The Politics of Anticolonial Resistance: Violence, Nonviolence, and the Erosion of Empire

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ABSTRACT

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This dissertation studies conflict in a hierarchical international system, the British Empire. How did the British Empire respond to violent and nonviolent resistance within its colonies? I develop a theory explaining how and why an imperial metropole becomes involved in and grant concessions to its colonies. Unlike federal nation-states and looser relationship like in an international organization, modern European empires were characterized by selective engagement of the metropole with its peripheral colonies. This has important implications for understanding metropolitan response to peripheral resistance. In contrast to more recent work, I find that violence was more effective at coercing metropolitan concessions to the colonies in the British Empire than nonviolence. I argue that this occurred because violence overwhelmed the capabilities of local colonial governments, and violence commanded metropolitan attention and involvement. This theory is supported with a wide range of data, including yearly measures of anticolonial resistance, every colonial concession made by the British Empire after 1918, daily measures of metropolitan discussions of colonial issues from cabinet archives, and web-scraped casualty data from British death records. In addition, I present in-depth case studies of British responses to resistance in Cyprus and the Gold Coast, along with a conceptual schema of different types of resistance to understand strikes, riots, terrorism, and civil disobedience in a number of other British colonies. My findings show that the effectiveness of resistance is con-
ditional on the political structure that it is embedded in and that hierarchy matters for understanding state responses to resistance.
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To PernaLyn
0.1 Introduction

Who was right, Gandhi or Fanon? The fall of the European empires in the 20th century transformed the international system. Explanations in the International Relations (IR) literature locate this change by referencing Cold War dynamics or the restructuring of the global economy. Less emphasis is placed on the role of anticolonial resistance within the colonies. This is puzzling, since anticolonial resistance was a near-constant response to imperial rule, occupied the metropole’s attention, and factored into colonial policy. Both the violent and nonviolent forms of anticolonial resistance mobilized populations all around the globe, and the leaders of these movements at the time of independence came to rule their states for decades. Yet little is known about how the European empires responded to resistance, what the relative effects of violent and nonviolent resistance were, and how resistance in imperial structures may differ from the more commonly studied context of the nation-state.

This dissertation studies the effects of violent and nonviolent anticolonial resistance on metropolitan policy in the British Empire during the 20th century. To understand this phenomenon, I present a model of imperial response. Empires, un-
like nation-states, are political structures that are segmented into the metropole and its peripheral units. Peripheral units are directly administered by the local governors, but the metropole is in charge of large-scale changes in policy and other imperial relations. Metropolitan involvement in the colonies varies spatially and temporally. I theorize that anticolonial resistance can induce concessions from the metropole when the resistance is better able to command the metropole’s attention. Violent resistance is more effective at coercing metropolitan concessions because it is better able to threaten the metropole’s core interests and garner the attention of the metropole. While disruptive to governance, nonviolent resistance is much less likely to be debated and discussed by metropolitan policymakers. Nonviolence, because it is less likely to threaten the interests of the metropole, remains the province of the colonial governor.

However, there are limits to violent resistance. Since imperial metropoles are mostly concerned with issues of security, the strategic value of an imperial possession conditions metropolitan response to unrest. In strategically important colonies, granting concessions (and by extension, increasing suffrage) risks empowering hostile actors and allowing them to take over the levers of the colonial state. This jeopardizes the metropole’s post-independence relations with these colonies. The result, in most cases, is a bargaining failure—concessions reduce anticolonial hostility, but granting concessions can also cause the metropole to lose access to its colonies. The persistent refusal of the metropole to grant concessions in response to unrest for strategically important colonies explains why some colonies experienced large-scale conflicts during the decolonization era.

This work makes a number of contributions to existing scholarship. By privileging
the interests of the target of resistance in my theory, I show that this variation mat-
ters for understanding responses to violent and nonviolent resistance. Current work
focuses on aspects of resistance movements themselves. I argue that this approach is
incomplete, and determining why a resistance movement is successful—or why they
chose a primarily violent or nonviolent strategy—requires an assessment of what the
target wants and their willingness to concede or repress (or both). In addition, by
offering an empire-wide analysis of all formal colonies in the British Empire, this work
compares colonies that experience violent, nonviolent, and no resistance, along with
spatial and temporal variation in those variables.

In addition to the theory of imperial response, this work also presents a typol-
ogy of resistance types that allows resistance to vary along two axes: violent and
nonviolent resistance, and whether the resistance is spontaneous or hierarchically or-
ganized. A key difference between a riot and a strike is riots are violent and strikes
are not. Both events, however, are characterized by a mass gathering of individuals
protesting some political or economic issue. Similarly, a civil disobedience campaign
and an armed insurgency obviously differ in their tactics and strategy, but unlike
riots and strikes, these campaigns are characterized by a hierarchical leadership, op-
erate on longer timelines, and are much more deliberate in their choice of actions. I
apply this typology—which can be used to understand more contemporary acts of
resistance—to understand how the metropole responded to forms of resistance within
the colonies that varied along the dimension of violence/nonviolence, and sponta-
neous/hierarchical.

I conclude that violence was overwhelmingly more successful at coercing conces-
sions from the metropole to the colonies that nonviolence. This is at odds with recent research arguing that nonviolence and civil resistance are effective strategies for creating political change. There are reasons for this disagreement. For one, my study focuses on a historical time period (British decolonization) that may be substantially different than, say, the Arab Spring and other urban protests in autocracies. More importantly, however, my theoretical framework explicitly takes into account the willingness of the target state to grant concessions, which helps account for some of the selection effects (whereby the likelihood of a strategy’s success influences which strategy is chosen) that plague comparisons of violent and nonviolent campaigns. Armed campaigns of violence are often launched after sustained repression or a lack of success with less costly tactics, including nonviolent ones. By jointly examining the determinants and effects of violent and nonviolent activity and the interest of the target of resistance, this work is able to partially account for these selection effects. In addition, by examining the relative effects of resistance within a single polity that faces multiple types of resistance from a large number of separate entities, I am able to keep a number of important variables constant.

The findings complicate some of the conclusions of the historical literature on both decolonization and the Cold War. Much of this literature contrasts the rising anticlonial United States and USSR with the declining European colonial powers in the immediate postwar period (Louis and Robinson, 1994). Here, the story goes, the increasingly powerful US and USSR pressured Britain and France to relinquish control over their empires (with some notable exceptions), making the Cold War an accelerant to decolonization. This, of course, did happen, and both the US and USSR ap-
peared to have sincerely held anticolonial beliefs that were occasionally compromised. However, the geopolitical environment of the Cold War—specifically the USSR’s increasing threat to British interests—made Britain less willing to grant concessions to certain colonies. Britain doubled down on some of their colonial commitments as a bulwark against Soviet encroachment (Heinlein, 2013, 16). The increasingly powerful United States did pressure Britain to decolonize in some areas, but Cold War security concerns prevented the British from doing so in other areas. My argument helps show that the Cold War and decolonization were not separate global processes but were deeply integrated and had heterogeneous effects on decision-making within a single state.

Building on standard assumptions of neorealism (Waltz, 2010; Mearsheimer et al., 2001), I argue that the British state was primary motivated by security concerns, and that this had important implications for how it dismantled its empire. While imperial officials and members of the colonial bureaucracy were concerned with economic extraction and the levels of revenue and expenditure within a colony, I show that these concerns were largely absent from metropolitan management and the crafting of imperial policy. Security concerns dominated cabinet and parliamentary discussions of the empire. The metropole did discuss the importance of sterling and how some colonies could be used to alleviate the depreciation of sterling. Even in these discussions, however, anxiety about the falling value of sterling were rooted in how it could threaten the British state’s ability to defend itself against impending threats from the USSR. While acknowledging that economic factors best explain the expansion of imperialism (Hobson, 2018; Lenin, 1999; Cain and Hopkins, 2014), my argument shows
that security concerns were paramount in understanding the end of formal European empires.

Decolonization was “the most important change in world politics” (Jervis, 1989, 34) during the 20th century. Its impact cannot be understated: it shifted the balance of conflict away from interstate war to intrastate war (Thomas and Thompson, 2018, 453), it created dozens of new-nation states, and helps explain variation in current levels of political and economic development (Lee and Paine, 2019). As Duncan Bell writes, “the world in which we live is largely the product of the rise, competition, and fall of empires” (Bell, 2016, 91). Yet International Relations scholars—the ones most suited to study large-scale changes in the international system and the relations between states—have paid relatively little attention to this important global process, albeit a historically specific one.

### 0.2 Literature Review

This section situates the dissertation within the broader political science literature on empires and international hierarchy, the relative effectiveness of violence and non-violence, and the historiography of British decolonization.

Before reviewing the relevant literature, I offer a brief summary of the argument in the dissertation. I theorize that the structure of imperial rule of the British Empire matters for understanding the effects of violent and nonviolent anticolonial resistance. Most studies evaluating the effectiveness of resistance do so by examining resistance in the context of the modern nation-state. The metropole-periphery structure of
empires means that the metropole can selectively engage in each periphery and change metropolitan policy in response to events in the peripheral colonies. In most colonies, anticolonial resistance would garner metropolitan attention, and the metropole would respond with concessions in order to prevent future anticolonial resistance. Violence is more effective because violence is better able to command the metropole’s attention than nonviolence. The metropole’s interest in each colony was not the same, however. Some colonies were strategically important, and the metropole is not willing to grant concessions to them, since doing so will jeopardize the security of the metropolitan state. In these colonies, anticolonial resistance is generally ineffective.

Violence and Nonviolence

This section evaluates the competing arguments regarding the relative effectiveness of violent and nonviolent resistance.

Most studies examine the effectiveness of resistance within the context of the nation state. Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) argue that nonviolent resistance campaigns are more successful than violent ones because nonviolent actors are less likely to be seen as extremists, are better able to garner international support, and facilitate mobilization and participation. Moreover, governments pay a higher cost if they engage in violent repression of a nonviolent movement. Their analysis is primarily concerned with campaign-level explanations for success. In their quantitative analysis, they only include the polity score of the targeted state as a target-level control (in effect controlling for whether a state is democratic or not). While they do discuss
the target’s interests in their case studies, this is not the focus of their examination and is not systematically analyzed.

More directly related to the present study is the work by Griffiths and Wasser (2018). Griffiths and Wasser study whether violent secessionism is more successful than nonviolent secessionism using all data on secessionist campaigns during the 20th century. They find that, after taking into account whether secessionist groups use institutional or extra-institutional means to wage their campaign, violent secessionism is no more successful than nonviolent secessionism. Importantly, their dataset and definition of secession includes anticolonial movements. While their approach provides important nuance by taking into account the institutional environment, the interests of the target remain static.

These studies assess effectiveness by comparing the success rate of violent and nonviolent campaigns. Applying such an approach—by manually coding a resistance campaign in a colony as successful or not along with its primary method of resistance—to the British Empire would not tell us much. Indeed, a striking feature of Griffiths and Wasser’s data is that all anticolonial secessionist movements (regardless of the methods they use) are coded as successful. Similarly, in Chenoweth’s dataset, all anticolonial campaigns that are active at the time of independence are coded as successful campaigns while those that petered out before independence is declared are deemed unsuccessful campaigns. Moreover, there are huge inferential problems arising from the endogeneity between British reluctance to grant a colony independence and the likelihood that a violent campaign arises at all or that a nonviolent campaign turns violent. For some colonies, de facto independence occurred well
before de jure independence, which placated more aggressive nationalists. Moreover, anticolonial resistance occurred in widely different contexts. The Mau Mau revolt, for example, was largely a civil war among Kikuyu that resulted in the deaths of about two dozen settlers (Bennett, 2013; Anderson, 2005). The British spent many lives and resources to combat the Mau Mau rebellion, but in Ceylon, the British were unwilling to pay those costs. Once there was the spectre of violence in Ceylon, the British withdrew (Thomas, 2014b, 110).

In order to properly assess the relative effectiveness of violent and nonviolent resistance in the British colonies, a common outcome must be used as a measure of success. I study the effects of resistance on the likelihood of the British Empire to grant concessions and reforms to the colonies. This approach has an number of advantages over assessing the effect of resistance on independence. For one, concessions were much more frequent. This enables the study of the effects of resistance over time within the same colony. In addition, the timing of independence was often a strategic outcome between anticolonial nationalists and the colonial government; it was not always in the interest of the nationalists to be granted independence, especially if the colonial government was actively suppressing domestic threats to the nationalist’s base of power. Concessions, however, were changes in policy that favor those in the colony, which most frequently took the form of increasing autonomy.

The political science literature on the effects of violence generally uses variation in the type or intensity of violence as the independent variable and some common outcome (concession, achievement of goals, etc.) as the dependent variable. Since most studies focus on the context of the nation state, it is rare to see studies that
examine a large number of different actors engaging in resistance against the same target (which of course did occur in many imperial polities). While many studies acknowledge that different targets of resistance have different sensitivities to political resistance, how this variation matters remains underexplored empirically.

The literature on the effectiveness of terrorism, for example, uses only measures of regime type to account for differences in casualty sensitivity. Pape (2006) argues that suicide terrorism is an effective form of resisting foreign occupation because it targets civilians and imposes costs on democracies. Abrahms (2006) analyzes twenty-eight terrorist groups on the list of foreign terrorist organizations designated by the United States Department of State. He finds that these groups accomplished policy objects only 7 percent of the time. Abrahms’s explanation for why terrorist groups perform poorly is that terrorists groups cannot coerce targets because they miscommunicate their policy objectives. When a group commits violence against civilians, this signals that the violent group has maximalist objectives, when in reality their objectives may be quite limited and specific. Variation in the effectiveness of terrorism is left unexplored.

The absence of a theory of how the target’s interests matter for understanding the effectiveness of violence is puzzling when considering the recent studies on the effects of terrorism within the context of civil wars. Rebel groups fighting a democratic opponent are more likely to use terrorism (Stanton, 2013). Thomas (2014a) uses monthly data on African civil conflicts to assess whether terrorism by rebel groups increases the probability of state extending negotiations to those groups. Her results show that more terrorist attacks lead to more concessions in the form of negotiations between
rebel groups and the state, primarily because terrorist acts have the power to hurt. How much hurt the state can endure, however, is assumed to be static. These studies show that terrorism can have positive effects for rebels and that the regime type of the target matters. Fortna (2015) finds that groups primarily using terrorism are less likely to win a civil war, but terrorism is associated with longer conflicts, suggesting that weaker groups may use terrorism to prolong a conflict to their advantage. She presents evidence that terrorism in a civil war is less ineffective against democracies. Peter Krause has expanded the theoretical framework about non-state violence to include the the movements themselves (Krause, 2013). Krause argues that non-state violence is successful when it does two things: achieves the organizational goals of the group and the strategic goals of the group. While expanding our knowledge of how violence achieves organizational goals, the role of the target remains unexplored in Krause’ framework.

I theorize that the interests of the target of the resistance matters for understanding the effectiveness of a resistance campaign. The strategic interests of the British conditioned whether any resistance is effective, while their concern with security and political stability meant that metropolitan attention responded more to violence than nonviolence. A target that is particularly sensitive to having their soldiers or civilians killed will be more susceptible to changing their behavior due to violent action then nonviolent action, while a target that is particularly sensitive to economic difficulties will be more susceptible to changing their behavior due to nonviolent action such as boycotts. In the context of the British Empire, strikes may have severely harmed the economic extraction from Britain’s African colonies—more
than any violent activity—but this would have little effect on the decision makers in London largely because they were not terribly concerned with economic matters, relative to strategic ones. In colonies that were deemed strategically essential, both violent and nonviolent anticolonial resistance were met with repression and a denial of meaningful reforms. The approach of most political science research would be to look at specific group-level or colony-level factors to understand why some forms of resistance against British imperial rule were effective. The British, however, did not treat each colony equally, and its willingness to concede was much lower in strategically important colonies than it was in others. The onset of hierarchically organized violent campaigns in some colonies can not only be understood by examining political dynamics within the colony. Metropolitan policymaking must be incorporated into an explanation of why colonial subjects rebelled.

**Empires**

Empires are a form of international hierarchy (Mattern and Zarakol, 2016; Lake, 2009a). While many definitions of empire include one group dominating the other, my study theorizes how the structure of imperial rule—especially modern overseas empires—matters for understanding imperial dynamics. Empires, regardless of how control is acquired, are characterized by a metropole and periphery. I present a theory of how events in the periphery affect metropolitan involvement and response. This theory explains dynamics between actors in a hierarchical international system. One of my key variables (metropolitan attention to a colony) helps explain why some types
of resistance are effective at granting concessions. Variation in metropolitan attention only occurs in the context of an imperial structure and has no clear analogue to the nation-state.

Many scholars agree that a unique feature of empires is that they are divided into a core and periphery (Münkler, 2007). Doyle describes empires as “a relationship, formal or informal, in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another political society” (Doyle, 1986, 45). More recently, Nexon and Wright define empires as multiethnic polities that “involve the dominance of one polity over other political communities, and that core-periphery relations are an important component of empire” (Nexon and Wright, 2007, 258). The distinction between a metropolitan core and a peripheral colony is an essential feature of many definitions of an empire (e.g., (Wimmer and Min, 2006; Jordheim and Neumann, 2011; Cooley and Nexon, 2013; Howe, 2002; Lake, 2009b).

Hierarchy and empire also provide useful frames to study international relations outside of Western Europe. David Kang argues that “the fundamental organizing principle in historical East Asia was hierarchy, not sovereign equality” and hegemony, rather than the balance of power, dominated East Asia during the Qin/Han era from 221 BCE to 220 CE (Kang, 2019, 1). Empire has also been used to refer to more modern, even postwar institutions. Mark Beissinger notes that “empire has become a common frame through which the Soviet state and its collapse are analyzed, with regard both to the relationship between the Soviet state and its multicultural population and to Soviet control over eastern Europe” (Beissinger, 2006, 294). This risks reading the history of empire and the Soviet state backwards—in the 1920s
few believed that the Soviet state was an imperial polity (Lieven, 2002). While
the Soviet state had a structure of land-based empire, its policies were designed to
modernize the state and integrate peripheral areas (Slezkine, 2000). In contrast to
European colonial empires, ties between the Soviet metropole (to the extent that
it did exist) and the segmented states it attempted to integrate were much more
direct and bilateral than the empires of Britain or France. Nevertheless, the imperial
frame for studying the rise and fall of the Soviet state is useful for understanding
why the term “empire” was so easily and forcefully applied to Soviet rule. Beissinger
concludes that “Empire is not a clearly bounded transhistorical model but rather
a Wittgensteinian ‘family resemblance’ whose meaning and referents have altered
significantly over time” (Beissinger, 2006, 303). Postwar nationalism helped unravel
European empires and in the process also did violence to the concept of ‘empire’
itself. Recent uses of “empire” have applied it to European Union (Khanna, 2008;
Zielonka, 2007; Marks, 2012).

A consequence of the core-periphery structure of an empire is that the metropole
can selectively engage and disengage with its peripheral units. This tendency was
higher in the modern European overseas empires than the more traditional land-based
empires like the Russian 18th century empire (Kumar, 2019, 161). Heterogeneous
contracting between the metropole and periphery means that there is variation in au-
tonomy, obligations, and importance across colonies. The metropole can place larger
demands on some colonies than others. While many historical accounts acknowledge
this variation (for example in studies of France’s relationship to West Africa and
Algeria), less is known about what drives variation in metropolitan involvement and
attention to its colonies.

Despite acknowledgment that the core-periphery structure characterizes imperial rule, there are few studies examining how hierarchical links between states in a core-periphery relationship are contested. Moreover, less is known about how formal hierarchical links break and are replaced by informal ones. One of the characteristics of international hierarchy is some form of compromised sovereignty by the subordinate state. How can the subordinate state restore some of its sovereignty from the dominant state? Why does the dominant state devolve power to some peripheries but not others?

This dissertation integrates the state back into the study of empires. The core-periphery structure matters here. However, I argue that how the core responds to activity in the periphery rests on the interests of the state that makes up the core. Building on standard realist assumptions, states in a self-help system are concerned, above all, with security. The British Empire consisted of the British state apparatus (the cabinet, parliament, Foreign Office, etc.), along with a mix of private (missionaries, the East India Company) and state-operated bureaucracies (the Colonial Office, the India Office). During the 20th century, I argue that policymakers in the British metropole—members of parliament and cabinet officials—were almost entirely unconcerned with colonial extraction, taxation, and revenue in the colonies. Rather, their focus was on international security and how each individual colony could contribute to the security of the British state. The political economy scholarships that examines the spatial variation and impact of colonial investments and taxation does, of course, answer important questions about development and politics in the colonies.
(Huillery, 2009). However, these decisions were made by on-the-ground colonial officials. Metropolitan concern with issues of revenue and taxation was generally low and was confined the regular and periodic review of colonial reports (Frankema and Van Waijenburg, 2014).

0.3 Decolonization, Historiography, and IR

Scholarship

Despite reshaping the entire international system, creating dozens of new nation-states, and influencing contemporary politics in numerous ways, recent work in International Relations has not attempted to understand decolonization. Political theorists have taken up the mantle and written important analyses of the long-term legacies of imperial thought (Pitts, 2018) or how anticolonial activities envisioned the postcolonial world order (Getachew, 2019). Why have IR scholars paid relatively little attention to decolonization? I suggest that there are two reasons. One is that previous works have done a very good explaining changes in the international system (Crawford, 2002), comparing changes in empires across time periods (Abernethy, 2000), and providing a social science approach to specific historical questions (Kahler, 2014). The other reason, I suspect, is that decolonization does not facilitate quantitative empirical analysis. The most obvious quantifiable outcome related to decolonization is the timing of independence for each state. Independence, however, was overdetermined, making it difficult to tease out exactly why some colonies re-
ceived independence when they did. Moreover, formal independence often resulted after substantial reforms that granted autonomy to the colonies. For many anticolo- nial nationalists, formal independence was important, but was one goal among many. Even after independence, many colonies remained subject to unwanted influence from their former metropoles.

Studies that try to explain the timing of independence from colonial rule privilege proximate causes of decolonization over systemic or longer-term ones. For example, Hager and Lake (2000)’s work offers a systemic theory of imperial breakup by focusing on how struggles between states in the international system affect pressure on the metropole to grant independence to colonies. In their discussion on the historical litera- ture of decolonization (much of which consists of case histories of specific colonies) they write that “this literature provides a useful baseline and even a null hypothesis for our study, namely that decolonization is the result of an autonomous struggle by indigenous peoples to throw off the yoke of imperialism” (Hager and Lake, 2000, 118). They argue that there is little support for this claim, since third-parties (those not residing in the metropole or the colony) played an active role in the timing of independence. Focusing exclusively on the timing of independence ignores the erosion of ties between the metropole and colony in the decades prior to independence.

Other works have provided theoretical frameworks to understand decolonization as a form of large-scale change in the international system (Gartzke and Rohner, 2011). Gartzke and Rohner (2011) present a formal model that helps to explain why states do not seek to control physical territory abroad. In their theory, as colonies become economically developed there is a decline in the benefit derived from controlling land,
minerals, and capital. Technological changes make it too costly for states to control territory and they are better able to realize their goals by participating in a global marketplace rather than in vertical integration of the control of territory. The thrust of their argument is that the United State’s penchant for choosing influence over territorial control lies not in any characteristic of the United States. Rather, this behavior is determined by systemic forces (an argument supported by (Go, 2011)).

There is a tension between systemic level explanations that relate large-scale technological change to the tendency of all empires to abandon a particular tactic with a study aimed at assessing the short term impact of anticolonial resistance. In some sense, describing the immediate effects of anticolonial resistance pushes system-level explanations onto the backburner. My argument that violence eroded the British Empire is not incompatible with systemic explanations for decolonization. Rather, these explanations provide an important scope condition to my theory: violent resistance in the colonies only coerced concessions from the metropole when the metropole was somewhat willing to grant these concessions. Violent and often sustained anticolonial resistance plagued the era of imperial expansion. Large anticolonial revolts, such as the 1857 Indian Mutiny and the 1865 Morant Bay uprising, led Britain to double-down on their imperial holdings and reduce colonial autonomy. This study is more concerned with how states manage their decline rather than the root causes of that decline. Moreover, system-level explanations cannot explain variation in decolonization across empires (Spruyt, 2005), let alone the heterogeneous responses of a single metropole to its different colonies.

The historiographical literature on Britain’s decolonization has presented com-
pelling and detailed portraits of individual personalities and the choices they made under bureaucratic and political constraints. These works, often consisting of constructed narratives built from a jumble of archival documents from the Colonial Offices, the Foreign Offices, and the personal papers of important colonial officials, necessarily privilege the decisions made by these men (and they were almost always men) (Hyam, 2007). Systemic explanations for the relinquishing of colonies are largely absent—as Darwin (1984)’s query as to whether Britain’s postwar decolonization was a “pattern” or a “puzzle” illustrates. Indeed, explanations regarding why some colonies were granted freedom earlier than others is often attributed to the ease with which colonial officials were able to negotiate the terms of independence. Settlers compounded these negotiations (Paine, 2019), but the role of domestic politics—or even metropolitan politics more broadly—is largely absent from these works. In 1997, David Cannadine wrote that “as far as the majority of the population concerned, [the British Empire] was given away in a fit of collective indifference” (Cannadine, 1998, 6). Porter (2006) presented a portrait of British politics whereby the empire was something that happened elsewhere, and never came home.

0.4 Outline of Dissertation

To investigate the relative effects of violent and nonviolent anticolonial resistance in the British Empire, the following chapter presents a theoretical framework that specifies my key variables and the expected patterns of interaction between these variables. I also articulate a model of imperial response within an imperial structure,
and contrast that structure with more integrated federal nation-states and less integrated international organizations. In addition, I also theorize how imperial response to unrest may differ in colonies that are deemed as strategically important. This theoretical framework will be supported by a number of empirical chapters. Following the presentation of my theory, the third chapter in the dissertation provides a brief primer on the British Empire and decolonization. The goal here is to present an overview of the historiographical literature and specific historical information required to understand the arguments made in the later chapters.

Following these two chapters is the main chapter that presents the quantitative empirical evidence in support of my argument. I describe the quantitative data I collected and run a number of statistical models to estimate the effect of violent and nonviolent resistance. Briefly, I collected data on every concession made by the British to their colonies after 1918, yearly and monthly measures of the level of violent and nonviolent anticolonial resistance within each colony, and daily measures of metropolitan attention from cabinet archives and the parliamentary debates. In addition I collected multiple measures of a colony’s strategic importance. The data are analyzed using a variety of models where the unit of analysis ranges from the year-colony to the month-colony. The results provide strong evidence that violence was more effective at coercing concessions than nonviolence, and the reason this occurred was because nonviolent anticolonial activity was less likely to command metropolitan attention and involvement than violent anticolonial activity.

The statistical models and quantitative data I use group different types of violent and nonviolent resistance together, in effect flattening important variation. To
remedy this, the fifth chapter presents a typology to understand important variation within each category of anticolonial resistance, disaggregating strikes from civil disobedience and riots from insurgencies. Here I demonstrate the utility of this typology by providing brief descriptions of important acts of anticolonial resistance and discussing how those events affected (or did not affect) metropolitan discussion and whether there was a policy change in response to the resistance.

A core part of my argument is that in strategically important colonies, resistance does not lead to concessions because British policymakers feared that granting concessions would jeopardize British security. In the Chapter 6 I investigate these dynamics in the case of Cyprus. Using official documents from the Colonial Office, I present extensive qualitative evidence that British policy towards Cyprus was above all concerned with the island’s strategic importance and that these concerns were the prime motivation for Britain’s unwillingness to grant concessions in the aftermath of the 1931 riots and later during the Cyprus emergency.

Following that, in Chapter 7 I again use Colonial Office documents to study Britain’s response to the 1947 Accra riots in the Gold Coast and the ensuing process by which Britain appointed commissions, issued recommendations, and implemented constitutional reforms that increase autonomy and suffrage in the colony. This chapter helps to provide texture and detail to the causal process connecting violence and concessions. In addition, I provide evidence of nonviolent events in the Gold Coast, mostly in the form of strikes and boycotts, were ignored by the metropole and easily dealt with by local colonial officials.

Chapter 8 offers a quantitative examination of the British parliamentary debates.
Here, I present results from a number of text-analytic methods to try and assess the extent to which the British parliament discussed violent and nonviolent activity in the colonies. Many British politicians would use euphemisms to describe anticolonial activity. Rather than call a riot a riot, Colonial Office officials and Members of Parliament would refer to ‘disturbances’, ‘unrest’, or ‘disorder’ in the colonies. To assess what exactly these words were referring to, I use word embeddings, which are commonly used in the computer science literature and are becoming increasingly adopted for interesting applications by political scientists (Rheault and Cochrane, 2020; Rodman, 2020). I present evidence that euphemisms were much more likely to refer to violent than nonviolent anticolonial activity. In addition, I show that the use of euphemisms decreased over time, suggesting that Members of Parliament became more honest about anticolonial resistance during the era of decolonization.

The concluding chapter wraps up and contextualizes the information presented in the dissertation, addresses shortcomings, and provides suggestions for future work.
This section develops my theory of imperial response. I use this theory to generate predictions about how different variables interact and the relative effects of violent and nonviolent resistance within an imperial structure. My approach takes seriously the interests of the metropole in predicting how the metropole will respond to resistance in the periphery. This theory will provide the framework to understand the quantitative and qualitative empirical chapters that follow.

This chapter begins with the definition of key terms and variables. I then articulate my theory of imperial response and show, graphically, how these variables fit together and their relationship in different contexts. I draw explicit distinctions between a loose hierarchical structure of informal empire, formal empire with direct ties to each colony, and a vertically integrated polity like a land-based empire or federal nation-state. The theory is used to generate hypotheses, which I test in later chapters, and scope conditions are provided.
0.6 Variable 1, Resistance

The first variable in my theory is anticolonial resistance. A number of works have examined anticolonial insurgencies, rebellions, and civil resistance campaigns. All of these are included under my variable of anticolonial resistance. The main difference with my variable is that the definition is more expansive. While many historical works have debated whether a mass rebellion was truly nationalist (Syria, Iraq) (Gelvin, 1998; Kadhim, 2012), my theory sidesteps the issue of whether a rebellion was simply one that reflected a desire to change policy or reflected the growth of nationalist consciousness. I do this because the British were intensely skeptical that any form of resistance to the colonial state was nationalist. Indeed, critics have argued that the British engaged in the criminalization of nationalism as a way to further the imperial project and deny international support for truly nationalist movements (Kelly, 2017). Whether a episode of resistance contains the seeds of a broader nationalist consciousness is, of course, an important question, and the ability for those leading the resistance to tap into nascent nationalist sentiment can facilitate mobilization. However, since my theory is target-centered, and the colonial mindset flattened nationalist and proto-nationalist resistance into criminal unrest and rebellion, I include nationalist and non-nationalist forms of anticolonial resistance in my key independent variable.¹

The variable for anticolonial resistance is also limited to non-institutional forms of contentious politics. All colonies possessed some form of representative institutions for

¹In this sense, my variable is entirely unconcerned with whether an episode of resistance is truly nationalist or not.
colonial subjects. In some colonies, like India, these institutions were quite powerful. In others, like in Palestine, fractionalization and infighting between the native elites prevented any effective form of resistance. These institutions allowed the native elites to shape British policy through conventional means: negotiations, meetings, petitions, etc. Institutional resistance was an important form of colonial politics. However, these elites were also collaborationist. They benefited, sometimes handsomely, from the colonial regime and facilitated the colonial project. Their interactions with the British were not contentious. They were part of, and not separate from, the colonial state. For these reasons, institutional forms of resistance conducted by the native elite are not included in my variable of anticolonial resistance.

This variable includes common and visible forms of resistance such as riots, protests, strikes, boycotts, and bombings. More organized forms of resistance are included as well, such as an armed insurgency, as happened in places like Kenya, Cyprus, and Palestine. Notably, most discussions of anticolonial resistance focus on these types of mass conflicts and counterinsurgency operations, or with Gandhi or Nkrumah’s use of nonviolent civil resistance. These campaigns relied on a nationalist framework to resist the colonial power. They were also led by elites. Focusing only on mass, elite-led resistance excludes the common—but not quite everyday—forms of resistance that was endemic in the colonial project. My variable is much more expansive. I define anticolonial resistance as contentious political actions that were in any way related to the colonial state. Variation in the level of organization of the resistance was important as well, while I explore in Chapter 0.25.

My theory explicitly considers the relative effects of violent and nonviolent forms
of resistance. The distinguishing feature between violence and nonviolence is whether there is any physical destruction or harm to individuals. Deaths (intentional or not) as a result of an act of resistance will almost always mean that the resistance was violent. Riots, even when no one is physically harmed, are also considered violent because they result in the destruction of property. Acts of nonviolent resistance include mass protests, organized boycotts, and strikes. Strikes were a common tool of colonial subjects that were used to coerce concessions from local industry but were also, in some cases, explicitly nationalist. For example, during the war in Cyprus, over 1,000 Cypriots organized a hunger strike to protest British policies, and in Palestine, the 1936-1939 Arab nationalists successfully orchestrated a general strike for months until it petered out and devolved into a more conventional violent insurgency.

0.7 Variable 2, Concessions

The second variable, and my main dependent variable, is a concession from the metropole to the colony. I define a concession as a substantive policy change that favored the colony. This definition excludes smaller favorable actions made by the local colonial government and larger repressive actions made by a combination of metropolitan and local police forces. The revocation of a constitution or the declaration of an emergency was a substantive policy change, but did not favor the colony. Other colonial acts did favor colonial subjects, such as a reduction in the amount of taxes collected or increasing investments in specific areas. These types of changes were often made at the local level by colonial or district governors and did not require
metropolitan input.

Colonial concessions by the metropole to the colony consisted of three main categories. The first category consists of constitutional reforms or amendments. These reforms often expanded suffrage, increased internal self-government, and established institutions with native control. The second category consists of expanding the legislative council. Expanding the legislative council was an easy concession to make that increased local representation without requiring the process of a constitutional amendment. In the vast majority of cases, the seats added to the legislative council were seats earmarked to be held by native, and not European, elites. This helped dilute the power of the European seats. In theory and in practice, expanding the legislative council increased the representation of the non-European population. The third category includes all other substantial reforms. In Palestine, these reforms consisted of restricting or relaxing immigration for one of the two ethnic groups engaged in conflict. During the decolonization era, the British recognized native nationalist leaderships by holding a constitutional conference to discuss independence plans. These acts are coded as concessions.

In my theoretical model, concessions are enacted by the metropole in order to provide some benefit to the colonies. Concretely, these benefits usually resulted in the granting of rights, increased representation, or increased suffrage. Concessions are also directed to one specific colony and not an empire-wide reform, such as the British Colonial Development Act which changed widespread imperial policy but did not take into account facts on the ground in each colony. Within the colonial empires, concessions were not a tactic used only by the metropole. Colonial governors and even
district governors used concessions as well. However, these were more often smaller concessions that related to the day-to-day governance of a colony, namely tax relief and colonial investments. Local level officials could accede to the demands of colonial subjects by redistributing colonial investments or by selectively choosing not to collect legally mandated taxes. This, however, required no change in colonial policy, and was determined by local and colonial governors, not metropolitan politicians.

0.8 Variable 3, Strategic Importance

As in any hierarchical relationship, the metropole benefited or perceived to benefit from ruling its colonies. In modern imperial systems, the value of each colony to the metropole can vary considerably. Indeed, the importance of some colonies can be high enough that maintaining colonial rule is analogous to maintaining the territorial integrity of the state, as was the case with France’s attachment to Algeria. In the British Empire, colonies were also symbolically important, with India acquiring the moniker of the “Jewel in the Crown” of Britain.

Colonies varied in their importance to the metropole. While some colonies produced economic benefits in terms of large amounts revenue to the colonial office, the primary way in which a colony was important was for strategic reasons. In the 20th century, the metropole was almost entirely unconcerned with the finances of the colonies. Strategically important colonies were colonies where it was important for the British to maintain sufficient control over the inner workings of the colony in order to provide quick and uninterrupted access to its military bases. A colony’s
geographic location helped elevate the colony’s strategic importance. Colonies like Malta, Cyprus, and Palestine spanned small geographic areas but were proximate to the main theaters of potential conflict in Asia. The Middle Eastern mandates, namely Iraq, Kuwait, and Bahrain, were important as well but the main strategic goal of keeping the oil flowing could be achieved without too much meddling in internal affairs.

The strategic value of a colony was commonly discussed in the metropole during the decolonization era. While there was rarely a unanimous agreement among British policymakers that a colony was strategically essentially, there was a general lack of debate around these issues. This was possibly due to the rather technical military information required in order for a policymaker to make an informed judgment of a colony’s strategic value, including the depth of the water near its accessible ports and how changes in naval technology altered the mobility of naval vessels and the flying range of airplanes. In many cases, the archives show Cabinet, Foreign Office, and Colonial Office officials taking their cue on what colonies were strategically important from rather dry analyses authored by military specialists.

Importantly, this variable in my theoretical model is concerned with perceived rather than objective strategic importance. The British excelled at generating post-hoc justifications for their behavior and maintaining mythologies about the unique characteristics of colonies. Objective measures of strategic importance—for example by counting the number of military bases or geographical distance to potential theaters of war—risks misunderstanding how British policymakers understood their colonial empire and how they made decisions based on that understanding. For
these reasons, any discussion of strategic importance will be in reference to perceived strategic importance, rather than any objective measure.

Strategic importance varied over time. This occurred for a number of reasons. The strategic importance of a colony was linked to other colonial possessions. When India became independent in 1947, for example, the British downgraded the importance of maintaining control over nearby Ceylon. Relinquishing India also encouraged British withdrawal from the formerly strategically essential Mandate Palestine. With India, Palestine, and Ceylon independent, maintaining a foothold in Cyprus became a preferred option in the metropole. Non-colonial factors mattered as well. Troubles with sterling increased the importance of colonies like Malaya. Malaya possessed abundant rubber plantations which were exported and used to convert sterling into dollars and ease monetary pressures (Sutton, 2015). Importantly, the metropole viewed troubles with sterling as a threat to the security of the British empire and less as a direct economic benefit (Krozewski, 2001).

Strategically important colonies made successful bargaining between the metropole and the native colonial leadership difficult in the era of decolonization. In colonies that were not strategically important, the metropole was able to grant concessions and devolve autonomy without jeopardizing their core interest. In the era of widespread capital markets and international exchange, a former metropole would be able to enjoy access to trade and raw materials with its former colony once it achieves independence. Sovereignty for colonies did not threaten economic exchange. What it did threaten was the metropole’s access to military bases and the strategic use of a colony’s territory. No postcolonial leader would be able to credibly commit to
the metropole that, after they received independence, they would allow the metropole continued access to their colony by the former metropole’s military forces, which symbolized the very force that dominated the colony prior to independence. Metropolitan reluctance to grant concessions in response to anticolonial resistance made it more likely in the postwar era for hierarchically organized violence to occur. As Howe writes “it was already apparent by the later 1940s that two types of colonial territory would pose particular problems: those with substantial white settler populations and those of strategic importance to Britain and/or the USA” (Howe, 1993, 146).

### 0.9 Variable 4, Metropolitan Attention

In contrast to nation-states, the core-periphery division in an imperial polity means that metropolitan territorial control may not be consolidated throughout the empire. Areas under control of the metropole are much more in flux as well—territorial gains can come and go in an empire without jeopardizing the fundamental institutional core of the state itself. Britain could lose India and remain Britain but Spain without Catalonia would perhaps be a fundamentally different entity. The sheer number of formal colonies and areas with informal territorial control or even informal influence that are under metropolitan control in an imperial system means that metropolitan attention to each area is not constant. Quite simply, the metropole can safely ignore some areas at the expense of others.

I argue that metropolitan attention is the mechanism linking resistance in a colonial territory with any substantive change in metropolitan policy. The hierarchical
structure of imperial systems provides local-level governors with sufficient powers and resources to run colonies with limited metropolitan intervention and only occasional or regular oversight. Large-scale policy changes become more likely when the metropole becomes involved in colonial affairs simply because the metropole controls the resources and means in order to make these changes. Empire-wide reforms may occur but are likely to apply to regional groupings of colonies or to the entire colonial system and not to any specific colony.

Metropolitan attention is a mechanism less in the Elsterian sense of an explanation without a prediction, and more of a necessary condition for resistance to cause concessions (Elster, 2015). In order for the metropole to grant policy concessions to the colony, they must at first know about the unrest. When anticolonial resistance occurs in a colony, the metropole may discuss the colony more to figure out the proper way to address the colonial unrest. Unrest without attention does not lead to reforms. This is, admittedly, a low bar—metropoles receive fairly regular information about the goings on in their territories, so there will be some level of metropolitan attention paid to each territory. One of the reasons why violence is, on average, more effective than nonviolence in changing metropolitan policy is because violence is much more likely to increase metropolitan attention. In Chapter 0.33, I examine the parliamentary debates in the House of Commons to see how violence and nonviolence affects the character of that attention. While metropolitan attention is theoretically important, the variable’s high level of variation and ease of measurement makes it useful for empirically assessing the effects of violent and nonviolent actions.

How does understanding metropolitan attention matter for understanding the rel-
ative effects of violence and nonviolence on concessions? The answer is that resistance causes concessions via attention. This happens in two ways: resistance increases the amount of attention to a colony from the metropole, and resistance also changes the discourse about the colony in the metropole. The empirical implication here is that when resistance occurs, the metropole will discuss the colony and will do so in different ways depending on whether the type of resistance is violent or nonviolent. My theory predicts that violence in a colony will lead to increased attention to that colony relative to nonviolence, and that violence changes the character of the attention in important ways, while the impact of nonviolent resistance is smaller.

My theory maintains that violence will have a bigger impact on concessions than nonviolence because violence leads to more metropolitan attention that is conducive to granting concessions. Why then does violent resistance capture the attention of the metropole more than nonviolence? What is it about actions like riots, bombings, physical attacks, gun raids, etc. that capture so much attention while strikes, boycotts, and protests can be safely ignored by the metropole?

One potential answer is that violent actions are simply more costly in terms of resources than nonviolent actions. The destruction of buildings, infrastructure, and the lives of colonial rulers harm the economy of the colony itself and reduce colonial extraction. Nonviolence, while not conducive to economic growth, simply doesn’t have the immediate ability to cripple an economy. Numbers matter as well. Doing serious economic harm via a boycott requires a coordinated effort from a large group of people. Strikes also have a negative economic impact but are usually concentrated in a specific industry or place of employment. For violence, a small group of terrorists
can inflict serious economic harm simply by planting a few bombs in key locations. Riots need large numbers of people to matter but a semi-spontaneous riot can inflict serious harm to infrastructure in a short period of time and produce substantial negative economic consequences.

This argument, while plausible, assumes a number of things about the metropole’s relationship to its colonies. The most basic assumption is that the metropole is aware of, and has regular and accurate information about, the economic situation in each colony. Another assumption is that the metropole cares about the economic situation and the costs of administering colonial rule and colonial extraction. When the economic situation in a colony worsens, so the argument goes, achieving metropolitan goals with respect to that colony become more difficult. Since the metropole cares about the economic output of each colony and violence harms that output, violence in a colony will lead to more discussion in the metropole about that colony, and that discussion will be primarily concerned with the economic output of the colony.

Ultimately, then, this argument is based on what the goals of imperialism are. This has been the subject of numerous debates and has important stakes for understanding why states expand their territorial control. Most theories, even ones that locate the source of imperial expansion in great power politics, concede that economics plays some role in encouraging states to expand, whether that is through planned expeditions to extract resources or by haphazardly seizing control of non-state actors (as in the case of the Dutch and British East India companies). However, the sources of imperial expansion need not be related at all to the sources of imperial contraction. While there is no logical connection as to why the cause of imperial expansion should
lead to contraction at a later time, the fundamental changes in the international system and the world economy make it even more likely that centripetal pressures for imperial contraction are unrelated to centrifugal ones.

Economics, of course, plays a role. However, my theory contends that metropoles, because they are states themselves engaged in a hierarchical relationship to other colonial states, are fundamentally concerned about security in an era of imperial decline. This does not deny that colonial extraction matters, but what it does deny is that colonial extraction matters for those in the metropole during the era of imperial decline. Extracting revenue mattered tremendously to colonial governors and more local-level colonial officials. However, for those in the metropole, the metropole’s relationship to its colonial possessions is one hierarchical relationship between units among many. Declining metropoles attempt to manage their existing imperial possessions and foster beneficial post-independence relationships with their colonies. In the era of imperial decline, security concerns are paramount because today’s colonies will be tomorrow’s independent states.

British leaders in London could not pay equal attention to all of their colonies. Indeed, metropolitan negligence was baked into imperial rule. Colonial governors ruled over district administrators, and the metropolitan government was quite happy to let the agent in the principle-agent relationship rule the colony without unnecessary interference. In some sense, metropolitan attention to a colony was a failure of local colonial governing. Moreover, there were regularly scheduled avenues for metropolitan oversight of the colonies. Territories administered by the Colonial Office were subject to Question Time in Parliament. The production of annual reports—collected for
posterity in the appropriate nicknamed 'Blue Books’—occupied substantial resources of colonial officials and the numbers contained in these reports contained enormous detail about colonial happenings. For example, if the metropole cared to know about how many pairs of socks Iraq exported to Palestine in 1937—including whether the socks were made out of plain cotton yarn mixed with shoddy of wool and cotton or plain cotton yard mixed with artificial silk—they could consult the Blue Books. The relevant point here is that metropolitan attention to each one of its colonies by the cabinet and parliament was attention outside of regularly scheduled channels.

0.10 How Do These Variables Fit Together? A Theory of Imperial Response

My theory posts that the structure of imperial rule matters for understanding the differential effects of violent and nonviolent resistance. The British Empire commonly granted concessions to its colonies. This is in contrast to federally structured nation-states where segmented states within the federal structure may seek concessions. In those cases, reputational effects and the need to preserve territorial integrity make concessions that increase autonomy to secessionists risky (Walter, 2009). The nature of imperial structures means that concessions can more easily be granted to one colony without substantially encouraging other colonies to demand similar concessions. (The British feared that giving concessions to one African country would inspire demands in a nearby one, but most of the anticipated contagion was for geographically proximate
colonies, not all of those within the empire.) In response to violence, then, concessions can be granted without jeopardizing the entirety of imperial rule.

What is a colony? I adopt Go and Watson (2019)’s definition of a formal colony (which echoes (Osterhammel, 1997)’s) as “a territory that is under the sovereign power of a state but which is classified and treated as juridically and administratively inferior to other areas and peoples under the sovereign” (Go and Watson, 2019, 35). Go and Watson also distinguish formal colonial empires from federalist systems (akin to Russia’s land empire and the United States in the 19th century) and monarchist regimes like the Hapsburg Empire. The main difference between these structures and a formal colonial empire is that in federalist systems and monarchist regimes “the territories are equal in the sense that they are each equally subject to the control and power of the center. Everyone except the king or group of rulers is a subject; the citizen-subject binary does not apply” (Go and Watson, 2019, 35).

I argue that, unlike federally structured nation-states, the distance (in terms of geographic but also in terms of information and control) between the metropole and its colonies meant that policymakers in the metropole were much less frequently concerned with the goings on in each individual colony. Metropolitan attention to colonies was at a premium. In order for subjects to do something that led to a change in policy, they needed to get the attention of the metropole. Since the amount of attention devoted to each colony was low and the default position in most cases was to delegate authority and control to local-level officials, metropolitan policymakers were quite happy to not discuss a colony and let colonial governors administer the colony and perform other, non-imperial tasks.
Resistance had the potential to disrupt this equilibrium. Resistance could overwhelm the capacity of local colonial state to repress, contain, or defuse the resistance. Resistance was also visible to outside and domestic observers. Unrest in the colonies undermined the reputation of the British as benevolent colonial rulers who were shepherding their subjects into the next stage of development. Resistance in the colonies could also inject colonial issues into metropolitan politics. Since resistance signaled that local colonial officials were unable to maintain order in their colonies, the metropole responded by discussing the situation in the colony. For the British Empire, important discussions of colonial unrest occurred in the House of Commons and the Cabinet. Both institutions routinely conversed with local officials in the Colonial and Foreign Offices. It was in these institutions where the appropriate metropolitan response was discussed and debated.

All else equal, metropolitan governments preferred no resistance in their colonies. Resistance inhibited tax collection, the building of the colonial state, the extension of colonial investments, and perhaps most importantly, entangled empires in colonial wars. At the same time, metropoles would prefer not to devote extra-institutional metropolitan attention to colonies. The structure of imperial rule created local governors and colonial officials whose job it was to oversee and administer the colonies. As in any principal-agent relationship, the principal (the metropole) preferred that the agent (colonial officials) do what the principal delegated the agent to do with as minimal oversight and interference as possible. The default state of the metropole was thus to spend as little attention and hope for as little resistance as possible in their colonies.
If the theorized overall effect of resistance is to increase metropolitan attention, why does the difference between violence and nonviolence resistance matter? I argue that violence is effective against imperial rule for two reasons. Violence was better able to increase metropolitan attention to the colonies. This attention made it possible for the metropole to respond by offering colonial concessions. Violence is more effective at garnering metropolitan attention because violence made it very difficult to maintain colonial rule. Nonviolent resistance simply did not garner the attention of the metropole because strikes, protests, and boycotts could be easily dealt with using traditional colonial methods of concessions made by the local colonial government. Increasing wages, for one, was a tried and true tactic of officials in colonial Africa. It is not that nonviolent resistance was futile or ineffective—indeed, nonviolent resistance by colonial subjects likely had a serious impact on the development of the colonial state and patterns of taxation and investments. The fiscal state of a colony was, of course, important and affected the lives of colonial subjects. However, the metropole controlled the most important political features of the colonial state: its constitution, level of suffrage, political representation, etc. Nonviolence may grant a wage increase but could not bring about a reformed constitution or self-government.

The defining feature of violent relative to nonviolent activity is that violence can kill. The threat of armed resistance raised the possibility that colonial subjects and colonial officials could be killed. Deaths and property damage signaled to the metropole that the local colonial government could not adequately govern the colonial state. Therefore, my theory posits that violent resistance will have a more substantial effect on metropolitan attention that nonviolent resistance. Violence will both
increase the amount of attention and also change the character of that attention. Violence will lead to more attention simply because violence is much less likely to be ignored. In addition, violence demands a response. Attention is increased since there is generally more discussion on how to respond to violent resistance.

For nonviolent resistance, the effects are different. The agent in the principal-agent imperial relationship can be tasked with dealing with nonviolent more than violent resistance. In the British Empire, containing strikes, protests, and boycotts was the province of local officials. Crushing violent resistance often required metropolitan troops. Nonviolent resistance can more easily be combated with local police (rather than military) forces. Colonial governors did not want the increased oversight that came with using metropolitan resources to combat unrest. They preferred to use their own resources to quell unrest, and were better able to do so when the unrest was nonviolent rather than violent.

Therefore, violent activity in the colonies is more likely to invite metropolitan involvement and attention. Nonviolent activity is more likely to be ignored by the metropole. Why then does metropolitan attention lead to colonial concessions?

The goal of imperial rule was to maintain control of colonial possessions at a low cost. Granting concessions that increased colonial autonomy was a cheap way to defuse future anticolonial resistance. Concessions could be granted to the colonies that both demonstrated metropolitan goodwill and delegitimized nationalist grievances against colonial rule. Metropoles could also choose to repress anticolonial resistance. Importantly, concession and repression were not mutually exclusive. Indeed, in the 20th century metropoles commonly deployed troops to colonies to repress an upris-
ing while at the same time instituting policies to increase colonial autonomy. Local colonial police forces often engaged in wanton repression of resistance movements.

Since the importance of colonies to the metropole varies, the response from the metropole when resistance occurs in a colony should differ. I argue that the perceived strategic importance of a colony determines the metropolitan response to unrest. When a colony is strategically important and resistance occurs, the metropole will be much more reluctant to grant concessions. Granting concessions when violent resistance occurs in strategically important colonies risks empowering violent actors, increases the autonomy of the colony relative to the metropole, and jeopardizes the metropole’s access to these military bases.

Perceived strategic importance is a subset of the more general tendency to be unwilling to grant concessions. Colonies with substantial settler populations created bargaining problems between the metropole and the local colonial government, which also inhibited the granting of concessions. In Palestine, the British government faced the difficult task of crafting policy that satisfied both the Arab and Jewish populations, while fulfilling the terms of the League of Nations and later United Nations mandate. The pervasive view that relinquishing Algeria would cause a civil war in mainland France (which almost did happen) encouraged the metropole to actively fight Algeria’s independence movement.

Concessions, however, are not all the same. My theory predicts that strategically important colonies will be less likely to receive concessions in the face of anticolonial resistance. However, concessions are still a policy tool that the metropole did use in their relationship with strategically important colonies. Since the metropole did
not want to relinquish control over strategically important colonies, but concessions did occur, then we would expect that concessions in strategically important colonies are in some ways different than concessions in colonies that were not strategically important colonies. Increasing the suffrage share was an effective way to increase representation and defuse anticolonial sentiment. In strategically important colonies, increasing the suffrage share risked the metropole losing control over the colony to colonial subjects. This suggests that concessions should increase the suffrage share of a colony, but in strategically important colonies, concessions should have no effect on the suffrage share.

**Graphical Schematics**

Here I graphically present how these variables interact and the predicted effects of different combinations of variables. I first illustrate the classic hub-and-spoke structure of formal imperial rule. Figure 0.1a presents the structure of imperialism under ideal conditions (at least from the metropole’s perspective). The black lines represent formal and regular connections. Here, the metropole has regular and institutionalized oversight of the colonial government. The colonial government reports to the metropole on the goings on of all the colonies. The arrows running from the colonial government to the metropole indicate the metropole’s role of providing oversight to the colonial government while allowing the colonial government to manage the political situation in the colonies. The arrow running from the local government to the colony indicates that the local government administers the state in these contexts.
In this scenario, the metropole has no direct involvement with colonial affairs and delegates colonial policy to the local colonial government.

When resistance happens, the relationship between the nodes change. Figure 0.1b shows direct connections between the colony and the metropole when anticolonial resistance occurs. The red arrow indicates that happenings in the colony are being discussed in the metropole and bypass the local colonial government. This information can travel in a number of ways, via personal contacts between local colonial officials and domestic critics of empire within the metropole, newspaper reporting, or by metropolitan oversight of colonial affairs outside of regular reporting (in the British Empire, for example, each colony issued periodic reports on the state of the colony, and on occasion officials from the Colonial Office would be publicly queried during parliamentary Question Time). In turn, the metropole becomes directly involved in local colonial politics, as represented by the blue line. Once involved in local politics, the metropole can either grant a concession, deploy imperial troops, or do both. The relevant point here is that resistance in the periphery overwhelms the capacity of the local colonial government, forcing the metropole to become involved in colonial politics outside of regular channels. This allows for the possibility of nonviolent resistance, provided that its is large and coordinated enough, to overwhelm the capacity of the local colonial government and invite metropolitan involvement. In Chapter 0.25, I examine a particularly effective case of nonviolent resistance during the early phase of the Arab Revolt in Palestine where most of the Arab Palestinian population participated in a nonviolent general strike that crippled the colonial economy. My argument is that violence is on average more effective than nonviolence.
because violence is much better able to overwhelm the capacity of the local colonial government and only exceptionally powerful cases of nonviolence are able to do so.

The relevance of the structure of imperial rule for understanding the effect of resistance may become clearer by distinguishing imperial rule from other contexts. In a federally structured nation-state or even a mass land-based empire, metropolitan involvement in the peripheral units is much more frequent and integrated with larger metropolitan policy. Figure 0.2a displays this relationship. Lines connecting the
metropole to the local colony indicate these formal relationships. Figure 0.2b reflects a more decentralized relationship between the metropole and its constituent units. In contrast to a more loosely connected international organization, like the Hanseatic League or the European Union, the metropole (or core) has no formal authority to implement substantial policy changes at the local level. The imperial rule of 19th and 20th century European empires was not rule over entities possessing territorial sovereignty, nor was it analogous to the territorially contiguous United States in the 18th and 19th century or the Russian and Soviet empires.

The above models illustrate the structure of imperial rule and how metropolitan involvement in colonial affairs changes due to anticolonial resistance. Here I present simpler models that represent testable hypotheses about the differential effects of violent and nonviolent resistance on metropolitan attention and concessions from the

Footnote 2: For an argument for viewing the EU as an imperial polity, see Marks (2012).
metropole to the colony.

First, I separate resistance into its violent and nonviolent forms. As argued above, violence is more likely to overwhelm the resources and capabilities of local colonial governments and invite metropolitan attention. Increased metropolitan attention in turn demands a response to the unrest. In this case, I assume that granting concessions is politically feasible and not terribly costly to the metropole. The metropole responds to unrest by granting concessions and reforms, which they hope will defuse future unrest. Nonviolence does not increase the likelihood that the metropole will grant concessions because nonviolence is handled by the local colonial government. Metropolitan attention does not increase, and thus does not prompt the need to reform the government. Figure 0.3 displays these relationships.

![Figure 0.3: Relative Effects of Violent and Nonviolent Resistance](image)

These dynamics differ for strategically important colonies. Colonies where it is too costly for the metropole to grant reforms will not respond to increased metropolitan attention with reforms. In these colonies (see Figure 0.4), granting reforms jeopardizes
the metropole’s interest in the colony. Reforms can empower nationalists which risks the wholesale loss of a colony and important accesses to the colony’s military bases. The metropole can always simultaneously repress the subjects in a colony and grant reforms; in strategically important colonies, only repression occurs. Over time these colonies continually fail to coerce autonomy from the metropole. In turn, a much larger scale campaign of violence may erupt. Today’s refusal to concede can lead to tomorrows guerrilla warfare. Importantly, for strategically important colonies, the link between violence, nonviolence, and metropolitan attention generally remains the same as in other colonies. There are two important difference for these colonies. First, even when attention is high, the metropole will not respond to the unrest with concessions for the reasons argued above. Second, both violence and nonviolence may lead to higher levels of metropolitan attention than in other colonies. Strategically important colonies are, by definition, colonies that are important to the metropole. The metropole may pay more attention, on average, to events in those colonies, which means that even sufficiently coordinated nonviolent activity can garner metropolitan attention (even though that attention will not lead to concessions). I explore these dynamics empirically in Chapter 0.25.
However, the effect of violence on metropolitan attention is not constant. In a large-scale colonial conflict (where the metropole has decided to engage in widespread repression and an armed group has launched an insurgency) the effect of violence on attention attenuates over time. Violence works in part because it shocks the status quo. In colonial wars, the metropole expects violence. Figure 0.5 represents the declining effect of violence on attention with a dotted line. Since violence has a decreasing effect on metropolitan attention over time, and the metropole has already decided that the colony is worth repressing with a counterinsurgency war, the attention in this scenario has no effect on concessions. In these scenarios, nonviolence has very little effect on metropolitan attention, as the example of thousands of protesters engaging in a hunger strike during the Cyprus emergency shows (Correspondent, 1957).
Clarifying the Role of Violence

As articulated, the role of violence in my theory of imperial response is, at different times, a cause of concessions and a result from not receiving enough concessions. This is by design. Violence in purposefully endogenous in the theory because otherwise, the empirical analysis would treat the manifold forms of violence that resisted the British Empire as interchangeable. They were not. In Chapter 0.25, I disaggregate both violence and nonviolence into hierarchically organized and spontaneous forms of resistance, in effect splitting the variable of violence into terrorist campaigns and mass riots. The relationships between violence, concessions, and attention were different when the British metropole was engaged in a counterinsurgency campaign against anticolonial rebels. Attention becomes less responsive to violence as a campaign goes on. Concessions against hierarchically organized resistance was often not designed to increase the welfare of the masses but to placate the hierarchically organized resistance.
group. Hierarchically organized violence was more likely to occur after the metropole failed to improve the welfare of the masses after an episode of spontaneous violence.

0.11 Hypotheses

In this section I connect my broader theory on imperial response to specific hypotheses regarding the relationship between resistance, attention, concessions in the British Empire.

The British imperial project had two main goals in the 20th century: extracting resources from the colonies and providing strategic military bases. Nonviolent activity was unable threaten the stability of colonial rule. The colonial project could operate relatively smoothly despite strikes, protests, and boycotts. Violence, however, killed people, destroyed colonial investments, and made ruling a colony more difficult. This generates hypothesis 1.

**Hypothesis 1 (H1).** *Violent resistance within a colony should be more likely to lead to concessions by the colonial state than nonviolence.*

Alternatively, if the theorized mechanisms for why nonviolent resistance works are present, then we would expect nonviolence to precede concessions. Nonviolence could threaten the stability of colonial rule if it was large enough and sufficiently coordinated. Moreover, if the cost of devolving power to the colonies was less than the cost of repressing nonviolent activity and possibly encouraging a turn to violence, then we would see nonviolent activity be more likely to precede concessions. This generates hypothesis 2.
**Hypothesis 2** (H2). *Nonviolent resistance within a colony should be more likely to lead to concessions by the colonial state than violence.*

To test the causal mechanism, I investigate the determinants of metropolitan attention. The metropole was involved with many of the concessions granted. Theoretically, the reasons to expect violence and/or nonviolence to predict concessions are the same reasons we would expect violence and/or nonviolence to explain metropolitan attention to the colonies. That is, imperial rule was sensitive to costs and when anticolonial resistance imposed cost on colonial rule, the metropole became more involved. Attention can be reflected in the level of discussion of a colony by the British Cabinet. The corresponding hypotheses regarding the effect of the type of resistance on metropolitan attention that I test are hypothesis 3.

**Hypothesis 3** (H3). *Violence should be a larger predictor of mentions in the cabinet than nonviolence.*

My theory predicts that the metropole’s response to resistance should vary across colonies. Specifically, violence should be less effective at coercing concessions in strategically important colonies. Granting concessions risked losing control over a colony, and the British were simply unwilling to do this for colonies that they deemed were vital to their national security. Accordingly, I test hypotheses 4.

**Hypothesis 4** (H4). *The effect of violence on concessions should be lower in strategically important colonies.*
As articulated above, my theory also predicts that concessions should have differential effects on the suffrage share of a colony, based on whether that colony is strategically important or not. This generates the following hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 5** (H5). *Concessions should increase the suffrage share in a colony, except for strategically important colonies.*

In the empirical chapters I test these hypotheses.

### 0.12 Scope Conditions

What are the scope conditions of this theory? To answer this question it is important to decouple the dynamics of imperial expansion and contraction (Abernethy, 2000). Briefly, this theory only applies to an era of imperial decline. This era is one where imperial retrenchment and withdrawal are realistic policy options and the goal of metropolitan policymakers is to reduce their colonial commitments. When empires are seeking to expand, anticolonial resistance can be used a pretext to more aggressive repression and the formalization of control over colonial subjects. This pattern occurred in the British Empire during the 19th century after the Morant Bay uprising in Jamaica and the Indian Mutiny. In both cases, these largely violent rebellions resulted in significant metropolitan discussion (Gopal, 2019). Metropolitan policy, however, did not result in concessions, but resulted in making Jamaica a Crown Colony and assuming control from the British East India company. Similar formalizations of control in response to resistance occurred in the French conquest of Algeria (Sessions, 2015).
There are other scope conditions. For one, there must be some formal control from the empire over a colony. Informal rule, like Britain’s influence of Argentina and more recent examples of ‘neocolonialism’ are not explained by the theory since informal rule, almost by definition, means that the metropole is not involved in constitutional issues. In the face of widespread violent resistance in an informally controlled territory, the metropole has the option to completely disengage and leave the local (non-colonial) government in charge of responding to the resistance. When the local government is a colonial one and staffed with metropolitan officials, it is not a realistic option for the metropole to wash their hands of the local colonial government and leave them to fend for themselves in response to rebellion.

0.13 Conclusion

This chapter has introduced and discussed the theory of imperial response. The hub-and-spoke structure of empires matters for understanding state responses to resistance. When anticolonial resistance is violent, it is more likely to command metropolitan attention and overwhelm the capabilities of the local colonial government. When the anticolonial resistance is nonviolent, it is less likely to command attention. In an era of imperial decline, metropolitan attention due to violent resistance encourages the metropole to grant reforms to the colony in order to stave off future unrest. Strategically important colonies make bargaining harder—granting concessions to these colonies jeopardizes metropolitan security. In these colonies, concessions are not used to defuse unrest. In the following chapters, I test this theory
using qualitative and quantitative data.
Historical Background

0.14 Introduction

This chapter presents the relevant historical background on the British Empire. My goal here is to present an overview of how the British Empire operated, how it declined and fell, and to discuss the historical debate on anticolonial resistance and Britain’s decolonization. I also provide textual detail to some of the major acts of resistance and the types of reforms that were implemented along with a brief overview of the counterinsurgency campaigns that the Empire fought. A key part of my theory stipulates that the structure of modern European colonial empires matters for understanding the effects of anticolonial resistance. To support this claim, I also discuss how the apparatus of empire—the Colonial Office, Foreign Office, India Office, etc.—managed the colonies.

The British empire was the largest polity in history (Taagepera, 1978). It contained a wide variety of subordinate states within its hierarchy: crown colonies, protectorates, UN and League of Nations Mandate trust territories, and states with no formal colonial apparatus that experienced substantial informal pressure from London. The peak of the empire’s geographic reach occurred immediate after World War
I, when both Britain and France acquired the former colonial possessions of the fallen German and Ottoman empires. In addition to these dependent possessions, there were the dominions: Canada, Australia, and South Africa, which in the 20th century had little formal or legal connection to Britain but British influence still mattered. Britain also practiced informal empire. Britain was the dominant external actor in Argentina’s financial and monetary policy (Cain and Hopkins, 2014), and exerted substantial influence over the internal affairs of its former Middle Eastern colonies, specifically Egypt and Iraq (Darwin, 1999). Britain’s informal relationships with the newly independent Middle Eastern colonies revolved around specific issues. For Egypt, Britain cared most about access to its military bases in the Suez Canal, while for Iraq, the main goal was controlling its oil.

Britain’s Empire began declining from its height after World War I (Hyam, 2007). While Britain was severely harmed by the war, the global conflagration did more damage to Germany and the Ottoman Empire, allowing others to pick up the pieces. The newly acquired formerly Ottoman territory of Palestine was administered under the auspices of the League of Nations. This was the last colonial possession that Britain would acquire. From this point forward, the balance of control slowly shifted from the metropole to Britain’s colonies. Some colonies formed nationalist organizations. The Indian Nationalist Congress was founded in 1885. During the 1920s, it became the main institution agitating for Indian independence. Other organizations and resistance movements would follow, both inspiring and emulating each other.

The expansion of the British empire was driven by why Cain and Hopkins called “gentlemanly capitalism”—that is, the confluence of financial interests located in
London that encouraged British expansion abroad and benefited from access to export markets and raw materials (Cain and Hopkins, 2014). In their view, geopolitics mattered for where Britain expanded, but the main impetus behind the pressure to expand was the combination of financial interests in “the City” and landed interests. Provincial manufacturers, the traditional bugbear of imperial expansion (Hobson, 2018), were secondary. Part of this global financial network was the sterling system of monetary exchange, which included the dominions. The empire’s role in this system (whereby colonies sold goods and raw materials on the world market and converted sterling into dollars) helped cushion some of the negative impact from Britain’s postwar sterling crises (Krozewski, 2001). Generally, sterling was the primary way in which colonial economic issues mattered to policymakers in London largely because they viewed sterling issues through the lens of domestic politics and international security.

This study ignores partisan politics largely because there was an established consensus about the role of Britain’s empire and the need to maintain it across parties, with the exception of the radical flank of the Labour party (Howe, 2002). Both the Labour’s base in the manufacturing sector and the Conservative’s base in the ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ of the London-based financial sector benefited from British imperialism (Narizny, 2007). For example, the 1945 Labour Party’s manifesto only made one vague reference to imperial politics (Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2016, 24). Why then did these interest groups not resist the slow devolution of power from the metropole to the colonies? Part of the answer lies in the changing international system and how those changes altered the costs and benefits of imperial annexation. In short,
as markets became more integrated globally, Britain’s manufacturing and financial sector could maintain their interests in peripheral markets without formal annexation. This helps explain why, for example, the Middle Eastern territories of Iraq and Egypt were so easily relinquished. For Iraq, Britain’s control over the oil industry was secure without formal control. For Egypt, which was under heavy informal influence by Britain for decades, formal control was essentially superfluous. After each colony received independence, British military and economic influence remained prominent (Narizny, 2007, 223).

For much of the British Empire, there was little partisan difference between the Labour and Conservative parties on imperial issues. Labour could hardly be described as anticolonialist, although they did advocate for a more gentle and efficient form of colonial rule. Yet a substantial number of colonies received independence under the conservative rule of Harold Macmillan. There were few strident critics of colonialism within the British government. Exceptions include Fenner Brockway and the short-lived Movement for Colonial Freedom. It is debatable to what extent these anticolonial activists within the metropole changed British policy (Howe, 1993; Goldsworthy, 1971; Gopal, 2019). The relevant point is that, with few exceptions, the so-called imperial consensus present in British high politics was that questions of Empire revolved around the costs and benefits of colonialism, and not on any moral argument.
What are the explanations for Britain’s decolonization?

Imperial historians have long debated the causes of Britain’s decolonization. Decolonization was a global process that meant different things to different empires and to different colonies.

Standard explanations for Britain’s decolonization can be categorized in the following way. There is the argument that Britain granted independence to each of its formal colonies due to her benevolent nature. In this view, decolonization was altruistic and pragmatic and Britain chose this path not out of weakness, but out of strength. This was the view of Harold Macmillan and much of the conservative establishment, which helped to garner broader support for the granting of independence. Others have argued that as global capitalism spread, businesses viewed the end of formal colonialism as profitable, and therefore pressured the British establishment to abandon their colonies (Baran, 1962). Strachey (1961) has argued that changes in the domestic political environment led to changes in British colonial policy. Colonialism had become at best passé and at worst an embarrassment. There is also the view that Britain’s economic and political decline was the root cause of decolonization. Darwin (2017) counters this claim by pointing out that many other empires experienced even more drastic declines without abandoning their imperial possessions. Then there is the peripheral account of Britain’s decolonization: anticolonial nationalists within the colony replaced willing collaborators, exposing the weakness of the colonial state and making colonies more trouble than they were worth.
Darwin, perhaps unsatisfyingly, attributes Britain’s decolonization to three competing forces: “the domestic politics of ‘decline’; the tectonic shifts of relative power, wealth, and legitimacy at the international level; and the colonial (or semi-colonial) politics of locality, province, and nation” (Darwin, 2017, 552). Ronald Hyam offers a cricket analogy to categories the different explanations for decolonization: “Either the British were bowled out (by nationalists and freedom-fighters), or they were run out (by imperial overstretch and economic constraints), or they retired hurt (because of a collapse of morale and ‘failure of will’), or they were booed off the field (by international criticism and especially by United Nations clamor)” (Hyam, 2007, xiii).

This study is not concerned with adjudicating between these competing explanations. All explain some variation in colonial policy. My goal, rather, is to show that conflating anticolonial resistance with the postwar nationalism within the colonies misses the frequency and intensity of resistance in the prewar era that may or may not have been explicitly nationalist. In addition, the pattern of violent resistance and response with concessions accelerated in the postwar era but was not confined to it. The seeds of decolonization and independence were planted before the end of World War II and indeed began sprouting before that period.

How did anticolonial resistance affect decolonization? Krozewski (2001) offers a qualification of accounts that attribute independence to anticolonial nationalism. Krozewski’s thesis is that resistance only mattered when it threatened Britain’s sterling relationships. This is a bold claim. Krozewski’s study confines itself to the immediate postwar period, when Britain experienced a sterling crisis that threatened
to destabilize its imperial relationships along with the daily functioning of the British state. Nevertheless there is some evidence to support his claim. He cites the Gold Coast and Malaya, where concessions in response to anticolonial resistance assisted metropolitan management of sterling. This was indeed the case (perhaps more so in the case of Malaya) but as I argue, the imperative to manage imperial sterling relationships did not lead to concessions—they merely facilitated their implementation. Krozewski offers additional reasons as to why anticolonial resistance was ultimately a cause of decolonization are. He argues that in most territories resistance had little effect on imperial economic relations, “Britain’s retreat from the empire in 1960 was unexpected” (Krozewski, 2001, 207) and thus not driven by events in the colonies, and that external changes in the international system led to both anticolonial resistance and concessions. In other words, both resistance and concessions were jointly caused by international changes.

Things did change in 1960, and did so unexpectedly. In Cape Town, South Africa, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan delivered a shocking speech to the Parliament of South Africa, which became known as the “Wind of Change” speech (Ovendale, 1995). Here, Macmillan signaled that the conservative government would no longer block reforms to the colonies and decolonization would be allowed to unfold with little metropolitan resistance. It was an acknowledgment that the nationalist genie could not be put back in the colonial bottle. Interestingly, Macmillan had delivered an almost identical speech earlier that year in the Gold Coast, but the British media largely ignored it. What led to this speech and pivot towards independence for the colonies? Goldsworthy (1971) argues that the driving force in the change of policy
was the new secretary of state for the colonies, Iain Macleod, and his realization that continued colonial rule would lead to bloodshed. Darwin (1988) also argues that many officials in the Colonial Office feared that what happened in Malaya would happen all over Africa. Moreover, officials did not wonder how a sustained counterinsurgency campaign in Africa would fare for a colonial power. France’s failure in Algeria and the war in the Belgian Congo demonstrated to British officials the immense costs that resistance to concessions could impose on a metropole (Ovendale, 1995, 457). The Suez debacle, of course, changed things as well and displayed the limits of Britain’s military prowess abroad while also highlighting the importance of world opinion. Macmillan delivered the “Wind of Change” speech in 1960. By 1964, Cyprus, Malta, Kuwait, Jamaica, Malaya, and Trinidad and Tobago, received independence (Stockwell, 2017, 77).

In Heinlein’s study of British imperial policy, he explains Britain’s decision to grant independence to a colony as driven by their belief that “the goodwill of local nationalists [was] the best guarantee for [preserving British] interests” (Heinlein, 2013, 6). The prospect of favorable postwar relations determined the course of de-colonization. Colonial leaders that favored maintaining a strong post-independence relationship soothed Britain’s concerns about how independence would harm their interests. Pressure to grant independence had to be balanced against the need to cultivate a colonial elite that could insure favorable post-independence relations. In Burma, for example, policymakers feared that maintaining colonial rule past its expiration date would lead to ill-will among the colonial elite and lead Burma to leave the Commonwealth (and Britain’s sphere of influence) after independence (Heinlein,
In Malaya, concessions were used to garner support for the population as a way to reduce the appeal of communism (Heinlein, 2013, 109). Heinlein offers qualified support for the argument that nationalist pressure encouraged Britain’s decolonization: “in some cases, [nationalists] proved a nuisance, in others it was the prospect of a strong nationalist movement emerging which prodded Britain towards action. More often than not, however, the demands of nationalist groups only somewhat accelerated constitutional advance without being at the root of any radical changes” (Heinlein, 2013, 303).

In her overview of British decolonization, Stockwell summarizes the current view among historians that decolonization resulted from “some combination of metropolitan weakness and anti-colonial political movements in bringing about post-war imperial dissolution...the British empire fell victim to the same global forces as other modern empires as world war reconfigured colonial politics and tilted power away from the old western European imperial powers and towards new centres” (Stockwell, 2017, 65). This is a systemic argument, that locates the cause of Britain’s decolonization in global processes that make it harder for empires to thrive and favor a system of sovereign nation-states.

In his influential article on British decolonization, John Darwin identifies four issues that must be studied in order to understand why Britain’s empire ended and the decisions that policymakers took. They are: “How rapidly and how completely would British power contract? How swiftly would self-government be conceded to the extremely heterogeneous collection of territories that constituted the imperial system? What would self-government amount to when and if it were granted? And
what kind of post-colonial relationship would be established between Britain and her ex-colonies?” (Darwin, 1984, 88). In answering these questions Darwin cautions scholars of empire not to interpret the plans articulated by colonial officials as being more than self-serving justifications for their haphazard improvisations to quickly changing political pressures. The mandarins of the Colonial Office reacted quickly to changing circumstances, he argues, and the actual policies of the empire reflected the decisions made in response to these circumstances, and not a blueprint of how to handle imperial decline. This has important implications for understanding the cause of Britain’s decolonization—the sheer chaos of transferring sovereignty makes it difficult to view it as a benevolent gift from enlightened bureaucrats in London. Elsewhere, Darwin has written that “those who ’made’ colonial policy were guessing, hoping, gambling - and miscalculating” (Darwin, 1988, 20). This is a reasonable view to take from someone ensconced in the colonial archives. Finlayson agrees as well, writing that “Britain fabricated an account of its colonial policies from a mass of incoherent actions to make them appear more altruistic, and to make past decisions appear to be the obvious precursor to future policy” (Finlayson, 2002, 6). Colonial documents do reflect a jumble of incentives, goals, tactics, and seemingly apolitical personal conflicts between officials. However, viewing Britain’s decolonization as an inscrutable puzzle misses some broad patterns.

There was no grand strategy of British decolonization. At the time Britain was devolving power to nationalists in sub-Saharan Africa, they were launching a war in Suez. However, the reactive nature of British imperial policy does not mean that there were no broad patterns that emerged. As I show, the British did grant concessions
in response to resistance. Importantly for understanding the scope of my argument and its import, this was not a stated policy. If it was, it would have been fought over, mis- and re-interpreted, ignored, and amended. Granting concessions in response to resistance was a result of a structural artifact of colonial rule. In the same way, the pattern of local colonial officials reducing tax rates after strikes and protests was not stated policy. These choices were simply the best available response to colonial unrest.

Wm. Roger Louis & Ronald Robinson present an even more complicated view of what decolonization actually was. They state that “to see the transformation of an imperial coalition as if it were the collapse of an imperial state is like mistaking the melting tip for the iceberg” (Louis and Robinson, 1994, 462). In their view, imperial decline did not lead to decolonization: granting independence to colonial states was not a necessary result from a weakening imperial center. They point out that Canada, Australia, and South Africa received independence when Britain was at the height of its power. The ties between the former dominions and Britain remained strong after independence, which served Britain’s interests. Britain’s declining postwar Empire coincided with the rise of the US, which helped forge an enduring Anglo-American alliance and the replacement of Britain’s formal empire with the US’ informal economic hegemony. They conclude that “American influence expanded by imperial default and nationalist invitation” (Louis and Robinson, 1994, 495).

This study is primarily about the concessions that Britain granted to their colonies, not decolonization as a global process or even why some colonies were granted independence earlier than others. As mentioned earlier, independence for each colony was
overdetermined, which partly accounts for why the various explanations for the end of the European empires (metropolitan, peripheral, economic, strategic, etc.), considered individually, are convincing. Studying the proximate causes for independence can tell us something about how complex negotiations are conducted and which issues make these negotiations more difficult, but they will tell us little about the relative effects of violent and nonviolent resistance. The variation of interest is not what happens in the year or two before independence is granted. Assessing the effects of anticolonial resistance immediate prior to independence is a bit like studying the hinges on a stable door to find out why the horses had bolted. As Stockwell writes, “the momentum established by earlier constitutional reform had led to the independence or impending independence of Malaya, Ghana, and Nigeria, as successive British governments sought to accommodate nationalism as the best means of preserving influence and of protecting British interests” (Stockwell, 2017, 78). Reforms empowered nationalists, increased suffrage, and demonstrated that revolting worked (Darwin, 1988, 31).

Reforms were an important part of decolonization. Decolonization was a process, not an event. Darwin identifies four different definitions of decolonization. These are 1) the legal-constitutional transfer of sovereignty (formal independence), 2) the removal of all foreign influence from a subordinate state 3) the breakdown of global colonial order and the denial of self-government to subordinate societies, 4) a system of economic relations states where subordinate states served as export markets and provided raw materials for more powerful states (Darwin, 2017).

By exploring anticolonial resistance’s effect on British politics, this work shares
similarities with Priyamvada Gopal’s *Insurgent Empire: Anticolonial Resistance and British Dissent*. A scholar of postcolonial literature, Gopal explores how large-scale colonial uprisings shaped British politics by performing close readings of key texts that were produced by policymakers, political officials, and journalists. Most of her work examines resistance outside the era of imperial decline during the 19th century. These uprisings, partly because of their violent nature, created major debates about how to address anticolonial resistance and exacerbated divisions in British politics. The British political elite viewed the empire as an essentially benevolent force that spread democracy and civilization to backwards savages. For some, violence committed by those resisting colonialism forced supporters of empire to grapple with the question: if empire benefited colonial subjects, why did they react to purported imperial benefits with violence? Gopal (2019)’s work shows that activists on the fringes of British politics did debate these questions, and that criticism of the imperial project within the metropole was driven by anticolonial dissent.

Gopal’s project is unabashedly presentist: it is designed in part to demolish the notion, common in present day British discourse, that British politicians granted colonies their independence after the colonies achieved political maturity. Gopal rightly argues that this view ignores the frequent forms of resistance committed by colonial subjects. My work goes farther and shows that an important feature of the process of decolonization was the concessions that the British granted to their colonies in response to this resistance. Colonial autonomy and independence were not benevolently granted, rather, they were violently earned: Gopal writes that “The making of an empire that was forced over time to make concessions, offer reforms,
attend to human rights (if only notionally), embrace ‘humane’ considerations, and
even regard itself as an emancipator in the first instance, must be read as a response
to resistance” (Gopal, 2019, 27).

The most important and well-known example of large-scale anticolonial resistance in the 19th century was the Great Rebellion in India of 1857. Discontent with British rule had started in the Army of Bengal, which was the largest of the three armies operated by the East India Company. Rumors spread about the troops (or sepoys as they were called) being deployed overseas, where they would likely have their religious traditions violated. On May 10, 1857 in the city of Meerut, the troops mutinied after some were punished for refusing to use ammunition cartridges that had been prepared with animal fat, in contravention of both Muslim and Hindu religious law. These troops killed their British officers, then marched to Delhi, where the revolt spread throughout most of the colony. The British responded by moving troops from Iran, China, and the Crimea to suppress the uprising. Here, the British were successful: by July 1958, the rebellion was officially over. The rebellion made a huge impact on metropolitan and international audiences, largely due to the work of a Times of London correspondent, William Howard Russell (Osterhammel, 2015, 551-553). In his thematic survey of 19th century history, Osterhammel (2015) places the Great Rebellion in comparison to other revolts of the time period. He argues that “it was a rebellion, not a revolution” largely because those rebelling had no new vision of order, unlike the 1848 revolts in Europe or the Taiping revolt (Osterhammel, 2015, 551).

Insurgent Empire also corroborates a key argument of my work: that violence
increased metropolitan involvement in colonial politics. The Morant Bay Uprising of 1965, when Jamaican peasants protested, rioted, and killed twenty five people, disrupted the view that colonialism was essentially benevolent. Metropolitan attention to Jamaican affairs led to “the views and aspirations of black Jamaican peasants” being made available “in a striking variety of forms: petitions, memorials, speeches, addresses, resolutions, letters, placards, and leaflets” (Gopal, 2019, 87). The local colonial government in Jamaica responded to the uprising by engaging in severe repression and abuses. Governor Eyre declared martial law and metropolitan politics deemed him responsible for the deaths of hundreds of Jamaicans during this time. The appropriateness of this response led to an even fiercer debate in Britain. Gopal refers to the Eyre controversy as a local classicus, that is, “a characteristic moment of internal moral crisis leading to self-correction” (Gopal, 2019, 84-85). Unlike British policy in the era of decolonization, metropolitan response to the Morant Bay uprising was the incorporation of Jamaica as a Crown Colony in 1866, which further reduced self-government.

0.16 Historical Background & the theory of Imperial Response

This section provides additional background to the British empire, with three main goals. The first is to show that British interest in the colonies varied spatially and temporally. The second is to review the types of reforms and concessions that were
granted to the colonies. The third discusses the importance of metropolitan involvement for the granting of concessions.

**Heterogeneous Importance**

Not all colonies were equally important to the metropole. For example, India was the ‘Jewel in the Crown’ of the British empire, while much smaller island colonies rarely received any attention from London. Geostrategic dynamics altered the value of colonial possessions over time. When colonial control became less useful to the British in the era of decolonization, one response was withdrawal. For example, independence to India was granted in part because India became a net creditor to Britain. Extensive use of the Indian Army in World War II led to a massive outflow of sterling from London to India. By 1945, India’s sterling balances totaled £1,400 million (Brown and Louis, 1999, 440). India’s drain on the sterling reserves, combined with a friendly collaborationist elite in the form of the Indian National Congress meant that post-independence relations would continue the close relationship between Britain and India without exacerbating the sterling crisis. As Judith M. Brown put it, “In 1945-46 the British recognized, however reluctantly, that in the particular and unique circumstances of post-war India an Imperial Raj no longer achieved the goals they sought” (Brown and Louis, 1999, 444). This, in turn, affected the value of controlling other territories. An independent India lowered the value of a foothold in the Indian Ocean, which made control over Ceylon less important and prompted independence for the island.
The postwar anxiety over declining sterling reserves also raised the importance of some colonies. British interests in Malaya grew rapidly after the loss of India due to Britain’s need to convert sterling into dollars and rising great power rivalry in the region (Stockwell, 1995a, liv). Maintaining rule over Malaya became essential during the sterling crises since the large volume of rubber exports from Malaya enabled the easy exchange of dollars into sterling. Hinds goes as far as to say that “it was virtually impossible for Britain to relinquish political control over its main dollar earning colonies” during the Sterling crises (Hinds, 1999, 107).

The Cold War also changed the value of colonies. Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin argued in the immediate postwar period that Britain must maintain control of all their Middle Eastern territories in order to prevent Soviet encroachment. This stance became encapsulated in the motto “what we have we hold,” which characterized how the official mind of those in the Foreign and Colonial Offices viewed informal control in the Middle East (Heinlein, 2013, 15-16). The Chiefs of Staff agreed with Bevin and viewed the maintenance of informal control as one of the three “cardinal requirements for the future defense of the British Commonwealth” (Heinlein, 2013, 18).

While some colonies produced economic benefits, the primary way in which a colony was important was for strategic reasons. In the period after World War I, the economic benefits that a colony provided were secondary to its strategic importance. The metropole was almost entirely unconcerned with the finances of the colonies. Decision makers in the cabinet largely ignored questions of budgets, revenue, and expenditures of the colonies. The impetus for much imperial expansion and the settlement of colonies was the search for raw materials and resource extraction (Cain
and Hopkins, 2014). The desire for economic resources explains the expansion and intensity of colonialism but is less relevant for understanding the dynamics of decolonization. The exceptions to this tendency were Britain’s attempt to maintain access to Middle Eastern oil through informal influence in former colonies like Iraq and Britain’s interest in export materials that eased the sterling crisis in the immediate postwar period. For example, rubber from Malaya became a concern of the metropole in the postwar era because rubber exports could be used to exchange sterling into dollars, which eased the sterling crisis by strengthening the value of sterling.

Here it is difficult to disentangle strategic from economic considerations. Oil is an economic commodity whose strategic and military uses were paramount. Malayan rubber is less clearly related to security issues. The relevant point here is that these commodities were not important to the metropole because financial firms in London exerted their influence on colonial policy and encouraged resource extraction, as had happened through much of the 19th century. Rather, these commodities were part of Britain’s “external economic policy” and were integral to Britain’s strength as a world power (Krozewski, 2001, 9-10).

Some colonies were viewed as strategically essential for the defense of the Empire. The British fought to maintain control of Cyprus largely because the loss of India and Palestine reduced their strategic foothold in the Middle East. Withdrawal from Cyprus would mean immediate unification with Greece and decline in British influence (Heinlein, 2013, 57). Informal control over the Middle East was important partly because of the region’s location on the route to India (Cain and Hopkins, 2014, 407). In October 1938, the Chiefs of Staff recommended that “the first commitment of our
land forces, after the security of the United Kingdom, should be the security of Egypt and of our interests in the Middle East” (Ashton and Stockwell, 1996, xxxvi). After World War II this assessment persisted. Prime Minister Eden described defending the Middle Eastern colonies as “a matter of life and death to the British Empire” (Ashton and Stockwell, 1996, xliii). British interests in Iraq were primarily “strategic and political” (Fieldhouse et al., 2006, 70) due to its oil and geographic location. The main goal of the British in operating the Mandate was to maintain access to their military bases without any serious foreign threat (Fieldhouse et al., 2006, 71-72,88). Protecting British commerce in Iraq was a “relatively minor consideration” (Fieldhouse et al., 2006, 88). Similarly, Palestine’s importance was primarily strategic since it provided easy access to its military bases in Egypt and India (Fieldhouse et al., 2006, 196,218). No clear relationship existed between geographic size and importance. The Committee of Imperial Defense in 1923 believed that Aden was of “general strategic importance to the Empire” because of its wireless telegraph and fueling station (Hankey, 1996, 47).

Concessions and Resistance

Throughout the 20th century the British Empire routinely granted concessions to the colonies. These concessions took the form of constitutional reforms or increasing autonomy of colonial subjects. The main reason these concessions occurred was due to unrest within the colonies (Smith, 1978). Concessions were either a response to past unrest or an attempt to stave off future unrest (Rathbone, 1992, xxxvii). In the era of
anti-colonial nationalism, colonial officials engaged in a policy of “making reasonable concessions [to the colonies] without conceding any points which are genuinely essential” (Heinlein, 2013, 24). The goal was the gradual advance to self-government and the empowerment of native elites that would ensure favorable relations with Britain in the post-independence period. For example, the Governor of Burma quickly conceded demands to the Anti-Fascist PFL in 1946 after a series of strikes threatened to paralyze the colony in order to defuse the situation (Heinlein, 2013, 43). The strategy of granting concessions to quell unrest was also used in Malaya alongside conventional counterinsurgency tactics (Heinlein, 2013, 52).

After the 1948 Accra riots in the Gold Coast, the Colonial Office responded by appointing the Watson Commission of Inquiry to investigate the causes of the disturbances and to find ways to prevent future unrest. Their recommended remedy was constitutional reform. In their view, the constitution of Ghana “must be reshaped as to give every African of ability an opportunity to help govern the country, so as not only to gain political experience but also to experience political power. We are firmly of the opinion that anything less than this will only stimulate national unrest” (Rathbone, 1992, xliv-xlvi). Recommendations also included increasing voting rights and the size of the Legislative Council to include more Africans (Rathbone, 1992, xlv). These recommendations were in line with current colonial thinking about British Africa. In response to the recommendations of the Watson Commission, the colonial office appointed a committee to formulate a draft of a new constitution (Rathbone, 1992, xlvi). The goal here was to prevent further riots though concessions while maintaining control over external affairs and defense (Heinlein, 2013, 54). These dynamics
of concessions and nonviolent resistance in the Gold Coast will be explored further in Chapter 0.46.

This pattern occurred again after the rise of Kwame Nkrumah and his Convention People’s Party (CPP). Nkrumah’s organizing of strikes, boycotts and demonstrations lead to his imprisonment in 1950. To further combat Nkrumah’s influence, the Governor set up a committee to review proposals for further constitutional reforms. The logic behind this approach was that voluntarily offering concessions would preserve British influence better than appearing to be coerced into granting concessions. While Nkrumah was not the ideal colonial elite from the British perspective, officials feared that Nkrumah and the CPP could be outflanked by more radical elements. Britain’s economic interests in the Gold Coast made it vital that cocoa exports continued and convertibility of sterling into dollars was maintained (Hinds, 1999, 105). The result was the new constitution of 1950 (Heinlein, 2013, 54-56). This strategy was present in Ceylon and Malaya as well. Frank Heinlein concludes that, “the sudden upsurge of nationalist demands ... led Britain to accelerate constitutional development beyond anything imagined feasible immediately after the war” (Heinlein, 2013, 63).

The metropole reacted to unrest across colonies in different ways. Despite their best efforts, the campaign of West African cocoa farmers to withhold supplies from cocoa manufacturing firms and European merchants failed to garner significant metropolitan attention. The 1935 Copperbelt strikes in Northern Rhodesia resulted in repression by local police forces and a number of fatalities, yet never became as significant a topic of discussion in London as the widespread rioting that occurred in the West Indies from 1935-1938 (Ashton and Stockwell, 1996, lxvi). Ashton and Stockwell
claim that the labor unrest in the West Indies was “the single most important occurrence which confronted officials during the inter-war years” (Ashton and Stockwell, 1996, lxxxvi) largely because of the violent nature of the unrest combined with the importance of sugar production.

London granted concessions to the colonies mostly by reforming the constitution or expanding the legislative council. Constitutional reforms often expanded suffrage, increased internal self-government, and established institutions with native control. Expanding the legislative council (the primary legislative body within a colony) was an easy concession to make that increased local representation without requiring a the process of a constitutional amendment. In the vast majority of cases, the seats added to the legislative council were seats earmarked to be held by native, and not European, elites. This helped dilute the power of the European seats. In theory and in practice, then, expanding the legislative council increased representation the non-European population.

**Metropolitan Involvement**

While the Colonial Office was mostly in charge of implementing concessions, they did so under metropolitan pressure. For example, Howard Johnson argues that the Colonial Office focused their attention on the implementation of labor legislation reforms in the wake of the West Indian disturbances of 1937-1938 due to criticism from the Labour Party in Parliament (Brown and Louis, 1999, 608). Lord Moyne, then the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in 1941 proposed a constitutional reform
for Jamaica and an increase in suffrage to the Jamaican Governor (Wallace, 1977, 56). For the reform of the Gold Coast constitution in 1954, the Colonial Office drafted recommendations which were then formally accepted by those in Whitehall (Rathbone, 1992, lx). Palestine was briefly under the control of the Foreign Office but power was transferred to the Colonial Office in 1922. According to Roza El-Eini, “few decisions could be taken without prior knowledge and approval of the metropolis” (El-Eini, 2004, 32). Decisions by district governors were referred to Jerusalem which then consulted with officials in London, including the Prime Minster. In 1950 the Secretary of State for the Colonies appointed a board to review the constitutions of British colonies in the Caribbean (Wallace, 1977, 75). Ultimately the decision to grant independence was a metropolitan one. Before Ceylon became fully self-governing, the House of Commons passed the Ceylon Independence Bill in November of 1947 (Heinlein, 2013, 50).

The shift towards development in Colonial Policy was spearheaded by the metropole. The first Colonial Development Act of 1929, enacted by Parliament, was ostensibly designed to further British financial interests, but in the West Indies its more prominent effect was to increase native participation in the civil service (Wallace, 1977, 31). In response to the West Indian disturbances of 1937-1938, colonial development became the primary framework for dealing with the colonies of the West Indies, largely because commissions of inquiry after large-scale strikes and protests in the West Indies blamed poor wages rather than the denial of self-government as the root cause of the disturbances (Wallace, 1977). For example, the commissions of inquiry for Barbados and Trinidad located the cause of the disturbances in poor social services
and recommended large-scale investment. According to Howard Johnson, “this information was not new to Colonial Office officials, but in 1938 they feared unflattering scrutiny of colonial administration in the Caribbean when the British government was on the defensive about the Empire, especially in the face of US criticism” (Brown and Louis, 1999, 608). The value of the colony also conditioned the response to unrest. For example, after the West Indian labor unrest of 1937-1938, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, William Ormsby-Gore, himself established a Commission of Inquiry in Trinidad due to the colony’s strategic importance (Brown and Louis, 1999, 608).

Metropolitan concerns were paramount in determining how the colonies responded to resistance.

Large scale revolts served to discredit the policy of the local colonial government. Metropolitan involvement in Iraq after the 1920 revolt was partly a response to the inability of the India Office (which, for purely idiosyncratic reasons, controlled Iraq) to properly govern the mandate (Kadhim, 2012, 31). The Jamaican disturbances of 1938 demonstrated that local budgets were unable to provide sufficient reforms and that substantial Treasury assistance was necessary. This resulted in large-scale financing from the Treasury and approval from the House of Commons (Brown and Louis, 1999, 609). The colonial governor consistently referred to the October 1931 riots in Cyprus as “disturbances” in discussions with the metropole in order to downplay the extent of the unrest (Ioannides, 2019, 160-170). The use and effect of these types of euphemisms for anticolonial violence in parliament will be discussed in Chapter 0.33.

The British Cabinet also was heavily involved in Colonial Affairs, particularly in areas related to federation and constitutional changes. For example, the Cabinet
devoted considerable attention to the constitution of Ceylon in 1928 and 1929, and again during World War II. During the war, the Cabinet also discussed the constitutions of Jamaica, Malaya, and Malta. After World War II, constitutional changes in more peripheral colonies were discussed, including Zanzibar, the Gold Coast and Nigeria. The Arab Revolt and the ethnic conflict between Jews and Arabs in Palestine commanded considerable Cabinet attention during the 1930s and 1940s. Unless there was a direct impact on security issues, the Cabinet left the handling of trade, finance and raw materials to issue-specific committees (Thurston, 1998, 3-4).

While the interest of the colonial governors was to maximize revenue (Xu, 2018), the metropole was overwhelmingly concerned with imperial security. A 1945 report by the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff (PHPS) on the security of the British Empire in the wake of World War II distilled the essentials of imperial security as maintaining “the integrity of the British Empire against both external and internal threats” and the security of “world-wide sea and air communications on which depend the cohesion of the Empire, and access to essential raw materials and industrial capacity” (Staff, 1996, 340). The report listed internal security as a necessary goal of Britain’s strategic policy. The report goes on to note that “threats to the security of British interests, which may call for use of British armed forces, fall into three main categories:- A. Aggression by minor Powers against British territory. B. Wars between minor Powers affecting British interests. C. Internal unrest. These commitments, particularly internal unrest, will constitute a considerable drain on our resources” (Staff, 1996, 347).
0.17 Conclusion

This chapter has provided the historical detail that will be useful for understanding later chapters and to facilitate matching the theory of imperial response with the empirical analysis I conduct. In the following chapter, I present my main quantitative data collection on concessions and resistance, along with a number of statistical models showing the relationship between resistance, metropolitan attention, and colonial concessions.
0.18 Introduction

This chapter provides quantitative empirical support for my theory of imperial response. I present and describe the quantitative data I collected on anticolonial resistance, metropolitan attention, and colonial concessions. I estimate a large number of statistical models that explore the relationships between these variables. The results provide strong empirical evidence for the hypotheses derived from my theory.

The results show that violence is a bigger predictor of a colonial concession than nonviolence. This effect is attenuated for strategically important colonies because the British were less willing to concede access to the colonies. I also show that violence is a bigger predictor of metropolitan attention, which is a key mechanism in my theory that links resistance to metropolitan responses. I addition, I also estimate the effect of violence on metropolitan attention within a anticolonial insurgency to see how this effect changes over time, along with an investigation as to the effect of colonial concessions on suffrage levels within a colony.
0.19 Research Design

To test the empirical implications of my theory of imperial response, I run a number of statistical models to analyze the relationship between variables. Since concessions were relatively infrequent events that were not immediate reactions to anticolonial resistance, I use colony-years as the unit of analysis when the dependent variable is whether a colony receives a concession from the metropole. However, metropolitan attention was more frequent and also responded quicker to events in the colonies. For this reason, and to limit the threat of unobserved heterogeneity that may bias my inferences, I use a colony-month as the unit of analysis when estimating the effect of unrest on metropolitan attention. Since the choice to use violence or nonviolence by imperial subjects was a strategic one, it is unlikely that there exists a scenario where there is as-if random variation in violence and nonviolence, and it is even more unlikely that such a design examining this hypothetical scenario would have any meaningful external validity. Using a granular unit of analysis such as the colony-month—which not equivalent to complete randomization of the independent variables—aids inference by ensuring that similar units of analysis are being compared. Moreover, the private nature of metropolitan attention as measured by cabinet discussions helps limit reverse causality as one other potential threat to inference. While endogeneity is present in nearly all observational studies—and especially those involving the dissolution of centuries-old international phenomena involving dozens of countries around the globe—this approach helps increase the likelihood that the effects uncovered in the statistical models reflect a causal relationship.
Temporally, my study is limited to the so-called ‘Second’ British Empire, which began after World War I (Parsons, 2014). I chose this cutoff for two reasons. One is that there is better quantitative and qualitative data available after World War I. The other is that, after the fall of the Ottomans, the British acquired some of its former possessions, including Palestine. These territories were the last important territories acquired by the British empire, which simplifies the analysis by not having units enter into the sample. Colonies are removed from the sample after they are formally granted independence. This time period also maps onto my scope conditions discussed in Chapter 0.4.

I include territories formally administered by the Colonial Office and the India Office, and exclude the Dominions, since there was almost no variation in either the independent or dependent variable.\(^3\) During the entirety of the 20th century, the Dominions were fully autonomous and British influence was largely informal. Moreover, there was rarely (if any) contentious politics in the Dominions related to British influence.

There are a number of potential threats to reliable inference. One potential threat is the presence of a selection effect. If actors strategically choose the type of resistance based on the likelihood of the colonial state to grant concessions, then the parameter estimates will be biased. This is, indeed, a likely prospect. However, in order for the bias to work against the predictions made by the theory, nonviolence would have to

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\(^3\)The colonies in the study are: Aden, Bahamas, Basutoland, Bechuanaland, British Guiana, Bechuanaland, Burma, Ceylon, Cyprus, Gambia, Gold Coast, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Malaya, Malta, Nigeria, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Palestine, Sudan, Southern Rhodesia, Tanganyika, Transjordan, Trinidad, Uganda, Yemen, and Zanzibar.
be chosen in cases where the colonial state is less likely to grant concessions. Given that violence is more likely to occur after nonviolent protests are violently repressed, this is unlikely (Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008). I also try to explicitly account for the onset of different types of resistance in empirically in the qualitative chapters and theoretically in Chapter 0.25.

Very often the reasons that smaller-scale riots, strikes, protests, and insurgent attacks occurred were unrelated to decisions made by the colonial state. In Palestine, for example, the strength of the Palestinian leadership determined whether the nationalist movement was primarily violent or nonviolent (Pearlman, 2011). Lawrence (2010) argues that competition and strife within a nationalist movement explains variation in anticolonial violence in the French empire. Outbidding and competition between groups also helps explain tactical choice and the escalation of violence, especially in Mandate Palestine (Kydd and Walter, 2006). Similar patterns help explain nonviolence as well (Cunningham et al., 2017). In the British Caribbean, intra-union squabbles led to more frequent strikes and protests (Wallace, 1977, 74). Exogenous commodity shocks decreased prices and reduced income, which also exacerbating grievances. The cause of the so-called Womens War of 1929 in Nigeria can be explained by a variety of factors: resentment towards direct taxation, corruption by chiefs and the collapse of palm kernel prices (Ashton and Stockwell, 1996, 376).

Another potential problem is that movements and concessions were not independent. Larger-scale resistance movements fed off each other and learned from each others successes and failures. A successful episode of violent resistance in one colony could spur another colony to take up arms. This tendency was not confined to colonies
under British rule. The FLN’s fight against the French in Algeria inspired revolutionary movements around the globe (Connelly, 2002). Moreover, the British may have learned from their past mistakes and may have become more likely to concede in one colony after failing to do so in another. In statistical terms, the observations are not independent and identically distributed. The relevant point for understanding the non-independence of observations in the statistical models is that, while observations were very likely dependent, it is not clear exactly which direction the bias may run.

The British engaged in a brutal counterinsurgency campaign in Aden that started in 1963, which was after the failures of Palestine, Kenya, Malaya and Cyprus. Since the pattern of dependence between observations is extraordinary complex, there is no reliable way to statistically control for the dependence between observations that would then render the estimates unbiased.

The problem of selection effects, learning, and dependence between observations plagues nearly all statistical models of contentious politics. The enormity of these problems shows the usefulness of the models that estimate the effect of resistance on metropolitan attention, which rely on much more fine-grained data that is aggregated to the month level. In these models, which compare the short-term effect of resistance on attention within the same year, these problems are mitigated because the dependent variable is completely unknown and unobservable to those doing the resistance—while the parliamentary debates were public, the cabinet discussions were confidential and only known to those within the British cabinet. The inability of anti-colonial activists to observe the effects of resistance on attention likely made learning quite difficult. Our confidence in the results of these models should be higher than
those using a less granular unit of analysis.

0.20 Data

Instead of relying on hand-coded measures of violence and nonviolence, I perform a textual search of the entire Times of London newspaper corpus. This results in a granular independent variable that includes smaller-scale acts of resistance. I construct this data by executing a query on the Gale Historical Newspapers Database. First, I select all news articles where the colony name is in the subject or keyword of the article in the Times. Then, I filter the articles to ones that include words from a selected list that refer to violent and nonviolent activity. I then sum the number of articles containing each word for every year. To aggregate the words referring to each type of resistance, I take the average of all news articles containing the nonviolent and violent words, separately. For example, to construct the colony-year variable for Palestine in 1936, there were 12 news articles about Palestine discussing terrorism, 13 articles discussing riots, and 0 articles discussing an insurgency. I then take the average of these three variables to create the measure of violence for Palestine in 1936. Since the result is a skewed distribution, I log both the violent and nonviolent variables to improve normality. The result is two colony-year variables measuring violent and nonviolent activity in the colonies. The data are presented in Figures 0.6

\footnote{Words related to nonviolence are: boycott, protest and strike. Words related to violence are: terrorism, riots and insurgency. In choosing these words, the main goal was to use words that would be more likely to describe actions by the colonized rather than the colonizer. For example, “massacre” or “atrocity” could refer to colonial or anticolonial activity. Words with a pejorative meaning would be more likely to be applied to activity by the colonized. To avoid ambiguity about whether the act is violent or nonviolent, common words like “unrest”, “disturbance”, “revolt”, were excluded.}
and 0.7.

These data have a number of possibly important biases that I try to address with statistical models and other data sources. The obvious problem is that the data are built using newspaper sources, which create biases related to the undercounting of events and the choice of events that are covered (Barranco and Wisler, 1999). For the British empire in the 20th century, newspaper coverage was generally much higher for a colony like India than for Britain’s much smaller island colonies. Newspaper coverage also changed over time. To fix these two problems, all models estimated include colony and year fixed effects, which force the coefficient estimates to be driven by within-colony variation. Year fixed effects control for increased empire-wide newspaper coverage over time and other temporal shocks. The main threat to the quality of these data would be when variation in newspaper reporting was driven by variation in resistance. This is likely. The Times of London almost certainly sent reporters to cover events during the large-scale colonial conflicts of the postwar era and in other periods of upheaval, such as the riots in the Caribbean during the 1930s. There is also an important bias across variables. The Times of London was probably more likely to report on acts of violence and nonviolence, especially smaller-scale acts of violence. Unfortunately there is no statistical method to account for these biases since the true distribution of violence and nonviolence in the colonies is unknown. What can be assumed, however, is that since the data on nonviolence is likely to have higher levels of undercounting and miss smaller acts of nonviolence. This should bias the coefficient estimate upwards, since we only observe acts of nonviolence when they are above some threshold, and smaller acts of nonviolence will have a lower probability
of inducing a concession than larger acts of nonviolence. I also try and triangulate the measures of violence and nonviolence by using administrative data on British casualties during colonial conflicts and by using discussions of violence and nonviolence in the British parliament.

The dependent variable in my study is whether the colonial government grants a concession to those in the colony. I define a concession as any formal substantive change in colonial policy that favored colonial subjects. In almost all cases, a concession was a reform that devolved autonomy, usually through increased representation, to colonial subjects. In Palestine, which was the only colony without a legislative council (Miller, 1985), concessions were given to specific ethnic groups and took the form of restricting immigration from other ethnic groups. Data on concessions was hand-coded at the year level through examining historical dictionaries, encyclopedias, and the vast secondary literature on British imperialism. The full list of concessions is included in the Appendix. The variable used in the analysis is simply a binary variable indicating if a concession was granted in that year. In addition, I also use an ordinal measure of concessions. This variable ranges from 0-3 and rates constitutional changes (coded as 3) as being larger concessions than those related to expanding the legislative council (coded as 2). All other concessions are coded 1, and these include policies such as recognizing a nationalist leadership in a constitutional conference, facilitating self-government at the local level, or other types of policy.

I also use a number of time-varying controls. To control for the level of repression in a colony, I use two measures. One is the government censorship effort, which

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5I also code the year the colony achieved independence as a concession.
captures the government’s attempt to censor print or broadcast media. Censorship was a common tactic by the British to repress nationalist dissent in the colonies. The other variable is the physical violence index. This measures the freedom from political killings and torture by the colonial government. Other controls intended to capture variation in the political and economic development of a colony include the number of political parties that have national organizations, whether a political party has unified control over the government, the distribution of power across social groups, the suffrage level, the urbanization rate, and educational equality in the colony. All of these measures are at the colony-year level. These measures come from Varieties of Democracy dataset and (Coppedge and Ziblatt, 2018).

To construct a measure of metropolitan attention by the cabinet, I use the cabinet archives containing the conclusions of each cabinet meeting during the time period studied. These documents contain brief information on each cabinet meeting, including what issues were discussed and the conclusions reached. Which topics were discussed at a cabinet meeting was the discretion of the prime minister, and the departmental ministers could request an issue to discuss during a meeting. These documents were circulated to all those present at the meeting, and on occasion the Cabinet Secretary would send them to the heads of the Treasury, Foreign Office and Chiefs of Staff (Thurston, 1998). For each document, I note what colonies were discussed and the date of the discussion. Since the data are right-skewed, I take the log of the total discussions. These data are presented in Figure 0.8.

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6 The reference groups for these documents is: CAB 23, CAB 24, CAB 65, CAB 66, CAB 67, CAB 68, CAB 128, CAB 129, CAB 181, and CAB 195.
Since the measures of resistance are at the year level, they are suitable for analyzing the effect on concessions, which were not immediate reactions to events but were the product of lengthy deliberations. However, metropolitan attention varied considerably over time and quickly responded to events on the ground. Comparing the yearly level of resistance to the yearly level of attention likely smooths over important variation. To remedy this, I collect additional data on large events of violent and nonviolent resistance in colonies, along with the date the event occurred. I do this by performing a textual search through the Times of London archive on a narrower range of articles, using only auto-tagged keyword searches on news dispatches. This limits the scope of the search but allows me to manually scan each article and extract the date of the event of interest. Both the cabinet discussions and the granular measure of larger acts of violent and nonviolent resistance are aggregated to the month level.

Measuring the strategic importance of a colony is difficult. The British excelled at generating post-hoc justifications for their behavior and maintaining mythologies about the unique characteristics of colonies. Objective measures of strategic importance—for example by counting the number of military bases or geographical distance to potential theaters of war—risks misunderstanding how British policy-makers understood their colonial empire and how they made decisions based on that understanding. While there was rarely unanimous agreement among British policy-makers that a colony was strategically essential, there was a general lack of debate around these issues. This was possibly due to the rather technical military information required in order for a policymaker to make an informed judgment a colony’s strategic value, including the depth of the water near its accessible ports and how
changes in naval technology altered the mobility of naval vessels and the flying range of airplanes. In many cases, the archives show Cabinet, Foreign Office, and Colonial Office officials taking their cue on what colonies were strategically important from rather dry analyses from military specialists.

To remedy these problems, I offer three measures of the strategic importance of a colony. The first is simply a time-invariant binary variable indicating if the colony was viewed to be strategically important. I manually coded this measure from primary and secondary sources. The primary sources consist of a handful of military assessments that were circulated in the Colonial Office. This variable is mainly generated from the assessments of historians who have written about Britain’s decolonization. This coding is generated by reading a large number of secondary historical works and recording which colonies were described by historians as strategically essential. The shortcoming of this approach is that it relies on subjective assessments by historians and a colony may have been strategically important to the British but the secondary literature simply never mentions it.

The second measure is a time-varying ordinal measure that ranges from 0-3. This measure helps account for variation in a colony’s strategic importance over time, again coded from primary and secondary sources. Most of these changes in strategic importance occurred after World War II. Strategic importance varied over time for a number of reasons. The strategic importance of a colony was linked to other colonial possessions. When India became independent in 1947, for example, the British downgraded the importance of maintaining control over nearby Ceylon. Relinquishing India also encouraged British withdrawal from the formerly strategically essential
Mandate Palestine. With India, Palestine, and Ceylon independent, maintaining a foothold in Cyprus became a preferred option in the metropole. Non-colonial factors mattered as well. Troubles with sterling increased the importance of colonies like Malaya. Malaya possessed abundant rubber plantations which were exported and used to convert sterling into dollars and easy monetary pressures. For most colonies and years, this variable takes a value of 0. It takes a value of 2 for Cyprus from 1953-1960 and Aden from 1940-1956. It takes value of 1 for Malta from 1918-1964, Cyprus from 1918-1952, Nigeria from 1948-1960, Kenya from 1918-1963, Palestine from 1940-1948, Aden from 1918-1940 and 1956-1967, India from 1918-1943, and Malaya from 1918-1957.

However, manually coded measures may capture the post-hoc justifications of British officials for their behavior or the biases of hindsight by historians, in addition to all the problems associated with subjective coding of qualitative data into quantitative data. To provide another measure, I refer to the House of Commons parliamentary debates. If a British policymakers viewed a colony as strategically valuable, then we should see some discussion of that strategic value whenever policy toward the colony is discussed. To create this time-varying measure, I first identify contributions from members of parliament that mention a colony. This is performed by simply using regular expressions to see if the name of a colony is mentioned in the contribution. While crude, the sheer volume of contributions (over one million) for the time period under study makes it extremely efficient and precludes alternative options. Within this set of contributions, I then identify whether a MP uses the phrase “strategically important”. If a MP uses this phrase while also mentioning
Cyprus, then this would count as an event where Cyprus was viewed as a strategically important. I then sum up all these events and then aggregate them to the year level to create a time-varying continuous measure of strategic importance for each colony. This measure and the manually coded measures are qualitatively similar.

Summary statistics are presented in Table 0.1.

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<th>Pctl(75)</th>
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<td>Boycott</td>
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<td>0.611</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time since concession</td>
<td>1,134</td>
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<td>14.098</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concession</td>
<td>1,134</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>0.317</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet Mentions</td>
<td>1,134</td>
<td>0.392</td>
<td>0.787</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.693</td>
<td>3.912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suffrage Level</td>
<td>1,127</td>
<td>20.479</td>
<td>36.300</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>14.000</td>
<td>100.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Organization</td>
<td>1,134</td>
<td>−1.098</td>
<td>1.267</td>
<td>−2.989</td>
<td>−2.113</td>
<td>−0.071</td>
<td>2.252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of Expression</td>
<td>1,134</td>
<td>−0.148</td>
<td>1.248</td>
<td>−2.379</td>
<td>−1.086</td>
<td>1.016</td>
<td>2.447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Violence Index</td>
<td>1,134</td>
<td>−0.434</td>
<td>1.123</td>
<td>−2.502</td>
<td>−1.260</td>
<td>0.439</td>
<td>1.910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Organization</td>
<td>1,134</td>
<td>0.511</td>
<td>0.250</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.278</td>
<td>0.739</td>
<td>0.934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suffrage Share</td>
<td>1,128</td>
<td>21.785</td>
<td>35.020</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>20.000</td>
<td>100.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 0.1: This table shows summary statistics of the data.

0.21 Model and Estimation

To estimate the effects of my independent variables on my dependent variables, I use normal linear models with colony and year fixed effects, with standard errors clustered at the colony. I estimate two sets of models for each hypotheses being tested. One model includes only the independent variable of interest and two-way fixed effects for controls, the other model includes a wider range of control variables. Since a concession is measured using a binary dependent variable, I use cubic time splines to
Figure 0.6: This plot shows the yearly level of violent relative to nonviolent activity in the colonies. Vertical lines indicate years in which a concession was granted.

control for temporal dependence between binary observations (Carter and Signorino, 2010)
I first discuss the results of models where a concession to the colony is a dependent variable. Figure 0.9 presents the coefficient plots for the effect of violent and nonviolent resistance on the probability of a concession. There is a positive and statistically significant effect for violence on concessions, while a slight negative and not significant effect for nonviolence on concessions. A one unit increase in the level of violence is related to a 10% increase in the probability of a concession in the following year. The standard deviation of the violence variable is 0.47, meaning that an increase in one standard deviation of the variable increased the probability of a concession by five percent in any given year. The coefficients and and associated standard errors are stable across specifications.

Table 0.2 shows the results of these models with control variables included. In addition, the effect of violence and nonviolence on concessions using an ordered variable in included as well. The results for the ordered model show a similar pattern, with more violence being associated with larger concessions, and no effect for nonviolence.
Figure 0.9: This shows the coefficient estimate of three linear probability models where the independent variables are the level of violent and nonviolent activity as measured by British newspaper articles. The dependent variables are the probability of a concession. All models include colony and year fixed effects with standard errors clustered at the colony. Cubic time splines, along with a battery of controls, are included but not shown. The bars indicate a 95% confidence interval.
### Dependent variable:

**Concession (Ordered)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>0.152*</td>
<td>0.178**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.090)</td>
<td>(0.083)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolence</td>
<td>−0.032</td>
<td>−0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.064)</td>
<td>(0.062)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Violence Index</td>
<td>1.578**</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.643)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of Expression</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.115)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Equality</td>
<td>0.037</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.085)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suffrage Level</td>
<td>−0.001</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Observations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,108</td>
<td>1,102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:**

*p* < 0.1; **p** < 0.05; ***p** < 0.01

Table 0.2: This table shows the results of linear probability models where the dependent variable is whether there is concession to the colony. The main independent variables measures the level of violence and nonviolence in the colony. All models include cubic time splines along with colony and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the colony.

My theory also predicts that null effects of violence and nonviolence should be produced when estimating the effect for strategically important colonies. Table 0.3 presents the results of models where a measure of strategic importance is interacted with the variables measuring violence and nonviolence. I use three different mea-
asures of strategic importance: a binary indicator, a time-varying ordinal measure, and a time-varying continuous measure of mentions of strategic importance from the parliamentary debates.

The results show that the effect of violence on concessions is higher for non-strategically important colonies. The coefficient for the interaction term between a variable measuring strategic importance and the level of violent resistance is negative and statistically significant in all but two of the models. The effect is stronger and more precisely estimated for the time-varying measures of strategic importance. This is likely due to the increased relevance of strategic considerations in the British Empire during the postwar era when Cold War dynamics became prominent. The unconditional effect of strategic importance on concessions is not estimated because the colony fixed effects force the coefficient for the time-invariant variable to drop out. The interaction term on this variable simply represents the effect of violence and nonviolence on concessions in strategically important colonies relative to non-strategically important colonies. To make this more concrete, the coefficient for violence in model 1 is 0.157 and nonviolence is −0.047. These coefficient estimates represent the effect of violence and nonviolence in colonies that are not strategically important. To calculate the effect of violence and nonviolence for colonies that are strategically important, we simply add the interaction terms to these variables. For strategically importance colonies, the coefficient for violence is 0.050 (0.157 − 0.107) while the coefficient for nonviolence is −0.017 (−0.047 + 0.030). The interaction term between violence/nonviolence and strategically important colonies attenuates the effect of resistance on concessions. In effect, according to models 1 and 2, political
resistance in strategically important colonies has almost no effect on the probability of a concession.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Concession</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>0.156**</td>
<td>0.149**</td>
<td>0.155***</td>
<td>0.156***</td>
<td>0.147***</td>
<td>0.152***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td>(0.063)</td>
<td>(0.062)</td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Importance</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Importance (Weighted)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.068</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Mention</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.184)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolence</td>
<td>−0.047</td>
<td>−0.017</td>
<td>−0.046</td>
<td>−0.038</td>
<td>−0.017</td>
<td>−0.028</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Violence Index</td>
<td>0.488</td>
<td>0.452*</td>
<td>0.452*</td>
<td>0.489*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.262)</td>
<td>(0.201)</td>
<td>(0.286)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of Expression</td>
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<td>0.078</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Equality</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suffrage Level</td>
<td>−0.0001</td>
<td>−0.0001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence * Strategic Importance</td>
<td>−0.107</td>
<td>−0.085</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolence * Strategic Importance</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
<td>(0.063)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence * Strategic Importance (Weighted)</td>
<td>−0.130**</td>
<td>−0.117**</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolence * Strategic Importance (Weighted)</td>
<td>0.033</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence * Strategic Mention</td>
<td>−0.176**</td>
<td>−0.175**</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.077)</td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolence * Strategic Mention</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.094)</td>
<td>(0.099)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations: 1,108 1,102 1,108 1,102 1,108 1,102
R²: 0.209 0.222 0.218 0.231 0.215 0.228
Adjusted R²: 0.146 0.153 0.155 0.165 0.151 0.162
Residual Std. Error: 0.296 (df = 1025) 0.292 (df = 1015) 0.294 (df = 1024) 0.291 (df = 1014) 0.295 (df = 1024) 0.291 (df = 1014)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 0.3: This table shows the results of linear probability models where the variables for violence and nonviolence are interacted with three different measures of strategic importance: a binary variable, an ordinal variable, and a continuous measure derived from the parliamentary debates. All three measures produce substantively similar results, which is that violence did not lead to concessions when a colony’s strategic importance was high.
0.23 Results: Attention

In my theory of imperial response, attention is the variable linking anticolonial resistance to metropolitan concessions. Resistance is more likely to result in a concession when the resistance increases metropolitan attention. Violent resistance is more likely to command attention, which helps explain why violent resistance is more likely to result in a concession. In this section I present results of models using a more fine-grained unit of analysis to show that violence is more likely than nonviolence to lead to increased metropolitan attention.

Table 0.4 shows the results of models estimating the effect of violence and nonviolence on the amount of discussion of that colony by the cabinet. Both the independent and dependent variables are logged to account for skewness. The unit of analysis is the colony-month. The results show that violence in the previous month predicts the level of cabinet discussion in the subsequent month, while no such effect is present for nonviolence. This pattern holds when the variable measuring levels of violence and nonviolence are lagged by two months. Year fixed effects ensure that the comparisons are made between months within the same year, which compares like units and controls for any long-term temporal trends.
### Dependent variable: Cabinet Discussion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violence (t-1)</td>
<td>0.188***</td>
<td>0.157***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolence (t-1)</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence (t-2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.072**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolence (t-2)</td>
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<td>0.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations 13,286 13,262
R² 0.130 0.138
Adjusted R² 0.124 0.132
Residual Std. Error 0.172 (df = 13198) 0.171 (df = 13172)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 0.4: This table shows the results of models where the independent variables are measures of violent and nonviolent activity within a colony and the dependent variable is the level of discussion in the British Cabinet about the colony. The unit of analysis is the colony-month. Measures of activity are lagged by one (t-1) and two (t-2) months. Both models include colony and year fixed effects with standard errors clustered at the colony.

My theoretical model argues that resistance garners metropolitan attention and that this attention leads to concessions to the colonies. To examine the link between attention and concessions, I run models where the main independent variable is the level of cabinet discussion in a colony and the dependent variable is whether there is
a concession in the following year. Table 0.5 presents the results. Models 1 and 2 use
the binary measure of concessions as the dependent variable, while models 3 and 4
use the ordered measure. The results show that increased discussion by the cabinet
leads to a higher probability of concessions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Concession</th>
<th>Concession (Weighted)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet Discussion</td>
<td>0.040*</td>
<td>0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Violence Index</td>
<td>0.501</td>
<td>1.580**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.306)</td>
<td>(0.641)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of Expression</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>0.084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.114)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Equality</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.081)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suffrage Level</td>
<td>−0.0002</td>
<td>−0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1,108</td>
<td>1,102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.194</td>
<td>0.206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.135</td>
<td>0.144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual Std. Error</td>
<td>0.297 (df = 1032)</td>
<td>0.295 (df = 1021)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 0.5: This table shows the results of linear probability models where the independent variable is the amount of discussion of a colony within the British cabinet, and the dependent variable is a measure of a concession to the colony. The results show that cabinet discussions increase the probability of concessions to a colony.

The results of the statistical models in this section support my theory of imperial response by showing that violence, more than nonviolence, increases metropolitan attention, and that increased metropolitan attention leads to an increased probability of a concession to a colony. Next, I examine the limits of violence in commanding metropolitan attention during a colonial war.
Were There Limits to Metropolitan Attention?

My theory stipulates that during a sustained anticolonial insurgency campaign, the effect of violence on metropolitan attention will attenuate over time. More intense colonial conflicts where the British were engaged in sustained counterinsurgency campaigns lasted years. This section examines how variation in violence within five colonial conflicts (Kenya, Aden, Palestine, Cyprus and Malaya) affected the level of metropolitan attention.

Doing this requires more fine-grained data on the level of violence within a colony. To gather this data, I collected the date of every British military casualty that occurred in these colonies from the start of the conflict until independence was declared. This was performed by web-scraping the death records of databases of colonial deaths from https://www.findmypast.co.uk/. I scraped the name of each individual casualty in each conflict, extracted the date of their death, and summed over each death for each week to create a dataset on the number of casualties in each week for each colony. I then use the data on the cabinet discussion and the parliamentary debates to measure the level of discussion for each colony at the week level. Since no database exists for colonial deaths during the Kenya emergency, I use Douglass and Harkness (2018)’s dataset on events during this conflict built from British intelligence reports. Figure 0.10 presents the log of British casualties for each insurgency over time.

---

7When aggregated to the year, the measure from British casualties and the measure of anticolonial violence have a correlation coefficient of 0.76. The casualty measure and nonviolent resistance are positively correlated at 0.29.
Figure 0.10: This plot shows the log of the number of British casualties for five colonial counterinsurgency campaigns. The data is collected from British administrative data of death records. The plots are smoothed to highlight the temporal variation. The data only exist for time periods the counterinsurgency campaign was active.

This data is then analyzed using linear models with conflict fixed effects. I create a variable measuring the number of weeks that have elapsed since the first casualty was recorded. I then interact this weekly time trend with the log of casualties that occurred during that week to see how the effect of violence on metropolitan attention changes during the conflict. The dependent variable is the log of times that the colony is mentioned in the parliament and the log of times that the colony is discussed in the cabinet. The unit of analysis is the conflict-week.
The results are presented in Table 0.6 and graphically in Figure 0.11. They show that metropolitan attention was driven by the level of violence within each conflict, but that this effect attenuated over time. The results are the same when using parliamentary debates or cabinet discussions to measure attention. This shows that there were limits to the effect of violence during colonial conflicts on metropolitan attention.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable:</th>
<th>Mentions Commons (Log)</th>
<th>Cabinet Discussion (Log)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties (Log)</td>
<td>0.223**</td>
<td>0.400***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly Time Trend</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties (Log) * Weekly Time Trend</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<td>2,197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual Std. Error</td>
<td>1.162 (df = 2173)</td>
<td>1.186 (df = 2193)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 0.6: This table shows the results of models where the dependent variable is the amount of parliamentary discussion of a colony and the amount of discussion of a colony by the British cabinet. The unit of analysis is the conflict-week and the main independent variable is the number of British war deaths for each colonial conflict that occurred that week. The log of the casualties is interacted with the weekly time trend to show how metropolitan attention declined over time. The colonial conflicts included are Kenya, Aden, Palestine, Cyprus and Malaya.

What Was Effect of Reforms?

My theory predicts that the metropole will grant concessions to the colony in response to violent resistance, but will not grant concessions to strategically important colonies in response to unrest because granting concessions increases the suffrage of the colo-
nial population and jeopardizes metropolitan access to the colony. The metropole, however, did grant concessions to strategically important colonies. Were the concessions granted to strategically important colonies different in some way than the concessions granted to other colonies? The ordered measure of concessions attempts to account for the different size of the concessions. It does this by using objective characteristics of the concession—whether they amended the constitution, whether they expanded the legislative council, etc. However, within these categories there exists variation. It is possible that the constitutional reforms to strategically important colonies were different than constitutional reforms to other colonies.

To investigate this, I estimate a number of linear models where the dependent variable is the suffrage share of the adult male population. This data comes from Coppedge and Ziblatt (2018). The independent variable is whether there was a concession in the previous year. I also include the standard controls and an interaction variable between concessions and strategic importance. We should expect concessions in strategically important colonies to have a smaller effect on the suffrage level than concessions to non-strategically important colonies.

The results are presented in Table 0.7. On average, concessions have a positive effect on the suffrage share. This finding has important implications. A number of works have examined the long-term political and economic effects of colonial rule by comparing spatial variation in colonial investments within a colony, comparing the identity of the colonizer (Lee and Paine, 2019), or whether there was a violent movement for independence. This result shows that one of the reasons for spatial and temporal variation in suffrage levels is the direct result of metropolitan policy.
In addition, the negative and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction term between a concession and strategic importance shows that, even when the metropole granted concessions to strategically important colonies, they did so without substantially increasing suffrage in the colony. This provides further support for my theory that metropolitan policy toward strategically important colonies aimed to limit increasing suffrage in these colonies.

Table 0.7: This table shows the results of linear models where the dependent variable is the share of suffrage in a colony. The main results show that a concession from the metropole to the colony, on average, increases the suffrage share by about 10%. However, for strategically important colonies, granting a concession results in almost no increase in suffrage. This finding provides support for my argument that metropolitan policymakers were reluctant to increase the suffrage of strategically important colonies. Since strategic importance is time-invariant, the colony fixed effects drop the coefficient where there is no interaction term.
Alternative Measures of Violent and Nonviolent Activity

The above measures of violent and nonviolent anticolonial resistance all drawn from newspaper reports in the Times of London. There are a number of reasons why this measure may be biased. It is almost certain that there was an increased level of newspaper coverage of activity in the colonies from 1918 to 1960 (although the year fixed effects used in all the models estimated accounts for this problem). Undercounting is also an issue, since smaller and more distant colonies had less newspaper coverage. To address these shortcomings, I provide an alternate measure of violent and nonviolent resistance within the colonies that is constructed from the parliamentary debates.

These measures are constructed in the following ways. For each colony, I extract the colony name from the parliamentary debates along with the year that the colony was mentioned. I also extract the text within a specified range around the colony name. I then count the number of times words related to violence—terrorism, riots, bombings—are mentioned, along with words related to nonviolence. Then, these counts are summed by year to produce a colony-year measure of violent and nonviolent mentions. I also do this for mentions of strategic importance, to capture the heterogeneous effects for strategically important colonies. To ensure robustness, I vary the range around each colony mention from 10 words to 100.

These measures are then used in linear models presented in Table 0.8. Across varying ranges around the mention of a colony name, violence is a significant positive predictor of a concession. This effect is attenuated when a colony is mentioned

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8I use regular expressions to minimize error to ensure that “riot” and “riots” are included.
strategically, which is in line with the results from the main models estimated in the paper.

It should be noted that these measures do not capture resistance in the colonies but rather are better understood as measures of metropolitan discussions of violent and nonviolent resistance in the colonies. It's quite likely that some colonial subjects resisted the colonial state, but either due to inadequate newspaper coverage or a colonial state's ability to crush the resistance before it ever got off the ground, that resistance never became known in the metropole. The relevant point here is that metropolitan discussions of violence in a colony led to an increased probability of a concession, while no such relationship exists for metropolitan discussions of nonviolence (indeed these models show a slight negative effect). This should strengthen our confidence in the main models presented in Figure 0.9.

The data on violence and nonviolence within a colony is built from newspaper reports and is thus subject to reporting bias. The casualty data is not affected by this bias at all since is collected from administrative records. This enables us to validate the measures of violence and nonviolence driven by newspaper reporting. If the casualty data are correlated with the measures of violence, and not correlated with the measures of nonviolence, then this should increase confidence in the data and model estimates. There are two important qualifications. The first is that the data do not measure the same underlying concept. Violent anticolonial resistance includes acts that result in property damage and deaths of settlers, British colonial officials who are not members of the military, and deaths of other native colonial officials. The British casualty data includes all military servicemen who die while
Table 0.8: This table shows the result of models where showing that discussions of violence and nonviolence in the parliament are correlated with concessions in the following year. This shows that when both a colony and violence were mentioned in proximity to each other in the parliament, a concession was more likely. No such pattern exists for mentions of nonviolence. The same pattern holds for the interaction effect of resistance and strategic importance.
serving abroad—including those who die of disease or accidentally (automobile accidents were quite common). The relevant point here is that if both data sources are completely free of error, we should not expect a perfect correlation between the two. The second important qualification is that the casualty data is only collected for a small number of colony-years (41) for colonies where the British were engaged in an active counterinsurgency campaign. The dynamics of violence in colonial counterinsurgency campaigns may very well be different in different time periods and different forms of colonial rule.

The casualty data are recorded at the day level while the main measures of violence and nonviolence are aggregated to the year level. To compare the three measures, I aggregate the total number of British casualties that occur in a colony to the year. The correlation coefficient for the 41 colony years where there are casualty data is 0.76 for the correlation between violence and casualties, and 0.27 for the correlation between nonviolence and casualties. The newspaper measure of violence has a much higher correlation with the casualty measure than nonviolence. To further probe these correlations, I use the casualty measure as a dependent variable in a linear model with colony fixed effects and the violence and nonviolence measures as the main independent variables. The results are presented in 0.9. Violence is a large, positive, and statistically significant predictor of a British casualty, while nonviolence has a very small negative effect that is not precisely estimated. These are the expected patterns and should increase our confidence in the measures of violence and nonviolence collected from newspaper reporting. Given that the casualty data, when aggregated to the year level, only compromises 43 observations (out of 1,180) for five
different colonies in different time periods, and there is no reliable administrative
data on the number of nonviolent actions to serve as a necessary control for these
observations, we are unable to test the larger proposition that violence (as measured
by casualty data) predicts a increased probability of a concession.

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Casualties (Log)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>1.621***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.246)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolence</td>
<td>−0.156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.380)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.724</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 0.9: This table shows the relationship between the yearly measures of violence
and nonviolence drawn from newspaper reporting with the log of British casualties
in five colonial conflicts. The results show that the measures of violence are strong
predictors of casualty levels, while nonviolence is not. This is, of course, as expected
and should increase confidence in the yearly measures of violence and nonviolence.
This linear model includes colony fixed effects.
0.24 Exploring Heterogeneous Effects

Evaluating the Effectiveness of Resistance over Time

It is unlikely the effectiveness of resistance on concessions remained stable over time. While a scope condition of my theory is that an empire must be looking to retrench, and not expand, the British empire endured a number of important geopolitical changes after 1918, including World War II and occupation of many of its colonies. This means that the parameters in the statistical models estimated above may not be accurately estimated since the model itself is incorrectly specified due to non-constant effects.

To address this, I evaluate the effects of violent and nonviolent resistance on colonial concessions over time. I do this by using the Interflex R package (Hainmueller et al., 2019). In models with interaction terms between continuous variables, the nonlinearity assumption is easily an often violated, which can severely bias the coefficient estimates. The models included in the Interflex package include statistical tests to detect if there are nonlinearities, along with diagnostics to see how robust the nonlinear assumption is. In other words, these models do not assume that change in the effect of violence from 1920 to 1930 is the same as the change in the effect of violence from 1950-1960.

Estimating how the effect of violence and nonviolence changes over time has important implications for understanding the causes of decolonization. Figure 0.12 shows that the frequency of colonial concessions increased over time and was markedly higher in the postwar era. This pattern jibes with the historical literature detailing
Britain’s efforts to accelerate the process of devolving power to the colonies. Why did this occur? What role did anticolonial resistance play in the increased number of colonial concessions?

Figure 0.12: This plot shows the total number of colonial concessions that were granted in each year. The blue line shows the smoothed average. The rate of colonial concessions increased markedly in the postwar era.

To answer this question, I run models where the effect of violent and nonviolent resistance on concessions is interacted with the year variable. This allows the effect of resistance on concession to vary for each year. The dependent variable is the ordered measure of concessions. Controls include colony and year fixed effects (so that the interaction with the year variable does not capture the increased rate of concessions), and a linear time trend to measure the time since the last concession. Standard errors are clustered at the colony level. I estimate two models, one where violence
is interacted with the year variable, and one where nonviolence is interacted with the year variable. For the model where violence is interacted with the year variable, nonviolence is used as a control, and vice versa.

Figure 0.13 shows the results of the model with an interaction between violent anticolonial resistance and the year. The upward sloping line shows that the effect of violence on colonial concessions increases over time and is on average above zero. The red bars reflect the binning estimates produced by the `Interflex` package, which show the assumption of a linear interaction effect is not violated. As Figure 0.14 similar upward trend exist for the effect of nonviolence over time, although this is less precisely estimated and the magnitude is much closer to zero.

These results are important for understanding the causes of decolonization. Britain fought major anticolonial insurgencies in Palestine, Aden, Cyprus, Malaya, and Kenya. All of these occurred in the postwar era. Decolonization accelerated and anticolonial resistance exploded after the end of World War II, as did the pace of concessions that Britain granted to its colonies. These results show that the increased frequency of concessions was driven partly by an increasingly effective violent resistance.

0.25 Conclusion

I have shown that violent resistance in the British colonies during the 20th century encouraged the colonial state to grant concessions to the colonies. No consistent effect exists for nonviolent resistance. Null effects for both types of resistance are produced for colonies whose primary value lies in their strategic importance. The mechanism
linking resistance to concessions is metropolitan attention, which reacted more to violent resistance than nonviolent resistance. Using web-scraped death records, I show that there were limits to the effect of violence on metropolitan attention during a colonial conflict. In addition, I show that the concessions granted to strategically important colonies did not increase the suffrage level within the colony.

My theoretical framework attempts to make sense of how the British empire actually functioned, and how activity in the colonies led to metropolitan involvement. Understanding metropolitan involvement is important because the metropole was in charge of concessions that reformed the constitution or increase representation. Smaller-scale concessions, such as wage increases or tax relief, remained the province of the colonial governor. I argued that overseas empires have a common structure where local officials manage the day-to-day operations of the colonies and metropolitan involvement in that operation varies spatially and temporally.

The empirical results show that there may be limitations to the approach of comparing the success rate of violent and nonviolent campaigns. Current approaches code campaigns are either successful or not, and comparing successes may miss important variation in the effects of violent and nonviolent activity. Moreover, the value that the target places on a possible concession affects the likelihood that any resistance will be effective. It is no coincidence that many of the colonies that were viewed as strategically essential—and thus were denied concessions that increased suffrage—erupted into large scale colonial violence in the postwar era.

This study has a number of limitations that can be addressed in future work. The data on violent and nonviolent resistance is culled from British newspapers. One
advantage of this approach is that it ensures that the metropole is aware, or at least could be aware of unrest within the colonies. In addition, data on unrest from colonial archives would suffer from other reporting biases—many reports containing information on resistance were compiled by subordinates and sent up the chain of command. Too much reported unrest suggests a poor performing colonial official. Of course, not every act of resistance was covered in the press. Many of the foreign correspondents were located in the colony’s capital or other large cities. Presumably, acts of resistance in the hinterlands were less likely to be reported by these correspondents, thus making it less likely for these acts to be discussed by the metropole and to have a meaningful effect on policy. A full model of what types of unrest are reported by the press and by colonial officials could significantly advance our understanding of when resistance is effective and the inner workings of colonial empires.

The finding that violence was more effective than nonviolence at coercing concessions raises important implications for understanding the fall of the European empires during the 20th century. Explanations abound for the global transition from empire to the nation (Emerson, 1962). Much of this work has focused on variation in the timing of independence for colonies within and across empires (Spruyt, 2005). This work shows that the transition from colony to nation was not a rupture in hierarchical relations between states, but rather was a process where autonomy was slowly granted in response to violence. For many British colonies, independence was a formality, although this applies less to colonies engaged in a sustained campaign against colonial rule. The results here suggest that decolonization spanned the 20th century, accelerated after the end of World War II, and that violent anticolonial resistance
played an important role in the decolonization process. Moreover, the effectiveness was not driven by the more commonly studied large-scale colonial conflicts, rather, concessions were also a response to low-level riots and unrest.
Figure 0.7: This plot shows the distribution of the level of violent relative to nonviolent activity for each colony.
Figure 0.8: This plot shows the log of the number of times per year that each colony is discussed by the British Cabinet.
Figure 0.11: This plot shows the result of an interaction model where the dependent variable is the amount of cabinet discussion of a colony and the independent variable is the number of British casualties interacted with a weekly time trend. The downward sloping line indicates that metropolitan attention during a colonial conflict attenuated over time.
Figure 0.13: This plot shows the effect of violence on colonial concessions over time. The dependent variable is the ordered measure of concessions and the main independent variable is violent anticolonial activity interacted with the year variable. The red bars tests for nonlinear effects and show that the interaction is largely linear. The upward sloping line shows that violence becomes more effective over time.

Figure 0.14: This plot shows the effect of nonviolence on colonial concessions over time. The dependent variable is the ordered measure of concessions and the main independent variable is nonviolent anticolonial activity interacted with the year variable. While sloping upwards, the effect of nonviolent resistance is much smaller in magnitude than violent resistance and imprecisely estimated.
Comparing Strategies of Resistance

The quantitative empirical analysis presented in Chapter 4 examined two separate categories of anticolonial resistance: violent and nonviolent. This is a defensible choice when examining the British metropole’s response to resistance, as metropolitan policymakers flattened different types of resistance into restrictive categories, but such a parsimonious approach smooths over important variation. On the ground, there was important variation within violent and nonviolent anticolonial activity. For example, the 1930s unrest in the Caribbean started out as nonviolent labor strikes, but the colonial police often engaged in aggressive actions that transformed the strikes into riots (Thomas, 2012, 206-234). In Cyprus and Palestine, the policing of labor for extractive purposes was largely absent. In these colonies, anticolonial resistance—especially in the postwar era—was directed by leaders of hierarchical organizations who followed a strategic plan of national liberation. These movements used largely violent strategies interspersed with nonviolent tactics. In contrast, Kwame Nkrumah’s 1950s plan of “positive action” was an organized campaign of strategic nonviolence (Presbey, 2012) as was Gandhi’s (Roberts, 2009).
To provide a more granular and nuanced categorization of the forms of anticolonial resistance, this chapter presents a typology of resistance. The categorization used in the quantitative analysis presented in Chapter 0.17 was a simple binary categorization that divided resistance into its violent and nonviolent types. This categorization facilitated quantitative empirical analysis. However, the quantitative analysis glossed over important variation. In Cyprus, the 1931 riots were fundamentally different than the sustained insurgency campaign launched by EOKA (both of these types of resistance are studied in Chapter 0.41). The typology presented here introduces an additional dimension to analyze resistance: that is, the extent to which the resistance was organized within a hierarchical structure. I then take this typology and use it to understand different instances of anticolonial resistance and provide detail as to how the metropole discussed the resistance and how it formulated a response.

This typology is especially useful for understanding anticolonial resistance that was not hierarchically organized. The difference between a strike and a riot was not always clear. A commonality between both a strike and riot is that there was usually some mass gathering of people expressing some political or economic grievance towards the colonial state. A riot usually occurred in response to the decision of an individual to escalate. Those decisions were usually made by the colonial police, who were often poorly trained and quick to panic (Anderson and Killingray, 1992). They could also have been made by more radical elements participating in an anticolonial demonstration who knew that the police were liable to use their weapons against nonviolent protesters. Ultimately, we may never know exactly why an individual peaceful demonstration escalated to violence. The important point for evaluating my
theory of imperial response is to understand how the British metropole responded to riots and strikes, regardless of their proximate cause.

What does the political science literature tell us about why some nonviolent demonstrations turn violent? Gustafson argues that food price instability and high unemployment facilitates the escalation to violence because the instability increases the anxiety and impatience of individual protesters (Gustafson, 2020). Moreover, organized demonstrations, as opposed to spontaneous ones, sustain nonviolent activity. Gustafson supports his argument with granular data on African and Latin American protests from 1991 to 2017. Ives and Lewis offer a similar explanation for the escalation from nonviolence to violence. They show that repressive actions by the state, in addition to a lack of a hierarchical leadership, explain why some protests turn violent (Ives and Lewis, 2020). Using the campaign as a unit of analysis, Ryckman (2020) shows that concessions by the state can placate organized resistance movements and make it less likely for them to turn violent.

Despite using more recent data, these theorized dynamics and mechanisms are useful for understanding anticolonial resistance. The organized/spontaneous distinction has obvious utility: protests organized by Nkrumah and Gandhi (in addition to the strike actions during the Palestinian Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 and the Cyprus emergency) were fundamentally different than labor protests in, say, Nigeria or Jamaica. The latter protests were made possible by the union’s facilitation of collective action (Butcher and Svensson, 2016). Declining commodity prices decreased employment and induced desperation among laborers in the Caribbean, which likely contributed to the cause of the riots (Thomas, 2012, 206-234). (Ryckman, 2020)’s
emphasis on concessions jibes with my argument that Britain’s refusal to grant concessions explains why large-scale violent conflicts erupted in some colonies but not others. In sum, recent political science literature on nonviolent and violent dynamics offers a theoretical framework that can help differentiate among types of anticolonial resistance.

Take, for example, variation in violence and nonviolence in the Gold Coast. This will be explored further in Chapter 0.46, but there were two important types of anticolonial resistance in the Gold Coast during the postwar era. While no large-scale violent insurgency occurred, the case of the Gold Coast allows us to explore dynamics of nonviolent spontaneous protests that turned violent due to the actions of the colonial state and also organized nonviolence. The former can best be exemplified by the riots of 1948. Here, colonial police (likely) fired on semi-organized protesters in the capital of Accra, which led to rioting throughout the colony. A dozen Africans were killed and over two hundred were wounded. The damages totaled two million pounds. The riots demonstrated the instability and fragility of colonial rule, led to substantial constitutional reforms, and paved the way for the rise of Kwame Nkrumah.

In contrast with spontaneous violence driven by repression was the organized nonviolence of Kwame Nkrumah’s “positive action”. There were three components of this strategy: pressures for constitutional reforms, newspaper campaigns, and more active forms of resistance like strikes, boycotts, and protests. While this campaign was highly organized (many strikers adjusted the timing of their strike to whenever Nkrumah ordered it), violence was never completely absent. On January 17, 1950, for example, a similar pattern to the events of February 1948 unfolded. Ex-
servicemembers protested in Accra. After the police provoked them, the protesters killed two police officers. In response, and despite his condemnations of the violence, the colonial government arrested Nkrumah and imprisoned him for a year (Presbey, 2012, 59-63). Despite of (or because of) his imprisonment, Nkrumah’s political party, the Convention Peoples Party (CPP), enjoyed a surge in support while the rest of the leadership organized voting drives and boycotts. This nonviolent campaign was obviously successful for Kwame Nkrumah and his CPP: Nkrumah became the first leader of an independent Ghana in 1957.

Before discussing different types of anticolonial resistance within the British Empire in detail, I begin this chapter by presenting a typology of anticolonial resistance, which also maps on to more contemporary forms of political resistance. There is substantial utility in this approach since most current research examines large-scale campaigns or individual events. The maximalist campaigns studied by political scientists lump a variety of different resistance campaigns together, and their inclusion criteria includes a level of hierarchical organization and strategic thinking that may be absent in more spontaneous events (Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008; Griffiths, 2016). For this approach, it is straightforward to assess whether a campaign is successful or not—did it achieve its stated goals? Another method of analysis uses high-frequency event data culled from newspaper reports to examine the microdynamics of resistance and repression. This is also useful for exploring the short-term effects of, say, a protest—did the protest lead to repression by the state? Did more protests follow? However, it is exceedingly difficult to identify whether an ephemeral type of political protest with a wide range of possible effects is “successful”. The goal here is to
offer a theoretical framework that fills in the gap between the study of maximalist campaigns and fine-grained event data.

To show the utility of this typology and to assess the effects of different forms of resistance, I chose a number of events of anticolonial resistance to examine in depth. These events were chosen because there exists ample historical information about the events and to select events that varied across the dimensions in the typology. For violent events with low organization, I chose the 1938 riots in Jamaica and the 1929 Women’s War in Nigeria. The 1938 riots were part of a widespread anticolonial rebellion in the West Indies that were driven by dissatisfaction with the poor economic situation that was exacerbated by the worldwide depression. The result of these riots were increased metropolitan attention and constitutional reforms. The Women’s War was another mass act of resistance that included violent actions. Importantly, this event had comparatively low levels of violence. Property was destroyed but no colonial officials were hurt. The metropole ignored these acts (they were never discussed in the cabinet) and the colonial state, not the metropole, instituted reforms. The metropole ignored the Women’s War because the level of violence was low, political activity by women were generally delegitimized in British society, and the British viewed Nigeria as exemplifying the power of indirect rule and thus were more likely to allow local officials to handle political events.

I also run a number of statistical models using data on mass resistance campaigns to disaggregate violent and nonviolence along the dimension of the level of organization. These models explore the effects of hierarchically organized resistance on metropolitan attention and concessions.
0.27 A Typology of Resistance

This section introduces my typology of anticolonial resistance. While the quantitative empirical analysis of Chapter 0.17 breaks down anticolonial resistance into violence and nonviolent forms, the typology offered here varies on the additional axis of the level of organization in the resistance. Generally, this helps distinguish between spontaneous acts of resistance and resistance organized by leaders of a movement. This typology treats mass riots resulting from police repression and economic grievances as fundamentally different than armed insurgencies. For nonviolence, this typology helps distinguish between organized campaigns of civil disobedience—like those organized by Gandhi, Nkrumah, or even the Arab National Committee in Palestine—with more ephemeral strikes and protests that were less coordinated. These often occurred in the context of a labor movement.

Figure 0.15 presents this typology in a 2 by 2 table. On the vertical axis, the method of resistance varies according to whether it is violent or nonviolent. On the horizontal axis, the variation lies in the level of organization, with a hierarchical form of resistance having a clear leadership and spontaneous resistance being less elite-driven. This typology presents four discrete and mutually exclusive types of resistance. In practice, of course, substantial variation existed within each category and violent activity often coexisted with nonviolent activity.

What separates each category? In chapter 2 I defined violent resistance as resistance where people were hurt or property was damaged. Nonviolent activity is simply resistance where these things did not happen. On the level of organization,
Figure 0.15: This figure shows a 2 by 2 table showing variation across two dimensions of anticolonial resistance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Violence)</td>
<td>(Hierarchical)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgency</td>
<td>Riot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Nonviolence)</td>
<td>(Spontaneous)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Disobedience</td>
<td>Strike</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I define hierarchical resistance as resistance where there was some sort of leadership that either planned, coordinated, or executed the resistance. Hierarchical resistance is top-down, spontaneous resistance is bottom-up and driven by those actually engaging in the resistance. To evaluate the relative effects of each type of resistance, I present an abstraction of each type of resistance and then describe an instance of that abstraction (representing each quadrant of Figure 0.15 in detail. Each ideal-type of resistance accompanies an in-depth discussion of a type of actual anticolonial resistance that occurred within the British Empire. Doing so can help probe the limits and
explanatory power of my theory of imperial response. I will pay particular attention to how the metropole reacted to each type of resistance and whether any concessions were granted. In addition, I also pay attention to how colonial officials changed their views on withdrawal or independence. In the postwar era, many colonies had unofficial timelines for independence. These timelines often contracted or expanded in response to political conditions within the colonies.

0.28 Riots

Why were there anticolonial riots? Riots required high levels of participation—while a dozen or so individuals could engage in an insurgency, a prerequisite for a riot was a large number of people concentrated together. Participation in nonviolent action is easier for the marginal actor than participation in violent action. Within the British Empire, riots often resulted from repressive actions by the colonial state against nonviolent political protests. The colonial police often supplied the spark that transformed a protest into a riot.

Jamaican Riot of 1938

Description

In May of 1938, sugar can workers launched a strike at the Frome estate plantation, one of the largest in colonial Jamaica and owned by the West Indies Sugar Company. Three thousand workers gathered at the compound’s headquarters early
on Monday, May 2nd. At 5:30 AM, one hundred police officers arrived at the scene. By 9:00 AM, the number of strikers ballooned. At this time, there were reports of some strikers destroying property elsewhere on the Frome estate. Some strikers threw bricks and stones at the police after the police fired shots into the air in an attempt to get the crowd to disburse. Adding to the tense atmosphere were the bayonets affixed to the rifles used to fire the warning shots. The volley fire killed four protesters and injured nine more. The crowd scattered and began setting fire to the sugar cane fields (Thomas, 2012, 220-226). This event was part of a larger series of protests that turned violent after excessive police repression. In his analysis of policing in Jamaica during this period, Martin Thomas writes that "The magnitude of these disorders, their orchestrated destruction and the level of violence used to contain them reverberated throughout the island" (Thomas, 2012, 225). Despite directly contributing to the deaths of a handful of colonial subjects, the police behaved in the way that they were trained and implemented the best practices that were introduced in recent policing reforms within the colony. To some colonial officials, this suggested that the way to prevent future disorders was not better and more policing, but political and economic reforms. In June 1938, the new governor of Jamaica, Charles Campbell Wooley, announced a half a million pounds of funding for a land settlement reform and the alleviation of unemployment (Thomas, 2012, 228). A number of local commissions were appointed to investigate the causes of the disorders.

Response

How did the metropole react to these disorders? On May 25 1938, the cabinet
discussed the events in Jamaica. The pattern of events theorized in Chapter 2 fits my theory of imperial response: violence occurred, the metropole discussed the violence, and issued recommendations for reforms. At the cabinet meeting, the Colonial Secretary, William Ormsby-Gore, described the events as starting from strikes by dockworkers that escalated when “the control of order had got beyond the powers of the Police” (Cabinet, 1938, 11). Since these were labor strikes, their goal was clearly telegraphed to metropolitan policymakers. Ormsby-Gore noted that the “object of the strike was an all-round increase in wages” and that the outbreak of violence in the West Indies was “ultimately...due to economic issues” (Cabinet, 1938, 11). The cabinet then discussed details about implementing a royal commission to ”study this problem in its fundamentals” and to solve the ”Constitutional problem in Jamaica” (Cabinet, 1938, 11).

On June 14 1938, the House of Commons discussed the disturbances in Jamaica. The Secretary of State for the Colonies (and future governor of Kenya) Malcolm MacDonald, answered questions in parliament. He stressed that the events in Jamaica were not one-off events, but reflected deep-seated issues that needed to be addressed. His exhortation is worth quoting at length:

I do not think they are movements simply on the surface, without roots underneath, which we can dismiss lightly and forget about as each one apparently comes to an end. I think we must recognise that these outbreaks express a sense of unrest which is fairly widespread in the West Indies, which arises from feelings which we must respect and which will
remain as a source of further trouble unless we can do something effective, in co-operation with the local administrations, to meet the legitimate grievances of our fellow-subjects in the West Indies. These feelings of unrest are a protest against the economic distress of the Colonies themselves, a protest against some of the consequences of that economic distress: uncertainty of employment, low rates of wages, bad housing conditions in many cases, and so on (Hansard, 1938a).

MacDonald went on to stress that the demonstrators were driven by legitimate grievances and not by anti-British hostility. For this reason, he recommended substantial reforms to improve the economic and political situation in Jamaica. Ormsby-Gore agreed, and told the cabinet that “whatever agencies may have been at work the primary cause underlying this unrest is the very low standard of economic and social conditions among the coloured communities; and that this in turn can be traced to the depressed state of agriculture in those Colonies” (Thomas, 2012, 231).

0.29 Strikes

Copperbelt Strike of 1935

Description
The aptly named Copperbelt was a region of Northern Rhodesia with substantial copper ore deposits. During the 1900s, a number of mining companies began investing in the region. Laborers throughout Africa migrated to the Copperbelt to work
in the mines. These workers were heavily taxed and lacked outside local options for employment. By 1930, there were about 30,000 African mine workers employed in the Copperbelt region (Phiri, 2006). The Great Depression reduced demand for mining labor, and in order to make up the loss in revenue collected, the state increased taxes on mine workers. The strike started on May 21, 1935, when police announced that taxes would again be increased. In response, miners refused to go underground. This decision was spontaneous and resulted directly from the announcement of new taxes (Henderson, 1975, 87). News about the protest spread and ultimately involved four major copper mines. At the Roan Antelope mine, protesters surrounded the compound offices, and the police panicked, fired their weapons, and killed six protesters (Henderson, 1975, 84). The police arrested forty-four protesters (Perrings, 1977, 34). Thousands of workers participated in the strike. There was little to no destruction of property and no police were injured. Damages were limited to a broken window pane and the looting of a small amount of grain (Henderson, 1975, 97).

Response

In response to these strikes, the metropole organized an official commission to investigate the causes of the disturbances. The commission would be conducted by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and the report it issued, known as the Russel Report, would be presented to Parliament. The commission was established by the Governor of Northern Rhodesia quite quickly: the events ended in May 1935, and the committee published the report that October. While the report is quite short (around 70 pages), the committee by all accounts was quite thorough, interviewing
Figure 0.16: The Copperbelt Region of Northern Rhodesia.
61 European and 94 African witnesses, in addition to public meetings with colonial subjects in Northern Rhodesia. The commission located the cause of the strike in increased taxes and declining wages, along with the abrupt manner in which the new tax was announced and the pool of unemployed labors who lived near the mines. This is supported by the testimony of native participants in the strike, who expressed resentment at the growing economic burden on miners in the Copperbelt region. The Russell Report defensively claims that overall tax revenue in Northern Rhodesia stayed the same and that taxes increased in the Copperbelt largely because those workers had a higher ability to pay the tax. In addition, the report claims that the colonial police acted with admirable levels of restraint (Russell, 1935).

The 1935 Copperbelt disturbances did not go ignored in Parliament. This was partly due to the novelty of the strikes, which had not occurred in Northern Rhodesia before 1935. Parliament first discussed the strikes a week after they occurred, well before the publication of the Russell Report. MPs questioned the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister. Cunliffe-Lister provided an overview of the events and assuaged any fears that these strikes portended more intense unrest. He averred that, as of June 3rd, there was “no actual dispute to settle” between the striking workers and the owners of the mines, and over 90 percent of the strikers had returned to work (Hansard, 1935). Moreover, the strike did not represent widespread discontent but was instigated by a small group of members in a secret society who wanted to protest a tax increase. These answers, and the information contained in the Russell Report, must have satisfied any metropolitan critics of colonial rule in Northern Rhodesia: despite the publication of the Russell Report in October,
the 1935 Copperbelt Strike was never seriously discussed in parliament again. The cabinet summaries make no mention of Northern Rhodesia in 1935 or 1936. The constitution of Northern Rhodesia would not be reformed until 1946.

Sudan Strike of 1947-1948

Description

In 1947 and 1948, the Sudan Workers’ Affairs Association (WAA) launched a number of strikes by railway workers operating near the ports of Sudan. Labor strikes among transportation workers in Sudan could seriously damage the colonial economy, as colonial extraction entailed moving raw materials from the interior into the coastal ports. Strikes were also easily coordinated along railroads due to information and personnel connections. Decreasing purchasing power due to inflation and stricter export controls weakened the economic condition of Sudanese rail workers (Cross, 1997). These conditions gave impetus to the formation of transportation workers unions, such as the WAA.

The July 1947 strike started in the same way as many other colonial strikes during this time period: an organized march to a government or employment headquarters was interrupted by a confrontation with the police. On July 12 1947 railworkers organized by the WAA marched to the railway headquarters to petition for reforms. The workers were greeted at the headquarters by police. Skirmishes ensued, with dozens injured but no one was killed. The following day, the WAA called for a
strike. Half of the railworkers in the Sudan—approximately ten thousand employees—participated in the strike. On July 13, the WAA issued a call for a general strike after police detained members of the WAA leadership. After negotiations between the colonial government and the WAA, mediated by Sudanese political parties, the WAA called off the general strike on July 23. Scholars regard the outcome of the strike as a success for the WAA: they received their prime demands of the government legalizing trade unions and dropping all criminal charges against the leadership of the WAA (Curless, 2013). For the next year and a half similar strikes were launched by the WAA calling for increased pay and better working conditions, which were occasionally granted (report, p14).

Response

The official public line of the British was that these strikes were instigated by the Egyptians or communists outside of the Sudan. The annual Report on the Finances, Administration, and Condition of the Sudan for 1947 located the strike as part of a worldwide discontent with economic conditions and dismissed anticolonial activity in the Sudan as having ”a minor character” p13. The report blames the increasing cost of living which gave rise to the strike as driven by ”external world conditions” and did not reflect colonial governances p14. The report also blamed ”unscrupulous ringleaders” for strike action, and not the will of individual workers.

In London, the discourse on Sudan, to the extent that it existed, focused on Sudan’s relationship with Egypt. An important issue in Anglo-Egyptian relations was how to manage control over the Sudan, which was ruled by overlapping layers of
sovereignty. Discussions of Sudan’s constitution and attempts at the British to reform it also centered around Sudan’s relationship with Egypt. It is likely that British preoccupation with Sudan’s constitution crowded out any discussion of anticolonial resistance in the Sudan. The Sudan was also unique because the Foreign Office, not the Colonial Office, possessed formal authority. However, the metropolitan silence on the general strikes of 1947 and 1948 is notable. Sudan’s labor unrest were simply never mentioned in the parliament or the cabinet conclusions during the entirety of 1947 and 1948.

The British did reform the constitution and expand suffrage in 1948. A general strike in 1947 and a constitutional reform in 1948 would suggest that the strikes led to the reforms. There is evidence suggesting that this is not the case. For one, Anglo-Egyptian negotiations over the Sudan’s constitution began in early 1947, well before the strikes occurred (Hansard, 1948a). Egypt was heavily involved in the negotiations—with the British ambassador and the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs (whose approval of the constitution was required by the terms of the condominium) regularly meeting in Cairo to discuss Sudan’s constitutional status (Hansard, 1948a). The timing of the constitutional reform was driven not by British willingness to increase Sudanese self-government, rather, it was driven by Egyptian intransigence. As Mayhew remarked in Parliament on May 5 1948, "We feel we have done all we can to help forward Sudanese self-government” and the onus for reforms now lay with the Egyptians” (Hansard, 1938b).
0.30 1929 Women’s War in Nigeria. Why were there no Reforms?

In November of 1929 thousands of Igbo women from the Bende District in Nigeria traveled to the town of Oloko to protest the policies of the Warrant Chiefs. The seeds of what would be known as the Women’s War started when an Assistant District Officer in the Bende district conducted a redundant census of villages where he would begin to count the number of women in the household for tax purposes. The women in the villages quite reasonably feared that their accounting by the census would lead to increased taxation. A worldwide depression and a decrease in the price of Nigeria’s main export of palm oil strained colonial subjects. In response to the threat of a higher tax burden, women from six different ethnic groups organized a march on the District Office. They blockaded roads, brought down telephone poles, and released detained prisoners. On December 13, 1929 a British medical officer ran over two women in his car. Women attacked stores and banks owned by foreigners. Over ten thousand women participated in the revolt (Zukas, 2009). The British engaged in widespread repression to combat the resistance, employing soldiers, police, and even Boy Scouts (Van Allen, 1975, 22). Many women were massacred, and whole villages were razed. Scholars estimate over thirty women were killed by colonial soldiers (Umoren, 1995).

My theory of imperial response predicts that the Women’s War should have resulted in increased metropolitan discussion, some assessment by the metropole about the root causes of the riots, and political reforms that increased the political power of disaffected colonial subjects. This did not happen. Why? My theory offers an expla-
nation as to why there were no reforms: the theory of imperial response predicts that bargaining failures due to the metropole’s unwillingness to grant concessions because of security concerns would prevent the granting of concessions, but have no effect on the level metropolitan discussion. This explanation is not satisfactory. While Nigeria possessed important military bases and metropolitan policymakers viewed the colony as strategically important, in 1929 strategic concerns were not as paramount as they would be in the postwar era. More importantly, the Women’s War failed to command metropolitan attention and involvement. The cabinet completely ignored the riots, and the parliament only discussed the events sporadically. Bargaining failures interrupt the causal chain connecting violence to concessions only after violence has increased metropolitan attention. Investigating why the Women’s War did not lead to metropolitan involvement can help us interrogate the theory of imperial response and understand when resistance is successful.

I argue that there are three factors about the 1929 Women’s War that explain why the metropole was relatively unconcerned with the riots. These are: the high level of indirect rule in Nigeria, an exceptionally strong and able colonial state that could effectively implement reforms that would address the grievances of the rioters, and a general feeling held by colonial authorities that political protests orchestrated by women were unimportant. Other idiosyncratic factors inhibited any metropolitan involvement. The report on the disturbances was delayed due to turnover in the Colonial Secretary and an illness suffered by the Governor of Nigeria, which reduced interest in the colony by parliament (Hansard, 1930a). Since the colonial state was relatively strong, symbolized the power of indirect rule, and could handle the demands
of women, the metropole allowed the colonial state to handle responding to the riots and granting local reforms.

In a landmark 1975 article, Judith van Allen examined the gendered responses by the British to the 1929 Riots in Nigeria. The British referred to these events as the "Aba Riots", while the Igbo themselves and more recent scholars refer to them as the "Women’s War". For van Allen, this terminological difference was symptomatic of Britain’s tendency to erase the political agency of colonial women. This led to Britain’s failure to "recognize the Women’s War as a collective response to the abrogation of rights" (Van Allen, 1975, 23). District Officers believed that the women were not acting out of their own accord but were simply following men’s orders. According to van Allen, the British viewed the women’s demands that women serve in the Native Courts as "irrational and ridiculous" (Van Allen, 1975, 23). Using colonial officials’ biographies, autobiographies, journals, and memoirs, van Allen argues that these officials were unable "to discover and protect Igbo women’s political and economic roles” because they assumed "that politics and business are neither proper nor normal places for women” (Van Allen, 1975, 28).

The local colonial government in Nigeria was able to successfully contain the rebellion and to implement reforms in response to the Women’s War. When the demonstrations started in Aba and Opobo, forces from local colonial police were supplemented with troops from the Royal West African Frontier Force (Hansard, 1929). These reinforcements helped contain the riots and prevented them from spreading. Regarding reforms, in November of 1930, the government issued an ordinance, with approval from the Secretary of State for the Colonies, that appointed new Warrant
Chiefs and deposed of inept ones. The colonial governor was not required to consult with the metropolitan government before enacting this policy change (Hansard, 1930b).

The extent to which indirect rule was practiced on the round varied across empires and within colonies. In the British Empire, Nigeria was the model for indirect rule. Regardless of what this meant in practice, metropolitan and colonial policymakers treated Nigeria somewhat differently than other colonies. The incredibly influential theorist of indirect rule, Frederick Lugard, was the High Commissioner of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria when he penned his treatise, *The Dual Mandate in Tropical Africa* (Lugard, 2013). The result of this orientation to colonial rule was that native courts administered native law, which meant that much of the punishment doled out to colonial subjects in Nigeria in the wake of the Women’s War was to be handled by local courts with little British influence. This principle was discussed in parliament in the aftermath of the Women’s War and provided justification for leaving matters related to the Women’s War to the Native Courts (Hansard, 1930c).

An additional explanation for why the Women’s War did not command metropolitan attention is that it simply was not violent enough. There were no British casualties. Those participating in the revolt did not kill anyone; they used cassava sticks (commonly used as a kitchen tool) as weapons, not guns (Umorden, 1995, 70). They did, however, do extensive damage to property, including the burning down of several buildings. Most of these buildings were affiliated with the colonial state or foreign businesses. What reforms were implemented by the colonial state? The number of Native Courts were increased and Warrant Chiefs were replaced by a larger number
of judges elected by villagers (Van Allen, 1975, 23). There was no taxation of women, the prices of imported goods were reduced, and some women became members of the new court system (Umoren, 1995).

0.31 Within-case analysis: Palestine 1936-1939

The typology presented above organized resistance along violent/nonviolent dimensions and the extent to which the resistance is hierarchically organized. To study the different effects on metropolitan discussion and response for violent spontaneous resistance and nonviolent spontaneous resistance, I have compared the effects of strikes and riots on the metropole across colonies, and across cases. Comparing spontaneous resistance across colonies did not pose a huge threat to inference because the determinants of both strikes and riots were similar. They were both spontaneous action directed against the colonial state and agitated for some political or economic reform. Riots were rarely planned actions, and strikes turned violent due to the actions of individuals (whether they be colonial police or more radical anticolonial activists). This facilitated cross-case comparison without massive threats to inference.

Comparing hierarchically organized resistance campaigns is much more difficult. The civil disobedience campaigns of Nkrumah and Gandhi arose in entirely different contexts than the insurgencies of the Mau Mau or EOKA. Comparing how the British responded to civil disobedience with how they responded to insurgencies will tell us little because the decisions the British made in response to resistance across colonies directly led to the conditions that facilitated the organization of these campaigns. In
short, when it comes to making inferences about the effects of hierarchically organized resistance campaigns, endogeneity between Britain’s response and the type and intensity of resistance makes causal inference difficult.

To remedy this, I provide an within-case analysis of the 1936-1939 Arab Revolt in Palestine. The “Great Revolt” started in April of 1936 and, after an extensive campaign of repression by the British, ended in 1939 (Porath, 2015). There was substantial temporal variation in the use of violent and nonviolent resistance, both of which were hierarchically organized by Arab nationalists in Palestine. From April 1936 to October 1936, the Higher Arab Committee (the central political body in Mandate Palestine) called for a general strike and boycott of Jewish goods. Committees in Nablus and Jaffa, almost simultaneously, also called for a general strike. The boycott was followed by a large majority of the Palestinian population for over a month and a half (Anderson, 2017). While the most frequent type of resistance during this time period was nonviolent, I argue that colonial officials were much more interested and concerned about the violent activity that occurred during the general strike.

In October a revolt that started in Haifa devolved into an armed insurrection in the countryside. This insurrection later spread to urban areas and targeted British forces (Norris, 2013, 2008). Rebels launched attacks in September of 1937 with the publication of the report by the Peel Commission, which recommended partition between Arab and Jewish states (Banko, 2013). The revolt peaked in the fall of 1938 and greatly tapered by 1939 (Anderson, 2017) Since both forms of resistance in the revolt were hierarchically organized, this aids inference in comparing the effects of
both forms of hierarchical resistance within the same colony. The goal of the strike was to coerce the British to restrict or ban Jewish immigration. More radical peasants wanted complete independence from the British (Anderson, 2017). In the later stages of the revolt, a distinct religious and anti-bourgeois sentiment drove rebel violence (Radai, 2016).

As Figure 0.8 shows, there was a higher level of metropolitan attention throughout colonial rule toward Palestine than there was in many other colonies. Relative to other colonies, both the Parliament and the Cabinet discussed Palestine extensively, even when there was little anticolonial resistance in the colony. This was largely because the political problems in the colony were potentially explosive and required frequent discussion and re-visiting through the Mandate period. Generally these issues revolved around the appropriate level of Jewish immigration into Palestine. British officials tried to satisfy the Zionist movement, who wanted less restrictive controls on Jewish immigration into Palestine, while at the same time, the British limited immigration as a way to placate Arab nationalists in Palestine. For much of the mandate period, the Arab nationalists’ singular issue was the restriction of Jewish immigration, which they viewed as a foreign invasion. These issues meant that the metropole was heavily involved in colonial policymaking in Palestine. As it had in the United States, Palestine also occupied a unique position in Britain due to its religious connections.

How did the metropole discuss the general strike in Palestine during the period of April to October of 1936? To answer this, I plot the number of cabinet summaries per month that indicate that the cabinet discussed Palestine from 1936-1939, as
shown in Figure 0.17. The red area indicates the time period where there was mostly nonviolent activity in the form of the general strike, while the blue portion indicates the time period where the resistance was mostly violent. The highest number of cabinet discussions occurred in the beginning of 1939, precisely when the armed insurgency in the countryside was at its peak and the British responded with extensive repression. As predicted by my theory of imperial response, metropolitan attention was higher during the periods of largely violent activity than in periods where there was largely nonviolent activity.

![Figure 0.17: This plot shows the number of times that the British cabinet conclusions discussed “Palestine” by month. The red portion indicates the period of the general strike (hierarchically organized nonviolence) while the blue portion indicates the period of armed insurgency (hierarchically organized violence).](image)

Examining the parliamentary debates tells a more complicated story. Figure 0.18 presents data on the number of times that Parliament mentioned the word “Palestine” during the debates. Contrary to the predictions made by the theory of imperial response and the plot of the cabinet discussions, this plot shows parliamentary men-
tions were quite high during the period of nonviolence in the Arab Revolt. Why? The answer is that there was a vigorous debate about Britain’s policy toward Palestine in parliament during the Arab Revolt. This debate inflated the number of times that a Palestine was mentioned. These debates revolved around a number of issues. One is that MPs without much interest in colonial affairs still had strong opinions about maintaining control over an outpost in the Middle East bordering a large body of water and discussed the colony more. Secondly, the terms of the League of Nations trusteeship meant that the British had to satisfy their obligation to the trusteeship while still engaging in their standard practices of colonial rule. Figuring out how to do this was quite difficult. Third, there was heightened interest in Palestine because of its religious significance. All of these factors fueled public interest in British rule in Palestine, which led to more MPs becoming involved in colonial policy (Sheffer, 1978, 313).
Figure 0.18: This plot shows the number of times that the British parliament mentioned the word “Palestine” by month. The red portion indicates the period of the general strike (hierarchically organized nonviolence) while the blue portion indicates the period of armed insurgency (hierarchically organized violence).

Reading the transcripts of the parliamentary debates shows some of these dynamics. There were a large number of mentions about Palestine during the early part of the revolt because MPs debated what the proper response to the general strike should be. On June 19th 1936, for example, the House of Commons discussed Palestine and mentioned the colony’s name 43 times. The debate was facilitated by forthcoming answers about the political situation in the colony by the new Secretary of State for the Colonies, William Ormsby-Gore, who lamented at this time that “disturbances, accompanied by strikes of non-Jewish shops, motor transport, the port workers at Jaffa, and, in short, of almost all Arab industrial enterprises, have now, I regret to say, continued for some eight weeks” (?). In response to the strikes, the British metropole decided to appoint a commission inquiring to the causes of the Arab general strike and increases tension between Arabs and Jews. A commission
was appointed in part because the alternative would have been to welcome separate Arab and Jewish delegations, which would have been a political minefield (?)

The commission appointed in August visited the Mandate in November. Known officially as the Palestine Royal Commission, it is more famously known as the Peel Commission, named after the head of the commission, Lord Peel. The report offered a descriptive background to the revolt and a potential solution: abandonment of the Mandate and the partition of Palestine into Arab, Jewish, and neutral territories. This was a compromise solution that satisfied no one, and both the Jewish and Arab leadership rejected the proposal.

What was the character of metropolitan attention during the revolt? A reading of colonial reports shows that colonial officials were concerned with both violent and nonviolent activity. A general strike indicated higher tensions between Jews and Arabs, but interethnic violent conflict signaled that a full-blown civil war could occur. In their assessment of the situation and in their policy response, the authors of the Peel Commission were concerned with both violence and nonviolence. In the chapter of the report entitled, “The Disturbances of 1936”, the report begins its overview of the events of 1936 abruptly: “The trouble began with the murder of two Jews by Arab bandits on the night of 15th of April on the Tulkarm-Nablus road. The following night two Arabs were murdered not far from Petah Tiqva as an act, so the Arabs believed, of Jewish reprisal” (Peel, 1937, 96). The report then began detailing the intensity of the general strike: “in May, Arab work and trade were virtually at a standstill. Jaffa [the main trading port in the Mandate] port was out of action. Arab shops in Jerusalem and elsewhere were closed” (Peel, 1937, 97).
However, the main concern of the British government in Palestine during the early phase of the revolt was the violent actions undertaken by the Arabs both against British targets and Jewish civilians. The general strike and the violence that ensued were not the first time that Arab nationalists in Palestine attempted nonviolent action. For years, the nationalist leadership tried to achieve their goals through normal, constitutional channels. The High Commissioner of Palestine, Sir Arthur Grenfell Wauchope, recognized this and understood the viewpoint of the nationalist leadership. In the July 4th 1936 Palestine High Commissioner Review, which was an official report distributed to the Cabinet, Wauchope wrote that: “The contention of the Arabs is that they have for many years tried peaceful, constitutional methods, but without avail, and that the failure of His Majesty’s Government to find a remedy for their grievances has compelled them to adopt forcible methods of bringing their grievances to the attention of the world. I cannot agree that any of these contentions of the Arabs are valid, but that they represent generally the local Arab view there can be little doubt” (Commissioner, 1936b, 643). The report also noted that there were, on average, about twenty to thirty attacks per day by Arab militias. These groups would snipe or bomb British troops and Jewish settlements. The report concluded “that [the Arab militias] constitute a definite rebellion against the Government there can be no denying” (Commissioner, 1936b, 644). A peaceful Palestine could not be achieved by military means. In August the High Commissioner wrote to the cabinet that “far from the situation showing any signs of improvement, there are indications that it may seriously deteriorate, unless some political action is taken which will bring about a change in spirit in the Arab leaders and their supporters” (Commissioner,
That same month, the High Commissioner wrote a secret dispatch to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. In this missive Wauchope lamented that the unrest in Palestine had lasted for over four months, with 65 Jews killed, 15 British killed, and hundreds more wounded. Wauchope also expressed that he did not want to make any political concession as long as the violence lasted, but suggested that since the situation was so dire, the colonial government may want to implore the Palestinian leadership to verbally denounce the attacks. This would be a prelude to a political concession to the Arabs that would hopefully forestall future disturbances. He wrote that “some concession is the only course open to use by which we can attain the two objectives” of maintaining law and order and British prestige. The reason that Wauchope softened his stance toward the Arabs and recommended a concession was because of the violence. His dispatch concludes: “as the present methods have not succeeded in restoring order during the last four months, and as acts of violence are growing more widespread and brutal reprisals more frequent, I consider some change of policy is now called for” (Commissioner, 1936c, 657-660).

Both violence and nonviolence led to increased metropolitan discussion, but only violence led to a concession. No concession was made to either Arabs or Jews in Palestine by the British as a result of the Arab general strike of 1936. It was only after the Palestinian Arabs launched a hierarchically organized campaign of violence against British targets that the British government granted a concession to one of the dominant ethnic groups in Palestine. In May 1939, the British published a White Paper that reoriented British policy toward Palestine in response to the revolt. It
satisfied a number of demands made by the Arab nationalists. The White Paper announced that Palestine would be independent within a decade. Power would be devolved and self-government would slowly increase. Within the White Paper, the British included provisions to protect their national security interests: any treaty between Palestine and Britain would include “such requirements to meet the strategic situation as may be regarded as necessary by His Majesty’s Government in the light of the circumstances then existing” (of State for the Colonies, 1939, 6).

The most important part of the 1939 White Paper was that it placed restrictions on both Jewish immigration into Palestine and land purchases for the next five years. During this time, only 75,000 Jewish immigrants would be allowed into Palestine, and after this period, restrictions on Jewish immigration would be lifted only with Arab consent (of State for the Colonies, 1939, 7-9). Jewish immigration and land purchases were the main issues surrounding the conflict in Palestine. This change in policy greatly favored the Arabs and was detrimental to the Jews. For this reason it has remained a contentious part of the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, with some scholars referring the change in policy as “appeasement” (Cohen, 1973). For the contemporary Palestinian leadership, the White Paper signaled that violent tactics were successful. As Grob-Fitzgibbon writes, “the Muslim population in Palestine had rebelled against British policy and, as a consequence, had been granted their demands” (Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2016, 10).

The character of mass nonviolence during the first phase of the general strike was unusually strong and widespread yet was unable to coerce a concession from the metropole. Ethnic divisions between Jews and Arabs in Palestine eroded other, non-
By any metric, Palestine was a strategically important colony (Sheffer, 1978, 313). Why, then, did the British concede after an episode of violence? The theory of imperial response predicts that concessions will be rare in strategically important colonies due to bargaining failures, and concessions that are granted to strategically important colonies will not increase suffrage and will not sacrifice metropolitan control of the colony. The White Paper was a concession, but it did not expand the legislative council nor did it alter the Constitution of Palestine. Suffrage levels remained the same. The concession was relatively minor and it only empowered one ethnic group, which meant that the concession did not jeopardize British control over the colony.
Adding more variables reduces the parsimony of a theory. What is the advantage of further dividing anticolonial resistance into different categories? Doing so serves two main purposes. The first is that there was important variation within the categories of violence and nonviolence. This variation matters for understanding the onset of resistance. The determinants of hierarchical resistance and spontaneous resistance were not the same. Hierarchical resistance was much more likely to be explicitly nationalist, occurred in the postwar era, and was much more deliberate and strategic in how it resisted the colonial state. This is not to deny that these factors characterized spontaneous resistance, only that they were more prevalent in forms of hierarchical resistance.

Explaining why resistance occurs is important for understanding my theory of imperial response, but the main goal of the theory is to explain the effect of resistance on concessions. Is the added dimension categorizing the level of organization of the resistance important for understanding why the metropole granted concessions to the colony? In other words, were concessions more likely against hierarchical or spontaneous resistance, independent of whether that resistance was violent or nonviolent?

In this section I explore the often countervailing effects that hierarchical resistance—in both its violent and nonviolent forms—had on colonial concessions. The relationship between hierarchically organized resistance and concessions is not deterministic.
In Palestine, for example, the metropole granted a concession in the form of the Passfield White Paper in 1930 after the 1929 spontaneous riots, and granted another concession after the hierarchically organized violent resistance 1939 of the Arab Revolt (Cohen, 2014, 216). The British granted Palestine independence in 1948 after a sustained campaign of terrorism (Hoffman, 2016). Similarly, in Cyprus, the British refused to grant any concessions after the 1931 spontaneous riots and during the campaign of violence launched by EOKA.

What are the reasons why hierarchical resistance would lead to more concessions? Hierarchical resistance is better able to mobilize colonial subjects into participating in the resistance. An organized leadership also makes it easier for the resistance movement to articulate its demands to both the local colonial state and the metropole. This may make it less likely for the metropole to become directly involved in local colonial affairs. When a leadership articulates demands after an act of resistance, there is no need for the metropole to appoint a commission to investigate the causes, since the metropole can simply query or negotiate with the leadership to see what policy change could defuse future resistance. Armed with the information about the specifics of the leadership’s demands, the metropole can strategically use targeted concessions in scenarios where the most powerful nationalist leadership in the colony is relatively moderate compared to a more radical flank. This explains the British’s later embrace of Kwame Nkrumah in the Gold Coast, who they viewed as someone they could work with. In Cyprus this strategy was debated (although never implemented) as a way to empower EOKA and marginalize more radical communist groups.

There are also reasons that hierarchical resistance made it less likely for the
metropole to grant a colony-wide concession. Very often the leadership of an anticolo-
nial movement were in some sort of negotiations or dialogue with the metropolitan
and colonial government. Concessions could still be granted to these movements in
response to resistance, but the concessions need not be colony-wide or even a vis-
ible reform that elevated the status of colonial subjects. Instead of granting these
reforms, the metropole could engage in other, less visible acts that favored the move-
ment rather than the colony as a whole. These targeted acts could include recognition
of a resistance group, publicly meeting with the group’s leadership, allowing a group
to participate in an election, or even verbal assurances by the metropole that the de-
sires of the movement would be satisfied. In addition, colony-wide concessions could
placate an unruly populace and stave off future unrest. Concessions in response to re-
sistance by a hierarchically organized resistance group risked emboldening the group
and encouraging more resistance, not less.

To investigate the effect of hierarchical resistance on concessions I use the data on
violent and nonviolent maximalist campaigns as coded by Stephan and Chenoweth
(2008), known as the NAVCO dataset. Stephan and Chenoweth define a campaign
“as a series of observable, continuous tactics in pursuit of a political objective. A
campaign can last anywhere from days to years. Campaigns have discernible lead-
ership and often have names, distinguishing them from random riots or spontaneous
mass acts” (Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008, 16). The difference between hierarchi-
cally organized resistance and spontaneous resistance is not always clear and easy to
define. An act of resistance could appear to be a spontaneous act but in reality was
orchestrated by a organized leadership. Indeed, the British tended to blame commu-
nists for surreptitiously coordinating riots and strikes rather than recognize legitimate grievances of colonial subjects. The NAVCO data do not categorize individual acts as violent or nonviolent, rather, the data indicate if a violent or nonviolent campaign was active in a given year. My modeling strategy is to interact my granular measure of violent and nonviolent acts coded from newspaper sources with the binary variable indicating if a violent or nonviolent campaign is active. This enables us to see how (non)violent activity while a (non)violent campaign is ongoing affects the probability of concessions. This approach does not allow us to assess the effect of spontaneous or hierarchically organized individual acts affect the probability of concessions, but it is the best approach to examine how the level of organization affects the probability of concessions in the wake of resistance given data availability constraints and the difficult of identifying hierarchical and spontaneous resistance.

Table 0.10 presents the results of three linear probability models with colony and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the colony. The dependent variable is a binary indicator for whether a concession occurred. All independent variables are lagged by one year, and the unit of analysis is the colony year.

All models show that my measure of violent anticolonial activity during periods when there is no violent campaign increases the probability of a concession. In keeping with the results in Chapter 0.17, nonviolent activity has no effect on the probability of a concession, regardless of whether it occurs during a nonviolent campaign. Models 1 and 3 interact the violence measure with whether there is a violent anticolonial campaign ongoing. This captures hierarchical violent resistance. The coefficient on the interaction term between violence and an ongoing violent campaign is negative.
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<td>(0.199)</td>
<td>(0.195)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolence</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent Campaign</td>
<td>0.072*</td>
<td>0.074*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence * Violent Campaign</td>
<td>-0.110</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.117)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.110)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolence * Nonviolent Campaign</td>
<td>-0.070</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1,153</td>
<td>1,153</td>
<td>1,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>0.190</td>
<td>0.191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.131</td>
<td>0.131</td>
<td>0.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual Std. Error</td>
<td>0.298 (df = 1071)</td>
<td>0.298 (df = 1073)</td>
<td>0.298 (df = 1073)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:**  
*p*<0.1; **p**<0.05; ***p***<0.01

Table 0.10: This table shows the results of models where violent and nonviolent resistance is interacted variables indicating if there is an ongoing maximalist campaign as measured by the NAVCO dataset.

but not statistically significant. Models 1 and 2 interact the nonviolence measure with whether there is a nonviolent anticolonial campaign ongoing. In both cases, the effect of violent and nonviolent resistance on the probability of a concession during an anticolonial resistance campaign are lower than resistance outside of an ongoing campaign. However, one of the coefficients on the interaction terms are statistically significant at conventional levels.

In addition I explore how the level of violent and nonviolent activity affects the probability of a concession when violence happens in during a nonviolent campaign and when nonviolence happens during a violent campaign. During a ongoing non-violent campaign, violent resistance could signal to the metropole that anticolonial
resistance could escalate and erupt into widespread violence, thus inducing a con-
cession. Conversely, nonviolent activity during a violent anticolonial campaign could
induce a concession by signaling to the metropole that a more moderate faction is
increasing in power and could be rewarded with a concession. Table 0.11 shows the
results of models where violent and nonviolent anticolonial activity is interacted with
a dummy variable indicating that a violent anticolonial campaign is ongoing, and
these measures are interacted with a variable indicating that a nonviolent campaign
is ongoing.

The results are presented in Table 0.11. Model 1 interacts both forms of resistance
with a indicator for whether a violent campaign is ongoing, while model 2 interacts
both forms of resistance with an indicator for whether a nonviolent campaign is on-
going. Both models show that when there is no sustained campaign ongoing, violent
anticolonial activity increases the probability of a concession. The relevant interac-
tion term, that is distinct from the interaction terms in models in Table 0.10, for
model 1 is the interaction between a violent campaign and nonviolent anticolonial
activity. For model 2 the relevant variable is the interaction between violent anti-
colonial activity and a nonviolent campaign. The coefficient on the interaction term
between a violent campaign and nonviolent activity in model 1 is substantively large
and not statistically significant. The coefficient on the interaction term between a
violent campaign and violent activity is much smaller in magnitude and not statis-
tically significant. Model 2 interacts violent and nonviolent resistance with a binary
variable indicating if there is a nonviolent campaign ongoing. Both interaction terms
in Model 2 are substantively large but not statistically significant. Interestingly, the
### Table 0.11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interaction Term</th>
<th>Coefficient (1)</th>
<th>Coefficient (2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violence * Nonviolent Campaign</td>
<td>0.113***</td>
<td>0.076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent Campaign</td>
<td>0.212</td>
<td>0.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent Campaign</td>
<td>0.151</td>
<td>(0.112)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent * Nonviolent Campaign</td>
<td>−0.157</td>
<td>(0.118)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolence</td>
<td>−0.031</td>
<td>−0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent Campaign</td>
<td>−0.0004</td>
<td>0.108**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence * Violent Campaign</td>
<td>−0.038</td>
<td>(0.175)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent * Violent Campaign</td>
<td>−0.084</td>
<td>(0.125)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Observations:** 1,153 1,153

**R$^2$:** 0.192 0.192

**Adjusted R$^2$:** 0.131 0.131

**Residual Std. Error (df = 1071):** 0.298 0.298

**Note:** *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 0.11: This table shows the results of addition models interacting measures of violence and nonviolence with binary variables indicating if there is an ongoing violent or nonviolent campaign.

The interaction term between violent activity and a nonviolent campaign is positive. This suggests that the metropole may be more likely to grant a concession to a nonviolent campaign if there is a more radical element committing violence in the colony.

What are we to make of the statistical models interacting the NAVCO data on
violent and nonviolent campaigns with the more granular measures of violent and nonviolent anticolonial resistance? One consistent result is that violence occurring outside of a sustained campaign is effective at coercing concessions. In other words, the finding of Chapter 0.17 that violence is more effective than nonviolence is corroborated and is not driven only by large-scale insurgencies like those that occurred in Cyprus, Malaya, Aden, Kenya and Palestine. Indeed, the NAVCO data on violent campaigns rightfully codes all of these insurgencies as maximalist violent campaigns. This helps us understand why the interaction term between violent activity and a violent campaign (in models 1 and 3 in table 0.10) is negative, although not statistically significant. This interaction term is estimating the effect of violent activity during an insurgency campaign. These were scenarios where the metropole was much less likely to grant a concession in general because these colonies were strategically important and the metropole was willing to spend almost endless amounts of money and sacrifice British lives to retain control of the colony. Moreover, the effect of violent on metropolitan attention declines over time during an insurgency campaign, as shown again in Chapter 0.17. These factors make it extraordinarily difficult to tease out whether hierarchically organized violence was simply less effective overall or whether the reluctance to grant a concession during episodes of hierarchically organized violence were driven by British intransigence.

Regarding both spontaneous and hierarchical nonviolent resistance, the results from these models provide support for my claim that nonviolent resistance does not lead to concessions. The coefficient for nonviolent resistance is small in magnitude, often negative, and not statistically significant. There is no consistent or meaningful
pattern for nonviolent resistance that occurs during a nonviolent campaign. For example, the interaction term between nonviolent resistance and a nonviolent campaign in Models 1 and 2 from Table 0.10 are also small, negative, and not statistically significant. Table 0.11 includes models where both granular measures of resistance are interacted with a violent (Model 1) campaign and a nonviolent (Model 2) campaign. Here, we see that more nonviolent activity during a violent campaign is associated with a lower probability of a concession. Model 2 shows the same pattern holds for nonviolent activity during a nonviolent campaign: more resistance leads to less concessions. Importantly, in Model 2, the marginal effect of any nonviolent campaign occurring (in other words, when nonviolent activity is very low) is positive and statistically significant. This suggests that nonviolent campaigns not actively engaged in contentious political activity against colonial rule did receive concessions, but more aggressive nonviolent campaigns were not rewarded with concessions to the colony.

0.33 Conclusion

The typology of resistance introduced in this chapter adds an important dimension to anticolonial resistance. By separating resistance into hierarchical and spontaneous forms, my theory explicitly accounts for the level of organization behind resistance. This helps differentiate spontaneous acts (such as a riot or a strike) from hierarchically organized acts (such as an insurgency civil disobedience campaign). I then offer a brief description of different forms of anticolonial resistance that vary along the hierarchical/spontaneous and violent/nonviolent dimensions.
Both the qualitative and quantitative results show that violence is, on average, more effective than nonviolent resistance. This effect is stronger for violence that occurs outside of a maximalist anticolonial violent campaign. While not conclusive, the results do suggest that violent anticolonial activity that occurs while a nonviolent campaign is ongoing is the most effective form of anticolonial resistance. The metropole may have responded to increased violence with concessions reflecting the demands of the leaders of the nonviolent campaign as a way to defuse future violent activity.

A number of caveats are in order. For one, since campaigns required extensive leadership and organization, their onset and continuation is more complex and determined by the policies of the metropole than more short-term acts of resistance like a riot or a strike. This makes it difficult to ascertain whether the effects of hierarchical resistance are driven by the resistance itself or the policies of the metropole. In addition, the NAVCO data are not very granular. They simply contain a binary variable indicating if a campaign is ongoing. What this means is that for some colonies, like Burma and India, the NAVCO data indicate that an anticolonial campaign was ongoing for decades, making it so the interaction term between resistance and a campaign capture the effect of that resistance during those decades. Indeed, for India the entire time period studied here (from 1918 to 1948) a nonviolent anticolonial campaign was ongoing.

Despite these caveats, this should increase our confidence that violent anticolonial resistance was more likely to lead to a concession that nonviolent anticolonial resistance. More tentatively, it is most likely that spontaneous violent anticolonial
resistance was the most effective form of resistance. Indeed, there are a number exemples presented throughout this dissertation showing that the British reacted to widespread riots with colonial concessions (including the Caribbean in 1936 and the Gold Coast in 1954).
This chapter examines the parliamentary debates of the British House of Commons to understand how the metropole discussed colonial affairs. There are four goals. The first is to describe the British parliament’s role in colonial policy. Doing so can help us understand how changes in metropolitan politics as a result of anticolonial violence affected policy toward the colonies. The second goal is to study how Members of Parliament (MPs) used euphemisms to describe anticolonial activity in the colonies, and whether those euphemisms connoted violent or nonviolent activity. Simply counting the number of times violence or nonviolence were directly mentioned in a parliamentary debate many significantly underestimate the extent to which metropolitan attention was focused on violent or nonviolent anticolonial activity. The parliamentary debates were littered with euphemisms about anticolonial activity. Determining what those euphemisms referred to can provide more accurate measurements of the effect of violent and nonviolent activity on metropolitan attention.

The third goal is to disaggregate and describe the different forms of metropolitan attention in order to study how anticolonial activity affected metropolitan attention
and how the different forms of attention affected the probability of a concession. Using a number of linear models, I try to assess how violent and nonviolent anticolonial activity affected euphemism use in parliament, and in turn, how that euphemism use affected the probability of a concession. I also assess how the level of organization behind the anticolonial resistance affected the character of metropolitan attention in parliament.

The fourth goal is to assess the changing relationship between anticolonial activity and euphemisms over time. In short, the analysis in this chapter tries to ask, did metropolitan discussions of anticolonial violence become more honest over time? This has been a matter of some debate in the historical literature, with some scholars arguing that metropolitan politics were relatively unconcerned with Empire and had little impact on decolonization (Porter, 2006), while others have argued domestic anticolonialism from the left helped inject formerly marginalized critiques of the colonial project into the mainstream (Howe, 1993; Gopal, 2019). One implication of the argument that metropolitan politics became more concerned with colonial issues and the excesses of colonial rule is that anticolonial activity was discussed in more accurate and honest terms.

To achieve these goals, this chapter uses a number of statistical text analytic methods. The data consist of every utterance in the House of Commons from 1918-1970.

The findings here support my broader argument that British policymakers in London were more concerned with anticolonial violence than nonviolence. When MPs used euphemisms to describe anticolonial activity, those words—such as disorder,
unrest, or disturbance—were more likely to refer to violent activity than nonviolent activity. I use a text-analytic method known as word embeddings that is common in the machine learning literature to measure the similarity between different words, based on their context. In addition, I measure the distance between the euphemisms and their referents (meaning the difference between unrest and say, terrorism and strikes) over time. The findings show that the distance between euphemisms and their referents decrease over time, which could be a result of MPs being more honest about events in the colonies.

The next section reviews how and why the British parliament mattered for colonial policy. Parliament’s formal powers in this arena were quite limited. Colonial policy was the province of the Colonial or Foreign Office, with frequent involvement by the Cabinet. MPs, however, could exert political pressure on colonial officials. During moments of colonial crisis, when the an uprising embarrassed the local colonial officials and invited a metropolitan response, MPs would attempt to hold colonial officials accountable. In short, there was little regular oversight of colonial policy by parliament, but parliament became substantially involved when colonial issues occupied metropolitan attention.
0.35 Background in Parliament’s Role in Colonial Affairs

This section presents relevant information on the British parliament’s involvement in and discussion of colonial affairs. Colonial policy was not created in the House of Commons. However, colonial politics were an occasional, and at times central, part of parliamentary discussions on foreign affairs. Legislation by the crown had to be approved by and presented to parliament and had to be enacted by ministers who were held responsible to the parliament. For many colonies, the parliament could pass legislation dealing with a variety of issues, including constitutional, legal, defense, financial, and developmental issues. In his analysis of parliament’s role in colonial issues during the postwar era, Goldsworthy writes that Parliament “acted as the final arbiter of the distribution of authority” in the colonial territories (Goldsworthy, 1971, 64-65). Therefore Parliament’s formal powers were quite broad.

MPs could also exert political pressure on those in the Colonial Office and hold them politically accountable for the status of the colonies. During Question Time (when the MPs are able to directly question government ministers), MPs would query colonial office officials about colonial policy and the political situation in the colonies. Most of the more vigorous debates about colonial policy occurred during Question Time. During the postwar era, as colonial politics became more relevant to left-wing MPs (Howe, 1993) and as clashes between metropolitan troops and anticolonial nationalists escalated into large-scale civil wars, the House of Commons discussed colonial politics more frequently and with more intense debate. MPs also influenced
colonial politics in private meetings with colonial officials (Goldsworthy, 1971, 66).

The geographic distance of colonies, their diversity, and their perceived inscrutability made parliamentary oversight uneven. Moreover, there was no clear distinction between issues that should be delegated to local officials and those that warranted parliamentary involvement. Some MPs believed in vicarious representation—that is, since colonial subjects did not have members in parliament specifically tasked with representing their interests, like in the French case, British MPs needed to pick up the slack. One way of doing this was to publicize a hitherto unheard of colonial problem in the hopes of arousing public sentiment for or against a particular colonial issue (Goldsworthy, 1971, 65-71). However, this was a relatively rare occurrence and was mostly confined to discussions of excessive brutality of the colonial state during counterinsurgency wars.

MPs often discussed colonial issues and specific colonies after the occurrence of a colonial crisis (Goldsworthy, 1971, 65-74). In his study of anticolonialism among the British Left, Howe (1993) characterizes parliament’s response to colonial crises thusly: there is initially a slow response from MPs to an anticolonial revolt. Once discussion gets underway, a Labour MP will demand more detail on what actually happened along with a public inquiry. The colonial government will drag their heels on this front. A vigorous parliamentary debate will ensue between the majority of MPs who supported a powerful empire and the much fewer but fiercely committed anticolonialist MPs.

This pattern was first established after the 1935 riots in the Caribbean. As Howe (1993) describes it, three months after the riots, MP William Lunn raised
questions about the St Kitts disturbances and called for a full public inquiry. The Colonial Secretary averred that they had no official or unofficial information on what happened. Parliament was quiet on this issue for over a year, until riots in British Guiana provided an opportunity for anticolonial MPs to discuss the broader imperial role in the Caribbean. One of those Labour MPs was E.F. Fletcher, who attributed one of the causes of the riots to the colonial subjects’ demand for self-government and low wages.

In 1937 three Labour MPs called for a formal inquiry into labor conditions in the Caribbean islands after a series of riots that lead to the deaths of British troops erupted in Trinidad. The colonial office continued to drag their heels and failed to provide official statistics of labor conditions. In parliament the Colonial Secretary, William Ormsby-Gore, professed that he had no idea what the minimum wage was in Trinidad. After a series of uncomfortable questions about Ormsby-Gore’s knowledge of labor relations in Trinidad, anticolonial MP William Lund pointedly asked the colonial secretary: “Does there have to be a disturbance before the Government will act?” (Hansard, 1937).

Lunn again spearheaded the more vigorous debate in the parliament in February of 1938. He demanded a full inquiry into the crisis and excoriated the local colonial government for creating hostile labor conditions. Lunn’s proposed solution was to increase native representation and expand the franchise:

Underlying the economic evil is the constitutional question. The franchise ought to be more widely extended, side by side with a more advanced system of education. Closer union ought to be promoted. I think that I shall have the Colonial Secretary with me on that particular matter.
Opportunities should be given for public opinion to express itself, and I regret that the Commission did not lay more emphasis on this subject. If we give the islands a real form of self-government, I have no doubt that peace and prosperity can be established, not only for a few people, but for the whole of the inhabitants of the colony, and I hope, for the whole of those who live in the West Indies (Hansard, 1938c).

Under pressure, Ormsby-Gore agreed that constitutional reforms were needed, partly because improvements in the economic situation would not lead to real change without an accompanying political reform. Ormsby-Gore lamented, “at the moment there are only 26,000 people on the franchise out of a population of over 400,000. The franchise is far too limited, and the qualification for membership of the Legislature is far too high. In the Legislature there are only seven out of 26 representatives who are elected.” He proposed substantial constitutional reforms that would increase native representation: “I suggest it would be a good thing not only that the franchise should be broadened and the standard of qualification for membership be reduced, but that the Governor should no longer preside over the Legislature, and also that there should be a larger element in the council of elected members” (Hansard, 1938c).

Before the end of World War II, there was little organized anticolonialism in British politics (Howe, 1993). In the postwar era, however, organized opposition to empire grew in the left as the British Labour party took over and Britain’s economic decline encouraged a reevaluation of the importance of colonial possessions. This resulted in more sustained and higher quality metropolitan involvement in parliament. Howe (1993, 251) writes that the “MPs’ responses to crises were on the whole better informed, more vigorous, more rapid, embraced more Members, and aroused stronger partisan emotions than had been the case a decade before.”
This brief description shows how and why colonial issues in the House of Commons mattered for the metropole’s response to events in the colonies. Anticolonial resistance within the colonies propelled colonial issues into parliamentary discussions. These discussions were spearheaded by a small number of MPs who took a particular interest in colonial affairs. MPs could query colonial officials and put political pressure on them in the wake of an anticolonial revolt. This pressure was often translated into colonial reforms that prevented another uprising.

The rest of this chapter conducts a quantitative analysis of the parliamentary debates. It is mostly descriptive, showing overall trends and patterns of the debates in order to further our understanding of how colonial debates changed over time and what words were used in discussions of colonial issues. An important exercise is the analysis of euphemisms for anticolonial activity. The key emphasis of this dissertation has been on the relative effects of violent and nonviolent resistance on metropolitan policy. Disentangling the relative effects of different forms of resistance on the parliamentary debates is difficult because many MPs used euphemisms to discuss anticolonial activity. I use a statistical text analysis method known as word embeddings to uncover the meaning of these euphemisms, which enables me to estimate what these euphemisms were really referring to.

The theory detailed in Chapter 2 predicts that violence in the colonies increases metropolitan attention more than nonviolence, and that metropolitan attention leads the metropole to grant concessions to the colonies. This chapter examines the character of that attention. How does violence and nonviolence change metropolitan discussions of a colony? How do these effects change over time? How does hierarchical
or spontaneous resistance affect metropolitan discussions? I show that metropolitan discussions of colonies changed more in response to violence in the colonies than nonviolence. In addition, I assess how these effects change over time. This chapter also includes results from regression models showing that discussions of violent anticolonial activity increases the probability of a concession, while no effect exists for discussion of nonviolent anticolonial activity.

0.36 What was an “uprising”? 

I begin the analysis with a simple word count of the each colony name from the parliamentary debates. To do this, I performed a search through the entire corpus for the time period, starting in 1918 and ending whenever a colony received independence. I then count the number of times each colony name is mentioned in the debates for each year, then take the log of the number of mentions. The plot of this data is presented in Figure 0.19. The plot shows an number of patterns. One is that, as expected, India is discussed more than any other colony, especially for the early portion of the 20th century. The other pattern that this plot shows is a slight upward trend in the mention of each colony over time. As the global decolonization process unfolded, colonial issues became more pronounced in the metropole, providing quantitative support for Howe (1993)’s narrative about the rise of the anticolonial left in postwar Britain.

In order to understand how violence and nonviolence affected the rise of colonial issues it is important to examine the relationship between anticolonial activity within
the colonies and the parliamentary discussion of colonial issues. A straightforward way to do this would be to count the number of times a colony name is mentioned in proximity to a word referencing violence or nonviolence. If there were many more instances of, say, “riots” appearing near the words “Gold Coast” than there were “strikes” near “Gold Coast”, then that would suggest that riots were more of a

Figure 0.19: This plot shows the log of the number of mentions of each colony’s name in the parliamentary debates for each year. Colonies are removed after they receive formal independence.
concern of MPs and riots in the Gold Coast were more likely to be discussed in parliament than strikes in the Gold Coast.

Violence and nonviolence were not directly referenced, however. Numerous euphemisms were used to describe strikes, protests, bombings, and riots in the British colonies without directly mentioning them. Colonial officials in private documents would employ euphemisms in order to make their policies look better. Euphemisms were even more common in public discussions of colonial issues. For example, the official report on the 1948 riots in the Gold Coast—where over two dozen people were killed and hundreds were injured—was titled “Report on the Gold Coast Disturbances”, and the commission charged with investigating the riots (the Watson Commission) was officially titled “Commission of enquiry into disturbances in the Gold Coast” (Arden-Clarke, 1992, 478). Here I try and assess the extent to which euphemisms were used in the parliamentary debates, and when those euphemisms were being employed. When members of parliament referred to unrest, disturbances, or disorders in the colonies, were they talking about violent or nonviolent activity in the colonies?

To do this I use word embeddings. Word embeddings are simply a numeric representation of a word. These numeric representations—word vectors—are learned from the context that the word appears in. More technically, these vectors are the numerical values of an embedding layer in a neural net that is trained to predict a word from the surrounding word within a specified window. Unlike other forms of applied automated text analysis in political science, word embeddings take the order and context of the words in a document seriously. While standard topic models use
the bag-of-words model, where context and word order are entirely irrelevant, word embeddings are learned by models that use the information contained by the order and proximity of words to each other. The core assumption of these models is that similar words will be used in similar contexts. If there is a very high probability that two different words are preceded and succeeded by the same set of words, then those two individual words likely have the same meaning since they are used in similar contexts.

Word embeddings can thus be used to learn the meanings of words in historical contexts. British politicians in parliament and in colonial bureaucracies used euphemisms to describe colonial unrest. Instead of referencing riots and strikes, they would refer to them as disorders or unrest. The core assumption of the present exercise is that the precise meaning of a strike, riot, or bombing has been quite stable over time, but the meaning of these euphemisms is unclear. Generating word vectors for each word in the parliamentary debates, and then comparing the similarity of these words, can help us learn what these euphemisms were referring to. We can thus build a statistical model to learn the word vector of each word in the parliamentary debate to ask specific questions, such as how similar are “unrest” and “riot”? Is difference between “disorder and “strike” bigger or smaller than “disorder” and “riot”? The goal here is to uncover the meaning of euphemisms used in descriptions of anticolonial resistance.

The parliamentary debates however cover a wide range of issues. If we are interested in finding out how euphemisms were used to describe colonial issues, we must first ensure that the text being analyzed references colonies. To do this, I pare down
the debates to only include text that appears within a specified range of the mention of any colony within the British Empire. This is a rather simple method but given the size of the debate transcripts themselves and the range of the topics discussed, probabilistic or model based approaches (such as a topic model) prove difficult to implement in practice and are likely to miss offhand mentions of colonial activity that take place within a larger discussion. Moreover, the temporal range is quite large—from 1918 to 1970—provides another challenge since topics are unlikely to be stable over time. My solution is to restrict the corpus to only include text that is within 20 words of the mention of a colony name. In other words, if “Cyprus” is mentioned, the corpus will include the twenty words preceding the word “Cyprus” and the twenty words after it. While this drastically reduces the size of the parliamentary debates, the remaining text is still massive, consisting of over 25 million characters.

To find out the meaning behind words like “unrest” and “disorder”, I run a word vector embedding on the entire corpus, ignoring the time dimension. I use the Word2Vec model in the Gensim package in Python to generate the word embeddings. I use the following parameters: all words that appear fewer than five times in the corpus are excluded, the vector length is 200 (higher numbers are more computationally taxing but capture more nuance), and the window size around each target word is set to 10 as per the authors recommendations. The skip-gram algorithm is used to train the model, which predicts the targeted word from the surrounding context. It is slower than the alternative algorithm—the Continuous Bag of Words—but works better when words are infrequent (Mikolov et al., 2013).

The model produces a vector of length 200 for each word in the corpus. This vector
is simply a string of 200 numbers. The vector itself represents each word. The vectors produced by word embedding models have a geometric interpretation: more similar words will have more similar vectors, and point in the same direction in geometric space. This enables an easy and straightforward way to compare the similarity of two words. My approach to finding out the true meaning behind euphemistic words is to analyze their word vectors to see the other words that they are similar to.

I do this for five words: revolt, disturbance, unrest, disorder, and rebellion. None of the words have clear and unambiguous reference to violent or nonviolent activity. A disturbance could refer to a strike in one of the colonies, or it could refer to a bombing by terrorists. To find out what these words mean in the context of colonies discussed in the British parliamentary debates, I query the model to find the ten most similar words to each one of the euphemisms. It is also possible that the euphemisms were interchangeable and sometimes used to refer to violence and sometimes were used to refer to nonviolence. There is nothing in the statistical model that assumes that each euphemism has a one to one correspondence with violence or nonviolence. If the most similar words to a euphemism included an equal share of words related to violence and words related to nonviolence, then this would suggest that the euphemism was referring to both violence and nonviolence in roughly equal proportion. Conversely, if the list of most similar words includes words related to violence but not words related to nonviolence, then that would suggest the euphemism is most likely referring to violence.

The results are presented in Table 0.12. The top row, with the bold text, presents the word being queried, while the bottom 10 rows presents the most similar words to
the queried word, in decreasing order. The table shows that the most similar word to ‘revolt’ is ‘rebellion’. ‘EOKA’—the Cyprus anticolonial organization that used terrorist methods during the emergency—is the sixth most similar word to ‘revolt’. The most similar word to ‘disturbance’ is ‘rioting’, which provide strong evidence that ‘disturbance’ or ‘disturbances’ were a politically palatable way to discuss colonial riots in the metropole. For the words most similar to ‘unrest’, none of them have a clear violent connotation (although the third most similar word to ‘unrest’ is ‘disturbance’, which does have a violent meaning since it refers to riots). Disorder clearly has a violent connotation: ‘bloodshed’, ‘violence’, and ‘terrorism’ all show up in the query for ‘disorder’. A similar pattern exists for ‘rebellion’, with ‘rioting’, ‘massacres’, and ‘EOKA’ being in the list of ten most similar words.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Re却</th>
<th>Disturbance</th>
<th>Unre却</th>
<th>Disorder</th>
<th>Rebellion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>revolt</td>
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<td>deteriorating</td>
<td>violence</td>
<td>massacres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>incite</td>
<td>inconvenience</td>
<td>prevails</td>
<td>terrorism</td>
<td>outbreak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>excesses</td>
<td>dislocating</td>
<td>tension</td>
<td>disorders</td>
<td>curfew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>waged</td>
<td>prevailing</td>
<td>apprehension</td>
<td>menace</td>
<td>eoka</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 0.12: This table shows the similarity ten most similar words to five euphemisms: revolt, disturbance, unrest, disorder, and rebellion. The euphemisms are in bold and the words directly below them are the most similar words in the House of Commons debates, in descending order of similarity.

I also graphically present the most similar words to these euphemisms in by using a dimensionality reduction technique known as t-Distributed Stochastic Neighbor Embedding (t-SNE). This is a visualization method that is useful for presenting the
similarity of long vectors, which may contain important nonlinear relationships that Principal Component Analysis may miss. In effect, this method projects the 200-dimensional vectors onto a two dimensional space. Similar words will appear near each other. I plot the reduced vectors of the top ten most similar words to the list of euphemisms in Table 0.12.

The result is presented in Figure 0.20. The color indicates which word the plotted word is most similar to. For example, the top ten words related to revolt will have purple dot, words most similar to rebellion will have a red dot, etc. When the same word is one of the most similar to two of the queried words (for example, 'rioting' is similar to both 'disturbance' and 'rebellion') two slightly separated dots for the same word will appear. The orientation of the axis is completely arbitrary. What is relevant, however, is the proximity of each word to each other, and the proximity of words within and across a cluster.
Figure 0.20: The plot shows the clustering of different words in the House of Commons debates. The color represents the group of words that are most similar to the euphemism being queried. Although the X and Y axis measurements are arbitrary, similar words are located closer together while more dissimilar words are located farther apart.

0.37 Euphemisms Over Time

I also explore how the use of euphemisms to describe anticolonial resistance in the parliamentary debates changed over time. Figure 0.21 plots the number of times each euphemism is used near the mention of a colony name in the parliamentary debates.
Figure 0.21: This plot shows the use of euphemisms in the parliamentary debates for each colony.

To assess how the relationship between violence, nonviolence, and euphemisms changed over time, I examine how the cosine similarity between words connoting violence/nonviolence and euphemisms changes over time. The cosine similarity is a simple geometric measure of the similarity between two vectors. It ranges from 0 to 1, where a higher cosine similarity between a pair of words suggesting that both
words appear in more similar contexts.

I begin by dividing the parliamentary debates into separate datasets by year. For each year, I then run a word embedding model. In the word embedding models from Section 0.36 that ignore the time dimension, the text was filtered to only include words that appear within 20 words of the mention of a colony name. Since I am running word embedding models on much smaller datasets (since each year is treated as a separate corpus) only including words that appear within 20 words of a colony name severely decreases the size of corpus and compromises the word embedding model. For this reason, the datasets build on each individual year include all text where a colony name is mentioned in an entry of the House of Commons debates. These entries vary from one-sentence questions to longer monologues.

I choose three euphemisms to analyze: disorder, unrest, and disturbance. For each euphemism, I compute the pairwise cosine similarity between the euphemism and a word connoting violence (riot, terrorism, violence) or nonviolence (strike, boycott, protest) for each year. This procedure generates 18 cosine similarity scores (3 euphemisms with 3 violent and 3 nonviolent words, each). Since the corpus is small, in some years a euphemism or a word connoting violence/nonviolence may not appear with enough frequency and will be dropped by the word embedding model. In these cases, the cosine similarity between the euphemism and the target word be computed as a zero.

To increase the frequency of these words used and to get more accurate embeddings, I replace the plural variant of the word with the singular one, except for 'protests', since 'protest' often signifies contentious actions within the parliamentary debate itself.

The parameter specifying the minimum frequency of a word is set to 3 for these models.
My goal is to generate scores of the similarity between euphemisms and violence or nonviolence. To do this, I average over each non-zero cosine similarity between a euphemism and word connoting violence for each year, and then do the same for each euphemism and a word connoting nonviolence. This produces a composite score of the average similarity between a euphemism and words connoting violence/nonviolence that varies over time. Figure 0.22 displays the results of this exercise using smoothed estimates of how the cosine similarity changes over time. This figure illustrates two important features. One is that the euphemisms are on average, more similar to words connoting violence than nonviolence, as evidenced by the solid black line being higher on the y-axis than the dotted line.

![Figure 0.22: This plot shows the average cosine similarity between words referring to violence and nonviolence, and euphemisms, plotted over time. This plot shows that violence is more similar to the euphemisms than nonviolence, and that the distance between euphemisms and both violence and nonviolence increases over time.](image)

The other important result is that the distance between each euphemism and words connoting violence or nonviolence increased over time. In other words, words
like 'disorder' or 'unrest' were less likely to be used in similar contexts with both 'strikes' and 'terrorism' in the 1950s than they were in the 1920s. This suggests that MPs became more honest in their discussions of anticolonial resistance in the postwar era. This is a likely result of the increasing presence of the anticolonial left in the British parliament. Lobbying groups, like the Movement for Colonial Freedom, helped organize left-wing MPs to discuss colonial issues more and to hold officials in the Colonial Office accountable (Howe, 1993). The presence of a sustained and coordinated opposition to colonial rule in the metropole likely resulted in a more honest assessment of anticolonial activity, at least among left-wing anticolonial MPs.

0.38 What drove the use of euphemisms?

In this section I use the data on euphemisms on anticolonial activity that were present in the parliamentary debates to examine how activity in the colony drove the use of euphemisms, and to examine the effect that these euphemisms had on colonial concessions.

How did anticolonial activity affect the rate of euphemism use in parliament? To answer this question I run two linear models where the dependent variable is the log of the number of times a euphemism is used in proximity to a colony name in parliament, per year. The main independent variables are the measures of violent and nonviolent anticolonial activity described in Chapter 4. For controls, I include the number of times a colony is name is mentioned at all, which in effect normalizes the rate of euphemisms per colony. Since euphemism use is correlated with mentions of
violence and mentions of nonviolence, I also include these variables as controls. The unit of analysis is the colony year. To examine how the effect of violent and nonviolent activity on euphemism use changes over time, I run separate models where I interact violence and nonviolence with a linear time trend. I use a flexible kernel estimator which does not force the interaction term between the form of resistance and the time trend to be linear.

Figure 0.23 shows the marginal effect of violent anticolonial activity on the rate of euphemisms over time. Since the controls include direct mentions of violence and nonviolence, the relevant interpretation here the is that the plot shows the effect of violent anticolonial activity on the share of euphemism use relative to more 'honest' discussions of violence. (Indeed, transforming the dependent variable to be a ratio of the number of euphemisms used to the number of mentions of violence produces a nearly identical plot.) For nearly the entire sample, violent anticolonial activity increases the probability of using a euphemism in a parliamentary discussion of a colony. This corroborates the analysis of word embeddings presented in Figure 0.22, where the distance in similarity between euphemisms and violent words decreases over time. In contrast, Figure 0.24 presents the results of a model where nonviolent activity is interacted with a linear time trend to estimate how nonviolent activity affects the rate of euphemisms across time. The substantive effect is much smaller than the effect of violent activity on the euphemism rate, and there is almost no variation in the effect over time. Taken together, these two plots provide further evidence that the use of euphemisms were driven by violent activity in the colonies and that parliamentary discussions of anticolonial activity became more “honest”
Figure 0.23: This plot shows how the marginal effect of violent activity within the colonies affects the number of times a euphemism is used in parliament when discussing a colony. Starting in the mid-1930s, the effect of violent activity on the rate of euphemisms becomes smaller over time. This suggests that the British parliament became more “honest” about violent anticolonial activity within the colonies.
Figure 0.24: This plot shows how the marginal effect of nonviolent activity within the colonies affects the number of times a euphemism is used in parliament when discussing a colony, and how that effect changes over time. The overall effect of nonviolent activity is substantively small and relatively stable over time.

0.39 Hierarchical Resistance and Euphemism Use

Were euphemisms used more in when there was hierarchical resistance in the colonies? To answer this question, I use the NAVCO data from (Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008) on maximalist violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns. I run two normal linear models where the dependent variable is the number of euphemisms used for each colony-year. The main independent variables are the granular measures of violence and nonviolence, along with interaction terms that capture whether this activity occurs while a maximalist campaign is ongoing. Standard colony and year fixed effects are included and standard errors are clustered at the colony. For controls, I
include the number of mentions of violence and nonviolence around a colony name, along with the number of times that a colony name is mentioned in the parliamentary debates for that year. Including these controls means models are estimating the effect of resistance on the share of euphemism use relative to more honest discussion of violence and nonviolence.

The results are presented in Table 0.13. Model 1 interacts violent and nonviolent activity with a dummy variable indicating if a violent hierarchical campaign is ongoing, while Model 2 does the same with a variable indicating if a nonviolent hierarchical campaign is ongoing. For both models, the coefficient for violent activity is larger than the coefficient for nonviolent activity. This suggests that spontaneous violent resistance increases the share of euphemism use more so than spontaneous nonviolent resistance. The coefficients on the interaction terms tell a different story. In Model 1, the coefficient on violence during a hierarchical violent campaign is large, statistically significant, and negative. While violent activity and the existence of a violent campaign both increase the share of euphemisms, the effect of increased violence on euphemism use decreases when it occurs during a violent campaign. No such conditional effect exists when a nonviolent campaign is ongoing. Both the interaction terms between violent and nonviolent resistance during a nonviolent campaign are small in magnitude and not statistically significant.

What do these models tell us? For one, it provides further evidence that euphemisms were more likely to be used to describe political activity in a colony when that colony experienced violence relative to nonviolence. Interestingly, euphemism use is not driven by the presence of a nonviolent campaign and only slightly driven
by nonviolent activity. The model results suggest that violent activity occurring outside of a hierarchical campaign had the largest effect on the rate of euphemisms used in parliament. However, more violent activity during a violent campaign lowered the share of euphemisms used. This corroborates the finding presented in Chapter 0.17 that the effect of violence on metropolitan attention within a colonial conflict decreased over time. Many of the violent campaigns included in the NAVCO data were anticolonial insurgency campaigns that occurred after 1945. Discussions of these campaigns in parliament were more honest.
### Table 0.13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable:</th>
<th>No. of Euphemisms (log)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent Activity</td>
<td>0.424***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.090)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent Campaign</td>
<td>0.363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.355)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent Campaign</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent Activity</td>
<td>0.118**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mention of Violence</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mention of Nonviolence</td>
<td>0.204***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mention of Colony Name</td>
<td>0.075***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent Activity * Violent Campaign</td>
<td>−0.449**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.202)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent Activity * Violent Campaign</td>
<td>−0.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.291)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent Activity * Nonviolent Campaign</td>
<td>0.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.103)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent Activity * Nonviolent Campaign</td>
<td>0.079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1,074</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:*  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

### 0.40 Attention, Euphemisms, and Concessions

So far I have shown that violence activity increased the share of euphemism use, while nonviolence has little effect on increased euphemism use. Regarding the orga-
nizational dimension, euphemism use is much higher for spontaneous violent activity than for hierarchical violent activity. Understanding the extent to which euphemisms were used and their meaning is an important exercise for understanding the character of metropolitan attention. However, our main research question is trying to understand how resistance affects attention and how attention affects concessions. What was the effect of euphemism use in the parliamentary debates on concessions?

To answer this question, I run a series of linear models where a concession is the dependent variable and the main independent variables are mentions of violence, nonviolence, and euphemism use in the parliamentary debates. Controls include the number of times that the colony is mentioned in the debates along with country and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the colony. The results are presented in Figure 0.14.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable:</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concession</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Euphemisms</td>
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<td>0.008</td>
<td>−0.007</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mention of Violence</td>
<td>0.061*</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mention of Nonviolence</td>
<td>−0.057**</td>
<td>−0.069***</td>
<td>−0.071***</td>
<td>−0.076***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mention of Colony Name</td>
<td>0.029***</td>
<td>0.025***</td>
<td>0.024**</td>
<td>0.027***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Euphemisms * Mention of Violence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.018*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>1,050</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 0.14

All the models in Table 0.14 suggest that that increased euphemism use has little
effect of the probability of a concession. Violence has a slight positive effect while nonviolence has a negative effect. As expected, increased discussion of a colony leads to higher probability of a concession. What happens when both discussions of violence occur when there is also higher euphemism use? Model 4 interacts euphemisms use with mentions of violence in the debates. The coefficient on the interaction term is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that when there was a parliamentary debate about a specific colony, that colony was more likely to receive a concession when there was a discussion of violence where euphemisms were mentioned.

I have also argued that parliamentary discussions of colonial violence have become more 'honest' over time. How has the effect of euphemisms and discussions of violence changed over time? To answer this question I run another linear model where the dependent variable is whether there is a concession in the following year, and the independent variable is the log of euphemisms that are used within proximity to a colony name. Controls include the number of mentions of violence and nonviolence, again to assess how the use of euphemisms relative to more honest mentions affects the probability of a concession. To see how the effect of euphemisms change over time, and since we expect that these effects are constant based on the results of other models, I interact the rate of euphemisms with a linear time trend. The results are presented in Figure 0.25. As time increases, the effect of a euphemism on a concession increases as well, although the average effect (the same effect captured by the linear models in Table 0.14) is null.
Figure 0.25: The plot shows that parliamentary uses of euphemisms ("disturbance", "disorder", "unrest") about a colony becomes more likely to lead to a colonial concession over time.

0.41 Conclusion

In this chapter I have argued that when British colonial officials used words like 'disturbances', 'disorders', or 'unrest' in the colonies, that they were referring to violent anticcolonial activity. I have used a variety of text analytic methods on the parliamentary debates to support this claim, showing that these euphemisms were more likely to be found in similar contexts to works that explicitly connote violence than words that explicitly connote nonviolence. In addition I show that these euphemisms became less likely to refer to both violent and nonviolent anticcolonial activity over time, suggesting a more frank discussion of colonial issues in the metropole overtime. This
accords with the historical research on metropolitan anticolonialism in the postwar era (Howe, 1993; Goldsworthy, 1971).

Increased euphemism use, combined with increased discussion of violence, were followed by a higher probability of a colony receiving a concession. This provides support for my theory of imperial response that metropolitan attention is a key variable connecting anticolonial resistance to concessions. I also show that euphemism use was driven by violent, rather than nonviolent, anticolonial activity within the colonies. Models using the NAVCO data to measure the level of hierarchical organization when resistance occurs suggests that spontaneous violent resistance was the form of resistant that was most likely to increase euphemism use. These findings provides strong evidence that colonial issues became more salient over time and that debates in parliament were more concerned with violent than nonviolent anticolonial activity. This corroborates my theory of imperial response: anticolonial violence occupied metropolitan attention more than nonviolence. Indeed my examination of euphemisms show that looking at raw mentions of explicitly violent or nonviolent activity within the parliamentary debates may underestimate the extent of the discussion of anticolonial violence since those raw counts would not capture the use of euphemisms.

The parliamentary debates matter because it enabled MPs to affect colonial policy in important ways. The Colonial Office was formally answerable to parliament and political pressure from MPs could politically embarrass colonial officials, especially when anticolonial resistance exposed the fragility of colonial rule. Some MPs on the left would highlight and discuss episodes of anticolonial activity as a way to
undermine the broader colonial project and inject these issues into political discourse. The parliament also formally approved independence bills and major constitutional reforms. In short, the parliament helped hold local colonial officials accountable.
0.42 Introduction

This chapter explores British policy towards Cyprus in the 20th century. The chapter aims to convince the reader of three facts: that the British viewed Cyprus as a strategically important colony, that this viewpoint shaped British responses to unrest within that colony, and that the British were reluctant to grant autonomy to Cyprus in response to violent unrest largely because they feared that doing so would jeopardize their use of Cyprus as a strategic asset.

The theory of imperial response outlined in Chapter 2 predicts that in colonies where successful bargaining between the metropole and the native colonial leadership failed, concessions will not be granted and violence will ensue. This chapter explores the details of that bargaining failure and argues that the perceived strategic necessity of Cyprus to the British state made them unwilling to grant concessions in response to violence. The typology presented in Chapter 5 also helps explain important variation in resistance in Cyprus. While most anticolonial resistance in Cyprus was violent, there was important variation in the level of organization. The 1931 riots were spontaneous violence, while the later campaign of terrorism launched by
EOKA was hierarchically organized. The imperial response to both types of violent resistance was to deny any substantial constitutional reforms that would lead to the expansion of suffrage.

I support these argument by examining the secondary historical literature, archives containing Colonial Office and Foreign Office dispatches, records of cabinet discussions, and the Parliamentary debates in the House of Commons. These documents provide important information regarding the private, and sometimes public, explanations for colonial policy. The evidence presented shows that Cyprus was viewed as strategically essential for the defense of Britain, her allies, and the empire itself. Importantly, I make no claims about the actual strategic utility of Cyprus. As the evidence shows, a near consensus existed among British policymakers that Cyprus’ location and Britain’s declining power in other parts of the Middle East meant that Cyprus was strategically essential. Few disagreed. The relevant point is that Britain’s view toward Cyprus, whether for Orientalist or other mythological reasons, centered around its strategic utility.

The official goal of colonial policy after 1945 was to prepare colonies for independence. Cyprus was no exception. Colonial policymakers understood that the empire would not last forever. What type of system of hierarchical relations between the UK and its former colonial possessions would replace the empire? Would some colonies become commonwealth members? Would others participate in a free trade union with Britain? For Cyprus, the most likely outcome was to grant sovereignty to the colony, Enosis (political unification with Greece) would be achieved soon afterwards, and then Britain could still retain their strategic interests in Cyprus but do so under the
framework of conventional diplomacy with Greece. The problem with this strategy was that Greece could not make a credible commitment to Britain that the military bases in Cyprus would remain accessible indefinitely. Britain feared a takeover of Cyprus by hostile leftist forces that would demand the abrogation of any treaty with Britain. Greece was unable to commit to the suppression of any such movement in Cyprus since the Greek population supported their co-ethnics in Cyprus. For the Greek government to work to eliminate any movement seeking total independence for Cyprus would be incredibly unpopular and politically disastrous. The British knew this, and also knew that their only option for Cyprus was to limit its sovereignty. Doing so was the only way for the British to maintain the use of Cyprus as a military outpost.

The case of Cyprus provides strong support for my theory of imperial response. The evidence shows that the British were obsessed with Cyprus’ almost mythological ability to satisfy a number of military and strategic goals of the Empire. This conditioned their overall tendency to grant sovereignty to the island in addition to their reluctance to grant concessions in the wake of violent unrest. The metropole almost entirely ignored nonviolent resistance by Cypriots—whether it was labor strikes in the mines or the thousands of hunger strikes that occurred during the emergency. The district and colonial governor were responsible for handling these disturbances. The decolonization of Cyprus, of course, was one of the largest colonial conflicts of the 20th century. The main force of violent anticolonialism in Cyprus was EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters)—a Greek Cypriot resistance group lead by the charismatic Georgios Grivas. Britain’s willingness to launch a full-scale coun-
The insurgency campaign in suppression of EOKA and their campaign for Enosis was directly related to its view of Cyprus as strategically essential. Likewise, EOKA’s willingness to use violent tactics in an attempt to change British policy stemmed from Britain’s continued denial of demands for Enosis and the suppression of self-determination. The relationships between strategic importance, large-scale violence, and the granting of concessions are, of course, endogenous. Is is this endogeneity that this chapter explores.

0.43 Violent and Nonviolent Resistance in Cyprus

There were two large-scale episodes of resistance against British Colonialism in Cyprus during the 20th century. Both contained mixtures of violent and nonviolent activity. On October 17th, 1931, Bishop Nicodemos resigned from the Legislative Council in protest against British policies. The following day eleven other Greek members resigned. Nicodemos issued a manifesto calling for Enosis and to practice civil disobedience in opposition to colonial rule (Ioannides, 2019, 174-175). On October 21th of 1931, a series of organized boycotts inspired by Gandhi’s example in India spontaneously erupted into mass rioting in a large number of Cypriot villages. These riots were largely peasant based, directed at symbols of British rule, and lacked any central authority. The October 31st riots, as they came to be known, took the British off guard. The most shocking event was the burning of the Government House which
forced the Governor, Richard Storrs, to flee (Ioannides, 2019, 177). In Limassol the Commissioner’s House was also burnt down (Marovich-Old, 2018). While of obvious symbolic import, these attacks also threatened the lives of the British imperial elite. Cyprus colonial police, supplemented with British forces from Egypt, squashed the rebellion within a week. Seven Cypriot protesters were killed, along with 68 wounded. Four hundred people were arrested and ten Greek Cypriot political leaders were deported for life. Over two thousand protesters were convicted in court (Rappas, 2014, 3). Scholars have debated the root causes of the riots, with the most satisfying answer being some combination of a deteriorating economic situation and grievances directed at British attempts to remove Greek cultural influences (Frendo, 1998). The riots were short lived but had a long term impact on colonial rule of Cyprus. Many historians argue that this event reflected a distinct nationalist consciousness and support for Enosis. The high participation rates among the Greek peasantry, along with the targeting of symbols of British rule across a large number of villages, support this claim.

The British chose to respond to the riots of 1931 with repression rather than concessions. As a result of the 1882 Constitution, the Legislative Council had eighteen members. Six were appointed by the High Commissioner, three were Turkish Cypriots, and the remaining 9 were Greek Cypriots. The Legislative Council was dominated by a Turkish-British alliance that crushed any moves to increase Greek representation (Ioannides, 2019, 165). Instead of reforming the legislative council to increase the responsiveness of its members to the wishes of the Greek peasantry in order to prevent future unrest, the colonial government chose to repress elected
representation (Markides and Georghallides, 1995). On November 12th, 1931, weeks after the end of riots, Britain abolished the Cypriot Legislative Council and enacted political suppression and police tactics (Marovich-Old, 2018). Initially, the suspension of the Legislative Council was a temporary measure until a new constitution could be drafted and ratified. Instead of reestablishing the legislative council, the colonial government established an Advisory Council, which the secretary of state for the colonies said was designed to “postpone indefinitely any future constitution” (Rappas, 2014, 35).

Repression was targeted only at the Greek population but also stripped the rights of the large community of Turkish-Cypriots, who largely abstained from the 1931 revolt (Rappas, 2008, 364). The reformed Cyprus Criminal Code outlawed political activity (Rappas, 2008, 369). Prime Minister Venizelos complied with this repression because he felt Enosis demands jeopardized Cyprus’ foreign relations with Greece, Britain and Italy (Markides and Georghallides, 1995, 67). Throughout the 1930s British practiced authoritarian rule over Cyprus, which was the “only form of government that they believed did not ultimately threaten British sovereignty over the island” (Markides and Georghallides, 1995, 78). The British practiced brutal repression over the Greek population of Cyprus. This new era of authoritarian rule was the responsibility of the Colonial Governor, Governor Sir Herbert Richmond Palmer. Palmer implemented a wide variety of repressive measures, including curfews, banning the use of Greek flags and church bells, having political gatherings, and bearing arms. Palmer heavily censored the press by banning the import of pro-Enosis newspapers from Greece and censoring telegrams abroad. Thousands were arrested in the wake
of the 1931 riots. Enosis leaders were deported (Marovich-Old, 2018). Greek Cypriots dubbed Palmer’s rule “Palmerocracy” (Ioannides, 2019, 61). The suspension of a constitutional government remained in place until Cyprus became an independent republic (Holland, 1998, 5). Rappas argues that these policies reflected a colonial mentality determined “to penetrate the local society and understand its inner workings” (Rappas, 2008, 368). This repression originated in the Colonial Governors office, not in London. The structure of imperial rule, and the extent of the repression desired by Palmer required metropolitan approval. Palmer convinced the Colonial Office to grant him extensive repressive powers by stoking fears about another revolt like the one that erupted in 1931 (Rappas, 2008, 373).

The second large-scale episode of anticolonial resistance against the British in Cyprus occurred during the 1950s. The campaign against EOKA constituted a full-scale counterinsurgency war. While EOKA’s hierarchically organized terrorist violence and Britain’s counterinsurgency strategy has occupied much scholarly attention (French, 2015), there was actually a considerable amount of nonviolent resistance against the British that occurred during the civil war. For example, in July of 1957, the Times of London reported that over one thousand men imprisoned in a camp on suspicion of terrorism engaged in a 24-hour hunger strike to protest their detention without any trial. Hundreds of workers marched in support of the detainees in Nicosia. At Larnaca, workers engaged in a two-hour stoppage in solidarity (Correspondent, 1957). Despite the large number of participants across multiple locations, this mass nonviolent protest was not mentioned in the House of Commons or by the
Rumblings of anticolonial violence started in the early 1950s when a Ioannis Ch. Ionnides established KARE (Cypriot Fighters Risk-taking Leaders) in Athens in the Fall of 1952. KARE’s goal was to ship arms to and foment unrest in Cyprus against British rule. KARE would later work with EOKA, which was secretly established in the early 1950s. On April 1st, 1955, EOKA began its violent anticolonial insurgency. Archbishop Makarios acted as the political leader of EOKA, while George Grivas was in control of the military campaign. Before EOKA committed any violent acts, British policymakers and intelligence offers had no idea that a secret underground organization had planned a campaign against British rule for years (Ioannides, 2019, 268).

While the Emergency and the riots of October were the two largest episodes of anticolonial resistance in Cyprus, other events occurred, including acts of spontaneous nonviolence. On Monday, August 31 1936, some 1,500 employees of the Cyprus Mines Corporation (CMC) went on strike, demanding salary increases and workmen’s compensation. A number of strike leaders were arrested and imprisoned. Two years later, in June of 1938, factory workers in Famagusta went on strike. The strikers went to the colonial district commissioner with demands for a shorter work day and higher salary. Thirteen strikers—all women working as spinners—were arrested in July of 1938. All of them were fired, some were imprisoned (Rappas, 2014, 159-168). In March of 1940, 40 public workers were arrested during a strike (Rappas, 2014, 177).

This is based on a search through the Hansard for any mention of any strike during this time in Cyprus and a qualitative reading of the Cabinet conclusions.
When the Cyprus delegation returned from the UN after a making their case for Enosis, tens of thousands of demonstrators lines the streets of the airport in Nicosia (Ioannides, 2019, 247). There were also number of mass demonstrations in support of Enosis. In early 1952, mass demonstrations occurred throughout Cyprus on the second anniversary of the unofficial referendum where Cypriots overwhelmingly voted in favor of Enosis (Ioannides, 2019, 258). Greek Cypriot Church Council organized the referendum after the British had refused Archbishop Makarios’s demand for an official one. Ninety-five percent of Greek Cypriots voted for union with Greece.

0.44 British Views of Cyprus

Metropolitan officials in London viewed Cyprus as an important strategic asset that was essential for the defense of the empire and British national interests in the Levant (Holland, 1998, 146). This view originated when the British initially occupied Cyprus for strategic reasons in the late 19th century (Varnava, 2017, 12). Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli told Queen Victoria in 1878 that controlling Cyprus would ensure the free flow of both trade and communication from Europe to the East and prevent Russian expansion. He argued that “Cyprus was the key to Asia” (Ioannides, 2019, 34). Cyprus could also be used to defend the Suez Canal (located just 240 miles away) and the route to India. The small island inhabited largely by peasants lacked important raw materials or other economic resources. At the time of colonization, investors ignored Cyprus (Ioannides, 2019, 33-35). Later, investors would establish a small mining presence on the island (Rappas, 2014, 158).
Cyprus’ strategic value occupied a prominent place in how the British viewed the island. Lawrence Durrell, author of the popular literary memoir of his time in Cyprus, *Bitter Lemons*, and a former colonial official in the 1930s referred to Cyprus as an “aircraft carrier” and the “skeletal backbone of the Empire” (Ioannides, 2019, 45). A Colonial Office report that was disseminated to the British Cabinet characterized the importance of Cyprus as “the third in the chain of British bases across the Mediterranean [that] has acquired the post-war strategic importance of serving as a base for protection of British interests in the Near East, for support to the Baghdad Pact, and for the defence of the southern flank of NATO” (Brook, 2000b, 21).

Some historians have argued that Cyprus’ strategic importance was a myth—that is, Cyprus occupied a mythological place in the colonial mind and there was a substantial gap between its imagined importance and its actual strategic utility (Varnava, 2017, 3). Whether Cyprus’ strategic value was based on cultural signifiers or the outcome of sober assessments is largely irrelevant for understanding British policy. The widespread belief that Cyprus was invaluable probably stemmed from its geographical proximity to Russia, Turkey, and the Middle East. One could easily glance at a map and conclude that this small island made a great location for a military base. As John Harding, the Governor of Cyprus, said in response to an inquiry about why Cyprus was so important: “look at the map” (Holland, 1998, 92). Knowledge that the soil quality on the coastline was poor and made it difficult to construct usable naval bases or a deep water harbor was confined to a few dissenters willing to challenge the conventional wisdom (Markides and Georghallides, 1995, 75).
Varnava claims that Cyprus’s postwar importance was due to “exaggerated strategic perceptions” from “imperial strategists that maintained that it was...a very significant strategic asset” (Varnava, 2017, 278-279).

Britain consistently viewed Cyprus as a strategic asset throughout the 20th century but this view was not static. Britain’s acquisition of the Middle Eastern mandates after World War I gave Cyprus renewed strategic importance (Rappas, 2014, 59). During World War II “Cyprus became an integral part of the British military defense strategy in the Middle East and North Africa” (Ioannides, 2019, 192). Cold War dynamics elevated Cyprus’ strategic role (Johnson, 2000, 114). In the immediate postwar period, the overthrow of King Farouk and the rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt and anticolonial violence in Palestine signaled that both imperial possessions would not be suitable areas to maintain military forces. Without reliable access to Egypt and Palestine, the strategic value of Cyprus increased (Holland, 1998, 15),(Ioannides, 2019, 265). The Air Ministry in London concluded that “the strategic importance of Cyprus has grown enormously since the Second World War” (Holland, 1998, 22). In 1950 the Chiefs of Staff were asked to provide a definitive assessment of the strategic value of the island. This assessment concluded that Cyprus had ‘a positive and increasing strategic role as an air base and a garrison’ and that the only way to ensure access to these bases was by maintaining British sovereignty (Holland, 1998, 22). In response the British began building more military bases with the goal of reconstructing what they had in the Suez Canal Zone (Holland, 1998, 35). These assessments lead Britain to move its Middle East headquarters from Egypt to Cyprus in 1954 (Varnava, 2017, 278-279). The proposed withdrawal from Suez in 1956 left
Cyprus as the only remaining British territory in the area; relinquishing control would jeopardize Britain’s treaty commitments and weaken Britain’s perceived resolve to defend its Middle Eastern interests (Johnson, 2000, 115). All of this made Britain even more reluctant to grant concessions to the Cypriots and loosen their control over the island.

There were of course important reasons why Cyprus was valued strategically. Cyprus served as a logistical base for British troops stationed in Greece during World War I (Ioannides, 2019, 20). Cyprus figured prominently in Britain’s military defense strategy of the Middle East and North Africa in World War II (Ioannides, 2019, 192). During the 1956 Suez invasion, unrest made it politically difficult to use Cyprus’ military bases to launch Operation Musketeer, the planned invasion of Egypt. The invasion required the substantial use of land forces that needed to be transported by boat. Cyprus posed an obvious first choice for many military advisors. Military assessments that took into account the unrest in Cyprus led to the choice to use nearby Malta as a staging ground. The trip to Egypt from Cyprus was shorter than the trip to Egypt from Malta. Field Marshal Harding partly attributed this Suez debacle to the longer time that troops were in transit en route to launch a surprise attack on Egypt. Cyprus also played a prominent role in planning of the coup against Iranian leader Mohammad Mossadeq (Ioannides, 2019, 268).

Britain’s view of Cyprus as a strategic asset affected their broader colonial policy toward the island and conditioned how the metropole responded to unrest. One official in the Foreign Office said that “we are in Cyprus for strategic reasons...and must remain there until such reasons are no longer valid” (Holland, 1993, 153). In
1950 the Chiefs of Staff argued their case for “unfettered” control over Cyprus and in a fit of honesty acknowledge that “we must resign ourselves to being primarily an occupying power” (Holland, 1993, 153). Harding, a former soldier, himself felt that policy changes needed to be in accord with “the requirements of the strategic situation” (Holland, 1998, 92). The British felt that the only way that access to their military facilities in Cyprus could be guaranteed would be by maintaining “pure and undiluted” sovereignty over its important imperial possessions (Holland, 1998, 22).

The secondary literature on Cyprus and British Colonialism consistently argues that Britain’s view of Cyprus as essential to the defense of the Empire prevented metropolitan reforms and increased Britain’s resolve to fight the Enosis movement. Varnava claims that Britain’s refusal to grant union with Greece despite the threat of violence was their “belief in Cyprus’ strategic value after the Second World War” (Varnava, 2017, 279). Similarly, Holland argues that Britain’s “tenacity” to maintain imperial control over Cyprus as the campaign for Enosis ratcheted up “may be explained as much by the island’s location on the emotional and ideological map of British power overseas as by any strategic considerations arising from its physical situation in the eastern Mediterranean” (Holland, 1993, 150-151). Ioannides wrote that Britain’s “geopolitical interests in the region dictated British policies vis-à-vis the strategic island” (Ioannides, 2019, 41).

In 1954 after Britain announced that they would move their Middle East headquarters from Egypt to Cyprus, the Foreign Office was charged with reviewing British policy toward Cyprus. In discussions during the review (where Anthony Eden and the British Ambassador to Greece, Sir Charles Peak, were present) it was concluded that
any British statement of policy for Cyprus should declare self-government and not self-determination to be the ultimate goal. Cyprus should remain a commonwealth fortress” (Ioannides, 2019, 270). A month later, in a discussion about Cyprus’s independence, the junior Colonial Office Minister stated in the House of Commons that “it has always been understood and agreed that there are certain territories in the Commonwealth, which, owing to their particular circumstances, can never expect to be fully independent” (Ioannides, 2019, 270). Ioannides concludes that this complete denial of the right to self-determination “inexorably push[ed] Cypriot nationalists toward the path of violence” (Ioannides, 2019, 271).

0.45 How British Responded to Resistance

Why did the British respond with repression instead of concessions after the outbreak of the 1931 riots? One answer is that colonial officials feared that granting concessions would embolden more violence. Many adhered to an Orientalist mentality and believed that Cypriots only understood force and that concessions signaled weakness. In 1929 the colonial governor said that Cypriots “are apt to regard every concession which we make to them as proceeding from motives of weakness and surrender” and that “the grant of responsible government would be hailed as a complete surrender by Great Britain” (A.J., 1992). After conceding, the result would be more agitation for Enosis. This view persisted into the 1930s and was the standard response to Cypriot demands for representative institutions since “concessions [had] been misinterpreted as weakness on the part of the Imperial government and the secretary of state for
the colonies had therefore decided against making similar concessions in the future” (Rappas, 2014, 20). In the weeks after the October riots, the Secretary of State for the Colonies told the cabinet that “any decisions as to the future Constitution of Cyprus must be deferred until the agitation had died down both in the island and in Greece” (Archives, 1931). When that agitation did die down, the response was repression, largely handled by the colonial governor without metropolitan involvement.

The British did not steadfastly refuse to reform the Constitution of Cyprus. What they did refuse, however, reforming the Constitution to allow self-determination, since self-determination would lead to union with Greece and a rejection of British rule. In 1937, for example, Secretary of State for the Colonies William Ormsby-Gore told the House of Commons that the Colonial Office had no intention to reform the constitution and increase representation among the central government, instead opting for a decentralization policy that empowered local officials with heavy training by the British (Rappas, 2014, 40). Britain’s main concern was that granting reforms would lead to the loss of British control over the island (Markides and Georghallides, 1995). This helps explain why they fought so hard to crush EOKA—doing so would remove one of the main pillars of support for Enosis and enable the British to increase Cypriots’ sovereignty without jeopardizing their control. Indeed the removal of EOKA, the limitation of state interference in education, and the reduction of the political power of the Church were stated preconditions for British negotiations with Archbishop Makarios regarding a new constitution (Holland, 1998, 109).

In 1947 the Southern Department of the Foreign Office held a meeting to discuss their Cyprus policy and floated the idea of ceding control of the island to Greece (Sar-
The FO quickly encountered opposition. According to the Colonial Office and the Chiefs of Staff, this was unacceptable because Cyprus was essential to the defense of Britain. Cyprus was “the sole territory in the [Middle East] region in which, unfettered by treaties, she could undertake defensive measures” (Ioannides, 2019, 202). After World War II Cypriot nationalists traveled to London and demanded Enosis. According to Ioannides, the Colonial Secretary, Arthur Creech Jones, told that delegation “in no-unclear terms that Cyprus could not be united with Greece as the island was too importantly strategically for the British Empire” (Ioannides, 2019, 203).

In a Cabinet meeting held on February 11th, 1947, the Chief of the Air Staff “view[ed] with the gravest misgivings any proposal to surrender our sovereignty over Cyprus” since the imperial grip over Egypt and Palestine was weakening. If increased sovereignty led to a lack of control over Cyprus, the Chief said that “the strategic foundations of our defence of the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth would be undermined” (Cabinet, 1992b). The Minister of Defence concurred and reiterated that it was more important now than before that Cyprus remain a secure military base (Cabinet, 1992b).

Not all agreed that Cyprus was essential for securing British interests. As it became clear that British forces would withdraw from Palestine, J. S. Bennett penned a eloquent memo that attempted to poke holes in the conventional wisdom about Cyprus’ strategic value. Bennett’s memo carefully criticized the “current thinking [that] is likely to give new importance to the fact that Cyprus is ‘the last British territory’ and to picture Cyprus as a British strongpoint on the edge of the Middle
East” (Bennett, 1992a, 84). Bennett argued that Cyprus’ strategic importance by
itself was quite small, and could only be used in conjunction with land forces on a
nearby mainland. Since it was an island, Bennett argued that it required a strong
naval presence to protect and ensure its utility during a conflict. Moreover, Cyprus
did not lie along a potential enemy’s sea supply routes. Bennett concluded that, if
war were to erupt, “Cyprus alone...would surely be an unenviable position for any
British forces located in it” (Bennett, 1992a, 89). Bennett’s memo is important
because it directly acknowledges the extent to which many British viewed Cyprus
as strategically essential. In addition, Bennett’s proscriptions for British policy in
light of his re-assessment of Cyprus’s strategic value highlight the role that a colony’s
perceived value played in discussions about granting concessions that would improve
local autonomy. In short, Bennett’s de-valueing of Cyprus’ strategic value led him
to view Enosis as a possible option for Britain’s Cypriot policy. He says at much:
“it should be possible, when the strategic position of Cyprus has been redefined as
suggested above, to re-assess what would be involved in the union of Cyprus with
Greece and consequently the importance to be attached in future [sic] to the Enosis
movement and the way it should be handled” (Bennett, 1992a, 90). Bennett’s memo
also shows us that the reason so many colonial officials opposed Enosis was because
unification with Greece would undermine Cyprus’ strategic utility to Britain. He
wrote, “the new strategic situation may even make it desirable to reconsider the
objections to” the argument that Cyprus should unify with Greece (Bennett, 1992a,
90).

Bennett’s authority on strategic matters and the force of his argument invited re-
responses from Colonial Office officials who disagreed strongly with his position. While acknowledge Bennett’s expertise, Trafford Smith criticized Bennett’s argument for assuming that one could know all the possible scenarios that may occur if war broke out, and that “policy is like a tree which grows organically from year to year and adapts itself in the process to the changing circumstances which surround it” (Bennett, 1992a, 91). Smith recommended that all policy changes be deferred until they received input from the Chiefs of Staff and the Foreign Office. M. Martin directly engaged with Bennett’s reassessment and offered a concise statement of the view that Cyprus was strategically essential:

The strategic importance of Cyprus to the United Kingdom arises not only from the facts that (a) in war it is strategically so placed as to assist in the defence of our interests in the Middle East and for offensive operations, and (b) in peace it provides us with alternative air staging bases and naval and air facilities for security control of the Eastern Mediterranean (I am not sure that this control will matter once Palestine has gone), but also from the fact that we must deny control of the Island to any potentially hostile power, which might use it as a base for attack (Bennett, 1992a, 92).

In a response to a memo by the Secretary of State advocating constitutional reforms in Cyprus, Clement Attlee stated that he “was not easy about the proposals” for reform and reminded the Secretary of State that “the position in Palestine and Egypt has deteriorated and it is now more than ever necessary from the strategic aspect to keep our foothold in the Eastern Mediterranean in Cyprus” (Attlee, 1992).

\(^{12}\)Smith wrote: “My knowledge of the early and more recent history of the Middle East, and of the general factors contributing to the formulation of strategic and political policy there as a whole, does not seem sufficient, in comparison with Mr Bennett’s, to permit me to attempt to challenge any of his conclusions. (I don’t intend this as sarcasm. It is literally true.)” (Bennett, 1992a, 90)
On December 22, 1947, the British Cabinet discussed comments by Secretary of State for the Colonies about Constitutional Reform in Cyprus. The cabinet memorandum noted that “irredentist sentiment [i.e., Enosis] had hitherto proved an effective obstacle to constitutional progress” and discussed a proposal to grant responsible government to the Cypriots with Britain maintaining control over external and military affairs (Committee, 1992). Again Attlee expressed caution about granting constitutional reforms “particularly in view of the strategic importance of the island” and the growing communist presence (Committee, 1992). Some of the ministers supported the proposal to grant Cyprus provisional autonomy. Others disagreed. The memo notes that some ministers thought “that it was premature at this stage to contemplate the grant of responsible government to Cyprus, even subject to the restrictions proposed. The strategic importance of the Colony had greatly increased as the result of recent developments in the Middle East, and no step ought to be taken which might in any way weaken our control over it...precipitate concessions at this stage might fatally undermine our position in Cyprus” (Committee, 1992). This argument clearly articulates the logic of how strategic importance of a colony prohibited the granting of constitutional reforms and concessions to some colonies.

The proposal for provisional autonomy to Cyprus was again discussed by the Cabinet Commonwealth Affairs Committee on January 21, 1948. The Governor of Cyprus was present and supported the proposal. Some ministers expressed fear that, since the proposed constitution was temporary, “Cypriot leaders would be bound to regard it as a makeshift and to devote their efforts to securing further concessions” (Bennett and Martin, 1992). Apprehension about reforms was also expressed due
to Cyprus’ strategic importance: “Recent developments had greatly enhanced the strategic importance of Cyprus. No steps ought to be taken which might jeopardize our future strategic requirements in the Island. Moreover, it was in any event unfortunate that important constitutional changes should have to be initiated at a time when we were engaged in evacuating Palestine, and when no decision had been reached about the future of Cyrenaica. It was suggested that, from this point of view, it would be advantageous if further discussions could have been deferred for six months” (Bennett and Martin, 1992). Bennett again criticized the proposed reforms (arguing instead for full autonomy) and expressed puzzlement at the minister’s unwillingness to grant concessions due to strategic concerns. Part of his concern was with the international repercussions for refusing to grant a new constitution for Cyprus. Bennett acknowledged that “there is a good deal of truth” in the claim that Cyprus is “fit for self-government but that they can’t have it because of our strategic interests” but “it would be a gift to Communist propaganda if we said it” (Bennett and Martin, 1992).

In 1948 the Cabinet discussed a proposal for constitutional reform that granted limited autonomy to Cyprus. The constitution was designed to grant enough autonomy to be accepted by the Cypriots but without jeopardizing British interests in the island. In a cabinet memorandum, Lord Listowel noted that “Our strategic requirements in Cyprus and the Middle East generally have been very much in mind in framing these constitutional proposals. I am satisfied, and ... there is nothing in the Constitution now proposed which would prejudice our strategic requirements. While the minimum essential safeguards for these purposes must be and have been
inserted, we must avoid being placed in the position where it could plausibly be said that we were denying political liberties to a developed people like the Cypriots simply for 'Imperialist’ reasons” (Hare, 1992). Four of the 18 elected seats of the legislative council were reserved for Turkish Cypriots. Suffrage was increased as well—all male British subjects over 21 were guaranteed the right to vote. The elected legislature, however, was free to pass laws relating to domestic affairs but was under considerable constraints with regards to any external matters that may harm British strategic interests (Cabinet, 1992c). For example, the Crown reserved the “power to revoke, add to or amend the Constitution and to make laws by Order in Council” (Hare, 1992). In addition, the constitution prohibited that the legislature “discuss the status of the Colony within the Commonwealth”, ensuring that any opposition to British rule would be through extra-institutional means (Hare, 1992). Bennett offered advice on how to convince the Foreign Office of the need for limited constitutional reforms. He suggested that the Cabinet make a statement to the FO “openly linking our determination to stay in Cyprus with the part the Island plays in the scheme of Western European defence” since there is “no other reason for us holding this European community in Colonial status and denying them self-determination” (Bennett, 1992b). The Greek Cypriots, encouraged by the church leadership, rejected the proposed constitution “insisting on 'Enosis and only Enosis.”’ (Markides and Georghallides, 1995, 79). Denying Cypriots self-determination was essential because, as the CO argued, “it

13Bennett was more knowledgeable about Cypriot affairs than other colonial officials but he still had difficulty correctly predicting the future course of events: “In many ways the situation reminds me of Palestine in about 1943/44. We did not show our teeth to the Jews and their foreign supporters until they were sufficiently strong for it not to be effective. The Cypriots are not, on past form, the fighters the Palestine Jews proved to be; but if that should ever change, the parallel would become even more gloomy!” (Bennett, 1992b).
would be a delusion to suppose that...the establishment of self-governing institutions would ease the situation. On the contrary, it is more than likely that elections would result in in control of the legislature by politicians pledged to violent opposition to the Government and to acceptance of nothing short of Enosis” (Fisher, 1992).

In 1950 the Cabinet requested a formal review of Britain’s strategic interest in Cyprus by the Chiefs of Staff in preparation of talks with the United States. A summary of the report written by the Chief of the Air Staff, Lord Tedder, was sent to Omar Bradley, the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. The memo stated that Cyprus was strategically valuable because of the number of British troops on the islands and the location of its air base (Tedder, 1992). Moreover, troubles in Egypt led to a smaller troop presence and British forces in Libya were expected to be withdrawn shortly. Because Egypt was unstable, Tedder told Bradley that “as long as it remains a British possession, [Cyprus] is the only place in the Eastern Mediterranean which affords the necessary security of tenure. The U.K. requirements in Cyprus are therefore to be able to station there in peace any part of the forces of all three Services which might at any time be considered necessary to meet the strategic situation in the Middle East” (Tedder, 1992). Cyprus’ location meant that any aircraft based there could reach further into Russia than from any other location in the Middle East. Tactical aircraft could be deployed from Cyprus to meet any conflict in Turkey. Tedder stressed that “it is the view of both the U.K. Chiefs of Staff and the Foreign Office that the facilities mentioned in para. 3 above [the strategic utility of Cyprus] can only be assured if Cyprus remains under British sovereignty” (Tedder, 1992).
The US bought Britain’s argument regarding the strategic utility of Cyprus. In 1951, a confidential State Department memo mentioned that “The position of the Department of State with regards to Cyprus problem is: There are impelling strategic considerations for the retention of Cyprus by the British as a military base” (Ioannides, 2019, 256). This had important implications for the ability of the Enosis movement in Cyprus to garner international support for their cause, as had many other successful anticolonial insurgencies. Makarios and Cyprus failed to find the desired support in the UN because of Cold War dynamics. The US also recognized Cyprus’ strategic utility for Britain in particular and the Western bloc in general. Like Britain, the US could not afford to lose control over Cyprus. In 1954, the US helped organize opposition within the UN to the Greek draft resolution that advocated for Cyprus’ self-determination. Due to US opposition this resolution never reached the floor of the UN. A few months later, on April 1, 1955, EOKA launched a full-scale armed rebellion in support of Enosis. This took London by surprise and this unwillingness to cede sovereignty fueled a massive counterinsurgency campaign against EOKA (Ioannides, 2019, 273).

The alternative to British sovereignty was some sort of agreement with Greece where Greece maintained control over Cyprus but granted basing rights to Britain. This proposal was never satisfactory to British interests because Greece could not credibly commit to maintain the agreement. Cold War dynamics delayed the process of decolonization in Cyprus by stoking fears about Greek communists taking control over former colonies and revoking any deal favoring Britain that was signed as a condition of independence. Tedder said as much in his letter to Bradley. He wrote
that “Greek authorities have offered, in return for the cession of Cyprus to Greece, to
grant us such military rights as we might require on the island. Although under such
an arrangement the U.K. might initially obtain all the facilities and the freedom of
action she requires for strategic purposes in Cyprus, a Communist Greek Government
might denounce or break any treaty by which these facilities were secured, or even
offer similar facilities to Russia” (Tedder, 1992). It was not communism per se that
threatened the prospect of a credible treaty, but “any regime with extreme nation-
alist tendencies might conceivably attempt to abrogate or whittle down the military
rights and facilities accorded to us, as in the case of Egypt” (Tedder, 1992). Tedder
concluded his letter with a request to Bradley for the US Chiefs of Staff to endorse
his view “as to the strategic importance to our combined military effort of retaining
U.K. sovereignty of Cyprus” and to disseminate this information to the State Depart-
ment (Tedder, 1992). British control over Cyprus was essential because, as Edward
Johnson writes, “Cyprus, as part of sovereign territory, was worth far more to Britain
than it would be as a collection of bases leased from Greece” (Johnson, 2000, 115).

Indeed, Cyprus and Greece both made major concessions to Britain in an attempt
to reach a deal. In 1951, Makarios met with the Prime Minister of Greece in Athens,
Venizelos, to discuss Greece’s policy toward Cyprus. They signed a protocol outlining
both leader’s wishes and how they could achieve them. The protocol acknowledged
Britain’s strategic interests in Cyprus and offered Britain access to Cyprus’ military
bases if Enosis was achieved. The protocol stated: “with Cyprus united with Greece,
Great Britain could maintain its military bases on the island (and perhaps elsewhere
in Greece)” (Ioannides, 2019, 254). Ioannides writes that “the most important com-
ponent” of this “historic document...was that Greece and Makarios were willing to satisfy Britain’s strategic needs in the region in case of Enosis by offering military bases on its territory...this was an extremely important Greek concession. The British argument all along had been that England needed Cyprus to defend its strategic interests in the Middle East. Makarios and Greece were addressing this British concern” (Ioannides, 2019, 255).

Throughout the emergency Britain used Cyprus’ strategic value as an argument as to why concessions should not be made. In 1957 the cabinet added a Cold War gloss to a longstanding argument as to why concessions to sovereignty were unacceptable. “It is the military view that United Kingdom strategic requirements in Cyprus can only be fully met by British sovereignty over the whole island. Any system of partition or condominium would seriously restrict the use of the island as a base from which to support the Baghdad Pact or British interests and, to a lesser degree, NATO” (Brook, 2000a, 36). The Radcliffe Report of 1956 echoed these sentiments. Sovereignty would be allowed after EOKA was crushed and only if sovereignty was compatible with continued British rule (Holland, 1998, 162).

0.46 Conclusion

This chapter has examined British policy toward Cyprus. Colonial discourse around Cyprus elevated the island to an almost mythological status with regard to its importance for national and imperial security. Without complete access to Cyprus’ military bases, British policymakers feared that their interests in the Middle East and Asia
Figure 0.26: This plot shows variation in the number of British casualties during the Cyprus Emergency along with the level of Cabinet Discussion and the number of times that Cyprus was mentioned during the Parliamentary Debates in the House of Commons.

were jeopardized. While Britain would be satisfied with a compromised sovereignty for Cyprus—that is, one that granted representation to the Cypriots but guaranteed the British military access—this was impossible due to Greece’s inability to credibly commit to upholding such an agreement. Any agreement was subject to abrogation by the takeover of the Cyprus government by left-wing nationalists. The result was a classic bargaining failure. The continued denial of meaningful constitutional reforms and self-determination meant that the Enosis movement could only achieve their goals if they engaged in a sustained campaign of anticolonial resistance.

The case of Cyprus highlights important dynamics for my theory of imperial response. The evidence presented above clearly shows that Britain viewed Cyprus as strategically important and because of this they were unwilling to grant concessions toward self-determination. In response to unrest, the local colonial government insti-
tuted a sustained campaign of repression. Metropolitan involvement was quite heavy with a large number of discussions of Cyprus in the cabinet and parliament (see Figure 0.26). Repressive actions against unrest were largely initiated by the local colonial governor before the campaign against EOKA and the Cyprus Emergency. Cyprus was the location of one of the British Empire’s most bloody decolonizing conflicts because Britain’s view of Cyprus as strategically essential prevented it from making any meaningful concessions to the Cypriots themselves. The political leaders of Enosis (Grivas and Makarios) felt they had no choice but launch a sustained violent campaign after all attempts at securing self-determination were denied.

Strategic considerations made it difficult for Britain to grant concessions to Cyprus. This reluctance did not last forever, and Cyprus achieved independence from Britain on February 19, 1959. What changed? Satisfactorily answering this question requires a more detailed analysis of how, exactly, British officials in charge of crafting policy toward Cyprus changed their views in response to nationalist violence. One explanation for the timing of decolonization is that in the late 1950s many British policymakers reevaluated and downgraded Cyprus’s strategic importance. This occurred for two reasons: Britain’s successful test of the H-Bomb in 1957 made conventional land and sea forces that could be stationed on Cyprus less important, and the Suez invasion showed that Cyprus did not possess the strategic benefit that many thought it did (Johnson, 2000, 123-124). Domestic politics mattered as well. The Conservative government of Harold Macmillan wanted to decolonize and was free to do so since the Suez debacle effectively neutralized more hawkish critics. The independence of Cyprus was a multilateral negotiation, with Turkey, Greece, and the UN all playing...
an important role. Johnson claims that “the changed strategic role for Cyprus was the vital factor which allowed a British reappraisal but undoubtedly the annual diplomatic battle in the UN was a drain on the time and energy of the British government” (Johnson, 2000, 127).

One of conditions for independence set in the multilateral talks included the guarantee of British access to military bases in specific areas of the island. Greece, Turkey, and Britain held the right to take action to ensure access to the bases if they ever became jeopardized (Christofis and Kyritsi, 2018, 11). The constitution of Cyprus, which was drawn up in April of 1959, excluded Britain from any other involvement in Cypriot affairs. Unlike most other colonies, British involvement in the writing of the constitution was nonexistent (Holland, 1998, 331). To the bitter end, Britain refused to grant the Cypriots the right to self-determination and let Greece, Turkey, and the United Nations determine the post-independence fate of the island.
0.47 Introduction

This chapter reviews British responses and views of anticolonial resistance in the Gold Coast. I argue that the British responded to violent resistance by granting substantial constitutional reforms that increased suffrage and autonomy. This pattern is best exemplified by Britain’s response to the 1948 riots in Accra, where over two dozen people were killed and hundreds were injured. The 1948 riots became an important topic of discussion in the metropole and were heavily debated in Parliament. Britain responded by appointing a commission to study the ways in which the political autonomy of the Gold Coast could be increased as a way to defuse future violence and prepare the colony for independence.

The typology detailed in Chapter 5 differentiates between hierarchically organized violence and spontaneous violence. Spontaneous violence in the British empire often occurred after the colonial police reacted to a nonviolent conflict with violent tactics. Generally, an agitated crowd would gather to express some political demand, and an overzealous colonial police officer would respond to some provocation with a truncheon or rifle. Much of the violence explored in this chapter consisted of
spontaneous violence. This type of violence occurred concurrently with nonviolently activity. While in the later colonial era, after 1950, Kwame Nkrumah’s campaign of ‘positive action’ organized nonviolent activity, there was no sustained campaign of violent political activity organized by an anticolonial movement in the Gold Coast. As this chapter shows, spontaneous violent anticolonial activity still lead to colonial concessions. The British responded to violence with concessions because riots in the Gold Coast threatened the stability of colonial rule and signaled that the local colonial government was ill-equipped to contain colonial subjects. Moreover, violence threatened the Gold Coast’s reputation as a model colony. The level of violence in the Gold Coast was relatively low—a dozen people were killed in the 1948 riots that lead to a new constitution—but this violence was unexpected and portended even more resistance if it remained unchecked.

The metropole paid little attention to episodes of nonviolent resistance in the Gold Coast during the late 1930s and mid 1940s. Numerous strikes occurred during this period that were ignored by the metropole. Since the metropole did not become involved in the internal affairs of the Gold Coast colony, they did not grant any constitutional concessions in response to strikes and protests. What concessions were granted, however, were granted by the local colonial government in the form of increased wages and improved working conditions. Increased representation, constitutional amendments, and the institution of elections only occurred after the 1948 Accra riots. This mass act of violence shocked policymakers in London. In response, they appointed a number of committees and commissions to investigate the cause of the riots and to offer remedies that would prevent further violent unrest. Metropoli-
tan involvement resulted in a brand new constitution that expanded the legislative
council and instituted new elections (Hinds, 1999, 100).

The Gold Coast was economically important to Britain. Unlike the case of Cyprus,
the British felt comfortable granting constitutional reforms in the Gold Coast because
doing so did not jeopardize their key interests in the colony. The Gold Coast was
a politically advanced model colony. It offered little strategic value, and its main
benefit to Britain was the production of cocoa. Granting reforms and devolving
autonomy simply did not threaten the level of exports of cocoa from the Gold Coast.
Cocoa production was constantly under threat and this caused anxiety among colonial
officials. This anxiety, however, was not driven by politics. Swollen shoot virus,
spread by mealybugs, was (and remains) a constant problem for cocoa farmers in
West Africa. The virus decreases cocoa production and eventually kills the cocoa
tree. Colonial Office officials spent more time worrying about the impact of swollen
shoot virus than the impact of constitutional reforms on cocoa yields.

The engine of nonviolent resistance after 1948 was Kwame Nkrumah and his Con-
vention’s People Party (CPP). Nkrumah launched a sustained resistance campaign
espousing a strategy of ‘positive action’. This program consisted of boycotts, strikes,
and mass protests which were designed to prevent the functioning of the colonial
state, increase the power of the CPP within the Gold Coast, and coerce the British
into granting further colonial reforms. Using documents from the Colonial Office,
I show that the British felt threatened by Nkrumah’s obvious political prowess and
his ability to mobilize the population of the Gold Coast against the colonial state.
However, the CO viewed the CPP’s strategy of nonviolent resistance as threatening
largely because large-scale political mobilization raised the specter of violence and not because of the direct costs of the nonviolent acts. While Nkrumah’s campaign was successful (he ruled the colony at the time of independence), and nonviolence played an important role in that success, the CO’s preoccupation with the possibility of violence shows that the major threat to continued colonial rule was not strikes and boycotts, but riots and violence.

0.48 Background

Officially, the Gold Coast included the Gold Coast Colony, the Northern Territories protectorate, the Mandate of Togoland, and the colony of Ashanti, which was administered separately. All of these territories were under the jurisdiction of the Gold Coast governor and the Executive Council. The Legislative Council, which experienced gradual expansion throughout the 1940s and 50s, only administered the southern section (the Gold Coast Colony), although there was some jurisdictional overlap regarding finances and budgets for other areas within the Gold Coast. For the remaining areas outside the Gold Coast Colony, the governor held legislative authority. Reforms instituted in 1925 created provincial councils with local elected chiefs who were empowered to select members for the Legislative Council.

During the 1930s and mid-1940s, the British viewed the Gold Coast as an advanced model colony. The population were among the most well-educated in sub-Saharan Africa (Rathbone, 1992, xxxv). However, it had a reputation for being politically difficult. Throughout the 1930s ’cocoa hold ups’ would occur, where cocoa farmers
would strike by withholding the sale of cocoa to protest the monopsony power of firms run by the British. These strikes were ultimately ineffective as divisions between rich and poor farmers prevented sufficient collective action (Rhodie, 1968). The southern rural kingdoms experienced mild unrest as colonial subjects tried to depose kings and chiefs that were formally incorporated into the colonial state. The Gold Coast was at both times an advanced and economically productive colony that was politically difficult and potentially unstable.

The strategy of the Colonial Office to administer the Gold Coast took into account the colony’s high level of development and its political instability. Reforms would be granted to foster development and defuse nationalist demands. This was embodied in the colonial governor, Sir Alan Burns, who governed from 1941 to 1947. Burns was a popular governor with colonial employees and the native population, partly because the war effort provided him with funds to create profitable jobs for the population of the Gold Coast (Rathbone, 1968). Burns wanted to build up native authorities to further advance the colony both politically and economically. He favored expanding the administrative councils to include more native voices and to train colonial subjects for self-government. The chiefs, many of whom were formally incorporated into the colonial state, would also be strengthened in order to counterbalance the more radical nationalists (Rathbone, 1992, xxxviii). The strategy of co-opting and favoring more moderate elements while marginalizing radical ones would also be used in the 1950s with Kwame Nkrumah. The result of this strategy was a number of important reforms that increased local representation and instituted formal councils staffed by natives that helped craft policy.
The Gold Coast provides a hard test for my argument that violence was more effective at garnering metropolitan attention and inducing concessions since nonviolent activity by Gold Coast farmers had the potential to seriously disrupt the economy of the entire colony. The Gold Coast satisfied Britain’s economic interests of converting dollars into sterling which helped boost the value of their currency. Conservative tribal chiefs and Western-educated elites made British rule stable (Darwin, 1988, 175). The main export that facilitated convertibility of sterling to dollars was cocoa. By the late 1940s, cocoa from the Gold Coast became important for converting sterling into dollars, generating $47.5 million, second only to Malaya (Hinds, 1999, 108). Cocoa made the Gold Coast one of the most important colonies within the sterling area in the postwar period (Krozewski, 2001, 83). The Gold Coast became even more important to sustaining the value of sterling in 1947 when the price of cocoa skyrocketed at the same time that sterling experienced a convertibility crisis (Krozewski, 2001, 83). Cocoa’s convertibility meant that farmers in the Gold Coast possessed a high amount of bargaining power relative to the colonial government. In the Gold Coast, where cocoa farmers could potentially inflict serious harm on the purchasing power of Britain’s currency, strikes and protests by these farmers were rarely discussed by the cabinet. As the sterling crisis worsened, pressure increased on Britain’s ability to turn sterling into dollars and prevent the value of sterling from falling either further. In the 1930s, a number of farmers protested tax increases by holding up cocoa production. These nonviolent methods of resistance were ignored by the metropolitan government but did provoke involvement from the colonial governor (Krozewski, 2001, 21).
Local colonial officials administered the Gold Coast and were responsible for the majority of colonial policies. Unless there was departmental infighting or matters related to imperial defense, the Colonial Office and the colonial governor were left to run the colony with minimal metropolitan involvement (Rathbone, 1992, xxxiii). As Richard Rathbone writes, “when major constitutional and political issues were under consideration, the Governor of the Gold Coast returned to London for discussions at the CO with the secretary of state and his officials” (Rathbone, 1992, xxxiii). Once this happened, and as the policy-making process became more publicized, Parliament became involved and often discussed these colonial issues, which increased pressure for reforms (Rathbone, 1968, 214).

The Gold Coast was an important colony to Britain largely for economic reasons related to the management of sterling. In contrast to colonies that were strategically important, the British were willing to grant concessions in response to violent resistance. As Krozewski succinctly puts it, “Britain’s concessions to nationalist demands assisted sterling area management” (Krozewski, 2001, 207). Granting concessions and reforming the constitution did not jeopardize British interests in the colony. For the Gold Coast, the British were not opposed to increasing suffrage because increasing suffrage enabled Britain to rely on the Gold Coast to prop up sterling. Reform was a “means of securing the territory’s cooperation with policies for protecting sterling” (Krozewski, 2001, 207). Moreover, reforms could be instituted without “derailing its agenda for economic recovery and the restoration of sterling to convertibility” (Hinds, 1999, 106). In Cyprus, granting concessions would empower supporters of Enosis and lead to a political leadership hostile to imperial rule. In the Gold Coast
however, granting concessions would “broaden the base of colonial participation in the administration...without yielding full participation or control over monetary or fiscal policy” (Hinds, 1999, 108). This dynamic did not change after 1950 when the CPP came into power. Darwin writes that the CPP “would make little fundamental difference to Britain’s material interests which were primarily economic...[and] the Gold Coast held little strategic significance” to the British (Darwin, 1988, 179). Moreover, accommodating Nkrumah helped empower him, and many British policymakers felt that despite his nationalist credentials, Nkrumah understood the political benefits of working with the British rather than being hostile to them. Denying concessions to the Gold Coast risked fracturing Nkrumah’s fragile coalition and threatened Britain’s post-independence relations. By the 1950s, the British had every reason to believe that these post-independence relations would be favorable to Britain. The Gold Coast was a prime example of how Britain’s informal economic influence after independence (sometimes referred to ‘neo-colonialism’) could be sustained due to the depth of economic ties between the metropole and colony. Ultimately, however, the Colonial Office was more concerned politics than economics. In her study of how British firms maintained influence in the Gold Coast during and after independence, Sarah Stockwell writes that “there is scant evidence that the Colonial Office was much exercised by the fortunes of the West African trade in the post-war period” (Stockwell, 1995b, 278). Even when independence was formally achieved in 1957, the new state of Ghana remained in the British Commonwealth, which maintained economic ties to the metropole, until 1960.
The pattern of metropolitan neglect and local concessions is illustrated by a discussion of strikes in the Gold Coast from 1939-1948. The local colonial government, rather than the metropole, took responsibility for addressing and responding to these disturbances. For example, after a railway strike in Takoradi in 1941, the colonial governor established a committee to collect information on pay rates and the cost of living and established a policy where temporary bonuses would be disbursed when the cost of living rose. The governor promised that the railway workers would receive a cost of living bonus, but after a failure to disburse the funds and a threat of arbitration of the dispute by a third-party, the railway workers struck again, on November 25, 1941. This strike hindered the movement of essential war supplies, including the export of manganese and the import of military aircraft. The colonial government repressed the strike and arrested thirteen ringleaders. The strike, along with more repression, spread to other areas such as Kumais and Sekondi (Rathbone, 1992, xxxiii).

It was only after the strike spread to other areas that the cabinet discussed events in the Gold Coast. A departmental report was created, Churchill read it, and responded “not a good story”. This represented the extent of discussion about the Gold Coast strikes in the Cabinet. After the workers refused to return to work for four days, the Governor announced that the cost of living bonus would be disbursed immediately along with a 20% increase in wages. After this concession, harbor workers at Takoradi returned to work. The strike effectively ended on December 9th, 1941.
when railway workers across the Gold Coast resumed working. In total, 84 people were arrested. The strike was not ineffectual: the cost of living bonus was formally instituted, conditions related to the granting of leave and the award of gratuities were conceded (Morgan, 1980). All three of these concessions were granted by the local colonial government, while metropolitan involvement remained low.

The departure of Burns as Governor in August 1947 marked a shift in the political mood in the Gold Coast. Many nationalists felt that the battery of reforms rolled out during the early and mid-1940s did not go far enough. This resentment, combined with a deteriorating economic situation due to wartime inflation, the closing of air bases that pumped imperial money into the local economy, and the influx of fifty thousand unemployed servicemen, led to increased nationalist agitation. Low rainfall also exacerbated these problems in rural farming areas, along with the spread of a virus afflicting trees in the cocoa-growing areas. The local colonial government was not prepared for what was to come. The new governor, Sir Gerald Creasy, did not arrive in the Gold Coast until January 1948, leaving the governor’s post unoccupied for six months (Rathbone, 1992, xlii).

Another strike occurred in the Gold Coast in 1947, with a similar lack of involvement by the metropolitan government and concessions made by the local colonial governor. Without involvement or even consultation with the Colonial Office, union negotiations with the Gold Coast government began in July after the government-run Gold Coast Chamber of Mines refused to discuss minimum rates of pay, overtime rates, holiday pay, or annual leave. The miners union responded in September with the notice of a strike. At this point, the London Advisory Committee of the Cham-
ber of Mines contacted the Colonial Office to discuss the situation in the Gold Coast and recommended that no further concessions be made. The Advisory Committee and the miners union accepted having the dispute arbitrated by William Gorman, a member of the National Arbitration Tribunal. By October, railway strikes prevented any trains from running. The strike spread to Kumasi, Sekondi, and Accra (Cabinet, 1947). The Gold Coast government, which felt that they had been generous in their treatment of the railway workers, instituted emergency powers to keep open the ports of Takordi and Accra so that essential exports and imports could move freely. Arbitration proved successful: on October 29th, 1947, the arbitrator announced that both parties had agreed to end the strike and workers would return to work the following week (Morgan, 1980, 129-131). The strike ended on December 10th, after the Gold Coast government enacted a cost of living bonus to all government employees and a twenty percent increase in pay (Cabinet, 1947).

In August of 1947, Dr. J.B. Danquah and a group of left-wing lawyers founded the United Gold Coast Convention. One of their stated goals was “to ensure that, by all legitimate and constitutional means, the control and direction of Government shall, within the shortest time possible, pass into the hands of the people and their chiefs.” The UGCC enjoyed support from those in more urban areas, including young government employees and ex-servicemen. Kwame Nkrumah became the general secretary of the UGCC in late 1947. The British viewed Nkrumah as a more radical alternative to Danquah and noted that his “immediate programme seemed to be the stirring up of anti-European feelings and the disruption of the country by nationwide strikes and boycotts” (Arden-Clarke, 1992, 473).
None of these acts of resistance upset the Gold Coast’s stability. The traditional chiefs and urban elites remained united in support of British rule. In 1946 Britain attempted to formally bind these two groups together and consolidate their rule in rural areas with the Burns constitution (Darwin, 1988, 175). Established in 1946, this constitution granted an African majority in the Legislative Council (Creech Jones, 1992a, 91). Britain viewed this reform as a first step on the slow path to full self-government for the Gold Coast. What Britain did not expect, however, was a rise in opposition to these constitutional changes. Many felt that the new constitution did not go far enough at increasing representation and squelched serious opposition to colonial rule. These grievances, among a litany of others, fueled the 1948 Accra riots, which completely changed metropolitan views of political development in the Gold Coast.

0.50 The 1948 Riots and their aftermath

Tensions increased in the Gold Coast during the immediate postwar era due to the spread of swollen shoot virus and a general deterioration of the economic situation. In 1947 a businessman and traditional chief in Accra, Nii Kwabena Bonne II, instigated a boycott of foreign owned firms in an attempt to curtail inflation. Support for the boycott spread throughout the colony, which reflected the degree of discontent. The boycott continued into January 1948 and ended that February (Gocking, 2005, 83). Dissatisfaction with the economy was particularly high among ex-servicemen returning home after the war. High unemployment made it difficult for them to find
work, while high inflation eroded their pension. In 1946 they formed the Gold Coast Ex-Serviceman’s Union. Union members were enthusiastic participants in Bonne’s anti-inflation boycott campaign. In 1948 the union organized its members to march in Accra to the seat of government in Christiansborg Castle to petition the colonial governor. En route, the servicemen encountered the police, who attempted to stop the procession. In response to thrown stones, the superintendent in charge of the police grabbed a rifle and opened fire on the protesters. Two servicemen were killed and many others were wounded (Rathbone, 1968).

The procession returned to the center of Accra where protesters had already been engaging in the looting and arson of foreign owned firms. When news of the shooting spread, these activities intensified. Rioting occurred in a nearby prison, where some prisoners escaped. Over the next few days rioting spread to Koforidua, Nsawam, Akusa, and Kumasi. The colonial government’s response was to declare a state of emergency. The metropole ordered colonial troops stationed in Nigeria and Gibraltar to suppress the riots in the Gold Coast (Rathbone, 1968, 214). In total, twenty-nine people were killed in the 1948 riots and 266 were injured (Gocking, 2005, 84).

The 1948 riots profoundly influenced the course of decolonization in the Gold Coast. They occurred at a time when the Gold Coast became particularly important for the protection of sterling (Hinds, 1999, 106). The riots also had an international dimension, and both the USSR and the US criticized Britain for how they practiced colonial rule in the Gold Coast. The riots signaled the political urgency of decolonization. The timetable for devolving power and granting independence to the colonies—especially African colonies—was not solely the result of each colony’s
ability to practice “self-government” or the desires of the Colonial Office. The 1948 riots showed the British that colonial subjects could exert a profound force on the timetable of decolonization.

In 1946 the introduction of the Burns Constitution made the Gold Coast the first colony in British Africa to have a majority of Africans on the Legislative Council, with eighteen elected and twelve unelected members. The high level of representation in the Gold Coast made the outbreak of riots in February of 1948 a complete shock to those in London (Klose, 2013, 58). In his initial telegraph to London, Governor Creasy blamed communist influence for the unrest. Creech-Jones, the Colonial Secretary, replied to Creasy’s telegram by granting him blanket powers to make it so that those attempting “to disrupt the ordered life of the territory...will be given no opportunity of succeeding. I must necessarily leave to your discretion what active and specific measures you take to achieve this object” (Creech Jones, 1992h, 159).

Creech-Jones was skeptical that communist intrusion caused the riots and also pushed hard for a serious investigation of their causes. A committee of inquiry known as the Watson Commission was quickly established and headed by Aiken Watson. According to Creech-Jones, the goal of this committee was “to enquire into and report on the disturbances and their underlying causes and to make recommendations”. This issue was “one of first-class political importance” and the riots required “urgent investigation” (Creech Jones, 1992b, 63).

The Watson commission did not draft a new constitution, rather, what it did was propose principles of constitutional change. These principles were: the democratization of local authorities, the establishment of regional councils, an enlarged Assembly
consisting of elected members, an Executive Council of eight ministers, five of whom would be Africans (Creech Jones, 1992e). The franchise would also be extended and the Legislative Council would be expanded to include native Africans (Rathbone, 1992, xlv). Few of the Watson Commission’s recommendations were completely new. The slow transfer of power to Britain’s most political advanced African colony was always part of the plan in the postwar era. What the riots did, however, was to greatly accelerate this timetable. For example, the Agenda Committee on the Conference of African Governors said that in May 1946 that “in Africa the period before self-government can be granted will be longer than in most other parts of the Colonial Empire...it may be said in the Gold Coast, the territory where Africans are most advanced politically, internal self-government is unlikely to be achieved in much less than a generation” (Rathbone, 1992, xlv). Rathbone writes that “the February rioters and the Watson Commission Report were together to decisively destroy that complacent timetable” (Rathbone, 1992, xlv).

In response to the Watson Commission’s recommendations, the CO appointed an entirely African committee tasked with formulating a new constitution. This committee, known as the Coussey Committee, produced the first draft of the new constitution. The Coussey Constitution drew on other colonial institutions in Jamaica, Ceylon, and Trinidad to promote constitutional development. In general, there were few points of disagreement between the Coussey Committee and policymakers in London. What disagreements did persist, however, revolved around whether the legislature should be unicameral or bicameral and relations between the Legislature and the Executive. After the Coussey Committee published a report with their recom-
mendations a year long debate ensued regarding the details of the constitution and
the implementation of elections between African members of the Legislative Council,
officials in the Gold Coast Government, and the Colonial Office (Creech Jones, 1992a,
91).

On October 13, 1949, the cabinet approved the recommendations of the Coussey
Committee to reform the Gold Coast constitution (Cabinet, 1992a). Cabinet Secret-
tary Brook, in a discussion with Attlee, expressed misgiving about the weakness of
the proposed constitution, but acknowledged the difficulty of granting representation
while maintaining British rule (Brook, 1992). The committee’s recommendations in-
cluded the expansion of the legislative council so that eight of the eleven seats were
elected, thereby ensuring a majority African representation on the council (Parsons,
2014, 151). In addition the committee recommended a nationally elected assembly
(Gocking, 2005, 93). There were limits to the Coussey Constitution’s reforms, how-
ever. The Executive Council, while including more African voices, remained under
the jurisdiction of the governor. The governor still held veto power over any policy
changes. The constitution itself could be revoked at any time. These limitations
fueled both the UGCC and Nkrumah’s agitation for more autonomy and reforms.
Full self-government did not arrive until 1954 (Rathbone, 1992, liii).

In addition to the constitutional reforms, the Accra riots significantly changed
the mindset of colonial officials regarding the timeline for constitutional advance
and autonomy for the Gold Coast. As late as 1947, “many of the colonial officials
attending a summer school in Cambridge were doubtful about plans to evolve the
Gold Coast towards self government ‘in a generation’” (Furedi, 1993, 92). The riots
changed all this. In November of 1948 Creech-Jones addressed the West African Council and listed a number of important ways that power could be devolved the Gold Coast. These included, increasing African representation in government, conferring responsibility to regional bodies within a colony, and increasing rural representation in elections for the Legislative Council (Creech Jones, 1992e, 198-199).

0.51 After 1948

In 1949 a number of strikes occurred in the police force, prison warders, and the civil service. The response by the colonial government was to prohibit civil servants from being politically active and to temporarily increase their cost of living allowance (Arden-Clarke, 1992, 477). In May 1949 workers at the Oil Storage Company of Takoradi launched a strike that persisted for a month. The strike throttled the fuel supply, disrupting the shipment of food to urban areas (which were transported by cars) and preventing the operation of flood-prevention pumps in the gold mines. The government’s response was to use the army to distribute the necessary supplies. In March and April strikes occurred at the trade and technical schools in Asuansi and Takoradi. The colonial government instructed school administrators with punishing teachers who participated in the strike (Arden-Clarke, 1992, 477). The colonial government enacted other repressive measures. To prevent further strikes the colonial government told the railway, public works, and posts & telegraph unions that strikers who did not return to work by a certain date forfeited their jobs. In preparation of the publication of the Watson report, emergency legislation was enacted. Sedition
was outlawed and anticolonial groups were prohibited. The government also required newspapers to be registered (Arden-Clarke, 1992, 478).

Britain’s hope in reforming the constitution was that its influence would continue to safeguard their interest by empowering conservative urban elites and rural chiefs. They were wrong. Britain profoundly underestimated the skill of Kwame Nkrumah and the appeal of his Convention People’s Party (CPP). Nkrumah had resided in London during the 1940s and helped organize trade union workers in opposition to British rule. He returned to the Gold Coast and in March of 1949 Nkrumah announced his plan of ‘positive action’ which consisted of nationwide strikes and boycotts designed to cripple the colonial government. Part of Nkrumah’s strategy was also to criticize the Coussey Committee as “Quislings” for collaborating with the British (Arden-Clarke, 1992, 475). The colonial government jailed Nkrumah in 1950, but the appeal of the CPP continued. Nkrumah’s party won the election in 1950, forcing Britain to release him from jail to become chief minister of the new assembly (Darwin, 1988, 177).

On January 6, 1950 the CPP and the TUC called for a general strike after the colonial government refused to meet their demands for a reinstatement of the employees who were fired for prior strike activity. Pobee Biney led the strike by walking out with the Railway Engine drivers on midnight of January 7th with a call for other unions to join. The strike spread to Sekondi, where electricity and telegraph workers started to strike the following night. The strike crippled transport services throughout the colony. On January 9th the colonial government issued repeated warnings that a general strike was illegal. On January 11th the strikes spread to Kumasi.
and workers in the telephone and electricity supply industry participated. At this time the colonial government feared that the rising tension throughout the colony would lead to violence if the strike continued. For this reason the Executive Council unanimously supported emergency legislation, increasing the repressive powers of the colonial state.

The state of emergency was declared on January 12th at midnight. Curfews were imposed, traffic was restricted, and public services were cut off. According to the colonial office, “police action against hooliganism and intimidation was immediately intensified” (Arden-Clarke, 1992, 490). The police began mass arrests of those participating in political activity, including CPP leaders. In response, the CPP cut main telephone wires and sabotaged the railway lines in Takoradi. Just a few days later, workers returned to work and stores re-opened. The colonial government told its employees that if they did not return by the 20th of January then their jobs would be forfeited. On the 20th, police arrested Nkrumah and many of his associates. By the 23rd most employees had returned to work.

In March of 1949, R. Scott sent a dispatch to Authur Creech-Jones discussing agitations for self-government in the Gold Coast. Scott discussed his assessment of Nkrumah plan’s to launch a general strike and boycott so that “the Government would be rendered incapable of maintaining essential services.” Scott also mentioned strike threats from the Gold Coast Mines Employee Union and the Gold Coast Trades Union Congress (TUC). The threat of widespread civil resistance against the Governor did not worry Scott: “in the economic field, there is no apparent danger point as present, although the campaign against swollen shoot might produce demonstrations in certain
rural areas which would be contagious” (Creech Jones, 1992d, 212). The real problem was that mass demonstrations raised the possibility of violence. Farmers, for example, “if exacerbated by the inconveniences and contentious of strikes” could “very quickly be brought to a frame of mind in which violence appeared to be just ‘retaliation’” (Creech Jones, 1992d, 212). Scott describe Nkrumah’s growing involvement in the Police Service and Christian Churches, which could be future sites of unrest. To defuse potential discontent, one of EGG Hanrott’s recommendations was to “improve the organization of sport” in order to divert “political excitement into other channels” (Creech Jones, 1992d, 214).

A dispatch from TRO Mangin to Creech Jones in May of 1949 further shows that the Colonial Office kept a keen eye to subversive anticolonial activity throughout the Gold Coast and feared that this activity could escalate. Mangin’s note discussed the “disorders and strikes that occurred in some educational institutions during the disturbances of last year” (Mangin, 1992, 218). Mangin feared that discontent among students in the schools and universities would “join with similar nuclei in the Government service generally and in the Trade and Ex-servicemen’s Unions in a general outburst of violence” (Mangin, 1992, 218). The dispatch also assessed the level of discontent in the police forces and how the local governor could defuse this feeling by firing unruly officers and improve the working conditions of the police. Mangin assured Creech Jones that it was not the case that “matters have reached a stage where a general conflagration is about to break out” (Mangin, 1992, 220). Mangin however thought it important to defuse or contain this discontent, and recommended an executive order like the ones issued in Kenya and Cyprus that prohibited Govern-
ment employees from belonging to a political organization. Mangin concluded that “present circumstances in the Gold Coast are far from normal and that drastic action is essential if the situation is not further to deteriorate” (Mangin, 1992, 221). In his response, Creech Jones agreed that an executive order was needed. He summarized Nkrumah’s plan as “adopt[ing] the tactics of non-co-operation, to bring about a sit-down strike and to make the work of the Administration impossible by non-violent methods. It seems unlikely in the present political temperature of the Gold Coast that these methods could be widely employed and still stop short of degeneration into violence” (Creech Jones, 1992g, 224).

In October 1949 Creech Jones prepared a cabinet memorandum on the Gold Coast constitution. The memo built on the Watson Commission of Enquiry’s recommendation (with Cabinet endorsement) to increase African representation. Creech Jones further affirmed that if local opinion supported these recommendations that the Colonial Office would be “prepared to make arrangements for their early implementation” (Creech Jones, 1992c, 68). Creech Jones resisted some of the Coussey Committee’s recommendations. In particular, he argued that colonial Governor should have reserve powers over the legislature in case of emergencies. Ultimately, Creech Jones expressed support for the Coussey Committee and that “immediate constitutional advance is necessary” that would grant a “considerable degree of African participation in the control of policy, while preserving the Governor’s ultimate responsibility” (Creech Jones, 1992c, 71). The Committee itself reflected moderate nationalist opinion, and by accepting their recommendations, the colonial government could placate moderate elements while sidelining more radical ones.
Nkrumah and the CPP organized a general strike in January of 1950. The strike never became fully ‘general’, and strikes only occurred in the railway sectors and some other public services. Creech Jones criticized Nkrumah’s strategy of “positive action”, writing that “while it is claimed to be ‘constitutional’ and ‘non-violent’, a programme of political strikes directed at the Government is in fact unconstitutional and illegal and was repeatedly declared to be so by the Gold Coast Government”. Creech Jones also mentioned that the colonial government “warned Nkrumah personally that political strikes against the Government were illegal and were bound, under African conditions, to lead to violence and disorder”. In the view of the Governor, “this deliberate challenge to constituted authority would, if not checked, inevitably lead to violence and bloodshed such as occurred in February and March, 1948”. The response to the strike was handled purely by local officials. The colonial police arrested the leaders of the Convention People’s Party and members of the Gold Coast Trades Union Congress. African members on the Legislative Council denounced the strike. The Governor declared a state of emergency in January 12th. Striking workers steadily returned to work, and my late January normalcy had returned (Creech Jones, 1992f, 240-242).
How did anticolonial activity in the Gold Coast affect the British parliamentary debates? My theory of imperial response predicts that violence will be more likely to be discussed in the metropole than nonviolence, because nonviolence can safely be handled by the local colonial government while violence requires the resources and involvement of the metropole. The examination of the dynamics of violence and nonviolence in the Gold Coast and their impact on debates in the British House of Commons provides support for my theory. Recall that the 1948 riots started with a widespread boycott of foreign goods that started at the end of 1947 and ended in February of 1948. The boycotts were never discussed in parliament. Indeed, parliamentary discussions ignored the Gold Coast during this time period, except for a brief discussion about diseased Cocoa Trees (Hansard, 1948b).

Things changed when riots broke out on February 28th and 29th. On March 1, 1948, MPs questioned the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, David Rees-Williams about the “disorders at Accra”. Rees-Williams offered his account of what happened in Accra. He describes a parade organized by the ex-Servicemen’s Union that “got out of hand” and had a “very ugly temper” partly because many of those in the parade were drunk. Rees-Williams also claimed that the protest turned into a riot after the police tried to disburse the crowd, but in the process were injured. At that point, “after two police officers had been injured shots had to be fired”. The MPs posed a variety of questions to Rees-Williams. These related to whether there
was any communist subversion, what type of investigation would be undertaken, and whether the Gold Coast had recently experienced a large increase in pubs, which many explain the public drunkenness. At this point, however, MPs in particular and metropolitan officials in general had little information about the events in the Gold Coast (Hansard, 1948c).

On March 10th, Rees-Williams presented information on the extent of the damage that resulted from the rioting. He reported that 26 Africans were killed and 227 were injured. Fifteen non-Africans were injured as well. The financial consequences were large as well. Rees-Williams claimed that looting cost over one million pounds sterling, with an additional million pounds sterling lost by retailers due to damaged merchandise. None of these estimates included damage to building or other infrastructure. Rees-Williams assured parliament that a full investigation into the proximate and root causes of the riots would be undertaken. In April, parliament questioned the Arthur Creech Jones, and tried to extract more information about the disturbances, but he had little to add (Hansard, 1948d).

Subsequent parliamentary debates in about the Gold Coast concentrated on Watson Report and the Coussey Committee. Given the extent of the reforms, this debate was actually quite limited. Part of the reason why the Gold Coast’s constitutional reforms were neglected in parliament likely can be attributed to the competence and thoroughness of the Watson Report and Coussey Committee. An additional explanation is Arthur Creech Jones’ cagey behavior regarding discussing the Gold Coast after calm was restored to the colony and the constitutional reforms were accepted. In Creech Jones’ view, the House of Commons should leave well enough alone. In
November 1949, Cyril Dumpleton asked Creech Jones if the Coussey Committee had “created a very favourable and helpful impression in the Gold Coast”. Creech Jones replied: “Yes, and I think that on the whole the Gold Coast has received the Report with very great calmness and is giving it most serious consideration. It would be unfortunate if anything said in this House were to provoke difficulties” (Hansard, 1948e).

0.53 Conclusion

Kwame Nkrumah’s hierarchical campaign of nonviolent positive action began in 1950 and reached its peak in 1954. This campaign was successful on its own terms. The day after Nkrumah’s release from prison in 1951, he was invited to form a new government and assume the role analogous to that of a Prime Minister. At this point, the CPP and the colonial government in effect ruled the Gold Coast in through a power sharing agreement. Reforms were gradually rolled out in response to high-level negotiations between the CPP and the British government. Cooperation between the British and the CPP served two purposes: it helped defuse resentment by colonial subjects that fueled the more contentious politics of the late 1940s and also marginalized regional parties, such as the National Liberation Movement in Ashanti. These actors threatened the stability of the Gold Coast and risked fracturing the colonial state, which was bad new both for the British and Nkrumah. The constitution was reformed again in 1954. These reforms strengthened the parliament headed by Nkrumah and eliminated European seats on the Legislative Assembly (Hargreaves,
Suffrage did not, and could not, increase—the 1950 constitution drafted by the Watson commission in response to the 1948 riots had already ensured that all colonial subjects were free to (at least nominally) vote in elections.

On March 6 1957 the Gold Coast received independence from Britain. This followed repeated negotiations between the British and Nkrumah, along with a series of elections. Internal struggles between Nkrumah and both moderate and extremists nationalists characterized domestic politics in the Gold Coast during the 1950s. Rumblings about violent secessionism in Ashanti worried British policymakers, but when independence came, even those in the Ashanti Region celebrated the birth of Ghana (Gocking, 2005, 112).

The Gold Coast was economically important to the British. Except for the use of military bases in remote regions during World War II, the colony had little strategic utility. Britain could grant concessions to the Gold Coast without jeopardizing their key interest in the colony of economic extraction. Since the 1940s, the British instituted a plan of the gradual transfer of power to their model colony. The 1948 riots in Accra changed that, and accelerated the timetable for independence. In response to the riots, policymakers in London appointed the Watson Commission to study the causes of the riots, which in turn appointed an all-African Coussey Committee to make recommendations on constitutional advance. The British instituted most of the Coussey Committee’s recommendation and devolved autonomy and increased suffrage to the Gold Coast.

The effects of the 1948 riots provides support for my theory of imperial response and the effectiveness of violence. Numerous strikes, boycotts, and protests occurred
throughout the Gold Coast in the 1940s and 1950s. The metropole largely ignored these, while the local colonial government made adjustments to wages and taxation to defuse these actions. When over two dozen people were killed and hundreds injured in February 1948, the House of Commons and the Cabinet discussed the events and the metropole appointed a committee to investigate the causes. Reforms were granted to the Gold Coast, which increased suffrage and autonomy. An analysis of documents from the Colonial Office show that officials in the CO were concerned about nonviolent activity, especially when that activity was spearheaded by the obviously skilled Nkrumah. The biggest threat to the British from this nonviolent activity, however, was not the immediate impact of a boycott or strike. Rather, colonial officials worried that these instances of mass collective action portended more violent events in the future. Violent anticolonial resistance in the Gold Coast was a much bigger threat to the colonial state than nonviolent resistance.
Conclusion

This dissertation has argued that violent anticolonial resistance was more effective at coercing concessions from the British metropole than nonviolent anticolonial resistance. The British metropole was overwhelmingly concerned with violent activity in their colonies and could safely ignore nonviolent resistance. In most cases, the local colonial government could defuse nonviolent resistance. Strikes and protests were often met with wage increases, lowered taxation, or other concessions that placated the colonial masses but did not command metropolitan involvement or resources. Violence, however, overwhelmed the resources of the local colonial government.

A key variable in my theory connecting resistance to concessions is metropolitan attention. In the same way that violence against civilians in a modern civil war commands the attention of and possible intervention by the international community, colonial subjects were better able to coerce the metropole into granting concessions after the metropole became involved in local colonial politics. Violence was the best way to increase metropolitan involvement. The British cabinet and parliament in the aftermath of a violent episode in a colony would discuss the state of that colony. In most cases, the metropole responded with policy reforms that increased the representation of colonial subjects.
Negotiating and implementing these concessions were not always feasible. In strategically important colonies, granting concessions and expanding suffrage risked undermining the British military presence in the colony. Maintaining access to overseas bases was a primary concern of the British metropole. While economic interests propelled the colonial project and help explain the rise of European imperialism, in the decolonization era the British metropole was not overly concerned with colonial extraction. The 20th century was the era of imperial decline. The British recognized this and in most cases developed policies to ensure that post-independence relations with their former colonies would be favorable.

A number of factors help explain why Britain’s management of decolonization was more concerned with security than economics. The British Commonwealth system, established in 1949, offered a way for former colonies to maintain close economic relations with Britain without sacrificing any of their territorial autonomy. The image of khaki-clad British soldiers stationed on a staid military base aroused nationalist sentiment in many colonies. Informal economic influence and favorable trade relations with Britain incited less resentment among formerly colonial subjects. The metropole could devolve power without sacrificing many of the important economic benefits of colonialism. The restructuring of the global economy reduced trade barriers between states and meant that many British firms and the financial sector in London did not need to rely on formal imperialism to do business in the former colonies. In addition, Britain’s postwar decline and the rise of the Soviet threat also meant that Britain’s island colonies near the Russian heartland assumed a more important role in safeguarding metropolitan security.
This dissertation has also offered a typology of resistance types. One dimension of resistance is whether it is primarily violent or nonviolent. This is useful for understanding the effectiveness of broader strategies of resistance and how states respond to these strategies. The second dimension in the typology is the level of organization behind the resistance—is the resistance spontaneous or hierarchically organized? A violent insurgency was different from a mass riot, and in the same manner, a campaign of civil disobedience or positive action is not the same as a labor strike. Introducing this typology and the dimension of organization complicates the theory but does so in a way that illuminates how anticolonial activity affected both metropolitan attention and colonial concessions. Hierarchically organized violence was less effective at coercing concessions that benefited colonial subjects than spontaneous violence, and was also less likely to garner metropolitan attention. There are two reasons for this. One is that spontaneous violence threatened the colonial order. A riot signaled that the local colonial government was incapable of managing the colony—indeed, Xu (2018) shows that colonies with governors that were appointed to their position as a form of patronage rather than for merit were more likely to experience unrest. The mass and unorganized character of this type of violence showed the metropole that the problems of the colony were deep and not confined to a select few radical nationalists. In cases where these radical nationalists did launch an insurgency campaign, variation in the level of violence does not explain metropolitan attention. There was a shock value to spontaneous violence. Imperial rule suffered from principal-agent problems, and violence helped reveal to the principal that the agent needed more effective monitoring and assistance. Violence during a hierarchi-
cally organized campaign was expected, and the longer the campaign lasted, the more the metropole became inured to anticolonial violence.

A potential counterargument to both my theory and empirical analysis is that all types of anticolonial resistance that varied across the two dimensions resulted in a concession. Spontaneous nonviolent resistance encouraged the local colonial government to placate discontent with wage increases and tax decreases. Hierarchical nonviolent resistance pressured formal institutions like the Indian National Congress to cave to some of the demands of the resistance movement. Hierarchical violent resistance did not result in constitutional reforms but did force the metropole to recognize the leadership of the resistance movement as legitimate leaders of the colony. In response to this violence, the metropole was less likely to increase suffrage and more likely to sit down and negotiate with the rebel group. An implication of this counterargument is that choosing colony-wide concessions instituted by the metropole as the dependent variable ignores all the other types of concessions that were granted by the metropole to the colony in response to nonviolent resistance or hierarchically organized violence.

This is a fair criticism but undergirding this counterargument is the assumption that these concessions were somehow of equal importance. They were not. Lower taxes, increased wages, recognition of a rebel group, etc. were all important developments that shifted the balance of power from the metropole to the colony. Yet colony-wide policy concessions marked the most important change in metropole-periphery relations. They increased native representation, reduced the power of the local colonial state, and increased suffrage of colonial subjects. These were important develop-
ments. Native representation and political control were what anticolonial nationalists were fighting for. For many of these nationalists, formal independence was the end goal of anticolonial resistance (for others, decolonization was not a legal process but also a cultural and economic one). Metropolitan concessions to the colony were an incremental step on the way to dissolving formal colonialism.

Independence was overdetermined. The granting of complete legal sovereignty to a colony was driven by a variety of international and domestic factors (in both the metropole and the colony). This makes it exceedingly difficult to assess the effectiveness of resistance on the timing of independence. Independence days celebrated in postcolonial states marked the end of a long process of metropolitan disentanglement from colonial affairs. Concessions were important junctures in the process of decolonization.

By showing that violence was a more effective strategy of coercing concessions from the metropole to the colony than nonviolence, this work provides an important piece of the puzzle as to why decolonization of the British Empire occurred and when. At the end of World War I, Britain was at its peak, having acquired a number of former Ottoman territories in the Middle East. It had ruled the Indian subcontinent for centuries. Fifty years later, most of its colonies were independent and British soldiers were dying in a failed counterinsurgency campaign in Aden. What happened?

The financial sector of London provided the impetus for the expansion of the British Empire, as Cain and Hopkins have masterfully shown (Cain and Hopkins, 2014). The restructuring of the global economy in the 20th century and the erosion of barriers to trade and financial flows meant that many British firms could enjoy the
benefits they received from operating in colonial territories without formal imperialism. This, so the argument goes (Gartzke and Rohner, 2011), is why there is no more British Empire. The new global economy removed the justification for imperialism, and the British state responded by dismantling the empire without any coordinated resistance by international firms. British institutions hoped to maintain influence in a postcolonial era, so they worked to ensure that their network of ties in colonial territories remained after independence (Stockwell, 2018).

This argument is plausible but incomplete. It is certainly the case that British firms and the financial sector did not put up as big a fight against decolonization in the postwar era as they would have in the 19th century. In the metropole, however, discussions of economic relations between the metropole and colony were largely absent. Within the colonies, the Colonial Office could manage decolonization with little interference from British firms (Stockwell, 1995b). Economic interests were not generally in favor of decolonization, but they also did not get in the way of the process and metropolitan officials were keen to ignore the ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ of the financial sector.

The theory and empirics that I present here attempts to synthesize competing explanations for decolonization. Many historians have treated the Cold War, anticolonial nationalism, and British domestic politics as separate explanations for the end of the British empire (Darwin, 1988; Hyam, 2007). This dissertation shows that these phenomena all interacted and were mediated by each other. British domestic politics and views of empire did change during the 20th century, but as my analysis in Chapter 0.33 demonstrates, anticolonial violence within the colonies helps explain
how and why that change occurred. Parliamentary debates about colonies reacted strongly to spontaneous violence by colonial subjects, and became more honest about violence in the colonies over time. The Cold War made strategic outposts more important to the British, which in turn made it even more difficult for the British to relinquish control over these colonies. In these cases, Cold War dynamics made decolonization more difficult, rather than less.

This work makes a number of contributions to the political science literature on empires, political resistance, and changes in the international system. Perhaps the most important finding is that violence was more effective at coercing concessions than nonviolence. This is at odds with a strain of research finding the opposite conclusion regarding the success rate of violent and nonviolent campaigns. I show the benefits of disaggregating different forms of resistance using more granular data. My research design that estimates the effect of resistance on metropolitan attention—the mediator between resistance and concessions—using high-frequency data helps alleviate endogeneity concerns.

My explanation for why I find that violence was effective while research focusing on more recent political resistance campaigns finds the opposite effect can partly be attributed to the structure of modern overseas imperial rule. The structure of these empires mean that local colonial officials were relatively insulated from metropolitan involvement, and the metropole can selectively engage and disengage from its colonial states. Since violence overwhelmed the capabilities of these states and commanded metropolitan involvement, violence led to changes in colonial policy. An important scope condition of my theory is that these dynamics only apply to the era of imperial
decline. In the era of imperial expansion, violence that overwhelmed the local colonial state was often met with repression and the consolidation of imperial control. This suggests that metropolitan response to peripheral resistance was conditional on the change in relative power of the metropole.

By arguing that spontaneous violent resistance was the most effective form of anticolonial resistance in the British empire, this work also relocates the impetus for changes in the international system away from states and toward nonstate actors. Metropolitan influence over formal colonies constituted a hierarchical relationship between states in the international system. Colonies were not fully sovereign entities, but they were not completely subsumed by the metropole. This work examines how interstate relations between states in a hierarchical relationship were contested, negotiated, and severed partly due to the activities of nonstate actors in the subordinate state.

0.54 Limitations & Future Work

This dissertation has a number of limitations that could be addressed in future work. The theory development and testing are all built from studying the British Empire. The British Empire, relative to other overseas European empires, has a stark division between metropole and colony. How do the variables of resistance, attention, and concessions map on to and explain dynamics in other imperial polities? The differences and similarities across empires requires more development. Here I offer a brief comparison with anticolonial resistance in the French Empire.
A number of works have drawn explicit comparisons of decolonization in the French and British Empires (Kahler, 2014; Spruyt, 2005; Thomas, 2014b; Smith, 1978). Generally, these works have argued that the French decolonized hastily in some regions but were more likely to drag their feet in the process of devolving autonomy in others. In the latter cases, French intransigence led to the large-scale insurgencies of Algeria (Horne, 2006) and Vietnam (Logevall, 2012). France’s three North African colonies (Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria) all experienced hierarchically organized nonviolent campaigns that devolved into violence after the colonial police violently repressed these demonstrations. (Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008).

The French also instituted reforms to stave off unrest as it declined. In the late 1950s, Vietnamese Nationalists defeated French at Dien Bien Phu, violence erupted in Morocco and Tunisia (Joffé, 1985), the FLN’s campaign of terror in Algeria was in full swing, and mass anticolonial movements were beginning to rumble in sub-Saharan Africa (Chafer, 2002). The metropolitan National Assembly assessed the deteriorating situation throughout the empire and decided that reforms were necessary. In June of 1956, France introduced a new empire-wide framework, known as the loicadre, that increased autonomy and self-government in France’s colonial possessions (Schmidt, 2007, 96).

The case of riots in 1953 Morocco are an example of violence leading to colonial concessions. In the Moroccan case, these were not constitutional reforms that devolved autonomy. Rather, the French responded to riots by removing the pro-French sultan. Intra-elite disputes led Thami El Glaoui, the Pasha of Marrakesh in August of 1953 to called on Sidi Mohammed (the de facto leader of the Moroccan Nationalist
movement who more radical elements viewed as overly accommodating to French requests) to step down and be replaced. To support this, El Glaoui dispatched a band of rebels to Rabat. French security forces clashed with these protesters, opening fire and killing several. Elsewhere in Oujda, eighteen Moroccans were killed. Zisenwine writes that “the impact of these events, and concerns about further deterioration in Morocco led the French government to change its position with regard to the sultan” (Zisenwine, 2010, 217). The French metropole endorsed the removal of Sidi Mohammed, although this decision was not made unanimously. One cabinet minister, François Mitterand, resigned in protest. It is unclear how much the metropole knew about the intricacies of Moroccan politics at this time, and evidence exists that the hardline French residency within Morocco presented a sensationalized picture of Moroccan politics to policymakers in Paris. Nevertheless ministers in Paris chose to depose the sultan and appease more radical elements after a wave of violence because they feared that a civil war was imminent (Zisenwine, 2010, 215-220).

Resistance and French decolonization cannot be properly understood without some discussion of France’s brutal war in Algeria. More than any other overseas colony (with the possible except of Ireland), to many French, Algeria was a part of France (Shepard, 2008). Why was Algerian decolonization so violent? What was the effect of this violence? Satisfactorily answering these questions is outside the scope of this project, but the general consensus regarding the first answer was that French colonialism was particularly brutal in Algeria, the French responded to anticolonial resistance with widespread and violent repression (Smith, 1974), and the mountainous terrain of Algeria combined with urban concentration led to conditions
that facilitated a sustained insurgency (Garcia-Ponce and Wantchekon, 2015). The FLN was also a highly skilled rebel group that practiced a variety of tactics and was able to cultivate a base of support that sustained the insurgency (Hutchinson, 1978). In Algeria, violence resulted from bargaining failures. The large and powerful settler population impeded any chance for meaningful reforms (Paine, 2019). Leftists in mainland France did try to defuse the violence with increased autonomy for colonial subjects through a “federalist” framework that maintained autonomy for the settlers but granted Algerians more local control, but these reforms never materialized (Smith, 1974).

Security concerns were paramount as well. The Mers-el-Kébir base, located in Algeria, was a “first rank strategic base” that was essential to the French war effort during World War II (Cooley and Spruyt, 2009, 60). The base was even fortified against attack from a nuclear weapon. The Evian Accords signed between the FLN and the French in 1962 granted continued French access to the base while relinquishing French control elsewhere. Before these negotiations, the French were unwilling to divide sovereignty over Algeria. Cooley and Spruyt write that “France’s relative decline [in the postwar era] was not apparent to French decision makers...Empire was considered a sine qua non for great power standing with fears of becoming ‘Greece’ or ‘Portugal’ without such holdings” (Cooley and Spruyt, 2009, 61). Smith agrees, writing that “the loss of Algeria meant the irrevocable decline of France to second power rank” (Smith, 1974).

The British prepared for decolonization long before the French did. While independence for many of Britain’s colonies was inevitable, or at least viewed as inevitable
at the time, the French viewed Algeria as part of France and some believed that it would remain that way indefinitely. One reason that French views may have changed is the intensity and sophistication of violence launched by the FLN in Algeria and the Viet Minh in Vietnam. In his studies of France’s wars of decolonization, Clayton concludes that the debate about the effect of violent anticolonial nationalism on independence “is largely irrelevant in the case of the French Empire” since anticolonial nationalism played “the lead role...in achieving flag independence” (Clayton, 2014, 186).

The French Empire differed from the British Empire in the level of integration between the metropole and the colony. The French constitution governed the colonies, and many constitutional changes, such as the 1958 referendum on whether to adopt the constitution of the Fifth Republic, were empire-wide and were not targeted at a specific colony. Future work could explore the extent to which there was variation in metropolitan attention to its colonies in the French Empire that was analogous to the British Empire.

None of this is to say that my theory of imperial response applies to the French Empire specifically or other European overseas empires in general without any modification. The theory I advance applies to the British Empire in the era of imperial decline that began after World War I. Both the theory and empirical work offers insights that I hope will help us understand contemporary political resistance and dynamics in other imperial polities. Ultimately this study is a form of historically bounded political science research that is not designed to uncover universal laws but to explain a specific historical process with implications for understanding related
phenomena (Fordham, 2020).

Violence committed by sugarcane cutters, cocoa farmers, and stevedores destabilized colonial rule and coerced the British into relaxing control over their colonies during the 20th century. This is fitting. As Fanon argued, violence undergirded the colonial project. Colonial rule was impossible without conquest or the threat of violence to keep dissenters in line. Colonial states ruled through violence and co-optation rather than more durable forms of legitimacy. Gandhi’s practice of non-violence fundamentally changed colonial politics and inspired movements around the globe. Nonviolence did not, however, coerce Britain into increasing native representation or expanding suffrage of colonial subjects. The largest polity in world history did not erode because of the spread of international law or the restructuring of global capital. Rather, the British Empire withered and shrank in response to violence by colonial subjects.
Appendix

0.55 List of Concessions

Aden

- 1934 - (1) - Treaty of Sanaa. Native representation increased.
- 1947 - (2) - Legislative Council inaugurated.
- 1955 - (2) - Legislative Council elections held for first time. Four out of 18 council seats were elected.
- 1959 - (3) - New Constitution. 12 out of 23 members of the legislative council elected.
- 1967 - (3) - Independence.

Barbados

- 1943 - (1) - Property qualifications reduced. Franchise extended.
- 1947 - (2) - Power of European legislative assembly reduced.
- 1950 - (1) - Universal adult suffrage adopted.
- 1954 - (2) - Elected members of Barbados executive committee increased to five members.
• 1958 - (2) - Advanced to full self-government with responsibility for internal affairs.
• 1961 - (2) - Internal self-government granted.
• 1966 - (3) - Independence.

Bechuanaland

• 1960 - (3) - A new constitution established a legislature with an elected majority.
• 1965 - (2) - Internal self-government granted.
• 1966 - (3) - Independence.

British Honduras

• 1935 - (3) - New constitution. Franchise extended and voting restrictions lifted.
• 1945 - (1) - Nominated officials were dropped from the legislative council.
• 1954 - (3) - New constitution with expanded legislative council and universal suffrage.
• 1960 - (1) - Constitutional conference held.
• 1972 - (3) Independence.

Burma

• 1921 - (1) - Dyarchy introduced.
• 1935 - (3) - Government of Burma Act - Provided for responsible government in which a Cabinet of Burmese ministers was answerable to a Westminster-style
legislature.

- 1937 - (2) - Burma was given responsible government in domestic matters. The Governor still had ‘reserved’ powers over defense and foreign policy. The Lower House was all elected, although there was now a Senate, half of whose members were nominated. Burmese held all government portfolios and officials ceased to sit in Parliament.

- 1947 - (3) - Independence.

Ceylon

- 1920 - (2) - First Manning Reforms included an extension of Legislative Council: 16 of the 37 members were now elected.

- 1923 - (2) - Second Manning Reforms. The Second Manning Reforms of 1923 increased membership of the legislative council from 37 to 49, of which 12 were official and 37 were unofficial.

- 1931 - (2) - The Legislative and Executive Councils were replaced by a Council of State. This consisted of 60 members: 8 appointed (4 European, 4 ‘native’) and 52 elected on a territorial basis. Elections were by universal suffrage but with a five-year residence qualification.

- 1946 - (3) - New constitution. Ceylon now had complete internal self-government, although defense and foreign policy were still ‘reserved’.

Cyprus

- 1925 - (1) - Made a crown colony. Legislative council expanded from 18 to 24.
- 1943 - (1) - First municipal elections introduced.
- 1960 - (3) - Independence.

Gambia

- 1947 - (3) - New constitution with elected members to the Legislative Council. Other ‘unofficial’ members were nominated. Unofficial members, both elected and nominated, were eligible to serve on the Executive Council.
- 1954 - (2) - Unofficial members had 7:5 majority on the Executive Council. Unofficial members also had a majority on the Legislative Council.
- 1960 - (3) - Franchise extended to all adults and legislative council enlarged.
- 1964 - (1) - Internal self-government granted.
- 1965 - (3) - Independence.

Gold Coast

- 1925 - (2) - Allowed Africans to be elected members of the legislative council.
- 1946 - (3) - New constitution. Required legislative council to have an African majority.
- 1950 - (3) - New constitution.
- 1952 - (1) - Local government enlarged.
- 1954 - (3) - This constitution made the exercise of the governor’s powers, in
relation to the Public Service, subject to the recommendation of the native led
Public Services Commission.

• 1957 - (3) - Independence.

India

• 1919 - (3) - Government of India Act.
• 1933 - (1) - White Paper printed, offered draft of new constitution.
• 1935 - (3) - Government of India Act of 1935.
• 1946 - (1) - Cabinet Mission to plan independence.
• 1947 - (3) - Independence

Jamaica

• 1944 - (3) - New constitution provided for (a) a House of Representatives of
32 elected members under Universal Adult Suffrage and with power to elect a
speaker; (b) Executive Council of five of those elected, with three officials and
two nominees presided over by the governor, and (c) a Legislative Council of
nominated members with the power of review only.
• 1953 - (3) - Constitution modified to allow for elected government ministers
of parliamentary body. Executive council created with a majority of elected
legislators who would be appointed and removed on the advice of the leader of
the majority party to be known as the Chief Minister.
• 1957 - (2) - the Executive Council was replaced by a Council of Ministers and
the powers of the Governor reduced

- 1959 - (2) - Full internal self-government.
- 1962 - (3) - Independence.

**Kenya**

- 1927 - (2) - The Legislative Council was reconstituted with 20 official, 11 elected European, 5 elected Indian and 1 elected Arab members. There was to be one nominated member to speak for African interests there.
- 1954 - (1) - A council of ministers was created in 1954 with some African and Asian membership.
- 1956 - (1) - Enlarged African representation in the legislature
- 1957 - (2) - First direct elections of native leaders to the Legislative Council
- 1960 - (2) - Legislative Council expanded. Conference, representing all the main Kenyan groups, held at Lancaster House in London. This agreed in principle to an African majority on the Legislative Council.
- 1962 - (1) - Second Lancaster House constitutional conference held.
- 1963 - (3) - Independence.

**Basutoland**

- 1960 - (2) - Legislature and Executive Council established.
- 1964 - (1) - Constitutional conference.
- 1965 - (3) - New constitution.
• 1956 - (3) - Independence.

Malaya

• 1948 - (3) - Legislative Council established, consisted of six elected members, three members chosen by the Chambers of Commerce (European, Chinese and Indian), four European ex-officio, members, five nominated European officials and four nominated Asian unofficials.

• 1951 - (2) - Legislative council extended. Three additional elected seats were conceded, thus making a total of nine out of a Council of twenty-five.

• 1956 - (1) - Constitutional conference held.

• 1957 - (3) - Independence.

Nigeria

• 1922 - (3) - New constitution. The Legislative Council of 46 included 15 nominated and 4 elected members.

• 1946 - (3) - New constitution. The central government now included a Legislative Council, responsible for the whole country, with 16 official and 28 non-official members; of the latter 24 were nominated and 4 elected.

• 1954 - (3) - New Constitution. Federal Elections held.

• 1957 - (1) - Partial self-government of East and West Nigeria.

• 1960 - (3) - Independence.
Nyasaland

- 1931 - (2) - Indirectly elected representatives of various groups introduced into the Legislative Council.
- 1955 - (3) - New constitution which provided that 6 of the 22 members of the Legislative Council should be directly elected by Europeans and Asians, but that the 5 African members should be indirectly elected by the Provincial Councils.
- 1960 - (1) - African majority of the legislature ensured.
- 1964 - (3) - Independence.

Palestine

- 1922 - (1) - Churchill White Paper restricting Jewish immigration.
- 1930 - (1) - Passfield White Paper restricting Jewish immigration.
- 1939 - (1) - White Paper restricting Jewish immigration.
- 1948 - (3) - Independence.

Sierra Leone

- 1924 - (2) Legislative Council members now elected.
- 1951 - (3) New constitution: 7 members of the Legislative Council were to be directly elected from the Colony and 14 indirectly from the Protectorate. The Executive Council was to have equal numbers of official and unofficial members.
- 1961 - (3) Independence.
Southern Rhodesia

- 1953 - (1) - Federation with Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia.
- 1961 - (3) - New constitution for Southern Rhodesia approved in referendum.

Sudan

- 1944 - (2) - Advisory Council established with 24 Sudanese and 4 foreign members.
- 1948 - (3) - A new constitution was adopted. The Legislative Assembly had 75 members, most of whom were elected by male voters with certain property qualifications but 13 were chosen by chiefs and councils in the South and 10 nominated by the Governor-General.
- 1952 - (3) - Executive council established. It consisted of twelve to eighteen members, of whom at least half were Sudanese. The Executive Council approximated in functions to a cabinet.
- 1956 - (3) - Independence.

Tanganyika

- 1925 - (2) - The Legislative Council had 13 official and 7 unofficial members, comprising 5 Europeans and 2 Asians. African membership was considered a matter for the future.
- 1955 - (3) - New constitution. This was based on equal representation for Europeans, Asians and Africans.
• 1961 - (3) - Independence.

Trinidad

• 1941 - (1) - Slight increase in the elected element of legislative council.

• 1945 - (2) - Universal adult suffrage established.

• 1950 - (3) - New constitution permitted a majority of the executive council to be chosen from among the elected legislators by the legislative council as a whole.

• 1956 - (2) - Elected majority of legislative council expanded.

• 1960 - (1) - Last official member of the executive council removed.

• 1952 - (3) - Independence.

Uganda

• 1921 - (2) - Legislative Council formed.

• 1954 - (2) - Legislative Council expanded. An important step was taken in 1954 when the African council membership increased to 14 out of a total of 28 nonofficial members; the 14 were selected from districts thought to be more natural units of representation than the provinces that had previously existed.

• 1955 - (2) In 1955 a ministerial system was introduced, with 5 nonofficial African ministers out of a total of 11.

• 1958 - (1) Direct election of the legislature introduced.

• 1961 - (2) Constitutional convention.
• 1962 - (3) Independence.

Zanzibar

• 1926 - (2) - Legislative Council established.
• 1946 - (2) - Legislative Council expanded to include native representation.
• 1955 - (2) - Legislative Council restructured to give equal representation to Africans.
• 1963 - (3) - Independence.

Mauritius

• 1947 - (3) - New Constitution. Legislative Council established.
• 1955 - (1) - Constitutional conference held.
• 1957 - (2) - Ministerial system introduced.
• 1958 - (2) - Universal Suffrage granted.
• 1961 - (1) - Constitutional conference held.
• 1965 - (1) - Constitutional conference held.
• 1968 - (3) - Independence.

British Guiana

• 1928 - (2) - Crown Colony Government Introduced. The old constitution was abolished, and a Crown Colony type of legislative council was created with nominated officials and elected members together constituting a majority over
the officials but with the elected members in the minority.

- 1943 - (1) Nominated officials removed. Elected members now a majority.
- 1945 - (1) Property and income qualifications for voting reduced.
- 1953 - (2) Adult Suffrage extended.
- 1956 - (2) - Bicameral Legislature instituted.
- 1961 - (1) - Full internal self-government.
- 1962 - (1) - Constitutional conference.
- 1966 - (3) - Independence.

**Malta**

- 1921 - (2) - Bicameral Legislature established.
- 1936 - (3) - Constitution amended to provide for nomination of members to Executive Council.
- 1939 - (3) - Constitution amended to increase elected seats in Council of Government.
- 1947 - (3) - Self-government instituted with an elected legislature.
- 1960 - (1) - Constitutional convention.
- 1964 - (3) - Independence.

**Northern Rhodesia**

- 1948 - (3) - Constitution reformed.
- 1954 - (2) - Legislative Council expanded.
• 1962 - (3) - New Constitution. Native seats on legislative council expanded.

• 1964 - (3) - Independence.
Below are examples of a cabinet summaries.

3. The Cabinet considered a memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies (C.P. (49) 199) reporting the conclusions reached by a local Committee which had been appointed in January 1949 to consider constitutional reform in the Gold Coast.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies said that he was in favour of accepting the recommendations of this Committee subject to three points: (i) He thought it impracticable to adopt the proposal for a bi-cameral legislature; he preferred the alternative suggestion of a single Chamber in which a third of the seats would be reserved for Chiefs and elder statesmen. (ii) He considered that the Executive Council must continue to be advisory to the Governor, rather than responsible to the House of Assembly, for so long as the ultimate responsibility for the administration of the Colony rested with the Governor. (iii) In the absence of a Party system, he did not regard it as practicable for the Leader of the House of Assembly.

2. The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C. (58) 4) covering a draft Parliamentary statement of policy on Cyprus, together with an outline of measures to be announced simultaneously by the Governor.

The Colonial Secretary said that a new initiative by the Government was necessary if the situation in Cyprus was not seriously to deteriorate once again. The draft statement in Annex A to C. (58) 4, which had been approved by the Colonial Policy Committee and was intended to be made to Parliament on its reassembly, reaffirmed the Government's intention to achieve a settlement of the problem of Cyprus on the basis of the principle of self-determination seven years after the ending of the present emergency, provided that—

(i) questions affecting the Turkish community in Cyprus would be fairly settled and the Turkish-Cypriots no less than the Greek-Cypriots would be given the right of self-determination as a community;

(ii) such bases and installations as might be required to meet the strategic needs of Her Majesty's Government and their Allies would be retained under British sovereignty;

(iii) the people of Cyprus showed during the seven-year period that they were ready to co-operate in working and maintaining a representative Constitution, the details of which would be for discussion, in the first instance, with the Governor of Cyprus in the Island.
Bibliography


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