2025 Theses Doctoral

Hegel on the Concept of the Psyche and Psychic Illness in the “Anthropology"

Wang, Connie

This dissertation investigates Hegel’s conception of the psyche [𝘚𝘦𝘦𝘭𝘦] and psychic illness [𝘚𝘦𝘦𝘭𝘦𝘯𝘬𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘬𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘵] in the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘩𝘳𝘰𝘱𝘰𝘭𝘰𝘨𝘺 a widely neglected, understudied, and opaque part of Hegel’s philosophical system. Despite the fact that 𝘚𝘦𝘦𝘭𝘦 constitutes the central subject matter of the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘩𝘳𝘰𝘱𝘰𝘭𝘰𝘨𝘺, it is, as anyone who has read the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘩𝘳𝘰𝘱𝘰𝘭𝘰𝘨𝘺 can attest to, far from apparent how one ought to understand Hegel’s conception of 𝘚𝘦𝘦𝘭𝘦. The overarching aim of this project is to offer an answer to this question—what is 𝘚𝘦𝘦𝘭𝘦 and how are we to understand it?—and to illuminate the surprising and continued relevance of Hegel’s conception of the psyche and psychic illness for domains as far-reaching as philosophy of mind, psychoanalysis, social and political philosophy, and, as I will argue, environmental philosophy, and environmental ethics. Each of the three chapters that make up this project are an attempt to shed light on Hegel’s rich, opaque, and provocative conception of 𝘚𝘦𝘦𝘭𝘦 from divergent but interrelated perspectives.

Chapter 1 presents and defends a novel interpretation of Hegel’s conception of 𝘚𝘦𝘦𝘭𝘦 as dealing with the most basic and primitive forms of mindedness or subjective experience—that is, self and other awareness. To defend this interpretation, I first consider and ultimately reject two candidates for understanding Hegel’s conception of Seele, beginning with what might appear to be an intuitive starting point, given 𝘚𝘦𝘦𝘭𝘦'𝘴 status as the proper subject matter of the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘩𝘳𝘰𝘱𝘰𝘭𝘰𝘨𝘺—namely, the idea that 𝘚𝘦𝘦𝘭𝘦 refers straightforwardly to the human being. What such interpretations of 𝘚𝘦𝘦𝘭𝘦, however, fail to adequately take into account is the way in which Hegel characterizes 𝘚𝘦𝘦𝘭𝘦 at the beginning of the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘩𝘳𝘰𝘱𝘰𝘭𝘰𝘨𝘺, 𝘚𝘦𝘦𝘭𝘦'𝘴 role within Hegel’s philosophical system as that which emerges out of nature’s overcoming of itself, and the relatively primitive nature of many, if not all, of the psychic capacities that Hegel explores in the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘩𝘳𝘰𝘱𝘰𝘭𝘰𝘨𝘺.

The second interpretation of 𝘚𝘦𝘦𝘭𝘦 that I consider and ultimately reject is an Aristotelian reading of Hegel’s 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘩𝘳𝘰𝘱𝘰𝘭𝘰𝘨𝘺, which understands Hegel’s conception of 𝘚𝘦𝘦𝘭𝘦 on the model of Aristotle’s conception of the psyche [psuchē] and therefore as dealing with life and the capacities of living organisms. There are, however, at least three problems with an Aristotelian interpretation of 𝘚𝘦𝘦𝘭𝘦. The central problem is that such a reading fails to adequately explain the subject matter of the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘩𝘳𝘰𝘱𝘰𝘭𝘰𝘨𝘺 and, therefore, Hegel’s conception of 𝘚𝘦𝘦𝘭𝘦. But I also argue that Aristotelian readings of 𝘚𝘦𝘦𝘭𝘦 can obscure both important discontinuities in the kind of account that Aristotle and Hegel’s respective conceptions of the psyche are interested in providing and the way in which Hegel imbues his conception of 𝘚𝘦𝘦𝘭𝘦 with an anthropological significance that is distinctively Kantian with respect to the way 𝘚𝘦𝘦𝘭𝘦 is bound up with freedom and reimagined as the proper subject matter of anthropology.

Finally, I present a novel interpretation of Hegel’s conception of 𝘚𝘦𝘦𝘭𝘦 as dealing with the most basic and primitive forms of self and other awareness. Not only does recasting 𝘚𝘦𝘦𝘭𝘦 in terms of self and other awareness avoid the pitfalls of the other two interpretations, but it also emphasizes the fact that the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘩𝘳𝘰𝘱𝘰𝘭𝘰𝘨𝘺 is not simply interested in the conceptual development of subjectivity and self-awareness. It is, I contend, just as much interested in the conceptual development in the sense of the other that corresponds to and occurs in tandem with the development of an increasingly self-aware subject. Self and other develop, in other words, together.

On the basis of this understanding of 𝘚𝘦𝘦𝘭𝘦, Chapter 2 argues that Hegel’s conception of 𝘚𝘦𝘦𝘭𝘦 can be understood as an account of psychic health. The first part of this chapter focuses on Hegel’s normative conception of health and disease, arguing that Hegel understands health and disease on the model of conceptual realization. It also considers two markers of health, order and subjective_H vitality, and the corresponding senses of disease to which they give rise, disorder and subjective_H weakness. In doing so, my aim is to spell out some of the implications of a conception of health and disease as modeled on conceptual realization—namely, that health and disease ought not to be understood as mutually exclusive states or conditions; that disease conceptually presupposes and requires some degree of health; that only entities which exhibit the structure of subjectivity_H can be understood as healthy or diseased; and that this model of conceptual realization does not rule out the possibility of conceptual openness.

The second part of this chapter finally turns to the concept in question—𝘚𝘦𝘦𝘭𝘦—and articulates how Hegel’s conception of 𝘚𝘦𝘦𝘭𝘦 can be understood as an account of psychic health. My contention is that Hegel’s concept of the psyche, in typical Hegelian fashion, turns out to consist of three different, conflicting, and hierarchically interrelated conceptions of the psyche, which are each characterized by their increasingly self and other aware ways of relating to the world. Put simply, the three stages of the psyche can be understood as capturing different modes of self and other awareness that together produce what might be understood as primitive, embodied, and preconscious forms of subjective experience.

Chapter 3 turns to the other half of this account of 𝘚𝘦𝘦𝘭𝘦 as an account of psychic health—that is, the sense in which Hegel’s conception of 𝘚𝘦𝘦𝘭𝘦𝘯𝘬𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘬𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘵 can be understood as an account of psychic illness. In the first part of the chapter, I defend the idea that psychic illness can be understood as a state or condition that is marked by the normative failure of the psyche to realize itself, highlighting three important features of this account of 𝘚𝘦𝘦𝘭𝘦𝘯𝘬𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘬𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘵. The first concerns what it means to understand 𝘚𝘦𝘦𝘭𝘦𝘯𝘬𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘬𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘵 as a disproportion between concept and reality and some of the diagnostic implications that follow such an understanding of 𝘚𝘦𝘦𝘭𝘦𝘯𝘬𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘬𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘵. The second aspect of 𝘚𝘦𝘦𝘭𝘦𝘯𝘬𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘬𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘵 to which I draw our attention to concerns its normative status, as able to accommodate both a certain degree of moral agnosticism as well as the ethical kind of normativity associated with social critique. The third aspect of 𝘚𝘦𝘦𝘭𝘦𝘯𝘬𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘬𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘵 that I turn to is its broad scope as a concept which captures far more than what we ordinarily today think of as mental illness.

In the second part of the chapter, I turn to the two species of 𝘚𝘦𝘦𝘭𝘦𝘯𝘬𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘬𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘵 with which this project is primarily concerned—deranged self-feeling [𝘝𝘦𝘳𝘳ü𝘤𝘬𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘵] and deranged habit or what is sometimes referred to as ‘death by habit’ in the secondary literature. With regard to 𝘝𝘦𝘳𝘳ü𝘤𝘬𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘵, I present and defend a novel interpretation of 𝘝𝘦𝘳𝘳ü𝘤𝘬𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘵 that is committed to two claims. The first is that 𝘝𝘦𝘳𝘳ü𝘤𝘬𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘵 can be understood as a disordered mode of psychically relating to the world that is characterized by an aggrandizement of the self and a disregard for the actuality of the other. The second is that 𝘝𝘦𝘳𝘳ü𝘤𝘬𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘵 is a fundamentally broader concept than what we ordinarily think of as mental illness, whose empirical manifestations include not only what we ordinarily think of as mental disorders but also deranged ways of psychically relating to the natural world.

In doing so, I take Hegel’s conception of 𝘝𝘦𝘳𝘳ü𝘤𝘬𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘵 beyond its obvious contemporary relevance for understanding mental health and illness and illuminate its surprising relevance for environmental philosophy and, in particular, an environmental ethics that can be considered Hegelian in spirit. My suggestion is that the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘩𝘳𝘰𝘱𝘰𝘭𝘰𝘨𝘺 provides a fascinating window into the sorts of ideas that could ground a Hegelian environmental ethics, insofar as it precisely explores the normative status of the kinds of entities that living organisms, ecological systems, and the natural world as a whole are, the regard that they are owed on the basis of their normative status, and the way in which human beings ought to normatively and ethically relate to them. My project, in other words, is not simply focused on the extent to which Hegel’s theory of the psyche might be relevant for making sense of the myriad psychic and mental health crises that are so prominent and widespread today. It is also fundamentally interested in the ways in which Hegel’s theory of 𝘚𝘦𝘦𝘭𝘦 and 𝘚𝘦𝘦𝘭𝘦𝘯𝘬𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘬𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘵 diverge from our contemporary ordinary understanding of mental health and illness and the extent to which they can offer rich conceptual resources to formulate a Hegelian account of psychic illness that has relevance for both social and political philosophy as well as environmental philosophy and environmental ethics.

With regard to deranged habit, I contend that death by habit, like 𝘝𝘦𝘳𝘳ü𝘤𝘬𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘵, can be understood as a type of 𝘚𝘦𝘦𝘭𝘦𝘯𝘬𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘬𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘵 but one that is characterized by an inversion of the two main features of 𝘝𝘦𝘳𝘳ü𝘤𝘬𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘵—that is, an aggrandized sense of the other and a disregard for the actuality of the self. In doing so, this project recasts death by habit in a new light as a sister psychic illness to other deranged ways of relating between self and other, illuminating the intimate conceptual ties between excessively habituated ways of relating to our social world, mental disorders, and diseased ways of relating to the natural world. In redrawing the conceptual lines demarcating these phenomena, this project also challenges us to reconsider and interrogate the kinds of self-other relations that can be understood as indicative of psychic health and illness, what it means to be psychically healthy and ill, who is capable of it, and what possibilities there are for treating these disordered ways of relating to the world. Not only does attending to these two types of 𝘚𝘦𝘦𝘭𝘦𝘯𝘬𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘬𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘵 challenge us to provocatively reimagine what it means to be both mentally well and mentally ill but it also offers us the opportunity to understand our relation to both the natural world and the social worlds which we inhabit in a new light—namely, as more or less psychically well or disordered ways of relating to the world.