2025 Theses Doctoral

Scaring the Monkey by Killing the Chicken: Effectiveness of Countercriticism Coercion by China

Char, Stephanie

In response to the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to activist Liu Xiaobo, China restricted salmon imports from Norway and froze diplomatic relations with Norway for six years. This is an instance of countercriticism coercion, or threats and diplomatic and economic sanctions in response to purely rhetorical expressions of disapproval from other countries. Why do states ever respond coercively to human rights criticism from abroad, and what are the consequences of countercriticism coercion?

Economically powerful states that censor domestic speech are more likely to engage in countercriticism coercion. There have been over 80 instances of countercriticism coercion in response to United Nations country resolutions, prizes and meetings with human rights activists, and recognition of historical human rights atrocities since 1945.

China is the predominant user of countercriticism coercion, followed by Turkey, and joined more recently by Saudi Arabia and India. China could enact countercriticism coercion to influence China’s domestic public, the direct target of coercion, or third-party states. China implements countercriticism coercion tacitly, rather than advertising coercive responses to the domestic public. Of all of China’s human rights critics, China overwhelmingly chooses to sanction champion states, which actively promote human rights principles abroad. Champion states that are the direct targets of countercriticism coercion, such as Norway, do not withdraw or suspend their human rights criticism of China. China’s tacitness and selection of targets suggests that China intends to deter third-party states from human rights criticism, using the logic of the Chinese phrase, “kill the chicken to scare the monkey.”

Countercriticism coercion has been effective at deterring third-party states from issuing human rights criticism. States with reputations for countercriticism coercion were less likely than states without reputations for countercriticism coercion to receive human rights criticism from other countries, accounting for other drivers of human rights criticism. In case studies of Indonesia and Malaysia, policymakers refrained from criticizing China over the situation in Xinjiang in 2019-22, while simultaneously criticizing other states that lacked reputations for countercriticism coercion. Policymakers observed China’s past behavior in response to human rights criticism and withheld criticism to avert economic retaliation. Among third-party states, states with higher potential economic gains from China’s Belt and Road Initiative, measured through states’ infrastructure deficiencies, were more likely to be deterred from criticizing China. In comparison to China, Saudi Arabia has similarly failed to influence the direct targets and has been less effective than China at deterring third-party states, but may carry out countercriticism coercion to influence its domestic public.

This study demonstrates that developing a reputation for economic coercion can be effective at influencing third-party states. China’s more assertive foreign policy may have undermined China’s relations with the targets of coercion, but has deterred a broader audience of third-party states from publicly criticizing China. The continued effectiveness of countercriticism coercion could undermine the international human rights order by reducing criticism of powerful states with reputations for countercriticism coercion.