2025 Theses Doctoral

The Measure of Goodness: The Virtuous Human and the Citizen Animal

Tian, Chuyu

In my dissertation, I argue that Aristotle’s ethics differs from rule-based ethics by beginning with the good human being. The good human being not only has unique epistemic access to what is good, but also serves as a litmus test for measuring what is good. I argue that this is not relativism, but a kind of constitutivism: the character of the good human being, by virtue of being well-formed and personifying the human form, defines what is good for human beings.

In this way, rules are downstream of human nature. The good human being cannot be reduced to a set of rules, because in habituation, experience both attunes emotions and helps locate the right universals, and because knowing the “why” necessarily requires a higher-order, legislative point of view. Extending this to the political realm, I argue that the polis is a necessary condition for a flourishing life, because living as a full-fledged citizen in a full-fledged polis is the telos and maturation of the human form of life.

As much as Aristotle’s ethics is teleologically prior to his ideal constitutional design by providing the goals of education, his ideal constitutional design is nonetheless prior by giving substance to his ethics. I conclude my dissertation with a critical analysis of Aristotle’s citizenship: the human being, qua “the citizenship animal,” is a status conferred by the polis on the basis of socio-economic factors, running the risk of dehumanization.