Inconsistent Colors
The role of Social Movement Organizations in post-Color Revolution states

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Submitted in partial completion of the graduation requirements set forth by the Barnard College Political Science Department
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Special thanks to Hannah Dwan for her enthusiastic editing and encouragement.
Abstract
Over the course of the last decade, Eastern Europe and Central Asia have experienced similar non-violent, pro-democratic social movements led by Social Movement Organizations. In contrast, though, post-social movement states are not equally democratic today. In this essay, I analyze where the SMOs that led three of the Color Revolutions, Kmara, Pora, and Otpor, changed the course of democratization in Georgia, Ukraine, and Serbia, respectively. From this analysis, I conclude that the decision of SMO activists to actively engage with the newly established democratic regime as both opposition and as following a social movement is more beneficial for democratization than passively challenging and more feasible than other means.

“To make democracy work, we must be a nation of participants, not simply observers.”
-Louis L’Amour

Chapter One
A New Wave Rises
At the end of the 20th century, sweeping changes in the global political environment shook up the status quo as the Soviet Union collapsed and a new era began in Eastern Europe. The region, ruled by authoritarian regimes for decades, faced a great opportunity and responsibility - building democracy. Throughout eastern Europe and central Asia countries began building their first independent governments and the world saw a third wave of democracy rise.¹ However, citizens of these new states quickly realized that the transition from an authoritarian empire to an independent democracy is difficult to initiate and maintain. Many of the first democratically elected leaders of these new states did not truly support democratic practices and frequently fell into authoritarian tendencies. From afar, we saw Yugoslavia's President Milosevic brutally suppress opposition to his regime through military force on the streets of Belgrade, Serbia² and overwhelming evidence that Ukraine's President Kuchma ordered the murder of a popular

opposition journalist, later found decapitated and buried in a field near the woods outside Kyiv. Yet hope for democracy did not die.

As the 21st century approached, opposition activists organized in new ways to bring democracy to the region. In Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine, activists built non-violent Social Movement Organizations (SMOs), named such things as “Otpor” meaning “Resistance” in Serbian, “Kmara” meaning “Enough” in Georgian, and “Pora” meaning “It is time” in Ukrainian. Bulldozer, Rose, and Orange - these “revolutions” were vibrant in color, massive in size, and changed the world’s understanding of what it takes to bring down a dictator. Leading the movement, though, were primarily young activists who were born behind the Iron Curtain, raised in the instability that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, and who unified with the goal of electing democratic governments that were free of corruption.

Were these SMOs meant to be both the warriors of democracy and its guardians? In the movements that brought democracy to these states, young people, frequently students, strategized for years to ensure that democracy would finally come. These youth mobilized thousands of people, provided logistical support for protests, and were usually the first wave of protestors in the SMOs they created. Frequently, these youth-led SMOs became the umbrella organizations for all opposition organizations in the movement because of their energy, strategy, and attitudes toward creating political change. In the years that have followed, Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine have faced many challenges to their democratic integrity internally and externally and activists have responded to these challenges in a spectrum of ways. Sometimes activists in

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civil society overcame these challenges. Other times, the challenges went unanswered and pushed states towards de-democratization.

Why have groups who led incredibly similar movements had incredibly different effects on democratization? To answer this question, I explain how Serbia’s Otpor succeeded, Ukraine’s Pora failed, and Georgia’s Kmara never really tried to develop post-Color Revolution democracy. I argue that post-autocracy youth SMOs have a unique potential to influence democratization, unlike other organizations, institutions, or politicians. To develop my argument, I demonstrate how this unique potential can be achieved through a variety of means (with a wide range of success) but ultimately must be used in some manner if democratization is to occur. Through my analysis of Otpor, Kmara, and Pora and their respective states, I have formulated a model for youth organizations’ post-Color Revolution options. The post-Color Revolution actions and developments of Otpor, Kmara, and Pora have fallen under two categories - NGO and political party - and each have subcategories as follows:

A. NGO
1. Elections Monitoring
2. Activist Training
3. Think Tank
4. Political Organizing/Watchdog Organizations
5. Lobbying/Special Interest Groups

B. Political party
1. Regime Coalition
2. Opposition Party
3. Ruling Party

Post-movement youth organizations can - and often do - divide into the two major categories and develop a variety of these options. Though this list is not exhaustive, it offers the most important examples of what activists can implement. The comparison of the successors of Otpor, Kmara, and Pora and how effective they are at encouraging democratization provides a useful model for
what we want other post-democratic social movement societies to create in their government and
civil society. Certainly SMOs successor organizations can take on a variety of different roles,
split into different organizations with the same roles, or anything in between. My working
definitions of each of these options are as follows:

*Elections Monitoring* - Independent organization that observes elections and reports on
irregularities in voting procedures.

*Activist Training* - Organization that provides seminars, pamphlets, or other assistance for
activists seeking to build their own social movement or just pressure leaders for political
reform.

*Think Tank* - Organization that produces public policy generally from a particular
perspective or focused around a particular issue.

*Political Organizing/Watchdog Organization* - Organization that takes part in and
coordinates any number of popular political activist strategies including voter
mobilization, petition writing, canvassing, and organizing protests. Political organizing is
heavily influenced by “watchdog organizations” that publicize negative government
actions.

*Lobbying/Interest Groups* - Organizations, generally with a specific interest such as
environmental or education policy, that meet with politicians and pressure them to
champion their causes.

*Regime Coalition* - Forming a political party that is part of the coalition in parliament that
supports the ruling regime.

*Opposition Party* - Forming a political party that opposes the ruling regime.

*Ruling Regime’s Party* - Joining the political party of the regime either actively or
through political appointment to government offices.

As I discuss how these three groups developed and what their successors are doing currently, I
will refer to these definitions. Not all of these options have been blatantly pursued by Otpor,
Kmara or Pora, but I provide them because there are characteristics of each defined option that
have been exhibited in some way. To answer my question, it is important to understand all influences of youth SMOs.

**Why Otpor, Kmara and Pora?**

When selecting cases, I chose based on the similarities between the youth SMOs and differences in the political environment to which they contributed. Democratic movements in these states were not uncommon and were certainly not a new phenomenon in the region. Modern democratic social movements can be dated back to the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia in 1989 and the Solidarity movement in Poland that happened throughout the 1980s. Bulgaria continued this pattern with its own democratic revolution in 1996-97, followed soon by Slovakia. The first “Color Revolution” occurred in Serbia in 2000 and this phenomena soon spread, leading to pro-democratic movements in Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004, Lebanon in 2005 and the most recent successful revolution occurring in Kyrgyzstan, also in 2005. We have also seen several unsuccessful attempts by pro-democratic activist organizations to democratize in Belarus in 2005 and 2006, Burma in 2007, and Iran in 2009. Most recently, in late 2010 through early 2011, many new democratic social movements have spread throughout North Africa and the Middle East with more success. Regime based violence has been a dominant factor, but the level of movement success and the influence of these current movements on neighboring authoritarian regimes had been impressive to say the least. However, these movements are not popularly considered to be one of the Color Revolutions.

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Of all the countries in which youth organizations led pro-democratic movements, Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine share important similarities in the development of their youth organizations before, during, and after their respective “revolutions.” The size of the well-coordinated youth activist organizations in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine surpassed the numbers in other states that had similar movements during this time. The Bulldozer, Rose, and Orange revolutions also exhibited a relative lack of activist violence compared to the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan. Otpor, Kmara, and Pora also had vital connections to one another – unlike other pro-democratic movements that occurred around the same times as the Bulldozer, Rose, and Orange Revolutions. Serbia’s Otpor was the inspiration and model for other pro-democratic SMOs, hosting trainings in Serbia or sending members to help train Georgia’s Kmara activists and later to Ukraine’s Pora activists.

International involvement in the political development of Color Revolution states was not limited only to activist training by NGOs from other Color Revolution states. More importantly, the blatant influence of Western powers on Otpor, Kmara, and Pora was not only vital for their success, but also more striking than in other countries. All three groups were formed and developed on or around university campuses that support pro-Western policies and were highly visible in Western media. They also used new technology, innovative forms of protest, and western resources to their advantage. Another important international influence was the Russian response and relationship to each of these movements. While Serbia was not formally a state of

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the former Soviet Union, Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine were all under heavy Soviet influence and still maintain dynamic relationships with the successor state of the Soviet Union, Russia.

**Social Movement v. Revolution**

Would a *true* revolution have changed the course of democratization in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine? The Color Revolutions, despite their name, are not actually “revolutions” by traditional definitions or, at the very least, were only temporary revolutions and few were partially successful as revolutions. Samuel P. Huntington explains what makes a revolution,

> The political essence of revolution is the rapid expansion of political consciousness and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics at a speed which makes it impossible for existing political institutions to assimilate them. Revolution is the extreme case of the explosion of political participation. Without this explosion there is no revolution. A complete revolution, however, also involves a second phase: the creation and institutionalization of a new political order. The successful revolution combines rapid political mobilization and rapid political institutionalization.\(^9\)

The social movements that occurred in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine undoubtedly involved a “rapid expansion of political consciousness” and a “rapid mobilization of new groups” led by Otpor, Kmara, and Pora that the regimes in power were not able to counter. While other organizations played large roles in supporting the movements, it was primarily Otpor, Kmara, and Pora who worked most directly with the citizens of the country who were ultimately key to creating a strong democratic society. An “explosion of political participation” also occurred initially in each case, largely the product of the youth activist organizations’ efforts. According to Huntington’s explanation, however, a complete revolution did not truly happen in the cases I am examining.

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Had true revolutions occurred in Serbia Georgia and Ukraine, it is unlikely that Otpor, Kmara and Pora could have made these states would have been more democratic or, at the very least, it is incredibly difficult to predict affirmatively. By its very nature, a revolution creates a completely new government and frequently through violence both on the side of the opposition and the regime. To have led a true revolution and established a democratic government, Otpor, Kmara, and Pora would have to have been very different SMOs. The nature of the organizations is one that unifies around wanting change through nonviolent protest. These young activists did not necessarily seek to lead the country from within the government, but rather to make sure authoritarian Serbia or Georgia or Ukraine did not outlive them. Inspired to change the world but with little desire to be politicians, the leaders of the SMOs would not have transitioned easily into leading democratic governments. SMOs based on Otpor’s model are very decentralized in nature and had they removed all existing structures of government and begin anew, it would have been incredibly difficult to build completely new institutions. Whether the SMOs and their respective leaders would have been able to overcome these challenges is unknown, but the odds certainly side on a negative outcome.

If “revolution” is not an accurate description, then what were these three events? What are we to make of the youth SMOs in each case? Charles Tilly describes the three elements of a social movement being a campaign, political action and exhibiting the qualities of WUNC (worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment).\(^\text{10}\) However, Tilly also cautions against incorrectly calling “an episode of popular collective action” a social movement. In doing so, he explains the three common confusions that arise when discussing social movements. First, using an example of

\(^{10}\) Tilly, Social Movements, 3-4.
environmentalists including any action on behalf of the environment as part of the worldwide environmental movement, Tilly states, “Analysts and activists often extend the term ‘social movement’ loosely to all protest activity or at least all relevant popular protest of which they approve.” Second, Tilly explains that analysts often confuse the participants (organizations and networks) as the movement itself or believe that these constitute a movement. Third, Tilly explains that, “analysts often treat ‘the movement’ as a single unitary actor” which causes problems both because movements frequently have realignment; interaction between all aspects of the social movement (allies, rivals, enemies, targets, constituents, etc.) create a texture that is constantly changing.\(^{11}\)

While there is not a simple, irrefutable definition of “social movement,” I generally associate the “Color Revolutions” of Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine with Tilly’s description of social movements. However, the general trajectory of international democratization in the 21st century suggests that these three events were part of a larger international social movement for democracy, rather than strictly being individual, contained social movements. In Social Science History, Craig Calhoun, president of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), discusses how shared characteristics between new and old social movements can offer support to the latter in that characteristics and styles have a propensity for cyclical repetition. Calhoun explains, there is not a unilateral direction of the social movement narrative, but rather a constant tension that is dependent on mobilization.

“For at least 200 years, under one label or another, the public has been opposed to the private; the economic to the aesthetic; the rationalist to the romantic; secularization to revival; and institutionalization to nascent movements intent on breaking free. These tensions lie behind recurrent ebbs and flows in movement

\(^{11}\) Tilly, Social Movements, 6-7.
Rather than viewing the Color Revolutions as distinctly new social movements, we should instead look at them in the wider scope of the ongoing process of democratization within the region and even within the world. The organizations that have fueled this international trend are more important than the individual protests or the individual dictators. What the SMOs created was drastically different from what revolutions would have or could have created.

As we begin to define the role of Otpor, Kmara, and Pora in this international movement we also explain their affect on democratization. Individually, they mobilized thousands of people in separate series of protests. Collectively, they worked with one another - specifically in the case of Otpor traveling to Georgia, Ukraine, and other countries - to organize massive grassroots efforts that peacefully led to regime change. They were the warriors of democracy. When the protests ended, however, many, though not all, went their separate ways and departed from the activist culture that drove their individual campaigns for democracy. If we look at these individual campaigns as part of a collective effort for democratization, the action of demobilizing or leaving the organizations and activist culture translates as an abandonment of the movement. This perception is further amplified when we see how many of these activists and organizers did not take up efforts to remobilize when their new leaders began on a path to de-democratization.

**Thesis Outline**

To answer why these SMOs have affected democratization so differently, I begin Chapter Two with a discussion of scholarly literature on social movement theories, particularly that of  

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Mark Beissinger, Charles Tilly, and Florian Bieber. These scholars provide a general framework for analyzing the process each organization followed from social movement to democratization within their individual states. Beissinger’s theory of modular political phenomena explains how the framework of the revolutions developed in each country and spread. Tilly’s three elements of social movements places the efforts of these organizations into the context of the larger, ongoing social movement for democratization. Florian Bieber’s analysis of Otpor provides an understanding of what organizations should do during and after social movements. Bieber's four points for democratic activism (mobilizing citizens, gathering information, formulating alternatives, and uniting the opposition) that explained Otpor's success are also useful in understanding where Kmara and Pora failed. Finally, Charles Tilly’s theories on democratization and de-democratization provide us with a framework to analyze what happened in the years that followed each Color Revolution.

In Chapter Three, I trace the path of each youth organization from the beginning of their respective movements to the present. Because the leaders and members Otpor, Kmara, and Pora have divided and branched from the original organizations, my analysis of recent years primarily involves the examination of the organizations that are these three SMOs primary successors. I introduce this section with my model of organizational development for Otpor, Kmara, and Pora. Arranging the SMOs from least effective to most effective, I discuss the ways each organization developed within their political landscape and how this influenced democratization. The driving idea behind this approach is that these organizations should theoretically mobilize in times of de-democratization. If they are complacent, it is important to understand why. This section explains
of how these organizations have developed within their individual democratizing social movements and how their relevance has changed over time.
Chapter Two

Literature Review

Mark Beissinger's theory of Modular Political Phenomena explains how the political environment created by successful protests, greatly influences activists in other states. In doing so, Beissinger explains that the traditional structural requirements for action significantly decrease as the influence of successful example increases.\(^\text{13}\) The term modular political phenomena is defined using Sidney Tarrow's use of “modular” to describe a spread of collective action across groups. This action is based significantly and, at times primarily, on prior successful examples of other groups through emulation and imitation. Beissinger admits that there are other forms of cross case influence – including spillover effects, herding behavior, path-dependence, and reputational effects - but explains that, “in a globalizing, electronic world” the challenges posed by Galton's problem, and specifically by modular behavior, are growing.

Galton's problem, very basically, questions whether phenomena that seem independent actually “derive from an earlier common source.”\(^\text{14}\) In regard to democratic movements in the region of the former Soviet Union, Beissinger explains that the revolutionary experience of each successful movement has been borrowed, spread, and emulated throughout the region. Though the basic model was slightly altered to “confront the reality of local circumstances,” there is a set of six basic features that maintained during each.

“1) the use of stolen elections as the occasion for massive mobilizations against pseudo-democratic regimes;
2) foreign support for the development of local democratic movements;

\(^{\text{13}}\) Beissinger, 269.

\(^{\text{14}}\) Beissinger, 259-60.
3) the organization of radical youth movements using unconventional protest tactics prior to the election in order to undermine the regime’s popularity and will to repress and to prepare for a final showdown; 
4) a united opposition established in part through foreign prodding; 
5) external diplomatic pressure and unusually large electoral monitoring; and 
6) massive mobilization upon the announcement of fraudulent electoral results and the use of nonviolent resistance tactics taken directly from the work of Gene Sharp, the guru of non-violent resistance in the West.”15

This paradigm explains the conditions that influenced the beginning of the movements, but was post-movement democratization also a modular political phenomena? The extent to which Beissinger’s six features were exhibited varied between the movements in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine. Yet it is through our understanding of how they varied when the protests ended that explains why each country is in a very different position today. For example, relying too heavily on foreign support could create problems with sustainability and independence of external influence whereas mass mobilization is a vital feature to building a strong democracy internally. So while Beissinger’s theory explains how these democratic movements not only develop, but influence and spread, we have not seen the same spreading of democratic structures and tendencies following the fall of authoritarian regimes. Because the long term outcome varies from state to state, the post-social movement development of political organizations would provide insight to why democratization happened so differently.

Charles Tilly's theories on the development of social movements and how they are sustained helps address the “means to an end” issue that we see in Color Revolution activism. Tilly explains that social movements are a synthesis of three elements:

1. a sustained, organized public effort making collective claims on target authorities (let us call it a campaign);

15 Beissinger, 261.
2. employment of combinations from among the following forms of political action: creation of special-purpose associations and coalitions, public meetings, solemn processions, vigils, rallies, demonstrations, petition drives, statements to and in public media, and pamphleteering (call the variable ensemble of performances the social movement repertoire); and [end pg. 3]

3. participants’ concerted public representations of WUNC: worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment on the part of themselves and/or their constituencies (call them WUNC displays).16

The definition of campaign is clear enough but in the context of the Color Revolutions, seeing the “campaign” should be understood as the collective effort to make the claim on target authorities to create a democratic government. In this understanding of the “campaign,” the movement should not end when massive protests occur and a new leader is sworn in. Instead, it is a longterm, sustained effort as democratization occurs with the understanding that democracy is not an outcome, but rather it is a process.

Through this new understanding of “campaign,” the element of political action also has new meaning. As democracy develops, different types of political action are required. Mass protests of hundreds of thousands of people are vital to the successful ousting of an authoritarian leader, but are not necessary for single issues and could possibly even destabilize democratic progress. At the same time, petitioning would not be useful if a government is no longer responsive to the public. Therefore, youth activist organizations must change their methods of action over time. Though their activity is always important and should be consistently present, it should always be targeted, specific, and appropriate to be effective.

The third element of social movements, WUNC, Tilly explains, stands for worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment. These characteristics are used to determine the capacity of a social movement to be effective. Tilly argues that for successful campaigns to occur, qualities in the

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acronym WUNC must be exhibited. It is necessary to keep in mind, however, that these characteristics do not need to be exhibited equally and can vary in the way in which they are exhibited.

Worthiness in a campaign is undoubtedly important, but while Tilly's definition – “sober demeanor; neat clothing; presence of clergy, dignitaries, mothers with children” - is applicable, it needs to be reinterpreted for application to the cases I am examining. The energy and the protest style of these youth activists was essentially at odds with the “sober demeanor; neat clothing” aspects of Tilly's definition, and thus the worthiness of these movements would theoretically be called into question if his definition is taken verbatim. The main point Tilly is making in this definition is that the campaign must have legitimacy demonstrated by its widely accepted characteristics and purpose. Therefore, I approach the application of worthiness in these cases to be use of nonviolent means used by civilian members of society in opposition to policies or oppressive actors. In its long-term application, worthiness can be viewed as nonviolent means to promote a worthy end - democratic society.

As for unity, numbers, and commitment, Otpor, Kmara, and Pora all exhibited these factors as defined by Tilly, but at varying degrees. For example, while numbers were largest within Pora, Otpor arguably had the most commitment to their cause factoring in the precedent for such movements and the regime they were engaging with.

What would a successful post-social movement organizational structure look like? Florian Bieber, political scientist and Balkans expert, discusses four points of action that Otpor used to

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17 Tilly, 3-4.
ensure success in their efforts for Serbian democracy.\textsuperscript{18} Otpor, the most successful of the three SMOs, exhibited these points of action before and after the fall of Milosevic. In doing so, these young activists created a powerful structure that combined grassroots activism, civil society, and political strategy that brought an end to an oppressive regime and integrated their strategy into post-Milosevic democratization.

The first point Bieber describes is \textit{mobilizing citizens}. Bieber examines this point as engaging civil society to join the movement through both positive and negative campaigning methods. Mobilizing citizens, while obviously necessary for the success of a revolution, is democratic in its very definition. This empowerment pushes citizens to value what they're fighting for. A mobilized and engaged citizenry is also theoretically more likely to yield an engaged democracy. What distinguishes Otpor’s efforts to mobilize citizens from its Kmara and Pora counterparts is that Otpor has maintained a mobilized citizenry. By this I do not mean to say that there are thousands of people constantly protesting in Serbia, but Otpor activists have remained involved in various protests led by new watchdog organizations such as \textit{Samo Vas Gledamo} (We Are Watching You).\textsuperscript{19} Further more, while protests might not necessarily be in the favor of the Democratic party, there have been numerous protests with no reports of state repression and frequently state response.\textsuperscript{20}

The second point Bieber describes is \textit{gathering information}. This expresses how the activists of Otpor sought public opinion through polling and other forms of information and took action


based on the data they collected. Gathering information is applied to determining which candidates to back and which kinds of policies are the most popular to push. Doing this not only helps promote positive popular policies, but also encourages public interest in the movement because the citizenry feels more connected to the activists as they see their input being applied to strategies.\textsuperscript{21}

The third point he describes is \textit{formulating alternatives}. Key to any successful political progress, formulating alternatives – creating a political agenda and some policy initiatives – is used for gaining support from the public, uniting unlikely allies around an agenda, and building a strategy for a new leadership. Without strong alternatives, a social movement or revolution is in danger not only of failing, but also in creating a power vacuum that can cause larger problems than the movement initially sought to resolve.\textsuperscript{22}

The final point he describes is \textit{uniting the opposition}. Though this is done through various methods, it is key to the success and longevity of a democratic movement. Many of Serbia's problems before the Bulldozer Revolution rested with an extremely divided opposition. Serbian politics have functioned in a dynamic environment but pro-democratic parties have retained power and kept Serbia democratic. Despite differences in the opposition and occasional fractures, the parties have joined together and advocated for pro-reform candidates when Milosevic’s supporters run for office and threaten to take power. The 2008 Presidential election is a notable example of this when G17 and three Muslim minority parties joined behind Boris Tadic and the Democratic Party to defeat Tomislac Nikolic in a narrowly won election.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{21} Bieber, 73-90.

\textsuperscript{22} Bieber, 73-90.

vital commitment to reform and maintaining democracy ensures that when threats to democracy arise, there will be strong leadership to protect de-democratization from occurring.

Simultaneously, many of Ukraine's problems post-Orange revolution rest in an extremely divided opposition.

Charles Tilly's theories on democratization and de-democratization, as discussed in his book *Democracy*, provide an important framework for understanding the ebb and flow of factors that determine the level of democracy or authoritarianism exhibited by a state. In defining the style in which states function, Tilly describes four different types (with variations within each): *high-capacity undemocratic*, *low-capacity undemocratic*, *high-capacity democratic*, and *low-capacity democratic*. The term “capacity” used in this case describes the capabilities of the state to exert power. Depending on how democratic the state is, having a “high-capacity” can range from state monitoring of public politics to “extensive involvement of state security forces in any public politics.”

In *Democracy*, Tilly examines the change in democracy within states based on Freedom House rankings of civil liberties and political rights. Through mapping this change, readers can trace the dynamic changes of democratic qualities within a state. Tilly explains the basic differences between how democratization and de-democratization:

*On the whole, de-democratization occurs in the course of rulers' and elites' responses to what they experience as regime crises, most obviously represented by threats to their own power. Democratization usually occurs in state response (however reluctant) to popular demands, after crises have eased. As a result, de-democratization generally occurs more rapidly, and with much greater central direction, than democratization.*

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Regarding states that are transitioning, Tilly traces how democratic each is based on four inquiries. First, how are the demands of citizens playing a role in the state's actions? Second, how equally do different groups of citizens experience the translation of their demands into state action? Third, how much state protection is provided for the expression of political demands? Finally, how much of the process of putting demands into action commits both the citizen and the state? These four questions have guided my research but also provide insight into where Otpor’s activists succeeded, Pora’s activists partially succeeded, and Kmara’s activists have failed.

26 Tilly. Democracy, 59.
Chapter Three
Colorful Democracies or Failed Consolidation?

What are the options for young activists after the streets clear and the process of building democracy begins? The first decision activist organizations can make is to remain independent or to work within the government. As an NGO, activists can take on a variety of roles. For the sake of this thesis and in reflection of my research, I have broken NGO options into the following five roles: elections monitoring, activist training, think tank, political organizing, and lobbying. Becoming part of the government is more complicated than forming an NGO and, from an organizational perspective, options are best described as creating or joining current political parties and holding political office. Much like the options for organizations becoming NGOs, organizations can take part in multiple political parties or none. The options I discuss in this thesis are becoming part of the regime’s coalition of parties, becoming an opposition party, or becoming part of the ruling regime’s party.

As a disclaimer, I am looking at organizations and institutions that have developed as a direct result of Otpor, Kmara, or Pora activists or leaders from these organizations demonstrating a direct influx into an already existing organization such as a political party or think tank. While there are examples of the options in all three countries that are not connected to Otpor, Kmara or Pora and that developed before, during, or after the Color Revolutions. Their effects are not negligible, but the effect of the youth activist organizations after the Color Revolutions is where the central question of this thesis rests. Conversely, I have not discussed all organizations that developed or activism that has occurred as a result of the SMOs, but rather those that have had a noticeable effect. Furthermore, determining the influence of specific leaders within all the SMOs,
specifically in Georgia, was difficult due to the decentralized nature of the organizations. In such cases, I have taken the word of the authors I cite despite not always being capable of independent confirmation of the legitimacy of the individuals.

In Figure 1 below, I have discussed the positive and negative aspects of each of the options for post-social movement activist organizations and whether these examples have been exhibited by Otpor and Serbs, Kmara and Georgians, and/or Pora and Ukrainians. Lobbying is the only option that these groups have not explicitly expressed in an organized fashion under the non-government options, but remains both a legitimate option for organizations and one that organizations can easily transition into. It is also an option that could be highly effective in practice and could balance out many of the problems that have arisen in these three post-Color Revolution states, but has not really been tested. None of the organizations have formed opposition parties directly following the overthrow of autocrats, either. While this may seem illogical following the successful overthrow of a dictator, Ukraine is an example where politicians and political parties tied to the SMO had to become opposition parties following subsequent elections. I discuss what this means for democratization later.
As I continue my analysis, I refer to Figure 1 in discussions of how Kmara, Pora, and Otpor have effected democratization. Comparing the development of these three organizations allows for understanding the effect of each of their actions on democratization and provides insight to what conditions are needed for organizations to develop their energies in certain ways.
In the following sections, I will be referring to measurements of democracy used in Freedom House’s annual *Nations in Transit* publication. Freedom House established seven scores for characteristics of democracies (six prior to 2003) and one overall democracy score. The scores are on a scale from one to seven with one being the most democratic and seven the least democratic. The current categories are described as follows:

*Democracy Score* - An average of scores for the Electoral Process, Civil Society, Independent Media, National Democratic Governance, Local Democratic Governance, Judicial Framework and Independence, and Corruption. This score is used to express the overall view of how democratic a state is in any given year.

*Electoral Process* - A score based on the procedures and processes in place to support free and fair elections. This score will examine campaign laws, voting laws, political parties, and “popular participation in the political process.”

*Civil Society* - A score based on the activity and growth of NGOs and nonprofit organizations. This score usually examines the number of organizations, legislation regulating activity, trade union activity, interest group participation in the policy process, and funding available for organizations.

*Independent Media* - A score based on the freedom of the media. This score examines state regulation of print, television, Internet, and all other forms of media, libel laws, harassment of journalists, financial viability of the press and Internet access for private citizens.

*National Democratic Governance* - A score based on how the national level of government, its democratic character, independence, effectiveness and accountability. This score examines legislation, oversight of state services, and stability of leadership.

*Local Democratic Governance* - A score based on local level of government institutions. This score examines the election, responsibilities, and capacity of local governments, and transparence and accountability of authorities.

*Judicial Framework and Independence* - A score based on the justice system including independence and human rights protections. This score examines at public trust in the judicial system, status of minority rights, treatment of procedures, criminal code reform, judicial independence and constitutional reform.
Corruption - A score based on levels of corruption in the state and governmental initiatives. This score examines public perceptions of corruption, financial disclosure laws, effectiveness of anti-corruption measures, and business interests of policy makers (conflict of interest issues).

Kmara - Enough Roses in Georgia

The Rose Revolution of 2003 has been called an “anti-revolutionary revolution” by some scholars following the rise and reign of Georgia’s current President Mikheil Saakashvili. At the time, however, many saw the success of the Rose Revolution and Saakashvili’s leadership as a huge achievement for democracy in the former Soviet Union and believed it could play a key role in further democratization and influencing similar revolutions. While Kmara, described by one scholar as a “supporting actor in the 2003 Georgian political drama,” was much smaller than Otpor (only 3,000 members at its peak) and was not the primary umbrella organization leading the movement, it was a vital instrument in the 2003 protests. Because scholars disagree on the importance of Kmara in the success of the Rose Revolution as a whole, it is necessary to acknowledge that Kmara was responsible for popular mobilization - leading the efforts that worked directly with Georgians and providing vital resources needed for a democratic revolution. Therefore, while it was not the “stars in a large cast” like Otpor, Kmara was greatly influential and important to the Rose Revolution’s success.

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In examining Kmara, however, we must place it in the context of Georgia and its unique history. While protests led by Otpor in Serbia reached one million at one point (one-tenth of the country’s population) and dwarfed the protests in Georgia, the protests during the Rose Revolution were extraordinary in size and organization by Georgian standards. Rose Revolution protests involved a large collection of people from all parts of the country. Where many of the protestors in the Bulldozer Revolution came from Belgrade and the surrounding areas, the protestors in Georgia were from both rural and urban locations.32

Post-Soviet history in Georgia only makes Kmara’s efforts more impressive. The simple fact that a bloodless “revolution” succeeded in a state whose recent history includes only violent social movements, a civil war, two secessionist wars and at least two assassination attempts on its president within 15 years is extraordinary.33 Though the Bulldozer Revolution was the first in the series of modern Color Revolutions, Kmara was taking part in what Stephen Jones, Mount Holyoke professor of Russian and Eurasian studies, calls, “the first successful assault in the former Soviet Union on what the scholarly field calls ‘competitive authoritarian states.’” Jones explains,

“All such states - Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan - were (and most still are) led by Soviet-trained former apparatchiki. These leaders were publicly committed to democracy including elections, a degree of press freedom and toleration of organized public dissent. But all presided over regimes which had metamorphosed into peculiar post-Soviet capitalist hybrids, distinguished by presidential strongmen ruling through corrupt client networks and semi-privatized state structures over fractured societies.”34

32 McFaul, 13.
33 Jones, 320.
34 Jones, 319-20.
Being first in this respect - and remembering the environment in which it occurred - seemingly promoted a belief that this movement was much more revolutionary than it truly was, based on the popular conception of “revolutions.”

Kmara as an SMO differed from its Serbian predecessor in other important ways as well. Though they had the advantage of being trained by Otpor activists, Kmara activists were quite new and did not pave in the way for protests as Otpor had. Kmara’s presence in Georgia and having been trained by successful activists, however, gave Kmara the opportunity to play a more central role in mobilizing the protests. As the momentum built and opposition began forming a coalition, leaders of the opposition - notably current President Saakashvili - made more radical demands than Otpor had. Georgian opposition demanded that not only should parliamentary results be recognized, but that President Shevardnadze be ousted from office despite not being in a Presidential election at the time.35

Kmara’s first public action was on April 14, 2003, when they led a march of 500 young activists from Tbilisi State University to the state chancellery. Following this, the group expanded its activities to include theater, rock concerts, and “branding” of symbols and slogans to both inspire young people and challenge the regime’s authority. Because Kmara sought a movement similar to the Bulldozer Revolution but had drastically smaller numbers of activists, the group formulated tactics to seem much larger and more powerful than it truly was and put more pressure on the regime. Graffiti, one of these tactics, was heavily used in Kmara’s early development to establish their recognition.36 Activists would spray paint large fists (a symbol originally used by Otpor) throughout Tbilisi and other major cities.

35 McFaul, 13-4.
36 Bunce & Wolchik, 60.
Much like other SMOs, particularly Otpor, Kmara was originally a decentralized organization—it initially had no hierarchy and, defining itself as a movement, was very fluid. An unclear structure meant that government authorities were unable to harass and arrest the leaders of Kmara, something that could have ended the movement in its primary stages. Kmara became more organized, however, as more certainty in the power of the opposition and members began holding coordinated events in multiple locations simultaneously to appear even more powerful. Kmara’s increased organization and power also coincided with working more closely with opposition parties and political leaders. Valerie Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik, political scientists at Cornell University and George Washington University, respectively, elaborate on this relationship,

“Kmara enjoyed a much closer relationship with partisan political leaders, particularly those grouped around Mikheil Saakashvili, and benefited more from its association in particular with the youth groups of several opposition political parties than Otpor did. Kmara’s actions were also more narrowly focused on changing perceptions and encouraging citizens to participate than in the other cases under discussion here.”

There were also a number of organizations that began to work with Kmara, but focused primarily on parallel vote tabulation and election monitoring. Kmara worked with these groups at times, but as activists, their main goal was mobilizing Georgians.

The Rose Revolution culminated in Kmara’s storming of the Georgian parliament, bringing both justice to the parliamentary elections and the forced resignation of President Shevardnadze. Michael McFaul, director of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at

37 Bunce & Wolchik, 60.
38 Bunce & Wolchik, 61.
39 Bunce & Wolchik, 61.
Stanford University and advisor to President Obama, explains Shevardnadze’s surprising response,

“Shevardnadze had a more legitimate reason to use force against the rebellious opposition. They, after all, stormed the parliament and then demanded his resignation, not simply the recognition of the results of the parliamentary election. Shevardnadze, however, refrained from trying to use force. He may have realized that finding reliable forces to carry out such an order would be no sure thing, but also may have had sincere qualms. Then too, Shevardnadze enjoys a positive reputation in the West by dint of his role in winding down the Cold War as Mikhail Gorbachev’s foreign minister, and no doubt felt reluctant to mar that good name with the blood of civilians.” 40

As Shevardnadze left and Saakashvili (an individual whom Shevardnadze had recruited to government service)41 became president in Georgia, Kmara’s members seemingly felt that the organization’s purpose was fulfilled and they began to focus their efforts in other areas. Simultaneously, United States President George W. Bush, in a flawed and contradictory effort to emphasize the success of democracy in Georgia, pushed for a stronger relationship with and more support for the Georgian government rather than the development of democratic institutions and Georgian civil society.42

By the end of 2003, however, Kmara demonstrated signs of organizing into a long term activist organization that participated in political organizing and activist training abroad and domestically. Kmara members, within three months of the Rose Revolution, helped organize protests in various regions of Georgia and, specifically, in breakaway or autonomous regions. Ajaria, an autonomous republic of Georgia, was the site of a controversial arrest of two students

40 McFaul, 15.

41 McFaul, 16.

connected to Kmara activists in February 2004. The arrest of these students, Merab Mikeladze and Lasha Chakavadze, was reportedly because of illegal weapons possession and gained national and some international attention. On the same occasion ten Kmara activists were also placed under arrest for disturbing public order and had worked in coordinating protests against autonomy. The politics behind destabilizing the autonomous region aside, Kmara was also seen as a legitimate threat by the leader of Ajaria. Reports of attacks on not only Kmara offices, but also the offices of Democratic Ajaria party and of the Our Ajaria movement were reported in Russia and Russian media reported on warning shots being fired over protestors heads. This activity within Georgia as activists was comparatively short lived, however, and any accounts of participation in domestic political organizing seem to disappear from major media and Radio Liberty / Radio Free Europe after July 2004. The last major media reports of Kmara being domestically active in Georgia were in July 2004 when a situation similar to Ajaria arose in South Ossetia and once in February 2006 when Kmara members “registered their disenchantment with Varshalomidze,” the leader who came to power in the Ajara region following the ouster of Aslan Abashidze. As of today, Ajaria and South Ossetia remain autonomous republics.


In the initial weeks and months that followed the Rose Revolution, Kmara members worked closely with members of Otpor in hosting trainings for activist organizations in other countries, particularly Zubr in Belarus and Pora in Ukraine. The most visible cooperation and coordination that Kmara participated in was with Zubr of Belarus. Throughout early 2004 and into 2005, Kmara had contact with Zubr and secretly provided training sessions. On August 24, 2005, Georgiy Kandelaki and Luka Tsuladze, two Kmara activists were arrested and detained in Minsk with Zubr member Uladzimir Kobets. Kandelaki and Tsuladze were apprehended during a raid at the Zvyazda Hotel in Minsk where they were staying. During the raid, Belarusian authorities checked the Kmara activists’ documentation and allegedly considered it to be “suspect.”

According to a BBC report, the Directorate's Head, Aleh Slepchanka stated that, "The documents contained amendments and showed signs of wear and tear."\(^\text{48}\) Kobets, the Zubr leader, was released after being fingerprinted, but Kandelaki and Tsuladze remained in custody for several days and were released on September 02, 2005.

Various international news sources have reported on connections of Kmara activists to other pro-democracy activists such as Pora in Ukraine,\(^\text{49}\) Oborona in Russia,\(^\text{50}\) and KelKel in Kyrgyzstan,\(^\text{51}\) around the time of the Belarusian incident. It is unclear exactly how much Kmara activists worked with these organizations, especially because very few organizations are willing


to promote the idea of “exported democracy” and allow foreign activist training organizations to outshine their achievements. Similarly, activist training organizations are not always so willing to acknowledge their influence or efforts. Furthermore, there is a distinct geographical division of how cooperation between Kmara and other SMOs was presented in the international press. Most Western media released favorable reports of the protestors cooperating while Russian media consistently portrayed these activities as dangerous, threatening and radical. Considering Russian-Georgian relations, these reports are not surprising and likely did nothing to turn Georgian opinion against Kmara and likely influenced public opinion on similar SMOs in Russia. However, Kmara more or less disappeared from major media, apart from references to the Rose Revolution, after late 2005. Some who worked with Kmara during the Rose Revolution had integrated into the Liberty Institute - a Libertarian leaning think tank with many founders elected to parliament following the Rose Revolution52 - or had worked their way into government positions (mostly appointed but some elected). The activists who remained part of Kmara and played a minor role in guiding protests in Ajara and in training with Otpor were a small group and after two years it appears that they decided to end their activity in Kmara. While the organization existed, it is unclear if Kmara did anything to truly democratize the state of Georgia. Since 2003, Georgia’s *Nations in Transit* ratings have grown worse in most areas and the state is less democratic now than it was prior to the Rose Revolution.

Kmara’s story after the Rose Revolution is a troubling example of what activist organizations should not do after overthrowing a dictator if they seek to positively influence democratization. To understand why this is so, first look at what has happened in Georgia since 2003. While the

process of removing Eduard Shevardnadze from power was extra-constitutional, the opposition that came to power upon his resignation did use the Georgian constitution to restore order in the country. Georgia experienced a newly energized civil society that exceeded the expectations of outside observers. This new civil society was significantly supportive of the new, pro-Western leaders, particularly President Mikheil Saakashvili. Since 2003, Saakashvili has remained very popular as president, easily re-elected in 2008. There have not been any major partisan political changes since 2003, however. In fact, President Saakashvili’s party has remained remarkably dominant, but remarkably very popular. As in any state that is seeking to democratize, a highly unbalanced support of one party over opposition creates problems or, at the very least, creates questions about how democratic the state truly is. Ghia Nodia, Professor of Politics at Tbilisi Ilya Chavchavadze University, explains in his 2005 Nations in Transit analysis of Georgia,

“...[S]trengthening the state was accompanied by certain setbacks in democratic freedoms and the balance of political power. Supporters of the Shevardnadze government, as well as opposition groups that chose not to support the revolution, were discredited and failed to create credible opposition forces. The opposition presence in the Parliament is almost insignificant. The new government, eager to maintain the momentum of revolutionary change and achieve fast results, has not always respected existing laws and procedures in pursuing its policies. Constitutional changes in February 2004 weakened the Parliament and moved Georgia in the direction of superpresidentialism. Independent media became less critical and pluralistic, prosecutors became less likely to follow due process, and the courts rarely dared to disagree with the prosecution.”

In the years that have followed this analysis, the domination of politics by President Saakashvili and the lack of a strong, pro-democratic opposition have continued and even worsened. Without a viable opposition, a vacuum of opinion exists in Georgia where the power of the President


consistently goes unchecked and the state goes further away from the path of democracy. An active Kmara less closely aligned with Saakashvili could have provided this voice or, at the very least, encouraged other parties to fill the position of a democratic opposition.

During his terms as President of Georgia, Saakashvili has made a concerted effort to stay in the favor of young Georgians. Following their release, the two Kmara members who had been detained in Belarus traveled to Tbilisi and met with President Saakashvili who jokingly asked them “Which cell did they keep you in?”55 Throughout their interaction, Saakashvili presented himself more as a comrade than a commander-in-chief, creating an image of a leader who has a powerful connection with young activists and can relate to their experience. The truth of that manufactured image is certainly questionable (I have not found any evidence of Saakashvili being detained for protesting in Belarus) but its message is impressive. Whatever Kmara may or may not have been at the time, its members were vocally supported by the ruling regime of Georgia in a way that seemed to use them to redirect attention from Georgia’s issues with democratization to other states and place international support behind the minimal progress of the Saakashvili regime. Presenting himself in this way likely galvanized youth support behind the regime as well and put youth in a position that was very unlikely to turn hostile towards the regime.

Saakashvili’s representation of his relationship with activists and Kmara activists not protesting the de-democratization of Georgia under Saakashvili are both important points in understanding why Kmara has not effected democratization in the same way the other SMOs

55 “Georgian president welcomes home youth activists freed by Belarus.” Rastavi-2 TV, Tbilisi, BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union - Political 06 Sep 2005.
have. Kandelaki, one of the Georgians detained in Belarus, reflected on his experience in Belarus in an interview with Natalya Radzina from Belarus's Charter-97,

“The entire system of power in Belarus is based on total paranoia. Even our cellmates doubted that the Belarusian authorities have enough wit not to put themselves in a stupid situation. This is an empirical feature of such regimes. As soon as the authorities -- either in Serbia or Georgia or Ukraine -- espoused such paranoia, their death throes began. Apart from this, according to our information, Moscow intervened in this affair. A signal to arrest us came from there. Paranoia in this regard exists in Russia, too. If a democratic wave sweeps across Belarus, Russia's plans to reanimate the empire will completely collapse. The recent deportation from Moscow of Marko Markovic, an active participant in the Orange Revolution and producer of the [Ukrainian rock music] group Okean Elzy, shows whom we are dealing with.”

Certainly the activists were still optimistic about the potential for democracy in the region and seemed to genuinely believe in the success of the Rose Revolution in bringing democracy to Georgia. It appears though, based on Kandelaki’s comments, that activists themselves had adopted a certain kind of paranoia towards Russia and almost an elitism toward undemocratic states such as Belarus. Saakashvili has exhibited a similar approach to the two states which creates a chicken and egg situation of who adopted this attitude first? While I cannot conclusively prove who adopted this attitude first, the course of events that have followed the Rose Revolution through today clearly suggest that the practically lock-step opinion was detrimental to democratization in Georgia. Saakashvili appears to have established a relationship with Kmara’s activists that creates fear of the external (Russia, etc.) and an unwavering trust of and sense of security within the state. In doing so, the likelihood for Kmara to play an active role in checking Saakashvili’s power severely diminished.

To Saakashvili’s credit, though, there have been substantial reforms economically in the country. In the World Bank’s “Ease of Doing Business” survey, Georgia was ahead of Finland

and Sweden, ranking 12th of 183 countries. Georgia was also ranked eighth easiest to start a business and second in registering property. Many of the economic reforms that produced such impressive economic development have been attributed with the Western educated leadership that came to power after the Rose Revolution and President Saakashvili’s focus on fighting corruption in even high levels of Georgian society.\footnote{Chopivsky.} Knowing the state of the Georgian economy before the Rose Revolution and understanding the challenges created by the 2008 war with Russia, this is an incredible accomplishment by virtually all standards.

Though while the Rose Revolution was certainly motivated, at least partially, by a demand for economic reforms, it was promoted as a democratic revolution. Unfortunately, when considering Freedom House’s factors in its analysis, Georgia has made little progress in democratization and has even declined below pre-Rose Revolution levels in some ways. While the overall score of democracy has only worsened by 0.6 since 2001 and only 0.1 from Shevardnadze’s regime, the simple fact that it has worsened at all warrants great frustration. The only two areas in which scores have net improvement, corruption and local democratic governance, still remain very high and among Georgia’s highest scores at 5 and 5.5 respectively.\footnote{Aphrasidze, 211.} When considering how much Saakashvili has been hailed for his efforts to clean up corruption and his level of popularity, it is concerning how little seems to have actually happened.

Looking at \textit{Graph 1} and \textit{Figure 2} below, it is clear where exactly Georgia has become less democratic than it was during Shevardnadze’s presidency. While civil society and local democratic governance have made modest progress, an incredible gap exists between what is and what could have been achieved. Since Kmara has disbanded or become inactive as an
organization in late 2005, there have been significant increases in Georgia’s scores for electoral process, civil society, and national governance as well as the overall democracy score of Georgia. Correlation certainly does not equate causation and the nature of Kmara was never an organization that was willing to directly oppose Saakashvili. However, the role that Kmara initially took as political organizers and activist trainers was one that could have provided, at least in theory, a response to Georgia’s de-democratization and possibly pressured the administration.
Figure 2: Georgia Nations in Transit Scores 2001-2010

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From Nations in Transit 2010

Pora - A Time for Orange

Of the three organizations used in this analysis, the Ukrainian youth activist, pro-democracy organization, Pora is the newest. Pora is also arguably the most recognized SMO, the Orange Revolution was the best documented, and the political leaders of Pora were the most visible and charismatic. While the Orange Revolution did not materialize until 2004, the first stirrings of a youth led pro-democracy movement began in 2001 with anti-Kuchma protests led by

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59 Aphrasidze, 211.
organizations such as Ukraine Without Kuchma (YBK). Taras Kuzio, academic and expert in Ukrainian political, economic and security affairs explains what was different about these early organizations from their predecessors,

“They were younger, more active and better organized in Ukraine’s regions. In 2001 the youth NGO Za Pravdu (For Truth) united different youth groups under the umbrella of the opposition Committee of National Salvation, the political body that had grown out of the Ukraine Without Kuchma! protests. Two smaller NGOs, Opir Molodi (Youth Resistance) and Sprotvy (Resistance) were spin offs of the Za Pravdu (For Truth) NGO.”  

Pora, as an independent organization, officially formed in 2002-2003 from the “hard-core” activists that had been leading the aforementioned NGOs. These activists had been in contact and had been training with Otpor activists in 2001-2002 following the successful overthrow of Milosevic.  

Contrary to common knowledge at the time and even for a time after, what we commonly refer to as “Pora” was, in reality, two distinct organizations that worked toward similar goals and under the same name. However, this division was not known by outsiders until after the Orange Revolution. Black Pora was a youth led, non-partisan, pro-democracy activist SMO that had been trained by Otpor and Kmara members. Black Pora’s funding came from domestic and international resources, a change from Otpor which could not rely on domestic resources due to the devastation of war within Serbia. In nearly every oblast in Ukraine and through financial assistance from British, Polish, and Dutch organizations, activist leaders from Otpor, Kmara and Zubr (from Belarus) provided training for Pora activists. It is important to note that the United States did not provide direct assistance to Pora. However, Otpor received large amounts of

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60 Kuzio, 371.
funding from the United States institutions and other international institutions following Milosevic’s indictment which likely had influence on their ability to train Pora members.\textsuperscript{62}

Kmara’s international support, particularly from the Soros foundation, though not directly through the US government, was also influential in Pora’s successful training.\textsuperscript{63}

Yellow Pora, more commonly referred to collectively with its allied parties as the Orange Coalition, was a coalition consisted primarily of politicians and their close associates developing after the early elections in 2004. The leaders in Yellow Pora were the faces of the movement for the outside world rather than the youth activists. Yellow Pora was also the individuals whom Black Pora eventually unified around when a candidate was chosen for the runoff and evidence of false elections surfaced. Former President Viktor Yushchenko and former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko were the figureheads of the Orange Revolution and the sentiment of Black Pora was that the election of Yushchenko would determine whether the Orange Revolution was successful. Compared to the other revolutions, this group marketed themselves in a much more peaceful manner. Whereas images of Otpor youth were seen sticking “He is finished!” stickers on riot police officer’s shields\textsuperscript{64}, Yulia Tymoshenko and Pora protesters were photographed and video taped giving flowers to riot police in front of the President’s mansion.\textsuperscript{65} Approximately one million protestors took to Maidan Nezalezhnosti led by Pora and stayed in tents through the freezing cold. International media covered the protests in great detail, pressuring the Kuchma regime and its appointed successor, Viktor Yanukovych, to step down. The two major parties

\textsuperscript{62} Kuzio, 371.

\textsuperscript{63} Fairbanks, 115.

\textsuperscript{64} Vejvoda, 309.

began negotiations as the protests continued. In July 2005, McFaul predicted an optimistic future for Ukraine based on the negotiations process.

“Ukraine’s leaders eventually did agree to negotiate, with the assistance of international mediators, a pacted arrangement by which Kuchma and his side allowed the second round of the presidential election to be rerun and Yushchenko and his side agreed to changes in the constitution, giving the parliament and prime minister more powers and the president fewer. At the time of these roundtable talks, some leaders of Ukraine’s opposition wanted to end discussions, follow the example of the Rose Revolution, and simply seize power. Yushchenko, however, rejected these calls for storming government building three times, and insisted instead on the negotiated path. Yushchenko’s decision will constrain his presidential powers in the short run, but in the long run may help to consolidate democratic practices of compromise and checks and balances between branches of government. If so, he may prove the most visionary of the three anti-authoritarian leaders.” 66

After several weeks, the court system in Ukraine declared the election void and ordered a new election to be held. In this second election, Viktor Yushchenko won with 51.99% of the electorate compared to Yanukovych’s 44.2%.67

Following the dramatic events of the Orange Revolution, the two branches of Pora formally separated. Yellow Pora officially became a political party and joined President Yushchenko’s Orange Coalition. The most active members of Black Pora developed, primarily, a non-partisan NGO named Opora Civil Network which does elections monitoring, some activist organizing and training, and has offices in eleven oblasts around Ukraine. Pora took a different direction from its predecessors by splitting in two. The past 7 years have led Yellow Pora and Black Pora to undesirable situations that leave both with inadequate influence of democratization. Some members of the Orange Coalition associated with the Pora Party still remain in power, but are

66 McFaul, 18.

few. The Pora party, while still officially registered, does not currently hold any seats in parliament. Opora Civil Network (Opora CN), the largest successor of Black Pora, though its members describe themselves as a group that does a large number of things, is known for its work in elections monitoring and observing and is not frequently discussed beyond elections work. They are officially non-partisan and do not endorse candidates or parties.68

Yellow Pora began its post-Orange Revolution development in a very promising fashion. As Yushchenko entered office, many people were optimistic about the kind of reform that could be achieved under his leadership. Initially, President Yushchenko put Ukraine on a path to democratization and greatly increased government transparency and accountability. At the same time, however, the reforms that had been made as part of the compromise of the Orange Revolution that shifted some power from the executive to the parliament, raised concern that the system of checks and balances would be unbalanced. In 2006, Freedom House writers Oleksandr Sushko, Olena Prystayko raised concerns about the longevity of this pro-democratic movement saying, “stable and mature institutions ensuring the rule of law and the irreversibility of democratic changes have not yet been built.”69 By the end of the first session of the Verkhovna Rada in his term, Yushchenko had submitted fewer draft laws than any of Ukraine’s post-Soviet leaders.70

Over the next several years, the structure of Ukraine’s parliament (the Verkovna Rada) created more problems for the reformers. Not only did President Yushchenko’s opposition gain

significant power, creating new obstacles in passing any reform, but Viktor Yanukovych was elected Prime Minister in 2006 when the Socialist Party shifted its support to the Party of Regions. The shift in support from President Yushchenko’s party was also contributed to by what Sushko and Prystayko describe as “long-term intrigues surrounding the creation of the ‘Orange Coalition.’” Underlying tensions between President Yushchenko and former-Prime Minister Tymoshenko created greater rifts in the government and weakened the capacity to build support for Yushchenko’s reforms, as limited as they were.

Throughout this time, the Pora Party, Yellow Pora politicians, struggled to gain much power as a party within Verkhovna Rada, but had remained part of the Orange Coalition. As Yushchenko increasingly alienated eastern Ukraine and the Orange Coalition began to splinter, the potential for democratizing reforms significantly decreased. The platform that Pora had protested and then ran on was, quite simply, not implemented. Tensions culminated when the Pora Party joined with Tymoshenko’s BYuT to register a vote of no confidence, creating the greatest fracture in the Orange Coalition. Officially, the Pora Party still exists but does not play a relevant role in democratization.

Yellow Pora nearly an exact opposite of Kmara but is possibly even less influential to democratization today. While the Pora Party did not immediately oppose Yushchenko, splintering of the Orange Coalition caused this party to become an opposing force alongside Tymoshenko. A number of factors inhibited Yushchenko’s reforms, including his own political skill, but midway through his term he had strong opposition from both the Party of Regions (Yanukovych) and BYuT (Tymoshenko). Because of the nature of the division, the parties and coalitions

71 Sushko, 417.
primarily focused their attention on political maneuvering to gain or maintain seats in the Verkhovna Rada. Civil society, as a result, appeared to have lost the ability to have a meaningful voice in creating reforms at the national level.

The system through which Yushchenko came into power placed the Pora Party, Orange Coalition, and ultimately Ukraine on this non-democratizing reform path. Where Georgia had no legitimate opposition to Saakashvili and had placed more power in the hands of the executive, Ukraine had two strong opposition forces to Yushchenko and legislation that took power from the hands of the president. Apart from negotiating with the regime over storming parliament (as Tymoshenko hoped to do), Yushchenko and Tymoshenko allowed rifts to essentially hand power back to the Party of Regions who had always been a strong opposition power. This new system and the rift kept the Orange Coalition from creating any meaningful, democratizing reform.

What about the activists? Created in 2005, the successor of Black Pora, Opora CN, is newer than CANVAS (Otpor’s successor organization discussed in the next section) and models itself in a way that expands on what Pora was during the Orange Revolution. On its website, Opora Civil Network describes its “priority activities” as: “Education policy, Housing and communal politics, Cultural policy, Election process, and the development of local communities.” Methods to achieve these priorities are described as: “Protection of rights and public interests (advocacy); Monitoring and public control (watch-dog activity); Policy analysis; Civic Education; Legal and protection of citizens; Social media lobbying; Public journalism; Direct action; and Legislation development.” Considering this information alone, this organization would be categorized as

72 "Організація."
When searching for information on Opora CN in news sources other than Opora CN’s website, however, all news reports available through a basic LexisNexis Academic search discuss Opora CN’s work with elections and elections monitoring. While there are also reports and interviews with some coordinators of Opora CN discussing their policy proposals and work as a watchdog organization, these policies and efforts as a watchdog organization are consistently in the context of elections. Research of leaders of Opora CN, particularly Andrew Dutchak who works at Opora’s Lviv office, yields a number presentations available for download that appear to be very similar to activist training materials used by Otpor and now by CANVAS. These presentations have been posted on an online document sharing site within the past 3 years and several this year. From this information, I would conclude that Opora CN is still involved in activist training in some capacity. Understanding the nature of such training seminars (usually occurring in oppressive authoritarian regimes), it is not surprising that this aspect of the organization would not be as actively publicized.

While Pora members developed Opora CN with the needs of Ukraine in mind, their approach demonstrated a myopic interpretation of democracy’s definition. Looking at Graph 2 and Figure 3, we see a clear trend of improved electoral practices and civil society. The methods that Opora CN uses appear to have an influence on improving elections. International media seeks Opora CN’s coverage of elections and the organization has established a level of legitimacy and respect. Furthermore, Opora CN is one of the few groups who consistently reports on elections policies.

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and procedures and raises awareness domestically and internationally. In doing this, Opora CN has created a balanced response to politicians who sought to rig elections or other parties seeking to disrupt fair and free elections. In fact, Opora CN has taken on the primary role in domestic elections monitoring. In the local elections held on October 31, 2010, Opora CN had 1,003 monitors at polling stations and 425 at territorial election commissions.\textsuperscript{74} Comparatively, a total of 645 came from the Committee of Voters of Ukraine and 117 from the Front of Change.\textsuperscript{75}

Unfortunately, Opora CN has not maintained a strategy for an activist response to elections rigging, or really any forms of de-democratization, and rely on the enforcement of government officials. This has proven effective thus far for elections standards. When the parliament passes laws that make elections less democratic, there is no organized system to provide an activist response. One example of de-democratizing the electoral process occurred on August 21, 2009. In surpassing a presidential veto, the Verkhovna Rada approved an amendment to the Law on Presidential Elections that shortened the campaign period from 120 to 90 days, introduced a high balloting fee (2.5 million UAH) only returned to the candidate if they reach the second round, abolishing the supporter signature requirement and eliminating absentee ballot provisions. The Constitutional Court ruled some aspects of the law unconstitutional but upheld canceling the use of absentee ballots.\textsuperscript{76} I have not been able to find any evidence of large scale or organized protesting or activism in response to this action. Opora CN has written about the law in many mediums and taken a physically passive approach to opposing it, but such an extreme change to

\textsuperscript{74} “Ukraine's local elections valid in general, but will be challenged in certain areas, says Opora Civil Network.” \textit{Ukraine General Newswire} 02 Nov 2010.

\textsuperscript{75} "Lytvyn assures international observers that possible complaints about elections will be studied." \textit{Ukraine General Newswire} 29 Oct 2010.

election laws should theoretically create protests or more visible opposition in a functioning democracy.

Interestingly, Ukraine’s civil society is one of the strongest of Freedom House’s transitioning democracies outside of the Baltic states and has a large number of diverse NGOs.\footnote{“Tables Table 1. Nations in Transit 2010 Ratings and Democracy Score Summary." \textit{Nations in Transit 2010: Civil society, democracy and markets in East Central Europe and the newly independent states.} 'Ed'. Christopher Walker. New York, NY: Freedom House, 2010. 38.} This means very little, however, when organizations do not coordinate and even less when the capacity to establish and run an NGO is made unnecessarily difficult. As of right now, many NGOs rely on foreign resources for funding as the Ukrainian government prohibits them from generating any income.\footnote{Sushko, 551.} Through crippling the capacity of civil society to be effective in this manner, the state allows NGOs to be visible on paper and to be active, but they are too weak to create meaningful change or force the government to create democratic reform. Furthermore, Ukrainian NGOs and non-profits do not appear to have created any formal system that allows them to work together and many efforts appear to coordinate and form coalitions on issues. In such a weakened position, a certain level of cooperation almost seems to be required to have any meaningful effect. As leaders of a massive coalition of people during the Orange Revolution, former Pora leaders at NGOs such as Opora CN should be leading public opposition to de-democratizing action.

As of right now, Pora has divided and evolved into an extremely limited \textit{opposition political party}, an active \textit{watchdog organization} (focused on elections), an active \textit{elections monitoring} organization, and possibly does \textit{activist training} as well. This series of developments has had varying effects on democratization in Ukraine, with the most influential being the \textit{watchdog}
organization work and elections monitoring of Opora CN. Ukraine has democratized more than Georgia and Opora CN has been very important to that. Despite legislation that de-democratized elections practices, Opora CN has been able to play a meaningful role in providing some countering to make elections as fair as possible. Countering and balance are different, however, and should Ukraine’s electoral process and other variables of democracy begin improving again, it needs to come from the public and needs to involve true activism. Ukraine’s large civil society will be the factor that puts the state back on to a path of democratization.
Figure 3: Ukraine Nations in Transit Scores 2001-2010

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<td>National Democratic Governance (*after 2004)</td>
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<td>Local Democratic Governance (*after 2004)</td>
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From Nations in Transit 2010

Otpor - Resistance and the Bulldozer of Democracy

Though Serbia’s Otpor inspired a new phenomenon of youth led pro-democracy movements, Serbians were not new to activism nor even youth activism. Throughout the reign of Milosevic (1989-1997 as President of Serbia and 1997-2000 as President of Yugoslavia), protests were surprisingly common. Anti-regime protests (March 1991, fall 1999), student protests (June-July 1992, November 1996 – March 97), and protests against electoral fraud (November 1996 -

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*Sushko, 549.*
February 1997) filled the streets, but did not achieve much success at establishing reform.\(^{80}\) The protests were frequently met with violent responses from the regime, including a showdown with tanks and military on March 9, 1991 in which the opposition leader Vuk Draskovic was arrested.\(^{81}\) The exceedingly authoritarian rule of Milosevic consistently shut down opposition efforts and media outlets. Even small victories by opposition groups were met with strengthened resistance by the Milosevic regime. Despite the fierce resistance of the regime, Serbians continued their efforts for a more democratic state. NGOs began to form and throughout the wars in the 1990s, young Serbians dodged the draft and participated in various civic resistance movements.

Many scholars consider Milosevic’s regime to have been one of the most, if not the most, brutal of post-Soviet Eastern Europe. Florian Bieber, scholar of east European politics, even expressed his belief in a 2003 article in *the International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* that Serbia was “biologically, materially, and morally ruined” and that the institutions required for a functioning democracy had been destroyed as a result of Milosevic's rule.\(^{82}\) To understand why opposition had not been able to overthrow the regime before 2000, it is important to understand both the nature of the opposition during the 1990s and even into 2000 and the influence of the West in building an opposition coalition.\(^{83}\)

During the 1990s, political parties could be broken down into three different types: extreme nationalist, democratic national, and reform-oriented. Because of the focus on nationalism within

\(^{80}\) Bieber, 83.

\(^{81}\) Vejvoda, 298.

\(^{82}\) Bieber, 73.

\(^{83}\) Barker, 3.
a large wing of the opposition, problems arose in creating a powerful democratic opposition to Milosevic's semi-authoritarian regime. Bieber explains,

“Parties in this [nationalist] grouping gave absolute priority to the "solution" of the national question, including the use of force, and placed less emphasis on the democratization of Serbia. This neglect of democracy only left such groupings the options of joining the regime (implicitly or explicitly) or being marginalized. As a result only the Radical Party continued as a representative of this political wing of the opposition (1993-1997) or as part of the regime (1992-93, 1998-2000).”

Because nationalism frequently trumped democracy in priority, division amongst the opposition parties on the issue of nationalism made it virtually impossible to create a large enough coalition within parliament that could constitute a majority and create true democratic reform. Even parties who focused on creating a democratic Serbia, such as the Democratic Party, the Democratic Party of Serbia, and the Democratic Center, would occasionally adopt nationalism as part of their agenda and would create greater rifts within pro-democratic opposition. Parties who could be categorized as either extreme national or were democratic nationalist with more emphasis on nationalism were frequently “co-opted” by the Milosevic regime and blurred the line between the opposition and the regime. Until 1996, no opposition party held any major political office except for those who worked with the regime.

Many Serbians, witnessing the inability of political parties to form a coalition to make a meaningful difference in Serbian politics and the failure of their isolated protests to move politicians, began to shift their efforts towards establishing NGOs. As this shift occurred, support, primarily financial, from the West was available and enabled activists to develop strategies and gain international attention. This was not the first time the West had taken notice

84 Bieber, 75.
85 Bieber, 80.
of what was happening in Serbia. Penn, Schoen & Berland Associates, an American consulting firm, and others had been involved with polling and other support for opposition efforts in 1992, but it was not until 1999 that the US foreign policymaking community began offering support and the international media began taking notice of the efforts of the opposition.86

Otpor, the youth-led SMO that led the Bulldozer revolution, is one of the products of failed protests and a beneficiary of Western support. In 1998, Otpor formed around protesting policies that stripped universities of their autonomy, frustration with opposition infighting, and frustration with the failed student protests. Their unique protests began as performances that mocked the regime and eventually grew to include 30,000-40,000 activists, 120 local branches, and seven regional centers by July of 2000.87 Otpor didn't have a clear hierarchical structure that would allow co-optation by the opposition but provoked harsh suppression by the Milosevic regime. Through this, Otpor placed Milosevic on the defensive and made it clear that the opposition could not cooperate with the regime. Two other important NGOs, also formed following the major protests in 1996-7, were close allies of Otpor throughout the Bulldozer Revolution. While the two NGOs generally worked under the heading of Otpor and Otpor emphasized the unity of the movement, they - Center for Free Elections and Democracy and G17Plus - focused specifically on elections monitoring and policy reform, respectively.88

Bieber explains that through the efforts of Otpor and the cooperative efforts of the Center for Free Elections and Democracy and G17Plus, these organizations served four important purposes in the eventual overthrow of Milosevic. First, through mobilizing citizens, Otpor encouraged

86 Barker, 3.
87 Bieber, 84.
88 Bieber, 86.
voter participation and vocalizing opposition to the regime through protesting. Using both negative (focusing on authoritarian actions of the regime) and positive (rock concerts and poster campaigns) tactics, thousands were motivated to actively oppose Milosevic. Second, Otpor gathered information about public opinion, a new step for opposition groups. In doing this, Otpor was able to understand the direction the public wanted the campaigns to take. Much of this data collection was done by the Center for Policy Analysis and was used by the activists in Otpor. Third, Otpor, primarily through the efforts of G17Plus, formulated alternatives to the regime – a step forward from the opposition's previous approach to focusing primarily on nationalism rather than creating solutions to social and economic issues. Finally, the activist coalition formed by Otpor worked to unite the opposition through intensively pressuring for a united front. Otpor members threatened opposition parties with publicly shaming them if they didn't agree to unite with the opposition coalition. The Serbian Renewal Movement was one such victim of this unwillingness to join, receiving tough criticism for its refusal.89

At its peak, Otpor had 18,000 members but remained independent of even the opposition parties. In fact, Otpor’s presence at opposition rallies and events served the purpose of both catalyzing the opposition and serving as a watchdog of the individual parties.90 As the momentum built, Vojislav Koštunica was selected to be the candidate because he was able to “rally a broad spectrum of democratically-minded voters from left to right” and, as Ivan Vejoda explains, there was not any doubt who would be the best choice.91 Koštunica worked with

89 Bieber, 86.

90 Vejvoda, 309.

91 Vejvoda, 311.
Otpor’s civil society movement and with the G17+ to develop detailed plans and policies for a
democratic government and was very much kept in line with the pro-democratic opposition.

Through dramatic scenes of millions protesting in the streets and a bulldozer driven up to the
Yugoslav Federal parliament building in Belgrade, Otpor had been organizing with other Serbian
NGOs and opposition politicians for the culmination of the movement. Using very limited force,
protestors stormed parliament and seized the national TV station in Belgrade. This limited
amount of force was used primarily to show that the opposition was serious about their demands,
but they were prepared to forcefully defend their electoral victory against regime violence.92
Should this have happened, the leadership of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia had a secret
plan prepared to defend the victory in the streets and begin taking over a strategically planned
series of key state institutions and media outlets.93 The opposition also began spreading rumors
that several army generals’ sons and daughters were part of the protests, compromising the
regime’s control over these generals to use force against the street protestors. The regime
ultimately did not use force and Vojislav Koštunica stood on the balcony of Belgrade City Hall at
6:30pm on October 5th to pronounce Serbia a free country and promised to endeavor to make it a
“boring” one.

Otpor was a revolutionary organization. Without the efforts of Otpor activists, Kmara and Pora
would likely not have been created. The Serbian activists of Otpor brought the struggle for
democracy to the attention of many outsiders and demonstrated that activists could force regime
change without destructive violence. Serbia has improved greatly in comparison to Ukraine and
Georgia. Its civil society, governance and electoral process all continue to improve, giving hope

92 Vevjoda, 314.

93 McFaul, 13.
for further development of democracy.\textsuperscript{94} The Center for Applied Non-Violent Action and Strategies (CANVAS), an international organization that promotes nonviolent activist strategies for regime change, continues Otpor’s legacy internationally and has been important to many similar social movements around the region.

Otpor has been one of the most impressive examples of how young activists can develop their organizations following successful social movements. Leaders of Otpor took on three roles initially and sustained two that they still maintain. First, members of Otpor formed a \textit{coalition political party}, one that was part of Koštunica’s party’s coalition. Second, activist leaders were involved in \textit{activist organizing} through planning protests on several occasions and politically organized during the 2008 presidential elections in Serbia who some members had merged with in 2000.\textsuperscript{95} Third, through the capacity of Otpor and then in the capacity of CANVAS, leaders provided \textit{activist training} for democratic activists to lead their own social movements using nonviolent strategies. Certain individuals who operated under the general leadership of Otpor but worked on policy as a \textit{think tank} (G17) or \textit{elections monitoring} (Center for Free Elections and Democracy) continued in various capacities and some members created a \textit{regime coalition political party} or joined the \textit{regime’s political party}. However, my analysis relies on the independent organization, Otpor and its leaders and members.

Of the directions Otpor leaders and members went, holding political office was the most temporary. Srdja Popovic, one of the eleven original members of Otpor, had been an active member of the Serbian Democratic Party during his early 20s and went on to serve in the Serbian


\textsuperscript{95} "Agency profiles Serbian Justice Ministry state secretary." \textit{BBC Monitoring Europe - Political} Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring 05 Mar 2009.
National Assembly and spatial advisor to the Prime Minister of Serbia for a brief period following the Bulldozer Revolution. Before he helped establish Otpor in 1998 at age 25 and became its executive director in 2000, Popovic served as regional coordinator for an electoral campaign for the Democratic Party of Serbia (1993), president of the Democratic youth (1994-96), spokesperson for the Democratic party (1998-2000), and was the youngest elected member of the Belgrade city parliament (1996-2000). 96 Slobodan Đinović, another one of Otpor’s original organizers, also temporarily worked within the Serbian government but as an advisor or contractor on health and technology issues (2001-2002). 97

Within Serbia, Otpor’s effects on democratization and specifically civil society are not as directly visible but are very important. Student unions, organizations of university students, worked very closely with Otpor and had enormous crossover in membership throughout the Bulldozer Revolution as Otpor consisted largely of politically active students and student unions were generally politically minded. Needless to day, the groups greatly influenced one another. Serbia had an active civil society before Milosevic’s overthrow, but student unions played an important role in the democratization process after the fall of 2000. The Serbian Student Union even organized 1,000 people in February 2008 to rally and to march on the government. When officials did not meet with the protestors, Serbian Student Union member Srecko Sekeljic, directed towards Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica, said

“Unless, as prime minister, you meet these demands in the shortest possible time - and they are in keeping with the pro-European orientation of most people of Serbia - we will take that to mean that you either do not support them or are


unable to meet them. In either case, the young people of Serbia will ask you to resign your office in government [loud cheering] and to schedule early parliamentary elections as the only way out of the crisis in which Serbia has found itself."

Koštunica, who had become President of Serbia as a direct result of the Bulldozer Revolution, was never above the demands of students and activists who always remained skeptical of political leaders. During the 2008 Serbian Presidential elections, these same student unions organized in Belgrade to support presidential candidate Boris Tadić who was in an extremely close race against Tomislav Nikolić. Student unions were not organized by Otpor at this time, but much of the coordination and communication was greatly influenced by connections made during the Bulldozer Revolution. In the 2008 presidential elections, voter turnout increased by 7% between the first and second rounds of voting (compared to the 0.6% increase in 2004) and the Democratic Party’s support increased by 15% between the two rounds (Serbian Radical Party only increased by 8%).

Of everything Otpor has done following the Bulldozer Revolution, the largest impact has been through their capacity as the Centre for Applied Non-Violent Strategies (CANVAS). While the domestic influence of CANVAS is not as noticeable, the organization has influenced a vast number of SMOs abroad. Furthermore, of Otpor, Kmara, and Pora, this has been the most impressive and fascinating organization that activists developed. Srdja Popovic along with Slobodan Djinovic, also an original member of Otpor, decided to form CANVAS in 2003 after a visit to Zimbabwe. At the time, they had already advised Georgian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian activists and both were working for the Serbian government in various capacities. Popovic was a

98 Bozovic, Milena. "Belgrade: over 1,000 students protest against Serbia "drifting away" from EU." BBC Monitoring Europe - Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring 11 Feb 2008.

member of the Serbian parliament at the time but stepped down to pursue a career as an organizer and a revolutionary.100 Djinovic had created Serbia’s first wireless Internet service provider in 2000 and, apart from his work with his company, he also worked as a contractor and advisor.101 Currently, CANVAS has four and a half staff employees. CANAVS trainers are veterans of successful democratic social movements in five countries and are paid as contractors. The largest source of CANVAS funding comes from Djinovic, who uses money from his own pocket (made from his Internet and phone company) to pay for about half of CANVAS’s operating expenses and the costs of roughly half the training workshops. Though I do not doubt that Djinovic genuinely wants to support CANVAS in any way he can, this level of financial support is at least partially influenced by Otpor’s experience with allowing their activities to be partially funded by external organizations and specifically the Uniter States government. When this was disclosed and it became clear that Otpor leadership had lied about their source of funding, many Otpor members had felt betrayed by what they had thought was an independent social movement and quit Otpor. Currently, CANVAS participates in some workshops financed by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the United Nations Development Program, Humanity in Action, and Freedom House but is wary of too much publicized connection with American institutions.102

The training that CANVAS provides does more than help activists plan individual events. Instead it teaches them how to create their own tactics and to develop long term plans and strategies based on the specific situations of each social movement. Each training that CANVAS


101 "Slobodan Đinović."

102 Rosenberg.
holds is slightly different in style based on the situation of the country and the opposition culture in politics and each have different responses and outcomes. The non-violent curriculum, however, remains the same. One of CANVAS’s recent trainings was held for Burmese activists - a change from training groups native to far less violent and repressive autocracies. In her article on CANVAS, Foreign Policy writer Tina Rosenberg discusses CANVAS’s approach to different activists in different regimes,

“The less developed the democracy movement, the longer it takes for the gears to start turning. The countries whose activists had caught on the quickest...were Georgia and Vietnam. The Burmese were more likely to respond like others from totalitarian countries had. "Belarus," said Djinovic, shaking his head. "They were extremely tough to motivate -- extremely passive. I couldn't find the spark in their eyes." And then there were the North Koreans: "They were great young students in a big hotel in Seoul," Popovic told me. "We worked for two days and had no idea how the hell we were doing. People didn't change the expression on their faces. They sat like monuments. It was awful."

With Africans, Latin Americans, and Georgians, the CANVAS trainers were loose and lively -- "Serb style," Popovic called it. With people from Asia, the Middle East and most of Eastern Europe, they tried to be more formal. But while the style needed adaptation, the curriculum stayed the same. It was developed for the first two ongoing conflicts where they had worked, Zimbabwe and Belarus -- places that differed in every possible way. Middle Eastern students, Djinovic said, sometimes argued that the strategies wouldn't work in the Islamic world. But CANVAS's only successes outside the former Soviet Union had come in Lebanon and the Maldives, both predominantly Muslim countries.”

While CANVAS certainly does not have a perfect record, they have created a system that can be exported or diffused across national borders and have come to understand how to present this system in different cultural languages. CANVAS has not seen a 100% success rate by any means. However, in a world that is much more familiar with bloody wars overthrowing regimes, having any success at all in training students to use non-violent strategies to produce the same effect is awesome and inspiring.

103 Rosenberg.
The effects of CANVAS domestically are also fascinating. One way that CANVAS has influence in Serbia is through a graduate level program at Belgrade University with the Faculty of Political Science. The program, created in January 2008, is titled Strategies and Methods of Nonviolent Social Change and is the first university certified course dedicated to Strategic Nonviolent struggle based on CANVAS Core Curriculum. The rough English on the university program page of the CANVAS website makes the format, length, and certification of the program difficult to understand. However, it explains that there are 6 courses taught by instructors: Political Power; Social Conflicts – types, causes and solution models; Strategic Planning; Managing Political Campaigns; Methods and Tactics of Non-violent Struggle; Challenges in the Process of Building Democracies. Instructors include three CANVAS representatives Slobodan Djinovic, Srdja Popovic, Zivorad Andjelkovic among other leaders of Color Revolutions, academics from the United States, and professors from the Belgrade University. The second “generation” of the program began in 2010 and students who had high scores on tests from the first “generation” of students now work for CANVAS as researchers and web administrators.¹⁰⁴

What is almost more impressive than what Otpor, CANVAS, and their members have done is where the group began and has continued to work. When Slobodan Milosevic was ousted and the Bulldozer Revolution nominally ended, Otpor was essentially forced into an important period of transformation as Serbia, at the time still Yugoslavia, underwent political transformation. More than Ukraine, Georgia and arguably more than any other Color Revolution state, Serbia’s political structure has changed the most. Otpor and its leaders had to redefine their mission during a relatively politically tumultuous time in Serbia. The past decade of Serbian political

history is extraordinarily dynamic and complicated. From 2000-2003, Serbia and Montenegro remained in a very loose federation, similar to what had existed prior to the overthrow of Milosevic. In 2003, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia dissolved and reformed as the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro when Serbia and Montenegro signed the Belgrade agreement, a step that involved the European Union and, at least nominally, drew the state closer to the West. This new state was highly decentralized and tensions between Serbia and Montenegro remained. Montenegro and Serbia functioned almost independently within the same republic, with Montenegro even using a separate currency. Nationalists in Montenegro continued to pressure for independence and in 2006, the two states formally separated. The Serbian government issued a referendum on October 28, 2006 to accept a new constitution and it was promulgated on November 8, 2006. This new constitution was viewed as an improvement over the 1990 constitution written during Milosevic’s presidency but was criticized by many as there was no public debate and negotiations happened behind closed doors.

Since 2006, the Serbian government has held two parliamentary elections (2007 and 2008) and one presidential election (2008). Both elections were viewed by outside observers, such as Freedom House, to be positive progress for democracy in Serbia. While problems with Kosovo and building coalitions in parliament caused concerns for outsiders, Serbia is still led by pro-democratic leaders. Based on the timeline set forth by the Serbian constitution, parliamentary elections are set to be held in 2012 and presidential elections are set for 2013.


Through all of this political instability, Serbia has made significant progress in democratization. Since 2001, Freedom House’s democracy rankings of Serbia have improved 1.33 points. This is a significant change within any state but especially within one with such a dynamic political climate. Through overthrowing Milosevic, the 2003 change in government structure, and Montenegro’s independence in 2006, Serbia has maintained a path of democratization. Furthermore, civil society, the aspect that Otpor interacted with and CANVAS continues to interact with the most, has seen a steady improvement over the past 12 years from the time of Otpor’s beginning (5.25) to today (2.5). Overall, Serbia has made the most improvement of any Color Revolution state.

If there is an area for concern, it would be in the independence of the media. Where all other areas of analysis have consistently improved or remained steady after improving, independent media has been the only area that has demonstrated a pattern going back to its previous levels. Freedom House’s Nations in Transit ratings for Serbian media independence were at 4.5 in 2001 and decreased to 3.25 by 2003. For several years, the score shifted between 3.25 and 3.75 but was given a score of 4 for the 2010 edition of the annual publication. This most recent change stems primarily from controversial laws and amendments to laws that were adopted without public debate. Observers are concerned that this will create even more problems with independence from Serbia’s political powers, increase self-censorship, and weaken the media economically. This is compounded on by continuing attacks on journalists and media outlets including several murders that are not being confronted in the judicial system, according to

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108 Pesek, 455.

109 Peseck, 455.
Freedom House.\textsuperscript{110} The most popular radio station and news source in Serbia, B92, remains independent but has a pro-democracy slant. Taken over by Otpor during the Bulldozer revolution, B92 has various reporters and contributors who are activists in student unions, former Otpor members, or others who share an opinion on Serbian politics. The influence of B92 as a dominant form of media is certainly not negligible, but is virtually impossible to quantify. I would contend, however, that based on its popularity, B92 is an important resource of Serbians and a pro-democracy slant is a positive influence on the public.

The activist culture that was created by Otpor and sustained by student activists in the country has done more to support democratization in Serbia than most scholars realize. Certainly responsive politicians have been necessary to create reforms and create new laws. Yet the power of experiencing the Bulldozer Revolution and working with an increasingly strong civil society not only pressures politicians for reforms, but keeps the government in check. Students continue to organize and make demands through the lessons they learned in the Bulldozer Revolution. Serbian civil society rapidly improved following Milosevic’s overthrow and remained active. The leaders elected in the Bulldozer revolution and their democratic successors have never been outside of Otpor’s scope of influence or civil society’s watch. Civil society in Serbia is not only more willing to oppose democratic leadership (unlike in Georgia) but also remains active and able to build a coalition around democratic reforms and candidates as needed (unlike Ukraine). Serbia is far from perfect in terms of democratization, but the influence of Otpor activists as more than just passive opposition to the state or domestic activist training has had an important

\textsuperscript{110} Peseck, 458.
impact on democratization within Serbia and in the larger international movement for democracy.
Graph 3: Serbia Nations in Transit Scores 1999-2001
### Figure 4: Serbia Nations in Transit Scores 1999-2010

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From Nations in Transit 2010\(^{111}\) and 2001\(^{112}\)

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\(^{111}\) Pesek, 455.

\(^{112}\) Bardos, 418.
Chapter Four

Conclusion: Future Applications and Implications

So why does this matter? Though democracy is more common now than in any time in history, there are many countries, including Eastern European states such as Belarus and Russia, that cannot be called democratic but could follow a similar path toward democratic movements in the next decade. At the same time, there are voices in the academic community claiming that the Color Revolutions have ended or halted indefinitely. Knowing if there is any potential for these pro-democracy movements to begin spreading again, specifically through non-violent means, matters greatly for international relations should these “revolutions” become successful and consolidate democracy.

At the same time, it’s important to understand if we can truly call these movements successful. Certainly Otpor, Kmara, and Pora demonstrated initial success of implementing pro-democratic leaders and governments. Yet looking at the current state of democracy in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine, the promise of democratic consolidation has faltered and potentially failed in many aspects. Currently these organizations are focused on very different goals and use very different tactics. Did the development of these groups and civil society change how democracy functions in these states? Should these organizations have developed differently to ensure that the democratic promise was fulfilled or did the responsibility of implementing and nurturing democracy belong to democratically elected officials? Could they have developed differently and played a different role?

Predicting the future of Color Revolutions aside, examining the stability of these three countries as they continue on the path to democratic consolidation is important. Democratization
in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine indicates whether there is a place for large scale, grassroots, non-violent, youth activism in shaping politics in the region and, if so, which strategies are most effective for effecting long term change. I do not argue that this method is perfect. In fact, it is very flawed as I have explained in the case of Georgia and Kmara activists. However, the methods used are some of the best we have seen and finding where the process failed will show organizers what they can do better in the future. If this relatively inexpensive and peaceful method of creating regime change can be developed into both an effective and adaptable model for promoting democracy, we could see a new, longterm wave of democratization around the world.

Developing these youth organizations to guard against authoritarianism and empower individuals to participate in their new democracies would be one of the best ways to ensure democracy consolidates within each state. While this has been attempted in the past primarily through the development of political parties, the situation in post-Color Revolution states provides an opportunity for a new strategy. What is different and important about these particular youth organizations stems from their ability to develop an infrastructure for activism. Though vital support was provided by the international community and, specifically, the United States, these movements were led by young people from within each state who had a vested interest in long term democratizing reform.

In post-Color Revolution political environment, there was an enormous potential for SMOs to serve as watchdog organizations that would keep the newly elected leaders from adopting undemocratic policies and some states did this. Activist organizing was also developed in some states and provided a response to government actions that violated the goals of the movement.
SMOs are capable of serving as a tool for citizens seeking to take on a more active role in their democracies. Developing SMOs into an IGO or NGO or non-profit and helping them become financially independent would give them domestic legitimacy, keep them independent from individual politicians or parties, and would certainly create opportunities for citizens to play a role in their democracy. More importantly, institutionalizing an activist culture could have a domino effect on democratic participation and activism through generations. Through understanding the varied development of Otpor, Kmara, and Pora, we begin understand effective post-social movement strategies and apply these lessons to developing youth led social movement organizations into politically effective organizations.

In early 2011 what many have called “Arab Spring” began with a single act of political defiance in Tunisia, triggering a series of events that brought millions to the streets in peaceful protest. These movements not only resembled the Color Revolutions of the past decade, but had been influenced by the non-violent strategies used in previous movements. Much like Otpor, Kmara, and Pora, groups leading these protests had been strategizing for years, building massive support. Seemingly triggered, or at least catalyzed, by the Tunisian man who lit himself on fire in front of the parliament building, these movements progressed rapidly and the world witnessed an unprecedented regime change in the Middle East. What happens next? Looking to the examples of Otpor, Kmara, and Pora, leaders of these movements and the people of these newly democratic states must not become passive or allow their new leaders to go unquestioned. In the words of Otpor’s Srdja Popovic, “A movement is a shark. If it stops moving, it dies.”

113 Popovic.
democracy is not a product, but rather a process and it is up to those who risked their lives fighting for democracy in the streets to make sure that process continues.
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