For the Life of the Soul

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Submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
under the Executive Committee
of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

2025

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Abstract

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There are a handful of analytic and educational philosophers in recent times who bear witness to the meaning, reality, history, and value of the soul. They believe it is a crucial phenomenon to consider in our philosophical anthropology, our educational theorizing, and in considerations of human flourishing. They bear witness to the soul in spite of an anti-soul culture present in the academy, and in spite of an increasingly techno-dominant world. However, the analytic and educational philosophical traditions are not united. They do not cite each other. Their terms, modes of thought, and the value they perceive in the soul can appear quite different. In this study I investigate representative thinkers from each tradition, representing the core tenets of their approach to the soul. I then argue that these differences in approach are not fundamental nor of necessity, but in fact can be joined together in a mutually beneficial, stronger, more holistic approach to the soul. To do this, I defend an image of the world in which both analytic and analogical thought are at home, along with science, and along with our first person experience of the soul at the human scale. I show that, ultimately, a joint approach between analytic and educational approaches depends on a certain kind of unity in the soul – a unity of head and heart, reason and imagination. This leads me to conclude that this work of joining these approaches is as much theoretical as it is ethical. I end the dissertation with a meditation on our office as human beings who enjoy the life of the soul. May this study be a renewal of that life.

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Acknowledgements

To my wife Dawnielle, unending gratitude. Your name won't be on the front but your soul lives in these pages. Neither myself nor our kids would have held together in one piece without your presence bringing life, care, and support these last six and half years. You are my editor, my interlocutor, my Diotima.

To David and Megan who took a chance on me, thank you. May this dissertation be a small testament to your faithful and excellent guidance to students in philosophy and education. David, thank you for your extra sacrifice of time and support to be the chair of my committee.

To the members of my committee, especially Stewart Goetz, Thomas James, and Kevin Gary, thank you for agreeing to be on my committee when you had never met me before. May the free gift of your service and care be an example and guide to me forever.

To the members of my cohorts in the philosophy and education program, your patience and steady guidance has meant the world to me.

To my past teachers, especially Mr. Johnston, Mr. Harrington, Dr. Melissa Schubert, and Dr. John Mark Reynolds, you continue to inspire me to care for my own soul, and the souls of others. I would not be here without you.

To Jeff, my spiritual director and friend, your grace, your strength, and your wisdom saved my life. Thank you.

To my parents, grandparents, and friends who gave financially to keep me in school, this would not have happened without you. You kept a roof over our heads, food on the table, and resources for keeping a balanced life. Thank you all.

And finally, thank you to my kids, Rémi, Hazel, and Pepper. You are delightful and care for me in your own way. If you ever read this, may it nourish the life of your soul.

Dedication

Dedicated to Steve and Nancy Carr, my parents.

You have given everything for your children's education.

Chapter 1: Introduction

Who cares for the soul? If anyone does, it should be the analytic philosophers and the philosophers of education, for as Socrates, the great initiator of Western philosophy and education suggested, these endeavors are a type of care for the soul. Montaigne reaffirmed this purpose of philosophy in the 16th century. Of all the humanities' arts – among them logic, physics, geometry, rhetoric – he thought philosophy most directly engaged with the soul. Its aims were to cultivate judgement, resoluteness, purity, and wisdom in the soul, and by these virtues, enable a liberal, free, flourishing life (Montaigne, 2004, p. 53). He is not alone. The great philosophers of education, from Plato, to Aristotle, to Rousseau, and even to John Dewey, all appear firmly persuaded that the soul is a fundamental dimension of human beings – and therefore a fundamental dimension of education – even if they disagree about exactly how to understand it. Why is it the case, then, that the soul does not figure more prominently in philosophy or education today?

One of the soul's few defenders in recent educational literature, Parker Palmer, thinks there is a broad anti-soul culture that has had far reaching influence in academic educational circles. There are a handful of philosophers who defend the soul in the analytic tradition who agree – Richard Swinburne (1997), Stewart Goetz & Charles Taliaferro (2011), and John Cottingham (2020) – for example, testifying to a strong climate of resistance to the soul in their domains.[1] In addition, one must consider how psychology and psychiatry (etymologically the "study of the soul" and the "cure of the soul") appropriated the term and delivered it over to

[1] For example, Richard Swinburne from Oxford, a proponent of the soul and substance dualism, suggests that in 1986 (the year the first edition of his *Evolution of the Soul* was published), and in the year 1997 (the year the second edition of the book was released), "few philosophical positions are as unfashionable" even though for 3,000 years it was the dominant position. Arguments for God, he says, gain more sympathy now than do arguments for the soul.

natural sciences, as John Cottingham suggests (2020, p. 27). He thinks that practitioners of these disciplines have historically had a materialist and naturalist bias, at times understanding the very project of something like neuroscience to be "explaining all aspects of human mental activity by reference to the functioning of the brain" (p. 28). The key phrase, of course, is *all aspects*, implying that every aspect of our inner lives is reducible to material-chemical processes in the brain. Therefore, some are motivated by the express purpose of eliminating the soul entirely from our vocabulary and our self-understanding. In educational circles there is, at times, strong resistance to the soul due to the "binary" self-and-world which it thinks the concept of soul helps create. "Dualism" or "dualistic" become self-evidently pejorative words from this perspective. Gilbert Ryle's (still quite popular) description of Descartes' soul as a "ghost in the machine" epitomizes this very objection. Finally, the language of the soul has largely been replaced by the term "mind" in analytic philosophy, and this move has had some reductionist effects, for the "mind" does not carry the full richness of the term "soul." For these reasons, among others, the soul has lost much of its relevance, attraction, and centrality in both philosophy and education.

Therefore, one of the major underlying motivations for this study is to deliver the soul back into the hands of philosophers and educators, to soften the edge of the anti-soul culture, to resist comprehensive materialism and scientism, and to bear witness to the full richness of the soul from two traditions *in the hopes that* both philosophers and educators will consider the soul more seriously as an option in their own philosophical anthropology.

One might suspect that, if the environment around the soul in academia is as hostile as these thinkers claim, all those who defend its value and relevance would band together in spite of their differences. However, when it comes to recent analytic philosophers and soul educators, that is not what I have found. They never cite one another as far as I can tell, their modes of

thinking feel quite opposed, and when reading within each tradition one might find themselves asking – though they each keep using the word "soul" – are they even talking about the same thing? Therefore, part of the reason for this study is to investigate what the source of these felt differences might be, find out whether or not these two groups are genuinely opposed, and if not, to try and chart a course for how to bring them into genuine collaboration and dialogue with one another. If both camps can work together, the work of reviving and reclaiming the soul expands, grows stronger, and the possibility of its relevance, attraction, and centrality in philosophy and education becomes a live option for our philosophical anthropology.

Analytic philosophy approaches the soul with the purpose of establishing its nature, its existence or non-existence, and its relationship to science. It does this through highly refined propositional thinking and arguments. Common themes are whether or not the soul is identical to the person, the relationship of the soul to the body, and what theoretical or metaphysical frameworks better house the phenomenon of the soul. The literature in recent analytic philosophy is strongly connected to historical arguments and assertions about the soul, linking itself to a longstanding tradition in the West. It is now commonplace to interchange the "soul" with "mind" in analytic philosophy, and most soul-talk is now categorized under the branch of philosophy known as "philosophy of mind," as mentioned before.

Recent educational philosophy approaches the soul with the purpose of identifying its value for living, to faithfully articulate how it shows up in particular arts, crafts, and disciplines, and to ground a type of spirituality in education. It generally bypasses historical arguments for and against the existence of the soul, extended discussions of the soul's exact nature, and how it is that modern scientific discoveries harmonize with the phenomena of the soul. More important in recent educational philosophy is uncovering and connecting to one's own soul as an essential,

true dimension of oneself. Soul educators think this discovery holds meaningful, creative, spiritual, and educational potential for a person, whether in the role of student or teacher. This discovery of oneself is not done primarily by direct, intellectual gazing at oneself, or by what I call direct, reflexive knowing. Rather, educational philosophy emphasizes the role of arts, practices, and disciplines – especially the *conditions* – under which these things may be conducive to becoming aware of and cultivating one's soul. The type of spirituality educational philosophy associates with the soul tends towards Christian mysticism, Christian humanism, and secular humanism more broadly, though these theorists are often quick to emphasize how one can begin to approach the soul without prematurely identifying with any particular religious or philosophical position. Some, like John P. Miller, incline more towards Buddhist and Eastern spirituality.

Instead of ever-refined propositions inserted into tightly woven arguments, metaphor plays a more crucial role in educational thinking about the soul. Metaphor, here, is not considered a secondary mode of thought. It is considered equally if not more revelatory of the soul than more direct, analytic modes of thought. It is thought that good metaphors, good practices, good teachers and texts, help facilitate the emerging of a person's soul from behind ego, fear, and all the forces which seem determined to keep us slipping around on the surface of our lives.

Central Readings in Contemporary Educational Thought About the Soul. There seem to be several "main" voices in the last twenty years of educational theorizing who think the soul and spirit are of primary educational significance. They are Parker Palmer, Angelo Caranfa, Jim Garrison, Dirck Roosevelt, John P. Miller, and Peter Grimmett.

It is difficult to justify why I think these authors are main voices in one sense, because, for example, Garrison and Roosevelt have only produced a single article about the soul, while Angelo Caranfa's articles are not explicitly *about* the soul per se, but rather invoke the soul and spirit frequently as he explores different mystical thinkers. Parker has really only produced two academic educational articles about the soul, and those were in 1998 and 2003. Peter Grimmett makes it in because he published an entire book in 2019 about the soul's relationship to teacher education. Palmer has written popular level books but these are not necessarily academic educational pieces, with the possible exception of his *The Heart of Higher Education: A Call to Renewal*, published in 2010. The authors I center in this dissertation are Angelo Caranfa, Jim Garrison, Dirck Roosevelt, and Parker Palmer. The reason I do not give Peter Grimmett as much attention as the others is because his comments on the soul are very similar to Palmer's, and because his main focus is on politics and re-enchantment. Even though 're-enchantment' is not my current focus, its significance is growing on me. One potential argument for taking the soul more seriously is its relationship to re-enchanting the world. I will address further address this thought in my epilogue.

I believe Palmer is a central voice on the soul, not only because two articles about the soul is a relatively large contribution given the scarcity of recent educational literature about it, but because his life work has involved starting the *Courage to Teach* institute, which places the soul at the center of its theorizing and practice. This institute, claims Palmer, builds on decades of prior work with educators of all kinds, and thus Palmer comes in as a deeply experienced thinker and carer of the soul.

Garrison and Roosevelt are main voices because their article, "Yet the Root of the Matter is Not In Them," is an insightful and singular exploration of Dewey's view of the soul and the

spirit. There is nothing else quite like their article in the recent literature. Dewey being the educational force that he is makes the significance of this article grow.

Angelo Caranfa is a main voice because the number of articles he has produced which invoke the soul/spirit is greater than anyone else's. Though it is difficult to piece together exactly what *Caranfa* thinks, as he's always interpreting what other great authors think in his articles, there are moments where his thought shines through. In "Light and Silence in Matisse's Art: Listening to the Spirit," for example, Caranfa gestures towards an education of the spirit in his introduction. It's clear he considers the spirit as a distinct faculty of a human being, along with the body and the mind. It's his consistent attention to matters of the spirit that make him a significant voice on the subject, even if our conclusions about *his* exact thoughts on the soul we must hold somewhat tentatively.

Centering the above voices is the best move because it represents the real weight of recent educational philosophy on the soul. However, it is worth noting that this project does not fully represent the varied, provocative, and idiosyncratic ways that soul and spirit appear elsewhere in recent educational literature. Themes from these articles include but are not limited to animism as it relates to a global partnership between human beings and all things, re-enchantment of a Weberian variety as it relates to a spiritual and philosophic life, spirit as inspiring productivity, communion, and meaning in academic writing groups, and Hegelian conceptions of spirit, to name a few.

Structure of the Dissertation. The form of this dissertation is not a sequential, chapter-by-chapter ladder which culminates in the conclusion in Chapter Six. It is much more like a circle, with the dialogue in the middle – Chapter Four – functioning as the beginning and the ending, with chapters 2, 3, 5, and 6 extending, supporting, and clarifying Chapter Four.

Dialogue is not common as a dissertation format, nor even as a chapter in a dissertation. I chose to write a dialogue chapter for at least four reasons. First, if one is trying to argue that two seemingly disparate points of view can reach a unified position, but that position is not yet clear, then a dialogue is a perfect genre. In it, one can model the step-by-step back-and-forth of philosophical discussion with all of its complexity, surprising turns, and human texture involved. Second, dialogue is a perfect genre if one desires to unite genuine rational exchange with the personal presence of individual souls. A good dialogue can never be perfectly rational nor perfectly spirited nor perfectly appetitive – it must work, or at least try to work, at every level of the soul. Third, a good dialogue must mediate cultural assumptions, imitate real-world exigencies (like class coming to end!), and work through social dynamics. This takes what could feel like a discussion in a vacuum and opens it up to the world. This is why, in my dialogue, a discussion of Artificial Intelligence and technological manipulations of our first-person experience shows up here rather than anywhere else in the dissertation. Fourth, it facilitates longing for the truth precisely because it does not make all answers explicit. The dynamic of a dialogue is a ceaseless movement between revelation and hiddenness. This creates a space where, I believe, readers can become genuine participants in the dialogue in a way that formal argumentation does not allow.

1.1 Purpose

The formal purpose of this study is to give insight into the nature of analytic and educational approaches to the soul in recent times, to discern places of genuine overlap and disagreement, and then to present both arguments and images for how they can be united. As I carried out this work a surprising conviction emerged – that in order to genuinely accomplish the first purpose, an ethical call must be made to individuals. That is, genuine unity between these disciplines depends on a certain kind of unity in the very souls of individuals within these

disciplines, and therefore, the secondary purpose of this dissertation is to provide a compelling ethical vision for unity within the soul. In particular, I sketch a vision of what it would mean to unite the head and the heart, reason and imagination, and to be a mediator between the converging opposites which bear on us at the human scale of being.

1.2 Research Questions

The research questions for this dissertation are as follows:

1. What are the main features of the analytic and educational approaches to the soul?
2. Where are these traditions opposed or in agreement, either in appearance or in substance?
3. Is it possible to unite these two approaches to the soul? If so, what theoretical, personal, and ethical requirements are needed in order to accomplish this?

1.3 Methodology

1.3.1 Philosophical Foundations for Methodology

This is a theoretical study with no empirical fieldwork. Thus, I will begin with the theoretical, I will engage deeply with varying theoretical voices, and the outcome will be a new theoretical position. I select a handful of representative texts from the analytic tradition, I select a handful of representative texts from the philosophical educational tradition, and then I offer interpretations of these works for the reader. In representing these works, I try to not merely re-present the formal terms, arguments, and conclusions each group makes, but to characterize and embody the very spirit in which they make them.

Sometimes methodology is meant as one's underlying epistemic commitment which influences one's approach to a subject. I did not come into this study with a pre-identifiable commitment such as a "positivist," "foundationalist," "pragmatist," or "idealist" position.

Beyond a basic commitment to the idea that there is *a truth* about things, I take my point of departure from my experience, namely, the repeated experience of having philosophical conversations in community, sharing an inquiry with members of that community, and moving closer to the truth thereby. Whatever commitments are necessary to explain that experience – those are my commitments.

I subscribe to the ancient distinction between inductive and deductive reasoning in this dissertation. At times I work from the conceptual "downwards," and at other times I work from the inductive "upwards." It strikes me that no matter what epistemic position one ultimately identifies with, thinking requires inductive and deductive reasoning. I perceive in the back-and-forth dynamic between inductive and deductive reasoning a dialogic, mutually informing relation. Seemingly true propositions are refined and expanded by particulars, and particulars are refined and expanded by deductive thinking. By inductive I mean working from examples, particulars, and experiences towards a more general conclusion, and by deductive I mean working from statements which seem true, deriving from them particular conclusions that bear on examples and experience.

I am convinced that every methodology must to some degree find its justification in a true image of reality. A true image does not claim to tell the whole story, nor does it exclude the possibility of broader, deeper, or different true images. Critical theorizing correlates to an image of reality riddled with power relations and injustice, logical positivism to a world of more direct, stable inferences, hermeneutics to a world in need of translation. Therefore, part of my methodology for suggesting a joint analytic and educational approach is to articulate an image of the world in which they can coherently work together, *not* by merely making that case with propositions and arguments. I do this primarily in Chapter 5 and 6. This two-pronged approach is

itself an enactment of my underlying argument – that reason and the imagination, analytic thinkers and soul-educators, can beneficially join together.

1.3.2 Researcher Positionality

I am and I live this dissertation. There is no distance between it and me, and therefore no objectifying the people and ideas portrayed here, for better or for worse. I am fully persuaded in the reality, the value, and the centrality of the soul in life and education.

From the moment my high school teacher, Mr. Johnston, made philosophical, historical, and theological texts come alive with (almost) equal parts analytic mind and generous heart, the spirit of philosophy leapt from his soul into my own. There it has tortured me ever since, always calling me into equal parts *knowing* and *valuing*, repeating phrases like, "The *unexamined* life is not *worth* living." It refuses to give up when there is every imaginable reason to do so; it continues to plod along without any guarantee of effectively changing anything in the world or myself beyond the smallest of scales. It continues to seek deep moments of understanding, clarity, and transformation, only for me to be found wordless, frozen, vice-ridden, and ignorant when the world takes a moment to look my way. Nevertheless, it is this very spirit which has never let me abandon my own soul, for I suspect it knows it has no life apart from it. Augustine thought that when the intelligent soul reflects on itself, it grasps not only that it is an intelligence, but that it is *alive*. This life we all find in ourselves.

Therefore, in my research through literature which bears witness to this life, I inevitably intermingle their words with my own, for my soul snatches phrases out of their mouths and tells me it has known this all along. Thus, my real position as a researcher is one of gratitude mixed with theft.

1.4 Significance

This study has great significance for several groups and for several reasons. First, it possesses great significance for analytic philosophers and philosophers of education who already consider the soul as a genuine aspect of their philosophical anthropology. To them, it offers new insights, new modes of collaboration, and an enriched set of arguments and images which may serve to renew their interest and care for the soul in their own lives and academic disciplines.

Second, to these handful of people, I hope that my work here at least opens a space for genuine dialogue between the formal work of analytic thinkers and educational thinkers. Even if every argument I offer ultimately fails, my hope is that the very attempt at finding a middle-way itself possesses a movement and a significance for these two groups to find their own way into genuine collaboration.

Third, analytic philosophers and philosophers of education who care about our philosophical anthropology but are unsure of whether the soul is of any use will find some clarity here on what is at stake when we adopt or abandon the soul in our self-understanding. To them, this study offers genuine reasons why the soul is a very serious and provocative option in our self-understanding, one which is teeming with personal and educational goods, and one which is rich in historical philosophical precedent.

Fourth, this study possesses significance for those who are already on the path of trying to live a more holistic and integrated life, one which moves further away from dissociation, disconnection, and alienation. In particular, this study shows how the soul is emblematic of this integrated unity, and it shows how the language of the soul, especially in the educational tradition, is marked by pursuit of wholeness and living connections with all things.

Fourth, this study possesses significance for the philosophy and education community. It tries to lay the groundwork for others to jump into the history of philosophical theorizing about education and the soul with a basic set of vocabulary, concepts, and an initial understanding of the two dominant modes of thinking about the soul. One might jump from this dissertation into investigating authors such as Jean Jacques Rousseau, Blaise Pascal, John Dewey, Hannah Arendt, Simone Weil, W.E.B DuBois, Paulo Freire, Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, Michel Foucault, Friedrich Nietzsche, etc. – all of whom use the "soul" in their works. This would equip the researcher to make quicker and better connections between the analytic and educational modes of thought, expanding the work started here, and expanding the possibility of renewing our current educational thinking and practice in light of those new developments.

1.5 Chapter Overviews

This first chapter has provided an overview of the project and a discussion of its purpose, the questions with which it is concerned, the methodology employed in the inquiry, and the significance of the study.

Chapter Two takes up the question: What are the main features of the analytic approach to the soul? I summarize the analytic approach to the soul by engaging with a handful of analytic philosophers: Stewart Goetz, Charles Taliaferro, John Cottingham, and Richard Swinburne. Section 1 covers the role of direct, reflexive knowing; what analytic philosophers think we know about our souls as a result of our immediate awareness; and the epistemic confidence we should have in that first-person awareness. Section 2 covers the analytic approach to the soul as a formal essence in a broadly conceived scientific account of the world. In this section I discuss the analytic impulse towards essence, definitions, propositions, and entailment. I then suggest that

analytic methodology shares a kinship with scientific methodology. I then compare and contrast how these philosophers articulate the relationship between the soul and science.

I conclude Chapter Two by summarizing the two fundamental movements that are at play in the analytic tradition on the soul – the movement towards experience, and the movement towards essence – suggesting that they more heavily lean on the movement towards essence. I then offer what I think is the originating source for these contrasting movements. These concluding remarks set the table for what comes in Chapter Four, where I try to unite the analytic and educational approaches to the soul.

In Chapter Three, I take up the question: What are the main features of the educational approach to the soul? I summarize the educational approach to the soul by engaging with a handful of educational philosophers: Parker Palmer, Dirck Roosevelt, Jim Garrison, and Angelo Caranfa. Section 1 shows how metaphor has oriented educational thinking about the soul since Plato, forming an interconnected tradition of images for the soul. Section 2 covers the concept of a soul-education, showing that soul-educators conceive of a liberal education as an education of the soul, by the soul, through great works of art in the context of nature. The soul is part of the very logic of a liberal/aesthetic/spiritual understanding of education. Section 3 covers the educational concept of working with the soul. I give examples of the conditions and practices, such as solitude, listening, and silence, which must be maintained by an individual or a community in order that they may know their soul, connect with their soul, and work with the soul.

Chapter Four takes up the question: How might the analytic and educational approaches to the soul be joined together? As mentioned before, this chapter is a dialogue. I set the dialogue in the future, in a graduate-level discussion, where students and the professor have read all of the

analytic and educational philosophers I mention in this dissertation. They also have in their possession an unfinished dissertation draft which bears no name. It's no secret. It's *this* dissertation, except without Chapters 4, 5, and 6. In this context, the professor asks them to, in effect, complete the dissertation and unite these two approaches to the soul during their class period. Though the students in the class are first-rate, tackling their professor's prompt without question, there is still a felt degree of futility which affects the students. The world of power, technology, materialistic and utilitarian reductionism have crushed most liberal arts programs by this period, and they engage in the dialogue knowing the dissertation which already attempted to do this failed. They engage in it knowing that the integration of technology with the body has reached a level that it profoundly manipulates people's first-person experience of the world – an organic first-person experience without which the analytic and educational understanding of the soul cannot get off the ground. And yet, they try.

Chapter Five takes up the question: Is there an image of the world in which analytic and educational approaches to the soul are both at home? While these two camps are primary, this chapter also tries to develop the image of the world in which science – but not scientism – is at home. Seen from a different angle, this chapter is asking how we might balance the body and the soul, the material and the immaterial, in a mutually informing analogical relationship. The image I develop is what I call a philosophy of nested being. As this image develops, a surprising resonance is discovered between the domain of the material and the immaterial – one which sets the stage for, in the next chapter, appealing to metaphor (and the soul) as that which mediates the analogical relationship between the body and the soul, the material and the immaterial.

Chapter Six takes up the question: Do analytic and educational modes of thought have fundamentally discordant epistemic beliefs and assumptions, as the poet-philosopher Jan Zwicky

appears to think they do, or are they simply patterns of thought originating from two different capacities of knowing in the soul? I take the latter position. I argue that analytic thought originates primarily from the head, and that educational thought originates largely from the heart. The "head" represents reason and, following Zwicky, the heart represents imagination. Imagination is a form of knowing according to Zwicky. What it knows are analogical patterns – metaphorical resonances in the world. Inspired by Zwicky's language, I articulate the sort of patterns which analytic reasoning picks up, then articulate the sort of patterns which imagination and "gestalt perception" picks up on. I then offer reasons why these two capacities and their attendant patterns can work together in our understanding of the world, thereby charting a path for the head and the heart to unite.

I conclude Chapter Six by meditating on what the image of nested being, combined with the integrated, mutually edifying capacities of reason and imagination, mean for us. I suggest that we have a role to play in light of our profound capacities bestowed on us through the soul, and in light of the fact that we find ourselves in a unique place in our nested cosmos.

In the epilogue, I consider some possible direction for future research.

Chapter Two: The Analytic Approach to the Soul

It is ironic that analytic philosophy is partially responsible for the decline of the soul in Western thought. It is ironic because Descartes, in some ways an icon of the analytic tradition, passionately defended the existence of the soul while being the very person who segued the tradition more towards the "philosophy of mind," which in many ways has tried to move past the soul. Goetz and Taliaferro contend that Descartes' equation of the soul with the "thinking mind," as well as his rejection of Aristotle's long accepted theses – that the soul gives life to the body (i.e. the nutritive soul) and that the soul is the subject of perceptions/sensations (i.e. the sensitive soul) led to a drop in the usage of "soul" altogether (Goetz and Taliaferro, 2011, p. 5). These factors were joined by others, such as the rise of scientism and secularism, and for the last hundred or so years, more and more analytic philosophers have rejected the existence of the soul.

However, there are a handful of analytic philosophers who have never been persuaded to abandon the soul, and as mentioned in Chapter One, I have elected to focus on four of them. They are Stewart Goetz, Charles Taliaferro, Richard Swinburne, and John Cottingham. The particular books in focus will be Goetz and Taliaferro's [hereafter G & T] *A Brief History of the Soul*, Swinburne's *The Evolution of the Soul*, and Cottingham's *In Search of the Soul*. Together, I believe they generally characterize the analytic approach to the soul in recent times.

In **Section 1** which follows, I examine the most important aspect of the analytic approach to the soul – what I call direct, reflexive knowing. Nearly every major Western contributor to the discussion about the nature of the soul testifies to the role of direct, reflexive knowing. This knowledge comes by merely being aware of oneself. I compare and contrast how these thinkers characterize direct, reflexive knowing, as well as what they think we know about ourselves, or our souls, as a result. I conclude section 1 by showing that these analytic thinkers all contend that

we should have epistemic confidence in our first-person knowledge of ourselves. This sort of first-person knowledge is considered by many thinkers in the Western tradition to be *as evident*, if not *more evident*, than any scientific conclusions we have about the world.

In **Section 2**, I suggest analytic philosophers approach the soul as a formal essence in a broadly conceived scientific account of the world. Broadly conceived, a scientific account of the world is accounting for and describing all the happenings in the world (Swinburne, 1997, p. X). In discussing the approach to the soul as a formal essence, I examine the analytic impulse towards essence, definitions, propositions, and entailment. I then suggest that analytic methodology shares a kinship with scientific methodology. I conclude section 2 by comparing and contrasting the relationship between the soul and science as articulated by the thinkers I have chosen. My aim is not to fully explicate each thinker's view on science and the soul, but to show the reader it is deeply embedded in their approach to the soul.

I conclude the chapter by summarizing two fundamental movements that are at play in the analytic tradition on the soul, suggesting that on the whole the tradition leans towards one of them. I then offer what I think is the originating source for these contrasting movements. These concluding remarks set the table for what comes in chapter four, where I attempt to unite the analytic and educational approaches to the soul.

2.1 Direct, Reflexive Knowing

Goetz & Taliaferro, Cottingham, and Swinburne all affirm direct, reflexive knowing in their own ways. It is fundamental to the history of Western philosophizing about the soul, and each of these analytic thinkers ultimately grounds their work in direct, reflexive knowing.

In *A Brief History of the Soul*, direct, reflexive knowing is referred to in multiple ways. Sometimes G & T refer to it as a "first-person perspective," sometimes as "internalist," sometimes as "self-awareness" or "introspection," or sometimes as "direct introspective awareness" (2011, pp. 34, 125). Given that their book is a "history," they survey the main philosophical contributors to the soul in the West, often pointing out how direct, reflexive knowing figures in Western thought. The main features of the soul that are "discovered" in direct reflexive knowing, at least the ones that G & T return to the most, are the soul's simplicity, singularity, continuous personhood, teleological purposings, and transparency. While I cannot exhaustively cover their history of the soul or these concepts, a brief selection will help fill out what is meant by these terms.

For Plato, and for G & T, the simplicity and singularity of the soul is evidenced by the unity of consciousness.[2] Plato gets at the unity of consciousness, as G & T point out, by appealing to the unity of perceptual and sensual experience:

> In a discussion about knowledge and perception in the *Theatetus,* Socrates asks: "Is it more correct to say that we see and hear *with* our eyes and ears or *through* them?" Theatetus responds, "I should say we always perceive through them, rather than with them, and Socrates retorts as follows:

[2] G & T acknowledge that there are different interpretations of Plato's "tripartite soul," and whether or not Plato thought these parts were "substantive" parts (*A Brief History of the Soul*, 2011, pp. 15 – 18). If he did think they were substantive, then the soul would not be simple. For now, I take the view that Plato did not think these were substantive parts of the soul, but differing capacities/powers.

> "Yes, it would surely be strange that there should be a number of senses ensconced inside us, like the warriors in the Trojan horse, and all these things should not converge and meet in some single nature—a mind, or whatever it is to be called—with which we perceive all the objects of perception through the senses as instruments" (Plato, 184C-D, quoted in G & T, 2011, pp. 17 - 18).

Plato highlights an uncanny unity to our perceptual and sensual experience. No matter which of the *multiple* senses is being exercised, nor which *part* of the body is stimulated, even simultaneously, our multiple sensations "somehow converge at the single point that is the soul itself, which is the subject of awareness" as G & T put it (p. 18). If our mind were like the substantially distinct individuals inside the trojan horse, and each of our senses stimulated a different substantially distinct "part," how could one explain the manifest unity of our conscious life? The language of converging at a "single point" is what points towards the concept of a *simple* soul, for what it communicates is singularity, not multiplicity.

Aristotle makes a similar point from a slightly different angle while reflecting on his own awareness. When we experience different qualities in some object, we are able to distinguish between them. This may seem like a simple observation but it reveals, thinks Aristotle, something about the nature of our soul. The soul must be singular in order for it to genuinely discriminate between the different qualities in an object, for the same entity must know both qualities simultaneously in order to know in what respect they differ. Suppose you had, by analogy, two people. One person had only ever known sweet and the other had only ever known sour. Further suppose that you asked them to distinguish between sweet and sour together. This would be manifestly difficult given that they have no genuinely shared experience from which they could pick out respects in which sweet and sour are different. For all the sour person knows, what the sweet person is describing is exactly the same thing as their experience of sour, and for all the sweet person knows, what the sour person is describing is exactly the same thing as their

experience of sweet. However, if these persons' souls were united into a single soul, they would be in a position to genuinely discriminate between the sweet and the sour, for there would be a convergence of sensations into a single entity. As Aristotle puts it, "both the qualities discriminated must be present to something that is one and single" (Aristotle, 426b, quoted in G & T, 2011, pp. 23-24). Therefore, since it is the case that we do genuinely discriminate between qualities, that which does the discriminating (the soul) must be single.

St. Augustine agreed with Plato and Aristotle and built upon their ideas. Augustine formulated an argument for the non-bodily nature of the soul by appealing to the transparency of the soul to itself, as well as to its singularity. G & T quote Augustinian scholar Etienne Gilson who renders Augustine's idea in this way,

> "[T]he mind [soul] knows its own existence with immediate evidence. When it discovers itself (even in doubt), it apprehends itself as an intelligence. It knows that it exists and lives, but the life it grasps is the life of a mind. Because it knows this, it is capable of knowing what it is and what it is not. Since it is intelligence, it certainly is what it knows itself to be, and it is certainly not what it does not know itself to be" (Gilson, 1960, p. 46, quoted in G & T, 2011, p. 36).

To explain what Gilson means by the soul knowing "what it is not" (i.e. bodily in nature), G & T summarize Augustine's understanding of the body. To Augustine, a body is clearly something with height, length, width, and divisible parts. Thus, the soul knows of itself that it cannot be divided, extended, or measured like a body, and therefore it is simple and indivisible – a different sort of thing than bodies are (Goetz and Taliaferro, 2011, p. 37). Stated in formal argumentative form, G & T quote G. B. Matthews,

1) If the mind were made of some kind of physical stuff, then the mind, simply by being fully present to itself, would think (be aware) of the physical stuff it is made of.
2) The mind, simply by being fully present to itself, does not think (is not aware) of any physical stuff. Therefore,
3) The mind is not made of any kind of physical stuff (G & T, 2011, p. 38).

This, the non-bodily nature of the soul (i.e. its simple nature), is one of the features we perceive in light of the soul's transparency, and this perceiving is direct and reflexive.[3]

Augustine offers one more reason, based on direct awareness, for thinking the soul is fully present to its own singular self. He does so in the context of thinking about how the soul relates to space. Space is like a body in that it appears to have extension. Bodily things can be "extended in space," and in much of Western thinking, spatial extension is correlated with divisibility. If the soul is simple and indivisible, then how does it connect with a body which is extended and divisible? Is it in some way "stretched out" throughout the body? Does a singular entity "encompass" the body? Augustine suggests the soul is *wholly present in* each part of the body which occupies space. G & T summarize Augustine's thought in this way,

> What is clear is that he [Augustine] believes the soul is present in its entirety at each point in the space it occupies, for the following reason: When something touches (or damages) a soul's body at a particular location (e.g. a toe), the soul in its entirety experiences a sensation (e.g. pain) at that location. Moreover, if that body were simultaneously touched (or damaged) at a different spot (e.g. a finger) then the soul in its entirety would simultaneously experience pain at both locations. If the soul were spread out in space by local diffusion, one part of it occupying one area of space and another part occupying a different area, then one part of the soul would experience one pain and another part a different pain, but neither of the parts would experience the other's pain. However, this is not as things are. One and the same entity (the soul) is experiencing both pains, which leads Augustine to maintain that the soul in its entirety is simultaneously present at both locations (2011, p. 44).

The "I" that is the subject of sensations experiences greater pain as more parts of the body are damaged, and therefore the same entity must be somehow *singularly present*, or "wholly present" at every part of the body where pain is felt. The "I" experiences the cumulative degree

[3] G & T clarify two different ways to interpret the degree of self-knowing that Augustine is suggesting, but the stakes for each position are not necessary to detail here. G & T suggest the "strong position on self-knowledge" is that the soul, at any given moment, is "perfectly transparent to itself" (2011, p. 36). The weaker position on self-knowing would be that "the soul fails to be aware of itself exemplifying properties that entail that it is a body" (p. 37).

of pain. Augustine does not explain exactly *how* the soul is wholly present in each part of the body, but rather deduces that it must be. It seems incorrect to talk about the subject of sensations being locally diffused or spread out in space, for we do not perceive physical extension between pains, pleasures, ideas, or any other occurrences in the soul. Therefore, based on the transparency of certain features of the soul (like our experience of pain), Augustine reaffirms the unity of consciousness and simplicity theme – that a singular conscious subject is the endpoint of various sensations.[4]

So far I have shown, following Goetz and Taliaferro, how philosophers in the Western tradition think of the soul as the unified center of consciousness, as simple, as transparent, and as non-material in nature. But this simple, non-material, wholly present-in-the-body, unified center of consciousness is something more – it involves continuity and personhood. In the Platonic, Augustinian, and Cartesian tradition, the simple soul just *is* the person, the essential self that persists through time.

As G & T note, this understanding of the self encountered serious objections during the 16th and 17th centuries. They quote Martin and Barresi as suggesting that during the 16th and 17th centuries, the "self" shifted from being a "non-relational" immaterial substance to a relational mind – a "dynamic natural system subject to the laws of growth and development" (Goetz and Taliaferro, 2011, p. 105). If the self became "dynamic" and subject to the "laws of growth and development," then it seems the soul is more subject to the world of change than previously

[4] G & T show how even more recent philosophers of mind – John Searle, Roderick Chisholm, and Colin McGinn, to name a few – make very similar comments about the nature of consciousness and perception, all in their own way (G & T, 2011, pp. 40-41). These authors make the point that when we think of ourselves and our own consciousness, we are not aware of substantial "parts" to our consciousness in the way we are aware of them in physical objects, nor are we aware of our conscious life as being extended in the way physical objects are extended, nor can we seem to explain consciousness in terms of ever smaller spatial processes, like we tend to be able to do when explaining physical phenomena. For more arguments which point towards the simplicity and unity of the soul, please see G & T's discussion of Thomas Reid and Kant, pages 105 – 120, 125 – 130).

thought. And if that is true, is there really a singular entity – the "I" – which persists through time? Can there be any reconciliation between an immaterial and simple self and a relational, dynamic view of the mind?

David Hume is someone who answered in the negative. He suggested that we are not aware (and *could not* be aware) of anything like a simple, unchanging, immaterial soul/self (G & T, 2011, pp. 121-122). Rather, what we are directly aware of is a constant flux of perceptions and mental events whose varying qualities are unending. We never find a simple self. While I cannot do justice to the complexity and history of this question, G & T's response to Hume sheds light on how direct, reflexive knowing is foundational not only to perceiving a simple self, but to perceiving that it persists through time.

Goetz and Taliaferro think that along with all of our varying perceptions, we are also directly aware that *we*, *our continuous selves,* are having those perceptions.

> How can Hume truly say that he cannot find himself, if he is right when he says that he is aware of himself stumbling on certain things such as heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure? The problem for Hume is that what he cites as evidence for the position that there are only perceptions and no substantial self implies not only that there is heat or cold, light or shade, pain or pleasure, and so on, but also that there is a substantial self that finds these things, which implies that the self that finds the heat or cold is the same self as that which finds light or shade and the rest. Hence, not only does Hume find perceptions, but he also finds that he is the one who finds them (Chisholm, 1994, p. 97, quoted in G & T, 2011, p. 122).

Said another way, one cannot think upon one's own particular perceptions and sensations without being met with ourselves each time. Our introspective awareness of the particular and successive changes in ourselves, therefore, reflects back towards a unified, continuous self which cannot be identical to those particular successive changes. G & T go on to explain this difference between the dynamic and the consistent in our mental life in terms of unchanging general capacities and

powers vs. changing particularities (G & T, 2011, 123-124). What I take G & T to be suggesting is that we are directly aware, not just of particular changes and activities of the soul, but of the source of those particular occurrences – the underlying faculties through which the particular changes come to be. These unified and continuous underlying faculties just *are* the self, the person, the persisting soul.

Perhaps the most important other feature G & T positively affirm about the soul based on direct, reflexive knowing is the fact that we are teleological agents. As Swinburne puts it, we are "causally efficacious" (Swinburne, 1997, p. 1). As persons, we make decisions – we choose to act – and then there is a resulting action which can be ultimately explained by an appeal to our purposes in acting. Thus, in addition to materialistic and physical explanations of phenomena, there are teleological explanations which are not reducible to material and physical causes. This concept, of course, goes back to Socrates. Towards the end of their book, as G & T consider the scientific methodological objections to the soul, it becomes clear just how rooted in our first-person experience this teleological concept of souls is. G & T push back on the idea that those who affirm the soul appeal to the "gaps" in scientific explanation that have yet to be filled. They argue, "The dualist claim is *not* that there are certain physical events . . . the failure to find a complete physical causal story of which warrants appeal to the causal activity of a soul as their ultimate explanation. Rather, the claim is that an *ordinary understanding* of the purposeful activity of a soul-body compound entails that some physical events must occur whose ultimate causal explanation is not other physical events, but nonphysical mental events who occurrences are explained teleologically by purposes [*emphasis added*]" (2011, p. 158). Later in the chapter, when commenting on the assumptions of the scientistic proponent and the proponent of intelligent design, it becomes even clearer. "However, if our argument in this section is correct,

then those who believe in the possibility of a nonphysical being's intervention in the natural order do not believe what they do on faith or on ecclesiastical authority. Rather, they believe it on the basis of their own direct, introspective awareness of themselves as agents who perform mental acts for purposes that produce effects in the physical world" (2011, p. 176). Therefore, on G & T's view, the soul grounds the possibility of our agential and teleological nature, and we are persuaded we are of this nature because of our direct, reflexive knowledge of ourselves.

John Cottingham largely agrees with Goetz and Taliaferro (and for that matter, Plato, Augustine, and Descartes) about the centrality of direct, reflexive knowing in coming to know the soul, although *what* we know about ourselves receives a different accent. Cottingham is not a substance dualist, as Goetz and Taliaferro are, but rather some variation of an Aristotelian hylomorphist and a property/attributive dualist, as far as I can tell (2020, pp. 39 – 41, 58). For Cottingham, the soul becomes an irreducible domain of ourselves which is indissolubly integrated with our body and brain. The soul is not separable from bodily processes but neither is it reducible to them (Cottingham, 2020, p. 227). Instead of emphasizing a distilled set of features, like simplicity, transparency, substance, or the unity of consciousness, Cottingham refers to a whole host of non-reductive features which constitute our first-person experience – the "rich web of mental activity manifest to each conscious subject as a complex flow of beliefs and desires, feelings and sensations, aspirations and longings – everything that gives our existence *meaning*" (2020, p. 29). "To be human," argues Cottingham, "is to have an inner life" (p. 30). And if we are to understand ourselves, we cannot merely refer to the "objective" and "external" methods of science, but we must refer to that inner life. In fact, we undertake that very project of self-understanding, scientific or otherwise, in virtue of our inner life – what Cottingham calls the "domain of the soul" (p. 30). One key thread which runs through Cottingham's book is the idea

that out of this domain of the soul arises an idea which confronts each of us in our lives: "Growing towards the selves we were meant to be" (p. 31). "We are all engaged in the task of trying to understand the "soul" in this sense: the experiencing subject, the core self that makes us what we are. . . Each of us, like it or not, is on a journey, to grow and to learn, and to reach towards the best we can become" (pp. 31-32). Cottingham thinks this journey just *is* the task of *Searching for the Soul*, as he titles his book. While Cottingham does not emphasize the agential teleology or causally efficacious abilities we enjoy in virtue of having a soul as Goetz, Taliaferro, and Swinburne do, his Aristotelian leanings bring him to say that this search for the soul is to be understood teleologically.

That the rich web of mental activity is "manifest to each conscious subject," and that to be human is to have an "inner life," and the phrase "the experiencing subject, the core self" all point towards the sort of direct, reflexive experience we have of ourselves every day. For Cottingham, this concept of the "core self" and the "experiencing subject" is really inspired by Descartes. While Cottingham disagrees with Descartes' inference to the soul as a distinct immaterial substance, he heartily agrees with Descartes' direct, reflexive "phenomenology," if you will. Let me explain.

One thing Cottingham recounts in his book is that Descartes' had an extremely "progressive" (in a scientific sense) program for explaining all sorts of phenomena from a mathematical and mechanical perspective. These explanations are why Descartes rejected the nutritive and sensitive soul of his predecessors. However, what Descartes thought *defied* explanation in these terms were the abilities and experience of the rational mind. But by "rational," Descartes did not merely mean a kind of logical, conceptual thought (though he certainly did include that), but as Cottingham puts it, "conscious mental attention" (2020, p. 52).

It's the experience of not just walking or painting or looking, but *intellectually attending* to the walking, painting, or looking while one is doing it. It is our conscious intellectual attending which allowed Descartes to anticipate much of the later philosophical debate around the "qualia" or "what is it is like" to be or experience the world from a human first-person perspective (pp. 60 – 64). Cottingham puts it this way,

> "This *me* [*ce moi*], that is to say the soul, by which I am what I am." Descartes' use of the first-person pronoun is profoundly significant. What he takes each of us to be aware of is something that is directly accessed from a first-person perspective. You can investigate me from the outside, measure my brain states, collect any other data about my body and nervous system that you please, but you cannot enter the conscious domain of which I am directly aware and which seems to give me my very sense of what it is to be myself – "this me, that is to say the soul, by which I am what I am." I am not an object or item to be measured through the quantitative methods of science; I am a *subject* – the owner, as it were, of the thoughts and feelings and experiences that constitute my conscious life (p. 70).

Therefore, in the spirit of Descartes, Cottingham deeply relies on direct, reflexive knowing as a crucial component of coming to understand *that* one has a soul and what that soul is like. It is an intimate, direct awareness of personhood, of being confronted with the teleology of meaning, and the whole domain of interior life. Cottingham has a wide-ranging philosophical discourse about the relationship of this "soul domain" to neuroscience, psychology, history, and to housing frameworks like naturalism and theism, but at the end of the day the key word for Cottingham is *irreducibility.* Each and every human being is directly aware of an "irreducible reality of conscious thought and of the rich conceptually mediated lifeworld to which each one of us has access as a conscious subject of experience" (p. 79).

Richard Swinburne is another analytic philosopher who in his approach to the soul relies heavily on direct, reflexive knowing. The goal of his book *The Evolution of the Soul* is different than the other works we have considered. He is not telling the intellectual history of the soul as

Goetz and Taliaferro attempt to do, nor is he trying to articulate the good life in terms of the soul, as Cottingham tries to do, but rather he is trying to tell a broadly scientific story about how the soul evolved alongside, or along with, life on earth – hence the title *The Evolution of the Soul*. Interestingly, evolution gets comparatively little airtime and instead Swinburne painstakingly argues that pure mental events are distinct from physical events, that humans and higher animals consist of two parts, a body and a soul (mental events being goings-on in the soul while physical events are goings-on in the body), and then he tries to describe what the human soul is like. And while there is no way to do justice to the depth, breadth, and complexity of Swinburne's work here, Swinburne reveals his reliance on direct, reflexive knowing quite early in the work.

Swinburne begins his introduction by pointing out the "radical" qualitative difference between what men evolved from and what they have evolved into. Rocks, rivers, and trees do not have thoughts, sensations, or purposes (sensation is a technical term for Swinburne), whereas human beings do (1997, p. 1). Mental life may be caused by physico-chemical events in many instances, but it is distinct from those events. Conscious mental life is "rich in inbuilt color, smell, and meaning" (p. 1). If we can accept this vast qualitative difference between inanimate beings and animate humans, Swinburne thinks certain qualities becomes manifestly evident right away about our conscious life. First, there is a "continuity of experience" (p. 1). I have referred to this already as the continuity of personhood. Second, "conscious experience is causally efficacious" (p. 1). Thoughts, feelings, and other aspects of our internal life *cause* other thoughts, feelings, and other internal phenomenon. They also result in actions which an agent does because he seeks to fulfill his or her purposes in the world (p. 2). Based in large part on the evidence of our first-person experience, later in the book Swinburne argues that human beings have powers of complex, logical thought, awareness of moral goodness and obligation, and some measure of

free will not enjoyed by "lower" animals and inanimate beings. Therefore, one can already perceive the resonance between Swinburne and the previous analytic philosophers discussed: Direct, reflexive awareness reveals *that* we have a soul as well as essential features about our soul.

Swinburne seems convinced that a compelling case for the genuine distinctness of the soul from physical mechanisms requires a compelling description of the major components of our internal life. Thus, in part he tries to defeat soft materialism and hard materialism by fine-combed descriptions of thoughts, purposes, desires, and sensations, devoting chapters to each. Arguments for the various "naturalist" positions fail, he thinks, largely because of phenomena and fine-combed descriptions of our conscious life which are available to us from a first-person perspective. One can just imagine how difficult it would be to argue against materialism and scientism *without* our first-person experience of ourselves. Does this brain have a continuous experience as a subject? We would not know! One long passage from Swinburne communicates everything I am trying to convey about him and his approach to direct, reflexive knowing:

> The physiologist studies the development of the first cell of each new human baby into a full-grown adult. The evolutionary biologist studies the forces which have formed the genetic structure of the first cell. But relatively seldom do either of these scientists point out that their descriptions only cover the evolution of the physical characteristics of man, and that they give no account of the most important characteristics of man – the characteristics of his conscious life, his feelings and desires, hopes and beliefs, those characteristics in virtue of which we treat men, and think we ought to treat men, as totally different from machines. . .
>
> Scientists have tended to regard the life of conscious experience as peripheral, not central to understanding man. But there is so much and so rich human experience, and experience which is apparently continuous and is causally efficacious, that this attitude will not do. His life of experience must be taken seriously if we are to understand man. Scientific revolutions occur when data and coincidences previously regarded as unimportant are taken seriously and made the focal point of understanding. This book takes seriously the fact of human conscious experience, its continuity and its causal efficacy – and around these facts, hitherto regarded as peripheral, builds its understanding of man and his

> evolution. . . The prospects for a fully explanatory super-science which embraces the mental world as well as the physical world are poor. But we must not fall into the trap of believing that that which we cannot explain (at any rate by a normal scientific pattern of explanation) does not exist. The conscious life evidently exists – that we have sensations and thoughts, feelings and hopes, is the most evident thing that there is (1997, pp. 3 – 4).

Swinburne does not accent words like "direct" or "immediate" or "direct access" like Goetz, Taliaferro, and Cottingham do. However, it seems obvious to me that Swinburne is appealing to the very same experience of ourselves as continuous, causally efficacious persons that the other philosophers appeal to. Why else would Swinburne claim that these aspects of our conscious life are the "most evident thing that there is"? They are the most evident because they enjoy being ever-present, manifest, and deeply meaningful in our response to ourselves and others as ensouled beings. Swinburne testifies that a first-person human perspective possesses a direct, reflexive knowledge without which our understanding of ourselves as ensouled beings would not be grounded in our experience.

The above passage transitions us to the final aspect of section 1 – that of the epistemic confidence each of these analytic thinkers place in our ordinary, first-person perspective of the world. It is no ordinary trust. It is a sacred trust as each of these thinkers understands themselves to be safeguarding certain pillars of our humanity.

As soon as the subject of epistemic reliability surfaces, the longstanding issue of skepticism comes with it. My goal here is not to give any sort of compelling defense of the reliability of our first-person perspective, but merely to show that analytic thinkers are highly cognizant of the role epistemic confidence plays in undergirding all of the claims made in virtue of our direct, reflexive knowledge of the soul.

John Cottingham approaches the topic of epistemic reliability in the context of science. He rejects scientism, the "claim that science is the measure of *all* reality, or *all* truth," because it is a "claim that could not possibly be established by scientific means" (p. 26). Thus, there is no reason to think that all phenomena in reality will be describable merely in scientific terms. While philosophers like Daniel Dennett think science will adequately explain the entire relevant data set for conscious life, Cottingham argues that is fundamentally mistaken. Our experience of meaning, value, and our intellectual life, to name a few things, are shot through with "rich and irreducible content that is simply of a different kind from the phenomena falling withing the scope of scientific inquiry" (p. 30). How do we have access to this domain of irreducible content? It is by having soul – an irreducible, continuous, first-person perspective on the world.

But what if this first person perspective is an illusion, the scientistic skeptic continues to ask. Cottingham addresses this question in a number of ways in Chapter 3 of his book. One basic response, however, is that if you call into question such basic, ever-present, manifest aspects of our experience, then to be consistent you must reject all the dictates of science which are further removed and less evident to us. Not only that, Cottingham argues that all of the mathematical and predictive models of science are ultimately rooted in our first-person experience of the world (2020, p. 95). To decry as illusion our most basic self-experience is to yank out the first floor of a building which will quickly come tumbling down.

In *A Brief History of the Soul*, Goetz and Taliaferro point out the long history in the West of resisting skepticism in virtue of what we know in our souls from a first-person perspective (2011, p. 25). Augustine and Descartes are two famous examples of this, and Goetz and

Taliaferro join that tradition. It appears Kant tried to cast suspicion on our experience of the continuity of personhood from a first-person perspective. He supposed that there were multiple pool balls on a table, and further supposed that each pool ball represented a state of consciousness. He imagined that one pool ball was in motion before it hit the next pool ball on the table, thereby transferring its motion to it. He further imagined that *that* pool ball in turn hits another, and so on, each transferring its motion to the next. If, by analogy, these pool balls are states of consciousness, then we can imagine that one state of consciousness passes its representations and consciousness to another state of consciousness *without being identical* to that state from which it received its representations and consciousness, just as the pool balls are not identical to each other while still passing along its motion. Therefore, our experience of continuity might not be derived from a continuous, persistent self, but successive non-identical states. G & T respond,

> This seems to amount to an argument for thorough-going skepticism. After all, the same kind of argument might be formulated against the believed identity of a physical object through time. . . . As we pointed out a moment ago, if it is really plausible to maintain that we are in error about deep matters of the self – in this case its persistence as numerically the same entity through time – then one cannot help but wonder how it is that we supposedly manage to avoid error in our thoughts about anything else in the world . . . Kant seems to regard as unproblematic the existence of billiard balls that remain self-identical through time. But why? Surely there is no more reason to be confident about the persistence of billiard balls than there is to be confidence about the persistence of the self (2011, p. 129).

Kant's argument is indicative of other seemingly desperate attempts to avoid giving credence to some basic aspects of our experience. In the analytic approach to the soul, it is deeply important to safeguard the epistemic reliability of our first-person perspective.

2.2 Formal Essence and Science

One characteristic habit of mind for analytic philosophers is the intellectual bent towards nature, essence, definition, and entailment. I do not mean that all analytic thinkers are committed to the conclusion that all things have essences or natures, but their typical method approaches most phenomena as if they do. The basic pattern of most analytic thinking is to break down terms, concepts, and ideas into as many constituent parts as seems fit, to distill those parts into clear definitions and representative propositions, and then to organize them logically in order to point out what is entailed by their relationship to each other. Most disagreement in the analytic tradition comes down to disagreeing about the definition of terms, whether or not a proposition is true or false, or whether the way someone has logically organized the terms/propositions in fact entails what they think it entails.

Why is this a movement towards nature and essence? Because a constant slicing of terms, propositions, and arguments into the subtlest nuances of meanings, definitions, and entailments is an attempt to elucidate the conceptual and logical core of those ideas and their relations. It is because we tend to think of the "nature" of something not as its whole being but its core, defining features. Analytic philosophers typically do not want an exhaustive set of rich descriptions which correspond to the *whole* of something's being. Instead, they tend to want to know what something is or is not, or *why* it is or is not, in its distilled, clearest conceptual rendering. They think towards essence.

One perceives these qualities relatively quickly when picking up a work by an analytic philosopher. What these qualities convey is a set of values and standards for how to conduct one's thinking in the search for truth. The communication and evaluation of truth is best done by a) defining terms, b) discerning true from false propositions, and c) ultimately weighing whether the terms, the propositions, and the structure of the argument *entails* the truth of the conclusion.

If not entails, then at least gives very good reason for the conclusion. In short, the type of relationship analytic philosophy tries to establish between its constituent parts is a relationship of entailment. The terms of the argument defined in this particular way, taken together with the propositions stated in this particular way, and the argument laid out in this particular way, establishes an entailment, or at the very least a strong logical relationship.

Understood this way, there is a resonance between analytic methodology and the methodology of science. Viewed from a distance, analytic philosophy and science appear be different species within the same methodological genus – science in establishing relationships of material causation and correlation, philosophy in establishing relationships of entailment and logical coherence among ideas. Generally speaking, both camps love to divide their respective phenomena into as many respective parts as possible, and then to try to establish a relationship between defined parts. Analytic philosophers never tire of repeating, "We must make a distinction," and the scientists define each material aspect in controlled experiments to elucidate the specific relationships at play.

The methodological kinship between analytic philosophy and science goes further than the impulse towards division, definition, and systematically establishing relationships between defined parts – they both generally possess a longing for theoretical unity among academic disciplines. Generally speaking, scientists want the claims of paleontology to not contradict the claims of anthropology, and they do not want the claims of anthropology to be contradicted by the claims of psychology. Thus even when there are differences between the methods internal to "science," the scientifically minded generally assume that there will be eventual unity in our theoretical picture of the world if things are going well. The comprehensive materialists who persistently invoke science as a means to reject the soul or our first-person experience do so on

the assumption that the claims of science have bearing on the claims of analytic philosophy – a distinct discipline and mode of knowing. The analytic philosophers assume just as much when they offer their observations, descriptions, and claims about the soul in relation to science, attempting to demonstrate that *their* claims are not contradictory with science. Thus what both camps generally assume is that science and philosophy (and probably most other disciplines) both contribute to a synthetic, mutually reinforcing, coherent picture of the world if things are going well.[5] Either they assert this more explicitly (as in Swinburne and Cottingham do), or tacitly in their work as they argue consistency with established scientific findings (as Goetz and Taliaferro do). Finally, the desire for theoretical unity is evidenced by the fact that analytic philosophers, scientists, and comprehensive materialists are always fighting about what "housing" framework about the universe best fits the phenomena at play in the soul debate. Three frequently invoked possibilities are theism, panpsychism, or some variation of materialism.

The assumption of eventual theoretical unity, or the assumption of a greater housing framework which integrates evidence from different disciplines, runs counter to some currents of thought which are alive and well in the educational domain – things like the belief in the incommensurability between academic paradigms/assumptions, epistemic or cultural relativism, postmodernism, epistemic pluralism, or epistemological anarchism. These currents likely contribute to why the educational literature on the soul feels so different than analytic literature on the soul, and specifically, why soul educators mostly bypass scientific considerations as they discuss the soul. It appears as if these soul educators do not feel the pull towards theoretical unity to the degree of urgency as the scientists and the analytic philosophers. As we will see in the next

[5] It is important to note that this view does *not* entail logical positivism.

two chapters, soul educators are much less concerned about theoretical unity as they are about how the soul inspires a certain way of life, how it shows up in educational practice, and whether or not descriptions of the soul resonate with our experience. For now, let us turn to how these analytic philosophers articulate the relationship between science and the soul in order to demonstrate that in fact it is a central concern in their approach to the soul.

John Cottingham's *In Search of the Soul* is replete with commentary on the relationship between science and the soul. He acknowledges that the "march of science," has led to a shrinking of the soul, that even psychology and psychiatry (which etymologically mean "the study of the soul" and the "cure of the soul") appropriated the term and delivered it over to the "empirical scientific study of the workings of the human and animal mind, manifested in desire, aversion, appetition, memory, sensation, cognition, and so on, together with the behavioural dispositions, while psychiatry became part of medical science. . ." (2020, p. 27). He further claims that many of the practitioners of these disciplines were themselves materialists, as well as many practitioners of cognitive science and neuroscience, whose purpose is sometimes expressed in terms of "explaining all aspects of human mental activity by reference to the functioning of the brain" (p. 28). Cottingham's basic contention throughout the book is *not* that the soul is an immaterial substance itself – he thinks the soul is grounded in and realized in biological systems – but that the irreducible phenomena we have access to from our first-person experience is not fully describable nor explainable by scientific disciplines. "It is fundamentally misguided to suppose that the web of meaning arising from this human mental activity – our thoughts and feelings and hopes and fears – can be reduced to the working of brain processes. Meaning and interpretation require a whole context of social organization and interpersonal communication, a rich culture and "form of life," the understanding of which takes us far outside the scope of

psychological and neurological science, however sophisticated" (p. 29). He makes this point in various ways throughout the book, suggesting that the soul and its content "is simply of a different kind from the phenomena falling within the scope of scientific inquiry" (p. 30). Therefore, it is not that there is a different scientific method which is well-suited to engage the phenomena of the soul; it's that the phenomena lies outside of the scope of scientific inquiry. Cottingham argues "that understanding of our human nature requires us to follow two incommensurable and distinct paths of explanation: one that invokes the physical processes undergirding our mental activities, and one that refers to our conceptual grasp of the meaning of those activities" (p. 58). What, then, is the relationship between these two "distinct" paths of explanation for Cottingham?

Cottingham appears to think that these two distinct paths are subsumed in the project of understanding man. We simply cannot gain a coherent or more complete understanding of ourselves without both paths. As we saw earlier, Cottingham thinks this teleological task of self-understanding is not *merely* rational, though it is that, but more importantly ethical. To begin to self-understand is to already begin to more fully realize the best that we can become. Why? Because as some form of Aristotelian, Cottingham thinks that exercising one's irreducible meaning-making and intellectual nature is to better realize what you are – to be a *good* what you are. However, things are not yet so clear. Are these two *equal* and incommensurate paths? Does the teleologically ethical path have priority over the scientific path in our human self-understanding? If these are two "non-overlapping conceptual categories," then is there an overarching category which makes room for both (p. 60)? How is it that these "resolve" in Cottingham's view, if at all?

Cottingham does not offer a formal argument for the existence of God in the book, but he does seem to think that the best explanation for the irreducible content, experience, and meaning in the universe is a theistic outlook. Otherwise, this irreducible realm of meaning, value, and personhood is a cosmic anomaly – brute facts which do not fit the rest of the picture well. Within his theistic outlook, Cottingham thinks science should continue on analyzing the structures of the universe with the quantitative formulas, models, and mechanisms they already employ. The "phenomena" of irreducible content, which on his view includes God, is not affected in the least. One begins to discern how the two non-overlapping pathways eventually relate to one another in the following passage,

> But there is nothing in the theistic picture to contradict the findings of modern science . . . But the scientific account does not in itself encompass the very special nature of the properties we enjoy in virtue of having such complex brains and nervous systems – the attributes whereby we have conscious awareness of ourselves and the world around us, and have the power to feel and think and reflect on that awareness, and thereby to enter and be responsive to the whole domain of value and meaning. These extraordinary human powers, on the theistic picture, are not a strange cosmic anomaly but depend on our minds being, albeit in a limited and finite manner, reflections of the divine intelligence, the *logos* that enfolds all things. From the subjective horizon of our own conscious awareness, each of us looks out into a cosmos that even from our limited grasp of it we can recognize to be *intelligible* – not an arbitrary series of properties and events, but an intelligible whole, understood and held in awareness by the primordial divine mind (p. 90).

To answer the question I raised earlier, there really is no overlapping conceptual category which includes scientific phenomena and soul phenomena. What there is, Cottingham thinks, is a divine intelligence which "enfolds" all things. Even the mathematical, quantitative, and mechanical descriptions of science assume a degree of intelligibility which reflects the "primordial divine mind." If it is a personal and divine consciousness which is at the center of the theistic outlook, then it is likely Cottingham thinks the mathematical, quantitative, and mechanical descriptions of reality must ultimately be subsumed under the purposes of the personal, ethical, and teleological

domain, for it is this domain which ultimately enfolds the physical. However, Cottingham is well aware that not everyone is going to go down the theistic path as he does. He does not articulate how the "objective" and "subjective" (terms he uses a lot) might relate to each other in a non-theistic yet irreducible world, but it is clear that everyone must refer to both in their attempt to understand the true nature of human beings.

Goetz and Taliaferro are not quite as explicit about the relationship of science and the soul, but they devote an entire chapter of *A Brief History of the Soul* to the subject. Of course, the line is always a bit blurry as to whether analytic defenders of the soul are "fighting against" science or just "scientism." Comprehensive materialists think soul defenders are fighting against science, and soul defenders think they are fighting against comprehensive materialists, *not* science. Thus much of the debate is really a debate over the *interpretation* of relatively established scientific claims, *and* what those claims entail. The goal of G & T and others like them is to show what scientific claims do and do not entail, and to show that the claims they make about the soul do not entail a contradiction with those scientific claims.

In "The Soul and Contemporary Science" chapter, G & T break down the scientific objections to the soul into three main categories: The Soul and the Brain, The Soul and Scientific Methodology, and The Soul-Body Interaction and the Conservation of Energy. While I cannot go into detail on each of these sections, it is worth stating briefly the gist of each. When it comes to brain, the main objection is that as neuroscientists continue learning more about the brain, they continue to correlate all the powers normally attributed to the soul to specific areas/processes in the brain, thus edging out the soul or the mind as the thing which in fact performs those operations. The response is threefold. First, no matter how much correlation science offers between brain events and mental events, correlation never amounts to identity. To say it does is

to go beyond the evidence. Second, soul defenders have always known that the normal functioning of our soul/mental life is causally affected by the brain or other parts of the body. They have always known it depends to some extent on the body for normal operation. If somebody gets hit in the head with a club, whether that be in 1276AD or 2024AD, it will immediately affect the ability of that person to perform typical operations of the mind, to remember, to reason about this or that problem, or to be moved by love. What we have now is ever greater knowledge of *how* the brain underpins and supports the operations of the mind, not a brand new revelation. Third, most everyone who affirms the soul does not do so because science failed to explain some aspect of human experience. "Without question, those in the Plato-Augustine-Descartes line (which includes Butler and Reid) believe in the soul's existence on the basis of what they are aware of from the first-person perspective. There is not the least bit of evidence that they arrive at their belief in the soul's existence after failing to explain various experiences in terms of what goes on in the physical world" (G & T, 2011, p. 155). Therefore, correlation of brain functions to mental operations is not an argument against the soul or dualism.

Some argue that scientific methodology itself makes belief in the soul unreasonable because things like modern medicine are only possibly in light of "methodological materialism" (p. 157). Perhaps the "weight" of this suggestion is the success of treatments and medical advances in light of methodological materialism. The argument seems to be that since this method is a mechanical (non-purposeful) in nature, it therefore rules out explanations that invoke teleological/purposeful explanations which imply causal interaction between a soul and the body, like in the case of human action. However, it is not only the success of methodological materialism that is a supposed strike against the soul. As G & T point out, people like Richard Taylor and Jaegwon Kim have argued that in order to do the scientific method at all, one must

assume the causal closure principle. That is, not only does one need to assume only physical causes (no "outside" mental or non-material causes) in the particular experiments and investigations in each respective science, one must assume the "causal closure of the physical world" (p. 161). G & T respond. First, they suggest it is incorrect to think that, for example, their typing out a chapter on the soul and contemporary science, is *completely* explicable in terms of the physical sciences. What about their purpose in writing it? Second, they acknowledge that since scientists are often trying to explicate what is going on in terms of physical processes, they will need to assume causal closure in the particular location that they are working in (e.g. perhaps a part of the brain they are testing). However, there is no reason to assume complete causal closure of the whole world and all events at all times and places because one is trying to elucidate physical relationships using the scientific method. Afterall, there are examples of very good scientists – neuroscientists even – who affirm the soul, believe in teleological/mental causation, and are not persuaded cosmic causal closure as necessary for the scientific method to get off the ground. G & T conclude, "If the neuroscientist makes the universal assumption that in *any* context events in micro-physical entities can only have other physical events as causes and never be causally explained by mental events of souls and their purposes, then he does so not as a scientist but as a *naturalist* – where a naturalist is a person who believes that the occurrence of physical events can *only* be explained without reference to ultimate and irreducible purposes of souls or mental agents" (pp. 164 – 165). Third, G & T go into a deep and nuanced discussion of causation itself, suggesting that the indeterminism of events at the quantum level supports a non-deterministic picture of reality, which at the very least creates space for the possibility of non-physical causation. Once again, one can only assume physical determinism in virtue of being a *naturalist*, not a scientist. G & T conclude this subsection by insisting that none of their

arguments for teleological or mental causation are rooted in any kind of faith. Rather, they affirm and defend this sort of phenomena primarily because of their first-person experience of the world.

Finally, G & T respond to the idea that affirming mental/bodily causation violates the conservation of energy principle. Essentially, mental causation introduces would require new energy to be introduced into closed system, but according to the laws of physics, no new energy can be introduced into a closed system. Without going into too much detail, one response is simply that one ancient and highly plausible concept of causation does not at all depend upon the idea of a "transfer of energy," from a cause to the effect caused, whereas the conservation of energy principle does. In other words, the concept of causation at play when we invoke teleological action does not involve the concept of the conservation of energy. It's not applicable. Second, even if we assume it is applicable, that does not necessarily demonstrate that the brain (or all physical systems) are in fact closed, as G & T gestured towards in the previous section. G & T have more to say on the subject, but once again they wrap up the whole section with an emphasis on first-person experience. They reply to those who accuse them of being "ad hoc" and "question-begging" as they try to show how the soul does not run afoul of scientific declarations. In short, if one is convinced of the irreducible, continuous personhood of the soul from a first person experience, then it is entirely reasonable to "search for ways . . . in which one might make one's belief in the soul's existence consistent with possible developments in physics" (p. 181). This is what leads G & T to say "that the soul's existence is affirmed largely, if not entirely, on the basis of first-person experience and is not a theoretical postulate" (p. 181). Therefore, it is not for the theoretical sciences to "prove" or "establish" the existence of our first-person experience of ourselves as non-reducible, continuous persons, and therefore, neither is it for the theoretical

sciences to prove or establish the non-existence of the soul. Its "existence" is an ancient, longstanding feature of human experience which is basic to that experience. Though they do not say this, perhaps G & T think it *is* within the purview of philosophy and the sciences to think through and articulate *how* we should talk about the soul, how to understand the soul, and how to articulate the soul's relationship to other theoretical domains, like science. When it needs to, philosophy can come to the aid of the soul if there are those who seek to undermine and reject our first-person experience, but by itself analytic philosophy should never play the role of establishing the soul's existence. That privilege falls to our very conscious awareness of ourselves as human beings.

Richard Swinburne has his own take on the relationship between the soul and science which in part blends the previous approaches. For this section, please refer to the full passage quoted on pages 29 – 30 of this chapter, from which I am pulling from heavily.

Swinburne, like Cottingham, thinks we are all already underway in the purpose of trying to understand ourselves as human beings. He agrees with Cottingham that the approach and understanding of our internal life is distinct from the "normal pattern of scientific explanation," holding out little hope that there will be an overarching "super-science" which will fully explain the mental and physical aspects of reality (1997, pp. 3 – 4). However, he disagrees that we should consider the description of the soul and other aspects of our first-person experience as less of a "science" than, say, evolutionary biology, for example. The reason is because Swinburne has a broad conception of science. By it, he means accounting for and describing all the happenings of the world (1997, p. X). Our experience of the soul is just as much a happening in the world as cells replicating is a happening in the world and is therefore equally within the scope of science. However, because historically scientists have considered our conscious life as

peripheral to the project of science, important data has been blurred – so much so, in fact, that by bringing conscious life into focus, a scientific revolution becomes possible (Swinburne, 1997, p. 3). He goes still further. Not only is our conscious life on equal footing with sciences and itself equally part of the scientific project, it is *more* important to our self-understanding than other branches of science. Why is it more important? He seems to think that the soul, along with its hopes and fears and access to the realm of meaning, is the reason why we must treat other persons as "totally different than machines" (p. 3). It is the most important because it is the grounds of our ethical and personal obligations to each other as dignified, agential, personal beings. It is the most important because it can confer meaning to our lives.

Swinburne's vision is one where our first-person human experience is on equal par with the "third-person" perspective of the hard sciences when it comes to the scientific project. We cannot have only "that" phenomena approached in "this specific way" and be mute about other aspects of our experience. His book is not merely an attempt to defend the non-physical nature of our souls and mental life, but an attempt to consider our first-person self-understanding and our third-person self-understanding as equals. That is, Swinburne considers the "physical" aspect of human beings alongside the "non-physical" aspect of human beings in light of the evolutionary story. "This book takes seriously the fact of human conscious experience, its continuity and its causal efficacy – and around these facts, hitherto regarded as peripheral, builds its understanding of man and his evolution" (p. 3). While he does not say this explicitly, one would be on good grounds to think that Swinburne ultimately sees the third-person perspective of science as needing to be subsumed under the first-person perspective. If indeed our first-person human soul experience is the most important, value enriching, agential, personal, and ethical domain, then the prototypical sciences should serve its purposes, not the other way around.

John Cottingham, Stewart Goetz, Charles Taliaferro, and Richard Swinburne all appear to think that responding to science and scientism is crucial in approaching the soul. It is crucial because those who continue to use science as a means to diminish, reject, or outright deny our first-person experience of the world must be resisted. It is crucial because our first-person understanding is the source of our self-understanding, not the third-person self-understanding. It is crucial because the soul has longstanding claim to be the grounds of our continuous, irreducible, teleological personhood, *not* any of the terms found within the hard sciences.

Each of these authors seeks either eventual theoretical unity among the sciences, or consistency among them, or at least non-contradiction. As helpful and provocative as these authors' suggestions are, there remain many unanswered questions about the relationship between our first and third-person self-understandings. There remains a rift between them. Even Swinburne, who thinks they are both aspects of the scientific project, does not think they will ever be unified under a "super-science." Goetz, Taliaferro, and Cottingham all affirm established scientific findings, they carve out and defend a space for our first-person experience of ourselves in a third-person dominated landscape, but no actual unity is achieved between them. Future work could be done to better articulate the relationship between our first and third-person self-understanding as it relates to the soul and science.

2.3 Conclusion

There are two contrasting motions in the analytic approach to the soul. Direct, reflexive knowing moves the conversation back towards experience, to what it is like and what we are aware from a first-person human perspective. This basic experience, analytic philosophers contend, is "pre-theoretical" or "non-theoretical" and is therefore not established by theory (scientific or otherwise), rather illuminated by it. On the other hand, there are several factors

which contribute to an opposite motion in the analytic tradition. The fact that Swinburne, Goetz & Taliaferro, and John Cottingham all contextualize the discussions of the soul as resisting the totalizing claims of comprehensive materialism, the fact that analytic thinkers are highly conscious of the theoretical claims of science, engaging them with great detail, and the fact that they frequently contextualize the soul within its intellectual history, all place the soul in a theoretical and conceptual space. Furthermore, the ever-present inclination towards definition, division, essence, and entailment further weaves the soul into a theoretical space, for dwelling on the logical relations of ideas and their inexhaustible nuances, together with the fact that each concept ends up depending on further intellectual commitments outside of the initial discussion (for example, the nature of causality is crucial to the discussion of teleological action and the soul, but it pulls the discussion into a whole other extremely thick and nuanced domain) deepens the theoretical grip on the soul in the analytic approach. Once entered, the intellectual web around the soul in the analytic approach, as illuminating and essential as it is, can lead one to approach the soul just *as* an idea that exists in the land of ideas. If one is not careful, one could very easily lose touch with the movement back towards experience, and move ever more into only approaching the soul merely as an idea.

Those who perceive the analytic tradition on the soul from the outside are not aware of the movement towards experience. The current tradition appears to the outside as thoroughly removed from the matters of everyday life and the heart. Even Cottingham, whose main point in *In Search of the Soul* is to reclaim the human "domain of the soul" as involving a search for transcendent meaning to a popular audience is a highly intellectual book. While there is no necessary commitment by any analytic author to approach the soul merely as an intellectual idea embedded in the history of intellectual ideas (in fact, quite the opposite if what I've said in this

chapter is true), however the routine intellectual habits of mind, together with the felt need to provide a unified or consistent theoretical outlook among different disciplines, in addition to the felt need to resist the nuanced arguments of the comprehensive materialists and the scientistically minded, tip the weight of the analytic tradition towards approaching the soul as an idea. As I suggest in chapter 3, I believe this inclination comes from the fact that the attempt at self-understanding in the analytic tradition is primarily spun from the rational "part" of our souls.

Chapter Three: The Educational Approach to the Soul

Wholeness and connection are the heartbeat of the educational approach to the soul. Everything returns to a cry for wholeness and connection. The great educational thinker, Plato, prefigures this cry in the voice of Socrates. In the Phaedo, when Socrates' interlocutors feel pushed and pulled by the arguments for and against the eternality and nature of the soul, Socrates instructs them about where to focus their attention: "We should not allow into our minds the conviction that argumentation has nothing sound about it; much rather we should believe that it is we who are not yet sound and that we must take courage and be eager to attain soundness, you and others for the sake of your whole life still to come, and I for the sake of death itself" (Plato, *Phaedo*, 90d-91, Hutchinson, 1997). Socrates instructs them to direct their attention towards themselves in pursuit of wholeness, trusting in the power of the dialectic to carry them towards that end. Socrates again, at the very end of the *Phaedrus*, prays a prayer that resonates with so much of the recent literature on the soul. He prays, "Beloved Pan . . . give me beauty in the inward soul; and may the outward and the inward man be at one . . . . Anything more? The prayer, I think, is enough for me" (Plato, *Phaedrus*, 279 b-c, Hutchinson, 1997). The simplicity and clearness of Socrates' prayer cuts past all intellectual questions that may cloud the soul, as necessary as those may be, and evokes the longing which animates the educational approach to the soul.

Recent soul educators are unlimited in their proposals for connection. In their view, the best possible world would be one in which our souls are connected with everything good in the cosmos. If God, then God; if Beauty, Truth, Goodness, Forms, then those; if meaning, then all meaningfulness. Depending on the thinker, they dream of a world in which one's soul is connected to the earth, to nature, to ourselves, to our work, to our civil and political life, to

students, to all subjects, to our neighbors, and to all unknown others. What kind of connections do soul educators have in mind, here? The key adjectives educators use to modify the word "connection" or any of its synonyms are the adjectives "vital" and "living." There are countless examples but let me highlight a few. Parker Palmer claims, "In a wide variety of ways, good teachers bring students into *living communion* with the subjects they teach [emphasis added]" (Palmer, 1993, p. XVII). And again, "In such an education, intellect and spirit would be one, teachers and learners and subject would be in *vital* community with one another, and a world in need of healing would be well served [emphasis added]" (p. XIX). Angelo Caranfa says it another way, "But how does Matisse express this world of the spirit in his art? His answer is through color relationship. From this relationship, Matisse writes, results 'a *living harmony* of colours, a harmony analogous to that of a musical composition [emphasis added]'" (Carnanfa, 2014, p. 86). And finally, John Dewey articulates it this way, "To say emphatically of a particular person that he has soul or a great soul is not to utter a platitude, applicable equally to all human beings. It expresses the conviction that the man or woman in question has in marked degree qualities of sensitive, rich and coordinated *participation* in all the situations of *life*. Thus works of art, music, poetry, painting, architecture have *soul*, while others are dead, mechanical [emphasis added]" (Dewey, 1925, p. 223 as quote in Roosevelt and Garrison, 2018, p. 183). Said another way, soul educators look past connections of aboutness, of causality, or of entailment – however necessary those may be – towards living and vital connections.

When soul educators are not crying out for wholeness and connection, so to speak, and when they momentarily pause the soul disciplines which they believe bring about wholeness and connection, they do in fact *think* about the soul. I do not mean to suggest they are less thoughtful than anyone else, but I do mean to highlight the fact that soul educators are primarily concerned

with connecting and cultivating the soul, and only secondarily concerned with what to say about it formally. A distinctive characteristic of soul educators is the way they approach thinking about the soul in that they prefer to think in metaphor and images.[6]

Therefore, in **Section 1** - **Metaphor**, I will convey the significance of metaphorical thinking about the soul by presenting three ancient, Platonic images of the soul which have enjoyed enduring influence, followed by multiple evocative metaphors from recent soul educators. I try to make plain the harmonic resonance between these images, revealing how metaphor has always oriented educational thinking about the soul.[7]

In **Section 2 – A Soul Education,** I address how soul educators consistently see a special relationship between the soul and art, and through art, to education. Soul educators all agree that a liberal/aesthetic/spiritual education is irreversibly an education *of* the soul, *by* the soul, *through* great works of art. In short, great and beautiful souls become incarnate in great works art, be that literature, sculpture, painting, music, architecture, what have you. In turn, human beings who engage with these works of art can be transformed, not by mere material, but by the life-giving and communicative soul which they possess.

In **Section 3 – Working with the Soul**, I address a subset of the conditions and soulful practices educators find essential to finding the soul, connecting with the soul, and through the soul, linking up with deeper dimensions of life. The soul is emphatically *not* something we merely want to know about and give an account of. It exists in conjunction with the realm of action, and therefore educators seek to inspire it, connect with it, direct it, cultivate it, heal it,

[6] For the purposes of this chapter, I use these terms interchangeably. In Chapter Four and Chapter Six, it should become clear as to why.

[7] The term "resonance" is used intentionally here. In Chapter Six, I explore Jan Zwicky's notion of resonance as it relates to metaphor and analogical thought.

facilitate its growth in virtue, listen to it, descend into it, habituate it, appeal to it, order it, form it, balance it, etc. Similarly, *with* the soul, one might meditate, pray, love, learn, teach, feel, think, create, absorb, grasp, perceive, lead, and form connections. The ultimate goal of working with the soul is, yes, wholeness and connection, but at the same time soul educators invoke the language of finding one's true self. One's true self (which is synonymous with the soul in the literature) is considered as one's personhood, one's essence, one's animating vital energy. And therefore, the ultimate goal of working with the soul is to ever more, by increasing increments, live tapped into the authentic, life-giving, personal core that is our true self. Since an entire dissertation could be written on this theme alone, I must focus my attention on a limited subset of the conditions and practices which soul educators think are essential to finding and working with one's true self, their soul.

3.1 Metaphor

Metaphor is perfectly natural in the course of ordinary language, and it finds a natural home in educational thinking about the soul. Just as premises are inherent to an argument, so too are metaphors in educational thoughts about the soul. Therefore, metaphors constitute a means of orienting educational thinking on the soul, and they have played this role since at least Plato.

3.1.1 Images from the Tradition

In the *Symposium*, the soul is likened to an altar. Altars are quintessential features of most religions – a site where human beings offer up sacrifices to the gods in return for, they hope, favor, blessing, and right relationship. The reasons for sacrifice can vary, but inevitably there is a type of exchange between heaven and earth. Plato, like the Psalmist who cried out that the sacrifices of God are a broken and contrite spirit, imagines the soul as altar – a site of exchange

between heaven and earth. Instead of fire burning the flesh of bulls and goats up to heaven, in the *Symposium*, it is the "spirit of love" which travels between heaven and earth.

The dialogue opens with Socrates and his friends offering a round of speeches to the god of Love (i.e. Eros). These "praises" are themselves offerings to the god – offerings which originated in each of their souls. Each speaker declares what they think the "mode of exchange" for honoring Eros is. Some think that in return for honoring Eros, they receive artistic inspiration; some think by honoring Eros, they receive health and reconciliation in their community. Diotima suggests, however, that the real means by which one honors Eros is not simply by keeping the external religious rituals associated with Eros, but by devoting one's heart and soul to a life of philosophy. The "mode of exchange" for this devotion is a vision of heavenly beauty which, if merely touched by our sight, will inspire true virtue in our souls.

In the drama of the *Symposium*, Alcibiades stumbles into the party right as Socrates finishes retelling Diotima's explanation of this heavenly vision. Alcibiades is in love with Socrates, and he is angry at him for having refused his advances on many an occasion. Alcibiades' history of advances reveals his own "mode of exchange" for love: he offers sex with his own youthful and beautiful body, and he will even throw most of his wealth (which he has offered to Socrates), for the wisdom, virtue, and love of Socrates' soul. Socrates questions him in this context, "But, then, is this a fair exchange that you propose? You seem to me to want more than your proper share: you offer me the merest appearance of beauty, and in return you want the things itself, 'gold in exchange for bronze'" (Plato, *Symposium*, 218e, Hutchinson, 1997).

I think we are to read the S*ymposium* as suggesting the true altar – the site of exchange between gods and men – is the soul. The soul is in-between the bodily and the immaterial,

between the mortal and the immortal, the visible and the invisible. It shares, therefore, a kinship with the god of Love, who as Diotima points out, is also in-between:

> "He is a great spirit, Socrates. Everything spiritual, you see, is between god and mortal. They are messengers who shuttle back and forth between the two, conveying prayer and sacrifice from the gods and gifts in return for sacrifices. Being in the middle of the two, they round out the whole and bind fast the all to all. Through them all divination passes, through them the art of priests in sacrifice and ritual, in enchantment, prophecy, and sorcery. . . He who is wise in any of these ways is a man of the spirit. . . " (202e – 203a).

This passage, and the *Symposium* as a whole, depict an image of the soul as an alter and intermediary, whose mode true mode of exchange is wholeness-seeking love.

The second image I want to explore is the soul as like a wool cloth. In Book IV of the *Republic*, Socrates is discussing the education of the guardians with Glaucon, and he tells Glaucon that he thinks the city has civic courage because "the part of itself that has the power to preserve through everything its belief about what things are to be feared. . . I mean preserving it and not abandoning it because of pains, pleasures, desires, or fears" (Plato, *Republic*, 429b-d, Hutchinson, 1997). Glaucon is apparently not following, so Socrates presents this image,

> You know that dyers, who want to dye wool purple, first pick out from the many colors of wool the one that is naturally white, then they carefully prepare this in various ways, so that it will absorb the color as well as possible, and only at that point do they apply the purple dye. When something is dyed in this way, the color is fast – no amount of washing, whether with soap or without, can remove it (429e).

Socrates argues this "dyeing of the soul" is exactly like what they were attempting to do when they discussed the education of soldiers (in Book III), training them in music and physical education. Music, like the purple dye, was thought to have the deepest permeation in the souls of those guardian students. This theme surfaces throughout the *Republic* as well as other dialogues, namely, that the soul is deeply absorbent in nature. In

fact, learning itself could be considered a type of absorption by the soul. Does not every educational thinker have to wrestle with this basic image at some point or another? It seems to me that this sacred possibility – that the soul might be able to open up and receive aspects of the world into itself – is the very assumption which grounds what most educators think they are doing.

At the same time, Plato's image suggests the soul can latch onto – even harden – into a particular form which resists attempts to change it, or stimulate it in a direction opposite of its bent. Thus, the absorbent, softness of the wool is contrasted with the "hardness" of the dye which is nye impossible to efface, once dried. Educational philosophy is filled with direct and indirect commentary which plays on this image of the soul, not the least of which is the idea that the soul's of children are more absorbent than those of adults, whose souls have hardened in time.

Plato provides a third image for the soul – its tripartite nature. In the *Republic*, having discussed the tripartite nature of the just city (i.e. rulers, warriors, and producers who must become a singular, whole society), Socrates suggests we should look to the individual soul to see if it has the same three classes. The answer is yes, where the ruler of the soul is reason (logos), the warriors/auxiliaries is spirit (thumos), and the producers are the appetitive part of the soul. Reason is correlated with the head, spirit is correlated with the chest, or the heart, and the appetitive passions are correlated with the belly. Each part is inclined towards its own ends (i.e wisdom, honor, and pleasure) but ideally, the pursuit of honor and pleasure is subsumed into the pursuit of wisdom, as reason is king. Educationally, this tripartite distinction has been of unending significance for reasons which I cannot pretend to encompass. At the very least, it should be stated that Plato's notion of virtue depends on the tripartite image – that education

itself must appeal to each dimension of the soul if one is to guide students towards a just and flourishing life, and that these dimensions of soul provide somewhat of a basis for the ordering and hierarchy of subjects/curriculum.[8] Now let us turn to more recent educational metaphors for the soul, before we link them to these ancient images.

3.1.2 Metaphors in Recent Literature

Each and every one of the metaphors below could be the subject of its own chapter. My goal is not to fully explicate each image, but simply to show *that* metaphors are ubiquitous in the recent educational literature, and *that* they characterize the educational approach to the soul.

3.1.2.1 The Soul as Intermediary, as In-Between

John P. Miller is an educational theorist who in his work, *Education and the Soul* (2000), divides the self into three parts – the spirit, the soul, and the ego. He says quite clearly that the "soul connects our ego and spirit" (p. 24). He understands spirit to be the "divine essence within," and the ego to be our "socialized sense of self. . . our sense of separateness, the exterior 'I'" (p. 24). The soul is imagined as in-between these two domains of the self. Whereas the spirit is oriented upwards towards the divine, the soul "has a sense of depth" because we "look down into our souls" (p. 24). Therefore, the phenomena of the ego must pass through the deep soul on its way to the divine, and the phenomena of the spirit must pass through the soul on the way to our socialized, exterior self. Thus, "It is through soul that we attempt to link our humanity with divinity," which I understand to be the process of reconciling the spirit with the ego through the mediation of the soul. Miller's ideas about ego and spirit lead him to call for balance between the

[8] Perhaps it should also be noted that these Platonic images for the soul appear to be deeply influential for Aristotle, Rousseau, and John Dewey, all of whom are considered canonical in the philosophy of education.

inner and outer life throughout the book. The soul not being a divine entity, nor a wholly socialized external self, is the medium by which the human being is balanced and reconciled into a whole person. For Miller, the soul is in-between and intermediary.

Educational philosopher Angelo Caranfa presents Matisse as thinking the soul is in-between. He beautifully sets up Matisse's mystical educational vision by declaring the spiritual realm a "recessive yet essential dimension" (Caranfa, 2014, p. 77). The spiritual dimension is not separated out from the material/physical realm, it permeates it, and the soul becomes a locus of interpolation and convergence between the two domains. Matisse says of light – "It's with colour that you put down this light of course, but above all you must feel this light, have it within yourself" (p. 85). And again, "'Colour,' Matisse writes, 'helps to express light, not the physical phenomenon, but the only light that really exists. . . Moreover, color takes possession of one's soul; it wins 'you over more and more. A certain blue enters your soul. . . . A certain colour tones you up'" (p. 85). Thus, the light Matisse is rendering on the canvas is not purely an externalized, reductionistic "physical phenomena," but neither is it purely an internal and wholly spiritual light, because blue "enters" the soul and "tones you up." In the hands of a skilled artist, the union of material/spiritual dimensions in the soul can be enacted on the canvas: "If drawing belongs to the realm of the Spirit and colour to that of the Senses, you must draw first to cultivate the Spirit and to be able to lead colour through the paths of the Spirit" (Caranfa, 2014, p. 121). Though I cannot fully explore Matisse's provocative suggestions here, it is clear that the soul functions as an intermediary between the spiritual and material dimensions of the world. The soul is in-between.

When Caranfa takes up Simone Weil's educational thought, he paints a similar picture. In Weil's view, the soul is itself linked up to a deeper dimension – a spiritual plane – whose

centerpoint and culmination is God. Given the taint of sin and ego in a suffering of the world, we find ourselves greatly alienated from this fundamental aspect of reality. Yet, because it is through the soul that we can link up to and make progress on the spiritual plane of existence, the soul functions as an intermediary between God and our state of alienation.

Weil speaks of God and grace quite frequently, but she also appeals to the Platonic language of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness. Her view of studying involves working with the soul, exercising it to wait in patient openness for any moment of illumination by truth. It's no matter if one's studies are full of mistakes, confusions, or even bewilderment, for Weil thinks no effort of attention is ever wasted. "It always has its effect on the spiritual plane," and "perhaps he who made an unsuccessful effort will one day be able to grasp the beauty of a line of Racine more vividly on account of it" (Weil, 1957, pp. 106-107 as quoted in Caranfa, 2010, p. 66). Therefore, the soul is very much like a field between the spiritual and the material. Our charge is to work with the soul, excising alienation, ego, and sin through (at the very least) studying – preparing the soil for when it might rain grace and light. For Weil, the soul is in-between.

3.1.2.2 Soul as a Medium for Birth and Recreation

In their own respective ways, the soul as a medium for rebirth and recreation is a core image for soul educators. Very often this image correlates with the idea that the world is recreated, perpetuated, re-iterated through the soul. Therefore, to change the soul is to change the world.

Caranfa presents a powerful image from Matisse about rebirth through the soul of the artist. "The artist or the poet possesses an interior light which transforms objects to make a new world of them—sensitive, organized, a living world which is in itself an infallible sign of the

Divinity, a reflection of Divinity" (Caranfa, 2014, p. 76). A good example of this living and re-organized world is Matisse's own work on the chapel of Vence. Caranfa argues the chapel represents a "synthesis of his [Matisse's] search for true composition or construction," where the composed light recreates material elements into a living and active spiritual domain.

> This inner vision is light—as it is for Plotinus, for St. Augustine, and for à Kempis—hence, "the blues, greens and yellows of the windows [on the chapel at Vence (sic.)] compose a light within the chapel" (149). This light, Matisse tells us, is intended to inscribe "a spiritual space" (136) that is "a completely separate world from that of the chapel" (129). Thus, "colors exist as an artistic reality" (ibid.), apart from nature—as they do for Paul Gauguin and for Vincent van Gogh; they exist to express the spiritual dimension of our existence. "I want the chapel visitors to experience a lightening of the spirit," says Matisse, "So that, even without being believers, they sense a milieu of spiritual elevation, where thought is clarified, where feeling itself is lightened (140)" (Caranfa, 2014, pp. 85-86).

Even though Matisse suggests this living world is a "completely separate world" here, most of the other language Caranfa cites from Matisse communicates that Matisse thought of his works as equal parts soul and world, as I suggested in the previous section. More to the point: Through the soul's "interior light" Matisse reorganizes – composes – rebirths – aspects of the world to create a living space. In *The Soul as In-Between* section, I pointed out Caranfa's assertion that the spiritual domain is a "recessive yet essential dimension" of reality. In the context of rebirth and recreation, we can say that what begins as a recessive yet essential dimension in nature can, through the soul, become a forthcoming presence in a composition. The world is reborn through the soul.

Parker Palmer affirms this image in his own way. Palmer imagines the soul as a "hidden wholeness" which persists below the surface of self and ego (Palmer, 1993, pp. 12-13). Palmer agrees with John P. Miller that the ego, the "exterior I," has been shaped and in many ways deformed by the world. For Palmer, the world and the self are in a constant power struggle to define and contain the other in its own image (p. 13). This happens when we disconnect from the

"hidden wholeness" that is the soul, and from the transcendent reality of love that is at the center of the soul and reality. In a disconnected state, the primary mechanism for recreation is *power* and *projection*. "The self creates the world by means of projection," says Palmer (p. 12). In contrast, the primary mechanism for recreation in a connected state is love.

> Only by transcending self and world can we find the authenticity and spontaneity, the truth and freedom, of which Merton speaks. As long as we stay locked in their closed logic, allowing the self and world to circle each other in an endless quest for power, we have little choice: dominate or be dominated. . . An education in transcendence prepares us to see beyond appearances into the hidden realities of life – beyond facts into truth, beyond self-interest into compassion, beyond our flagging energies and nagging despairs into the love required to renew the community of creation (Palmer, 1993, p. 13).

Thus, in the place of projection and power, renewing the soul in the image of a transcendent good creates a world where wholeness is hidden no longer. The world is reborn through the soul.

3.1.2.3 The Soul as Partite

For recent soul educators, there is not even a whiff of concern about whether or not the soul is singular and simple, as the analytic philosophers argue, or whether or not the soul has genuinely substantial parts. They universally describe the soul or the self has having different parts, but this should not be read as necessarily substantial parts. I think they simply are unaware of any consequences, theoretically, for talking this way. Regardless, most recent soul educators could rightly be described as asserting a "duelpartite" soul as opposed to the Platonic tripartite soul. The central metaphor for the soul's duelpartite nature is by reference to the head and the heart. Roughly, the head correlates with rational, calculative, and more scientific thinking, whereas the heart correlates with intuition, imagination, love, and the fundamental orientation towards wholeness and connection.

The head and the heart are considered two fundamental "poles" in the soul, around which our internal life is organized. In a fascinating reversal from Plato, most soul educators are suspicious of the head's role in leading the heart. Some outright identify the head as derivative from ego and a false epistemology.[9] Even where the head is accepted, it is often merely tolerated. Soul educators mostly agree: The head should be in service to the heart, our truest and best guide in the soul.

In truth, Parker Palmer's entire "pedagogy of the soul" depends upon the duelpartite distinction. From *To Know as We are Known* (1993) to "Teaching with Heart and Soul" (2003) to "Evoking the Spirit in Public Education" (1998), the language of the heart as opposed to head is ever-present. *To Know as We are Known* begins by Palmer arguing that there is an "eye" of the mind and an "eye" of the heart. The eye of the mind corresponds to the world of fact and reason, which for Palmer has become a cold and mechanical place (1993, p. xxiii). The eye of the heart corresponds to "a world warmed and transformed by the power of love, a vision of community beyond the mind's capacity to see" (p. xxiii). He claims we either switch back and forth between these ways of knowing, resulting in a "blurry double image," or we live in one to the exclusion of the other, but we rarely unite the two in what Palmer describes as "wholesight." (p. xxiii). For Palmer, the head could never contain the heart, but the heart certainly can encompass the head. Thus, the heart becomes the primary educational priority.

In "Evoking the Spirit in Public Education" (1998), Palmer contrasts the sorts of questions that come from the head and the heart. "Heart questions," which he also refers to as "spiritual questions," represent the animating core of our spiritual longing for wholeness and

[9] For one example of a soul-educator's suspicion of the head, see Thomas Moore's Forward to *The Education of the Soul* (Miller, 2000, p. viii).

connection. These are open-ended questions like, “Does my life have meaning and purpose?” “Whom can I trust?” “How can I rise above my fears?” He gives no specific examples of “head questions,” but one can piece-together that these are more close-ended, factual questions whose answers rarely involve the personhood of the person who is learning them. Palmer argues head questions only take on meaning when they are embedded within a context of heart questions, where the teacher is first and foremost connecting to the heart and spirit of a student: “Teaching and learning, done well, are done not by disembodied intellects but by whole persons whose minds cannot be disconnected from feeling and spirit, from heart and soul” (Palmer, 1998, p. 10). On display here is the vivid distinction between two different parts of the soul which can both “come apart” or “come together” in life and in the practice of teaching and learning.

Both Matisse and Caranfa affirm the duelpartite nature of the soul. Caranfa opens his essay on Matisse’s aesthetic-spiritual educational ideas by distinguishing between three human faculties. “If education has for its object the integral development or growth of the human self, then it should cultivate not only the faculties of the body and the mind but also the faculty of the spirit” (Caranfa, 2014, p. 76). The whole purpose for Caranfa’s article on Matisse is to sketch a vision of education which cultivates, in his language, the faculty of *the spirit*. If Caranfa wanted to sketch a more complete account of how to educate the human self, he would need to write further commentary on how to cultivate the mind and the body. On display here, again, is a duelpartite vision of the soul which centers the heart.

Matisse himself makes this duelpartite distinction when describing the role of the head and the heart in the act of painting. Consider Caranfa’s amalgamation of Matisse’s words:

> For Matisse, art is not exclusively an intellectual activity: “All the intellectual . . . part of my work is secondary and very little evident” (ibid., 92). The primary catalyst of work is feelings, emotions: “I . . . let myself always be

> guided by my instinct" (68); and, "While working I never try to think, only to feel" (51). The effort of the mind is, thus, only secondarily responsible for the creation of the work of art: "Very often," Matisse teaches, "the difficulty for an artist is that he doesn't realize the quality of his emotion and that his reason leads this emotion astray. He should use his reason only for control" (Caranfa, 2014, p. 79).

Feelings and instinct are primary, therefore, and the mind's role is to serve these movements in the soul by keeping them from going too far. Reason *may* play a positive role, but it is reason which may misguide the "quality of emotion" the artist feels. Thus, reason is not only secondary, it is outright suspicious. Both Caranfa and Matisse articulate a duelpartite soul which privileges heart over the head.[10]

3.1.2.4 The Soul as Hidden

That the soul is hidden from us, and in some sense requires us to seek it out, is a pervasive image among soul educators. When soul educators imply its hiddenness, they rarely if ever articulate the degree to which it is obscured. They seem to work out their ideas about the hidden soul between the following poles: 1) The soul is hidden and obscured, 2) The soul can be known (apparent, unhidden) under the right conditions. What is the soul hidden "behind" as it were? Soul educators generally agree it is hidden behind 1) external noise in the form of imposed directives on one's attention, unending surface-level projects/activities, or general theories which do not accommodate the soul well, such as materialism 2) our ego/false self, understood as the self-centered part of ourselves which is afraid, vengeful, violent, or which seeks power over world and others, and 3) its own coyness. The paradox of educational talk about hiddenness is precisely that everything that is hidden is known (for they are speaking of it plainly), and

[10] For more images of the partite soul, please see: Thomas Moore's *The Education of the Heart*; John P. Miller's *The Education of the Soul*; Rousseau's *Emile.*

everything that is known is hidden (for we have yet, perhaps, to know it fully in ourselves or others). Hiddenness thereby becomes a spectrum of interchanging disclosure and concealment.

John P. Miller and Parker Palmer take their cue about hiddenness from the Christian mystic Thomas Merton. Thomas Merton opens his poem "Hagia Sophia" with the following line, "There is in all visible things an invisible fecundity, a dimmed light, a meek namelessness, a hidden whole-ness" (Merton, 1968). Palmer identifies the soul with this hidden wholeness in his books *To Know as We are Known* and *A Hidden Wholeness*. John P. Miller, in *The Education of the Soul*, quotes another passage from Merton which distinguishes between the exterior and interior "I" – "But the exterior "I," the "I" of projects and of temporal finalities, the "I" that manipulates objects in order to take possession of them, is alien from the *hidden, interior* "I" who has no projects and seeks to accomplish nothing, even contemplation. He only seeks to be, and to move (for he is dynamic) according to the Secret laws of Being itself [emphasis mine]" (Merton, 1959, pp. 5-6 as quoted in Miller, 2000, p. 15). Palmer and Miller both work out what this manifest disclosure and concealment of the soul means for educators.

According to Palmer, the hiddenness of the soul becomes evident in what he terms "heart questions." As discussed previously, heart questions constitute the core spiritual fodder of teaching and learning. Palmer associates such heart questions with this "hidden wholeness," and thus they are not always easy to discern, even to the person who has them. The predicament many educators find themselves in is that these heart questions are obscured by our cultural and educational environment, as well as the dominance of ego. "Inwardly, we and our students ask such questions all the time. But you would not know it to hear us talk, for we usually talk in settings where the imperatives of the fearful ego, or of the task at hand, strand us on the surface of our lives, compelling us to ask questions that are not the deepest we have. . . Our real

questions are asked largely in our hearts because it is too risky to ask them in front of another" (Palmer, 1998, p. 8). The role of teachers is exactly correlated with the hiddenness of heart questions. They are to facilitate a context in which the hearts of young folks are able to reveal themselves, be known, and in turn orient their lives (p. 8). Much of Palmer's work is thinking through exactly that: How *do* we facilitate a space in which the hidden wholeness, along with its heart questions, come to light, are known, and orient lives? And it is not just students. Palmer's work in creating the Courage to Teach institute is an attempt to create a space for teachers to connect with their own soul, their own heart questions, so that they can in-turn carry out the same work in their classrooms.[11] For soul educators, the soul is hidden.

3.1.2.5 Soul as Life-Giving, as Moving, as Life-Receiving

Roosevelt and Garrison [hereafter R & G], in *The Root of the Matter is not yet In Them* (2018), articulate a Deweyan vision of the soul as it relates to teaching and learning. They inquire into "the soul" of teaching and learning itself. In their essay, a primary image for the soul is that it gives and receives life through its animating motion. When teaching is soulful and the soul of the teacher beautiful, it inspires movement in the souls of students. R & G take their cue from Dewey, who says,

> When the organization called soul is free, moving and operative, initial as well as terminal, it is spirit.… Spirit quickens; it is not only alive, but … gives life. Animals are spirited, but man is a living spirit. He lives in his works and his works do follow him. Soul is form, spirit informs (Dewey, 1925, pp. 223-224 as quoted in Roosevelt and Garrison, 2018, p. 181).

There's a subtle spirit/soul distinction here which does not bear on my purposes. What matters is Dewey's association of the soul with movement, quickening, and giving-life. When inspired, the

soul becomes a living spirit whose superabundant life is distilled into that person's life and works. The particular "work" Roosevelt and Garrison consider in the article is teaching and learning. Right from the outset, they identify soulful, inspired teaching with "the kind of teaching that most moves the souls of students" (2018, p. 177). The image here is one where life is passed from soul to soul. This life-inciting-motion between souls confers meaning, love, and a new form of life. It constitutes the very core of the educational experience between teacher and student.

The association of the soul with life-giving, meaningful, vital motion is ubiquitous in educational literature. It hearkens back to the ancient notion that the soul even gave life to the body. In the introduction, I hinted at the "vital connections" soul educators always associate with the soul. In the context of this image, perhaps one layer of meaning can be added to that. Vital connections are connections in which a person and another person, place, or thing are in a mutually life-giving and life-receiving relation. It's a relation where reciprocity is an ever-present communion of mutual in-forming and inspiring of souls.

3.1.3 Conclusion

Educational thinking about the soul is unapologetically informed by images and metaphors, and has been for at least 2,300 years, since Plato's dialogues. There are many other soul metaphors from the last thirty years I've been forced to skip – images that schools, cities, and even the world can in some sense have soul; images of the soul as center, as spherical; images of soul as a mirror of the world; images of the soul as something which opens and closes along with beauty and suffering. Though there are different philosophical nuances within each thinker who invokes these images, to my mind it is nigh impossible to miss the continued inspiration of Plato.

Nearly all the recent soul-metaphors I've presented here find their analogue in the three Platonic metaphors I noted. That the soul is in-between the divine and the human, the spiritual and the material, is on full display in the *Symposium*, where the soul is an inward altar between the divine and mortal. That the soul is a medium of creation and recreation is also evident in the *Symposium*, where gazing on heavenly beauty can transform one's fragmented and disordered soul into a virtuous and whole soul, which in turn can inspire transformation in others and the world. After all, was not Socrates "attached to Athens" to spur it on towards virtue? That the soul is partite, and that much of the spiritual work involving the soul requires an ordering of those parts of soul into an integrated whole is deeply inspired by Plato, even if soul educators mostly privilege the heart over the head in contrast to him. The soul's hiddenness can be traced to Plato as well, who in the *Phaedo* and the *Phaedrus* acknowledges the difficulty of articulating the exact nature of the soul, given our own condition of incompleteness and ignorance, our limitations in our methods of knowing, and given the invisible nature of the soul. Even the soul as life-giving owes some of its inspiration to Plato, as Plato considered the soul to be a principle of motion which gave life to the body, *and* which communicated its motions to other souls.

Recent soul educators mostly do not offer precise arguments for why we should think of the soul as *this* sort of image or *that* sort of image. They do not, for example, give premised arguments as to why we should think of the mind and the heart as two separate domains, nor why the soul is in-between the material and the spiritual, nor why the soul is a medium of recreation. Instead, they appeal to a tradition of metaphor that has been built up over the centuries. This tradition is drawn from, evoked, complemented, and further nuanced. And, as none of these recent metaphors inherently contradict or exclude the other metaphors in the tradition, they form an interconnected, mutually reinforcing continuum of thought on the soul. As such, they deserve

more serious attention by those who want to think about the soul. The soul has never appealed to people merely because of the good arguments for it, but equally because its images and metaphors have been found resonate and compelling.

3.2 A Soul Education

There is a mystery at the heart of educational thinking about the soul. The life of the soul, it is thought, can incarnate itself in a person's works. It radiates outwards from a person, providing life, organization, and inspiration to whatever it touches. This life-giving and incarnational mode is not an impersonal process, for it occurs in the midst of a person's work, their vocation, their purposeful endeavors in the everyday. Each human being possesses a gratuity of life fathoms beyond what is required to stay alive. Each one of us is therefore found in the predicament of abundance and must make a choice. Will we offer our superabundant life for the sake of others and the world, or will we exchange "gold for bronze" as Socrates puts it, aborting the life we have to give for a self-consumptive black hole. A life given is a life that will keep on giving, and this mystery is what undergirds a liberal education for the soul, by the soul, through great works of art.

That great works of art and literature are fundamental to a liberal education goes without saying, but in the context of the soul, it makes one rethink what is responsible for their transforming power. Hints are strewn throughout the philosophical educational tradition. Let's consider just two instances from Montaigne and Rousseau, before turning to the more recent literature.

Montaigne, in his essay "On Educating Children," both criticizes his own and his contemporaries' thinking and virtue as empty compared to the great-souled writers of ancient

times. Of himself he says, “I acknowledge myself to be so weak, so paltry, so lumbering and dull compared with such men, that I feel scorn and pity for myself” (p. 38). Of others he says, “. . . French words, words so bloodless, so fleshless and so empty of matter that indeed they were nothing but French and nothing but words” (p. 39). The underlying assumption of Montaigne’s descriptions, here, is that the soul and its qualities *come through*, or are *communicated via* artistic and literary works, and thus they possess great educational significance. By no means does Montaigne think we instantly, and without effort, absorb their virtues by merely reading their words. Instead, Montaigne likens the engagement with ancient authors to a type of wrestling match in which one’s own soul is tested and proved by them. The change that results is incremental. “I do not take on those old champions all at once . . . it is a matter of slight, repeated, tiny encounters” (p. 40). Therefore, at least on Montaigne’s view, engaging with ancient texts in a liberal education is not merely wrestling with the meaning contained in sentences. It is wrestling with the very quality, presence, and power of soul incarnate in those texts.

Rousseau, in Book IV of *Emile*, considers the moral education of Emile. Rousseau insists a moral education requires learning about the human heart. For several reasons, Rousseau recommends studying history as the best way to learn the human heart, for “It is by means of history that, without the lessons of philosophy, he will read the hearts of men; it is by means of history that he will see them, a simple spectator, disinterested and without passion, as their judge and not as their accomplice or as their accuser” (Rousseau, 1762/1979, p. 237). Rousseau insists that, in his day, the more recent historians were so duplicitous and fantastical – “producing highly colored portraits which often represent nothing” – that they will not do for his pupil, Emile (p. 239). It is far better to study those ancient historians, especially Plutarch. What

Rousseau perceives in the ancients is a simplicity of soul which is transmuted and preserved in their work (pp. 235 – 240). It is a simplicity which Rousseau hopes will transmute itself into the soul of Emile, shaping the way Emile sees his fellow human beings. The explicit assumption of this entire project, of course, is that the human heart (i.e. the soul) is incarnate in human works. The particular qualities and virtues of soul (e.g. simplicity in this case) are transmuted into those works, and in turn, they can be used in an educational space to engage the souls of students.

More recently, Angelo Caranfa presents Matisse as expressing the idea that his soul is imbued into his work. Caranfa gives various quotations which all point in the same direction, but the following expresses how these works of art are quite literally "pieces of" Matisse.

> "The page is written; no correction is possible": the work is complete; the artist has embodied his or her true or beautiful self in the work—"The work is the emanation, the projection of the self. My drawings and my canvases are pieces of myself. . . . The work represents, expresses, perpetuates [myself]" (Matisse on Art, 144); his or her soul is filled with light—"It's with colour that you put down this light of course, but above all you must feel this light, have it within yourself" (Caranfa, 2014, p. 85).

If we take Matisse quite literally, it is wrong to consider a work of his art as an "object," much less a mere "material" object. Each authentic work is itself a soulsomatic union which participates in, even extends, the personhood and soul of Matisse. It's not that Matisse is less for having imbued his life into a canvas; it's that Matisse himself is a generative source of life which edges over into the world. Once imbued, these works of art take on nearly every feature of soul which one perceives in a person – a distinct personal presence, intellectual and emotional dimensions, and of course, a vital energy which causes one's own soul to leap.

If true, then a work of art possesses great educational significance. Those who engage an authentic work cannot but engage with the very soul of the person in that work. A transference occurs between the creator and the onlooker: "Drawing is the precision of thought. By it the

feelings and the soul of the painter travel without difficulty into the spirit of he who looks on" (Caranfa, 2014, p. 85).[12] And again, hearkening back to the *Soul as a Medium of Recreation* section, the discussion about Matisse's work on the Chapel of Vence is quite relevant. It is not a mere reorganization of material elements which creates a space which elevates the soul – it is that the space itself is imbued with the soul of Matisse, along with any spiritual light and virtue Matisse himself had received and managed to instill in the work.

Caranfa emphasizes the mystical leanings in Matisse. He shows how so much of Matisse's articulation of the artistic life resonates with other mystical writers, people like Plato, Plotinus, Augustine, and Alfred North Whitehead. This is important because it guards against interpreting Matisse's words as part of the more modern obsession with self-expression, where the soul and self are alienated from the spiritual realm. What Matisse ex-presses into a work of art is more a function of his soul finding and cultivating itself in relation to a spiritual realm of sincerity, hope, truth, and beauty, than it is a function of an autonomous self creating its own meaning.

Dirck Roosevelt and Jim Garrison present a subset of Dewey's views on the soul in *Yet the Root of the Matter is Not in Them* (2018). Roosevelt and Garrison suggest that Dewey thinks of the soul as something which can become inspired, beautiful, and harmonious. Once inspired, this inner movement and beauty is contagious, and it can transform a student-teacher relationship, a school, and social domains. It does so by "informing" (a term of art in the essay)

[12] Within the domain of painting, as Matisse matured as an artist, he appeared to grow in his ability to communicate the soul more precisely in his work. "Simple colours can act upon the inner feelings with more force, the simpler they are. A blue, for example, accompanied by the brilliance of its complementaries, acts upon the feelings like a sharp blow on a gong. The same with red and yellow; and the artist must be able to sound them when he needs to" (Caranfa, 2014, p. 87).

those relationships. Roosevelt and Garrison offer an interpretation, then quote Dewey on the matter,

> Noble, lovely, spirited souls have a dynamic, open, textured form that imparts proper proportion, grace, balance, and coherence to their informing acts: "To say emphatically of a particular person that he has soul or a great soul is not to utter a platitude, applicable equally to all human beings. It expresses the conviction that the man or woman in question has in marked degree qualities of sensitive, rich and coordinated participation in all the situations of life. Thus works of art, music, poetry, painting, architecture, [and teaching], have soul, while others are dead, mechanical" (Dewey, 1925, p. 223 as quote in Roosevelt and Garrison, 2018, p. 183).

What Roosevelt and Garrison are asserting is that the soul of an inspired person *imparts* itself into all of its works. It in-forms them. This is why Dewey is able to say that some works of art and music and poetry "have soul," whereas others are "dead, mechanical." Therefore, it's not just the human person who has sensitive, rich, and coordinated participation in all the situations of life – those very same qualities can be imparted into a work of art. This hearkens back to the Dewey quote I offered in the "Soul as Life-Giving" section, where Dewey says, "When the organization called soul is free, moving and operative, initial as well as terminal, it is spirit.… Spirit quickens; it is not only alive, but … gives life. Animals are spirited, but man is a living spirit. He lives in his works and his works do follow him. Soul is form, spirit informs (Roosevelt and Garrison, 2018, 181). It is true that the soul is life-giving as I previously argued, but Dewey makes a further point here. He appears to explicitly connect the fact that man is a living spirit *and* the idea that man "lives in his works." Man, the living spirit, seeks a home outside of himself. It is the superabundant, outward-pouring life of the soul in virtue of which he does this. In Dewey's language, that home is man's "works," and as if those very works have come to life, Dewey claims they "do follow him." Anyone tracking this line of thought will see how manifestly important it would be for a liberal education to engage with the great works of human

art. They are not a lifeless record of past lives and past thoughts. They are a makeshift home in which great souls continue to live, inform, and inspire.

3.3 Working with the Soul

So far I have testified to the role of metaphor in educational thinking about the soul, and I have given voice to the relationship soul has to art, and through art, to education. However, to the educational mind, the real significance of both these strands is ultimately found in how we live our lives. As I said in the introduction, the soul is emphatically not something educators merely want to know about and give an account of. Since it abides in conjunction with the realm of action, one must investigate the conditions under which effectively working with the soul becomes a possibility. Said another way, if one only ever gained insight through revealing metaphors about the soul, or if one only ever meditated on great works of art and literature in a liberal education, one might still never fully come to know and connect with their own soul in a way that contributes to living well.

Soul educators contend that there are certain conditions and practices without which our efforts at working with our own soul will be stunted. In the introduction, I listed out ways in which educators work with the soul within the realm of action: teaching, inspiring, cultivating, ordering, learning. I also listed actions one might take *with* the soul: meditating, writing, praying, thinking, imagining, knowing, connecting, etc. To do any of these activities to their fullest extent, and to do them while tapped into one's true self, require the individual to embrace what I call soulful disciplines. Space only permits me to address a small but essential subset of these soulful disciplines. The conditions I address are silence and solitude, and the practice I address is listening.

3.31 Solitude and Silence

Without a measure solitude and silence, one remains relatively incapable of coming to know and work with their soul. They are preconditions like air is to rising bread. The opposites of solitude and silence are attachments and noise, and therefore, creating the right conditions for soul-work involves actively detaching and de-noising one's life. What constitute "noise" takes on a range of meanings in the literature, as does "detachment." In what follows, I will briefly characterize the interplay of silence, solitude, detachment, and noise in the thinkers I have been centering so far in this chapter.

In *To Know as We are Known* (1993), Parker Palmer takes as instructive those ancient Christian desert mothers and fathers who removed themselves from the noisy, distraction-filled cities, so that they could encounter truth *apart* from power (p. 40). Their relocation was a "solitary quest" which laid the groundwork for contemplative communities like monasticism and eventually, he contends, the university (p. 41). Palmer tells the story of a desert father called Abba Felix, who was sought out in the desert by a of group younger men seeking direction. They found Abba Felix and begged him for a "word," but Abba Felix merely kept his silence. When pressed, Abba Felix said, "There are no more words nowadays" (p. 41). The story goes on and Palmer returns to it as an icon of soulful teaching throughout the book. This culminates in a chapter titled "To Teach Is to Create a Space," where Palmer reinterprets the story of Abba Felix for the reader.

> To teach is to create a space in which obedience to the truth is practiced. . . Abba Felix and his fellow seekers left the crowded cities to meet truth in the desert, one of the most open and spare spaces on earth. They went there not only to enter an outer space free of the cities' clutter, but also to open up an inner space of heart and mind, free of inward noise. In desert emptiness the soul is able to settle on truth. . . his students come to him with an urgent request for "a word". . . Instead, he leads them into the vast space of silence, a wordless inner desert in

which their mental constructs of reality wither and fall away (pp. 69-70).

I'd like to suggest that Palmer's use of "space" and "desert" is essentially a form of solitude – an inward and outward solitude whose potentiality is silence. As if the outer and inner life parallels the other along a crease, openness in the one creates openness in the other, and where nothing but the strongest and most durable things survive – the desert – so too only the truest inner beliefs can withstand the vast inner space of silence. This solitude breaks down all "constructs," ego, and false words one's soul has absorbed during life. Though Palmer does not acknowledge it here, this process must be painful indeed. However it is worth it, for through this breaking down in silence, the "the soul is able to settle on truth" (pp. 69-70). Palmer most certainly means "truth" more generally here, as in the truth about things, but more fundamentally he is referring to the truth of our "hidden wholeness," and everything that hidden wholeness contains. Silence and solitude are a space in which the soul is able to come out and meet itself, then through itself, enter vast spaces of silence in which truth can speak its own word.[13]

Silence and solitude are essential conditions in Simone Weil's thought. If practicing a certain form of attention is Weil's highest educational practice, then solitude and silence are its conduit. Attention simply cannot be achieved without them.

For Weil, there are three levels to solitude, the final one being caught up in her mystical theological vision. The first level is physical. It is to regularly secure space unto oneself. This alone is no easy feat for many people. The second level is mental. It is to regularly spend hours

[13] In several works, Palmer spends much time working out what this practice of silence and solitude looks like in the classroom, down to how one might consider arranging the chairs. The Courage to Teach Institute, which I reference in the chapter, is itself a working out of this silence and solitude, for one must "retreat" to places closer to nature, and practice silence and solitude, in order for the soul to "come out" and be heard.

with one's own thinking, both thinking about oneself but also about great works of art and literature. The third and final level of solitude is to make ever-more progress in detaching from the world and from oneself. Weil has strong language about the detachment from oneself, at times insinuating the self is destroyed or decreated such that "there is no part left in his soul to say "I" (Weil, 1977, p. 318 as quoted in Caranfa, 2010, p. 71). Weil goes so far as to say that a pure mystic must even detach from their personality, for personality belongs to "ego and sin" (p. 71). Weil has equally strong language about detachment from the world, describing it as uprooting oneself vegetatively and socially, exiling oneself from every country on earth. "Keep your solitude," she instructs, and "don't allow yourself to be imprisoned by any [attachment]" (Weil, 1977, p. 361 as quoted in Caranfa, 2010, p. 71). Thus, the third level of solitude is a cumulative physical, intellectual, and spiritual condition of detachment – a way of being in the world, a space of freedom. Caranfa points out the paradox in that this extreme level of detachment is the very means by which Weil thinks someone can, in all sincerity, truth, and power, begin to be present in the world in a unique way. "Every creature which attains perfect obedience constitutes a special, unique, irreplaceable form of the presence, knowledge and operation of God in the world" (Weil, 1952, pp. 41 – 43 as quoted in Caranfa, 2010, p. 69). Therefore, solitude is a condition without which the soul cannot come to know itself truly. What is more, without solitude one's soul is effectively hampered in its attempts to be at work in the world. In Weil's view, only by achieving the condition of solitude can other soulful disciplines be fully realized.

For Weil, solitude folds into silence. Because in Weil's theological vision the silent speech of God is the very fabric and vibration of the cosmos itself, we achieve harmonic resonance with God when we ourselves become silent. This silent word of God is not audible to

our ears, of course, but to our souls (Caranfa, 2010, pp. 69 – 70). When we cannot hear it, it is because "our soul is so constantly clamorous with noise" (p. 70). Just like Palmer, Weil perceives a parallel between our attachment to the world and the noisy disturbance in our souls, and this is why, as one detaches by degrees from the world we by degrees begin to hear our own silence ring with inaudible meaning. The image Weil associates with this progress in detachment and silence is one of descent. In silence and solitude one begins to descend into the soul where one can discover music and beauty unrivaled by any other. Deep in our soul is a central convergence point of all proportion, harmony, and balance (p. 70). It is where the finite touches on the infinite silence of God. According to Weil and Caranfa, solitude which embraces silence is one key whereby one can unlock the backdoor of one's own soul to the heart of all things.

3.3.2 Nature

Suppose you had successfully achieved a degree of solitude and silence that these educators would praise you for. Suppose further that you did just what they recommended – reflected/meditated deeply upon yourself within the space of silence, and out of that self-knowing, began to act more truly, more connectedly, more soulfully. Even so, something – and it's not always clear exactly what – but something about your own soul would remain opaque and underdeveloped without a relationship with nature. Soul educators emphasize this so much that it effectively becomes a condition almost as important as solitude and silence.

For Weil, the relationship between God and nature seems key. Weil viewed the very fabric of the universe, of events, and things as vibrations of the word of God. Thus, literally everything in nature is a sacramental means by which God can communicate Himself to creatures. In particular, it is the *beauty* of nature more than anything else that communicates the divine presence, and when one experiences this beauty in nature, a type of mirrorlike self-

revelation occurs: One discovers the very same Being "on the inside" of the soul, as much as one does on the "outside" in nature. And therefore, if one only ever achieved solitude and silence in the basement of one's house, this mirrorlike resonance and experience of beauty would be to some extent limited, either in degree or clarity.

Palmer approaches nature slightly differently. All CTT retreats, where the express purpose is to invite the "soul" to come out, be known, and connected to – they're intentionally set "closer" to nature. It seems to Palmer that the four seasons mirror deeply important cycles in our lives, and therefore teachers meet four times a year, once in each season, for two years. The metaphors and questions which arise in each of these seasons are natural and non-threatening, and therefore, a wide variety of religious backgrounds can make progress in thinking about spirituality and the soul together. Parker explains, "Beneath our deep differences in belief and / or disbelief, we share something much deeper: creaturely lives embedded in the natural world and cycles of human experience that echo the cycles of nature. Seasonal metaphors evoke our shared condition, taking us onto common ground where we can explore meaningful matters and experience our connectedness" (2003, p. 382). The word "evoke" is a term of art for Palmer, and it essentially means making manifest what is already there, what is already true. Palmer's entire framework of the soul and spirituality in education is that it's all already there, all already true – we simply need to evoke this dimension which is present in ourselves and in our academic disciplines. Practicing solitude and silence in the context of nature – both nature itself and the art/poetry/metaphors rooted in the four seasons – allow for the soul to be "evoked," but it also allows for our shared human experience of life to be "evoked." Why is this? In part it is because nature's cycles mirror our own cycles of human experience, but perhaps even more importantly, nature is a safer space for the soul. Nature is open, non-egoistic, and it does not lord itself over us

in surveillance. It knows nothing of the mindless, infinite set of tasks which belong to the city. The environments these teachers are retreating from – academic/educational institutions, cities, spaces where fear and ego and business dominate – they all obscure the recessive yet essential domains of life. Just as the desert was a space where the church fathers and mothers could encounter "truth without power" according to Palmer, so too is nature a space where the soul is invited to come out and be known in truth.

3.3.3 Listening

Listening is the primary activity of solitude and silence. It is the practice in which all the other soulful disciplines participate. Listening connotes a range of meanings: It is the act of opening up oneself to oneself; it is attending to the inaudible motions of being as they resonate in the heart; it is discerning the truth without imposition, willing, or force, or it is directing one's attention according to eros, to heart questions, to the honest directives of pain and suffering. Listening is receiving what has already been given.

Listening takes its own shape in the context of particular disciplines. Caranfa suggests Matisse cultivated a practice of listening to nature which Matisse himself deemed as "meditation" (Caranfa, 2014, p. 80). This active listening was at times profoundly difficult for Matisse, and in context of painting it involved cultivating an "inner vision." Practicing listening involved working to see past appearances and prejudices of the physical eye, as well as resisting the noise of ego and external pressures. It involved remaining faithful to his own childlike, intuitive vision of the world (p. 78). Over time, Caranfa thinks this active discipline of listening "turns the inner eye from the outer to the inner world and from perception of the visible and the fragmentary to the invisible and the whole" (Caranfa, 2014, p. 86). As mentioned in the "Soul as In-Between" section, this wholeness is not in some outer realm we have no access to. Instead, it

is a wholeness which permeates our own realm. By continued listening, Matisse began to hear his own soul, and through it, the wholeness latent in all things. As Matisse like to put it, "There are flowers everywhere for those who want to see them" (p. 86).

Roosevelt and Garrison's article on Dewey associates listening with attention. In the article they criticize one particular teacher training method for overly harping on skilled habits. This over-focus on the exterior habits in teaching leads the attention of teachers to be placed in the wrong place – either on the eventual assessment of exterior techniques by a superior, their own ego, or on the exterior "good behavior" posturing from students. Instead, what teachers should *really* be giving attention to is their own and their students' inner lives – their souls. The best teaching, Dewey argues, "means insight into soul action, ability to discriminate the genuine from the sham, and capacity to further one and discourage the other (Dewey, 1977, p. 254 as quoted in Roosevelt and Garrison, 2018, p. 185). What Dewey seems to zero in on as the most educationally significant motion in the soul is the student's thinking. An inspired and soulful teacher is fully aware of the presence or absence of genuine thinking in their students. They listen for it. They call it forth in their practice.

Roosevelt and Caranfa do not emphasize the conditions of silence and solitude for listening in the way that other educators do. Rather, they invoke Deweyan language that may be unfamiliar to the modern ear, namely, that the chief condition for active listening in the classroom is being inspired by a particular spirit – the spirit of inquiry. It is the spirit of inquiry which opens up the inner eye of a teacher to be able to listen for genuine inquiry in their student. In Dewey's own words, good teachers are, "themselves so full of the spirit of inquiry, so sensitive to every sign of its presence and absence, that no matter what they do, nor how they do it, they succeed in awakening and inspiring like alert and intense mental activity in those with

whom they come in contact" (Roosevelt and Garrison, 2018, p. 185). Clearly, "listening" in this context is being moved by the spirit of inquiry to such a degree that one becomes increasingly sensitive to the same motion in students' souls. That this should be considered "listening" is further supported by the fact that Roosevelt and Garrison consider "noise" as the great enemy of soulful teaching. Noise for Roosevelt and Garrison is in part constituted by the constant demands on teachers' and students' attention from exterior authorities and tasks. In a section subtitled, "Can't Hear the Student Souls," Roosevelt and Garrison recount the story of a teacher whose mind was so filled with noise – what *had* to get done, what was *on* topic, how *she* would be evaluated – that the actual questions from the children did not register within (2018, p. 188). There was no inward or outward solitude, no inward or outward silence, and therefore no possibility of listening to students' genuine heart questions.

Angelo Caranfa, Matisse, Roosevelt and Garrison, Parker Palmer, and Simone Weil all consider solitude and silence as making space for the soul to show up, to emerge, to be heard. Therefore, to work with the soul in the domain of action, to act soulfully while remaining tapped into the source of one's life and authenticity, one must, at the very least, secure a measure of solitude and silence. Furthermore, if one wants to work with one own or others' souls in all truth, one must practice listening.

3.4 Conclusion

Soul educators think about the soul, educate by the soul, and work with the soul towards wholeness and connection. The images they conjure form a mutually supporting array of icons which orient their thinking about the soul. They acknowledge and tolerate the head's involvement with the heart, but their secret wish – one they themselves disagree with at the end of the day – is that the heart by itself would constitute our true selves. And who wouldn't be

tempted if indeed the heart is the source of love, the seat of the imagination, the root of intuition, and home to life-giving energy? They know the head must have a place, but in spite of themselves they privilege the heart and suspect the head of possible treason. Could it be that this very suspicion plays a role in the distance one perceives between the analytic and educational approach to the soul? No matter how provocative, insightful, and revelatory the images in the educational tradition may be, one eventually feels unmoored floating on a sea of beautiful images for the soul. The answer to Socrates prayer – that he be filled with beauty in the inward man, and that the outer and inner man may be one – I think is found in a marriage of the head and the heart, and out of that marriage, a singular, integrated, more beautiful life.

Chapter Four: A Unified Approach

4.1 Prologue

In Chapter One I offered some reasons why I chose to use a dialogue in my dissertation (p. 7). What I want to do here is give a bit of context to the characters and the setting.

First, Julian is a character based on a friend I made while living in New York City. The wisdom of his African American heritage gave his heart a depth of feeling and a rooted intellectual life. Constance, for me, possesses the qualities of soul necessary to carry the seed of this dissertation to its fruition in life and action beyond it. She is razor sharp yet less grounded than Julian. I imagine Dr. Ouvert – whose name means openness – as one who has gone before and opened a pathway to this dialogue. Without Dr. Ouvert, the dialogue would never occur, even though he does not speak very much. It is not just his opening question, nor his course, nor his scholarship which sparks the dialogue, but as I imagine it, his singular, living, soul-presence which Julian and Constance, unbeknownst to them, are invited into.

Oh – and Sylvia. Look in the mirror!

4.2 Spinning Whole

Dr. Ouvert: Let's get underway. I'm not sure if Sylvia will show today, but we will do the best we can without her. So far in this seminar "On the Soul," I've tried to select background readings which have led up to what we read for today – the introduction and first two chapters from this unfinished dissertation from 40 years ago. We don't know why this person didn't finish, and the only copy we have doesn't have a name. I propose we call this person "TC" because likely they were a student at Teachers College.

Clearly, TC thought the analytic and the educational approaches to the soul could be mutually beneficial to each other, but as he never finished, we don't quite know what he had in mind. We don't know how he imagined they would work together, exactly why they should join forces, or how confident he was that his project would be successful. Of course there are hints in what survives, and we can take a look at those today.

Our task today is this: Complete his project. How might the educational and analytic approach to the soul be unified, and why should anyone try? And yes, we can only make a beginning today, but let's do the best we can.

Perhaps I could state what appears obvious to me. He really divided up the analytic approach into three sections. I'll call them the epistemic, the modal, and the theoretical.

In the **epistemic** section, he speaks about direct, reflexive knowing – what it is we know about ourselves merely by being aware of ourselves. Hand-in-hand with direct, reflexive knowing are arguments for why we should be confident in the conclusions we make from a first-person perspective.

In the **modal** section, he argues that the mode of analytic thought inclines towards formal essence. From this inclination springs heightened attention to clarity of terms (definitions), distilled true or false propositions, and valid or invalid entailments.

In the **theoretical** section, he speaks about how analytic accounts of the soul position themselves in relation to established theoretical conclusions from science. However, while science gets a lot of airtime, because those who argue against the soul frequently appeal to science, the deeper underlying motivation is to have a consistent and unified theoretical view of reality, insofar as that is possible. This may seem like a no-brainer to some, but in stark contrast, "soul educators" rarely position themselves in relation to science. Soul educators rarely try to "harmonize" their theoretical convictions about the soul with the theoretical conclusions from other disciplines.

TC also divides the educational approach into three sections. The first is on metaphor, the second is about a soul education, and the third is about working with the soul.

In the **metaphor** section, he shows how metaphor has oriented educational thinking about the soul since Plato, forming an interconnected tradition of images for the soul.

In the **soul-education** section, he suggests a liberal education is an education of the soul, by the soul, through great works of art. The soul is part of the very logic of a liberal/aesthetic/spiritual understanding of education.

Finally, in the **working with the soul** section, he addresses solitude, silence, and listening as examples of the conditions and practices which must be maintained by an individual and a community in order that they may know their soul, connect with their soul, and work with the soul.

Therefore, I ask again, how might these two approaches to the soul be unified, and why should anyone try?

[Silence]

Constance: It does not look like these different approaches want the same thing from the soul. The analytic appears to desire a certain type of account of the soul, established by a specific mode of thought, grounded in first-person direct knowing, whereas the educational appears to desire a spiritual, aesthetic, and liberal way of living and educating, and they incline towards

accounts of the soul which help move us towards that end. Perhaps thinking of the soul in "metaphors and images," as he puts it, is sufficient for this end.

Julian: Are you saying that soul educators are not interested in giving a formal account of the soul?

Constance: There are exceptions to the rule. But no, I don't think they are really after an ontological or metaphysical account of the soul or its nature. Their account is more like a description of experience. In our readings so far, soul educators have made a few assertions about the soul, but you hardly ever know what theoretical commitments they really have about the soul. Are they dualists? Are they soft materialists? Are they property dualists? What's the relationship between the soul and the body? Is the soul a "thing" or a "process"? They rarely spell it out. Analytic folks tend to identify themselves outright, whereas people like Parker Palmer wave off this mode of thinking as "philosophical haggling," expressly distancing himself from this sort of account.

Julian: Can you give an example?

Constance: Yes. Here let me just read from *A Hidden Wholeness* page 33, "Philosophers haggle about what to call this core of our humanity, but I am no stickler for precision" (2004). After saying this, he lists out what all these different groups call the soul, and follows that description by saying,

"*What* we name it matters little to me, since the origins, nature, and destiny of call-it-what-you-will are forever hidden from us, and no one can credibly claim to know its true name. But *that* we name it matters a great deal. For "it" is the objective, ontological reality of selfhood that keeps us from reducing ourselves, or each other, to biological mechanisms, psychological projections, sociological constructs, or raw material to be manufactured into whatever society needs – diminishments of our humanity that constantly threaten the quality of our lives."

See? The soul's origin, nature, and destiny are "forever hidden from us," and he shrugs off precise haggling. So it's not *really* an account of the soul's nature, but something different. You cannot claim to be giving an account of something that is forever hidden from you. What would that even mean?

Julian: Okay, I can see how the language of hiddenness can be misleading. But don't you think, from the very same passage, Palmer suggests the soul *is* a knowable, perceivable, ontological feature of reality and of people? He says its nature is forever hidden, and yet he acknowledges that he thinks the soul is our dignifying core selfhood. Is that not in some sense speaking to its nature – naming what it is? And if he's asserting what it is, and saying it is "ontological," then is he not giving some sort of ontological and metaphysical account just like the analytic folks are?

Constance: This goes back to what we were talking about last week. These educators sometimes want to claim knowledge, and then in the same breadth, claim mystery and hiddenness and unknowing! They know *and* they don't know. Both constantly!

Julian: Ah that's funny and kind of true. But look, on the same page you brought us to, it looks like Palmer invokes a metaphor from Mary Oliver to illustrate this knowing and unknowing quality about the soul. Listen to Palmer and Oliver: "'Nobody knows what the soul is,' says the Poet Mary Oliver, 'it comes and goes / like the wind over the water.' But just as we can name the functions of the wind, so we can name some of the functions of the soul without presuming to penetrate its mystery" (2004, p. 33).

Constance: And?

Julian: Well, can we first acknowledge how fitting it is that Palmer deploys a metaphor from a poet to illustrate his epistemological approach to the soul?

Constance: Sure.

Dr. Ouvert: It's fitting.

Julian: Thank you. But the real point is, soul educators think they are giving an account of the soul's "effects" or "functions," but not its true nature. Therefore, it's the essence or nature of the soul which is hidden, but its powers and effects which are known and accounted for. Now that I say that out loud, it makes sense that an emphasis on powers and effects is well-suited to an inclination towards actionable educating and living.

Constance: But that's ridiculous.

Julian: Why? What's ridiculous?

Constance: I can grant that soul educators are not inclined to render the soul as a nature or essence in the same way as analytic thinkers are. However, I think Palmer and other soul educators are just as inclined towards essence, *and* just as confident that they can know essences as the analytic folks are.

Julian: Do you have an example?

Constance: Sure. A page before where you read, page 32, Palmer says the following. "When my first grandchild was born, I saw something in her that I had missed in my own children some twenty-five years earlier, when I was too young and self-absorbed to see anyone, including myself, very well. What I saw was clear and simple: my granddaughter arrived on earth as *this* kind of person, rather than *that*, or *that*, or *that*" (2004). After this, he describes the continuity of her personhood from infancy into her teenage years, and he concludes, "In my granddaughter I actually observed something I could once take only on faith: we are born with a seed of selfhood that contains the spiritual DNA of our uniqueness – an encoded birthright knowledge of who we are, why we are here, and how we are related to others" (2004, p. 32).

See? Palmer claims to perceive, in real-time, the very thing which he says is forever hidden. He perceives the very *thisness* of his granddaughter, the "seed of selfhood." Therefore, if Palmer is representative, these soul educators who resist analytic haggling over the nature of the soul appear to me to be just as confident they can know it and talk about it. And yet, it's obvious that there's still something quite different about both of their accounts.

Dr. Ouvert: Let's recap. At first, Constance was saying soul educators are not giving an account of the soul, and then Julian argued they were. However, he argued it is only an account of the soul's functions, not its nature. Constance replied that soul educators in fact *do* try to give an account of its nature, only, they render it differently than the analytic folks do.

Julian: That sounds right.

Dr. Ouvert: If what we've said is right, then it seems we've already stumbled upon a point of "almost" unity between these two approaches. I say "almost" because they both seem inclined towards nature/essence, and they both are confident they are mapping onto something ontological, but Constance is not yet sure why they feel so different from each other. Let's try to name the sameness and difference each camp has with respect to nature and essence.

Constance: I think it has something to do with *what* the soul is verses *who* the soul is, if that makes sense. Analytic folks render the soul's nature and properties by zeroing in on *what* it is and *what* these properties of soul are, whereas educators render the soul's essence as a whole distinctive presence. Palmer's granddaughter is a perfect example, for he emphasizes she was *this* particular type of person, not that, or that, or that.

Julian: That is interesting. It actually relates to something I am learning in a history of philosophy course I'm in.

Constance: How does it relate?

Julian: Because of these interesting philosophical terms – "quiddity" and "haecceity." Quiddity refers to the general, shared form of something. It is enjoyed by all members of a species or group. Haecceity refers to the property in virtue of which a particular instance of something is distinct from others even within the same species or group. Haecceity particularizes.

As I think about all the literature we've read, it strikes me that analytic thinkers and soul educators say the soul is both the quiddity of human beings and the haecceity of persons. Although, I understand Constance to be saying that soul educators tend towards haecceity – the particularizing quality of an individual soul, whereas analytic thinkers tend towards quiddity – the shared nature of the soul among human beings.

Dr. Ouvert: It seems to me like the soul enjoys being described as both in the history of Western philosophy. For example, the type of soul human beings shared (i.e. rational) was thought to distinguish them from other classes of beings, such as animals and plants. This was a shared form among human beings and therefore quiddity. At the very same time, individual souls have frequently been thought to just *be* an individual's essence, their haecceity. Thus, the soul conferred both nature and distinctive personhood, depending on context.

Constance: I agree with Julian that the convergence of quiddity and haecceity upon the soul has continued to this day. For example, Palmer says the soul ". . . is the core of our shared humanity as well as our individual uniqueness" (2004, p. 65). I think Swinburne echoes this in another one of our readings. Here it is – his Appendix D, from *The Evolution of the Soul*, accents the same convergence: "The Nature of souls; Their Thisness."

Dr. Ouvert: Let us grant that there is a convergence of quiddity and haecceity in reference to the soul in the West *and* in the recent educational and analytic literature. However, Constance may still be right that one camp tends towards one and not the other, and this may contribute to our experience of how different the literature is from these respective approaches. Perhaps, Julian, you have some examples?

Julian: Sure. It's well known that Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro (hereafter G & T) are substance dualists. They think the person is essentially their soul. Thus – and I could be misusing the term here, but I think I'm close – the soul is considered to be that which confers distinctive personhood – haecceitas. It's what makes them *them*. However, in *A Brief History of the Soul*, when they respond to some Humean objections to the continuity of personhood and the possibility of finding a simple soul, they give us a window into what they really take the soul to be. They suggest it is a singular substance that has "essential powers and capacities, where powers are the basis for its actions and capacities are the basis for its passions" (2011, p. 123) Some of its powers are thinking and intending, and some of its capacities are feeling and loving. In context, they argue that each of our particular thoughts, perceptions, and feelings presuppose and reflect back to ourselves the truth that it is *us*, our continuous self, which is having those particular experiences.

TC elaborates on this passage when he says, "What I take G & T to be suggesting is that we are directly aware, not just of particular changes and activities of the soul, but of the source of those particular occurrences – the underlying faculties through which the particular changes come to be. These unified and continuous underlying faculties just *are* the self, the person, the persisting soul."

Therefore, even though haecceitas is affirmed, and I might add, certainly *not* contradicted, what is in fact articulated is quiddity, for if they are right, do not all human beings share in this underlying collection of powers and capacities, all harmonized into a singular continuous personhood?

Constance: And what about soul educators? They too affirm the haecceity and quiddity of the soul, but lean towards haecceity?

Julian: I like the way you put it. They render essence as a distinctive whole presence. The granddaughter example is great, but in general, it looks like these soul educators identify the soul as this deep, continuous, true, creative self that has been obscured and damaged by the world. Soul growth is associated with coming into one's own distinctive whole presence, and soul-teaching is eliciting and making space for the distinctive whole presence of students. There are moments where they offer definitions and describe general soul features that everyone shares, but what they spend most of their time doing is bearing witness to whole presence in the context of education, and therefore they lean towards haecceity.

Dr. Ouvert: Let's agree that analytic folks tend towards quiddity and education folks tend towards haecceity, though each affirms both are true of the soul. We can always go back and revise if needed. In spite of this "almost unity," why do we think their approaches feel so different? I think we need to articulate this before we can attempt to unify these camps.

Julian: I think we need to go back to our discussion about their differing sort of "accounts." Earlier it was said that analytic folks are offering a metaphysical and ontological account of the soul, whereas soul educators are offering a description of experience. However, I argued from Palmer that in fact soul educators are also offering an ontological account, only *not* of its nature, but its powers and effects, with the aim of inciting a way of living and educating. Constance pushed back, suggesting that even soul educators are confidently addressing the nature of the soul, only in a haecceitas sort of way, not the quiddity sort of way. However, the way they talk about the soul when giving an account is still so different. What do these folks even mean by an account of something?

Constance: I can think of three main uses for the word "account." One is a "philosophical account," one is a "scientific account," and one is "an accountant." As best I can put their relationship to each other is this: Each of these accountings is a type of counting.

Julian: What type of counting is the "philosophical" type?

Constance: Well, when Dr. Ouvert summarized TC's analytic chapter, he said that analytic philosophers incline towards formal essence, which leads to an emphasis on clear terms (definitions), distilled true or false propositions, and valid or invalid entailments. I think we could just, for short, say that philosophical accounts primarily count in "entailment," because they try to weigh whether the terms + the propositions + the arrangement of them all together amount to a valid entailment.

Julian: What about the scientific account?

Constance: Their favorite type of counting is in terms of causality and material explanation. I'm sure it's much more nuanced when you get into the weeds, but this will work for now.

Julian: That make sense. And let me guess, accountants' favorite type of counting is in regard to money?

Constance: Wrong.

Julian: Are you serious?

Constance: Just kidding you're right.

Julian: Wow. What about soul educators? Do they have their own type of "counting"?

Constance: I'm afraid to say it out loud, because it sounds odd.

Julian: Maybe we can make it sound even. What is it?

Constance: TC says these soul educators love to think in metaphors and images. Therefore, I think soul educators must "count" in metaphors and images.

Julian: I'm inclined to agree, based on what we've already agreed to, even though I don't know what we mean. The only thing I would add is that soul educators "weigh" accounts of the soul in terms of what they lead to in our actions and lives. I think "count" and "weigh" are pretty close in meaning, for they both involve the soul's contemplation of value.

Constance: Yes, either word works as far as I'm concerned.

Julian: But how does one "count" or "weigh" in metaphors and images?

Constance: I'm not perfectly clear on that. I *think* images and metaphors are quite distinct in how they present the world than philosophical arguments or scientific causal explanations. An image does not present particular terms and propositions in sequence, showing how some parts entail the next part, like premises to a conclusion. An image does not articulate what the exact material or causal relationship is between different parts within a closed system. Rather, an image presents a whole, even if it does not articulate every aspect or dimension of the whole.

Julian: What do you mean by that last part?

Constance: Well, like a portrait. A portrait presents a whole person but obviously, it does not articulate everything there is to say about its subject. It presents a whole but does not encompass the whole.

Julian: I see the connections now, I think. You're saying that educators convey the "whole presence" of souls through metaphors and images, because it's the particular office of images and metaphors to present things whole?

Constance: Yes. But soul educators, to use the metaphor I just used, are not merely painting portraits of individual souls. Rather, they also bear witness to distinctive whole presences in nature and great works of art and literature.

Julian: That makes sense.

Constance: And even though it sounds strange, it really is a type of counting. Counting in the basic sense appears to involve working with wholes and parts such that together they are sound. The accountant seeks to balance the sheet, the scientist seeks causes which amount to the result, and the analytic philosopher seeks validity and soundness to arguments. They all weigh their respective values in search of a resolution. However, one thing is unclear to me. How do soul educators resolve the whole and the parts in terms of metaphors and images?

Dr. Ouvert: Let's ask it this way. Do soul educators try to work out how individuals, communities, nature, and great works of human art and literature can be resolved into a living, personal, and unified whole?

Julian: That actually seems right. TC emphasized that the heart of the educational approach to the soul involved a pursuit of wholeness and living connection with everything. What else is a living connection with everything via one's own soul but a unified and living whole?

Dr. Ouvert: Excellent work. So are we in agreement that soul educators count towards living wholeness, and *that* is what they are ultimately after in their accounts of the soul?

Constance: It sounds right to me.

Julian: I think I agree. Just to be clear, the "parts" they work with are particular persons, nature, and particular works of art and literature, and the "whole" they are trying to resolve the parts into is a living and unified whole such that together the parts and the whole are sound?

Dr. Ouvert and Constance: Yes.

Julian: I'm sorry – you both seem to be agreed already, but I do not want to get ahead of myself and agree to something I'm not clear on or comfortable with yet.

Dr. Ouvert: Always feel free to voice your reservations, Julian. What's your concern?

Julian: I know we said that images and metaphors convey the soul, or distinctive whole presences, but I'm still not clear on the role that images and metaphor play in the "counting" towards a living and unified whole. Like, I understand how clearly defined terms fit within propositions, and I understand how propositions fit into arguments, but I'm not sure how images and metaphors fold into a living wholeness.

Dr. Ouvert: Do you agree with Constance that images and metaphors present things more in terms of wholes? She's not saying images present the entirety of someone or something in one gesture, but she is saying they present something without dividing it up into many parts, without each part receiving its own definition and precisely articulated relation to something else.

Perhaps an example would help. Forest Gump has a great line. "Life is like a box of chocolates. You never know what you're going to get" (Roth, 1994). The metaphor lets life be life, presenting it whole. While it highlights a particular resonance with a box of chocolates, it does not precisely define or divide up anything. It lets life be whole. It assumes the whole. It lets the reader assume the full extent of their own experience of life.

Julian: Technically that's a simile, right?

Dr. Ouvert: Oh yes, but I think when TC says metaphors and images, what he is really getting at is poetic, analogical language in general.

Julian: I agree. So with soul educators, when they invoke poetic language in their approach to the soul, they "assume the whole," letting the soul be whole? And if I'm following, the helpful part of a metaphorical and poetic approach is that it is better at conveying whole, distinctive, and personal presences, which is primarily how educators think of the soul. So now we've come again to my question. Let's assume you're right about what we've just said. How then do soul educators think we get from these images in words to the *actual* living whole they are after?

Dr. Ouvert: What a singularly good question, Julian. It seems that somehow, someway, accounts of the soul are thought to inspire a way of life which participates in that living whole. The vision must become lived.

If we wanted to restate what counts as a successful account of the soul for soul educators, based on what we've said, surely it must:

1) Resonate with readers' own experience of distinctive, whole presences, whether in people, nature, works of art and literature,

2) Inspire a mutual, life-giving relationship with yourself, others, nature, or some aspect of the world
3) Not contradict the images and metaphors for the soul handed down in the tradition

Do you think we can temporarily agree to the three points I just wrote on the board? We can always go back and revise if needed.

Julian and Constance: We can agree.

Dr. Ouvert: So we've established that the analytic and educational approaches "count" quite differently, which is another way of saying they weigh different values as they consider the soul.

Constance: Sounds so simple when you say it that way!

Dr. Ouvert: We've also agreed that they both affirm the haecceity and quiddity of the soul, but analytic thinkers tend towards quiddity, whereas educational thinkers tend towards quiddity.

Do we now agree that both approaches can rightly be said to give an account of the soul with these differences?

Constance: Technically we've only agreed that they both "count," but we have yet to agree that they both "account."

Dr. Ouvert: Fair enough. Do you agree that anyone, either analytic philosopher or soul educator, could count in their respective modes privately?

Constance: What? What do you mean?

Dr. Ouvert: In short, could an analytic philosopher "weigh" the value of an argument, and could a soul educator weigh the value of an image of the soul, in the solitude of their own soul?

Constance: Yes.

Dr. Ouvert: Well, suppose one weighed the value of the great works of art and literature in their soul but never spoke a word to anyone about it. Could that person be said to be giving an account of the great works of art and literature?

Constance: No.

Dr. Ouvert: But they would be "counting" as we've described it?

Constance: Yes.

Dr. Ouvert: So is the difference between counting and accounting merely whether or not someone is sharing their counting publicly?

Constance: I would only add one thing.

Dr. Ouvert: What's that?

Constance: In the academic realm, it's not the mere fact of sharing it publicly that makes it an account. It's also allowing that account to be tested by others using the terms and standards within that mode of counting.

Dr. Ouvert: Surely you're right about that. And that's exactly why I think soul educators are not required to give their account of the soul by the terms and standards of the scientists, nor the analytic philosophers, nor vice-a-versa.

Constance: I agree they are not required. However, if TC thinks the analytic and the educational approaches should join forces, doesn't that mean they must learn to count and account together?

Dr. Ouvert: Surely you're right about that too.

Constance: Does that mean, given what we've said, that analytic philosophers must practice weighing the soul in terms of whole presence, with metaphors and images, working towards a living whole, while soul educators must practice weighing the soul in terms of precise definitions, true or false propositions, and valid and invalid arguments, all the while working towards unified theoretical view of things?

Julian: *If* they are going to be unified, then yes.

Dr. Ouvert: Can we give just a little bit more specificity to what Constance said? We just articulated what sorts of values soul educators would consider as they weigh an account of the soul, but could we restate them as questions? In addition, as a placeholder, could we articulate the sorts of questions analytic philosophers would ask?

Constance: For analytic philosophers, I would say:

1) Are the terms clear?

2) Are the propositions true or false?

3) Is the argument valid or invalid?

4) How does the account harmonize with other disciplines, perhaps especially science?

Julian: For soul educators, I would say:

1) Does the account resonate with readers' own experience of distinctive, whole presences, whether in people, nature, or works of art and literature?
2) Does it inspire a mutual, life-giving relationship with yourself, others, nature, or some aspect of the world?
3) Does it contradict the images and metaphors for the soul handed down in the tradition?

Dr. Ouvert: These are great as placeholders. A joint approach would involve analytic and educational thinkers asking these questions of any account of the soul, testing each other by the terms and standards of the other.

Now where do you feel we are at? Have we unified these approaches to your satisfaction?

Constance: I'm certainly not satisfied.

Dr. Ouvert: How so?

Constance: Even if we can imagine these folks together in the same room, asking these sorts of questions of each other and themselves, trying to see and think about the soul through the eyes of the other, the question remains – why would they want to? For my part, I don't think they'll ever do it unless both camps desire the good the other seeks. This brings us right back to the beginning where I asked whether these groups even want the same thing out of an account of the soul. How do you get both camps to desire the good the other has, and therefore pursue them both together? It's not like learning to see and think in a new way is easy.

Julian: I don't think that's the only way towards unity.

Constance: What do you mean?

Julian: Perhaps there is a good they already share, that they both already desire, and all we have to do is show that a) they already desire it, and b) both approaches will better help them attain it.

Constance: You make it sound easy! Do you already have something in mind?

Julian: Honestly, I'm surprised that this idea I've been mulling over for a few weeks has somehow become relevant to this conversation. But it just sounds odd, at first. Almost off-topic.

Constance: As you said to me earlier, maybe we can make it sound even. Go for it.

Julian: Bear with me as I piece it together.

As we've been reading all these texts on the soul the past two months, I've developed this conviction that, no matter how different these approaches look and sound, no matter if they "count" and "account" differently in their formal academic work and environments, even perceiving each other's defects more than their own, deep down they agree on what matters most. Does it not seem to you that both are testifying to a sacred, singular, whole presence in human beings in virtue of which we act purposefully, are said to have singular and continuous personhood, which can pour life and meaning into our work, and in virtue of which we long for wholeness and living connection beyond power, class, survival, and economic competition?

Constance: That's beautiful. And it's not off-topic.

Julian: Thanks, but I was not quite done.

Constance: Sorry, please continue.

Julian: Well – as much as my heart rejoices at the possibility of the soul, if I'm being honest – it's just that in the forty years since TC wrote, the world has changed so much. Just as TC was writing this, the first artificially intelligent machines hit the public market. The United States has half of the colleges and universities we once did, and there are only a handful of thriving liberal arts programs left in the entire country. Education was already in process of being mediated by machines when TC wrote, and now, one can hardly have a thought, or a feeling, or a movement of the body that is not in some way mediated by a machine. It's to the point where our social and

self-understanding is inextricable from these devices. Those who design and manage them have nearly inconceivable control over the framing our first-person experience of ourselves, the world, and humanity.

TC hinted at what his fear was. He was afraid that the analytic approach was too "head-centered," and he was afraid the educational approach was too "heart-centered," and he wanted to join the head and the heart together for a more balanced approach. But wouldn't being overly heady or overly heart-centered be a gift in our world today? And I guess this brings me to my main point.

I think the reason why these two approaches should join together, or at the very least *should* have joined together 40 years ago, is because what they *really* have in common, and what they both desire to safeguard against all the forces in the world which threaten it, is our first-person human experience of the world.

Constance: You were right – I was not expecting you to say that. Can you say more?

Julian: As you know we read Swinburne, Goetz and Taliaferro, and John Cottingham, and so much of what we read matched my expectations – highly analytical, a drive towards definition and precision, and engagement with science at a deep level. However, there was a single line that stood out to me in Goetz and Taliaferro's *A Brief History of the Soul*, and when I stopped to think about it, my entire view of the analytic approach inverted itself. TC acknowledged it but not enough, in my opinion.

Remember when G & T claim that, fundamentally, the soul is "not a theoretical postulate" (Goetz and Taliaferro, 2011, 181)? Sounds simple but nothing could be more counterintuitive, at least for me coming into this course. They contend that the primary and fundamental grounds for the soul is really our first-person, pre-theoretical experience of ourselves. This is why "direct, reflexive knowing" takes on the role it does in the analytic approach. If you remember, TC explains this sort of knowing this way, "This knowledge comes by merely being aware of oneself." Naturally, these thinkers spend considerable time arguing why we can have epistemic confidence in the conclusions we make about ourselves and the world from a first-person perspective, as TC details in chapter two.

Why call it a *defense* of the first-person human point of view? Why not merely an affirmation? In overt and clandestine ways, comprehensive materialism and scientism – the sorts of folks Goetz and Taliaferro are positioning themselves against – imply that our first-person view and experience of the world, in lieu of discoveries in modern science, is to an unbelievable extent delusional and untrustworthy. Therefore, the basic, ancient, and common-sense self-understanding that human beings are not reducible to bio-chemical entities – that we experience ourselves as having a non-reductive spiritual dimension – is a non-starter. Just take, for example, human action. We experience ourselves every day as having purposes – choosing to take an action for the sake of some end. It seems all the world like it is our inner self (not our brain) which decides to act, and therefore, there is soul-body/mind-body causation involved. Comprehensive materialists, however, argue that the process of "deliberation" to "action" is an

entirely a physical-chemical process, and therefore, your perception of "making a decision" or "purposing" is delusional. There are many other examples I could give.

Constance: We can come back to them. Are you equating Goetz and Taliaferro's idea of the soul with a first-person conscious perspective of the world?

Julian: G & T certainly do not say it quite like that. Here's what I'll say – If I am not saying *that*, I am saying something very close to that. For G & T, to be aware of our own thoughts, purposes, feelings, meanings, values, pains, pleasures, and loves – all things we experience form a first-person perspective – is to be reflexively aware that those very things are part of a singular and continuous personhood which simply cannot be reduced to the physical-chemical processes in our body and brain. We can refer back to chapter two if we need refreshers on this. But no matter how exhaustive the physical-chemical explanations are at the micro and atomic levels, no explanation of those processes should make us think our first-person experience is fundamentally delusional. That sort of thinking forces our world inside out. We, from the "inside looking out," try to fully identify ourselves with a theory which views us from the "outside looking in," and therefore, we must dissociate in order to fully inhabit the scientistic point of view of ourselves. In short, to affirm the soul, either as a full-blown dualist or as a non-reductive type, really is to defend the first-person, human perspective.

Constance: You talk a lot about Goetz and Taliaferro. What about Swinburne and Cottingham? Do they agree with Goetz and Taliaferro that the soul is not fundamentally a theoretical postulate?

Julian: Given how technical and highly theoretical analytic philosophers are at times, at first I read Swinburne and Cottingham by *only* trying to understand and analyze their work in terms of their definitions, propositions, and argumentative content in them. Purely theoretical. However, when I meditated on the idea that the soul is fundamentally a first-person experience, I began to see that no matter how logical, systematic, and theoretical these analytic defenders of the soul could be, all of them appeared to ground their thinking in basic first-person experience. In fact, the *Evolution of the Soul* is primarily about simple things we experience everyday: Sensations, thoughts, purposes, desires, beliefs, rationality, freedom of action, and so on. He extends these reflexive meditations with arguments, but I found the arguments always traced back to first-person experience.

Then, I began to see Swinburne's emphasis on first-person experience everywhere. As TC quoted him, "Scientists have tended to regard the life of conscious experience as peripheral, not central to understanding man. But there is so much and so rich human experience, and experience which is causally efficacious, that this attitude will not do. His life of experience has to be taken seriously if we are to understand man" (1997, p. 3). That experience, of course, is from a first-person perspective, and for Swinburne, is best understood as involving a soul.

As for Cottingham, I found his book absolutely filled with beautiful affirmations of first-person experience of oneself and the world, but there was one section that really stood out. You know what I'm talking about?

Constance: The Descartes section?

Julian: Wrong.

Constance: Seriously?

Julian: No you're right, as per usual, but I got you back!

Constance: Petty.

Julian: Cottingham takes Descartes, an icon for the analytic mode of thought, and while he disagrees with Descartes' version of dualism, he walks through what made Descartes' articulation of the soul so compelling. I have it right here let me just read it.

"This *me* [*ce moi*], that is to say the soul, by which I am what I am." Descartes' use of the first-person pronoun is profoundly significant. What he takes each of us to be aware of is something that is directly accessed from a first-person perspective. You can investigate me from the outside, measure my brain states, collect any other data about my body and nervous system that you please, but you cannot enter the conscious domain of which I am directly aware and which seems to give me my very sense of what it is to be myself – "this me, that is to say the soul, by which I am what I am." I am not an object or item to be measured through the quantitative methods of science; I am a *subject* – the owner, as it were, of the thoughts and feelings and experiences that constitute my conscious life (p. 70).

Constance: Ce moi! It's "say-muah," not "say-moy"!

Julian: Ha! I'm sticking with "say-moy" all day.

Constance: Terrible.

Julian: *Any*ways, is my point coming into focus for you guys? These analytic philosophers think the soul is directly accessed in intimate and trustworthy knowing, and they think we are aware of our soul as sacred, personal, singular and continuous, that it comes with incredible powers and capacities, and all of this is "perceived" from a first-person human perspective.

Constance: I see what you're saying. Obviously there are many, many questions we could pursue here, but I understand you're merely trying to show that in fact analytic philosophers care deeply about and defend a first-person human view of the world, and that *that* first-person view involves the soul. Since you're trying to show that soul educators *also* deeply care and defend a first-person human view of the world, why don't you turn to that?

Julian: I feel like I'm talking too much.

Dr. Ouvert: We both are eager to hear your next point.

Julian: I guess I think soul educators stand guard over a first-person view of the world in their own way. First, they try to recall people back from their externalized, alienated, confused flight from themselves. Their work invites people back into a living connection with themselves, the world, with academic subjects, with nature, or with God – all of which is another way of saying – a genuine, real-time, first-person connection with everything.

Simone Weil has this image of descending, through silence, deeper into the soul. For her, overcoming dissociation, disconnection, and noise involves entering solitude and silence, so that in a deep, first-person experience, she could hear the silent love of God vibrating through all nature, and beauty, and suffering. This coming back into herself through solitude, silence, and love allowed her, as Angelo Caranfa argued, to act truly and singularly in the world. I see Matisse, as Caranfa presents him, descending into his first personhood as he enters his own solitude and silence. I see him overcoming dissociation, disconnection, and noise by finding his spiritual core in his craft of painting. I see Palmer, his students, and his teachers descending through silence and solitude into first-person connections with their own heart questions, their "inner teacher," their "true self," their "hidden wholeness."

Constance: This seems quite different than analytic philosophers' understanding of direct, reflexive knowing. The way TC presents it, the direct knowing of the analytic philosophers is pretty much available to everyone all the time, perhaps barring some extreme bodily/mental issues. It's "direct" with almost nothing in-between. The direct knowing of the soul educators, on the other hand, seems more relational and ethical-moral-spiritual. It's relational in that one is coming into a certain relationship and knowledge of oneself, and it's ethical-moral-spiritual in that certain conditions and practices, and one's spiritual state, can greatly influence the clarity and degree of one's self-perception and understanding.

Julian: It's true that there are different epistemological accents at play in both approaches, but both still very much involve and depend on a first-person experience of the world. I agree that soul educators are more attuned to conditions, contexts, and spiritual state: What is "direct" to some may feel indirect to others. For example, and I know we keep coming back to this I'm sorry, but in the passage about Palmer's perception of his granddaughter's unique soul, he clearly says that it took growing up and a decrease in self-centeredness before he could see, for himself, the truth about her distinctive whole presence being there from birth. Earlier in life he had to "take it on faith."

Constance: Can you elaborate a little more as to how this ethical-moral-spiritual self-understanding relates to a first-person human perspective?

Julian: Of course. Consider two more reasons why this relational direct knowing is still deeply connected to a first-person view of the world.

First, think about the soulful disciplines which TC emphasizes – solitude, silence, and listening. Yes, those who engage in these practices are not merely "thinking upon themselves" as TC describes analytic direct knowing. They are equally engaging in practices which are quite literally a means of severing over-enmeshment / false connections with others and the world. These practices, in turn, create space for the soul to "come out" and connect with the world in a new, life-affirming way. This transformation is a transformation from within one's first-person experience. It's learning to see, to know, and to connect from *one's own soul*, rather than merely playing inside of another's world, or inside a false world we've created for ourselves.

Second, the way we naturally see and interpret the world from a first-person experience is deeply metaphorical, deeply poetic. The fact that soul educators are quite confident in and reliant upon

metaphors suggests, to me, that they are very comfortable with our basic first-person experience of the world as being poetic. We do not experience the world as mere cause and effect, nor mere logical entailment. And therefore, I think soul educators use of metaphor is itself an indirect way of defending our first-person experience of the world.

Dr. Ouvert: Julian, thank you for sharing all of your thoughts with us. Let me try to briefly rearticulate what I heard, and you can tell me if I'm close. Is that okay?

Julian: Of course.

Dr. Ouvert: We had just agreed that analytic philosophers and soul educators emphasize different values in their accounts of the soul, and we had just agreed about what sorts of questions they would ask each other and themselves *if* they were going to begin to be more unified. Constance, however, re-emphasized how these two approaches might not desire the same thing from an account of the soul, and without a deeply shared desire for the same goods, they would never truly be unified. You suggested that perhaps they already shared a deep desire for the same good, and therefore, we would not have to persuade either group to love the good of the other group. Rather, we could merely show that in order to achieve the good they already love in common, they should expand their approach to include the other. That good, you have just argued, is a defense of the first-person human perspective of the world?

Julian: Yes.

Dr. Ouvert: And you think that the treasure worth defending in the first-person perspective is that from it we have access to, as you put it, ". . . a sacred, singular, whole presence in human beings in virtue of which we act purposefully, are said to have singular and continuous personhood, which can pour life and meaning into our work, and in virtue of which we long for wholeness and living connection beyond power, class, survival, and economic competition?"

Julian: Yes.

Dr. Ouvert: And that whole presence is the soul?

Julian: Yes.

Dr. Ouvert: What do you think, Constance?

Constance: I think Julian has given us lots of things to consider. Even if there is plenty of room for more detail in what was just said, I think I can generally agree that they are both defending, in their own way, a first-person human experience of being in the world. However, *if* they are both defending this fundamental experience we have of ourselves in the world, and if they both use the language of the soul, then what's the real *animus* behind their differences? I ask that while acknowledging how much clearer some of the differences in their approach have already become in this conversation. But still, if they both are beginning with the soul, and they both are defending our first-person human experience of the world, then what's the real heart of their division?

Julian: I don't know. Dr. Ouvert, do you have any thoughts?

Dr. Ouvert: I do, actually. Earlier, Julian, you made me think of this when you referenced how TC hinted that analytic thinkers could be too heady and soul educators too heart-centered. That little comment crystallized an idea that's been forming in me for months. To say it plainly: The reason why both of these camps begin with the same subject and end up with division is because they are trying to self-understand with different "parts" of the soul. Analytic philosophers try to self-understand through the intellect, or "reason," or "mind," and soul educators try to self – understand through the "heart."

Constance: I can understand why the analytic is spun from the rational part of the soul, with its never ending quest for precision, clarity, definition, and theoretical unity, but why do you say the educational is spun from the heart?

Dr. Ouvert: Tell me if you disagree, but the heart is always said to be the home of love, the seat of the imagination, a lover of the beautiful, and the means by which we grow deeply connected to the world and other people – all things soul educators are always going on about.

Julian: How does their reliance upon metaphor connect to the heart?

Dr. Ouvert: I apologize for not being clearer. I take the imagination to be the "mother" of images and metaphors because both images and metaphors elucidate visual thought. Visual thought, of course, is within the purview of the imagination. Therefore, if the old association of the imagination with the heart is correct, then the fact that soul educators have recourse to images and metaphors is a good reason to think they are trying to see with the heart.

Constance: I can see how "images" evoke "visual thought" as you put it, but why say metaphors are children of the imagination? They are linguistic phenomena.

Dr. Ouvert: Great question. I think metaphors also elucidate visual thought in us. Next week we are going to read Zwicky. She discusses metaphor in terms of "seeing as." That is, we use metaphors when we see one thing in light of, or in association with, or in resonance with, another. Therefore, images and metaphors are overlapping categories, I think. Perhaps all metaphors are images, but not all images are metaphors.

Julian: Yeah so maybe these two approaches really do need each other.

Dr. Ouvert: What do you mean?

Julian: If each camp only ever approached the soul from their own mode of knowing, they would perpetually reincarnate a divided soul and a skewed self-understanding.

Constance: And if these two parts of the soul both possess their own mode of operation, but we mostly lived out of one or the other, then we would always know ourselves as less than what we, in wholeness, are. And perhaps not only ourselves, but the world.

Dr. Ouvert: If what we are saying is true, it is true at two different scales. At the academic institutional scale, the analytic approach is spun largely from the intellect trying to understand who we are by using the values and terms it finds most fitting, whereas the educational approach is spun from the heart trying to understand who we are by using the values and terms it finds

most fitting. At the individual scale, this very same dynamic can occur within the soul of an individual. Therefore, if I'm tracking with what's been said and where it's going, a more complete account of the human being from a first-person perspective necessarily requires both the analytic and educational approaches to the soul.

I know we are running low on time today. What do you think? Do you think we have satisfactorily said how these two approaches would be united and why they should be?

Julian: I feel like we've made progress.

Constance: We have articulated ways in which their approaches are different, practices which would help them unify, as well as genuine shared territory which they both desire as good. We have even given some reasons, but certainly not proved, how they both stand in need of each other, if indeed we've rightly said that these approaches are spun from different parts of the soul which itself stands in need of wholeness. I know we are going to have to come back to this next week, perhaps, but there's one thing I think we need to try and answer today before I'm satisfied with what's been said.

Dr. Ouvert: What's that?

Constance: How do we become whole in respect to the head and the heart? And afterwards, how does the soul of the academy become whole in respect to the head and the heart? And I know those are impossible questions to ask as time is running out. But hear me out.

As individuals, I think our intellect is always spinning, if it spins at all, and I think our hearts are always spinning, if they spin at all, but I think it is quite rare that they spin together. We can tend to live out of one or live out of another, and we can even switch between these modes depending on context, or even down to particular issues, but rarely do we find those robust and more complete souls, or institutions, whose lives spin whole and true in perpetual integrity. But how do *we* get there?

Ah! Okay the next class is here. I'll gather my books as I finish.

It's strange, to me, that I would even have to ask this sort of question because if these analytic folks are right, am I not already one, singular, and continuous person, and irrevocably so? If the educational folks are right, am I not already a whole distinctive presence? And therefore, where does this "divide" in us come from? Which reminds me: At the very same time these soul educators affirm our distinctive whole presence, our "original wholeness" as Palmer might put it, they insist that the journey of the soul requires unlearning, unknowing, even soul death. And why? Because many of us, and even our institutions, have a "false" self – "ego" as recent educators like to put it. We must, I think, unlearn, or unknow, or die to this division between the head and the heart. But how?

Dr. Ouvert: If this were a Plato dialogue, we might begin discussing philosophy as a way of learning to die. And that wouldn't be a half bad thing to do. But I am not Plato nor am I Socrates.

Julian: What do you say, then?

Dr. Ouvert: I say our work here is not done. Let's come back next week to continue making progress on this front. Perhaps Sylvia will join us. In the spirit of Constance's question, I think we also need to address how to die to the intelligent machines which are now embedded in so many of our bodies – especially those which now mediate our first-person experience of the world.

And Constance. In my experience, when I have earnestly asked questions like the one you're asking now, I sometimes find out later that the answer has already snuck in somewhere. All you have to do is continue to remain open and faithful to what has already begun in your soul.

Chapter Five: A Philosophy of Nested Being

It is no accident that one can only go so far in discussing the spiritual and the immaterial before one must reference nature and the material. In the history of Western thought, these are mutually informing, mutually illuminating relations. In many cases, the accounts of the soul and the body, the spiritual and physical, form a mirror of fruitful opposition. For Plato, if the nature of immaterial reality is invisible, unchanging, and eternal, then the nature of materiality is visible, changing, and temporal. If the soul is a self-moved mover, then a body is other-moved. For Plato, Augustine, Descartes, and others, if the nature of bodies was to be divisible, to have parts, and to be extended, then the nature of things like souls was to be indivisible, simple, and not spatially extended, at least not extended in the way that bodies are. For Aquinas, bodies have surfaces, lines, and extremities which are the points of contact between other bodies. Souls, which are unlike bodies, cannot be said to make contact with bodies or other souls like this, because they do not have surfaces, lines, and extremities in the same way (Goetz and Taliaferro, 2011, p. 49).

Thus, while there are independent reasons given for all of the descriptors above (i.e. the visible is not temporal *just because* the invisible is eternal, but for some other reason), the nature of the physical and the non-physical have been continually illuminated via contrast with one another. In light of this, it is thoroughly unsurprising that a total revolution in our understanding of material bodies in the last couple hundred years would bring about a reckoning with the soul. The balance within the mirror of fruitful opposition was thrown off. But those who, using the imbalance as leverage, have tried – and continue to try – to stamp out the soul from theoretical existence might not be happy to consider that the mirror of fruitful opposition is ancient and

strong, and is quite reasonably thought to be grounded in our very nature as beings which participate in the visible and invisible domains of life. Even if our understanding of materiality were to continue transforming for the next couple hundred years, as I am sure it will, I am convinced the soul cannot be completely effaced from the mirror of our self-understanding. No matter how exhaustive the mathematical, scientific, and third-person descriptions of the world become, no matter the manipulations of first-person human experience we create for ourselves, our soul will wait until there is a moment of silence and solitude to wonder about the other half of the mirror. It will always ask what all this material description and manipulation means for the other domain of our being, for who we are, for how we should live.

It is because the mirror of fruitful opposition is alive and well today that I think we must consider images of the material world when giving accounts of the soul. It is tempting to try and rebalance the mirror by leaving science and the material world to take care of itself, focusing all one's energy on foregrounding the domain of the soul. But while there are benefits to considering the soul's nature in itself, by itself, as much as possible (as Plato recommended), or even "by itself" as it shows up in particular contexts – like in education or a particular art form – I believe the best and most compelling accounts of the soul will always return to the mirror of fruitful opposition, balancing the material and the immaterial in a mutual analogical relationship.[14] A philosophy of nested being is an attempt to look deeply into the mirror of nature in order to discern a place for the soul in it. It is an attempt to take one image of the material world and find a home for the educational and analytic approaches to the soul in reference to it. It hopes to better see what the soul is and what it is not; where the soul is, and where it is not; and ultimately

[14] Love him or hate him, we should not forget how deeply Descartes' account of the soul was wrapped up in philosophizing about the nature of materiality, and that this fact is perhaps one reason why its influence has been astonishing in its scope and endurance.

to see the soul as equally nested within the ascending and descending scales of nested being. In doing this, a surprising resonance is discovered between the domain of the material and the immaterial – one which sets the stage for, in the next chapter, appealing to metaphor as that which mediates the analogical relationship between the body and the soul, the material and the immaterial.

5.1 The Concept of Scale

A philosophy of nested being begins with the concept of scale. The concept of scale was introduced to me by Mark Miodownik in his book *Stuff Matters*. The idea that materiality is scaled, that *things* are scaled, is the idea that there are different levels or "spheres" to materiality. Each sphere, from the atomic to the human, folds into the next sphere, or it enfolds the smaller spheres within it, like Russian nesting dolls. Miodownik suggests that a complete material account of something would involve not only what is happening at each scale of its being, but how these differing scales interact with each other to bring about the properties and features we perceive at the human level. Miodownik divides materiality into about six levels, illustrated below from page 217:



As you will notice, there are arrows at the bottom and at the top, suggesting that there may be other levels he is not including – a point I will return to later. But there is another conclusion one might make from the arrows, and it is that materiality is not *uni*directional. Materiality is not like the Nile River which flows only downwards into the Nile Delta but not the other way. Rather, the influence of the atomic registers all the way up into the human, and the influence of what occurs at the human registers all the way down to the atomic. Hence there are interlocking ascending and descending scales to the material world which mutually influence one another. If one hits a piece of metal at the human scale, the force renders changes down through all the intermediate scales to the atomic, and any changes at the atomic level have, in principle, effects which ripple outwards through interlocking scales towards the human, even if we cannot perceive all of them with the naked eye.

What appears at each scale is generally different in its properties, structures, and laws. For example, suppose you had a perfectly clear microscope which allowed you to peer into the atomic realm. You would never find DNA, nanotubes, or cellulose there. Those features of reality simply do not appear at that scale. Or suppose that you were a conscious cell at the micro level, and you only had powerful enough instruments to give you insight into the macro scale. You would never discover that hair is very much part of reality, or that it gets oily when not washed enough. To support the idea that properties and laws also vary between scales (not just what appears), Miodownik says, "The crucial difference between the car motor and a nano-motor is that in the case of the nano-version the physical forces that dominate at that scale, such as electrostatic and surface tension forces, which can pull things together, are very strong, while gravitation forces are weak. At the scale of a car, by far the strongest force is the gravitational force of the earth, which pulls the various bits of the motor apart" (2013, p. 220). This is why at the human scale we have to glue, bind, or weld things together, whereas entities at the nano-scale appear to self-assemble. Both scales play by different rules which lead to very different properties. There are plenty of other examples in the book, but perhaps one example outside the book will drive home the point. It is a relatively well known scientific conclusion that quantum laws do not accurately describe reality at the cosmic scale, and neither do astrophysical laws accurately describe quantum phenomena. Beyond these varying mathematical and scientific "laws" at these different spheres, what appears at the quantum and the cosmic spheres of being is quite different. Take, for example, the recent discussion of dark matter. Supposedly, everything ever witnessed more directly by human beings, things like galaxies a billion light years away, elements, and black holes, make up about 73% of the universe as we currently perceive it, while dark matter is estimated to make up 27% (NASA). While dark matter is "invisible" to us, it is

discernable in the effect it has on the motion of galaxies and the expansion of the universe – effects which cannot be explained by what we currently do consider "visible," nor by any know elements on our periodic table. Suppose dark matter is very much real, and suppose it is like the scientists think it is – like a "vast, web-like structure that winds through the whole universe – a gravitational scaffold" – then it is truly astonishing that we would not perceive such an intimate and fundamental aspect of reality throughout the entire atomic revolution. But perhaps it is slightly less astonishing if we conceive of reality as revealing itself along ascending and descending nested spheres of being. The cosmos is not a linear, two-dimensional set of causes and effects which reveal themselves on a flat deterministic plane. Instead, we could rightly think the cosmos is constituted by "spheres of wonder," as each is utterly surprising, new, and beforehand inconceivable in its properties, structures, and laws.

Miodownik is clear that a scaled understanding of materiality rejects the idea that a thing's atomic content, or its chemical composition, is what *makes* it what it is. Having just stated the fact that graphite and diamonds have exactly the same atomic content, he says,

> This apparent alchemy illustrates that even with a very restricted set of atomic ingredients you can create materials with wildly different material properties. Our bodies are very good examples of this: we are mostly made of carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen, and yet through the subtle rearrangements of the molecular structure of these ingredients, and the sprinkling of a few minerals such as calcium and potassium, an immense diversity of biomaterials results, from hair, to bone, to skin. It is hard to overestimate the philosophical as well as the technological importance of this dictum of materials science: that knowing the basic chemical composition is not enough to understand materiality (2011, p. 219).

If I understand Miodownik correctly, he is really suggesting that the *form* and *shape* of material is equally determinative of what something is as its content. A piece of graphite and a diamond are different, dare I say it, "substances," with wildly different properties, and yet they are both made of the exact same atom: Carbon. Miodownik says the "structure of graphite is radically

different than a diamond. It consists of planes of carbon atoms connected in a hexagonal pattern," whereas in a diamond the hexagonal structure is more lattice-like with stronger bonds between layers (pp. 162 – 166). Essentially it is the cumulative shape of carbon at different levels of being which amounts to the very distinct entities of graphite versus diamond at the human scale. For example, one reflects light and the other does not; one conducts electricity while the other does not. Therefore, atomic content alone does not make something what it is. Structure at each scale of being, or what I will simply refer to as shape and form, are equally determinative of what it is and what its properties are. Materials science has more to say on why materials are what they are and behave the way they do, but I highlight the graphite and diamond example because the role of form and shape in materiality will play a crucial role in my next chapter.

What counts as a full explanation of why a material behaves in such-in-such a way, or why it has a certain set of properties, is expanded by the concept of scale. It makes suspect any attempt to reduce the full explanation of what is going on in a material being to a single scale. Miodownik acknowledges that for some properties a certain scale will play a more prominent role in the explanation (2013, pp. 216, 218). He further acknowledges the incredibly powerful explanatory role that the atomic scale plays and has played in our current understanding of materiality. Yet he goes out of his way to state the dictum of materials science as resisting a reduction of materiality to the atomic scale or atomic content. Again, "knowing the basic chemical composition is not enough to understand materiality" (2013, p. 219). He elaborates on this nicely in the following passage,

> One of the most fundamental of these material structures is the atom, but it is not the only structure of importance. At the larger scales there are dislocations, crystals, fibers, scaffolds, gels, and foams, to name a few that have been featured in this book. Taken in isolation, these structures are like characters in a story, each contributing something to its overall shape. Sometimes one character dominates

> the story, but it is only when they are put back together that they explain fully why materials behave the way they do (2013, p. 216).

Miodownik is suggesting that there are other characters at other scales (beyond the atomic) which are equally real and bring their own personalities to the table. Fibers, scaffolds, and gels truly exist in their own right, and they play a unique role in the story of materiality – one that is distinct from the atom. The idea that a full explanation involves putting all the pieces back together into the context of the whole puts pressure on the constant desire to declare complete causal description and explanation prematurely, especially when it only invokes one scale of being. Miodownik is focusing on the atomic to the human scale when he says this, but there is no reason why we should not apply the same logic all the way to the cosmic scale. Afterall, it might be the case that dark matter is equally influencing the way materials behave at the smaller scales, although it currently plays no explanatory role for why things appear to self-assemble at the nanoscale. Even if we have what appear to be very good explanations for behavior at the nano scale – like electrostatic and surface tension forces – one day we might be able to perceive the role dark matter plays at that scale. In other words, even when we have very good explanations for certain phenomena at a particular scale, the overall concept of scale encourages us to not think for a moment we have actually given a *full* explanation of phenomena. It is highly likely that there are other characters at other scales of being that are in fact playing a role that is not yet perceived or articulated, even when your current explanations appear to be very good.

Popular culture is rife with examples where explanations are offered at one scale *as if* that settles the matter at every scale. In the recent film, *Oppenheimer*, Kitty asks Oppenheimer to explain quantum mechanics to her. He says, “Well, this glass, this drink, this counter top, uhh . . . our bodies, all of it. It’s mostly empty space. Groupings of tiny energy waves bound together.” “By what?” Kitty asks. Oppenheimer says, “By forces of attraction strong enough to convince us

matter is solid, to stop my body passing through yours" (Nolan, 2023, 32:16). In the dramatized Oppenheimer's view, he thinks that because there is great space between atoms in the quantum realm, then *everything* is mostly made up of space at every scale. Thus, the appearance of solidity at the human scale is an illusion (i.e. the words "*convince us"* imply solidity is illusion). However, when Oppenheimer makes this jump it is a mistake. We do not pass through each other's bodies *exclusively because* of what is happening at the atomic scale, nor can an explanation at the quantum scale be the only word on the matter. In high school, my chemistry teacher told us that the wooden desks we were sitting at were really just a whirling mass of atoms that were in perpetual flux. Frustrated with how this explanation grated on my sense of reality, I somewhat angrily hit the palm of my hand down on the solid tabletop and enunciated, "So, you're telling me that this thing I am hitting right now is really just a whirling mass of ever changing atoms, and you're telling me that it's actually made up mostly of space, and that the only reason my hand can't go through it is because of the forces between these vastly spaced out atomic structures?" The teacher simply said, "Yes." I responded, "But it's a table, and it's clearly solid, and it's wood (by which I meant it's not just atoms), and it's relatively stable because *it* will be here in 100 years." Was I really to think that the table was nothing more than its description at the atomic scale, and that, by extension, all of my perceptions of material beings were equally delusional as my eyesight did not track with what was assumed to be the *most fundamental* aspect of material beings? And if my perception was delusional about material things which were plainly evident, then what could I possibly conclude about the reliability of what was more indirect – the domain of the invisible?

5.2 The Scientistic Imagination

I did not realize at the time that my basic common sense was up against what I now call the scientistic imagination. It did not matter that my school was outspokenly *not* a scientistic and reductionistic institution. The images and language of the scientistic imagination are "in the water" as they say, and anyone can unwittingly fall back into them. What is the scientistic imagination? To start, the scientistic imagination has four distinctive features, which are important to spell out because they stand in the way of adopting the concept of nested being, and thus, taking seriously the very concept of soul.

The first is the idea that what is smaller and less divisible is more fundamental to something than what is a larger, divisible, and exists at larger scales. The smallest part is assumed to be the "most real" part, as if the wooden table is less real than the atomic level of its being. The scientistic imagination asserts that what the table *really* is, is what is happening at the atomic level. Though it is very tempting to attribute more reality to what we are progressively growing better at manipulating and controlling – the smaller scales of being – are atoms any more real than gravity? Is gravity any more real than whole planets? Are planets more real than space itself? Without any compelling arguments to think so, prima facie it seems we must affirm that what appears at each scale of being is equally real. Reality is one interconnected whole with many different spheres of being.

The second scientistic idea imagines there is a strong disconnect between form and matter, between shape and "the stuff" that is shaped. The "shape" and "form" of the material is external or accidental to its being, whereas its atomic "content" or "stuff" *is* its being. Part of the reason for this sort of thinking is that, in the scientistic imagination, the form and shape of material is assumed to be a feature only at the human scale. Thus, that the wood is shaped like a table, or that a flower has lanceolate petals were thought to be a mere accidental property. But

form and shape do not only appear at the human scale. It is not just flowers, buildings, and t-shirts which have form and shape. The scientistic imagination skips over all the enfolding shaped structures in the intermediate scales between the human and the atomic, declaring as fundamental supposedly formless numeric content items and their description. But as we saw with charcoal and diamonds, the shape and form of the atomic "content" at each enfolded scale is in fact essential to what sort of being and set of properties we end up with. The shape and form of the material is as "internal" to the material as protons and electrons, because one cannot have protons and electrons without them taking form and shape.

The third feature of the scientistic imagination is that the properties we perceive at the human scale are to a great extent illusory. While I cannot actually defend the reliability of our perception at the human scale here, it is worth pointing out that the declaration of our perception at the human scale as illusory depends, to a great extent, on the first two features of the scientistic imagination I have already described. If there is a great separation between form and content, and our perception at the human scale picks up on the form of beings at the human scale, then our perception is relegated to the external, the accidental. If our perception picks up on *wholes* more than atomistic parts, and those parts are the most fundamental and real, then our perception of wholes is less real. But why think that? Solidity, wood, stability, smoothness, and the smell of pine are not illusory nor less real. If what we perceive at the human scale is a perfectly nested being, with each of the shaped entities, properties, and laws folding into the next level of being, up and down between human and atomic scales, then what we perceive at the human scale is not external and accidental, but a cumulative and resonate revelation.

The fourth feature of the scientistic imagination is that explanations at smaller scales take explanatory preeminence over explanations at larger scales. You might explain that your hand

does not pass through the wood table because both the wood and your hand have solidity and density, but according to the scientistic imagination this is not really true. As Oppenheimer and my chemistry teacher demonstrated, the real explanation is at the smaller scales. The qualities and features of the world that strike us at the human scale often find themselves awaiting their preeminent explanation in the smaller scales. But as Miodownik encourages us, we should reject the idea that any particular scale gets explanatory preeminence over the other scales when we *want to give an account of the whole*. A more complete and full explanation will involve not only what happens within each scale, but how the scales interact to form a cumulative and nested being. No matter how true it might be that there are powerful forces at the atomic scale which contribute to why my hand will not pass through a wood table, it cannot be the exclusive explanation. There is simply much more "reality" involved than what is discernable at the atomic scale.

5.3 Nested Being and the Soul

We have, therefore, an image of the material world. It is a cosmos filled with ascending and descending nested spheres of wonder – quite literally astonishing and unpredictable in their structures, laws, and properties at every turn. A philosophy of nested being holds that each sphere of being is equally real, equally necessary in an account of the whole, that form and shape are equally determinative to what something is as its "content," and it suggests that the scientistic imagination many of us were educated to believe in is deeply misleading. To Miodownik's scales between atomic and human I have added the scale of "nature" and the "cosmic." In light of this depiction, the mirror of fruitful opposition urges us to now ask, "Where does the soul belong in relation to this image?"

A few hundred years ago, the great Blaise Pascal thought it profoundly important to understand our experience of ourselves as conscious beings in relation to a material image of the cosmos which invoked scale. For Pascal, we are nested between two infinites: the infinitely small and the infinitely large. When we meditate on these two principles we discern that we occupy a sort of cosmic midpoint. Our soul-life enables us to think and reflect on the cosmos in a way that mere material phenomena cannot, and therefore we enjoy a greatness and nobility unlike the merely extended and divisible domain. Yet the sheer magnitude of the infinitely small and infinitely large dwarfs our greatness, fences in our reason, and we become aware that we are almost nothing. Our locality as conscious souled beings suspended midway upon the infinite plays a pivotal role in his thought. While Pascal develops these conclusions in ways which go beyond the point of this chapter, clearly the mirror of fruitful opposition is at work here. Pascal weighs his understanding of the soul in relation to an image of the material cosmos, drawing on both in his attempt at self-understanding. I too want to hold an image of the soul and an image of materiality together, asking what the image of scaled, nested, ascending and descending spheres of materiality might mean for the analytic and educational approaches to the soul. I can only *begin* to sketch an answer to this question here, because I think the ramifications are quite extensive and profound.

First and foremost, the soul belongs to the human scale of being. It is within the human scale where the soul most vividly appears. Our very conscious awareness and perception "shows up" in the cosmos between the miniature scale and the sphere of nature. It is within the human sphere that we gain direct, reflexive knowledge of ourselves as agential, singular, and continuous persons – an irreducible and truly unique entity in the world. It is within the human sphere that we encounter souls as comprised of the intellect and the heart, along with a range of powers and

capacities. Here we discover souls as in need of an educational community, as longing for wholeness and connection, as imparting its superabundant life into great works of art and literature, and as orienting our lives around meaningful purposes. It is also within the human scale that we gain knowledge of souls through images and metaphor, for example that the soul is "intermediary" and "in-between," that it is "life-giving and life-receiving," that it is "partite," that it hardens and softens along the lines of suffering and beauty, that it is a medium for rebirth and recreation, and finally that it is in some sense "hidden" from us – all images I detailed in chapter three. Said another way, the soul, along with the educational and analytic approaches to it, appear at the human scale and can therefore be said to "belong" to it.

This appearance of the soul at the human scale takes on a new meaning when it is considered in relation to the image of nested being. First, the soul's dramatic entrance at the human scale is consistent with the concept of scale in that it is entirely unexpected, induces wonder, and would never in a million years be predicted if we only had knowledge of, say, the atomic scale of being. It is also consistent in that we very much *should* expect new structures, laws, and properties to reveal themselves at each distinct level of being. That there are phenomena at certain scales which are not exhaustively describable in the terms, laws, and descriptions which apply to other scales is just the way it goes when it comes to a nested image of reality. Thus, the soul finds its original and primary home within the human sphere of being where it has appeared since the dawn of recorded history.

The second way that the soul relates to the image of nested being has to do with the relationship of scale to methodology. Different scales, and the distinct phenomena at those scales, often require distinct approaches. The evidence for this is somewhat obvious within the breakdown of academic disciplines. We frequently distinguish between academic subjects by

"subject" and by "scale." For example, astronomy, environmental science, and materials science all study the material domain, but they do so at different scales, and thus they warrant distinct titles. The instruments needed to approach the respective phenomenon at these different scales are quite literally different, thus requiring not only a different "theoretical" approach, but a quite different hands-on approach. For example, telescopes, barometers, interferometers, and microscopes relate the human being to material world at different scales. Of course, many tools are designed with a specific phenomenon in mind (e.g. recording devices for sound), but my main point here is to show that scale also plays a key role in how we approach phenomena. Therefore, one would expect that the phenomena at the human scale, like the soul, will require distinct methodologies and distinct tools from other phenomena at other scales of being in order to adequately engage with it. What, then, are these tools most fitted to the soul at the human scale? We certainly will not get a better look at the soul through the Hubble Space Telescope nor the microscopes which allow us to peer into and directly manipulate matter at the nano scale of being. I want to offer three initial suggestions.

First, the primary "tool" or "method" for the approach to the soul at the human scale is via the soul itself. This is not a circular suggestion, but is dialogically self-referential. Both analytic and educational domains testify to the fact that soul is aware of itself and seeks to understand itself. As human beings we do not merely want to understand the phenomena we "look out at" in the cosmos. We want to understand that which does the looking out, and we do that fundamentally *by* or *through* our own self-reflection. This is quite clear if one thinks about the role of direct, reflexive knowing which I detailed in Chapter Two. But one can also think of the educational understanding of the soul as a type of reflexive self-knowing as well. For example, in Palmer's perception of the unique soul of his granddaughter, or in a teacher's

perception of "heart questions" in students, or in Weil's descent into the soul via solitude and silence, the soul is reflected to ourselves through one another in community. We come to know the soul through our soul.

It is true enough to say that we come to know the soul through the soul, however, if you combine this idea with a longstanding idea in the West – that our soul has different parts which correlate to different kinds of knowing, such as "heart knowledge" versus "head knowledge," or "the rational" versus the "intuitive," – then within the self-knowing of the soul there can be distinct "tools" or "parts" which can be relied on more or less when we attempt to self-understand. Of particular relevance to this dissertation is the distinction between the head and the heart. In Chapters Three and Four I argued that analytic philosophers try to self-understand primarily through the head (i.e. the rational), whereas soul educators try to self-understand primarily through the heart. The analytic philosophers do not explicitly say they are primarily trying to self-understand via the rational, as far as I am aware (even though I still think this is the case), but soul educators make consistent use of the head-heart distinction, perpetually associating a certain (in their opinion, better) way of knowing with the heart, and a different (more suspicious) mode of knowing with the head. In the Chapter Four dialogue, I tried to animate the head and the heart distinction, suggesting that there can be deep division or deep harmony between them. Constance is particularly keen on overcoming the division between the two. It is implied that this must happen if the educational and analytic approaches are to be joined together, not just in the academy, but in Constance's own soul. Regardless, the main point here is to draw attention to the fact that the head and the heart can be considered as distinct tools which can be used to approach the phenomenon of the soul at the human scale.

Second, one can begin to perceive the soul through the cultural works of any given community. I will not belabor this point as chapter three gives a substantial characterization of how soul educators think of the soul as incarnated in works of art and literature. Once incarnated, those cultural works communicate the soul of their author to anyone who sincerely engages with them. One could say that instead of using a microscope or a telescope to engage the phenomena, it is works of art and literature which "bring the soul into focus" and communicate its life.

Third, one can perceive the soul in the shared life of different places. A good example of this comes from Plato. In the *Republic*, Socrates suggests that they should first look for justice "in the city," as it would be written in larger letters, before they turn to look for justice in the individual, which will be more difficult to discern as it is smaller. In their philosophic search for the just city, they discover three classes: the rulers, the warriors, and the craftsmen. After discussing what a virtuous city would look like, with all three classes working as a coherent whole, they temporarily agree to an image of justice in the city. Socrates and his interlocutors then turn to ask whether justice in the city is the same as in the individual. It is in this context where Socrates says,

> Well, isn't it absolutely necessary for us to agree to this much: that the very same kinds of things and conditions exist in each one of us as exist in the city? After all, where else would they come from? You see, it would be ridiculous for anyone to think that spiritedness did not come to be in cities from the private individuals who are reputed to have this quality, such as the Thracians, Scythians, and others who live to the north of us; or that the same is not true of the love of learning, which is mostly associated with our part of the world; or of the love of money, which is said to be found not least among the Phoenicians and Egyptians (Book IV, 435e-436a).

Socrates' main point is to answer the question in the affirmative. Yes, the image of justice in the city *can* be applied to the individual because the spirit of the city is ultimately derived from those

very individuals. The city has no independent "spirit" of its own except that which has been incarnated in the cultural works from the people who have lived there.

Even so, it seems that there is something more than individual souls present in this passage. Clearly Plato and Socrates believe individual persons have souls, but the examples Plato chooses communicate something of a shared spirit with shared qualities. Up to the north, the Thracians, Scythians, and others are known for spiritedness; in Athens, they are known for their shared love of learning; and Phoenicians and Egyptians are known for the love of money. From the outside, the properties of a culture's shared spirit are perceivable as part of a coherent whole. The explicit point, in context, is that these perceived qualities are not reducible to "external" behavior or "external" social structures, but are rather incarnations of soul in the shared culture of a place. As individuals come together into relationships, a shared spirit emerges.

Socrates' secondary point seems to be that each culture can be disordered in its own way, privileging one "part" of the soul over another, which would be a failure of justice in the whole soul, leading to a failure of justice in the whole city. I emphasize that this shared spirit and soul of a culture is "of a place" or "in a place" because a huge thrust of the educational literature which considers the "spirit" finds an intimate relationship between the shared spirit of a culture and the locale they inhabit.[15] Therefore, one of the "tools" or "methods" to look for the soul at the human scale is to consider larger-scale, non-reductive, shared qualities of a particular culture. We can, at times, discover qualities of our own soul by reading the "larger" letters of our shared

[15] For more on the relationship between soul/spirit and locale, or soul/spirit and material entity, see: "Challenging the Productivity Mantra: Academic Writing with Spirit in Place" (2017); "From Page to Stage: Locating the Spirit of Branar's Adaptation of Oliver Jeffer's How to Catch a Star" (2020); "The 'Spirit of Education' in Indonesian Pesantren" (2009); "'The Spirit of Our Rural Countryside': Toward an Extracurricular Pedagogy of Place" (2019)

spirit. Reading these "larger" letters of a shared soul is certainly distinct from the sort of immediate, self-reflexive knowledge that exists at the level of the individual person.[16] It is within this context of a shared soul with its macro-properties, then, that we are confronted with a new possibility. Is it just materiality that admits of being scaled and nested, or could it be that the domain of the soul *also* can rightly be said to involve ascending and descending spheres of being, with new structures, laws, and properties emerging at the different levels of its being? The mirror of fruitful opposition tacitly encourages us to pursue this apparent resonance between the domain of the soul and the image of materiality presented in this chapter. If it is true that the domain of the soul can be considered as scaled and nested, then this would be an essential piece of information if, as I am, one were trying to discern how to relate the soul to the imaged nested being as it applies to materiality.

To answer this question of whether the domain of the soul can rightly be said to be scaled and nested, let us recall the basic features of nested being as I have presented them:

1. that there are different levels of being which both enfold and fold into each other like Russian nesting dolls
2. that at each level of being new structures, laws, and properties appear
3. that in order to give an account of the whole one must give an account of each level of being, as well as the relationships between the scales
4. that the scales mutually influence one another in a dynamic, bidirectional manner, and
5. that form and shape are equally determinative of what something is as its atomic "content"

[16] In future work I hope to spell out what approaching the soul at this broader scale might look like, and how it might involve certain approaches which already exist. For example, in *The Spirit of Cities*, by Daniel Bell and Avner de-Shalit, the authors try to discern the spirit of cities like Jerusalem, Oxford, Montreal, and Beijing, among others. They do not invoke the concept of scale, as far as I am aware, but their approach clearly relates to the present discussion.

How might these descriptions apply to soul-life?[17] For example, can souls be said to fold into and enfold into one another? Can souls link up to one another in community such that a "new scale" of soul emerges, leading to new structures, properties, and laws? Is the soul equally determined by its "substance" or "content" as its shape and form? There is no space here to rigorously defend the view that each of these five conditions equally apply to the domain of the soul, nor to spell out in great detail exactly what is entailed by that. However, in what follows, I want to begin to sketch a picture of the domain of the soul as one that *is* scaled and nested in ways relevant to conditions 1-4. The 5th condition is very interesting when considered in relation to the soul because the idea that the soul is the form of the body goes back to Aristotle. In addition, it is interesting to consider what it would mean for the soul to have a shape and form which is equally determinative of its properties, for we tend to think of shape and form as "physical" properties. Sadly, considering condition 5 would take too much space here and would distract from the overall point which is simply this: There is good reason to think the domain of the soul as scaled and nested, and this matters for a philosophy of nested being.

Let's assume for a moment that how I have interpreted Plato on cultures having shared spiritual qualities in something like a shared soul is correct. If so, then the Thracians who are up North share an inclination towards honor. It is a shared feature of their inner cultural life

[17] It should be said that Miodownik himself has much to say (even if in few words) about the relationship between "mind" or "soul" and materiality. He thinks human needs, desires, and ideas are quite literally embedded in the material world which we have manipulated into a million different forms. Material creations, therefore, have meanings which we can read off of them – meanings which relate to our needs, desires, thoughts, pains – in other words, our soul-life. Miodownik even suggests that the stuff of the mind is immaterial. "We inhabit an immaterial world, too: the world of our minds, our emotions, and our perceptions. But the material world, although separate, is not entirely divorced from these worlds" (2013, p. 225). He goes on to suggest that these worlds mutually influence each other, and although he does not invoke the concept of scale in relation to the immaterial domain, he largely talks about how these worlds influence each other at the human scale, as that is where *we* primarily experience the material domain.

together. Even if this is true, though, this fact does not mean that there may be some individual Thracians who *do not* incline towards honor. Those who do not incline individually may yet participate in that shared feature in some other way. They may aspire to it, resist it, or flat out reject it as a good inclination to have, yet in all three of these cases the individual who does not incline towards honor participates in this shared feature of the Thracians soul-life together. This simple observation alone appears to support the notion of scale in the domain of the soul, for the properties which "appear" or "do not appear" at the individual scale are not always the same properties which appear or do not appear at the shared-soul level, even though it is the same subject under consideration, that is soul-life.

Rousseau is an author who I think supports the idea of soul-life being scaled and nested. In the *Emile*, Rousseau appears to argue for something quite similar to the concept of scale in the domain of the soul. In Book IV, Emile is of the age where he must begin to consider and compare himself in relation to others. He must enter the moral and social domain in a new way, and in order to compare himself in the appropriate way to others, Rousseau is convinced that Emile must learn the secrets of the human heart and soul. Without knowledge of the heart and soul, Rousseau thinks Emile will be deceived by the charades and masks that human beings don for themselves. For example, the rich, the powerful, and the beautiful may appear to be happier than Emile, or the respected officers of government may appear to be worthy of more respect than Emile, yet in reality (i.e. the state of their hearts), Emile may in fact be happiest, worthiest, and most noble. Thus, Rousseau is in need of a discipline which can reveal the heart of humanity to Emile so he can compare himself in truth. Thus, Rousseau introduces the study of history. "It is by means of history that, without the lessons of philosophy, he will read the hearts of men; it is by means of history that he will see them, a simple spectator, disinterested and without passion,

as their judge and not as their accomplice or as their accuser" (Rousseau, 1979, p. 237). But where to begin this study of history? Rousseau says,

> I would prefer to begin the study of the human heart with the reading of lives of individuals; for in them, however much the man may conceal himself, the historian pursues him everywhere. He leaves him no moment of respite, no nook where he can avoid the spectator's piercing eye; and it is when the subject believes he has hidden himself best that the biographer makes him known best. "Those who write lives, says Montaigne, "are more suited to me to the extent that they are interested in intentions more than in results, in what takes place within more than in what happens without. This is why Plutarch is my man."
>
> It is true that the genius of assembled men or of peoples is quite different from a man's character in private, and that one would know the human heart very imperfectly if he did not examine it also in the multitude. But it is no less true that one must begin by studying man in order to judge men, and that he who knew each individual's inclinations perfectly could foresee all their effects when combined in the body of the people (1979, p. 240).

The explicit point, in context, is to study human beings in such a way as to discern their inner life – their "intentions" or their "heart" more than "results" or externals. It is about what is "within" more than what is "without." In that context, Rousseau quite clearly suggests that, while there is a deep kinship between what is within the individual and what is within a collective, they are quite distinct. The "genius" of collectives, either of assembled groups, multitudes, or even nations, is not identical to what we perceive about soul-life at the level of the individual. Thus, it seems like Rousseau might initially agree with conditions 1-4.

First, it appears that individual souls fold into greater collectives of people – "assembled men" or "peoples" he calls them. Individual souls clearly influence the collective because one could perfectly foresee the cumulative effects on the genius of collectives if one perfectly knew all relevant information about individual souls. From the *Emile* as a whole we can surely deduce that Rousseau thinks assembled peoples influence individuals. After all, a powerful theme in *Emile* is Rousseau's attempt to safeguard Emile from the corrupting influence of society. In good

faith we could add other "levels" or "spheres" of collectives Rousseau does not explicitly mention here, such as families, cities. This satisfies conditions 1 and 4.

Second, do not new properties, structures, and patterns emerge at different levels of human collectives, not only in the externally visible, but in their shared internal life together? Beyond the fact that it just seems plainly evident that the inner context of families, neighborhoods, cities, or nations are not identical in their properties, structures, and laws, Rousseau acknowledges that the genius of collectives is distinct from individual character in private. This satisfies condition 2.

Third, it is obvious that if one was going to give an account of the *whole* heart or the *whole* soul, one would need to include the different levels of soul-life. One would need to take into account individual souls, the shared soul of collectives such as families, institutions, nations, and then try to given an account of how they interrelate to one another. This satisfies condition 3.

Before I transition to consider whether elements in the individual soul are scaled and nested, I want to briefly consider a particularly important and relevant collective of human beings, namely, schools. I want to give this example not only to honor the soul educators who I reference in this dissertation, but to give a little more credence to the idea that certain groups of individuals might come to have something like a shared soul.

John P. Miller, in *Education and the Soul*, comes right out in his chapter "The Soulful School" and asserts, "The school itself also has a soul; however, this is rarely acknowledged" (2000, p. 107). Drawing on the work of Lance Secretan, Miller defends the idea that schools are not mere tools for socialization, the transfer of knowledge, nor even institutional support for personal growth. They are *sanctuaries* – sanctuaries for the soul. For Secratan, any institution

may be called a “soulful organization,” or a “sanctuary,” if it is “not a collection of parts but an integrated system of souls – not so much a place but a state of mind” (Secretan, 1996, p. 38 as quoted by Miller, p. 109). Miller argues that some of the signs of a sanctuary are that people’s feelings are acknowledged, that people feel their souls are nourished by being there, that students and teachers both look forward to being at school, that people feel heard “at a heart level,” and that love, rather than fear, predominates.

However, Miller suggests there is a central defining feature of a sanctuary. “Most of all, there is a deep sense of community. In fact, in the sanctuary, people don’t just communicate or exchange ideas: they experience communion with one another. Communion is where the soul touches soul” (2000, p. 109). This image of soul touching soul gives a sense of how it might be that souls which come into community might become something more together. Because souls “touch” each other, they can become linked into an integrated and intercommunicative whole. It thereby becomes possible that motions initiated by one soul, or even motions which are generated from outside the communion of souls, can be passed from one individual to another such that the whole can reverberate, or resonate, together. What we normally experience at the individual level – ideas, hopes, purposes, pain – can be shared and experienced *together* in a communion facilitated by a sanctuary. Schools are to be such places – places where individual souls can themselves become nested into the shared soul of the school itself.

What about the soul at the individual level? Can the individual soul be said to be scaled and nested in some meaningful sense? It seems to me that it can. In *A Brief History of the Soul*, Goetz and Taliaferro try to shed light on how it is that the soul can be said to be simple and singular and yet manifest an array of capacities, powers, and properties. This multiplicity of

powers would seem to communicate *multiplicity* or "parts," yet they remain firm in asserting the soul is *one simple* entity. Goetz and Taliaferro say,

> The objection, however, is based on a confusion between complexity at the level of substance and complexity at the level of qualities or properties. One must be mindful of the fact that a soul-body dualist like Augustine maintains that, while a soul has multiple essential psychological powers and/or capacities (e.g. the power to think, the power to remember, the power to choose, the capacity to experience pleasure, the capacity to desire, the capacity to fear), these powers and capacities are not themselves substances (they are not substantive). Because they are properties and not substances, powers and capacities cannot be separated from or exist independently of the soul that has them, so as to become parts of other substances. They are not substantive, separable parts of the soul in the way in which a portion of a table (e.g. a top, or a leg) is a substantive, separable part of the table and can exist independently of the table and become a part of another substance (e.g. the leg of a table can become the leg of a chair). Thus a table, unlike a soul, is a complex entity or thing in virtue of the fact that it is made up of parts that are themselves substances (substantive parts). Contemporary physical scientists inform us that a table is actually a lattice structure of molecules bound together by attractive powers affecting appropriate capacities, and, when this lattice structure is broken by a sufficient force, the table breaks. A soul-body dualist like Augustine maintains that a soul, unlike a table or physical objects in general, is not a complex entity, because it has no substantive parts. Instead, it is substantively simple in nature. Thus complexity at the level of propertyhood is compatible with simplicity at the level of thinghood (2011, p. 38).

The very language of "levels" – that is the "level of thinghood" versus the "level of propertyhood" – is something quite resonate with the language of nested being so far explored in this chapter. At one level of the soul's being – perhaps this is its *innermost* or *outermost* level (or perhaps should be understood in some other way – Goetz and Taliaferro do not clarify) – the soul is simple. I assume the only property (or one among very few) properties which could apply to the soul at this scale of its being is precisely that – simplicity, singularity. However, at another scale of its being there is a certain kind of multiplicity and complexity, so long as we do not understand that multiplicity in the terms attributable to materiality, like extension and a conglomeration of severable parts. While thinking and feeling are capacities in themselves, they are "modes," if you will, of an underlying singular person. It seems inevitable that Goetz and

Taliaferro would maintain that though there are different "levels" of the soul such as "thinghood" and "propertyhood," these levels inextricably fold into and enfold one another. Thus it seems likely Goetz and Taliaferro's description of the individual soul qualifies as scaled and nested, and therefore I will consider it scaled and nested within itself in some meaningful sense.

Finally, does the concept of scale play a role in the relationship between the soul and the divine? Not all who affirm the soul are theists, but let's take one example of a theist whose work we have considered in this dissertation – John Cottingham. As Cottingham works through the nuanced terrain of how science and the soul relate (which I detailed in chapter two), he also considers how theism and non-theism relates to science. As a theist he thinks that the source and origin of the universe is a personal being – a "divine mind" as he puts it. In characterizing the relationship between the divine, personal mind and the material universe, he resorts to images of folding into and enfolding, where the universe folds into the enfolding presence of the divine mind. Consider what he says,

> But there is nothing in the theistic picture to contradict the findings of modern science, nothing that denies that the structure of the universe can be analysed and its workings predicted with impressive accuracy using the quantitative formulae and all the other models and mechanisms of the modern physical sciences. Nor (except for the fundamentalists and scriptural literalists) does the theistic outlook clash with the idea of the universe developing over vast stretches of time . . . All these aspects of the scientific account remain in place. But the scientific account does not in itself encompass the very special nature of the properties we enjoy in virtue of having such complex brains and nervous systems – the attributes whereby we have conscious awareness of ourselves and the world around us, and have the power to feel and think and reflect on that awareness, and thereby to enter and be responsive to the whole domain of value and meaning. These extraordinary human powers, on the theistic picture, are not a strange cosmic anomaly but depend on our minds being, albeit in a limited and finite manner, reflections of the divine intelligence, the *logos* that enfolds all things. From the subjective horizon of our own conscious awareness, each of us looks out into a cosmos that even from our limited grasp of it we can recognize to be *intelligible* – not an arbitrary series of properties and events, but an intelligible

> whole, understood and held in awareness by the primordial divine mind (2020, p. 90).

Thus when Cottingham considers the universe as a theist, he thinks in terms of it being scaled and nested, where the personal and immaterial enfolds the material; the material folding into the personal. These two domains fold into and enfold one another as part of an "intelligible whole." If one considers Cottingham's image in relation to the image of nested being I have developed here, there is a deep resonance. I suspect a theist like Cottingham would gladly welcome the philosophy of nested being into his understanding of the relationship between the personal and the material domains.

5.4 Two Domains of Nested Being

What we have before us, then, are two resonate images. We have the image of the material world as scaled and nested from the atomic to the cosmic, and we have the beginnings of an image of the domain of the soul as scaled and nested, from within the individual soul, through collectives of people such as families, schools, cities, nations, and humanity, all the way to the divine. As one would expect, given the mirror of fruitful opposition, these images are mutually illuminating but non-identical. There is a balance and a harmony to these images when set alongside each other. One *might* say these images themselves could fold into and enfold one another. Yet one can hardly contemplate these images together for any length of time before one of the central skeptical questions about the soul since Descartes asserts itself – that of soul-body interactionism. In my own terms, "Exactly how and precisely where does the soul interact with the body?" Or if we broaden it out a bit, "Exactly how and precisely where does the domain of the soul interact with materiality?"

While I will not in any way be "solving" this question in this chapter, I think the philosophy of nested being contextualizes this question in a new way. The debate around interactionism typically involves looking for a single causal nexus between the soul and the body, like the brain or the indeterminate quantum phenomena which ultimately fold into brain synapses, which would allow the body and the soul to mutually interact with one another. But it seems far more likely, in the context of these mutually scaled and nested images of materiality and the soul, that there are layers of intersections at different scales between body-soul, materiality-immateriality. These intersections will likely exhibit different properties depending on which scale of being one considers. In other words, exactly *how* these domains interact will likely look different at different scales and intersections. If it is reasonable to think that the domain of the soul is informed by but not identical to the material domain, then just as there are different structures, properties, and laws at the nano scale which seem to allow for an wildly different causal possibilities than at the human scale (recall Miodownik's example of the car motor and the nano motor), then it seems justifiable to think that the same holds true in the domain of the soul, and by extension, wherever these similar but non-identical domains intersect at their respective levels of being. Therefore, if there is soul-body interactionism, or even "domain of the soul" – "materiality" interactionism, as many have thought there is, the two resonate images from the philosophy of nested being initially thinks of this relationship as layered and intersecting at multiple, distinct scales of being.

5.5 Conclusion

I began this chapter by suggesting that the balance within the mirror of fruitful opposition had been thrown off in the last hundred plus years. Through incredibly powerful tools we have gained deeper knowledge of materiality at scales we had never before broached. These material

insights have intermingled with the scientistic imagination, and as a result, there have been ceaseless attempts to eclipse the other half of our being with an image which is far too small to do the job. If a hasty generalization is taking the scope of one conclusion and applying it at a much broader scale incorrectly, then a "hasty imagination" is the expansion of a single image of reality beyond its appropriate scope and context. It's precisely because scientism and materialism are not merely constituted by a set of propositions but an attendant imagination that alternative images like nested being are crucial to countering them. In the context of the scientistic imagination, it is almost more important to reimagine materiality than to reimagine the concept of the soul, for it is a misleading, totalizing, and oft repeated image of materiality which eclipses the manifest experience of the soul. I have not shown in this chapter what the exact relationship between the material and immaterial domains are, but I have suggested that they are mutually scaled and nested and likely intersect at different scales of being. I believe this image of nested being provides a context where the balanced analogical relationship between the material and immaterial domains can find a footing. In the next chapter, I hope to show how the concept of metaphor (broadly construed) is transformed by the image of nested being argued for in this chapter. I hope to show how metaphor plays a key role in the analogical space between the material and the immaterial, that it reveals a certain kind of connection between things in reality that is distinct from connections of entailment or cause-and-effect (thus distinct from the logical and the scientific but equally true), and that the image of nested being is itself a kind of grounding metaphor which illuminates why good metaphors really "work" to reveal aspects of reality to us.

Chapter Six: At Home in Nested Being: Reason, Imagination, and the Soul

In my Chapter Four dialogue I argued that the analytic and educational folks account for the soul according to a different set of values. When analytic and educational philosophers contemplate the soul and accounts thereof, they do so according to their respective values – each "evaluating" or "weighing" the testimony about the soul with those values in mind. I called this "counting." I chose "counting" as a primary metaphor because it captures the purposiveness of these thinkers in the act of trying to resolve the parts and the whole in terms of the values they hold, just as thinker tries to resolve the parts 2 and 2 into the whole of 4. I represented the analytic values in the following questions: 1) Are the terms clear? 2) Are the propositions true or false? 3) Is the argument valid or invalid? 4) How does the account harmonize with other disciplines, perhaps especially science? I represented the soul educators' values in the following questions: 1) Does the account resonate with readers' own experience of distinctive, whole presences, whether in people, nature, or works of art and literature? 2) Does it inspire a mutual, life-giving relationship with yourself, others, nature, or some aspect of the world? 3) Does it contradict the images and metaphors for the soul handed down in the tradition (p. 92)? I suggested analytic thinkers and educational thinkers must learn to ask these questions together, of each other, of themselves, but then an underlying question surfaced – Why would they want to? And further, how could they overcome some of their apparent epistemological variance?

It was suggested by Julian that perhaps they could work out their differences, and be motivated to join together, so long as they loved the same good. Surprisingly, Julian argued that they, in fact, already cherished and defended the same good, namely, the 1st person human

experience of the world. Perhaps the strength of love for a shared good could itself overcome the apparent divisions between the head and the heart, between reason and the imagination.

However sympathetic one might be to these suggestions, one might still think that love, no matter how strong for the same good, cannot unlodge genuine epistemic disagreements. Perhaps a great love could suspend the disagreement into a mutually held dynamic space, sand down the sharpness and strength of defensive walls, and even open up possibilities for interaction previously unforeseen, and yet *still* not bring both parties into a genuinely unified state. Perhaps analytic thinkers and soul educators must genuinely see, with their own eyes, the truth that there is no necessary epistemic division between their approaches to the soul.

My goal in this chapter is to begin to do just that – to make plain that there is no necessary epistemic division in these approaches to the soul. Of course, I cannot respond to every possible objection nor go too deeply into the analytic world of epistemology. Instead, I am going to make my appeal by working with Jan Zwicky's thought. I read Jan Zwicky, especially her works *What is Lyrical Philosophy* and *Wisdom and Metaphor*, as suggesting there is a fundamentally different (and misguided) epistemology and ontology at work in the analytic mode than there is in soul educators' thought. Zwicky does not use my term "soul educators," but it is a key assumption of this chapter that soul educators incline much more towards a Zwickian mode of thought than an analytic mode of thought. After characterizing Zwicky's suggestions as to the difference between analytic and non-analytic thought, I argue that some of her criticisms of analytic thought do not apply to the analytic philosophers of the soul I have considered in this dissertation. In other words, while Zwicky's criticisms do certainly apply to some analytic thinkers, the idea that there is a fundamental epistemological and ontological difference between analytic and poetic thinkers goes one step too far.

However, I agree with Zwicky that analogical and imaginative understanding are on epistemically equal footing with analytic, rational understanding, and therefore a joint approach to the soul must affirm both modes as potentially revelatory of the truth about the soul. Therefore, reason and imagination must be joined together in order to bear witness to the whole truth about the soul.

I attempt to demonstrate that the image of nested being I developed in the last chapter provides a mutually beneficent home to reason and the imagination. I do so by showing how the patterns which each capacity picks up on are both equally present in the image of nested being. In addition, both of these capacities are features of an underlying singular soul which, when flourishing, must have all faculties working in harmony.

Finally, I end the chapter by recalling the different threads found in this dissertation into a call for action and reflection. It is a call to remember and to guard the truth of our 1st person human experience of the world and why it matters. It is a reflection on our role – and metaphor's role – in trying to work out how to resolve individuals, communities, nature, and great works of art and literature into a living and unified whole.

6.1 Analogical and Analytic Patterns

Jan Zwicky prefaces her book *Wisdom and Metaphor* by suggesting that poets are among the unacknowledged thinkers of the world. Their thought does not take the shape of scientific thought, nor does their thought take the shape of analytic thought, but nonetheless they think, they know, and they, in her view, are rightly said to be philosophers. They are able to think "truly" and "wisely" because "the shape of their thinking echoes the shape of the world" (Zwicky, 2014a, p. 11). Thus the poets' thinking and knowing is not second-hand nor something

to get past, unless one wants to get past reality. Zwicky identifies this type of thinking as metaphorical, analogical, and basic to our mind and language. Particular metaphors, similes, poems, narratives – anything that partakes of metaphorical and analogical thinking – she refers to broadly as "metaphor" in the book. The point is that "metaphor" is not merely a literary device but a way of seeing certain relationships in the world.

Zwicky is quite clear that this analogical thinking and seeing of the world is itself ontological work. It is discovering and revealing the world as it is. From Aphorism 6: "Metaphor is one way of showing how patterns of meaning in the world intersect and echo one another. The ability to think analogically is a reflection of sensitivity to ontological form" (Zwicky, 2014a). Zwicky also refers to metaphorical thinking as "lyric." Again, in the preface to *Wisdom and Metaphor*, Zwicky describes the characteristics of lyric thought. It is the "deep epistemological structure" of poetry, and it is "thought whose *eros* is coherence." "Thus, the characteristic formal properties of lyric, I have suggested, are resonance and integrity: and, as a fundamentally integrative mode of thought, I have argued that it is, at root, a flight from the condition of language" (2014a, p. 11). Thus, the general contours of Zwicky's ontology begin to emerge. Zwicky thinks of being as a unified whole, as interconnected, as capable of a coherence whose signposts are resonance and integrity. As Zwicky develops the concepts of resonance and integrity throughout her work, she hearkens back to phrases like "patterns of meaning," "intersecting" or "overlapping" or "interpenetrating" patterns in reality, thereby deepening the emphasis on a relational ontology. Key to understanding her emphasis on relational patterns of being is to understand what sort of ontology and attendant epistemology she is working against.

A clue to who and what Zwicky is working against comes from the opening assertion in the forward that poets are among the unacknowledged thinkers of the world. In short, it is the

scientistic and rationalistic modes of thought she is resisting– perhaps half out of genuine disagreement, half out of an attempt to carve out epistemic parity with positions that are known to look patronizingly down at the poets.[18] Zwicky characterizes the ontology and epistemology of the scientistic and analytic in the following excerpts.

> What characterizes the philosophical subculture of technocracy is a cluster of related features: the assumption that any meaning worthy of the name is linguistic in form; a methodology that, for the most part, appears to be analytic — that is, appears to proceed on the assumption that understanding is a function of breaking a whole into its component parts and that such parts are metaphysically independent of and prior to the wholes into which they are combined; a conviction that the breaking of a whole into its parts is thus not attended by any loss of meaning; a willingness to pursue unintuitive taxonomies, apparently because they facilitate an analytic approach; a distrust, evinced as much in the style of thinking as in what is said, of intense emotion; and an insistence on the generic superiority of the rational intellect to emotions, desires, and sensations (2014b, p.18).

The movement of analytic thought, according to Zwicky, is premised on the assumption that the only and best method for arriving at understanding is to make ever sharper distinctions which correlate to ever-smaller, distinctive parts. Once these parts receive their clear-cut distinctions and definitions, they "stand-out" as it were from the rest of reality, almost as if they were *more* real as a result. This leads to Zwicky's assertion about parts becoming metaphysically independent and prior to the whole. The treatment of these parts and their relations as metaphysically independent and prior to the whole is not so much an explicit assertion by the analytically minded as it is revealed by unending declarations of explanatory totality, or explanatory preeminence, because "parts" (of thought or materiality) received a definition and a tight mathematical or logical relationship to other parts. A perfect example would be my high

[18] On my read of Zwicky, it would be wrong to say she outright rejects analytic thought as a valid mode of thought. There are passages where she positively relies on analytic distinctions and articulations to argue her points. However, I think there is a real unresolved tension in Zwicky's work – a tension between the analytic and the analogical, evidenced by the very quote on this page, where the "analytic" is clearly being criticized.

school chemistry teacher who I mentioned in Chapter Five (p. 110). While she would formally disagree with the assertation that parts are "metaphysically independent" and "prior to the wholes" of which they are part, she would simultaneously assert that the atoms in the table were more real, and their description more fundamental, than the wood table itself at the human scale of which those atoms were part. In this way, Zwicky insinuates that the ontology of analytic and scientistic thought privileges parts over wholes. The epistemological method of always breaking things down into parts, then functionally acting like those parts are more fundamental, reveals this ontological bent. In the opening page of her *What is Lyric Philosophy*, Zwicky quotes Max Wertheimer who represents this idea:

> It has long seemed obvious—and is, in fact, the characteristic tone of European science—that "science" means breaking up complexes into their component elements. Isolate the elements, discover their laws, then reassemble them, and the problem is solved. All wholes are reduced to pieces and piecewise relations between pieces. The fundamental "formula" of Gestalt theory might be expressed in this way: There are wholes, the behaviour of which is not determined by that of their individual elements, but where the part-processes are themselves determined by the intrinsic nature of the whole (Wertheimer, 1938, p. 1 - 11 as quoted in Zwicky, 2014b, p. 17).

It is not that there are only wholes and no parts, and it is not that all "part-processes" are incorrect, but that the analytic movement of thought *can* lead to blindness of the whole, a supplanting of the whole by part-processes, or a forgetfulness that we always begin and therefore must return to the whole upon which any divisions we make are predicated.

Zwicky generally lumps scientific analytic thought and philosophical analytic thought into the same family, but she has a special label for the type of analytic philosophy she feels is reductionistic of what philosophy more fully is: "systematic logico-linguistic analysis" (2014b, p. 16). Each word there is important. "Systematic" suggests that there is a movement towards a single synthetic picture of the world. "Logico" suggests that there is a high degree of emphasis

on logical relationships between parts. I interpret this as relationships between propositions, terms, conclusions, or between evidence and justification. “Linguistic” suggests there is a degree of obsession with words and language itself. Based on some other things Zwicky says, she seems to have in mind here a fixation on individual words, particular word order, exact “correct” constructions of propositions or statements, and forcing the dialogue about truth to only follow a specific linguistic, rationally dominant formula (Zwicky, 2014b, pp. 23 – 24). I suppose Zwicky imagines the type of thinker who has their definitions, their argument, and their exacting constructions. Someone may disagree with such a person, yet be incapable of putting their ideas in the exact terms and argumentative constructions demanded by the thinker. We should not immediately think that the person who cannot or will not formulate their meaning in this exact mode of articulation is irrational, wrong, or not a lover of wisdom! In fact, there might be truths which cannot be articulated very well in such a mode of thought. Hence Zwicky’s assertation that any definition of philosophy worthy of the name should allow room for Heraclitus to count as a philosopher (2014b, p. 16). I take Zwicky to be making space for meanings and relationships in the world which do not fit as easily into a system, a proposition, or tightly wound logical or scientific relationships. This impulse is itself traceable to Zwicky’s more fundamental conviction that being – considered in its fullness – is itself characterized by all sorts of different, interconnected patterns, not just logical or cause-and-effect patterns. As Aphorism 39 says, “Being is the interconnectedness, the resonant ecology, of things. The meaning of what-is is the live, metaphorical relation between things and the resonant structure of the world (Zwicky, 2014b, p. 22). Thus, one would be on equal epistemological and ontological footing with scientific and analytic processes *so long as* one is genuinely picking up on patterns and

relationships that are part of being. This is exactly what Zwicky argues for, and in particular, her focus is on analogical and metaphorical patterns of resonance.

I am absolutely convinced that Zwicky's descriptions of analytic thought very much "get-at" certain qualities in the analytic tradition. At the very least, she characterizes certain inclinations in analytic thinking that, if gone unchecked, would culminate in some of the formal assertions she attributes to analytic thought. But one must remember that I am not dealing with analytic philosophers *en generale*, but a handful of analytic philosophers who are deeply invested in the soul. The question becomes – "Do Zwicky's characterizations and criticisms of systematic, logical, analytic thought apply to these handful of philosophers and their approach to the soul?"

In Chapter Two's conclusion, I argued that there are two different movements in the analytic approach to the soul. One is the movement towards experience, and the other movement is towards the soul as a formal essence in a broadly conceived scientific account of the world. This latter movement is where I locate the impulse towards division, definition, propositions, and entailment, or what Zwicky would call systematic logico-linguistic analysis. I said, "Why is this a movement towards essence? Because a constant slicing of terms, propositions, and arguments into the subtlest nuances of meanings, definitions, and entailments is an attempt to elucidate the conceptual and logical core of those ideas and their relations. It is because we tend to think of the "nature" of something not as its whole being but its core, defining features. Analytic philosophers typically do not want an exhaustive set of rich descriptions which correspond to the *whole* of something's being. Instead, they tend to want to know what something is or is not, or *why* it is or is not, in its distilled, clearest conceptual rendering. They think towards essence" (p. 33).

The movement towards experience, however, is much less about division, inference, and the logical core of a set of ideas. It is much more about a faithful characterization of *what it is like* to be a human being from a 1st person human perspective, to remain grounded in the basic, pre-theoretical experience of personhood in its wholeness. It is from this pre-theoretical experience that terms like *continuous*, *singular*, and *teleological* are rooted. In fact, Stewart Goetz, Charles Taliaferro, and likely Swinburne and John Cottingham are foundationalists in their epistemology, thinking that there are basic beliefs we have about ourselves which are not inferred or argued from any other idea or belief – that they are grounded in our awareness of themselves. I argued in the Chapter Four dialogue that these analytic philosophers actually give priority of place to our basic awareness of ourselves, grounding much of their movement towards formal essence on that – *not* the other way around. This fact alone suggests that these analytic philosophers do not fully qualify for Zwicky's characterization of analytic thought. They cannot, for at the root of their thinking about the soul is a gestalt experience of oneself – a pre-linguistic, wholistic, gestalt perception of the soul in the world. If true, then these philosophers, who are indeed highly rational, analytic, and resistant to metaphor cannot be said to categorically support an ontology which thinks divided and defined parts are more real than experiences of wholes and their meaningfulness. They cannot be said to uncritically affirm that logical relations or cause- and effect-relations are more real than other sorts of relations, for the very root of their awareness is not a cause-and-effect sequence, nor a logical sequence, but rather a non-inferential state of intelligent awareness out of which all thought and gestalt perception is predicated.

Perhaps Zwicky's charge that analytic thought supplants the original "whole" with a piecemeal image applies to these analytic philosophers. After all, the currency they "do-business in" everyday highly privileges the logical relationships between terms, propositions, and

conclusions. Whatever constructions of thought they have established in doing so may obfuscate the structural and relational "whole" of being which is prior and posterior to all of their thinking. However, this charge does not apply to these analytic philosophers for three reasons. First, without first demonstrating that these logical relationships are completely unfounded, false, and do map onto any patterns in the whole of being, they appear to be *more evidence* that reality has a resonate and relational structure – only the resonance at play here is between rationally comprehended ideas and their logical relationship to each other. Second, any pattern or structure of thought, whether it be poetic or it be Descartes' argument for dualism, can potentially obfuscate the original whole out of which the patterns first emerged. The problem is not that there are parts which are highly defined and set in an argument, or analogical parts set in a lyric structure, but the failure to hold the patterns we perceive open handedly while remaining open to more illumination from the whole, or from other sorts of patterns we are not quite as practiced at picking up on.

Therefore, it seems we cannot fault the analytic approach to the soul for merely being analytic in emphasis. If they do not approach the soul analytically because of a false epistemology or ontology, and if they do not approach the soul this way because of an inherent blindness to the whole, why do analytic philosophers lean more towards a direct, non-metaphorical, analytic mode of thought? Further, why do soul educators lean more towards a poetic, imaginative, and Zwicky-like mode of analogical thought as they approach the soul?

I have previously given some possible reasons why. First, as I suggested in Chapter Four, there is an unnatural duplicity in our soul. The presence of strong divisions between head and heart and their corresponding modes of knowing are present throughout the Western canon. Second, this division translates into habit. People, either due to personality or education or both,

tend to incline towards the head or towards the heart, but rarely do they incline towards both in a fully integrated, rich, mutually edifying relationship. Many who *do* feel inclined towards both the head and the heart end up switching back and forth between them depending on audience, genre, or social setting. It is quite rare to find souls who have overcome this division in themselves (and in society) and begun to relate themselves to being with their *whole* soul. Therefore, in order for this particular project to be successful – that of trying to find a way for the analytic and educational approaches to the soul to be joined together – it would require persons to do exactly that: become more integrated themselves.

But what exactly might that mean in our present context, where there is a tug-of-war between analytic and analogical modes of thinking and perception? To answer this question, I want to return to Zwicky's thought. We have a characterization of analytic thought from Zwicky, but what exactly is analogical and metaphorical thought? What are these sorts of patterns? What capacity in us picks up on these patterns as opposed to logical and cause-and-effect patterns? In answering these questions, I think we will be in a better position to understand one way of joining these two modes of thinking together.

In *What is Lyric Philosophy* and in *Wisdom and Metaphor*, Zwicky writes in aphorisms. This aphoristic writing is itself an example of the sort of relationships Zwicky is hoping the reader will experience. "Developed in a certain way, a collection of aphorisms invites a reader to see connections for her- or him- self. That is, aphoristic writing can be used to cultivate our ability to see-as. We may be puzzled at first —but then we "get it," we experience the coalescence of a gestalt. It is the experience of the coalescence that is crucial. It is an experience quite other than that of granting the reasonableness of proposition B, given proposition A" (Zwicky, 2014b, p. 22). Instead of spelling out in explicit terms the reasonable relationship

between proposition A and B, Zwicky might be said to set things next to each other, then waits until unexpected relationships emerge. Zwicky quotes Charles Simic as an example.

> My poems (in the beginning) are like a table on which one places interesting things one has found on one's walks: a pebble, a rusty nail, a strangely shaped root, the corner of a torn photograph, etc. . . . where after months of looking at them and thinking about them daily, certain surprising relationships, which hint at meanings, begin to appear (Simic, 1990, pp. 62 – 68 as quoted in Zwicky, 2014b, p. 20).

Suddenly there appears a living connection between disparate and distinct phenomena. It moves the author. The author is moved to write down a poem as a way of inviting others into the same experience of meaning. The poem itself, the aphorisms themselves, set things side-by-side in an aesthetically conscious way. "One way the facilitation of understanding may proceed, then, is by the judicious selection and arrangement of elements of that whole. Another is by the setting up of objects of comparison" (Zwicky, 2014a, Aphorism 2). But if these unanticipated connections are not logical connections, nor cause-and-effect connections, then what sort of connections are they?

Much of what I have already said from Zwicky characterizes these connections. They are intersecting, overlapping, interpenetrating relationships. Perhaps they are intersecting in the way that a geometric line might intersect with another, forming a variety of new relationships between them and in the space around them. Perhaps they are overlapping like a Lissajous curve, or harmonic functions, or the layers of fabric in triage bandages. Maybe the interpenetrating connections are like loving relationships, where our lives are lived through one another, or like Shakespeare – the world contained in a stage, and simultaneously, the stage contained in the world. I think this is Zwicky's point: The wide variety of what counts as an analogical relationship is why it might be difficult to distill these sorts of connections to a single, defined

form. The best that Zwicky does is actually quite general – they can be characterized as "*Seeing-As*." Thus, if we had to give a temporary definition to analogical patterns according to Zwicky, one might say: Any *thing* or *pattern* in the world which is capable of being seen *as* something else. Of course, in Zwicky's view, genuine analogical relationships are not "add-ons" or mere "illustrations" of a more fundamental idea. Something can be genuinely seen as another thing in a compelling way only because there is an already present ontological resonance.

Zwicky names the imagination as the capacity in us that perceives analogical relationships. "Imagination is required to see – as," she says (2014a, Aphorism 25b). Again, "The capacity to recognize other beings' gestures for what they are— expressions of experience like our own—is the capacity to experience meaningful coincidence of context, the arc of energy released when two contexts, laid across one another, coincide in ways that refract back into the individual contexts. This capacity—a sensitivity to resonance—is what we call imagination." (Zwicky, 2014b, p. 21). Here, Zwicky is distancing herself from certain cultural assumptions that are attached to the word "imagination." Imagination here has nothing to do with making something up. In her own words,

> To see-as, to hear with a "musical ear," is to grasp meaning—it is to perceive the face in the chaos of lines, to sense the shape of the phrase. And the face and the shape are there, we aren't making them up. But because a faculty we've called "imagination" is involved, and because in reductionist contexts imagining has come to mean making it up; and because for some time meaning has been thought to reside only in nonmetaphorical language: we feel that in seeing-as, or hearing musically, we are confronted with an unusual phenomenon. But all that confronts us is the world, gesturing at us. The world has patterns, of which our thinking is a part. It makes us feel good to experience these patterns: it is one way of coming home (Zwicky, 2014b, p. 23).

Therefore, imagination is a capacity for picking up on resonate, analogical relationships. It is itself a mode of understanding.

When our capacity for analogical relationships is genuinely linked to some analogical pattern of being, we experience attunement. “Seeing-as is the result of the natural attunement of our capacities for perception to the world. In understanding (in seeing – as, in the experience of meaning) we show human thinking’s fit with being” (Zwicky, 2014a, Aphorism 26).

6.2 Head and Heart Knowledge

While Zwicky does not use the head-heart distinction much in the texts in question here, and neither does she invoke the language of the soul and spirit very much, I thought it important to draw attention to the language of “capacities” and “imagination” in her lexicon because these words are very much at home in the language surrounding the soul. In that domain, the imagination is frequently associated with the heart; in Chapter Three I said, “the heart is the source of love, the seat of the imagination, the root of intuition” (p. 81). The language of “capacities” and “powers,” as touched on in Chapter Two, is also very much at home in the language of the soul. Goetz and Taliaferro, in *A Brief History of the Soul*, talk about the soul as constituted by a variety of capacities and powers. Capacities are the abilities of the soul to *be moved* in a variety of ways (e.g. pain, love, emotion), and powers are the abilities of the soul *to move* (e.g. choose, will, think) (Goetz & Taliaferro, 2011, pp. 123-124).

It is through this language of capacities and powers of the soul that we can turn to the analytic capacity of the soul to reason. I cannot even begin to fully address the nuances of this capacity to reason in the Western tradition. Still, I must give a basic characterization. Reason is associated with the head, and it is that capacity which is generally credited as the source of the analytic, logical mode of thought. As I see it, there are two different versions of the question which are interrelated. First, how might the capacities of reason and the imagination relate to

each other *as capacities*? Second, how might the analogical patterns which activate the imagination relate to the logical patterns which activate reason?

The first thing to say is that these differing capacities are equal dimensions of a singular soul. As capacities of the same entity, one assumes that if that entity were to function at its highest and best, these capacities would be integrated and mutually edifying. Only to the extent that a soul is divided within itself would these capacities come apart, or work against each other. Therefore, as capacities, we assume that their relationships is mutually edifying and equally necessary in the work of understanding.

Second, the purpose of these capacities is quite different. I make no grand claims here about the ultimate purpose or function of reason or imagination. But, given what I have covered in this chapter, Zwicky sees the purpose of the imagination as holding onto the meaningfulness of gestalt perceptions of *wholes* and the analogical resonance *between* wholes. This ultimately serves the purpose (for Zwicky) of helping to make a meaningful home in the world, to find our "fit with being" as referenced earlier. More broadly it serves the purpose of remembering that being is expansively, reiteratively, and wholistically beautiful. Reason, in the analytic mode, serves the purpose of breaking down the constituent parts of any given set of ideas or aspects of experience in order to define parts, set them in logical relationship to each other, and to determine what is entailed by them. It might be characterized as setting things *apart* in a definitionally particular way *so that* they may be brought together in a logical way. This process ultimately serves the purpose of clarifying *what* things are or *why* they are or are not the case. If true, then we can say that imagination and reason are each essential capacities for mediating between parts and wholes – imagination primarily in mediating between wholes and other wholes, reason in primarily mediating between parts and other parts.

What might be said about the relationship between logical patterns and analogical patterns and how *they* relate? First, I will discuss what we mean by logical patterns, then discuss what we mean by analogical patterns, and then attempt to put them together.

Let's begin with the basic ingredient of arguments – terms. In the proposition "All men are mortal," the terms are "men" and "mortal." The general consensus is that in order for an argument to be genuinely persuasive, the terms must be clear. The way to achieve clarity about what one means is by offering a definition such that the definition "picks out" the thing in the world you are giving an argument about. What you mean by "piety" might not be what Euthyphro means by "piety." The very act of offering a definition of a term, then, is a way of setting the thing apart from other things. It "particularizes" the thing away from associations which are not essential to the term. Propositions are the second ingredient to a logical argument. Propositions are assertions which must be true or false. Either it is true or it is false that "All men are mortal." The final ingredients for a logical argument are other premises and a conclusion which is thought to be entailed (or at least strongly supported) by the prior premises. *If* the terms are clear, and *if* all the premises are true, and *if* the logical progression is *valid*, then the argument is considered *sound*. In an inductive argument this means there is strong support for the conclusion, in a deductive argument it means the conclusion is certain.[19]

Let's assume in the following argument that the terms are clear, the propositions true, and the argument is valid. Everything is sound. P1: All men are mortal. P2: Socrates is a man. Conclusion: Socrates is mortal. What this argument establishes is a certain *internal* relationship between particular things in the world, namely mankind, Socrates, and mortality. We can

[19] While I did not quote directly from it, I want to acknowledge that some of the thought here is inspired by Peter Kreeft's *Socratic Logic*.

conclude that Socrates is mortal because that truth is contained in the very meaning and structure of the first two premises, which is another way of saying the truth of Socrates' mortality is contained in the state of affairs in the world to which the first two premises gesture.

Now let's consider the patterns of imagination, namely patterns of resonance, overlap, and unexpected association of wholes.[20] Any poem which invokes "man" or "mankind" or "humanity" or "mortality," in order to be successful and meaningful, does not need to begin by definitionally particularizing the concept of humanity or mortality. Neither would a painting or a play or a song which invokes these terms need to clarify what is or is not contained in the very structure of the thing before proceeding to set them in a poetic structure. One would not fault Shakespeare for not defining the term "world" or "stage" in his statement that "All the world's a stage." Imaginative patterns, therefore, proceed by assuming the *whole* of associations within things (or terms). Imagination relies on the *fullness* of terms, including whatever social, ethical, emotional, and affective valences are present in them, as opposed to merely the *essential* formal properties of terms. However, even though those who are thinking or creating through the capacity of imagination *begin* by assuming the fullness of terms, it is the work of the poems themselves, or the aphorisms themselves, or the music itself to draw out the analogical resonances between the elements the thinker or artist is working with. They try to integrate these elements in such a way which will incite gestalt experiences in the audience. "All the world's a stage" is not successful at advancing poetic and imaginative understanding without the rest of the play layering the phrase such that it sings with meaning.

[20] Zwicky, as far as I am aware, never actually discusses what should be considered a part or what should be considered a "whole." Clearly, there's a sense in which there is an original "whole" of experience out of which we begin to make distinctions, or the "whole" of reality which always stretches beyond the limits of our particular knowing. However, when it comes to individual things and persons, there's a sense in which they can be considered both.

How do these analogical and logical patterns relate to each other? First of all, as I have characterized it, logical analytic thought seeks a very particular *internal* relationship between concepts. It really wants to know what is contained or not contained in any given concept (e.g. justice, virtue, knowledge, soul etc), but it wants to know this by seeking the most essential meanings to each term. Then it wants to see how these essential meanings relate to each other. Analogical thought is not primarily concerned with what is or is not contained in the essential meanings of terms. Rather, it is concerned with representing and connecting the fullness of terms in all of their harmonic (or inharmonic) properties. When these patterns are spelled out in this way, it seems to me that they overlap to a great extent.

Consider the fact that logical thought ultimately seeks a resonate, structural *whole* in the form of a sound argument. Is it not the case that when analytic philosophers try to link some aspect of the world (say humanity) and another (say mortality) they are seeking a resonance – not between the fullness of both terms – but between the conceptual core of both terms? Analogical thought is less obviously an internal relationship between the structural essence of terms. "Life is a box of chocolates" seems at first glance to be a merely external association. However, if Zwicky is right about analogies working because of genuinely shared structural resonance, then successful analogical thoughts are not external and accidental. In fact, as far as the concept of resonance goes, it cares not whether the resonance is internal or external or neither or both, so long as the two things under consideration genuinely share some structural aspect of being.

Consider the fact that the success of the analytic and imaginative modes rely on one another. Analytic thought must begin with wholes before it can begin whittling away at non-essential associations. If an analytic thinker accidentally whittles themselves into nothingness, they must return back to the original whole, apprehended by perception and imagination, and

start again. Analogical thought on the other hand, when it assumes the fullness of meaning between two terms it is setting side-by-side in a poetic relationship, must *in that very moment* recognize that the analogical understanding at play to some extent depends on a more literal and, in Zwicky's conceptual frame, more analytic truth. Zwicky acknowledges this in aphorism 14 and 15 of *Wisdom and Metaphor*, where she affirms that while all metaphors take the form of asserting A is B, this very assertion depends on the recognition that quite literally A is not B. For example, the success of the metaphor "Life is a box of chocolates" depends on the recognition that, in fact, "Life is *not* a box of chocolates." Because Zwicky thinks of these more direct, literal, and nonmetaphorical meanings as exactly the type of meanings analytic philosophers are after, analogical thought therefore depends to some extent on analytic thought. Conversely, though I cannot fully make the case here, the success of nonmetaphorical thought also depends on metaphorical thought, as one necessarily needs to apprehend wholes and their associations before one can begin to divide, distinguish, and separate them out. And perhaps it is worth saying, in this context, that in our everyday language, and in every naturally occurring language I know about, both literal and metaphorical meanings and expressions are inextricably interwoven. Therefore, both analogical and analytic capacities and patterns are in need of one another.

6.3 At Home in Nested Being

Recall again the image of nested being which I developed in the last chapter. The image is of an interconnected, whole, singular cosmos. Within this whole are ascending and descending spheres of being, each of which reveals new, wonder-inducing laws, properties, and structures. These different levels of being fold into and enfold one another, forming a cumulative and resonate structure. This cumulative and resonate structure suggests that there is no inward-outward distinction between the "content" of being and the "form" it takes – that *both* are equally

determinative of what something is, as was seen in the example of charcoal and diamonds. Thus, the form and shape of things is not relegated to an accidental, secondary, and external life apart from something's material or atomic content. The form and shape we perceive at any level of being – but especially, for us, at the human level of being – are cumulative expressions of structural character. Historically, we have always shaped material at the human and nature spheres of being in order to represent our ideas, satisfy our desires, or to honor the spiritual domain. We are extending our ability to do this at ever smaller *and* more expansive spheres of being in the 21st century. As we shape materiality, Miodownik thinks we quite literally embed our world with human meaning, for our shaping and forming of material at different levels of being alters its structural character, thus changing what its cumulative substance, form, and shape expresses. To truly given an account of the whole, one must not only give an account of what happens at each level of being, one must give an account of how each level relates to the next, combining each character and their interrelationships into the whole story.

Within this image of the cosmos the soul primarily appears at the human scale. We found that the domain of the soul itself can be characterized as scaled and nested, at the very least ascending from the individual soul, through intermediary shared souls like families, schools, and cities, all the way to the shared soul we have when we consider humanity as a whole. Of course, those with religious convictions would further contextualize the soul life we experience, from within ourselves to humanity as a whole, as itself enfolded by a divine life. I did not suggest exactly *how* the domain of the soul and materiality interact, nor did I say *exactly* what each of them is definitionally, but I did say that based *if* we can consider both the domain of the soul and materiality as scaled and nested and connected, *then* it is likely that the domain of the soul and

the material domain do not intersect at a *single* nexus point, but rather intersect at different scales.

Throughout the last chapter I invoked the mirror of fruitful opposition. The mirror of fruitful opposition points towards a dynamic in human self-understanding, the poles of which are materiality and immateriality, body and soul. Historically, the mirror of fruitful opposition has been used as a means of mutual illumination for two non-identical but connected domains, and I suggested the balance in this mirror has been thrown off by the rapid progress in material and scientific understanding of the material world, among some other causes. However, the soul, no matter how rejected, how little accepted in the academy, or in religiously or secularly inclined materialism, remains. Serious analytic philosophers and serious educational philosophers bear witness to the soul as essential in our self-understanding. In doing this work they try to reclaim the other half of the mirror; they bring balance. I concluded chapter five by suggesting that the image of nested being provided a home where the analogical relationship between material and immaterial domains can find a footing, and where reason and imagination are equally at home. I now turn to make this case.

Assuming this image of nested being is true, does it privilege either analytic or analogical patterns? I think the obvious answer is that it privileges neither. This image of nested being provides ample room for both analytic and analogical patterns, for the capacities of reason and imagination, and ultimately for the soul.

Zwicky characterizes analytic thought as deeply concerned with parts and part-processes, and poetic thought as deeply concerned with wholes and the interrelationship between wholes. As far as nested being goes, each sphere of being has its own wholes and its own parts. It privileges neither the part nor the whole at any scale, except perhaps at the cosmic scale. Given

that the cosmos is a single, interconnected whole, there remains a sense that there is an original whole out of which all of our distinctions and analytic particularizing depend, and which every part at every level must ultimately reference *if* one is giving an account of the whole.

The language of resonance and integrity is at home in a philosophy of nested being. The very idea of a reality with layers which fold into and enfold one another, and of domains which overlap and intersect with one another, communicates a structural, relational, and cumulative ontology where forms and structures in one part of being can echo in harmony with forms and structures in another aspect of being.

Not only is it likely that material wholes resonate with other material structures across the range and spheres of being, but the fact that the domain of the soul and the material overlap and intersect at different levels helps ground the possibility of resonance between structures, forms, and shapes in both domains. This is a key point in linking the work I did in the previous chapter to this one. In the previous chapter I referenced the mirror of fruitful opposition, where two related but non-identical material and nonmaterial domains are invoked in our attempts at self-understanding. These domains, historically, have been used to mutually illuminate what the character of the other is like and not like. I suggested that our very nature as beings which participate in both domains is what grounds the perpetual resilience of the mirror of fruitful opposition. That being said, they can very much *seem* to come apart. In one frame of mind we pick up on material things and their explanations and it can seem like that's all there is. In another frame of mind, we seem to perceive irreducible phenomena – phenomena I would say is part of the domain of the soul – and though it is less common in our current context, some think of everything as, at root, mental, or spiritual, or irreducible.

But the everyday reality for most of us that there is a deep interpenetration and relationship between these domains. It is at this intersection where many artists claim to live, like Matisse whom I explored in Chapter Three. Matisse felt deeply that there was an interrelationship between the spiritual domain and the material domain in nature. It was his "job" as an artist to render, to bring out, make visible the latent nonmaterial grace and meaning in nature. Importantly, what Matisse thought he was rendering on the canvas was not a causal or logical relationship between the domains, but something much more like an analogical one – seeing this thing *as* or *through* another. Matisse, the artist, played an important role in bearing witness to dynamic and meaningful interplay *between* these domains, and he, along with Angelo Caranfa, invoked the soul as an essential site for the absorbing and recapitulating of these dynamic and analogical relationships through art. The reason I think the image of scaled and nested being is a good housing image for what Matisse describes is because, if it is true, then one would *expect* there to be an interrelationship between the soul and body at the individual level, *and* a related but distinct relationship between the domain of the soul and materiality (i.e. nature) at a broader level. Perhaps even more importantly, if both domains are linked at broader levels of being, then we are not tempted to think that Matisse is merely imposing his individual soul on nature in the canvas, or that this spiritual domain is just "floating around" in nature; but rather that Matisse is himself linked on the same continuum of interconnection, himself participating in both domains, and is therefore properly placed to be a mediator and articulator of both domains in nature.

This understanding of the person as a type of mediator between domains resonates with Zwicky's understanding of how metaphors, themselves, work. Metaphors work to unify aspects of reality not immediately understood to go together, they unite differing contexts, and

considered as analogical thoughts, they facilitate intercourse across domains. Zwicky quotes Nelson Goodman,

> An understanding of metaphor further requires the recognition that a label functions not in isolation but as belonging to a family….What occurs is a transfer of a schema, a migration of concepts, an alienation of categories. Indeed, a metaphor might be regarded as a calculated category-mistake – or rather as a happy and revitalizing, even if bigamous, second marriage (Goodman, 1976, pp. 71 – 73 as quoted in Zwicky, 2014a, Aphorism 11).

She quotes I.A. Richards as saying,

> The traditional theory noticed only a few of the modes of metaphor; and limited its application of the term *metaphor* to a few of them only. And thereby it made a metaphor seem to be a verbal matter, a shifting and displacement of words, whereas fundamentally it is a borrowing between and intercourse of *thoughts*, a transaction between contexts. *Thought* is metaphoric, and proceeds by comparison, and the metaphors of language derive therefrom" (Richards, 1936, p. 94 as quoted in Zwicky, 2014a, Aphorism 14).

Zwicky herself says, in aphorism 18, "We may say: A metaphor is the result of seeing the rôle of a word or concept in one language-game as the rôle of another word or concept in a different language-game" (2014a). Transfers of schema, belonging, migration of concepts, transactions between concepts, intercourse of thoughts – all of these point towards the work of metaphor as a mediator between domains of thought, dialects, and contexts. It suggests that metaphorical thought is predicated on a longing for unity between disparate domains.

The image of nested being home to the soul in another way. In the spirit of Pascal, it brings new layers of meaning to our *locale* in the cosmos. The living, whole presence of the soul appears at the human scale, and this is significant. We are positioned not only as in between the domain of the soul and the material domain, but between the incredibly small and the incredibly expansive. We show up in the middle between the atomic and cosmic scales of being, all of which, theoretically, bear their influence on us, and which, theoretically, we influence in return. The cumulative and interpenetrating domains of the soul and the material suggest that our souls

are not entities which haunt the machine of our body, or constitute some sort of cosmic anomaly at the human scale. Rather, body and soul are layered together and the cumulative expression of our character at the human scale is significant. We are *here*, and here is a cumulative midpoint and juxtaposition in the cosmos. In the previous chapter, I suggested that this is important for thinking about how to approach the soul. I suggested we discover the soul via the soul itself *here* at the human scale, through its incarnation in cultural works of art, and through the shared life of a people in a *place*. Said another way, the soul shows up less when it is floating, haunting, or ghosting. It is much more visible in human action, human creation, human living in a place. The soul longs for, and needs, a home.

6.3 Conclusion

I want conclude this dissertation by returning to a driving question for this project: What would an account of the soul be if it were to join together the analytic and educational approaches to the soul? What might we gain by working to integrate these modes in our attempt at self-understanding?

We have discovered that both analytic and educational approaches to the soul begin with gestalt perceptions of the soul from our first person human perspective at the human scale. From there, they follow very different paths in order to testify to, and defend, the truth and value of the soul. It is almost as if two army units started a war on the same frontlines but were separated, each thinking they were the only ones left to fight the battle. They *could* join forces again, but they must follow their own path to get back to center. What might happen if they did happen to do just that?

For one thing, a razor sharp intellectual mode of sifting the world down to its essential, conceptual, and logical core – one which slices away all excess, all extraneous daze, all irrational clutter, would be joined to an integrative mode of thought which sings all harmonies, overlays all patterns, and gives space to the mysterious, the silent, and the unsayable gestures of the world. This joining of reason and imagination will ensure that sequential, structural, and analogical patterns will all be taken into consideration as one contemplates the soul and its place in our lives.

For another thing, a theoretical approach which is very keen on unity with other disciplines will be joined to a theoretical approach which is keen on preserving a unity of life. Both the theoretical unity and the unity of life will gain insight, strength, and expanded horizons from joining together.

Furthermore, unforeseen resonances lie in wait to be revealed. As we lay these two approaches on the table, as Charles Simic does with the elements that he contemplates before writing his poems – enjoying the joy and distinctness of their being – we anticipate when suddenly new thoughts, new actions, and new possibilities emerge in our efforts to care for the soul, both in its conceptual life and its presence in individuals, classrooms, and schools.

Fourth, through this work we ourselves may become more whole, more connected, and more attuned to reality. Head might grow closer to the heart, imagination closer to reason. As a result, our lives will more truly reflect the singular and unique soul that constitutes the core of our conscious life. Functioning as an integrated whole, we move towards flourishing.

We live in the middle. We live between the quantum and the cosmic, between the "upward" ascending cumulative powers and structures, and the "downward" descending

influential cascade of being, all of which express their character, for us, primarily at the human scale. We live in the middle, between the possibilities of an entirely material cosmos and an entirely mental or spiritual one, appearing to participate in both domains. We live in the middle between patterns of cause and effect, logical systems of inference, and patterns of analogical resonance. We live between the direct and the indirect, the literal and the metaphorical, the known and the unknown. We live between haecceity and quiddity. I believe it is the office and duty of our personal, singular, continuous, intelligent and irreducible soul, with all its capacities and powers, and with its communicative presence, to stand open to these converging opposites; and absorbing them into itself, aspire to re-incarnate and resolve its home into a living, resonant, and nested whole.

Epilogue

This study has only been a beginning. In my view, it has been an attempt to harmonize broad yet significant characteristics from the educational and analytic approach to the soul. It has not been comprehensive in working out all the details. In what follows, I want to suggest some possible next directions for myself or others who may want to continue this particular line of research. In addition, I want to suggest some thoughts on how this work might be of interest to teachers, teacher educators, and in general to those who care about education by thinking well about it.

The Analytic, the Educational, and the Historical. I am personally interested in continuing this project of finding harmonic relationships between analytic and educational thought on the soul, as a means towards finding a more complete, holistic, and integrated view of the soul. This study has focused mostly on recent literature in the analytic and educational domains. However, I am convinced there is much, much more to be discovered in the history of theorizing about the soul which would inform both educational and analytic domains. My suspicion is that there has been a divide historically, in many cases, where the more analytic thinkers do not take the educational thinkers on the soul as seriously as they should, and the educational thinkers do not take the analytic thinkers as seriously as they should. One possible example would be Rousseau, who embeds some serious, provocative, and insightful reflections on the soul throughout the *Emile*. Yet, no one I know would likely cite the *Emile* as a serious treatise on the nature and value of the soul, and nor does the *Emile* figure in any history of the soul that I am aware of. In short, not only are many of these historical works able to offer genuine contributions in and of themselves, but given the ideas put forth in this dissertation, one

could use those insights as material to further work towards finding mutually beneficial relationships between analytic and educational uses of the soul.

Nested Being. I am personally interested in further developing the concept of scale and nested being. My articulation of it in Chapter Five is my own most developed, yet there is much more to flesh out. For example, my image of nested being entirely lacks the concept of time, or movement through time, and therefore it lacks an obvious place for the historical. Future work would further develop this concept in this direction.

In Chapter Five, I only articulate a general view of scaled and nested materiality. However, it turns out that there is a verifiable difference between the different scales of a *living* being verses a non-living one. Mark Miodownik reports that there is a lively debate in material science about what exactly the difference is between animate and inanimate "matter" if you will, however, it seems that it is generally agreed that in living beings there is dynamic, real-time *communication* between the different scales which is simply not there in non-living beings. Thus, living beings form an entirely different range and dynamic set of relationships between scales than the interrelationship between the scales of a non-living beings. This matters very much, especially given the deep historical association between the soul and *living* beings. Future work on nested being would further develop the concept along the lines of the living and non-living, while not losing site of the general truth that all of the cosmos appears to be part a singular, nested whole.

One of the features of nested being I argue for in Chapter Five is that form *and* atomic content are equally determinative of what something is. In context, this is referring to material bodies. However, as the reader is aware, I also argue that the domain of the soul is equally scaled and nested, just as material bodies are. However, I did not articulate what it might mean that, in

the domain of the soul, form and content are equally determinative of a soul. I do not presently have a clear answer to this. Yet it is worth pointing out that in the history of theorizing about the soul, "form" has a special kinship to the soul. If one considers Aristotle's idea that soul just *is* the form of the body, or even Plato's concept that the soul, while not being a form itself, has a special kinship to the realm of forms, then one can see that this discussion of form in the context of nested being and the soul could be in incredibly fruitful one. Future work on the concept of nested being would work towards clarity on the relation of form to body and soul. A personal difficulty is that it has always been more intuitive for me to think of the body as the form of the soul, not the other way around. Alas, I defer to philosophical greats without a decent enough argument!

While I could not address it in this study, I believe nested being and the concept of scale has important implications in the moral / ethical domain. What if the moral / ethical domain itself is scaled and nested? What if the moral phenomena which appears at the individual scale and governs / informs individual ethics is somewhat distinct from the moral phenomena that appears at the cellular, familial, city-wide, or global scale? Perhaps, just as in the material and soul domain, new moral / ethical properties, structures, and laws appear at different scales which would inform how we think about, assess, and go about trying to "improve," "cultivate," or "educate" at these different scales. I am positive there are ethical theorists who routinely consider the moral nuances that come to play at different scales, but I am ignorant of anyone who has tried to ground these differences in a philosophy of nested being which purports to harmonize with the material and soul domains. Future work on nested being would develop its relationship to the moral / ethical domain in the integrative, philosophic spirit.

Finally, I think it would be absolutely crucial for educational theorists to hear, from myself or from other theorists, how a philosophy of nested being informs what it means to be a school. I embedded a few suggestive thoughts in Chapter Five, where I articulate the idea that a school can be considered a sanctuary, can have a shared soul, and that in some real sense the individual members of the community are nested in this larger communion. But further questions come to mind. Is it a different thing to care for the soul of a school than to care for one's own soul? How so? How does the soul of a school relate, or ought to relate, to the soul of the city? What about the soul of a classroom? Is there such a thing? Since the main point in chapter five was to give an array of examples of how the domain of the soul is spoken of as having different scales, I did not really offer a rigorous defense of this concept of a "shared soul." Future work which invokes "the soul" at broader scales would more rigorously argue that this is the case.

Further, any serious treatment of schools through the lens of nested being would try to discern more clearly the soul-body relationship in a school. At the individual scale, the soul-body relationship has been perpetually discussed in analytic philosophy, largely as a contested space between soul-skeptics and soul-defenders. But not only could one easily look at the soul-body relationship at the individual scale through different lenses (e.g. the soul-body relationship as mediated by trauma), one could look at the soul-body relationship at a broader scale, as in the soul of the school and the material makeup and environment of the building. As odd as this may sound, I am merely following the argument in this dissertation that the material and soul domains are scaled and nested and likely interact at different scales. In this spirit, one would ask questions like, "To what extent does the material makeup and material environment form the soul of a school?" "To what extent does the soul of a school shape the material makeup and material environment of a school?" "Is the "culture" of a school an outward sign of its "shared soul," and

if so, what do its rituals suggest about its character? What embodied rituals does it lack in order to more fully express the type of soul-character it seeks to cultivate?

If it sounds crazy to talk about souls and shared souls, even some theorists as well-known as Michel Foucault do not think it is crazy to talk like this. In *Discipline and Punishment* he articulates a view of the soul in which the soul is the prison of the body (reversing the supposed Platonic view that the body is a prison for the soul). The soul, for Foucault, is like a locus of power which is expressed through our knowing. Methods of surveillance in prison systems (and in schools!) for example, create spaces where a knowing power – the soul – permeates a physical space, attempting to organize the space, but also the behavior of individual bodies within the space. In this spirit, one can look at a car, or the design of an office building, and perceive intimations of an organizing soul. Thus even for Foucault, not only can we talk about the soul beyond the individual scale, the soul has a relationship to the body beyond the individual scale. Future work on nested being would investigate the relationship of the soul to the body beyond the individual scales, especially in the context of educational environments, and this work should be informed by other articulations of the soul-body relationship found in theorists like Rousseau, or Hegel, or Foucault, or anyone else.

Analytic Insights for Education. Educational theorizing on the soul naturally lends itself towards thinking through how the soul should inform our teaching, the classroom, our connections, or our own life (like, for example, seeking a measure of silence and solitude in order to hear the soul). Indeed, the literature has much more to say about this than I have even summarized in this study. However, much more work could be done – work which I hope to begin one day – on linking the deeply insightful work of analytic philosophers on the soul to education. Take, for example, Richard Swinburne. Swinburne's quintessentially analytic thinking

is on display in his *The Evolution of the Soul*. As I mentioned in the dissertation, with masterful (and at times overwhelming) analytic skill, Swinburne works through different dimensions of soul-life in his book, things like thoughts, desires, sensations, purposes, and feelings. In my view, there are rich possibilities in the project of connecting Swinburne's insights into educational theorizing on the soul. For example, Dirck Roosevelt and Jim Garrison quote Dewey as saying that the most important aspect of the soul a teacher should pay attention to is the presence or absence of genuine thought in a student. Dewey certainly has his own understanding and articulation of what "thought" is, but think of what a teacher might gain from considering another vivid, clear, and genuinely demystifying account of what thinking is? How might Swinburne's understanding of what "purposing" is help a teacher facilitate youth into exercising their own soulful power of purposing in the classroom? How might Swinburne's account of desire, if recontextualized in a classroom setting, help a teacher facilitate genuine attraction in the souls of their students? Could it be that Swinburne's account of sensations has something to offer pedagogies which deeply value the exposure of the young to a wide variety of materials and textures in the classroom? Further attempts to unite the analytic and the educational approach to the soul would involve thinking through how analytic insights bear on educational practices.

Dignity. Though I did not speak to this very much in the dissertation, one aspect of the soul which both analytic and educational philosophers value is the dignity it confers. Further work could be done to show how important the concept of the soul is to remembering, affirming, and upholding our dignity as persons, not only in our general view of ourselves and other people, but in educational institutions and relationships. Does the view that one's dignity is inherent in virtue of being a sacred and singular presence in the world have anything to offer discussions of dignity in education today?

The Soul and Spirituality. One need not ascribe to a particular religious tradition in order to recognize, name, and affirm the phenomena of the soul. However, there is a deep connection between the soul and spirituality. In the analytic philosophers I have explored, this comes out primarily in their reflections on different "housing frameworks" for the soul, such as theism vs. materialism. John Cottingham, however, goes further in his *In Search of a Soul*. He finds in the soul a longing for some sort of transcendent-imminent meaning, a telos towards meaning, self-understanding, self-formation. Still, the spirituality present in these analytic philosophers is not discussed primarily in the context of education or the classroom.

Educational philosophers, by contrast, consistently link the soul with spirituality through an array of contemplative practices and actions, such as mindfulness in the classroom, breathing exercises in school, keeping a record of one's dreams, building schools next to forests to facilitate a spiritual connection with nature, and all sorts of other practices. As I mentioned in Chapter One, educational philosophers of the soul are inspired by an array of spiritual and religious traditions, primarily including Christian mysticism, mystical thinkers inside and outside of Christianity, Christian humanism, secular humanism, and Buddhism. In one sense, philosophy itself is a type of spiritual tradition which inspires spiritual practices in education. In my view, Socrates and Plato considered philosophy as a spiritual practice aimed at, yes, the contemplation of beauty, truth, and goodness, but also through coming into a relationship with these transcendentals, a realization of virtue in the soul. An early version of Socrates (as presented by Plato) understood himself to have heard a divine vocational call to "minister" to the city of Athens through philosophy, attaching himself to the city in order to spur it on towards virtue and renewed life.

There are other philosophical-spiritual writers in that tradition, including figures like Emerson, Thoreau, and Marcus Aurelius. Thus, there are different currents of spirituality coursing through educational theorizing on the soul. This has led to the integration of soulful and spiritual practices from various traditions into educational practice and thought. There are certainly some positive effects from this integrated educational space, but in my experience, it sometimes has a hodgepodge effect. It's hard to know what's what, what underlying commitments one is overtly or implicitly affirming, and this confusion can in fact hamper how well one can genuinely think through the soul and its relationship to spirituality in education. Therefore, more work could be done to clarify to what extent these different spiritual traditions actually have different views of the soul, to what extent they overlap, and to further articulate how a certain set of spiritual disciplines / practices relates to certain views of the soul but not others. Further research in this domain will not only further our academic understanding of the relationship between the soul and spirituality, one would hope it could help teachers engage with students' souls – and their attendant spiritual context – in ways that are life-giving to the student.

Direct, Indirect, and Unknowing. While this dissertation clearly acknowledges the direct, immediate awareness of the soul which analytic philosophers defend, as well as the indirect educational emphasis on some of the indirect and mediated ways we come to understand aspects of our soul, as well as the educational and mystical emphasis on unknowing and unlearning aspects of ourselves as we grow more fully into ourselves, it seems to me further work could be done towards explicitly working out how these different emphases are not contradictory. Even better would be to show how they are all necessary, mutually beneficial, and constitute essential aspects of our self-understanding. Chapter Six begins this work by working out how the more direct, literal, and logical patterns of analytic thinkers positively relates to the more indirect,

holistic, and analogical patterns of the poets, and vice versa. Chapter Four engages with analytic and analogical patterns as well, in addition to engaging with "unknowing" and "dying to oneself." Still, more work could be done to unify these three essential modes of self-understanding.

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