Minority Political Ambition and Candidate Supply in the United States

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Abstract

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The racial composition of elected officials in the United States has significantly diversified in recent decades. Nevertheless, the proportion of candidates of color still fall far short of the underlying voter population, particularly as the minority demographic continues to grow at a rapid pace. To explain the source of racial disparity in government, scholars have long examined various political opportunity structures under which minority candidates arise, suggesting that whether candidates of color emerge or not is a strategic matter: minority candidates enter politics when they perceive high electoral viability, which they estimate using information such as the racial composition of a district and prior electoral success of co-ethnic candidates. However, absent from this scholarship is a comprehensive understanding of how minority individuals enter the emergence process in the first place and how the factors that advance them through the pipeline to power evolve over time.

This dissertation investigates the process by which racial minorities decide to enter politics, examining the entire pipeline to power from developing an initial interest in running for office to officially becoming a candidate. First, I examine political ambition among the general American public, focusing on the racial differences in the development

of political ambition and the factors uniquely influencing ordinary minority voters' entry decisions. Through an online survey on a sample of ordinary American voters, post-stratified to be representative of each racial population, I find that factors commonly used to predict political ambition, such as encouragement from personal or political sources, political efficacy, and community participation, operate differently between minority respondents and their white counterparts as well as across different racial groups.

A conjoint experiment designed to examine entry decisions among ordinary minority voters both confirms existing theories and offers a new insight. I find that the perceived electoral viability is higher in electoral districts with larger share of co-ethnic populations, which aligns with conventional wisdom that minority population is often used to gauge the primary voter base among minority candidates. Furthermore, I find that among politically ambitious minority respondents, perceived electoral viability is higher when an incumbent shares the respondent's ethnicity. However, this effect is reduced when both the incumbent and the challenger share the same ethnicity, indicating that minority status is no longer a comparative electoral advantage.

Second, in two field experiments embedded in real-world candidate recruitment efforts, I investigate the relative influence of intrinsic and extrinsic appeals on developing nascent interest in running for office. I find that intrinsic motivation to run, such as a desire to bring about social change, increases not only the immediate information-seeking behavior but also a longer-term commitment to candidacy, including applying to and attending a campaign training program. On the other hand, extrinsic appeals intended to increase the perceived likelihood of winning generate a significantly smaller effect on the immediate consideration of political candidacy while exerting a modest amount of influence on the longer-term commitment.

Third, through a conjoint experiment on minority individuals situated at different stages of the emergence process, I study how the motivation to run evolves as they

progress through their political journey. I find modest evidence of a shift in priority, from intrinsic to extrinsic, as minority individuals advance through the pipeline to power. Specifically, those with low levels of political ambition prefer to run in districts that have undergone a surge in violence targeted toward co-ethnic groups. In contrast, those with a high level of political ambition prefer districts with a substantial share of their co-ethnic population.

Fourth, I examine how both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations to run play out in real-world elections. Leveraging city-level exposure to police brutality, I find that the share of Black candidates running in municipal elections increases in cities after a fatal police shooting of a Black resident, suggesting that racial violence politicizes group consciousness among the Black community, which, in turn, influences their desire to enter politics. However, exploring individual cases of who those candidates are and when they appear on a ballot reveals that Black candidates emerge for both intrinsic and strategic reasons: political veterans emerge immediately after the incident as they take advantage of increased minority voter turnout and open seats, whereas political newcomers arise several years later as they require more resources.

The empirical findings challenge the conventional wisdom that attributes minority under-representation to strategic calculations alone. Instead, they highlight the importance of examining both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations at *each* stage of the emergence process to fully understand why racial minorities run for office. In doing so, this research offers new insights into the nuanced dynamics of minority candidate emergence and, in turn, minority representation in the United States.

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Acknowledgments

This dissertation is a reflection of my and of many immigrants' experiences in this country. We grow up watching our parents give up on opportunities so we don't have to. We grapple with our values as much as American society questions our presence. We hustle to get a job that validates our worth in the American economy. Of course we don't have leisure for politics. But in this pursuit, we lose so much from having no representation.

None of this work would have been possible without the unwavering support of my committee members. Profound thanks to Yamil Velez, with whom many of the ideas in this project were born and whose faith in my work fueled my passion for research; to Naoki Egami, who guided my work to reach its fullest potential and taught me not only how to do research but also how to be a good scholar; to Donald Green, whose passion and curiosity for science inspired me to push the boundaries of my own research; to Shigeo Hirano, whose insights illuminated new ideas and encouragement kept me alive in academia. I also thank Michael Ting, who introduced me to the world of political science. To all, every conversation we shared brought solutions to old questions, new questions to the solutions, and, importantly, joy.

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부모님께.

To my parents.

In 2019, Anna Hernandez, a community organizer from Phoenix, lost her little brother due to police brutality. Despite her grief, she saw this tragedy as a call to action to advocate for her community and re-imagine safety for all. In 2021, Anna joined a New American Leaders' training, Ready to Lead, to explore running for office.

New American Leaders Annual Impact Report, 2022

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Introduction

How do racial minorities decide to run for office? In the United States, more than half a million elected office jobs exist, and, as many elected positions there are, individuals from many walks of life choose public office jobs. Anna Hernandez, featured in the epigraph, decided to do so after losing her brother to police brutality. Similarly, Fran Griffin attended a city council meeting for the first time after the police killing of Michael Brown a mile from her house and ran for city council five years later (Hidalgo, 2019). Catalina Cruz, a former undocumented immigrant and now a New York State Assemblywoman, was motivated to run for office after Trump's decision to rescind Deferred Action

for Childhood Arrivals, the Obama-era program that allowed undocumented young people to work and study in America (CBS, 2017; Acevedo and Leanos, 2018). Ellen Park, a New Jersey State assemblywoman, where lack of non-English provision in the community prompted her to get involved in politics, now seeks to implement Asian history to be taught in schools (Chao, 2021).

The presence of minority elected officials carries substantial consequences for public life. Minority descriptive representation leads to substantive representation (Bratton and Haynie, 1999; Grose, 2005; Burden, 2007; Broockman, 2013; White, Nathan and Faller, 2015; Lowande, Ritchie and Lauterbach, 2019) which, in turn, produces long-term societal impacts including political engagement (Ture and Hamilton, 1992; Spence and McClerking, 2010; Barreto, 2007), trust in government (Scherer and Curry, 2010; Griffin, 2014), labor force participation (Davis, Livermore and Lim, 2011), and student performance (Meier and Stewart, 1991; Meier et al., 2005) among minorities. Consequently, examining why racial minorities pursue public office is a crucial first step in understanding racial disparity in various facets of democratic institutions.[1]

To explain when and where minority candidates emerge, scholars have long investigated various political and structural circumstances under which minority candidates arise. The conventional wisdom is that a sizeable co-ethnic population is a key to minority candidacy: minority candidates can only survive in majority-minority districts due to both strong co-ethnic voting and lack of support from white voters (Lublin, 1997; Grofman, Handley and Lublin, 2000; Branton, 2009; Casellas, 2010). Recent studies, however, show that the deficiency in minority representation arises from potential minority candidates opting not to run for office, pointing to prior minority electoral success and party recruitment as important determinants of when and where minority candidates emerge

[1]Throughout this project, I use the term "race and ethnicity" interchangeably with "race", "ethnorace", or "people of color"; "racial minority" with "minority"; and "non-Hispanic white" with "white". Unless noted otherwise, I use the term "Asian" to refer to non-Hispanic Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders, "Black" to non-Hispanic Black and African Americans, and "Hispanic" to Hispanics and Latinx.

(Juenke, 2014; Shah, 2014; Fraga, Juenke and Shah, 2020; Atsusaka, 2021). The common thread in this research, therefore, suggests whether minority candidates emerge or not is a strategic matter: minority candidates enter when they see a high probability of winning, a probability they estimate using information from the district racial composition, recent elections, and other political opportunity structures.

While prior research has advanced our understanding of minority candidacy, several unresolved questions remain. First, there is still a lot we do not know about how minorities develop political ambition *in the first place*. Existing research primarily examines the entry decisions of candidates or officeholders—all of whom have already run or served in office—hence naturally focusing on strategic factors involved with winning the elections. However, a unique yet equally important stage of the development of political ambition happens long before the actual decision to file for candidacy. If the idea of running for office has never even crossed an individual's mind, the decision to place her name on the ballot would never follow. Therefore, these studies shed light on the decision-making process at the final stage of candidacy, leaving the initial motivations behind entering political office largely unexplored.

Studying the initial decision to run for office is an essential first step in addressing the fundamental issues of minority under-representation. As shown in Figure 1.1, the most substantial drop in descriptive representation occurs during the transition from office-eligible citizens to candidates rather than from candidates to elected officials. In fact, minority candidates tend to have favorable odds of success once they officially enter races (e.g., Shah, 2014), as the racial makeup of candidates closely mirrors that of elected officials. Examining who enters the initial stage of the emergence process, therefore, lays the groundwork for subsequently understanding who we see on a ballot. Without insight into the initial interest, we cannot fully grasp the root cause of minority under-representation.

Second, prior studies' focus on strategic responses overlooks the intrinsic benefits

Figure 1.1: Racial Composition of General Population, Electoral Candidates, and Elected Officials in the U.S.



Note: Share of non-white (bottom four bars) and non-Hispanic white (top green bar) population among total population (leftmost column), voting age population (second column), political candidates who run for office (third column), and elected officials (rightmost column) at all levels of government. (source: U.S. Census Bureau, de Benedictis-Kessner et al. (2022), and Reflective Democracy Campaign)

that may drive minorities to consider political careers even when victory is not guaranteed. While minority candidates may be motivated by a personal desire for power, the ambition for political office can also be motivated by an altruistic desire to bring about social change. And although the intrinsic motivation of minority individuals to engage in politics has been extensively documented among voters and politicians, it is rarely the focus of research on candidate emergence.[2]

Examining the intrinsic motives behind running for office presents a unique opportunity to bridge the gap between voter and elite behavior in representation research. The literature on minority voter participation reliably finds that racial consciousness effectively fuels political activism among minority voters beyond a simple act of voting (e.g., Chong and Rogers, 2005; Barreto, 2007; Zepeda-Millán, 2014). This literature, however, has grown independently from research on office-seeking behavior among minority

[2]I use the term "intrinsic" motivation to denote a deep-seated drive rooted in a psychological attachment to one's racial identity politicized to promote in-group status through collective action. This contrasts the term "strategic" motivation, which encapsulates actions taken to maximize the electoral winning odds.

politicians, which demonstrates that politicians of color advocate for the welfare of their racial group regardless of external incentives (e.g., Broockman, 2013; White, Nathan and Faller, 2015; Lowande, Ritchie and Lauterbach, 2019). However, voters *are* the potential future politicians who end up substantively representing their racial groups in office, and running for office *is* a form of political participation that voters may take when their racial identity is politicized. Simply put, candidate emergence is a *continuous* process wherein voters transition from being civic-minded individuals to becoming policymakers themselves, and intrinsic motivation among minorities may serve as a critical platform to demonstrate this continuity.

This dissertation project examines the process of candidate emergence among racial minorities in the U.S., examining each phase of the process from the initial decision to enter politics to officially becoming a candidate. Through descriptive surveys, field and survey experiments, and observational data, I explore what motivates racial minorities to run for office and how such motivating factors vary across individuals situated at different stages of the emergence process. The research reveals that intrinsic motivations, such as a desire to bring about social change, play a critical role in the initial decision to consider a political career, especially among those without prior political ambition. Furthermore, in exploring how these motivations interact with strategic considerations such as district demographics and political opportunity structures, I uncover the nuanced interplay of both intrinsic and extrinsic factors as minority individuals progress through their political journey. Overall, this dissertation not only highlights the complex dynamics behind the emergence of minority candidates but also provides new insights into minority candidate supply and, in turn, the source of minority under-representation in elected offices.

1.1 Chapter Overview

Chapter 2 reviews the literature on candidate emergence. I begin with a discussion of a set of classical studies of political ambition. I then provide an overview of the candidate emergence literature that focuses on racial minorities in the United States, where I discuss major contributions and missing gaps in the literature. I then introduce a conceptual framework for understanding the development of political ambition among racial minorities, from nascent interest to actual candidacy. I rely on the theoretical expectations developed here to formulate testable hypotheses that I take to the data in the subsequent empirical chapters.

Chapter 3 begins by examining political ambition among the American public. Americans from non-elite educational and professional backgrounds serve at all levels of government offices. Yet, the process by which these ordinary Americans cultivate political ambition remains largely unexplored. This chapter fills this gap by surveying a sample of the general American public, with a particular focus on the racial disparities in political ambition and the factors influencing minority voters'decisions to run for office. I find that, while gender plays a consistent role in predicting political ambition irrespective of race, other factors commonly used to predict political ambition, such as encouragement from personal sources, political efficacy, and community participation, operate differently between minority respondents and their white counterparts. A conjoint experiment examining factors that uniquely influence minority voters' entry decisions both confirms existing theories and offers a new insight: while a larger co-ethnic population increases both the desire to run and the perceived chances of winning among minority individuals, the co-ethnicity of incumbents encourages politically ambitious minority respondents, especially when the minority status can be used as a comparative advantage during elections.

In Chapter 4, I narrow my focus on a subset of the minority population with some

potential of running for office. Holding ability fixed at this high level allows for an investigation of the individual-level decision to enter politics while mitigating the issues of a rare-event problem—derived from studying the entire population of office-eligible citizens—as well as selection bias—derived from studying only those who have already filed for candidacy. Two encouragement experiments were conducted during a candidate recruitment effort by New American Leaders, an organization that recruits and trains people of color and immigrant heritage to run for office. Members of the organization were encouraged to participate in a candidate training program while randomly varying the personal appeals to run for office. The experimental result reveals that intrinsic motivation, rather than the strategic calculus of winning office, plays a vital role in sparking initial interest in candidacy among minority citizens. In particular, encouragement messages that emphasized shared experiences around racial discrimination caused recipients to seek immediate information about candidate training.

Furthermore, I find that the effect of intrinsic motivation persists over time: those who received intrinsic treatment messages are more likely to express further their commitment by applying to and attending a candidate training program weeks after the treatment. In contrast, the messages intended to increase perceived electoral viability generated a significantly smaller effect on the immediate consideration of political candidacy, while exerting modest influence on the longer-term commitment. These results challenges the notion that strategic incentives are the primary determinants of minority candidate emergence. Instead, my findings suggest that the intrinsic benefits of office can sufficiently influence the initial decision to run among minority individuals, highlighting the nuanced dynamics underlying the entry decisions.

While Chapter 4 focused only on minority individuals who have yet to consider political candidacy, Chapter 5 examines minority individuals with both low and high levels of political ambition—alums and non-alums of a candidate training program—and ex-

plores how their motivation shifts as they progress through their political journey. I test at which stages of the emergence process intrinsic factors exert greater influence than extrinsic factors and vice versa. Through a conjoint experiment, I find modest evidence of a shift in priority, from intrinsic to extrinsic, as individuals advance through the emergence process. Specifically, consistent with the findings from the field experiments, I find that those with low levels of political ambition (those who have never attended a program nor have run for office in the past) prefer to run in districts that have experienced a surge in violence targeted towards co-ethnic groups. In contrast, in line with prior studies that point to strategic determinants of minority candidate emergence, I find that those with a high level of political ambition (those who had undergone a campaign training and/or had run for office) prefer to run in districts with substantial co-ethnic populations rather than districts that have undergone racial violence. These findings suggest that minority candidacy is a dynamic process in which the incentive schemes evolve over time.

In Chapter 6, I move beyond the experimental sample and examine how both intrinsic and extrinsic factors play out in real-world elections. Specifically, I leverage city-level exposure to police brutality to examine how the racially charged events targeting Black residents impact the emergence of Black candidates in subsequent municipal elections. Using a generalized synthetic control method, I find modest evidence that the share of Black candidates in city council elections increases in cities after a fatal police shooting of a Black resident, suggesting that racial violence sparks group consciousness among the Black community, which in turn may influence their decision to run for office. Furthermore, looking closely at *who* the candidates are and *when* they emerge reveals that strategic and intrinsic benefits of running are not mutually exclusive: political veterans appear on the ballot soon after the incident as they take advantage of increased minority voter turnout and open seats resulting from the incident, while political novices, who require more time and resources, arise several years after. These patterns suggest a confluence of intrinsic motivation to advocate for their racial communities and extrinsic considerations

regarding the optimal timing to maximize the chances of winning.

1.2 Contributions

The nation's demographic landscape is evolving at an even faster pace than initially projected, with significant growth in Hispanic and Asian American populations. However, as shown in Figure 1.1, this demographic shift is inadequately reflected in the composition of the government. While this minority under-representation is due in part to low turnout by minority voters, it is also in part due to not enough racial minorities running for public office positions: "if no minority candidate is running then the likelihood of a minority candidate winning is zero" (Shah, 2014, 2). To understand the root causes of this under-representation, we must start by looking at how political ambition develops among racial minorities and how that desire to run progresses through actual candidacy.

This project investigates this supply side of minority representation, examining the entire pipeline to power from the initial interest to officially becoming a candidate. In doing so, this research makes methodological, practical, and theoretical contributions to our understanding of minority representation.

Prior work on minority candidate emergence considers filing for candidacy as an outcome and examines the extrinsic circumstances under which minority candidates emerge. By viewing candidate emergence as a spectrum rather than a static event, this research introduces new intermediate behavioral outcomes to the study of minority candidate emergence and demonstrates how the motives that drive minorities to enter the initial stage of the emergence process can substantially differ from those that drive them to stay through the later stages. In doing so, this paper contributes to the minority political participation literature that examines how politicized racial identification can mobilize minority voters to partake in various forms of political participation. I find that racial consciousness can also influence a more assertive form of political participation—running for office.

This research also extends the research on political ambition among women (e.g., Fox and Lawless, 2014; Sanbonmatsu, 2010; Bernhard, Shames and Teele, 2021). For example, Fox and Lawless (2005) introduces the theoretical framework on the development of political ambition and assess gender disparities in the initial interest in seeking office. Using a national sample of Americans, Crowder-Meyer (2020) identifies how political ambition develops differently for ordinary women and men. As Fox and Lawless (2005) notes, "[a]t the nascent ambition phase...potential candidates' abstract notions of themselves as candidates...not as election competitors or victors...affect whether they consider running for office" (652). My research adapts the theoretical framework put forth in this body of literature and applies it to understand the determinants that distinctively impact racial minorities' development of political ambition.

Methodologically, this study includes empirical analyses of minority populations rarely studied in prior research: minority individuals who have a higher potential to run for office than the average voter but have not yet attained political candidate status. Identifying the correct pool of individuals to study political ambition is one of the most challenging tasks in studies of political ambition. On the one hand, because of selection bias, studies of individuals who have already filed for candidacy cannot provide insight into the factors that motivate them from ever seeking office in the first place. On the other hand, studying the entire population of office-eligible citizens runs into a rare-event problem as the rate at which a citizen enters politics is extremely low. I overcome this empirical challenge by targeting members of an organization that recruits and trains people of color to run for office. Moreover, this group comprises individuals with diverse levels of political ambition: some have not yet considered political candidacy seriously, while some are actively preparing to run for office. This variation in individual levels of political ambition provides a rare opportunity to examine the evolution of political ambition from nascent to expressive.

This study also contributes to a field experimental research on recruiting agents to public office jobs (Gulzar and Khan, 2021). The field experiment targets a subset of the minority population that has received limited attention in prior research: minority citizens with potential to run for office that have not yet decided to do so. By centering on this group, this research is able to study the progression towards candidacy while circumventing various empirical challenges prevalent in previous studies.

Importantly, the adaptive experimental design implemented in this research minimizes inefficiencies while maximizing socially desirable outcomes *during* the experiment—a feature that is substantively valuable in real-world recruitment contexts. Despite the natural value to political science experiments, there has been little use of these methods in the field, although my research contributes to a small but growing number of examples (e.g., Caria et al., 2020; Offer-Westort, Coppock and Green, 2021; Offer-Westort, Rosenzweig and Athey, 2022).

The findings of this project also carry real-world implications. Organizations like New American Leaders are growing in terms of both numbers and influence: APAICS recruits and trains Asian American and Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, Voto Latino trains Latinos, Higher Heights trains African American women, and Catalyst PAC trains Republicans of color, all of which aim to encourage ordinary minority voters to partake in the emergence process. The results of this study suggest the need for a more targeted approach to candidate mobilization: for minority individuals who have not previously considered running for office, a recruitment strategy that appeals to their intrinsic motivations may be more effective. On the other hand, for those minorities with a stronger political drive, offering concrete resources such as electoral tactics and information on a district profile could be more beneficial. Understanding these distinctions is crucial for facilitating a seamless transition from being voters to becoming politicians.

More broadly, this study contributes to a growing body of literature that demon-

strates "intrinsic motivations such as prosociality and warm glow can shape civic and cooperative behavior" (Gulzar and Khan, 2021, 5). While previous work on political entry has long focused on pecuniary incentives (Ferraz and Finan, 2009; Fisman et al., 2015; Dal Bó and Finan, 2018), a small but growing research provides evidence on how prosocial motivations can be mobilized to enter politics (Gulzar and Khan, 2021) as well as how identity-based appeals by party can help recruit rank-and-file political agents (Ravanilla, 2021). My research extends this work by examining the type of intrinsic motivation that uniquely operates among racial minorities in the U.S.

2

Theoretical Framework

Questions about who belongs in government office and how they got there have long been of interest to social science scholars. The relevant research traditionally began with a view that political ambition is a type of political personality an individual is born with. In *Power and Personality*, Lasswell writes that "some personalities are power seekers, searching out the power institutions of the society into which they are born and devoting themselves to the capture and use of government" (1948, 20). Exploring how such personality is developed for some but not others, Lasswell's subsequent work theorizes that "[e]lite members who prepare to play active political roles usually become differentiated

at an early age from their more passive contemporaries. Such differences of perspective affect motivation to acquire the base values appropriate to politics, notably the skills essential to leadership" (Lasswell and Lerner, 1966, 21). Empirical research supporting the concept of "political type" followed suit, linking individuals'personal attributes, psychological characteristics, and early socialization experiences to elite behavior (Barber, 1965; Glick, 1966; Edinger and Searing, 1967; Fishel, 1971).

With the introduction of Schlesinger's *Ambition and Politics* (1966), the study of political ambition largely shifted its focus towards investigating the structure of opportunities rather than individual politician's aspiration. Schlesinger put forward a rational choice paradigm to examine the career patterns of political leaders, emphasizing the role of political and structural incentives involved in running for office (Black, 1972; Rohde, 1979). Under this paradigm, prospective candidates are primarily concerned with winning an election. Hence, they strategically decide when to seek elective positions by gauging their likelihood of electoral success based on information obtained from open seat availability, term-limit requirements, district partisan composition, and party congruence with constituents (Soule, 1969; Prewitt and Nowlin, 1969; Herrick and Moore, 1993; Diermeier, Keane and Merlo, 2005).

The literature has since expanded to studies that assess various aspects of political ambition—particularly as it relates to women in politics (Lawless, 2004; Fox and Lawless, 2005, 2010, 2011, 2014; Sanbonmatsu, 2010; Kanthak and Woon, 2015; Preece and Stoddard, 2015*a*)—and the strategic decisions of career-minded politicians (e.g., Cox and Katz, 1996; Fowler, 1993; Maestas et al., 2006; Broockman, 2014*a*; Maisel and Stone, 2014). In exploring the source of the under-representation of women in government office, scholars have investigated both personal circumstances and structural barriers that influence the rise of female candidates. For example, Lawless (2015) argue that "the primary institutions of social and cultural life" in the U.S. continue to perpetuate the traditional gender

roles and expectations upon women from an early age, leading to depressed political ambition among women (353). Even among qualified and politically ambitious women, the prospect of a political career comes at a greater opportunity cost associated with breadwinning and child care (Bernhard, Shames and Teele, 2021).

More recent work in the U.S. also points to candidate supply as a potential source of growing polarization in Congress. Hall (2019) examines the ideological positions of the House candidates and finds evidence that those who run for federal office have become more ideologically extreme as the costs of running for office as an ideological moderate increased. Thomsen (2017) makes a similar claim, focusing on how party fit in the legislature discourages moderates from running for the U.S. House, thereby driving polarization. Broockman et al. (2021) also find that local party leaders prefer nominating candidates reflective of typical co-partisans, not centrists.

2.1 Minority Candidate Emergence

What are the factors that uniquely impact political ambition among racial minorities? Interest in studying the emergence of racial minority candidates perhaps began with the enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which effectively forced states to create legislative districts on the basis of race. The creation of new majority-minority districts invited many controversies, with advocates deeming the policy vital to bring African Americans and Latinos to office and opponents decrying it as an unnecessary aid that actually harms minority electoral influence.

Many scholars attempted to put this to an empirical test. Namely, *The Paradox of Representation* by David Lublin (1997) uses congressional elections between 1965 and 1994 to investigate the effects of racial gerrymandering on minority descriptive representation. The author finds that racial gerrymandering has substantially increased the number of African Americans and Latinos in Congress: "Non-blacks won 5007 of the 5079 elections

held in white-majority districts between 1972 and 1994; blacks triumphed in 200 of the 219 elections in black-majority districts" (1997, 41). Thus, Lublin concludes that the only way to elect more than a token number of racial minorities to Congress is to create minority-majority districts. Numerous empirical studies provide additional evidence to this claim (Hill, 1995; Cameron, Epstein and O'halloran, 1996; Grofman, 1998; Grofman, Handley and Lublin, 2000; Canon, 1999*a*; Krebs, 1999; Lublin and Voss, 2000; Branton, 2009; Casellas, 2010; Fraga, 2016) finding a strong positive correlation between co-ethnic population size and minority candidate supply.[1] Conclusions drawn from these seminal works have since become conventional wisdom in representation research that a co-racial population in an electoral district is key to understanding where and when minority candidates emerge.

In the past decade, representational scholars began to look beyond the demographic factors to explain the rise of minority candidates. While acknowledging the significant effect of minority population size, scholars have pointed to the growing phenomena in which minority legislators tend to fare well in elections in majority-white districts, particularly in local elections. For example, Juenke and Shah (2015, 2016) look at instances where minority representation happens outside of majority-minority districts and demonstrate that, when minority and white candidates are compared in similar districts, their likelihood of success is equivalent. The largest barrier to minority representation, therefore, is simply that minority candidates rarely emerge (Highton, 2004; Juenke, 2014; Fraga, Juenke and Shah, 2020).

Therefore, studies examining the source of minority underrepresentation from the supply side have investigated other structural and contextual factors that impact the rise of minority candidates. These studies are largely rooted in the rational choice framework, which views prospective minority candidates as election seekers whose primary goal is to win elections (Schlesinger, 1966; Black, 1972; Levine and Hyde, 1977). Following this

[1] See Marschall, Ruhil and Shah (2010) for a comprehensive review.

assumption, relevant research has pointed to various external resources and political opportunity structures that influence the perceived viability of winning (Shah, Marschall and Ruhil, 2013; Shah, 2014; Juenke, 2014; Juenke and Shah, 2015; Fraga, Juenke and Shah, 2020).

One source of information that minority candidates use to gauge their viability is the prior success of candidates of color. For example, Fraga, Juenke and Shah (2020) find that successful minority candidates in higher-level offices increase the perceived chance of winning and encourage minority candidate emergence down the ballot (also see Dancygier, 2014). Another source of information is recruitment by party elites and political organizations (Broockman et al., 2014). Doherty, Dowling and Miller (2019), for instance, find that local chairs from both parties believe that minority candidates are substantially less likely to win than white candidates, suggesting that minority candidates may be less encouraged to run by political elites who are reluctant to devote resources to them. This observation is also evident in studies of women's political ambition, which find that a call for more women by credible leadership can increase women to run and get elected (Karpowitz, Monson and Preece, 2017).

Therefore, focusing on demographic, political, and structural circumstances involved in running for office, the prior studies conceptualize minority candidate emergence as primarily a *strategic* response: minority candidates enter when they see a high probability of winning, which they estimate using information from the district racial composition, recent election, and other political opportunity structure. Integrating the conclusions drawn from recent theories with conventional wisdom, a logical model developed by Atsusaka (2021) predicts that the rise of minority candidates is a deterministic function of (1) the electoral performance of co-ethnic candidates in the most recent elections and (2) the district racial composition.

This conceptualization assumes that strategic consideration is what drives individu-

als to enter politics in the first place. That is, minority candidates enter races only when they see a high chance of winning while their personal circumstances are treated as exogenous. However, another crucial phase in the evolution of political ambition takes place long before the concrete decision to participate in a particular competition is made. For an individual to weigh the strategic factors associated with office jobs, she must already be reasonably committed to the act of running. However, if the idea of running for office has yet to even occur in an individual's mind, then she is never aware of the political and structural opportunities.

If the strategic consideration is the sole predictor of minority candidacy, it also implies that those minority individuals who choose to enter politics are of "political type": they are born into a power-seeking personality who has always kept an eye out for the favorable political circumstances.[2] However, politicians in the American government have increasingly moved away from the traditional archetype of a political candidate, with studies finding that "ordinary Americans" can develop political ambition as a function of their personal and social experiences (Crowder-Meyer, 2020). Furthermore, if only citizens possessing specific profiles are considered for seeking office, it raises serious concerns about both descriptive and substantive representation.

This focus on the strategic response is mainly because most existing research examines how elites—i.e., those who have already run or serve in office—perceive their prospect of running. Hence, our current knowledge of what affects minority candidate emergence is limited to those with "expressive ambition"—actually competing in an election (Fox and Lawless, 2005; Bernhard, Shames and Teele, 2021)—while little is known about the initial phase of the development of political ambition. To fully understand when and why minority candidates emerge, it is necessary to consider the *entire* emergence process, which involves closely examining how one develops political ambition

[2]This notion aligns with the traditional work on political ambitions, precisely, Lasswell's (1948) notion of the "political person" that certain power-seeking personalities are associated with political careers.

from the outset.

2.2 Conceptual Framework

Focusing on candidates or office holders, the determinants to minority candidates explored in previous work speak to expressive ambition—i.e., "whether individuals will choose to enter specific political contests" as candidates sift through various strategic considerations to maximize their winning odds (Fox and Lawless, 2005, 644). Information such as the size of co-ethnic population or whether or not a co-ethnic candidate has successfully won elections in the same district factor into the probability that a minority candidate can win elections.

However, a crucial phase in the evolution of political ambition takes place long before the concrete decision to participate in a particular competition is made. For an individual to weigh the strategic factors associated with office jobs, she must already be fairly committed to the act of running. But if the idea of running for office hasn't even occurred in her mind, then she never actually be aware of the political and structural opportunities. Hence, our current knowledge of what affects minority candidate emergence is limited to those with expressive ambition—i.e., "whether individuals will choose to enter specific political contests"—while little is known about the development of nascent political ambition—i.e., "the inclination to consider a candidacy" (Fox and Lawless, 2005, 644). To fully understand when and why minority candidates emerge, it is necessary to consider the *entire* emergence process—from nascent to expressive.

Figure 2.1 adapts conceptualization of political ambition introduced by Fox and Lawless (2005), which includes both nascent political ambition as well as expressive ambition as elements to the continuous process of candidate emergence. Consistent with previous work on minority candidate emergence, I view expressive ambition to be driven by factors that increases electoral viability among racial minorities, both perceived or actual.

These include factors identified in previous work, such as the prior co-ethnic candidate success and elite recruitment (called credible demand).



Figure 2.1: Conceptualization of the minority candidate emergence process

The initial interest in candidacy, however, is less directly tied to specific electoral contexts than expressive ambition. In this initial stage, I suggest that minority individuals are motivated by personal or normative considerations rather than strategic considerations. In particular, following the literature on minority political participation, I suggest that racial consciousness, the politicized racial identification that "articulates collective discontents and strategies for improving the status" of one's own racial groups, to influence the initial inclination for candidacy (Chong and Rogers, 2005, 354).

2.2.1 Intrinsic Motivation and Expectation

Building on social identity theory (Tajfel et al., 1971, 1979; Tajfel and Turner, 1986), research on identity choice reliably finds that group consciousness can engender psychological benefits from the race-based group identification, which can lead minority voters to engage in politics and minority politicians to promote the welfare of their co-ethnic groups even in the absence of extrinsic rewards (Simon and Klandermans, 2001; Devos

and Banaji, 2005; Rogers et al., 2013; Burden, 2007; Broockman, 2013; Lowande, Ritchie and Lauterbach, 2019). Understanding how racial identification spurs actions for both elites and voters illuminates the path to which intrinsic motivation leads to interest in candidacy.

Among politicians, the literature on substantive representation reliably finds that legislators tend to promote the policy interests of voters with whom they identify. They are more responsive in their roll-call voting to the interests of those who share their personal backgrounds (Burden, 2007; Canon, 1999*b*; Grose, 2005; Tate, 2003; Whitby, 2000), are more likely to serve on committees, participate in oversight hearings, provide constituency service, and sponsor legislation addressing group interests (Canon, 1999*b*; Haynie, 2001; Minta, 2011; Butler and Broockman, 2011). Notably, the link between descriptive and substantive representation has been shown to be driven by politicians' intrinsic motivation to promote the welfare of their group (Burden, 2007). For example, Lowande, Ritchie and Lauterbach (2019) find that ethnic minority legislators are more likely to advocate for their underrepresented communities by contacting federal agencies than their white counterparts—a constituency service rarely observed by voters. In an experimental setting, Broockman (2013) finds that Black legislators tend to help Black alias even when doing so promises little political reward. These findings suggest that minority legislators are motivated to advance the interests of their group for "purely psychic...benefits" (Citrin, Green and Sears, 1990, 6) driven by a sense of group solidarity with others with similar ethnic backgrounds (Whitby, 1997; Broockman, 2013).

With substantial evidence at hand, a question remains as to what extent intrinsic motivation serves as a primary impetus for entering politics initially. It may be the case that minority legislators enter politics for reasons irrespective of serving group interests (e.g., promoting a particular policy unrelated to racial issues) but become motivated to advance their groups' interests only after they secure office. Empirical findings support-

ing this claim would then align with prior research, suggesting that the motivation to run is primarily strategic and equally affects both expressive and nascent ambition. However, while it may not be the ultimate decision-making factor while campaigning, a strong attachment to their racial identity may serve as an initial motivation to consider public office jobs. In that sense, identity-based motivation to run provides an initial pool of candidates who may later face political and structural opportunities. Empirical evidence of this would suggest that the dynamics underlying the initial decision differ from those influencing the later stages and that race identification can be a distinct source of political ambition among minority individuals.

Among voters, literature on identity politics shows that racial identification and consciousness boost not only a basic form of political participation, such as voting and donating, but also more active forms such as protesting, boycotting, and petitioning government officials (Shingles, 1981; Bobo, 1983; Dawson, 1994; Pantoja, Ramirez and Segura, 2001; Chong and Rogers, 2005; Kuo, Malhotra and Mo, 2017; Phoenix and Arora, 2020).[3] In particular, issues that threaten or have a direct impact on the welfare of racial groups tend to spur activism among racial minorities at a mass level. For example, analyzing New York's 2006 immigrant protests, Zepeda-Millán (2014) finds that immigrant groups' levels of participation were influenced by the degree to which they felt threatened by H.R. 4437 (also see Pantoja, Ramirez and Segura, 2001). Masuoka (2006) finds personal experiences with racial discrimination as the most important factor in raising group consciousness among Asian Americans, which translated to greater mobilization amid the anti-Asian rhetoric during the 2016 election season (Farrell et al., 2022). In a similar vein, social movement literature finds that race-based group appeals affect mobilization among ethnic minority groups (Bonilla and Tillery, 2020; Wasow, 2020).[4]

[3]Racial consciousness have generally been operationalized through the measure of linked fate (Dawson, 1994), a cognitive heuristics grounded in social identity theory. For more details, see McClain et al. (2009).

[4]The link between group consciousness and participation also relates to the theory of inter-group emotions (Smith, 1993, 1999): when social identity is salient, group members'appraisals of a given inter-group situation (e.g., discrimination) triggers specific emotions (e.g., anger) towards out-group members. Conse-

Can group consciousness motivate minority citizens to participate in a more costly form of political participation—running for office? Running for office is arduous: it requires a significant amount of time, money, and effort. However, studies of political participation show that policy motivation can compensate for these individual-level opportunity costs. Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) claim that having a direct stake in a policy may increase an individual's likelihood to participate politically around that issue. Furthermore, Canon (1990) demonstrates that clear policy goals can sufficiently motivate congressional candidates with no previous political experience to enter politics (also see Green, Conroy and Hammond, 2023). Therefore, issues that politicize racial identification may allow interested individuals to seek options beyond the conventional ones on how to best promote their policy goals.

Literature on racial consciousness points to two mechanisms underlying a link between intrinsic motivation and minority candidate emergence: motivation to represent and sense of shared experience. First, feelings of solidarity and commonality among group members foster a sense of duty to act for the group (Mansbridge, 1999). Studies find that exposure to a message that calls for a greater voice from minoritized groups leads to increased political participation among minority voters (e.g., Boudreau, Merolla and Shah, 2020). This line of research is also similar to comparative politics literature on candidate supply. For example, Gulzar and Khan (2021) shows that encouraging people to run for office for prosocial reasons changes who runs and improves policy alignment with citizens' preferences.[5]

Second, shared experience is understood as a core mechanism binding members of the disadvantaged group (Mansbridge, 1999; Swain, 1995). Previous research finds that, when faced with a race-relevant threat, the belief that one's group is being unfairly

quently, these specific emotional experiences lead to specific types of inter-group behavior (e.g., challenging the injustice collectively by confronting the out-group (also see Yzerbyt et al., 2003; Mackie, Devos and Smith, 2000.

[5]However, the main mechanism discovered in this study is not group solidarity but a monitoring effect, as the effects exist only when the encouragement was made in a public setting but not in private.

targeted can stimulate anger and strengthen individuals' resolve to take corrective action on behalf of the group (Sellers and Shelton, 2003; Ryan, 2012; Brader and Marcus, 2013; Phoenix, 2019; Phoenix and Arora, 2020). Similarly, ethnic minorities respond to group "separateness" with increased political activity such as protesting, voting, and party-switching (Miller and Krosnick, 2004; Bowler, Nicholson and Segura, 2006; Feldman, Huddy and Cassese, 2012; Kuo, Malhotra and Mo, 2017). This argument also finds support in the literature on emotion, which theorizes that feelings of anger and anxiety can evoke politically consequential behavior (Valentino, Gregorowicz and Groenendyk, 2009; Huddy, Feldman and Cassese, 2007; Weber, 2008; Ryan, 2012; Ferrer, Grenen and Taber, 2015; Albertson and Gadarian, 2015).

Therefore, I expect that **motivation to represent** and **sense of shared experience**, when activated, will exert a stronger effect on developing the early stages of political ambition among racial minorities as compared to the extrinsic motivations that require strategic calculation of political opportunities.

2.2.2 Extrinsic Motivation and Expectation

While intrinsic motives may play a vital role initially, strategic-based factors related to perceived viability may become more critical towards the later stage of candidate emergence. Individuals who had never seriously contemplated running for office may initially be driven by emotional discourse, only later engaging in strategic thinking about their electoral prospects. Thus, in accordance with previous research on minority candidate emergence, I expect that extrinsic motivation to run, based on informational cues such as districts with large **co-racial population**, **prior success of candidates of color**, and **recruitment by party elites and political organizations** to impact more advanced forms of political ambition.

It is important to note that the extrinsic factors that are expected to exert influence in the later stages of the emergence process represent a *shift* in focus rather than a *complete*

replacement of motivation among potential minority candidates. Should the intrinsic motivation to serve their group interests entirely dissipate, the behaviors of minority politicians upon assuming office would not differ from their white counterparts. However, as discussed, minority politicians advocate for the welfare of their co-racial group even without extrinsic rewards. Hence, I expect that the intrinsic and extrinsic motivation are not mutually exclusive.

2.3 Concluding Remarks

The chapter introduces a conceptual framework for understanding the development of political ambition among racial minorities, from nascent interest to actual candidacy. It posits that intrinsic motivations, such as identification with one's racial group and a desire to address racial issues, are initial drivers of political ambition. This perspective is supported by research indicating that minority politicians often advocate for their communities out of a sense of duty and shared experience, even in the absence of direct political gain. Moreover, the discussion on extrinsic motivations highlights the importance of strategic considerations in the later stages of political ambition development. Factors like district demographics, prior success of similar candidates, and recruitment efforts by political organizations play a critical role in motivating minorities to transition from considering to actively pursuing political office. The dual focus helps unravel the complex process of minority candidate emergence and offers insights into strategies for enhancing diversity and representation in political institutions.

I test the theoretical expectations laid out here in various empirical settings. Beginning with an "office-eligible" population (stage 1 in Figure 2.1), Chapter 3 examines how ordinary American citizens develop aspirations to run for office and how it varies among people of different racial backgrounds. In Chapter 4, I then narrow my focus to a group of minority individuals with a high potential to run for office and investigate the types of encouragement appeals, both intrinsic and extrinsic, that can tangibly increase

nascent political ambition (stage 2). Chapter 5 seeks to directly test the expectation that the extrinsic benefits of running become more apparent as minority individuals progress further through their political journey (stages 3). Chapter 6 then explores how intrinsic and extrinsic motivations to run for office play out in real-world elections.

Of course, what we see in a real-world is a combination of both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. As I discuss further in Chatper 6, a Black candidate with passion for reforming the police system can still strategically choose to enter politics in a timely manner as they try to maximize their winning odds. Various motivations co-exist in an individual as she weighs across a number of factors impacting her entry decisions. The purpose of this research, however, is to identify the general relative pattern between the two motives as individuals progress through the pipeline to power.

3

Political Ambition among Ordinary American Voters

In the United States, there exist more than half a million elected office jobs across all levels of government. A vast majority of the positions are at the local level, comprised of over 96% of the elected office jobs in the U.S. government. In contrast, the federal positions constitute only 0.1% of elected positions (PoliEngine, 2022). However, the politicians that dominate the studies of representation are mainly concentrated at the federal level, majority of whom come from prestigious educational and professional backgrounds (e.g.,

Lublin, 1997; Casellas and Wallace, 2015; Juenke and Shah, 2015; Lowande, Ritchie and Lauterbach, 2019).

In fact, many politicians do not fit the prototypical candidate profile. Particularly below the federal level, people from many walks of life seek government office jobs. For instance, city council candidates have occupations "as diverse as homemaker, funeral coordinator, elderly care administrator, landscaper, legal assistant, dispatcher/bus driver, and childcare provider" (Crowder-Meyer, 2020, 361) and 32% of city council members do not have a Bachelor degree (Carnes, 2013).[1] Even among mayoral candidates—a group that largely reflects business leaders—over half of them come from occupational backgrounds outside of business owner/executive or attorney, and about 18% of them did not have any political experiences prior to running (Kirkland, 2022).[2] Furthermore, a 2008 survey of sitting state legislators finds that about 21% of representatives and 15% of senators did not have a college degree (Carroll and Sanbonmatsu, 2013). Picturing the candidates and officeholders with these backgrounds produces quite a different image from the stereotypical elected officials.

To understand who seeks office throughout the American political system, we need to examine not just those who are already known to political insiders or hold positions among the political or economic elite. Instead, we should consider the broader American public as a source of political candidates. Furthermore, because the pathways to office vary across races, studying political ambition among a broader population provides an opportunity to explore the foundation on which ordinary minority individuals build their ambition and how it differs from their white counterparts.

This chapter provides empirical analyses with these two goals in mind. The first objective is to explore the racial disparities in political ambition evident within the gen-

[1] Based on city council candidates in California who appeared on a ballot between 1995 and 2011. Data collected by CEDA (2011) (see Crowder-Meyer, 2020, fn.2).

[2] Based on mayoral candidate data from 259 cities between 1950 and 2007 collected by Kirkland (2022).

eral population. Through an online survey of the general population, I examine how the predictors of political ambition vary across individuals of different races. Evidence suggesting that political ambition develops differently between racial minority and white voters lays a solid groundwork for pursuing the second goal in the research agenda: exploring factors that uniquely impact minority voters' decision to run for office. Through a conjoint experiment, I investigate how both strategic as well as intrinsic entry factors impact the way minority individuals see themselves as a viable candidate.[3]

3.1 Racial Differences in Political Ambition

In order to narrow my research focus to individuals of color, I first validate the implicit assumption underlying this research—political ambition develops differently for racial minorities from their white counterparts.[4] Racial minority voters are presented with different electoral conditions in many ways. First, the vast majority of politicians are non-Hispanic White, which itself suggests racial inequality in interest and viability in office jobs. Second, and relatedly, this lack of minority representation is in part due to the relatively low and dispersed minority population in the U.S. As discussed in Chapter 2, the size of the co-ethnic population size is a key determinant of minority candidate emergence—a factor less relevant among white candidates. Third, various institutional settings bear a direct impact on minority voters, which may shape the way they perceive political office jobs (e.g., Abott and Magazinnik, 2020). Fourth, minority status itself may function as both an impediment and an advantage to the electability of racial minorities (Reny and Shah, 2018). All of these factors uniquely impact individuals of color, suggesting that the way political ambition develops among racial minority voters may starkly differ from that among non-Hispanic white voters.

[3]The survey discussed in this chapter is approved by IRB at Columbia University (IRB-AAAU4228). Pre-analysis plan can be accessed at https://osf.io/6rf4d.

[4]In Appendix A, I also examine racial inequality in political ambition in prior empirical research by replicating the analyses of two political ambition studies: Bernhard, Shames and Teele (2021) and Crowder-Meyer (2020). The replication analyses reveal that the theories of political ambition tested in these studies often do not hold or run in the opposite direction once the analyses are limited to non-white samples.

To empirically investigate *how* political ambition differs by race, I identify a set of hypotheses commonly tested in studies of political ambition: gender differences, stage in life, individual perception, and encouragement from both personal and political sources. Although these theories have been extensively studied, their application has predominantly been within samples of white individuals.[5] Therefore, whether these theories hold across all racial groups remains an empirical question. I administered an online survey to the general public to assess whether these hypotheses hold equal, both in magnitude and direction, between respondents of color and non-Hispanic white respondents. I first summarize the four testable hypotheses.[6]

3.1.1 Testable Hypotheses

3.1.1.1 Gender Differences

One of the longest-standing arguments in political ambition studies is that gender influences candidates' progressive ambition (Moncrief, Squire and Jewell, 2001; Costantini, 1990; Fox and Lawless, 2005, 2010; Sanbonmatsu, 2010; Kanthak and Woon, 2015; Bernhard, Shames and Teele, 2021). These studies suggest that women tend to be less politically ambitious than men even when they share the same sociodemographic backgrounds due to the differences in gendered norms in early life experiences, socialized personality traits, lack of descriptive representation, and perceptions of campaigning. In a survey of a national sample of individuals from law, business, education, and professional activism backgrounds, Fox and Lawless (2005) find that women are not only less interested in high-level government office jobs but also have never considered running

[5]For example, one of the most comprehensive panel surveys of prospective candidates done by Lawless and Fox (2010) still has 83% of their sample being white.

[6]While my analysis focuses on testing the conditional effects of race, I note that all theories laid out here have been studied in the context of gender inequality in political ambition to a great extent. For example, while a theory suggests that marital status dissipates one's political ambition, empirical research finds that the effect is stronger among women (Bernhard, Shames and Teele, 2021; Lawless and Fox, 2010). Similarly, encouragement to run from personal sources is more effective among women (Crowder-Meyer, 2020; Fox and Lawless, 2014). While exploring these gendered effects is of significant importance, they are beyond the scope of this research.

for office at a much lower rate than their male counterparts. Subsequent studies focusing on women from different sub-population find consistent results that being a woman is negatively related to political ambition (Gaddie, 2004; Maestas et al., 2006; Fox and Lawless, 2014; Kanthak and Woon, 2015).[7] Therefore, following the pioneering work on women's political ambition, I test the hypotheses that *women are less politically ambitious than men (H1)*.

3.1.1.2 Stage in Life

Studies of political ambition also point to the relationship between family structures and seeking office (Sapiro, 1982; Silbermann et al., 2015). The general expectation is that younger men and women may have "more energy to enter politics, endure the rigors of a campaign, and engage in the activities necessary for networking and fundraising" (Fox and Lawless, 2005, 647). In fact, a survey of office-holding national political convention delegates finds that younger delegates are more likely than delegates over 55 years old to express interest in seeking higher office in the future (Gaddie, 2004). At the same time, the literature theorizes that younger men and women are also more likely to encounter challenges in balancing a career with family responsibilities. A study of members of the candidate-eligibility pool in New York, for example, found modest evidence that traditional family responsibilities—marital status and having children—decrease the likelihood of running for all levels of office (Fox and Lawless, 2003; Conway, 2001). This negative relationship, however, has not been replicated with other sample populations (e.g., Williams, 2008; Crowder-Meyer, 2020).

Although the empirical evidence on age and marital status have been conflicting, this analysis aims to examine whether the relationship between demographic characteristics and political ambition varies across races. Therefore, I rely on the conventional hypothe-

[7] Studies that examine the intersectionality between race and gender remains rare (but see Hardy-Fanta et al., 2016; Phillips, 2021).

ses that *age, as well as marital and parental status, to be negatively correlated with political ambition (H2)*.

3.1.1.3 Individual Perception

Scholars have shown that a positive self-perception of qualifications tends to enhance political ambition (Fox and Lawless, 2011; Moore, 2005; Preece and Stoddard, 2015*a*; Holman and Schneider, 2018). Fox and Lawless (2005) describe self-perception as an 'inherited' interest in political affairs that functions as a reasonable proxy for the decision to enter politics in the future, irrespective of sociodemographic characteristics or personality traits. They argue that, similar to political interest, the attitude towards "good citizenship" can also be passed on within the family at an early age, and this socialization process instills the belief in children that they "have the power to influence government action" (646). Therefore, an individual's perceptions of his/her qualifications to run for office are a product of politicized upbringings, which in turn influences the likelihood of possessing political ambition. Following the prior theories on individual perception, I test the hypothesis that *self-perception of qualifications increases political ambition (H3)*.

3.1.1.4 Encouragement from Political Sources

Encouragement to run for office from political elites appears to play a vital role (Niven, 1998; Sanbonmatsu, 2003; Preece and Stoddard, 2015*b*; Butler and Preece, 2016; Han, 2016). In a review of 24 elite surveys that have asked candidates and party leaders about the recruitment process, Broockman (2014*b*) finds that a majority of political candidates consistently report that encouragement to do so from others played the most critical role in deciding to run for office. Furthermore, in a survey of individuals with elite professional backgrounds, Fox and Lawless (2005) find that "[r]eceiving the suggestion to run for office from a party leader, elected official, or nonelected political activist boosts respondents' likelihood of considering a candidacy nearly 40% and the probabil-

ity of expressing interest in high-level office by approximately 10%" (651). Following the consistent evidence of recruitment from a political source, I test the hypotheses that *self-reports of encouragement are positively associated with interest in office (H4)*.

3.1.1.5 Encouragement from Personal Sources

Political ambition also depends on personal support. Fox and Lawless (2005) find that individuals whose parents encouraged them to pursue public office are twice as likely to view themselves as "very qualified" to run for office compared to those who did not receive such parental support. A survey of ordinary American voters by Crowder-Meyer (2020) also finds a strong positive relationship between encouragement from friends and families and the level of political ambition for individuals at all levels of education. Even political organizations find personalized appeals most effective at mobilizing prospective candidates (Broockman, 2014*b*). Therefore, I test the hypotheses that *encouragement from personal sources tends to increase political ambition (H5)*.

3.1.2 Survey Data and Method

To test these hypotheses, I conducted an online survey of 1,348 individuals recruited via CloudResearch in February 2024. Because the primary interest of the analysis is racial differences in political ambition, I recruited an online sample that is balanced across four racial categories: non-Hispanic Asian American and Pacific Islander (N = 334), non-Hispanic Black/African American (N = 333), Hispanic/Latino (N = 335), and non-Hispanic white (N = 346).

Furthermore, because the collected data is from a convenience sample, I implement a raking weighting method to adjust the sample data to be reflective of a nationally representative sample *within each racial group*. Raking iteratively adjusts the weights for each unit in the data until the sample distribution aligns with the population distribution for selected sociodemographic covariates (Battaglia et al., 2004; DeBell and Krosnick, 2009).

For example, given that 50.4% of the U.S. population is female and 22% of the population has a college degree, a researcher can adjust the weight so that the survey sample reflects this marginal distribution of gender. I perform raking separately for each of the four racial groups. That is, I collect marginal population distributions of gender, age, marital status, education, employment status, income, party identification, and region of residence conditional on each race and use them to create the weights that bring, for example, Black sample to be representative of the Black population in the U.S.[8]

I implement the conditional raking method to obtain more precise estimates within each racial group, as the goal of this research is to examine how the effects on political ambition vary by race rather than to understand the average effects of political ambition across all populations irrespective of race. Furthermore, the relatively small minority population size would result in imprecise estimates if the weights accounted for the marginal distribution of race/ethnicity. According to the 2020 Census, non-Hispanic Asian Americans and African Americans constitute only 6% and 12% of the total population in the U.S., respectively, compared to non-Hispanic whites, who constitute over 57% of the population. If the weights were to reflect the nationally representative sample across all races, this would result in a *down*-weighting of non-white and *up*-weighting of white samples in the data, which, in turn, would result in imprecise estimates on variables measuring racial effects.

Table 3.1 displays the marginal distributions of select demographic covariates for each race. Within a set of columns for each race, column "N" represents the actual sample size in the survey data, "Target" represents the marginal distribution of a given racial population in the U.S., "Unweighted" represents the unweighted marginal distribution in the survey data, and "Weighted" represents the weighted marginal distribution after implementing the raking method.

[8]For Hispanic/Latino, I also include a marginal distribution of race among Hispanics.

Table 3.1: Sample Marginal Distribution Conditional on Race

	Asian				Black				Hispanic				White			
	N	Target	Survey		N	Target	Survey		N	Target	Survey		N	Target	Survey	
			Unweighted	Weighted			Unweighted	Weighted			Unweighted	Weighted			Unweighted	Weighted
Gender																
Female	140	0.52	0.43	0.48	179	0.53	0.54	0.53	150	0.50	0.46	0.46	136	0.50	0.40	0.49
Male	186	0.48	0.57	0.52	151	0.47	0.46	0.47	179	0.50	0.54	0.54	204	0.50	0.60	0.51
Age Group																
18 - 24	81	0.12	0.27	0.22	45	0.14	0.16	0.23	41	0.16	0.14	0.17	30	0.11	0.11	0.15
25 - 34	128	0.16	0.43	0.30	114	0.16	0.40	0.29	133	0.16	0.45	0.47	103	0.13	0.37	0.23
35 - 44	80	0.16	0.27	0.33	97	0.13	0.34	0.24	106	0.14	0.36	0.24	93	0.13	0.34	0.23
55 - 64	10	0.11	0.03	0.12	17	0.12	0.06	0.12	12	0.09	0.04	0.08	33	0.15	0.12	0.22
65 - 74	2	0.09	0.01	0.03	12	0.08	0.04	0.10	4	0.05	0.01	0.03	15	0.13	0.05	0.16
Marital Status																
Divorced	6	0.04	0.02	0.04	23	0.10	0.07	0.11	17	0.07	0.05	0.06	29	0.11	0.08	0.09
Married	93	0.60	0.28	0.55	102	0.31	0.31	0.31	128	0.44	0.38	0.35	154	0.54	0.45	0.57
Separated	2	0.01	0.01	0.02	4	0.03	0.01	0.03	3	0.03	0.01	0.02	2	0.01	0.01	0.01
Single	230	0.31	0.69	0.37	198	0.50	0.59	0.51	182	0.42	0.54	0.55	158	0.28	0.46	0.30
Widowed	3	0.04	0.01	0.03	6	0.06	0.02	0.05	5	0.03	0.01	0.02	3	0.07	0.01	0.03
Education																
College degree	187	0.33	0.56	0.41	132	0.17	0.40	0.22	126	0.15	0.38	0.24	146	0.26	0.42	0.28
Graduate degree	64	0.27	0.19	0.25	51	0.11	0.15	0.13	40	0.06	0.12	0.10	60	0.16	0.17	0.17
HS or below	19	0.27	0.06	0.17	44	0.43	0.13	0.35	45	0.57	0.13	0.32	47	0.32	0.14	0.27
Some college	64	0.14	0.19	0.17	106	0.29	0.32	0.30	124	0.22	0.37	0.34	93	0.26	0.27	0.28
Employment Status																
Employed	193	0.63	0.58	0.64	213	0.54	0.64	0.55	209	0.60	0.62	0.53	216	0.59	0.62	0.59
Unemployed	141	0.37	0.42	0.36	120	0.46	0.36	0.45	126	0.40	0.38	0.47	130	0.41	0.38	0.41
Income Level																
Less than $20,000	20	0.04	0.06	0.02	36	0.07	0.11	0.08	26	0.08	0.08	0.06	29	0.04	0.08	0.05
$20,000 - $49,999	61	0.25	0.18	0.26	99	0.46	0.30	0.42	91	0.52	0.27	0.43	91	0.31	0.26	0.28
$50,000 - $99,999	128	0.36	0.38	0.35	129	0.35	0.39	0.35	155	0.31	0.46	0.36	125	0.41	0.36	0.41
More than $100,000	125	0.35	0.37	0.37	69	0.12	0.21	0.15	63	0.09	0.19	0.14	101	0.24	0.29	0.26
Party Identification																
Democrat	231	0.57	0.69	0.63	210	0.66	0.63	0.64	194	0.47	0.58	0.56	191	0.38	0.55	0.42
Independent	51	0.17	0.15	0.16	86	0.15	0.26	0.18	70	0.18	0.21	0.20	61	0.08	0.18	0.09
Republican	52	0.26	0.16	0.21	37	0.19	0.11	0.18	71	0.35	0.21	0.24	94	0.54	0.27	0.49
Region																
Midwest	35	0.12	0.10	0.13	56	0.18	0.17	0.17	33	0.10	0.10	0.08	57	0.26	0.16	0.24
Northeast	69	0.21	0.21	0.19	48	0.16	0.14	0.14	50	0.14	0.15	0.16	65	0.19	0.19	0.15
South	101	0.24	0.30	0.26	199	0.58	0.60	0.60	145	0.38	0.43	0.36	129	0.36	0.37	0.38
West	129	0.43	0.39	0.42	30	0.09	0.09	0.08	107	0.38	0.32	0.40	95	0.20	0.27	0.22
Race Group																
Asian									7	0.004	0.02	0.02				
Black									30	0.02	0.09	0.04				
Other									53	0.77	0.16	0.47				
White									245	0.20	0.73	0.47				

Note: Population data on demographic characteristics are obtained from the Census Bureau. Data on party identification is obtained from Gallup and APIA Vote.

Table 3.1 shows that raking brings the weighted distribution of the survey sample closer to the target population reasonably well. Namely, the weight corrects for the over-sampling of college-educated adults, particularly among non-white samples. For example, 40% of Black respondents have a college degree, whereas the population distribution is 17%. Once raking is applied, the share of college-educated Black respondents reduces to 22%. Similarly, the survey generally down-weights the respondents who identify as Democrats and are single while up-weighting the older and lower-income respondents.

3.1.2.1 MEASURES

I measure individual-level political ambition with a question "In the last few years, have you ever thought about running for political office, for example, as a representa-

tive, mayor, or city council member?" followed by five selections ranging from having no interest in running to having held an office position in the past.[9] The distribution of responses are displayed in Figure 3.1. The vast majority of respondents—about 80% of respondents within each racial group—reported that they have never thought about running for office. Less than 20% of respondents from each group reported that they have sometimes thought about running, hence expressing a nascent level of political ambition. In contrast, an extremely small proportion of respondents have considered a political candidacy beyond the nascent level. Due to the lack of variability in the advanced levels of political ambition, I binarize the political ambition measure to take a value of 0 if a respondent selected "No, I've never really thought about it" and 1 otherwise (i.e., if a respondent expressed *any* level of interest in political candidacy).[10]

Figure 3.1: Self-Reported Level of Political Ambition



Note: Weighted proportion of samples that fall into each category under a political ambition measure separately for each race.

Beyond race/ethnicity, I collect sociodemographic information, including gender, age, marital status, having a child, education, and income. I use the first three variables to test H1 and H2. To test H3, I use the survey instrument used in a political ambition survey conducted by Crowder-Meyer (2020), which asks "Overall, how qualified do you

[9]The type of questions and wordings largely follow the survey instruments implemented in an empirical analysis of gender difference in political ambition by Crowder-Meyer (2020).

[10]Therefore, I largely view this outcome to be capturing nascent political ambition.

feel you are to do the job of an elected official?" with an option ranging from "not at all qualified (1)" to "very qualified (4)". To test H4 and H5, I rely on a multiple-selection question asking respondents to select groups that have encouraged the respondents to run for office. Based on their selections, I measure encouragement from personal sources as a binary indicator that equals 1 if a respondent reported that a family member, a friend, a co-worker, or a neighbor has suggested that he/she run for office and 0 otherwise. Similarly, I measure encouragement from political sources as a binary indicator that equals 1 if a respondent selected one of the following: a member of an interest group, a current/former politician, or a leader in a political party committee. In addition, I collect variables that have previously been shown to influence interest in running for office, such as party identification, political participation, community participation, political knowledge, and political efficacy.[11]

3.1.2.2 Estimation Strategy

I run a logistic regression separately for each racial group. Formally, for an individual i that belongs to a racial group $k \in K = \{Asian, Black, Hispanic, White\}$:

$$ln\Big(\frac{Pr(Y_{ik}=1)}{1-Pr(Y_{ik}=1)}\Big) = \alpha_k + \beta_{1k}Female + \beta_{2k}Age + \beta_{3k}Marital + \beta_{4k}SelfQual + \beta_{5k}EncourPolitical + \beta_{6k}EncourPersonal + \mathbf{X}_{ik} + \epsilon_{ik} \quad (3.1)$$

where Y_{ik} represents a binary measure of individual-level political ambition, $\mathbf{X}_{ik}$ represents a matrix of covariates (e.g., party identification, education, income). The focuses are on β_{1k} through β_{6k}, in which prior literature predicts the following relationship irrespective of respondent race: $\beta_{1k} < 0, \beta_{2k} < 0, \beta_{3k} < 0, \beta_{4k} > 0, \beta_{5k} > 0, \beta_{6k} > 0 \ \ \forall \ \ k \in K$.

[11] See Appendix B.2 for a discussion of survey instruments for political knowledge, participation, and efficacy measures.

3.1.3 Result: Do Theories of Political Ambition Hold across Race?

Table 3.2 displays the result. I present regression results in two ways. First, columns (1) and (2) show the logistic regression results based on the entire sample and limited to non-white respondents.[12] Second, columns (3) through (6) run the same model separately for each racial group. Furthermore, in columns (7) through (9), I compare my results against a similar survey-based analysis by Crowder-Meyer (2020) (hereafter "replication survey"). The original author surveyed a nationally representative sample of U.S. adults in 2014 to explore the development of political ambition among ordinary women and men. This survey data is particularly valuable because it includes an over-sample of racial minorities, and many of the variables collected in my survey closely resemble those of the original author, including the measures of political ambition, self-perceived qualification, political participation, and political knowledge.[13] This provides an opportunity to compare the results under near-identical model specifications as well as to assess the external validity of the existing theories on determinants of political ambition.[14]

Starting with H1, I find a consistent result that women tend to be less politically ambitious than men. Across all samples (column (1)), the estimated coefficient is -0.466 (s.e. = 0.208), which corresponds to a 12% difference in the probability of gaining interest in political office jobs between men and women (Gelman, Hill and Vehtari, 2020, 220). The estimate is similar in magnitude among minority and white samples in my survey, though

[12]For the regression results based on the entire sample, weights are based on the marginal distributions across the entire U.S. population. See Appendix B.1 for the marginal distributions of the U.S. population as well as the sample population (both weighted and unweighted).

[13]The original analyses by Crowder-Meyer (2020) corrects for the over-sampling of racial minorities by weighting the data to match the overall U.S. population. I use the same weights and logistic model specifications in Table 2 of the original author's paper to produce results shown in Table 3.2. I note that the main goal of the original author's analyses is to examine differences in the development of political ambition between elite and ordinary Americans, as well as gender differences in political ambition among ordinary Americans. While the analyses presented in this chapter aggregate the author's sample across both gender and elite status, I provide a detailed replication analysis of the original author's main results in Appendix A, where I discover racial differences even within each intersectionality of gender and elite status.

[14]Due to low sample size within each racial group in the replication survey, I only show results using all racial minorities in the data. Though less precise, I provide the results of the replication survey broken out by race in Appendix B.3.

Table 3.2: Predictors of Political Ambition among Ordinary Americans

	This Survey						Re-Analysis of Crowder-Meyer (2020)		
	All	Minority	White	Asian	Black	Hispanic	All	Minority	White
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Self-perceived qualification to hold office[a]	0.411***	0.634***	0.873***	0.868***	0.898***	−0.141	0.490***	0.138	0.710***
	(0.126)	(0.140)	(0.265)	(0.274)	(0.246)	(0.485)	(0.127)	(0.233)	(0.168)
Encouragement from political sources	0.905**	0.509	0.967	2.609***	−0.044	−1.360	0.459	7.397***	−1.124
	(0.358)	(0.365)	(0.931)	(0.809)	(0.587)	(0.933)	(0.868)	(2.294)	(1.088)
Encouragement from personal sources	1.753***	1.410***	0.899*	1.715***	1.613***	2.772***	2.247***	4.934***	1.197
	(0.198)	(0.230)	(0.466)	(0.510)	(0.482)	(0.589)	(0.575)	(1.182)	(0.760)
Political Participation[a]	0.456***	0.433***	0.808***	0.096	0.946***	0.634*	1.643***	1.143	2.661***
	(0.114)	(0.129)	(0.309)	(0.290)	(0.242)	(0.324)	(0.547)	(0.950)	(0.805)
Community Participation	0.623***	−0.103	1.653***	−0.448	−0.028	0.991*	0.819**	0.185	1.538***
	(0.225)	(0.275)	(0.473)	(0.633)	(0.528)	(0.595)	(0.380)	(0.693)	(0.541)
Political Knowledge[b]	−0.144	0.107	−0.611***	0.184	0.356*	−0.432	1.036***	1.115*	1.083*
	(0.100)	(0.119)	(0.225)	(0.239)	(0.194)	(0.329)	(0.398)	(0.638)	(0.578)
Political Efficacy[b]	0.596***	0.810***	0.483*	0.709**	0.621**	1.932***	−0.115	0.937**	−0.926***
	(0.130)	(0.146)	(0.265)	(0.338)	(0.265)	(0.471)	(0.229)	(0.385)	(0.330)
Female	−0.466**	−0.467**	−0.597	0.102	−0.981**	−1.322**	−2.463***	−2.963***	−2.523***
	(0.208)	(0.221)	(0.480)	(0.478)	(0.469)	(0.558)	(0.618)	(1.028)	(0.854)
Married	−0.269	0.518**	−1.136**	0.215	0.321	1.856***	0.877***	0.438	1.141***
	(0.231)	(0.261)	(0.562)	(0.563)	(0.534)	(0.643)	(0.263)	(0.457)	(0.359)
Has child	0.234	−0.061	1.010*	0.888	−1.239**	0.932*	−0.164	0.270	−0.166
	(0.220)	(0.252)	(0.531)	(0.555)	(0.539)	(0.542)	(0.262)	(0.468)	(0.344)
Age[a]	0.089	−0.022	−0.073	−0.358*	0.224	0.282	−0.009	−0.004	−0.011
	(0.072)	(0.085)	(0.186)	(0.214)	(0.145)	(0.256)	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.010)
Education[a]	0.295***	−0.057	−0.071	−0.423*	−0.140	0.111	0.138*	0.251*	0.110
	(0.082)	(0.093)	(0.182)	(0.237)	(0.170)	(0.252)	(0.077)	(0.139)	(0.109)
Income[a]	0.023	−0.091**	0.035	0.124	−0.334***	−0.042	−0.048	0.051	−0.134**
	(0.032)	(0.039)	(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.089)	(0.040)	(0.075)	(0.057)
Black	0.295	−0.267					−0.548	−12.767	
	(0.308)	(0.273)					(0.351)	(1,061.919)	
Hispanic	0.157	−0.159					0.798**	−11.155	
	(0.235)	(0.276)					(0.344)	(1,061.919)	
Asian	1.121***						−0.137	−12.547	
	(0.310)						(0.453)	(1,061.919)	
Republican	0.432*	−0.119	0.796	−0.802	0.160	−0.233	0.352	−0.615	0.663
	(0.238)	(0.335)	(0.677)	(0.821)	(0.598)	(0.868)	(0.442)	(0.800)	(0.585)
Democrat	−0.062	−0.756**	0.162	−0.341	−1.949***	−1.639*	0.540	0.283	0.822
	(0.232)	(0.299)	(0.709)	(0.618)	(0.562)	(0.956)	(0.435)	(0.696)	(0.596)
Constant	−5.902***	−2.916***	−6.197***	−3.234**	−2.790**	−5.618***	−4.630***	5.548	−4.069***
	(0.615)	(0.614)	(1.671)	(1.393)	(1.101)	(1.603)	(0.691)	(1,061.920)	(0.913)
Observations	1,348	1,002	346	334	333	335	1,181	670	511
Log Likelihood	−419.294	−311.886	−94.510	−83.890	−103.833	−68.647	−309.199	−99.539	−181.965
AIC	876.588	659.771	221.020	199.780	239.666	169.293	660.398	241.078	397.930

Note: [a] indicates ordinal variables, and [b] indicates covariates normalized with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. The remaining variables are binary indicators. Not all variables are measured in the same way as Crowder-Meyer (2020). See Appendix B.2 for a list of differences in survey instrument and covariate measurement. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

not statistically distinguishable from zero among non-Hispanic white respondents. The results are also consistently negative in the replication survey, where the estimates are, in fact, much larger in magnitude. Examining the gender effects separately for each race

reveals an interesting pattern: gender inequality in political ambition is the lowest among Asian Americans, with a non-significant estimate that corresponds to less than 3% difference in the probability between Asian men and Asian women. At the same time, Blacks and Hispanics show at minimum 24% gender differences in the probability of developing political aspiration.

I find mixed evidence for both age and marital status (H2). Though varying in directions, the effect of age on political ambition is null across both surveys. The only exception is the Asian American sample, where age appears to be negatively associated with political ambition, which may be a reflection of the younger generation of Asian immigrants becoming much more involved in politics in recent years (Lin, 2020; Ruiz, Noe-Bustamante and Shah, 2023). The effects on marital status are more conflicting. Among non-Hispanic whites, being married is negatively correlated with political ambition in my sample, while the relationship is the opposite among white respondents in the replication survey. Furthermore, while the effect is positive among all minorities in my survey— primarily driven by the Hispanic respondents—the effect is null among the minority sample in the replication survey. This inconclusive finding is, in fact, in line with prior research: studies by Fox and Lawless (2014) and Williams (2008) find marital status to be uncorrelated with ambition, while studies by (Carroll and Sanbonmatsu, 2013), Silbermann et al. (2015), and Crowder-Meyer (2020) find the opposite. A more careful causal identification is required to examine how individuals at different stages in life perceive political jobs.

Regarding H3, I find a generally positive effect of the self-perceived qualification to hold office on an individual's political ambition. The estimated coefficient is positive for both white and non-white respondents in my sample, although the magnitude is smaller among the latter group. This is in line with the results from the replication survey, which, in fact, finds null results among its minority respondents. Across different racial groups, the relationship between self-qualification and political ambition does not hold among

Hispanic respondents: while non-significant, the effect is, in fact, negative.

Moving on to H4 and H5, I find that personal encouragement influences the development of political ambition among minorities much more than their white counterparts. The estimated coefficient across all minority samples is 1.410 (s.e. = 0.230), which corresponds to a 35% difference in the probability of gaining interest in serving in elected office between those who did and did not receive encouragement from their friends and family.[15] On the other hand, the estimate is 0.899 (s.e. = 0.466), corresponding to a 22% difference among non-Hispanic whites in my sample and is, in fact, null among the non-Hispanic white sample in the replication survey. Encouragement from political sources appears to impact political ambition among a particular racial group. While the effect is null among both minority and white respondents in my sample, the effect is significant and quite high among Asian Americans: between Asian Americans who were encouraged by political elites and Asian Americans who were not, the estimated percentage difference in level of interest in office is near 65%. This observation is also somewhat supported in the replication survey, where the positive relationship between support from political elites and political ambition is significant only among the minority sample.

Different patterns emerge in variables beyond the primary ones. First, participation in politics and community tends to predict political aspiration among whites more strongly than non-white respondents. This is particularly true for community participation: among white respondents in my survey, those who have participated in community organizations are associated with over 40% increase in the probability of developing interest in public office jobs as compared to those who have not ($\beta = 1.653$, s.e. = 0.473). This difference is indistinguishable from zero among Asian and Black respondents and is substantially lower among Hispanics (25% increase). The replication survey shows a similar

[15]This finding is also consistent with the observation from the recruitment process at New American Leaders. A conversation with the organization's members and staff reveals that most individuals who participate in the campaign training program first heard about the opportunity from friends who are in politics or were involved in politics.

result, where the estimated coefficient of community participation is only significantly positive among the white sample. Similarly, political participation predicts political ambition among white respondents at a higher magnitude than the minority respondents.[16]

Second, political efficacy appears to drive political ambition, particularly among minority respondents. Political efficacy measures beliefs that political institutions are responsive (external efficacy) and an individuals' self-perception that they are capable of understanding and competent in participating in politics (internal efficacy) (Craig and Maggiotto, 1982, 86). Across all racial groups, I find a significantly positive correlation that the higher a non-white respondent scores on political efficacy, the more likely she is to develop an interest in political ambition. The estimate is also positive but much smaller in size among white respondents—about one fourth the magnitude of the estimate among Hispanic respondents. This pattern is also observed in the replication survey where the relationship between political efficacy and political ambition remains positive among minority samples but turns *negative* among white samples. This implies that, for minority groups, the degree to which they see themselves as an essential member of the policy-making process serves as a proxy for their desire to run for public office. Meanwhile, for white groups, the less they feel like their voice matters in the policy-making process, the more likely they develop a desire to run for office.

In sum, testing several hypotheses regarding factors influencing political ambition reveals the differential impact among respondents of different racial backgrounds. Initially, it uncovers a consistent trend across all samples, indicating that women are generally less politically ambitious than men. Self-perceived qualification to hold office also appears to be a strong predictor of political ambition irrespective of race, although the relationship is less apparent among Hispanics. Encouragement from personal sources, such as friends and family, significantly heightens political ambition among minorities,

[16]However, I observe great variation in the estimates across different races. For example, while the effect is null among Asian respondents, the effect is large among Black respondents, even larger than that of the white respondents.

particularly Asian Americans, while yielding null or less significant effects among non-Hispanic whites. Additionally, participation in political and community activities predicts political aspiration more strongly among white respondents than non-white counterparts, suggesting varying pathways to political ambition across racial lines. Moreover, political efficacy emerges as a significant driver of political ambition, particularly among minority groups, where higher levels correlate positively with political ambition, contrasting with a negative relationship observed among white respondents, reflecting differing perceptions of political agency and engagement within diverse racial groups.

3.2 Decision to Run among Ordinary Minority Voters

Now that I have established disparities in political ambition across racial lines, I shift the focus to ordinary minority voters, aiming to investigate the unique factors that influence their decision to pursue public office. Specifically, I aim to test the theoretical expectations outlined in Section 2.2 of Chapter 2, examining how these factors shape minority perceptions of political office and whether these perceptions vary among ordinary minority voters with different levels of ambition. I formulate four testable hypotheses concerning both intrinsic and extrinsic factors that may uniquely impact the entry decision among ordinary minority voters. Subsequently, I empirically evaluate these hypotheses through a conjoint experiment integrated into the general public survey discussed in the previous section.

3.2.1 Testable Hypotheses

3.2.1.1 Extrinsic Motivation

First, I test the conventional wisdom in representation research that *a larger share of the co-racial population in an electoral district leads minority candidates to emerge (H1)*. Second, following the expectation that prior success of co-ethnic candidates impacts political ambition, I hypothesize *the presence of co-ethnic incumbents in government office to in-*

crease minority political ambition (H2). Furthermore, I test whether the effect of incumbent race/ethnicity is conditional on the incumbent's margin of victory in the most recent election as well as the race/ethnicity of a challenger who ran against the incumbent in the prior election. Studies find that minority candidate emergence is determined not only by whether or not a co-ethnic candidate won elections in the past but also by how "safely minority candidates win their seats relative to their white counterparts" (Atsusaka, 2021, 1213). Therefore, I expect that *the effect of co-ethnic incumbency on minority interest in public office to be stronger when the incumbent has won the prior election by a large margin (H2a).*

The direction of the conditional effect on the racial identity of challengers is less clear. On the one hand, a minority individual can perceive the election of two co-ethnic candidates competing against each other as a high likelihood of winning for herself. On the other hand, if an individual considers her minority status as an electoral advantage that guarantees considerable support from her co-racial voters, she may view an election with "too many" co-ethnic candidates as a dilution of racial voting. An individual may withdraw her ambition to run for office in such instances. Therefore, while I stay agnostic of the direction of the conditional effect, I expect *the racial identity of the incumbent to interact with the racial identity of the competitor (H2b).*

3.2.1.2 Intrinsic Motivation

Third, following the expectation that a sense of shared experience around racial violence, when politicized, can exert an effect on developing political ambition, I hypothesize that *a racially-charged event resulting in casualties of co-ethnic residents to increase minorities' interest in becoming a policy-maker (H3).* That is, in line with the story of Anna Hernandez in the epigraph, violence targeted against members of co-ethnic groups may intrinsically motivate other co-ethnic community members to take actions beyond mass-level participation. Furthermore, the government's failure to promptly respond to social issues often fuels anger and movement among the public (Hahn, 1970; Eisinger, 1973; Moore,

2010). Therefore, I expect the interaction effect between racial violence and government responsiveness, that the *motivation to run to be further amplified by the incumbent's lack of responsiveness (H3a)*.

3.2.1.3 Heterogeneous Effect

As illustrated in Section 3.1, even within a sample of ordinary minority voters, we observe some variation in their self-reported level of political ambition. I leverage this variation to test for relative influence in each of the abovementioned hypotheses. Specifically, as discussed in Chapter 2, I expect extrinsic factors (H1 and H2) to exert a greater impact among ordinary minority voters who have expressed some level of ambition to run. On the other hand, I expect intrinsic factors (H3) to influence minority individuals with no prior interest in office jobs.

3.2.2 Experimental Design

To test these hypotheses, I embedded a conjoint experiment in the general public survey discussed in Section 3.1.2. In a conjoint survey, each respondent reviewed three pairs of hypothetical electoral districts that randomly varied the attributes of six contextual and political settings, as shown in Table 3.3.

The first attribute, Co-ethnic Population, randomly varies the size of the co-ethnic population in three different ways and is intended to validate H1. The second attribute, Incumbent Race, which serves to test H2, varies the race/ethnicity of an incumbent local official in a hypothetical district via names that indicate whether an incumbent is an in-group (i.e., of the same race/ethnicity as the respondent's self-reported race) or an outgroup. To vary the ethnic-sounding names of the incumbent, I first identify the respondent's self-reported race/ethnicity in the survey before proceeding with the conjoint survey. I then group respondents into nine racial categories: Hispanic, non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic Black, non-Hispanic Asian Americans with the following sub-categories:

Table 3.3: Conjoint Survey Vignette and Treatment Factors

Vignette
We would like to ask your opinion about the ideal type of environment in which you are willing to run for office. Please review carefully the descriptions of two hypothetical districts and answer the following questions. In district A, [**Co-ethnic Population**] of voters are [respondent race]. The incumbent district representative is [**Incumbent Name**], who ran against [**Challenge Name**] and [**Election Vote Margin**]. [**Major Social Issue**]. [**Incumbent Response**]. In district B, [**Co-ethnic Population**] of voters are [respondent race]. The incumbent district representative is [**Incumbent Name**], who ran against [**Challenger Name**] and [**Election Vote Margin**]. [**Major Social Issue**]. [**Incumbent Response**]. If you were to run for office in one of these districts, which district would you prefer? Assume the electoral settings are identical between these districts (i.e., salary, term limits, timing of election). ☐ District A ☐ District B If you were to run for office in one of these districts, which district do you think you have a better chance of winning? Assume the electoral settings are identical between these districts (i.e., salary, term limits, timing of election). ☐ District A ☐ District B

Treatment Factors	
Extrinsic	
Co-ethnic Population (3)	- 30% - 50% - 70%
Incumbent Race (2)	- Out-Group (4): white-sounding name (e.g., Mary Meyer/Emily Smith/Thomas Wagner/Richard Hoffman) - In-Group (4): co-ethnic-sounding name (e.g., Mei Chen/Indira Shah/Keisha Thomas/Gabriella Rodriguez)
Challenger Race (2)	- Out-Group (4): white-sounding name (e.g., Ashley Hartman/Meredith Roberts/Richard Schmidt/Brett Smith) - In-Group (4): co-ethnic-sounding name (e.g., Ling Wong/Trang Pham/Lakisha Jackson/Juanita Martinez)
Electoral Vote Margin (2)	- barely won by a narrow margin - won by a huge margin
Intrinsic	
Major Social Issue (3)	- Natural Disaster (2): e.g., Lately, there's been a surge in natural disasters due to heat wave, including brushfire in a local park injuring dozens of residents. - Gun violence (2): e.g., Lately, there's been a surge in gun violence in the district, including a shooting at a public elementary school injuring dozens of students. - Racial Violence (2): varies by race (e.g., Recently, the Latino/Hispanic community has experienced a rise in anti-Latinx hate crimes, including anti-immigrant slurs and aggravated assaults.)
Incumbent Response (2)	- However, the incumbent has not yet put forth any proposals to address this issue - The incumbent swiftly took action by introducing action plans to address this issue

Note: In an experiment "[respondent rate]" is replaced with a respondent's self-reported race. The racial violence narrative under Major Social Issue treatment was chosen based on the respondent's self-reported race. Baseline categories are underlined. See Appendix B.4 for a full list of names used under Incumbent Name and Competitor Name attributes and a full list of narratives used for Major Social Issue. Numbers in parentheses followed by attribute titles indicate the total number of levels used for the analysis. Numbers in parentheses in attribute levels indicate the unique number of levels randomized in the survey.

Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Filipino, Southeast Asian other than Filipino, and South Asian (e.g., Indian, Pakistani).[17] Next, I use two unique names associated with each subracial

[17]The separation within Asian respondents is because names starkly differ from one Asian ethnicity to another. Studies reliably find that Asian Americans are not a monolithic voting bloc: Separate ethnicities within the Asian group have their unique political perspectives, and coethnic attachment does not necessarily translate beyond the national origin (Tam, 1995; Park, 2008; Leung, 2021). The Filipino names were

group: male and female. Finally, I use two names generated to signal an in-group and two white-sounding names to signal an out-group for non-white respondents. For example, a Korean respondent would randomly observe an incumbent name from the following options: Hana Choi, Hyeon Park, Mary Meyer, and Thomas Wagner.[18] The names of the challengers are created in the same manner. See Appendix B.4 for a complete list of race-inferring names used in the experiment.[19] Importantly, the detected preferences on the incumbent race along with the challenger race allow me to test the conditional effect described in H2a.[20]

The fourth attribute, Electoral Vote Margin, captures the competitiveness of the election from which the incumbent won. An interaction between the Electoral Vote Margin and the Incumbent Race, therefore, is used to validate H2b. The fifth attribute, Major Social Issue, is to test H3, which randomly varies the type of major social event that recently occurred in a district in three different ways: issue related to gun violence, issue related to natural disasters, and issue related to racial violence. In order to mitigate the effect driven by the particular language of the event description, I generated two different versions associated with each of the three attribute levels. Specifically, for the gun

further separated out from other Southeast Asian names due to their distinct Spanish-origin surnames. In my survey, the majority of Asian respondents are Chinese (37%), followed by Vietnamese (13%), Indian (11%), Korean (10%), and Filipino (9%).

[18]For white respondents, I used four white-sounding names to signal an in-group and four ethnic-sounding names—one East Asian, one South Asian, one Black, and one Hispanic-sounding—to signal an out-group. The reason for a greater number of levels among white respondents is to include unique ethnic names from as many ethnic groups as possible. However, the aggregation of individual attribute levels results in the same uniform distribution of 50% in-group and 50% out-group for all respondents regardless of race.

[19]The names are selected mainly from a list of validated names provided by Crabtree et al. (2023), who experimentally tested the salience of ethnicity in a host of Asian, Hispanic, Black, and non-Hispanic sounding names. I only used names that resulted in more than 85% probability of correct matches between the perceived and intended race. For names of ethnicities not included in this study, I relied on names used in audit studies (i.e., Lauderdale and Kestenbaum, 2000; Milkman, Akinola and Chugh, 2012; Castillo et al., 2016).

[20]While this analysis focuses on ordinary minority voters, I also conduct conjoint surveys on white respondents. The definition of an out-group for white respondents is ethnic-sounding names (e.g., Gabriela Martinez/Wei Li/Raj Singh/Thanh Nguyen/Tyrone Johnson), and an in-group is white-sounding names for Incumbent Race and Challenger Race attributes (e.g., Miguel Hernandez/Hai Wong/Deepak Patel/Chi Tran/Latoya Brown).

violence narrative, I devised one narrative related to school shootings and another about street shootings downtown. For the narrative of natural disasters, I designed one on heat waves and one on flash floods.

As for the racial violence narrative, one version discussed an aggressive form of violence that led to a civilian death, and one discussed non-fatal incidents such as assaults and discrimination. Furthermore, for the issue to resonate with respondents' own racial identity, two narratives were created for each of the three minority groups—Asian, Black, and Hispanic groups—based on the most salient types of racially charged issues relevant to each group. For example, a Black respondent, given she received a racial violence narrative, would read about either a police shooting of a Black resident or a police racial profiling of Black drivers. See Table B.5 in Appendix B.4 for a full list of narratives used for each racial group.[21]

Upon reviewing each hypothetical scenario, respondents were asked two questions. First, they were asked to choose in which district they prefer to enter the electoral race for an elected position. Second, they were asked to choose which district they believed to have a higher chance of winning. Both measures capture an individual's perception of public office jobs, with the former capturing general interest and the latter capturing perceived electoral viability. I use both of these binary indicators as outcomes to evaluate the hypotheses.

I estimate both the Average Marginal Component Effect (AMCE) and Average Component Interaction Effect (ACIE) (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2014*b*). Estimated AMCEs on Co-ethnic Population, Incumbent Race, and Major Social Issue treatment factors are used to evaluate H1, H2, and H3, respectively. To validate H2a, I estimate ACIE by including an interaction term between the incumbent race and the electoral vote margin. To validate H2c, I estimate ACIE by including an interaction term between

[21] All attributes were assigned with uniform distributions. Among white respondents, two of the six unique narratives of racial violence were randomly chosen.

the racial identity of the incumbent and challenger. Similarly, an estimated ACIE of an interaction term between Major Social Issue and Incumbent Response is used to validate H3a.[22]

Importantly, to assess how the treatment effects differ between minority individuals with and without prior interest in public office jobs, I utilize the binary indicator of self-reported political ambition used as a dependent variable in Section 3.1 and run the analyses separately for those who have never considered running for office and those who have expressed some level of ambition to run.

3.2.3 Result: Predictors of Minority Candidate Supply

Figure 3.2 presents results based on the first outcome measure—individual preferences for the district to run for office—and Figure 3.3 presents results based on the second outcome—perceived electoral viability. The results are shown separately for politically ambitious (dark green) and not politically ambitious (light green) respondents. The leftmost column displays results across all non-white samples, while the following three columns show results separately for each racial group.[23]

I start with H1, which can be assessed via estimated AMCEs on different levels under the Co-ethnic Population. As shown in Figure 3.2 (top row), I find consistent results across all racial groups that a larger coethnic population size increases a minority individual's preferences for running for office. This is also true under the outcome that measures an individual's perceived electoral viability (Figure 3.3), indicating that a larger co-ethnic population size increases a minority individual's belief that one can win an election. In comparing the effect size by respondent's ambition level, I observe that the effects are slightly larger among politically ambitious samples, although the differences are not dis-

[22] I use `R` package `cjoint` developed by Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto (2014*a*) to estimate AMCE and ACIE.

[23] See Appendix B.5 for full estimation results, which show estimated differences between ambitious and non-ambitious respondents. In Appendix B.6, I show results across all samples irrespective of self-reported political ambition (see Figure B.1) as well as results among white respondents (see Figures B.2 and B.3).

Figure 3.2: Estimated Preferences for District to Run for Office



Note: Estimates of the effects of the randomly assigned district attributes on interest in running for office. The outcome measures a respondent's binary choice between two districts, reflecting their preference to run for office. Estimates are based on AMCE (top) and ACIE (bottom) estimators. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Solid points represent estimates that are statistically significant at the 5% level. The points without horizontal bars denote the reference category for each attribute.

Figure 3.3: Estimated Perceived Likelihood of Winning



Note: Estimates of the effects of the randomly assigned district attributes on interest in running for office. The outcome measures a respondent's binary choice between two districts, reflecting perceived electoral viability. Estimates are based on AMCE (top) and ACIE (bottom) estimators. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Solid points represent estimates that are statistically significant at the 5% level. The points without horizontal bars denote the reference category for each attribute.

tinguishable from zero.[24] In fact, both ambitious and non-ambitious individuals appear to use district racial composition as an essential tool when considering political candidacy. For example, compared to a district with a 30% co-ethnic population, politically ambitious respondents prefer a district with a 70% co-ethnic population by 20.3 percentage points (s.e. = 0.065). This effect is only 1.1 percentage points (s.e. = 0.072) lower than that among non-ambitious minority samples.

This homogeneously strong effect of co-ethnic population size may be due to the ordering effect in choice experiments since the order of the treatment factors was not randomized (Auspurg and Jäckle, 2017; Bansak et al., 2021).[25]. The Co-ethnic Population attribute was the first piece of information respondents viewed, potentially priming them to react more sensitively to the first piece of information they encountered. Furthermore, in investigating moderating factors that may be driving the result, I find modest evidence that the effects are correlated with the size of the co-ethnic population in respondent's residential areas. That is, among respondents who live in areas with a high proportion of co-ethnic residents, the co-ethnic population size exerts a stronger influence on their interest in office jobs than respondents who live in areas with a relatively low share of co-ethnic residents (see Appendix B.7).

I find support for H2 that the co-ethnicity of an incumbent increases both preferences to run as well as perceived chances of winning an election *only* among politically ambitious respondents, particularly among Asian and black samples.[26] For example, the presence of a Black incumbent increases a politically ambitious Black respondent's perceived chances by 17.7 percentage points (s.e. = 0.083) and preferences to run by 15.1 percentage

[24] Across all racial groups, the only estimated differences that are statistically distinguishable from zero is the difference in estimated AMCE on 50% co-ethnic population size between ambitious and non-ambitious respondents among Asian sample.

[25] This decision was made to generate a hypothetical scenario that could be readable as a sentence rather than bullet point options.

[26] The null effect among Hispanics may be due to the Hispanic identity reflecting a considerable amount of heterogeneity, both politically and culturally (Jones-Correa and Leal, 1996; Garcia, 1982; Segura and Rodrigues, 2006). However, the positive finding among the Asian sample, which also aggregates Asians of dissimilar national-origin groups, is worth noting.

points (s.e. = 0.072). At the same time, the effects on both outcomes are indistinguishable from zero among non-ambitious Black respondents.

However, I do not find that the large vote margin received by the co-ethnic incumbent in a most recent election further helps minority individuals to consider political candidacy. As shown in row 8 in Figure 3.2 the estimated ACIE between Vote Margin and Incumbent Race shows that respondents gain no more additional interest in running for office when they observe a co-ethnic incumbent winning by a considerable margin as compared to a narrow margin. The conditional effects are positive, hence in the expected direction, but they are not statistically significant across all politically ambitious racial minorities.[27]

On the other hand, politically ambitious Black respondents see themselves *less* electorally viable when both the incumbent and challenger are Black. This is also true among Asian and Hispanic respondents who self-reported as ambitious, although the estimates are not distinguishable from zero among these groups. This negative finding suggests that ambitious Black respondents may view multiple co-ethnic candidates as a vote dilution or as a loss of comparative advantage on minority status, which consequently decreases their perceived likelihood that they will perform well in an election that already has many co-ethnic candidates in a ballot.

Regarding H3, I do not find any evidence that racial violence in a district influences minority individuals' decision to run for office *irrespective* of their prior level of ambition.[28] In exploring moderating factors that might be at play, I find suggestive evidence that this null effect is driven in part by the *negative* effects found among respondents who

[27]Interestingly, the conditional effect is significantly positive among *non*-ambitious minority groups on their perception of winning chances (row 8 in Figure 3.3).

[28]Instead, I find a positive effect of gun violence among politically ambitious Black respondents. However, once I break out the effect of gun violence for each narrative, I find that the positive effect is primarily driven by the street shooting narrative, which suggests that Black respondents may have perceived the street shooting to involve co-ethnic civilians, which in turn generated a larger effect (see Figure B.4 in Appendix B.6).

live in areas that have never experienced a police shooting of co-ethnic residents in the past three years, indicating that the lack of personal experience may drive down minority individuals' interest in office jobs (see Figure B.6 in Appendix B.7).

In sum, the conjoint experiment revealed several important, albeit mixed, findings. First, under Co-ethnic Population conditions, all racial groups exhibited increased preferences for running for office when faced with larger coethnic populations, irrespective of their self-reported level of political ambition. Second, the presence of a co-ethnic incumbent increases preferences to run for office and perceived chances of winning among politically ambitious respondents, particularly among Asian and Black samples. Furthermore, politically ambitious Black respondents perceived themselves as less electorally viable when faced with multiple co-ethnic candidates, possibly due to concerns of vote dilution or loss of comparative advantage on minority status. Finally, I do not find evidence that racial violence in a district influences minority individuals' decision to run for office regardless of prior ambition levels. Conversely, a lack of personal experience with police shootings of co-ethnic residents in the past three years was associated with decreased interest in office jobs among some respondents, highlighting the potential influence of personal experiences on political aspirations.

3.3 Concluding Remarks

Americans from non-elite educational and professional backgrounds serve in various offices across the American government. However, the process by which these ordinary Americans cultivate political ambition remains largely unexplored. This chapter investigates the dynamics of political ambition among ordinary American voters, with a particular focus on the racial disparities in political ambition and the factors influencing minority voters' decisions to run for office. Through an online survey of the general public, I find that, while gender plays a consistent role in predicting political ambition irrespective of race, racial inequality in political ambition is found in other factors, including

encouragement from personal sources, political efficacy, and community participation. Furthermore, in delving into factors that uniquely influence minority voters' decisions to run for office, I find that larger co-ethnic population sizes and the co-ethnicity of incumbents significantly increase both the desire to run and the perceived chances of winning among politically ambitious minority individuals, particularly among Asian and Black respondents. In sum, this chapter highlights the complex interplay of race, personal experiences, and structural opportunities in shaping aspirations for political office.

Although certain trends were identified, the survey experiment's predominantly mixed results call for a more rigorously designed empirical approach. Ordinary citizens may only have an abstract idea about political office jobs. Hence, their self-reported level of political ambition and other political beliefs may not accurately reflect their true intentions (Converse, 1964; Zaller, 1992). Survey experiments also face challenges such as social desirability bias and ordering effects, complicating the accurate identification of effects. To mitigate these challenges, I move to an experimental research design, focusing on a specific group within the minority population likely to possess a more tangible understanding of what being an elected official entails.

4

Minority Political Ambition: Early Stages

Studies that examine individuals' motivation to run face a unique empirical challenge. On the one hand, inferences about the decision to enter politics are vulnerable to selection bias if derived from studying only those who have already filed for candidacy. This population cannot provide insight into the factors that motivate (or prevent) people from ever seeking office in the first place and are subject to the well-documented biases associated with selecting on the dependent variable (Gulzar, 2021). On the other hand, studying the entire population of office-eligible citizens runs into a rare-event problem as the rate at which a citizen enters politics is extremely low. This issue was evident in

the general survey discussed in Chapter 3, where a lack of concrete ideas about political careers may have led to predominantly inconclusive results. The result is either a lack of statistical power or a lack of generalizability to unpack the sources of candidate emergence.

Investigating political ambition through surveys also presents obstacles. It is difficult to instantly alter an individual's perception of political careers during a brief online survey, let alone identify one's true intention about running for office (Converse, 1964; Zaller, 1992). Furthermore, survey respondents might wish to portray themselves favorably when answering questions related to political ambition, participation, and social encouragement, leading to results that may be skewed by the Hawthorne effect (Adair, 1984).

In this chapter, I overcome these empirical challenges in two ways. First, I focus on the subset of the minority population that has the potential of running for office: active members of a training program organization, New American Leaders. By narrowing the target sample to a group of politically engaged racial minorities, the analysis offers new insight into the factors that develop and sustain their ambition. Second, I implement an experimental design to circumvent the problems inherent in survey methodologies. Specifically, I embed an experiment in a real-world candidate recruitment effort and observe individual behavior in a controlled setting, which allows for a more accurate measure of minority individuals' true interest in pursuing political office.[1]

4.1 Data: New American Leaders

New American Leaders (NAL) is a non-profit organization that recruits people of color and immigrant heritage to run for elected office. It provides training programs that help them get elected, including fundraising, navigating campaigns, and leveraging

[1]This experiment is approved by IRB at Columbia University (IRB-AAAT3890). Pre-analysis plan can be accessed at https://osf.io/rjwf7. See Appendix C.8 for list of deviations from pre-analysis plan.

their identities to connect with broad voter bases. Since its inception in 2012, NAL has roughly 1,500 program alums, the majority of whom ran for office (mainly at the local level) within a few years of training. In 2022, NAL held six training programs across the country with nearly 200 participants, 31% of whom are Asian American/Pacific Islanders, 21% are Hispanic/Latino, and 20% are Black or African Americans.[2] As of 2023, NAL had over 13,000 members subscribed to the organization's newsletters.[3]

This sample of minorities mitigates the rare-event problem as they represent a subset of the minority population who are more politically engaged than the general public. This sample also represents those who have opted in to receive communications from the organization, suggesting that they support the organization's objective of promoting the voice of ethnic minorities in politics. This target sample can, therefore, be described as those who exhibit relatively strong group attachment—i.e., the sample where the effect is most likely to exist. Experimental work by Valenzuela and Michelson (2016) finds that ethnic identity appeals in Get-Out-the-Vote messages increase turnout only among Latinos with strong prior attachments to a politicized group identity, suggesting that not all individuals are equally likely to respond to racial or ethnic appeals.[4]

Furthermore, this sample is comprised of minorities with varying levels of political ambition, including those with a keen interest in politics but have yet to seek information or engage in formal training, those who have participated in campaign training programs thereby are more serious about running, and those who have run for office (and won) in the past. This diversity in members' aspirations provides a unique opportunity to examine how motivation varies across individuals at different stages of the emergence

[2]The rest are 16% multi-racial and 8% Middle Eastern. See https://newamericanleaders.org/facts-and-figures/.

[3]These members are recruited from various sources such as partner organizations, organization events, word of mouth, media exposure, and social media.

[4]Although the inferences drawn are valid for the specific population being studied, the findings cannot speak to how political entry operates in the *entire* population. Furthermore, this scope condition means that my experimental findings likely serve as a theoretical upper bound for the effect of identity appeals on greater minority populations.

process.

4.1.1 Experimental Sample

In this chapter, I focus on members of NAL with low levels of political ambition to examine which motivating factors impact the initial interest in running for office. That is, I limit the sample to roughly 10,000 NAL members who have not yet taken the campaign training program and run two encouragement experiments—via email and SMS text—both of which send messages to recipients encouraging them to participate in a training program while randomly varying the appeals embedded in the message. Based on self-reported demographic data collected by the organization, about 60% of the members are women, and roughly two-thirds are Asian Americans or Hispanic/Latino. See Appendix C.1 for descriptive statistics.

Despite NAL members having a greater interest in politics than the average citizen, those who have not participated in the training program are likely yet to have considered running for office. Political interest does not necessarily mean having a high level of political ambition, which distinctively represents individuals' willingness to run for office. Therefore, if we use whether or not an individual has participated in the training program as a proxy for measuring emerging political ambition, we can treat the non-participants as those possessing none to a low level of nascent political ambition.

Furthermore, it is also highly likely that the non-alum members are even unaware of the training programs organized by NAL. Based on a conversation with the staff members at the organization, I find that the organization shares a listserv with partner organizations such as APIAVote and RE:Power that mainly promote voter mobilization.[5] Therefore, not only do the individuals in my sample possess little to no prior interest in running for office, but they are also less likely to have sought information about the training program prior to the experiment.

[5]See their partner organizations at https://newamericanleaders.org/leadership/.

To ensure that the level of political ambition is lower among the non-alums, I surveyed a random sample of 211 non-alums as well as 124 alums of the training program. As shown in Figure 4.1, when they were asked whether they ever plan on running for office in the future, 70% of the non-alums reported that they have either "absolutely no interest" or "no current interest but would not rule it out forever", whereas a sizable share of alums—43%—reported that they are either "announcing [the] campaign in the next year or two" or "planning to [run] in the near future".

Figure 4.1: Survey Response to "Do you plan to run for office at some point?"



Note: Based on an online survey of 124 alums and 211 non-alums of the NAL training program conducted from March to June 2023.

4.2 Email Encouragement

The first experiment sent emails to roughly 7,500 subscribed members of NAL, inviting them to participate in a training program while randomly varying the messages with different motivational appeals.[6] Table 4.1 shows the email text and primary treatment messages used in the experiment.

[6]The field experiments were conducted between January and February of 2023.

Table 4.1: Email Text and Treatment Messages

Email Skeleton
From: **[Sender]**, New American Leaders Subject: **[First name]**, you'd be a great elected official.      We see you, **[First Name]**. You volunteer, advocate, and show up for your community. People like you make for fantastic elected officials. And we want to help you get there. [**Treatment Message**] At Ready to Lead, you will learn everything you need to share your story, fundraise, connect with voters, and network with other New Americans who are ready to offer a helping hand. You'll learn how to embrace your immigrant story and use it as a tool to connect with voters and win. But most importantly, you will connect with other New Americans and elected leaders, learning from them and creating a support network. Whether you are just thinking about getting involved or are ready to run, we are here to help. RSVP now for an information session or apply for a training today! We hope to see you there! In solidarity, The NAL Team

Primary Treatment Messages	
Generic	
Personal Appeal	There are more than half a million elected positions in our country—that means there are more than half a million opportunities to help decide what our children learn in schools, which industries move into our towns, and how to keep our communities safe. We think that you should be one of them making these important decisions for our communities.
Intrinsic: Group Consciousness	
Group Solidarity	There are more than half a million elected officials in our country who have the power to decide what our children learn in school and whether to treat us differently based on how we look or who we love. But even with recent wins, New Americans still hold less than 5% of state legislative positions. It's time to replace the pale, stale, and male political establishment and bring in a diverse new generation of leaders. We need people like you at the table to shape policies that affect our friends and families in our communities.
Racial Threat I	George Floyd, Michelle Go, and Gonzáles Brebe. They are just a few of the victims of the violence, hate, and racial injustice perpetuated by oppressive systems. The systems that should protect us intentionally devalue our lives. This has to change—from the inside. We need people like you to dismantle systems built on hate, oppression, and white supremacy.
Racial Threat II	From a racial slur on a daily commute to police brutality on national TV, we are constantly faced with the stark reality that racism, discrimination, and hate are on the rise. This has to change. Yet, the system built on white supremacy is not going to change unless people like us—like you—step in. We need someone like you at every level of government to make this change and create a more inclusive democracy.
Extrinsic: Electoral Viability	
Co-ethnic Incumbency	You might think, "Me? No way." But we believe in you, just like we believe in Ylenia Aguilar, a formerly undocumented immigrant now serving as a school board member, and Stephanie Chang, a New American and the first AAPI woman elected to the Michigan legislature. They used their life stories as a tool to connect with voters and won. More people like you are running for office and winning. And many of them took their first steps with us at Ready to Lead. We want you to do the same.
Credible Demand	Our democracy calls for people like us to serve at every level of government. From the White House's Executive Order on Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion to your local government pressing for greater diversity in office, politicians and organizations are actively recruiting New Americans, LGBTQ+ folks, and people of color to close the representation gap and address the issues that have been ignored in policy decisions for too long. This is where you come in.

Following the theoretical expectations laid out in Chapter 2, the message randomly varied the presence of encouragement to run for office in 17 different ways, six of which are shown in the table. The "Generic" treatment was included as a placebo, which had no race-relevant discourses while simply encouraging members to run for office.[7] Following the theoretical expectations laid out in Section 2.2.1 of Chapter 2, the "Group Solidarity" and "Racial Threat" treatments are the **motivation to represent** and **sense of shared experience** appeals, respectively, intended to intrinsically motivate the members to consider public office jobs. Two versions of the "Racial Threat" appeal were tested to differentiate the personalized effects: one explicitly mentioning the names of victims and one that does not. Literature on framing effects finds that the inclusion of explicit names may produce a stronger personalized effect that allows recipients to easily recall race-relevant events and evoke greater emotional responses (Gross, 2008; Lecheler and De Vreese, 2016; Aarøe, 2011; Mendelsohn, Budak and Jurgens, 2021).

Following the theoretical expectations laid out in Section 2.2.2 of Chapter 2, the "Co-ethnic Incumbency" and "Credible Demand" appeals are the **prior success of candidates of color** and **recruitment efforts by party elites** that tap into strategic entry decisions. Along with these six primary treatment messages, I included 11 additional appeals combining two or more primary treatment factors. See Appendix C.2 for a complete list of treatment text messages.[8]

The emails included a link that, if clicked, brought recipients to NAL's website, where they could learn more about the training program. I used a binary indicator of whether or not a recipient clicked on the link embedded in the email as an outcome, which measures an immediate information-seeking behavior of the recipients—i.e., nascent level

[7]The language of the generic appeal is adapted mainly from the recruitment language used by Broockman (2014*b*).

[8]To ensure that the treatment languages convey intended mechanisms, a survey was conducted on a sample of 100 undergraduate students where they evaluated how accurately each treatment message conveyed the mechanisms the researcher theorized. The result confirms the accurate reflection of the intended mechanisms for all primary treatment messages. See Appendix C.4 for further discussion on the student survey.

of political ambition. Note that an identical subject line was used for all conditions, implying that the rate at which the recipients opened the email should be equal across all arms. Therefore I present two sets of results—based on all sample and based on samples limited to those who have opened the email.

4.2.1 Adaptive Experimental Design

The experiment was implemented via an adaptive design (Offer-Westort, Coppock and Green, 2021). Unlike a traditional experiment that utilizes the entire sample all at once by randomly assigning each treatment with equal probability, an adaptive experiment conducts a series of experiments with small batches of the sample as it dynamically adjusts the treatment assignment probability. Not knowing which treatment will perform especially well, the adaptive design begins by assigning subjects with equal probability. However, once early results are in hand, the method uses the collected data to determine how to allocate subjects in the next round. That is, a researcher can assign more respondents to the treatment arms that perform well (e.g., generate higher click rates among respondents), allowing for a more precise estimate of high-performing treatment arms. Adaptive design proceeds in this manner until all respondents are treated.

Figure 4.2 shows the roll-out schedule for each experiment batch. The email experiment was conducted over nine periods, separated by intervals ranging from four to seven days.[9] I allot a larger sample in the first period to reduce the likelihood of sub-optimal arms appearing as the best by chance due to the low sample size. I also impose floors on treatment assignment probabilities, ensuring that I can continue to observe outcomes under all treatment conditions throughout the experiment, regardless of the performance of these arms early on.

An adaptive design has several advantages over a static design. First, rather than

[9]The first half of the batches were disseminated weekly. However, after observing that the open rate reduced to near zero on the fourth day, I disseminated the batches every Monday and Thursday in period five onward. This schedule change is partly due to the organization's request to facilitate member outreach.

Figure 4.2: Adaptive Experiment Roll-out Period



Note: Roll-out schedule for email (top, purple) and text (bottom, green) experiments. Date and sample size for each batch of the experiment are specified. "K", "N_{total}", and "N_p" (where $p = \{1, ..., P\}$) indicate number of treatment arms, total sample size, and sample size for each batch p.

pre-selecting only a few treatment arms for investigation, researchers can test a more extensive set of treatment arms simultaneously, as is the case with this particular study, as the experiment allocates more resources to the most promising treatments during the experiment. Second, adaptive designs tend to outperform static designs in settings where the goal is to discover the treatment arm with the highest returns. When the sample size within each arm is relatively small, the static design is unable to obtain an accurate estimate for *any* of the arms. In contrast, the dynamic allocation not only elevates the likelihood of discovering the best arm but also allows for a more precise estimation of treatment arms that perform well. This feature is particularly useful in email encouragement settings where the response rates tend to be low (e.g., Broockman, 2014*b*). Third, adaptive designs improve outcomes for individuals *during* the experiment as it assigns more samples to "good" arms while minimizing the assignment of "bad" arms. This feature was especially crucial as the experiment was embedded in the organization's actual candidate recruitment effort, where increasing minority participation is normatively valuable.

Adaptive trials are utilized in a range of substantive domains from online advertising (Graepel et al., 2010; Chapelle and Li, 2011) to clinical trials (Villar, Bowden and Wason, 2015; Atkinson and Biswas, 2013). Despite their natural value to political science experi-

ments, there has been little use of these methods in the field. My research contributes to a small but growing number of examples (e.g., Caria et al., 2020; Offer-Westort, Rosenzweig and Athey, 2022). In Appendix C.3, I discuss the adaptive design in detail, including the statistical theory behind sampling algorithms (Sections C.3.1–C.3.3) and estimation strategy (Section C.3.4). In Appendix C.5, I also provide simulation results that compare the performance of adaptive designs against a static design.

4.2.2 Estimation Strategy

Under adaptively collected data, common estimators such as sample means or inverse propensity-weighted means can be biased or heavy-tailed. For example, if an arm happens to perform well in early periods (i.e., generates a higher mean outcome), it receives more samples in the subsequent rounds. Therefore, even if these arms appear to have a "good" performance by chance in the beginning, they will have an opportunity to correct themselves as they get more samples and regress to the means. However, if an arm just so happens to perform "badly" in earlier periods, it will not get the same opportunity because of the reduction in sampling.

The most common approach to correct this bias is using an inverse-probability weighting (IPW) estimator that weights individual observations by the inverse of the treatment probability under which they were sampled. This approach compensates for the outsize influence of early downward fluctuations that reduce the probability of an arm being assigned by up-weighting later observations within that arm when we see them. However, while the IPW estimator fixes the bias problem, it results in a non-normal asymptotic sampling distribution. This non-normality makes statistical inference challenging, as it prevents researchers from making frequentist statistical inferences such as t-tests.

To address this, I use an adaptively-weighted augmented inverse probability-weighted (AWAIPW) estimator developed by Hadad et al. (2021). This estimator adaptively reweights "the terms of an augmented inverse propensity-weighting estimator to control

the contribution of each term to the estimator's variance" and, as a result, "reduces overall variance and yields an asymptotically unbiased and normal test statistic" (1).[10] Simply put, this approach allows for estimating and testing the value of a given arm (i.e., mean outcome) as well as differences between two such values, even in data-poor situations where the data-collection mechanism did not target these estimands.[11] Formally, the mean outcome $\hat{\mu}$ for an arm $k = \{1, ..., K\}$ can be estimated as follows

$$\hat{\mu}^{AWAIPW}(k) = \Big(\sum_{i=1}^{N} h_i(k) \Big(x_i \frac{1\{K_i = k\}}{\pi_i(k; S_i)} + \big(1 - \frac{1\{K_i = k\}}{\pi_i(k; S_i)}\big) \hat{m}_i(k) \Big) \Big) / \Big(\sum_{i=1}^{N} h_i(k) \Big) \quad (4.1)$$

where N represents the total sample size, S_i denotes the treatment history and outcome prior to seeing observation i. Therefore, $\pi_i(k; S_i)$ represents the treatment assignment probability assigned to an individual i based on the treatment and outcomes from previous batches. $\hat{m}_i(k)$ represents conditional mean from prior batch and $h_i(k)$ represents history-adaptive evaluation weight.[12] Note that $\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} x_i \frac{1\{K_i=k\}}{\pi_i(k;S_i)}$ is the conventional IPW estimator. The AWAIPW estimator therefore simply adds two components to the IPW: (1) $\big(1 - \frac{1\{K_i=k\}}{\pi_i(k;S_i)}\big)\hat{m}_i(k)$, a regression adjustment, and (2) $h_i(k)$, an additional degree of flexibility in controlling the tails of the sampling distribution. The former acts as a "control variate" which preserves unbiasedness while reducing variance. The latter compensates for "erratic trajectories of the assignment probabilities" and stabilizes the estimator variance (Hadad et al., 2021, 3). Once I estimate the mean outcomes of each arm using the AWAIPW estimator, I implement traditional hypothesis testing to test for differences in each pair of treatment arms.

[10] See Appendix C.3.4 for detailed discussion about the estimator.

[11] In my pre-registered analysis plan, I purported to use the Hájek estimator. However, Hadad et al. (2021) show that, while IPW weighting fixes the bias problem, it still results in a non-normal asymptotic distribution and can exacerbate the inference problem. However, the results are similar when the Hájek estimator is used.

[12] Hadad et al. (2021) note that $\hat{m}_i(k)$ any estimator of the conditional mean—even the biased ones—can be used. In my estimation, I use a simple mean outcome. The authors also provide two approaches to construct $h_i(k)$: constant-allocation scheme and two-point allocation scheme. I use the former approach.

4.2.3 RESULT

Figure 4.3 presents the estimated click-through rate by treatment condition. Overall, the cumulative open rate was 6.5%, and the click-through rate was 0.6% across all treatment arms.[13] Note that an identical subject line was used for all conditions, implying that the rate at which the recipients opened the email should be equal across all arms.[14] Therefore, I examine the average click rate in two ways: based on all data regardless of the open rate (left panel) and based on data limited to those who have opened the email (right panel). For ease of interpretation, the top panel presents aggregated estimates that combine treatments that are intrinsic (green), extrinsic (orange), or a combination of both (black) from the individual treatment messages.

Overall, the recipients are more likely to seek information about running on the organization's website upon receiving the intrinsic appeals relative to the extrinsic appeals. Looking at the aggregate estimates based on all data (left panel), I find that the intrinsic appeals generate the highest click rate on average: the average click rate is 0.9 percent (s.e. = 0.002), which is 0.6 percentage points (pp) higher than the extrinsic appeals and the difference is statistically distinguishable from zero (two-tailed, p-value = 0.014). The click rate of the intrinsic appeal increases to 13.6 percent once we limit it to those who have opened the email: roughly 22 out of 168 recipients opened the email and sought information about the training program. In comparison, less than four percent of recipients who opened the email with an extrinsic appeal condition engaged in immediate information-seeking behavior.[15]

[13]This is somewhat lower than the average response rate from a similar email experiment in the past. For example, a 2012 candidate recruitment experiment by Broockman (2014*b*) finds the average click rate to range between 1.68% and 2.93% across four different treatment arms with roughly 25,000 recipients in each arm. This discrepancy could be due to advanced spam filter technology and a lack of interest in non-personal emails. Furthermore, I use a much more conservative counting method where, even if a recipient clicks on a link several times, I count it as a single click, while other commonly used methods (e.g., Bitly) track the total number of counts per recipient.

[14]The F-test via randomization inference fails to reject a sharp null hypothesis that the open rate is equal across all recipients for all treatment arms (p-value > 0.9).

[15]The difference between intrinsic and extrinsic appeals is statistically distinguishable from zero (two-

Figure 4.3: Average Click-Through Rate



Note: Average response rate based on all samples (left panel) and conditional on having opened the email (right). The error bars represent a 95% confidence interval. Estimated average click rate, standard errors, and sample size for each treatment arm are shown. "RT" = Racial Threat, "GS" = Group Solidarity, "CI" = Co-ethnic Incumbency, "CD" = Credible Demand. "I" and "II" indicate different versions of Racial Threat appeals.

Interestingly, when a message contains both intrinsic and extrinsic appeals, the effect is much closer in magnitude to the extrinsic appeal. The lengthy treatment wordings may have offset the effects of the intrinsic appeal, as the combined appeals generally had a higher word count and may have led to inattention. Indeed, the treatment message "GS + RT + CI + CD", which combined four primary treatment messages and thereby had the highest word count, generated a zero response rate. However, assuming the recipients become inattentive halfway through the treatment message, we can find minimal differences between the intrinsic and extrinsic appeals within a combined text. Specifically,

tailed, p-value = 0.006). See Appendix C.6.2 for estimated differences across all arms.

the wording of the treatment condition "GS + CI" began with the Group Solidarity language followed by the Co-ethnic Incumbency language. The average response rate of this treatment message is slightly higher than the "RT + CI" condition, where the Co-ethnic Incumbency language preceded the Racial Threat language.[16]

It is also worth noting that, although underpowered, compared to the neutral condition, the intrinsic and extrinsic appeal moves in the opposite direction. That is, compared to the appeal with no mentioning of racial identity, emphasizing that someone who "look like" them have run and won office in the past in fact *discourages* while emphasizing the sense of racial group consciousness *encourages* a minority individual to develop the initial interest.

The effects on the individual treatment message reveal a consistent pattern that intrinsic appeals tend to yield higher responses than extrinsic appeals. In fact, the only treatment condition with a click rate that is distinguishable from zero is the Racial Threat condition, which had an explicit mention of victims ("Racial Threat I"), with average click rates of 1.5 percent (s.e. = 0.004) based on all sample and 25.8 percent (s.e. = 0.059) conditional on having opened the email.[17] Another racial threat message ("Racial Threat II") included in the experiment yielded a much weaker and non-significant result, with an average click rate of 0.005 (s.e. = 0.004). Including explicit names may have produced a stronger personalized effect, allowing recipients to recall race-relevant events and evoke greater emotional responses easily. This is consistent with research on framing effects, which finds that episodic frames elicit stronger and longer-lasting impact due to their emotive qualities as compared to thematic frames that place an issue in an abstract context (Gross, 2008; Aarøe, 2011; Lecheler and De Vreese, 2016; Mendelsohn, Budak and Jurgens, 2021).

[16]However, the difference between the two conditions is not statistically different from zero.

[17]In comparing the average click rates between treatment arms, I find that the top-performing racial threat message is statistically different from all but three competing messages: "GS + CI", "GS + RT I" and "RT + CI".

Other intrinsic appeals generate a relatively higher, albeit largely non-significant, average response rate to the extrinsic appeal. For example, while the "GS + RT I" condition generates a low and non-significant average click rate across all samples (0.7 percent; s.e. = 0.004), its response rate among those who have opened the email spikes to 13.2 percent (s.e. = 0.063) and is statistically distinguishable from zero. One exception is the Group Solidarity appeal, which results in one of the lowest response rates. However, as I discuss further in Section 4.4, despite the null effect on immediate information-seeking behavior, the Group Solidarity appeal effectively generates more commitment towards running for office.

On the other hand, all of the individual treatment messages with an extrinsic appeal result in average click rates that are lower in magnitude than the generic appeal, regardless of whether a recipient opened the email. For example, the extrinsic appeal that accentuated the electoral success of other candidates of color resulted in an average response rate of 0.3 percent (s.e. = 0.003) but is non-distinguishable from zero. Among those who opened the email, the click rate increases to four percent (s.e. = 0.041) but is statistically non-significant.

The results show that messages intended to intrinsically motivate, particularly by accentuating shared experiences of racial discrimination, are most effective at increasing interest among minorities. The average response rate under intrinsic appeals is higher than that under extrinsic appeals, with a difference of 10 percentage points among a subset of the sample who were exposed to the treatment message. This difference is also substantively significant: a simple change in encouragement wording, from extrinsic to intrinsic, can substantially increase the number of minority individuals to develop a nascent level of political ambition—a crucial first step towards actually filing for candidacy. Moreover, the finding that intrinsic appeals are more influential than extrinsic ones among minorities in the initial phase of the emergence process implies that the choice to engage

in politics is not solely determined by strategic considerations, as previous research indicates. Instead, it underscores the significance of both intrinsic and strategic factors, whose effects fluctuate across different stages of the emergence process.

4.3 Text Encouragement

The second experiment replicates the previous experiment in a text message setting. While email communication is associated with more impersonal interactions, texts tend to be more informal and situation-specific (Heinonen and Strandvik, 2007). Studies find that this difference in communication generates distinct consumer behaviors in terms of not only the engagement level but also the perception of values in content (Tan et al., 2014). Therefore, the second experiment tests whether the findings from the email experiment are replicated under an alternative communication environment.

The experiment targeted a subset of NAL members who opted in to receive text messages (N = 3,169) but have not yet taken the training program. Because this sample is comprised of individuals who have voluntarily provided their phone numbers (in addition to email) to communicate with the organization personally, they may be more politically engaged than the email-only members.

Due to the word limit in text messages, the experiment only focused on the four primary treatment messages and did not include appeals that combined different treatment conditions. Nine treatment messages were devised: two versions of the four primary treatment factors plus one generic appeal. See Table 4.2 for the text skeleton and treatment languages.

Upon receiving a text, respondents were asked to respond "Y" if they were interested in learning more about the program. I used whether or not a respondent responded to the initial message as an outcome to measure their initial interest in running for office.[18]

[18]The initial message intentionally did not include a hyperlink to avoid getting filtered as spam. The text experiment was, therefore, a "harder test" in the sense that it required recipients to engage in text

Table 4.2: SMS Text and Treatment Messages

Text Skeleton



Treatment Messages	
Generic	
Personal Appeal	There are more than half a million elected officials in our country. We think you should be one of them making important decisions for your communities.
Intrinsic	
Group Solidarity A	Too many elected officials are pale, stale, and male. We want people like you—someone who understands our needs—at the table instead to shape policies for our communities.
Group Solidarity B	America is diverse. Our leaders should be too. We think you can help close the representation gap and be the leader our communities need.
Racial Threat A	Many of us have experienced hate and discrimination perpetuated by unjust systems. We want someone like you in office who can change that.
Racial Threat B	With hate and racism on the rise, our lives and the lives of our families are on the line. We need leaders in office who understand that—leaders like you.
Extrinsic	
Co-Ethnic Incumbency A	When people like us run, we win. From undocumented immigrants to 2nd generation Americans, more people like you are running for office and winning. So can you.
Co-Ethnic Incumbency B	Our power is growing. Every year, we see more New Americans like you running for office across America—and winning. You can do the same.
Credible Demand A	At every level of government, local leaders are recruiting New Americans like you to run for office to close the representation gap. This is where you come in.
Credible Demand B	Across the country, community leaders are looking for New Americans like you to run for office to close the representation gap. This is where you come in.

As shown in Figure 4.2, the experiment was implemented over two periods with two days of intervals. Because the receipt of text messages is instant (compared to emails, which may take days for recipients to check their inbox), the outcomes are collected

communication.

within 24 hours of disseminating treatment texts. The experimental sample included a small share of individuals who were also exposed to the email experiment (4% of the total sample). In order to avoid inconsistent treatment assignment, the individuals who opened the treatment email received the same type of treatment appeals as the email, whereas those who either unopened the treatment email or were outside of the email experimental sample received randomly assigned treatment messages.[19] I then take the weighted average of the estimated mean outcomes from each group to obtain the overall mean outcomes.

4.3.1 RESULT

The results are shown in Figure 4.4. The overall cumulative response rate across all treatment arms was 12.7%. This response rate is much higher than that under email, which supports the assumption that the target sample in the text experiment might not entirely consist of individuals new to political engagement.

The results show that the intrinsic appeals, in the aggregate, generate higher responses as compared to the extrinsic appeals: the average response rate of the intrinsic message is 0.136 (s.e. = 0.008), meaning that more than 200 out of 1,534 recipients were interested in learning more about running for office. This is about three percentage points greater than that of the extrinsic appeal, and the difference is statistically distinguishable at the 5% level.

With respect to the individual treatment effects, both iterations of the Racial Threat appeals exhibit the highest level of engagement. Specifically, highlighting shared experiences of racial discrimination through two different phrasings resulted in average response rates of 16 (s.e. = 0.014) and 14.8 (s.e. = 0.020) percent, respectively. This finding is noteworthy, considering that the Racial Threat appeals used in this context did not explic-

[19] Those who received pre-determined treatment messages, therefore, were assigned an inverse-probability weight of 1. Results excluding this group of individuals do not change the substantive interpretation of the results.

Figure 4.4: Average Text Response Rate



Note: Average response rate of treatment appeals via text. The error bars represent a 95% confidence interval. Estimated response rate, standard errors, and sample size for each treatment arm are shown. "A" and "B" suffix indicates different versions of appeals used for each treatment condition.

itly mention any victim names. That is, even in the absence of personalized framing, the mere mention of racial discrimination significantly enhances initial interest in candidacy.

I also observe a relatively high effect on one of the Group Solidarity appeals, with an average response rate of 14 percent (s.e. = 0.022). However, the Group Solidarity A appeal generated a much smaller effect, which may be due in part to its particular wording.[20] Nonetheless, as I discuss in Section 4.4, the Group Solidarity appeal exerts greater influence on longer-term outcomes, such as applying for the candidate training program weeks after the treatment take-up.

Both Co-ethnic Incumbency appeals show a lower average response rate, with average response rates of 10 (s.e. = 0.018) and 9.4 percent (s.e. = 0.017). Similarly, the Credible

[20]The Group Solidarity A treatment included a phrase *"[t]oo many elected officials are pale, stale, and male"* that may have generated backlash effects.

Demand A appeal results in an average response rate of 10.9 percent (s.e. = 0.019). While the average response rates of these extrinsic appeals are statistically positive, three out of four of these appeals have response rate lower than the generic appeal (albeit non-significant difference) and the difference between these appeals and the Racial Threat B appeal is statistically distinguishable from zero.

However, the Racial Threat B appeal is not statistically different from the Generic appeal at any conventional level. This may be due to the sample characteristics: if the recipients are more politically interested, then *any* encouragement to join the training program may increase interest, while no particular prime generates significantly higher interest over the other. While the experiment cannot provide evidence that the racial threat treatment is superior to *all* alternative arms, it nevertheless supports the claim that, compared to emphasizing the success of co-ethnic candidates, the shared experiences of race-based exclusions generate greater interest in the training program.

In exploring heterogeneous treatment effects, in Appendix C.6.3, I estimate mean response rates by respondent gender and ethnorace. While the interpretation should be viewed with caution, I find modest evidence that female recipients tend to respond less than their male counterparts, and the intrinsic appeals tend to generate higher response rate among Black recipients compare to non-Black recipients, in both email and text experiments.

4.4 Long-Term Effects: Emerging Political Ambition

The experiments provide evidence that the encouragement appeals that tap into intrinsic motivation trigger immediate information-seeking behavior at a higher rate than the extrinsic appeals. However, do these appeals also influence further commitment beyond the immediate response? To answer this question, I collected program registration data for all individuals who applied for NAL training programs in 2023, including infor-

mation on the application submission and the program attendance status. I then matched the applicants in the registration data to those in the experimental sample using a unique member ID across the two data sets. The final data set, therefore, allows me to examine the effects of the treatment on the further development of their political ambition.

The campaign training program is quite intensive: individuals must first submit an application that includes a professional resume as well as three essays describing their goals for candidacy. The applications are then rigorously evaluated by the staff members at NAL. The program is three days long, covering various topics, including writing a stump speech, campaign fundraising, and media engagement. It also includes a panel of local elected officials and political experts that offers networking opportunities. While the program fee varies over time, the registration costs about $150. Many of the alums file for candidacy within three years. Therefore, the act of applying for and participating in the program demonstrates high level of nascent political ambition—that is beyond the nascent level but has yet to reach the expressive level. Examining the effects of treatments on these longer-term outcomes offers valuable insights into the motivating factors that propel individuals further along their political journey.

4.4.1 Result

A total of 614 individuals began the application process, 395 of whom finished the application. Out of the 395 final applicants, NAL has admitted 128 individuals. Across the two experimental samples (N = 10,531), I identified 235 individuals who have started the application process, 198 who have applied, and 31 who have attended the program. I find strong correlations between the immediate response rate and application/attendance rates, which indicates that the instant information-seeking behavior is an appropriate surrogate index for longer-term outcomes (Prentice, 1989; Frangakis and Rubin, 2002).[21]

Figure 4.5 shows the average application start rate (left panel), application submis-

[21] Appendix C.7.1 provides the correlation analysis results.

sion rate (center panel), and program attendance rate (right panel) separately for email (top) and text (bottom) experiments. For ease of visualization, I only show the individual treatment effects for intrinsic, extrinsic, and generic appeals and present full results, including the combined treatment conditions, in Appendix C.7.2.

Figure 4.5: Average Application and Attendance Rates



Note: Average treatment effects on long-term outcomes. The error bars represent a 95% confidence interval. See Appendix C.7.2 for full regression results.

Note that because the sampling algorithm used in the experiment was optimized for a click rate, the sample size in each treatment no longer reflects the longer-term outcomes observed here. This implies that, while the estimates are unbiased, they may be

less precise. Furthermore, because of the unknown nature of the selection process by the organization, the effect on the attendance rate should be viewed with caution. Individuals can only be accepted if they have applied, meaning that the attendance status is not a sole reflection of one's interest in running but also of other considerations, including applicant's residency, qualifications, and other factors idiosyncratic to their submission status.[22] Relatedly, the average attendance rate is subject to random sampling variability, implying that it is the randomization assumption may not necessarily guard against the possibility that the differences across treatments are driven by reasons independent of the treatment.

Regarding the email experiment, intrinsic motivation continues to generate a meaningful effect on both application and attendance rates. The average rate for treatment conditions across all intrinsic appeals is 1.5 percent (s.e. = 0.002) for starting the application, 1.3 percent (s.e. = 0.002) for completing the application, and 0.3 percent (s.e. = 0.001) for attending the program. However, while these rates are higher than the extrinsic appeals, the extrinsic appeals also show non-zero effects on these longer-term outcomes: the application submission rate is 0.8 percent (s.e. = 0.003), although no one from this treatment group attended the training program. This submission rate is slightly lower than that of intrinsic appeal—0.5 percentage point (s.e. = 0.003)—but the difference is not distinguishable from zero.[23]

The individual treatment effects reveal that the higher rate of long-term outcomes is driven by the Group Solidarity and Racial Threat I appeals. For example, the application submission rates are roughly 2 percent, and the attendance rate is roughly 0.5 percent for both treatments. A stark difference is made against the Co-ethnic Incumbency appeal, which consistently shows null effects across all three long-term outcomes and is statistically lower than either of the two intrinsic appeals at the 1% level.

[22]Based on a conversation with the organization staff, the program attendance in 2023 was also impacted by Covid-19.

[23]See Appendix C.7.3 for estimated differences.

The results of the text experiment provide stronger effects of intrinsic appeals: in the aggregate, the average application start, submission, and attendance rates under intrinsic appeals are consistently higher than those under extrinsic appeals, and the differences are statistically significant at a 10% level. The individual treatment messages also display a clear distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic treatment conditions: all intrinsic appeals appear as the top-performing arms, whereas the three least-performing arms are extrinsic appeals. Namely, the application starting and submission rates under the Racial Threat B appeal are statistically greater than those under the three least-performing arms.[24]

The findings of long-term outcomes reveal that intrinsic appeals continue to influence minority individuals' interest in holding office beyond their immediate response to treatment appeals. This suggests that intrinsic motivation not only boosts initial political aspirations but also contributes to the ongoing development of political ambition. However, it is noteworthy that extrinsic appeals exhibit a stronger impact on long-term outcomes compared to immediate information-seeking behavior. While recipients of extrinsic appeals may not immediately seek information, they tend to become more actively involved later on.

This mixed evidence implies that the positive results of extrinsic appeals may indicate the presence of non-alums who are more politically ambitious. That is, for those non-alums with a relatively higher level of prior interest in running for office, upon receiving an extrinsic appeal, they may not necessarily react immediately by clicking on a link or responding to the texts. Instead, they may express a more serious commitment, such as applying or attending the training program.

Of course, to understand whether the treatment appeals generate differential effects on the final stage of the emergence process, one would need to observe the rate at which treated individuals actually run for office. Such data is unavailable as it takes between one

[24]Only the application submission rate under the Group Solidarity A appeal is statistically larger than those under the three least-performing arms.

and three years for committed trainees to file for candidacy. However, according to the NAL's annual report, across roughly 1,500 alums that have participated in the training program over the years, about 200 of them have run for office as of 2022, indicating a non-trivial run rate of 13.3%. To the extent the rate at which individuals run for office is independent of treatment conditional on these outcome measures, the effects observed here may serve as a useful proxy (Prentice, 1989; Frangakis and Rubin, 2002).

4.5 Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I focus on a group of racial minorities with higher levels of political engagement to examine factors that impact their initial development of political ambition—the first important step in entering the emergence process. By utilizing the New American Leaders (NAL) training program as a primary data source, the chapter addresses a critical gap in understanding how intrinsic motivations, as opposed to strategic considerations, influence minorities' initial interest in political candidacy. Through two field experiments embedded within NAL's candidate mobilization efforts, the findings reveal that encouragement messages emphasizing intrinsic appeals, particularly those highlighting shared racial discrimination experiences, lead to immediate information-seeking about candidate training compared to extrinsic appeals. Moreover, the influence of intrinsic motivation persists over time, as individuals exposed to such messages are more likely to commit to applying for and attending the training program, indicating a deeper engagement with the political process.

These results shed light on the nuanced dynamics underlying the entry decisions among racial minorities. Unlike prior research, which has treated potential minority candidates as rational actors whose sole goal is to win elections, these findings suggest that the intrinsic benefits of running for office can sufficiently influence the initial decision to run for public office among minority individuals. In doing so, this finding brings racial identity to the forefront of minority candidate supply research. While the literature on

minority voter participation has long emphasized the significance of racial consciousness and its impact on mass-level mobilization, the degree to which the politicization of racial identity impacts political ambition and, in turn, minority candidacy was virtually ignored. The personal motives found in these experiments underscore the importance of racial identity in minorities' entry decisions and suggest diverse pathways through which individual minorities enter government office.

5

Nascent to Expressive Political Ambition

The analyses presented so far focused on individuals with low levels of political ambition—politically engaged racial minorities who have not yet taken political office jobs seriously. In this chapter, I examine minority individuals with both low and high levels of ambition and explore how the motivating scheme differs between the two groups of individuals situated at different stages of the emergence process. As discussed in Chapter 2, I expect that, while intrinsic motives play a vital role at the beginning, strategic-based factors related to perceived viability may become more critical towards the later stage of candidate emergence. Questions such as *"What is my voter base?"* or *"What is my actual*

chance of winning the election?" are unlikely to cross the minds of individuals who have never given serious consideration about running for office. However, individuals may first form an abstract idea about running for office upon facing an emotional discourse, after which they begin to think strategically about their electoral chances.

To validate this claim, I conduct a Qualtrics survey on members of New American Leaders from March to June 2023. The survey targeted both alums of the training program, some of whom have run for office, as well as non-alums. Given the intensity of the training program, I consider the alums to have a high level of emerging and/or expressive political ambition in comparison to the non-alums, who are likely to possess a minimal level of political ambition. I leverage this variation in the individual level of political ambition to examine whether the factors that motivate minorities to run for office differ between those who are in the initial stages of the process versus those who are more invested in seeking office.[1]

5.1 Sampling Frame and Survey Recruitment

To recruit survey participants, I began with roughly 13,000 subscribed members in the organization's listserv, roughly 1,500 of whom (12%) are alums of the program over the past ten years. I then contacted all 1,500 alums and a random sample of 2,000 non-alums from the entire pool via email.[2] The respondents were recruited in batches, each containing a random sample of 500 alums and 500 non-alums. The batches of emails were sent out weekly with a goal of reaching 200 respondents from each group (i.e., 400 respondents in total).[3]

In total, 3,722 members were contacted, 335 of whom participated in the survey,

[1]This project is approved by IRB at Columbia University (IRB-AAAU5083). Pre-analysis plan can be accessed at https://osf.io/x6buf.

[2]The email came from the Columbia University email account, not from the organization.

[3]This iterative recruitment strategy is primarily due to budget constraints: each respondent was paid $10 for their participation.

generating a final response rate of 9%.[4] Out of the 335 participants, 124 are alums (37% of respondents), and the remaining 211 are non-alums who have never run for office in the past. 46 out of the 124 alums indicated in the survey that they previously ran for office. Due to the low sample size, however, I combine all alums into a single category regardless of whether or not they have run in the past and compare their responses against non-alums.

Alums and non-alums are similar in terms of the share of female, marital status, and racial composition. However, I observe that the alums are more educated and wealthier than the non-alums on average. In particular, the median education category is a post-graduate degree among the alums and a bachelor's degree among the non-alums. Similarly, over 71% of alums have reported income over $70K while the share is only 65% among non-alums.

5.2 Survey Design

The 10-minute survey was composed of two parts. First, a host of questionnaires were included to gather information on individuals' general interest in running for office (e.g., self-qualification, local organization recruitment), prior exposure to politics, and resource and demographic factors impacting their entry decisions (e.g., race, gender, income).[5] These are a standard set of questionnaires collected to investigate leakage in the pipeline to power, adopted particularly from the literature on women's political ambition. In Section 5.4, I use these variables to investigate barriers that lead individuals to decide against candidacy.

Second, the survey included a conjoint experiment designed to investigate the differ-

[4]This response rate comports with online surveys of political elites in recent years. For example, Teele, Kalla and Rosenbluth (2018) and Hertel-Fernandez, Mildenberger and Stokes (2019) received 9% and 10% response rate, respectively.

[5]The question wordings were primarily adapted from the survey instrument developed by Bernhard, Shames and Teele (2021) and Phillips (2021). See Appendix D.1 for descriptive statistics.

ence in election preferences across individuals with varying levels of political ambition. In a conjoint survey, a respondent reviewed ten pairs of hypothetical electoral districts while randomly varying the attributes of four contextual and political settings of the electoral district, as shown in Table 5.1. The attributes within each treatment were assigned using uniform distributions.[6]

Table 5.1: Conjoint Survey Vignette and Treatment Factors

Vignette
We would like to ask your opinion about the ideal type of environment in which you are willing to run for office. Please review carefully the descriptions of two hypothetical districts and answer the following questions. In district 1, [**Co-ethnic Population**] of the voters are [*respondent race*]. [**Co-ethnic Electoral Performance**]. Recently, [**Major Social Issue**]. For an upcoming election, a local political committee is seeking to endorse candidates [**Credible Demand**]. In district 2, [**Co-ethnic Population**] of the voters are [*respondent race*]. [**Co-ethnic Electoral Performance**]. Recently, [**Major Social Issue**]. For an upcoming election, a local political committee is seeking to endorse candidates [**Credible Demand**]. If you were to run for office in one of these districts, which district would you choose? Assume the electoral settings are identical between these districts (i.e., salary, term limits, timing of election). ☐ District 1 ☐ District 2

Treatment Factors	
Intrinsic	
Major Social Issue (3)	- there was a mass shooting in one of the schools in the district, resulting in numerous casualties - the district was hit by a storm that spawned hundreds of tornadoes, resulting in numerous casualties - there's been a surge in [*racial violence specific to respondent race, shown below*] in the district, resulting in numerous casualties · Hispanic: *anti-Latino sentiment* · Black: *police brutality against Black people* · Asian: *hate crimes against Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders* · MENA: *hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims* · Other/Multi-Racial/White: *hate crimes against racial minorities*
Extrinsic	
Co-ethnic Population (3)	- 30% - 50% - 70%
Co-ethnic Electoral Performance (3)	- The current city councilor is non-Hispanic white, and no [*respondent race*] have ever run in local elections before - The current city councilor is non-Hispanic white, but there's been an increase in [*respondent race*] running in local elections lately - In the district, [*respondent race*] frequently run for office and win elections, including the current city councilor
Credible Demand (3)	- who can promote renewable energy projects - who stand up for small business - from a variety of racial and ethnic backgrounds

Note: In an experiment "[*respondent rate*]" is replaced with a respondent's self-reported race. Under the Major Social Issue treatment, the race-relevant event narrative (i.e., the italicized portion) was chosen based on the respondent's self-reported race. Baseline categories are underlined. Numbers in parentheses indicate total number of attribute levels used in each treatment.

Similar to the encouragement design in Chapter 4, the Major Social Issue treatment

[6]Wordings of the survey instruments have been adjusted based on a pilot study on a general adult sample recruited via CloudResearch (N = 1,635).

varied the presence of major events experienced in the district: natural disasters, school shootings, or racial violence. This treatment factor was intended to test whether the intrinsic benefit of running for office observed in the field experiment replicates in a survey setting among the non-alums. The remaining three extrinsic treatment factors varied the co-ethnic population size in the electoral district (Co-ethnic Population), the performance of co-ethnic candidates in past elections (Co-ethnic Electoral Performance), as well as the type of candidates the local political organization seeks to endorse (Credible Demand). These treatment factors were intended to tap into the strategic entry decisions, which I expect to exert greater impact on the preferences of the alums.

In order to personalize the hypothetical scenarios, the treatment factors used respondents' self-reported race in the narratives. That is, I collected data on respondents' self-reported race and replaced the placeholder "[respondent race]" in the narratives with their self-reported race. Moreover, the attribute levels under Major Social Issue used racial discrimination narratives specific to the respondents' self-reported race. For example, a Black respondent who received the racial threat attribute would read about increased police brutality in a hypothetical district, while an Asian American respondent would read about a surge in hate crimes against Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders in a hypothetical district.[7]

Upon reviewing each hypothetical scenario, respondents were asked to choose in which district they were more willing to enter the electoral race for a city council position. I use this binary indicator as an outcome measure to estimate the Average Marginal Component Effect (AMCE) (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2014*b*) separately for program attendees (higher level of political ambition) and non-attendees (low level of political ambition).[8]

[7]The survey includes 25% Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders, 12% Black or African Americans, 39% Hispanics, 7% Middle Eastern and North Africans (MENA), 12% non-Hispanic whites, 3% multi-racial, and 7% other/multi-racials.

[8]I use `R` package `cjoint` developed by Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto (2014*a*) to estimate AMCE.

5.3 Intrinsic Motive and Strategic Shifts: Conjoint Experiment

I first present conjoint experiment results.[9] Figure 5.1 displays estimated AMCEs and 95% confidence intervals for each attribute level across four treatment factors separately for alums (red) and non-alums (green).

I find modest evidence that the preferences regarding the types of district settings in which respondents are willing to pursue office vary by the individual level of political ambition. For non-alums, their preference depends more on racial issues: compared to districts that have experienced a school shooting, they prefer to run in districts that have experienced violence targeted toward their co-racial group by nine percentage points on average (s.e. = 0.04). This is not true for alums, whose estimated effect is near zero. To test for statistically significant differences between the two groups, I estimate the Average Component Interaction Effect (ACIE) by interacting the attendance indicator with the Major Social Issue treatment factor. I find that the estimated differences between the two groups are statistically distinguishable from zero at the 10% level (p-value = 0.069).[10]

In contrast, the preferences of alums are influenced by the perceived viability of winning. Compared to districts with 30% co-ethnic populations, they prefer to enter race in districts with 70% co-ethnic population by eight percentage points (s.e. = 0.03). On the other hand, the preferences of non-alums do not depend on the district's racial composition. In fact, the estimated effect on the 70% co-ethnic population is negative, albeit non-significant, suggesting that they prefer districts with a smaller share of the co-ethnic population.[11] The difference in the estimated AMCE on the 70% co-ethnic treatment between alums and non-alums is statistically distinguishable from zero at the 5% significance level (p-value = 0.038). The effects on other extrinsic treatment factors, however,

[9] The analysis excludes respondents who self-identified as non-Hispanic white or Other category.

[10] See Appendix D.2 for ACIE results.

[11] This finding can also be interpreted as a motivation to represent: among less politically ambitious individuals, they recognize the need for greater political representation in districts where the co-racial population is low.

Figure 5.1: Estimated AMCEs of District Attributes



Note: Estimated AMCEs of district attributes on willingness to run for office by training program attendance status. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Solid points represent estimates that are statistically significant at the 5% level. The points without bars represent the reference category for each attribute. The standard errors are clustered by the respondent to account for the dependence of observations across respondents. See Appendix D.2 for full results.

show null effects.

The finding that the preferences of non-alums are driven by racial discrimination is consistent with the experimental result that the shared experiences around racial discrimination are most effective at increasing initial interest in running for office among minority individuals with little to no prior interest in office jobs. Conversely, the positive effect of co-ethnic population size among alums is in line with the longstanding argument in the minority representation literature that points to the size of the co-ethnic population as a primary determinant of minority candidate emergence.

5.3.1 Mechanism: Co-ethnic Population and BLM

I explore two mechanisms through which the effects of co-ethnic population and racial threat treatment vary. First, literature on minority candidate emergence finds that minority candidates tend to arise in majority-minority districts, suggesting that the respondents' geographic location possibly drives the positive effect on the large co-ethnic population size. To assess this, I merge Census place-level minority population size to the respondents' self-reported zip code and re-estimate the AMCEs separately for respondents who live in 1) non-competitive (less than 46%); 2) competitive (between 46-68%); and 3) minority-majority districts (greater than 68%).[12]

Figure 5.2 displays estimated ACMEs across three groups of NAL alums based on their exposure to a co-ethnic population. I find that the positive effect on the co-ethnic population treatment is largely driven by attendees who live in minority-majority districts. As shown in the top left panel, those who live in places with more than 68% minority population consistently prefer to run in districts with safer levels of co-ethnic population size. At the same time, the effects are null for those who live in places with smaller minority populations.[13]

This finding may suggest that prospective minority candidates are sensitive to the racial composition of their legislative districts only when they can use it to their electoral advantage. However, when they live in districts where the minority population is not an electoral advantage, they may look for other considerations, such as open seats or party recruitment, that are not captured in this study. However, recent studies find that minority candidates often have good chances of winning even in districts that are not majority-minority (Juenke, 2014; Juenke and Shah, 2015; Shah, 2014). Future research may examine incentive factors unique to the small but growing number of minority candidates

[12]The categorization evenly splits the total sample into three groups.
[13]The effects are null for all treatment factors for non-attendees.

Figure 5.2: Marginal Effects by Exposure to Co-ethnic Population



Note: Marginal effects of district attributes on willingness to run for office, separated by Census place minority population size in which respondents live (limited to attendees). Bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Solid points represent estimates that are statistically significant at the 5% level. The points without bars represent the reference category for each attribute. The standard errors are clustered by the respondent to account for the dependence of observations across respondents.

who decide to run for office in districts where co-ethnic voting is no longer reliable.

Figure 5.2 also reveals an interesting variation in estimates for the Co-ethnic Electoral Performance treatment factor: alums who live in cities with a high share of co-ethnic population *do not* prefer districts where there have already been many co-ethnic candidates successfully running and winning elections. This suggests that the alums expect other co-ethnic candidates to run for office in these elections, diluting racial voting across all co-ethnic candidates and thereby decreasing their electoral chances.

Second, I examine whether the observed effect on the Major Social Issue treatment varies by places where respondents live. On the one hand, racial discrimination may be a more prevalent issue in the minds of minorities when it is made salient via larger social

movements (Wallace, Zepeda-Millán and Jones-Correa, 2014). On the other hand, race-based discriminatory events may be felt more strongly in places where protests against racial violence are held for the first time as it signals to the minority members of the community the novel sense of support (Gillion, 2013).

To assess this, I re-estimate the AMCEs separately for respondents who live in places that held more than ten large-scale minority rights protests between 2020 and 2022 versus those who live in areas with fewer than ten protests.[14] The results are shown in Figure 5.3.

Figure 5.3: Marginal Effects by Salience of Civil Rights Protests



Note: Marginal effects of district attributes on willingness to run for office, separated by the presence of protests in which respondents live (limited to non-attendees). Bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Solid points represent estimates that are statistically significant at the 5% level. The points without bars represent the reference category for each attribute. The standard errors are clustered by the respondent to account for the dependence of observations across respondents.

I find that the marginal effect on the Major Social Issue treatment is largely driven by

[14]The protest data comes from ACLED US Crisis Monitor. I only consider protests relevant to minority rights (e.g., BLM, immigrant rights) participated by more than 100 people.

the non-alums who live in areas with fewer incidences of civil rights protests.[15] On average, among the non-alums who live in areas with less exposure to civil rights protests, they prefer to run for local elections in areas that have undergone racial violence as compared to school shootings by ten percentage points (s.e. = 0.045). The estimated effects are non-significant among non-alums living in places with frequent civil rights protests.

In the protest data set, places with fewer than ten protests include relatively small cities such as Columbus, IN (that had one protest against the ethnically-motivated attack of an Asian American woman in January 2023 and two protests supporting BLM in 2020) and Bentonville, AR (that had three protests supporting BLM in 2021). On the other hand, places with more than ten protests typically include large cities with sizable minority populations, including Los Angeles, CA, and Washington, DC.

The positive effects in areas with less exposure to civil rights protest are surprising: literature on social mobilization finds that minorities are more likely to engage in political participation where there is greater activism in the area because these areas already have resources in place to mobilize minorities effectively (e.g., Leighley, 2001). However, the results show the opposite evidence, wherein the racial threat effect is greater in areas with fewer incidences of protest. This finding suggests that the sharp *change* in the community-wide support for minority rights, rather than habitual support, may function as a greater motivation among minorities to take action. This logic is somewhat consistent with the politicized places hypothesis by Hopkins (2010), who find that the abrupt *change* in minority population, rather than *level*, is more predictive of immigration attitude among white voters.

[15] The effects are consistently null among alums.

5.4 Leakage in Pipeline: Descriptive Survey

The results from conjoint experiments shed light on factors that *encourage* minority individuals to enter the emergence process. But what are the factors that *discourage* them from doing so? In this section, I provide descriptive analyses that explore the source of leakage in the pipeline to power. First, I examine how socio-demographic characteristics correlate with one's political ambition. In particular, I run a simple linear probability model using both a program attendance indicator as well as an indicator of whether or not a respondent has run for office in the past as a function of respondent demographic characteristics, including gender, race/ethnicity, education level, and income level.

Figure 5.4 shows estimated coefficients of the four respondent demographic characteristics on attending a training program (red) as well as running for office conditional on attending the program (green). Consistent with the findings on the political ambition of women, female respondents are less likely to run for office even after attending the training program, despite the fact that the majority of the program attendees are female (Fox and Lawless, 2005; Lawless and Fox, 2010; Bernhard, Shames and Teele, 2021). Controlling for all other covariates, male alums are estimated to run for office at an average rate of 29 percentage points (s.e. = 0.08), whereas female alums are likely to run at a rate less than three percentage points (s.e. = 0.11) on average. I also observe income and education level to be correlated with both the attendance as well as run rate, which supports findings from prior studies that point to resource constraints among women and people of color (Reny and Shah, 2018; Bernhard, Shames and Teele, 2021).

Second, I examine respondents' self-reported sources of discouragement when considering running for office. As shown in Figure 5.5, when respondents were asked to report what discouraged them from running, a sizable share of respondents—both alums and non-alums— reported financial concerns (rows 3 and 7), indicating that fiscal burden

Figure 5.4: Predicted Attendance and Run Rate by Demographic Characteristics



Note: Points represent estimated predicted probability, and error bars represent 95% confidence interval built from heteroskedasticity-robust (HC2) standard errors. Solid points represent estimates that are statistically significant at the 5% significance level.

may depress candidate emergence among novices Bernhard, Shames and Teele (2021). This response also aligns with the conclusion drawn by Broockman et al. (2014) who find that party gatekeepers are primarily motivated to support candidates who are successful fundraisers.

Furthermore, racial discrimination (row 12) represents the non-trivial level of concern among respondents. Interestingly, those who have run for office in the past express these concerns more than those who have never run for office in the past, which may reflect the ex-runners' explicit experience with racial discrimination during campaigns. Alternatively, this finding may imply that racial discrimination is a "two-edged sword": it can lead to political apathy on the one hand and assertive political participation on the other (Reny and Shah, 2018). Future research may further investigate the conditions that determine whether discrimination enhances or hinders political participation among minorities.

Figure 5.5: Response to "Which of the following considerations discourage you to run for office the most?"



Note: Response to the source of discouragement for non-alums (red), alums who have not run for office (green), and ex-election runners (blue). Values in the plot represent shares of responses associated with each answer within each respondent group. Responses by non-alums are limited to those who expressed at least some interest in running for office in the future.

5.5 Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I examine how political ambition develops among racial minorities and uncover different factors that are at play at different stages of the emergence process. Through a conjoint survey of racial minorities with varying levels of political ambition, I find modest evidence of a shift in priority, from intrinsic to extrinsic, as individuals advance through the emergence process. The result shows that those with low levels of political ambition (those who have never attended a program nor have run for office in the past) prefer to run in districts that have experienced a surge in violence targeted towards co-ethnic groups. In contrast, in line with prior studies that point to strategic determinants of minority candidate emergence, I find that those with a high level of political

ambition (those who had undergone rigorous campaign training and/or had run for office) prefer to run in districts with substantial co-ethnic populations rather than districts that have undergone racial violence.

In exploring heterogeneous effects by geo-locating the survey respondents, I find that the positive effect among non-alums on the Major Social Issue treatment is primarily driven by those who live in small cities with less frequent minority rights protests, suggesting that minority residents may be more sensitive to the community-wide support for minority rights when it happens so rarely. Among alums, those living in cities with large co-ethnic populations tend to prefer districts with large co-ethnic population sizes, while they do not favor elections where they may have to compete with other co-ethnic candidates. Therefore, alums who are more serious about running strategically consider the district settings likely to give them higher chances of winning.

Lastly, in examining leakage in the pipeline to power, I validate general findings from previous studies on political ambition: 1) women tend to run for office at a lower rate than their male counterparts even after receiving a campaign training program, and 2) fiscal burden correlates with the degree to which minority individuals seek office.

6

Police Brutality and Minority Representation in Local Elections

The experimental results in Chapters 4 and 5 suggest that the motivations driving the decision to pursue political office vary across different stages of the emergence process: intrinsic motivation holds greater sway in initiating the early stages of political ambition while extrinsic factors tend to assume greater significance on expressive ambition. In this section, I move beyond the experimental sample to examine how different motivating factors play out in real-world elections. Specifically, I leverage the city-level exposure to

police brutality—the intrinsic appeal with the greatest impact on the initial stage—and investigate its effect on minority candidate supply in local elections.

Police brutality has been demonstrated to have a significant impact on mass political participation, particularly among Blacks (Pierce and Carey Jr, 1971; Lawless and Fox, 2001; Branton, 2009; Williamson, Trump and Einstein, 2018; Walker, 2020; Morris and Shoub, 2024). Police killings often ignite protests at both local and national levels as well as political movements pushing for reform, such as Black Lives Matter and #DefundThePolice (Williamson, Trump and Einstein, 2018). Police brutality not only generates mass-level movement but also shifts public opinion (Reny and Newman, 2021), changes political interest (Burch, 2011), and increases turnout (Morris and Shoub, 2024). These findings collectively suggest that police brutality is an event that resonates with the community and serves as a catalyst for increased political participation among affected minority groups.

The prior findings that police brutality increases political participation among Blacks also align with the experimental evidence discussed in Chapter 4, which finds that a recruitment message emphasizing shared experiences of racial discrimination yields the largest impact on the early cultivation of political ambition. In Chapter 3, although I did not find positive effects on police brutality in the conjoint experiment, I find positive effect of street shooting on both perceived electoral viability and electoral district preference among politically ambitious Black respondents.

The real-world consequences of fatal police shootings of unarmed citizens extend far beyond what can be captured in an experimental setting. Even as personal experiences with such incidents might inspire individuals to consider a political career, embarking on the path to candidacy demands a substantial investment of time and resources, challenging the notion that intrinsic motivation alone can push minority individuals through the entire emergence process. Meanwhile, incidents such as police brutality, especially

when they are made salient, may open up new opportunities as they often bring structural changes to the electoral environment, including a spike in minority voter turnout, resignation of incumbents that leads to open seats, increased involvement of parties and other political organization, and social movement that reshapes policy priorities in local politics. To dissect this complex phenomenon, I analyze individual cases of prominent police brutality incidents and explore how politicized racial identification affects the supply of minority candidates—i.e., expressive political ambition.

6.1 Data and Method

To examine the change in racial composition of electoral candidates, I use the candidate-level local election database compiled by de Benedictis-Kessner et al. (2023) that contains results of over 17,000 city council elections in 481 cities over the past two decades, as shown in Figure 6.1. The database provides information on candidate race/ethnicity, which allows me to calculate the share of ethnic candidates in a given election. As discussed above, because police brutality disproportionately affects Black citizens, I focus on Black candidates. Specifically, I collapse the data to the city-election year level and use the share of Black candidates in each election year as an outcome measure.

To compare the candidate racial composition between cities that have undergone police killings (treated) and cities that did not (control), I must first identify a set of salient police killings to use as a treatment. To do so, I first collect a complete list of police brutality incidents in 2014-5 that have prompted protests and received nationwide attention.[1] I focus on police deaths that happened in this time period because they represent years when police brutality issues and the movement that followed suit became nationally salient again in the U.S. since the 1990s: the hashtag #BlackLivesMatter appeared on Twitter for the first time in July 2014 with national coverage on police killings occurring immediately after (Anderson, 2016). The saliency of the event is important to identify the

[1] I rely on a list of controversial police encounter fact sheet by CNN Editorial Research (2023).

Figure 6.1: Cities Included in the Election Data



Note: Municipalities included in the analysis. Colors represent total number of available years included in the data. Size of circles represents population size.

impact on minority candidacy (Hopkins, 2010; Morris and Shoub, 2024). The death of a co-racial citizen by police may only catch local residents' attention when it is made salient to them. In other words, police brutality might not be seen as having political ramifications unless a salient frame helps people "define what the problem is and how to think about it" (Kinder, 1998, 170).[2]

The collection resulted in six unique police killings that happened in 2014-5: Eric Gar-

[2]It is important to note that the control units in this analysis do not necessarily entail that fatal police shooting never happened in these localities. According to a detailed record of police shooting collected by Fatal Encounters, there were over 180 police shootings of Black citizens in 2015. The cities are considered "treated" when they have experienced fatal police shootings *and* such incident was made salient.

ner in New York (2014), Freddie Gray in Baltimore (2015), Laquan McDonald in Chicago (2014), Michael Brown in Ferguson (2014), Tamir Rice in Cleveland (2014), and Walter Scott in North Charleston (2015). While all these casualties ignited protests, the degree to which they grabbed nationwide attention varies greatly. Therefore, I used Google Search Trends to estimate which of these events were most salient during the year of the incident. Figure 6.2 shows the Google search result, which displays the level of search frequencies of each of the six victim names relative to the search term "France."[3]

Figure 6.2: Google Search Trend of Police Brutality Victim Names



Three incidents stand out: Eric Garner, Freddie Gray, and Michael Brown. The other three received little to no search interest compared to these victim names. Therefore, I use the three most frequently searched police brutality incidents as a treatment to estimate each of its effects on Black representation on candidate supply.[4]

[3]Google Trend only returns results based on relative frequencies. Therefore, normalizing search volumes of terms against a stable keyword such as "France" or "Google" has become a common practice in academic research (e.g., Curme et al., 2014; Nghiem et al., 2016; Huang, Rojas and Convery, 2020).

[4]I provide the result of Tamir Rice in Figure E.3 in Appendix E.3, which shows no effect on the share of Black candidates in subsequent municipal elections. The effects of Laquan McDonald and Walter Scott were not estimated due to a lack of observations in those cities in the data set.

The three treated units are, therefore, municipalities that have experienced the police killings of Garner, Gray, and Brown—New York City, NY; Baltimore, MD; and Ferguson, MO. I run three separate analyses, examining the change in the share of Black candidates running in city council elections in a given treated unit compared to the change in the share of Black candidates in control units. Because the treatment in these analyses comprises a single unit (e.g., Ferguson, MO), a standard difference-in-difference (DID) approach is untenable. Instead, I use a generalized synthetic control (GSC) method developed by (Xu, 2017) that extends the synthetic control method (Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller, 2010), of which DID is a special case. Specifically, the method imputes counterfactuals for the "treated unit using control group information based on a linear interactive fixed effects model that incorporates unit-specific intercepts interacted with time-varying coefficients" (57). I provide a detailed discussion of the GSC estimator and its estimation procedure in Appendix E.1.

The primary quantity of interest is the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) at period t after the treatment. For example, the estimand in the case of Michael Brown is the change in the share of Black city councilors in Ferguson in elections held t years after the death of Michael Brown (2014) relative to the change in counterfactual municipal elections during the same periods. The GSC estimator for ATT is given by the difference between the actual outcome—which is observed for treated units in post-treatment periods—and its estimated counterfactual—which is imputed based on a linear interactive fixed effects model. To construct the counterfactual outcome for the control units, I use city-year level covariates, including population density, share of Black residents, share of White residents, share of residents with Bachelor's degree, share of urban residents, share of residents older than 65, unemployment rate, median household income, Democratic party vote share in presidential elections, and number of deaths by police, as well as share of Black candidates in municipal elections up to 10 election years prior to the treatment for the interactive fixed effects model. This method allows me to compare cities

that did and did not experience the police killings but are otherwise similar in terms of city-level characteristics and the share of Black candidates in municipal elections before the event.

6.2 Result I: Effects of Brown, Garner, and Gray

Figure 6.3 shows the estimated ATT for each post-treatment period for the three salient police killing incidents. In each plot, the vertical line represents the beginning of the treatment period (e.g., 2014 for the case of Michael Brown); hence, the estimated ATT for each year is shown to the right of the vertical line, with the overall estimated ATT (and the 95% confidence intervals) reported on the top left corner.

Figure 6.3: Estimated Effects of Individual Police Brutality Related Deaths



Note: Estimated average treatment effect of salient police brutality incidences on % Black candidates in local elections in subsequent years. The solid black line represents the estimated average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), and the gray bands represent a 95% confidence interval. Estimated ATT across all post-treatment periods and its 95% confidence intervals are reported on the top left corner of each panel. See Appendix E.2 for full estimation results.

Starting with the case of Michael Brown, I find that the share of Black candidates in the Ferguson municipal election increased by 33 percentage points on average (95% CI: [0.17, 0.48]). This is a substantial increase in Black representation. Given that the total number of candidates running in local elections is about five on average, the 33

percentage point increase represents a shift of Black candidates from being the minority group (one out of five) to the majority (three out of five). This effect appears to be quite immediate. In the first year after the treatment, the effect is quite large—an increase of 31 percentage points (95% CI: [0.06, 0.56]).

This closely reflects the reality wherein a substantial number of Black candidates ran for city council positions immediately after the death of Michael Brown. In particular, prior to the incident, only three Black candidates had run, and only two have ever actually served in the city council since the city was incorporated 120 years ago (Healy and Eligon, 2015). However, in 2015, four out of eight candidates running for city council positions were Black. Ward 3, a predominantly black part of the city that includes a neighborhood where Michael Brown was shot, was guaranteed to have a Black representative as both candidates, Wesley Bell and Lee Smith, were African-American. The two other Black candidates were Adrienne J. Hawkins and Ella M. Jones, both vied for a seat in Ward 1.

The results also show a gradual increase in Black representation over the span of five years, with a peak in the fourth year after the treatment. Indeed, the data shows that four out of five total candidates running for city council in 2018 were Black. The effect persists through five years after the treatment, which is the year when Lesley McSpadden, Michael Brown's mother, ran for Ward 3 against Fran Griffin, who is also Black (Hidalgo, 2019).

The substantial long-term effect provides several important implications. First, it represents the time and resources required to file for candidacy, especially for political amateurs. Both Lesley McSpadden and Fran Griffin had no prior experiences in politics (Griffin attended a town hall meeting for the first time after Michael Brown's death). In contrast, most of the Black candidates running immediately after the event had a profile of a prototypical political candidate: Wesley Bell was a lawyer and a municipal judge, Ella Jones was a member of the city's Human Rights Commission, and Adrienne Hawkins was

a federal employee and a longtime Ferguson resident (Rosenbaum and Mannies, 2015).

Second, it represents increased political opportunities among Black prospective candidates due to political structures such as term limits and career ladders. Wesley Bell ran for the county Prosecuting Attorney after four years of serving in the city council. Ella Jones, who won the seat in Ward 1 in 2015, ran for Mayor in 2019 when the incumbent, James Knowles III, could not seek re-election due to term limits (CBS News, 2020).[5] This observation suggests that the long-term effects of police brutality may be a function of both intrinsic motivation to serve the group interest as well as a strategic consideration of when to enter the race.

The results are similar in the case of Freddie Gray. The death of Freddie Gray resulted in an increase of the share of Black candidates in Baltimore city council elections by almost 80 percentage points (95% CI: 0.55, 1.04), the effect that is consistently large over five years after the treatment. Baltimore has 14 council districts, with typically two to three candidates running in each district, and has had a relatively high number of Black candidates running in local elections even before the death of Freddie Gray as compared to other cities that are majority Black. In the 2004 election, 15 out of 36 candidates were Black. However, given that 62% of the city was Black, the share of Black candidates was still well below the representational parity. This representation gap reduced substantially in the first municipal election after the event in 2016; 21 out of 37 candidates were Black, and in the 2020 elections—five years after the event—15 out of 27 candidates were Black.[6]

The temporal political structure pattern that gave rise to Black candidates in Baltimore is also similar to that of Ferguson. In the 2016 election, many candidates were from political backgrounds, including Old Goucher Community Association President Kelly Cross and Black Lives Matter activist DeRay Mckesson (Shen, 2016). In 2020, five

[5] Ella Jones ran for Mayor against James Knowles III in 2017 and lost.

[6] However, I find that the substantial increase is largely due to the negative counterfactual outcomes (see Figure E.1 in Appendix E.3. If we cap the minimum outcome value to zero (i.e., no Black candidates in a given election), the estimated ATT would be around 50 percentage points.

incumbents retired or ran for a different office, including Brandon Scott, the city council president who ran for Mayor in that year, leaving an unusual number of open seats for city council positions (Leckrone, 2020).

In contrast, I do not find any evidence that the death of Eric Garner influenced the emergence of Black candidates in New York City. The estimated ATT drops to negative for up to four years since the treatment, although it shows a significant increase in the fifth year. Note that the substantial variation in the pre-treatment period, which indicates that the matching along the included covariates failed to create an accurate synthetic counterfactual. Therefore the post-treatment estimates found here is not internally valid and should be viewed with extreme caution. I provide conjecture on why the case of Eric Garner may have generated a weak identification. First, New York City is much more ethnically diverse than other metropolitan cities. In fact, unlike Ferguson and Baltimore, where the candidates are mainly comprised of Black and non-Hispanic whites, New York City elections invite Hispanic candidates as many as Black candidates, and, in certain districts (e.g., Queens), the majority of candidates are Asians. This diversity may have depressed the effect that was intended to isolate the effect among Blacks.

Second, the city is much more geographically spread out, with a total of 51 city council districts. In contrast, the saliency of the issue may be mainly concentrated in Staten Island, where the incident occurred. Nevertheless, when I re-define the treated units to be the three council districts in Staten Island rather than the entire districts in New York City, I observe a positive but non-significant treatment effect on the share of Black candidates (see Figure E.3 in Appendix E.3).

Third, New York City Council members were much more active in the movement and swiftly took action toward police reforms immediately after the event. The members collectively blocked traffic to facilitate protests, held an oversight hearing, released a public statement, and proposed a bill criminalizing banned police chokeholds soon after

the incident (Lemire, 2014; Jorgensen, 2014; Goodman, 2015). Unlike in other cities where the incumbents were blamed for the casualty and their handling of the aftermath, the incumbents in New York City Council were praised for their prompt responses.[7] Furthermore, much of the public focus was paid to the special election in 2015 held in order to fill the seat vacated by Congressman Michael Grimm, whose district included Staten Island (Bergin, 2015).

6.3 Result II: Aggregate Effects of Police Brutality

The results from the three individual cases provide suggestive evidence that the death of co-Black citizens by a police officer spurs political candidacy among Blacks. However, results from a particular incident cannot provide an externally valid conclusion about the effect of police brutality on Black representation. Therefore, to estimate an effect that is more generalizable across cities with different district settings, I re-define treated units as a set of cities that have experienced police brutalities in the past and re-estimate the ATT. Specifically, I consider the period after which a city was first exposed to at least three police brutality-related deaths in a given year as treated and compare the change in the share of Black candidates in subsequent elections against the change in Black candidates in counterfactual cities.[8]

The results are shown in Figure 6.4. The overall estimated ATT across seven years after the treatment shows a significant increase of Black candidates by six percentage points (95% CI: [0.01, 0.10]). While this effect in magnitude is much smaller as compared to the case of Michael Brown or Freddie Gray, the positive effect suggests that, across cities with varying district and demographic characteristics, deaths of co-Black citizens

[7] In fact, Baltimore mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake dropped re-election bid after much criticism since Freddie Gray's death (Schleifer, 2015; Stolberg, 2015).

[8] See Figure E.2 for the list of treated units and their treatment periods. I use three counts of police brutality-related deaths in order to capture the saliency of the incidents. Nevertheless, in Appendix E.3, I show the results based on defining treated units as experiencing at least one death as well as at least five deaths (see Figure E.4). Police brutality data is obtained from Fatal Encounters.

do exert influence, on average, on the degree to which Black residents decide to run for office. Furthermore, the gradual increase in the estimated ATT is consistent with those found in the individual cases, suggesting that the rise of both political novices as well as those well-versed in politics jointly emerged several years after the incident.

Figure 6.4: Estimated Effects of Police Brutality Related Deaths Across U.S. Cities



Note: Estimated average treatment effect of BLM protests across U.S. cities on % Black candidates in local elections in subsequent years. The solid black line represents the estimated average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), and the gray bands represent a 95% confidence interval. Estimated ATT across all post-treatment periods and its 95% confidence intervals are reported on the top left corner of each panel. See Appendix E.2 for full estimation results.

In sum, the results provide suggestive evidence that police brutality-related deaths have a positive relationship with the rate at which Black candidates emerge in subsequent municipal elections. However, caution is warranted in interpreting the result as conclusive. First, the GSC estimator relies on the strict exogeneity assumption that the "error term of any unit at any time period is independent of treatment assignment, observed covariates, and unobserved cross-sectional and temporal heterogeneities of all units at all periods" (Xu, 2017, 61-2). This assumption is likely violated as I do not account for all

covariates that can potentially differentiate the temporal heterogeneities between treated and control localities. For example, cities that experience police deaths may be a function of the racial identity of police officers themselves—a factor I cannot observe. Similarly, electoral settings such as term limits, candidate qualification, structures of local government, and political party involvement with candidate recruitment may systematically differ in cities where police brutality is a major social issue. It may also be the case that cities that underwent police shootings may have undertaken a drastic police reform; hence, the observed effects may be a product of the policy change that only happens in treated cities. These potential violations are also suggested in the estimated effects in both Figures 6.3 and 6.4, where the estimated ATT (which should theoretically be null) are significant and non-zero in some pre-treatment periods.

Furthermore, the reliance on saliency means that I cannot fully isolate the intrinsic motives that give rise to Black candidacy from the strategic ones. As discussed in the case of Michael Brown, many of the candidates who ran for city council immediately after Michael Brown's death were already well-versed in politics. To them, the death of co-Black citizens and the movement that followed suit may have meant higher expected turnout among Blacks and, as a result, higher chances of electoral success among Black candidates.[9] Thus, they may have strategically chosen to enter the political race at the opportune time to maximize their winning chances.

Nevertheless, it would be remiss to overlook the enduring and escalating impact of police brutality in the years following the intervention. Equally significant is the emergence of political newcomers such as Lesley McSpadden and Fran Griffin, whose aspirations for public office stem from personal experiences with racially charged incidents. Furthermore, strategic and intrinsic benefits of running may not be mutually exclusive—

[9]Indeed, the turnout among Black residents increased markedly in the first election following the civil unrest in Ferguson and Baltimore: about 30% of the city's registered voters cast ballots in Ferguson's local election in 2015—more than double the typical turnout (Desmond-Harris, 2015). Similarly, in Baltimore, the number of voters in the 2016 Mayoral election exceeded "even the primary election that led to America's first Black president" (Woods, 2016).

events like the police killings of co-racial citizens spark racial consciousness among the Black community, which in turn may influence their decision to run for office, and they hope to do so when the time is right. What I observe from the observational analyses, therefore, is a confluence of intrinsic motivation to advocate for their racial communities and extrinsic considerations regarding the optimal timing for electoral candidacy.

6.4 Concluding Remarks

This chapter examines the effect of police brutality on the supply of minority candidates in local elections, specifically focusing on how incidents of police brutality impact Black political representation. Leveraging city-level exposure to high-profile cases of police brutality as a form of intrinsic motivation, the study investigates its influence on the emergence of minority candidates. The findings reveal a significant increase in Black candidate representation in local elections following the deaths of Michael Brown and Freddie Gray, respectively. Additionally, an aggregate analysis across U.S. cities suggests a modest increase in Black candidates' representation in local elections following police brutality incidents, supporting the idea that such events serve as a catalyst for political participation among Black Americans. These findings suggest that the increase in candidacy can be attributed to a heightened sense of racial consciousness, motivating political newcomers, as well as to strategic timing exploited by seasoned politicians—highlighting the intricate interplay between intrinsic motivations and strategic considerations in the decision to pursue public office.

7

Conclusion

Over the last five decades, the racial and ethnic makeup of elected officials in the United States has undergone a significant transformation, with a notable increase in Black, Latino, and Asian representatives. About a quarter of voting members of the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate are racial minorities, making the 117th Congress the "most racially and ethnically diverse in history" (Schaeffer, 2021). Moreover, while the first Black mayor of a major city was only elected in 1967, today there are at least 500 Black and 300 Latino mayors, demonstrating that minority candidates are securing electoral victories in a growing number of locales (Shah, 2014; Kurt, 2022).

However, we continue to see a dearth of descriptive representation in U.S. politics. Despite the increased diversity in government offices, the U.S. has also witnessed tremendous growth in racial and ethnic minority populations. This is especially true of urban cities where the non-white population is often the majority, yet such diversity is not reflected in local government offices. Therefore, the gains in representation are offset by the rapidly changing population in the United States, reflecting the continued underrepresentation of racial and ethnic minorities in the political process.

What drives this representational gap? Much of the literature attributes the low level of descriptive representation to the *demand side*, focusing primarily on voter attitudes and behaviors among Black and white communities and their impact on minority office-holding (Cameron, Epstein and O'halloran, 1996; Canon, 1999*b*). However, with limited exceptions, there has been scant attention to the *supply side* of representation: how often is the lack of minority representation due to the absence of minority candidates in the first place?

My dissertation sheds light on the supply side of minority representation in American politics: What motivates them to participate in politics not simply as politically minded voters but as elites actively participating in the policymaking process? I answer this question by studying the entire emergence process, from the initial consideration of public office jobs to the final step of candidacy filing. I apply a diverse set of methods to examine how minority individuals develop political ambition and how they sustain their ambition through their political journey. The research reveals that intrinsic motivations, such as a desire to bring about social change, play a critical role in the initial decision to consider a political career, especially among those without prior political ambition. Furthermore, exploring how these motivations interact with strategic considerations such as district demographics and political opportunity structures, I uncover the nuanced interplay of intrinsic and extrinsic factors as minority individuals progress through their

political journey. Overall, this dissertation challenges the traditional notion that views minority candidates solely as strategic election seekers and unveils the multifaceted process through which minority candidates come to the forefront of political candidacy.

Broadly, findings from this research show how personal experiences can fuel individuals to participate in politics—a phenomenon observable across various electoral and governmental contexts in the United States. After the mass shooting at a high school in Parkland, Florida, parents of students who were killed during the incident ran for the school board (Mazzei, 2018). A handful of individuals who were at the Capitol on January 6th, 2021 vied for seats in Congress afterward, including rioters Derrick Van Orden and J.R. Majewski who stormed the Capitol as well as an officer Harry Dunn who defended the Capitol (Edmondson, 2022; Broadwater, 2024). Inspired by her own experience of giving birth while in office, Representative Anna Paulina Luna (FL-R) broke with her party to support proxy voting for female members of Congress for six weeks after giving birth (Karni, 2024). Simply put, in the words of President Joe Biden, "all politics is personal."[1] The empirical findings presented here identify what the personal experiences are that are commonly shared among racial minorities.

The findings of this research also carry real-world implications. Organizations that recruit and train ordinary minority voters to run for office—e.g., APAICS for Asian Americans, Voto Latino for Latinos, Higher Heights for African American women, and Catalyst PAC for Republican of color—are growing in terms of both numbers and influence. The results of this study suggest the need for a more targeted approach to candidate mobilization: for minority individuals who have not previously considered running for office, a recruitment strategy that appeals to their intrinsic motivations may be more effective. On the other hand, for those minorities with a stronger political drive, offering concrete resources such as electoral tactics and information on a district profile could be more beneficial. Understanding these distinctions is crucial for facilitating a seamless transition

[1]From an interview with Conan O'Brien at Conan O'Brien Needs a Friend aired in December, 2023.

from being voters to becoming politicians.

7.1 Future Research

The findings from this research offer just an initial glimpse into the complex landscape of minority representation, yet they lay the groundwork for an exciting new avenue of research on racial politics. First, this project highlights the significance of racial identity in political decision-making, but it also acknowledges that race is just one of many dimensions individuals rely on to form political beliefs. Namely, gender has been identified as a significant predictor of political ambition (e.g., Fox and Lawless, 2005; Lawless and Fox, 2010; Crowder-Meyer, 2013; Bernhard, Shames and Teele, 2021). Historically, these two dimensions of identity have been examined in isolation, treating each as independent and unrelated. However, an approach that considers *only* racial or *only* gender dynamics can obscure the nuanced factors that influence candidacy and electoral success. An intersectional perspective can reveal how "race-gendered" groups, such as Latinas and Asian American men, navigate the electoral sphere in ways that are both similar and distinct from their counterparts (Phillips, 2021). Future research should delve into how race and gender interact to both limit and enable electoral opportunities across diverse sexual and racial identities.

Second, the development of political ambition may vary not only between, but also within, minority groups. Studies have shown that Asian Americans and Hispanics are far from monolithic, and their social experiences and political predispositions differ substantially from that of African Americans (Darity, Dietrich and Hamilton, 2005; Masuoka, 2006). This variability underscores the need for theories that are tailored to specific minority groups (Lee, 2008; McClain et al., 2009). Unfortunately, the field experiment discussed in Chapter 4 did not explore the varied effects across different racial groups, nor did it tailor the racial violence treatment narratives to each group. Future research should aim to address these limitations.

Third, the empirical studies presented here stop at the point when minorities decide to run for office, leaving many questions unanswered about the campaign process and their tenure in office. One exciting line of future research is the influence of minority candidates on the policy platforms of their white competitors. Could the mere presence of a minority candidate alter the strategic policy positioning of white candidates? Evidence suggesting that minorities on a ballot can sufficiently influence the policymaking process even when they do not win can potentially reshape the way we think about substantive representation.

Furthermore, understanding how minority candidates leverage their racial identity during campaigns offers another rich vein of inquiry. As exemplified by Marco Rubio and Ted Cruz, whose approach to their Hispanic identity has been far from identical (Alvarez and Fernandez, 2015), minority candidates choose to either accentuate their racial identity or de-racialize themselves during campaigns (Stephens-Dougan, 2020). It is also the case that the degree to which minorities can manipulate their identity during campaigns is a function of both ascribed and prescribed identity (Huddy, 2001). Examining these various dimensions of identity and how they interact with the way political candidates communicate with their voters can provide a comprehensive understanding of the role race plays in the electoral environment.

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A

Replication Analyses

The dynamics of political engagement are far from monolithic. Although certain factors may play a common role in determining candidate emergence regardless of individual demographic characteristics, distinct motivations may exist that set racial minorities apart from their white counterparts in their decision to pursue political office. As an extension of the general public survey outlined in Chapter 3, I illustrate how the influence of commonly studied factors on individuals' political ambitions may differ across various racial and ethnic groups by re-analyzing two seminal empirical research: Bernhard, Shames and Teele (2021) and Crowder-Meyer (2020).

A.1 BERNHARD, SHAMES, AND TEELE (2021)

Bernhard, Shames and Teele (2021) surveyed over 700 alumnae of Emerge, a national organization that trains Democratic women to run for office, to examine obstacles to women's candidacies. Although the original authors were interested in the gender dynamic, the variation in responses across women of different racial backgrounds provides valuable insight into how the decision-making process differs between non-Hispanic whites and racial minorities even when they share similar professional experiences.

In response to an open-ended question, "Why did you decide to seek office?"[1], it was clear how much racial identity mattered in cultivating political ambition among minorities: over one-fifth of the minority respondents expressed their will to represent the people of their race, whereas only over one-tenth of them mentioned the need for female representation. This contrast is striking, considering that these are participants of a women-only training program, in which their gender-based membership was made salient throughout the survey. For a more direct comparison, Table A.1 provides an example of responses by minority respondents (left column) against responses by *counterfactual* white respondents (right). I use propensity score matching to match each minority respondent with a white respondent based on socioeconomic characteristics such as age, family status, income, and state residency. I then compare the open-ended answers by minority respondents against similarly situated white respondents to assess the differences in responses as a function of racial backgrounds.

When minority respondents emphasize their racial or immigrant backgrounds, white respondents tend to emphasize other dimensions of social identity. For example, when a minority respondent emphasizes a lack of representation for people of their racial back-

[1]This question was answered by roughly 420 alumnae who have either run or been appointed to an office in the past, 33% of whom are women of color.

Table A.1: Comparisons of Office-Seeking Incentives

Why did you decide to seek office?

Minority Response	**Matched non-Hispanic White Response**
"I didn't see too many people who looked like me (Asian American female) in public office and felt like I could contribute a different perspective in policymaking decisions..."	"Public service is the best way to serve. You can do the most good for the most people. I believe strongly that women need to serve in elected office so that decisions made in government address the needs and concerns of children and families."
"I sought to run because I felt a need to represent the diverse community I live in."	"To make change for our community."
"I love serving my community. It is a value instilled in me by my mother who was eternally grateful for having the ability to immigrate to the United States."	"Care about having the perspective of young working mothers in our policy making arenas."
"As a Latina Mom Immigration Attorney Wife Advocate, I have a lot to contribute to our Country ... My voice is important for Immigrants and Latinos..."	"Rather than constantly writing, emailing, calling and visiting my state center and not having him respond in a positive way, I will run against him and seek to truly listen to and respond to my constituents..."
"I wanted to be a voice for minorities and educate others on Native American issues."	"I wasn't satisfied with the names being tossed around for the Democratic nominee...I wanted someone better...someone who was not a 50 something white male..."

Note: Comparison of responses between non-White (left) and white (right) respondents. The nearest neighbor matching method is used to match white respondents to non-white respondents. A propensity score is estimated with logistic regression.

ground, a counterfactual white respondent often brings up their gender identity in explaining why they decided to seek office (rows 1 and 5). Moreover, even when a pair similarly states a generic interest in serving her community, a minority respondent adds values to the diversity of her community, while the counterfactual white respondent does not (row 2).

Furthermore, the original authors argue that financial pressure reduces women's willingness to run. To support this claim, the authors measured to what extent the respondents feared loss of income when considering running. These responses were then used as a main independent variable in a set of OLS regressions predicting whether or not a respondent has sought office in the past, where each regression iteratively includes additional covariates. The authors find a strong negative correlation between fear of lost income and women filing for candidacy, concluding that financial responsibility constrains women's candidacies.

However, once the analyses are broken out by the minority status, I find that these

Figure A.1: Main Analysis of Bernhard, Shames and Teele (2021) Broken out by Race



Note: OLS regression analyses in Figure 5 of Bernhard, Shames and Teele (2021), separately for white and non-white respondents. The plots show estimated coefficients predicting the probability of running using household contribution (left), fear of lost income (center), and fear of racial discrimination (right) as primary predictors. Successive rows show how the correlations change as more controls are added cumulatively. Solid dots represent statistically significant estimates at the 5% significance level.

correlations are driven entirely by white respondents. As shown in the left panel of Figure A.1, white respondents' fear of losing income while campaigning predicts a significantly lower likelihood of running across all models. However, this is not true for non-white respondents. Instead, what seems to drive minorities' decisions is concerns with racial bias, which has a *positive* correlation with running for office. As shown in the right panel, between two similarly situated non-white respondents, one who expressed concern over racial discrimination is more likely to run for office than one who did not. This positive relationship is striking, implying that racial discrimination could potentially be a motivating, rather than discouraging, factor in minorities' decision to run.

These descriptive findings provide valuable insight into the interplay between racial identity and entry decisions among minorities: not only do their racial backgrounds play an essential role in generating political ambition, but also do their experiences with discrimination potentially serve as an incentive to seek public office.

A.2 CROWDER-MEYER (2020)

Crowder-Meyer (2020) surveyed 1,240 American voters to explore the development of political ambition among ordinary women and men. Unlike studies focusing on elite groups, Crowder's findings reveal distinct factors influencing the political aspirations of men and women within the general population. Notably, the study demonstrates that ordinary women's ambition is largely influenced by support from personal and political networks who can help them navigate the challenges of candidacy. Conversely, men's ambition is less reliant on external encouragement but correlates more strongly with educational attainment, political engagement, and marital status.

Fortunately, the Political Ambition survey conducted by Crowder-Meyer (2020) oversampled racial and ethnic minority Americans, with the respondent racial breakdown shown in Figure A.2. This allows me to replicate the author's primary analyses and evaluate heterogeneous effects by respondent race.

Figure A.2: Racial Composition of Respondents in Political Ambition Survey



The author runs a logistic regression predicting the political ambition of respondents

separately for individuals with a graduate degree (a proxy for elite ambition) and with up to college degrees (a proxy for ordinary ambition). I replicate the author's analyses in Table A.2 columns (4) and (7). In comparing the regression results separately for the two groups, the authors make several observations (Crowder-Meyer, 2020):

- "[A] woman is negatively related to political ambition among the ordinary respondents in my sample, this relationship is not statistically significant among my elite respondents" (370).
- "[E]ncouragement from others and family circumstances affect mass and elite political ambition differently....members of the public are more likely to rely on the encouragement of those with whom they more regularly interact—personal sources like their friends, family, and coworkers..." (371).
- "I find that ambition among the American public is substantially positively related to being married" (370).

In order to investigate how results differ between non-Hispanic white and racial minority individuals, I re-run the author's original model separately for white and non-white respondents. The first three columns of Table A.2 aggregate respondents across all education levels. Columns (5) and (6) re-run the author's model limited to the American public sample, separately for white and non-white. Similarly, columns (8) and (9) re-run the author's model limited to the elite sample.

In terms of gender, I find consistent effects that women tend to have lower levels of political ambition than men among the mass sample *regardless* of race. I also find a similar relationship between marital status and political ambition between the two groups: being married positively correlates with political ambition among the mass sample.

However, several predictions starkly differ between the two racial groups. First, I find that the positive effect of encouragement from personal sources is entirely driven by

Table A.2: Table 2 of Crowder-Meyer (2020) Broken out by Race

	All Education Level			"American Public Sample" 4 Year College or Less			"Elite Sample" Graduate Degree		
	All	White	Non-White	All	White	Non-White	All	White	Non-White
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Female	−2.463***	−2.523***	−2.963***	−2.648***	−2.749***	−3.173***	−1.668	57.805	−4.222
	(0.618)	(0.854)	(1.028)	(0.669)	(0.911)	(1.157)	(2.587)	(166,807.500)	(3.565)
Self-perceived qualification to hold office	0.490***	0.710***	0.138	0.450***	0.657***	0.018	0.898	25.478	0.066
	(0.127)	(0.168)	(0.233)	(0.141)	(0.177)	(0.288)	(0.550)	(27,308.220)	(0.836)
Qualifications × Female	0.819***	0.753**	1.113***	0.970***	0.945***	1.316***	0.025	−38.528	1.687
	(0.232)	(0.331)	(0.382)	(0.260)	(0.367)	(0.450)	(0.888)	(92,839.510)	(1.287)
Encouragement from political sources	0.459	−1.124	7.397***	−0.298	−1.455	8.131***	5.000	34.068	4.660
	(0.868)	(1.088)	(2.294)	(0.926)	(1.151)	(2.773)	(5.379)	(692,864.700)	(5.192)
Encouragement from personal sources	2.247***	1.197	4.934***	2.709***	1.334	7.319***	4.090*	353.104	−0.227
	(0.575)	(0.760)	(1.182)	(0.655)	(0.849)	(1.561)	(2.355)	(170,097.800)	(4.433)
Political participation	1.643***	2.661***	1.143	2.092***	2.828***	1.698	1.534	8.153	2.409
	(0.547)	(0.805)	(0.950)	(0.608)	(0.888)	(1.071)	(1.790)	(95,524.690)	(3.090)
Community participation	0.819**	1.538***	0.185	0.984**	1.491**	0.603	0.721	36.596	2.267
	(0.380)	(0.541)	(0.693)	(0.426)	(0.594)	(0.804)	(1.342)	(117,033.600)	(1.937)
Political knowledge	1.036***	1.083*	1.115*	1.052**	0.961	2.181***	0.984	15.944	1.783
	(0.398)	(0.578)	(0.638)	(0.430)	(0.591)	(0.840)	(1.389)	(86,447.140)	(2.486)
Political efficacy	−0.115	−0.926***	0.937**	0.004	−0.928**	1.419***	−0.436	−3.961	−1.188
	(0.229)	(0.330)	(0.385)	(0.257)	(0.361)	(0.472)	(0.839)	(37,736.950)	(1.519)
Married	0.877***	1.141***	0.438	1.013***	0.939**	1.490**	−0.562	12.191	−0.674
	(0.263)	(0.359)	(0.457)	(0.292)	(0.377)	(0.594)	(0.922)	(47,714.670)	(1.718)
Has child	−0.164	−0.166	0.270	−0.453	−0.474	0.146	3.554***	172.784	2.897
	(0.262)	(0.344)	(0.468)	(0.288)	(0.368)	(0.541)	(1.339)	(107,773.800)	(1.821)
Age	−0.009	−0.011	−0.004	−0.006	−0.0002	−0.019	−0.055*	−4.522	0.001
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.020)	(0.029)	(2,224.207)	(0.039)
Education	0.138*	0.110	0.251*	0.296***	0.190	0.652***			
	(0.077)	(0.109)	(0.139)	(0.093)	(0.127)	(0.204)			
Income	−0.048	−0.134**	0.051	−0.080*	−0.121*	−0.139	0.030	15.761	0.016
	(0.040)	(0.057)	(0.075)	(0.046)	(0.062)	(0.099)	(0.185)	(13,397.060)	(0.296)
Black	−0.548		−12.767	−0.744*		−10.536	−0.816		−0.918
	(0.351)		(1,061.919)	(0.410)		(1,061.920)	(1.075)		(1.522)
Hispanic	0.798**		−11.155	0.804**		−8.530	1.384		2.682
	(0.344)		(1,061.919)	(0.366)		(1,061.920)	(1.724)		(2.373)
Asian or Pacific Islander	−0.137		−12.547	−0.161		−10.294	−0.186		−1.136
	(0.453)		(1,061.919)	(0.552)		(1,061.920)	(1.081)		(1.616)
Multiracial or other race	−0.402		−12.565	−0.417		−10.401	0.323		
	(0.339)		(1,061.919)	(0.381)		(1,061.920)	(1.166)		
Democrat	0.540	0.822	0.283	0.416	0.899	−0.292	3.081	33.583	3.809
	(0.435)	(0.596)	(0.696)	(0.462)	(0.626)	(0.774)	(2.470)	(106,041.200)	(4.561)
Republican	0.352	0.663	−0.615	0.341	0.704	−0.609	1.020	−14.715	−1.298
	(0.442)	(0.585)	(0.800)	(0.470)	(0.620)	(0.873)	(2.478)	(97,663.210)	(5.183)
Constant	−4.630***	−4.069***	5.548	−5.258***	−4.459***	1.319	−6.731*	−215.745	−6.151
	(0.691)	(0.913)	(1,061.920)	(0.786)	(0.988)	(1,061.922)	(3.597)	(175,951.400)	(5.723)
Observations	1,181	511	670	1,000	436	564	181	75	106
Log Likelihood	−309.199	−181.965	−99.539	−259.415	−162.643	−67.676	−37.514	−0.000	−12.965
Akaike Inf. Crit.	660.398	397.930	241.078	560.830	359.286	177.352	115.028	32.000	63.931

Note: Results based on logistic regression models weighted to reflect a national representative sample. The outcome variable is an indicator that equals 1 when a respondent responded at least "sometimes thought about running" to a question "In the last few years, have you ever thought about running for political office?". The author's original models are highlighted in gray. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

the non-white groups. The estimated coefficient is 7.319 (s.e. = 1.561) among non-white. That is, a difference of 1 in the encouragement scale corresponds to more than 180% positive difference in the probability of gaining political ambition (Gelman, Hill and Vehtari, 2020, 220). On the other hand, the estimate is not only non-significant but also substantially smaller in magnitude—1.334 (s.e. = 0.849)—among white respondents. Furthermore, I find that the encouragement from political sources is also positively related to political ambition among minorities in the mass sample. In contrast, the relationship is negative (albeit non-significant) among white respondents. Therefore, these results reveal that a substantial amount of encouragement from both political and personal sources is required in order to develop political ambition among minorities compared to their white counterparts.

Second, what appears to drive white respondents' political ambition is not external encouragement but their own political participation and self-perceived qualification to hold office. Among the mass sample, the estimated coefficients for self-perceived qualification, political participation, and community participation are consistently positive and significant among white respondents, while the same is not true among non-whites. The findings collectively suggest that white groups rely on internal validation, whereas non-white groups rely on external validation when developing political ambition. This difference is visually illustrated in Figure A.3, which displays the predicted probabilities between white and non-white respondents along the four variables: encouragement from personal sources, political efficacy, political participation, and self-perceived qualification.

Another interesting difference between the two racial groups is the relationship between political ambition and political efficacy scale. The author measures political efficacy as respondents' 'agreement with four statements about the government (e.g., people like me do not have any say about what the government does, sometimes politics and

Figure A.3: Predicted Probabilities of Select Covariates



Note: Predicted probabilities of select covariates estimated from the "American Public Sample" logistic models. Weighted averages were used for the remaining covariates to estimate each predicted probability. Scatter points represent the distribution of covariate values from the data.

government seem so complicated that a person like me cannot really understand what's going on)" (Crowder-Meyer, 2020, 369). While the relationship is significantly positive among non-white groups, it is significantly negative among white groups. This implies that, for minority groups, the degree to which they see themselves as an important member of the policymaking process serves as a proxy for their desire to run for public office. Meanwhile, for white groups, the less they feel like their voice matters in the policymaking process, the more likely they develop a desire to run for office.

The author also presents regression models that separate out the American public samples (4 years of college or less) by gender. I re-run the original analyses, again further separating out the samples by race. The results are shown in Table A.3.

I find that the commonality in effects cut across both race and gender. First, encour-

agement from political sources consistently influence the development of political ambition among women, but not among men, irrespective of race. On the other hand, once the white sample is broken out by gender, I find that personal encouragement strongly predict political ambition of white female as well. Second, there exists a large contrast between white men and non-white men more than their female counterparts: while both self-perceived qualification, political participation, and political knowledge positively correlate with political ambition among white men, the correlations are consistently null among non-white male sample. In contrast, the effects of these three predictors appear similar between white and non-white female samples. Third, the notable differences between white and non-white female sample appears in marital status and political efficacy. While being married exerts no influence among white female sample, it is negatively associated with political ambition among minority female samples. Furthermore, the self-reported political efficacy does not seem to predict political ambition among white female sample, whereas it strongly predicts ambition among non-white female samples.

The replication analysis of Crowder-Meyer (2020) demonstrates that political ambition develops differently among racial minority groups and their white counterparts. The author also recognizes the need for investigation of the intersectionality between race and gender: "[r]ace and ethnicity may intersect with gender to shape how political ambition develops...[t]he analyses in this paper do reveal that, once one controls for the other variables in my models, few effects of racial and ethnic identity on political ambition emerge...I look forward to explaining this finding and its connection to racial inequality in political representation and to exploring how race and gender intersect to affect ambition in future work" (369).

Table A.3: Table 3 of Crowder-Meyer (2020) Broken out by Race

	Male			Female		
	All	White	Minority	All	White	Minority
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Self-perceived qualification to hold office	0.593***	0.730***	0.344	1.279***	1.709***	1.347***
	(0.152)	(0.191)	(0.280)	(0.287)	(0.421)	(0.396)
Encouragement from political sources	−1.241	−1.862	1.482	4.952**	7.073*	6.929**
	(1.138)	(1.306)	(4.898)	(2.292)	(4.237)	(2.956)
Encouragement from personal sources	2.439***	1.515	7.551***	6.968***	5.629*	5.691**
	(0.826)	(0.978)	(2.038)	(1.893)	(2.892)	(2.295)
Political participation	2.148***	2.330**	1.492	2.553*	2.788	0.446
	(0.772)	(1.126)	(1.315)	(1.327)	(1.879)	(1.771)
Community participation	0.627	1.777**	−0.922	0.129	−0.020	0.310
	(0.566)	(0.751)	(1.295)	(0.904)	(1.543)	(1.200)
Political knowledge	1.147**	1.341*	1.212	1.307	0.406	1.285
	(0.561)	(0.731)	(0.899)	(0.860)	(1.223)	(1.195)
Political efficacy	−0.573	−1.149**	−0.077	0.544	−0.688	2.078***
	(0.350)	(0.471)	(0.571)	(0.480)	(0.694)	(0.753)
Married	1.870***	1.734***	2.284***	−0.590	−0.745	−1.857**
	(0.385)	(0.493)	(0.777)	(0.586)	(0.751)	(0.890)
Has Child	−0.705**	−1.071**	0.600	0.516	0.658	0.785
	(0.357)	(0.467)	(0.644)	(0.624)	(0.809)	(0.932)
Age	−0.008	0.002	−0.029	−0.025	−0.033	0.012
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.026)
Education	0.386***	0.259	0.580**	0.222	0.128	0.060
	(0.126)	(0.163)	(0.244)	(0.185)	(0.260)	(0.223)
Income	−0.064	−0.099	−0.102	−0.158	−0.188	0.077
	(0.058)	(0.076)	(0.119)	(0.105)	(0.146)	(0.135)
Black	−0.913*		−8.766	−1.229		−0.767
	(0.477)		(1,061.920)	(1.089)		(0.978)
Hispanic	0.747*		−6.785	0.861		1.440
	(0.438)		(1,061.921)	(0.840)		(0.963)
Asian or Pacific Islander	−1.090		−8.800	0.597		0.703
	(0.926)		(1,061.920)	(0.950)		(1.040)
Multiracial or other race	−1.140*		−8.505	−0.246		
	(0.638)		(1,061.920)	(0.704)		
Democrat	0.770	1.037	0.084	−0.974	−1.019	0.153
	(0.551)	(0.732)	(0.893)	(0.991)	(1.397)	(1.503)
Republican	0.105	0.505	−2.172*	0.576	0.817	0.705
	(0.568)	(0.732)	(1.148)	(0.988)	(1.211)	(1.608)
Constant	−5.234***	−4.971***	1.976	−6.997***	−4.725***	−12.084***
	(0.917)	(1.130)	(1,061.922)	(1.531)	(1.746)	(2.803)
Observations	402	176	281	598	260	389
Log Likelihood	−163.332	−110.974	−42.730	−66.509	−39.369	−37.579
AIC	364.664	251.949	123.460	171.018	108.737	111.158

Note: Data is limited to respondents with a 4-year college degree or less. The outcome variable is an indicator that equals 1 when a respondent responded at least "sometimes thought about running" to a question "In the last few years, have you ever thought about running for political office?". The author's original models are highlighted in gray. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

B

General Public Survey

B.1 WEIGHT

Table B.1: Sample Distribution With and Without Weight

	N	Target	Survey	
			Unweighted	Weighted
Gender				
Female	605	0.47	0.45	0.45
Male	720	0.46	0.53	0.51
Non-binary / third gender	23	0.07	0.02	0.03
Age Group				
18 - 24	197	0.09	0.15	0.13
25 - 34	478	0.14	0.35	0.25
35 - 44	376	0.13	0.28	0.24
45 - 54	189	0.12	0.14	0.20
55 - 64	72	0.13	0.05	0.12
65 - 74	33	0.10	0.02	0.06
75 - 84	3	0.05	0.002	0.01
Marital Status				
Divorced	75	0.10	0.06	0.08
Married	477	0.45	0.35	0.47
Separated	11	0.04	0.01	0.02
Single	768	0.34	0.57	0.39
Widowed	17	0.06	0.01	0.03
Ethnorace				
Asian	334	0.06	0.25	0.10
Black	333	0.12	0.25	0.15
Hispanic	335	0.19	0.25	0.25
White	346	0.58	0.26	0.50
Education				
College degree	591	0.22	0.44	0.27
Graduate degree	215	0.14	0.16	0.15
HS or below	155	0.36	0.11	0.26
Some college	387	0.28	0.29	0.32
Employment Status				
Employed	831	0.60	0.62	0.63
Unemployed	517	0.40	0.38	0.37
Income Level				
Less than $50,000	453	0.34	0.34	0.32
$50,000 - $99,999	537	0.29	0.40	0.30
More than $100,000	358	0.38	0.27	0.38
Party Identification				
Democrat	826	0.30	0.61	0.34
Independent	268	0.41	0.20	0.39
Republican	254	0.29	0.19	0.27
Region				
Midwest	181	0.21	0.13	0.19
Northeast	232	0.17	0.17	0.17
South	574	0.38	0.43	0.39
West	361	0.24	0.27	0.25

Note: Sample distributions are matched to the marginal distributions of select covariates in U.S. population irrespective of race.

B.2 SURVEY INSTRUMENT

Table B.2: Survey Instrument: Comparisons with Crowder-Meyer (2020)

Variable	Instrument in Crowder-Meyer (2020)	Instrument in This Survey
Political Ambition (Outcome)	"...by asking '*In the last few years, have you ever thought about running for political office?*'...Respondents are coded as having low political ambition (0) if they responded 'No, I've never really thought about it,' while other responses 'Yes, I've sometimes thought about running,' 'Yes, I've thought a lot about running,' 'Yes, I've seriously investigated the possibility of running,' 'Yes, I've run for public office,' and 'Yes, I've held an elected office' are coded as displaying political ambition (1)" (fn 8).	Same categorization, except the main question asked "In the last few years, have you thought about running as a candidate in an election for public office, for example as a representative, mayor, or city council member?"
Self-Perceived Qualification to Hold Office	"...by asking 'Overall, how qualified do you feel you are to do the job of an elected official?' and allowing respondents to indicate they are not at all qualified (1) to very qualified (4)" (fn 9).	Same question and categorization.
Encouragement	"Both of the Encouragement measures (from political sources and from personal sources) are coded from 0 to 1 indicating the proportion of three possible political sources or three possible personal sources from whom a respondent received encouragement" (fn 10).	Asked a multiple selection question "Have any of these individual(s) suggested that you run?" with following options: (1) A family member; (2) A friend or co-worker; (3) A neighbor or church member; (4) A member of an interest group; (5) A current or former politician; (6) A member of a community organization; (7) A leader in a political party committee. Encouragement from personal sources is measured as an indicator that equals 1 if (1), (2), or (3) are selected, 0 otherwise. Encouragement from political sources is measured as an indicator that equals 1 if (4), (5), or (7) is selected.
Political Participation	"measures what proportion of four political activities each respondent has engaged in during the last few years: regularly voting, regularly contacting elected officials to express their views, volunteering for a campaign organization (e.g., political party or candidate's campaign), and donating money to political causes or campaigns" (fn 12).	Asked a multiple selection question "During the last few years, which of the following activities have you engaged in?" with following options: (1) Contacting elected officials to express my views; (2) Donating money to political causes; (3) Attending a city council or school board meeting; (4) Volunteering for a campaign organization; (5) Volunteering for a civic group; (6) Volunteering for community organizations; (7) Volunteering for a civil rights group. (1) through (5) are used to measure political participation.
Community Participation	"proportion of two community activities each respondent engaged in during the last few years: volunteering for a civic group (e.g., the Chamber of Commerce, a union, or the Sierra Club), and volunteering for other community organizations like churches or community service organizations" (fn 12).	Same question as above. (6) and and (7) are used to measure community participation.
Political Knowledge	"proportion of correct answers respondents gave to five factual questions about American government (e.g., which party has the most members in the U.S. House, which of the two major parties is usually referred to as the more conservative)" (fn 12).	Used four factual questions (e.g., do you happen to know which political party has a majority in the U.S. House of Representatives?) and measured the total number of correct answers.
Political Efficacy	"a scale measuring respondents' agreement with four statements about the government (e.g., people like me don't have any say about what the government does, sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on)" (fn 12).	Seven statements were used—three external and four internal political efficacy—on a 4-point scale from "Strongly agree" to "Strongly disagree".

Note: Political efficacy questions are adopted from ANES (https://electionstudies.org). Political knowledge questions are adopted from Pew Research (https://www.pewresearch.org/).

B.3 RE-ANALYSIS OF CROWDER-MEYER (2020)

Table B.3: Re-Analysis of Crowder-Meyer (2020) Broken out by Race

	All	Minority	White	Asian	Black	Hispanic
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Self-perceived qualification to hold office	0.490***	0.138	0.710***	0.547	0.783	13,326,920,210,960.000***
	(0.127)	(0.233)	(0.168)	(1.122)	(0.508)	(11,245,005.000)
Self-perceived qualification X Female	0.819***	1.113***	0.753**	−1.642	−0.166	130,649,182,804,423.000***
	(0.232)	(0.382)	(0.331)	(2.599)	(0.859)	(16,254,418.000)
Encouragement from political sources	0.459	7.397***	−1.124	28.167*	−0.049	8,711,796,887,583,524.000***
	(0.868)	(2.294)	(1.088)	(16.700)	(4.013)	(156,179,745.000)
Encouragement from personal sources	2.247***	4.934***	1.197	14.134*	7.944***	4,771,833,771,020,581.000***
	(0.575)	(1.182)	(0.760)	(7.318)	(2.628)	(75,938,346.000)
Political Participation	1.643***	1.143	2.661***	−1.932	1.132	311,154,171,369,479.000***
	(0.547)	(0.950)	(0.805)	(4.068)	(2.074)	(46,019,321.000)
Community Participation	0.819**	0.185	1.538***	4.603*	−0.131	332,741,585,218,639.000***
	(0.380)	(0.693)	(0.541)	(2.639)	(1.816)	(35,016,659.000)
Political Knowledge	1.036***	1.115*	1.083*	1.303	2.043	1,304,913,455,137,831.000***
	(0.398)	(0.638)	(0.578)	(2.656)	(1.429)	(31,320,457.000)
Political Efficacy	−0.115	0.937**	−0.926***	−0.283	−0.505	2,633,595,977,384,021.000***
	(0.229)	(0.385)	(0.330)	(1.878)	(0.828)	(18,017,141.000)
Female	−2.463***	−2.963***	−2.523***	0.703	0.127	−1,277,459,474,200,769.000***
	(0.618)	(1.028)	(0.854)	(4.988)	(2.300)	(29,147,306.000)
Married	0.877***	0.438	1.141***	2.083	0.440	−128,852,550,479,226.000***
	(0.263)	(0.457)	(0.359)	(2.489)	(0.983)	(16,933,525.000)
Has child	−0.164	0.270	−0.166	0.442	0.620	2,939,780,410,064,188.000***
	(0.262)	(0.468)	(0.344)	(2.441)	(1.040)	(17,684,835.000)
Age	−0.009	−0.004	−0.011	0.001	−0.031	−54,693,948,215,717.000***
	(0.008)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.089)	(0.031)	(621,475.400)
Education	0.138*	0.251*	0.110	−0.258	0.589*	−135,048,151,668,591.000***
	(0.077)	(0.139)	(0.109)	(0.683)	(0.353)	(7,975,364.000)
Income	−0.048	0.051	−0.134**	−0.025	−0.088	352,884,957,084,311.000***
	(0.040)	(0.075)	(0.057)	(0.414)	(0.176)	(4,084,658.000)
Black	−0.548	−12.767				
	(0.351)	(1,061.919)				
Hispanic	0.798**	−11.155				
	(0.344)	(1,061.919)				
Asian	−0.137	−12.547				
	(0.453)	(1,061.919)				
Other/Multi-Racial	−0.402	−12.565		−14.634		
	(0.339)	(1,061.919)		(2,886.597)		
Republican	0.352	−0.615	0.663	0.274	−0.574	−969,853,497,369,922.000***
	(0.442)	(0.800)	(0.585)	(3.177)	(1.981)	(26,268,564.000)
Democrat	0.540	0.283	0.822	0.633	−0.517	−85,326,058,279,005.000***
	(0.435)	(0.696)	(0.596)	(2.687)	(1.627)	(22,511,396.000)
Constant	−4.630***	5.548	−4.069***	−5.246	−6.217**	−7,342,238,688,594,442.000***
	(0.691)	(1,061.920)	(0.913)	(6.173)	(2.641)	(43,062,075.000)
Observations	1,181	670	511	125	335	94
Log Likelihood	−309.199	−99.539	−181.965	−4.098	−17.122	−0.000
AIC	660.398	241.078	397.930	44.195	68.244	34.000

Note: Results based on logistic regression models weighted to reflect a national representative sample. The outcome variable is an indicator that equals 1 when a respondent responded at least "sometimes thought about running" to a question "In the last few years, have you ever thought about running for political office?". *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

B.4 Attribute Levels in Conjoint Experiment

Table B.4: Race-Inferring Names Used in Incumbent and Challenger Attributes Levels

Race	Sex	Incumbent		Challenger	
		In-Group	Out-Group	In-Group	Out-Group
Asian: Chinese	F	Mei Chen	Mary Meyer	Ling Wong	Meredith Roberts
	M	Chang Huang	Thomas Wagner	Dong Lin	Richard Schmidt
Asian: Filipino	F	Althea Garcia	Mary Meyer	Samantha Cruz	Meredith Roberts
	M	Angelo Reyes	Thomas Wagner	Joshua Santos	Richard Schmidt
Asian: South Indian	F	Indira Shah	Mary Meyer	Sonali Desai	Meredith Roberts
	M	Raj Singh	Thomas Wagner	Deepak Patel	Richard Schmidt
Asian: Japanese	F	Yoko Takanashi	Mary Meyer	Masako Tanaka	Meredith Roberts
	M	Hiroshi Suzuki	Thomas Wagner	Kenji Sato	Richard Schmidt
Asian: Korean	F	Hana Choi	Mary Meyer	Nara Cho	Meredith Roberts
	M	Hyeon Park	Thomas Wagner	Ji-Seok Kim	Richard Schmidt
Asian: Southeast Asian	F	Anh Le	Mary Meyer	Trang Pham	Meredith Roberts
	M	Thanh Nguyen	Thomas Wagner	Tuan Tran	Richard Schmidt
Black	F	Keisha Thomas	Mary Meyer	Lakisha Jackson	Meredith Roberts
	M	Lamar Washington	Thomas Wagner	DeShawn Washington	Richard Schmidt
Hispanic	F	Gabriella Rodriguez	Mary Meyer	Juanita Martinez	Meredith Roberts
	M	Guadalupe Rodriguez	Thomas Wagner	Julio Perez	Richard Schmidt
White	F	Emily Smith		Ashley Hartman	
	F	Mary Meyer		Meredith Roberts	
	M	Brad Anderson	Chang Huang	Brett Smith	DeShawn Washington
	M	Thomas Wagner	Guadalupe Rodriguez	Richard Schmidt	Deepak Patel
	M		Lamar Washington		Dong Lin
	M		Raj Singh		Julio Perez

Note: Names are selected from the following studies: Lauderdale and Kestenbaum (2000); Milkman, Akinola and Chugh (2012); Castillo et al. (2016); Crabtree et al. (2023).

Table B.5: Narratives Used in Major Social Issue Attribute Levels

Level	Sub-Level	Asian	Black	Hispanic	White
Gun Violence	School Shooting	Lately, there's been a surge in gun violence in the district, including a shooting at a public elementary school injuring dozens of students.	Lately, there's been a surge in gun violence in the district, including a shooting at a public elementary school injuring dozens of students.	Lately, there's been a surge in gun violence in the district, including a shooting at a public elementary school injuring dozens of students.	Lately, there's been a surge in gun violence in the district, including a shooting at a public elementary school injuring dozens of students.
	Street Shooting	Recently, the district community has experienced several incidents of gun violence, including street shootings in the downtown area.	Recently, the district community has experienced several incidents of gun violence, including street shootings in the downtown area.	Recently, the district community has experienced several incidents of gun violence, including street shootings in the downtown area.	Recently, the district community has experienced several incidents of gun violence, including street shootings in the downtown area.
Natural Disaster	Flood	Recently, the district community has experienced a rise in natural hazard events, following the summer of extreme rainstorms.	Recently, the district community has experienced a rise in natural hazard events, following the summer of extreme rainstorms.	Recently, the district community has experienced a rise in natural hazard events, following the summer of extreme rainstorms.	Recently, the district community has experienced a rise in natural hazard events, following the summer of extreme rainstorms.
	Heat Wave	Lately, there's been a surge in natural disasters due to heat wave, including brushfire in a local park injuring dozens of residents.	Lately, there's been a surge in natural disasters due to heat wave, including brushfire in a local park injuring dozens of residents.	Lately, there's been a surge in natural disasters due to heat wave, including brushfire in a local park injuring dozens of residents.	Lately, there's been a surge in natural disasters due to heat wave, including brushfire in a local park injuring dozens of residents.
Racial Violence	Assault	Recently, the Asian American community has experienced a rise in anti-Asian hate crimes, including anti-Asian slurs and aggravated assaults.	Recently, the Black community has experienced a rise in police violence, including cops treating Black drivers more aggressively.	Recently, the Latino/Hispanic community has experienced a rise in anti-Latinx hate crimes, including anti-immigrant slurs and aggravated assaults.	Recently, the Asian American community has experienced a rise in anti-Asian hate crimes, including anti-Asian slurs and aggravated assaults.
					Recently, the Black community has experienced a rise in police violence, including cops treating Black drivers more aggressively.
					Recently, the Latino/Hispanic community has experienced a rise in anti-Latinx hate crimes, including anti-immigrant slurs and aggravated assaults.
	Fatal	Lately, there's been a surge in hate crimes targeting Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders, including a shooting at an Asian grocery store injuring dozens.	Lately, there's been a surge in police brutality against Black people, including a fatal police shooting of an unarmed Black resident in the district.	Lately, there's been a surge in hate crimes targeting Latino/Hispanic community, including a shooting at a Mexican grocery store injuring dozens.	Lately, there's been a surge in hate crimes targeting Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders, including a shooting at an Asian grocery store injuring dozens.
					Lately, there's been a surge in hate crimes targeting Latino/Hispanic community, including a shooting at a Mexican grocery store injuring dozens.
					Lately, there's been a surge in police brutality against Black people, including a fatal police shooting of an unarmed Black resident in the district.

B.5 Full Estimation Results

Table B.6: Full Estimation Results, Outcome: Δ Pr(District Preference)

Estimand	Attribute	Levels	Sample Group			Difference
			All Sample	Ambitious	Not Ambitious	Amb - Not Amb
		Minority (N = 6012; No. Resp = 1002)				
AMCE	Co-ethnic Population (Baseline: 30%)	50%	0.162 (0.028)***	0.145 (0.056)***	0.167 (0.031)***	-0.022 (0.064)
		70%	0.194 (0.028)***	0.203 (0.065)***	0.191 (0.031)***	0.011 (0.072)
	Incumbent (Baseline: Out-Group)	In-Group	0.007 (0.023)	0.091 (0.039)**	-0.014 (0.026)	0.106 (0.047)**
	Challenger (Baseline: Out-Group)	In-Group	-0.009 (0.022)	-0.044 (0.051)	-0.003 (0.024)	-0.041 (0.057)
	Vote Margin (Baseline: Won by Narrow Margin)	Won by Huge Margin	-0.002 (0.022)	0.017 (0.049)	-0.006 (0.025)	0.023 (0.055)
	Social Issue (Baseline: Natural Disaster)	Gun Violence	-0.016 (0.027)	0.035 (0.058)	-0.031 (0.030)	0.067 (0.066)
		Racial Violence	-0.026 (0.027)	-0.062 (0.060)	-0.017 (0.030)	-0.045 (0.067)
	Incumbent Response (Baseline: Swiftly Took Action)	Has Not Addressed the Issue	0.067 (0.025)***	0.103 (0.055)*	0.058 (0.028)**	0.045 (0.062)
ACIE	Challenger:Incumbent	In-Group:In-Group	-0.051 (0.043)	-0.109 (0.090)	-0.038 (0.050)	-0.071 (0.103)
	Vote Margin:Incumbent	Won by Huge Margin:In-Group	0.070 (0.042)*	0.063 (0.100)	0.076 (0.047)	-0.013 (0.110)
	Social Issue:Incumbent Response	Gun Violence:Has Not Addressed the Issue	0.059 (0.051)	0.173 (0.106)	0.026 (0.058)	0.147 (0.120)
		Racial Violence:Has Not Addressed the Issue	0.062 (0.052)	0.078 (0.113)	0.057 (0.058)	0.021 (0.127)
		Asian (N = 2004; No. Resp = 334)				
AMCE	Co-ethnic Population (Baseline: 30%)	50%	0.175 (0.047)***	0.273 (0.090)***	0.153 (0.053)***	0.120 (0.104)
		70%	0.219 (0.049)***	0.349 (0.126)***	0.199 (0.054)***	0.149 (0.137)
	Incumbent (Baseline: Out-Group)	In-Group	0.010 (0.039)	0.191 (0.065)***	-0.021 (0.045)	0.212 (0.079)***
	Challenger (Baseline: Out-Group)	In-Group	-0.050 (0.039)	-0.183 (0.097)*	-0.033 (0.042)	-0.150 (0.106)
	Vote Margin (Baseline: Won by Narrow Margin)	Won by Huge Margin	-0.008 (0.034)	0.151 (0.067)**	-0.035 (0.038)	0.187 (0.077)**
	Social Issue (Baseline: Natural Disaster)	Gun Violence	-0.039 (0.049)	-0.059 (0.104)	-0.036 (0.056)	-0.023 (0.118)
		Racial Violence	-0.038 (0.047)	-0.052 (0.107)	-0.028 (0.053)	-0.024 (0.119)
	Incumbent Response (Baseline: Swiftly Took Action)	Has Not Addressed the Issue	0.103 (0.040)***	0.051 (0.102)	0.104 (0.043)**	-0.053 (0.110)
ACIE	Challenger:Incumbent	In-Group:In-Group	-0.100 (0.073)	-0.160 (0.160)	-0.077 (0.083)	-0.083 (0.179)
	Vote Margin:Incumbent	Won by Huge Margin:In-Group	0.179 (0.068)***	0.201 (0.140)	0.177 (0.075)**	0.024 (0.158)
	Social Issue:Incumbent Response	Gun Violence:Has Not Addressed the Issue	-0.129 (0.080)	0.034 (0.164)	-0.161 (0.090)*	0.195 (0.186)
		Racial Violence:Has Not Addressed the Issue	-0.080 (0.085)	-0.059 (0.165)	-0.081 (0.098)	0.021 (0.191)
		Black (N = 1998; No. Resp = 333)				
AMCE	Co-ethnic Population (Baseline: 30%)	50%	0.182 (0.048)***	0.105 (0.098)	0.196 (0.055)***	-0.090 (0.113)
		70%	0.190 (0.050)***	0.110 (0.102)	0.203 (0.058)***	-0.093 (0.118)
	Incumbent (Baseline: Out-Group)	In-Group	0.067 (0.039)*	0.151 (0.072)**	0.039 (0.045)	0.112 (0.085)
	Challenger (Baseline: Out-Group)	In-Group	0.044 (0.040)	0.044 (0.089)	0.034 (0.045)	0.010 (0.100)
	Vote Margin (Baseline: Won by Narrow Margin)	Won by Huge Margin	0.021 (0.040)	-0.020 (0.092)	0.033 (0.044)	-0.053 (0.102)
	Social Issue (Baseline: Natural Disaster)	Gun Violence	0.047 (0.048)	0.147 (0.069)**	0.013 (0.056)	0.134 (0.089)
		Racial Violence	-0.003 (0.048)	-0.088 (0.094)	0.010 (0.055)	-0.098 (0.109)
	Incumbent Response (Baseline: Swiftly Took Action)	Has Not Addressed the Issue	-0.035 (0.042)	0.164 (0.083)**	-0.085 (0.047)*	0.248 (0.096)***
ACIE	Challenger:Incumbent	In-Group:In-Group	0.033 (0.077)	-0.097 (0.138)	0.063 (0.090)	-0.160 (0.164)
	Vote Margin:Incumbent	Won by Huge Margin:In-Group	0.011 (0.073)	0.098 (0.187)	-0.006 (0.076)	0.104 (0.201)
	Social Issue:Incumbent Response	Gun Violence:Has Not Addressed the Issue	0.146 (0.091)	0.157 (0.188)	0.117 (0.103)	0.040 (0.214)
		Racial Violence:Has Not Addressed the Issue	0.100 (0.089)	0.093 (0.178)	0.097 (0.102)	-0.004 (0.204)
		Hispanic (N = 2010; No. Resp = 335)				
AMCE	Co-ethnic Population (Baseline: 30%)	50%	0.128 (0.048)***	0.091 (0.092)	0.147 (0.056)***	-0.056 (0.107)
		70%	0.182 (0.047)***	0.256 (0.103)**	0.177 (0.052)***	0.079 (0.115)
	Incumbent (Baseline: Out-Group)	In-Group	-0.044 (0.038)	-0.050 (0.057)	-0.048 (0.046)	-0.002 (0.073)
	Challenger (Baseline: Out-Group)	In-Group	-0.011 (0.034)	-0.048 (0.073)	0.003 (0.038)	-0.051 (0.083)
	Vote Margin (Baseline: Won by Narrow Margin)	Won by Huge Margin	-0.012 (0.039)	-0.050 (0.083)	-0.007 (0.044)	-0.043 (0.094)
	Social Issue (Baseline: Natural Disaster)	Gun Violence	-0.043 (0.044)	0.004 (0.134)	-0.051 (0.046)	0.055 (0.141)
		Racial Violence	-0.042 (0.042)	0.008 (0.103)	-0.053 (0.047)	0.061 (0.113)
	Incumbent Response (Baseline: Swiftly Took Action)	Has Not Addressed the Issue	0.121 (0.046)***	0.040 (0.100)	0.140 (0.051)***	-0.101 (0.112)
ACIE	Challenger:Incumbent	In-Group:In-Group	-0.093 (0.075)	-0.051 (0.183)	-0.093 (0.084)	0.042 (0.200)
	Vote Margin:Incumbent	Won by Huge Margin:In-Group	0.025 (0.077)	-0.054 (0.169)	0.037 (0.089)	-0.090 (0.190)
	Social Issue:Incumbent Response	Gun Violence:Has Not Addressed the Issue	0.139 (0.092)	0.277 (0.196)	0.101 (0.105)	0.176 (0.221)
		Racial Violence:Has Not Addressed the Issue	0.148 (0.092)	0.168 (0.240)	0.137 (0.098)	0.031 (0.258)
		White (N = 2076; No. Resp = 346)				
AMCE	Co-ethnic Population (Baseline: 30%)	50%	0.124 (0.042)***	0.034 (0.116)	0.146 (0.045)***	-0.112 (0.124)
		70%	0.232 (0.044)***	0.016 (0.128)	0.278 (0.045)***	-0.262 (0.136)*
	Incumbent (Baseline: Out-Group)	In-Group	0.014 (0.034)	0.117 (0.080)	-0.006 (0.037)	0.123 (0.088)
	Challenger (Baseline: Out-Group)	In-Group	-0.000 (0.035)	-0.014 (0.091)	-0.009 (0.038)	-0.006 (0.099)
	Vote Margin (Baseline: Won by Narrow Margin)	Won by Huge Margin	-0.078 (0.036)**	-0.063 (0.101)	-0.080 (0.039)**	0.016 (0.108)
	Social Issue (Baseline: Natural Disaster)	Gun Violence	-0.068 (0.050)	-0.151 (0.082)*	-0.045 (0.057)	-0.106 (0.100)
		Racial Violence	-0.152 (0.044)***	-0.259 (0.091)***	-0.138 (0.049)***	-0.121 (0.103)
	Incumbent Response (Baseline: Swiftly Took Action)	Has Not Addressed the Issue	0.093 (0.046)**	0.078 (0.112)	0.098 (0.050)**	-0.021 (0.123)
ACIE	Challenger:Incumbent	In-Group:In-Group	0.031 (0.074)	0.063 (0.181)	0.034 (0.082)	0.029 (0.197)
	Vote Margin:Incumbent	Won by Huge Margin:In-Group	0.040 (0.070)	0.327 (0.160)**	-0.016 (0.074)	0.343 (0.176)*
	Social Issue:Incumbent Response	Gun Violence:Has Not Addressed the Issue	0.139 (0.101)	-0.279 (0.290)	0.219 (0.106)**	-0.498 (0.307)
		Racial Violence:Has Not Addressed the Issue	-0.060 (0.095)	-0.501 (0.223)**	0.031 (0.103)	-0.532 (0.244)**

Table B.7: Full Estimation Results, Outcome: Δ Pr(Perceived Likelihood of Winning)

Estimand	Attribute	Levels	Sample Group			Difference
			All Sample	Ambitious	Not Ambitious	Amb - Not Amb
		Minority (N = 6012; No. Resp = 1002)				
AMCE	Co-ethnic Population (Baseline: 30%)	50%	0.150 (0.027)***	0.206 (0.058)***	0.138 (0.031)***	0.069 (0.066)
		70%	0.214 (0.028)***	0.269 (0.060)***	0.201 (0.031)***	0.069 (0.067)
	Incumbent (Baseline: Out-Group)	In-Group	0.002 (0.022)	0.119 (0.040)***	-0.028 (0.025)	0.147 (0.047)***
	Challenger (Baseline: Out-Group)	In-Group	0.008 (0.022)	0.009 (0.051)	0.005 (0.024)	0.004 (0.057)
	Vote Margin (Baseline: Won by Narrow Margin)	Won by Huge Margin	-0.028 (0.022)	-0.029 (0.051)	-0.028 (0.025)	-0.001 (0.057)
	Social Issue (Baseline: Natural Disaster)	Gun Violence	-0.010 (0.027)	0.037 (0.057)	-0.021 (0.031)	0.058 (0.065)
		Racial Violence	-0.008 (0.025)	0.022 (0.052)	-0.017 (0.029)	0.039 (0.060)
	Incumbent Response (Baseline: Swiftly Took Action)	Has Not Addressed the Issue	0.122 (0.023)***	0.104 (0.052)**	0.129 (0.026)***	-0.024 (0.058)
ACIE	Challenger:Incumbent	In-Group:In-Group	-0.047 (0.043)	-0.265 (0.087)***	0.010 (0.049)	-0.274 (0.100)***
	Vote Margin:Incumbent	Won by Huge Margin:In-Group	0.111 (0.042)***	0.088 (0.094)	0.122 (0.047)***	-0.033 (0.105)
	Social Issue:Incumbent Response	Gun Violence:Has Not Addressed the Issue	0.084 (0.052)	-0.062 (0.109)	0.112 (0.058)*	-0.174 (0.123)
		Racial Violence:Has Not Addressed the Issue	0.046 (0.054)	-0.006 (0.121)	0.052 (0.060)	-0.058 (0.134)
		Asian (N = 2004; No. Resp = 334)				
AMCE	Co-ethnic Population (Baseline: 30%)	50%	0.155 (0.043)***	0.301 (0.088)***	0.125 (0.047)***	0.176 (0.100)*
		70%	0.209 (0.048)***	0.344 (0.124)***	0.196 (0.051)***	0.148 (0.134)
	Incumbent (Baseline: Out-Group)	In-Group	0.012 (0.038)	0.219 (0.063)***	-0.037 (0.042)	0.256 (0.076)***
	Challenger (Baseline: Out-Group)	In-Group	-0.025 (0.041)	-0.010 (0.099)	-0.039 (0.044)	0.029 (0.108)
	Vote Margin (Baseline: Won by Narrow Margin)	Won by Huge Margin	-0.040 (0.037)	0.077 (0.098)	-0.057 (0.040)	0.134 (0.106)
	Social Issue (Baseline: Natural Disaster)	Gun Violence	-0.057 (0.048)	-0.130 (0.102)	-0.029 (0.054)	-0.101 (0.115)
		Racial Violence	-0.083 (0.046)*	-0.053 (0.089)	-0.087 (0.053)	0.034 (0.104)
	Incumbent Response (Baseline: Swiftly Took Action)	Has Not Addressed the Issue	0.158 (0.037)***	0.082 (0.100)	0.170 (0.039)***	-0.089 (0.107)
ACIE	Challenger:Incumbent	In-Group:In-Group	0.011 (0.074)	-0.201 (0.158)	0.080 (0.082)	-0.281 (0.177)
	Vote Margin:Incumbent	Won by Huge Margin:In-Group	0.161 (0.068)**	0.062 (0.177)	0.187 (0.075)**	-0.125 (0.191)
	Social Issue:Incumbent Response	Gun Violence:Has Not Addressed the Issue	0.012 (0.082)	-0.234 (0.173)	0.066 (0.087)	-0.300 (0.193)
		Racial Violence:Has Not Addressed the Issue	-0.010 (0.090)	0.072 (0.209)	-0.027 (0.098)	0.099 (0.230)
		Black (N = 1998; No. Resp = 333)				
AMCE	Co-ethnic Population (Baseline: 30%)	50%	0.133 (0.051)***	0.133 (0.102)	0.132 (0.059)**	0.001 (0.117)
		70%	0.215 (0.051)***	0.177 (0.083)**	0.220 (0.060)***	-0.043 (0.102)
	Incumbent (Baseline: Out-Group)	In-Group	0.019 (0.038)	0.162 (0.072)**	-0.023 (0.042)	0.185 (0.084)**
	Challenger (Baseline: Out-Group)	In-Group	0.055 (0.035)	0.014 (0.087)	0.052 (0.040)	-0.038 (0.096)
	Vote Margin (Baseline: Won by Narrow Margin)	Won by Huge Margin	-0.027 (0.039)	-0.199 (0.082)**	0.009 (0.044)	-0.208 (0.093)**
	Social Issue (Baseline: Natural Disaster)	Gun Violence	0.050 (0.050)	0.161 (0.057)***	0.014 (0.058)	0.146 (0.081)*
		Racial Violence	0.050 (0.045)	0.000 (0.077)	0.054 (0.052)	-0.054 (0.093)
	Incumbent Response (Baseline: Swiftly Took Action)	Has Not Addressed the Issue	0.082 (0.040)**	0.171 (0.076)**	0.062 (0.045)	0.110 (0.088)
ACIE	Challenger:Incumbent	In-Group:In-Group	-0.022 (0.076)	-0.368 (0.129)***	0.066 (0.086)	-0.435 (0.154)***
	Vote Margin:Incumbent	Won by Huge Margin:In-Group	0.173 (0.070)**	0.199 (0.153)	0.182 (0.076)**	0.018 (0.170)
	Social Issue:Incumbent Response	Gun Violence:Has Not Addressed the Issue	0.206 (0.094)**	-0.052 (0.176)	0.236 (0.107)**	-0.288 (0.205)
		Racial Violence:Has Not Addressed the Issue	0.060 (0.091)	-0.107 (0.182)	0.091 (0.100)	-0.198 (0.207)
		Hispanic (N = 2010; No. Resp = 335)				
AMCE	Co-ethnic Population (Baseline: 30%)	50%	0.161 (0.048)***	0.216 (0.105)**	0.152 (0.053)***	0.064 (0.118)
		70%	0.218 (0.045)***	0.337 (0.104)***	0.196 (0.051)***	0.141 (0.116)
	Incumbent (Baseline: Out-Group)	In-Group	-0.014 (0.037)	-0.031 (0.059)	-0.016 (0.043)	-0.015 (0.073)
	Challenger (Baseline: Out-Group)	In-Group	-0.001 (0.036)	-0.030 (0.079)	0.009 (0.040)	-0.039 (0.089)
	Vote Margin (Baseline: Won by Narrow Margin)	Won by Huge Margin	-0.014 (0.038)	0.040 (0.080)	-0.033 (0.043)	0.073 (0.091)
	Social Issue (Baseline: Natural Disaster)	Gun Violence	-0.033 (0.045)	0.079 (0.112)	-0.053 (0.047)	0.132 (0.121)
		Racial Violence	0.005 (0.041)	0.141 (0.086)	-0.028 (0.046)	0.169 (0.097)*
	Incumbent Response (Baseline: Swiftly Took Action)	Has Not Addressed the Issue	0.123 (0.045)***	-0.003 (0.085)	0.153 (0.051)***	-0.156 (0.099)
ACIE	Challenger:Incumbent	In-Group:In-Group	-0.121 (0.074)	-0.163 (0.173)	-0.100 (0.084)	-0.062 (0.191)
	Vote Margin:Incumbent	Won by Huge Margin:In-Group	-0.000 (0.076)	-0.037 (0.128)	-0.004 (0.091)	-0.033 (0.156)
	Social Issue:Incumbent Response	Gun Violence:Has Not Addressed the Issue	0.024 (0.092)	-0.004 (0.205)	0.028 (0.101)	-0.033 (0.228)
		Racial Violence:Has Not Addressed the Issue	0.077 (0.097)	-0.020 (0.217)	0.094 (0.107)	-0.114 (0.240)
		White (N = 2076; No. Resp = 346)				
AMCE	Co-ethnic Population (Baseline: 30%)	50%	0.128 (0.041)***	0.004 (0.110)	0.165 (0.044)***	-0.161 (0.118)
		70%	0.255 (0.042)***	0.203 (0.122)*	0.271 (0.045)***	-0.068 (0.130)
	Incumbent (Baseline: Out-Group)	In-Group	0.025 (0.033)	0.073 (0.094)	0.018 (0.034)	0.056 (0.100)
	Challenger (Baseline: Out-Group)	In-Group	-0.003 (0.034)	0.088 (0.099)	-0.031 (0.035)	0.119 (0.105)
	Vote Margin (Baseline: Won by Narrow Margin)	Won by Huge Margin	-0.108 (0.033)***	-0.184 (0.082)**	-0.087 (0.036)**	-0.096 (0.090)
	Social Issue (Baseline: Natural Disaster)	Gun Violence	-0.037 (0.050)	0.047 (0.078)	-0.052 (0.058)	0.099 (0.097)
		Racial Violence	-0.088 (0.043)**	-0.092 (0.096)	-0.092 (0.049)*	-0.000 (0.108)
	Incumbent Response (Baseline: Swiftly Took Action)	Has Not Addressed the Issue	0.146 (0.043)***	0.137 (0.104)	0.152 (0.046)***	-0.015 (0.114)
ACIE	Challenger:Incumbent	In-Group:In-Group	0.126 (0.075)*	0.181 (0.179)	0.111 (0.081)	0.070 (0.195)
	Vote Margin:Incumbent	Won by Huge Margin:In-Group	0.058 (0.072)	0.369 (0.168)**	0.003 (0.079)	0.367 (0.185)**
	Social Issue:Incumbent Response	Gun Violence:Has Not Addressed the Issue	0.184 (0.098)*	-0.205 (0.267)	0.269 (0.102)***	-0.474 (0.284)*
		Racial Violence:Has Not Addressed the Issue	0.033 (0.092)	-0.233 (0.239)	0.098 (0.102)	-0.332 (0.258)

B.6 Supplementary Results: Conjoint Experiment

Figure B.1: Figures 3.2 and 3.3 across All Sample



Note: Estimates of the effects of the randomly assigned district attributes on interest in running for office. The outcome measures a respondent's binary choice between two districts, reflecting their perceived likelihood of winning (left) and preference to run for office (right). Estimates are based on AMCE (top) and ACIE (bottom) estimators. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Solid points represent estimates that are statistically significant at the 5% level. The points without horizontal bars denote the reference category for each attribute.

Figure B.2: Table 3.2 including Results from White Respondents



Note: Estimates of the effects of the randomly assigned district attributes on interest in running for office. The outcome measures a respondent's binary choice between two districts, reflecting their preference to run for office. Estimates are based on AMCE (top) and ACIE (bottom) estimators. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Solid points represent estimates that are statistically significant at the 5% level. The points without horizontal bars denote the reference category for each attribute.

Figure B.3: Table 3.3 including Results from White Respondents



Note: Estimates of the effects of the randomly assigned district attributes on interest in running for office. The outcome measures a respondent's binary choice between two districts, reflecting perceived electoral viability. Estimates are based on AMCE (top) and ACIE (bottom) estimators. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Solid points represent estimates that are statistically significant at the 5% level. The points without horizontal bars denote the reference category for each attribute.

Figure B.4: Separating out Major Social Issue Attribute Levels



Note: Estimates of the effects of the randomly assigned district attributes on interest in running for office. The outcome measures a respondent's binary choice between two districts, reflecting their preference to run for office. Estimates are based on AMCE (top) and ACIE (bottom) estimators. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Solid points represent estimates that are statistically significant at the 5% level. The points without horizontal bars denote the reference category for each attribute.

B.7 Supplementary Results: Mechanisms

Figure B.5: Effects of Co-ethnic Population by Respondent District Racial Composition



Note: Estimates of the effects of co-ethnic population size on interest in running for office, separately for individuals living in cities in which the size of co-ethnic population is less than the median in the data ("Bottom 50th Pct") and those living in cities with share of co-ethnic population greater than the median in the data ("Top 50th Pct"). Estimates are based on AMCE estimator. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Solid points represent estimates that are statistically significant at the 5% level. The points without horizontal bars denote the reference category for each attribute.

Figure B.6: Effects of Major Social Issue by Prevalence of Police Shooting



Note: Estimates of the effects of major social issue on interest in running for office, separately for individuals living in cities with at least one fatal shooting of co-ethnic resident since 2021 ("At least 1") and those living in cities that have not experienced fatal shootings since 2021. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Solid points represent estimates that are statistically significant at the 5% level. The points without horizontal bars denote the reference category for each attribute.

C

Field Experiment

C.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table C.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the sample used in the experiment. The gender information is missing for the majority of the samples. Based on a small subset of the sample who self-reported their gender, about 65% of the sample are women. Using `gender` package in `R` to predict the gender of the entire sample based on their first name also generated similar result—about 60% of the sample is predicted as women.[1]

Similarly, self-reported race/ethnicity information is available for only a small subset

[1] Probability-summed method was used to estimate the overall distribution (DeLuca and Curiel, 2022).

Table C.1: NAL Members Descriptive Statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Female	973	0.646	0.478	0	1
Prior Email Engagement	10,321	0.178	0.618	0	8
Prior Contributions (N)	10,321	0.239	1.376	0	66
Prior Contributions ($)	10,321	46.902	1,302.236	0	125,000
Days Since Joined NAL	10,321	1,084	501	6	1,474
Live in Program-Held State	10,321	0.318	0.466	0	1

of the data ($N = 635$). Among those groups, most of the sample self-identified as either AAPI or Hispanic/Latino. See the leftmost panel in Figure C.1.

Figure C.1: Racial Composition of Experimental Sample



I also show the predicted racial identification of all individuals in the sample using `wru` package in `R`. The center and rightmost panels in Figure C.1 show the distribution of respondent race/ethnicity based on predictions with first and last names (center) as well as based on predictions with zip code and last names (right).[2] Both show a similar share of Hispanics as the self-reported, although the share of non-Hispanics is substantially high based on predicted race. This is likely due to 1) MENA individuals being treated as non-Hispanic whites under the U.S. Census and 2) high false negative rates among AAPI

[2]Probability-summed method was used to estimate the overall distribution (DeLuca and Curiel, 2022).

and Black individuals due to their English-sounding last names.

C.2 Treatment Messages

Table C.2: Email Treatment Messages

Generic	There are more than half a million elected positions in our country-–—that means there are more than half a million opportunities to help decide what our children learn in schools, which industries move into our towns, and how to keep our communities safe. We think that you should be one of them making these important decisions for our communities.
Group Solidarity	There are more than half a million elected officials in our country who have the power to decide what our children learn in school and whether to treat us differently based on how we look or who we love. But even with recent wins, New Americans still hold less than 5% of state legislative positions. It's time to replace the pale, stale, and male political establishment and bring in a diverse new generation of leaders. We need people like you at the table to shape policies that affect our friends and families in our communities.
Racial Threat I	George Floyd, Michelle Go, and Gonzáles Brebe. They are just a few of the victims of the violence, hate, and racial injustice perpetuated by oppressive systems. The systems that should protect us intentionally devalue our lives. This has to change—from the inside. We need people like you to dismantle systems built on hate, oppression, and white supremacy.
Racial Threat II	From a racial slur on a daily commute to police brutality on national T.V., we are constantly faced with the stark reality that racism, discrimination, and hate are on the rise. This has to change. Yet, the system built on white supremacy is not going to change unless people like us—like you—step in. We need someone like you at every level of government to make this change and create a more inclusive democracy.
Co-ethnic Incumbency	You might think, "Me? No way." But we believe in you, just like we believe in Ylenia Aguilar, a formerly undocumented immigrant now serving as a school board member, and Stephanie Chang, a New American and the first AAPI woman elected to the Michigan legislature. They used their life stories as a tool to connect with voters and won. More people like you are running for office and winning. And many of them took their first steps with us at Ready to Lead. We want you to do the same.
Credible Demand	Our democracy calls for people like us to serve at every level of government. From the White House's Executive Order on Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion to your local government pressing for greater diversity in office, politicians and organizations are actively recruiting New Americans, LGBTQ+ folks, and people of color to close the representation gap and address the issues that have been ignored in policy decisions for too long. This is where you come in.
GS + RT I	George Floyd, Michelle Go, and Gonzáles Brebe. They are just a few of the victims of the violence, hate, and racial injustice perpetuated by oppressive systems rooted in white supremacy. The systems that should protect us intentionally devalue our lives and exclude us from policy decisions that would bring change and justice. This has to change. We know that your experiences and understanding of our communities' needs is your strength; one that you can use to make a real change from the inside—for you and for our community.
GS + RT II	From a racial slur on a daily commute to police brutality on national T.V., we are constantly faced with the stark reality that racism, discrimination, and hate are on the rise. This has to change. But we also know that these systems built on white supremacy are not going to change unless people like us—like you—step in and make sure our rights and lives are protected. Too many elected officials are white men who do not understand our pain and continue to make policies ignorant of our needs. You can change that.
GS + CI	There are more than half a million elected officials in this country, but too many are still part of the pale, stale, and male political establishment. We need someone like you who understands our experiences to shape policies that affect our friends and families. Still need convincing? Meet Ylenia Aguilar, a formerly undocumented Arizonan now serving as a school board member, or Stephanie Chang, a second generation New American and first AAPI woman elected to the Michigan legislature. More New Americans like Ylenia and Stephania are running for office and winning. And so can you.
GS + CD	We need someone like you who can replace the pale, stale, and male establishment to carry our movement forward. We think that your unique experiences and deep ties to our communities are incredibly powerful and should be used to represent us in government. In fact, from the White House's Executive Order on Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion to your local government pressing for greater diversity in office, politicians and organizations are actively recruiting New Americans, LGBTQ+ folks, and people of color to close the representation gap and address the issues that have been ignored in policy decisions for too long. This is where you come in.
RT + CI	You might think, "Me? No way." But we believe in you, just like we believe in Ylenia Aguilar, a formerly undocumented immigrant and now a school board member, or Stephanie Chang, a second-generation New American who became the first AAPI woman elected to the Michigan legislature; both of whom used their life stories to connect with voters and won. As elected officials, they now work tirelessly to make our voices heard. And so can you. Your leadership is needed now more than ever as racial injustice and hate crimes are literally taking away lives of our friends and families. We have the power to dismantle systemic white supremacy but it will take all of us.

RT + CD	From a racial slur on a daily commute to police brutality on national T.V., we are constantly faced with the stark reality that racism, discrimination, and hate are on the rise. This has to change. Yet, the system built on white supremacy is not going to change unless people like us—like you—step in. In fact, from the White House's Executive Order on Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion to your local government pressing for greater diversity in office, politicians and organizations are actively recruiting New Americans, LGBTQ+ folks, and people of color to close the representation gap and address the issues that have been ignored in policy decisions for too long. This is where you come in.
CI + CD	You might think, "Me? No way." But we believe in you, just like we believe in Ylenia Aguilar, a formerly undocumented immigrant and now a school board member, or Stephanie Chang, a second-generation New American who became the first AAPI woman elected to the Michigan legislature; both of whom used their life stories to connect with voters and won. And so can you. In fact, from the White House's Executive Order on Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion to your local government pressing for greater diversity in office, politicians and organizations are actively recruiting New Americans, LGBTQ+ folks, and people of color to close the representation gap and address the issues that have been ignored in policy decisions for too long. This is where you come in.
GS + RT + CI	With the rise in racism, hate and white supremacy, our lives and the lives of our families and friends are on the line. We need leaders in office who understand that—leaders like you. We think that your experiences and understanding of our needs is your strength that you can use to make a real change from the inside—for you and for our community. You might think, "Me? No way." But we believe in you, just like we believe in Ylenia Aguilar, a formerly undocumented immigrant and now a school board member, or Stephanie Chang, a second-generation New American who became the first AAPI woman elected to the Michigan legislature; both of whom used their life stories to connect with voters and won. More people like you are doing the same to fight the system from the inside. And so can you.
GS + RT + CD	George Floyd, Michelle Go, and Gonzáles Brebe. They are just a few of the victims of the violence, hate, and racial injustice perpetuated by oppressive systems rooted in white supremacy. The systems that should protect us intentionally devalue our lives and exclude us from policy decisions that would bring change and justice. This has to change, starting with you. Your experiences and understanding of our communities' needs is your strength, one that you can use to make a real change from the inside—for you and for our community. In fact, from the White House to your local government, politicians and organizations are actively recruiting New Americans, LGBTQ+, and people of color to address the issues that have been ignored for too long. This is where you come in.
GS + CI + CD	There are more than half a million elected officials in this country, but too many are still part of the pale, stale, and male political establishment. We need someone like you who understands our experiences to shape policies that affect our families and kids. You might think, "Me? No way." But we believe in you, just like we believe in Ylenia Aguilar, a formerly undocumented immigrant and now a school board member, or Stephanie Chang, a second-generation New American who became the first AAPI woman elected to the Michigan legislature; both of whom used their life stories to connect with voters and won. More people like you are doing the same to fight the system from the inside. And so can you. In fact, from the White House to your local government, politicians and organizations are actively recruiting New Americans, LGBTQ+, and people of color to address the issues that have been ignored for too long. This is where you come in.
RT + CI + CD	From a racial slur on a daily commute to police brutality on national T.V., we are constantly faced with the stark reality that racism, discrimination, and hate are on the rise. This has to change. Yet, the system built on white supremacy is not going to change unless people like us—like you—step in. You might think, "Me? No way." But we believe in you, just like we believe in Ylenia Aguilar, a formerly undocumented immigrant and now a school board member, or Stephanie Chang, a second-generation New American who became the first AAPI woman elected to the Michigan legislature; both of whom used their life stories to connect with voters and won. More people like you are doing the same to fight the system from the inside. And so can you. In fact, from the White House to your local government, politicians and organizations are actively recruiting New Americans, LGBTQ+, and people of color to address the issues that have been ignored for too long. This is where you come in.

C.3 Adaptive Experimental Design

An adaptive survey experiment dynamically allocates respondents to each arm as more data comes in. As an illustration, suppose that a researcher was interested in testing how to best mobilize a voter to turnout via text. To do so, she commissions a poll of 1,000 eligible voters to assess which of the 20 potential wordings maximizes the willingness to vote. When applying a conventional static design, a researcher would ordinarily

randomly assign these 20 wordings (i.e., treatment arms) evenly across the total sample and compare the share of willingness-to-vote across all arms. This one-shot experimental design may have difficulty determining the optimal wording since each arm is allotted only 50 observations.

Adaptive design helps overcome this problem by assigning more subjects to better-performing arms. Instead of analyzing the data at the end of the trial, an adaptive survey periodically evaluates interim results to the properties of each arm (Bechhofer, 1954; Bubeck, Munos and Stoltz, 2011). In the running example, a researcher could split the total sample into equally sized batches and conduct experiments for each batch sequentially—e.g., 100 subjects per batch over ten batches. Not knowing at the outset which arms will perform especially well, the researcher typically begins by assigning subjects with equal probability. However, once early results are in hand, the researcher can use them to determine how to allocate subjects in the next round. That is, a researcher can assign more respondents to the arms that seem to perform well (e.g., generate higher "yes" votes among respondents). Adaptive design proceeds in this manner until a stopping rule is invoked, which might refer to a budget constraint, a total N, or a target level of statistical uncertainty (Berman et al., 2018; Rao, Glickman and Glynn, 2008).

C.3.1 Thompson Sampling

One of the most common algorithms to allocate subjects adaptively is Thompson sampling (Thompson, 1933). Thompson sampling is rooted in a Bayesian probabilistic model of which arm is best and assigns treatments accordingly. The intuition behind this algorithm is simple: the more confident we are that a given arm is best, the more likely we are to assign that arm in the next batch. In the first period, there is no data to generate a probability; therefore, treatment arms are sampled with equal probability. In the next period, the Thompson sampling algorithm uses the data collected from the previous period to generate the probability that each arm is best. For example, if the model suggests that

there is a 60% chance that a ballot wording A is best among all wordings tested, 60% of the subjects in the next period will be randomly selected to receive wording A. Similarly, if a ballot wording B receives only 5% of a chance of being best according to the algorithm, in expectation, only 5% of the subjects will receive wording B in the next round. This probabilistic calculation is updated over time as more data are accumulated. Supplementary Material Section B describes the statistical theory underlying this algorithm.

In each period, I randomly assign subjects to treatment arms according to their posterior probability of being the best arm. A click rate in all emails is the outcome of interest, so each observation is defined as whether a recipient clicked on the application link (success) or not (failure)—i.e., $x \in \{0, 1\}$. Specifically, let $k = \{1, ..., K\}$ denote treatment arm and $n_{k,t}$ denote the cumulative number of individuals assigned to arm k up to batch $t \in T$.[3] Then the individual-level outcome for each arm can be represented as $X_k^{n_{k,t}} = (X_{1k}, ..., X_{n_{k,t}k})$ in which each arm has an unknown success rate θ_k that follows a Bernoulli distribution. If we assume that the prior distribution of the success rates follows a beta distribution—$\theta_k \sim Beta(\alpha, \beta)$. Then, the posterior distribution of the success rates for each arm given data at period t becomes

$$\begin{aligned}
\underbrace{f(\theta_k|x_k^{n_{k,t}})}_{posterior} &\propto \underbrace{f(x_k^{n_{k,t}}|\theta_k)}_{likelihood}\underbrace{f(\theta_k)}_{prior} \\
&\propto \theta^{\sum_{i=1}^{n_{k,t}} x_i}(1-\theta_k)^{n_{k,t}-\sum_{i=1}^{n_{k,t}} x_i}\theta_k^{\alpha-1}(1-\theta_k)^{\beta-1} \\
&\propto Beta(\theta_k|\alpha + \underbrace{\sum_{i=1}^{n_{k,t}} x_i}_{Success}, \beta + \underbrace{n - \sum_{i=1}^{n_{k,t}} x_i}_{Failure})
\end{aligned} \tag{C.1}$$

While a standard Thompson Sampling approach assumes a uniform prior (i.e., $Beta(1, 1)$), I use empirical Bayes estimation to estimate hyper-parameters of a Beta prior—i.e., $\hat{\alpha}$ and $\hat{\beta}$—using the observed data. In the next section, I discuss how I estimate the shape pa-

[3] I generally follow the same notation as in Offer-Westort, Coppock and Green (2021).

rameters. In short, I fit a Beta distribution to the set of θ_k after each batch and add in the estimated shape parameters to the observed successes and failures for each arm (which make up the shape parameters under maximum likelihood estimation).

Once the $\theta_k' s$ are drawn from the Beta distribution, I calculate the probability that a given arm is best by obtaining the proportion of times a given θ_k was the best across all draws. Formally,

$$P\Big[\Theta_k = \max_k\{\Theta_1, ..., \Theta_K\}\Big|\Big(X_1^{\{n_{1t}\}}, ..., X_k^{\{n_{Kt}\}}\Big)\Big]. \tag{C.2}$$

This updating process continues until the end of the period.

I also impose floors on treatment assignment probabilities, ensuring that I can continue to observe outcomes under all treatment conditions throughout the experiment, regardless of the performance of these arms early on.[4] This means that if an arm underperforms by chance in an initial period, there will be an opportunity to correct those estimates. This reduces instability and protects against accidental over-exploitation of sub-optimal arms. It also improves the precision with which we can estimate mean outcomes under the worst-performing arms.

C.3.2 Hyper-parameter Estimation

An empirical Bayes estimate involves a point estimate of the prior (i.e., $\hat{\alpha}$, and $\hat{\beta}$) that's used as a hyper-parameter to model the posterior distributions in each period. Recall that

$$\begin{aligned} x_{ik} &\sim Bernoulli(n_{kt}, \theta_k),\ i = 1, ..., n_{kt} \\ \theta_k &\sim Beta(\alpha, \beta). \end{aligned} \tag{C.3}$$

[4] See https://mollyow.shinyapps.io/adaptive/#Thompson_sampling.

If $y_k = \sum_{i=1}^{n_{kt}} x_{ik}$ (i.e., cumulative number of successes for treatment arm k up to, and including, batch t), we know that y_k has the binomial distribution

$$f(y_k|\theta_k) = \binom{n_{kt}}{y_k} \theta_k^{y_k}(1-\theta_k^{y_k}). \tag{C.4}$$

Following Beta distribution, the density function of the prior is

$$f(\theta_k) = \frac{\Gamma(\alpha+\beta)}{\Gamma(\alpha)\Gamma(\beta)} \theta_k^{\alpha-1}(1-\theta_k)^{\beta-1}. \tag{C.5}$$

Note that the term $\frac{\Gamma(\alpha+\beta)}{\Gamma(\alpha)\Gamma(\beta)}$ can be expressed as $\mathbf{B}(\alpha,\beta)$. Then, through compounding, the prior predictive distribution $f(y_k)$ is a Beta-Binomial distribution: first, we find the simultaneous distribution

$$\begin{aligned} f(y_k) &= f(\theta_k) f(y_k|\theta_K) \\ &= \binom{n_{kt}}{y_k} \frac{1}{\mathbf{B}(\alpha,\beta)} \theta_k^{\alpha+y_k-1} \theta_k^{\beta+n_{kt}-y_k-1} \end{aligned} \tag{C.6}$$

after which we integrate θ_k away to get the predictive distribution

$$f(y_k) = \binom{n_{kt}}{y_k} \frac{\mathbf{B}(\alpha+y_k, \beta+n_{kt}-y_k)}{\mathbf{B}(\alpha,\beta)}, \; y_k = 0, 1, ..., n_{kt} \tag{C.7}$$

The Beta-Binomial distribution can be written as

$$y_k \sim BetaBin(n_{kt}, \alpha, \beta) \tag{C.8}$$

I use the `R` packages `VGAM` and `mle` to fit a Beta-Binomial distribution by maximum likelihood estimation and estimate the shape parameters, $\hat{\alpha}$ and $\hat{\beta}$. The initial shape parameters are set to values estimated using the method of moment estimation.

This calculation is performed at the end of each period to update the Beta prior,

which forms posterior distributions. Based on these posterior distributions, I calculate the posterior probability that each arm is best. I then assign treatment according to that probability.

C.3.3 Empirical Bayes Thompson Sampling

Empirical Bayes essentially "shrinks" toward the average across all treatment arms, and this approach provides several benefits that are especially useful for my experiment. The empirical Bayes estimator concentrates exploration on the *set* of best arms rather than over-exploiting a *unique* best arm. The treatment messages contain similar texts—hence, finding a *group* of messages that work best, rather than a single one, to pass onto the static design is a useful feature.[5] Furthermore, empirical Bayes leads to better resulting decisions by hedging more efficiently when the best arm is uncertain. An implication is that the estimator is able to reduce uncertainty across *all* arms.[6] As I am interested in having as much accuracy as possible for as many treatment arms as possible, such effectiveness in optimization is particularly appealing.

To validate this, I run a simulation to compare across different sampling approaches: 1) static design; 2) Thompson sampling with uniform prior; 3) empirical Bayes Thompson sampling; and 4) Thompson sampling with balancing weights (Dimakopoulou et al., 2017). I find that empirical Bayes Thompson Sampling is better at concentrating exploration on the set of best arms rather than a single best arm than the other methods and generating more precise estimates.

I compare the performance of adaptive designs under different adaptive algorithms:

1. *Thompson Sampling with Uniform Prior*: this is a standard Thompson Sampling ap-

[5] For example, if a set of best arms (that are mixtures of two or more different identity-driven messages) turn out to always contain the "social exclusion" messages, we can infer that this particular identity-driven message may be the main driving factor in generating interest in candidacy.

[6] In a simulation, Dimmery, Bakshy and Sekhon (2019) find that 85% of treatment arms experienced a reduction in Mean Squared Error (MSE) from using empirical Bayes.

proach where uniform prior ($\hat{\alpha} = \hat{\beta} = 1$) is assumed when generating the posterior probability of best arms (Offer-Westort, Coppock and Green, 2021).

2. *Empirical Bayes Thompson Sampling*: this approach fits a Beta-Binomial distribution by MLE to estimate the prior shape parameters $\hat{\alpha}$ and $\hat{\beta}$ using the observed data (Dimmery, Bakshy and Sekhon, 2019).[7]

3. *Thompson Sampling with Balancing Weight*: This algorithm integrates balancing methods in the estimation to make it less prone to estimation bias (Dimakopoulou et al., 2017). Specifically, after estimating outcome means and variances using the IPW weighting method discussed in Section C.3.4, I assume that the distribution of outcomes is approximately normal under each arm:

$$\theta_k \sim \mathcal{N}(\hat{\theta}^{haj}(k), \hat{V}(\hat{\theta}_k^{haj}(k)) \tag{C.9}$$

and sample from this distribution to find the proportion of times that each arm has the highest value. Then, these proportions are used as posterior probabilities to assign treatment in the next round.

I simulate an experiment under a hypothetical scenario that closely reflects the actual field setting. I simulate a 10-period experiment with a total sample of 6,000 subjects, assigning treatment to 25 arms. I assume a scenario in which a set of arms perform are superior to the rest: four arms have 0.30 success rates with small random error $\epsilon \sim U(0, 0.001)$, another four arms have 0.20 success rates plus ϵ, and the remaining 17 arms have success rates of 0.10 plus ϵ. The first period samples 1,000 units, and each of the remaining periods samples 560 units. Treatment arms are assigned according to one of the three

[7] If the likelihood and prior take on simple parametric forms, then the empirical Bayes problem is only to estimate the marginal and the hyper-parameters using the complete set of empirical measurements. For example, one common approach, parametric empirical Bayes point estimation, approximates the marginal using the maximum likelihood estimate (MLE), which allows one to express the hyper-parameters in terms of the empirical mean and variance. This simplified marginal allows one to plug the empirical means into a point estimate for the prior.

adaptive algorithms as well as a standard static design.

Figure C.2: Simulated Posterior Probabilities over Period



Note: Assignment algorithms are balanced static design (Static), Thompson sampling with uniform priors (T.S., Uniform), empirical Bayes Thompson sampling (T.S., E.B.), and Thompson sampling with balanced weight (T.S., B.W.). True success rates of the best four arms are 0.30 plus ϵ.

First, I show a result from a *single* simulated experiment. The top panel in Figure C.2 displays the posterior probabilities of being the best arm, and the bottom panel displays the cumulative sample size drawn from the posterior probabilities in each period for the top 4 best arms with true success rates of 0.3 plus ϵ. I find that Thompson sampling with a uniform prior over-exploits a single best arm early on, unable to explore the remaining three best arms with near identical success rates. On the other hand, empirical Bayes Thompson Sampling explores the four best-performing arms quite evenly—a feature appealing to an experiment with a factorial design. Thompson sampling with balanced balancing weight also prioritizes exploration over exploitation, but it explores too much, and wastes draws on inferior arms throughout the entire period.

I now show the averages across 1,000 simulations in Figure C.3. The result shows that, over a series of experiments, using uniform or empirical Bayes priors doesn't make

Figure C.3: Simulated Posterior Probabilities and Cumulative Sample Size



Note: Smooth curves of posterior probabilities fitted via Generalized Additive Model (GAM). Assignment algorithms are balanced static design (Static), Thompson sampling with uniform priors (T.S., Uniform), empirical Bayes Thompson sampling (T.S., E.B.), and Thompson sampling with balanced weight (T.S., B.W.). True success rates of the best four arms (black) are 0.30 plus ϵ, of the second best arms (blue) are 0.20 plus ϵ, and of the remaining arms (gray) are 0.10 plus ϵ.

much difference (or using a static design, for that matter). One noticeable finding is that the balanced weight Thompson sampling does incredibly well in distinguishing not just the set of best arms (solid black) but also the set of second-best arms (dotted blue). This is a valuable feature for experiments interested in identifying a group of arms that perform well. A downside, however, is that this algorithm requires more periods to achieve such accuracy: only after period 8 does the algorithm start to distinguish across different sets of arms.

Table C.3: Iterated Simulation Statistics

Arm	θ	$\hat{\theta}^{Haj}$ ($\hat{SE}$)				RMSE				Bias ($\hat{\theta}^{Haj} - \theta$)			
		Static	TS, Unif	TS, EB	TS, BW	Static	TS, Unif	TS, EB	TS, BW	Static	TS, Unif	TS, EB	TS, BW
Best 1	0.301	0.300	0.302	0.300	0.299	0.020	0.016	0.020	0.045	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	-0.002
		(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.036)	(0.066)								
Best 2	0.301	0.300	0.301	0.302	0.297	0.020	0.017	0.019	0.046	-0.000	0.000	0.001	-0.003
		(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.035)	(0.063)								
Best 3	0.301	0.299	0.300	0.301	0.302	0.020	0.017	0.021	0.043	-0.001	-0.000	0.000	0.002
		(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.039)	(0.062)								
Best 4	0.301	0.301	0.300	0.299	0.299	0.020	0.018	0.021	0.046	0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002
		(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.038)	(0.064)								
2nd Best 1	0.201	0.201	0.196	0.199	0.200	0.016	0.064	0.077	0.078	-0.000	-0.005	-0.001	-0.001
		(0.022)	(0.081)	(0.095)	(0.089)								
2nd Best 2	0.201	0.201	0.200	0.191	0.202	0.018	0.065	0.078	0.074	0.000	-0.001	-0.010	0.001
		(0.022)	(0.080)	(0.095)	(0.090)								
2nd Best 3	0.201	0.201	0.203	0.196	0.199	0.017	0.064	0.081	0.080	0.000	0.003	-0.005	-0.002
		(0.022)	(0.084)	(0.096)	(0.089)								
2nd Best 4	0.201	0.202	0.195	0.206	0.196	0.018	0.066	0.080	0.078	0.001	-0.006	0.005	-0.005
		(0.022)	(0.081)	(0.100)	(0.086)								

Note: Average mean (standard error), RMSE, and bias across 1,000 simulations shown for the best and second best set of arms.

C.3.4 Estimation Strategy

A key component of adaptive designs is that the assignment probability to each arm depends on observed outcomes, which fluctuate over time. For example, suppose that ballot wording A performed poorly (and therefore received a very low probability of being best) in the first period; it could still perform much better in the next round and, consequently, be accorded a much higher probability of being best. This observed variability is more pronounced in the early stages of the study when data are limited. Therefore, even if we are only interested in estimating the share of yes votes in each arm at the end of the study, those final sample means are prone to bias.

To account for bias, I use adaptively-weighted augmented inverse probability weighting (AWAIPW) estimators proposed by Hadad et al. (2021) for estimation. This approach adaptively reduces overall variance and yields an asymptotically normal test statistic by re-weighting the terms of an IPW estimator, thus accounting for how the algorithm performs at different points in the experiment. Simply put, this approach allows for estimating and testing the value of a given arm (i.e., mean outcome) as well as differences between two such values, even in data-poor situations where the data-collection mechanism did not target these estimands.[8]

Formally, three estimators associated with inverse-probability weighting are shown

[8] I pre-registered using Hájek estimator. However, Hadad et al. (2021) show that, while IPW weighting fixes the bias problem, it still results in a non-normal asymptotic distribution and can exacerbate the inference problem. However, the results are similar when Hájek estimator is used.

below:

$$\hat{\mu}^{IPW}(k) = \frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N} x_i \frac{1\{K_i = k\}}{\pi_i(k; S_i)} \tag{C.10}$$

$$\hat{\mu}^{AIPW}(k) = \frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N} \Big(\underbrace{x_i \frac{1\{K_i = k\}}{\pi_i(k; S_i)} + \big(1 - \frac{1\{K_i = k\}}{\pi_i(k; S_i)}\big)\hat{m}_i(k)}_{\hat{\Gamma}_i(k)} \Big) \tag{C.11}$$

$$\hat{\mu}^{AWAIPW}(k) = \Big(\sum_{i=1}^{N} h_i(k)\hat{\Gamma}_i(k)\Big) / \Big(\sum_{i=1}^{N} h_i(k)\Big) \tag{C.12}$$

where N represents the total sample size, S_i denotes the history of treatment and outcome prior to seeing observation i. Therefore, $\pi_i(k; S_i)$ represents the treatment assignment probability assigned to an individual i based on the treatment and outcomes from previous batches. $\hat{m}_i(k)$ represents conditional mean from prior batch and $h_i(k)$ represents history-adaptive evaluation weight.

The AWAIPW estimator simply adds two components to the IPW estimator in Equation C.10: (1) $\big(1 - \frac{1\{K_i=k\}}{\pi_i(k;S_i)}\big)\hat{m}_i(k)$, a regression adjustment, and (2) $h_i(k)$, an additional degree of flexibility in controlling the tails of the sampling distribution. The former acts as a "control variate" which preserves unbiasedness while reducing variance. The latter compensates for "erratic trajectories of the assignment probabilities" and stabilizes the estimator variance (Hadad et al., 2021, 3).

To demonstrate how well the AWAIPW estimator does against other estimators, I run a set of simulated adaptive experiments with ten treatment arms run over ten batches, where I set the true parameter such that there is one best arm with a true mean of 0.2 and the rest have the true mean of 0.1. Table C.4 shows the simulation results.

The results shown here are based on the same set of 10,000 simulated experiments, where I estimate the mean of the best arm using different estimators at the end of each simulated experiment. The result shows that when the sample size is relatively small,

Table C.4: IPW Estimators Simulation Statistics

	Bias			RMSE			CI Width		
	N=1000	**N=2500**	**N=3500**	**N=1000**	**N=2500**	**N=3500**	**N=1000**	**N=2500**	**N=3500**
Mean	0.0061	0.0010	0.0002	0.0296	0.0136	0.0106	0.0457	0.0243	0.0199
IPW	0.0003	0.0001	-0.0002	0.0323	0.0164	0.0132	0.0628	0.0324	0.0260
Hajek	**0.0002**	**0.0000**	-0.0002	0.0300	0.0156	0.0125	0.0628	0.0324	0.0260
AIPW	**0.0002**	0.0001	-0.0002	0.0305	0.0157	0.0126	0.0595	0.0310	0.0249
AW-AIPW	0.0038	0.0008	**0.0001**	**0.0287**	**0.0139**	**0.0109**	**0.0490**	**0.0255**	**0.0207**

Note: Based on 10K simulated adaptive experiments with ten arms and ten batches. True parameters = {0.2, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1}. Results are based on the best arm with $\theta = 0.2$. "RMSE" is the root mean squared error of the simulated estimate. "CI Width" represents the mean of the standard error of the simulated estimate multiplied by a z-score of 1.96. The lowest values (excluding sample mean) in each column are in **bold**.

the AWAIPW estimator is biased, but the magnitude of the bias is reduced as the sample size increases. However, RMSE is consistently the smallest for the AWAIPW estimator, as the estimator has the properties of asymptotic unbiasedness. On the other hand, the confidence interval width shows that the variance is consistently narrower under this new estimator.

C.4 Assessing Construct Validity

To ensure that the language used for each identity prime accurately conveys the intended mechanism, an opinion survey was conducted on a sample of 100 undergraduate students.[9] In the survey, respondents first reviewed the overall experimental design, followed by a description of what the researcher intended to convey in a priming language for each of the four mechanisms. Respondents were then shown a random selection of the priming languages used in the experiment and asked to choose one that they think most accurately taps into the mechanism described.[10] The result shows that, across all mechanisms, the majority of the respondents chose the prime actually used in the experiment

[9]This survey was approved by IRB at Columbia University (IRB-AAA6271). A set of students taking an undergraduate course on either American politics or political science quantitative research were selected for the survey, given that it required both a substantive understanding of the research question as well as a basic knowledge of randomized experiments. However, validation from a sample of undergraduate students may not be generalizable to other populations.

[10]Ex: "We'd like to come up with a priming text that is likely to increase recipients' sense of race-based social exclusion. That is, we emphasize discrimination and violence against racial minorities and urge them to take action. Which of the following primes do you think most accurately captures what the researchers try to convey?"

as the text that most accurately conveys the intended mechanisms and that roughly 90% of the respondents expressed such texts are "somewhat accurate", "accurate", or "very accurate".

To ensure that the language used for each identity prime accurately conveys the intended mechanism, I conducted an opinion survey on a sample of roughly 100 undergraduate students. In the survey, respondents first reviewed the overall experimental design, followed by a description of what the researcher intended to convey in a priming language for each of the four mechanisms. Respondents were then shown a random selection of four priming languages used in the experiment and asked to 1) choose a prime that they think most accurately taps into the mechanism that a researcher tries to convey and 2) rate how accurate the primes are in conveying the mechanism.

Figure C.4 shows a snapshot of the survey instrument used for the co-ethnic incumbency mechanism. To minimize survey biases, the survey randomized the order in which each mechanism is introduced as well as the selection of primes in each question. For 1), the prime used in the experiment was always included in the selection, while the remaining three primes were randomly selected.

Figure C.5 shows the distribution of primes selected by respondents for each mechanism. For example, the top right panel shows that 65% of the respondents correctly identified the prime language used in the experiment as the language that most accurately conveys what the researchers tried to convey for the co-ethnic incumbency mechanism (see Figure C.4). Across all mechanisms, the proportion of respondents with correct identification ranges from 46% (group solidarity) to 76% (racial threat). Primes used for group solidarity and credible demand received the least amount of correct responses, indicating that the language used in the experiment may not have captured the intended mechanism as well as the other two.

This is also indicated in Figure C.6, which shows the perceived accuracy of the

Figure C.4: Student Opinion Survey Survey Instrument I



Figure C.5: Student Survey Theory Identification Result



Note: Black columns represent the share of respondents who have correctly identified the primes used in the experiment.

primes used in the experiment. While almost all respondents responded that the primes were at least "somewhat accurate" for the co-ethnic incumbency and racial threat primes, a sizeable share of respondents expressed that the primes were inaccurate to varying degrees for primes used for the credible demand and group solidarity mechanisms. For example, 9% of the respondents responded that the prime used for the group solidarity mechanism in the experiment was either "inaccurate" or "somewhat inaccurate".

Lastly, the survey also asked respondents to match the two primes used in Experiment II. Specifically, respondents reviewed one of the two versions of the primes that tap into a given mechanism. The respondents were then provided with a selection of other primes used in the experiment and asked to choose the prime most similar to the one they reviewed. Figure C.7 shows the snapshot of the question used for the racial threat mechanism. To minimize survey bias, the order in which each mechanism is asked, the version of the prime being reviewed, and the selection of primes in each question were randomized while always including the matching prime used in the experiment.

Figure C.8 shows the results. Each plot shows the distribution of primes selected by respondents. For example, the top left plot shows that 78% of the respondents correctly selected the matched prime used for the co-ethnic incumbency mechanism. That is, upon reviewing the "Co-Ethnic Incumbency A" prime, 78% of the respondents were able to select "Co-Ethnic Incumbency B" prime as the text that most closely related to the prime they reviewed. Across all mechanisms, the share of respondents with correct matching ranges from 60% (group solidarity) to 84% (racial threat).

Figure C.6: Student Survey Perceived Accuracy Result



Note: Limited to respondents who correctly identified the prime for each mechanism—i.e., respondents corresponding to black columns in Figure C.5.

Figure C.7: Student Opinion Survey Survey Instrument II



Figure C.8: Student Survey Matched Pair Result



Note: Black columns represent the share of respondents who have correctly matched the two primes used in Experiment II.

C.5 Robustness Checks

How different would the results have been had we run a standard static design instead? To assess this, I treat the observed mean outcomes in each arm as the ground truth and simulate 2,000 experiments according to an adaptive as well as a standard static design. For example, with respect to the email experiment, I use the observed average click-through rate as the ground truth and simulate 1) a static experiment that randomly samples respondents with equal treatment probability across 17 arms and 2) an adaptive experiment that randomly samples respondents for each of 9 periods, assigning treatment to 17 arms according to the Thompson sampling algorithm. In order to reflect the experimental setting as closely as possible, the adaptive experiment simulation also draws a larger sample ($1,500$) in the first period. The simulations are run separately for email and text encouragement, using the observed mean outcomes from each experiment as the ground truth.

Tables C.5 and C.6 show the simulated results for email and text experiments, respectively. Column "True (S.E.)" shows the average response rate and standard error estimated from the actual experiment.

First, I evaluate how often a static design is able to detect the best arm as compared to an adaptive design. For the email experiment, I find that the Racial Threat I appeal—the best-performing arm according to the experiment—turns up as the best arm in 65% of the static experiments, whereas it is selected as best in almost 80% of the adaptive experiments. Furthermore, the root mean squared error (RMSE) for the top-performing arm suggests that the adaptive design is less susceptible to random sampling variability. The higher precision on the best-performing arm is due to the adaptive data collection: by allotting larger samples to arms that perform well, the adaptive design is able to estimate the mean outcomes of the best arms with less uncertainty.

The results are similar to the text experiment. Taken together, these simulations show

Table C.5: Simulated Statistics, Email

			Simulated Adaptive				Simulated Static			
	Arm	True (S.E.)	% Best	Bias	RMSE	Coverage	% Best	Bias	RMSE	Coverage
1	Racial Threat I	0.015 (0.004)	0.793	-0.000	0.005	0.944	0.652	-0.000	0.006	0.883
2	GS + CI	0.008 (0.005)	0.064	-0.000	0.005	0.820	0.106	0.000	0.004	0.860
3	GS + RT I	0.007 (0.004)	0.053	-0.000	0.005	0.790	0.089	-0.000	0.004	0.826
4	RT + CI	0.007 (0.004)	0.034	-0.000	0.004	0.820	0.059	0.000	0.004	0.937
5	GS + RT II	0.005 (0.004)	0.018	0.000	0.004	0.736	0.026	-0.000	0.004	0.897
6	Racial Threat II	0.005 (0.004)	0.013	-0.000	0.004	0.733	0.032	-0.000	0.004	0.900
7	Generic	0.005 (0.003)	0.010	0.000	0.004	0.680	0.017	0.000	0.003	0.868
8	GS + CD	0.003 (0.003)	0.001	0.000	0.003	0.481	0.002	-0.000	0.002	0.685
9	GS + RT + CD	0.003 (0.003)	0.002	-0.000	0.003	0.500	0.003	-0.000	0.003	0.690
10	Co-ethnic Incumb	0.003 (0.003)	0.003	-0.000	0.003	0.503	0.002	-0.000	0.003	0.688
11	GS + CI + CD	0.003 (0.003)	0.002	0.000	0.003	0.489	0.003	-0.000	0.002	0.693
12	Group Solidarity	0.003 (0.003)	0.003	0.000	0.003	0.484	0.002	-0.000	0.003	0.688
13	Credible Demand	0.003 (0.003)	0.003	-0.000	0.003	0.501	0.002	0.000	0.002	0.684
14	CI + CD	0.003 (0.003)	0.002	-0.000	0.003	0.484	0.003	0.000	0.002	0.658
15	RT + CD	0.002 (0.002)	0.002	-0.000	0.003	0.462	0.003	-0.000	0.002	0.661
16	GS + RT + CI	0.000 (0.000)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
17	GS + RT + CI + CD	0.000 (0.000)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Note: Based on 2K simulated adaptive and static experiments with 17 arms and 9 batches. True parameters are shown in column "True (S.E.)". "RMSE" is the root mean squared error of the simulated estimate. "Coverage" represents the mean of the standard error of the simulated estimate multiplied by a z-score of 1.96.

Table C.6: Simulated Statistics, Text

			Simulated Adaptive				Simulated Static			
	Arm	True (S.E.)	% Best	Bias	RMSE	Coverage	% Best	Bias	RMSE	Coverage
1	Racial Threat B	0.160 (0.014)	0.483	-0.000	0.019	0.947	0.458	-0.000	0.020	0.946
2	Racial Threat A	0.148 (0.020)	0.218	-0.000	0.020	0.940	0.220	-0.000	0.019	0.948
3	Group Solidarity B	0.144 (0.022)	0.150	0.000	0.020	0.946	0.164	0.000	0.019	0.945
4	Credible Demand B	0.141 (0.022)	0.103	0.001	0.020	0.941	0.117	0.000	0.018	0.950
5	Generic A	0.130 (0.021)	0.037	0.000	0.021	0.935	0.036	0.000	0.018	0.945
6	Group Solidarity A	0.109 (0.019)	0.003	-0.000	0.020	0.938	0.003	0.000	0.017	0.936
7	Credible Demand A	0.109 (0.019)	0.004	-0.000	0.020	0.939	0.003	0.000	0.016	0.950
8	Co-ethnic Incumbency B	0.100 (0.018)	0.001	0.000	0.020	0.933	0.001	-0.000	0.016	0.945
9	Co-ethnic Incumbency A	0.094 (0.017)	0.001	-0.000	0.019	0.936	0.000	0.000	0.015	0.959

Note: Based on 2K simulated adaptive and static experiments with nine arms and two batches. True parameters are shown in column "True (S.E.)". "RMSE" is the root mean squared error of the simulated estimate. "Coverage" represents the mean of the standard error of the simulated estimate multiplied by a z-score of 1.96.

that, even under a scenario where 1) a single arm outperforms the other arms by a substantial margin (as is the case in the email experiment) or 2) the true best arm is closely followed by the next runner-ups (as is the case in the text experiment), adaptive designs tend to outperform static designs in settings where the goal is to discover the best-performing arm.

C.6 Supplementary Results: Short-Term Effects

C.6.1 Development of Posterior Probabilities

Overall, the cumulative open rate was 6.5%, and the click-through rate was 0.6% across all treatment arms. This is somewhat lower than the average response rate from a similar field experiment in the past. For example, a 2012 candidate recruitment experiment by Broockman (2014*b*) finds the average click rate to range between 1.68% and 2.93% across four different treatment arms with roughly 25,000 recipients in each arm. This discrepancy could be due to several reasons. First, the spam filter technology may have improved in the past decades. Second, with increased ad-like emails over time, people may have become increasingly uninterested in non-personal emails. Third, I adopt a much more conservative counting of a click rate where, even if a recipient clicks on a link several times in different locations, I count it as a single click, while other commonly used methods (e.g., Bitly) track the total number of counts per recipient.

Figure C.9 shows the over-time development of the posterior probability that each arm is best. The adaptive trial revealed a clear top-performing arm early on. The top-performing arm, with respect to generating the highest click rate, was the *racial threat* identity prime that made salient racially charged events such as police brutality and hate crimes, with a posterior probability of being best of 0.196.[11]

[11]The best treatment arm's message was: "George Floyd, Michelle Go, and Gonzáles Brebe. They are just a few of the victims of the violence, hate, and racial injustice perpetuated by oppressive systems. The systems that should protect us intentionally devalue our lives. This has to change—from the inside. We need people like you to dismantle systems built on hate, oppression, and white supremacy."

Figure C.9: Over-time posterior probabilities of being best arm.



Note: "RT" = Racial Threat, "GS" = Group Solidarity, "CI" = Co-ethnic Incumbency. "I" and "II" indicate two different versions of Racial Threat primes used in the experiment.

C.6.2 Estimated Differences

Figure C.10: Average Treatment Effects of Intrinsic Appeals, Email



Note: The point estimates represent the difference between top-performing and remaining arms. The error bars represent a 95% confidence interval. The top panel compares the Intrinsic appeal estimate against the other treatment appeals. The bottom panel compares the Racial Threat I appeal estimate against the other individual treatment appeals. "RT" = Racial Threat, "GS" = Group Solidarity, "CI" = Co-ethnic Incumbency.

Figure C.11: Average Treatment Effects of Intrinsic Appeals, Text



Note: The point estimates represent the difference between the top-performing arms and the remaining arms. The error bars represent a 95% confidence interval. The top panel compares the Intrinsic appeal estimate against the other treatment appeals. The bottom panel compares the Racial Threat B appeal estimate against the other individual treatment appeals. "RT" = Racial Threat, "GS" = Group Solidarity, "CI" = Co-ethnic Incumbency. "A" and "B" indicate two different appeal versions used in the experiment.

C.6.3 Heterogeneous Effects

In this section, I examine heterogeneous treatment effects using respondent demographic information: gender, ethnicity, race, and residential state. Note that these demographic variables are missing for a large bulk of the sample. When gender and race/ethnicity information is missing, I rely on the predicted values discussed in Section C.1. Therefore, the estimates based on these variables should be interpreted with caution as they may not accurately reflect the individual demographic characteristics. Furthermore, incorporating covariate adjustment is challenging because the estimates based on AWAIPW are manually calculated. Therefore, I rely on a regression-based ordinary least squares with robust standard errors using `estimatr` package in `R`, equivalent to the Hajek estimator.

The results are shown in Table C.7. The first two columns show the treatment effects on Intrinsic appeal interacted with respondent gender (reference category: Male) from email (column (1)) and text (column (2)) experiments. The next two columns add three individual race/ethnicity indicators that compare each specific race against all others, and the next two columns add an indicator on whether or not a respondent lives in a state where the training program is held.

The result shows that female respondents tend to respond less than their male counterparts. For example, in column (2), I find that the average rate at which a female respondent responds to a text message with an extrinsic appeal is 6.4 percentage points less than their male counterparts. This rate increases by 3.5 percentage points when the female respondents are treated with intrinsic appeals, although the difference is not statistically significant. This is consistent with the findings in political ambition of women that women are less likely than men to consider running for office despite their qualification due to gender-based socialization (Fox and Lawless, 2005; Lawless and Fox, 2010; Reny and Shah, 2018; Bernhard, Shames and Teele, 2021).

In terms of race/ethnicity, I find that the effect of the intrinsic appeal is notably higher

Table C.7: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects, Immediate Outcome

	Gender		+Race/Ethnicity		+State	
	Email	Text	Email	Text	Email	Text
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
(Intercept)	0.006	0.141***	0.007	0.138***	0.008	0.148***
	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.004)	(0.017)	(0.005)	(0.018)
Intrinsic	0.008	0.017	0.005	0.015	0.001	0.025
	(0.006)	(0.020)	(0.006)	(0.024)	(0.007)	(0.025)
Generic	-0.006	0.002	-0.007	0.032	-0.014+	0.029
	(0.005)	(0.031)	(0.005)	(0.041)	(0.007)	(0.043)
Combined	-0.002		-0.002		-0.005	
	(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.006)	
Female	-0.005	-0.064***	-0.005	-0.064***	-0.005	-0.060**
	(0.005)	(0.018)	(0.005)	(0.018)	(0.005)	(0.019)
Other/Unknown	-0.006	-0.055*	-0.006	-0.054*	-0.006	-0.052*
	(0.005)	(0.026)	(0.004)	(0.026)	(0.004)	(0.026)
Intrinsic × Female	-0.004	0.035	-0.004	0.038	-0.003	0.045+
	(0.007)	(0.027)	(0.007)	(0.027)	(0.007)	(0.027)
Generic × Female	0.009	0.005	0.008	0.008	0.009	0.008
	(0.007)	(0.041)	(0.006)	(0.041)	(0.006)	(0.041)
Combined × Female	0.003		0.003		0.003	
	(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.006)	
Intrinsic × Other/Unknown	-0.001	0.018	0.002	0.009	0.000	0.016
	(0.007)	(0.037)	(0.007)	(0.038)	(0.007)	(0.038)
Generic × Other/Unknown	0.021	0.082	0.022	0.080	0.021	0.075
	(0.015)	(0.067)	(0.015)	(0.068)	(0.015)	(0.066)
Combined × Other/Unknown	0.003		0.003		0.002	
	(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.005)	
AAPI			-0.003	-0.015	-0.003	-0.011
			(0.002)	(0.025)	(0.002)	(0.025)
Black			-0.002	0.006	-0.002	0.006
			(0.002)	(0.034)	(0.002)	(0.034)
Hispanic			0.001	0.011	0.001	0.011
			(0.005)	(0.020)	(0.005)	(0.020)
Intrinsic × AAPI			0.000	0.037	0.000	0.037
			(0.004)	(0.038)	(0.004)	(0.038)
Generic × AAPI			-0.002	-0.090+	-0.003	-0.090+
			(0.006)	(0.051)	(0.007)	(0.052)
Combined × AAPI			0.006		0.006	
			(0.005)		(0.005)	
Intrinsic × Black			0.009	0.089+	0.009	0.090+
			(0.009)	(0.054)	(0.009)	(0.053)
Generic × Black			-0.004	0.071	-0.004	0.072
			(0.007)	(0.091)	(0.007)	(0.092)
Combined × Black			0.005		0.005	
			(0.006)		(0.006)	
Intrinsic × Hispanic			0.012	-0.030	0.011	-0.024
			(0.008)	(0.028)	(0.008)	(0.028)
Generic × Hispanic			0.007	-0.073	0.006	-0.074+
			(0.013)	(0.044)	(0.012)	(0.044)
Combined × Hispanic			-0.001		-0.001	
			(0.005)		(0.005)	
In-State					-0.004+	-0.029
					(0.003)	(0.018)
Unknown					-0.005+	-0.068*
					(0.003)	(0.030)
Intrinsic × In-State					0.007	-0.040
					(0.005)	(0.026)
Generic × In-State					0.018+	-0.003
					(0.010)	(0.041)
Combined × In-State					0.005	
					(0.003)	
Intrinsic × Unknown					0.014+	-0.035
					(0.007)	(0.044)
Generic × Unknown					0.004	0.148
					(0.003)	(0.134)
Combined × Unknown					0.006	
					(0.005)	
Num.Obs.	7355	3176	7355	3176	7355	3176
R2	0.003	0.008	0.005	0.015	0.007	0.022
R2 Adj.	0.001	0.006	0.002	0.009	0.002	0.015
AIC	5530.7	1985.9	5554.0	1982.7	5568.7	1971.6
BIC	5620.5	2046.6	5726.6	2097.9	5796.5	2123.2
RMSE	0.35	0.33	0.35	0.33	0.35	0.33

Note: Reference category for treatment appeal is 'Extrinsic', for gender is 'Male', for state is 'Out-of-State'. Each of the race-specific covariates is a binary indicator that equals 1 if a respondent is of a given race/ethnicity and 0 otherwise. Estimates are based on the Hajek estimator with heteroskedasticity-robust (HC2) standard errors. +p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<.01, ***p<0.001.

for Black respondents than for non-Black respondents. Specifically, Black respondents who received an intrinsic appeal are 8.9 percentage points more likely to respond via text than Black respondents with an extrinsic appeal. The positive treatment effect among Black respondents also comports with relevant literature that emphasizes the importance of racial "linked fate" among Black voters that leads them to make political decisions based on co-racial group interests rather than on their won (Dawson, 1994).

C.7 Supplementary Results: Long-Term Effects

C.7.1 Correlation Analyses

Table C.8: Correlation Coefficients of Click Rate on Long-Term Outcomes

	Application Started			Application Completed			Attended					
							All Data			Limited to Applicants		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Clicked	0.068***	0.050***	0.049***	0.050***	0.035***	0.034***	0.014***	0.013***	0.013***	0.099	0.143*	0.133*
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.076)
Experiment Type (Email=0;Text=1)		0.028***	0.040***		0.024***	0.034***		0.0005	0.004		−0.134**	0.081
		(0.003)	(0.010)		(0.003)	(0.009)		(0.001)	(0.004)		(0.054)	(0.220)
Constant	0.020***	0.012***	0.010	0.017***	0.010***	0.008	0.002***	0.002***	−0.00003	0.142***	0.218***	−0.000
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.028)	(0.041)	(0.206)
Treatment Arms:			X			X			X			X
Observations	10,531	10,531	10,531	10,531	10,531	10,531	10,531	10,531	10,531	198	198	198
R^2	0.008	0.015	0.017	0.005	0.011	0.013	0.003	0.003	0.005	0.009	0.040	0.166
Adjusted R^2	0.008	0.015	0.015	0.005	0.011	0.011	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.004	0.030	0.039

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

C.7.2 Full Regression Results

Table C.9: Treatment Effects on Emerging Political Ambition

Treatment	Total Treated	Application Started		Application Completed		Attended Program		Attended | Applied	
		Est (S.E.)	N	Est (S.E.)	N	Est (S.E.)	N	Est (S.E.)	N
Email Experiment									
Intrinsic	2,662	0.015 (0.002)***	37	0.013 (0.002)***	32	0.003 (0.001)***	8	0.254 (0.080)***	8
Generic	422	0.014 (0.006)**	6	0.007 (0.004)*	3	0.000 (0.000)	0	0.000 (0.000)	0
Combined	3,119	0.011 (0.002)***	33	0.010 (0.002)***	32	0.003 (0.001)***	9	0.277 (0.081)***	9
Extrinsic	1,152	0.010 (0.003)***	12	0.008 (0.003)***	9	0.000 (0.000)	0	0.000 (0.000)	0
Group Solidarity	382	0.023 (0.008)***	9	0.018 (0.007)***	7	0.005 (0.004)	2	0.282 (0.193)	2
Racial Threat I	1,113	0.020 (0.005)***	18	0.019 (0.005)***	16	0.006 (0.003)*	4	0.325 (0.161)**	4
Credible Demand	383	0.017 (0.006)***	7	0.012 (0.005)**	5	0.000 (0.000)	0	0.000 (0.000)	0
GS + CI + CD	382	0.015 (0.006)**	6	0.015 (0.006)**	6	0.007 (0.004)*	3	0.473 (0.231)**	3
Generic	422	0.014 (0.006)**	6	0.007 (0.004)*	3	0.000 (0.000)	0	0.000 (0.000)	0
RT + CD	389	0.013 (0.006)**	5	0.013 (0.006)**	5	0.002 (0.002)	1	0.180 (0.187)	1
GS + RT + CI	380	0.011 (0.005)**	4	0.011 (0.005)**	4	0.000 (0.000)	0	0.000 (0.000)	0
Racial Threat II	377	0.011 (0.005)**	4	0.011 (0.005)**	4	0.003 (0.003)	1	0.261 (0.253)	1
GS + RT + CD	382	0.010 (0.005)**	4	0.010 (0.005)**	4	0.005 (0.004)	2	0.516 (0.284)*	2
RT + CI	439	0.010 (0.005)**	5	0.009 (0.004)**	4	0.000 (0.000)	0	0.000 (0.000)	0
CI + CD	388	0.010 (0.005)**	4	0.008 (0.004)*	3	0.000 (0.000)	0	0.000 (0.000)	0
GS + RT + CI + CD	379	0.008 (0.005)*	3	0.008 (0.005)*	3	0.000 (0.000)***	0	0.000 (0.000)	0
GS + CD	380	0.008 (0.004)*	3	0.008 (0.004)*	3	0.003 (0.003)	1	0.349 (0.316)	1
GS + CI	388	0.008 (0.004)*	3	0.008 (0.004)*	3	0.005 (0.004)	2	0.649 (0.317)**	2
GS + RT I	409	0.007 (0.004)*	3	0.007 (0.004)*	3	0.003 (0.003)	1	0.370 (0.324)	1
GS + RT II	381	0.007 (0.004)*	3	0.005 (0.004)	2	0.000 (0.000)	0	0.000 (0.000)	0
Co-ethnic Incumb	381	0.003 (0.003)	1	0.003 (0.003)	1	0.000 (0.000)	0	0.000 (0.000)	0
Text Experiment									
Intrinsic	1,534	0.054 (0.006)***	82	0.044 (0.005)***	67	0.005 (0.002)***	9	0.123 (0.040)***	9
Extrinsic	1,302	0.039 (0.006)***	51	0.032 (0.005)***	42	0.001 (0.001)	2	0.040 (0.029)	2
Generic	340	0.039 (0.010)***	14	0.037 (0.010)***	13	0.009 (0.005)*	3	0.235 (0.121)*	3
Racial Threat B	519	0.070 (0.014)***	30	0.057 (0.012)***	24	0.006 (0.004)	3	0.101 (0.065)	3
Group Solidarity A	272	0.060 (0.015)***	16	0.060 (0.015)***	16	0.005 (0.005)	1	0.084 (0.083)	1
Group Solidarity B	320	0.050 (0.012)***	16	0.041 (0.011)***	13	0.006 (0.005)	2	0.153 (0.105)	2
Racial Threat A	423	0.046 (0.010)***	20	0.032 (0.009)***	14	0.006 (0.004)	3	0.185 (0.107)*	3
Credible Demand A	266	0.042 (0.012)***	12	0.038 (0.011)***	11	0.003 (0.003)	1	0.082 (0.082)	1
Generic A	340	0.039 (0.010)***	14	0.037 (0.010)***	13	0.009 (0.005)*	3	0.235 (0.125)*	3
Co-ethnic Incumbency B	347	0.039 (0.011)***	13	0.030 (0.010)***	10	0.002 (0.002)	1	0.082 (0.082)	1
Co-ethnic Incumbency A	331	0.037 (0.011)***	12	0.030 (0.010)***	10	0.000 (0.000)	0	0.000 (0.000)	0
Credible Demand B	358	0.037 (0.010)***	14	0.029 (0.009)***	11	0.000 (0.000)	0	0.000 (0.000)***	0

Note: Status of application start, application completion, and attendance rate for each treatment group from email and text experiments. Within each group shows the total sample size associated with each status ("N") and the estimated average rate associated with each status ("Est (S.E.)"). Average rates are estimated using the AWAIPW estimator. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

C.7.3 ESTIMATED DIFFERENCES

Figure C.12: Average Treatment Effects of Long-Term Outcomes, Aggregate



Note: The point estimates represent the difference between the intrinsic appeal and the remaining treatment appeals. The error bars represent 95% confidence interval.

Figure C.13: Average Treatment Effects of Long-Term Outcomes, Email



Note: The point estimates represent the difference between the Group Solidarity appeal (top row) as well as the Racial Threat I appeal (bottom row) against the remaining treatment appeals. The error bars represent a 95% confidence interval. "RT" = Racial Threat, "GS" = Group Solidarity, "CI" = Co-ethnic Incumbency.

Figure C.14: Average Treatment Effects of Long-Term Outcomes, Text



Note: The point estimates represent the difference between the four individual intrinsic appeals and the remaining treatment appeals. The error bars represent a 95% confidence interval. "RT" = Racial Threat, "GS" = Group Solidarity, "CI" = Co-ethnic Incumbency.

C.7.4 HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS

Table C.10: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects, Long-Term Outcomes

	Application Started						Application Submitted					
	Gender		+Race		+State		Gender		+Race		+State	
	Email	Text	Email	Text	Email	Text	Email	Text	Email	Text	Email	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
(Intercept)	0.006	0.141***	0.007	0.138***	0.008	0.148***	0.006	0.141***	0.007	0.138***	0.008	0.148***
	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.004)	(0.017)	(0.005)	(0.018)	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.004)	(0.017)	(0.005)	(0.018)
Intrinsic	0.008	0.017	0.005	0.015	0.001	0.025	0.008	0.017	0.005	0.015	0.001	0.025
	(0.006)	(0.020)	(0.006)	(0.024)	(0.007)	(0.025)	(0.006)	(0.020)	(0.006)	(0.024)	(0.007)	(0.025)
Generic	-0.006	0.002	-0.007	0.032	-0.014+	0.029	-0.006	0.002	-0.007	0.032	-0.014+	0.029
	(0.005)	(0.031)	(0.005)	(0.041)	(0.007)	(0.043)	(0.005)	(0.031)	(0.005)	(0.041)	(0.007)	(0.043)
Combined	-0.002		-0.002		-0.005		-0.002		-0.002		-0.005	
	(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.006)		(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.006)	
Female	-0.005	-0.064***	-0.005	-0.064***	-0.005	-0.060**	-0.005	-0.064***	-0.005	-0.064***	-0.005	-0.060**
	(0.005)	(0.018)	(0.005)	(0.018)	(0.005)	(0.019)	(0.005)	(0.018)	(0.005)	(0.018)	(0.005)	(0.019)
Other/Unknown	-0.006	-0.055*	-0.006	-0.054*	-0.006	-0.052*	-0.006	-0.055*	-0.006	-0.054*	-0.006	-0.052*
	(0.005)	(0.026)	(0.004)	(0.026)	(0.004)	(0.026)	(0.005)	(0.026)	(0.004)	(0.026)	(0.004)	(0.026)
Intrinsic × Female	-0.004	0.035	-0.004	0.038	-0.003	0.045+	-0.004	0.035	-0.004	0.038	-0.003	0.045+
	(0.007)	(0.027)	(0.007)	(0.027)	(0.007)	(0.027)	(0.007)	(0.027)	(0.007)	(0.027)	(0.007)	(0.027)
Generic × Female	0.009	0.005	0.008	0.008	0.009	0.008	0.009	0.005	0.008	0.008	0.009	0.008
	(0.007)	(0.041)	(0.006)	(0.041)	(0.006)	(0.041)	(0.007)	(0.041)	(0.006)	(0.041)	(0.006)	(0.041)
Combined × Female	0.003		0.003		0.003		0.003		0.003		0.003	
	(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.006)	
Intrinsic × Other/Unknown	-0.001	0.018	0.002	0.009	0.000	0.016	-0.001	0.018	0.002	0.009	0.000	0.016
	(0.007)	(0.037)	(0.007)	(0.038)	(0.007)	(0.038)	(0.007)	(0.037)	(0.007)	(0.038)	(0.007)	(0.038)
Generic × Other/Unknown	0.021	0.082	0.022	0.080	0.021	0.075	0.021	0.082	0.022	0.080	0.021	0.075
	(0.015)	(0.067)	(0.015)	(0.068)	(0.015)	(0.066)	(0.015)	(0.067)	(0.015)	(0.068)	(0.015)	(0.066)
Combined × Other/Unknown	0.003		0.003		0.002		0.003		0.003		0.002	
	(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.005)	
AAPI			-0.003	-0.015	-0.003	-0.011			-0.003	-0.015	-0.003	-0.011
			(0.002)	(0.025)	(0.002)	(0.025)			(0.002)	(0.025)	(0.002)	(0.025)
Black			-0.002	0.006	-0.002	0.006			-0.002	0.006	-0.002	0.006
			(0.002)	(0.034)	(0.002)	(0.034)			(0.002)	(0.034)	(0.002)	(0.034)
Hispanic			0.001	0.011	0.001	0.011			0.001	0.011	0.001	0.011
			(0.005)	(0.020)	(0.005)	(0.020)			(0.005)	(0.020)	(0.005)	(0.020)
Intrinsic × AAPI			0.000	0.037	0.000	0.037			0.000	0.037	0.000	0.037
			(0.004)	(0.038)	(0.004)	(0.038)			(0.004)	(0.038)	(0.004)	(0.038)
Generic × AAPI			-0.002	-0.090+	-0.003	-0.090+			-0.002	-0.090+	-0.003	-0.090+
			(0.006)	(0.051)	(0.007)	(0.052)			(0.006)	(0.051)	(0.007)	(0.052)
Combined × AAPI			0.006		0.006				0.006		0.006	
			(0.005)		(0.005)				(0.005)		(0.005)	
Intrinsic × Black			0.009	0.089+	0.009	0.090+			0.009	0.089+	0.009	0.090+
			(0.009)	(0.054)	(0.009)	(0.053)			(0.009)	(0.054)	(0.009)	(0.053)
Generic × Black			-0.004	0.071	-0.004	0.072			-0.004	0.071	-0.004	0.072
			(0.007)	(0.091)	(0.007)	(0.092)			(0.007)	(0.091)	(0.007)	(0.092)
Combined × Black			0.005		0.005				0.005		0.005	
			(0.006)		(0.006)				(0.006)		(0.006)	
Intrinsic × Hispanic			0.012	-0.030	0.011	-0.024			0.012	-0.030	0.011	-0.024
			(0.008)	(0.028)	(0.008)	(0.028)			(0.008)	(0.028)	(0.008)	(0.028)
Generic × Hispanic			0.007	-0.073	0.006	-0.074+			0.007	-0.073	0.006	-0.074+
			(0.013)	(0.044)	(0.012)	(0.044)			(0.013)	(0.044)	(0.012)	(0.044)
Combined × Hispanic			-0.001		-0.001				-0.001		-0.001	
			(0.005)		(0.005)				(0.005)		(0.005)	
In-State					-0.004+	-0.029					-0.004+	-0.029
					(0.003)	(0.018)					(0.003)	(0.018)
Unknown					-0.005+	-0.068*					-0.005+	-0.068*
					(0.003)	(0.030)					(0.003)	(0.030)
Intrinsic × In-State					0.007	-0.040					0.007	-0.040
					(0.005)	(0.026)					(0.005)	(0.026)
Generic × In-State					0.018+	-0.003					0.018+	-0.003
					(0.010)	(0.041)					(0.010)	(0.041)
Combined × In-State					0.005						0.005	
					(0.003)						(0.003)	
Intrinsic × Unknown					0.014+	-0.035					0.014+	-0.035
					(0.007)	(0.044)					(0.007)	(0.044)
Generic × Unknown					0.004	0.148					0.004	0.148
					(0.003)	(0.134)					(0.003)	(0.134)
Combined × Unknown					0.006						0.006	
					(0.005)						(0.005)	
Num.Obs.	7355	3176	7355	3176	7355	3176	7355	3176	7355	3176	7355	3176
R2	0.003	0.008	0.005	0.015	0.007	0.022	0.003	0.008	0.005	0.015	0.007	0.022
R2 Adj.	0.001	0.006	0.002	0.009	0.002	0.015	0.001	0.006	0.002	0.009	0.002	0.015
AIC	5530.7	1985.9	5554.0	1982.7	5568.7	1971.6	5530.7	1985.9	5554.0	1982.7	5568.7	1971.6
BIC	5620.5	2046.6	5726.6	2097.9	5796.5	2123.2	5620.5	2046.6	5726.6	2097.9	5796.5	2123.2
RMSE	0.35	0.33	0.35	0.33	0.35	0.33	0.35	0.33	0.35	0.33	0.35	0.33

Note: Reference category for treatment appeal is 'Extrinsic', for gender is 'Male', for state is 'Out-of-State'. Each of the race-specific covariates is a binary indicator that equals 1 if a respondent is of a given race/ethnicity and 0 otherwise. Estimates are based on the Hajek estimator with heteroskedasticity-robust (HC2) standard errors. +p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<.01, ***p<0.001.

C.8 Deviation from Pre-Analysis Plan

- The total number of periods in the Experiment I (Email) was reduced from 10 to 9. The first batch was run on a sample of 1,500, each prime with a different subject line. The result revealed that the open rate depended significantly on the subject line, which, given the word limit, did not accurately convey the mechanisms the experiment intended to convey. Furthermore, the result revealed that the subject line with a personal appeal, "you'd be a great elected official." (which was used in the experiment by Broockman, 2014*b*) had a significantly higher open rate across all 17 different subject lines tested. Therefore, for the ensuing nine periods, the subject lines were set to such for all treatment messages.
- Related to the previous note, the total sample size was reduced from 13,514 to roughly 10,000 after removing 1) duplicates and 2) the sample from period 1.
- Experiment I adaptive trial was pre-registered to be conducted every week beginning on Tuesday, January 3, 2023. The first batch began on Tuesday, January 10, 2023. Furthermore, as shown in Figure 4.2, the interval was shortened such that the batches were sent every Monday and Thursday from February 6, 2023, and onward. This decision was made for several reasons. First, the adaptive trials were expedited upon the organization's request. Second, the open rate was observed in real-time for the first four batches (when the batches were sent every week), and I found that the open rate dropped to near zero after two days.
- Experiment II (Text) was pre-registered as a static experiment with five treatment primes but was conducted in a 2-period adaptive trial with nine treatment primes.
- Experiment II was pre-registered to begin after the end of Experiment I but was conducted between batch 5 and 6 of Experiment I Phase I (see Figure 4.2). The organization requested an early start of Experiment II.

- Because Experiment II utilized samples who were treated in Experiment I, the first period of Experiment II adopted block randomization among two groups: 1) those who were never treated or opened the email in Experiment I (96% of the total sample); 2) those who opened the email in Experiment I (4%). For samples in group 2), they received the same treatment message as the one they received in Experiment I. That is, if a recipient received a racial threat prime via email, they also received a racial threat prime via text. The I.P. regression estimates account for the differing treatment assignment probabilities.
- Because Experiment I Phase II was conducted after Experiment II, block randomization was implemented based on four groups: 1) highly engaged members who were treated in Experiment II (5%); 2) less engaged members who were treated in Experiment II (76%); 3) highly engaged members who were not treated in Experiment II (1%); and 4) less engaged members who were not treated in Experiment II (17%). The level of engagement was based on the open rate of the most recent email by NAL prior to the experiment (in December 2022).
- Following the previous note, the treatment messages for those in groups 1) and 2) were fixed to the same treatment primes they received in Experiment II. The I.P. regression estimates account for the differing treatment assignment probabilities.

D

New American Leaders Member Survey

D.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table D.1: NAL Survey Sample Descriptive Statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
US Born	335	0.576	0.495	0	1
Female	242	0.595	0.492	0	1
Single	240	0.442	0.498	0	1
Has child	240	0.429	0.496	0	1
Income: <$30K	235	0.081	0.273	0	1
Income: $30-50K	235	0.106	0.309	0	1
Income: $50-70K	235	0.136	0.344	0	1
Income: $70K-100K	235	0.243	0.430	0	1
Income: $100K-150K	235	0.209	0.407	0	1
Income: >$150K	235	0.226	0.419	0	1
Education: HS or below	240	0.033	0.180	0	1
Education: 2yr or some college	240	0.146	0.354	0	1
Education: Bachelor's degree	240	0.346	0.477	0	1
Education: Postgraduate degree	240	0.475	0.500	0	1
Race: Asian	318	0.248	0.433	0	1
Race: Black	318	0.119	0.325	0	1
Race: Hispanic	318	0.387	0.488	0	1
Race: MENA	335	0.066	0.248	0	1
Race: Multi-racial	335	0.033	0.178	0	1
Race: Other	335	0.072	0.258	0	1
Race: White	335	0.113	0.318	0	1
Attended Program	335	0.370	0.484	0	1
Run for Office	335	0.137	0.345	0	1
Won Elections	335	0.075	0.263	0	1

Figure D.1: Geographic Distribution of Survey Participants



D.2 Full Estimation Results

Table D.2: Full Results: AMCE and ACIE

Attribute/Level	ACME			ACIE	
	All (N=2326) (1)	Attended (N=1174) (2)	Did Not Attend (N=1152) (3)	Attended - Did Not Attend (4)	Attended - Did Not Attend (5)
Co-ethnic Population (Baseline: 30% co-ethnic)					
50% co-ethnic	0.001 (0.033)	0.002 (0.047)	0.011 (0.046)	-0.010 (0.066)	0.012 (0.054)
70% co-ethnic	0.031 (0.025)	0.075 (0.038)**	-0.018 (0.034)	0.093 (0.051)*	0.093 (0.045)**
Credible Demand (Baseline: Renewable energy)					
Small business	-0.007 (0.035)	0.000 (0.052)	-0.007 (0.046)	0.008 (0.069)	
Racial diversity	0.010 (0.025)	-0.007 (0.033)	0.033 (0.037)	-0.040 (0.049)	
Co-ethnic Electoral Performance (Baseline: None)					
Increasing	0.022 (0.029)	0.018 (0.043)	0.024 (0.039)	-0.006 (0.058)	
High	-0.017 (0.028)	0.006 (0.036)	-0.051 (0.043)	0.057 (0.056)	
Major Social Issue (Baseline: School shooting)					
Natural disaster	0.015 (0.037)	-0.014 (0.052)	0.047 (0.051)	-0.062 (0.073)	-0.086 (0.067)
Racial violence	0.042 (0.033)	0.001 (0.045)	0.094 (0.046)**	-0.093 (0.065)	-0.112 (0.062)*

Note: ACIE estimates represent the difference in marginal effects between program attendees and non-attendees. Positive (negative) estimates therefore represents higher estimate among the program attendees. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

E

Observational Study

E.1 Generalized Synthetic Control Estimation Strategy

All notations and descriptions used here are a direct adaptation from Xu (2017). Let $Y_{i,t}$ be the outcome of interest for city i at period t. Let $\mathcal{T}$ and $\mathcal{C}$ be the sets of cities in treatment and control groups, respectively. The total number of cities in the data is represented by $N = N_{tr} + N_{co}$ where N_{tr} and N_{co} denote the numbers of treated and control cities, respectively. Let $T_{0,i}$ be the number of pre-treatment periods for city i, which is first exposed to the treatment (e.g., death of Michael Brown) at time $T_{0,i} + 1$ and onward, observed for $q_i = T - T0, i$ periods. Cities in the control group are never exposed

to the treatment. For simplicity, assume that the first exposure to the treatment happens at $t = 0$—i.e., $T_{0,i} = T_0$ and $q_i = q$—for all cities.

The GSC estimator assumes that the outcome $Y_{i,t}$ is given by a linear factor model:

$$Y_{i,t} = \delta_{i,t} D_{i,t} + x'_{i,t}\beta + \lambda'_i f_t + \epsilon_{i,t} \tag{E.1}$$

where $D_{i,t}$ denotes the treatment indicator that equals 1 if city i has been exposed to the treatment prior to period t and 0 otherwise. $\delta_{i,t}$ denotes the heterogeneous treatment effect on city i at time t; $X'_{i,t}$ is a $(k \times 1)$ vector of observed covariates, $\beta = [\beta_1, ..., \beta_k]'$ is a $(k \times 1)$ vector of unknown parameters, $f_t = [f_{1,t}, ..., f_{r,t}]$ is an $(r \times 1)$ vector of unobserved common factors, $\lambda_i = [\lambda_{i,1}, ..., \lambda_{i,r}]'$ is an $(r \times 1)$ vector of unknown factor loadings, and $\epsilon_{i,t}$ represents unobserved idiosyncratic shocks for unit i at time t with mean zero. The factor component of the model, $\lambda'_i f_t = \lambda_{i,1} f_{1,t} + ... + \lambda_{i,r} f_{r,t}$, takes a linear, additive form by assumption.

Using the notation from the potential outcomes framework for causal inference, we can rewrite the data-generating process (DGP) of each unit as follows:

$$Y_i = D_i \circ \delta_i + X_i\beta + F\lambda_i + \epsilon_i, \quad i \in 1, 2, ..N_{co}, N_{co} + 1, ...N \tag{E.2}$$

where $Y_i = [Y_{i,1}, ..., Y_{i,T}]'$; $D_i = [D_{i,1}, ..., D_{i,T}]'$; $\delta_i = [\delta_{i,1}, ..., \delta_{i,T}]'$; $\epsilon_i = [\epsilon_{i,1}, ..., \epsilon_{i,T}]'$ are $(T \times 1)$ vectors; $X_i = [x_{i,1}, ..., x_{i,T}]'$ is a $(T \times k)$ matrix; and $F = [f_1, ..., f_r]'$ is a $(T \times r)$ matrix.[1] Thus, the outcome across all control units can be written as:

$$Y_{co} = X_{co}\beta + F\Lambda'_{co} + \epsilon_{co} \tag{E.3}$$

The main quantity of interest is the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) at

[1]Therefore $Y_{i,t}(1)$ and $Y_{i,t}(0)$ denote the potential outcomes for city i at time t under treatment ($D_{i,t} = 1$) and control ($D_{i,t} = 0$), respectively.

time t:

$$\begin{aligned} ATT_{t,t>T_0} &= \frac{1}{N_{tr}} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{T}} [Y_{i,t}(1) - Y_{i,t}(0)] \\ &= \frac{1}{N_{tr}} \sum_{1 \in \mathcal{T}} \delta_{i,t} \end{aligned} \tag{E.4}$$

where $\delta_{i,t}$ is treated as given once the sample is drawn. Because $Y_{i,t}(1)$ is observed for treated units in post-treatment periods, the main goal of GSC is to construct counterfactuals for each treated unit in post-treatment periods, which essentially becomes a missing data imputation problem.[2]

The GSC estimator for ATT for city i at period t is given by the difference between the actual treated outcome and imputed counterfactuals—i.e., $\hat{\delta}_{i,t} = Y_{i,t}(1) - \hat{Y}_{i,t}(0)$. $\hat{Y}_{i,t}(0)$ is imputed with three steps. First, we estimate an interactive fixed effects (LFE) model using just the control group data and obtain $\hat{\beta}, \hat{F}, \hat{\Lambda}_{co}$:

$$\begin{aligned} (\hat{\beta}, \hat{F}, \hat{\Lambda}_{co}) &= \underset{\tilde{\beta}, \tilde{F}, \tilde{\Lambda}_{co}}{\operatorname{argmin}} \sum_{i=C} (Y_i - X_i\tilde{\beta} - \tilde{F}\tilde{\lambda}_i)'(Y_i - X_i\tilde{\beta} - \tilde{F}\tilde{\lambda}_i \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \tilde{F}'\tilde{F}/T = I_r \quad \text{and} \quad \tilde{\Lambda}_{co}'\tilde{\Lambda}_{co} \quad \text{is diagonal} \end{aligned} \tag{E.5}$$

The second step is to estimate factor loadings for each treated unit by minimizing the mean squared error of the predicted treated outcome in post-treatment periods:

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{\lambda}_i &= \underset{\tilde{\lambda}_i}{\operatorname{argmin}} (Y_i^0 - X_i^0\hat{\beta} - \hat{F}^0\tilde{\lambda}_i)'(Y_i^0 - X_i^0\hat{\beta} - \hat{F}^0\tilde{\lambda}_i) \\ &= (\hat{F}'^0\hat{F}^0)^{-1}\hat{F}'^0(Y_i^0 - X_i^0\hat{\beta}), \quad i \in \mathcal{T} \end{aligned} \tag{E.6}$$

In order to estimate the number of factors (r), the GSC estimator relies on a leave-one-out-cross-validation scheme, in which it holds back a small set of control group data (i.e.,

[2]For additional assumptions and constraints, see Xu (2017).

$\{Y_i, X_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{C}}$) and use the rest of the control group data to predict the held-back information with different values of r. The algorithm then chooses the model that minimizes the mean square prediction error—i.e., a model that makes the most accurate predictions on average.

Lastly, we calculate treated counterfactuals based on $\hat{\beta}, \hat{F}$, and $\hat{\Lambda}_{co}$:

$$\hat{Y}_{i,t}(0) = x'_{i,t}\hat{\beta} + \hat{\lambda}'_i \hat{f}_i \quad i \in \mathcal{T}, t > T_0 \tag{E.7}$$

An estimator for ATT_t is therefore

$$\hat{ATT}_t = \frac{1}{N_{tr}} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{T}} [Y_{i,t}(1) - \hat{Y}_{i,t}(0)] \quad \text{for} \quad t > T_0 \tag{E.8}$$

GSC has several statistical and practical advantages. First, GSC reduces the implausibility of the assumption of parallel trends, which is necessary for standard DID estimation strategies. Second, the GSC method produces frequentist uncertainty estimates, such as standard errors and confidence intervals, and improves efficiency under correct model specifications. Third, it automates the selection of the number of factors of the interactive fixed effects via a cross-validation scheme, which reduces the risk of overfitting. Fourth, GSC generalizes the conventional synthetic control method to cases of multiple treated units.

Table E.1: Effect of Police Brutality Related Deaths on Black Candidate Supply

Time	Michael Brown, Ferguson		Eric Garner, New York		Freddie Gray, Baltimore		Police Brutality (≥3 Deaths)	
	ATT (S.E.)	95% C.I.	ATT (S.E.)	95% C.I.	ATT (S.E.)	95% C.I.	ATT (S.E.)	95% C.I.
-9	-0.10 (0.08)	[-0.26, 0.07]	-0.17 (0.08)**	[-0.34, -0.01]	0.27 (0.07)***	[0.13, 0.41]	0.01 (0.01)	[-0.02, 0.04]
-8	0.10 (0.09)	[-0.07, 0.27]	-0.16 (0.09)*	[-0.33, 0.00]	-0.05 (0.09)	[-0.23, 0.12]	-0.02 (0.01)	[-0.05, 0.01]
-7	-0.12 (0.09)	[-0.28, 0.05]	0.26 (0.09)***	[0.09, 0.43]	-0.03 (0.09)	[-0.20, 0.14]	-0.05 (0.01)***	[-0.08, -0.03]
-6	0.20 (0.09)**	[0.03, 0.37]	-0.41 (0.09)***	[-0.59, -0.24]	-0.11 (0.09)	[-0.28, 0.06]	-0.03 (0.01)*	[-0.06, -0.00]
-5	-0.15 (0.08)*	[-0.31, 0.01]	-0.21 (0.08)**	[-0.37, -0.04]	0.32 (0.09)***	[0.15, 0.49]	0.00 (0.01)	[-0.02, 0.03]
-4	0.10 (0.09)	[-0.08, 0.28]	0.35 (0.10)***	[0.16, 0.54]	-0.03 (0.07)	[-0.17, 0.10]	0.01 (0.01)	[-0.02, 0.04]
-3	0.09 (0.09)	[-0.08, 0.26]	0.61 (0.09)***	[0.44, 0.78]	0.01 (0.07)	[-0.14, 0.15]	0.02 (0.01)	[-0.00, 0.05]
-2	-0.17 (0.09)*	[-0.34, 0.01]	0.05 (0.10)	[-0.14, 0.24]	0.01 (0.08)	[-0.15, 0.17]	-0.04 (0.01)***	[-0.07, -0.01]
-1	0.02 (0.08)	[-0.14, 0.18]	-0.16 (0.08)*	[-0.33, 0.00]	-0.19 (0.08)**	[-0.34, -0.04]	-0.03 (0.01)**	[-0.06, -0.00]
0	0.01 (0.11)	[-0.20, 0.23]	-0.15 (0.11)	[-0.38, 0.07]	0.15 (0.06)**	[0.03, 0.26]	0.03 (0.01)*	[-0.00, 0.05]
1	0.31 (0.13)**	[0.06, 0.56]	-0.36 (0.13)**	[-0.61, -0.10]	0.70 (0.13)***	[0.45, 0.95]	0.01 (0.03)	[-0.04, 0.06]
2	0.17 (0.14)	[-0.10, 0.43]	-0.36 (0.14)**	[-0.64, -0.08]	0.68 (0.16)***	[0.36, 1.00]	0.01 (0.03)	[-0.05, 0.07]
3	0.17 (0.13)	[-0.09, 0.43]	-0.15 (0.14)	[-0.43, 0.13]	0.88 (0.21)***	[0.47, 1.30]	0.06 (0.03)*	[-0.01, 0.13]
4	0.60 (0.14)***	[0.32, 0.88]	-0.13 (0.16)	[-0.45, 0.19]	0.71 (0.16)***	[0.40, 1.03]	0.08 (0.04)*	[0.00, 0.17]
5	0.46 (0.12)***	[0.22, 0.70]	0.34 (0.14)**	[0.06, 0.62]	0.98 (0.32)***	[0.35, 1.60]	0.11 (0.05)**	[0.01, 0.20]
6	0.26 (0.17)	[-0.07, 0.59]	0.26 (0.19)	[-0.12, 0.63]			0.06 (0.06)	[-0.05, 0.17]

Note: Time is relative to the treatment period, with 0 representing the treatment year. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

E.3 Supplementary Results

Figure E.1: Actual and Counterfactual Outcomes



Note: Actual (solid black) and counterfactual (dashed blue) share of Black candidates. The vertical line represents the beginning of the treatment period.

Figure E.2: List of Treated Cities



Note: List of treated cities used to estimate ATT in Figure 6.4. Light (dark) blue represents a pre- (post-) treatment period.

Figure E.3: Estimated Effects of Police Brutality



Note: Estimated average treatment effect of police brutality incidences across U.S. cities on % Black candidates in local elections in subsequent years. The solid black line represents the estimated average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), and the gray bands represent a 95% confidence interval.

Figure E.4: Aggregated Effects of Police Brutality with Different Thresholds



Note: Estimated average treatment effect of police brutality incidences across U.S. cities on % Black candidates in local elections in subsequent years. The solid black line represents the estimated average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), and the gray bands represent a 95% confidence interval.