeling” are named).\footnote{Thales of Miletus, Anaximander of Miletus, Anaximenes of Miletus, Anaxagoras of Clazomene, Archelaus the naturalist, Socrates the ethicist, Pherecydes, Pythagoras of Samos, Xenophanes from Colophon, Parmenides the Elean, Zeno of Elea, Melissus the Samian, Leucippus the Milesian, Democritus of Abdera, Metrodorus of Chios, Protagoras of Abdera, Diogenes of Smyrna, Pyrrho of Elis, Empedocles of Argigentum, Heraclitus of Ephesus, Proclus, Plato the Athenian, Aristippus of Cyrene, Theodorus, the atheist, Hegesias of Cyrene, Antisthenes the Athenian, Diogenes the Cynic, Crates of Thebes in Boeotia, Arcesilaus, Carneades, Aristotle the Macedonian (or Thracian), Theophrastus of Ephesus, Strato of Lampsacus, Praxiphanes of Rhodes, Crito of Phaselis, Zeno of Citium, Cleanthes, Persaeus, Chrysippus of Soli, Diogenes of Babylon, Panaetius of Rhodes, Posidonius of Apamaea, Athenodorus of Tarsus, and Epicurus of Athens.} Media and Ethiopia are each reputed to have six distinct sects. Epiphanius further
reports that in Parthia, Elamitis, Caspia, Germany, and Sarmatia and among the Persians, Dauni, Zickchi, Amazons, Lazi, Iberians, Bosporenes, Geli, Chinese, “there are any number of different laws, philosophies and sects and a countless throng of varieties.”\(^{70}\) Acknowledging the plenitude of cultic mysteries and rites among the Greeks, Egyptians, Persians, Babylonians, and Indians, the bishop pays them inconsistent attention (their priestly attendants are described only briefly as well) as he resigns himself to the opinion that “these people are hopelessly lost.”\(^{71}\) Epiphanius’ scholastic pursuits serve as a testimony to his skills as an ethnographic compiler and, in turn, herald his textual achievement. His myriad additions to the heretical pantheon illustrate his active engagement with and knowledge of the world beyond the eighty; it draws attention to his relentless push to consume and reveal as much knowledge as he can muster.

Irenaeus, already in the second century, had signaled the practical limits of attention: “In the present book, we shall build up (our own system) as far as we are able and as time will

\(^{70}\) Epiphanius, *De Fide* 10.3. (Holl and Dummer, 3:497).

\(^{71}\) Epiphanius, *De Fide*, 11.2 (Holl and Dummer, 3:497). Fully embracing his role as armchair ethnographer, Epiphanius flaunts a few of the odder, more wondrous, customs known to exist, while also dismissing many, notably the disgust of the Indian sects, as unnecessary and unworthy of his time.\(^{71}\) He reports, for instance, that “Chinese men stay at home and weave, and anoint themselves and do womanly things in readiness for their wives,” while “the women cut their hair short, wear men’s underclothing, and do all the field labor” (De Fide 10.4). Epiphanius glosses the inversion by describing the Chinese men’s work as womanly (and their subservience to their wives), which, of course, presumes certain counterfactual gendered norms among his readers. Despite offering virtually no details about the habits of the Chinese (or any of the “nations” listed in Epilogue), save the inclusion of this lone cultural reversal—depriving us of the opportunity to study women’s transference from or balancing of two spheres of life, the domestic and the labor, perhaps paralleling Herodotus’ description of the Amazonian occupation of two seemingly polarized spheres, war and marriage—the bishop’s interest in cultural oddity signals a strategy of delimiting Christian virtue, its moral, pietistic, marital, disposition by, in a sense, mocking and cataloguing its opposites. The reversal of gender roles among the Chinese follows the Herodotean and Melaean techniques of difference and inversion, whereby the author translates or converts cultural or ethnic differences as anti-sameness. See Francois Hartog, *The Mirror of Herodotus: The Representation of the Other in the Writing of History*, trans. Janet Lloyd (Berkeley: University of California Press), 212-224. Epiphanius glosses the inversion by describing the Chinese men’s work as womanly (and their subservience to their wives), which, of course, presumes certain counterfactual gendered norms among his readers. The same language applies to the Valesians, who impose the injunction of Matthew 5:29-30 literally, and castrate themselves to avoid self-offense. See *Pan*. 58.3.1 for the gender-bending proclivities of the Valesians (Holl and Dummer, 2:359-60).
permit, and we shall overthrow their entire system by main principles.”

To rectify the deficiencies of their ethnographic totality, the heresiologists rationalize a dichotomy between practical impossibilities and necessities and conceptual impossibility: they insist upon the latter and deny any sense of the former. Hippolytus, in his discussion of the Gnostics, explains his decision to omit information about the Gnostics as a matter of intentional excision: “there are, however, among the Gnostics diversities of opinion; but we have decided that it would not be worthwhile to enumerate the silly doctrines of these heresies, inasmuch as they are (too) numerous and devoid of reason, and full of blasphemy.” The sheer madness and total irrationality of the heretics compels Hippolytus to wield his ethnographic knowledge steadily and selectively. As the ethnographer of heresy, Hippolytus is the theological filter for his readers, which endows him, as I noted earlier in this chapter, with the prerogative to edit.

Epiphanius, similarly, uses omissions to demonstrate his role as shepherd of his readers. As the augmentative exhibition of his wide-ranging knowledge builds, the bishop formulates his excisions as a necessary predicate of limited time and space. When the bishop revisits the philosophical and theological topography of the Christian world in De Fide, he concedes the impossibility of a comprehensive investigation by citing Hebrews 11:32: “And ‘what shall I say? For this time will fail me if I tell’ of the countless differences in people’s various practices, as well as in their virtue and in their vice.” Although Epiphanius openly

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73 Hippolytus, Refutatio Omnium Haeresium VII.26.2, ed. Miroslav Marcovich (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1986), 319. On omission in Epiphanius see Pan.8.7.4 (εἰς τὸ μὴ τὸ πᾶν αὐτῶν παρασιωπῆσαι); 26.9.1; 27.4.5; 32.3.1 (Epiphanius, ed. Karl Holl, GCS 25 [Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1915], 1:193, 285, 305, 441). I have followed the translation in ANF.

74 Epiphanius, De Fide 11.1 (Holl and Dummer, 3:511).
confesses his text’s insufficiency of scope, he crafts his concession around a fundamental
distinction between textual constraints of practicality and textual barriers of conceptuality. He
recasts the limitations of his heresiological venture as a justifiable redaction of the facts. But
the excision of data reflects a conscious choice, not an underlying failure of intellectual
capacity: “But again, I omit the names of many other mysteries, heresiarchs and fomenters of
schism whose leaders are called Magusaeans by the Persians but prophets by the Egyptians,
and who preside over their shrines and temples.”75 The Panarion, despite its omissions, is not a
product of ignorance, but of remarkable judgment and restraint. Its precise delineation
communicates the bishop’s firm grasp of an increasingly erratic and evolving heretical
domain. The scope of Epiphanius’ heresiological investigation, the bishop skillfully implies,
suffers not from a lack of knowledge; instead, it is the fear of incompleteness that curbs its
grandeur.

While one could read—and, indeed, the heresiologists did read—excisions as evidence of
totality (the former, as I noted earlier assumes the latter), the menace of the heresies derived
from the fact that they denatured the boundaries of the known world. The profound
ethnographic paradox of heresy was that it made the known world unknown. Strategic
ignorance could, theoretically, contain the counterworld of Mela, even though he himself
proved unable to avoid “being there.”76 For the heresiologists, however, there was no escaping
heresy’s (and, indeed, Christianity’s) bowdlerization of geographical difference. Any one
heresy might exist in only one region or territory, but heresy, as theological and ethnographic

75 Epiphanius, De Fide 12.5 (Holl and Dummer, 3:497).
category, existed everywhere. The ethnographic logic of the *Panarion* unveils the dangers of Christian universalism. The rhetorical universalism of heresiology, epitomized in the famous remark from Chapter 10, Book I of Irenaeus' *Adversus Haereses*, depicted a world without theological borders or difference. But the eradication of theological borders creates the conceptual conditions by which heretical intransigence transformed the *singular* world of knowable Christian orthodoxy into a singularity within which was an unknowable mess of heretics. Writing of Roman *humanitas* (humanity or the state of civilization), Paul Veyne has argued that the Romans well knew that they were not the lone civilized state within the vast reaches of the world. Civilization was, in his formulation, a question of discovery not

77 The Jews represent a similar problem insofar as they have spread themselves out across the Empire, but there was no sense that the Jews were reproducing sectarian parties at a profoundly disturbing rate. A relevant parallel can be found in René S. Bloch, “Geography without Territory: Tacitus’ Digression on the Jews and Its Ethnographic Context,” in *Internationales Josephus-Kolloquium Aarhus 1999*, ed. Jürgen U. Kalms (Münster: Lit, 2000), 38-54; and Rhiannon Evans, “Geography without People: Mapping in Pliny’s *Historia Naturalis* Books 3-6,” *Ramus* 34.1 (2005): 47-74.


79 Irenaeus, *Adv. haer.* 1.10.2 (*Contre les hérésies, Livres I*, ed. and trans. Adelin Rousseau and Louis Doutreleau, SC 264 [Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1979], 1:2:158-160): “The Church, as we have said before, though disseminated throughout the whole world, carefully guards this preaching and this faith which she has received, as if she dwelt in one house. She likewise believes these things as if she had but one soul and one and the same heart; she preaches, teaches, and hands them down harmoniously, as if she possessed one mouth. For, though the languages throughout the world are dissimilar, nevertheless the meaning of the tradition is one and the same. To explain, the churches which have been founded in Germany do not believe or hand down anything else; neither do those founded in Spain or Gaul or Libya or in the central regions of the world. But just as the sun, God’s creation, is one and the same throughout the world, so too the light, the preaching of Truth, shines everywhere and enlightens all men who wish to come to the knowledge of the Truth. Neither will any of those who preside in the churches, though exceedingly eloquent, say anything else (for no one is above the Master); nor will a poor speaker subtract from the tradition. For, since the faith is one and the same, neither he who can discourse at length about it adds to it, nor he who can say only a little subtracts from it.”

invention; one found its qualities among foreigners and within nature itself. Thus, despite the fact that Romans repeatedly claimed, “that they held sway over the entire the world” and that they had incorporated the domain of the Greeks into their own empire (since “the Greeks had long been telling them that the whole inhabited earth had fallen under their domination”), their totalized vision was admittedly fragmentary. They had dominated only the “known world” (the oikouμένη), which was defined in strictly favorable terms. Rome, and Greece before her, had struggled to map the world through an ethnocentric paradigm that narrowed it to comport with tendentious interests and military conquests. At certain textual moments, as we saw with Pomponius Mela, the scope of ethnographic knowledge suddenly broadened beyond the tailored borders of the known world.

For the heresiologists, the ethnographic dilemma was not just a fear of the unknown in the periphery, but a fear of the disruptive proximity of unknowable sectarianism. The endlessly unknowable had been cemented within the very confines of the voluminous oikouμένη; the territorial and theological fluidity of the heretics unraveled the fixity of the very concept of the known world. A law from 389 C.E. against the Manichaeans, issued by Valentinian, Theodosius, and Arcadius (to Albinus, prefect of the city of Rome), attests the unsettling effects of heresy in the language of geographical unity: “if any person whatever should disturb the world (mundus) under the name of Manichaeans, they shall indeed be expelled from the whole world (orbis terrarum) but especially from this city (Rome), under

81 Paul Veyne, “Humanitas: Romans and Non-Romans,” 344.


83 On the Romanocentric depiction of the world (and the efforts to unify the world through focalized reading and textual production), see C. Nicolet, Space, Geography and Politics in the Early Roman Empire; Katherine Clarke, Between Geography and History, 22-76; Katherine Clarke, “In Search of the Author of Strabo’s Geography,” Journal of Roman Studies 87 (1997): 92-110; S. Carey, Pliny’s Catalogue of Culture, 32-40.
threat of judgment.” The heretics, put simply, fostered ethnographic and geographic regression. The world that had once been known was now filled with the unknown. The language of transcendence and universality confronted the realities of delimited control. This (wishful) ideology of universalism, in tandem with the diffusion of heresy throughout the Mediterranean, demolished the strategy of ethnographic isolation. The infinitude of the heretics ensured that the desire for a totalized oikouμένη was indefinite and forever unobtainable. If the Church was to act as the guarantor of a eminent theological civilization—in the way that Rome had conceived itself as the new protector of civilized values (succeeding Greece)—absolute knowledge (and total control) of its demesne was the sine qua non of the heresiologists’ argument for orthodoxy. The heretics had ensured that Christian scholasticism—and the rationale of orthodoxy—failed before it had even begun.

Epiphanius’ scriptural prooftext, instead of strengthening the text’s force of closure, rends completely the totalizing framework. The verse decrees the infinitude of heresy: “How many other sects have not grown up among the Greeks after the four most famous ones which we have mentioned—and further, after those sects and the ones after them, how many individuals and ideas keep arising of themselves, with seeming youth, in accordance with the opinion of each?” In upending the heresiologists’ measures of control—scriptural authority, diligent research, divine intervention, and rhetorical bombast—Scripture codifies the insurmountable propagation of heresy. Epiphanius’ attempt to enclose the heretics in a precise and bounded system of ethnographic classification, hewing to the governance of Scripture,

84 Codex Theodosianus 16.5.18 in The Theodosian Code and Novels and the Sirmodian Constitutions, trans. Clyde Pharr (Union, NJ: Lawbook Exchange, 2001). On the broader juridical tension between orthodoxy and heresy, see Caroline Humfress, Orthodoxy and the Courts in Late Antiquity, 243-268.

85 Emma Dench, Romulus’ Asylum, 50-52.

86 Epiphanius, De Fide 9.2 (Holl and Dummer, 3:504).
exposes the breaches within the conceptual fabric of the endeavor itself. The discursive effort to obtain textual comprehension over against the heretics evinces a highly unstable and indefinite grip on the depths of a rapidly evolving, expansive Christian milieu. As a phenomenological category with names aplenty, the malleability and variability of heresy agitates the steady course of ethnographic inquiry.⁸⁷ Epiphanius himself struggles to naturalize the seeming infinitude of the heretical parties—and, in fact, recasts the problem in terms of the unified orthodoxy versus the diversified plurality of heresy—and, by extension, to diminish the explicit impossibility of a complete textual catalogue. He writes:

And so, as I have said, the sects I have listed in succession are eighty concubines. But no one need be surprised (θαυμαζέτω) if each of them has been called by different names in every country (ἄλλοις ὄνομασιν ἐκάστη τούτων κικλήσκεται ἐν ἑκάστῃ χώρᾳ). What is more, we must observe that each sect in turn has frequently divided into many parts on its own and taken different names. This is no surprise; it is the way things are (ἔστι γὰρ καὶ οὕτως). But I find eighty-one in all—one [more than eighty] because of the one who is different from them all, but is the only one allotted to the bridegroom whom he has acknowledge by such a name as ‘one is my dove,’ and again, ‘my perfect one.’ In other words all the concubines are low-born and of no particular harmlessness, purity and gentleness.⁸⁸

Epiphanius, here, addresses the essential abnormality of the heretics, which differentiates them, as far as I can discern, from every other known ethnographic or geographic object. The heretics presented a double challenge to their “orthodox” opponents: not only did they articulate alternative modes of being Christian—with distinct rituals, texts, interpretive strategies, cosmologies, and histories—but they also endlessly adapted and altered their alternative Christianities. In other words, they destabilized by means of both the specificity of their message and in their very being. In the most basic sense, the heresy’s ontological elusivity thwarted Epiphanius’—and all of the heresiologists’—scholastic dexterity. In contrast

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⁸⁷ Epiphanius, De Fide 9.2 (Holl and Dummer, 3:504).

⁸⁸ Epiphanius, De Fide 6.4-6 (Holl and Dummer, 3:502).
to the Roman and Greek ethnographers who had struggled to describe a world at once—and still—beyond complete comprehension, the heresiologists labored to define a sprawling miasma of theological variation that was mutating before their very eyes.\(^9\) There was no conceptual way to define out an infinitely vast and forever evolving counterworld of heresy. By virtue of the fact that his conceptual ruminations were fastened to any ethnographic object that lacked any conditions of enclosure, his rhetorical braggadocio was a Sisyphean gesture. Despite the fact that his list of named “youths without number,” proves Scripture’s veracity as the determinant of the natural order of things, it functionally lacerates the foundations of heresiological containment. Even though the path of heresy is shown to follow the letter of Scripture, the proof is an altogether irreconcilable discovery.

The magnitude of the heretical expansion was formulated by an ideological system in which the indomitable desire to expose the heretics marked its rhetorical trajectory. But lurking beneath the florid veneer of textual domination was the binding paradox of ethnographic obsession. Writing of Roman fixations and fascinations, the historian Carlin Barton has identified the destructive hold of that which simultaneously allures and repels.\(^9\) In orienting her remarks around the spectacle of the monstrous, Barton emphasizes the fundamental disjuncture between fascination and regulation:

It was a great temptation to be fascinated. It was hard to resist, impossible to defeat, because it was born of longing and frustration and loss. The unsightly, the unspeakable—the obscaenus, deformis, the turpis, teater, foedus, immundus—

\(^9\) Adaptation is an important technique within Theodoret’s *Compendium of Heretical Fables*. Helen Sillett has treated the largely unstudied *Discernment of Lies and Truth* in her essay, “Orthodoxy and Heresy in Theodoret of Cyrus’ *Compendium of Heresies*,” in *Orthodoxy, Christianity, History*, ed. Susanna Elm, Éric Rebillard, and Antonella Romano (Rome: École Française de Rome, 2000), 261–273. See my criticism of Sillett’s argument in chapter two. Augustine, too, as I discuss in the next chapter emphasizes the agility of heresiology. It is not static tome, but an adaptive repository of ever-growing knowledge of the heretical world. Adaptation, of course, is a reflection of changing circumstances.

were things which confounded one. They should be hidden; their sightings should be expiated. At the same time they were *monstra*...things which spoke a mysterious language calling for decipherment. They carried a message, however unclear. The ambiguous, the paradoxical, the puzzling, the obscure and difficult to categorize—in short, the monster—was the great and fatal temptation. As Plutarch’s Mestrius Florus points out in the *Quaestiones conviviales*, ‘the man who demands to see the logic of each and every thing destroys the wonder in all things’...Fascination, he realizes is not compatible with ‘the logic of things’....To subject something which is uncommon, anomalous, monstrous, to a *sensus communis*, to subject it to a physics, to ‘naturalize’ the ‘unnatural,’ to give the absurd a species—in short, to interpret—is to wrest control of, to break the spell and fascination of, the monsters.

Bound by a litany of textual challenges, each new head of this ever-growing hydra of heresy concretizes a pervasive threat to intellectual and ethnographic solidity and mettle. The cycle of discovery and decipherment is, on the one hand, the ceaseless power of ethnographic inquiry and, on the other, its conceptual ruination. While proclaiming new knowledge of peoples across the world fills the crevices in the ethnographic mainframe—shoring up the center’s hold over the periphery—codified exposure holds the potential, as in the case of heresiology and ethnography more broadly, to create new lacunae within the very same

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91 Barton, *The Sorrows of the Ancient Romans: The Gladiator and the Monster*, 101-2. Consider this gem from the Panarion 27.4.5-5.1 (concerning the Carpocratians), which quite nicely illustrates the rhetorical bind of Barton’s argument and the disruptive force of monstrosity that pervades Mela’s *Chorography*: “Again, I am afraid to say what sorts of actions, or I might uncover a trench like a hidden sewer, and some might think that I am causing the blast of foul odor. Still, since I am constrained by the truth to disclose what goes on among the deluded, I am going to make myself speak—*with some delicacy and yet without overstepping the bounds of the truth.* The plain fact is that these people perform every unspeakable, unlawful thing, which is not right even to say, and every kind of homosexual union and carnal intercourse with women, with every member of the body—and that they perform magic, sorcery and idolatry and say that this is the discharge of their obligations in the body, so that they will not be charged any more or required to do anything else, and for this reason the soul will not be turned back after its departure and go on to another incarnation and transmigration. Their literature is such that the intelligent reader will be astounded and shocked, and doubt that human beings can do such things—not only civilized people like ourselves, but even those who *live with* wild beasts and bestial, brutish men, and all but venture to behave like dogs and swine.”

92 On heresy as hydra, see Hippolytus, *Ref*. V.11.1 (Marcovich, 173) and John Cassian, *On the Incarnation* I.1 in Iohannis Cassiani De institutis coenobiorum et De octo principalium vitiorum remediis libri XII; De incarnatione domini contra Nestorium libri VII, ed. Michael Petschenig, CSEL 17 (Vienna: C. Geroldi Filium, 1888), 237: “Thus also heresies in the churches bear some likeness to that hydra which the poets’ imagination invented; for they too hiss against us with deadly tongues; and they too cast forth their deadly poison, and spring up again when their heads are cut off” (*ita ergo etiam haereses in ecclesiis illius quam poetarum commenta finxerunt hydrae similitudinem gerunt. et istae enim adversum nos linguis feralibus sibilant, et istae virus letale iaciunt, et istae sectis capitis renascentur*).
ethnographic edifice. Not only do the customs and habits of the heretics firmly disorient the supposed norms of orthodox Christianity, they also envelop the entire history of the Church, past, present, and future, in a cloud of epistemological incertitude, fear, and impossibility. As much as discovery begets knowledge, and knowledge buttresses existing models of human diversity (and/or engenders new ethnographic models), there comes a recognition point at which the accrued information becomes too abundant, diverse, and fantastical for the authorial intellect and textual field to hold firm. Organizing the infinite renders ethnography a task of monstrous absurdity. By proving the firm grip of Scriptural precepts, Epiphanius endorses a model of heresy that is, by its very conclusions, uncontrollably vast and beyond reach of textual and human comprehension. Epiphanius’ destructively crafty reading of Song of Songs, while purporting to contain the world of heresy, in fact infinitely multiplied its dominion. And it was not just that the some heresies remained unknown, obscure, or altogether unknowable; certain heresies had yet to come into existence. The history of heresy had yet to run its course, and its generative vacillations eluded textual efforts to encase it within a system of systematic precision. The impulse to perform knowledge of the heretics usefully essentializes the bind of ancient ethnographic discourse. The heresiologists fear revealing too much before their readers and yet they persistently strive to demonstrate the fruits of their labor. But their laborious productions are themselves deficient illustrations of the heretical world “out there.” In that sense, heresiology only strengthens the inherent structural insufficiencies of the ethnographic project.

93 This is especially clear in Augustine’s De Haeresibus Epilogus 1.1-17; 2.24-27 (in S. Aurelii Augustini Pars XIII, ed. R. Vander Plaetse and C. Beukers, CCSL 46 [Brepols: Turnhout, 1969], 343).

94 Augustine, De Haeresibus Epilogus 2.55-57 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 344).
Writing of his own ambivalence as the author of an unsettling yet necessary treatise, Epiphanius divulges the restraints of his performance while alluding to multiplicity of possible constructions:

In any case may I, and all the <body> of the holy catholic church, and all the readers of this book, remain unharmed by such a suggestion of the devil and his mischief! For if I were to start <in> again on the other things they say and do—which are like these and as numerous, and still more grave and <worse>—and if, for a curative drug, I should also wish to match a remedy, like an antidote, with each thing they say, I would make a heavy task of composing this treatise.95

Even if he had more time—or the wherewithal to begin anew—the epistemological and conceptual fissures remain firmly embedded within the very nucleus of the genre. Precisely because there is no escaping, as it were, the endless iterations of heretical generation, the genre is a failure of ambition and imagination. Its inabilities were its essence. Indeed, when the bishop tries to defend his text’s unbridled potentiality for exhaustive comprehension, he only underscores the scriptural strictures undergirding its production:

But if I were to describe the woman ecstacies in Memphis <and> Heliopolis who bewitch themselves with drums and flutes, and the dancing girls, and the performers at the triennial festival—and the woman at Bathys and in the temple of Menuthis who have abandoned shame and womanliness—to what burdens for the tongue, or what a long composition I could commit myself, by adding the countless number [of these] to the number I have already given! For even if I were to take on the enormous task [of recounting all the sectarian offshoots within offshoots] I would leave our comprehension of these things incomplete, since scripture says that there are ‘young women without number.’96

While there is, in the end, no escaping the parameters of Scripture, the infinitude of the heretics attests the overarching textual paradox of ethnographic inquiry. In the extreme case of heresy, its ethnographic objectification evolves into a vicious cycle of intellectual pursuit, which was conditioned to futility. The very quandary of heresy’s malleable persistence upsets

95 Epiphanius, Pan. 26.17.1-3 (Holl, 1:297; altered from Williams).
96 Song of Songs 6:8; Epiphanius, De Fide 12.1-2 (Holl and Dummer, 3:511-12).
the hyper-structured balance of ethnographic analysis: the diversity of the world is not, so it seems, subject to intellectual regulation, born of careful research and investigation, but illustrative of the inherent restraints of the human condition.

With ever a watchful eye upon his steering proof-text, Epiphanius’ theoretical and practical concession—the two have seemingly become a single problem—concretizes his equivocation. But even though exhaustive discovery is finally revealed to be a scholastic and ethnographic mirage, the bishop concludes his epilogue with a reminder that these sects, despite their innumerability, are youths. They are bound by a certain shared disruptive disposition and theological disorientation, which perhaps renders them less indistinct than appears:

And so, at the close of the entire work, I have said that those who are ‘young’ in their own way, to suit their own tastes, are ‘without number’ (Song of Songs 6:8)—by no means for good, to practice the various forms of wisdom, judgment, courage, prudence and righteousness. Others of these act ‘young’ more arbitrarily, and perversely <estrangé> themselves from truth, in numbers there is no way in counting. But the one dove herself, the holy virgin, confesses that God is the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, a perfect Father, a perfect Son, and a perfect Holy Spirit.97

While Epiphanius expects heretical plurality, difference, and mutation, the binary between the plurality of heresy and the singularity of orthodoxy obviates the need for textual perfection. The heretics, he implies, can be refuted with reference to the condition they represent as the embodied contradistinction of the ever-stable Church of Christ. Their impurity conditions their immateriality. If, as his Proem proposed, heresy follows a particular genealogy of error, which begins with Peleg and Serug, the impossible numbers are but more symptoms of an already diagnosed disease. The rhetorical escape hatch—the way around the problem of ethnographic peril—is to remind readers that heresies are a plurality of sameness. They are all

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97 Epiphanius, De Fide 13.9 (Holl and Dummer, 3:514).
manifestations of the same hubristic condition. Their outward difference is superficial, while their inward ontology is the same.

Conclusion: Knowability in Heresiological Discourse

Near the start of the second Proem of his *Panarion*—before the bishop unfurls his epic tale of the history of sectarianism—Epiphanius invoked the Lord and Holy Spirit, in a gesture explicitly reminiscent of the Greek authors’ invocation of a Muse, to strengthen his inadequate and feeble mind as it undertook a systematic treatment of the heretics. In making his plea to the Christian God, Epiphanius posits an essential distinction between the knowable and unknowable capacity of the human mind. He writes about the limits of his investigation in terms of temporality and eternality, humanity and divinity, apophaticism and cataphaticism:

To a person reading a work on any question the aim <of the treatise> ought to be <clear>—the discoveries which training enables my small mind to grasp lie in the temporal realm, and I certainly do not promise <to impart the knowledge> of everything in the world (πάντων τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ). There are things which cannot be uttered, and things which can. There are things untold (ἀμύθητα), beyond counting (ἐν ἀριθμῷ μὴ καθιστάμενα), inaccessible so far as man is concerned, and known only to the Lord of all. But we are dealing with variance of opinions and kinds of knowledge, with faith in God and unbelief, with sects, and with heretical human opinion which misguided persons have been sowing in the world from man’s formation on earth till our own day, the eleventh year of the reigns of Valentinian and Valens and the seventh of Gratian’s [375 C.E.].

While the dichotomy Epiphanius posits is fairly cogent—knowable and utterable things (φατά) belong to the human mind and the temporal realm, while unknowable and unutterable (ἀφατα) are the province of God alone—the details of these epistemological categories are left unspecified and unelaborated, save his immediate suggestion that the sectarian/heretical

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problem of his treatise belongs to the temporal realm. These are heretical human opinions (κακοδόξου γνώμης ἀνθρωπείας), which have been sowed by misguided persons (πεπλανημένων ἀνδῶν). Although Epiphanius forthrightly acknowledges the limitations of his investigation—what we might call the known unknowns of divine matters—he is clear that the heretics fall well within the category of known knowns, seeing as they follow distinctly human pedigree. Indeed, Epiphanius’ insistence that those things which are beyond counting remain squarely outside the human realm of cognizance suggests a hazier trajectory for thinking about his ability to comprehend the world of heresy. His own textual ruminations, as I have suggested throughout this chapter, expressly problematize the simple dichotomy between the kinds of knowledge he supposes at the outset.

Defined though it is by the words of scripture, Epiphanius’ numerical ordering of the heretics emanates equally from his own exhaustive yet mindfully incomplete knowledge of the world of heresy:

I mean that I have composed a description and refutation of <eighty> sects, and at the same time, as far as my human frailty permitted, revealed what goes on in each. For this is the end of my full account of the origins and causes of the eighty sects I have been told of, and whose number and names I know, and the formularies, proof-texts and positions of some of them.100

Because heresiology was an attempt, above all else, to manage the unmanageable, its rigid codification identifies a complex matrix of epistemological and compositional failure. By wading into the water of heretical infinitude, Epiphanius succumbs to the very same error that, as Barton noted, marks the absurdity of Plutarch’s interlocutor: how does one seek to impose order over that which allures us precisely because of its illogic, dissimilarity, and

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100 Epiphanius, Pan. 80.10.1-2. (Holl and Dummer, 3:497).
The formula of Song of Songs 6:8, the infinite perpetuity of heresy, provokes an even more fundamental question: what, in essence, are the heresies? By that I mean, the heresiological investigation ascribes certain theological, ritualistic, genealogical, philosophical, and exegetical qualities to “heretical being,” but the pedigree of the heretics is shrouded in liminality. Although heresiological discourse coalesced the entirety of the heretical “race” by means of an underlying epistemological arrogance, the heresiologists propounded divergent explanations of heresy’s origins and ascendancy. The vast differences between the heretical parties further reinforced the fact that the each sect was, despite being a member of a common genus, a unique species. But what is the relationship between the heretical genus and the created world? Are the heretics natural or unnatural phenomena? Are they divine or human? Predictable or random? Logical or illogical? Knowable or unknowable? What is their ontological core? How do they display the created world? How do they disrupt it?

The ethnographic orientation of heresiology thrusts heresy into two interdependent domains of epistemological consequence: heresy reflects both the laws of the natural world and the operations of the supernatural order. To that end, heresy’s ontological fluctuation between the world of men and the world of God explains its simultaneously controllable and yet elusive existence. It is, in one sense, discoverable and traceable, and, in another, beyond the bounds of the human mind. Its uncontrollability is a reflection of its essential duality. And while one solution to the problem of the heretics’ dualistic ontology is to naturalize them within the cosmological and theological inner workings of divine creation, the implications are, in fact, gravely problematic for the Christian project of ethnographic mapping, theological expansion, and ideological triumph.

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“But if the inhabitants were mute, perhaps the earth itself would speak to me. Over and above the marvels which had enchanted me along the river, perhaps it would answer my prayer and let me into the secret of its virginity. Where exactly does that virginity lie, behind the confusion of appearances which are all and yet nothing? I can pick out certain scenes and separate them from the rest; is it this tree, this flower? They might well be elsewhere. Is it also a delusion that the whole should fill me with rapture, while each part of it, taken separately, escapes me? If I have to accept it as being real, I want at least to grasp it in its entirety, down to its last constituent element.\footnote{I have followed the text of Claude Lévi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques, trans. John Weightman and Doreen Weightman (New York: Penguin Books, 2012), 333.}

- Claude Lévi-Strauss\footnote{I have followed the Latin text of Augustine, De Haeresibus in S. Aurelii Augustini Pars XIII, ed. R. Vander Plaetse and C. Beukers, CCSL 46 (Brepols: Turnhout, 1969), 286-345. In addition, I have more or less adhered to the translation of Heresies in Arianism and Other Heresies, ed. John E Rotelle and trans. Ronald J. Teske, The Works of St. Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century, vol. 1/18, (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1995), 15-77. The general attitude towards Augustine’s text, which I will discuss below in some detail, is fairly lackluster. His De Haeresibus is}

In positing a conceptual and discursive consonance between ethnographic writing in the ancient world and the genre of heresiology, I have drawn particular attention to the problem of heresiological comprehension and closure. The previous chapter demonstrated that Epiphanius himself contemplated the boundless depths of the heretical world precisely as he navigated efforts to circumvent this entrenched predicament. My point was not that the Panarion failed to enact or realize its full-scale plan, but rather that its author actively pondered the problem of heretical profusion in terms of textual and authorial abilities to translate the world into words. In this chapter I wish to explore the application and internalization of ethnographic writing, using Augustine’s long-neglected De Haeresibus as my primary example.
Though Augustine’s text eschews any sort of ethnographic overlay—it lacks a master narrative of macroscopic design—the text reveals and foregrounds the process of translating ethnographic information into pertinent, tactile knowledge. In terms of both its form and content, Augustine’s *De Haeresibus*, as a distillation of the heresiological genre into a ready-to-use handbook, illustrates not only the dogged difficulties of controlling the written word (by way of armchair ethnographic research), but also a perceptive authorial and ethnographic hesitation. The process of honing the heresiological enterprise induces Augustine to ask a series of pointed questions about the authorial capacity to research, write, and comprehend.

This chapter will proceed along two interrelated avenues. First, I will widen the scope of my inquiry to discuss the sources and methods that Augustine, Epiphanius and Theodoret deployed to manage the constraints of ordering and obtaining knowledge, including inter-

described as a mundane compendium of various sources, offering little in the way of original exposition. The text lacks, so its critics argue, any of Augustine’s impressive intellectual talents; instead, it presents itself as a stark and unoriginal amalgamation of sources. When scholars do cite it, they tend to use it as a comparative source or gloss rather than as a subject worthy of inquiry in its own right. By my reckoning there is not a single essay in the entire history of the journal *Augustinian Studies* devoted to *De Haeresibus*; a rather remarkable feat, I would argue. The judgment of Brent D. Shaw, “‘Who were the Circumcellions,’” in *Vandals, Romans and Berbers*, ed. A.H. Merrills (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 227-258, seems to linger. I shall return to his essay later in this chapter. Even G. Bardy’s classic essay on Augustine’s sources, “Le ‘De haeresibus’ et ses sources,” in *Miscellanea Agostiniana: Testi e Studi*, vol. 2, ed. G. Morin and A. Casamassaeds (Rome: Tipografia Poliglotta Vaticana, 1931), 397–416, very much assumes the text’s recapitulative nature. The text is studied for its sources, not for any sort of substantive contribution to the genre of heresiology. The judgment that the text as catalogue lacks originality is unfounded because it glosses over the immensely fraught process of heresiological compilation as well as ignores Augustine’s introductory and conclusionary remarks. There are some notable exceptions, which treat the text as worthy of studying for its own value (not as mere source or gloss in Augustine’s larger oeuvre): Liguori G. Müller, *The De Haeresibus of Saint Augustine: Translation, with Introduction and Commentary* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1956); Francesca Tasca, “‘Ecce Panis Haereticorum’: Diversità alimentari ed identità religiose nel ‘De haeresibus’ di Agostino,” *Augustinianum* 50.1 (2010): 233-253; Robert Dodaro, “‘Omnès haeretae negant Christum in carne uenisse’ (Aug., serm. 183.9.13): Augustine on the Incarnation as Criterion for Orthodoxy,” *Augustinian Studies* 38:1 (2007): 163-174; Judith McClure, “Handbooks against Heresy in the West, From the Late Fourth to the Late Sixth Centuries,” *Journal of Theological Studies* 30 (1979): 186-197; and Gian Ackermans, “Einige rechtliche und theologische Fragen zu den Abeloitae in Augustins *De Haresibus*,” in *Augustine, Manichaeism and other Gnosticism: Studies for Johannes van Oort at Sixty*, ed. Jacob Albert van den Berg, Annemari Kotzé, Tobias Nicklas, and Madeleine Scopello (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 123-138. Though Tasca’s essay falls into the category of glossed analysis—it uses *De Haeresibus* to consider more fully Augustine’s Sermon 183—it should be singled out if only because it is one of the few serious attempts to grapple with, however briefly, the remarkable prologue of the text.
The heresiologists harnessed the power of libraries, informants, experience, theological deference, divine intervention, and ethnographic theorization to keep their catalogues current and thus useful. To the extent that the success and viability of the genre was dependent upon continuously updating its content, it necessarily remained in a constant state of flux. While fixity of content was an elusive though pursued ideal, the persistent editing of heresiology was harnessed as evidence of the genre’s adaptability and strength. The genre did not lie dormant; it evolved with the times. In the second part of this chapter, precisely because there is a cyclical relationship between fissures within the genre’s conceptual framework and textual efforts to minimize these breaks—editing solves certain problems but creates new ones—I explore Augustine’s text as it performs, organizes, and explores the depths of its knowledge. In this section, I will argue that Augustine’s heresiological handbook evidences the process by which he adapted and updated the genre (the text is, as we shall see, an act of performative editing by which I mean that Augustine explains his editorial decisions explicitly as he writes his own text), while also pessimistically opining about the relationship between heresiological textuality and heretical reality. In asking how the world of heresy was translated into a specific textual form, I contend that the underlying logic of Augustine’s intellectual mapping is a quintessentially ethnographic construction. Augustine’s reflections about his work are not simply stylistic or

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3 I did discuss, briefly, in chapter three the implied effects of editing: that is, editing fit comfortably within the ideological perspective of totality and fully enumerated knowledge. Here, I am less interested in the language of totality than I am in demonstrating the relationship between textual construction, authorial subjectivity, and compiled knowledge.

4 If one subscribes to the notion that heresiology was, at some level, an attempt to situate and/or place the heretics within the Christian world, the heresiologists’ dependence upon divine intercession need not be read as a superfluous trope. If the heretics were the temporal manifestation of a demonic lineage, as Theodoret most explicitly proposed, it follows that God himself possesses the capacity to enhance human understanding. If the lineage of the heretics is more than just human—if it holds a tinge of supernatural ontology—the heresiologists require divine support and knowledge.
rhetorical; they are deeply unsettling questions about the ability of authors to describe and control in texts the world around them, to manage the disruptive potential of ethnographic excursion, and explain the problems of human unity and difference. In the latter instance, Augustine meditates, quite unsettlingly, on the inherent problem of words, language, and authorial subjectivity.\footnote{Augustine clearly falls into Roland Barthes’ description of the writer (and not the author). See Roland Barthes, “Authors and Writers,” in A Barthes Reader, ed. Susan Sontag (New York: Hill and Wang, 1983), 185-193. Augustine “posits a goal (to give evidence, to explain, to instruct) of which language is merely a means; for him language supports a praxis, it does not constitute one” (187). He is not actively writing the language of Christian ethnography, save in his effort to translate the disjunctive and discursive texts of Philaster and Epiphanius—sweeping ethnographies of heresy—into a digestible and updated form. But Augustine’s text, I would argue, aptly follows the ethnographic assumptions of the heresiological genre. And, critically, the text holds the same textual timidities and fissures as the more protracted investigations. The move to condense and distill heresiological knowledge pinpoints the discursive feedback loop of heresiological investigation and production. His text is trying to remain active in the world. It is trying to be relevant.}

\textit{Corrective Counting: Armchair Ethnography in Heresiology}

his knowledge and to cement his genre’s vitality and utility; after all, no one needs an obsolete heresiology! To the degree that Augustine introduces new heresies, eliminates some—he excludes all the Jewish sects found in the Anacephalaesosis of “Pseudo”-Epiphanius and in Philaster’s Diversorum hereseon liber—and modifies still others, he is honing the genre to rise to the challenge of an ever-diversifying heretical environment. By editing, citing, and referencing sources, the heresiologists improve their genre and reinforce its scholastic potency and relevancy. Inter-textual culling, above all else, is a solution to the problem of heresiological profusion and discordance. In peppering their treatises with myriad references to sources and reflecting upon their assiduous research, the heresiologists construct their textual labor with a substructure of labored scholasticism.

At the outset of the second Proem of the Panarion, Epiphanius reports concisely, if vaguely, on the sources he has culled and the methodological techniques he has employed in writing his textual curative. Much like Diodorus Siculus who heralds “that enthusiasm for the work which enables every man to bring to completion the task which seems impossible,” “a fondness for study (φιλομαθίας)” undergirds Epiphanius’ exposition. Epiphanius’ promulgation of a scholarly urge is a fitting rejoinder to the request “of beauty-loving persons (ἐξ ἀνδρῶν φιλοκάλων; i.e. scholars) who urged my weakness on at various times and in various ways, and practically forced me to get at it.” The request from the presbyters Acacius and Paul, which asked Epiphanius to share his knowledge of and teachings on the heretics,

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7 Later in this chapter I will discuss the specific inclusions and exclusions Augustine made with respect to his predecessors and contemporaries—Epiphanius, Philaster, Pseudo-Jerome, and Eusebius. At the outset, however, it is necessary to identify one major difference. Augustine omits any reference to Jewish or pagan/philosophical heresies. He includes only those heretical groups that fashion themselves as “Christians.”


serves both to test the bishop’s intellectual skill (the underlying supposition of their request: it takes a remarkable mind to complete a work of heresiology), and to validate his expertise (after all, they beseech Epiphanius, as I noted in the previous chapter). In writing his tome, he consulted an array of scholarly works, most notably Irenaeus’ *Adversus Haereses*, and cited the writings of his opponents at length. Hearsay and the occasional first-hand observation (“I happened on some with my own ears and eyes”) likewise complement his self-professed bookishness. While the next section of this chapter shall detail the specific manner in which

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11 Augustine, it should be noted, quotes from the *Anacphealaeoses* of Epiphanius once in each of his discussions of the (two sects of) Origenists (*De Haeresibus* 52.3-5 and 53.1-4 [Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 310]) and twice in his discussion of the Sabellians (*De Haeresibus* 51.19-20, 33-34 [Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 308]). He also cites Philaster during his description of the Sabellians (*De Haeresibus* 51.31-35 [Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 309]). Theodoret quotes Irenaeus once (*Haereticarum Fabularum Compendium* I.5 in Patrologia Graeca 83: 336-556, ed. J.P. Migne, 352D) and Clement once as well (*Haer.* 1.6; Migne, 353A-B). In each case, however, the citation is fairly terse. Epiphanius is the only heresiologist, as far as I can tell, who marshals his literary predecessors and opponents at great length. There is no parallel within the heresiological corpus on the order of Epiphanius’ appropriations from Irenaeus, Marcellus, George of Laodicea, Basil of Ancyra, Melitius, Ancoratus, Proclus, Methodius, Origen, Marcion, Turbo, Athanasius, and Aetius. For a heresiologist, his use of sources is unprecedented and, in the late antique world, unrepeated. The method and rise of patristic citation is a matter that has recently garnered some much-needed attention: see Mark Vessey, “The Forging of Orthodoxy in Latin Christian Literature: A Case Study,” *Journal of Early Christian Studies* 4 (1996): 495–513; Éric Rebillard, “A New Style of Argument in Christian Polemic: Augustine and the Use of Patristic Citation,” *Journal of Early Christian Studies* 8.4 (2000): 559-578.

12 Epiphanius, *Pan.* Prooemium II.2.5 (Holl, 1:170). See also his introduction to the Sethian sect: “I think I may have met with this sect in Egypt too—I do not precisely recall the country in which I met them. And I found out some things about it by inquiry in an actual encounter, but have learned other things from treatises” (*Pan.* 39.1.2 [Epiphanius, ed. Karl Holl and Jürgen Dummer, GCS 31 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1980), 2:72]). Much like the deft deployment of sources, polemical and evidentiary testimony alike, the heresiologist occasionally augments the accounts of sources with his firsthand, experiential knowledge. A jolt to bolster his credibility and strengthen his hand, Epiphanius, in his reportage on the Gnostics, quips that, “I happened on this sect myself, beloved, and was actually taught these things in person, out of the mouths of the people who really undertook them” (*Pan.* 26.17.4 [Holl, 1:297]). The rarity with which eyewitness testimony is invoked—by the heresiologist himself or by a source—is hardly dispositive as a recent ethnography was primarily a venture undertaken with written sources. Even as ideologically driven, polemically constructed treatises, heresiology’s evidentiary bona fides serve to demonstrate and enhance its mastery of the material at hand. Much emphasis, especially with respect to Augustine’s *De Haeresibus*, is placed on the collection and distillation of relevant material. Theodoret, also, trumpets his usage of sources and signals his genre’s dependence upon his intellectual antecedents and contemporaries. Heresiology does not exist in a vacuum of tradition. It is a work of compilation and construction. See the diagram of heresiological interdependence in Gérard Vallée, *A Study in Anti-Gnostic Polemic: Irenaeus, Hippolytus, and Epiphanius* (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1981), 6. Glenn Melvin Cope’s unpublished dissertation, “An Analysis of the Heresiological Method of Theodoret of Cyrus in the ‘Haereticarum fabularum compendium’” (PhD diss., Catholic University of America, 1990) ventures into a fairly detailed discussion of Theodoret’s sources—contesting, for example, Vallée’s claim that Theodoret was unaware of the
Augustine’s *De Haeresibus* conspicuously elaborated and performed the collection, augmentation, and emendation of heresiological knowledge, the genre itself, even before Augustine, fundamentally operated as a literary palimpsest, which amassed its capacity to know and refute in relationship to textual antecedents. Epiphanius’ extended citations from Irenaeus on the Valentinian and Marcosian heresies, together with oblique textual allusions to a predecessor, functioned jointly as the interpolation of his own work within a distinct (textual) discursive genealogy of heresiology.

While Hippolytus’s lost *Syntagma* and Irenaeus’ *Contra Omnes Haereses* served as the principal sources for the *Panarion*, there is evidence to suggest, based upon Epiphanius’ few explicit references and an analysis of textual parallels, that he consulted a number of other works, including Eusebius of Caesarea’s *Ecclesiastical History*, his *Chronicle* and *Praeparatio Evangelica*, the *Apostolic Constitutions*, an unnamed work of Clement of Alexandria, Philaster of Brescia’s *Diversarum Haereseon*, and the spurious thirtieth chapter of Tertullian’s *Praescriptio Haereticorum*, known as the work of Pseudo-Tertullian. The earlier heresiologies by Irenaeus

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Panarion, in which he posits that the Theodoret’s ambiguous references and citations reflect his methodological (and theological) interest. His Compendium is less an exhaustive survey of the heresiological world than an opportunity to turn the “classical” corruptions of the heretics into a tractate detailing orthodox opinion.

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I wonder to what extent the inter-textual knowledge of the heresiologists was unique in early Christian literary circles. By which I mean that the genre’s design and longevity were dependent upon an evolving tradition, both in relation to authors and authorial objects. Heresiology as a textual form was written in dialogue with its textual antecedents. Of course, others Christian literary forms evidenced inter-textual dialogue (adversus and apologetic literature come to mind), but heresiology evolved into a tradition that was defined by its collation and collection. For a useful parallel see the work of Ann M. Blair, *Too Much to Know: Managing Scholarly Information before the Modern Age* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), esp. 11-24 and 174-229.

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Richard Adelbert Lipsius, *Zur Quellengeschichte des Epiphanios* (Wien: W. Braumüller, 1865) offers the most systematic review of Epiphanius’ sources. Aline Pourkier, *L’hérésiologie chez Épiphane de Salamie* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1992), 53-75, surveys the literature more briefly (though, he juxtaposes the knowledge of the various sources throughout his work). It remains inconclusive whether the bishop knew any of Justin’s work (his lost *Syntagma*, the *Dialogue with Trypho*, and his *Apologies*) or the *Elenchos* of Hippolytus. Pourkier, 93-117, offers a systematic comparison between the works of Hippolytus and Epiphanius. On Justin’s reference to his lost work, *Against All the Schools of Thought That Have Arisen* (The *Syntagma*), see his *First Apology* 26. For the Greek text and a French translation, see *Justin: Apologie pour les chrétiens*, ed. and trans. Charles Munier, SC 507 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2006), 198-202. For more on Justin and heresiology, see David Brakke, *The Gnostics*, 105-111; Alain Le Boulluec, *La
and Hippolytus offered structural and organizational models—augmented as we saw in chapter two by the bishop’s proof-texts from Galatians, Colossians, and Song of Songs—for Epiphanius’ historical-geographical-genealogical master narrative. In addition, a far greater variety of texts—some heresiological, others not—provided substantive data about the various sectarian groups he contested. Composed over layers of heresiological tradition (in consultation with an array of available texts), Epiphanius subsumes, rejects, and edits the works of his forebears and contemporaries to suit his own theological, stylistic, and rhetorical needs. It is a text that assimilates its data within a structural edifice of ethnographic theorization.

Epiphanius balanced his need for evidentiary corroboration—his textual dependency—against his own claims of authorial mastery and control. His text is no mere compilation or catalogue, but instead, it is a highly ordered and unprecedentedly structured ethnographic categorization, at once macroscopically theorized and microscopically constructed. His text segues from his overarching master narrative into the nitty-gritty of lived heresy. What Epiphanius actually produced, however, was a polemical dialogue—or rather, a series of dialogues—between Christianity’s unity and diversity, which was modulated through Epiphanius’ narrative structure “with the help of other people’s words, created and distributed specifically as the words of others.” The Panarion’s polyvocality, the marshaling of “orthodox” sources alongside the presentation of quotations from the heretics’ themselves—is harmonized via Epiphanius’ biblical prooftext and ethnographic model. His universalizing genealogy is corroborated and realized through the words of his Christian brethren and heretical foes alike.

15 See the brief remarks of Frank Williams, trans. The Panarion of Epiphanius of Salamis: Book I (Sects 1-46) (Boston: Brill, 2009), xxv-xxvii.

16 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, ed. and trans. Caryl Emerson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 188.
Bakhtin draws a pertinent parallel in his analysis of the dialogical relationship between the
authorial voice and his sources. “A scholarly article,” writes Bakhtin:

where various authors’ utterances on a given question are cited, some for
refutation and others for confirmation and supplementation—is one instance of
a dialogic interrelationship among directly signifying discourses within the
limits of a single context. The relationships of agreement/disagreement,
affirmation/supplementation, question/answer, etc., are purely dialogic
relationships, although not of course between words, sentences, or other
elements of a single utterance, but between whole utterances. In dramatic
dialogue or a dramaticized dialogue introduced into the author’s context, these
relationships link together represented, objectified utterances and therefore are
themselves objects. 17

The incorporation and expression of various forms of textual disposition erects the contours of
heresiology’s textual dialogue. In letting the heretics, on occasion, speak for themselves,
Epiphanius illustrates the simplicity of his endeavor: exposure is sufficient to demonstrate his
victory. But the genre’s singular authorial position is, in fact, a push-and-pull between
appropriation and separation. Epiphanius’ usage of extended quotations from the heretics
themselves, not only valorizes his own investigative efforts—“to show all studious persons
who are in search of truths of faith that I do not accuse people without reason, but do my best
to base what I say on reliable evidence”—it also enables him to insist on the radical disjuncture
between his own voice and those of his opponents. 18 With passages from Ptolemy, Marcion,
Origen (from his commentary on the first Psalm), Arius, Marcellus, Basil of Ancyra, George of
Laodicea, Acacius, Melitius, Aetius, the Gnostic texts Ascents of James and the Travels of Peter, a
Gospel According to the Hebrews, and the Book of Elkasai, Epiphanius, more than any other late

17 Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, 156.

18 Epiphanius, Pan. 73.23.1 (Holl and Dummer, 3:296).
antique heresiologist, turns the heretics’ own writings against them. As Irenaeus succinctly put it, “indeed, the very manifestation of their doctrine is a victory against them.” The heresiological voice, above all else, hinges on its ability to navigate the heretical world via an authenticated and appropriated knowledge: “a given work can be the product of a collective effort, it can be created by the successive efforts of generations, and so forth—but in all cases we hear in it a unified creative will, a definite position, to which it is possible to react dialogically.”

Theodoret, who acknowledges at the start of his treatise his personal debt to Justin, Irenaeus, Clement, Origen, “Eusebius the Palestinian and [Eusebius] the Phoenician,”

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19 Epiphanius, Pan. 31.5.1-6.10; 32.4.4-5.6; 33.3.1-7.10; 42.1-78; 64.6.1-7.4, 12.1-16.7; 66.6.1-6.11, 25.3-31.8; 69.7.2-8.5; 72.2.1-3.5; 73.2.1-22.8; 76.11.1-12.37. In acknowledging his Panarion’s literary dependence upon the writings of Irenaeus, Hippolytus, Clement and others earlier Christian writers, Epiphanius underscores the continuity and tension within the textual tradition of heretical refutation. Heresiology, in its later iterations, bore the mark of a genre in tension with itself. Authors not only edited their texts numerically, they considered the structural mechanisms by which the undertaking could be limited, including scriptural strictures and efforts to define in precise terms the meaning of heresy. As I explained in chapter one, the Panarion assumed as its modus operandi a heresiological style that was oriented around an orthodox curative for the disease of heresy. J. Rebecca Lyman, “Epiphanius on Orthodoxy,” in Orthodoxy, Christianity, History, eds. Susanna Elm, Éric Rebillard, and Antonella Romano (Rome: École Française de Rome, 2000), 149-161, has argued that Epiphanius’ choice of therapeutic rhetoric signifies a paradigmatic shift in the heresiological worldview. By the fourth-century, she contends that the genre, “reflects a particular social and spiritual assertion of theological authority,” in which Epiphanius wields the stable, calm, unyielding power of orthodoxy as the cure to the now internal (i.e. ecclesiastical) error of heresy (154). The move away from “philosophical competition which highlighted opposing arguments or intellectual genealogies,” toward a model of “natural history and medical handbook for the identification, cure, and prevention of error in the church,” demonstrates the Panarion’s prioritization of veridical obedience (to orthodoxy) over the discovery of truth (vis-à-vis the heretics) (154). Because the Panarion is not an investigation of truth per se, but an attempt to excise and demolish untruths from within the church, delimited now by creedal (i.e. Nicene) norms, Lyman distinguishes heresiological obedience from an interest in persuasion: the latter applied to the second-century world of Irenaeus with its diffusion of churches and the problem of choice, while the former now engulfs the singular orthodox. On the difference from Irenaeus, Lyman writes, “the individual needed therefore to be protected from wrong choice (haireisis) by being convinced of true teaching about the nature of God or armed with arguments in order to meet the challenged of multiple teachers” (156). Having conceded the reality of endemic Christian heresy, most notably with Origen and Apollinarius, Epiphanius is “unable to exclude them by a separate genealogy...instead [he] identified their intellectual and spiritual weakness which led to the illness within the church” (155).


21 Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, 184.
Adamantius, Rhodon, Titus, Diodore, and George, concludes his discussion of a number of the heresies—by my count there are seventeen unmistakable instances—with generalized references to alternative sources of refutation. In the fourth chapter of Book III, for example, “Concerning Novatus,” his brief narrative about the rise of the Novatians (or Cathari as they were also known) ends with a brief addendum: “Cornelius wrote many letters against this heresy, and Dionysius, bishop of Alexandria [wrote] many, also many other of the bishops at that time [wrote].” He mentions Origen on nine occasions, Irenaeus on nine as well, Clement six times, Dionysius of Alexandria five, and Eusebius of Emesa at three junctures. And while these references to sources skew toward the chronologically earlier heresies—those tackled by Justin, Origen, and Clement—a sparse handful of the (later) contemporary heresies—the Meletians, and the Messalians (the Euchites and Enthusiasts)—find themselves the recipients of these referential coda. Furthermore, Theodoret does invoke and cite the testimony of

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22 Theodoret, *Haer. Praef.* (Migne, 340A). He also notes a personal familiarity with the heretical practices of a ninety-year-old man, who, following as a devotee of Marcion, reports that he rose “at dawn, washed his own face with a larger amount of spittle, and having been asked the reason for this said that he did not want to be indebted to the Demiurge, by receiving water from the things created by that one. But those who were present asked: how can you eat, or drink, or dress, or sleep, or discharge the mysteries that you believe? Answering from absurdity, he said that he did that because it was not possible to live nor to celebrate the mysteries any other way. That mad man confessed, against his will, that he held that nothing was called good of itself, but all the good things are derived from the things made by the Demiurge” (*Haer.* I.24 [Migne, 376B-C]).

23 Theodoret, *Haer.* III.5 (Migne, 408C).


25 Theodoret, *Haer.* IV.7 (Migne, 425B); *Haer.* IV.11 (Migne, 432C).
Irenaeus and Clement, the former in the case of Carpocrates and the latter with respect to Prodicus, as unimpeachable witnesses to the authentic teachings of the heretics. He follows closely Eusebius of Caesarea’s account of Simon Magus, without citing it or even alluding to it, and augments his description with details from Clement. Theodoret never explicates his rationale for the inclusion of general references, beyond conceiving his text as a compendium or summary (rather than as a florilegium of heresiological citations) to alternative refutations. Insofar as Theodoret’s descriptions appear to be curt, banal, and largely mundane rehearsals of well-tread material, the descriptions of the heresies are but a means to his end: They stand as the necessary corollary for the larger aim of his project, its theology of orthodoxy, thematically ordered in the second half of his treatise.

Theodoret fashions the first four books of his Compendium as a polemically descriptive account of the heresies: “for I have not undertaken to refute them for the present.” As a process of collecting, collating, and concisely summarizing the “scattered compositions” of his textual antecedents, Theodoret plies his heresiological trade as an editor. He indicts and lauds the failures and successes of his Christian colleagues (just as he denounces the errors of his religious opponents), at turns excising sources and embellishing the data of others, in the arbitration of heresy and the heretical legacy. But the specific content of the heresies

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26 Theodoret, Haer. I.4 (Migne, 352D); Haer. I.4 (Migne, 353A-B).

27 Cope’s dissertation, “An Analysis of the Heresiological Method of Theodoret of Cyrus in the ‘Haereticarum fabularum compendium,’” 68-73, ventures into a fairly detailed discussion of Theodoret’s sources—contesting, for example, Vallée’s claim that Theodoret was unaware of the Panarion, in which he posits that the Theodoret’s ambiguous references and citations reflect his methodological (and theological) interest. His Compendium is less an exhaustive survey of the heresiological world than an opportunity to turn the “classical” corruptions of the heretics into a tractate detailing orthodox opinion.

28 Perhaps his unspecific references would have been well known to his readers or, perhaps, he is simply summarizing. I presume that the inclusion of oblique references serve as a justification for his brief, if not altogether cursory, attention to the heresies themselves.

29 Theodoret, Haer. Preface (Migne, 340B).
constitutes only one frontier of the genre’s full-frontal polemic, as instances of heretical anonymity and vapid description (i.e. devoid of real content) evidence. The heresiologies refine their project’s mastery and command of the Christian world with the mere decision to include or exclude the heresies. In attempting to define or even grasp the contents of the heretical world both positively and negatively, they adjudicate the legitimacy and determine, in a wickedly ironic sense, which heresies will live and which will die.

The various techniques by which Epiphanius refashioned the problem of heresy, as his textual medium translates a Christian phenomenon into a universal history (or narrows a universal history into a distinctly Christian vernacular), instantiate a self-corrective process in which this discursive genealogy of writing heresy turns in on itself to innovate, reassess, adapt, and redeploy its resources, style, structure, and substance. The textual interplay, implicit and explicit, positive or negative, between Tertullian, Epiphanius, Augustine, Irenaeus, Hippolytus, and Theodoret unfolds as the incorporation of this literary body into a mutually reliant, adaptive, and ever-expanding traditio haereticorum. The process of editing intertwines textual production and epistemological capacities of texts themselves and the heresiologists. The heresiologists, indeed, undertake their overt textual augmentations and erasures to perform the expansiveness of their knowledge. Augmentation is a sign of textual progression and advancement, even as it illumines omissions, errors, and shortcomings. The betterment of the

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30 This argument, moreover, is not absent from Epiphanius’ text. Consider his remarks following a lengthy citation of Methodius on Origen’s fallacious theological opinions: “This is the selection of consecutive passages which I have made from Methodius, or Eubulius’, comments on Origen and the heresy which, with sophistical imposture, Origen puts forward in his treatise on resurrection. I believe that my quotation of these passages here will take care of his silly teachings, and refute this destruction of men’s hope for life with a malignant growth which has been taken from pagan superstition and plastered over. For many other things—surely even as many more—were also said in his follow-up of the subject by Methodius, a learned man and a hard fighter for the truth. But since I have promised to say a few things in its refutation about every sect—there are not a few of them—I am satisfied with quoting Methodius’ work [only] this far. And I, of my poverty, shall add a few more comments of my own on Origen’s nonsense and conclude the contest with him, awarding the prize to God who gives us the victory and, in his lovingkindness, adorns his church at all times…” (Pan.64.63.1-4 [Holl and Dummer, 2:500]).
genre, from the heresiologists’ perspective, reinforces its comprehensive foundations. The tradition of heresiology is building itself and amassing its potency as it strives to foreclose the contours of its theological object. The culling of heresiological resources (and the “data” contained therein) simultaneously dichotomizes the heresies by transferring through textual exclusion (invalidity) or inclusion (legitimacy) only certain heresies into the vernacular and discourse of the Christian world. The persistent updating, both the casting aside and seeming resurrection, of the sources defines heretical legitimacy, even if the legacy of the heresies is expressly contained or entirely extinct. Later heresiology strives to compile an accurate record: to get the facts straight, as it were, by correct counting. The veracity of heresiology’s data reinforces the genre’s utility and authority as a traditional font of Christian learning.

There is, however, one corollary to this corrective endeavor, which I alluded to in chapter four. As these texts race to know their objects, their authors are likewise mired in a quest in which they struggle to digest and apprehend the value of their endeavor, its feasibility, and the limits of their function as servants of Christ. In their position as pastoral caretakers, the heresiologists managed the information at their disposal with a dual mandate: reveal and restrict. Indeed, even as Epiphanius valiantly attempted to prove his dexterity with pronouncements about his diligent scholasticism, references to sources, and overflowing admiration for his heresiological predecessors, the fear of overexposing the heretics remained a looming concern. While heresiology served to protect its readers from the disease of heresy by means of identificatory and curative knowledge, the bishop of Salamis, like Hippolytus, Tertullian, and Theodoret, ensures his audience’s protection by consciously restricting the flow of heretical information: “and so as not to do more harm than good by making their proof-texts public, I am going to omit most of them—otherwise I would cite all their wicked
sayings and go through them here.”

Having canvassed the heretical topography, the heresiologists fashioned their textual redactions as legitimate outgrowths of their authorial obligations. In distilling the heretics down to their essence and sparing their readers the most corruptive, blasphemous minutiae, the heresiologists provided their readers the instruments by which they could comprehend and combat the heretics without compromising their texts’ overarching efficacy.

Maneuvers to restrict the reception of heretical knowledge signal a breach in totalization of heretical knowledge only at the level of text’s reception and absorption. And although certain knowledge about the heretics was withheld from readers, the knowledge itself was neither concealed nor unknown; it had been dutifully collected, processed, and interpreted by the heresiologists. When Theodoret revisits the findings of the first book of his Compendium, he frames his excisions as comported in a way that still serves his readers:

> What off-shoots the most bitter root of Simon sprouted forth and what destructive fruits these [heretics] produced, we clearly demonstrated in the first book, abbreviating the extent of the fables as far as it was possible, and being terrified to mention the greatest of [their] blasphemies, but indeed handing over to silence both the most impure and the most loathsome [matters] of [their] most polluted works. For we believed that we would offend our readers if we taught these things to the unlearned; for neither did the people who were completely enslaved to luxuries take the things dared by those heretics into their thoughts.

While Theodoret unrepentantly emphasizes the cautionary measures he has taken to restrict the most nefarious of heretical details, his editorial hand operates from a position of intellectual strength. His excisions reflect the stages of the heresiological construction.

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31 Epiphanius, Pan. 26.9.1 (Holl, 1:285).

32 Theodoret, Haer. II, Prologue (Migne, 384A-B’ altered from Cope).

33 During his discussion of Eunomius and Aetius, Theodoret omits a report of a certain heretical rite, which he describes as an abomination. It is sufficient, he informs his readers, to know that such an abomination exists, but
Although the preparatory labor of the investigative process is encyclopedic, its textual manifestation has been calculatingly delimited. In order to erect theological safeguards, Epiphanius and Theodoret had elected to curtail the scope of their treatises. Heresiological redaction was framed as a deliberative act of dutiful protection that preserved the vaunted rhetorical posturing of heresiological literature. The protective responsibility that necessitated the redaction of heresiology presumed the expertise and labor of its progenitors. Since the texts’ omissions were, in fact, commissions, the heresiologists’ reputation as tireless investigators remained fixed to the supposition that editing followed expertise. Paradoxically, totality—the quest to be exhaustive—necessitated brevity.34 If the whole world is to be surveyed, it must be condensed. The acknowledged limits of heresiology were a reflection of authorial judgment and choice. It was not lack of knowledge that defined down the scope of Theodoret’s inquiry, but a defensive inclination to maximize potency and minimize peril. Authorial excisions distill the difficulties of heresiological knowledge into a principled stand of intellectual legitimacy that sustains its comprehensive aspirations.

Distilling Ethnography: Listing Heretics in Text

The earliest treatises on the heretics, by Hippolytus, Irenaeus, and Tertullian, aimed their polemics principally against “Gnostic” formulations of cosmology and Christology and Marcionite hermeneutics and theology. In this first stage of heresiology’s development, authors stressed the principles of tradition and apostolicity as the measures of theological truth, ecclesiastical authority, and pedagogical legitimacy. As the heresiologists attacked their enemies they simultaneously propounded their own doctrines of ecclesiology, cosmology, anthropology, epistemology, and Christology; negative attacks conditioned positive theological reflection and elaboration. When Epiphanius composed his Panarion in the late fourth century, after nearly a century and a half of the genre’s general dormancy, the text’s discursive lens, while continuing to channel the heresiological language established by Irenaeus and Hippolytus, defined its inquiry of heresy through the language of medicine and a specificity scope; the Panarion’s rhetoric explicitly embraced the language of enumeration. Because this second stage of heresiology reported a massive increase in the sheer volume of heresies, it began to produce lists. As catalogues of heretical names, the works of the later


36 This is most clearly illustrated in the Panarion’s concluding section, De Fide, a celebration of the Church as God’s one dove of Song of Songs and, more systematically, in the concluding section of Theodoret’s bipartite heresiological treatise, which explicitly casts an ordered knowledge of the heretics alongside a similarly ordered knowledge of orthodox opinion.

heresiologists, Epiphanius, Philaster of Brescia, Augustine, and Theodoret signified a new rubric of circumscribed identification and exposition.\textsuperscript{38}

Brent Shaw summarizes the tactical and stylistic developments of later heresiology as signifying a move away from protracted investigation toward ease of identification: “Rather than the extensive and detailed theological treatise, therefore, it is the ‘heresy list’ that is the characteristic document of this second age...The lists were meant to provide quick ‘identity profiles’ by which interested believers could recognize any one of the variegated host of enemies that the orthodox faced.”\textsuperscript{39} In describing Augustine’s Book of Heresies (\textit{Liber de haeresibus}) Shaw further emphasizes its lack of ingenuity. As an assemblage of sources—a work of editing rather than erudition—the text is, in Shaw’s estimation, “a turgid list that lacks the verve and genius of the author, and which betrays on every page that it is not much more than a re-canned work quickly put together from other existing sources.”\textsuperscript{40} Though we might temper Shaw’s general characterization of later heresiological, and Augustine in particular, his remarks do importantly foreground the development of heretical listing.\textsuperscript{41} But unlike Shaw, who associates the banality of heresiology with its practice of devising lists, I contend that the list as a form captures the centrality and paradox of heresiological exactitude and the rhetoric of containment. Augustine’s \textit{De Haeresibus} is surely a list—or perhaps more accurately a

\textsuperscript{38} J. Rebecca Lyman, “Epiphanius on Orthodoxy,” in Elm, Rebillard, and Romano, 149-161, makes this point expressly.

\textsuperscript{39} Brent Shaw, “Who were the Circumcellions,” in \textit{Vandals, Romans and Berbers}, ed. A.H. Merrills (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 233.

\textsuperscript{40} Shaw, “Who were the Circumcellions,” in A.H. Merrills, 238.

\textsuperscript{41} However one judges the literary and intellectual qualities of heresiology’s “listing tradition” (Shaw, 239), it is important to consider—as Shaw does—the ways in which the list’s content was altered and modified. Shaw suggests that the form of the list—its literary clarity and adaptability—eased the reception of Augustine’s modifications (about the Circumcellions). That is, in hewing to the character of an externally produced genre (from Epiphanius, Philaster, and the \textit{Indiculus}) Augustine can update the list without, so it seems, any sense of disruption. In other words, he plays with the elision between the form and content of the list.
catalogue—and it falls within the tradition of the ancient handbook. At the same time, the move from ethnography to list—to condensation of ethnographic knowledge—does not simplify the task of the heresiologist; in point of fact, it magnifies the genre’s conceptual plan to map the whole of the heretical world. The desired finitude and exactitude of catalogues of the heretics—the so-called controlling force of textualized knowledge—entangles the heresiologists in the vicissitudes of a world whose very scope and shape render it a complex and elusive object of inquiry. As the investigation of the heretical world is forever evading the gaze of the heresiologists, the process of inventorying the heretics exposes the genre’s weakness. The heresiologists are enveloped by a world that demands unceasing attention, and yet that very attention—the ethnographic gaze of the heresiologists—forces these authors to reflect on the conceptual and practical impediments to the completion of their task.

If writing can be “a locational sorting device,” lists commemorate, memorialize, enumerate, account, and order through classification.


concepts by “defining a ‘semantic field,’ since it includes some items and excludes others.”

The list presents information through an organized system or principle, by which readers locate and retrieve data readily (the reference function) or grasp meaning through the fact of arrangement (a specific impression). The nonliterary list, governed by its utilitarian or pragmatic function, presents information in a practically ordered form. The literary list, which may contain “an inner logic of form” and leave it unexpressed, unfolds at the whims and imaginings of its authors. It induces us to speculate about its possible significance and hypothesize its organizing principle (it is less a search for specific knowledge than an opportunity to devise meaning and purpose).

The literary list, unmoored from obligations of formalism, declared meaning, and exactitude, holds the potential to fashion and refashion

44 Goody, The Domestication of the Savage Mind, 103.

45 Belknap, The List, 3. Ivan M. Havel, “Time in Lists and Lists in Time,” in Doležalová, identifies six typical characteristics of lists: (1) artificiality (they are constructed); (2) significance (they hold meaning); (3) “the existence of a carrier” (its medium of transmission) (4) ordering; (5) dynamics (the features of adaptability), which includes six sub-types: insertion, deletion, modification, sorting, combining, and splitting; and (6) accessibility of its items based on enumeration or naming, content, or position (10).

46 Lists were fostered, in Jack Goody’s analysis, by the economic, institutional (or bureaucratic) needs of the earliest literate societies. Scribal activities and literary exploration or “play,” pushed the governmental, cosmological, zoological, botanical, religious, and lexical usages of the form. The binarism originally proposed by Jack Goody and Ian Watt, “The Consequences of Literacy,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 5.3 (1963): 304-345 between alphabetic literacy, as embodied in ancient Greek civilization, and all other societies, both literate and not (later expanded and slightly modified in Goody’s The Domestication of the Savage Mind), posits that the advent of writing marks a radical cognitive change within social formations (and their institutional structures). Though Goody concedes that formalized tables and/or lists were not consequences solely of the social or cultural introduction of writing, he is nonetheless adamant that, “the shift from utterance to text led to significant developments of a sort that might be loosely referred to as a change in consciousness and which in part arose from the great extension of formal operations of a graphic kind” (Goody, Domestication, 75). Goody and his scholarly progeny have come under fierce criticism for perpetuating, it is claimed, a variant of the ethnocentric divide posited between primitive and civilized; that is, Goody and Watt’s binary of orality/literacy became, in the words of Masao Miyoshi, Off Center: Power and Culture Relations Between Japan and the United States (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), “a new shelter for ethnocentricity” (51). And while the presence of lists, in their administrative, lexical, and event capacity, may well speak to evolutions in writing, lists in the ancient world also evidence a deeply oral tradition. Perhaps the most famous ancient list is Homer’s catalogue of the ships in his Iliad. Without taking sides in questions about Homeric authorship and the poem’s redaction into a written text, the performative quality of the list remains potent and undeniable. See, now, Benjamin Sammons, The Art and Rhetoric of the Homeric Catalogue (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

47 This fits within Belknap’s, The List, 18-20, observation about the power of the author who compiles her list. Similarly, expandability and aesthetic choice are not mutually exclusive ideals (Belknap, The List, 31).
itself as it unfolds. The dual nature of the list, wherein it holds contents and the contents hold the list together, attenuates the fixity of the list by eliding form and function.\(^4^8\) Because “the list is simultaneously the sum of its parts and the individual parts themselves,”\(^4^9\) the association between terms imbues the list’s members with an additional meaning or legitimacy only the whole list can supply.

The eighty-eight heresies of Augustine’s *De Haeresibus* exist as a measure of both distinction and unification, and their collapse into a single document identifies the twin foci of the field of inquiry: “By accretion, the separate units cohere to fulfill some function as a combined whole, and by discontinuity the individuality of each unit is maintained as a particular instance, a particular attribute, a particular object or person.”\(^5^0\) The particularities of each sectarian group evidence the microscopic accretions of heresiological knowledge, while the structural edifice itself, born of collation and collection, defines the macroscopic field of inquiry: the fashioning of an ordered world of Christianity. Writing in his *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*, Michel Foucault describes the historical process of “a general science of order” (*mathesis*) an “arrangement of identities and differences into ordered tables” (*taxanomia*).\(^5^1\) The configuration of knowledge developed its own scientific discourse, which questions not only “the origin of knowledge” but its very power to

\(^4^8\) If a list is, as Francis Spufford, *Cabbages and Kings*, has suggested, “only a name for something completely determined by what is put in it, like a paragraph,” form follows content (?) And yet, in organizing and defining categories and classes of information, the function of a list is expressly bound to its blurring of its textual form and textual content. I would argue that there is a false dichotomy, then, between the form and function of the list.


\(^5^0\) Belknap, *The List*, 15.

systematize the natural world: “the sciences always carry within themselves the project, however remote it may be, of an exhaustive ordering of the world; they are always directed, too, towards the discovery of simple elements and their progressive combination; and at their centre they form a table on which knowledge is displayed in a system contemporary with itself.”

The plan to organize in texts the heresies of the world assumes the language of scientific exactitude, constructed by a professional class. If, as Belknap has phrased it, “the list form is the predominant mode of organizing data relevant to human functioning in the world,” Augustine’s determination to list the heretics bespeaks an effort to manage the content of Christianity’s world; it is a text that aspires to aid and orient the Christian self within a world of enemies and temptations. To the extent that the augmentative adaptability of listing governs the general structure of later iterations of heresiological literature, it complements the genre’s persistent claims of ever-improving comprehension. The history of heresiology evidences the compositional process by which the genre’s authors refined and expanded its polemical trajectory. Textual additions and subtractions hold the capacity not only to solidify a list’s utilitarian force by expanding its inventory, but also to destabilize its

52 Foucault, The Order of Things, 73.

53 Foucault, 71–76, at 74. While his analysis traces the discontinuity of thought between intellectual cultures of the 16th and 17th centuries, Foucault’s analysis points toward the natural inclination toward the organization of knowledge. His description of a rigorous scientific project of rethinking knowledge and in precise mathematical and philosophical terms, points to a universal method of analysis (56–57). When he writes that, “taxonomia…treats of identities and differences; it is the science of articulations and classifications; it is the knowledge of beings…taxonomia establishes the table of visible differences” (74), he signals, I think, the broader, and less historically contingent, production of sciences of organization. In the Classical Age, they take on a schematized hew of tabulation and calculation, while in earlier cultural moments theories of temporality, ethnogenesis, and mythography provide the same structures of naturalized order.

54 Belknap, The List, 8. The stages by which the list is conceived, constructed, and honed reflect the stakes and possibilities attending the ordered transmission of knowledge. But even as the pragmatic list signals its potentiality to expand by incorporating and accumulating additional content, it denotes its purview by editing and excising. But as the list fluctuates between the obligations of its content and the capaciousness of its form, it negotiates the limits of its adaptability. See Havel, “Time in Lists and Lists in Time,” in Doležalová, 9–11.
comprehension by emphasizing its inconstancy and adaptability; incompleteness undercuts authority. However much the rhetoric of a progressive “scientific” truth—the expression of heresiology’s methodical enhancement—attempts to foreclose a field of knowledge, the push toward a textual conclusion, as the inter-textual workings of heresiology so aptly signal, discloses the partial accumulations and ruptures within the author’s presentation of

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See János M. Bak, “Lists in the Service of Legitimation in Central European Sources,” in Doležalová, 34-45. One particular function of the list, the attestation of inheritance and transmission, is predicated upon the precision of the agents or terms of its succession. Chains of tradition, biological lineages, and genealogies of knowledge may possess and present degrees of mutability, and therein lie their danger. They are susceptibility to manipulation even if their terms are impossible to alter. Indeed, precisely because biological and political successions carry such immense ideological, theological, and political opportunity and potential, they emerge as sites of immense complication, contestation, and inexactitude. On political effects of the list, see Kenneth Sisam, “Anglo-Saxon Royal Genealogies,” Proceedings of the British Academy 39 (1953): 287-348. The problematic nature of listing—the ability to introduce error—is explicitly considered by Epiphanius at the outset of the Panarion. As a precursor to the full-fledged enumeration of the Christian heresies, Epiphanius comments in the second Proem of his Panarion on the requisite exactitude of a particular list. In the midst of his presentation of the age of Judaism in the Panarion, Epiphanius acclaims the correction of a mistake within a genealogical list. His readers, he reflects, “must feel relieved at once, at having regained the wording which, because of an ambiguity, certain ignorant persons have removed from the text with the intent of improving it” (Pan. 8.8.1 [Holl, 1:194]). In his elaboration of the Jewish sect (before detailing its seven individual groupings), Epiphanius narrates a condensed biblical history of the Jews: he explains their origin, the united monarchy under David and Solomon, the separation between Judah and Israel, the exile into Babylon, and the return under Ezra. He digresses, however, in his list of the Jewish kings to address and dispel a genealogical error, one that upends the infallibility to scripture. In fact, the error of one list—the succession of the kings of Judah and Israel—triggers the more damaging error a second list, the genealogy of Christ (Pan. 8.7.7-10 [Holl, 1:193-4]). When Epiphanius resumes his treatment of Judaism, after he interrupted his initial discussion with a discussion of the Hellenistic philosophies, the Israel’s genealogy picks up with Nashon, whose descendants are tracked down to Rehoboam, David’s grandson. The ensuing narrative—a greatest hits of Israel’s biblical history—offers another list: a catalogue of the twenty seven (counted as twenty two) books of Scripture (Pan. 8.6.1-4 [Holl, 194-5]). The generations up until Christ, as enumerated by the evangelist Matthew, follow three divisions of fourteen: from Abraham to David, David until the captivity, and from the captivity until Christ (Matthew 1:1-17; Epiphanius, Pan. 8.8.2 [Holl, 1:194]). Epiphanius fears that a deviation from this tripartite division against the text of Matthew functions to enervate the infallibility of scripture. The two generations of Jeconiah, which Epiphanius places in the third sequence (he ends the second and begins the third for Matthew), have been inexactly collapsed into one (Epiphanius, Pan. 8.8.2-3 [Holl, 1:194-5]): “By removing the one name as though for scholarship’s sake (ὡς κατὰ φιλοκαλίαν) certain persons ignorantly made the promise (which is implied in the text) come short of its purpose with regard to the total of the fourteen names, and destroyed the regularity of the arrangement (καὶ τὸ πολύπειρον τῆς σχέσεως ἡράνθουσαν; Epiphanius, Pan. 8.8.4 [Holl, 1:195]).” As the precise and rightful sequence of Christ’s genealogical list reasserts an imperative theological contention, Epiphanius’ corrective actually embellishes as quashes the problematic flexibility of the list. In trying, however, to concretize the list’s successive lineage by parsing and fixing an ambiguity of Scripture, the language of scholastic investigation, properly executed by the hands of the bishop, ultimately ensures the list’s propriety and closure.
comprehensive knowledge.\textsuperscript{56} To try and order knowledge of the heretics is, as Augustine discovers, to trace an illusion of infinite varieties.

In late 427, Quodvultdeus, a deacon at Carthage and later the city’s bishop, wrote Augustine, requesting his pedagogical guidance.\textsuperscript{57} The deacon inquired if the bishop of Hippo might compose a treatise that instructs “both the learned and the uneducated, for those with leisure and for those who are busy,” how to function in a world overrun by heresy.\textsuperscript{58}

I, therefore, beseech Your Goodness to deign to explain, from the time that the Christian religion received the name of the heritage it promised, what heresies existed and now exist, what errors they introduced and now introduce, what they have held and now hold in opposition to the Catholic Church concerning the faith, the Trinity, baptism, penance, Christ as man, Christ as God, the resurrection, the Old and New Testaments, and absolutely every point on which they disagree with the truth.\textsuperscript{59}

\textsuperscript{56} This, of course, is the opposite effect of the famous problem/condemnation of writing and memory as described by Plato (via Socrates) in the \textit{Phaedrus} 274b-279c, ed. and trans. Harold North Fowler, Loeb Classical Library 36 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1913), 560-579.


\textsuperscript{59} Quodvultdeus, \textit{Epistula} 221.2.20-30 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 273).
The shift toward listing in the second stage of heresiological literature emanates from the desire to impose order upon an unruly, chaotic field of inquiry; the move seeks to naturalize the scope and contents of this evolving branch of learning. Conceding that the task has been undertaken previously, by Augustine himself no less, Quodvultdeus stipulated a particular point of differentiation: “I ask that you briefly, succinctly, and summarily set forth the opinions of each heresy and add what the Catholic Church holds in opposition to them, in a single handbook, as it were, drawn from all of them, to the extent that it suffices for instruction.” Those seeking fuller answers could scour “the extensive and magnificent volumes” of Augustine and the other heresiologists; above all else, it was brevity that the deacon desired.

While Quodvultdeus impressed his correspondent by revealing “that [his] brilliant mind both thirsts for the truth about so many things and insists upon brevity out of fear of a surfeit,” Augustine initially protested, proposing instead that Quodvultdeus consult the work of Philaster of Brescia or undertake a Latin translation of Epiphanius’ treatise. And while Quodvultdeus acknowledged that the works of Philaster and Epiphanius had “escaped [his] notice,” he refused to withdraw his request. He pointedly suggests Augustine that the works

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60 Michel Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge*, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 62-63, 186-191; Foucault, *The Order of Things*, 50-58, 125-162. The latter section on classifying investigates the structures of knowledge in the Classical episteme (17th C.), wherein observation (as the most essential of the senses) functions, with certain limitations, as the domain of natural history.

61 Quodvultdeus, *Epistula* 221.3.34-38 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 274). On handbooks of heresy see J. McClure, “Handbooks Against Heresy in the West, from the Late Fourth to the Late Sixth Centuries.”

62 Quodvultdeus, *Epistula* 221.3.40 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 274).

63 Augustine, *De Haeresibus Praefatio* 4.47-49 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 287).

64 Augustine, *Epistula* 222 2.8-32 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 276-7).

65 Quodvultdeus, *Epistula* 223.2.17 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 278).
of Epiphanius and Philaster would fail the test of brevity, and he further conjectured that each of them had suffered from an insufficiently expansive scope and a deficiency of persistence: “I still do not think that they have observed such care and diligence that they added responses and included the practices contrary to each and every opinion.”

In arguing that the previous generation of heresiologists had failed to assiduously array the total output of the heresies, Quodvultdeus pressed Augustine to become the genre’s foremost expert and ply his intellect to produce an exhaustive report. The need to protect the feeble from the onslaught of the heresies, so it seems, ultimately persuaded Augustine to undertake the task requested of him.

For, as he admitted, “we cannot, after all, abandon such people in their troubles, for they are not only our tenants, but—what is more—our brothers and come under our care in the love of Christ.”

Acutely aware of the heresiological resources at his disposal, having suggested some to his interlocutor, Augustine composed his De haeresibus in consultation with four heresiological sources: the condensed summation of Epiphanius’ Panarion, the Anacephalaeoses or Recapitulations (now thought to belong to the pen of a different author, called Pseudo-Epiphanius); Eusebius’ Ecclesiastical History; Philaster of Brescia’s The Book of Diverse Heresies (Diversarum haeresion liber); and, most likely, Pseudo-Jerome’s Catalogue of Heresies (Indiculus de

66 Quodvultdeus, Epistula 223.2.18-21 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 278-9).

67 The threat is aptly summarized in James J. O’Donnell’s essay, “The Authority of Augustine,” Augustinian Studies 22 (1991): 7-35: “One need only read Augustine’s De Haeresibus, the catalogue he compiled late in life (based on a Greek source) (sic) of all the heresies known to him to get a sense of how fragile and threatened was his sense of church unity: so many ways to go wrong, such fine points leading to such disastrous error” (26 n.7).

68 Augustine, Epistula 224.3.41-44 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 281). His death in 430 would prevent him from completing the second part of his heresiological project: a discussion of what makes one a heretic. He gestures at this plan toward the end of the preface of De haeresibus: “The first part of this work will be about the heresies which arose against the teaching of Christ after his coming and ascension, insofar as we could get knowledge of them. But in the second part there will be a discussion of what makes one a heretic” (Praefatio 7.108-113).

69 On the author of the Anacephalaeoses, see Liguori G. Müller, The De Haeresibus of Saint Augustine, 23-25.
He openly admitted and discussed his reliance upon three of these works, mentioning Epiphanius by name on twenty-six occasions, Philaster on nine, and Eusebius on four. At times mimicking his textual antecedents and at times correcting or supplementing their presentation, Augustine dutifully enumerated eighty-eight heresies. Although Epiphanius’ heresiology supplied nearly sixty-five percent of the data for Augustine’s treatise, the Panarion was not an immutable precedent; it was subject to augmentation, supplementation, wholesale rejection, and reinterpretation:

In listing (in commemorandis) the heretics, I have not followed his manner, but his order, for I have from other sources added some things that he did not have, and I have omitted some things that he did have. Hence, I have explained some

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70 He knows Rufinus’ Latin translation of Eusebius’ Ecclesiastical History and the two additional books Rufinus composed about later eras (down to 395): De Haeresibus 83.19-21 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 337). See the “Introduction,” in Arianism and Other Heresies, ed. John E. Rotelle and Ronald J. Teske (Brooklyn: New City Press, 1995), 17. Despite what Augustine acknowledges in his Confessions (Augustine, Confessiones I.XIV.23.1-11 in [Confessionum Libri XII, ed. Martin Skutella and Lucas Verheijen, CCSL 27 [Brepols: Turnhout, 1990]], 12-13), his Greek seems to have been sufficiently dexterous to enable him to consult what he thought was Epiphanius’ Panarion, but was, in fact, simply the summarization or recapitulations of each book. As Bonner notes, however, St. Augustine of Hippo: “it must however be admitted that Augustine’s translation is a very laboured and literal one, the work of the man who relies much on the dictionary, rather than one to whom the original language is a living reality (395). On Augustine’s general ignorance of Greek authors (in their original language), see Josef Lössl, “Augustine in Byzantium,” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 51 (2000): 267-295. In certain occasions, he simply translated these Anacephalaesi into Latin and added it to his treatise (De Haeresibus XLII and XLIII [Vander Plaetse and Beukers, -311]). On the question of Pseudo-Jerome, see Teske’s “Introduction,” in Rotelle, n.22 and G. Bardy, “L’Indiculus de haeresibus du pseudo-Jérôme,” Revue des sciences religieuses 19 (1929): 385-405. For the dating of the Indiculus de Haeresibus see also Brent D. Shaw, “Bad Boys: Circumcellions and Fictive Violence,” in H.A. Drake, 182 n9. The text of the Indiculus is found in Patrologiae Latinae Tomus 81, ed. J.P. Migne, 636-644. It is also worth noting that Augustine displays familiarity with the works of Irenaeus of Lyons in his treatise Against Julian, an Unfinished Work (at 4.72 and 4.73). For the Latin text, see PL 44:641-874 at 774, 775. For an English translation, see Augustine, Against Julian, trans. Matthew A. Schumacher, Fathers of the Church: A New Translation, vol. 35 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1957).


72 Chapters 1-57 of De Haeresibus are largely dependent upon the Anacephalaesi (chapters 42 and 43 are exact translations), though other sources are plied for additional information. Chapters 58-80 are heresies found in Philaster’s work. His total of eighty-eight is eight more than Epiphanius’ total and sixty-eight less than Philaster, who lists twenty-eight heresies before Christ and one hundred-twenty-eight after. On Augustine, citation, sourcing, and authority, see Éric Rebillard, “A New Style of Argument in Christian Polemic.”
points more fully than he, and I have also explained others more briefly, and in some cases I kept to the same brevity governing everything according to the demands of the plan I had in mind.\textsuperscript{73}

With his ambition to supersede Epiphanius’ textual constraints—“for, you will see how much the work produced by the above-mentioned bishop falls short in comparison to the work you want me to produce”—Augustine, parroting Quodvultdeus’ registered dissatisfaction, rationalized his editorial alterations as textual enhancements.\textsuperscript{74} Having “incorporated fifty-seven [heresies] from Epiphanius’ work into my own” and twenty-three from Philaster, Augustine proffered eight additions of his own: Luciferians,\textsuperscript{75} Jovinianists,\textsuperscript{76} Arabian heretics,\textsuperscript{77} Helvidians,\textsuperscript{78} Paternians,\textsuperscript{79} Tertullianists, Abeloi, and Pelagians.\textsuperscript{80} Augustine’s streamlining of


\textsuperscript{74} Augustine, De Haeresibus Praefatio 6.91-93 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 288). Augustine shelves Epiphanius’ twenty pre-Christian heresies, considering only the sixty of the Christian era. He excludes three sects, the Lucianists (number twenty-three), the Marcellians (number fifty-two), and the Colydrians (number seventy-nine), which Epiphanius had explained. In addition to three outright omissions, Augustine differentiates and combines two other heretical clans. He combines the Tatians and Encratites (despite the fact that though Epiphanius “called the Encratites schismatics from Tatian”) into one heresy, insisting, instead, that the Tatians “are also called Encratites” (De Haeresibus 25.1, 8-9 [Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 301]). He also differentiates the Artotyrites from the Pepuzians. From Philaster, Augustine adds twenty-three sects to his editions of Epiphanius, which, at that point in De Haeresibus, gave him a running total of eighty.

\textsuperscript{75} Augustine’s knowledge of the Luciferians, he tells us, comes from “a certain author, whose work does not bear his name” (De Haeresibus 81.4-5, [Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 336]). The subsequent citation about the inheritance and nature of the soul corresponds exactly to the words of the Indiculus de haeresibus 38 (Migne, 642), now ascribed to Pseudo-Jerome. Owing to the exactitude of the citation, Bardy, “Le ‘De haeresibus’ et ses sources,” 408-411, argued that Augustine consulted and cited the Indiculus itself. Given the lack of affirmative evidence, Müller, The De Haeresibus of Saint Augustine, 28, posited that Augustine and the Indiculus could well have shared the same source. Firm attestation, he insists, is impossible to prove.

\textsuperscript{76} While Augustine reports that he gleaned knowledge of the Jovinianists in the same anonymous author of De Haeresibus 81 (see the parallel at Indiculus 35 (Migne, 641) he tells us that, unlike the Luciferians of whom he appears to have been wholly ignorant, he already possessed knowledge of the Jovinianists (quos iam noueram; De Haeresibus 82.16-17, [Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 337]).


\textsuperscript{78} His knowledge of Helvidus, the followers of whom were called Antidicomarties, came, so it seems, from Jerome’s work, Adversus Helvidium de Mariæ virginitate perpetua (PL 23, ed. J.P. Migne, 193-216). The name caused some
the genre’s form—to maximize its utility—consolidates all the divergences in the source material into an authoritative whole of his own creation.

Augustine’s text attests the transformative process by which various full-fledged ethnographies have been condensed into an expressly useful guidebook. This codification of a heretical catalogue de-emphasizes the generative and organizational structure of ethnographic theorization and, instead, hones in on the microscopic data of heretical being. Writing about ancient Jewish identity—as measured by appearance and name—in the Greco-Roman world, Shaye Cohen asked in his *The Beginnings of Jewishness*, “how, then, did you know a Jew in antiquity when you saw one?” While Cohen insisted on the impossibility of Jewish identification in the ancient world (based on phenomenological factors), we might do well to think of Augustine’s *De Haeresibus* as an attempt to render the heretics known by virtue of the senses: how, then, did you know a heretic in antiquity when you saw or heard one? While many of Augustine’s designated heretics are distinguished by opinion—cosmological,\(^82\) theodicean,\(^83\) Christological,\(^84\) Trinitarian,\(^85\) angelologic,\(^86\) demonologic,\(^87\) etc.—the heretics are


\(^80\) When describing the Abeloim and Pelagians, Augustine mentions the fact that the former reside “in our countryside,” while the latter “began in our time;” Augustine, *De Haeresibus* 87.26-29; 88.1.1-4 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 339, 340).


\(^82\) On Cosmology: *De Haeresibus* 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 11; 13; 15; 19; 20; 77 (existence of innumerable worlds).

\(^83\) On Theodicy: *De Haeresibus* 21; 22; 23; 33; 46; 59; 61; 65; 66.
distilled into observable customs and habits. Among the descriptive markers Augustine
asccribed to the heretics were alimentary matters, sexual behavior and marriage, dress (or
lack thereof), attitude towards women, idolatry, the Jewish Law, ritualistic conduct, and
bodily practices. The unnamed sixty-eighth heresy, for instance, consists of those “who
always walk with bare feet,” following strictly God’s diktat at Exodus 3:5. The Valesians
(number thirty-seven) “castrate themselves and their guests,” while the Cataphrygians and
Pepuzians (twenty-six and twenty-seven, respectively) “are reported to have gruesome
sacraments (sacramenta funesta), for they are said to confect their eucharist from the blood of a
year-old infant while they squeeze from tiny punctures all over its body; they mix it with

84 On Christology: De Haeresibus 8; 10; 14; 21; 49; 51; 52; 60; 80.
85 On the Trinity: De Haeresibus 36; 46.16; 49; 52; 54; 74.
86 On Angels: De Haeresibus 8; 39.
87 On Demons: De Haeresibus 24; 85.
88 On Food: De Haeresibus 5; 24; 27 (baby blood bread); 28 (also blood bread); 46.5-6, 9; 53; 62; 64; 70.2 (shuns meat as
unclean); 71 (refuse to eat with outsiders); 75 (water not made by God); 82 (fasting and abstinence from certain
foods is of no benefit). Francesca Tasca, “Ecce Panis Haereticorum:’ Augustinianum 50.1, 251-3, suggests that
dietary practices and rituals can reveal religious and referential universes. Diet, in other words, can illuminate
any entire sectarian theorization of the world and the human place within it.
89 On Marriage and Sex: De Haeresibus 1; 5; 25; 26; 38 (no second marriages); 49 (rejection of marriage); 46.13; 47; 82
(no value in marriage); 87 (no intercourse with wives; adoption of children).
90 On Dress: De Haeresibus 31 (naked); 58 (walks with bare feet).
91 On Women: De Haeresibus 27; 56; 84 (hostile to the virginity of Mary).
92 On Idolatry: De Haeresibus 1; 7.
93 On the Jewish Law (relationship to, both positive and negative): De Haeresibus 7; 8; 9; 10; 18; 21.
94 On Rituals: De Haeresibus 16; 17; 26; 27 (make bread from blood of infant); 28 (sacrificial offerings of bread and
cheese); 38 (purity); 46.9, 17; 53; 57; 64; 69.5.
95 On Bodily Practices: De Haeresibus 37 (castration); 42 (do unspeakable things to their bodies); 69.4
(circumcelions).
96 Augustine, De Haeresibus 67 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, De Haeresibus, 330).
wheat and make bread from it” (miscentes eum farinae, panemque inde facientes). The “truth” of these pronouncements is less interesting to me than their articulation as the (outré) traits, par excellence, of the heretics. In moving away from the tomes of Epiphanius and Philaster and embracing the structure of the abbreviated Anacephalaeoses, Augustine ventures to define the heretics by means of a distinguishing opinion and/or practice. And although the heretics, like the Jews of the second Temple Period, may well have blended seamlessly into their environs, Augustine at least sought to make the task of identification less difficult. He supplied Quodvultdeus with a refined ethnographic handbook. The seemingly panoptic knowledge of Augustine was now the province of yearning Christian minds.

Paring down the heretics into essentials—to distill groups or movements into singular ideas or habits—was no mindless or artless task. In agreeing to undertake Quodvultdeus’ request to produce a streamlined heresiological handbook, Augustine reflects on the difficulty of abridgment, not the difficulty of the overarching subject: at the outset of the project, it is form and not content that concerns the bishop. He asks himself, “whether I ought now to begin this work and send you a part of it so that you might see that its difficulty is greater in proportion to the brevity with which you want me to carry it out.” Augustine’s acquiescence reflects, I would argue, his own scholastic and pastoral determination. He undertakes the task both because it was asked of him and, more importantly, because he could do it to a degree as of yet unseen. That is, as he firmly declared of his investigation, “I want even more” (quanto magis quod ego). But in wanting more—in attacking, as it were, the domain of the heretics—Augustine would come to a very different realization: it was content as much as form that

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98 Augustine, Epistula 224.1.5-7 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 280).
99 Augustine, De Haeresibus Praefatio 6.93 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 288).
entangled his heresiological ambition. In the process of constructing this polemical list, Augustine acknowledges his specialized knowledge of the circumstances, practices, and opinions of the heretics, while he also concedes his restricted perception of the heretical world. His desire for comprehension was undercut by his incapacities as an author, which could not circumvent his limitations as a mere human.

*Writing and Traversing Heresy: The Limits of Knowledge and Experience*

Augustine’s valedictory remarks in *De Haeresibus* depict a man pondering the epistemological conditions, both as a matter of process and result, governing his attempt to write about the heretics in a systematic manner. While Augustine had expressed some hesitations during his exchange with Quodvultdeus, he seized his closing remarks of the treatise both to ponder and concede the multifaceted limitations of the heresiologists’ knowledge of the world he so tireless had mined.\(^{100}\) He knows or, perhaps more accurately, he discovers in the very process of writing the constraints of his work as an armchair ethnographer. He is, I shall argue, confronting the ethnographer’s tenuous understanding of the world and peoples he studies. Like ethnographers who examined their authorial hand in producing their ethnographies, Augustine interrogated his active and passive participation in perpetuating the ethnographic *traditio haereticorum*.\(^{101}\) He articulated his knowledge of the

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\(^{100}\) For a fairly comprehensive treatment of Augustine’s theory of linguistic (or verbal) epistemology see Marcia L. Colish, *The Mirror of Language: A Study in the Medieval Theory of Knowledge* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), 7-54. Colish argues that Augustine theorizes that the revealed wisdom of Christ enables humankind to possess a redeemed speech: “the key to the linguistic epistemology which he posits is Christ, whom he sees as the verbal and actual reconciliation of God and man” (25).

\(^{101}\) By contemporary ethnographic examination (or more accurately, self-examination) I mean the process by which anthropologists and sociologists, in reaction, perhaps, to the post-modern turn, reflected upon their own, irreversible ideological interpretation of fieldwork and research. Unlike, earlier anthropologists of the late
heretics in both positive and negative terms. On the one hand, there was a real, tangible, articulable knowledge of heresy: the eighty-eight heresies have customs, habits, and opinions that could be and were described in writing. Like Hippolytus, Irenaeus, Tertullian, Philaster, and Epiphanius before him, Augustine knew the heretics via the writings of his fellow Christians and from his own experience.\(^{102}\) To write heresiology was to merge scholastic knowledge with phenomenological and experiential familiarity. On the other hand, scholastic lacunae gestured at the more unsettling problem of bringing heresy and his heresiology to a close. This unknowable aspect of the heretics necessitated explanation. Augustine, as I see it, offers three rationalizations to account for this epistemological chasm. The first, I have already discussed briefly, namely the problem of inter-textual collection, comparison, and archiving. Second, there was the conceptual problem of abundant and persistent heretical metamorphosis, which disrupted a neat binary between types of articulable knowledge. And third, Augustine’s authorial position erected a fundamental distance between himself as ethnographer and his object of study.

The exchange between Quodvultdeus and Augustine framed De Haeresibus as a text of explicitly utilitarian orientation. An occasion for Augustine to unveil his investigative mettle, his text, as I have argued above, transformed heresiological dissonance into a uniform, nineteenth and early to mid-twentieth century, who claimed simply to report the facts about a given peoples and place, recent ethnographers have apprehended (if not abandoned) the fallacious dangers embedded in such claims. Writing an ethnography was neither a passive nor dispassionate activity: it was invariably marked by the style, voice, biases, and interests of its author. The most prominent examples of this newfound discourse include: James Clifford and George E. Marcus, eds., Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); Paul Rabinow, Reflections on Fieldwork in Morocco. 30th Anniversary ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007) Vincent Crapanzano, Tuhami: Portrait of a Moroccan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985); George E. Marcus and Dick Cushman, “Ethnographies as Texts,” Annual Review of Anthropology 11 (1982): 25-89; and Jonathan Boyarin, ed., The Ethnography of Reading (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).

\(^{102}\) I shall return to the issue of Augustine’s personal involvement with the Manicheans as well as his ecclesiastical and theological dealings with Donatus and Pelagius.
compendious, and comprehensive handbook. In combing through various resources to capture the fullest portrait of heretical plurality, he jettisoned some findings, refined others, and ignored still more. But editing, collating, and collecting could only supply Augustine a partial knowledge:

You see how many heresies we have mentioned, and we still have not fulfilled your request. How could I mention all ‘the heresies which have arisen,’ to use your words, ‘from the time the Christian religion received the name of the inheritance promised it,’ since I could not get knowledge of all of them (qui omnes nosse non potui)? I think that the reason is that no one of those whose writings I have read has recorded them all. At times I found in one author heresies that I did not find in another. I have listed more than they did, because I have gathered heresies from all of them, though I did not find all of them in each author. Moreover, I added those which I myself recall, but could not find in any of those authors. Hence, I am right in believing that I could not record all the heresies, both because I do not see that any of them whom I have read have recorded them all.  

Complete knowledge of the heretics nonetheless leaves the extreme difficulty, as Epiphanius discussed previously and Augustine reflects upon here, of transferring his knowledge into textual form: “who can fail to see the amount of work and the number of books this request would demand?” Incorporting the works of his predecessors, Philaster, Epiphanius, and Eusebius into his authoritative account only exacerbates his failuer to include every relevant text. As Augustine goes on to explain, “I have heard that the saintly Jerome has written

103 Augustine, De Haeresibus Epilogus 1.1-14 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 343).

104 Augustine, De Haeresibus Epilogus 3.43-44 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 344).

105 Augustine similarly tries to transfer the manifest shortcomings of his heresiological handbook to the heretics, whose failure to comprehend their own divergences and abundance of error seemingly acquits Augustine’s failure: “those who compose empty tales that are long and complicated, are so full of many false teachings that they themselves could not count them or could do so only with great difficulty” (De Haeresibus Epilogus 3.38-41 [Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 344]). The deflection of culpability, however, is left unelaborated, even if it implicitly distinguishes institutions of singularity from modes of multiplicity. For Augustine, the heretics’ inability to keep track of their own errors and numbers renders them inscrutable to outsider assessment. How, Augustine essentially asks, could I know them in all their multiplicity, if they fail to know their own variety! The observation, perhaps, frees him from the burden of comprehension; for when the contours of heresy are beyond number, both its definition and its ascertainment becoming logical impossibilities.
something on heresies, but we could not find his work in our library and we do not know where to get it.”\footnote{Augustine, De Haeresibus Epilogus 2.18–20 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 343).} But even if Quodvulteus were to discover Jerome’s work on this trickiest of topics (a text, it seems, that was unknown to Augustine), his understanding might have increased only marginally. Indeed, owing to Augustine’s constancy of thought, Jerome’s text had failed even out of Augustine’s sight: “I do not think that even he, although a very learned man, could track down all the heresies” (\textit{quamvis nec ipsum, licet hominem doctissimum, omnes haereses arbitrer indagare potuisse}).\footnote{Augustine, De Haeresibus Epilogus 2.24–27 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 343).} If ever Ecclesiastes 12:12 could capture Augustine’s predicament, here was its heresiological moment: “Of making books there is no end!”\footnote{Faciend\textit{t plures libros nullus est finis} in the Vulgate.} In an essay entitled “And,” which begins as an examination of this all-too-familiar conjunction and morphs into a consideration of literary organizing principles, the novelist William Gass writes of terminological chains that, “every addition implies that somewhere there’s a sum.”\footnote{William Gass, “And,” in Wier and Hendrie Jr., 108.} Enumeration not only implies conclusion and completion, it assumes the stability of its terms: “you can’t add one number to another—8 to 4—if the 8 has disappeared by the time the 4 has come round to be counted.”\footnote{Gass, “And,” in Wier and Hendrie, 108.} And if “a list is able to fill a gap in our knowledge” and can negotiate a way to achieve its desired end, what of a list with no end?\footnote{Tavas Visi, “A Science of Lists?,” in Doležalová, 26.} What are we to make of a list whose components are always changing? Precisely by casting his text as the most recent and thorough iteration of the heresiological genre, Augustine transposed an inquiry about the \textit{process} of textual collation into one about its \textit{telos}: where and
how does heresiology end? Not only had study and research failed to create a fully mapped portrait of the heretical world, it gestured toward Augustine’s more unsettling conclusion: “even if I did perhaps record all of them, which I do not think is the case, I certainly do not know that these are all of them. Hence, that which you want me to put down in my writing I cannot even grasp with my mind, for I cannot know them all (non saltem potest me cognoscente comprehendi quia omnia scire non possim).

Knowledge of the heretics was not simply a matter of exhaustive labor: it may very well have been, as Augustine himself suggests, beyond the very bounds of human reason. To the extent that Augustine has shed his original fears—how to distill the heretics into a brief catalogue—he apprehended a new set of textual and epistemological problems in the course of writing. For him, the (rhetorical) fear of knowing the heretics too well or too completely—in essence, the fear of becoming a heretic or a heretical apologist—has been recast as a problem of never being able to really know the heresies. Inasmuch as Epiphanius had mused about heretical infinitude in his De Fide, he only gestured at the source and problematical nature of this quandary. Augustine confronted (and ultimately rationalized) the problem directly. He realizes, in language far less sanguine

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112 Augustine, De Haeresibus Epilogus 1.14-17 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 343).

113 Near the very end of his valedictory to the church, having recapped the trajectory of the preceding Panarion, Epiphanius interrupted his remarks to request a fair appraisal from his readers (De Fide 19.1-20.5 [Holl and Dummer, 520-1]). In turning to the church in his concluding remarks, the bishop reiterates his theological dogma. The church, as the one dove of Song and Songs 6:8, “confesses that God is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, a perfect Father, a perfect Son, and a perfect Holy Spirit” (De Fide 14.1 [Holl and Dummer, 514]). The everlasting and unified Trinity is the source of all creation. In contrast, however, stands the highly imperfect Epiphanius: “This is the faith, the process of our salvation. This is the stay of the truth; this is Christ’s virgin and harmless dove. This is life, hope and the assurance of immortality. But I beg all you readers to pardon my mediocrity and the feebleness of my very limited mind—torpid and all as it is from a heavy dose of the sects’ poison, like the mind of a man vomiting and nauseated—for the expressions I have been brought to use in referring to certain persons <with harshness> or severity or calling them “offenders,” “scum,” “dupes” or “frauds.” Though I do not readily make fun of anyone, I have had to dispose of them with expressions like these to dispel certain persons’ notions. Otherwise they might think that, since I have publicly disclosed the things the sects say and do, I have some measure of agreement with the heresy of each” (De Fide 19.1-3 [Holl and Dummer, 3:520]).

114 The problem of collection and counting are most explicitly addressed, though not altogether substantively, at De Fide 6.5, 9.1-4, 10.1-2, 11.1, 12.4-5 (Holl and Dummer, 3:502, 504, 509, 511, 512).
than Epiphanius, the impossibility of his genre’s potency. If earlier heresiology was marked by its digressive musings, the ordered succession of later heresiology enveloped the genre in a rhetorical edifice of entropic discovery and self-reflection. As Augustine reminds Quodvultdeus, his treatise is but a sampling of the heretical world, since “other heresies which are not mentioned in this book of ours can exist or come to exist” (possunt... vel esse vel fieri).115

In denying the orthodox force of closure over against the heretics, Augustine’s embrace of an epistemological chasm within his heresiological writing solidified not authorial control and mastery, but rather an entrenched and irreversible authorial weakness.116 Irenaeus, two centuries earlier, had emphatically declared the human mind’s inability to apprehend the fullness of divine truth. While the mystery of creation existed to be discovered and rationalized, it, too, was beyond definitive explanation:

We, however, precisely inasmuch as we are inferior to God’s Word and his Spirit, have need of a knowledge of his mysteries. It should be no surprise if, in matters spiritual and heavenly and such as need to be revealed, we experience this, because even matters that are at our feet—I mean, that are in this creation, and that we can touch and see that are with us—many of these matters escape our knowledge, and we leave these to God...What happens when we try to explain the reason for the rise of the Nile? We give many answers, perhaps plausible, perhaps not, but what actually is true, certain, and secure is in God’s keeping117

Although the wonders of the natural world—the rising of the Nile, the migration patterns of birds, the ebb and flow of the tides, weather patterns, the stations of the moon, the elemental foundations of the earth galvanizes the heretics to inject—could be subjected to rational,

115 Augustine, De Haeresibus Epilogus 2.55-57 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 344).

116 This had the added benefit of undercutting the association both with heretical hubris and philosophical intellectualism. Here, Augustine’s seeming intellectual power ultimately uncovers a deeper humility and ignorance.

scientific explanation, it was “God alone, who made them” and he alone “can declare their truth.” Insofar as human models of the observable phenomena of creation remained mere theory, the innate truths of the divinely ordered universe were shrouded in an aura of mystery, wonder, and epistemological transcendence. There were some matters, Irenaeus reasoned, that fall well within the purview of the human mind, while others belong solely to the realm of the divine. And although the natural world—the things before our eyes, in our hands, and at our feet—eluded precise understanding, it was, at least, subject to observable scrutiny and investigation. By contrast, the epistemological hubris epitomized by the heretics drove individuals to turn away from the observable phenomena of the physical world and instead speculate wildly about the invisible, super-celestial, and spiritual matter of the cosmos. As Hippolytus lamented, all those heretics who “name themselves Gnostics in this peculiar way...they alone have gulped down the marvelous knowledge of the perfect and good.”

For Irenaeus, the abiding mystery of creation produced humanity’s pedagogical dependence on God. To leave the lacunae of Scripture unanswered—how and from where God created matter, why he produced it, why some of his creations sinned against him and yet others preserved, what drives the nature of the sinner—was not, as the heretics surmised, injurious. “As long as we live in the form of this world,” Irenaeus explained, “we should leave perfect knowledge and such questions to God.”

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120 Hippolytus, *Refutatio Omnium Haeresiwm* V. 23.3, ed. Miroslav Marcovich (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1986), 199; altered from ANF.

wisdom, it essentially bound itself to an incomplete temporal existence, “so that God should may always teach and man may always learn from God.” The promise of eternal glory in the kingdom of heaven preserved the acquisition of plenary knowledge. In the present, however, they must embrace, as Tertullian advocated in his De Praescriptione, a life of humility and even ignorance. By admonishing his readers to “preserve, the proper order of your knowledge, and do not, being ignorant of things genuinely good, seek to rise above God himself,” Irenaeus sought not simply to tame the hubristic heretical mentality, but to preserve the underlying mystery of Christian doctrine and salvation.

When Epiphanius, in his valediction to the catholic church, he signals his inability to articulate fully the nature and visage of the Christian God. His praise for God’s earthly institution cannot ultimately supplant the mystery of divine transcendence:

As you go through the whole work, or even parts of it, pray for me and make request that God will give me a portion in the holy and only catholic and apostolic church and the true, life-giving and saving faith, and deliver me from every sect. And if, in my humanity, I cannot reach the full measure of the incomprehensible and ineffable Godhead, but am still pressed to offer its defense and compelled to speak for God in human terms, and have been led by daring [to do so], you yourselves, pardon me, for God does.

122 Irenaeus, Adv. haer. II.28.3 (Rousseau and Doutreleau, 2:2:274).

123 Now, there is no great conceit than to think that one is better and more perfect than he who created and formed us, and gave us the breath of life, and bestowed existence itself. And so it is better, as I have said, for one who knows nothing at all, not even one reason for anything created as to why it was created, to believe God and continue in his love, than by knowledge of this kind to be puffed up and fall away from love, which gives life to man. [It is better] not to go in search of knowledge about anything else than Jesus Christ the Son of God, who was crucified for us, than through subtle questions and hairsplitting to fall into impiety (Irenaeus, Adv. haer. II.26.1 [Rousseau and Doutreleau, 2:2:258]).


125 Epiphanius, De Fide 80.3-4 (Holl and Dummer, 3:521). See Nightingale, Once Out of Nature, on the process of “mak[ing] meaning out of mutable manner” (134) and Augustine’s embodied attitude toward textuality, 132-163.
The juxtaposition here between the redemption from heresy (by way of faith) and the ineffability of God registers a fundamental distinction between the knowable and the unknowable. Knowledge of and in the world stands apart from the “knowledge” of the divine, insofar as the former is subject to human comprehension, discovery, and theorization, while the latter is not. Moreover, Epiphanius’ remarks allude to the very start of his *Panarion*, where he articulated the trajectory of his inquiry:

> There are things untold, beyond counting, inaccessible so far as man is concerned, and known only to the Lord of all. But we are dealing with variance of opinions and kinds of knowledge, with faith in God and unbelief, with sects, and with heretical human opinion which misguided persons have been sowing in the world from man’s formation on earth till our own day....

126

Just as the human condition very much enables him to comprehend and refute heretical opinion because it is human, his condition also prevents him from reaching complete comprehension of the Godhead.127 The unreachable chasm—the unknowability of God—produced the space for faith in God.128 While Epiphanius insisted, as I explained in chapter four,

126 Epiphanius, Pro. II.2.2-3 (Holl, 1:170).

127 The Gnostic school of thought (as we saw in chapter two) ventured into the world of the divine cosmos and ascertained a higher order of knowledge about the nature of the god of creation (Ialdabaoth) and the various aeons or, in David Brakke’s phrasing, “the corresponding unfolding of God into lower, mediating divine principles, the lowest of which does the work of creating the material universe” (*The Gnostics*, 59). The Gnostics agreed with Epiphanius and the catholic church about a fundamental principle of divine transcendence. There was a divine source, which the Gnostics termed the Invisible Spirit, that existed apart from human comprehension (even for the most spiritually inclined thinkers). The disagreement between the Gnostics and the heresiologists (Irenaeus, Hippolytus, Epiphanius) concerned the end point of this epistemological lacuna. What David Brakke ascribes to the Gnostics—“according to the Gnostics, the ultimate God—“the Father of entirety” or “the Invisible Spirit”—is unknowable and beyond description. One should not even think of the Invisible Spirit as divine because ‘it is superior to deity’ (*Ap. John* II 2.35-36)—could easily describe, at least conceptually, the “orthodox” attitude toward the Godhead.

that these two kinds of knowledge, the temporal and the divine, were, in fact, radically distinct, the diverse profusion of the heretics tested and enervated the solidity of this epistemological disjuncture.¹²⁹

Like the human effort to comprehend the Godhead,¹³⁰ Augustine recognized that an epistemological disjuncture overlaid his understanding of the heretics: “Even if I knew all of them, I still am not able to do what your letters hold, ‘that we state entirely all those things on which the heretics dissented from the truth.’ Far less can I do, since I am not able to know all of them.”¹³¹ In bemoaning the gap in his knowledge, Augustine defines his relationship to the

¹²⁹ Looming over the entire edifice of heresiological discourse was the assumption that any effort to comprehend the specifics of any one or all the heresies—the process of classifying these sectarian groups—presupposed a foundational understanding of heresy itself: “there are, in fact, heretics who are opposed to the rule of faith on single doctrines or on just a few more, such as the Macedonians or the Photinians and whatever others of this sort there may be” (De Haeresibus Epilogus 3.34-37 [Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 344]). Not yet satisfied with the various shortcomings (both practical and conceptual) already enumerated within the text, Augustine investigates one final constraint: a definitional puzzle. Each species of heresy, though differentiated by particular habits, practices, theological doctrines, scriptural addenda or excisions, cosmological theories, etc. belonged, so the heresiologists assumed, to the same genus. Augustine, however, forthrightly confesses and confronts the millstone that is the nature of heresy itself. See the essays of Gerald Bonner, “Dic Christi Veritas Ubi Nunc Habitas: Ideas of Schism and Heresy in the Post-Nicene Age,” in The Limits of Ancient Christianity: Essays on Late Antique Thought and Culture in Honor of R.A. Markus, ed. William E. Klingshirn and Mark Vessey (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 63-79 and Robert Dodaro, “Omnes haeretici negant Christum in carne uenisse (Aug., serm. 183.9.13),” Augustinian Studies 38.1 (2007): 163-174. Each attempts to parse Augustine’s definitions of heresy and schism. And while both essays make use of De Haeresibus, neither discusses the text extensively.

¹³⁰ Writing in the Confessions of his own effort to describe and “confess” his life before God, Augustine bemoans his lack of time to produce an ordered and comprehensive account of himself and his place within the divine creation: “And if I have the capacity to proclaim this in an ordered narrative, yet the drops of time are too precious for me. For a long time past I have been burning to meditate in your law and confess to you what I know if it and what lies beyond my powers—the first elements granted by your illumination and the remaining areas of darkness in my understanding—until weakness swallowed up by strength. I am reluctant to expend on any other subject those hours which I find free of the necessities for restoring the body, of intellectual work, and of the service which we owe to people or that which we render to them when under no obligation” (Augustine, Confessionum Libri XII, 11.H.2.1–11 ed. Martin Skutella and Lucas Verheijen, CCSL 27 [Brepols: Turnhout, 1990], 194; Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick [New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, 222].

¹³¹ While the term apophatic has a particular theological resonance typically associated with theorizations of the Godhead, it has utility for my argument insofar as it explicitly juxtaposes the divine being (the divine ontology) with the heretical essence and its demonic lineage. A recent edition to the massive literature on the subject, Henny Fiskå Hägg, Clement of Alexandria and the Beginnings of Christian Apophaticism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), sheds some useful light on the subject by situating the discourse of negative theology in Christianity
heretics as one of perpetual inadequacy. The limitations Augustine discovers in his own writing and cognition reflect a deeper awareness of the limitations of language and thought: “there always remains an opaque residuum of inexpressibility when a man tries to signify verbally his internal states of being. In the face of the ineffable mystery of God, human language labors under crushing limitations.” What Colish ascribes to Augustine’s self-interrogation in the Confessions likewise applies to his outward interrogation of the heretics. If the task of the heresiologist was to expose the secrecy of the heretics—“but (in) exposing the doctrines of all these [groups] in detail, we shall keep nothing hidden...when all are made to behold openly, the secret rites of these men, and the secret orgies which, as their controllers, they impart to the initiated alone”—herein lay the most unsettling of all conclusions for him: the heretics, like God himself, could never be known in full. Although the Incarnation had bestowed humankind with a redeemed speech, which functioned as a “mirror through which men may know God in this life by faith,” Augustine’s newly forged Christian eloquence could not circumvent the epistemological constrains of his human condition.

at the hands of Clement of Alexandria. See also the excellent study by Charles M. Stang, Apophasis and Pseudonymity in Dionysius the Areopagite: “No Longer I” (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). Charles W. Hendrick Jr.’s remarks in his History and Silence: Purge and Rehabilitation of Memory in Late Antiquity (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000), have an undeniable relevance here: “Silence, because it is imagined as outside of representation, is frequently associated with truth. Silence can be misinterpreted, may even be intended to mislead, but can silence itself be a lie? Can what is not said be false? Because silence is not imagined to represent at all, it is normally not thought to be able to represent what is not. From a common perspective, silence can be regarded as the only appropriate response to truth. This idea is familiar in late antiquity in the literature of Neoplatonism and various mystic religions, particularly in the literature of apophatic (or negative) theology, as represented by such authors as Dionysius the Areopagite. The only appropriate representation of a transcendental truth, such as god, is to not represent it at all. God is what is above and beyond representation, what guarantees representation; attempts to bring god into the world of representation are perversions and diminishments of the divine, as, on a realist theory of language, representation is merely a dependent reflection of the real, a secondary and inadequate substitute for the truth of being. The divine remains outside of representation, and any attempt to represent it can only diminish it. God is the unnameable” (120-121).


133 Hippolytus, Ref. Prooemium 5.27 (Marcovich, 55; altered from ANF).

The heretics, like God himself, were shrouded in an essential mystery. Because, Augustine reasons, “it is very difficult to define,” heresy imposes, through its essential ambiguity, a treacherous burden on those who attempt to systematize: “we should, therefore, be cautious, when we try to count them all so that we do not omit some, though they are heresies, and include others, though they are not.” Augustine’s acknowledgment of gradations of heretical existence further complicates the task of plenary classification; the irregularity and uncertainty of heresiological mapping evolves out of the very lack of fixity of heresy itself. A coherent definition would at least guide the inevitably messy future of the genre and serve its didactic purpose: for to “inquire into what makes one a heretic so that, in avoiding that with the Lord’s help, we may avoid the poison of heresies, not only of those which we know, but also of those we do not know, whether they already actually exist or

135 Definitional discordance illuminated and qualified Augustine’s decision to include only twenty-three of Philaster’s one-hundred fifty-six heresies: “[Philaster] mentions others (heresies) as well, but I do not think that they should be called heretics” (De Haeresibus 80.8-9 [Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 336]). Whether it was flimsy or unreliable heretical descriptions or Philaster’s overzealous determination to herd a superabundance of heresies, Augustine’s deep ambivalence about his predecessors work reveals a fundamental oversight of the genre: the failure to ask, “what is our object?” Even before Augustine undertook his full-fledged editorialization of Philaster and Epiphanius, he framed the task, in his first response to Quodvultdeus, as a definitional problem: “[Philaster] listed twenty-eight of them (Jewish heresies) and one hundred and twenty-eight after the Lord’s coming. Epiphanius, the bishop of Cyprus, who was highly esteemed for his teaching of the Catholic faith, also wrote on this subject in Greek. He too gathered heresies from both periods and put together eighty. Although both of them intended to do what you ask of me, you see how widely they differ on the number of the sects during these times. That, of course, would not have happened if they had not disagreed about the definition of heresy. After all, one should not suppose that Epiphanius was ignorant of some heresies that Philaster knew, since Epiphanius was by far the more eminent scholar. One should, rather, say, that Philaster had missed many, if Epiphanius had fathered more and Philaster fewer. Of course, both did not have the same view on the question under discussion, namely, what heresy is” (Epistula 222.2.11-28 [Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 276-7]). In acknowledging at the outset that “not every error is a heresy; yet, since every heresy involves a defect, a heresy could only be a heresy by reason of some error,” Augustine sought to impose a baseline coherence upon his admittedly partial knowledge (De Haeresibus Praefatio 7.98-100 [Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 289]). In effect, the perpetual cycling of heresies in and out of existence condenses Epiphanius’ universal history into a problem of definitional uniformity. Augustine’s task was thus doubly undercut by terminological incoherence: the heretics were not simply growing and changing themselves, their so-called opponents had never had a coherent rubric by which to identity them!

136 Augustine, Epistula 222 2.28-32 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 277). Bonner, Dic Christi Veritas Ubi Nunc Habitas, remarks of this passage: “this last observation was crucial: heresy can exist in the mind of the inquisitor rather than in the intention of the heretic” (73).
merely could exist.” The heretics, like nature, evolve and evade simple detection and precise rationalization. While this constant metamorphosis induces corresponding speculations and hypotheses to order this development, the macroscopic theorization of heretical progenesis can only lead the heresiologist so far. But the construction of an overarching whole into which each part fits does not, however, provide descriptions and refutations of each new part: for these twin goals, the heresiologists rely upon methodical scholasticism and ethnographic experience. But even the microscopic collection of data reaches an epistemological culmination: human understanding of the heretics, like human comprehension of the laws of nature and God, remains forever partial and inexact. Augustine’s explication of this conceptual breach in the edifice of his heresiology signals his refined perception of the restricted epistemological reach of the ethnographic gaze and the ethnographic word.

Crossing the Ethnographic Chasm?

137 Augustine, De Haeresibus Epilogus 2.58-62 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 344-5).

138 Precisely because humans “have known everyone externally” (extrinsecus unumquemque nosti), Tertullian distinguishes human and divine levels of comprehensions of individual orientation through his dichotomization of internalized and externalized perception or the categorical difference between the limitations of human sense perception and divine omnipotence (Tertullian, De Praescriptione Haereticorum 3.7 [Traité de la prescription contre les hérétiques, ed. R.F. Refoulé, SC 46 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1957), 91]; translation altered from Greenslade). With passages IV Ezra 8:20; I Sam. 16:7; II Tim. 2:19; Matt. 15:13, he articulates the distinction between human and divine “sensory” perception: “you, as a human, have known everyone externally. You think as you see. You see, however, as far as you have eyes. But ‘the eyes of the Lord are high,’ scripture says, ‘Man gazes into the face, God observes upon the heart.’ And therefore ‘the Lord knows those who are his’ and ‘roots out the plant which he has not planted’” (Praescr. 3.7-8 [Refoulé, 91]). This rather obvious distinction between orders and magnitudes of knowledge, nonetheless, serves to articulate Tertullian’s theorization of human knowledge as superficial and incomplete. Heresiology was only a surface-level effort. Moreover, because, as the Cappadocians insisted (see Richard Lim, Public Disputation, Power, and Social Order in Late Antiquity [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995, 165-171] demonstrates, that “to know God one must first know his creation,” “scientific knowledge as a prerequisite (though not the only one) for speculation about the divine effectively curtailed” (Lim, 168). If, then, heresies had become a naturalized part of the created order, the heresiological project was a necessary step (a precondition) for the move toward a fuller knowledge of the divine. But its impossibility, as Augustine discovered, ultimately precluded any such progression. The natural world was too vast and too elusive to permit (ever?) the turn toward the divine.
In Book III of his *Confessions*, Augustine recounts his eager embrace of the Ciceronian maxim, “not to study one particular sect but to live and seek and pursue and hold fast and strongly embrace wisdom itself, wherever found.” While he internalized Cicero’s diktat, he writes that he nonetheless turned away from the *Hortensius*, since it lacked mention of the name of Christ: “Any book which lacked this name, however well written or polished or true, could not entirely grip me (*non me totum rapiebat*). I therefore decided to give attention to the holy scriptures (*scripturas sanctas*) and to find out what they were like.” His devotion to the Bible, however, proved disappointing. What met him was a text he failed to comprehend; only from his ecclesiastical perch decades later did the book’s seeming lowliness reveal its “mountainous difficulty...and mysteries.” Augustine’s failure to apprehend the profundity and immense potentiality of scripture, which stemmed from his judgment, paradoxically, that the bible lacked the “dignity of Cicero” (*Tullianae dignitati*), precipitated a prolonged period of Christian waywardness:

My inflated conceit (*tumor meus*) shunned the Bible’s restraint, and my gaze never penetrated to its inwardness (*et acies mea non penetrabat interiora eius*). Yet the Bible was composed in such a way that as beginners mature, its meaning grows with them. I disdained to be a little beginner. Puffed up with pride, I considered myself a mature adult. That explains why I fell in with men proud of their slick talk, very earthly-minded and loquacious. In their mouths were the devil’s traps and a birdlime compounded of a mixture of the syllables of your name, and that of the Lord Jesus Christ, and that of the Paraclete, the Comforter, and the Holy Spirit. These names were never absent from their lips; but it was

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139 Augustine, *Confessiones* III.IV.8.29-31 (Skutella and Lucas Verheijen, 30; Chadwick, trans. 39); *quod non illam aut illam sectam, sed ipsum quaecumque esset sapientiam ut diligerem et quaererem et assequerem et tenerem atque amplexarem fortiter*. Translation from

140 Augustine, *Confessiones* III.IV.8.36-V.9.2 (Skutella and Lucas Verheijen, 30-31; Chadwick, trans., 40).

141 Augustine, *Confessiones* III.V.9.3-4 (Skutella and Lucas Verheijen, 31; Chadwick, trans., 40).

142 Augustine, *Confessiones* III.V.9.7 (Skutella and Lucas Verheijen, 31).
no more than sound and noise in their tongue. Otherwise their heart was empty of truth.\textsuperscript{143}

His turn toward the teaching of the Manichees, which he describes in Books III, IV, and V of his \textit{Confessions} as a period of wandering and separation from God, began as an effort to fill a theological void: he wondered, “where does evil come from? And is God confined within a corporeal form?”\textsuperscript{144} His misguided incursion into the customs and privations of the Manicheans, where he privileged the fruits of the earth, the stars, and his own sensuality, ended after his engagements with the esteemed Faustus. Augustine deemed the man, who was

\textsuperscript{143} Augustine, \textit{Confessiones} III.V.9.7-VI.10.6 (Skutella and Lucas Verheijen, 31; Chadwick, trans., 40).

praised as the intellectual luminary of the Manichean, to be a largely ignorant thinker. Though Augustine’s personal ties to the Manicheans do not arise explicitly in De Haeresibus or in his letters with Quodvultdeus, the latter does contain, as Johannes van Oort has noted, an inquiry about a certain Theodosius, “by whom some Manichees were revealed” (per quem Manichaei nonnulli sunt prodi in Carthage. Augustine’s preoccupation with the Manicheans—it is by far the lengthiest entry in the text, comprising a full sixth of its total content—quite naturally stems both from his intimate familiarity with the heresy and from the fact that it persistently distressed the Christian communities in North Africa.

In his descriptions of the Tertullianists (86), Abeloim/Abelians (87) and Pelagians (88), Augustine, again, emphasizes their contemporaneity and/or his personal experience with them. He avers, for example, that the Tertullianists were “gradually dying out toward our

145 Though Faustus was an elegant speaker—“when he came, I found him gracious and pleasant with words. He said things they [Manichees] usually say, but put it much more agreeably” (Confess. V.VI.10.7-9 [Sktella and Lucas Verheijen, 61; Chadwick, trans. 77]) —he lacked, according to Augustine, a broad education in the “liberal arts” (liberalium disciplinarum; Confess. V.VII.11.38): “after he had clearly showed his lack of training in liberal arts in which I had supposed him to be highly qualified, I began to lose all hope that he would be able to analyse and resolve the difficulties which disturbed me...In consequence, the enthusiasm I had for the writings of Mani was diminished, and I felt even greater despair of learning from their other teachers after having consulted on the many points which disturbed me the man who was particularly distinguished” (Confess. V.VII.12-13 [Sktella and Lucas Verheijen, 63; Chadwick, trans. 79]).

146 Augustine, Epistula 222.3.43-44 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 277); De Haeresibus 46.9 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 314-5) further emphasizes the current infestation of Manicheans within the African Christian community.

147 Johannes van Ort, “Mani and Manichaeism in Augustine’s De haeresibus. An Analysis of haer. 46.1,” in Studia Manichaica: IV. Internationaler Kongress zum Manichäismus, ed. Ronald E. Emmerick, Werner Sundermann, and Peter Zieme (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2000), 451-463. Van Ort’s essay parses only the first paragraph of Augustine’s remarks on the Manicheans, which relays his name and place of teaching.

time” (usque ad nostrum tempus paulatim deficiences), though upon his last visit to the city of Carthage, “they were completely gone (consumpti sunt).” And while Augustine’s personal familiarity with certain heretics and his diligent research of others supplied his text with authorities of scope and skill, the bishop nonetheless knew that, despite his thoroughgoing effort, his task remained fragmentary and imperfect. Whereas Epiphanius had mused about heretical infinitude by way of biblical allegory, Augustine articulated a simple yet unmistakably ethnographic cognizance of the constraints of his position as a foreign author. As he recounted his plan to apprehend the full-range of heretical parties, opinions, and practices, he parlayed the undeniable achievement of his De Haeresibus—here is the most accurate, systematic, and dutifully researched account yet of the heretics—into a manifestation of his a priori failure as an ethnographic author: “Nor can any heresy be so readily known to any outsider as [it is] by its own members; hence, I acknowledge that I have not stated and have


149 Augustine, De Haeresibus 86.2-3 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 338).

150 Augustine, De Haeresibus 86.5-6 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 338).
not learned all the teachings of those heresies which I mentioned.”¹⁵¹ His authorial confession demonstrates his acutely ethnographic disposition. His text cannot erase the insurmountable distance between his authorial self and the object of his inquiry: the bishop is simply unable to infiltrate the world of heresy and describe it thickly. His authorial presence indicates his epistemological absence. The disjuncture he observes between the abundant heretics with all their microscopic particularities and his extrinsic authorial occupation remains forever severed by the conceptual fissure of the ethnographic gaze. The fact that Augustine’s accounts of the Manicheans, Tertullians, Pelagians, Donatists, and Priscillianists, those most recent of heresies, make up such a disproportionate volume of the text (in comparison to his other descriptions) only reinforces the ethnographic rift. His knowledge of the heretics, even when it appears altogether comprehensive, is but the tip of the iceberg. The sheer volume of heretics, those known and unknown, present and future, imposes an impossible burden upon the heresiologist. While he is troubled by the implications of his incomplete knowledge, he refuses to falsify his ethnographic authority. Rather than deny his limitations as an ethnographer and compiler of heretical data, Augustine, in fact, incorporates these constraints into the rhetoric of his text.

In his Triste Tropiques, a masterful, though admittedly abstruse, structuralist ethnography, travelogue, and philosophical meditation, Claude Lévi-Strauss vividly notes his own presence within his ethnographic narrative. Even as he laments the “extraordinary advantage” of earlier generations of anthropologists, who had “access to communities which had never been the object of serious investigation,” Lévi-Strauss builds the mystique of discovery and unveiling into his text (or into his field work, to borrow Clifford Geertz’s

¹⁵¹ Nec ulli alieno ulla haeresis facile sic innotescit ut suis; unde nec earum quas commemoravi Omnia dogmata me dixisse vel didicisse profiteor; Augustine, De Haeresibus Epilogus 3.41-43 (Vander Plaetse and Beukers, 344).
The purpose of exploration is not to cover territorial breadth, rather it is to study “in depth: a fleeting episode, a fragment of landscape or a remark overheard may provide the only means of understanding and interpreting areas which would otherwise remain barren of meaning.” Lévi-Strauss, like many anthropologists before and after him, insists that the irreducible core of ethnography is self-conscious cultural interpretation and translation. And, so, when many pages later, he ventures deep into the jungles of Brazil to find and meet the Tupi-Kawahib, he relishes the opportunity to partake in the experience of the earliest travellers:

I was about to relive the experience of the early travellers and, though it, that crucial moment in modern thought when, thanks to the great voyages of discovery, a human community which believed itself to be complete and in its final form suddenly learned, as if through the effect of a counter-revelation, that it was not alone, that it was part of a great whole, and that, in order to achieve self-knowledge, it must first of all contemplate its unrecognizable image in this mirror, of which a fragment, forgotten by centuries, was not about to cast, for me alone, its first and last reflection.

As an adventuring anthropologist, he cannot resist the thrill of a new, unprecedented discovery. And although he reminds himself in the very next paragraph of the great destruction wrought by European voyagers, such memories cannot completely dull the sensation of ethnographic transcendence.

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152 See Clifford Geertz, *Works and Lives: The Anthropologist as Author* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 37. Even though he disavows, at times, thoughts of Brazil and South America, for which he had no strong inclination to study, as bound to notions of “exotic countries” that are “the exact opposite of ours,” (60) his journey to Rio only serves to cement a cultural and social distance: here he was, he tells us, entering the New World (73ff).


When Lévi-Strauss finally meets his Indians and ventures into their village, rather than apprehend the sublimity of “the ends of the earth,” he is overcome by a sense of loss and failure. Like Augustine and the heretics, there is a relational chasm of infinite depth and insurmountable nativity. The precise moment that Lévi-Strauss grasps the full weight of his remoteness and blindness is as arresting and as it is profound:

However, although I had set off on the adventure with enthusiasm, it left me with a feeling of emptiness. I had wanted to reach the extreme limits of the savage; it might be thought that my wish had been granted, now that I found myself among these charming Indians whom no other white man had ever seen before and who might never see again. After an enchanting trip up-river, I had certainly found my savages. Alas! they were only too savage. Since their existence had only been revealed to me at the last moment, I was unable to devote to them the time that would have been essential to get to know them. The limited resources at my disposal, the state of physical exhaustion in which my companions and I now found ourselves—and which was to be made still worse by the fevers of the rainy season—allowed me no more than a short busman’s holiday instead of months of study. There they were, all ready to teach me their customs and beliefs, and I did not know their language. They were as close to me as a reflection in a mirror; I could touch them, but I could not understand them. I had been given, at one and the same time, my reward and my punishment.  

Lévi-Strauss’ failure, his richly ironic and torturous punishment, derives from his lack of time, resources, and the untranslatability of language and experience. There was no way to know the Tupi-Kawahib under the conditions in which the anthropologist found himself. It is his anthropological mindset that betrays his presence: “I had only to succeed in guessing what they were like for them to be deprived of their strangeness: in which case, I might just as well have stayed in my village.”  


While Augustine, unlike Lévi-Strauss, possessed the linguistic capacity to engage his opponents in debate, he is, like the anthropologist, keenly aware of the limitations of time, resources, and authorial presence. He lacks the time to acclimate himself fully to the particularities of the heretics; he lacks the resources, textual and otherwise, to produce a comprehensive heresiology; and, above all else, he lacks the identity necessary to know what it is heretics do, say, and believe. In standing apart from the heretics, Augustine gains only superficial knowledge; his foreignness, like Lévi-Strauss; forever precludes a plenary understanding. I am not suggesting that Augustine’s ruminations about his authorial constraints are as systematically rendered as those of Lévi-Strauss or, in fact, that they are dependent upon the formal barriers of language. I am, however, trying to draw a parallel between notions of ethnographic authorization that incorporate their own failings and limitations into their texts. There is no effort to bury the complexities of the natural and supernatural worlds; they are embraced as the consequences of the human condition. Both Augustine and Lévi-Strauss, despite their manifestly different attitudes and ideologies, wonder how they can successfully traverse the intellectual and cultural landscapes they seek to study.

**Conclusion: Constructing Lacunae**

Augustine’s abbreviated heresiology conceives heretical errata as more than historical or theological phenomena to be refuted in texts; heretics become ethnographic and thus textual dilemmas by virtue of their distinct identities. And even in the cases where orthodox

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authors include heresies they report to be extinct,\textsuperscript{159} identity only in passing,\textsuperscript{160} or fail to name (and merely describe),\textsuperscript{161} the zeal to report comprehensively saturates the rhetoric of heresiological inquiry. But, as I have argued in this chapter (as well as in chapter four), the drive for textual comprehension construes the heresies not simply as problems of and by texts, but \textit{beyond} them as well.\textsuperscript{162} While Augustine rests at eighty-eight heresies, Epiphanius had enumerated eighty, and Philaster had proposed one hundred-fifty six.\textsuperscript{163} The world of heresy was not a stable entity of irreducible parameters.\textsuperscript{164} Beneath the veneer of infallibility, totality, unyielding investigation, exposure, and refutation, there is an equivocal awareness of the incompleteness and impossibility of the heresiologists’ project. In openly acknowledging the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{159} Augustine’s Tertullianists, as I noted already, were reportedly extinct. Theodoret tells us, for instance, at \textit{Haer. III. Pro.} (Migne, 401A), that the myths of certain heretics have been banished. In \textit{Haer. II.11} he claims that the Cerinthians, Ebionites, Theodotians, Elcesaites, Melchisedecians, Sabellians, Paulians, Marcionites, and Photians have been completely demolished; none of their kind remain.
\item \textsuperscript{160} See Theodoret on Monoimus, \textit{Haer. I.18} (Migne, 369B).
\item \textsuperscript{161} Augustine, \textit{De Haeresibus} 71-80; all ten lack names.
\item \textsuperscript{162} Gillian Clark gets at an essential component to the “problem” of textuality and discovery in Augustinian thought. In her essay, “Augustine and the World,” in \textit{The Early Christian Book}, ed. William E. Klingshirn and Linda Safran (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 117-138, which is a study of his masterful \textit{City of God}, Clark emphasizes the power of scripture to alleviate the disjuncture between divine transcendence and human apprehension. Scripture, thus, functions “as damage limitation” (132). As she explains, “so, according to Augustine, the world in which we live is shaped by a text. A text helps to heal the separation of fallen humans from God, and human history is to be interpreted by that text. Rome, city and empire, culture and religion, is a city of books. Its history, ancient and recent, is subject to interpretation by ‘our’ book, the Christian book, the one authoritative book that God has entrusted to mortal writers and readers...But the words of God must still be written and interpreted by mortals who are resident aliens, \textit{peregrine}, in the earthly city of their time, and who share the local customs and culture” (133). Displaced from their rightful home in the heavenly realm, humanity’s presence in earthly cities is a time of alienation. A reclamation of sorts resides in the text of scripture, which binds the earthly city to the heavenly one. I would argue that \textit{De Haeresibus}, though lacking the scale of \textit{City of God}, functions precisely as a type of damage limitation, which tries to use textual knowledge to construct a sense of the heretical world out there. But because scripture does not center it, the text lacks interpretative grounding; its bases suffer from the same faults and failings.
\item \textsuperscript{163} See Filastrii Episcopi Brixiensis Diversarum Hereseon Liber, ed. F. Heylen, CCSL 9 (Brepols: Turnhout, 1957), 207-324.
\item \textsuperscript{164} This, too, is part of Clark’s argument. \textit{City of God} or \textit{De Haeresibus} is a “built environment, a textual city constructed of books” (133): neither can match the righteousness of scripture, which is “a coherent covering for the encampment of strangers and sojourners, the \textit{civitatis peregrina} of God’s people for whom scripture is the collective memory, the history, and the authoritative text” (132-133).
\end{itemize}
elusive quality of the heretics and heretical knowledge, Augustine tries, instead, to theorize these fissures in his knowledge. The excessively possible—the hubristic diction of exposition and the language of endless discovery—has mutated into an explicit meditation on the possibility of the endeavor itself.\footnote{There is an important epistemological workaround, proposed most glaringly by Epiphanius (though it is a thematic emphasis also found in Hippolytus, Irenaeus, and Theodoret). The omissions, commissions, limitations, and errors of these texts become opportunities to retreat from the discourse of totality and mastery and, instead, humble before God (which filled in, the heresiologist hoped, the lacunae in his knowledge). The move toward humility is most clearly seen in Epiphanius' description of the sixtieth heresy of his Panarion, the Angelics. It was a movement the bishop included, despite his utter bafflement over its genesis, name, and nature. In speculating about the origin of the sect’s name, he offers three possible explanation: (1) a geographical solution (“there is a land called Angelina”); (2) a theological possibility (the group took its name from the creators of the universe, the angels); (3) a behavioral etymology (“they boasted of having the ranks of angels and leading particularly exemplary lives” (Pan. 60.1.2 [Holl and Dummer, 2:379]). To temper his authorial ignorance, Epiphanius styled his oblivion as a gesture of authenticity by reiterating the frailty of his mind for the challenges of his textual task. His remarks are worth citing in full: “But if you are reminded of something now, reader, you will harbor no suspicion to my discredit. I promised to report the roots and the nourishment of some sects, or some of the things they do, but just to mention others by name; but as the divine power has equipped and aided me, until this sect I have gone right through them all and left none unexplained, except this one. But perhaps it is because it was puffed up with pride for a short while and later came to an end, that I have no understanding of it. But I shall name it with the mere quick mention of its name as though of an untimely birth, pass its place [in the series] by, and embark on the investigation of the others. I likewise entreat the Lord of all to disclose himself to me, show my small mind what the sects do, and give it all the exact facts, enabling me to correct myself and my neighbors so that we may avoid what is evil, but gain a firm foundation, in God, in what is good, and absolutely true” (Epiphanius, Pan. 60.2.1-6 [Holl and Dummer, 2:379-80]). Here, confession follows his promise to name the heresies in full, even in cases where he lacks knowledge of their particulars. Beseeching the Deity to flesh out his words, Epiphanius cradles his frailty before God as a means of deafening his lacuna. He also, tellingly, blames the heresy itself for his ignorance. The brevity of their existence precluded his knowledge. If only the Angelics had endured, he would have harbored full knowledge of their error! Epiphanius' wish for heretical longevity manifests, I think, the inability of the heresiologists to sublimate their enjoyment of the sport of tracking down and performing their “executions” of the heresies. Knowledge of the heresies owes itself to and depends upon the Holy Spirit to transmit the divine knowledge. The orthodox writers openly confess their dependence upon the knowledge of God (and patiently await its inspiring instruction), while the heretics, as I traced earlier, attempt to circumvent the epistemological disjuncture between human and divine. There is a sense, however, that despite the intercession of the Spirit, the heresiologists are simply overmatched, outflanked by an impossibly expanding enemy.}

Heresiological authors sought, as we saw with Hippolytus, Epiphanius, and Theodoret in chapters one and two, to classify a seemingly chaotic world of unknowable disruption by anchoring heresy’s essential function to the divine narrative of sacred history. Ethnographic master narratives ordered the disruption, and centralized its remedy within the church. But while master narratives systematized the production and perpetuation of heretical diversity,
they did not (and could not) explain the particularities of each new generation of heresy.\textsuperscript{166} Ethnographic paradigms did not constitute people; they organized them. Microscopic data, by contrast, described peoples, but did not theorize them. These twin pillars of the ethnographic project—the macroscopic theorization and the microscopic collection of data—were mutually reinforcing; the one supplied the lacunae for the other. Augustine, however, smashes the epistemological interdependence of this bipartite conceptualization. His “confusion of feeling” over the scope of his ethnographic project concludes that there is no coherent structure that can elucidate the world of heresy.\textsuperscript{167} Augustine captures the paradox of Christian universalism: to claim to be an Ur-culture, as Christian authors routinely and emphatically asserted, is to defy the labile conditions of culture. Stephen Greenblatt’s comments about cultural formation and exportation in early modern Europe deduce the bind of early Christian expansion and comprehension:

Cultures are inherently unstable, mediatory modes of fashioning experience. Only as a result of the social imposition of an imaginary order of exclusion—through the operation of what in the discussion that follows I will call ‘blockage’—can culture be invoked as a stable entity within which there are characteristic representations that are ordered, exported, accommodated. Such blockage occurs constantly—an infinite, unrestricted, undifferentiated

\textsuperscript{166} Michel Foucault, \textit{The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences}, writing about the continuity of nature and the imposition of an ordered structure upon, notes the problematic assumption that continuity of structure can, in fact, order and describe the contents therein: “For if it were given to experience, in its uninterrupted momentum, or traverse, exactly, step by step, the great continuity comprising individuals, varieties, species, genera, and classes, there would be no need to constitute a science; descriptive designations would attain to generality quite freely, and the language of things would be constituted as scientific discourse by its own spontaneous momentum. The identities of nature would be presented to the imagination as though spelled out letter by letter, and the spontaneous shift of words within their rhetorical space would reproduce, with perfect exactitude, the identity of beings with their increasing generality. Natural history would become useless, or rather it would already have been written by man’s everyday language (147). The laws of nature do not constitute nature; they order it.

circulation would lead to the collapse of cultural identity altogether—but it is never absolute.\footnote{Stephen Greenblatt, *Wondrous Possessions: The Wonder of the New World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 121. He goes on to explain the process by which cultural formation is negotiated, contested, and produced: “the rhetoric of absolute blockage is everywhere in the discourse of early modern Europe, but the reality is more porous, more open, more unsettled than it first appears. Any element in the structure of a culture is potentially up for grabs. Any idea, however orthodox, can be challenged. Any representation can be circulated. And it is the character of this circulation—secret or open, rapid or sluggish, violently imposed or freely embraced, constrained by guilt and anxiety or experienced as pleasure—that regulates the accommodation, assimilation, and representation of the culture of the other. This representation is never quite synonymous with direct possession of a social reality which is always mobile and elusive, though the discourse of travel is saturated with the glittering promise of such possession and records extraordinary steps taken to secure it” (121).}

Precisely because the world of heresy is an assorted mass, its very expansiveness, liminality, and mutation confound the ethnographic gaze. Heretics contest the fabric of Christian ecumenical culture by exposing its systematic ignorance of the world around it. Neither macroscopic analysis nor microscopic travel can circumvent the limitations of ethnography and ethnographic classification. Internal rhetoric of heresiological texts complicates at best and subverts at worst the triumphalist, expansive discourse of Christian orthodoxy. The heresies are not simply a disruption within sacred history; they challenge the very foundations of narration, comprehension, and human understanding of the world they have permeated. Insofar as Christian ethnography could never fully map and by extension unite the world it studied, the world given to Adam was perhaps not so easily governed, named, and ordered as Genesis had surmised.
Conclusion: Genealogies of Ethnography

[The Greeks and the Romans] also wondered whether primitive humanity had lived in a state of ignorance or whether, to the contrary, it had not inherited true philosophy, later forgotten or altered: certain very ancient peoples (the Egyptians, Indians, Ethiopians, Chaldeans, and even the Jews) had preserved a very ancient wisdom and an ancient religion that may well merit study (which is what Apollonius of Tyana, Iamblichus, and a good many others did). Civilization was made not of inventions but of discoveries. And where did one discover something? Among foreigners, when they knew what we do not know, or in nature itself.

-Paul Veyne

The very first words of Homer’s Odyssey signal straightaway its ethnographic interests:

“Tell me, Muse, of the man of many ways, who was driven far journeys (μάλα πολλά πλάγχθη) after he had sacked Troy’s sacred citadel. Many were they whose cities he saw, whose minds he learned, many the pains he suffered in his spirit upon the sea, struggling for his own life and the homecoming of his companions.” Odysseus narrates his wondrous, harrowing journey to the Phaiakians as a series of remembrances in Books IX-XII. As it unfolds, the marvelous, exotic, and distant lands, peoples, and creatures emerge as emblems and harbingers of

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3 Homer, The Odyssey IX-XII (Lattimore, 137-197 [Murray, 1:302-464, 2:2-34]).
tragedy, destruction, reclamation, and seduction. Just as exposure to the New World(s) of Odysseus’ travels captivate(s) the minds of his companions—freeing them of the obligation and/or desire to return homeward (think, for instance, of the enchantment of the lotus-eaters)—they also instill feelings of isolation and remoteness via the introduction of radically distinct norms and customs:

> From there we sailed on, grieved at heart, and we came to the land of the Cyclopes, an insolent and lawless folk, who, trusting in the immortal gods, plant nothing with their hands, nor plow; but all these things spring up for them without sowing or plowing, wheat, and barley, and vines, which bear the rich clusters of wine, and Zeus’s rain makes these grow for them. Neither assemblies for council have they, nor appointed laws, but they dwell on the peaks of mountains in hollow caves, and each one is lawgiver to his children and his wives, and they have no regard for one another.

Even when the dystopic, lawless world of the primitive Cyclopes, further embodied by the cannibalistic Laistrygonians, finds a less mendacious representative in Circe, the results are still a variation on a theme: though spared death by cannibalism, Circe’s spells, instead, quite literally denature the humanity of those so-called civilized companions of Odysseus. But the hazard of these new worlds is only one side of traveler’s experience. As the hospitality of the Phaiakians demonstrates—“clothing for our guest is stored away in the polished chest, and intricately wrought gold, and all those other gifts the Phaiakian men of counsel brought here to give him”—the vagaries of displacement hold the potential to lead one to utopia as much as

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4 In his *Works and Days*, Hesiod warns the farmer of the dangers of ill-considered travel. It is a treacherous task to be undertaken only under the most precise of circumstances. It cannot be undertaken out of dalliance and curiosity, but most follow from careful planning and consideration. For, as Hesiod tells his listeners, “it is a terrible thing to die in the waves. So I am urging you that you should ponder deep in your heart all my advice...for it’s a terrible thing to meet with disaster at sea” (687-691). For the Greek text, see *Theogony. Works and Days. Testimonia*, ed. and trans. Glenn W. Most, Loeb Classical Library 57 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007). 142.

5 Homer, *The Odyssey* IX.82-104 (Lattimore, 139-140 [Murray, 1:308]).

6 Homer, *The Odyssey* IX.105-115 (Lattimore, 140 [Murray, 310]). Homer, of course, masterfully plays with perceptions of monstrosity, violence, and cultural superiority. The Cyclops Polyphemous is not the only one who cages and slaughters his guests: Odysseus himself, in Book XXII, shuts the suitors inside his palace and slaughters the lot of them. Who, we are left to wonder, is the real monster of this epic?
they do to torment and upend convention.\textsuperscript{7} Discovery of the previously unknown remained as much a source of cultural triumphalism as a site of moral decay and destruction.

In light of the mysteries and revelations of Odysseus’ displacement and travel, the cultural and geographical extremes arrayed within \textit{The Odyssey} imbue ethnographic experience with simultaneously vivifying and destructive appetite for discovery, novelty, and wonderment. When almost two millennia later, Dante depicts Ulysses in his \textit{Inferno} (in the seventh pouch of the eight circle; the area devoted to thieves and thiev ery), our Homeric hero, now encased within an eternal flame with Diomede, answers Virgil’s question about the circumstances of his death by completely recasting the trajectory of his personal odyssey:

When I sailed away from Circe, who’d beguiled me to stay more than a year there, near Gaeta—before Aeneas gave that place a name—neither my fondness for my son nor pity for my old father nor the love I owed Penelope, which would have gladdened her was able to defeat in me the longing I had to gain experience of the world and of the vices and the worth of men...I saw as far as Spain, far as Morocco along both shores; I saw Sardinia and saw the other islands that sea bathes And I and my companions were already old and slow, when we approached the narrows where Hercules set up his boundary stones that men might heed and never reach beyond...‘Brothers,’ I said, ‘o you, who having crossed a hundred thousand dangers, reach the west, to this brief waking-time that still is left unto your senses, you must not deny experience of that which lies beyond the sun, and of the world that is unpeopled. Consider well the seed that gave you birth: you were not made to live your lives as brutes, but to be followers of worth and knowledge.’\textsuperscript{8}

But just as soon as his eyes gaze on this most majestic of lands, his transcendent gladness “soon turned to sorrow for out of that new land a whirlwind rose and hammered at our ship, against her bow...it lifted up the stern so that our plow plunged deep, as pleased an Other until the sea again closed—over us.”\textsuperscript{9} Odysseus, in privileging his uncontrollable yearning for

\textsuperscript{7} Homer, \textit{The Odyssey} XIII.10-12 (Lattimore, 198 [Murray, 2:2]).


\textsuperscript{9} Dante, \textit{Inferno} XXVI.136-142 (Mandelbaum, 244-5).
knowledge above all else, reconceives the Homeric telling of his journey. He ventures into the world not to reunite with Penelope, but to reach the ends of the earth. He dies not as a warrior or king, nor for glory or fame, but as an itinerant and in the name of wisdom. His preoccupation with knowledge of the unknown and unpeopled lands reaches, the text implies, beyond the rightful parameters of the human experience; he desires a knowledge he cannot have. But while in Dante’s telling Ulysses’ travails on the open-sea explain his demise, they are not the cause of his eternal damnation (he is punished for the theft of Troy’s Palladium). Neither Dante nor Virgil challenges the valor, value, or veracity of his confession. The text permits his account to stand without authorial commentary. However much Ulysses’ epistemological and experiential hubris cuts short his life, he expresses no remorse for his choice. His geographical transgression overtook his identity. There was no circumventing the allure of the undiscovered.¹⁰

Through expeditions of economic and military necessity (and the power of autopsy), the hearsay of witnesses, and careful research in the libraries of great Mediterranean cities, Greeks and Romans devised, as we have seen in the previous chapters, theories about laws of the natural world and the human diversity within it.¹¹ The genesis of human difference was not only a facet of the natural world, but it was also, in the case of geographical or astrological determinism, conditioned by its working principles. Insofar as foreigners and nature both held promise as refuges of discovery and knowledge acquisition, as the quote from Paul Veyne demonstrates, they became parallel sites/sources of investigative and theoretical resolution.

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¹⁰ This expression of exhilaration is not meaningfully dissimilar from Lévi-Strauss’ longing to see people untouched by human hands and unseen by human eyes, as I noted in chapter five.

¹¹ Those theories did not, as much as they tried to account for phenomenological differences, dispel the lingering “moral” problems of civilization. They merely heightened its acuity. To the extent that the concept of the uncivilized mind (vis-à-vis the corrosive urbanites of cities and civilizations) proved a valuable point of contrast, it invoked the language and laws of nature to parse the distinction.
There is an essential consonance between positing and deciphering the laws of the natural world and writing the history of human development and difference. The rationalization of the world through a single (we might say singular) ideological perspective draws upon both the mundane and eccentric alike to impose its vision of predictability and order. In *The Raft of Odysseus*, her ethnographic reading of Homer’s *Odyssey*, Carol Dougherty summarizes the shared impulse of ancient and modern ethnographers to venture outward and return home with stories and insights about foreign peoples and fantastical places:

> The culture studied, the ‘ethnos’ in ‘ethnography,’ was understood to be foreign, far away, and fantastic: Herodotus’ cannibalistic Scythians, Tacitus’ savage Britons, E.E. Evans-Pritchard traveled to Africa to study the Azande, and Claude Lévi-Strauss sailed overseas to capture the tribes of Brazil in his ethnographic masterpiece, *Tristes tropiques*. Thus the practice of ethnography has always been located at the margins of two worlds or systems of meaning; it decodes one culture and then recodes it for another.

Here, the clichéd maxim of rendering the strange familiar—translating in our terms, outré habits, customs, and ways of life—governs the ancient and modern ethnographic processes. But beyond the rather persistent refrain of identity formation, mimesis, and subversion as effects of cultural imperialism, conquest, and colonialism—not to be minimized or ignored, surely—lies another set of fraught concerns about ethnographic representation and language that I have discussed in relation to the world of Christian late antiquity and the heresiologists. I have argued that in the late antique world, defined by remarkable religious and political change, the preoccupation to organize and systematize the world writ large appends the refrain of Christianization (the aspiration, we might say, to unite the world under the mantle of Christianity) to the ethnographic endeavor. The world is not simply classified, but it is

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Christianized. Nature and its laws and peoples are made to be compatible with the demands of Christian theology, polemic, and culture.

For reasons both practical and methodological, I narrowed my focus in the above chapters to only one illustration of Christian ethnographic writing (and its corresponding implications) in late antiquity. But the collection of ethnographic data and the theorization of Christian and human difference extended far beyond the boundaries of heresiological literature. In writing about the world they inhabit, their relationship to it, and their interpretation of it, Christian writers infused various genres of writing, including letters, sermons, commentaries, travelogues, monastic handbooks, and hagiographies, with an awareness of macroscopic paradigms and microscopic description. To take full account of the pervasive presence of ethnography and ethnographic writing in the texts of Christian late antiquity, one would need to survey a wide range of authors and forms. Epiphanius, indeed, already points toward a secondary avenue of ethnographic interest toward the conclusion of De Fide. Having labored to name the heretical-philosophical addenda to the eighty sects of his text’s body, he transitions to a discussion of the “the tenets of the faith of this only catholic church and harmless dove” which concludes with a description of its various members. There are priests, presbyters, deacons, sub-deacons, deaconesses, the order of readers, exorcists, translators, undertakers, laity, nuns, and monks, the latter of which garners the most attention. He describes, cursorily and incompletely, the habits and customs of the monks: where they live, what they wear, how they sleep, what they eat, and how they pray. While “the custom of hospitality, kindness, and almsgiving to all has been prescribed for all members

15 Epiphanius, De Fide 21.3-11 (Holl and Dummer, 3:521-522).
16 Epiphanius, De Fide 23.2; 23.3, 23.6; 23.6; 22.7; 22.11; 23.8 (Holl and Dummer, 3:524, 523, 525).
of this holy catholic and apostolic church,” there is a plurality of Christian ways of living piously. In directing his readers toward an ethnography of the monks, Epiphanius harnesses the didactic value of laudatory auto-ethnography.\textsuperscript{17} Books I-IV of John Cassian’s \textit{Institutes} further describes and moralizes the praxis of monks of particular geographical regions and traditions.\textsuperscript{18} To understand monastic piety, Cassian tells his readers at the outset of his treatise, one must understand their outward way of life.\textsuperscript{19} This focus on aspirational ethnography, whereby outward habits prepare and enable the inward turn toward God, symbolizes the transformative potential of praxis and habitualization: it is “edificatory ethnography, anthropology designed to improve,” which “arises almost entirely out of the development of a powerful expository style at once spare, assured, lapidary, and above all resolute: definite views, definitely expressed.”\textsuperscript{20}

In her description of hagiographical literature, Georgia Franks emphasizes its alluring potency: “such tales recounted the wonder-working and wisdom of distant monastics, for whom the desert became a stage for biblical spectacles. Christian audiences were drawn by these stories into another world, one shaped (and authenticated) by unceasing prayer, prophecy, healing, and exorcism.”\textsuperscript{21} Saints, like monks, appeared otherworldly. At once human

\textsuperscript{17} Epiphanius, \textit{De Fide} 24.1 (Holl and Dummer, 3:525).

\textsuperscript{18} For the text, see Iohannis Cassiani \textit{De institutis coenobiorum et De octo principalium vitiorum remediis libri XII}, ed. Michael Petschenig, CSEL 17 (Vienna: C. Geroldi Filium, 1888), 3-231.

\textsuperscript{19} Cassian, \textit{The Institutes} I.1: “De institutis ac regulis monasteriorum dicturi unde competentius donante deo quam ex ipso habitu monachorum sumemus exordium? quorum interiorem cultum consequenter tunc poterimus exponere, cum exteriorem ornatum sub oculorum depinxerimus obtutibus” (Petschenig, 8).


and divine, they straddled the worlds of the natural and divine. Indeed, their liminality only amplified their revered power to perform the seemingly impossible. Here were men and women whose very identities created alternative expressions of space: saintly geography.\textsuperscript{22} Travel and pilgrimage literature—the \textit{Itinerarium Egeriae}, \textit{Lausiac History}, the \textit{Itinerarium Burdigalense}, and the \textit{Topographia Christiana}, to name but a few illustrative examples—is yet another reflection of a burgeoning Christian ethnographic disposition.\textsuperscript{23} The expansive gaze of Christian travelers, who described their world through their Christian eyes, infused their writings with ethnographical and geographical maps of piety: to travel in the world was to see and spread its Christianity everywhere. The Christian narrative of sacred history encompassed the elaboration, both macroscopically and microscopically, of holy topographies and hallowed ethnographies. Christian writers, as we have seen, did not wait for the world to become manifestly Christian; instead, they used their texts to make it Christian at its very core.

From Homer, Herodotus, Pliny, and Tacitus, down to Epiphanius, Augustine, Cosmas, and Isidore, ancient ethnographical writing, in all its variations, transmits authorial ideology into textual form by means of representation. And while ancient ethnographic writings do not strictly conform to the modern ethnographic practice in its professed effort to avoid a discourse of essentialization (there were no rules in place to prevent certain types of interaction), these two “stages” or historical moments of writing peoples do reflect a parallel set of questions and textual negotiations. Indeed, ethnography is as much about the particularities of its content as it is about confronting the capacity of writing in the name of

\textsuperscript{22} See, for instance, Susan Weingarten, \textit{The Saint’s Saints: Hagiography and Geography in Jerome} (Boston: Brill, 2005).

representation. The unforeseen and foreseen consequences of ethnographic writing envelop huge quantities of intellectual capital, which expose epistemological and textual limitations. Writing about the discourse of discovery and the New World, Stephen Greenblatt emphasizes the tension between “the idea of spreading their [Western religions’] representations while resisting the possibility of free movement of alternative symbolic systems.”24 The appropriation, moralization, and construction of cultures, at home and abroad, produced corresponding processes of textual representation and archival regulation. As Greenblatt explains of the early Modern situation:

This representation is never quite synonymous with direct possession of a social reality which is always mobile and elusive, though the discourse of travel is saturated with the glittering promise of such possession and records extraordinary steps taken to secure it...European voyagers create up artifacts that they have purchased or stolen or received as gifts, and they take unsuspecting or undefended natives captive, not only in order to serve as interpreters but in order to ship them back for display at home...What the spectators got for their money is the experience of wonder in the presence of the alien: they see and perhaps touch (or, we are told in the case of Caliban, smell) a fragment of a world elsewhere, a world of difference. But, of course, that world is not present; only a sliver of it, an anecdote in the form of a dead or dying captive, has crossed the immense distance. And, as the very name Indian suggests, even this sliver of otherness is not accessible to direct apprehension; the viewers carry with them to exhibits, as to the lands from which the exhibits have been seized, a powerful set of mediating conceptions by which they assimilate exotic representations to their own culture. These conceptions are at once agents and obstacles in the drive to possess a secure knowledge of the alien; they are bound up with the primal act of witnessing around which virtually the entire discourse of travel is constructed.25

To the extent that the legacy of Christianity adumbrated and continues to inform the discourse of ethnography, the intellectual process by which these twin foci, Christian truth and human diversity, intersected belongs not to the middle ages, early Modern Europe, the


25 Greenblatt, Marvelous Possessions, 121-2.
Renaissance, or with the writing of Herodotus, but to the age of Origen, Jerome, and Augustine. Late antiquity occupies surprisingly little attention in narratives about the formation and perpetuation of Christianized styles of travelogues, geographies, ethnographies, and universal histories. This was the era in which classical culture of Pliny, Tacitus, and Herodotus was facilitated through the precepts and principles of Christian scholasticism (and further refined in the middle ages). I would posit that the late antique biblicization of Herodotus and Herodotean styles of ethnographic writing, to formulate the transformation somewhat crudely, fundamentally transformed the landscape of ethnographic expressions and contemplations about the peoples of the world. Sir Walter Raleigh’s multi-volume *The History of the World*, for example, is teeming with references not only to Herodotus, Josephus, Berossos, Pliny, and Mela, but also to Augustine, Eusebius, Orosius, Origen, and Jerome. It is the negotiation and melding of these modalities of cultural representation, the incorporation of macroscopic theorization and microscopic description, that produced the language of Christian ethnographic writing.

Initiated in late antiquity, refined in the middle ages, and fully enacted and expanded, we might say, during the Renaissance and Enlightenment eras, Christian ethnographic discourse has cast a wide, if underacknowledged, shadow in the history of anthropology and uncritical ethnography. While my discussion of late antique ethnography analyzes one aspect

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of the Christian turn in writing about peoples (and has been limited to the first five hundred years of the first millennium C.E.), the effects of the Christianization of the writing peoples endure well into the present. Even a cursory glance at texts as wide-ranging as Bartolomé de Las Casas’ *Apologetic Summary History of the People of These Indies*, Jean-Frédéric Bernard and Bernard Picart’s *Religious Ceremonies of the World*, Euthymius Zigabenus’ *Panoplia Dogmatica*, and Samuel Purchas’ *Purchas His Pilgrimage, or Relations of the World and the Religions observed in All Ages and Places Discovered, from the Creation unto This Present* attests the permeation of the late antique ethnographic disposition.\(^{28}\) Not only does the effort to express the internal diversity of the Christian world continue unabated, but the totality of the human species becomes increasingly subjected to the intellectual and conceptual strictures of a Christian ethnographic tradition. It is telling, indeed, that Ephraim Pagitt’s massive seventeenth-century treatises were designed in expressly complementary terms: *Christianographie, or the Description of the Multitude and Sundry Sorts of Christians in the World, Not Subject to the People and Heresiography; or, a Description of the Hereticks and Sectaries of These Latter Times*.\(^ {29}\) These distinct yet mutually reinforcing compendium juxtapose those who rightfully, though differently, belong to the world of Christianity with those who squarely remain outside its tradition and history. But even as the world massively grew in size to include the “New” and the *periplus* through the

\(^{28}\) The discourse of travel, discovery, exhibition, and classification that infused the writings of Christopher Columbus, Nehemiah Grew, Sebastian Muenster, François Deserz, Michel de Montaigne, and Francis Bacon, was an outgrowth not only of heresiology but of ecclesiastical history, itineraries, and universal histories.

\(^{29}\) Ephraim Pagitt, *Christianographie, or The Description of the Multitude and Sundry Sorts of Christians in the World, Not Subject to the Pope. With their Unity, and How They Agree with the Protestants in the Principall Poynts of Difference between Them and the Church of Rome*, 2nd ed. (London, 1640); and *Heresiography, or a Description of the Hereticks and Sectaries of These Latter Times* (London: 1645). Thomas Edwards’ considerably more famous heresiology *Gangraena*, published in 1646 in London reads, in the Preface and throughout, as a text stuck out of time: “this present Treatise is not so much against any one errour and sect, as against all I have hard of, a Discovery of, and Directions against that many headed monstrous Hydra of Sectarism sprung up in these times” (Preface, A). He not only internalizes the rhetoric of ancient heresiology, but he appeals his forefathers by name (Jerome, Augustine, Ambrose, to situate his own project.
Christian theological and geographical diversity grew ever more complex and less manageable, the history of Christianity remained as a fractured narrative of both its constructive and destructive elements.³⁰ There was no escape from the dizzying profusion and diffusion of sectarian opinion. It had been irrevocably imprinted into the fabric of Christian history.

³⁰ As Pagitt’s Christianographie so vividly demonstrates, there is no escaping the history of Christianity’s expansion; like Genesis, it is the sine qua non upon which the entire narrative of Christianity’s geographical profusion is built. To that end, he foregrounds his discussion of Christianity’s geographical diversity with an enumeration of the apostolic missions (and even manages to quote Irenaeus!): “in the ecclesiastical histories,” he tells his readers, “the countries and nations are named, in which and to whom they preached” (17). The ensuing schematization of the world categories by the Christians by geographical locus: there are those of Europe, Africa, and Asia, who are variously subject to the Pope of Rome, and Patriarchs of Constantinople, Moscow, Jerusalem, Antioch, Alexandria, and Ethiopia. But it was not just that the apostles remained the exemplars of Christian expansion, but that Christian expansion and difference was explained through the elaboration of form, structure, method, and scope.
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