

Columbia University
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Human Rights Studies Master of Arts Program

The Exacerbation of Non-State Armed Group Violence Succeeding Government Abuses of
Physical Integrity Rights

Manmeet Kaur Nijjer

Thesis Advisor: Dr. Stuart Gottlieb

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the
Requirements of the degree of
Master of Arts

January 2022

Abstract

The last few decades have seen a proliferation of asymmetric violence perpetrated by non-state armed groups. Attempts to prevent and counter this violence, therefore, have become the goal of many in the international community. Thus, academics and policy makers, in particular, have been researching the strategic goals and actions of these groups to create effective countering measures. However, one key element mostly overlooked in their analysis is truly understanding the motivations of these groups along with its importance in decreasing non-state violence. To what extent does the relationship between state and non-state actors affect this armed conflict and can motivational factors be seen as a tool to comprehending this relation? To answer these, this thesis examines how the state's violation of physical integrity rights exacerbates the violent actions of non-state armed groups. This research explores definitional and theoretical frameworks which aid in comprehending this conflict. Through a case study on the Irish Republican Army, it analyzes the increase or decrease of attacks following state abuses of human rights and discusses the motivational factors which influences their decision-making process.

Keywords

Physical integrity rights, non-state armed groups, guerilla warfare, insurgency, terrorism, armed conflict, motivations, tactical diversity, Irish Republican Army, and state abuse.

Acknowledgments

I would like to express my deep gratitude to my thesis advisor, Dr. Stuart Gottlieb, for his unwavering support and guidance throughout this research. I thank all of my professors for their invaluable teachings which expanded my perspective and comprehension of this complex subject. This especially includes Dr. Adam Day, Professor George Fletcher, Professor Michel Paradis, Dr. Luca Falciola, and Dr. Lara Nettelfield. I would also like to thank my parents and family for their encouragement during this entire program. I was also fortunate to have the support and advice of Shabnam Fayyaz, a close friend, during the challenging weeks of writing this thesis. I also extend my thanks to Dr. Bruce Hoffman for providing great insights and for igniting my passion during undergrad for studying armed conflict before I even had a chance to speak with him through his book, *Inside Terrorism*. Finally, I want to thank all the people I interviewed for providing crucial data and different perspectives for this thesis.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION	4
CHAPTER TWO: DEFINITIONAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS	8
I. NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS	8
II. STRATEGY AND TACTICS	12
III. PHYSICAL INTEGRITY RIGHTS	14
<i>DEFINING PHYSICAL INTEGRITY RIGHTS</i>	15
<i>NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS AND PHYSICAL INTEGRITY RIGHTS</i>	17
IV. REPRESSION	20
<i>REPRESSION AND ARMED CONFLICT</i>	20
<i>REPRESSION AND TACTICAL DIVERSITY</i>	23
V. RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS AND SECURITY TRADE-OFF	26
VI. MOTIVATING FACTORS FOR DECISION MAKING	30
<i>GRIEVANCE</i>	30
<i>BACKLASH</i>	33
<i>INTER-GROUP CONFLICT</i>	33
CHAPTER THREE: A QUALITATIVE APPROACH TO THE IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY	36
I. IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY	36
<i>MEMBER RECRUITMENT AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT</i>	38
<i>VIOLATIONS OF PHYSICAL INTEGRITY RIGHTS</i>	42
<i>TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC MEASURES</i>	47
CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUDING REMARKS	50
BIBLIOGRAPHY	52

Chapter One: Introduction

There has been a clear shift in the character of armed conflict in the world, as interstate warfare has diminished while asymmetric non-state militant groups have proliferated.¹ Technological advances and a more globalized setting have facilitated the international reach and extent of violence perpetrated by such non-state actors.² This violence has significantly impacted many regions of the world, including the African Subcontinent, the Middle East, South Asia, and, more recently, North America and Western Europe.³ However, these non-state actors are not the only ones engaging in this violence. State violations of human rights, and internal violence in general, have also increased at alarming rates.⁴ Some well-known examples of such state abuses of human rights include Bangladesh, with its violations regarding Rohingya refugees; China's ill treatment of the Uyghur population; India's arbitrary arrests of protesting farmers, journalists, and academics; North Korea's enforced disappearances; Russia's growing number of political prisoners; and Saudi Arabia's extrajudicial killings.⁵ But while violence by these different actors – state and non-state – may appear to be disconnected, they in fact often feed off each other in ways not easily understood.

My research focuses on answering the question: How have state violations of physical integrity rights served as catalysts for increased non-state armed group violence? To answer this question, the following sub-questions will be considered: Does the nature of the non-state actors' grievance matter in the way they react to these catalysts? If groups expand their violence, how is

¹ Max Roser, "War and Peace," Charity Website, Our World In Data, 2016, <https://ourworldindata.org/war-and-peace>.

² "A New Era of Conflict and Violence," Intergovernmental Organization, United Nations, 2020, <https://www.un.org/en/un75/new-era-conflict-and-violence>.

³ "A New Era of Conflict and Violence." International Organization, United Nations, 2020.

⁴ "Human Rights Violations," Charity Website, Our World In Data, 2014, <https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/human-rights-violations?time=2014>.

⁵ "World Report 2021: Our Annual Review of Human Rights Around the Globe," Human Rights (United States: Human Rights Watch, 2021), <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021>.

that seen through their tactical utility? And how do certain motivating factors lead to the decision-making process of these individuals? Abuses of political prisoners, arbitrary arrests, extrajudicial killings, and torture are just some of the noted violations committed by state governments.⁶ Additionally, the increase in armed conflict and state abuses of human rights do not seem to be unconnected. This thesis will therefore explore to what degree respecting or violating political integrity rights impact prospects for peace or good outcomes in armed conflict.

Numerous scholars have researched violations of human rights by non-state armed groups.⁷ However, few studies have addressed the relationship between state and non-state armed violence, regarding their interaction and exacerbated violence against one another, through thematically conducted qualitative research based on case studies.⁸ The scholarship that exists within this field is limited because it relies on quantitative methods.⁹ Thus, there is a lack of research specifically exploring the perspective of these non-state armed actors. This perspective includes changing attitudes, reasonings, and motivations for why these actors adopt

⁶ “Human Rights Violations,” Charity Website, Our World In Data, 2014, <https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/human-rights-violations?time=2014>.

⁷ Rogelio Alonso and Fernando Reinares, “Terrorism, Human Rights and Law Enforcement in Spain,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 17, no. 1–2 (February 23, 2005): 265–78, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550490520727>; Ezequiel Heffes, Marcos D Kotlik, and Manuel J Ventura, *International Humanitarian Law and Non-State Actors Debates, Law and Practice*, 2020; Claudia Hofmann, “Engaging Non-State Armed Groups in Humanitarian Action,” *International Peacekeeping* 13, no. 3 (September 2006): 396–409, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310600824090>

⁸ David Cingranelli et al., “Human Rights Violations and Violent Internal Conflict,” *Social Sciences* 8, no. 2 (January 28, 2019): 41, <https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci8020041>; Keith Krause and Jennifer Milliken, “Introduction: The Challenge of Non-State Armed Groups,” *Contemporary Security Policy* 30, no. 2 (August 2009): 202–20, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260903077296>; James I. Walsh and James A. Piazza, “Why Respecting Physical Integrity Rights Reduces Terrorism,” *Comparative Political Studies* 43, no. 5 (May 2010): 551–77, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414009356176>. These authors mention this gap within the research and recommend that future research views this relationship through more qualitative methods.

⁹ Oskar N.T. Thoms and James Ron, “Do Human Rights Violations Cause Internal Conflict,” *Human Rights Quarterly* 29 (2007): 674–705; James I. Walsh, and James A. Piazza, “Why Respecting Physical Integrity Rights Reduces Terrorism,” *Comparative Political Studies* 43, no. 5 (May 2010): 551–77, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414009356176>; Michael C. Horowitz, Evan Perkoski, and Philip B.K. Potter, “Tactical Diversity in Militant Violence,” *International Organization* 72, no. 1 (2018): 139–71, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818317000467>; David Cingranelli et al, “Human Rights Violations and Violent Internal Conflict,” *Social Sciences* 8, no. 2 (January 28, 2019). <https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci8020041>.

more violent tactics.¹⁰ As these kinds of conflicts continue to expand, it is becoming imperative to delve into this relationship. What is the association between state and non-state actors and do they influence each other in the measures of violence that are used? Is the behavior between them telling us anything? How do non-state actors' grievances impact their tactics? Could it be that motivations stem from these grievances which serve as catalysts for violence in this modern setting of conflict? Well, understanding this phenomenon is what this thesis is all about.

In this research, I will be arguing that the state's violation of physical integrity rights leads to an escalation of non-state armed actors' motivations for violent actions. I contend that there exists a direct link between a government's decision during an armed conflict to, for instance, torture or carry out extrajudicial killings and a non-state armed member's motivation for engaging in more violent actions and increased tactical diversity. Therefore, this thesis consists of four chapters, including these introductory remarks. Chapter Two deals with definitional and theoretical frameworks which includes: a discussion on the utility of defining non-state armed actors broadly; the strategic goals and tactical diversity of these groups; an explanation of physical integrity rights and its relationship to these armed actors; the theory of repression and its link to armed conflict and tactical diversity; a detailing of rights obligations and the security trade-off debate; and concludes with motivational factors for a NSAG's decision-making process.

Chapter Three presents a case study on the Irish Republican Army which includes: a historical brief on the overall conflict; reasonings for member recruitment and financial support linked to state abuse; specific events where state violations of physical integrity rights can be

¹⁰ Michael C. Horowitz, Evan Perkoski, and Philip B.K. Potter, "Tactical Diversity in Militant Violence." *International Organization* 72, no. 1 (2018): 139–71, 140. Some examples of more violent tactics include suicide bombing, hijackings, and use of weapons of mass destruction. This will be further elaborated within Chapter Two.

viewed; and finishes with an exploration of the IRA's strategic and tactical measures. Chapter Four begins with concluding remarks; then, summarizes the overall findings of this research concerning the motivational factors for the group; and finally, ends with recommendations regarding the protection of physical integrity rights and international counter-militancy, counter-insurgency, and counter-terrorism policies.

Chapter Two: Definitional and Theoretical Frameworks

The field of armed conflict is one surrounded by much complexity. Therefore, it is essential to analyze definitional and theoretical frameworks which provide the foundation for this research. The first section of this chapter will discuss how these non-state armed actors are defined and why such a broader term has been utilized for the thesis. Next, the second section will focus on the strategic goals and tactical diversity of these groups. Following that, the third section defines physical integrity rights and examines its relationship to these NSAGs. Then, in the fourth section, the theory of repression is analyzed through its link to armed conflict and tactical diversity. After that, the fifth section discusses rights obligations and the security trade-off debate which exists within the field. Lastly, the sixth section of this chapter inspects several theories of motivating factors that play a role in the decision-making process for these non-state armed groups.

I. Non-State Armed Groups

Within various fields and aspects of society, definitional frameworks concerning terms such as militancy, insurgency, and especially terrorism are matters of constant debate. Whether viewed through an international or national lens, no consensus can be reached as to what feature or factor assists the designation of one group as either an insurgent or terrorist organization. In fact, this discrepancy can be seen through the United States' own intelligence community. For instance, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines these terms and operates upon them differently than the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Furthermore, examined even more closely, this complexity can be viewed through a local perspective as the NYPD Counter-

Terrorism division, a leading department on countering armed conflict, has an even more distinct definition.

Notwithstanding this complexity, within the field of academia many attempts have been made in pinpointing certain features of each term to create widely accepted definitions. The work of Bruce Hoffman (2017), in particular, has recently garnered much recognition in providing a nuanced definitional understanding of these groups. First, militant or guerrilla groups are larger divisions of armed individuals that operate as a “military unit,” target military forces, and control some form of territory along with its population.¹¹ This implies that motivations for formation tend to be state-centric and therefore, guerrilla groups target entities such as armies of governments. Their tactics, distinct from insurgents and terrorists, are thus intended for government pressure, do not include the targeting of civilian populations, and are very limited territorially.

Second, insurgent groups can be defined as groups that not only employ military tactics but involve “coordinated informational (e.g., propaganda) and psychological warfare efforts” to gain popular support against an established “national government, imperialist power, or foreign occupying force.”¹² Militant and insurgent groups share the similarity of being reactionary agents to state actions. However, a key difference is that insurgent groups involve larger territorial goals, informational warfare, and stay active through popular support. And third, transnational or terrorist groups are viewed as individuals that use “deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change” and that have “far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim (s)” to create power where it is too

¹¹ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*. Third Edition. Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare. New York: Columbia University Press, 2017, 36-7.

¹² Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 2017, 37.

little or none.¹³ Distinguishing features mentioned by Bruce Hoffman, between an insurgency and terrorism, include that these terrorists:

do not function in the open as armed units; generally, do not attempt to seize or hold territory; deliberately avoid engaging enemy military forces in combat; are constricted both numerically and logistically from undertaking concerted mass political mobilization efforts; and exercise no direct control or governance over a populace at either the local or the national level.¹⁴

Although these defining aspects and distinctions are helpful when one begins to analyze these groups, they are unfortunately not static. In fact, not only is there much overlap between these categories of armed conflict, but these actors are also everchanging and thus, so are their definitions. For instance, the aforementioned features are currently not as distinguishable between insurgencies and terrorism due to the emergence of numerous transnational terrorist groups which have been attempting to seize territories and/or to have direct control over a populace. Additionally, many of these violent actors utilize guerilla, insurgent, and terrorist strategies or tactics – which will be examined in the next section – while perpetrating attacks which in turn makes it difficult to classify organizations through just one of these categories.

Due to this complexity, it is important to clearly lay out, for the purposes of this thesis, how these groups and their tactics will be labeled and defined. As Lawrence Freedman, a known military historian contends, “it is safest analytically to describe political entities by reference to their core political identity and not by whatever strategy or tactics they happen to be adopting at the time.”¹⁵ Therefore, the overarching label of non-state armed groups will be used to identify these actors. Non-State Armed Groups or NSAGs can be classified as actors which operate out of a state’s control while posing a challenge through asymmetric or unconventional violent

¹³ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, Third Edition, Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), 44.

¹⁴ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 2017, 37.

¹⁵ Lawrence Freedman, “Terrorism as a Strategy,” *Government and Opposition* 42, no. 3 (2007): 314–39, 317.

actions¹⁶ to its authority, power, and legitimacy¹⁷, and whose goals can be political, economic, or ideological with a structure that has “at least a minimal level of command and control and coordination, along with a clear group identity.”¹⁸ For the purpose of this thesis, the definition is specifically tailored to exclude other non-state groups that do use violence but do not pose a direct challenge to a state’s control – i.e., mafias, gangs, and private military contractors.

In addition, the term *terrorism* is often accompanied with a strong negative connotation, which is understandable from a societal point of view. However, academically, it places quite a barrier for those trying to understand the phenomenon of armed conflict. It is known that due to definitional ambiguity and, in some cases, varied political stances, various people can categorically label the same group differently. For instance, historically, terrorism has been used by governments or government entities to label those that may have opposing views. Therefore, referring to these groups as NSAGS, alleviates much of that complexity and negative connotations which then allows for more efficient academic research. In order to counter or prevent a phenomenon, it is necessary to understand it. Furthermore, the small amount of academia which focuses on this topic of government abuse of rights and armed conflict focuses exclusively on either militant, insurgent, or terrorist actions. Using the overarching term of NSAGs allows for inclusive research which encompasses all of those actions.

Nevertheless, that does not mean that the attacks perpetrated by these groups will be viewed in such broad terms. As Bruce Hoffman stated in a recent interview:

The trouble is if you come up with a term that is so anodyne, it doesn’t really describe the phenomenon ... I just worry that we keep redefining something to

¹⁶ Richard Shultz, Douglas Farah, and Itamara Lochard, “Armed Groups: A Tier-One Security Priority” (Institute for National Security Studies, September 2004), 14.

¹⁷ David Petrasek, *Ends & Means: Human Rights Approaches to Armed Groups* (Versoix, Switzerland: International Council on Human Rights Policy, 2000), 6.

¹⁸ Benedetta Berti, “What’s in a Name? Re-Conceptualizing Non-State Armed Groups in the Middle East,” *Palgrave Communications* 89 (November 29, 2016), 2.

attempt to have greater precision or greater inclusivity but that we water it down too much ... I'm comfortable with terrorism, guerilla, and insurgent with the understanding that guerillas and insurgents use terrorist tactics and that terrorists aspire to use guerilla tactics when they're numerically large enough or insurgency when they can mobilize a population.¹⁹

Therefore, while keeping the overarching term to categorize the Irish Republican Army, which will be explored within the research, the categories of guerilla, insurgent, and terrorist will be used to define the attacks perpetrated by them in order to properly analyze an increase in tactical violence. Thus, this allows for the comprehension of the phenomenon through targeted descriptions of the tactics used by these actors, while making sure that individuals do not get lost in the everchanging definitions to the point where these groups cannot be classified.

II. Strategy and Tactics

Strategic goals are imperative to comprehending the decision-making process taken by these violent actors. In the context of armed conflict, strategy involves the use of force or violent means to achieve political objectives and goals while the means with which these goals are achieved are called tactics. Tactics utilized by these groups are often determined based on the actors' capabilities and resources. Strategy refers to the choices which allow "available means to be turned into desired ends"²⁰ and often times strategies involve interdependency in that certain actions may "depend on the choices that others are making, possibly with the express purpose of frustrating one's own strategy."²¹

For the purpose of this thesis, strategic goals and especially tactical diversity can help to elucidate catalysts of violence. Viewing the strategic goals of these armed actors, it is important

¹⁹ Bruce Hoffman, Interviewed by Manmeet Kaur Nijjer, September 29, 2021.

²⁰ Lawrence Freedman, "Terrorism as a Strategy," *Government and Opposition* 42, no. 3 (2007): 314–39, 318.

²¹ Lawrence Freedman, "Terrorism as a Strategy," *Government and Opposition* 42, no. 3 (2007): 314–39, 318.

to remember that terrorism, and in some cases guerilla warfare and insurgency, is “a strategy of provocation so that the violence is designed to provoke a government response that then sets in motion this upwards cyclical nature of violence” and in turn, enables an armed actor in “credibly claiming that they’re defending the people rather than showing that they are the aggressor, they put themselves as the victim.”²² This is essential to comprehending these actors’ decisions.

Concerning tactical diversity, as stated by a U.S. Army irregular warfare intelligence analyst, “understanding what leads to diversification in militant tactics and violence is essential in helping to assess capability and [to] reduce uncertainty ... given that much of what we care about in an insurgent context is not directly observable, [therefore] visible indicators like diversity in militant violence are critical.”²³ Tactical diversity can be defined as changes in attack tactics and strategies in which non-state armed groups employ multiple approaches to violence.²⁴

Horowitz, Perkoski, and Potter (2017) contend that NSAGs rely on tactical diversity to force “states to spend their defensive capabilities thin” and to “overcome disadvantages in terms of resources and personnel.”²⁵ These academics focus on exploring conditions that lead certain groups to adopt narrow or diverse tactics.²⁶ They contend that diversification has three main payoffs for these non-state armed actors. They argue that first, diversification increases the number of targets thereby forcing the state to defend and expand their counter-measures. Second, that this diversity stretches thin defenses in that states have to “prepare for a broader range of possible attacks, [and] can ultimately introduce new vulnerabilities that militants can

²² Bruce Hoffman, Interviewed by Manmeet Kaur Nijjer, September 29, 2021.

²³ Michael C. Horowitz, Evan Perkoski, and Philip B.K. Potter, “Tactical Diversity in Militant Violence,” *International Organization* 72, no. 1 (2018): 139–71, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818317000467>, 140.

²⁴ Michael C. Horowitz, Evan Perkoski, and Philip B.K. Potter, “Tactical Diversity in Militant Violence,” 139.

²⁵ Horowitz, Perkoski, and Potter, “Tactical Diversity in Militant Violence,” 139.

²⁶ Horowitz, Perkoski, and Potter, “Tactical Diversity in Militant Violence.” Narrow signifies the use of less tactics and strategies while diverse indicates the use of multiple tactics.

subsequently exploit.” Third, this tactical diversity helps these actors circumvent or overcome innovations of defense by the state.²⁷

They conclude by stating that their “theoretical proposition is about adaption: militant organizations rationally diversify their tactical approaches in response to external pressures.”²⁸ This diversification is more clearly seen when these actors adopt particularly disruptive tactics such as armed assault, assassination, hostage-taking, infrastructure attacks, suicide bombing, airline hijackings, improvised explosive devices, and NBCR (nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological) attacks. For this research, catalytic violence can be viewed numerous ways, including through a group’s adoption of a tactic they did not previously use and use of multiple disruptive and more violent tactics within a shorter period of time. In the following sections of this thesis, the reasoning behind this diversification will be explored.

III. Physical Integrity Rights

There are various kinds of human rights abuses which affect the actions of these groups, however, quantitatively derived data found by scholars indicate that physical integrity rights have more of an impact. Two such scholars are Thoms and Ron (2007) who contend that “discrimination and violations of social and economic function as underlying causes of conflict, creating deep grievances and group identities that may, under some circumstances, motivate collective violence.” On the other hand, “direct conflict triggers” can be identified more clearly

²⁷ Michael C. Horowitz, Evan Perkoski, and Philip B.K. Potter, “Tactical Diversity in Militant Violence,” *International Organization* 72, no. 1 (2018): 139–71, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818317000467>, 143-144.

²⁸ Michael C. Horowitz, Evan Perkoski, and Philip B.K. Potter, “Tactical Diversity in Militant Violence,” 145.

through “violations of civil and political rights.” Abuse of physical integrity rights, in particular, is “associated with escalation, and immediately repressive regimes appear to be most at risk.”²⁹

Similarly, Walsh and Piazza (2010) find that violations of political integrity are more “closely tied” to non-state armed groups, especially terrorist organizations, than “rights protecting civil liberties and political participation.”³⁰ They argue that there is a direct link between a government’s increased respect for physical integrity rights and a decrease in violence used by these armed actors.³¹ Therefore, although other kinds of human rights violations, like economic and religious abuses are definitely an aspect of underlying issues in regard to NSAGs, this thesis will mainly focus on physical integrity rights.

Defining Physical Integrity Rights

Physical integrity rights, also known as personal integrity, political integrity, and personal security rights, encompasses the “life and inviolability of the human person” as they are core rights which are indispensable and require “absolute protection, even when other liberties are temporarily suspended.”³² Governments violate these rights when they inflict physical harm on people. These rights include protection against extrajudicial killings, torture, arbitrary arrests or political imprisonment, and forced disappearances. A definitional understanding of each physical integrity right, and in turn its violation, can aid in the comprehension of what specifically has been quantitatively proven to have a direct impact on the violence of armed groups.

²⁹ Oskar N.T. Thoms and James Ron, “Do Human Rights Violations Cause Internal Conflict,” *Human Rights Quarterly* 29 (2007): 674–705, 674.

³⁰ James I. Walsh and James A. Piazza, “Why Respecting Physical Integrity Rights Reduces Terrorism,” *Comparative Political Studies* 43, no. 5 (May 2010): 551–77, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414009356176>, 554.

³¹ James I. Walsh and James A. Piazza, “Why Respecting Physical Integrity Rights Reduces Terrorism,” 554.

³² Oskar N.T. Thoms and James Ron, “Do Human Rights Violations Cause Internal Conflict,” *Human Rights Quarterly* 29 (2007): 674–705, 685.

First, extrajudicial killings involve government officials' perpetrated killings of persons without due process of the law. These killings could be a result of "deliberate, illegal, and excessive use of lethal force" by security forces, police entities, or other agents of the state against those suspected of criminal activity, detainees, political prisoners, and civilians. In addition, extrajudicial killings can be murders carried out by private groups "instigated by the government."³³ Second, torture can be defined as the inflicting of extreme pain, mental or physical, on purpose by "government officials or by private individuals at the instigation of government officials. Torture includes the use of brutality by police and prison guards that is cruel, inhuman [and/or] degrading."³⁴ Deaths while in custody of the police or government officials due to negligence is also included.

Third, political imprisonment involves the incarceration of individuals by government officials due to their "speech; their non-violent opposition to government policies or leaders; their religious beliefs; their non-violent religious practices including proselytizing; or their membership in a group, including an ethnic or racial group."³⁵ Arbitrary arrest indicates that the individual was incarcerated for a crime without due process of law and that no evidence exists linking them to what they are accused of. This includes widescale arrest and internment without trial. Fourth, forced disappearance refers to when persons have "vanished, political motivation appears likely and the victims have not been found" along with the fact that it is not public knowledge where the disappeared is. However, although there is no way of knowing where these victims are, "it is typically known by whom they were taken and under what circumstances."³⁶

³³ David Cingranelli et al., "Human Rights Violations and Violent Internal Conflict," *Social Sciences* 8, no. 2 (January 28, 2019): 41, <https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci8020041>, 26.

³⁴ David Cingranelli et al., "Human Rights Violations and Violent Internal Conflict," 28.

³⁵ Cingranelli et al., "Human Rights Violations and Violent Internal Conflict," 26.

³⁶ Cingranelli et al., "Human Rights Violations and Violent Internal Conflict," 26.

Non-State Armed Groups and Physical Integrity Rights

Now that the definitional frameworks for these armed actors and physical integrity rights have been examined, the relationship between both can be analyzed. Academic scholars have found that greater respect for these physical integrity rights “consistently reduces the number of terrorist attacks regardless of the type of terrorism – domestic or transnational.”³⁷ This shows that physical integrity rights have a “statistically significant and substantively large influence on the number of terrorist attacks” perpetrated by these groups.³⁸ The authors of this study even go as far as stating that the violations of these rights not only increases attacks by these armed groups but that it also “promotes terrorism.”³⁹ This is seen clearly through the findings of Walsh and Piazza (2010), which are represented through this graph⁴⁰:




Figure 1: Percentage decrease in expected number of terrorist attacks for one-unit increases in physical integrity index

³⁷ James I. Walsh and James A. Piazza, “Why Respecting Physical Integrity Rights Reduces Terrorism,” *Comparative Political Studies* 43, no. 5 (May 2010): 551–77, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414009356176>, 564.

³⁸ James I. Walsh and James A. Piazza, “Why Respecting Physical Integrity Rights Reduces Terrorism,” 566.

³⁹ Walsh and Piazza, “Why Respecting Physical Integrity Rights Reduces Terrorism,” 570.

⁴⁰ Walsh and Piazza, “Why Respecting Physical Integrity Rights Reduces Terrorism,” 566.

Although this graph showcases data only for terrorist attacks, it is still relevant in analyzing the relationship between NSAGs and these rights. Figure 1 indicates that changes with a government’s respect for physical integrity rights has a negative impact on all measures of terrorism. Interestingly, as can be seen, raising the respect index of 0 by only one unit reduces the number of expected attacks from between, depending on the measure, 17% to 40%. This shows that even a small improvement in protecting these rights can cause substantial reductions to terrorist attacks. Similarly, Cingranelli et al., (2019) argue that countries with greater respect for physical integrity rights will experience less overall violent conflict. Their research finds that “countries with high levels of respect for physical integrity rights experience 37% fewer violent protests, 79% fewer terrorist attacks, and 86% fewer civil war deaths on average.”⁴¹

This can be viewed through the findings of Cingranelli et al. (2019) in Figure 2 below⁴²:




Figure 2: Respect for physical integrity rights and conflict

⁴¹ David Cingranelli et al., “Human Rights Violations and Violent Internal Conflict,” *Social Sciences* 8, no. 2 (January 28, 2019): 41, <https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci8020041>, 12.

⁴² David Cingranelli et al., “Human Rights Violations and Violent Internal Conflict,” 13.

These charts showcase data on protests, civil war and terrorist attacks; but for the purpose of this thesis, the analysis will focus on the latter two. All three graphs depict the number of conflict events on average over a 20-year period with countries that have high and low respect for physical integrity rights. Figure 2 indicates that on average repressive state governments have more terrorist attacks than non-repressive states for all but one year. As for civil war deaths, an even more prominent difference can be seen as there are significantly more deaths in repressive states than non-repressive states for each of the year examined. Although this is a good indicator of this relationship and has helped form this research, it still lacks some clarification. For instance, within a civil war guerilla, insurgent, and terrorist tactics can be utilized. Therefore, it is not clear as to whether all attacks using terrorist tactics have been extracted or included within the civil war deaths analysis. For future quantitative research, it would be helpful to view this analysis divided by specific tactics.

Another aspect of the link between these non-state armed groups and physical integrity rights concerns the intensity of abuse. Governments globally use disappearance and extrajudicial killing the least, therefore these violations can be seen as the most extreme forms of abuse. On the other hand, torture is one of the most common tools of repression which government's use among all the physical integrity rights. In regard to arbitrary arrests and political imprisonment, although previously common, it has become rarer after democratization.⁴³ Thus, Cingranelli et al., find that "political imprisonment and disappearances produce an increase in more forms of internal conflict than torture or extrajudicial killings."⁴⁴ This leads to the conclusion that

⁴³ David Cingranelli et al., "Human Rights Violations and Violent Internal Conflict," *Social Sciences* 8, no. 2 (January 28, 2019): 41, <https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci8020041>, 7.

⁴⁴ David Cingranelli et al., "Human Rights Violations and Violent Internal Conflict," 21.

repressive measures in which a government's abuse of certain physical integrity rights is linked to increased non-state armed conflict which will be explored next.

IV. Repression

Repression refers to the act of subduing something or someone by force. As Jeff Goodwin contends, revolutionary movements are often a response to “severely constricted” political opportunities which includes increased or chronic state repression.⁴⁵ As state repression is a major risk factor in armed conflict it “can transform latent grievances into active antagonisms, providing the persecuted with strong motivations for violence.”⁴⁶ Additionally, Thoms and Ron (2010) find that although individuals may tolerate discrimination or economic inequality for a long period of time, they are more likely to “respond with violence when physically threatened or attacked. This response is especially likely when repression is indiscriminate, since quiescence offers little protection.”⁴⁷

Repression and Armed Conflict

These repressive measures include the violation of physical integrity rights. Therefore, many scholars have explored this link through quantitative analysis by using the Political Terror Scale, a five-point index which views a state's usage of terror. One such study was conducted by Thoms and Ron (2010). Their findings can be viewed through Figure 3 below⁴⁸:

⁴⁵ Oskar N.T. Thoms and James Ron, “Do Human Rights Violations Cause Internal Conflict,” *Human Rights Quarterly* 29 (2007): 674–705, 695.

⁴⁶ Oskar N.T. Thoms and James Ron, “Do Human Rights Violations Cause Internal Conflict,” 695.

⁴⁷ Thoms and Ron, “Do Human Rights Violations Cause Internal Conflict,” 695.

⁴⁸ Thoms and Ron, “Do Human Rights Violations Cause Internal Conflict,” 698.




Figure 3: Association between state repression and internal conflict

This graph divides up the world's countries into five groups, based on Amnesty International reports, according to their average PTS score for the period of 1990 to 2003. The findings indicate that there is a strong association between repression and internal conflict. Thoms and Ron (2010) find that out of the thirty-six states engaged in extensive or systematic terror, thirty-one were entangled in internal conflict. This shows that the increased violation of physical integrity rights is directly linked to the uptick in violence between state and non-state actors. They also find that although the widespread category was almost evenly split, sixty-nine out of seventy-eight least repressive governments were free of conflict. And interestingly, for countries that rarely resort to political terror, no internal conflict was found. Even though this study focused broadly on overall internal conflict, its findings still further support the claim that the state's increased violation of physical integrity rights does in fact lead to more conflict.

A recent study, which focused more specifically on the association between physical integrity rights and specific kinds of conflict, was undertaken by Cingranelli et al. (2019). Their analysis can be found in Figure 4 below⁴⁹:

	Violent Protests	Acts of Terrorism	Civil War
Lower Level of Respect for Physical Integrity Rights (Index)	No	Yes	Yes
More Disappearances	No	Yes	Yes
More Extrajudicial Killings	Yes	No	Yes
More Political Imprisonment	No	Yes	Yes
More Torture	No	Yes	Yes
Worse Respect for Women’s Rights	Yes	?	No
More State Repression of Protesters	Yes	NA	NA
Freedom of Association and Assembly	?	No	No
Freedom of Foreign Movement	No	Yes	No
Freedom of Speech	No	Yes	No
Higher Level of Negative Horizontal Inequality	No	Yes	Yes
Higher Level of Positive Horizontal Inequality	No	No	No
A Large Group of People Discriminated Against in Society	Yes	Yes	Yes
Higher Level of Vertical Inequality	No	No	No

Note: “?” means that there were inconsistent results among the results of the statistical models that we used or that the results for onset and greater number of events were statistically significant but inconsistent. “No” means that results for all models were statistically insignificant or in a direction we did not anticipate. “NA” means not applicable, because the relationship was not tested.

Figure 4: Factors associated with either increased risk of onset or greater numbers of violent protests, terrorism events, or civil war deaths

This table supports the findings of Figure 1 and Figure 2, in that a lower level of respect for these rights increase the risk of terrorist acts and civil war. It also indicates that when government refrain from conducting disappearances, they are less likely to experience civil war or acts of terrorism; governments that extrajudicially kill their citizens are at a greater risk of violent protests and civil war; states that engage in political imprisonments are more likely to have increased civil war deaths and terrorism; and that the use of torture increases the number of both acts of terrorism and civil war.⁵⁰ Although extrajudicial killings have been termed as an extreme form of abuse, it is intriguing that it does not increase the risk of terrorist attacks.

⁴⁹ David Cingranelli et al., “Human Rights Violations and Violent Internal Conflict,” *Social Sciences* 8, no. 2 (January 28, 2019): 41, <https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci8020041>, 23.

⁵⁰ David Cingranelli et al., “Human Rights Violations and Violent Internal Conflict,” 18.

In order to understand the reasoning behind this, it is important to view the motivations of a group. One possibility can be that extrajudicial killings have become more common as a countermeasure for terrorism. Another possible reason is that NSAGs which use terrorist tactics are often ready to die for their cause. Many groups have adopted suicide bombing as a tactic, and therefore many of these individuals have a martyr mentality; it is honorable to die fighting for what they believe in. Therefore, getting killed by a state is not as severe of an abuse as disappearances are. This will be explored more in the motivations section.

A key argument against this causal link is made by some scholars that indicate this relationship could be reversed; rather than armed conflict increasing due to repression, it could be that increased violence by NSAGs force governments to suppress or repress these physical integrity rights. Although not much research exists on this relationship, the few studies that have attempted to analyze this link have not been completely successful. For instance, Shor et al. (2014) attempted to quantitatively prove this reversed link but instead they concluded that “at least when it comes to domestic terrorism, the now well-established association between terrorism and state repression may be largely due to the effects of repression on terrorism rather than the other way around.”⁵¹ Therefore, this argument is yet to be proven.

Repression and Tactical Diversity

Research conducted in the 1980s, focusing on organizational behavior, found that militant groups diversify their strategies and tactics while responding to external pressures⁵², but

⁵¹ Eran Shor et al., “Terrorism and State Repression of Human Rights: A Cross-National Time-Series Analysis,” *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 55, no. 4 (August 2014): 294–317, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0020715214552460>, 309.

⁵² Michael C. Horowitz, Evan Perkoski, and Philip B.K. Potter, “Tactical Diversity in Militant Violence,” *International Organization* 72, no. 1 (2018): 139–71, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818317000467>, 145.

it was not until recently that scholars analyzed the specifics of this diversification. Horowitz, Perkoski, and Potter (2017) build on this notion and find that there is a direct link between repression and tactical diversity. They state that “in the face of substantial repression from the state, militants rely on tactical expansion to circumvent defenses, improve their success rate, and ultimately ensure their continued relevance.”⁵³

One of the unintended consequences of repressive politics is that often instead of weakening these non-state armed actors, they become emboldened and can lead to an increase in violence through retaliation. In addition, successful operations by these groups in response are especially important in regard to state crackdown since it signals a group’s “continued capacity, resolve, and viability – all of which are necessary to bolster organizational cohesion and [to] maintain external support.”⁵⁴ Furthermore, when repression is indiscriminate, it can further anger local populations and provide legitimacy for the group’s use of violence.⁵⁵ And in the case of the NSAGs, the failure to retaliate regardless of the level of escalation, “can undercut popular support and seriously threaten the group’s long term viability.”⁵⁶ Thus, these authors contend that following substantial repression from their state, armed actors rely on tactical expansion which usually includes strategies with increased violence.⁵⁷ This is depicted through Figure 5 below⁵⁸:

⁵³ Michael C. Horowitz, Evan Perkoski, and Philip B.K. Potter, “Tactical Diversity in Militant Violence,” *International Organization* 72, no. 1 (2018): 139–71, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818317000467>, 141.

⁵⁴ Michael C. Horowitz, Evan Perkoski, and Philip B.K. Potter, “Tactical Diversity in Militant Violence,” 146.

⁵⁵ Michael C. Horowitz, Evan Perkoski, and Philip B.K. Potter, “Tactical Diversity in Militant Violence,” 146.

⁵⁶ Horowitz, Perkoski, and Potter, “Tactical Diversity in Militant Violence,” 146.

⁵⁷ Horowitz, Perkoski, and Potter, “Tactical Diversity in Militant Violence,” 148.

⁵⁸ Horowitz, Perkoski, and Potter, “Tactical Diversity in Militant Violence,” 154.




Figure 5: Repression, Competition, and Tactical Diversity

Horowitz, Perkosi, and Potter (2017) find that the number of tactics a group will use will increase by at least one tactic when exposed to more levels of repression from the state. As seen through this graph, the two specific incentives that force these groups to move away from status quo towards tactical expansion are state repression and intergroup competition.⁵⁹

Although, this study, along with the other quantitative studies analyzed so far are necessary for establishing the kind of link NSAGs and repression have, it is equally as important to understand how the state's obligations to these rights affect these actors and their decision-making.

Therefore, the next sections will explore the state's obligation to protect these rights and what is motivating the actions of these armed groups.

⁵⁹ The relation of intergroup competition will be explored further within Section VI on Motivating Factors.

V. Rights Obligations and Security Trade-Off

States have an obligation to protect the rights of all individuals. As nicely summarized by Cingranelli et al. (2019):

The UN framework of human rights responsibilities for states stipulates that they have the obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill the rights included in international treaties. The obligation to respect means that states must refrain from interfering with or curtailing the enjoyment of human rights. The obligation to protect requires states to protect individuals against human rights abuses committed by agents of the state (e.g., police, soldiers or prison guards), private actors and/or corporate entities. Finally, the obligation to fulfill means that states must take positive action to facilitate the enjoyment of basic human rights. Thus, state action or inaction can violate human rights.⁶⁰

In the case of these NSAGs, the state's action through the active violation of physical integrity rights, along with inaction with regard to holding the system accountable, depicts its' failure to this obligation. It is important to note that although this framework has created societal norms, is it still not legally binding for states. Even though states may sign and ratify a treaty stating that physical integrity rights must be protected, in the event that those states violate these rights, no legal procedure exists to hold them sufficiently accountable. This becomes even more complex viewing the rights of non-state armed groups as the violation of their rights can be easily justified. For instance, labeling certain groups or individuals as terrorist provides governments with the framework to legally bend these obligations and their own laws.

This was seen through both Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, where individuals were arbitrarily arrested, imprisoned and then subjected to torture. Especially viewing Abu Ghraib, Bruce Hoffman states that "they were just ordinary people that were swept up because the United States could not get any intelligence and people got the sense that [they didn't think] there was

⁶⁰ David Cingranelli et al., "Human Rights Violations and Violent Internal Conflict," *Social Sciences* 8, no. 2 (January 28, 2019): 41, <https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci8020041>, 3.

approval to do this to terrorists.”⁶¹ When this information hit the public and the images were released, it not only negatively impacted the worldview of the U.S. but also helped provide these armed actors with more sympathy for their cause by local populations and fueled anger against the United States. Additionally, when states or individuals of the state who violate these rights are not held accountable, it reinforces a group’s understanding that the only way forward is to continue using violence.

Despite this, many prominent people hold the belief that restricting certain rights is an unfortunate but necessary cost as a security tradeoff to ensure the prevention of militant, insurgent, and/or terrorist attacks.⁶² Some believe that protecting physical integrity rights and other political freedoms restricts a state’s ability to monitor, interrogate, and catch perpetrators. This also stems from the findings of some studies which indicate that democracies, and thereby societies which protect human rights, may be more vulnerable to armed conflict than others.⁶³ However, the aforementioned studies paint a different picture. It can be seen through this research that the lower a government’s respect is for these rights, the more incidences of attacks occur.

Another important aspect of security is that it has been found that counter measures are negatively impacted when a state abuses physical integrity rights. Walsh and Piazza (2010) hypothesize within their research that this is true for three reasons: it alienates the state from its own population that can help give intelligence on these groups; that the violation of these rights causes conflict with other political entities within the state and therefore damages the efficacy of the state’s own policy for counterterrorism; and that it reduces the willingness of the

⁶¹ Bruce Hoffman, Interviewed by Manmeet Kaur Nijjer, September 29, 2021.

⁶² James I. Walsh and James A. Piazza, “Why Respecting Physical Integrity Rights Reduces Terrorism,” *Comparative Political Studies* 43, no. 5 (May 2010): 551–77, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414009356176>, 552.

⁶³ James I. Walsh and James A. Piazza, “Why Respecting Physical Integrity Rights Reduces Terrorism,” 552.

international community to cooperate with the government.⁶⁴ Their research finds that physical integrity violations that were committed in campaigns against terrorist activity “bred political opposition that placed the government on the defensive, provoked scrutiny of counterterrorism policy, and eventually propelled the government into political crisis, damaging the coherence of its counterterrorism policy and often, it’s very ability to maintain power.”⁶⁵

A similar argument is made for counter insurgency measures in that a “key difference between successful and failed counterinsurgency campaigns is a policy of ‘rectitude’ rather than repression.”⁶⁶ Rectitude can be defined as actions which stem from morally correct or upright behavior. For instance, in cases where states and their military officials offered “generous treatment of civilian populations in which insurgents lodged and humane treatment of captured insurgents – counterinsurgency efforts were successful.”⁶⁷ As Walsh and Piazza state, “this is why competitions between a government and terrorists are often described as a ‘battle of hearts and minds’ of the populace. Abuse of physical integrity rights makes it more difficult for the government to win this battle.”⁶⁸

Additionally, much debate has also occurred between “those who insist on the primacy at all times of the need to nurture and protect liberal values, especially with regard to civil liberties, and those who assert the primacy of security, especially when dealing with individuals and groups who care little for these values and who seek to exploit perceived weakness.”⁶⁹ In response to those that assert the primacy of security, the exploitation of perceived weakness is not a valid argument against the protection of physical integrity rights. For instance, if a

⁶⁴ James I. Walsh and James A. Piazza, “Why Respecting Physical Integrity Rights Reduces Terrorism,” *Comparative Political Studies* 43, no. 5 (May 2010): 551–77, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414009356176>, 552.

⁶⁵ James I. Walsh and James A. Piazza, “Why Respecting Physical Integrity Rights Reduces Terrorism,” 559.

⁶⁶ Walsh and Piazza, “Why Respecting Physical Integrity Rights Reduces Terrorism,” 555.

⁶⁷ Walsh and Piazza, “Why Respecting Physical Integrity Rights Reduces Terrorism,” 555.

⁶⁸ Walsh and Piazza, “Why Respecting Physical Integrity Rights Reduces Terrorism,” 557.

⁶⁹ Lawrence Freedman, “Terrorism as a Strategy,” *Government and Opposition* 42, no. 3 (2007): 314–39, 338.

government does not violate an individual's freedom from torture or extrajudicial killing, that is not perceived as a weakness. On the contrary, these violations can make members of the society sympathetic for a group's cause and in some cases, it even helps non-state armed actors with recruitment. As Bruce Hoffman says in a recent interview:

Sometimes, I don't think we fully appreciate the damage that's done by collateral casualties. We think we can just pay people off or say we're sorry. But I think it has a much more corrosive impact and [undermines] American values. I write this in *Inside Terrorism* and I wrote it in the 1980s, after the retaliatory bombing of Libya called Operation El Dorado Canyon, that innocent civilians are innocent civilians – whether they are Libyans or Americans or the Turk who was killed in the West Berlin disco bombing – and any military action that's killing civilians. You know, General McChrystal was absolutely adamant about this, and even his commanders complained that they were so constrained; but that was exactly the right way to fight it. Because you're just handing your enemy ammunition and you're just completely undermining all the values that you're trying to impact because everybody thinks the United States are just hypocrites. So, that to me is the most important thing – not falling into the strategy of provocation and understanding that the terrorists are provoking you or baiting you to make the kinds of mistakes that, historically, governments just keep repeating.⁷⁰

As viewed through the quantitative research which exists, not only the killing of civilians but the violation of all physical integrity rights, including those done to members of these armed groups, can lead into increased violence. And as one falls into this strategy of provocation, often an involuntary cyclical process begins of tit-for-tat violence and retaliation, a phenomenon coined by Martha Crenshaw as engrenage.⁷¹ Within this cycle, both state and non-state actors lose control of violence in such a manner that no end to the conflict is visible.

Concerning the statement that armed groups do not care about these values or morality, there isn't sufficient enough data to support this claim. Previously conducted studies have primarily focused on quantitative analysis, and the small amount of qualitative data which exists

⁷⁰ Bruce Hoffman, Interviewed by Manmeet Kaur Nijjer, September 29, 2021.

⁷¹ Martha Crenshaw, "The Effectiveness of Terrorism in the Algerian War," in *Terrorism in Context* (The Pennsylvania State University, 1995), 475.

does not dive into the values of an armed actor. Furthermore, it is restrictive to focus solely on the feelings of these individuals. Instead, the question should be broader; what motivations fuel these groups to increase their violence following a state's violation of physical integrity rights? The answer to which will be explored within the next section.

VI. Motivating Factors for Decision Making

There has been much discussion within the academic field of armed groups on how important motivations can be in the formation of a group as well as for the continuance a group's actions. However, the impact this has on ongoing conflict has not been examined quite as extensively. Motivations are the causal factors which lead individuals to act in a particular manner. How are these motivations related to the decision-making process of these NSAGs leaders? This thesis will focus on various motivational factors and consider how significant they are in affecting armed actors and their actions. This qualitative research finds that motivations for these NSAGs are mostly tied to theories of grievance, backlash, and inter-group conflict.

Grievance

Grievance, as a motivation, can be defined as a wrong done to either an individual or a group which can cause resentment over any issue. Within armed conflict, this typically comes up as a resentment of inequality, discrimination, racism, or infliction of some harm. However, recently conducted research indicates that grievance is more of a motivating factor for these NSAGs. This can be seen through the findings of Cingranelli et al. (2019) as they state that institutionalized discrimination and marginalization reinforce cleavages where "members of one

ethnic group have significantly fewer resources and political power” than members of a different ethnic group.⁷²

Regarding infliction of harm, many academic scholars find that state repression has an enormous role in perpetuating these grievances. Walsh and Piazza (2010) contend that “state repression can foster conditions under which ethnic, religious, or social groups experience communal discrimination, constructing what is referred to in the internal conflict literature as ‘collective grievances’ against the state or political status quo.”⁷³ Additionally, as Kalyvas (2004) argues, this abuse of human rights and indiscriminate violence by the state victimizes “many nonterrorists and turn some of them against the government, especially when there is an active and organized group that can provide them with some promise of retribution against the government’s actions.”⁷⁴

This retributive attitude becomes even more complex when a government specifically uses political imprisonment or disappearances as mentioned in the last section.⁷⁵ These “coercive techniques” in turn create more civilian grievances and dissatisfaction than any other kind of physical integrity right violation because “citizens perceive political imprisonment and disappearances as the direct result of the deliberate policy choices of politicians.”⁷⁶ Thus propelling even more individuals towards these NSAGs as non-violent political options seem to impact no real change. As stated by Hoffman and McCormick (2004), most non-state armed groups, especially those that use terrorist tactics, want to draw attention to their grievances. In

⁷² David Cingranelli et al., “Human Rights Violations and Violent Internal Conflict,” *Social Sciences* 8, no. 2 (January 28, 2019): 41, <https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci8020041>, 6.

⁷³ James I. Walsh and James A. Piazza, “Why Respecting Physical Integrity Rights Reduces Terrorism,” *Comparative Political Studies* 43, no. 5 (May 2010): 551–77, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414009356176>, 557.

⁷⁴ James I. Walsh and James A. Piazza, “Why Respecting Physical Integrity Rights Reduces Terrorism,” 558.

⁷⁵ David Cingranelli et al., “Human Rights Violations and Violent Internal Conflict,” *Social Sciences* 8, no. 2 (January 28, 2019): 41, <https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci8020041>, 7.

⁷⁶ David Cingranelli et al., “Human Rights Violations and Violent Internal Conflict,” 7.

fact, they “plan attacks in ways that maximize popular and media attention” and the violations of these human rights “augments these grievances” making effective appeals for support.⁷⁷

This claim is also supported by Bruce Hoffman who has interviewed scores of these actors in places like Ireland, Turkey, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Palestine, and Israel. He finds that its always “idiosyncratic when it comes to terrorists but the one thing that [he] always hears is that it was generally something done by the security forces to ... an elderly relative or to a young relative or some act of humiliation or dishonor or some lack of justice that motivates an individual.”⁷⁸ Thus, there seems to be quite an important link between grievance and the escalation of violence by these actors.

It is also important to note that often the argument is presented that grievance is used as an excuse by most if not all armed groups to justify their actions, when in reality their motivations stem from a less moral and more practical place. Two such scholars are Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler who examine the theory of grievance and greed, in the context of civil war, and find that greed is a much more likely motivator than grievance.⁷⁹ Greed, within this research, implied that groups which engage in armed conflict do so for the financial opportunities they are given. Thus, both grievance and financial opportunity are analyzed as motivations within the next chapter through the examining of the Irish Republican Army.

⁷⁷ James I. Walsh and James A. Piazza, “Why Respecting Physical Integrity Rights Reduces Terrorism,” *Comparative Political Studies* 43, no. 5 (May 2010): 551–77, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414009356176>, 557.

⁷⁸ Bruce Hoffman, Interviewed by Manmeet Kaur Nijjer, September 29, 2021.

⁷⁹ Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” *The World Bank Development Research Group*, no. 2355 (May 2000), 26.

Backlash

Backlash refers to the “extent to which government threats or imposition of punishment increases the future incidence of prohibited behavior.”⁸⁰ Although backlash and grievance are not mutually inclusive, often punishment dealt out by the state can be perceived as part of a collective grievance which in turn causes actors to respond with escalated violence. As Goodwin (2001) contends “state repression creates the belief among the population that there is ‘no other way out’ besides armed revolt against an unjust and abusive regime.”⁸¹ Hoffman similarly states that these armed actors “always feel that they are reluctant warriors so it’s always some incident or act that they see as humiliating and insulting but also aggressive and violent. And this is often what leads them to the conclusion that only violence can remedy the situation.”⁸² Therefore, following this repression, which is seen as unjust punishment by these armed actors, beginning the use of violence or increasing it seems like the only option. Thus, backlash is also a variable for decision-making analyzed while viewing the case study Chapter Three.

Inter-Group Conflict

Inter-group conflict can be defined as hostility or confrontation between two or more groups for a similar or common goal. In regard to armed conflict, “competition amongst groups is one of the biggest factors that drives up terrorist attacks ... it also contributes to their severity and lethality.”⁸³ On an organizational basis, leaders of these groups have to “satisfy the demands

⁸⁰ Gary Lafree, Laura Dugan, and Raven Korte, “The Impact of British Counterterrorism Strategies on Political Violence in Northern Ireland: Comparing Deterrence and Backlash Models,” *American Society of Criminology* 47, no. 1 (2009), 19.

⁸¹ David Cingranelli et al., “Human Rights Violations and Violent Internal Conflict,” *Social Sciences* 8, no. 2 (January 28, 2019): 41, <https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci8020041>, 6.

⁸² Bruce Hoffman, Interviewed by Manmeet Kaur Nijjer, September 29, 2021.

⁸³ Bruce Hoffman, Interviewed by Manmeet Kaur Nijjer, September 29, 2021.

of their followers” and that means that they have to always be “fashioning activities of a war, which mean violence.”⁸⁴ This is quite similar to the argument put forth by Lawrence Freedman:

If a leader decides that terrorism is not working and something else must be tried, or asks militants to exercise restraint while negotiations are explored, then erstwhile followers can form a new group or follow another leader who is urging no compromise. Radical groups may abandon or moderate militant and violent campaigns because of constant frustration and attrition but it is always difficult to do so as a matter of strategic choice because they see opportunities in elections or non-violent campaigns.⁸⁵

Therefore, using this argument logically, it could be that when a state violates certain rights of civilians or members of the group, leaders need to take action in order to keep their followers satisfied. For instance, if a government opens fire at a civilian crowd resulting in the death of many or if a member of the group is disappeared without due process, the followers of a group may demand retaliation for this violence. Consequently, if a leader does not respond to these violations, members may leave and join another group. Additionally, these groups have to change and adapt their tactics depending on whether or not they have been successful in the past so that they can remain a competitor within a certain region. Therefore, leaders of NSAGs can be motivated by inter-group conflict to increase violence or their tactical diversity to ensure that their followers do not leave.

To illustrate, Bruce Hoffman gives an account for competition amongst groups and the use of suicide bombing, which is categorized as one of the most extreme terrorist tactics:

These groups can demonstrate that they’re so committed to the cause that they are willing to put their lives [on the line], that they are more violent and therefore more effective than their rivals ... [for instance,] Hamas had been using suicide terrorism, then the Palestine Islamic Jihad did and then when the second intifada started no one cared about the Fatah. So, Fatah created the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. And it’s fascinating that 59 suicide attacks were carried out in that one year, compared to the 62 attacks in total carried out in the last eight years. It was clearly a competition and you could see that. Fatah is a secular group ... but they adopted a cover name

⁸⁴ Bruce Hoffman, Interviewed by Manmeet Kaur Nijjer, September 29, 2021.

⁸⁵ Lawrence Freedman, “Terrorism as a Strategy,” *Government and Opposition* 42, no. 3 (2007): 314–39, 337.

for their suicide terrorist operations that was completely evocative of religion ... So, you can see the competition in there – declining popularity against the more religious groups like Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad meant that they had to follow suit with their tactics and adopt a name that was [more religious] than the religious groups.⁸⁶

This statement further proves the quantitative analysis found within Figure 5, in that inter-group conflict can lead to an adoption of another tactic. This leads to several questions. Can this relation clearly be seen in other NSAGs? To what extent do groups motivated by this competition react to physical integrity violations? Is there any evidence of combined motivations – in which both grievance and inter-group conflict can be seen? How is the decision-making process of the leaders for these groups affected by competition? The answers to these questions will be sought through the Irish Republican Army examined within the next chapter.

⁸⁶ Bruce Hoffman, Interviewed by Manmeet Kaur Nijjer, September 29, 2021.

Chapter Three: A Qualitative Approach to the Irish Republican Army

In order to understand this increase in violence following state abuse of physical integrity rights, it is essential to view how the decision-making process for these non-state armed groups is made. Therefore, based on sufficient historically collected data and the successfully conducted interviews for this research, the case study chosen to be analyzed is the Irish Republican Army (IRA).⁸⁷ The data for analysis includes interviews conducted for this thesis, selected archival data, scholarly articles, historical books, and sources from human rights NGOs. The chapter begins with a historical brief on the IRA in which inter-group conflict and escalated violence is viewed. Next, reasonings for member recruitment and financial support are examined. Following this, the violations of physical integrity rights by the British state and its entities are put forth. Then, strategic and tactical measures are explored. And finally, throughout the chapter, motivational factors are analyzed.

I. Irish Republican Army

Although, violence can be seen in the region dating back centuries, the advent of the IRA and the first violation of physical integrity rights within this armed conflict occurred during the Rebellion of 1916; when rather than giving a command to arrest the individuals rebelling, shoot to kill orders were issued to the British army. The British “executed the principal leaders of the revolt, imprisoned others, imposed martial law, and hanged Sir Roger Casement.”⁸⁸ This in turn

⁸⁷ An attempt to conduct research with various former non-state armed groups was made however, due to COVID-19 restrictions and a limited time frame, the data collected primarily focused on the Irish Republican Army. Therefore, this thesis consists of one case study, rather than the intended several. In future research, the hypothesis analyzed here will be used as a foundation to examine other armed groups.

⁸⁸ Tim Pat Coogan, *The IRA*, Fully rev. and updated, 1st Palgrave ed (New York: Palgrave for St. Martin’s Press, 2002), 21.

led to “great roaring fires of patriotism” and increased violence by the Irish Volunteers.⁸⁹ Due to this increase in violence, a truce was attempted and in December of 1921 the Treaty was announced for setting up an Irish Free State, which would be made of “twenty-six of Ireland’s thirty-two counties.”⁹⁰ After these newly created Irelands, things began to slip into a sense of normalcy until the 1960s which saw the death of a weakened IRA; the arrival of a non-nationalist peaceful civil rights movement; loyalist aggression along with government anxiousness due to the possibility of renewed violence; and eventually the birth of the Provisionals.⁹¹

In 1968, a series of protest marches occurred – some were quite peaceful while others, unfortunately, were not. A Derry demonstration against discrimination in housing and employment occurred where Eamonn McCann, one of the main organizers, stated that “the march was trapped between two cordons of police in Duke Street and batoned into disarray.”⁹² The state’s brutality and abuse were displayed across global media as images and videos were broadcasted on televisions. Although the government and police tried to frame this as a response to IRA disturbance, “there was no way they could refute the charges of brutality or wish away the images of uniformed thugs batoning defenseless people.”⁹³

In response, “1969 was to witness the birth of the bloody troubles and of their most lethal offspring: The Provisional IRA.”⁹⁴ During this time, members of the IRA asked the higher command for supply of arms to fight back, however this was not granted. It was then that

⁸⁹ Tim Pat Coogan, *The IRA*, Fully rev. and updated, 1st Palgrave ed (New York: Palgrave for St. Martin’s Press, 2002), 21.

⁹⁰ Richard English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 30.

⁹¹ Richard English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA*, 81.

⁹² English, *Armed Struggle*, 100.

⁹³ English, *Armed Struggle*, 100.

⁹⁴ English, *Armed Struggle*, 101.

“suggestions that a separate Northern Command be formed” started.⁹⁵ On December 18, 1969, “thirteen dissident delegates from the IRA Convention and thirteen of their supporters – met and elected a twelve-member Provisional IRA executive, who in turn chose a seven-member Provisional IRA Army Council – with Seán MacStiofáin as its Chief of Staff.”⁹⁶ The new IRA was born.

Consequently, the motivating factors seen here are backlash and inter-group conflict. Following the state brutality which took place during these protests and the uptick in loyalist aggression, members of the IRA wanted to retaliate but the leadership did not give them access to arms. Therefore, this new IRA was formed and since its creation stemmed from the need to retaliate, the new leadership had to appease their followers. Thus, explaining why the IRA began to utilize more violent tactics – which will be explored later in this chapter – and overall increased its number of attacks. This escalation of violence was also aided by the increase in recruitment and financial support received which is analyzed in the next section.

Member Recruitment and Financial Support

Recruitment of new members is an important aspect concerning non-state armed groups. Often times, a depleted number of foot soldiers can cause a group’s decline. Conversely, an uptick in recruitment helps NSAGs not only continue steadily towards their strategic goals, but also allows for an increase in attacks. Therefore, increased recruitment can be directly linked to an increase in attacks, and in some cases, tactics as well. For instance, the usage of suicide bombing, in its very definition, leads to the death of members. If a group has a limited

⁹⁵ Tim Pat Coogan, *The IRA*, Fully rev. and updated, 1st Palgrave ed (New York: Palgrave for St. Martin’s Press, 2002), 333.

⁹⁶ Richard English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 106.

membership, less use of this tactic may be seen. Thus, within the interviews conducted, one question consisted of why these individuals decided to join the IRA and their roles in the overall structure of operations. A Former Member of the Irish Republican Army states that:

The arrival of the British Army, for a young teenager who was going about their business, [and] the militarization of the conflict was very much in your face ... in the area where I lived, there was a lot of killings by the state paramilitary forces which were the s-squads as we called them, like the UVF ... and we knew it very much at the time that those groups which were actually doing the killings were state forces linked with those groups. By day, I suppose they were patrolling the street as state forces and then by night, they were going out as part of these paramilitary groups and killing just nationalists, republicans within the area ... To me, the state was at war with our community and so that's when I made a decision that [joining] was the only route I would take if I was going to make any sort of difference. I was an active volunteer so I was engaging with the state, in whatever way we could.⁹⁷

In a similar manner, an Ex-IRA Volunteer says that:

I was a young person grouping up in the six counties in the north of Ireland, from 1969 into 1970. It was the experience of being in an oppressive state ... And the response to Bloody Sunday, for a lot of people of my generation, [was] to fight back through military struggle and the IRA was the only organization that provided that platform ... It was the right thing to do. I ended up being involved in the quartermaster's department ... [in which] my responsibility was hiding weapons or explosives or ammunition.⁹⁸

When asked the same question, a Former Republican Prisoner replies with:

Well, I joined following Bloody Sunday ... I came to the eventual conclusion that I'd been working on in my head for years, that things were not going to be changed, that people had to change them. I had been involved very peripherally in the civil rights marches ... and I knew nobody within the republican movement. A lot of things were coming together, and one of those things coming together was the growing, educated, young, nationalist people who wanted a better life ... and if you don't give in to any reform, you'll have revolution. Simple as. And there wasn't timely reform [politically], therefore, the revolution kicked off and it was a snowball rolling down the hill. They couldn't stop it. The republican movement was not like a standard standing army. We were all basically amateurs ... I was a civil servant, what was I doing with weapons or bombs, you know? But, to the best of your ability you then took part.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ Interviewed by Manmeet Kaur Nijjer, July 7, 2021.

⁹⁸ Interviewed by Manmeet Kaur Nijjer, July 8, 2021.

⁹⁹ Interviewed by Manmeet Kaur Nijjer, July 9, 2021.

In all three of these answers, each individual mentions at least one event where the abuse of a physical integrity right, extrajudicial killing, occurred. While the first member speaks about these killings which happened throughout this time period, the other two interviewees mention Bloody Sunday specifically, a massacre explained in further detail within the next section. This shows that the abuse of these rights, specifically extrajudicial killings is linked to an increase in recruitment. Therefore, in the case of recruitment, it seems grievance is the main motivational factor. Due to these violations, these members felt that the only way to fight back against these killings was to join in the IRA.

Some other related aspects which are essential to continuing an armed group's attacks are through the use of financial means, material goods, and sympathetic support from the community. As one of the interviewees mentions, regarding the prison struggles which occurred during internment, the "hunger strikes took place which had a big impact in terms of people coming forward to the IRA, ... and with the overall sympathy, people offered assistance to the IRA in terms of support and resources."¹⁰⁰ In this case, arbitrary arrests and imprisonment by the state in turn led to more sympathy and support for the IRA. These violations also led to aid coming in from the international community. As another interviewee states:

Initially, the IRA was quite heavily involved in using whatever it could and resources came from the United States, machine guns and occult weapons, but eventually that started to dry up and basically money came from the U.S. so, the IRA began to look elsewhere. The most famous are the Libyan I suppose. It's not necessarily that we were supporters of Gaddafi, but as soon as you got the weaponry over, the Irish befriended them. After these supplies arrived, it considerably changed the tactical approach to the war which allowed the IRA to carry out many major operations, both against individual agents of the state and state structures.¹⁰¹

¹⁰⁰ Interviewed by Manmeet Kaur Nijjer, July 7, 2021.

¹⁰¹ Interviewed by Manmeet Kaur Nijjer, July 9, 2021.

Even though the specific reasoning behind this help from Libya is not present, it seems that power dynamics and collective grievance may have played a role. And along with material support in weaponry that the IRA received, the financial support they received also made a big difference in available resources. Generally, within these armed conflict situations, individuals or entities outside of the region may support by monetary means as sympathizers. As for the IRA, many Irish folk who had immigrated to different countries supported by sending financial support back to Ireland. According to an Academic Supporter:

A long time ago, they used to have an Irish Day in Brooklyn, in this big open area space. As a young person I went to one of these and saw the IRA had a sort of tent there with all their information and I said, let me approach them and they had this way of supporting the IRA with monies. I signed up and I supported them with money for a while. And I always kept up with what was going on there. So, I was always supportive. It's just the matter of basic humanity ... you know the killings of Catholics in Northern Ireland which the IRA was fighting. I said, who's in the right here and of course it was the IRA. They were branded as terrorists by the British because that was the only way they had to fight back ... I knew of people whose families have been tortured and killed. They had no choice.¹⁰²

Although there may be several factors which lead individuals or entities to materially or financially support NSAGs, it seems that grievance linked to the violations of physical integrity rights are one of the biggest motivators. This interviewee did not have a prior link to the group, other than being an Irish person in Brooklyn who condoned the extrajudicial killings and torture occurring in the north of Ireland. Therefore, they believed that they had to support, which was possible through monetary means, and this in turn provided resources to the IRA to continue their attacks. These violations of physical integrity rights are explored in more depth within the next section.

¹⁰² Interviewed by Manmeet Kaur Nijjer, September 16, 2021

Violations of Physical Integrity Rights

There are some notable state violations of physical integrity rights which exacerbated the violence of the IRA. A major violation seen during this conflict was that of arbitrary arrest and political imprisonment. One significant event was the internment period of 1971 to 1975 in which 2,158 orders of imprisonment were given and “erroneous arrests” of non-afflicted individuals occurred without any trial.¹⁰³ This was seen as “solely an anti-Republican and Catholic measure ... accordingly no Protestants were seized although there was a litany of criminal activity on that side of the fence visible for all to see – if they wanted to.”¹⁰⁴ This was seen by members of the IRA and sympathizers as blatant discrimination regarding prosecution of crimes. Also, it has been documented that many of the Catholics that were locked up during this time “for the most part had little or nothing to do with the IRA.”¹⁰⁵ As a Former Member contends:

They brought people in, people who weren't involved in the IRA at all, and basically abused them until they confessed something they weren't involved in. So, that the whole criminal justice system was used to legitimize human rights abuses ... it very much became a part of the state apparatus. If you end up at an interrogation center, and you're tortured until you confess something you haven't done, you end up in prison. You were just lost then, in terms of broader society caring about what happened to you or believing that any wrong was done to you.¹⁰⁶

This depicts that not only were arbitrary arrests made, but torture was also utilized in order for the state to obtain false confessions. The interviewee also touches upon an important aspect of grievance as injustice to those that were not involved with the IRA at all and the inefficient criminal justice system. This is also mentioned by an Ex-IRA Volunteer who states:

¹⁰³ Gary Lafree, Laura Dugan, and Raven Korte, “The Impact of British Counterterrorism Strategies on Political Violence in Northern Ireland: Comparing Deterrence and Backlash Models,” *American Society of Criminology* 47, no. 1 (2009), 36.

¹⁰⁴ Tim Pat Coogan, *The IRA*, Fully rev. and updated, 1st Palgrave ed (New York: Palgrave for St. Martin's Press, 2002), 343.

¹⁰⁵ Tim Pat Coogan, *The IRA*, 343.

¹⁰⁶ Interviewed by Manmeet Kaur Nijjer, July 7, 2021.

With the introduction of internment in 1971, you have the case of what became known as hooded men. These were a number of men that were singled out for very specific interrogation techniques, they were used as guinea pigs and experimentation of torture techniques ... [and as for no prosecution] the rationale of this is a colonial mindset that the British brought to this conflict in the North that basically allowed their army to view the Irish as less worthy. So, it was okay for them to torture and kill people.¹⁰⁷

Another violation of physical integrity rights found within this conflict is extrajudicial killings. A major event of this violation was Bloody Sunday, a massacre which took place on January 30, 1972. This was when the British paratroopers shot into an unarmed demonstration of the Civil Rights procession. As accounted, “thirteen people were shot dead and, in the countrywide wave of indignation which followed, the British Embassy in Dublin was burned down.”¹⁰⁸ Fuel was added to this situation as the inquiry into this event exonerated the paratroopers which defended their decision by stating that shots had been fired at them, and that their lives were in danger. Several eyewitness accounts responded to this, including well-known journalists, that there were no shots fired before the army began to shoot.¹⁰⁹ But the inquiry was not revisited.

These killings were widespread and most members of the IRA knew at least one individual who was extrajudicially killed, which in turn made non-existent prosecution more personal. For example, as one member says, “we witnessed sons, neighbors, or the sons of neighbors and in some instances, the daughters of neighbors being shot down. I mean, during the early 1970s in particular, it wasn’t unusual during rioting for British soldiers to fire at and kill people.”¹¹⁰ Similarly, another former member states:

¹⁰⁷ Interviewed by Manmeet Kaur Nijjer, July 8, 2021.

¹⁰⁸ Tim Pat Coogan, *The IRA*, Fully rev. and updated, 1st Palgrave ed (New York: Palgrave for St. Martin’s Press, 2002), 344.

¹⁰⁹ Tim Pat Coogan, *The IRA*, 344.

¹¹⁰ Interviewed by Manmeet Kaur Nijjer, July 8, 2021.

In terms of arbitrary killings, I mean I'm trying to think on the top of my head, of the many people that I know and called close friends, I would count six were killed by state forces. And there were many more that I knew one way or other. And that's just by state forces themselves, not including those killed by loyalist paramilitaries. Once again, none of the state forces were prosecuted for it; they were seen as just separatist legitimate state killings. So, to me, you watched the state very much at its rawest point, it's the ability of what it can do and what it can get away with whenever these things become sort of normalized ... and the use of plastic bullets, for example, to deliberately target children. I mean, a number of children had been killed with plastic bullets that were deliberately fired – a plastic bullet fired at a child's head is going to kill it and that's what happened. But it had been covered up and no prosecution existed.¹¹¹

This shows that, within the minds of these armed actors, protection against extrajudicial killings and the prosecution of those that committed these atrocities are important. Another major event in which the state abused this physical integrity right occurred over a three-day-period, known as the Falls Road curfew. On July 3rd, “an area was cordoned off, placed under curfew, saturated by troops and a most vigorous and rough handed search for arms was undertaken.”¹¹² Then, for the next two days, CS gas was spread across the area. Approximately five people were killed, while sixty civilians and fifteen soldiers sustained injuries. In addition, “homes were wrecked, furniture was smashed and thrown into the streets, and needless, petty offense offered to the Catholics.”¹¹³

Here, the motivational factor of backlash can be found. Gary Lafree, along with colleagues, find that in the case of the IRA, government responses to conflict through violent means serves a “negative backlash effect” in that it increases future incidents of prohibited behavior.¹¹⁴ Through their research, these academics found that three of the six military

¹¹¹ Interviewed by Manmeet Kaur Nijjer, July 7, 2021.

¹¹² Tim Pat Coogan, *The IRA*, Fully rev. and updated, 1st Palgrave ed (New York: Palgrave for St. Martin's Press, 2002), 345.

¹¹³ Tim Pat Coogan, *The IRA*, 345.

¹¹⁴ Gary Lafree, Laura Dugan, and Raven Korte, “The Impact of British Counterterrorism Strategies on Political Violence in Northern Ireland: Comparing Deterrence and Backlash Models,” *American Society of Criminology* 47, no. 1 (2009), 17.

interventions had significant backlash effects.¹¹⁵ This can be examined through Figure 6 below¹¹⁶:




Figure 6: Attacks by Republicans and Loyalists, Northern Ireland from 1969 to 1992

As can be seen, after Falls Curfew and the Internment, violence by the IRA proliferated and decreased following the end of internment. The same is also true for the Criminalization period. Another major violation of physical integrity rights found within the conflict was torture. As a former member states, “I was arrested a number of times and it was the usual physical abuse. I mean, I would get punched in the stomach and the privates, areas in which there’s no bruises showing up. Being held in chokeholds until you almost passed out. And this was pretty much part of the course at that stage.”¹¹⁷ Often times these violations coincided with one another

¹¹⁵ Gary Lafree, Laura Dugan, and Raven Korte, “The Impact of British Counterterrorism Strategies on Political Violence in Northern Ireland: Comparing Deterrence and Backlash Models,” *American Society of Criminology* 47, no. 1 (2009), 34.

¹¹⁶ Gary Lafree, Laura Dugan, and Raven Korte, “The Impact of British Counterterrorism Strategies on Political Violence in Northern Ireland,” 33.

¹¹⁷ Interviewed by Manmeet Kaur Nijjer, July 7, 2021.

in that after being arbitrarily arrested, individuals would be tortured and, in some instances, extrajudicially killed. Another interviewee tells this at length:

I was sentenced in the court to life imprisonment and I spent 16 years in prison because they said I made a statement admitting to kill somebody. I didn't make that statement. Maybe about a year before I was imprisoned, I was held in an interrogation center and beaten over a three-day period. It's no big deal, but it was pretty horrendous. I'm one of thousands of people, thousands upon thousands where the state will do whatever it can to get people off the streets who are opposed to them. Colleagues of mine were water boarded within Belfast in 1974 and 1975. And a person who was charged with me was also water boarded, a very good friend of mine. [And in terms of killings,] what we know about the colonizers ... is that they always have to have a ready-made, local, illegal support group. And in this case, we call them Loyalists. So, the British state, the agencies of the state – the intelligence services – over the decades has been revealed, factually, mobilized killing squads to attack the Republican community, our Republican activists and kill them ... and one of the major problems is that inquests have still not been held. So, there's a whole plethora of things which the British did, which to me – an Irish Republican – reinforces the reason why they shouldn't be here. They killed us. They interned us. They falsely charged many of us. They tried to intimidate us. They told the world that we were criminals, gangsters, and terrorists. And all we are, are Irish people on the island of Ireland with a foreign army. That's our perspective ... We are not lunatics, we're not born killers, and we're not terrorists.¹¹⁸

This statement showcases the sentiment many members had – of the British as colonizers occupying Irish land as a foreign army, which the IRA was fighting. As for the specific abuse of torture, interestingly, in 1978 the Commission of Human Rights found that five distinctive techniques had been used by the British: “hooding the detainees except during interrogation; making them stand continuously against a wall in a spreadeagled and painful posture for prolonged periods of some hours; submitting them to continuous and monotonous noise; depriving them of sleep; and restricting them to a diet of one round of bread and one pint of water at six-hourly intervals.”¹¹⁹ But despite this, and other reports which found instances of torture committed by state forces, no prosecutions have been held. Taking these violations into

¹¹⁸ Interviewed by Manmeet Kaur Nijjer, July 9, 2021.

¹¹⁹ Tim Pat Coogan, *The IRA*, Fully rev. and updated, 1st Palgrave ed (New York: Palgrave for St. Martin's Press, 2002), 438.

consideration, the next section details how they are linked to the increase of violence by the Irish Republican Army.

Tactical and Strategic Measures

Following this period of increased violations of physical integrity rights, the tactical targeting and killing of politicians and other prominent members became the norm for the IRA.¹²⁰ This was even more frequently used as a tactic following the extrajudicial killing of two innocent Derry men in 1971. Concerning strategy, the use of defense, retaliation, and offense seemed to be the IRA's motto during this period. Immediately after the Fall Road curfew, for instance, anyone that could get their hands on arms did so, for their own security and defense. It was also during this period when the IRA expanded their targeting once again, to include business owners, through an economic justification of exploitation, and prison warders.¹²¹ This is explained by a Former Republican Prisoner who states that, "as things move along in a conflict situation, you realize errors, or tactical mistakes ... and a glaring realization that the Republicans got was that the British economy was more important to the British government than British lives. And what the IRA did strategically, and more so tactically, it then moved on to bombing economic targets in Britain."¹²²

This further clarifies why the IRA also increased their usage of proxy car-bombings, in that a driver was forced to drive into another vehicle under the threat of their own families' lives. On a single day in March, "one of the most spectacular of such bombs caused three-quarters of a

¹²⁰ Tim Pat Coogan, *The IRA*, 357.

¹²¹ Coogan, *The IRA*, 379.

¹²² Interviewed by Manmeet Kaur Nijjer, July 9, 2021.

million pounds' worth of damage in the centre of Belfast."¹²³ This increase in violence continued to ravage Northern Ireland. It was also during the British campaign, of this period, when civilian casualties were deliberately caused.¹²⁴ This in turn exacerbated the violence of the IRA and led them to adopting terrorist tactics. For instance, the IRA would lure individuals out with their families, lay them down on the floor, and would shoot. And Loyalist groups were doing the same, one example of which is the McGurk bar which was blown up by Loyalists in which fifteen people died including numerous families.¹²⁵ During this time, transit bombs and restaurant attacks on civilians including men, women, and children became frequent.

As a former member explains, "unfortunately, what began to happen with tactics is that ... [after] loyalists' death squads targeted Catholics or nationalists, the IRA leadership allowed itself to be drawn into begin targeting ordinary Protestant, unionist, loyalist communities. But in my mind, there is no legitimizing the targeting of civilians for whatever reason ... [even] as a response. So, we were trying to restructure and get away from that."¹²⁶ Another interviewee states that:

"We do regret the deaths of civilians when IRA operations went wrong for whatever reason ... but, at the same time, it is clear that in cases where people who were collaborating with the British forces were targeted, its legitimate in the context of a guerrilla war ... [and in terms of strategic measures and usage of tactics] most attacks were carried out based on plan and calculated action, it was not reactive however, [in the case of] Bloody Sunday and Derry in particular ... a lot of people through their anger wanted to join the IRA ... and organize IRA activity on British crime forces personnel."¹²⁷

¹²³ Tim Pat Coogan, *The IRA*, Fully rev. and updated, 1st Palgrave ed (New York: Palgrave for St. Martin's Press, 2002), 378-9.

¹²⁴ Tim Pat Coogan, *The IRA*, 380.

¹²⁵ Coogan, *The IRA*, 381.

¹²⁶ Interviewed by Manmeet Kaur Nijjer, July 7, 2021.

¹²⁷ I Interviewed by Manmeet Kaur Nijjer, July 8, 2021.

Therefore, this depicts, understandably, mixed sentiments between members of the IRA. While some believed that the IRA did begin targeting civilians, others responded by stating that it was not the intent at any time for the IRA to intentionally kill civilians. However, evidence of this targeting and its link to physical integrity rights can be viewed through a study conducted by Paul Gill and his colleagues. This study finds that the indiscriminate killing of Catholic civilians by security forces of the state increased subsequent overall bombings by the IRA; that an increase in killings attributable to British Security Forces increased subsequent IRA bombings targeting civilians; and that the indiscriminate killing of Catholic civilians by state security forces increased subsequent IRA bombings against civilian targets.¹²⁸ Therefore, not only did the extrajudicial killings by the state increase overall bombings perpetrated by the IRA, but also led to the increase of specifically targeted IRA attacks against civilians.

Additionally, sectarian murders and assassinations were common tactics used by various groups in Ireland. Loyalist paramilitary groups, for instance, would go around warning Catholic families to leave their home with threats of hooding them, implying murder. Due to the “scores of young Catholics ... found with hoods over their heads and bullets through their brains,” these threats were not taken lightly. As a response to this, civilian targeting once again rose, and quite importantly, after a steep decline of sectarian killings in 1977, civilian casualties by the IRA also declined.¹²⁹ Thus, this implies that there is a direct link between extrajudicial killings by the state along with its entities and the targeting of civilians by the IRA.

¹²⁸ Paul Gill, James A. Piazza, and John Horgan, “Counterterrorism Killings and Provisional IRA Bombings, 1970–1998,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 28, no. 3 (May 26, 2016): 473–96, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2016.1155932>, 491.

¹²⁹ Tim Pat Coogan, *The IRA*, Fully rev. and updated, 1st Palgrave ed (New York: Palgrave for St. Martin’s Press, 2002), 451.

Chapter Four: Concluding Remarks

Non-state armed group conflict is proliferating throughout the globe at an alarming rate. Therefore, understanding this complex phenomenon through its definitions, theoretical frameworks, quantitative research, and qualitative analysis is important. Utilizing quantitative data found by numerous scholars and qualitative data obtained through conducted interviews, scholarly journals, and historical books, a relationship based on violent dynamics has been found between state actors and NSAGs. This thesis finds that the state's violation of physical integrity rights does, in fact, lead to an escalation of non-state armed actors' violence.

This research, through its case study analysis, finds that state violations of arbitrary arrests or political imprisonment, extrajudicial killings, and torture have a direct link to increased IRA attacks and its tactical diversity. For instance, an increase in tactically targeting politicians, bombing economic targets, and deliberate attacks on killing civilians is seen following extrajudicial killings by the state. Viewing strategic measures, it is found that after the violations of these physical integrity rights, the IRA used defensive and retaliatory measures. And interestingly, the role of disappearances did not show up within this qualitative research. Therefore, in future research, analyzing its effects on this violence should be considered.

As for the reasoning behind this increase, numerous motivational factors were discovered. The formation of the new IRA, more violent than the previous one, was motivated by: inter-group conflict as the old IRA leadership did not provide materials to fight back; backlash as this new IRA began to increase attacks and tactics after 1969; and underlying grievance which existed as the violations of physical integrity rights continued. Concerning the recruitment of members, extrajudicial killings seem to be greatly linked to an increase in the number of foot soldiers. Collective grievances and, particularly, the use of arbitrary arrest and

imprisonment by the state was found to affect the amount of material and financial support given to the IRA. This was especially the case for monies sent by Irish folk living overseas. Greed was not a measure found within this research, however, in a greater data set it would be interesting to see if it has any relation. Interestingly, an unexpected factor was seen through the conducted interviews. Although no question regarding the criminal justice system was asked, all of the members indicated a frustration towards the lack of prosecution for these violations. The manner in which these individuals referred to this lack depicts that this unaccountability could also be a motivating factor for increased violence. As the individuals responsible for the violations of these political integrity rights were unprosecuted, members of the IRA saw fighting back with increased violence as their only option.

As respecting or violating physical integrity rights have a significant impact on the increase and decrease of violent armed group conflict, this thesis recommends that: first, international counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism policies should include the violations of these rights as indicators for a prospective increase in NSAG attacks and tactical diversity; second, policy makers and advisors should incorporate the respecting of these rights into preventing and countering measures as they may aid in the decrease of certain group's usage of more violent tactics; and lastly, third, governments internationally should understand the implications of violating these rights and should reinforce, the protection of physical integrity rights. Additionally, the research examined here is merely a starting point for comprehending the relationship between these state and non-state actors. Thus, in future research, more qualitative studies can be conducted to examine this relationship in depth, several other non-state armed groups should be analyzed through these rights violations, and more varied motivational factors can be explored.

Bibliography

- “A New Era of Conflict and Violence.” 2020. Intergovernmental Organization. United Nations. 2020. <https://www.un.org/en/un75/new-era-conflict-and-violence>.
- Alonso, Rogelio, and Fernando Reinares. 2005. “Terrorism, Human Rights and Law Enforcement in Spain.” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 17 (1–2): 265–78. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550490520727>.
- Berti, Benedetta. 2016. “What’s in a Name? Re-Conceptualizing Non-State Armed Groups in the Middle East.” *Palgrave Communications* 89 (November).
- Cingranelli, David, Skip Mark, Mark Gibney, Peter Haschke, Reed Wood, and Daniel Arnon. 2019. “Human Rights Violations and Violent Internal Conflict.” *Social Sciences* 8 (2): 41. <https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci8020041>.
- Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2000. “Greed and Grievance in Civil War.” *The World Bank Development Research Group*, no. 2355 (May).
- Coogan, Tim Pat. 2002. *The IRA*. Fully rev. and Updated, 1st Palgrave ed. New York: Palgrave for St. Martin’s Press.
- Crenshaw, Martha. 1995. “The Effectiveness of Terrorism in the Algerian War.” In *Terrorism in Context*. The Pennsylvania State University.
- English, Richard. 2003. *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.
- Freedman, Lawrence. 2007. “Terrorism as a Strategy.” *Government and Opposition* 42 (3): 314–39.
- Gill, Paul, James A. Piazza, and John Horgan. 2016. “Counterterrorism Killings and Provisional IRA Bombings, 1970–1998.” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 28 (3): 473–96. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2016.1155932>.
- Heffes, Ezequiel, Marcos D Kotlik, and Manuel J Ventura. 2020. *International Humanitarian Law and Non-State Actors Debates, Law and Practice*.
- Hoffman, Bruce. 2017. *Inside Terrorism*. Third Edition. Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Hofmann, Claudia. 2006. “Engaging Non-State Armed Groups in Humanitarian Action.” *International Peacekeeping* 13 (3): 396–409. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310600824090>.

- Horowitz, Michael C., Evan Perkoski, and Philip B.K. Potter. 2018. "Tactical Diversity in Militant Violence." *International Organization* 72 (1): 139–71.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818317000467>.
- "Human Rights Violations." 2014. Charity Website. Our World In Data. 2014.
<https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/human-rights-violations?time=2014>.
- Krause, Keith, and Jennifer Milliken. 2009. "Introduction: The Challenge of Non-State Armed Groups." *Contemporary Security Policy* 30 (2): 202–20.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260903077296>.
- Lafree, Gary, Laura Dugan, and Raven Korte. 2009. "The Impact of British Counterterrorism Strategies on Political Violence in Northern Ireland: Comparing Deterrence and Backlash Models." *American Society of Criminology* 47 (1).
- Petrasek, David. 2000. *Ends & Means: Human Rights Approaches to Armed Groups*. Versoix, Switzerland: International Council on Human Rights Policy.
- Roser, Max. 2016. "War and Peace." Charity Website. Our World In Data. 2016.
<https://ourworldindata.org/war-and-peace>.
- Shor, Eran, Jason Charmichael, Jose Ignacio Nazif Munoz, John Shandra, and Michael Schwartz. 2014. "Terrorism and State Repression of Human Rights: A Cross-National Time-Series Snaalysis." *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 55 (4): 294–317.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0020715214552460>.
- Shultz, Richard, Douglas Farah, and Itamara Lochard. 2004. "Armed Groups: A Tier-One Security Priority." Institute for National Security Studies.
- Thoms, Oskar N.T., and James Ron. 2007. "Do Human Rights Violations Cause Internal Conflict." *Human Rights Quarterly* 29: 674–705.
- Walsh, James I., and James A. Piazza. 2010. "Why Respecting Physical Integrity Rights Reduces Terrorism." *Comparative Political Studies* 43 (5): 551–77.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414009356176>.
- "World Report 2021: Our Annual Review of Human Rights Around the Globe." 2021. Human Rights. United States: Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021>.