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About the National Center for Disaster Preparedness

Founded in 2003, the National Center for Disaster Preparedness (NCDP) is an academically-based resource center at Columbia University’s Mailman School of Public Health dedicated to the study, analysis and enhancement of the nation’s ability to prepare for, respond to, and recover from major disasters, including terrorism. The NCDP has a wide-ranging research, training and education, and advocacy agenda, with a special interest in megadisasters. NCDP staff and faculty have testified at Congressional hearings, conducted briefings for senior government officials, and have presented at numerous scientific conferences and meetings.

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Over the years, two things have become evident to us as philanthropic leaders. First, that philanthropy becomes exponentially more difficult when combined with disasters. Second, with the appropriate resources, philanthropy on a national scale should be able to become a national powerhouse in disaster preparedness, response and recovery.

In the first few days after Hurricane Katrina hit Louisiana and breached New Orleans’ Industrial Canal, the city began to fill up like a bathtub and 1.5 million people fled the Crescent City and other communities on the Gulf Coast. Seemingly overnight, the population of Baton Rouge, the capital, increased by more than 50%. As our family and friends throughout the Southern parishes of Louisiana and in Mississippi began what would turn out to be a multi-year struggle with the enormity of the storm and its aftermath, a small group of colleagues in the foundation community, entrusted with the management and effective deployment of our donors’ funds, communicated with each other in extremely urgent terms. We were intently focused on the farthest horizon: How would the Gulf Coast recover from this devastating event? What could our organizations do?

As a consultant to the largest family foundation in the state, located in Baton Rouge, I immediately contacted my trustees and obtained a commitment to start a $1 million fund for New Orleans. I then called John Davies, President of the Baton Rouge Area Foundation (BRAF). I said, “May I come over? I have money and we must start a fund for NOLA.” I will never forget John’s reply: “Come now, I need your brain more than the money.” John and I, along with associates at the Huey Wilson Foundation (also of Baton Rouge) and Lamar Advertising, spent an entire day talking with each other. Within a day, the four organizations had each donated $1 million to help respond to Katrina’s devastating effects. As it turned out, figuring out a sensible and effective way to help would prove to be a much greater challenge for all of us than obtaining funding from our generous donors.

With the city of New Orleans in chaos and the federal and state government not sure what to do (and not doing it very well!) the initial $4 million went to work, enabling BRAF to house the Greater New Orleans Foundation and several other foundations and out of town grantors. Soon our initial $4 million stake had grown to $45 million as national donors contributed to our fund. The Louisiana philanthropic sector, out of necessity and sheer will, had become a force that kick-started a broad range of recovery efforts when everyday leaders fled and the bureaucracy was paralyzed. Through our donors’ support, philanthropic organizations conducted shelter assessments, performed some of the earliest post-Katrina damage assessment tours of NOLA, engaged the International Rescue Committee for their first ever job on U.S. soil, rebuilt the NOLA restaurant community, and gave out $300,000 to help families with lost wages and who had incurred added expenses for hosting families. The philanthropic sector also set up the Louisiana Recovery Authority, a coordinating body within the governor’s office that oversaw the entire recovery enterprise and managed the federal funding streams as well as a number of private revenue streams. In short, philanthropy was a “gap filler” no more. Philanthropy was in the wheelhouse!

Other path breaking disaster response efforts arose
from those desperate discussions at a moment of extreme crisis. Our grant-making changed case management policy at the federal level and created “Encourage,” a mental health program for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) that wasn’t covered in the Stafford Act. Philanthropy led to the creation of Louisiana Speaks, a smart growth program that convened community residents and engaged them in planning efforts, and that hired architects and planners who guided the redevelopment of ten square blocks in St. Bernard Parish. Philanthropy also revitalized a dormant Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters (VOAD), created the first ever tri-state VOAD among Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, and played an important role in the Road Home Program. After Hurricanes Ike, Gustav and Isaac, and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, philanthropy led the way with the creation of the Water Institute, a public-private partnership dedicated to the study of water as an asset for coastal protection and restoration. Philanthropy cultivated relationships and established networks with national political leaders, Washington think tanks, and major national businesses and civic leaders to keep disaster preparedness in the public eye even when no disasters were occurring.

Since Hurricane Katrina, whenever a major disaster has struck a community anywhere in the country, one of us from that initial group in Baton Rouge has been called upon to offer advice, to answer the question, “What can we, donors and the philanthropic sector as a whole, do in addition to writing checks?” This happened during Hurricanes Gustav, Ike, Irene, Isaac, and Sandy. It happened after the Joplin tornado, and after the Midwest floods. This past summer it happened after the “super derecho” of violent thunderstorms that cut a 700-mile path of devastation from the Midwest to the Mid-Atlantic States. These calls also have come from government officials, community leaders and key representatives of the non-profit and business sectors. The common themes focus upon how we recover, how we can put together public and private money and effort, and what we can tell donors who are compelled to contribute.

Over the years, two things have become evident to us as philanthropic leaders. First, that philanthropy becomes exponentially more difficult when combined with disasters. Second, with the appropriate resources, philanthropy on a national scale should be able to become a national powerhouse in disaster preparedness, response and recovery. By convening, coordinating, compelling and leveraging broad cross-sections of society, philanthropy on a national scale should be able to wield its power and have the same kind of influence that the Gulf Coast philanthropies had in the Katrina response and recovery. For both of these reasons, and so that donors never again need to wonder to whom they should turn for advice and what they should do when a disaster occurs, we founded the Center for Disaster Philanthropy. It was born, in spirit, that day in Baton Rouge when Katrina and its effects were still swirling about us. In many ways, this document on the future trends in disaster philanthropy is the outgrowth of everything we have learned (and are still learning) since those tumultuous days in August 2005. Four key lessons serve as underpinnings for many of this report’s recommendations:

- First, it is critical to engage interested parties in a discussion when they are not in the middle of a disaster. It is extremely hard to network and plan when people and organizations are focused on sheer survival, and many of their administrative and fiscal systems have been disrupted. Disaster philanthropy has to begin before the event.

- Second, it is important to look at disasters through a “cross-sectoral perspective.” Our greatest successes came from learning from each other. We brought together people from business, policy sectors, academia, philanthropy, and
from local, state, and federal government agencies.

- Third, disaster philanthropy needs to focus – first – on the assets and innate resilience of disaster prone communities. This means becoming involved in preparedness and mitigation efforts, in planning and networking before events occur, and understanding the inherent strengths of a community so that re-imagining that strength in a post-disaster setting can become a key recovery goal.

- Fourth, much the way our colleagues in medical research consider how to move from “bench to bedside,” taking what is learned in a laboratory to a patient’s side, we need to turn our “lessons learned” into creative actions and innovative interventions. From a philanthropist’s perspective, that could be as simple as maintaining the institutional memory and structure to apply past successes to future threats.

We live in the most generous country in the world and we don’t like to see others suffer. That humanitarian motive is what drives so much of disaster philanthropy. But then this largesse falls off abruptly after media coverage ends, even though there are many ways to give throughout the whole cycle of a disaster. Philanthropy may be its most effective as a source of risk capital and “patient capital.” Disaster philanthropy is not just about rebuilding homes, although that is certainly critical. It is also about addressing many of the social ills and vulnerabilities exposed by a disaster, the very root causes that we, as philanthropists, work on every day. I hope that this guide for potential donors inspires you to broaden your thinking, and informs your philanthropic efforts.

Lori Bertman
President, Irene W. and C.B. Pennington Foundation
Co-founder and Chairman of the Board, Center for Disaster Philanthropy
Donors are essential sources of support for disaster recovery in two distinct categories of communities.

- Post-disaster communities that have stabilized to the point of thinking about “getting back to normal” and not merely getting by day to day (page 6).
- Communities that have not experienced a disaster recently or ever, but because they clearly are in harm’s way, want to establish mechanisms to help them jump start the process of recovery if the worst should happen (page 6).

Seven major trends will shape and define the political and economic environment in which donors confront requests for disaster-related assistance.

1. There likely will be less federal money to support recovery than in prior years (page 8).
2. “Recovery” as a discipline and area of professional specialization has begun to “mature” or “come of age,” which means it potentially may become more bureaucratized and formulaic (page 8).
3. A major long-term reduction in the amount of catastrophic risk that households, businesses and the public sector have transferred to the private insurance market will result in much greater losses borne by communities when disasters strike (page 9).
4. Decaying and under-maintained infrastructure is a time bomb facing communities that experience disasters (page 12).
5. Many communities may lack an adequate understanding of their exposures (page 12).
6. Disasters are followed by a very short window when communities can attempt to envision and embark on a path towards alternative futures (page 13).
7. With the exception of Hurricane Katrina, the United States has not experienced a true megadisaster (page 13).
KEY TAKEAWAYS

Donors can support long-term recovery--both before and after disasters--in diverse ways that suit diverse donor missions, philosophies and styles.

- Build trust and break down barriers among stakeholders (page 18).
- Promote stakeholders’ understanding of their risks and exposures (page 19).
- Help state and local actors across the public, private and non-profit sectors integrate into the new National Disaster Recovery Framework (page 19).
- Enable interested local, state and federal parties to maximize the resources brought to bear (page 20).
- Provide recovery coaching for local leadership (page 21).
- Support catalytic recovery projects and enterprises (page 23).
- Strengthen and build networks of NGOs and Faith-Based Organizations active in recovery (page 23).
- Provide practice and thought leadership for recovery as a critical component of disaster philanthropy (page 26).

Donors can promote disaster recovery by helping communities develop the critical components of a long-term recovery process (page 14).
This paper examines how donors can support stabilized communities that are beginning to think about “getting back to normal.” Donors should also be prepared to support vulnerable but proactive communities that wish to plan to recover from a disaster that may never occur.

When disasters strike, Americans are very generous, donating billions to aid individuals and families in need. In the years since Hurricane Katrina made landfall along the Gulf Coast on August 29, 2005, more than $6.5 billion has been provided to the region’s residents, businesses, and institutions through philanthropic giving.¹

The vast majority of disaster-related donations comes from individuals² in the initial days and weeks when a disaster’s impacts are fresh in our minds and images are still appearing on the evening news.³ Charities understand this, which is why many of them issue appeals and advertise their disaster response efforts in that early window of time before the reporters and film crews pack up and go home. Although this strategy can maximize aggregate donations, the risk is that too much money gets concentrated in time and with charitable organizations that are (like most federal and state disaster assistance) legitimately focused on the immediate provision of emergency medical care, food, shelter, and clothing rather than on longer-term issues. After all, it takes time to discover the full extent of a disaster’s impacts and response and recovery needs. The task of rebuilding communities, economies, and individual’s lives can take years, even a decade or more.

This guidance paper goes above and beyond what donors can learn—or already have learned—from a handful of excellent guides developed by the philanthropic community since Hurricane Katrina.⁴ Much of this literature on “disaster philanthropy” has been directed at the most effective ways for donors and their agents can help provide food, water, clothing, shelter, sanitation, health care and self-governance for masses of displaced and traumatized people. Here, we discuss innovative and under-appreciated ways that donors can help American communities recover and rebuild resiliently from disasters. The goal is to give donors a fresh perspective on supporting local efforts not only to rebuild from disasters already sustained, but also to prepare to recover from potential disasters. In both cases, there are opportunities for donors to directly fund, or pool and leverage funds for a variety of recovery and rebuilding activities, programs and services.

By “donor,” we mean the individuals and organizations that provide their own funds, marshal funds contributed by others, and disburse or administer such funds. “Donors” includes the entire spectrum of people and organizations involved in generating and distributing discretionary, philanthropic spending: wealthy individuals and families, family foundations and offices, community foundations, large public foundations, corporate social responsibility departments and corporate foundations.

This paper looks at the post-disaster recovery and rebuilding needs of communities that donors can support. This would include disaster-stricken communities that have stabilized to the point where they have the physical, economic, political, and psychological wherewithal to begin thinking about the process of “getting back to normal” or alternatively, attaining some new and different steady state in which residents would feel safe, secure, emotionally attached to their changed environment, and accepting of their changed life circumstances. Few disaster-stricken community officials,
businesses, and residents – the army of recovery rebuilders – have prior disaster recovery experiences and quite often lack the necessary resources to plan and execute such a complex and long-term process.

This paper also considers communities that have not yet actually experienced a disaster or haven’t had one recently, but are clearly in harm’s way. Around the United States, several states and localities in this category have begun to take the prudent step of putting in place mechanisms that would help them jump start the process of recovery if the worst were to happen. For example, the State of Florida now mandates that 203 coastal counties and municipalities create “post-disaster redevelopment plans” and has provided a guidebook to assist in that process. In 2008, the City and County of San Francisco initiated a “Citywide Post-disaster Resilience and Recovery Initiative” that “seeks to address comprehensive advanced planning to accelerate post-disaster recovery.” As will be described later, the U.S. National Disaster Recovery Framework urges all vulnerable communities to consider taking such actions.

This paper assumes that its readers already know the terms under which they are ready, willing and able to fund this sphere of philanthropy, or are in the process of answering that question. Therefore it does not address a range of strategic, tactical and operational issues amply covered in the previously cited literature. Some of those issues include contingency planning for rapid reallocation of budget capacity from existing priorities to unpredictable disasters; compliance with international humanitarian aid standards; stepping outside of the donor’s mission to fund disaster-related assistance; relying upon recommendations and the local “intelligence” of parties with more local presence than the donor; having different application, monitoring and reporting processes for disaster-related assistance; participation through donor collaborations; distribution of donor’s total disaster funding commitment between immediate humanitarian aid and longer-term recovery support; and the kinds of measurement and evaluation the donor requires.

In preparing this guidance paper, Columbia University’s National Center for Disaster Preparedness (NCDP) performed extensive background research addressing two major developments in federal disaster recovery policy and their implications for disaster philanthropy. One is the National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF), the other proposed amendments (currently stalled in Congress) of the Stafford Act, which is the primary statute that governs the federal government’s response to most major disasters. This research documented the broad conceptual parameters of the NDRF and its limited operational deployment to date, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of bills intended to enhance the utility of the Stafford Act. This guidance paper builds upon that research, but treats the Stafford Act and the NDRF as just two of numerous important contextual factors bearing on disaster philanthropy and donors’ decision-making.

The remainder of this paper contains three sections. The first describes seven major elements of the environment confronting donors who may be contemplating funding long-term disaster recovery assistance. Although the correspondence is not perfect, the challenges facing donors largely overlap with the challenges facing communities that experience a disaster or are planning for how to deal with a disaster they hope will never occur. The second section briefly discusses a theoretical model of long-term disaster recovery that has emerged from prior NCDP research. The paper utilizes this model to organize the varied activities, programs and services that donors can support, and to explain how they relate to a comprehensive approach to long-term disaster recovery. Finally, this paper discusses the kinds of donor support that NCDP believes would have the greatest beneficial impact.
Donors contemplating providing support for locally-based efforts to recover from major disasters need to consider the following issues:

There likely will be less federal money to support recovery.

Although one ultimately must look to the federal budget and the annual appropriations acts to determine a trend in federal support for disaster recovery, the current economic and fiscal crisis environment has provided other compelling indications that federal assistance will at best hold steady and more likely, decline.

The proposed amendments to the Stafford Act, although they are stalled in this session of Congress, reflected legislators’ sentiment that it should become harder for disasters to qualify for federal assistance.

Those amendments proposed a new “worst case” incident level, with at least one billion dollars of estimated damages, to be called a “Catastrophic Disaster,” and stipulated that a presidential declaration of a “Catastrophic Disaster” could not become effective unless an independent panel previously had rendered a non-binding recommendation on that subject. The bill also would have restricted the availability of supplemental appropriations of community development block grants to “Catastrophic Disasters,” denying that source of non-Stafford Act funding to communities that had sustained anything less than one billion of damage.

One of the major tenets of the National Disaster Recovery Framework is that the federal government, while in effect imposing a mandate on communities to prepare for disasters, will not provide any funds for that purpose above and beyond the minimal planning and preparedness grants it currently offers. When it comes to disaster recovery, NDRF is clear that the current Stafford Act is as good as it’s going to get.

Finally, planners and local government officials have observed that FEMA is adhering more rigidly to the formal process requirements for declaring an incident to be either an “Emergency” or “Major Disaster,” the current threshold determination to be eligible for Stafford Act assistance. This increases the burden on impacted communities to demonstrate that they’ve suffered a sufficient aggregate level of losses to satisfy the Stafford Act’s (and related regulations’) threshold.

Proposed changes in federal law would make it harder for large disasters to qualify for federal assistance.

“Recovery” as a discipline and area of professional specialization has begun to “mature” or “come of age,” which means it potentially may become more bureaucratized and formulaic.

This is most evident in FEMA’s extensive efforts to roll out the NDRF on a nationwide basis and impress upon states and local governments that the federal government is changing the way it deals with disaster-stricken communities beyond the immediate crisis period. Just as states and localities were forced to adapt to and
conform their own emergency management systems with the National Incident Management System and the National Response Framework starting in February 2003, they now will have to embrace and master a new (and just barely emerging) set of functions, roles, relationships, policies and rules in order to maximize whatever recovery support the federal government will make available.

NDRF will create a number of significant structural changes in the process whereby a disaster-stricken community applies for and obtains federal assistance for recovery. For example, federal recovery funds won’t flow to a disaster site until there is a joint state and federal recovery plan approved by FEMA. As a key step in implementing the NDRF, FEMA has appointed the high level regional officials mandated by that document, known as “federal disaster recovery coordinators.” FEMA will also appoint at least one national “Mitigation Advisor” pursuant to the Interagency Operational Plan for NDRF. The agency already has debuted drafts of new guidance documents to define intra-federal and intergovernmental relations in disaster recovery and retained the American Planning Association (APA) to update a well-known classic book on post-disaster recovery to reflect NDRF concepts. APA is considering establishing an internal hazards and disaster management section, and certificate and degree programs in “recovery” also may appear soon.

All of these developments signal the emerging primacy of state and local recovery plans and planning processes and the professionalization and potential bureaucratization of recovery. This trend has the potential to increase awareness of and political support for recovery planning as a routine function of local government and of other local stakeholders such as the non-profit, faith-based and business sectors. If that occurs, and recovery preparedness becomes as deeply-ingrained in vulnerable communities as emergency preparedness has become, communities potentially could be much better prepared to address recovery than they have been historically.

Alternatively, federal encouragement of state and local structure and processes for recovery planning and preparedness, coupled with an absence of federal resources to support the work, could be a burden rather than a boon to states and localities. Furthermore, there is some concern that over time, bureaucratized “recovery” could become compartmentalized or forced into silos. Much as some communities have hired consultants to develop cookie-cutter hazard mitigation plans in order to qualify for grants under the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, developing long-term recovery plans also could degenerate into a “check the box” exercise.

A major long-term reduction in the amount of catastrophic risk that households, businesses and the public sector have transferred to the private insurance market will result in much greater losses borne by communities when disasters strike.

In many parts of the U.S. that are vulnerable to catastrophic disasters, particularly the hurricane and earthquake-prone states on the East and West Coasts, homeowners and renters have far less, or more restrictive, insurance coverage to help them rebuild destroyed homes or replace possessions when disasters happen. In the economic downturn of recent years, many businesses in these same regions have
reduced their insurance limits and thus have fewer outside resources to help repair catastrophic damage to their facilities, replace destroyed inventory and compensate for business interruptions caused by these hazards. Similarly, cash-strapped local government agencies—driven by legal mandates to balance their budgets and possibly by the belief the federal government ultimately will bear the costs of disasters—have opted to reduce their insurance coverages and decrease their coverage values from full replacement cost to depreciated value (often called “actual cash value”). Consequently, they will absorb an even greater proportion of the losses caused by damage to expensive public buildings and infrastructure. Thus, either deliberately or unaware, almost all sectors of society are retaining a significantly greater portion of the risk of loss from catastrophic events instead of transferring that risk to private insurers. Consequently, disaster-impacted communities will likely sustain continuously growing gaps between loss levels and private insurance coverage.

Many factors account for this. As a result of sustaining many years of record losses from natural hazards (See Figure 1, below), the insurance industry has attempted in various ways to achieve a more favorable balance between the premiums it expects to earn on catastrophe-related policies and the claims it expects to pay on such policies (particularly for earthquakes and hurricanes). Many catastrophic related coverage terms have higher minimum deductibles and/or lower limits than previously. Also, an “all perils” policy - covering floods and earthquakes along with wind and fire - may be less available in some regions, such as the central U.S., than in years past or may be available only at substantially higher premiums. In some states, insurance companies have completely stopped offering coverage for losses caused by specific perils, resulting in some well-known actions by the states to create state-backed insurance programs, such as the California Earthquake Authority and Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund.

In addition, over the past 20 years, the insurance industry has increasingly utilized much more sophisticated and granular catastrophic risk models that enable insurers to better assess risks based on varying location and construction type, and to adjust their pricing (i.e., premium rates) accordingly. Some insurance companies use these models to give credit in their premium rates for various types of loss mitigation measures that individual homeowners, governments and businesses have taken (e.g., installing storm shutters or elevating critical electrical and HVAC equipment). However, the industry’s risk and pricing models generally do not incorporate community-level factors and attributes such as the existence of zoning, building codes, or community engagement processes.

These changes cumulatively have made coverage for catastrophic losses much less available in the insurance marketplace, and more expensive and less attractive to would-be purchasers when it is available. As a result, some consumers, businesses and government decide to take a gamble and go uncovered for catastrophic losses, or to buy less coverage than they

**Individuals, families, businesses, non-profits and local government all will absorb an increasing proportion of catastrophic losses, due to carrying less private insurance.**
are likely to need in a catastrophic event. In all likelihood, a certain number of people, governments and businesses that carry some kind of property insurance assume that they are covered for catastrophic losses from all perils when in fact they are not.

Figure 1 illustrates the worldwide trend of rising disaster costs over a 30-year period, and the corollary rise in the amount of uncovered financial losses. Although the ratio of uncovered to covered losses actually has declined over this three-decade timeframe, from approximately 8:1 to 4:1, absolute dollar losses have escalated tremendously. This may represent gains in mitigation efforts to insure against losses in high-risk areas, but the size and growth of uncovered losses suggest a growing recovery challenge. This difference between covered and uncovered losses reflects the absolute minimum investment required for affected areas to return to pre-event conditions, much less build back to a better or higher standard. Furthermore, what this trend line cannot capture are those disaster consequences not so easily monetized – diminished physical and mental health among an affected citizenry, loss of a sense of community and attachment to place, environmental degradation, or large-scale social disruptions or population displacements.

**Figure 1**

Natural catastrophes worldwide 1980 - 2011: Overall and insured losses with trend
Decaying and under-maintained infrastructure is a time bomb facing communities that experience disasters.

Since 1998, the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) has published a periodic “report card” on the state of America’s infrastructure. These reports have assigned a grade to various major classes of infrastructure based upon current condition, the degree of deferred maintenance, public safety, resilience and other factors. In addition, the report card provides ASCE’s recommended level of investment in infrastructure over the next five years in order to remedy noted deficiencies. ASCE’s most recent report card, in 2009, assigned grades of “C” to “D-” to fifteen classes of infrastructure, and estimated that America needs to spend $2.2 trillion over the next five years. These estimates do not reflect investments needed to adapt to climate change.

Unintentional or willful ignorance of infrastructure vulnerabilities, insurance coverage gaps and economic drivers can turn a major problem into a catastrophe.

Both private insurance for infrastructure damage and the Stafford Act’s “Public Assistance” program for repairing or replacing infrastructure cover the protected party only up to the value of infrastructure in its pre-existing condition. For many cash-strapped states, municipalities and special districts, years of deferred maintenance may result in their infrastructure systems already being severely worn and depreciated at the time a disaster strikes. Thus the full replacement cost of damaged infrastructure may well exceed the amount of funding that will be available from external sources at the exact moment when a disaster has severely impaired the jurisdiction’s own revenues and reserves. Vulnerable communities may be ignorant and/or in denial about the magnitude of their potential exposure from a disaster. Furthermore, upon sustaining a major hit to their infrastructure, local officials may become so focused on remedying the public sector’s own direct losses that their capacity (i.e., their own time, energy, and concentration, and that of their staff) to address broader recovery issues may be badly diminished.

Many communities may lack an adequate understanding of their exposures.

Besides not fully appreciating the extent of their infrastructure deterioration or the degree to which their households, businesses and local governments have retained the risk of catastrophic loss, many communities may not have a sufficient baseline analysis of their local and regional economies to correctly gauge the nature of the economic damage a disaster has caused. Such communities will be sorely challenged to articulate what needs to be “fixed” or restored after the crisis is over. Understanding the drivers of a regional economy is complicated under ideal conditions, but communities that do not have a reasonably clear picture of what has changed post-disaster are likely to have difficulty coming up with meaningful plans, offering incentives to attract or keep businesses, making infrastructure and other public sector investments, or doing those things in an effective sequence.
Disasters are followed by a very short window when communities can attempt to envision and embark on a path towards alternative futures.

During this window of community solidarity and relative absence of political friction, there is at best an equal balance between the desire for speed of recovery and the desire for deliberation. People and organizations are at least willing to consider new restrictions on where and how property owners may rebuild, modifications in permitted land uses, and the use of taxpayer-funded subsidies to encourage certain types of development. However, as planners Robert Olshansky and Laurie Johnson state so aptly, “speed is difficult to resist.” The desire to rebuild quickly—and largely as things were before the disaster—inevitably overwhelms calls for rebuilding smarter and better, with mitigation and with less risk. Olshansky and Johnson conclude that given this reality, “the appropriate question is how to deliberate and how to plan more efficiently—get more planning done in less time—in order to achieve as much improvement as possible...”

With the exception of Hurricane Katrina, the United States has not experienced a true megadisaster.

Many of America’s major metropolitan areas are vulnerable to large-scale catastrophic disasters comparable to, or even exceeding the scale of losses sustained in the Gulf Coast region due to Hurricane Katrina. Miami, Tampa, Houston and New York City are among the larger coastal cities that have not been hit recently by a major hurricane. Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego and Memphis similarly face the risk of a catastrophic earthquake. Scientific research suggests that large-scale disasters are long overdue in many regions of the country. In the future, we should expect to see disasters that cause damages and losses that will dwarf those from domestic disasters since Katrina. These events will cause widespread and systemic failures of infrastructure and even possibly disruptions of social order.

The desire to rebuild quickly and largely as before the disaster inevitably overwhelms calls to rebuild smarter, better and with less risk.

Even before hurricane Katrina, the federal government had begun to organize high profile studies, planning exercises and drills to highlight and better understand the risks associated with catastrophic events. Some of these efforts have focused on a catastrophic hurricane in New Orleans, major earthquakes on the San Andreas and New Madrid faults, an earthquake and tsunami in the Cascadia subduction zone, and dirty bombs and improvised nuclear devices in major cities. But much more research, analysis and open discussion are needed regarding “how bad can it get.”
In 2010, NCDP conducted a study of pre-disaster long term recovery planning in four vulnerable mid-size American cities, and elaborated upon one particular theory of recovery first proposed in 1985. The end result was a broadly descriptive model—portrayed as a pyramid—of how the long-term recovery process may function (see Figure 2). In this section, we briefly discuss this model and illustrate it with examples from Joplin, Missouri and the first six months of its recovery from the devastating tornado of May 2011. In the next section of this report, we will use this model to organize a menu of specific activities, programs and services that donors may wish to support.
The foundation of the pyramid is a complex constellation of contextual factors, unique in each locality, but including the political and social environment, the dynamics of the local and regional economy, cultural norms regarding cooperation and competition, and prior experience with major disruptive events. In Joplin’s case, these would include (among many others) the Council-Manager form of municipal government and the method of electing Council members both from specific zones and at large; Joplin’s status as the economic hub of a multi-state region; a recent history with localized tornados and ice storms that resulted in an experienced coalition of non-profit organizations active in disasters; a long-established chamber of commerce with strong regional connections and experience in running economic development programs; a public school system that recently had been engaged in a strategic planning process and major construction program; a large faith-based community that had established collaborative relationships across its members and with the schools and municipal government; and the existence of two major not-for-profit health systems.

As reflected in the next to bottom level of the pyramid, a community’s ability to utilize its recovery tools and capabilities effectively depends upon it having robust and highly competent administrative structure and processes in its day to day, normal operations. A community that can effectively pursue complex but important goals under ordinary conditions should have a better chance of rising to the extraordinary challenges posed by a disaster than a community that cannot. Before the tornado, Joplin city government had led efforts to revitalize the downtown. The public school system had collaborated with churches and area businesses in a highly-regarded program called “Bright Futures” designed to increase high school graduation rates. The Joplin Area Chamber of Commerce was a productive economic development agent for the city and region, as well as a long-time recipient of 5-star accreditation from the United States Chamber of Commerce. For nearly 50 years, the Economic Security Corporation of Southwest Area had attracted millions of federal housing and social services dollars into Joplin. Local churches and social service agencies had successfully mobilized resources to assist victims of several major ice storms and smaller tornados. Just weeks before the May 2011 tornado, a local university with dormitory facilities, the local American Red Cross chapter and the city government had established a sheltering arrangement as a prudent preparation for a catastrophe nobody had reason to expect would actually occur.

In this model, the middle level of the pyramid indicates that communities embarked upon recovery also need what we have called “recovery process infrastructure” - tools and capacities related to recovery that they will employ after a disaster and which may well remain latent until activated by a disaster. This includes things such as legal authorities to temporarily suspend or selectively apply certain land use, environmental and administrative regulations; committees, task forces and other formal mechanisms to establish relationships among diverse political actors; recovery plans and guidance documents; and mutual aid agreements and other memoranda of understanding. Like most other communities in the United States, Joplin had not invested in a diverse tool-kit specifically with recovery from a disaster in mind. It had in place the previously-mentioned sheltering agreement and the association of non-profits active in disasters. The local network of faith based organizations and their year-round mission activities represented a capacity that the churches could dramatically scale up following a disaster.
Although few formal long-term recovery tools or mechanisms pre-dated the tornado, various members of the community rapidly put them in play after the fact. This included the FEMA-supported “long term community recovery” process through a “Citizens Advisory Recovery Team,” a housing needs study commissioned by the City Manager, a regional jobs recovery and expansion initiative spearheaded by the chamber of commerce, and a request for statements of interest from potential master developers. Various new funds and foundations were established to facilitate the collection of external recovery assistance dollars, and Missouri state government promptly allocated both low income housing tax credits and state business income tax credits in order to help direct private sources of capital towards Joplin’s recovery.

A community that can successfully pursue complex goals under ordinary circumstances should have a better chance of recovering than communities lacking such competence.

According to the model, the achievement of the results that people care about most (shown at the peak) depends upon a set of “instrumental outcomes” shown in the second level from the top. These are outcomes that don’t factor directly (or perhaps even consciously) into the way individuals, families, households and social groups think about their well-being. For example, in order to ultimately get new housing and jobs, to repair infrastructure and to create an environment that citizens accept and remain bonded to, there must be continuity of the public sector. An impaired or incapacitated local government can’t manage debris removal, engage with the public in a goal-setting process, work with state and federal government to get tax credits and grants, or evaluate competing re-development proposals.

The community also must have a variety of ways to bring in external resources to replace what the disaster has stripped away, and an environment that supports households, businesses and community organizations in making their independent decisions to remain, rebuild and reinvest. This does not necessarily mean that government must subsidize or attempt to steer such individual decisions in a particular direction. At a minimum, though, government must consciously consider how actions it takes in the aftermath of disasters may complicate, impede or delay rebuilding and investment decisions that individual actors wish to make. Ideally, local government should take steps to simplify the process for those that are ready, willing and able to act.

The City of Joplin supported its citizens’ and businesses’ desires to rebuild first and foremost by removing the rubble in record time and promptly

To be ready to pursue recovery when disaster strikes, communities need to have pre-existing, latent tools and capacities that they can activate immediately.

cont’d
lifting the initial short-term construction moratorium area by area as debris removal progressed. The leaders of the public schools and of the two major health systems, through early and dramatic decisions to reopen, rebuild and scale up, did everything in their power to instill confidence that recovery would occur rapidly and to encourage fence-sitters to reinvest in homes and businesses in Joplin. The diverse community actors who contributed to the Citizens Advisory Recovery Team process of setting long term recovery goals completed their exercise in barely four months under very difficult conditions.

Instrumental Recovery Outcomes make it possible to attain the jobs, housing, functioning schools and infrastructure, good physical and mental health, and other results that make the various sectors in a community feel truly “recovered.”

The pinnacle of the pyramid represents the “ultimate recovery outcomes” in which planners, policy-makers and citizens are interested. These include the reconstruction of housing, restoration of critical infrastructure like schools, transportation and health care facilities, revitalization of the local economy and replenishment of lost jobs, and the attainment of good physical, mental and emotional health. These elements all are necessary in order for people who have lived through disasters to return to some degree of normalcy, stability and acceptance.

This framework of long-term recovery is predicated upon the assumption that a community that articulates where it hopes a recovery process will lead and the kinds of ultimate recovery outcomes it hopes to attain, will be more likely to engage in coordinated and integrated post-disaster activities than a community that isn’t explicit about its goals. It also reflects the assumption that a community that has a strong foundation—a resilient economic base, an amenable political culture, competent and effective organizations and leaders, and a tradition of cooperation and collaboration across sectors—and the tools and capacities to keep all sectors operating post-disaster and to gather community input and build consensus, will be more likely to articulate its recovery objectives. In Joplin, the CART distilled thousands of pieces of citizen input into a precise, concrete, and achievable set of objectives for local government, the school system, the public health system, the business community, the local non-profit network and faith-based organizations. Although Joplin’s long-term recovery from a disaster that displaced close to one third of its population is just beginning, these CART recommendations already have influenced specific public and private decisions about the selection of a “master developer,” zoning and land use changes, allocation of low income housing tax credits, and the disbursement of grants from some of the philanthropic funds established by donors after the tornado.
The National Disaster Recovery Framework promulgated by FEMA in September 2011 (NDRF) emphasizes the importance of what FEMA has come to call the “Whole Community” approach to recovery, in which all sectors of society pitch in and contribute human and financial resources instead of relying primarily upon the federal government. To this end, the NDRF goes to great lengths to describe roles and responsibilities of individuals and households, businesses and the nonprofit sector, as well as those of government. While acknowledging the “formidable value of the work” of the nonprofit sector, NDRF describes a very traditional set of recovery roles for this sector. Those roles generally fall under the rubric of “fill[ing] gaps where government authority and resources cannot be applied” and “implement[ing] an inclusive, locally-led recovery organization and process...as Federal and State recovery support recede and local leadership and community recovery organizations complete the mission.” NDRF does not discuss any unique roles for donors.

University of North Carolina professor Gavin Smith’s comprehensive and up-to-date book Planning for Post-Disaster Recovery: A Review of the United States Disaster Assistance Framework, describes how foundations have supported disaster recovery by keeping local NGOs fiscally and managerially solvent during periods of immense financial and operational stress. Smith also emphasizes the roles foundations have played as conduits for financial assistance and relief supplies, as advocates for particular constituencies, as policy experts and as funders of disaster research and program evaluation. However, Smith’s book also devotes little attention to potential innovative roles for donors.

In this section, we identify eight broad categories of activities, tools, programs or services that should be high priorities for donors wishing to help communities recover from disasters already sustained, or to prepare to recover from disasters feared. Several examples are provided for each category, and a full list of potential donor activities is included as Table 1. Our assignment of donor options to these eight categories is somewhat arbitrary, as some items arguably should be in more than one. Table 1 also indicates the time periods—before a disaster, after a disaster or both—when a donor could meaningfully support such an activity.

1. Build trust and break down barriers among stakeholders

One ubiquitous theme rises to the top in most discussions of long term recovery, from the NDRF to FEMA’s “Whole Community” manifesto to NCDP’s four-city long term recovery study. Namely, that it is critical that people be ready, willing and able to rely upon one another immediately once a disaster hits. This means much more than merely engaging cautiously, guardedly and perhaps even suspiciously with people whom one barely knows. It implies sufficient confidence and trust in another person to hand off a problem and walk away to do something else, with the expectation that the other person will act in a way that respects your interests and values. Many have noted that after a disaster is not the time to try to begin forging relationships of trust; almost by definition, breaking down barriers is something that must occur (and that donors should support) when a vulnerable community is not in crisis mode.

Building trust and breaking down barriers is as essential within sectors of the community as across them. Employees of diverse departments of a municipal or county government need to build relationships with each other as much as they do with local NGOs and business organizations. The leaders of local government need to cultivate relationships with the state and federal government staff upon whom they will rely if a time comes when they need federal recovery assistance. The various organizations in a local network...
of NGOs need to build relationships so that can build upon their respective strengths and not treat each other as competitors if a disaster occurs.

It may not be feasible or realistic for a donor or any outside third party to attempt to create relationships of trust among diverse recovery stakeholders, but donors can prime the pump to encourage such relationships to emerge organically. Specifically, donors can design, support and offer various opportunities for local actors to come together, including:

- Generic (i.e., not related to recovery matters) experiences in team-building and collaborative problem solving such as organizations across all sectors use to improve performance;

- Opportunities for parties that are relatively inexperienced in recovery issues and NDRF principles to observe and/or participate in functional and tabletop exercises where they can begin to forge relationships with those with whom they’d need to work following a disaster;

- Workshops focused on limited but perennial areas of recovery conflict, such as between planners and development interests over public discussion of hazards or mitigation measures that potentially could impair real estate or business values.

- Online and social opportunities for members of an emerging recovery constituency to stay in touch and strengthen relationships beyond formal training (see Box 4, Tri-State VOAD Conference).

2. Promote stakeholders’ understanding of their risks and exposures

As noted previously, many local leaders may not fully appreciate what their exposures might be— their insurance gaps, their infrastructure deterioration or their economic vulnerabilities—should a disaster strike. This limits a community’s ability to make appropriate trade-offs and decisions. Donors cannot force a clearer understanding of risks and exposures upon local leaders who, for political reasons, may not want to have that information (or want others to have it). In most communities, however, many parties will be very eager to have such knowledge. In particular, donors can:

- Provide subsidized, independent assessments by qualified professionals of uncovered catastrophic exposures, hidden infrastructure deficiencies, and local and regional economic drivers.

- Support NGOs’ and faith-based organizations’ efforts to analyze their own vulnerabilities to operational disruptions from disasters (see “Strengthen and build networks of NGOs and Faith-Based Organizations.”)

3. Help state and local actors integrate into the National Disaster Recovery Framework

After the federal government promulgated the National Incident Management System and the National Response Framework roughly a decade ago, state and local governments across the United States began to adapt their local emergency management structures to the emerging federal structures. Similar adaptations are likely to occur in response to the National Disaster Recovery Framework, but with one major difference. Emergency services/emergency management is a routine function of virtually all states and local governments in the nation. Even where it is nothing more than the local sheriff or fire department, emergency response receives a base level of funding from various levels of government regardless of whether or not there is a disaster.
Disaster recovery, on the other hand, doesn’t correspond closely to any routine, ordinary function of local government. Absent federal funding to hire specialists for pre-disaster recovery planning, cities, counties and states are going to need help figuring out how to piggyback that function onto routine, funded functions of government without overburdening or compromising those routine activities.

FEMA has begun the process of developing detailed guidance for the local public sector on how to fulfill its roles and responsibilities under the NDRF. It has circulated a preliminary draft of a document known as Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 102, and it has commissioned the American Planning Association to update the classic volume that FEMA and APA collaboratively produced 15 years ago, entitled Planning for Post-Disaster Recovery and Reconstruction. These FEMA efforts, however, do not make donors superfluous by any means. Donors can:

- Create or support tools and training resources that supplement whatever FEMA ultimately may decide to provide for the benefit of the local public sector.
- Subsidize the participation of the non-profit, faith-based and business sectors in collaborative efforts with FEMA to develop comparable guidance on fulfilling their respective NDRF roles.
- Create or support tools and training specifically designed for state government level officials, who have unique roles to play in the NDRF as conduits and coordinators of federal assistance to stricken localities.
- Provide similar support for state health and education departments, upon which local health departments and school districts are heavily dependent during recovery.

4. Allow all interested local, state, and federal parties to maximize resources brought to bear

Community members’ lack of a common awareness of the resources available to support recovery, both within the community and from various levels of government and donors, is a huge impediment to recovery. Gavin Smith points out that in most disaster contexts, the universe of people and organizations with resources that they could contribute to recovery is not networked in any meaningful way. They don’t know the others exist, or if they do, they play by different rules, they don’t coordinate, they don’t have relationships, they duplicate effort and they forego opportunities. All of these failures repeatedly and predictably lead to disaster assistance being wasted, underutilized or used inefficiently.

As mobilizing and deploying resources to replace or restore what a disaster has destroyed is the essence of recovery, donors should focus on ways to facilitate that process:

- Donors can fund the development and ongoing maintenance of a unique software application that incorporates all the forms and procedures for the major government assistance programs. Local leaders in post-disaster settings have viewed running the federal assistance gauntlet as one of the most opaque and frustrating ordeals they’ve ever faced. In the past, American households and businesses almost universally viewed filing income tax returns the same way. Yet software companies have captured the entire Internal Revenue Code (and 44 states’ overlapping tax laws and regulations) in user-friendly applications that millions of American households and businesses now use routinely. If smart programmers and subject matter experts can tame the income tax process, they possibly can...
do the same for the process of seeking recovery assistance. As no individual community or business will be able to justify the costs of developing such software, doing so is an ideal opportunity for donors.

- Donors also can fund a “situational awareness” tool that disaster-impacted localities can use to see the big picture of the resources that are available and latent in their community. One existing product, the Center for Effective Philanthropy’s “Strategy Landscape,” may offer instructive insights on how to pursue such a tool.17

- Donors can directly subsidize VOADs, other NGOs and faith-based organizations that have predictable long-term post-disaster roles serving as case managers, and marshaling and distributing massive quantities of survival necessities, household goods, building supplies and volunteer labor of all kinds. These organizations can more effectively fulfill these roles with inexpensive capital infusions to acquire extra temporary staff, warehouse space, trucks and communications equipment.

- Donors can provide seed funding for the organization and capitalization of “social impact” financial mechanisms such as those created in Los Angeles in the late 1990s following a series of major military base closures and the Northridge earthquake (see Box 1).

- Donors also can make subordinated investments in social impact financial vehicles, such as the New York City Acquisition Loan Fund, LLC.

5. Provide coaching for local leadership

In the aftermath of a disaster, local leaders (especially those for whom it is a first-of-its-kind experience) can feel an overwhelming burden. It is a challenge for which all of their professional experience and training is at best an approximation. They are confronted with a seemingly endless series of urgent decisions at a time when they likely do not have access to their full staff or full complement of organizational resources. Local revenues also may be radically impaired for an extended period. This burden is vastly compounded if leaders personally have experienced the death or injury of a relative, friend or loved one, or substantial damage to their home, neighborhood or business.

- Donors can organize and sustain a flexible national network of “recovery coaches.” The network could include a core of individuals who had lived and worked through major disasters themselves in positions of significant leadership and responsibility, supported by a roster of subject matter experts who previously had consulted on recovery efforts following major disasters.

- Donors could make the coaches available to local leaders—not just public officials, but leaders in any sector who are bearing a large share of the burden of reviving a traumatized community—for a year or even longer, depending upon the local leaders’ wishes. Coaches would provide customized assistance tailored to how each impacted community defines its own needs.

- The coaches would have the credibility to serve as a sounding board and source of feedback and encouragement for local leaders currently confronting unfamiliar and daunting challenges, and desiring some validation of their judgments and assessment of problems. If the local leaders opted to deploy them this way, the coaches also could provide some much needed “bench strength” on specific recovery tasks.
BOX 1: MAXIMIZING RESOURCES - THE GENESIS LA FAMILY OF FUNDS

Genesis LA Economic Growth Corporation, created in 1998 under the leadership of former Los Angeles Mayor Richard Riordan, has sponsored a series of investment vehicles designed to help direct private capital towards lower income communities in southern California.

“We strive to provide greater social and economic opportunity by bridging the chasm between the real estate capital markets, community development organizations and government entities. Through such partnerships, we have created a new hybrid model of community development, which ensures that all project participants benefit: empowering local stakeholders, ensuring financial returns for investors, and creating new opportunities for underdeveloped communities.”¹

Through professionally managed funds (the Genesis LA Real Estate Funds, which focus on economic development and job creation and the Genesis Workforce Housing Funds, which focus on “middle-income housing and neighborhood retail”),² and the self-managed 130 million Genesis LA Community Development Entity New Markets Tax Credits program,³ Genesis LA has marshaled more than $500 million to support its mission.

Setting up the Genesis LA funds required specialized expertise and cost approximately $500,000. Donors provided the funds to accomplish this ($200K from the city of Los Angeles and $300K from local banks).⁴ That initial donor support ultimately leveraged $1000 of investment for every dollar of seed money.

⁴ NCDP conversation with Deborah La Franchi, 4/2012.
6. Support catalytic projects

Many local leaders believe that high visibility projects can contribute to recovery by fostering optimism and pride, eliciting positive media coverage and external funding, and encouraging displaced residents and businesses to hang tough and stay in the area until a tangible recovery milestone has been completed. Examples include the early commitment by the major universities in New Orleans to reopen for classes in January 2006, and the early decision by the Sisters of Mercy Health System to build a new hospital in Joplin, Missouri after the May 2011 tornado destroyed Mercy’s local hospital. (See Box 2 regarding the decision to start the 2011-2012 Joplin school year on time despite the loss of many facilities).

- Donors can support local leaders daring enough to make major early commitments and increase their chances of delivering on those promises. For some leaders, the most useful form of support will be financial support to bring on board on a short-term basis (3-4 months) a highly valued person whom the leader believes has the expertise to move the project forward. For other leaders, access to specialized technical, engineering or legal expertise may be the most critical need. Still others may value assistance in public communications and mobilizing citizen engagement the most. Coaches such as those described above, could help local leaders refine their assessments of the kind of donor support that would be most helpful for pulling off for a catalytic project.

7. Strengthen and build networks of NGOs and Faith-Based Organizations Active in Recovery

Donors are used to working with major relief organizations like the American Red Cross, Catholic Charities and United Way, as well as countless smaller and specialized NGOs and faith-based organizations, to deliver shelter and other crisis assistance. But these not-for-profit organizations often take on critical tasks in long-term recovery as well. They act as the case managers for Stafford Act Individual Assistance and for a wealth of assistance generated in or by the community and administered by community organizations. They also recruit volunteers, obtain donations from their members and affiliates, house and feed volunteers and people who are displaced, and provide household goods, food, clothes, furniture, appliances, and cleaning supplies. They even provide clean-up crews, building materials and skilled construction labor, all above and beyond what disaster victims receive from government and all for free. They are major rebuilders of housing and major providers of mental health services. Donors can support this critical infrastructure by helping to ensure that non-profits and NGOs themselves are resilient in the face of certain kinds of natural hazards, and by enhancing their ability to collaborate with each other (see Box 3). Specifically donors can:

- Create, nurture and/or fund local NGOs such as San Francisco CARD (Community Agencies Responding to Disaster) to promote widespread adoption by local non-profits and faith-based organizations of existing preparedness standards and to provide preparedness training. Simply increasing the likelihood that non-profit networks will survive major disasters would be a major contribution to the success of long-term recovery.
Less than 48 hours after an EF-5 tornado had destroyed six of the Joplin Schools’ ten school buildings, Dr. C.J. Huff, the superintendent, announced that the public schools would reopen for the 2011-12 school year on schedule, just 85 days later. Through the Herculean efforts of the school staff, volunteers and business and non-profit organizations, Huff and his team met their deadline with a 95% student retention rate.\(^5\) Many in Joplin viewed this decision as something that not only motivated high levels of community participation in recovery-related efforts, but also kept many people from moving out of the area.\(^6\)

A year later, Huff mentioned two ways that donors could have significantly increased the likelihood of reopening the schools on time.\(^7\) First, funding temporary finance staff to work with the local assessor on managing the mid-long term implications of the tornado’s tremendous hit to the schools’ property tax base. That would have freed up the school system’s CFO to focus on a host of crisis problems. Second, providing resources and expertise to manage an abundance of restricted donations that Joplin Schools were delighted to receive, but that likewise diverted staff from the problems with the shortest fuse.

\(^5\) NCDP Huff interview 12/2011.

\(^6\) NCDP Ducre and Knutzen interviews 12/2011.

\(^7\) NCDP conversation with CJ Huff 7/2012.
In 2008, in response to various concerns about how well the Santa Barbara area could respond to a natural disaster of a scale comparable to Hurricane Katrina, The Orfalea Foundation created the “Aware & Prepare Initiative: A Community Partnership to Strengthen Emergency and Disaster Readiness.”

During previous wildfire emergencies in Santa Barbara County, NGOs that serve a significant population of vulnerable constituencies—lower income, non-English speakers, homeless, people with disabilities—had been severely handicapped by the absence of Spanish language media or Spanish “reverse 9-1-1,” limited English-Spanish translations for official communications, overtaxed staff and financial resources, a relatively inactive county-level VOAD, and poor relations with both city and county emergency management officials. A number of the NGOs lacked any planning for how to serve their constituency during an emergency or how to ensure their own survival.

To begin addressing these issues, Orfalea organized a regular series of meetings among NGOs and the County OES, reinvigorated the Santa Barbara County VOAD and arranged for NGO representation in the County’s Emergency Operations Center. Orfalea also helped increase the level of coordination regarding disaster readiness among local donors. “Since its inception, Aware & Prepare has been supported by a collaborative of funders including the Orfalea Foundation, the Santa Barbara Foundation, James S. Bower Foundation, Wood-Claeyssens Foundation, Outhwaite Charitable Trust, Hotchkis Family Foundation and the Fund for Santa Barbara. It is Aware & Prepare’s goal to have all local funding for emergency readiness coordinated with the strategy and priorities set forth by the Emergency Managers Committee in Santa Barbara County and the Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters.”

8 http://www.orfaleafoundation.org/partnering-impact/aware-prepare/key-elements-aware-prepare

8. Provide Practice and Thought Leadership for Recovery as a Critical Component of Disaster Philanthropy

The future will offer numerous opportunities for donors, acting independently or through a national resource organization, to take a direct leadership role in accelerating recovery from specific disasters.

- Donors, particularly those who are not major political actors in a stricken community, have a unique ability to act as honest brokers, facilitators, and conveners and to create momentum in an environment when energy, creativity and flexibility already are stretched to their limit.

- As highlighted in a seminal article on effective disaster philanthropy released in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, donors can make widely available multiple modalities—webinars, interactive websites, social media, breakfast meetings, funders-only conclaves—of exchanging information between the donor world and localities seeking recovery assistance.19

They also can provide support to codify an increasing body of evidence and experience about the most effective ways to mobilize and manage volunteers, and how to apply the economic value ascribed to volunteerism to meeting a local matching share for federal assistance under the Stafford Act and other laws.

Independent of an actual disaster situation, donors also can fund research on some of the big, as yet unanswered questions about how recovery occurs. Table 1 includes suggested topics.
In mid-November 2011, with more than $400,000 of support from the Baton Rouge Area Foundation, the Louisiana Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters convened the first of what is intended to be an ongoing series of conferences with its sister organizations along the Gulf Coast. This three day gathering attracted approximately 250 leaders from organizations that are active in the three states’ VOADs, along with representatives from the federal government, universities and other organizations that are not active members of a VOAD.

Headlined as “Because Disasters Know No Boundaries,” the conference’s goal was to begin “to address persistent gaps in response and preparedness with update response strategies,” and towards that end it “featured national and regional disaster experts in roundtable discussions, plenary and breakout sessions, and five training courses.” The event also provided many structured and informal opportunities for networking both within and across state, including an “evening event with food and entertainment.” Among attendees who returned completed evaluations, the networking opportunities received the highest grades of all components of the conference.


### Table 1.

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<tr>
<th>Activities, Tools, Programs, and Services</th>
<th>Pre Disaster</th>
<th>Post Disaster</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Build Trust and Break Down Barriers Among Stakeholders</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Organize and underwrite experiences in team-building and collaborative problem-solving for stakeholders in government, NGO, faith-based and business sectors.</td>
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<td>Subsidize opportunities for parties inexperienced in recovery and NDRF principles to observe and/or participate in functional recovery exercises where they may begin to forge relationships.</td>
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<td>Build bridges among planners and “pro-development” interests concerning public discussion of hazards or mitigation measures that potentially could impair real estate and business values.</td>
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<td>Create opportunities for the trained parties to remain in informal contact via dedicated social networking products.</td>
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<td>Provide funding for narrowly-focused projects undertaken collaboratively by local government, school systems, business organizations, foundations and faith based organizations.</td>
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<td>Maintain online library of examples of non-disaster related collaborations.</td>
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<td>Provide training and support to localities in managing media relations during recovery.</td>
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<td><strong>Promote Stakeholders’ Understanding of Their Risks and Exposures</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Provide subsidized independent risk management advice to enable NGOs, municipalities and businesses to get better information about their uncovered exposures.</td>
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<td>Provide subsidized independent engineering assessments of hidden infrastructure deficiencies and/or shortfalls in existing insurance for infrastructure damage.</td>
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### TABLE 1 (CONTINUED).

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<th>ACTIVITIES, TOOLS, PROGRAMS, AND SERVICES</th>
<th>PRE DISASTER</th>
<th>POST DISASTER</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provide subsidized independent analyses of regional economic drivers, to facilitate planning and decision-making to attract or keep businesses and make infrastructure investments.</td>
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<td>Support local NGO efforts to analyze their own vulnerability and resilience in the face of certain kinds of natural hazards</td>
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<td>Support local NGO efforts to address underlying root causes of risk and vulnerability, and to “strengthen and amplify local organizing, social justice concerns and movement building.”20</td>
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<td><strong>HELP STATE AND LOCAL ACTORS INTEGRATE INTO THE NDRF</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Offer training to educate the non-profit, NGO, faith-based and business sectors about their designated roles in NDRF.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subsidize non-governmental participation in the development of guides for the non-profit, NGO, faith-based and business sectors equivalent to Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 102.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supplement FEMA-provided training for state government officials designated to perform the NDRF-mandated role of “State Disaster Recovery Coordinator.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop training for state departments of health and departments of education in the extraordinary needs of municipal and county health departments and school boards during disaster recovery.</td>
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<td>Support local government feedback on FEMA-generated guidance on how local governments can incorporate the NDRF into traditional, ongoing programs and planning activities.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>PROVIDE TOOLS AND CAPITAL TO PROMOTE OPTIMAL USE OF LOCAL AND EXTERNAL RESOURCES</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Tools</strong></td>
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<td>Commission and maintain in updated form, a computer application to enable applicants for all categories of federal recovery assistance to correctly navigate the federal application process.</td>
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<td>ACTIVITIES, TOOLS, PROGRAMS, AND SERVICES</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commission customizable templates for localities to use in assembling inventories of recovery-related physical and human assets.</td>
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<td>Offer impacted localities a “situational awareness” tool to provide a comprehensive and dynamic picture of the recovery efforts occurring across the broader</td>
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<tr>
<td>Create a national inventory and online portal to free or low-cost tools to improve Continuity of Operations procedures for small and medium businesses</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop innovative approaches to post-disaster donor due diligence of NGOs, when local non-profit organizations are least capable of diverting resources to educating donors.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Capital</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Subsidize acquisition of temporary paid staff, warehouse space, trucks, and communications equipment by organizations that marshal and distribute large</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provide seed capital to support the organization and capitalization of “social impact” financial mechanisms to induce private funding for housing, economic development and health facilities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Make subordinated capital investments in “social impact” financial vehicles.</td>
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<td>Nurture a local foundation that could assume some critical roles that other local actors may be ill-prepared to handle during a disaster.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subsidize multi-sector support for FEMA’s development of an “integrated case management tool.”</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>PROVIDE COACHING AND SUPPORT FOR CATALYTIC PROJECTS</strong></td>
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<td>Organize and sustain a flexible national pool of “recovery coaches” consisting of alumni of major disasters and highly qualified subject matter experts.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provide disaster-impacted localities free and sustained access to Recovery Coaches for at least 6-12 months.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provide financial and/or staff support to help a local leader (in any sector) deliver on a commitment she or he has made to a publicly-announced, high profile recovery project.</td>
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TABLE 1 (CONTINUED).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITIES, TOOLS, PROGRAMS, AND SERVICES</th>
<th>PRE DISASTER</th>
<th>POST DISASTER</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support the creation of tools such as land-banking to help localities address the speed vs. deliberation conundrum and other complications posed by “time compression.”</td>
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<td>Support governmental and NGO efforts to track evacuees, extend services to them regionally and facilitate their repatriation</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>STRENGTHEN AND BUILD NETWORKS OF NGOs and FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS ACTIVE IN RECOVERY</strong></td>
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<td>Improve coordination among the national and local level NGOs likely to be active following disasters.</td>
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<td>Create and/or fund local VOADs and other entities to support preparedness and recovery training for NGOs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop preparedness standards to help ensure that NGOs and faith based organizations survive disasters and are able to perform their critical roles in long-term recovery.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support local efforts to prepare the philanthropic sector to survive and recover from a major disaster, similar to the Northern California Grantmakers’ Bay Area Disaster Preparedness and Response Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Practice Leadership</strong></td>
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<td>Provide independent and politically neutral encouragement to convene local leaders, help identify priorities and needs, forge relationships and incubate catalytic projects.</td>
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<td>Offer multiple modalities of exchanging information between the donor world and localities seeking recovery assistance.</td>
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<td>Support efforts to promulgate national standards for volunteer organization behavior in conjunction with FEMAcorps, Americorps, and the National Emergency Management Association</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Thought Leadership</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Support efforts to capture, document and disseminate information about what recovery activities have worked and not worked in prior disasters.</td>
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<td>Assess whether “pilot programs” (unrelated to disasters) that the philanthropic sector has incubated and “handed off” to the public sector, offer models that could be developed for recovery.</td>
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<td>Document cases of the philanthropic sector successfully advocating policy reforms outside the disaster sector that potentially could be applicable to piece-meal Stafford Act reform.</td>
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<td>Commission a study of best practices in managing the consequences of mass population displacement and out-migration following a disaster.</td>
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<td>Explore whether micro-credit and micro-insurance products can mitigate anticipated increasing loss exposures for individuals, households and businesses.</td>
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<td>Examine the nexus of disaster philanthropy and “impact investing,” i.e., investing donor capital for a return of principal, a “social” impact and possibly a below-market financial return.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Explore with the Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN) whether disaster recovery can be incorporated into GIIN’s “Impact Reporting and Investment Standards” (IRIS).</td>
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<td>Determine whether so-called “hybrid value chains” or “social impact bonds” might be useful recovery tools following domestic disasters.</td>
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<td>Examine whether it is feasible to utilize challenges and innovation prizes to generate solutions to complex recovery problems.</td>
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David M. Abramson, PhD MPH, Deputy Director
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Center for Disaster Philanthropy

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Footnotes


4 Key examples include:


Footnotes


8 http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org


10 Ibid.

11 Rubin C, Saperstein M, Barbee D. Community recovery from a major natural disaster. Boulder: University of Colorado Institute of Behavioral Science; 1985. This study was based upon Rubin’s study of fourteen cities with presidentially-declared disasters. The prior Columbia study was funded by the Baton Rouge Area Foundation, the Center for a Resilient Society, the Louisiana Disaster Recovery Foundation, and the Stephenson Disaster Management Institute.


16 Smith, 2011. Planning for Post-Disaster Recovery.


