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The Crisis In American Church Historiography

DAVID W. LOTZ

The title of this address may well seem implausible, if not presumptuous, since the craft of church history in the United States appears to be in reasonably good working order. I know of no widespread personal or professional anxiety among contemporary church historians concerning the legitimacy of their discipline: its theoretical possibility, intellectual respectability, and practical productivity. Indeed, if church history be defined pragmatically as what practicing church historians do with their days—what varied subjects they in fact study and write about—then clearly church history is a flourishing enterprise in this country no less than abroad, engaged in significant scholarly pursuits, productive of an increasing number of praiseworthy monographs, even adorned by some distinguished monuments to contemporary historical scholarship.

Of course, one might pause to ask whether church history is best defined simply as "what church historians do." It still remains to be determined whether what they are doing deserves to be called church history, or whether that title might be more honorific than denotationally precise—a concession, perhaps, to traditional usage rather than an accurate index of content.

The fact is that for at least a generation past, numbers of leading church historians have been calling attention to serious difficulties and problems in their craft. In 1950, for example, in his presidential address to the American Society of Church History, James Hastings Nichols observed: "The contemporary revival of interest in theological and Biblical studies does not seem to find any substantial counterpart in church history. The scientific status of church history is not challenged. But is church history holding its own as a department of theology; does it convey religious insight in significant patterns of interpretation?" In the same vein Albert Outler, in his 1964 presidential address to the ASCH, called attention to "a radical secularization in ecclesiastical historiography." "There has been loss and gain in this," he asserted, "reduction of obscurantism and the narrowing of the gap between church history and critical history in general. Our loss has been that church history, in this century, has largely ceased to count as a theological discipline." Like Nichols, then, Outler expressed concern, even alarm, that church history and theology had parted ways, with the result that church history had apparently lost both its time-honored status as a theological discipline and its integral role in theological education.

The last decade has witnessed even more notable developments. In 1968 the University of Chicago Press published a volume of essays under the title, Reinterpretation in American Church History, edited by Jerald Brauer. This volume is remarkable because, its title notwithstanding, its contents indicated on the whole that church history had been replaced by a scholarly enterprise more appropriately labelled "religious history." The reinterpretation, in short, involved a disappearing act. Editor Brauer made this pointedly clear when he declared in his introductory essay: "Perhaps the day of the church historian, as he was long known, is now past. and we can speak only of historians of Christian religion." And in a subsequent

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essay Martin Marty could summarily comment: “We picture church history in a crisis, then. In its bearing toward ‘church’ it ‘barely maintains its existence as a discipline.’” Marty himself drew the immediate conclusion: “Therefore, this is a promising time to study religious history, to examine its roots and its goals.”

One might say that Marty’s own procedure—his forthright abandonment of church history for religious history—nicely illustrates the very crisis he notes.

Appearances notwithstanding, therefore, the discipline of church history is presently beset by uncertainty and perplexity about its very foundations. The simple truth is that we who still call ourselves church historians have somehow lost the “church” in church history. While retaining the traditional nomenclature and guild structures, we have actually surrendered our once distinctive subject matter and have become students of an amorphous phenomenon called “Christianity” or the “Christian religion.” In the process we have tacitly rejected a theological approach to church history in favor of a descriptive-empirical one. Thus, professionally speaking, we have become phenomenologists of religion rather than historical theologians. Even so we have arrived at a point of genuine “crisis” in the craft of church history, namely, at a “vital or decisive stage of events” calling for a “decision” or “judgment” about our future course of action.

I propose to pursue this general theme of “crisis in the craft.” Specifically, I should like to inquire how it is that we have lost the “church” in church history, to identify and analyze the primary causes for this fateful development. Additionally, in the interest of advancing the discussion and generating scholarly debate, I wish to pose a series of questions about the relative necessity of replacing church history with religious history. That is, I want to ask whether this transformation of the discipline is the only viable response to the current crisis. I hasten to note, however, that my immediate purpose is to analyze and diagnose the crisis, not to propose a specific solution or prescribe an instant remedy.

At the same time, in keeping with this occasion and with a personal sense of accountability for my occupancy of the Washburn Chair, I wish to state that for the foreseeable future my scholarly work will center primarily on the attempt to recover and refashion a theological approach to church history that will do justice to the inner dynamic of the church’s existence as the creation and the carrier of the Christian gospel. In fact this inaugural lecture represents what I view as the initial, diagnostic stage in this complex task of historiographical reconstruction.

The quest for the root causes of the current crisis in American church historiography is perhaps best served by scrutinizing a particular genre of historical literature already referred to, namely, the long series of presidential addresses delivered to the American Society of Church History since its founding by Philip Schaff in 1888. For present purposes, special value attaches to the pellucid and conceptually sophisticated address delivered in 1964 by Albert Outler, under the intriguing title “Theodosius’ Horse: Reflections on the Predicament of the Church Historian.” In the course of his elegant essay, Outler pointed out that “the peculiar problem of interpreting church history comes from the historian’s obligation to rehearse the Christian past in the light of the Christian world view,” namely, the Christian community’s understanding of its origin, mission, and destiny in the world. It professes to be the pilgrim people of God on earth. It claims a significant continuity throughout the centuries and civilizations, and a significant identity between its origins and subsequent developments. Moreover, Christians generally have attributed this identity and continuity to the action of God in history, and even if this notion has been variously interpreted, it has always amounted to one or another aspect of the doctrine of God’s providence. Any plausible narrative of any part of this history must proceed with this background in view.

Outler’s insistence that the “Christian world view” is indispensable for any plausible
interpretation of church history, as well as his brief outline of this special viewpoint, would have evoked the cordial assent of such mid-nineteenth century church historians as Philip Schaff, Robert Dabney, Henry Boynton Smith, William G.T. Shedd and their confreres. The rhetoric may have changed noticeably over the century, but the same basic point was being scored: that the Christian church is the unique people of God, constituted by God's own redemptive action in history, and preserved in its identity and continuity through time by divine providence. The most striking difference between Outler's approach and his predecessors' is that what was axiomatic for them had become problematic for him. This dramatic change reflects the no less dramatic developments in the church historian's craft since Schaff's day.

The entire theological enterprise, including the study and writing of church history, has been transformed by modern historical thinking, its methodological canons, theoretical presuppositions and overarching morality of knowledge. For nearly a century now church historians in this country have acknowledged in principle, if not always in practice, that their discipline is subject to the same procedural rules governing the selection, testing, interpretation and explanation of evidence as is every form of historical inquiry. This acknowledgement means that church historians enjoy no privileged sanctuary where they can ply their trade according to their private rules. They are historians first and foremost, governed by the public canons of the historian's craft and subject to trial by their professional peers. The fact that they are church historians defines only their specific subject matter, not their method, which remains the critical-historical method common to all members of their guild. As a result of this methodological compact among professional historians, the old walls dividing so-called sacred or salvation history from secular or profane history have collapsed, never to be restored (so long as the compact is universally honored and adhered to).

In keeping with this professionalization and secularization of their discipline, church historians have become acutely self-conscious about the responsibility they bear for justifying their working assumptions before the bar of critical-historical thinking. In the present context, therefore, the decisive question remains: can the so-called Christian world view, which Outler has articulated in such representative fashion and which he identifies as the sine qua non of church historiography, withstand cross-examination in the light of the established canons of historical inquiry?

Consider, for example, the crucial assertion of the church's identity and continuity over the centuries. Can one even begin to take this assertion seriously, much less justify it empirically, in view of the internecine warfare, schisms, mutual anathemas and excommunications which crowd the pages of church history? Where is the impartial historian to look for purposes of identifying the "one, holy, catholic and apostolic church"? To the annals of the Roman Catholic or the Protestant or the Orthodox churches, or perhaps to the chronicles of the so-called sectarian bodies and their multifarious offspring? And with what ancient church are the more recent confessional churches in unbroken continuity? Surely not with an undivided church of the early Christian centuries, since historical investigation discloses no such church. Here too one can speak only of competing, mutually exclusive churches, whether Marcionite, Montanist, Donatist, Nestorian, Monophysite, Catholic, or what have you. Likewise the notion of a pristine, undivided apostolic church has also been proven a myth, along with the related notion of a homogeneous, unified canon of apostolic scripture. Everywhere we look, unless our assumptions and beliefs blind or beguile us, we see discontinuity and disunity rather than the oneness and continuity of the church which the Christian world view presupposes and professes.

Given this genuine predicament, this patent contradiction between pious theory and recalcitrant fact, little wonder that church historians end up appealing to God's providential action as somehow guaranteeing what history itself cannot give. But this means that history has been overcome by dogma, by a theological doctrine of providence, and so by metahistory. In the eyes of the critical historian this recourse to divine providence can only appear to be the church historian's equivalent of the tragedian's deus ex machina.

Beyond this, however, the critical historian cannot permit any attempt to explain the course of human affairs by appeal to divine activity or supernatural intervention. Since historians intend to tell true stories about the human past, they must assume that human beings have made human history. History is thus the story of human doing, suffering, thinking, feeling; it is not and cannot be an account of any purported acts of God. In the present case, then, the church historian's...
traditional appeal to divine providence is not only empirically tenuous but is also theoretically untenable, unacceptable in principle since it contradicts the fundamental assumption of the historian’s craft that human history is susceptible of human understanding only because it is the study of fully human phenomena.

The conclusion, therefore, seems inescapable: the traditional and still widespread theological approach to church history, based on the church’s own self-understanding as the unique community of the redeemed, is theoretically unjustifiable on critical-historical grounds. By appealing to acts of God in history it not only runs athwart the evidence, but espouses a notion of supernatural intervention which must be rejected on principle. Furthermore, a detailed examination and analysis of this traditional perspective would disclose many other objectionable features, in particular an appeal to privileged sources of insight and information (“revelation”) about the future course of history, indeed a claim to know the hidden meaning of the whole of history (whereas “ordinary” historians know at best only the meaning of the past or, more likely, of some parts of the past). This entire approach culminates in a sharp division between secular history and that sacred history which supplies the true meaning of the whole story (precisely because it is the unique history of God’s unique people). Clearly this “Christian world view” is no longer valid for historiographical purposes if church historians wish to retain their status as professional, critical historians, and “scientific” church historiography can no longer be undertaken from such a perspective.

II

Let us grant, however, that some church historians might wish to continue using this traditional perspective, perhaps because (like Outler) they consider it essential to the task of the authentic church historian. They might even be prepared to defend their approach as critical and scientific by bringing forward counter-proposals against the theoretical arguments I have adduced. Or, more likely, they will not unduly trouble themselves with such abstruse considerations, but will boldly seize the day and get on with the task at hand: the actual writing of the church’s story from the time-honored perspective of the Christian faith. I submit, however, that this sane, admirably pragmatic course of action must eventually encounter serious, even insuperable difficulties. The problems in this case are not so much theoretical as methodological (albeit the two sets of problems interlock and interact). They are well illustrated by another presidential address of the American Society of Church History, in this instance that delivered by Leonard Trinterud in 1955, entitled “The Task of the American Church Historian.”

Trinterud’s overarching concern is that all Christians, not only church historians, “need to renew their awareness of the Church Catholic.” In the service of this praiseworthy cause, “the task of the American church historian is that of any church historian. He is to labor in a catholic manner to make known and relevant the way, or ways, whereby this strange religious history [of the church universal in all its baffling variety] is somehow that redemption which comes through Jesus Christ, namely, the holy, catholic Church.” Trinterud takes special note of the problem posed for historians of American Christianity by this call for a truly catholic historiography, since doubt is widespread whether one can even speak of the “church” in America in a universalist sense. To be sure, one might write the history of those “various ecclesiastical institutions which we know as ‘churches.’” But, asks Trinterud, “is the Church Catholic to be thus identified with its institutional expressions? Most of us,” he replies, “would admit that it is not.”

What, then, is the Church Catholic? According to Trinterud, the Church of Jesus Christ, in all ages, and under all circumstances has in the last analysis regarded itself as a people of God, a people related to God by the redemption which comes through Jesus Christ. This then is the Church Catholic—in every age, in all situations, and beyond all those institutional forms in which it finds expression—redemption through Jesus Christ under the circumstances of historical existence. Wherever there is redemption through Christ in history, there is the Church his Body.
One will note that Trinterud employs virtually the same definition of the church as does Outler, predicated on the same "Christian world view." Like Outler, he also assumes that this perspective is indispensable for a genuine church history (as distinct from the history of the Christian "churches" or of the Christian "religion"). Unlike Outler, however, he is not visibly exercised by the conceptual or theoretical problems attendant upon such a perspective. He does not fret over its status as metahistory or over his status as a critical historian. The root problem lies elsewhere. "The Church Catholic," Trinterud concludes, "regards itself as coming into being, and continuing in existence, through the activity of God himself. To be the Church, therefore, you must always confess faith and not a matter of historical investigation and proof. How, then, can you write the history of the work of God, unless you are a Prophet or an Apostle?... The answer, of course, is that you cannot." 12

Thus Trinterud finally encounters that same stumbling-block which we encountered before: the historian of the church catholic must at some crucial juncture appeal to God's own activity in history as the ultimate basis of the church's origin, identity and continuity. This strategy, of course, contravenes the canons of critical-historical thinking. But even allowing such an appeal to stand unchallenged—not repudiating it forthwith as metahistorical and so theoretically illicit—how in fact does one write the history of such divine activity? What mortal historian has known the mind of God? What historical criteria are available to assist the historian in identifying those elect people who have truly experienced "redemption through Christ under the circumstances of historical existence"? Which of the competing churches, if any, is the genuine church catholic? Perhaps an apostle or prophet, some divine seer, may venture to make such identifications, but such insight obviously lies beyond the ken of earthbound historians. Trinterud rightly concludes that the identity and continuity of the church as the redeemed people of God are matters of faith and so are closed to "historical investigation and proof." In short, it is methodologically impossible to write the history of the church catholic, however earnestly church historians yearn and call for such an historiography.

What kind of history then can church historians actually write? Nothing else, it appears, than the story of "what this redemption in Christ has meant to men of the past." 13 In brief, church historians critically investigate all those groups which have claimed to participate in redemption, showing how they have understood and acted out their salvation. Hence they end up writing the history of the churches, of the various institutions which lay title to Christian salvation. But for Trinterud this institutional history is precisely what church history ought not be. Even so he feels obliged to close his address with a painful confession of failure. Once again he insists that apart from the controlling assumption that "the Church is a community of people redeemed by God in history through Jesus Christ, ... there would be no church history, but rather the history of the Christian religion." Yet, as he clearly sees, this assumption-cum-definition cannot be translated into viable working procedures. His brave proposal remains historiographically barren. And so he confesses, "here then, is laid bare my bad conscience. I assume that I ought to present church history, but I end up with only the history of Christianity." 14

III

Reviewing developments to this point, we seem to have landed in a genuine quandary regarding not simply the practice but even the possibility of church history. If, following Outler and Trinterud, church history be understood as the attempt to research and write the story of the redeemed community, the unique people of God, then such an enterprise appears foredoomed to failure. It is theoretically untenable owing to its explicit appeal to acts of God in order to interpret and explain events in human history. It is methodologically impossible because, in any case, can the ordinary historian "write the history of the work of God," barring an illicit appeal to privileged sources of information and insight? In sum, genuine church history appears to be impossible, as opposed to a history of the churches or of Christianity or of the Christian religion. In this light Martin Marty's words, quoted earlier, ring dismayingly true: "We picture church history in a crisis, then. In its bearing toward 'church' it 'barely maintains its existence as a discipline.'"
This crisis is further compounded when we examine some of the concrete historiographical applications of this traditional, theologically grounded approach to church history. In addition to generating theoretical and methodological difficulties and dilemmas, this perspective has repeatedly been used in service of an historiography which is suspect, if not indefensible, on evidential grounds. I have already noted in passing that the metahistorical appeal to divine providence ill accords with the facts of church history (since the special favor and support of the same God can scarcely be attributed to mutually exclusive, warring churches, and since these very antagonisms and divisions seem to contradict the notion of providential guidance). Here, however, I specifically have in mind the use of a traditional "redemptive history" perspective by various 19th century historians of religion in America, e.g., Robert Baird, Daniel Dorchester and even that prince of American historians, Philip Schaff.

Like their fathers and brethren, these historians commenced their labors with the certainty that they were telling the story of the church catholic, of the holy people of God, the communion of saints. More importantly, however, they also possessed the certainty that they knew both where that church catholic was to be located and who the saints were. They experienced no discernible predicament, they confessed no bad conscience in pursuing their craft, for they knew how to trace the finger of God writ large in human affairs, nor did they doubt that God so wrote. Standing one and all in the glorious tradition of Reformed Protestantism, especially in its Puritan and Pietiest garb, they confidently located the one true church in the circle of Evangelical Christianity. The church catholic, in sum, could be readily identified by its doctrinal rectitude in holding steadfast to the faith once delivered to the prophets and apostles, the church fathers and the Protestant reformers.

Robert Baird, for example, developed a typology of the American denominations which rigidly differentiated evangelical from unevangelical religious groups on doctrinal grounds. His seminal work, Religion in America (1844), bears the revealing sub-title, An Account of the Origin, Progress, Relation to the State, and Present Condition of the Evangelical Churches in the United States, with Notices of the Unevangelical Denominations. The latter category included Unitarians, Universalists, Shakers, Swedenborgians and Mormons, as well as Jews, Deists, Atheists and Socialists, all of whom either denied or distorted the basic evangelical doctrines. Roman Catholicism afforded a special case since its otherwise orthodox piety had been corrupted by unevangelical practice and unscriptural traditions. Philip Schaff leaned heavily on Baird's typology in his own America (1855), as did Daniel Dorchester in his massive, 800-page volume, Christianity in the United States (1888).

Here is not the place to analyze this historiographical tradition in detail; that has been done elsewhere and often. Clearly, however, this traditional use of doctrinal-theological criteria to identify the true visible church cannot commend itself to critical historians. Such an approach entails normative axiological judgments which are not derived from history (the course of events) itself, but from ideological, hence metahistorical considerations. History is literally overcome by dogma. Furthermore, the very idea of doctrinal rectitude is notoriously imprecise of definition and no less slippery in its application. What looks like orthodoxy to one historian may well be another's heterodoxy.

Such considerations apart, however, perhaps the most telling defect of this venerable historiographical tradition is that it was so unabashedly harnessed to the viewpoints and values of the so-called evangelical empire. America itself could be hailed as the "principal kingdom of the Reformation" where mainline Protestantism presumably generated the dominant culture-shaping power. Patriotism and evangelical piety were considered inseparable, as were Protestantism and progress. Above all the vision of a fully Christian America, a yet more glorious Christendom in distinctively Protestant guise, warmed the hearts and captured the minds of American evangelicals, inspiring their common endeavors to build the kingdom of God on these peaceable shores. Yet this vision and the historiographical tradition which in part created it, and which certainly carried it down the generations, were soon shattered by the course of events. Again theory foundered on the shoals of fact. Robert Baird's classic text is a telling case in point. Writing in 1844, he devoted a scant two pages to the Roman Catholic Church, though by 1850 this was the largest denomination in the United States. No self-respecting historiography, in principle at least, could long endure in the face of such countervailing evidence.
Today historians of American religion have joined forces in a massive attack on this uniquely American form of *Kulturprotestantismus*, unmasking its nativism, nationalism, triumphalism, its ethnocentrism and latent racism. And in the process, although this is less frequently noted, they are dismantling a traditional model of church historiography which at least had the merit of intending to be *church* history, which explicitly set out with a theological understanding of the church as the unique people of God, but which came to signal grief at the point of so confidently identifying the true church with American evangelical Protestantism.

**IV**

My intent in this lecture has been not only to announce and assert a crisis in the church historical enterprise — for other scholars have at least hinted at such a state of affairs — but particularly to uncover its taproots in both theory and practice. Many church historians, ably and eloquently represented by Albert Outler and L. J. Trinterud, have time and again called for (and hence also lamented the absence of) a genuine church historiography, namely, the history of the church catholic, not merely the history of this or that institution which claims to be the church. In company with Outler and Trinterud, they further insist that this venture requires the conscious adoption of the so-called Christian world view, namely, that theological perspective which identifies the church as God’s unique people called into being by God’s decisive redemptive action in history through Jesus Christ, and preserved in its identity and continuity through time by God’s providential guidance. So far the theory. It is admirably clear and coherent, but is it equally compelling?

Outler, as we have seen, candidly acknowledges a “predicament” because he knows that the church historian’s appeal to divine activity in human history transgresses the critical historian’s working assumptions and world view. And Trinterud confesses to a “bad conscience” because he realizes that the church historian cannot in any case write “the history of what God is doing.” Thus the very subject matter of church history — the church universal, ever one and ever the same in every age — eludes our grasp. While we can conceive this church in thought and confess it in faith, we cannot capture it in our historiographical nets.

To be sure, we could invoke the precedent of a venerable company of American church historians who were persuaded that they did know what God was doing in history and that they could identify the one true church. But in their hands the putative story of the church catholic became the partisan story of evangelical Protestantism (and of its presumed historical antecedents). The manifest failures of this audacious undertaking have not merely discredited the old “Protestant synthesis,” but stand as a sober reminder that a church historiography which sets out with the universalist notion of the “people of God” seems repeatedly to end up with a sectarian portrayal of the “church of the elect.” Present-day historians, therefore, might reasonably conclude that historiographical wisdom, justice and charity do not lie in the direction of attempts to write a history of the “church catholic,” all earnest entreaties to do so notwithstanding.

Taken together, these varied considerations point to one inescapable conclusion: the church historical discipline in the United States is in a state of crisis. This claim is warranted; it is no rhetorical ploy. And this crisis in our craft obtains precisely because we who still call ourselves — or allow ourselves to be called — church historians appear to be forced to choose between “church” and “history,” between a time-honored theological approach to the church based on the church’s own self-understanding as God’s unique people, and a critical-historical approach which not only prescinds from the “Christian world view” in the name of objectivity and neutrality but must on principle reject it as metahistorical. As I have been at pains to show, however, the situation is complicated by other weighty factors besides this long-standing conflict between the historian and the believer.

Drawing together the strands of my analysis and argument, I would describe the prevailing situation as follows: Insofar as the church is defined and understood theologically as the special community of persons redeemed by God in history through Jesus Christ, we have inescapably lost the “church” in church history since such a theologically grounded historiography is
indefensible on theoretical, methodological and evidential grounds. In particular, (1) this
historiography contradicts the canons and working assumptions of critical, scientific history and
so lands us in a realm of theoretically unjustified metahistory. (Recall Outler's "predicament.")
(2) It establishes projects for the actual study and writing of church history which are impossible
of realization and so are methodologically and historiographically barren. (Recall Trinterud's
"bad conscience.") (3) It has been consistently used in the service of a church historiography
which either cannot be squared with the evidence or is vitiates by special pleading and so is
empirically indefensible. (Recall the cautionary tale of the "Protestant synthesis.") In this
context we may assuredly speak of a crisis in the subject matter of church history.

If church historians have lost or surrendered their distinctive subject matter — if they
cannot write church history in Outler's and Trinterud's sense — what, then, are they actually
doing with their days? What kind of history are they studying and writing? The fact is
that they have turned with renewed vigor to that enterprise which Trinterud scored as
inauthentic church history: the history of the Christian churches and denominations, the
history of Christianity or, most broadly construed, the history of the Christian religion. In
short, they have surrendered the traditional definition of the church as the unique people of
God. Indeed, they have apparently surrendered any and every theological approach to church
history in favor of a descriptive, phenomenological, institutional, socio-cultural approach based
on the procedures and principles of critical, scientific historiography.

In this sense, then, the "church" — understood as the church catholic, the unique people of
God, the community of the truly redeemed — has virtually disappeared from church history. In its
place one puts the "churches" /"denominations" or "Christianity"/the "Christian religion,"
substituting descriptive-empirical for normative-theological constructs and thereby focusing
attention on those groups of people, institutions, thought forms, life styles, rituals, etc., which
claim to be Christian or exhibit some form of Christian behavior or character. Since Christianity
and Western history are inseparable at many points, and intimately joined at most other, this
new style church historiography readily assumes its due and proper place in the total spectrum of
modern historical study.

The result is that church history has become a particular form, and integral component,
of a broadly-based institutional, intellectual, social and cultural history. The enterprise retains
only its old title (honoris causa?); its theory and practice have undergone a sea-change.
Similarly, the sociology of the discipline has been transformed since the new style church history
is best pursued in the congenial, collaborative setting of university departments of religion,
history and the social sciences, rather than in the narrower context of theological study in
seminaries and divinity schools. In fact it is no longer clear in what precise sense church history
is a theological discipline, if at all, or what indispensable role it plays, if any, in the
theological curriculum. Nor is it clear in what specific ways, if any, so-called church historians
in seminaries and divinity schools differ from so-called religious historians in colleges and
universities. (For these reasons the current crisis in church historiography reflects and
contributes to the parallel crisis in theological education, and raises insistent questions about
the professional identity and vocational goals of the church historian.)

As I have attempted to show, these far-reaching developments have specific, discernible
causes and can in some legitimate sense be regarded as "inevitable." For old style church
history, with its theological definition of the church as the unique people of God and its
indissoluble connection with the "Christian world view," carried within itself its own seeds
of dissolution. With the advent and well-nigh universal acceptance of the critical-historical
method, traditional church historiography was destined to pass away. In claiming public
status as history, it invited public testing before the bar of critical historical thinking. In the
process, and in the ways I have indicated, it was judged indefensible on theoretical,
methodological and evidential grounds. The wonder is that it has endured so long.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the "church" has virtually disappeared from church
history, since modern historical thinking has undermined the old foundations of the discipline. By far the most striking feature of this entire development is that few if any notable attempts have been made to restore the “church” to church history through a fundamental reconceptualization of the discipline. One hesitates to speak of a failure of nerve in this regard, but one can point to an astonishing absence of efforts to rethink and restructure the church historian’s craft. The guild has apparently accepted with equanimity the prevailing movement away from old style church history to new style religious history, and from historical theology to the phenomenology of the Christian religion. The protesting voices of a decade or more past find little or no echo in the present — no doubt because these very protests were not followed up by concrete proposals for a comprehensive theological reconstruction of the discipline. For that matter, it now seems to be taken for granted that theology and critical history are two distinct, separate and ultimately incompatible disciplines, two competing modes of knowing grounded in two contradictory world views. Hence the very idea of a theological and yet critical approach to church history is regarded as a contradiction in terms.

Granted, however, that the old style theological approach to church history is impossible, is it necessarily the case that any and every theological approach must be ruled out of the critical historian’s court? Is a theologically grounded church history untenable on principle because “theology” must necessarily entail “metahistory”? Might it not be possible to redefine the “church” in a genuinely theological fashion, without recourse to metahistorical assumptions and appeals? Is the history of Christianity or of the Christian religion the only viable alternative to old style church historiography? In sum, can the “church” be restored to church history? Can church history recover its status as a theological discipline, and rediscover its role in the theological curriculum? Can church history again answer to the Christian community’s perennial need and ongoing quest for self-understanding in the light of the Christian gospel and heritage of faith? And can all this be attempted — one trembles to say accomplished — without rejecting critical historiography, without reintroducing salvation history, without sealing off Christian faith from historical reason and the seminary from the university?19

Admittedly, these questions have a rhetorical ring and might be dismissed as the utterances of wishful thinking or as signs of sheer muddleheadedness. Yet each question relates to a specific feature of the current crisis in church history and so is intended to ask whether that crisis, in its particular details and as a whole, is inescapable and irresolvable. As noted previously, many scholars have observed the crisis and some have lamented it; yet few have traced its roots in church historical theory and practice, and even fewer have accepted the challenge to rethink and, if possible, refashion the discipline as an integral, indispensable part of the theological enterprise.

The challenge, in brief, is this: to articulate an approach to church history which is at once theological and critical, at once ecclesiastically meaningful and scientifically responsible — one which is not untenable on theoretical and methodological grounds, and which will not invite withering criticism on evidential grounds. In my judgment, the persistent failure to take up this challenge would be the most serious crisis of all in American church historiography.
NOTES

8. The advent of "scientific" church historiography in the United States may be conveniently dated from the inauguration of Ephraim Emerton in 1882 as Winn Professor of Ecclesiastical History in Harvard Divinity School. See his inaugural address, "The Study of Church History," *Unitarian Review and Religious Magazine* 19 (1883): 1-18.
15. This work, according to the customary dating, was originally published in Great Britain in 1843. It then appeared in American editions in 1844 and 1856, the latter being a substantially revised and expanded edition of the former. My own bibliographical findings indicate, contrary to the usual notices, that the British edition is to be dated 1844 and that the first American edition, also published in 1844, is not merely a reprint of the British edition but is a significantly revised edition, hence a second edition in its own right. The 1856 edition is thus a third edition, a further revision of a revision. The original British edition has recently been reprinted (New York: Arno Press & The New York Times, 1969). The 1856 edition has likewise been reissued in the form of "A Critical Abridgement with Introduction" by Henry Warner Bowden (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1970).
19. See, however, William A. Clebsch, "History and Salvation: An Essay in Distinctions," in Paul Ramsey and John F. Wilson, eds., *The Study of Religion in Colleges and Universities* (Princeton, 1970), pp. 40-72. If I understand him aright, Clebsch contends that this call for a theological yet critical church historiography amounts to the pursuit of a chimera. It represents an undertaking which, to his mind, is impossible in principle. He argues that "a critical historiography of Christianity is viable so far as it is marked off from the enterprise of Christian theology" (p. 40). Church history is necessarily metaphorical since it is a theological discipline and claims, therefore, to yield genuine knowledge of God.
namely, of what God has done and is doing in history to effect salvation through faith in Jesus Christ. The critical history of salvation (=history of Christianity), by contrast, describes Christian salvation "as a quality of the lives of historical persons and groups, not as a divine, ideal reality making appearances on a spatio-temporal stage" (p. 63). Clebsch’s position thus entails an exclusive choice: either one writes, as a church historian cum theologian, the history of the church as the unique locus of God’s redemptive action; or one writes, as a critical historian of Christianity, the history of salvation as a particular quality of human life. _Tertium non datur._ Here is not the place to debate Clebsch’s position. It is striking, however, that in the entire course of his brilliant essay he fails to consider whether Christian theology might in fact know of other approaches to the church than that which identifies the church as the unique locus of God’s immediate, saving activity, or as an institution whose self-identity through time can only be grounded on an empirically untenable claim to uninterrupted unity and continuity or on a metaphorical claim to be the spatio-temporal locus of God’s real presence. Clebsch, in short, appears to believe that church history as a theological discipline must _necessarily_ move in the circle of salvation history and that Christian theology, accordingly, is itself _inextricably_ bound up with a salvation history perspective. He virtually equates “theology” with old style (Augustinian) or new style (neo-orthodox) _Heilsgeschichte._ This dubious equation facilitates, indeed requires, his identification of both theology and church history with metahistory. In any case, he neglects to identify, much less investigate, alternative theological models of church history which intentionally break with salvation history on explicitly theological grounds (e.g., in the name of a _theologia crucis_ as opposed to a _theologia gloriae_), and which thereby give promise to aligning church history with critical historiography. I believe that such a theological yet critical church historiography is possible, and I hope to articulate such a model in subsequent essays.
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Creation And Liberation

GEORGE M. LANDES

Though it is neither customary nor requisite for these opening convocation addresses to begin with, or even to have a text, this one does both. The text is the familiar words of the final verse of the 124th Psalm: “Our help is in the name of the Lord who made heaven and earth.” Perhaps we have heard those words so often at the beginning of a worship service that we no longer pause to reflect on what they are saying. So it is their meaning and significance that I want to explore in this address.

In his concluding affirmation the Psalmist has succinctly brought together what very well may be the two most important themes in the entire biblical witness: liberation and creation — liberation, epitomized in the word ‘help’, signifying the divine powerful assistance in deliverance from enemies and oppressors, and creation, referred to in one of the chief identifying titles of the liberating Lord: He is the one who made heaven and earth. Though on occasion one can find these two themes mentioned in the Bible quite independently and in isolation from one another, more typically they appear inextricably linked, especially in the Old Testament, but also in crucial New Testament contexts as well. This raises at the outset at least two important questions: first, why were they joined together? Why did the biblical writers regularly feel compelled to unite their expressions of liberation and creation-faith, and what does it mean that they did this? And secondly, how was the relation of the two elements in this conjunction conceived? Did liberation take precedence over creation, subordinating the latter to liberation’s primary activity? Or did creation receive priority over liberation as its necessary ground and presupposition? Or is a hierarchical stratification of these themes really to misconceive their relationship altogether, to miss the fact that they are crucial to each other, and that something is inevitably lost when either one is made secondary, to say nothing of being ignored or neglected?

The belief in divine creation of the cosmos is of course very old, attested literally as early as the Sumerians in the third millennium B.C. Moreover, to all the ancient Near Eastern peoples, there was no high god — that is, no deity of cosmic and widespread significance — who could qualify as such without possessing as a crucial attribute the power to create. For to these peoples there was no greater power conceivable than creation power, the power to bring the heaven and earth into existence and everything in them, and to order and maintain the cosmic structure free from all external threats, in particular the threat of uncreated watery chaos from whose defeat the universe was originally formed. There was a sense, then, at least for the Mesopotamians, that the creation of the world was at the same time a liberation, a freeing of the ordered cosmos from the ever present menace of primordial chaos, so that especially human social and political structures might be prevented from disintegration, the bonds of cohesion, cooperation, and stability maintained and strengthened, and continuity, social unity and solidarity ensured.

Though the early Hebrews did not buy into all the cosmological trappings associated with the views of world origin held by their ancient Near Eastern neighbors, there were nonetheless certain ideas which they could affirm. In using Elohim as the generic designation

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for their God — a plural of majesty and totality derived from the personal divine name El, whose common Semitic root meaning seems to refer to power, preeminently creation power — the Hebrews would have linked creation activity with their deity from the beginning. Even when they came to venerate Yahweh, whom without hesitation or scruple they identified with El and Elohim, the function of divine creatorship was not lost. Indeed the very name Yahweh, which is probably to be derived from the initial verb form of a cultic epithet referring to El as the one who brings into existence all that exists, must have been understood in connection with creation work. And even though at the burning bush Moses is given to understand a unique broadening and extension of the meaning of the divine name to include creation work within history — indeed to identify this creation work with liberation work: Yahweh is the actively Present One in breaking the yokes of bondage — still the cosmic creativity of Yahweh is neither denigrated nor denied.

I therefore find it difficult to agree with the late Professor Gerhard von Rad, whose view on this issue continues to predominate within Old Testament scholarship, when he argues that creation-faith within Israel was a comparatively late development, and even then was principally an ancillary and secondary belief supportive of, but subordinate to Yahweh's primary redemptive deeds. Yet when Israel told her story of the Exodus, the wilderness wandering, and the giving of the land, Yahweh's delivering actions were not depicted involving only historical human actors and political events, but also with the use of the forces and elements of nature — in the plagues against the Egyptian oppressors, in the parting of the waters of the Red Sea, in the sending of the manna, quails, and water, in separating the waters of the Jordan, in making the sun and moon stand still for Joshua. Only the Creator-God, the One who made the sea, the animals, the heavenly bodies, and all of nature, could employ these elements in His redemptive work. But out of all of her experience in liberating events, Israel did not only at some distant later date infer that the Liberator-God must be the Creator-God, but rather, because she already knew Yahweh as the Creator of heaven and earth, she understood how it was that wind and sea, birds and insects, sun and moon could be used as instruments supporting the divine liberating activity.

From this she went on to affirm something new — something not shared by her ancient Near Eastern neighbors: the cosmic Creator was also the Liberating Creator, whose creative power was extended into history, not for the purpose of either continuing or redoing cosmic creation (these ideas receive no place in biblical thinking except in an eschatological framework beyond history), but for creating a people through liberating deeds and a covenant commitment, from which they would become enfranchised into a new service, the service of their creating and redeeming God. Like the original cosmic creation, Israel also was created out of nothing — “Once you were no people, but now you are God’s people,” as the author of the First Epistle to Peter puts it in addressing the early Christians (I Peter 2:10) — and the power that created her was just as strong and effective and awe-inspiring as that which formed the heavens and the earth. Thus for Israel, Yahweh’s creation power in history was at the same time his liberation power, and they must be held together. One could not be properly understood without the other.

Why is it, then, despite the biblical canonical order, which, with Genesis, begins with an account of creation, that frequently when Israel told of Yahweh’s liberating activity she not only did not begin with creation, but did not even mention it at all? How is to be explained this so-called reticence about world creation?

It seems to me that those who have made so much of the fact that references to cosmic creation are often missing in those places where Israel confessed God’s mighty liberating acts have failed to pay sufficient attention to an important perception that Israel made with respect to God’s creation of the world — a perception that sets her view apart from that of the other ancient Near Eastern peoples — viz., the creation of the cosmos by Yahweh was essentially not a liberating act. Though it stands prior to and introduces God’s salvific activity with His people, the creation of the heavens and the earth is not itself reckoned as the initiation of God’s redemptive work. Why? Because in Genesis 1 and other Old Testament texts either describing or referring to Yahweh’s cosmic creativity the heavens and the earth are not brought into existence from a situation requiring their liberation.
The primordial waters, which have to be separated before the heavens and earth can be established as such, are not thought of as intrinsically evil or threatening, no more than are the waters from which all of us come from out of our mothers' wombs at birth. In Gen. 1:2 the earth is said to be tohu wa-bohu, a curious hendiadys rhyme formation in Hebrew that is best rendered in English as something like 'darkened desolation or emptiness', not chaos. At the beginning of its creation, the earth is empty, enclosed by waters in total darkness. But when God's Spirit moves over the waters to separate them, the earth can be born, so to speak, i.e. it can emerge from its primordial darkness into the light of time, its surrounding waters gathered and ordered into the seas, and its emptiness filled with plants, animals, and humanity. At the end of Genesis 1 the whole creation is declared to be very good, and this includes the darkness, the waters, along with everything else. To accomplish this creative work, Yahweh engages in no battle with the primeval waters, as did the Babylonian Narduk with Tiamat, or the Canaanite Baal with Yamm. In those psalmodic and prophetic texts where Yahweh is portrayed as in conflict with figures variously named Rahab or Leviathan, or Tannin, the background is probably not some early Israelite myth which described Yahweh's cosmic creation as the result of a theomachy, no more than Baal's defeat of Yamm in the Ugaritic mythological texts devolved into an account of the origin of the world, but rather led to the affirmation of the kingly rule of the fertility god over the sea in an already created cosmos. So also Yahweh controls and orders the waters in history, viewed poetically either as a historical personification of Israel's oppressors, as e.g. Rahab was identified with Pharaoh or Egypt or as an instrument of nature used by God in His activity of judgment and redemption. Thus because in no place was Yahweh's cosmic creation seen as an act of liberation, it is understandable why the biblical writers did not regularly see fit to incorporate references to God's creation of the heaven and the earth as a part of the record of the divine salvatory events.

It might also be observed here that the literary form in which Israel mentioned Yahweh's cosmic creation, with its implied Sitz im Leben, is important, either by itself or in conjunction with His liberating deeds. For here we see it is principally the poetic texts, the hymns and liturgies, in which Israel celebrates the divine creativity in the setting of worship. The purpose, then, in mentioning creation is not primarily to satisfy some idle curiosity about how the world may have come into existence, but to praise the Creator-God for His creation work with worshipful adoration in joy and thanksgiving. Though the same can be said for the poetic exaltation of Yahweh's liberating action, when the latter was expressed in prose (more in the service of a non-liturgical function, i.e. to teach or inform), the references to creation drop out. For the biblical writers it was almost as if the most appropriate context for talking — or better, singing — about creation was the sanctuary, not the school room or some other didactic setting.

So though there were sometimes plausible reasons for Israel's speaking about liberation-faith without any reference to cosmic creation-faith, the primary emphasis was upon their association, not their separation. Cosmic creation, though not itself and activity of liberation, was nonetheless the crucial presupposition of God's liberating work in history, which was also a form of creation. Unless the Liberator-God is at the same time the cosmic Creator-God, responsible for the origin and ordering of the entire world in which He takes a constant and active interest as its Creator, the work of liberation is deprived of a critical authoritative and effective ground. It would seem then to be the task of any theology which finds its basic source in and has respect for the biblical witness, to include within its interpretive function this important conjunction between creation and liberation.

Now interestingly, when we turn to look at recent theology — quite in contrast to Barth, who, in his Church Dogmatics, devoted more space to the doctrine of creation (some 2,300 pages in the English rendering) than to any other — there seems to be a tendency not simply to separate creation from liberation, but even to ignore or push out altogether this central theme. Within the 602 pages of the English translation of Hans Küng's massive theological tome on what contemporary Christian existence might mean, very little explicit attention is given to the doctrine of creation, and none at all to its relation to liberation, as if to say (which Küng very well might not, if pressed), that creation-faith
has little or no significance for 'being a Christian' today. Among the liberation theologians, especially those who want to take the Bible seriously, whether Black, Feminist, or Third World, my impression is that most tend to pass over the doctrine of creation, or if they deal with it at all, it is very briefly, and often inadequately from a biblical exegetical standpoint. But perhaps none of this should really surprise us in the light of our knowledge of the history of Christian thought, in which the doctrine of creation has not infrequently been the source of difficulties.

In his 1971 presidential address before the American Theological Society, George S. Hendry, until his retirement last spring, Professor of Systematic Theology at Princeton Theological Seminary, while bemoaning what he called the 'eclipse of creation' in current theology and its increasingly widespread loss of significance, traced its most recent decline in the American context to the influence of 18th century deistic notions and to the fallout from the 19th century science vs. religion controversies. As a result, questions of origins were declared to be of no vital concern to faith and were either abandoned or turned over to the scientists for their investigation and speculation. The diminished role of creation-faith was also reflected in popular piety. As Hendry writes:

... when occasion calls for a brief, summary statement of faith, creation is often passed over. It is not mentioned, for example, in the membership formula of the World Council of Churches, or in the creedal statement that forms part of the service of ordination in the United Presbyterian Church. Even in the brief formula of faith composed by so circumspect a theologian as Karl Rahner, man is referred to God as the sacred mystery which constitutes the sustaining ground of his existence, but not (not expressly at any rate) as the Creator from whom he has derived his existence.

I would imagine there are those who in no way share in Hendry's deploring of what has happened to the doctrine of creation in recent theology and piety, who indeed see a too strict adherence to a transcendent Creator Deity, who, to use John MacQuarrie's terminology, is unfortunately conceived in a monarchial rather than organic relation to the world, implying a dependence and subservience that too much restricts the attainment of full humanity and the exercise of its potential. As it happens, I am more in sympathy with Hendry, and in my remaining remarks, I would like to focus first on what I see are some of the unhappy losses suffered when creation-faith is cut off from liberation-faith, and then in a more positive vein, look at some of the more vital contributions of creation-faith to liberation-faith.

First, the losses. To ignore or reject the linkage between creation and liberation is in the first place to remove an essential feature in the biblical view of the relationship between the Creator Deity and the created world which stands in need of His liberating creation work. As Creator, God functions in both an immanent and transcendent relationship to all types of his creativity. He creates not only authoritatively by His Word standing apart from all that which it calls into being, but also by working with that already created, to bring forth something entirely new, though still not a part of the Deity's own Being. To diminish or rule out the transcendent dimension to the Creator-God is to limit Him both spacially and temporally, to restrict His power principally to the terrestrial plane and hence court the danger of holding it as susceptible to human control and manipulation, broaching idolatry, and to refuse to acknowledge the cosmic dimensions of evil against which only the liberating power of a cosmic Creator-God can be effective.

In the second place, radically to divorce creation from liberation can also mean to lose the perspective of the total arena in which the Creator-God's liberating power is at work. Biblical faith affirms not only that it is effective with human instruments, their structures and relationships on the plane of history, but also, as we have noted earlier, in and through the forces of nature, which are under the control and direction of the Liberator-God as Creator of heaven and earth. We are rightly concerned today with what we do and have done to nature, how we can live in a more symbiotic, non-destructive relation to it. But biblical creation-and liberation-faith is also concerned about what God does to us in and
through nature, both for our redemption and judgment. To the biblical writers, the forces of nature were not morally neutral, and though this poses some difficult theological problems for us, that does not mean we should ignore or pass over in embarrassed silence the biblical witness to the divine use of nature in liberation activity, for in becoming more sensitive to this dimension, we are led to a great appreciation of the strength and magnitude of the divine power against oppression, and of the lengths to which God is willing to go to assure the redemption of His people. Also, there is no realm of creation in which God’s liberation power is excluded or without effect.

Finally, to separate creation from liberation runs the risk of losing a sense of the scope of the object of the divine saving work. One of the best examples of this in the Old Testament is the case of the prophet Jonah. In the course of their desperate search for deliverance from the death-threatening storm, the sailors ask Jonah about his mission and identity (Jon 1:8). In response, he confesses, “I am a Hebrew, and I fear Yahweh the God of heaven, who made the sea and the dry land” (1:9). It will be observed that Jonah’s identification of himself with the Hebrew constituency is given as his answer to the sailor’s question about his mission. For the Hebrews originally did not receive their total identity from their status as an oppressed people, but even more from the fact that they had been called by their God through Abram — who is called the first Hebrew in the Bible (Gen. 14:13) — to become a people with a mission, not simply to themselves, but to all the families of the earth (Gen. 12:3, 22:18). As a Hebrew prophet, Jonah had been commissioned by Yahweh to join in that mission — a mission to be the mediator of a potential blessing, not to Jonah’s own Hebrew constituency, which he would doubtless have welcomed, but rather to the Ninevites, those cruel enemies and hated oppressors of his people. But Jonah cannot escape his mission even though he endeavors to run away from it. On the storm-tossed ship at sea, the upshot of his confrontation with the sailors, who clearly must be identified, like the Ninevites, with the non-Hebrew families of the earth, is that through his decision and action, he holds the key to their deliverance. His response to the sailors’ questions thus underlines the deep irony of his position. On the one hand, his proud profession of a Hebrew identity suggests his divinely appointed mission to bring blessing and liberation to the nations, while on the other, his confession of faith that the God who has called him is also the one who has created the sea and the dry land implies the futility of his flight and rebellion. Jonah, of course, believes in both Yahweh’s liberation and creation, but he refuses to hold them permanently together and accept the implications of that. When he is the sole beneficiary of the divine liberation, implemented by creation power, as he is when rescued from the sea by the great fish and delivered temporarily from his angry despair by the sudden growth of the qigayon-plant, Jonah can sing Yahweh’s praises and rejoice with great joy. But when the boundaries of this liberation are extended to the nations, including those who have terribly mistreated Israel, Jonah will have none of it. Yet it is because the Creator-God is the Liberator-God that liberation has universal dimensions. Yahweh’s concluding words to Jonah emphasize this point: “You have had compassion for the plant, for which you did not labor, nor did you make it grow, which came into being in a night and perished in a night. But should not I have compassion on Nineveh that great city, in which there are more than a hundred and twenty thousand persons who do not know their right hand from left, and also much cattle?” (4:10-11). Jonah’s compassion for the plant epitomizes his concern for his own liberation, which he has received as a gift of the divine grace; he has neither created nor nurtured it. By contrast, in addition to His compassion to Jonah through the plant, Yahweh also shows it to the populous Ninevites, because He has created and nurtured them, and therefore wills their liberation. By refusing to acknowledge the full implications of the fact that the Creator-God is the Liberator-God, Jonah, who himself is a rightful object of the divine deliverance, at the end remains undelivered, wishing only for death.

It has on occasion been observed — most recently by Professor Robert McAfee Brown in an article in Christianity and Crisis — that “the Bible was written out of the experience of oppressed people, by oppressed people as a message for the liberation of oppressed people.” This is certainly true, as far as it goes, but I do not think it goes far enough. Certainly, the
Bible was written out of the experience of oppressed people, but not only that, as e.g. in the wisdom traditions, we encounter a broader base of experience than that coming solely from conditions of oppression. Some of the biblical traditions indeed probably did find their earliest expression among the oppressed, but we must also keep in mind that much of the Bible, particularly the Old Testament, was shaped, expanded, redacted, and edited by those associated with the royal court and the religious establishment, whom we would hardly identify with the oppressed. And the message of the Bible is certainly for the liberation of the oppressed, but also for the liberation of the oppressors, in fact for everyone, regardless of their status or condition. The audience for which the author of Jonah primarily intended his message was hardly limited to the oppressed, just as in the New Testament, the parables that Jesus used as the chief vehicle of his teaching are frequently seen to be directed not first of all at the poor, the outcast, or mistreated, but rather to the Jewish religious leaders, whose beliefs and actions often contributed to oppressive conditions. My point is in no way intended to reduce the significance of the Bible's message for the oppressed — indeed, it may be they who today will best hear and respond to it — but to remind us that as the Bible was written and shaped and passed on by all types of people from a variety of conditions and situations, so its teaching is meant for all. Holding together creation- and liberation-faith should prevent us from losing sight of this fact.

I have dealt with what I perceive to be, in light of the biblical witness, some of the most important losses we incur when we radically separate or isolate creation from liberation. Now in conclusion, I would like briefly to turn to some of what I would deem to be the more important of the particular features of biblical creation-faith that especially should be held in mind when we reflect upon and act for liberation.

First, the uniqueness of the divine creatorship. As is well known, the Hebrews often employed a special verb when the wanted to talk particularly of Yahweh's creating. Nowhere in the Old Testament does this verb (*bara'*) ever occur with anyone but God as its subject. This was not because of any peculiar nuance inherent to the verb as such, or that its definition necessarily implied the unique modes of divine creativity — *ex nihilo*, without effort, by the commanding Word — but rather because of the types of objects which regularly receive the incidence of this verb's action: preeminently the cosmos, the heavens and the earth and their constituent creatures. It was also this same verb which could be used with reference to the divine creativity within history, now not primarily cosmic but salvatory. Again in these contexts the subject of the verb continues to be only Yahweh, because its objects are not the result of initiatory human creativity: thus Israel (Isa. 43:15), various foreign persons or peoples (Ezek. 21:30 [H, 35], 28:13, 15), the new Jerusalem (Isa. 4:5), various salvatory deeds (Exod. 34:10; Isa. 45:8, 48:7, 57:19) or the creation of a 'clean heart' within a human individual (Psa. 51:10 [H, 12]), or a unique form of divine punishment (Num. 16:30). All of these are associated with *bara'* as creative expressions of Yahweh's liberating activity within history. Thus for Israel's creation-faith, a clear demarcation was made between divine and human creativity.

With regard to cosmic and natural phenomena, there seems little cause to dispute this distinction, for despite remarkable modern scientific advances human creative enterprise has not been able (with possibly only minor exceptions) to produce creatures in the astral or natural realms. But when it comes to the divine creativity associated with liberation there has been a significant effort, particularly among some of the liberation theologians, to treat this in close conjunction with human creativity. Thus, for example in Gustavo Gutierrez's *A Theology of Liberation*, we read, in the legitimate interest of correcting the neglect of markedly stressing the liberating and protagonistic role of humanity, that human creatures are the lords of creation and coparticipants in their own salvation, that salvation itself is the movement of human self-generation, humans assuming their destiny in history, forging and fulfilling themselves by continuing the work of creation through working to transform the world and build a just society by struggling against every form of human misery and exploitation. Or in his *Theology of Human Hope* and *Tomorrow's Child*, Rubem Alves tells us that creation is a join enterprise between God and humanity, particularly the future which is created by God and His human creatures in
historical dialogical cooperation. Humanity helps God when they become involved through their actions in the task of transforming the world of today into the new earth of tomorrow. Moreover, it is especially humanity that is the creator of the reality of the social system, and this creative act is the highest expression of human life. Because God makes humanity free to create, creation is therefore unfinished; God remains open, and this openness implies unfinishedness.

In these views of Gutierrez and Alves is affirmed a very high anthropology that clearly has some support from within the biblical tradition — in the creation of humanity as God's image, in the expectation that Israel was capable of obeying all of the covenant stipulations. As the Deuteronomist once put it: "But the word is very near you; it is in your mouth and in your heart, so that you can do it" (Deut.30:14). To biblical liberation-faith, humanity was no mere passive observer to the activity of liberation, but was called to participate in it, to work for the betterment of human life and the destruction and transformation of all that frustrates this. Also in the New Testament, though Paul speaks of salvation as the gift of God's grace based upon faith rather than works (Eph. 2:8), he could also say to the Philippians, "work out your own salvation with fear and trembling, for God is at work in you, both to will and work for his good pleasure" (Phil. 2:12f.). This is no contradiction, for grace stimulates moral exertions; because it is given, the recipient must work. Grace is exhibited in making humanity co-workers with God (cf. I Cor. 3:9). But if all this is so, what is to be made of the biblical insistence on a distinction between divine and human creativity in redemption?

Here it is important not to isolate the high view of humanity found at the end of Genesis 1 from the somewhat different picture we get in Genesis 3 (and indeed elsewhere in the biblical story), and make the anthropology of Genesis 1 the only normative one for our understanding of human creativity. When we put Genesis 1 and 3 together, which of course is what the Bible has done, what we find is essentially a confrontation between two differing conceptions of the divine image. On the one hand, there is the image bestowed by God to humanity in His creating them; on the other, the image, as it were, taken by humanity from God in disobeying His command not to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. On the one side we have the endowment of humanity with the capacity to represent the divine rule and authority over the animals and natural world, and all the freedom and opportunities for creativity that that implies; on the other, we see the counting of equality with God as a thing to be grasped, in the exercise of human autonomy, decision-making, and judgment without any reference to the Deity, because humanity has become like God, knowing good and evil. Thus not just one but two images are at work within human creativity, and because humanity does not simply represent the divine rule, but endeavors to usurp it, to play God on its own with overweening pride, self-confidence, hubris, this infects what humans do in their participation in God's liberating activity, so that the result is not clearly an unambiguous indication of a coincidence of the human with divine creativity. The conclusion to be drawn from this is not that human liberation work should be curtailed or become passive, but that in carrying it forward there must always be a frank acknowledgment that if too strong a stress is placed on the self-emancipation of humanity, then in the words of Norman Young in his recent book Creator, Creation and Faith, this “expects both too much and too little — too much of man who consistently turns his creative capacities to destructive ends; too little of God who comes from beyond man's own sphere of management to offer new directions and possibilities.”

I think there are also two other important factors in the divine creation activity for liberation that need to be brought into this picture. The first has to do with the motif of finishing, which within the Bible as a whole is applied to both creation and liberation. Just as at the end of the first creation story at the beginning of Genesis 2 God declares that all his cosmic creation work is brought to completion, so also in the New Testament the Fourth Evangelist records Jesus as proclaiming from his cross that his redemptive work is finished (John 19:30). At the end of the first creation story, the proclamation that the divine creation work is finished means that the fundamental structures and elements within the cosmos do not have to be redone, either annually on the New Year's Day, as in Babylonia,
or in some other periodic cyclical rhythm, in order to insure the harmony and stability of nature and society from the constantly encroaching threat of chaos, and also that the problems of history are not to be resolved by cosmic re-creation prior to the final consummation, nor is their ground to be traced from the original creation work. In the New Testament, when Jesus says from his cross, "It is finished" (John 19:30), it means that the way of suffering love that leads through the valley of the shadow of death has reached its fulfillment, and Jesus has brought to completion what God had commissioned His Anointed to say and do. This is not to imply that either the Old or New Testament words about finishing are meant to reduce or preclude human creativity, or make human participation in liberating work both futile and without significance. But they do serve to remind us that even before we begin our redemptive tasks, something decisive has already been accomplished by God in relation to this work, and that what has been done provides the framework, sets the tone, and indicates certain characteristics and limits to our own activity. Thus Alves' assertion of the openness of creation with its future and therefore its unfinishedness, is only partially correct. Obviously, there is a sense, acknowledged by the New Testament, in which all is not yet finished, neither with creation nor redemption. As Paul says in Romans (8:22f.) "We know that the whole creation has been groaning in travail together until now; and not only the creation, but we ourselves, who have the first fruits of the Spirit, groan inwardly as we wait for adoption as children, the redemption of our bodies." We live in anticipation of yet another culmination, an even more all-embracing and climactic word about finishing. But again, this is neither determined nor proclaimed as a result of the basis of human creative enterprise, but as John reveals in his final vision of the new heaven and the new earth in Revelation, it is the One sitting upon the throne who says: "It is done! I am the Alpha and the Omega, the beginning and the end. To the thirsty I will give water without price from the fountain of the water of life" (Rev. 21:6). At a point between the already and the not yet, we are privileged now to hear this divine word from the end, without which we are unable to undertake the unfinished task of bearing witness to God and His work with confidence and hope.

A second important factor that must be considered in the divine creativity for liberation relates to the problem which most frustrates and complicates our liberation work, viz., humanity's reaching out for its own divine image, its propensity to play God, or in the biblical words, to be like God knowing good and evil. By the early 6th century B.C., with the fall of Jerusalem and its aftermath, several of Israel's prophetic voices were prepared to admit that the traditional solution to this problem — that is, through expressing loyalty to Yahweh alone and showing it through total obedience to the covenant stipulations — was a manifest failure. From among these voices, it was the prophets Ezekiel and Jeremiah who had the most radical proposal to make: the recreation of humanity, at the apparent sacrifice of human freedom. For Ezekiel, the new humanity would be constituted by the gift of a new heart and a new spirit, a heart not of stone but of flesh, and a spirit which would cause people to walk in God's statutes and carefully observe His ordinances (Ezek. 36:26-27). For Jeremiah, though using different imagery but with similar import, the new humanity required a new covenant, a covenant not like the one made with the ancestors at Sinai, but one which presupposes that the divine teaching has been placed within people from the beginning, written as it were, upon their hearts, so they will no longer have to be taught its precepts or be exhorted to know the Lord, for they will already know Him by nature. Neither Ezekiel's nor Jeremiah's vision of the new humanity was fulfilled until the coming of Jesus, for it was in his life and ministry that the Church saw the first living example of a human new creation, whose divine image was not in the form of grasping equality with God, but in representing the invisible God and manifesting His fullness by emptying himself, taking the form of a servant, being born in human likeness and found in human form, humbling himself and becoming obedient unto death, even death on a cross (Phil. 2:7-8). And so in this way, all things, whether on earth or in heaven, are reconciled to God through him, making peace by the blood of his cross (Col. 1:20), i.e. the new covenant is initiated, as Jesus indicated to his disciples at his last supper, when he gave them the cup, saying, "This is my blood of the covenant, which is poured out for many" (Mark 14:24).
But how does Christ as the new humanity and the perfect divine image relate to our creative participation in liberation work? Obviously, we are not yet transformed or renewed after the image of our Creator, and we still wrestle with the double-image of on the one hand truly representing God's dominion, and on the other, acting as if only we were God. Yet Paul tells us that we can share in Christ's new humanity, we can become new creatures, to the extent that we become “in Christ,” and this suggests that one of the most important things we do in relation to our liberation tasks is to learn what it means for them that we are in Christ. That, in nuce, may be what theological education is or should be about. Clearly there is no time left to explore this, but only to say that to be in Christ, far from indicating basically a mystical absorption or physical unification with Deity, suggests that we take seriously the model of Christ's liberation work for our own, that as we work for social justice and against all oppression, we be able to hear and respond to his call to repent, acknowledging our involvement in sin, receive his forgiveness and then extend it to others, that we be willing to risk being crucified, dying, and being buried for the sake of His kingdom that we might also be raised with him, and in the end sit with him in heaven and appear with him in glory.

I hope that in what I have been trying to say here, I have managed to escape the characteristics against which the author of the Epistle to the Colossians admonished his readers. In the translation of J. B. Phillips, it reads: “Be careful that nobody spoils your faith through intellectualism or high-sounding nonsense. Such stuff is at best founded on man's ideas of the nature of the world and disregards Christ!” (Col. 2:8) Of course, as you will doubtless experience, if you have not already done so, intellectualism, high-sounding nonsense, and the stuff best founded on men's ideas of the nature of the world disregarding Christ, are not foreign to the theological scene, and we should not only be aware of this, but expose them for what they are. However, if I have succeeded in challenging your thinking, stimulating your imagination, and making you even more eager to be about the work that your presence here entails, I shall be satisfied that your theological journey at Union has well begun, and it is my hope that while on that journey, you also may be emboldened to take a fresh and critical look, as I have tried to do here, at important points where biblical and theological issues intersect, and then assess what this might mean for our faith and action, both in the Church and in the world.
NOTES

1. For this usage of Hebr. 'ezer, note esp. Exod. 18:4; Deut. 33:7, 29; Psa. 70:6 [Eng. 5]. God's 'ezer can also refer to the divine sustaining support (cf. Psa. 20:3 [Eng. 2]) and protection (cf. Psa. 33:20; 121:2f).


3. As e.g. has often been pointed out for the Old Testament where the tradition contains a recital of Yahweh's mighty redemptive deeds, but no mention of creation. Cf. Deut. 26:5-9; Josh. 24:1-15; 2 Sam. 7:4-17; Pss. 78 and 105. For a possible explanation of this, see further below. Cf. n. 2 above for several references in which creation is mentioned, but not redemtion.


6. For discussion and illustrations, see Brandon, S. G. F., Creation Legends of the Ancient Near East (London: Hodder and Stoughton, Ltd.; 1963).


10. J. Philip Hyatt has endeavored to develop the case against Yahweh ever having been conceived originally as a creator deity, but in the present writer's opinion, not convincingly. See his study, "Was Yahweh Originally a Creator Deity?", JBL 86 (1967). pp. 369-377.


12. Note the comments of P. Schoonenberg in his Covenant and Creation (London and Sydney: Sheed and Ward; 1968), p. 68. Though he thinks there may still be an echo in Genesis 1 of the old cosmogonic and theogonic faith in creation as liberation in the refrain, "And God saw that it was good," such an interpretation is problematic. A statement like that of Denis Baly in his recent monograph, God and History in the Old Testament: The Encounter with the Absolutely Other in Ancient Israel (New York: Harper and Row; 1976), according to which, "...for the Israelites every act of creation is an act of salvation" (p. 116, cf. also fn. 38), is patently hyperbolic, and not an accurate characterization of all creation traditions in the Old Testament.

13. Cf. Anderson, B. W., "A Stylistic Study of the Priestly Creation Story," in Canon and Authority: Essays in Old Testament Religion and Theology, ed. by G. W. Coats and B. O. Long (Philadelphia: Fortress Press; 1977), p. 161: "Properly speaking, the creation story, according to the Priestly scheme, is not really part of the primeval history (Urgeschichte), which begins with the portrayal of human history in the genealogies and narratives from Gen. 2:4a and on. Rather, the creation story is the preface to the primeval history. It sets the stage and provides the theological and anthropological presuppositions for the ensuing story. In the Priestly presentation, then, creation is not the beginning of history. It is proto-historical. Thus the pentateuchal story of redemption, in which Israel has a special role, is grounded in the prior affirmation of faith that God is the Creator."

14. Unless, of course, one understands 'chaos' more in terms of some of its original Greek meanings, i.e., referring to the yawning space and expanse of air between heaven and earth, or to darkness, especially that of the nether abyss, which is usually not the case when the word is used in English. In the Old Testament, Hebr. tohil seems rarely to be best rendered by the translation, 'chaos,' but instead by such ideas as 'emptiness, desolation, without inhabitants,' especially when applied descriptively to a desert (cf. Deut. 32:10; also Psa. 107:40; Job 6:18; 12:24), or to a city (cf. Isa. 24:10), or the earth (at creation, cf. Isa. 45:18; Job 26:7), under conditions where the latter two have the desert features of emptiness and desolation.

15. For Rahab, cf. Psa. 87:4; 98:11 (Eng. 10); Isa. 30:7; 51:9; Job 9:13; 26:12; Leviathan: Psa. 74:14; 104:26; Isa. 27:1; Job 3:8; 40:25 (Eng. 41:1); Tannûm, variously rendered in English by 'sea monster' (Gen. 1:21; Psa. 148:7; Job 7:12) and 'dragon' or 'monster' (Isa. 27:1; 51:9; Jer. 51:34; Ezek. 29:3; 32:2; Psa. 74:13), when depicting a creature whom Yahweh defeats in battle.

17. In his two studies, “Creation at Ugarit and in the Old Testament,” (in *VT* 15 [1965], pp. 313-324), and “From Chaos to Cosmos,” (in *Encounter* 26 [1965], pp. 183-197), Loren R. Fisher has attempted to show how Baal’s struggle with Yamm at Ugarit can rightly be interpreted as a cosmogonic activity, but he does this largely by broadening the traditional definition of creation to include the achievement of control over an already created order. For criticism of his effort, see McCarthy, *op. cit.*, p. 393, n. 1.


23. For Kung’s reflections on liberation, see esp. pp. 183-191; 554-602.

24. However, I must confess that I have not yet had sufficient time to work through all of the liberation theologians’ writings, so there may be some notable exceptions that have escaped my attention.


30. This obviously poses some difficult hermeneutical problems for the contemporary biblical interpreter, who may be tempted to resolve them too simplistically by opting for a ‘canon within the canon.’ Though in my view this solution should be avoided, how an alternative hermeneutic should be shaped that does justice both to the full biblical as well as present-day contexts is not easily determined, and unfortunately there is not space to pursue the matter further here.

31. For instance, since 1940, scientific enterprise has been able to produce 11 new elements, to bring the total now known to 103, but these have been made from already existing elements, not ex nihilo.


37. Young, *op. cit.*, p. 190. Cf. also the succinct way in which Roger Hazelton has appropriately described the relationship between human and divine activity, quite in keeping with the thrust of biblical tradition on this issue: “I am called upon to cooperate with God, not in the sense of doing what God cannot do without me, but in the sense of doing what I cannot do without God,” in *God’s Way With Man: Variations on the Theme of Providence* (New York and Nashville: Abingdon; 1956), p. 78.

38. Obviously a great deal more both could and should be said about what role biblical ‘new creation’ theology might play in a theology of liberation, but there is not space to do that here. See how Jürgen Moltmann has developed this in his *Theology of Hope* (London: SCM Press; 1967), esp. chapter III, and Young’s critical assessment of this, *op. cit.*, pp. 153-155. For an excellent study of the biblical background, see Reumann, J., *Creation and New Creation* (Minneapolis: Augsburg; 1973).
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In discussions of the theology and social teaching of the Roman Catholic Church in the twentieth century, it is common to hear references to the basically static view of the popes with regard to historical change. This static view is presumed to have characterized the teaching of the Church in the twentieth century.

The popes in their writings have given clear evidence of a static world view, and have, on various occasions, condemned alternative views. But there is a great deal of variation among the twentieth century popes in the matter of historical change; their views are not by any means uniform. This article will briefly examine some expressions of papal attitudes on historical change and suggest some of the consequences of these attitudes for the papal teaching on “social justice,” the term the popes used to designate that justice whose object is the common good.1

The twentieth century popes have all sought to clarify the link between charity, justice and peace in their social teaching. They have all maintained that justice is an indispensable part of the charity which is the message of the Gospel.2 All similarly agree that justice is a prerequisite of true peace.3 Peace is a Christian virtue to which the popes are sincerely attached. The peace of Christ should prevail on earth, they say.4 Meanwhile, justice is a universal norm, like charity.5 The two are necessarily inseparable, though clearly distinguishable.6 Charity is a higher virtue than justice, as it both motivates and completes justice.7 But the twentieth century popes are careful to deny that charity can substitute for justice;8 they insist that persons who are capable of doing justice cannot legitimately prefer to do charity. There is a strong emphasis in papal social teaching from that of Pope Leo XIII (1878-1903) onward on the pressing need for society to incorporate justice in legal and institutional structures as an aid in establishing a more just society on earth.9 This is, very briefly, the doctrinal view of justice used in papal social teaching. In papal determinations of justice in particular situations, however, one can find in the social teaching evidence of other understandings of justice. This article will attempt to demonstrate the correlation between these examples of another understanding of justice and particular papal attitudes toward historical change.

The first twentieth century pope to add to, change, or even address in any depth the social teaching of his predecessors was Pius XI (1922-1939).10 The two previous twentieth century popes had been preoccupied either with combatting Modernist theology and popularizing the sacrament of the Eucharist (Pius X) or with the promotion of negotiation and relief efforts during the first world war (Benedict XV). Thus our study begins with Pius XI, though reference to Leo XIII, the originator of modern social teaching, will be necessary.

In his documents involving social teaching Pius XI demonstrates the traditional belief in the permanency of truth. For Pius XI it is the Church’s possession of eternal truth — the whole of eternal truth — 11 which is the basis of the Church’s claim to be the perfect society, the leader of all other societies.12 Pius XI refers to the teachings of the Church which contain these truths as “eternal,” “unchanging,” and “unchangeable.”13 Pius XI apparently thought that the age in which these eternal truths were best reflected was the Middle Ages. He was sincerely attached to the order which prevailed in the Middle Ages, and

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demonstrated his attachment not only in allusions to that good order, but also through his fascination with the theory of Catholic corporatism. This fascination was often betrayed in his writings (the most obvious case being paragraphs 91-95 of Quadragesimo anno, May 15, 1931), but Pius XI’s hesitations concerning the state corporatism of his day prevented him from unreservedly advocating corporatism.

Like all the popes, Pius XI recognized the existence of change in the world. R.L. Camp quoted a passage from a May 16, 1926 letter of Pius XI to Italian Catholics which reads:

My first reflection relates to the mutability of human affairs — not only the lesser ones but the greater ones as well, not only those which are contingent aspects of social life but also those which appear to be of its very essence and are usually considered impossible to conceive except as eternal. This is truly a mutability from which no one can escape, because this is the destiny of all created things — in fact, this mutability is inevitable.

This is, as Camp maintained, a remarkable statement from any pope. Camp also asserted that this statement is characteristic of the openness of the first part of the papacy of Pius XI, an openness which ended with the world depression. Beginning in the early thirties, Camp continued, Pius XI became increasingly more conservative than even his predecessors. But from the information Camp gives about this letter, other conclusions are possible. (This letter is not contained in the Acta, and I find no other references to it.) In this letter, Pius XI did express the view that change is integral to history and affects even essential aspects of human existence, such as property, labor, and the family. But when he continued, after the above passage, he asserted that the Church, though eternal, could live with changes in the world. Camp did not appreciate the extent to which this was a continuation of the traditional view that the spiritual was primary, and the material secondary because transient. Change in the world could be accepted (at least insofar as it did not interfere with the position of the Church) because it was not important.

It is true that this passage was, nevertheless, much more accepting of change than any of those of Pius XI’s predecessors or even those of his immediate successor. But this sentiment was not reflected in any of Pius XI’s other writings. This view of change was entirely absent when he considered particular historical change, such as in the following passage explaining how the good order of the Middle Ages gave way to the present one:

At one period there existed a social order, which, by no means perfect in every respect, corresponded nevertheless in a certain measure to the needs and conditions of the times. That this order has long since perished is not because it was incapable of development and adaptation to changing needs and circumstances, but rather to the wrong-doing of men. Men were hardened in excessive self-love, and refused to extend that good order, as was their duty, to the increasing numbers of people, or else, deceived by the attractions of false liberty and other errors, they grew impatient of every restraint and endeavored to throw off every authority.

This is the most characteristic explanation of change in the world for Pius XI: individual sin. And the most common particular sin responsible for such social changes was, for Pius XI as for the long tradition, the sin of apostacy. The abandonment of the faith of the Church was the action which Pius saw responsible for all the evils besetting the modern world. In his consideration of particular changes in the world, Pius XI’s attachment to the order of the Middle Ages caused him to equate change with evil.

That Pius XI did not view historical change as naturally forthcoming and progressive was best demonstrated in his consideration of capitalism in Quadragesimo anno. Pius XI was the first pope to note that the character of capitalism had changed. In 1931 he observed that domination had replaced competition in the capitalist system. He saw the concentration of wealth and power as the natural result of allowing unrestrained competition. But despite his acute analysis of the concentration process, Pius XI placed the blame for this change for the worse not on any natural direction of the capitalist system, but on the lack of moral restraint of those involved. He not only rebuked the State for having become involved in the controversy but praised Leo’s attempt to “adjust the capitalist economic system to the norms of right order” and declared:

It is clear then that the system as such is not to be condemned. Surely it is not vicious of its very nature; but it violates right order whenever capital so employs...
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the working classes as to divert business and economic activity entirely to its own arbitrary will... 28

Pius XI, then, left evidence that he viewed change in the world not as an essential element, but as the unavoidable result of human sin and the mark of the imperfection of all material things. Like the change from the medieval system, the change from competitive to monopoly capitalism was interpreted by Pius XI as the consequence of sin and not as the result of dynamic human history.

The writings of Pius XII (1939-1958) indicate a view similar to that of Pius XI on the subject of historical change. Pius XII wrote more extensively on this subject than other twentieth century popes. It became the subject of one of his most important encyclicals, Humani generis, August 12, 1950, in which he condemned "existentialism, historicism, a false theory of evolution, the urge for innovation, and the Catholic feeling of inferiority with regard to modern science."29 In this encyclical Pius XII wrote:

Looking around at those outside the fold of Christ, one can easily discern the principal trends which not a few learned men follow. Some are imprudent and indiscreet enough to hold that the so-called theory of evolution, although not yet fully proved even in the domain of the natural sciences, explains the origins of all things, and they go so far as to support the monistic and pantheistic notion that the entire world is subject to continual evolution. Communists eagerly seize upon this theory in hopes of depriving souls of every idea of God and of defending and propagating more effectively their dialectical materialism.

The fictitious tenets of evolution, which repudiate all that is absolute, firm and immutable, have paved the way for the new erroneous philosophy which, a rival of idealism, immanentism, and pragmatism, has come to be called existentialism because, forgetful of the immutable essences of things, it concerns itself only with individual existence.

There is also a false historicism which, refusing to look beyond the random happenings of human life, undermines the foundations of all truth and absolute law in the domain of philosophy as well as that of Christian dogma.30

Five years later Pius XII delivered an address on the Church and history in which he again addressed the subject of historicism in much the same terms:

The term "historicism" describes a philosophical system; that which sees only change and evolution in every spiritual reality, in the knowledge of what is true, in religion, in morality and law, and rejects in consequence, everything that is permanent, eternally of value, and absolute. Such a system is assuredly not reconcilable with the Catholic conception of the world, or in general, with any religion which recognizes a personal God.31

Pius XII was aware of change in the world. His allucutions and radio addresses touched on every aspect of the modern world, with a noticeable preference for the topics of science, technology, communications and modern medicine. But as the above passages reveal, this recognition of change and the pace at which it occurs did not prevent Pius XII from conceptualizing the world as one in which we find "the random happenings of human life" and "the immutable essences of things."

Pius XII, as Pius XI before him, viewed truth as eternal, entrusted to the Church. The Church was to teach this eternal truth, bringing humanity back to the faith, and thereby reinstitute the worldly order which accorded with that truth.32 Changes in the world in which this project was to take place were incidental, to be taken into account for purposes of communicating better this truth which Christ entrusted to the Church.33 This attitude reflects the belief of these two popes that the supernatural, the soul, and heaven are superior to the material, the body, and this world.34 In keeping with these priorities, the Church was viewed as the depository of truth and did not need to take too seriously the world.

John XXIII (1958-1963) expressed a modified position on this understanding of historical change which characterized Pius XII. John XXIII gave many indications of regarding truth in much the same manner as his predecessor, similarly identifying it with the teaching of the Church and the Gospel message.35 But in his opening address to the Council on October 11, 1962, John XXIII differentiated the deposit of truth from the manner in which those truths are formulated, and implicitly approved updating those formulations.36 This passage is not easily
reconciled with John XXIII's other pronouncements on truth, especially the sentence from *Mater et Magistra*, May 14, 1961, which reads: "The permanent validity of the Catholic Church's social teaching admits of no doubt." The statement to the Council seems also incompatible with the position which John assumed on the use of Latin in the Church, since he maintained that the use of Latin rather than vernaculars helped insure freedom from error, and should therefore be retained.

But as for historical change, one does not find in John XXIII nostalgia for a past age such as was present in the writings of Pius XI. Nor did John appear to hold the view of Pius XII that neither truth nor essential elements of the world change. John XXIII was a conservative by nature; his planning for the Council, and his positions on the use of Latin and the worker-priest movement all place him in the conservative camp, if not the reactionary camp, within the hierarchy. But John saw the world and its changes as cause for optimism; his writings clearly prove that he thought the direction of change in the world was in accordance with the demands of the Gospel. He emphasized correction of abuses less than his predecessors, and, in the words of one commentator, "frankly admired what was already being done and wished an extension of its benefits to all people."

John XXIII had little need to examine the relationship between truth and change, for he thought that truth was becoming manifest amidst all the change. He seems to have trusted in progress in history to an extent which was not possible for his predecessors, who were suspicious of change itself. John XXIII was enthusiastic about existing institutions and the social programs of the modern state, and viewed capitalism as a positive blessing. In his dealing with the modern world John XXIII was essentially uncritical (which is a cause for criticism with some commentators who question the judgement of history on his papacy.)

The documents of Paul VI (1963-) reveal yet another understanding of truth and change in the world, and possible even more than one. Paul VI signed the Pastoral Constitution of Vatican II, *Gaudium et Spes*, November 1965, which had this to say of change:

> Today the human race is passing through a new stage of its history. Profound and rapid changes are spreading by degrees around the whole world. Triggered by the intelligence and creative energies of man, these changes recoil upon him, upon his decisions and desires, both individual and collective, and upon his manner of thinking and acting with respect to things and to people. Hence we can already speak of a true social and cultural transformation, one which has repercussions on man's religious life as well.

As happens in any crisis of growth, this transformation has brought serious difficulties in its wake.

History itself speeds along on so rapid a course that an individual can scarcely keep abreast of it. The destiny of the human community has become all of a piece, where once the various groups of men had a kind of private history of their own. This, the human race passed from a rather static concept of reality to a more dynamic, evolutionary one. In consequence, there has arisen a new series of problems, a series as important as can be, calling for new efforts of analysis and synthesis.

In these paragraphs there was a clear difference with the view of John, a difference characteristic of the entire introductory statement of *Gaudium et Spes*. The self-propulsion of historical change was recognized, but rather than identify the direction of this change with the Gospel message, the Council Fathers recognized the problems to which this change gives rise. Equally striking was their elaboration of John's statement of the need to reformulate the truths of the Gospels for the present time. The Fathers proposed the use of the findings of secular science, and of literature and the arts, in addition to theological principles. They endorsed "the introduction of modern literature and the arts into the sanctuary where they can help raise the minds of persons to God." In the social teaching for which Paul VI alone is responsible one can find some part of this message. In *Octogesima adveniens*, May 14, 1971, Paul VI wrote.

The Gospel is not out of date because it was proclaimed, written and lived in a different socio-economic context. Its inspiration, enriched by the living experiences of Christian tradition over the centuries, remains
ever new for converting men and for advancing the life of society. It is
not, however, to be utilized for the profit of particular temporal options,
to the neglect of its universal and eternal message.  

While the first part of this passage contains the theme from *Gaudium et Spes* above, the
passage ends with the assertion of the one universal and eternal message of the Gospel. Presuming,
as Paul’s closing warning seems to do, that one can recognize the eternal message of the Gospel so as
to avoid using it for the profit of a temporal option, then the assertion of one eternal message effect-
ively calls into question the possibility of the newness of the Gospel in every age.

Such a compromise between the historicist and traditional viewpoints has characterized Paul’s
pronouncements on faith and history. He spoke of historical evolution and how it led to an awareness
of new applications of social justice and social teaching in the decades since Leo

But it evidently did not seem to Paul that historical evolution had any effect on the principles of the social teaching.
In accordance with papal tradition, Paul referred to change in the social teaching as if it were always
only further elaboration which entailed no alteration, abridgement, or substitutions. There is no
clear break between Paul and the view of Pius XI that changes in the world represent the context in
which the Church preaches her message, not the context in which the message rises revealed.

The understanding of Paul VI on historical change is not, therefore, readily categorized. It
was not clear to what extent he endorsed the position of the bishops in part I of *Gaudium et Spes*,
nor to what extent his historicist vocabulary and mode of expression represented his views. In general
however, there can be little doubt that whatever his understanding of the relation between history and
the truths of faith, his understanding and analysis of political and economic changes in the world was
more acute and realistic than that of previous twentieth century popes. His *Populorum progressio*,
March 26, 1967, and *Octogesima adveniens* include data from social scientific analysis of historical
development in their consideration of current problems in a much more explicit manner than in
previous papal writing.

We now turn to the documents of these same popes as they deal with the concept of social
justice and its determinations. We shall see that the popes differ among themselves on this subject
fully as much as they do in their views of historical change.

In the social teaching up to John XXIII there has been a continuous trend to relate social
justice to peace and order in society. The common good was often described in terms of the
absence of strife and controversy. Though these popes recognized with Leo

Though these popes recognized with Leo XIII that peace could
only be built on justice, the assumed static view of history made it difficult for them to accept
the controversy which each new approximation of justice demanded. Consequently, they tended
to de-emphasize justice in the great stress put on peace.

It is undeniable that the history of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries offered the popes
little incentive to either recognize the faster pace of change or adapt to the new modern reality. The
modern world had not been kind to either the spiritual or the temporal authority and position of the
Church, and her unwillingness to embrace it was to some extent an unwillingness to open herself to
more attacks. The popes were determined to hold onto those aspects of the world which were familiar
and acceptable, and to change those aspects of which they disapproved. This was basically a reformist
position, and the popes explicitly recognized it. The basic structures of society were not called into
question by the popes, who still saw them as the supports of that peace and order which had reigned
in the past and could again if all would support the traditional institutions: the Church, the family,
private property, and the (Christian) state. All the popes have either identified the cause of the social
problems with apostasy from God and his Church, or identified the solution of the social problem with
the return of the entire flock to its shepherd, the Church. But though the popes saw all the social
problems linked to this sin of apostasy, they did not see them linked to one another. They envisioned
them as essentially self-contained, not as evidence of social sin or of structural problems in society.

In paragraph 29 of *Rerum novarum*, Leo XIII set forth a principle which, later elaborated by
Pius XI as the principle of subsidiarity, was highly influential in later social teaching on the point
of the connection between social problems. Leo XIII wrote:

If by a strike, or other combination of workmen, there should be imminent
danger of disturbance to the public peace; or if the circumstances were such
that among the laboring population the ties of family life were relaxed; if
Religion were found to suffer through the workmen not having the time and
opportunity to practice it; if in workshops and factories there were danger to morals through the mixing of the sexes or from any occasion of evil; or if employers laid burdens upon the workingmen which were unjust, or degraded them with conditions which were repugnant to their dignity as human beings; finally, if health were endangered by excessive labor, or if work were unsuited to sex or age, — in these cases, there can be no question that, within certain limits, it would be right to call in the help and authority of the law. The limits must be determined by the nature of the occasion which calls for the law's interference — the principle being this, that the law must not undertake more, nor go further, than is required for the remedy of the evil or the removal of the danger.55

This is the first of a series of papal statements in which it is assumed, if not stated, that justice is to be restored after a disturbance of peace. Presumably, the disturbance has alerted authorities to the existence of an injustice, which, when remedied, is the end of both the disturbance of the peace and the injustice. The popes seem to begin with peace, the fruit of justice, move to an equation of peace and justice, and finally assume that where there is peace there is justice. Thus when wage disputes broke the peace, one remedied the obvious cause of the disturbance and raised wages, thereby doing justice. But since the principal objective was to restore peace, no investigation or analysis of the justice of the total situation was ever done. In fact, Leo denied the civil power the right to do more than restore the peace. It is this restriction which is formulated by Pius XI as the principle of subsidarity:

It is indeed true, as history clearly shows, that owing to the change in social conditions, much that was formerly done by small bodies can nowadays only be accomplished by large organizations. Nevertheless, it is a fundamental principle of social philosophy, fixed and unchangeable that one should not withdraw from individuals and commit to the community what they can accomplish by their own enterprise and industry. So, too, it is an injustice and at the same time a grave evil and a disturbance of right order, to transfer to a larger and higher collectivity functions which can be performed and provided by lesser and subordinate bodies. Inasmuch as every social activity should, by its very nature, prove a help to members of the body social, it should never absorb or destroy them.

The State authorities should leave to other bodies the care and expediting of business and activities of lesser moment, which otherwise become for it a source of great distraction. It will then perform with greater vigor, freedom, and effectiveness, the tasks belonging properly to it, and which it alone can accomplish: directing, supervising, encouraging and restraining as circumstances suggest or necessity demands. Let those in power, therefore, be convinced that the more faithfully the principle of 'subsidiarity' is followed and a hierarchical order prevails among the various organizations, the more excellent will be the authority and efficiency of society, and the happier and more prosperous the condition of the commonwealth.56

Pius XI and Pius XII were both reacting against the modern trend of the State to absorb the powers of former intermediate institutions, "leaving virtually only individuals and the State."57 They maintain that this is a dangerous situation for the State, which has its energies distracted from its real task. But the popes were also aware that this newly empowered State was dangerous for the Church as well, as recent history had well proved. This State challenged not only the privileges of the Church, but the rights of individuals, who could not withstand the power of the State and were left without any intermediate institutions under which to shelter. As a result, the limitation of the rights of the State has been a central theme of papal teaching.58 Pius XI's statement is very characteristic of that teaching which seeks to delimit the power of the state.

The principle of subsidiarity functioned to raise questions about the legitimacy of a State which attempted to tackle structural problems in its society, even though the presupposition underlying the
principle of subsidiarity was that there were no other powers capable of doing so. Pius XI relied on
this same principle of subsidiarity to question the State's purpose in his address on the anniversary of
Rerum novarum, La solemnita (June 1, 1941). He denied the State's power to reconstruct itself
or to restructure any parts of itself, because Pius XII, like Pius XI, refused to grant the State powers
which might be used against individuals and aspects of the society which the popes supported. In
Pius XII this denial of power to the State was treated in conjunction with the errors of communism,
suggesting that in the opinion of Pius XII is was the communist State which claimed such power.
The total opposition of Pius XII to all things communist was often explicit in his writings.

By contrast, John XXIII in Mater et Magistra quotes the first of the two paragraphs above from
Pius XI on the principle of subsidiarity, but then qualifies their application:

Indeed, as is easily perceived, recent developments of science and technology provide
additional reasons why, to a greater extent than heretofore, it is within the power
of public authorities to reduce imbalances, whether those between various sectors of
economic life, or between different regions of the same nation, or even between
different peoples of the world as a whole. These same developments make it possible to keep fluctuations in the economy within bounds and to provide effective
measures for preventing mass unemployment. Consequently, it is requested again
and again of public authorities responsible for the common good, that they
intervene in a wide variety of economic affairs, and that, in a more extensive and
organized way than heretofore, they adapt institutions, tasks, means and pro­
cedures to this end. Nevertheless, it remains true that precautionary activities
of public authorities in the economic field, though widespread and penetrating,
should be such that they not only avoid restricting the freedom of private citizens,
but also increase it, so long as the basic rights of each individual person are pre­served inviolate.

John XXIII has here reduced the effect of Pius XI's pronouncement to the point of almost nulli­
fying it, first, by omitting the specific prohibitions against the state interfering in business, and second,
by approving the state as overseer of the economy. His warning that in doing these things the state should
take care not to infringe on individual rights radically changes the sense of Pius XI's statement. Pius
had said that the State could not do these things without violating these rights, and therefore it was
not licit for the state to do them. John XXIII further changed the meaning of the principle of subsi­
darity two years later in his encyclical Pacem in terris, April 11, 1963:

Just as it is necessary, moreover, in each state that relations which the public
authority has with its citizens, families, and intermediate associations be con­
trolled and regulated by the principle of subsidiarity, it is equally necessary that
the relationships which the worldwide public authority and the public authorities
of individual nations be governed by the same principle. This means that the
world-wide public authority and the public authorities must tackle and solve
problems of an economic, social, political, and cultural character which are
posed by the universal common good. For, because of the vastness, complexity,
and urgency of these problems, the public authorities of the individual states
are not in a position to tackle them with any hope of a positive solution.

The world-wide public authority is not intended to limit the sphere of action
of the public authority of the individual state, much less to take its place. On
the contrary, its purpose is to create, on a world basis, an environment in which
the public authorities of each state, its citizens and intermediate associations can
carry out their tasks, fulfill their duties, and exercise their rights with greater
security.

Paul VI continued in his writings, both in Populorum progressio and less explicitly in
Octogesima adveniens, this insistence on the creation of new forces and authorities able
to deal with international problems. Thus what had been a principle which denied to the state the
authority to regulate the economy and related aspects of life evolved into a principle which demanded
the creation and empowerment of overarching authorities to deal with problems of international
economic injustice.

As was the case with Paul VI's view of historical change, his treatment of justice is somewhat
difficult to categorize. Earlier popes, especially Pius XI, had condemned the imperialism of money and criticized the structures of society, but were explicit about their belief that these structures were basically sound and capable of reform. Paul VI, in both *Populorum progressio* and *Octogesima adveniens*, was very critical of the existing social and economic order and the modern mentality which supports it. Some of his criticisms went much farther than those of earlier popes in analysing what the specific ills are and to what extent they are systemic. But Paul, like his predecessors, saw no available alternative to the neo-colonial capitalist system of today, though he clearly felt that a great deal of manipulation of the system was necessary for real development to occur. Paul was much stronger in his attack on capitalism, and not nearly so optimistic about possibilities for reform as his predecessors had been. In *Populorum progressio*, his condemnation of the relationship between First and Third world countries (in which connection Paul uses the term "neo-colonialism" in paragraph 52) was more than a deliberate balance to his condemnation of socialism and more than a purely theoretical critique of capitalism. The statement seems rather to be based on a kind of analysis of reality, on the data gathered by the social sciences (such as the section on the growing gap between the rich and the poor, the rich nations and poor nations).

Perhaps the point which best conveys the difference between Paul VI and the previous papal tradition on the relationship between social justice and the status quo is the famous phrase from *Populorum progressio*: "development is the new name for peace" (*hodie nemo dubiat progressionem idem valere ac pacem*). Clearly Paul VI had turned the usual attitude on its head; now it was not the status quo which was assumed to be just, but the change of the status quo which justice required. This was a significant shift at the level of theory; whether this theoretical change will make itself felt by reversing the traditional tendency to support the status quo is, of course, another question.

This has been a very brief overview of a complex subject. There are many other aspects of papal treatment of justice in the twentieth century which have developed in a similar direction, especially papal determinations of justice in specific situations and for individuals. But this examination of twentieth century papal views on historical change and social justice is sufficient to indicate some parallelism of development.

NOTES

1. Jean-Yves Calves and Jacques Perrin, *The Church and Social Justice* (London: Burns and Oates, 1961) pp. 153ff. The popes spoke of justice from within the Thomist framework (*Summa* 2a2ae, 58-61). Their one addition to the Thomist vocabulary was the term "social justice" which corresponds closest to the Thomist term "general justice" (literally "legal justice").


17. *Church and Social Justice*, pp. 422-423; *Papal Ideology*, pp. 36-40.


19. Ibid., p. 37.

20. Ibid., p. 38.


23. QA, AAS 23 (1931): 221.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid., AAS 23 (1931): 212.

27. Ibid., AAS 23 (1931): 211.

28. Ibid.


32. SP, AAS 31 (1939): 440-441; *Sertum laetitiae*, AAS 31 (1939): 649.


36. AAS 54 (1962): 792.


39. Ibid.


42. Ibid., p. 159.


44. GS, AAS 58 (1966): 1027.

45. Ibid., AAS 58 (1966): 1029.

46. Ibid., AAS 58 (1966): 1083.


49. A continuing note in papal documents has been the gradualism which the popes urge as the proper method of dealing with injustice. They justify this approach by claiming speedy changes destroy the order which prevents total injustice. See: *Meminisse juvat*, AAS 50 (1958): 449-459; MM, AAS 53 (1961): 433; *Ad petri cathedram*, AAS 51 (1959): 527; PT, AAS 55 (1963): 301. Perhaps the best example of this line of thought is Leo XIII’s *In plurimis*, AAS 20 (1888): 545-559.

50. QA, AAS 23 (1931): 202, 203, 207, 210, 218, 225-226; DR, AAS 29 (1937): 84; PP, AAS 59 (1971): 273, 296, 297. These are instances of the popes’ labeling their own proposals as reforms. But perhaps Pius XII, so absorbed in opposition to Communism, and John XXIII, so optimistic about world
development, were more reformist and less radical regarding change in the capitalistic west than these popes.


54. Pius, of course, did not present it as an addition to the social teaching, but as reiteration of previous teaching.

55. ASS 23 (1891): 658.

56. QA, AAS 23 (1931): 203.

57. Ibid.

58. Leo XIII did this in: Arcanum, Diuturnum, Immortale Dei, Sapientiae Christianae, Graves de communi. Pius XI continued to point out the limits on state action: Mit brennender sorge, Casti connubi, Divini illius magistri, and Non abiamo bisogno (translated by National Catholic Welfare Conference, Sixteen Encyclicals of Pius XI [Washington, D. C.: NCWC, 1937]). Pius XII was much less systematic, but considered the question in SP, Sertum laetitiae, In questo giorno, and La solennita. There was a break with John XXIII.

59. AAS 33 (1941): 222.


64. See note 48.


66. AAS 59 (1967): 283: "novum quoddam colonicae dictionis genus".


68. The Thomist term for this is "particular justice", of which there are two varieties, distributive and commutative, both of which are explicitly treated by the popes. (See Summa 2a 2ae, 58.)

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BOOK REVIEWS


The first thing to say is that I can’t write a conventional review of this book. It grabs and involves me too much. Bill Coffin is a person and Christian minister interacting with events of history. As he tells of those events, I find myself repeatedly writing in the margins of his book notes about what I was doing at the same time. So I can write about this book only by writing more about myself than is modest.

As one example, both trivial and world-shattering, both of us were beside radios on the afternoon of December 7, 1941. He was in the home of an Andover Academy teacher, listening to the New York Philharmonic Orchestra. I was in a tent at Camp Robinson, Arkansas, where for the only time in an army career I tuned in on the National Radio Vespers for a sermon of my teacher, Harry Emerson Fosdick. Both of us remember the interruption of the broadcasts by the announcement of the bombing of Pearl Harbor, an event that was to shake and shape our lives. Neither of us knew of the other, nor could we guess that he would some day be my pastor and the successor to Fosdick in the pulpit of the Riverside Church.

Although I started life about seven years earlier than Bill Coffin, he moved faster. Thus he was only two years behind me in going through the Officers Candidate School at Ft. Benning, Georgia. (On Sunday afternoon, when the post was lonely, I practiced on the obstacle course so that I would not flunk out of the school; he practiced to set a new regimental record.) He crossed the channel from England to France only two months after me. (In Paris he envied the troops on the battle front, while we in the fighting envied those in Paris. His book verifies our worst suspicions that they were really living it up back there.) During my last spring as a graduate student at Union Theological Seminary, he came to the annual Conference on Ministry for college students, but we did not meet. He, still moving faster than I, was found “guilty” in a civil rights case in a southern court a full two years ahead of me.

We share other memories. There was Henry Sloane Coffin, known as “Uncle Henry” to many student generations at Union, but literally Uncle Henry to Bill. There was the news of Franklin Roosevelt’s death, coming to him in a French camp and to me on a road in Bavaria, and somehow impressing each of us as a personal loss. There were days, both tedious and exhilarating, in court rooms— he as defendant in a famous case, I as frequent witness and consultant in trials of conscientious objectors.

Just when we first met, I don’t remember. Our paths did not cross often. But occasionally I find myself filling in the spaces between the lines of this book with some memory of Bill in action.

So, as I say, this can’t be a normal book review. Bill Coffin’s memoir will always be to me a precious book, stirring memories, prodding my conscience, jarring me to heightened awareness of history, faith, and responsibility in this twentieth century.

Even so, I can and ought to say a few things of a more “objective” sort. This is the story of an adventurous, gifted man of action with a marvelous skill in language and anecdote. By family background and personal aptitude he came to move readily among the great and famous. His confidence in encounters—whether of fists or wits— is overwhelming. Who else ever phoned the White House, long distance collect, twice with the same dime, to ask for help? Who else, having never met U Thant, ever phoned the United Nations and made an appointment—in the nonchalant confidence that “gracious gall was the best modus operandi”? 
Bill Coffin was born into an aristocratic world that is no more—a world destroyed partly by non-intentional forces of history and partly by crusaders like Bill himself. Yet, in these days when ministers strain to establish their origins among the oppressed, he skips the guilt trip and tells what life was like among the “children of a ruling class.” In his early teens, studying piano and harmony in Paris, he aspired to be a concert pianist. In the Army his linguistic skills brought him assignments as a headquarters interpreter, then as a Russian liaison officer, in which capacity one event convinced him forever of the moral inadequacy of simply obeying orders. At Yale College he was impressed with the writings of Sartre and Camus, but decided that “the theologians seemed to be in touch with a deeper reality.” Even so, it was almost an accident that he entered Union Seminary rather than going to work for the CIA. After an “exceedingly happy” year at Union, he did sign on with the CIA, working in Europe for three years. Then it was Yale Divinity School, followed by chaplaincies at Andover, Williams College, and the prominent fifteen-plus years of chaplaincy at Yale.

It was his participation first in the civil rights movement, then in the resistance to the war in Vietnam that made the name of Coffin, if not a household word, at least a word well known on campuses and in government offices. There were many unsung heroes of those days, but in Coffin the situation and the person came together with peculiar aptness. He showed an ability to dramatize issues—and occasionally to dramatize himself. It is to his credit that he acknowledges a weakness on occasion, for “rhetorical showboating”; it is to his greater credit that he has an authentic eloquence, a biblical imagination, and a theological depth that enable him to address the seventies as powerfully as he did the sixties.

Every writer of autobiography—I speak as one who has had a bit of a fling at that venture—in intentionally tells some things and holds back others. The same writer also inadvertently reveals and conceals a self.

Bill Coffin sees himself as a person with conflicting passionate and duty-oriented impulses, as a romantic and a WASP, as a prodigal son and older brother—within one personality. He occasionally wonders that he likes “to work with one crowd and drink with another.” He can enjoy his own confidence and smile at his brashness. He unveils some of his doubts and anxieties. Of music, he says: “In times of utter desolation, God alone has comforted me more.”

In particular, he acknowledges the fears of one who “had never been taught how to deal with failure.” Failure in marriage is painful to any sensitive person; to acknowledge such failure twice must be especially painful to somebody accustomed to success. Bill recalls with a smile that in his distress it was Rabbi Abraham Heschel who reminded “a Christian that his salvation lay not in being sinless, but in accepting forgiveness.”

Bill Coffin is now the Senior Minister of the Riverside Church in New York. The press sometimes refers to the prestige of that church. More important is the fact that, unlike a campus church, this is a church of tremendous variety—educationally, economically, racially, culturally. Bill’s dream is of a ministry of this church to the city and to the world-wide community. It is a dream for a person who has known triumphs and failures, a dream that calls for the utmost of power and the utmost of trust in grace.

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This book in a remarkable way expresses the wholeness of the Christian message and of the Church’s mission. At first glance a reader may get a misleading impression and assume that it is just one more popular study book of a familiar kind or just one more book about cities in distress.
It is a book with so many dimensions that it is difficult to do justice to it in a review. It not only provides fresh and illuminating material for anyone concerned about Christian social ethics but it also can be extremely useful in ways I shall explain later for groups in congregations which are at all open to the social concerns of the Church. I think that even the title gives a too limited idea of what the book is about; it is about people living in urban civilization more than about the familiar problems of cities as such.

The most distinctive contribution of the authors is in the second half of the book which is a brief report of the study of a scientifically chosen sample of residents in the urban area made up of Raleigh, Durham, and Chapel Hill, North Carolina. These cities may seem remote from the experience of readers in other areas of the country but I think that the study has more than regional importance because of the mixture of conservatism which happens to be of a southern variety and strong progressive influences in those cities. Churches in other areas would not expect to find a much more liberal mixture in this area than in theirs but the liberal factor is important. ("Liberal" as a label has become confusing but my use of it should be clear from the context.) The study reveals a surprising openness to liberal goals in this sample even though Nixon carried the area in 1972 as the authors remind us. It suggests that, whatever may be said about the increasing conservatism of the American electorate, the situation is really very spotty and that unexpectedly liberal opinions are quite widespread on free health care for those who cannot afford it, on the government's responsibility to guarantee a living to those who cannot find work, and even on broader questions having to do with the unfairness of the system and the need for major changes. The same is true on questions of racial equality and, most surprising to me, on spending less for defense and more on education.

The questions addressed to the sample brought out the fact that people often thought that their neighbors were more conservative than they themselves were. The authors make the following comment on this: "One moral advantage of social research is that it opens the window a bit to the thinking of one's neighbors down the block. What if in increasing numbers they too are uncomfortable with their culture's shrill note of individualism? To discover that would make one feel less lonely, less a solitary voice crying the wilderness." (p. 125)

One result of the study is that there is generally greater openness on these issues among people who have economic security than among the less secure. I know that this is true of some positions on the conservative-liberal spectrum but would not members of organized labor insist on reforms in regard to medical care and unemployment? Perhaps they are among the more secure. (On national defense their leaders tend to be hawkish.) I am no judge of sociological methods but I have confidence in what I know of the history of the authors.

Their comment which I have quoted suggests that this book should help seminary students and ministers to be less afraid of the conservatism of middle class congregations. Also, and more important, if the book were studied by members of a congregation, they could discuss in an objective way whether or not it mirrors them and, if not, why not. Many of the most important and controversial social and political issues would be brought out for discussion in a more helpful way than when a group is responding to presentations by persons who have their own concerns to get across.

The authors find a great deal of hard core conservative individualism. They describe this by referring to "the tendencies for racism, sexism and militarism to be associated with a general posture that is individualistic, reveres America uncritically, and explains problems in society through blame for their victims". (p. 124) It could hardly be better described. I think that the book is dominated by a great sense of change in what is taken for granted, of change in moral sensitivity in attitudes toward minorities and society's victims generally. One illustration that is mentioned is quite telling. What would most Americans, both white and black think, if the president of the United States should say what Theodore Roosevelt, to whom the adjective "liberal" would have been applied in many respects, said about blacks. He "spoke of black people as 'a race altogether inferior to whites' and confessed publicly that he erred in inviting Washington [Booker T.] to the White House as a dinner guest." (p. 130) One hopeful sign in the Church and in political life is that so many things that have been said by respected leaders in the past can only be said by cranks in some corner today.

The study of opinions expressed by the sample is accompanied by a deeper study of character traits and fundamental attitudes, of commitments and anxieties. There is a very complicated discussion of the results of the study in terms of four criteria "for defining the 'ethical maturity' of a group of modern urban citizens". (p. 112) They are as follows: 1. "A disposition to act on their
beliefs; 2. "a willingness to act for the good of others or for the common good when there is a sacrifice of private interest required;" 3. "openness to the interests of others regardless of race, sex, age, nationality, or other arbitrary social boundaries;" 4. "an affirmative disposition toward life which is given expression in mutually supportive friendship patterns". The authors made a point of using language that would be understood in the secular world. Their study of the relation between the four criteria is of great interest and its complexities call for very careful study.

One of the chief findings which is no surprise but which does have great importance for the pastoral responsibility of the Church and for churches as communities is that those who are most active for the sake of justice and the common good greatly need interpersonal support, the support of a koinonia. The following passage is close to one of the main interests of the authors:

"Some of the high incidences of insomnia and stomach trouble can be found among persons who express a high level of ethical sensitivity but lack friends whom they can count on in time of personal need. Anxiety experienced alone leads easily to bitterness and depression; it can be fended off in the mind by apathy or cynicism. But anxiety experienced in a supportive community can be countered by other people's hope and ideas for problem response. For these ethically sensitive individualists, community is rare and cynicism is plentiful." (p. 131)

To note another aspect of this concern of the authors: those who have given themselves with most passion and single-mindedness to social causes are likely to reach a point where they are in special need of the whole gospel, of faith, grace and forgiveness. The lack of this is described here as the lack of a "life story" which gives meaning to both personal and social life. The authors trace the "meaning deficit" in the churches to this lack and relate it to the "one-sided ethical influence of American churches." (p. 151) This book is chiefly about the ethical influence in a context which keeps it from being one-sided. Those of us who have lived closely with the passionate social commitments of the 1960's know that religious support and the kind of interpersonal support I have mentioned are needed not only when the struggles are on but perhaps even more when a particular struggle has changed its character or even in some way has come to an end. Perhaps former partners may now be on the other side in a new phase of the cause. Perhaps one is now without a clearly focused issue to unify life. In that situation the "meaning deficit" for the individual is often a profound crisis.

One other finding is the great importance for words and ideas and generalized commitments to be accompanied by concrete action. There are many illustrations of this in the book and I am impressed by the extent to which what begins by being personal and local leads to concern about the wider political and social issues. This is a good corrective for me because, while I have always welcomed such local concreteness, in my academic ivory tower I have often feared that this, because it emphasizes the near, manageable, and vividly human may be an escape from dealing with the larger and more complex and more controversial issues. I should add that "political" is a good word throughout this book.

The emphasis I have given to the second half of the book may seem strange but I have feared that a first glance at the early chapters alone might cause many who would learn a great deal from the book as a whole to conclude that it is too simple and popular and intended for someone else. The first chapter introduces the reader to the six case studies which keep reappearing in later chapters to keep the discussion from being about groups and statistics and not about individuals. The second and third chapters are about the Biblical basis for the whole enterprise. These are in the mode of the popular and comprehensive study book but they are very well done and they spell out that Christian "life story" which is emphasized in the later chapters as so essential for the meaning and the context of the social and political concerns which dominate those chapters. The book would not have been written if the authors had not been inspired and guided by the material in these two chapters on the Old and New Testaments.

The fourth chapter deals with the history of the Church's relation to the problems of justice in society with emphasis upon the American churches which is indicated by the heading:
"From Geneva to Boston". There is emphasis on the Calvinistic tradition and the discussion of the Church's economic ethics reflects the specialized scholarship of the authors. There is one surprising omission through no one should ask the authors to be more comprehensive than they are. They come up to the recent American past and content themselves with a reference to Martin Marty's discussion of the co-existence of evangelical Protestantism and "Public" Protestantism and the impression is left that there has been very little of the latter. (This is strange in the light of the later reference to the "one-sided ethical influence of American churches.") Reference to the Social Gospel is very slight and there is no hint of the social and political influence of the kind of Neo-orthodoxy associated with Reinhold Niebuhr, or of the radical responses in many Christian circles to the depression, or of the ecumenical as well as denominational institutionalization of the Church's public ministry. In brief we might say that much that is embodied in Union Seminary in New York and, as I know from recent experience, in Union Seminary in Richmond has been left out in this comprehensive historical chapter! This does not detract from the contributions of the book. I hope that many readers will find in it fresh stimulus and hope, some surprising information and insights, and that many congregations will be led by it to new thoughts about the meaning of their faith for their social responsibility.

A personal word: this book as a revelation of the mind and spirit of one of the authors gives me the greatest satisfaction as I think of him as the leader of the seminary that means so much to me.

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Redneck Liberation! And why not? We have black liberation and women's liberation. We hear of the struggles for liberation in Africa, Asia and South America. But what about the poor Southerner? What about the family farmers and the farmworkers in rural America—our peasant brothers and sisters? What about the millhands and the coal mine diggers—the proletariat in the United States? What about the redneck's liberation?

We try not to think about the redneck. After all, he is a racist, and a sexist too. He does not even care about who controls the government of Angola. He killed women and children in Vietnam. All we have for the redneck is condemnation. And to the extent that the above is true, that is a Christian word of judgment upon him. Now here is a Christian word of grace for the redneck: Brother To A Dragonfly.

Will Campbell, the author, was known in the 1960's for his activism in the cause for racial justice. He was also known for saying that if he lived to be as old as his father he expected to see black people killing white people, because if black people were equally as good, they were also equally as bad as white people. This statement is representative of the depth of Campbell's sense of sin and judgment. However Campbell has also always been known, as Prof. Glenn T. Miller introduced him at Southeastern Seminary in February of 1977, as "spokesman for grace."

The grace of God and an understanding of human nature pervades Campbell's new book. Campbell tells the story of his relationship with his brother, Joe. It is a story of the joy and tragedy of two brothers and their life in the South from the depression until integration. Will uses the life of a dragonfly as a parable for the life of his brother. A dragonfly flies high and flies fast, tires and then dies. Joe had worked hard and taken too much of other people's medicines. He took the drugs which
were accessible to him as a pharmacist in order to speed up his activity or to relax his body. He
died in middle age of a heart attack.

The story of the two brothers is told chronologically from the time of their boyhoods until the
death of Joe. Occasionally Will recounts stories about his life which he was telling his brother at that
moment in their history. Other times Will relates an incident of which he is reminded while telling
the story. These breaks in the narrative add enormously to the humanness of the story and of the story-
teller; however the breaks are also responsible for some of the lack of continuity in the biography.
This lack of continuity is compounded by Will Campbell's failure to tell the reader what happened
between the significant times in his relationship with his older brother. I found myself always wanting
to know more about what Campbell was doing during the months or years which were left out. I
have concluded that this book is the life story of Joe Campbell as seen through the eyes of his brother
Will; this is not the autobiography of Will Campbell.

The narrative of the Campbells' story is engaging. It is like listening to one's father tell of his
exciting younger days. Before the reader is a written example of the rural South's tradition of oral
history. A book like this one must be shared in passages and then in its entirety with other people.
Campbell's humor, in his country stories and in his experiences in "the movement", makes a person
chuckle and then laugh out loud. If for only this much enjoyment the book is worth reading.

Another reason for reading Brother To A Dragonfly is the insight into the background of some
of the "radical" proclamations of Will Campbell. I began to understand Will's anti-institutionalism,
his suspicion of politics, and his tendency towards anarchism. He learned much from the anger of his
brother. When Joe had been estranged from his first wife for two years, he wanted to marry his second
wife before the previous divorce was settled:

"Do you know what legal marriage is?" "Marriage is when two people get together
and give each other the right to sue one another if they ever want to." My god!
He's right. Like so many seeds he dropped from time to time in a moment of
passion that notion began to grow in my head. If there is a body, a community,
which is truly the Church, or even claims to be the Church, why should it be the
executor of Caesar's documents?

One of the most powerful conclusions Will draws concerning their relationship is in regard to
their vocations: Will as a preacher of racial justice, Joe as a pharmacist.

Joe took his pills so he could help other people. And so he would feel good.
I took on . . . the State Legislature, and the mores of the South to help other
people. And to make me feel good.

Joe took his pills because he wanted to. And because he needed them.
And, even at the time, I suspected that my battle with bigotry might have
to do with my glands as well as with my faith.

How does one criticize a narrative, even one with psychological, philosophical, and theological
conclusions. I want to ask Will Campbell "Where is your hate for the rich people who oppressed your
parents and friends, blacks and whites. Where is your fear of the drugs which destroyed your brother's
life?" I think I know his answer. Will has been reconciled to the drugs and to the oppressors by the
action of God in Jesus Christ. And as Will still grieves for his brother I hope he can hear the words he
spoke in Southeastern's chapel: "After the world has done all it can do, the last word still belongs to
God . . . as Jesus said 'I have come to bring life, forever life' that we might not deceive ourselves into
thinking we can take it away." I thank God for this Mississippi Baptist preacher and his brother, a
dragonfly.

This book comprises the texts of the Schaff Lecture Convocation in 1976 at Pittsburgh Theological Seminary, given by two individuals well-known for their commitment to "liberation and change," but coming at those problems from different perspectives. A useful introduction by Ronald Stone, of the Seminary faculty, positions the discussion and outlines the main themes. For those who have assumed that "liberation theology" sprang de novo onto the Christian scene only a few years ago, Professor Gutierrez' long historical exposition of the themes of "Freedom and Salvation" serves as a salutary reminder that the position must be understood in an historical context, not simply (a) as something that has historical antecedents here and there, but also (b) as a reaction against what is usually referred to by him as the "dominant theology." For Gustavo (those who have known him at Union cannot for long call him "Professor Gutierrez"), there is a break -- not only a theological break but a political break -- between the way theology has been done in the past, and the way it must be done in the future. His exposition of the trends of the past helps us to see how our tradition is viewed by one who is speaking for "the absent in history," the non-persons, the poor, by whom theology must now be done if it is to speak authentically to the great majority of the human family.

For Gustavo, the important lesson we need to learn seems to be the following:
"Today we clearly perceive that what represented a movement for freedom for Europeans and North Americans was a new and more refined form of exploiting the poor, 'the condemned of the earth.'" (p.60)

The individual freedoms achieved in the Enlightenment, the new rationalism, the new empiricism -- such things have actually militated against the poor, and the church's alignment with such movements means that it has remained relatively deaf to the cries for "liberation from despoilment and oppression." Consequently, a theology involving a more widespread and social dimension of liberation "increasingly breaks with the dominant, conservative, or progressive theologies."

The creative alternative is then sketched out, beginning with the extraordinary study of Bartoleme de las Casas (1474-1566) who took the part of the Indians against the conquistadores, refusing to acquiesce in the coalition between the church and the Spaniards who came to "colonize" South America. The subsequent colonialis history created the dependency and domination under which Latin America has lived, and with which the church entered in untroubled coalition. So, to repeat the main point, theology of liberation's break with traditional and progressive theologies is political as well as theological. A new theology must be written by "the absent of history," by those who see history "from the underside." More and more they must be able to speak -- and act -- on their own, and not through intermediaries (cf. esp. pp. 87-88, and 93).

Spelling this out is the subject of the last of the three lectures, and it leads in the direction of "social revolution rather than reformism, liberation rather than development, and socialism rather than modernization of the ruling system." (p. 76) Rather than summarizing these packed pages, I would only point out -- against the armchair critics of liberation theology -- that this is no "reduction" of theology to politics. There is political wisdom here, but it is put within a basic theological framework that gives the lie to the critics. "The principal hermeneutic of the faith" is "Jesus Christ," and theology is critical reflection on what one does with personal commitment to engagement with Jesus Christ in the life of the poor. In the phrase of the Peruvian writer Arguedas (whom Gustavo frequently quotes), "The god of the masters is not the same as the God of the poor."

Richard Shaull, professor of Ecumenics at Princeton Theological Seminary, and before that active as a missionary in liberation struggles in Brazil, writes on "The Death and Resurrection of the American Dream." In a wistful introduction, he speaks of his own disillusionment with the American dream, the crucial step being his recognition that the American dream had been built on exploitation of Third World peoples, including destruction
of movements seeking a more just social order; and that simply as an American he was complicit in that destructiveness. So the dream turned into a nightmare.

Can the death of the dream lead to its resurrection in a different form? It is this question that engages most of the four lectures. There are signs of a new world emerging, in "radical discontinuity with the structures of death around us." (p. 102) Old conceptual ways of thinking must be put aside, old objects of former trust must be disavowed, old pretentions of extensive power must be surrendered. Out of this a scattered community, an underground community, harbinger of a new order, is beginning to emerge. We must negate, break loose, and die -- in order to live (cf. pp. 112ff). Since our nation was founded out of one revolution, it can be re-founded out of another. We must see society standing under judgment and headed for an apocalypse; we must feel alienation from it; we must "embark on an Exodus," not leaving the country but leaving present value systems; we must lay the foundation for a new historical era, and we must "question the very foundations of our industrial, capitalist society." (pp. 116-117) Shaull concludes that in this process "Marxism cannot help us very much." New questions have been raised with which Marx did not deal, and with which modern Marxists show no real ability to deal. At the very least, a Marxist vision will have to be re-created today, not appropriated from the past.

For Shaull, the new seeds of hope are going to come from small groups, intentional communities, those who determine to live now the vision of the future, thus establishing the "beachheads of a new order." (pp. 140 ff.) He looks for "new life in intimate relationships," and for ways in which work -- so often a curse in our society -- can be transformed into "an occasion for self-realization and service." The need is not for "a new ideology and strategy for social change; it is rather to create conditions for a new politics." This will mean turning attention "to the development of communities in which perspectives are changed, values and goals redefined, and new energies released..." (p. 149) In significant detail -- this is not arm-chair dreaming -- some of the qualities a new koinonia might have are enumerated (cf. esp. pp. 157 ff).

The implications for our theological lives will involve a break with dominant theological systems, and a greater openness to elements of the Christian story that have been peripheral in the past, but may have new power for our own time. These in turn must interact with the missionary situation, the human sciences, autobiography, and the resources of our Christian history (p. 177).

The Shaull who at the Geneva Conference in 1966 was calling for revolution, or at least for ideological guerilla tactics, here presents a more muted and modest set of proposals. There is a diminution of expectations, borne of disappointment, and a recognition that whatever else our age is, it is a time not for harvest but only for proper sowing. The collective fruits of the harvest may be a long way off in the future, but those who sow can participate in them proleptically.

The strength of the book should now be clear. If offers us two powerfully constructed and very different ways of facing the future. The weakness of the book is that the two protagonists do not engage in a genuine confrontation, something that apparently happened at the informal sessions on the occasion of the lectures. There is, to be sure, a brief "response" by Gustavo that begins the process, his chief criticism being that Shaull makes the notion of revolution "too broad," and thus appears to be talking about "transformation." But there is no response by Shaull, nor does either lecturer engage head on with the alternative vision of his colleague. And yet, the "weakness" may contain a hidden strength; rather than solving the problem of how to relate two disparate visions, it leaves us with the task of establishing that relationship for ourselves.

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REVOLUTIONARY PATIENCE, Dorothee Solle; Maryknoll, N.Y., Orbis Books, 1977, 82 pp., $2.95.

You don't have to be a believer to like these poems. But it helps. Neither do you have to be an unbeliever. But that helps too. I don't mean to play around with light headed paradox. I think Dorothee Solle's poetry walks a thin line between the world as evidence, and the world as impassible, a fraud, a morass, a mirage. And she lives to tell of it. I call that faith.

Perhaps it's only in poetry that one can get away with it, that unwinnable debate, argument better, whose scroungy and majestic model is the Book of Job. In prose we fill another want. We tend toward clarity, formula, certainty; a subject, predicate, object; assert something. The sentences are there, Thomas Aquinas to Barth, the western fathers who gave us our Credo. The prose is thus for momentous hours, public witness, or the worry beads, the casting out of devils. For formal occasions, for combat, for the hour of our death; such times require that for one another's and the future's sake, we say in simple American what our faith is. Then there's the poetry. Let me quote one of Solle's best, the first in Revolutionary Patience. It is called "When He Comes Again".

I can't promise you for sure
I have nothing definite to go on
sectarian illusions fill me with sadness
and I recall the faith of my fathers with scorn
Who will come again I would ask
cock robin or humpty dumpty
the singsong of children waking early
the buckets in the abortionist's office
No smile has ever returned
no angel come twice
no peace will come again
If he comes again
I can't promise you for sure
but I promise him to you
I with nothing to go on
you without expectation
he without proof
on his return

Many words come to mind, in praise. I think the tone is just right for a generation which is all but tongue-tied about faith, about life in the world, about the stupendous promise that lies out there somewhere at the edge of things, barely visible, hardly bearable. The tone: diffident, unassertive, one to one; one eye on the holy promise, the other not playing around with doubt so much as taking into account all the burden of evidence to the contrary. To the contrary of the promise. That evidence being today overwhelmingly circumstantial, mountainously to the contrary. The abortionist's pail, alike in this to the psalmist's cup, but with what a hideous difference, overflows. And a diabolic circuit is joined; for the warmakers now need the abortionists to do their bloody work. A report reaches me as I write this; the pentagon has imported 45,000 foetuses from South Korea, in order to test the effects of the neutron bomb on fresh human tissue. "The buckets in the abortionist's office......No peace will come again." Indeed. Christ have mercy.

It is this taking into account of the bloody and recidivist sinfulness of the world that gives these poems substance. That, and the neat turn with which several of them end. The reservations, once 'assumed,' are now 'taken up.' Life is not so much a matter of our faith, our pumping iron, our being found right or correct or relevant or any other absurd feint. The majestic initiative of grace is the point. Dorothee insists on this, she walks straight ahead; she puts the burden of life, of belief, of trust,
squarely where it belongs, a neat capstone falls in place in the soul's arch. You can almost hear the sigh, a great weight coming to rest; angle, fit, neat as feathers dovetailing.

I can't promise you for sure
but I promise him to you

The chancy quality of faith. Not a shrug of distemper, adolescence, world weariness. Her art is mature, she knows the difference between taking a chance and giving up on it all. She sees clearly; the mess made of the world, the people crushed before they had well begun to breathe. She has a point of vantage; not lost in a void, the spoiled hope of the grabbers. Her center, a great advantage for poetry, a pivot, is simply the eye of Christ. "Los ojos del Senor, el camino corto," wrote Teresa of Avila. And 'when I look in his eyes, I know," said Nhat Hanh. And again; non assumptum, non salvatum; which is translated (clumsily, with respect to us and our sorry equipment, malfunctioning), 'If the world wasn't chancy for him also, a matter of seeing things through in spite of all, of being defeated, wrung dry, found wanting, crying aloud at the horror of it all — then it's all up with us.

... and actually he had a much assurance
of victory as we in these parts do

None

A Christian woman is a homilist, not a preacher. Her method is indirection, parable, she is tentative, no bully. She believes the truth can stand on its own, needs no huffing puffing embellishment by the sacred Whooping Cranes. Most of us today can't stand sermons; men are the best argument for women in the pulpit. We hear little but our own bray, magnified inexorably. Meantime women, denied the pulpit, instruct us royally and gently in the grand tradition of truth telling. This poem is about the lies that encircled Christ (a woman was listening). Also his response, which leaves the listener uneasy.

... when they lied about his intentions
that he didn't say anything
is supposed to show greatness
I don't know

When they lie about him
I want to scream

Now are the liars to be thought of only as ancient pharisees and embalmed rumor mongers? Or are they also the common run of preacher today? Is the poet saying that she, and most of us, can hardly stick in the pew when that Ancient Order of Brahmans turns up the volume?

You have to be a woman, serving a kind of penal (!) servitude in the church, before you can write this way. A woman in metaphor or fact. It seems to me that from the beginning, in any number of instances, Christ 'assumed' the metaphor of woman, underdog, pariah, scantily accepted one, poor bloke, and ran it through his own soul. A kind of death, a rehearsal that deserves the name genetic. Such a life has little to recommend it; beyond of course, everything. At least this can be said for it: it sets up resonances, ironies, rhythms, oppositions, heights and depths, the world at large, the world at small. The rest of us live off these insights. They are the prime material of creation, of poetry, of great teaching, revelations, the world's true course and well spring. But it is chiefly the fusing of oppositions that is striking here.

He is abandoned
that's why he says
don't give up...
He is afraid
of yesterday of today of me of them
that's why he says
don't be afraid

Time and again, she turns away from that 'faith of our fathers' which has never had the simple courtesy to listen to the faith of our mothers, to hearken to its different turn, its second sense, its own speech. Much less could that olympian paternalism admit that the faith of our mothers might be needed lest the fathers become (as they have largely become) simple self serving idols.

I don't as they put it believe in god
but to him I cannot say no hard as I try

Delicious, devastating. Need we, dear male readers, pope, cardinals, priests, males all, labor to identify the 'they' of line one? and would we venture to say why the “g” of the same line, is lower case? and might we offer an opinion on the conjunctio oppositorum of lines 1/2, as they dramatize O so subtly the classic yin/yang of an intense, divided hardworking faith? and which of us could write of our faith in equivalent terms? (It seems to me a rigorous reading of the text is now and then good for the soul.)

Well. Such a sense of things is not commonly offered in schools of theology. Unless someone like Dorothee Sölle is in residence. Several of her poems are profoundly disturbing, classical, mystical in the grand neglected sense of that word. Our faith in Christ, she says, partakes of the pathos of the cross. We cannot quite leave him there, to die, to suffer consequence, the first of the victims named Genevese.

One can't let him pay alone
for his hypothesis
so I believe him about
god

The formula is not credo quia absurdum, that hits the wrong nail. More like patior ut intelligam, let me go along that way, I may yet gain a glimmer of understanding. Indeed. It is perilous business, this poetry that is called religious. On the one hand, and act of impertinence. Who are we to intrude ourselves, our feelings, our frictions, on the sacred? But in this area, not to act, not to write, is just as perilous. For indeed, who are we to be silent? Has any age, any grand or puny age, any faithless or orthodox one, not spoken? This Jesus is a very stalker of the centuries, he stands in our path, gives us no peace. We shall simply have to take our chances, even if it is to blaspheme. Even if it is to believe.
Surely one of these chances is called poetry.
The language of scientific theology simply 'is.' The language of poetry, 'is like.' Thus "religious" poetry borrows its verb, a part of its method, from theology. We would like to go from there, we are not disinterested, or spectators, or mere readers, consumers better, Kierkegaard's despised esthetes. No, we wish to rejoice, to be appalled even, to be renewed to take hope. And then to act. We would like, now and then, to show to ourselves and the world, some inkling of greatness, some touch of the heroic; as is in fact the burden of our line, a germ in our blood.

How to go from here? The butcher’s pail is filled, it is not enough to weep.
And yet — is there a how? In the poems of Dorothee Sölle we rejoice, we are appalled, renewed, we take hope. The rest will follow.

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The purpose of this review is to faithfully convey Boesak's intent, call attention to his central message and highlight some of his main themes.

Farewell to Innocence is written by a South African Black theologian and social ethicist who makes careful, evaluative, bold and passionate use of his materials. Boesak evaluates the works of leading North American Black theologians, Latin American theologians, products of South African White theologians, and the hard won insights of South African Black theologians. Farewell to Innocence makes one major contribution seen in three ways. Boesak's main contribution is that he strengthens awareness of the interconnection between: (1) Black Theology in South Africa and Black Theology in the United States; between Black Theology and African Theology; between Black Theology and Latin American Theology of liberation — all within the broader framework of liberation theologies. All of which attempt to illuminate the whole meaning of the liberating Gospel of Jesus Christ in our time.

Secondly, he links (2) the interpersonal (or intersubjective) and the social-political levels of awareness and power. This is an important contribution. Many attempts to do theology either focus on the personal and private side of faith and ignore the structural and systemic dimensions of power altogether; or they focus on the structural and overlook the self as agent in structuring situational possibilities. Boesak understands power to be relational. He conjoins in his analysis political impotence and personal disintegration. He links the inner reality of affirmative power, which he calls "the courage to be," with its outward manifestations. He does not distinguish between situations within or capable of being brought within one's control and those situations outside of or beyond the possibility of control. His focus is upon the intentional self. In this regard, the self as agent is more than just a victim. He or she does something — acts with intent — even if passively participating or acquiescing in his or her own suffering. The key to self-authorship, self-determination is in risk and vulnerability and responsible self-affirming action. This power is power in service for others. This statement takes on greater signification when "others" refers to the conscious empowerment of relationships within the community of the oppressed. We shall return to this theme shortly.

(3) Thirdly, Boesak makes an important contribution towards an ethic of liberation, which has implications for Black theology in South Africa as well as in the United States. I suggested above that one of Boesak's contributions was in his correlation of inner with outer realities as mutually determining, reciprocal processes constituting a social force within the community of the oppressed and within the larger society. In chapters one and two, Boesak identified such key concepts as "courage and power to be," "self-affirmation," "Blackness" and "Black Power." His analysis is focused around the relationship between the oppressed and oppressors. His argument is important and compelling. But it does not extend far enough. The critical dimension that needs to be developed in these two chapters is the meaning of these concepts within the community of the oppressed, themselves.

It is the dimension of the "communal" — within the community of the oppressed that needs elaboration in this section of the book. The analysis of "power," "courage to be," of "self-affirmation" tends to lean towards an individualized interpretation, i.e. what one is able to do one's self in a particular context or movement. Boesak argues:

"When one embraces Black Power as a concept, one automatically becomes involved in Black Power as a movement. In other words, Black Power very definitely has implications on the personal as well as on the socio-political levels. To begin with, the implications of Black Power are psychological. We have argued that power begins with the essential identification with oneself, with a positive self-affirmation. One becomes aware of one's position, of one's identity and the need to challenge the ideological power of the oppressor." (64)

Now, this point is important, but there is a missing link. The relational (and covenantal) dimension is a bit short changed here. "Self-affirmation" (and self-negation) and "courage to be" are relational concepts. One's self-affirmation needs the supportive affirmation of other oppressed persons. Our
sense of self-worth is derived and interdependent, and our ability to affirm self occurs within "Self-Other" interactional frames of references. Hence, the face-to-face relationships within the community of the oppressed are fundamental to building structures of trust, power and solidarity as the oppressed interpret the meaning of the actions of other oppressed people and gain perspective on their own praxis. It is not enough to assume that because people are oppressed that solidarity and trust are automatically given. A sense of solidarity emerges in co-presence and from self-conscious, purposive action. Solidarity and trust and supportive relationships have to be built-up through joint action and maintained as structures of power. This does not happen automatically. It has to be worked at.

Now Boesak speaks to this issue in other sections of the book. Yet the burden of the analysis is between the oppressed and oppressors.

The other dimension centers in what happens within the community and power systems of the oppressors as they face their powerful powerlessness — their realization that their power is ineffectual when it comes to the full acceptance of Black humanity and Black Power. Black humanity spells out the limitations of white power in the world.

Boesak reviews and contrasts the positions of a number of American Black theologians. He contrasts the positions of Jones, Cleage, Washington, Roberts, Williams and Cone on Black Theology, Black Power, violence, non-violence, hope and reconciliation. Boesak takes to task those theological formulations that either narrow the situational choice of Black people to violence as the "only" authentic way to liberation, or those formulations that limit freedom to the inner sphere of Black human reality. For Boesak, social reality is both a subjective realization as well as objectively real. Hence, freedom, in the context of Black liberation struggles, is both a struggle against objective structures of oppression, against principalities and powers "out there," as well as a struggle against internalized pejorative self-appraisals. This struggle may or may not include violence. It is in risk and vulnerability and the conscious struggle against oppressive conditions that Black people encounter the God who is for them, who fights on their side, because he is the Liberator.

Boesak's strength, also is in his openness to consider and critically evaluate alternative perspectives in liberation theology. He brings to his writing the awareness that in a complex, changing and interdependent world, "solutions" to the problems of oppression are also complex and demand the careful attention and depth analysis of those who understand that a definition of a situation is a function of social location, and that "problem defining" is itself a social process that demands patience, persistent attention and openness — not only to what the oppressed are doing, but to what God is doing in and through their activity.

Boesak's most compelling illustrations of the role and function of Black Theology in society come from his analysis of South African Black Theology and the activity of South African Black theologians who are "still defining the problem." The defining process, itself is of special importance. For it is an interpretive process as well as "an act of solidarity," a black solidarity which encompasses all the different ethnic groups in the Black community, sharing the solidarity of the oppressed. It is a positive, conscious determination to break down the walls erected by an Apartheid-inspired false consciousness between "coloureds," "Indians," and "Bantu." (139)

We may ask: doesn't Boesak run the risk of compromising his own work and the current work of Black Theology in South Africa, where the problem is still being defined, by considering prematurely, too broad a spectrum? This was a similar question raised of Dr Martin Luther King, when he attempted to link (too early some thought), in public consciousness, the unfinished Civil Rights struggle in America with American presence in Vietnam. But Boesak is firm in arguing that liberation from oppression anywhere is God's business. Oppression anywhere is a threat and challenge to oppressed people everywhere. It is the task of Black Theology to discern God's liberating activity and affirm themselves by embracing the struggle.

Boesak comes close to accusing some expressions of Black American Theology of being "reactionary" and for this reason still under the control of white racism and white power. The call to bid farewell to innocence is also a call to black theologians to link racism with an equally in depth analysis of social systems of stratification and the still deeper malady of western capitalism and imperialism. For Boesak, the American system of exploitive capitalism is the main culprit for the perpetuation of racism and classism for Black and oppressed people the world over. To leave the American system of capitalism virtually unchallenged is to, in effect, legitimate the very system that undergirds oppression. Hence to challenge and attempt to destroy racism while ignoring the system of capitalism is to engage
in a form of pseudoinnocence. This form of innocence, Boesak finds naive and inexcusable, and a part of the demonic process that entraps Black reality in a false consciousness, paralizing adequate ethical responses to the complex character of oppression.

Finally, Boesak argues that we can know and do the will of God. God freely wills to liberate the oppressed whose cause he has taken on. Liberation is God’s self-disclosure and we can not only know (experience and reflect upon it) but we can and must participate in it — if our faith is genuine. Black Theology, then, is “reflection on the praxis of liberation within the black situation”. (142) But such praxis must have an ethic of liberation. And here is where Boesak makes his most invaluable contribution.

The ethic of liberation is a situational ethic. For Black Theology the situation is the situation of blackness, self-reflexive and self-critical. The ultimate criterion for a black theological contextual ethic must be the active liberating Word of God, not the situation itself. The content of a Christian ethic, he concludes, is liberation. “This means that the liberation praxis is finally judged not by the demands of the situation, but by the liberation gospel of Jesus Christ.” (143) Boesak correctly warns against the danger of absolutizing the situation itself, so that “the situation” becomes the criterion for judging God’s activity, rather than the Sovereign One judging the activity of the situation. To absolutize the situation (human will and activity, itself) is to subvert the real role of Black Theology, thereby reducing Black Theology to an ideology. It is at this point that Boesak identifies a weakness in the theology of James Cone.

Cone’s mistake is that he has taken Black theology out of the framework of the theology of liberation, thereby making his own situation (being Black in America) and his own movement (liberation from white racism) the ultimate criterion for all theology. By doing this, Cone makes of a contextual theology a regional theology, which is not the same thing at all. (143)

Although there is much of Cone’s work with which Boesak agrees, this is just the tip of the iceberg of Boesak’s disagreement with Cone’s theological position. Cone, however is the respected and most often quoted Black Theologian in this book. Boesak’s point is that any theological program (not just Cone’s) which endows a situation with autonomous, ultimate and absolute authority in a multi-dimensional complex of interactional situations is wide open for an ideological takeover. Here blackness no longer functions as an interdependent symbol of oppression, it has become itself, the exclusive arbiter of God’s activity.

Boesak’s intent is to open up Black Theology in South Africa to dialogue with the theological thrust of oppressed people in other contexts such as Asia, Latin America and the oppressive situation of native Americans. “Blackness” is the only legitimate way of theologizing for Blacks within the broader framework of the theology of liberation. It is not the only legitimate way for native Americans, Asians, Latin Americans, or other racially oppressed situations yet to be identified.

Farewell to Innocence is highly recommended reading. Boesak raises, addresses and links important theological questions in ways that will stimulate debate and are relevant not only to theologians, but also to social scientists and so-called secularists as well.

Archie Smith, Jr.
Pacific School of Religion

THE RADICAL IMPERATIVE: FROM THEOLOGY TO SOCIAL ETHICS,

Some old theologians, like some old soldiers, fade away. Not so John Bennett, who after retirement from teaching and administration at Union Seminary, has continued to teach and write. Indeed, one can almost speak of a completely new blossoming in his career. He faithfully attends meetings of profess-
ional societies, continues active lecturing, explores new theological ideas, and keeps an extensive and encouraging correspondence with fellow ethicists.

The Radical Impriative is one, and perhaps one of the most helpful, fruits of his capstone career. In this book Bennett looks carefully at several important emphases in recent Christian theology and ethics. Succinctly, clearly, and sympathetically he assesses these emphases and states them with a calm clarity and balanced persuasiveness which is not always present in the original. In doing so he finds his own theological position returning near to that of his first book Social Salvation. But the return is by no means a re-play. It is a freshly informed and richly matured elaboration of some perennial aspects of the Christian social imperative.

Chapter One explicates five sources of the Christian imperative to seek justice and peace. God's involvement with humanity in history mandates our concern. The conjunction of the material and spiritual in persons means we must be responsible with respect to both. God's aggressive love for all persons presses us to special obligations toward the weak, oppressed and dispossessed. Sin has social consequences which must be dealt with. The ecumenical nature of the church, which is increasingly real in interracial, international and intercultural dimensions, demands that Christians wrestle with the divisions which tear apart the unity of Christ.

Chapter Two provides a general view of the biblical sources of ethical guidance, with special reference to the problem of understanding biblical materials in light of contemporary experience. Bennett notes the different emphases which have dominated biblical scholarship in his own lifetime—ranging from confidence in the guidance offered by Jesus as an historical figure through skepticism about and indifference toward the historical Christ, to a more mediating position in which biblical scholars have become interested in matters which ethicists alone used to address. Affirming the importance of biblical roots for the Christian imperative, Bennett suggests guidelines which include the centrality of Christ as the norm for reading the Bible, the continuity between Jesus Christ and the Old Testament prophets, a reading of the Bible for general perspective rather than prescriptive specificities, and allowance for the time span that separates us from biblical circumstances.

Chapter three deals with the experiences of the churches as a corporate source of ethical guidance. Suggesting that Christianity has, in the course of many years, done about face on many issues, the chapter affirms the importance of evolving understandings in Christian social teaching. An overriding change in this respect is the development of belief in the importance of religious liberty. This has largely overcome Christian support once routinely given even to despotic political power and sanctioned by teaching about unquestioned obedience to authority. A similar and not less important change has occurred in Christian attitudes toward the Jewish people. Bennett also notes changes that have occurred in Protestant-Roman Catholic relationships. A large portion of this chapter is devoted to explaining the methods used, the dynamics involved, and the significance of social pronouncements by denominational and ecumenical bodies. Bennett suggests how the activities of churches have simultaneously become both more activistly witnessing and pioneeringly studious than in the past.

Chapter Four studies the conflict in the American churches over social issues—issues that sometimes divide clergy from laity, local from national leadership. Not only does Bennett point out, as Hoge and Marty have done, how theological individualism has undercut the radical imperative, but he also examines (with reference to Weber's sociological studies) how the social and economic alliance of North American Christianity renders social understanding difficult. Bennett believes contravailing forces—including global exchange and communication, a greater theological openness, Protestant-Catholic ecumenicity, and the emergence of social concern among some conservative evangelicals—will do much to recast the older script. This chapter continues with a suggestive analysis of the importance of both law and grace as the source of Christian action? of both justification and sanctification, "comfort" and "challenge", in freeing us to accept the Christian challenge.

Chapter Five sketches the contribution of contemporary theologies of liberation. This chapter is a remarkable survey, deft and fair in its collation and interpretation of several theological movements in our time (women's liberation, black theology, the liberation theologies of South America.) If you know of any persons who have been turned away by the shrill manner in which some of these agendas have been advocated you might find Bennett's treatment a convincing alternative.

In a chapter discussing economic imperatives Bennett points to the differences between the economic struggles which occurred when labor was still engaged in the right to organize (which prompted considerable social gospel activism) and the problems of today. Tracing the development of ecumenical
social thinking about economic matters (in which he himself had no small part), Bennett shows why economic issues have acquired a renewed centrality for social ethics. Medical care, income maintenance, better balance in the distribution of wealth, and the importance of full employment (guaranteed by government if necessary), are all suggested as means for implementing the economic implications of love for neighbor. Bennett does not reaffirm the belief in a comprehensive socialism he had in early years, but he does reiterate the importance of making justice a more workable reality in financial matters. The chapter concludes with a sign of the times—a discussion of inflation.

Chapter Seven discusses what we should learn from the Indochina war. The experience of opposing that war has caused not a few religious leaders to become rejectionistically radical, but Bennett allows his experience to enrich and toughen his own sound judgments. Beginning with an autobiographical recounting of his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1970, Bennett moves back to trace how policy makers came to realize the abortiveness of the war effort and even back to show the roots of our difficulty in the triumphalism in America's self image as this was unwittingly (and unnecessarily) reinforced by the successful struggles against totalitarianism in the 1940s. The major lesson is succinct: "The United States should not use its power to prevent other nations from having their own revolution." (p. 179). This does not mean isolationism, but rather a continual moral scrutiny over governmental policy and concern for the aspirations of other peoples as well as for national self interest.

A final chapter looks at interlocking (both domestic and global) threats to the human future. Indebted to Robert Heilbroner, Bennett considers the population problem, environmental issues, threats of hunger, war and tyranny. Returning to themes implicit in Chapter One, Bennett suggests that these problems must be faced with a belief in God's providential rule, an awareness of the importance of living with (rather than over) the peoples of the world, and confidence that the Spirit does bring creative breakthroughs.

There is no despair, no cynicism, no sense of superior moral posturing here—only a genuine clarity and charity set forth with spiritual richness and intellectual thoroughness. Bennett has listened to and learned well from the voices and events of his life—and not least from those of recent years.

Edward LeRoy Long, Jr.
Drew University


As Bernard Meland remarks in his Foreword to this volume, with the death of Henry Nelson Wieman in June 1975, at ninety years of age, "one has the sense of a half century of theological Americana coming sharply into focus."1 It has been more than thirty years since I undertook a critical exposition of Wieman's thought in relation to that of other empirical philosophers of religion whose work was influential at that time.2 Even then, however, there was a widespread feeling that the theological significance of these persons had been eclipsed in forms of neo-orthodoxy, and that their philosophical aims were outdated by the more rigorous and the more modest understanding of the task of philosophy as analysis. Some of the philosophical and theological concerns and convictions expressed in Wieman's form of empirical religious philosophy have been articulated and devel-
oped in forms of process-philosophy like that of Charles Hartshorne and John Cobb, and in the process-theology of our late colleague Daniel Day Williams, who was a friend of Wieman. On the whole, however, for several decades there was relatively little interest in Wieman in theological circles. Why then, should the American Theological Library Association sponsor the publication of this monograph in its selected dissertation series? Is the purpose primarily to put a good piece of work in the history of American religious thought on the shelves? Perhaps this is one aim; if so, the reader will be rewarded not only by a careful study of a concept central to Wieman's thought, but also by insights into the work of thinkers by whom he was deeply influenced: Ralph Barton Perry, William Ernest Hocking, Henri Bergson, Alfred North Whitehead, William James and John Dewey. I believe, however, that this study is also highly relevant to many interests of contemporary theologians, and that we may be on the verge of a "rediscovery" of and renewed appreciation for empirical philosophy and theology as we engage in our own reshaping of the theological task.

Liberation theologians, for instance, are constantly calling attention to the necessity for identifying the divine presence and power in concrete doings in human affairs. A Union colleague who works in Christian ethics is focusing on the nature and role of perception in relation to belief in an effort to specify the experiential grounds of faith and ethical commitment. Another colleague who works in systematic theology speaks of the Word of God as human experience and seeks to identify the experiential reality of grace. He uses Wiemanesque terms light "human co-creativity with Divine creativity." Another colleague, in practical theology, wrote a dissertation on the implications of Wieman's thought for contemporary theological education. Are we back to where we came in or at the point of a new breakthrough? A bit of both, I think.

Professor Minor's book, therefore, speaks to our current situation. His major thesis is that creativity, or creative interchange, is the central mature concept at the heart of Wieman's naturalistic theism, and that throughout Wieman's development of this concept there was a "creative tension" between two elements in it. One is the element of openness to experience in its indefinitely rich immediacy, the element celebrated by mystics; the other is the element of progressively clarified fruitful conceptuality, the element celebrated by scientists and by philosophers and theologians. The efficacy and warrant of thought is explicated in an experimentalist epistemology. Those who are now interested in varieties of religious experience, especially of the sort called mystical, will find Wieman's reflections on that element suggestive if not wholly satisfactory, while those who are seeking modes of specifiable verification for theological truth-claims will find his reflections on that element also suggestive if not wholly satisfactory. Minor shows that Wieman was most indebted to Hocking, with his theory of alternation between worship and work, for his initial and continuing understanding of the religious in experience. Yet he sought to combine in one structure what Hocking tended to polarize, and he could not accept the bases in Hocking's idealism for assurances of "anticipated attainment." Bergson introduced him to the view of reality as dynamic process, and he tempered his appreciation of both Hocking and Perry in the light of this view during his graduate study at Harvard. It was only later that he began systematically to read and to learn from Whitehead, and to discern in Whitehead some of the grounds of a viable naturalistic theism. He finally came to feel, however, that elements of romanticism and rationalism in Whitehead are unwarranted by the empirical materials through which Whitehead sought to establish the adequacy of his cosmology. He believed that our actual engagement in and with that creativity which is God—the supreme value and savior—speaks an outcome indefinitely open and offers no transmutation of ambiguity in a "primordial" eternal perspective, or in a "consequent" nature of God.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Wieman found Dewey's philosophy to be more congenial to his theological convictions. Minor gives an interesting and detailed account of Wieman's attempt to identify his concept of creativity with Dewey's "active relation of ideal to actual" or with God as unifier of ideals, and of Dewey's rejection of the attempt. Dewey thought that Wieman must be monistic and cryptosupernaturalistic, while Wieman thought that Dewey's pluralistic instrumentalism was not incompatible with the view he wished to commend. In later years each admitted that he may
have misunderstood the other. In any case, Minor is correct, I believe, in seeing in the role of the esthetic in Dewey's philosophy the key to Dewey's views of the religious as well as other forms of experience, and also the most natural analogue in Dewey for what Wieman wanted to designate—never too clearly—"creativity" or "creative interchange." Wieman had both appreciated and criticized Whitehead's philosophy as basically esthetic. But in Dewey's understanding of imagination as paradigmatically exemplified in experience as esthetic there is something close to what Wieman means by creativity. For Dewey, Minor suggests, "Imagination is the creative interaction among the elements of our being. It is 'that which holds all other elements in solution.' It is what makes experience fluid rather than fixated. It is that active relation which connects the actual forces and conditions of nature with ideal ends projected. This kind of creative connection within experience gives it integrity. Wieman's term, 'creative interchange,' is a good way to refer to it. But it should be given the name 'God'."

Many theologians will take exception to the final sentence in that quotation. I am convinced, however, that both theologians and theorists of religion may gain productive insights from more extensive consideration of the relation of the esthetic to the religious in experience. The result should not be an anesthetic religion or a religious esthetic. It may be a more fruitful understanding of the holy as both judgmental and soteriological; as manifested in both liberating processes and unitive contemplation.

In any case, it is good to have Minor's book, even though it suffers from many of the infelicities of dissertationese. He has taught at Earlham, at Missouri, and at West Virginia University. Now he is Director of the Foundation for Creative Philosophy—a token of loyal (and creative?) discipleship. How firm a foundation is laid there for the saints of the Lord?

NOTES

1. Ibid., p. ix.

J. A. Martin, Jr.
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David Tracy's important study in fundamental theology has received so much attention that an additional summary of his proposals is inappropriate. Yet the work deserves further review and discussion, not only for its rich and insightful argumentation, but because it carries implications for a broad range of questions in theology.

One of the strongest aspects in Tracy's effort is his ability to appropriate a variety of philosophical and theological works to his own purpose without distorting these positions. The sources that have most decisively shaped his thinking are Whiteheadian process philosophy and the works of his past and present University of Chicago Divinity School colleagues, notably those of Norman Perrin, Schubert Ogden, Langdon Gilkey, and Paul Ricoeur. Tracy's arguments are also informed by numerous other theologians, philosophers, and sociologists; in fact, one of the most intriguing aspects of the book is the extent to which he maintains a transcendental Thomist position before breaking with this tradition at critical points.

Despite the profusion of arguments and references, however, one central claim illuminates the entire work: the argument that theology is no different from sociology, history, or chemistry insofar as its commitment to the morality of scientific knowledge is in question. It is in resistance to all forms of theological positivism, fideism, and confessionalism that Tracy urges the ethical necessity of ascribing fundamental allegiance in theological work to the canons of scientific inquiry.

Against the suggestions of critics such as Fr. Avery Dulles, it is not the case that Tracy is necessarily working with a positivistic concept of science when he advances this claim. Tracy is certainly aware of Karl Popper's refutation of positivist instrumentalism in his 1934 work, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, as well as the subsequent challenge to Popper's falsificationist theory offered by Thomas S. Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, and others. In the light of this contemporary debate in philosophy of science, Tracy realizes that "critical evidence" exists only in relation to or against a particular historical paradigm or theory, and that theories interpret culturally conditioned perceptions, not objective or provable facts. Tracy's claim for the primacy of scientific morality has nothing necessarily to do with positivist foundationalism, but rather, it involves the assertion that only the scientific mode contains a principled openness to revolutionary paradigms and methods. (p. 6) It is the singularity of science's ethical requirement, its essentially critical logic in following evidence, that justifies its status as the primary methodological referent for theological work. Of course, this view of science would be disputed by a philosopher such as Feyerabend, but the charge of positivism is clearly inaccurate as applied to Tracy.

The implications of this commitment to the morality of scientific knowledge, however, raise a number of serious questions. Following the distinction between the autonomous scientific community and the community of faith, Tracy sets the "faith of secularity" against other belief systems, and further denies the necessary connection between theological work and religious conviction. These are considerations which usually distinguish a "university theology" from a more confessionally-centered theology, but Tracy invokes the distinction between fundamental theology (the establishment of theological criteria and methodology) and the confessional discipline known as dogmatic or systematic theology, and notes that in the present work he is constructing a fundamental theology.

Now, it is true that the differentiation between fundamental and dogmatic theology is a traditional Roman Catholic distinction, but the severity of the distinction in Tracy's work is certainly unprecedented in Catholic theology, and it represents the crucial difficulty in the book as a whole. Excepting the general subject of process metaphysics, with which this discussion shall end, virtually every deficiency or questionable aspect in Tracy's work is related to this attempt to separate the disciplines of fundamental and dogmatic theology. By Tracy's schema, the logical theological connection between the scientific community and the community of faith is left to the explanations of dogmatic theology, as well as the entire question of the meaning of Christian faith itself, since
in Tracy’s fundamental theology “faith” is nothing else than a belief which serves to justify or warrant a theoretical conviction.

A similar difficulty is raised in his discussion of Christological language, which is essentially confined to an analysis of modes of Christological mythology. Is it really a satisfactory method for any Christian theology to exclude the consideration of historical referents from a discussion of Christology? It is difficult to understand what is gained by this method. The restriction of fundamental theology to such a narrow mode of analysis would seem to reduce its importance in Catholic theology, where fundamental theology is usually assigned the tasks of criteriology and apologetics. There is no subject in Blessed Rage for Order that should be the exclusive concern of fundamental theology, and further, the subjects that are discussed are artificially divested of their historical meanings, so that their discussion is limited to the analysis of “texts”, the “Christian fact”, or Christological myths instead of to the Scriptures, tradition, gospel, or the reality of Jesus.

It is entirely possible, of course, that Tracy’s forthcoming work in dogmatic theology will successfully address all of these questions, and that he will modify his position concerning the dualism in theological disciplines. A consideration of more enduring significance is the doctrine of God, and Tracy’s commitment to the tradition of neo-classical metaphysics. His argumentation does not approach the technical sophistication of a work such as John B. Cobb’s A Christian Natural Theology, but Tracy’s defense of process metaphysics as the most adequate theory of reality which is also compatible with biblical faith is a clearly and forcefully written discussion. He argues for the superiority of the dipolar conception of God, over against the model of classical theism, on the grounds that the dipolar model upholds greater inner coherence, offers deeper religious meaningfulness, and represents closer fidelity to the witness of Scripture. The statement “God is dipolar” is a metaphysical statement, a ground-statement that gives coherence and meaningfulness to reality; it consists of the claim that the being of God is in continuous process of self-creation analogous to the creation
of the human self, and that therefore the actuality of God is relative to all other beings inasmuch as God actually changes as our actions occur and affect God.

The central concern of this metaphysics, which is properly a transcendental mode of argumentation and not an axiomatic or inductive mode, is the resolution of the classical problem concerning God's possible affection by the world. Tracy presents the dipolar conception of God as the most satisfactory alternative to a classical theism in which God is not really affected by human action. However, Tracy's critique of the classical model is somewhat disingenuous. He contends that in the classical conception, the Scriptural statement "God is love" can only bear the attribution of a "mere metaphor", a "mere symbol", or a "useful anthropomorphism", and that for St. Thomas Aquinas this metaphor is "an analogy of improper attribution." (p. 161) This is an intriguing error in interpretation, since in the *Summa Theologiae* V,1a., q.20, St. Thomas explicitly argues that the attribution of God's love is not metaphorical or improper, but rather "that those only of which the formal meaning implies no incompleteness can properly be attributed to God. Love and joy have this character."

For St. Thomas, love in God is a "joining force" in God's self-relation, and this is the beginning of the difference between classical and process theology, since the latter view claims the necessary relation between God and God's creation in mutual reciprocity. In the classical conception, the necessary or "real" relation is only true from the side of creation, so that God's relation to the world is not necessary. God is not subject to destruction, or at least, God does not suffer from anything forced on God. As Karl Barth repeatedly argued, God cannot be free for us unless God is free from us; as the implication of God's election to create a world, election precedes redemption. In the classical conception, then, God takes up into God's own being the suffering of the world, and redeems it; everything is in God, whose particularity is constitutive of reality.

Although the question of God's possible affection is still a serious problem for classical theology, I think that this mode is not necessarily as restricted and inadequate as Tracy argues. As a reason for adopting the dipolar conception of God, the relative weight of the question of divine affection is a matter for each person to judge individually. At the very least, the challenge proffered by theologians such as Tracy and Cobb should move all Christians to re-examine and clarify their conceptions of the divine reality.

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**MOBY DICK AND CALVINISM: A WORLD DISMANTALED, T. Walter Herbert, Jr; New Brunswick, N. J., Rutgers University Press, 1977, 186 pp., $12.50.**

In an intriguing study Prof. Herbert explores the American masterpiece, *Moby-Dick*, as a revolt against the Calvinistic theological idiom in which the author, Herman Melville, lived and wrote. Drawing from intensive research on Melville's life, Prof. Herbert posits that the novel is the aesthetic exploration of the psychic conflict that resulted from the influence of the orthodox teachings of the Dutch Reformed Church and the influence of the liberal theological tradition prevalent in New England. The conservative influence was personified by Melville's mother, whose Calvinist God demanded unquestioning obedience from totally depraved humanity. The liberal influence was personified by Melville's father whose progressive God aided humanity, through reason, to ever greater achievements. The psychic conflict became pointed for Melville through the unexplainable financial collapse of his father.
Had he been castigated by the Calvinist God, or had he been forsaken by the God of liberal theology? This two-sided question challenged the theocentric conception that governed the intellectual idiom of the age. Toward this question Melville assumed the position of the pursuer of Truth. This necessitated a critical and even rebellious attitude toward a God who claimed absolute sovereignty over the world, but no culpability for the evil therein.

Prof. Herbert, in the second half of the book, deals with the aesthetic medium of Melville’s psychic conflict, and the themes which develop because of it. In the novel Moby-Dick, Melville’s psychic conflict becomes a cosmic war between Ahab and the white whale. Ahab is the man eternally damned by the Calvinist God. The whale is a symbol of the wrath of that God. Starbuck, like Melville’s father, is the liberal and progressive man who is destroyed by the inexplicable evil. Ishmael is somewhat like Melville himself, a skeptical searcher for Truth. Prof. Herbert sees these themes as constituting a radical tapestry in which morality, original sin, and the quest for Truth provide, by their interplay, a new perspective on the method, mind and madness of a great American author.

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“How can a theologian approach literature, in a meaningful way, without doing violence to either literature or theology?” Prof. Mallard courageously confronts this perennial issue and emerges with some unique observations. He attempts to outline and, eventually, demonstrate a “theology for literature” in contrast with “theology proper.” Prof. Mallard feels that they must be distinguished because most theologian-critics approach literature concerned predominantly about which theological categories will illumine its meaning. What these scholars fail to see, says Mallard, is that there are theological categories inherent in all Western literature. The problem then is to ascertain the dimensions of these categories as they appear in literature. The theology that appears in literature is “reflected theology”; a mirror image of theology proper. Following the mirror analogy, Mallard acknowledges that reflected theology often displays categories which are refracted and sometimes reversed in comparison to those of theology proper.

He builds his argument through linguistic analysis, epistemological analysis and two case studies in the work of Faulkner and Kafka. This line of inquiry leads Mallard to the conclusion that the function of language is very closely related to the function of theology. In Part I, he explores the nature of language in general and concludes that language presents reality; and in that presentation reality is perceived as “present” but also as “receding”. That is to say, it is manifest and hidden at the same time. It is the nature of theology to address God, and on its revelatory side, to make God manifest. Mallard notes here that God is revealed but also hidden. The concepts of God and reality are joined in “reflected theology”. Obviously influenced by the Whiteheadian school of thought, Mallard posits that in reflected theology God is simply process. Language presents reality, and language as art presents God as “the temporal process of things itself, including the meaning of that process.” p. 150.

As God is reflected in literature as process, Christ is reflected in the “crisis and recovery principle.” This principle is also related to the nature of language. Mallard argues that a crisis emerges in poetic and metaphoric language when no logical inference exists between words and what is meant to be expressed. Recovery is effected when “the synthesizing imagination is able to ‘see together’ ”
words and meaning. This “crisis and recovery principle” is the cross-resurrection principle in aesthetic work. Though Mallard firmly supports this concept he asserts that there is no actual Christology in reflected theology. In his case studies on Faulkner and Kafka Mallard argues that the theological themes revolve in an insoluble ambiguity which is caused by the theological residuals in literature and the lack of a determinative principle, e.g. a Christology. This is the primary difference between reflected theology and theology proper. The former has no firm Christology and the latter does. The crux of the issue is that theology proper is concerned with the Bible; a book about a man called Jesus; a book distinct from other Western literature. Is there any way that reflected theology and theology proper can mutually inform one another? Prof. Mallard believes so, though not in the expected fashion. He concludes that a theological criticism of literature is a dual task. One must always be aware of the categories of reflected theology in literature. Moreover, the task of doing theology proper must not be neglected.

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