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"To promote thought and action in the service of Christ"

VOL. XIX

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
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The Foolishness of God

John Knox

IT WAS AN UNUSUAL AND PROFOUND INSIGHT OF ST. PAUL which gave us the phrase "the foolishness of God," and like all phrases struck off in such moments of insight, it is true in more ways than that consciously intended by the writer. For example—although there is no reason for supposing Paul thought of it in this way and indeed every reason for believing he did not—the phrase may suggest to us one aspect of the meaning of the glory of the world about us, which is so inescapable even on a day like this and for which we have just been giving thanks in psalm and song. One cannot live long in the world and love it much and still believe that God is only wise. There is everywhere about us an extravagance, a purposeless profuseness and splendor, which, if it be not proper to call "foolishness," is surely not wisdom. The heavens have never been said to declare the wisdom of God, but rather what would appear to be His foolish prodigality, His magnificence, His glory.

GOD OF MORE THAN WISDOM

WE USUALLY THINK OF GOD AS DELIBERATE AND PURPOSEFUL. We can use such a phrase as "the definite plan and foreknowledge of God." We recognize, of course, that His intentions are often obscure and that His purposes run far deeper than we can hope to follow with our understanding. We say: "How unsearchable are His judgments and how inscrutable His ways!" But all the while we know that His judgments are wise, deliberate judgments and His ways are conscious, careful ways. How otherwise could we trust ourselves to His keeping, both in life and death? But although reflection of this kind answers to one aspect of God's being, it does not take account of all we may know of it if the nature of nature is any clue to the nature of God, as it must be. Not only is it futile to ask what was God's purpose in making things just as they are; it is also impossible for us to suppose that He did so with what we would call a purpose

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This sermon was delivered at the morning service in James
Chapel.*

at all. We are told that He knows each star by name—this we can believe, for every separate star is the work of His hand. But that He created each star for some use or as a means to some end—this passes belief! The stars do not exist because of their utility; so far as we can see, they exist because God found joy in making them. The earth and the heavens in their concrete fulness cannot be explained as planned constructions, the products of conscious purpose and labor; rather, they represent, at any rate under one of their aspects, the illimitable freedom, the pure joy, the boundless creativity, the foolishly wasted beauty, of God.

If this is true about the nature of the world, it is clear that something besides wisdom is required to understand, enjoy and share its life most richly and intimately. We begin to understand that a deep necessity gives support to Jesus' words, "Thou hast hidden these things from the wise and prudent and hast revealed them unto babes," and also why he should have said that only a little child can see the kingdom of God. In fact, the thing that explains Jesus' own ability to get so near the heart of life and to "mingle with the universe" so completely seems to be the fact that he understood something of this "foolishness of God" and made it his own, expressing it in act and word. Sometimes comparisons are made between the teachings of Jesus and those of ancient contemporaries, or near-contemporaries, like Epictetus or Hillel, with a view toward showing that these teachers were quite as wise as Jesus, or perhaps even wiser. That may be. Is not the very distinction of Jesus' teaching that it was not wise at all? Why do we listen, as to the very voice of God, when he says, "Resist not evil; if any one should smite thee on one cheek turn to him the other or if one would sue thee at law and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak as well," or when he says, "Love your enemy, pray for them who persecute you," or when he says, "Take no thought for your life what you shall eat or what you shall drink, nor yet for your body what ye shall put on." Why, I say, do we listen to such words, and listen, not as to merely human words, but as to the words of God? It is not because they strike us as prudent words. It is not because of any wisdom they may be demonstrated to possess. It is not because we can justify them with any argument or even prove their truth by any example. It is rather because they seem to answer, as the more reasonable and moderate words of other teachers do not, to something strange and deep in the nature of the world and therefore in ourselves who belong to it. Jesus always makes this correspondence clear. I am to love my enemy because God sends His rain upon the just and the unjust and causes His sun to rise upon the evil and the good. I am to be free from cares because the birds do not sow or

reap or gather into barns and yet God feeds them, and the lilies toil not, nor spin, and yet Solomon in all his glory was not clothed like one of them. Could any words seem more foolish? And yet something we sense in the world about us and therefore find in our hearts will not permit us to forget them or, despite our unfaithfulness to them, to deny their truth.

GOD THE PRODIGAL

WE USE THE WORD "PRODIGAL" in naming one of Jesus' parables. That adjective might be much more extensively applied. As a matter of fact, Jesus' parables are filled with prodigals, and even in this particular one there are two—the son who wasted his substance and the father who wasted his love. The real prodigal is the latter—dividing his living with a disobedient and unworthy son who wishes to leave home, watching eagerly for his return, running to meet him when he sees him afar off, falling on his neck and kissing him, calling for shoes for him and a ring, and the fatted calf for a feast for him—was there ever such a prodigal father? And what wise man does not sympathize with the complaint of the elder son? Jesus told many such stories. One recalls the parables, not only of the prodigal father, but of the prodigal employer (who insists on paying everybody a full day's wage no matter how little one has worked), the prodigal Samaritan (whose care for a stranger overflows all the bounds of reason or duty), the prodigal sower (most of whose seed is wasted), and the prodigal host (who fills his banquet table from among the poor of the street). We read about prodigal kindness ("good measure, pressed down, shaken together and [as though that were not so much more than enough] running over") and prodigal forgiveness ("seventy times seven times").

Once a woman broke on Jesus an alabaster box of precious ointment and some one prudently said, "Why this waste? This should have been sold and the money given to the poor." As a justification of her behavior Jesus' answer seems singularly unconvincing. The truth is that her act could hardly be "justified"; it was extravagant and wasteful in the extreme. But Jesus said, "Let her alone. She hath done a beautiful thing." The spilled ointment was for him a symbol of the vast creative goodness of God, poured out in such utterly wasteful abundance.

EXTRAVAGANT GOODNESS

AND DOES NOT THE CROSS, again under one of its aspects, exhibit to us this same foolish, extravagant goodness? Would it not have been wiser to see that love could not follow its own way in a world

where selfishness and hatred were so firmly established, that one could not afford to be freely generous in a world so bound by conventions and traditions of religion, race and class? Would it not have been wiser to recognize that something has gone so wrong with man that he simply cannot receive, or even tolerate, the goodness of God; that, although he was created by this goodness and his life can be fulfilled only in the knowing and enjoying of it and although he deeply knows this, because he is perversely unable to open his heart to it, he cannot bear the thought, much less the sight of it. It is for this reason he nails the Son of God to a tree and crucifies the Lord of glory. He cannot bear to see depicted too clearly or to hear spoken too plainly what his own heart, responding to what is deepest and most real in the nature of the world, tells him is ultimately true.

But in this he cannot succeed. For we cannot finally deny what our hearts know and we cannot finally reject what our hearts love. And the Cross, wherever it is found, whether on Golgotha or on our own street, speaks only the more eloquently of the deep, firm grasp God's beauty and love have, and have always had, on our hearts for showing, as well, what brutal blows we have dealt in our ruthless effort to get free of it. But this last we cannot do. For the God who spreads above our heads the glorious night has also set eternity and the infinite spaces of the stars within our very hearts; and we cannot escape our nature and our destiny. Our wisdom must finally yield to the wonder of His glory and our proud strength, to the relentless pressure of His love.

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Do Not Let Your Minds Be Captured

Robert T. Handy

THAT ANCIENT CIRCLE OF MAJESTIC STONES known as Stonehenge, arising impressively above rolling Salisbury Plain in southern England, has long aroused much speculation as to its origin and history. It has attracted a steady stream of visitors for centuries. Many of those who come pause only briefly to gaze at the great monoliths, erected originally in the pre-Christian era. But the experts who have spent many months at the site can tell us much about Stonehenge in minute and fascinating detail. One of these experts, Professor R. J. C. Atkinson, ten years ago discovered a hitherto unnoticed carving on one of the great stones. It is in the form of a dagger—a significant symbol for the ancients who gathered there, something like the cross for Christians. Reflecting on his discovery, Atkinson writes:

The carvings present us with a remarkable object-lesson in the fallibility of human observation. Few people who have seen the Stonehenge dagger will deny that, once one knows where to look, it is perfectly obvious; indeed when the sun is shining across the face of the stone, it can be seen from the gate of the Stonehenge enclosure, over 100 yards away. Yet during the past three centuries hundreds of thousands of visitors must have looked at the dagger . . . without actually *seeing* it. Nothing could demonstrate better that one sees only what one is expecting to see.¹

Today, of course, the informed visitor to Stonehenge comes expecting to see the dagger and does see that which has been overlooked for centuries.

As we keep in mind Atkinson's striking sentence, "nothing could demonstrate better that one sees only what one is expecting

¹ *Stonehenge*, Penguin Books, 1960, p. 46.

Robert T. Handy is Professor of Church History at Union. This address was delivered as part of the opening exercises for the current academic year.

to see," let us shift our attention from the sign of the dagger to the sign of the cross. Christian faith arose in the fulness of time under the guidance of the Spirit as response to God's disclosure of himself in Jesus Christ. The divine dynamic that is at the heart of the gospel has for centuries exerted its powerful fascination over millions of men. Many of them have tried to state the meaning of the gospel in various forms: systematic, homiletic, imaginative, artistic. Christians have continually attempted to keep their widely differing institutional forms open to the reality of the gospel.

WORDS FROM THE PAST

WE CAN NOT HELP BUT BE APPRECIATIVE of our forebears in the past and our contemporaries in the present who have struggled to express the gospel meaningfully for their times, and who have striven to make alive its reality in the Church of their times. We are and will always be deeply in their debt. Their labors enable us to see riches in the faith which might otherwise be forever hidden from us. Their efforts have done much to renew the churches in which we have been nourished in the knowledge and love of God. Much of our time in this seminary is rightly spent in studying their contributions, many of which have enriched our own minds and hearts. In our matchless library of Christian theology and history the wisdom and experience of Christian life in past and present can be tapped. No leader in the Christian Church can count himself prepared for his task who has not worked effectively in the treasury where the heritage from the past and the records of the present are preserved.

These great resources can, alas, be wrongly used—to stifle rather than to inspire, to confine rather than to excite, to imprison rather than to emancipate. They can become our masters rather than our guides. Perhaps these dangers spring in part from the fact that human language is never quite adequate as a vehicle for great spiritual experience, so that if we are not careful the letter of Christian writing rather than its deeper spirit can claim us. Dr. L. G. Champion once noted that the biblical writers themselves had to struggle against the limitations of language as they wrote. He said:

Every attempt to express the soaring experiences of the Christian faith encloses these experiences in a cage. . . . But as we read the testimony of the apostles we must not pay too much attention to the cages. . . . The phrases and metaphors which the apostles use are but invitations to come and share these amazing relationships with God and man which are made possible in Christ and constitute the gloriously free life of the children of God.²

² *The Church of the New Testament*, Carey Kingsgate Press, 1951, pp. 53 f.

If these difficulties of expression plagued those who lived in the time of the great event of the incarnation, how much more difficult has it been for the faithful laborers in the Church through the centuries and in the present to catch fully the divine dimensions of the gospel in their writings and in their institutions. If we let their words and deeds master us too much, then our vision of the gospel may be narrowed, encaged, and we shall go on seeing only what they have been able to tell us to expect to see. We may then miss seeing clear signs of guidance which the heavenly Father has set for us in our time, because we will see only what we are expecting to see.

To take an illustration from a quite different field, it has been suggested that one of the reasons for the fruitfulness of Benjamin Franklin's early experiments in electricity was that he approached the subject freshly without too many preconceptions. As Daniel Boorstin sums the matter up, "he saw more because he knew much less of what he was supposed to see."³ Later Franklin became over-impressed with the European authorities and his work in this field lost something of its freshness. He came to see only what he was expecting to see! We can get so weighed down by the very wealth and variety of our Christian inheritance, we can get so impressed by what is set down in theological tomes and in institutional patterns, that we fail to use our remarkable resources as a point of departure, as a springboard, as a source of stimulation and inspiration. We may come to see only what we have been told to expect to see, while the significantly new, that which could stir our imaginations and arouse our creativeness, remains hidden from us. The apostle Paul no doubt had many more things in mind than the single thought which I am attempting to expound when he wrote a sentence in his letter to the Colossians (2:8) which the New English Bible translates this way: "Be on your guard; do not let your minds be captured by hollow and delusive speculations, based on traditions of man-made teaching and centred on the elemental spirits of the world and not on Christ."

My thesis is simply this: we must not let our minds be captured either by using wrongly the written material of past and present or by following slavishly the institutional patterns which come out of the past and which surround us today. Wonderful as they may be, they have their limitations; they bear not only the marks of divine inspiration but also of human imperfection. We must not let our minds be captured so that we see only what they teach us to expect to see.

3 *The Americans: The Colonial Experience*, Random House, 1958, p. 254.

HERITAGE AND FRESHNESS

AN ANTI-INTELLECTUAL CONCLUSION might be drawn from what I have tried to say so far: so as to be really free of all preconceptions, so as to be really free of the distorted perspectives of past and present, so as to be really free to see afresh, let us deliberately turn away from the records of the past and the traditions that live on in the present. But this would be, if not what Paul repudiated as continuing in sin that grace might abound, at least seeking the darkness that the light might shine. What I am calling for is certainly not the slightest neglect of the Christian heritage, but its proper use, in such a way as to instruct us, to guide us, to correct us, to excite us. If I may revert to my opening illustration, the Stonehenge dagger after all was not seen first by a rank amateur but by a skilled archaeologist who was highly schooled in his profession, yet who was sensitively open to what lay before him. At this seminary we spend much time and energy daily in both chapel and library, at both study and worship, in both classroom and prayer cell, at both intellectual analysis and spiritual meditation. Nothing less is adequate to the great commandment to love God with heart, with soul, with strength, and with mind. Nothing less can acquaint us with the spiritual riches of the Christian heritage and yet keep us sensitively open to the presence of the Eternal working in our midst.

There are certainly many reasons why we in our day need a fresh vision, why we need to see more than our forebears can teach us to expect to see. We in seminary have been called to minister in one way or another to men and women who live in this rather terrifying age of the splitting of atoms and the piercing of space. Dean H. E. Root has put into one sentence what many of us are feeling: "It is by no means clear that anything like Christian faith in the form we know it will ever again be able to come alive for people of our own time or of such future time as we can imagine."⁴ If not Christian faith in the form we know it, then, let us hope and pray, in *some other* form. But *what* form? Here we may be so riveted by our past that we can hardly even imagine anything really new or different, either in the way Christian faith is stated or in the way it is institutionalized. We may be so tied by the familiar, by the expected, that the very imprint of divinity which is given to light our way in this day of unimaginable but precarious opportunity may seem to us to be the denial of faith. The forms of our theology and of our churches, the shape of our Christian hymnody and art both transmit the gospel and yet hide it, for they carry the scars of the accidents of history and the marks of human limitation. But always

⁴ "Beginning All Over Again," in A. R. Vidler, ed., *Soundings: Essays Concerning Christian Understanding*, Cambridge University Press, 1962, p. 6.

the mysterious, divine dynamic of the gospel, as God wills, seeks to find us through words and images, through sacraments and Church, to lighten our darkness and to enable us to see that which we do not expect to see and can not yet even imagine. Nor is the light that shines for us, if we let Him sweep the scales from our eyes, effective only within the Church, it is given also (and even primarily) for all men, for the whole world which God loves. In a recent article on "Christian Ethics and International Affairs," Dr. John C. Bennett refers to certain problematic local economic pressures, and declares that "Such pressures can only be met by a national plan not now in sight."⁵ At the moment my concern is not to get us into a debate on the details here—there will be time and place for that later—but to agree that in this area as in many others in American life there are needed plans that are not yet in sight, and actions that have not yet been imagined. Surely Christians, who know the Eternal as loving all men and as concerned with full life for all, may not evade wrestling with the common problems of man and society. Hopefully, out of their Christian experiences, men and women who labor in the market place and at the council table can find fresh guidance beyond what they may now expect toward the more adequate handling of social, economic and racial issues. If we allow the fateful dichotomy of sacred and secular as it has been worked into the warp and woof of our western heritage to chain us forever, then our civilization will indeed be drawing to its close.

OPENNESS TO THE SPIRIT

ONE OF THE POWERFUL, HOPEFUL STRANDS in the theological renaissance of our time emphasizes the work of the Holy Spirit. Ironically, many seem to conceive that He can work only along lines which have been laid out for Him by past theologies, while others have been so negatively affected by those who have traditionally stressed the doctrine of the Holy Spirit that they do not expect Him to be effectively at work at all. But the Scriptures promise that the Spirit will guide Christ's followers into all truth. He can as He wills illumine for us the pages of the Bible, the annals of church history, the tomes of theology, and He can as He wills direct and inspire the manifold contemporary efforts to set forth Christian faith in a way and form that will be relevant to our time. He can so lead us that we will not let our minds be captured; He can cause the scales to drop from our eyes so that we shall see not only what we now expect to see, but more than we can ask or think. As it is written: "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love him." (1 Cor. 2:9)

⁵ *Christianity and Crisis*, XXIII (August 5, 1963), 151.



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Bonhoeffer's Concept of Religion

Clifford Green

IN THE PAST DECADE BONHOEFFER's concepts of "the world come of age" and "non-religious Christianity" have attracted widespread attention. Not infrequently these vivid phrases have been irresponsibly used as slogans, so that it is not surprising that counsels of caution are now to be heard. If theological discussion is to be fruitful a clear understanding of the concepts involved is an obvious prerequisite.

Eberhard Bethge, the recipient of Bonhoeffer's letters from prison and now his editor, has said that in the prison writings Bonhoeffer's thoughts are moving in an interdependent triangle—Christ, world come of age, and religion;¹ and John Godsey has rightly observed that one of the key questions involved in Bonhoeffer's thought is the meaning of "religion."² It is obvious from the outset that when dealing with a subject that has been so variously defined as religion, we must be prepared for yet another interpretation which claims a place in its own right. Indeed, while Bonhoeffer praised Barth for his critique of religion, a comparison of their positions shows that even they cannot be identified; but to pursue this comparison, instructive and suggestive as it is, lies beyond the present subject.

For Bonhoeffer religion and Christian faith are two quite antipathetic things. He rejects the thesis of the religious a priori, as found for example in the work of his teacher Reinhold Seeberg. In Bonhoeffer's judgment, religion has been a garment that Christianity has worn in various modes throughout its history; and while this garment may have been warm, comfortable, flattering to the wearer, and even according to the finest pattern of its type, it must now be discarded.

The closest Bonhoeffer came to defining his view of religion was when he said that to "interpret in a religious sense" . . . means

¹ "The Challenge of Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Life and Theology," *Chicago Theological Seminary Register*, LI, No. 2, Feb. 1961, p. 33.

² "Barth and Bonhoeffer," *The Drew Gateway*, XXXIII, no. 1, Autumn 1962, p. 14.

Clifford Green is a candidate for the S.T.M. at Union.

to speak on the one hand metaphysically, and on the other individualistically."³ This statement is somewhat abstract and not self-explanatory, but it can be explicated both by the concept of "the world come of age" and by examining his major passages where the idea of religion occurs.

THE WORLD COME OF AGE

THE CONCEPT OF THE WORLD'S COMING OF AGE, as Bethge points out,⁴ is the new element in Bonhoeffer's prison thought. Humanity has attained its majority: it is adult, self-confident, self-dependent. Science, social and political affairs, art, ethics, and even religion itself (Feuerbach, e.g., *The Essence of Christianity*) operate from their autonomous laws. Alike in intellectual life and personal life we live without the support of "God" as a working hypothesis. In both we are content with a modest secularity, and in both we are concerned with the life of this present world.

Bonhoeffer's affirmation of the secular world must not be read as a total blessing upon it. His thought involves a dialectic of the world, which is not only the world come of age, but also the godless world.⁵ Nevertheless, the theme of man's coming of age stresses man's *independence* of God as a working hypothesis. This is *one* of the reasons why Bonhoeffer speaks of the end of religion. Thus although we find the critique of religion with him before this period, it becomes highly likely that now religion has to do with some sort of *dependence*, which this new element of autonomy now makes impossible.

Upon what, in Bonhoeffer's view, was man dependent in the childhood of humanity? The answer is: upon God as the *Deus ex machina*. This concept is one that is central to his argument, and, while it is by no means uncommon elsewhere, a knowledge of its origin vividly illustrates Bonhoeffer's point. It is reported as first being used in a Greek form by Lucian, the pagan satirist, in the second century A.D. The literal meaning, "God from the machine," is an allusion to the mechanical device by means of which the god was made to appear on the stage in the drama. Thus it has come to refer to "an unexpected benefactor who extricates from a difficulty." Doubtless Bonhoeffer would say that in the past such a benefactor in divine form has been by no means unexpected!

MAJOR PASSAGES ON RELIGION

IN THE EXEGESIS OF BONHOEFFER'S MAJOR PASSAGES where the concept of religion explicitly occurs, his constant theme is that re-

³ *Prisoner of God*, ed. Eberhard Bethge, trans. Reginald H. Fuller, Macmillan, 1961, p. 125.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 32.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 167.

ligion is *boundary dependence*; man uses "God" as a stopgap, a working hypothesis, *Deus ex machina*, to support himself where human powers give out. Such situations may be boundaries of knowledge; the boundary of existence, namely death and the world beyond; boundaries within existence, such as personal tragedies and failures, suffering, war experiences; and boundaries of "ultimate questions" such as sin and guilt, and the problem of evil. The "religious" doctrine of God which is correlative to these weaknesses and needs of man is God as omnipotent stopgap, the *Deus ex machina*.

I. This definition of religion as boundary dependence is confirmed in his first letter of the theological discussion proper, April 30, 1944:

Religious people speak of God when human perception is . . . at an end, or human resources fail: it is in fact *always* the *Deus ex machina* they call to their aid, either for the so-called solving of insoluble problems or as a support in human failure—*always*, that is to say, helping out human weakness or on the borders of human existence.⁶

II. The same theme is found again in a later letter where he is discussing a favorite subject, the Old Testament. (In the following passage it must be noted that the word "salvation" is used in a technical sense; he does not deny a legitimate "non-religious" interpretation of salvation.) The faith of the Old Testament, Bonhoeffer declares, unlike other oriental religions, is not a religion of salvation; and it is a cardinal error, he continues, to regard Christianity as a religion of salvation.

Myths of salvation arise from human experiences of the boundary situation.

Salvation means salvation from *cares* and *need*, from *fears* and *longing*, from *sin* and *death* into a better world beyond the grave.

The emphasis falls upon the far side [*jenseits*] of the boundary drawn by death.⁷

In opposition to this, Bonhoeffer asserts, the Old Testament is concerned with historical redemption on this side [*diesseits*] of death; and likewise the Christian hope of resurrection, in contrast to all mythological hopes,

sends a man back to his life on earth in a wholly new way which is even more sharply defined than it is in the Old Testament.⁸

In this example man's boundary experiences of cares and need, fears and longing, sin and the threat of death make him look for

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 124. Italics added.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 154. Italics added.

help to "God" to release him from this world. Thus "religion of salvation" is just another way of saying religion—it is boundary dependence.

III. Psychotherapists and existentialists, in Bonhoeffer's judgment, are "secularised methodists," and in a discussion of their approach another notable use of the word "religion" occurs. Existentialist philosophers and psychotherapists try to

demonstrate to secure, contented, happy mankind that it is really unhappy and desperate, and merely unwilling to realize that it is in severe straits it knows nothing at all about, . . .⁹

Unwilling to accept at their face value health, strength, security, and simplicity, they seek to drive men to inward despair. Man's private sphere, from prayer to sexual life, is their hunting ground. But this, protests Bonhoeffer, is "religious blackmail." Now why is the word "religious" used of the activities of those whom Bonhoeffer has previously called "secularised offshoots of Christian theology"? Precisely because they too always drive to the boundary they try to find a sphere of weakness to which they can then correlate their answers and thus effect a rescue. In this they are parallel to the activities of many Christian apologists.

IV. In another major passage Bonhoeffer stresses the decisive difference between Christianity and all religions. The Bible, he says, directs us to a powerless and suffering God who is with us and who calls us to share his suffering for the sake of the world. This is Christianity properly understood. But in contrast to this,

man's religiosity makes him look in his distress to the power of God in the world; he uses God as *Deus ex machina*.¹⁰

The theme is consistent: the boundary of distress where man is dependent on an almighty "God" to support him. The same point is made in the following letter of July 18, 1944. Jesus calls his disciples to watch with him in Gethsemane, to share his suffering. "That is the exact opposite of what the religious man expects from God."¹¹

V. In his outline for a book,¹² two further references bear on the explication of his concept of religion. In the first chapter there is the direct opposition of religion and the world come of age.

The decay of religion in a world that has come of age. 'God' as a working hypothesis, as a stop-gap for our embarrassments, now superfluous. . . .¹³

That is to say, in that men do not use God as a working hypothesis

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 146.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 166.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 178.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 164.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 178ff.

in science, economics, politics, art, and ethics; in that men are not concerned with saving their souls for a world beyond the grave; in that men generally are content with their modest share of happiness; in that even those who call themselves religious do not act "religiously"; in so far, that is, as men do not live at the boundaries and are self-dependent, religion has decayed and "God" as a stopgap for our embarrassments is superfluous.

In the second chapter of the book outline, approaching the question of religion from the side of God rather than from the boundary of man's weakness, he writes:

Our relationship to God is not a "religious" one to a highest conceivable, mightiest conceivable, best conceivable Being—that is a spurious concept of transcendence—but our relation to God is a new life in "being-for-others," in participation in the being of Jesus.¹⁴

Such a supreme being, which Bonhoeffer here sets in contrast to the being of Jesus, is the one pole of the religious relationship, the other pole of which is man in boundary dependence. In such a "religious" relationship to a "mightiest conceivable Being" there can be no true transcendence. We shall dwell more on this point later.

VI. Throughout the letters we find a number of concrete experiences recounted which also illustrate Bonhoeffer's meaning of religion. Notable is the case of the fellow prisoner in an air raid, crying, "O God, O God!" Bonhoeffer told him it would soon be over, feeling it wrong to force "religion" down his throat under such conditions. He later asks:

Are we to fall upon one or two unhappy people in their weakest moment and, so to speak, assault them into religion?¹⁵

BONHOEFFER'S GENERAL DEFINITION

THE PASSAGES ON RELIGION which we have examined above have yielded a concrete and consistent expression of Bonhoeffer's concept of religion. This must now be related directly to his summary statement that religion involves on the one hand metaphysics and on the other individualism. These two are correlative concepts, and the sense in which he uses them is seen in the following passages. Firstly, individualism:

Is it not true to say that the *individualistic concern for personal salvation* has almost completely left us all? Are we not really under the impression that there are more important things than bothering about such a matter? (Perhaps not more important than the matter itself, but more than bothering about it) . . . Is there any concern in the Old

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 179. Translation mine.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 122. Translation mine.

Testament about saving one's soul at all? Is not righteousness and the kingdom of God on earth the focus of everything, and is not Romans 3.14ff., too, the culmination of the view that in God alone is righteousness, and not in an individualistic doctrine of salvation? It is not with the next world that we are concerned, but with this world as created and preserved and set subject to laws and atoned for and made new.¹⁶

This is a treatment we have already met in the discussion on religions of salvation. Related to this is his remark that the time of inwardness and conscience is over, "which is to say the time of religion as such."¹⁷ A further example of individualism as Bonhoeffer regards it is seen in the following passage:

It is not some religious act which makes a Christian what he is, but participation in the suffering of God in the life of the world.

That is *metanoia*. It is not in the first instance bothering about one's own needs, problems, sins, fears, but allowing oneself to be caught up in the way of Christ, into the Messianic event, and thus fulfilling Isaiah 53.¹⁸

Individualism then, is preoccupation with oneself to the neglect of responsibility in the world, especially preoccupation with securing deliverance from the boundary experiences in which our weakness and insecurity loom up before us. The correlate to this individualism is metaphysics.

Bonhoeffer does not go on to spell out his view of metaphysics as he does with individualism, but several remarks make clear what he means. He says of Tillich, for example, that he

set out to interpret the evolution of the world itself—against its will—in a religious sense, to give it its whole shape through religion.¹⁹

Modern non-religious man, on the other hand, Bonhoeffer says, is an absolute nihilist. ". . . we've given up worshipping everything, even idols."²⁰

Metaphysics is the system, the overarching scheme and mental order by which we explain life to ourselves and give ourselves meaning and security. Bethge has summarized the point well; the transcendence of metaphysics, he says,

provides the completion which is felt necessary for this world. God or the godly is the superstructure for being.²¹

Under the heading of metaphysics we are to place the "answers" to "ultimate questions," such as the problem of evil, which Bonhoeffer would classify as one of the boundaries.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 125–26. Italics added.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 147–48.

²¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 34.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 166.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 153.

It is possible to illuminate Bonhoeffer's concept of religion by referring to Bethge's brief discussion of the subject. He sees four features involved, mentioning along with individualism and metaphysics, the *Deus ex machina* concept and provincialism.²² Yet these latter two are not really separate elements. The previous discussion has shown that the *Deus ex machina* concept is fundamental to Bonhoeffer's interpretation of religion because it is the counterpart to man's boundary dependence. Individualism and metaphysics are the two poles of the religious situation as Bonhoeffer sees it. Human weakness at the boundaries requires the counterbalance of metaphysics; metaphysics is the buttressing for human insecurity. Thus the *Deus ex machina* concept is the focal point of the whole pole of metaphysics—it is the buttress *par excellence*.

Provincialism is not so much a fundamental feature of Bonhoeffer's definition of religion as a derivative description of the area of life which religion occupies. Provincialism, whether in personal or social life, is the inevitable consequence of religion as Bonhoeffer views it.

By way of summary, some observations on provincialism may fill out the picture further. Religion affects only a sector of life because it arises not from the center of life but from the boundary experiences.

The religious act is always something partial, faith is always something whole, an act involving the whole life.²³

It is not difficult to see why this is so. The religious act is at the boundary in weakness. But when the crisis is past, or the insoluble ultimate question is solved by some "answer," man remains unconfounded at the center of his existence; indeed, it is he who *gives himself* the religious answer. Hence even a religious man, by confronting "God" at the peripheral boundary, is not affected in the center of his being by the "religious encounter," let alone a non-religious man who is not concerned with the boundaries of life.

Christ, Bonhoeffer contends, confronts man at the center of his being—in his health, confidence, knowledge, and power. There he is called to discipleship, and there the root of sin is exposed in strength, not in weakness. Christ calls man out of his *being-for-himself*. Only participating in the sufferings of Christ for the world, which is repentance and faith, only abandoning *being-for-self* in favor of *being-for-others* is the act of the whole man in the center of his being. Only thus can there be a complete reorientation of human being; only thus in a new life for others is the spurious transcendence replaced by true transcendence; only thus do we find

²² *Ibid.*, p. 33f.

²³ *Op. cit.*, p. 167.

our true humanity and community; only thus are we the *Ekklesia*, not conceiving ourselves "religiously" as specially favored, but as existing wholly for the world; and only thus is Christ

no longer an object of religion, but . . . indeed and in truth the Lord of the world.

. . . Lord even of those with no religion.²⁴

Only thus is Bonhoeffer's central question answered: "Who is Christ for us today"?

THE NON-RELIGIOUS INTERPRETATION

WE HAVE MOVED NOW OF NECESSITY into the heart of the question of the "non-religious interpretation"; but first we must ask why it is that religion is impossible any longer. Obviously Bonhoeffer's first point is that the world has come of age. Men, even so-called religious men, are no longer religious in the sense he has defined. But while this point of the world come of age is central in the letters, it is prior only in the sense in which the fuse is prior to the gunpowder. In other words, it brings his Christology into even more powerful play. Christ is not an object of religion. He does not meet us in our boundary dependence.

Christ is the centre of life, and in no sense did he come to answer our unsolved problems.²⁵

This is Bonhoeffer's abolition of religion, and that not dialectically, but absolutely.

Thus he calls for a "non-religious interpretation of biblical and theological concepts." This should not be seen simply as a matter of interpreting concepts in some merely intellectual sense, for his central question is: "Who is *Christ*, what is the christian *life* for us who are non-religious?" For the same reason we should not see this as primarily a question about language, although Bonhoeffer certainly is concerned about the concrete forms of expression, as for example, the question of revising the creeds. We must remember in this context one of his first remarks at the beginning of the theological discussion in the letters, in which he says:

The time when men could be told everything by means of words, whether theological or simply pious, is over. . . .²⁶

The non-religious interpretation begins not at the boundary (religion), but in the center. Christ calls us out of our *being-for-self* into sharing his suffering for the world, into *being-for-others*. "That

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 123.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

is faith, that is *metanoia*, that is what makes a man and a Christian. . . ."²⁷ This confrontation at the center by being called to participate in the suffering of Christ must be, Bonhoeffer says, "the starting point for our 'worldly' [*weltliche*, which is equivalent to non-religious] interpretation."²⁸

Bonhoeffer wants to give this non-religious interpretation to all the central concepts of theology—repentance, faith, justification, rebirth, sanctification, atonement, redemption, God, Christ, Church, sin, fall, creation, and the last things! There are several remarks in the letters which could give the impression that he was still right at the beginning of this reinterpretation, and that what is involved is quite enigmatic. But this is not so, for in fact he has given us the fundamental lines of this reinterpretation in his approach to faith, repentance, God, and Christ. We can also see it being clearly worked out in his references to sin, where he wants to begin in the center with sins of strength and not on the periphery with sins of weakness. It is also seen in his view of the Church in the center of life, and as living wholly for the world. From the center of life, under the lordship of the servant Christ, for the world: this is the manner of the non-religious interpretation, this is the approach which is *weltliche*.

But what is the significance of Bonhoeffer's continual stress on the world? If the non-religious interpretation begins, as he says, in discipleship with the suffering Christ, where does it lead? Is this a theology of the catacombs, a theology for martyrs? We must not let Bonhoeffer's personal suffering in prison distract us from another theme which is a strong voice in the polyphony of these fragments, even in the midst of his suffering. We must remember his remark that suffering is not to be sought as an end in itself—that will save us from all pious martyr complexes! This theme may perhaps best be summarized as a very powerful doctrine of creation, implicit but ever present. Here of central importance is his distinction between the penultimate and the ultimate. This world and our life in it is the penultimate, the thing before the last, but it is *truly before*; it has a proper existence in its own right as God's creation, as the world which God loves and preserves and redeems and makes whole. It is not by any means to be prematurely written off. Here we must recall Bonhoeffer's concern with the Old Testament. We must love God *in* our lives, and regard our earthly affections, pleasures, health, achievements and knowledge as the blessings of God; gratefully to accept them as such is properly to honor God. Again and again he speaks of the natural, the earthly, the human; and that precisely

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 169.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 164.

because Christ is the New Man, the True Humanity. For this reason the ambiguity of the world come of age is to be recognized, and its godlessness exposed, though not religiously.

It is perhaps necessary to add that the non-religious interpretation is not a mandate for the rejection of the Church. Certainly Bonhoeffer finds much in the life of the Church that is highly problematical, and he calls for a radical reform. Further, he raises the question of unconscious Christianity; what does that mean for the understanding of the Church in the world of which Christ is Lord? But these are questions about the Church's renewal, not its death warrant. We find, indeed, that some of his final writings include his thoughts on the reformation of the Church. Further, the important concepts in the letters of this-worldly, socio-ethical transcendence, was in fact laid in his theological foundation in *Sanc-torum Communio* in 1927. There Bonhoeffer showed himself as a thoroughly churchly dogmatician, a role which he maintained to the end.

Finally in connection with the non-religious interpretation, reference must be made to the important theme of the *Arkandiszip-lin*—the secret discipline. This needs to be worked out in considerable detail, but for the sake of space it will be treated only very briefly here. The problem is: how can the fullness of the gospel be relevantly and powerfully and concretely proclaimed to the world come of age? Where this cannot be done the treasures of faith must be kept in a secret discipline until the proper time, lest they be dissipated in profanity.

Some examples may clarify this point. Bonhoeffer once said that the Church may have lost the right in our time to proclaim the gospel to the Jews; to speak would be to profane the gospel. This does not mean that there is no gospel for the Jews, but that it must be kept hidden until the time to speak has come. Again, we notice that in his prayers for fellow prisoners he "soft-pedalled," as he says, prayer for forgiveness. If people are not worried about their sins it is blasphemy to go through the forms of hypocritical penitence, for grace is thereby made cheap. So the prayer for forgiveness, which is indeed at the heart of the Christian life, is preserved from profanity in hiddenness. Further, Bonhoeffer's chief criticism of Barth was that he set the whole of Christian doctrine, each part equally significant and necessary to the whole, before the world to be accepted *in toto* or not at all. But, in Bonhoeffer's judgment, this is not in accordance with the Bible, which recognizes degrees of significance and degrees of perception. Therefore, and here he states his concern very concisely, "a secret discipline must

be re-established whereby the *mysteries* of the Christian faith are preserved from profanation."²⁹

TRUE AND FALSE DEPENDENCE

ONE FINAL QUESTION must engage our attention. What is the place of dependence upon God in the Christian life? Bonhoeffer's attack on religion has centered on the issue of dependence, seeking divine help at the boundary. But is there no legitimate dependence? What are we to say when we find him pointing to such verses as in Psalm 50: "Call upon me in the time of trouble"?³⁰ Or when he remarks that "the history of the children of Israel is one long story of such cries for help"?³¹ Or again when we read of his own dependence as expressed so poignantly in most of his poems? Or when he says that "danger can only drive us closer to him"?³² Or when he writes that a weak and suffering God can help us?³³

If there is therefore apparently an illegitimate dependence and a legitimate dependence, how do we distinguish between them? It is the distinction between the boundary and the center, and the issue is between the sovereignty of man or the sovereignty of God. Man living at the center of his life as *being-for-self* is religious when he comes from time to time to a boundary in his existence. He, master of his own fate, decides that at such a time God would be convenient; so he as lord calls upon God to be almighty and to be his servant. One way or another the crisis passes, and he continues in his unchallenged way.

The Christian has been confronted by the servant Christ at the center of his life. In the center of his life the sovereignty of God is established. *Being-for-self* is overthrown, and as new man he is *being-for-the-brother*. He now shares in the suffering of Christ for the world. And in this suffering as God's servant he now finds a weakness and a dependence the like of which he had never before imagined. But in suffering with Christ and being weak with Christ he is at the same time upheld and renewed, fed and forgiven, and participates in Christ's victory, for Christ conquers the world by his weakness. And this is who Christ is for us today—not an object of religion, but in deed and very truth Lord of this world.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 126.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 164.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 183.

Somewhere East of Eden

I GET UP off my knees once more,
Ashamed; again I cannot speak
The truth this day, and as before
I find I know no way to pray
For love, much less humility
For hearing in my heart.

With what reproach I loose my hands,
Too weak to grip the searing bands
Of faithless creeds; I shy away—
The way too long, the reed too wry,
The cost so infinitely high. . . .
I drive the piercing nail.

And yet I do not dare deny
I court my exile willingly—
Pursue the prostituting pride,
Provoke the hatefulness of heart
That, lusting, knows no suicide,
But tears the soul apart.

If one eye's good, then I've an eye
Astray for God's eternity,
A wanderer that wills to die
The love of insincere abuse
That fawns and grovels frantically
To pry the Spirit loose.

Cry down upon this stillborn face
A curse upon the human race,
Until my dolmen spirit cries
Against my incapacity
To reach deep down inside myself
And live the life apart.

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A Trilogy: Engel, Murray, and Schempp

*The Supreme Court
and Public School Devotions*

Andrew N. Farley

THE FREQUENCY OF "SEPARATION" CASES appearing on judicial calendars has noticeably increased since the mid-forties. With every successful demand that the Jeffersonian wall be buttressed, public, press, religious leaders and even (in the case of Southern, Bible-belt conservatives, more particularly) Congressmen have raised the hue and cry.

The issue of relations between Church and State has again been confronted by the United States Supreme Court. No sooner had the outbursts of indignation and calumny waned in the *Engel* case viz., the New York Board of Regents' prayer, than the Court heard and decided *Schempp v. School District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania* and *Murray v. Curlett*. The point in controversy was morning devotions as conducted in Pennsylvania and Maryland school districts. The facts in *Schempp* and *Murray* are as interesting and as controversial as those in *Engel*, and the dispute in the former two assumed monumental proportions when the Attorneys General of nineteen states joined their colleagues from Pennsylvania and Maryland by filing briefs *amici curiae*. The individual appellees had the benefit of briefs' *amici curiae* submitted by the American Jewish Committee, the Synagogue Council of America, and the American Ethical Union. All three situations deserve consideration, with the emphasis being placed upon the more recent.

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THE SUPREME COURT CASES

I *Engel v. Vitale*

IN 1955 THE NEW YORK BOARD OF REGENTS urged the independent school boards to adopt for morning exercises the recitation of a rather innocuous prayer. The twenty-one word devotional read: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon thee, and beg thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our country."

The Engels, parents of children in a school district that had adopted the Regents' prayer, brought action to compel the school district to discontinue its use. They argued that the recitation of any such official prayer was contrary to the beliefs, religion, and family practices of themselves and their children. The basis for the suit, and the ground upon which the Supreme Court's opinion rests, was that the recitation of a state-composed prayer implies the establishment of religion and is therefore contrary to the guarantees afforded by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and as applied to the states through the Fourteenth.

Justice Black, writing for the six-man majority, argued:

It is neither sacrilegious nor anti-religious to say that each separate Government in this country should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave that purely religious function to the people themselves and to those the people choose to look to for religious guidance.¹

Most students of the law would, after some reflection, concur in the view of one commentator who surveyed the factual issues and then wrote:

There is nothing revolutionary about Justice Black's conclusion that the issuance of an official prayer is a violation of the establishment clause of the first amendment. . . . [That] if preference for one edition of the Bible is unconstitutional, then certainly writing and issuing a prayer would be also.²

II *Schempp v. School District of Abington Township*

The *Schempp* case involved Mr. and Mrs. Edward Schempp, parents of Ellroy, a senior in the Abington Township High School, Roger, an eighth grader, and Donna Kay, a seventh grader. Later testimony confirmed their Unitarian heritage; they did not believe in the divinity of Christ, in the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, nor in the concept of the Trinity. Ellroy had complained

¹ 370 U.S. 421, 435 (1962).

² 24 *University of Pittsburgh Law Review* 179, 181 (1962).

during his junior year that daily Bible readings were contrary to his family teachings, and after discussing the matter with the vice principal, was excused from the prescribed devotions. However, when as a senior he again sought to be excused, the request was refused. The assistant principal advised that, "he should remain in the homeroom and attend the morning Bible reading and prayer recitation period." He later justified his decision by maintaining that it was necessary for pupils,

to show respect . . . simply to obey a school rule, that matters of conscience and religion were not as important here as merely conforming to the school rule.³

The Schempps filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. On first hearing, the court found the state statute to be unconstitutional in that it violated the First Amendment. The school district and the Commonwealth, as *amicus curiae*, appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. In the meantime the Pennsylvania General Assembly amended the state School Code to permit "any child [to] be excused from such Bible reading, or attending such Bible reading, upon the written request of his parent or guardian." In view of this development the Supreme Court remanded the matter to the district court for reconsideration, which court reaffirmed its previous decision. Once again the defendant school district and the state appealed. Following arguments, the Court by an 8-1 majority struck down the Pennsylvania law.

An interesting variation in the school codes of Maryland and Pennsylvania is that the latter's law subjects a teacher to discharge for failing to conduct the required devotional exercises. In addition, although either the King James or the Douay versions of the Bible may be used, Abington Township gave each teacher a presentation copy of the King James version for use in the daily devotionals.

III *Murray v. Curlett*

The *Murray* case differs only slightly from *Schempp*. The Baltimore, Maryland, public schools required the reading, without comment, of a chapter from the Bible. Optional under the law was the daily recitation of the Lord's Prayer, better known to those of the Roman persuasion as the "Our Father." The Murrays claimed to be atheists. At trial, the school-age minor testified that he was compelled to participate in the daily exercises until, at the behest of the State Attorney General, the Maryland legislature amended the code to permit students to leave the classroom.

³ 177 F.Supp. 398, 401 fn 12 (E.D.Pa. 1962).

The Maryland State Court of Appeals held, in a 4-3 decision affirming a lower court, that inasmuch as anyone, upon proper application, could avoid participating in the devotions, the student's constitutional rights were not violated.

The Murrays, however, argued that the statute on its face violated the doctrine of separation of Church and State, that enforcement threatened their religious liberty to "believe or disbelieve," that such subjected the freedom of conscience to the rule of the majority and that the ruling equated moral and spiritual values with religious values. They claimed that their belief and ideals were rendered "sinister, alien and suspect" before their friends and neighbors and that doubts and questions were raised concerning their morality, good citizenship and good faith.

Counsel also argued that being excused from participation, even though voluntarily sought, causes the student to be regarded with aversion and derision. Second, he emphasized that the student is placed at a social disadvantage, because the attitude of equality among peers peculiarly inherent to those of tender years is destroyed. The Murrays appealed. The *Murray* case was decided at the same time as *Schempp*, and the Maryland public school devotionals were also declared unconstitutional.

GOD AND COUNTRY

NOTICE IS FREQUENTLY TAKEN of the early settlers' belief and recognition of the God-head and, more particularly, the Trinity. The earliest compact of the Colonies opens with an invocation for the grace of the Deity: "In the Name of God, Amen." These settlers fled religious, political and social discrimination to make their way in the New World. With few notable exceptions, however, the new colonies were no more inclined to tolerate variances from the communal norm than were the monarchies from whence the settlers fled.

The Scrooby congregation, to illustrate, abandoned their way of life in central England, and removed themselves to Holland. This act was precipitated by numerous arrests of members of their sect for disobedience to the Crown in matters of religion. In little more than a decade the congregation, again seeking to preserve family and religious traditions, emigrated westward, settled in the Cape Cod Bay region and established a government reflecting the forms of church organization to which they had been accustomed. Their Mayflower Compact sought to create a society patterned on the model of Calvinist Geneva. The Scriptures permitted men to associate and contract to provide civil as well as religious institutions;

they were, for practical purposes in the Scrooby-dominated colony, one and the same. This formal Church-State "establishment" survived in Massachusetts until 1833.

To the south in the Virginia Colony, Church and State likewise developed in the same mold. There tax monies supported the Anglican clergy, the police power of the government circumscribed and, in some instances, suppressed other religious groups, and appointment of bishops represented the exercise of the Crown's political power. The episcopate was an arm of the state; the state in turn preserved the episcopate.

One result of this intermingling of religious and secular power was the proscription of the Quakers as "pestilant heretics." Another was the exile of adherents of the Church of Rome. At one time in the Virginia colony to profess allegiance to the papacy was tantamount to suicide, the penalty for practicing that faith being death. A third was that Lutheran clergymen, as an example, had to go to England for Anglican ordination before they could solemnize marriages.

Only in the colonies of New York, Rhode Island and Pennsylvania could one sense the breath of change. In the former Dutch colony along the Hudson River, an attitude of indifference coupled with the plethora of sects in the major urban center stimulated mutual non-interference between religious groups and the governing body. This tended to be a marked improvement over the strict "establishment" of and suppression exercised by the Dutch Reformed Church in New Netherlands.

Roger Williams, founder of the colony which would become Rhode Island, was himself an exile from the Puritan (Scrooby) colony of Massachusetts. He had incurred the wrath of those early church fathers by emphasizing the unique singularity of the religious encounter, by arguing for complete separation of the sacral and the secular as necessary to protect the free exercise of individual conscience, and by opposing enactment of a penalty statute suppressing the Society of Friends.

Stresses developed in the early Church-State alliances as more non-English-speaking stocks fled to the eastern shores. Merle Curti has noted that these groups of immigrants did not subscribe to either the Anglican or congregationalist forms of religion and their opposition to the payment of taxes for the maintenance of such forms strengthened the infant movement for separation of Church and State.⁴ Other cleavages developed as organized church bodies, the Presbyterians, for example, reacted to the expanding power of the Church of England and actively cultivated alliances to prevent

⁴ Curti, *The Growth of American Thought*, 1951, pp. 50-79.

the appointment of bishops in the several colonies. Less vocal minority groups, fearing political subversion, viewed the bishops as passive instruments controlled by the Crown. In later years these alliances, including a traditional one between Baptists and Presbyterians, would turn upon attempts to establish an American episcopate of the Roman church. Finally, newcomers, such as the seventeenth century Maryland Roman Catholics, helped develop separation arguments in order to preserve their own position and permit them time to make it more tenable.

In spite of these leavening influences, one of the major consequences of the early Church-State alliances was the organization of schools. Because the emphasis of many colonial churches required an ability to read the Bible, the stress upon literacy yielded compulsory attendance at schools. Even as late as 1800, the so-called "public" schools were, in fact, parochial, Protestant institutions. (One compelling reason, it ought to be noted, that caused the Roman church to concentrate its efforts and assets in a private educational system.)

Finally, let us lay to rest a notion that endures beyond human belief, which Franklin H. Littell has described as "the most reactionary legend of all American folklore": the religiosity of the nation's founding fathers. The sects who utilized exile and even the penalty of death to keep their colonies oriented toward the "true faith" constituted a minority of the population. For example, in 1776 only 5% belonged to any church; as late as 1850 this had increased to only 15.5%. (Compare these statistics with the 1962 estimate that 63.6% acknowledge a church home.)⁵

The success of these power blocs to stamp out "heresy" can be attributed only to the fact that the institutions of government enforced the prerogatives of the state church. Implicit recognition of the predominance of this factor may be found in one of James Madison's letters to his compatriot, Thomas Jefferson. During the period when drafts of the new constitution were being circulated, Madison advised the Virginian that one of the objections to the document in New England was that the prohibition of religious tests would open a door for "Jews, Turks & infidels."⁶

⁵ 370 U.S. at 434; *Zorach v. Clauson*, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952); *Everson v. Board of Education*, 330 U.S. 1, 71-72 (1947); Littell, *From State Church to Pluralism*, 1962; Stokes, *Church & State in the United States* pp. 358-446; Bureau of Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, *Statistical Abstract of the United States* 46, 48 (83d ed. 1962).

⁶ *Writings of James Madison*, 1900 18, 21; Perry & Cooper, *Source of Our Liberties*, 1959. See *Pawlet v. Clark*, 9 Cranch 292 (1815); Beard, *Rise of American Civilization* 1933, p. 60; Cobb, *Rise of Religious Liberty in America*, 1902; MacDONALD, *Documentary Source Book of American History*, 1934, pp. 31, 33.

"IN GOD WE TRUST"

IN ADDITION TO THE HISTORICAL APPEAL a variety of specious arguments accompany the usual expression of concern about the Court "legislating the nigger into school and God out." Editors buttress their polemics with references to the fourth stanza of the National Anthem, to the national motto "In God we trust" inscribed on coins and paper currency, to the Pledge of Allegiance, and even to Speaker of the House McCormack's recent order to have the national motto inscribed over the Speaker's rostrum.

These references beg the question. Each of the precedents may very well represent historical as well as contemporary popular beliefs, but there was no standing on the part of any person, whether Christian, Jew, agnostic, or atheist, to raise a justiciable issue. One may argue that in each of the above situations the majority acted wrongly, but that alone is not enough. There is no injury, no proscription of constitutional guarantees which can give rise to a cause of action.

Factually, these "make-weight" analogies are just as misleading. The motto "In God we trust" was first inscribed on United States coins during the Civil War. The order for the inscription was an administrative act by Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon P. Chase. His action apparently stemmed from a suggestion by the Rev. M. R. Watkinson of Ridleyville, Pennsylvania, who wrote Chase after a series of Union losses had precipitously lowered the North's morale. The good minister "felt our national shame in disowning God as not the least of our present national disasters" and urged the "recognition of the Almighty God in some form on our coins." The slogan first appeared on occasional pieces minted in 1864 and has periodically disappeared and reappeared until the Congress ordered it placed on all coins and paper currency in 1955 and designated it the national motto in 1956.⁷

The addition of the words "under God" to the Pledge of Allegiance did not occur until 1954, although at that time President Eisenhower remarked "we are reaffirming the transcendence of religious faith in America's heritage and future."⁸ (It ought to be further noted that the Supreme Court has affirmed the right of the children of Jehovah's Witnesses not to participate in the classroom recital of the Pledge, because this was, according to the Witnesses, "false swearing.")

⁷ Act of July 11, 1955, 69 Stat. 290, 31 U.S.C.A. § 324a (1962); Act of July 30, 1956, 70 Stat. 732, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 623b (1962); 1955 U.S. Code & Admin. News 2417 (84th Cong., 1st Sess.).

⁸ Act of June 14, 1954, 68 Stat. 249, 36 U.S.C.A. § 172 (1962 Supp.); 1954 U.S. Code & Admin. News 2339 (83d Cong., 2d Sess.).

Even the official use of the fourth stanza of Francis Scott Key's composition during the bombardment of Fort McHenry on September 13 and 14, 1814, is comparatively recent as the history of this nation is reckoned. The first stanza was written by Key during the fighting as he stood on the deck of the H.M.S. *Surprise*; the fourth, the following day after he had been put ashore. But the poem, originally set to the tune "Anacron in Heaven," was not designated the official anthem until March 3, 1931.

At most, the various enactments represent a reaction by a select group of the populace. That such could occur is more a tribute to now unknown, but then active and vocal lobby groups, than to any overwhelming religious conviction or, for that matter, popular expression that the government should be more than neutral to the catholic faiths. Howard Mumford Jones suggests that the "mystique" of the nation during this period of constitutional debate was Christianity. Be that as it may, overt anticlericalism among the unsophisticated masses and the vague deism of the elite, of the leadership structure, rebuts his premise. In fact even the intelligentsia indulged themselves when one compares their fatalistic approach to faith with the Christocentric, dynamic liberalism of today. Nevertheless, these enactments have only a symbolic or ceremonial interpretation. They preclude the citizen's litigation. Nor is the question of government sponsored military chaplaincy *apropos*. The isolation of the man in military service and the circumscription of many of his rights require that means be made available, within the framework of the requisite discipline, to permit him, if he chooses, to practice his faith.

Indeed, the conflicts in matters of constitutional interpretation arise out of more significant encounters between the citizen and his government.

THE COURT AND INDIVIDUALITY

IN AN EARLY NUMBER OF *Dialog*, a publication of the Roman diocese of Pittsburgh, the editor discussed the individual in relation to the crowd. He wrote:

We're not really afraid of losing our individuality; we're afraid of the responsibility of gaining it, of having to relate to others as individuals themselves, as persons—not simply as members of the crowd . . . we can approach a synthesis [Coleridge's "multeity in unity"] as we get to know [love] individuals.⁹

In large part the outbursts and expressions of indignation that sur-

⁹ *Dialog*, 1, Mar. 23, 1962.

round cases such as *Engel*, *Murray*, and *Schempp* result from our lack of understanding of those who dare to step out of the crowd and protest their lot. As individuals enjoying the protection of the majority, we fear to hear the clamor of the minority. Our reaction tends toward suspicion. Instead of accepting those who dare to differ as individuals, those who seek to act as their conscience dictates, we accuse them of being libertines, amoral, and, yes, even communists.

Yet, as did Madison, we cannot fail to see "that the bill of rights [is] violated in every instance where it has been opposed to a popular current." He concluded that a "multiplicity of sects" would be "the best and only security" of religious freedom.¹⁰

Thus it is today. The oppression of religious freedom by the colonial minority power bloc can be exceeded only by the tyranny of the majority, seeking to use this same power to deny the fundamental rights of the minority. Pluralism in this country is an undisputed fact. The institutions of government thus know no heresy and can react to religious claims only as being relative, one with the other. This contradicts the keystone of each individual church which has as its essence a belief that it alone is the repository of the true faith. To so stress the secular is not, either necessarily or by definition, to promote immorality, irreverence or revolution. The capstone of democratic society must be neutrality to the claims of religious and non-religious, being neither hostile nor subservient; preferring none, disparaging none:

Those who fashioned the Constitution decided that if and when God is to be served, his service will not be motivated by coercive measures of government . . . if a religious haven is to be worked into the affairs of our people, it is to be done by individuals, groups, and churches, not by government.¹¹

Applying U.S. Supreme Court Justice Douglas' concept to the state rule of compulsory attendance at morning devotions, few would disagree that such represents the coercive power of the state at its worst.

The major point in controversy is why the majority cannot have their morning Bible reading and recitation of prayer, *if those who choose not to participate are excused from so doing*. "Why," the proponent of devotions asks, "can't these children sit respectfully as do the Jehovah Witnesses during the flag salute? They need not recite." Another proponent inquires: "They may be excused if they object. Why keep our children from school-time devotions?"

¹⁰ *Memorial and Remonstrance, Writings of Madison* pp. 183f.

¹¹ *McGowan v. Maryland*, 366 U.S. 420, 563 (1961) (dissent).

In the author's opinion, the conduct of devotions, whether Bible reading or prayers, in the public classroom is objectionable, even if the privilege of being excused exists. Three factors, sociological, legal and religious, influence this conclusion.

NONCONFORMITY AND COMPULSION

THERE CAN BE NO GAINSAYING but that the law of imitation operates. Nonconformity, particularly in children of tender years, is not an outstanding characteristic. The parents no doubt might attempt an explanation of why Johnny or Sue may not participate in the daily devotions, but the best for which one could hope would be confusion in the child's mind. Nor can the parent rationally explain to the youngster the tenets of the family's faith in an endeavor to strengthen the child's willingness not to join his peers. Faith is beyond reason. The parents feel obligated to train their offspring as to "whither he goest." Compelling obedience and thus non-attendance creates an ambivalent attitude in the child: a desire to follow the dictates of one loved over against a longing to participate in his own world with his classmates.

Dr. Solomon Grayzel, an expert testifying in the *Schempp* case, noted that portions of the New Testament, the required morning devotional reading, tended to bring the Jews into ridicule or scorn. The trial court in summarizing his testimony cited his observation that:

if portions of the New Testament were read without explanation, [Jewish children] could be, and in his specific experience with children [he] observed, had been, psychologically harmful to the child and had caused a divisive force within the social media of the school.¹²

Because the propensity of children is to identify themselves with the group, the child who waits outside the homeroom until devotions are concluded readily becomes the scapegoat of the group. He is the "odd-ball." He represents atheism, which in some circles, even among children, is tantamount to being a communist. He must bear the oft-unbearable burden of all those who are "different" and henceforth must stand beyond the pale of human intercourse. As the negro schooled only with negroes was denied full participation in the educational processes, so is the child who professes his parents' faith, unknowing and perhaps unwilling, denied the opportunity, drab and unimportant as such may be, to interact as a peer with his school chums as "one of the gang."

¹² 374 U.S. 203 (1963); 31 LW 4683 at 4684.

LEGAL ISSUES

MOST STATE SCHOOL CODES REQUIRE ATTENDANCE at certified educational institutions. The compulsive power of the state generates participation in education by the young. If exemption from the daily devotionals be predicated upon an affirmative act, e.g., the parent having to petition the institution to secure the release of the child from the otherwise mandatory requirement, it raises an interesting constitutional question. Does a person have to profess a belief in the Christian God? A disbelief?

In 1961 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the issuing authority for notaries public in Maryland could not deny the requisite certificate to a Mr. Torcaso simply because he refused to acknowledge a belief in a "superior Being" as required by the state law governing notaries.¹³ The essence of the Court's ruling was that the state had absolutely no right to require a profession of faith of any person.

The present requirements in Maryland and Pennsylvania, as developed by the facts in *Murray* and *Schempp* respectively, oblige the parent to profess disbelief. The parent, by seeking to have his child excused from the daily ritual, implicitly acknowledges a non-Christian or non-catholic persuasion.

Belief ought not be the concern of the state or its agents. If the Church, as Jaroslav Pelikan indicates, has no right to interfere with the sanctity of personal judgment and conviction in matters of faith, then neither does the State. To compel an expression of disbelief in the majority's religious persuasion goes beyond the constitutional prerogatives of the State. The pluralist society cannot accept any standard which permits any faith or faiths to avail themselves of government action to perpetuate their dogmas.

The statutory basis for morning devotional exercises, whether prayer, meditation, or Bible reading, is of recent origin. Massachusetts had the first legislation on the subject *ca.* 1900. However, a review of the circumstances and debate surrounding these enactments demonstrates that such exercises in public schools were intended to perpetuate a predominantly Protestant ethos and were, as such, forms of religious worship. Unlike the so-called "blue laws," which also incidentally, were enacted out of religious zeal, but which have of recent date been transmuted into health and welfare statutes, the daily devotionals have retained their *raison d'être*, viz., religious indoctrination and orientation.

The Court in *Schempp* reiterates that "none of the parties to either of these cases [*Schempp* and *Murray*] has questioned these basic conclusions of the Court." First, the First Amendment pro-

¹³ *Torcaso v. Watkins*, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).

scription on enactment of law respecting establishment of religion is applicable to the respective states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, the so-called "establishment" clause goes beyond merely precluding governmental preference of one religion over another. In fact, almost a quarter of a century ago the Court held that:

[neither] a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.¹⁴

Both conclusions have been "long established, recognized and consistently reaffirmed." While others may question the history, logic and efficacy of these conclusions, it seems apparent that "such contentions . . . [are] entirely untenable and of value only as academic exercises."¹⁵

MAN AND HIS GOD

FINALLY, FOR RELIGIOUS REASONS, I oppose morning devotionals in public schools. The Special Committee on Church and State reported to and recommended that the 174th General Assembly of the United Presbyterian Church, USA, reaffirm its conclusion that "Bible reading (except in connection with courses in literature, history or related subjects) and public prayers *tend* toward indoctrination or meaningless ritual and should be omitted for both reasons."¹⁶ For us of the reformation and catholic faiths, conscience defines the relationship of man to God. Man must act in accordance with his conscience, recognizing that conflicts with other men as to matters of conscience are inevitable. But when such occur neither can have recourse to the State for support. The religious freedom tends toward the most absolute of the freedoms covenanted to Americans. It can be circumscribed only when practices of religion present potential danger to the health, safety or morals of the community at large.

To eliminate these daily devotions does not destroy the faithful's opportunities; it does not preclude proper instruction in religion. It merely requires that man quit depending upon daily school exercises to perpetuate his beliefs. It requires the faithful to reemphasize family instruction and devotions as well as family participation in the Church and her activities. With this new and reformed emphasis the irreverence of synthesized public school religious endeavors may be cast aside.

¹⁴ *Everson*, supra at 15.

¹⁵ 31 LW 4683, 4687.

¹⁶ Report, Special Committee on Church and State, 174th General Assembly of the United Presbyterian Church, U.S.A., 1962, pp. 1-10.

The Essence of Education: *Alfred North Whitehead*

Ronald H. Stone

WHITEHEAD RAISED ISSUES FOR MANY besides the mathematicians when he asserted in an address to the Mathematical Association of England: "The essence of education is that it be religious."¹ This remarkable statement by one of the great thinkers of recent years is of considerable interest to those concerned with the relationships between education and religion. The question this article attempts to answer is: What did Whitehead mean by his claim that education is ultimately religious? The statement itself raises two prior questions; what does Whitehead mean by religion, and what does he mean by education?

The center of religion, for Whitehead, was the vision of the God who is both beyond and in the world. This vision was understood as: the insight a man possesses into the ultimate mystery of the universe, the resultant worship, and the recognition of worth in one's self, one's fellows, and the world. The oft-quoted definition, "Religion is what the individual does with his own solitariness,"² led to the statement that "Religion is world-loyalty."³ Whitehead believed that both Buddhism and Christianity, which he regarded as the two religious options for civilized men, were in periods of decline and decay. Though his philosophy drew on both of these religions, he maintained a freedom from their particular historical contingencies, and he called for radical reforms in Christianity. The exposition of Whitehead's philosophy of religion in this article concentrates on the doctrines of creation and God.

THE CREATIVE PROCESS

WHITEHEAD'S PHILOSOPHY STANDS OR FALLS on its doctrine of creation. Whitehead's philosophy begins with the world and ends

¹ *The Aims of Education*, Mentor Book, 1960, p. 26.

² *Religion in the Making*, Meridian: Living Age Book, 1960, p. 57.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

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with God, and its grandeur is its speculation about the relation of God to the world. "In my view," writes Whitehead, "the creation of the world is the first unconscious act of speculative thought; and the first task of a self-conscious philosophy is to explain how it has been done."⁴ Whitehead's concept of creation is expounded in *Science and the Modern World*, *Process and Reality*, and *Religion in the Making*.

God, for Whitehead, was not before creation; rather He is with creation. God in His primordial nature relates the infinite realm of forms to creativity to produce a particular creation or order from chaos. The creative process is operative in the birth of each new physical occasion, aesthetic experience, or mental occasion. The birth of each new occasion is a result of the creativity of the world being limited by God's primordial nature and related to the eternal forms. Religious insight, for Whitehead, consists of grasping this truth, that the harmony and order of the world are due to the confrontation of creativity and forms by God.⁵

Whitehead derives his speculation about creation from the experience we have of the creation. His chapter on "The Creative Process" in *Religion in the Making* must be set within the framework of the last paragraph of that book:

The present type of order in the world has arisen from an unimaginable past, and it will find its grave in an unimaginable future. There remain the inexhaustible realm of abstract forms, and creativity, with its shifting character ever determined afresh by its own creatures, and God, upon whose wisdom all forms of order depend.⁶

The creative process can be discovered in the birth of a new occasion. Each new occasion may reflect a dominant line from a preceding occasion, but it also reflects the whole world. The whole world influences the creative process and provides the opportunities for the new occasion. The creative process must be understood as a process of both inclusion and exclusion. Actuality is characterized by the vividness of certain aspects of the whole world and the relegation to insignificance of other aspects of the whole world. God, for Whitehead, "is the principle of concretion—the principle whereby there is initiated a definite outcome from a situation otherwise riddled with ambiguity."⁷

Whitehead considers his understanding of creation to be consistent with the philosophical tradition represented by the *Timaeus*. Following the *Timaeus* he repudiates the idea of God, as the excep-

⁴ *The Aims of Education*, p. 165.

⁵ *Religion in the Making*, p. 115.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 154.

⁷ *Process and Reality*, Harper Torchbook, 1960, p. 523.

tion to all metaphysical principles, who by divine fiat arbitrarily created the world by an act of will. Whitehead sets his understanding of creation against the trend developing from the *Scholium* which assumed the non-evolution of matter. Finally, he avoids the difficulties of dealing with a time when there was nothing. He refuses to speculate beyond the time when there was chaos because "you cannot approach nothing; for there is nothing to approach."⁸ His concern to avoid the question of a time when there was nothing except God is also based upon his belief that such a view implies a deficient God and eliminates all meaning of the word "God."

Whitehead rejects the traditional concept of *creatio ex nihilo* partially because he refuses to ascribe the origin of evil to God. Similarly to Hume, Whitehead sees the seriousness of the claim that God, the absolute good, is the unqualified creator of a world full of evil. It is erroneous to believe that Whitehead was forced to posit a God limited by the realm of possibility and by the world simply because of his need to avoid ascribing the creation of evil to God. Rather, the problem of evil was one more factor which made the classical Christian doctrine impossible. Whitehead's view of the creative relationship between God and the world is dependent primarily upon his metaphysics and not on any one problem in the prevailing view of creation.

Many of the apologists for *creatio ex nihilo* have defended its use as a protection against the positing of a chaotic primordial matter. Whitehead does speak of chaos while rejecting *creatio ex nihilo*, but his whole philosophy of organism guards against the fallacy of misplaced concreteness which posits a primordial matter. His refusal to speak of God as being before creation also guards against the view in *Enuma Elish* that at one time the deity began to form the world out of the already existing matter.

Whitehead accepts Plato's *Timaeus* as being essentially correct in its location of the origins of the present epoch in an aboriginal disorder which from our viewpoint can be called chaotic. The world has been evolving through many epochs and the reign of order has been furthered by God. Neither order nor chaos are absolute terms in Whitehead's thought. God's primordial nature which conditions creativity is constantly ordering the elements of chaos. "The immanence of God gives reason for the belief that pure chaos is intrinsically impossible."⁹ Conversely, however, Whitehead believes that the immeasurable dimensions of the world negate the hope for an absolutely ordered world.

The great creative period of Christian theology, for Whitehead,

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 142.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 169.

was the period of Platonic dominance. He honored Origen as one of the few thinkers who have improved upon Plato's fundamental metaphysical doctrines. He saw similarities between his doctrine of creation and that of (1) Origen, who conceived of God as eternally creating, and (2) the Apologist, Justin Martyr, who saw the similarities in the creation myths of the *Timaeus* and Genesis. Orthodox Christianity, however, has affirmed *creatio ex nihilo* and the rejection of the doctrine has been characteristic of such heretical groups as the gnostics.

Whitehead's metaphysical speculation about creation differs radically from Emil Brunner's exposition of the Christian orthodox doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo* which Brunner himself admits is "utterly beyond all human understanding."¹⁰ Langdon Gilkey argues that "the formula *ex nihilo*, . . . specifically denied the pre-existent matter, the finite God, and the necessary evil of dualism."¹¹ Whitehead accepts limitations on God as a condition of God's relationship with the world. He goes further than Gilkey to deny the pre-existent matter by denying separate existence to matter. Finally, Whitehead doubts that the real dangers of dualism have been overcome by positing an infinite God who through his volition created a world metaphysically different from His own nature.

Other points of contrast with the classical Christian formula of creation arise at Whitehead's refusal to distinguish between an original creation and continuing creation; his refusal to think of God as actual without the world; his assumption of an evolving order which has brought the world out of a more chaotic past; his treatment of God and the world within the same metaphysical system; and his radical view of God's working directly with His creation in the birth of each new occasion.

WHAT IS MEANT BY GOD

WHITEHEAD'S DOCTRINE OF CREATION leads inevitably into his doctrine of God. The primary problem of theology, for Whitehead, is the concept of God. "Today there is but one religious dogma in debate: What do you mean by 'God'?"¹²

Critics of Whitehead have maintained that his metaphysical system is independent of God, and that his concept of God could be removed by a "painless theoctomy" from his philosophy. It is true that many definitions of God have no place within Whitehead's

¹⁰ Emil Brunner, *The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption*, Westminster, 1952, p. 9.

¹¹ Langdon Gilkey, *Maker of Heaven and Earth*, Doubleday, 1959, p. 51.

¹² *Religion in the Making*, p. 66.

system. In attempting to ascertain the importance of God for Whitehead's system, however, we must allow the philosopher to speak of God as he understands Him.

Whitehead has demonstrated in the tenth chapter of *Science and the Modern World*, entitled "God," his conviction that his metaphysical system requires God as the Principle of Concretion in a manner analogous to Aristotle's need for God as a Prime Mover.¹³ Whitehead limits the extent to which a "properly general metaphysics" can describe God. He finds Aristotle's Prime Mover unsatisfactory for religious purposes, but he also indicates that, unless illicit considerations are introduced, metaphysics can go no further.

God as the Principle of Concretion is necessary to Whitehead's metaphysical scheme because it is the Principal of Concretion that limits possibility and creates order which the existence of real things demands. The general metaphysical character underlying all particular occasions is qualified by an active entity limiting possibility. God, then, is required by the world when considered metaphysically, and by the process of metaphysics when it examines concrete events.

Whitehead states that if God is metaphysically relevant, He is required by the general character of things.¹⁴ Two of the facts which compose the general character of things are: (1) a process of actual occasions; and (2) occasions are the emergence of values. Both of these facts require that the course of events be influenced by a prior limitation with particular conditions and values. No reason can be given for this prior limitation except that it is the prior limitation's "nature" to impose limits. Whitehead calls this prior limitation God. There is a metaphysical necessity for the Determiner, but there is no metaphysical necessity for what he determines.

Whitehead conceives of God as "the supreme ground for limitation."¹⁵ God is the metaphysical necessity which is presupposed by the nature of all existence. For the realm of absolute possibility to decide upon actualization is a contradiction. Therefore, a particular actualization which is the choice of a particular possibility reveals the Principle of Concretion which limits possibility. Beyond this Principle of Concretion, which Whitehead calls God, metaphysical analysis cannot go. Therefore "we have come to the limit of rationality." The nature of God cannot be analyzed for "that nature is the ground of rationality." This truth about God is abstract; further knowledge of him (concrete knowledge) must be found through empiricism.¹⁶ His understanding of God found in *Religion in the*

¹³ *Science and the Modern World*, Mentor Book, 1960, p. 157.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 161.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

Making reveals knowledge drawn from particular events, cultural resources, and social science disciplines as well as from metaphysics.

Whitehead was unable to accept the prevailing doctrine of God which regarded God as complete within Himself, absolute, omnipotent, and omniscient. He labeled such a view of God "the Semitic Despot" and regarded it as a result of the origins of Christianity in the Orient where gods and kings were often attributed the same characteristics. He viewed Rome's acceptance of Christianity as a victory for Caesar, culminating in the Church's ascription to God of attributes rightfully reserved for Caesar. The Semitic Despot conception of God had four major weaknesses: (1) no real understanding of human freedom (in the sense of ability to influence an undetermined future) was possible; (2) a God completely beyond metaphysical rationalization could not be known by man; (3) the gulf between God and the world left the relationship between the two, at best, shrouded in mystery; (4) a wholly transcendent God was not provable.

Although Whitehead rejected much within the orthodox dogmas of God, he reconstructed the doctrine of God. The highest forms of religion that have evolved understand God as comrade, Whitehead maintained. Plato discovered that God was a persuasive agency; Jesus' life testified to it; and the theologians of Alexandria so interpreted it.¹⁷ Whitehead pointed to this development as he defined religion.

Religion is what the individual does with his own solitariness. It runs through three stages, if it evolves to its final satisfaction. It is the transition from God the void to God the enemy, and from God the enemy to God the companion.¹⁸

This understanding of God as an immanent companion accomplishing His will by persuasive action stands in bold contrast to "The Semitic Despot."

"God is the great companion" in the sense that He is the "fellow-sufferer who understands." Neither God nor the world is complete without the other. The dynamic working of the world is being shaped into a unity by God's absorption of the world. God's nature receives each actuality of the temporal world. "What is done in the World is transformed into a reality in heaven, and the reality in heaven passes back into the World."¹⁹

Whitehead's God does not merely complement the structures of the world; God is working with the world to overcome evil. God

¹⁷ *Adventure of Ideas*, Mentor Book, 1960, p. 170.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

¹⁹ *Process and Reality*, p. 532.

is overcoming the chaos. Each event gives God something new which He shapes within His nature. "Thus the nature of God is the complete conceptual realization of the realm of ideal forms. The kingdom of heaven is God."²⁰ Within the kingdom of heaven good overcomes evil, pain and degradation. The concretion of every event then introduces God into the world, and the world is sustained by this incarnation. Because of this metaphysical view of things, Whitehead could claim that, "[God] is the ideal companion who transmutes what has been lost into a living fact within his own nature. He is the mirror which discloses to every creature its own greatness."²¹ Nothing is excluded from divine concern. God gathers up the past into His own being and He concretizes a present with limits placed upon evil.

PHILOSOPHY OF HIGHER EDUCATION

THE BULK OF WHITEHEAD'S EXPLICIT EDUCATIONAL THEORY is found in *The Aims of Education*. This book does not, however, explain the bearing of Whitehead's general philosophy upon his educational theory and must be read against the background of his general metaphysical approach. It should be emphasized that, despite the lack of explicit connection, his educational theory is consistent with his broader philosophical work. The seven chapters of the work (originally given as lectures between 1912 and 1918) are brief and were intended only as starting points for further discussion of the issues raised. They deal with the general ordering and meaning of education. They reflect Whitehead's general view of education and are not based upon other studies nor upon the exhaustive data required for a comprehensive study of education.

AIMS OF EDUCATION

IN THE CHAPTER WHICH GIVES ITS TITLE TO THE BOOK, "The Aims of Education," Whitehead declares his purpose to be, "to suggest how to produce the expert without loss of the essential virtues of the amateur."²² The aims of education are, for Whitehead, the impartation of the wealth of culture, expertness in a given field, style, power, and a sense of duty and reverence.

"Life in all its manifestations"²³ is the proper subject matter for the educational process. This study of life should cultivate a receptiveness to speculative reason, beauty, and humane feelings. Whitehead protests strongly against inert ideas and the memoriza-

²⁰ *Religion in the Making*, p. 148.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *The Aims of Education*, p. 25.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

tion of scraps of information. "A merely well-informed man is the most useless bore on God's earth."²⁴ The past ought to be studied for understanding gained of the present, and the study of culture should be an exposition of the present. "The present contains all that there is."²⁵ So he emphasizes the value of the study of culture, but in a sense different from that of many classical enthusiasts.

The goal of generalization in education is pursued by careful attention to particular facts. Through education the student should be helped to "see the wood by means of the trees."²⁶ Therefore, the student must be exposed to brilliance in specialized subjects in which he is interested and which he can apply. The central problem of education is keeping knowledge alive. This implies that only a few subjects may be taught and that excellence must be expected in those subjects. The more knowledge gained that can be related to life as experienced by the student, the more productive will be the instruction. Specialization is required before the student can catch a vision of the power of ideas. "What education has to impart is an intimate sense for the power of ideas, for the beauty of ideas, and for the structure of ideas, together with a particular body of knowledge which has peculiar reference to the life of the being possessing it."²⁷ He declares that a goal for education is the development of the eye for the whole chessboard, but he never forgets that the movements of each piece must first be thoroughly mastered.

Specialization is the only means by which style, the final achievement of education, can be obtained. Style gives man the foresight to calculate the results of his actions, to avoid waste, and to pursue his goals prudently. Style belongs only to the expert and with style comes the gift of power. The man with style prefers good work, but style also enables the worker to accomplish his end. Style is an aesthetic sense, characterized by attainment and restraint. Whitehead invokes the utility of education, asking that men specialize so that they may become experts developing their style so as to receive the gift of power.

In closing his lecture on "The Aims of Education" Whitehead reminded his listeners at the Mathematical Association that the old summary of the educational ideal must be affirmed—"The essence of education is that it be religious"—and then he defines religious education in terms of duty and reverence:

A religious education is an education which inculcates duty and reverence. Duty arises from our potential control over the course of events. Where attainable knowledge could have changed the issue,

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

ignorance has the guilt of vice. And the foundation of reverence is this perception, that the present holds within itself the complete sum of existence, backwards and forwards, the whole amplitude of time which is eternity.²⁸

This over-arching principle of education is that which inspires criticism of the present system and furnishes guidance of the total educational purpose. The virtues of duty and reverence justify the development of the characteristics of the speculative mind: expertness, mastery of specialized knowledge, and style.

UNIVERSITIES AND THEIR FUNCTION

WHITEHEAD'S VIEW STRESSES THE STUDENT as a living organism. All "tool sharpening" theories are rejected and a heavy emphasis is placed upon the study of subjects at the appropriate time. The principle of the rhythm of education means, essentially, that the various subjects and means of study should be undertaken at proper levels of mental development. The paradox of education is that the training which produces skill is likely to kill the imagination. Order in education is necessary, but it can become stifling. Thorough training in technique is a prerequisite to excellence, but over-emphasis on technique becomes tedious.²⁹ Whitehead's model of the world as resting upon ideal opposites (e.g., Permanence and Flux, Time and Eternity, Freedom and Necessity, and God and the World) is likewise applied to his theory of education where order is seen as both prerequisite for excellence and stifler of excellence. The proper balance of order and freedom in education is of the utmost concern. The rhythm theory is his attempt to achieve this balance. This theory treats the educational process as one great cycle: the stage of romance lasts until the age of twelve; the stage of precision through secondary education; and the student arrives at the university ready to enter into the period of generalization.

Whitehead's prescriptions for the university are based on the assumption that something has happened beforehand, and that the entering student has a solid background in mathematics, languages, science and the humanities. The function of the university is to teach a few general principles which the student will apply in concrete situations long after he has forgotten the crammed detail of textbooks and lectures. The principles are not to be divorced from fact, but the emphasis of the university should be on the wide sweep of generality.

Whitehead opposed those who rejected "utilitarian" education.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

²⁹ *Process and Reality*, p. 514.

He affirmed the role the university played in building modern culture and strongly supported the addition of a business school at Harvard University.³⁰ His willingness to recognize realistically the responsibility of the university has been clearly stated:

I can put my point otherwise by saying that the ideal of a university is not so much knowledge, as power. Its business is to convert the knowledge of a boy into the power of a man.³¹

Whitehead emphasized the importance of recruiting and maintaining an able, imaginative faculty. All other proposals for university reform are secondary to the collection of a band of imaginative scholars, willing and able to confront the young. "The whole art in the organization of a university is in the provision of a faculty whose learning is lighted up with imagination."³² Whitehead did not join the educational reformers who attack research and publication as the bane of the university; he believed that some research and contributions to knowledge stimulate the teacher by keeping him at the frontiers of his discipline. He stressed that the number of courses taught be reduced and that those taught be done more thoroughly. He asked for the maximum freedom for the instructors, since conditions of great freedom, he felt, are most likely to produce a faculty that will run a successful university. Elton Trueblood has caught the genius of Whitehead's view of a teacher's responsibility:

To one who asked earnestly what he taught, so that he might choose between the courses, Whitehead is supposed to have replied, with equal earnestness, "I teach three courses, Whitehead I, Whitehead II, and Whitehead III."³³

Whitehead's views on the university provide a good general basis from which to proceed to further study of the university. There are four problems, however, which his philosophy of education ignores. (1) American students do not reach the university with an adequate command of the tools they need to proceed to the process of generalization which he prescribes. At least the first two years of university education must be spent in mastering basic courses in English, foreign languages, science, math, history, religion and philosophy; (2) The problems resulting from unlimited freedom for instructors are more serious than Whitehead reveals in *The Aims of Education*. Increased freedom for many professors means they instruct less and less and spend more of their time in isolated re-

³⁰ *The Aims of Education*, pp. 95-106.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 101.

³³ Elton Trueblood, *The Idea of a College*, Harper & Brothers, 1959, p.

search. Whitehead's endorsement of the "need to publish" opens the door to many attendant evils³⁴ which prevent the student from having frequent contact with the imaginative scholar; (3) Whitehead fails, in his explicit writing on education, to emphasize the need for community. This emphasis might be expected from a man who asserted "that he became educated by participating in discussion night after night in the Senior Common Room at Trinity College, Cambridge."³⁵ Christian writers on education in general and Sir Walter Moberly in particular³⁶ stress the need for community in the educational process much more than Whitehead does; (4) The final criticism to be aimed at Whitehead's view of the university is one which Henry Holmes directs at his theory of education:

His views of general education look toward the training of youth in civic, political, and philosophic understanding. But I cannot find that he has faced squarely the inclusive problem of providing an education either adequately selective with reference to vocations or general with respect to social intelligence and character for the young of an entire nation—America, for example, with its thirty million pupils of school and college age.³⁷

RELIGION AND THE UNIVERSITY

WHITEHEAD HAS POINTED to the peculiar position of religion in life. The doctrine of God, for example, portrays the dual role of religion: the doctrine is required by a metaphysical examination of reality, but the full understanding of God is also dependent upon sources unique to religion itself. This recognition of religion's peculiarity can serve as the basis for an understanding of its unique role in the university. Religion "arises from that which is special, but it extends to what is general."³⁸ It has a unique content which is the subject of specialization, yet religion has implications for all of man's thought and life. This tension is seen in Whitehead's own writing; several of his books have chapters on God or religion as a part of the total human experience and yet he was led to publish a separate book on religion. Whitehead's whole system, especially his doctrine of creation, seems to be leaning toward the conclusion that all subjects can become religious education through proper teaching.

Whitehead recognizes the legitimacy of special courses in

³⁴ See Robert M. Hutchins, *The Higher Learning in America*, Yale University Press, 1936, pp. 109-111.

³⁵ Nels F. S. Ferre, *Christian Faith and Higher Education*, Harper & Brothers, 1954, p. 111.

³⁶ See Walter Moberly, *The Crisis in the University*, SCM Press, 1949, p. 212.

³⁷ Henry W. Holmes, "Whitehead's Views on Education," in Paul A. Schilpp, ed., *The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead*, Tudor, 1951, p. 632.

³⁸ *Religion in the Making*, p. 31.

religion. He has not commented on the debate regarding special departments or schools of religion.³⁹ It appears that he would be more concerned about the quality of teachers than over the technical arrangements of religion in the curriculum. He urges religious educators to become aware of the importance of the rhythmic law of growth. The premature teaching of morals and religious detail has sapped the vitality of religion greatly. He regards morality in its petty negative sense as a deadly enemy of religion. Moral instruction is impossible without visions of greatness. He is especially concerned with the vision of the greatness of Rome, but the visions of Athens and Jerusalem should not be completely subsumed into the vision of Rome.

Whitehead's doctrines of creation and God, as well as the necessity of God to his metaphysic, point toward the realization that all education, if properly undertaken, is religious education. Neither religion nor God, if defined in Whiteheadian terms, can be separated from life—which is the proper subject matter for the university. All education, then, is religious to the extent it inculcates duty or reverence. But the religious implications of various subjects are not simple. Whitehead resisted attempts to posit simplicity in theological matters. The religious dimensions appear in education when insights into the unity in the midst of the diversity of human experience appear and when awe is invoked. Religious questions occur only in the depths of subjects studied and, because of the need for specialization, religious problems in some classes may be only implicit. If the connections between religion and education are not as simple for Whitehead as for some other scholars, one reason is that, for him, Christianity is still a religion seeking a metaphysic. Whitehead is a long way from Christians who call for a fundamental reorientation of the university to insure that the ground of truth, the Living God, is being recognized. All denials to the contrary, many of the boldest Christian claims are motivated by a desire to return to a more secure period when theology was the "Queen of Sciences."⁴⁰

While affirming the need to study generalizations and life in its broadest context, Whitehead does not fall into the idealism of Robert Hutchins, who writes, "If we can revitalize metaphysics and restore it to its place in the higher learning, we may be able to establish rational order in the modern world as well as in the universities."⁴¹ Whitehead has too great a respect for other disciplines

³⁹ Whitehead has, in general, protested against the increased departmentalization of the university. See Henry P. Van Dusen, *God in Education*, Scribner's, 1951, p. 47.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 82.


⁴¹ Robert M. Hutchins, *The Higher Learning in America*, p. 105.

to declare that either theology or metaphysics should order the university. He also is aware of the manifold subtleties and difficulties of the two disciplines. He realizes that the best way to approach the metaphysical implications of any field is through specialization in that field.

Pursuing the meaning of Whitehead's statement that the essence of education is that it be religious by examining his philosophies of religion and education and their interrelations has shown that he provides a general understanding of education rather than detailed, documented proposals for education. He points to the dimensions of religion in education rather than resolving the problems of religious education. The sections on doctrine provide a basis for understanding his claims that education is religious rather than labeling the connections between religion and education. His religion is woven into the structure of his mind as his God is woven into the structures of his metaphysical system. Religion and education are important structures in their own right. Each has its own standards and mannerisms, and yet each overlaps the other. Inasmuch as education is instruction in the "art of life," it concerns itself with religion which expresses values discovered in the adventure of living. Religion, on the other hand, needs patterns of vital education to communicate its heritage to each new generation and to prohibit the isolation of religion from the other structures of man's existence.

To return to our initial question—Whitehead's statement that "The essence of education is that it be religious" implies the following four convictions: (1) Education is to be useful. Style which is the final result of a good education, dominates the whole person, freeing the individual from waste and allowing man to calculate the results of his efforts. Style is the privilege of the expert and gives its possessor the power to attain the desired ends; (2) Education must move through a mastery of particular facts to a vision of a whole world drawn together by innumerable connections; (3) Education leads to imagination, speculative reason, and appreciation for beauty and worship; (4) Education should make a student reverent or aware of the quality of eternity in present time.

The editors wish to correct an error in the May, 1963 issue. On page 418, left column, in lines eleven and twelve, the name Barnabas should read Apollos.



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Book Reviews

Theology of the Old Testament
by WALTER EICHRODT, Volume I, trans.
J. A. Baker, The Westminster Press,
1961, 542 pp, \$7.50

The translation of Eichrodt's monumental work into English almost thirty years after its original publication will be welcomed by all students of the Old Testament. One can only be grateful to J. A. Baker, who has succeeded admirably in rendering the difficult original into remarkably clear and effective English. Fortunately, the translation is made from the sixth German edition with the author's revisions up to 1960 (the seventh edition has recently appeared in German).

It is Eichrodt, more than any other, who is responsible for the return to biblical theology, and it may be said, without exaggeration I think, that his work has not yet been superseded by the numerous theologies that have followed the original appearance of his work in 1933-39. Eichrodt is quite aware, as any scholar must be, of the acute difficulties attending any attempt to formulate the faith of Israel in a systematic and comprehensive fashion. Anyone who undertakes to survey the Old Testament materials and to take full account of their vast diversity will soon recognize the enormous problems which confront the theologian here. For one thing, any kind of formulation, precisely because of the nature of the literature, must be preceded by a mastery of the requisite pre-

liminary disciplines; it is not surprising therefore that many of the theologies of the past were written at the end of the scholar's life or were published posthumously. Moreover, the problems of methodology are singularly troublesome, and it may be said with confidence that no one will ever resolve them with complete satisfaction.

Eichrodt seeks to give "a complete picture of the Old Testament realm of belief," and he does so by taking what he describes as a cross section of the O.T. realm of thought, "thus making possible both a comprehensive survey and a sifting of what is essential from what is not." (p. 27) He sees very clearly that the O.T. does not stand by itself, but is related, on the one hand, to the religions of the other peoples of the ancient Near East and, on the other, to the religious faith of the New Testament. No theology with which I am acquainted takes so full account of the religions of Israel's neighbors, and this surely must be accounted one of the most salutary features of his work. What is more, the author grasps the dynamic unity and continuity of the O.T. with the N.T. and of the N.T. with the O.T. He is very sensitive to the forward drive which breaks through again and again in the course of the history of Israel's faith, and he says, finely, that "that which binds together indivisibly the two realms of the Old and New

Testaments—different in externals though they may be—is the irruption of the Kingship of God into this world and its establishment here.” (p. 26)

Eichrodt finds the unifying force in Israel's religion in the category of the covenant, and a perusal of the table of contents at the beginning of the volume will show how dominant the covenant is in his thought—every one of the eleven major chapters contains the word. Yet one must read what Eichrodt has to say in his defense of this term; some reviewers seem to have read only the introductory pages. As a matter of fact the author employs the term with great fluidity; it cannot be fairly stated that it obtrudes itself unjustifiably in the book as a whole. Moreover, one may question whether other theologians have resolved the matter of unity more successfully. Eichrodt offers us a brief excursus at the close of this volume in which he subjects von Rad's theology to a trenchant criticism, certainly at the point where von Rad is most vulnerable, viz., his skepticism of the historical factuality of biblical revelation and his resort to typology to describe the relation of the O.T. to the N.T.

Whatever one's views may be as to Eichrodt's choice of the covenant as the central theme of the O.T., he cannot but admire the superb organization of his materials. This literary articulation is a rare accomplishment and is not matched by any other O.T. theology. Throughout the work history is taken very seriously, the theological commentary grows inevitably out of the historical discussion, and critical questions are recognized where they are present, especially in the notes. Everywhere Eichrodt is aware of the persistence of the divine will throughout Israel's history, and he does not

resort to the popular distinction of *Historie* and *Geschichte* to overcome historical difficulties.

Two long chapters are devoted to “the instruments of the covenant”: the charismatic leaders (Moses, the founder of the religion, the seers, Nazirites, judges, the early ecstasies, the classical prophets) and the official leaders (priests and king). The section on the prophets makes rewarding reading; it is fresh and vivid and instructive. The section on the king did not seem to me to be quite satisfactory, but fortunately it is remedied by the further discussion on “fulfilling the covenant” where the theology of the sacral king is elaborated and the relevant modern literature on the subject is discerningly evaluated.

I have not undertaken to engage in the conflict that rages today about the nature and method of biblical theology; suffice it to say, Eichrodt has had his critics, and they have not been generous with him. But such hard-hitting dissent is all to the good. The issues involved are of great importance, not only for the student of the O.T., but for all students of theology, including the minister of a parish.

JAMES MULLENBURG

Memory and Tradition in Israel
(Studies in Biblical Theology No. 37)
by BREVARD S. CHILDS, Alec R. Allenson
Inc., 1962, 96 pp, \$2.00

The “Studies in Biblical Theology” continue to expand in diversity and to heighten in their significance as indispensable aids to serious biblical study. This excellent monograph by Brevard S. Childs, Associate Professor of Old Testament at Yale University Divinity School, takes its rightful place within the series. Fortunately Childs'

careful research, as can be judged both from an inspection of plentiful and relevant footnotes and from the orderliness and clarity of presentation, led him to the publication of a separate compressed volume rather than to an article which he had first envisaged, since the results in their present form should rightfully enjoy a wider audience. Childs is only partially accurate in maintaining that his study deals with a *small* area within the Old Testament. That may be true insofar as his work focuses on one Hebrew root, *zkr* (fundamentally meaning "to remember"), as it emerges in its nominal and verbal forms, yet in his confronting the problems of "Memory and Cult" and "Memory and History" (the actual titles of his closing chapters), one justifiably suspects much more has been wrought.

Although his is not the elaborate philological product that the dissertation of Willy Schottroff, *Die Wurzel zkr im Alten Testament* (Mainz, 1961), is said to be (a study mentioned by Childs in his postscript that does not appreciably affect his more theologically oriented examination), Childs demonstrates his concern for the detailed work of exacting biblical scholarship by opening with a lexicographical analysis of *zkr* and its cognates. He summarizes the occurrences of the verb and related nouns, joins the company of recent lexicographers who find they must content themselves in knowledge that the etymology of the Hebrew root is beyond discovery, and attempts to establish the various meanings of the verb. He refers to the standard lexica of Brown, Driver and Briggs, Gesenius-Buhl, and Köhler, but extends himself well beyond their enumerations. Childs holds that the Qal (basic) and Hiphil (causative) stems must be examined independently and that the latter dis-

tinguishes between cultic and juridicial usage. Not only is the weight of evidence on his side, but only in this manner is the complexity of the root appreciated. While he cannot avoid the terminology of Hebrew grammar, Childs does school the reader untrained in Hebrew. If by its very nature this is not the most interesting portion of the monograph, it is requisite to all that follows.

In his focus on the Hebrew psychology of memory in chapter two Childs engages in an extensive dialogue with both J. Pedersen, who is credited as the first to raise and deal effectively with the problem, and James Barr, who has taken Pedersen to task on methodology. If it was Pedersen's contribution to study the psychological aspects of *zkr* and its wide semantic ranges, it was Barr's insight that exposed Pedersen's confusion of the semantic and thought aspects of the root and his indiscriminately imposing upon the Old Testament a prelogical thought category. Childs stands closer to Barr than to Pedersen in his concern to determine the nonidentity of, and distance between, thought and action within Hebrew mentality. One wishes Childs had more fully developed his own approach; the chapter is too much given to an evaluation of Pedersen and Barr. Yet in the final analysis Childs has more than scratched the surface since much of what remains touches upon the problem of Hebrew psychology.

In chapters three through five Childs expands his word study through a scrutiny of the verb *zkr* used with God and then with Israel as subject, and of the nouns *zikkārôn* (memorial sign) and *zēkher* (name). Especially in his inspection of the verb, form-critical analysis dominates. This is based upon the premise that our concern should

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not rest with artificial "chance occurrences on the literary level" (p. 34) but with oral traditions in which *zkr* is set in a convincing living context. Within the confines of a monograph, Childs is permitted to enter into a discussion of only a limited number of examples, but this is executed effectively. A mere listing of forms wherein the prophets employed *zkr* (p. 50) may prove frustrating to the reader, however, and betray the author's eagerness to shift into the theological development of the verb at some length. With specific reference to Deuteronomy, Second Isaiah, Ezekiel and the Psalter, Childs now sets out to show that "a new and highly theological usage of *zkr* emerged from Israel's attempt to reinterpret the significance of her traditions." (p. 50) Although he makes rather little of the contrast, Childs indicates that in the paranesis of Deut. 8 and its use of *zkr*, Israel is *not* called to relive her painful past but is urged in this manner to show obedience in the future. In the Sabbath commandment of Deut. 5:15 where *zkr* also appears, however, "Memory functions as an actualization (*Vergegenwärtigung*) of the decisive event in her tradition." (p. 53) As one continues to read in this section he is aware that the total functioning of *zkr* is complex. The problem is compounded in the Psalter, where *zkr* occurs frequently, but Childs exhibits a sound methodology in focusing upon those expressions that parallel *zkr*, for it is through them that the range of meaning of *zkr* can be determined.

The most illuminating aspect in his concluding chapters lies in his exposition upon the meaning of actualization (*Vergegenwärtigung*) in the cult. Clearly, wider implications of the word study *per se* are squarely faced. In his

review of the two prevalent and rival approaches, Childs openly attributes the mythical interpretation to Mowinckel and in a footnote refers to Noth as an exponent of the historical explanation. It is understandable that Mowinckel's approach is criticized for failing to separate clearly the Israelite cult, which had replaced mythical with historical events, from the general pattern of the Ancient Near East. However, the common historical explanation with its participation emphasis is also under censure. Childs is dissatisfied with the statement that actualization takes place "when the worshipper experiences an identification with the original events." (p. 82) For Childs this explanation suggests that in cultic actualization the worshipper moves to an original and stationary event. Reasoning from the other side he insists that it is the dynamic of the event that is *brought* to the worshipper, not the once for all event, but its indigenous redemptive reality. It is not a matter of identification with primordial event but the contemporizing of the past event through its own dynamic. In this way the *wasness* of the event is not dissipated into some type of mythological structure. One may question whether fundamentally Childs stands very far from the exponents of the historical explanation of actualization, although this is not to deny that Childs has switched the point of emphasis. Indeed, who could take issue with his statement, "The biblical events have the dynamic characteristic of refusing to be relegated to the past?" (p.88) We may hope this monograph will be the harbinger of other conscientious and stimulating studies of words so vital to the vocabulary of the Bible.

J. KENNETH KUNTZ

Let My People Go. A Journey through Exodus by JACK FINEGAN, Harper and Row, 1963, 148 pp, \$3.75

This volume is a sequel to the author's previously published work on the book of Genesis, *In the Beginning*. Here Dr. Finegan turns his attention to the pivotal book of Exodus. His style is, as usual, quite clear and uncomplicated, calculated to leave little room for misunderstanding or confusion. With great patience the author leads the reader along with a series of questions, "Who . . . Why . . . Where . . . When . . .?" Even the least knowledgeable of readers should have little trouble understanding the author's discussion.

The main contribution made by Professor Finegan in this study lies in the area in which he is best qualified. He has carefully and thoroughly mustered a vast quantity of archaeological data and seeks to illumine various aspects of the biblical account with this material. Most of this information, to be sure, is available through other sources, but here it is conveniently gathered and made accessible to the general reader.

Despite the contributions made by the author this book is marred by an excessively polemical attitude and an overly simplified methodology. Dr. Finegan in his "Preface" declares that a "strange dichotomy" exists in current biblical study, "namely, the affirmation on the one hand that we cannot possibly find out what actually happened and that it is even misguided effort to try, and the exhortation on the other hand to share the faith of those who participated in the events now obscured from view, which remarkable but unfortunately hidden events were the very basis of their faith." (p. vii) To Dr. Finegan this is

an impossible situation and he sets forth to demonstrate that it is based on an unfounded skepticism of the biblical account. Therefore, the author adopts a methodology current in archaeological circles and repeatedly outlined in this book: the biblical account can be assumed to be historically dependable if it can be shown that it fits into the historical period with which it is concerned. Armed with this principle Dr. Finegan sets out to "prove" the historical "probability" of the Exodus narrative by amassing as much archaeological data as possible which seems to corroborate the biblical account.

There is no need to go into a lengthy discussion of this methodology as it has often and effectively been challenged. However, at least three specific criticisms must be raised with Dr. Finegan's position. First, while archaeological detail may enrich our understanding of the biblical account, it cannot in anyway "prove" the historical value of the biblical narrative. For instance, the author's lengthy discussion of the geography of Lower Egypt (p. 4f.) is interesting and instructive, but it in no way proves the historical reliability of the Israelite tradition of a time of bondage. That such tradition may have an Egyptian provenance may be inferred, but this is not seriously denied by most scholars. Second, Professor Finegan greatly underestimates the value of determining the literary forms used in the biblical account. He sees such an effort in negative terms and warns, "Further, one must do this [apply his method] without making either the literary prejudgment that the sources are of such a sort that they cannot possibly contain useful historical information, or the theological prejudgment that it is impertinent and irrelevant to inquire

after the historical basis of faith." (p. viii) This misunderstanding of the work of the form-critic leads Dr. Finegan to brush aside too quickly distinctions that are not only valid but essential. Thus he can treat Moses' birth narrative as being as historically relevant as the Song of Miriam. Or again, disregarding the nature of his sources, Professor Finegan launches into a futile and rather forced attempt to show that the ten plagues now recorded "could" have happened and therefore "did" actually take place! Needless to say, such a disregard for the nature of one's sources cannot be allowed by serious scholarship. Finally, to imply as Dr. Finegan seems to at points, that those who employ the methods and results of literary and form criticism are theological cynics or skeptics who deny the obvious truth found in the Bible is unwarranted and again shows a misunderstanding of the questions involved. There is no conflict in saying that we cannot explain what "really" took place and at the same time urging faith in the God who stands behind the biblical events. What men such as Noth, von Rad, Muilenburg and many others have stressed is that the biblical account is itself an expression of faith. The rationalistic, somewhat naive attempt by Dr. Finegan to "explain" the plagues, the crossing of the sea, and so forth does not help but hinders the attempt to understand biblical faith by seemingly basing the validity of this faith on the success of verification of the details of the ancient account.

In conclusion, this book is interesting and contains a good summary of the archaeological data which bears on Exodus. There is little detailed exegesis and the theological comment is limited to a few scattered "sermonettes." Had the author's methodology been more

flexible and willing to benefit from other serious studies in the field, the results might have been more satisfying.

W. EUGENE MARCH

God and History in the Old Testament by HARVEY H. GUTHRIE, The Seabury Press, 1960, 179 pp, \$4.25

In this unpretentious and attractive volume the author seeks to translate "the content and thought of the Old Testament into contemporary categories capable of catching something of the total import of the biblical point of view." (p. vii) This point of view is historical; the Old Testament concerns itself with what we would today call a philosophy of history. The relevant question always is "What does history mean?" Despite the many different kinds and forms of literature represented, the dominant interest lies in a particular series of events. Much of this is, of course, familiar to all of us, but Guthrie presents his case in a very fresh and vivid and even independent fashion. It is by no means a rehash of other people's ideas.

The introduction properly undertakes to describe the biblical view of God. There is no place for facile generalization or abstraction here, but rather for historical concreteness. God makes himself known in Israel's history and through it in the history of the whole earth. The history is related to that of other peoples of the ancient Near East. The first chapter, the longest in the book, presents the witness of the narrative. (pp. 14-39) The account is discerning and perceptive. The section on the Yahwist epic is exceptionally good, and the historical judgments are sound. The characterization of David as king of united

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The third chapter is entitled "The Witness of the Law," but most of it is concerned with corollary and other matters. It is gratifying to have a young scholar do sufficient justice to the northern traditions of the Elohist. I am not quite so sure about the date of the Elohist as Guthrie is; I should be inclined to place it somewhat earlier. I should also stress the probability that the Yahwist is dependent upon northern oral traditions. On the other hand, Guthrie is probably correct in his early date of the original form of Deuteronomy. What he has to say about Moses on pp. 65 ff. is worthy of attention. The following chapters on the witness of the prophets and the witness of the priestly synthesis are well executed. Guthrie knows how to see the relationships and the continuities of various strata of tradition, and he sets forth his case persuasively. In some ways the last chapter of the book is the best because it deals with the continuity of the New Testament with the Old in an unusually wise and convincing way, although one might wonder whether more should not be made of the relation of the Elohist-Deuteronomic traditions together with Hosea and Jeremiah with the New Testament (note, e.g., the traditions centering in Moses). But it is salutary to have him say that "in the spirit of the J Document and the prophets, the New Testament . . .

is pointing to a history—to the whole history of Israel—and maintaining that the latest development in that history is the work of God in history's Lord." (p. 150)

JAMES MUILENBURG

The Church and the Reality of Christ by JOHN KNOX, Harper and Row, 1962, 158 pp, \$3.50

This book is difficult for me to review because I agree so much with Professor Knox's position and with Robert Grant's statement on the jacket that the "thesis marks nothing less than a 'break-through';" nevertheless I feel impelled to carry the discussion, if possible, a little further. Knox's point is that the Church is the community in which the basic Event took place, and which remembers Jesus and the Event. The Church is the witnessing, worshipping, living community that bears the revelation and in which the new life is mediated, not externally but internally, since everyone who is related to the Event actually lives in the Church. Here one must explain that Knox uses "Event" in his own sense, not Bultmann's. (p. 19, *n.*) By putting it in this way I believe that Knox has avoided the difficulty of Bultmann's "kerygma" and Tillich's "picture" which to many of us seem to hang in the air. He sees the story of Jesus' life and work and the whole Event as securely rooted in history through the Church.

Use of the word Church in this connection is disturbing to many, and some will still feel uncomfortable and unsatisfied after reading his book, because to them the word Church suggests either the denomination they know best or some other organization which seems external and authoritarian.

ian. The last chapter, which treats such issues as tradition, scripture and the Event, and the questions of Jesus' sinlessness and evil in the Church, gives a very good answer. We have to remember that such words as Church, and modern coinages like Event, kerygma and so on, not only have certain denotations when carefully defined, but are also *Pathosformeln* with emotional associations. The answer is to give "Church" its proper New Testament flavor.

Many of the positions will be familiar to readers of Knox's earlier books. He is particularly good in dealing with the distinction between what can be known, strictly historically, about Jesus' life, and what the Church "remembered" about his character and nature. I would add that Jesus' relation to his disciples was remembered as authority as well as love. (p. 55; cf. the whole passage, pp. 50-59) I agree with Knox, Bornkamm and others that through historical method we can know much about the human life of Jesus and that this, far from being irrelevant, sharpens the picture for us. Granted that the historian, just because of his preoccupation with method, is always in danger of separating himself, however slightly, from the life of the Church and its insights, yet it occurs to me to ask what significance his researches have for the welfare of the Church. Perhaps historical investigation is necessary because the elements in the tradition that rest on faith and "the Church's memory" are always in danger of creating stereotypes that impose themselves on the New Testament and can lead to dogmatic harshness or certain extreme types of pietism; see, e.g., the remarks on pp. 64, 95-97, where Knox

deals with a too static view of the Incarnation. Therefore any fresh view of Jesus may call attention to an element in the tradition that is in danger of being neglected. The historian's work is as necessary an aspect of "remembering" Jesus as any other. For example, Knox's discussion of the gospel miracles, particularly the Resurrection (p. 67 f.) and the Virgin Birth (p. 75), puts the question in its right perspective.

Since this is avowedly a book on Christology and the Church, and does not cover every possible subject, the next remark may be unfair. On p. 79 Knox discusses the objection that he seems to confine God's reality, and the real knowledge of him, to the Church. His answer, of course, is that he is dealing with God known in Christ or as the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. At the same time, one recalls that precisely for this reason, I think, Paul finds Christ—and the Fathers find the Eternal Son—present in the Old Testament. This can lead one into a dangerous and difficult field; nevertheless it must be said that the positive value of the Old Testament revelation is not always recognized in modern Christology. Surely the God of love revealed by Jesus is visible in the Old Testament, and we may recall how often the Fathers begin with the Old Testament and then interpret it from the New. The whole question of God's self-disclosure in Hebrew religion and even outside it calls for a new approach.

This is a book that merits ecumenical discussion, and one hopes that it will be translated into other languages and be considered in Europe as well as in America.

SHERMAN E. JOHNSON

The Bible in Current Catholic Thought ed. JOHN L. MCKENZIE, Herder and Herder, 1963, 247 pp, \$6.50

This volume is dedicated to a conscientious scholar and a respected teacher, Father Michael J. Gruenthaner. Both the variety and the quality of the essays presented here evidence the vitality and competency of current Roman Catholic biblical scholarship and make this volume a fitting tribute to Father Gruenthaner.

The Bible in Current Catholic Thought is a collection of thirteen essays representing various areas of biblical study. John McKenzie introduces the collection with a brief preface which is followed by a short sketch of Father Gruenthaner's life and career, including a bibliography of his work by Francis Petru. The essays include six dealing with topics drawn from the Old Testament ("A Kingdom of Priests," William L. Moran; "Recent Melkizedek Study," Ignatius Hunt; "Gerhard von Rad's *Genesis*," Frederick Moriarty; "The Concept of Wisdom Literature," Roland E. Murphy; "Northwest Semitic Philology and Job," Michell J. Dahood; "The Great Tree and Nabuchodonosor's Madness," Louis F. Hartman), three with the intertestamental period ("Levitical Messianism and the New Testament," Bruce Vawter; "The Qumran Reservoirs," Robert North; "The Bar Cochba Period," Joseph A. Fitzmyer), and four with New Testament topics ("New Understanding of the Gospels," David Michael Stanley; "The Gospel Miracles," Raymond E. Brown; "Changing Styles in Johannine Studies," Thomas Aquinas Collins; "Living Water in John," Francis J. McCool). Most of the essays are copiously documented demonstrating wide research and increasing their value to others.

While all the essays are interesting, most will not be appreciated apart from a serious reading illumined by some background in biblical study.

The general purpose of this collection of articles, apart from the specific subject of each independently, is to acquaint those who do not already know with the significant work being done by Roman Catholic biblical scholars. But beyond this there are two underlying themes in this volume of essays. First, there is the desire to demonstrate to both Protestant and Roman Catholics the intellectual freedom enjoyed by Roman Catholic biblical scholars today. Contrary to the view held by many these scholars are not bound within tight dogmatic limits. Since the time of Pius XII particularly, biblical scholars have been encouraged to utilize all possible methods in their study of the Bible. That this has indeed been done is clearly seen in these essays. Second, the doctrine of the inerrancy of Scripture, a view which has often hampered both Protestant and Roman Catholic scholarship, is subtly countered. In order that his work will be understood and appropriated the scholar must convince his readers of the validity of the critical approach. The doctrine of inerrancy, if allowed to stand unquestioned, puts an impossible obstacle in the way of biblical studies. Thus, the authors represented here seek at several points to bypass or overcome this restricting view of Scripture. In his article on the Gospels, Stanley, for instance, cites the papal encouragement for biblical study given by Pius XII and then stresses that the Pope himself "drew attention to the very small number of Scriptural texts whose meaning has been authoritatively settled." (p. 174) Louis Hartman approaches the question in another man-

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ner: "Inasmuch as neither of these genres [haggadic and apocalyptic] is concerned with history, it is no longer the task of Catholic exegetes to try to solve the seeming inerrancies in historical matters where an inspired writer, such as the author of Dn [Daniel], did not intend to write history." (p. 75) The most direct statement however, is made by Hunt and occurs early in the collection of essays: "In general, our overly tense Catholic preoccupation with inerrancy has made us shy away from conclusions that were accepted by independent scholars of the highest repute decades ago." (p. 28-29)

In summary this is a group of relatively technical essays characterized by critical independence and dedication to the best principles of biblical scholarship. To those who are already acquainted with current Roman Catholic biblical scholarship the quality of these essays will come as no surprise.

W. EUGENE MARCH

Philosophy and Religion in Colonial America by CLAUDE M. NEWLIN, Philosophical Library, 1962, ix, 212 pp, \$4.75

This extended essay was the winning entry for the 1961 Philosophical Library prize in philosophy. It is a worthy winner. The author, Claude M. Newlin, of Michigan State University, has made a contribution to our understanding of the intellectual and religious currents in the American colonies in the eighteenth century and has presented his results concisely and attractively. Students of American intellectual history and of the history of theology in America should have this book on their shelves.

The first part, concerned with "The

Puritans and their Philosophy," is very brief and is not designed to present any original conclusion. Its function in the book is merely to sketch a background for the major section of the essay, Part II, "The Growth of Rationalism and the Defense of Orthodoxy." In the seven chapters of this part, Dr. Newlin is concerned to show that "enlightenment" came to New England earlier and in more various contexts than is suggested by the usual run of intellectual historians. Indeed, he treats Jonathan Edwards especially, and Samuel Johnson of Kings College, too, as figures of the eighteenth century rather than as the belated tail of the seventeenth century. This treatment makes it clear that there was a theologically traditional Enlightenment in America as well as a rationalistic, theologically liberal Enlightenment. Considering the enormous amount of literature dealing with Edwards and the Edwardseans it is high praise to say that Dr. Newlin has exemplified a new way of looking at this body of theological material and that it bids fair to be a fruitful way.

In the final chapter the author deals directly with the "natural religion" of such rationalists as Jonathan Mayhew, Ebenezer Gay, Andrew Eliot and others. The particular value of his discussion is his use of the Dudleyan Lectures as source material. The interest of this material suggests that it would be a happy idea for Dr. Newlin to do a more extended study of this phase of eighteenth century theology in America. It would be valuable to have an American companion to Stromberg's *Religious Liberalism in Eighteenth Century England*. On the evidence of his work here Dr. Newlin would be an excellent person to make this study.

JOSEPH L. BLAU

American Christianity: An Historical Interpretation with Representative Documents, Volume II, 1820-1960 by H. SHELTON SMITH, ROBERT T. HANDY, and LEFFERTS A. LOETSCHER, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1963, 634 pp, \$10.00

With the publication of their second and final volume of *American Christianity*, this triad of separate but equally able, students of American church history have completed a pioneering venture. As the full title suggests this work is a mule, a cross between a textbook and a source book. No doubt it will be criticized for not being a donkey or a horse, pure and simple. As for its performance potential one might say that harnessed to a course it will pull more weight than a textbook donkey, and yet it will follow the furrows of the authors' interpretation better than a source book horse.

Paperbacks and source books have revolutionized teaching by making the raw material of history readily available. Teachers differ in their attitude toward such materials. Some will appreciate the comprehensiveness of this work's interpretation-plus-readings package feature. Others with what one of our students called a "most-documents-for-the-dough" mentality, and blind to the fact that interpretation lurks in selection itself, will regret that one third of the space is taken by Smith, Handy, and Loetscher. But with a modicum of ingenuity such a teacher can treat the author-editors' "historical interpretation" as another long document to be analyzed in class for what it reveals about post-liberal interpretations of American church history.

This second volume continues the underlying interpretation of volume

one. Its eighty-eight documents evoke the concerns, thought, and activities of Christianity in America from 1820 to 1960. The volume is divided into three equal sections: Period IV, Reform and Reaction 1820-1865; Period V, Conflicting Responses to New Forces 1865-1930; Period VI, Revaluing the Heritage, 1930-1960. The authors are to be praised for devoting one third of their space to these last thirty pregnant years. The documents are well chosen and of sufficient variety to give a broad sampling from each period. The individual selections are long enough to convey their special meaning. One does not have the feeling that he is reading an extract out of context.

Despite their length the documents are often in danger of being overshadowed by the sheer bulk of the interpretive material. Comments made in introducing a section are repeated in chapter introductions to be repeated again in introducing the specific documents. The reader is likely to think that he would have gotten the point from the last and most precise description of the document's significance and substance. Indeed, there seems to be an inverse ratio between the number of introductory words and their meaningfulness. Chapter XXI, "Realism in Social Christianity," makes the most of its introductory pages, yet has the fewest of them in relation to pages of document.

The general facts of American history, which are presented as a context for the specific documents, are magnetized, in the author's historical interpretation, around the themes of change, growth, acceleration, and transformation. Action and reaction, stimulus and response, event and adjustment form a pattern for this one

hundred and forty year span of time. Strikingly, it is Christianity—its leaders, thinkers, institutions—that plays the role of passive reactor. The impression is one of staggering, unprecedented changes in a world in which the church, having lost all initiative, is running hard to catch up. One sees the history of the church in America since 1820 as a long chain reaction of revivalism leading to a resurgence of churchliness which prompts liberalism, which produces fundamentalism, which leads to a new liberalism, the reaction to which is post-liberalism. Whatever spontaneity or intellectual and spiritual creativity may have issued from the churches during this time span hardly has a chance to appear in such an interpretive context. All of Period V, for instance, is blanketed with the title, "Conflicting Responses to New Forces."

In the final section, Period VI, "Revaluing the Heritage," it becomes clear that present-mindedness colors much of the interpretation. The authors are self-consciously "post-liberal." In one sense, this is unavoidable since everyone must stand somewhere, but the danger which they have not entirely escaped is in supposing that all views one is criticizing are relative while the critic's is not. The authors seem quite sure about their grasp of "ultimate Reality" (p. 429), of the "enduring values" (p. 430), of "the fundamental nature of man's moral predicament" (p. 432), and of what is "realism in social Christianity" (the title of Chapter XXI). In the catalog of the characteristics of the post-liberal mind (p. 437) appears among others: "the recovery of a realistic view of human nature." Aside from the implied confidence that the current view is realistic which in turn assumes a knowledge of the whole meaning of reality

and its historical mutations, it is startling to find on page 432 that a realistic view of human nature is illustrated from the writing of the Unitarian, Dean W. W. Fenn, and the arch-pre-post-liberal of them all, Harry Emerson Fosdick, speaking in 1913 and 1922 respectively. Accepting their stance as normative, the authors write off Arthur C. McGiffert's 1919 comment:

Religious education in a democracy should not be such as to encourage the delusive belief in supernatural agencies and dependence upon them, but it should be such as to convince everybody that things can be controlled and moulded by the power of man. (p. 428) . . . ,

with the reflection that "that is an amazing statement, yet it was by no exceptional in its time." Do the authors mean that the post-liberal would defend the opposite of McGiffert's "amazing statement"—that dependence on supernatural agencies should be encouraged while man's belief in his capacity to control and mould things should be discouraged?

The authors' use of "post-liberal" to describe the present theological mind is of a piece with the overall interpretation in terms of reaction and response. It also reflects the current tendency to define the identity of a contemporary movement by relating it to something dead and gone, which in turn suggests that the possibility of a past without a future fascinates this generation. The implications of "post" titles are fascinating in themselves, but in this particular case the prefix may be premature. Professor Wilhelm Pauck recently wrote that "liberal theology is slowly gaining ground, and surely it will ultimately shape the outlook of men," while Anglican Bishop

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John A. T. Robinson's jewel, *Honest to God*, is going to be difficult to fit into a post-liberal setting.

A minor cross to be born by those who will be using the volumes primarily as source books is the location of all bibliographical data, in small type, at the end of each document. The table of contents carries only the editors' titles for the selections, so it takes some thumbing to find out the author, and what, one is reading. Because there is wide familiarity with many of the authors quoted, an alphabetical list with page references would have been a great help. Of course, for those who will use the volumes primarily as text-books, the underplaying of the sources of the documents is good, for it pushes the interpretation to the foreground with the documents, analogous to footnotes, behind them.

But however one may disagree with some interpretations, and with details of organization, this great collection of documents stands as a tribute to the extensive researches and careful labors of *American Christianity's* editors. Students of American church history will be indebted to their integrated effort for years to come.

SIDNEY E. MEAD
JOYCE O. APPLEBY

Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions by PAUL TILlich, Columbia University Press, 1963, 97 pp, \$2.75

This slender but important volume contains the four Bampton Lectures given by Paul Tillich in the Low Memorial Library of Columbia University in the fall of 1961. In a style exhibiting his characteristic conciseness of statement and economy of words, Til-

lich discusses a number of important problems integrally related to the encounter of Christianity with the living religions of the world. No radical new development or transformation of positions enunciated in earlier studies is offered. Nonetheless the subject is brilliantly illuminated by means of a penetrating empathy with the nature of religious forms and the complexity of the issues raised by them.

Tillich bases his examination on his familiar definition of religion in the broad sense as "the state of being grasped by an ultimate concern, a concern which qualifies all other concerns as preliminary and which itself contains the answer to the question of the meaning of life." (p. 4) By means of this definition, Tillich is able to include in his discussion not only the great world religions, but what he calls quasi-religions, of which Fascism, Communism, and liberal humanism are notable examples.

Tillich insists that his purpose is not to provide neutral descriptions of religious phenomena. He writes as a "participant in the dynamics of the situation he is describing." (p. 2) From this perspective he distinguishes three ways in which the relation of Christianity to other religions might be described. First, Christianity might simply reject other religions. Secondly, it might distinguish between elements that are true and others that are false in both itself and the other religions. Such a way would warrant the adjective syncretistic. Thirdly, there is the way that Tillich espouses. He calls it "a dialectical union of acceptance and rejection, with all the tensions, uncertainties, and changes which such dialectics implies." (p. 30)

The complexity of this dialectical approach is first revealed in Tillich's fascinating account of the tensions re-

vealed in the history of Christianity's interpretation of itself and its relation to other religions. One tension is between the particular and the universal character of the Christian claim. Tillich makes an impressive case for the existence of "a long line of Christian universalism affirming revelatory experiences in non-Christian religions, a line starting in the prophets and Jesus, carried on by the Church Fathers, interrupted for centuries by the rise of Islam and of Christian anti-Judaism, and taken up again in the Renaissance and the Enlightenment." (pp. 77-8) This astonishing universalism is then balanced by the concreteness and particularity of the claim that the appearance and reception of Jesus of Nazareth as the Christ is a "symbol which stands for the decisive self-manifestation in human history of the source and aim of all being." (p. 79, cf. pp. 36ff.)

This point leads to a second tension between Christianity as a religion and Christianity as the negation of religion. The Christ event is viewed as a judgment upon Christianity itself as well as other religions. Christ becomes the criterion of judgment because in him what is particular is sacrificed to what is universal and ultimate. At the present time this view of Christ as the judge even of Christianity is frequently utilized by theologians representing very different methodologies and fundamental approaches. In Tillich's position it becomes the means by which he is able to maintain an exceedingly complex dialogue between Christianity and other religions in which elements on both sides are affirmed, negated, transformed.

Four rules for such a dialogue are stated: (1) both partners acknowledge the value of the other's religious con-

viction; (2) each represents his own religious basis with conviction; (3) a common ground which makes both dialogue and conflicts possible is presupposed; (4) both sides are open to criticisms directed against their own religious basis. (p. 62) A concrete example of such a dialogue is then offered in the form of a possible conversation between a Christian and a Buddhist that makes use of a dynamic typological method to compare the two religions on a more profound level than that of a simple juxtaposition of doctrines alone.

No doubt some theologians will decide that Tillich's third dialectical way has not escaped the eclectic difficulties of the second way that he has noted and rejected. (p. 30) However, it is clearly not Tillich's intent to achieve some kind of amalgam of the basic truths in all religions. As an astute phenomenologist he is acutely aware of the folly of relinquishing

one's religious tradition for the sake of a universal concept which would be nothing but a concept. The way is to penetrate into the depths of one's own religion, in devotion, thought and action. (p. 97)

Furthermore, in this study Tillich should satisfy the Christian particularist that he (Tillich) offers definite allegiance to the concrete "event in history which judges all religions, including Christianity." (p. 33) Yet it is evident that Tillich's particularism differs from that of some other contemporary theological varieties. (cf. pp. 44-5) One point of difference is that it would seem that Tillich is prepared to pursue the judgment of the Christ event on Christianity as a religion to a more radical point than are some other advocates of this principle. (cf. pp. 82-97)

Another point of difference lies in Tillich's interpretation of the *logos* theology of the Church Fathers. (pp. 34ff.) By means of this approach Tillich is able to maintain his complex position in which Christ is both the particular revelatory event in history and the universal word speaking to all religions. He is both the fulfillment of the *telos* of all religions and the judgment of all their sinful distortions of the revelation.

Is it the case that such a position is eclectic? Or is it not rather a fact that any position denying the universal element in the Christian faith as described by Tillich is a gross simplification, in fact a Christian heresy? At any rate, the rejection of Tillich's approach will impose a pressing obligation on the conscientious theologian. Can he, on other grounds, state the rules for a dialogue between the religions in which the Christian can genuinely listen and learn as well as preach from some superior vantage point beyond the reach of responsible criticism? It seems to this reviewer that Tillich's impressive performance in this respect represents a notable achievement worthy of serious consideration by all those sharing with him the role of an "observing participant."

W. RICHARD COMSTOCK

The Diversity of Meaning by L. JONATHAN COHEN, Herder and Herder, 1963, 340 pp., \$5.95

This book by a Fellow of The Queen's College, Oxford, takes up the problem of meaning, which has been a recurring topic for debate since Ogden and Richards published their famous book, *The Meaning of Meaning*, in 1923.

The author is concerned to show that no narrowly conceived theory of meaning will fit all the diverse kinds of meaning which we employ. There are timeless meanings, like the meaning which Lincoln intended to express in his Gettysburg address. There are also temporal meanings, like those of words which have varied their meanings in different periods or in different geographical areas of a culture. Failure to distinguish between these two kinds of meaning has led to a good deal of confusion. The philosophical study of meaning goes wrong if it supposes that all meanings are timeless, but on the other hand it merges into sociology if it becomes a purely empirical study of actual word usage. The question for the philosopher is: "How can words do their present jobs better (more clearly, more consistently, more profitably) than they sometimes seem to do?"

In the course of his argument, the author criticizes many views that have been or still are fashionable—that ordinary English usage somehow enshrines the wisdom and perspicuity of generations; that a tidy division can be made between the informative and emotive uses of language; that words are best thought of on the analogy of tools; that meaning is to be located in the behavioural response to language—these views, and many others, are either debunked or at least shown to have a much more limited scope than has sometimes been claimed for them.

It is a little hard to know why a topic-neutral book like this should have been sent to a theological journal for review. Everyone, of course, is concerned with meaning, but presumably the book is not going to be reviewed in journals of history, medicine, stamp-collecting, etc., though the author dis-

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cusses problems relating to his theme from all of the areas just mentioned. There is, however, a good deal of discussion going on just now among theologians on the problems of hermeneutics and of the semantics of biblical language. Those who are engaged in such discussions would find Mr. Cohen's book very useful, especially the earlier chapters in which he works out his distinction between "saying-words" and "culture-words," and has many interesting points to make about the relations between a language and the culture in which it operates.

JOHN MACQUARRIE

Twentieth-Century Religious Thought by JOHN MACQUARRIE, Harper and Row, 1963, 415 pp, \$5.00

Mr. John Macquarrie, professor of systematic theology at Union Theological Seminary, has written a long and comprehensive book about what he calls "the frontiers of philosophy and theology, 1900-1960." This somewhat histrionic subtitle is a covering expression for a somewhat conventional survey of 415 pages and twenty-three chapters, of positions and persons somehow related to various kinds of abstract religious writing. The early pages review the absolute and personal idealists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Caird, Bradley, Royce, Hocking, Webb and others), and subsequent pages delineate Neo-Kantians, positivists, philosophers of culture and history, pragmatists, phenomenologists, neo-thomists, empiricists, linguistic analysts, existentialists, liberals, theologians of "the Word," and neo-liberals. It seems that most of the big "isms" are here and most of the big names too. Some Amer-

icans might miss Lyman, D. C. MacIntosh, Nels Ferré and Calhoun, but there are so many others that one can not really complain.

If a reader wants a little sophistication about religious themes this is surely a book to read. It is informative, full of learned asides, rich in categories and types, and there seems to be a position for almost everyone and everything. Besides, Professor Macquarrie tells us that religious thought is like both a territory and a frontier. His book is something of a map, and if you look hard enough you will probably find what you are looking for. With the enormous number of things happening on a frontier, for one thing everybody taking positions, this book bids fair to being the best account by a man who has been there and will undoubtedly continue at his dangerous frontier spot, God-willing, for quite a time.

There can be little doubt that many readers will find here what they want. With the extraordinary and widespread curiosity about religion rife in this land one can predict that students and clergy, Ph.D. candidates and laymen will find this book to their liking. But it seems to me that this book is not really a serious work however arduous and sincere the author was when he wrote it and the readers are when they peruse it. Seriousness here would not permit the author to flatter his readers by serving up big views to satisfy their needs. If religious and philosophic writings make any sense at all—and that is not settled by citing criteria or saying "they make sense to me"—they certainly make sense only to persons properly qualified. Just what the qualifications are takes seriousness to determine. But these qualifications are not solely curiosity, or being a person, or wanting a

point of view. I find, therefore, something very superficial about this kind of book; and it is the kind of book I object to not simply this particular performance. For how can anyone make up his mind on the host of important matters covered by "religious thought" by reading about what others have said? With modern libraries collating materials for us and lectures and printing being what they are, it is as if easy access is now being provided to things that are earnest and difficult.

It seems regrettable to me that modern scholars fall into this too, albeit with all the richness of the craft—learning, methods and footnoting. Professor Macquarrie tells us near the end of his book (p. 371) that his reader "may well feel somewhat bewildered." And he says: "Out of this teeming diversity, no common view emerges." Certainly he is right. All kinds of expressions are cited and used by Professor Macquarrie to summarize the scene—"sharply conflicting," "so diverse," "a multitude of incoherent and incompatible points of view," "a violent struggle," "a wealth of opposing viewpoints." What he worries about in all this is that the reader might let his bewilderment pass into scepticism about the whole business.

But at this point Professor Macquarrie has another gambit to play. Early in his pages he likens his book to Moussorgsky's *Pictures at an Exhibition*. We have been looking at a lot of pictures or views or philosophies or theologies. And now the issue seems to be—which picture or view will it be? The answer is a strangely personal one. Professor Macquarrie chooses the philosophies of existence and being as the way to understand religion philosophically and the theologies of Bultmann and Tillich as the way to understand religion on "the

theological side." The author is far from saying that his book presents a conclusive argued case. He seems to have chosen his view, and he says that even granted his criteria and the data presented, every reader must decide for himself whether a "positive understanding of religion can survive in our time?" (p. 374)

Apparently, everyone must have a picture—a view! This conviction is not argued and nowhere examined in the book. But pictures and views, theologies and philosophies, are apparently "understandings." So anyone who wants to understand needs some kind of scheme and/or view. Here, indeed, is something to worry about. Most people say they want to understand, and, I suppose, that most of us do not consider that arguable. But what is an understanding of religion? I propose that one has no right to leave that word, "understanding," unexamined. When about two dozen major positions and several hundred authors, contradictory, conflicting and incoherent (as the author says) are all taken as instances, I submit that "understanding" needs very serious examination. Where everything works, nothing works, where everything counts, nothing counts. For too long students and teacher, lay and clerics, have been intimidated by the weight of such learning as this. "If such intelligent people cannot even agree, how can I be expected to make up my mind?"—This is what many neophytes in seminaries and colleges have long been saying about theologians and philosophers. After seeing what the professors do with this stuff, usually at second hand, who can blame them?

Another picture, if I may be pardoned the usage, emerges for me. The author says (p. 18): "It is impossible to study the history of any problem

without studying the problem itself." This statement is certainly false, but that is not the principal issue. It seems that all of these authors, like the rest of men, have minds and bodies. On the one side is the man with his mind; on the other is the big state of affairs, existence and the being of everything. Everybody has supposedly the same problem if these components are generic. When a man tries to understand, I gather, he is trying to put things together in some kind of picture or view. But to date, even in the twentieth century, there are many pictures.

What brings all of this material together for Professor Macquarrie is a picture of everyman, with a pervasive unrequited need which he, if he is intelligent, converts into his problem. Those many philosophies and theologies are so many good tries, partial glimpses, ardent conjectures and culturally relevant essays. If one had perfect understanding one would have absolute truth. Here is where the glory would really lie, but drat it, absolute truth is unattainable. That Professor Macquarrie finds it even sensible to talk about it astounds me. Absolute and final truth functions as a kind of norm for him and gives him solace respecting all of those views. For they must content us as the only thing available even though they point us "in the direction of a degree of relativism." (p. 372) Besides, men are finite, dependent upon "the mood of the culture," and quite unable to notice everything at once. Therefore, we must live on available insights and keep dialoguing just as the New Testament writers and the Reformers did and the theologians and philosophers have been doing, lo, these many years.

A generation or so ago the popularizers and pedagogues of philosophy

were somewhat chastened by the incertitudes respecting metaphysics and epistemology. Then they began to construe the history of philosophy around a set of supposedly generic human problems. Having been trained to do that myself, I suddenly discovered how strange it was to be teaching problems of philosophy to people about whom you were loudly insisting that they had the problem of knowledge, the problem of the good and a host of others already. But now it is the theologians' turn. Many of them are slipping into the conviction that there are massive and infinitely subtle ontological problems by which every man is really beset and of which he can be conscious if he is intelligent. I submit that such problems are something we slip into if we do not watch ourselves—our speech, our thoughts, our habits—very carefully. They beset us only if we let them happen to us. The infinite array of answers seems to me to suggest that the problem is neither singular nor really pressing. Furthermore, I believe that this is a mistaken way to use this vast array of literature. Many of the theological and philosophical pieces can be read otherwise and ought to be.

Thus it seems to me very dubious to try to make all the variety that passes for religious thought count up in any one way. One does not have to have a position on all of it either. Does it really make sense to keep insisting that there is an ever-escaping kind of understanding beckoning us all on? Rather, because the Christian religion is a host of things, saying prayers, singing hymns, forgiving and being forgiven, worshipping God, following Jesus, thanking for your food, loving your neighbor, being justified, visiting the fatherless; because it is all this and more, understanding the

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faith is many things too. Of course, if there were an intellectual distillate in all of these, then understanding would be singular and specific. But I submit there is no such distillate after all. But many of these things can be understood; and by doing these things always and in all circumstances we also encompass soon enough much of our world.

And lest the theologians and philosophers believe that this strips them of their positive tasks, we only need remember that this generation may be crooked and perverse. If it is, one has a great deal to do to help others to understand. Think of the variety of enterprises it would include. All one needs to ask is—do I understand who my neighbor is? Understanding the command to love neighbors is quite different than understanding that we must worship God.

My complaint then is that this book makes religion a very complicated matter. I have admitted religion is complex, for it certainly teaches and requires many things. But I am not at all certain that the solemn pronouncements about “the revelatory symbols and the communal worship” (p. 374) and the fact that the theologians will help us bring them back to life by interpretation and understanding is at all germane. The thought that religious thinkers can repristinate and revive all these sick words and signs by glimpsing for us and with us God and being again is downright funny! It seems to me that a pure heart, a contrite and broken spirit and seeking with all one’s heart too might still be the way to know God. Lending dignity to every twentieth century thinker who has used a few religious words by assuming the profundity and genuineness of their quest seems to me undeserved. Like the rest of us many of

them were probably confused; but even if they were not, it behooves every reader to ask what in the world he wants. Do we want views? Why? Can we get them by reading and hearing lectures? Are we clear about all of that? If so many spasms of reflection satisfy us, ought we not to begin with a conscientious re-examination of the questions that started us off?

In another fifty years the views will probably have doubled in number. Think how hard it will be to make up one’s mind then. On the other hand, it will be just as easy too!

PAUL L. HOLMER

Karl Barth: An Introduction to His Early Theology 1910-1931 by T. F. TORRANCE, SCM Press Ltd., 1962, 231 pp, \$5.00

The author of this book is Professor of Christian Dogmatics in the University of Edinburgh and joint editor of the English edition of Karl Barth’s *Church Dogmatics*. This study is the fullest exposition in English of Barth’s early thought and development and for that reason is an important addition to the growing literature on Barth. Although limited to the “early” Barth, the study clearly reflects the significant developments in Barth’s thought during the period of the *Church Dogmatics*. Thus the author inclines, on occasion, to read some of the mature Barth into the early theology. It is, therefore, instructive to read and compare this study of the early Barth with those of Pauck, Hoyle and McConnachie written thirty years ago.

The author’s purpose is not so much to expound the content of Barth’s early thought as to trace “the course

of his debate with modern theology." One of the weaknesses of the book is the fact that Torrance is so convinced of the errors of "modern theology" that his chronicle of Barth's relation to it fails to come off as a debate. Barth wins hands down without an argument. Torrance is prone to labels (e.g., "Schweitzer failed because he operated with romantic-idealist and rationalist assumptions . . ."), and thus the reader must be alert to the frequent use of pejorative language. Torrance also tends to use his exposition of Barth as a vehicle for his own views and critique of modern theology. The reader unfamiliar with Barth could easily mistake Torrance's *dicta* as those of Barth.

I recommend the book to those who will read it critically. The exposition of Barth's development from the book on *Romans* to *The Doctrine of the Word of God* is generally accurate and incisive. Of special value are the extended expositions of the book on Anselm, *Fides Quaerens Intellectum*, *Die Christliche Dogmatic and Schicksal und Idee in der Theologie*. Torrance is of less value and sometimes quite misleading when he turns from Barth to what Barth was opposing. For instance, in dealing with the Barth-Harnack debate of 1923, Torrance dismisses Harnack's theology as a docetic flight from concrete existence and historical reality. (p. 73) This was exactly the danger Harnack saw in Barth's theology and today Barth admits that during this period his theology was dangerously close to an unhistorical docetism with its radical antithesis of time and eternity.

In the Preface to the book Torrance says that "Karl Barth deserves . . . the same attempt to evaluate him in his own serious intention, as he has manifested in his interpretations of the

great theologians of the past," but then Torrance adds that "In this work no attempt has been made to criticize the theology of Barth except within the logic of its own development." What is lacking in this study is what one generally finds in Barth's interpretations of the great theologians: a provocative exposition of the theologian's intention and most powerful ideas *coupled with* a trenchant critique of his assumptions, methods and results.

In the book's summation on "The Barthian Revolution" Torrance depicts contemporary Protestant theology as at a watershed between the either-or of Bultmann or Barth. Most would agree, I think, that there are a few more options than these and that we are not called upon to choose either the method of Barth or "the dissolution of Christianity."

Appended to the book is a good selected bibliography of Barth's early writings, including important lesser-known essays and articles.

JAMES C. LIVINGSTON

Being and Time by MARTIN HEIDEGGER, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Harper and Brothers, 1962, 589 pp, \$12.50

Martin Heidegger is an enigmatic figure. His literary output has been relatively slight; his personal contacts with other intellectuals are few. Teaching has been his one avenue of personal contact and his pupils are numerous and influential in German university life. Since retirement he has only seldom left his secluded mountain hut in the Black Forest. At no time in his career has he led a public life. Nevertheless, he is without doubt

the most influential and widely-discussed of living German, and, perhaps, of Continental philosophers. His thought has found resonance in nearly every aspect of European intellectual life from the sciences to theology. That influence flows from one book, *Sein und Zeit*, first published in 1927. Heidegger's later writings have been far less successful and his reputation, secure and still growing, rests essentially on his achievement in *Sein und Zeit*. It must be counted among the small number of original and pioneering works of philosophy published in the twentieth century.

In English-speaking countries Heidegger has been a name known since the thirties but his thought is known mostly by hearsay or through works which are indebted to him. The language barrier and a lively, though never universal, aversion to metaphysics have combined to inhibit his influence in America and the British Commonwealth. Of recent date, however, the anti-metaphysical bias has shown signs of weakening and a number of important Continental authors have found translators. Since the second war significant works of Husserl, Scheler, Sartre, Marcel and Merleau-Ponty have been rendered into English. Some smaller works of Heidegger have also appeared, and now, with the publication of this translation of *Sein und Zeit*, the last major obstacle in the way of an assimilation of Heidegger's thought has been lifted.

Nothing could be said in a short review to add to or detract from the stature of the original work. An appraisal of the quality of the translation, however, might be useful. Do the translators succeed in making Heidegger's thought accessible to English readers? To answer this question one must know something about the nature



of the book, the general strategy of the translation, and its probable readers.

Sein und Zeit is a difficult book, to be studied, not just read. Its difficulty stems partly from the originality of its ideas and partly from the novel linguistic devices employed to express them. The main theme of the book might be expressed as an attempt to overcome the conceptual gulf between the inner and outer worlds. Its chief accomplishment is a philosophical anthropology which lays bare the foundational structures characterizing human existence. (This remains true even though Heidegger views his *Daseinsanalyse* as a mere propaedeutic to a "fundamental ontology," as yet incomplete.) In order to achieve this philosophical anthropology Heidegger has to move his readers out of habitual modes of thinking. On the whole he avoids traditional terminology in favor of a new set of imaginative and richly suggestive expressions. Some of these are current in ordinary German, but used with a limited or expanded scope, others are revivals of older usages or fresh coinages. In particular, Heidegger seeks to revive the strength of tired or dead words by refreshing one's awareness of their root meanings or by tapping the metaphorical energy of earlier uses. The result is a picturesque and unconventional language which is always suggestive, sometimes brilliantly illuminating, but often ambiguous and obscure. Herbert Spiegelberg, a recognized authority on these matters, remarks that "even the native German finds himself all too often stymied by Heidegger's way of writing, which would almost call for a translation into ordinary German. . . . Even the German reader has really no alternative to learning Heidegger's vocabulary just as he learned his mother

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
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tongue, i.e., by watching its uses and by trial and error." It will be appreciated, then, that the translation of such a work is a task of the utmost difficulty.

A translator begins his work by making a choice. He must choose between emphasizing a literal correlation of the two languages or emphasizing the style characteristics and idiomatic flavor of the language he will publish. These are not exclusive alternatives, of course. One hopes to be both accurate and readable. Yet, on every page of a text there will occur passages for which the translator can favor a scrupulous fidelity at the price of easy readability or, conversely, an idiomatic felicity at the price of exactness. Messrs. Macquarrie (currently on the faculty at Union) and Robinson have chosen to stress fidelity. As a result, there is never any doubt about the fact that this is a translation. The total impression is one of awkwardness and, occasionally, artificiality. One is frequently forced to re-read sentences and whole paragraphs in order to get the general drift; more work is required to get any precise meaning. Much of this difficulty occurs also in the German text but it is, I believe, increased in the translation because of excessive literalness. This literalness is carried much too far, e.g., in attempting to match the facility with which German creates substantives out of verbs and adjectives or the ease with which words coalesce into larger units in German. In English these devices invariably appear forced and barbaric. But, apart from such excesses, the translators have made the choice which best serves the readers they are likely to find.

Who will read this book? University students, theoretically inclined members of academic departments and of such professions as psychiatry, the

ministry and perhaps the arts. They will probably have some acquaintance with writers labelled "existentialists"; most likely they will know some German. They will read the book slowly, reflectively, perhaps making occasional reference to the German. For such persons a literal translation is what is wanted. The translators have provided every conceivable aid to such students: page references to the eighth German edition are given; technical terms are explained at their first occurrence; variant readings and alternative translations are supplied; a glossary of German expressions is provided together with indices for English, Latin and Greek terms and for proper names. The result is a usable book for students. Perhaps the translators will want to round off some of the rough edges in future editions. But, meanwhile, they deserve the thanks of the learned world for undertaking this monumental task. They have made accessible to persons of serious scholarship a book which demands and will reward close study.

DANIEL D. O'CONNOR

The Empirical Theology of Henry Nelson Wieman, Volume IV, *The Library of Living Theology* ed. ROBERT W. BRETALL, The MacMillan Co., 1963, 423 pp, \$8.50

Previously having dealt with the theologies of Tillich, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Brunner, this most recent addition to the Kegley-Bretall series deals with Henry Nelson Wieman, the distinctively American theologian who is now Professor Emeritus of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago. More recently Wieman has been Distinguished Visiting Professor

of Philosophy at the University of Southern Illinois. His recent books include *The Source of Human Good* (1946), *The Directive in History* (1949), *Man's Ultimate Commitment* (1958), and *Intellectual Foundations of Faith* (1961).

This collection of interpretive and critical essays includes a brief but valuable intellectual autobiography, as well as a useful bibliography of Wieman's work. Of particular interest is the change in format which allows Wieman to reply directly to each contributor immediately after each critique, thus giving a unity not always present in collections of essays written from various perspectives. The profundity and occasional sharpness of Wieman's running debate with his critics is, further, an endeavor to create the kind of conditions that would foster that "creative interchange" which he has come to prize so highly. Those who are unfamiliar with Wieman's thought will find the first three essays particularly valuable as an introduction to the background and method of his thought. Unusually significant and possibly lasting contributions to the current theological scene may be found in the essays by Daniel D. Williams, Edmund Cherbonnier, and Father Weigel, and the pointed replies by Wieman to each of these thinkers.

Profoundly influenced by his truly pious Calvinistic upbringing, Wieman's intellectual roots include Bergson and Whitehead, Dewey and James, as well as contemporary value theory. Given this perspective he has been deeply aware of and involved in the philosophical and spiritual crises of our times since he first began to teach in the 1920's. Standing so completely within the modern world of scientific method and process metaphysics, Wi-

man's intellectual quest has centered upon the question of God. This question, however, is not about God's existence. It is the question of how we are to discern the presence of God in such a way as to be able to distinguish truth from falsehood, to avoid confusing the living God with our own selfhood, or our own highest abstractions or our ideas of God—to the end that we might be freed to bend our energies to His services. In the classic sense Wieman is a God-intoxicated thinker, yet one who is keenly sensitive to the fact that all of our ideas of God are partly wrong.

The rightful task of theology is to leave behind all anxiety about the fate of one's theological ideas, for one will know that they are at best inadequate approximations to the divine truth and that creative interchange can be trusted to lead beyond them in its own way. (p. 387)

Although Wieman carries on a rather serious lover's quarrel with most contemporary theology, it is instructive to note his own understanding of his relation to Barth and Tillich. He agrees with Barth's view of God as *existing*, and concretely so, in Jesus Christ. His disagreement with Barth is generally four-fold: on the use of traditional linguistic forms in the theological task; on the really constructive function of reason in theology; on what he considers to be Barth's inability to deal with the *fact* of evil; and in regard to Barth's dogmatic insistence that history's only meaning lies beyond all histories. Wieman believes that only an honest and thoroughgoing use of reason can liberate man from enslaving illusions, and that the divine creativity, which one can discern operating *within* history, is vulnerable insofar as its ultimate

victory is never assured. Over against Tillich, Wieman applauds the liberation from orthodoxy which he finds there, but rejects Tillich's conception of "God beyond God." While gratefully noting his real obligation to Tillich's analysis of the function of non-cognitive religious symbols, Wieman very carefully disagrees with Tillich's doctrine of symbolism because God, says Wieman, is not absolutely unknowable mystery. The main issue for man is his salvation, and hence the primary thrust of religious inquiry is to discern that concrete reality operating here and now to free all men.

Given this field of inquiry Wieman endeavors in a prophetic sense to call men back from sentimental attention to abstractions, holding that the only meaningful way to distinguish between truth and falsehood is by means of empirical method. In our day there are, of course, various kinds of empiricisms. Wieman's empirical method is of the James-Whitehead-Dewey sort, and is intricately interwoven with value theory. There is more to experience than the senses allow, in this view, so when God speaks man listens with his whole being and not merely with his ears, his "self" or his conscious cognition. In terms of this perspective God in his concrete transcendence can be encountered in an empirically-based vision—not *all* of God, but *enough* of God, as in the Old Testament theophanies. For most readers, however, the whole problem of Wieman's empirical method, and its availability for the theological task will remain a critical issue throughout the book.

A further issue in Wieman's thought is that of language and tradition. He believes that all of the more or less orthodox theologies cannot solve the problem of ambiguity involved in re-

taining familiar phrases while changing their meaning. This concern for concrete meaning and truth leads him to a radical demythologizing of the theological tradition, in spite of the fact that Wieman believes, or once believed, that one only comes to the Christian community in terms of the traditional symbols. His concrete demythologizing, based on a naturalistic or process metaphysics as opposed to Bultmann's existentialist base, is of such a radical nature that it may not directly and easily serve popular theological interests. It would help one, probably, to come at him from some familiarity with Whitehead or other current naturalists. While Wieman does not solve the problem of language and tradition, he at least reminds us that there are alternative demythologizing perspectives available, however difficult. In an age which at worst has forgotten or at best is confused about the meanings and value of traditional theological symbols and language, it is sentimental to hope that even whatever meaning is possible for men can be quickly or easily grasped.

In spite of the variation in quality of the essays, and in spite of the profound issues remaining in Wieman's thought, this book calls us to re-evaluate the possible fruitfulness of this theological perspective. If the "theological spectrum" has in fact been shattered in this last half of the twentieth century, it may well be an enriching and clarifying endeavor for us—not to return to Wieman—but, to wrestle with him in open conflict and to listen attentively to his witness. There is more here than mere historical significance. For those within and without the Church whose structures of meaning have collapsed, who have lost sight of the familiarly authoritative landmarks of faith, there

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
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JAMES W. BERGLAND

The Realities of Faith. The Revolution in Cultural Forms by BERNARD EUGENE MELAND, Oxford University Press, 1962, 362 pp, \$6.50

Bernard Meland has been Professor of Constructive Theology, The Divinity School, University of Chicago, since 1945. Since his first book in 1934, *Modern Man's Worship*, he has consistently concerned himself with the developing of a reconstructed liberalism that will enable man to grow in sensitivity to the saving realities that are not of man's making.

Major themes and concepts reappear here from earlier works: *Seeds of Redemption* (1947), *The Reawakening of Christian Faith* (1949), *America's Spiritual Culture* (1948), *Faith and Culture* (1953), "The Faith of a Mystical Naturalist," (*Review of Religion*, 1:3, March, 1937), and "Tradition and New Frontiers," (*Christendom*, V:3, Summer, 1940), to name but a few. Familiar concepts from Henry Nelson Wieman are here: "impoverishment of outlook" and "discernment of the God we already have"; from Alfred North Whitehead: "conrescence" and "prehension"; and from Meland's own writings: "search for significance" and "seeds of redemption."

New readers of Meland will need to know that *The Realities of Faith* will again and again seem to be saying something ordinary when actually the burden of his thought-provoking argument is being stated. Thus, on page 362, where he says the encounter between men is a "confrontation of realities—realities which at elemental

levels of our humanity speak for themselves and thereby summon us to what is saving beyond our humanity," the sentence itself is deceptively vague. In the context of his developed "post-liberal" process theology, however, "what is saving beyond our humanity" becomes a profoundly significant and powerful statement of the cosmic depths of meaning hidden in our common life. He is speaking here not only of the distinctive witness of the Christian faith to the non-Christian, but of the fact that even encounter "at the level of humanity" may be an occasion for the "miracle of a higher encounter."

The book may well turn out to be Meland's magnum opus, for it is a thorough statement of his system. The structure of the book is in itself an exhibition of Meland's method of philosophy of religion, similar to that of Wieman and Whitehead. The method consists of: (1) observation of the ambiguities and complexities of the events surrounding and involving us; (2) logical discrimination in the "modern idiom" of what religion is on the basis of the "focus" provided by the Christ event (including the renewal and reconciliation generated by that event); and (3) return to renewed observation of the current scene from the vantage point of one's deepened emotional and spiritual sensitivity. Thus Meland starts with an analysis of the "world revolution," including many of his observations during his recent trip to give the Barrows Lectures in India and Burma. Then he develops the full implications of his "deeper empiricism," begun in *Faith and Culture* (1953), taking full cognizance of Wieman's empirical philosophy of religion (while going far beyond it), of depth psychology, of analytic philosophy, of organismic thought, of existentialism,

and of post-Newtonian scientific thought. Finally he returns to the re-evaluation of the church's task in relation to the "revolution in cultural forms" he has perceptively described.

Meland is concerned about the growing secular temper in both the East and West. He defines secularism as the condition and response within human existence which disregards all intrinsic meaning as this applies to man, and thus deprives him of dignity and of a personal destiny. The malady that strikes at the vitals of modern civilization is a "human introversion" that leaves man unresponsive, if not insensitive, to "realities beyond our own human formulations." Christians have failed to distinguish carefully their cultural and partisan objectives from the truth which the Christian faith never grasps completely but only witnesses to. Meland's suggestion is not that we abandon science, as though the ancient mechanistic-idealistic battle still rages, but that we accept more fully the new vision to which the sciences themselves are coming because of the radically new developments in modern physics. Meland does not mean a return to the modernist's veneration of scientific schema to the neglect of unique elements of revelation. *The Realities of Faith*, in fact, presents for the first time a thoroughgoing statement of his Christology, along the lines of Pittenger's "social doctrine" in *The Word Incarnate* (1959). But he does mean that we conceivably may be able to apprehend the realities of the Christian faith more adequately today not in spite of, but because of the new vistas of modern science. Meland is contending that in this often-termed "post-Christian" era, we have potentially an advantage over all preceding ages in that we may move toward a new level of what he calls,

after Wieman, "qualitative attainment."

Something of what Meland is suggesting hereby is contained in his analysis of the corporate character of experiencing. He insists, as Whitehead does, that experience is never a simple sensory act nor a simple subjective event, "but a happening within relationships that takes on a public character with social consequence." The structure of experience forms the living nexus in which all individual experiences participate, or from which they derive their public conditioning or character. Scientific research is not simply objective in contrast to the subjectivity of religious or aesthetic experiencing. From this position the step is not difficult to take to Meland's assertion that all experiencing is grounded in the dominant myths of the culture in which the experiencing takes place. If, once for all, Newtonian exactness as a normative ideal for all human disciplines is now broken through, Christian and non-Christian alike may become increasingly open to recovery of a sense of an ultimate condition of our human existence, namely that our life is in God.

A return to supernaturalism is not the answer to our new awareness of the limitations of the human cognitive outreach, as far as Meland is concerned. Nor can we return, now that relativity is here to stay, to an unrepentant liberalism which stubbornly insists on the claim that this is after all an orderly universe. The route to follow, says Meland, is one of thoroughgoing awareness of the gulf between human thought and reality, but at the same time an awareness that man participates in these realities "at the level and mode of experience we call duration." We may not ever know the mystery that sur-

rounds us in any explicit, cognitive way, but we do participate in what Meland calls "the life of spirit." We do live in tension with the sensitivities of spirit as a higher dimension of freedom and goodness that grasps us as a novelty of grace within our human structure, judging us, yet summoning us to that which is beyond our own human order of good.

Meland's position is that we live in a matrix of relationships that we partly apprehend. "We are concretions of this communal ground, actualizing its intent under certain limited circumstances." One of his more exciting notions is about the meeting of Christian with non-Christian. If God "gives of himself in every act of concretion," we must thoroughly insist on a doctrine of universal divine immanence. And if God intrudes at the point of our finite limits as free and individuated selves with special "*Gestalts* of grace" or revelation—special strands of history like the Christ event and its concomitants—we must insist on God's transcendence and on the way he makes himself uniquely available through Christ. No human individuals or groups have a corner on insight into precisely how God is working in our time. "We [Christians] are in no position to judge or to measure the normativeness of this Word for all men." We do not manage or assess the response to our witness to Christ. We do witness. We Christians do so from the fallible standpoint of our concrete reception of God's grace and judgment. Other men witness from the standpoint of their faiths which also occur in a certain conditioned matrix of culture which in some way also points beyond itself to some dim ultimate apprehension of grace and judgment. The interrelationships that result may not be so much

the specific words and symbols Christian and non-Christian speak to each other as the fact that both may be opened to "a dimension of sensitivity and goodness that transcends their existence." What eventuates is in God's hands, who alone can help us to communicate with our brethren of other faiths across differences and divisions.

JOHN GEORGE KUETHE

Honest to God by JOHN A. T. ROBINSON, Westminster Press, 1963, 141 pp, \$1.65

This is a curious book. A bishop of the Church of England announces the discovery of the twentieth century. He does it with some of the excitement and the naiveté of a person trying to prove that he is sophisticated by making an argument for sophistication.

The book is not entirely naive. Bishop Robinson is an intelligent man who has read some contemporary theology. He is impressed by Paul Tillich's criticism of supranaturalism, Rudolf Bultmann's demythologizing, and Dietrich Bonhoeffer's suggestions of a Christian faith without "religion." He is a little surprised by what he finds, and he likes it. Realizing the difference between these theologies and the more conventional thought of the churches, he sets out to popularize the new themes—a valid, if somewhat risky, enterprise.

Much of Bishop Robinson's writing is cogent and invigorating. What the book lacks is subtlety and intellectual discrimination—important qualities for its purposes. Hence there is a failure of precision at several important places.

For example, Robinson rejects the idea of a God "up there" or "out there," preferring Tillich's idea of God

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
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as "the ground of being." Then he says, "God is not outside us." But if God is the ground of being, surely He is as truly outside us as inside us. Sometimes the argument would appear to require the conclusion that God was created along with man—a strange conception of the ground of being. Again, Robinson seems to side with Tillich on the issues concerning a "personal God." Yet at the crucial point he slips over to a quotation from Buber, as though there were no difference on this issue between Buber and Tillich.

To take another example, Robinson seems to like Tillich's apologetic devices and ignores Bonhoeffer's attacks upon them. Conversely in taking up Bonhoeffer's criticism of religion he plays the fashionable word game of praising Christian faith while sniping at religion (and plays it with only a few slip-ups), quite ignoring Tillich's criticism of the game. I do not mean that an avowed popularization need go into all the fine points of an argument, but the author needs to think them through. He cannot invoke the prestige of several modern theologians at exactly the points where those theologians tangle with each other.

Perhaps the greatest difficulties come on the issue of myth. Robinson moves from Tillich's rejection of God as "a Being" into Bultmann's criticisms of myth, quite ignoring Tillich's argument that Bultmann should distinguish between different levels of myth. Robinson himself wants to keep some of the *less* important myths—e.g., the star of Bethlehem—realizing that they are myths. But on basic doctrine he takes a tough-minded stance—except that he appeals to paradox and neglects to tell us that perhaps it is

exactly the paradoxical elements in faith that make myth not an embarrassment but an appropriate expression of faith.

Robinson expresses a fine ethical sensitivity within a radically situational ethic. He uses this ethic quite cogently when he mounts an assault on the Church of England's rigid canons against divorce. Where the target is not legalism but ethical chaos such relativism is less impressive. The praise for "intuitive" ethics overlooks the fact that sin works as effectively through intuitions as through legalisms. Elsewhere Robinson's references to "the structure of our being" raise the question as to whether some corresponding "structure" of ethics may not be appropriate.

I am not sure just how far Bishop Robinson intends to go in his self-conscious radicalism. Occasionally he shows unexpected streaks of conservatism, as in unexplained references to the empty tomb and the sacramental ministry. I do not quite believe him when he says his concern "is in no way to change the Christian doctrine of God," and I do not see why he says that.

Still, all this carping ignores some real values in the book. As keen a mind as Bishop Robinson's cannot interpret Tillich, Bultmann, and Bonhoeffer without stirring up some invigorating debates. The attack on docetic Christology is apt and persuasive. The paragraphs on New Testament interpretation (Robinson's own field of scholarship) are controversial but often refreshing and illuminating. The stir created by the book may serve a healthy purpose in driving some Christians to ask themselves what they really believe.

ROGER L. SHINN

Science and Religion: An Interpretation of Two Communities by HAROLD K. SCHILLING, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1962, 272 pp, \$4.50

As its practitioners are now coming to see, philosophy of science throughout most of this century has paid too little attention to what scientists actually *do*, and it has suffered much from this oversight. While Dr. Schilling's book is not a technical treatise in the philosophy of science, much of its value derives from avoiding this mistake. He is, as his subtitle implies, concerned above all with what scientists, and Christians, actually do as scientists and Christians.

Science and Religion has two basic theses, one pertaining to its content and one to its methodology. The former of these is that science and religion are very much alike—"especially in those very aspects in which they are typically regarded as most incongruous, namely in their spirit, temper of mind, and in their basic attitude toward truth and reason, and freedom of inquiry, as well as toward the spiritual, non-material necessities of life." (pp. 6-7) The methodological thesis is that the way to show this basic harmony is by studying science and religion as human communities. In using this method Dr. Schilling does not attempt to solve all problems which might arise between science and religion, but rather "to help develop an atmosphere of informed, mutual understanding and appreciation within which the difficult task of relating science and religion meaningfully can be undertaken, in which the insights and methods of each can more effectively enrich the other, and in which they can together contribute more significantly to the attainment

of a well balanced life and world view." (p. 7)

One result of this social approach to science is the denial that there is anything properly called "scientific method," if by that term is meant something different from other uses of the intellect. Dr. Schilling rightly criticizes conventional theories of induction as having no connection with the manner in which scientific knowledge actually proceeds. He properly stresses the role of creative imagination in scientific discovery, and the conceptual complexity of theory. He correlates scientific theory and theology as having similar roles within their respective communities, seeing both as the result of reflection on certain kinds of experience. He argues that the primary differentiating factor between science and religion is not method, but subject matter. Another related factor is the degree of personal concern and involvement in each area.

Dr. Schilling's approach to his problem has the added virtue of emphasizing the role of the community in both science and religion, and he makes clear the way in which the community forms the environment without which there would be neither religious nor scientific experience. Just as there is a sense in which the Church is essential for men to receive God's revelation of Himself, there is a sense in which the scientific community is essential for men to see light as something that "moves." Contrary to popular opinion both science and religion are essentially social.

There is no tendency in this book to reduce science to religion, or vice versa. The important differences between the two, such as the unique and central role of the concept of God in religion, which has no parallel in science, are carefully delineated.

Science and Religion is not the place to look for solutions to technical problems of philosophy or theology, nor does it attempt to be. For example, Dr. Schilling does not discuss in detail the problem of the reality of theoretical entities in science, nor the problem of demythologization of scripture. He does observe that scientists are now more reluctant to treat theories in a realistic manner, and that there is a need for getting behind at least some of the mythological structure in the Bible. The value of his work, and this value is considerable, lies in setting the context in which intelligent interchange of views can take place. This book presents no difficulties beyond the reach of any educated person, and would even be worth considering for use in an adult or campus study group, provided the members have moved beyond nineteenth century battles between science and religion.

RICHARD JAMES WOOD

Institutionalism and Church Unity
eds. NILS EHRENSTROM and WALTER G. MUELDER, Association Press, 1963, 378 pp, \$6.50

In the elaborate and impressive schema of preparatory documentation for the Fourth World Conference on Faith and Order at Montreal last July, this was the most substantial volume available to the delegates prior to the meeting. It is to be hoped that it was the most influential, for it is the most important.

The background leading to its publication has much more than historical interest. It throws startling illumination on the realities of "Faith and Order" inquiries. The topic of "In-


stitutionalism" had no place in early Faith and Order studies. It was not provided for in the original plans for the Second Conference at Edinburgh in 1937. Insistence by Americans led to its inclusion. Characteristically, the theme was committed to a Commission of Americans. Under the leadership of Professor William Adams Brown of U.T.S., New York and Dr. Angus Dun of Episcopal, Theological Seminary, Cambridge, there was drafted a notable document under the somewhat forbidding title, "The Non-Theological Factors in the Making and Unmaking of Church Union." Greeted by not a few European theologians as an illustration of "American Activism," it established the validity and importance of its subject. The next decisive step was a personal comment from Professor C. H. Dodd of Cambridge to the then Secretary of Faith and Order, Dr. Oliver Tompkins now Bishop of Bristol: "A Letter Concerning Unavowed Motives in Ecumenical Discussion," subsequently published in a Lund Conference volume on *Social and Cultural Factors in Church Divisions*. One recalls the catastrophic impact of Dr. Dodd's forthright testimony that many years of participation in Faith and Order discussions had led him to the recognition that, each time a crucial "theological" issue was resolved, a new "theological" issue emerged to frustrate progress, and thus to the conclusion that the intractable issues were probably not "theological" at all but at a more fundamental and deeper (*sic*) than theological level. Since then, "non-theological factors" now identified as "Institutionalism" have compelled recognition. The present volume is the latest and most thorough-going exploration of them.

"Ecumenical conversation is a noisy gong unless it leads to ecumenical con-

version. . . . If the ecumenical movement is to be realistic and down-to-earth, it must challenge the churches to become more self-critically aware of the subtle ways in which their institutional structures and procedures obstruct or facilitate ecumenical advance." These provocative sentences from the Preface define the context for this inquiry. The book is almost equally given to "Part I: Foundations" and "Part II: Case Studies." In the earlier part half a dozen essayists from almost as many countries and traditions examine with commendable competence, realism and candor the decisive bearing of church structures upon professed and actual efforts to achieve church union. In the latter part, eight of the most significant realized or attempted church unions

are described and appraised, each with special and illuminating reference to the bearing of sociological, economic and other "institutional" factors upon their success or failure. Two case studies are of re-unions within a single denomination, unfortunately both Methodist. The remaining six deal with the far more difficult and noteworthy type of union, embracing churches from varying and contrasted historic families. Here are valuable accounts of the achievement and present health of the four most outstanding United Churches in Christian history, those of Canada, South India, Japan and America. A brief concluding essay treats of "Cooperation in the Local Community" based upon a single small American city—a topic whose adequate presentation would have re-

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quired another volume of at least equal length.

Inevitably, so rich a feast tempts one to covet even more. One of the two Methodist unions which were substantially parallel, in England and the United States, might well have given place to an examination of one of the re-unions within Presbyterianism, either the slow and careful efforts in Scotland which, over more than a century, reduced thirteen Presbyterian Churches to four with the overwhelming bulk of adherents within the Church of Scotland, or the parallel history in the United States issuing in the new United Presbyterian Church. One wishes that the editors had made bold to attempt a summarizing chapter, setting forth the conclusions which emerge from this composite work, their own judgment as to the crucial issues and obstacles, and their prognosis for future developments. In any event, their volume will take its place upon the rapidly lengthening ecumenical shelf as an invaluable resource, a "must" for all who would grapple with the realities of church unification, and an excellent starting point for the student who desires induction into this misty and often mystifying territory.

HENRY P. VAN DUSEN

The Challenge to Reunion: The Blake Proposal Under Scrutiny
eds. ROBERT McAFEE BROWN and DAVID H. SCOTT, McGraw-Hill, 1963, 292 pp, \$6.50

A generation ago the various mergers and reunion schemes involving American churches came and went, regardless of their worth, without an earthquake sense of historical significance. In these days, however, the Blake proposal for the union of the

Presbyterian, United Church of Christ, Methodist, Protestant Episcopal and (since the famous 1960 sermon by Blake) the Evangelical United Brethren and the Polish National Catholic churches strikes almost everyone as the great classic "test-case" in contemporary American ecumenics. It is not an outrageous analogy to claim that the silhouette of the Blake proposal is as striking among the mountainpeaks of American church history as Dred Scott or Marbury vs. Madison are among the broader ranges of American history.

Certainly some such self-consciousness as that must lie behind this fascinating volume. In addition to the fine introduction by Robert M. Brown which deals with the problems of *bustle, bigness, bishops* and *bureaucracy*, there are nineteen chapters of criticism pro and con by a veritable pantheon of ecumenical spokesmen from each of the denominations involved. Eugene Carson Blake concludes with a reasoned and persuasive reply.

One wonders, for example, if the Church of South India proposal had been subjected to such sophisticated analysis, before the fact, whether it would have been consummated. The ecumenical X-ray machine here photographs the Blake patients from every angle: institutionalism, doctrine of church, doctrine of ministry, Methodist imperialism, Anglican bridges, United Church of Christ battle experience, Presbyterian history. As one who wishes this proposal well and finds most objections to it rather specious, it is disconcerting to find the negative judgments outweighing the favorable. Curiously, it is a reformed theologian, Markus Barth, whose remarks are most negative. He does not like the clergy-laity assumptions; the prospect of "kowtowing"

before Bishops, the interpretation of the sacraments, or the prospect of such a reunion resulting in a "cartel of rich churches." The Episcopalians seem to hold the matter as far away as a Bishop's staff can reach—Edward Hardy refers to the proposal as a "reunion by agglutination." Methodist Bishop Kennedy recoils in horror at the prospect of bigger churches. Only the United Church of Christ representatives (Messrs. Douglass, Arndt, Carleton and Wagner) seem eager to play ball with Blake and Pike. Incidentally, one wishes that Hardy would stop using the bridge-church simile when speaking of Anglicanism. Ecclesiastical matters (and metaphors) are too mixed for that anymore.

Gerald Kennedy remarks "that many will shout 'Hosanna' to the vision but cry out 'Crucify it' when they see what it costs. This is one of the most unlovely aspects of the ecumenical movement." (p. 223) The Blake proposal is going to be costly in time, money, energy (particularly the building of defense mechanisms). If this proposal doesn't succeed, we will be left with the building of ecclesiastical "blocs" as the American solution to our denominational manias: the Presbyterian-United Church-Disciples bloc, the E.U.B.-Methodist bloc, the Anglican-Orthodox bloc. So serious are the alternatives to these merger conversations!

WALTER D. WAGONER

The Miracle of Dialogue by REUEL HOWE, The Seabury Press, 1963, 154 pp. \$3.50

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earlier books in the concept of Dialogue as the principle through which interpersonal meeting leads to meaning. The relational character of life, the possibilities and the barriers arising in communication, and the emergence of creativity in the solution of the problems of life, are here discussed in terms of the "dialogical" process.

Dialogue is defined as, "that address and response between persons in which there is a flow of meaning between them in spite of all the obstacles that normally would block the relationship. It is that interaction between persons in which one of them seeks to give himself as he is to the other, and seeks also to know the other as the other is." (p. 37) Clearly, this extends the meaning of the word beyond the interplay of verbal exchange. Indeed, as the author points out, it is quite possible to have such verbal give and take without ever entering into dialogue at all. The clever can even use such exchange as a means of avoiding true dialogue.

The principle of dialogue is developed by illustration drawn from various areas of interpersonal life: marriage, the relations of parents and children, the intramural life of the church as well as the relation of the church to the world, industry and international life. The dialogical process can be seen more easily, of course, in those areas in which interpersonal meeting is limited to a few individuals. It becomes less easily discerned in the processes of industrial relations or international affairs.

The limitations encountered in these areas point to one aspect of the problem with which the book is concerned: what are we to do when, having done what we can to enter into real dialogue, we still fall short? The author

does not try to minimize the difficulties with which dialogue is beset. His discussion of the barriers to communication which dialogue must overcome, and of the disciplines it requires, can be very helpful; and he is deeply aware of the tragic dimension of those relationships we have with other persons which are blocked and frustrated. But there is a—probably unintended—impression conveyed at some points that if the right practice of dialogue is entered into, creativity will break forth for the adequate solution of the problems of our interpersonal life. More exposition of the need of grace to live within those situations wherein dialogue, and its fruitful consequences, are not possible would have corrected this impression.

Especially valuable are the author's descriptions of the "dialogical person," his analysis of the dialogical crisis in which we now stand in church, school, family, and public life, and his application of dialogue to the task of renewing the Church. Here the concept of the dialogical teacher, as distinguished from the monological pedant, and the dialogical nature of ministry for both the lay and non-lay ministers of the Church contains provocative suggestions.

The reader might at times wish that a richer spectrum of meaning of the basic idea might be suggested in appropriate synonyms for the key word "dialogue." But repetition of the term should not prevent him from grasping and being instructed by the idea it connotes, nor lead him to miss the critical significance of this central theme for a wide spread of our concerns. The author continues his own creative and confronting ministry by giving us this book.

JOHN L. CASTEEL

An Expository Preacher's Notebook
by D. W. CLEVERLY FORD, Harper and
Brothers, 1960, 220 pp, \$3.50

The first eleven pages of the text of this excellent book are the best short summary this reviewer has encountered in print of the meaning of expository preaching and the method of doing it. The author is able to deal convincingly in a very few words with the relation of biblical preaching to the personal needs and concerns of one's parishoners, and with the effect of the character and personality of the minister upon his message. Few will disagree that his statements need much elaboration and qualification; yet, what he does say strikes us as being true.

The major portion of the book is given over to sermons, which were preached by Dr. Ford to his parish in

South Kensington, England, illustrating the results of his method. The sermons are clearly written and, from an Anglican's perspective, articulate the gospel in fresh, vivid, appealing fashion, as it takes shape in the exposition of the various texts. Not many sermons one reads these days come near these in conveying so great a spirit of love and compassion. If this volume is a true encounter with the man, we should judge him as one who speaks to his congregation of God's love and help, while he himself loves them. This combination makes for the only really authentic preaching, and we who emphasize preaching as "kerygma" need to bear it in mind!

Those who have not been exposed in their seminary days to courses in biblical preaching may find the introduction worth the price of the book.



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If one hopes to find here material to replenish a notebook of illustrations, he will, I think, be disappointed. He will find Ford's work not a substitute for, but a stimulus to substantial thought.

JOHN MASON STAPLETON

Christian Education as Engagement
by DAVID R. HUNTER, The Seabury Press, 1963, 183 pp, \$3.00

Engagement means "the moment when God acts in or upon the life of an individual and the individual faces the obligation to respond." Since God is "always acting in all life" a person's total existence has the possibility of engagement.

Most Christian education, Dr. Hunter believes, is didactic; that is, it prepares for the future rather than the present, it transmits culture rather than being an agent of change and it emphasizes man's activity and ingenuity rather than God's grace. The purpose of this book is to develop a Christian education theory that gives precedence to encounter with God in all his manifestations in one's life rather than abstract 'truth' distilled from recorded accounts of other people's knowledge of God. The key concept is 'religious issue.' This notion embraces the reality of a situation in which one must reflect and react. By this notion Hunter desires to avoid the static study of the past or the ephemeral nature of personal experience.

Curriculum developed under this concept isolates the major religious issue at each age level. The educational process is centered in the teacher's ability to recognize and use the specific manifestation of that general issue as it appears in his pupil's lives. For the seventh grade the general re-

ligious issue is freedom and authority, a significant early adolescent problem. The curriculum of the Protestant Episcopal Church known as the Seabury Series reflects the educational approach described by Hunter.

The engagement concept instead of focusing attention on balance, comprehension and sequence of subject matter in a textbook, places the teacher at the center of the educational process. Teacher training then becomes the most important activity of the church and the word "training" is used deliberately in this book. Training means, "to make proficient by instruction and practice."

This insistence on a teacher's experiencing the method he is to use is probably the most important part of Dr. Hunter's system. Most teachers teach as they were taught and no significant change can ever be brought about until the teacher knows experientially what he is attempting to do. This point seems so simple one feels apologetic to mention it, yet it is at this point that most of our educational reforms fail. Along with training Hunter makes a practical suggestion that seems to me to have rich promise. Knowing that ministers are overworked, he proposes that they see their teachers as an extension of their ministry and therefore helps in ministering to the religious needs of the parish. Specifically, he proposes that the minister give one hour a week for two months to every new church school teacher. In such a meeting the teacher will share what he is facing in the classroom and the minister will interpret ways that the teacher can be a lay minister in such a situation. This simple procedure would develop a pastoral relation with the teacher, and quickly stop the nonsense about separation of education

and the preaching ministry that sometimes develops in a local church.

Although one can question Hunter's reliance on group process as a method and the adequacy of religious issues as an organizing principle for the curriculum, the main thrust of the book is sober, insightful and challenging. Hunter, for example, does not limit Christian education to the parish as "nurture in the faith" but considers the parish as preparation for living the faith in the world. Moreover, he calls on the educators in the church to train Christians to work with other Christians in the community's social problems. Indeed, this is a new project and goal for parish education.

Likewise, Hunter faces realistically the problem of pastoral training in the Seminary, pointing out that the trend

for the past fifty years of including more training for the practical work of the church is ended and we are now facing a crisis in the practical field of theological education. His proposal although not detailed would suggest a closer supervision of the student's actual experience in the church by professors who were attempting to help him gain personal competence. Such an idea would reorient the practical field in a theological seminary. In many ways Union's experimental program in the practice of Christian ministry planned three years ago and now in its second year of operation is an effort to institutionalize and test a remedy for some of the problems of theological education Hunter criticizes.

C. ELLIS NELSON

"An original and courageous study"

—JAMES S. STEWART

A Historical Introduction to the New Testament

**By ROBERT
M. GRANT**

The three major approaches to the New Testament—literary, historical, and theological—are brought together for the first time in this one-volume presentation. Dr. Grant discusses both the methods used in analyzing and interpreting the New Testament and the conclusions to which they lead. Throughout this basic text, the prime concern is to provide the background and principles by which the reader may evaluate for himself the views of others.



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Protestant Worship Music by
CHARLES L. ETHERINGTON, Holt, Rine-
hart and Winston, 1962, 278 pp, \$5.00

There are available to all of us many books dealing with the history of music; there is a veritable wealth of music dictionaries, encyclopedias, etc. However, many church musicians, particularly those who have not had the advantages of specialized training (and, we suspect, parish ministers as well), have long felt a need for a practical but relatively complete history of Protestant church music. Mr. Etherington's 278 page volume seems to this reviewer to have in large measure filled this gap.

It is important at the outset, however, to understand the viewpoint from which the book is written. First, Mr. Etherington is writing as an American (albeit Canadian) *non-liturgical* Protestant; second, he is writing as a practicing church musician, aware of the necessity for improving the state of Protestant church music, but realistic enough "to recognize conditions as they are [particularly] when conditions under which they [organists] work sometimes make the fulfillment of ideals difficult or impossible." He encourages the church musician "to begin his upward climb . . . from the state of music as it exists in the church where he is active. This book is written to help him in that ascent, and to prepare him for the rebuffs that he will encounter on the way."

A third premise, an especially important one, is Etherington's attempt to make his writing intelligible to clergy and laity, avoiding technical language as far as possible. In this last respect Mr. Etherington has been particularly successful. His explanation of the derivation of the Greek modes,

their use or misuse and development by the "Gregorians" and their later codification appears to be a clear and concise exposition which will help unravel the "modal mystery" for many a layman. This is particularly important in view of the extensive contemporary use being made of these modes.

His treatment of the various methods of tuning for fixed pitch instruments, such as the organ and the piano, is likewise a brave—and to this reviewer—a successful venture. He compares the method of equal temperament tuning to those employed by one who is laying twelve inch squares of tile in an odd-sized room: each individual tile is slightly reduced in size, rather than removing all the excess from one tile. Thus—equal temperament, with its succession of slightly small-sized intervals.

In those chapters where the material presented makes it advisable, we are provided with what are called "References." These are in reality lists of composers, works and/or collections which illustrate the musical style of the period under discussion. These are a particularly valuable feature of the book, appearing as they do immediately after, but not intruding upon the textual material. Publishers' names are provided as well, so that the serious student will have little difficulty in correlating the first-hand study of the musical materials with the textual explanation.

We are indebted to Mr. Etherington for including the organ in his history, particularly for his up-to-date view regarding the renaissance in "classic" organ design, the electronics, and his relating the problems not so much to the instruments themselves, as to the dearth of competent organists well

enough trained to use them at their best.

One would question the chapter heading for the period, 1750-1850, "The Century of Neglect." This seems too serious an indictment of this period. It is correct to emphasize that during the Baroque period the emphasis shifted from church music to secular music, and this trend became intensified during the next century. It is also correct that the great composers did turn their energies to the orchestral and chamber music field. But it seems unfair to characterize the great century of musical development that produced Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, Schubert, Schumann and Mendelssohn as "The Century of Neglect." This *was* a period when great works were written for the church. This *was* the century of the hymn. It *was* the century of the "rediscovery" of Bach by Mendelssohn (granted that this occurred in 1829 toward the close of this period).

It is interesting to note in this connection that Mr. Etherington provides us with 104 anthems, motets and oratorios (exclusive of Bach's works) in the *Reference* section for the Baroque period and 103 examples of similar nature from "The Century of Neglect."

The final chapters, "The Present State of Worship Music," and "The

Years Ahead" are a provocative appraisal of the present and a thoughtful look to the future. Clergy, musicians and laymen would all do well to ponder the problems presented. Particularly stimulating in today's vital ecumenical movement is the author's plea for a campaign conducted at denominational and higher ecumenical levels to further the cause of good worship music, avoiding the excessively restrictive measures epitomized by the Calvinists, but protecting against the anarchy of absolute freedom of choice, which is the cause of so many of the ills in today's non-liturgical Protestant church music programs.

This is *not* a detailed study of the history of music for the serious graduate student with thorough training in music history and theory. It is a very good survey of the history of Protestant *church worship music* (including its Jewish and Roman roots) which can be recommended to most of America's parish ministers for a widening of their musical understanding, and to many of America's church musicians for fresh (and re-freshing) information. It does offer practical means for each one moving along on his "upward climb" to bring church music to the place where it should exist.

CHARLES HICKMAN

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