
Roman Szporluk

Russia, Ukraine, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union

(Hoover Institution Press, 2000)

Reviewed by Mark L. von Hagen

Today, when ethnic identity and nation-building have assumed a hegemonic place in the programs of AAASS conventions, at the recent World Congress in Tampere, and in specialist organizations such as the Association for the Study of Nationalities, it is difficult for the current generation of social science and humanities scholars to realize that these issues were decidedly at the margins of earlier Sovietological agendas. But that same generation—my generation to a large degree—that today lovingly cites Benedict Anderson, Anthony Smith, Ernest Gellner, and Rogers Brubaker—to name only a few of the late-20th-century social science “revisionists” of national identity—looks back far less often at the work of those who have labored patiently and quietly for several decades within our own Sovietological vineyards.

Roman Szporluk, the Mykhailo Hrushevskiy Professor of History and Director of the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University, is the author of several books devoted to twentieth-century East and Central European intellectual history, including: *The Political Thought of Thomas G. Masaryk* (Boulder, 1981), a study of the “father” of modern Czechoslovakia; *Communism and Nationalism: Karl Marx versus Friedrich List* (Oxford, 1988); and an annotated, translated edition of *Russia in World History* (Ann Arbor, 1970) by Mikhail Pokrovsky, the dean of the “new” Soviet historians of the 1920s who, for his efforts to write a global history based on historical materialism and internationalism, suffered disgrace under Stalin. The volume under review, *Russia, Ukraine, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union*, brings together a selection of Szporluk's essays spanning twenty-five years between 1972 and 1997. Their greatest contribution is to the rethinking of the postwar period of Ukrainian, Russian, and Soviet history, including post-Soviet developments. The essays also illustrate how broadly informed, good old-fashioned Kremlinology can help us better understand Soviet politics and post-Soviet developments through the prism of “the nationality question” in Russian and Soviet history. Because most of the essays were written before the relevant archives were opened in Ukraine and Russia,

Szporluk posed interesting questions to a wide range of available published sources: Soviet ethnographers' studies and demographic statistics, urban geography, education, press, and language policy, ideological pronouncements, even fictional literature. But he was also constantly scouring the latest social science literature on nationalism for additional insights and comparative perspectives, including such partly forgotten classics as the works of Hans Kohn, John Armstrong, Frederick Barghoorn, and Karl Deutsch.

The essays give us a preview of some of the major outlines and themes of Szporluk's forthcoming history of modern Ukraine. The histories of both Ukraine and Russia, or more accurately their historiographies, after a half-century of Cold War divisions and struggles, and with archives opened wide, are ripe for reconceptualization. Perhaps because Szporluk's work has been so focused on ideas, particularly geopolitical and historiographical ones, his own reflections on modern Ukrainian and Russian history are very suggestive of such new avenues of conceptualization.¹ It is on those larger themes and conceptualizations that I want to focus in this essay.²

¹ Particularly in this aspect, Szporluk's essays recall a respected tradition in Ukrainian historical writing in the diaspora of raising important intellectual and historiographical issues for future historians, even when the hope of archival access remained distant. The most influential such collection has been the writings of Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky, *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History* (Edmonton, 1987); an important collection on Galician Ukraine edited by Andrei S. Markovits and Frank E. Sysyn, *Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism* (Cambridge, 1982); and on early modern history, edited by Ivo Banac and Frank Sysyn, *Concepts of Nationhood in Early Modern Eastern Europe* (Cambridge, 1986). For a still earlier period Ihor Sevcenko recently brought several of his essays together in a provocative and learned volume, *Ukraine Between East and West* (Edmonton, 1996).

² I have been grappling with many of these themes in my own research and writing: “Does Ukraine Have a History?” *Slavic Review* (fall 1995); “Writing the History of Russia as Empire,” in Ospovat, Evtukhov, Gasparov and von Hagen, eds., *Kazan', Moscow, St. Petersburg: Multiple Faces of the Russian Empire* (Moscow, 1997); with Karen Barkey, eds., *After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building* (Boulder, Colorado, 1997); “Federalism, Regionalisms and Pan-Movements as Re-

Russia, Ukraine, Empire, Nation

Szporluk's overarching concern has been with the state- and nation-building history of Eastern and East Central Europe. The cases he highlights in this collection are Ukraine and Russia, in their various editions in the modern period. He argues that the fates of these two contemporary states have been historically interwoven in ways that are full of ironies and paradoxes. And today, he argues further, their separate state- and nation-building projects continue to influence each other in profound ways.

The central nationality question for Eastern Europe, Szporluk reminds us in a very sobering reversal of the traditional focus on the non-Russians, is the Russian question,³ by which he means the urgent imperative for Russian elites to transform their state's self-identity from an imperial to a national one as a crucial component of Russia's political modernization. What Szporluk describes as the Soviet Union's own version of imperialism has its roots in Stalin's russification policies; the consequence has been a confused and dialectical relationship between Russianness and Soviet communism. He insists that while desovietization and shedding the imperial legacy are two distinct processes, they are also intertwined in complicated ways because the Soviet Union and Soviet identity, such as it existed, became perceived by non-Russians as Russian, even if the ethnic Russian population, or at least some of its leading intellectuals, felt itself denied national self-expression in the Soviet Union. The new national identity (*rossiiskii*, presumably) that Szporluk clearly prefers for Russia is one we would call civic or territorial, not ethnic. In other words, citizens of Russia must come to see themselves primarily not as ethnic Russians (*ruskie*) allied with other Russians outside the borders of today's Russian Federation, but as accepting the sovereignty

imaginings in/of the Russian Empire," unpublished paper; and most extensively in the collaborative research project (with Andreas Kappeler, Frank Sysyn, and Zenon Kohut), "Peoples, Nations, and Identities: The Russian-Ukrainian Encounter" (with funding from the NEH, the Alexander-von-Humboldt Stiftung, and the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies).

³ Indeed, Szporluk relies on a much richer literature on the non-Russian nations than he is able to for the Russians themselves. Besides an unjustly forgotten study by Frederick Barghoorn, *Soviet Russian Nationalism* (New York, 1956), Szporluk turns to more recent studies of Russian nationalism. See Yitzhak M. Brudny, *Reinventing Russia: Russian Nationalism and the Soviet State, 1953-91* (Cambridge, 1998); John Dunlop, *The Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism* (Princeton, 1983); and Alexander Yanov, *The Russian New Right* (Berkeley, 1978).

of those borders and the multiethnic population that lives within them.⁴

Much of the same is true for post-Soviet Ukraine, which paradoxically inherited a civic-territorial version of a Ukrainian nation from Soviet institutions and practice; however, that achievement is threatened today by extremists both within Ukraine and without (especially in Russia) who seek to ethnicize politics and identity in ways that Szporluk fears would lead to violence. Instead of the ethnic nationalism (or nationalizing states) that most scholars look for (and find), Szporluk devotes several chapters to defining better (and on Ukrainian material) what we understand by civic-territorial identities and loyalties.⁵ How have Ukrainians been able to think about themselves and their state without emphasizing ethnicity and even language? In a particularly ingenious borrowing from the literature of urban and regional geography, Szporluk traces how Kyiv achieved the status of "primate city" in Ukraine; he interprets the 1959 census data as evidence that Kyiv was perceived and accepted by most Ukrainians, east, west or south, as their historically legitimate capital and major city.

The status of the capital in the rank-order of major Ukrainian cities became an important factor in Ukrainian citizens' capacity to imagine a Ukrainian territorial state. (Kyiv only became the capital of Soviet Ukraine in 1934, after it was transferred there from Khar'kiv.)⁶ Here Szporluk demonstrates how important the postwar period of Soviet and Ukrainian history is proving to be in better understanding contemporary politics and identities in the region. His observations are grounded in analyses

⁴ Chapters 1 and 16 allow the reader to see the continuity in Szporluk's concerns while also charting a considerable evolution of his thought in response to important changes in post-Soviet politics.

⁵ Szporluk's reflections on civic-territorial identity are especially developed in chapter 5. Here and elsewhere he takes issue with Rogers Brubaker and David Laitin, and the many scholars who have followed in their theoretical and methodological footsteps, on their notion of the "nationalizing state" pursuing an ethnicization of politics, culture and identity.

⁶ Szporluk borrows the concepts via the writings of Chauncey Harris (*Cities of the Soviet Union: Studies in Their Functions, Size, Density, and Growth*, 1970) and David Hooson (*The Soviet Union: People and Regions*, 1966) and applies them to a critical analysis of Soviet demographic and ethnographic statistics.

of changes in ideology and policy, as well as demographic and ethnographic trends.⁷

The Soviet West and Eastern Europe

But, of course, the Ukrainian-Russian relationship does not exist nor has it evolved in a geopolitical and intellectual vacuum. Another major theme of Szporluk's essays is the enduring importance of both Eastern and East Central Europe more generally but also what he calls Far Eastern Europe, or the Soviet West, in particular, for the Ukrainian-Russian relationship and for the fate of Empire, whether Russian or Soviet. This region includes the historic *kresy* of Poland (territory today shared by Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine), Latvia, Estonia, Moldova and other contiguous territories contested by Romania, Russia and the Ottoman Empire at various points in the past. Szporluk contends that the western half of the Russian Empire, and later the Soviet Union, proved to be a constant threat to the imperial order by undermining its legitimacy; the populations of this region were more "European" than the Russians themselves and have not ever been successfully integrated into the Moscow-centered state. What Szporluk means by the region's "European" or "Europeanizing" character is that it was a conduit for and translator of modern ideas and institutions, especially national ones, from western Europe into the Russian Empire and Soviet Union. The relations of the Russians with other parts of their empire, especially the Turko-Muslim worlds, were also fraught with tensions and contradictions, but insofar as the imperial and Soviet elites thought of themselves as European or modern (or wanted to be so regarded by others), it was the relationships with and attitudes toward this Soviet/Russian Far West that were more urgent to those elites' self-understanding.⁸

⁷ Szporluk explores how postwar urbanization processes helped reconfigure the status and prestige of Kyiv in chapters 3 and 5. For other explorations of non-ethnic Ukrainian nationalisms, see the work of two anthropologists and a historian: Catherine Wanner, *Burden of Dreams: History and Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine* (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998); and Adriana Petryna, "Sarcophagus: Chernobyl in Historical Light," *Cultural Anthropology*, 10 (2): 196-220, 1995; "Technical Error: Measures of Life After Chernobyl," *Social Identities*, 4 (1): 73-92, 1997; Amir Weiner, *Making Sense of War* (Princeton University Press, 2001).

⁸ This thesis is presented most succinctly in chapter 9 of the current collection, but is explored more fully in an earlier volume of essays edited by Professor Szporluk, *The Influence of East Europe and the Soviet West on Soviet Society* (New York,

During the nineteenth century Poland's several rebellions turned out to be "too much for Russia to swallow," but nationalist ideas were attracting large audiences in Finland and among the Baltic peoples as well. After the disintegration of the Russian Empire in the wake of the First World War, the Bolshevik state lost those western territories until the start of World War II. In its moment of greatest triumph in war, the Soviet Union annexed its Far West and then consolidated its empire in postwar Eastern Europe; ironically, that annexation brought with it alien political cultures that could not be entirely Sovietized out of existence. Szporluk's very original contribution here is to focus on the period 1939-47 as a transformative moment, a historical turning point, whose contradictory outcome eventually undermined the Soviet solution to the "national question" that had been hammered out in the interwar years.

Of course, in a set of writings that are so wide-ranging and, in many cases, speculative or provocative, there are bound to be some issues of contention between historians who have had different "groundings" and who therefore look at putatively the same processes and events from somewhat different perspectives. Most of the concerns I raise in Professor Szporluk's work are questions of emphasis and degree of generalizability. One set of questions revolves around the concept of the (Soviet) West and that region's crucial contribution to the destabilization of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union. First, how coherent is the concept of a historical Soviet West to begin with, when the differences and similarities are difficult to balance in the end? Estonia and Latvia differ in important ways from Lithuania even among the Baltic countries; all three played a different role from Poland and Finland (though Estonia has close ties to Finland and Lithuania to Poland). And Belarus seems to be an outlier for most of the important similarities, as suggested by Szporluk's own diminished treatment of Belarus in comparison to the other cases. Ukraine, of course, both fits and doesn't fit the Soviet West, reflecting the historic divisions between western Ukraine and the more Russian (or Russified) eastern and southern Ukraine. These hesitations notwithstanding, the Soviet West is highly suggestive and worth pursuing further, but it needs more sustained exploration to make the case.

Washington, and London, 1976). See also *The Soviet West: Interplay between Nationality and Social Organization*, ed. by Ralph S. Clem (New York, Washington, London, 1975).

Once we agree that there is something that holds together the Soviet West, we need to think about how geopolitically important it was as a region or sub-region. One might argue that in key moments of modern history, whether in the recent dismantling of the Soviet Union or the revolutionary end to the Russian Empire in 1917, the Caucasus has played an equally important role in transforming relations of power in the region. Certainly the Georgians and the Armenians claimed ancient kingdoms and “rediscovered” their national identity in the nineteenth century; Armenia shared Ukraine's fate in being divided between empires, but also in being an imperial diaspora population. (True, neither the Armenians nor the Georgians had to “share” their ancient kingdoms with the Russians, as Ukrainians have had to contest Russia's claims to sole ownership of the Kyivan Rus' period in their own history.) The Armenians, Azeris, and Georgians all had short-lived civil war-era states, similar to the Ukrainian (and to some degree the Belarusan) experiences; and particularly the Georgians and Armenians were able to preserve not only their language and literature, but distinctive alphabets (much as the Baltic republics fought to maintain their languages and Latin alphabets as distinct from the Cyrillicized written languages elsewhere in the USSR). The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict proved fatal for the Soviet elites' efforts to hold the multinational state together and became the first case of inter-ethnic violence on Soviet territory that could not be effectively contained.

In fairness, Szporluk does not attempt to raise the Soviet West to the prime cause of Soviet collapse, but he suggests that that region posed the most intractable dilemmas for the Moscow leadership. And he does attribute much of the credit for the relatively peaceful dismantling of the Soviet Union to the actions of Russians themselves, particularly those led by Boris Yeltsin (xxxvi). On the other hand, Szporluk's focus on the Soviet West offers a far more powerful explanation for the political crises that led to the dismantling of the Soviet Union than much of the analysis that expected the end to come from the forces of resurgent Islam in Central Asia.⁹ Still, Szporluk's intriguing theses await a more comprehensive and synthetic treatment of the role played by the “national ques-

tion” (and individual “national questions”) in the end of the Soviet state and political economy.

Russia, Eastern Europe and Europe

Another important theme is Szporluk's insistence on returning the history of Eastern Europe and even Russia to a European history that has been distortingly and misleadingly divided by the geopolitical struggle of the Cold War for the past half century at least. The redrawn boundaries of post-1945 Europe were reproduced in a redrawing of intellectuals' boundaries which excised Russian history from that of Europe after 1917 and Eastern Europe's history after 1945 (and by retroactive reperiodization in effect excised all East European history) from NATO's reconfiguration as the telos and limits of Europe. Although communism was one spatial and temporal boundary that served to separate Eastern Europe from the “real” Europe, so too was East European nationalism used to segregate specialists in the region from their counterparts who studied “normal” states and civil societies with healthy patriotism, rather than the versions that are described in often racist terms as tribal or atavistic in the East.¹⁰

In contrast, Szporluk insists on the European normality of much of East European national history. (He insists particularly that Ukraine's history is not all that different from the rest of Eastern Europe's.) For one, the nationalisms of Eastern Europe are not qualitatively different from analogous movements in Europe more generally, but share important commonalities in ideas of popular sovereignty, language and culture. True, the three dynastic empires (and USSR) that ruled over today's nations and successor states posed different challenges to nation-making elites in the East, and the sequence of state- and nation-building was different from that of the classic West European models. But Eastern Europe has shared in many of the fundamental processes of modern European history and deserves broader sympathy and more genuine understanding from those scholars who call themselves Europeanists than has been the case certainly for the past half century.

Though Szporluk appeals for Europeanists to relocate their conceptual boundaries farther to the east, he hesitantly draws the line somewhere west of Russia's current borders. (He, after all, sees the

⁹ This view was most forcefully propounded by Helene Carrere D'Encausse in her *Decline of the Soviet Empire: The Triumph of the Nations* (New York, 1992). Szporluk himself makes only positive references to d'Encausse's work.

¹⁰ The most influential proponent of dividing the nationalisms of world history into good, civic ones and bad ethnic ones has been Liah Greenfeld, in *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, 1992).

Soviet Far West as Europe's Far East.) The relationship of Russia to Europe, however defined, has today once again been raised on the policy and intellectual agenda. Martin Malia, at one end of the divide, asserts that Russia has returned to her European path of development after having been derailed first by World War I and then seventy years of alien, Soviet rule. He seeks to rehabilitate a westernizing, liberal, national alternative to Soviet ideocracy.¹¹ Szporluk's view of Russia, by contrast, stresses greater continuity from the Imperial institutions and ideologies to their Soviet, particularly Stalinist successors. Such a view aligns him more closely with an important antagonist of Malia's, Richard Pipes, who also emphasizes Russia's unfortunate history of failed nation-building in the name of Empire and autocracy.¹² In other words, for Szporluk, European means post-imperial (and Russia, in his opinion, has not attained that status yet), though the history of a couple important European powers, France and Britain, remind us that decolonization and deimperialization were also reluctantly undertaken only in the postwar years, and with often tragic consequences (witness, for example, the French-Algerian war).

The discussions about NATO and European Union expansion have given new life to these disagreements about Russia's place in Europe, and the views of Eastern and East Central Europeans are helping to shape those discussions. Szporluk's and Pipes' interwar Polish origins have influenced their own wrestling with the question of how "European" Russia can become, and their views are closer to the European (and I suspect American) mainstream than those of Malia. Still Szporluk reminds us, in the final analysis, that Ukraine's contemporary state- and nation-building projects, and possibly Ukraine's basic survival, hinge on the successful transformation of Russia to a democratic, civic, territorial nation. Many friends of independent Ukraine often appear to be wishing for the worst in Russia because they rue the historic domination of Ukraine by Russia. But a Russia excluded from Europe—from European institutions, norms, and values—would be a threat to Ukraine's own integration into Europe. After all, a starkly contrasting

model of post-Soviet state relations is that of Belarus and Russia in their solemnly proclaimed union. Belarus's leadership appears to be willing to cede considerable sovereignty to the union and to restrict the processes of democratization inside Belarus', and such concessions encourage neo-imperialist thinking inside Russia (and among certain circles in Ukraine) as well.

And just as many Russians today blame "Soviet legacies" for their contemporary difficulties rather than facing up to their own mistaken policies, so, too, many Ukrainian political leaders blame "the Russian factor" for most of Ukraine's contemporary woes rather than admit their own lack of imagination and political will. This does not mean we should turn a blind eye to Russian policies or trends that run counter to European or Euro-Atlantic interests and values, nor is it a denial of the considerable institutional and social-psychological legacies of the Soviet system and Russian domination in that system, but too often this type of laying blame becomes ideology rather than objective analysis of the situation. However the issues of legacies are to be resolved, Ukrainian-Russian relations are likely to be very important for the foreseeable future. Those who hope for the survival and growth of an independent Ukraine should also hope for a truly democratic Russian neighbor. The survival of an independent Ukraine in itself will be an important indicator of Russia's successful deimperialization, or, in Szporluk's understanding, its Europeanization.

Alternative Geopolitical Imaginaries and Periodizations

The theme of Russia's reformability is tied to Szporluk's search in the region's history for alternate political and geopolitical arrangements that would have permitted greater accommodation of national cultures, identities, institutions, and elites in the contexts of the Soviet bloc. Sadly, it is a search that leads to the gradual erosion of his hope in the Soviet elites' capacity and willingness to redress the inequities of Soviet nationality policies and policy toward Eastern Europe. Early on, the Bolsheviks' own nationality policies during the 1920s, the period of *korenizatsiia*, offered some hope for a more equitable balancing of powers between the dominant Russians and subordinate non-Russians. And Szporluk insists that Lenin himself had a good appreciation of the Ukrainian question, even if Lenin's views remained a distinct minority opinion

¹¹ See his *Russia under Western Eyes* (Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1999); and *The Soviet Tragedy* (New York, 1994).

¹² For Pipes' important statements on these issues, see his *Russia under the Old Regime* (New York, 1974); and *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923* (Cambridge, Mass., 1964). Geoffrey Hosking has also recently reformulated this thesis in *Russia: People and Empire* (Cambridge, Mass., 1997).

in the Bolshevik leadership.¹³ Elsewhere in the region both Tomas Masaryk's alternate vision of the political arrangement of post-1918 East and East Central Europe (p. 263) and the Prague reforms of 1968 (p. 14), one element of which was to restore equality in the relations between Czechs and Slovaks in Czechoslovakia, held out hope, in turn, for Soviet reforms of inter-state East European and intra-Soviet national relations. Szporluk also explores the Yugoslav solution of extraterritorial cultural identity as a possible option for the Soviet Union (p. 59).¹⁴

From a perspective that is sensitive to alternative paths of development, Szporluk argues for a periodization of the Russian-Ukrainian relationship that is marked by the following important years: 1922, the first "resolution" of the Soviet national question in the structure of the USSR, a structure which under Stalin would be proclaimed as a universal model for all states, most importantly those in East Central and Southeastern Europe after World War II; 1939-45, a violent extension of that Soviet model of nation-building to a region that had had considerable alternative experience, first Far Eastern Europe, later Eastern Europe after the wartime victory; 1956-68, from the realignment of power after Stalin's death that permitted a doctrinal reassessment of Soviet experience and the brief tolerance of multiple national roads to socialism until the repudiation of East European experience and the reassertion of the Soviet model as universal after the Prague Spring; 1988/91, the dismantling of the East European bloc and then the Soviet Union itself.

I might reformulate the first important turning point in the Russian-Ukrainian encounter by adding World War I, the revolutionary and civil war years, 1914-1923. The war militarized and internationalized the Russian, Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian

¹³ Mikhail Pokrovskii, the subject of Szporluk's earlier scholarship, set the goal of Soviet history-writing to overcome the Russian chauvinist and imperialist legacies of pre-revolutionary Russia. But also the dissident critique of Soviet nationality policy articulated by Ivan Dziuba in *Internationalism or Russification?* (New York, 1974) influenced Szporluk's thinking; Dziuba argued that Stalinist nationality policies violated the more enlightened programs of the Leninist 1920s. On Lenin's views being those of the minority, see a recent study by Jeremy Smith, *The Bolsheviks and the National Question, 1917-1923* (New York, 1999); on the politics and practice of *korenizatsiia* in Ukraine, see George Liber, *Soviet Nationality Policy, Urban Growth, and Identity Change in the Ukrainian SSR, 1923-1934* (Cambridge, 1992).

¹⁴ See chapter 2 in the volume under review for a discussion of reformist alternatives to Soviet policies.

Empires' nationalities politics, including the expectations of "all-Russian" and Ukrainian political and intellectual elites. The revolution of 1917 marked the first steps in Ukrainian state- and nation-building in conditions of relative democracy, and the civil war years confronted the White armies and the Bolshevik leadership with their first experience of Ukrainian states, even if semi-sovereign and even if short-lived. (And, after all, how sovereign were either the White Governments or even the Bolsheviks during the civil war years?) As with other periods of transformation in the Russian-Ukrainian relationship, so too this set of realignments did not happen in isolation from broader processes of change in class, national identity and other political loyalties. In large measure, the 1922 Constitution of the USSR is a legacy of that period's wrenching transformations. Geoff Eley has made a persuasive case for such a periodization (1914-1923), and this chronological remapping also offers the possibility of bringing historians of Eastern and Western Europe together in new ways, in other words of integrating East European history into the narrative of an expanded Europe's past.¹⁵

Szporluk's essays touch on many other issues, but the grand questions of relations between Russia and Ukraine, the futures of Europe and Empire, are key for rethinking the meaning of the twentieth century and remain firmly on the geopolitical agendas of today's policymakers in the region and beyond. His ambivalence about Russia's relationship to Europe reflects the very real doubts and misgivings in both European countries and Russian elites about Europe's new borders. His suggestions for rethinking the periodization of the twentieth century in Eastern Europe promise greater dialogue with historians of western Europe.

To Wayne Vucinich, one of Szporluk's Stanford University teachers and a veteran nationalities specialist himself, we owe thanks for arranging with Hoover Press to publish these essays, but above all, Roman Szporluk has earned our gratitude for challenging conventional wisdom and imaginary geopolitical boundaries.

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¹⁵ See Geoff Eley, "Remapping the Nation: War, Revolutionary Upheaval and State Formation in Eastern Europe, 1914-1923," in P. J. Potichnyi and H. Aster, eds., *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective* (Edmonton, 1988), pp. 205-46. For more on my attempt at rethinking the place of the Ukrainian revolution in the events of 1914-1923, see my essay "Ukraine," in Acton, Cherniaev, and Rosenberg, eds., *Critical Companion to the Russian Revolution, 1914-1921* (London, 1997), pp. 728-40.