Between Empire and Nation: Taiwan Sekimin and the Making of Japanese Empire in South China, 1895–1937

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ABSTRACT

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After the Japanese colonization of Taiwan in 1895, colonial and diplomatic officials sought to encourage, regulate, and surveil the movement of individuals from Taiwan to the south China treaty-ports by conferring upon those who traveled there the legal designation *Taiwan sekimin*, or "registered Taiwanese." Japanese officials and sekimin alike fashioned the Taiwan's inhabitants, their capital, their socio-economic networks, and Taiwan's colonial institutions as the basis for expanding the Japanese empire's political and economic influence. This legal status afforded sekimin the extraterritorial protection of local Japanese consulates and subjected them to consular oversight. Over time, the category of Taiwan sekimin was expanded to include local and overseas Chinese whose support Japanese officials sought to garner. This dissertation charts the transformation of Taiwan sekimin as a juridical and social category and argues that it was central to Japanese colonial policy in Taiwan and imperial ambitions in south China. By tracing these changes, this dissertation shows how efforts by Japanese and Chinese officials, as well as by sekimin themselves, drew upon and reshaped the existing social and commercial networks that linked Taiwan to the south China treaty-ports and conditioned Japanese imperial and Chinese imperial and national state formation in south China.

Taiwan sekimin ranged from wealthy elites, petty merchants, and doctors and other professionals trained in colonial Taiwan, to young anti-colonial activists drawn to China, criminal elements who formed gangs, and disreputable proprietors of opium and gambling

establishments. Diverse though the category was, the status of Taiwan sekimin became, at times, the basis of individuals' appealing for Japanese consular protection, and at others, the basis of Japanese officials' laying claim to exercising jurisdiction over individuals considered Japanese subjects. By exploring how Taiwan sekimin individuals both supported and challenged the ideologies and institutions of the Japanese empire at its margins, this dissertation reveals their role in entrenching a Japanese imperial sphere across and beyond the region between 1895 and the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937.

The legal and spatial bounds of Taiwan sekimin as a juridical and social category were central to intra-imperial and inter-imperial contestations for power in south China. Contention over the Japanese empire's economic and political ambitions led to contestation over the legal boundaries of Taiwan sekimin between Japanese colonial officials in Taiwan and local consular officials, who sought to regulate the mobility of people, ideas, and capital between Taiwan and the treaty-ports. Over time, Japanese officials also sought to channel the support of sekimin through new institutions. These institutions expanded the spatial scope of jurisdictional contests within and beyond the treaty-ports and thus the scope of imperial power; these institutions also rendered Japanese imperial ambitions more contingent on the support of the sekimin. Chinese local, national, and diplomatic officials also actively challenged the legality of sekimin status and the inclusion of individuals these officials considered Chinese nationals under its purview, particularly after the rise to power of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang) in the late 1920s. In the 1930s, the concept of Taiwan sekimin was increasingly at odds with Chinese national conceptions of social and economic order. This dissertation shows that, in this context, conflicts involving sekimin were not just local scuffles to be resolved on the interpersonal level

but laden with ideological import, leaving the sekimin caught between the logics of empire and nation.

This dissertation draws on Japanese- and Chinese-language materials from Japan, Taiwan, and China. It reads official sources "along the grain" to reveal the logic that organized knowledge production about the sekimin and "against the grain" to reconstruct a history largely beyond the purview of bureaucratic institutions. By exploring the competing inter- and intra-imperial claims to authority over Taiwan sekimin, this dissertation argues that jurisdictional contestation had legal and spatial implications in linking Chinese national and Japanese imperial state formation in south China.

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Note on Transliteration

I use Revised Hepburn for Japanese terms, names, and titles. For clarity, I use Hanyu pinyin for Mandarin pronunciations of historical Chinese terms, names, and titles, except in cases where historical figures were better known by other transliterations or where individuals prefer or commonly use other romanizations. For example, I transliterate the name of the Taiwan-based scholar Hsu Hsueh-chi instead of Xu Xueji (Hanyu pinyin). Although the city of Xiamen was commonly known as Amoy in early twentieth-century writings (and Fuzhou as Foochow; Shantou as Swatow, etc.), I render it as Xiamen for clarity, except in Japanese-language citations, where I use the transliteration Amoi. I use widely common English-language place-names in the text and ciations, for example Tokyo instead of Tōkyō and Taipei instead of Taibei. Finally, I refer to colonial-era institutions in Taiwan by their Japanese names, for example Shōka Bank instead of Zhanghua Bank.

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Introduction

On the evening of January 3, 1932, Mito Mitsuko (水戸光子), an employee of the Japanese elementary school in the southeast coastal Chinese city of Fuzhou (see Map 1), answered the door. Her husband, Mitsuo (水戸三雄), also a teacher, had been convalescing from an illness at home and she was expecting guests to pay a call on him. Her visitors, however, were no friends; they shot her once and stabbed her four times, before moving on to her husband, whom they shot once in the forehead. Leaving him for dead, the assailants quickly escaped, leaving Mitsuo to stagger to the neighboring Japanese residents' club, from where he was transferred to the nearby Japanese hospital. Despite the doctor's best efforts, Mitsuo died that night. Among his last words were a revelation to the local Japanese consular police chief that his attackers were one Taiwanese and two Chinese.

Tamura Teijirō (田村貞次郎, in office 1929–1932), the Japanese consul posted at Fuzhou, rushed to the scene to conduct an investigation and telegraphed the Prime Minister and acting Foreign Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi (犬養毅, in office December 1931– May 1932) the next morning to report the incident and place the blame on local Chinese officials. The murder of the Mitos came on the heels of an incident the previous day, when three senior Japanese naval officials and Consul Tamura had gone in plainclothes to a local park to observe—they claimed—an anti-Japanese gathering and parade organized by Chinese students to protest Japan's occupation of Manchuria, in northeastern China, in September 1931. Upon seeing anti-Japanese posters displayed around the park, the naval captain took it upon himself to remove them. The Chinese students, in response, showered the group with insults, and pursued them all the way to the Chinese police office, where the four Japanese officials were forced by the indignant crowd

to take refuge until ten o'clock that night.[1] Tamura sought to characterize the murder of the two teachers on the night of the 3rd as a consequential—and therefore inexcusable—escalation of the anti-Japanese activities in the park the preceding day, in order to chastise local Chinese officials for the resulting social disorder. Tamura knew from the outset that the incident had involved a suspect from Taiwan, an island across the Taiwan Strait from Fuzhou which had been a colony of Japan since 1895 and whose inhabitants were subjects of the Japanese empire and thus under Consul Tamura's jurisdiction. He regarded the protest and murders as an opportunity to extract concessions from local officials and to expand the presence of Japanese consular police forces on Chinese territory in the name of protecting Japanese subjects there. Since the Manchurian Incident of September 1931, which Japanese military officers had staged as a pretext to invade Manchuria, Chinese students and other nationalist groups had organized protests across China to denounce Japanese imperialism. Anti-imperialist protests in China were not a new feature of the urban landscape, but they had gained renewed fervor, and since the Manchurian Incident had been directed increasingly at Japan. Consul Tamura feared the subversion of Fuzhou's Taiwanese residents, who he suspected, despite their legal status as Japanese subjects, had anti-colonial tendencies and would be drawn in by the anti-Japanese stance of the protesters.

Imagine Tamura's shock to discover that the Taiwanese involved in killing the Mitos was none other than Li Luyi (李爐已), a former journalist for the Japanese-subsidized local newspaper, the *Min Bao* (Fujian News), whose wife, Chen Queying (陳卻英), was a colleague of the Mitos' at the local school for Taiwanese subjects. Li had plotted the murder at the behest of a Japanese naval admiral stationed in Taiwan to create a pretext for a military landing in Fuzhou,

1. This account is derived from diplomatic archival records of Tamura's report of the incident, "2. Fukushū jiken kankei / Fukushū ni okeru Nihon kanchōra ni tai suru bōkō jiken no gaiyō," JACAR (Japan Center for Asian Historical Records) B02030349400.

repeating the Japanese Army's strategy of creating a *casus belli* for the invasion of Manchuria the year before. Li was a subversive figure, but hardly the anti-Japanese Taiwanese subject of Tamura's fears. He was, instead, well known as a broker of local intelligence and now the accomplice in a Japanese military plot, chosen for his network of social and personal contacts with local Chinese officials and military leaders, whose support for a Japanese military landing he had reportedly solicited. The Manchurian Incident of 1931 had indeed moved Li to action but, contrary to Tamura's assumptions, not in support of Chinese nationalism, but rather as a proponent of Japanese military expansion in China at any cost, even that of murdering Tamura himself.

Although Li Luyi was an exceptional case, the unfolding of his murder plot foregrounds the importance of Taiwanese subjects in mediating Japanese efforts to expand their influence in south China. These Taiwanese subjects ranged from wealthy elites with commercial interests in China, doctors and other professionals trained in the Japanese education system in colonial Taiwan who relocated to China for professional opportunities, and young anti-colonial activists who were drawn to China and further radicalized by left-wing and anti-colonial nationalist ideology, to criminal elements who formed gangs and disreputable proprietors of opium and gambling establishments. Their relationships to local Chinese society, both perceived and real, were both assets and impediments to the Japanese empire: at times, colonial officials in Taiwan perceived the connections held by wealthy elites with commercial interests to be the foothold for Japanese economic expansion in China, while at other times, the preponderance of disreputable Taiwanese in the opium and gambling industries and escalating threats of violent conflict with Chinese officials convinced Japanese diplomats that the legal protection afforded to these subjects was more trouble than it was worth.

Map 1: Taiwan and the South China Treaty-Ports

Throughout the period of Japanese colonial rule, of Taiwan from 1895 to 1945, the movement of individuals and ideas between the island colony and China, and in particular its urban centers along the southeast coast directly across the Taiwan Strait, shaped Japanese colonial policy in Taiwan, Sino-Japanese relations, and the transition of these Chinese urban locales from the end of China's last empire, the Qing, in 1912 to its nascent republic. Both attempts to monitor and regulate this mobility from above and challenges to official efforts from below shaped the contours of the Japanese empire in south China.[2] As subjects of the Japanese

2. For a recent study of how efforts to monopolize the control and regulation of migration gave rise to new modern state formations in the colonial context, see Radhika Mongia, *Indian Migration and Empire: A Colonial Genealogy of the Modern State* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2018). Mongia historicizes the process by which the British empire came to exercise a monopoly on the migration of its subjects. The scholarship on the relationship between migration, its control, and (nation-)state formation is immense. One particularly influential example is Adam

empire, Taiwanese who traveled to China held the legal status of "Taiwan sekimin," or "registered Taiwanese."[3] This juridical status both afforded them the protection of local Japanese consulates as foreign subjects in China and subjected them to the consuls' surveillance and jurisdiction. At times "Taiwan sekimin" would appeal for consular protection on the basis of this legal status, as in commercial or legal disputes with local Chinese officials. At other times, the legal status was the basis of consular claims to jurisdiction over the activities of Taiwan sekimin, as when consuls sought to prosecute anti-Japanese bandits who had escaped Taiwan for China in the 1900s or left-wing anti-colonial nationalists charged with thought crimes in the late 1920s and 1930s. In addition, Japanese consular officials in China and colonial officials in Taiwan offered elite local Chinese the possibility of naturalizing as Japanese subjects as a strategy of building local support for the Japanese empire. Over time, "Taiwan sekimin" became a legal category that encompassed a diversity of residents of south China whose connections to Taiwan were tenuous at best. I therefore use "Taiwan sekimin" not only as a descriptive category that encompassed a diversity of individuals, but also as an analytical category, which offers the possibility of historicizing the formation of "Taiwan sekimin" as a juridical category and charting the malleable relationship between Japanese colonial and consular officials and their subjects as well as the claims that tied them together.[4]

McKeown, Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of Borders (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).

3. For the process by which the Taiwan Government-General sought to systematize the legal status of "Taiwan sekimin" and issue passports to those who held this status, see Jun Kurihara, "'Taiwan sōtokufu kōbun ruisan' ni miru Taiwan sekimin to ryoken mondai," *Tokyo joshi daigaku hikaku bunka kenkyusho kiyō* 63 (2002): 19–40. For recent work that emphasizes the indeterminacies in controlling mobility and classifying who fell under the purview of new regulations in the first few years of Japanese rule, see the work of Wu Qing. Qing Wu, "Nihon tōchika no Taiwan ni okeru jinkō idō seisaku: 1895 nen 5 gatsu 8 nichi —1897 nen 5 gatsu 8 nichi no yūyo kikan wo chūshin ni," *Shakai shisutemu kenkyū* 21 (2018): 1–21. Qing Wu, "Nihon tōchiki no Taiwan ni okeru tokō seido no keisei--1897 nen 5 gatsu 8 nichi zengo o megutte," *Ningen kankyōgaku* 27 (December 2018): 169–81.
4. To the degree possible, I try to be specific in my use of the category "Taiwanese," an ethno-national descriptive category that is often neither accurate nor adequate. This dissertation attempts to be comprehensive in chronological scope and differs from earlier research by arguing that, by historicizing the indeterminate nature of Taiwan sekimin

Although the drama of Li Luyi's murder case took place in Fuzhou, the capital of Fujian Province and its administrative center, most Taiwan sekimin were concentrated in Xiamen, a city south of Fuzhou on the Chinese coast. Both these cities were "treaty-ports," opened to foreign trade by the "unequal treaties" signed after Britain's defeat of the Qing empire (1644–1912) in

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as a juridical category, we can better understand the various individuals that came under its purview; to the degree possible I have tried to be precise in my terminology. Some scholars are careful to differentiate the Taiwanese outside Taiwan by profession, class, location, and so on. For one example that uses "Taiji" (Taiwan registered) as a category and is focused on Manchuria, see Hsueh-chi Hsu, "Manzhouguo zhengfu zhong de taiji gongwu renyuan (1932–1945)," in Taiwan lishi de duoyuan chuancheng yu xiangqian, ed. Hsueh-chi Hsu (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Taiwan shi yanjiusuo, 2014), 15–67. For an example focused on doctors, see Ming-cheng Miriam Lo, Doctors within Borders: Profession, Ethnicity, and Modernity in Colonial Taiwan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). Others, particularly legal scholars, tend to occlude the differences between "Taiwan sekimin" and "Taiwanese," focusing rather on the role of differentiation from local Chinese—legal and administrative but by implication identitarian—in giving rise to a proto-Taiwanese identity. See Tay-sheng Wang, "Riben tongzhi xia Taiwan ren guanyu guoji de falü jingyan: yi Taiwan yu Zhongguo zhi jian kuajie de renkou liudong wei zhongxin," Taiwan shi yanjiu 20, no. 3 (September 2013): 43–123. For a collection of pioneering research on the Taiwan sekimin and their role in the Japanese empire's "Southern Advance" policy, see the collection of essays by Liang Huahuang. Huahuang Liang, *Taiwan zongdufu de "duian" zhengce yanjiu* (Taipei: Daoxiang, 2001). For work focused on the economic history of investments by Taiwan sekimin in Southeast Asia and China, see the work of Man-houng Lin. Man-houng Lin, "Riben zhengfu yu Taiwan jimin de Dongnanya touzi (1895–1945)," *Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo jikan* 32 (1999): 1–56. Man-houng Lin, "Taiwanese Merchants in the Economic Relations between Taiwan and China, 1895–1945," in *Japan, China, and the Growth of the Asian International Economy, 1850–1949*, ed. Kaoru Sugihara (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 217–43. Man-houng Lin, "The Power of Culture and Its Limits: Taiwanese Merchants' Asian Commodity Flows, 1895–1945," in *Chinese Circulations: Capital, Commodities, and Networks in Southeast Asia*, ed. Eric Tagliacozzo and Wen-Chin Chang (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), 301–35. For the association between Taiwan sekimin and criminality within the historical context of Xiamen's urban history, and for sekimin as the agents of the opium policy of the Government-General (and Japanese empire, writ large) opium policy, see the work of Wang Xuexin. Xuexin Wang, "Xiamen heibang jimin de xingcheng yu fazhan (1895–1937), you 'Taifei' dao 'wulipai,'" *Hanxue yanjiu* 25, no. 2 (December 2007): 295–328. Xuexin Wang, "Taiwan heibang jimin yu Riben dui Hua yapian moulüe," *Guoshiguan guankan* 9 (September 2006): 1–48. Chung Shu-ming has also argued that Japanese officials were passive onlookers, if not active abetters, in allowing disreputable sekimin to engage in the opium industry. Shu-ming Chung, "Taiwan zongdufu de duian zhengce yu yapian wenti," in *Taiwan wenxian shiliao zhengli yanjiu xueshu yantaohui lunwenji*, ed. Jintian Lin (Nantou: Taiwan sheng wenxian weiyuanhui, 2000), 223–256. In English, and for a focus on the individuals involved in the drug trade, see especially Chapter 5 of Peter Thilly, "Treacherous Waters: Drug Smuggling in Coastal Fujian, 1832-1938" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Northwestern University, 2015).For research that makes use of the archival material from the Japanese and Chinese Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the Taiwan Government-General, and covers the entirety of China, see the work of Bian Fengkui. Fengkui Bian, *Rizhi shiqi Taiwan jimin zai haiwai huodong zhi yanjiu (1895–1945)* (Taipei, Leshan shuju, 2006). For a recent attempt at a more comprehensive overview, though within a nation-state framework, see Chen Xiaochong. Xiaochong Chen, *Riju shiqi Taiwan yu Dalu guanxi shi yanjiu, 1895–1945* (Beijing: Jiuzhou chubanshe, 2013). In English, the work of Seiji Shirane has been groundbreaking in highlighting the "frontier imperialism by colonial proxy" exercised by the Taiwan Government-General in south China (and Southeast Asia) over Taiwan sekimin, which he translates as "overseas Taiwanese." See Seiji Shirane, "Mediated Empire: Colonial Taiwan in Japan's Imperial Expansion in South China and Southeast Asia, 1895–1945" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 2014). For another example in English, focused on Taiwan sekimin in Shantou, see Lin-yi Tseng, "A Cross Boundary People: The Commercial Activities, Social Networks, and Travel Writings of Japanese and Taiwanese Sekimin in the Shantou Treaty Port (1895–1937)" (Ph.D. Dissertation, City University of New York, 2014).

the First Opium War (1839–42) and thereafter hosts to foreign communities of merchants.[5] Subjects of the foreign imperial powers in the treaty-ports were subject not to Chinese law, but rather to the jurisdiction of local consular officials in a practice known as "extraterritoriality," which was an arrangement that was, at its outset, consonant with Chinese understandings that foreign subjects should be ruled by their own laws in a system of personal law.[6] With its defeat of the Qing empire in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), the Japanese empire, once subjected by European imperial powers to the same arrangement of treaty-ports and extraterritoriality in Japan itself became an imperial power in its own right. Thereafter, Japan, which had conducted diplomatic and commercial relations with the Qing empire on the basis of equality, became an imperial power whose subjects, including Taiwan sekimin, enjoyed extraterritorial protection from Chinese legal jurisdiction. In short, residents of China who held Taiwan sekimin status were treated as Japanese subjects and enjoyed the extraterritorial privileges of Japanese consular jurisdiction.

The appeal of this legal protection only grew with the collapse of the Qing after the Chinese Revolution of 1911, which saw authority and jurisdiction devolve to local military leaders during the late 1910s and early 1920s. Local leaders often levied heavy taxes to fund military expenditures, from which foreign subjects, including Taiwan sekimin, were exempt. At

5. A recent edited volume gives a good sense of the state of the field of research on treaty-ports in China. Some works focus on individuals or institutions in single treaty-ports or across the system as a whole, while others take single treaty-ports as their unit of analysis. See Robert A. Bickers and Isabella Jackson, eds., Treaty Ports in Modern China: Law, Land and Power (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2016). The many studies on Shanghai are a useful corrective to the conception that demographic changes in treaty-ports only occurred in their "foreign" communities. Shanghai, for example, was the destination for significant internal migration from its immediate surroundings and across China as a whole. For one example see Bryna Goodman, Native Place, City, and Nation: Regional Networks and Identities in Shanghai, 1853–1937 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995).

6. Pär Kristoffer Cassel, Grounds of Judgment: Extraterritoriality and Imperial Power in Nineteenth-Century China and Japan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

the same time, Japan's empire expanded in Asia with its victory in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 and the annexation of Korea in 1910. Taking advantage of the distraction of the European powers during World War I, Japan sought to intervene in Chinese domestic affairs, notably with the Twenty-One Demands of 1915, just at the time that China was beset by groups competing for power in the wake of imperial collapse. The 1920s witnessed a shift in Japanese foreign policy to one of non-intervention, but this did not preclude conflicts on the ground in south China, where warlord rule and its economic pressures dragged local Chinese leaders into conflicts with Taiwan sekimin precisely because they were exempt from local jurisdiction. In Xiamen, for example, it was during this period that Taiwan sekimin came to dominate the city's opium and gambling industries, displacing and sometimes coopting the existing participants in the city's earlier ecosystem of illicit industries.

With the rise to power of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang, hereafter GMD) and its nominal unification of China in 1927–28, local politics witnessed yet another shift toward attempts at nationalizing the economy and consolidating jurisdictional authority from the center, which brought with it newfound challenges to the category of "Taiwan sekimin," its legality, and its juridical bounds. As the Great Depression exacerbated commercial tensions, the persistence of extraterritorial privilege came to take on national import, particularly in the visible form of Taiwan sekimin operating under the sanction of the Japanese empire, a group whom some in Chinese society regarded as "traitorous merchants" (*jianshang*).[7] In theory, the commercial activity of foreign subjects in China was supposedly confined to the spatial boundaries of the

7. For an examination of the emergence of this term to describe opium smugglers in Fujian during the mid-nineteenth century, see Peter Thilly, "Opium and the Origins of Treason in Modern China: The View from Fujian," Late Imperial China 38, no. 1 (June 2017): 155–97. On the new regulations passed by the GMD government in the 1930s to extend state control over the economy and their effects on coding certain commercial behaviors as illicit and traitorous, see Philip Thai, China's War on Smuggling : Law, Economic Life and the Making of the Modern State, 1842–1965 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018).

treaty-ports and foreign subjects were only permitted to rent land within these boundaries. In some cases, this gave rise to exclusive areas known as concessions, the most famous being the French Concession in treaty-port Shanghai. In practice, however, the legal boundaries of foreign settlement and commerce were not so clearly defined. Smaller treaty-ports like Xiamen and Fuzhou lacked designated concession areas and foreign subjects lived in "mixed residence" with local Chinese. This arrangement brought its own legal troubles, since Japanese consuls interpreted jurisdiction by Japanese consular police of Taiwan sekimin to be applicable regardless of where these subjects were located within the treaty-ports.

Historicizing the constant remaking of the boundaries of "Taiwan sekimin" as a legal category offers the possibility of charting how the treaty-port system and extraterritoriality functioned not only in theory but on the ground. Over time, Chinese critics saw this exercise of Japanese police authority as a constraint on Chinese police authority and a violation of Chinese territorial sovereignty.[8] In response, Chinese officials sought to confine consular police jurisdiction to the so-called "free areas" or commercial centers of the treaty-ports, though, as in the case of Xiamen, Taiwan sekimin lived and worked across the entire city. Conflicts over legal jurisdiction became more frequent as the number of Taiwan sekimin in the south China treaty-ports grew. In Xiamen, which consistently harbored the largest number of Taiwan sekimin in China, the number of sekimin increased from roughly 500 in 1900 to 5,000 in the early 1920s, surpassing 10,000 by 1934, three years before the Second Sino-Japanese War. In contrast, the number of Taiwan sekimin in central China, which included Shanghai, never exceeded 1,000, even though the Japanese community there was the largest of the foreign communities in the city

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8. On similar contestation over the scope of Chinese police jurisdiction in Shanghai, see Frederic E. Wakeman, Policing Shanghai, 1927–1937 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).

and the largest of the Japanese communities in China. Taiwan sekimin in north China were even fewer in number, rarely exceeding 100.[9]

The concentration of Taiwan sekimin in south China, and in Xiamen in particular, resulted from the economic, social, and familial ties that linked Taiwan and the mainland, which predated the Japanese colonization of Taiwan in 1895. Studying Japanese efforts to appeal to Taiwan sekimin reveals how the Japanese empire sough to draw on and remake the regional political economy that linked Taiwan to south China and locales across the South China Sea. Between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, Chinese settlers from the areas surrounding Xiamen, particularly Quanzhou and Zhangzhou, emigrated to Taiwan, which gradually transformed the island from a trading outpost at the center of maritime shipping lanes crossing the East and South China Seas to a frontier region of the Qing empire.[10] At the same time, other emigrants from Xiamen and its environs conducted commerce with and settled in littoral Southeast Asia, from the Malay Peninsula to present-day Indonesia and the Philippines. Commercial networks that linked Taiwan, a producer of agricultural commodities like sugar and rice, to Xiamen, an entrepôt with a deep-water port, burgeoned following the opening of Xiamen

9. The exact numbers for these years are as follows: 531 (1900), 1,046 (1905), 5,226 (1922), and 10,625 (1934). These numbers are based on statistics compiled from a variety of sources, including reports by the Japanese consular police and studies by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japanese residing overseas. The consuls were the first to admit that counting the number of Taiwan sekimin was notoriously difficult and that statistics were unreliable. Consular regulations on registering residence, and the general trend of expanding surveillance of the movement and personal backgrounds of Taiwan sekimin by the colonial government in Taiwan, also affected the total number of sekimin accounted for. For a chart of the number of Taiwan sekimin, see Wang, "Riben tongzhi xia Taiwan ren guanyu guoji de falü jingyan: yi Taiwan yu Zhongguo zhi jian kuajie de renkou liudong wei zhongxin," 49.

10. For two examples of the transformation of Taiwan from an inter-imperial trading outpost in the seventeenth century to a frontier settlement colony of the Qing empire by the nineteenth in the English-language literature, see Tonio Andrade, How Taiwan Became Chinese : Dutch, Spanish, and Han Colonization in the Seventeenth Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), Xing Hang, Conflict and Commerce in Maritime East Asia : The Zheng Family and the Shaping of the Modern World, c. 1620-1720 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), and John Robert Shepherd, Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600–1800 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993).

as a treaty-port in the mid-nineteenth century and the connection of the region to global networks of exchange. By the end of the nineteenth century, late Qing Taiwan was an important producer of such goods as tea and camphor for world markets.[11] The production and exchange of these goods, along with an increase in commercial activity along the Chinese coast, in turn, brought the island to the attention of foreign powers in the late nineteenth century. Additional unequal treaties signed by the Qing court opened two ports in Taiwan—Tamsui and Tainan—to foreign trade. Two incidents in 1867 and 1871 of shipwrecks-turned-violent off the coast of Taiwan involving the United States and Japan, respectively, called into question the degree of Chinese sovereignty over the island, and were used by the United States and Japan to justify punitive expeditions that quickly turned into reconnaissance missions. This development led the Qing empire to undertake efforts to modernize the island and bring it under firmer Chinese control between 1875 and 1895.[12] These efforts, known as the policy of "opening the mountains and pacifying the savages," (*kaishan fufan*) involved bringing the island's indigenous population, previously thought to be "beyond the pale of civilization," under Chinese control, a task which required the assistance of local strongmen families who were landlords with large militias. Their assistance was bought by conferring official titles to transform them into local gentry elites, as was the case with two families surnamed Lin, of Banqiao in northern Taiwan and of Wufeng in central Taiwan, which were both involved in cross-strait trade that had accelerated after the opening of the treaty-ports.[13] This late-Qing economic and social context shaped Japanese

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11. Robert P. Gardella, "From Treaty Ports to Provincial Status, 1860–1894," in Taiwan: A New History, ed. Murray A. Rubenstein (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 163–200.

12. For one example of this policy, see Emma Teng, Taiwan's Imagined Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures, 1683–1895 (Cambridge, Mass: Distributed by Harvard University Press, 2004).

13. For one account of such a settler family that turned into landlords and strongmen, the Wufeng Lins, see Johanna M. M. Meskill, A Chinese Pioneer Family: The Lins of Wu-Feng, Taiwan, 1729-1895 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979). On cross-strait trade between Taiwan and the Chinese coast in the eighteenth century, see

understandings of the strategic and commercial value of Taiwan, and, in turn, made brokering relationships with strongmen-turned-gentry elites with commercial links to China (like the Banqiao and Wufeng Lin families) of paramount importance for the colonial government during the first two decades after Japanese rule began in 1895.

After the colonization of Taiwan, Japanese officials in the Taiwan Government-General, the colonial government, perceived the Chinese market as a key area for Japanese economic expansion. During the first decade of Japanese rule in Taiwan, colonial officials oriented the administration of Taiwan as a stepping-stone toward the goal of Japanese economic expansion in China. Aware of the dominant market share of intra-Asian trade held by Chinese merchants, colonial administrators fashioned Taiwanese as possible commercial intermediaries between Japanese interests and Chinese economy and society. Katsura Tarō, a Japanese army general and the second Governor-General of Taiwan (桂太郎, 1848–1913, in office June–October 1896), implored colonial administrators to keep one eye always cast across the Taiwan Strait on China. The fear that foreign intervention would thwart Japanese ambitions in Fujian Province led the Japanese government to sign the "Fujian Non-Cession Treaty" in 1898, whose meaning would be subject to debate but confirmed Chinese recognition of Japan's "special interests" in the province because of its proximity to the Japanese colony of Taiwan. Japanese diplomats continued to invoke this treaty until the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 whenever any foreign power seemed to be gaining undue influence in the province. Katsura and his successors in the Government-General, aware of the networks that linked Taiwan to south China, saw the cross-

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Yu-ju Lin, "Trade, Public Affairs, and the Formation of Merchant Associations in Taiwan in the Eighteenth Century," in Merchant Communities in Asia, 1600-1980, ed. Madeleine Zelin and Yu-ju Lin (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2015). On the effects of the opening of Tamsui as a treaty-port on the commercial community there in English, see Niki J. P. Alsford, Transitions to Modernity in Taiwan: The Spirit of 1895 and the Cession of Formosa to Japan (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2018).

strait mobility of individuals and ideas as both opportunity and threat. These connections ranged from family and commercial ties that connected late Qing elites from Taiwan to the mainland, some of whom relocated to south China after Japan took over in 1895, to seasonal labor migration and commodity exchange. Properly mobilized, the networks could serve as the conduit for Japanese commercial interests on the mainland; ignored, the networks could channel disorder and instability from China into Taiwan and imperil Japan's control of its colony.[14]

The degree and nature of the control the colonial government sought to exert over cross-strait networks fluctuated over time. Some administrations advocated the extension of colonial institutions like the police, hospitals, schools, and newspapers to China, while others, strapped for resources, preferred to focus on policies in Taiwan. The extent of the colonial government's involvement in south China also depended on changes in the Japanese empire's diplomatic relationship with China and its broader geopolitical and strategic concerns, which could be divided into two general camps: one, led by the Army, which advocated a "Northern Advance" focused on Manchuria and north China, and viewed Russia and later the Soviet Union as Japan's main adversary; and the other, led by the Navy, which championed a "Southern Advance" into south China and Southeast Asia, and viewed Japan as a fundamentally maritime power whose enemies were the Anglo-American naval powers. Whereas the former faction was behind the Manchurian Incident of 1931, the latter, for example supported Li Luyi's creating a pretext for landing Japanese troops in south China. Regardless of the policies adopted by the colonial government, the understanding of Taiwan and south China as linked by history, commerce, and mobility shaped the approach of colonial administrators both in ruling Taiwan and in devising a

14. On attempts by the Japanese colonial government to mobilize elites in Taiwan, see Ching-chih Chen, "Impact of Japanese Colonial Rule on Taiwanese Elites," Journal of Asian History 22, no. 1 (1988): 25–51.

policy for the Taiwan sekimin in China. During the first two decades of colonial rule, Japanese legal scholars conducted studies of Taiwan's social structure and the history of migration from the mainland during the Qing period.[15] These studies shaped Japanese officials' understanding of social and economic behavior, which was articulated in the language of ethnicity and so only one step away from being applicable to Japanese policy in China. This point emphasizes the importance of China and its perceived historical and cultural links to Taiwan for Japanese colonial policy in Taiwan, which, in turn, would be championed by colonial officials as a model for Chinese modernization; it does not however suggest that the colonization of Taiwan was the first in a series of events that led Japan to wage war on China in 1937.

Concurrent with Chinese settlement of Taiwan during the Qing period, the overseas movement of Chinese from Xiamen and its surrounding areas to littoral Southeast Asia gave rise to commercial networks that connected nodes across the South China Sea. These networks shaped both Japanese ambitions for economic and political expansion and the broader socio-political context in Xiamen as many of these "overseas Chinese" "returned" to China in the early twentieth century. Although the Qing state encouraged internal migration, it banned emigration until the mid-nineteenth century, when it loosened restrictions, which gave rise to large-scale migrations and networks, not only to Southeast Asia but to the Americas as well. Commercial links between southeast China and Southeast Asia had existed for centuries. But the rise in Chinese sojourning and sometimes settling overseas during the seventeenth through the

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15. See, for example, the studies on Taiwan's "private law," commercial practices, and the "administrative law" of the Qing empire. Taiwan shihō (Taipei: Rinji Taiwan kyūkan chōsakai, 1910). Rinji Taiwan kyūkan chōsakai dainibu, Chōsa keizai shiryō hōkoku (Tokyo: Sanshūsha, 1905). Shinkoku gyōseihō (Taipei: Rinji Taiwan Kyūkan Chōsakai, 1913). For two examples of studies of how these publications were compiled, see Hideaki Nishi, "Taiwan shihō" no seiritsu katei: tekisuto no sōigakuteki bunseki o chūshin ni (Fukuoka: Kyūshū Daigaku Shuppankai, 2009) and Cheng-Yi Huang, "Enacting the 'Incomprehensible China': Modern European Jurisprudence and the Japanese Reconstruction of Qing Political Law," Law & Social Inquiry 33, no. 4 (2008): 955–1001.

nineteenth centuries has received particular attention from scholars, who have long debated how to characterize these individuals and their mobility, using terms such as "overseas Chinese," "Chinese diaspora," and "Huaqiao" (Chinese sojourner).[16] By the final decade of the Qing dynasty in the first decade of the twentieth century, the court revised its view of migrants as traitors and began to appeal to the overseas Chinese to solicit investment in infrastructural projects in China, offering official titles to elite merchants in exchange for capital investment.[17] Late Qing thinkers, including Kang Youwei, an advocate of constitutional monarchy, and the republican-minded Sun Yat-sen and his allies popularized the concept of "overseas Chinese" to create a single term that would unify disparate Chinese groups and appeal to their natural links to the Chinese nation.[18]

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16. For an example of the debate on the applicability of "diaspora," see Adam McKeown, "Conceptualizing Chinese Diasporas, 1842 to 1949," The Journal of Asian Studies 58, no. 2 (1999): 306–37. More recent examples that emphasizes the importance of time are the works of Shelly Chan; see Shelly Chan, "The Case for Diaspora: A Temporal Approach to the Chinese Experience," The Journal of Asian Studies 74, no. 1 (2015): 107–28 and Shelly Chan, Diaspora's Homeland: Modern China in the Age of Global Migration (Durham: Duke University Press, 2018). Earlier scholars, chief among them Wang Gung-wu, found the terms diaspora and overseas Chinese inapplicable to Chinese migration to southeast Asia, proposing instead Chinese overseas, as a term that was less essentializing. For a more transnational approach, which focuses less on institutions and policy and more on global/regional economy, see Takeshi Hamashita, Kakyō, Kajin to chūkamō : imin, kōeki, sōkin nettowāku no kōzō to tenkai (Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 2013), especially Chapter 5 on the Japanese empire in Southeast Asia.

17. See Michael R. Godley, The Mandarin-Capitalists from Nanyang: Overseas Chinese Enterprise in the Modernization of China, 1893–1911 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

18. Gungwu Wang, "Southeast Asian Hua-Ch'iao in Chinese History-Writing," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 12, no. 1 (1981): 1–14. Gungwu Wang, "A Note on the Origins of Hua-Ch'iao," in Community and Nation: Essays on Southeast Asia and the Chinese, ed. Gungwu Wang and Anthony Reid (Singapore: Published for the Asian Studies Association of Australia by Heinemann Educational Books (Asia), 1981), 118–28. Prasenjit Duara, "Nationalists among Transnationals: Overseas Chinese and the Idea of China, 1900–1911," in Ungrounded Empires : The Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism, ed. Aihwa Ong and Donald Nonini (New York: Routledge, 1997), 39–60. Prasenjit Duara, "Transnationalism and the Predicament of Sovereignty: China, 1900–1945," The American Historical Review 102, no. 4 (1997): 1030–51. See also see Gungwu Wang "Introduction: Migration and New National Identities" and Gungwu Wang "Upgrading the Migrant: Neither Huaqiao nor Huaren" in Elizabeth Sinn, ed., *The Last Half Century of Chinese Overseas* (Aberdeen, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1998). 1–12 and 15–34. In contemporary writings, as in secondary scholarship, the term "Huaqiao" does not usually include the Taiwanese who moved to China during the early twentieth century, though some writers, Japanese and Taiwanese alike, would remark on the similarities shared by the Taiwanese and the Huaqiao, as both populations were nominally born under a (foreign) imperial power, and, more importantly, often held the citizenship of (and were therefore subject to the jurisdiction of) that foreign power. "Huaqiao," however, was often used by observers in the early twentieth century to refer to Chinese laborers in (colonial) Taiwan.

Japanese colonial administrators were well aware of the history of these "merchants without empire," as one historian has called the overseas Chinese, and their desire to expand Japanese commercial influence in China was always aimed at gaining a foothold within these broader regional networks as well.[19] In the 1920s and 1930s, many overseas Chinese "returned" to southeast China to buy land, build houses, establish schools, and undertake infrastructural and urban modernization projects.[20] This was particularly true in Xiamen, where overseas Chinese returning to their "homeland" gained considerable influence in municipal politics. Although the overseas Chinese were embedded in the same commercial networks as the Taiwan sekimin, spoke nearly identical Chinese dialects, and in some cases also held status as subjects of foreign imperial powers, the relationship between overseas Chinese and Taiwan sekimin was often contentious, particularly with the rise of Chinese nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiment in the 1920s and 1930s.[21] Overseas Chinese commercial networks, and the increasing participation of

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19. Gungwu Wang, "Merchants Without Empire: The Hokkien Sojourning Communities," in China and the Chinese Overseas, ed. Gungwu Wang (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1991), 79–102.

20. James A. Cook, "Bridges to Modernity: Xiamen, Overseas Chinese, and Southeast Coastal Modernization, 1843–1937" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, San Diego, 1998).

21. Whether or not overseas Chinese held the status of foreigner seems to have depended in large part on the local regulations of the foreign power, which had colonized the part of Southeast Asia they were living in. Overseas Chinese in the Philippines, for example, were required to pay considerable sums to acquire American citizenship, so only the most elite members of Philippine Chinese society did so. In the Dutch East Indies, a citizenship law passed in 1907 sought to mandate that all Chinese born in Java be considered Dutch subjects, which would require as conditions colonial adjudication over and taxation of inheritance, in addition to military service. This caused an outcry among the Overseas Chinese there and provided the proximate motivation for the Qing court to pass its own nationality law (guoji fa) in 1909, which, in a jus sanguinus definition of citizenship, regulated that all people born to Chinese fathers be considered Chinese subjects. Although the Qing empire fell in 1912, many of its successor regimes inherited this patrilineal, jus sanguinus definition of Chinese nationality. The situation in the treaty-ports and other areas of foreign trade was no less complex: in 1908, the Spanish Consul reported that forty people in Xiamen and Shanghai had donated money to become Spanish nationals, which had been determined in 1905 not to be illegal after the Circuit Intendant (daotai) of Shanghai inquired after the individuals under Spanish jurisdiction. The Japanese consuls in Xiamen often remarked on the number of Chinese naturalized as English subjects (to whom they referred as "English sekimin") in their population surveys of the city. The phenomenon extended beyond the treaty-ports, with Chinese merchants living in the borderland regions with Russia of Heilongjiang and Xinjiang reporting claims to Russian nationality. Whether Taiwan sekimin as a whole, or certain individuals who held this status, would be considered Chinese nationals after the passing of the Qing nationality law in 1909, and whether Chinese nationality law was mutually exclusive with Taiwan sekimin status, was a subject of ongoing debate. See

overseas Chinese returnees in local politics, shaped the local context of the Taiwan sekimin who settled in south China, often more so than any central government in the Chinese capitals of Beijing or Nanjing.[22] This context only strengthened Japanese views that saw the success of Taiwan sekimin in the south China treaty-ports as a stepping stone toward expanding Japanese influence among overseas Chinese who, with the growing links between anti-Japanese boycotts and Chinese nationalism in the 1920s, were increasing seen as an impediment to Japanese expansion in southeast Asia.

Institutions of Collaboration and Control

Given the dense networks that connected Taiwan sekimin to China and beyond and threatened to draw their loyalties elsewhere, the promise and peril of Taiwan sekimin settlement in the treaty-ports necessitated, in the view of Japanese officials, channeling Taiwan sekimin through institutions. Only by uniting the interests of Japanese officials and Taiwan sekimin through institutions would imperial policy be able to achieve the goals of promoting beneficial economic activity and preventing subversive criminal activity. These institutions included the so-called "three pillars" of Japanese rule: newspapers, hospitals, and schools. These were joined by consular police forces and local municipal associations known as Taiwan Associations, which were semi-autonomous organizations intended to coordinate the economic activities of Taiwan

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Dan Shao, "Chinese by Definition: Nationality Law, Jus Sanguinus, and State Succession, 1909–1980," Twentieth-Century China 35, no. 1 (November 2009): 4–28. Yinghui Li, Huaqiao Zhengce Yu Haiwai Minzu Zhuyi, 1912–1949 (Xindian, Taipei: Guoshiguan, 1997). Xinyan Wen, Huaqiao guoji wenti (Jiulong: Ziyou chubanshe, 1955). Shiru Qiu, Huaqiao guoji wenti (Taipei: Zhenzhong shuju, 1966). Hua Liu, Huaqiao guoji wenti yu Zhongguo guoji lifa (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 2004).

[22] Historians have studied the "return" of these overseas Chinese to southeast China during the early twentieth century and the different vision of Chinese modernity they held from national leaders in Beijing and Nanjing owing to their time spent in European colonies in Southeast Asia, but have largely retained the nation-state as the primary lens of analysis. See Cook, "Bridges to Modernity: Xiamen, Overseas Chinese, and Southeast Coastal Modernization, 1843–1937."

sekimin. Many of the Japanese institutions in the treaty-ports traced their roots to initiatives by elite Taiwan sekimin like the Banqiao and Wufeng Lins in the last decade of Qing rule (1902–1912). They were founded with a combination of private contributions and subsidies from the Government-General, in a pattern that drew on Qing traditions of elite philanthropy and the colonial government's efforts to coopt elite support to stabilize their rule over Taiwan. In the 1910s, after the collapse of the Qing empire and with the rise of republican revolutionary fervent in China, these institutions gained importance as vectors of moral suasion and social stability in the treaty-ports. The colonial government increased its subsidies and strengthened efforts to export colonial institutional models to the treaty-ports, which culminated in the establishment of a standing consular police force in Xiamen and hospitals in south China's four major treaty-ports of Fuzhou, Xiamen, Shantou, and Guangzhou. Social instability following the 1911 Chinese Revolution buoyed Japanese officials' hope that institutions would also serve to garner support and participation from local Chinese elites.

Over time, this institutional infrastructure would draw more Taiwan sekimin to China, although, as in the case of Li Luyi, who edited the local Japanese-funded newspaper and whose wife was employed by the local Taiwanese school, these residents did not always bring more stability. Institutions were not only constrained by external challenges, but their success was contingent on Taiwan sekimin participation in them. The consular police force, which was established by diplomatic officials in 1895 and fortified with a standalone office in Xiamen during the 1910s, came under scrutiny as a violation of Chinese territorial sovereignty in the late 1920s and early 1930s, when the Chinese press identified it as a symbol of longstanding Japanese aims at expansionism in China. Because Japanese diplomatic strategy in China was predicated on assumptions of Chinese disorder and the incompetence of Chinese officials,

officials believed that issues involving sekimin could only be solved by expanding the Japanese consular police presence in the city. In the case of Li Luyi, even though Fuzhou Consul Tamura knew from the outset that the suspect included a Taiwan sekimin, his immediate reaction was to pin the blame on the negligence of Chinese officials and demand the stationing of more police officers there. Colonial officials supported the unequivocal strengthening of the consular police forces, which they viewed as crucial to maintaining public order in Taiwan. But unilateral efforts at expanding consular and colonial state capacity to surveil and control the movement of sekimin always remained uneven and incomplete, which was symptomatic of the improbable task of assigning the legal status of Taiwan sekimin to individuals who remained highly mobile. The scope of offenses that Japanese consuls sought to punish expanded dramatically following the passage of the Japanese empire-wide Peace Preservation Law in 1925, which sought to prosecute ideological dissidents, including socialists, communists, and anti-colonial nationalists on the charge of thought crimes that threatened the national body politic (*kokutai*). Over time, the combination of this interpretation of jurisdiction, which understood Japanese authority to apply to individuals in China no matter where they were located, and the institutional infrastructure it required in the form of consular police, was increasingly at odds with the Chinese interpretation of territorial sovereignty, which understood the bounds of foreign jurisdiction to be circumscribed by the spatial limits of the "free area" of the treaty-ports.

Another institution that aimed to direct the economic and social activities of Taiwan sekimin in the treaty-ports was the Taiwan Association. Initially a voluntary institution that bore similarities to Chinese native-place merchants' associations and Japanese residents' associations in the treaty-ports, the Taiwan Association remained relatively autonomous from the consulate and during the late 1910s and 1920s held the power to negotiate with local officials in a time of

decentralized authority. The Association's leaders collected taxes, organized fundraisers, and provided legal protection to its members in the case of civil and commercial disputes. But with the rise of the GMD in the late 1920s, the Associations' local authority weakened vis-à-vis the newly established municipal governments, which made them more reliant on the Japanese consulates and, paradoxically, more powerful among the Taiwan sekimin, who came to depend on the Associations' ability to mediate between the growing sekimin population and the consulates. Over time, the consulates made membership in the Association obligatory for all sekimin, consolidating the Association's institutional authority over the resident sekimin. In this regard, charting the functions of the Association over time reveals the local effects of Chinese state centralization. Both individual circumstances and broader social conditions mediated enthusiasm for participating in local Japanese institutions, which channeled Japanese interests and conditioned reliance on them in a manner that was both productive and repressive.

Taiwan Sekimin and Local Networks

Throughout the course of Consul Tamura's investigation of Li Luyi's plot to murder the Mitos in Fuzhou, he was struck by the depth of Li's social networks and personal connections. Li's willingness to execute a murder on behalf of the Japanese Navy revealed his connections to military authorities, but it was Li's ties to local Chinese society in the provincial administrative city of Fuzhou that made him an ideal candidate to assess the feasibility of the plan and determine its execution. In a lengthy confession to Consul Tamura, Li insisted that his plan enjoyed wide support from Fuzhou's Taiwan sekimin, and that his position in the city's Taiwan Association provided him a platform to stir up fervor and recruit a henchman to execute his plot. Li's plan also found allies in local Chinese warlord leaders who had seen their power gradually

eroded by GMD centralization in the late 1920s and early 1930s and were eager to collaborate with Li if his plan could bring a return to decentralized authority. Li also maintained close contacts with provincial authorities based in Fuzhou, who were nominally allied with the GMD government but who appeared to give priority to their own positions over loyalty to the central government. Tamura initially assumed that the involvement of a Taiwan sekimin in the murder plot confirmed that it was motivated by anti-Japanese ideology, demonstrating the consuls' assumption that the networks maintained by sekimin were also a potent source of subversion. The depth of Li's local connections was such that, despite Tamura's best efforts to conceal the details of the plot from Chinese officials, they were already well aware of, if not complicit in, Li's plan.

While Li's plot reflects an exceptional case of the local social networks sustained by Taiwan sekimin, such connections were not all that unusual. The ability of Taiwan sekimin to forge local connections and mediate Japanese interests with Chinese officials was one of the reasons that Japanese officials viewed them as ideal conduits for the empire's interests in China. Between the colonization of Taiwan in 1895 and the collapse of the Qing empire in 1912, colonial officials sought to draw on elite Taiwan sekimin in China—some of whom had left Taiwan to evade Japanese rule and had relocated to China to take up official positions there in the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, but came around to collaborating with Japan once they were in South China—to secure contracts for exclusive rights to railway construction and camphor production there. In other cases, as in the aftermath of the 1911 Chinese Revolution, Taiwan sekimin status became the sole basis for Chinese officials' rejecting proposals for infrastructural development projects, or so Japanese officials suspected. As the case of Li Luyi reveals, reliance on Taiwan sekimin networks was a double-edged sword: local

networks offered the possibility for Japanese officials to broker closer ties to Chinese officials, but they also threatened to encourage sekimin to join Chinese officials in subverting Japanese interests.

The context of each treaty-port city shaped the Taiwan sekimin population and presence in each locale. Xiamen was home to the largest number of China's Taiwan sekimin, and it was shaped by its connections with overseas Chinese networks in Southeast Asia. Fuzhou, in contrast, was the capital of Fujian Province and home to provincial-level Chinese officials, and the sekimin populations in Shantou and Guangzhou were far fewer in number. Nevertheless, colonial officials in Taiwan conceived of the four cities and the two coastal provinces they were in, Guangdong and Fujian, as a unified region they called "South China." This terminology was, in part, an effort to stake a claim to the unique relationship between Taiwan and southeast China and to expand the scope of that influence beyond the environs of Xiamen (southern Fujian, known in Chinese as *Minnan*) to the broader region. Nor was the term "South China" stable; over time, it came to include the inland contiguous provinces of Jiangxi, Guangxi, and Yunnan. Informed by the networks that linked South China to littoral southeast Asia, known in Chinese as *Nanyang* and in Japanese as *Nan'yō*, colonial officials in Taiwan often spoke of a "South China-South Seas (*Nan'yō*)" policy that implied connections between Japanese interests in the two areas. In reality, the nature of the subsidies offered by the colonial government to institutions in South China and Southeast Asia were quite different. In the former, the Taiwan Government-General subsidized institutions like hospitals, schools, newspapers, and local consular police forces, whereas in the latter, they supported small-scale enterprises, often run by Japanese from the metropole, local civic groups of Japanese merchants, and studies of natural resources, agricultural commodities, and colonial administrative structures. Only when the Government-

General established the Taiwan Development Corporation in 1936 on the eve of war in order to promote agricultural development in Hainan (South China) and Indochina (Southeast Asia) were these two regions finally unified by a comprehensive economic policy, although even then the corporation's goals remained distinct from the colonial government's interests in the South China treaty-ports.

Decentralized authority in China from the collapse of the Qing empire in 1912 until the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 meant that even these four main treaty-port cities, proximate to one another as they were, often fell under different local administrations, to say nothing of the interior regions. In the early 1930s, for example, both the Chinese Communist Party and the Nineteenth Route Army, known for its left-leaning orientation, controlled the city of Zhangzhou, which lay about thirty-five miles inland of Xiamen along the Jiujiang River. Local administrative conditions relative to the rest of China made Zhangzhou particularly hospitable to left-wing Taiwanese activists, who, in 1932, made use of local conditions and institutional support to print pamphlets denouncing Japanese imperialism, which they distributed throughout Xiamen and the other treaty-ports. Since Zhangzhou was not a treaty-port and did not have a Japanese consular presence, the Japanese consul in nearby Xiamen sought to use Japan's Peace Preservation Law to accuse these activists of ideologically criminal sedition and prosecute them, even though their activities fell far outside the treaty-port of Xiamen. Since the activities of Taiwan sekimin were not circumscribed to individual treaty-ports in south China, and since Japanese consuls and colonial officials understood the region as a unified whole, I include individuals and events in of both locally-specific and regional import.

From Local to National: Imperialism, Nationalism, and Foreign Relations

Over time, the structures and scope of Japanese diplomatic control over Taiwan sekimin expanded from the local to the regional level. The mobility of the Taiwan sekimin across south China as a whole, on the one hand, and the gradual nationalization of the discourses of anti-Japanese sentiment, on the other, drove this expansion. Already in the 1860s, Chinese official Zeng Guofan had conceived of China's subjugation by the Euro-American imperial powers in commercial terms, calling for a "commercial war" (*shangzhan*) to resist foreign domination.[23] In its last decade of rule, the Qing court turned to overseas Chinese as a source of investment capital for infrastructural projects because Chinese officials feared the effects of foreign capital investment on the empire's already fragile sovereignty. In practice, however, distinguishing "foreign capital" from "Chinese capital" would not be so easy, as shown by the efforts of Taiwan sekimin to invest in infrastructural projects in south China. The importance of both commercial and military resistance to foreign incursion on Chinese sovereignty led to the emergence of consumer nationalism and Chinese boycotts of foreign products, first in 1905 in protest of American restrictions on Chinese immigration.[24] Calls to display patriotism by purchasing "national products"—which rendered foreign goods and the merchants who traded them "enemy goods" and "traitorous merchants" by contrast—were a recurrent feature of China's discursive landscape, though the effects of these calls to action on actual commercial practices would remain to be seen.

Initially limited to Chinese urban intellectuals and student activists in the 1910s, anti-foreign protests gained traction as they joined with a nascent labor movement in the 1920s. This

23. Wen-Hsin Yeh, Shanghai Splendor: Economic Sentiments and the Making of Modern China, 1843-1949 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007).

24. Karl Gerth, China Made: Consumer Culture and the Creation of the Nation (Cambridge, Mass: Distributed by Harvard University Press, 2003).

alliance sought to disrupt foreign commerce with work stoppages and to supplement protests with strikes, most famously in Hong Kong and Shanghai in 1925 in protest of the British shooting of anti-foreign Chinese protesters. At the same time, Chinese opposition to Japanese attempts to intervene in domestic politics—first by issuing the infamous Twenty-One Demands in 1915, and later in Japanese attempts to gain control of former German colonies in the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 following World War I—gave rise to anti-Japanese protests that were national but still limited in scope. Outside the major urban centers of Shanghai and Beijing, calls to "remember national humiliation" brought on by the Twenty-One Demands at the hands of the Japanese remained sporadic before the mid-1920s. It was only over the course of the decade that student and then labor activists in Xiamen joined to oppose the Taiwan sekimin as "traitorous merchants" and conduits of Japanese capital and commercial interests. But, unlike in Shanghai, where activists targeted foreign-owned factories as symbols of foreign commercial interests, the economy in Xiamen remained primarily organized around trade in sundry goods, so Taiwan sekimin merchants often weathered boycotts and protests by temporarily shuttering their stores.

The popularity of imperialism as an analytic to describe China's foreign relations grew in the same period as its conceptualization evolved from one based on Social Darwinist notions of competition between nation-states, as advocated by turn-of-the-century Chinese intellectual Liang Qichao, to Leninist-inspired economic explanations that understood China as a "semi-colony," implying that it was on the cusp of full colonization.[25] Under the influence of Soviet assistants in the 1920s, Chinese leaders in both the GMD and Communist (CCP) Parties came to

25. You-Li Sun, China and the Origins of the Pacific War, 1931–41 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993). Jürgen Osterhammel, "Semi-Colonialism and Informal Empire in Twentieth-Century China: Towards a Framework of Analysis," in Imperialism and after: Continuities and Discontinuities, ed. Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Jürgen Osterhammel (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), 290–314.

understand China's economic subjugation as the result of foreign imperialism. In the 1920s, GMD leader Sun Yat-sen, who had been open to accepting foreign capital investment in the 1910s, reformulated the conception of China from one of a "semi-colony" to that of a "hypo-colony"—the slave of not one but many masters, leaving it with all the economic degradation and none of the benefits of full colonial rule. In the late 1920s, anti-imperialism manifested itself in a new proactive approach to foreign relations, known as "revolutionary diplomacy," which sought to reverse some of the effects of the unequal treaties, and was successful in reclaiming tariff autonomy in China by 1929 and negotiating voluntary Anglo-American withdrawal from minor treaty-ports.[26] Although the Japanese Foreign Ministry under Shidehara Kijūrō (in office 1924–1927 and 1929–1931) was committed to a policy of non-intervention and "peaceful economic diplomacy" in China, the persistence of conflicts involving Taiwan sekimin in south China led local consuls to advocate the retrenchment of Japanese interests on the ground.[27]

It was only after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 that anti-imperialism in Chinese popular discourse and foreign policy of the 1920s which had identified all foreign powers as equal enemies of China gave way to the focused anti-Japanism of the 1930s. The Manchurian Incident also signaled a shift in diplomatic outlook for Japan, which, under the rising influence of the military in driving relations with China, shifted away from its

26. Edmund S. K. Fung, The Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat: Britain's South China Policy, 1924–1931 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).

27. Diplomatic histories of Japan emphasize the "peaceful economic expansion" of Shidehara diplomacy to highlight the contrast between him and his critics, like Tanaka Giichi, who did not renounce the use of military force in pursuit of economic and imperialist aims. This chronology of a peaceful, internationalist 1920s, when foreign relations were driven by the Foreign Ministry, giving way to a militarist, expansionist 1930s, when foreign relations were driven by the military, mirrors the earlier chronology of modern Japanese history that views the 1920s as a period of incipient democracy that was interrupted by the "militarism and ultranationalism" of the 1930s. See for example Ian Nish, *Japanese Foreign Policy, 1869–1942: Kasumigaseki to Miyakezaka* (Boston: Routledge & K. Paul, 1977).

commitment in the 1920s to international cooperation and restrictions on military buildup to an aggressive militarism in Manchuria and north China. During this decade, Taiwan sekimin were identified not only as "traitorous merchants" working on behalf of a foreign power, but also as the running dogs and vanguard of a rapacious Japanese expansionism, which was now traced back to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95. The prevalence of disreputable Taiwan sekimin in the opium and gambling industries in Xiamen, a relic of the policies of warlord rule of the previous decade, only compounded this unfavorable image and lent potency to the metaphor that these disreputable sekimin were poisoning and subjugating China from within. Finally, the ongoing efforts of the GMD government following its nominal unification of China in 1927–28 to nationalize the economy, regulate foreign commerce, and raise tariffs to promote a policy of import-substitution industrialization, which were further impelled by the Great Depression of the 1930s, placed many Taiwan sekimin increasingly at odds not only with local but also with national economic and diplomatic goals.

The Taiwan Sekimin in Historiography

Historians have long identified coastal China as the location of Sino-foreign encounters following the First Opium War, leading them to characterize the treaty-ports as early sites of Chinese modernization.[28] Earlier narratives that focused on the role of "Western impact" and the "opening of China" by foreign imperialism in shaping the beginnings of China's modern history gave way to historiographical models that advocated a "China-centered" approach.[29] In

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28. John King Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842-1854 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964).

29. Paul A. Cohen, Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).

emphasizing an understanding of Chinese history on its own terms, however, the "China-centered approach" tended to downplay the utility of imperialism as an analytical tool for the study of modern Chinese history, viewing it as a marginal phenomenon with limited effects beyond the treaty-ports. Recently have scholars returned to the question of imperialism in China, and, by extension, to the coast and its treaty-ports.[30] If recent works have reframed the "Sino-foreign" encounter as a cultural one that gave rise to new forms of knowledge, they have also, to a large degree, retained its oppositional binary category of "foreign" and "local/Chinese." At the same time, historians of the Qing empire have taken up the term imperialism and delineated the imperial practices of the Qing state to show that it was an empire in its own right. Although this "New Qing History" was primarily focused on the empire's western borderlands and territorial expansion in Inner Asia, it also shone light on the Qing empire's gradual incorporation of Taiwan, a marginal maritime frontier, over the course of 250 years of rule.[31] Late-nineteenth century Taiwan can best be understood by combining the approaches of New Qing history, the China-centered model, and, to a certain degree, even the older impact-response model. Taiwan's incorporation into global networks of exchange following the opening of the treaty-ports, a process that built on existing networks that connected it to both China and to Southeast Asia, occurred simultaneously with efforts by the Qing empire to fully incorporate the island and its frontier into the imperial polity. The dual processes that incorporated Taiwan into a world economy while bringing frontier Taiwan under imperial Chinese control, gave rise in the late nineteenth century to a political economy that relied on local elites who were involved in

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30. Ruth Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-Port China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004). Fa-ti Fan, "Science in Cultural Borderlands: Methodological Reflections on the Study of Science, European Imperialism, and Cultural Encounter," East Asian Science, Technology and Society 1, no. 2 (December 2007): 213–31.

31. Teng, Taiwan's Imagined Geography.

expanding imperial state capacity on the frontier and were also engaged in commerce with the Chinese treaty-ports and beyond. After Japanese colonization of Taiwan in 1895, the same local elites contributed to Japanese efforts to expand its commercial interests in the South China treaty-ports, efforts which used and transformed the existing late-Qing networks of exchange.

Over the course of the early twentieth century, the Taiwan sekmin in treaty-port China shaped local attempts at urbanization and modernization, more because they challenged the foreign versus Chinese binary that underpinned the treaty-port economic and legal order, rather than because they posed an actual economic threat. Elite sekimin who channeled Japanese capital into infrastructural development projects in China on one end of the spectrum, and petty smugglers and disreputable sekimin involved in the opium trade on the other, gave credence to the belief that foreign legal status was merely a tool to justify evading the authority of Chinese officials, which, in turn, impelled Chinese efforts to build state capacity to exert jurisdiction over them. Yet it would be a mistake to view Taiwan sekimin as motivated exclusively by personal interests and acting solely in instrumental ways, or conversely, to understand their appeals on the basis of sekimin status to differentiate themselves from local Chinese as reflective of an incipient "Taiwanese consciousness" counterposed to a Chinese identity. Rather, their claims were contingent and conditioned by local context. Their conflicts with local officials and their national conceptions of economic and social order were increasingly not just local scuffles to be resolved on the interpersonal level, but laden with national ideological import.[32] It was, over time, the clash of the logic of empire that understood Taiwan sekimin as imperial subjects on one hand,

32. The contradictions between "national time" and "diaspora time" highlighted by Shelly Chan are useful to consider in determining when and why these conflicts emerged.

and the logic of the nation-state that understood Taiwan sekimin as disloyal traitors undermining China's modernization on the other, that left them stranded "between empire and nation."

The Taiwan sekimin also posed a challenge to the competing priorities of the Taiwan Government-General and the Japanese Foreign Ministry, precisely because of their relative economic unimportance.[33] An inter-imperial perspective that accounts for these competing priorities between colonial and diplomatic officials reveals the contingencies that shaped the economic and social positions of the sekimin in China. The colonial government initially held high hopes that Taiwan sekimin would become economic brokers between Japan and China and commercial leaders in treaty-port industries, and some did indeed play that role. But the majority of Taiwan sekimin lacked capital and were either petty traders or, more frustrating for diplomatic officials, disreputable figures involved in vice and illicit industries. In part this was a creation of the colonial government, which was unwilling and unable to subsidize individual sekimin ventures. The colonial government relied instead on capital-rich sekimin elites like the Banqiao and Wufeng Lin families, leaving their efforts contingent on elite support. Without subsidies from the colonial government, diplomatic officials argued, Taiwan sekimin would remain in disreputable industries and conflicts would persist, testing the limits of diplomatic officials who were responsible for their adjudication. But neither did the colonial government want to permit removing Taiwan sekimin from the register, which they thought would imperil the desirability of Japanese subject status and cast doubts on the reliability of consular protection and extraterritorial jurisdiction. To further complicate matters, the Taiwan Government-General was a low priority in the view of Tokyo officials, eclipsed by the far more important colonial

33. A recent work that emphasizes the inter- and intra-imperial conflict between and competing priorities of the Government-General and the Foreign Ministry is the dissertation by Shirane, "Mediated Empire: Colonial Taiwan in Japan's Imperial Expansion in South China and Southeast Asia, 1895–1945."

holdings of Korea and Manchuria, and for the Japanese Foreign Ministry, China was a low priority, and South China lower still. Considering the colonial government from the periphery demonstrates that the colonial state was not nearly as omnipotent as it might appear from the center, while observing the Foreign Ministry from the periphery provides a departure from the existing perspectives focused on high diplomacy.

Nor was Fujian a prime concern for most national-level Chinese officials. Consider the contrast with Shanghai, the treaty-port that has received the most attention from scholars and has become a model of urban studies of twentieth-century China. Xiamen and Fuzhou barely had an industrial base and were of comparatively little economic value. Yet the uneven nature of centralized control over Fujian makes it an ideal site, as yet another bureaucratic periphery, in which to consider the impact of foreign imperialism on China's transition from empire to republic in the early twentieth century. Unlike Shanghai, Xiamen and Fuzhou had low levels of Japanese capital investment and their economy remained centered around commodity exchange. These factors affected the local experience and effects of anti-Japanese boycotts, conditioned local understanding of the effects of foreign imperialism, and shaped the state-society relations that influenced the "local response" to the exercise of Japanese power.

This dissertation builds on recent studies of the Japanese empire that have highlighted the importance of the movement of individuals across and beyond the empire in shaping, consolidating, and often challenging, the nature of Japanese imperial power.[34] A focus on

34. For two examples of how a focus on networks across space can bring new insights to our understanding of the Japanese empire, see Kate McDonald, *Placing Empire: Travel and the Social Imagination in Imperial Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2017). David R. Ambaras, *Japan's Imperial Underworlds: Intimate Encounters at the Borders of Empire* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018). For an example of how Xiamen in particular was connected to other Asian locales through the drug trade, see Peter Thilly, "The Fujitsuru Mystery: Translocal Xiamen, Japanese Expansionism, and the Asian Cocaine Trade, 1900–1937," *Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review* 7, no. 1 (2018): 93–117.

individuals emphasizes the contingency of imperial power, while also helping to reveal the individual and local contexts in which Taiwan sekimin chose to collaborate with the institutions and structures of the Japanese empire, thus moving beyond the binary of resistance or collaboration that defined many earlier studies of colonized societies. Existing research on individuals who served as mediators or brokers of imperial power have focused on "settlers" in the Japanese empire and their roles in transforming the political economy of the colonial societies in which they settled. These studies emphasize intra-imperial jockeying within the empire, describing the roles of Japanese settlers in Korea as "brokers of empire" between colonized Koreans, the Korean colonial state, and the Imperial Diet, for example, or elite Japanese settlers in the northeast Chinese city of Dairen (C: Dalian) in the Japanese-ruled Kwantung Leasehold Territory.[35] The history of the Taiwan sekimin in treaty-port China, in contrast, must consider both the intra-imperial conflict between the colonial government in Taiwan and the Japanese Foreign Ministry, as well as the inter-imperial dynamics of jurisdictional conflicts between the Japanese empire, local and national Chinese authorities, and the rising municipal power of the overseas Chinese who were tied to the broader political economy of the South China Sea littoral.[36] The importance of inter-imperial conflicts that

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35. Jun Uchida, Brokers of Empire: Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1876–1945 (Cambridge, Mass: distributed by Harvard University Press, 2011). Emer S. O'Dwyer, Significant Soil: Settler Colonialism and Japan's Urban Empire in Manchuria (Cambridge, Mass: Distributed by Harvard University Press, 2015). Also influential is the work of Hyun-Ok Park, which demonstrates the confluence, rather than opposition, of imperial Japanese and nationalist Chinese efforts to regulate Korean migrants to northeast China/Manchuria with the aim of capitalist expansion there. Such a focus on capitalist expansion can explain why, for example, colonial officials from Taiwan and local Chinese officials from Fujian (not to mention Taiwan sekimin and officials from both polities) sought to collaborate in pursuing infrastructural development projects in China; see Chapter 5 of this dissertation. Hyun Ok Park, *Two Dreams in One Bed: Empire, Social Life, and the Origins of the North Korean Revolution in Manchuria* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005).

36. My understanding of "inter-imperial perspectives" includes the overseas Chinese across the South China Sea littoral, because they, in many cases rather than the Euro-American imperial powers themselves, were dominant figures in the regional political economy. Although this volume does not deal with Taiwan in much detail, see, for example, Kaoru Sugihara, ed., *Japan, China, and the Growth of the Asian International Economy, 1850–1949* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). Three works that highlight inter-imperial contestations over,

emerged in the spaces where the Japanese empire came into contact with the new GMD Chinese state and broader overseas Chinese networks reflect the observation of David Ambaras that the course of Japanese empire in Asia was as much conditioned by its "reopening to the Sinosphere" as it was by its "accommodation to Euro-American imperialism."[37] In a recent work, Robert Eskildsen proposed the framework of "recursive imperialism" to explain how Japan formulated itself as an imperial power in the late nineteenth century by adapting the vocabulary of empire.[38] Such a framework is useful for highlighting the inter-imperial and Sino-Japanese contexts that drove Japanese policy in China in twentieth century. My approach thus builds on existing scholarship that takes into account both intra- and inter-imperial perspectives, which has described the often competing attempts to regulate the mobility of subjects on the margins of empire and shows, for example, the importance of Korean labor migrants who settled in Manchuria and were dependent on loans from Japanese development corporations, or the subversive and sometimes transgressive intimate encounters between Chinese and Japanese in

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and constitutions of, imperial power in the context of Taiwan, south China, and Southeast Asia are Shirane, "Mediated Empire: Colonial Taiwan in Japan's Imperial Expansion in South China and Southeast Asia, 1895–1945." Justin Adam Schneider, "The Business of Empire: The Taiwan Development Corporation and Japanese Imperialism in Taiwan, 1936–1946" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1998). Hiroko Matsuda, *Liminality of the Japanese Empire: Border Crossings from Okinawa to Colonial Taiwan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2018).

37. Ambaras, *Japan's Imperial Underworlds*, 5.

38. Japanese adaptations drew energy from the late nineteenth century anxieties about Social Darwinist inter-imperial competition and fed a recursive feedback loop that only magnified the perceived necessity of preemptive and proactive military action. Robert Eskildsen, Transforming Empire in Japan and East Asia: The Taiwan Expedition and the Birth of Japanese Imperialism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019). In a recent talk at Columbia University Eskildsen remarked on his earlier article which uses the concept "mimetic imperialism" to describe the same concept, and mentioned that he had initially proposed "recursive imperialism" but was advised to change this to "mimetic." The connotation of slight and piecemeal escalation captured by "recursive" (and avoidance of the implications of imitation in "mimetic") make "recursive imperialism," in my mind, a more useful analytic for describing inter-imperial competition.

the liminal space between the Japanese empire and the broader "Sinosphere" that destabilized official efforts to regulate territory and demarcate space.[39]

Finally, the lens of "settlement," dominant in the literature on northeast Asia, does not fully capture the dynamics of the Taiwan sekimin in China. The Taiwan sekimin presence in the treaty-ports lay instead somewhere between settlement and mobility. Although "settlement" is useful for revealing the intermediary role played by and structural privileges enjoyed by settlers, attending to the mobility of Taiwan sekimin refocuses our attention on the jurisdictional conflicts that emerged from attempts by Chinese and Japanese bureaucratic regimes to render legible, regulate, and control their mobility. Attending to jurisdictional conflicts, in turn, reveals the changes in institutional circumstances and infrastructural capacities of states to make claims on subjects over whom they claimed jurisdiction, as well as the ideological bases upon which they attempted to do so.[40] The institutional and ideological nature of jurisdictional claim-making by both Chinese and Japanese officials over Taiwan sekimin in the treaty-ports developed in parallel, in part because of the growing conflict between how different jurisdictional bodies defined Taiwan sekimin as juridical subjects and sought to exercise sovereignty over them.[41] Nor

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39. Park, *Two Dreams in One Bed*. Ambaras, Japan's Imperial Underworlds. On Japanese efforts to lay claim to Koreans in Manchuria, see also Barbara J. Brooks, "Peopling the Japanese Empire: The Koreans in Manchuria and the Rhetoric of Inclusion," in *Japan's Competing Modernities: Issues in Culture and Democracy, 1900-1930*, ed. Sharon Minichiello (Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawai'i Press, 1998), 25–44. On the regulation of mobility and the institutionalization of regimes of border control that resulted from Chinese transnational migration, see McKeown, Melancholy Order.

40. Jaeeun Kim, Contested Embrace: Transborder Membership Politics in Twentieth-Century Korea (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016). Jaeeun Kim's account of membership politics builds upon Roger Brubaker's suggestion that scholars of ethnicity and race take ethnicities/ethnic groups not as static, given entities but rather the social, cultural, and psychological processes of their formation as the unit of analysis. Her emphasis on state strategies of categorizing and identifying subject populations and their "transborder movements" has informed my approach to understanding the historical relationship between state formations and mobility.

41. Particularly influential on my understanding of jurisdictional politics and contestation over sovereignty has been the work of Lauren Benton on early modern European empires. See Lauren Benton, *Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400–1900* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Lauren Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400–1900 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). The emphasis on jurisdictional politics is particularly pronounced in her introduction to the edited

were these jurisdictional claims solely top-down; as important in shaping Taiwan sekimin status were claims made by individuals on its basis from the bottom-up.[42]

The changing place of the Taiwan sekimin in the treaty-ports and, by extension, the changes in how Japanese officials conceived of the relationship between colonial Taiwan and south China, reveal transformations in the nature of the Japanese empire between 1895 and 1937, which were conditioned by the place of Taiwan in the Japanese empire, inter-imperial competition in China, and Japan's place in the regional and world orders. Between 1895 and the collapse of the Qing empire in 1912, colonial officials in Taiwan sought to draw on elite Taiwan sekimin's official connections to gain exclusive rights to railway construction and to control south China's camphor production. This period was characterized by railway and financial imperialism in China, and Japanese officials understood extending economic interests in China as a cornerstone of colonial policy in Taiwan and crucial to its long-term success. The fall of the Qing empire in 1912 brought with it greater opportunities to shape Chinese domestic affairs and intervene in China's economic development, but also threatened the social order of Taiwan with the advent of revolutionary republican and nationalist ideology. In the decade following the 1911 Chinese Revolution, Japanese officials advocated extending colonial institutions of social control and moral suasion to the treaty-ports to direct Taiwan sekimin support of the empire.

The devolution of authority to the local level and the control of municipal politics in Xiamen by warlords in the 1920s, a period of transition not covered in detail in this dissertation,

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volume Lauren Benton and Richard Ross, eds., *Legal Pluralism and Empires, 1500–1850* (New York: New York University Press, 2013).

42. "Recursion" is a useful metaphor in understanding the process by which state capacity developed from both bottom-up and top-down negotiations—state-society relations in a colonial register—as well as inter-imperial negotiations.

saw increased involvement of disreputable sekimin in the opium industry, an arrangement which was welcomed by the local warlord Zang Zhiping (臧致平) because of the tax revenues it offered. The unstable and local nature of warlord administration also led to greater autonomy of the Taiwan sekimin from consular control and an increased role for institutions like the Taiwan Association in adjudicating local conflicts. This local autonomy from local Chinese and Japanese consular control was slowly reversed following the rise of the GMD to power in 1927–28 and its nominal unification of China. The consolidation of the GMD on a national scale and the reorganization of municipal governments in the treaty-ports in Fujian, especially Xiamen, where overseas Chinese came to play an important role, led to contestation between Japanese and Chinese officials over the scope of police jurisdiction in the treaty-ports, and by extension, over the definitions of imperial versus national sovereignty. These conflicts led to an expansion in the scope of jurisdiction claimed by Japanese consuls in the treaty-ports, a transformation welcomed by the consuls, and one which was also driven by a new law that viewed left-wing or anti-colonial nationalist activities as thought crimes to be prosecuted. The Taiwan Government-General was eager to stamp out anti-colonial nationalism and left-wing ideology (their prosecution of the activists in Taiwan had caused them to flee to China), but ongoing financial woes in Taiwan made subsidizing policies in south China a low priority. The burgeoning number of Taiwan sekimin impelled by economic troubles to seek opportunities in China who strained the consuls' jurisdiction further revealed the neglect constituted by the low priority of the colonial government's south China policy as part of its responsibility to contribute to imperial policy writ large.

Although the Manchurian Incident of September 1931 transformed Sino-Japanese relations and brought changes in Japanese domestic politics and Chinese foreign policy, its local

effects in south China would not be felt until the following year. In mid-1932, the Nineteenth Route Army, which had developed a reputation for resisting and halting the Japanese invasion of Shanghai in January of that year, was relocated to Fujian, and set out to reform local and provincial administration. This change posed the most serious threat yet to the logic of Japanese claims over Taiwan sekimin in the province, and conflict between the consuls and the Army's administration of the province was exacerbated by consuls' earlier efforts to expand the scope of their jurisdiction, which they understood as offering the only possibility to avoid conflicts that could escalate into war. Meanwhile, administration of the province by a left-leaning, anti-Japanese force made Fujian more hospitable to the left-wing and anti-colonial nationalist Taiwanese activists that the consuls wanted to prosecute. The Army's administration of Fujian was short-lived, however, with control reverting to the ambit of the GMD central government in Nanjing after a brief rebellion by the Army, known as the Fujian Rebellion of 1934, which while unsuccessful nonetheless called the loyalties of Taiwan sekimin into question.

In the immediate aftermath of the rebellion, local sekimin leaders in Fujian hoped for the renewed possibility of establishing municipal and provincial administration based on an alliance between local, sekimin, and overseas Chinese elites. One Japanese pan-Asianist and old China hand even made an attempt at brokering such an alliance, thinking that it offered the possibility of elite-led programs of industrial development based on Sino-Japanese cooperation and without government interference. But such hopes were dashed when, between 1934 and 1937, Fujian came under the rule of Chen Yi, a close confidant of Chiang Kai-shek. Chen had been educated in Japan and was therefore reputed to be "pro-Japanese," buoying consular officials' hopes for reduced conflicts between sekimin and municipal officials. Under Chen's administration, the province undertook efforts to industrialize and reform its agricultural sector, and, under the

encouragement of colonial officials in Taiwan, emulated colonial Taiwan as a developmental model. Direct relations between Chinese officials in the Fujian provincial government and Japanese officials in Taiwan's colonial government sidelined sekimin, local, and overseas Chinese elites in Fujian. Many sekimin elites nevertheless saw their future tied to the empire's expansion in South China and increasingly Southeast Asia. But a new colonial government policy that organized economic expansion in South China and Southeast Asia through the Taiwan Development Company foreclosed any remaining possibility of subsidies for individual sekimin ventures. Finally, in the 1930s, nation-wide efforts under the GMD to nationalize the economy, regain control over foreign trade, and promote import-substitution industrialization led to sekimin small-scale trade in goods such as sugar and rayon being characterized as smuggling. Far from eradicating these commercial networks, the new regulations increased the profitability of trading in illegal goods, which in turn exacerbated conflicts with local customs officials.

To return to the murder plot of Li Luyi in 1932, his lengthy confession to Consul Tamura, which revealed the origins of his plot and delineated the nature and scope of his social networks and official connections survives in the diplomatic archive only because Tamura feared that Li could have been acting as an agent of the Taiwan Government-General and was reluctant to extradite him to Taiwan for trial. Indeed, the records contained in the Japanese diplomatic archive are limited to the conflicts that came under the jurisdiction of Japanese consuls. The relative autonomy of the sekimin in the treaty-ports and the depth of their connections to local society were inversely related to the number of relevant diplomatic records about them, rendering diplomatic and colonial records of limited value for reconstructing the social history of Taiwan sekimin. These efforts are further constrained by the incomplete nature of official surveillance, and the overburdened and underfunded South China consuls. Faced with this

difficulty, I have used the tools of "historical ethnography," which, as described by a scholar of nineteenth century Mediterranean migration and mobilities, casts focus on "fleeting facts, ostensibly trivial events, petty detail, the mundane, and experienced…[to] make sense of recondite shards of evidence generated by migratory peoples and processes."[43] Some figures reappear throughout the period—often, and unsurprisingly elites—allowing for deeper contextualization, whereas others appear but once, requiring a prospographical approach to reconstruct their social worlds.

Since monitoring the mobility and social activities of Taiwan sekimin was always an incomplete task, diplomatic and colonial official records serve as an index of Japanese efforts to produce knowledge about a colonial subject population and their efforts to render the social worlds of Taiwan sekimin legible.[44] Particularly useful for charting the developments in the colonial and diplomatic bureaucracies and the changes in their understanding of Taiwan sekimin is the strategy of "reading along the grain," which seeks to uncover the processes of archival and epistemic production and the sensibilities and anxieties that informed them.[45] Fuzhou Consul Tamura conducted a frenetic series of negotiations after receiving news of the Mitos' murders, and his mind turned immediately to suspecting Taiwanese subversion and demanding concessions from Chinese officials. Attending to the process by which these archival records

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43. Julia Clancy-Smith, Mediterraneans: North Africa and Europe in an Age of Migration, c. 1800–1900 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011).

44. The literatures on state legibility and colonial knowledge production are immense. Some representative works on colonial knowledge production and its role in demarcating and justifying "colonial difference" include Bernard S. Cohn, *Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996). Nicholas B. Dirks, Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001). George Steinmetz, The Devil's Handwriting: Precoloniality and the German Colonial State in Qingdao, Samoa, and Southwest Africa (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).

45. Ann Laura Stoler, Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).

were produced, in turn, provides a corrective balance to the impulse of uncovering from the archive the social history of "what happened," and delineates the conceptual transformations in how Japanese officials understood the Taiwan sekimin as a subject population, their place in the local political economy, and how this knowledge informed attempts to regulate their activities.

The social and intellectual histories of the Taiwan sekimin in south China, while grounded in individual stories and local specificities, offer a vantage point for understanding broader transformations in state-society relations, state and bureaucratic capacity, global capitalism, and nationalism and imperialism in modern East Asia. In legal terms, sekimin were caught between two different and increasingly opposing logics of subjecthood and therefore of state sovereignty. Notions of subjecthood and sovereignty were in turn central to Chinese and Japanese officials' understandings of the economy, which found Taiwan sekimin caught between two opposing logics, one imperial and one national. For individual Taiwan sekimin, a claim on consular jurisdiction or participation in Japanese imperial institutions may have seemed like a question of personal practicality within their individual social world, or to use the words of dismissive consuls and some recent scholars, motivated by "economic rationality." But for Japanese consular and colonial and Chinese local officials, the individual actions of Taiwan sekimin were never confined only to their local context, but always threatened to initiate a slow but irreversible remaking of the social, legal, and economic orders of intra-imperial, inter-imperial, and national East Asia.

Chapter One: Taiwan and Taiwanese at the Edges of Empires, 1891–1910

In early 1891, a young Japanese diplomatic official at the beginning of his career by the name of Ueno Sen'ichi (上野専一, 1856–1939) arrived in Taiwan with orders from the Foreign Minister to investigate the commercial potential of the island.[46] Ueno began his career in China in 1874, traveling to Shanghai to study Chinese and English, and rose through the ranks of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a series of postings in Qing China. The year Ueno first traveled to Shanghai for language study, a group of Japanese naval officers embarked on a military mission to the southern tip of the island of Taiwan, seeking to punish the indigenous inhabitants for a murder three years prior of a group of shipwrecked fishermen from the southernmost of the Ryūkyū islands, which lay between the Japanese archipelago and Taiwan.[47] The Qing government in Beijing had initially refused to take responsibility for the murders, claiming that they had occurred in a part of the island that was "savage territory" beyond the pale of Chinese civilization and therefore beyond the scope of court jurisdiction. After heated debate in Japan's new and ambitious Meiji government, the naval officers decided that the Chinese response justified a punitive mission in the name of protecting Ryūkyūan sailors—and, by extension, laying the foundation for future Japanese claims to sovereignty over the Ryūkyū islands. Armed with the rhetoric of "civilization and enlightenment," the officers set off for Taiwan, setting in

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46. For the details of Ueno's background, see Masako Hayashi, "Ueno Sen'ichi: Nisshin sensō mae no Taiwan ninshiki no senkusha," Taiwan kingendai shi kenkyū 2 (August 1979): 30–60.

47. For details of this expedition, known in Japanese as the "Taiwan Expedition," and its many after effects, see the two recent studies: Paul D. Barclay, *Outcasts of Empire: Japan's Rule on Taiwan's "Savage Border," 1874–1945* (Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2018). Eskildsen, *Transforming Empire in Japan and East Asia: The Taiwan Expedition and the Birth of Japanese Imperialism*.

motion a decades-long process that would remake the regional Sinocentric order and transform Japan into a modern, imperial power.

Ueno's investigative trip to Taiwan in 1891 shaped Japanese officials' understanding of the economy and society of late Qing Taiwan. In 1894, Japan and China would go to war, which would end in a Japanese victory and its acquisition of Taiwan as its first colonial holding in 1895. Although most accounts of the colonization of Taiwan begin with the outset of Japanese rule in 1895, I begin by recounting Ueno's visit to reveal the continuities between his observations and later Japanese officials' understandings of the economy and society of late Qing Taiwan that shaped Japanese efforts to colonize the island.[48] As Ueno reported after his return to Fuzhou, the treaty-port city in China to which he was posted, Taiwan was embedded in regional networks of commercial exchange that linked it to the South China coast. The Qing court had recently upgraded Taiwan to a province in recognition of its strategic importance and had appointed a new provincial administrator to undertake steps to develop the island's industries and consolidate authority over its frontiers. These changes had been accomplished by collaborating with the island's local elite, who had been enriched by the new commercial opportunities offered by resource extraction in the interior and the treaty-port exchange network that now connected Taiwan to global markets. Following Japan's colonization of Taiwan in 1895, the colony's new administrators ruled the island in view of its late Qing political economy

48. For other works that show the continuities between late Qing rule and early Japanese efforts to colonize Taiwan, see Lung-chih Chang, "From Island Frontier to Imperial Colony: Qing and Japanese Sovereignty Debates and Territorial Projects in Taiwan, 1874–1906" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 2003). Antonio Tavares, "Crystals from the Savage Forest: Imperialism and Capitalism in the Taiwan Camphor Industry, 1800–1945" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 2004). Two newer works that adopt this approach are Barclay, *Outcasts of Empire*. Eskildsen, *Transforming Empire in Japan and East Asia: The Taiwan Expedition and the Birth of Japanese Imperialism*. Although I begin with the Taiwan Expedition, my primary concern is not with Taiwan's indigenous population but with the effects on the regional political economy and the relationship between local authorities and elites brought on by late nineteenth century transformations and the subsequent effects on Japanese colonization.

and sought to bolster the island's connections to the treaty-ports in South China, using Taiwan and its inhabitants as a stepping stone into the Chinese market. One step colonial officials took toward this goal was pushing the Japanese Foreign Ministry to establish a consulate in Xiamen, the treaty-port city most closely connected to Taiwan. On account of his knowledge of the region and its economy, Ueno was appointed the first Japanese consul to serve in Xiamen.

After his posting at Xiamen, Ueno drew on his knowledge of late Qing Taiwan and the island's location in the regional political economy to shape the collaborative efforts of the Japanese Foreign Ministry in China and the colonial government in Taiwan to expand Japanese interests from the empire's new colony to the Chinese mainland. Japanese administrators in Taiwan's colonial government also drew on the connections of local elites in Taiwan to Qing officials and elites in China to gain exclusive rights to railway construction and to control south China's camphor production. Taiwanese elites aided the efforts of the Japanese empire in South China at inter-imperial competition with the Western powers during the scramble for concessions and railway rights at the turn of the twentieth century. These ventures enjoyed limited success, but linked the interests of Taiwanese elites to those of the colonial state through joint investments of capital.

At the same time, colonial and diplomatic officials sought to regulate the mobility of individuals across the Taiwan Strait, recognizing the commercial potential in encouraging mobility while fearing the potential dangers of the unregulated movement of individuals in and out of Taiwan. These efforts would culminate in Japanese officials designating a new legal status, Taiwan sekimin or "registered Taiwanese," to refer to any Taiwanese subject traveling to China. In theory, this would confer the benefits of Japanese extraterritorial jurisdiction to its holders in China and allow the consuls to regulate their movement. But in practice, controlling

mobility amounted to drawing a border across a network connected by historical and commercial links. Determining who would and would not hold this legal status was a difficult task that required ongoing negotiations between consular and colonial officials and revealed their divergent priorities. The colonial government was eager to remove barriers to the movement of Taiwanese elites and their capital, on which they relied for ventures in China. Japanese reliance on Taiwanese elites and their capital in expanding imperial influence in China would, in turn, render these efforts conditional on elite Taiwanese support. Diplomatic officials, in contrast, were burdened with the day-to-day tasks of adjudicating claims brought to the consul, and sought to reduce the burdens placed on their office by removing the registration of those they deemed disreputable and a threat to public order. This chapter traces Japanese conceptions of Taiwan's place in the regional political economy, the changing relationship of the island and its elites to the treaty-ports on the Chinese mainland, and efforts to regulate mobility of people and capital across the Taiwan Strait during the first decade of Japanese rule in Taiwan.

Ueno Sen'ichi and the View of Late Qing Taiwan

Ueno's 1891 trip to Taiwan was his second; he first visited the island ten years before in 1881, as a junior secretary (J: *shokisei*) in the diplomatic corps in Shanghai.[49] In the decade between his first and second visits, the Qing bureaucracy and infrastructure on Taiwan had undergone rapid change. The Qing government, partially in response to the vulnerabilities the island faced at the empire's maritime frontier, had initiated an ambitious series of modernizing

49. Ueno mentions this in a subsequent report of an investigation on Taiwan, published in 1894–5 over three issues of the periodical Chigaku Zasshi. Lung-chih Chang, "From Island Frontier to Imperial Colony: Qing and Japanese Sovereignty Debates and Territorial Projects in Taiwan, 1874–1906" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 2003).

reforms, focused both on building infrastructure and extending formal governmental control deeper into the areas inhabited by indigenous peoples, an initiative known as "Opening the Mountain and Pacifying the Savages" (C: *kaishan fufan*). At the helm of these reforms was Chinese military officer-turned-governor Liu Mingchuan (劉銘傳), who had first served as a general in the Taiping Rebellion, before being appointed to defend Taiwan during the 1884–85 Sino-French War. The French Navy targeted the island without success, thanks to Liu. After the Sino-French War, Liu quickly began building the island's first railway, upgrading its defensive capabilities, and reforming its taxation and financial systems. In recognition of Taiwan's new strategic importance, the Qing court upgraded the island from an administrative outpost of Fujian to a province in its own right in 1887. This ambitious course of action would not have been possible without enlisting the help of local elites, who, in exchange for investing in infrastructure and commanding militias who monitored the frontier with indigenous peoples, were transformed from local strongmen into influential officials in their own right. These local elites, most prominent among them from two families surnamed Lin—the Banqiao Lin in northern Taiwan and the Wufeng Lin in central Taiwan—were also merchants who participated in Taiwan's trade with the south China coast. Taiwan in the late nineteenth century was a predominantly agricultural society, which exported commodities such as rice, sugar, camphor, and tea via the entrepôt of Xiamen across the Taiwan Strait in Fujian province to markets around the world.

In 1891, Ueno was posted in Fuzhou, another port city on the south China coast, and one of a few maritime commercial centers that had been opened to foreign trade after the Qing defeat in the First Opium War fifty years earlier. The Japanese diplomatic presence on this stretch of the south China coast between Shanghai and Hong Kong was limited at this time to the city of Fuzhou. Foreign Minister Aoki had sent Ueno to investigate commercial conditions in Taiwan

because its strategic location "between our [Japan's] southwest border and the Chinese mainland" made it of utmost political, strategic, and commercial importance.[50] Aoki mentioned to Ueno that he had heard reports that many of Taiwan's inhabitants resented Liu Mingchuan's rule, "begrudging the yoke of the Manchu Qing empire" and detesting its new heavy taxation. It was only a matter of time, Aoki said, before the next "incident in the Far East" gave some European power the pretext to land troops on the island.

Perhaps predisposed by his superior's orders to discover an island filled with people resentful of Qing rule, Ueno arrived in Taiwan only to discover that Aoki seemed indeed to be correct. Taiwan was rife with inter-ethnic strife among the Chinese settlers who had arrived in waves from different parts of the mainland. Many were also dissatisfied with the recent tax increases that were used to fund new military and defense expenditures. Ueno reported that Taiwan's inhabitants hated the Qing government so much, in fact, that they were secretly jealous of the island's foreign population, of whom he recorded meetings with a Spanish missionary and an English doctor. Things were better before Liu came, all of Ueno's interlocutors seemed to agree, and they yearned for the days when the island had been a lightly administered outpost of Fujian province.

Although Ueno began his reports with a narrative account of his observations of society at large, he was also eager to meet the new province's ruling elite, namely Liu Mingchuan and Lin Weiyuan of northern Taiwan's Banqiao Lin family. Here Ueno shifted into interview mode, recording interactions with these two feigned as a series of candid conversations between officials. Of particular interest to Ueno was the construction of Taiwan's first railroad, which

50. See "Taiwan tō jōkyō shisatsu hōkokusho Meiji nijūyonen," JACAR B16080717600.

was underway under Liu's direction. But first Liu was curious to know why his visitor had come to Taiwan.

"Liu: Consul, how many years have you been in China?
Ueno: It has already been over ten years.
Liu: Then you must be well versed in China's matters!
Ueno: I have paid most close attention to matters of trade."

Moving on to the railroads, Ueno reported that Liu was particularly congratulatory about Japan's rail development. By comparison, China's railway mileage was only in the several hundred *li*. "'If the railways succeed, they will be extremely profitable, but in my honest opinion their construction is extremely difficult…' Liu grimaced and shook his head. 'The Chinese people do not know how to speak from [a place] of true logic, and so doing anything requires a great public discussion of a multitude of voices (*butsugi hyakushutsu*). This is my greatest difficulty. What about the people of your country?'" Liu replied. Ueno confirmed that, though Japanese had been similar at first, "once they recognized the true benefits of a venture, they were extraordinarily easy to organize." Though it is impossible to tell how faithfully Ueno recorded their conversation, he seemed at pains to relay Liu's praise for Japan's rapid industrial development, made all the more impressive in comparison to China's cultural deficiencies.

The two moved on to discuss trade. As he said, Ueno had paid close attention to trade, having published the *Dictionary of China's Trade and Products* three years earlier. Liu was first to ask a question.

"Liu: How much does Japan collect in maritime customs each year?
Ueno: Around five or six million per year.
Liu: Isn't that extremely little!
Ueno: It is difficult to compare to China, which is a large country with many ports.

Liu responded by reminding his guest that China's many ports and commercial relations were not necessarily a good thing; on the contrary, they had attracted many foreigners who were

eager to deceive the Chinese, who in the beginning "could have certainly overwhelmed the foreigners." But, since then, foreign merchants in China had single-mindedly pursued profit and monopolized the benefits of trade. Though the two returned to the topic of railways after Liu's long response, the implications were clear: although China's volume of trade dwarfed that of Japan, its markets had also attracted the attention of foreign commercial activity, which had not necessarily benefited the country.

Ueno next visited Lin Weiyuan, then an imperial commissioner (*qincha dachen*) and from a family that was "reportedly long the wealthiest in Taiwan," with holdings of some forty million taels. Lin was involved in many kinds of development construction; "he had poured his strength into every venture behind the scenes," Ueno reported. Lin invited Ueno to his mansion in Banqiao, on the outskirts of the provincial capital Taipei, where the two had a conversation that, unsurprisingly, started on the topic of railways.

> "Lin: The railroads in Japan have truly progressed rapidly. Do you employ foreigners [in their construction]?
> Ueno: At the present moment everything is done by Japanese hands; there is no reason to hire foreigners…how many foreigners are involved in Taiwan's railway?
> Lin: In total there are six. However, their construction is extremely flawed, and for the amount of money spent we have not seen results, which is extremely regrettable.
> Ueno: Why don't you hire Japanese engineers? Compared to [other] foreigners, I think their salary will be lower, and their work will be in no way inferior.
> Lin: The engineers hired at present are paid 400 silver *fu* a month; there are surely better engineers in Japan. How much are they paid per month at the first-, middle-, and low-class ranks?
> Ueno: I cannot say for certain, but I will pursue the question and inform you."

They moved on to talking about camphor, which at that moment was in great worldwide demand, and of which Taiwan was the world's top producing region, outranking Japan. Lin Weiyuan was one of the island's merchant-officials who provided militia support for the frontier regions where camphor trees were located, and was in charge of negotiating with the indigenous

people who held customary rights to camphor forests. The profits from the government's control over the sale and export of camphor in turn funded Lin's control of the frontier. Ueno had likely heard of Taiwan's camphor industry, but innocuously asked his interlocutor where the forests were located. "Near the 'savage border' in the north," Lin replied, mentioning the forests that were then under his direction and one of the many sources of his wealth.

Ueno concluded his report on Taiwan by speculating about what would happen after Liu's death or retirement. Would the investments in Taiwan's infrastructure stop with Liu, if he left the island? It would not be difficult to envision a foreign power stepping in to invest in Taiwan, Ueno imagined. "From the perspective of Far East strategy, the future of this island is something that we Japanese should also pay close attention to from now on," warned Ueno. What made Taiwan attractive was its "stunning degree of riches, possessing from gold, silver, copper, steel and so on, every product necessary for people's livelihood. It was truly a heaven blessed treasure house," Ueno effused.

Just three years later, Japan and China went to war over influence in Korea, and at war's end China ceded Taiwan to the Japanese empire as its first formal colony. Many observers later credited Japan's victory to its superior industrial development, echoing themes repeated in Ueno's conversations with his hosts in Taiwan, although the two powers had in reality been fairly evenly matched at the outset of the war. The Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed to conclude the war, brought Japan recognition by China as an imperial, treaty-port power, which meant that equal and reciprocal commercial relations between China and Japan were replaced by Japan gaining parity with the Western imperial powers and obtaining special commercial and legal rights in China. Since the war was fought over Korea, Japan's subsequent acquisition of Taiwan is sometimes described as an accident or an afterthought. Ueno's report on his observations of

Taiwan suggest otherwise, showing the extent of Japanese knowledge of Taiwan's commerce, politics, and society and its awareness of Taiwan's strategic position in East Asia, which predated the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–5.

Ueno's report is also significant because at the end of the war, Japan's new colonial government in Taiwan, the Government-General, requested the establishment of a Japanese consulate at Xiamen, with Ueno as its consul.[51] In his tenure as Xiamen consul, a position he held until 1907, Ueno oversaw the rapid extension of Japanese commercial interests in China in industries that had dominated his conversations with Liu Mingchuan and Lin Weiyuan: railroads and camphor. This is not to say that Ueno predicted a decade of Japanese imperial policy. But his influential role in shaping Japanese diplomatic policy in China and extending Japanese interests from colonial Taiwan to the mainland as the Xiamen consul, preceded his appointment in 1895. Shortly after Ueno met Liu Mingchuan in early 1891, Liu retired for health reasons, leaving the island in a state of flux as Ueno had predicted. But Ueno's other host, Lin Weiyuan, and his many family members, went on to play influential roles in shaping the course of the Japanese empire in Taiwan and China, outlasting Ueno and continuing through the early twentieth century.

Sawamura Shigetarō and Taiwan in the Regional Political Economy

Shortly after consolidating rule over colonial Taiwan, the Government-General dispatched Sawamura Shigetarō, a junior naval official, to Xiamen in May 1896 to observe commercial conditions there.[52] The treaty-port city was newly host to a Japanese diplomatic

51. See "3. Ueno Sen'ichi," JACAR B14090818500.

52. In the early days of colonial rule, Sawamura had been involved in the drafting of a "Taiwan policy," which was published in September 1895 as Taiwan seido kō. This policy draft was primarily concerned with land tenure, land

presence and was the object of the colonial government's ambitions. Sawamura stayed in Xiamen for almost three years, conducting on-site investigations and interviews with customs officials and local and foreign merchants. He drew on local gazetteers, place-specific works produced in China during the late imperial period to introduce localities and record their history, geography, commercial relations, and so on. Sawamura's accounts, published in July 1898 as *Cross-Strait Conditions*, are useful because they reveal how the broader regional political economy of which Taiwan had been a part in the late Qing, was a topic of great concern for the Government-General even from its earliest days before it had consolidated rule over Taiwan.[53] Debates in the Japanese government about the profitability of colonizing Taiwan—a serious question during the early years of Japanese rule—were mistaken, Sawamura said, as they started from the premise that saw Taiwan in isolation. "[People] have not yet researched how Taiwan will be a conduit for trends in the Far East and the world, what foothold it will occupy, and how it will influence interests in the future; this is truly regrettable."[54] Focusing mostly on Taiwan's existing commercial relations with the China coast but primarily Xiamen, Sawamura sketched out a vibrant network that linked ports on Taiwan's west coast to those up and down the Chinese littoral. Commodity-specific and location-specific guilds, known as *jiao*, had facilitated this regional trade in goods. From the perspective of Japan, which had previously exported goods to China via Tianjin in the north, Shanghai in the center, and Guangzhou and Hong Kong in the south, these *jiao* trade networks connecting Taiwan to new locales in China provided a fast track for advancing Japanese commercial interests in a competitive market. If Japanese goods did not

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taxation, and the management of frontier defense bureaus. See "10. Zatsu/Taiwan sōtokufu reiki rui shō Taiwan seido kō 1," JACAR B03041712200.

53. Shigetarō Sawamura, Taigan jijō (Tokyo: Nakagawa Tōshirō, 1898).

54. Sawamura, 21.

sell well in colonial Taiwan, rather than send them back to Japan, it would be better to offload them in China, Sawamura suggested.

Echoing Ueno's conversation with Liu, one question at the forefront of Sawamura's mind was how the colonization of Taiwan could help Japanese merchants seize the upper hand from regional Chinese merchants, who were satisfied with low margins and benefited from low operating costs. Sawamura suggested that Japan could take advantage of its strengths—a standardized system of measurements, joint partnerships, banks, and a newly codified Commercial Code—to entice Chinese with merchant licenses and joint enterprises to pool their capital. Both Sawamura's suggestions would have a future in Japan's ongoing efforts to gain a foothold in China's commercial markets. While Japanese merchants faced stiff competition from Chinese merchants, they were also at a significant disadvantage compared to the Western powers, which had been trading in Xiamen for much longer. Of particular interest to Sawamura was the British-run Douglas Steamship Company, which operated the only steamship liner between Taiwan and the mainland; smaller Chinese junks conducted the remaining transportation of goods and people. Although Sawamura wanted to make entry into these *jiao* networks connected by junks, he also saw the eventual Japanese replacement of Douglas' monopoly on steamship shipping as a necessity. The Taiwan Government-General accomplished this just a few years later, replacing Douglas' routes with similar ones operated with heavy government subsidies by the Osaka Yūsen Kaisha shipping company. Controlling the smaller scale traffic in junks, later to be replaced by small motor-powered boats, however, vexed the colonial government for decades. Finally, remarking on Xiamen's foreign population, Sawamura had stayed in Xiamen long enough to witness the emergence of a new Taiwanese merchant community in the city. Taiwan and Xiamen had commercial links that stretched back centuries;

the Taiwanese merchants were not "new" in this regard. Rather, they were "new" in the sense that they were now operating as Japanese subjects with the status of foreign merchants, which exempted them from taxes and local jurisdiction, as I will describe below. "In no time," Sawamura predicted, "Xiamen will become one huge market for Taiwanese."[55]

Sawamura's reports highlights two points. First, the Government-General conceived Taiwan as connected to China, and particularly the southeast coast, through historical and commercial networks. The necessity of understanding Taiwan within this network and not in isolation from it, Sawamura insisted, was a recurring theme. Second, although this network provided innumerable opportunities for Japanese economic interests, it was also an arena of fierce competition with Western imperial powers and local Chinese merchants. The density of mobility across the network, not only in commodities but also in people, soon became as much a threat as an opportunity for Japanese rule on Taiwan.

The Emergence of "Taiwan Sekimin" as a Legal Question

Though the Japanese empire defeated the Qing in early 1895, and the two powers signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki ending the war and agreeing to the cession of Taiwan to Japan, the Japanese army faced considerable local resistance after landing on the island to establish control. Changes on the island in the preceding decades had empowered local elites, many of whom were merchants-turned-officials who had gained influence by facilitating the extension of Qing authority under the "Open the Mountains and Pacify the Savages" (*kaishan fufan*) policy. Many of these local elites remained loyal to the Qing and were extremely resistant to Japanese rule over the island; moreover, Qing policies of the preceding decades meant that many of them were

55. Sawamura, 258.

in control of powerful local militias. Although most local elites eventually surrendered to the Japanese, or left the island altogether, the armed uprising from members of these militias—whether remaining in Taiwan or having escaped to China—continued to threaten the stability of Japanese rule in Taiwan, even in the face of brutal suppression. Japanese officials in Taiwan were therefore very concerned about monitoring and regulating the movement of this population, in addition to existing patterns of mobility, across the Taiwan Strait.

One provision of the Treaty of Shimonoseki allowed for "residents of the territory ceded to Japan" to, within two years, sell off their property and assets and relocate elsewhere.[56] All other inhabitants (*jūmin*) remaining after this time would be considered subjects of Japan (*Nihon shinmin*). They were not made "Japanese nationals" because Japan did not have a "nationality law" (*kokuseki hō*) until 1899. In theory, this option gave individuals, mainly local elites, the opportunity to relocate to China and avoid becoming Japanese subjects. In practice, though, this provision and subsequent laws determining who would be considered a Japanese subject, based on the category of "inhabitant," were not so easily defined. Although Japanese officials started to compile records of household registration as early as July 1895—before the whole island had been brought under Japanese control—these records were incomplete at best. The Government-General attempted to define the category of inhabitant as "a person who held a permanent

56. Quoted in Wang, "Riben tongzhi xia Taiwan ren guanyu guoji de falü jingyan: yi Taiwan yu Zhongguo zhi jian kuajie de renkou liudong wei zhongxin." 59n40. This has been the subject of much existing scholarship, but I will summarize the legal process of defining Taiwanese individuals' status in the colony and when traveling to the mainland as it provides key background to this dissertation. See Wang Tay-sheng's article, focusing on the process from the lens of individual understandings of "citizenship"; Jun Kurihara, "'Taiwan sōtokufu kōbun ruisan' ni miru Taiwan sekimin to ryoken mondai," Tokyo joshi daigaku hikaku bunka kenkyusho kiyō 63 (2002): 19–40, which uses the archives of the Taiwan Government-General to examine how the colonial government selectively granted citizenship to "desirable individuals" even after the 1897 deadline; Toyomi Asano, Nihon teikoku no shokuminchi hōsei (Nagoya: Nagoya daigaku shuppankai, 2008), Section 1, on the legal aspects of the legal status of Taiwanese residents after Japanese colonization; and Qing Wu, "Nihon tōchika no Taiwan ni okeru jinkō idō seisaku: 1895 nen 5 gatsu 8 nichi —1897 nen 5 gatsu 8 nichi no yūyo kikan wo chūshin ni," Shakai shisutemu kenkyū, 21 (2018): 1–21. Wu focuses on the changes in legal classification within the first two years of colonization.

address in Taiwan or the Penghu Islands before May 8th, 1895," making an effort to exclude the temporary seasonal laborers from China who worked in the tea industry, or others mobile across the Taiwan Strait. Even before the expiration of the two-year limit on leaving Taiwan, it was these existing patterns of mobility, for which Japanese officials had to account to determine who was a proper inhabitant of Taiwan, that complicated the process of deciding who would and would not be considered a Japanese subject.

One set of issues had to do with individuals entering Taiwan, who were in some cases seasonal migrant laborers and merchants, and were in other cases family members of Taiwanese families who had fled the island at the start of the Sino-Japanese war to escape conflict and were now returning to Taiwan. As Chinese officials did not distribute documentation of national status (the category did not exist at this time), Japanese officials had to determine how to classify these individuals when they landed in Taiwan. In January 1896, Japanese officials promulgated the "Regulations on Chinese (*Shinkokujin*) Landing in Taiwan," which required documentation from Chinese officials stating an individual's hometown, name, profession, age, and purpose of travel, and which excluded laborers and "individuals without a fixed profession," (*ittei no shokugyō*) in practice forbidding the entry of anyone who could not claim to be a merchant.[57] For those who had been mobile between Taiwan and China, the regulations required documentation stating as much from either local officials in Taiwan or Japanese diplomatic consuls in China. And even

57. Quoted in Wu, "Nihon tōchika no Taiwan ni okeru jinkō idō seisaku: 1895 nen 5 gatsu 8 nichi —1897 nen 5 gatsu 8 nichi no yūyo kikan wo chūshin ni." 4. Wu notes that the inclusion of "inhabitants of Taiwan" under those to whom the "Regulations on Chinese Landing in Taiwan" applied demonstrates that "inhabitants of Taiwan" was a sub-category within the larger category of "Chinese." The charts reproduced by Wu on page 6 collected by officials in Tainan indicate that the three categories of "profession" were: merchant (shōgyō), no occupation (mushoku), and other. Between January 1896 and May 1897, for example, of the "Inhabitants of Taiwan" that landed, of 3,745 men, 57% were merchants, 29% were without an occupation, and 14% were "other," while of 1,958 women, 25% were merchants, 67% were without an occupation, and 8% were other. Wu suggests that all the men without an occupation can be assumed to have been male children.

though these regulations prohibited the entry of those without a fixed profession, this regulation was in practice only applied to adult men; adult women and children were allowed to enter Taiwan as family dependents even if they did not have jobs. Conversely, this understanding of the family as the basic unit of society served as the justification for forcibly repatriating single men without formal documentation of employment, categorizing them as “scoundrels” or “ruffians” (J: *burai*; C: *wulai*).[58] In practice, this regulation was used to “repatriate” Qing militia forces who surrendered to Japanese rule after 1895. As early as 1896, then, both the colonial officials in Taiwan and diplomatic officials in China were involved in determining the boundaries of who was and was not “Taiwanese.”

A related set of regulatory complications emerged out of controlling the movement of individuals leaving Taiwan for China. In this case, too, issues emerged out of regulating existing patterns of mobility even before the 1897 deadline for leaving. In February of 1896, for example, officials in the Tainan Branch of the Office of Civil Affairs (*minsei shibu*) realized that documentation they were issuing to individuals in Taiwan who were traveling to China was being passed on in China to other individuals. As there was not yet a codified system of issuing documentation for travel, the Tainan office was already exceptional in the forms it issued. Another branch office in Fengshan, for example, did not issue any documentation to departing individuals, which also meant that it did not require documentation upon return. The Fengshan official’s reasoning was that the office could not require any documentation if it did not have a predetermined means of issuing it and feared that individuals would not be able to return to

58. See Asano, Nihon teikoku no shokuminchi hōsei, 36-39.

Taiwan. In contrast, the Tainan official argued that this opened the door for falsification and human trafficking, and demanded more stringent documentation issued upon departure.[59]

The Tainan official's position won out and the documentation he advocated was the predecessor to the passport, issued beginning in April 1897 to all Taiwanese traveling to China.[60] These individuals were hereafter referred to by a new legal category, "Taiwan sekimin," which means "people registered in Taiwan." In China, this juridical category entitled its members to all the legal rights and privileges afforded to subjects of foreign empires, including extraterritorial legal jurisdiction and tax exemption. This foreign subject designation also prevented Taiwan sekimin from owning land (requiring them to lease it indefinitely instead) and from settling in the "interior" of China, that is, outside the treaty-ports proper. In theory, this system was built upon a system of personal legal jurisdiction, whereby resident consuls governed their country's foreign subjects. To prevent the misuse of this official documentation, in time the Japanese consuls came to require Taiwan sekimin to deposit their passports at the consulate upon arrival, but compliance was often incomplete and impossible to enforce.

In practice the system of extraterritorial jurisdiction and the boundaries of the juridical category of Taiwan sekimin were far from watertight. Individuals continued to enter the household registration system long after 1897, thereby rendering them eligible for status as Taiwan sekimin if they traveled to the mainland. For the most part, as the Government-General was well aware, these applicants included people from China who sought to find a way to

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59. This conflict is detailed in Wu, "Nihon tōchika no Taiwan ni okeru jinkō idō seisaku: 1895 nen 5 gatsu 8 nichi —1897 nen 5 gatsu 8 nichi no yūyo kikan wo chūshin ni," 9–10.

60. These passports are held in the archive of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For more information, see Shin Kawashima and Shu-ming Chung, "Riben waiwusheng waijiao shiliaoguan guancang Taiwan ren chuguo huzhao xiangguan ziliao zhi jieshao (1897–1934)," *Taiwan shi yanjiu* 4, no. 2 (December 1997): 133–47.

register in Taiwan to evade local taxes or gain benefits in working or taking out loans.[61] In other cases, individuals seeking registration after 1897 could have briefly taken refuge in China after the onset of Japanese colonization on Taiwan to wait it out before making a decision to return to Taiwan. In yet other cases, even if adult men were in possession of proper documentation allowing them and their accompanying dependents to travel, incomplete efforts at tracking the mobility of women and children lead to suspicions of human trafficking, which only came to colonial officials' attention when they attempted to register in Taiwan.[62] The Government-General was also aware that colonial officials' entering individuals who sought the legal benefits of Taiwan sekimin status in China into the household registration system would then obligate the Japanese consuls in south China to provide them with legal protection in the event of conflict. Taking note of this, Civil Minister Gotō Shinpei required local officials in Taiwan in 1900 to first consult the opinions of their diplomatic colleagues across the Taiwan Strait before registering any new persons. The Government-General later required investigating individuals before registering them, essentially institutionalizing wealth, occupation, level of education, and personal conduct as criteria for official consideration.[63] Local and provincial officials in China also played a part in the systematization of registering individuals in Taiwan; these officials caught Gotō off guard on his trip to Fujian in 1900 by complaining of the difficulties in apprehending and prosecuting individuals who claimed to have Taiwan sekimin status, which I will discuss in the next section.

61. See Kurihara, 25.

62. See Kurihara, 32.

63. See Kurihara, 27, and the following section for examples.

The Taiwan Government-General's inability to monitor mobility across the Taiwan Strait led to conflicts between colonial and diplomatic officials over the activities of the "bandits" who escaped from Taiwan to China. The summer Governor-General Kodama Gentarō (1852–1906, in office February 1898–April 1906) came to power, Xiamen Consul Ueno wrote to him to report on the "bandits" (*hizoku*) who had capitulated to colonial rule but escaped to the mainland. "Because of the bandits…commerce between Xiamen and Taipei is entirely stopped, and banks have also ceased their transactions,"[64] Ueno relayed. A few days later, Ueno elaborated on the situation, commenting that it was not only local Chinese merchants but also those with Japanese status, like Lin Weiyuan, who were affected by the disorder. "Even in the middle of the day, they charge into people's houses and rob them, and it is absolutely impossible to expect the security of commerce…local residents are extremely skeptical of the lack of prestige of the government of Taiwan, and it is said that the capitulation of the bandits' leaders was not a true act of submission but solicited by a bribe from the Government-General." Needless to say, this allegation both insulted and emboldened the new Governor-General, himself a military official with a long career in the army, who responded by denying the situation and accusing Ueno of being unaware of conditions in Taipei and of relying on local rumors. Ueno remained unconvinced: the banditry had become a subject of conversation even among the wealthy merchants who had relocated from Taiwan to Xiamen, and the rumors had spread beyond the city to neighboring Zhangzhou and Quanzhou as well. Even from the earliest days of colonial rule, the movement of people across the Taiwan Strait created in Japanese officials' minds the need to approach the surveillance and control of mobility holistically. In the same way that news about the possibility of registering in a Taiwanese household in order to gain the status of

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64. "16. Taiwan dohi ōkō no tame Shinkoku shō oyobi Taimin zokuzoku Amoi ni tokō no gi ni tsuki Ueno ryōji yori gushin ikken," JACAR B08090136500.

Taiwan sekimin could travel across the strait, so too could news of ongoing banditry that affected Japan's capacity as a new imperial power.

Despite the vast expansion of attempts to control and surveill the movement of individuals across the Taiwan Strait, the Government-General's attempts were always incomplete at best, whether intentionally or accidentally. Conflicts emerging from who was to be considered a Taiwan sekimin—brought at times by individuals to consuls, and at others by consuls over individuals—continued throughout the early twentieth century, only ending with the dismantling of Japan's empire and abolishing the system of extraterritoriality at the end of World War II.

Kodama and Gotō at the Helm: Gotō Shinpei's Visits to Fujian and the Emergence of a "Cross Straits Policy"

Ueno's critique of Governor-General Kodama's incomplete attempts at suppressing banditry and controlling the mobility of people and goods across the Taiwan Strait likely especially rankled the new Governor-General because it was under Kodama's administration that the colonial government saw, for the first time, the emergence of a coherent "China policy." His short-lived predecessor Governor-General Katsura Tarō (1848–1913, in office June–October 1896), had first conveyed the importance of Taiwan as a strategic foothold and implored Japanese colonial administrators to cast their eyes across the Taiwan Strait, after a tour of Taiwan and China shortly following his appointment.[65] Kodama and Gotō Shinpei, his Civil

65. "Katsura no nanshinron," transcribed in Yūsuke Tsurumi, Seiden Gotō Shinpei, Taiwan jidai 1898–1906 nen (ketteiban), ed. Tomoyoshi Ikkai, vol. 3 (Tokyo: Fujiwara shoten, 2005). Also present on this tour was Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi and Navy Minister Saigō Tsugumichi, the commander of Japanese naval forces in the Taiwan Expedition of 1874. It would take Kodama's administration for Katsura's ideas to ossify into a "cross-strait policy" (taigan kei'ei); Tsurumi's partial transcription of Katsura's writing only mentions policy in the context of "institutions in and policy for Taiwan" (Taiwan no shisetsu kei'ei). Katsura's focus was on "extending national power" (kokusei shinchō) to "the coast of south China" (Nan Shin no enkaku), and making Xiamen into a "new

Minister, inherited this viewpoint and were clear that the success of Japanese rule hinged not only on its administration of the island colony, but of its capacity to exert influence in politics and commerce across the strait. It was shortly after Kodama's appointment that the term "across the strait" (*taigan*) came into wide use to refer to China broadly but more often the provinces of Fujian and Guangdong along the southeast coast.[66] This term conveyed both distance from and proximity to China while positioning Taiwan as the vantage point. "Across the strait" was also combined with the term "management" to from the concept of a "cross-strait strategic policy," which took shape in 1900 under Kodama and Gotō's administration. The evolution of this yet inchoate policy was anticipated in an article from the *Taiwan Daily News* in February 1900, which sought to introduce its readers to the new concept.

The article extolled the successes of the new "cross strait policy," opening with "reports from Japanese in all parts of Fujian province [say that] everyone has been brought a promising future, the intentions of officials and people alike are truly harmonious, and Japanese are generally welcomed…The close cooperation of Japanese and Chinese will be established on such a foundation, and if this is generally found favorable among the people of Fujian, I do not doubt that our cross strait policy will be immensely successful (*ben'eki aru*)."[67] The author, however,

gateway" (shin kadoguchi) for introducing Japanese ideas (fūkyō) and goods to China to cultivate latent Japanese power across Fujian and eventually, to the vaguely defined "southern islands" (nanpō guntō) and "south seas" (Nan'yō). See also Stewart Lone, Army, Empire and Politics in Meiji Japan : The Three Careers of General Katsura Tarō (London: Macmillan, 2000), 45–48.

This speech is also quoted as the turning point in Japanese colonial officials' devising a coherent economic policy for Taiwan in Han-Yu Chang and Ramon H. Myers, "Japanese Colonial Development Policy in Taiwan, 1895-1906: A Case of Bureaucratic Entrepreneurship," The Journal of Asian Studies 22, no. 4 (1963): 433–49.

66. As an example consider the section "Miscellaneous Matters in China (Across the Strait)" in the Taiwan Daily News, which appeared first in May 1898. This section contained articles on the Japanese concession in Tianjin, the Small Swords Uprising, the practice of selling official titles in the Qing, the price of rice in Fuzhou, and coastal defense, among others.

67. "Taigan keiei to Shinkoku no keisatsu," Taiwan nichinichi shinpō, February 28, 1900.

reported problems in Xiamen—the one place in Fujian where Japanese were unwelcome, but also the "sole gateway to Fujian Province" and the "foothold (*rikkyakuchi*) for our cross strait policy." The author continued: "the cross strait policy must start from Xiamen, so in the management (*keiei*) of Xiamen we must focus our efforts on winning the hearts of the people of Xiamen and rooting out the rebels and rabblerousers (*bōkankyōto*)." In contrast to Ueno's diagnosis, the article pinned the blame of this condition rather on the police in Xiamen, and issued a declaration to "our relevant authorities" (the Foreign Ministry) in the treaty-port: either allow the extension of "our police jurisdiction" to the treaty-port, or at the very least suggest the reformation of the local police force along Japanese lines.

Several things stand out in this first articulation of the "cross strait policy" in the *Taiwan Daily News*, an organ of the colonial government. First is the strategic importance of Xiamen, the "sole gateway to Fujian Province." Second is the optimism placed in the idea of Sino-Japanese cooperation as the basis for a successful China policy. Xiamen's "rebels and rabblerousers" would also be a recurrent theme in the Foreign Ministry and Government-General's disagreements on how best to manage Japanese interests in the treaty-port. Here the author is likely referring to those involved in anti-Japanese activities in the transition form Qing to Japanese rule, who had escaped to Xiamen. By casting them as rebels, the author called to mind the colonial government's ongoing efforts to clamp down on armed resistance and to justify the expansion of the colonial police force. The extension of Japanese police authority to the Chinese mainland, and in general the expansion of colonial forms of governance and infrastructural management to China based on their professed successes in the colony was another recurrent logic of Japanese officials. The appeal to "our relevant authorities," finally, was a critique

whereby colonial officials in Taiwan sought to justify their incursion into diplomatic affairs by castigating the Foreign Ministry's ineffectiveness.

This article was in many ways the public-facing version of Kodama's earlier "Memorandum Concerning the Past and Present of the Rule of Taiwan," (*Taiwan tōchi no kiō oyobi shōrai ni kansuru oboegaki*) from 1899.[68] The memorandum, likely drafted with Gotō's input, had only two items pertaining strictly to Taiwan. The others were related to policies in China, including making Xiamen subsidiary to Taiwan (*fuzokuchi*), winning over the hearts of the Fujianese (*Fukken minshin wo shūran suru saku*), establishing bank branches and Japanese schools, obtaining railway, road, and dock construction rights, surveying and identifying mines for opening, and passing a "nationality law" (*kokuseki hō*) or "Taiwan naturalization law" (*Taiwan kika hō*). Perhaps most important was Kodama's insistence that the strategy be peaceful—"without fighting, occupy Xiamen in all but name" (*tatakawazu shite Amoi senryō no jitsu wo osamuru*). Likely influenced by the Triple Intervention of 1895, when Russia, France, and Germany forced Japan to return to China the Liaodong Peninsula, which China had ceded after the Sino-Japanese War, and the Fujian Non-Cession Treaty signed in 1898 with Qing China, which guaranteed that China would not cede the province to a third power, Kodama wanted to tread lightly. Gotō visited Fujian twice in 1900, once in April and once in August, for the purpose of meeting local officials and merchants with ties to Taiwan, many of whom had only recently relocated to Fujian after having been merchant-officials in late Qing Taiwan.[69]

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68. Reprinted in Tsurumi, Seiden Gotō Shinpei, Taiwan jidai 1898–1906 nen (ketteiban), 500–508.

69. For details about Gotō's visits to Fujian in 1900, see Masashi Sugano, "1900 nen haru, Gotō Shinpei chōkan no Fukken hōmon nitsuite," Nara shigaku 11 (December 1993): 50–71, which is largely an exegesis of diplomatic materials, materials reprinted in the biography of Gotō by Tsurumi Yūsuke, the Taiwan Daily News, and Gotō's personal papers. Sugano suggests that Gotō may have used his trip to Tokyo from December 1899 to February 1900 to secure approval from the central government for these goals.

Accompanied by a retinue of junior officers, Gotō departed from Taiwan on April 1st and spent most of his three-week trip in Fuzhou, the administrative center of the province and the seat of the Min-Zhe (Fujian and Zhejiang Provincial) Governor-General, largely engaging in meetings in pursuit of the goals outlined in the memorandum.[70]

When Gotō departed for China, he insisted that he intended only to survey local conditions and to meet and build warm relationships with local officials and notables. In records of his meetings, he took the approach of praising the accomplishments of Japanese civilization—and particularly its achievements in ruling Taiwan. Japan had been especially successful at modernizing, Gotō claimed, because it had selectively adopted the best systems of the West and adapted them to the customs and manners (*minzoku fūzoku*) of the East.[71] By 1900, this had become a boilerplate account of Japanese modernization, especially vis-a-vis a declining China, but it is worth repeating because it was further inflected in this case by Gotō's experience as the architect of colonial Taiwan's ruling systems and ideology, itself informed by German-influenced conceptions that administration be adapted to the folkways and history of the ruled. He further proposed that his hosts visit Taiwan, not just for reference as a model for emulation, but to deepen Sino-Japanese relations. Gotō was not just being self-promotional; he was also at pains to take a defensive stance. Prior to his departure, Gotō had asked the Foreign Ministry to relay news of his visit to local Chinese officials via Chinese diplomatic officers. His hosts seemed to have taken this as an opportunity to coordinate their focus not on Gotō's desired topics of industrial and commercial cooperation, but on the procedural matter of Japanese registration law. In an inversion of the accusation from the newspaper article that Xiamen was crime ridden

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70. JACAR B16080747500 is a record of Gotō's trip to Fujian, reported to the Foreign Ministry.

71. Records of Gotō's private notes, quoted in Sugano, 57.

because its local police were incompetent, Chinese officials suggested that it was in fact the fault of colonial officials and the registration system that they were powerless to prosecute crime. "Taiwan and Fujian are separated by only a narrow strip of water, so there are frequent comings and goings of merchants and people (*shōmin*). Thus, if for example someone commits a crime here [in Fujian] and flees to Taiwan, cleverly registering [as a subject], because this criminal is a registered subject of your country, we have no avenue to investigate him. There are many similar examples, which harm our mutual relations (*higa no kōsai*)." Taken by surprise, Gotō was at pains to defend the colonial government's coastal security and registration bureaucracy, and ultimately blamed their misinformed assessment on estranged relations between Chinese officials and their subjects. Gotō's proposal that Chinese officials visit Taiwan was as much an effort to dismiss Chinese accusations of fault as it was promotional.

Gotō's hosts in Fujian included the Min-Zhe Governor-General Xu Yingkui (許應騤), who seemed particularly intrigued by colonial Taiwan's extremely profitable opium monopoly but "was otherwise a stiff and stereotypical Chinese official," and Chen Baochen (陳寶琛), from a family of scholars who had risen in the ranks from Jiangxi educational commissioner (*tidu xuezheng*) to Academician in the Grand Secretariat (*neiwu xueshi*), and had recently returned to his hometown of Fuzhou where he reportedly "had the rare distinction" of "holding secret sway among local officials."[72] But perhaps his most important meetings were those that bookended his trip with Chen's relative by marriage Lin Weiyuan, the patriarch of the Banqiao Lin family.[73]

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72. Quoted in Sugano, 59. Chen had five other brothers; of the six siblings, three were juren and three were jinshi.

73. Chen Baochen's younger sister, Chen Zhifang (陳芷芳), was married to Lin Erkang (林爾康), Weiyuan's nephew. Chen Baochen's daughter, Chen Shihuan (陳師桓), was married to Lin Xiongxiang, Lin Erkang's son. In other words, Lin Xiongxiang was married to his mother's (Chen Zhifang) brother's (Chen Baochen) daughter (Chen Shihuan). The other members of the Lin family will reappear later this dissertation. Other scholars have suggested that marrying women from Chinese official families (as opposed to women in Taiwan) was a deliberate strategy by the Lin family to maintain its power and fortune. The Lin family also had the distinction of never achieving official

After the Qing defeat in the Sino-Japanese War, Lin Weiyuan had moved his family back to Fujian, resettling in their home on Gulangyu, an island off the coast of Xiamen. Prior to his departure, he had been asked by the founders of the short-lived Republic of Taiwan that existed between the interregnum of the Qing defeat and the Japanese conquest of Taiwan to be the chairman of its parliament. Although he declined, their offer speaks to Lin's stature in late Qing Taiwan. With Taiwan suffering from insufficient capital for the Government-General's ambitious projects in the island colony, not to speak of the mainland, Gotō certainly had Lin's wealth and stature in mind when he sought an audience with Lin.

Perhaps buoyed by his accomplishments and wealth, Lin had developed a reputation as somewhat of a braggart, with the *Taiwan Daily News* going so far as to deride his "second rate personality."[74] As a result, Xiamen Consul Ueno usually warned Japanese visitors to delay their meetings with Lin a few days, but Gotō wasted no time in meeting him on the day he arrived in Xiamen, the first stop of his trip. The two talked convivially and at length, and Lin invited Gotō to his home the next evening, where he welcomed Gotō with a wide smile, which Lin returned with a deep bow. Gotō moved on to Fuzhou, but visited Lin once more in Xiamen at the end of the trip, when Gotō encouraged Lin to return to Taiwan, intimating that he must have family affairs to put in order—a tall order, given that Lin had fled the colonizing forces five years earlier. Lin returned Gotō's courtesy by thanking his guest for protecting his family and promising that "in time, [he] looked forward to calling on Goto's house of learning as his pupil and hearkening to his great teaching"[75] (*enmon o tataki tsune ni daikyō o kiku no ki aru beshi*).

positions through the imperial examination system, only through purchase—in sharp distinction to their highly credentialed in-laws, the Chens.

74. Quoted in Sugano, 64.

75. Quoted in Sugano, 64.

After ingratiating himself, Lin surprised Gotō the following day when, over lunch at his house, he broached the topic of his properties in Taiwan that had been occupied by the Army, insinuating that they had been wrongfully seized. Gotō was quick to reassure his host but had clearly been caught off guard. Perhaps Lin's question on the last day Gotō was in Xiamen, was just an example of his boorish personality. Or perhaps Lin sought to bridle Gotō's confidence, implying that there would be constraints on the Government-General's ability to seek his support in future ventures in the province.

Nevertheless, Gotō considered his nascent relationship with Lin a success—or as he called it, a "souvenir from his trip" for Governor-General Kodama. But others in Taiwan were less certain about Gotō's visit: one writer in the *Taiwan Daily News* speculated whether he had an ulterior motive beyond "observing local conditions." In an article titled "So-Called Cross Strait Management" (*Iwayuru taigan keiei*)—printed directly above a telegraph report that Gotō had arrived in Fuzhou—the author acknowledged that, while the time had come for the Government-General to coordinate its efforts with the south China consuls, doing so while all the world's eyes were on the area was bound to arouse suspicion.[76] "When the world sees the words 'cross strait management,' they may not be moved to action…but attempting to 'manage' (keiei) a [foreign] country is not at all proper. If Qing Chinese hear this, they will find it extremely peculiar, and we must give great consideration to the words 'cross strait management.'" The writer went on to insist "the policy must be nothing more than spreading the light of civilization (*bunka no kōhi*) and developing natural resources. This means making the people of China enter into the bounds of civilization, and, by developing untapped natural resources, strive for prosperous commerce and trade." While the author implies that Gotō was engaged in military

76. "Iwayuru taigan keiei," Taiwan nichinichi shinpō, April 8, 1900.

adventurism, he seemed more skeptical of Gotō's policy in name than in substance. The author was eager enough to condone economic expansionism in the name of civilizational development, a perennial justification for colonization and military expansionism.

This suspicion of a desire for military adventurism may have been warranted, as Kodama saw an opportunity later that year to dispense with his earlier commitment to "without fighting, occupy Xiamen in all but name." The Boxer Rebellion, an anti-imperialist uprising of peasants that targeted foreign schools and missionary communities, had spread across north China and threatened foreign communities in Beijing in the summer of 1900.[77] At the rebellion's outbreak, Gotō hurried to write to his new liaisons in China whom he had met earlier that year during his trip there, including Min-Zhe Governor-General Xu Yingkui and Huguang (Hunan-Hubei, in inland central China) Governor-General Zhang Zhidong.[78] These two Chinese officials were among the five provincial leaders of southern and eastern China that had agreed to reject the Qing court's recognition of the rebellion's legitimacy and to refuse the court's orders to attack the foreign powers, seeking instead to preserve peace in the localities under their jurisdiction. Gotō reassured Zhang Zhidong that rumblings that the Taiwan Government-General was planning to dispatch several thousand troops to Fuzhou and Xiamen were nothing more than

77. The imperial powers had only obtained the right of missionaries to establish institutions in the interior of China (that is, beyond the coastal treaty-ports) with the Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed in 1895. In other words, the missionary presence in areas of China like Shandong was a new one in 1900.

78. Tsurumi reproduces Gotō's letters to Zhang Zhidong and Chen Baochen, but does not date them. The letters are preceded in Tsurumi's narrative by one written sometime in mid-July (Gotō mentions having been in Tokyo upon hearing news that various foreign powers had dispatched naval ships to the Chinese coast, and that he had arrived there on July 8th, 1900. The letters are followed by Tsurumi's description of escalating threats of conflict spreading to central China, including the British landing of troops in Shanghai and the Russian occupation of Niuzhuang (Yingkou) in Manchuria, which frame Gotō's turn from diplomatic resolution to military intervention. Tsurumi then quotes a report from Fuzhou Consul Toyoshima to Foreign Minister Aoki from July 24th, which maintains that conditions there were peaceful. Tsurumi then quotes a report from Consul Ueno reporting similar conditions in Xiamen, dated July 4th. By early August, however, the Fujian consuls reported that undercurrents of anti-foreign sentiment were bubbling to the surface; most threatening was the proposition that China should recover Taiwan.

rumors, and that the colonial government's priorities remained in maintaining "undisturbed and prosperous commercial relations with Taiwan" and the territorial integrity of China.[79] Gotō emphasized Japan's commitment to Chinese territorial integrity to underscore its reliability as an ally to these regional officials in the face of actions underway to divide China into spheres of influence by the European imperial powers, aided by the Qing court's appetite for war. Gotō reiterated this in a letter to Chen Baochen, Lin Weiyuan's in-law and an official in the Grand Secretariat, seeking to stoke Chen's fears of machinations by the European powers to jump on an opportunity to divide China. Quoting his earlier letter to Zhang, Gotō sought to convince Chen to draw on his relationship with Zhang to compel him and other regional Chinese officials to conclude an agreement with Kodama and Gotō, enlisting Japanese military and political expertise in devising a "prudent strategy" (*zengosaku*) to maintain the peace in south China. By showing his support for growing regional resistance to the Qing court's central authority, Gotō proposed an alliance with regional authorities in the name of maintaining peaceful commercial relations in south China that would nevertheless be undergirded by the threat of Japanese military force.

That summer, the "Eight Nation Alliance" of Japan and the other imperial powers mobilized to suppress the rebellion in north China, and soon thereafter Britain dispatched troops to Shanghai, in central China, and stationed its navy off the coast of China, to be followed by French, German, and later Japanese forces.[80] Not to miss an opportunity, Gotō traveled to Tokyo in late July to lobby for the central government's support, and by mid August, had secured the

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79. Tsurumi, Seiden Gotō Shinpei, Taiwan jidai 1898–1906 nen (ketteiban), 539.

80. T.G. Otte, "The Boxer Rebellion and British Foreign Policy: The End of Isolation," in The Boxers, China, and the World, ed. Robert Bickers and R.G. Tiedemann (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), 157–78, 167.

commitment to dispatch troops from Taiwan to Fujian if necessary from a cabinet filled with such militarists as Prime Minister Yamagata Aritomo, Home Minister and leader of the 1874 Taiwan Expedition Saigō Tsugumichi, Navy Minister Yamamoto Gonbei, and Army Minister and former Governor-General of Taiwan Katsura Tarō.[81] The fervor in China and the opportunity for Japanese military expansion without risking confrontation with the Western powers converted even the most ardent pro-"Northern Advance" (against Russia) politicians to proponents of expansion from Taiwan to south China.[82]

Gotō arrived in Xiamen on August 23rd, making his second visit that year, but withdrew after British protest. The next day, a fire broke out in Xiamen's Japanese Honganji temple, providing Gotō a casus belli for landing Japanese troops in the city, in what came to be known as the Xiamen (Amoy) Incident. Takamatsu Sei, a former samurai who had turned to Buddhism and become the temple's own abbot, reported to Ueno that an anti-Japanese mob had burned down the temple, though Xiamen's American consul A. Burlingame Johnson conveyed that the temple's priests had moved their belongings out of the building the night before the fire, suggesting that arson was an internal plot.[83] The choice of a temple as a target was no coincidence; the Boxers had identified churches and other missionary institutions in north China

81. Gotō's and Kodama's efforts to lobby the central government for permission to dispatch troops to Fujian, and their justifications of preventing violence from spreading to south China and then to Taiwan, are detailed in Tsurumi, Seiden Gotō Shinpei, Taiwan jidai 1898–1906 nen (ketteiban) , 537–549.

82. Seiji Shirane, "Mediated Empire: Colonial Taiwan in Japan's Imperial Expansion in South China and Southeast Asia, 1895–1945" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 2014), 39–42; Marius Jansen, "Opportunists in South China during the Boxer Rebellion," Pacific Historical Review 20, no. 3 (August 1951): 241–50; Marius Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-Sen (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1954), 96–104. Jansen calls them "hard-headed realists who saw that nothing could be done in North China, Manchuria, or Korea at the time."

83. Jansen quotes a contemporaneous report by a "Japanese adventurer" Hirayama Shu and comments that Hirayama "reports rather disingenuously that some people thought the Japanese might have set the fire themselves," suggesting that Japanese authorities were correct in placing the blame on local Chinese. See Jansen, 246. Shirane, on the other hand, quotes more recent scholarship on Kodama Gentarō by Kobayashi Michihiko, which claims that Kodama had channeled military funds to the temple via Gotō to set the fire. See Shirane, 41n119.

as the targets of their critique. As Shirane has shown, the Government-General was quick to marshal the language of the need to "protect good Taiwanese subjects," and an article in the *Taiwan Daily News* again blamed the inadequacy of the Qing police for the need to intervene.[84] Reports from Ueno stoked fears that the culprits were, in fact, "anti-Japanese Taiwanese" who had fled Taiwan to escape Japanese prosecution. Japanese naval battleships landed their troops in Xiamen and Gotō and Kodama debated mobilizing the Taiwan Army to reinforce the Japanese military presence in the city. Foreign opposition to the prospect of a Japanese invasion mounted quickly, and much to the chagrin of its most ardent supporters in the cabinet and colonial government, the central government aborted its plans on August 28th on the recommendation of former Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi, who was eager to present to the Western imperial powers a militarily capable, yet internationally cooperative, Japan.[85]

An article in the *Taiwan Daily News* titled "The Outlook of Cross Strait Management" (*Taigan keiei no zento*), reflecting on the failure of the incident, reassured readers that commerce and travel—by local notables (*yūshika*)—between Taiwan and south China were as healthy as ever.[86] Ironically, the author credited the contained disorder in the north for allowing business as

84. Shirane, "Mediated Empire: Colonial Taiwan in Japan's Imperial Expansion in South China and Southeast Asia, 1895–1945," 41, quoting Ichirō Kashiwagi, "Taiwan sōtokufu to Amoi jiken," in Kindai Nihon no keisei to tenkai, ed. Makio Yasuoka (Tokyo: Gannandō Shoten, 1998), 191–212, 198. The original title is "Amoi bōdō to taigan no chian."

85. The Euro-American powers were not without selfish reasons for opposing Japanese military intervention in, and a possible future occupation of, Xiamen. Shirane quotes Japanese naval communiqués (by Sawamura Shigetarō, "30 nen 8 gatsu Amoi tankō kaisha setsuritsu no ken," Kaigunshō kōbun ruishū M30-18-221, held in Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, see JACAR C10126283100) from 1897 that attest to British and French mining interests in the province, and American diplomatic reports of the city's shipping networks and its potential as a source of Chinese labor for the newly-colonized Philippines. See Shirane, 43.
The failure left Kodama so dejected that he threatened to resign as Governor-General, which led to his being named Army Minister as well; Prime Minister Yamagata Aritomo resigned to take responsibility. See Shirane, 43–44, and Jansen, "Opportunists in South China during the Boxer Rebellion," 248. Replacing Yamagata as Prime Minister was Itō himself.

86. "Taigan keiei no zento," Taiwan nichinichi shinpō, October 27, 1900. In a December report on the incident, the Minister Plenipotentiary to China Murota Yoshiaya declared that business was back to usual almost immediately, and, perhaps to prove this fact, included in his report of the incident a survey of businesses in Xiamen owned by

usual in the south. The problem was that Japan had become the laughing stock of the Western powers, who had teamed up to erase the power that Japan had built up in the region in the two years since establishing a treaty-port presence in 1898. The incident had also reinvigorated Chinese contempt for Japan, but this was an opportunity. "Not being seen as the same as Euro-Americans may harm our cross strait management. But I believe that, compared to the Euro-Americans, we are in a favorable position in several respects," the author concluded, by which he meant Japan's experience with modernization and civilization, making it an ideal teacher, as well as Japan's racial affinity with China. The author seems at pains to reassure his readers that the Xiamen Incident was not a failure, but a temporary setback and a cause for reflection. By pinning the blame on the intervention of the Western powers, the article called to mind the Triple Intervention. It ended by declaring that, "to hesitate in momentary bad luck (*furi*) and to delay the enterprises (*jigyō*) underway, is a [path] we will absolutely not take." One wonders if, at pains to justify the continuity of cross-strait management, the author might have been Gotō himself.

Kodama, too, was determined to see the cross-strait policy through, if with some minor changes. "If we are to make this [Fujian] part of our territory, we must first invest resources, and establish our power in commerce and communication, and plan slowly. Otherwise, [like] today a mob will appear and occupy Fujian, which would not be a good course of events," he reflected after the Incident.[87] Undeterred, Kodama and Gotō proposed the policy be based on the slow building of institutions and infrastructure, including a concession, schools, hospitals, and

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Japanese subjects. See "10 Meiji 33 nen 12 gatsu 28 nichi," JACAR B02031929200.

87. "Amoi jiken no tenmatsu oyobi taigan shōrai no seisaku," quoted in Sugano, "1900 nen haru, Gotō Shinpei chōkan no Fukken hōmon nitsuite," 67.

financial institutions.[88] The most important of the institutions was a new company, to be called the Sango Company, which would channel the colonial government's interests on the mainland. Many scholars see the establishment of the Sango Company as recognition of the failure of the Xiamen Incident and a turn away from militarism towards economic expansionism. But Kodama himself had initially renounced using force to occupy Xiamen, and had only resorted to military intervention when the broader regional geopolitical context seemed to provide an opportunity. This is not to say that the Incident was just an incidental occurrence between an otherwise continuous policy of economic and institutional expansion. Quite the opposite: economic and military imperialism were not opposing but complementary strategies for Kodama and Gotō, with abstinence from military force dictated only by the geopolitical context. In time, "protecting Japanese economic interests"—not to mention the need to "protect Japanese subjects," a justification that Shirane has shown emerged in the course of the incident—would always be undergirded by the threat of military force, whether tacit or explicit. Nor was the incident the beginning of an ongoing Japanese military plot to invade Xiamen and by extension China, as some postwar Chinese accounts suggested. The main effect of the Government-General's commitment to economic and institutional forms of imperialism in south China was that it relied all the more on relationships with intermediaries on the mainland, of the type Gotō had tried to cultivate on his trip. It is to several cases of these relationships and their role in conditioning Kodama's economic institution building that I now turn.

The Return to Economic Empire in the Aftermath of the Xiamen Incident

88. For details about the schools (the Tō-A Shoin in Xiamen and Tōbun Gakudō in Fuzhou) see Takashi Nakamura, "Tō-A Shoin to Tōbun Gakudō: Taiwan sōtokufu ka'nan kyōiku shisetsu no ranshō," Tenri daigaku gakuhō 124, no. 3 (1980): 1–18.

After the failure of the Xiamen Incident in 1900, Kodama and Gotō returned to non-military means of extending Japanese influence into south China; their efforts in the pursuit of economic aims after Incident should be seen less as a break and more as a continuation of earlier aims by different means. Chief among these new means was the establishment of the Sango Company (J: *Sango kōshi*, C: *Sanwu gongsi*) in 1902, named "Three-Five" (san-go) after the year in which it was founded, Meiji 35.[89] The company's director was Akuzawa Naoya (愛久澤直哉), a recent graduate of the faculty of politics at Tokyo Imperial University and employee of the Mitsubishi group's Nippon Yūsen Shipping Line. Gotō hired Akuzawa in 1900 to serve in Taiwan, from where he was first dispatched on observational trips to Southeast Asia and India in late 1900. Akuzawa remarked on his trips in a series of articles in the *Taiwan Daily News*, and though opium goes unmentioned, he had likely conducted these trips in conjunction with his position in the colony's newly-established Monopoly Bureau.[90] Inspired by its analogues in European colonies in Southeast Asia, the colonial government had established a monopoly on opium in 1897, motivated by profit and cloaked in rhetoric of gradual rehabilitation.[91] The opium monopoly was consolidated with monopolies on other key commodities, including salt, camphor,

89. Much of my understanding of the company and the context in which it was founding draws on the work of Chung Shu-ming. Shu-ming Chung, "Meiji makki Taiwan sōtokufu no taigan keiei: 'Sango kōshi o chūshin ni'," *Taiwanshi kenkyū* 14 (October 1997): 32–42.

90. Gotō's observations were reported in a three-part series of articles in the Taiwan Daily News, titled "Observations in the South Seas and Java" (Nan'yō Java shokan), published February 9th, 10th, and 13th, 1901. Among the things Akuzawa reported on are water transport and irrigation, systems, agricultural produce, and transportation systems. In the Dutch East Indies he was particularly impressed by the colonial government's ability in convincing European colonists and officials to stay in the colony. He went on another trip to Southeast Asia and India later in 1901 and further reported his observations in a series of articles in late August and early September of that year.

91. See Miriam Kingsberg, Moral Nation: Modern Japan and Narcotics in Global History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013) and Hung Bin Hsu, "The Taste of Opium: Science, Monopoly, and the Japanese Colonization in Taiwan, 1895–1945," in Cultures of Intoxication, ed. Phil Withington and Angela McShane (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 227–46. For work in Chinese on the relationship between the Government-General's opium policy in Taiwan and the Taiwan sekimin in China, see Wang, "Taiwan heibang jimin yu Riben dui Hua yapian moulüe." Chung, "Taiwan zongdufu de duian zhengce yu yapian wenti."

tobacco, and alcohol, to form the Monopoly Bureau in 1901. After his return from South and Southeast Asia, Akuzawa became the director of the second division, focused on economic studies, of the Provisional Commission for the Investigation of Taiwanese Old Customs (*Rinji Taiwan kyūkan chōsakai*) created by imperial ordinance in October 1901.[92] Akuzawa's role as director of the second division is a crucial yet overlooked detail in understanding the establishment of Sango Company. The second division was focused on studying Taiwan's economic conditions in the realms of agriculture, manufacturing, and commerce (*nōkōshō*). Their studies involved collecting information and conducting research not only on Taiwan proper but on the parts of the mainland to which Taiwan had economic links, primarily Fujian province.

The later investments of the Sango Company in railway construction and the camphor industry seem, in retrospect, quite haphazard, and were not very successful in economic terms, as many scholars conclude. In contrast, I highlight Sango's connections to Akuzawa's earlier role as director of the second division to show that, even after Akuzawa had moved on to other ventures, the research division (first in the second division of the Commission, and later in Sango Company itself) produced studies that reveal the much broader scope and scale of the Company's ambitions, even if they were never realized. The origins of these studies in the Commission for the Investigation for Old Customs further demonstrates that, like the first division's studies of Taiwan's legal system(s), the systematic investigation of economic

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92. The Commission's first and more famous division was focused on Taiwan's legal system (hōsei), and was directed by legal scholar and Kyoto University professor Okamatsu Santarō. The Commission continued its research activities until it was disbanded in 1919, by which time it had far outlived the ideological outlook—focused on Taiwan's particular "customs" and history that distinguished it from Japan proper—that informed its creation. Following the publication of the thirteen volume Taiwan Private Law between 1909 and 1911, the Commission published The Administrative Law of the Qing, a series of studies of Taiwan's indigenous populations, and then a series of studies on particular realms of law including inheritance, ancestral estates (C: jisi gongye), and joint-share partnerships. In 1923, under the new assimilationist principle of "extending the mainland (of Japan, to Taiwan)" (J: naichi enchō shugi), almost all of the Japanese Civil Code was extended to Taiwan, except for the section on inheritance, which continued to draw on codified code informed by Okamatsu's studies.

conditions in Fujian were initially understood to be crucial to colonial rule in Taiwan and its extension to the mainland through economic means. After the founding of Sango Company, the research activities of the Provisional Commission were subsumed under the Company's "Investigation Department" (*chōsabu*), which in 1905 published its findings in a "Report on the Investigation of Economic Materials" (*Chōsa keizai shiryō hōkoku*).[93] The report, primarily focused on Taiwan, was divided into four sections, focusing on industry (*sangyō*, organized by agricultural commodity), an outline of industry by region, transportation and communication (*kōtsū*), and general economic materials. Following this publication was another that focused on Fujian specifically, titled "Report of On-Site Investigation of Conditions in Fujian" (*Fukken jijō jissa hōkoku*), published in 1908. This second report was divided into 11 sections, this time each focusing on a different realm of society (industry, commerce, finance, communication/transportation, cities and villages, immigration, taxation, administration, military preparations, religion, and education), each of which was loosely divided into subsections by location. This 1908 Report was published by Sango Company, but it inherited the broadly stated and unfulfilled aims of the Commission's 1905 Report to "examine the ancient habitual customs related to: village structure, the family system, kinship relations, succession and the parceling of inheritance, large and small [scale] agriculture, and commercial dealings…to introduce a true picture of the society and life of Chinese people."[94]

93. Unlike the first division, whose leader Okamatsu Santarō remained director of until his death, the second division experienced a great deal of personnel turnover. Further complicating its research capabilities, its budget was halved in 1904, which led the division's new leader, Mochiji Rokusaburō, to advocate for organizing and publishing the research materials they had already collected (rather than conduct any kind of additional systematic analysis). All these factors have likely contributed to obscuring its significance to later observers. See Rinji Taiwan kyūkan chōsakai dainibu, *Chōsa keizai shiryō hōkoku*.

94. Sango kōshi, ed., Fukken jijō jissa hōkoku (Taipei: Taiwan nichinichi shinpōsha, 1908).

At the root of their investigation was the impulse to uncover "economic conditions" that would reveal the "many areas of practical benefit (*jitsumu hieki*) to Japanese" in the sections on industry, commerce, finance, and communication and transportation. After this economic overview, the writers discussed the longer-term aspects of society that they viewed as more closely tied to local government—and therefore having suffered the neglect of Chinese officials. The researchers rejected existing studies that relied on printed materials and statistics, as well as those that "reveled in the pedantry of the [published] letters of provincial and prefectural gazetteers." They preferred "on the ground" research that emphasized "actual accomplishments" (*jisseki*). This was a practical decision—they admitted the impossibility of gaining access to taxation or administrative records from Chinese officials, and mentioned having been rebuffed by Chinese officials when making these requests—but it was also an ideological commitment to an on-the-ground mode of colonial knowledge production.

The report identified Xiamen as an entrepôt at the center of a regional economy, importing food and other goods from the upriver interior as well as from Southeast Asia and Taiwan. Remarkably, these studies were not confined to the treaty-ports cities in which Japan had a formal consular diplomatic presence. They spanned the whole province and were particularly concerned with the networks formed by the mobility of commodities and people, which connected the treaty-ports to inland centers of production and to overseas Southeast Asian destinations of labor migrants. Though its authors never stated it so explicitly after the introduction, they implied that they were identifying areas of potential economic expansion for Japanese industries. Among the industries of particular interest were mines and opium, the latter implicating complex relations among the legal system, public morals, and the national economy.

Although the scope of Sango's inquiry far exceeded the industries in which it actually invested, the range gives a sense of its ambitions, even if they were precluded by budgetary constraints.

Largely absent in the account were the individuals—merchants, workers, officials—who facilitated the provincial trade in commodities; indeed, even labor migrants were treated as commodities. The report did discuss the social structures that facilitated commerce, like the *jiao* regional trade guilds and industry-specific and regional associations. But it did not refer either to the "local notables" found in the gazetteers whose knowledge the editors rejected, or to the community elites in Taiwan on whom the Commission's first division's scholars relied in making sense of local legal practices. This is all the more remarkable because local individuals, particularly merchant-officials with connections to Taiwan, were decisive in shaping the course of Sango's and Akuzawa's two early areas of investment in railways and camphor in south China. For railways, a late Qing merchant-official who had relocated from Taiwan to China in 1895 and was a member of central Taiwan's wealthiest family was initially seen by Sango as a shortcut to a Chinese-sanctioned monopoly only later to become a hindrance. For camphor, a local merchant-official with Taiwan ties served as Akuzawa's surreptitious investment channel in a company legally restricted to Chinese capital. These individuals are crucial to making sense of the practical and structural constraints on Sango's investments, and also of how Akuzawa sought to circumvent these constraints. These two individuals played a decisive role in shaping the course and scope of Sango's capital investments.

Sango and Fujian's Camphor Monopoly

In order to understand Sango's initiatives in the camphor industry in Fujian in 1902, it is necessary to take stock of the camphor monopoly on Taiwan that this venture was supposed to

support, as well as of the late Qing practices and individuals that shaped the camphor trade in Taiwan prior to Japanese colonization. In 1902, merchant-official Lin Chaodong held the rights to the production of camphor in Fujian, and he who had been Taiwan's most successful camphor merchant in the last decade of Qing rule (1885–1895) before he fled to China with the onset of Japanese rule on Taiwan. In contrast to the opium monopoly, inspired by policies in European colonies in Southeast Asia, the camphor monopoly in Taiwan was born out of late Qing practices in Taiwan, which began as a procurement system of camphor lumber from the island's interior to supply official shipyard construction in the early nineteenth century and was transformed into a "government-supervised merchant-run" (*guandu shangban*) system in the mid-1880s, in which a Camphor Bureau monopolized the rights to purchase camphor from state-licensed suppliers at a fixed price and managed its onward distribution.[95]

The late Qing Camphor Bureau emerged during the period of the "open the mountains and pacify the savages" (*kaishan fufan*) policy, which saw the Qing state take a much more active role in encouraging Han Chinese settlement of the frontier. The Bureau was intended to fund the military costs of conflicts with indigenous inhabitants of the upland areas of central Taiwan where camphor forests were located. Its local offices were staffed by local elites who were involved in controlling this frontier border with local militias and regulating access to forests customarily understood to be in indigenous territory. The Bureau was organized such that the profits of the monopoly would fund military expenditures without requiring additional financial support from an already fiscally burdened central government. Liu Mingchuan enlisted the help of local deputies in managing the Camphor Bureau—in northern Taiwan Lin Weiyuan

95. See Tavares, "Crystals from the Savage Forest: Imperialism and Capitalism in the Taiwan Camphor Industry, 1800–1945."

of the Banqiao Lin family, and in central Taiwan, Lin Chaodong of the Wufeng Lin family. The local government set prices and controlled the right of extraction by granting licenses to profit from the industry. The system was not without its critics, however, especially from British merchants, who in earlier decades had contracted with individual Chinese merchants to provide raw camphor from the interior. Competition for camphor became more acrimonious as demand in Europe rose in the late 1880s, since camphor was a key ingredient in the production of celluloid, a plastic used in manufacturing and film production. It was in fact British merchants who decried this practice as a "monopoly" inimical to the premises of free trade upon which the treaty-port system was founded. As Tavares has shown, the late Qing system was not a "monopoly" in the sense that the state was not dedicated to "suppressing private enterprise, raising productivity, or improving the industry. Rather the operation of the Camphor Bureau and the organization of the camphor industry were premised on the fusion of official-merchant interests and aimed at the extraction of government revenues and private commercial profits."[96]

The emergence of the state monopoly in the early days of the Japanese colonial period was therefore a departure from Qing practices, which had made Lin Chaodong wealthy and later shaped his efforts to obtain sole rights to camphor production in Fujian. Lin had been a key figure in the Qing system. After the establishment of the Qing Camphor Bureau in 1886, foreign firms were prohibited from purchasing camphor at their sites of production, and local officials strictly monitored the routes and means of transporting camphor from the interior to ports on the coast.[97] At the heart of many disputes was the threat of interrupting intricate relationships between merchants, procurers, processors, and local indigenous leaders caused by the influx of

96. Tavares, 140.

97. For more details, see Chapter 2 of Tavares.

foreign capital. Access to raw materials had to be negotiated through frontier brokers with local indigenous chiefs, who maintained control over forests. Within this system, Lin Chaodong was by some accounts Taiwan's most successful camphor merchant, as he was able to play many roles in a multi-step process: managing a local camphor branch office responsible for collecting frontier defense fees, contracting to supply camphor to foreign firms as a comprador (mostly the German firm Butler & Co.), and working within regional Chinese commercial networks to export camphor in his own right directly to Hong Kong. Lin's personal militia, known eponymously as the "Dong Militia," preceded the Camphor Bureau but was strengthened by the Bureau's transformation of the frontier political economy, when it was called upon (and funded) to patrol the frontier. Because the Qing system was not a state monopoly in the strict economic sense of controlling all steps of production, it provided vast opportunities for merchant-officials like Lin Chaodong precisely because they could play many roles within it.

Although it only lasted for ten years, the Qing system underwent many changes in this short time because the fluctuations in demand and price led local and foreign merchants to try to circumvent regulations to produce or purchase camphor outside of the state Bureau. On one hand, camphor required relatively low initial capital investment, which allowed smaller-scale processors to enter the industry. Driven by demand in Europe and the United States from new chemical production industries, foreign and Chinese merchant capitalists attempted to control the trade in camphor by advancing capital to producers in the interior, seeking to guarantee the sale of camphor at a fixed price. But for foreign firms, there was always the threat of producers selling camphor at a higher rate on the market, leading to conflict. In 1891, the Qing state tried to reduce this conflict and what it viewed as disorderly commercial relations by advancing its own

capital to camphor workers in the interior, although in practice this "state" capital was most likely that of merchant-officials like Lin Chaodong.

After the Japanese colonization of Taiwan, metropolitan officials advocated more stringent state control over supply, pricing, and production. As camphor was only produced in Taiwan and Japan, colonial officials in particular saw the possibility of controlling the world's supply of the material and fixing prices to ensure state profits, which would solve the colonial state's fiscal needs in the early years of Japanese rule. The experience of massive oversupply in 1897, when supply outpaced demand by a factor of two, likely lent urgency to the voices calling for a monopoly.[98] With the establishment of the camphor monopoly in 1899, new laws consolidated the sole right of camphor production (*seizōken*) in the hands of a single individual, where they had previously been dispersed across a complex web of individuals. Soon camphor production also saw consolidation in the hands of Japanese who bought up permits from local producers. During the early years of Japanese rule, there was vehement protest from foreign merchants, mainly British, who regarded the attempts by the colonial state to regulate the production and supply of camphor as violations of Japanese promises to uphold the Qing system. Ultimately colonial officials were able to eliminate British competitors by restricting the issue of permits under the monopoly in 1899 to previous holders of permits under the Qing. Because most permits under the Qing were issued to local compradors—foreigners were not allowed to produce or purchase camphor in the interior—this rule essentially invalidated British claims to ownership and restricted them to purchasing camphor from the newly established colonial Monopoly Bureau.

98. See the timeline of the camphor industry in Fusan Huang, "Taiwan zongdufu zhangnao zhuanmai zhengce yu Wufeng Lin jia," in Riju shiqi Taiwan zhimindi shi xueshu taolunhui lunwenji, ed. Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan Taiwan shi yanjiu zhongxin (Beijing: Jiuzhou chubanshe, 2010), 341–53.

A monopoly over the world supply of camphor required that colonial officials prevent the emergence of all competitors. One such competitive threat came to the attention of Kodama and Gotō in 1901, when Sawamura Shigetarō, author of *Cross Strait Conditions* (*Taigan jijō*) and now a bank official in Shanghai, informed the two officials that Lin Chaodong, who had fled to the mainland in 1895 and now an alternate circuit intendant (*houbudao*) in central China's Jiangsu province, had obtained sole rights to camphor production in Fujian province.[99] In early May 1901, Lin paid a visit to the Xiamen consul, reporting that he had received these rights from the Fujian-Zhejiang (Min-Zhe) Governor-General Xu Yingkui, earlier host to Gotō. Lin was remarkably candid in reporting the state of his prospects in Fujian to Consul Ueno: although there were a few camphor trees scattered in forests around the province, it remained to be seen if they would be profitable. Despite his half-baked plan, Lin communicated to Ueno his interest in establishing the Yuben Company (*Yuben gongsi*), and mentioned that he had submitted a request and a provisional charter for the approval of Governor-General Xu and officials in the local Reconstruction (*shanhouju*) and Taxation (*shuilizongju*) Bureaus.[100] Lin began his petition:

> "China's land is vast, its resources abundant, and its production (*chuchan*) prosperous. How regretful, then, that the atmosphere is still not yet open (*weikai*) to the ways of manufacturing…thereby rendering useful material into useless waste…For example, the manufacturing (*zhizao*) of camphor trees: people in the interior do not know the method of production. Recently the market for camphor has been extremely expansive, and if [we] could establish furnaces widely, sell camphor in all places, for the time being attempt production, and wait for the tide to turn favorably, then [we] will be able to regain profits in all areas. Because there are many camphor trees in Fujian Province, I wish to encourage profits in my homeland, and do not wish to spare expense in hiring those who are well-versed in camphor production."

99. The houbudao was a civil service position that could be purchased during the late Qing period. Reported as such in a letter from Consul Ueno to Foreign Minister Sone Arasuke in June 1901. See "Bunkatsu 1," part of "Shinkoku Fukken shō ni okeru shōnō jigyō kankei ruisan dai ikkan," JACAR B11092165500.

100. The assistance of these two bureaus would be crucial to ensuring all camphor passed through the company's hands.

Lin framed his request to Governor Xu in terms of encouraging China's national manufacturing and exploitation of untapped natural resources, winning his superior's approval by promising the industry would recoup the failing province's lost tax revenues. In this regard, he drew on his experience in Taiwan of having supplemented local finances with camphor production without requiring central government support. His proposal likely also appealed to Governor-General Xu, who had been one of a handful of provincial officials critical of the Qing court's support of the Boxer Rebellion the previous year, during the period of the "New Policies" (*xinzheng*), which were passed by the Qing court in the aftermath of the Rebellion's failure to reform China's economic, military, educational, and administrative systems. Governor-General Xu's reply guaranteed a fixed yearly rate of return if the industry were profitable, and established a fixed price at which the company would buy raw camphor and set fixed wages to be paid to workers. In order for the company to be profitable, Lin said, he needed to hire patrol guards to protect against the harvesting of camphor for illegal private sale. In its particulars, Lin's proposal was informed by the arrangement he had overseen in Taiwan, which had been immensely profitable. But the forests of Fujian were not the same as the highland forests of Taiwan, where the political economy of accessing raw camphor was imbricated in frontier policy. It would remain to be seen if Lin could replicate the late Qing system from Taiwan in Fujian. Pending further approval of his charter and investigation into local conditions, Lin said that he would return to Consul Ueno to seek his cooperation and assistance.

Ueno was skeptical when Lin returned to ask him for a loan from the Bank of Taiwan in the summer of 1901. For another element missing in Lin's ability to replicate his success in Taiwan was access to capital, which had been crucial in enabling Lin to play many roles in the multi-step industry on the island. Unsure whether and how the Bank of Taiwan would guarantee

such a loan to Lin, Ueno called for an investigation into the prospects of the camphor industry in Fujian. In July of 1901, Gotō Shinpei dispatched Ogawa Shin'ichi (小川真一), referred to as a "technical expert" (*gishi*) but better known as an early supporter of a Japanese monopoly and an early investor in Taiwan's camphor industry, to conduct an on-the ground investigation (*jitchi chōsa*) in Fujian.[101] Ogawa's trip spanned forty days (July 13th to August 23rd) and the entire province. There were many camphor trees in Fujian, Ogawa reported, but they were not as densely clustered as those in Taiwan; instead, they were scattered in forests among other species. The camphor trees near rivers and roads and therefore readily accessible were mostly young, whereas older trees were located deep in inaccessible forests which often had spiritual significance for local residents. The industry in Fujian also lacked the skilled laborers of its counterpart in Taiwan. Apart from a few laborers who had experience in northern Taiwan and migrated to China, there were none to speak of. Of utmost concern to Ogawa, though, was that the production system resembled that of late Qing Taiwan, and was not a "complete structure of camphor production" as Japanese officials had transformed the island's industry into. In Fujian, landowners contracted production from foremen at a fixed rate, and in exchange provided capital, which the foremen used to buy raw materials and processing tools, as they had in late Qing Taiwan.

In conclusion, Ogawa stated that Fujian "has camphor trees but does not produce camphor." Although Lin Chaodong had obtained exclusive production rights in the province, he had not been sold publicly owned trees. Unlike in Taiwan, where the new colonial government

101 See JACAR B11092165500. For details on Ogawa's activities in Taiwan, see Tavares, Chapter 4. Ogawa was the local representative of camphor company Gōshō Gōshi Kaisha (江商合資会社) and also advised Gotō on camphor policy.

had prioritized setting regulations on the use of forests, Fujian's forests were commonly owned. Therefore, there was nothing stopping a local from contracting with an "avaricious foreign merchant" to provide him with raw materials, as had been a problem in late Qing Taiwan. Despite these hurdles, Ogawa was optimistic about the future of the industry in Fujian: labor was cheap, if unskilled, and there was no threat of bandits or indigenous people laying claim to the land. Fujian could pose a formidable threat to Taiwan's industry in the future, but it would not be impossible to "exercise complete mastery" (*yakurōchū*) over Fujian's camphor provided the full infrastructure was in place.

Buoyed by his confidence in Japan's recent transformation of colonial Taiwan's camphor industry—an opinion informed by a stadial view of Fujian that understood it as underdeveloped compared to Taiwan—Ogawa concluded that a successful future for Fujian's camphor lay with Japanese technical and managerial expertise, not with Lin Chaodong.[102] Ueno came to the same conclusion, relaying in a letter to Foreign Minister Komura in September that Lin had been unaware of the scale of the project. Ueno had been convinced that the "path ahead for promoting industry" (*shokusan kōgyō no michi*) was less promising—hence, less threatening—than he had feared. But he was wary of the possibility that Lin would cooperate to fix production to prevent oversupply with Governor-General Xu, who was eager to resolve the provinces' financial crises. Like Ogawa, Ueno was hopeful about camphor's future in Fujian, but he expressed misgivings about Lin's capabilities, preferring instead that Japanese work directly with local officials. He concluded a letter to Foreign Minister Komura by saying: "Establishing facilities for the

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102. In 1900 the monopoly's rate of profit was 42 percent, which accounted for 60 percent of monopoly profits and 26.9 percent of net tax revenues. Between 1899 and 1915, the average rate of profit in Taiwan's camphor industry was 37 percent. Camphor profits accounted for 35 percent of total monopoly profits, and 11.2 percent of total tax revenues. See the chart on page 199 of Tavares, "Crystals from the Savage Forest: Imperialism and Capitalism in the Taiwan Camphor Industry, 1800–1945."

improvement of the treaty ports, like the Industry Promotion Bureau, is the responsibility of local authorities…In order to develop crucial regional commodity production, it is of utmost urgency for Chinese officials to take measures to hire appropriately specialized engineers, obtain the support of local elites (*shinshi yūshika*), and instruct natives in industrial knowledge."

For Ueno, the nascent industry required forms of expertise that Lin Chaodong could not provide. To make camphor production profitable, officials in Fujian needed to emulate the monopoly in Taiwan—which, if under the direction of Japanese officials, would have the convenient added benefit of protecting Taiwan's monopoly and its profits. A later report by Ueno envisioned that Taiwan sekimin in Fujian would control all transport channels for the commodity and purchase the product in Fuzhou or Xiamen, to be sold to the monopoly in Taiwan. Ueno thus imagined that Taiwan sekimin would staff a network of supply chains in Fujian that would control the trade of camphor from point of production to point of export and preclude the possibility of undue outside influences gaining a hold in any part of the industry, which would avoid repeating the mistakes that beset the Qing-era system on Taiwan. Remaking Fujian's commodity production and transportation networks for local profit was also an opportunity for Japanese officials to bring local Chinese officials and notables under their control, Ueno remarked. But all of this had to be arranged before Western merchants and officials caught wind of the situation.

Over the course of two months in late 1901, Ueno used his existing connections with provincial administrative commissioner (*buzhengshi*, responsible for financial matters) Zhou to shape the future of the Sino-Japanese agreement about the province's camphor industry. In doing so, Ueno used his existing relationship with the lowest-ranking official, Zhou, to direct the view of Governor-General Xu away from working with Lin Chaodong and to dispel the influence of

competing opinions that feared provoking the Western powers (voiced primarily by the province's Foreign Affairs Bureau, *yangwuju*). Because camphor was dispersed across a large area and because the industry's success relied on it being an official venture with foreign specialists, "it would not be good policy to have the industry managed solely as a public venture (*jinmin tandoku no keiei*)," Ueno advised Zhou. Although Lin Chaodong was himself an official, Ueno thereby managed to marginalize Lin in the project.

Given Lin's history as a local strongman turned merchant-official in Qing Taiwan, who had commanded a militia that offered considerable resistance to the Japanese takeover of the island, it is unsurprising that Japanese officials were reluctant to work with him. A brief overview of Lin's activities between Japanese colonization in 1895 and the Fujian camphor venture in 1901 shows why. Japanese naval intelligence from early 1896 had reported that Lin, having fled to the mainland, was in control of "rebel" forces in Quanzhou and was buying weapons in an attempt to retake Taiwan.[103] Lin's plot, if it had ever been credible, amounted to little, and he spent the next several years trying to raise a militia in China without much success. As for his militia forces remaining in Taiwan, Lin Chaodong had put them under the control of his cousin, Lin Shaotang (林紹堂).[104] The new local prefect, crediting the militia with the protection of the frontier and with preventing disaster in the camphor industry, very gradually reduced the militia's scope, responsibilities, and remuneration. Given the militia's ongoing presence on the frontier, Lin Chaodong sent his two sons, Jishang and Ruiteng, back to Taiwan in 1896 to naturalize as Japanese subjects with the goal of continuing the family's dominance in

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103. See "Amoi haken'in hōkoku," in Kaigunshō chō zappōgō M29-1-5, held in Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, JACAR C11080952900.

104. For details, see Huang, "Taiwan zongdufu zhangnao zhuanmai zhengce yu Wufeng Lin jia."

the industry. Yet it declined with each passing year. Still hopeful, Chaodong hired Ge Yukuan (葛玉寬) in 1901 from Fuzhou to assist his son Jishang in Taiwan. Ge was the younger brother of Ge Zhuxuan with whom Lin had worked in the 1880s to transport camphor directly to Hong Kong and who was later the household affairs assistant to Lin Weiyuan. Ge arrived in December 1901, but died of disease just one year later.

Lin's efforts at establishing a camphor industry in late 1901 and early 1902 faced numerous challenges, not to mention Ueno's ongoing efforts to undermine his position. Lin attempted to resolve the challenge of unskilled labor by hiring workers from Taiwan, but low production yields forced him to reduce the scope of his operations. Lin also faced the challenge identified in Ogawa's report of camphor trees being dispersed across the province. Lin found that there were not many willing to work and sell camphor to him at the fixed rate he had agreed to purchase it. For all of Lin's efforts to replicate the late Qing system on Taiwan in Fujian, the political economy of the camphor industry, which required military control over access to dense forests and high rates of profits, was not easily transferred to a new landscape.

The camphor industry in Fujian also faced a set of legal issues relating to maintaining Chinese sovereignty amidst the infusion of Japanese capital and technical expertise. In time, Ueno had convinced Governor-General Xu, via provincial administrative commissioner Zhou, to agree to establish a local monopoly to be entrusted to Japanese experts, which was signed into a contract in January 1902.[105] But the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Waiwubu*) was concerned that, unless the Camphor Bureau were funded exclusively by Chinese capital, it would arouse the protest of the other imperial powers. Chinese diplomatic officials were in a standoff

105. For details, see "Bunkatsu 2," part of "Shinkoku Fukken shō ni okeru shōnō jigyō kankei ruisan dai ikkan," JACAR B11092165600.

with Governor-General Xu, with the former demanding solely Chinese funding and the latter insisting that such a constraint would doom the Bureau to failure. As a solution, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggested to Xu that, in order to preclude foreign demands for rights in the Bureau, its affairs should be placed under the "full control" (*baoban*) of Lin Chaodong, a "Fujian gentleman official."[106]

With debate in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ongoing, Akuzawa went to Beijing himself to try to influence the situation. Despite continued protest from the British consul in particular, Akuzawa managed to secure a deal with Governor-General Xu, and succeeded in marginalizing Lin's influence in it. In the contract signed by Akuzawa and Xu, the Bureau would hire Akuzawa and borrow money to pay him. The loan would be secured by a Japanese company (likely Sango), which would not collect interest from the Bureau, but would retain the rights to expropriate any investments made by the Bureau in machinery or land at the end of the contract term.[107] Furthermore, the contract guaranteed that Akuzawa would collect the profits to redistribute in part to the governor, and that he would be consulted in all matters regarding the industry. Not willing to give up so easily, Lin Jishang (Chaodong's son) protested at the beginning of June, seeking to retain control over forests near Zhangzhou, Yongchun, and Longyan (all inland north and west from Xiamen, where Chaodong had set up his firm's office). The Bureau, now under Akuzawa's control, bought Lin out of all his machinery and materials, effectively sidelining his remaining claims to the camphor industry in Fujian.

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106. JACAR B11092165600.

107. The details are in "Bunkatsu 3," part of "Shinkoku Fukken shō ni okeru shōnō jigyō kankei ruisan dai ikkan," JACAR B11092165700.

Studies of Sango's and Akuzawa's investments in the Fujian camphor industry have largely written it off as a temporary venture that ended in failure. This is a fair assessment. The industry was beset with a number of problems that were never fully resolved. Protests by British diplomats via the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued, charging the Japanese with having established a monopoly in violation of treaty agreements. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs never abandoned its position that appointing "Chinese merchant" (*huashang*) Lin as a figurehead would resolve these complaints. The Bureau tried to meet this demand by appointing the new provincial administrative commissioner and Zhou's successor, Yan Nian, the Bureau's "Superintendent" (*duban*), but even a figurehead would not so easily resolve resistance to the Bureau. Revisions to the charter in August 1902 reverted some control to the hands of Chinese officials, who now received direct reports of the Bureau's profits. The Bureau's biggest challenge came with the death of Governor-General Xu in 1903 and his replacement, who was far less accommodating to the idea of a Japanese-controlled monopoly. This personnel transition led Akuzawa and his Japanese diplomatic colleagues to turn their efforts toward ensuring that Akuzawa and Sango could liquidate their interests in the industry if necessary. In short, the Japanese desire for a state-company-led and managed monopoly was incompatible with Chinese officials' position, backed up by British protests, for a Chinese-led, if not Chinese-financed, operation.

By 1905, although Sango had surrendered its monopoly over camphor production, it was the only company with sufficient capitalization to withstand fluctuations in the worldwide price of camphor. But by 1910, after a drop off in worldwide demand, Sango withdrew from the camphor industry in Fujian. Colonial officials in Taiwan continued to worry that Chinese camphor might threaten Japanese control over the world supply at crucial periods of high

demand.[108] In 1914, the Government-General ordered the Japanese-backed Taika Company (C: *Taihua Gongsi*) to purchase camphor from Fujian for processing into camphor oil, only to have the venture collapse two years later due to fluctuations in demand brought on by the Great War. The end of the war briefly revived hopes that Japanese firms could dominate the supply of camphor from China, but competition between three Japanese companies with interests in China (Taika, Mitsui, and Suzuki) led to the buyout of their rights in 1920 by the Taiwan Camphor Company.[109] In this way, after almost twenty years of efforts, Taiwan's colonial camphor monopoly finally secured near total control over China's camphor output. Despite the best efforts of Japanese colonial administrators to dominate all potential source of competition, they could not prevent the emergence of artificial camphor, which had become a significant source of competition for the industry in the Japanese empire. Colonial authorities attempted to maintain market share by reducing prices, but this only encouraged foreign competitors to match their tactics, which led colonial officials to reduce the costs of production by cutting prices to producers.[110]

The story of the camphor monopoly in Fujian reveals the dynamics of efforts to secure the colonial economy through monopolies, Japanese diplomatic attempts to contest Chinese trends resisting foreign capital investment, and policies to advance Japanese economic interests in China in the face of stiff foreign competition. In this case, Lin Chaodong, the late Qing strongman turned merchant-official in Taiwan and later on the mainland, posed a significant

108. See Tavares, Chapter 4.

109. See "49. Fukken shō ni okeru kanshōkyoku no setchi narabi ni Taika Mitsui Suzuki sansha no bunritsu jigyō haishi ni sonau Taiwan seishō kaisha no jigyō keiei ni kansuru ken Taishō kyūnen sangatsu," JACAR B11092175700.

110. Tavares, "Crystals from the Savage Forest: Imperialism and Capitalism in the Taiwan Camphor Industry, 1800–1945," 223–229.

challenge to Japanese goals. Lin's securing sole rights to camphor production in Fujian was a threat, not an asset, to Japanese control of the industry in Taiwan and worldwide. In seeking to advance Japanese goals through connections with Chinese officials, Ueno's role was remarkable, as was his approach of persuading his Chinese colleagues to sideline Lin from the bottom up. In replicating Taiwan's late Qing camphor system in China, Lin Chaodong posed a threat to Japanese attempts to remake the regional political economy and Taiwanese merchant-officials' position in it. But Lin's attempts to rebuild his wealth and position along a familiar model failed precisely in his attempt to transpose Taiwan's system in Fujian: neither his diminished institutional authority in China nor the political economy of camphor supply and procurement in Fujian were amenable to such simple reproduction.

The Chao-Shan Railway Project

Japanese officials' efforts to control Fujian's camphor industry, which relied on bottom-up official connections and sought to sideline Lin Chaodong's influence, were in marked contrast to the steps taken by Japanese officials in securing railway rights for Akuzawa and Sango, in which colonial officials and more senior diplomatic officials played a bigger role. In November 1903, Akuzawa Naoya was in Fujian, managing Sango's camphor ventures in the province. There he met Wu Liqing (吳理卿), a wealthy merchant residing in Hong Kong who had made his fortune in the opium industry. Wu had concluded a secret agreement with Sheng Xuanhuai (盛宣懷, 1844–1916), merchant-official, protege of Li Hongzhang, and then the "Railway Minister" (*tetsudō daijin*), which granted permission to construct a railway between the coastal cities of Chaozhou and Shantou in eastern Guangdong Province (the Chao-Shan railway,

hereafter 'Chaoshan').[111] Though Akuzawa did not yet know the scope of Wu's agreement with Sheng, he hurried to dispatch Hasegawa Kinsuke (長谷川謹助, 1855–1921), an engineer in colonial Taiwan's railway bureau, to survey the feasibility of the railway. In the meantime, Consul Ueno spared no time in meeting with Wu, and concluded that Wu "wanted, as concerns his rights (*kenri*), to negotiate with us Japanese on the method of construction and to have us provide engineers and all the raw materials, or ask us for a portion of the capital."[112] For Akuzawa and his diplomatic colleagues, this seemed like a godsend, especially amid the scramble by Britain, France, and the United States to secure railway construction rights across southern China. Japanese diplomats had been engaged in protracted negotiations to secure exclusive rights to the construction of a coastal railway line in Fujian, and Wu's proposed project would abut the southern end of such a line along the south China coast. Ueno's inclinations were right: after negotiations, not only did Wu agree to accept Japanese capital to finance the project, but also to allow Akuzawa to employ Japanese engineers in the railway's construction. Akuzawa recruited Lin Lisheng (林麗生), of the Wufeng Lin family, Chaodong's relative, and then the comprador for the Osaka Shipping Company's Xiamen branch office, as his deputy, and dispatched him to finalize an agreement with Wu.[113]

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111. The railway was referred to in Chinese by a portmanteau of the two cities it connected, "Chao-Shan." Japanese documents ordinarily do not provide a gloss for the reading of these characters, so I have used "Chōzan" in my citations, but one example has the gloss "Chōsen." The city Shantou was usually referred to in Japanese documents by an approximation of its pronunciation in the local dialect, "Suwatō," similar to the English "Swatow."

See "Nanshin tetsudō kankei ikken," in Nihon gaikō bunsho, Meiji, vol. 37, 2 (Tōkyō: Nihon Kokusai Rengō Kyōkai, 1947), 44.

For details on Sheng Xuanhuai's background, see the classic work Albert Feuerwerker, China's Early Industrialization: Sheng Hsuan-Huai and Mandarin Enterprise (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1958).

112. See "Nanshin tetsudō kankei ikken." 44.

113. By 1903, Lin's immediate family had already had a history of working with Japanese diplomatic and colonial officials, making him a trustworthy companion in their estimation. With his father Henian (林鶴年) and brother Lucun (林輅存), Lin had worked with Sawamura Shigetarō to establish the Tō-A Shoin school in Xiamen in 1899.

Closely monitoring the situation, Lin noticed a newspaper article in December 1903, which reported that an individual by the name of Zhang Yunan (張煜南), had requested permission from the newly-established Ministry of Commerce (*shangwubu*) to construct the same railway line. Concerned the project would fall into other hands, Lin immediately informed Akuzawa and called him back to Xiamen. A few days later, however, Lin confirmed that Zhang was in fact a partner under whose reputable name (*meimoku*) Wu had wanted to submit the request for permission. Zhang was a native of Jiaying, Guangdong, who had become a wealthy merchant based in Java.[114] Under the Dutch colonial government there, he had gradually risen in the ranks of the bureaucracy established to manage Chinese migrants to the colony, and held the rank of kapitan. Japanese officials initially had trouble identifying who he was, and confused him for his more prominent relative Zhang Bishi (張弼士), an overseas Chinese merchant turned official. The two Zhangs' biographies were similar: following the lead of his more prominent relative Bishi, Zhang Yunan had recently entered the ranks of the Qing bureaucracy by

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Donations from the Lin family, their relative Lin Chaodong, Lin Weiyuan (no relation), and some seventy other Taiwanese merchants in Xiamen, along with the Bank of Taiwan, Mitsui Bussan, the Osaka Shipping Company, and Nippon Shipping Company funded the school. Nakamura places the school's funding in the context of the contemporaneous Hundred Days' Reform led by Kang Youwei. Provincial representatives of the supporters of Kang's reform oriented allies traveled to Beijing, with Lin Henian and Lin Lucun being among the representatives from Xiamen. It was during this time when Sawamura, then in Beijing, proposed the idea of the school to the Lins, which came to fruition when they returned to Xiamen after the movement's failure. See Nakamura, "Tō-A Shoin to Tōbun Gakudō: Taiwan sōtokufu ka'nan kyōiku shisetsu no ranshō."

Ziwen Zhou, ed., Taiwan lishi renwu xiaozhuan. Ming Qing ji Ri ju shiqi (Taipei: Guo jia tu shu guan, 2003), https://bit.ly/2Chd4v0 mentions that Lin Lucun was implicated in the 1900 anti-Qing uprising led by Tang Caichang and fled to Europe and the United States. He returned and was later elected as a representative in the Fujian Provincial Assembly in 1909, a position that was limited to imperial degree holders.

Regarding Lin Henian (not to be confused with another Lin Henian from the Wufeng Lin family), the Taiwan Lishi Renwu Xiaozhuan mentions that he was a native of Anxi, Fujian, and a tea, camphor, and gold mining merchant who settled in Tamsui. He was old friends with Lin Weiyuan and became close with Tang Jingsong, a general in the Sino-French War, later appointed governor of Taiwan, and the president of the short-lived Republic of Taiwan in 1895.

114 See "Nanshin tetsudō kankei ikken," 51.

purchasing a position, through which he had become close to Sheng Xuanhuai. "Zhang Bishi is like the Lin Weiyuan of this area," an associate in the Xiamen consulate reported, "the most prominent and well-known wealthy merchant of Chaozhou."[115] Japanese diplomatic officials and their colonial colleagues in Taiwan were intrigued by Zhang but feared he might be out of their league. They were wary of the effect such a wealthy individual might exert over the railway's future prospects, especially given its "extremely intimate relationship" with the empire's other ambitions in the province.

The stakes for Akuzawa and the Japanese diplomatic officials in Fujian were high. Earlier that year in mid-November, Japanese officials in Fujian had caught wind of news that Taiwan sekimin Chen Rixiang (陳日翔, 1860–1913) was in discussion with French officials in the province to build a coastal railway line that would link Fuzhou and Xiamen "as a joint enterprise of Chinese and foreign capitalists."[116] Foreign Minister Komura Jūtarō hurried to telegraph China Minister Uchida Kōsai in Beijing, telling him to approach "Prince Qing" (Yikuang, then the head of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to "request that the assurance repeatedly

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115 See "Nanshin tetsudō kankei ikken," 43.

116 Chen Rixiang (1860–1913) was born in Fengshan in southern Taiwan (now Kaohsiung), and was educated in Jinjiang, Fujian (near Quanzhou) before returning to Taiwan to work in a local school (a 'yixiang,' 邑庠 indicating that Chen had reached the xiucai rank). In 1885 he attained the juren rank. In 1892 provincial officials were compiling a gazetteer (Taiwan tongzhi) and he became a committee member and was in charge of collecting legal documents (caifangce) from his hometown, Fengshan. After the Qing defeat in 1895, he left his family (and their financial holdings) and moved to Gulangyu, Xiamen, where he became well acquainted with local officials. He was later appointed the Chinese consul in Manila. Upon returning to Taiwan to manage his family grave, he was received very politely by Japanese officials. One gets the sense from his biographical details that he was a skilled official, but without family or personal capital to rely on, which can possibly account for his difficulty in attracting funds for the railway project. See Zhou, Taiwan lishi renwu xiaozhuan. Ming Qing ji Ri ju shiqi.

At the time, Chen was the Manila consul. See Zhengcheng Zheng, "Rizhi shiqi Taiwan zongdufu dui Fujian tielu de guihua yu buju," Shihui 10 (September 2006): 1–18.

For the diplomatic communication, see "Bunkatsu 1," part of "Chōsan tetsudō kankei ikken dai ikkan." JACAR B10074700800. Original in English. Urgent communication among diplomatic officials was conducted by telegraph, requiring the use of English, whereas more detailed requests were elaborated upon in letters.

given by him on the subject of our demand for railways in Foo-kien be always adhered to."[117] Komura was referring to the 1898 Fujian Non-Cession Treaty, which Japanese diplomats had concluded with the Qing government in response to the Triple Intervention of 1895 that saw Germany, France, and Russia intervening to force Japan to return control of the Liaodong Peninsula to China after having obtained it in the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Japanese officials were determined to prevent a repeat of such a situation, especially because of Japan's "special interests" in the province given its proximity to Taiwan. They interpreted the agreement to obligate the Chinese government to give priority to Japan should they ask for outside technical assistance or capital investment. Japanese diplomats had then extended their interpretation of the agreement in Fujian to extend over two adjacent provinces, Jiangxi and Zhejiang, across which various imperial powers had been attempting to build a network of railways since 1900. Most recently, the "Chinese Investment and Construction Company of America" had proposed funding the project through a syndicate, which gave additional urgency to Japanese anxieties that their treaty-granted rights were slipping out of their fingers. Yikuang assured Komura that he did not disagree with giving Japan priority in principle, but he was merely skeptical that an exclusively Sino-Japanese venture would be able to muster sufficient capital for such an undertaking. But in Komura's mind, conceding to a foreign power on one part of the railway—the Fuzhou-Xiamen portion, for example—imperiled Japanese rights of priority in the whole province.

At the end of 1903, Fuzhou Consul Nakamura Takashi (中村巍 in office 1903–1905) confirmed that Chen's specific plan "seems almost certainly a matter of fact," reporting this time that the railway would extend from Fuzhou not just to Xiamen but further down the south China coast all the way to Guangzhou, linking the four cities (including Shantou) where Japanese

117 JACAR B10074700800. Original in English.

diplomats were posted.[118] But Nakamura expressed hope that the plan was not yet set in stone: Chen was still scurrying around the province trying to raise capital, and save for one provincial commissioner (*buzhengshi*) named Zhou, most local officials seemed unaware of Chen's activity—not to mention the proposed railway's overlap with the Chaoshan line. "Though they appear extremely cautious and honest, the two [Chen and Zhou] are in reality quite cunning," warned Nakamura. Consul Ueno, monitoring the situation in Xiamen, reported that Chen had approached Lin Weiyuan to solicit his financial support. Thankfully for the Japanese, Lin had declined participation, which relieved Ueno. Plans for a Fuzhou-Xiamen railway with French officials stalled, although this did not deter Chen from continuing to seek out opportunities for other lines in the province. At the end of November, Chen sent an associate to Governor-General Kodama to apologize for having "made the Japanese feel inexpedient and disadvantaged," but Japanese diplomats reporting on the matter were still unsure whether Chen was trustworthy. Japanese colonial and diplomatic officials placed hope in the possibility of collaborating with "Taiwan sekimin"—which in the case of Chen was a designation used by Japanese diplomatic officials to mean that he was born in Taiwan and had family there, and not that he had sought to avail himself of any Japanese subject status. But in practice, individuals like Chen tried to draw on connections with (non-Japanese) foreign powers or local Chinese elites in ventures that directly hampered Japanese ambitions.

This was the context that impelled the sense of urgency for Japanese officials in trying to secure the agreement for the Chaoshan line. They faced two problems: how to secure the initial investment of Japanese capital, and how to secure the involvement of Japanese engineers and management. At the heart of the former concern was Sheng Xuanhuai's requirement that the

118 JACAR B10074700800. Original in English.

railway be financed only by Chinese capital, specifically limiting the funders to "Chinese merchants (*huashang*)" and "foreign-registered individuals" (*yangji ren*). Lin, reporting the financiers' back-and-forth with Sheng, noted the ambiguity in the term "foreign-registered individuals," which could mean either "foreigners" (*gaikokujin*) or "Chinese who have obtained foreign registration" (*Shina jin no gaikokuseki wo kakutoku seru mono*).[119] Sheng clarified that he meant "only the capital of (Qing) Chinese," (*Shinjin no shikin*), which worried Lin as it would seem to exclude Akuzawa, though in practice the term "Qing Chinese" (*Shinjin*) was no clearer a designation for the sources of investment. The project was estimated to cost 2,000,000 yuan, of which half would be shouldered by Zhang and another investor Xie Rongguang (謝容光). While Lin sought to iron out the details with the other financiers—essentially assessing the technicalities and legalities of funneling capital from Akuzawa, not to mention hiring him to direct the project—he had already signed a separate agreement with Wu. Their agreement committed to hiring Akuzawa as an advisor, entrusting him with the sourcing of materials and all the responsibilities of construction and management, and accepting loans underwritten by Akuzawa to buy shares in the railway company. It was an open secret among diplomatic officials that Lin was Akuzawa's conduit—referred to as anything from a "representative" to an "agent"—but Wu had received funding from Akuzawa as well.[120] The only thing left was to convince their fellow (Chinese) financiers to agree to their plan, which provided a channel not

119. See "Nanshin tetsudō kankei ikken," 42.

120. The agreement that Akuzawa and Lin later finalized on their own in a contract reveals the degree of control Akuzawa retained over the Japanese capital being invested in the railroad project. Akuzawa would secure (tanpo) Lin's 500,000 yuan of shares in the company by lending Lin the full sum of money in several installments (item 1). Any rights or obligations that arose from Lin's shareholding required Akuzawa's consent prior to acting; in exchange, Akuzawa would bear responsibility for all of Lin's actions (item 4). See "Bunkatsu 2," part of "Chōsan tetsudō kankei ikken dai ikkan," JACAR B10074700900.

only for Akuzawa's capital but his technological management of the railway's construction as well.

From the time that they discovered Zhang was a part of the project proposal, Japanese diplomats had worried about how to resolve the apparent hypocrisy of insisting that Akuzawa be brought in as a foreign investor and consultant while forestalling Zhang's ability to do the same for another foreigner. This was their second problem: securing Japanese engineer and management in the railroad's construction. Komura, in a series of communication with Gotō Shinpei (then in Tokyo) and a number of enterprising junior officers in the Taiwan Government-General, namely Iwai Tatsumi (祝辰巳), the head of the Monopoly Bureau, settled on a strategy of diplomatic pressure: they would first convince Minister of Commerce Zaizhen, who would then relay the idea to Zhang. Approaching Zhang first ran the risk of his opening the door to a swarm of interested foreign parties, likely the British, which, with Zhang's many businesses connections, he might be hard pressed to turn down. On February 17th, Komura instructed Uchida Kōsai, the Minister Plenipotentiary to China, to "exert your best efforts to obtain a grant from the Chinese Government of the right of construction of the contemplated railways as a joint enterprise of Japanese and Chinese. Steps will be taken to have a syndicate constituted of the capitalists of the two countries upon the necessary grant becoming obtained and mode of construction and other details will be determined subject to approval of the Chinese Government."[121] Though Uchida was reluctant to broach the topic with the Minister of Commerce Zaizhen, fearing it would seem to come out of the blue, Komura, Gotō, and Iwai persisted. Details of the specific diplomatic maneuvers orchestrated by Gotō and Komura are the subject of an article by Cai Longbao, who argues that the diplomats were driven by a top-down

121. See "Nanshin tetsudō kankei ikken," 55. In English.

notion of politics, and whose influence demonstrates the decisive role of the government in securing the involvement of Japanese capitalists.[122] For the purposes of this chapter, however, what stands out is the remarkable influence the Taiwan Government-General—through a junior officer Iwai, at that—was able to exert on the Japanese Foreign Ministry, and in particular its Foreign Minister Komura, who reiterated his request to Uchida in an urgent telegram two weeks later saying, "I am aware this is a very delicate task, but as it is earnestly requested by the Government-General, you are desired to take suitable steps."[123] Komura added urgency by informing Uchida that many foreigners were laying in wait in Beijing for Zhang to return to Hong Kong, seeking to influence Zaizhen. Uchida relented in his resistance, and met with Zaizhen. He attested to Akuzawa's experience in railway construction and his unique knowledge of engineers and procurement of materials, and, to everyone's surprise, managed to convince Zaizhen to persuade Zhang to hire Akuzawa.[124]

With Zhang's support of Akuzawa secured, the four investors (Zhang, Xie, Lin, and Wu) convened in April 1904 at the Japanese consulate in Hong Kong to sign a contract outlining the terms of the railway's construction and management in the presence of Akuzawa and the Japanese consul. The contract named Akuzawa the sole manager (*baoban*) for the construction of

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122. Longbao Cai, "Nihon tōchiki ni okeru Taiwan sōtokufu tetsudōbu no nanshin seisaku: Shinkoku Kanton shō chōzan tetsudō no jirei," Rikkyō keizaigaku kenkyū 69, no. 5 (March 2016): 1–24.

The first half of Cai's article focuses on diplomatic maneuvers, and the second half on the role of Hasegawa Kinsuke, the engineer from the Taiwan Railway Bureau who would go on to play a decisive role in the Chaoshan railway's construction. His article makes use of the compilation of documents in Nihon gaikō bunsho, which I consulted after reading his article, and which are slightly different in order and content from those in the diplomatic documents I have accessed through JACAR. Though there are overlaps between the two, I have cited the source where I read the information.

123. See "Nanshin tetsudō kankei ikken." 71. In English.

124. Cai suggests, quoting Kodama, that Zaizhen was the key figure in these negotiations. Zaizhen had just visited Japan for the Industrial Exposition of 1903, which had inspired him to establish the Ministry of Commerce.

the railway, and put him in charge of sourcing all the construction equipment and materials, from the tracks and the cars to the factories that would be used for upkeep and the housing for its employees.[125] The final agreement exceeded Akuzawa's expectations: not only was he contracted for the railway's construction, but he was retained as a manager to advise in matters of hiring and in future plans to extend the line. The new company committed to hiring Japanese engineers for construction and for future operations, but otherwise pledged to hire Chinese to staff the company. The charter also established the company as solely run by merchants (*shang*), refusing official (*guan*) interference. But "official" and "merchant" were not dichotomous or mutually exclusive descriptors. Zhang himself was also technically an "official" if only by having purchased a title. In retrospect, it is tempting to wonder whether excluding "official" interference was meant to forestall intervention by elements of the Qing bureaucracy, such as the Ministry of Commerce, once the charter was approved. In any case the trend in Chinese businesses in the early twentieth century was moving away from the "official-supervised, merchant-run" (*guandu shangban*) businesses popular in the late Qing period. Needless to say, Gotō was elated: he reportedly gripped a copy of the contract and proclaimed "this is the basis of our Cross Straits Management!"[126]

A confluence of factors contributed to the plan's success: as highlighted by Cai, diplomatic pressure was crucial, as was having a receptive audience in Zaizhen. While it is easy to dismiss Lin as a puppet for Akuzawa's interests among the financiers and a conduit of

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125. Whereas the Chinese version explicitly stipulates his sole responsibility (baoban), the Japanese version is less specific in naming his role, describing him only as a "Japanese subject."

The contract eventually signed for the sourcing of materials reveals the scope of purchases to be facilitated by Akuzawa. See "Nanshin tetsudō kankei ikken," 97-100.

126. Cai, 15, quoting a report by Taiwan railway official Tsuda Motohiko, in the biography of his superior Hasegawa, Kōgaku hakase Hasegawa Kinsuke den.

Akuzawa's demands and capital in the drafting of the agreement, it is worth pausing to consider why Lin was able to occupy such a role to begin with. Lin's family had built up a reputation in late Qing local politics, at the same time that overseas Chinese were converting capital into official positions in the Qing bureaucracy and then funneling that capital into large-scale infrastructure investments. Lin's extended family, the Wufeng Lins, had transformed from local strongmen along the frontier in Taiwan and profited in money and status from their family's role in managing the camphor monopoly. Whereas Lin Chaodong's attempt to replicate late Qing Taiwan's camphor industry in Fujian worried Japanese officials and ultimately led to his marginalization from Sango's venture, Japanese officials viewed his relative Lin Lisheng as a convenient conduit to funnel Japanese capital into a railway construction project that sought to exclude foreign investment and management. Japanese diplomatic officials unanimously agreed that Lin was Akuzawa's agent, but he appeared, at least on paper, to fulfill Sheng Xuanhuai's criterion of being a source of "Chinese capital." Just to be sure, though, the financiers attempted a sleight of hand, subtly changing the wording of the charter's provision on the sources of capital, from "righteous merchants [including/and] foreign-registered individuals and so on from Hong Kong and across Southeast Asia" (*Xianggang Nanyang gechu yishang yangjiren deng*) to "Chinese merchants in the interior, overseas Chinese, and merchants who have obtained foreign registration" (*Neidi shangren huaren ji ru yangji shangren*).[127] Though the original made

127. See "Nanshin tetsudō kankei ikken," 69. Here "righteous merchants" appears more an honorary distinction than a category. But still the wording is highly ambiguous. In the original, it is unclear if "righteous merchants" modifies "foreign-registered individuals" or is a distinct category from it. I have translated "neidi shangren huaren" as the two separate categories of "Chinese merchants in the interior" and "overseas Chinese," interpreting "huaren" as a separate category designating overseas Chinese without foreign registration. But "neidi" (interior) was also often used in this time to refer to China beyond the treaty-ports. Since none of the investors fell into this category, I interpret the addition of "neidi shangren" to account for Lin Lisheng, based in Fujian (China proper), but also properly "ru yangji shangren" (merchants who have obtained foreign registration), though Chinese officials would likely have had the other investors in mind when reading this.

provision for Chinese merchants who had naturalized as foreign subjects, it also gave the impression that the capital would originate in southeast Asia and Hong Kong, whereas the edited version was much more vague. While Wu was the first to approach Akuzawa, it seems that Lin played a crucial role, not just in channeling Akuzawa's interests in the financiers' internal negotiations, but also in keeping diplomatic officials apprised of their progress. Zhang seemed less reluctant in the end to accept Akuzawa's role than Japanese diplomatic and colonial officials had initially worried—his conferral of an indefinite position to Akuzawa was proof enough. Lin's role as the sole "local" investor earned him the role as the head of management (*eigyō buchō*), although in practice day-to-day operations would fall to the engineers from Taiwan's railway bureau.

The Chaoshan Railway Company was not without its critics. For one, investor Wu Rongxiang grew uncomfortable about the degree of share control held by Akuzawa, who had underwritten a partial loan to Wu for 200,000 yuan and to Lin for the entirety of his 500,000 yuan, leaving Akuzawa with a plurality of shares. Before long, Wu wanted to move his money elsewhere, to invest in a bank he had established in Hong Kong in conjunction with the railway company, leading him to sell off his remaining shares to Akuzawa. As a result of these changes, Akuzawa, Lin, and Zhang signed a contract in August 1904, with Akuzawa and Zhang each holding half of the total two million shares. The private nature of fundraising frustrated local officials and wealthy merchants in the Chaoshan region, to which none of the investors was native. As a gesture of goodwill, the railway's financiers opened a small number of shares to public sale in June 1904, attracting the investments of a local merchant named Zeng, a comprador for the British Tait and Co. Merchant House (C: *Deji yanghang*).[128] The financiers

128. See "Nanshin tetsudō kankei ikken," 102.

named Zeng a member of the company (*lishi*), but he suddenly and inexplicably cut his ties with the company soon thereafter. Japanese diplomatic officials, remaining as vigilant as ever, suspected this was a plot by local English companies, who were jealous of the company, and they urged ongoing attention. Once construction started, the route the railway would take—through the middle of a village, whose inhabitants feared passing trains would lead houses to collapse on themselves, and over gravesites, which spread concerns about disrupting the dead—brought further conflicts between local residents, local officials, and the local operations of the construction.[129]

More worrying for Japanese officials, however, were the railroad's fierce critics in the Chinese media. An article in the Shanghai-based *Zhongwai Ribao* from September 1904 denounced the purchase of materials from Japan and the unexpected appointment of full control to Akuzawa.[130] Following this, in November 1904 a group of Chinese students studying in Japan discovered the details of the company's construction. These students published articles in Japanese newspapers and, more concerning for Japanese diplomats, secretly forwarded these articles to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce. They accused the Taiwan Government-General and the Japanese government of being connected to the project, denounced the railway as an infringement on Chinese sovereignty, and demanded the ministry annul Zhang's contract. Akuzawa, who reported the articles to diplomatic officials, succeeded in enlisting Zhang to mollify the Chinese ministry officials while reminding the Japanese Home Ministry to censor any exposés that would risk inflaming the foreign powers or imperiling Japanese interests in China.

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129. See "Nanshin tetsudō kankei ikken," 103.

130. "Bunkatsu 3," part of "Chōsan tetsudō kankei ikken dai ikkan," JACAR B10074701000.

Perhaps censored by officials in Japan, a group of Chinese students from Guangdong submitted the railroad's most damning revelation to *Shibao*, a newspaper in Shanghai, in January 1905.[131] Published in the form of an official memorial to Zaizhen, the students said: "only after investigating did we discover that the so-called 'foreign shareholder' (*yang gu zhe*) is Lin Lisheng, who is one and the same as a Japanese (*yu Riren gu er er yi, yi er er zhe*)," and without whose involvement (Chinese) sovereignty would not have fallen into foreign hands. The article denounces Zhang, who, having worked with the "treacherous Japanese" (*Riren guiyu*) out of stupidity, "ultimately wanted to deceive himself in order to deceive officials; he brought calamity on himself and thus brought calamity on his native place (*sangzi*). Why did the Japanese feel like they needed to use Lin's name?" the article asked rhetorically. "This is because the railway proclaimed it would not solicit foreign capital (*yanggu*). If the railway accepted [foreign capital], this would be a clear violation of the charter and risk engendering officials' denunciation."

The students backed up their article with shareholder statistics, though in fact they underreported Akuzawa's and Lin's holdings, still believing that Xie had a stake in the company.[132] The students concluded by outlining an incremental trajectory by which Japanese officials and capital would entrench their interests in the region with the railroad as a base. "Though the Japanese are shameless, how could they plunder someone else's land and make it their own?…Lin Lisheng made a joint-management contract into a agreement for exclusive contract—what will this bring about? Will agreeing to an exclusive contract then lead to Japanese monks coming to Chaozhou to proselytize? Will they then appoint a consul to Shantou?

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131. JACAR B10074701000. As the students are unnamed, it is unclear if this is the same group of students as those who wrote the November articles.

132. They report Zhang's shares as one million, Xie's as 500,000, and the remainder as 500,000. This had never been the ratio of shares held, so it is unclear where they derived this information—or perhaps they simply made a conjecture.

Will they then establish a postal office? Will they then open a hotel?"[133] Alhough their memorial is imbued with a sense of panic, the progression of Japanese interests built on the basis of a railway mirrored Gotō's ambitions for the province, and the Japanese Foreign Ministry had in fact established a consular in Shantou in July 1904 to respond to matters of railway construction. In this sense, the complaints of the students were remarkably acute.

Japanese diplomats had anticipated some of this backlash. In a letter to Komura in December 1904, Fuzhou Consul Nakamura praised Japanese officials' quick-witted decision to abandon their initial insistence on a Sino-Japanese joint syndicate, which they understood to have been a commitment corollary to the Fujian Non-Cession Treaty.[134] But although obtaining railway rights through diplomatic finagling was suitable in responding to the vicissitudes of Chinese society and public opinion, finagling was not a permanent policy, or at least not a successful one. In Nakamura's opinion, the tide seemed to be turning against the viability of Sino-Japanese syndicates, and it was increasingly difficult to put faith in the Qing government's adherence to existing agreements (by which he meant the change from what Japanese officials understood to be Japanese rights of priority to Chinese refusal of foreign capital). Ever ready to extrapolate, Nakamura worried that this Chinese diplomatic unpredictability endangered other Japanese industries in the province, namely in camphor and mining. Most of this handwringing about anticipating Chinese reactions came to nothing, since often greater circumstances aligned to impede railway construction. Comparing the case of Chen Rixiang's proposal for a Fujian coastal line is instructive in this respect. Although Chen seemed untrustworthy because he repeatedly returned to collaborate with the French, for the most part, his proposal seemed

133. JACAR B10074701000.

134. See "Nanshin tetsudō kankei ikken," 117.

promising. Chen had official connections within the Qing bureaucracy and with overseas Chinese merchants as the Manila consul, in which capacity he had secured the financial backing of a wealthy merchant named Lin Bingxiang. After submitting the proposal to the government in his name, he was willing to entrust all responsibility of construction to the Japanese. But what ultimately doomed the coastal line was a study by engineer Hasegawa that deemed the railway unprofitable. Japanese railway fervor in the province had been dashed by basic material considerations.[135]

And although the Chaoshan railway remained profitable through the decade, not least because of factors like the local river drying up and eliminating its competition, it was beset by other problems, which revealed the limits of Akuzawa's and Gotō's corporate aspirations in the province. For one, Akuzawa had a reputation for being an irascible manager, even though he did not run the railway's day-to-day operations. The company structure adhered to a strict hierarchy segregated by ethnicity, leading to a protest followed by a strike by Chinese and Taiwanese workers in the summer of 1909 over the company's preferential treatment of Japanese employees. They penned their complaints in an article published in a local Shantou newspaper, describing how, although they had been promised promotions to driver positions after training in Taiwan, Japanese employees remained in control of driving. For the strikers, Japanese control over driving was an apt metaphor that described their retaining power over Chinese sovereign territory. The strikers also attempted to appeal to their distant investor, Zhang Yunan, by proclaiming that he must be shocked by this sorry state of affairs. The charter had, after all, committed the company to hiring Chinese workers for all but the highest leadership positions, and it seems that Zhang may have played a role because most Chinese employees were from his

135. See "Nanshin tetsudō kankei ikken," 78.

neighboring hometown of Jiaying. The strikers also appear to have accessed the company's records, implicating Akuzawa in having exercised influence in the company from the outset through his secret shareholdings, and discovering that Lin Lisheng had initially been listed in the books as a "Taiwanese" before a manager changed this to "Fujianese." At the same time, a letter threatening the life of Zhang Yunan's son, Gongwei, circulated in the area, proclaiming to know that Lin's stocks were in fact XXX's (three characters, for the three of Akuzawa's surname), and declaring that "we plotters [work] for the common good, and cannot bear to see Your Excellency father and son becoming sinners of the Chinese people."

The plot likely involved local agitators who had been disgruntled about the railway from the time of its construction, but the strike, which brought Taiwanese and local Chinese workers together in a work stoppage and then a media campaign, reveals certain problems internal to the company. The strike mobilized nationalist discourse at a time when public opinion continued to turn against foreign investment. In this way it was a minor harbinger of the Railway Protection Movement to follow in 1911, which saw protest against the Qing government's plans to nationalize locally-funded railways to sell off to foreign banks. But from the perspective of Gotō's "Cross Strait Management," the strike revealed the limits to Japanese ambitions, both in promising enterprises staffed by Chinese workers as a model of Sino-Japanese cooperation, and also in proposing Taiwan as a model for successful emulation (in training train drivers to facilitate technological transfer to China). Akuzawa recognized some of their grievances and made a public display of committing to hiring more Taiwanese and Chinese and to handle matters internally so they did not become problems for local officials. But the railway's infrastructure was already organized in a way that privileged Japanese interests: shipping, for example, was and would continue to be handled entirely by the Osaka Shipping Company, the

only major line operating in Shantou.[136] Around the same time in September 1909, Taiwan Governor-General Sakuma Samata (佐久間左馬太 1844–1915, in office 1906–1915), Kodama's successor who prioritized addressing ongoing conflict with Taiwan's indigenous populations over sustaining his predecessor's focus on economic relations with China, wanted to liquidate the colonial government's investment in the company. Although Akuzawa was retained as an advisor on a renewable two-year contract set to expire in 1919, he and Lin signed an agreement nullifying their earlier contract and publicly divested holdings from the railway, reducing his authority within the company.

Or so everyone thought, until over a decade later in 1921, when the railway suddenly appeared on diplomatic officials' radar again.[137] The Zhang family, beset by financial troubles in Southeast Asia brought on by the financial crisis following World War I, was rumored to be considering selling the company. It was at this point that Akuzawa reappeared on the scene, or at least in the diplomatic record, correcting the rumor. He would know of any plans to sell, he mentioned to someone at the Kobe branch of the Bank of Taiwan, because he had retained full rights to contracting and management.[138] The strike in 1909 had led the company to insert the caveat "so long as there is no opposition in local opinion" to his job description, simply concealing his role to prevent public backlash. Furthermore, rumors that the Zhang family wanted to sell the railway had been generated by a visit to Akuzawa by Zhang Gongliang, but Akuzawa dispelled this speculation by asserting that Zhang had visited him to consult his

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136. "Bunkatsu 3," part of "Chōsan tetsudō kankei ikken dai nikan," JACAR B10074701800.

137. This account is based on "Bunkatsu 4," part of "Chōsan tetsudō kankei ikken dai nikan," JACAR B10074701900.

138. It is unclear what Akuzawa was doing in Kobe at the time but the port city was an important center of trade with China and Taiwan and also the location of Sango's Japan office.

opinion on constructing a new factory. The enterprise was growing, not shrinking, and it was doing so with Akuzawa still at the helm. The Zhang family was indeed facing hard times, but they found a solution in selling the family's shares, now held by Zhang Yunan's niece, Fuying (林福英), to her husband, Lin Jingren (林景仁). Jingren was none other than the grandson of Lin Weiyuan of the Banqiao Lin family in Xiamen, who had even proposed a loan from the Bank of Taiwan to underwrite his buy-out.[139] By the 1920s the priorities of colonial and diplomatic officials and the contexts in which they worked in had changed, but questions of infrastructural development and financing continued to link Japanese capital and Taiwan sekimin and overseas Chinese networks well after the railway had faded from public scrutiny.

Up until now, I have primarily discussed the period between the colonization of Taiwan and the collapse of the Qing empire (1895–1912) in terms of elite Taiwan sekimin and the large scale, capital intensive ventures they invested in with Japanese backing. Individuals like Lin Chaodong, Lin Lisheng, and Lin Weiyuan had amassed power and wealth in the final years of Qing rule on Taiwan, under the island's economic and social transformations brought about by treaty-port trade and *kaishan fufan*. Having benefited from the Qing's attempts to extend social and economic control over the island, it comes as no surprise that these local elites chose to leave Taiwan in 1895 and settle permanently in the commercial centers of Fujian, which, after all, had been the entrepôts for the island's trade and its sources of elite education and culture. But as families that had derived their wealth primarily from land and commodity exchange, Japanese colonization of Taiwan also threatened regional systems and networks of accumulation, both by

139. Lin Jingren's father, Lin Erjia, was the adopted son of Lin Weiyuan, and followed him from Taiwan to Xiamen in 1895. Lin Erjia and Lin Jingren are discussed in the next chapter in their connection to the Xiamen Chamber of Commerce (Erjia) and the Taiwan Government-General supported newspaper Quan Min Xin Ribao (Jingren).

remaking them and bringing them under stricter government control, and by reorienting industries to produce commodities for the Japanese domestic market. As demonstrated by Gotō's solicitous visit to Fujian, where he made a point to call on Lin Weiyuan, colonial officials in Taiwan were intent on maintaining cooperative if not collaborative relationships with these elite Taiwan sekimin. The Japanese envisioned these relationships would build and advance Japanese interests in the province on the existing social, political, and commercial networks of these elite Taiwan sekimin, who would act as intermediaries with Chinese merchants and officials (Lin Lisheng, Lin Weiyuan), a "Chinese face" to gain access to projects and positions that otherwise excluded foreigners (Lin Chaodong, Lin Lisheng), or simply as sources of capital. In this sense, it was their integration into Chinese society at its most socially and commercially elite levels that facilitated these ventures. Japanese officials called them "Taiwan sekimin," reflecting a legal understanding that that these individuals were ultimately registered in Taiwan, but they themselves more likely saw themselves as part of elite Chinese society in Fujian, which during the late Qing had no shortage of wealthy merchant-officials registered as subjects of various foreign empires. Finally, these elites were instrumental in building the predecessors of many institutions that would become the pillars of Japanese interests in China—namely schools, newspapers, and hospitals (see the next chapter). While scholars are right to emphasize the influence of the new institutions' colonial analogues, seeing these figures as late Qing social elites, who engaged in a range of social philanthropy and infrastructural development, provides an additional context for making sense what motivated their activities.

If these elites enjoyed relatively free mobility of movement and capital, the same could not be said about lower-class individuals trying to move across the strait, or of their activities in the treaty-ports, which came under increasing consular and local official scrutiny as the decade

went on. The regulation of mobility to and from China in the early years of Japanese colonization gave rise to new regimes to restrict mobility and define the juridical categories that emerged from its complexity—chief among them "Taiwan sekimin." In the same way that this juridical category emerged from bureaucratic attempts by colonial and diplomatic officials to rationalize cross-strait mobility and legal status in the treaty-ports, the activities of these individuals who laid claim to it contributed to shaping its contours. At times Japanese colonial and diplomatic officials were eager to expand the category and its legal connotations, and at other times jurisdictional and administrative demands stretched the consuls' bureaucratic capabilities to the limit, leading them to advocate circumscribing its bounds. While top-down directives from colonial and diplomatic officials were important, these transformations were driven as much by on the ground changes and the social history of the individuals who claimed consular jurisdiction as Taiwan sekimin.

Increasing need for direct communication between the Xiamen consulate and the Taiwan Government-General led to the request and approval of a direct line of communication between Xiamen and Taipei in 1906.[140] This direct line allowed consular and colonial officials to communicate directly without routing all communications through the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo. Increasingly frequent consular adjudication of legal and commercial issues in China led the Fuzhou consul to suggest the levying of processing fees in 1907, reflecting the consuls' increased workload.[141] "In nine cases out of ten," the consul reported, "Taiwanese (*Taimin*) are named as the accused by Chinese…due to the treatment of Taiwanese as equal to us Japanese by

140. "(11) Taiwan sōtokufu to zai Amoi ryōjikan kan Taiwan sekimin no jikō sono ta ni kan shi chokusetsu tsūshin no ken Meiji yonjūnen ichigatsu yori," JACAR B13080098000.

141 "11. Ryōjikan no chōshū suru tesūryō ni kan shi zai Fukushū ryōji yori seikun no ken dō," JACAR B12082101900.

treaty, not only do [they] abuse these special rights and recklessly cause incidents, but they also lend their names in legal disputes between Chinese with the aim of conferring these benefits." Nor were legal conflicts and consequent demands placed on Japanese consuls circumscribed to the spatial bounds of the treaty-port's urban centers. In 1907, a land dispute came to the attention of the Shantou consul, in which a Taiwan sekimin owned property outside the treaty-port that he had purchased prior to naturalization.[142] Although treaty law forbade foreign subjects in China from purchasing land, how was the Japanese consul to manage property that had been purchased legally but was now held by a subject with Japanese status?

Minor and individual cases involving Taiwan sekimin were consequential for the Japanese consuls because by nature of their uniform legal status, officials were insistent on coming up with a uniform and comprehensive policy. In 1907, Xiamen Consul Segawa Asanoshin (瀬川浅之進, in office 1907–1910) surveyed the Taiwan sekimin population and categorized them into three groups.[143] The first were those who owned property in Taiwan and were temporarily in Xiamen on business or for other purposes—"there is value in treating them as pure Japanese subjects." The second were those who had relocated with their entire families to Xiamen and held no intention ever to live "within Japanese territory"—they were not Japanese nationals (*Nihon kokumin*) in name or in truth. The final were those who had come into Taiwan sekimin status by improper means. Consul Segawa recognized that the three populations were quite different from one another, in motivation if not in utility for the future of Japanese policy, but the nature of their legal status required the consuls adopt a uniform policy for managing

142. "Taiwan zai sekimin ga Shinkoku naichi ni okeru yū suru fudōsan shoyūken hogo ikken," JACAR B12083424200.

143. Quoted in Masataka Endō, "Taiwan sekimin wo meguru Nihon seifu no kokuseki seisaku no shuttatsu: nijū kokuseki mondai to Shinkoku kokuseki hō he no taiō wo chūshin ni," Waseda daigaku seiji keizai gakkai 376 (December 2009): 51–71, 57.

them. The challenge to execute a comprehensive and uniform policy came in 1909, when a Taiwan sekimin who was a Chinese subject returned to Guangdong to find his family's grave destroyed and had been arrested by local officials upon appeal. Consular officials recognized that this individual was Chinese, but were at pains to secure his legal protection to uphold the rights of all sekimin vis-a-vis local officials. Japanese consuls' solution was to keep Sino-Japanese negotiations on the local level, to avoid involving the Chinese Foreign Ministry whenever possible, and to maintain ambiguity and flexibility. Resolution between Japanese diplomats and their counterparts at the local Chinese level was a deliberate strategy by the Japanese consuls and not a result of devolution in Chinese authority.

Individual disputes paled in comparison to a structural challenge to the entire system of Taiwan sekimin legal status that came at the end of the decade with the promulgation of the Qing's Citizenship Law. Reacting to efforts by the Dutch colonial government in the East Indies to naturalize its ethnic Chinese populations (and require conscription and official handling of inheritance), the Qing promulgated a *jus sanguinus* citizenship law in 1909, China's first, which considered all children of Chinese fathers Chinese citizens.[144] Fuzhou Consul Amano Kyōtaro (in office June–November 1909) immediately suspected that this was a targeted effort by Qing officials to consider all Taiwan sekimin Chinese subjects.[145] The law stated that it would consider Chinese subjects: those who did not hold papers proving they had renounced Chinese citizenship; those who obtained foreign citizenship before the law's promulgation but had bought property or received inheritance, i.e. rights to be enjoyed solely by Chinese subjects; and those

144. The sole study in English that addresses the Qing Citizenship Law of 1909 at length is Dan Shao, "Chinese by Definition: Nationality Law, Jus Sanguinus, and State Succession, 1909–1980," Twentieth-Century China 35, no. 1 (November 2009): 4–28.

145. Quoted in Endō, 64.

who were Chinese officials. Facing the consuls was the challenge of competing claims by the Japanese and Chinese empires over these individuals. Though Japanese officials wanted to protest this legal change, they were also at pains not to appear as if they were interfering in the Qing government's legislative processes.

Primarily because the Qing government was beset with other issues, and would collapse a few years later, these competing claims never escalated into a conflict requiring a permanent and juridical decision over whether Taiwan sekimin were Japanese or Chinese subjects. Japanese diplomatic officials continued to resolve individual cases on an ad hoc basis, though they were careful not to let disputes escalate beyond the local level. Part of their strategy was ignoring Chinese requests for documentation, for example, that would prove whether current Taiwan sekimin had been "inhabitants" of Taiwan at the time of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, or if they had been entered into the registry after the treaty was signed. As earlier disputes between colonial and diplomatic officials showed, this was not an easy matter for Japanese officials to resolve internally, let alone with Chinese officials. Though the active administrative challenge to Taiwan sekimin legal status through the Chinese Citizenship Law sunk beneath the surface with the fall of the Qing, the juridical interpretation of Taiwan sekimin as Chinese, and not Japanese subjects, would never fully be resolved. If Japanese consuls relied on ad hoc resolution of matters of a subject's legal status, so did Chinese officials rely on the same ad hoc measures to reassert claims to jurisdiction over Taiwan sekimin for a variety of reasons, a source of conflict that would persist throughout the early twentieth century.

Chapter Two: New Institutions and the Taiwan Government-General's "New South China Policy" in the Shadow of the 1911 Chinese Revolution and World War I, 1911–1919

Introduction

At the end of May 1916, Shimomura Hiroshi (下村宏 1875–1957, in office 1915–1921), then the Civil Governor (*Minsei chōkan*) in the Taiwan Government-General, wrote to Komura Kin'ichi (小村欣一), a senior official in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Political Affairs Bureau, to introduce a series of new studies being undertaken by the police bureau of the colonial government on the Chinese mainland. Shimomura wrote: "The relationship between Taiwan and South China (*Nanshi*) is extremely intimate, and thus in order to secure the foundation of the rule of Taiwan, we must first thoroughly investigate the policy towards South China."[146] Shimomura's brief note to Komura underscored the theme of the extensive report that he attached for Komura's consideration, titled "The Relationship Between Taiwan and South China." The internal report, one of the first of a sixty-five volume series, systematically categorizes the South Sino-Taiwanese relationship from the perspectives of communications and exchange (*kōtsū*), control of published materials, punishment of crimes, and banditry (*doi jiken*). The subsequent reports, most with the title "Reports Concerning China and the Chinese" (*Shina narabi shinajin ni kansuru hōkoku*) by the commander-in-chief of police inspectors (*keishi sōchō*) Yuchi Kōhei (湯地幸平 1870–1931), detailed the social, political, and economic conditions of the south Chinese treaty-ports (Fuzhou, Xiamen, Shantou, and Guangzhou) and its Taiwanese residents from 1916 to 1919 from the vantage point of colonial police officers

146. "2 Toku ni Taiwan keisatsusho taisaku riyō no ken," JACAR B03041647000. See appendix for biographical details. For an exploration of the institutions established and research projects undertaken by Shimomura, see Takashi Nakamura, "Taiwan to 'Nanshi, Nan'yō,'" in Nihon no nanpō kanyo to Taiwan, ed. Takashi Nakamura (Tenri, Nara: Tenrikyō dōyūsha, 1988), 1–33. 16–18. Here I have chosen to capitalize "South China" because the term Shimomura uses in Japanese (Nanshi) has the connotation of being a discrete geographical term.

dispatched from Taiwan since 1915.[147] The series contains reports from the police in Taiwan on the circulation of people, publications, and ideas from the mainland to the island colony, reinforcing Shimomura's conviction that China was a source of criminal and ideological trouble for Taiwan.

Why were police officers from colonial Taiwan dispatched to the south China treaty-ports, what did they observe, and what purpose did their reports serve in shaping the south China policies of the colonial government in Taiwan and the Japanese Foreign Ministry in the wake of China's transition from empire to republic after 1912? Before Japanese colonization in 1895, Taiwan had been a frontier region of the Qing empire which had only begun to be rapidly incorporated into the empire in the last two decades of Qing control from 1875 to 1895. Trade in important commodities like tea, rice, camphor, and sugar linked Taiwan in global trade via entrepôts across the Taiwan Strait on the south coast of China, particularly Xiamen, creating a regional economic network that connected Taiwan and south China to southeast Asia.[148] Shimomura's belief that Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan was intimately linked to Japanese diplomatic policy in south China was not new; it had been articulated by Taiwan's second governor-general, Katsura Tarō (in office June–October 1896), and acted upon in ambitious

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147. Exceptions in this naming scheme are the reports on piracy ("Kaizoku torishimari to minami Shina to no kankei," JACAR B03041650800) and plagues ("Taiwan ni okeru 'pesuto' to Nanshi to no kankei," JACAR B03041650900), which were incorporated into a revised version of "The Relationship between Taiwan and South China" written the following year in 1916, "6 Taiwan ni okeru 'pesuto' to Nanshi to no kankei," JACAR B03041652800.

Yuchi Kōhei served as the "commander in chief of police inspectors" (keishi sōchō) from December 11, 1915 to April 4, 1919, under Governor-Generals Andō Teibi (in office 4/30/1915–6/5/1918) and Akashi Motojirō (in office 6/6/1918–10/18/1919). The extension of Taiwanese police authority to south China was in line with other policies Shimomura advocated and suggests that the goals of the police force and civil administration were often aligned.

148. Foreign trade and expansion of maritime shipping lanes in East Asia had only accelerated with the opening of treaty-ports along the China coast in the 1840s, among them Xiamen, and again in the late 1850s, this time including two ports in Taiwan, Tamsui and Tainan. But as both of these smaller ports in Taiwan lacked deep-water ports, most trade between Taiwan and the global economy was still conducted via Xiamen.

infrastructural and institutional investment by its fourth governor-general, Kodama Gentarō (in office 1898–1906) and his Civil Minister Gotō Shinpei, only to decline in importance under his successor, Sakuma Samata (in office 1906–1915). From the earliest days of the Japanese colonization of Taiwan, colonial officials were interested not only in exploiting the island's natural resources which had sustained its economy in the Qing period, but also in utilizing Taiwan's existing commercial, social, and political links to south China and southeast Asia to expand Japanese interests in the region. Shimomura's understanding of Taiwan's relationship with south China was heir to these earlier ambitions.

But Shimomura's vision was not merely a revival of earlier Japanese policies, even if he positioned himself as inheriting the priorities of earlier governors-general. The political and social context in China had changed drastically in the previous decade: the Qing empire had collapsed in 1912, replaced by a series of attempts at constitutional and republican government on the national and local levels. Political authority had become even more localized and contested, and the specter of revolutionary action of various sorts loomed large. Historians have identified the 1910s as a pivotal decade for Sino-Japanese relations and Japanese foreign policy, as China's transition from empire to republic and World War I from 1914–1918 rapidly changed the political and social contexts in which Japanese and Chinese officials operated.[149] Rather than focus on the levels of diplomacy and high politics, however, I again view Sino-Japanese relations

149. See, for example, Frederick Dickinson, War and National Reinvention: Japan in the Great War, 1914–1919 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Asia Center, Harvard University Press, 1999). Nish, *Japanese Foreign Policy, 1869-1942*. Akira Iriye, After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921–1931 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1965). Historians who focus on colonial Taiwan, in contrast, generally see the end of the decade (1919) as a turning point, citing the influence of the end of World War I, the March First and May Fourth Movements in Korea and China, respectively, and the turn to civilian rule in colonial Taiwan which adopted policies of "cultural rule" and gradual "extension of the mainland (Japan)" (naichi enchō shugi). See Caroline Hui-yu Tsai, "Shaping Administration in Colonial Taiwan," in Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1895–1945: History, Culture, Memory, ed. Ping-hui Liao and David Der-wei Wang (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 97–121. Leo T. S. Ching, Becoming "Japanese": Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).

and Japanese policy in China rather more from the bottom up, beginning with the vantage point of the Taiwan sekimin residing in the south China treaty-ports.

Yuchi's "Reports Concerning China and the Chinese" range from incidental observations to in-depth, serialized, longitudinal studies of prominent individuals and institutions, and touch on a range of Taiwanese social, political, and economic activities in Fujian and Guangdong between 1915 and 1919. These were diverse; there was no simple "Taiwanese reaction" in south China to the developments of the 1910s. Yet because both the Japanese Foreign Ministry and Taiwan Government-General understood them to be "Taiwan sekimin," they were all subject to scrutiny and worthy of investigation. Some of the individuals and institutions reported on were prominent and have known biographical details allowing them to be placed in broader historical context. Others appear but once, prompting speculative and prospographical readings.

An examination of Yuchi's reports reveals the changes in Japanese policy in South China in the 1910s from the vantage point of an official in the colonial police force. Yuchi's observations reflect the duality of peril and promise that Japanese officials placed in the sekimin, which had only been amplified by social instability: on one hand, they could channel Japanese interests in China and draw local Chinese within the ambit of the Japanese empire; on the other hand, sekimin in China could also be exposed to revolutionary ideology and not only subvert Japanese interests on the mainland but bring revolutionary fever back to Taiwan and imperil Japanese rule there. The threat posed by such a possibility was epitomized by Lin Jishang (林季商), the son of camphor merchant Lin Chaodong and a member of the Wufeng Lin family who naturalized as a Chinese citizen and threw his weight behind the Chinese Revolution. Lin was motivated, in part, by Chinese local officials, some of whom saw Taiwan sekimin ineligible for investing in ventures in China, and even more threatening in Yuchi's view, others of whom

began to challenge the legal foundations of the category itself. The rise in the number of sekimin across South China threatened the tax revenues of local governments and rendered them incapable of controlling commercial activity. In Yuchi's view, local Japanese consuls who were insufficiently forceful in protecting local sekimin were partly to blame, revealing further divergence in the outlook of colonial and consular officials. In response, Yuchi advocated the construction of a more durable infrastructure of Japanese empire in the South China treaty-ports by replicating colonial institutions like the police force and hospitals. These institutions would serve two functions: aligning the interests of Taiwan sekimin with those of the empire, and garnering support for Japan from local residents. Support of these new institutions would also commit the Taiwan Government-General to a policy of subsidies, which continued until the start of war in 1937. Although scholars have studied these institutions as the pillars of the Taiwan Government-General's policy in South China, I argue that they must be understood in the context of Yuchi's reports on local conditions in the treaty-ports. During this period of transition, not only the Japanese consuls and colonial officials from Taiwan, but also local Chinese officials and municipal groups including chambers of commerce, sought to define the juridical position of Taiwan sekimin within the treaty-ports and beyond in China. The success of these institutions, then, was always contingent upon the participation of Taiwan sekimin in them, which in turn transformed the nature of the relationship of local consular and colonial officials to their sekimin subjects.

These reports of the Taiwanese police officers in the treaty-ports provide evidence of the social histories of the urban treaty-ports in the wake of the 1911 Revolution and in the aftermath of the failure of Japan's Twenty-One Demands to China in January 1915. These Demands,

issued by Foreign Minister Katō Takaaki and Prime Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu, sought to capitalize on European powers' preoccupation with World War I and withdrawal from Chinese foreign policy to extract concessions from the military leader-turned-president of the Republic of China Yuan Shikai. In the face of harsh Chinese popular opposition, Katō withdrew what one historian has characterized as the most odious of these demands (Group Five), which included Japanese claims to the following rights: to construct railways, hospitals, schools, and churches in China, to freely travel, reside, and own land in China, and, in some areas of the country, to joint Sino-Japanese police administration.[150] As another historian has argued, however, these demands were squarely in the tradition of late nineteenth century imperialism in China and "simply placed in writing what had already become general practice among the great powers," which explains in part why despite the highly publicized diplomatic failure of the Demands in 1915, some of its most apparently contentious elements were institutionalized in practice by the end of the decade.[151] As this chapter will show, the Government-General, under Shimomura's

150. The final group of the Twenty-One Demands, concerning Japan's demand for special economic rights in Fujian Province in the form of control over railways, mines, and ports, among other demands, "triggered the most intense Chinese opposition" and was eventually removed by the Japanese government before submitting the remaining demands as an ultimatum to Yuan Shikai on May 7th, 1915. See Karl Gerth, "Twenty-One Demands," in Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern World (Oxford University Press, 2008).

151. Frederick Dickinson, cited by Gerth, argues that, put into the broader history of Sino-foreign diplomacy, the demands in group 5 (and as a whole) were not particularly harsher or more extreme than existing agreements China had signed with other imperial powers. As concerns Fujian, Dickinson contends that group 4, stipulating the promise by Beijing not to cede further territory to a third foreign power and maintained in the final ultimatum, was a reaction to Japanese fears of encroaching American influence in Fujian (understood as an extension of the Fujian Non-Cession Treaty). Dickinson notes that the interpretation of group 5 of the Demands as aiming for "Japanese political and military domination of China" was suggested by an American official's note. Dickinson, War and National Reinvention: Japan in the Great War, 1914–1919, especially 84–116. Zhitian Luo suggests that the "Chinese reaction" to the demands was primarily an urban, elite, educated one, and headed by Chinese students studying in Japan. In his analysis of fundraising by the National Salvation Fund he concludes that "in such areas as Manchuria and Shantung, where the Japanese influence was most concentrated, the fund raising was actually very successful." Attempts in Xiamen and Guangzhou (the only south China treaty-ports included in this analysis) were similarly "successful" on an absolute scale, though in both cases dwarfed by the exponentially greater amounts raised in Beijing, Shanghai, and even regional cities Changsha, Hankou, Tianjin, and Xi'an. Zhitian Luo, "National Humiliation and National Assertion: The Chinese Response to the Twenty-One Demands" 27, no. 2 (May 1993): 297–319.

Though Shimomura's reports only begin the following year, they make barely any reference to the Twenty-One

recommendation, came to advocate building schools and hospitals, securing Sino-Japanese joint policing of Taiwanese subjects in Fujian, and protecting Taiwanese subjects' right to own property and live in China as essential for securing colonial rule in Taiwan and extending Japanese power in China. Though Katō's tenure as foreign minister ended in August 1915, that his successors were willing to countenance the same policies, jointly pursued with the Taiwanese colonial government, no less, suggests that historiography may have overestimated the international reaction to the Twenty-One Demands. Even if the immediate and local impact in Fujian of Chinese opposition to the Twenty-One Demands may have been overestimated, the protests gave birth to the new language of "national humiliation" (*guochi*) of China at the hands of an expansionist Japanese empire. The outcome of the Treaty of Versailles (1919) only amplified such perceptions, when Chinese delegates were unable to stop Japan from gaining control over the former German colonial holding of Shandong in North China, giving rise to the anti-colonial nationalist May Fourth Movement shaped by opposition to Japan. The anti-Japanese sentiment of this decade would transform in the 1920s and 1930s, when it was given immediate social and economic effects with the rise of tactics such as boycotts and strikes, but in the 1910s, they had not taken on their nationalist implications or their national scale.

The conditions of production of the "Reports on China and the Chinese" by an ambitious colonial government seeking to double down on an already extensive system of policing on the island, also reveal how the Taiwan Government-General sought to amplify its own authority in Sino-Japanese diplomatic affairs in south China. In this sense, the reports reproduced a tautological, imperial logic: by identifying municipal disorder and Sino-Japanese conflicts in the

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Demands, suggesting that the reaction to them outside Beijing and Shanghai, despite locally concentrated Japanese influence in Fujian, was short-lived and limited.

treaty-ports as the root cause of disorder in Taiwan, which could only be solved by the dispatch of colonial police and the extension of police authority to the Chinese coast, Shimomura and Yuchi established the pretext for dispatching and ultimately stationing police officers in the treaty-ports to collect information and produce knowledge that confirmed their conceptions about the origins of colonial disorder. An annotation, possibly Shimomura's, on the cover of a later 1916 version of "The Relationship Between Taiwan and South China," revised to include portions on piracy and plagues, declares:

> "Not only is the opposing coast of China (*taigan*) the base of operations for various kinds of secret plots, but it is also the origin of epidemics and the lair (*sōkutsu*) of pirates. Furthermore, the Chinese police are powerless and cannot be relied on. As a result, we must bring the coasts of the Fujian, Guangdong, and Shanghai regions within our sphere of influence (*waga seiryoku han'i*) and completely purge the sources of evil [that harm] the rule of Taiwan. As a first step, [we] should extend Taiwan's police powers (*keisatsuken*) to the China coast (*taigan*)."[152]

Further at stake for the colonial government in Taiwan was the recent memory of the Ta-pa-ni (Xilaian) Uprising of 1915, led by an alliance of Han Chinese settlers and indigenous inhabitants of a frontier region in southern Taiwan and the largest anti-Japanese uprising —and the most prominent since the outset of colonial rule. In Shimomura's account, the uprising was not brought about by failed Japanese colonial policies, but was the symptomatic culmination of anti-Japanese banditry (*doi*), which emanated from south China and was exacerbated by incomplete "submission to Japanese imperialization."[153] This echoes the verdict drawn by Japanese colonialist historiography, which, as Paul Katz shows, tends to see a pathology of

152. "25 Taiwan to Minami Shina to no kankei," JACAR B03041652800.

153. "2 Toku ni Taiwan keisatsusho taisaku riyō no ken," JACAR B03041647000. The "imperialization" (kōka, 皇化) referred to by Shimomura is not the same as the wide-ranging attempts at "imperialization" (kōminka, 皇民化) embarked on by the colonial government after 1937, but remains the best translation for his term. Katz also shows how Taiwanese nationalist historiography has tended to view the uprising in anti-colonial, ethno-nationalist terms; see following note.

Taiwanese banditry in the origins of the uprising.[154] This context was important for Shimomura and Yuchi, both of whom were appointed in the bureaucratic reshuffling following the incident. Katz further shows that the uprising's leaders were inspired by millenarian and folk religious beliefs that led its participants to believe that they were impervious to Japanese modern military control. The uprising's resonances with the Boxer Rebellion likely further troubled Shimomura and Yuchi and can explain, in part, why they revived Kodama's and Gotō's conviction that colonial disorder originated on the mainland.

Thus, the social history of Taiwanese residing in the treaty-ports and the intellectual history of colonial bureaucrats like Shimomura and Yuchi, who in collaboration with their diplomatic colleagues in the Foreign Ministry, sought to characterize and manage Taiwanese activities in the treaty-ports, were inextricably linked. Like earlier Japanese colonial and consular officials, Shimomura and Yuchi paid particular attention to elites on the one hand, and those identified as "ruffians" (J: *buraikan*) or "disreputable" (*furyō*) on the other. But their studies also exhibited an interest in the growing number of Taiwan sekimin who were merchants or involved in local financial ventures, who Yuchi understood could provide stability and infrastructure to Japanese interests in the treaty-ports, if properly supported by the colonial government. Devolution of Chinese authority to the local level, Sino-Japanese diplomatic tensions following Japan's issuing the Twenty-One Demands, and the desire to extend Taiwanese police authority to the treaty-ports following the Ta-pa-ni Incident of 1915 in order to consolidate colonial rule,

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154. There may have been some truth to this claim. Katz mentions that the leaders of the uprising tried to plant the blame on Lin Jishang, a member of an elite family from central Taiwan explored in this chapter. Paul R. Katz, When Valleys Turned Blood Red: The Ta-Pa-Ni Incident in Colonial Taiwan (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2005). This claim was recently repeated by Lin's grandson in a 2015 conference at Taiwan's Academia Historica; see: https://www.th.gov.tw/epaper/site/page/141/2056.

were joined by the additional geopolitical and economic context of perceived growth of Japanese economic opportunity in China and southeast Asia created by World War I. Yuchi's interest in a broader swath of Taiwan sekimin reflects the opportunities for Japanese expansion and the dangers posed by potential instability created by this context. These factors all contributed to making the latter half of the 1910s a period of transition for the Japanese empire at whose center stood the Taiwan sekimin.

Fears that revolutionary insurrection in China might spread to Taiwan were evident in Yuchi's observations of colonial Taiwan's most famous participant in the Chinese Revolution of 1911 and its subsequent politics, Lin Jishang. From a family of considerable means, the Wufeng Lins, Jishang continued to rely on connections with individuals and colonial institutions in Taiwan, even as he participated in revolutionary activities on the mainland. Chinese nationalist historiography by Taiwanese scholars has characterized him as the first, and consummate, pro-Republic of China revolutionary patriot from Taiwan, but this scholarship overlooks his ongoing ties with Japanese colonial officials and institutions in Taiwan and on the mainland.[155] Fears of revolution and insurrection were larger than any one individual, however, and were shared by local Chinese and diplomatic Japanese officials alike. These fears were most often directed not at elite revolutionaries like Lin but at Xiamen's lower class Taiwanese, who were involved in resurrecting the city's opium economy and attendant criminal activity. The prosecution of these figures, who fell between Chinese and Japanese jurisdiction, united officials from both countries

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155. Historians of this view are in the minority, but one representative work is that by Shao Minghuang. Shao was the director of the Party Archives of the Guomindang in Taipei under the Ma Ying-jeou administration when he published this account, which relies heavily on documents from the Party archive and the de-classified diaries of Chiang Kai-shek. In the introduction, he writes: "The moral integrity (qijie) of Lin Zumi (Jishang's chosen name after naturalization as a Chinese subject) in selling his family property to invest in anti-Japanese [activities] and the recovery of Taiwan, [makes] the peoples' hearts flutter (zhendong renxin)." Minghuang Shao, *Tansuo Lin Zumi: xin yinxiang, xin fengmao* (Taipei: Haixia xueshu chubanshe, 2009), i.

in the cause of expanding Japanese police powers in the city. For the most part, the city's Taiwanese either sought stability around existing institutions, or hoped to use the post-imperial interregnum to build new institutions in the absence of a proactive Japanese diplomatic policy of support. This lack of Japanese support became an item of Yuchi's criticism, as he sought to expand the infrastructure in China that would promote Japanese interests, by more strictly prosecuting crime and more proactively attracting local elite support for the empire. Emblematic of Yuchi's and Shimomura's new "South China Policy" were two institutions, a new Japanese consular police office in Xiamen outside of the treaty-port concession proper on Gulangyu, and a new hospital. These institutions channeled diplomatic and colonial interests to the mainland through the following decades until the outbreak of war in 1937.

Yuchi and Shimomura seem to have stopped producing the reports on "China and the Chinese" in April 1919 after sixty-five issues. They concluded the series with a summary of "present institutions and future policies" (*genzai no shisetsu narabi shōrai no hōshin*) and an outline of an agreement between the Xiamen and Fuzhou consuls and the Taiwan Government-General to collaborate on police administration. The series' bookending with two policy proposals reinforces the ideological tenor of police officers' observations in south China, especially since Shimomura and Yuchi were successful in reaching their goals of extending Taiwanese police authority to south China and securing the financial support of the Taiwan Government-General for the expansion of institutions (schools and hospitals) and investment in new infrastructure (railways) and business ventures. These institutions and the ongoing investments in them formed the character of the Government-General's policies in south China for the next two decades, signaling a shift from an earlier policy of corporate subsidies for

economic development (Ch. 1) to one based on expanding police authority and institutional infrastructure.

In pursuing these aims, Shimomura found allies among the Taiwan sekimin in China, as well as among local Chinese, mainly elites, who saw Japanese institutions providing stability in times threatened by revolution and change. But, as one might expect from reports whose underlying premise was that of China as the source of Taiwan's political and social instability, Shimomura and Yuchi also found Taiwanese in the treaty-ports who were critical of Japanese colonial rule and who had traveled to the mainland to participate in the revolution. In other cases, Yuchi discovered, the instability fomented by the revolution had pushed Taiwan sekimin into tighter reliance on existing Chinese-run municipal organizations. Finally, the two colonial bureaucrats found Taiwan sekimin whose ambitions to create new institutions to address the changes in local politics coincided, if not always perfectly, with the newly stated aims of the Taiwan Government-General. Despite the diversity of opinions, these observations convinced Shimomura of one thing: that both the Taiwan Government-General and the Japanese Foreign Ministry needed a new "South China policy."

The "Reports Concerning China and the Chinese" and Yuchi's Ideological Frame

In the "Relationship Between Taiwan and South China" first articulated by Yuchi in 1915, he begins by praising the accomplishments of Japanese rule in Taiwan while reminding his readers not to be overly optimistic: "when you examine the realities of rule, and furthermore when you consider the location (*ichi*) of Taiwan, we cannot yet celebrate its accomplishments."[156] The threat inhibiting Japanese success in Taiwan came, of course, from

156. JACAR B03041647000. The report is not signed, and, unlike the later "Reports Concerning China and the Chinese" attributed by name to Yuchi, the only indication of authorship is the Taiwan Government-General, Bureau

China, and justified expansion of institutions of social control from the island colony to the mainland. Not only did Taiwan have "an extremely intimate relationship with southern China, [sharing] the same race, customs and traditions (*fūzoku shūkan*), and language," but "every move and every action had immediate reverberations in Taiwan" as a result of the islanders' "cherishing the memory of their homeland."[157] Secret plots hatched on the mainland threatened to reveal the superficiality of Japanese efforts to assimilate the Taiwanese. Links between Taiwan and South China were not merely spiritual and historical: Taiwanese individuals moved freely across the Taiwan Strait, not to mention the publications that could travel from China to Taiwan along those same conduits and threaten public order in the colony. Some anti-Japanese Taiwanese saw China as a destination where they could evade Japanese punishment and official monitoring, and individuals on one side of the strait owned property on the other. Like his forbears Gotō and Kodama, Yuchi concluded that establishing a South China Policy immediately was essential for ruling Taiwan.[158] If the success of Japanese rule in Taiwan was understood by colonial officials as litmus test of Japan's capabilities as an empire, Yuchi cautioned his readers also to be aware of another set of observers of this model colony: Chinese officials. Indeed, the first observations in Yuchi's "Reports Concerning China and the Chinese" were not of police dispatched to south China, but of colonial police welcoming officials from the mainland for the "Taiwan Industrial Exposition" (*Taiwan kangyō kyōshin kai*) held in April–May 1916 to

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of Civil Administration, General Board of the Police (Taiwan sōtokufu, minsei bu, keisatsu honsho). Handwriting provides no clues to authorship, though a handwritten note on the cover suggests that the report was submitted to the Chief of Civil Administration (i.e. Shimomura). I have therefore chosen to attribute authorship in my analysis to Yuchi, though this is not to suggest that Shimomura was uninvolved.

157. JACAR B03041647000. The language of "customs and traditions" derives, in part, from Meiji-era surveys in Japan of local social practices, which in turn informed surveys and research of Taiwanese social, commercial, and legal practices understood in the frame of the island's history of Chinese settlement.

158. For "migration" Yuchi uses the term "tennyū."

celebrate the twentieth anniversary of Japanese rule on the island and display its accomplishments.[159]

If Yuchi's description of Japanese policies in Taiwan extolled their relative success, their shortcomings revealed his critiques of the deficiencies in the Foreign Ministry's existing China policy. Yuchi's reports, then, can be read as colonial officials in Taiwan's Government-General, like Yuchi and Shimomura, taking a more active role in trying to shape the direction of Japanese diplomatic affairs in south China. Their ambition was often shared by local Japanese diplomatic officials, who held relatively marginal positions in the Japanese Foreign Ministry's hierarchy and were understaffed for the number and frequency of diplomatic issues in south China, considered by the Ministry to be of low diplomatic importance.[160] The control of information and potentially subversive publications provides an illustrative example of cooperation between diplomatic and colonial officials. Managing the flow of information required not only bolstering the surveillance capabilities of the Taiwanese colonial police, but also countering such information in China

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159. Seiji Shirane details this exposition, placing it in the context of contemporaneous Japanese "brain trusts" established in Taiwan to produce knowledge about south China, in this case the South Seas Association (*Nan'yō kyōkai*). The Taiwan Government-General's Tokyo office founded the Association in 1915 with a branch office opened in Taipei in April 1916 by Shimomura, the same month as the exposition. For details of the exposition, see Seiji Shirane, "Mediated Empire: Colonial Taiwan in Japan's Imperial Expansion in South China and Southeast Asia, 1895–1945" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 2014). 125–126. The exposition's Chinese guests included officials from Fujian province, in addition to industrial and commercial leaders from Beijing and Shanghai. Nakamura Takashi mentions that some one in five Taiwanese attended the Exposition. Nakamura, "Taiwan to 'Nanshi, Nan'yō,'" 18. For details on the observations by Chinese officials from Fujian of colonial Taiwan in the context of the broader scope of Japanese rule of Taiwan, see Wen-kai Lin, "Riben zhi Tai jingyan qujian: zhanqian Fujian guanfang de Taiwan diaocha yu kaocha huodong zhi fenxi, 1911–1933," Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History 101 (September 2018): 117–56. For an institutional history of the Association focused on the training of personnel and on its de facto manager Inoue Masaji, see

160. Barbara Brooks has shown how diplomats posted to China were marginalized within the Ministry vis-à-vis their counterparts in Europe and the United States. Her study focuses primarily on the diplomats who occupied the position of Minister Plenipotentiary to China, based in Beijing. The officials posted in south China were further marginalized relative to the more important postings in Manchuria and central China (Shanghai and Nanjing), where Japan had more pronounced economic interests. Manchuria posed the additional complication of agricultural migrants from Korea, a Japanese colony after 1910, who then relied on local consuls to resolve conflicts with Chinese officials there. Barbara J. Brooks, Japan's Imperial Diplomacy: Consuls, Treaty Ports, and War in China, 1895–1938 (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000).

proper through active support of newspapers by the Foreign Ministry. The need to bolster Japanese consular police powers in the treaty-ports provides another example of common interest. Stability in Taiwan not only relied on a strong police force on the island colony, but was actively threatened by the inability of the minimal consular police force to manage the movement of Taiwan sekimin on the mainland and the forgery of official papers by Taiwanese and local Chinese. Yuchi's critique of the Foreign Ministry's existing policy towards China was an active attempt by the Taiwan Government-General to reshape the Japanese empire's involvement in China. In both the preventative measure of strengthening existing capabilities to surveill subjects on the mainland and the proactive measure of building new institutions to bolster Japanese influence in China, the Taiwan sekimin—whether as objects of suasion or of surveillance—stood at the center of Yuchi's designs.

Although the majority of Taiwanese subjects on the mainland lived in Xiamen during this period from 1911–1919—as they did throughout the early twentieth century—the Reports defined the "South China" region as the treaty-ports of Fuzhou, Xiamen, Shantou, and Guangzhou and their associated administrative "hinterlands" (*okuchi*). In the decade following the Chinese Revolution of 1911, these four cities were, in spite of their proximity, quite different. Fuzhou, the provincial capital of Fujian, maintained the closest ties to Beijing and the regime there under Yuan Shikai; Guangzhou, itself also a provincial capital (of Guangdong), was the center of the Guomindang (GMD) Party, whose leaders at thetime included Sun Yat-sen and Hu Hanmin, who often challenged the authority and legitimacy of Yuan's government in Beijing. Xiamen, meanwhile, was most closely tied to overseas Chinese networks that connected the city to the commercial centers of Southeast Asia, and in this period, Manila and Singapore in particular. These distinctions were not trivial. In his final report, Yuchi concluded that the

networks of information connecting each city to the wider world were distinct. Remarking on the origins and relative importance of news in Fuzhou and Xiamen, Yuchi relayed that, "as the administrative capital [of Fujian province], news in Fuzhou is transmitted directly from the capital; in Xiamen, there are many who are successful in southeast Asia (Jp: *Nan'yō*; Ch: *Nanyang*), and so news from southeast Asia is more important than that from Beijing."[161] It makes sense to examine the relatively independent individual treaty-port ecosystems while keeping in mind Yuchi's framework of treating the geographical space of "South China" as a unified region. And despite the relative independence of these treaty-ports, particularly during this decade, connections still existed between them. Rumors that the colonial police under the direction of the consul in Fuzhou were preparing to conduct a widespread investigation of Taiwanese in that city in November 1916, for example, prompted many to relocate down the coast to Xiamen or inland up the Min River to Yanping.[162] These cities were connected in other cases by family connections: the Lins of Banqiao, for example, had in the late Qing period stationed certain family members in Fuzhou, in close proximity to the provincial center of government, and others in Xiamen, to better manage commercial interests centered there. Yuchi's interest in the hinterlands reflects an understanding that the cities were embedded in regional networks of people and commerce, as well as a greater Japanese interest in extending intelligence efforts and jurisdiction beyond the confines of the treaty-ports. A study of the Taiwan sekimin thus requires attention to both urban specificity and broader regional trends.

Lin Jishang and the Specter of the Chinese Revolution

161. "20 Taiwan to Minami Shina to no kankei oyobi genzai no shisetsu narabini shōrai no hōshin," JACAR B03041652300
162. "32 Shina narabini Shinajin ni kan suru hōkoku (dai sanjū hō)," JACAR B03041650100.

Many Taiwanese appear in the Reports, but one in particular seems to have attracted attention even before the dispatch of police to South China: Lin Zikeng (林資鏗, 1878-1925), better known at this time by his courtesy name Jishang (季商) and later in life by his sobriquet Zumi (祖密).[163] The son of Lin Chaodong, the enterprising camphor merchant discussed in Chapter 1, Jishang was a member of the Lin family of Wufeng, Taichung, in central Taiwan. He had relocated to China with his family in 1895 following the Sino-Japanese War but returned to Taiwan in 1898 with his brother, Ruiteng (but without their father), to register as a Taiwan sekimin.[164] Writing on the history of anti-Japanese banditry in Taiwan, Yuchi suspected that the Taiwanese who had escaped to the mainland after the failed uprising in 1902 were in secret contact with Lin. "Not only do both parties want to display their power in the Fujian region, but they seem to have a tacit understanding to collude in [fomenting] a secret plot in Taiwan."[165] Lin was no ordinary "bandit," either. As the member of a wealthy gentry family, he could both marshal social status and muster finances to support anti-Japanese activities. Further worrying for Yuchi were Lin's ties to the Chinese Revolution, deepening fears that Lin could bring revolutionary fervor to Taiwan. Even before 1911, Lin Jishang, like his merchant-official father Chaodong, had already invested in a number of infrastructural projects in Fujian, particularly around Zhangzhou, a city upriver from Xiamen and to which his lineage traced its ancestry. These projects included constructing a canal in Zhangzhou; reclaiming and irrigating land in

163. Zumi was his chosen name after he naturalized as a Chinese citizen in 1913. Japanese diplomatic documents usually refer to him as Jishang, a choice that is unsurprising given they did not fully accept his naturalization and renunciation of Japanese subjecthood. See Shao, *Tansuo Lin Zumi: xin yinxiang, xin fengmao*. 7.

164. See "Shinkoku jin Rin Kishō Rin Zuitō Taichū ken e nyūseki," 00291/001, Taiwan Government-General Archive (Taiwan zongdufu dang'an), Academia Historica.

165. JACAR B03041647000.

Zhangzhou and Changle County (near Fuzhou); dredging up the northern reaches of the Jiulong River basin, which flowed from inland Fujian (and in part near Longyan, where coal mines were located) to Zhangzhou harbor, emptying into Xiamen harbor; and investing in transportation ventures, which included a steamship connecting Zhangzhou to Xiamen, requested by merchants in Zhangzhou, and a light rail from Quanzhou to Anhai, which would facilitate connections to Xiamen.[166] Many of these ventures thus connected natural resources and commercial markets located inland to Xiamen, where Japanese influence and Taiwan sekimin settlement was concentrated. Lin had also obtained local political stature: he was appointed as a "hereditary commandant" (*shixi qiduwei*) for Xiamen and as one of the Chinese members of the Gulangyu Municipal Council, and had obtained status as an official in the Qing government in 1908, buying the post of alternate circuit attendant (*houbu daotai*), in which capacity he advocated for boycotts on Japanese products.[167] As someone who had amassed social, political, and financial capital in southern Fujian, Lin had attracted the attention not only of colonial Taiwanese officials but the Chinese "revolutionary faction" as well.

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166 Lin Man-houng's account cites newspaper reports from the Taiwan Daily News from October 9, 1904 and January 7, 1917 but does not give dates for these various investment projects. The "light rail" appears to be the same one mentioned in the following paragraph, from Quanzhou to Dongshi, that was rejected by the Chinese government because Wu Ruxiang was a Japanese subject. Man-houng Lin, "The Power of Culture and Its Limits: Taiwanese Merchants' Asian Commodity Flows, 1895–1945," in Chinese Circulations: Capital, Commodities, and Networks in Southeast Asia, ed. Eric Tagliacozzo and Wen-Chin Chang (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), 301–35.

"24 Shina narabini Shinajin ni kan suru hōkoku (dai nijūni hō)," JACAR B03041649300 mentions Lin Jishang's consideration of the investment in Changle (irrigation), and investment in land in Mawei (of several 10,000 mu of paddy fields), for which they wanted to charge the farmers four shi (a measure word for grain) of water-rent. The report mentions his visit to Fuzhou and his observations of the conditions there because they had previously ended in failure.

167. Note the contrast between Shao's account, which focuses entirely on political and official titles obtained by Lin Jishang, and Lin Man-houng's account above. It is clear that Shao views Lin Jishang as the Chinese nationalist ur-patriot par excellence to be emulated by (present-day) Taiwanese. Shao's emphasis on Lin's relations with Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek, therefore, must be understood in this background. Shao, *Tansuo Lin Zumi: xin yinxiang, xin fengmao*. 8–9.

Though revolutionaries like Lin were rare among the Taiwanese in China, and those with financial backing to carry out revolutionary aims even rarer still, Lin Jishang is significant because he represented for Japanese observers a worst case scenario: Taiwanese attracted by revolutionary politics, funded by wealth that had been amassed in Taiwan under the Qing period and used during its last decades to purchase and gain official status in China, allied with local Chinese leaders, and intent on thwarting Japanese interests in the region. Existing scholarship on Lin often focuses on either his revolutionary, nationalist, and anti-Japanese politics, or his role in financing infrastructural ventures in Fujian. Accounts that mention both tend to assume that his investments in the province were motivated by patriotic nationalism. Yuchi's reports show that Lin was a more complicated figure: he may have naturalized as a Chinese subject to protect claims to his infrastructural investments, and he may have drawn on older connections with the Bank of Taiwan, a colonial institution of the type one might expect Lin to have renounced, to fund his revolutionary activities. Since Lin had official connections on both sides of the strait and capital to invest, he is a particularly illustrative example of the many social and legal roles that Taiwan sekimin could play and the number of overlapping social worlds they could traverse.

An August 1916 report by Yuchi comparing the post-revolution infrastructural investments of Lin Jishang and Wu Ruxiang (吳汝祥, 1868-1941), a Taiwan sekimin active in south China, demonstrates the commercial benefits of Lin's ties with Chinese officials, which troubled Yuchi. Wu was born in Quanzhou, had immigrated to Taiwan in 1889, and was in 1916 a district counselor in Taichū (C: Taizhong; his title was J: *Taichū-chō sanji*, C: *Taizhong-ting canshi*).[168] He was also the president of Shōka Bank (C: *Zhanghua yinhang*), which he had

168. This position, based on a late imperial Chinese model, was largely symbolic, conferred by Japanese colonial authorities on local elites, who entrusted with proferring suggestions to Japanese authorities. See Ching-chih Chen, "Impact of Japanese Colonial Rule on Taiwanese Elites," Journal of Asian History 22, no. 1 (1988): 25–51. 32–33. Katz translates this title as 'prefectural secretary.' See Paul Katz, "Governmentality and Its Consequences in

founded in 1905 with the finances gained from a large land sale to the Japanese colonial government following Gotō Shinpei's land survey. He likely came from a family of absentee landlords (C: *dazuhu*) who in the late Qing period lived on the mainland and owned land in Taiwan which they leased to local sub-landlords on the island.[169] Yuchi reported that Wu had, along with nine other people, tried to build a light rail line (*keitetsu*) from his native Quanzhou city to Dongshi, which faced Weitou Bay and would replace part of the maritime route from Quanzhou to Xiamen with an overland railway. Wu and his co-investors, among them Lin Erjia, had even solicited the help of the Taiwan-based Japanese engineer Iizuka Shigenori to draw up plans, when their proposal was denied approval by Chinese officials because Wu Ruxiang was a Japanese subject (here Yuchi says "Japanese sekimin," or J: *Nihon sekimin*, C: *Riben jimin*). He then reapplied using the name of his nephew, Wu Lun (吳倫), a resident of Quanzhou.[170]

Comparing Wu's stalled light-rail project to Lin's mining venture in Longyan, and reflecting on the future prospects for Sino-Japanese joint ventures in the province, Yuchi writes:

> "The [Fuzhou] consul's aforementioned plan [to support ventures] is convincing, and is, in theory, truly praiseworthy. But in the end will we be able to make great strides into the industrial world with Sino-Japanese ventures? This is a considerable problem [that warrants] research. Take the canal project in Longyan of former sekimin Lin Jishang,

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Colonial Taiwan: A Case Study of the Ta-Pa-Ni Incident of 1915," The Journal of Asian Studies 64, no. 2 (May 2005): 387–424. 402.

169. See Yuefang Dai, Taiwan da jiazu (Taipei: Taiwan shufang chuban youxian gongsi, 2012), 182–183. The original plan for the capital, discussed with the local Japanese official, was to found a sugar plantation, but the two ultimately agreed that a bank would be easier to manage. Among the additional initial investors that appear in this chapter were Shi Fanqi and Gu Xianrong, both of whom had connections to Lugang, a port city in Changhua. Shōka Bank had an initial capital investment comparable to other banks established in the early period of Japanese rule primarily with Taiwanese capital, of 220,000 yen. Agricultural and Commercial Bank (1903) and Kagi Bank (1905), for example, were established with 300,000 and 250,000 yen of capital, respectively. By contrast, the Taiwan Government-General backed Bank of Taiwan (1899) had an initial investment of five million yen (funded with the indemnity paid by the Qing government after the Sino-Japanese War, and the Taiwan Commercial Bank (1910, now First Commercial Bank), one million yen. See page 43 of Yimin Zhang, "Taiwan zhuxu yinhang zhi sheli yu qi fazhan (1899–1912 nian): jian lun Taiwan shi shang shouzong yinhang hebing an," Taiwan shi yanjiu 23, no. 1 (March 2016): 35–74.

170. "3 Shina narabini Shinajin ni kan suru hōkoku (dai ni hō)," JACAR B03041647100.

> and the light rail project between Dongshi and Quanzhou of sekimin Wu Ruxiang. One has a capital investment of some ten thousand yen, the other some thousand yen, and preparations for construction had been underway. But as a result of Japanese subjecthood, [the Chinese government] did not grant approval (*kyoka*). In the end, Lin Jishang renounced his citizenship and became a Chinese [subject], and Wu Ruxiang still has not received approval."[171]

Yuchi's comparison of these two ventures—in which he identified the factor determining success or failure as the nationality of the applicant—led him to conclude that, "unless [we] confirm the policies of the Chinese officials, and put [matters] in the hands of the Japanese consul, there is currently no likelihood of success in industrial investment." Conferring sekimin status on local elites in the treaty-ports was a strategy that writers at the time and historians alike have highlighted, but this case reveals that the reverse could also be true: Japanese status could prevent investment opportunities.[172] A rumor relayed by Yuchi in June 1916 suggests Wu shared Yuchi's assessment of the situation. Taiwanese travelers returning to the island from Xiamen reported that Wu was trying to raise funds to support the revolutionary party's military expenses in order to facilitate approval of the project, suggesting Chinese official approval could be bought for a price.[173] A version of the Quanzhou-Dongshi light rail was eventually constructed, though it fell under the investment accomplishments of none other than Lin Jishang. Yuchi's comparison, implying that Chinese citizenship was a prerequisite for government approval, also suggests we revisit the narrative of Lin's nationalistic-inspired (re-)naturalization. A later report from June suggests that after Wu failed to receive permission for his project on account of his

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171. "24 Shina narabini Shinajin ni kan suru hōkoku (dai nijūni hō)," JACAR B03041649300. It is unclear if Yuchi is implying that Lin Jishang naturalized as a Chinese citizen (only) to gain the Chinese government's approval for his canal project. Neither Lin Man-houng nor Shao Minghuang mention this possibility or give dates for the canal undertaking.

172. For additional examples of this, see Chapter 1 of this dissertation.

173. See "4 Shina narabini Shinajin ni kan suru hōkoku (dai san hō) 1," JACAR B03041647200.

nationality, Lin Erjia, of the Banqiao Lin family and then the chairman of Xiamen's Chamber of Commerce (no relation to Jishang), took over the project. He may have been the one who later to transferred it to Lin Jishang.[174]

Lin Jishang continued to appear on Yuchi's radar, as he later became a general (J: *shōshō* C: *shaojiang*) in the Southern Army, allied to Sun Yat-sen's Guangzhou-based regime. Although he had risen in the ranks of Sun's revolutionary movement, Lin did not entirely renounce his connections with Japan, especially if colonial officials in Taiwan could be persuaded to support the Southern Army's war effort. In late 1918, the Sun-allied Southern Army was at war with Beijing-allied rival warlord and Fujian military governor Li Houji and hoped to capture Fuzhou and Xiamen.[175] The costs of war had put pressure on the regime's finances, and, as Lin's colleague Zeng Zhuangfei, another Southern Army general reported to Japanese officials during a visit to Taipei in early November 1918, the army would have to pay further taxes to gain the Beijing government's recognition if they were successful in retaking the province.[176] As Zeng mentioned, the regime's leaders aimed to supplement their meager finances with donations solicited from wealthy overseas Chinese. It was not wise to rely on American- and British-supplied munitions, Zeng said; rather,

> "our country has an interdependent relationship as close as tooth and jowl with Japan, and, being of the same yellow race, [we] should endeavor for the eternal peace of the Far

174. "5 Shina narabini Shinajin ni kan suru hōkoku (dai yon hō) 1," JACAR B03041647400. Yuchi reports that Jishang visited Erjia in August, to discuss issues related to the light rail and an additional shared joint venture in the Longyan mines. See also "24 Shina narabini Shinajin ni kan suru hōkoku (dai nijūni hō)," JACAR B03041649300. See appendix for details on Lin Erjia.

175. This was relayed to Yuchi by another Southern Army general, Zeng Zhuangfei (曾壯飛) during his visit to Taipei in early November 1918. See "33 Shina narabini Shinajin ni kan suru hōkoku (dai gojūhachi hō)," JACAR B03041653600. See appendix for biographical details on Li Houji.

176. Zeng mentions this as well; the Southern Army would have to pay the Beijing government 300,000, and had secured a yearly donation of 200,000 from overseas Chinese. See JACAR B03041653600.

> East and resist the white race. We should certainly mutually cooperate (*ai teikei*), endeavoring for mutual benefit. Recently, Japan has been vigorously promoting development in South China and the South Seas; we southern Chinese hope for and welcome Japan's development of South China. Japan should, as a government, of course, but also as individuals, invest in designing industry. The British and Americans take orders and supply materiel, but I do not know why it is that Japan alone does not provide this convenience [to the Southern Army]."[177]

Whether Zeng believed in the ideals of Sino-Japanese industrial cooperation, he saw in them an opportunity to persuade Yuchi that supporting the Southern Army was in line with the Government-General's new goals of promoting investment and industrial development in South China. The problem with Zeng's request was that it contradicted the Japanese central government and Foreign Ministry's existing policy of supporting the Beijing-based regime. As Zeng mentioned, support for Beijing had been the policy of former Prime Minister Terauchi Masatake, who had orchestrated the Nishihara Loans to Beiyang general Duan Qirui to aid his victory in the ongoing contest for control of north China. The attitude of the new Hara Cabinet was too early to tell.[178] Perhaps Zeng's entreaty that "Japan" should invest in South China's industrial development was meant to imply that supporting the Southern Government would aid the aims of the Taiwan Government-General's South China policy. Or perhaps it was meant to introduce the idea that individual Taiwanese support of the Southern Army was not an extension of anti-Japanese banditry in the colony, as Yuchi believed, but rather a natural extension of the goals of industrial development.

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177 JACAR B03041653600. It is unclear what he means by "Britain" and "America," as the official policy of both governments was to support the Beijing-based government. It should also be noted that World War I was still underway at the time of Zeng's visit to Taiwan, so it is unclear who would have been capable of supplying the Southern Army with materiel.

178 Prime Minister Terauchi resigned in September 1918 following the Rice Riots, and was succeeded by Hara Takashi.

Whatever Zeng's aims, Yuchi also reported a rumor that, at the same as Zeng's official visit in November, one such pro-revolutionary individual had reappeared on the scene in Taiwan, seeking to muster financial support from the Taiwanese people for the Southern Army's cause. Cai Huiru, formerly a district councilor in Taichung who had moved to China to aid Lin Jishang, had returned to Taiwan on Lin's request to raise 300,000 yen in funds—the exact amount that general Zeng suggested would make the southern regime solvent.[179] Cai was one of three Taiwanese who had traveled to China a month earlier to aid Lin Jishang, the other two being Lin's brother, Lin Ruiteng (林瑞騰), and Lin Jianyin (林建寅, no relation).[180] Late November saw another brief return to Taiwan by Lin Jianyin, sent by Lin Jishang to negotiate with a local colonial official on his behalf. Jianyin reported that Jishang was currently in Zhangzhou and was in control of many troops whom he paid in cash and rice. But Jishang's military ventures had strained his finances and left him with little time to manage his various infrastructural development projects, including the Longyan canal and mining operations. Jishang had identified three others who were sympathetic to his predicament and with whom he wanted to divide management rights: the aforementioned Cai Huiru, Wu Ruxiang (of the failed bid to construct the light rail in Quanzhou, and Zheng Zhaoji (鄭肇基). As Jianyin conveyed, Jishang hoped that the Bank of Taiwan would act as a financial guarantor for the projects and loan him funds for military operations in China. Lin Jishang asked that this request be forwarded to the district chief of Taichū and Civil Governor Shimomura.[181]

179 See JACAR B03041653600.

180. See appendix for biographical details on Lin Jianyin.

181. See "34 Shina narabini Shinajin ni kan suru hōkoku (dai gojūkyū hō)," JACAR B03041653700.

Even as an active general in the Southern Army, Lin Jishang still sought the legal financial backing and liquidity offered by the Bank of Taiwan, essentially guaranteeing his investments with the official backing of the colonial government.[182] Lin must have known that the colonial government was monitoring his and his associates' whereabouts. Even so, it seems that he was pursuing all avenues to procure funds: first by sending Cai to Taiwan to fundraise for the Southern Army's continued revolutionary efforts, convinced that Taiwanese donations could provide a windfall; and then by seeking the colonial government's institutional and financial backing for his infrastructural investments. While he was an exceptional figure, Lin's activities in Fujian demonstrate that political and revolutionary activities and infrastructural development with the backing of the colonial state were not necessarily contradictory and could be pursued by the same person, even if impelled only by difficult circumstances.

Lin Jishang's revolutionary activities and infrastructural investments were not contradictory impulses: they were mutually reinforcing. We have already seen the Fuzhou consul's suspicion that Lin's projects won Chinese official approval only because of his naturalization as Chinese. In later reports, Yuchi relayed intelligence that Lin Jishang was hoping to use profits from his mining venture to supplement his dwindling finances. Yuchi predicted that, by placing Cai Huiru and Lin Jianyin in charge of the mine, he could hope to reap profits of 12,000, 18,000, and 30,000 over the next three years.[183] Lin Jishang also continued to pressure his brother, Ruiteng, for advances to fund military expenditures on the mainland. Cai's return trip to Taiwan to raise 30,000 yen in funds for the revolution was apparently successful though not

182. There is no record of this specific loan to my knowledge, or whether the Bank of Taiwan approved it, but Lin Jianyin was later able to secure a loan for Jishang through other channels. There is also a diplomatic record of a similar loan made by the Bank of Taiwan five years later. Yuchi later reports that Lin was liquidating his assets to fund the revolution; perhaps this is proof that he never received the loan from the Bank of Taiwan?

183. JACAR B03041653700.

without difficulty, raising Yuchi's suspicion that Cai, too, harbored the intention to buy his way to officialdom in China. Lin Jianyin was also able to secure a loan for Jishang from the Bank of Taiwan, drawing on the support of another wealthy Taiwanese, Gu Xianrong, known for his pro-Japanese and accomodationist tendencies. Lin Jishang's revolutionary and industrial activities in Fujian, considered together, are interesting because they range across so many sectors. He was not merely a patriotic revolutionary who absconded from Japanese-ruled Taiwan to throw his weight behind Sun Yat-sen, nor was he merely an elite industrialist whose investments in Fujian aimed to extend the scope of Japanese rule to the mainland. Even after relocating to the mainland, his military activities there reinforced his reliance on institutional and personal ties with Taiwan, brokered by his relationships with elite associates on whom he relied both to raise military funds and facilitate loans from the Bank of Taiwan with the tacit approval of the colonial government. And, as Lin's brother feared, further investment in military expenditures would only entrench Lin in the revolutionary landscape in China and attract the attention of rival warlords, not to mention implicate the investments of institutions and individuals to whom Jishang had mortgaged off his assets for loans.[184] Rather than try to determine his loyalties based on the incomplete and sometimes contradictory evidence available, Lin Jishang is best understood as a figure who epitomized both the promise and peril of Japanese collaboration with Taiwan sekimin.

Lin Jishang was not the only Taiwan sekimin drawn to the mainland to participate in revolutionary politics. Others without his financial resources and political connections evaded

184. See JACAR B03041653700. Lin was assassinated by Zhang Yi, a warlord allied with Sun Chuanfang, in 1925. The nature of Lin Jishang's relationship with Sun Yat-sen is under debate (mainly the question of when the two met, and under what contexts), as is the nature of Lin's relationship with Chen Jiongming, a general allied with Sun Yat-sen but who turned against Sun in 1922. See Xu Xueji, Lin Zhengheng de sheng yu si (Nantou: Taiwan sheng wenxian weiyuanhui, 2001), 12; Shao Minghuang, Taiwan renmin yu kangri zhanzheng (Beijing: Tuanjie chubanshe, 2015), and Shao Minghuang, Tansuo Lin Zumi.

the colonial government's surveillance to travel to China, though with very different consequences. Their experiences are instructive by contrast. Yuchi mentions an individual by the name of Zeng Niupi (曾牛皮), who enters the diplomatic record in April 1916 on the occasion of his death at the hands of the Yuan-allied Northern Army while he was en route from Tong'an to Xiamen. The incident reached Yuchi's attention because it implicated the Xiamen consul Kikuchi Girō (菊池義郎 1877–1944, in office 1910–1917), as the local Japanese diplomatic official, in negotiating compensation with Chinese officials for his death. The case was likely brought to the consul's attention by sekimin through the Taiwan Association and diplomatic resolution demanded by the sekimin themselves.[185] Although Zeng was a pro-Sun Revolutionary, in the eyes of the leaders of the Taiwan Association, he was still a Japanese subject, even—and perhaps especially—in death.

After further investigation, Yuchi discovered that Zeng was killed alongside Chen Fa (陳發), another Taiwan sekimin, under Yuan Shikai's orders. The two had been in possession of their passports, allowing for identification and sparing them from death on the spot.[186] Despite

185. See "4 Shina narabini Shinajin ni kan suru hōkoku (dai san hō) 1," JACAR B03041647200. Yuchi reports a rumor that Zeng and two others traveled to China from Taiwan via Japan (thereby evading the passport and documentation regime of the Taiwan Government-General) in March 1916 to join the Southern Revolutionary Army, but were subsequently captured by the Northern Army, and Zeng was shot. Yuchi mentions that this information was corroborated by a letter sent by Yang Weixiu (楊維修), a native of Zhanghua, Taiwan and who was working as a counselor to Lin Jishang, to Li Chongli in Taiwan, who also mentioned that the remaining two (Wang Lu 王爐 and Zheng Youfu 鄭有福) were in custody and had evaded execution through the intercession of the Taiwan Association, respectively. It was perhaps through the involvement of the Taiwan Association that the Taiwanese in Xiamen were aware of Zeng's death, which Yuchi reports put pressure on the consul to take the matter seriously. Furthermore, since the three were reported to have traveled via Japan, there would have been no record of them at the consul or a passport on Zeng's person. According to a rumor circulating in Zhanghua, found on Zeng's body (though not mentioned by whom) were a copy of his household registration, documents from the Taiwan railway system, and several records of personnel dismissal.

186. See "12 Shina narabini Shinajin ni kan suru hōkoku (dai jū hō) 1," JACAR B03041648100. Chen Fa was not among the two Taiwanese that Yuchi first mentioned having traveled with Zeng to China via Japan. Yuchi mentions that, because they were in possession of passport documentation—here he uses the term goshō (C: huzhao) 護照 and not ryoken 旅券—by order of the Republic of China, they were spared death on the spot (satsuriku 殺戮), though they were executed (satsugai 殺害). The earlier report says Zeng was "shot to death" (jūsatsu 銃殺) by the Northern Army. The rumor circulating in Zhanghua (mentioned in the above footnote) does not mention a passport, though it

the two being implicated in revolutionary activities, the Xiamen consul was at pains to uphold his responsibility for the death of a Japanese subject and demanded from officials in Beijing compensation of 10,000 yen each, the execution of the responsible Chinese supervising officers, a face-to-face apology from the general, and a guarantee that such an incident would not happen again. Although the Beijing government (led now by Li Yuanhong after Yuan's death in mid-June) refused the demand to execute the responsible officers, it offered compensation of 20,000 yen for each of the officers killed, an additional 8,000 yen for each additional (unnamed) injured officer, and an apology, fueling speculation that the change in presidency in Beijing might signal a shift in Sino-Japanese relations.

The on-the-ground demand for consul Kikuchi's action by the Taiwan Association was mirrored by an order from above: stringent demands for compensation and swift Chinese actions came most likely from Vice-Minister Shidehara, who reprimanded Xiamen consul Kikuchi for failing to mention at the outset that Zeng and Chen were in fact Taiwan sekimin, which formed the legal basis on which Kikuchi should have approached settling the situation.[187] In communication addressed to Kikuchi in May, Shidehara reminded the consul that, "in Xiamen, matters involving the Taiwan sekimin have long been extremely bothersome," emphasizing that they required diligent and delicate handling. Zeng's and Chen's deaths were only one example, albeit extreme, of the need for utmost caution in relaying information, due to the particular legal troubles that arose regarding the Japanese diplomatic imperative in claiming jurisdiction over the Taiwan sekimin. Shidehara included a not-so-gentle reminder that the Xiamen consul should be assiduous in conveying the details of negotiations with Chinese officials: "when you mentioned

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does mention Zeng's household registration.

187. See "45 Zai Amoi ryōji e denbun sakusei hō ni tsuki chūi no ken," JACAR B13080294400.

'the three demands made by the Chinese side on the 29th,' did you mean that they made these three demands on the 29th, or that these were the demands that they had already made?" This suggests that the devolution of central authority in China left negotiating responsibilities in the hands of local officials like Kikuchi but with potentially national consequences, as feared by Shidehara.

The contrast between Yuchi's close monitoring of Lin Jishang—a wealthy and prominent figure who could marshal resources in Taiwan and perhaps cause instability on the island—and diplomatic officials Kikuchi's and Shidehara's concerns that Zeng's and Chen's deaths were properly negotiated and compensated by Chinese officials, further reveals that the priorities of colonial and diplomatic officials as concerned the Taiwan sekimin in China were not always entirely aligned. For Vice-Minister Shidehara the priority was in upholding proper procedure in adjudicating incidents involving sekimin in order to prevent any threat to what they understood to be Japanese diplomatic prerogative in China. Consul Kikuchi, handling matters on the ground, seemed to have remained unaware of the deaths of Zeng and Chen longer than other sekimin in Xiamen, who brought the news to Kikuchi's attention and demanded he resolve the issue. Yuchi does not detail the resolution of the murders in his reports, focusing instead only on the fact that individuals had been attracted by revolutionary politics, evaded the surveillance of colonial authorities, and found their way to China. Although colonial and consular officials were both perturbed by Taiwanese drawn to China by the revolution, Yuchi's concern seemed to stem from the threat of subversion in Taiwan whereas Kikuchi and Shidehara remained most committed to maintaining social order in the treaty-ports by upholding proper procedure for negotiating the bounds of jurisdictional authority over Japanese subjects of any ideological stripe with Chinese authorities.

Taiwan Sekimin in Fujian's Opium Economy and Sino-Japanese Joint Police Investigation

The case of Lin Jishang was only one reaction to the political conditions created by the Chinese Revolution. The record left in the diplomatic archive is more an index of the anxieties of revolutionary insurrection that Lin triggered among colonial officials than the possibility of similar occurrences among the Taiwan sekimin population at large. Although the 1911 Revolution changed the conditions for sekimin in China, their reaction was, for the most part, less revolutionary and military fervor and more conservatism and protectionism, centered around institutions that operated with the local Japanese consul's legal protection.[188] But in the minds of Japanese diplomats, local Chinese officials, and the general public, the political instability created by the revolution, and particularly by Yuan Shikai's death in the summer of 1916, amplified the perceived threat of subversion by violent groups of armed Taiwanese in Xiamen, who had amassed power in the previous decade around the opium economy and under Japanese diplomatic protection.[189] The revolution had frustrated attempts underway in the early twentieth century to regulate and eliminate opium consumption in the province; if anything, the political

188. See portion below on Lin Kaizhi for one example.

189. A report from July 1916 (after the investigation examined below) gives a sense of the scale of the opium economy in Xiamen and Taiwan sekimin dominance in it. Of the nine major opium purveyors (ton'ya) surveyed by Yuchi, four were operated in part or in full by Taiwan sekimin (the others being English, Dutch, and Chinese subjects). These purveyors were involved in the import of opium from overseas (primarily India, by way of Hong Kong, or Singapore, Annam, and Taiwan) for distribution within the city and could make from 500 up to 1000 yen a day. Each type of opium came in a different form based on its place of origin and fetched different prices. Yuchi claims that the smuggling was facilitated by English control of the Maritime Customs Office in Xiamen (of the foreigners in the office 15 of 22 were English, and both the director and vice director were also English). These officers colluded to look the other way when ships arrived from Hong Kong, claiming that investigation there was strict, while being particularly scrupulous with ships from Taiwan. The Taiwan sekimin dominance was far more pronounced among proprietors of opium smoking houses, where of 255 total opium dens counted, some 237 were either operated by Taiwan sekimin or were operating under the name of a Taiwan sekimin, compared to seven owned by English subjects ("English sekimin"), six by Chinese, three by Japanese from the home islands (naichijin), three Spaniards, one American subject, and one "other." See "14 Shina narabini Shinajin ni kan suru hōkoku (dai jūni hō)," JACAR B03041648300.

situation in Fujian seemed to have amplified the demand for the profits of opium cultivation and consumption. Yuchi was insistent that these Taiwanese ruffians (J: *wulaihan*) were in fact opportunistic bandits who had escaped from Taiwan in the early years of Japanese rule, but not before obtaining Japanese papers that would secure them the legal protection of Japanese consuls on the mainland as Taiwan sekimin.[190]

Fears of the threat posed by armed Taiwanese shared by Chinese officials and Japanese diplomats manifested themselves in June 1916 when Yuchi received a report that a group of armed Taiwanese had sent a letter to members of the local Taiwan Association, attempting to extort money under threat of violence.[191] Like the report about Zeng Niupi's death, this news followed a circuitous route along maritime commercial channels inherited from the late Qing period via Taiwan to Yuchi. The head of the China Maritime Customs' Xiamen office, Huang Xiaocheng (黃筱埕), reported the issue in a letter to a member of the Taipei Tea Merchants' Association, Yan Longguang (顏龍光).[192] Taiwanese ruffians had apparently joined together with armed groups of their Chinese counterparts and specifically targeted the seventy-some Chinese members of the Taiwan Association.

A few days later the threats came to the attention of Consul Kikuchi, who referred to them as "ruffians who declare themselves to be Taiwanese and Taiwan sekimin" (*Taiwanjin no buraikan to shō suru* and *Taiwan sekimin no buraikan to shō suru*).[193] This time, the threats were reported as aimed not only at the Association's Chinese members but also at the city's "good

190. For one example, see "4 Shina narabini Shinajin ni kan suru hōkoku (dai san hō) 2," JACAR B03041647300.

191. See JACAR B03041647200.

192. See appendix for details on the Taipei Tea Merchants' Association (台北茶商公會).

193. See JACAR B03041647300.

subjects and wealthy merchants" (*ryōmin mata wa gōshō*) more generally, including members of the Chamber of Commerce. Perhaps through Chairman Lin Erjia's connection, the Chamber was known to employ Taiwanese ruffians as a local militia force, which, for Consul Kikuchi, made the threatening letters sent to its members all the more puzzling.[194] The problem with apprehending the sekimin lay in a circular logic that emerged from attempts by Chinese police to prosecute their activities: whenever police attempted to apprehend someone, the person in question would immediately claim to be Taiwanese and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of Chinese police; but as a result, police began to assume that all ruffians were Taiwanese. This association between "Taiwanese" and criminality spread to the general public, which viewed Taiwanese as "snakes and serpents." Although the consul maintained that the letter was merely a scare tactic, he was moved to action when those threatened came to include wealthy merchants who had dealings with the Mitsui Trading Company and who sought the consul's intervention.

According to observations by some Japanese residents of Xiamen, the division between the city's "good" and "lawless" Taiwanese was not so stark, nor was the city's crime so easily pinned on its Taiwanese residents as the opinions of local police might have made it seem.

> "There is no place in the city where there are no ruffians. Chinese backing supports the [widespread] dispersal of Taiwanese rampant dominance and their unlawful activities. Casinos and opium dens and the like are welcomed by Chinese, who falsely use a Taiwanese name to gain vast personal profits, which they then give a portion of to the Taiwanese in question. In other cases, they have the Taiwanese live among them (*zakkyo seshime*) and display Japanese merchant signboards…in order to evade the interference of Chinese officials. In short, Chinese are at the root. Chinese officials are careless in their mismanagement of controlling the people and merely shift the blame to the Taiwanese (*itazura ni tsumi wo Taiwanjin ni ka suru mono nari*)."[195]

194. See JACAR B03041647300.

195. JACAR B03041647300.

According to Yuchi's observations, the Taiwanese ruffians, though far fewer in number than their Chinese counterparts, had recognized the advantage of Japanese legal support. In fact, the balance of power within the city had emerged from an earlier conflict between the newly arrived Taiwanese residents and members of Xiamen's traditionally powerful "three families," the Wu, Chen, and Ji[196], who, though they outnumbered the Taiwanese, had been forced by the Japanese consul to pay compensation to injured Taiwanese. Since then, Yuchi remarked, the three families had come to fear the Taiwanese, although they also saw the Taiwanese as a possible tool (*hitotsu no dōgu*) to gain legal protection in their own right. Since troops in both the Northern and Southern armies also feared the Taiwanese, this created the conditions in the post-Revolutionary period for local Chinese residents in the city to rely on the legal protection afforded them by their status as sekimin. Under these conditions, Consul Kikuchi seemed to assume that the letter to local wealthy merchants was an attempt at extortion and not a threat of physical violence. Even so, an investigation was necessary, but the conditions of mixed residence (*zakkyo*) made it difficult to investigate these Taiwanese groups and the establishments they ran:

> "When [Japanese] consular officials attempt to enter sekimin homes the sekimin flee and Chinese come out, villifying [the officials, saying] they do not accept the investigation (*torishimari*) of Japanese police officers. In response to Chinese investigations, the Chinese flee and the Taiwan sekimin come out to reject the investigation: nothing can be done. There are many additional inconveniences because there are very few consular employees."[197]

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196. This could refer to an incident in August 1913, reported by naval officers in Xiamen, "Amoi ni okeru jūmin bōkō jiken no tenmatsu hōkoku," Kaigunshō Shinkoku jihen M44-42-177, held in Bōeishō bōei kenkyūjo, JACAR C08041068900. Conflicts between members of the "three families" and the Taiwanese ruffians, who later formed the basis of the "armed faction" (J: buryokuha, C: wulipai) would continue into the 1920s and 1930s.

197. JACAR B03041647300.

Kikuchi's frustrations suggest that the Chinese and Taiwanese ruffians had turned the logic of personal jurisdiction and consular protection against both Japanese diplomats and Chinese officials, leaving their jointly-run establishments beyond the jurisdiction of either.

In response, Kikuchi settled on the strategy of a Sino-Japanese joint investigation.[198] Following a request by Vice-Minister Shidehara, the Taipei district police office dispatched Ōto Sotojirō (大戸外次郎) and five officers to Xiamen to head the investigation, showing the close relations between the colonial and consular police forces.[199] Joined by consular police chief Koreeda and the (Chinese) police chief of Xiamen circuit (*daoyin zhixian jingcha ting zhang*), the investigation divided its targets based on the language of their advertising signage: Japanese officers for Japanese-language signs, and Chinese officers for Chinese-language signs. The officers under Ōto's direction began their investigation at 4:30 in the morning on May 31st, and finished just a few hours later, detaining a total of thirty six people of whom seven professed themselves to be Taiwan sekimin (*Taiwan sekimin to jishō suru mono*). An additional two Taiwan sekimin (of fourteen total arrested) were detained by the officers under consular police chief Koreeda. All were men in their twenties and thirties, and some were found to be in possession of varying amounts of opium, knives, and guns. None had been in Xiamen for more than a few years: the earliest had arrived in 1913, and the most recent arrival had been in the city for less than a month. Some had come to China with official documentation, but most had

198. Philip Thai mentions the use of Sino-Japanese joint investigations, particularly around the issue of smuggling. He mentions that the Japanese term is kyōdō kaishin, suggesting a legal hearing of some kind, whereas the terms used here were kyōdō torishimari or kyōdō sōsaku, suggesting joint prosecution or a joint search. Even though they worked together, there seemed to be little cooperation in the sense of coming to an agreement on how to prosecute offenders; rather, the "joint" aspect was more about sending Japanese and Chinese police officers to preclude the possibility of subjects refusing police jurisdiction on the basis of nationality. See Philip Thai, China's War on Smuggling: Law, Economic Life and the Making of the Modern State, 1842-1965 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018).

199. See JACAR B03041647400.

crossed the Taiwan Strait without a passport. All were from northern Taiwan, with most holding household registrations in the Mengjia and Dadaocheng areas on the outskirts of Taipei city, which had been the commercial centers of the treaty-port trade in the late nineteenth century. The investigation was violent and met with resistance; a bomb thrown from the roof of one of the houses in question killed a Chinese police officer and injured others.

The investigation heightened existing tensions in the city, which filled with some three thousand Chinese troops and military police of a variety of ranks, some reportedly en route to dispatch in Guangdong. Under these conditions, conflicts between the Chinese military police and Taiwan sekimin continued, despite the original intent of the investigation to parcel out police authority by assumed nationality. A Taiwan sekimin by the name of Zhou Que (周卻), a native of the Dadaocheng section of Taipei who was mentioned in an earlier report as having founded the Taiwan Association, exchanged shots with Chinese police officers associated with the Northern Army. For the most part, the joint investigation did seem to resolve the issue of the city's armed Taiwanese, if only temporarily—the remainder of the sekimin fled for neighboring Zhangzhou or Quanzhou, or so Yuchi reported.

But did the investigation resolve the issue of the threatening letter, or the broader issues around nationality and jurisdiction that emerged from the participation of Taiwan sekimin in the opium economy? A Japanese (*naichijin*) who had been living in Xiamen for two years told Yuchi that "Among the Taiwan sekimin ruffians, there are only four or five who engage in extreme criminal activity (*hanahadashiki akuji*); the others secretly sell opium, open opium dens, or loan their names to Chinese to gain one or two yen a day. Others [are engaged in] gambling, which is not a major crime (*dai naru hanzai*)."[200] In conducting a joint investigation with

200. See JACAR B03041647400.

Chinese military police and "relying on the strength of foreign police," the consul had, in the opinion of this local Japanese observer, "rejected of imperial prestige…Relying on the strength of the Taiwan Government-General and Chinese officials in investigating is, from the perspective of our China policy a great problem that will require extremely careful consideration." Far from success, the investigation was a humiliation in the eyes of this Japanese observer, who asked: "Where was the necessity in using military force to investigate a small number of sekimin [living] among Chinese people? He laughed derisively." From his perspective, the joint investigation had only given the Chinese military police license to conduct further investigations of the Taiwan sekimin under the pretext of rooting out their criminal elements. In his view, involving Chinese military police and Taiwanese colonial police would only exacerbate what should remain a strictly diplomatic affair in which "imperial prestige" was the most important issue at stake and which, in any case, involved only a small minority of Xiamen's Taiwanese residents.[201]

And despite the cooperation between consul Kikuchi and police chief Yuchi, the report conveyed their disagreement over the long-term efficacy of a joint investigation. Yuchi's view was clear: "Even if you find the Taiwan sekimin ruffians and extradite them to Taiwan, they will surely not take up honest jobs. If you allow them to live in Xiamen, make use of them, and show them favor, their feelings of patriotism will arise and soon enough there will be benefits. I have repeatedly told this to Consul Kikuchi, but he is the type of person not to take in others' ideas.

201. Although it is impossible to know for sure without further details of his social position, profession, living situation, and so on, his fear was likely less that he would be subject to a joint investigation and more that the Japanese consular police's consenting to a joint investigation would weaken it in the eyes of municipal and police officials and potentially weaken its position in the city.

Additionally, since his second bout of lung disease, he has become short tempered, and does not take into consideration the question of interests (*riken mondai*).”

The problem, as Yuchi and other colonial officials in Taiwan saw it, lay in the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s insufficiently proactive stance in providing “honest” business opportunities for the Taiwanese in China. This represented two different, and often competing, logics: the Foreign Ministry wanted to remove all “dangerous,” “subversive,” and “dishonest” individuals from the treaty-port, preferring to extradite them for punishment in Taiwan. Yuchi, on the other hand, represented the view of the Government-General, which thought the solution lay in greater moral and social suasion in the treaty-ports, and in building infrastructural capabilities to offer these Taiwanese alternatives to criminal behavior and surveill them more closely. The views represented two conceptions of the spatial order of police authority in colonial Taiwan and treaty-port China: the former saw them as two distinct spheres, whereas the latter saw them as intimately linked.

Yuchi concluded by reminding his readers of how Kikuchi had handled negotiations with Chinese officials regarding the Taiwan sekimin who was shot by the Northern Army, which had justified their actions by labeling him a bandit. “Treating a Taiwanese (*Taiwanjin*) the same as a Chinese (*bokokujin*) was unacceptable,” was the way Yuchi summed up the failures of the negotiation skills of his diplomatic colleague. Kikuchi’s passivity had failed both to attract permanent settlement of Taiwanese engaged in stable industries and to protect a Taiwan sekimin who had improperly fallen under the jurisdiction of Chinese military officials.

The joint investigation in Xiamen was successful because, in targeting the Taiwanese ruffians in Xiamen, it united the divergent interests of its three participant groups—the Japanese consulate in Xiamen, the Taiwanese colonial police force, and local Chinese military police.

Ultimately, however, this was no coincidence or accidental perfect storm. Just as the joint investigation came to an end, Yuchi reported that the person who had sent the threatening letter to forty or fifty prominent Chinese in the city was not, in fact, a Taiwan sekimin; rather, the letter had been falsified by a Chinese.[202] The panic that had impelled these three groups to action was, in fact, a crisis deliberately engineered to play on existing anxieties. A later report from June 1916 paints a fuller picture of the events leading up to the joint investigation. Conflict between the Taiwan sekimin and members of Xiamen's "three families," as mentioned by Yuchi in an earlier report, dated back to 1913. Increasing violence between the two groups had led Chinese officials to push the Japanese consul (then also Kikuchi) to resolve the situation, but the consul's decision to call in the Japanese navy and land troops in the city only further discomfited Chinese officials. Although the Japanese military presence temporarily dispersed the armed members of the three families, they gradually snuck back into Xiamen, all while the number of armed Taiwan sekimin in the city also increased. Yuchi reports that the three families sought to "revive their glory days" by bribing officials, developing relationships with them, and in some cases becoming spies for the municipal government.

The arrival sometime in 1914 or 1915 of members of the Chinese Revolutionary Party led by Sun Yat-sen in exile gave greater urgency to the "three families," who were certain that the Japanese would support Sun's Revolutionary Party over the present regime in Xiamen led by Yuan Shikai.[203] Meanwhile, Xiamen's British residents intimated to the municipal government that, if the Revolutionary Party came to Xiamen, the Taiwan sekimin would gladly join its ranks.

202. JACAR B03041647400.

203. The report only says that the people arrived from Tianjin after the third founding of the Revolutionary Party, which occurred in the summer of 1914 after Sun Yat-sen was exiled by Yuan following the dissolution of the National Assembly.

The municipal government, under the sway of the three families, approached Consul Kikuchi to encourage him to investigate the Taiwan sekimin, but was rebuffed. Needing a more proximate threat, the leaders of the municipal government, under British influence, fabricated a letter to send to members of the Chamber of Commerce, which impelled Kikuchi to action. Yuchi mentions that municipal government leaders did not see eye-to-eye with lower level officials and members of the three families, who presumably would not have condoned a joint investigation that also targeted armed Chinese in the city. Nevertheless, Chinese officials, under the sway of the three families, engineered the conditions to investigate the city's Taiwanese ruffians, and they manufactured Kikuchi's consent by falsifying a letter that fomented citywide panic and threatened the local economic interests of Japanese companies.

This is not meant to suggest that the Taiwan sekimin were unfairly targeted, or that the fear that Taiwan sekimin might join the Revolutionary Party was groundless: Lin Jishang was but one example, and an investigation by Yuchi earlier in May had uncovered a plan by a Taiwanese by the name of Lin Kaizhi to broker a sale of weapons from armed Taiwan sekimin in Xiamen to the Revolutionary Army.[204] These very Taiwan sekimin, and the houses where they had been hiding weapons and materiel, were coincidentally the targets of the joint investigation, which thus narrowly thwarted the failed insurrection. Nevertheless, for Yuchi, the investigation confirmed the necessity of strengthening the Japanese police presence in the treaty-port. In Yuchi's estimation, Kikuchi's decision to cooperate with Chinese military police officers had

204. Yuchi mentions one additional threat posed by the growing conflict between the Northern Army (including local leader Li Houji), based in Xiamen; and the Sun Yat-sen aligned Southern Army (including Lin Jishang and others), who were marshalling power across the region. Lin Kaizhi (林開枝) a native of Jiayi, Taiwan, had traveled to Xiamen from Tokyo via Guangdong with two Japanese men, and allegedly came to support the revolutionary movement. Lin had a secret plan to assemble 1500 Taiwanese violent ruffians (wulaihan) to form a group to sell weapons to the Revolutionary Party for a total of 10,000 yen, and their plot was only thwarted by the joint investigation. See appendix for further details.

revealed the consulate's weakness and inability to protect the interests of Japanese residents. The city's Taiwanese shared this opinion and "unanimously concluded that there was no value to being a Taiwan sekimin. One originally desired [the status of] sekimin principally to evade the pressure of Chinese officials. However, since May 31st (the date of the investigation), Chinese officials have raided (*shin'nyū*) and searched our houses. And what was the need to accept the help of Chinese officials in our (the consular) government arresting five or six ruffians? We are truly shocked beyond belief."[205] The Japanese resident that Yuchi interviewed seemed to be correct in predicting that cooperation with Chinese military police would only confer further license in extending its jurisdiction to non-Chinese subjects. And it was not only the Taiwan sekimin who appeared frustrated with Kikuchi. Xiamen's Japanese residents, too, agreed that the consul "does not protect its residents like the consuls of other nations," though their point of reference was the other imperial subjects in the treaty-ports, rather than local Chinese, who were the concern for Taiwan sekimin.[206] The consul's performance had divided the city's Japanese subjects into the "Kikuchi faction" and the "Akuzawa faction," Yuchi reported, leaving his readers to infer that the latter group longed for their eponymous leader's model of corporate and economic development in the treaty-port supported by the Taiwan Government-General.

Despite Yuchi's apprehensions regarding the outcome of the joint investigation in Xiamen, the Foreign Ministry attempted the same strategy the following month in Fuzhou.[207] In

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205. See JACAR B03041647400. Needless to say, this opinion was not unanimous among the Taiwan sekimin. In a later report, Yuchi mentions four individuals who were working for the Xiamen police department in various capacities: one who was involved in policing street sales of vegetables, meat, and other consumables, and designating proper disposal of street and household waste; one who was a veterinarian; one who was a clerical worker (jimu); and one who was part of the office's dispatch investigation squad. See JACAR B03041647900.

206. See JACAR B03041647400.

207. "15 Shina narabini Shinajin ni kan suru hōkoku (dai jūsan hō)," See JACAR B03041648400.

response to complaints from officials in the Fujian Provincial Diplomatic Office (*Fujian sheng jiaosheshu*), the investigation department of the Opium Suppression Bureau (*Jinyanju diaochake*), and the Public Order Division Chief of the Police Office (*jingchating baoan fenduizhang*) about Taiwanese involvement in the opium industry, Fuzhou Consul Saitō Ryōe (斎藤良衛) requested the dispatch of colonial police from the Taipei office, to be led again by Officer Ōto Sotojirō, to conduct a joint investigation with local Chinese police officers. Like its predecessor in Xiamen, the investigation in Fuzhou aimed to uncover the Taiwanese who had lent their names to Chinese proprietors of opium dens, or had themselves opened up casinos, and had evaded investigation by bribing local Chinese and Japanese consular officials. And like its counterpart in Xiamen, the Fuzhou investigation proceeded in two groups and targeted men between the ages of 18 and 45, many of whom were from Dadaocheng. The connections were not only incidental; many of those targeted were reported as having recently come from Xiamen.

Following the pattern of Yuchi's reporting on the Xiamen joint investigation, his postmortem in Fuzhou involved soliciting the opinions of local Taiwan sekimin, whose backgrounds, commercial ventures, and capital holdings he mentions so as to convey their class backgrounds. Two members of the local business community, Yang Wenguang (楊文光) and Liu Heshang (劉和商). "Of the seven hundred sekimin [in Fuzhou], two thirds are not engaged in 'honest jobs.' However, the 'ruffians' in the eyes of the consulate and Chinese officials are not necessary ruffians. Rather, evil activities (*burai kōi*, or "ruffian-esque activities") that do not come to one's attention are more numerous. But the latter are not investigated, and instead it is the petty crimes (*zaiaku no shō naru*) of the former that experienced the calamity of an investigation in the hands of Chinese officials and Japanese consular officials that was wholly unskillful. The consul [should] not unhesitatingly accept the altogether speculative evidence of

the Chinese officials."[208] Liu Jinqing (劉金清) and Lin Jinlu (林晉祿) had a more practical explanation that hinged on the profitability of opium.

> "The minority of Taiwan sekimin who sell their names to Chinese can earn 35 to 50 yen a month. Those who come to China without a penny to their name and open opium or gambling dens can earn several hundred yen in just a few months. But when their clients are Chinese, because Chinese officials truly detest opium, they must be cautious. In any case, all the responsibility is vested in the consul…in the future, when investigating Taiwan sekimin, it is necessary to, at the same time, to protect the sekimin and make sure that the sekimin do not unavoidably commit bad acts (*yamu wo ezu furyō kōi*)."[209]

"In sum," Yuchi offered by way of concluding these two opinions,

> "the consulate is understaffed and as a result cannot fully handle (*torishimari*) the sekimin or protect their rights and interests. Furthermore, the consul and police officials have only been in service for a short while and do not have a deep knowledge of conditions, so they are gullibly lured [into believing] Chinese customary rhetoric…at present, the bad actions of sekimin are only in a nascent stage. It would be best at this moment to station police officers who understand the 'manners and customs' (*fūzoku shūkan*) of the Taiwanese. If [we] do not protect and prosecute (*torishimari*) the sekimin, I cannot but guarantee that we will in no time be faced with alarming consequences."[210]

The perception that the consul had rushed into an investigation under pressure from Chinese officials circulated as a rumor and even found its way back to Taiwan, Yuchi reported.

Japanese Jurisdiction and Yuchi's Social Knowledge Production

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208. See JACAR B03041648400.

On the topic of "speculative evidence," Yuchi mentions in a later report that the investigation was carried out without any concrete evidence (kakujitsu naru shōko). In the same report, Yuchi mentions having surveyed additional Taiwan sekimin after the joint investigation in Fuzhou, who reported that the number of officers dispatched during the investigation was incommensurate with the scale of the problem, as, unlike in Xiamen, there was no threat of violence. See "22 Shina narabini Shinajin ni kan suru hōkoku (dai nijū hō)," JACAR B03041649100.

209 See JACAR B03041648400.

210 See JACAR B03041648400. Yuchi reiterates these points in a later report, emphasizing that the Fujian consuls did not undertake/had not undertaken studies of the sekimin and the Chinese. See JACAR B03041649100.

In the aftermath of the investigation, Yuchi set out to study and catalog the Taiwanese living in South China. On one hand, the police chief was interested in developing a fuller picture of the Taiwanese involved in local opium economies, and on the other, he sought to identify existing industrial and commercial development schemes led by local Japanese consuls and elite Taiwan sekimin. These were not two separate impulses but two sides of the same coin. Yuchi's succinct description of the consul's responsibilities—prosecution of crime and promotion of rights and interests shows the degree to which he understood these two duties as linked. Just as important for Yuchi was discovering the areas in which the consuls were failing to uphold his understanding of their responsibilities. Seeing Yuchi's knowledge production in the context of the investigation, it becomes clear that he did not view these two sectors of society—the commercial world and the illegal narcotic world—as discrete phenomena, but rather as connected by the failures of Japanese diplomatic policy in China. By providing insufficient financial support and guidance to local Taiwan sekimin elites, the Japanese consuls had in essence created the economic conditions of an institutional vacuum for opium peddling to thrive. Consular officials had also failed to direct local elites to take the charge in moral suasion of these Taiwan sekimin, and to hire consular police officers acquainted with the "manners and customs" (*fūzoku shūkan*) of those within their jurisdiction. And by soliciting the opinions of Taiwanese in Xiamen and Fuzhou, elite and non-elite, Yuchi was able to represent the desire for a strengthened consular and police presence in Fujian as not only his own, as a Taiwanese colonial official, but as held widely by the Taiwan sekimin themselves.

From the first report, Yuchi had cataloged the institutions and individuals that constituted the Japanese presence in south China. His background as a colonial officer informed his taxonomy of evaluating the conditions in the treaty-ports, but his reports inclined toward the

piecemeal and descriptive rather than being policy-oriented and prescriptive. It was only following the joint investigations in Fuzhou and Xiamen that the contours of a new and strengthened China policy took shape. This policy included strengthening the permanent Japanese police presence in the treaty-ports, building new institutions to channel Japanese policy interests in China, and supporting elite Taiwan sekimin commercial and social ventures that facilitated Japanese imperial interests or channeled the consul's power in retaining indirect power over local sekimin. Yuchi catalogued the variety of responses to the Chinese Revolution among Taiwan sekimin individuals and institutions in the treaty-ports; these observations informed his formation of a new South China policy for the Taiwan Government-General by the end of the 1910s.

Yuchi noted that very few Taiwan sekimin and other local Chinese elites commanded trust among the city's Taiwanese. Particularly reputable and powerful among the sekimin were Shi Fanqi (施範其), the head of the "Southern Country Company" (J: *Nankoku kōshi*, C: *Nanguo gongsi*), responsible for recruiting Chinese laborers to send to Taiwan, and a comprador (J: *baiben*, C: *maiban*) for the Xiamen branch of the Bank of Taiwan;[211] Zeng Houkun (曾厚坤), who, having returned from the 1916 Industrial Exposition in Taipei was working to establish a financial institution for the Taiwan sekimin who lacked the resources and reputation to borrow from the city's branch of the Bank of Taiwan; Lin Erjia, then a representative in the Republic's National Assembly's second iteration; and Lin Lucun (林輅存), then the head of Xiamen's Overseas Chinese Bureau (*Ji'nanju*), and incidentally the brother of Lin Lisheng, the colonial government's partner in securing the contract for the Chaoshan railway.[212]

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212. See "16 Shina narabini Shinajin ni kan suru hōkoku (dai jūyon hō)," JACAR B03041648500. Shi was the

Further biographical details help to contextualize the late Qing, cross-strait commercial elites who came to hold Taiwan sekimin status identified by Yuchi. Only Lin Erjia, the patriarch of the Banqiao Lin family, had been born in Taiwan, like most other non-elite Taiwan sekimin. Choosing to relocate to Xiamen after the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, however, Lin Erjia was never registered under the colonial government in Taiwan and never held the status of Taiwan sekimin, but this did not stop the Government-General from making repeated attempts to cooperate with him or his family, the richest in Taiwan. Although Yuchi identified Lin Erjia as Chinese, in other reports he mentioned that the residents of Xiamen still considered him a "Taiwanese" (*Taiwan jin*), suggesting that in the minds of the public, place of origin could outweigh legal status as an identifier. Shi and Zeng had been conferred sekimin status by the Government-General in the late Qing period in a Japanese effort to curry favor with local Xiamen elites; no record of applying for sekimin status appears for Lin Lucun. This did not mean that Lin, Shi, and Zeng had weaker ties to the Taiwan Government-General. Zeng, for example, was a native of Pinghe, near Xiamen, and was a tobacco merchant with a shop in Tainan. In 1910, the Government-General invited him to Tainan to cultivate tobacco and train farmers, with the goal of improving agricultural practices and output for the Monopoly Bureau, where he also had a position. He was the head of the Taiwan Association for over ten years and in 1921 the

founding member of the Taiwan Association (Taiwan kōkai) and reportedly had ties to those involved in opium dens. Riji langren shiliao zhengji xiaozu, "Xiamen riji langren jishu," in Xiamen wenshi ziliao, vol. 2, 1963, 1–49. Xing Lin, "Riju shiqi Taiwan jimin shetuan tanchu: yi Xiamen Taiwan gonghui wei li," Fujian luntan, Renwen shehui kexueban 9 (2008): 76–81.

Zeng was the head of the Taiwan Association for over ten years and was honored for his contributions by being designated a "gentleman" by the Taiwan Government-General in 1921. He was also employed by the Tobacco Office of the Monopoly Bureau of the Taiwan Government-General. See the Taiwan sōtokufu senbaikyoku kōbun ruisan (1907–1916) in the Archive of the Institute of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.

On the Tō-A Shoin, see Takashi Nakamura, "Tō-A Shoin to Tōbun Gakudō: Taiwan sōtokufu ka'nan kyōiku shisetsu no ranshō," Tenri daigaku gakuhō 124, no. 3 (1980): 1–18. See the appendix for details on the Overseas Chinese Bureau.

Government-General recognized him for his contributions by conferring the title "gentleman" (*shinshi*). Both Shi and Zeng later became longstanding leaders in the Taiwan Association. Lin Lucun, a native of Anxi, also near Xiamen, was from a family of tea merchants with shops in Guangzhou, Xiamen, and Taipei. He was living in Taiwan with his family at the time of the Sino-Japanese War, but chose to relocate to Xiamen after the start of Japanese rule. No record appears to exist for his applying to the Taiwan Government-General for Taiwan sekimin status like his brothers, Lisheng and Qiongcun (林瓊存), but he co-founded the city's "Tō-A Shoin" (East Asian Academy) in 1898 with then Governor-General Kodama Gentarō and opened the city's Red Cross Society with Japanese consul Ueno Sen'ichi.[213] Despite relocating to Xiamen after the onset of Japanese rule in Taiwan, Lin Lucun continued to manage his family's investments in the tea, camphor, and gold mining industries on the island. The backgrounds and commercial and social interests represented in Yuchi's "influential" Taiwan sekimin—none of whom who held the legal status had been born in Taiwan—demonstrated the types of local and regional leaders embedded in treaty-port economic networks that Yuchi sought to draw under Japanese influence with the promise of legal protection conferred to Taiwan sekimin.

For Yuchi, their individual biographical details were not as important as explanation for the small number of reputable figures: he emphasized that the small number was proof that the

213 Records of a debate over his brothers' application for the status are in the Taiwan Government-General Archive (Zongdufu Dang'an) V04142/A029. In 1931 their national status became the subject of debate between the Taiwan Government-General, Guangzhou consular representative Suma Yakichirō, and the Guangzhou district court. The Guangzhou district court, consulting the Lin family genealogy, claimed that the brothers were Chinese citizens, and had not completed the proper procedures for renouncing Chinese citizenship, despite no citizenship law existing when they claimed to have registered in 1899. The Government-General had no way to prove their registration, though, because a flood in 1911 destroyed all the documents at the Taipei district police office. Lin Lucun died in 1919, which could account for his being left out of this debate.

Taiwan Government-General had failed to invest in institutions that would win local residents' trust.[214] He wrote,

> "In essence, I believe that, in order to be successful, the Japanese consul must now place emphasis on the sekimin, strengthen prosecution, direct elites, and provide them protection during ordinary times. The insufficient communication with the Taiwan Government-General leaves much to be desired (*kakkasōyō*, lit. 'trying to scratch an itch from outside one's shoe'). If the Chinese are generally treated in the same way as Taiwanese, who in Taiwan are pressured by institutions there, there may [be progress] in a few decades. The Chinese race are truly an unfortunate people: recently there have been outbreaks of revolution, resources are compelled through military force, and because of rampant banditry [people] cannot expect the security of life and property…comparing their assets to Taiwanese and comparing taxes paid, [people] realize that China levies heavy taxes, and are extremely jealous. These feelings are yet more pronounced among those who visited Taiwan for the Industrial Exposition. Many desire to become Taiwan sekimin (there are many who, from the perspective of [personal] interest, seek to register as Japanese to evade taxes and to receive the protection of officials). Furthermore, there are those (in the middle class and above (*chūryū*)) who predict that, in the near future, [Fujian] will come into Japan's sphere of influence. There are no people who hold this belief in Guangdong, but in Fujian one sometimes hears reverberations of this sort in conversation. Even if one does not adhere to this idea, it is a fact that there are those who hold these opinions."[215]

At stake for the empire's policy in south China was not only the control of the Taiwan sekimin, but attracting local Chinese, especially those of the upper classes, to naturalize through the promise of protection of life and property, the very colonial logic that Japan used to justify its rule of Taiwan. The desire of the Government-General to extend forms and institutions of colonial rule from Taiwan to Fujian was shared, Yuchi implied, by local residents of Xiamen, and especially the propertied classes whose support he was eager to attract. Yuchi also mentioned that, historically, residents of Xiamen had traveled to Southeast Asia (*Nan'yō*/*Nanyang*) because "local officials had failed to make land fertile and did not promote industrial development," again marshaling colonial logic to critique Chinese failure and advocate

214 In Yuchi's narrative the biographical details I have shared above come after the following quote.

215. JACAR B03041648500.

for Japan's role in the region. Finally, in recounting the efforts of Zeng Houkun to establish a financial institution for local Taiwanese, Yuchi proposed the extension of a colonial institution, the Bank of Taiwan, to the Chinese treaty-ports as a solution for social problems there.[216] He blamed the Bank of Taiwan for having thwarted the plans of Taiwan sekimin in Xiamen by depriving them of the necessary capital to carry out their plans. "For the sekimin who have been in Xiamen for a long time and have always been infected by improper deeds (*fuseiji ni kansen suru*), allowing appropriate capital to flow and allowing them to develop will bring great happiness."[217] Of the 250,000 yen in initial capital, the Government-General provided half at no interest, to be paid back gradually, and issued in the form of Bank of Taiwan banknotes. The institution was to be supervised in all its activities by Japanese representatives from the Bank of Taiwan. Thus it may have had the appearance of a Taiwan sekimin venture but was in its management and capitalization an extension of a colonial institution. Yuchi concludes by conveying Zeng's promise that he was not acting out of self-interest but out of a true desire to contribute to the goals of the Taiwan Government-General by promoting the development of the Taiwan sekimin. In insisting that Zeng was not motivated by "self-interest" (*jiko shugi*), Yuchi suggests the Taiwan Government-General's official aversion to give institutional backing to smaller-scale ventures was rooted in mistrust of perceived attempts at personal gain among Taiwan sekimin.

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216. Zeng was not the only one to start a financial institution with links to colonial Taiwan. Yuchi relayed later that summer that Wu Ruxiang (of the failed light rail venture) had opened a qianzhuang native bank to provide loans to local Taiwanese with an initial capital investment of 10,000 yuan. Though the origin of this capital is unclear (it was possibly connected to his leadership of Shōka Bank mentioned earlier), Yuchi's report gives the sense that Wu's institution was independent of the Government-General's oversight and financial support. See "27 Shina narabini Shinajin ni kan suru hōkoku (dai nijūgo hō)," JACAR B03041649600.

217. JACAR B03041648500.

Overall, the Foreign Ministry, which was ultimately responsible for regulating the commercial ventures of Japanese subjects in the treaty-ports, gave preference to Sino-Japanese joint ventures, especially those under the leadership of notable and wealthy locals. The Fuzhou consul noted that this would not only allow Japan to gain dominance in the Chinese industrial sector, but would also "reinforce Sino-Japanese friendship."[218] Yuchi was far more skeptical. In surveying the Taiwanese who had recently come to Fuzhou to engage in the timber, marine products, and sundry goods (*zakka*) industries, Yuchi discovered that the consul was reluctant to grant licenses to applications for individual, small-scale ventures, which he named "so-and-so *yanghang*" (*yanghang* denoting a foreign trading company in China). Though Yuchi did not disagree with the consul's policy in theory, he had doubts about its long-term potential: "As an ideal, I think the consul's policy is truly wonderful (*jitsu ni rippa*), but will Sino-Japanese joint ventures be able to make great strides in the industrial world? This is a great problem [that requires] research."[219] Though Yuchi may have simply been prejudiced against China's economic potential, he also viewed local official opposition as a barrier. As an example, he returned to Lin Jishang's management of the Huafeng Mine in Longyan and his canal venture, and Wu Ruxiang's attempted light rail project between Dongshi and Quanzhou. Although both had amassed capital and had begun the management of their projects, Wu's business did not receive permission from local officials simply because of his Japanese citizenship. Lin, on the other hand, "immediately renounced [Japanese] citizenship and became a Chinese."[220] Not only did

218. See JACAR B03041649300. Yuchi mentions that in Fuzhou this was a new policy, instituted in the summer of 1916 ("the past three months," writing from late August), which had an effect especially as many Taiwanese had started coming to the city starting in May.

219. JACAR B03041649300.

220. JACAR B03041649300.

Sino-Japanese ventures carry little commercial promise, they risked pushing Taiwanese to naturalize as Chinese citizens under the pressures of obtaining official approval. In Yuchi's mind, the consul's preference was yet another example of the Foreign Ministry taking a conciliatory stance with Chinese officials which would ultimately backfire.

A subsequent report from neighboring Shantou detailing recent struggles with local officials regarding the payment of local taxes by Sino-Japanese joint ventures confirmed Yuchi's reservations about their potential.[221] Shantou was a market for Taiwanese rice, alcohol, marine products, coal, and matches, for which it exported tobacco in return. On the coast about halfway between Xiamen and Hong Kong, the city was an important intermediary port along Japanese and other shipping routes that connected Taiwan to Hong Kong. It was also connected to the city of Chaozhou, the native home of many overseas Chinese, via the Chaozhou-Shantou railway recently completed with Japanese investment.[222] In short, it had the conditions to excel as a market destination for goods from Taiwan and Japan, transported via Taiwan, and would strengthen Japanese shipping concerns along the south China coast. Like Fuzhou, Shantou had seen an uptick in Taiwanese merchants from earlier that year. Taiwanese merchants, when transporting goods from the Chinese interior to the treaty-port, were supposed to be exempt from internal transport taxes (*lijin*), as they were Japanese (i.e. foreign) subjects.[223] Foreign merchants

221. Another case from Jinjiang (晉江), not a treaty port, illustrates the consequences of local officials asserting that Taiwan sekimin were subjects of China and not Japan. In this case, as Jinjiang was not a treaty port, sekimin were not supposed to travel without passports, were not allowed to own land, and were not allowed to sue Chinese in court. This order issued by a Jinjiang official suggests that these were all things that sekimin in the interior of China were attempting to do. See "12 Shina narabini Shinajin ni kan suru hōkoku (dai sanjūkyū hō)," B03041651500.

222. See Chapter 1.

223. The question of taxation of the Taiwan sekimin—which taxes, by whom, and method of payment—was a perennial issue throughout the early twentieth century. A March 1912 report from Xiamen reports that the Qing-era lijin internal transport tax had been abolished by the Fujian Provincial Military Governor (Zhonghua minguo junzhengfu Min dudu) on October 1th, 1914, to be replaced with a "merchant/commercial tax" (shangjuan 商捐) as proposed by the provincial ministry of finance (Fujian dudu caizhengshi). Consul Kikuchi reports that the city's merchants were to be assembled into associations (here he uses the Japanese term kumiai) by sector, and each

held documentation issued by their respective consulate to avoid the levying of these taxes; the rise in commerce handled by such merchants thus meant the loss of local tax revenue for Chinese officials.[224] But recently, Chinese officials had started rejecting this documentation, claiming that the Japanese-registered merchants were in fact "unscrupulous Chinese merchants" (*jianshang*) who, for the purpose of evading tax responsibility, operated under the borrowed name of a Japanese merchant."[225] Taiwanese operating in a joint venture were not exempt from this charge, and perhaps operating in a joint venture made them more vulnerable to such an accusation. Chinese officials used this reasoning as a pretext to appeal to the local Japanese consulate, attempting to have the merchants' permission to operate annulled.

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association would be taxed yearly at a fixed rate. This absolved the provincial government of the need to tax each individual item, but also required delegating authority to these associations to tax its constituents. On May 1st, commercial taxation bureau (shangjuanju) was established to attempt collection. Kikuchi was of the opinion that there was no basis for forming the associations; he also maintained that the Taiwanese were not legally obligated to pay this tax, though warned of potentially adverse consequences if they refused. Once again, the differences in opinion between the diplomatic officials and Chinese municipal officials originated in differing spatial interpretations of Chinese sovereignty and its scope over commerce outside the "free area" of the treaty-port; Kikuchi insisted that Taiwanese merchants, no matter where they were, were exempt from what he considered to be "local" taxes. Whether the lijin was also abolished or replaced in Guangdong Province (where Shantou is located) is unclear.

The official history of the Xiamen Chamber of Commerce adds the details that merchants in Xiamen (in general) were highly against the commercial tax, which was only implemented after the provincial government faced fiscal problems following the abolition of the lijin tax. General economic conditions in the city contributed to this, as the treaty-port had yet to recover from the Revolution, which had seen the collapse of Shanxi piaozhuang banks and their sources of credit, the collapse in local demand for textiles and medicinal materials, and low external demand from northern China for sugar exports. See Xiamen zongshanghui gongshang lian, ed., Xiamen shanghui shi (Xiamen: Xiamen zongshanghui, 2001) , 385-386.

224. Yuchi calls these forms "sanliandan" (三聯單), issued by foreign consulates in China to their resident nationals, which permitted them trade in the interior without taxation. The name denotes a three-sheet carbon form, presumably to avoid falsification and ensure verification with the original held at the consulate.

225. "25 Shina narabini Shinajin ni kan suru hōkoku (dai nijūsan hō)," JACAR B03041649400.

"Jianshang" would soon undergo a transformation in meaning from "unscrupulous merchant" to "treasonous merchant" during the various anti-Japanese boycotts of the 1920s and 1930s. Reading this report secondhand in a Japanese translation poses additional difficulties in determining context of specific words. For this transformation, see especially Chapter 4 of Karl Gerth, China Made: Consumer Culture and the Creation of the Nation (Cambridge, Mass: Distributed by Harvard University Press, 2003). For the nineteenth century genealogy of the term, see Peter Thilly, "Opium and the Origins of Treason in Modern China: The View from Fujian," Late Imperial China 38, no. 1 (June 2017): 155–97.

But, as in Xiamen and Fuzhou, the Japanese consul was too quick to believe the evidence proffered by Chinese officials, which Yuchi thought was falsified. Although the consul eventually reissued documentation attesting to the merchants' foreign status, the delay in processing left goods to rot and degrade. "Merchants' losses obstructing development in South China were caused not by foreigners or by Chinese, but by our own officials. Taiwan sekimin are Japanese subjects, and so [we] should aim to protect their life and property and facilitate their business."[226] Yuchi saw little potential for joint ventures: investments by sekimin should remain fully under the jurisdiction of Japanese consular authorities, and any remaining conflicts with Chinese officials was only further evidence for the necessity of a strengthened Japanese presence in the treaty-ports.While the main object of Yuchi's critique was Japanese consular officials and consular policy, his description of economic conditions in China gives a sense of the reasoning behind Chinese officials' increasing attempts to treat Taiwan sekimin not as subjects of the Japanese empire but of China. The exigencies of local municipal and provincial finances had been exacerbated by the revolution, as local leaders relied on tax revenue to fund ongoing military conflict.

But critiques by Chinese officials in the Fujian Provincial Government were not couched only in fiscal terms; they marshaled international law to reject the existence of "sekimin" as a juridical category in Fujian. Even if only on the local level, Chinese challenges to the Japanese interpretation of treaty and nationality law threatened to upend the justifications undergirding the existence of sekimin status. Hu Ruilin (胡瑞霖), for example, shortly after becoming the provincial governor in early 1917, telegraphed the central government in Beijing to report on the

226. JACAR B03041649400.

problem of Taiwan sekimin in Fujian.[227] He rejected the term "sekimin," which he asserted did not appear in treaties or in international law.[228] Hu's solution for the difficulty in determining a merchant's nationality and the limits of Japanese consular jurisdiction in Fujian was a household registration law (C: *huji fa*, J: *koseki hō*), based on the Japanese model Hu had reportedly encountered while studying in Japan.[229] Yuchi considered this proposed household registration law "anti-Japanese in many clauses," and felt that it specifically aimed to exclude "Taiwanese, as Japanese subjects (sekimin)," despite the presence of many others who had registered as subjects of various empires.

Furthermore, Hu had gone forward with his plan to carry out household registration in the treaty-ports, starting with Fuzhou and moving on to Xiamen, despite lacking the sanction of the central government in Beijing. A representative in the Chinese National Assembly Huang Tingyuan (黃廷元) relayed that the proposal had passed several rounds of debate in the provincial assembly but had not received the central government's approval. Hu's imminent resignation, and the otherwise preoccupied National Assembly, prevented his proposal from coming to fruition.[230] But the challenge to Japanese interpretations of treaty and international law were clear, if only on the local level.

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227. JACAR B03041650600. This declaration was made after the establishment of a Taiwanese police office in Xiamen, detailed in the following section. See appendix for further biographical details on Hu Ruilin.

228. Printed in Shenbao under the title "Xiamen shejing wenti zhi dianxun Hu Ruilin suo ni banfa."

An April 6th, 1913 article in Shenbao titled "Fujian" mentions that the then civil minister of Fujian (minzhengzhang) Zhang Junyuan (張君元) was trying to promulgate a household registration law in Fujian (hujifa), while acknowledging that a household registration law was normally the provenance of the central government.

229. Hu mentions this in his telegram (see above) and Yuchi comments on it in a subsequent report. See "4 Shina narabini Shinajin ni kan suru hōkoku (dai sanjūsan hō)," JACAR B03041650700.

230. The timeline here is a bit confusing: an article in Shenbao mentions Hu's resignation in June, concomitant with Li's declaration of independence from the central government, but Yuchi's report that the household registration surveys were underway is dated July 7th.

In the context of growing uncertainty, some sekimin found alternative means of weathering commercial and economic stability. Though far less common in the record, there were also cases of Taiwan sekimin joining existing Chinese municipal institutions rather than relying on Japanese diplomatic channels of resolution. In one example, a sekimin used the possibility of being seen as a Chinese merchant to weather a case of an insolvent debtor. In Shantou, when a Chinese merchant was faced with bankruptcy, his creditor could, through the mediation of the Chamber of Commerce, appeal for some of the assets of the insolvent party, representing a collective source of financial security to guarantee loans made among its members. In one case, a Japanese national (*hōjin*) who could not join the Chamber was excluded from claiming assets as a creditor, on the basis that he did not pay dues to the Chamber. "Seeing this example," Yuchi reports, "a cunning Taiwanese professed to be a Chinese and joined the Chamber of Commerce in a desperate last resort," using the mediation of the Chamber to retrieving some payment back from a debtor. Examples such as these might have been underrepresented in the Japanese diplomatic archive because reliance by Taiwan sekimin on local institutions escaped the notice of already overburdened diplomatic officials, whether through benign neglect or sheer ignorance.

Despite the difficulty in determining how representative this case was, it illustrates how different municipal groups and institutions—the Chamber of Commerce, the Japanese consul, and local Chinese officials—defined the legality and juridical bounds of "Taiwan sekimin." For Yuchi, holding Taiwan sekimin status exempted an individual from the oversight and demands of Chinese officials. Hu Ruilin shared Yuchi's assessment, although he came instead to the conclusion that Taiwan sekimin status was therefore illogical and legally indefensible. A contradiction emerged in the overlap between "Taiwan sekimin" and "Chinese," which existed in

part because Japanese authorities conferred sekimin status on local Chinese and in part because local officials and merchants saw sekimin not as foreign but as Chinese. The ability of a Taiwan sekimin to join the Chamber of Commerce in a last ditch effort to recover a debt displays this overlap: despite his legal status as sekimin, the Chamber's members considered him Chinese. In Hu's view, because this sekimin merchant was Chinese, he should not be permitted to hold sekimin status as a foreigner. In the view of Chinese officials like Hu Ruilin, "Taiwan sekimin" like the creditor were Chinese, and therefore "Taiwan sekimin" was an illogical category without legal basis and Taiwan sekimin should be understood to be Chinese subjects, eliminating the category altogether.

Japanese colonial and diplomatic officials also disagreed on how the category should function in practice, if not in theory. Colonial officials like Yuchi feared "Taiwan sekimin" naturalizing as Chinese and renouncing their Japanese subject status to prevent Chinese rejection of business ventures, as Lin Jishang had. In his view, all efforts should be made to preserve and strengthen the status, and the failure to do so revealed the consuls' delinquency. Japanese diplomatic officials, on the other hand, sought to harden the boundaries between "Chinese" and "Taiwan sekimin" to avoid the jurisdictional troubles caused by questionable appeals brought to them by individuals claiming to hold the status of Taiwan sekimin, an understandably practical means of addressing the issue of inadequate consular personnel. Given the various interpretations of these categories and the divergent interests of the groups involved, contestation over the politics of inclusion and systems of classification had the effect not of resolving conflicts but exacerbating them.

Far more common than Taiwan sekimin last-resort reliance on local institutions, at least in the historical record, were local Chinese seeking naturalization as Japanese subjects, those

with whom Hu had been concerned.[231] Surely in part because local Chinese naturalizing as Japanese represented for Yuchi the success of Japanese appeals to protect property and livelihood, he mentions several instances of it. In one example he referred to it as a "movement" to be promoted, demonstrating that the priorities of colonial officials seemed at odds with the practical concerns of the consuls. An official in Taichū prefecture reported applications by three Chinese, Su Yi (蘇溢), Shi Xingjie (施性潔), and Shi Nengfeng (施能鋒) to obtain Japanese nationality (*Nihon kokuseki*). Su, a native of Quanzhou, had visited Taiwan on the occasion of the Industrial Exposition in 1916, and had stayed with relatives in Taipei.[232] Shi Xingjie and Shi Nengfeng, brothers, had been born in Lugang, central Taiwan, but had returned to the mainland after their father died. They also returned to Taiwan for the Industrial Exposition and took the occasion to visit friends. Both conveyed that they desired Japanese status because they feared the disorder caused by the Revolution and the impending effects of the Revolutionary Party coming to power in Fujian. They spoke of their observations in Taiwan favorably, seeming overly eager to flatter their audience:

> "Even when they are in China, the [Taiwanese] islanders (*hontōjin*) who acquire Japanese nationality do not face any oppression, and can engage in business most peacefully. When in Taiwan, one does not know of the military disturbances across the strait, and the residents all live with a sense of security (*kaki ni anji*), and new industries are promoted every day (*shokusan kōgyō*); this is absolutely beyond the dreams of Chinese, who are envious at seeing [the Taiwanese] basking in the favor [of the Japanese]. How can we obtain Japanese nationality? We have started a movement to move (*ijū*) to Taiwan and obtain Japanese nationality without a moment's delay, and hope that we will receive assistance and expediency."

231. In addition to the examples discussed below, an additional request by Chinese Huang Zhennan (黃振南) to gain Japanese nationality through a relative who lived in Tainan is discussed in JACAR B03041648100. The trend suggests that most of these "Chinese" who were trying to naturalize had some connection to Taiwan, whether by birth or through family.

232. It is possible that this is the same person as Su Yibin (蘇溢濒), who appears in Chapter 3 as a claimant in a land expropriation case in Xiamen and who served as a committee member of the Taiwan Association in 1928.

This "movement," if in this example only comprised of three people, was confirmation enough for Yuchi that the industrial and commercial progress of the colony, combined with the colonial regime's commitment to protect property and commercial interests, could be a tool for promoting Japanese interests in China. The petitioners' framing of Taiwan sekimin in the treaty-ports as having themselves "obtained Japanese nationality" deemphasizes a distinction between the island colony and the mainland in favor of framing property ownership as the sole criterion for nationality. The optimism of Yuchi and other Japanese colonial officials in such a trajectory of garnering support for the empire was surely reinforced by the existing success of figures like Zeng Houkun and Shi Fanqi, early local Chinese adopters of Taiwan sekimin status who had established companies to regulate the flow of seasonal workers from China to Taiwan (Shi) and brought their commercial and agricultural expertise to benefit colonial Taiwan's monopoly economies (Zeng), and who would both go on to lead municipal organizations in Xiamen in the 1920s.

Institution Building and the Expansion of Colonial Police Administration in China

In the late 1910s Yuchi and his colleagues in the Taiwan Government-General turned their attention to building new institutions in Fujian to direct Japanese interests in China. Though this spike in institution building in Fujian is usually described as a belated adaptation on the part of the colonial government of the "South Seas boom" of 1916–1923, in my view this institution-building arose in the more geographically and historically proximate context of the Chinese Revolution and the new challenges and opportunities it seemed to present to subjects of the

Japanese empire in China.[233] For their part, colonial officials in Taiwan were also buoyed by the economic boom caused by the World War I, which saw rapid expansion of Japanese exports to Southeast Asia, especially in textiles, and the attendant expansion of shipping lanes in Asia subsidized by the colonial government.[234] It is therefore is easy to understand why Yuchi was so concerned about securing the commercial rights of Taiwanese merchants in south China as a such destination for Japanese goods and Taiwanese raw materials and why he sought to attract the participation in Japanese institutions of overseas Chinese merchants who controlled south China's trade with southeast Asia with the promise of protecting their life and property.[235] Reports of attempts to obtain sekimin status, as for example by individuals who had attended the 1916 Industrial Exposition and were impressed by Taiwan as a symbol of colonial modernity, convinced Yuchi that bringing local elites under the ambit of the Japanese empire by conferring sekimin status to them was a promising strategy. When Yuchi suspected, conversely, that sekimin status had led to economic ventures being rejected by Chinese officials, he chided the

233. See Nakamura, "Taiwan to 'Nanshi, Nan'yō.'" and Takashi Nakamura, "Taiwan sōtokufu no kanan bunka shisetsu," in Nihon no nanpō kanyo to Taiwan, ed. Takashi Nakamura (Tenri, Nara: Tenrikyō Dōyūsha, 1988), 33–230. The latter is particularly detailed on the establishment of schools in the south China treaty-ports. On schools in particular see also Chapter Two of Shirane, "Mediated Empire: Colonial Taiwan in Japan's Imperial Expansion in South China and Southeast Asia, 1895–1945."

This "Taishō-era South Seas boom" is bracketed, in Nakamura's explanation, by the economic boom caused by the spike in demand for Japanese goods during World War I and the Great Kantō Earthquake of 1923, which, along with the economic downturn following the end of the war, further damaged the financial stability of the Japanese empire. See Nakamura, "Taiwan to 'Nanshi, Nan'yō,'" 5–6.

234. See Nakamura, "Taiwan to 'Nanshi, Nan'yō,'" 14, and Oliviero Fratolillo, "Introduction: Japan and the Great War," in Japan and the Great War, ed. Oliviero Fratolillo and Antony Best (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 1–10, 5. Frederick Dickinson mentions that 1916 was the first year that Japan had produced a balance of payments surplus since 1909, to continue through 1919. Dickinson, *War and National Reinvention: Japan in the Great War, 1914–1919*., 161n27.

235. Reports by Japanese observers to south China also make this point in an August 1917 report, but also express apprehension that once the war was over that goods from Europe and the United States would once again flood Chinese markets. See "12 Shina narabini Shinajin ni kan suru hōkoku (dai sanjūkyū hō)," JACAR B03041651500.

consuls' derogation and insisted on expanding the capacity of the South China consulates to protect imperial interests.

Much of this institution-building—which included banks, schools, hospitals, newspapers, and such—was supported by newly readily available capital from a combination of Japanese metropolitan and Taiwanese colonial sources, both public and private. Lin Jishang was one of many Taiwanese who sought to invest capital in public infrastructure and resource extraction, both of which were supported and partially underwritten to varying degrees by the colonial state-led Bank of Taiwan. The most conspicuous and best known instance of this "financial imperialism" or "financial diplomacy" was the Nishihara Loans of 1917 from the Japanese central government to Chinese general Duan Qirui, to support his victory in the ongoing conflict in north China. These loans and the strategy they represented were emblematic of the new orientation of the Terauchi cabinet which came to power in 1916, in which Gotō Shinpei, the administration's Home Minister, would play an important part.[236] Frederick Dickinson contends that while the Nishihara Loans were unprecedented, the novelty of Terauchi's and Gotō's China policy resulted more from newly available capital than it symbolized a turn toward a conciliatory policy toward China. If anything, the administration inherited the goals outlined in the infamous Twenty-One Demands of its predecessor, Katō Takaaki—including a "special relationship" with Fujian province—and then further extended them by advocating Japan's superior position in all of China.[237] This empire-wide context helps to explain the desire of the Japanese Foreign Ministry to build new institutions in Fujian, and it cautions against reading the establishment of schools or hospitals as a somehow gentler form of 'soft power.' As for the motivations of Yuchi,

236. See Chapter 5 of Dickinson, War and National Reinvention: Japan in the Great War, 1914–1919.

237. Dickinson, 160–161.

Shimomura, and other colonial officials in the Taiwan Government-General, I have argued that Yuchi's knowledge production in the "Reports on China and the Chinese" were based on a colonial logic, if not in territorial ambitions then in its taxonomy of categorizing institutions that would channel cultural progress and capitalist development. It is thus more useful to explore the role of the Taiwan sekimin in Fujian in the emergence of these new institutions, which formed the basis of a new colonial and diplomatic policy toward south China, in particular the two new institutions of a bolstered colonial police force and a new hospital in Xiamen.

The earlier joint investigations into prosecuting the Taiwan sekimin involved in the local opium economy had combined the efforts of local Chinese military police officers, consular police, and colonial police dispatched from Taiwan. Chief Officer Ōto from the Taipei Police Bureau led both investigations, demonstrating that, even for Vice-Minister Shidehara who had requested their participation, the colonial police were the model for the consular police in South China. Yuchi shared the opinion that the colonial police force were superior—unsurprising given his role as "commander-in-chief of police inspectors"—and often took one step further to advocate the permanent extension of colonial police to the mainland and the subordination of the consular police force to the colonial bureaucracy. Yuchi had proposed extending colonial police policy to south China from the beginning of his reports, so it is not surprising that he reached the same diagnosis at the conclusion of the reports in 1919.[238] For Yuchi, ensuring colonial police control over the traffic across the Taiwan Strait in people, goods, and ideas was a matter of

238. One of the first reports published was titled "On utilizing the measures of the Taiwanese police force" ("Toku ni Taiwan keisatsusho taisaku riyō no ken"), JACAR B03041647000, from May 1916.

public security for Taiwan[239]. In addition, the colonial police were best suited for controlling the empire's subject populations in the south China treaty-ports because they were equipped with a knowledge of their subjects informed by ethnicity and culture.

To reach the goal of coordinating police efforts across the strait, Consuls Saitō (Fuzhou) and Kikuchi (Xiamen) traveled to Taipei on September 25th, 1916, for a three-day meeting hosted by the Taiwan Government-General, a few months after the joint investigations in their two cities.[240] The meeting was the first of several of its kind over the next two decades, and, though the meeting was reportedly called by the request of the Foreign Ministry, the Government-General controlled the agenda and the areas of cooperation.[241] The most consequential outcome of the meeting was the establishment of a police "branch office" on Xiamen island, where most of the treaty-port's recorded 3,000 odd Taiwan sekimin lived, and which was separated by a narrow body of water from Gulangyu island, home to the International Settlement established in 1902 and the various foreign consulates, Western and Japanese.[242]

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239. These were all topics of separate reports in the series of "Reports on China and the Chinese."

240. Erik Esselstrom mentions this meeting and the subsequent establishment of the Xiamen police branch office, but does not provide the broader context behind these decisions, leaving the impression of a generalized expansion of Japanese imperial power on the mainland. His overall framing, however, which locates the origins of the diplomatic/consular police in late nineteenth century Korea, is useful for considering the links between colonial and diplomatic policing, which I try to highlight by exploring the Taiwan Government-General's motivations for establishing the branch office in Xiamen. Erik Esselstrom, *Crossing Empire's Edge: Foreign Ministry Police and Japanese Expansionism in Northeast Asia* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2009).especially Chapter 2.

241. Of the "areas of cooperation," (kyōtei jikō) the Government-General proposed 15, the Fuzhou consul 2, and the Xiamen consul 6. The records do not mention who represented the Government-General at the meeting. See Gaimushō Gaikō shiryōkan zō, Gaimushō keisatsu shi, 97–105.

242. Records of the numbers of Taiwan sekimin in South China were consistently unreliable. This estimate comes from a count taken by the consular police office established in Xiamen (in 1916), although the consulate also periodically conducted its own counts. On the whole, the consular police tended to arrive at higher estimates of the number of sekimin in the treaty-ports, perhaps in part because they relied less closely on the data of the number of sekimin who had registered with the local consulate upon arrival in China. The exact numbers are: 2,654 (1916), 2,883 (1917), 3,374 (1918), 3,516 (1919), and 3,765 (1920). The recorded number would continue to grow in the 1920s, almost doubling 7,476 by 1930.

The areas of cooperation agreed to at the meeting included stationing two assistant officers (*keisatsukan keibuho*) and fifteen patrol officers (*junsa*) across the four south China ("cross-strait") cities of Fuzhou, Xiamen, Shantou, and Guangzhou. All commanding authority would remain with the consul, as would responsibilities for directing investigations. The Government-General requested cooperation in the investigation of supsicious publications, the movement of temporary laborers from the mainland (under the auspices of Southern Country Company, *Nankoku kōshi*), and smuggling and piracy. The Government-General proposed a new policy to handle the Taiwanese "vagrants" (*furōsha*) prone to "disrupting public order and morals (*fūzoku*)" on the mainland: expand detention facilities in Taiwan to imprison offenders, and increase efforts to monitor attempts by existing offenders to return to the mainland, whether via Japan, or by traveling undocumented on a scheduled liner ship or by junk. To ensure that those registered as Taiwan sekimin and carrying passports were in fact registered with the Government-General, the colonial government committed to sharing passport and registration records with the consuls.[243] As for the numerous local Chinese that Yuchi reported as desiring naturalization as Japanese, the Government-General affirmed that it was "at an appropriate opportunity, a timely measure on the policy level to give those good individuals (*zenryō naru mono*) desiring naturalization with appropriate social standing (*chii*) and reputation (*meibō*) the status of registration (as Taiwan sekimin, i.e. naturalization)," but that they had to ensure with the central government that such an action was within the legal bounds of conferring Japanese

243. "(8) Taiwan sōtokufu keisatsusho oyobi gun'yakusho to Nanshi ryōjikan to chokusetsu tsūshin ni kansuru ken Taishō jūyonen jūgatsu yori," JACAR B13080105900 describes establishing direct connections from the main and regional police offices (keisatsusho and gunyakusho) and the south China consulates, from January 1917.

subjecthood by imperial sanction for meritorious service to the nation (*kokka ni kōrō aru mono*).[244]

Perhaps unexpectedly, the Government-General also mentioned the request by the Xiamen (Chinese) police office to hire colonial police officers, and the desire to establish a police training center under the direction of colonial officers, at sometime in the future. Fuzhou consul Saitō warned that, given the anti-Japanese sentiment prevalent in the treaty-ports, such measures would have to wait, but suggested that in the meantime Chinese police officers could travel to Taiwan for such training. As for the items proposed by the two diplomatic consuls, two positions of Xiamen Consul Kikuchi stand out. Regarding the many sekimin who were currently in China without passports, Consul Kikuchi agreed with the Government-General's plan to increase surveillance, communication, and detention facilities in Taiwan, but not without mentioning that "among the sekimin without passports, many are the insubordinate (*futei*) types, and giving these types of fellows special protection (*tokken*) feels especially excessive."[245] He also proposed the capacity to remove sekimin from the registry, that is, strip them of their status, but this seems to have been shot down by the Government-General, which committed "for the time being to strengthening prosecution based on the aforementioned articles." This was in line with Kikuchi's earlier approach in dealing with criminality in the treaty-port, which gave priority

244. *Gaimushō Gaikō shiryōkan zō, Gaimushō keisatsu shi*. 99.

245. "Futei" was a catch-all term for insubordination, which, in metropolitan Japan, was popularized by police networks to describe Koreans, who were mostly workers. Ken Kawashima, translating it as "unruly" but also preserving the original Japanese, has argued that that this descriptor gradually became tied to Koreans (as in it was increasingly difficult to identify "non-insubordinate Koreans") following the March First Korean Independence Movement of 1919, a major anti-colonial uprising. The connection between insubordination and Korean subjects only grew stronger as Koreans were identified in the 1920s with anarchism, communism, and Bolshevism—all ideologies that threatened to sunder the national body politic. See especially Chapter 5 of Ken C. Kawashima, The Proletarian Gamble: Korean Workers in Interwar Japan (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009).

to deporting criminals to Taiwan rather than spending resources to rehabilitate them or show them imperial favor to win them over.

Fuzhou Consul Saitō, by contrast, took a more cooperative and conciliatory tone toward the Government-General. Although he sought to strengthen the consuls' ability to deport back to Taiwan any Taiwanese who disrupted diplomatic relations, public order, or the economic development of the sekimin in China, Saitō recognized that ensuring the economic activities of the sekimin required cooperation between diplomatic and colonial officials. Colonial officials had to do their part to allow only "good sekimin to travel to China," whereas diplomatic officials were responsible for "improving the sekimin [already] in China." Such a division of labor committed the Government-General to institutionalizing investigations into the assets (*zaisan*), behavior (*sokō*), and purpose of travel of all those who desired passports. Erik Esselstrom has noted how this meeting gave birth to a "colonial police force on sovereign Chinese territory." But from the perspectives of bureaucratic capacity and imperial policy, the efforts went even one step further. The meeting committed officials on both sides of the strait to more frequent and more systematic surveillance and knowledge regimes. Such surveillance could be upheld only through deeper integration of diplomatic officials into Taiwan sekimin activities, and it required a bureaucratic infrastructure of constant cross-strait communication. In unifying diplomatic and colonial efforts in regard to sekimin, the participants at the meeting accepted Yuchi's starting premise that the future of colonial policy in Taiwan was tied to that of diplomatic policy on the mainland.

After the meeting, Consul Kikuchi conveyed the details about the police branch office to Prime Minister and then interim Foreign Minister Terauchi: it would be staffed with two assistant officers and seven patrol officers, and would be housed in a rented building to be

renovated to accommodate a permanent presence.[246] Kikuchi anticipated resistance from Chinese officials, and sought to preempt future liability for his own professional responsibility by approaching the newly appointed diplomatic official (C: *jiaosheyuan*), named Luo, even though Kikuchi presumed Luo had no familiarity with the situation in Xiamen. Kikuchi even anticipated that the office would be interpreted as a infringement on Chinese sovereignty "by some extremely foolish Chinese people," and reports having sent multiple letters to convince Chinese officials of his position—by which he meant accepting the unilateral decision to station Japanese police on Chinese soil. As a concession, Kikuchi decided to have the sign hung outside the door, which read "Consulate of the Empire of Japan, Police Office Xiamen Substation" (*Dai Nippon Teikoku ryōjikan keisatsusho Amoi bunsho*), temporarily made of paper instead of wood, as if to convey a veneer of impermanence.[247]

As expected, Chinese official critiques hinged on this point, that is, whether "exercise of consular jurisdiction" implied the right of Japanese consular police officers to follow imperial subjects wherever they were in China. Chinese officials feared the conclusion of this interpretation would be a repeat of the situation in Manchuria, where Japanese diplomatic officials had asserted the right to open police branch offices outside the "free area" of the concession to follow Japanese subjects who had settled there. Local officials in Fuzhou,

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246. This is also recorded in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see "21 Keisatsu jimu ni kan shi Amoi Fukushū ni ryōji to kyōtei shitaru jikō," JACAR B03041652400.

Yuchi also mentions in a November 11, 1916 report that the Xiamen police office had hired four Taiwan sekimin to join its force, though he does not mention whether they would be among those staffing the new office. In August, two had been dismissed, leaving two left, Yang Guoren (楊國仁) and Wu Huoshi (吳火石), who were at risk of dismissal themselves by the new police chief (whom Yuchi does not name). Yang had been in charge of "hygiene," suggesting experience in dealing with opium use, whereas Wu had been a household chief head (a C: bao/J: ho in the colonial C: baojia/J: hokō system). See "32 Shina narabini Shinajin ni kan suru hōkoku (dai sanjū hō)," JACAR B03041650100.

247. *Gaimushō Gaikō shiryōkan zō, Gaimushō keisatsu shi*. 102-103.

responding to rumors that the Japanese Foreign Ministry sought to open a police office there as well, feared that what appeared to be a police office on the surface would be in reality an office to investigate local conditions and monitor local officials, essentially repeating the history of Japanese strategies in Korea.[248] By the end of 1916, the debate had escalated to the highest levels of Sino-Japanese diplomacy in an exchange between head of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Wu Tingfang (伍廷芳) and Japanese Minister Plenipotentiary to China Hayashi Gonsuke (林権助).[249] Hayashi dismissed his Chinese colleagues' objections out of hand, declaring the right to exercise police authority (*keisatsuken*) over "the Empire's subjects residing in China" (*kikoku zairyū teikoku shinmin*) concomitant with consular jurisdiction "in theory and in practice without a doubt." He claimed that establishing a police substation was within the bounds of both treaty and international law, since it did not imply exercising police authority over Chinese subjects.

Chinese criticism was not limited to officials in Fujian and the central government; provincial assemblies and governors from Jiangsu, Hunan, and Yunnan voiced their protest to the central government (largely in a critique of the inabilities of local officials to thwart the plan).[250] Local newspapers joined in as well, attempting to rally compatriots in Guangdong and Southeast Asia and warning not to let "our stately and resplendent southern border go the sorrowful way of Korea and Taiwan." As early as the first month it was open, branch office police officers had conducted no fewer than ten arrests, detaining Taiwan sekimin and Chinese in

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248. See B03041650100.

249. *Gaimushō Gaikō shiryōkan zō, Gaimushō keisatsu shi*. 104-105. From December 20th, 1916. See appendix for biographical details about Hayashi Gonsuke.

250. See "3 Shina narabini Shinajin ni kan suru hōkoku (dai sanjūni hō)," JACAR B03041650600.

violation of the treaty, one newspaper article reported. Provincial officials investigated the situation in an attempt to find a solution, and efforts to challenge the police branch office on the basis of treaty law continued into the next year. In a meeting of the Fujian provincial assembly in February 1917, two representatives reported that, because the Sino-Japanese treaty made no specific mention of police authority, the office was a violation of Chinese sovereignty and the province's Taiwan sekimin were "pioneers sent to cause a disturbance." Later proposals from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs took a more conciliatory approach, proposing the establishment of an exclusive, spatially delimited Japanese concession (*senkan kyoryūchi*) in Xiamen to solve the problems caused by the two differing interpretations of jurisdiction and sovereignty. In the case of rumors of a similar proposal for Fuzhou, apprehensions about a possible Japanese police office were not limited to Chinese officials. Taiwan sekimin involved in the opium economy there mentioned that, while they were critical of the joint investigations for having emboldened Chinese searches of Taiwan sekimin property, they suspected a permanent Japanese police force would be dedicated to eradicating opium use by deporting offenders back to Taiwan, and would replicate the harsh policing from the colony in the treaty-port.[251] As a result, Yuchi reported, many of these sekimin left Fuzhou for upriver Yanping and Xiamen.

Yet the police office in Xiamen also appeared to have supporters. A report by Huang Tingyuan (the provincial chairman) held that, upon investigation it was in fact two Taiwan sekimin and Chamber of Commerce members, Cai Qiutao (蔡秋濤) and Chen Zongshu (陳宗書), who had lobbied for, funded, and rented the property for the branch office (though they reportedly tried to conceal their involvement once the news broke).[252] Later inquiries into the

251. See "32 Shina narabini Shinajin ni kan suru hōkoku (dai sanjū hō)," JACAR B03041650100.

252. The original report is from "3 Shina narabini Shinajin ni kan suru hōkoku (dai sanjūni hō)," JACAR B03041650600. I have not found additional information to corroborate this claim, nor much biographical

opinions regarding the police office by Yuchi sought to prove that, while opposition may have appeared superficially fierce, the police office enjoyed broad support beneath the surface. Reiterating a point made at the meeting in Taipei, he mentions the proposal of local Chinese officials to adopt the prosecution methods of the Japanese consulate and expand Chinese police offices. This proposal, which would cost 1800 yuan, had already garnered a list of financial backers, led by wealthy merchant Ye Chonglu (葉崇祿) and others in the Chamber of Commerce. The Chamber, Yuchi argued, was ultimately a commercial institution and therefore held public order, the protection of property, and the eliminations of obstructions to commerce as its highest priorities. Local Chinese officials were of the same opinion, having been the ones to request Japanese prosecution of the Taiwan sekimin, whose rampant evil acts had brought about a slump in commercial activity, threatened the safety of private property, and whom Chinese officials were unable to control. The opinions Yuchi reported that unsurprisingly and conveniently reinforce his own views should be taken in this context. But it is not impossible to see how the city's commercial leaders and municipal officials could not only condone but seek to emulate the police office, especially as they likely did not see themselves as the probable targets of an accidental arrest. Even if local elites and officials tolerated—if not welcomed—the police office on an individual level, over time it would come under fire as the most flagrant violation of Chinese territorial sovereignty and a physical symbol of the Japanese empire's expansionist aims. But the colonial logic of policing was such that the expansion of jurisdictional capabilities only led to the discovery of more crime by officials and an increase in demands by Taiwan

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information on either of these Taiwan sekimin. Cai Qiutao appears in a 1924 Shusheng (蜀聲) newspaper article detailing resistance by local Xiamen merchants to the levying of a merchant tax, and is mentioned as the vice chairman (fuhuizhang) of the Xiamen Chamber of Commerce. Xiaochong Chen, Xia Tai guanxi shiliao xuanbian, 1895–1945 (Beijing: Jiuzhou chubanshe, 2013).

sekimin for police adjudication of conflicts increasingly marred by violence. In this regard, the establishment of the branch police office only threatened to exacerbate the frequency of Sino-Japanese conflict between officials and individuals alike.

The Benevolence Hospital and the Logic of Institution Building in Yuchi's "New South China Policy"

One form of cooperation discussed in the meeting between the south China consuls and the Taiwan Government-General was the establishment of a "foundation" (*zaidan hōjin*) to strengthen the position of Japanese officials in China in managing institutions like hospitals.[253] The funds for the foundation would draw on subsidies from the Government-General, revenue generated from the institutions' operation, and donations, and would appoint officers from among existing institutions in the treaty-ports, including the postal office chief, the director of the hospital and its medical officers, the head of the Japanese residents' association, and the head of the Taiwan Association. In a meeting whose agenda was otherwise dominated by questions of police jurisdiction and prosecution, what was the aim of this new foundation? The answer lies in Yuchi's and Shimomura's conception of a new south China policy for the Government-General and Foreign Ministry. Yuchi had advocated not only for stricter punitive measures, but also for the construction of new institutions, including schools, hospitals, and newspapers, that would channel the interests of local Taiwan sekimin elites and build support for the empire in south China. Like his search for "men of renown" in the treaty-ports, Yuchi had long reported on the

253. *Gaimushō Gaikō shiryōkan zō, Gaimushō keisatsu shi*. 99. I have translated zaidan hōjin for lack of a better term to describe a corporate legal body aimed at financially supporting cultural institutions (here using the definition of "cultural facilities" from the time which meant largely the institutions of colonialism, including hospitals, schools, and newspapers).

status of medical and educational institutions and newspaper companies, suggesting that this institution building is what he had in mind all along.

Yuchi outlined the contours of this new policy in a report titled "The Relationship between Taiwan and South China and Current Institutions and Future Policies." Having started by outlining the accomplishments in the first two decades of Japanese rule on Taiwan, he turned his attention to South China. "By earnestly establishing the basic policy of ruling Taiwan, and by pushing forward, extending our reach into South China and Southeast Asia, we will realize the meaning of our possession of Taiwan (*hontō ryōyū no igi o kantetsu subeki*). Is this not a godsend of an opportunity?" Referring to the threat posed by South China—a haven for revolutionaries, a nest for inculcating anti-Japanese sentiment, and the lair of pirates—Yuchi reiterates his point, shifting his focus from Taiwan to South China: "It goes without saying that the establishment of a South China policy is the fulfillment of the true meaning of our possession of Taiwan, and thus, for the rule of Taiwan, is truly urgent task."[254] Yuchi's logic of expansion and empire building as self-defense was not new in the context of colonial Taiwan, much less the Japanese empire.[255] But Yuchi and Shimomura were not merely recapitulating the approach taken by Gotō, Kodama, and their Taiwanese collaborators detailed in Chapter 1, despite their assertions that theirs was a task inherited from their predecessors. The turn to institution building meant that the Government-General would have a more active role in the social life of the treaty-

254. "20 Taiwan to Minami Shina to no kankei oyobi genzai no shisetsu narabini shōrai no hōshin," JACAR B03041652300. This report is undated. Its position within the archive file—between a "China and the Chinese" report dated February 8, 1917 and a report on the items of cooperation following the September 1916 meeting with the south China consuls, itself preceding a report that picks up the "China and the Chinese" series dated February 28, 1917—suggests it could have been written sometime in February 1917. But its content, which mentions that there had not yet been a meeting to coordinate the efforts of the Taiwan Government-General and the south China consulates, suggests that part of it could have been written earlier, before the September 1916 meeting mentioned above.

255. Yuchi uses the phrase "from the perspective of self-defense, this cause for taking measures is an inevitability."

ports, channeling Japanese influence and interests in China beyond the model of late Qing capital projects through individual partnerships with elite Taiwan sekimin. This turn was also conditioned by the aftermath of the Chinese Revolution and intended to channel the resultant instability in local institutions into groundswell support for the Japanese empire among Taiwanese and Chinese alike. Even if Yuchi's dream that the hospital would be a first step toward building a pro-Japanese alliance was merely wishful thinking, the hospital did manage to garner financial support from sekimin and local Chinese, buoying Yuchi's hopes.

Yuchi emphasized the importance of the institutions being supported by money from both local Chinese donations and the Taiwan Government-General, and the management being entrusted to an impartial foundation. Otherwise, "if our Government-General proceeds to manage [the hospital], the Chinese, who are abundant in suspicion, will misunderstand and think that this is certainly a plot that harbors some sort of Japanese aspiration. This runs the risk of ultimately obstructing Sino-Japanese friendship."[256] Thus, the Government-General would not rush to proffer funds or appoint officers to run the hospital, preferring instead to promote initiatives from among local Chinese. Yuchi's hopes for Chinese involvement and voluntarism had its limits, though. He was quick to mention that the number of Chinese officers would be limited, because "we cannot have too many [Chinese] local notables at our beck and call (*waga yakurōchū no mono*)."[257] Reflecting Yuchi's wishes for a Sino-Japanese mix of local elites, the members signed the founding charter establishing the hospital and the foundation on August 10th, 1916, to be forwarded to the Foreign Ministry for approval.[258] The founders included, in equal

256. JACAR B03041652300.

257. JACAR B03041652300.

258. For details on the hospital's future and further details on the analogous institutions founded in Fuzhou, Shantou, and Guangzhou, see Xuexin Wang, "Kangzhan qian boai hui yiyuan zhi yunzuo yu riben dalu zhengce zhi

Sino-Japanese-Taiwanese proportions, Japanese leaders from the local branch offices of Mitsui, the Osaka Shipping Company, and the Bank of Taiwan and the leaders of the local elementary school for Taiwan sekimin (*Kyokuei shoin*) and the Japanese post office, and Chinese and Taiwan sekimin "gentlemanly elites," who are afforded no further description, except for the chairman of the Xiamen Chamber of Commerce. [259]

The founding declaration asserted that, although "Xiamen was a prominent port in south China with many households, prosperous commerce, and frequent comings and goings," it did not have a medical facility adequate to "relieve the people and save livelihood."[260] The name of the foundation and the hospital, "Universal Love Association" (J: *Hakuaikai*, C: *Boaihui*), reflected the founders' perception that the hospital was meant as an act of benevolence and charity to benefit the general public without discrimination, suggesting it drew as much on late Qing legacies of elite local philanthropy as on replicating colonial institutions from Taiwan.[261] Perhaps reflecting Yuchi's desire for the appearance of local initiative, the charter of the hospital committed itself to a goal of establishing a fund so as to be financially self-sufficient, though the foundation was established by donations from Xiamen's Japanese Residents' Association and the Taiwan Association, reflecting its reliance on existing institutions composed of the city's Japanese and Taiwan sekimin residents. The limits of the desire for local voluntarism were

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guanxi," Fengjia renwen shehui xuebao 16 (June 2008): 107–31.

259. Figures that appear elsewhere in the dissertation include Lin Erjia, Zeng Houkun, and Ruan Shunyong. See "Kōeki hōjin kankei zakken / Zai Man-Shi kōeki hōjin chōsa kankei bunkatsu," JACAR B04011310100. This is a reprint of the original by Xiamen consul Yamada Yoshitarō produced on March 25th, 1937, in response to a survey of charitable organizations in China and Manchuria by the Foreign Minister. This item is also cited in Wang Xuexin's article.

260 The original is "kyūminsaisei," a portmanteau of saving/relieving (kyūsai) and "people's livelihood" (minsei).

261. This name has led Miriam Ming-cheng Lo to call these hospitals (the Xiamen branch was only the first of many) "philanthropic hospitals." Ming-cheng Miriam Lo, Doctors within Borders: Profession, Ethnicity, and Modernity in Colonial Taiwan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 97-98.

reflected in the organization's leadership as well: the chair of the group responsible for fundraising and donations was the chair of the Japanese Residents' Association, Nishioka Hideyoshi, who held the power to dismiss committee members and direct meeting agendas; and the Xiamen consul (by now Yatabe Yasukichi) was retained as an advisor, who reserved the right to approve "important matters."

Reflecting the association's eponymous mission to promote universal love, Yuchi was careful to add that the hospital was not meant only to serve Japanese and Taiwan sekimin. He states quite explicitly, in fact, that the "underlying goal" (*rimen no mokuteki*) must be "to use the hospital building as a linchpin between Chinese and Japanese (literally "them and us," or *higa*), and, by drawing many Chinese local notables into this enterprise, strive for Sino-Japanese friendship and enroot the empire's power across the [Taiwan] strait."[262] Yuchi hoped that by requiring the founding Chinese members to work in close cooperation with the hospital and consulting their opinions, he could gradually "draw the local notables of South China closer to Taiwan." If the association achieved this, Yuchi envisioned a future where "local notables from Taiwan [will] mutually collaborate with them [elites from south China] to hold a gathering to come to mutual understanding of the sort of a 'A Friendly Discussion of Business in South Japan and South China,' (*nan Nichi nan Shi jitsugyō konwakai*) [where members] must endeavor to speak frankly and with sincerity to achieve Sino-Japanese friendship."[263] These efforts in the practical world of business would be matched by research in the world of ideas, which would identify areas for industrial cooperation. Only by linking the disparate interests of the Chinese and the Japanese would the policy reach its true goal, which included the "spread of this great

262. JACAR B03041652300.

263. JACAR B03041652300.

power to northern China," perhaps implying that it would inform any future policy or regime change in Beijing.

While it is easy to dismiss Yuchi's lofty ambitions and succession of events as overly grandiose, the broader aims of the Hakuai Association are worth considering.[264] Its lofty commitment to benevolence was not merely rhetorical: the hospitals provided some treatment free of charge to patients, and also provided medical education, both systematic and popular.[265] This has been the focus of many studies of the hospital, which tend to treat it in isolation, with only passing mention of its being one of many institutions built by the Government-General in China at the time. Although "hygienic modernity" was a hallmark of Japanese colonial policy and its claims to modern administration in Taiwan, it does not figure prominently in Yuchi's framing of the hospital's specific appeal to Japanese administrators, even if it clearly played a part in the founders' charter declaration. In promoting Japanese interests by building new institutions, Yuchi hoped to link the interests of business elites on both sides of the strait. He advocated soliciting the donations and opinions of local elites, not only to garner their support, but also to maintain the appearance of being an unofficial venture and evade accusations of the new institutions' being a Trojan horse for Japanese imperialism—though he was the first to admit that this was, in fact, their aim. For all of Yuchi's professed commitment to the appearance

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264. Yuchi articulates a version of this logic in response to observations by Japanese visitors to China, who claimed that the Euro-American powers had won over Chinese hearts by investing large sums of money into religion (churches), schools, and hospitals, thereby securing a foundation for economic development. In contrast to these observations, which held no promise for Japanese commercial development, Yuchi saw the temporary lull in Euro-American exports to be a blessing—a fortuitous if temporary opportunity. Without investing in institutions to win over the hearts of the Chinese (minshin wo shūran), there could be no hope in planning to promote commerce; Japanese and Japanese products faced no chance against anti-Japanese ideas. See "12 Shina narabini Shinajin ni kan suru hōkoku (dai sanjūkyū hō)," JACAR B03041651500.

265. See the chart on page 113 of Wang, "Kangzhan qian boai hui yiyuan zhi yunzuo yu riben dalu zhengce zhi guanxi." Fuzhou served by proportion the largest number of free patients, perhaps owing to the Xiamen hospital's relatively inconvenient location on Gulangyu (though there was a branch on Xiamen island from 1918 to 1928, it is unclear if it was included in the calculations).

of local, if elite groundswell support, these new institutions, which in addition to hospitals included schools and newspapers, would not have survived without the heavy intervention of the Taiwan Government-General. The colonial government was responsible for staffing the institutions, which in time made it a destination for the graduates of the colony's new normal and medical higher schools, not to mention the engineers and planners sent from Taiwan for their physical construction. The colonial government aggressively subsidized all the institutions, more than doubling its budget for supporting institutions in south China and Southeast Asia from 1918 to 1919 (from 296,277 yen to 595,685 yen), and steadily increasing thereafter until 1924 when it experienced only a slight dip.[266] The policy instituted by Shimomura and Yuchi lasted throughout the colonial period, though the budget saw ups and downs. In 1919, of the portion of the budget allocated for institutions in south China, which made up 58% of the total that year, over half was dedicated to hospitals, demonstrating not just their hefty initial costs but also the higher costs of maintaining them.[267] Yuchi himself pinned his hopes on hospitals, rather than on schools or newspapers, which might at first glance seem like obvious contenders as mechanisms

266. See Nakamura, "Taiwan to 'Nanshi, Nan'yō.'" 19-20.

267. According to Wang's calculations, the hospital's revenues never exceeded the 30% range in Xiamen until 1929, when the number of free patients the hospital would admit was limited. Profitability was marginally higher in Fuzhou, and yet higher in Guangzhou, but nowhere did it exceed 70% in any year between 1918 and 1937. See Wang, 118.

Chung Shu-ming has argued that the "south China" and "Southeast Asia" budgetary subsidies represented two separate policies, despite falling under the same header. The "south China" subsidy was meant to extend the power of the police force in Taiwan and was therefore aimed at supporting institutions that would further these goals, whereas the "Southeast Asia" subsidy comprised mostly of loans to Japanese agricultural settlers scattered across the region. See Shu-ming Chung, "Taiwan zongdufu de 'nanzhi nanyang' zhengce: yi shiye buzhu wei zhongxin," Taida lishi xuebao 34 (December 2004): 149–94.

Statistics compiled by Nakamura reflect this division. Even accounting for the overhead costs for hospitals that inflate their percentage of the total, the other categories receiving support in Southeast Asia were enterprises (kigyō) and studies/investigations (shiken, chōsa), whereas in south China support went to schools and newspapers. See chart on pg 20. Nakamura's research also shows that this support for schools went entirely to fund the Taiwanese school; the Foreign Ministry provided funds for the school for Japanese elementary school students (and provided no support for Taiwanese education).

of ideological suasion. In Yuchi's mind, while newspapers could direct popular discourse (and therefore control its impact on Taiwan), and schools could train the younger generation and keep parents from leaving the treaty-ports to seek better educational opportunities for their children, it was a hospital that he felt could best draw the interests of local Chinese elites.[268] Finally, it was

268. By comparison, the financing structure for the newspapers in Xiamen and Fuzhou were quite different. In 1917 Shimomura agreed, with Nakagawa Kojūrō of the Bank of Taiwan, to split the costs of establishing the "Good Neighbor Association" (Zenrin Kyōkai), which purchased the existing Min Bao (Fujian News) in 1918 and Quan Min Ribao (Pan-Fujian Daily News) the year after.

But, as Nakamura describes, the process for acquiring the Quan Min Ribao was not simple. Shimomura and Yuchi had dispatched Xiamen Consul Yatabe to purchase a stake in the newspaper from owner Jiang Baosheng, a Taiwan sekimin who was operating the newspaper with the financial backing of Lin Jingren, the eldest son of Lin Erjia. In a December 1917 meeting, however, Shimomura and Yuchi suddenly decided that they did not want to buy the newspaper, preferring to establish a new periodical instead. They feared the involvement of future investors in giving dissenting opinions, and thought that a periodical would be cheaper to finance than a daily newspaper. Finally, as the newspaper was already under the control of a Taiwan sekimin, they thought that it could already be easily controlled. Yatabe returned to the two colonial officials with a counter offer, proposing that the Quan Min Ribao be put under a Sino-Japanese foundation with a fixed and limited amount of subsidy from the Government-General. Though the Government-General did not negotiate at this point, Yuchi wrote back mentioning that the editor must be Japanese, to be chosen by the foundation members and the president of the newspaper, who should be Lin Erjia, who would also work with the editor to choose the journalists. Yatabe then relayed this series of events to the Foreign Ministry, expressing the impossibility of a venture like a newspaper to be put under Sino-Japanese joint management, especially with underlying support from the Government-General, and mentioned that the Government-General's actions had alienated Lin Erjia and diminished his interest in the newspaper. In a change of events, the Foreign Ministry expressed its interest in revitalizing its involvement in local Chinese newspapers, and so agreed to support the newspapers in Fujian. Though the "Good Neighbor Association" supported the newspapers financially, they never interferered in its day-to-day operations, which ostensibly remained under the direction of Lin Erjia and Jiang Baosheng. Quan Min Ribao also had difficulty in attracting Japanese journalists to Xiamen as per Yuchi's requirement, but in 1922 appointed Miyakawa Jirō (宮川次郎) to the post, followed by Meiji University graduate Xie Longkuo (謝龍闊), who reformed the newspaper by buying a printing press. After he retired, a journalist dispatched by the Government-General briefly held the post, before Lin Erjia appointed his own son, Tokyo University graduate Lin Lüxin (林履新), as vice president and editor. This caused such an uproar among the staff that Lin was not able to take up his position.

Perhaps, then, Yuchi was overly optimistic in his faith that the newspaper would run smoothly (and espouse pro-Japanese views) just by virtue of being run by a Taiwan sekimin; if anything, it seems that the political context of the 1920s made Taiwan sekimin loathe to write anything too provocative. And perhaps Yatabe was correct in his assessment that newspapers were not ventures made for a structure of Sino-Japanese cooperation. For further details, see Nakamura, "Taiwan sōtokufu no kanan bunka shisetsu."

Yuchi's purview and prescription did not involve establishing schools, which were already a part of the institutional landscape of the treaty-port. Elementary schools were founded in Fuzhou (1908) and Xiamen (1910) at the request of the diplomatic consuls, who faced budget shortages after the Foreign Ministry redirected funds to north and central China. The Taiwan Government-General was more than happy to step in here, advocating for the schools to follow a curriculum modeled off that of common elementary schools (kōgakkō) in the colony, though with the important difference that the schools also accepted local Chinese students, and was tuition-free for all students. In the mid- to late-1910s the schools were streamlined to offer students opportunities to pursue further studies in medicine and education in Taiwan, and eventually Xiamen Hakuai Hospital also opened a medical education program for graduates of the local elementary school (in 1921). For details of these two schools, see Shirane, Seiji,

in the hospital's relative high initial cost that Yuchi saw the opportunity to secure local elite investment—financial and therefore emotional.

The role of Taiwanese and Chinese elites in establishing the hospital and the institution's policy of treating patients without the means to pay for free notwithstanding, not everyone was satisfied with the hospital's establishment. Xiamen's Taiwanese independent doctors, for example, opposed it, likely fearing that the consolidation of medical services would put them out of business.[269] During the following decades, Taiwanese independent doctors established their practices outside the treaty-port in neighboring cities like Quanzhou and Zhangzhou, likely in part because the Hakuai Hospital would have made their services in Xiamen redundant. But it was also true that the hospital created networks for more Taiwanese from the colony to move to Xiamen as medical professionals, a point I will return to shortly. In this way, Yuchi's focus on institutions created the conditions for colonial Taiwanese who lacked opportunities in the colony to seek them in China, whether within in the Taiwan Government-General funded institutions in the treaty-port, or beyond them in the interior of China. Since many of these new residents were trained within the colonial educational system, the doctors and others within this professional

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59–73, and Nakamura.

Curiously, Yuchi does not mention the schools at all as part of his investigation. Perhaps it was due to the schools' existing difficulty in attracting local Chinese, especially elite Chinese, for whom Anglo-American missionary institutions were much more longstanding and popular. Yuchi does emphasize that hospitals are an area in which there were no competing Anglo-American institutions. In fact, a later report that the British consul and other important British subjects were showing interest in using the Boxer Indemnity to establish a hospital in Xiamen greatly concerned Yuchi ("40 Shina narabini Shinajin ni kan suru hōkoku (dai roku[jū]go hō)," JACAR B03041654300). The sentiments were mutual, at least in Yuchi's accounts. Reacting to news that the Japanese consul had established a hospital, the Anglo-American consuls characterized it as "the first step in pursuing a long cherished ambition," Yuchi reported. The hospital was just the next step following the police office, and, in Yuchi's reports, the Anglo-American consuls reacted by inciting their subjects and churches to fan anti-Japanese sentiments. See "11 Shina narabini Shinajin ni kan suru hōkoku (dai sanjūhachi hō)," JACAR B03041651400.

269. See "12 Shina narabini Shinajin ni kan suru hōkoku (dai sanjūkyū hō)," JACAR B03041651500.

class gradually changed the composition of the Taiwan sekimin population in south China, as well.

Although there were hints that Yuchi's dreams for ongoing Sino-Japanese-Taiwanese business cooperation would materialize from the hospital project, there are no indications that it actually did so, except for mention of one effort by two of Xiamen's Japanese residents to consolidate the efforts of the Japanese Residents Association, Taiwan Association, and Chamber of Commerce into a single Chamber of Commerce and Industry. This impulse to consolidate was mirrored by a proposal by Shantou Consul Fukuzawa to merge the local Japanese Residents Association with the Taiwan Association there. But in Xiamen at least, Taiwan sekimin, even those in the minority that elected to join the Taiwan Association, managed to maintain not only relative autonomy but positions of power in managing the hospital and its affairs. An attempt by the Hakuai Association to expand in Xiamen proper in 1926 on a plot of land purchased in 1923 by then Taiwan Association head Chen Changfu (陳長福), for example, was thwarted when the new Xiamen municipal council (*shizhengfu*), less amenable to Taiwan sekimin transactions in land, refused to recognize land transactions conducted under the city's previous warlord leader Zang Zhiping.[270] The local Siming District Court upheld this decision, and even the Japanese Minister Plenipotentiary to China Yoshizawa Kenkichi could not reverse it, though he did try.[271] The Japanese strategy of using local Taiwanese to mediate imperial interests had its limits.

270 Disputes over land transactions and accusations that the municipal government in Xiamen, reorganized in 1924 under the control of the GMD Navy, had illegally expropriated property held by sekimin, are explored in the next chapter.

271 In theory, foreigners were not allowed to own property in China, only lease it in perpetuity. The consul is quite explicit in stating that Chen Changfu purchased the land "as a Chinese" with the intentions of providing it for the Hakuai Association's use.

Yuchi was confident that by strengthening colonial police surveillance over the social, economic, and political life in the treaty-ports, he could avert major crises and manage the Taiwanese population in south China. In late 1917, he proposed dispatching additional police officers to the treaty-ports to collect information about their political, economic, and other business-related matters.[272] Yuchi had an ally in Xiamen Consul Yatabe, whose only requests were that the officers had educational backgrounds commensurate to their position, and that they be sent under the auspices of a company dispatch or bank employee rather than as police officers as not to arouse too much suspicion. Yatabe reiterated the Foreign Ministry's desire to collaborate with the Taiwan Government-General and requested especially those who had familiarity with specialized knowledge in mining, railway construction, and marine products. The active production of knowledge about the region in the following years by both diplomatic and colonial officers can only be understood in the context of its origins in surveillance by the colonial and diplomatic police of the region's Taiwan sekimin and efforts to promote their economic activities.[273]

But the ability of the Hakuai Hospital, and any institution for that matter, to channel Japanese interests on the mainland was also limited by the support of the Taiwanese it drew into

272 See JACAR B16080285400.

273. 1923 saw the publication of Amoi teikoku ryōjikan kankatsu nai jōkyō chōsa hōkokusho, an encyclopedic catalog of the region's economic and political conditions. The report's coverage extended beyond the treaty-port to include the area the consulate defined as under its jurisdiction (kankatsu).

Colonial Taiwan also saw the explosion of south China and Southeast Asia focused knowledge production in this period, much of which was conducted under the aegis of the Government-General's newly established "Encyclopedia Bureau" (chōsa ka). This bureau was later staffed by graduates of the Taihoku Commercial College (Taihoku Shōgyō Gakkō), which was established by Shimomura. For details on the Bureau and the College, see Shirane, "Mediated Empire: Colonial Taiwan in Japan's Imperial Expansion in South China and Southeast Asia, 1895–1945," Chapter 3, "Colonial Taiwan as Japan's Brain Trust for Southern Studies"; Kaori Yokoi, "Nihon tōchiki no Taiwan ni okeru kōtō shōgyō kyōiku," Gendai Taiwan kenkyū 23 (July 2002): 72–92; Kaori Yokoi, "Taihoku kōtō shōgyō gakkō sotsugyōsei no dōkō ni kansuru ichi kōsatsu," Tōyō shihō 8 (2002): 41–48.

its orbit. A member of the first crop of medical professionals from colonial Taiwan to staff the hospital was Lai He 賴和, 1894-1943), a young Taiwanese physician who had been educated at the Government-General's Medical College. An elite product of the colonial government's highly discriminatory educational system, he was, on paper, perhaps the Xiamen resident of Yuchi's dreams (he often fulminated about the low or nonexistent educational credentials of Xiamen's Japanese and Taiwanese residents). Lai was also part of the first generation to grow up entirely under Japanese rule and to be educated almost entirely within the colony's new educational facilities—in this regard he shared a background with many of the Taiwan sekimin we will see in the following chapters, who sought educational opportunities in China in the 1920s, were exposed to various strands of left-wing and Chinese nationalist ideologies, and became a persistent threat of subversion for, and the targets of surveillance of, Japanese consuls in south China. Lai's move to Xiamen coincided fortuitously with the outbreak of the May Fourth Movement in 1919, an anti-colonial nationalist movement which saw students organize in the aftermath of World War I and the Treaty of Versailles against the Chinese government's perceived international weakness at the treaty's negotiations and its inability to prevent control of Shandong, a German colonial holding, from being awarded to Japan.[274] His firsthand experience of the movement imbued in him the ideals of China's New Culture Movement, whose leaders rejected "tradition" for "modernity" and brought ideological fervor to Chinese intellectual life. Perhaps inspired by these transformations in China, and particularly by the

274. For an account of the movement and its aftereffects, see Rana Mitter, A Bitter Revolution: China's Struggle with the Modern World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). For an attempt to place the movement in the transnational context of similar anti-colonial nationalist movements worldwide, including in Egypt, Korea, and India, see Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). Much recent scholarship on modern Chinese history and society has sought to decenter the singular importance of the May Fourth Movement and its main figures in conceptualizations of Chinese modernity.

trajectory of Lu Xun, one of modern China's most famous writers and with whose work Lai became familiar at the time, Lai turned away from medicine to literature, as Lu Xun had. Recurring themes of the brutality of colonial police and the structural inequality of colonial institutions that appeared in his later work likely drew in part on his time in Xiamen. But poems he composed while working at the Hakuai Hospital best capture his reflections and emotions about the institution he was serving. Here is one example written by Lai while in Xiamen to a friend, De Minchuan, in Taiwan.

> Recalling wistfully my native land, I shed many tears
> At the end of the world wanders just one common doctor
> This journey was mistaken, taken in by a hollow reputation
> And thus losing one's footing, yet who could have known
> The wanderer's tracks flowing like water, and the traveler's regrets
> The melancholy mourning of prisoners sharing the same fate passing like autumn wind
> Life of late does not require asking how many poems have been written from the sorrow of departing.[275]

Yuchi's plan for Japanese institutions garnering local support in the treaty-ports relied on the cooperation, if not active collaboration, of Taiwan sekimin. He endeavored to tie the interests of elites, sekimin and local alike, to those of the Japanese empire by drawing on their capital to fund projects like the Hakuai Hospital. In replicating colonial institutions from Taiwan in Xiamen, Yuchi was also encouraged by reports of local residents who desired sekimin status, which convinced him that local residents of Fujian were eager to support a Japanese vision of colonial modernity as officials had implemented by force in Taiwan. But since Yuchi's vision relied on local support, its success also hinged on the willingness of Taiwan sekimin to tie their futures to Japanese interests. Examples of Taiwan sekimin naturalizing instead as Chinese

275. Original text: 故國相思三下淚，天涯淪落一庸醫/此行祇為虛名誤，失腳誰能早日知/流水萍蹤遊子恨，秋風蕁膾楚囚悲/近來生活無須問，贏得傷離幾首詩。Quoted in Yizhong Zhou, "Shilun Lai He de 'lunshi' shi," in Yilin Shi, ed. Laihe wenxue lun, shang: minjian, gudian wenxue lunshu (Taipei: Chenxing chuban youxian gongsi, 2016), 241–281.

subjects like Lin Jishang, whether motivated by revolutionary fervor or commercial interest, threatened to upend Yuchi's vision. These new institutions also sought to bring a new urban infrastructure to the Japanese empire's presence in Xiamen, and they would draw professionals educated in Taiwan under the colonial schooling system to staff their ranks. But like the example of Lai He, such a vision also risked exposing Taiwan sekimin to new ideological trends in China like the May Fourth Movement, which could contribute in part to their coming to see institutions in Xiamen, and indeed the entire Japanese imperial project, as nothing but a "hollow name" (*xuming*).

Chapter Three: Extraterritoriality, Property, and Personhood in the Taiwan Sekimin's Early Nanjing Decade, 1928–1933

Introduction

In the middle of the night on March 2nd, 1928, the Japanese consul in Xiamen, Sakamoto Tatsuki (坂本龍起, 1894–1969, in office 1927–1929), dispatched a group of Japanese police officers to arrest Lee Gang (李剛) and Lee Gihwan (李箕煥), two Koreans with suspected Communist leanings in hiding in the treaty-port. The two men had been on Sakamoto's radar since the previous month, when they were thought to have quietly entered the city.[276] A week before the arrest, in late February, Sakamoto had written to Japan's Prime and Foreign Minister Tanaka Giichi (田中義一, 1864–1929, in office 1927–1929), stating the difficulty of monitoring the comings and goings of Xiamen's Japanese colonial subjects, mainly from Taiwan, because of the port's many maritime connections to Southeast Asia. Sakamoto hoped to confirm the identities of the new arrivals, who were increasingly brazen in delivering public speeches advocating Korean independence and other such "threatening" topics. Suspecting trouble, Sakamoto followed up with the Foreign Minister four days later, noting the seemingly sudden increase in the number of Koreans in the city, and speculating that they might have arrived from Shanghai or Guangdong, where the Guomindang (GMD, or Chinese Nationalist) government had intensified its suppression of Communists in April and December of the previous year (in a policy known as *qingdang* or "party purification"). On February 27th, the Foreign Ministry received a letter from the Shanghai consul, Yada Shichitarō (矢田七太郎 1879–1957, in office

276. "1 Shōwa san nen ni gatsu nijūsan nichi kara Shōwa san nen nigatsu nijūhachi nichi," part of "Amoi Chōsenjin taiho jiken narabini jiken ni yoru hai-Nichi kankei ikken tsuketari Teikoku keisatsukan no kaihōchi oyobi kaihōchi gai ni okeru Teikoku shinmin hanzainin ni kan suru senrei chōsa kankei," JACAR B02031470700.

1923–1929), who confirmed that although Lee Gang was a member of the provisional Korean government in exile in Shanghai formed after the March First anti-colonial uprising and independence movement but not recognized by world powers, and had participated in insubordinate (*futei*) activities, he had not committed a crime that warranted arrest.[277] Despite the lack of any clear transgressions on Lee's part, the police chief of the Korea Government-General responded to the Foreign Ministry's notification the following day, confirming the Lees' identities and requesting the arrest and extradition to Korea of both Lee Gang and Lee Gihwan under the charge of political thought crimes.[278] The Japanese empire-wide Peace Preservation Law, passed in 1925, sought to prosecute ideological dissidents including socialists, communists, and anti-colonial nationalists on the charge of threatening the national body politic (*kokutai*), and was increasingly used by Japanese consuls in China to brand such radicals as criminals. Acting under the cover of darkness so as not to arouse the suspicion of any witnesses, Sakamoto arrested the two men and prepared to have them sent to Korea for investigation and trial.

To the surprise of Sakamoto and others in the Foreign Ministry, the arrest of the two Lees set off a string of boycotts in Xiamen, renewed the anti-Japanese movement that had recurred periodically in Xiamen and nationwide since the 1910s and whose members had escalated its impact by adopting the tactics of strikes and boycotts, and provoked a debate between the Foreign Ministry and the ambitious, centralizing GMD government over the jurisdictional scope of Japanese police authority, the validity of Japanese law on Chinese territory, and the citizenship claims of Japanese colonial subjects in the treaty-ports. Although all

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277. JACAR B02031470700. "Futei" was a catch-all term for a specifically racialized Korean criminality; see Chapter 2.

278. JACAR B02031470700.

of these issues had existed previously, GMD centralization and its attempts to control economic life and extend its legal jurisdiction gave them renewed fervor. The arrests show the new pressures on the Japanese Foreign Ministry and the Taiwan sekimin in China after the GMD consolidation of power in 1928, and reveal the degree to which anti-Japanese policies divided factions of the GMD in Xiamen, which affected the position of the Taiwan sekimin in the city. Above all, Sakamoto explained in a letter to Foreign Minister Tanaka on March 6th, the consul hurried to arrest the two because he feared trouble from the arrival of Koreans—especially those connected to the anticolonial and Communist movements in China—could signal a new tendency among Japanese colonial subjects in China to use Xiamen as the base for left-leaning political activity.[279] Sakamoto's concern exhibits the persistent suspicions of Japanese bureaucrats, which were shared by elite Taiwan sekimin as well, that after 1928 left-leaning politics would find a welcome among the more anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist factions in the GMD.

By the early 1930s, the Japanese consuls in the treaty-ports played many roles: they guaranteed property rights, adjudicated criminal and civil cases involving resident imperial subjects, including the Taiwan sekimin, and, after the passing of the Peace Preservation Law in 1925, prosecuted political and thought crimes. In this chapter I examine three crises—land disputes, a criminal murder case, and persecution of ideological dissent—precipitated by the GMD rise to power to reveal how the jurisdictional contestation over Taiwan sekimin expanded the attempts by Japanese consuls to exercise authority over sekimin subjects. Each type of crisis produced a different sort of paper trail in the Japanese diplomatic archive: land disputes in

279. "2 Shōwa san nen san gatsu mikka kara Shōwa san nen san gatsu tōka," part of "Amoi Chōsenjin taiho jiken narabini jiken ni yoru hai-Nichi kankei ikken tsuketari Teikoku keisatsukan no kaihōchi oyobi kaihōchi gai ni okeru Teikoku shinmin hanzainin ni kan suru senrei chōsa kankei," JACAR B02031470800

petitions to the consul, murder cases in criminal investigations, and ideological dissent in consular surveillance of the political activities of its Taiwanese subjects and collection of their suspect publications. Examining the politics of archival formation and the attendant anxieties of diplomatic officials also shows how these incidents and how they came to the consuls' attention was part of an effort on their party to render Taiwan sekimin social and political life legible to them. In the case of a petition, Taiwan sekimin demanded the consuls' attention, while in the case of surveillance over ideological dissidents, consular officials made on and claims over its subjects. Examining these cases together despite their difference provides a window into understanding how GMD centralization generated anxiety among the Japanese consuls over their ability to render legible their sekimin subjects, which changed the nature of consular power over sekimin and transformed the relationship of Taiwan sekimin to Japanese consuls.

If the three cases I discuss fall into the juridical category of "Taiwan sekimin" which was the basis on which the Japanese consuls claimed authority, their divergent causes and outcomes demonstrate that, on the individual level, it was difficult if not impossible to speak of a juridical "Taiwanese" identity in the treaty-ports. To speak of a singular "Taiwanese" reaction to the conjuncture of the 1930s is a fallacy of methodological nationalism. To avoid this, I juxtapose three different reactions to GMD centralization, each of which implicated the infrastructural and bureaucratic capabilities of the Japanese consuls, yet in different ways. At a time when other imperial powers, in particular, the British Empire, were slowly withdrawing from the south China treaty-ports, Japanese diplomats there faced pressure—from their own interests and those of Taiwanese alike—to expand their infrastructural and bureaucratic capabilities.[280]

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280. For a diplomatic account of the withdrawal of the British Empire from south China see Edmund S. K. Fung, *The Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat: Britain's South China Policy, 1924–1931* (New York: Oxford University Press,

The GMD rise to power in 1928 proved to be an important conjuncture in the history of the Taiwan sekimin in the south China treaty-ports and for Japanese imperialist ambitions in China more broadly. On an administrative level, GMD centralization of authority sought to challenge existing practices relating to which people and which economic and political activities fell within the jurisdiction of the Japanese consuls and what the legal bases and spatial boundaries of that authority were. Chinese ambitions were bolstered by the new GMD diplomatic policy of "revolutionary diplomacy," (*geming waijiao*) which entailed adopting a proactive stance in making demands and negotiating with foreign powers on an equal basis.[281] In practice, this amounted to challenging what the Japanese Foreign Ministry, aided by the threat of military action, had come to view as extraterritorial rights guaranteed by treaty: namely, police authority over, and the sanctity of private property rights of, Taiwan sekimin in China.

An examination of the resulting jurisdictional politics in the "legally pluralist" spaces of the treaty-ports reveals that these Sino-Japanese contestations were constitutive—not marginal—elements of defining, upholding, and in some cases extending claims to sovereignty over land and subjects both for the Chinese republic and the Japanese empire. As historical sociologist Jaeeun Kim has shown in her study of transborder ethnic Korean populations in Northeast Asia, the institutional circumstances and infrastructural capacities of states to make claims on the subjects over which it claims jurisdiction are as important as the ideological bases upon which it

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1991). The British Foreign Office negotiated a peaceful reversion of the tiny British concession in Xiamen (not to be confused with the International Settlement on Gulangyu) in 1930.

281. On "revolutionary diplomacy," see En-han Lee, *Beifa qian hou de "geming waijiao," 1925–1931* (Nangang, Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindai shi yanjiusuo, 1993). This policy was adopted after the May Thirtieth Movement of 1925, which involved the Shanghai Municipal Police under British control shooting on Chinese protesters and which sparked a series of nationwide anti-foreign protesters. It remained the general ethos of the Chinese Foreign Ministry until the Manchurian Incident in 1931.

attempts to do so.[282] Although debates over jurisdiction and sovereignty were not new—they had existed since the treaty-ports' inception—the institutional changes of the 1930s renewed them and gave them new force. The institutional and ideological nature of jurisdictional claim-making by the Republic of China and the Japanese empire was indivisible, not only because states required infrastructural capacity to pursue ideological claims, but because of the different ways in which the Japanese Foreign Ministry and the GMD party-state defined the Taiwan sekimin as juridical subjects. Over time, these jurisdictional contestations led to an expansion in capacity for both the Japanese consuls and local officials, thus setting the stage for further conflicts. The problem rested in the irreconcilable differences in how Japanese consuls and local Chinese officials determined the scope of jurisdictional authority, over both individuals and territory, and the implications these definitions of jurisdiction had for the scope of sovereignty.

Increasing GMD challenges to Japanese authority amounted to a slow and piecemeal, if not *de facto*, abolition of extraterritoriality during the 1930s. The GMD rise to power was also accompanied by significant ideological transformation, which informed which individuals and activities were deemed Chinese and therefore subject to Chinese jurisdiction. The GMD was determined to establish the nation as the basis for organizing economic and political activity, but the case of the Taiwan sekimin in south China reveals that the 1930s also witnessed an ideological departure from earlier practices—local to the Japanese presence in the south China treaty-ports—regarding who exactly constituted this national people.[283] Scholars of colonial

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282. Jaeeun Kim, *Contested Embrace: Transborder Membership Politics in Twentieth-Century Korea* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016).

283. For an examination of the effects of these politics on economic activities and their legality across the treaty-ports, see Philip Thai, *China's War on Smuggling: Law, Economic Life and the Making of the Modern State, 1842-1965* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018). On a national economy and the nation as the unit of economic planning, see Margherita Zanasi, *Saving the Nation: Economic Modernity in Republican China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006). On changes in political activity, see Brian Tsui, *China's Conservative Revolution: The*

Taiwan and the Japanese empire tend to overlook the rise of the GMD and the significance of its ideological and jurisdictional claims over the Taiwanese in shaping the trajectory of Japanese power on the mainland in the 1930s, when consuls sought to expand their jurisdictional authority through consular police to meet challenges from the GMD and at times drew on the threat of military intervention to back their claims.[284]

At the same time, these administrative and ideological transformations were not top-down *fait accompli*, but were met with contestation and negotiation by the Taiwan sekimin. Elite Taiwan sekimin who found their property expropriated during the rapid urban transformation of Xiamen in 1929–30, a group which included local Chinese who had registered as sekimin such as the tobacco merchant Zeng Houkun, appealed to the local Japanese consul as a last resort to intervene on their behalf as Japanese subjects, where before they had the local social and political standing to resolve conflicts themselves.[285] The opposite was true for some left-leaning Taiwanese students and activists in South China, who appealed to local GMD party authorities to protect them as Chinese subjects, in the face of Japanese claims that they were in fact sekimin

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Quest for a New Order, 1927–1949 (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

284. Wang Tay-sheng argues that the rise of Taiwanese reliance on consular adjudication reflected the Taiwanese opinion that the Japanese legal system was rational and modern, and reinforced the sense of a distinct (legal and ethnic) identity among Taiwanese vis-à-vis Chinese in the treaty-ports. He characterizes this separate identity as an experience of a distinct "nationality" (*guoji*). Tay-sheng Wang, "Riben tongzhi xia Taiwan ren guanyu guoji de falü jingyan: yi Taiwan yu Zhongguo zhi jian kuajie de renkou liudong wei zhongxin," *Taiwan shi yanjiu* 20, no. 3 (September 2013): 43–123. The policy of non-intervention of Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijūrō (in office 1924–27 and 1929–1931) is conventionally juxtaposed with the more "proactive" willingness of military man Foreign Minister Tanaka Giichi (in office 1927–1929), who came to office during the Shōwa Financial Crisis, to dispatch troops to back Japanese interests in China, as he did in the Jinan Incident (May 1928) during Chiang's Northern Expedition. For an examination of the continuities between these two approaches to foreign policy in the classic account of Japanese diplomacy during the 1920s, see Iriye, *After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921–1931*.

285. The Taiwan Association came to play an important role in mediating local conflicts among Taiwan sekimin and between sekimin and local residents in the 1920s when Xiamen fell under the rule of warlord Zang Zhiping, who controlled Xiamen from 1917 to 1924. On Zang, see James A. Cook, "Bridges to Modernity: Xiamen, Overseas Chinese, and Southeast Coastal Modernization, 1843–1937" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, San Diego, 1998), 132.

guilty of violating colonial laws forbidding "thought crimes," even though they lived outside the formal territorial jurisdiction of the Japanese treaty-ports (in this case, Zhangzhou, a city around thirty five miles inland from Xiamen along the Jiujiang River). More than a story of state attempts to centralize devolved local authority, these jurisdictional conflicts emerged from contestation over the juridicial definition of "Taiwanese" in China.

In both cases, the claims of the Japanese consul to jurisdiction over Taiwanese subjects was based on an understanding of personal law which gave the consul authority over *individuals* registered as sekimin in China, in and outside the treaty-ports. GMD authorities, in contrast, understood Japanese exercise of legal jurisdictional and police authority to be defined in terms of *territory* and circumscribed by the spatial boundaries of the Japanese treaty-port concessions. Increasingly GMD authorities argued that Taiwanese outside the Japanese concessions were subject to Chinese law, not only because they were on Chinese soil, but because they were, in a revival of a bloodline interpretation of citizenship, Chinese citizens. Such an understanding of citizenship law recalls the view of provincial administrator Hu Ruilin in 1916 that Taiwan sekimin was in fact an illogical category with no standing in treaty or international law. These transformations were political and ideological, and set the stage for jurisdictional conflicts in the 1930s after the GMD rise to power.

The Arrest of the Lees and Conflicting Claims over Land and Subjects

After Sakamoto arrested the two Lees, he suspected that the incident might become a cause celebre for a proxy war between the various factions of the GMD trying to exert their influence in the city. This reflected one historian's observation that accusations of being insufficiently anti-Japanese often served the basis of intra-party critiques and became

increasingly potent as various leaders and factions sought to control the future of national policy.[286] Though the proximate cause of the incident was two Korean subjects, the underlying disagreement was rooted in jurisdictional conflict about authority over the space of Xiamen and its Taiwanese residents. When the local GMD Party learned that the two had been arrested, it immediately claimed that the Japanese consular police did not have jurisdiction over the "free area" of the treaty-port—meaning Xiamen island, where the majority of the city's Taiwanese lived—and should have first informed the municipal authorities of their intention to arrest someone.[287] Sakamoto's suspicion deepened when Zhang Zhen, a major general in the National Revolutionary Army (Guominjun), arrived in the city from neighboring Zhangzhou. Sakamoto feared the Party and Zhang would vie for control over the city, displacing GMD navy Admiral Lin's precarious alliance with overseas Chinese from the colonial Southeast Asian cities of Manila, Penang, Singapore, and Penang who had "returned" to settle first on Gulangyu island and later in Xiamen itself in the late 1910s and early 1920s, and had come to dominate the Xiamen Municipal Council by the mid 1920s. This alliance had created the stability for the Xiamen municipal government and undertake new urban development projects to remake the city.

Anti-Japanese protests broke out on March 9th, 1928 led by the Anti-Japanese Committee for the Protection of National Sovereignty (*Fan-Ri guoquan yonghu weiyuan hui*), a coalition organized by local students, followed by a transport stoppage the next day between the

286. This was especially the case after the Manchurian Incident of 1931, when You-Li Sun identifies a shift in Chinese diplomatic and popular outlook from anti-imperialism to anti-Japanese politics. You-Li Sun, *China and the Origins of the Pacific War, 1931–41* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).

287. Here the distinction is between the general "free area" of the treaty-port and a solely Japanese concession, which did not exist in Xiamen. There had been plans for a Japanese concession in Xiamen near Hutou Mountain, but they never materialized.

main island of Xiamen and the small offshore island of Gulangyu, home to the International Settlement and the Japanese consulate. Anti-Japanese protests led by local students were not new. Xiamen experienced its share of protests throughout the 1920s and particularly during the Northern Expedition (1926–28), when Chiang led his army north to eliminate his enemies and consolidate control over most of eastern China. Protesters directed their attention to the Japanese during this period because the consul at the time, Inoue Torajirō (井上寅次郎 in office 1924–1927) opposed the attempts by the municipal government, controlled by GMD Admiral Lin and elite overseas Chinese in the municipal council, to expropriate land owned by Taiwan sekimin to rebuild roads in Xiamen. Anti-Japanese activity reached fever pitch in Xiamen on May 9th, 1926, the anniversary of Japan issuing the Twenty-One Demands and now branded as "National Humiliation Day." The protests following the arrests of the Lees saw the first instance of transport stoppages in Xiamen, which effectively isolated the Japanese consulate on Gulangyu island from the majority of the sekimin living in Xiamen city. Under these conditions, intelligence reports from the Japanese navy of rumors that Chinese planned to attack the Japanese consul's branch police office on Xiamen island, which had been established by Yuchi's efforts in 1916, and prevent Taiwan sekimin from taking refuge on Gulangyu, caused particular concern for Japanese officials.

The GMD consolidation of power over diplomatic affairs meant that any hope of resolving the issue lay in negotiations with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was a marked shift from earlier patterns of local resolution. Northern China was still not fully under GMD control and the Japanese envoy to China was based in Beijing, so negotiation on the Japanese side fell instead to the consuls in Shanghai and Nanjing, and on the Chinese side to three diplomats newly appointed as of that month, Huang Fu (黃郛, 1880–1936), Tang Yueliang (唐悅

良, 1888–1956), and Yuan Liang (袁良).[288] The Shanghai consul, Yada Shichitarō (矢田七太郎, 1879–1957 in office 1923–1929), seemed particularly sympathetic to the Chinese cause, relaying Huang's opinion on the 11th that in order to prevent future infringements of Chinese sovereignty, the Xiamen consul should consult Chinese officials before making any arrests.[289] In Huang's view, the arrest constituted the unlawful exercise of Japanese police authority and Japanese law on Chinese territory. The dispute thus implicated a central disagreement over extraterritoriality: did Japanese jurisdiction, in a system of personal law, apply to all Japanese imperial subjects in the treaty-ports regardless of where they were located, as Japanese officials understood it? Or was Japanese police authority circumscribed in a system of territorial law to Japanese concessions in treaty-ports (which Xiamen lacked) and subordinate to Chinese jurisdiction in the treaty-ports, as Chinese officials understood it?[290]

Sakamoto responded to Huang's claims the same day, explaining that in the past the Xiamen consul had arrested Japanese subjects in Xiamen without the prior permission of Chinese authorities, and had never acceded to Chinese requests for extradition.[291] "There is no documentary evidence to be furnished; we are [just] following the example of each consul exercising the rights of consular jurisdiction," Sakamoto said, defending his actions. He wrote

288. "3 Shōwa san nen san gatsu jūichi nichi kara Shōwa san nen san gatsu hatsuka," part of "Amoi Chōsenjin taiho jiken narabini jiken ni yoru hai-Nichi kankei ikken tsuketari Teikoku keisatsukan no kaihōchi oyobi kaihōchi gai ni okeru Teikoku shinmin hanzainin ni kan suru senrei chōsa kankei," JACAR B02031470900.

289. JACAR B02031470900

290. In other treaty-ports, such as Shanghai, it was the Chinese residents who lived within international or imperial-power-specific concessions, rather than "foreign" subjects (as the Taiwan sekimin, as Japanese imperial subjects, were) living outside designated concessions among local Chinese residents. The majority of Xiamen's residents with non-Japanese foreign status (primarily British subjects), furthermore, lived in the International Settlement on Gulangyu, a small island removed from Xiamen city proper, which had its own Mixed Court modeled on that at Shanghai over which the Gulangyu Municipal Council unambiguously exercised jurisdiction and sovereignty.

291. I have not examined consular records from the 1920s in enough detail to determine the number of previous requests by Chinese authorities for extraditing suspects for Chinese prosecution.

the Foreign Minister again the following day, reporting a rumor that Lee Gihwan had naturalized as a Chinese citizen. Though Sakamoto wrote this off as an attempt by the anti-Japanese committee to stoke fear and move the local Party to action, the claim implied that Sakamoto's arrest was not only an infringement on Chinese territorial sovereignty, but also the illegal exercise of authority over a Chinese citizen. Sakamoto concluded his letter to Tanaka by noting the increasingly disparate interests of the Japanese empire and the other imperial powers in Xiamen, accusing the anti-Japanese committee of trying to take advantage of an emerging trend of the powers' withdrawing from south China. Indeed, leaders of the anti-Japanese protests to the consul's opposition to urban infrastructure construction projects had not targeted the other foreign powers in Xiamen. The city's other foreigners primarily lived on Gulangyu island and were far fewer in number, and it was only Japan who had large numbers of subjects, the Taiwan sekimin, with property holdings on Xiamen island. In Sakamoto's view, informing Chinese authorities before any arrests would diminish Japanese consular rights—especially, as in the case of Lee Gihwan, if the person in question had personal ties to the GMD Party—and be seen as a concession to anti-Japanese activity. On a more abstract level, Sakamoto worried that it would signal the first step of abolishing extraterritoriality and would "have a grave impact on the state of affairs of the almost 10,000 Taiwanese living in the city"—though whether by rendering them subject to Chinese authority, or by paving the way for the possibility of their participation in anti-Japanese politics, he did not mention.

March 12th, the third anniversary of Sun Yat-sen's death, saw the escalation of demands from the anti-Japanese committee, which demanding a break in economic relations with Japan, a Japanese admission of guilt for wrongly arresting the Lees, and their extradition to Chinese

control.[292] But Japanese naval intelligence reported that most Chinese merchants did not share the sentiments of the anti-Japanese committee, lending credence to Sakamoto's suspicion that the committee lacked popular support. Reports from the Shantou and Guangzhou consuls in the following days confirmed that the protests had not spread to neighboring treaty-ports. All this must have confirmed for Sakamoto that local authorities' refusal to suppress anti-Japanese protests was part of a larger scheme to use the protests as a threat and as a bargaining chip, since the anti-Japanese committee demanded full capitulation before taking any action. Huang Fu, the Chinese Foreign Minister, also placed hope for resolution in Sakamoto's finding a way to assuage popular sentiment, demonstrating the persistence of some autonomy for local consuls to resolve local issues. But the GMD's Chief Consul Zhang Qun (張群), in negotiations with the Nanjing consul, confirmed that the Chinese Foreign Ministry held the view that Sakamoto's actions were unlawful, a position which continued to trouble the Japanese bureaucrats. Refusing to give in to the demand to extradite the two Koreans, Sakamoto prepared for a war of wills, deciding that enduring the situation was the only hope for resolution.[293]

It appeared that the anti-Japanese committee was also committed to the long game. The strike continued nearly two full weeks longer, when it turned violent. The local police force tasked with patrolling the seas opened fire on boats attempting to transport foreigners, including Taiwanese, between Xiamen and Gulangyu. Under these conditions, the anti-Japanese committee doubled down on its demand that the Japanese consul close the "branch office" of the consular police force on Xiamen island, which Sakamoto maintained was merely a "dormitory" to house

292. The local GMD Party was involved in this committee, but the national Party was wary of letting its activities get out of hand out of fear of provoking a Japanese response.

293. "4 Shōwa san nen san gatsu nijūni nichi kara Shōwa san nen san gatsu nijūroku nichi," part of "Amoi Chōsenjin taiho jiken narabini jiken ni yoru hai-Nichi kankei ikken tsuketari Teikoku keisatsukan no kaihōchi oyobi kaihōchi gai ni okeru Teikoku shinmin hanzainin ni kan suru senrei chōsa kankei," JACAR B02031471000.

the police officers and their dependents. In Sakamoto's view, maintaining a standing consular police presence on Xiamen was critical for preserving order over the island's Taiwanese residents. The anti-Japanese committee, in contrast, viewed the station on Chinese territory as a flagrant violation of national sovereignty. The escalation of violence led Sakamoto to float the idea of a self-defense force composed of the Taiwanese residents (a proposal summarily rejected by the Foreign Minister, who said it would "cause more problems than it would solve," likely because it would entail empowering a civilian force of questionable loyalty with paramilitary authority) and prompted both the Taiwan Association and the Japanese Residents Association to voice their opinions to the Foreign Minister as well.[294]

The Taiwan Association saw the committee as controlled by a minority of left-wing activists with outsized influence in the city, and accused these leftist groups of ignoring Sino-Japanese treaty agreements that the Association understood to permit Japanese exercise of police authority in the treaty-ports. The Association further decried the anti-Japanese committee's proposal to break economic relations with Japan as unlawful. Anti-Japanese activity in the city thus led the elite leaders of the Taiwan Association to ally with the consul to oppose any disruption to economic activity, which both the Association and Sakamoto understood to be a left-wing plot hatched by a radical minority. Sakamoto had previously reported that the sampans and porters at the dock had joined in the strike, which imperiled the transport of goods and revealed the reliance of Xiamen's Taiwan sekimin merchants on local labor.[295] The sekimin's allegiance to and reliance on the consul, particularly of elites, would only grow in the following

294. JACAR B02031471000.

295. JACAR B02031470900.

years, supplanting interpersonal connections with local Chinese elites as factions within the local GMD became increasingly anti-Japanese.

The continued threat of violence gave urgency to the ongoing negotiations in Shanghai and Nanjing between Chinese Foreign Ministry officials and the Shanghai consul Yada, who, on the 25th, wrote to Japanese Foreign Minister Tanaka Giichi with a solution. The Chinese officials demanded Sakamoto's resignation, blaming him for both the initial illegal arrest and for extraditing the two Koreans while deliberations continued, which made him, in the opinion of the Chinese officials, an untrustworthy partner. Yada also reported that Chinese diplomatic officials would not budge when it came to opposing the (Japanese) right of arrest in the treaty-port; the Chinese officials demanded that they be included in any such future actions. Chinese officials were perhaps emboldened by a petition sent to them a few days earlier by the anti-Japanese committee in Xiamen, which had brought the demand to close the police branch office to their attention. The new approach of "revolutionary diplomacy" adopted by Chinese diplomats that aimed to negotiate with foreign powers on an equal basis made it, in Yada's view, "impossible to force the GMD Government to recognize a practice that they publicly did not approve of," demonstrating the power of public opinion in keeping the GMD accountable to the aims of such an approach to diplomacy. In Shanghai, consul Yada had already adopted the practice of requesting the understanding if not support of the local Chinese police or military officials before conducting an arrest in areas where Chinese resided. Perhaps with this knowledge in mind, the Chinese negotiators were prepared to pressure the Shanghai consul to press the Japanese Foreign Ministry to adopt the local practice nationwide.

And so the next day, Japan's Foreign Minister Tanaka accepted the plan discussed by China's Foreign Minister Huang and consul Yada: Tanaka conceded that the arrest had been

conducted in accordance with existing practice (thereby exculpating Sakamoto and saving him from dismissal), but promised to involve Chinese officials in the future. That, in Tanaka's view, Chinese officials were reinterpreting the Sino-Japanese treaty—and perhaps, as Sakamoto conjectured all along, that Chinese officials were taking the first steps to overturn the system of extraterritoriality and consular jurisdiction—made clarifying the specifics of the treaty an urgent task. For the time being, Tanaka demanded that Koreans and other Japanese subjects (i.e. Taiwanese) not be allowed into the GMD or to naturalize as Chinese citizens, and sought to make common cause with the GMD by proposing cooperation in pursuing an anti-Communist policy. Allowing local groups like the anti-Japanese committee to draw out the strike and giving their more radical views a platform bespoke an "unfavorable trend."

Tanaka was measured in the final version of the plan he adopted and communicated to the China consuls, but the portions Tanaka struck from his original draft in his final communication reveal underlying tensions that would characterize Sino-Japanese relations in Xiamen and the position of the Taiwanese in the city through the following years.[296] Although Tanaka ultimately committed to informing Chinese officials of an arrest, this seems to have been a begrudging concession: he initially demanded the maintenance of Japanese police rights in the open treaty-ports, and not only in the Japanese concessions, all of which were located in minor treaty-ports.[297] Tanaka shared Sakamoto's suspicion that the Chinese Foreign Ministry was working informally (and unilaterally) to engineer a reversal of the unequal treaties, and he feared

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296. Tanaka's concessions and his changes to his original draft support the observation of Iriye that Tanaka was not as much of a "hard line" diplomat as some historians have made him out to be. Iriye, *After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921–1931*.

297. The treaty-ports with Japanese concessions were Tianjin, Hankou, Hangzhou, Suzhou, and Shashi. None of the south China treaty ports (Fuzhou, Xiamen, Shantou), nor Shanghai, by far the most important port for Japanese trade, had Japanese concessions.

the trend of the national-level GMD's permitting—opportunistically, he suggested—the use of violence by local groups vying for power to advance anti-foreign, and particularly anti-Japanese, aims. In the following days, Tanaka wrote to the other China consuls to ask about existing practices for arresting Japanese subjects; in no other treaty-ports had consuls informed local officials before conducting arrests.[298] Through Chinese negotiation, and because of the authority of the Shanghai consul in the Japanese Foreign Ministry, Tanaka had committed to a major change in policy.

In Xiamen itself, the city witnessed further escalation of conflict after the settlement. At the height of negotiations, Yada, in Shanghai, sounded the alarm about rapidly deteriorating public order and rising public panic in Xiamen, appraised of the situation by his interlocutor Huang in Nanjing. Japanese naval intelligence on the ground, however, maintained that the claims of the violence and panic were greatly exaggerated, suggesting that hyperbole had pushed Huang and Yada to seek a resolution. The results of the negotiation, however, led various groups in the city to voice again their support for severing economic relations with Japan, with some turning to violence, which the local Chinese police struggled to contain. A coalition of labor, merchant, and student groups in Xiamen called for a total ban on Japanese products on the 1st; they received trans-regional backing the following day from the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce, which accused the GMD government of caving in to Japan.[299] In response, the

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298 "10 Tsuketari kaihōchi oyobi kaihōchi gai ni okeru Teikoku shinmin hanzainin taiho ni kansuru senrei kankei," part of "Amoi Chōsenjin taiho jiken narabini jiken ni yoru hai-Nichi kankei ikken tsuketari Teikoku keisatsukan no kaihōchi oyobi kaihōchi gai ni okeru Teikoku shinmin hanzainin ni kan suru senrei chōsa kankei," JACAR B02031471600.

299. It is worth noting that, according to a report by the Guangzhou consul, the Guangzhou Chamber of Commerce had "crushed a proposal" by the Xiamen Chamber to express support for the strike in late March (March 26th).

central Party, fearing an escalation of conflict, doubled down on its position and ordered the Xiamen GMD Party office to reorganize Party affairs, which led to the local party's dismissal of Li Hanqing, the head of the party's anti-Japanese faction.[300] Seeking to gain control of the situation, Admiral Lin Guogeng ordered local newspapers to stop publishing anti-Japanese articles the following day. This did not stop a Taiwanese student group in Shanghai from publishing an acerbic critique of the incident, which they likened to other Japanese atrocities and placed within a larger Marxist framework to condemn Japanese imperialism:

> "Japanese imperialism is exceedingly violent and barbaric, oppressing Taiwan and Korea and destroying China. In Taiwan and Korea they arbitrarily plunder and commit atrocities, and in Xiamen they have arrested a Korean comrade. The atrocity of infringing on [China's] national sovereignty in Xiamen, and crossing borders to arrest a Taiwanese revolutionary in Shanghai are one and the same. To our chagrin, just as Japanese imperialism is on the decline, [they] use a tiny minority of ruffian Korean comrades in Manchuria, and in Xiamen the most backward minority of Taiwan rōnin subvert our front lines, alienating Chinese, Taiwanese, and Korean people from one another. According to the newspaper reports, Japanese imperialism is using a small minority of Taiwanese ruffians to prevent the severing of [economic] relations with Japan in Xiamen. We deeply believe that we must collectively struggle with the comrades of Xiamen and the whole country."

It was only under threat of Communist subversion of the anti-Japanese committee that Admiral Lin took action.[301] The situation unfolded as Tanaka had feared, that GMD inaction in Xiamen would lead to Communists' coopting anti-Japanese sentiment to push for more radical change. Sakamoto wrote to Tanaka on the 11th, complaining about the consequences of what he

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300. Anti-foreign riots in Nanjing in 1927 during the Northern Expedition that targeted foreign individuals and businesses led Britain and the United States to fire on the city, land troops there, and demand compensation from the GMD government. The GMD blamed radical factions of the GMD and the CCP, then their allies (though they would be purged the next month), for the protests. For the many incidents that took place during the Northern Expedition, see Hans J. Van de Ven, *War and Nationalism in China, 1925–1945* (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003).

301. Japanese naval intelligence reported that Lin got wind of Communists entering the city on the 9th.

viewed as Lin's opportunism. As soon as Lin realized the diminishing returns of the boycott, he, too, moved to pressure the Party to quash its anti-Japanese leftist elements. Admiral Lin and the Japanese consuls shared a fear of the perceived specter of Communist subversion, both within the local GMD Party and, particularly for the Japanese consuls, among Taiwanese Communists living in nearby treaty-ports. Attempts by Chinese officials to circumscribe the authority of the Japanese consular police to the treaty-ports proper, moreover, would constrain the consuls' ability to identify these Taiwanese Communists and preempt subversion, leading to more tensions between them. In the view of Consul Sakamoto, any tolerance by Chinese officials of anti-Japanese protests were opportunistic attempts by leaders such as Lin to foment disorder to gain authority over the city. Such a risk was not worth taking, in the view of Sakamoto, who believed that such a strategy would inevitably lead to radical forces coopting the anti-Japanese movement to further escalate tension in the city.

By exerting increasing pressure on the Japanese consuls and attempting what seemed to be a piecemeal recovery of Chinese sovereignty over the treaty-ports, the Chinese Foreign Ministry revealed the tensions inherent in the existing system of jurisdiction over foreign subjects in China. This tension was especially pronounced in Xiamen, where Taiwan sekimin tended to live in mixed residence among local Chinese. As Sakamoto wrote to Foreign Minister Tanaka shortly after the decision to adopt the plan negotiated between the Shanghai consul Yada and Chinese Foreign Minister Huang, "the plan…takes into consideration the position of the Nanjing government, but unlike the area of Chinese residence (*Shina-machi*) in Shanghai, in Xiamen the Japanese subjects and the Chinese live together.[302] They have many different types

302. Here Sakamoto uses the term "naichijin" (内地人), usually used to refer to Japanese from the home islands, but

of relationships and so it is truly difficult for us to enumerate them one by one."[303] Though Sakamoto deferred delineating a "basic policy" to a later date, he recognized the possibility that future negotiations—likely involving the Shanghai consul, who would be using their knowledge of that city—could lead to a policy potentially inapplicable if not deleterious to the special situation in Xiamen.

Yet it was precisely the integration of Taiwan sekimin into local society and Xiamen's entrepôt economy organized around commodity trading, rather than manufacturing as in Shanghai, that the consul identified as having shielded them from the boycotts of 1928. Perhaps unlike Japanese economic interests in Guangzhou or Shanghai organized around textile factories which could serve as physical targets for boycotts and direct action, in Xiamen, the organization of the city's economy around commodity trade made it difficult to target "Taiwanese economic activity"—if it could be defined in such ethno-national terms at all. Therefore, at the same time that the Chinese Foreign Ministry was pressuring the position of the Taiwan sekimin in the local legal order, their integration into Xiamen's local order, and the nature of Xiamen's economy organized around import-export commodity trade, shielded the elite merchants in the treaty-port from the effects of the boycotts.

The pressure put on Japanese consular power and increasing claims by Chinese officials to the jurisdiction over Taiwanese subjects led the Xiamen consul to survey the Taiwanese residents in the treaty port. Over the next few years, the south China consuls dedicated ever more resources to surveilling, surveying, and producing studies about the Taiwan sekimin, generating

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he most likely meant Taiwanese.

303. "5 Shōwa san nen san gatsu nijūnana nichi kara Shōwa san nen san gatsu sanjūichi nichi," part of "Amoi Chōsenjin taiho jiken narabini jiken ni yoru hai-Nichi kankei ikken tsuketari Teikoku keisatsukan no kaihōchi oyobi kaihōchi gai ni okeru Teikoku shinmin hanzainin ni kan suru senrei chōsa kankei," JACAR B02031471100.

knowledge about their land- and other property-holdings, their ties with local Chinese authorities (military and civilian alike), their capability to marshal paramilitary violence, and, perhaps most importantly, their radicalization in China by left-leaning ideological currents. This knowledge was not merely sociological depiction, but rather reflected the new institutional and ideological pressures felt by the consuls, and new attempts to mobilize this knowledge to exercise more jurisdiction over sekimin in and beyond the treaty-ports.

The Local Xiamen GMD Party

After nominally centralizing authority over China in late 1927, the Nationalist Government sought to extend its power over diplomatic affairs, taking control of the resolution of conflicts that had previously been in the purview of mediation with local officials. The GMD also sought to extend its jurisdiction over local affairs through local party branches, as was especially the case in Xiamen, whose largely urban bourgeoisie population made it a prime target for the GMD's mobilization efforts. On July 15th, 1930, Xiamen consul Terajima Hirobumi (寺嶋広文, in office 1929–1931) wrote to Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijūrō (幣原喜重郎, 1872–1951, in office 1929–1931) about a newspaper clipping published by the Xiamen party branch of the GMD, proposing that the local Party punish unlawful actions by Taiwan sekimin in accordance with the laws of the Nationalist government.[304] Terajima acknowledged that Xiamen was a hotbed for "disreputable Taiwanese" (*furyō Taijin*) owing to Taiwan's proximity to Xiamen, arguing that this "naturally" led to conflicts with local Chinese. The newspaper clipping reveals attempts by the local Xiamen branch of the party to bring Taiwanese under the

304. "1 Shōwa go nen shichi gatsu jūgo nichi kara Shōwa hachi nen ichi gatsu jūroku nichi," part of "Taiwanjin kankei zakken / hogo oyobi torishimari kankei," JACAR B02031446000.

jurisdiction of the Nationalist Party, and by extension, wrest control of conflict resolution from the local police. The position of the local Party demonstrates how claims to "uphold legal rights (*faquan*) that were, in truth, the prerogative of the Party (*dang bian*)" and the assumption of authority over foreign affairs were central to the local Party's consolidation of power; As a rare example of the local Party's position regarding the sekimin, it is worth reproducing in full.[305]

> I have investigated the registered Taiwanese living in Xiamen, who routinely rely on the protection of their country of registration [Japan]: they do not obey the regulations of our Party government, to the extent that they frequently transport and sell prohibited items, oppress Chinese workers, and massacre Chinese [people]; all this they do to the extreme.
>
> As long as the registered [Taiwanese] see benefits therein, they do not hesitate to sacrifice the welfare of the people of the friendly country [the ROC]. Instead, they will do everything they can to realize their own benefits.
>
> However, our Party is confined by the scope of the law: not only does it not have the power to prevent the illegal actions of the Taiwanese before they happen, but also has no power to punish them after they happen. Every time an incident occurs involving a Taiwanese, there are negotiations to resolve it, during which they give excuses, shirk responsibilities, and protract [the negotiations]: therefore, we have never been able to reach the goal of prosecution.
>
> Furthermore, the obstinacy of the Taiwanese becomes ever more extreme throughout the process. Because the other government [Japan] sees [our government] as unwilling to take action, fearing it will imperil relations, they [Japan] give free reign to the Taiwanese. That the Taiwanese rely upon this power to bully the weak is already exceedingly clear even without Japanese instigation.
>
> As for the disputes between Chinese workers and the Taiwanese: because the workers cannot bear being mistreated by the Taiwanese, they always rush to inform the Party Government. But the Party can hardly respond because it cannot exercise direct [authority over the Taiwanese]. As a result, there is arbitration in

305. I did not realize until after finishing fieldwork in Taiwan the important role that the local and national Party and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs would play in this story in the 1920s and 1930s. Further research in diplomatic and party archives in Taipei may yield more insights.

name but not in reality, not to mention that everywhere there are people who do not accept the Party's arbitration.

[If this situation] continues like this, the Party's concern for alleviating the suffering of the people cannot be addressed. Because it is beyond the capability [of the Party] to be thorough in responding to the workers' appeals for help, the workers will be prone to the incitement of the Communists, which will play out as tragedy: there are many lessons to be learned from the red flames [of the past].

In light of the circumstances of Sino-foreign relations becoming more successful day by day, and the abrogation of extraterritoriality underway, [we] should apply the same principle to all aspects. All the Taiwanese living in the interior (*neidi*) of China should fall under the legal jurisdiction of this Party government, so as to have name accord with reality. For this purpose I am submitting this document to ask you to forward it to the central government to order the (Chinese) Foreign Ministry to present [it] to the Japanese envoy to China, [asking]: whether regarding conflicts with Chinese [those with Chinese citizenship], or the unlawful actions of the Taiwanese, [they should] all accept the arbitration of this Party government in order to uphold the legal rights that are, in truth, the prerogative of the Party.

National-level GMD prerogatives had begun to make themselves felt in Xiamen's local politics: whether in the local Party's claim to jurisdictional authority over Taiwanese, or in attempts by the Chinese Foreign Ministry to intervene in deciding the fate of the arrests of Lee Gang and Lee Gihwan as a diplomatic, if not internal, affair. Although the local GMD Party and Xiamen's elite overeas Chinese leaders often existed in an uneasy partnership—the latter suspecting the former of harboring redistributive, Communist-inflected aims for the city—they found common cause in attempts to diminish the local authority of the Taiwan sekimin there.[306]

306. Individual overseas Chinese (or overseas Chinese, a group with significant internal differentiation) collaborated and competed with Taiwan sekimin; the two categories were also by no means exclusive, with some "overseas Chinese" having taken on Taiwan sekimin status in the early 20th century. The most famous of the overseas Chinese who registered as a Taiwan sekimin was the merchant Guo Chunyang (郭春秧).

Elite Taiwanese in Xiamen and the Foreign Ministry as Protector of Private Property Rights

By late 1930, the Depression had made itself felt in Xiamen. The collapse of the rubber market in Southeast Asia, combined with the successive crashes of the gold-based European economies to which colonial Southeast Asia were tied, meant that the Overseas Chinese experienced the depression earlier than the rest of China. The ambitious projects of urban development, initiated in 1924 by Zhou Xingnan (周興南, 1885–1968), raised fever pitch by the end of the decade and resulted in the city running out of land for reclamation by the end of 1929.[307] Zhou, a native of Huiyang, Guangdong who had spent his youth in Batavia and Singapore, gained experience in civil administration under the Guangdong regional leader Chen Jiongming.[308] In 1919, Zhou became Chen's first civil administrator in Zhangzhou after Chen took control of the city in a series of military campaigns in Fujian. Seeing that Zhou was a capable administrator, Lin Erjia of the Banqiao Lin family invited Zhou to Xiamen to lead the municipal government there, where Zhou would serve as the head of the Xiamen Municipal Administrative Bureau until 1934.[309] Under Zhou's leadership, the overseas Chinese who had settled in and around Xiamen would ally with the GMD Navy (which gained control of Xiamen

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307. Cook, "Bridges to Modernity: Xiamen, Overseas Chinese, and Southeast Coastal Modernization, 1843–1937."Although Cook takes into account the role of Southeast Asia in narrating the modernization of Xiamen and southeast coastal China more broadly, his frame, drawing on Paul Cohen's "China-centered history of China," takes into account internal variations to Chinese nationalism and modernization but considers them exclusively from a bounded Chinese standpoint.

308. Cook, 292.

309. Note the role of Lin Erjia, who Yuchi mentioned was widely seen as a Taiwanese (though he did not hold Taiwan sekimin status), in inviting Zhou to Xiamen to serve as a municipal administrator and construct the city's roads at the expense of smaller-scale sekimin property holders.

in 1924) to raise funds from Southeast Asia and remake the city's urban infrastructure throughout the 1920s.

Running out of land for reclamation in 1929, however, forced the municipal government to turn to ever more extortionary methods of obtaining land; this was despite having promulgated new land laws guaranteeing ownership rights in the city to placate local elites fearful of rising left-wing power in the Nationalist government. Finally, having recovered tariff autonomy in early 1929, the Nationalist government held growing aspirations to abrogate extraterritoriality, threatening the position of merchants with foreign legal status in China, including the Taiwan sekimin. Even with the legal protection of the consul, sekimin who lost their land holdings in the 1920s found it increasingly difficult to appeal to Chinese authorities in Xiamen because of the powerful alliance between Zhou, the overseas Chinese, and the GMD Navy. There was no telling who would protect their interests if the GMD government were successful in negotiating the end to extraterritorial privileges.

It was under these changing conditions that a group of elite sekimin in the city issued a declaration asserting their property rights in the face of growing infringement by the municipal government.[310] Though it is unclear exactly to whom and through what channels the declaration was addressed, this version, written in Japanese (and ultimately ending up in the hands of the Xiamen consul), was issued in the name of the "overseas Japanese in Xiamen," (J: *Amoi nikkyō*; C: *Xiamen riqiao*) a positioning that emphasized their status as Japanese subjects while drawing on the peripatetic imagery (J: *kyō*; C: *qiao*) of the "overseas Chinese" (*kakyō*, *huaqiao*) of Xiamen. The declaration gives insight into how the sekimin understood their legal rights and

310. "5 Shōwa go nen ichi gatsu jūichi nichi kara Shōwa go nen roku gatsu jūhachi nichi," part of "Taiwanjin kankei zakken," JACAR B02031443200.

economic position in the city under the combined pressures of the world economy, local politics, and changes in Sino-foreign diplomacy in the early 1930s.

These sekimin—here an elite group of landholders including many leaders of the Taiwan Association—began the declaration by extolling the accomplishments of the Nationalist government in "improving Chinese culture, and bringing about the happiness of the residents."[311] Citing infrastructural development and improvements to the city's educational facilities and industry, the sekimin "expressed heartfelt respect" for the "new face" of the city—"along with the Chinese (national) people" (*Chūgoku kokumin*). Vaguely describing themselves as "residents" characterizes them as legitimate stakeholders in shaping the future of Xiamen, while the phrase "along with the Chinese people" positions the sekimin legally outside of but aligned with the Chinese nation-state. The sekimin go on to celebrate the Sino-Japanese relationship, and in doing so carve out a space for themselves as brokers between the two polities:

> Both the Japanese Empire and the Chinese Republic are on the world stage: if one imagines the East as a car, they [China and Japan] would form the two axles. Only through mutually leaning on and helping one another can we expect prosperity and development for either country; the ruin of one would herald the ruin of the other. The realm of the East has been entirely carried away from the Easterners: this is clearer than the light of day.[312] This is to say that the rise and fall of China is connected to the rise and fall of our empire. In the case of a grave problem, China and our empire are in the position of mutual existence and mutual prosperity (*kyōson kyōei*): they must laugh together, be happy together, be sad together, and mourn together.[313]

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311. I refer to them here as "elites" but this group should be differentiated from the super elite families examined in Chapter 1. This group, which included the tobacco merchant Zeng Houkun and others, held property and commercial interests in the city but were not nearly as powerful as the elite Lin families.

312. Literally "clearer than looking at a fire."

313. The attempts by elite sekimin to highlight similarities to and differences from local residents is reminiscent of Jun Uchida's "brokers of empire," who were Japanese settlers that at times collaborated with and at other times fiercely opposed local Korean elites in colonial Korea. As previously mentioned, Uchida's "brokers" are largely intra-imperial whereas the Taiwan sekimin are both inter- and intra-imperial.

That Japan and China could only survive through mutual economic interdependence was a cornerstone of Pan-Asianist thought in the 1920s, though this had not yet taken on its full wartime tenor, as was the implication that "the East" had been stolen by the West and could only be recovered through cooperation. Japanese diplomatic officials and Taiwanese alike had long positioned the sekimin, especially elites, as intermediaries between China and Japan, by 1930 their position in Xiamen relied on Sino-Japanese cooperation, and its language provided the framework through which sekimin advocated their important role in the city's society and economy. This was especially true as the overseas Chinese who controlled the city were moving to work with the Chinese Foreign Ministry and Overseas Chinese Chambers of Commerce in Southeast Asia to organize anti-Japanese political activities and economic boycotts.[314]

It was to the municipal administration of Xiamen that the sekimin next turned their critique: while expressing their sympathies for the desire, of the Chinese government and people alike, to abolish extraterritoriality, the sekimin emphasized above all the protection of life and property of foreign residents as the aim of responsible administration. By putting the municipal administration—by which they meant the local navy, controlled by Lin Guogeng—in opposition to the "life and property of foreign residents," perhaps the sekimin authors intended to make common cause with the Overseas Chinese, who were also subjects of foreign empires with significant real estate holdings in the city. Throughout the previous decade, the Overseas Chinese had invested in real estate and municipal construction projects, and closely collaborated with the GMD after it centralized power in 1927. This alliance was challenged by left-wing elements in the GMD party, including students and workers, who accused the Overseas Chinese of being

314. Cook, "Bridges to Modernity: Xiamen, Overseas Chinese, and Southeast Coastal Modernization, 1843–1937," 351.

foreigners wielding inordinate power in party and municipal politics.[315] That the sekimin named the municipal government, and not the overseas Chinese elites, in their critique, suggests that they were drawing on the same language and logic of effective government as protection of private property and elite interests— both a precondition of cultural and political progress—that would have appealed to a overseas Chinese audience. It suggests that the Taiwan sekimin may have been pushing the Overseas Chinese in the municipal government to intercede on their behalf and rein in the expropriating tendencies of local government, by appealing to a logic of the protection of private property.

From coastal reclamation to municipal reorganization, urban development in Xiamen had infringed on sekimin property rights. These indignities had only been magnified by a municipal government unwilling to negotiate with the Japanese consul, instead "going back and forth with their words, aimlessly pushing back the date [of negotiation], and resorting to force in destroying the property of a sekimin on Datong Road," a new major thoroughfare, which had stalled in negotiations the year before. Just the previous year, the Overseas Chinese-controlled municipal government had promulgated new land laws guaranteeing ownership. Perhaps the perception of unequal enforcement combined with a seeming disregard for diplomatic protocol had incensed the sekimin. The instances were so numerous that it was "not even worth it to enumerate them," the sekimin complained—yet this was precisely the point of the declaration, it seems, which ends with detailed descriptions of seven cases of property disputes.

The seven cases—six individual and one related to the construction of Datong Road—show that the rapid infrastructural transformation of Xiamen was beset by conflict over

315. Cook, 394.

dispossession. The disputes also illustrate that, by 1930, sekimin elites had lost their power to negotiate appeals through existing channels of personal relationships, and that even appeals as Japanese subjects through the consulate went ignored by the GMD-controlled municipal government. Whether this was a deliberate policy by Chinese authorities, or selective targeting by Chinese authorities for dispossession, is impossible to determine from this declaration alone. What is clear, however, is that the marriage of convenience between the municipal GMD and Overseas Chinese elites, described by James Cook as having facilitated Xiamen's infrastructural development, heralded the decline of sekimin power on the local level. Combined with pressure from the national GMD to abolish extraterritoriality, the sekimin were increasingly at odds not only with municipal authorities but with the policies of the Japanese Foreign Ministry as well.

Of the six individuals whose cases appear in the appeal, two of them—the tobacco merchant Zeng Houkun (曾厚坤) and Ruan Shunyong (阮順永)—headed the Taiwan Association for all but two years between 1914 and 1930; yet another, Wu Yunfu (吳蘊甫), was designated a "gentleman" by the Taiwan Government-General in 1920. These were men with institutional backing and power.[316] Zeng, Wu, and also Chen Shaowu were men who traced their immediate origins not to Taiwan but to wealthy merchant families in and around Xiamen. They had been conferred Taiwan sekimin status in an effort by the Japanese consul to broker relationships with local elites in the late Qing and early Republican periods.[317] I therefore treat

316. On the designation of "gentleman" to Wu Yunfu see "Go Unho hoka jūichimei shinshō kōfu no ken," 03057/013, Taiwan Government-General Archive (Taiwan zongdufu dang'an), Academia Historica. Chen Changfu was the head of the Taiwan Association between 1925–26. From *Amoi Taiwan kyoryūminkai hō sanjusshūnen kinen tokkan* (Xiamen: Amoi Taiwan kyoryūminkai, 1936).

317. These families often came into conflict with other Taiwanese residents of Xiamen, especially in the mid 1920s; the Taiwu (Taiwanese vs. Wu family) Incident being a prime example. The nomenclature of the incidents, assigned by the Japanese consul, suggests that, depending on the situation, members of elite families who had obtained Taiwan sekimin status were necessarily understood to be "Taiwanese." This nomenclature has persisted in Chinese literary and historical materials (*wenshi ziliao*), perhaps because they frame conflicts as "local" vs. (Japanese-supported/allied) Taiwanese, though as is clear from this example, members of these local families were also

their claims as Taiwan sekimin, and as "sojourning Japanese" in particular, as attempts to appeal to the consul on juridical, not strictly ethnic, terms. The petitioners wrote in Japanese and published the pamphlet themselves, suggesting not only that their intended audience was Japanese, but that they had the resources (financial and material) to make a printed appeal. The phrasing and nature of their petition further suggests that they had the social connections to highly educated individuals who would have been able to help them translate the pamphlet into Japanese, as none of the men involved had been educated in Japanese.

Zeng had obtained the property in question through purchase from the then Qing Dynasty naval head (*Shuishi tidu canfu*) in 1904, receiving a lease in perpetuity, as was then customary for foreigners.[318] He had paid appropriate taxes on the property, he claims—first to the Chinese department of taxation in December of 1915, and then again on September 8th, 1925, when he paid a stamp tax on the land. It was in 1927 when the GMD navy under Lin Guogeng wanted to build a coastal embankment that Zeng's problems began.[319] Though his land was initially outside the proposed embankment, Zeng, perhaps to capitalize on the development craze that was sweeping Xiamen, invested 400,000 yuan to establish a company to reclaim the shore with the owner of the adjacent plot, Chen Shaowu. Hearing that the Office of Coastal

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registered as Japanese subjects and made juridical claim to their status as Taiwan sekimin as well.

318. See Yu Chen, "'Rent-in-Perpetuity' System and Xiamen Title Deed: A Study of Sino-Anglo Land Transactions in China's Treaty Ports," in *Life in Treaty Port China and Japan*, ed. Donna Brunero and Stephanie Villalta Puig (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 185–214, which mostly focuses on Gulangyu Island. See also Yang Yu, "Remaking Xiamen: Overseas Chinese and Regional Transformation in Architecture and Urbanism in the Early 20th Century" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Hong Kong University, 2007).

319. Cook translates the office in charge of this project as the "Office of Dike Construction" (*tigong banshichu* 堤工辦事處), but it seems that the translation "coastal embankment" is more accurate for the project they were undertaking. Cook also traces the establishment of this office to September 1928, shortly after Lin Guogeng dissolved the Xiamen Municipal Council and sidelined erstwhile Overseas Chinese leaders to consolidate the council's authority under the new office, whereas Zeng's petition only gives 1927 (Minguo 16) as a vague date reference.

Embankment Construction was recruiting a contract for the work, Zeng immediately made an agreement with Chen and sent him as a representative to the office with a proposal. Chen Shaowu was a member of the Chen clan, one of the three large clans of Xiamen, and was himself a Taiwan sekimin.[320] Zeng's expectation that the intercession of a member of a locally powerful family would ensure an agreement demonstrates the web of personal relationships that sustained the power of sekimin in Xiamen.

But Zhou Xingnan refused Chen's offer, responding that, because the reclamation of Zeng's and Chen's land would require public compensation, the office itself should do it. Zeng was further disappointed by the news that the office was only offering 80,000 yuan in compensation, but begrudgingly accepted this amount, hoping that he might still find a way to have the work done by his own company. He then approached Hong Xiaochun (洪曉春), also known as Hong Hongru (洪鴻儒) and the head of the Xiamen Chamber of Commerce, asking him to intercede on his behalf. A few days later Hong returned with a reply from the office. Although the designated plan and the cost were not surprising, Zeng was shocked by the plan to include three sections, including a wharf, for public use. Zeng quickly sent Hong back to the office for clarification, realizing that if the proposal allocated land for public use he would be forced to negotiate a settlement. Hong came back with more surprising news: there was discussion of auctioning off half of the land in question to a Chaozhou capitalist from Hong Kong. A few days later, Zhou informed Hong that the land had indeed been auctioned off. Zeng was incensed: "For the office to wantonly confiscate privately owned land, especially land leased in perpetuity to a foreigner, and [treat it as] its own property, was truly extremely unlawful, and

320 This is mentioned in the report on Sino-Taiwanese armed groups, in "9 Shōwa nana nen jūichi gatsu tōka kara Shōwa nana nen jūni gatsu yokka," part of "Taiwanjin kankei zakken," JACAR B02031443600.

difficult to accept."[321] In the end, despite appealing again to yet a higher authority—Admiral Lin Guogeng himself—Zeng and Chen did not reach a solution. Lin refuted the facts of Zeng's account, and required a witness, leaving Zeng with no choice but to petition the consulate for a negotiator. For a sekimin of Zeng's stature, appealing to the Japanese consul was a last resort, attempted only after direct negotiations with the de facto ruler of the city had failed. Perhaps the written declaration to the consul was yet another attempt at petitioning the higher-level intercession of the Foreign Ministry. And even after rigorous negotiations, the Japanese consul failed to receive an immediate response, only managing to offer a resolution months later; at the time of the petition, the issue had still not been settled.

Zeng was not the only sekimin whose property claims seemed to stand in the way of the office's coastal reclamation projects. Su Yibin (蘇溢瀕) held a plot of land that was within the original reclamation plan, the cost of which was to be shouldered by the owners at the price of 120 *fu* per square *zhang*. Su—portraying himself in the declaration as a law-abiding resident—immediately went to the office to pay the reclamation fees and furnish his proof of ownership for inspection. Despite his urging, the office never accepted his payment, so he dropped the matter. Like Zeng, Su was later informed that his land had already been reclaimed, as it was seen by the office as its own property and would be sold at will at any price; to add insult to injury, the office later returned to request Su pay the reclamation fees. Although Su initially laid claim to ownership (*shoyū*) over the land, it seems that, like Zeng, Su had signed a lease for rent in perpetuity from the owner Zhuang Yuhui, with whom he had registered his claim with the Siming local court registration office in 1925. Unlike Zeng, however, Su does not seem to have had the same connections with visible institutions of power—he appears only once in leadership

321. JACAR B02031443200.

rolls of the Taiwan Association, and his account does not mention appealing to other local elites for help.[322] Instead, Su went straight to the consulate to submit a protest that, like Zeng's, did not reach resolution.

While Zeng attempted to draw on his connections with Chen Shaowu, a member of a powerful family, another petitioner, Wu Yunfu, was himself the member of such a family. Wu's account mentions no contracts for rent in perpetuity; instead, the Tongan Prefectural Government gave his holding to him in 1908. The claim of Wu's brother, Wu Keming (呉克明), is also mentioned: Keming purchased his plot from a Huang Ruyi, whose grandfather had, like Yunfu, received it from the Tongan Prefectural Government. At the time of reclamation, both Wu brothers demonstrated proof to the office that they had "absolute ownership" (*kanzen ni gyōken*) over the land.[323] Unlike the sekimin originally from Taiwan who had moved to Xiamen like Zeng, the Wu brothers had no rent in perpetuity contracts because they had not been registered as foreign "sekimin" at the time of purchase. The Wus had come into their property holdings as Chinese subjects, and were sekimin of the sort that had been conferred the status by Japanese consuls at some point during the late Qing or early Republican periods, though it is unclear whether this conferral preceded or followed their acquisition of land. Therefore, their appeals to the Japanese consul would have to rely on the Foreign Ministry's willingness to intervene, based not on the form of ownership they exercised over the land but instead on their personal status as sekimin —foreign subjects were not legally permitted to own land in China, so their claim

322. As a committee member (*iin*) in 1928.

323. Here I am translating both usufruct ownership rights (*gyōken* 業権) as conferred by a lease in perpetuity, and absolute ownership over property (*shoyūken* 所有権) as "ownership rights," though there are two terms in the Japanese that seem to correspond to the manner in which the land was obtained, and the individual's status—foreign, I.e. Taiwanese subject of Japan, or Chinese—at the time the land was obtained. On the various terms and types of Taiwanese property ownership that emerged from Okamatsu Santarō's legal studies in Taiwan, see *Taiwan shihō* (Taipei: Rinji Taiwan Kyūkan Chōsakai, 1910).

presents somewhat of a legal conundrum. Yet Wu Yunfu was left disappointed too. “Beguiled by the sudden rise in land prices along the river,” Wu said, “[the office] irrationally decided to ignore the clear rights to land and seized it, which was to renege on the officials’ previous proclamation.” Here his frustration at the discord between the municipal government’s stated commitment in April 1929 to guarantee ownership rights and his experience of having his land “helplessly seized” by the government was especially clear. In the end, the land of the two Wu brothers and also a third, Wu Shengsan, was forcibly reclaimed by the office and sold off. The GMD’s reclamation projects, while enriching those who profited from speculation in land, reduced the wealth of powerful families like the Wus, who were aligned with the Japanese consul through their sekimin status and with other sekimin through existing social networks.

For some sekimin, like Su, the GMD’s rise to power meant losing property and being left with no recourse but depending on the Japanese consul. For more elite sekimin, like Zeng, the GMD’s rise meant lost property, but more critically, missed business opportunities accompanied by diminished social capital. For all the authors of the petition, the GMD’s rise to power and the navy’s reorganization of the Overseas Chinese-dominated Xiamen Municipal Council in 1927 was a crucial turning point. Ruan Shunyong, another sekimin who lost his land in the project to widen Xiamen’s major thoroughfares, faulted the replacement of the municipal council with the Provisional Office for Road Administration (*Linshi luzheng chu*) in 1928 with the sudden “ignoring of ownership rights (*shoyūken*) and unlawful [actions].” Some sekimin, like Chen Chunting, recalled that land reclamation and excavation started suddenly and without notice. Others, like Chen Jiesong (陳捷松), recounted being initially reassured that municipal excavation would not damage ownership rights (*gyōken wo bōgai*), only to find later that their property had been sold off. Some suggested that the windfall profits gained by the municipal

government by selling off the requisitioned land was a calculated plan to raise funds and benefit from the speculation in land prices.[324] For all sekimin, though, the culprit was the GMD navy, and as the declaration made clear, their experiences were not isolated incidents but rather a calculated plot by the navy to override the property rights of foreigners.

"What, really, is the motivation behind the state of mind of the GMD navy in running such a wholly tyrannical government and [in doing so] affronting the overseas Japanese and trampling on [their/our] rights? We truly struggle to understand." The sekimin concluded their declaration by castigating the navy for the pattern of urban land reclamation taking precedence over private property. Yet they were careful to specify the navy, and not the GMD central government in Nanjing, as the target of their critique. They ended their declaration with what reads as a half-veiled threat: "If this [the disregard for sekimin's private property rights] continues, it will bring about great misfortune for China; if this truth is divulged to the great powers, who already believe the occasion [for the abolition of extraterritorial rights] is premature, it will become yet another obstacle for China. We truly cannot help but feel sorry for China."

By connecting the navy's disregard for their property rights to the conditions upon which extraterritoriality would be reversed and elevating their concerns to a matter of foreign policy and diplomacy, while avoiding direct criticism of the GMD central government—they were careful to express their opposition to any obstacles to the revision of extraterritoriality—the sekimin perhaps sought to bring their concerns to the level of the Japanese Foreign Ministry and

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324. Cook's account of the sudden real estate frenzy starting in late 1928, sparked by the spike in remittances the same year, combined with the accounting of the losses incurred by the sekimin (calculated by post-boom 1930 land values), suggest the possibility of an ad hoc attempt by the sekimin at accounting for debts with the municipal government. The Japanese consul had been drawn into many negotiations with the municipal government over land rights, but I have not been able to determine if those included the ones mentioned in the petition.

magnify their implications. Maintaining their support for the national GMD was also important to avoid alienating Overseas Chinese leaders, while the petitioners were attempting to make common cause with them against local officials. Indeed, in the closing section of the declaration, the sekimin declared that abolishing extraterritorial rights was still a distant hope in the excess of evidence of Chinese officials' lacking the conception of the rule of law and their use of force to inflict harm on "foreigners"—a derogatory form of addressing the city's overseas Chinese.

Describing the GMD as tyrannical had another implication: to drum up fear of a Communist wing in the party. The sekimin recalled an occasion in the widening of Datong Road that required expropriating sekimin residential property, when local police (*Gonganju*) interrupted negotiations between the navy and the Japanese consulate to seize the houses in the middle of the night. "On a worldwide day of rest—Sunday—the other side acted with impunity and sent out several committee members and more than two hundred members of the army, infiltrating every place and surrounding the residents' houses while they were deep asleep. With a loud noise, they destroyed the roofs and dug in from above, without a thought for endangering the life or property of the people inside…this disastrous scene was even more deplorable than all the atrocities the Chinese Communists have committed over the years." Su Yibin, too, saw the "nonchalant and shameless attitude" of the municipal government as no different from the Communist Party. Recall, too, that Zeng was particularly horrified that his expropriated land was to be converted to public use as a wharf. In the context of 1930 Xiamen, red-baiting appealed to both the Japanese Foreign Ministry and the elite overseas Chinese alike. Disputes over land revealed to both the consul and the sekimin involved that they no longer held the connections with municipal leaders and avenues of local resolution that they had once enjoyed. In the context of the GMD's revolutionary diplomacy, moreover, the consul was unable to appeal to national

level diplomats to intercede on their behalf. Faced with this situation of increasingly ambitious municipal and national governments, the sekimin found themselves even more closely tied to the Japanese consulate and its institutions, even though the power of the consul, too, was weakened.

There were sekimin in South China, particularly those who were not elite landholders, for whom the maintenance of extraterritorial privileges and defense of private property rights were not the ideal goal of municipal governance. I now turn to one such sekimin, who thought that the challenges to the Japanese Empire posed by the GMD, and the crisis of global capitalism more broadly, could be solved by neither local mediation nor diplomatic maneuvering.

Li Luyi, the Fuzhou Incident, and the Threat of Right-wing Radicalization

On the evening of January 3rd, 1932, Mito Mitsuko (水戸光子), an employee of the Japanese elementary school in Fuzhou and a native of Fukushima prefecture, answered the door. Her husband, Mitsuo (水戸三雄), also a teacher, had been convalescing from an illness at home and she was expecting guests to pay a call on him. Her visitors, however, were no friends; they shot her once and stabbed her four times, before moving on to her husband, whom they shot once in the forehead. Leaving him for dead, the assailants quickly escaped, leaving Mitsuo to stagger to the neighboring Japanese club, from where he was transferred to the nearby Japanese hospital, where, despite the doctor's best efforts, he died that night. Among his last words were a revelation to the consular police chief, Yamanaka, that his attackers were one Taiwanese and two Chinese. Blood gushing from his jaw, he repeated, "It was done by Shinkichi…two Chinese…inside his sleeve."[325]

325 From the account reported by Fuzhou consul Tamura. The first part of this sentence could also be translated roughly as "I was done [in by] Shinkichi."

Tamura Teijirō (田村貞次郎, in office 1929–1932), the Japanese consul posted at Fuzhou, rushed to the scene that night to conduct an investigation and telegraphed the Prime Minister and acting Foreign Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi (犬養毅, in office December 1931– May 1932) the next morning to place the blame on local Chinese officials: "The provincial government has repeatedly gone against its promises and the lives of local residents has been exposed [to danger.]"[326] The murder of the Mitos came on the heels of an incident the day before, when three senior Japanese naval officials and consul Tamura himself had gone in plainclothes to a local park to observe—or so they claimed—an anti-Japanese gathering and parade organized by students. Upon seeing anti-Japanese posters displayed around the park, naval captain Kitamura took it upon himself to remove them, claiming they defamed the Japanese Imperial Navy. The Chinese students, in response, showered the group with insults, and pursued them all the way to the Chinese police office, where the four Japanese officials were forced by the indignant crowd to take refuge until ten o'clock that night.[327]

In Tamura's eyes, the murder of the two teachers on the night of the 3rd was a consequential—and therefore inexcusable—escalation of the anti-Japanese activities in the park the preceding day. Earlier in the day of the 3rd, Fujian provincial official Lin Zhiyuan (林知淵) had agreed to the consul's demands for an apology, dissolving the anti-Japanese groups, and

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326. "2. Fukushū jiken kankei / 2 Shōwa nana nen ichi gatsu yokka kara Shōwa nana nen ichi gatsu itsuka," part of "Manshū jihen (Shinahei no Mantetsu ryūjōkō bakuha ni yoru Nichi, Shi gun shōtotsu kankei)/hai-Nichi, haika kankei/hai-Nichi bōkō kankei dai ikkan," JACAR B02030349500

327. Inukai became the acting Foreign Minister (and the Prime Minister) after the Wakatsuki government was dissolved on December 12th, 1931, and was succeeded by his appointed permanent Foreign Minister Yoshizawa Kenkichi (芳澤謙吉) on January 14th, 1932. Yoshizawa had previously served as the consul in Xiamen in 1902 and as the envoy to China from 1923–29. He would be assassinated a mere four months later by junior members of the navy in an attempted coup. This account is derived from Tamura's report of the incident, in "2. Fukushū jiken kankei / 1 Fukushū ni okeru Nihon kanchōra ni tai suru bōkō jiken no gaiyō," part of "Manshū jihen (Shinahei no Mantetsu ryūjōkō bakuha ni yoru Nichi, Shi gun shōtotsu kankei)/hai-Nichi, haika kankei/hai-Nichi bōkō kankei dai ikkan," JACAR B02030349400

banning their future activities in the city. That local officials were willing to apologize immediately proved to Tamura and his colleagues in the Japanese Foreign Ministry that they bore no responsibility for the events in Fuzhou. If anything, the murders only intensified Tamura's desire to extract further concessions and guarantees from Lin and other provincial officials. The newly appointed head of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chen Youren (陳友仁), however, disagreed: the Japanese officials had displayed "disparaging attitudes" and, despite their plainclothes attire, were clearly acting in a supervisory role and thereby responsible for provoking the local Chinese, who were understandably incensed after the Japanese Army's occupation of Manchuria just days before.[328] Radical junior officers in the Kwantung Army stationed in Manchuria, which had in the late 1920s become gradually more autonomous from the oversight of the central government and more militaristic, staged a bombing near a Japanese-held railway there as a pretext to initiate a military invasion.[329] Chen further alleged that the Japanese officials were armed, and that the Chinese had not violated any law—he challenged the Japanese consul in Nanjing to point out the law that they had broken. If anything, it was the Japanese officers who had broken the law, and the Japanese Foreign Ministry continued to flout agreements made at the League of Nations by resolving the conflict on a local level rather than

328. Also known as Eugene, Chen Youren was a lifelong diplomat, serving in, among other capacities, as an official in Sun Yat-Sen's Guangzhou government in the early 1920s, as a representative at the Paris Peace Conference at Versailles in 1919, the foreign minister of the rival Guomindang government in Wuhan in 1927, when he oversaw the successful forcible reclamation of the foreign concessions there. He returned from exile in 1931 as Chiang Kai-shek's appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, but would be exiled again following his participation in the 1934 Fujian Rebellion (the subject of the next chapter). See Howard Boorman, Richard Howard, and Joseph Kai Huan Cheng, eds., "Eugene Chen," in *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967).

329. Even the hard line Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi found it difficult to control the Kwantung Army. During his tenure, junior officers murdered Zhang Zuolin, the Chinese warlord in the area and the main impediment to Chiang's attempts to unify China. Zhang Zuolin was replaced by his son, who allied with Chiang's government. The officers were later executed under Tanaka's orders.

through national diplomatic talks.[330] If Tamura's assessment of the events relied on a generalized propensity to anti-Japanese political violence that could only be reined in by local officials and in which Taiwanese were plausible accomplices, Chen's view of the situation hinged on the Japanese Foreign Ministry's being complicit in, if not accountable for, the consequences of the army's actions in Manchuria.[331]

Although Tamura knew from the outset that the incident had involved a Taiwanese suspect, whom the consul speculated wanted to topple the provincial government, he concluded it would be advantageous to keep this information from Chinese officials.[332] Tamura wanted to use the two incidents together to pressure the Chinese side to commit to suppressing anti-Japanese groups in the city and to allow for the stationing of a permanent Japanese patrol force, long an ambition of the Foreign Ministry in the treaty-ports. Though the Foreign Ministry had a small police force in the treaty-ports, Tamura concluded that the quickest route to public order was to invite naval officers to police the city.[333] Whereas for Chen and other ambitious "revolutionary diplomats," the persistence of conflict was a sign that sovereignty had to be returned to Chinese hands, for the Japanese consuls in China and particularly those in the south China treaty-ports, political violence was cause for a further entrenchment of Japanese resources,

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330. JACAR B02030349500.

331. Tamura mentions this as a plausible possibility in communication with Inukai on January 4th, see JACAR B02030349500.

332. As a result of the Guomindang requiring provincial leaders to bring remaining local warlords to heel, Lin Zhiyuan and others in the Fujian Provincial Government suddenly faced considerable local opposition. Lin and others were kidnapped in January 1930 by several of these local warlords, and had only recently been returned to Fuzhou (as Li Luyi, the perpetrator, recalls Lin mentioning). Perhaps this is what made Lin especially willing to cooperate with Tamura's demands. See Huei-ying Kuo, "Native-Place Ties in Transnational Networks: Overseas Chinese Nationalism and Fujian's Development, 1928–1941," in *Chinese History in Geographic Perspective*, ed. Yongtao Du and Jeff Kyong-McClain (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2013), 141–60, 147n36.

333. For a discussion of the Foreign Ministry police force, primarily focusing on late Choson (late 19th century) Korea and early 20th century Manchuria and North China, see Esselstrom, *Crossing Empire's Edge: Foreign Ministry Police and Japanese Expansionism in Northeast Asia*.

especially in light of the willingness of local officials like Lin to admit their "unfortunate lack of preparation" to secure public order, even if this meant cooperating with a Japanese military that seemed increasingly independent of bureaucratic oversight.[334]

To Tamura's surprise, however, the Taiwanese involved in killing the Mitos was none other than Li Luyi (李爐已), a former journalist for the Japanese-sponsored local newspaper, the *Min Bao* (Fujian News), and who had plotted the murder at the behest of a Japanese naval admiral.[335] Tamura feared the murders intended to take advantage of the incident with the naval officers on the 2nd to foment public disorder in the city. He would later find out that his solution to strengthen the Japanese naval presence in the city would play directly into the hands of those behind the scheme. In the course of his arrest and interrogation, Li revealed his network of existing social and personal contacts and role as a broker of local intelligence that made him an ideal candidate for the navy's plot to cause disorder and land troops in Fuzhou. Li's professed sympathy for a strengthened Japanese military presence on the Chinese mainland only deepened after the Manchurian Incident of 1931.

While by no means representative of the Taiwanese population in Fuzhou or south China at large, the rapid escalation of Li's support for Japanese militarism in China, his willingness to resort to violence for political ends, and the allies Li's ambitions found not only among Taiwanese residents but local Chinese officials and warlords chafing under an ambitious central government make his involvement in the Mito murders illustrative of the ideological and institutional positioning of a Taiwan sekimin, if an exceptional one.[336] Upon hearing that a

334. JACAR B02030349500.

335. Another possible reading of his name is "Li Luji" (李爐己), based on the printing of the final character of his name.

336. For a detailed study of how one woman justified avenging her father's death by assassinating his murderer by

Taiwanese was among the murderers, Tamura assumed that he was collaborating with Chinese warlords, showing the consul's suspicion of the allegiances of the city's Taiwanese residents. Little did he anticipate that Li was cooperating not only with local warlords but also with the Japanese navy, and ultimately perhaps even with the Taiwan Government-General, to create a pretext for a Japanese military landing and while manipulating and undermining the power of the consul and the diplomacy of the Foreign Ministry writ large.

Compared to the Manchurian Incident the year before, the Mito Incident of January 1932 was a minor blip in the history of Japanese imperialism in China. It did not further fan the flames of support for militarism in the metropole or among residents in China; it did not lead to the establishment of a Japanese client state in south China; nor did it exacerbate existing diplomatic tensions on an international level.[337] But although it ultimately ended in failure, the goal of landing naval officers in south China had, in Li's understanding, widespread support

successfully mobilizing public sentiment in 1930s China, see Eugenia Lean, *Public Passions: The Trial of Shi Jianqiao and the Rise of Popular Sympathy in Republican China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007). For a broad discussion of political violence and fascism as tactics adopted by select groups of actors in the Nanjing Decade see Maggie Clinton, *Revolutionary Nativism: Fascism and Culture in China, 1925–1937* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017).

337. On the rise of support for militarism in the metropole, see the classic study of Manchuria. Ching, *Becoming "Japanese."* On support in the colonies, namely the Kwantung Leasehold Territory in Manchuria, see Emer O'Dwyer's study of the Japanese community in Dairen (Dalian) and the members of the South Manchuria Railway Company, whose support for the Japanese military after the Manchurian Incident, though not unconditional, contributed to turning the incident into a crisis. Emer S. O'Dwyer, *Significant Soil: Settler Colonialism and Japan's Urban Empire in Manchuria* (Cambridge, Mass: Distributed by Harvard University Press, 2015). Jun Uchida also discusses the broader support among Japanese settlers for the expansion of the empire into Manchuria following 1931, especially in Chapter 7: The Manchurian Impact. Jun Uchida, *Brokers of Empire: Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1876–1945* (Cambridge, Mass: distributed by Harvard University Press, 2011).

Most studies of Taiwan proper identify 1937, the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War and the start of the "imperialization" movement or kōminka as a critical turning point, including Wan-yao Chou, "The Kōminka Movement in Taiwan and Korea: Comparisons and Interpretations," in *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945*, ed. Peter Duus, Ramon Myers, and Mark Peattie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 40–70. On Taiwan, see also Leo T. S. Ching, *Becoming "Japanese": Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). On the effects of the Manchurian Incident in Manchuria and north China, see, for example, Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003).

among the Japanese Navy stationed in Taiwan. Perhaps the Navy, which advocated a "Southern Advance" policy into south China and Southeast Asia and prioritized the development of Japanese maritime power, sought to replicate and balance the Army's success in creating a pretext for war in Manchuria, which was the goal of the competing "Northern Advance" policy promoted by the Army. This incident requires us to broaden the theater of Japanese militarism in China in the early 1930s beyond military action in Manchuria and Shanghai, and to include among its collaborators the Taiwan sekimin in South China.[338]

Li Luyi (1894–1943) was born in Taipei on the eve of Japanese colonization, and graduated at the top of his class at the Taiwan Government-General School for National Language (*Taiwan Sōtokufu Kokugo Gakkō*), then one of the only institutions of higher education in Taiwan, in 1915. While serving as a public school teacher three years later, he was found guilty of gambling, fined, and dismissed from his job.[339] He secretly escaped from Taiwan and moved to Tianjin, returning to Taiwan briefly to marry his first wife, Chen Wumei. Thereafter he returned to Tianjin via Moji (in Japan) under a pseudonym, Li Luwu (李路物), finding employment at the Japanese-run publication *Sino-Japanese Review* (Jp.: Nikka Kōronsha; Ch.: Rihua Gonglunshe) through the introduction of the consular police chief in Tianjin.[340] Despite his

338. The "Jinzhou Operation" involved the dispatch of Japanese Army troops from Mukden (Shenyang), expanding the Army's control over southern Manchuria (December 21, 1931–January 3, 1932); whereas the "Shanghai Incident" involved the dispatch of the Japanese Navy in late January 1932 after five Japanese monks in the city were allegedly killed by Chinese nationalists, leading to conflict with the Nineteenth Route Army (which will be discussed in Chapter 4). The same foreign ministry file also has a report of the "Guangzhou Incident," which followed after the killing of a Japanese resident of Guangzhou by a local laborer.

339. Based on Takashi Nakamura, "Fukushū Mito jiken nitsuite," *Nanpō bunka* 9 (November 1982), 230–31n14, itself based on a consular report published in 1920 ("Taiwan sekimin torishimari ikken," April 1919). A letter from Tamura to Inukai on the 11th alleges that he was a graduate of the school but was of poor talent (akuzai; it is unclear if this refers to his academic performance, and therefore contradicts Nakamura's account, or his professional history as a teacher), and ultimately ordered to leave Tianjin by the consul in 1917.

340. An article titled "Li Luyi qi ren qi shi" in *Nanyang Siang Pau* (a Singapore-based newspaper founded by Overseas Chinese Tan Kah Kee in 1932) article from January 19, 1954 alleges that Li was also an employee of (and

criminal history he was eventually granted a passport by the Governor-General's office for travel to China, suggesting that he may have relied on personal connections or developed a reputation as a reliable source for intelligence for the colonial government.[341]

After moving to Fuzhou, Li continued to work in journalism at the Taiwan Governor-General-subsidized *Fujian News* (*Min Bao*). The newspaper's chief editor, Kamata Masanori (鎌田正威, 1885–1935), had previously worked in the Intelligence and Monopoly Bureaus of the Taiwan Government-General, and during his time in Fuzhou became close with a local warlord, Lu Xingbang (盧興邦).[342] In 1928, Chen Queying (陳氏卻英), Li's second wife and herself a teacher, was assigned a post at the school for Taiwanese students in Fuzhou (the Tōei School); she supported Li after he quit the newspaper in 1931. Li was deeply enmeshed in Fuzhou's small circle of Japanese officials: of the "three pillars" of Japanese cultural institutions in the city—schools, newspapers, and hospitals)—Li held a professional appointment at one and was married to an employee of another. Tamura reported to Inukai that Li was especially skilled at socializing with unscrupulous Taiwanese opium den proprietors and local Chinese warlords like Lu Xingbang, and was not afraid to brag about it, even after his detention.[343] Li was a "fervent patriot one cut above the rest," who had publicly blustered about his role in transmitting local intelligence from Fuzhou and the interior of Fujian Province to the Japanese military in Taiwan.[344]

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the head of) the Tianjin-based *Yong Bao*.

341. Nakamura, "Fukushū Mito jiken nitsuite." 230–31n14, based on a reading of the consular report above.

342. According to a recollection published in 1936 after Kamata's death, Kamata Masanori sensei tsuisōroku, quoted in Nakamura. 231n15.

343. JACAR B02030349700.

344. Diplomatic reports from the various South China consuls (the arrest of the two Koreans in Xiamen at the beginning of this chapter being a good example) were typically accompanied by military intelligence reports that

Tamura's discovery that the assassination was a navy plot notwithstanding, the consul persisted in trying to conceal his discovery from Chinese officials and use the sense of crisis to pressure them to yield to his demands for a standing police office. Tamura received Lin Zhiyuan's commitment on January 7th and wrote to Yang Shuzhuang (陽樹莊), the newly appointed provincial chairman who had previously served as the head of the Chinese Navy, on the 10th. Tamura must have been surprised when Lin told the consul in a meeting on the 11th that he was well aware of Li's possible role in the plot and of Li's longstanding aspirations and efforts to see the provincial government collapse. To add to Tamura's surprise, Lin revealed that he had met with Li over dinner the night before his arrest, even asking his close confidant, Li, whom he addressed as brother, to be his personal investigator for the incident.[345]

In a long confession over the course of the nights of the 12th and 13th, Li recalled the course of events and revealed his ties to local Chinese officials—members of the provincial government (Lin Zhiyuan) and its opponents (Lu Xingbang) alike—and Japanese military officers, not to mention Tamura himself. Having refused food since his arrest, Li finally agreed to speak with Tamura on account of being tied to him by "past bonds of kindness" (*heiso no onjō ni kizuna sare*).[346] "While presumptuous (*sen'etsu*) [to say] I approached the solution of the problems in Fujian from the wrong starting point, I saw this as my loyal and patriotic sacred task,

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conveyed in great detail conditions on the ground. Perhaps Taiwanese in the treaty-ports like Li were responsible for supplying military officials with this intelligence.

345. "2. Fukushū jiken kankei / 2 Shōwa nana nen ichi gatsu kokonoka kara Shōwa nana nen ichi gatsu jūichi nichi," part of "Manshū jihen (Shinahei no Mantetsu ryūjōkō bakuha ni yoru Nichi, Shi gun shōtotsu kankei)/hai-Nichi, haika kankei/hai-Nichi bōkō kankei dai ikkan," JACAR B02030349700; see also Li's confession.

346. "2. Fukushū jiken kankei / 2 Shōwa nana nen ichi gatsu jūichi nichi kara Shōwa nana nen ichi gatsu jūyokka," part of "Manshū jihen (Shinahei no Mantetsu ryūjōkō bakuha ni yoru Nichi, Shi gun shōtotsu kankei)/hai-Nichi, haika kankei/hai-Nichi bōkō kankei dai ikkan," JACAR B02030349800

and the only way (*michi*) to rescue the thirty million [sic] good people of Fujian.[347] This was the broader cause," Li prefaced his confession. Shortly after the Manchurian Incident, Li was approached by a Japanese naval lieutenant in the intelligence department of the Taiwan Army by the name of Asai Toshio (浅井敏夫), whom Li had never met. Asai had seen his reporting in the *Fujian News*, he claimed, and, in a conversation recalled by Li, asked: "Li-*kun*, would you like to do something in Fujian?" Confused, Li asked the lieutenant to clarify. "Take it. Mix things up," (*toru ka, kakimazeru ka*) Asai answered, in the curt military style characteristic of Li's recollections. Confirming that Asai's propositions were not just his own but widely shared among officials in Taiwan, Li confessed his desire to go to Manchuria, where he felt he could be of some use in the aftermath of the Manchurian Incident.[348] Asai dissuaded Li, assuring him that the Taiwan Army was prepared to take action to turn an incident into a *casus belli* in South China.[349]

Li was careful to confirm that his desire for Japanese military intervention in China was widely shared among fellow Taiwanese residents of Fuzhou. As Li explained to Tamura, in a Kamata Masanori, the head of the *Fujian News*, asked Asai rather cryptically in a subsequent visit to Fuzhou, "if anything happens here [Fuzhou], what will the Taiwan Army do?"[350] Asai responded emphatically that the army was prepared for intervention; that many in the audience

347. The population of Fujian Province was around thirty million around 1990, so it is unclear what this figure (*sanzenman*) refers to.

348. It is unclear if in referring to the "widely held opinion" Li and Asai mean military officials alone, or if they are implicating the Taiwan Government-General as well; the word they use for "official opinion" is "chōgi" (朝議).

349. I have not been able to determine what level of the military purportedly supported this plan, or whether support came from the Taiwan Army, the Navy, or both.

350. "2. Fukushū jiken kankei / 11 Mito jiken tenmatsusho sōfu no ken 1," part of "Manshū jihen (Shinahei no Mantetsu ryūjōkō bakuha ni yoru Nichi, Shi gun shōtotsu kankei)/hai-Nichi, haika kankei/hai-Nichi bōkō kankei dai ikkan," JACAR B02030350400.

voiced their support (*zehi onegai suru*) only strengthened Li's resolve for decisive action. The close relationship between the Foreign Ministry and the military undergirded the Japanese presence in the China treaty-ports, and the threat of military violence was always only barely beneath the surface of Japanese diplomacy in China. That military intervention seemed to have wide support not only among the elite members of Japanese society in Fuzhou, but among Taiwanese as well, suggests that military intervention in the aftermath of the Manchurian Incident in 1931 was less of a departure from and more of an escalation of existing conditions in the South China treaty ports. The residents and consuls of the treaty-ports justified the recourse to military action in the language of maintaining public order, whereas the military offered a justification for intervention in the language of divine calling, with Li's rationalization falling somewhere in between. "Maintaining public order" and "fulfilling a divine calling" were two sides of the same coin, with both resting on the assumption that the only response to perceived Chinese disorder was an expansion of Japanese military capacity. This was the logic undergirding the Japanese invasion of Manchuria orchestrated by the Kwantung Army, but it was also the logic that justified the Japanese Foreign Ministry's mobilization of armed force to secure Japanese economic interests in the treaty-ports; in this approach of giving diplomatic actions the backing of military force, Japan was hardly unique among the world powers. This helps to explain why, even after finding he was the original target of the Navy's assassination plot, Tamura continued to pursue the strategy of hoping for the best in dispatching more troops across Fuzhou, even if doing so would facilitate a plot inside the military.[351]

351. "2. Fukushū jiken kankei / 6 Shōwa nana nen ichi gatsu jūgo nichi," part of "Manshū jihen (Shinahei no Mantetsu ryūjōkō bakuha ni yoru Nichi, Shi gun shōtotsu kankei)/hai-Nichi, haika kankei/hai-Nichi bōkō kankei dai ikkan," JACAR B02030349900. Tamura wrote to Yoshizawa Kenkichi (newly and briefly the Foreign Minister as of the 14th) that if, while doing their utmost to handle the incident with the naval chief by dispatching police officers in the city, there occurred an inside plot, it would "truly be exceedingly regrettable" (*makoto ni ikan senban*).

In seeing local disorder as a politically productive force, Li and his military benefactors found allies in local Chinese warlords, who saw their autonomy challenged by GMD centralization. Just as Li was beginning to worry about lacking co-conspirators for his plot—he constantly scorned certain local Taiwanese for being motivated only by money, mirroring Asai's condemnation that Taiwanese were incapable of decisive action—he received a letter from Lin Shouchang, a local warlord based down the Min River from Fuzhou in Changle Prefecture and an ally of the warlord Lu Xingbang. In Li's recollection, Lin and other warlords invited him to head a coalition of warlords that wished to topple the provincial government—led by Li's good friend Lin Zhiyuan. The warlords promised that they would follow Li's orders on the sole condition that collaboration did not lead to concession of Chinese sovereignty or land to the Japanese (*guoquan guotu wu sangshi*). In exchange, Li managed to get the warlords to provide 120,000 bombs and commit to a pro-Japanese policy of industrial development and to relying on the tutelage of Japan to live in mutual harmony and cooperation (*kyōson kyōei*). It was perhaps also the promise of a future of pro-Japanese industrial development in Fujian that led Li to seek and gain the approval of two elite Taiwanese merchant industrialists, Lin Xiongzheng (of the Banqiao Lin family) and Gu Xianrong, the patriarchs of two of Taiwan's wealthiest families. Gu reassured Li that the plot was sound, reminding Li that the fate of Fujian was "fundamentally decisive" for that of Taiwan.[352] Although Asai may have identified in Li an intermediary uniquely positioned to align the interests of the Taiwanese in Fuzhou, warlords outside the city, elite Taiwanese industrialists, and Japanese military elites in Taiwan, Li's confession suggests that military intervention enjoyed tacit if not explicit support from an unlikely coalition of allies.

352. The collaboration of elite Taiwanese and the pro-Japanese provincial authorities installed after the failed Fujian Rebellion in 1933–34 is the subject of the next chapter, which will trace industrial development in Fujian Province on the eve of the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War.

Ultimately it was Li's social position among the Taiwanese community in Fuzhou that enabled him to recruit a henchman to execute the task. Li had been appointed a member of two committees formed by the Fuzhou Taiwanese Association to respond to the Chinese students' harassment of the Japanese naval officers on the 2nd, giving him not only a pretext for advocating intervention but a platform for doing so. While riling up the crowd of Taiwanese at a meeting, he noticed a young man in the audience crying. Li refers to him as Shinkichi, whom he later approached privately with the order to disrupt Fuzhou's public safety by finding a victim to murder. So committed was Li to the cause, he confessed, that he ordered Shinkichi to kill his (Li's) own family if he could not find other suitably important victims to warrant a *casus belli*.

It is important to keep in mind that Lin's detailed confession remains in the diplomatic archival record only because Tamura was afraid that the Taiwan Government-General was complicit in the plot to kill the Mitos and ultimately foment disorder in Fujian. According to an agreement between the south China consuls and the colonial government in Taiwan in 1925, criminal cases originating in Fujian Province were to be appealed to the colonial court in Taipei, but, considering the "special nature of the case," Tamura recommended to Foreign Minister Yoshizawa Kenkichi (芳澤謙吉, 1874–1965, in office January–May 1932) that the case be sent to Tokyo or Nagasaki instead. Tamura's suggestion was ultimately rejected by Yoshizawa, who resisted changing the administration of the case on legal grounds and encouraged the consul to cooperate with the colonial government in Taiwan as much as possible. Fearing the news of a Taiwanese suspect in the murder of the Mitos would inflame public opinion in both China and metropolitan Japan, Yoshizawa ordered Tamura to resolve the case as discreetly as possible, which resulted in minimal press coverage of the incident in either China or Japan. Although the Foreign Ministry minimized the immediate impact of the incident (aided, no doubt, by the fact

that the Japanese Imperial Army in Taiwan did not, as Asai had promised, immediately land troops in Fuzhou), Yoshizawa's insistence on legal procedure in sending the case to Taiwan ended just as Tamura had feared: the colonial court dismissed the case, claiming it had been instigated by local warlords, and pardoned Li. Despite conveying regret that the victims were the Mitos, with whom he was well acquainted because of his second wife's employment at the Taiwanese school, Li expressed not even a modicum of regret in his confession. In a final twist, Li received his original wish of becoming a military officer in Manchuria, paid for by none other than his former boss Kamata, the editor of the Fujian News. Accompanying Li to Manchuria was Iwasaki Keitarō, an employee of the Taiwan Governor-General who had appeared suspiciously in Fuzhou to bring Li back for trial and to whom Tamura was reluctant to release Li to because he had arrived without any official designation from the colonial government.[353] In January of 1933, slightly over a year after the murder of the Mitos, Li sent a New Year's card to the consul, addressed from the office of the military secret service (*tokumu kikan*) in Fengtian, announcing that he was welcoming the New Year in the "expansive [wild] plains of Manchuria" (*nobinobi to shita Manshū no ya*). As if to deride Tamura's failure in prosecuting his crime, Li offered a sardonic apology for having been out of touch the past year, and wished the consul the greatest fortune (*kōdō no manpuku*).

Compared to the Manchurian Incident the year before, the Mito Incident of January 1932 was a minor blip in the history of Japanese imperialism in China. It did not further fan the flames

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353. On the release of Li to Iwasaki, see "2. Fukushū jiken kankei / 2 Shōwa nana nen shi gatsu hatsuka kara Shōwa nana nen shichi gatsu sanjūnichi," part of "Manshū jihen (Shinahei no Mantetsu ryūjōkō bakuha ni yoru Nichi, Shi gun shōtotsu kankei)/hai-Nichi, haika kankei/hai-Nichi bōkō kankei dai ikkan," JACAR B02030350300; on the payment of Li's travel to Manchuria, see "2. Fukushū jiken kankei / 14 Shōwa nana nen hachi gatsu jūhachi nichi kara Shōwa nana nen hachi gatsu hatsuka," part of "Manshū jihen (Shinahei no Mantetsu ryūjōkō bakuha ni yoru Nichi, Shi gun shōtotsu kankei)/hai-Nichi, haika kankei/hai-Nichi bōkō kankei dai ikkan," JACAR B02030350700; There is a detailed discussion of the biography of Iwasaki in Masami Kondō, *Sōryoku sen to Taiwan: Nihon shokuminchi hōkai no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Tōsui shobō, 1996).

of support for militarism in the metropole or among residents in China; it did not lead to the establishment of a Japanese client state in south China; nor did it exacerbate existing diplomatic tensions on an international level.[354] With the benefit of hindsight, it is tempting to condemn Tamura for aiding and abetting the rise of Japanese militarism by resorting to the existing practice of responding to perceived public disorder in Fuzhou with military action; or, at the very least, to find ironic his insistence on pinning the incident on a Chinese suspect in order to extract concessions from local Chinese authorities, only to find out that his interlocutors were well aware of the plot. More important, it was Li, too, and—if his account is to be believed—a broader if unlikely coalition of allies, organized by Li's many social and political ties within and beyond Fuzhou, who supported military intervention as a vehicle for political change. As one historian has shown in an account of the Japanese empire in Manchuria, which traces the contingent rise of Chinese nationalism in opposition to Japanese imperialism after the Manchurian Incident, resistance was only one of a variety of responses to Japanese militarism.[355] Even if Li's plot failed to facilitate action, it was not for lack of support. The Mito Incident reveals the complex web of social and political relationships in Fuzhou of which Taiwanese stood at the center.

354. On the rise of support for militarism in the metropole, see Louise Young's classic study of Manchuria. Young, *Japan's Total Empire*. On support in the colonies, see Emer O'Dwyer's study of the Japanese community in Dairen (Dalian) and the members of the South Manchuria Railway Company, whose support for the Japanese military after the Manchurian Incident, though not unconditional, contributed to turning the incident into a crisis O'Dwyer, *Significant Soil*, 281. Jun Uchida also discusses the broader support among Japanese settlers for the expansion of the empire into Manchuria following 1931, especially Chapter 7: The Manchurian Impact. Uchida, *Brokers of Empire*. Most studies of Taiwan proper identify 1937, the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War and the start of the "imperialization" movement or kōminka as a critical turning point, including Chou, "The Kōminka Movement in Taiwan and Korea: Comparisons and Interpretations." Ching, *Becoming "Japanese."*

355. Rana Mitter, *The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance, and Collaboration in Modern China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

The Taiwanese Communist Party in Zhangzhou and the Marxist Critique of Japanese Empire

In January of 1927, the Taiwanese Cultural Association (J: Taiwan Bunka Kyōkai; C: Taiwan Wenhua Xiehui), a group of largely elite, university-educated men from across the island, was at an impasse. Established in 1921 in Taipei by Taiwanese students who had met while studying in Tokyo, the Association was funded by Taiwan's gentry families, including Lin Xiantang of the Wufeng Lins and a relative of Chaodong and Jishang. The Association published a monthly bilingual journal titled "Taiwan Youth," and drew its inspiration from analogous student, youth, and national determination movements in the post-World War I era, including the May 4th Movement in China and the March 1st Movement in Korea of 1919.[356] But by 1927, the group began to fracture at the seams of its own ideological diversity. Seizing the leadership and ideological direction of the association from its conservative benefactor and patriarch Lin Xiantang and his allies, who had since 1923 dedicated the Association to annually petition the Japanese Diet for the establishment of a local parliament for Taiwan, a younger, more left-wing group of Taiwanese pushed the Association toward more radical politics.[357] Many of them had been involved in the Erlin Incident of two years earlier, in which a group of Taiwanese

356. The association and its journal were fashioned along the lines, and inspired by analogous student, youth, and national determination movements in the post-World War I era, including the May 4th Movement in China and the March 1st Movement in Korea. For more details on the category of "youth" see Sayaka Chatani, *Nation-Empire: Ideology and Rural Youth Mobilization in Japan and Its Colonies* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018). especially Chapters 1 and 4. For one conceptualization of Taiwan's place within the empire and debates over the importance of Taiwan's recent history by one of the Association's founding members, Cai Peihuo, see Chapter 4 of Kate McDonald, *Placing Empire: Travel and the Social Imagination in Imperial Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2017).

357. On the divisions within the group, see Bowei Lin, "Taiwan kangri yundong de zuoyou fenliu: Taiwan wenhua xuehui de fenlie," *Nantai gongzhuan xuebao* 10 (June 1989). On southern Fujian see especially Chapter 3 of Bozhou Lan, *Riju shiqi Taiwan xuesheng yundong* (Taipei: Shibaowenhua, 1993). On the Communists, see especially Chapter 6 on the Communists in Songxian Huang, *Taiwan wenhua xiehui de sixiang yu yundong, 1921–1931* (Taipei: Haixia xueshu, 2008).

sugarcane farmers rose up against the owners of the plantation, the Banqiao Lin family.[358] Though many scholars have identified metropolitan Japan as an important destination for the education and politicization of Taiwanese youth who came of age in the 1920s, the urban centers of China—Shanghai, and to a lesser degree Xiamen and Guangzhou—were important sites for the development of left-wing Taiwanese political groups.[359] The Association had an important if overlooked afterlife in the treaty-ports of China—which were, for ideological and institutional reasons, crucial to the further radicalization of the former Association's left-wing members. Their publication, *Taiwan*, likely printed in Zhangzhou (a city near Xiamen), was distributed across the south China treaty-ports, and discovered by local Japanese consuls there in late 1932 and early 1933.[360]

In April 1927, only a few months after the left-wing rise to power in the Cultural Association, the Taiwan Communist Party was founded in Shanghai by, among others, Hong Chaozong (洪朝宗), Cai Xiaoqian (蔡孝乾), Xie Yuye (謝玉葉), Li Shanhuo (李山火), Jiang Wenlai (蔣文來), and Weng Zesheng (翁澤生), as a subsidiary branch of the Japanese Communist Party.[361] Shanghai was then the epicenter of left-wing politics for radicals from

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358. On the Erlin Incident, see "Important Dates in Chinese, Korean, Japanese, and Taiwanese Proletarian Arts," Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique 14, no. 2 (Fall 2006): 245–50.

359. The tendency to overemphasize Japan (and, by association, the elite moderate/conservative wing of the Taiwan Cultural Association) leads to an interpretation of its significance as ending in 1931, when the moderate splinter group of the Association, the Taiwan People's Party, was dissolved by the Governor-General. Lin's petition to establish a local parliament was rejected eleven years in a row from 1923–34. See, for example Ching, Becoming "Japanese."

360. Xiamen consul Miura reported distribution in Zhangzhou and Quanzhou, though not yet Xiamen, in a letter to Foreign Minister Uchida on October 24th, 1932; see "1 Shōwa yo nen shichi gatsu mikka kara Shōwa nana nen jū gatsu nijūyokka," part of "Taiwanjin kankei zakken / Taiwanjin hakkō no shinbun, zasshi sono ta kankōbutsu kankei," JACAR B02031446500. Fuzhou consul Moriya reported his discovery of the publication in a similar letter on January 16th, 1933; see "2 Zasshi 'Taiwan' sōfu no ken," part of "Taiwanjin kankei zakken / Taiwanjin hakkō no shinbun, zasshi sono ta kankōbutsu kankei," JACAR B02031446600.

361. For the Taiwan Governor-General's account of the history of the formation of the TCP, see *Taiwan sōtokufu keisatsu enkakushi* (Tokyo: Ryokuin shobō, 1986). On the involvement of Hong Chaozong in the Party and his

across the Japanese empire, including Japan and Korea, as well as for Chinese Communists. While studying in Shanghai between 1925 and 1928, Cai Xiaoqian, for example, participated in a Chinese Communist Youth Group, while serving as a committee member on the Association. A combination of circumstances, including the Guomindang's "purification" of the Nationalist Party's Communist members in 1927 and the resulting dispersal of the Chinese Communists from Shanghai; the Japanese Foreign Ministry's increased surveillance of people suspected of radical politics under the guise of the Peace Preservation Law (*Chian iji hō*) passed in 1925; and the heightened persecution of Taiwanese Communists in the colony itself in early 1931, led several of these Taiwanese to converge on Zhangzhou by early 1932.

Zhangzhou, a city around thirty five miles inland from Xiamen along the Jiujiang River, was, like Xiamen, in the general area in southern Fujian Province from which a number of Taiwanese traced their ancestry and where many still maintained social and familial ties. But unlike Xiamen, Zhangzhou was not a treaty-port and lay outside the *de facto* jurisdiction of Xiamen's Japanese consul. In 1932, it was a largely hospitable environment for a combination of left-wing Communist anti-imperialism and an anti-Japanese nationalism ready to accuse the GMD of passivity in the face of an existential threat posed by the Japanese empire. The Red Army of the Chinese Communist Party briefly occupied the city in April. It had been chased inland of Zhangzhou by the Guomindang Army after Chiang's rise to power but, in 1932, made a push to gain access to the coast and occupied the city in an attempt to establish maritime

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participation in agrarian politics see also the essay Jian Wang, "Mi tang xiangke" yu zongdufu mi tang tongzhi: Riju houqi Taiwan zhimindi nongye zhi tanchu," in *Riju shiqi Taiwan zhimindi shi xueshu yantaohui lunwenji*, ed. Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan Taiwan shi yanjiu zhongxin (Beijing: Jiuzhou chubanshe, 2010). Japanese scholars disagree about Hong's identity: Mukōyama Hiroo claims that Hong Chaozong was in fact the same person as the similarly named Hou Chaozong (侯朝宗), whereas Wakabayashi Masahiro disagrees. In either case, he was born Liu Qiguang (劉啟光) and the details of this debate and his early life are discussed in Kondō, *Sōryoku sen to Taiwan: Nihon shokuminchi hōkai no kenkyū*.

communication with the left-leaning regime in Guangzhou led by Chen Jitang (陳濟棠). In May, control of the city switched again, this time to the Nineteenth Route Army, which was aligned with, but critical of the GMD, and which pushed the Red Army out of the city a month after its arrival.[362] Unlike Xiamen, where local politics were dominated by conservative elite Overseas Chinese and the Japanese consul was on high alert for any radical Taiwanese, or Fuzhou, where the provincial government headed by Lin Zhiyuan was aligned with the GMD central government in Nanjing, ideological conditions in Zhangzhou in 1932 remained consistently favorable for Taiwanese participation in a combination of left-wing, Chinese nationalist, and anti-imperialist politics.

All the more threatening was the possibility that Taiwanese in Zhangzhou and neighboring small cities in Fujian and Guangdong Provinces were being aided by, if not under the direct financial and institutional support of local GMD Party apparatuses. Pro-Chinese stances—"Chinese" here connoting any variety of cultural, political, institutional, or ethnic signifiers—were not new to the 1930s and had, at times, even been condoned if not encouraged by the colonial government in Taiwan. The ideological and institutional context of the early 1930s, however, made the potential for collaboration between Taiwanese and local Chinese authorities especially threatening in the eyes of the Japanese consuls, particularly if they were located outside the already circumscribed jurisdictional spaces within the treaty-ports, and their politics based on a shared commitment to Marxist anti-imperialism that advocated a

362. The Nineteenth Route Army had developed a national reputation earlier that year for coming to the rescue of the GMD and resisting and repelling a Japanese attack on Shanghai in January 1932. The Nineteenth Route Army would also come to control Xiamen by December of 1932, marginalizing the navy. They would, finally, lead the Fujian Rebellion against the GMD government, proclaiming the People's Revolutionary Government on November 11th, 1933, which will be covered in the next chapter. On the Nineteenth Route Army in Xiamen, see Cook, "Bridges to Modernity: Xiamen, Overseas Chinese, and Southeast Coastal Modernization, 1843–1937." On their anti-GMD politics and participation in the Fujian Rebellion, see Lloyd Eastman, *The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927–1937* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1974).

reorganization of political economy. A letter from the Guangzhou consul Yoshida Shūichirō (吉田舟一郎, in office 1932–1933) to Foreign Minister Uchida Kōsai (1865–1936, in office 1932–1933) on December 24th, 1932, summed up three broad aspects of the threats posed by left-wing and Communist Taiwanese. Xie Shuhuang, a native of Zhanghua, Taiwan, had held public office in Haideng Prefecture (海澄縣), separated from Xiamen by Zhangzhou Harbor.[363] As a local official, Xie had attempted to recruit and organize local Taiwanese into a civilian paramilitary force to participate in a hypothetical Red Army attack on Xiamen. Although the Red Army had been expelled from Zhangzhou, the threat of large-scale military uprising with Taiwanese participation remained on his mind. The second threat was Taiwanese participation in the local GMD party: the Guangzhou consul reported that the local party was trying to recruit local Taiwanese doctors, and was in contact with the Taiwanese Independence Party. The third threat was that of ideologically subversive materials, printed in Zhangzhou and circulating to the treaty-ports. Yoshida concluded his letter to Foreign Minister Uchida by noting that Zhang Zhen (張貞), a local general allied to Chiang Kai-shek, had been weakened by the Red Army occupation of Zhangzhou earlier that year.[364] Having fallen on hard times, Zhang was looking to sell his newspaper and found a willing buyer in Zhangzhou's Taiwanese residents, who were financially supported by the local GMD party.

The publication *Taiwan* was produced by a group that called itself the Taiwan Democratic Party (J: Taiwan minshutō, C: Taiwan minzhudang), and likely published in the newspaper facilities purchased from Zhang. Although the individual articles were published

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363. See "9 Shōwa nana nen jūichi gatsu tōka kara Shōwa nana nen jūni gatsu yokka," part of "Taiwanjin kankei zakken," JACAR B02031443600; Haideng is now a part of Longhai city.

364. A native son of Zhangzhou Prefecture from Zhao'an, Zhang was a general in the National Revolutionary Army (Guomin geming jun), aligned with Chiang Kai-shek.

under pseudonyms, the Party was likely composed of Hong Chaozong, Jiang Wenlai, Li Shanhuo, and Xie Yuye. The first article sought to rewite the history of the "loss" of Taiwan into a narrative of China's "National humiliation" (*Zhongguo guochi yu Taiwan de sangshi*). The idea of "National humiliation" first emerged in China in 1915 as a rallying cry to boycott Japanese products after Japan's attempts to extract economic and political concessions from the Chinese government in the Twenty-One Demands were leaked to the public. By the 1930s, it served as a catch-all phrase used by nationalists to encourage Chinese to oppose not only the avaricious demands of the imperialist powers, especially Japan, but also Chinese governments that were too weak to stand up to these demands. That the loss of Taiwan to Japan in 1895 preceded the emergence of the concept of "national humiliation" notwithstanding, the author sought to remind readers that the colonization of Taiwan was a part of this narrative, if not the earliest instance in its recent history. If the first article rewrote China's loss of Taiwan into a longer history of Japan's invasion of China, the second traced this military aggression from the Shanghai Incident of 1932 back almost four hundred years to the Wanli reign of the Ming Dynasty (1592), when Toyotomi Hideyoshi attempted an invasion of Korea, referred to as "our dependency Korea" (*wo shu Chaoxian*). Japanese invasion gradually shifted from military to economic aggression, "causing our country to suffer and the people to become poor"; thus, severing economic ties with Japan would be an act of national defense. The article marshaled trade balance statistics to demonstrate the Japanese economic reliance on China (which was home to 80% of Japanese overseas investments and accounted for 70% of Japan's overseas trade), and argued that Japan faced several crises (*konghuang*): of natural resources, trade, food supply, and overpopulation. Despite its scientific and industrial progress (*kexue gongye fada*), it had not reached the levels of England, the United States, or Germany. Moreover, its immigrants faced discrimination by the

imperial powers, leading Japanese imperialists to rely entirely on China. The author was exceedingly self-assured in advocating the breaking of economic relations with Japan; it was the pusillanimous (*weixi qieruo*) authorities who were holding China back.

The Taiwanese Communists' publication of *Taiwan* is best seen in the light of the GMD rise to power and the outbreak of war with Japan after the Manchurian Incident. Whereas the elite sekimin in Xiamen reacted to having been caught in Sino-Japanese jurisdictional conflicts by positioning themselves as "overseas Japanese," the Communists fashioned the Taiwanese (on the mainland as well as on Taiwan) as the first victims of Japanese imperialism. In retrospect it may seem natural that what is now known as the "First Sino-Japanese War" of 1894–95 was an obvious starting point of a half century of Japanese imperialism in China, culminating in total war from 1937 to 1945. But this teleological narrating and bookending of the early twentieth century as one of recurring Sino-Japanese conflict was in fact the creation of the Taiwanese Communist Party in the 1930s. Having identified trade relations as the theater of conflict, drawing on the legacy of the late Qing concept of the "commercial war" (*shangzhan*), the authors turned to describing front lines of the coming war (*zhanzheng de zhanxian*).[365] The League of Nations had proven itself an organization for imperialists to divide the spoils of war, and neither could the GMD government be trusted to act. The task of saving the nation would fall on the people, even if they lacked power and courage. Not only would the war be fought in cities, but also by farmers (*nong*), industrial workers (*gong*), merchants (*shang*), students, and our dear armed comrades in northern China, where the military threat was most acute after the Manchurian Incident.

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365 On the late Qing concept of the "commercial war," see Yeh, *Shanghai Splendor*. For its legacies in the GMD period, see Chapter 2 of Thai, *China's War on Smuggling*.

The first two articles offered a historical narrative whose main protagonists were states (China and Japan), heroic patriots, and the world-historical force of global capitalism. The next article addressed its interlocutors in the second person according to social class. The second person plural (you, *nimen*) oscillated from referring vaguely to the Chinese people to very specifically the Taiwanese in China, as did the first person plural, which shifted between referring to a vague "we the people" or "we the Chinese race" to a more specific "Chinese as a whole" exclusive of Taiwanese.[366] If the elite Taiwan sekimin petition sought to recover expropriated property by framing sekimin in China as "overseas Japanese," the publication *Taiwan* sought to do the opposite, by identifying Taiwanese as members of the Chinese race and the first victims of Japanese imperialism to marshal identity as the basis for historical and political action.

The writers reserved their harshest opprobrium for merchants, perhaps unsurprising given the authors' experience organizing farmworkers in Taiwan, and given the rise of discourse that condemned traitorous merchants as impeding the path to a national economy. Such writing can only be understood in the context of the prominent role played by elite Taiwanese merchant families in the south China treaty-ports who sustained Japanese colonial institutions in south China like hospitals, newspapers, and schools, and in particular the Banqiao Lins, who were the landlords of the Erlin sugar plantation. The writers addressed these merchants directly: "There are a great deal of people who revile you as cold-blooded monsters and traitorous merchants [deserving] extermination (*miezhong de jianshang*). Even though this is what they say, one cannot help but feel embarrassed for you. In truth you cannot deny that it is because you resign yourself to flattering, supplicating, and pathetically worshipping the Japanese monsters at their

366. The original Chinese is "women minzhong; women siwanwan de tongbao, hai he sibaiwan Taiwan de tongbao"

precious throne, doing their slavish dirty work and sucking at the dregs left behind by the violent Japanese."[367]

The author does not name the merchants but identifies them based on their position in the capitalist market economy and reminds the merchants that their interests were not aligned with those of the Japanese capitalists and would not be fulfilled by fealty to them. "Are you still deluded in trying to imitate the dreams of the capitalists? The capitalists are not willing to do it [the work of capitalism]; and they cannot do it; if you clearly understood the progress of society and the conditions of the economy, you would not be willing to do it either!" And despite marshaling the language of Marxian class consciousness, it was not a Marxist class-based revolution the author was advocating, but one based on the idea of the ethnic nation: as long as the merchants could refuse the temptations of wealth that conferred only the (shameful) "domestication" by the enemy Japanese, they, too, could, by rejecting Japanese products and contributing funds to the war effort, play a role in the impending Sino-Japanese economic war.

If the article spoke of merchants in vague class-based terms—although in undeniably evocative language—the final article of the publication turns its invective to a single wealthy merchant, Gu Xianrong (1866–1937).[368] The title of the article, "Gu Xianrong's Loyalty and Patriotism" (*Gu Xianrong de zhongjun aiguo*), evokes a term for 'loyalty and patriotism' that, for Taiwanese readers and anyone else educated in Japanese schools, would have conjured up Japanese moral education, which the authors describe as taught to subdue the Taiwanese. The article opens with a lengthy explication of the 1915 Ta-pa-ni Uprising, notable as the last major

367. See JACAR B02031446500.

368. Gu was mentioned earlier as (the other) elite Taiwanese (in addition to Lin Xiongzheng) consulted by Li Luyi on the productivity of political violence, and will be examined in Chapter 5.

armed uprising in Taiwan involving Han Chinese and which was put down by the Government-General with the aid of the island's gentry landholders, and described in Chapter 2.[369] By juxtaposing the two articles, the author implies that "Gu's Loyalty and Patriotism" can and should be interpreted in light of the role of Taiwanese capitalist-merchants in suppressing revolution.

Gu Xianrong himself had a reputation for collaborating with Japanese authorities that stretched back to the first moments of colonial rule, when he reputedly opened the gates of Taipei city to Japanese troops in 1896. Gu had been mentioned by Li Luyi as one of the elite Taiwanese whose advice he had sought to condone his plot to assassinate someone in Fuzhou to cause a disturbance. But it was Gu's establishment of the "Public Good Association" (*Gongyi hui*) in Taiwan with Lin Xiongzheng (of the Banqiao Lin family, and also consulted by Li) and other island elites in 1923—in direct opposition to attempts by the Taiwan Cultural Association to challenge the colonial government—that was the object of the author's censure. The following year, Gu convened an "Island-wide General Meeting of Powerful Individuals" (*Quandao youlizhe dahui*)—which, the author was quick to deride, attracted no more than some ten people. As the writers deemed deserving of quoting in full even nine years later, Article Four of the Association's charter urged: "Revere the teachings of Confucius, disseminate morals, and virtuously guide thought." Gu Xianrong's instrumental use of Confucius to discipline a younger generation of thinkers incensed the author, who mocks Gu for his outmoded thought reminiscent

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369. The uprising, also known as the Ta-pa-ni Incident, is also mentioned in Chapter 2. Katz explores the millenarian aspects of the revolt, which, as he argued, frightened the colonial authorities in their similarities to the Boxer Uprising. As Katz is careful to point out, the incident was led by a coalition of Han Chinese, Plains people (pingpu zu), and indigenous people, whereas participation in the more recent (1930) Wushe/Musha Incident was limited to indigenous people. The account offered in the journal in question is interesting because it contains elements of both the Chinese nationalist resistance narrative and the Taiwanese independence narrative, suggesting that it was only the politics of the post-1949 period in Taiwan that made these two interpretations irreconcilable. Katz, *When Valleys Turned Blood Red*.

of turn-of-the-century Chinese reformer-turned-reactionary Kang Youwei.[370] The publication of *Taiwan* thus sheds light on the afterlife of the politics of internal discord among the members of the Taiwan Cultural Association, which scholars have described as disappearing under the weight of censorship after 1931.

Although a critique of Confucianism as antiquated was a well-known component of China's student-led May Fourth New Culture Movement in 1919, the author's decision to single out Gu's hollow Confucian elitism might have had a more proximate target in the embrace of the ancient sage by elite overseas Chinese in neighboring Xiamen, including Tan Kah-kee and Lim Boon-keng, who had reinterpreted Confucius to revive and refashion an alternative, conservative Chinese modernity to that championed by the revolutionary Communist Party.[371] In 1925, Gu and his conservative allies continued to invoke Confucian platitudes—a "false mask" as the author declared—in promoting the construction of Taipei's "Sages Temple" (*Sheng Miao*), located directly across from the local branch of Gu's own trading company.[372] The author of the article in *Taiwan* adopted two strategies to refute Gu: the first was outright mockery, and the second using moral opprobrium to chastise Gu and his elite allies for their hypocrisy. The author first offers a "translation" of Gu's Confucian platitudes into *baihua* vernacular Chinese, peppered with sardonic excursus. Taking on Gu's voice, he says, "Come and pay your filial respects to

370. Kang Youwei (1858–1927) was a turn of the century Chinese thinker who was known for arguing for "reformist" rather than reactionary elements in Confucian thought as the basis for political and social reform in the final days of the Qing Empire.

371. On the Confucianism of the overseas Chinese see Cook, "Bridges to Modernity: Xiamen, Overseas Chinese, and Southeast Coastal Modernization, 1843–1937." The embrace of Confucianism as the basis of a right-wing, disciplinary ideology (and also in a direct critique of Communism) would also be seen in the GMD's New Life Movement two years later. See Tsui, *China's Conservative Revolution*. Clinton, *Revolutionary Nativism*.

372 The original reads "Dao zhi mian zhiyi xiaodi zhongxin; yun zhiyi liyi lianchi; yang zhiyi xiuqi zhiping zhi li…" The author's choice of this subject could also be juxtaposed with the previous article's treatment of the Yu Qingfang/Ta-pa-ni Incident, after which, as Katz shows, the Japanese colonial government attempted to co-opt popular religion and practices in order to prevent them from becoming the basis of further insurrections.

Sage Gu and fulfill your patriotic duty to the barbaric country of Japan! When you demonstrate the proper sense of honor to the capitalists and imperialists; when you cultivate your moral character; then you will speak no more of some "revolution!!…Sir Gu and the others (*Gu daren deng*) care about the moral ways of the world, already have a dozen some mistresses—how merry!—and witness your hardships! Why won't you go and learn this kind of merriment?" Not only were Gu's morals hypocritical and his personal conduct profligate, but his ideological position only served the counter-revolutionary impulses of enforcing fealty to Japan.

Taken as a whole, the publication denounced Japanese imperialism on a structural basis at the regional and global level. The critique of Gu Xianrong can be read as a particular censure of the institutional and ideological complicity of elite Taiwanese merchant-capitalists not only in upholding colonialism in Taiwan, but in undergirding Japanese interests in China as well. Having called Gu a "Sage," the author concludes by quoting two other ancient thinkers to provide a classical basis for the argument that "sages" would bring not wisdom but disorder. First he quotes Laozi: "When you eliminate the sages and dispense of their wisdom, the people will benefit a hundred times." He follows with Zhuangzi, influenced by Laozi: "When sages are born, robbers arise." The robbers were, of course, none other than Gu's coterie of "rabid running dogs" of the imperialists, "reared like livestock on the fodder of the Japanese government." The reaction of the Taiwanese Communists the conjuncture of the 1930s can be understood only in the context of the ongoing jurisdictional debates over Taiwan sekimin as Japanese subjects in the treaty-ports. Left-leaning Taiwanese in China played a crucial role in promoting the ideological position that Taiwanese were not only Chinese subjects, but also the first victims of Japanese imperialism.

Conclusion

The rise to power of the GMD in the late 1920s and the escalation of Sino-Japanese tensions after the Manchurian Incident of 1931 created the conditions for a range of reactions among Taiwan sekimin in China during the early 1930s. Local tensions—whether civil disputes over land or cases involving colonial subjects suspected of anti-Japanese ideological thought crimes—threatened to escalate into full-scale conflicts which had to be adjudicated at the national level. For the rest of the 1930s, Japanese consuls in the south-China treaty-ports cited the increasing frequency of Sino-Japanese conflicts that implicated Taiwanese subjects to justify increasing consular jurisdictional capacity. Perpetrators of thought crimes, such as the Taiwanese Communists, required extra surveillance, whereas elite sekimin whose property rights were being infringed upon required consular capacity to place pressure on municipal governments. The rise of jurisdictional conflict across the ideological spectrum led to the unilateral response among the south China consuls for an increase in capacity, at the time that the other imperial powers were disengaging from the region. In other cases, Taiwanese subjects themselves, like Li Luyi, utilized the logic of escalating political tensions as a deliberate tactic to foment disorder.

Issues previously resolved on a local level—that is, not only municipal but also at the level of local organizations like the Taiwan Association—were increasingly understood as, and adjudicated at, the level of the nation. The term "nation" here connotes the new institutional framework through which GMD officials approached Sino-Japanese relations, as well as the legal framework of state-to-state diplomacy, through which GMD officials demanded issues be resolved. The Chinese "nation" was the level at which news and ideas now circulated—local conflicts could no longer be contained within single treaty-ports, nor could ideologically suspect material, particularly that produced outside the treaty-ports, be effectively censored.

The level of the nation also affected how Taiwanese in China understood themselves and their place in economy—in the sense of a political economy of an impending Sino-Japanese trade war, where front lines would be drawn based on ethnicity. Contestations over national identity were not prior to these legal, economic, and political conflicts; they were constitutive of new ways of understanding identity, whether in juridical or ideological terms. Within this ideological and institutional context, the existence and activities of Taiwan sekimin in the treaty-ports became understood as the "Taiwan sekimin problem." Looming in the background of this "problem," as described by the Taiwan-based China scholar turned pan-Asianist Ide Kiwata (井出季和太) in two 1931 articles, was the long shadow of larger questions about the future of the legal and economic framework of the Chinese treaty-ports, including tariff revision, territorial retrocession, and transformation of legal status.[373] The logic of understanding the Taiwan sekimin, their economic and political activities, and their mobility across and beyond the south China treaty-ports as a "problem," was mirrored with increasing frequency throughout the decade by Chinese journalists, too, writing in newspapers such as the Shanghai-based *Shenbao* and the Tianjin-based *Dagongbao*. Even Taiwanese in China, like the authors of the publication *Taiwan*, participated in this discourse, denouncing collaborator and elite Taiwan sekimin as metonymic instantiations of the evils of Japanese imperialism tout court. In the eyes of the Japanese consuls, the "problem" gave coherence to the threat of several little fires escalating into a national conflagration, a threat that they responded to by retrenching the Foreign Ministry's institutional commitments to military control and surveillance.

373. Kiwata Ide, "Minami Shina no Taiwan sekimin nitsuite, jō," *Taihō geppō* 25, no. 1 (January 1931). Kiwata Ide, "Minami Shina no Taiwan sekimin nitsuite, ge," *Taihō geppō* 25, no. 2 (February 1931). Ide had also previously published on the subject of extraterritoriality in China. Ide had published an article over three issues on the problems of extraterritoriality in China two years before, also in *Taihō geppō*, in which he mentions the Taiwanese in China in general terms. Kiwata Ide, "Shina no chigaihōken mondai nitsuite," *Taihō geppō* 23, no. 5 (April 1929).

The three cases explored here represent disparate individual reactions to a conjuncture that affected all Taiwan sekimin, if unevenly based on class, geography, ideology, and so on. The structural conditions that gave rise to these responses became more entrenched after 1933, when the entire region came under the unified control of the decidedly anti-Japanese Nineteenth Route Army. It is to this following period that I turn next.

Chapter Four: The Nineteenth Route Army, The Fujian Rebellion, and Anti-Japanese Challenges to the Taiwan Sekimin, 1933–34

> The ceded lands sue endlessly for peace/Admiring the august figure of the deceased King Zheng
> A hundred years in the pursuit of hegemony, washed away like water/Forever grieving, remembering Fang Weng
>
> Devoured by an alien race for thirty-eight years/The green mountains as old, and the waters unhurried
> How pitiful the suffering of a million prisoners/The country destroyed, families ruined, and hatred everlasting
>
> The old island fallen to enemies, I now realize the wrong/The mountains and rivers must be returned
> Thirty years of empty crying/Befuddled and muttering, the sun sets on my despair

These three stanzas, each composed of two couplets, were published in the *Remembering 617 Special Edition* (*Liu yi qi jinian tekan*) on the 38th anniversary of Japanese rule of Taiwan on June 17th, 1933.[374] Like the writings of the Taiwanese Communists in Zhangzhou of the previous year, the authors of the *Special Edition* took the consulates' celebration of the anniversary to remind their readers—Chinese and Taiwanese alike—that colonial rule had inaugurated not the rational modernity of colonial administration, but the Japanese pursuit of hegemony over East Asia and the Chinese people, whose first victims were the Taiwanese. Rife with historical and literary allusions, the poems bring the reader from "Fang Weng" (放翁)—the sobriquet of twelfth century poet Lu You (陸游), whose patriotic writings decried the invasion of the Song Dynasty by the Jurchens from the north—to "King Zheng," referring to Zheng Chenggong (鄭成功), the final heir of the maritime military and merchant family that controlled the South China

374. "10 Shōwa hachi nen ni gatsu nijūichi nichi kara Shōwa hachi nen roku gatsu nijūshichi nichi," part of "Taiwanjin kankei zakken," JACAR B02031443700

Sea and waged resistance against the Qing Empire from Taiwan in the late seventeenth century. Despite their claims to a shared historical past of resisting foreign invasion, the poems convey above all an existential and timeless sense of a unified national body, rooted in the unchanging physical landscape. This unified national body was further formed by foreign invasion: although "country destroyed and families ruined" (*guopo jiawang*) was a phrase that dated back to the Jin Dynasty (266-420) and had appeared in subsequent writing, this author rewrites the Ming Dynasty official Zhao Bi's (趙弼) conclusion to that phrase—"and enterprise halts" (*shiye xiu*)—to turn the effects of destruction outward, forming an "everlasting hatred" of the existential Japanese enemy, the "alien race" "in the pursuit of hegemony."

At the intersection of the existential national community, timeless national space, and the recent history of Japanese military aggression in Manchuria and north China that threatened them both was a sense of imminent crisis. This crisis is best summed up in the sobriquet of the poet themselves, whose name, "Jue Fei" (覺非) means "realizing wrongs" and is repeated in the first couplet of the last sentence, "The old island fallen to enemies, I now realize the wrong." The language "awakening" recalls the May Fourth legacies of students and youth as the vanguard of national awakening, but "realizing wrongs" has an older referent, in a line from Jin Dynasty poet Tao Yuanming's (陶淵明) work "Returning Home" (*Guiqulai ci*), in which the author narrates a pastoral return accompanied by a present realization of past follies.[375]

The sense of inhabiting a present framed by "recognizing past wrongs" suffuses all the articles in the *Special Edition*. Articulated in June 1933, this sense of a present crisis also reflected a transformation in how they understood the political place of the Taiwanese in China,

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375. 歸去來兮，田園將蕪胡不歸？既自以心為形役，奚惆悵而獨悲？悟已往之不諫，知來者之可追；實迷途其未遠，覺今是而昨非。

as a result of which their previously local and regional significance would take on national-level import, in the dual sense of the ethnic nation and the nation-state. A few days after the publication of the *Special Edition* by the Anti-Japanese Alliance, the Japanese consul in Guangzhou Yoshida Shūichirō (吉田舟一郎, in office 1932–33) reported to Foreign Minister Uchida Kōsai (内田康哉, 1865–1936, in office July 1932–September 1933) that yet another grouping of anti-Japanese Taiwanese had gathered under the aegis of the Guangdong Provincial GMD Party. The Taiwanese coalition included anarchists, the Liberal Party (J: *Jiyū shugi ha/*C: *Ziyou zhuyi pai*; formerly the "Group to Lead the Taiwanese Revolution," C: *Taiwan geming zhudao tuanti*), and the Taiwan Democratic Party, which included the authors of the publication *Taiwan*. Most troubling for Yoshida was the group's connection to Chen Mingshu's Social Democratic Party, a loose grouping of political leaders based in Guangdong Province that advocated a "third way" between Chiang's Nanjing regime, which they found reactionary, and the Chinese Communist Party in Jiangxi Province west of Fujian, whom they thought were prone to revolutionary excess.[376] Although there had already been a diversity of ideological groups composed of Taiwanese before 1933, they had not enjoyed the kind of official sanction that they did in 1933, nor had they been concentrated in South China.

The impending sense of crisis conveyed in the writings of *The Special Edition* resulted on one hand from the transformation of Chinese diplomatic policies and public culture from anti-imperialism more generally to one that identified Japan as the sole enemy. This changed the nature of anti-Japanese sentiment nationwide, but it was the arrival of the famously anti-Japanese

376. The "Third Party," as the Social Democratic Party was more commonly known, is detailed in Eastman, *The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927–1937*. The group included many veterans of the failed First United Front of 1923–27, an alliance between the GMD and the Communists aimed to eliminate warlords and unify China through the Northern Expedition. The alliance was broken by Chiang Kai-shek when he purged Communists in April 1927.

Nineteenth Route Army in Fujian in the summer of 1932 that made its effects most pronounced on the local level. The Army, famous for its defense of Shanghai from a Japanese attack earlier that year, conferred official-level sanction on left-wing Taiwanese groups across the province that they had not previously enjoyed. The combination of national and local political shifts emboldened local left-wing Taiwanese in cities surrounding the Fujian treaty-ports, which kept the tensions between Chinese officials, Japanese consuls, and Fujian's Taiwan sekimin—left-wing or not, and now dispersed across the province—at an all-time high. The atmosphere lent itself to Chinese and Japanese suspicions of subversion by Taiwan sekimin of all stripes. This chapter traces the effects of the Nineteenth Route Army's brief rise to power in Fujian on the juridical and social positions of the Taiwan sekimin there and heightened contestation between Japanese consular and Chinese officials over them.

The consuls' determination to stamp out anti-colonial and leftist ideology, moreover, seemed increasingly impossible, since the groups were dispersed across Fujian and greater in number, not to mention they enjoyed official protection from a provincial administration that seemed determined to reverse the system of extraterritoriality tout court. Increasing conflicts with Chinese officials filled Japanese consuls with a sense of crisis, too, and in 1933 they advocated a further expansion of the consular police force and a long-term plan to transition disreputable sekimin in illicit industries like opium and gambling into stable, reputable jobs with the goal of foreclosing the typical sources of Sino-Japanese conflict. Embedded in this proposal was a criticism by the Foreign Ministry of the Taiwan Government-General, which had not revisited its South China policy since Yuchi's enthusiastic institution building spree of the late 1910s and had neglected its responsibility to contribute to imperial policy. In late 1933, the Army's criticisms of Chiang's policies reached a breaking point, and the army staged a rebellion

against the central government that was quickly quelled. The tensions that characterized the short period that the army was in power (sixteen months before the start of rebellion) nevertheless called into question the loyalties of the sekimin in South China from both sides, and the rise of Chinese nationalism renewed accusations that the sekimin were traitorous merchants. With tensions rising after 1931, Taiwan sekimin with interests allied to the Japanese consul were not just "traitorous merchants," but "race traitors" in the first instance. In the view of Taiwanese leftists, on the other hand, as members of the Chinese nation, Taiwanese were too the victims of Japanese imperialism—and the first among Chinese and in East Asia, having been colonized since 1895.

A military general by training, Chen was one of the leaders of the Nineteenth Route Army, which had defended Shanghai against a Japanese military attack in January 1932. Following the Manchurian Incident in July 1931, Shanghai saw repeated anti-Japanese protests and boycotts, many of which were encouraged by a rival GMD faction in Guangdong and, fueled by their perception of the Nanjing government's inaction, directed against Chiang Kai-shek. Seeking a distraction from ongoing conflicts in Manchuria, a junior Japanese army official by the name of Tanaka Ryūichi staged a Chinese attack on five Japanese monks in Shanghai to create the pretext for Japanese military retaliation. Forty Japanese in a youth mobilization association (*Seinendan*) in the city responded to the attack by burning two Chinese-owned textile factories, and the conflict soon escalated to full war. To the surprise of many in China and abroad, and to the chagrin of Chiang, who opposed military resistance to Japan and preferred to wait for Japanese aggression to bring another world power into the conflict to China's aid, the Nineteenth Route Army fought the Japanese Navy and Japanese Kwantung Army reinforcements sent from Manchuria to a standstill. Hailed as patriotic heroes by the public, the Army was relocated in

July 1932 to Fujian, where they were ostensibly tasked with resisting the Communists in neighboring Jiangxi.

Throughout 1933, following the Army's relocation, Chen and his allies pressured the GMD in Nanjing to take a more forceful anti-Japanese stance. The role of the Army in defending Shanghai and its ongoing agitation of Chiang's central government to resist Japanese diplomatic and military pressure more forcefully gave the Army a reputation for being anti-Japanese. This reputation made it particularly popular among the overseas Chinese in Fujian, many of whom shared the view that the central government ought to more decisively resist Japanese encroachment on Chinese sovereignty. Contemporary reports remarked that the Army was "received ecstatically by the local population…[which] welcomed them madly and respected them as gods."[377] Despite being tasked with rooting out the Communists, the Army also proved to be ambitious administrators, and they quickly turned their attention to economic and social reform, including tax reforms, the nationalization of natural resource industries, and surveys of land for redistribution. Though some overseas Chinese were eager to make common cause with the Army in supporting the new regime's infrastructural ambitions, with many fundraising in Southeast Asia and donating large sums to subsidize the Army, others might have been more suspicious of the Army's policies that bordered on redistribution. The overseas Chinese and the Army were also united by their growing desires for federalism and local autonomy, which they proposed as a better solution than Chiang's determined centralization to the crisis with Japan[378].

The Army was also intent on rooting out local sources of civilian and military power. In October1932 the Army accused the provincial chairman Yang Shuzhuang of growing and

377. See Eastman, 96–97.
378. The tenuous alliance between the Overseas Chinese and the Nineteenth Route Army is the subject of Chapter 7 of James A. Cook, "Bridges to Modernity: Xiamen, Overseas Chinese, and Southeast Coastal Modernization, 1843–1937" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, San Diego, 1998).

smoking opium, and said Yang had referred to Sun Yat-sen as a bandit chieftain, in open disrespect of China's national father. These accusations prompted the provincial government, which remained intact after the GMD rise to power in 1927–28, to resign, and Nineteenth Route Army leaders filled their positions. In December, the Army invited local army commander Chen Guohui to Fuzhou, only to arrest him, put him on trial for imposing a "reign of terror," and publicly execute him.[379] By eliminating its local enemies, the Army consolidated its power and, for the first time since the Qing period, a single entity controlled all of Fujian Province. In nearby Guangzhou, Japanese Consul Yoshida feared that among the allies that Chen was eager to recruit to his expanding cause in Fujian and neighboring Guangdong, his home province, were the left-leaning Taiwanese dispersed across south China.

One of the effects of the Nineteenth Route Army's rise to power was the general institutional protection and ideological legitimacy the Army provided to the anti-Japanese activities of left-leaning Taiwanese. Their relationships with local Chinese, who were themselves ideologically diverse, forced them to articulate their anti-Japanese positions in a variety of ways for a variety of audiences. But newfound support from the highest levels of provincial authority for a broadly defined anti-Japanese politics came in the form of new publishing opportunities and new political coalitions gathered under provincial leaders. In the minds of Japanese diplomatic officials, these developments threatened to escalate the relatively isolated radicalism of the early 1930s into full-scale subversion.

Between 1933 and the outbreak of total war in 1937, questions of the economic and political position of both Taiwanese as members of the Chinese nation, as well as Taiwan sekimin as a legal category in China were elevated to a level of provincial and national

379. The Army's consolidation of power in Fujian is detailed in Eastman, 96–102.

significance. In these years, Fujian Province saw the brief declaration of independence from the Nanjing government by the anti-Japanese ruling Nineteenth Route Army, only to be replaced in early 1934 by a nominally pro-Japanese Provincial Governor, Chen Yi. In both cases, however, the political orientation of the provincial government was decisive in reshaping the position of Taiwan sekimin in south China. Whereas the former gave hope to anti-Japanese nationalism that later gave way to desires for secession or regional autonomy, the latter reinvigorated ambitions by the Taiwan Government-General to promote Taiwan's economic and political ties to Fujian, although now it could do so directly with local authorities without relying on local intermediaries. The anniversary of Japanese rule over Taiwan symbolized for these writers the apogee of national humiliation; for colonial officials in Taiwan and, over time, groups of Chinese officials including Chen Yi, the anniversary of Japanese rule was an occasion to commemorate and an opportunity to promote the export and emulation of Taiwan's model of colonial modernity.

Finally, these local transformations and growing contradictions took place against a backdrop of Japanese intra-imperial changes that saw the military, colonial government, and Foreign Ministry vying for influence in shaping the Japanese empire's strategy in south China. The Manchurian Incident in July 1931 had initiated a string of events that saw the collapse of two cabinets within six months and the effective end to party-politics and civilian-controlled government in Japan.[380] Meanwhile, the Kwantung Army declared the independent state of

380. The crisis in Japanese domestic politics started with the inability of Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijirō to rein in the Kwantung Army in China. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria enjoyed vast domestic popular support, since Japan was then suffering the economic consequences of the Great Depression, which were only exacerbated by conservative fiscal policy. In December the Wakatsuki cabinet dissolved, and its Foreign Minister, Shidehara Kijūrō, who was known for his policy of non-intervention in China and his attempts at diplomatic resolution with Chiang's Nanjing government and the Western powers, was briefly replaced by Yoshizawa Kenkichi, former Minister Plenipotentiary to China. The new ruling party, the Seiyūkai, whose cabinet was led by Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi, had critiqued their predecessor's soft attitude towards China and had a reputation for taking a more

Manchukuo in 1932 and, despite ongoing international and Chinese refusal to recognize the state, continued military expansion across Manchuria. Though Japanese diplomatic officials and some of their Chinese counterparts persisted in trying to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict—whether international, through the League of Nations, or bilateral—the Japanese Foreign Ministry could not rein in the military and was increasingly marginalized in domestic politics in its ability to control the contours of the Japanese empire's policies towards China. In February 1933, Japan left the League of Nations in protest of the League's conclusion that Japanese troops should withdraw from Manchuria. In May of the same year, Japan and the Republic of China signed the Tanggu Truce, which was ostensibly a cease-fire at the cost of Chinese recognition of Manchukuo. Though open hostilities appeared confined to northern China, their ongoing effects were national, with Chinese political officials and military leaders continuing to disagree over the proper course of action. While Japanese diplomats effectively withdrew from international cooperation, high-level Chinese diplomats concluded that the only hope for resolving the Sino-Japanese conflict lay in cooperation with the international powers, which they hoped would pressure Japan to temper its military expansion in China. This turn away from China's earlier policy of "revolutionary diplomacy" towards one aimed at appeasing the international powers, Japan included, put senior diplomatic officials like Foreign Minister Wang Jingwei at odds with more proactive forces like the Nineteenth Route Army. Caught in the balance of these international and high-level diplomatic changes were the Taiwan sekimin in Fujian, whose legal privileges conferred by their foreign national status became the targets of criticism and attempted reform—all the more so because they were subjects of Japan, now the existential enemy of the Chinese nation.

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proactive stance, but still, Inukai did not want war. Just five months later, right-wing junior naval officers assassinated Inukai, and all cabinets thereafter were led by military officials.

The Rise of the Nineteenth Route Army in South China

The Nineteenth Route Army assumed control over Xiamen's municipal governance in December 1932 by appointing Lin Hongfei (林鴻飛) to head the Public Safety Bureau (Gonganju, equivalent to a municipal police force) early the following year.[381] In a series of telegrams to Foreign Minister Uchida, Xiamen Consul Miura Yoshiaki (三浦義秋, in office 1931–33) expressed his concern about the impact this new appointment would have on the legal status of Taiwanese in the city. Not only was Lin's affiliation with the famously anti-Japanese Nineteenth Route Army cause for worry, but the ability of a military organization to carry out the administrative functions of a municipal civilian organization also troubled Miura. If the GMD rise to power in 1928 brought attempts by the national and local Party to consolidate jurisdiction over Xiamen's Taiwan sekimin, the Nineteenth Route Army's control of Xiamen in 1933 saw these attempts realized in developments closer to home in personnel changes on the municipal level. These personnel changes constituted new attempts by the Public Safety Bureau to exercise jurisdiction over Taiwan sekimin in the treaty-port, acting in practice as a municipal government, with consequential effects on the legal and economic status of sekimin in south China.

The appointment of Lin Hongfei displaced the authority of Lin Guogeng (林國賡), the GMD naval officer and Fuzhou native who had held power over the city for the preceding nine years. The personnel change was enough to set both Miura and some Taiwanese in the city on guard. On January 3rd, the Consul reported to the Foreign Minister that he had warned the armed

381. See "1 (1) Ippan 1 Shōwa hachi nen ichi gatsu mikka kara Shōwa hachi nen ichi gatsu nijūgo nichi," part of "Shina chihō seikyō kankei ruisan / Nanshi seikyō dai gokan," JACAR B02031808600. In mid-January 1933, Lin was involved in shaping the interpretation of the new provincial government on extraterritoriality.

groups of Taiwanese (J: *buryokuha*; C: *wulipai*) to be patient and prudent (J: *innin jichō*) and avoid any rash and imprudent actions (*keikyo mōdō*).[382] Several days later, on the seventh, the Consul further described the situation:

> "the personnel turnover of the Public Safety Bureau, which is a significant issue the change in regime, is giving unusual impetus to all levels, civilian and official, as was previously reported. Given the nature (*bashogara*) of Sino-Japanese relations, with the memories of the Shanghai Incident ever fresh among the residents of Xiamen city, many harbor the fear that Sino-Japanese [relations] will shortly and suddenly (*kisezu shite*) reach a breaking point. This [situation], on the contrary, breeds suspicion during the most ordinary course of events, fanning the flames of rumor. Recently the armed Taiwanese groups have even made preparations to have their families evacuated; they are displaying an unexpectedly high level of apprehension."[383]

With formal municipal governments established in Fuzhou and Xiamen only in mid-December 1932, the Public Safety Bureau was the most important municipal authority in Xiamen.[384] Chief Lin himself reiterated this point, proclaiming on January 5th that the Public Safety Bureau should assume all authority in the city. This assumption of power led the local police chiefs to tender their letters of resignation, although Lin eventually convinced them to stay on. Although the overseas Chinese were initially supportive of the Nineteenth Route Army's anti-Japanese political stances, they were also wary of Lin Hongfei's leadership. Having seen the Nineteenth Route Army's conduct in the hinterland of the province, the overseas Chinese were concerned about their taking control in Xiamen and wanted to keep Lin Guogeng in power, as consul Miura reported to the Foreign Minister on January 7th. And for a moment, it appeared that a new balance of power between the new and old authorities in Xiamen might be possible. On

382. "1 (1) Ippan 1 Shōwa hachi nen ichi gatsu mikka kara Shōwa hachi nen ichi gatsu nijūgo nichi," part of "Shina chihō seikyō kankei ruisan / Nanshi seikyō dai gokan," JACAR B02031808600

383. JACAR B02031808600

384. On the establishment of municipal governments, see Cook, "Bridges to Modernity," which quotes an article from the *Huaqiao Ribao*.

the 7th, Miura mentioned rumors that Cai Tingkai, a general in the Nineteenth Route Army, had written to Lin Guogeng asking him to return to Xiamen, possibly to become the first mayor of the city.

A conversation between a local informant, known to Consul Miura as "Gensekai," and local overseas Chinese notables, among them Huang Yishou (黄奕守), younger brother of overseas Chinese sugar merchant Huang Yizhu (黄奕住), illustrates the position of an elite overseas Chinese resident of the city on the regime change and the threat of instability.[385] "In consideration of the distinctiveness (*tokushusei*) of Xiamen, the relations with Japan should be paid special heed," these local notables warned. They agreed that the Shanghai Incident occurred because local residents and influential leaders were swept up in anti-Japanese sentiment, which was exacerbated by the lack of common understanding between Japanese and Chinese authorities. Gensekai reported that he and Huang had paid the new chief Lin a visit, reminding him that, in the "difficult situation" (*nankyoku*) of the past year and a half since the Manchurian Incident, Miura had played an "extraordinarily large" role in maintaining public order, a detail no doubt gratifying to the Japanese consul. As if to insinuate that Lin Hongfei was inheriting the mantle of preserving order from the Japanese Consul, they expressed their hope that Lin would maintain "intimate and favorable" communication with the Japanese consul. Lin reassured his visitors that he had no prejudices against Japan—he even counted some Japanese among his old friends. This conversation was certainly recounted in a way to flatter the Japanese Consul by asserting his importance in maintaining social order in Xiamen. But support for the Consul from

385. "Gensekai" is likely a Japanese reading of his (Chinese) name, though the Chinese characters are not provided. The consul refers to him as an "elder" (*genrō*) of Xiamen and an informant (*chōhō*) of the consulate. Huang Yizhu, who was also known also by his name romanized as Oei Ik Tjoe, was a native of Nan'an, Quanzhou, and also founded the China and South Seas Bank (中南銀行) in 1921.

the city's conservative elites, whether long-term residents like Gensekai or newer returnees like the Huang brothers, suggests that, by 1933, the Japanese Consul was an important, if not one of the only, possible counterweights to a municipal government feared to be overly zealous in remaking the region's economy and society.

Lin stressed his friendly position to Miura in a visit on January 9th, promising him that, in regard to the Taiwan sekimin, he would "treat large problems as small problems, and small problems as no problems," and maintain mutual communication to solve any issues that could arise. Miura conceded that, despite the "question of other places [in China]," in Xiamen he wanted to "take policies to maintain complete peace and order, because our residents (*ware zairyūmin*) number over 10,000…and compared to those of other countries are troublesome (*oyakkai*) for the bureau chief."[386] Miura's response suggests his awareness of the delicate balance he had to strike between maintaining amicable relations with local officials in handling the city's uniquely large population of Taiwan sekimin on the one hand, and not conceding too much jurisdictional authority and thereby opening the door to overturning Japanese extraterritorial rights in China writ large on the other. For the time being it seemed, the consul and bureau chief had transformed a potential conflict into rapprochement. Lin's appointment of a graduate of the Imperial Japanese Army Academy as secretary-cum-security chief (*hoan taichō*) further reassured Miura that the new administration would be "cautious" in dealing with Japan.

Less than a week later, on the 14th, Lin gathered a group of local journalists and explained his governing policies (*shisei hōshin*), avowing that his administration would place special emphasis on the Taiwan sekimin. He elaborated,

"Because of the condition of especially complicated Sino-Foreign (J.: *Ka-Yō*; C.: *Hua-Yang*) mixed residence in Xiamen, the most disagreeable matter is handling [those who trade]

386. JACAR B02031808600.

normally forbidden items using the protection of foreign status. In the past the Bureau, as regards consular jurisdiction, has had to take a very passive position, but it is impossible to expect such a policy to be sufficient. In any country, there are police, and there are police laws (J.: *keiritsu*; C.: *jinglü*) that must be upheld. So even though Xiamen has the special condition of having many sekimin, there is no reason that police laws are [treated] specially, or for the sekimin to receive special treatment. In any civilized country, it is absolutely inexcusable for a foreigner to carry out an illegal action; if this (a crime) becomes clear, it follows that prosecution must also be thorough. Since the Nineteenth Route Army entered Fujian, it has universally banned smoking and gambling through military law, and has taken the burden of responsibility for regional order."[387]

In committing to a law and order policy, Lin's policing-as-municipal administration sought to revert to the Bureau authority over the economic activities of the sekimin that had been made illegal by declaration of the Nineteenth Route Army, which included the various sectors of the opium industry but could have also included trade in certain commodities imported from Taiwan like sugar and textiles. By categorizing China as "any civilized country," Lin reversed the language through which the European imperial powers had justified China's signing the unequal treaties in the nineteenth century, and also echoed the claims made by elite sekimin to criticize the inadequacies of the municipal government. Notably absent from his statement to the journalists was any mention of cooperation with the Japanese consul.

By assuming the authority to adjudicate conflicts involving the Taiwan sekimin, Lin elevated the level of his jurisdiction from the local to the municipal. After an earlier outbreak of violence between a Taiwanese and a Chinese on November 26th, 1932, Xiamen consul Miura relayed that the conflict had been resolved through the intercession of prominent local Chinese and Taiwanese (J: *Tai-Shi jin yūryokusha*) under the guidance of officials from both sides. These prominent locals settled the matter by arranging for compensation for the relatives of the deceased party. Though Miura observed the ongoing threat of Sino-Japanese conflict—a fear

387. JACAR B02031808600.

shared by the previous Xiamen Public Safety Bureau Chief—he expressed hope for continued resolution through cooperation.[388] Miura's observations convey a reality where the possibility of conflict resolution lay in local leaders, rather than in diplomatic channels via the consul, or municipal administration via the Public Safety Bureau. Although Lin's initial visit to the consul might have reassured Miura that the Public Safety Bureau Chief would continue to rely on official cooperation if not on local interpersonal resolution, Lin's statement to local journalists suggests that he sought to frame the matter as one of consistent administrative jurisdiction requisite of a modern, civilized nation. This absolute interpretation of local police jurisdiction, which constituted a transfer of local authority upwards, also suggests that overseas Chinese and local leaders like Huang Yishou and "Gensekai" understood it as an attempt to reverse the devolution of previous decades, stripping elites of their longstanding role in conflict resolution.

By the end of January 1933, both Xiamen Consul Miura and Fuzhou Consul Moriya had disclosed apprehensions that the new Public Safety Bureau Chiefs were using new anti-drug and anti-weapon regulations to prosecute Taiwanese and diminish their power in the city. Moriya suspected the Bureau's "proclamation to suppress recalcitrant violent groups" contained the ulterior motive (*kontan*) of "preventing yet unrealized armed resistance."[389] Miura repeated this fear, reflecting on Lin's statement to the journalists earlier that month and casting doubt on his sincerity. "He [Lin] clearly presented this [statement] to newspaper reporters as a move to challenge the sekimin, as if preparing his troops in formation…in light of this, one has the feeling that a great storm is brewing. Around the time the Bureau Chief visited the consulate, his

388. "1 Shōwa go nen shichi gatsu jūgo nichi kara Shōwa hachi nen ichi gatsu jūroku nichi," part of "Taiwanjin kankei zakken / hogo oyobi torishimari kankei," JACAR B02031446000.

389. Both the Chinese Bureau and the Japanese consuls referred to these groups as "recalcitrant" or more literally "no-good." The original term is 不良 (J: *furyō*, C: *buliang*)

words and deeds were prepared in advance (*junbi bantan*). Should his be seen as a desperate plot that anticipated [exploiting] our negligence?" Miura further expressed his concern to the Foreign Minister, recalling a visit the same day to the Consul by new Bureau secretary Chen Guoying (陳國英), a Chinese who had studied in a Japanese military academy and whose background Miura was confident might make him less prone to anti-Japanese political positions. Miura surmised "the sekimin are probably even more panicked than we can imagine, and the police are also extremely pained in their attempts to control the sekimin." He concluded by asking his interlocutor Chen, sincerely and not rhetorically, about Lin's statement to the newspaper a few days earlier. "In what state of mind (*ittai ika naru kangae nite*) did he break such news (*danwa wo happyō*)?" Both Moriya and Miura implied that the transformations in municipal governance under the Nineteenth Route Army sought to challenge not only the recalcitrant Taiwan sekimin, but the very legal system of extraterritorial jurisdiction that undergirded Taiwan sekimin residence in south China.

Yet for all their apprehensions, Miura expressed the hope that his fears would not materialize. He continued his telegram to the Foreign Minister by remarking that, as of yet, Lin had acted prudently and deferred to the Japanese consular police. "Internal information collected from various locales" suggested to Miura that Lin might have been waiting for the Japanese side to "take excessive measure" as a pretext to exert authority. Reflecting on the situation, Miura suggested that "perhaps our aforementioned apprehensions will end uneventfully in merely needless anxiety…and perhaps I had too much of a worried look on my face when I approached him [Lin], which led to my oversight in sizing up the situation."[390] Though the long-term effects

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390. "2 Shōwa hachi nen ichi gatsu jūroku nichi kara Shōwa hachi nen jū gatsu jūyokka," part of "Taiwanjin kankei zakken / hogo oyobi torishimari kankei," JACAR B02031446100.

of the Nineteenth Route Army's administration over Fujian remained to be seen, both sides seemed apprehensive that any conflict involving Taiwan sekimin could set off a string of events that would challenge the existing balance of power and unravel the foundation of Taiwan sekimin living in south China.

But it seems that Miura's relief was only temporary. He wrote to the Foreign Minister again later that day, recounting another visit by Secretary Chen, reiterating his trustworthiness as an "alumnus of Japan" (*Nihon shusshin*). This time, Chen professed the need for a "formula" to be applied when a sekimin committed a crime, reflecting the Bureau's desire to standardize procedures vis-a-vis the sekimin and consulate alike. But, as Miura had the Japanese consular police chief explain, a formulaic approach and "indulging in excessive reason will not necessarily bring about a good result; rather, it is better to look at the situation in a general way to yield a common and mutual understanding."[391] If Miura placed his hopes in a process that eschewed codified procedure and relied instead on bureaucratic discretion and flexibility, the Nineteenth Route Army's inexperience with civilian affairs was even more troubling. As he confided in the Foreign Minister, "with the stationing of military police, the chances for misunderstandings are ever greater…it is very dangerous for military police to prosecute civilians, as is the case when administration is solely in the hands of the Public Safety Bureau (*Kōankyoku no te nomi ni te okonau*)."[392] Despite the Japanese consuls' frequent recourse to military mobilization at the slightest hint of anti-Japanese violence in the treaty-ports, Miura still understood the administration of Xiamen's Japanese subjects to be a strictly civilian affair, if only to deny the Nineteenth Route Army's claims to superior jurisdiction over the city.

391. JACAR B02031446100.

392. JACAR B02031446100.

Further alarming Miura was Secretary Chen's proposal that the Bureau, short on funds, collect taxes from the city's Taiwanese residents. Under extraterritoriality, Miura countered, the Taiwanese, as foreigners, were not supposed to be taxed. Ongoing pressure by the Bureau made them even less likely to assent to a new tax. "Only when the Taiwanese are under the care of the Bureau, will they as a matter of course voluntarily donate a fixed sum of money…when it comes to be that the Taiwanese fully understand the policies of the new Bureau and have experienced the benefits of its favor (*onyoku wo taiken*), there and then will this be resolved, and the consulate will be happy to serve as the broker between the two."[393] Miura did not object to a municipal tax on the Taiwan sekimin in theory, but argued that it had to be predicated on a mutual agreement between the city's new administrators and its foreign residents. In a subsequent meeting on February 5th, this time the Bureau Chief Lin himself pressed Consul Miura for permission to levy an individual police tax on all Taiwanese in the city at the same rate as Chinese residents. Lin also propounded a stamp tax on houses of entertainment (*geigiya*). Whereas the Taiwanese currently paid a municipal tax at the fixed rate of 900 yuan collected by the Taiwan Association, Lin's proposal to tax Taiwanese residents directly and individually would not only transfer authority from the Taiwan Association to the Bureau, but would also require the Bureau to maintain a population register of Xiamen's Taiwan sekimin. This new scheme would also connote a direct relationship between Xiamen's municipal government and the city's Taiwan sekimin, not mediated through either the Taiwan Association or the local consul. Although Miura demurred in person, in private he confided being troubled by the Bureau's attempts to extend the reach of direct municipal administration over Taiwan sekimin.

393. JACAR B02031446100.

Most contentious in the administration contested by the Nineteenth Route Army and the Japanese consulates in Fujian was the issue of opium dens. Fuzhou Consul Moriya recounted a meeting with the head of the provincial foreign affairs department on February 3rd. Visiting under the orders of the Fujian Provincial Government and the Xiamen Bureau Chief, the Chinese official wanted to discuss a solution for Taiwanese-run opium dens and had come prepared with a proposal which he offered for the consul's consideration.[394] Although the Chinese diplomatic official suggested joint Sino-Japanese investigation of the opium dens, Moriya refused to entertain this suggestion on legal grounds, deferring discussion by saying it required further research. As he confided to the Foreign Minister, "there are about 200 or so opium dens here, and their disappearance is quite impossible. Recently there have been more and more fights with Chinese soldiers and police officers who smoke for free, which has aroused the attention of Chinese officials. On the other hand, this is the result of the Chinese side encouraging prosecution of Chinese opium dens…As a measure that affects part of the legal regulations of extraterritoriality, I [Moriya] find it difficult to agree to this proposal…As concerns the Taiwanese, this office will handle prosecution in good faith," Moriya was at pains to reassure his guest. But this caused a "change in the face of his visitor," who averred that all Taiwanese opium dens had to be closed without exception. Three months later on May 30th, Moriya relayed that, despite the continued protests of his consulate, the local Public Safety Bureau had persisted in investigating the dens under various pretexts. Although the investigations led to the temporary closing of the dens (only to reopen several days later), the new confrontations had given rise to a group of unscrupulous elements (J.: *buraikan*, C.: *wulaihan*) who had formed a violent group of

394. This was not the same as the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Waijiaobu*), but seems instead to be a holdover from the late Qing period, when provinces with significant foreign populations had offices to handle diplomatic affairs (*shewaiju*).

youths to resist the illegal entry by Chinese officials. Chinese locals, for their part, had responded by forming a group to counter this Taiwanese opposition.

The Nineteenth Route Army's rise to power in 1933, combined with its newfound ambitions in municipal governance, taxation, and opium eradication, challenged the sekimin by its attempts to reform the existing social order. Efforts to crack down on "no-good Taiwanese" by banning weapons and gaining a monopoly on violence were accompanied by larger legal transformations that would, as Miura feared, affect all Taiwanese, "no-good" or not. The Nineteenth Route Army's ambitions also challenged the existing social order by wresting jurisdictional authority from other sources: diplomatic authority claimed by the Japanese consul; institutional authority vested in the Taiwan Association and sekimin elites; and community authority held by resident elites, overseas Chinese (the Huang brothers) or those with a longer history in the city (Gensekai). These three groups—the Japanese diplomatic authorities, the Taiwan Association, and overseas Chinese elites—were at times at odds with one another. But members of all three groups recognized that the Army's consolidation of power portended that larger changes were afoot.

Although Chief Lin emphasized that Xiamen's Sino-foreign mixed residence was "especially complicated," echoing former Consul Sakamoto's opinion, this was perhaps only true from the vantage point of Shanghai. In Shanghai most "foreign" residents lived in the International Settlement, and the Municipal Council, an inter-imperial body of self-government, administered policing and local taxation (the French Concession had its own governing body, the French Concession Council). In Xiamen, in contrast, Chinese and "foreign" residents lived together and across the city, and the foreign residents did not have a Municipal Council

responsible for administrative functions.[395] The Municipal Council in Shanghai also served to limit the boundaries of its jurisdictional authority, in which the spatial boundaries of the Council's authority were circumscribed by the physical boundaries of the International Settlement. The lines between "Chinese" and "foreign" were not so clearly drawn in Xiamen, where the Army's attempts to tax and police all the city's residents regardless of national status, including Taiwan sekimin, hinged on a logic of jurisdictional authority based on a territorial understanding of sovereignty.

With significant changes on the horizon, Miura concluded a message to the Foreign Minister at the end of January 1933 with a proposal.

"This particular state of affairs of the prevalence of Taiwanese in Xiamen in illicit industries…is, in light of the circumstances of the home country [China] (*hongoku*), certainly not admirable. However, the more days I serve in this post, the more I understand that the relations between them and us (*higa*) have a thirty-year history, and have continued thus to the present day. There is no doubt that trying to eradicate them (the Taiwanese) overnight will cause a serious state of affairs for public safety in the future.[396][We should] maintain the present situation, preventing the increase in number and domination of these fellows (*tohai*), and when the opportunity presents itself at a later date to bring about a manufacturing industry, [we] can use this opportunity to lead them into proper industries and gradually look forward to adopting a policy of slow eradication [of their participation in illicit industries]. As this group makes up one in three of ten thousand Taiwanese, exercising force against their armed elements to prosecute them would, at the present moment, require many more times the number of personnel, and cannot be carried out at the moment. Fortunately, we are currently succesful in prosecuting [them] with only a few dozen consular police. We hope to reach a full understanding on this matter by increasing the psychological (*seishinseki*) pressure on them [the Taiwanese] without pushing them into self-despair and self-destruction."

Miura's proposal recalls the conundrum faced by former Fuzhou Consul Tamura in dealing with the Li Luyi case with paltry resources. Short of committing exponentially greater resources to the consular police force, there seemed to be no solution to the problems

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395. As mentioned, Gulangyu, the small island facing Xiamen, did have an International Settlement and a Municipal Council, but the majority of the Taiwanese lived on Xiamen island, and not on Gulangyu.

396. JACAR B02031446100.

exacerbated by the change in local municipal leadership. Miura's insistence that the Foreign Minister envision a long-term policy of paternalism prefigured transformations later in the decade, when elite Taiwan sekimin and Japanese consuls sought new ways to deal with the end of extraterritoriality in China.

That the position of the Taiwanese was at a particular crossroads which required greater investment of resources and personnel was a position Miura had voiced even before the rise of the Nineteenth Route Army. On June 9th, 1932, he wrote to Prime Minister and acting Foreign Minister Saitō Makoto (斎藤実, 1858–1936, in diplomatic office May–July 1932), complaining that the Taiwan Government-General was not pulling its weight in support of the sekimin. He wrote to the Minister,

> "what I only realized for the first time after arriving at my post and found surprising was that, in the past the Taiwan Government-General has not cared much for south China or the Taiwan sekimin… there is even considerably strong doubt cast on the basic theory of the existence of the various institutions that have been supported until now, causing unease and apprehensions about the sekimin. That business with China is a fundamental portion of our national policy goes without saying, now more than ever. As the Korea Government-General, South Manchuria Railway Company, and Kwantung Administration manage their own institutions, so should the Taiwan Government-General take responsibility for the execution of national policy towards south China…however, this [policy] is limited to the Government-General, or perhaps just one part of the Government-General, and is controlled by the opinions of just part…when you observe the internal state of affairs at the Government-General, there is almost no one at the official (*kanbu*) level who has any knowledge or conception of south China; it is not hard to believe that we are being pulled along by the information of only the chance two or three "South Seas ideologues" (*Nan'yō ronja*), or ideologues who treat the management of hospitals and newspapers as insignificant—in short, self-proclaimed experts."[397]

The changes in the portion of the Taiwan Government-General's budget allocated for subsidizing the empire's interests in the "Southern Region" (*Nanpō shisestu hi*) supported Miura's apprehensions about changing priorities in the colonial government: the total subsidies

397. JACAR B02031446000.

peaked in the early 1920s and in 1931 reached their lowest point since Yuchi's and Shimomura's institution-building spree in the late 1910s (see table below). This "Southern Region" was comprised of south China and Southeast Asia; the colonial government subsidized the former through institutional support of hospitals and schools and the latter with direct subsidies to individual enterprises and local organizations. Nakamura estimates that, of the total subsidies to the "Southern Region," 60% was allocated to south China, of which more than half went to subsidizing the Japanese Hakuai hospitals in the treaty-ports, with the remaining 40% of the total going to Southeast Asia, of which 60% was distributed as subsidies to individual enterprises, commercial and commodity research projects, and local organizations.

Taiwan Government-General Subsidies for the "Southern Region," 1915–1934

Year	Amount (yen)	Year	Amount	Year	Amount
1915	115,951	1922	848,876	1929	762,355
1916	115,495	1923	896,915	1930	688,072
1917	212,211	1924	896,915	1931	566,088
1918	296,277	1925	760,923	1932	582,263
1919	595,685	1926	753,273	1933	582,565
1920	737,695	1927	762,621	1934	582,682
1921	828,390	1928	762,698		

Reproduced from Nakamura, 19.[398]

Miura's suggestion in January 1933 that the Foreign Ministry commit to a long-term policy of industrial development can be read as a mirror image of his criticism of the Taiwan Government-General's paltry contributions to the goals of Japanese national policy in the post-Manchurian Incident era. The Foreign Ministry's China consuls had long "walked a tightrope

398. Takashi Nakamura, "Taiwan to 'Nanshi, Nan'yō,'" in Nihon No Nanpō Kanyo to Taiwan, ed. Takashi Nakamura (Tenri, Nara: Tenrikyō Dōyūsha, 1988), 1–33.

between the fluctuating but consistent domestic demand for greater Japanese dominance in China and the international pressure to conform to the more limited rules of the treaty system in China," as Barbara Brooks has shown.[399] Yet in the case of Xiamen, the "problems" posed by the Taiwan sekimin seemed to demand the path of greater investment and involvement, in this case not despite, but because of the "rules of the treaty system in China," which, in Miura's mind, committed the Japanese consul to the sole administration of the sekimin. Particularly troubling to Miura was the Government-General's lack of material support for local commercial activity, which, "in light of the basic principle of national policy, is unbearably alarming, and should not be carelessly overlooked."[400] Here Miura was again critiquing the established subsidy policies of the Taiwan Government-General, which had supported individual enterprises only in Southeast Asia, and there only those managed by ethnic Japanese (and not Taiwan sekimin). Miura's conviction that the challenge posed to the Taiwan sekimin by strengthened municipal administration in Xiamen could only be solved through coordinated efforts between the Government-General and Foreign Ministry would only be realized later in the decade after a realignment of power in the region.

The Problems of Opium and Gambling

Later in the summer of 1933, the tensions between the Xiamen Public Safety Bureau and the Japanese consulate came to a head with the Bureau's investigation of a Taiwanese-run gambling establishment. Consul Miura's report of the events provides a rare but instructive

399. Barbara J. Brooks, *Japan's Imperial Diplomacy: Consuls, Treaty Ports, and War in China, 1895–1938* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000), 79.

400. JACAR B02031446000.

example of Sino-Japanese jurisdictional conflict of the sort that became more frequent under the Army's administration over Xiamen. He wrote to the Foreign Minister:

> "Last night on [June] 29th, after seven in the evening, the Public Safety Bureau, the Public Security Group (C.: *Baoandui*), and the investigatory group (J.: *Tanteitai*) received information of a raid on a gambling facility, and went to inquire at the site. At the same time, the Consul dispatched a few [consular] police officers under Katō. Surprisingly, the home of several sekimin had already been entered, fifty armed public security officers were deployed, and fifteen or sixteen plainclothes officers had their guns drawn. They [the Public Safety Bureau?] kidnapped a few Chinese and confiscated the gambling implements—it was quite the extreme situation. I immediately called the head of the Public Safety Bureau and demanded his presence at the scene. He arrived two to three minutes after the investigation concluded. I accompanied the Bureau chief to the second floor [of the building] and directly cross-examined him; he said that it had been mistaken for a Chinese house. I sternly said that this house was Taiwanese, and that, as the Japanese consul, I could not stand by watching silently, whereupon he repeated '…' and so we could not come to a resolution. By around eight, everyone had been evacuated, and as a result the night fortunately passed without [the Chinese officials] putting a hand on the Taiwanese. Furthermore, around forty Taiwanese and Chinese who had escaped to the third floor (a residence) were not touched. In the presence of the Japanese consul, the rest of the night went by without further conflict. Several thousand onlookers gathered on the street in front of the house, and even small quarrels threatened to turn into a large incident. It was the first time I witnessed such a scene. This office was utterly disgusted by the audacious attitude and the indiscreet actions of the Chinese. If such unlawful investigations continue, it will surely weaken Taiwanese trust in Japan, and they [the sekimin] will no longer obey the restrictions (*seishi*) ordered by Japanese officials. I fully realize the difficulty in ensuring that the violent clique among the Taiwanese does not lead to conflict. I expect that we will sternly warn the Chinese side, but we can anticipate their objections and their saying that this is a matter they should carry out themselves. It seems simply impossible for us to anticipate any kind of self-reflection (*hansei*)."[401]

Miura's description of the Bureau's investigation of a Taiwanese-owned gambling establishment—unlawful entry, in his mind—illustrates the potential for conflict between the Bureau's and Consul's opposing conceptions of jurisdiction over Taiwanese gambling. Miura believed that property owned by Taiwanese alone—since many Taiwanese also owned property jointly with local Chinese—was under his sole jurisdiction, regardless of the people inside or the

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401. JACAR B02031446100; Lin's response of "…" is a blank space in the document, so I have interpreted this space as a tacit non-response.

activities they were engaged in. For Bureau chief Lin, on the other hand, the illegal activity of gambling and the presence of Chinese subjects, was more than enough to warrant entry and action. Despite professed commitments to "Sino-Japanese cooperation" from both Chief Lin and Consul Miura, occurrences like this suggest that their interpretations of the limits of the Bureau's authority were at odds with one another.

Miura reported another incident to the Foreign Minister later that summer, showing that attempts at Sino-Japanese cooperation had further deteriorated. Relaying an incident involving a beating, the consul expressed he was "keenly aware of the insufficient number of [consular] police in detaining the Taiwanese suspect, having relied on the army and patrol to arrest him." Rather than cooperate with the Public Safety Bureau, in other words, Miura had elected to draw on Japanese military officers to address the lack of sufficient staff in the consulate. This predicament exemplified a central intra-imperial struggle of the Foreign Ministry during the 1930s: to steer the goals of Japanese imperialism in China by wresting control from competing stakeholders, namely the military, while forced to rely on those very competing interests to carry out its goals. Yet if cooperation with members of the military was a necessary evil, by August 1933 when Miura wrote to the Foreign Minister, cooperation with Chinese officials was seen as a non-starter. He explained:

> "Although the Public Safety Bureau has repeatedly asked for our assistance, if we allow it even once, we will incite antipathy among the Taiwanese. Furthermore, in light of the increasing arrogance of the Chinese, we should refuse [their requests] and focus on our own efforts."[402]

Miura faced a circular problem. The less thorough the consular prosecution, the more Taiwanese would lose confidence in the consistency of consular jurisdiction. But the more

402. JACAR B02031446100.

consistent the consular jurisdiction, the more resources would be required of the consulate. He outlined the pressures on the consular police:

> "In order to monitor the ruffians (C.: *wulaihan*) dispersed across the city, we would need to form groups of three (it is dangerous for groups to have fewer than three people), and we would need at least ten groups. Enforcing such a policy would not only leave our own house empty and leave us short of hands to guard the police cell [at the consulate], but also render us unable to dispatch support groups in response to urgent reports, permitting no time for staff to rest during turnover [between shifts]."[403]

Miura's logic saw no alternative to the pressure on the consulate to monitor the Taiwanese, especially since he refused to cooperate with Chinese officials and only begrudgingly conceded to involving members of the military. The only solution was a strengthened consular police presence, so he proposed what sounds like a permanent standing police force to patrol the city. The problem was exacerbated by the dispersal of the Taiwanese across the city, not only increasing the number of personnel required to realize Miura's vision of a standing police force but directly challenging the Bureau's claim to sole sovereign jurisdiction over Xiamen. Miura credited the consular police chief with resolving the issue by "completing his activities boldly and sternly…having the tense appearance of someone who had not slept or rested." Miura maintained that on one hand, this "made the Taiwanese ruffians' blood run cold," and on the other "made the Chinese side trust us and unable to continue in their affairs as before." For all his entertaining Chinese proposals for "Sino-Japanese cooperation," Miura revealed that his hope for stability lay in intimidating the Taiwanese and disabling Chinese initiatives by garnering their "trust" through bureaucratic competence. He concluded his report by confiding in the Foreign Minister that he was "fearful that the Communists and Taiwanese will take advantage of this moment and instigate something, especially given the groundless rumors that have been

403. JACAR B02031446100.

circulating." The delicate situation in the province, where local Communists and the Nineteenth Route Army, not to mention the central government under the GMD, were contesting for power, further confirmed for Miura the need to strengthen surveillance and policing.

Earlier, Fujian Province was ruled by the GMD navy which was nominally responsive to the pressures of national-level administration, but in 1933, Fujian under the Nineteenth Route Army was both less subordinate to the national-level GMD, and more ambitious—and effective—in its attempts to use local power to extend administrative jurisdiction. Through the Nanjing consul, the Japanese Foreign Minister lodged a protest with Tang Yueliang, a Chinese diplomatic official based in the capital, about the anti-Japanese stance of the Nineteenth Route Army officials and the arrest of a Taiwan sekimin in October of 1933. Tang responded to the Foreign Minister, attesting that the Chinese Foreign Ministry had not received any notification of such activities, and claiming that the Fujian Provincial Government had prevented the Nanjing government from exercising its full authority. Tang promised that the government would issue a formal proclamation, but confessed that he thought it would be difficult for it to have any effect. In contrast to earlier attempts by the national government to consolidate authority over the economic and political activity of Xiamen's Taiwanese residents, the Japanese consuls in Fujian now faced a locally-powerful party with national-level ambitions. This situation left Japanese diplomats—on the ground in Xiamen and in the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo—unable to rely on diplomatic channels to resolve conflicts, while rendering obsolete previously effective local methods of conflict resolution.

Beyond the Treaty-Ports: The Nineteenth Route Army and Taiwan Sekimin in the Interior

The Nineteenth Route Army's control of Xiamen in 1933 built on changes initiated by the GMD centralization of power on the national level and transformed the administrative logic and jurisdictional scope of municipal government, threatening the legal and economic position of sekimin in the treaty-port. A a regional military force with more direct local capability than the national-level GMD, the Nineteenth Route Army's administration of Fujian also affected Taiwanese who lived outside Xiamen in other parts of the province. The first effects of this had appeared in the publication of *Taiwan* by Taiwanese Communists in Zhangzhou.

In May of 1933, a dentist from Shishi, a district in Jinjiang Province (part of present-day Quanzhou city, roughly 100 kilometers north of Xiamen on the coast) visited Xiamen Consul Tsukamoto Takeshi (塚本毅, in office April 1933–August 1935) and spoke with him unofficially about the state of affairs of local resident Taiwanese.[404] Shishi was, according to a 1935 survey, connected to various parts of Southeast Asia by no fewer than twelve private postal exchanges that facilitated the transmission of remittances. The district was one of many nodes connecting Fujian Province to overseas Chinese populations across Southeast Asia.[405] The Taiwanese dentist's description captured the recent effects of the Nineteenth Route Army on Quanzhou, whose Taiwanese residents were considered under the jurisdiction of the Xiamen consul, and provided a general snapshot of the Taiwanese who lived outside of the Fujian treaty-ports proper.

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404. "9 Taiwan sekimin kankei jikō chōsa hō ni kan suru ken 7," part of "Taiwanjin kankei zakken / zaigai Taiwanjin jijō kankei," JACAR B02031445700. Tsukamoto does not give any detail about the nature of his relationship with this dentist, nor does he explain why the dentist paid him a visit. Tsukamoto identifies the geographical scope of the dentist's report by indicating that he spoke about "the Taiwanese residing in that (same) area," (*dō hōmen kyojū Taiwan jin*) so here I assume he means the broader region of Quanzhou and not just the district of Shishi. It is unclear if the referent of "Taiwan jin" (Taiwanese person) was the dentist's or Tsukamoto's, but here I assume a deliberate distinction from "Taiwan sekimin," which would include local Chinese who held the status.

405 From Linkuan Zheng, *Fujian huaqiao huikuan* (Fuzhou: Fujian sheng mishu chu tongji shi, 1940), 69, quoted in Cook, "Bridges to Modernity," 227–8.

The Taiwanese population in Quanzhou was mainly composed of doctors with independent practices, followed by those engaged in commerce; in total they numbered around eighty people. Given their professional status, it is likely that these Taiwanese doctors, facing the institutional discrimination described by Miriam Ming-cheng Lo, chose to respond not by finding other jobs in the Japanese imperial realm but by moving to a part of China outside the orbit of Japanese colonial influence (like Xiamen, where the Hakuai Hospital was located) to operate independently. The Taiwanese in Quanzhou, the dentist continued, were not particularly oppressed by the Nineteenth Route Army officials, but, at least in the district of Shishi, formed a force to be reckoned with.

> "Recently, fellow Taiwanese have expressed interest in forming a (political) party to advance self-interest and contest for power, exchanging mutual hostilities. In the most extreme case, one Taiwanese has come to occupy the important office of Chief of the Shishi District Anti-Japanese Committee's Investigation Group. Another group of Taiwanese acquired [the business] of [someone surnamed] Hong, and secretly reported his [Hong's] dealings in and use of Japanese goods to the Anti-Japanese Committee, which led to his being severely punished. This was entirely in the pursuit of self-interest. Hong is also using this secret feud in pursuit of improper profit and greedily covets gain, and so on."

In an area under the direct control of the Nineteenth Route Army where, according to the dentist, Taiwanese were not facing pressure from the new administration, the Army's presence was nevertheless transforming the nature of political alliances in the city. Any individual report, especially one that hinged on vague accusations of "personal profit seeking," deserved scrutiny. Perhaps the dentist framed these individuals' ambitions as self-seeking because he sought to downplay the ideological nature of joining the locally-sanctioned Anti-Japanese Committee. The existence of a "Investigation Group," intended possibly to encourage community members to report on one another, might have especially troubled the consul by threatening to foment internecine conflict. This would be all the more troubling since Quanzhou lay indisputably

outside the consul's jurisdiction, despite Japanese pretenses to the area's Taiwanese residents still falling under his extended control. But the dentist's deliberate framing of the state of affairs as driven exclusively by self-interest (and by implication, not necessarily by ideological alignment with the Anti-Japanese Committee), underscores the plausibility of political realignment under the Nineteenth Route Army conditioned by but not solely reducible to anti-Japanese sentiment.

Over the summer of 1933, the Fujian consuls continued to receive Taiwanese visitors who confirmed reports of heightened tensions since the beginning of the year. The Nineteenth Route Army had raised the stakes of the position of Taiwanese in the province, and its Taiwanese residents had responded—in some cases by moving closer to the consuls and their directives, and in others, by allying themselves with the new forces in the province. On September 9th, 1933, Fuzhou Consul Moriya reported news of correspondence from one such visitor earlier that month named Huang Yufeng (黃玉峰), who identified himself as the chief of the Detective Group of the Pacification Office (*Suijing zhuren gongshu tanzhendui zhang*), and mentioned that he had previously been part of the Nineteenth Route Army. The Pacification Offices were instituted nationwide under the GMD to undertake the Party's ongoing mission of identifying and rooting out Communists across China. Given the reorganization of the Taiwanese Communists in Fujian in the 1930s, it would not be entirely surprising that a Taiwanese led the Detective Group, especially since there were a few Taiwanese who had attended Chinese military academies and ascended in the military hierarchy in China. Huang started his letter to the consul,

> "I came to China as a Taiwan sekimin and already six or seven years have passed without my having done anything to contribute to the Great Japanese Empire, which I find disgraceful (*chijoku*). I recently found out about the existence of the Taiwan Anti-

> Japanese Alliance and wanted to destroy this group in order to carry out my innermost desires to serve my country (*hōkoku no bichū wo itashitashi*)."

Although the "country" that stirred Huang's innermost desires referred to Japan, the goal of defeating the Taiwanese Anti-Japanese Group, many of whom had Communist leanings, united the Japanese consul and the GMD-controlled Pacification Office. Huang's personal history in the Nineteenth Route Army receives no further attention in the letter, which might have raised questions for the consul, given the Army's support of Taiwanese Anti-Japanese groups and activities in the region. Huang then recounted how, in an attempt to find out more about the Alliance, he had dispatched members of his office to secretly investigate them. Huang followed up his initial letter with a phone call on the 5th, and Moriya, troubled by this information, secretly sent a consular police officer, Liu Dehe (劉德和), to meet with Huang in private.

The Taiwanese consular police officer affirmed that Huang, registered as Huang Jusen (黃炬森), was originally from Takao county (*shū*), Chōshū district (*gun*) in southern Taiwan (C: Gaoxiong-zhou, Chaozhou-jun), and currently lived in Fuzhou. The officer confirmed that Huang was both a detective for the Pacification Office and a detective for the Nineteenth Route Army in its sixty-first division. As Huang told officer Liu, "In the first year of Showa (1926), I graduated from Guangdong Military Academy (J: *Gunkan gakkō*; C: *Junguan xuexiao*) and have since been in the Nineteenth Route Army. The whole time I have been living my life as a member of the armed forces and all these years I did nothing in service of Japan (*Nihon no tame ni kōken shitaru koto nakarishi*)." The present conjuncture had inspired Huang to "try his best to do something for Taiwan."

At the very moment, Huang attested, the head of the Anti-Japanese Alliance in Quanzhou, a well-known Taiwanese named Zhang Bangjie (張邦傑), was forming a "death squad" (J: *kesshi tai*) in a plot to kill the Japanese consul in Fuzhou.[406] Huang, seeking to capture Zhang, expressed his enthusiasm by offering to send four or five of his subordinates to Quanzhou. But his proposal to Liu came with a caveat: sending subordinates on a secret mission to Quanzhou would require providing for their later escape to Shanghai, and the subordinates—now sounding more like mercenaries—would want to be compensated for their travel and given an advance to guarantee their fealty. Liu, uneasy about handing over money beforehand, promised compensation after the fact. This incensed Huang, who now "did not even appear as if he was going to go through with the plan." Huang then approached the consul directly to demand the money, and his professed local intelligence sounded increasingly incoherent.

Growing suspicious, Consul Moriya contacted the locality in Taiwan where Huang was registered to inquire after his identity. He was, the local official confirmed, as reported: the nephew of Huang Renxian, born on February 27, 1904, and a graduate of Tainan Normal School. He had been expelled in his fourth year at the normal school, thereafter displaying a "violent disposition, dangerous thought, and a cunning [nature]." Later he had been hired by the Taitō Financial Affairs Office (*zaimukyoku*), but was dismissed after being found guilty of selling off wasteland at an exorbitant price. Consul Moriya also discovered that, though he went by his registered name, Huang Yufeng, in Xiamen, Guangdong, and Fuzhou, he was also known by the name "Huang Zhongda" (黃仲達) in Quanzhou—the city in which he reported his discovery of

406. Zhang (1897–1964) was a graduate of Waseda University and had joined the Taiwan Cultural Association and Taiwan People's Party in Tokyo. He later moved to Shanghai and then was active in southern Fujian during the 1930s. During the war, he continued to chair the Taiwan Revolutionary Alliance (*Taiwan geming tongmenghui*) and the Taiwan Revolutionary Party (*Taiwan gemingdang*), and returned to Taiwan after the war, where, after offending new administrative official Chen Yi, he barely escaped persecution in the February 28th Incident.

the Anti-Japanese Committee. As Zhongda, Huang had been engaging in the illegal import of sugar and marine products to Quanzhou, and had also appeared the previous month on the Xiamen consul's list of "Taiwanese to watch"—as a member of the same Anti-Japanese Alliance. What Huang had framed as fulfilling his duty of patriotism now seemed more like an attempt at resolving an internal feud. What could have accounted for Huang's apparent abrupt volte face, especially amidst the growing ideological stakes of anti-Japanese campaigns among the Nineteenth Route Army?

This was not the first time that Huang, as Huang Zhongda, had come across Xiamen Consul Tsukamoto's radar. Throughout the summer of 1933, Tsukamoto had been monitoring Huang's participation in the Anti-Japanese Alliance in nearby Quanzhou. Before exploring how Moriya in Fuzhou was able to match his Huang Yufeng/Jusen to Tsukamoto's Huang Zhongda, an examination of the surveillance of Huang's Taiwanese networks in Quanzhou suggests the depth of his connections there. Earlier that summer, anti-Japanese Taiwanese across the province were planning public events to oppose Japanese imperialism to coincide with the anniversary of Japanese rule on Taiwan on June 17th.[407] Contrary to the report from the dentist from Shishi that there was no unusual activity in Quanzhou in May, a detective dispatched there by the Xiamen consul reported that the local anti-Japanese group in the city had reorganized itself and had met on May 14th and again on the 28th at the residence of Taiwan sekimin Zhang Xiling (張錫鈴)—the given name of none other than Zhang Bangjie, whom Huang would later accuse of plotting to kill the consul. In addition to Huang Zhongda, the detective reported other Taiwanese, Chinese, and Korean members involved in planning the event. Japanese Foreign Minister Uchida,

407. Mentioned in "10 Shōwa hachi nen ni gatsu nijūichi nichi kara Shōwa hachi nen roku gatsu nijūshichi nichi," part of "Taiwanjin kankei zakken," JACAR B02031443700.

reviewing the report from Xiamen, underlined Zhang's name, underscoring his prominence as a left-wing anti-colonial activist. The Japanese detective suggested that the group was self funded through member contributions and donations, and also received funding from the local Quanzhou GMD Party, which was affiliated with the Nineteenth Route Army division stationed in Quanzhou, of which Huang was a member.

The group called itself the "Taiwan Anti-Japanese Alliance" (J: *Taiwan Han-Nichi Dōmeikai*; C: *Taiwan Fan-Ri Tongmenghui*) and published a call to action (C: *husheng*) and an "Anti-Japanese Declaration to the Opposed Peoples" (C: *Bei yapo minzu kang-Ri xuanyan*). The local Public Safety Bureau attended the group's meeting around the June 17th anniversary, as did representatives from the army division (C: *shibu daibiao, shibu tebie daibiao*), suggesting that local Chinese officials sanctioned the group's activities. Though the local GMD Party, controlled by the Nineteenth Route Army, appears to have ordered the formation of the Alliance, the Xiamen consul confessed in his communication to the Foreign Minister that he did not fully understand the Party's motivations. By the 27th, Moriya in Fuzhou reported discovering the Alliance's propaganda leaflets in the city, which had been sent through the postal system from Xiamen on the 16th and called for overturning the Japanese empire. Both Moriya and Tsukamoto remained on high alert.

The next month, on July 14th, Consul Tsukamoto reported discovery of a plot by Zhang Xiling, host of the Anti-Japanese Alliance, to purchase over two hundred Japanese-made "Mauser" guns from Tsunoda Motojirō (角田資二郎), a Japanese resident of Taipei, with the approval of the Nineteenth Route Army.[408] The consul also reported that local garrison troops in

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408. "11 Shōwa hachi nen shichi gatsu tsuitachi kara Shōwa hachi nen hachi gatsu nijuroku nichi," part of "Taiwanjin kankei zakken," JACAR B02031443800; the consul does not give additional information about Tsunoda and I have not been able to find any biographical detail about him or his relationship with Zhang.

Quanzhou had arrested Zhang on June 22nd on the basis of a tip that he had divulged the activities of the Anti-Japanese Alliance to the Japanese consulate and on accusations of smuggling sugar. Though Zhang was later released on the grounds of insufficient evidence, Tsukamoto reported the incident for the Foreign Minister's consideration, primarily because the accusation against Zhang had been lodged by Huang Zhongda, categorized as a "Taiwanese in need of surveillance."

What Tsukamoto at the time thought was only a minor detail allows us to reconstruct and resolve the entire case of Huang's actions across the summer of 1933 in the shadow of the Nineteenth Route Army. The Xiamen consul reported on August 26th that Huang and his erstwhile colleague, a Taiwan sekimin by the name of Zeng Linze, both members of Quanzhou's Anti-Japanese Alliance, had initially masqueraded as members of the Nineteenth Route Army "in an attempt to gain improper profit," before gaining formal positions as detectives in the sixty-first division.[409] Huang and Zeng had planned to import sugar and other commodities illegally from Taiwan, but a business dispute broke up their partnership and leaked the details of their charade to the broader Taiwanese community. Huang then murdered Zeng, but, facing no consequences, relocated to Fuzhou and found a position there as the chief of a plainclothes patrol squad (J: *bengitai chō*), later becoming the assistant head of a middle school. As the Xiamen and Fuzhou Consuls would only later discover, the same accusations that Huang levied against his former ally and host of the Alliance, Zhang Xiling—accusations of divulging information to the consul and smuggling sugar—were those of which Huang himself was found guilty. And this Zhang Xiling, better known to consular officials as Zhang Bangjie, was the given name of the

409. "12 Shōwa hachi nen ku gatsu yōka kara Shōwa kyū nen roku gatsu nijūku nichi," part of "Taiwanjin kankei zakken," JACAR B02031443900.

very person on whom Huang tried to pin a plot to murder the Fuzhou consul, and whom Huang sought to extort the consul for a fee to track down.

What brought Huang to Fuzhou is unclear, especially given his history of allying with—or masquerading as—local authorities as a shield for illegal business ventures. Perhaps he was aware of the Xiamen consul's surveillance of him under the name of Huang Zhongda, recorded as a member of Quanzhou's Anti-Japanese Group, and sought to transform his purported insider knowledge of the group into pecuniary gain, with the goal either of tricking the consul or defrauding Japanese authorities. Or perhaps his interest in the Anti-Japanese Group had been institutional, valuable for the relationships it conferred and confirmed with the Nineteenth Route Army in Quanzhou, and not ideological at all. It is unclear why Huang's relationships with Zeng Linze and Zhang Bangjie/Xiling soured so rapidly, but the break seems to be at the crux of the transformations in Huang's outlook and approach. Although it is tempting and perhaps reasonable to adopt the consul's conclusion that Huang was motivated solely by profit, his ability to move between the various groups—the Taiwanese in Quanzhou, the local Nineteenth Route Army, and the Japanese consuls—though not without arousing some suspicion, illuminates the liminal position that Taiwanese could occupy in Fujian in 1933. Perhaps Huang played many roles: he simultaneously sought to curry favor with local Chinese authorities in Quanzhou while he was conducting illegal import business; worked within the ranks of the Nineteenth Army in its intelligence department, making use of his position as a broker of information; navigated primarily left-wing and student-run Taiwanese anti-Japanese organizing groups; and sought to use his status as a Taiwan sekimin to lobby the Fuzhou consul on the basis of his patriotism.[410]

410. Huang appears one more time in the consular record, in follow-up communication from Fuzhou consul Moriya to the Foreign Minister at the end of that month, September 1933. Though Japanese intelligence had reported Huang's promotion to head of the secret investigations department (J: *mitsutanchō*) on September 25th, he appeared at the consulate the next day with a letter of dismissal from the same post, perhaps attempting to clarify his divided

Huang may have been playing every side, but the range of roles he could inhabit reflects the many different local political contexts that existed in Fujian in 1933.

Taiwan Sekimin Paramilitary Groups and the Rising Specter of Armed Revolt

A final locus of local authority affected the position of Taiwan sekimin in Fujian as the Nineteenth Route Army consolidated its power in 1933. Gao Yi (高義) was a local warlord who was born in Taiwan and relocated to Fujian after resisting the Japanese takeover of the island in 1895. Gao had risen in the ranks of the GMD's National Revolutionary Army during the 1926–28 Northern Expedition, a military campaign which saw the GMD, based on Guangzhou in southern China, defeat rival generals and local governments in central and northern China and consolidate control over all of central and eastern China.[411] But other local leaders in the province, namely the naval leader Yang Shuzhuang, based in Xiamen, and Cai Tingkai, who would become the leader of the Nineteenth Route Army, opposed Gao, forcing him to retreat to Anxi, a prefecture about 100 km inland from the coastal cities of Xiamen and Quanzhou. Throughout 1933, the Nineteenth Route Army, perhaps wary of its former adversary, remained suspicious that a number of incidents involving Taiwan sekimin were in fact plots orchestrated by Gao Yi to undermine the Army's authority. The Japanese consuls, for their part, initially insisted to their Army contacts that these accusations were absurd and in one case even laughed them off. In correspondence with the Japanese Foreign Minister, the consuls showed no sign of

loyalties. As Moriya confirmed, there was no way to know whether this dismissal order was real or a forgery. Though Huang was rebuffed at the consulate, the next day, September 27th, he tried to arrange a meeting with the new Fujian News (Min Bao) editor Matsunaga (松永) through one of his employees, Huang Qingjiang (黄清江; unclear if they were related), in an attempt to find a platform for "advocating and promoting his personal positions."

411. During the Northern Expedition, Gao Yi was named the brigade chief of the First Independent Brigade of the National Revolutionary Army under General He Yingqin, who would later become the War Minister.

concealing information from their Chinese colleagues, so it is unlikely that they were being deliberately obtuse or complicit in a possible plot. It is entirely possible that individual Taiwan sekimin had contact with Gao beyond the consuls' knowledge—recall the web of warlord networks sustained by Li Luji. Most significantly, in the absence of additional records, the Army's suspicion—bolstered by Gao's history of anti-Japanese resistance—cast doubts on the Taiwan sekimin and exacerbated fears that they constituted an insurrectionary force waiting to be mobilized.

Army officials suspected that Taiwan sekimin were Gao Yi's accomplices in the treaty-ports, planning to undermining the Army's municipal and regional authority under Gao's direction from the hinterland. Their suspicions became a driving undercurrent in conflicts between the Japanese consuls and the municipal Public Safety Bureaus as early as January 1933, shortly after the new Xiamen Public Bureau Chief came to power. When Xiamen Public Safety Bureau Chief Chen Guoying paid a visit to Xiamen Consul Miura in late January 1933, he relayed news that Gao Yi was plotting to muster Republican Chinese troops opposed to the Nineteenth Route Army to expel the Army from the province, and was soliciting Taiwanese aid. Miura dismissed such a plan to mobilize a mob (*ugō no shū*) as "fighting a heroic but losing battle" (*tōrō no shū*), and laughed it off, saying such a proposition was difficult to take seriously. Despite dismissing Chen's suspicion, Miura speculated that this story could be traced to an inquiry by the provincial official Lin Zhiyuan (friend of Li Luyi), made on behalf of Chiang Kai-shek in Nanjing, about whether the Japanese consulate was the staging spot (J: *sakugenchi*) for opposition to the Nineteenth Route Army. Although the Nineteenth Route Army and Gao Yi were both ostensibly allied to the GMD, the Army's mistrust of Gao contributed to the suspicion that the Taiwan sekimin, under the direction of disaffected local warlords and the Japanese

consuls, constituted a fifth column ready to invade Fujian, despite never having played a role in the province's many transfers of power.

These suspicions deepened throughout the year and, regardless of their truth, further exacerbated tensions in Fujian. At the end of May, Consul Moriya, while reporting that the Public Safety Bureau had persisted in entering and investigating Taiwanese-run opium dens, mentioned that Chinese officials suspected Gao Yi was marshaling Taiwanese organized resistance to Chinese search and entry.[412] A few days later in early June, Moriya received a report from a local Taiwan sekimin. On guard after having concluded his investigation of the Li Luyi case, Moriya warned his colleague in Xiamen that the Taiwanese had been informed by a friend who was a member of the provincial Public Safety Bureau:

> "We received a letter sent from Xiamen and addressed to the Fujian Provincial Government about a plan by Japan to occupy Fujian. In order to disrupt public order in the province, the Japanese consul gave Gao Yi weapons, and in Xiamen formed the sekimin into eight groups, the leaders of which are Li Yushu, Xie Afa, Ke Kuozui, Lin Gun, Wang Hai, Chen Ziming, Wang Changsheng, and Chen Jiang. They distributed twenty-six guns to thirty casinos, and six more guns to three hundred or so opium dens. The Japanese consuls are in total support of this plan."[413]

The paramilitary leaders this Taiwan sekimin informant named were well-known kingpins of Xiamen's opium industry who did not shy away from armed force, if only to protect their commercial interests. The recent crackdown on Xiamen's opium industry and its Taiwanese-run establishments by the Public Safety Bureau provides one explanation for fears that these armed Taiwan sekimin would retaliate with force—Fuzhou Consul Moriya mentioned earlier that the sekimin there were organizing themselves into a paramilitary force to resist

412 JACAR B02031446100

413 JACAR B02031443700. It is unclear from my reading of the source whether the Japanese consul or the eight paramilitary group leaders distributed the guns in Xiamen.

investigations by the Bureau. But extrapolating from these changes a grand plot by the Japanese consuls and Gao Yi to orchestrate a Japanese military invasion of the province seems unsubstantiated. The Provincial Bureau official further confided to his Taiwanese friend that the Provincial Government took the threat seriously enough to provide funds to secretly assassinate or arrest the plotters, including a budgeted bonus for killing and arresting others tangentially connected to the plot. The Public Safety Bureau had assigned secret investigators to monitor the Japanese consul, the Taiwan Association, and the Houyangli area of Xiamen, an area where the sekimin were reported to gather. The Public Safety Bureau found an accomplice in Fuzhou-based gang leader Lin Meisheng who had been recruited to investigate both Taiwanese and Japanese in the province.[414] In a further attempt to curtail Gao Yi's ability to muster resistance to the Army, Army leaders Cai Tingkai ordered the arrest of Gao and the seizure of his funds.[415] Perhaps these moves by the Nineteenth Route Army fanned fears of insurrection to mobilize support for eliminating a source of resistance to their municipal administration.

Moriya concluded that these revelations seemed like nothing more than a Chinese plot to "spread an evil rumor," but given the present "time of crisis" (*jikyoku*), it was difficult to dismiss without prudent investigation. Moriya admitted that the rumor could not have been fabricated out of thin air—it had to be rooted in some truth—so he warned Consul Tsukamoto to be alert for similar plots brewing in Xiamen. Regardless of their veracity, Moriya confessed worrying that

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414. Lin Meisheng is described in various *wenshi ziliao* as being the leader of a local "gangster group" (*liumang jituan*); see for example *Xiamen wenshi ziliao*, Vols. 1–2 (Xiamen: Lujiang chuban she, 1963), 70; *Fujian wenshi ziliao*, Vol. 20, (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1988), 166; *Fuzhou wenshi ziliao xuanji*, Vol. 9, (Fuzhou: Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi Fujian sheng Fuzhou shi weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao gongzuo weiyuanhui, 1989), 126.

415. "2 Shōwa hachi nen ichi gatsu nijūroku nichi kara Shōwa hachi nen jū gatsu jūyokka," part of "Taiwanjin kankei zakken / hogo oyobi torishimari kankei," JACAR B02031446100.

Chinese attempts to control the Taiwan sekimin might backfire or invite retaliation: “it seems that the violent elements will use this as a good opportunity to foment instability.”

Moriya also mentioned to Tsukamoto that the recent intensification of anti-Japanese protests and Public Safety Bureau raids on Taiwanese-owned opium dens had led some three hundred Taiwanese disreputables (C: *wulaihan*) to flee from Xiamen to Fuzhou. He reported a rumor circulating among the sekimin in Fuzhou about one such individual, Ke Kuozui, who was among those the Public Safety Bureau suspected of allying with Gao Yi to invade Fujian. The rumor held that Ke was preparing to submit a letter to Chinese authorities to incite their opposition, thereby creating a pretext for conflict, and that the letter had recently arrived at the Fuzhou Taiwan Association. Though the consul could find no evidence of any of this, the atmosphere of rumor and subversion was surely disturbing.

This was not the first time that rumor and misinformation threatened public order in Fujian; they were part of the political atmosphere. Perhaps the events of the Li Luyi case—in which a Taiwanese with connections to local warlords and members of the Japanese military had attempted to subvert both the Japanese consul and the new Provincial Government—made Moriya more circumspect about dismissing the possibility of a plot than Miura had been in Xiamen five months earlier. The Nineteenth Route Army’s rise to power only lent potency to the circulation of rumors and information in the province. Rumors of insurrections involving Taiwan sekimin drove budgetary and policy decisions by the ambitious Provincial Government; they influenced the Public Safety Bureau’s attempts to bolster investigations of Taiwanese-run establishments; they consumed the energy of the Japanese consuls in monitoring and investigating Taiwanese activity; and they made Taiwanese insider information of the sort Moriya received particularly valuable. Whatever their truth, suspicions of the sekimin in Fujian,

harbored by Chinese Army and Japanese diplomatic officials alike, drew on administrative and budgetary resources and heightened tensions in the province. What started as a dispute between Army officials and the Japanese consuls over the scope of police jurisdiction threatened to escalate into armed conflict with the sekimin at its center.

The Fujian Rebellion and Its Aftermath

In November 1933, the Nineteenth Route Army and its allies in southern China (Guangdong and Guangxi) rebelled against the GMD central government in Nanjing, declaring the independent Fujian People's Revolutionary Government. In his study of the rebellion, Lloyd Eastman locates the causes of the rebellion in growing discontent among the Nineteenth Route Army leader Chen Mingshu and his allies over Chiang Kai-shek's insufficiently anti-Japanese foreign policy. Frederick Litten, in contrast, suggests that Chiang himself triggered the rebellion by cutting payments to the Army, thereby offering the Army's commander, Cai Tingkai, an ultimatum to submit and lose face, or rebel.[416] In any case, the details of the Rebellion are well known and need not be repeated here. The suspension of payments to the Army by the GMD in the summer and fall of 1933 provide a plausible explanation for the Army's repeated insistence

416. Litten characterizes the conflict in the Fujian Rebellion as one between Chiang Kai-shek and Hu Hanmin, who throughout 1933 had been trying to engineer resistance to Chiang's regime. Forcing an enemy's hand with a strong offensive that set the terms of engagement, Litten argues, was a military tactic advocated by Sunzi. Though Hu Hanmin did not participate in the Rebellion (he condemned it for dividing the country at a time when foreign imperialism, i.e. Japan, posed a greater threat), he is central to Litten's account of the Rebellion, and is ancillary to the major actors of Chen Mingshu and Cai Tingkai in Eastman's account.

Litten uses diplomatic sources from Germany, France, and the United States, but not Japan. Though I have not had time to consult them, the Japanese Foreign Ministry also collected intelligence on the origins and demise of the Fujian Rebellion, under the file names "Fukken dokuritsu undō kankei," 2 volumes ([Materials] related to the movement for the independence of Fujian), and related files "Zairyū hōjin hogo kankei" (Concerning the protection of resident nationals), "Yoron narabi shinbun ronchō" (Public opinion and the tone of newspaper reports), and "Kokumin seifu no Fukushū kō hōsa mondai" (The problem of the Nationalist Government's blockade of Fuzhou port). These files, in part, form the basis of Masataka Matsuura, *"Dai Tōa Sensō" wa naze okita no ka: han Ajia shugi no seiji keizaishi* (Nagoya: Nagoya daigaku shuppankai, 2010).

on levying municipal and police taxes on Xiamen's Taiwanese residents, which exacerbated existing tensions with the Japanese consul, thus seeming to corroborate Litten's account. Nevertheless, given the Army's anti-Japanese reputation and general disposition, financial trouble seems like a partial but incomplete explanation for the Army's tax policies, which are better understood in the broader context of the national success of recovering Chinese tariff autonomy and reversing foreign extraterritorial privileges. The Army's foreign policy, which remained committed to abrogating the unequal treaties signed with the foreign imperial powers in order to recoup China's territorial sovereignty (revolution notwithstanding) and abolish extraterritoriality, professed that it was inheriting the GMD's earlier proactive stance vis-à-vis the foreign powers, which was revised after the Manchurian Crisis of 1931 in favor of the more conciliatory tactic of gaining political capital from Britain and the United States to pressure Japanese expansionism in Manchuria and northern China.[417]

On the last day of 1933, Miura entertained a number of local political figures who had come to Xiamen to encourage the Consul to take action against the Nineteenth Route Army in the city and the province.[418] Among the visitors was Yang Tingshu (楊廷樞), who served in

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417. For the Nineteenth Route Army's foreign policy, see Eastman, *The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927–1937*. For Chinese foreign policy in general between the Manchurian Crisis in 1931 and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, see You-Li Sun, *China and the Origins of the Pacific War, 1931–41* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993) , especially Chapter 2, "The International Approach to the Manchurian Crisis, 1931–1933."

418. JACAR B02031446000. The document appears out of date order and is annotated to note that it had been moved from "Shina chihō seikyō kankei zassan nan-Shi seikyō," Diplomatic Archives of the Foreign Ministry of Japan A.6.1.3.1-1. I have not had time to consult the original file location yet.

According to a note (431n32) in Tong, T.K., "China's Decision for War: The Lukouchiao Incident," in Ulman, G.L., ed. *Society and History: Essays in Honor of Karl August Wittfogel* (The Hague: Mouton, 1978), the Huang Fu papers contain a diary by "Li Tse-I" (possibly 李哲藝) spanning 35 days from December 14th, 1933 to January 18th, 1934, detailing correspondence between Li, "an expert on Japanese affairs," and "General Matsui" (whom Tong incorrectly names the "Governor of Taiwan"; he was Matsui Iwane, the commander of the Taiwan Army and a prominent pan-Asianist) and other Chinese leaders of the period, including Chiang and Huang Fu. Li's name does not appear in the finding aid of Huang Fu's papers.

various roles as the head commissioner of Siming Prefecture (in which Xiamen was located), the head officer of the GMD Navy's court system (C: *Silingbu junfa chu zhang*), and was a close confidant of Naval Admiral Lin Guogeng, being the "most trustworthy and powerful [person] in the military and civilian [worlds]." Accompanying Yang were Gao Yi, the marginalized local warlord who the Nineteenth Route Army suspected was behind Taiwanese resistance to Army rule, and Wang Changsheng (王昌盛), whom the consul described as a "Taiwanese drifter in Fujian politics" (J: *Fukken seiji goro Taiwan seki*). In short, these three represented the stakeholders in the balance of local provincial politics that had preceded the reassignment of the Nineteenth Route Army to Fujian. Their ultimate goal, the three proclaimed, was "Fujian ruled by the Fujianese." (C: *Minren zhi Min*). In contrast to the Nineteenth Route Army, whose leaders were all natives of neighboring Guangdong, Miura's three visitors envisioned a restoration of Fujianese to local positions of authority and advocated an alliance based on localism that included the Taiwan sekimin. To that end, they were soliciting the aid of the Japanese, and promised that, under their control, they would satisfy the wishes of Japanese officials. The three also mentioned, quite implausibly, that they had received the tacit approval of Chiang Kai-shek, who had had the intention for quite some time to reduce the power of the Army, which was, not to mention, presently in open revolt against the central government.

The three had come to report that they were taking advantage of Admiral Lin having taken leave to travel to Shanghai and Nanjing to occupy the Public Security Bureau, which by December was in effect the municipal government in Xiamen. Joining Gao Yi's troops with the naval officers remaining in Fujian, the coalition would, "avoiding violence as much as possible, form the 'South Fujian National Salvation Army' (C: *Minnan jiuguo jun*) to suppress the Nineteenth Route Army, not to resist the central government." The three visitors attested that Lin

had already secured the central government's consent for this course of action, and that they hoped merely to reinstate the old regime—that is, the Navy itself—into power. They were at pains to reconcile their military action within the umbrella of patriotism, defining their goals as "national salvation," and to differentiate their claims for provincial autonomy—bordering on regional self-determination—that were supported by the Japanese and sanctioned by the central government, from the Nineteenth Route Army's more revolutionary ambitions. Given their collective military experience, it is not surprising that the three had concocted a strategy to expel the Army not only from Xiamen, but from Fujian Province as a whole. Perhaps the three sought to anticipate the central government in opposing the Army's declaration of independence in order to gain leverage in determining the fate of the province, which in their vision rested on a localism that would restore the rule of Fujian to "Fujianese"—a designation that included Taiwanese. But what consul Miura may not have been expecting was that this strategy involved the Japanese, too. "The Army will probably lead a great number of troops from Songyu (嵩嶼, on the coast of the Chinese mainland, facing both Gulangyu and Xiamen islands) to Xiamen, coming to shell it. In order to save the city residents from the line of fire (J: *heika no chimata*), the Japanese, who have many residents in the city, should dispatch a warship to impede them. Furthermore, if the Japanese could supply weapons and ammunition, this would be even better." The three might have thought that their unique blend of local autonomy and patriotism would mobilize Japanese military support without alienating the central government. But needless to say, the Japanese consul did not lend support to local military forces in suppressing the Fujian Rebellion, nor did he supply them with weapons and ammunition. Although the alliance between the three visitors could have been forged by the exigencies of the rebellion, their partnership could have also preceded the outbreak, thereby confirming the Army's suspicion of cooperation

between Taiwanese and local military leaders, brokered by the tacit support of the Japanese consul. Though perhaps in part wishful thinking, their vision of a local government was predicated on and reflected the abiding appeal of a Fujian-based localism that included Taiwan sekimin, however fanciful.

By early January 1934 the GMD Army was on the offensive to quell the rebellion—first with air raids on Fuzhou and then with a naval blockade of the port—and the People's Revolutionary Government ended by the middle of the month. Chiang Kai-shek took great care to avoid injuring any residents with foreign subject status and any of their property holdings. He requested the evacuation of all foreign subjects, including the Taiwan sekimin, out of the city centers of Xiamen and Fuzhou, which, in Xiamen, involved the improbable task of relocating the city's some 10,000 Taiwan sekimin to the small island of Gulangyu, home to the International Settlement. Here again the pattern of mixed residence in Xiamen, where Taiwan sekimin held property scattered across the city, made it near impossible to avoid the destruction of foreign property. Chiang Kai-shek was aided in his military strategy by a spy who informed him of the Nineteenth Route Army's plans, which allowed him to anticipate the Army's every move. Nor did Army leaders receive the support they had expected from local leaders in Guangdong and Guangxi, who were nominally independent from Nanjing and anti-Chiang but reportedly bought off by a hefty bribe from the general and his promises to reward their loyalty after he suppressed the rebellion. From the rebellion's outset, the national press worked to reverse the Nineteenth Route Army's anti-Japanese reputation, accusing the Army of secretly drawing on Japanese support. But despite their desperate financial predicament, the Army did not avail itself of Japanese military or financial support, even when a Japanese admiral paid a visit to the Revolutionary Government to offer as much in person. And for all the Nineteenth Route Army's

fears of an uprising that would mobilize the Taiwan sekimin as a fifth column in the province, the rebellion passed without Taiwan sekimin joining the efforts of either side.

In the wake of the Nineteenth Route Army's collapse in the province almost exactly a year after coming to power, the central government took the opportunity to reshape municipal provincial administration. In May of 1934, the GMD appointed Wang Gupan (王固磐) as the new Public Security Bureau chief, and Chen Yi (陳儀) as the governor of Fujian Province.[419] Wang, who previously served in the Shanghai Public Safety Bureau and whom many overseas Chinese warily saw as a "long-time Chiang Kai-shek confidant," formally disbanded the municipal government that had formed during the rebellion.[420] Chen Yi, too, was a "Japanophile" and long-time supporter of Chiang, having been allied to him since 1927.[421] Neither of these new leaders was, as the GMD naval officials had hoped, members of the regime that preceded the Nineteenth Route Army. Nor were they natives of Fujian, thwarting the desires for "Fujian ruled by the Fujianese," a goal shared by many overseas Chinese. Cook identifies both these appointments as "an obvious rebuke to Xiamen's overseas Chinese and…obvious punishment for overseas Chinese support of the Fujian rebellion," while he characterizes the choice of Chen as a move "clearly designed to placate Japan."[422]

These appointments directly reshaped the existing administration of Fujian province and Xiamen city, the Nineteenth Route Army and its overseas Chinese supporters had dominated local politics throughout 1933. Xu Youchao, a prominent member of the overseas Chinese

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419. Cook, 436.

420. Cook, 436–7, quoting a *Jiangshengbao* article.

421. Cook, 436–7, quoting a *Nanyang Siang Pau* article.

422. Cook, 437.

community in Manila, had been appointed mayor of Xiamen in January 1933, elevated to administrative chief of Minnan District (around Xiamen) in December 1933 at the rebellion's outset, and, having played a role in garnering overseas Philippine Chinese support for the rebellion, was forced to flee China after the rebellion's failure.[423] Part of the overseas Chinese support for the rebellion, Cook argues, stemmed from their desire to promote infrastructural projects and industrial development under the banner of "south Fujian self-rule" and "national and village salvation," goals which had first been realized under the appointment of Xu as mayor.[424] Although the failure of the Fujian Rebellion had eliminated the Nineteenth Route Army from the province, it did not erase these locally-held aspirations for projects of infrastructural and industrial modernization. The linked goals of village and Chinese national salvation (*jiuxiang* and *jiuguo*, respectively), had been articulated in 1932 in an article written in a overseas Chinese national salvation periodical:

> "Now is the time for national salvation. Now is equally the time for village salvation...Jinzhou is already in Japanese hands, while Zhang Xueliang is pursuing a policy of non-resistance in Manchuria...Manchuria, Tianjin, Shanghai will fall into the whirlpool of Japanese domination. But our Fujian is in a far more dangerous situation. Fujian is only a short distance from Taiwan... Japan's construction of Gaoxiong since 1919 as a naval base was designed for the occupation of Fujian... We must devote our effort to national salvation movement, but it is equally important that we assume the responsibility of saving Fujian."[425]

For the author of the above article, national and village salvation was made all the more urgent by Japanese infrastructural development in Taiwan, which posed a more proximate and

423. See Cook. On Xu's (also known as Eduardo Co Seteng, 1900–1962) participation in the Fujian Overseas Chinese Village Salvation Society (*Nanyang minqiao jiuxianghui*), 390; on his appointment as mayor, 410–421; on his elevation to position of administrative chief, 427; on the marshaling of overseas Chinese support for the rebellion, 429–434; on being forced into exile, 437. Cook suggests that Xu's quick promotion to administrative chief after the proclamation of the Revolutionary Government suggests that he had been key in its planning and execution, see 427.

424. See Cook 417, 427.

425. Bingmin Wu, "Yu jiuguo tan dao jiuxiang," *Kangri zhuan kan*, No 2 (February 27, 1932), quoted in Cook, 405.

direct threat to Fujian than events in north China. Stripped of their allies in the Army, Fujian's overseas Chinese held little hopes for the future of infrastructural development-as-national and village salvation under the new GMD appointees, given their close ties to Chiang. How could they expect the pro-Japanese Chen Yi, most of all, to sense the urgency of infrastructure as national defense?

Although the new provincial administration under Chen Yi would prove to be conciliatory towards Japan, it did not abandon the goals of infrastructural development in Fujian. On the contrary, Chen Yi was eager to undertake these projects, but would do so through an alliance with the Taiwan Government-General. This alliance is usually credited to Chiang's pro-Japanese stance, but it could have also been envisioned as a move to neuter the provincial authority of the overseas Chinese, whose anti-Japanese politics and agitation of Chiang had led them to partner with the Army. Indeed, during the period between Chen's appointment and the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War (1934–1937), colonial Taiwan became a model for Fujian's industrial and agricultural modernization. This provided Japanese diplomatic and colonial officials on both sides of the Taiwan Strait with hope that economic cooperation was a path forward for Sino-Japanese relations in south China, even as continued hostilities in north China would seem to make such hopes unlikely if not outright delusional. If this regime change quelled the fears of Japanese diplomatic officials of conflict at the provincial level, it did not necessarily resolve all the tensions at the local level. Even after the turnover in the leadership of the Public Safety Bureaus, Taiwan sekimin in Xiamen and Fuzhou remained the targets of police investigations. Moreover, partnership between provincial officials in Fujian and colonial officials in Taiwan would come to render the intermediary role earlier played by Taiwan sekimin

unnecessary. It is to these changes brought in the aftermath of the Rebellion that the next chapter turns.

Chapter Five: Between Cooperation and Conflict, 1934–1937

Introduction: Chen Qingchang's Asia Comrade Society and Cross-Ideological Links

For some Taiwan sekimin in Xiamen, the period following the Fujian Rebellion presented an opportunity to forge ties anew with local and overseas Chinese elites. Perhaps wary of what was to come under newly centralized GMD control later in 1934, a group of Taiwanese led by Chen Qinchang (陳欽錩) formed the Asia Comrade Society (J: *A-Shū Dōshikai*; C: *Yazhou Tongzhihui*) in March.[426] The Society had among its members Taiwanese, Chinese, and Japanese, as reported in the *Taiwan Daily News*, and was engaged in improving all aspects of education and industry.[427] Committed to the "self-strengthening and self-improvement" (J: *jikyō jiryoku*) of the yellow race in the face of proclaimed racial inferiority, the society's founding declaration (J: *shushisho*) augured the coming of a "Second World War" (J: *Dai-ni sekai sensō*; C: *Di-er shijie zhanzheng*), and sued for world peace on the necessary condition of white-yellow racial equality. The society's declaration called for the unification of the yellow race to resist (J: *taikō*) the white race, and emphasized the importance of education in the progress of culture, along with (public) hygiene (J: *eisei*), physical education, health, and physical strength. Finally,

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426. The March founding date is quoted in a report from Shanghai consul Ishii Itarō (石射猪太郎) to Foreign Minister Hirota on May 7th, 1934, in "12 Shōwa hachi nen ku gatsu yōka kara Shōwa kyū nen roku gatsu nijūku nichi," part of "Taiwanjin kankei zakken," JACAR B02031443900. The report was itself a translation of an article, "The Hidden Worries of South China" (C: Huanan zhi yinyou) written in Chinese by young Taiwanese, Xie Nanguang (謝南光 his chosen name; also known by his given name Xie Chunmu 謝春木) in a daily newspaper in Shanghai (Ishii's report refers to it as a "*Chūgoku nikkan shi*" 中国日刊紙 and "*Tōchi hakkō kanji nikkan shi shinbunpō*" 統治発行漢字日刊紙新聞報). Though I have not been able to locate the provenance of the original article, it appears to have been reprinted in the Singapore-based *Nanyang Siang Pau* on May 14th, 1934 under the same title. See appendix for biographical details on Xie Chunmu/Nanguang.

427 "Taigan Amoi ni A-shū dōshikai Chin Kinshō kun ga soshiki junbi chū," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, April 29, 1934.

the society professed its commitment to regional development and production through a focus on communication, agriculture, industry, and commerce.

In light of the recent collapse of the Nineteenth Route Army and its short-lived People's Government, the declaration is noteworthy for two reasons. First, its diagnosis of future conflict along the lines of race, rather than along Sino-Japanese lines, was a repudiation of the Army's (and others', including the Taiwanese Communists') identification of the Sino-Japanese conflict as the existential crisis of the time. The declaration had obvious resonance with Pan-Asianist ideology that framed a coming conflict as a race war. But in the context of post-rebellion Xiamen, by elevating the category of race above that of nation, the society's Taiwanese leaders looked to position themselves as Sino-Japanese brokers and attempted to lay claim to leadership positions in the city's industrial development, a goal shared by the Japanese diplomats and local and overseas Chinese elites alike. With the collapse of the Nineteenth Route Army, perhaps Chen and his Taiwanese colleagues in the society thought they could win over disaffected overseas Chinese who had thrown their support behind the rebellion, or at the very least create an unlikely alliance to resist the uncertainty of the city's future under more direct GMD administration. The declaration characterized the society as a forum for resolving conflicts involving its members: "if someone questions the interests (J: *rieki*) of a member, that is, if it is the case that a member is dishonored, or if it is the case that a loan [from a member] is defaulted on, it should be reported to this society which will, in all cases, use its power to take responsibility for resolving the issue. Libel will be fought in writing, and force will be countered with force."[428] In its attempts to recover local elite autonomy over dispute resolution, the society's function recalled authority vested in municipal organizations like the Taiwan

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428. JACAR B02031443900.

Association or the Chamber of Commerce for which the Public Safety Bureau had slowly assumed responsibility after GMD centralization. That the society could promise protection and retribution by pen and by sword suggests its appeal lay in its institutional backing.

Chen's Society was one of many attempts by Taiwan sekimin to rediscover their place within Fujian's society and economy as the newly-appointed provincial government remade the province's administration following the Fujian Rebellion. This chapter examines the period between the failed Fujian Rebellion and the reorganization of the Fujian provincial government under Chen Yi in 1934 and the start of the Second-Sino Japanese War in 1937, when Taiwan sekimin saw their position in South China shift yet again. While some sekimin, like the members of the Asia Comrade Society, hoped for the return of economic and social development led by an alliance of sekimin, local, and overseas Chinese elites, such a vision of the sekimin in South China was at odds with new policies promoted by the Taiwan Government-General. Some criticized the Government-General's dormant South China policy as a neglect of its duties to the empire, a criticism that recalled one voiced by Xiamen Consul Miura in 1933. One such critic, Naitō Juntarō, an old China hand and Pan-Asianist with connections to right-wing societies in Tokyo and experience in North China, turned his attention to Fujian as a new site of elite-led economic development schemes, echoing the ambitions of the Asia Comrade Society. Such ambitions, coupled with a staggering number of social connections to elite sekimin in Fujian, threatened to undermine consular authority there. Despite their disagreements, however, most of those offering new propositions seemed to agree that the Japanese empire needed to return to a proactive policy of economic and industrial development in the province, and everyone seemed to believe that they were properly inheriting the mantle of connecting Taiwan to South China

from Kodama Gentarō and Gotō Shinpei, colonial administrators in Taiwan at the turn of the twentieth century.

The shift in 1934 took place amid an impending geopolitical crisis brought on by the Japanese central government's decision to let the London Naval Treaty expire in 1935, which would remove Japan's obligation to limit its naval armaments. The prospect of future Japanese development oriented around naval and maritime power focused attention on South China as the site for renewed Japanese influence. The consuls, for their part, remained hopeful that the Government-General would consent to subsidize their plan to move Taiwan sekimin into stable industries, such as agriculture. The colonial government, however, had its own ambitions, particularly as the new provincial government in Fujian seemed not just amenable to, but enthusiastic about collaboration, and eager to emulate colonial Taiwan as a model of development. In a series of meetings, the Government-General charted a new policy that would renew its focus on South China and Southeast Asia, but would do so through the newly-established Taiwan Development Corporation. The targets of development were no longer the treaty-ports, but agricultural and resource-rich areas, whose development would facilitate Taiwan's nascent industrialization. Taiwan sekimin, for their part, remained enthusiastic collaborators in extending the empire's reach in South China and Southeast Asia, but their ambitions were at odds with the goals set out by the Taiwan Government-General. Without subsidies, the Taiwan sekimin in South China had few prospects, as did the Japanese consuls there, who faced the additional hurdle of the gradual institutional marginalization of the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo in the mid-1930s. Finally, although the Government-General had turned away from a policy that prioritized Taiwan sekimin as Sino-Japanese intermediaries that would

channel Japanese interests, two of the most elite sekimin remained hopeful until the eve of war that brokering a peace with China might be possible.

Without a full roster of the members of the Asia Comrade Society, it is impossible to determine who else was in this new coalition mustered by Chen, or what their social networks were. The article, discovered by the Shanghai consul, only states the society had among its founders "ten odd well known gentlemen"; twenty odd supporters, including a "Mr. Tan" (譚某) and the Buddhist priest of the local Nanputuo temple, Changxing (常惺); and around one hundred members, including members of the intelligentsia class (C: *zhishi fenzi*). But Chen himself was not a longstanding resident of Xiamen with existing social and kinship ties like many other Taiwan sekimin of the type one might expect to head such a society. Although he counted among his titles one of a director (J: *riji*) of the city's Taiwan Association, Chen was also a dispatched employee (J: *shokutaku*) of the *Taiwan Daily News*, and had only recently received his doctorate in literature from Taihoku Imperial University.[429] He was therefore of the

429. The consular report translating the article by Xie Chunmu reports that Chen listed these three credentials (*katagaki*) on his name card. Xie (1902–1969) had been educated in Taiwan and had been a member of the Taiwan Cultural Society and later the Taiwan People's Party. His increasingly left-leaning politics led him to seek a way to move to China in the late 1920s, but the colonial government refused to issue passports to members of his family. After the People's Party was disbanded in 1931, Xie moved to Shanghai, where, in 1932, he founded the *Hualian tongxunshe*, a publishing house dedicated to disseminating news that was critical of Japan and Japanese imperialism, and which received subsidies from the GMD government. He joined the Overseas Chinese Federation (*Nanyang Huaqiao* lianhehui) and changed his name in 1933 to "Nanguang," or "Southern Light." He remained a trenchant critic of the Japanese empire after relocating to Chongqing with the GMD after the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War, when he published *The Demands of Taiwanese* (Taiwanjin no yōkyū, in Japanese) and *The Decline of Japanese Imperialism* (Riben zhuyi de moluo, in Chinese). For details in consular records about Xie's activities in China, see "13 Shōwa kyū nen hachi gatsu jūyokka kara Shōwa kyū nen jūni gatsu nanoka," part of "Taiwanjin kankei zakken," JACAR B02031444000; "14 Shōwa jū nen ichi gatsu tōka kara Shōwa jūichi nen ku gatsu nijūyokka," part of "Taiwanjin kankei zakken," JACAR B02031444100; and "3 Shōwa kyū nen san gatsu nijūichi nichi kara Shōwa jūsan nen hachi gatsu hatsuka," part of "Taiwanjin kankei zakken / Taiwan jin hakkō no shinbun,

strata of Taiwanese with close ties with the Japanese diplomatic infrastructure in Xiamen, and with close ties to the Taiwan Government-General as well, through his appointment by the *Daily News*. And he was highly credentialed: he was the first Taiwanese to receive a doctorate from Taihoku Imperial University, a colonial institution established in Taiwan in 1928 which highly preferred Japanese students, and in literature, no less, a humanities field ordinarily foreclosed to Taiwanese.[430] Such a credentialed individual could plausibly have been an ally of the Government-General, which makes his quick rise to power in the Taiwan Association all the more notable.

Perhaps it was these qualifications that aroused the suspicion that the society was nothing but a ploy by the local Japanese consul to smooth over Sino-Japanese conflict after the rebellion. The Shanghai Consul Ishii Itarō (石射猪太郎, in office 1932–1936) relayed that he had caught wind of a theory that the society had been created under the direction of the consul and placed under the responsibility of the Taiwan Association in order to "cause [Chinese] compatriots (J: *kokujin*) to forget their enemy with the pretexts of goodwill and a war that would divide white and yellow."[431] No records from the Xiamen consulate either corroborate or refute this theory, but given the consul's scrutiny of the Taiwan Association's economic activities and the tense geopolitical and local context following the rebellion, it is likely that the consul was involved in giving the association at least his tacit approval. And despite the rallying cry that the society sought to delude Chinese into forgetting about Sino-Japanese enmity, the consul reported that the society counted among its members those affiliated with the GMD, Socialist Party, and

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zasshi sono ta kankōbutsu kankei," JACAR B02031446700.

430. See the appendix for biographical details about Chen Qinchang.

431. JACAR B02031443900.

Communist Party, all treated equally regardless of party affiliation. The inclusion of left-wing elements seems particularly unlikely, given that the commitment to anti-Communism often seemed the only point of agreement between Japanese diplomats and GMD officials. Despite the thin historical record of the society's activities, it suggests that following the Fujian Rebellion, elite Taiwan sekimin remained hopeful for the possibility of organizing political groups across ideological lines on the municipal level. With the rise of connections between provincial officials in Fujian and colonial officials in Taiwan, however, such municipal-level organizations faced increasing marginalization in the view of Japanese officials as crucial intermediaries in building Sino-Japanese relations.

The Persistence of Taiwan Sekimin-Public Safety Bureau Conflict over Opium and Gambling

Even after the GMD reorganized the municipal government in Xiamen, conflict between the Public Safety Bureau and the Taiwanese "armed group" persisted over the issues of Taiwanese-operated opium and gambling establishments. At the end of June 1934, a member of the Taiwan Association approached Xiamen Consul Tsukamoto to report that someone had thrown a bomb at the hotel managed by Xie Afa, a sekimin and the head of the "so-called armed group."[432] This group was "extremely agitated by having been continually challenged, and year after year there was the danger that the Tai-tan Incident would break out again," as Tsukamoto reported to the Foreign Minister, recalling the 1924 clash between Taiwan sekimin and local warlord forces under Zang Zhiping. In the consul's estimation, underlying the issue was the "complicated relationship with Chinese officials." But the Tai-tan Incident, which pitted sekimin

432. JACAR B02031443900.

in the drug and gambling industries against warlord Zang's military police over the question of entertainment taxes, had occurred over ten years ago in February 1924, and since then Xiamen had seen numerous changes in municipal governance. So what could account for the consul's fear that such a threat persisted? Tsukamoto detailed the course of events as follows.

> "I proceeded by investigating the immediate conditions of the above incident, [and found that] on the night of [June] 21st, someone had thrown a bomb at the store named 'Siyichun' (四宜春), which was managed by Chen Qingmao (陳清茂), the head of the investigation office of the Public Safety Bureau.[433] The culprit remains unclear. Chen had investigated a gambling establishment managed by a Taiwan sekimin on the 20th, and he explained that this was retribution for the actions of the Taiwanese armed group. As for the Taiwanese, they explained that Chen had dispatched his subordinates in this bombing incident as retribution (which seems plausible), and so the Taiwanese were infuriated. After this, several of the Taiwanese armed group carried guns and loitered in front of Siyichun, and so as a preventative measure Chen put sandbags in front of the store to send a warning to the Taiwanese. At the same time, Chen was rumored to have dispatched his subordinates to secretly kill Xie Afa. Ever since the Tai-tan Incident in 1924, the feelings (J: *kanjō*) between the two have not been fully resolved. Not knowing when another great conflict could come, the city dwellers were extremely anxious."

If the diplomats had any hope that the replacement of the Nineteenth Route Army by the GMD would ease tensions between disreputable Taiwanese and the anti-Japanese Public Security Bureau, they were sorely mistaken. But in the same way that the Army's crackdown on gambling and opium establishments in Xiamen could be explained by the Army's shortage of tax revenue, Tsukamoto understood what might otherwise be interpreted as an ideological or ethnic conflict as the recrudescence of a decade-old personal grudge between Xie Afa and Chen Qingmao. Chen Qingmao had risen in the ranks to become the chief of the investigation office in the new Public Safety Bureau, but he had a longer history, in fact, as a ruffian himself. Chinese

433. For Tsukamoto's report, see JACAR B02031443900. Chen Qingmao is identified as Qingmu in Xiamen shi zhengfa zhi bianweihui, ed., *Xiamen zhengfa shishi: Wanqing minguo bufen* (Xiamen: Lujiang chubanshe, 1989). See also Zifeng Zhou (Chau, Chi Fung), *Jindai Xiamen chengshi fazhan shi yanjiu, 1900–1937* (Xiamen: Xiamen daxue chubanshe, 2005).

sources identify Chen, also known as Chen Qingmu (陳清慕) as the head of the "inner city faction" (C: *chengnei pai*) of street gangsters (C: *jiaotou liumang*). Chen was able to maintain control over a prominent part of the city on account of his familial relations: among his paternal cousins were Chen Ruiqing (陳瑞清), head of the Xiamen Chamber of Commerce, and Chen Yuncai (陳允彩), a deputy at the Imperial Maritime Customs office. Siyichun, the target of the bombing, was the nucleus of his local center of control, near Qiaoting (橋亭) Street in Xiamen's central commercial district. Despite the purportedly "pro-Japanese" resumes of the provincial and municipal government's new leaders, the situation on the ground remained characterized by conflict, largely as a result of continuity in local and lower-level personnel.

Fujian As A Home For Elite-Led Economic Development Schemes

In the fall of 1934, the Shanghai Consul Ishii wrote to Foreign Minister Hirota Kōki to report the machinations of two Japanese individuals affiliated with the newly-formed, Tokyo-based "Ichiichikai" (*One-One Society*) named Tsunoda Kiyohiko (角田清彦) and Naitō Juntarō (内藤順太郎).[434] The consul noted that Tsunoda and Naitō had traveled to China several times in the past two years. There, they had appealed to several well-placed individuals and formed a number of associations with prominent figures in infrastructural work in Fujian province, including Lin Xiongzheng (of the Banqiao Lin family), Gu Xianrong, and Zheng Xu (鄭旭).[435] Tsunoda and Naitō were planning to use Taiwanese and pro-Japanese Chinese to forge

434. "13 Shōwa kyū nen hachi gatsu jūyokka kara Shōwa kyū nen jūni gatsu nanoka," part of "Taiwanjin kankei zakken," JACAR B02031444000, from October 12, 1934.

435. The consul uses the term "Fujian (infrastructural) work" (Fukken kōsaku), which is the same term used by Tsunoda and Naitō themselves, which I will explain below.

relationships with individuals on the ground, Ishii warned. Among those dispatched by Tsunoda and Naitō in 1934 was Chen Zhangchu (陳張楚), a Taiwanese living in Tokyo. Chen departed Japan for China in September, claiming he was Chinese, and stopped in Shanghai for three nights before proceeding to Xiamen.[436] In Xiamen, Ishii reported, he visited the city's prominent overseas Chinese Li Shuanghui (李雙輝), Huang Shijin (黃世金), Huang Yizhu (黃奕住) and the head of the Xiamen Taiwan Association, Chen Changfu (陳長福). From Xiamen he traveled to Fuzhou, where he met with provincial government officials, before returning to Shanghai, where he spoke on the topic of the role of the Ichiichikai in promoting infrastructural work in Fujian.

Ishii appended a pamphlet from the Ichiichikai with a transcription of a speech detailing its future aspirations, which provides a hint as to why the consul found their activities suspicious and potentially threatening.[437] "In the past, our infrastructural work in Fujian has been done in secret, so we have adopted a number of names for our groups, but recently we have come to use the name 'Ichiichikai.' Finally, as we have been looking forward to, we [will] put the control of guiding Taiwan and southern China, separated by only a body of water from Taiwan, under our direction, for the benefit of the emperor." Chen's declaration appeared to subvert the jurisdictional authority of the Foreign Ministry in Fujian and the Government-General in Taiwan, and it also suggested that the Ichiichikai had been building its clandestine coalition and

436. Consul Ishii gives Chen's home address as Taihoku-shū, Taihoku-shi, Hōrai-chō, 63 banchi, and his current location of residence as Tokyo, Akasaka-ku, Aoyama-minami-chō, 6-83. His home address is in the Dadaocheng area of Taipei, along the Tamsui (Danshui) River, which was the main commercial area of Taipei that developed in the late nineteenth century after Tamsui was opened as a treaty port by the Treaty of Tianjin (1858).

437. Ishii does not note where (presumably) Chen gave this speech or its audience, though given his location in Shanghai, I assume this is the location.

connections for quite some time, escaping the notice of the diplomatic consuls. Chen's speech continues:

> "This time I traveled to China for the purpose of observing, researching, and making connections. It is difficult to sum up the future infrastructural work of the Ichiichikai. But as for our first plan of action: despite Fujian's roads being relatively complete, the advances of the Red Army and the appearance of local bandits have led to the closure of forty some odd overland transportation routes. Transportation of goods from the interior by civilized means of transport has always been impossible, so the province has become impoverished and the provincial government has fallen into dire financial straits. [The provincial government] is utterly worn out trying to support governmental [functions], and has split into a central [government] faction and a Fujian faction, which are mutually opposed and unusually discordant. Locals (J: *dochakumin*) worry for the future and hope for the province-wide suppression of rampant rebels. Our Association will work for the protection of the livelihood (J: *seikei hozen*) of the people of the province. If we fully embrace this [task], infrastructural development in the province will be simple. First, in order to command power over transportation, [we] must win over the local bandits of the violent faction, and prepare against the Red Army. After this, [we will] invest capital to promote industry, and as a matter of course, will gradually consolidate power over all areas, including transportation, local security (J: *chian*), and industry."

Chen's speech suggested that the Ichiichikai had forged links with officials in the provincial government and had received permission to intervene in its functions to overcome internal strive among its members. Merchants lost commercial revenue due to infrastructural stoppage, which led to intra-provincial conflict and impeded the livelihoods of the "locals" (*dochakumin*) on whose behalf Chen claimed to speak. Chen's solution suggests that the Association's work in the province would culminate with all provincial infrastructural power relying on and resting in the grasp of a quasi-parastate composed of capital-rich elites. Combined with Chen's ambitious itinerary, replete with meetings with capital-rich, infrastructure-oriented Taiwan sekimin and overseas Chinese elites, the aspirations of the Ichiichikai appeared both formidable and subversive. Local conditions had contributed to diminishing overseas Chinese influence in municipal and provincial government. Perhaps the Ichiichikai could funnel capital from Japan and forge an alliance with the overseas Chinese on the basis of their shared goal of

development. Such a plan would provide the overseas Chinese elites an opportunity to revive the infrastructural projects of road and railroad building and industrial development of the sort to which they had been committed before the Fujian Rebellion.[438]

A pamphlet published earlier that year in August by Naitō Juntarō, also known as Naitō Wainan (内藤隈南), one of the leaders of the Ichiichikai, gives further context to the formation of the Association, its infrastructural and economic goals in Fujian, and its web of connections with local Taiwanese and Chinese in the province. The pamphlet, part of a series published by the Tokyo-based "National Policy Club" (*Kokusaku kurabu*), introduces Naitō as a member of the National Policy Club and a regular officer of the "Foreign Comrade Association" (*Taigai dōshikai*). Naitō wrote the pamphlet after returning from a trip with Tsunoda to Shanghai, Taiwan, Fuzhou, and Xiamen in the summer of 1934, likely one of those remarked on by Consul Ishii later that fall.[439] Titled "The National Policy of 'Northern Defense and Southern Advance' (*Hokushu nanshin*) and Taiwan and Fujian," the publication reads more like a travelogue than the basis for a new national imperialist policy that aimed to reorient Japanese ambitions from northern China and Manchuria to southern expansion from Taiwan and Fujian.[440] Filled with the "passion for greater East [Asia] as one heart, and Asia as one family" upon his return, his visit to Fujian convinced him of the necessity of Japanese-led infrastructural development in Fujian, for its own sake and for the national defense of Taiwan. By anchoring his vision for "southern

438. See James A. Cook, "Bridges to Modernity: Xiamen, Overseas Chinese, and Southeast Coastal Modernization, 1843–1937" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, San Diego, 1998).

439. The diplomatic archival record does not seem to have noticed or remarked on Naitō's summer trip to China as it was happening.

440. Whether the Japanese empire should focus on military operations in the "north" (i.e. north China, Manchuria, and Siberia) or the "south" (south China, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific) was not new—it was an ongoing debate as old as Japan's modern military, with members of the army advocating the former and members of the navy the latter (because each strategy determined which branch of the military would receive priority in funding and prestige).

advance" to a critique of the policies of the Taiwan Government-General and the Foreign Ministry, Naito's pamphlet, like Chen's speech, suggested that the Ichiichikai sought to offer an alternative path that would link the development of the Fujian and the Taiwan.

As he details by way of introduction, Naitō started his career in Taiwan in 1895, at the time when the Japanese empire had just consolidated rule over its new colony. "It was here [Taiwan]," he reminisces, "where I, in youthful pursuit, first took my first step in a foreign land."[441] His nostalgic return suffused his account with romanticism and enthusiasm. Echoing descriptions of Taiwan by diplomatic official Ueno (1891) and Governor-General Katsura (1896), he describes the island as "the gate of the empire's southern advance; Taiwan, blessed by heaven and eternal summer…a place which evokes deep feelings within us."[442] Naitō's first trip in 1895 had been cut short by a bout of tropical illness, leaving him to spend the intervening 39 years "in service of the empire's northern defense," likely as a roving "continental adventurer" (*Tairiku rōnin*) of the sort that were supported by secret societies and provided local intelligence to the Japanese military. In these years, Naitō had published a number of works on Chinese society and politics for a Japanese audience, many through the East Asia Society Publishing Company (*Tō-A Sha Shuppansha*), with titles including *Disputes in the Textile Industry in China* (Shina no bōseki sōgi, 1925), *Returning from Observing a Chaotic China (*Konran no Shina wo mite kite*,* 1926), *Japanese and the Development of Manchuria and Mongolia* (Man-Mō no kaihatsu to hōjin, 1927), *Japanese and the Peculiar Characteristics of Manchuria and Mongolia* (Man-Mō no tokushusei to hōjin, 1928), and *The Bloody Liquidation of Manchuria and Mongolia (*Man-Mō senketsu no seisan, 1931). Despite his long absence but with no shortage of

441. Juntarō Naitō, *Hokushu nanshin no kokusaku to Taiwan oyobi Fukken* (Tokyo: Kokusaku Kurabu, 1934), 1.

442. Naitō, 1.

experience, Naitō had returned to Taiwan eager to begin spending the rest of his years "devoted to the policy of southern advance."[443]

Naitō framed his vision of southern advance by placing the island colony in a regional economic and political perspective. "From the viewpoint of the state (*kokka*), Taiwan is not solely the problem of Taiwan. A policy contented with ruling Taiwan by separating it from the mainland, while [colonial] bureaucrats merely belabor (*akuseku*) account books piled up on the table, is extremely wrongheaded (*i o enu*)."[444] In Naitō's estimation, the colonial bureaucrats and their approach to ruling Taiwan were at the root of failed policy—not only in Taiwan but in Fujian as well. Their concern with bureaucratic knowledge production over popular conditions on the ground was but one manifestation of the attitude of "revering the bureaucrats and denigrating the people" (*kanson minpi*), which Naitō characterized as the fundamental ethos of the colonial ruling class in Taiwan.[445]

The ultimate example of this approach to colonial governance, Naitō argued, was the unchecked power and scope of the police in Taiwan. Apart from a small, elite subset of industrial and educational priorities, day-to-day governance lay entirely in the hands of the police. He singled out the colonial government under Governor-General Izawa Takio (伊沢多喜男 1869–1949, in office 1924–26) for critique: although it had paid lip service to a certain vision of "self-rule" (*jichi*), what use would such a policy be in practice if the Government-General did not first curb the power of the police? "A system of self-rule that is dictated from the top down and

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443. Naitō, 2.

444. Naitō, 12.

445. Naitō was not the first to use this phrase to critique the bureaucratic ethos of prioritizing the bureaucracy over the common people (min); Fukuzawa Yukichi, in the essay collection Fukuō hyakuwa (福翁百話), wrote "we scholars have been debating people's rights and equality (*jinken byōdō*) for quite some time. This is because "revere the bureaucrats and denigrate the people" goes against the essence of this argument (ronshi)." (Essay 99, 1897).

ignores old customs will merely destroy beautiful customs, and one need not wonder how it will work in practice,"[446] answered Naitō. Lacking the system of legal household registration (*koseki hō*) of mainland Japan, colonial Taiwan relied entirely on a population registry (*kokō*, C: *hukou*) compiled by the police. Such a registry recorded the "native place" of Taiwanese, which colonial police used to reinforce divisions in subjects between those whose ancestors had migrated to Taiwan from Fujian and those from Guangdong, even if their grandparents had been born on Taiwan. Categorizing colonial subjects by their ancestral provinces—"You are Fujianese! You are Guangdongnese!"—would not but reinforce in them the consciousness of being Chinese.[447] The reliance of colonial police on the *hokō* (C: *baojia*) system of mutual accountability, based on an older imperial Chinese model and that was "envisioned upon and sustained a [Chinese] ethnic consciousness," was another source of contradiction.[448] Such a system contravened the colonial government's professed desire to assimilate (*dōka*) the Taiwanese. No good could come of a system that reinforced its subject's "original Chinese consciousness" under the empire-wide push to promote Pan Asian ideology, Naitō declared.

But how was this critique of colonial policy in Taiwan ultimately related to the empire's fate in Fujian? For one, Naitō believed that Taiwan could not be ruled in isolation from a policy that took into consideration the island's position in the regional political economy and its relationship with China. On a more immediate level, Taiwan's system of harsh policing had already impelled many Taiwanese to flee to the mainland. Many others, seeking to escape the systemic discrimination and high prices in the island colony—yet another indictment of

446. Naitō, 4.

447. Naitō, 7.

448. Naitō, 7.

bureaucratic mismanagement—sought official positions or business opportunities in Manchuria or the South Seas (J: *Nan'yō*; C: *Nanyang*).[449]

> "How is it that officials can be so boastful while enacting such bad policies? The [Taiwanese] islanders, who are blood descendants of the brave Zheng Chenggong and are filled to the brim with the savage blood of the Southern Fujianese (*Min*) people, have not raised even a single revolt (J: *banzai sawagi*)? The police would say, of course, that this is due to the perfection of policing. But in reality, the blessing of natural resources means that many can make a living and put food on the table (*kutte ikeru*), and because the sun does not only shine on Taiwan (I.e. there are other places in the world), those who [perceive] unfairness go to China, Manchuria, and the South Seas in search of free realms."

Naitō's description of China, Manchuria, and the South Seas as lands of opportunity, which relies on his description of these locations as "free realms" (*jiyū na tenchi*) blessed by ample natural resources, further underscores his critique of Taiwanese bureaucratic ineptitude. Naitō's concern that the movement of Taiwanese to China, especially those disgruntled with colonial administration, would undermine colonial rule recalls Yuchi's two decades earlier. But whereas Yuchi's proposed solution lay in extending colonial police jurisdiction to China, Naitō identified the police and the entire colonial bureaucracy as the root of the problem. In contrast to Yuchi's suspicions that Taiwanese migrants were prone to violence or revolution, Naitō lamented that the Government-General had not harnessed their rugged and entrepreneurial spirit. If Yuchi was hopeful that the Government-General could direct the empire's expansion in China, the current colonial administration in Taiwan offered Naitō no such hopes.

449. It is unclear what specific geographic referent Naitō means when he uses the term Nan'yō/Nanyang; in Chinese the term usually denotes the areas of present-day "Southeast Asia" settled by ethnic Chinese who maintained commercial relations with southeast China, whereas in Japan the term could mean either Southeast Asia broadly or the South Pacific mandate, occupied by Japan after World War I. In this case the ambiguity seems to work in favor of Naitō's romantic, nostalgic attitude towards Taiwan's tropical climate and geographic position as the gateway to the south.

In addition, Taiwan's most effective administrators had always governed it with an eye to its position in the wider region. Naitō saw his Ichiichikai as inheriting the mantle of this historical destiny.

> "Under the regime of Governor-General Kodama (Gentarō) and head of civilian affairs Gotō (Shinpei), Taiwan was ruled as the foothold of operating a 'South China-South Seas' (*Nanshi Nan'yō*) policy. The South China-South Seas policy was ultimately an all-China (*zenshi*) policy, and [also] an all-Asia policy. People call Nan'yō our maritime lifeline (*waga umi no seimeisen*).[450] Therefore, isn't Taiwan the throat of this maritime lifeline? If the throat is infected with the cancer of 'revere the bureaucrats and denigrate the people,' and cannot swallow nutrients, [then we] cannot maintain this maritime lifeline."

Reviving Kodama's and Gotō's ambitions for Taiwan at the center of imperial policy—not just in south China but all of China, and not just Southeast Asia but all of Asia—was made all the more acute by the impending "1936 crisis" (*kiki*). The crisis referred to the upcoming London Naval Conference that would convene the world's imperial powers to renew international treaties limiting naval buildup, which, by early 1934, Japanese officials had already decided to abrogate.[451] British maritime shipping lanes connected Hong Kong to the rest of the south China coast, and American aviation lines extended from Shanghai to the coast and interior of Fujian, from which Taiwan was within beckoning distance. With Japan poised to refuse limits on naval armaments, the sea, particularly around south China, seemed like a likely site for future conflict with the Anglo-American powers. If existing Japanese policy had left this conduit

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450. The language of the "(imperial) lifeline" was not new; it was used to describe Korea, before and after annexation, see Peter Duus, *The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895–1910* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). It was also used to describe Manchuria and later Manchuria-Mongolia, see Young, *Japan's Total Empire*. 88-95, and the contemporary publications of Shirō Satō, *Manmō shinkokka to waga seimeisen* (Dalian: Manshū bunka kyōkai, Tokyo: Kaibundō shoten, 1932), and Bukyōsha, ed. *Seimeisen Manmō: shigen to fūzoku* (Tokyo: Bukyōsha, 1932), and on the maritime lifeline, see Kaigunshō, ed. *Umi no seimeisen* (Tokyo: Kaigunshō kaigunji fukyūbu, 1932). The navy could possibly be the "people" (hito) that Naitō quotes as speaking of the "maritime lifeline."

451. On the London Naval Conference of 1936 and the malleability of crisis (*kiki*), see Sandra Wilson, *The Manchurian Crisis and Japanese Society, 1931–33* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 67.

infected with the cancer of bureaucratic hubris and alienated the empire's Taiwanese subjects, how could they be brought back in and made a central part of imperial ambitions and national security in a time of crisis?

Though Japanese officials like Kodama and Gotō had once conceptualized Taiwan as the locus of Japanese expansion in China and across Asia, Naitō implied that the Government-General had lost its mandate and had failed the empire's ambitions. Japanese imperial expansion had indeed focused on continental military expansion in northeast Asia, led by the Army, over maritime expansion in southeast Asia. Recent events since the Manchurian Incident only seemed to confirm this trend. But with limits on Japanese naval build-up set to expire, the Japanese empire would soon face the consequences of the neglect of south China and Southeast Asia by the Taiwan Government-General, Naitō warned.

Like the "Cross-Strait Management" once proposed by Gotō and Kodama, Naitō's proposal put Taiwan sekimin and their capacity to broker Sino-Japanese relationships at their center. Whereas Gotō and Kodama had based their understanding of Taiwan's relationship to China on the economic, political, and personal connections between the two in the late Qing period, Naitō's conception drew on a more distant history of the seventeenth century. His proposal, devised with Tsunoda would bring Japanese, Taiwanese, and Chinese into a spiritual union (*seishinteki ketsugō*) and would require a unifying figure like Zheng Chenggong (1624–1662, also known as Koxinga), who counted among his qualities many germane to Naitō's vision.[452] Zheng and his family were merchants and militarists that ruled over a maritime expanse that spanned the East and South China Seas. Like the Dutch East India Company, whom

452. The literature on the Zhengs is voluminous, but one recent example that places the Zhengs in a regional early modern context is Xing Hang, *Conflict and Commerce in Maritime East Asia: The Zheng Family and the Shaping of the Modern World, c. 1620–1720* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

they rivaled and sometimes surpassed in fortune, the Zhengs' combined military prowess with commercial acumen, and their power extended beyond Chinese coastal commercial networks to link Japan, China, and Southeast Asia. The authors of the *Special Pamphlet* published in 1933, examined in the previous chapter, also fashioned themselves as the inheritors of the legacy of Zheng, who they rather understood to be a Chinese hero who had expelled foreigners from Taiwan and returned it to Chinese sovereignty.

Zheng Chenggong's mother was Japanese and his father from Fujian, making him in Naitō's mind the physical embodiment of such a "spiritual union." Well known for his fierce loyalty against difficult military odds, he expelled the Dutch from Taiwan, which, for Naitō, amounted to freeing the island from the occupation of white people. Though the Zhengs were ultimately defeated by the Qing empire, bringing Taiwan under the control of a Chinese empire for the first time, their legacy had imprinted the importance of Taiwan in geopolitical strategic terms on the region's ambitious imperial powers. Most crucial for Naitō's present needs, the memory of Zheng's accomplishments had been sustained through myth and superstition at the popular (*minkan taishū*), and not the official, level.[453]

While Naitō's discovery in Zheng an antidote to the empire's geopolitical and economic woes might seem like a quirky curiosity easily dismissed, the figure of Zheng is a motif that structures the remainder of his travelogue in China. Zheng was central to Naitō's understanding

453. After visiting Kaizan Shrine, built in the late Qing period (1875) as Kaishan Kingly Temple (*Kaishan wang miao*) to commemorate Zheng's expelling of the Dutch from Taiwan and repurposed as a Shinto shrine under Japanese rule in Tainan to take stock of the popular myths and superstitions that sustained the cult of Zheng in Taiwan, Naitō and Tsunoda set off for Fuzhou. The temple's name, "Kaizan" or "Kaishan," means "opening the mountains" and was a direct reference to the civilizational modernization program embarked on by the late Qing state in Taiwan named "open the mountains and pacify the barbarians" (*kaishan fufan*), started in 1875, the same year the temple's structure was overhauled and rebuilt in the style of a Fuzhou ancestral hall (*ci*). On "kaishan fufan," see Chapter 1 and Emma Teng, *Taiwan's Imagined Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures, 1683–1895* (Cambridge, Mass: Distributed by Harvard University Press, 2004).

of the future of Sino-Taiwanese-Japanese relations. First, relations had to be forged on an interpersonal level; second, relations had to be sustained through popular support rather than by official sanction. Naitō remarked that Zheng's ambitions lay not only in ruling Taiwan and south China, but extended across the South China Sea, seeking to unify southern China with Annam (Vietnam), Burma, Siam, and the South Seas islands, and were thwarted only by his untimely death. In this sense, the Japanese empire was the natural heir to Zheng's ambitions; Zheng's spirit, in heaven, "eagerly and endlessly awaited the coming of a great man."[454] If Zheng offered an ambitious example for the Japanese empire, he also provided a warning. One of his generals, Liu Guoxuan (劉國軒), had concluded that Taiwan was a land "full of wild beasts and without a king," and could not be ruled on account of its wild terrain.[455] But Liu's understanding was in error, and one that the Japanese empire was currently—but could not afford to continue—repeating. The error in question was attempting to separate Taiwan from Fujian and rule them separately; success in one determined success in the other.[456]

After traveling to Fujian, it was in Xiamen that Naitō encountered the most significant obstacle to this vision of regional hegemony: the Taiwan sekimin engaged in illicit businesses including opium and gambling. Naitō and Tsunoda stayed one night at the Fuxing Hotel, managed as a side business by the local casino proprietor Lin Gun. Lin, like Xie Afa, was one of the "armed faction" that commanded the disreputable sekimin as a quasi-paramilitary force in Xiamen. Naitō describes Lin as "possessing ten or so wives, concubines, servants and maidservants (C: *qiqiepubi*) [and] not tiring of an extravagant lifestyle." Lin was, however, a

454. Naitō, 24.

455. Naitō, 24. This echoes many characterizations of Taiwan, or at least portions of it, made by Chinese officials during the Qing dynasty. See Teng, Taiwan's Imagined Geography.

456. Naitō, 31.

good host: he set out *majiang* tables where his two guests could repose from the summer heat, while the casino's kingpins and their lackeys gambled the night away. Naitō suspected that this hospitality was not unusual: examining a recent publication of the local Taiwan Association, he noticed a photo of Japanese diplomat Sugimura Yōtaro on a recent visit to Xiamen in the company of the Association's sixteen officials (J: *giin*), some thirteen of whom were either casino proprietors or smugglers of opium and morphine. These illicit industries were an inappropriate basis for Japanese policy in Xiamen, Naitō insisted, and were unworthy of the city's older name "Siming," which, meaning "remembering the Ming," recalled Zheng's loyalty to the dynasty. "I cannot presume to know the feelings of dignified visitors to Xiamen (*rekireki no shisatsusha*) upon their return [to Japan], after being welcomed and treated to a feast and hearing the interest of Taiwanese in the strategic policy towards Fujian" said Naitō.[457] What perturbed Naitō, however, was that, although naval admiral and aide-de-camp Kobayashi (Kengo), who was also then in Xiamen, had received a proper welcome from the Taiwan Association, Naitō himself had been treated to a "sad dinner" with only the naval captain and consul present, despite mentioning that he had come on the direct orders of the Emperor. "'But of course,' I thought," Naitō concluded, insinuating his hosts' snub constituted lese majeste. Though his declaration that he came under the Emperor's orders was at odds with his assertions elsewhere that he was in Fujian merely as a concerned member of the public and not in any official capacity, his implication was clear: linking Taiwan and Fujian would need more than the military men offered the consulate's highest welcome; it required unwavering devotion to the Emperor and imperial policy.[458]

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457. Naitō, 27.

458. Naitō insisted that he was undertaking the task merely as a concerned member of the public (minkan no yūshi),

In the context of his insistence that Japan-Fujian ties be forged at the interpersonal and popular levels, Naitō's disdain for the Japanese official class in Fujian is an extension of his contempt for colonial officials in Taiwan. His bitterness at the snub was directed equally at the consulate's official guests and its disreputable hosts, the opium-peddling sekimin. "There is no need for infrastructural work in Fujian to rely on such lawless and unreasonable operations or illogical schemes," he chastised the consuls by association. The consular police in Xiamen were just as complicit in the failure of Japanese policy in China as their counterparts in Taiwan: they were harsh on the city's "good subjects" (J: *ryōmin*), but they not tolerated the likes of Lin Gun, but in some cases were too afraid even to look the worst of the ruffians in the eye. Naitō might have been unaware or dismissive of the fact that Xiamen consul Tsukamoto shared his disdain for the preponderance of Taiwanese in illicit industries. It is easy to imagine how, for Naitō, who saw Japanese policy in Taiwan as the basis of policy in China and across Asia, the preponderance of illicit Taiwanese political and economic activity in China could make the prospects of defending Taiwan in the threat of the 1936 crisis seem utterly futile.[459]

Naitō concluded his travelogue by encouraging Japanese policy in Fujian to pivot to revive models from the past, including interests in the Xiamen-Zhangzhou railway and the Anxi mines. The railway had been successful under the direction of Chen Baochen (陳寶琛), an elite Taiwan sekimin and in-law of the Banqiao Lins who now worked under the orders of the Japanese puppet emperor of Manchukuo, Puyi. Largely financed by the capital investment of Chen's older sister's son, Lin Xiongzheng, of the Banqiao Lin family, the railway was proof that the empire could revive its fortunes in Fujian by collaborating with knowledge- and capital-rich

and not as a scholar. Naitō, 14.

459. Naitō, 24.

Taiwanese. Reviving the railway could spur the whole region's economic development, which had suffered from plummeting remittances from Southeast Asia since the onset of the Depression. The plan could receive a further boost if the Chinese government acceded to Japanese requests to open Zhangzhou as a treaty port (C: *zikai shangbu*).

Naitō's blueprint for the future was modeled on reviving infrastructural development projects from the past and increasingly antiquated economic models like the treaty-port, which might seem like a hopeful anachronism in the context of GMD commitment to treaty revision in the 1930s. But Naitō's optimism in positioning Fujian as a model for Sino-Japanese collaborative projects that relied on Taiwanese, overseas Chinese, and perhaps even Japanese capital investment demonstrate that the centralization of GMD power over Fujian in 1934 had not foreclosed these transnational, imperial ambitions, but rather seemed to enable them. Perhaps most remarkable was Naitō's conviction that the GMD central government and its provincial chairman Chen Yi, committed to a policy of pacifying internal threats before resisting foreign invasion (C: *an nei rang wai*), would acquiesce to, if not actively collaborate with, Japanese plans in the province.

For Naitō, reestablishing the linked economies of Taiwan and Fujian was a matter of historical destiny. He quoted a letter from his friend, Matsui Tetsuo, reaffirming that, "when Taiwan was split from Fujian [in 1895], both Taiwan and Fujian suffered setbacks. From the official perspective, Taiwan has certainly developed, but before we [Japanese] were dispatched to Taiwan, Taiwan and Fujian were always a so-called bloc economy. Zheng Chenggong split Taiwan and Fujian apart in the past, and…if we fail to achieve greatness in China will also not escape the example [set by] Zheng."[460] By using the language of "bloc economies," and by

460. Naitō, 32.

drawing on the historical antecedents of Taiwan under Zheng and the Qing empire, Naitō underscored the economic urgency of revitalizing and strengthening Taiwan's economic interdependence—not with Japan, but with Fujian. "Only by utilizing the past accomplishments of the Taiwanese…and reviving the economic bloc between Taiwan and Fujian…will we see the rapid progress of the true qualities of the Japanese national policy of 'northern defense and southern advance,'"[461] Naitō concluded.

Although Naitō's plans would never come to fruition, the Taiwan Government-General and the Foreign Ministry consuls were, at the very same time, debating many of the ideas he proposed. These ideas ranged from the revival of a regional economy centered on strengthening the economic and political links between Taiwan, south China and southeast Asia, to finding ways to eliminate the local power of disreputable Taiwanese in gambling and the drug trade. Naito's proposals and those considered by colonial and consular officials, though uncannily similar, had one major difference. Naito had lost faith in the capabilities of the various imperial bureaucracies to direct policy and placed his hope instead in the people of Fujian and Taiwan. Colonial officials, however, would soon reach the opposite conclusion: namely, that only through large-scale ventures under direct state control could the Japanese empire reach its goals of regional economic expansion. The turn by the Government-General to large-scale ventures caught consular officials off guard: the new strategy eschewed the politically, economically, and socially complex treaty-port cities, where the economy was based primarily on commerce, for new locations in southeast Asia, where the Government-General looked to couple agricultural commodity and resource extraction with industrial progress in Taiwan. In this sense, the

461. Naitō, 28–29.

Nineteenth Route Army's rise and fall, and increasingly systematic attempts to exercise jurisdiction over Taiwan sekimin in the treaty-ports, contributed to the emergence of a pro-Japanese provincial government. This development allowed the colonial government in Taiwan to forge official links with Fujian while ignoring the situation of Taiwan sekimin on the ground, and perhaps adding to the Government-General's growing conviction that the jurisdictional and administrative problems posed by the Taiwan sekimin, combined with the rising capacity of the Chinese state, were more trouble than they were worth.

The 1934 Consular Meeting and the Officials' View of South China

In early 1934, after the dust of the Fujian Rebellion had settled and the province had come under new provincial chair Chen Yi's administration, the Taiwan Government-General called for a meeting with the south China consuls to be held that summer.[462] The meeting brought together consular, diplomatic, and colonial officials for the first time in a decade, with the last meeting having taken place in 1924. The minutes of the three-day affair were taken in considerable detail, making it an ideal vantage point from which to study the relative positions of the south China consuls and the growing tension between the Foreign Ministry, Taiwan Government-General, and regional military and corporate leaders.[463] The 1934 meeting was, like its 1916 counterpart examined in Chapter 2, an opportunity to discuss future policy in the region

462. The meeting was originally scheduled for June 14th to 16th to coincide with the anniversary of Japanese rule on Taiwan (June 17th), but was postponed to July due to a visit to south China by the Japanese aide-de-camp.

463. See "5. Shōwa kyū nen do / Bunkatsu 1," part of "Ryōji kaigi kankei zakken/Nanshi ryōji kaigi," JACAR B15100143100 for the correspondence exchanged prior to the meeting; the detailed minute records of the meeting (except for the afternoon of the third day) were later printed and distributed by the Taiwan Government-General, which can be found in "7. Shōwa jūichi nen do," part of "Ryōji kaigi kankei zakken/Nanshi ryōji kaigi," JACAR B15100143500. The meeting is also covered in Kondō, *Sōryoku sen to Taiwan: Nihon shokuminchi hōkai no kenkyū*. 79–89.

at a critical juncture. It reveals colonial and diplomatic officials' understanding of the impact of the Fujian Rebellion on the future of Japanese policy in the region. As in the 1916 meeting, the agenda for the 1934 gathering was determined by suggestions offered by its attendees. Xiamen Consul Tsukamoto Takeshi, for example, proposed that the Government-General establish both a "Foreign Affairs Bureau" (*gaijika*) to produce the specialized knowledge necessary to guide Japanese policy and to direct the facilities the colonial government supported in south China, and also a central military organization in Taipei for the Japanese navy to coordinate the exchange of military intelligence.[464] The persistence of irregular commercial relations between Taiwan and the mainland had underscored the need to articulate an economic policy for trade and cross-strait relations. For Tsukamoto, the economic downturn in Taiwan that had prompted many Taiwanese to seek opportunities on the mainland only made the need to coordinate policy decisions all the more urgent. More Taiwanese were crossing the strait, via both sanctioned (steamship) and quasi-sanctioned (junk boat) channels, Tsukamoto reported to the Government-General. The passport system had not been reformed to account for the treaty-ports' long-term residents who had fallen through the cracks of numerous updates to the colonial population registry, and more Taiwanese sought to buy land in China but were disappointed by the colonial government's poor institutional support for doing so. These frustrations were exacerbated, Tsukamoto said, by competition with the overseas Chinese capitalists who had "returned" to Xiamen in recent years and dominated the local economy and government, demonstrating the long-term effects of the rapid urbanization and land speculation in Xiamen examined in Chapter 3. The newly

464. Between 1909 and 1924, the Government-General had a "Foreign Affairs Bureau" (*gaijika*) that handled a wide range of responsibilities, including the management of foreigners, the overseas travel of Japanese for business, translation of foreign documents, foreign trade and maritime affairs, diplomatic negotiations, and Chinese affairs. In 1924, the Bureau's responsibilities were curtailed, and many of them were distributed to other bureaus under existing departments.

reorganized municipal and provincial governments provided an opportunity, made urgent by the economic crisis, to chart out a new policy for Fujian.

In many respects Tsukamoto's proposals for the 1934 South China meeting in Taipei reflected his assessment of Xiamen's conditions, which he wrote in a report on the eve of the Fujian Rebellion in late 1933.[465] Although his 1933 report was largely descriptive and his 1934 proposals prescriptive, they both displayed Tsukamoto's understanding that the treaty-port was Taiwan's, and therefore the Japanese empire's, link to China.

One feature that distinguished Xiamen from the other treaty-ports was the number of "Chinese by birth" (*seirai*) who had naturalized as subjects of foreign empires, namely the "sekimin." There were "English sekimin" and "Portuguese sekimin," but far outnumbering them both were the some 10,000 "Taiwan sekimin" who were subjects of the Japanese empire. Warlord rule of Xiamen until 1926, reliant on Taiwan sekimin for tax revenues, had permitted and cultivated their thriving opium economy. At the same time, regional instability had sustained local militias in the city (the sekimin "armed faction") and in the region at large, which were increasingly at odds with the ambitions of overseas Chinese and their Nineteenth Route Army allies to reform and modernize the infrastructure of Xiamen and Fujian. Tsukamoto's assessment of local politics in Xiamen suggests that he anticipated the larger context for the Fujian Rebellion. His understanding of local conditions in Xiamen and Fujian in late 1933 also formed the basis for his proposals for the 1934 meeting and his vision of reforming the place of the Taiwanese in the treaty-port's society and economy. Whereas many Taiwan sekimin had, in the 1920s, thrived in Xiamen's opium and other quasi-legal economies condoned by the warlord government, they should now be provided with small loans or agricultural subsidies by the

465. See "Amoi," part of "Zai-Shi kōkan kannai jijō hōkoku zassan dai gokan," JACAR B02031679800.

Government-General to pursue respectable livelihoods in farming or business. His suggestion to subsidize the transition of Taiwan sekimin from disreputable to proper industries recalls the January 1933 critique of former Xiamen Consul Miura, who, faced with the stringent attempts by the Nineteenth Route Army's Public Safety Bureau at exercising jurisdiction over the city's disreputable sekimin, concluded that the only solution lay in their gradual transition to manufacturing or a similarly proper industry guided by the consulate.

In attendance at the July 1934 "Meeting to Discuss Cross-Strait Consular Affairs" (*taigan ryōji uchiai kaigi*) were the consuls from Fuzhou, Xiamen, Hong Kong, Shantou, and Guangdong, in addition to diplomatic officials representing the Foreign Ministry's East Asian Bureau (*Tō-A kyoku*), China legation, and officials from the Ministry of Colonial Affairs (*Takumushō*). Representing the interests of the Taiwan Government-General were officials from the secretariat (*kanbō*), the colonial court, and the Industry (*shokusan*), Police, Finance, Education, Communications (*kōtsū*), and Monopoly Bureaus. In contrast to the 1916 meeting attended only by two consuls and representatives from the colonial government, the range of colonial offices in attendance at the 1934 meeting and implicated in the crafting of south China policy indicates the many faces of colonial policy to which it was tied. Also in attendance were representatives from the Bank of Taiwan, the Huanan (Kanan) Bank (financed by the Banqiao Lin family), and the Osaka Shipping Company (*Osaka shōsen kaisha*), demonstrating the expansion, if modest, of Japanese economic interests centered on colonial Taiwan, and members of the military, who played a largely observatory role but were periodically called on to answer questions. Taiwan Governor-General Nakagawa Kenzō (中川健蔵, 1875–1944, in office 1932–1936) opened the meeting by declaring that Taiwan and south China ought to be the pioneers (*senkusha*) of "strengthening economic links between the countries of the East, and especially

between China and Japan, to bring about co-existence and co-prosperity (*kyōzon kyōei*)."[466] Nakagawa spoke of the contemporary moment, reminding his audience of the establishment of Manchukuo (1932), Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations (1933), and the impending "crisis of 1935–36," when the London Naval Treaty limiting Japanese naval build-up was due to expire. His convictions—that Sino-Japanese economic relations were central to preserving regional peace and stability, and to be pursued through institutions such as schools, hospitals, and newspapers—could be traced back to the earliest days of Japanese colonization of Taiwan. Their rearticulation in the context of rising militarism in the mid-1930s makes Nakagawa's conviction that a South China policy be pursued jointly by the Foreign Ministry, Taiwan Government-General, and branches of the military all the more significant. Perhaps Nakagawa, a civilian and a member of the Minseitō party, though appointed by Prime Minister Saitō Makoto, a naval officer, sought to avoid the intra-imperial tussles between the military and the diplomatic and colonial bureaucracies that characterized the empire's fitful and contentious expansion in Manchuria.[467] Another possibility is that Nakagawa, recognizing the relatively low importance and marginal position of the Taiwan Government-General within the hierarchy of the Japanese imperial government, sought to revitalize the empire's long-neglected south China policy to strengthen the authority of Taiwan within the empire.[468]

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466. The term "co-existence and co-prosperity" was popularized in the period following the upswing of anti-colonial nationalism after World War I, and corresponded to a change in colonial policy in the Japanese empire, which signaled an ostensibly less economically exploitative, more cooperative form of empire. The term became a cornerstone of pan-Asianist thought in the Asia-Pacific War to suggest that Japanese military aggression was based on a desire to cooperate with their newly colonized subjects.

467. Nakagawa, in office until 1936, would be the last civilian Governor-General of Taiwan. Under his rule, the Government-General promoted mild efforts at self-government, though with the ultimate aim of assimilating the Taiwanese population. See chapter 2 of Steven E. Phillips, Between Assimilation and Independence: The Taiwanese Encounter Nationalist China, 1945–1950 (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2003).

468. The Taiwan Government-General had never been an important bureaucratic position in the Japanese cabinet, and was subject to the authority of the Home Ministry. In 1929, Tanaka Giichi created the Colonial Ministry, which would, in theory, control all the colonial bureaucracies. But the Korea Government-General, long more important

Despite the attendees' shared rhetorical commitment to improving Sino-Japanese economic relations and promoting Taiwan's economic position in the empire and the region—a goal that involved the question of how to commit colonial government subsidies to policy objectives—the various factions often disagreed on how to achieve these objectives. Fuzhou Consul Usami Uzuhiko (宇佐美珍彦, 1893–1969, in office 1934–1935), a budding career diplomat, was skeptical about the prospects of expanding economic influence in South China because the land was not suitable for industrial growth and its residents had little buying power. He called for detailed economic investigations into local conditions to identify areas for expansion, views shared by Xiamen Consul Tsukamoto. In the view of these two consuls, the colonial government should establish a new Foreign Affairs Bureau (*gaijika*) to be focused on South China. The Governor-General's Director-General for General Affairs (*sōmu chōkan*) Hiratsuka Hiroyoshi (平塚広義, 1875–1948, in office 1932–1936), however, indicated that, though they had gathered the South China consuls for a meeting focused on South China, the colonial government wanted to focus instead its developmental investment efforts in Southeast Asia. More important for the representatives from the colonial government, and particularly its Industrial and Monopoly Bureaus, was the potential of China as a market for Taiwanese goods such as rice, coal, canned pineapple, and alcohol. At stake in their disagreement was the tension in colonial developmental policy highlighted by the work of Justin Schneider. As he describes, the Government-General was at a turning point in the mid-1930s, having recovered from an economic recession and making the transition from subsidizing Taiwan's agricultural

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and independent than its counterpart in Taiwan, was loath to yield to the oversight of this new ministry, as was the Army Ministry, ascendant in Manchuria. The Colonial Ministry hardly had any influence over affairs in Taiwan either, except for its one attempt to create the Taiwan Development Corporation, see Justin Adam Schneider, "The Business of Empire: The Taiwan Development Corporation and Japanese Imperialism in Taiwan, 1936–1946" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1998).

development, in particular the rice and sugar industries aimed for domestic Japanese consumption, to a policy of industrial development to make Taiwan into a sub-imperial sphere in its own right vis-a-vis South China (Hainan island) and Southeast Asia (Indochina).[469] Perhaps the consuls' lukewarm response to the possibility of expanding markets for Taiwanese rice and sugar in South China, complicated by the ongoing possibility of anti-Japanese boycotts, further convinced colonial officials that Taiwan's economic future lay in industrial development. What would this mean for Japanese policy in the treaty-ports, whose economies were focused not on the production of raw materials to be processed in Taiwan, but on commerce and trade?

Usami and Tsukamoto were also in agreement when it came to solving the persistent problem of Taiwan sekimin in the opium industry. This was an issue that not only involved the Taiwan colonial police office and its associates in the treaty-ports, but also imperiled the already fragile state of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. The two consuls repeated the proposal to move them into stable, proper jobs in reputable industries, though it was unclear which ones. In reality, Tsukamoto implied, extricating the Taiwan sekimin from the opium industry was unlikely short of a wholesale reform of Chinese society. Even so, small-scale loans from the colonial government could help, Tsukamoto argued, though he was decidedly pessimistic about the possibility. Unfortunately for the China consuls, although the Government-General was willing to commit additional personnel to police the treaty-ports, it would not provide personal loans or additional infrastructural funding to expand existing facilities. At the heart of the issue was a transition underway in colonial developmental financial policy, which was moving away from providing direct subsidies to private firms under the heading "South China and South Seas Facilities Expenditures" (and mostly Japanese-run firms in southeast Asia, reflecting the demand

469. See Chapters 1 and 2 of Schneider.

for raw materials in Japan), and toward a new national development company to be established as the Taiwan Development Company in 1935.[470]

The question of financing sparked an acrimonious and extended debate between Consul Tsukamoto and representatives from the colonial Finance Bureau and Bank of Taiwan. On behalf of the Taiwan Association, Tsukamoto claimed, he asked for the colonial government's support for establishing an Industrial Department (*sangyōbu*) within the Association, to be comprised of investigation (*chōsa*) and information (*jōhō*) organs (*kikan*), and to provide low-interest loans for economic development. This proposal was closely tied to the request for a financial organ to provide loans for individual Taiwan sekimin, as the local branches of the Bank of Taiwan did not deal with personal finance and the sekimin had little recourse to capital. In both cases, colonial and financial officials were wary of the legality of such an operation, not to mention its prudence for Japanese policy. Although Industry Bureau representative Nakase Setsuo initially suggested that such a financing scheme could be facilitated by establishing chambers of commerce (*shōkō kaigisho*) as in Japan, his proposal was rejected by his colleague in the Finance Bureau, Okada Makoto, who held that loans were not to be given to individuals or private companies but only to industrial associations (*shokusan kumiai*) and public entities (*kōkyō dantai*). Okada added that the Bank of Taiwan had taken on many losses in the past by overextending its operations—likely alluding to the bank's 1927 collapse and the subsequent empire-wide Shōwa Financial Crisis, named for the imperial reign that had begun the previous year. And the Bank of Taiwan was hardly alone in making imprudent financial decisions; the Foreign Ministry had tried to devise schemes for international personal financing, none of which had been successful. The Bank of Taiwan representative, Araki Shōjirō, offered a simpler explanation: the bank was indeed

470. See Chapter 4 of Schneider.

primarily concerned with large-scale trade and not "local operations," but more importantly its capital was needed elsewhere. In response to his proposal being rebuffed, Tsukamoto launched an impassioned rebuttal. Because the Bank of Taiwan did not deal with personal financial operations in China, Taiwan sekimin engaging in large-scale money transfers relied on other channels, leaving the their capital to pass through other hands. If this were to be the case, Tsukamoto said, the sekimin should be allowed to establish a new financial institution that would fit their needs. "What we are considering is not profitability, but how to guide local residents [in Xiamen], and therefore how to develop Sino-Japanese commerce. What I wish for is such an organ to guide [residents] or execute national policy. A novice might overlook the benefits [in such a plan], but it would be wonderful if the Government-General could spare any subsidy at all."[471] Despite the best efforts of the China consuls to secure sources of financing for the Taiwan sekimin in the treaty-ports, the Government-General had a different strategy in mind for its renewed attempts at Southward Expansion.

One objective that united the efforts of consular and colonial officials was the need to expand Chinese officials' knowledge of Taiwan by encouraging visits to the island colony. Although such visits—many facilitated by elite Taiwan sekimin like the Banqiao Lins—had been common during the late Qing and first decade of the Republic (1912–1921), they had come to a halt under warlord rule of Fujian in the 1920s. After the nominal unification of China under the GMD in 1928, the Taiwan Government-General had again revived the idea of Chinese "study visits" to the colony, and played host to a group of students from Jimei School in 1929.

471. A key issue was that most of the wealth held by Taiwan sekimin in Xiamen was held in real estate, creating the need for liquid assets, which were usually mustered by cobbling together small personal loans from a variety of sources. Finance Bureau representative Okada later responded that the Bank of Taiwan could not issue loans backed by real estate, which would be getting involved in "regional finance." He also mentioned that the Bank of Korea had been involved in issuing similar loans in Manchuria, which had led to problems for the bank.

Displaying Taiwan's rapid development over the past forty years would not only sell Chinese officials on the Japanese model of colonial development, as proposed by Shantou Consul Harada Chūichirō, but also, in the mind of colonial official Nozawa, convince Chinese "living in a state of anarchy" that they should be "thankful for Japan's" economic interests in the province.[472] These visits were a double-edged sword, cautioned Nozawa, as they also risked providing opportunities for Taiwanese to realize that they were "of the same ethnicity (*minzoku*) as the Chinese and seek to unify the Han Chinese race under a newfound ethnic consciousness, which could lead to economic trouble." But still, Nozawa reassured the meeting's attendees, "looking at the larger picture of aiming for great profits," facilitating these visits was a worthwhile endeavor. If, for officials like Yuchi in Chapter 2, the social disorder following the Chinese Revolution of 1911 had provided the opportunity to export a colonial Taiwanese model of modernization to China and win over local elites, the renewed commitment to infrastructural development following the consolidation of authority in China in the 1930s appeared to offer a similar opportunity to revive this approach.

The meeting revealed the tensions between colonial and diplomatic policy, and thus its records are also useful as an index of the impact of the transformations underway in South China after the Fujian Rebellion on these tensions. Noticeably absent in the colonial government's strategy is the language of the Taiwan sekimin as cultural intermediaries, which was now replaced by interest in a "strategy of economic advancement." Consider colonial official (*jimukan*) Nozawa's opening agenda item, submitted on behalf of the Government-General Secretariat (*kanbō bunshoka*):

> "Reflecting on the administration of Taiwan in the forty years since [the outset of] Japanese possession, attention has been focused internally on improving institutions

472. See JACAR B15100143500.

> (*shisetsu no jūjitsu*) and elevating culture (*bunka no kōjō*). As a result, our awareness of external conditions and their institutions are lacking in many regards, which is regrettable. Until now, the Government-General's cross-strait institutions have been schools, hospitals, newspapers, and the like, all of which fall within the scope of cultural institutions; these very seldom take into account consideration of a concrete strategy of economic advancement. Awareness of the expansive land, the bountiful resources contained therein, and the enormous buying power across the strait must be recognized at this new juncture as critical in establishing a definite strategy of economic advancement, of which Taiwan is at the center."

Gone were the hopes of earlier Government-General officials like Yuchi Kōhei or Gotō Shinpei for cultural institutions leading to interpersonal collaboration and economic cooperation, and in their place was a strategy that understood China as a vast market and blank slate of untapped natural resources, although Gotō and others had viewed China in this way, too. In part this change reflected changes in the Government-General's ambitions; changes which saw debates in the earliest days of colonial rule between treating Taiwan as a commercial stepping stone to the Chinese mainland and developing agricultural sectors to privilege commodities needed in Japan's home islands, transformed into an understanding of Taiwan as an industrial, productive sub-imperial center in its own right—the turn, in short, to a policy focused on a national development company. In part the change can also be understood in the light of Chen Yi's appointment as governor of Fujian, which made both economic cooperation seem more likely and intermediary collaboration with Taiwan sekimin seem less necessary. Japanese colonial policy in Taiwan and Korea as a whole was also undergoing a transformation from being based on agriculture to industry, which would in turn reformulate these colonies into sub-imperial centers vis-à-vis other parts of Asia. Moreover, the rise of Japanese economic reform bureaucrats in the 1930s who were committed to economic planning and "control economies" as an antidote to the failures of capitalism championed the importance of technocratic interventions in economic policy; they were joined by growing voices advocating the establishment of an

autarkic yen bloc in East Asia, which opposed financial policies that prioritized aligning Japan's monetary system to the gold standard and to world financial markets in London and New York.[473] While Taiwan, like most colonial societies, was no stranger to centralized economic planning, the application of this logic to the colonial government's policy towards China was a departure from the status quo of the 1920s. Finally, the Japanese occupation of Manchuria and the establishment of Manchukuo confirmed the declining influence of the Foreign Ministry in shaping the empire's policy towards China, which, in the 1920s, had shied away from policies that might appear as violations of the Open Door Policy in favor of pursuing diplomatic consensus with the Anglo-American powers. Regardless, the institutions that seemed so crucial to Yuchi and others in the increasingly decentralized 1910s—hospitals and schools, but also municipal groups like the Taiwan Association, all sustained through some combination of Government-General subsidy and local donations—appeared by 1934 a bygone afterthought, to be managed by consular officials but not a priority of their colonial colleagues.

Another explanation for the Government-General's shift in strategy in both content and locale—away from south China and towards Southeast Asia—lay in the role played by the military in China. Despite escalating tensions between the Foreign Ministry and the Army in Northeast Asia from 1931 onwards, portrayed by Barbara Brooks as a losing battle for the Foreign Ministry's institutionally marginalized China hands against the military, low-ranking diplomatic officials like Tsukamoto in geographically unimportant posts like Xiamen persisted in trying to find ways to include the military in a South China strategy. For Tsukamoto, this was

473. Janis Mimura calls these reform bureaucrats "techno-fascist." See Janis Mimura, *Planning for Empire: Reform Bureaucrats and the Japanese Wartime State* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011). On the debates surrounding Japan's monetary system and financial policy, see Mark Metzler, Lever of Empire: The International Gold Standard and the Crisis of Liberalism in Prewar Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006).

probably a matter of necessity, since both the army and the navy stationed in Taiwan were key components of the consular officials' understanding of regional security. Indeed, no matter how "peaceful" the diplomatic strategy of transforming Taiwan sekimin to stable, reputable, and preferably legal jobs might have seemed, it still required cooperating with the military and relying on its intelligence networks. At one point during the meeting, the Government-General representative suggested standardizing the wireless telegraphic codes used to communicate between the South China consuls, the Government-General, and the military, a suggestion which delighted the military, as it would eliminate the need to route communications through the Tokyo office of the Foreign Ministry, and with which Tsukamoto concurred. Usami was less convinced of the urgency to remove all barriers to privacy between consular, colonial, and military officials, but this proposal reflected both an attempt by the Government-General to direct regional military and diplomatic affairs as well as Tsukamoto's consent to this balance of powers and interests.

This does not mean that the Foreign Ministry or the Taiwan Government-General as a whole were either more or less reliant on the military than generally understood, but rather that this arrangement was particular to the conditions of South China. In Justin Schneider's study of the process by which the Taiwan Development Corporation was approved in the Japanese central government, for example, he shows how Government-General officials, marginalized as Taiwan was in the eyes of Tokyo officials, sidelined the Foreign Ministry and cooperated instead with the Colonial Ministry (*Takumushō*), from which the idea of a development company emerged. This idea was strategic for the Colonial Ministry as well, since it was also increasingly marginalized by the Army in Northeast Asia and the autonomous-leaning Korea Government-General. For the Colonial Ministry, the development strategy was one way to counter the military's ascendant influence in the empire; for the Government-General, it was an opportunity

to circumvent the fiscal concerns of the central government, which thought the consolidation of investment financing and development policy in the same agency was financially imprudent. Perhaps, then, another reason for the Government-General's turn from subsidies in China to a development company centered on Southeast Asia may have been the understanding that an undertaking on the scale of a company was unlikely if not impossible in South China, where it would require managing military, diplomatic, colonial, and domestic political interests. Nevertheless, the Navy would welcome the possibility of reviving its long supported "Southern Advance" policy through economic expansion in the "Southern Region" because undertaking military expansion there, like that in Manchuria, threatened to provoke war with the Anglo-American naval Powers. The combination of changes in economic priorities and institutional constraints thus signaled a reduced role for Taiwan sekimin local politics as intermediaries between Japanese colonial and consular and local Chinese officials.

Taiwan as a Model of Colonial Modernity for Fujian

Hopes that Chinese officials would visit Taiwan were realized a few months later, when Provincial Governor Chen Yi, Police Chief Wang Gupan, and a retinue of junior officers made a ten-day trip to the colony in November 1934. Coming on the eve of the Government-General's plans for celebrating forty years of rule on Taiwan in 1935, Chen's trip was an opportunity for colonial officials and bureaucrats at every level to frame economic and social progress in Taiwan as a model for Chinese emulation. In an interview with the *Taiwan Daily News* in Xiamen upon his return to China, Chen offered three reasons for the colonial government's success.

> "First, the government has sufficient ability, and because [Taiwan] is a colony the government can be bold in its tasks. Second, Japanese are strong in their perseverance,

and push forward devotedly no matter what setbacks they encounter…Third, there is ample capital, and in any industry [they] can rely on having faith in the economy."[474]

Chen's praise for the accomplishments of the colonial administration's "leadership" (*shidō*) only highlighted, by contrast, the failures of the Chinese government to make economic progress and attract sufficient capital to do so. Juxtaposing Chinese stagnation and disorder with Japanese progress was a well-worn trope, particularly in the state-controlled *Taiwan Daily News*. But Chen's attempts to flatter his hosts' perseverance aside, his faith in applying the developmental paradigm of colonial infrastructure construction seemed genuine. He opened the preface to the findings of the observation group, published in March of 1935, with these words:

"The ability to see daily advances in human life is in the accumulation and transmission of knowledge. Only those who can accumulate [knowledge] can see their lives become more bountiful day by day. [And] only those who can transmit [knowledge] can see the scope of their lives broaden daily. Therefore, as a result of this accumulation and transmission, knowledge crosses national boundaries and becomes world knowledge. There is not a civilized power in the world that has not contributed knowledge to the world; and there has not been [a power] that has not imported world knowledge. This is evident from the historical record."[475]

Chen's framing manages to provide an intellectual justification for adopting and adapting the Japanese colonial model from Taiwan, while simultaneously positioning China in world history. Both Chen Yi and Chen Ticheng, the head of the provincial Construction Bureau and author of the report's overview, make mention of Fujian's and Taiwan's geographical proximity and ecological similarities, and Chen Ticheng further wrote of the mobility of people and commodities that connected the two.[476] In other words, Taiwan was not only a model because it

474 "Fukken kōsatsu dan Amoi de Taiwan shisatsu no kansō happyō," *Taiwan nichinichi shinpō*, December 1, 1934. Kondō Masami also mentions this visit on pgs 616–620.

475. Kaocha Taiwan shiye tuan, *Taiwan kaocha baogao* (Taipei, 1977), 1. Chen's global view of knowledge production can perhaps be attributed to his earlier trips as a Chinese central government official to the United States and Germany.

476. For Chen's "Overview" (zonglun) see Kaocha Taiwan shiye tuan, 17–26

was close to Fujian and had a similar climate, but because the two were already economically and culturally connected.

> "As our Fujian is only one boat ride away [from Taiwan], it is therefore [Taiwan's] ideal export market. The customs (*fengsu*) and language of Taiwanese are the same as those of the people in Zhangzhou, Quanzhou, and Xiamen. The overseas Taiwanese living in Fujian are comparable in number to the overseas Fujianese living in Taiwan. The commercial relations between the two locales are inevitably all the more intimate. To speak of ruling Fujian by using Taiwan as an example is a distant goal, which is why this group went to Taiwan for observation."

Chen Tichang proceeded to explain the principles undergirding Taiwan's economic success that would be applied in Fujian. They included "rationalizing" (*helihua*) agriculture through research and testing; top-down dissemination of new agricultural methods; the "command" (*tongzhi*, from the Japanese *tōsei*) of the national economy; and strengthening the government's directive capabilities and administrative structure. The report details each of Taiwan's major agricultural and industrial sectors—rice, sugar, tea, lumber, railroads, and electricity, among them—and administrative structures, including finance, water management, policing, education, hygiene, and opium and morphine addiction. The provincial government's efforts were ultimately curtailed by the beginning of war between China and Japan in 1937, but Chen's observations in Taiwan formed the basis for an ambitious project of industrial and agricultural modernization in Fujian, in addition to his overhaul of the province's administrative structure. His knowledge of the colony would serve him in a subsequent post when, in 1944, Chiang Kai-shek appointed Chen the chairman of the "Taiwan Investigation Committee." As chairman, Chen was responsible for investigating Japanese rule in Taiwan with the aim of devising a strategy for how the Republic of China would administer the island after it was handed over from Japan at war's end.[477]

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477. In the aftermath of the war, Chen was the Chairman of the island's Provincial Government that oversaw Taiwan's "retrocession" to China and the escalating violence between the island's inhabitants and its new

Chen Yi, Fujian Construction Bureau chief Chen Tichang, Police Chief turned Xiamen Mayor Wang Gupan, and other government officials visited Taiwan on numerous occasions between 1934 and 1937. In addition to these official visits, the Government-General also played host to Chinese journalists from across the strait.[478] The most high profile visit—and the one most in accordance with the Government-General's goal of celebrating the achievements Japanese governance over Taiwan—came on the occasion of the 1935 Exhibition to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of Japanese rule. The Exhibition welcomed many guests from abroad, with visits from South China organized and facilitated by Xiamen's Taiwan Association.[479] To encourage attendance, the Fuzhou and Xiamen consuls waived the usual processing fees and the guarantor fees required of the Taiwan Association.[480] On Chen's arrival in Keelung in the fall of 1935 for the Exhibition, Chen Yi effused to a journalist from the *Osaka Daily News*' Taiwan branch:

> "At present in Fujian we provide every convenience for the resident Japanese, and strive for the welfare of those in commerce and industry. The Fujian Provincial Construction Bureau has invited Japanese (Taiwanese) experts for projects in the areas of irrigation studies, agriculture, and manufacturing in Fuzhou and the interior, and they are underway in reforming industrial organizations in the Japanese style…Japanese are [invited to] invest and undertake enterprises in Fujian's agriculture, mining, and all its industrial sectors, and [we] will provide every convenience to welcome Japanese in all industrial [and] economic institutions. Although Fujian is full of prospects to develop agriculture, mining, and aquatic industries, personnel and capital have been lacking. To remedy this, and to establish an epochal vision for Fujian (*hyakunen no daikei wo tateshimeru*), there is no choice but to rely on Japan (Taiwan)."[481]

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government that resulted in the 1947 "February 28th Incident."

478. Records of one such visit from February 1937, including a lengthy reflection by a journalist from the Fuzhou GMD-organ newspaper People's News (*Min Bao*, not to be confused with the similarly named Government-General subsidized *Min Bao*, Fujian News), can be found in JACAR B02031015100. The visitors included journalists from a variety of newspapers in Fuzhou and Xiamen.

479. See "Honpō hakurankai kankei zakken 7. Taiwan hakurankai," JACAR B04012267500.

480. JACAR B04012267500.

481. *Osaka Mainichi Shinbun*, Taiwan edition, October 24, 1935. Reprinted in Kondō, 93.

Although undoubtedly framed to flatter his audience, Chen's comments are striking in their departure from existing developmental trends in Fujian—where, in Xiamen, for example, the Nineteenth Route-Huaqiao alliance had marginalized Taiwanese influence in the city—and also in China at large, where anti-Japanese sentiment combined with a growing commitment to an autarkic, ethno-national economy (*minzu jingji*) would seem to make Japanese investments unlikely, much less welcomed.[482]

The reflections of another Chinese visitor to the Exhibition, published in the local GMD Party's newspaper, the *Fujian People's News*, suggest however that Chen's praise was not mere flattery:

> "In the past, China considered Taiwan a wild island beyond the seas, which required yearly military subsidies and which was thought to be nearly irrelevant. But in only forty years of Japanese rule, Taiwan has made great strides in agriculture, industry, and commerce. Productivity of all products has risen ten or several tens of times, and, to our great surprise, Taiwan has become the treasure house of Japan. What was seen as an unnecessary wasteland on the frontier of China has, under the development of foreigners, become fertile and fecund, and its ports have become [economic] mainstays…how lacking the pioneering spirit of our forbears!"[483]

What were the consequences for the Taiwan sekimin of this shift in policy and the move by Fujian provincial and Taiwanese colonial officials to cooperate in development investment? Once again, class and social standing played a determining role. The 1935 Exhibition illustrates the marginalization of individual and small-scale merchants in favor of

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482. On "minzu jingji," see Zanasi, *Saving the Nation*. I have not done enough research into Chen Yi's economic thinking to understand why he would have invited Japanese capital investments, especially since the general understanding of imperialism in China during the 1920s was that it was an economic phenomenon. The only sensible hypothesis at the moment is that he either lost the support of the overseas Chinese or was deliberately eschewing their financial support in an attempt to broker Sino-Japanese cooperation in the province.

483. JACAR B04012267500. Fuzhou Consul Nakamura reported that the article was published on October 30th.

large-scale, developmental, official-led schemes. The Exhibition was initially designed to celebrate colonial Taiwan's industrial modernity and featured contributions from government agencies, including the Monopoly Bureau and corporations with interests in Taiwan.[484] Two exhibition sites in the new urban centers of Taipei developed under Japanese rule, and a third site including a hotel and spa in the suburban mountains north of the city, displayed commodities, administrative activities, dioramas, cultural displays, new technologies (like electrification), and military-themed exhibitions. In addition to thematic displays there were pavilions that showcased specific locales in the empire. Outside Taipei's colonial urban center in the late-Qing commercial center of Dadaocheng along the Tamsui River, lay the Exhibition's fourth site. Unlike the three sites included in the initial plan, the Dadaocheng site was lobbied for and entirely financed by local Taiwanese business leaders. Of the 501,055 yen raised for the Dadaocheng site, for example, 440,000 yen was collected through local donations and only 20,000 was subsidized by the Exhibition's support funds.[485] Spearheading the effort to include the Dadaocheng site was local tea merchant Chen Tianlai. Noticeably absent from the list of local supporters, however, were perhaps its two most wealthy merchants: Gu Xianrong and Lin Xiongzheng—incidentally, the two singled out for censure by the anti-colonial nationalists in the publication *Taiwan*. Gu and Lin were involved in the Exhibition, but as advisors for its "support organization" (*kyōsankai*); they were, in fact, the only two Taiwanese to serve in a committee otherwise made up of Japanese officials and business elites.

484. Focusing primarily on the first and second exhibition sites (in Taipei's colonial urban centers), Joseph Allen details the exposition in his book Taipei: City of Displacements. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2012, 121-126.

485. For details of the budget, see the reprint of the 1939 Kindai Nihon hakuran kai shiryō shūsei, *Shisei yonjusshūnen kinen Taiwan hakurankai kyōsankai shi* (Tokyo: Kokusho kankōkai, 2012), 308-314.

Despite the absence of support from the most elite levels of Taiwanese society, the Dadaocheng site shows how Taiwanese, especially those involved in commerce, also sought to link the island's economy and culture to a broader region vaguely understood as "the South," encompassing South China and Southeast Asia. The initiative of local Taiwanese business leaders—based in a commercial district which traced its roots to the late Qing regional export economy—suggests that, despite the trend of the colonial government toward an economic policy based on a high-level, large-scale national development company, there existed broad support for strengthening Taiwan's commercial and cultural links to a future in "the South." The official publication commemorating and describing the Exhibition framed the importance of the Dadaocheng site and its neighborhood: "Dadaocheng is one important part of greater Taipei's three major commercial areas, and was in earlier times the focus of commerce and finance. It stood in the forefront of Japan-Taiwan and cross-strait trade, and it is now the center of Taiwanese (*hontōjin*) commercial dealings in the entire island. Recently, it has also displayed great strides and progress in all areas including industry, education, hygiene, and communications; it is a true display of the rapid progress of Taiwan's brilliant culture."[486]

The centerpiece of the Dadaocheng site was the "Southern Hall," a complex of art deco, modernist interpretations of southern Chinese and Southeast Asian architectural styles. The Dadaocheng committee spared no expense in hiring famous Peking opera performers, believing that the success of the venue hinged on whether they could provide a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for their spectators.[487] The neighborhood's main avenues were "richly decorated

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486. Kindai Nihon hakuran kai shiryō shūsei, 288.

487. The budget can be found in Kindai Nihon hakuran kai shiryō shūsei, 300; the performer was hired from Shanghai; and a newspaper report from September 8th reproduced on 301 mentions that the success of environment of the Southern Hall depended on the quality of the performance.

with the curiosities of China," (*Shina shumi yutaka ni kazaru*) which linked lampposts wrapped in prismatic, dragon-patterned coverings. Absent from the commemorative magazine's narrative but captured in a published album of photographs was the interior of the "Southern Hall." Each southern Chinese city and Southeast Asian locale had a dedicated section displaying local cultural artefacts, in the case of cities like Xiamen, Guangzhou, and Hanoi, or human laborers working in a reconstructed diorama plantation, in the case of a Philippine hemp and rubber display provided by the South Seas Cultivation Association (*Nan'yō saibai kyōkai*). In this regard, the focus on commerce and culture in South China and natural resource extraction in Southeast Asia mirrored the economic policy goals of the South China consular meeting in the summer of 1934, which would be codified with the establishment of the Taiwan Development Corporation in a meeting that was held to coincide with the Exhibition in the fall of 1935. Many locales also had dedicated standalone exhibition halls. The site's "Fujian Hall," for example, displayed regional products from the province. Joseph Allen suggests that the "'authentic' architectural styles" of the buildings at the Dadaocheng site were meant to convey a "still purportedly traditional, non-progressive state of these areas." That these sites were lobbied for, designed, and constructed by Taiwanese commercial elites, and that they were located in an area of the city outside its new colonial administrative centers, however, suggests that there was more at work than the binaries of tradition-modernity and progress-stasis. If the military and technology exhibits, in Allen's words, "both promoted contemporaneous accomplishments and designated future directions," and aimed to "prepare its viewers for a future war," the agricultural displays of Southeast Asia organized around specific commodities could be interpreted along the same two lines: not as a traditional, pastoral community suspended in non-coeval time but rather

a landscape of natural resources to be exploited.[488] In this sense, Allen's interpretation of a Japan "poised to overwhelm East and Southeast Asia with its imperial schemes" is too quick to anticipate Japan's later militarism in south China and southeast Asia through the teleology of total war, and overlooks the more proximate ambitions to expand through aggressive economic development.[489] It was this latter mode of imperialism that appealed not only to the commercial elites of Dadaocheng but to the Exhibition's Chinese guests, as well.

The model of imperial expansion that connected industrial development in Taiwan with natural resource extraction, agricultural commodity production, and market expansion in the "Southern Region" took concrete form in the Taiwan Development Company, which was established in the fall of 1935 at the Tropical Industry Research Conference. The conference, held in Taipei between October 19th and 23rd to coincide with the Exposition (October 10th to November 28th), counted among its guests and active participants Lin Xiongzheng, Gu Xianrong, and mining industrialist Yan Guonian. The simultaneity of the Conference and the Exhibition, and the Conference's focus on economic expansion in Southeast Asia and South China, make the initial omission of the exhibits that would become the Exhibition's Dadaocheng site by colonial officials all the more curious. As Justin Schneider and Nagaoka Shinjirō show, the meeting had various antecedents through the years, most notably the 1926 South Seas Trade Conference (*Nan'yō bōeki kaigi*) convened by the Foreign Ministry, the 1930 Provisional Research Conference on Industry (*Rinji sangyō chōsakai*), and a failed attempt in 1925 by the Government-General to establish a "Taiwan Development Company" (*Taiwan takushoku*

488. Joseph R. Allen, *Taipei: City of Displacements* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2012), 125.

489. Allen, 121.

kaisha).[490] In Schneider's narrative, the company had a longer history that reached back to the beginning of colonization, when the Government-General used land reclamation to attract Japanese investment to finance development schemes in Taiwan. The development company, financed by government bonds, took shape after 1935 and pursued development schemes in and beyond Taiwan, most prominently on Hainan Island off the southern coast of China and in Indochina, that focused on land reclamation, cultivation, cotton textiles, immigration (of agricultural laborers), and finance. The company would also fund and hold a majority stake in smaller companies dispersed across Southeast Asia and to a lesser degree South China, working in industries including cotton (Thailand and Guangxi), fishing (Fujian and Singapore), canning (Dutch East Indies), and sugar (Thailand).

While most accounts of the 1935 Conference focus on the subsequent establishment of the Company, the conference also impacted the Government-General policy towards South China. Just as the 1934 South China consular conference revealed certain priorities while foreclosing others, the 1935 Conference further confirmed these changes. The Government-General established a "Foreign Affairs Bureau," as proposed by Fuzhou and Xiamen Consuls Usami and Tsukamoto on September 2nd, 1935, to be led by diplomatic official and former Xiamen Consul Sakamoto Tatsuki.[491] The Bureau would go on to be the main institution for the

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490. The primary emphasis in the Government-General's earlier schemes (1925 and 1930) was on development in Taiwan, whereas investment in industry and commerce in southeast Asia remained under the purview of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The 1925 proposal was rejected by the central government because it was considered dangerous to have a development company and a financing scheme organized in the same institution (with fears that it would lead to imprudent lending). The economies of colonial Taiwan and the Japanese empire more generally were also in a weak state in the mid-1920s following the 1923 Great Kantō Earthquake and the subsequent effects of overextended lending. See Chapter 2 of Schneider, "The Business of Empire: The Taiwan Development Corporation and Japanese Imperialism in Taiwan, 1936–1946."

491. Shinjirō Nagaoka, "Nettai sangyō chōsakai kaisai to Taiwan sōtokufu gaijibu no setchi," *Tōnan Ajia kenkyū* 18, no. 3 (December 1980): 90–103.

production of knowledge and formulation of the colonial government's strategy for South China and Southeast Asia until and following the start of war in China in 1937.

Some of the consuls' other proposals were rebuffed by the colonial government. In March 1935, for example, Xiamen Consul Tsukamoto wrote to Government-General Director-General Hiratsuka to propose a Chamber of Commerce in the treaty-port, reiterating a request he made at the consular meeting in 1934. Such an institution would not be new in China's treaty-ports; there were Japanese Chambers of Commerce in North China and Manchuria as well as in Shanghai. Following Tsukamoto's earlier proposal, the Chamber was intended to "promote Sino-Japanese friendship in the economic, industrial, and commercial worlds…and guide and support our local Japanese residents, who are numerous and in this regard differ [from other treaty-ports], by facilitating their economic development, which will, as a result, directly contribute to Taiwan's foreign economic development."[492] As Tsukamoto mentioned at the consular meeting, the main barrier to Xiamen's economic development was its lack of legitimate industries (*fuseiki*) and control (*futōsei*). A Chamber of Commerce would remedy both deficiencies by establishing a research arm to identify areas for growth while creating an administrative structure to facilitate consular direction of economic activities. Such a plan, however, would be costly and was impossible without subsidies from the Government-General, especially because they would have to hire new staff. Hiratsuka rejected the proposal, replying that there were no funds to be spared for such a Chamber, especially in consideration of the upcoming Tropical Industry Research Conference.

492. "12 Amoi shōgyō kaigisho," in "Zaigai hōjin (shōkō) kaigisho kankei zakken dai ikkan," JACAR B08061530900.

A few months later, in July 1935, Tsukamoto wrote again with a more modest proposal, that the colonial government subsidize an Industrial Department under the direction of the Taiwan Association. Tsukamoto had mentioned such an initiative by the Association in the 1934 meeting and hoped to formalize a department with the Government-General's assistance. Tsukamoto further suggested that the structure of a Japanese director (in Xiamen, Nakayoshi Tomooki, a local employee of the Bank of Taiwan) and Taiwanese clerks could be replicated in other cities in China. He repeated that the volume of work would still require subsidizing their compensation of around 3,000 yen per year.[493] A record of the Xiamen consulate's employees and division of labor from February 1935 suggests that its personnel was already overstretched, not to mention handling additional administrative tasks.[494] A different report from the same period stated that the number of cases in Xiamen requiring investigation had doubled from February 1934 to February 1935.[495]

Tsukamoto's successor made a final attempt to lobby for a Chamber in August, which were echoed by similar requests made by the other south China consuls (Fuzhou and Guangzhou), but all fell on deaf ears. It is not clear whether this was part of the Government-General's repudiation of economic progress led by the Foreign Ministry, or an intent to ignore refashioning the economic position of Taiwan sekimin in the treaty-ports. At the same time, diplomatic officials in Fujian closed down Taiwan sekimin-owned gambling establishments (Xiamen in March 1935, and Fuzhou in March 1936) and opium smoking establishments

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493. Nakayoshi Tomooki was a graduate of Taipei's Higher Commercial School, having enrolled in 1924 and graduated in 1927.

494. See "18. Kanmu buntan hyō sōfu no ken," part of "Zai-Shi teikoku kōkan kankei zakken, dai ikkan," JACAR B14090284800.

495 See "18. Zai Amoi sōryōjikan," part of "Keisatsukan shutchō kankei zakken, dai sankan," JACAR B15100100300.

(Xiamen in July 1936), suggesting that they were determined to eliminate Taiwan sekimin participation in illicit industries even without a plan to encourage them to take up "reputable" professions. The South China consuls were at pains to avoid any cause for diplomatic conflict with Chinese officials, especially after the reorganization of the provincial government in 1934 and its perceived "pro-Japanese stance." But without subsidies from the Government-General, the consuls were at a loss for how to move Taiwan sekimin into livelihoods less likely to lead to diplomatic or jurisdictional conflict.

A report titled "The Current State of Fujian Province and Japan's Policy of Development in Fujian" by the new Fuzhou Consul Nakamura Toyoichi (中村豊一, in office 1935–36), written in March 1936 on the occasion of an all-China consular meeting hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Shanghai, conveys the effects of the Fujian Rebellion, Chen Yi's appointment as Provincial Governor, and the Government-General's establishment of the Taiwan Development Company in regard to the economic and political activities of the Taiwan sekimin in south China.[496] Although Chen's supposedly "pro-Japanese" stance was celebrated by diplomatic and Taiwanese colonial officials, it had earned him the reputation of selling out to Japan among the members of his own party. Nor was Chen welcomed by his new constituents in Fujian, for whom Chen's heritage as a native of Zhejiang Province made him an outsider. These realities cast doubt on future of any new policies in the province, Nakamura said, since Chen's successor could overturn them if he left his post. With Japan's withdrawal from the London Naval Conference in January 1936, competition with the Anglo-American powers was again at the forefront of Nakamura's mind. Even in the realm of cultural institutions, where subsidies from the Government-General had allowed the Japanese empire to establish a foothold, Anglo-

496. "16 Fukken shō no genjō oyobi wagakuni no tai Fukken hatten saku," JACAR B02030162900.

American educational institutions had been far more successful in attracting local Fujianese youth. Japan was losing the competition in the economic realm as well: despite being of the "same race" as the local Chinese, the province's Taiwan sekimin had made no economic progress to speak of. Any hope that Japan possessed "special rights" in Fujian—repeatedly invoked by diplomatic officials who traced such a claim back to the Fujian Non-Cession Treaty of 1898—was nothing more than an illusion, Nakamura wrote. "If in the future Japan wants to develop South China, it will be essential to arouse attention by appealing to the special feelings that Japanese have toward Fujian."

On the possibility of collaborating with Chen Yi's provincial administration, Nakamura suggested that, though relying on Japan for capital, technology, and markets was the province's only way forward, provincial authorities had failed to attract Japanese loans. Some had suggested encouraging Taiwanese settlement in Fujian to strengthen economic ties with the province, which would be a more cost-effective solution. But for Nakamura the question was one of quality: "why would people leave Taiwan for China, which is unsafe and also extremely poor in natural resources?" China only attracted the type of Taiwanese likely to get involved in illicit industries, who would only strain the capacity of the Japanese consulates to protect them and further anger local Chinese. The only hope for further Taiwanese migration to China, and for resolving existing tensions, lay in local officials' permitting settlement in the interior, which Nakamura reported as having discussed with Fujian's provincial diplomatic officials. But Chen Yi was resistant to this idea, even if they naturalized as Chinese subjects, a condition that Nakamura opposed. Without Government-General support for a Chamber of Commerce, and with Chen Yi's provincial government reluctant to countenance Taiwanese settlement beyond

the treaty-ports, the consuls' commercial and agricultural schemes to solve the Taiwan sekimin problem stood at an impasse.

Gu Xianrong and Lin Xiongxiang and Elite Attempts at Sino-Japanese Cooperation on the Eve of War

For elite Taiwan sekimin like Gu Xianrong and Lin Xiongxiang, the growing alliance between the pro-Japanese Fujian Provincial Government and the Taiwan Government-General opened new opportunities for participating in local and national level politics, even as most Taiwan sekimin were increasingly marginalized in treaty-port economy and society. The disreputable sekimin, for example, faced repeated attempts by consular officials to close their opium and gambling establishments, disrupting an important source of revenue. Meanwhile, China's success in regaining tariff autonomy in 1929 and successive attempts to raise import and export duties in the 1930s had affected the small-scale sekimin merchants involved in sundry trade by making smuggling certain heavily taxed commodities like sugar and textiles both more lucrative and more likely to cause conflict with Chinese officials.[497] Gu and Lin, on the other hand, rose to prominence as intermediaries between Japanese colonial and consular officials on one hand, and Chinese provincial-level, and increasingly national-level, officials on the other. Incidentally, Gu and Lin's brother (Xiongzheng) were the only two Taiwanese members of the 1935 Exhibition's main planning committee and had also been singled out for censure as the "running dogs of the Japanese" by the left-wing anti-colonial nationalists writing in the magazine *Taiwan* in 1932.

497. On the rise in smuggling of certain goods along the China coast and attempts by the GMD to nationalize the economy, see chapters two and three of Philip Thai, *China's War on Smuggling: Law, Economic Life and the Making of the Modern State, 1842-1965* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018).

Gu Xianrong was a businessman involved in a number of industries, most notably as a supplier to the Government-General's salt and sugar monopolies. As an early collaborator with the colonial government, he had been granted numerous awards for his service to the government. Although the Gu family, like the Banqiao and Wufeng Lin families, was involved in cross-strait trade during the late Qing period, late Qing commerce was not the main source of Gu Xianrong's wealth, which possibly accounts for why, unlike the Banqiao and Wufeng Lins, he was a minor figure in the early South China Policy of the Government-General. Instead, he had made most of his money by purchasing government bonds from the colonial government in Taiwan, which had initially been issued to intermediary large landholders to buy out their claims to land ownership, and then using these bonds to purchase in land and establish various commercial ventures. In 1934, he was appointed to the Japanese House of Peers, where he was the body's first Taiwanese member and where he served until his death in 1937; it was in this capacity that his high-level connections with Chinese officials became important.

Although unlike members of the Banqiao Lin family, Gu never settled permanently in China—his wealth was concentrated in Taiwan—he visited China frequently, and made many official connections over time. His official biography, published posthumously in 1938 at the height of the Second Sino-Japanese War and predictably heavy on the details of his collaboration, described his greatest accomplishment as attempts to broker a Sino-Japanese peace in the years before the outbreak of war. "This achievement was not just for Gu Xianrong's personal honor, nor just for Taiwan, nor just for Japan; rather than say that it was for neighboring China, it would be better to say it was for the entire East Asian race, and therefore for the peace of all the world's people, [that he] poured out a lifetime of his heart's blood."[498]

498. Hideyoshi Yagashiro, *Ko Ken'ei-ō den: Ko Ken'ei* (Tokyo: Yumani shobō, 2008).

It was in the final years before Gu's death that he traveled first to Beijing in 1934, then to Nanjing to meet Chiang Kai-shek and to Fuzhou to meet Chen Yi in 1935. In these meetings, he was at pains to turn his hosts' attention away from the obvious ongoing conflict in Manchukuo, and later the short-lived puppet state formed in the buffer zone between Manchukuo and North China between 1935 and 1938, known as the "Jidong Government." Instead, he spoke of other areas of Sino-Japanese cooperation, particularly in industrial capitalism and anti-Communism. "Although political relations between China and Japan have started in the North, it is most expedient for [Sino-Japanese] economic relations to begin in Fuzhou and Taiwan, which are connected by one body of water. On this point, Taiwanese officials and people alike have deep interest and goodwill," Gu told Chen Yi, trying to pivot his attention away from the state of 'political relations' in Manchukuo. Chen, perhaps predictably given his pro-Japanese reputation, responded, agreeing that "cooperating with Japan rather than England and the United States, and with Taiwan rather than the Japanese home islands, is the most rational (*gōriteki*) and effective" course of action.[499]

In February 1937, after the conclusion of the House of Peers session, Gu departed Japan for China on what would be his last trip. Having turned 72, Gu was not in the best of health, and his failing condition was readily apparent to his hosts. He wrote a record of his month-long journey, which was published with his posthumous biography. A copy of his account also found its way to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which by 1937 was desperate to find any means possible to avert war with China.[500] Changes in the domestic political situations in China and

499. Yagashiro, 212, also quoted in Kondō, *Sōryoku sen to Taiwan: Nihon shokuminchi hōkai no kenkyū*, 618.

500. The record in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs archive is "26 Chūka minkoku ryokō ki," JACAR B02030163900, and is also reproduced in his biography, pages 235–262.

Japan on the eve of his departure threatened to escalate Sino-Japanese conflict into total war. As Gu was departing Taiwan for Japan for the House of Peers session, he received news of the Xi'an Incident. The incident, in which Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped by two subordinate generals seeking to the GMD government to broker a truce with the communists, signaled a shift in Chinese national policy from the priority of the ongoing civil war with the communists to joining forces with their erstwhile domestic enemies to focus on the threat posed by Japan. In Japan, the cabinet led by career diplomat Hirota Kōki (in office March 1936–February 1937), which had signed the Anti-Comintern Pact and issued a set of three demands to the GMD government, was replaced by the new Prime Minister Hayashi Senjūrō, an army general who had made his career in Korea, and whose cabinet returned control of the government to the military. The Xi'an Incident and the consequent change in Chinese national policy, and the change in the Japanese cabinet, impelled Gu to use a rhetorical strategy of appealing to his Chinese hosts on the basis of international anti-Communism, while reassuring them that the new Japanese cabinet was still committed to a policy of peace. Yet Gu was convinced that, despite the growing threat of military conflict, that "if China and Japan could renew mutual understanding and value brotherly friendship, they could gradually dispel long-held conflicts and turn hostility into friendship." Over the past two years, Gu explained, he had emphasized three things to his high-level official Chinese hosts: first, that Japan, while rapidly expanding, was not an invader nation; second, that both China and Japan had focused excessive attention on Manchukuo to the detriment of maintaining friendly relations according to "Eastern morals," which called for mutual opposition to Soviet Communism; and third, that promoting economic cooperation would preserve peace in East Asia. It was with these principles in mind that Gu set off on his trip to

China. Having become a Japanese imperial subject at age thirty, Gu said he was determined to make his best efforts to repay the empire's favor over the past forty years.

Upon arrival, Gu was surprised to find that even the so-called pro-Japanese officials in the GMD government were acerbic in their critiques of Japan. Invited to a luncheon in Shanghai hosted by Li Zeyi, a Japanese-educated official who had been a comprador for Mitsui and was now an advisor in the Fujian Provincial Government, Gu found himself seated at a table with Japanese naval officials and Chen Yi. After they finished eating, Admiral Hasegawa [Kiyoshi] prodded Gu and, within earshot of Chen and Li, said "I hope you can continue to strive for Sino-Japanese friendship," and left Gu alone with his two Chinese hosts.[501] Chen and Li, however, derided the entire "doctrine of "Sino-Japanese friendship" (*Nikka shinzenron*) as "all debate but no substance." There were many Japanese who were knowledgeable about and sympathetic toward China, Chen and Li said, but they had no power. And even so, Japan had an exceptionally poor track record when it came to upholding its diplomatic promises, making the doctrine of Sino-Japanese friendship useless. Chen and Li concluded by advising Gu to "return to Japan without making any crucial decisions that might sully [his] reputation in later years."

But Gu was not about to leave so quickly; he was determined to convince his hosts of the logic behind Japanese actions and prove to them that there was a future for the doctrine of Sino-Japanese friendship. Time after time, and host after host, he attempted to persuade Chinese officials that escalation in Sino-Japanese diplomatic conflict was attributed to the GMD government's failure to take Japanese interests into consideration. His hosts were all officials at the highest levels of the GMD government, including Wang Jingwei, Wu Zhenxiu from the Bank

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501. This detail is recorded in Gu's biography but is missing from the version held in the Foreign Ministry archive, which skips from Gu being invited to a meal to his finding himself alone with Li and Chen.

of China, and Zhang Qun from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; it was only Chiang Kai-shek's poor health that made him unavailable to meet Gu. Each meeting led to an introduction for the next, suggesting that Gu's relationships with these officials was based in part on trust and that Gu's reputation in China preceded him. One of his final interactions was with Kong Xiangxi (also known as H.H. Kung), Chiang's in-law, then the Minister of Finance, and serving as the Premier of the Executive Yuan, the legislative branch of the Republic of China. In Gu's account, their meeting opened with Kong's greeting: "Mr. Gu, I was waiting for you in Nanjing for quite some time. Once I returned to Shanghai, and heard that you had also returned to Shanghai, I hurried to meet you." Kong's first question to Gu was on the subject of his family's origins: "You were born in Taiwan! What part of China did [your family] move from?" Gu answered: "I was born in Taiwan, and [my family] moved from Quanzhou in Fujian." Kong probed further, asking, "How many years ago?" To which Gu replied, "In the time of Zheng Chenggong, so already about two or three hundred years." That their first topic of conversation was the Gu family's ancestral origins was no mere coincidence, whether this was how their conversation actually transpired or whether it was Gu's authorial flourish. Throughout the record of his visit and elsewhere in his biography, it was emphasized by Gu himself and the editors of his biography that Gu's commitment to Sino-Japanese friendship was rooted in his ancestral ties to China.

Kong's next question to Gu was on the topic of his membership in the House of Peers: "You must speak Japanese quite well!" On the contrary, Gu replied, he still struggled with speaking. "Isn't that quite inconvenient?" Kong wondered. This gave Gu the opportunity to praise the great favor, care, and forbearance the emperor had shown "even someone like him" who could not speak Japanese." In response to Kong's next question about the population of

Taiwan, Gu returned to this earlier point, stressing that: “Taiwanese receive the same treatment as Japanese. It has been forty some years since Taiwan came under the control of Japan, and in this time, under the imperial edict of ‘impartiality and equal favor’ (*isshi dōjin*), [Japan] has been actively devoted to administration and construction, [which is] why Taiwan is so prosperous today. The Japanese are a magnanimous people of a great nation.”[502]

Kong then turned his attention to the topic of the Taiwan sekimin in China, musing that: “the ancestors of the Taiwanese are Chinese (*minkokujin*) but they often come to China and cause violence, which is troubling. They are not Chinese, but they are Japanese; they are not Japanese, but they are yellow Orientals. They are Orientals, but they cause trouble: this is not good.”

That even a financier of Kong’s stature was aware of the Taiwan sekimin in Fujian as a disruptive social force demonstrated the popularization of the “Taiwan sekimin problem” in the Chinese national media. Kong’s understanding of the place of Taiwanese in China, jumping from the juridical to the ethnic to the racial, threatened to undermine the entire premise of Gu’s adherence to the doctrine of Sino-Japanese friendship, so he was at pains to explain that these Taiwanese were the exception and not the norm: “These people are unable to survive even in Taiwan, so they are better referred to as “*rōnin*” (drifters or wanderers, originally the term for a samurai without a master). It is not proper to see all Taiwanese in this way. Of course the remaining six million, in addition to the almost one hundred million Japanese, have goodwill toward the Republic.” This was the theme of Gu’s entire visit: to convince his hosts that the

502. In this response as well there is a discrepancy between the diplomatic record and Gu’s biography. Though the mention of equal treatment and Japanese magnaminity appear in both, the mentions of “impartiality and equal favor” and devotion to administration and construction were added in the biography, suggesting a wartime reconfiguration of the dialogue.

actions of a minority of the Japanese military—or South China's disreputable Taiwanese residents—were not representative of the whole.

Toward the end of their conversation, Gu attempted to flatter Kong, who claimed to be a direct descendant of Confucius, by drawing on his Confucian credentials as the benefactor of Taipei's Confucius Temple, to underscore Japan's commitment to morality and virtue. But Kong quickly corrected Gu, retorting that virtuous deeds would be repayed with virtuous deeds, and moral action with moral action. Their conversation would end soon thereafter, and Gu's trip came to a close. Gu did not leave China entirely despondent. He remained hopeful that Chinese people would come to countenance Manchukuo if Japan respected Chinese sovereignty in China proper, and that Japan could win Chinese goodwill by aiding China in national unification. Gu's record of his trip suggests that he was neither a mouthpiece nor an opportunist as one might deduce from descriptions of him as the consummate collaborator. His entire adult career, his wealth, and his political stature was built on a lifetime of finding opportunities to be close to Japanese power, first in colonial Taiwan and later in the metropole. His reputation did not necessarily brand him as a persona non grata in Chinese official and business circles; rather, his position seemed to enable him to develop relationships with officials at the highest levels of Chinese society. Where in 1935 Gu's invocations of Japanese imperial favor and Sino-Japanese friendship based on economic cooperation was a mutually agreed upon starting point for conversations, by 1937, it seems that Gu was often the only person in the room who still believed in his doctrines. Still, a combination of events between 1934 and 1937—his appointment as a member of the House of Peers, the rise of a pro-Japanese provincial government in Fujian, and efforts by the Taiwan Government-General at economic cooperation and expansion—seemed to make his efforts at Sino-Japanese friendship plausible, if only for a brief moment.

A few months later in October 1937, Lin Xiongxiang published "New Cooperation with Fujian with Taiwan at the Center" (*Taiwan wo chūshin to shitaru Fukken to no shin teikei*) in his capacity as the head of Fuzhou's Taiwan Association.[503] Total war in North China had begun in July after the Japanese-initiated "Marco Polo Bridge Incident." The war spread to central China later that summer as the Japanese invaded Shanghai, where the Japanese Army was on the cusp of declaring victory. In light of the radical changes in context from Gu's visit earlier that year, Lin's adherence to a policy of economic expansion in South China in October 1937 is all the more striking. There were differences, to be sure, from Gu's approach, which had focused primarily on national diplomatic politics, even in his discussions with provincial authorities like Chen Yi. In contrast, Lin emphasized that Fujian had been, with the exception of the interregnum of the Fujian Rebellion, under consistent central government control since 1928. The collapse of the Nanjing government was a chance for the province to realize a path of economic development that had been stifled by the center. As a business-minded official with economic interests concentrated in the province, Lin's focus on local economic development comes as no surprise. But he was quick to add that, though the province's mountainous geography made it an unsuitable target for military occupation or exploitation and therefore of little strategic value, Fujian held great potential for agricultural and industrial development on its existing commercial base. In this sense, Lin's proposal can also be read as a rejoinder to Taiwanese colonial officials, whose schemes through the Taiwan Development Corporation had largely sidestepped Fujian in favor of Southeast Asia.

503. Xiongxiang Lin, *Taiwan o chūshin to shitaru Fukken to no shin teikei* (Taipei: Fukushū Taiwan kōkai, 1937).

Pervasive anti-Japanese sentiment in Fujian, no doubt a main factor in the colonial government's hesitation to promote investment in the province, could be remedied through financial assistance in the form of small-scale agricultural loans. Lin suggested that the Government-General subsidize Taiwanese merchants' efforts to cut into the market share of Chinese merchants, allowing Taiwanese to reform the structures of the economy, prevent anti-Japanese boycotts, and secure their livelihood. Lin's proposal that the colonial government extend loans to Taiwan sekimin in south China and his optimism for moving Taiwan sekimin into the agricultural sector recalled Tsukamoto's proposals at the 1934 consular meeting. Lin's proposal went one step further by framing the necessity of loans and economic stability around the longstanding goal of Japanese colonial officials to gain market share in China, which could be traced back to Gotō's vision for using Taiwan to gain a foothold in the Chinese economy at the turn of the twentieth century. In Lin's account, Fujian's existing commercial base, composed of petty Taiwanese merchants, gave it an advantage over other locations in Asia. Perhaps in part playing to his audience, Lin identified the main enemy of his proposal as Euro-American capitalism. Not only did Euro-Americans or Chinese who had received an Anglo-American education control the taxation system and sow discord with Japan, but they were to blame for the system of compradorism and its uneven distribution of benefits in Chinese society. Overall, Lin's account—based on the now familiar tripartite institutions of schools, hospitals, and newspapers—was remarkably consistent with earlier Japanese imperial strategies in the province. This makes sense since he and his immediate family members had been involved in establishing or controlling these institutions. Lin combined the earlier institutional approach from the 1910s and 1920s with the agricultural and industrial developmental schemes from the mid 1930s to arrive at a strategy he saw fit for wartime. Ultimately, the people of Fujian should

participate in the war effort, which they could do best by building on trade to advance in agriculture and industry. Taiwanese agricultural emigration into the interior of Fujian was the linchpin of his formulation, since farming technologies like fertilizer and colonial government support could make Fujian into the next "treasure house for the Japanese empire." Even before war arrived in south China, elite Taiwan sekimin like Lin Xiongxiang were already devising plans seamlessly to adapt existing structures and strategies—of an economic expansionism ostensibly committed to peace—to meet the needs of a wartime economy. Although Lin seemed convinced that Fujian would not be the target of Japanese invasion because of its low agricultural productivity and weak industrial base, he sought nonetheless to take part in the war effort by transforming Fujian's economy and the place of Taiwan sekimin in it to meet the needs of the wartime economy.

State Centralization and Treaty-Port Commerce: The View From the Ground in Xiamen

The period between the Fujian Rebellion in 1933–34 and the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 provided opportunities for two elite sekimin at the provincial and national levels, but it also brought changes for petty merchant-smugglers on the municipal level.[504] After the provincial government was reorganized in 1934, and the Maritime Customs Office in Xiamen and local taxation agencies strengthened efforts to levy duties on foreign trade in the treaty-port city, Japanese consuls in Xiamen increasingly faced problems with petty commodity runners known as the "benriya" (literally "convenience store"). New regulations by the GMD

504. Following the observations of Eric Tagliacozzo and Philip Thai that the distinction between smuggling and legitimate trade depends only on how the activity is coded by the state, I have chosen to refer to them in this section as "merchant-smugglers." Eric Tagliacozzo, *Secret Trades, Porous Borders: Smuggling and States along a Southeast Asian Frontier, 1865–1915* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005). Thai, *China's War on Smuggling*.

government to nationalize the Chinese economy and promote native industrialization through a policy of import substitution, it raised tariffs on a number of key commodities, such as sugar and rayon. The new tariff policies sought to encourage domestic production, but the prohibitive tariffs also served to make smuggling an extremely profitable venture.[505] In a June 1937 report, Xiamen consular official Ikemi traced the origins of the benriya to a practice of "ordering goods on demand" to be delivered from Taiwan. The "new benriya" emerged after World War I as demand for Japanese products grew. Although anti-Japanese protests in the 1920s had threatened these petty importers, the economic boom caused by Xiamen's rapid development and the cheap price of silver in the early 1930s sustained the demand for Japanese products. This combination of factors led to a growth in numbers of the small-scale merchants, and led them to cooperate with the "armed" faction of Taiwan sekimin, who provided protection from the anti-Japanese groups.

In the mid 1930s, with Japanese attempts to recover from the Depression, the benriya became a direct conduit for Japanese products into China—both to the treaty-port proper and to the interior. In the ecology of Xiamen's commerce, benriya merchants fell in between secret junk trade conducted by small-scale boats, likely from Taiwan or along the coast and usually beyond the treaty-port proper, and proper import trade, which was undercut over time by the benriya's success at evading taxes. The benriya merchants brought goods via regularly-scheduled Osaka shōsen kaisha (Osaka Shipping Company) lines, which could transport around 300 people holding ten or so packages each, with the value of goods on each arriving ship totaling between

505. The tariffs on sugar, for example, increased over time to 11 percent in 1928, 34 percent in 1930, 80 percent in 1932, and 137 percent in 1934. Thai, *China's War on Smuggling*, 127. According to a 1936 report, early seventy percent of the cost of imported rayon in China accounted for import duties, making it far more expensive than domestic rayon, which was more expensive to produce. Thai, 123.

100,000 and 150,000 yen. Regulating the collection of taxes from such a number of people, described by a customs official as a “mob of, say, three hundred unruly and desperate runners who do not hesitate to obstruct or intimate the officers, and sometimes resort to violence,” seemed a difficult if not impossible task.[506] Before early 1934, small sampan ships, organized into a guild, would gather in the harbor upon a ship’s arrival and transport goods to shore to evade taxation, helped with a small bribe, if necessary.

The benriya merchant system was both characteristic of common patterns of smuggling along the China coast in the mid-1930s and unique to the particularities of Xiamen’s political economy: demand for Japanese products—both high quality marine products and textiles, unavailable in Xiamen which lacked any industrial production—was high; the economy was unusually strong, supported by urban development and the strong purchasing power of overseas Chinese residents with holdings in gold; paramilitary groups of armed Taiwan sekimin could protect this quasi-legal trade from anti-Japanese protests; a Japanese company operated shipping lines to Taiwan (a source of refined sugar) and Japan (a center of industrial textile production) and was willing to overlook, if not facilitate, this form of commercial activity; and the low capital barriers to entry made it an attractive industry for the generally capital-poor Taiwanese in Xiamen. Although Ikemi does not mention it, it is very possible that the benriya merchants were also importing Xiamen’s perhaps most valuable commodity, opium, shielded as they were from inspection.

After the reorganization of the Fujian provincial government, however, local officials moved inspections of goods from aboard the boat (where it was easy to hide goods and evade investigation) to a warehouse on the shore. Not only did this upset the benriya merchants, it also

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506 Quoted in Thai, *China’s War on Smuggling*, 149.

angered local customs officials, who, in Ikemi's account, lost out on bribes. The two groups then joined in efforts to resist the new system of inspection, finally reaching a compromise whereby all goods except for textiles and medicinal products would be inspected and taxed on board. Over time, the industry also faced structural issues as it started to cannibalize itself. Once a system based on ordering on demand, by late 1933 the industry faced an oversupply of goods and dwindling demand. It was at this juncture that leaders in the industry, Gao Shufa and Su Tan (based in Taipei), attempted to form an industry association, for which they requested consular support. As the association provided "control" (*tōsei*) over, and therefore stability to, the industry and its members, the consul was eager to support it.

But again, in time the association came into conflict with local Maritime Customs officials and the provincial government. In 1934, the Fujian provincial government embarked on an anti-piracy campaign since it suspected that some remaining anti-GMD forces from the Fujian Rebellion had joined forces with coastal pirates near Fuzhou.[507] In June 1936, the provincial government established inspection stations at several key riverine entry points, to prevent untaxed goods from traveling into the interior of Fujian.[508] Extending control over the coast and commercial activity along it linked the interests of national security and controlling the economy. As Ikemi reported, these inspection stations could confiscate untaxed goods, fine the offending individual, and even punish the smuggling by death. When these stations began to require documentation of proper taxes, benriya merchants could no longer get away with negotiating a flexible rate with customs officials, as had been the practice since 1934. The national

507. David R. Ambaras, *Japan's Imperial Underworlds: Intimate Encounters at the Borders of Empire* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 140.

508. The location and purpose of these inspection stations is detailed in "36. Fukken shō zeimu keisasho (seiritsu no ken," JACAR B08062042100.

government limited trade to large ships the next year, effectively rendering the junk trade illegal. "Proper trade," on the other hand, had been so severely undercut by the benriya industry that proper merchants, mostly Japanese, had been reduced to taking out loans from benriya merchants to avoid bankruptcy.[509] High tariffs, which Japanese officials often viewed as a specifically anti-Japanese measure, made benriya commerce the only possibility for conducting trade in Japanese goods with China. The benriya were so succesful in building commercial supply chains that Ikemi reported that by early 1937 they were selling goods directly from merchandising warehouses in Kobe and Osaka, circumventing Taiwan and Xiamen altogether, to the interior of China, even under the threat of execution.

By 1937, the benriya industry faced challenges from both within and outside. Ikemi proposed a solution to this impasse by introducing economic control into the industry to strengthen its inner workings by banning individual transport and excluding Chinese merchants to eliminate competition, connecting merchants with merchandising supply houses to stabilize prices and supply, and tidying up the local industry to cut down on the practice of Taiwanese selling their names to runners. These proposals were meant to ensure the survival of the benriya industry, which had proven enormously profitable, and seemed one of the only possibilities of work for sekimin. Trade volume was around 3 million yen in 1934, 4.4–4.5 million yen in 1935 owing to the decline of junk trade, and 4 million yen in 1936, with 3.2–3.3 million yen of that in textiles, 500,000 yen in sundries, and 300,000 in other goods. Given the volume of trade in textiles, and the protective tariffs specifically on cotton, encroachment from the Shanghai textile market, whose factories were mostly owned by Japanese merchants, was especially threatening.

509. In other cases, large Japanese firms turned to financing and operating their own smuggling operations. See Thai, *China's War on Smuggling*, 106.

Ikemi remained confident that the special geographical and commercial relationship between Taiwan and Xiamen would sustain the benriya trade if enough minor adjustments were made. In this way, sekimin networks of smuggling in China, which built on earlier circuits of exchange but transformed them, became so profitable that they outstripped all other possibilities of Japanese trade in Xiamen. In the absence of Government-General subsidies for turning the sekimin into farmers, Ikemi may have felt that regulating the industry, illegal though it was, would at least ensure its success and bring some economic stability to the sekimin. Attempts by provincial authorities to prosecute smuggling, even under the penalty of death, did not deter sekimin but seemed rather to encourage them by raising the profits involved. As the press popularized images of smugglers, the association of Taiwan sekimin in the treaty-ports with vice, treason, and greed only grew stronger.[510]

The benriya industry is interesting for several reasons. A rare example detailing economic and social life in Xiamen on the ground, Ikemi's report leads me to wonder whether the Government-General rejected proposals to subsidize small-scale commerce in the mid 1930s because it proved so unstable and resistant to control. Despite the numerous attempts by South China consuls to garner the Government-General's financial support for small-scale loans or agricultural settlement, they all ended in failure. Yet the relative lack of institutional support did not spell disaster for those involved in the benriya trade, whose commercial activity was only ever quasi-legal at best. The benriya trade was a rare example of economic and social networks in treaty-port China that were neither only "native" nor only "foreign." Although one might be tempted to think the persistent junk trade as "native," with its antecedents in the *jiao* system, and

510. On depictions of smuggling in the press see chapter 4 of Thai. Smuggling and piracy also figured prominently in the *Taiwan Daily News* in the 1930s, especially regarding sensationalized figures of a Japanese woman pirate-smuggler active in Fujian named Nakamura Sueko. See Chapter 3 of Ambaras, *Japan's Imperial Underworlds*.

label as “foreign” the “proper trade” conducted mostly by Japanese merchants working for Japanese companies such as Mitsubishi and Mitsui, the benriya trade fell somewhere in the middle. It was a phenomenon historically specific to the 1930s, and geographically specific to Xiamen. But for all its particularities, the benriya trade faced above all challenges from the same trends visible across China during the 1930s: state centralization and consolidation of administrative capacity, recovery of tariff autonomy, and attempts at controlling economic activity.

The Fujian Rebellion and the resultant growth in administrative capacity and attempts to control economic activity seemed to provide a new opportunity in the eyes of the Taiwan Government-General and elite Taiwan sekimin. New efforts to broker cross-strait economic ties at the offial level rendered the hopes of sekimin like Chen Qinchang of the Asia Comrade Society to serve as Sino-Japanese economic intermediaries and recover their local authority a matter of the past. Moreover, the Taiwan Government-General had shifted its policy priorities, as it signaled in the decision to fund the Taiwan Development Corporation: in substance from institutional subsidies to a national development corporation, and in location from the treaty-ports to Hainan and Southeast Asia. In part this decision was motivated by the goal of industrializing Taiwan, which departed from Gotō Shinpei’s model of cross-strait commerce, in which Taiwan would supply China with raw materials in a continuation of late Qing networks of exchange. The colonial government may have also been motivated by the ongoing social and economic instability of Taiwan sekimin in the treaty-ports. As the South China consuls were quick to note, their precarious and marginal situation was in part a creation of the Government-General’s policy in South China. But the situation of the sekimin also resulted from transformations in Chinese central government policy to nationalize the economy and reverse the

legal privileges of extraterritoriality. These policy changes threatened to undermine the economic and legal privileges enjoyed by the sekimin, transforming petty trade into smuggling and sekimin legal status into treachery. If for elite sekimin like Gu Xianrong and Lin Xiongxiang the trends of the 1930s appeared to provide the opportunity to invest in provincial-level industrial and agricultural ventures, the opposite might be said of the sekimin of the sort involved in the benriya trade, for whom these trends only heightened the economic and political contradictions of the circumstances that conditioned their existence in China.

Epilogue: The Taiwan Sekimin in an Era of Total War and Decolonization

On the night of July 7th, 1937, Japanese troops stationed near the Marco Polo Bridge on the outskirts of Beijing clashed with Chinese troops, in what came to be known as the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. Fighting continued through the night, and two days later Chiang Kai-shek sent troops into North China in a departure from his earlier cautious stance toward the Japanese military. By doing so, Chiang violated the He-Umezu Agreement (1935), a truce signed with Japan's Kwantung Army to broker a cease-fire in exchange for Chinese recognition of a Japanese puppet state in East Hebei, which extended the Japanese Army's control of China to the doorsteps of Beijing and Tianjin. Conflict escalated and, at the end of July, the Japanese Army attacked Tianjin and Beijing: China and Japan were at war. Chiang had been convinced that piecemeal demands by the Japanese Army for control over Manchuria and North China would eventually turn the geopolitical tide against Japan, draw a foreign power with more military capability into war and provide China with an ally against Japan.[511] Chiang thought that the Japanese occupation of Beijing, the capital, and Tianjin, a major treaty-port, would be important for the foreign powers for commercial if not political reasons, which buoyed his hopes that foreign help was forthcoming. Chiang's optimism led him to take the offensive and attack Japanese troops in Shanghai in August. Shanghai was the most industrialized city in China and a crucial source of revenue for the GMD government. Surely, if not Beijing or Tianjin, then Sino-Japanese conflict in Shanghai, at the center of foreign commercial interests in China, would draw a foreign power to broker peace. But once again, Chiang miscalculated the interests of Britain,

[511]. See Chapter 5 of You-Li Sun, *China and the Origins of the Pacific War, 1931–41* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).

the United States, and the Soviet Union. The GMD was defeated at Shanghai and later suffered a disastrous loss at Nanjing. The GMD withdrew from its center of power in central China and relocated inland, first to Wuhan and then to Chongqing.

The outbreak of total war between Japan and China in 1937 crushed any remaining hopes for localizing the conflict or brokering peace, and changed the course of events for Taiwan sekiminc in South China. Total war was not as destructive on a local level in South China as it was in North and Central China, which saw the bulk of the conflict and whose civilians experienced mass dislocation and violence.[512] But the disappearance of any possibility of diplomatic resolution and the empire-wide mobilization for total war make Gu Xianrong's claims from earlier that year seem delusional in hindsight. From the vantage point of South China, war may have seemed distant—and it remained so until the Japanese military occupied Xiamen in May 1938, Guangzhou (outside of GMD control) in October 1938, and Fuzhou only in April 1941. Yet the war accelerated existing trends which made it a turning point for the Japanese empire in Taiwan and South China and for the resident Taiwan sekimin. War brought the loyalties of Taiwan sekimin under harsher scrutiny than ever before. Both Japanese and Chinese officials were divided: were Taiwan sekimin loyal imperial or national subjects, or were they agents of subversion? Were their perceived cultural and political connections to the enemy power assets to be mobilized, or dangerous forces to be condemned? I have argued that Taiwan sekimin was a capacious legal term that counted included many types of individuals who were

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[512]. Recent works have done much to enrich our understanding of the civilian experience of the Second Sino-Japanese War. On businesspeople, see Parks M. Coble, *Chinese Capitalists in Japan's New Order: The Occupied Lower Yangzi, 1937–1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003). On refugees, R. Keith Schoppa, *In a Sea of Bitterness: Refugees during the Sino-Japanese War* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011). For a nuanced take on collaboration, see Timothy Brook, *Collaboration: Japanese Agents and Local Elites in Wartime China* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2005).

diverse in background, class, profession, and social position. But the analytical benefit of considering these individuals together, diverse as they were, is the light it casts on the ways in which the category of Taiwan sekimin functioned as a juridical status in the view both of Japanese officials and of the individuals who made claims on the status. It was the logic of war that necessitated differentiating friend from foe and the impulse to eliminate all remaining ambiguity. While conflicts between national and imperial logics of subject status were a constant feature across the period of sekimin settlement in the treaty-ports, wartime exigency made identifying subject status, and by extension individual loyalties, a matter of national security.

Given this situation, some Taiwan sekimin relocated to Taiwan, some temporarily and some likely permanently; others sought to naturalize as Chinese citizens and joined the war effort on the side of the GMD in various guises: from volunteer auxiliary and medical corps behind the frontlines in Central China and officials in the GMD's new Taiwan Party Headquarters responsible for collecting intelligence and producing propaganda in Chongqing and Zhangzhou to, in the rarest of cases, members of the Chinese Communist Party in remote Yan'an. Yet other Taiwanese, including Taiwan sekimin previously residing in China and those mobilized from the colony, came to fill the vast needs of Japan's military mobilization. They followed in the footsteps of educated Taiwanese professionals who struggled to find opportunities for employment and went to Manchuria starting in the 1930s as doctors and officials.[513] Forbidden

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[513]. The work of Hsu Hsueh-chi, including her collection of oral histories of these individuals, has been pioneering in this field. For one example, see Hsueh-chi Hsu, "Rizhi shiqi Taiwanren de haiwai huodong: zai 'Manzhou' de Taiwan yisheng," *Taiwan shi yanjiu* 11, no. 2 (2004): 1–75. For a more recent example, see Hsueh-chi Hsu, "Manzhouguo zhengfu zhong de Taiji gongwu renyuan (1932–1945)," in *Taiwan lishi de duoyuan chuancheng yu xiangqian*, ed. Hsueh-chi Hsu (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Taiwan shi yanjiusuo, 2014), 15–67. On doctors specifically, see Ming-cheng Miriam Lo, *Doctors within Borders: Profession, Ethnicity, and Modernity in Colonial Taiwan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).

to join the military until 1942, these Taiwanese were mobilized across the wartime empire to work in auxiliary capacities as farmers, translators, police assistants, prison guards, and construction workers in the Japanese occupation of China and later Southeast Asia. War also accelerated existing inter-institutional conflicts between the Taiwan Government-General, the Japanese Army and Navy, and the Foreign Ministry, the last of which lost power to the military. Geopolitical considerations generated by war in North and Central China led the various imperial bureaucracies to devise their own proposals for directing imperial policy. The Tropical Industrial Research Conference and the proposal of the Taiwan Development Corporation in 1935 had signaled an intent to return to the policy goal of the "Southern Advance," but it remained to be seen what form such a policy would take and what role each imperial bureaucracy would play. These geopolitical conditions also decisively shaped the paths taken by Taiwan sekimin in China and by Taiwanese across the empire. Recounting the individual stories of how the Asia-Pacific War shaped the lives of Taiwanese is the subject of a great deal of existing research, which lies largely beyond the scope of this dissertation. Here I chart the place of Taiwan and Taiwanese during the Asia-Pacific War, revisiting themes explored in the dissertation in light of the changes wrought by total war.

The Second Sino-Japanese War and Intra-Imperial Competition over the "Southern Advance"

The start of the Second Sino-Japanese War accelerated changes already underway in the balance of inter-institutional power in Japan between the Taiwan Government-General, the Navy, the Army, and the Foreign Ministry. Following its proposal of the Taiwan Development Corporation in 1935, the Government-General signaled that it held a renewed interest in a

"Southern Advance," though its interest had shifted from its earlier support of institutions in South China and individual Japanese enterprises in Southeast Asia to financing a national development corporation. The Diet approved the proposal in the summer of 1936, and in September of that year, the last civilian Governor-General Nakagawa Kenzō (中川健蔵 in office 1932–1936) stepped down, leaving his successor, Reserve Admiral Kobayashi Seizō (小林躋造 in office September 1936–1940), to implement the plan. In the meantime, the central government had allowed the restrictions on naval armaments to expire and in August 1936 named the "Southern Advance" an imperial policy of equal importance to the "Northern Advance," although winning the war against China remained the government's top priority.

With control of the colonial government returning to a military official for the first time since 1919, and particularly to a member of the Navy, the Government-General was poised to play a larger role in realizing the empire's goal of a "Southern Advance." Governor-General Kobayashi summarized his administration's policy in the three connected goals of "southern advance-ization (*nanshinka*), imperialization (*kōminka*), and industrialization (*kōgyōka*)."[514] Imperialization referred to the military and ideological mobilization of Taiwanese colonial subjects as "imperial subjects"; industrialization signified the Government-General's ambitions to industrialize sectors of the Taiwanese economy to reduce its reliance on mainland Japan and promote exchange with Southeast Asia.[515] The goal of forging new economic relations with

[514]. Masami Kondō, *Sōryoku sen to Taiwan: Nihon shokuminchi hōkai no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Tōsui shobō, 1996) , 121.
[515]. On "imperialization" see Wan-yao Chou, "The Kōminka Movement in Taiwan and Korea: Comparisons and Interpretations," in The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945, ed. Peter Duus, Ramon Myers, and Mark Peattie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 40–70. Leo T. S. Ching, Becoming "Japanese": Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).

Southeast Asia was realized, in part, through the Taiwan Development Corporation, which sought to industrialize Taiwan and pursued a strategy of developmental imperialism in Indochina and Hainan beginning in the late 1930s, transforming the colonial government into a proactive sub-imperial agent in its own right.[516] The Taiwan-Government General instituted bureaucratic restructuring and policy changes that reflected Kobayashi's goals: the Foreign Affairs Section (*Gaijika*), established in 1935, was upgraded to a Department (*Gaijibu*) in 1938, and its production of research studies skyrocketed, covering topics from Taiwan's relationship to South China and East Asian maritime relations to the patterns of overseas Chinese migration to Southeast Asia and ethnographic and historical research.[517] New studies of the overseas Chinese, a popular topic of research since 1938, identified them not as members of the general category "Chinese" but by province of origin: Fujian or Guangdong. This, in turn, led scholars to reason that Taiwanese who traced their ancestry to these two provinces were the ideal economic competitors of the overseas Chinese, who were active in organizing anti-Japanese boycotts and raising enormous sums to donate to the GMD war effort.

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[516]. See Chapter 5 and 6 of Justin Adam Schneider, "The Business of Empire: The Taiwan Development Corporation and Japanese Imperialism in Taiwan, 1936–1946" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1998).

[517]. See Chapter 5 of Seiji Shirane, "Mediated Empire: Colonial Taiwan in Japan's Imperial Expansion in South China and Southeast Asia, 1895–1945" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 2014). Shinjirō Nagaoka, "Nettai sangyō chōsakai kaisai to Taiwan sōtokufu gaijibu no setchi," *Tōnan Ajia kenkyū* 18, no. 3 (December 1980): 90–103. For a chart of the number of publications produced during this time, see page 25 of Ken'ichi Gotō, "Japan's Southward Advance and Colonial Taiwan," European Journal of Asian Studies 3 (2004): 90–103. For an overview of changes over time, see Huei-ying Kuo, "Learning from the South: Japan's Racial Construction of Southern Chinese, 1895–1941," in *Race and Racism in Modern East Asia: Interactions, Nationalism, Gender, and Lineage,* ed. Rotem Kowner and Walter Demel (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 151–177.

Not everyone was happy with the changes in colonial administration. The Taiwan Army, for one, opposed the appointment of a naval admiral to the colony's top post, preferring the autonomy it enjoyed under a civilian governor in directing military affairs.[518] The island's Japanese residents welcomed Kobayashi, but Taiwanese elites were uneasy about the control of the Government-General reverting to a military leader. Lin Xiantang, the patriarch of the Wufeng Lin family and the doyen of the Taiwan Cultural Association, left Taiwan in May 1937 in protest, relocating to Tokyo. When Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro came to power in July, Lin used his connections to convey his dissatisfaction directly to the prime minister, explaining that a military governor contradicted the longstanding imperial policy of gradually "extending the homeland" (*naichi enchōshugi*) to Taiwan with the goal of eventual integration with the metropole, and threatened to neglect economic development in Taiwan in favor of overseas expansionism.[519] Even Lin's direct appeal could not do much to reverse this trend, which brought an end to colonial policies that had characterized the period since 1919.

The Foreign Ministry shared Lin's apprehensions about the degree of national defense and military expansionism that would intrude into a policy ostensibly committed to economic development. The Foreign Ministry had already lodged its disapproval, and in so doing confirmed its own marginalization, at the Tropical Industry Research Conference which established the Taiwan Development Corporation in 1934. Diplomatic representative Katō Saburō thought that the meeting had been called with the objective of "peaceful economic relations" in mind but found himself the lone voice of opposition to a Company organized around "development." This goal raised the suspicion of the Euro-American powers, which held

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[518] Kondō, *Sōryoku sen to Taiwan: Nihon shokuminchi hōkai no kenkyū*, 28.

[519]. On naichi enchöshugi, Kondō. 28; on Lin's protest to Prime Minister Konoe, Kondō. 367.

colonies in Southeast Asia, and risked confrontation with them. Katō insisted that "development into South China and [the] South Seas should be planned by the Foreign Ministry…it is not a wise policy to introduce unnecessary tension in international relations under the banner of development of South China and [the] South Seas."[520] The Foreign Ministry found itself as sidelined in shaping the empire's policy in Southeast Asia as it had been in trying to control the military in China, a situation worsened by Kobayashi's own military background. This transformation is perhaps the most significant for the fate of the Taiwan sekimin, whose history was intertwined with the China consuls from those first to be posted in the region. The plea of Katō, a high level diplomatic official, to adhere to a policy of "peaceful economic relations," can seem at first like a swan song for an institution committed to internationalism, diplomacy, and peace.[521] In fact, however, the threat of military intervention almost always undergirded the Japanese diplomatic presence in China, in the event that its insistence on a unilateral interpretation of extensive consular police sovereignty could not resolve conflicts of jurisdiction. Katō's critique of terminology, one that recalls an early critic of Gotō Shinpei's policy of "Cross-Straits Management" in 1900 as risking misunderstandings, appears less one of substance than of jurisdictional authority. But ultimately his critique could not halt the goal of "development" and its role in neutering his ministry.

Like the Government-General, the Navy had also taken a more proactive stance with the expiration of the London Naval Treaty in 1936 and was preparing for a new "Southern Advance." In 1935 the Navy established a "Research Committee on Plans Concerning the South

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[520]. Quoted in Gotō, "Japan's Southward Advance and Colonial Taiwan," 22.
[521]. Barbara Brooks has done much to revise this romanticized view of the Foreign Ministry in her investigation of the China consuls in north China and Manchuria. Barbara J. Brooks, *Japan's Imperial Diplomacy: Consuls, Treaty Ports, and War in China, 1895–1938* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000).

Seas" to investigate the region's colonial administration, geography, history, and natural resources.[522] As in the Army, two factions, one more circumspect and one more impetuous, existed in the Navy, leading to tension over when and where to act. Any hint of military expansion in Southeast Asia risked starting a war with one of the Euro-American colonial powers there. The Army remained insistent that imperial policy focus on the war with China. In the view of the Taiwan Army, decisive victory in China was all the more important for securing public order in Taiwan, where as yet incomplete efforts at imperializing colonial subjects meant that "Taiwanese still place too much faith in China, based on their conception of [their] race (*minzokuteki kannen*), view China as their fatherland while slandering Japan, and hope for Chinese victory so Taiwan can be returned to China."[523] To meet the strategic aim of severing the supply routes that connected Chiang Kai-shek's forces to supplies in Hong Kong, the Navy occupied the coast of South China in 1938 and 1939, with the Army's approval and aid. This military occupation is what brought the war to Xiamen.

The expansion of the war to Southeast Asia in 1940 continued the contestation for power and over strategy between the Taiwan Government-General and the military. The European colonies in Southeast Asia became important export markets for Japanese textiles in the 1930s, and by the middle of the decade their trade volume with Japan threatened to overtake that of trade with the European countries that colonized them.[524] But since Taiwan's exports consisted of raw materials similar to those produced in Southeast Asian colonies, it was not immediately

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[522]. See Mark Peattie, "The 'Southward Advance,' 1931–1941, as a Prelude to the Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia," in *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945*, ed. Peter Duus, Ramon Myers, and Mark Peattie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 189–242. 214.
[523]. Quoted in Kondō, 122.
[524]. See Peattie, 197–202.

obvious if or how economic relations between the two areas might be made complementary.[525] The key to this impasse was the industrialization of Taiwan, but such a path forward would transform Taiwan's relationship to the metropole and potentially compete with Japanese exports in Southeast Asia.[526] Southeast Asia was the source of important natural resources for Japan, but until 1940, Japanese policy remained committed to securing resources and trade within the existing European colonial governmental system, rather than by overthrowing it and establishing military occupation.[527] Governor-General Kobayashi shared this outlook, and in 1939 characterized "the grand area of the South Seas adjoining our Taiwan" as "the source of resources that are in short supply in Japan, as a market for Japanese goods, as the destination for the expansion of Japanese enterprises, and for immigration."[528] The goals of both the Taiwan Government-General and the military remained consonant with the aims of the Taiwan Development Corporation, despite the ongoing war with China. Policy thus fell somewhere between Katō's imagined "peaceful economic relations" and the later military occupation of total war.

The outbreak of World War II in Western Europe in 1939 and the fall of France in 1940 changed the Army's calculations. It moved to occupy French Indochina, a part of the supply routes to Chiang Kai-shek's government, which had now relocated to the inland city of Chongqing. With Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke's proclamation in August 1940 of the "Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, whose local inflection in Taiwan was the "Southern

[525]. See Schneider, Chapter 4.
[526]. This was mentioned as a problem as late as 1941, by a Japanese resident of Taiwan, Nishizawa Kiichi, in the publication *Taiwan no nanshin sei* ("The Southern Advance Character of Taiwan"). Quoted in Gotō, 35–36.
[527]. Peattie, 207.
[528]. Quoted in Gotō, 31.

Region Co-Prosperity Sphere," the war took on a new ideological slant proclaiming that Japan was fighting to liberate fellow Asians from Euro-American imperialism.[529] Because Japanese troops were unprepared for warfare in tropical conditions, in January 1941 they turned to the research arm of the Taiwan Army, which in turn consulted the Government-General, which was aided by the Taiwan Southern Region Association (established in 1939) and the Bank of Taiwan. These institutions in Taiwan provided intelligence to the Japanese military on how to occupy and establish control over Southeast Asia. In June 1941, the cabinet under Konoe Fumimaro codified Taiwan's role in the empire's "Southward Advance" policy and advocated the total integration of the Government-General in order to make full use of Taiwan's position, resources, and experiences as the empire's base of advance into the Southern Region."[530] The occupation of Indochina led to an embargo oil by the United States, moving the two countries closer to the war that began at Pearl Harbor in December, 1941.

The Local Experience of War in South China

For the Government-General, the military's occupation of Xiamen on May 10, 1938 seemed to provide an opportunity to join the war effort in China. Two weeks later at a meeting between the Government-General and the Navy, colonial officials furnished a plan to share the administration of Xiamen with the Navy and Foreign Ministry and to establish a "Xiamen Restoration Committee" (*Amoi fukkō iinkai*), composed of Japanese, Taiwan sekimin, and Xiamen local elites, to rule the city.[531] Even before military occupation, the Taiwan Development Corporation had issued a request in January 1938 to the Foreign Ministry to

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[529]. Gotō, 27–28.
[530]. Quoted on Gotō, 33, also on Kondō, 129.
[531]. Kondō, 115.

support its bid for controlling Fujian's provincial government local financial organs, promoting industrial development, and extracting natural resources.[532] The Taiwan Army had also opposed to Government-General control over Xiamen, and in November 1937 the Greater Asia Association, founded by Taiwan Army commander and pan-Asianist Matsui Iwane (and of which Li Luji was a member), formed the South China Investigation Committee (*Nanshi chōsa iinkai*). The committee sought to preclude such a possibility and advocated instead separating Fujian from the rest of China, integrating it with Taiwan, and leaving its management in the hands of the Taiwan Army.

But the Government-General's efforts went ahead, and in August 1938 it established a "Temporary South China Investigation Bureau" (*Rinji nanshi chōsakyoku*), made up of the heads of the various bureaus of the colonial government, to draw up plans for the occupation of Guangzhou, Shantou, and Hainan Island.[533] In the Government-General's plan, the occupation of South China, starting with Xiamen, would draw on the Fukudai Company. The company was established in 1935 with funds from the Taiwan Development Corporation and private donations from companies and individuals and was modeled on (and funded by a subsidiary of) the South Manchuria Railway Company. It was initially meant to coordinate development in Fujian with Chen Yi's provincial government.[534] In occupied Xiamen, the company would restore public

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[532]. Kondō, 114.
[533]. Kondō, 112.
[534]. See Kondō, 95–99. There was debate about the company's purpose, sources of funding, and scope of investment. Most of the investors of the Fukudai Company as it was established in 1937 were Japanese magnates in Taiwan's sugar industry, but the roster of investors also included Lin Xiongzheng and Lin Xiongxiang of the Banqiao Lin family (their relatives, Lin Heshou and Lin Boshou, were excluded from the final plan for having participated in Taiwan's Movement to Establish a Parliament, and Gu Xianrong, also part of an earlier plan, died in 1937).

institutions and control commerce, while the Bank of Taiwan would be responsible for financial affairs and the Government-General's civil affairs bureau would assist officials in forming a puppet government. The Navy also requested the dispatch of police officers from Taiwan to investigate anti-Japanese groups and to conduct a household survey in the city. The East Asia Development Board (*Kō-A In*), established in December 1938 to promote economic development in China, opened a branch office in Xiamen, which came under the control of the Navy and eliminated any remaining authority held by the Foreign Ministry. Under the control of the Navy, the Hakuai Hospital was reopened, and the Good Neighbor Association, which had overseen the management of the Japanese-supported local newspaper, was revived to produce propaganda. In part because of the collapse in remittances from overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, economic instability thwarted the efforts of the Fukudai Company, imperiled the city's food security and led the company to turn to rations. Wary of any attempt by the Government-General to gain undue influence in administering Xiamen, the Navy reminded the colonial government that ultimate authority rested with the military. But because Xiamen was of little strategic significance, the Navy focused its efforts instead on Hainan Island, where it was attempting a full-scale colonization of the island based on the Taiwanese model, with the assistance of the Taiwan Development Corporation.[535] The prewar structures of the Japanese empire in Xiamen proved remarkably durable for the Japanese wartime occupation of the city, even if authority rested in the hands of the Navy and was never fully yielded to the Government-General, though not for lack of effort. This shift in the focus of South China policy away from the treaty-ports to the colonization of Hainan confirmed the transformations initiated by the proposal to establish the Taiwan Development Corporation in 1934.

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[535]. See Schneider, Chapter 6, and Shirane, Chapter 5.

The occupation of Fuzhou in April 1941 provided another opportunity for the Government-General to exercise influence in the wartime municipal administration of occupied China. Following military occupation, the "Fujian Association" (*Fukken kai*) was formed by a coalition of officials and individuals, including Lin Xiongzheng, Lin Xiongxiang, and Lin Xiantang. The Banqiao Lins' (Xiongzheng and Xiongxiang) support of the war effort and the economic opportunities it might provide seemed consistent with their earlier participation in the Fukudai Company and with Xiongxiang's *New Cooperation with Fujian with Taiwan at the Center* published in 1937. Lin Xiantang's support, on the other hand, was likely less an about-face from his earlier opposition to a military Governor-General and more probably the result of pressure exerted by the colonial government. The Association expressed its apprehensions that policies in Fujian (*Fukken kōsaku*) would lead to Taiwan's being ignored in imperial policy, which would imperil imperialization and the island's role as a base for Southern Advance. Governor-General Hasegawa Kiyoshi (長谷川清 1883–1970, in office 1940–1944) explained this in a letter to the Taiwan Army, stating that Taiwanese desired the long-term occupation of Fujian and the "unification of Fujian and Taiwan into one body" (*ittaika*). Notably, Hasegawa framed his request as the desire of Taiwanese elites, playing on the Taiwan Army's earlier fear that incomplete victory in China would imperil the success of imperialization in Taiwan. In response, the Taiwan Army permitted the colonial government a role in industrial and economic development but retained political leadership over the occupation. The Army also expressed a desire to occupy Quanzhou and Zhangzhou, which were the centers of overseas Chinese migration to Southeast Asia, in order to consolidate control over overseas Chinese networks and their remittances. But the hopes of the Fujian Association and Government-General for an

increased role in Fuzhou were dashed when the Army withdrew from the city shortly after occupying it.

What did all these changes mean for Taiwan sekimin in Xiamen and across the region? At the start of the Sino-Japanese War in August 1937, municipal officials in Xiamen removed all remaining Taiwan sekimin from local official positions. Beginning in August, the Taiwan Associations in the South China treaty-ports organized the relocation of Taiwan sekimin to Taiwan, but many did not want to "return" to Taiwan, if they had ever come from there in the first place. Some escaped to Hong Kong, while others stayed in the city and formed anti-Japanese groups. Some Taiwan sekimin even requested "naturalization" as Chinese citizens, which was met with a mix of apprehension and welcome from Chinese officials.[536] Some Chinese officials suspected that naturalization was a strategy of subversion, while others celebrated it as a sign of the sekimin's patriotism. One newspaper article acknowledged the reasons for suspicion but encouraged people to embrace their compatriots.[537] The GMD central government sought to facilitate naturalization while precluding any trouble it might cause by requiring background investigations, proof of financial self-sufficiency, and the assurance of two local Chinese guarantors. The government categorized these new citizens as "overseas subjects," (*qiaomin*) placing them in the same category as overseas Chinese. After the occupation of Xiamen by the Navy, the Fujian provincial government rounded up the city's remaining Taiwanese residents, now mainly former sekimin who had naturalized as Chinese, and moved them to Fuzhou, from where they were moved again north to Jinhua, in Zhejiang Province, and,

[536]. These records were nearly the only archival sources I found during a May 2016 trip to the Fujian Provincial Archive in Fuzhou.
[537]. See Kondō, 451.

with the occupation of Jinhua, yet again to Chongan county, in the western part of Fujian Province.[538]

In 1939, Taiwanese Li Youbang organized this roving group of around 100 (former) sekimin into the "Taiwan Volunteer Corps" (*Taiwan yiyongdui*). An auxiliary force located close to the front, it provided medical assistance and organized political activities, and since many were proficient in Japanese, contributed to propaganda work as well. A survey of the group in 1942 after its relocation to Chongan suggests that it included laborers (including day laborers and servants), small shop proprietors, doctors, and dentists.[539] Their publications, *Taiwan Vanguard Monthly* (Taiwan xianfeng yuekan) and *Taiwan Youth* (Taiwan qingnian), suggest that over time Li had developed quite the personality cult as an intellectual and leader.[540] Born in Taiwan, Li received military training at the Whampoa Military Academy in Guangzhou and formed the city's Taiwan Revolutionary Youth Group in 1924, but was pursued by both the GMD and the Taiwan Government-General on account of his revolutionary activities.[541] After the war, Li recalled an occasion when he was punished severely by his Japanese elementary school teacher for using the word "fatherland" to refer to China in a fight with a Japanese classmate, which

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[538]. Jacobs suggests that Li might have chosen Chongan/Longyan after leaving Jinhua because it was the location of the West Fujian Red Army, but arrived to find that the Army had been "exterminated" (by GMD forces). J. Bruce Jacobs, "Taiwanese and the Chinese Nationalists, 1937–1945: The Origins of Taiwan's 'Half-Mountain People' (Banshan Ren)," *Modern China* 16, no. 1 (1990): 84–118, 97–98. On the Taiwan Volunteer Corps see also Xiaochong Chen, *Yu Zuguo tongsheng: Taiwan tongbao zai dalu kangzhan zuji* (Beijing: Jiuzhou chubanshe, 2013). Junling Huang, *Kangzhan shiqi Fujian Chongan xian de Taiwan jimin* (Beijing: Jiuzhou chubanshe, 2010).

[539]. See Kondō, 454 for a chart.

[540]. This is the interpretation offered by Jacobs.

[541]. Kondō says 1906, consulting his family's genealogical record (*zupu*), 442 and Jacobs says 1905, 111. Li was born on Taiwan in 1905 or 1906 and was attending Taipei Normal School at the time that other Taiwanese were agitating for the establishment of a self-rule parliament in Taiwan.

became the inspiration for his revolutionary and patriotic activities. While this was in part authorial flourish, Li was part of the small but politically subversive group of Taiwanese who moved to China in the 1920s and were exposed to anti-colonial and revolutionary ideologies, fanning the anxieties of the South China consuls. A figure like Li was all the more threatening because of his connections with China's military elite. Li certainly would not have considered himself a "Taiwan sekimin," but the consuls would have been eager to prosecute his ideological subversion on this basis. Li relocated to Taiwan after 1945 and served as a provincial official in the government in Taiwan under the Republic of China. During the February 28th Incident in 1947, an anti-government uprising in Taiwan that was followed by mass imprisonment and execution, Li was arrested and imprisoned. In 1952, he was executed by the GMD on charges of being a Communist spy. The Chief Executive of Taiwan assigned there after Japanese surrender in 1945 for his knowledge of the island and overseeing the "recovered" province during the February 28th Incident was Chen Yi, the purportedly pro-Japanese governor appointed to Fujian Province in 1934 and notable for his effusive praise of Japanese colonization.

Another group of Taiwanese aligned with the wartime GMD government was the Taiwan Revolutionary Alliance (*Taiwan geming tongmenghui*) led by Weng Junming (1892–1943). Weng was trained as a doctor and became involved in politics early on, joining the Revolutionary Alliance allied to Sun Yat-sen in 1912 and traveling to Beijing in an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Yuan Shikai in 1913. He settled in Xiamen in 1915, and opened a private medical practice there. He invested in business ventures, most notably a camphor business with Chen Changfu, who was the head of the Taiwan Association during the 1920s. Weng was remarkable enough a figure to receive mention in a 1932 consular survey of Xiamen's Taiwan

sekimin local notables, and although he used his medical philanthropy to practice charity in Xiamen, was never suspected of subversive activities that required consular monitoring. With the start of war in 1937, however, Weng renounced his sekimin status and escaped to Hong Kong to establish a private practice there, where he also engaged in political work. Although (or perhaps because) GMD leaders viewed Weng as lacking in political experience, they appointed him the head of the Taiwan Party Headquarters (*Taiwan dangbu*) of the GMD in 1940. Under Weng's direction, the Party relocated several times after Hong Kong was occupied in 1941, finally establishing itself in Zhangzhou in 1943. Working out of a local hospital as its front, the Party, which numbered at its peak 689 members, produced propaganda materials to be distributed in nearby Xiamen and Taiwan and ran a far-flung intelligence operation with connections to Taiwan and the occupied cities of Xiamen, Shanghai, and Hong Kong. The Party was beleaguered by infighting and mutual accusations of spying, the most important of which was directed at Party Secretary Liu Qiguang. Liu was, in one historian's understanding, the new name of Hou Chaozong, one of the founders of the Taiwan Communist Party and likely one of the authors of the 1933 anti-colonial nationalist leftist magazine *Taiwan*. Although his identity is still debated, the circle of Taiwanese allied to the GMD in China was small. Among Liu's accusers was Zhang Bangjie, who had organized and hosted the Anti-Japanese Alliance in Quanzhou in 1933 under the aegis of the Nineteenth Route Army, and who had been falsely accused by a former Alliance member, former business partner, and shapeshifter named Huang. What ultimately doomed the Party's activities, however, was the untimely death of Weng in late 1943. Fellow Party members speculated that his death by poison was suicide (from financial troubles) or murder, with the list of suspects ranging from a Japanese or GMD agent to a married colleague secretly infatuated with his daughter. After his death, GMD central officials replaced

the leadership of the Taiwan Party Headquarters with individuals who had not been born in Taiwan. One can only speculate about the reasons for this, but it seems possible that the reshuffling was a deliberate plan to bring the Taiwan Party under centralized control and preclude the possibility of too much local autonomy after the end of the war. Earlier that month in the Cairo Declaration of November 1943, the Allies had declared their intent to "restore" Taiwan to Chinese sovereignty.

The Asia-Pacific War and the View from Taiwan

After the start of the war, the Governmment-General established new schools to train Taiwanese to serve as military auxiliaries and "agricultural volunteers," first in South China and later in Southeast Asia. Taiwanese were deployed as farmers, translators, police assistants, prison guards, and construction workers.[542] The colonial government also dispatched its own officials to serve in new bureaucratic offices in occupied Hong Kong and across Southeast Asia.[543] Gotō retells the story of one such graduate of a new institution established in Taiwan, the "Imperial Warrior School," named Ka Seitoku (a Japanese reading of his name), who was sent to wartime Indonesia as an auxiliary military officer.[544] On the night before his departure, he renamed himself Isomura Kazuo, taking the surname of the protagonist of his favorite novel by Japanese author Kikuchi Kan, demonstrating his commitment to the ideology of imperialization, which

[542]. Shirane, 264.
[543]. A chart on pages 130–131 of Kondō shows the geographic breadth of these dispatched officials.
[544]. Gotō, 21–22, 40–41. Gotō refers to a Seitoku and a Shōtoku; it is unclear if these two are different people, two different readings of the same name (生得), or a typographic error. The memoir he quotes is Seitoku Isomura, *Ware ni kaeru sokoku naku, aru Taiwan jin gunzoku no kiroku* (Tokyo: Jiji tsūshinsha, 1981).

included adopting Japanese surnames.[545] The institutional networks and patriotic imperialistic fervor that accompanied Ka's/Isomura's deployment to occupied Indonesia contrast with the circumstances under which his father, Ka Hoh, had moved to Java fifteen years earlier. Ka Hoh was a rice dealer in Taichung who made the sudden decision to move to the Dutch East Indies in 1927. He lived among relatives in Malang, in the highlands of East Java, and eventually became a successful coffee and cotton farmer. The Dutch East Indies was one of the few places in Southeast Asia that remained open to foreign investment, which accounts in part for the relatively high importance placed on studies of its industry by the Taiwan Government-General's Foreign Affairs Bureau. Ka Hoh held Taiwan sekimin status in Java, which afforded him legal protection there as a Japanese subject. With the outbreak of war between Japan and the Netherlands, Taiwan sekimin status led Dutch officials to confiscate his assets, detain him, and intern him in Australia.

The younger Ka recalled an occasion when he and his father witnessed a Japanese police officer in Taiwan abusing a farmer selling vegetables on the street. He juxtaposed this memory with another comment by his father, offered by way of explaining why he moved to Java, that when overseas, "Japanese were respected as a first-class people wherever you went." In Gotō's analysis the two Kas are emblematic of the changes in context between the father's departure in 1927 and the son's in 1942: the former was an escape to freedom and a "natural outflow," whereas the latter was coerced and structured by the exigencies of the war. The case of the Kas illustrates the continuities in and transformations to networks of mobility and circulation that led the elder Ka to Java, increased interest in Java as a subject of research and a location of

[545]. His postwar memoir is published in Japanese under the name Isomura Seitoku, suggesting he may have kept his Japanese last name but abandoned his generic first name (which means "first son").

investment, and finally saw the younger Ka dispatched during wartime as a military auxiliary. The new institutions established after the start of war and its economic exigencies transformed the nature of Taiwanese mobility. In the case of the older Ka, Taiwan sekimin status seemed, paradoxically, to offer freedom from the oppressive colonial state as well as the protection of the Japanese empire, until the wartime context led Dutch colonial officers to categorize him as an enemy national on that basis. For the younger Ka, Taiwan sekimin status was inconsequential, if it existed in his mind at all. His mobility was not just conditioned but directed by the state.

With Taiwanese made eligible for military service in 1942, soldiers joined in the many existing capacities in which Taiwanese participated in the empire's war effort. The total mobilization of Taiwanese society, and the many Taiwanese who served as auxiliary if not military officers, became one of the most contentious issues for the postwar GMD government which assumed control over Taiwan following the end of the war and the collapse of the Japanese empire in 1945. Whether the GMD should treat those who participated in the war effort on the Japanese side, either as civilian auxiliaries or military soldiers, as "race traitors" (*hanjian*) or war criminals was a subject of debate and confusion.[546] The debate reflected the broader problem of how the GMD should evaluate Japanese imperialism and thus how it would understand postwar and postcolonial Taiwanese society: were its people the most long-standing victims of Japanese imperialism and militarism waiting to be liberated, or the worst example of the totalizing effects of colonization and imperialization? The GMD military officers sent to administer Taiwan in the immediate aftermath of the war, who had been fighting the Japanese for the last decade or longer, were particularly predisposed to see their new subjects as "enslaved,"

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[546]. Jiu-jung Lo, "Trials of the Taiwanese as Hanjian or War Criminals and the Postwar Search for Taiwanese Identity," in *Constructing Nationhood in Modern East Asia*, ed. Kai-wing Chow, Kevin Doak, and Poshek Fu (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, n.d.), 297–317.

since they had spent just as long a period, if not longer, under Japanese policies of imperialization. The task was no easier for local GMD officials burdened with the legal, social, and historical implications of identifying collaborators and race traitors in the Japanese-occupied cities of China. The question was also political: had Japanese colonization showered Taiwanese with the benefits of modernity, making it a model province for the postwar Chinese state, or had colonization stunted the political consciousness of Taiwanese and rendered them incapable of understanding even the most basic concept of the nation?

While these binaries cam seem overwrought, they continue to play out in present-day debates over public historical memory and history writing. The recent interest in mainland Chinese scholarship in the Taiwan Volunteer Corps, for example, aided by rich archival holdings in Chongan, takes on an unmistakably patriotic register—with good reason, as its members were at pains to prove their patriotism through wartime service—with undeniably presentist overtones. When the 1943 biography of colonial Civil Minister Gotō Shinpei was republished in Japan in 2005, the book jacket on the Taiwan volume displayed a quote by the former and first democratically-elected president of Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui, which read, "The Taiwan of today rests on the cornerstone laid by Gotō Shinpei" (*Kyō no Taiwan wa, Gotō Shinpei ga kizuita ishizue no ue ni aru*), making a controversial claim for Japanese colonization as the origin of Taiwan's modernity. These are but two examples of the ways that contemporary context shapes interpretive choices in terms that were, particularly in the wartime period, the same binaries faced by the Taiwan sekimin in China.

A final personal anecdote illustrates this contemporary context. On a trip to the Fujian Provincial Archive in Fuzhou in May 2016, the archivist, examining my search history, remarked that I must be a "mixed-blood compatriot interested in discovering the fatherland" because most

of the records I turned up were of Taiwan sekimin who naturalized as Chinese citizens in 1937–38. A few days later at the Xiamen Municipal Archive, the archivist there denied nearly every request I made, remarking offhandedly that my interest in records that made mention of individuals made me a suspect of espionage. Unlike the newly digitized Provincial Archive, the Xiamen Municipal Archive was still in the age of paper indexes, which she begrudgingly let me see. Nearly half the listings were sloppily censored with pieces of paper taped over them, which were easily lifted to reveal the label of "Taiwanese" (*Taimin*), reflecting the great volume of conflicts involving Taiwan sekimin faced by municipal authorities in Xiamen. On a walk around the neighborhood during the archive's long lunch break, I remarked at the new construction in the area, much of which my companion, the friend of a colleague, said was being purchased by Taiwanese investors. Since Xiamen was designated as one of the first special economic zones in China opened to foreign investment in the 1980s, businesses and individuals from Taiwan have been among the city's most eager investors. Bemoaning the rapid rise in real estate prices in Xiamen, perceived to be driven by the influx of foreign capital, my companion mentioned a number of recent cases of overseas Chinese from Singapore making claims on property holdings that had been expropriated during the 1949 Revolution, which they based on archival and historical documents. While I cannot presume to know what was going through the archivist's mind when she denied access to "personal" documents—she may have just been frustrated by my persistence—a local professor concluded that her reluctance was driven by my "Taiwanese speech patterns," in light of the reality that archival documents might resurrect conflicts assumed put to rest seventy years ago.

In contrast to properties whose ownership is still under contest, Shuzhuang Garden, formerly part of the Banqiao Lin family mansion (where Lin Weiyuan impressed his guest, Gotō

Shinpei, in 1900), is now government property open to visitors and one of the most famous tourist attractions in Xiamen. The garden was modeled on the family's house in Taipei and built after the Lins relocated to Fujian in 1895. Celebrated on its descriptive placards as a prime example of Chinese garden design, it reveals, for the purposes of this story, the lengths the Banqiao Lin family took to present itself as properly learned and deservingly officials in late Qing China. Still one of the richest families in Taiwan -- having weathered the Japanese-GMD transition with its majority stake in Huanan Bank intact -- it is perhaps no wonder that the Banqiao Lin family is particularly resistant to inquiring historians, preferring instead to publish limited hagiographic accounts through their own family foundation. The Wufeng Lin family has proven far more receptive to historians, welcoming me with a group of Taiwanese historians on a fieldwork visit to their late Qing era mansion in central Taiwan, long before I came to research this topic. The family member leading the tour insisted on the role that the family had played in preserving traditional Chinese architecture and culture, which could prove useful "if, one day in the future, the flag flying above the mansion were to change once again"—a comment he made while standing below a letter and photo thanking the family for its contributions from then Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou, recently reelected and known for his overtures to the People's Republic. I mention these examples to show how the ongoing regional context and issues of historical memory continue to shape the process of history-writing. By focusing as much as possible on individual Taiwan sekimin and placing them in their social, institutional, and ideological contexts, I have tried to take a small step toward a fuller understanding of the historical processes and the people who lived them, which determined the past and continue to shape the present.

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Appendix: Selected Biographical Details
(in order of appearance)

Shimomura Hiroshi 下村宏 (pen name Kainan 海南, 1875–1957) served as the Civil Governor (renamed the Director-General for General Affairs (*Sōmu chōkan*) on August 8, 1919) from October 20, 1915 to July 10, 1921 under three Governors-General (Andō Teibi, Akashi Motojirō, and Den Kenjirō, the first civilian to hold the post), while earning his doctorate in jurisprudence from Tokyo University in 1919. By the time he left the Government-General he was by far the most long-standing member among its senior leadership. He had previously served as an official in Japan's postal savings program and would later join the news company Asahi Shinbun before becoming its vice-president (1930), a member of the House of Peers (1937), the chairman of the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (*Nippon hōsō kyōkai,* or NHK, 1937), the chairman of the Japan Amateur Athletic Association (*Dai nippon taiiku kyōkai*) at the time of Japan's bid for the 1940 Olympics, and member of the Suzuki Kantarō cabinet (1945), in which capacity he facilitated the broadcast of the Emperor's declaration of surrender (*Gyokuon hōsō*) at the end of the Asia-Pacific War in August 1945. After war's end he was briefly president of Takushoku University (1945–46), briefly imprisoned in Sugamo prison, and dismissed from his positions before dying in 1957. His papers are held in the National Diet Library's *Kensei shiryōkan,* the archives of Tenri University, and in part at the archives of the Institute of Taiwan History at Academia Sinica, but I have not had the time to consult them yet.[547] Shimomura's predecessor was Uchida Kakichi (内田嘉吉, 1866–1933, in office August 1910–October 1915), appointed by preceding Governor-General Sakuma Samata, and a proponent of overseas development; the author, in 1914, of *Kokumin kaigai hatten saku*; and the founder, with Den Kenjirō and Inoue Masaji, of the South Seas Association (*Nan'yō Kyōkai*) in 1915. Though Shimomura was by comparison a "realist" (in Nakamura's description) to Uchida's presumably "unrealistic" expansionist tendencies, he also had a large part to play in expanding colonial Taiwan's interests in and links to south China and Southeast Asia.[548]

Yuchi Kōhei (湯地幸平 1870–1931) served as the "commander in chief of police inspectors" (*keishi sōchō*) from December 11, 1915 to April 4, 1919, under Governor-Generals Andō Teibi (in office 4/30/1915–6/5/1918) and Akashi Motojirō (in office 6/6/1918–10/18/1919). Shimomura briefly served in this position before Yuchi in 1915 after his appointment as Civil Governor in October. His position is described as follows: "According to article 22 of the revision [in 1901 of the 'bureaucratic system of the government-general of Taiwan'], 'the commander-in-chief of police inspectors (*keishi sōchō*) was to be supervised by both the governor-general and the chief of civil administration (*minsei chōkan*) [i.e. Shimomura] and, in case of emergency, was to be empowered to direct prefectural heads within the jurisdiction of his authorization.' In this way, the police force was not only internalized into, but also placed above, the civil administration. Also, the police force was institutionalized in local administration. Significantly, the general board of the police (*keisatsu honsho*) was independent of the bureau of

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547. Teruo Ariyama, "Shimomura Hiroshi," in *Kin-gendai Nihon jinbutsu shiryō jōhō jiten* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2004). Makiko Okamoto, *Shokuminchi kanryō no seiji shi: Chōsen, Taiwan sōtokufu to Teikoku Nihon* (Tokyo: Sangensha, 2008). 386–389.

548. Takashi Nakamura, "Taiwan to 'Nanshi, Nan'yō,'" in *Nihon no nanpō kanyo to Taiwan*, ed. Takashi Nakamura (Tenri, Nara: Tenrikyō Dōyūsha, 1988), 1–33. 15.

civil administration (*minseibu*), and this was to be a key feature of Japanese rule in Taiwan."[549] See Okamoto Makiko for his dates in office.[550] Regardless of whether the police in Taiwan were subject to oversight by the civil administration, in the case of Shimomura and Yuchi, the bureau of civilian affairs (under Shimomura) and general board of the police (under Yuchi) worked together.

The **Xiamen Chamber of Commerce** (廈門商會，廈門總商會) was established in 1904 with Lin Erjia as its founding chairman, and, according to a 1916 report, was comprised of 40 officers (*yishiyuan*) and 316 businesses (*shanghao*).[551] Though one source states that Lin was only chairman from 1904–1907, other sources in this volume also mention that he was asked repeatedly to return to his post, and reprint newspaper articles stating he was reelected in 1908 and 1910. Lin had also been the chairman of the Qing Dynasty's "Baoshangju," (Protecting Commerce Bureau) after it was merged with the Chamber of Commerce in 1904. The "Baoshangju" was established in 1899 by order of the Qing court and meant to 'protect' Huaqiao returning to China and which had the exclusive power to issue passports to them, without which the returning merchants would be fined or detained, quickly making it a tool of extortion. This office in Xiamen was the first of its kind, established by the request of the governor-general of Fujian and Zhejiang in a memorial to the emperor, and was later expanded to Guangzhou. Lin was also the sole Chinese representative on Gulangyu's Municipal Council from 1909–1922, was an alternate member of the legislative assembly of the Provisional Government of the Republic of China founded in Nanjing in 1912, and in 1920 founded and became the head of the municipal council in Xiamen (*shizhenghui*).[552]

Li Houji (李厚基 1869–1942) was a general allied with Yuan Shikai's Beiyang Army and was one of Yuan's "most trusted generals." (Cook, 197n32) After Yuan's death in June 1916, then provincial general Xu Shiying (1872–1964) was promoted out of Fujian, leaving Li to take over local administration in Fujian. (Madancy, 345) Under Li's rule, taxation in Fujian was high, and Li demanded the local purchase of war bonds and relied on loans from the Bank of Taiwan to finance the administration of the province. These new financial pressures, Madancy and Cook observe, reinvigorated the local cultivation of opium in the countryside and stymied the prospects of opium prohibition in Fujian, though the legal import of foreign opium had been banned in 1914. The front line between Li's control in Fujian and the Sun Yat-sen allied forces under the control of generals Chen Jiongming and Xu Chongzhi in Guangdong, moreover, shifted throughout the decade. Cook calls this the "Guangdong-Fujian War of 1918." Hostilities

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549. Caroline Hui-yu Tsai, "Shaping Administration in Colonial Taiwan," in *Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1895–1945: History, Culture, Memory*, ed. Ping-hui Liao and David Der-wei Wang (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 97–121. 100.

550. Okamoto, *Shokuminchi kanryō no seiji shi: Chōsen, Taiwan sōtokufu to Teikoku Nihon*. 386-387.

551. See "1913 nian shanghui huiwu gaikuang," in Xiamen zongshanghui, Xiamen shi dang'an guan, eds. *Xiamen shanghui dang'an shiliao xuanbian*, Xiamen: Lujiang chubanshe, 9, from the Tō-A dōbunkai chōsa hensan bu, eds., *Shina nenkan*, 1916.

552. See his biography in the Xiamen zongshanghui, ed. *Xiamen shanghui dang'an shiliao xuanbian* (Xiamen: Lujiang chubanshe, 1993). 495–497.

between the two continued intermittently until 1920 and 1921 when Sun Yat-sen ordered the two generals out of Fujian and back to Guangdong. Madancy shows that the shifting control revived the local cultivation of opium, which fetched high profits, and was collected by the Fujian military officials (despite the ban on its cultivation by the Fujian military and civil governors).[553] Lin Jianyin (1887-1950) was a translator in Kagi (C: Jiayi) prefecture in southern China, and traveled to Xiamen to help Lin Jishang manage his business affairs. After Lin's death in 1925, he was entrusted with retrieving Jishang's canal business, which had been seized by his assassin, Zhang Yi (張毅), and freeing Jishang's detained family members. Lin Jianyin later became a military official in the Manchukuo government, and then a secretary-general at the Tianjin-based Northern China Railway. Lin Xiantang, Jishang's great-grandfather's (Lin Dingbang) brother's grandson and then head of the Wufeng Lin household (after Lin Chaodong fled to China), mentions in his diary attending Cai Huiru's funeral in 1929 with Lin Jianyin.[554]

The **Taipei Tea Merchants' Association (台北茶商公會)** traces its origins to 1885 and is still in existence. The tea trade in Taiwan was sustained by technical, agricultural, and commercial expertise provided by skilled laborers from Fujian, which persisted even under Japanese rule. Though Xiamen was the entrepôt to which almost all Taiwanese tea (90%) was first shipped before being redistributed to global markets during the late Qing (the Merchants' Association in fact started as a "jiao," a nineteenth-century merchants association or guild), these channels of distribution started to change under Japanese colonization. This can help to explain why the head of the Xiamen Maritime Customs office was in direct contact with a tea merchant in Taiwan, rather than the local Japanese consul, for example.[555]

Lin Kaizhi (林開枝) a native of Jiayi, Taiwan, had traveled to Xiamen from Tokyo via Guangdong with two Japanese men, Kodaka Kentarō (和田健太郎) and Wada Jiichi (和田治一), and likely also his Japanese wife, (reported by Wada as having been with Lin, and mentioned by her name, Inoue Tame, in an earlier report, JACAR B03041647300). Lin allegedly came to Xiamen to support the revolutionary movement and had a secret plan to assemble 1500 Taiwanese violent ruffians (*wulaihan*) to form a group to sell weapons to the Revolutionary Party for a total of 10,000 yen. Lin was to broker the deal and be in charge of distributing the

553. Joyce Madancy, *The Troublesome Legacy of Commissioner Lin: The Opium Trade and Opium Suppresion in Fujian Province, 1820s to 1920s* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, Harvard University Press, 2003). especially 345–357. James Cook. "A Transnational Revolution: Sun Yat-sen, Overseas Chinese, and the Revolutionary Movement in Xiamen, 1900-1912" in *Sun Yat-Sen, Nanyang, and the 1911 Revolution,* Lee, Tai To and Lee Hock Guan, eds. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011). 170–199.

554. See Xiantang Lin, ed. Xu Xueji, *Guanyuan xiansheng riji (er)* (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyan Taiwan shi yanjiusuo choubeichu, 2000). 158.

555. On the "jiao" and maritime trade between Taiwan and Xiamen in the late Qing, see Yu-ju Lin, "Trade, Public Affairs, and the Formation of Merchant Associations in Taiwan in the Eighteenth Century," in *Merchant Communities in Asia, 1600-1980*, ed. Madeleine Zelin and Yu-ju Lin (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2015).; For the statistic of 90%, see 155n36. On the Tea Merchants' Association, see Qiongyue Zhang (Chang Chiung-yeuh, 張瓊月), "Taibei shi cha shangye tongye gonghui shiliao gaishu," *Guoshiguan guanxun*, Vol. 6, 2011, 139-150.

money among the Taiwanese, and he also visited the hideout of the violent groups on May 28th and found pistols, bullets, bombs, and other weapons, and they confided in him their secret plan to invade Xiamen (which either Wada giving the testimony or Yuchi concludes was in reality a half-baked plan). In conjunction with this plan, Lin Kaizhi met with Lin Jishang and other members of the Revolutionary Party at this house on Gulangyu the following day (May 29th), deciding on the 30th to delay the plan until they could figure out the details, though Lin (Kaizhi?) was eager to see action. The plot was thwarted with the Sino-Japanese joint investigation on May 31st, causing the Taiwanese to disperse. The three men mentioned do not reappear in the Reports, nor is it clear why Wada, who seems to be reporting on Lin Kaizhi, initially concealed his relationship with Lin (he pretended to have met him serendipitously at the Kajiwara Ryokan, a hotel, in Xiamen).[556]

Lin Lucun (林輅存 1879–1918), a native of Anxi, was residing in Taiwan at the time of the Sino-Japanese War and was one of the minority that relocated to Xiamen after Japanese colonization. He was later suspected of participating in a 1900 revolt spearheaded by Tang Caichang and escaped to Japan and Europe. After returning to Xiamen, he co-founded the city's "Tō-A Shoin" (East Asian Academy) with then Governor-General Kodama Gentarō and opened the city's Red Cross Society with Japanese consul Ueno Sen'ichi. After the establishment of the Chinese Republic he was elected as a councilor in both houses of the short-lived Republic's National Assembly. After the assembly was dissolved he was chosen by Xiamen's Huaqiao to lead the city's new Overseas Chinese Bureau (*Ji'nanju*). Despite relocating to Xiamen after the onset of Japanese rule in Taiwan, he continued to manage investments in the tea, camphor, and gold mining industries on the island.[557] The authors draw on the diary of Taiwanese Lian Yatang (連雅堂) and newspaper reports in the Chinese and Japanese versions of the Taiwan Daily News, demonstrating the degree to which Lin's activities on the mainland were reported in the local news.

On the **Overseas Chinese Bureau (暨南局)**, see Cook, citing a *wenshi ziliao* on the bureau, names Lim Boon Keng (Lin Wenqing) as the bureau's director and credits Lin Lucun (whose name he romanizes as "Lin Gecun") instead with petitioning the new provincial government to establish the bureau. Cook also identifies Lin Lucun as an "Overseas Chinese," perhaps misidentifying the nature of the impulse behind establishing the bureau. Cook describes the responsibilities of the bureau as follows: "The organization's responsibilities included the issuance of passports, the coordination of colonization efforts, Overseas Chinese educational affairs, promotion of commercial affairs, the issuance of travel passes and visas, investigation of social conditions for Chinese living overseas, the approval of Overseas Chinese representatives, and reports to the central government." (185). It is unclear the degree to which the Overseas Chinese Bureau's definition of "overseas Chinese" included the Taiwan sekimin resident in Fujian, or the degree to which the Bureau tried to involve the sekimin in their activities.[558]

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556. See "11 Shina narabini Shinajin ni kan suru hōkoku (dai kyū hō)," JACAR B03041648000.

557. Ziwen Zhang, ed. *Taiwan lishi renwu xiaozhuan, Ming Qing ji riju shiqi* (Taipei: Guojia tushuguan, 2006). 269-270.

558. Cook, "A Transnational Revolution: Sun Yat-sen, Overseas Chinese, and the Revolutionary Movement in Xiamen, 1900-1912," 184, and 195n30.

Hu Ruilin (胡瑞霖) was a graduate of Hōsei University's Banking Division[559] and served as the Finance Minister in Hunan before being transferred to Fujian. Hu only served as provincial governor for a short time. In July 1917, he submitted his letter of resignation to Li Houji.[560] A representative at the Fuzhou consul reported in November that Li Houji had yet to appoint a replacement, and was still considering five candidates, among them Hu Ruilin. The representative, Mori Hiroshi, wrote that Hu had tendered his resignation due to disagreements with Li, but still maintained close relationships with members of the Cabinet, who were agitating for his reappointment. Mori seemed apprehensive that Li would reappoint Hu, and he was correct; Hu instead became an advisor for Xu Shichang, the President of the Republic of China in Beijing. See JACAR B03050116200. A January 1917 publication of officials in Fujian Province indicates that at the time Li Houji was still serving as provincial military governor (*dujun*) and provincial governor (*shengzhang*).[561] A Shenbao article from June 13th, 1917 reports that Hu left his position because Li Houji had declared independence from the central government, to declare his support for Duan Qirui, who was opposed by then president Li Yuanhong and members of the Chinese National Assembly over the issue of Duan's support for entering World War I. Later that summer Duan would negotiate the Nishihara Loans, part of which went to support Li Houji in Fujian, strengthening his military position. See Chan, Anthony. *Arming the Chinese: The Western Armaments Trade in Warlord China, 1920-1928*. Vancouver: UBC Press, 1982, especially Chapter 1.

The career of **Hayashi Gonsuke** (**林権助 1860–1939**) calls into question a stark distinction between "colonial" and "diplomatic" affairs on the Asian mainland. As the plenipotentiary minister to Korea (1899-1908), he was the Japanese signatory in the series of treaties granting Japanese police and diplomatic rights in Korea and eventually turning Korea into a protectorate. He was the minister plenipotentiary in China from 1916 to 1918, a position he "was not pleased" to be taking up due to his disagreements with the effects of the Ōkuma cabinet on Japan's China policy (he thought the Twenty One Demands "a grave error"). He was later the Japanese minister to the United Kingdom from 1920 to 1925, during the demise of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Washington Conference of 1925.[562]

Xie Chunmu/Nanguang (謝春木 謝南光 1902–1969) was a member of the Taiwan Culture Association and a participant in the agricultural labor movement following the Erlin Incident in 1927. He was a writer and a journalist and, after the Manchurian Incident, relocated to Shanghai at the end of 1931 where he worked for a publication funded by the GMD central government. His highly critical and anti-Japanese articles made him the suspect of surveillance by the local

559. "Qingguo liuxue fazheng (Hōsei) daxue yinhang ke zuye mingdan" in *Shenbao*, August 25, 1906.

560. "5 (Taishō roku nen) shichi gatsu itsuka kara (Taishō roku nen shichi gatsu nijūsan nichi," part of "Kakkoku naisei kankei zassan / Shina no bu / Fukuheki mondai dai yonkan," JACAR B03050228500.

561. "4 Fukken zenshō dōkanroku sōfu no ken 2," JACAR B03050113300.

562. Ian Nish, "An Overview of Relations between China and Japan, 1895-1945," in Ian Nish, ed. *Collected Writings of Ian Nish, Part Two*. (Tokyo: Synapse, 2001). 226-227.

consul and the Special High Police (*Tokkō keisatsu*), which was responsible for prosecuting thought crimes. He evaded capture and published prolifically before relocating to Chongqing with the start of the war in 1937. In Chongqing he participated in the GMD Taiwan Party Headquarters with Weng and Zhang Bangjie, and remained a trenchant critic of Japan and a source of intelligence. During the war, he was also in communication with the Allied leadership in an attempt to influence their decisions regarding Taiwan's fate at the end of the war. In 1945, he moved to Taiwan where he was briefly involved in the establishment of the Provincial Government but quickly grew disillusioned with the Nationalist government and returned to the mainland, where he joined the Communists. After the Chinese Civil War, he became involved in Sino-Japanese diplomacy, and died in Beijing in 1969.

Chen Qinchang (陳欽錩) An article on the archives of National Taiwan University (the name of the institution which succeeded Taihoku Imperial University, and its present name) records the title of his dissertation, submitted in 1931, as "An Annotated Collection of Formosan Songs Compared with English Ballads." Held in NTU's archives, Chen's dissertation was notably shorter than others (90 pages compared to others in excess of 300 pages), but this could be attributed to the fact that it was typed (in English, presumably), rather than hand written, like the others. Chen also appears to have submitted dissertations with similar titles in 1932, 1936, and 1937, which the article says "deserves further explanation."[563] A list of students permitted to enroll (J: *Nyūgaku kyoka*) from the Taiwan Government-General in May 1928 lists Chen as one of only three Taiwanese (determined by birthplace and surname) to enroll in Taihoku Imperial University that year, *Taiwan sotokufu* 0071030374a006. Li Donghua counts the number of Taiwanese graduates before 1943 from the Faculty of Literature at 7 out of a total of 61.[564]

563. Xinyi Lin and Weizhi Chen. "Jianjie Taiwan daxue suocang 'Tai-Da xiaoshi dang'an," accessed at http://www.lib.ntu.edu.tw/doc/cg/resources/U_His/academia/his.htm#0, also in Taibei diguo daxue ynjiu tongxun bianji xiaozubian, ed. *Taibei diguo daxue yanjiu tongxun* (Taipei: Nantian, 1996).

564. Donghua Li. *Guangfu chuqi Taida xiaoshi yanjiu (1945-1950)*. (Taipei: Guoli Taiwan daxue chuban zhongxin, 2014), 15, quoting "Daigaku sotsugyōsei shimei hyō," *Taihoku Teikoku Daigaku ichiran (Shōwa 18-nen 12-gatsu ban*), Taipei, 1943.