

Window for Peace:
Determinants of Third-Party Guarantees in Intrastate Conflict Resolution

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ABSTRACT

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The literature on civil war termination has argued that comprehensive peace agreements and third-party guarantees that provide verification, operational support, or enforcement of agreement implementation contribute to the successful settlement of civil wars. Yet there is to date no systematic study of the complex process by which guarantees are first given and then fulfilled while accounting for the strategic context within which this process occurs. This dissertation explores how potential guarantors' perceptions of their own and of the conflict parties' interests and means influence whether they give a guarantee and what type of guarantee they give.

I show that a guarantor's interests and capacity as well as its expectations of the conflict parties' commitment problems and preferences affect its decision to give a guarantee in support of intrastate conflict resolution. In particular, a potential guarantor's material and structural capacity determines the type of guarantee they are likely to give. In addition, a potential guarantor's perception that the conflict parties prefer a negotiated settlement over continued fighting increases its expectations of a successful guarantee and thus makes a guarantee more likely.

I test the theoretical hypotheses using statistical analysis of newly coded data, case study research, and in-depth interviews. The dissertation contributes to a better understanding of when and what types of third-party guarantees are given with the aim of supporting the successful implementation of peace agreements to end civil conflict. My findings provide a foundation for subsequent research on the effects of third-party guarantees on the peace process.

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For Bricklin

Chapter 1

Introduction

*At the beginning we make decisions of great complexity
with the least amount of knowledge.*

Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under-Secretary-General
for Peacekeeping Operations, 2000–2008

The literature on intrastate conflict termination has argued that comprehensive peace agreements and third-party guarantees aimed at providing verification, logistical support, or enforcement of agreement implementation contribute to the successful settlement of civil conflicts.¹ Yet there has been no systematic examination of the complex process and strategic context of third-party guarantees that differentiates between different types of guarantees, that recognizes that promised guarantees are not always fully provided, and that takes into account the calculated interactions of conflict parties and guarantors.

Furthermore, guarantee process variables have not been systematically linked to peace process outcomes to analyze the conditions under which third-party guarantees effectively support the implementation of peace agreements and the extent to which guarantees might potentially have a negative effect on the peace process. Empirical cases featuring both comprehensive peace agreements and third-party guarantees do not always result in successful

¹ See for example Walter (2002) and Fortna (2004a).

agreement implementation and lasting peace. For example, in efforts to end the civil wars in Angola in 1991 and Mozambique in 1992, the conflict parties reached comprehensive peace agreements and the United Nations (UN) agreed to monitor and verify the conflict parties' demobilization in order to aid the implementation of the agreement. Yet while Mozambique's civil war ended and peace was established,² in Angola the peace process failed, the treaty was never implemented, and conflict resumed.

These cases suggest that other factors influence whether peace agreements that are implemented with the help of third-party guarantees lead to the peaceful resolution of intrastate conflicts. This dissertation is motivated by the proposition that whether a peace agreement is able to resolve civil conflict is shaped by the effectiveness of third-party guarantees in supporting the implementation of the agreement. Guarantee effectiveness in turn is determined at the beginning of the guarantee process, namely at the time when a third party decides whether to give a guarantee. Why do third parties promise guarantees in some conflicts but not in others? Furthermore, in cases where third parties give guarantees, what determines the type of guarantee they promise? For example, in 1996 the UN promised to ensure transparency and provide operational support in the Guatemalan peace process by monitoring the ceasefire and supporting and verifying the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) of Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) militias as agreed by the government and rebels in the Agreement on the Definitive Ceasefire aimed at ending 36 years of civil conflict. In 1998 the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) gave an enforcement guarantee that was to be provided by an ECOWAS Military Observer Group interposition force with the mandate to enforce the Abuja Peace Agreement between the Government of Guinea Bissau and the Self-

² Peace lasted for over 20 years until 2013 when low-scale fighting resumed between Renamo and the Frelimo-run government. In 2014 both parties signed a peace agreement that provided for the integration of the Renamo fighters into the national army and for electoral changes ahead of the 2014 elections (Pettersson and Wallenstein 2015, 544).

Proclaimed Military Junta. In contrast, there was no third-party guarantee to support the implementation of the 1999 Agreement on Ending Hostilities in the Republic of Congo, where Cocoye, Ninja, and Ntsiloulou rebels were fighting the government following the 1997 coup-d'état that had brought Sassou Nguesso to power.

What accounts for this variation in the promise of guarantees? This dissertation focuses on the factors that drive a potential guarantor's decision of whether to give a guarantee and what type of guarantee to give. Understanding the determinants of third-party guarantees at the promise stage will provide the foundation for later research aimed at developing an explanation of why third-party guarantees are sometimes fully provided and sometimes not, and consequently of the variation in their effect on the peace process, as seen in the earlier examples of Mozambique and Angola. Given that potential guarantors differ across types, insight into their decision making process for giving a guarantee might also reveal what types of guarantors tend to be more effective than others in fulfilling a guarantee that successfully keeps agreement implementation on track. I argue that a potential guarantor's interest in the peaceful settlement of the conflict and its capacity for fulfilling a guarantee on the ground determine the type of guarantee it gives. In addition, the guarantee decision is shaped by a potential guarantor's perception of the conflict parties' needs for a third-party guarantee and their desire to settle the conflict peacefully.

Studying the determinants and effects of third-party guarantees in intrastate conflict resolution is urgent. In the most recent report by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program on armed conflicts, Pettersson and Wallensteen (2015) note that armed intrastate conflicts continue to be the prevalent form of conflict worldwide, that the number of intrastate conflicts has increased over the past ten years, and that the violence associated with civil conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq,

Nigeria, Syria, and Ukraine has resulted over the past few years in the highest annual deaths since the end of the Cold War. At the same time the number of peace agreements that have been signed to resolve intrastate conflict also has increased since 2011, though a majority of them have so far not been successful in ending the conflicts.³ Meanwhile the size and cost of peace operations have increased steadily over the past ten years. For the UN alone, the number of uniformed personnel in peace operations has increased from 72,778 in 2006 to 104,503 in 2016; the annual budget increased from \$5.03bn for 2005/06 to \$8.27bn in 2015/16.⁴ However, the record of UN peace operations in providing guarantees has been mixed. Next to successes—for example, in supporting the implementation of the General Peace Agreement for Mozambique and the Lomé Agreement in Sierra Leone—other operations have been unable to provide effective guarantees for agreement implementation, for example, in Angola. In the DRC, despite UN efforts to provide guarantees in support of the implementation of the 1999 Lusaka Accord, violence in the eastern part of the country persists and the country ranks fifth on the 2015 Fragile State Index.⁵ Understanding better under what conditions third parties can provide guarantees to support fragile peace processes more effectively will be key to giving conflict parties an opportunity to implement the peace agreements they have reached. Examining the factors that have so far determined when third parties offer guarantees is the first step toward that goal.

The scope of this dissertation is limited to armed internal (intrastate) conflicts and internationalized internal conflicts. Although some elements of the theoretical framework that I develop in the next chapter might be applicable to international conflict resolution, the

³ Pettersson and Wallensteen (2015, 544).

⁴ UN Peacekeeping Operations Fact Sheet, February 28, 2006, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/archive/2006/pkfactsheet2006.zip>; UN Peacekeeping Operations Fact Sheet, February 29, 2016, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/bnote0216.pdf>.

⁵ The Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index 2015, <http://library.fundforpeace.org/fsi15-report>.

heightened security dilemma in civil wars, the lack of defined borders between intrastate conflict parties, and differences in conflict aims, scope, and magnitude make civil conflicts more difficult to settle, require specific third-party support for the peace process, and produce different dynamics among conflict parties and third parties. The theory takes these aspects of civil conflicts into account in order to arrive at a better understanding of how third-party guarantees contribute to intrastate conflict resolution.

In the remainder of this chapter I will define third-party guarantees, review the existing literature on the determinants of third-party guarantees, and provide an outline of this dissertation.

1.1 Defining Third-Party Guarantees

Third-party guarantees are defined as peace operations provided by a third party (*guarantor*) with the explicit aim of reducing the conflict parties' insecurity associated with the implementation of high-risk security provisions of a ceasefire or peace agreement in order to encourage agreement implementation and support the peace process after civil conflict.

Third-party guarantees are provided through peace operations, including observation missions, interpositional missions, multidimensional missions, and peace enforcement missions.⁶ But while all guarantees are provided through peace operations, not all peace operations are mandated to provide guarantees to support ceasefire or peace agreement implementation. The

⁶ See Fortna (2008, 4–8) for a definition of peace operations and a description of the different types of peace operations. Doyle and Sambanis (2006, 10–18) provide a comprehensive discussion of generations and types of UN peace operations. See for instance Flores and Nooruddin (2011, 487–488) for the argument that third-party guarantees are a key function of peace operations.

primary purpose of a guarantee is to reassure conflict parties during the implementation of high-risk security provisions. High-risk security provisions, such as the demobilization and disarmament of combatants or police reform, have the potential to leave a compliant conflict party vulnerable to attack by an opponent. The explicit focus on supporting conflict parties in the implementation of agreement provisions that inherently pose significant risks to their security distinguishes third-party guarantees from the broader concept of peacekeeping, which also includes operations aimed at assisting conflict parties with the implementation of relatively low security risk provisions, such as holding elections. For example, guarantees are provided by peace operations mandated to monitor and verify, to actively support or carry out, or to enforce a ceasefire, the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) of combatants, or the reform of the armed forces or the police.

Peace operations that monitor, support, or enforce compliance with conditions or provisions that do not directly imply high security risks for the conflict parties do not provide guarantees as defined above. Operations that monitor or organize political processes such as elections are thus excluded from the study. Similarly, political missions and offices, peace operations with a humanitarian mandate only, operations aimed at implementing human rights agreements, including human rights monitoring and training, multidimensional operations tasked with institution building or economic development, and enforcement missions undertaken without the initial consent of at least one of the conflict parties are not fulfilling the functions of a guarantee and are thus outside of the scope of this research.

In studying the determinants of third-party guarantees, rather than the determinants of peace operations in general, I pursue two objectives. First, I aim to contribute to the existing literature on third-party guarantees, which focuses on the specific security-related functions of

guarantees that are not shared by all peace operations. Second, in honing in on a subset of peace operations and examining it from a specific angle I hope to gain insight that may add to our knowledge about the factors that drive peacekeeping in general.

The literature has referred to all types of third-party guarantees as “security guarantees.”⁷ The term conveys the scope and key function that is shared by all third-party guarantees I study in this dissertation: to reduce the conflict parties’ insecurity that results specifically from the implementation of security-related ceasefire or peace agreement provisions, for example, disarmament and demobilization. But the term may be insofar ambiguous as not all guarantees actually “guarantee” the conflict parties’ security. Under a stricter definition we might categorize only those guarantees as actual security guarantees that ensure the conflict parties’ security against military action by another conflict party. These more narrowly conceived security guarantees are provided by enforcement missions that are authorized to use force in defense of that objective. For clarity I define these guarantees as *enforcement guarantees*.

Aggregating the concept of third-party guarantees into one category potentially overlooks important differences in the functions of guarantees and consequently in the determinants that bring about one type of guarantee versus another. In conceptualizing third-party guarantees I distinguish among three main types of guarantees according to their primary functions.⁸ First, I define as *transparency guarantees* third-party guarantees aimed at monitoring and verifying the conflict parties’ compliance with high-risk security provisions in ceasefire or peace agreements,

⁷ See, e.g., Walter (2002), Flores and Nooruddin (2011), and Svensson (2014).

⁸ In addition to the primary functions of the three principal types of third-party guarantees, i.e., monitoring, supporting, and enforcing the implementation of ceasefire or peace agreements, guarantees also aim, e.g., to build confidence among conflict parties and between conflict parties and guarantors, to encourage the negotiation and/or implementation of further agreements to solidify the peace process, and to gather information for the planning of subsequent guarantor involvement in peace building initiatives. For comprehensive discussions of the causal mechanisms through which peace operations in general affect the peace process see, e.g., Doyle and Sambanis (2006, 27–68) and Fortna (2008, 76–103).

such as the disengagement and withdrawal of combat troops. Second, I define as *support guarantees* third-party guarantees that provide active logistical, technical, and/or military support for implementing high-risk security provisions in agreements, for example setting up and operating demobilization camps in order to implement provisions for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants. Third, I define as *enforcement guarantees* third-party guarantees aimed at enforcing the implementation of and compliance with high-risk security provisions in ceasefire and peace agreements, for instance, enforcing disarmament or protecting the physical safety and security of conflict party leaders. A guarantor may give any or all of these three types of guarantees. Support and enforcement guarantees inherently imply a transparency guarantee to monitor and verify progress of a support program or the enforcement of agreement implementation respectively. Importantly, the primary purpose of all three types of third-party guarantees is to alleviate the security concerns of conflict parties that might otherwise prevent them from implementing agreement provisions that leave conflict parties more vulnerable to an opponent's attack.

Third-party guarantors include the UN, regional organizations, such as NATO or the African Union, individual states, or ad-hoc coalitions of states.⁹ Guarantees are given as part of the mandate of specific peace operations and are authorized by a resolution of the third party's relevant decision-making body (for example, the UN Security Council).¹⁰ Most guarantees apply to all parties in a conflict dyad, though it is not a necessary precondition for a third-party

⁹ According to the typology of actors in conflict resolution that Svensson (2014, 368) proposes, guarantors are included in the category of *custodians*, i.e., external actors advocating a peaceful resolution of the conflict and providing explicit support in order to achieve it.

¹⁰ In the context of this research, third-party guarantees imply the deployment of a contingent of military personnel in the context of a peace operation. Commissions comprising the signatory factions and/or representatives of third parties that are formed in order to monitor a ceasefire, such as provided for in the 1996 Islamabad Accord during the civil war in Afghanistan, are not considered third-party guarantees unless at least one of the third parties offers the deployment of a peace operation in order to provide a guarantee.

guarantee to be included under this definition. While resolutions do not typically use the term “guarantee” when authorizing operations that are implicitly mandated to fulfill a guarantee, the authorized mandate is intended to *guarantee* conflict parties that a specific level of assistance for agreement implementation will be provided to them. According to the three types of guarantees, this assistance amounts to (1) transparency with respect to all conflict parties’ level of compliance with agreement provisions, (2) active support for the agreement implementation process, and (3) enforcement of agreement implementation.

The different guarantee types are fulfilled by different types of peace operations. Transparency guarantees are provided by observation missions, for example, UNAVEM II in Angola in 1991. Observation missions are unarmed or lightly armed missions of military observers (sometimes authorized with an additional protection force to ensure the safety of the observers) and/or surveillance drones deployed to monitor the extent to which conflict parties implement ceasefire or peace agreement provisions. Second, support guarantees are provided by operations that actively assist conflict parties in the implementation of specific agreement provisions, for example, UNAVEM III in Angola in 1994, which was mandated to assist in the establishment of quartering areas for combatants that had disarmed. Finally, enforcement guarantees are provided by enforcement missions, for example, UNMIL in Liberia in 2003, with a mandate to enforce the implementation of a ceasefire or specific agreement provisions. The request or initial consent of at least one conflict party is a necessary precondition for an enforcement guarantee, although continued consent is not required for the fulfillment of the guarantee on the ground. While observer missions, support operations, and peace enforcement missions are not explicitly mandated to provide transparency guarantees, support guarantees, and enforcement guarantees respectively in the text of the authorizing resolutions, these operations

are intended to provide the respective functions by providing information, furnishing assistance, and ensuring implementation in order to reduce the conflict parties' insecurity and allow them to implement their agreement.

The different types of third-party guarantees can be ordered along a continuum from low- to high-level guarantees based on two factors; first, the extent of costs and risks to the guarantor and, second, the impact on the degree of agreement implementation. Along this continuum transparency guarantees are on the lowest level, followed by support guarantees and finally enforcement guarantees on the highest level. Guarantor costs and risks related to providing a guarantee increase as operational size and mandates expand due to the increasing involvement that is implied in higher-level guarantees, from mere observation to providing active implementation support to enforcing compliance. At the same time, as the scope of a guarantee increases from providing information to assisting conflict parties in carrying out agreement provisions to enforcing implementation, so does its ability to reduce the conflict parties' insecurity, to actively prevent the recurrence of conflict, and to advance the implementation of the agreement.

Transparency guarantees are provided by observation missions that monitor conflict party behavior. Operations mandated to provide a transparency guarantee only are limited to observation and do not involve an active contribution to agreement implementation. Transparency guarantees imply relatively low involvement in and impact on the implementation process. Support guarantees are provided by larger operations with more extensive mandates that allow them to actively assist conflict parties in agreement implementation, thereby making successful implementation more likely. However, the success of operations providing support guarantees is contingent on the voluntary compliance of conflict parties. These operations cannot

guarantee that implementation will in fact be achieved. Enforcement guarantees are provided by substantial military contingents mandated to use armed force if necessary to ensure agreement implementation. Enforcement guarantees rank comparatively highest in guarantor cost and risk and in their impact on the level of agreement implementation. Ordering the different guarantee types along this continuum allows for a more comprehensive assessment of a potential guarantor's decision to offer a guarantee. As I discuss in developing the theoretical framework in the next chapter, when deciding whether to offer a guarantee potential guarantors take the costs and risks of providing a guarantee into account and evaluate these costs and risks in the context of their interests in the peaceful settlement of the conflict, their capacity to provide an effective guarantee, and the conflict parties' needs for a third-party guarantee and support for the peace process.

Giving a guarantee is not merely a promise to send a peace operation to a conflict state. It is an activity on the ground (monitoring, operational support, enforcement) aimed at guaranteeing that a specific condition (transparency of conflict party actions), process (operational support to conflict parties for agreement implementation), or outcome (enforcement of conflict party compliance) will be achieved. Alternative terminology for *guarantee* includes assurance, commitment, promise, pledge, et cetera; all these terms express acceptance of an obligation by the guarantor to ensure transparency, operational support, or enforcement of ceasefire or agreement implementation. This dissertation aims to contribute to the existing literature on third-party guarantees and therefore will continue the use the term *guarantee*.

1.2 The Third-Party Guarantee Process

A guarantee is *promised* (or *given*) when the guarantor authorizes a peace operation with a guarantee mandate and then *fulfilled* (or *provided*) when the authorized peace operation carries out its mandate. Though in most cases third-party guarantees are provided on the ground after a ceasefire or peace agreement was signed in order to promote its implementation, the promise of a third-party guarantee is often timed to encourage negotiations, the signing of a ceasefire or peace agreement, or compliance with preconditions for the deployment of a peace operation. Thus, guarantees might be given at any stage of the negotiation process, including prior to the onset of negotiations or during so-called talks about talks, as well as after an agreement has been signed.

That a guarantee has been given does not imply that the guarantor has the capacity to fulfill the guarantee on the ground. Apart from not following through on its guarantee promise at all, a guarantor can fall short in providing the guarantee in several ways, for example, when the deployed operation does not have the promised mandate or size or does not arrive in a timely manner. In addition, a guarantee might not be completely fulfilled once it is on the ground, for instance, when observers do not monitor the conflict parties' activities or peace enforcers do not enforce implementation of the agreement.

The guarantees I study aim to actively reassure conflict parties of their security in the agreement implementation process by verifying that all conflict parties abide by the provisions of the agreement, by supporting agreement implementation, or by enforcing the conflict parties' compliance. Thus, guarantors do not wait until a ceasefire is broken or agreement provisions are violated before deploying an operation to fulfill a promised guarantee. The guarantees I focus on are intended to be fulfilled shortly after they are given by deploying swiftly the operations to

provide them in order to prevent the violation of ceasefires and peace agreements in the first place.

In order to understand the effect of third-party guarantees on the peace process we need to understand first when they occur. I argue that guarantee promises are driven in part by a guarantor's expectations regarding the effects of guarantees on conflict party behavior and the peace process. Though ultimately aimed at reassuring conflict parties during the implementation of a peace agreement, third-party guarantees affect and are affected by the conflict parties' behavior at different stages of the peace process and thus have a wider impact on it. For example, the promise by a guarantor to give a guarantee if a peace agreement is signed may incentivize conflict parties to begin negotiations in the first place. And that conflict parties respect a ceasefire is likely a precondition for guarantors to actually provide a guarantee on the ground.

Decomposing the process through which guarantees occur is essential in order to understand the role of third-party guarantees in conflict resolution. The stages of the guarantee process include, on the part of the guarantor, first, the decision to authorize a guarantee to support the implementation of an agreement and, second, the provision of that guarantee by deploying an appropriate operation on the ground. Expectations regarding its ability to provide a guarantee on the ground impact a guarantor's decision about whether to authorize a guarantee and what type of guarantee to authorize. Both steps influence and are influenced in turn by the decisions and actions of the conflict parties: whether they negotiate, sign a ceasefire and peace agreement, abide by the ceasefire, and implement the agreement. The conflict parties' actions affect whether the conflict is settled and lasting peace is established. Figure 1.1 illustrates the guarantee process. The arrows suggest causal relationships.




Figure 1.1: Principal stages of the third-party guarantee process

As the figure suggests the guarantee decision (represented by the shaded box) is a key step in the process that is affected by the current and expected future actions of the conflict parties as well as by a third party's expectations regarding its capacity to provide the guarantee on the ground (guarantee fulfillment). At the same time, whether a guarantee is given and what type of guarantee is given directly affects the conflict parties' ability to implement an agreement and thus impacts the outcome of the peace process.

The figure illustrates potential endogeneity problems of examining the effect of third-party guarantees on the peace process. If guarantors are more likely to give guarantees in easy cases because they expect it to be easier to provide these guarantees on the ground, the effect of

guarantees on the peace process might not be significant since in easy cases the conflict parties are more likely to be able to implement their agreement without third-party support and peace might be achieved without a third-party guarantee on the ground. On the other hand, guarantees that are given in harder cases, where they are more difficult to provide on the ground, likely have a significant effect on the outcome of the peace process since conflict parties are unlikely to be able to implement an agreement without a third-party guarantee.¹¹ Thus, whether guarantees are effective in encouraging peace agreement implementation and bringing about lasting peace is likely contingent on whether they are given in easy or difficult cases. In other words, some of the factors that determine whether a third party is likely to give a guarantee also influence whether it is likely to fully provide that guarantee on the ground and whether the conflict parties are likely to implement their agreement and establish lasting peace.

Understanding when guarantors promise their support is important if we want to isolate the effect that guarantees have on the prospects of post-conflict peace. In this dissertation I focus on the guarantee decision stage, that is, on the determinants of third-party decisions to authorize a guarantee. The main research question asks what factors impact third parties' decision-making about whether to authorize a guarantee and what kind of guarantee to authorize given that the guarantors' and conflict parties' interests and means, preferences, perceptions, strategic interaction, and expectations of each others' future behavior shape the provision and the effect of third-party guarantees on the peace process.

¹¹ See Fortna (2008, 3) for a discussion of the selection issue as it relates to whether peacekeeping operations are deployed in easy or hard cases.

1.3 The Existing Literature on Third-Party Guarantees

This dissertation builds on the growing literature on civil war termination, part of which has examined third-party guarantees and their role in the settlement of intrastate conflict. Even though the conflict parties might reach a negotiated settlement, prospects for durable peace are dim.¹² Post-war security dilemmas, arising from insecurity and misperceptions among conflict parties, render it difficult to reach and sustain peace in the wake of civil war.¹³ Warring parties in intrastate conflicts face commitment problems that prevent them from reaching mutually beneficial outcomes.¹⁴ While they can agree to negotiate and reach an agreement that regulates incompatibilities, and while comprehensive agreements have been shown to promote stable peace,¹⁵ conflict parties are unable to credibly commit to abiding by the terms of the agreement. Implementing high-risk security provisions of the agreement, such as disarmament and demobilization, makes conflict parties vulnerable to an opponent's attack and increases their insecurity. Third-party guarantees are crucial in alleviating the conflict parties' security concerns by monitoring their military activities, carrying out their demobilization, and enforcing ceasefires, thereby rendering promises to abide by the agreement more credible.¹⁶

¹² Collier, Elliott, Hegre, Hoeffler, Reynal-Querol, and Sambanis (2003, 78–79); Licklider (1995, 681).

¹³ See, e.g., Snyder and Jervis (1999), Doyle and Sambanis (2000), and Fortna (2003).

¹⁴ Walter (1997, 1999, 2002).

¹⁵ See, e.g., Hartzell (1999), Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild (2001), Hartzell and Hoddie (2003), and Hoddie and Hartzell (2005).

¹⁶ See in particular Walter (1999, 2002).

The quantitative literature that focuses on the effects of peacekeeping in general finds that it increases the duration of post-conflict peace and decreases the risk of recurring conflict.¹⁷ Fortna (2008) addresses potential endogeneity problems of studying the effects of peacekeeping by examining first where peacekeepers tend to go. She analyzes 94 post-Cold War civil wars where a ceasefire was reached and finds that in general peacekeepers are deployed in difficult cases where peace is harder to keep. In addition she finds that where peacekeepers go and whether consent-based Chapter VI or Chapter VII enforcement missions are deployed is shaped by the interests of both the actors that send peacekeeping operations and the conflict parties. In terms of specific predictors, the number and relative strength of the conflict parties affect where peacekeeping operations are sent. Historical relations, alliances, and resources, on the other hand, do not appear to determine where peacekeepers go. Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild (2001) suggest that conflict characteristics and third parties' stakes in the peaceful outcome of a conflict determine the likelihood of third-party support for the peace process.¹⁸

Though research has confirmed the importance of external guarantees for the successful implementation of negotiated settlements, the topic has received scant attention.¹⁹ Important questions remain, including on the determinants of different guarantee types chosen by guarantors, the reasons for varying levels of guarantee provision, and how guarantee type and level of guarantee fulfillment affect the outcome of the peace process. Within the literature on third parties and conflict resolution some work has narrowed its focus on the role of guarantees as a third-party instrument for encouraging a negotiated settlement and its implementation. However, there is limited quantitative work specifically on third-party guarantees in conflict

¹⁷ See Doyle and Sambanis (2000) and Fortna (2003, 2004a,b, 2008).

¹⁸ See also Hartzell (1999), Hartzell and Hoddie (2003), and Hoddie and Hartzell (2005).

¹⁹ See Genet (2011) and Regan (2011).

resolution. Walter (2002) examines 72 civil wars (with 1,000 or more fatalities) initiated between 1940 and 1992 and finds that guarantees make agreement implementation more likely. She defines guarantees as an offer by a third party to verify or enforce compliance with a peace agreement, combined with the requirement that the guarantee also has to be provided on the ground. By tying promise and provision of guarantees together, Walter examines the effect of a peace operation in fulfillment of a guarantee (rather than the effect of a guarantee promise).

However, not differentiating between guarantee promises and their actual provision risks obscuring important aspects of the guarantee process, including the rationale of why conflict parties should trust a guarantee before it arrives on the ground. First, conflating both parts of the process potentially misses the effect that a guarantee promise alone may have on the likelihood that conflict parties initiate negotiations or sign a peace agreement, which in turn may have an independent effect on the outcome of the peace process regardless of whether the guarantee is actually provided. Second, it prevents an analysis of why third parties sometimes fail to follow through on their promise to put guarantees on the ground. Factors inherent in the conflict and the guarantor require careful separation to analyze the effect of third parties on conflict resolution. Third, studying the effectiveness of third-party guarantees without controlling for the level of their provision is likely to produce results that underestimate the effect of guarantees that arrive on the ground as promised.

Some work has begun to distinguish between the promise of third-party guarantees and their actual fulfillment. Svensson (2009) advances a reputational argument for third-party guarantee provision that assumes that the UN faces high reputational costs for not providing a promised guarantee on the ground. His theory predicts that the UN is therefore more selective than other types of guarantors in giving a guarantee. In the only quantitative study that examines

determinants for guarantees in support of peace agreement implementation Svensson tests the argument by examining guarantees written into peace agreements in internal armed conflicts between 1998–2003 and finds support for the hypotheses.

Svensson (2009, 122) defines a promised third-party guarantee as “an explicit commitment to enforce or verify the terms of demobilization written into the agreement.” The analysis does not distinguish among different types of third-party guarantees and adopts a minimum-threshold requirement for coding whether guarantors delivered on their promises. The variable measures provision of a third-party guarantee as having occurred as long as a peace operation was deployed, regardless of its size or mandate vis-à-vis the initial guarantee promise. It does not reveal whether guarantees were perhaps not fully provided as promised. However, the specific level of deployment relative to the initially authorized guarantee type is important, as it is likely a function of guarantor and conflict related factors and thus impacts a guarantor’s decision to give a guarantee in the first place. If guarantees were incompletely provided guarantors would have faced reputational costs after all. Factors other than reputational concerns might have contributed to the initial guarantee promise. Expectations of how its own capacity to provide a guarantee and the extent of the conflict parties’ support for the peace process impact a guarantor’s ability to provide a guarantee also affect its decision to give a guarantee. These expectations differ by guarantee type and by guarantor identity; accounting for variations in guarantee type and guarantor identity (beyond distinguishing the UN from non-UN guarantors) in the analysis might reveal the influence of other potential factors, including guarantor capacity and the conflict parties’ preferences for the implementation of the agreement.

Svensson finds that the likelihood of third-party guarantee promises increases in wars with 1,000 or more fatalities and shorter duration, in conflict states characterized by higher

economic development, and with peace agreements that contain political and territorial provisions. The results are limited in scope however, given that the analysis does not include guarantees that were given outside of peace agreements. In addition, not including guarantor specific determinants (guarantor identity vis-à-vis the conflict state, such as regional organization or past colonial power, and guarantor capacity) precludes analysis of a key argument of Svensson's theory, namely why some types of guarantors give more guarantees than others.

Existing work on third-party guarantees has not sufficiently taken into account the conceptual distinctions between the authorization of third-party guarantees and their fulfillment, as well as the different guarantee types and levels of guarantee provision. Separating the guarantee decision from guarantee provision on the ground reduces potential bias in evaluating the effect of guarantees. Taking into account that guarantees may be provided completely, incompletely, or possibly not at all is central to the argument that guarantor capacity likely has an effect on the level of guarantee fulfillment, the outcome of the peace process, and thus also on the likelihood that a third party gives a specific type of guarantee in the first place.

This dissertation contributes to the literature on third-party guarantees by advancing and testing hypotheses through a systematic analysis that decomposes the complex third-party guarantee process into different types of guarantees (transparency, support, enforcement) and different levels of guarantee provision (none, incomplete, complete) within a strategic framework that encompasses the dynamic interaction of the conflict parties' and guarantors' expectations and decisions. Conflict parties and guarantors pursue their interests and face commitment problems that have an impact on their expectations of each other's behavior, which in turn informs their decision-making. Expectations regarding the effects on the peace process of the level of fulfillment of guarantees and regarding the conflict parties' support for the

implementation of the agreement likely inform a guarantor's decision on whether to give a guarantee. This research aims to increase our understanding of when and what types of third-party guarantees are given in support of successful ceasefire or peace agreement implementation.

The findings will form the basis for subsequent research on the determinants of the level of guarantee provision on the ground and ultimately on the conditions under which third-party guarantees have a positive or negative effect on the peace process. These insights will in turn produce policy recommendations for the planning and provision of third-party guarantees aimed at supporting the peace process after intrastate conflicts.

1.4 Outline of the Main Argument and Research Approach

In this dissertation I study the factors that determine whether third parties give a guarantee and what type of guarantee they give. I propose that guarantors' decision-making is driven by their interests as well as by considerations of their capacity to provide a guarantee on the ground. In addition, the extent of the conflict parties' security concerns and the level of their support for the peace process also determine the likelihood of a guarantee. In their decision, guarantors consider both their own and the conflict parties' interests, means, and preferences.

In particular, I argue that a third party's interest in the peaceful settlement of a conflict forms the basis for a guarantee decision. The greater a potential guarantor's stakes in the security and stability of the conflict state and region are, the more likely it is to give a higher-level guarantee, such as a support or enforcement guarantee; low guarantor interest likely implies no guarantee or only a transparency guarantee. At the same time a guarantor's material capacity to

provide a guarantee curtails the effect of their interests; limited capacity likely decreases the level of guarantee a third party gives and results in a transparency guarantee or no guarantee at all, while high capacity allows a guarantor to give support or enforcement guarantees.

I propose furthermore that guarantors consider the extent of the conflict parties' commitment problems. Intrastate conflict produces an environment of insecurity, and specific conflict characteristics, such as conflict type and costs, can further increase the conflict parties' insecurity. As the conflict parties' insecurity increases they find it more difficult to implement peace agreement provisions that would make them vulnerable to an opponent's attack, for example, demobilizing and disarming their fighters. As the conflict parties' security concerns increase, higher-level guarantees are needed to reassure them, and third parties should be more likely to give support or enforcement guarantees in order to enable agreement implementation. In other words, when the conflict parties prefer a peaceful settlement of their conflict, but their security concerns make it difficult for them to achieve peace on their own, then third-party guarantees are more likely.

This effect is counteracted by guarantors' concerns over whether the conflict parties genuinely prefer to implement a ceasefire or peace agreement or to keep fighting. In particular, I argue that the comprehensiveness of the peace agreement and opportunity costs to implementing it determine the conflict parties' preferences for peace or continued conflict and thus the expected effectiveness of a third-party guarantee. Where conflict parties signed an agreement that does not address sufficiently their incompatibilities or where they have incentives to perpetuate a state of conflict, for example, significant financial benefits from the conduct of illegal activities, third parties likely prefer to keep their involvement limited and only promise a transparency guarantee or offer no guarantee given the likely failure of the peace process. In

contrast, where a political foundation for a successful peace process exists (comprehensive peace agreement, low opportunity costs), conflict parties are more likely to be genuinely committed to ending their conflict and potential guarantors are more likely to promise higher-level, that is, support or enforcement guarantees.

In order to develop and test the theoretical arguments the dissertation proceeds as follows: In the next chapter I construct a formal model and derive the principal propositions regarding third parties' decision-making over whether to give a guarantee and what type of guarantee to give. Based on existing scholarship I refine the theoretical arguments and specify testable hypotheses. In the remaining chapters I test the theory empirically using both quantitative and qualitative methods. In chapter three I introduce a newly coded dataset on annual dyadic third-party guarantees. It significantly expands upon existing datasets on third-party guarantees by including information on the identity of potential guarantors and their capacity to provide guarantees. The dependent variable is defined more broadly to include, in addition to guarantees mandated in peace agreements, also guarantees given prior to the start of negotiations and before and after the signing of a peace agreement. I analyze the data using logistic and multinomial logistic regression to examine the likelihood of a guarantee in general and of specific guarantee types, and find support for the proposed hypotheses on guarantor interest and capacity as well as conflict party commitment problems and preferences.

In order to complement the broad statistical findings, chapters four and five present in-depth qualitative evidence from case study analysis. Using process tracing, content analysis, and one-on-one semi-structured interviews, I develop an account of the third-party decision-making process that took place over whether to give a guarantee and what type of guarantee to give to support the implementation of the Lusaka Accord that was signed in 1999 in order to end the

Second Congo War. In Chapter six I draw conclusions from the main findings, discuss limitations of the study, and suggest avenues for further research.

Chapter 2

Theoretical Framework: Determinants of Third-Party Guarantees

2.1 Introduction

The theoretical framework that I develop in this chapter and the empirical analysis that follows in subsequent chapters distinguish between conflict-driven and guarantor-driven factors of a guarantee. Existing research suggests that conflict characteristics and potential guarantors' stakes in the peaceful outcome of a conflict determine the likelihood of third-party involvement in the peace process after civil war.²⁰ The conflict parties' need for a third-party guarantee is largely a function of conflict characteristics. Depending on how long fighting went on, how much violence took place, and how many fatalities the conflict caused, the conflict parties may not be able to trust each other to follow through on fulfilling the provisions of their agreement, and in turn may find it difficult themselves to commit to implementing it. Third-party guarantees can help to reduce mistrust by providing transparency regarding the conflict parties' actions, by actively supporting the implementation of specific provisions of an agreement, or by enforcing the conflict parties' compliance.

In terms of guarantor-driven factors, a potential guarantor's interest in the successful implementation of a ceasefire or peace agreement may be shaped by security-related, economic, cultural, and ideological considerations concerning the conflict and its effects, especially on the

²⁰ See, e.g., Hartzell (1999), Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild (2001), Hartzell and Hoddie (2003), and Hoddie and Hartzell (2005).

guarantor. In pursuing their interests, third parties may give a guarantee to support the implementation of the agreement and increase the likelihood of peace. A third party's commitment to fulfilling a given guarantee can affect the agreement implementation process in the short term by signaling resolve and encouraging the conflict parties to implement their agreement. A guarantee promise also has long-term effects on the agreement implementation process and on the reputation of the guarantor, based on whether it is followed by the actual deployment of a peace operation to fulfill the guarantee on the ground. Are potential guarantors motivated primarily by short-term benefits in their decision to give a guarantee? Or do they perceive long-term factors and outcome probabilities to weigh more heavily in deciding on a guarantee? In other words, do potential guarantors' incentives to give "empty" guarantees for short-term benefits discount the long-term costs associated with not providing a promised guarantee on the ground?

The theoretical answers to these questions are not straightforward. I develop a formal model (presented in appendix A) to gain insight into potential guarantors' optimal strategies based on the short- and long-term costs and benefits of giving a certain type of guarantee. The model examines potential guarantors' incentives for giving guarantees and produces results that provide clear answers to the above questions. It proposes that a guarantor's decision to give a guarantee is driven by its calculations of how the agreement implementation process will be affected by its ability to actually fulfill a certain type of guarantee as well as by the conflict parties' preferences regarding the outcome of the conflict. The model produces a counterintuitive hypothesis: Even though a guarantee promise might positively affect the peace process in the short term, third parties are likely to decide against a guarantee if they expect the agreement implementation process to fail despite a guarantee. Based on the propositions produced by the

model, this chapter derives the principal hypotheses regarding the determinants of different types of guarantees.

2.2 Guarantor-Driven Determinants

The formal model produces four main propositions. It suggests that, when deciding whether to give a specific guarantee, potential guarantors take into consideration their interests and capacity as well as the conflict parties' perceptions of guarantor commitment and capacity. In this section I discuss how guarantor interests and capacity influence the likelihood of a guarantee before turning to conflict-driven factors.

2.2.1 Guarantor Interest

The model suggests that interested third parties derive greater utility from conflict resolution and agreement implementation than from a breakdown of the implementation process. A third party's interest in the successful implementation of an agreement is the basis for a guarantee. A potential guarantor interested in the implementation of an agreement expects greater utility from that outcome (and associated reputational benefits) than from a breakdown of the implementation process despite the costs it bears to fulfill a guarantee.

Third parties are likely to give a guarantee to support agreement implementation if they have a stake in the outcome of the process. The United Nations and regional security organizations, such as NATO, typically have an interest in the successful outcome of a peace process if its failure would likely threaten international and regional security by causing trans-

border refugee flows and by exacerbating imminent or ongoing conflicts in neighboring states. Individual states' vested interests in the peaceful settlement of a conflict can be the result of a direct security threat emanating from the conflict or of significant trade interdependence. In addition, third-party interest can be caused by a desire to shape the future political or economic development of the conflict country.

The model suggests that third parties that have a stake in the peaceful outcome of the conflict are willing to bear the costs of providing an effective guarantee to support the implementation of a negotiated agreement. Potential guarantors with higher stakes in the security and stability of the conflict state and region are likely to give higher-level guarantees (support or enforcement guarantees) in order to actively promote agreement implementation. If stakes exist but take a lower priority than interests elsewhere, potential guarantors are more likely to give only a transparency guarantee. Potential guarantors without sufficient stakes in resolving the conflict are less likely to give a guarantee.²¹ The model further indicates that third parties with a significant stake in the outcome of the peace process but without the capacity to actually provide a guarantee might be willing to bear the reputational costs of giving an empty guarantee to encourage the conflict parties to maintain a ceasefire or agree on a negotiated settlement while they wait for the guarantee to arrive on the ground. These theoretical considerations result in the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1. *The greater (smaller) the stakes are that a third party has in the successful implementation of a negotiated ceasefire or peace agreement, the more likely it is to give a higher-level (a lower-level or no) guarantee to support the implementation process.*

²¹ For an account of how a lack of third-party interest has limited the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations see Marten (2004).

Note that the determinants of a guarantee are conceptually distinct from factors that account for *initial* third-party involvement in intrastate conflict resolution. The guarantee and its fulfillment imply significant material and immaterial costs that third parties do not incur by offering good offices or in making attempts at mediation.²² Importantly, guarantees are not costless given that both their fulfillment and failure to fulfill them imply costs for the guarantor. Empirical evidence supports this argument as only a subset of third parties involved in the negotiation of a peace agreement actually give a guarantee to support its implementation.

The model predicts that a potential guarantor is more likely to give a high-level guarantee if it has a significant interest in the successful outcome of the peace process. Interest can be driven by factors specific to a potential guarantor and by factors related to the conflict. Potential guarantors are likely concerned with limiting the negative externalities of conflict, i.e. consequences affecting economic and security interests. The following section will specify the testable hypotheses underlying the guarantor interest argument.

Conflict interrupts trade and destroys investment. Third parties have an interest in the quick cessation of hostilities and the stabilization of the economy in conflict states that are significant trading partners in the international economy. Potential guarantors will be more likely to give higher-level guarantees (support or enforcement guarantees) the greater a conflict state's contribution to the international economy is.

H1.1 The greater (smaller) a conflict state's economic ties are to the international community, the more likely is a third party to give a higher-level (a lower-level or no) guarantee in support of the peace process in that state.

²² I hope to explore in future research whether the same factors (as a matter of degree) or different factors drive these two outcomes, i.e., initial third-party involvement in conflict resolution and third-party guarantees.

In addition, third parties may see a greater need to provide support to resolve a conflict that is likely to threaten regional and perhaps international security due to its high intensity and its potential to exacerbate ongoing conflicts or impede third-party conflict resolution efforts in neighboring states. Conflicts that have resulted in high numbers of casualties are likely to cause significant trans-border refugee flows that destabilize neighboring countries and the region. Refugee camps, which are often established just across the border from the conflict state, present economic and security challenges to neighboring states, especially when fighters and weapons move across borders alongside refugees and when rebel groups utilize camps as external military bases.²³

Ongoing crises or conflicts in the region may intensify if combatants provide weapons or direct military support to insurgents in neighboring conflicts. The lack of government authority throughout the conflict state encourages arms trafficking and the illegal exploitation of natural resources that further perpetuate conflict throughout the region. Limited government control along the borders of the conflict state invite rebel groups that are in conflict with the government of neighboring states to establish safe havens and military bases for trans-border attacks. Instability throughout states and entire regions not only threatens economic interests of potential guarantors but the power vacuum created by internal conflict attracts warlords and terrorists that may threaten directly the security of potential guarantors. As a conflict's security threat to its region increases, third parties will be more likely to give support or enforcement guarantees to reduce that threat. Where a conflict poses a limited security threat a transparency guarantee or no guarantee is more likely.

²³ See Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) for a discussion of the link between refugee flows and the spread of civil wars.

H1.2 The higher (lower) a conflict's threat is to regional and international security, the more likely is a third party to give a higher-level (a lower-level or no) guarantee to foster its peaceful settlement.

The above hypotheses predict guarantees as a function of guarantor interests, originating in conflict and state characteristics and based on the economic and security stakes that third parties have in the peaceful settlement of the conflict. It is reasonable to expect that all third parties that give a guarantee have an interest in doing so, based on one or more of the above arguments. The type of relevant interest varies and the analysis seeks to determine what kind of interest drives what types of guarantee.

2.2.2 Guarantor Capacity

A potential guarantor's fulfillment capacity reflects its actual ability to provide a guarantee on the ground based on its material capacity to deploy a peace operation mandated to fulfill that guarantee. While a third party's track record of fulfilling guarantee promises is public information, a potential guarantor's current military and financial capacity as well as its political capacity to mobilize its material capabilities in order to fulfill a specific type of guarantee among other commitments is not entirely known to the conflict parties.

A guarantee is costly for guarantors that have the capacity to fulfill it as well as for those that lack it. In the model a third party with the capacity to fulfill a guarantee weighs the expected benefits of promoting agreement implementation against the costs of deploying a mission to provide a guarantee. A third party without the capacity to fulfill a guarantee may have an

incentive to pretend having capacity and promise a guarantee with the aim of signaling resolve and encouraging the conflict parties to negotiate and implement an agreement. However, giving a guarantee without following through implies reputational costs that might cause a potential guarantor without capacity to refrain from promising a guarantee to the conflict parties.

The model predicts that whether third parties are likely to give a guarantee depends on their capacity to fulfill it (see proposition 1.1 in appendix A). Proposition 2 in appendix A suggests that third parties with the capacity to fulfill a guarantee should be more likely to give a guarantee than a third party that lacks the capacity to fulfill a guarantee. For third parties with capacity, the benefits of supporting agreement implementation with a guarantee and the reputational payoffs of doing so outweigh the costs of providing a mission to fulfill the guarantee. Greater capacity to provide a guarantee is likely to translate to higher-level guarantees, while limited capacity will likely result in a transparency guarantee or no guarantee. But interested third parties that lack the capacity to fulfill a guarantee may pretend to have such capacity and give a guarantee if the benefits of a guarantee promise outweigh the reputational costs they incur at the time that it is revealed that they are unable to deliver on their promise.

A guarantee given by either type of guarantor encourages the conflict parties to cooperate until a mission arrives, given the conflict parties' mutual preference for a negotiated settlement and their interest in avoiding the costs resulting from enforcement by the guarantor. Though conflict parties will defect if a guarantee is not actually fulfilled at the expected time, their cooperation up to that point provides third parties additional time to improve the outcome of the conflict.

If one or both of the conflict parties defect based on security concerns (instead of intentions to disrupt the implementation process, which I discuss further below), cooperation

among the conflict parties breaks down and the guarantor (whether it has capacity or not) loses the benefit that cooperation would have provided. In that case, for a guarantor that lacks capacity to fulfill a guarantee, the reputational costs likely outweigh any benefits of giving a guarantee. A guarantor with capacity faces higher costs of fulfilling the guarantee as a result of increasing tensions among the conflict parties or deteriorating conditions on the ground when one or more conflict parties remobilize and violate the ceasefire. The risk of such defection is especially high between the time a guarantee is given and the time the guarantor actually fulfills it on the ground, given that a guarantee does not yet exist to alleviate the security dilemma the conflict parties face.

Conflict parties' perceptions of the credibility of a guarantee shape their beliefs about whether a guarantee will in fact be fulfilled and thus affect their ability to commit to the agreement implementation process until the operation arrives on the ground (see also proposition 3 in appendix A and hypothesis 3 regarding conflict party commitment problems below).²⁴ If a guarantee was given, the conflict parties update their beliefs about the credibility of that guarantee. A potential guarantor has an incentive to send a credible message to signal its capacity to fulfill a specific type of guarantee in order to encourage the conflict parties to cooperate until the guarantee arrives on the ground. Guarantors may signal such credibility with their track record of past missions to provide certain guarantees or with guarantor specific capabilities. Third parties are thus more likely to give a specific type of guarantee when such promise is aligned with public expectations about the guarantor's capacity to fulfill that guarantee. The more credible a guarantee appears to the conflict parties, the less likely they will defect before the guarantee is fulfilled as they expect the guarantee to effectively punish defectors and safeguard cooperators. Promises by guarantors without capacity might persuade conflict parties

²⁴ See Gilady and Russett (2002).

to cooperate initially, but once the failure to provide an actual guarantee reveals the guarantor's lack of capacity the conflict parties defect. Guarantees that are not perceived as credible by the conflict parties are unable to alleviate their security concerns and are likely to cause the conflict parties to defect in order to avoid vulnerability to the other parties' control and, since agreement implementation is unlikely, to prepare to decide the conflict outside of a negotiated settlement.

In addition, a potential guarantor's expectations regarding the effects that not fulfilling its guarantee is likely to have on its reputation renders it more likely to give a guarantee type it believes it can actually fulfill, unless benefits of short-term cooperation between the conflict parties outweigh the reputational costs it will incur (see above, and hypothesis 1). Reputational costs arise when guarantors who have given a guarantee to support the implementation of a ceasefire or peace agreement back out and fail to honor their commitment to fulfill the guarantee.²⁵ A third party's reputation reflects its propensity to keep commitments in its interactions with other actors in the international arena and contributes to its ability to establish and retain strategic relationships and achieve its interests. Guarantors such as the UN and regional security organizations, whose principal mission is the maintenance of peace and security, are likely to suffer significant reputational costs for failing to fulfill their guarantee and by extension their mandate. States value a reputation for honoring commitments vis-à-vis current and potential treaty partners as well as in their role as members of international organizations.²⁶

²⁵ Guarantors also face reputational costs for not offering a guarantee at all. These costs vary more widely by guarantor identity, conflict history, and other factors, and are thus difficult to capture in a formal model. The qualitative analysis tries to shed some light on the role of these reputational costs in determining a guarantee.

²⁶ However, the academic debate on reputation in international relations has produced different views on the value of reputation as a signal of a state's likelihood to keep its commitments. For example, Press (2005) argues that in conflicts a state's credibility derives not from past behaviors of keeping commitments but from its current power and the interests it pursues. Crescenzi (2007) on the other hand proposes that states do learn from past behaviors of each other and that states' reputations affect future interaction. Downs and Jones (2002) propose that reputation is tied to specific issue areas. For an argument of how concerns over their international financial reputation drive states to repay their sovereign debts see Tomz (2007).

Anticipating the reputational costs of not delivering on their promise, third parties are more likely to give the type of guarantees that they expect to be able to provide.

Furthermore, a third party's expectations about the negative effects that failing to fulfill a guarantee is likely to have on the peace process should increase the probability that only those types of guarantees are given that can be backed up. Potential guarantors are likely to consider the effects on the peace process of not completely fulfilling a guarantee, that is, by fulfilling a guarantee incompletely or renegeing entirely on their guarantee.²⁷ Given the intended functions of third-party guarantees, a lack of fulfillment has negative consequences for the peace process, given that conflict parties are unable to credibly commit to implementing the terms of the agreement. Where guarantees are provided only in part, but not all conflict parties are aware of it, one conflict party may rely on a false sense of security while the other exploits the lack of a fully backed guarantee to their advantage, for example, by escaping disarmament as the other side disarms, causing a redistribution of capabilities that the guarantee was intended to prevent. This false security can thus, under information asymmetry, increase a conflict party's expected payoffs from violating the agreement and its incentives to return to fighting. In addition, if conflict parties infer a limited commitment from third parties as a result of empty guarantees, they might be more likely to return to fighting, given the prospect of being able to resort to more aggressive means to achieve their aims without having to expect a significant response from the international community.

²⁷ In this discussion, third parties' expectations about their potential inability to completely fulfill a guarantee are linked solely to their own capacity. Note that this capacity does not include guarantors' inability to fulfill a guarantee if conditions worsen on the ground, i.e., where ceasefire violations and recurrence of violence would cause the lack of or incomplete fulfillment of a guarantee (this effect is discussed in the context of the conflict parties' preferences for implementing a peace agreement). The model accounts for these added challenges by increasing the fulfillment costs for the guarantor.

A potential guarantor's decision to give a specific type of guarantee is affected by its expected capacity to fulfill that guarantee, both in its own perception and in the perception of the conflict parties. A potential guarantor's expectations regarding the credibility of its guarantee as well as regarding the negative effects, on its reputation and on the peace process, of not following through on its guarantee determines the probability of a guarantee. These arguments result in the second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2. *The greater the likelihood is that a potential guarantor has (does not have) the capacity to fulfill a certain type of guarantee the more (less) likely it is to give that guarantee.*

Though this hypothesis suggests that a guarantee is more likely from a guarantor with the capacity to provide it, the model also shows that third parties without capacity may still give a guarantee under certain conditions, including substantial interest in the conflict and significant benefits from maintaining a ceasefire, even for a short term (see proposition 1.2 in appendix A).

The guarantor capacity argument generates two testable hypotheses that focus on a potential guarantor's material capacity as well as its structural capabilities as they relate to the specific aspects of different guarantee types.

Guarantors face several limits to providing a guarantee. Sufficient military and financial capabilities determine a guarantor's ability to fulfill a guarantee on the ground. Military capacity relates to a guarantor's ability to deploy military personnel in order to provide a guarantee. It derives from a state's national military or from an intergovernmental organization's ability to recruit military personnel from among its member states with sufficient capabilities. Financial capacity to fund the deployment of an operation for guarantee fulfillment complements military

capabilities. In IGOs, member states may be able to contribute either military or financial means to support a mission.²⁸ Greater military and financial capacity makes it more likely that a third party gives a higher-level guarantee (support or enforcement guarantee), while limited capacity is likely to restrict potential guarantors to giving transparency guarantees or no guarantees.

H2.1 Third parties are more likely to give a higher-level (a lower-level/no) guarantee the greater (more limited) their material capabilities are.

In addition, different categories of guarantors may face different structural limits to fulfilling specific guarantee types. Resource requirements for fulfilling a guarantee primarily depend on the type of guarantee given. Fulfilling a transparency guarantee requires sending an observer mission while an enforcement guarantee demands the timely deployment of a contingent of fully armed and trained combat troops. Compared to observer and enforcement missions, support guarantees require capabilities across military and civilian contingents backed by organizational capacity and experience with multidimensional operations.

In terms of political costs, unilateral enforcement missions are likely to lack the legitimacy that is often necessary for their success. Furthermore, peace enforcement missions do not require continued consent and their deployment weakens the sovereignty norm and non-intervention principle, an effect that states are likely to consider as costly with respect to their own autonomy.

²⁸ In some cases potential guarantors may face difficulties mobilizing existing material capacity to provide a guarantee. Lack of consensus or limited support for a guarantee among the guarantor's members or constituents can be a powerful restraint of its guarantee provision capacity if interest in conflict resolution on one hand and material support for a guarantee on the other originate with different institutions or stake holders within a guarantor. For example, the government may face significant risks or losses if a conflict is not contained. However, it may not be able to obtain the required material support from other branches of government (compare for example the powers of the Executive and Congress in the U.S. Government).

These limits to capacity affect different third parties to a varying extent and principle distinctions may be drawn between states, regional organizations, and the UN. The UN has over time built its capacity to engage in monitoring missions, traditional peacekeeping operations, and peace enforcement missions. Its organizational structure and capabilities have given it an advantage in the realm of multidimensional peacekeeping, while it has faced significant limitations in its ability to receive military contingents for peace enforcement missions from member states in a timely manner. States and regional organizations are limited in their capabilities to provide the wide-ranging tasks of a comprehensive DDR program, but their ability to rapidly mobilize their own armed forces increases their capacity to provide enforcement guarantees. Political costs most likely affect individual states when they engage in unilateral enforcement missions, given the lack of legitimacy, while regional organizations' and ad-hoc coalitions' multilateral operations increase their capacity to fulfill enforcement guarantees. These guarantor specific structural capabilities and limitations suggests that specific types of guarantees are more likely to be given by some third parties than others.

Given the UN's limited ability to rely on the timely deployment of member states' military contingents for enforcement missions and its extensive capabilities in implementing complex support operations, the UN should be comparatively more likely to give support guarantees. Regional security organizations and ad-hoc coalitions possess more limited capabilities regarding comprehensive support guarantees, but they have an advantage of acting multilaterally in fulfilling enforcement guarantees. Combined with their strong regional security interests and ability to mobilize regional military contingents more rapidly, regional organizations and ad-hoc coalitions should be comparatively more likely to give enforcement guarantees.

States, too, have limited capabilities to fulfill multidimensional support guarantees and face political costs for implementing unilateral enforcement guarantees. However, their ability to quickly deploy national contingents to station observers or dispatch drones renders them comparatively more likely to give transparency guarantees. The following hypothesis summarizes the argument:

H2.2 Given their respective structural capabilities and limitations, the UN is more likely to give support guarantees, regional organizations and ad-hoc coalitions are more likely to give enforcement guarantees, and states are more likely to give transparency guarantees than other types of guarantees.

In the empirical analysis I will examine the extent to which guarantor identity determines the type of guarantee. I hope to gain insight into the distribution of guarantee types for different categories of guarantors, and in turn into whether and how the decision-making process and determinants of a guarantee might vary across guarantors.

2.3 Conflict-Driven Determinants

In addition to their interest and capacity, the model proposes that potential guarantors take into account conflict driven factors, including the extent of the conflict parties' security concerns, which translate into commitment problems, and the conflict parties' preferences regarding the outcome of the peace process.

2.3.1 Conflict Party Commitment Problems

Even after negotiating an agreement, distrust between the conflict parties remains high as the security dilemma provides incentives to rearm in order to increase the chances of being able to ward off an attack. The model captures the conflict parties' inability to communicate openly and commit genuinely to implementing the agreement and maintaining the established ceasefire. The conflict parties choose their actions simultaneously and under conditions of incomplete information about the other party's intentions and preferences. As in the Prisoners' Dilemma, the conflict parties' optimal choice is to defect in order to ensure their own security. As a result they are unable to credibly commit to abstaining from measures that increase their security, thereby decreasing each other's security. Proposition 3 in appendix A establishes that unless a guarantor gives a guarantee to safeguard the agreement and is perceived as having the capacity to fulfill that guarantee, the conflict parties prefer to defect from the implementation process.

The degree of the conflict parties' commitment problems is likely to affect not only whether a third party gives a guarantee but also what type of guarantee it is likely to give. Conflict parties facing greater commitment problems are likely to receive third-party guarantees that have a greater impact on the peace process. Accordingly, transparency guarantees would be more likely promised in cases that feature relatively low insecurity, while enforcement guarantees are granted in more demanding conflicts that are characterized by high insecurity.

Commitment problems prevent conflict parties from implementing a mutually beneficial agreement that they prefer to continued fighting. As the conflict parties' commitment problems increase so does the need for higher-level third-party guarantees. Third parties are more likely to give guarantees when they are needed to safeguard the implementation of an agreement. Given limited resources, potential guarantors are likely to choose to give guarantees when they are most

effective, that is, in cases characterized by significant commitment problems among the conflict parties. Note that in these cases agreement implementation is difficult because security concerns prevent conflict parties from fully committing to the peace process, not because conflict parties have incentives to overturn the agreement and derail the peace process. I discuss my expectations regarding the likelihood of guarantees in these latter cases in the subsequent section on conflict party preferences.

Conflict characteristics, including conflict type and costs, underlie the conflict parties' commitment problems. Ethnic conflicts, more than other types of conflict, take place at an interpersonal level, causing significant distrust and insecurity, which in turn makes it difficult for conflict parties to embrace a peace process without a third-party guarantee to protect them.²⁹ Furthermore, the conflict parties' insecurity and inability to credibly commit to a peace agreement increases as perceived conflict costs rise and as power asymmetry between the conflict parties grows.³⁰ Third parties are more likely to respond with higher-level guarantees (support or enforcement guarantees) to conflicts that have resulted in high insecurity and commitment problems for the conflict parties. The following hypothesis summarizes the above arguments.

Hypothesis 3. *The more (less) difficult it is for conflict parties to credibly commit to the implementation of a negotiated settlement, the more (less) likely is a third party to give a higher-level guarantee to ameliorate the commitment problems that conflict parties face.*

²⁹ See for example Posen (1993), Kaufmann (1996), Lake and Rothchild (1996), Walter (1997, 1999), and Snyder and Jervis (1999).

³⁰ Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild (2001, 190).

The analysis seeks to verify whether, similarly to peacekeeping more generally,³¹ third parties choose to give guarantees where they are needed most, namely in cases where conflict parties face significant commitment problems that make the implementation of an agreement difficult, instead of cases where conflict parties can more credibly commit to implementing a negotiated settlement.

As mentioned above, the level of the conflict parties' commitment problems is a function of conflict characteristics, including conflict type and costs, as well as the extent of power asymmetry among the conflict parties. Some types of conflicts reinforce greater levels of distrust than others. Ethnic conflicts that penetrate a population to the basic levels pit neighbors and family members against each other. These types of conflict engender significant insecurity and increase the conflict parties' inability to implement agreement provisions that make them vulnerable unless a guarantee safeguards the process.³² Potential guarantors should be more likely to give support or enforcement guarantees in ethnic conflicts.

H3.1 Third parties are more likely to give a higher-level guarantee to support the peace process in ethnic conflicts than in other types of conflict.

As the total number of conflict fatalities increase, so do the conflict parties' insecurity and perceived sunk costs associated with the conflict,³³ decreasing in turn the ability of conflict parties to credibly commit to the agreement.

³¹ Fortna (2008, 18–46) finds that peacekeepers are more likely to be deployed in cases where peace is harder to keep.

³² See, e.g., Posen (1993), Kaufmann (1996), Lake and Rothchild (1996), Walter (1997, 1999), and Snyder and Jervis (1999).

³³ Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild (2001, 190).

H3.2 The more (fewer) fatalities result from a conflict, the greater is the likelihood that a third party gives a higher-level (lower-level) guarantee to support the peace process in that conflict.

Furthermore, the degree of power asymmetry among the conflict parties affects the extent of the credible commitment problem they face during agreement implementation. Conceptually, a conflict party's power reflects its relative strength vis-à-vis other conflict parties. Power asymmetry is caused by significant differences among the conflict parties in terms of the types and amount of weapons, equipment, troops, mobilization, strategic advantage, and infrastructure. Extreme power asymmetry is likely to result in a decisive victory for the stronger side. However, under conditions of high, but not extreme, power asymmetry, a moderately weaker conflict party is unable to credibly commit to disarming and demobilizing given its disproportionate insecurity vis-à-vis a stronger opponent. Similarly, a stronger conflict party, while it might prefer a negotiated agreement to a status quo in which it is unlikely to defeat the other side, has an incentive to resist disarmament with the aim of widening the power gap and increasing its chances to settle the conflict on its terms, thus rendering its commitment to the disarmament and demobilization process incredible.

H3.3 The larger (smaller) the power asymmetry is that conflict parties face among themselves, the greater is the likelihood that a third party gives a higher-level (lower-level) guarantee in support of the peace process.

Finally, multiparty conflicts pose a greater challenge to the conflict parties' ability to commit to the peace process. The more parties are involved in a conflict the greater is the

uncertainty for each party regarding the others' interests and preferences. As uncertainty and incomplete information increase, so do each conflict party's security concerns and credible commitment problems.³⁴

H3.4 The larger (smaller) the number of conflict parties is, the greater is the likelihood that a third party gives a higher-level (lower-level) guarantee in support of the peace process.

The above hypotheses on conflict party commitment problems suggest that potential guarantors choose to become involved in difficult cases. They tend to give guarantees when they are needed, that is, in cases that are unlikely to achieve a stable peace without outside support. Importantly though, for a guarantee to occur, stable peace must be attainable—conflict parties genuinely have to seek to end hostilities and settle their conflict peacefully. It is because of the conflict parties' commitment problems that they are unable to implement a ceasefire or peace agreement they mutually prefer over conflict. These cases are different from another category of difficult cases for which the chances of lasting peace are slim because conflict parties actually prefer to continue fighting. The model suggests that third parties likely differentiate between these two types of difficult cases in considering whether to promise a guarantee—they gauge conflict party preferences for lasting peace versus continued conflict before giving a guarantee. The next section specifies the hypotheses related to conflict party preferences.

³⁴ See Cunningham (2006).

2.3.2 Conflict Party Preferences

Whether third parties are likely to give a guarantee depends on their expectations of the conflict parties' preferences for peace versus continued conflict. The equilibrium specified in proposition 4 of the model implies that third parties are less likely to give a guarantee if they believe that a conflict party has incentives to cause the agreement implementation process to fail. Third-party guarantees allow conflict parties to overcome their commitment problems and to implement an agreement they genuinely prefer to renewed fighting. Where conflict parties prefer continued fighting to the successful implementation of an agreement, they do not face commitment problems, but instead have incentives to actively resist the implementation process. Third-party guarantees are effective in ameliorating commitment problems but are less likely to be successful in safeguarding an implementation process that some conflict parties prefer to derail.

Giving a guarantee might change preferences, potentially encouraging conflict parties to support an agreement they previously opposed.³⁵ However, where conflict parties actively resist the peace process, ensuring transparency is difficult and supporting demobilization or enforcing agreement implementation successfully is less likely. Fulfilling a guarantee implies costs to guarantors when they are successful, but a guarantee is even more costly when verification, support, or enforcement missions fail and cause human and material losses because of active resistance by the conflict parties. While lower-level guarantees might still be promised in such spoiler cases, given limited resources, potential guarantors are more likely to give guarantees in cases where they can be effective in assisting conflict parties in overcoming commitment problems in order to implement an agreement they genuinely prefer to continued conflict. Third parties are less likely to give high-level guarantees where the conflict parties' preferences signal

³⁵ Fortna (2008).

a lack of support for agreement implementation and incentives to continue fighting. The above arguments lead to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4. *The more the benefits that conflict parties derive from continued fighting outweigh their benefits from the successful implementation of an agreement, the less likely is a third party to give a higher-level guarantee.*

Like the other determinants of third-party guarantees, the effect of the conflict parties' preferences on the type of guarantee is a matter of degree and likely depends on how strong the conflict parties' preferences are for the implementation of the peace agreement. A lack of conflict party support for the peace process likely results in no guarantee or only a transparency guarantee. A guarantor might respond to the conflict parties' mixed signals regarding their interest in a peaceful settlement with a support guarantee that gives them the opportunity to voluntarily comply with an agreement and send clear signals regarding their preferences.

Conflict party preferences are difficult to determine conclusively. Signing a negotiated settlement and agreeing to a guarantee might signal cooperation, but it might also be a tactic by conflict parties to buy time to reorganize and rearm. Potential guarantors likely consider the conflict parties' perceptions of the balance of expected benefits from fighting versus agreement implementation in deciding whether to give a guarantee. Conflict parties' support of an agreement is likely limited when their expected benefits from continued fighting outweigh their expected benefits from a successfully implemented agreement. Limited support for agreement implementation is likely reflected in a negotiated settlement that is insufficiently comprehensive to resolve the conflict parties' incompatibilities to their mutual benefit. Furthermore, conflict

parties might have limited support for the peace process when they benefit disproportionately from ongoing conflict through the conduct of illegal activities in the absence of effective state control.

Conflict parties are likely to have limited support for an agreement that is not sufficiently comprehensive to resolve the conflict.³⁶ Incentives for continued conflict might have resulted in a weak agreement in the first place, and a weak agreement in turn is unlikely to resolve the conflict parties' incompatibilities and might make continued fighting preferable to a peaceful settlement. I argue contrary to Walter (2002, 97) that lower agreement comprehensiveness is unlikely to be compensated for by higher-level third-party guarantees. Instead, the fewer incompatibilities a peace agreement resolves, the less likely third parties are to give higher-level guarantees, given their expectations of the conflict parties' preferences for continued conflict.

H4.1 Third parties are less (more) likely to give a higher-level guarantee the less (more) comprehensive the negotiated peace agreement is.

Conflict parties also tend to prefer continued fighting to the implementation of a peace agreement when conflict provides disproportionate benefits as a result of the conduct of illegal activities in the absence of effective state authority, such as the exploitation of lootable resources and trafficking of humans, narcotics, and weapons.

H4.2 Third parties are less (more) likely to give a higher-level guarantee the more (less) the conflict parties benefit from the conduct of illegal activities.

³⁶ See Hartzell (1999), Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild (2001), Hartzell and Hoddie (2003), and Hoddie and Hartzell (2005).

In contrast to the commitment problem hypothesis, which predicts that guarantees are *more* likely to be given in those difficult cases where fighting is most likely to resume because the conflict parties’ insecurity is high, hypothesis 4 predicts that where recurring fighting is likely due to spoilers, potential guarantors are *less* likely to give a guarantee. Hard cases are thus not necessarily more likely to receive a guarantee. Instead, the model predicts that potential guarantors distinguish between the underlying causes of recurring fighting and give guarantees to conflict parties that prefer an agreement to conflict, yet are unable to implement it without help, but not to conflict parties that prefer continued fighting over a negotiated settlement.

H3: Commitment Problems

		Low	High
H4: Likelihood of Spoilers	Low	Guarantee LESS likely	Guarantee MORE likely
	High	Guarantee LEAST likely	Guarantee LESS likely

Figure 2.1: Likelihood of third-party guarantees in difficult cases

The figure above illustrates the interaction between the two conflict-driven hypotheses. The shaded boxes represent “hard cases”—renewed conflict is likely because commitment problems and/or the likelihood of spoilers are high. However, the model predicts that regardless of whether the conflict parties face commitment problems, high-level guarantees are less likely

when spoilers provide incentives to return to fighting. Hypotheses 3 and 4 jointly predict that potential guarantors are more likely to give a high-level guarantee when conflict parties have to overcome commitment problems but do not have significant incentives to abandon agreement implementation.

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter has laid out the theoretical framework and derived the principal hypotheses for empirical testing from the model and its theoretical implications. It has identified four potential determinants for guarantees, two each on the guarantor and conflict sides of the guarantee process. Both the guarantor-driven and conflict-driven factors figure in a potential guarantor's decision of whether to give a certain type of guarantee, and guarantor interests and conflict party commitment problems are the basis of the decision-making process. But whether a guarantee is ultimately given is likely determined by perceptions on the part of the guarantor and conflict parties regarding the guarantor's capacity to follow through on its promise, and by a potential guarantor's beliefs about the conflict parties' preferences for peace or continued conflict.

The model suggests that hard cases *per se* do not receive a guarantee. A potential guarantor is likely to give higher-level guarantees to conflict parties prone to return to war because of their commitment problems, but is less likely to give higher-level guarantees to conflict parties intent on spoiling the agreement process. The theoretical framework suggests that guarantee effectiveness figures in a potential guarantor's calculations. It also suggests more

broadly that any analysis of conflict resolution has to differentiate among different kinds of difficulty that render third-party involvement in “hard cases” challenging.

The principal aspects of a guarantee process—the level of actual fulfillment of a specific type of guarantee and the effect of guarantees on the peace process—are determined at the guarantee decision stage and are considered by potential guarantors in determining whether to send a peace operation to promote agreement implementation. Long-term effects and consequences matter in the view of guarantors, but so do short-term incentives of giving a guarantee. In the model, a guarantor, regardless of its capacity to fulfill a guarantee, receives a short-term benefit for promising a guarantee if the conflict parties abide by the ceasefire while waiting for the guarantee to arrive on the ground. The benefit derives from the immediate effects that a guarantee promise has—by signaling commitment and resolve by the guarantor—on the short-term stabilization of the conflict, on the conflict parties’ compliance with an established ceasefire, and on negotiations and the likelihood of concluding an agreement. Guarantees can also allay pressure from the international community on third parties to actively support the peaceful resolution of a conflict.

These short-term benefits contrast with considerations of the long-term effects of guarantees, including the effects on the peace process of a guarantor’s failure to live up to its promise, the impact on reputational costs, and the benefits from bringing the implementation process to its conclusion. A guarantor without capacity to provide a guarantee might still promise one when the short-term benefits of such promise outweigh potential long-term costs and negative effects. Such assessments are subjective to each guarantor, and the empirical analysis aims to shed light on how different potential guarantors approach the analysis of short- and long-term costs and benefits of giving a specific type of guarantee.

The remainder of this dissertation will test the above hypotheses by utilizing a multi-method approach that relies on statistical analysis, case study research, and interviews.

Chapter 3

Quantitative Evidence

3.1 Introduction

I examine the hypotheses introduced in the previous chapter using both quantitative (in this chapter) and qualitative (in the following two chapters) methods. While qualitative analysis tests the proposed theory based on the detailed study of a few cases, statistical analysis allows us to explore patterns across a large number of cases. Existing quantitative work on third-party involvement in intrastate conflict examines a broad range of questions, including third-party effects on the duration, outcome, and resolution of intrastate conflict, as well as on the long-term prevention of recurring conflict.³⁷

The research design I adopt for testing the hypotheses advanced in the previous chapter addresses some of the shortcomings of existing data and quantitative analyses of third-party guarantees as discussed in the literature review in chapter 1. The scope of this dissertation is limited to studying the first step in the guarantee process, that is, when does a third party give a guarantee and what type of guarantee does it give? Whether a third party gives a guarantee might be affected by the same factors that drive both whether the guarantee is provided on the ground and whether it is successful in supporting the peace process. Isolating these relationships is important if we want to understand the role of guarantees in the peaceful resolution of intrastate

³⁷ See, e.g., Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000), Regan (2000, 2002), Doyle and Sambanis (2000), Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild (2001), Fortna (2003, 2004a, 2008), and Hartzell and Hoddie (2003).

conflict. Decomposing the guarantee process allows me to study the determinants of a guarantor's decision to give a guarantee and to examine, in the next phase of this research, the factors that drive the level of guarantee fulfillment and the effect that guarantees have on the peace process.

At the same time this dissertation seeks to arrive at more generalizable results. In order to test the hypotheses developed in the previous chapter, I created a new dataset that contains information on annual dyadic third-party guarantees. The most significant addition compared to prior datasets on guarantees is the inclusion of information about potential guarantors. In examining why some guarantors give guarantees and why some of these guarantors sometimes do not provide promised guarantees on the ground, we should consider the identities and characteristics of guarantors. The information on guarantors includes variables that identify guarantors and capture their capacity to provide given guarantees. In addition, compared to other datasets, the universe of cases also includes conflicts with fatality levels between 25 and 1,000 battle-related deaths in order to examine guarantees in all civil conflicts, not just those characterized by high intensity. Furthermore, the outcome variable is defined more broadly, extending beyond guarantees mandated in peace agreements and including guarantees given prior to the start of negotiations and before and after a peace agreement is signed.

Apart from distinguishing between giving a guarantee and providing it on the ground, a better understanding of the effect of guarantees on the peace process requires a more nuanced analysis of the type of guarantees given by third parties. Walter (2002) codes different levels of a peace operation's strength that distinguish between verification (under 500 observers, more than 500 observers) and enforcement missions (under 5,000 troops, more than 5,000 troops). I adopt a different categorization that, in addition to transparency (verification) and enforcement

guarantees, also accounts for guarantees aimed at providing operational support for ceasefire or agreement implementation. These tasks are key to transitioning toward peace and often require not only verification by a third party but a guarantor's actual participation in order to allow conflict parties to overcome their security concerns and remain committed to the peace process.

The remainder of this chapter will introduce the dataset, discuss the statistical analysis, and present the results.

3.2 The Dataset: Annual Dyadic Third-Party Guarantees

The dataset provides information on third-party guarantees that were given to intrastate conflict dyads, consisting of two armed and opposing actors, with one being the government, that have a stated incompatibility. An intrastate conflict is included if the use of armed force between two parties resulted in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year, based on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2015 (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, and Strand 2002; Melander, Pettersson, and Themnér 2016).³⁸ Dyadic data for each of the included conflicts is drawn from the UCDP/PRIO Dyadic Dataset v.1-2015 (Harbom, Melander, and Wallensteen 2008; Melander, Pettersson, and Themnér 2016).³⁹ Individual conflict dyads are recorded in the dataset for every calendar year over the period 1989–2014 that the conflict was not terminated.

³⁸ UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2015, Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Uppsala University, <http://www.ucdp.uu.se>. While the time period under consideration begins in 1989, intrastate conflicts that started before 1989 are included if they continued during or after 1989. The case United States of America vs. al-Qaida, September 11, 2001, is dropped since it extends beyond the definitions of both internal and governmental conflict.

³⁹ UCDP/PRIO Dyadic Dataset v.1-2015, Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Uppsala University, <http://www.ucdp.uu.se>.

The tables below provide information on the number of intrastate conflicts, conflict dyads, and annual conflict dyad observations, as well as a map and a list of the 78 states that experienced intrastate conflict between 1989 and 2014.

Number of intrastate conflicts (1989–2014)	140
Number of intrastate conflict dyads (1989–2014)	317
Number of intrastate conflict dyad-years (1989–2014)	1,822

Table 3.1: Totals of intrastate conflicts, conflict dyads, and conflict dyad-years



Figure 3.1: Map of states experiencing intrastate conflict (1989–2014)

Region	Conflict States		
Eastern Africa	Burundi Comoros Djibouti Eritrea	Ethiopia Mozambique Rwanda Somalia	South Sudan Uganda
Middle Africa	Angola Central African Republic	Chad Congo	DR Congo (Zaire)
Northern Africa	Algeria Egypt, Arab Rep.	Libya Morocco	Sudan
Southern Africa	Lesotho	South Africa	
Western Africa	Côte d'Ivoire Guinea Guinea-Bissau Liberia	Mali Mauritania Niger Nigeria	Senegal Sierra Leone
Caribbean	Haiti	Trinidad and Tobago	
Central America	El Salvador Guatemala	Mexico Nicaragua	Panama
South America	Colombia Paraguay	Peru Suriname	Venezuela
Central Asia	Tajikistan	Uzbekistan	
Southern Asia	Afghanistan Bangladesh India	Iran Nepal Pakistan	Sri Lanka
South-Eastern Asia	Cambodia Indonesia Laos	Malaysia Myanmar (Burma) Philippines	Thailand
Western Asia	Azerbaijan Georgia Iraq	Israel Lebanon Syria	Turkey Yemen (North)
Eastern Europe	Moldova	Russia (Soviet Union)	Ukraine
Northern Europe	United Kingdom		
Southern Europe	Bosnia-Herzegovina Croatia	Macedonia, FYR Serbia (Yugoslavia)	Spain
Oceania	Papua New Guinea		

Table 3.2: States experiencing intrastate conflict (1989–2014)

The main unit of observation is the *guarantor-dyad-year*, that is, the annual triad of a potential guarantor and the two parties of a conflict dyad. Observations in the dataset are disaggregated by year and by conflict dyad (in addition to specific potential guarantors, see below) to allow for a more detailed analysis of the determinants of third-party guarantees. Some conflict characteristics, including conflict cost and intensity, which are hypothesized to affect the likelihood of third-party guarantees through guarantor interest and conflict party commitment problems, vary with time and across dyads. A conflict's potential for escalation and opportunity costs to fighting, which are hypothesized to influence guarantor interest and conflict party preferences respectively also vary over time. Conflict parties' relative power and exploitation of natural resources to finance conflict is dyad specific. In addition, some negotiations and ceasefire and peace agreements, for example, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, are only entered into by some of the conflict dyads; third-party guarantees in support of negotiations and agreement implementation may hence be specific to certain dyads as well. The chart below tracks the total number of intrastate conflicts, conflict dyads, and conflict dyad-potential guarantor triads annually, over the period from 1989 to 2014.




Figure 3.2: Number of intrastate conflicts, conflict dyads, and conflict dyad-potential guarantor triads (1989–2014)

3.3 The Dependent Variable: Third-Party Guarantee

The principal dependent variable codes the decision by a potential guarantor to give a guarantee in support of the peace process in intrastate conflict resolution. Third-party guarantees are defined as peace operations provided by a third party aimed at reducing the conflict parties' security concerns related to agreement implementation in order to advance the post-civil conflict peace process. Third-party guarantees may be given at any time during the peace process to encourage ceasefire or peace agreement negotiations, or the signing or implementation of peace

agreements. They are given in the form of peace operation mandates that are authorized by the third party's respective official decision-making body (UNSC, AUPSC) and that ensure transparency of conflict party actions, operational support for agreement implementation (for example, actively assist combatants in demobilization and disarmament or facilitate the redeployment of government troops), or enforcement of compliance. *Transparency guarantees* are given by authorizing monitoring and verification missions undertaken by unarmed or lightly armed civilian or military personnel (possibly backed by a protection force to safeguard the security of observers) to verify ceasefires or disarmament. *Support guarantees* are given by mandating active operational support for agreement implementation carried out by a range of military and civilian personnel. *Enforcement guarantees* are given by approving peace enforcement missions undertaken by military troops that have been authorized to "use all necessary means" to enforce agreement implementation and conflict party compliance. Multidimensional mandates may contain several of the above guarantees and employ a combination of military, police, and civilian capabilities.

The analysis focuses on guarantees that were given with the intention to provide active support to conflict parties in the post-conflict peace process. That is, these guarantees are provided on the ground not only after a ceasefire or peace agreement is violated. Rather, they are intended to establish conditions that prevent such violations in the first place. Accordingly, the analysis only includes guarantees embodied in peace operations, which in general aim to deploy shortly after their authorization. Guarantees designed to deploy only once a violation occurs (for example, the guarantee given by Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom in the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee to enforce its provisions in case of violations) are not included.

The definition furthermore implies that only those peace operation mandates are included as guarantees that aim at supporting conflict parties in the implementation of high-risk security provisions of a ceasefire or peace agreement. It excludes operations with a humanitarian mandate only (for example, UNOSOM I, UNITAF in Somalia, 1992), operations to support the implementation of human rights agreements that do not address any of the stated incompatibilities of the conflict parties (for example, MINUGUA in Guatemala, 1994–95), as well as political missions and offices, which lack capacity to provide guarantees (for example, United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire, 2003). I first coded such operations for the dyad-year that their mandate was adjusted to support ceasefire or peace agreement negotiation and implementation according to the definition of third-party guarantees (for example, CEMAC in CAR, 2007). Furthermore, enforcement missions undertaken without the initial consent of at least one of the conflict parties (for example, ECOMOG’s intervention in Sierra Leone after the military coup in 1997) are excluded from the dataset.

While most guarantees apply to both parties in a conflict dyad, it is not a necessary precondition for a third-party guarantee to be included in the analysis. For example, the South African Protection Support Detachment (SAPSD) was authorized in 2001 to provide an enforcement guarantee aimed at protecting Hutu politicians returning from exile to participate in the newly established interim government in Burundi.

I coded third-party guarantees based on a systematic screening of all peace operations authorized over the period 1989–2014 to identify the mandates that meet the criteria contained in the definition outlined above. I conducted the search through a review of information contained in the following sources: UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2015),⁴⁰

⁴⁰ UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), 2015, <http://ucdp.uu.se>.

UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset (Kreutz 2010),⁴¹ UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (Harbom, Högbladh, and Wallensteen 2006),⁴² UCDP Managing Intrastate Low-intensity Conflict (MILC) Dataset (Melander, Möller, and Öberg 2009),⁴³ UCDP Managing Intrastate Conflict (MIC) Dataset (Melander and Uexkull 2011; Croicu, Melander, Nilsson, and Wallensteen 2013),⁴⁴ Peace Agreements Database (United Nations Peacemaker 2015),⁴⁵ and SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database (SIPRI 2015),⁴⁶ as well as the respective resolutions by third-party decision-making bodies, for example, UN Security Council Resolutions (UN Official Document System)⁴⁷ and Communiqués by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU Resource Centre).⁴⁸

Each *guarantor-dyad-year* is associated with one of the following outcomes: no guarantee, one guarantee, or more than one guarantee. The dependent variable indicates whether a new guarantee was given (binary variable, coded ‘1’ for new guarantee). I coded third-party guarantees for the dyad-year that experienced the authorization of the respective operation aimed at providing a guarantee. Since a conflict is recorded in the dataset until the year of its termination, I coded a guarantee given in the year following conflict termination for the prior year (the last year the conflict is recorded in the data).

⁴¹ Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), 2015, <http://ucdp.uu.se>.

⁴² Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), 2015, <http://ucdp.uu.se>.

⁴³ Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), 2015, <http://ucdp.uu.se>.

⁴⁴ Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), 2015, <http://ucdp.uu.se>.

⁴⁵ United Nations Peacemaker, Peace Agreements Database, <http://peacemaker.un.org>.

⁴⁶ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2015, SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, <https://sipri.org/databases/pko>.

⁴⁷ Official Document System of the United Nations, 2015, <https://documents.un.org/prod/ods.nsf/home.xsp>.

⁴⁸ Resource Centre, Directorate of Peace and Security, African Union, 2015, <http://www.peaceau.org/en/resource>.

If a new guarantee was given, I specified the type of guarantee in an ordinal variable coded ‘1’ for transparency guarantee, ‘2’ for support guarantee, and ‘3’ for enforcement guarantee. Guarantee types are not mutually exclusive. Support and enforcement guarantees imply transparency guarantees, but not vice versa. An enforcement guarantee may be built on a support guarantee for a disarmament and demobilization program, but a support guarantee does not amount to enforcing the conflict parties’ compliance with such a program. If a guarantor gave several guarantees (for example, monitor a ceasefire and support a DDR program) as part of one operational mandate in the same year, I coded only one new guarantee based on the highest-level guarantee type.⁴⁹ If the mandate underlying a guarantee that had been given in a prior year was subsequently expanded to a higher-level guarantee type I coded a new guarantee. A guarantee given across multiple dyads is recorded for each dyad. If one conflict dyad received a guarantee from two guarantors in the same year, I coded both guarantees separately and recorded the highest level of *each* of these guarantees for the respective *guarantor-dyad-year* in the dataset. The total number of guarantors involved in any given conflict is coded in a third dependent variable.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Coding only the highest level of guarantee potentially underestimates the likelihood with which guarantors that tend to give enforcement guarantees also give support guarantees. However, examining the relationship between guarantor category and guarantee type based on a set of dummy variables that code each guarantee type individually given in a mandate yields similar results compared to the analysis based on the highest level guarantee (see table B.9 in appendix B).

⁵⁰ Guarantee renewal for a dyad-year in the form of a peace operation mandate extension is coded in a separate variable.

3.4 Potential Guarantors: Sampling Design

Each unit of observation specifies a potential guarantor whose decision of whether and what type of guarantee to give is coded in the dependent variable. A guarantor is defined as the third party that gives a guarantee by authorizing, through its official decision-making body, the establishment of a peace operation and by being primarily responsible for fulfilling that guarantee. Endorsing, commanding, or providing funding for a peace operation is not sufficient to be a guarantor. In addition, the concept used here should be distinguished from so-called guarantors to peace talks, for example, Norway and Cuba in the negotiations between the Colombian government and FARC in 2015.

Theoretically, there is a large number of potential guarantors: any state, combination of states, regional and international intergovernmental organization qualifies as potential guarantor: major powers, regional powers, colonial powers, neighboring states, the UN, regional security organizations, among others. Empirically, however, there are only nineteen different guarantors that have authorized peace operations in support of ceasefire or peace agreement implementation during 1989–2014. These guarantors are presented in the following table, categorized according to their identity vis-à-vis the conflict state.

Regional Organizations	Regional Power	Colonial Power	Universal
African Union (AU)	Australia	France	Norway
Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC)	India		United Nations
Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD)	Malaysia		United States
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)	Russia		
Commonwealth of Nations	South Africa		
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)			
Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS)			
European Union (EU)			
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)			
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)			

Table 3.3: Actual guarantors (1989–2014)

The distribution of *actual* guarantors provides a useful tool for deciding on the inclusion of specific types of *potential* guarantors in the dataset without introducing selection bias. It presents a blueprint for the inclusion of potential guarantors that fixes the profiles of potential guarantors across the dataset (such as regional power), but allows their specific identities to vary by conflict. The sampling design I introduce in this chapter accomplishes two goals: it allows me to include, in addition to the cases that were actually given guarantees (treatment),⁵¹ also observations without guarantees (control) in order to avoid selection bias and render the analysis

⁵¹ Note that the treatment cases are not a sample, but the full population of all cases with guarantees.

meaningful. Including all possible potential guarantors as controls, however, would result in a dataset with close to half a million observations, of which only a miniscule percentage would constitute cases with a guarantee. Statistical analysis of such data would produce biased estimates, significantly underestimating the likelihood that a third-party guarantee occurs.⁵² Instead, the sampling design I adopt includes only a small fraction of all possible controls. It only selects into the control group those potential guarantors that are likely to give a guarantee because they are *relevant* based on their specific interests and their relationship with the respective conflict state.⁵³

Ten of the actual guarantors in 1989–2014 were regional security organizations. Accordingly, the set of potential guarantors includes regional security organizations for all conflicts based on the subregion location of the conflict state.⁵⁴ In order to be included a regional security organization has to have a mandate and mechanism to mount military campaigns in its region. For example, the Collective Security Treaty Organization was founded to carry out military defense operations with a joint force drawn from its members. ASEAN on the other hand lacks an explicit security or defense dimension and the ability to carry out military

⁵² See for example King and Zeng (2001) for a discussion of the problems associated with rare events data analysis.

⁵³ The underlying rationale for selecting a control group of truly “potential” guarantors from the universe of all possible guarantors is similar to the logic according to which empirical analyses of interstate war use only a subset of all possible pairs of states, i.e., *politically relevant dyads* (pairs of states that are contiguous and/or including at least one major power), to compare to dyads that have experienced war. Lemke (1995) states that politically relevant dyads constitute the “correct referent group”, “a true control group” (29) with which to compare conflict dyads, since only relevant dyads have a reasonable probability of engaging in dyadic conflict. See Weede (1976) for an early discussion of politically relevant dyads. See Maoz and Russett (1993) and Oneal and Russett (1997, 2003) for analyses of relevant dyads in conflict research. See Lemke and Reed (2001) for a discussion of how potential measurement error and selection bias do not substantively affect results of conflict analysis in the context of the democratic peace. For a more critical view of how politically relevant samples might bias results in studies of trade interdependence and conflict, see Benson (2005). The sampling design for the inclusion of potential guarantors in the control group was chosen with the aim of overcoming problems of selection bias and limiting the potential of biased results.

⁵⁴ Regional and subregional groupings are based on the geographical region and regional composition table of the United Nations Statistics Division, <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm>.

operations. A regional security organization is paired with a conflict as potential guarantor if the conflict state is located in the same subregion as at least one of the members of that organization or if the conflict state is located in the same subregion as a state in which the organization has been militarily involved. An exception is the Commonwealth of Nations, which is matched only with conflict states that are also member states. The table below presents a list of regional organizations included in the roster of potential guarantors.

Another five of the actual guarantors in 1989–2014 were regional powers. The roster of potential guarantors thus includes regional powers for each conflict state. They are drawn from a list of regional powers that Shaw, Cooper, and Antkiewicz (2007) call the “BRIC plus.”⁵⁵ Regional power guarantors are matched as potential guarantors to conflict states located in the same subregion as the regional power as well as to conflict states located in the same subregion as states that have experienced military involvement by the regional power.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Shaw, Cooper, and Antkiewicz (2007, 1260) include in the “BRIC plus” group of regional powers Brazil, Russia, India, China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey. All but Thailand and the Philippines are included as potential guarantors for conflict states located in the respective regions.

⁵⁶ Egypt and South Africa are exceptions. They are matched to conflict states in additional regions given their broader traditional spheres of influence (see table 3.4).

Subregion	Regional Powers	Regional Security Organizations
Eastern Africa	South Africa	EU, AU, CEN-SAD, ECCAS, EAC
Middle Africa	South Africa	EU, AU, SADC, CEN-SAD, ECCAS, CEMAC
Northern Africa	Egypt	EU, AU, CEN-SAD
Southern Africa	South Africa	EU, AU, SADC
Western Africa	Nigeria	EU, AU, CEN-SAD, ECOWAS
Caribbean	United States	OAS
Central America	United States, Mexico	OAS
South America	Brazil	OAS
Northern America	United States	OAS, OSCE, NATO
Central Asia	Russia, China	CIS, OSCE, CSTO
Eastern Asia	China	
Southern Asia	Iran, India, China	NATO
South-Eastern Asia	Indonesia, Malaysia, China	EU
Western Asia	Russia, Turkey, Iran, Egypt, China	EU, OSCE, NATO, CIS, CSTO
Eastern Europe	Russia, France, United Kingdom	EU, OSCE, NATO, CIS, CSTO
Northern Europe	France, United Kingdom, Russia	EU, OSCE, NATO
Southern Europe	France, United Kingdom, Russia	EU, OSCE, NATO
Western Europe	France, United Kingdom	EU, OSCE, NATO
Oceania	Australia	

Regional Security Organizations include: African Union (AU), Economic Community of Central African States (CEMAC), Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS), European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization of American States (OAS), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Southern African Development Community (SADC)

Table 3.4: Potential guarantors: regional powers and regional security organizations

One of the actual guarantors, France, gave guarantees to support the peace process in two of its former colonies (in Djibouti in 1992 and in Côte d'Ivoire in 2003). Accordingly, if applicable, all conflict states are furthermore matched with their former colonial rulers as potential guarantors.⁵⁷

The remaining third parties who gave guarantees in 1989–2014 are the United Nations, the United States, and Norway. The UN has a mandate to maintain international peace and security beyond specific regions. Accordingly, the UN is universally matched as a potential guarantor with each of the conflicts in the dataset. The United States gave two guarantees during 1989–2014. It gave a transparency guarantee in 2002 in Sudan by proposing and implementing the Joint Military Commission to monitor a ceasefire in the Nuba Mountains. In Haiti in 1994, the U.S. gave an enforcement guarantee to the returning government under Aristide following the coup d'état. While its involvement in Haiti was as a regional power, its support for the peace process in Sudan reflects its global influence. Given its superpower status, the U.S. is thus matched as a potential guarantor with conflicts in all regions. In addition, given their status as permanent members of the UN Security Council with the ability to veto any resolution authorizing a peace operation in fulfillment of a guarantee, France, the United Kingdom, Russia, and China are also matched as potential guarantors with each conflict.

Lastly, Norway gave a transparency guarantee to support the peace process reconciling the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE in 2002. Since 1998 Norway had been engaged in shuttle diplomacy aimed at bringing the conflict parties to the negotiation table and subsequently mediated the talks. It led the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission that was set up to monitor the ceasefire agreement. Though other Scandinavian countries helped finance the mission and

⁵⁷ If applicable, conflict states are matched with their former colonial rulers based on Hensel (2014) ICOW Colonial History Data Set, version 1.0, <http://www.paulhensel.org/icowcol.html>.

contributed observers to it, Norway can be considered as the principal guarantor. Its guarantee to Sri Lanka did not result from a regional or colonial relationship, but is *sui generis* in character. Beyond its involvement in Sri Lanka, Norway has made substantial efforts to resolve conflicts worldwide. It hosted talks between the Guatemalan government and URNG in 1994–1996, sponsored a peace conference in Kenya aimed at resolving the conflict between the government of Somalia and the SRRC in 2003, supported the peace process between the government of Uganda and the LRA between 2004 and 2008, hosted and mediated negotiations between the government of the Philippines and CPP from 2004 to 2012, was an observer of the peace talks between the Colombian government and FARC in 2006–07, hosted secret negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban, and contributed troops to the International Monitoring Team in the Philippines in 2014. Though Sweden and other Nordic countries as well as other states, such as Switzerland, have provided good offices and mediated negotiations, Norway's contributions outweigh other countries' efforts. Given its substantial engagement in support of conflict resolution around the world, Norway is matched as potential guarantor with each conflict.

In sum, the guarantor-conflict dyad-year is created by combining every conflict dyad for every year it is active with the UN, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Norway, the former colonial power (if applicable), and all relevant regional powers and regional organizations. 1,822 intrastate conflict dyad-years (1989–2014) thus yield 21,478 guarantor triad years.

3.5 Independent Variables

The determinants of third-party guarantees can be categorized according to guarantor interest and capacity, and conflict party commitment problems and preferences. The first hypothesis that is generated by the guarantor interest argument proposes that potential guarantors are more likely to give a higher-level guarantee to conflict states that contribute to the global economy.

Economic integration is measured by a conflict state's total trade as percentage of GDP, averaged over the five years preceding the start year of the conflict. Trade data is available for all conflict states and for most years up to 2014 from the World Development Indicators database (World Bank 2015).⁵⁸

The second guarantor interest hypothesis posits that the greater the threat is that a conflict poses to regional and international security the more likely is a potential guarantor to give a higher-level guarantee to advance the peace process. A conflict's threat to regional security is a function of its intensity and its risk of exacerbating other ongoing conflicts. Conflict intensity is measured by annual dyadic battle-related deaths. Annual dyadic battle deaths data is available for most conflict dyad years during 1989–2014 in the UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset v.5-2015 (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005; Melander, Pettersson, and Themnér 2016).⁵⁹ It is transformed using the natural log and lagged by one time period to account for typical delays in the authorization of guarantees.

Furthermore, a conflict might affect, and be affected by the dynamics of ongoing violence and conflicts nearby, impacting regional security by increasing arms trafficking,

⁵⁸ World Bank, World Development Indicators, 1960–2014, <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators>.

⁵⁹ UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset v.5-2015, Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Uppsala University, <http://www.ucdp.uu.se>.

exacerbating conflict intensity, and aggravating refugee problems. I include the existence of ongoing political violence and conflict nearby by combining the intrastate and interstate violence magnitude scores for all bordering states from the Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV), 1946–2014, dataset (Marshall 2015) and recoding them into a binary variable that is coded ‘1’ for any dyad-year during which at least one of the states sharing a border with the conflict state experienced intrastate or interstate violence in the previous year, and ‘0’ otherwise.⁶⁰ The variable is lagged by one time period to allow time for influencing potential guarantor decision-making.

The guarantor capacity hypothesis argues that potential guarantors are more likely to give a certain type of guarantee if they have the material capacity to actually provide it on the ground. Material capacity of potential guarantor states is measured based on annual military expenditure in current US\$ million as recorded in the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. Military expenditure data is available for 1988–2014, though there are some gaps in the data, for example, for Russia during its transition from the USSR in 1991 and 1992.⁶¹ Material capacity of intergovernmental organizations (UN, regional organizations) was calculated by summing all member states’ annual military expenditures. The military expenditure variable is then transformed using the natural log. Since the sampling design excludes most low capacity guarantors from the analysis, it is biased against the capacity hypothesis. If we still find a relationship between capacity and guarantees this bias will render the results even stronger.

The capacity argument furthermore suggests that a potential guarantor’s structural capabilities vary across guarantor type and may render some guarantors inherently more likely to

⁶⁰ Center for Systemic Peace, Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) and Conflict Regions, 1946–2014, April 28, 2015, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html>.

⁶¹ SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2015, <https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex>.

give certain types of guarantees than others. The argument expects that states are more likely to give transparency guarantees, that the UN is more likely to give support guarantees, and that regional organizations are more likely to give enforcement guarantees than other types of guarantees. The hypothesis will be tested by examining the effect of a set of binary guarantor identity variables (UN, regional IGO, state) on the likelihood of specific guarantee types.

Conflict parties' commitment problems are a function of conflict variables, including conflict type (ethnic conflict) and costs, the degree of power asymmetry within a conflict-dyad, and the number of dyads in a conflict. The hypotheses posit that the greater a conflict dyad's commitment problems are the more likely is a third party to give a higher-level guarantee. Ethnic conflict is coded based on the Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV), 1946–2014, dataset (Marshall 2015).⁶² A binary variable is coded '1' if the conflict was characterized by ethnic violence or ethnic war in the previous year, and is coded '0' otherwise. It is lagged by one time period. Conflict costs are measured as total battle-related deaths per dyad, cumulative up to and including the current year, using the annual dyadic battle-related deaths data from the UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset v.5-2015, 1989–2014 (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005; Melander, Pettersson, and Themnér 2016).⁶³ The variable is transformed using the natural log and lagged by one time period.

The commitment problem hypothesis further argues that the greater the power asymmetry between conflict parties is, the more difficult it is for them to credibly commit to the implementation of a signed agreement. Power asymmetry is captured by two binary variables that reflect the relative strength of rebel forces vis-à-vis government forces. I recoded the *rebel*

⁶² Center for Systemic Peace, Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) and Conflict Regions, 1946–2014, April 28, 2015, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html>.

⁶³ UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset v.5-2015, Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Uppsala University, <http://www.ucdp.uu.se>.

strength variable from the Non-State Actor Data, version 3.4, so that *Rebels Stronger* is coded ‘1’ if the rebels are stronger or much stronger than the government forces and ‘0’ otherwise (parity or weaker), and *Rebels Weaker* is coded ‘1’ if the rebels are weaker or much weaker than the government forces and ‘0’ otherwise (parity or stronger).⁶⁴

Finally, multiparty conflicts imply greater commitment problems due to increased complexity, incomplete information, and higher levels of uncertainty.⁶⁵ The multi-dyad hypothesis argues that the greater the number of conflict parties is, the greater is the likelihood that a third party will promise a higher-level guarantee in support of the peace process. Based on the UCDP/PRIO Dyadic Dataset, v.1-2015, 1946–2014 (Harbom, Melander, and Wallensteen 2008; Melander, Pettersson, and Themnér 2016), the multi-dyad variable is coded ‘0’ if the total number of dyads that have participated in a conflict is one, ‘1’ for two dyads, ‘2’ for three and four dyads, ‘3’ for five dyads, ‘4’ for six to thirteen dyads, and ‘5’ for 14 or more dyads.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013), Non-State Actor Data, version 3.4, posted on November 23, 2013. http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/nsa_v3.4_21November2013.asc. See also Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2009).

⁶⁵ See Cunningham (2006).

⁶⁶ UCDP/PRIO Dyadic Dataset v.1-2015, Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Uppsala University, <http://www.ucdp.uu.se>. Four of the conflicts included in the dataset include such a large number of rebel groups that the UCDP dyadic dataset does not distinguish among them and includes all of them as “insurgents” in a single dyad. They are dyad UCDP ID 355, Government of India – Kashmir insurgents; dyad ID 387, Government of India – Sikh insurgents; dyad ID 472, Government of Thailand – Patani insurgents; and dyad ID 867, Government of Syria – Syrian insurgents. For these conflicts I coded the *multidyad* variable as 5 (i.e., 14 or more dyads) based on documentation in the UCDP codebook. For Government of India – Kashmir insurgents: “A large number of groups have been active. 60 groups were reported active in 1990, 140 in 1991 and 180 in 1992. Some of the larger groups have been JKLF (Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front), the Hizb-e-Mujahideen and, in recent years, also the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jesh-e-Mohammadi.” (UCDP/PRIO Dyadic dataset v2.1, Conflict_list_1946-2001, 9). For Government of India – Sikh insurgents: “A large number of groups have been active, reportedly more than 24 organizations and splinter groups in 1992. Some of the larger groups have been the KLF (Khalistan Liberation Force) and the KCF (Khalistan Commando Force).” (UCDP/PRIO Dyadic dataset v2.1, Conflict_list_1946-2001, 9). For Government of Thailand – Patani insurgents, see Human Rights Watch (2007). For Government of Syria – Syrian insurgents, a 2013 BBC report states “There are believed to be as many as 1,000 armed opposition groups in Syria, commanding an estimated 100,000 fighters.” (BBC News, “Guide to the Syrian rebels,” December 13, 2013, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24403003>).

The fourth main hypothesis posits that third parties are more likely to give a higher-level guarantee if conflict parties signal a genuine interest in the peaceful settlement of their conflict. The argument proposes that peace agreement comprehensiveness and opportunity costs affect the conflict parties' preferences. Agreement comprehensiveness is a cumulative measure of the number of major provisions an agreement contains. The measure is based on the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset v. 2.0 (Harbom, Högbladh and Wallensteen 2006; Högbladh 2011),⁶⁷ which records the number of military, political, territorial, and justice provisions agreed upon in peace agreements signed over the course of the conflict.⁶⁸ The measure cumulatively adds provisions made in agreements as they were signed over time and deducts the number of provisions in agreements that subsequently failed (for the year following agreement failure).⁶⁹ Deducting the number of provisions from failed agreements from the cumulative count allows me to distinguish ongoing, active peace agreements from those that did not succeed, and produce a measure that reflects for any given year the current level of conflict party support for the peace process as it is reflected in the comprehensiveness of the peace agreements that are still being implemented. While the provisions that are included in this measure may not all be comparable they do convey an effort to resolve the conflict parties' military, political, territorial and justice related incompatibilities. The measure only codes provisions agreed upon in partial and full peace

⁶⁷ UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset v. 2.0, Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Uppsala University, <http://www.ucdp.uu.se>.

⁶⁸ Specifically, military provisions include ceasefire, rebel integration into the national army, disarmament of conflict parties, and withdrawal of foreign forces. Political provisions include the right for the rebel group to transform into a political party, integration of rebels into the government, integration of rebels into civil service, elections or stipulated electoral reforms, rebel integration into the interim government, holding of national talks to solve incompatibility, and extensive power-sharing in the new government. Territorial provisions include autonomy, federalism, independence, referendum, local power sharing, regional development, cultural freedoms, border demarcations, and local government. Justice provisions include amnesty, release of prisoners, national reconciliation, and return of refugees. See Högbladh (2011).

⁶⁹ An exception is the Lomé Peace Agreement in Sierra Leone. It failed in February 2000 and the number of its provisions was deducted in 2000 to reflect the accurate count at the time the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement was adopted in November 2000.

agreements; it does not consider peace process agreements since the latter typically feature few actual regulations of behavior or incompatibilities and thus are not comparable documents for the purpose of this variable.⁷⁰ The UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset only covers peace agreements signed during 1989–2011. Peace agreements reached after 2011 are currently not part of the analysis; they will be included in future research.

The conflict party preferences hypothesis furthermore argues that rebel financing of the conflict through the conduct of illegal activities creates opportunity for conflict and increases rebels' incentives for continued fighting. A common way to finance conflict illegally is the exploitation of lootable resources, such as precious stones, drugs, and timber. I use the conflict level binary variable (natural resource financing = '1'; '0' otherwise) from Rustad and Binningsbø (2012) to capture the effect of illegal conflict financing.

The analysis also controls for several additional potential effects. A binary variable codes whether a dyad has held during the current or previous two years direct negotiations regarding one or more issues related to the conflict, such as a ceasefire or one of the dyad's incompatibilities. So-called talks about talks, that is, negotiations about future negotiations are not included in this variable.

In addition, in order to control for the effect that the signing of a peace agreement has on the likelihood of a guarantee I coded a peace agreement variable as '1' if a conflict dyad signed a peace agreement in the current year or in the past, and that agreement had not failed by the end of the previous year, and '0' otherwise.

⁷⁰ The exclusion of peace process agreements from the peace agreement comprehensiveness measure does not imply that peace process agreements might not be usefully examined separately regarding the likelihood that third parties give guarantees especially in the wake of peace process agreements in order to encourage negotiations.

Furthermore, the analysis controls for the effect of economic development and the opportunity costs implied by the availability of gainful employment options outside of fighting.⁷¹ Opportunity costs to conflict are measured by the level of economic development, proxied by infant mortality (mortality rate of infants < 1 year old, per 1,000 live births) and the level of youth male unemployment (% of male labor force ages 15–24). Both measures originate in the World Development Indicators database (World Bank 2015).⁷²

Another dyad year variable codes conflict duration as the number of years since conflict for a dyad began. Furthermore, the analysis considers information on the type of incompatibility (territorial conflict = ‘0’; governmental conflict = ‘1’) from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2015 (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, and Strand 2002; Melander, Pettersson, and Themnér 2016).⁷³ Lastly, the analysis includes a conflict state’s regime type based on its Polity2 Revised Combined Polity Score (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2016).⁷⁴

The following tables provide summary information regarding operationalization and data sources for the independent variables and controls.

⁷¹ See, for example, Fearon (2004, 81) and Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild (2001, 189).

⁷² World Bank, World Development Indicators, 1960–2014, <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators>.

⁷³ UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2015, Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Uppsala University, <http://www.ucdp.uu.se>.

⁷⁴ Center for Systemic Peace, Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2015, version 2015 (p4v2015 and p4v2015d), <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html>.

Hypotheses		Conceptual variables	Operationalization [source]	Level
H1. Guarantor interest	1.1 Global economic integration	Trade	Interval/ratio: Trade (% of GDP), 5-year average prior to conflict onset [World Development Indicators, World Bank 2015]	conflict
	1.2 Regional security threat	Conflict intensity: annual fatalities Violence and conflict in neighboring states	Interval/ratio: ln(annual battle-related deaths), lagged t+1 [UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset v.5-2015, 1989–2014] Binary: intrastate or interstate violence experienced by at least one bordering state in the previous year = 1; otherwise = 0 [Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV), 1946–2014, Marshall 2015]	dyadic, annual conflict, annual
H2. Guarantor capacity	2.1 Material capacity	Potential guarantor's military expenditure	Interval/ratio: ln(military expenditure) by country, in current US\$ m., 1988–2014 [SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2015]	guarantor
	2.2 Structural capacity	Structural capabilities and limitations	Binary: guarantor type = UN/regional IGO/state	guarantor
H3. Conflict party commitment problems	3.1 Conflict type	Ethnic violence or war	Binary: ethnic violence or ethnic war experienced by conflict state in previous year = 1; otherwise = 0 [Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV), 1946–2014, Marshall, 2015]	conflict, annual
	3.2 Conflict cost	Total fatalities	Interval/ratio: ln(total battle-related deaths, cumulative up to and including year of observation), lagged t+1 [UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset v.5-2015, 1989–2014]	dyadic, annual
	3.3 Power asymmetry	Difference in relative power	Categorical: recode <i>rebstrength</i> to binary: <i>Rebels Weaker</i> : rebels much/weaker than gov = 1, parity or much/stronger = 0; <i>Rebels Stronger</i> : rebels much/stronger than gov = 1; parity or much/weaker = 0 [Non-State Actor Data, version 3.4, Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2013]	dyadic
	3.4 Multiparty conflict	Multiple conflict dyads	Categorical: 1 dyad = 0; 2 dyads = 1; 3–4 dyads = 2; 5 dyads = 3; 6–13 dyads = 4; 14–25 dyads = 5 [UCDP/PRIODyadic Dataset v.1-2015, 1946–2014]	conflict
H4. Conflict party preferences	H4.1 Peace agreement comprehensiveness	Provisions contained in a peace agreement	Interval/ratio: number of military, political, territorial, and justice provisions contained in peace agreements that have not yet failed; cumulative (min=0, max=44) [UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset v. 2.0, 1975–2011]	dyadic, annual
	H4.2 Illegal conflict financing	Exploitation of natural resources	Binary: natural resources used by rebels to finance conflict = 1; otherwise = 0 [Rustad and Binningsbø 2012]	conflict

Table 3.5: Operationalization of independent variables

Control variables	Operationalization [source]	Level
Negotiations	Binary: direct negotiations were held during the current or previous two years between two conflict parties regarding one or more issues related to the conflict [UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2015, 1946–2014]	dyadic, annual
Peace agreement	Binary: dyad has signed peace agreement = 1; otherwise = 0 [UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset v.2.0, 1975–2011]	dyadic, annual
Opportunity costs/ economic development	Youth male unemployment: interval/ratio: unemployment, youth male (% of male labor force ages 15–24) (modeled ILO estimate) [World Development Indicators, World Bank 2015] Infant mortality: interval/ratio: mortality rate, infant, per 1,000 live births [World Development Indicators, World Bank 2015]	conflict, annual
Conflict duration	Years since conflict start [UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2015, 1946–2014]	dyadic, annual
Type of incompatibility	Territorial conflict = 0; governmental conflict = 1 [UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2015, 1946–2014]	conflict
Regime type	Polity2 Revised Combined Polity Score [Polity IV Project, Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2016]	conflict, annual

Table 3.6: Operationalization of control variables

3.6 Descriptive Statistics

Before turning to the results of the regression analysis a preliminary look at the data provides some initial insights regarding the hypothesized relationships. 21,478 total observations are generated as a result of pairing 1,822 conflict dyad-years with potential guarantors based on the sampling design outlined in section 3.4. A total of 138 guarantees were given across conflict dyads during 1989–2014. Of these 138 guarantees 47 are transparency guarantees, 41 are support guarantees, and 50 are enforcement guarantees.




Figure 3.3: Guarantees by type and guarantor category (1989–2014)




Figure 3.4: Guarantee types given by regional organizations (1989–2014)




Figure 3.5: Guarantee types given by states (1989–2014)

Figures 3.3-3.5 present actual guarantors and the number and type of guarantees given during 1989–2014. It provides a first look at the distribution of guarantee types by guarantor. Among all guarantors the UN provided most guarantees, giving 64 or just under half of all guarantees during 1989–2014. This result contrasts with Svensson’s (2009) prediction that the UN is likely to give fewer guarantees than other guarantor types given its commitment to fulfilling its guarantees on the ground to avoid reputational costs of failing to follow through on its promises. Regional organizations gave 56 guarantees, with the African Union (17), the European Union (14), and ECOWAS (9) providing most of them. States gave a total of 18 guarantees; ten of these were given by regional powers, seven were given by UNSC permanent members (four by France, one by Russia and two by the United States), and four by a colonial power (France in Côte d’Ivoire and Djibouti).

	Guarantor Category			
Guarantee Type	State	Regional IGO	UN	Total
Transparency	7	21	19	47
	14.89	44.68	40.43	100
	0.05	0.38	1.04	0.22
Support	1	7	33	41
	2.44	17.07	80.49	100
	0.01	0.12	1.8	0.19
Enforcement	10	28	12	50
	20.00	56.00	24.00	100
	0.07	0.50	0.66	0.23
No Guarantee	14,187	5,544	1,767	21,498
	65.99	25.79	8.22	100
	99.87	99	96.5	99.36
Total	14205	5600	1831	21636
	65.65	25.88	8.46	100
	100	100	100	100
	<i>row percentages; column percentages</i>			

Table 3.7: Guarantee type and guarantor category (Fisher's exact 0.000)

Table 3.7 examines the relationship between guarantee type and guarantor category more closely. As proposed by the structural capacity hypothesis we find that there is a statistically significant relationship between the identity of the third party (state, regional organization, UN) and the type of guarantee these third parties tend to give (Fisher's exact = .000). As argued, the UN's structural capacity for multidimensional operations makes it more likely to give support guarantees than other types of guarantees. During 1989–2014 more than half of UN guarantees were operational support guarantees.

Regional IGOs are, as proposed, more likely to give enforcement guarantees than other types of guarantees; half of all guarantees given by regional organizations are enforcement guarantees and buttress the argument that many regional security organizations are able to draw on their member states' military contingents more quickly and that multilateral enforcement missions enjoy a greater level of support. However, that almost 40 percent (21) of the 56 guarantees given by regional IGOs are transparency guarantees reflects a heterogeneity among regional organizations that complicates broad arguments such as that underlying the structural capability hypothesis. There are significant differences between regional organizations like NATO and CIS on one hand and the OSCE on the other in terms of capabilities and approaches to conflict resolution that result in a wider distribution of regional IGOs across the different guarantee types.

States give the fewest guarantees among the three guarantor categories. While almost 40 percent of the guarantees given by states are transparency guarantees, more than half of state-given guarantees are enforcement guarantees, suggesting parallels between states and regional organizations in terms of their guarantor capacity that will be examined further in the empirical analysis.

In addition to providing transparency, support, or enforcement as the conflict parties enter the post-conflict phase, guarantees likely also have an effect on the conflict resolution process. Figure 3.6 shows the number and types of guarantees given in the absence of negotiations, during negotiations, and after a peace agreement was signed. Twenty-one guarantees, or about 15 percent, were given before negotiations took place, possibly to encourage conflict parties to initiate direct talks. For example, the EU and UN gave a transparency and support guarantee respectively in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1993 in support of the peace process between the

government and the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia before the conflict parties began negotiations. In 2001, South Africa gave an enforcement guarantee to the government of Burundi, also in the absence of direct negotiations between the government and the rebels.




Figure 3.6: Number and type of guarantees given in the absence of negotiations, during negotiations, and following a peace agreement

Guarantees may also be given in order to encourage conflict parties to sign a negotiated peace agreement knowing that a third party will support its implementation. Of all guarantees given after the conflict parties began direct talks, almost half (58) were given before they signed a peace agreement. The distribution of these guarantees across the three guarantee types (19 transparency guarantees, 17 support guarantees, 22 enforcement guarantees) mirrors that of guarantees given after an agreement was signed (see figure 3.6). This supports the argument that

third parties may give guarantees with the aim of encouraging the conflict parties to reach a negotiated settlement.




Figure 3.7: Number and type of guarantees by number of provisions in signed peace agreements

Figure 3.7 indicates the distribution of guarantees across cases where conflict parties have signed a peace agreement. It confirms the argument that, among cases where guarantees were given, third-party guarantees in general and enforcement guarantees in particular are more likely the more provisions are contained in the agreement aimed at settling the conflict parties’ incompatibilities.

3.7 Regression Analysis Results

I first analyze the factors that contribute to whether a guarantee is given generally and then turn to an analysis of the determinants of specific guarantee types. The main dependent variable, whether a guarantee is given, is dichotomous. It is coded ‘1’ if a third party offers a guarantee and ‘0’ otherwise. I examine the factors that are associated with a guarantee using binary logistic regression. Logistic regression predicts the log odds that the outcome of the dependent variable is ‘1’, that is, that a guarantor gives a guarantee based on the hypothesized effects.

In order to test the hypotheses regarding the determinants of specific guarantee types I analyze multinomial logit models using a four-category dependent variable that specifies whether a third party gave no guarantee (‘0’, reference category), a transparency guarantee (‘1’), a support guarantee (‘2’), or an enforcement guarantee (‘3’). If several guarantees are included in one mandate only the highest guarantee was coded.

The tables below report the regression results, including the coefficients (log odds, denoted by $\hat{\beta}_X = \ln \left[\frac{\pi}{(1-\pi)} \right]$, where π is the probability that a guarantee is given ($g_{new} = 1$)) or the odds ratios ($\exp(\hat{\beta}_X)$, the effect of a 1-unit increase in predictor X , where $\hat{\beta}$ is the estimated parameter coefficient), standard errors, and confidence levels. Positive coefficients imply an increase in the likelihood of a guarantee.

Even though the control cases are a small subset of all possible potential guarantor-dyads, the 138 cases with guarantees constitute less than one percent of the triad-level data, suggesting likely biases in the probability estimates in the regression analysis. Specifically, the analysis likely produces conservative estimates of the odds of a third party guarantee. Logistic regression of rare events data (cases with a guarantee constitute merely .64 percent of the dataset) tends to

underestimate considerably the odds of a positive outcome.⁷⁵ In other words, the likelihood that a third party gives a guarantee might in fact be higher than what is reported in the tables.

Observations related to the same conflict state and same potential guarantor respectively are not necessarily independent of one another (although we assume that they are independent across conflict states and across potential guarantors). Accordingly, the standard errors are calculated using an estimator that provides cluster-robust inference for data that is two-way clustered by conflict state and potential guarantor in order to allow for intra-group correlation. Two-way clustering permits correlations among different conflict states for the same potential guarantor and among different potential guarantors within the same conflict state.⁷⁶

3.7.1 Interests Drive Guarantees

Table 3.8 presents results from models 1–3, which examine the hypothesized effects on the likelihood of a guarantee for all cases (model 1), for cases in which negotiations took place (model 2) and for cases in which a peace agreement was signed (model 3).⁷⁷ Confirming the results from the descriptive statistics, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between guarantees and the UN and regional organizations respectively. In contrast to

⁷⁵ See King and Zeng 2001.

⁷⁶ On two-way clustering see for example Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2006), Petersen (2009), Gow, Ormazabal, and Taylor (2010), and Thompson (2011). Cameron et al. (2006) propose a variance estimator that provides cluster-robust inference for data characterized by multi-way non-nested clustering. I implemented Cameron et al.'s (2006) estimation procedure using Stata ado files written by Jingling Guan and Mitchell Petersen in February 2008 (see Petersen 2009). For the logistic regressions I used the Stata ado file `logit2.ado` (<http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/petersen/htm/papers/se/logit2.ado>) and for the multinomial logistic regressions I modified the Stata ado file `ologit2.ado` (<http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/~dtayl/ologit2.ado>), a modification by Daniel Taylor (see Gow, Ormazabal, and Taylor 2010) of `ologit` code originally written by Jingling Guan and Mitchell Petersen in February 2008 (see Petersen 2009).

⁷⁷ In order to ensure sufficient rank for the variance-covariance matrix of the estimators I test the categorical independent variables in separate models here and in the multinomial regression below.

Svensson's findings, the UN is the guarantor most likely to give guarantees, followed by regional IGOs.⁷⁸ The organizational mandates of the UN and regional organizations for maintaining international and regional peace and security drive their interest in supporting the resolution of civil conflicts. In comparison, states (reference category) are in general less likely to give guarantees.⁷⁹

Given the shift toward cooperation in the area of international security it does not come as a surprise that the UN and regional organizations are the most likely guarantors. However, it is the member states of these organizations, and especially the P5 that draft, debate, and vote on the resolutions that send peace operations in support of agreement implementation. Though not reflected in the data and results, states are at the center of any guarantee decision. Given the incentives of burden sharing and the pressure of international norms toward multilateralism we should expect states to act within the institutional and legal framework of IGOs in the realm of conflict resolution. That some guarantees are then still given by individual states is all the more significant.

⁷⁸ Exponentiating the coefficients yields odds ratios. The odds ratio for the UN in model 1 is 20.6, i.e., holding all other variables in the model constant, for the UN, relative to states (reference category), the odds of giving a guarantee are expected to increase by a factor of 20.6. For regional organizations, compared to states, the odds of giving a guarantee increase by a factor of 4.6 (model 1).

⁷⁹ There are only ten guarantees by regional powers and four guarantees given by a former colonial power to former colonies. Where UN Security Council P5 gave guarantees—there are only seven guarantees total, given by the U.S., Russia, and France—it could also be attributed to their respective identities as global superpower, regional power, and former colonial power. Great Britain's lead in assembling the Commonwealth Monitoring Force to supervise rebel disarmament in Southern Rhodesia in 1979 (Verrier 1994) similarly might have been a result of its status as colonial power rather than P5. However, it might be their position as permanent members on the Security Council that increased the propensity of these states to act in their respective roles.

	Third-Party Guarantees		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
UN	3.0258*** (0.486)	3.2056*** (0.463)	2.9015*** (0.590)
Regional IGO	1.5258*** (0.483)	1.7002*** (0.481)	1.5442*** (0.571)
Trade	0.0192*** (0.006)	0.0213*** (0.007)	0.0197*** (0.006)
Annual Fatalities	0.0971*** (0.030)	0.0853*** (0.031)	0.1747*** (0.051)
Contiguous Conflict	0.5616 (0.450)	0.5030 (0.591)	0.5912 (0.854)
Ethnic Conflict	1.8438*** (0.340)	1.9640*** (0.388)	2.5067*** (0.671)
Total Fatalities	-0.0831 (0.059)	-0.1018 (0.065)	-0.1428 (0.088)
Rebels Stronger	-1.3954 (1.562)	-1.1645 (1.529)	-1.1754 (1.120)
Rebels Weaker	-0.2873 (0.565)	0.0019 (0.483)	-0.4281** (0.190)
2 Conflict Dyads	0.3301 (0.512)	0.2844 (0.496)	
3-4 Conflict Dyads	-1.8989 (1.261)	-1.9164 (1.422)	
5 Conflict Dyads	-0.2409 (0.647)	-0.8772 (0.705)	
6-13 Conflict Dyads	0.1404 (0.783)	-0.2080 (0.803)	
>13 Conflict Dyads	-0.1453 (0.764)	-0.9456 (0.855)	
Peace Agreement Comprehensiveness			0.0266** (0.012)
Natural Resource Financing	0.6275* (0.363)	0.5868 (0.435)	1.7539** (0.744)

Negotiations	1.2533*** (0.459)		
Peace Agreement	1.0791*** (0.259)	1.2174*** (0.272)	
Youth Unemployment	0.0599** (0.030)	0.0600* (0.034)	0.0480* (0.025)
Infant Mortality	0.0143 (0.009)	0.0134 (0.010)	0.0000 (0.007)
Conflict Duration	-0.0084 (0.023)	0.0052 (0.022)	-0.0327 (0.020)
Conflict Over Government	2.1751*** (0.646)	2.5512*** (0.946)	2.5694*** (0.777)
Democracy	0.0326 (0.047)	-0.0105 (0.049)	-0.0129 (0.020)
Constant	-13.0226*** (1.628)	-12.1601*** (1.760)	-10.1872*** (1.084)
Number of Observations	13,615	6,567	2,579

Logistic regression results for all data (model 1), data restricted to observations that experienced negotiations (model 2) and peace agreement (model 3). Coefficients, robust standard errors (two-way clustered by conflict state and guarantor) in parentheses. Statistically significant at the *0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01 level.

Table 3.8: Third-party guarantees

The economic integration argument of the guarantor interest hypothesis is supported in the data. The coefficient of *trade* is positive and statistically significant at the .01 level for all cases and for cases that have experienced negotiations and/or a peace agreement. With every percent increase of a conflict state's trade relative to its GDP the odds of a guarantee to support the post-conflict peace process increase by a factor of at least 1.02 or two percent (model 1), holding all other variables constant. The effect of trade remains substantively and statistically significant in both models in table 3.9. The multinomial analysis specifies this result further.

Table 3.10 reports the coefficients of trade for specific guarantee types. It shows that a one percent increase of a conflict state's trade relative to its GDP results in at least a two percent increase of the odds of an enforcement guarantee (model 3) and in at least a one percent increase of the odds of a support guarantee (model 3).^{80 81} Conflict states that are more closely tied to the international economy are more likely to receive a support or enforcement guarantee. The results support the argument that potential guarantors are more interested in resolving conflict in states that contribute to a greater extent to the global economy.

What support do we find in the data for the security hypothesis? Conflict intensity, as reflected in annual fatalities has a positive and statistically significant effect on the likelihood of a guarantee in general and in cases that have experienced negotiations and/or a peace agreement (table 3.8). The guarantor identity specific analysis in table 3.9 and the multinomial analysis in table 3.10 (all models) suggest that higher annual fatalities increase the odds of a guarantee given by a regional organization and the odds of transparency guarantees. The argument that especially regional organizations have an interest in preventing the escalation of conflict in their neighborhood is further supported by the statistically significant relationship between ongoing violence across the border from conflict states and guarantees given by regional organizations (table 3.9, model 1) as well as enforcement guarantees (table 3.10, model 3).

Conflict cases that have a potential to result in third-party involvement are complex. High fatalities or a coup d'état may increase the likelihood of a third-party guarantee but may also make other types of interventions more likely. For example, third parties might intervene to

⁸⁰ Though a statistically significant relationship cannot be established for transparency guarantees, the effect of trade remains overall statistically significant for the models in table 3.10 (e.g., $\chi^2(3) = 122.29$, $\text{Prob} > \chi^2 = 0.0000$ (model 1)).

⁸¹ To be precise, the effects of exponentiated coefficients in the context of multinomial logistic models should be discussed in terms of relative risk ratios (as opposed to odds ratios). However, where the positive outcome of the dependent variable ($Y = 1$) is relatively rare as in this dataset, relative risk ratios asymptotically approach odds ratios.

restore a toppled government (for example, ECOMOG in Sierra Leone in 1998) or to secure the environment for humanitarian operations (for example, UNITAF in Somalia in 1992) before the conflict parties are able to negotiate the terms of an agreement. While we might expect a guarantee based on certain conflict characteristics, a third party might instead intervene without a guarantee, potentially masking any hypothesized effects.

A related argument suggests that guarantees are more likely to be given once conflict parties begin to negotiate. The data confirms this argument; the effect of negotiations on the likelihood of a guarantee is positive and statistically significant. Direct talks between the conflict parties increase the overall likelihood of a guarantee by a factor of 3.5 (table 3.8, model 1) and of a guarantee given by a regional organization by a factor of 11 (table 3.9, model 1). In the multinomial analysis, negotiations increase the odds of a transparency guarantee by a factor of at least 3.2 and the odds of a support guarantee by a factor of at least 8.4 (table 3.10, model 3). Furthermore, signing a peace agreement increases the likelihood of a guarantee by a factor of at least 2.9 (table 3.8, model 1); the effect of a signed agreement is positive and statistically significant across guarantor identities and guarantee types (tables 3.8–3.10).

Conflict parties that engage in direct talks aimed at reaching an agreement may increase the odds of a third-party guarantee by providing an opportunity for both, conflict parties and potential guarantors, to explore avenues of cooperation and to gauge each other's commitment to the peace process. As conflict parties agree on potential provisions for resolving their incompatibilities they may also request a guarantee from a third party for specific objectives, such as a ceasefire or demobilization, or afford an opening for third parties in turn to offer guarantees in order to advance the peace process.

Adjusting the scope of the data may provide a closer look at the effects of potential guarantors' regional security concerns on the likelihood of giving a guarantee. Military intervention may be more likely to occur in cases where parties have not begun negotiations. At the same time, negotiations or a peace agreement may be a necessary condition for potential guarantors to consider a guarantee. Analyzing the data by restricting observations to cases that experienced negotiations or a peace agreement confirms the link between third-party economic and security interests and guarantees.

Models 2 and 3 in table 3.8 show the results of analyses based on observations that experienced negotiations or a signed peace agreement respectively. The results suggest that once negotiations are held or a peace agreement is signed, economic and security interests make potential guarantors more likely to give a guarantee. The effect of trade on the odds of a guarantee increases especially once negotiations start. The effect of high annual fatalities remains positive for cases with negotiations and makes third parties even more likely to give a guarantee once conflict parties have signed an agreement. Although third parties may promise guarantees in order to encourage conflict parties to *begin* negotiations, the results suggest that guarantees are even more likely once conflict parties are ready to settle their conflict peacefully and start negotiations toward an agreement.

In sum, guarantor interests influence the guarantee decision. Regional security concerns affect guarantors' decision to give a guarantee: high annual fatalities increase the odds of a guarantee. Economic interests matter as well: Third parties are more likely to give a guarantee to conflict states that are more integrated in the international economy. As expected, guarantor interest is a key determinant of a guarantee.

3.7.2 Structural Capacity Matters

Does military capacity to provide a guarantee on the ground make a third party more likely to give a guarantee? The results in table 3.9 are not conclusive. Given that military spending for the UN and regional organizations is calculated by summing the military spending of their respective member states, the analysis examines the different guarantor types (regional organization in model 1; state in model 2) separately by splitting the sample. Though the results confirm the effects of guarantor interest related variables for regional organizations, the coefficients for guarantor military spending in both models are negative and not statistically significant. The measure for military spending that is included in the analysis does not produce a statistically significant effect on guarantee decision either among states or among regional organizations.

The second part of the guarantor capacity argument proposes that different categories of guarantors possess varying operational capabilities that predispose them to giving some guarantee types more often than others. The results presented in table 3.10 confirm the preliminary findings obtained from the descriptive statistics in table 3.7. Structural capacity specific to each guarantor category creates a tendency to give certain guarantee types more often than others. As hypothesized based on the structural capacity argument, among the different guarantee types, the UN is most likely to give support guarantees (table 3.10, model 1). Compared to other guarantors, the UN's logistical strengths and experience with multidimensional missions give it an advantage when it comes to assisting agreement implementation with operational support guarantees.

	Third-Party Guarantees	
	Regional Organization	State
Trade	0.0111** (0.004)	0.0157* (0.008)
Annual Fatalities	0.1181*** (0.012)	-0.0083 (0.113)
Contiguous Conflict	1.0366** (0.415)	-0.6842 (0.631)
Military Spending	-0.0525 (0.137)	-0.3287 (0.281)
Ethnic Conflict	0.8594** (0.406)	1.7771* (1.072)
Total Fatalities	-0.1013*** (0.032)	0.1167 (0.172)
Negotiations	2.3871*** (0.824)	-0.3550 (0.611)
Peace Agreement	0.6383** (0.317)	1.8935*** (0.678)
Infant Mortality	0.0115*** (0.004)	-0.0044 (0.007)
Conflict Duration	0.0037 (0.008)	-0.0779*** (0.024)
Conflict Over Government	1.3114* (0.714)	0.8615 (0.815)
Democracy	0.0461*** (0.012)	-0.0296 (0.041)
Constant	-9.9522*** (2.021)	-4.7036* (2.688)
Number of Observations	3,940	10,142

Logistic regression results for regional organizations (model 1) and states (model 2). Coefficients, robust standard errors (two-way clustered by conflict state and guarantor) in parentheses. Statistically significant at the *0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01 level.

Table 3.9: Third-party guarantees and guarantor capacity

Regional IGOs are most likely to give enforcement guarantees, compared to other guarantee types (table 3.10, model 2). The ability of many regional organizations to mobilize troops from member states relatively quickly allows them to follow up on enforcement guarantee promises and in turn may reassure conflict parties that the guarantee will in fact be provided on the ground. However, as discussed in the context of the descriptive statics in table 3.7, regional security organizations differ in their capabilities and in their roles in conflict resolution, and relative comparative advantages render some, like NATO, more likely to give enforcement guarantees than others, for example, the OSCE.

States are overall less likely than the UN or regional IGOs to give any of the three guarantee types, but among the guarantees they do give, transparency and enforcement guarantees are more likely (table 3.10, model 3). States' immediate access to their military capabilities and their ability to mobilize quickly to provide verification and enforcement appears to outweigh concerns related to deploying unilateral military contingents on another state's territory.

In sum, though there is no conclusive evidence regarding the effect of military spending on the likelihood of a guarantee, structural capacity matters and, together with guarantor interests, it shapes the guarantor driven side of the equation on whether a guarantee is given in order to advance the peace process.

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	Trans- parency Guarantee	Support Guarantee	Enforcement Guarantee	Trans- parency Guarantee	Support Guarantee	Enforcement Guarantee	Trans- parency Guarantee	Support Guarantee	Enforcement Guarantee
UN	2.312*** (-0.441)	3.840*** (-0.698)	1.288*** (-0.162)						
Regional IGO				0.002 (-0.781)	-0.516 (-1.032)	1.014* (-0.580)			
State							-1.676** (-0.670)	-18.825*** (-0.658)	-1.689** (-0.760)
Trade	0.002 (-0.012)	0.017** (-0.008)	0.025*** (-0.004)	-0.001 (-0.011)	0.012 (-0.007)	0.022*** (-0.002)	0.001 (-0.013)	0.014** (-0.007)	0.022*** (-0.005)
Annual Fatalities	0.167** (-0.080)	0.138 (-0.104)	0.022 (-0.067)	0.171*** (-0.055)	0.069 (-0.093)	0.009 (-0.053)	0.157** (-0.062)	0.103 (-0.087)	0.012 (-0.048)
Contiguous Conflict							0.427 (-0.759)	-1.949*** (-0.614)	17.606*** (-1.088)
Ethnic Conflict	0.315 (-0.800)	2.686*** (-0.322)	1.509*** (-0.575)	0.036 (-0.936)	1.903*** (-0.232)	1.757*** (-0.616)	0.583 (-1.055)	3.355*** (-0.233)	1.408** (-0.618)
Total Fatalities	0.217 (-0.158)	0.113** (-0.046)	-0.184* (-0.100)	0.104* (-0.062)	0.206*** (-0.052)	-0.135* (-0.081)	0.203 (-0.126)	0.093** (-0.040)	-0.225* (-0.135)
Rebels Stronger	-0.946 (-0.849)	0.145 (-0.977)	-18.767*** (-1.164)	-1.179 (-0.968)	-0.185 (-0.284)	-2.022*** (-0.684)	-0.602 (-1.289)	0.761 (-0.852)	-20.693*** (-0.871)
Rebels Weaker	-1.821*** (-0.477)	0.707*** (-0.225)	-0.359 (-0.383)	-1.361* (-0.722)	0.437 (-0.315)	-0.450 (-0.323)	-1.682*** (-0.629)	0.628 (-0.525)	-0.302 (-0.320)
Natural Resource Financing				0.775** (-0.372)	-0.121 (-0.285)	0.539 (-0.362)	0.920 (-0.750)	0.109 (-0.324)	0.895*** (-0.312)

Negotiations	1.210**	2.178***	1.260				1.161**	2.128***	1.301
	(-0.509)	(-0.261)	(-0.839)				(-0.503)	(-0.208)	(-0.914)
Peace Agreement	0.697	1.155***	1.415***	1.376***	1.649***	1.457***	0.550	1.250***	1.213**
	(-0.648)	(-0.245)	(-0.402)	(-0.361)	(-0.431)	(-0.284)	(-0.724)	(-0.266)	(-0.475)
Youth Unemployment	0.064***	0.124***	0.046				0.058*	0.134***	0.038
	(-0.019)	(-0.016)	(-0.047)				(-0.031)	(-0.027)	(-0.043)
Infant Mortality	0.018***	0.048***	0.019	-0.002***	0.020***	0.009	0.011	0.054***	0.008
	(-0.005)	(-0.007)	(-0.012)	(-0.001)	(-0.004)	(-0.009)	(-0.008)	(-0.011)	(-0.010)
Conflict Duration	-0.068*	0.048***	0.012	-0.068***	0.030	0.002	-0.075*	0.061***	0.011
	(-0.038)	(-0.003)	(-0.034)	(-0.014)	(-0.021)	(-0.031)	(-0.043)	(-0.022)	(-0.031)
Conflict Over Government	-0.653	1.243***	16.038***	-0.237	0.655***	16.209***	-0.515	1.165*	18.572***
	(-0.492)	(-0.196)	(-0.543)	(-0.631)	(-0.250)	(-0.558)	(-0.632)	(-0.636)	(-0.561)
Democracy	0.023	0.031	0.021	0.023	-0.078*	0.006	0.028	-0.027	0.042
	(-0.062)	(-0.066)	(-0.049)	(-0.057)	(-0.043)	(-0.057)	(-0.066)	(-0.095)	(-0.049)
Constant	-9.847***	-22.147***	-25.812***	-5.803***	-13.362***	-24.054***	-8.473***	-18.940***	-43.456***
	(-1.587)	(-1.065)	(-2.350)	(-1.392)	(-2.063)	(-0.83)	(-1.544)	(-1.816)	(-2.471)
Number of Observations	13,615	13,615	13,615	14,802	14,802	14,802	13,615	13,615	13,615

Multinomial logistic regression results (reference category: *no guarantee*). Coefficients, robust standard errors (two-way clustered by conflict state and guarantor) in parentheses. Statistically significant at the *0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01 level.

Table 3.10: Third-party guarantee type

3.7.3 Conflict Party Commitment Problems

The results shown in table 3.8 lend support to the conflict party commitment problems hypothesis. Ethnic conflict, which is often difficult to resolve and penetrates an entire society, increases the odds of a third-party guarantee by a factor of 6.3 (model 1) and that relationship is statistically significant across the different models. The analysis by guarantee type reveals that ethnic conflict increases the odds specifically of support and enforcement guarantees, strengthening the argument that the intractability of ethnic conflicts increases the conflict parties' commitment problems and in turn makes higher-level guarantees more likely. Conflict costs as measured by total fatalities are not associated with a general increase in the odds of a guarantee, though they do produce greater odds of support guarantees, while decreasing the odds of enforcement guarantees (table 3.10).⁸²

Similarly, power asymmetry between conflict parties is not associated with greater odds of a guarantee in general, though the data indicates that in conflicts where rebels are weaker than government forces, transparency guarantees seem to be less likely (table 3.10). Table 3.10 also suggests a possible decrease in the odds of enforcement guarantees where rebels are stronger (though the small proportion of cases characterized by stronger rebels may drive this effect).

Finally, multiparty conflict (more than one conflict dyad) does not produce a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of guarantees.

⁸² Though the analysis does not produce a statistically significant relationship between total fatalities and transparency guarantees, the effect of total fatalities remains overall statistically significant for the models in table 3.10 (e.g., $\chi^2(3) = 46.97$, $\text{Prob} > \chi^2 = 0.0000$ (model 2)).

3.7.4 Conflict Party Preferences

The conflict party preferences hypothesis predicts that guarantors are less likely to give higher-level guarantees if conflict parties have incentives to continue fighting. I argue that a comprehensive peace agreement that resolves a high number of incompatibilities would be more likely to have the true buy-in from the conflict parties, which in turn should make a third party more likely to give a guarantee to promote the implementation of that agreement. The results in model 3 in table 3.8 confirm this hypothesis: for each additional provision contained in a peace agreement the odds of a third-party guarantee to support its implementation increase by three percent. The coefficient of peace agreement comprehensiveness is statistically significant for the analysis of all cases in which a peace agreement was signed. Conflict dyads that show that they prefer a political solution by resolving a high number of incompatibilities through a negotiated settlement are more likely to receive guarantees than conflict dyads that resolve only a few incompatibilities in a peace agreement. This result contrasts with Walter's (2002) findings that third parties give guarantees to compensate for low agreement comprehensiveness. To the contrary, these results suggest that potential guarantors are more likely to support the implementation of agreements that reflect the conflict parties' preference for establishing peace.

The other factor intended to capture conflict party preferences does not produce the hypothesized results. Conflict financing through natural resources actually increases the odds of a guarantee, especially after conflict parties have reached a peace agreement (table 3.8, models 1 and 3). This suggests that third parties may give a guarantee based on a negotiated peace agreement, even if resource financing might pose challenges to its implementation, if the need to end illegal resource exploitation has itself become part of the guarantors' approach to conflict resolution.

In sum, the substantively and statistically significant effect of peace agreement comprehensiveness supports the hypothesis that potential guarantors consider the conflict parties' preferences for peace in their decision to give a guarantee.

3.7.5 Multiple Guarantors

The analysis so far has examined the factors that determine whether a third-party guarantee is given and the factors that cause guarantors to promise certain guarantee types in particular. But what explains that some conflicts receive a guarantee from one guarantor while others are given guarantees by several different guarantors? Of the 140 conflicts included in the dataset, 94 did not receive any guarantees, 24 received a guarantee from one guarantor, and 22 conflicts received guarantees from more than one guarantor. In twelve of these conflicts the conflict parties were given guarantees by two guarantors, seven conflicts received guarantees from three guarantors, two conflicts were given guarantees by four guarantors, and one conflict, the civil war in the Central African Republic, 2001–2013, received guarantees from six different guarantors.

In order to examine the factors that determine whether multiple guarantors support a peace process I coded a third dependent variable, which takes on the value '1' if conflict parties received guarantees from *exactly one guarantor*, takes on the value '2' if conflict parties received guarantees from *more than one guarantor*, and takes on the value '0' otherwise. The model is tested using multinomial logistic regression. For this analysis, since the unit of observation is the conflict, I collapsed the data to the conflict level and dropped all potential

guarantors. The universe of cases numbers 140. The results are shown in table 3.11. As conflicts become more difficult to settle, multiple guarantors are more likely.

	One Guarantor	Multiple Guarantors
Trade	0.0471** (0.021)	0.1291** (0.053)
Annual Fatalities	2.3051 (1.598)	-2.9904 (2.433)
Contiguous Conflict	1.3142 (0.882)	2.6845 (2.099)
Ethnic Conflict	-1.6822 (1.137)	2.4266 (2.928)
Total Fatalities	-1.7806 (1.343)	3.9168* (2.328)
2 Conflict Dyads	3.7598** (1.598)	2.8132 (5.704)
3-4 Conflict Dyads	2.7325 (2.028)	3.8326 (4.048)
5 Conflict Dyads	2.0274 (2.022)	1.1419 (4.074)
6-13 Conflict Dyads	2.1605 (2.247)	8.2630 (5.240)
>13 Conflict Dyads	5.2975*** (1.936)	4.7153 (3.828)
Natural Resource Financing	2.6362** (1.242)	0.5788 (2.077)
Negotiations	3.7972*** (1.147)	4.0790 (5.028)
Peace Agreement	1.5573 (0.985)	4.4656 (2.897)
Youth Unemployment	0.0653 (0.049)	0.2638* (0.135)

Infant Mortality	-0.0134 (0.014)	0.0881 (0.055)
Conflict Duration	0.0469 (0.042)	-0.0604 (0.184)
Conflict Over Government	-0.2867 (1.225)	-1.8903 (2.026)
Democracy	0.0830 (0.108)	-0.0959 (0.328)
Constant	- 13.3507*** (4.433)	-37.5486** (17.555)
Number of Observations	81	81

Multinomial logistic regression results for one guarantor (model 1) and two or more guarantors (model 2); reference category: *no guarantor*. Unit of observation is the conflict (data collapsed to conflict level without potential guarantors). Coefficients, robust standard errors (clustered by conflict state) in parentheses. Statistically significant at the *0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01 level.

Table 3.11: Multiple guarantors

Guarantor interest and conflict party commitment problems affect the likelihood of guarantees from multiple guarantors. Conflict party commitment problems increase the odds of guarantees from multiple guarantors. As conflict costs, measured by total battle-related deaths, increase so does the likelihood of multiple guarantors.

The analysis further indicates that one of the parameters that affect the odds of a single guarantee—trade—also determines whether a conflict is given guarantees by multiple guarantors, with an even greater effect. While a one percent increase in conflict state trade increases the odds of single guarantees by five percent, it increases the odds of multiple guarantees by 14 percent.

The results support the guarantor interest and conflict party commitment problem hypotheses and suggest that where conflicts are more difficult to settle multiple third parties are more likely to come together to give guarantees in order to strengthen the peace process.

3.8 Robustness Checks

In order to check the robustness of the obtained results I analyze additional models structuring the data by different clusters, collapsing the data to the dyad and conflict level, and removing outliers from the data. The results are reported in appendix B.

The models analyzed above assumed correlation of observations within conflict states and potential guarantors and independence across these categories. I repeated the analysis of the effects on the main dependent variable clustering on potential guarantor and subregion instead of conflict state. Tables B.1 and B.5 show that designating different clusters does not significantly alter the results. Furthermore, I reran the analyses after removing outliers to examine whether results may be driven by a few observations at the far end of the scale (tables B.2, B.6, B.10). Finally, I repeated the regressions using versions of the data collapsed to the dyad level (tables B.3, B.7) and conflict level (tables B.4, B.8).

Guarantor interest continues to produce substantively and statistically significant effects. The effect of guarantors' economic interests reflected in the trade variable is consistent and statistically significant throughout the relevant models (except in models that examine the likelihood that regional organizations give a guarantee, clustered by subregion (B.5) and examined on the dyad (B.7) and conflict level (B.8)). After excluding outliers in conflict state

trade (trade as a percentage of GDP equal to >100) the hypothesized effect remains substantively and statistically significant (table B.2). The effect of annual fatalities as a measure of guarantors' security concerns continues to be positive and statistically significant, except when examined at the dyad level (table B.3). After excluding outliers in annual battle-related deaths ($>5,000$) the effect remains as hypothesized and statistically significant (table B.2).

The results supporting the structural capacity hypothesis are robust to an alternative model specification, which examines data with individually coded guarantee types in binomial variables, and confirm the findings (table B.9).

Regarding conflict party commitment problems, the relationship between ethnic conflict and third-party guarantees is robust to most variations, except when examined at the dyad and conflict level (tables B.3, B.4, B.7, B.8). For conflict party preferences, the effect of peace agreement comprehensiveness remains statistically and substantively significant across the various model specifications (tables B.1–4).

With respect to the determinants of multiple guarantors, after removing outliers (observations with annual battle-related deaths of $>5,000$, total battle-related deaths of $>5,000$, and trade as a percentage of GDP >100), the observed effects of trade (guarantor interest) and total fatalities (conflict party commitment problems) on the likelihood of multiple guarantors remain.

3.9 Conclusion

The results presented in this chapter provide support for each of the principal hypotheses. Guarantor interest and capacity, as well as conflict party commitment problems and preferences shape third-party decision-making about whether to give a guarantee. Greater third-party economic and security related interests increase the likelihood of higher-level guarantees. Guarantor capacity matters as third parties' structural capabilities tend to determine the type of guarantees they give. The analysis suggests that where conflicts are more difficult to settle because security concerns prevent conflict parties from being able to genuinely commit to peace, third parties are more likely to give guarantees to advance the peace process. Specifically, ethnic conflicts that cause high total fatalities are more likely to receive higher-level guarantees than other types of conflict. The odds of a guarantee increase if conflict parties begin direct talks and sign a comprehensive peace agreement, thereby signaling their preference for peace versus continued conflict. The robustness checks confirm the results; most effects remain substantively and statistically significant across alternative model specifications.

In terms of other explanations, youth unemployment (low opportunity costs to conflict) and conflict over government (as opposed to territory) increase the odds of a guarantee, while conflict duration, regime type, and economic development (measured by infant mortality) do not produce consistent results.

Guarantor and conflict characteristics affect the likelihood of specific guarantee types. Enforcement guarantees are most likely given by regional IGOs and by states, in conflicts over government and with ongoing violence or conflict in neighboring states, and where conflict parties have signed a peace agreement. Support guarantees are most likely given by the UN in

ethnic conflicts with high total fatalities, when conflict parties have begun negotiations or reached a comprehensive peace agreement. Transparency guarantees are most likely given by the UN and by states where annual fatalities are high and when the conflict parties have started negotiations. Guarantees by more than one guarantor are most likely in conflicts that cause high total fatalities.

The following two chapters explore in greater depth the determinants of specific types of third-party guarantees. Building on the results of the quantitative analysis, a case study and interviews seek to parse out individual effects and contextualize the hypothesized relationships. Guarantor capacity and conflict party preferences will be examined more closely as the quantitative measures employed in the statistical analysis—military expenditures and peace agreement comprehensiveness respectively—represent only one dimension of concepts that are complex and context specific.

In addition, the qualitative research attempts to answer some of the questions raised by the quantitative results, for example, what are the conditions under which third parties use guarantees strategically to encourage negotiations or the signing of a peace agreement? When and how does the level of peace agreement comprehensiveness affect potential guarantors' decision-making process on whether to give a guarantee? How does the dynamic between two, three, four, or more conflict parties affect the guarantee process, and what role does the power balance among conflict parties play? How do anticipated reputational costs and benefits affect potential guarantors' calculations? These and other questions regarding guarantor interest and capacity and conflict party commitment problems and preferences have a foundation in the quantitative analysis of this chapter and will be examined in greater depth in the next two

chapters in order to provide a more comprehensive account of when and why third parties give certain types of guarantees in support of the peaceful settlement of intrastate conflict.

Chapter 4

Case Study Evidence: The Second Congo War— Background and Potential Guarantors

4.1 Introduction

The quantitative results in the previous chapter suggest that certain factors, including economic interest, ethnic conflict, high fatalities, and comprehensive peace agreements are associated with an increased likelihood of a third-party guarantee. These findings indicate relationships that warrant further examination in order to understand what drives third-party guarantees. In this chapter I complement the statistical research with in-depth qualitative evidence from the guarantor decision-making process in order to further specify the determinants of a third-party guarantee. The analysis will focus on potential guarantors' considerations for giving a guarantee to support the resolution of the Second Congo War, specifically, the implementation of the 1999 Lusaka Accord.

In this chapter I will examine the conflict resolution efforts of several relevant potential guarantors, including South Africa, the South African Development Community (SADC), and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), before turning to the UN in the next chapter.⁸³ I discuss the specific interests these actors had in resolving the conflict and examine their capacity to provide a guarantee. South Africa, the SADC, and the OAU, though they initiated and sustained the peace talks, ultimately did not have sufficient capacity to provide a guarantee

⁸³ Few other potential guarantors had the military, political, and financial capacity to give a guarantee. Efforts at conflict resolution elsewhere, including Europe and Asia, occupied the EU and other third parties.

to support the implementation of the agreement. In the following chapter I examine the UN Security Council's interests and capacity for giving and fulfilling a guarantee as well as its perceptions of the conflict parties' need for a guarantee and their preference for the implementation of the peace agreement. Among the permanent members of the Security Council I focus on the U.S. given its cautious approach with regards to authorizing a peacekeeping operation in Africa. I analyze how U.S. capacity to support a UN guarantee and U.S. perceptions of the conflict parties' preferences affected the deliberations in the Security Council and the resolution that eventually authorized a transparency guarantee to support the implementation of the Lusaka Accord.

I attempt to find answers to important questions that the quantitative analysis cannot conclusively resolve. To what extent do potential guarantors consider what it takes to fulfill a guarantee on the ground? How do these considerations impact their guarantee decision? And how is that decision shaped by potential guarantors' beliefs about whether the conflict parties are committed to resolving their conflict peacefully? The measures I use in the quantitative analysis for guarantor capacity and guarantor perceptions of the conflict parties' interest in peace only capture a small facet of complex determinants. Guarantor capacity is not only a function of military spending, and conflict parties continue to demonstrate their support for the peace process after signing an agreement; whether they respect the ceasefire and cooperate in preparation of the deployment of an operation affects potential guarantors' views of the parties' preferences regarding continued conflict or peace. Do we find evidence for the guarantor capacity hypothesis and the conflict party preferences hypothesis if we look closely at the decision-making of potential guarantors for the conflict in the DRC?

4.2 Research Approach

In this and the following chapter I use case study research, content analysis, and semi-structured in-depth interviews to examine evidence for the factors that determine whether a third party gives a guarantee to support conflict resolution and a peaceful settlement. I discuss the Second Congo War's background, timeline, characteristics, and its political and economic effects on the region in order to gain an understanding of the extent of the conflict parties' commitment problems in the peace process and the stakes that regional powers and IGOs as well as the UN had in the resolution of the conflict. I then hone in on the attributes, interests, and perceptions of potential guarantors (South Africa, the SADC, the OAU, and the UN) by examining primary and secondary sources that discuss their response to the conflict. Specifically, I analyzed speeches, statements, letters, meeting records, resolutions, and reports by members and constituencies of the potential guarantors, by the conflict parties, officials, and other relevant actors, as well as media reports and academic and non-academic articles and books to uncover the causal mechanisms that were driving potential guarantors' actions and attitudes about giving a guarantee. I proceeded chronologically with the analysis in order to trace the decision-making process of potential guarantors and to identify changes in potential guarantors' actions or stated perceptions that occurred in response to behavior and statements by the conflict parties and other relevant participants in the peace processes.

The theoretical framework in chapter 2 points to the evidence I expect to find in the case study in order to confirm, reject, or qualify the hypotheses. I expect guarantor interest to be a necessary but insufficient condition for a guarantee. Guarantor interest grows out of the security and economic benefits and risks that potential guarantors associate respectively with the

resolution or continuation of conflict. Guarantor interest is based on concerns regarding the effects of unresolved conflict on the security of the potential guarantor or its allies. Potential guarantor's statements about the intensity of the conflict and regional instability, the potential of conflicts in neighboring states to intensify each other, refugee crises, arms trafficking, and safe havens for terrorists in conflict states indicate security concerns and an interest in the resolution of the conflict. In addition, reliance on raw materials and other imports from the conflict state, and significant or growing trade between the potential guarantor and the conflict state or region based on trade indicators and reports suggest economic interest in a peaceful settlement. Evidence that suggests specific security or economic interests in conflict resolution would support the guarantor interest hypothesis by providing the necessary precondition for a potential guarantee.

Like guarantor interest, I expect the conflict parties' commitment problems to be a necessary but insufficient condition for a guarantee. Commitment problems are a function of conflict characteristics. The inability to genuinely commit to the peace process as a result of security concerns is hypothesized to be stronger in ethnic conflicts, in conflicts with high fatalities, with multiple conflict dyads, and with high power asymmetry. In addition, detailed requests by conflict parties for third-party guarantees through observer, operational support, or enforcement missions likely indicate commitment problems, especially if guarantee requests are based on relevant provisions in comprehensive peace agreements. Evidence that shows that potential guarantors cite conflict costs and effects when arguing for a guarantee, and that they emphasize the inability of the conflict parties to advance the peace process without a third-party guarantee would support the commitment problem hypothesis.

A guarantor's ability to provide a guarantee on the ground is based on its military and financial capacity. A guarantor has military capacity if it or its member states are able to field the personnel and equipment required by the mandate for a respective guarantee. A member state's capacity to support a guarantee decision by an IGO in turn is measured by its ability to contribute militarily or financially to the respective operation carrying out the guarantee. Military and financial capacity is contingent on the approval of a potential guarantor's or member state's relevant decision-making body authorized to sanction the deployment of peace operations in support of a guarantee. Evidence that demonstrates that a potential guarantor makes its guarantee decision contingent on military and/or financial resources would support the hypothesis. Such evidence could include statements by potential guarantors that link limited financial or military capacity to a lower likelihood of a guarantee or to a lower-level guarantee. Limited capacity for a higher-level guarantee should result in no guarantee or a transparency guarantee. The hypothesis should be rejected if a high-level guarantee is given despite limited capacity.

Finally, the conflict parties' preferences are indicated by the extent of their support for the peace process and their compliance with the provisions of the ceasefire or peace agreement. Preferences are likely in favor of the peace process if the conflict parties signed a comprehensive peace agreement that resolves a high number of incompatibilities. Statements by potential guarantors that link comprehensive peace agreements to a higher likelihood of a guarantee constitute evidence for the peace agreement hypothesis. While it is difficult for conflict parties to carry out agreement provisions that imply high security risks (such as disarmament) without a third-party guarantee on the ground, they are able to signal their preferences for conflict resolution and support for the peace process by complying with those agreement provisions that do not by themselves increase the conflict parties' insecurity and thus do not require third-party

support for their implementation. Complying with such agreement provisions or other preconditions to the deployment of a peace operation, e.g. abiding by a ceasefire, consenting to the deployment of a peace operation to fulfill a guarantee, and providing access and security assurances for peace operation personnel, shows that conflict parties are likely to be genuinely committed to implementing the agreement. Potential guarantor statements that relate such actions to a higher likelihood of a guarantee support the conflict party preferences hypothesis. Repeated failure by the conflict parties to comply with low-security risk obligations should be regarded as evidence for a lack of genuine interest in the peaceful resolution of the conflict. In addition, financial or other benefits that arise for the conflict parties from continued conflict, for example, from illegal resource exploitation, likely imply incentives to impede the peace process. Statements by potential guarantors that cite ceasefire violations, repeated failure to comply with low-risk agreement provisions, or benefits from continued conflict when justifying a decision to give no guarantee or only a transparency guarantee would support the preferences hypothesis. We would have to reject the hypothesis if a high-level guarantee is given when evidence suggests that conflict parties prefer conflict and do not support agreement implementation.

The analysis is limited largely to sources that are publicly available. One challenge with studying public policy decision-making is that debates are sometimes held in closed settings where relevant interests and perceptions are expressed without being documented. However, deliberations took place among numerous different actors involved in the process, including members and representatives of potential guarantors and of the conflict parties, as well as officials and observers of the peace process, among others. While there were closed deliberations, for example in the Security Council, given the large number and heterogeneous affiliations of the stakeholders in the guarantee process, much of the debate occurred on public

record. In addition, the strategic nature of the decision-making process, including the holding accountable of guarantors and conflict parties to their actions, and public announcements of preconditions to giving a guarantee or implementing a peace agreement moved the debate into the public realm. The strategic, interactive context of the guarantee process that informed the theoretical arguments also implies relatively open access to the evidence to evaluate it.

The case selection was driven by the objective to provide a rigorous test for the theory while obtaining results that are relevant beyond the conflict in the DRC. The Second Congo War was characterized by factors that made it a high-interest, limited-capacity, high-impact, and high-risk case for a guarantee. The conflict's effect on the regional political and economic interests and its potential to degenerate into another genocide made it a priority for third parties to support its peaceful resolution. At the same time, potential guarantors faced significant limitations to their guarantee provision capacity. Previous negative experiences with peacekeeping in Africa and concurrent operations in East Timor and Kosovo made a guarantee in the DRC less likely.

Furthermore, the case represents conflicts that are difficult to resolve: ethnic violence, high fatalities, multiple conflict parties, and its international dimension increased the conflict parties' insecurity and difficulties of committing to the peace process, and, according to the theoretical argument, made a guarantee to support the peace process more effective and thus also more likely. At the same time, the conflict was also difficult to resolve given the conflict parties' incentives to resist the peace process. Economic benefits from the illegal exploitation of natural resources by the conflict parties and their international backers fortified resource based conflict structures; low opportunity costs rendered a settlement less compelling. The theory proposes that where conflict parties prefer continued conflict, third-party involvement is risky and guarantees are more difficult to provide and less likely to be successful. As a result potential

guarantors ought to be less likely to give high-level guarantees. These countervailing effects of high interest versus low capacity, and high effectiveness versus high risk place this case at the intersection of the proposed theoretical arguments that can thus be examined in regards to their relative impact.

Choosing a case like the DRC where the UN gave a guarantee renders the insights applicable, to some extent, to a majority of other guarantee decision-making cases as well. Over half of all guarantees are given by the UN and although each conflict presents different challenges and opportunities for supporting its peaceful settlement, the findings with regards to the effect of guarantor interest, capacity, and perceptions of the conflict parties' commitment problems and preferences are tied to guarantor identity and thus relevant in other cases with a potential UN guarantee.

In addition to examining primary and secondary sources, I conducted semi-structured one-on-one research interviews with current and former UN officials at the Under-Secretary-General, Assistant Secretary-General, and Senior Political Affairs Officer level in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and in the Department of Political Affairs (DPA). The interviews aimed at testing the hypotheses with an emphasis on examining the guarantor decision-making process as it is affected by the strategic interaction with conflict parties. Relevant evidence includes respondents' comments concerning perceptions of and attitudes toward the regional threat emanating from the conflict, potential challenges for the deployment of an operation, the ability of the conflict parties to implement the agreement and sustain the peace process, and the conflict parties' preferences and genuine interest in a peaceful settlement.

The interviews provided an opportunity to obtain more nuanced views on the research questions than what was communicated in Security Council statements and resolutions. However, officials responded “on record” and may have been hesitant to speak freely in ways that would reveal shortcomings in how the UN responded to the conflict. Yet, that the deliberations on supporting the Lusaka Accord took place 15 years ago possibly led respondents to reflect and reply with less constraint. In addition, many of the problems the UN encountered in responding to the conflict in the DRC were subject at the time to public evaluation and modification by the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations that Kofi Annan had established. The historical character of the case and the process of self-critical reflection by the UN that began after Rwanda and Bosnia and has continued to the present likely encouraged respondents to provide a candid account of UN conflict resolution efforts in the DRC.

4.3 The Second Congo War: Background

The war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo⁸⁴ had multiple roots, including ethnic divisions introduced by colonial rule,⁸⁵ grievances resulting from three decades of Mobutu’s dictatorship,⁸⁶ civil conflicts in the Great Lakes region,⁸⁷ and competition over the DRC’s natural resources.⁸⁸ The war played out on local, national, and regional levels. When the Tutsi-led

⁸⁴ The case background draws on Seybolt (2000) and the chronology in Kisangani and Bobb (2010).

⁸⁵ Breytenbach, Chilemba, Brown, and Plantive (1999), Karbo and Mutisi (2012, 381–402).

⁸⁶ McCalpin (2002).

⁸⁷ Young (2002).

⁸⁸ Economist, “War turns commercial,” October 22, 1998, <http://www.economist.com/node/173322>.

Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) captured Kigali in July 1994 and ended the genocide, it also caused two million refugees to stream into neighboring countries in the Great Lakes region.⁸⁹ Over one million refugees fled to the eastern part of DRC (then Zaire), among them genocidal Interahamwe and Hutu government officials and militia.⁹⁰ The civil war that broke out in 1998 was shaped by the 1996-97 civil war, during which the rebel group ADFL (Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire) overthrew Mobutu. Different groups, among them Congolese Tutsis from the Kivu region (Banyamulenge) and dissidents of the Mobutu regime, constituted the ADFL, which received military support from Rwanda and Uganda. The rebels launched their offensive in October 1996 in South-Kivu province, bordering Rwanda and Burundi. Rwandan troops fought alongside the ADFL in an effort to reduce the influence of Interahamwe militias and ex-FAR (former Rwandan Army Forces), which were operating from new bases in Zairian refugee camps. The ADFL advanced across the country and captured Kinshasa in May 1998. ADFL's leader Laurent Kabila renamed the country to Democratic Republic of the Congo and took power.

⁸⁹ On the Rwandan civil war and genocide see, for example, Prunier (1995), Appendix 1B: The war in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

⁹⁰ UNHCR (2000, 246).



Figure 4.1: Democratic Republic of the Congo, provinces and neighboring countries (Source: www.mapsopensource.com)

On August 2, 1998 a new rebellion started in eastern DRC that united Banyamulenge, disaffected soldiers of the Congolese Army, former ADFL rebels, former Kabila supporters, and former officials of Mobutu’s regime in the rebel alliance RCD (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie), which aimed at replacing Kabila with an elected government that would introduce reforms and end ethnic strife.⁹¹ Kabila had broken with his former allies, and Rwandan and Ugandan troops now backed the rebel uprising with the aim of fighting respectively Hutu genocidaires and Ugandan rebel groups that were operating from bases in eastern DRC. The rebels advanced swiftly toward Kinshasa and were repelled by Kabila’s army only with the

⁹¹ For a comprehensive discussion of the origins and motivations of the rebel groups in the Congo war, see Afoaku (2002). Also, BBC News, “Fighting rages in rebel town,” August 4, 1998, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/144459.stm>.

support of Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. Angola joined the conflict primarily to prevent the Angolan UNITA (União Nacional Para a Independência Total de Angola) rebel group from operating from DRC territory. Namibia joined to support its ally Angola.⁹² Zimbabwe's president Robert Mugabe joined the conflict given his aspirations to regional leadership. In addition to security interests, economic gains also drove the participation in the conflict of foreign governments and their armies. Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe benefited directly from the DRC's mineral wealth, in particular diamonds and gold, and Angola had an interest in protecting its oil investments along the coast.⁹³ Though the rebels were forced by Kabila's supporters to retreat from the west, they still controlled large parts of eastern DRC.

Efforts to find a resolution to the conflict took place soon after fighting began, but they were thwarted by Kabila's unwillingness to negotiate with the rebels. At a summit on August 8, 1998 in Victoria Falls, organized by the Zimbabwean president Mugabe, the presidents of Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania, Namibia, Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo were unable to settle the conflict.⁹⁴ Numerous subsequent attempts to forge a ceasefire by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the South African Development Community (SADC), and regional leaders failed because of disagreements over whether the rebels should participate in the talks and Rwanda's refusal to admit its support for the rebels.⁹⁵ Efforts to encourage a

⁹² For a discussion of Rwanda's and Uganda's involvement respectively, see Longman (2002) and Clark (2002); on Zimbabwe's role see Rupiya (2002). Turner (2002) discusses Angola's involvement in the conflict. For an overview of the size and motives of the foreign armies in the conflict see Seybolt (2000, 62–68). Further, IPS News, "DRC Conflict Spreads Northward," September 30, 1998, <http://www.ipsnews.net/1998/09/politics-africa-drc-conflict-spreads-northward/> and The New York Times, "Armies Ravage a Rich Land, Creating Africa's 'First World War'," February 6, 2000, <https://partners.nytimes.com/library/world/africa/020600africa-congo.html>.

⁹³ Economist, "War turns commercial," October 22, 1998, <http://www.economist.com/node/173322>.

⁹⁴ BBC News, "Congo talks fail to secure truce," August 8, 1998, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/147676.stm>.

⁹⁵ BBC News, "Congo peace talks break down," September 12, 1998, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/169890.stm>; BBC News, "Congo peace talks fail," October 28, 1998 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/201193.stm>; BBC News, "Rwanda admits having troops in Congo," November 6, 1998, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/209319.stm>.

peaceful resolution continued with a trip to the DRC by U.S. Assistant Secretary Susan Rice in October 1998, and by British Foreign Office Minister Tony Lloyd and EU Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region, Aldo Ajello in February 1999, however without success.⁹⁶ Kabila demanded the withdrawal of all foreign troops as a precondition for agreeing to a ceasefire.⁹⁷ In the April 1999 Sirte Agreement brokered by Muammar Gaddafi, Kabila and Ugandan president Museveni agreed on the withdrawal of foreign troops; however, Rwanda and the RCD rejected the agreement.

4.4 The Lusaka Accord

A summit convened by Zambia's president Chiluba, whom the Southern African Development Community had appointed in September 1998 to lead mediation efforts, resulted in a ceasefire and peace agreement that was signed by all parties to the conflict and that would become the basis for subsequent third-party efforts in support of the peace process.⁹⁸ The Lusaka Accord includes provisions that address military, political, and justice issues toward resolving the conflict parties' incompatibilities. It provided for a ceasefire and the formation of the Joint Military Commission (JMC) comprised of representatives of all conflict parties and mandated to monitor the cessation of hostilities and investigate violations of the ceasefire. Furthermore, the agreement stipulated the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants, as well

⁹⁶ U.S. Department of State, "Assistant Secretary Susan Rice's Trip to Africa," October 26, 1998, <http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/statements/1998/ps981026.html>; IRIN, "British envoy begins peace mission," February 22, 1999, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/5283/drc-british-envoy-begins-peace-mission>.

⁹⁷ BBC News, "Africa summit ends in deadlock," December 18, 1998, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/237685.stm>.

⁹⁸ Lusaka Accord, http://www.un.org/Docs/s815_25.pdf.

as the withdrawal of all foreign armies, and requested a UN peace operation to support the implementation of these provisions. In addition, it provided for the release of prisoners and hostages, the re-establishment of state administration over the territory of the DRC, and for the creation of a national dialogue for reconciliation. The agreement obliged the conflict parties to choose a neutral facilitator to mediate the inter-Congolese political negotiations.

The Lusaka Accord was signed on July 10, 1999 by the six states involved in the conflict—DRC, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, and Uganda. The signing of the agreement was complicated by the formation of a new rebel group and factious rivalry within the RCD. The rebel group MLC (Mouvement de Libération Congolais) was formed in November 1998 and joined the RCD in its fight to overthrow Kabila. Backed by Uganda, rebel leader Jean-Pierre Bemba quickly established a stronghold in the north. Meanwhile, divisions in the RCD resulted in its split into RCD-Goma under rebel leader Emile Ilunga and RCD-Kisangani (later renamed RCD-Mouvement de Libération (RCD-ML)) under rebel leader Ernest Wamba dia Wamba. The MLC signed the agreement on August 1, and after disputes over which faction of the RCD had the right to sign, all fifty founding members signed on August 31. Zambia, the OAU, the UN, and the SADC witnessed the signing of the agreement.

The agreement was comprehensive in view of the incompatibilities it addressed and detail it provided for its attainment. Specifics regarding the provisions in the agreement were spelled out in an appendix and a calendar for agreement implementation was included. As such the agreement reflected the parties' preference to settle their conflict peacefully. However, the ceasefire was violated by all parties within weeks of signing the agreement, and fighting continued at times with heightened intensity.⁹⁹ While the agreement may have represented an

⁹⁹ BBC News, "Congo accused of breaking truce," October 2, 1999, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/463868.stm>; BBC News, "Congo rebels lose northern town," December 3, 1999, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/547975.stm>.

outcome that all parties preferred to continued fighting (whether parties may have actually preferred conflict I discuss below), mutual suspicion and security concerns were likely to prevent them from implementing the agreement without reassurance that all parties would abide by the ceasefire.

The commitment problems that the conflict parties were facing continued to increase as a result of the tensions and mistrust emanating from the continuous threat of retaliation for attacks and counterattacks that caused large numbers of casualties and refugees: by the end of 1999 the conflict had claimed over 5,000 deaths directly related to fighting and was contributing to over 100 indirect civilian deaths each day from malnutrition and disease; about one million people had been displaced.¹⁰⁰ Ethnic tensions had been the catalyst of the conflict and were perpetuating it. Ethnic hatred was deeply rooted and difficult to overcome, even with a negotiated settlement in place. Ethnic fighting contributed further to the mistrust between the conflict parties and amplified their security dilemma, making serious attempts at demobilization and disarmament difficult.¹⁰¹

Furthermore, in addition to the competing interests of the intervening states, tensions and divisions among the rebel groups of the anti-Kabila alliance had led to heightened insecurity. In May 1999 the RCD had split into competing factions, RCD-Goma and RCD-ML, which were supported by Rwanda and Uganda respectively and pursued different political goals.¹⁰² The alignment caused clashes between the Rwandan and Ugandan armies in August 1999 to be

¹⁰⁰ UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset v.5-2015, Uppsala Conflict Data Program, www.ucdp.uu.se, Uppsala University; Office of the UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Field Co-ordination Unit (OCHA), DRC Monthly Humanitarian Bulletin, Nov–Dec 1999 and a Preliminary Annual Review, December 27, 1999, <http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/drc-monthly-humanitarian-bulletin-nov-dec-1999-and-preliminary>; BBC News, “Congo rebels lose northern town,” December 3, 1999, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/547975.stm>.

¹⁰¹ Karbo and Mutisi (2012, 381–402).

¹⁰² Afoaku (2002, 118–120).

mirrored by conflicts between the supported rebel factions. In addition, Afoaku (2002, 120) describes how the need to finance the war led to competition among the rebel factions over control of rebel-occupied resource rich territories. It was illustrated when, in October 1999, RCD-Kisangani moved its headquarters to Bunia and established new provinces in the Ituri district in the Province Orientale, and RCD-Goma immediately declared its determination to recapture the territory.¹⁰³ Agreement implementation was thus not only hampered by perceptions of insecurity between the government and rebel movement, but among rebel factions as well.

High conflict costs, ethnic fighting, and conflict among multiple parties had increased mistrust, uncertainty, and insecurity, which in turn made it difficult for the conflict parties to abide by the agreement's provisions to demobilize and disarm. That fighting continued after the ceasefire was signed underscores the challenges of overcoming mutual suspicions and indicates the need for effective third-party guarantees to provide reassurance to conflict parties and alleviate commitment problems during agreement implementation.

In order to reduce uncertainty and provide information regarding the conflict parties' activities the agreement established the Joint Military Commission (JMC) to monitor the ceasefire. In addition, the agreement included explicit requests for a UN operation to provide transparency, operational support, and enforcement guarantees to facilitate the implementation of the agreement.

The Joint Military Commission (JMC) was composed of two representatives of each conflict party under a neutral Chairman and "responsible for executing, immediately after the coming into force of this Agreement, peace-keeping operations until the deployment of the UN peace-keeping force." (Article III.11.b) In particular, the JMC was mandated to "establish the

¹⁰³ IRIN, "RCD-Goma to fight "somalisation" of provinces," October 11, 1999, [http://www.irinnews.org/report/9637/drc-rcd-goma-fight-"somalisation"-provinces](http://www.irinnews.org/report/9637/drc-rcd-goma-fight-).

location of Units; (...) facilitate liaison between the Parties; (...) assist in the disengagement of forces and the investigation of any cease-fire violations; (...) verify all information, data and activities relating to military forces of the Parties; (...) verify the disarmament (...) of all armed groups (...) [and] Congolese civilians; and monitor and verify orderly withdrawal of all foreign Forces.” (Annex A, Chapter 7). The JMC had been given an appropriate mandate and was meeting regularly to work out logistics for the deployment of observers and to devise mechanisms for the disarmament and disengagement of forces as well as for the withdrawal of foreign armies.¹⁰⁴ However, despite numerous pledges by the international community and some significant financial support from donors, including the U.S. and OAU, the JMC’s efforts to carry out effectively the supervision of the ceasefire were impeded by a lack of resources.¹⁰⁵

In carrying out its mandate, the JMC was to cooperate with and receive support from a UN peace operation. Chapter 8 of the Lusaka Accord included provisions for the deployment of an “appropriate” UN peacekeeping force “to ensure implementation of this agreement.” The mandate proposed by the agreement would provide transparency, operational support, and enforcement guarantees to the conflict parties. Specifically, with the aim of guaranteeing transparency during the process of agreement implementation, the UN, in cooperation with the JMC and African Union, would “monitor the cessation of hostilities; (...) investigate violations of the Cease-fire Agreement; (...) supervise the disengagement of forces of the Parties; (...)

¹⁰⁴ PANA, “Joint military commission on DRC meets in Lusaka,” June 2, 2000, <http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/joint-military-commission-drc-meets-lusaka>. For a chronology of the JMC’s plenary sessions see Ngolet (2011, 85–89).

¹⁰⁵ BBC News, “Congo peace at risk–warning,” October 30, 1999, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/493876.stm>; IRIN, “OAU funding JMC in absence of donor cash,” November 18, 1999, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/10608/drc-oau-funding-jmc-absence-donor-cash>; IRIN, “Holbrooke outlines new US policy,” December 7, 1999, <http://www.irinnews.org/news/1999/12/07/holbrooke-outlines-new-us-policy>; PANA, “Joint military commission on DRC meets in Lusaka,” June 2, 2000, <http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/joint-military-commission-drc-meets-lusaka>; IRIN, “Funding crisis threatens JMC’s existence,” January 16, 2001, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/16704/drc-funding-crisis-threatens-jmc’s-existence>.

supervise the re-deployment to Defensive Positions of forces of the Parties; (...) supervise the withdrawal of all foreign forces; (...) [and] verify all information relating to military forces of the Parties.” (Annex A, Article 8.2.1) The mission should also provide humanitarian assistance and collect weapons from civilians.

Furthermore, the conflict parties requested that the UN act under Chapter VII to give the operation enforcement authority and the option, if necessary, to take coercive measures in order to provide operational support and enforcement guarantees by “tracking down and disarming armed groups; (...) screening war criminals; handing over “genocidaires” to the International Crimes Tribunal for Rwanda; (...) [and] working out such measures (persuasive or coercive) as are appropriate for the attainment of the objectives of disarming, assembling, repatriation and reintegration into society of members of the armed groups.” (Article 8.2.2)

The explicit request by the conflict parties for a UN force to monitor the cessation of hostilities, supervise the disengagement and redeployment of forces, and “track down armed groups” in order to support the implementation of the ceasefire and other provisions of the agreement reflects their commitment problems in moving forward with the peace process. Continuous fighting, despite the deployment of regional JMCs to several provinces affected by the conflict, highlighted the need for a third-party guarantee with sufficient capacity to support the conflict parties in the maintenance of the ceasefire and implementation of the Lusaka Accord.

4.5 Potential Guarantors

The Lusaka Accord was a result of negotiations and collaborations among regional and international potential guarantors, including South Africa, the SADC, the OAU, and the UN among others. The Accord included provisions for UN peace operations, but the UN had not actually given a guarantee by the time the agreement was signed. Regional powers and organizations remained relevant as potential guarantors, and this chapter examines whether these other potential guarantors were likely to give a guarantee. Though the ceasefire had been violated, the parties to the conflict, regional stakeholders, and the international community continued to view the Lusaka Accord as the foundation for a peaceful settlement. The UN, the OAU and other potential guarantors for the DRC peace process considered the agreement as the basis for any involvement. This section explores South Africa's, the SADC's, and the OAU's interests in the peaceful settlement of the conflict as well as their capacity for fulfilling a potential guarantee promise, and examines how the extent of their interests and capacity affected their likelihood of giving a guarantee to support the implementation of the Lusaka Accord.

4.5.1 South Africa: Regional Power Constrained by Limited Capacity

South Africa's power status on the continent, its history of military involvement in the region, its leadership role in the SADC and OAU, and its immediate interest in the political and economic stability of Central Africa rendered it a potential guarantor for the peace process in the DRC. The South African Department of Foreign Affairs expressed its interest in supporting the resolution of the conflict in the DRC: "The current most important issues with regard to the Central African

Region are conflict resolution, promotion of good governance, peace and stability as well as economic reconstruction and development. In this regard, the specific challenges facing South Africa are to assist in the resolution of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) through the comprehensive implementation of the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement.” South Africa’s interest in the resolution of the Congolese conflict was closely linked to its economic priorities. The statement further emphasized: “In addition to the above, other challenges include the promotion of the values of democracy and good governance and the implementation of sound stable economic policies. The reconstruction and development of the economy and infrastructure of the DRC, once the conflict has been resolved, will play a central role in South Africa’s policy in the Region. (...) The other main priorities for South Africa are the further development and consolidation of its trade and economic relations with the countries of the region.”¹⁰⁶ Regional stability and economic prosperity were key interests as South Africa was aiming to consolidate its democracy and reenergize its economy.¹⁰⁷

South Africa’s initial approach toward the conflict in the DRC grew out of its newly shaped post-apartheid foreign policy. As Alden and le Pere (2004) describe, the ideals on which South Africa’s democratic transition had been founded subsequently guided its foreign policy choices: the promotion of human rights, development, democracy, and internationalism. South Africa actively worked to position African IGOs like the OAU and SADC at the center of

¹⁰⁶ South African Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). “Regional Profiles: Central Africa,” last updated February 13, 2004, <http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/profiles/afraeq.htm>.

¹⁰⁷ For a discussion of South Africa’s interests in the resolution of the Congolese conflict see Landsberg (2002). Resolving the conflict in the DRC was also a priority in the context of the *African Renaissance*, a socio-economic development agenda for Africa that was conceived by Mbeki and promoted in South Africa’s foreign policy: “It is a comprehensive and far-reaching global plan of action to tackle poverty and the developmental needs of Africa. (...) two further pre-requisites for the success of social and economic regeneration (...) are security and stability. There can be little sustainable development and growth in conditions of instability and conflict.” South African Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). “Establishment of the African Renaissance and International Co-Operation Fund,” last updated February 13, 2004, <http://www.dirco.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/profiles/arfund.htm>.

regional and international affairs.¹⁰⁸ However, initial expectations regarding South Africa's leadership role on the continent by its regional partners and the international community, especially during the Mandela years, were tempered by a lack of financial resources, limited institutional capacity, and the more pragmatic foreign policy approach of Mandela's successor, Thabo Mbeki, who took office in June of 1999.¹⁰⁹

In this context, South Africa's role was characterized by an emphasis on multilateral diplomatic efforts to find a settlement to the conflict in the DRC.¹¹⁰ In August 1998, just after the start of the conflict, the SADC mandated Mandela, who was SADC chairman at the time, to organize talks and work out a peace plan for the DRC.¹¹¹ While these efforts were marred by a rift within SADC over how to resolve the conflict (SADC members Angola and Zimbabwe decided to intervene militarily to support Kabila), together with Zambia South Africa remained one of the key mediators in the conflict. In early 1999, South Africa proposed a ten-point peace plan that included a ceasefire, withdrawal of foreign armies, the establishment of a joint military council, the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation, and the creation of an inter-Congolese dialogue aimed at restoring peace and reconciliation.¹¹² The Lusaka Accord adopted many of these provisions. South Africa remained deeply involved in the peace process and actively sought to resolve the differences that were delaying the signing of the agreement by the RCD.

¹⁰⁸ Alden and le Pere (2004).

¹⁰⁹ Alden and le Pere (2004).

¹¹⁰ Malan (1999).

¹¹¹ IRIN, "IRIN Background report on peace efforts," June 22, 1999, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/7439/drc-irin-background-report-peace-efforts>.

¹¹² Landsberg (2002, 178), Carlsnaes and Nel (2006, 183).

In August 1999 shuttle diplomacy by South African and Zambian ministers produced a solution based on which both RCD rebel factions eventually signed the Lusaka Accord.¹¹³

President Mbeki was aware that in order to retain the legitimacy of South Africa's diplomatic efforts and its credibility as a peacemaker it would have to be willing to actively support the implementation of an agreement it helped to negotiate.¹¹⁴ However, limits to its institutional and financial capacity for deploying a peace operation to the DRC made a South African guarantee to support the DRC peace process unlikely. The controversial military intervention of the South African National Defense Force (SANDF) and Botswana Defense Force in Lesotho in September 1998 with the goal of quelling unrest and protests alleging rigged elections likely cautioned South Africa to undertake further military operations abroad without international mandate.¹¹⁵ A debrief of the operation given at a meeting of the South African Defence Committee highlighted the institutional, financial, and logistical limitations the operation encountered.¹¹⁶

An October 1998 White Paper on participation in peace operations formulated policy guidelines for South Africa's contribution to international peace missions.¹¹⁷ The timing of the paper suggests that South Africa's formalization of principles and procedures occurred in the

¹¹³ BBC News, "DR Congo: The rocky road to peace," September 1, 1999, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/435614.stm>. South Africa took the lead in organizing talks that would culminate in the 2002 Pretoria Agreement, which outlined the transition to democratic institutions and elections.

¹¹⁴ Landsberg (2002, 178).

¹¹⁵ Though South Africa had claimed that the Combined Task Force Boleas had acted under the auspices of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), it had not received a mandate. For a discussion of South Africa's military intervention in Lesotho see Berman and Sams (2000, 184–189).

¹¹⁶ South African Parliamentary Defence Committee, "Joint Meeting of the Joint Standing Committee on Defence; Foreign Affairs Portfolio Committee; Security & Justice Select Committee: Report on Situation in Lesotho," November 2, 1998, <https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/6712/>.

¹¹⁷ South African Department of Foreign Affairs, "White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions," 1998, http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/peacemissions_1.pdf.

wake of its intervention in Lesotho and was accelerated by the Congolese conflict and by a perception in Pretoria that South Africa was expected to play a significant role in an impending peacekeeping operation in the DRC. “Whilst South Africa has, as a member of bodies such as the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), begun to play an active role in diplomatic conflict resolution initiatives, the country is also expected to contribute to wider multinational “peace missions”.”¹¹⁸ The White Paper emphasized South Africa’s interest in participating in an operation, among other contributors and under an international mandate: “In short, it is in the South African national interest to assist peoples who suffer from famine, political repression, natural disasters and the scourge of violent conflict. South Africa may thus provide civilian assistance and armed forces in common international efforts when properly authorised by international authorities to help in such efforts.”¹¹⁹ Any involvement in a peace operation in the DRC would have to be part of a multilateral effort under a clear international mandate.

South Africa’s ruling party ANC (African National Congress) confirmed this approach in a statement on the DRC peace process: “The ANC reiterates its confidence in the ability of the SADC, the OAU and the United Nations to facilitate the peace process aimed at finding a lasting peaceful solution to the Democratic Republic of Congo’s political impasse.”¹²⁰

Days before the Lusaka Accord was signed South Africa’s defense ministry announced that its involvement in a peace operation in the DRC would be contingent on a request from the

¹¹⁸ South African Department of Foreign Affairs, “White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions,” 1998, 4, http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/peacemissions_1.pdf.

¹¹⁹ South African Department of Foreign Affairs, “White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions,” 1998, 20, http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/peacemissions_1.pdf.

¹²⁰ African National Congress. Statement on DRC peace process. November 23, 1998, <http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=7860>.

UN, OAU, or SADC.¹²¹ After UNSC Resolution 1291¹²² authorized in February 2000 an observer mission intended to provide a transparency guarantee, South African President Thabo Mbeki announced at the summit on the DRC in Algiers on April 30, 2000 that South Africa was committed to providing troops to that operation.¹²³ However, any contribution would be limited to what South Africa's capacity could sustain: "We are not thinking what can we deploy? We are thinking what can we sustain for a long period of time. We could deploy a large force, but six months later, we would just not be able to support them in the DRC."¹²⁴

In sum, given its socio-economic agenda South Africa had considerable interests in the peaceful settlement of the Congolese conflict. It was prepared to become involved in an operation to support the peace process in the DRC, but limited capacity in terms of financial means, institutional capabilities, and the prerequisite to contribute only to multilateral, international mandated operations made a guarantee by South Africa less likely. Instead South Africa would fill a participatory role in the UN observer mission (MONUC) and subsequently under the extended mandate of MONUSCO.

¹²¹ IRIN, "Small peacekeeping role," July 9, 1999, <http://www.irinnews.org/news/1999/07/09/small-peacekeeping-role>.

¹²² UN Document S/RES/1291 (2000).

¹²³ Communiqué of the Organization of African Unity Summit on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Algiers, April 30, 2000, http://repository.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/33721/A_54_853%3BS_2000_369-EN.pdf?sequence=21&isAllowed=y.

¹²⁴ IRIN, "Military apprehensive ahead of DRC peacekeeping," August 27, 1999, <http://www.irinnews.org/news/1999/08/27/military-apprehensive-ahead-drc-peacekeeping>.

4.5.2 Southern African Development Community: Paralyzed by Divisions

Regional organizations, specifically the Southern African Development Community and the Organization of African Unity were potential guarantors for the peace process in the DRC by virtue of their explicit mandate to promote peace and security and by the existence of an institutional mechanism to authorize an operation in fulfillment of a given guarantee.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was established in 1980 as the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC). Its founding members included Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Namibia joined in 1990, South Africa joined with the end of apartheid in 1994, and the DRC joined in 1997 after Kabila came to power. The organization was transformed in 1992 with the adoption of the SADC Treaty, which gave legal status to member states' relations. The Treaty specified that the "SADC and its Member States shall act in accordance with the principles (of) sovereign equality of all Member States; solidarity, peace and security; human rights, democracy, and the rule of law; (...) (and) peaceful settlement of disputes" (Art. 4). The Treaty also set out that in addition to promoting development and economic growth one of the SADC's objectives "shall be to (...) promote and defend peace and security" (Article 5(1)c).¹²⁵ Toward that aim, member states established in 1996 the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation as a forum for coordination on political and security related issues.

Beyond the SADC's mandate to resolve the conflict in the DRC in order to foster peace and security throughout the region, its member states had political and economic interests that could only be safeguarded in a peaceful DRC: for example, Angola sought to limit the operational bases in the DRC of the rebel group UNITA and to protect oil investments along the

¹²⁵ South African Development Community, Declaration and Treaty, August 17, 1992, http://www.sadc.int/files/8613/5292/8378/Declaration__Treaty_of_SADC.pdf.

coast; Namibia had an interest in supporting its longstanding ally Angola and to safeguard investments as part owner, with Angola and Zimbabwe in a commercial bank in Kinshasa; South Africa aimed to further its political agenda of fostering peace and democracy in the region and to expand its economic and trade relationship with the DRC; and Zimbabwe's president Mugabe sought to assert his status as regional leader, to protect investments of over \$200 million in the DRC, and to benefit from the DRC's mineral wealth.¹²⁶

After the start of the rebellion Kabila appealed for political and military assistance from the SADC.¹²⁷ The first meeting by leaders of SADC member states to address the conflict was held by Mugabe at Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, on August 7–8, 1998. The Heads of State and Government of Angola, DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe attended.¹²⁸ At the summit a special committee comprising Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe was formed, which was tasked “to verify whether the fighting in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was the result of an internal rebellion or an aggression by neighboring countries; (and) to recommend a way forward, depending on the findings.”¹²⁹

The committee's report was examined at a meeting of southern African defense ministers in Harare, Zimbabwe on August 18, 1998.¹³⁰ After the meeting, Mugabe, in his capacity as Chair

¹²⁶ See Turner (2002) and Rupiya (2002) for Angola's and Zimbabwe's motivations respectively for intervening in the conflict; for a discussion of Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe's interests see Seybolt (2000, 62–68). Further, The New York Times, “Armies Ravage a Rich Land, Creating Africa's 'First World War',” February 6, 2000, <https://partners.nytimes.com/library/world/africa/020600africa-congo.html>; Economist, “War turns commercial,” October 22, 1998, <http://www.economist.com/node/173322>; IPS News, “DRC Conflict Spreads Northward,” September 30, 1998, <http://www.ipsnews.net/1998/09/politics-africa-drc-conflict-spreads-northward/>.

¹²⁷ Nathan (2012, 86).

¹²⁸ UN Document S/1998/891 (1998); BBC News, “Congo talks fail to secure truce,” August 8, 1998, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/147676.stm>.

¹²⁹ UN Document S/1998/891 (1998, 2).

¹³⁰ Nathan (2012, 87).

of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation¹³¹ announced that the SADC had unanimously agreed to provide support to Kabila's regime.¹³² By the end of August, Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe had deployed over five thousand troops to the DRC to prevent the RCD from taking Kinshasa. Sources suggest that Angola had sent about 2,500 troops, Namibia 200–300 troops, and Zimbabwe 2,800 troops.¹³³ By 1999, estimated troop totals were 2,000–7,000 for Angola, 2,000–3,000 for Namibia, and 7,000–11,000 for Zimbabwe.¹³⁴ Mugabe justified the military intervention by citing the obligation of collective defense against the invasion of another SADC member state by Rwanda and Uganda.¹³⁵

However, in contrast to Mugabe's announcement the decision had not been supported by all member states, including Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa, and Tanzania.¹³⁶ Mandela emphasized South Africa's opposition to a military intervention: "Our attitude is clear in regard to this problem. It is not to worsen the position by sending a military force. We are committed to

¹³¹ Differences over the leadership of the Organ, whose chair did not have to report to the SADC chair, had caused Mandela in 1997 to threaten with his resignation from the Chairmanship of the SADC. See, e.g., Zacarias (2003).

¹³² Berman and Sams (2000, 177); BBC News, "Congo troops launch counter-offensive," August 18, 1998, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/153685.stm>.

¹³³ Berman and Sams (2000, 180); The Washington Post cites estimates of 2,500 Angola troops: Washington Post, "Angola sends Thousands of Troops to Back Kabila," August 25, 1998, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1998/08/25/angola-sends-thousands-of-troops-to-back-kabila/c5da7c99-0f4a-469a-8a32-a74d46b79a0d/>; Reuters, "Congo rebels stalled in West, Angola sends troops," August 25, 1998, <http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/congo-rebels-stalled-west-angola-sends-troops>; Los Angeles Times, "Foreign Forces Battle With Rebels in Congo," August 23, 1998, <http://articles.latimes.com/1998/aug/23/news/mn-15909>.

¹³⁴ Seybolt (2000, 66–67). Total troops from Zimbabwe had increased to 13,000 by November 1998 according to the Economist: The Economist, "Down with war," November 5, 1998, <http://www.economist.com/node/174996>.

¹³⁵ Seybolt (2000, 66–67); UN Document S/1998/891 (1998).

¹³⁶ IPS News, "Mugabe Tells Mandela to Shut Up," August 20, 1998, <http://www.ipsnews.net/1998/08/disarmament-southern-africa-mugabe-tells-mandela-to-shut-up/>.

peace and that is our attitude, that is my attitude as chairman of SADC. We will do everything to bring about a peaceful solution.”¹³⁷

Moreover, only the defense ministers of Angola, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe had attended the meeting on August 18; other member states were represented by officials below the ministerial level, including South Africa.¹³⁸ Mandela stressed that the decision taken at the meeting in Harare did not constitute authorization by the SADC: “Anyone who pretends to be speaking for the SADC on this issue is misleading himself and the world. The question of committing troops is a very, very serious and complicated one. It is a decision that would require a gathering of the (SADC’s) 14 heads of state.”¹³⁹

Mugabe’s response indicated the deep rift within the SADC: “Those who want to keep out fine. Let them keep out, but let them be silent about those who want to help. (...) We are involved in accordance with decisions taken and recommendations by our defence ministers. Each country will support the DRC according to its capacity. (...) If South Africa does not want to participate, then fine. We will participate as Zimbabwe working with (other) SADC countries. (...) No one is compelled within the SADC states to go into a campaign of assisting a country beset by conflict.”¹⁴⁰

Mandela convened a SADC Summit on August 23 in Pretoria in order to focus on a diplomatic solution to the conflict. The Summit declared “the Democratic Republic of Congo is

¹³⁷ IPS News, “Mugabe Tells Mandela to Shut Up,” August 20, 1998, <http://www.ipsnews.net/1998/08/disarmament-southern-africa-mugabe-tells-mandela-to-shut-up/>.

¹³⁸ IRIN, “DRC: Zimbabwe says SADC to back Kabila,” August 19, 1998, <http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/drc-zimbabwe-says-sadc-back-kabila>.

¹³⁹ IPS News, “Mugabe Tells Mandela to Shut Up,” August 20, 1998, <http://www.ipsnews.net/1998/08/disarmament-southern-africa-mugabe-tells-mandela-to-shut-up/>.

¹⁴⁰ IPS News, “Mugabe Tells Mandela to Shut Up,” August 20, 1998, <http://www.ipsnews.net/1998/08/disarmament-southern-africa-mugabe-tells-mandela-to-shut-up/>.

afflicted with military conflict, which the Summit considers to be an unacceptable way of addressing any problems, which occasioned the conflict. The Summit committed itself to seek an end to the military conflict immediately.”¹⁴¹ It mandated Mandela to undertake, in consultation with the OAU Secretary-General, measures aimed at bringing about a cease-fire and the initiation of a political dialogue. However, Kabila, Mugabe, and Angola’s president dos Santos had not attended the meeting; their absence effectively undermined the Summit’s resolution and Mandela’s mandate to mediate a ceasefire.¹⁴²

Since its inception, disagreement over the structure and strategies of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation between a pacifist group around South Africa and a more militarist camp led by Zimbabwe had been impeding the Organ’s effectiveness in providing a forum for security and defense policy coordination.¹⁴³ The split now also hampered any efforts by the SADC to respond with a unified approach to the Congolese conflict and made a SADC guarantee less likely.

At a subsequent SADS Summit, held on September 13–14 in Mauritius, Zambian President Chiluba was given the mandate, with support from the presidents of Tanzania and Mozambique, to lead mediations toward a negotiated settlement.¹⁴⁴ President Chiluba’s

¹⁴¹ SADC 1998, Communiqué, Summit on the Democratic Republic of Congo, Pretoria, South Africa, August 23.

¹⁴² The New York Times, “Congo Gets More Help In Africa In Rebel War,” August 23, 1998, <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/23/world/congo-gets-more-help-in-africa-in-rebel-war.html>.

¹⁴³ Nathan (2012); IPS News, “DRC Conflict Splits SADC,” August 24, 1998, <http://www.ipsnews.net/1998/08/politics-southern-africa-drc-conflict-splits-sadc/>.

¹⁴⁴ UN Document S/PV.4047 (1999, 3).

appointment was the start of the Lusaka peace process, which was marked by intense efforts at conflict resolution and which culminated in the signing of the Lusaka Accord in July 1999.¹⁴⁵

Though it had initiated the mediation process that resulted in the Lusaka Accord, internal challenges affected the SADC's capabilities to give a guarantee to support its implementation. The SADC member states' military interventions in Lesotho and the DRC may have suggested military capacity to deploy an operation in fulfillment of a guarantee given under a SADC mandate. However, resource constraints within the SADC limited its options for financing a peace operation to provide a guarantee given by the SADC. While South Africa had pledged a contribution to a multilateral operation with an international mandate,¹⁴⁶ it made clear that the mandate – and funding – would have to come from beyond the SADC. “There is no intention of South Africa holding any line for other SADC countries. I think there is a growing consensus that any DRC mission should not be just a SADC affair. We want other Western countries to join in. We know if it is just SADC then South Africa will be left to underwrite the whole deployment. We do not want the DRC buck to stop here.”¹⁴⁷

In addition to limited financial capacity, the SADC's options of contributing to the peace process beyond mediation were limited by its inability to form a consensus on how to respond to the conflict. The differences between the hawkish and dovish camps in the organization were deeply rooted and had grown out of diverging philosophies and experiences. The two sides conflicted over the key question of whether to send troops to participate in the fighting or a

¹⁴⁵ UN Document S/PV.4047 (1999, 3); IRIN, “IRIN Background report on peace efforts,” June 22, 1999, <http://www.irinnews.org/fr/node/176849>.

¹⁴⁶ IRIN, “Small peacekeeping role,” July 9, 1999, <http://www.irinnews.org/news/1999/07/09/small-peacekeeping-role>.

¹⁴⁷ IRIN, “Military apprehensive ahead of DRC peacekeeping,” August 27, 1999, <http://www.irinnews.org/news/1999/08/27/military-apprehensive-ahead-drc-peacekeeping>. See also Carayannis and Weiss (2003, 278).

negotiating team to arrange a ceasefire. As in other potential guarantor IGOs, a guarantee decision requires consensus. The SADC illustrates that such consensus may be most difficult to attain when member states are located in the direct neighborhood of the conflict that affects their immediate security and economic interests.¹⁴⁸ Disagreement within SADC would continue to affect its ability to influence regional political affairs.¹⁴⁹

The case demonstrates the complexity of the guarantor capacity concept. In addition to financial and military capabilities, consensus among guarantor stakeholders and constituents about the approach toward conflict resolution forms the basis for a guarantee. The SADC member states' diverging views regarding how to respond to the conflict in the DRC caused a lack of consensus that severely limited the SADC's capacity to give a guarantee. A guarantee by the SADC was unlikely, and the signatories and mediators of the Lusaka Accord turned to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the UN to request guarantees for agreement implementation.¹⁵⁰

4.5.3 Organization of African Unity

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was involved from the start in the regional peace process to resolve the Congolese conflict. Founded in 1963 in the wake of the pan-Africanist

¹⁴⁸ Carayannis and Weiss (2003, 290).

¹⁴⁹ For example, in 2008 SADC was divided along the same lines about how to respond to the political dispute in Zimbabwe between the Mugabe government and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change, MDC regarding power sharing arrangements (see Reuters, "Regional summit fails to pressure Zimbabwe," August 17, 2007, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-summit-idUSL1779893720070817>; Reuters, "Regional leaders toothless in Zimbabwe crisis," November 10, 2008, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-zimbabwe-politics-region-idUKTRE4A946220081110>).

¹⁵⁰ Zambia lobbied the UN for a peacekeeping operation in support of the transparency, support, and enforcement guarantees requested in the Lusaka Accord. See, e.g., President Chiluba's briefing in UN Document S/PV.4047 (1999, 2–5).

movement, its charter listed among the organization's purposes "to defend [the] sovereignty [of African States], their territorial integrity and independence," and called upon its member states to "coordinate and harmonize their general policies, especially in (...) cooperation for defence and security." In pursuit of these purposes "the Member States (...) solemnly affirm and declare their adherence to the (...) non-interference in the internal affairs of States, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence, [and] peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration (...)." ¹⁵¹

The Charter's provisions predicated the OAU's overarching interest and significant involvement in the peaceful settlement of the conflict, though the Charter's emphasis on non-interference and respect for state sovereignty hampered its ability to support the peace process beyond diplomacy. In a communiqué issued on August 17, 1998 the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution "condemned the recourse to armed rebellion in the settlement of grievances, (...) called for an immediate cessation of hostilities, (...) condemned all external interventions in the internal affairs of [the DRC], (...) fully supported and endorsed the initiatives and approaches launched by the Regional [SADC] Summit held at Victoria Falls [on August 7–8], (...) [and] requested the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity to enter into urgent consultations with all concerned and closely coordinate OAU's efforts with those of the countries of the region and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, with a view to seeking a speedy and peaceful end to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo." ¹⁵²

¹⁵¹ Organization of African Unity Charter, May 25, 1963, http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/treaties/7759-sl-oau_charter_1963_0.pdf.

¹⁵² UN Document S/1998/774 (1998).

Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim joined the heads of state of the DRC, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe in peace talks on September 7–8 in Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe.¹⁵³ The OAU organized talks on September 10–12 in Addis Ababa, which were attended by the same group of states, Salim, and UN political and military advisors, and which produced a draft ceasefire agreement, including provisions for its implementation (however, as at the Victoria Falls talks, the rebels were denied face-to-face negotiations and subsequently rejected any agreements made in their absence).¹⁵⁴

When Zambia's president Chiluba was tasked at the September 13 SADC meeting to lead the regional mediation efforts, the OAU continued to be actively involved in the process, organizing a series of peace talks among the parties, including a mid-December meeting in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.¹⁵⁵ In addition to organizing talks at the regional and subregional level and actively participating in ad-hoc, SADC, and OAU level negotiations, the OAU also sought to coordinate regional and international peace efforts. Utilizing established channels for cooperation with the UN, the OAU transmitted information and requests between the participants in the Lusaka peace process and the international community.¹⁵⁶

The Lusaka Accord provided for a prominent role for the OAU, including in collaborating with the UN in the latter's deployment of a peacekeeping force (Art. 3.11(a)), participating in an initial observer group under the aegis of the JMC (Art. 3.11(b)), drafting a schedule for the withdrawal of foreign armies (Art. 3.12), providing a reporting mechanism for

¹⁵³ Scherrer (2002, 274).

¹⁵⁴ Scherrer (2002, 274).

¹⁵⁵ IRIN, "IRIN Background report on peace efforts," June 22, 1999, <http://www.irinnews.org/fr/node/176849>; IRIN, "Glimmer of light as sides agree to discuss," December 18, 1998, <http://m.irinnews.org/report/4178/drc-glimmer-of-light-as-sides-agree-to-discuss>.

¹⁵⁶ Carayannis and Weiss (2003, 292). See also UN Document S/1998/774 (1998).

ceasefire violations (Annex, Ch.1.3), guiding the parties in designating procedures for disarmament (Annex, Ch.2.3), assisting in the organization of the inter-Congolese political dialogue (Annex, Ch.5.3), and appointing the chairman for the JMC (Annex, Ch.7.2), among other responsibilities. As neutral guide and advisor to the conflict parties the OAU also took on the role of the agreement's "moral guarantor," closely overseeing progress on agreement implementation and exerting pressure on the conflict parties to uphold their commitments.¹⁵⁷

The likelihood that the OAU would also give a transparency, support, or enforcement guarantee on the ground was limited by a lack of capacity to deploy an operation in fulfillment of such guarantee. Insufficient resources, institutional barriers, and a lack of political consensus among its member states impeded OAU involvement beyond its moral guarantor status.

In order to take charge of dealing with the conflicts on the continent, in 1993 the OAU had established the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution.¹⁵⁸ However, member states' perceptions of limited financial resources biased their preferences toward involvement in the negotiation stage and with limited operations. The Declaration outlined the Mechanism's primary objective to be

"the anticipation and prevention of conflicts. In circumstances where conflicts have occurred, it will be its responsibility to undertake peace-making and peace-building functions in order to facilitate the resolution of these conflicts. In this respect, civilian and military missions of observation and monitoring of limited scope and duration may be mounted and deployed. In setting these objectives, we are fully convinced that prompt and decisive action in these spheres will, in the first instance, prevent the emergence of conflicts, and where they do inevitably occur, stop them from degenerating into intense or generalised conflicts. Emphasis on anticipatory and preventive measures, and concerted action in peace-making and peace-building will obviate the need to resort to

¹⁵⁷ Carayannis and Weiss (2003, 292).

¹⁵⁸ For a discussion of the weaknesses of OAU conflict management prior to 1993, see, for example, Berman and Sams (2003).

the complex and resource-demanding peacekeeping operations, which our countries will find difficult to finance.”¹⁵⁹

According to the declaration, peacekeeping was to remain the responsibility of the UN: “in the event that conflicts degenerate to the extent of requiring collective international intervention and policing, the assistance or where appropriate the services of the United Nations will be sought under the general terms of its Charter. In this instance, our respective countries will examine ways and modalities through which they can make practical contribution to such a United Nations undertaking and participate effectively in the peacekeeping operations in Africa.”¹⁶⁰

While a conflict management mechanism thereby had been established by the OAU, its scope and effectiveness were limited. Secretary-General Salim, who was the driving force behind adapting the OAU’s conflict management capabilities to the shifts in the nature of African conflicts noted, “as far as OAU is concerned, we now have the (...) institutional framework, for conflict management and resolution. We are trying to operationalise the mechanism, but still we are hampered by problems of resources, expertise, and even linkages with the various sectors of our societies.”¹⁶¹

Furthermore, the large number of conflicts in Africa impeded OAU efforts to take a proactive role in conflict resolution. “Referring to our own office in Addis Ababa, sometimes it

¹⁵⁹ OAU, AHG/DECL.3 (XXIX), Declaration on Establishing Within the OAU a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Cairo: OAU, June 30, 1993, <https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/3HOGASSEMBLY1993.PDF>.

¹⁶⁰ OAU, AHG/DECL.3 (XXIX), Declaration on Establishing Within the OAU a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Cairo: OAU, June 30, 1993, <https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/3HOGASSEMBLY1993.PDF>.

¹⁶¹ Salim Ahmed Salim, 2000. Closing Address at the international conference on ‘African Conflicts: Their Management, Resolution and Post-Conflict Reconstruction’, December 13-15, 2000, Addis Ababa, <http://www.dpmf.org/Publications/Occasional%20Papers/occasionalpaper1.pdf>.

is more like a fire brigade. Right now, we are all very relieved about the developments between Ethiopia and Eritrea. (...) But we still have to deal with other problems, such as the southern Sudan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, and even Guinea Bissau (...). All these crises require the sustained commitment of Africans.”¹⁶²

An OAU inter-African force to provide guarantees for the implementation of a ceasefire and peace agreement had been discussed since the September 1998 OAU meeting, but Secretary-General Salim declared that the OAU did not have the resources to sustain such an operation.¹⁶³ Salim saw the OAU’s strengths in diplomacy, not in peace operations: “For African conflicts, prevention is not only better than cure, but also far cheaper than the costly peacekeeping ventures which the OAU lacks the resources and expertise to undertake.”¹⁶⁴

In addition to resource constraints, institutional challenges significantly limited the extent to which the OAU could provide guarantees on the ground. The declaration concerning the establishment of the conflict management mechanism stated that “the Mechanism will be guided by the objectives and principles of the OAU Charter; in particular, the sovereign equality of Member States, non-interference in the internal affairs of States, the respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member States, their inalienable right to independent existence, the peaceful settlement of disputes as well as the inviolability of borders inherited from colonialism. It will also function on the basis of the consent and the co-operation of the parties to a

¹⁶² Salim Ahmed Salim, 2000. Closing Address at the international conference on ‘African Conflicts: Their Management, Resolution and Post-Conflict Reconstruction’, December 13-15, 2000, Addis Ababa, <http://www.dpmf.org/Publications/Occasional%20Papers/occasionalpaper1.pdf>.

¹⁶³ International Crisis Group (1999a, 8).

¹⁶⁴ IRIN, “Peacekeeping mission “modest”, OAU chief says,” May 11, 2001, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/21134/drc-peacekeeping-mission-“modest”-oau-chief-says>.

conflict.”¹⁶⁵ Adherence to the principles of noninterference and sovereignty essentially precluded effective guarantees aimed at reassuring the Kabila government as well as the rebels during agreement implementation.¹⁶⁶

The lack of financial and institutional capacity notwithstanding, the inability of member states to align their preferences regarding the OAU’s approach toward the conflict in the DRC restricted the OAU’s capacity for giving and fulfilling a guarantee. In addition to the disagreement among the SADC member states, with Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe supporting Kabila and Rwanda and Uganda assisting the rebels, while South Africa, Zambia, Mozambique and others remained neutral, African states beyond the SADC diverged in their preferences as well: Burundi had provided some assistance to the rebels,¹⁶⁷ while Kabila’s offensives had been backed by 2,000 troops from Chad (until May 1999) and Sudanese air support;¹⁶⁸ Libya allegedly had helped fund Zimbabwe’s assistance to Kabila.¹⁶⁹ As in the SADC, the level of consensus among OAU member states and its capacity to give a guarantee were closely linked.

UN Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Tayé-Brook Zerihoun reiterates the challenges of asking regional organizations to solve their own problems: “In the spirit of Chapter VIII the Security Council has been encouraging regional organizations to take a first crack at both facilitating peace processes but also helping in implementation. This has had mixed

¹⁶⁵ OAU, AHG/DECL.3 (XXIX), Declaration on Establishing Within the OAU a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Cairo: OAU, June 30, 1993, <https://www.issafrika.org/uploads/3HOGASSEMBLY1993.PDF>.

¹⁶⁶ Carayannis and Weiss (2003, 278).

¹⁶⁷ DeRouen and Heo (2007, 303).

¹⁶⁸ Seybolt (2000, 66).

¹⁶⁹ BBC News, “Zimbabwe names backers in Congo war,” January 7, 1999, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/250394.stm>.

outcomes. The problem of entrusting regional countries with this effort is that regional countries can sometimes be part of the solution but they're also part of the problem. They have agendas and in Africa in particular, where the current boundaries are arbitrary and divide subject populations, the regional countries (...) have a different agenda [aligned with] one party or the other.¹⁷⁰

The various constraints faced by the OAU made a guarantee unlikely. A shortage of material resources, challenges emanating from contradictory institutional design, and a lack of consensus among its member states implied that OAU support for the implementation of the Lusaka Accord was limited to the tasks prescribed for it in the agreement. The OAU continued its cooperation with the UN on the establishment of the Joint Military Commission. Two UN liaison officers were dispatched to OAU headquarters, while OAU senior officials traveled to New York for consultations with the Secretariat.¹⁷¹ The OAU appointed General Rachid Lallali as Chairman of the JMC. It also committed to contributing 50 observers to support the JMC in pursuing its mandate, though limited capacity affected its ability to deliver its share: The deployment of the OAU observers was delayed due to a shortage of resources and required the UN to agree on providing the necessary training.¹⁷²

¹⁷⁰ Zerihoun interview.

¹⁷¹ UN Document S/1999/1116 (1999, 5).

¹⁷² UN Document S/1999/1116 (1999, 6).

4.6 Conclusion

The conflict in the DRC was rooted in ethnic strife and characterized by high intensity fighting and high casualties. It was complex, involving a large number of parties with incompatibilities on the local, national, and regional level. These factors contributed to increased insecurity, lack of trust, and an inability to commit to implementing a negotiated settlement without third-party guarantees to provide transparency, operational support for a DDR program, and enforcement to reassure the conflict parties in the peace process. The peace process to resolve the ethnic war in the DRC, which was associated with high costs and involved multiple conflict parties required higher-level guarantees. The signatories to the peace agreement requested both an operational support guarantee for a DDR program and an enforcement guarantee.

Interest in the peaceful settlement of the Congolese conflict provided the impetus for South Africa and regional organizations to consider supporting the implementation of the Lusaka Accord. Stability and security in the DRC were a precondition for economic development and effective government control, both key interests for potential guarantors with economic stakes in the DRC and a desire to prevent rogue states and terrorist organizations from exploiting weak power structures in the region. The large number of refugees and internally displaced persons, the potential for genocide, high conflict casualties, and the risk of exacerbating conflicts in the region were driving potential guarantors' concerns regarding security and stability in the DRC. The SADC and OAU had a primary interest in supporting the peace process given their mandate to foster regional stability and security.

Lack of capacity rendered a guarantee by South Africa, SADC, or the OAU unlikely. The potential guarantors were not prepared to mobilize the required number of personnel or the

necessary equipment. Furthermore, a guarantee from the SADC or the OAU was unlikely given the divisions within these organizations and their inability to adopt a unified approach toward the conflict in the DRC. Moreover, the number of SADC and OAU member states involved in the conflict was high and left few states to give and fulfill a guarantee.¹⁷³

In the next chapter I turn to the UN as potential guarantor and examine how the Security Council members' interests and capacity and their perceptions of the conflict parties' need for a guarantee and preferences for peace versus continued conflict impacted the likelihood of a UN guarantee.

¹⁷³ Carayannis and Weiss (2003, 290).

Chapter 5

Case Study Evidence: The Second Congo War— The Guarantee Decision in the UN Security Council

5.1 Introduction

When examining the guarantee process for the UN it is essential to distinguish between the relevant institutions within the organization given their distinct functions in the guarantee decision-making process. The Secretariat conducts initial field assessments of the situation on the ground, based on which the Secretary-General provides reports to the Member States in the Security Council, presenting possible options for involvement. The authority to give a guarantee is vested in the Security Council (UNSC); it passes the resolution that authorizes size and mandate of a peace operation in fulfillment of a guarantee. The General Assembly approves the peacekeeping budget and resources.

Given their power to veto any resolution, the five permanent members (P5) of the Security Council drive the decision for or against a guarantee. Of the P5 members the United States is the focus of the analysis for two reasons. Relevant sources about the United States' guarantee decision-making process are more widely available and easily accessible to me than sources regarding the other permanent members. In addition, though the U.S. had been providing guarantees in conflict states, it was likely cautious about giving a guarantee, itself or through the UN, for the DRC peace process given its recent experience in Somalia.¹⁷⁴ Knowing that the UN eventually gave a guarantee we might gain most insight into the effect of the hypothesized

¹⁷⁴ For an analysis of the effects of the U.S.-led intervention in Somalia on U.S. and UN policies see, for example, Clarke and Herbst (1997).

guarantee determinants by examining more closely the interests and perceptions of the U.S., given its bias against a guarantee. Accordingly, in this section I study the actions and statements of the Security Council, in particular the U.S., as well as the activities and recommendations of the Secretary-General given his close interaction with the UNSC in the guarantee decision-making process.

5.2 Conflict Resolution in the DRC: Mandate and Interests

The Charter provides for the mandate and mechanism for giving a guarantee. It states the UN's principal purpose in Chapter I, Article 1.1: "To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace (...)." Toward that aim, the Charter, while it does not explicitly include articles on peacekeeping, provides the Security Council with options for taking action regarding "any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security (...)" (Ch. VI Art. 33). In the context of Chapter VI on the peaceful settlement of such disputes, "the Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment" (Art. 36). Further, Chapter VII provides that "the Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken (...) to maintain or restore international peace and security" (Art. 39),

including “action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security” (Art. 42).

Inherently, the Security Council’s interest in the resolution of the conflict in the DRC, “which poses a serious threat to regional peace and security,”¹⁷⁵ grew out of its principal mandate. In its resolution of April 9, 1999, the Security Council, “expressing its concern at the further deterioration of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the continuation of hostilities, (...) demands an immediate halt to the hostilities; [and] calls for the immediate signing of a ceasefire agreement allowing the orderly withdrawal of all foreign forces, the re-establishment of the authority of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo throughout its territory, and the disarmament of non-governmental armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”¹⁷⁶

UN Assistant Secretary-General Zerihoun explains the UN’s role and interest in supporting agreement implementation:

“We will work with [the conflict parties] on whether there would be a need for an implementation mechanism, and what kind of implementation mechanism would be best suited for that conflict. (...) In the discussion on the implementation the onus is on the parties; the political process is owned by the parties. We provide the proverbial third eye. We provide the expertise, and where there has been open conflict and there are fighters on both sides, we come in to deploy to ensure that the ceasefire that they have agreed to is respected and implemented, and all the other things attached to it on the security side, the demobilization, disarmament, reintegration, are addressed. (...) We want a peace agreement that can be sustained, and that for us is something that does not start and end with a peace agreement. Sometimes a good agreement is as good as its implementation mechanism.”¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁵ UN Document S/PRST/1998/26 (1998).

¹⁷⁶ UN Document S/RES/1234 (1999).

¹⁷⁷ Zerihoun interview.

United States Ambassador to the UN, Richard Holbrooke, during his ten-nation trip to Africa in December 1998, announced that “perhaps the most urgent objective of our trip is to search for ways to assist the resolution of conflicts that threaten the future of this region. This is, to my mind, the United Nations’ most vital responsibility throughout the world.”¹⁷⁸ And further, “if the parties find the will to maintain and bolster peace in Congo, it is the United Nations’ mission to help. It is the United States’ goal to assist. Where meaningful peace agreements are in place and observed—agreements like Lusaka—the UN and the United States should support their implementation. Where an international presence is required to achieve a meaningful peace agreement, or to provide the last element to an already meaningful agreement, the UN has a vital role to play.”¹⁷⁹

U.S. interest in the settlement of the Congolese conflict was in line with previous initiatives aimed at strengthening African conflict resolution capabilities, including President Clinton’s 1996 African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and several million dollars of funding for the OAU and ECOWAS, as well as \$1 million in contributions to the Joint Military Commission established by the Lusaka Accord.¹⁸⁰ Two principal goals were possibly driving U.S. support for the implementation of the Lusaka Accord: (1) restoring security to prevent rogue states and terrorist organizations from taking advantage of the power vacuum, and (2)

¹⁷⁸ U.S. Department of State (Washington), “Holbrooke Says Africa Will Be UN Priority in January,” December 7, 1999; “Conflict in Africa and the Search for Peace in Congo”: Remarks by U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Richard C. Holbrooke, Pretoria, South Africa December 6, 1999, https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Urgent_Action/apic_121499.html.

¹⁷⁹ U.S. Department of State (Washington), “Holbrooke Says Africa Will Be UN Priority in January,” December 7, 1999; “Conflict in Africa and the Search for Peace in Congo”: Remarks by U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Richard C. Holbrooke, Pretoria, South Africa December 6, 1999, https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Urgent_Action/apic_121499.html.

¹⁸⁰ U.S. Department of State (Washington), “Holbrooke Says Africa Will Be UN Priority in January,” December 7, 1999; “Conflict in Africa and the Search for Peace in Congo”: Remarks by U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Richard C. Holbrooke, Pretoria, South Africa December 6, 1999, https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Urgent_Action/apic_121499.html.

stabilizing the DRC and the region to protect U.S. stakes in the economic development of the region.

Instability and insecurity were a result of the large number of refugees and internally displaced persons, the risk of recurrence of genocide and a further increase in the already very high fatality count, and the conflict's potential to exacerbate ongoing conflicts in the region.¹⁸¹

U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, presiding over the Security Council in January 2000, observed about the DRC, "because of that nation's location and size, and because of the number of countries involved, the conflict there could be described as Africa's first world war."¹⁸²

Holbrooke said about the ongoing conflicts in Central Africa, "these wars, if they are left unchecked, leave the rest of the world with a monumental bill for refugee relief, reconstruction, and resettlement. That money ought to go to economic development."¹⁸³ Did the conflict threaten U.S. economic interests in the region? The United States is generally considered a closed economy. In 1999, according to U.S. Census data, exports accounted for just 10.6% of total GDP with imports adding another 15.6%. Export shares were dominated by trade relations with Canada and Mexico, while China was the United States' largest import partner. In 1999, the U.S. Census estimated that U.S. trade with Africa accounted for only 2.3% of total exports or a mere 0.2% of U.S. GDP. Trade with Africa was dominated by crude oil exports, which were worth about 90% of total trade with Africa. In terms of scope, U.S. trade with Africa at the time was about one-tenth of African exports to the United States.¹⁸⁴ The Democratic Republic of Congo

¹⁸¹ Banz interview.

¹⁸² UN Document S/PV.4092 (2000, 4).

¹⁸³ BBC News, "Grim prospects for Congo peace," December 11, 1999, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/560708.stm>.

¹⁸⁴ World Bank, Trade data, <http://data.worldbank.org/topic/trade>.

was ranked 147th in 1999 for goods imports to the United States.¹⁸⁵ In other words, trade between the U.S. and the DRC was negligible, and the U.S. had limited economic interests in the region. Though economic interests were often cited in relation to the DRC conflict (see, for example, Holbrooke below), U.S. economic stakes in conflict resolution in the DRC were minimal. There is a potential for future trade given the DRC's vast potential of natural resources and mineral wealth (the UNEP estimates the natural resource reserves to be around USD 24trn.¹⁸⁶), but given the longstanding conflict in the region it would take a long time to realize that potential and it did not figure significantly in the United States' calculations of its economic interests in the DRC during the Second Congo War. In sum, U.S. economic interests were limited and did not extend significantly beyond general altruistic interests in the economic development of the region.

In his testimony to the House International Relations Subcommittee on Africa, Holbrooke comprehensively laid out U.S. interests in supporting the peace process in the DR Congo:

“The U.S. has an interest in upholding regional stability and in preventing the resurgence of genocide and mass killing in Central Africa. (...) More than a half dozen regional states have been involved in the fighting. Congo is a contagion of crisis: if the conflict there is allowed to fester, efforts to resolve conflicts and promote stability throughout the region—in Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and Sudan—will be even more difficult. Additionally, the political and military vacuum in the Congo has drawn in rogue states such as Libya, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and Sudan. These states are seeking a foothold in a destabilized central Africa for weapons sales, political allies, terrorist bases, and access to strategic minerals (including uranium and diamonds). The fighting further threatens to spark a major humanitarian crisis, with a severe long-term impact on economic growth,

¹⁸⁵ U.S. Census Bureau, “FT900: U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services, December 2009,” February 10, 2010, <https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/Press-Release/2009pr/12/index.html>.

¹⁸⁶ UNEP, “UNEP Study Confirms DR Congo's Potential as Environmental Powerhouse but Warns of Critical Threats,” Oct 10, 2011, <http://www.unep.org/newscentre/Default.aspx?DocumentID=2656&ArticleID=8890>.

investment, and trade for the region. The current conflict is the most violent in Africa, with enormous costs to U.S. political and economic interests.”¹⁸⁷

U.S. security interests were at stake in resolving the Congolese conflict and the U.S. strongly encouraged UN leadership in managing the crisis. Holbrooke concluded his testimony: “I want to assure you that we are aware of the risks of this operation. Any effort toward peace in Congo will not be easy. However, (...) the risks of inaction are far, far greater. We cannot promise you immediate peace in the Congo. What I can say is that without strong UN leadership in addressing this situation at this moment, there is a high probability—in fact a near certainty—of a catastrophic political and humanitarian disaster in central Africa. Inaction risks the resurgence of genocide and the danger that this proxy war will devolve into a direct war between the many states already involved.”¹⁸⁸ U.S. security interests at stake in the DRC were significant and the basis for U.S. support for a UN guarantee.

The UN responded to the outbreak of fighting by issuing, in August and December 1998, two presidential statements, which called for an end to hostilities and expressed support for the regional mediation efforts by the OAU and SADC. Council members welcomed initiatives taken by the Secretary-General, including his efforts to broker an, albeit unsuccessful, ceasefire at the France-Africa Summit in Paris in November 1998, and encouraged the conflict parties to attend the upcoming summit in Lusaka and meeting of the central organ of the OAU.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁷ U.S. Department of State (Washington), Richard C. Holbrooke, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Testimony to the House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, Washington, DC, February 15, 2000, http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/2000/000215_holbrooke_congo.html.

¹⁸⁸ U.S. Department of State (Washington), Richard C. Holbrooke, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Testimony to the House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, Washington, DC, February 15, 2000, http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/2000/000215_holbrooke_congo.html.

¹⁸⁹ UN Document S/PRST/1998/26 (1998); UN Document S/PRST/1998/36 (1998).

UN and U.S. senior officials were participating in the negotiations under the Lusaka peace process and in OAU-led peace talks. The U.S. had sent Thomas Pickering, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, and appointed Howard Wolpe as Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region. In April 1999, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan named Moustapha Niasse Special Envoy for the peace process in the DRC. Niasse was to ascertain the conflict parties' positions and identify requirements for a ceasefire as well as identify possible ways of UN involvement in support of regional peace efforts.¹⁹⁰ The UNSC and U.S. joined African leaders in exerting diplomatic pressure to encourage the signing of the Lusaka Accord; the U.S. tied its development aid to states involved in the conflict to reaching a peace agreement.¹⁹¹

5.3 The Request for UN Guarantees

In December 1998, in order to encourage the conflict parties to reach a negotiated settlement, the Security Council first announced the possibility of a UN guarantee to support the implementation of a peace agreement: “The Security Council is prepared to consider, in the light of efforts towards peaceful resolution of the conflict, the active involvement of the United Nations, in coordination with OAU, including through concrete, sustainable and effective measures, to assist in the implementation of an effective ceasefire agreement and in an agreed process for a political

¹⁹⁰ UNSC, Security Council Demands Immediate Halt to Hostilities in Democratic Republic of Congo, April 9, 1999, <http://www.un.org/press/en/1999/19990409.sc6665.html>; IRIN, “IRIN Background report on peace efforts,” June 22, 1999, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/7439/drc-irin-background-report-peace-efforts>.

¹⁹¹ Carayannis and Weiss (2003, 276).

settlement of the conflict.”¹⁹² In its April 1999 Resolution, the Security Council “reaffirms its readiness to consider the active involvement of the United Nations (...).”¹⁹³

Advocating a return to a more prominent role by the UN in peacekeeping, Secretary-General Kofi Annan argued that a peace operation in the DRC should involve the UN:

“It is (...) unfortunate that in recent years the Security Council has been reluctant to authorise new United Nations peacekeeping operations, and has often left regional or sub-regional organizations to struggle with local conflicts on their own. That puts an unfair burden on the organizations in question. It is also a waste of the expertise in peacekeeping which the United Nations has developed over the years. (...)

“[L]et us not nurture any illusions that regional or sub-regional bodies will be able to handle these problems on their own, without help from the United Nations. You only have to list the countries which might make up a “regional force” in the Democratic Republic of Congo, for instance, to realize that many of them are already involved in the hostilities on one side or the other. Indeed, the experience of decades has shown that peacekeeping is often best done by people from outside the region, who are more easily accepted as truly detached and impartial. So I think we must be prepared for a conclusion which many African leaders have already reached: that if a peacekeeping force is required in the Congo, the United Nations would probably have to be involved.”¹⁹⁴

As the analysis on the SADC and OAU concluded in chapter 4, the conflict in the DRC involved too many regional states as to make an African guarantee effective. In the Lusaka Accord, the conflict parties directed to the UN their request for a peace operation to provide transparency, operational support, and enforcement guarantees to the conflict parties implementing the agreement: “The United Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and in collaboration with the OAU, shall be requested to constitute, facilitate and

¹⁹² UN Document S/PRST/1998/36 (1998).

¹⁹³ UN Document S/RES/1234 (1999, 3).

¹⁹⁴ UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, “The Future of United Nations Peacekeeping,” Address at Georgetown University, February 23, 1999; in: Congressional Record Vol. 145-Part 2: Proceedings and Debates of the 106th Congress First Session, February 24, 1999, http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc30915/m2/1/high_res_d/CRECB-1999-pt2.pdf.

deploy an appropriate peacekeeping force in the DRC to ensure implementation of this agreement” (Art. 11.a).¹⁹⁵ The force was to be given a mandate to “observe and monitor the cessation of hostilities; (...) schedule and supervise the withdrawal of all foreign forces; (...) collect weapons from civilians; (...) tracking down and disarming Armed Groups” (Appendix, Ch. 8).¹⁹⁶

On behalf of the conflict parties, Zambia’s president and leader of the Lusaka peace process, Chiluba, reiterated their request for a peacekeeping force and emphasized that the support guarantee for the DDR program requested in the Lusaka Accord will require a Chapter VII mandate—it would have to be coupled with an enforcement guarantee:

“While we acknowledge the need for Africa to take responsibility for its own problems, we also recognize that the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security lies with the United Nations Security Council. It is with this in mind that I wish to appeal to this body to send a peacekeeping force to the Democratic Republic of the Congo with an appropriate mandate and size to tackle the complex and unique problems in that country. The ceasefire agreement prescribes tasks to be tackled by the United Nations peacekeeping force that include disarmament of Congolese non-statutory forces, as well as foreign militias who will require relocation, reorientation and reintegration into their respective societies. It is, therefore, clear that the tasks of the peacekeeping operation go beyond Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter.”¹⁹⁷

Apart from the conflict parties, other regional states and organizations sought out UN support for the implementation of the Lusaka Accord.¹⁹⁸ The SADC in particular lobbied with the Security Council for a UN peacekeeping force.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁵ Lusaka Accord, http://www.un.org/Docs/s815_25.pdf.

¹⁹⁶ Lusaka Accord, http://www.un.org/Docs/s815_25.pdf.

¹⁹⁷ UN Document S/PV.4047 (1999, 4).

¹⁹⁸ Carayannis and Weiss (2003, 293).

¹⁹⁹ Carayannis and Weiss (2003, 293).

5.4 Guarantor Capacity Affects Guarantee Level

Following the signing of the Lusaka Accord Secretary-General Kofi Annan reiterated that the UN should support the peace process in the DRC. “The international community and the United Nations should (...) do everything in their power to assist the Congolese Government, parties and people, as well as the other Governments involved, in achieving a peaceful solution.”²⁰⁰ In his first report on the UN preliminary deployment in the DRC he emphasized that ensuring sufficient capacity was key given the high level of the conflict parties’ security concerns and commitment problems that derived from geographical and conflict related factors.

“In order to be effective, any United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, whatever its mandate, will have to be large and expensive. It would require the deployment of thousands of international troops and civilian personnel. It will face tremendous difficulties, and will be beset by risks. Deployment will be slow. The huge size of the country, the degradation of its infrastructure, the intensity of its climate, the intractable nature of some aspects of the conflict, the number of parties, the high levels of mutual suspicion, the large population displacements, the ready availability of small arms, the general climate of impunity and the substitution of armed force for the rule of law in much of the territory combine to make the Democratic Republic of the Congo a highly complex environment for peacekeeping.”²⁰¹

Sufficient guarantor capacity involves deploying a guarantee or preparatory contingents swiftly. Aware that maintaining the momentum of the peace process required quick reassurance of the conflict parties by the UN, the Secretary-General recommended the immediate deployment of up to 90 UN military liaison officers to regional capitals and military headquarters of the conflict parties to collaborate with the JMC and to prepare for the deployment, in the next phase, of an observer mission to provide a transparency guarantee. “As a second stage, on the

²⁰⁰ UN Document S/1999/790 (1999, 4).

²⁰¹ UN Document S/1999/790 (1999, 4).

basis of the report of the technical survey team and of the liaison group, I would then be prepared to recommend a further deployment, which could involve up to 500 military observers within the Democratic Republic of the Congo and as required to the belligerent and other neighbouring States. It would also be necessary to ensure their security, and I would formulate my recommendations accordingly.”²⁰² In addition, Annan foresaw “the need for the establishment of a well funded, well planned and long-term programme for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration into society of former combatants.”²⁰³

The Secretary-General and Security Council members continued to emphasize the importance of sufficient capacity to deploy an operation that effectively provides a guarantee. Kofi Annan argued that

“We must be prepared to insist that no such [peacekeeping force in the Congo] can be deployed unless it is given sufficient strength and firepower to carry out its assignment, and assured of the full backing of the Security Council when it has to use that power. (...) We must [be prepared to act] with sufficient resources— including credible military strength when a deterrent is necessary—to ensure the mission’s success and the peacekeepers’ safety. (...) And once the Council has authorised an operation, everyone—but especially those Council members who voted for it—must pay their share of the cost, promptly and in full.”²⁰⁴

During his Africa tour in December 1999, UN Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, too, emphasized the importance of deploying an effective operation: “Preparing for a peace-keeping mission in the Congo, getting it right, is our main focus for the remainder of the trip. (...) It is critical that, when required, UN peacekeeping is effective—we cannot afford to repeat the failed

²⁰² UN Document S/1999/790 (1999, 4).

²⁰³ UN Document S/1999/790 (1999, 6).

²⁰⁴ UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, “The Future of United Nations Peacekeeping,” Address at Georgetown University, February 23, 1999; in: Congressional Record Vol. 145-Part 2: Proceedings and Debates of the 106th Congress First Session, February 24, 1999, http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc30915/m2/1/high_res_d/CRECB-1999-pt2.pdf.

peacekeeping efforts from earlier this decade, the catastrophes that almost took the United Nations down that I mentioned earlier. The UN's sad performance in Bosnia and Somalia, and its—let me be frank—our inaction in Rwanda.”²⁰⁵

In the Security Council, Holbrooke continued to emphasize the importance of deploying an effective operation and of obtaining sufficient information to ensure adequate planning. The U.S. was acutely aware that in order to be successful the size, mandate, and structure of an authorized operation must match guarantor capacity.

“We want a peacekeeping operation, and we want to get it right. We cannot afford an operation which is not right, and there are many things to sort out here. The Under-Secretary-General a moment ago said he could not yet give us precision on the composition and structure of the peacekeeping force. We really need to know that, and with all due respect, I believe it is imperative that we have a more intense planning effort involving the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the nations on the Security Council and other potential major troop contributors, and other countries that will be asked to contribute money. This is very complicated—much, much more complicated than Timor or even Kosovo, and once we start down this path, (...) the command and control situation on the ground, the mandate, the size, the costs, the backup all need to be known. We should not vote a resolution until we know what we are voting for. (...) Such an approach (...) will better enable us to gain international support for this process, domestic support in our own countries, and, in my particular case, support from the Congress of the United States.”²⁰⁶

The U.S. was not going to pre-authorize an observer mission without having information regarding its mandate, size, and costs. Only a detailed proposal of the planned operation had a prospect of receiving funding from Congress. U.S. financial capacity for supporting a guarantee in the Security Council was limited by its dependence on congressional approval for funds,

²⁰⁵ U.S. Department of State (Washington), “Holbrooke Says Africa Will Be UN Priority in January,” December 7, 1999. “Conflict in Africa and the Search for Peace in Congo”: Remarks by U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Richard C. Holbrooke, Pretoria, South Africa December 6, 1999, https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Urgent_Action/apic_121499.html.

²⁰⁶ UN Document S/PV.4083 (1999, 5).

especially given its substantial financial contributions to large preexisting UN operations.

Holbrooke stated in the House International Relations Subcommittee on Africa:

“The new missions in Kosovo and East Timor and the expanded mission in Sierra Leone have not only doubled the number of United Nations peacekeepers in the field, but also have added a new level of complexity to our peacekeeping efforts. Congo is important, but success in these missions is just as critical. We will not allow our concern for Congo to come at the expense of our commitment to fulfilling these other missions. To sustain all of these UN peacekeeping efforts, we will need the support of other UN member states, the parties to the various conflicts, and most importantly, members of Congress. Without the means to finance our assessed contributions to peacekeeping activities, the UN will be unable to fulfill the mandates of these missions.”²⁰⁷

In the Security Council Holbrooke reiterated the United States’ limited financial capacity for giving a guarantee: “It is Congress that pays the bills, and (...) we will need to have their approval for American contributions to any peacekeeping efforts. We have achieved that in Kosovo and East Timor with difficulty, and in Sierra Leone and the Central African Republic.”²⁰⁸ The U.S.’s financial constraints were a result of preexisting commitments to peacekeeping operations elsewhere and of limited domestic support for a U.S. involvement in peacekeeping following its earlier experiences, especially in Somalia.

The failures in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda emphasized the need to deploy the ‘right’ mission—one that takes into account conflict characteristics and geographical and geopolitical features. Both the Secretary General and Ambassador Holbrooke were aware that a successful guarantee in the DRC would require significant capacity. At the same time the experiences of the early 1990s had made the U.S. and other Western governments cautious about future

²⁰⁷ U.S. Department of State (Washington), Richard C. Holbrooke, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Testimony to the House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, Washington, DC, February 15, 2000, http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/2000/000215_holbrooke_congo.html.

²⁰⁸ UN Document S/PV.4083 (1999, 4).

involvement in peacekeeping. Annan asserted at a meeting of the Security Council, “the United Nations is here to help. But the United Nations has also had bitter experiences of help gone wrong. This has made Member States profoundly uneasy, and has raised the threshold of persuasion for new involvements, even when suffering claims our attention and when solidarity demands that we act.”²⁰⁹ Especially after its experience in Somalia, the U.S. faced domestic opposition to a large operation with an enforcement mandate that would be commensurate with the conflict parties’ request for a guarantee for the DRC. According to the guarantor capacity hypothesis, the U.S.’s lack of financial capacity for contributing to the fulfillment of such a high-level guarantee made no guarantee or a lower-level (transparency) guarantee by the UNSC more likely.

Former Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno recalls that in the view of the Security Council there was no capacity to provide the enforcement guarantee that had been requested by the conflict parties. “There were certainly misgivings that translated into the resolution, the “tracking down”, there was clearly no capacity to do that. (...) There is a question of whether you can track down all these elements that were in Eastern Congo, whether that’s the solution. Whether a purely military solution is the solution is one question; [and] whether for the military part of the solution you have the capacities. [As] for the UN Security Council, they were not convinced that a purely military solution would do the trick and they were certainly convinced that there would not be the capacity to do it, hence the watering down of the wording and the idea that this mission initially in Congo would essentially be there to monitor the gradual withdrawal of armies along the ceasefire line.”²¹⁰ Perceptions in the Security Council of its members’ and contributing countries’ limited capacity to fulfill the

²⁰⁹ UN Document S/PV.4092 (2000, 6).

²¹⁰ Guéhenno interview.

enforcement guarantee requested in the Lusaka Accord made it unlikely that it would give such a high-level guarantee in the first place.

In fact, the U.S. declared in a SC meeting that it would be able to support a UN operation in the DRC only as long as it was limited in size and its mandate was restricted to observation and monitoring, not peace enforcement or maintaining DRC border security.²¹¹ Before the House International Relations Subcommittee on Africa Holbrooke confirmed that “[w]e have stated repeatedly (...) that the UN would not take on enforcement responsibilities, including any potential forcible disarmament of non-state actors.”²¹² Its limited capacity implied that the U.S. would only be able to support a UN transparency guarantee, but not a higher-level guarantee.

Following Secretary-General Annan’s proposal of a concept of operations for the 500-member military observer mission,²¹³ Secretary of State Albright restated in the Security Council the need to consult with Congress before authorizing deployment and the importance of applying the lessons of past UN missions “firmly and realistically.”²¹⁴ Capacity for U.S. action in the Security Council was further limited at the time by criticism and pressure from the U.S. Congress for UN reform.²¹⁵ Receiving congressional approval for a U.S. contribution to the observer mission proposed by the Secretary-General required that the operation would not be too expensive and would not turn into another failure. Authorizing a proportionately small observer mission with significant protection and a limited mandate was the U.S. strategy for keeping costs

²¹¹ UN Document S/PV.3987 (1999, 14).

²¹² U.S. Department of State (Washington), Richard C. Holbrooke, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Testimony to the House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, Washington, DC, February 15, 2000, http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/2000/000215_holbrooke_congo.html.

²¹³ UN Document S/2000/30 (2000, 9).

²¹⁴ UN Document S/PV.4092 (2000, 5).

²¹⁵ See, for example, Chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Jesse Helms’ Address before the UN Security Council, January 20, 2000, <http://www.jessehelmscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Senator-Helms-Security-Council-Speech.pdf>.

down and managing potential risks.

The proposed 500-member monitoring mission was incongruent both with the requested peacekeeping mandate outlined in the Lusaka Accord and with the Secretary-General's observations of country and conflict characteristics, especially "the huge size of the country, the degradation of its infrastructure, (...) the intractable nature of some aspects of the conflict, the number of parties, the high levels of mutual suspicion," and the corresponding need to send a "large and expensive" mission "in order to be effective."²¹⁶

Experts and officials considered the proposed operation to be inadequate.²¹⁷ In its report on the conflict in the DRC, the International Crisis Group cites a UN study that estimated that pursuing the mandate proposed in the Lusaka Accord would require a Chapter VII operation of 100,000 troops.²¹⁸ It recommended further that if the Security Council does not authorize a Chapter VII force it should deploy a Chapter VI operation mandated to monitor agreement implementation and provide protection to the civilian population—with size and mandate beyond what was proposed in the Security Council.²¹⁹ OAU Secretary-General Salim stated that he was "concerned over the current modest proposal for the deployment in the DRC, a vast country with complex and multi-faceted problems and myriad of actors, including non-state actors."²²⁰

Over the following years the UN would have to continue to increase the size and mandate of its presence in response to deteriorating conditions, preventing it from proactively shaping the

²¹⁶ UN Document S/1999/790 (1999, 4).

²¹⁷ Banz interview. See also The New York Times, "Armies Ravage a Rich Land, Creating Africa's 'First World War'," February 6, 2000, <https://partners.nytimes.com/library/world/africa/020600africa-congo.html>; BBC News, "UN approves Congo force," February 24, 2000, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/655778.stm>.

²¹⁸ International Crisis Group (1999b, 27).

²¹⁹ International Crisis Group (1999b, 30).

²²⁰ Agence France-Presse, "OAU chief wants thorough preparations for peacekeeping missions," May 10, 2001, <http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/oau-chief-wants-thorough-preparations-peacekeeping-missions>.

resolution of the conflict.²²¹ As Guéhenno describes it, “the nature of the mission incrementally changed through crises. (...) I don’t think it is a good strategy. It is one thing that you learn from all these operations. The window of opportunity to shape things is in the early days, it is much better to act decisively early and then be able to lighten the mission than to play catch up with a deteriorating situation. I think in Congo, if one was to intervene in Congo it would have been better to go in a much more decisive manner early on than what was done.”²²²

However, limited capacity caused the Council’s hesitant approach. As Guéhenno explains further, “at the same time I can see the argument why it was not doable and why maybe it might not have been advisable. It was not doable because Congo is such a big country that if you had tried to convince the Security Council to have an ambitious mandate at the beginning I think they would just run away. It was probably not realistic. And it might not have been advisable, because talking about tracking down those people, FDLR, Interahamwe, et cetera (...), certainly today it is still a problem, but it is a different problem, and it is a much more digestible problem today than it was five years after the genocide.”²²³ There was no capacity to field effective DDR support operations or enforcement missions in the DRC and as a result support or enforcement guarantees were not given. The decision supports the capacity hypothesis: lack of capacity for a higher-level guarantee made a lower-level guarantee—a transparency guarantee—more likely, despite an awareness that the successful resolution of the conflict required a higher-level guarantee.

Though lack of capacity precluded a higher-level guarantee, it did not prevent the Security Council from authorizing an observer mission despite expectations that it would not be

²²¹ Banz interview.

²²² Guéhenno interview.

²²³ Guéhenno interview.

able to fulfill its mandate of providing an effective transparency guarantee. This decision stands in contrast to the capacity hypothesis. Guéhenno remarks that, “the deployment of the mission (...) was done on [the] logic [that this mission initially in Congo would essentially be there to monitor the gradual withdrawal of armies along the ceasefire line], with bases spread throughout Congo so that with the radius of helicopters they would be able to monitor the ceasefire line and eventually accompany the disengagement. That was the idea. What was a charade was to think that it was about observing a ceasefire as you would observe a ceasefire (...) in Cyprus. The analysis of the situation was essentially flawed. Now, was it flawed by design, or ... ? I think partly by design, because I don’t think people are foolish enough not to see that it did not make sense.”²²⁴

What explains the decision to give a transparency guarantee despite the lack of capacity to put an effective observer mission on the ground? One possibility would be that the Security Council authorized a guarantee even though it was unable to back it up with an operation to fulfill it effectively because it was concerned that not giving a guarantee at all would reduce its capacity to act in the future and incur significant reputational costs. Holbrooke asserted in the Security Council that “[a]lthough we cannot expect the United Nations to impose peace in Congo (a country as large as Western Europe or the United States east of the Mississippi River), it is imperative that the UN do what it can to support the peace process the Africans themselves created. Failure to act may irreparably damage both the capability and credibility of United Nations peacekeeping.”²²⁵ UN Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs Zerihoun emphasized the Security Council’s awareness of its obligation to fulfill its mandate. “The

²²⁴ Guéhenno interview.

²²⁵ U.S. Department of State (Washington), Richard C. Holbrooke, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Testimony to the House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, Washington, DC, February 15, 2000, http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/2000/000215_holbrooke_congo.html.

Security Council and the UN are the last call; there is nobody else. There is this sense of responsibility in the Council; they would do all that is possible to respond.”²²⁶

Not giving a guarantee in support of Lusaka would have raised serious doubts regarding the UN’s identity as guardian of international peace and security. In addition, member states’ willingness to contribute to future operations would have been affected. Secretary-General Annan points out that “if our capacity continues to be under-utilized there is an obvious risk that Member States will not longer give us the resources we need to sustain it. (...) In Africa especially, I find that local powers, and indeed regional organizations, are turning more and more to the United Nations for help. We must not dismantle the capacity that can provide that help.”²²⁷ These expected consequences for the UN’s reputation and future capacity to act made it a priority to ensure that the Security Council authorized an operation, even if it was likely going to be unsuccessful at providing the given guarantee. Putting something on the ground, even though it might not be effective and possibly cause more harm than good in the long run, was still perceived to be better than doing nothing at all.²²⁸

The evidence discussed in this section supports the hypothesis that limited capacity is likely to preclude higher-level guarantees. However, the analysis also shows that a transparency guarantee may be given even though there is insufficient capacity to deploy the observer mission to provide it effectively. Concerns that a failure to act might affect its future capacity for peacekeeping were driving the decision to promise a guarantee without having the capacity to allow it to fulfill its mandate. Hence, the capacity hypothesis can only be confirmed with some

²²⁶ Zerihoun interview.

²²⁷ UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, “The Future of United Nations Peacekeeping,” Address at Georgetown University, February 23, 1999; in: Congressional Record Vol. 145-Part 2: Proceedings and Debates of the 106th Congress First Session, February 24, 1999, p. 3025, http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc30915/m2/1/high_res_d/CRECB-1999-pt2.pdf.

²²⁸ Zerihoun interview. Banz interview.

qualification. As expected, guarantors with limited capacity are unlikely to give high-level guarantees. However, guarantor interests, the conflict parties' commitment problems, and pressure to act in order to secure future capacity to contribute to conflict resolution may still result in a low-level guarantee even though the guarantor does not have the capacity to provide it successfully.

The case shows that the UN had incentives to provide a guarantee that would effectively assist the conflict parties in the implementation of the agreement, but limited capacity of a key member state restricted its ability to give a high-level guarantee proportionate to the requirements and conditions on the ground. The statements by the Secretary-General included in this section suggest that following its failures in the early 1990s the UN had been repeatedly limited by the capacity of its member states to provide appropriate guarantees. Thus the guarantee process in the DRC is likely an example of a more general pattern of UN guarantee decision-making.

5.5 The Political Foundation for a Guarantee

Following the negative experiences of the UN-mandated operations that were deployed to Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda without taking the realities of the conflict or the conditions on the ground fully into account, the Security Council was cautious to consider carefully the interests of the conflict parties and the extent of their preferences for implementing a political solution to their conflict. In his February 1999 address on the future of UN peacekeeping, Secretary-General Annan urged, "of course we must be careful to avoid the mistakes of the past. We must never

again send a UN force, just for the sake of it, to keep a non-existent peace, or one to which the parties themselves show no sense of commitment.”²²⁹

Conflict parties’ lack of support for the peace process, not out of insecurity but because of incentives to continue the conflict, endangers an ongoing peace operation and limits a guarantor’s ability to give a guarantee in the future. As Zerihoun stresses, “[i]f the parties don’t [prefer to settle their conflict peacefully] and if they’re going to continue hostilities, then our deployment would be suicidal, because it would be right in the middle of these groups, and troop contributing countries are very protective, understandably, and sometimes these troop contributing countries are outside of the region and on the human level, families, parents just don’t see why (...) they would send their sons and daughters halfway around the world to die in a war that they don’t understand. Security is a red line.”²³⁰

The Security Council considered a peace agreement to be the basis for UN peacekeeping involvement. In March 1999, the United States asserted in the Security Council that “[it] would consider supporting a peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo if there were a comprehensive agreement among the belligerents to end the conflict and to observe a ceasefire.”²³¹ Claudia Banz, a Senior Political Affairs Officer in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at the UN (and formerly with the UN Observer Mission in the DRC), explained that the Lusaka Accord was “a very strong agreement” that made a UN guarantee more likely.²³² The continued emphasis on the importance of the Lusaka Accord as a blueprint for the peaceful

²²⁹ UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, “The Future of United Nations Peacekeeping,” Address at Georgetown University, February 23, 1999; in: Congressional Record Vol. 145-Part 2: Proceedings and Debates of the 106th Congress First Session, February 24, 1999, p. 3025, http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc30915/m2/1/high_res_d/CRECB-1999-pt2.pdf.

²³⁰ Zerihoun interview.

²³¹ UN Document S/PV.3987 (1999, 14).

²³² Banz interview.

settlement of the conflict and as foundation for a UN guarantee suggests that potential guarantors consider peace agreements as an expression of the conflict parties' preferences and confirms the hypothesis that more comprehensive peace agreements make a guarantee more likely.

In August 1999, the Security Council authorized the deployment of 90 military liaison officers “to the capitals of the States signatories to the Ceasefire Agreement and the provisional headquarters of the JMC, and, as security conditions permit, to the rear military headquarters of the main belligerents in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”²³³ The liaison officers were given the mandate “to establish contacts and maintain liaison with the JMC and all parties to the Agreement; (...) to provide information to the Secretary-General regarding the situation on the ground, and to assist in refining a concept of operations for a possible further role of the United Nations in the Implementation of the Agreement once it is signed by all parties; and to secure from the parties guarantees of cooperation and assurances of security for the possible deployment in-country of military observers.”²³⁴ Through this mandate the Security Council signaled that it was prepared to give a transparency guarantee provided that all conflict parties sign the agreement (the RCD would sign the Lusaka Accord on August 31) and that the conflict parties give “guarantees of cooperation and assurances of security” for the deployment of military observers.²³⁵ These preconditions to a potential transparency guarantee suggest that the Security Council was not going to give a guarantee unless the conflict parties signaled their preferences for agreement implementation over continued conflict, lending support to the argument that guarantors consider the conflict parties' preferences before giving a guarantee.

²³³ UN Document, S/RES/1258 (1999, 2).

²³⁴ UN Document, S/RES/1258 (1999, 3).

²³⁵ UN Document, S/RES/1258 (1999, 3).

In October 1999, the conflict parties were still waiting for a UN guarantee to help them implement the agreement, and “the Political Committee expressed concern about ‘the slow pace at which the United Nations was handling the request for the deployment of peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (...) and called upon the United Nations ‘to address the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the urgency and seriousness it deserves.’”²³⁶ However, the Secretary-General noted that the deployment of additional personnel was contingent on detailed information provided by the liaison officers that had yet to be dispatched to the conflict parties’ military headquarters inside the conflict zone. Deployment of liaison officers “to the rear military headquarters of the main belligerents in the Democratic Republic of the Congo” and the dispatch of the technical survey team to gauge security conditions for such deployment was contingent on the receipt, from all conflict parties, of written guarantees of safeguarding the personal security of UN personnel deployed in the DRC.²³⁷ France urged the conflict parties, “in order to allow for the rapid deployment of these liaison officers, France calls on all parties that signed the Lusaka ceasefire accord—particularly the government—to quickly provide the security guarantees demanded by the UN Secretary-General.”²³⁸ Although all other parties had provided such guarantees, the DRC government had yet to submit an acceptable security guarantee.²³⁹ Until the DRC signaled its willingness to

²³⁶ UN Document S/1999/1116 (1999, 2). Also BBC News, “Congo peace at risk – warning,” October 30, 1999, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/493876.stm>.

²³⁷ UN Document S/1999/1116 (1999, 4); UN Document S/RES/1258 (1999, 2–3).

²³⁸ Agence France-Presse, “France seeks security guarantees for UN observers in DR Congo,” November 8, 1999, <http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/france-seeks-security-guarantees-un-observers-dr-congo>.

²³⁹ UN Document S/1999/1116 (1999, 4). See also Agence France-Presse, “DR Congo belligerents pledge to keep UN personnel safe,” October 12, 1999, <http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/dr-congo-belligerents-pledge-keep-un-personnel-safe>.

cooperate and assure the safety of UN contingents the Security Council would be unable to authorize a guarantee.

On the other hand, the Secretary-General urged that in order to be effective a guarantee ought to be authorized as soon as possible despite remaining concerns. “We must be prepared to act while things are still unclear and uncertain, but in time to make a difference.”²⁴⁰ It was Annan’s hope that a commitment by the DRC to safeguard the security and ensure the freedom of movement of UN personnel was imminent, in turn allowing for swift assessment by the survey team of the perimeters for deploying military observers to provide a transparency guarantee:

“In view of the urgency of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in order to lend momentum to the peace process, I think it advisable to proceed further to the extent possible. (...) The United Nations must continue to support the peace process to the full extent of its capacities. The suffering in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has persisted for far too long for us to miss the chance offered by the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. (...) I therefore recommend to the Security Council the extension of the mandate of the United Nations personnel currently in the Democratic Republic of the Congo until 15 January 2000. (...) I also request from the Security Council prior authorization for the setting up of a United Nations Observer Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and the deployment of up to 500 military observers with the necessary logistical and personnel support (...).”²⁴¹

In two resolutions following the report in the same month, the Security Council did extend the mandate of the UN military liaison officers, first until January 15 and subsequently until March 1, 2000, and decided that the liaison personnel together with its associated multidisciplinary staff would constitute the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). However, in neither of these resolutions did it authorize the deployment of military observers to provide a transparency guarantee.

²⁴⁰ UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, “The Future of United Nations Peacekeeping,” Address at Georgetown University, February 23, 1999; in: Congressional Record Vol. 145-Part 2: Proceedings and Debates of the 106th Congress First Session, February 24, 1999, p. 3025, http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc30915/m2/1/high_res_d/CRECB-1999-pt2.pdf.

²⁴¹ UN Document S/1999/1116 (1999, 7–9).

Instead the Security Council asked the Secretary-General merely to begin preparations for a possible future observer mission and emphasized the importance of the conflict parties' support for the peace process as a precondition for authorizing a guarantee by

“expressing its concern at the alleged violations of the Ceasefire Agreement and urging all parties to refrain from any declarations or action that could jeopardize the peace process; stressing the responsibilities of the signatories for the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement, and calling on them to permit and facilitate the full deployment of United Nations military liaison officers and other personnel necessary for the fulfillment of their mandate throughout the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo; reiterating the importance of the successful completion of the mission of the technical assessment team dispatched to the Democratic Republic of the Congo to assess conditions and to prepare for possible subsequent United Nations deployment in the country as well as to obtain firm guarantees from the parties to the conflict over the safety, security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel; recalling the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel adopted on 9 December 1994 (...).”²⁴²

Underlining the importance of completing security assessments before authorizing an observer mission and referring to the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel signals the Security Council's paramount concern regarding the safety and security of UN operations on the ground. It supports the argument that expected costs resulting from human and material losses enter into a potential guarantor's considerations; in the case of the DRC, the absence of security guarantees for UN personnel likely delayed the authorization of a transparency guarantee.

In addition to continued ceasefire violations that began soon after the agreement had been signed and a lack of assurance of the safety and security as well as the freedom of movement of UN personnel, by November 1999, the conflict parties still had not chosen a facilitator for the intra-Congolese political dialogue as stipulated by the Lusaka Accord.²⁴³ Given these problems,

²⁴² UN Document S/RES/1279, (1999, 1–2).

²⁴³ UN Document S/1999/1116 (1999, 3).

Security Council members emphasized concerns regarding the conflict parties' genuine preference to resolve their conflict peacefully in justifying the delay of a guarantee.

In December 1999, Holbrooke traveled to the DRC to ascertain that the conflict parties were still committed to a peaceful resolution of their conflict based on the Lusaka Accord. He spelled out the requirements for UN peacekeeping support: "When regional actors cooperate, when they observe a cease-fire, when they ensure total access and security for international observers or peacekeepers, when they choose a political facilitator to move the process forward, then the UN and the international community can make a real difference. We will be prepared to help central Africa to become stable and democratic (...)." ²⁴⁴

The U.S. proposed a phased approach to UN deployment in the DRC that emphasized the cooperation of the conflict parties as a necessary precondition for continued third-party support. The conflict parties would have to comply with key provisions of the agreement and signal their preference for a political settlement in order to receive continued U.S. support of a UN guarantee in the DRC. The plan implied a gradual progression from a preparatory stage to sending an observer mission to potentially providing additional support in the future for the implementation for the agreement. Ambassador Holbrooke laid out the plan for the members of the House International Relations Subcommittee on Africa:

²⁴⁴ "Conflict in Africa and the Search for Peace in Congo": Remarks by U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Richard C. Holbrooke, Pretoria, South Africa December 6, 1999, https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Urgent_Action/apic_121499.html. See also BBC News, "US issues stark DR Congo warning," December 6, 1999, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/552826.stm>; The New York Times, "As Congo's Peace Effort Falts, Holbrooke Issues a Warning," December 10, 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/10/world/as-congo-s-peace-effort-falters-holbrooke-issues-a-warning.html?rref=collection%252Ftimestopic%252FHolbrooke%252C%20Richard%20C.&action=click&contentCollection=timestopics®ion=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=8&pgtype=collection; BBC News, "Grim prospects for Congo peace," December 11, 1999, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/560708.stm>.

“[T]he phased approach to peacekeeping in the DROC (...) reflects what the U.S. Government, including the Department of Defense, has advocated as the best approach. After months of resisting unrealistic peacekeeping proposals for the Congo, we have succeeded in getting the UN to adopt this three-phase approach concept designed in part by U.S. military planners. This approach ties UN deployments to concrete progress on the ground toward the Lusaka Agreement’s political and military objectives.

“(...) The first phase focused on establishing liaison with the parties, their field commanders and the Joint Military Commission (JMC), and on planning for the deployment of subsequent peacekeeping operations. (...)

“Upon authorization by the Council, the Phase II deployment of the UN Observer Mission in the Congo (MONUC) would begin when key conditions are met, including security, access, and cooperation with UN personnel. (...) The observers would monitor the implementation of the cease-fire on the ground, assist with the disengagement of troops at certain locations, and assist the JMC with developing the mechanisms to implement further provisions of the Lusaka Agreement.

“Upon the successful completion of Phase II, the UN may recommend a Phase III operation to build on the progress of the National Dialogue and to support full and complete implementation of Lusaka. (...) [T]ransition to Phase III is not automatic, but would depend on developments during Phase II, including significant progress in the national dialogue.”²⁴⁵

Over the last months of 1999, the security situation deteriorated further and the United States emphasized that unless the conflict parties signaled their preference for the implementation of the Lusaka Accord the Security Council would delay the authorization of a guarantee. “The issue therefore is not whether we are going to support peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, (...) it is when and how.”²⁴⁶ In the December 1999 Security Council meeting, “[t]he point [was] also strongly made that the parties must show their determination to meet their commitments before it would be right or sensible for the United

²⁴⁵ U.S. Department of State (Washington), Richard C. Holbrooke, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Testimony to the House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, Washington, DC, February 15, 2000, http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/2000/000215_holbrooke_congo.html.

²⁴⁶ UN Document S/PV.4083 (1999, 20).

Nations to deploy more widely. These commitments include, first, the ending of ceasefire violations and agreeing on workable withdrawal arrangements, most particularly through an effective Joint Military Commission (JMC); secondly, full consent by all the parties to a United Nations presence including assurances of security and cooperation; thirdly, the commencement of meaningful national dialogue in the Democratic Republic of the Congo under an agreed facilitator; and fourthly, progress on tackling the external security issues, including realistic proposals for the disarmament, demobilization and peaceful reintegration of armed groups.”²⁴⁷

The Security Council expected the conflict parties to signal their support for the peace process by fulfilling these requirements as a precondition for a guarantee. The above requirements are either preconditions to a UN deployment or grow out of provisions in the Lusaka Accord. Importantly, fulfillment of these requirements did not imply greater security risks for the conflict parties. In the perception of SC members, the continued lack of compliance with these low-security risk conditions signaled the conflict parties’ preferences for continued conflict and lack of support for the peace process, which in turn delayed the Security Council’s authorization of a guarantee.

In January 2000, the Secretary-General reported that, while the parties had chosen a facilitator for the inter-Congolese political negotiations, the military and security situation continued to worsen.²⁴⁸ “With heavy fighting (...) and indications that the armed groups identified in the Lusaka Agreement have received new arms and training, and given the difficulties encountered by MONUC in its efforts to deploy across the country, there appears to be a need for the renewed commitment of the parties to the Agreement they signed in Lusaka.”²⁴⁹

The report concluded that “[t]he signatories bear a crucial responsibility for ensuring the

²⁴⁷ UN Document S/PV.4083 (1999, 23).

²⁴⁸ UN Document S/2000/30 (2000, 3).

²⁴⁹ UN Document S/2000/30 (2000, 10).

implementation of the Agreement. It is on the basis of their renewed and strengthened commitment to the Agreement they have signed that the international community will be ready to lend its full support and allocate the significant resources that will be required. In this context, no new military offensives should be launched, the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel should be guaranteed, and the spreading of hostile propaganda, especially incitements to attack unarmed civilians, should cease.”²⁵⁰

Annan reiterated in the Security Council the need for the conflict parties to demonstrate their preference for agreement implementation if the UN was to support the peace process with a guarantee. “The deployment of United Nations military liaison officers has been obstructed, undermining confidence in the implementation process. The belligerents must do better. The Lusaka Agreement remains the most viable blueprint for resolving grievances and for achieving a comprehensive negotiated solution. But if peace is to take hold, and if international engagement is to be sustained, the warring parties face a paramount challenge: they need to demonstrate the political will to apply the agreement fully, without further delay. All else flows from that essential requirement. (...) And we must never lose sight of our central dependence on the compliance of the parties involved. Whether we are speaking of the political process, of military deployments or of protection for humanitarian and other United Nations personnel, the parties themselves bear primary responsibility for adhering to commitments and creating the conditions conducive to progress.”²⁵¹

U.S. Secretary of State Albright emphasized the Security Council’s challenge to maintain momentum in the peace process given the conflict parties’ lack of support for it. “The parties must detail in a credible fashion their plans for meeting the commitments they have made. (...)

²⁵⁰ UN Document S/2000/30 (2000, 15).

²⁵¹ UN Document S/PV.4092 (2000, 5–6).

[P]rovided our efforts this week result in renewed impetus towards implementation of the peace Agreement, we will consult with our Congress and work to achieve a swift Council consensus on authorizing deployment of a phase-two United Nations peace mission. To succeed, any such mission must be based on commitments from the Lusaka signatories on the key issues of access, security and cooperation. As the Secretary-General will attest, we have learned much over the past decade about the “dos” and “don’ts” of United Nations missions. We must apply those lessons firmly and realistically in this case. But we must also be resolute in our determination to help the Democratic Republic of the Congo move from war to peace.”²⁵²

Other Permanent Members urged the Security Council to avoid letting past experiences prevent required action, emphasizing that the conflict parties can only genuinely commit to implementing the agreement when they receive guarantees for transparency and operational support for an effective DDR plan through deployment of a full scale robust peacekeeping operation. Britain’s Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Peter Hain pressed that “[w]e must move forward on the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the militia groups. Without a credible DDR plan, Lusaka will fail. (...) We should also reaffirm now our readiness to support, as soon as conditions allow, a full United Nations peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is time to bury the ghosts of the past and to ensure an effective United Nations peacekeeping operation. (...) [T]he cost of action is high, but the cost of inaction is higher still.”²⁵³

In a similar vein, France’s Minister Delegate for Cooperation and Francophonie Josselin warned that “[t]he absence at this point of an international system to monitor implementation of the Agreement—due to a lack of resources for the Joint Military Commission and to the delay in

²⁵² UN Document S/PV.4092 (2000, 4–5).

²⁵³ UN Document S/PV.4092 (Resumption 1), (2000, 13–14).

deploying United Nations personnel—regrettably encourages further ceasefire violations that threaten at any moment to reignite the conflict. (...) I would stress that the failure to respect the timetable attests to the distrust among the parties and compromises its implementation. But how are we to overcome this obstacle if we ourselves remain hesitant? (...) [W]e ardently desire [subsequent United Nations involvement on a larger scale], which will help complete and consolidate the peace process once conditions permit.”²⁵⁴ Notwithstanding other permanent members’ willingness to give guarantees despite the conflict parties’ failure to meet basic preconditions for a guarantee, the U.S.’s veto power resulted in a resolution based on the lowest common denominator.

At the January 24 Security Council session, the heads of state of the African countries involved in the conflict in the DRC made statements that were perceived by the U.S. as an expression of renewed support for the implementation of the Lusaka Accord. In one of these statements, the president of the DRC, Kabila, gave his consent for the presence of UN observers. On February 7, 2000, the U.S. State Department notified Congress that the U.S. intended to vote to authorize the deployment of an observer mission to the DRC. In his testimony before the House International Relations Subcommittee on Africa, Holbrooke assured its members that the conflict parties were committed to the implementation of the Lusaka Accord. “[T]he parties to Lusaka reiterated their commitment to the peace process and to providing full security and access for all UN personnel. (...) Significantly, all parties, including President Kabila, called for the immediate deployment of the Phase II military observer mission.”²⁵⁵ In the perception of the U.S., the conflict parties had demonstrated renewed support for the peace process by choosing a

²⁵⁴ UN Document S/PV.4092 (Resumption 1), (2000, 15).

²⁵⁵ U.S. Department of State (Washington), Richard C. Holbrooke, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Testimony to the House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, Washington, DC, February 15, 2000, http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/2000/000215_holbrooke_congo.html.

facilitator for the national dialogue and by giving guarantees for the freedom of movement and security for the UN observer mission.

As the U.S. had asserted in the Security Council, the conflict parties' demonstrated preference for agreement implementation would determine not *if*, but *when* the UN would authorize a guarantee. On February 24, the Security Council adopted resolution 1291, authorizing the deployment of the MONUC observer mission with the principal mandate to "monitor the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and investigate violations of the ceasefire." However, the conflict parties' statements in the SC had not been tied to any costly commitments, their decision to chose a new facilitator and their security guarantees for UN personnel were merely verbal statements; the parties might still renege on their commitments.

Yet the Security Council retained its leverage over the conflict parties since a guarantee had so far only been promised but not yet provided. The resolution emphasized that deployment should be conditional on the conflict parties' respect of the ceasefire, the development of a valid plan for the disengagement of forces, and "firm and credible assurances, prior to the deployment of MONUC forces, for the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and related personnel."²⁵⁶ The Security Council remained in a position to be able to demand continued support for the peace process from the conflict parties as a precondition for the actual deployment of an observer mission to provide the transparency guarantee. In that regard, the conflict party preferences hypothesis might be as or potentially even more pertinent in explaining the fulfillment of a guarantee. This aspect of the guarantee process lies outside of the scope of this dissertation, but some preliminary effects of two of the theorized determinants—guarantor capacity and conflict party preferences—on the actual fulfillment of the guarantee are briefly discussed in the next section.

²⁵⁶ UN Document S/RES/1291 (2000).

5.6 Guarantee Fulfillment

Insufficient capacity to provide personnel and equipment to fulfill the guarantee and a lack of support for the peace process by the conflict parties did not only affect the authorization of the guarantee, it also delayed the deployment of the operation to provide it. In June 2000, Annan reports,

“Department inspections have found serious logistical deficiencies in the units scheduled to be dispatched to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. One country, which had undertaken to provide four airfield crash rescue units, subsequently withdrew the offer and proposed only one unit instead. Another, which was supposed to provide an infantry battalion, has none of the 20 armoured personnel carriers required, and lacks significant amounts of other *matériel*, including generators, engineering equipment and radio-equipped jeeps. Some of the required equipment might be supplied by another donor country, but the timing and other details remain unclear. A third potential troop-contributing country, which had committed itself to providing a battalion, has informed the Department that it has no engineering equipment.”²⁵⁷

The Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, which Kofi Annan had established following the failures of UN peacekeeping operations in Rwanda and Bosnia, highlighted (in the Brahimi Report) the logistical and administrative challenges to ensuring sufficient capacity for the deployment of authorized operations. “The current practice is for the Secretary-General to be given a Security Council resolution specifying troop levels on paper, not knowing whether he will be given the troops and other personnel that the mission needs to function effectively, or whether they will be properly equipped. The Panel is of the view that, once realistic mission requirements have been set and agreed to, the Council should leave its authorizing resolution in draft form until the Secretary-General confirms that he has received troop and other

²⁵⁷ UN Document S/2000/566 (2000, 4–5).

commitments from Member States sufficient to meet those requirements.”²⁵⁸ The Panel emphasized the need to ensure guarantor capacity before authorizing a guarantee.

In addition to insufficient guarantor capacity to deploy the operation adequately staffed and equipped, the conflict parties continued to raise doubts regarding their genuine desire for the progression of the peace process. After authorization of phase II of MONUC, fighting on several fronts intensified, ethnic clashes caused heavy casualties, and the DRC government chose not to participate in the preparatory meeting for the inter-Congolese dialogue, refused the deployment of MONUC personnel to government-controlled territory, and requested a replacement for the appointed facilitator.²⁵⁹ Annan informed the Security Council of

“the adverse climate which has so far prevented the deployment of MONUC in accordance with the Council’s resolutions. The situation is characterized by persistent large-scale fighting in many parts of the country, severe restrictions imposed by the Government and other parties on the Mission’s freedom of movement, the refusal of the Government to permit the deployment of United Nations armed troops in accordance with the decisions of the Council and my Special Representative and, not least, by a sustained campaign of vilification conducted against MONUC and individual members of its staff, which has created significant risks to their security. The Lusaka peace process is therefore currently undergoing an extremely challenging phase, which requires substantial reevaluation not only on the part of its signatories, but also of the United Nations. In particular, the role MONUC can play under current circumstances remains unclear.”²⁶⁰

In response to resumed high level fighting in Kisangani despite a recent ceasefire, Richard Holbrooke stated in the Security Council that “it is more difficult now to get peacekeeping forces than it was a few weeks ago precisely because of the events in Kisangani. It is more dangerous. It is more problematical. Governments and their populations have more

²⁵⁸ UN Document A/55/305-S/2000/809 (Brahimi Report) (2000, x).

²⁵⁹ UN Document S/2000/566 (2000, 2–4); UN Document S/2000/888 (2000, 2).

²⁶⁰ UN Document S/2000/799 (2000).

reservations. And it will be harder to fund those efforts because of what happened in Kisangani.”²⁶¹ Regarding the effect of the obstruction by the government of the DRC of the inter-Congolese political negotiations Holbrooke asserted that “we do not believe that the renunciation of the facilitator appointed by the OAU and attacks on the national dialogue can be regarded as anything other than an attack on the Lusaka peace process.”²⁶² The response to the military and political developments following SC resolution 1291 shows that both authorization of a UN guarantee and deployment of the operation to provide it are affected by guarantor perceptions of the level of the conflict parties’ support for the peace process.

Potential guarantors are aware of their leverage over the conflict parties during the guarantee decision stage. That leverage decreases as soon as an operation in fulfillment of a guarantee is deployed, but until then it allows guarantors to shape the conflict parties’ preferences and establish a political foundation for an effective guarantee in support of the peace process. El-Ghassim Wane, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, emphasizes that conflict party support for the peace process

“has to be generated, through persuasion, pressure, incentives. (...) There are also ways through which you can isolate the troublemakers. But it requires a lot of sophistication in political analysis, the leadership of the peace mission, and to a large extent the unified support from the Security Council and from other key stakeholders. (...) In a classical UN operation you don’t deploy before an agreement is signed (...).”²⁶³

Wane explains that the UN is able to shape the conflict parties’ preferences throughout the guarantee decision phase. However, once the operation to fulfill a guarantee is deployed on the ground, Wane cautions that

²⁶¹ UN Document S/PV.4156 (2000, 7–8).

²⁶² UN Document S/PV.4156 (2000, 8).

²⁶³ Wane interview.

“then you have to be careful so as to not be somehow captured by the (conflict) state and to be used as a tool to change the balance of forces, (...) helping Kabila to tip the balance of forces against his adversaries. (...) It’s a very delicate process. And you will not have a template. (...) You have to remain very agile, very innovative, very creative, very attentive to the political developments on the ground to see how to position yourself, to push for what one could call sustainable peace, at least a situation in which troublemakers are no longer in a position to reverse gains and to get the country slide into violence.”²⁶⁴

A guarantor’s leverage over the conflict parties decreases as its involvement in conflict resolution efforts continues,²⁶⁵ and Guéhenno confirms the importance of establishing a political foundation for the peace process before deploying a guarantee:

“Every mission finds itself a bit hostage at some point, that’s why (...) you need to do as much as you can in terms of political change in the early days, because once you are there you are a kind of insurance policy for whoever is in power, (...) because, for instance, if today you were to pull the plug in Congo it would probably be bad, (...) it’s a risky course, and so you hesitate to pull the plug, and at the same time you remove the pressure of Kabila to really do a number of changes that he should do. (...) So the window that allows you to affect some real changes closes (...). The problem is that you have leverage so long as the parties to the conflict are in the position of *demandeur*, and once they don’t feel that *demandeur* anymore your leverage evaporates.”²⁶⁶

Yet despite guarantors’ leverage and the evidence in support of the conflict party preference hypothesis, sometimes guarantors give and fulfill guarantees even though the conflict parties might not support the peace process. As Guéhenno explains:

“A conflict gets an operation when there is a combination of sufficient political pressure on the members of the Council to act, when there is no country that is opposed, when the host country is not really opposed to it or does not have the means to oppose it, and when there is enough support around for that mission to recruit troops. All these variables are in

²⁶⁴ Wane interview.

²⁶⁵ Banz interview.

²⁶⁶ Guéhenno interview.

different shades of grey. You have a situation like Syria, there is a lot of pressure to deploy a mission (...), but certainly the host country wouldn't agree to it, there is no agreement in the Security Council, and there would not be troops available. Look at missions that have been deployed, for example, Mali; the country is desperate to have something, no fundamental disagreement in the Security Council and troops available. Now what is missing in the picture is that 'is there really a political foundation?' But the political foundation is not a determining factor, it is a determining factor of the success of the operation, but it is not a determining factor of its deployment."²⁶⁷

Guéhenno suggests that guarantor interest, consensus, and capacity, and the conflict parties' request for support determine a guarantee, but that in some cases conflict parties might not have subscribed to a political framework to resolve their conflict before a guarantee is given and perhaps even implemented. He stresses the need to consider the extent of the conflict parties' support for a political solution before deploying an operation to fulfill a guarantee. "The problem is more that the Security Council, which should always think, 'is there a political foundation for the mission?' often thinks of the mission first and the political foundation after, which is not a good way to proceed. When you prepare the report that is going to be the basis for the resolution of the Security Council authorizing the peace operation it is essential to have in place some kind of strategy (...). The Security Council doesn't think enough of the political conditions that make a mission possible."²⁶⁸ He adds, "including in the DRC, putting [an operation] on the ground sometimes can lower the level of violence, it mitigates the impact of violence, and it can create a space that can be used politically that is not always used. (...) It makes much more sense to really put more efforts in the politics and then think of possible troop deployment to shore up and provide some kind of reassurance to whatever shaky agreement is being shepherded. It's a much

²⁶⁷ Guéhenno interview.

²⁶⁸ Guéhenno interview.

more sensible thing to do. But that's the ideal world of peacekeeping, rather than its reality, which is much messier."²⁶⁹

Given guarantors' demonstrated concerns with the conflict parties' preferences before giving a guarantee—that a comprehensive peace agreement forms the basis of the peace process and that the conflict parties prefer to implement such an agreement instead of continuing hostilities—that guarantors sometimes give and fulfill guarantees in the absence of clear conflict party preferences in favor of the peace process is likely the result of the comparatively greater effect of guarantor interest in the resolution of the conflict. The formal model proposed that guarantors might give a guarantee even without the capacity to fulfill it if their stakes in the resolution of the conflict are high enough. Similarly guarantors might expect that their interests in conflict resolution outweigh potential negative effects of deploying a guarantee without a political foundation for the peace process.

5.7 Conclusion

In its efforts to support the implementation of the Lusaka Accord, the U.S. was aware of the importance of sending the 'right' mission—of giving operational support and enforcement guarantees that successfully alleviate the conflict parties' commitment problems—and of the need to back such guarantees with sufficient capacity for an effective operation to carry it out. However, as the capacity argument suggests, facing constraints in its capacity to fund a higher-level guarantee prevented the U.S. from proposing in the Security Council a combined support and enforcement guarantee that would have been commensurate with conflict characteristics and

²⁶⁹ Guéhenno interview.

realities on the ground. Once involved with an observer mission, the U.S. may be able to back a higher-level guarantee at a later date, but its initial involvement would have to reflect caution, and any increase in mandate or size would have to be contingent on developments on the ground.²⁷⁰ As the hypothesis predicts, limited capacity made a lower-level guarantee more likely.

The operation the U.S. was able to approve to provide the transparency guarantee—500 observers backed by a protection force of 5,000 troops—was of insufficient size to fulfill effectively its mandate of monitoring the ceasefire. Pressure to respond, potential reputational costs of not giving a guarantee, and the related risk of reduced capacity to act in the future led the Security Council to authorize a transparency guarantee despite not having sufficient capacity to back it up with an operation large enough to provide it. Moreover, during procurement and deployment it became apparent that pledged resources were inadequate or would not be disbursed in full. UN member states did not have sufficient capacity to staff and equip an operation that already on paper was too small to carry its mandate effectively.

In this respect the U.S. proposal and the UNSC resolution qualify the capacity hypothesis. But they also confirm one of the key results produced by the formal model: third parties without capacity to back up a specific guarantee may still give that guarantee despite its ineffectiveness in ameliorating the conflict parties' security concerns and fostering agreement implementation, if the stakes in conflict resolution, short-term gains in the peace process, and reputational costs of inaction are perceived by the guarantor to outweigh the negative effects that an incomplete guarantee might have on the peace process (see proposition 1.2 in appendix A). For the UNSC and the U.S., substantial interest in the stability and security of the Great Lakes

²⁷⁰ The U.S. did support Security Council Resolution 1925 (2010) in 2010 authorizing MONUSCO, an enforcement mission mandated to carry out protection of civilians and stabilization and peace consolidation; its troop levels were authorized to include a maximum of 19,815 military personnel, 760 military observers, 391 police personnel and 1,050 personnel of formed police units. See UN Document S/RES/1925 (2010).

region, reputational pressure to support conflict resolution in the DRC, and the need to maintain momentum of the Lusaka peace process resulted in a transparency guarantee that was still given despite insufficient capacity to fulfill it.

While capacity determined the level of guarantee to a certain extent, guarantor perceptions of the conflict parties' support for implementing the agreement determined its timing. Confirming the hypothesis on the effect of peace agreements, the U.S. made its support for a UN guarantee conditional on the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement. The Lusaka Accord addressed a wide range of the conflict parties' incompatibilities and suggested a detailed path toward conflict settlement, incorporating the ethnic, military, economic, and political dimensions of the conflict.

Importantly, the agreement was negotiated by the parties and facilitated by Africans in a regional peace process. It represented an 'African solution to an African problem'²⁷¹ that had the conflict parties' political support and conveyed their preference to resolve their conflict peacefully, in turn an important precondition for the Security Council's commitment to support it. According to Zerihoun, "the best, most enduring agreement is one negotiated by the parties, not one that is imposed by the international community."²⁷² Holbrooke stated that "there is a ready and excellent path to peace that has been laid out for Congo. It has been signed by all the parties, after a negotiation superbly led by President Chiluba of Zambia. It is called the Lusaka

²⁷¹ Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity stated in the Security Council: "The unprecedented presence of so many African heads of State at this special meeting is clear testimony to the seriousness with which they and the rest of Africa view the crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It also reflects their determination to continue to assume their responsibility for seeking a lasting solution to this African problem" (UN Document S/PV.4092 (2000, 24).

²⁷² Zerihoun interview.

Agreement. The United States supports the Lusaka Agreement fully.”²⁷³

The Security Council and the U.S. in particular emphasized that a UN guarantee was conditional on the conflict parties’ demonstrated preference for the peace process over continued hostilities. Respecting the ceasefire, choosing a facilitator for the political dialogue, providing guarantees for the security and freedom of movement of UN personnel, and encouraging the JMC to pursue its mandate were preconditions for the authorization of MONUC and for its subsequent deployment. Meeting these requirements did not imply an increased security risk that would have prevented the conflict parties from fulfilling them. As a result their repeated failure to comply with these preconditions signaled their limited support for agreement implementation and continued to delay Security Council authorization of a guarantee.

The multiparty character of the conflict increased the conflict parties’ commitment problems and also rendered it more difficult for the U.S. and Security Council members to discern the conflict parties’ preferences regarding the outcome of the conflict. Conflict parties that receive outside military support may also be obliged to pursue their backers’ interests. The rebel groups’ objectives in particular were closely intertwined with the goals of Rwanda and Uganda, their supporters, and thus not always evident to the U.S. or the SC.

The Security Council’s delay in responding to the comprehensive peace agreement and to the conflict parties’ request for high-level guarantees to help implement it negatively affected the peace process. OAU Secretary-General Salim observed that the “perception that the Security Council has been hesitant in mandating the deployment of a force that can go into the Democratic Republic of the Congo and make a difference has, unfortunately, served to

²⁷³ U.S. Department of State (Washington), “Holbrooke Says Africa Will Be UN Priority in January,” December 7, 1999. “Conflict in Africa and the Search for Peace in Congo”: Remarks by U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Richard C. Holbrooke, Pretoria, South Africa December 6, 1999, https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Urgent_Action/apic_121499.html.

undermine the speedy implementation of the Lusaka Agreement. It has also served to strengthen the conviction regarding the unfortunate imbalance that exists in dealing with African crises.”²⁷⁴

When a guarantee was not given six months after the signing of the agreement, the momentum generated by it was lost. Without a timely guarantee, the conflict parties were unable to implement the military provisions of the agreement given their security concerns. As the theoretical argument suggests, the conflict parties began to perceive a limited commitment by the international community to supporting the resolution of the conflict. The Security Council’s continued stipulation of preconditions for a guarantee that ultimately would not correspond to the realities of the conflict created a perception among the conflict parties of being held to different standards for abiding by the ceasefire than the parties to conflicts elsewhere, and a sense that the Security Council was hesitant to authorize an extensive and robust mission as it had recently done in Kosovo. These perceptions likely contributed to the resumption of fighting in some regions, at times with heightened intensity.

Security Council members were aware of the negative effects on the peace process of delaying an effective guarantee to support agreement implementation (see Britain’s and France’s statements in the Security Council quoted above). Yet the U.S. in particular continued to insist that the conflict parties demonstrate full support for the agreement implementation process and ensure the safety of UN personnel before authorizing and subsequently deploying the mission. Limited capacity and the need to ensure that the conflict parties preferred a peaceful resolution of the conflict resulted in a guarantee that was given late and with a size and mandate that did not correspond to the realities of the conflict.

The U.S.’s emphasis on the conflict parties’ support for the peace process was likely driven by the same factors that restricted its capacity to contribute funding to a high-level

²⁷⁴ UN Document S/PV.4092 (2000, 26).

guarantee: insufficient domestic support for a guarantee affected both the commitment the U.S. was able to make in the Security Council and its concerns with preventing another failure on the ground.

As the theoretical argument proposed, the ineffectiveness of the guarantee, which did not meet the needs on the ground and was given months after the agreement was signed, in turn affected the extent of the conflict parties' support for the peace process and consequently the prospects for peace. As a result, instead of limiting its involvement in the DRC, more than ten years after authorizing the observer mission, the Security Council eventually authorized an intervention combat brigade mandated to carry out military operations "with the responsibility of neutralizing armed groups (...) and the objective of contributing to reducing the threat posed by armed groups to state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC and to make space for stabilization activities."²⁷⁵

Security Council members were aware of the negative effects that not providing sufficient guarantees would have on the success of agreement implementation in the DRC. These concerns however were outweighed by the perceived consequences of not giving a guarantee at all to the signatories to the Lusaka Accord. Capacity did affect the guarantee, but only to a certain extent. Limited capacity resulted in a U.S. proposal for a transparency guarantee only, despite the need for higher-level involvement. Insufficient capacity to deploy an appropriately sized observer mission to provide an effective transparency guarantee, however, did not prevent the Security Council from authorizing it.

By tracing the developments of the Second Congo War and the debates about supporting its resolution, this chapter has gained important insights into the guarantee decision-making

²⁷⁵ UN Document S/RES/2098 (2013, 6). For a discussion of the subsequent international peacebuilding efforts in the DRC see for example Autesserre (2010).

process in the Security Council. It has contextualized abstract factors of the theoretical argument on the determinants of third-party guarantees, specifically guarantor capacity and perceptions of the conflict parties' preferences, and provided a more nuanced account of their relative effects. Together with the quantitative results the insights from this chapter provide a more comprehensive picture of how interests, capabilities, and perceptions determine third-party guarantees to support conflict resolution. The next chapter summarizes the main findings, discusses limitations, and suggests further areas for research.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

In this dissertation I have developed a formal model to derive theoretical hypotheses regarding the determinants of third-party guarantees and used statistical analysis of a new dataset, case study research on the Second Congo War, and in-depth interviews with UN officials to evaluate the theory. Combining the results from the empirical analysis I have developed an account of the guarantee decision-making process and identified key factors that determine whether and what type of guarantee third parties are likely to give.

The analysis has shown that guarantor and conflict characteristics affect a third party's guarantee decision. A potential guarantor's interest and capacity as well as its perception of the conflict parties' commitment problems and support for the peace process affect the likelihood of a guarantee and specific guarantee types. Specifically, third parties' interests in the resolution of a conflict and the conflict parties' difficulties to overcome their insecurity in order to advance the peace process are the basis for a guarantee. These two broad factors, guarantor interest and conflict party commitment problems, are likely necessary but insufficient factors for a third-party guarantee.

With respect to guarantor interest, potential guarantors are more likely to give a guarantee to support the peaceful resolution of conflicts that pose a risk to their economic and security-based interests. The greater the economic and security related interests are that a potential guarantor perceives to be threatened by a conflict, the more likely it is to give a higher-level guarantee, that is, an operational support or enforcement guarantee.

In addition, guarantors tend to give guarantees to support the peace process in conflicts that are difficult to resolve as a result of the conflict parties' inability to overcome their insecurity and to credibly commit to the implementation of a peace agreement. Guarantors are more likely to give higher-level guarantees to help resolve conflicts characterized by ethnic violence, high fatalities, and the involvement of multiple conflict parties.

Whether third parties give a guarantee is further affected by the extent of their capacity to provide it on the ground as well as their perception of whether the conflict parties prefer to settle their conflict peacefully or have incentives to return to fighting. With respect to guarantor capacity, limited capabilities to deploy an appropriate operation on the ground in order to provide the guarantee makes it more likely that guarantors give a transparency guarantee or no guarantee. The case study has shown that a potential guarantor's military and financial capacity to provide a guarantee can be affected by the level of consensus among its stakeholders (for example, by the inability of the SADC's or OAU's member states to agree on a unified approach toward the conflict in the DRC) and by the extent of domestic support for a potential guarantee (for example, the need for approval by the U.S. Congress of funding for a UN guarantee). In addition to military and financial capacity to fulfill a guarantee, guarantor specific structural capabilities make some guarantee types more likely than others.

The analysis of the U.S. and UN Security Council guarantee decision process for the Second Congo War produced insights that support the guarantor capacity hypothesis with some qualification. Its limited financial capacity prevented the U.S. from being able to support a higher-level guarantee for the DRC in the Security Council, which eventually gave a transparency guarantee in support of the peace process in the DRC. This finding supports the hypothesis that limited guarantor capacity increases the likelihood of a transparency guarantee or

no guarantee. However, the U.S. as one of the P5 and the UNSC as a whole did not have the financial or military capacity to deploy an operation that would be able to effectively provide a transparency guarantee on the ground that could fulfill its mandate of monitoring the ceasefire. The U.S. was only able to propose and vote for a monitoring mission of 500 observers (backed by a protection force of 5,000 troops), which was insufficient to fulfill such mandate given the characteristics of the conflict and the conflict state. Furthermore, when the operation was supposed to be deployed, the pledged resources were insufficient to staff and equip an already inadequate operation. The U.S. proposal and UN authorization of this guarantee, despite the lack of capacity to fulfill it, questions the guarantor capacity hypothesis, but also confirms a key proposition from the formal model: potential guarantors without the capacity to provide a guarantee on the ground may still promise that guarantee if they expect the short term gains from a guarantee promise to outweigh the negative consequences for the peace process of providing an incomplete guarantee. The Security Council was under pressure to act to maintain the momentum of the peace process, to avoid reputational costs for inaction, and to prevent an even more limited capacity to act in the future.

As the DRC case analysis suggests, a potential guarantor's perception of whether the conflict parties prefer a negotiated settlement to continued conflict significantly shapes the level and timing of a guarantee. Third-party guarantees are more likely if the conflict parties signal their support for the peace process by negotiating and signing a comprehensive peace agreement. While a peace agreement forms the basis of the peace process, if conflict parties do not prefer a political solution to continued fighting, it is more costly and risky for a potential guarantor to provide effective guarantees, making them less likely. In the case study, guarantor perceptions

that conflict parties did not fully support the peace process likely resulted in a lower-level guarantee and its delayed authorization.

In terms of specific guarantee types, the analysis has produced insights into the conditions under which we might expect a third party to give a certain type of guarantee. Transparency guarantees are more likely to be given by the UN and individual states in order to support the peace process in conflicts characterized by high conflict intensity (high annual fatalities) and conflict parties that have begun negotiations to resolve their incompatibilities. Operational support guarantees are more likely to be given by the UN with the aim of resolving ethnic conflicts with high total fatalities, where the conflict parties have begun negotiations or reached a comprehensive peace agreement. Enforcement guarantees are more likely to be given by regional IGOs and states to help resolve conflicts over government, where conflict parties have signed a peace agreement and where neighboring states experience ongoing violence or conflict. Guarantees by more than one third party are more likely in conflicts that are more difficult to resolve because of high total fatalities.

The empirical analysis has highlighted the differences between third parties' approach to conflicts that are difficult to settle due to the insecurity that they cause and their approach to conflicts that are difficult to resolve due to incentives for the conflict parties to continue fighting. While guarantors are likely to give higher-level guarantees to support the peace process in the former, lack of the conflict parties' support for a political solution causes guarantors to delay or scale back on potential involvement given concerns over the security and effectiveness of a guarantee. The evidence suggests that third parties are likely to distinguish between the different types of hard-to-resolve cases and do not give guarantees indiscriminately.

The theoretical argument has focused on two main sources of determinants that affect whether guarantees are given by third parties: conflict driven and guarantor driven factors. The analysis has shown that important variation exists both across conflicts and across guarantors that is reflected in different outcomes with respect to third-party guarantees. The effects of conflict-driven guarantee determinants are conditional on the guarantor. Guéhenno discusses how different levels of interest among third parties shape their assessment of conflict-related risks and result in guarantees that are largely guarantor-driven: “When [Mandela] was dealing with Burundi, he was pushing hard for a mission to be deployed (...), and my instructions discussed with Kofi Annan were very clear, that I had to tell him that this would just not fly, because there was no real peace agreement, because the UN would not take that risk.” However, depending on the guarantor, interests can outweigh concerns regarding the conflict parties’ support for a peaceful settlement. As Guéhenno adds, “the OAU was much more prepared to take risks in a messy way. (...) [In Burundi] you have seen a number of situations, where the Africans take risks for a variety of good and bad reasons, because there are also various interests at play.” Guéhenno cites another example: “In Somalia, at some point there was a lot of pressure to deploy a UN mission, and I was completely opposed to it because the Security Council did not want any negotiations with Al-Shabab, did not want them to be part of a political settlement. I didn’t think this was a wise strategy; just putting the UN peacekeeping mission [on the ground] (...) was a bad idea. It would not go well.”²⁷⁶ For the African Union, however, when it deployed AMISOM in Somalia, its interest in restoring stability outweighed concerns regarding the lack of a political basis for an operation.

These cases highlight a key finding of the analysis. Guarantee determinants are closely interconnected and contingent on conflict characteristics and guarantor identity. Guarantor

²⁷⁶ Guéhenno interview.

interest has both a direct and an indirect effect on the likelihood that a guarantee is given, since interest also shapes a guarantor's capacity to fulfill a guarantee. Similarly, the conflict parties' preferences affect a third party's guarantee decision directly, as well as indirectly by influencing its capacity to provide a guarantee on the ground.

In conclusion, a third party's guarantee decision is likely driven by short-term interests, but it also reflects considerations of the long-term effects of a guarantee on the peace process. A potential guarantor's expectations regarding its capacity to provide a guarantee on the ground and its perceptions of the conflict parties' preferences for a political solution to the conflict shape when and what types of guarantees are given. However, promised guarantees may not always be backed up with sufficient capacity or correspond to the needs of the conflict parties on the ground if guarantors expect short term gains from a guarantee promise to outweigh long-term costs of giving guarantees without the capacity to provide them effectively. The causes and effects on the peace process of incomplete and insufficient guarantees are the subject of the next stage of research on the role of third-party guarantees in conflict resolution.

The findings of this dissertation are necessarily limited by the assumptions that underlie the theoretical framework and the research design of the empirical analysis. The definition of third-party guarantee determines the scope of the analysis. Employing a broader or narrower definition might produce additional insights into factors that bring about specific types of guarantees. For example, examining operational support guarantees, which guarantee a process without promising a result, separately from transparency and enforcement guarantees, which guarantee specific outcomes, might result in a more detailed understanding of the decision-making process that underlies these different guarantee types.

In terms of the quantitative results, an expansion of the dataset to include later years would add valuable information to the analysis based on more recent third-party conflict resolution efforts, including the transparency guarantee that was authorized by the UNSC on January 25, 2016, only days after the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (FARC-EP) had jointly requested a UN guarantee, to monitor a ceasefire agreement that both parties were negotiating.²⁷⁷ Identifying additional explanatory variables, especially to capture guarantor capacity and conflict party preferences, would contribute to a more complete understanding of the relative impact of different capabilities (financial, military, and structural) and the role of spoilers in the guarantee process. The formal model provides for different levels of strength of spoilers and the preferences hypothesis argues that the greater a spoiler's incentives are to return to conflict, the less likely a higher-level third-party guarantee should be. Weak spoilers likely do not pose a risk to the peace process if it is supported by a guarantee; a higher-level guarantee should thus be more likely. The statistical analysis would be strengthened if it employed measures that capture varying strengths of spoilers and that reflect more accurately the opportunity costs to supporting the peace process by including illegal activities beyond the exploitation of lootable resources.

The case study has highlighted key factors contributing to third parties' guarantee decision. Additional case studies, honing in on both particular conflicts and specific potential guarantors would provide an opportunity to explore in greater depth the relationships and causal mechanisms that underlie a potential guarantor's decision to give a guarantee. What accounts for the differences in the responses of potential guarantors to the conflicts in the DRC and Uganda? No guarantees were given to support the implementation of the cessation of hostilities agreement between Uganda and the LRA in 2006, even though the agreement contained provisions that

²⁷⁷ UN Document S/2016/53 (2016), UN Document S/RES/2261 (2016).

would have required monitoring and verification. How did the UN's perception of the LRA as a "regional issue" affect its approach to supporting the peace process?²⁷⁸ What accounted for the involvement of six different guarantors to support the peace process in the Central African Republic? How can we explain the guarantee by Norway to support the peace process between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE in 2002, and how does its involvement in peace missions compare to that of Switzerland and other Scandinavian countries?

This dissertation has provided a basis for examining these questions and for extending the research to subsequent stages of the guarantee process. The findings of what determines third-party guarantees enable the analysis to turn to the guarantee provision stage in order to examine the determinants of complete and incomplete guarantee fulfillment and to study the effects of guarantees on peace process outcomes, including successful agreement implementation and duration of peace.

Guarantors have an opportunity to significantly shape the peace that they intend to support with a guarantee. Between the start of negotiations and the deployment of a guarantee there is but a small window to foster genuine peace. The time during which a guarantee decision is made is crucial for paving the way for the successful implementation of a negotiated settlement. This dissertation has taken a first step toward improving our understanding of the guarantee process to allow us to identify the opportunities for maintaining momentum of the peace process, for assuring the parties of outside support for peaceful conflict resolution, and for establishing a political foundation for effective guarantees that support the path to lasting peace.

²⁷⁸ Zerihoun interview.

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APPENDIX A

Determinants of Third-Party Guarantees:

A Signaling Model

A.1 Game Structure and Timing

The model aims to explore whether potential guarantors take into account the longer-term effects that a guarantee has on the agreement implementation process. It examines the specific factors that potential guarantors are likely to consider in evaluating the long-term consequences of giving a guarantee. These factors include a potential guarantor's capacity to fulfill a guarantee after giving it, the conflict parties' beliefs about a potential guarantor's capacity to follow through on their guarantee, and the guarantor's beliefs about the conflict parties' preferences for resolving the conflict through an agreement versus renewed fighting. If potential guarantors consider the outcome of the agreement implementation process in their decision to give a guarantee, they should be more likely to make that guarantee conditional on the factors above. If, on the other hand, the short-term benefits of a guarantee, including signaling resolve, demonstrating support for the peace process, and buying time are valued more highly by a potential guarantor, they should be more likely to make a guarantee independent of these factors.

This problem can be represented effectively by a signaling game, a sequential game of incomplete information (of the capacity of the guarantor, type t , and the preferences of the

guarantor and conflict parties) that consists of three players: the potential guarantor G and the parties to the conflict P_i ; $i = \{1, 2\}$, without loss of generality. In the order of play, at time τ_1 , G first selects a message $m \in M = \{m_y, m_n\}$, where m_y denotes a ‘guarantee’ in support of the implementation of an agreement and m_n denotes ‘no guarantee’. Outside of the model a guarantor might give a guarantee in support of an agreement that has already been signed or with the aim of encouraging the conflict parties to reach an agreement. In order to keep the model simple it assumes that a guarantee at time τ_1 follows a signed agreement at time τ_0 , without loss of generality. For the purpose of this analysis, fulfilling a guarantee on the ground (at time τ_3) is conditional on a signed agreement and affected by the conflict parties’ actions at time τ_2 .

In addition, the model formalizes the interactions between potential guarantors and conflict parties that face credible commitment problems; hence, it assumes that agreements only succeed in their implementation if third parties give and fulfill credible guarantees.²⁷⁹ Whether the guarantor actually has the capacity to fulfill a guarantee that it has given is private information known only to G and captured by G ’s type $t \in T = \{0, 1\}$, where $t = 1$ if G has that capacity. Nature determines t , with a common knowledge prior belief $p(\cdot)$ over the set T , such that $Pr(t = 1) = p$ and $Pr(t = 2) = 1 - p$. $g(m; t)$ denotes G ’s strategy to send message m (give or not give a guarantee) given its type t (capacity or no capacity to fulfill the guarantee). The conflict parties may update their beliefs about the guarantor’s type t given message m . Upon observing, at time τ_2 , the message sent by the guarantor, and upon observing, at time τ_4 , the revelation of G ’s type (fulfillment of guarantee or not), the conflict parties simultaneously choose an action $a \in A = \{a_c, a_d\}$, where a_c denotes ‘cooperate’ on agreement

²⁷⁹ Note that these assumptions do not imply that all peace agreements require third-party support for their implementation; implementation could be achieved by the conflict parties themselves if they are able to credibly commit to the peace process. Nor do these assumptions imply that conflicts can only be resolved through the implementation of an agreement; the outcome of a conflict can also be determined by fighting or outside intervention.

implementation at τ_2 and τ_4 , and a_d denotes ‘defect’; in particular, a_{d4} denotes ‘cooperate’ at τ_2 and ‘defect’ at τ_4 ; and a_{d2} denotes ‘defect’ at τ_2 and τ_4 (defecting in τ_2 implies defecting in τ_4). In interpreting actions a_c and a_d it is useful to distinguish the two phases that follow the announcement of a guarantee. First, at time τ_2 , while the conflict parties wait for a peace operation to fulfill the guarantee, a conflict party cooperates when it upholds the ceasefire until the mission arrives, and it defects when it violates the ceasefire or takes any steps to increase its relative power vis-à-vis the other conflict party (a_{d2}).²⁸⁰ Second, after observing whether subsequent to its message m the guarantor provided (or did not provide) at time τ_3 a mission to provide a guarantee, at τ_4 a conflict party cooperates (a_c) when it actively implements the agreement and abides by its provisions; it defects (a_{d4}) when it returns to armed conflict. Conflict parties P_i may thus defect at time τ_2 , at time τ_4 , or not defect at all. $h(a; m)$ denotes P_i ’s strategy to choose action a (cooperate or defect) given message m . The timing of the game can be summarized as follows:

- τ_0 Agreement between conflict parties P_i .
- τ_1 Guarantor G selects a message $m \in M = \{m_y, m_n\}$.
- τ_2 Conflict parties P_i simultaneously choose an action $a \in A = \{a_c, a_{d2}\}$. Guarantor G and conflict parties P_i receive first part of payoffs U_G and U_{P_i} respectively at the end of τ_2 .
- τ_3 Guarantor G fulfills guarantee contingent on G ’s type $t \in T = \{1, 2\}$ and G ’s message $m \in M = \{m_y, m_n\}$ sent at τ_1 .
- τ_4 Conflict parties P_i simultaneously choose an action $a \in A = \{a_c, a_{d4}\}$. Guarantor G and conflict parties P_i receive second part of payoffs U_G and U_{P_i} respectively at the end of τ_4 .

²⁸⁰ Gilady and Russett (2002).




Figure A.1: Game Tree

A.2 Utilities

The game results in one of two principal outcomes: the continued implementation of the agreement (I) or the breakdown of the agreement implementation process (W). The players' utilities of continued agreement implementation at the end of τ_2 and τ_4 are represented by $U_G(I)$ and $U_{P_i}(I)$ for the guarantor and conflict parties respectively, where $U_G(I) = u$ (u') following τ_2 (τ_4) and $U_{P_i}(I) = v$ (v') following τ_2 (τ_4); where $u < u'$ and $v < v'$. Payoffs are earned at the end of period τ_2 in addition to τ_4 to account for a guarantee's ($m = m_y$) potential short-term effects of encouraging the conflict parties to sign an agreement or stay committed to an already signed agreement and of showing resolve to support its implementation. The model aims to

explore whether these short-term benefits are supplanted by long-term considerations about the outcome of the agreement implementation and guarantee process.

If implementation breaks down, the guarantor and conflict parties receive $U_G(W)$ and $U_{P_i}(W)$ respectively, where $U_G(W) = U_{P_i}(W) = 0$. Implementation breaks down when two conditions hold simultaneously: at least one of the conflict parties defects on agreement implementation ($a_i = a_d$) at either time τ_2 or τ_4 , and the guarantor does not fulfill a guarantee (lack of promise, $m = m_n$, or lack of capacity, $t = t_2$).

If a third party has given a guarantee, the players' utilities depend on the guarantor's capacity to fulfill the guarantee and on the conflict parties' commitment to the agreement implementation process. In terms of guarantor utility, delivering on a guarantee is costly in terms of equipment and troops. Completely fulfilling a guarantee is associated with cost $c > 0, \epsilon \mathbb{R}$. If the guarantor does not deliver the guarantee, $c = 0$. Guarantee fulfillment costs increase by a factor $\gamma > 1, \epsilon \mathbb{R}$, when guarantees are deployed under conditions of conflict party defection ($a_i = a_d$).

The extent to which a guarantor fulfills their guarantee implies reputational benefits or costs, depending on whether a guarantee was fulfilled as promised or not. Reputational benefits amount to $r > 0, \epsilon \mathbb{R}$ if the guarantor fulfills the guarantee completely. Reputational benefits are negative (reputational costs) if the guarantor fails to follow through on the guarantee. While guarantors may experience a short-term reputational effect following their decision to give a guarantee, the model does not consider it since any short-term reputational gain is outweighed by the greater reputational costs or benefits that derive for the guarantor based on whether it followed through on its guarantee.

In addition to the payoffs from the outcome of the game—continued implementation of the agreement (I) or the breakdown of the implementation process (W)—the utilities of the conflict parties reflect costs that vary according to outcome. A conflict party that continues to implement an agreement suffers cost $k > 0, \epsilon \mathbb{R}$ when it has become susceptible to the control of another conflict party that has chosen to defect and when there is no guarantee to support the implementation process. In that case, the dominant conflict party gains $k > v' + v, k > 0, \epsilon \mathbb{R}$, given their ability to restructure the outcome of the conflict according to their interests. Conflict parties that defect on agreement implementation pay cost $k > 0, \epsilon \mathbb{R}$ if a guarantor deploys a guarantee to support agreement implementation.

The utilities of the conflict parties are a function of an action a selected by the conflict parties in response to the message m they received from the guarantor, given their beliefs about the guarantor's type t . The conflict parties select action a simultaneously and under conditions of incomplete information about each other's preferences, and their utilities follow the preference ordering of a classical Prisoners' Dilemma. If a potential guarantor does not give a guarantee (m_n) or if the guarantor does not have the capacity to fulfill a guarantee (t_2), the conflict parties prefer to defect from the implementation process: $a_i = a_d$ strictly dominates $a_i = a_c$.

$$U_{P_i}(t_1, m_n, a_i) = U_{P_i}(t_2, m_n, a_i) = U_{P_i}(t_2, m_y, a_i) = \begin{cases} v + v' & \text{if } a_{i,j} = a_c \\ v & \text{if } a_{i,j} = a_{d4} \\ 0 & \text{if } a_{i,j} = a_{d2} \\ v - k & \text{if } a_i = a_c, a_j = a_{d4} \\ v + k & \text{if } a_i = a_{d4}, a_j = a_c \\ -k & \text{if } a_i = a_c, a_j = a_{d2} \\ k & \text{if } a_i = a_{d2}, a_j = a_c \end{cases}$$

If the guarantor has the capacity to fulfill a guarantee, the payoffs for the conflict parties depend on their decision to cooperate (a_c) or defect (a_d). Defection means a violation of the agreement or refusal to implement it based on security concerns given the inability of the conflict parties to credibly commit to the agreement, especially when a guarantee has not yet been fulfilled on the ground. Despite defection based on security concerns, an implemented agreement remains the optimal outcome for the conflict parties. The analysis will be extended further below to take into consideration the possibility of a conflict party's defection in an attempt to spoil the implementation process. The model assumes that guarantors give and fulfill guarantees tailored to specific conflict conditions in order to support the agreement implementation process regardless of whether one or both conflict parties choose to cooperate or defect. Defection is punished by costs $-k$. P_i 's utilities when $t = 1$ and $m = m_y$ are given by

$$U_{P_i}(t_1, m_y, a_i) = \begin{cases} v + v' & \text{if } a_{i,j} = a_c \text{ or } a_i = a_c, a_j = a_{d4} \\ v' & \text{if } a_i = a_c, a_j = a_{d2} \\ v + v' - k & \text{if } a_{i,j} = a_{d4} \text{ or if } a_i = a_{d4}, a_j = a_c \\ v' - k & \text{if } a_{i,j} = a_{d2} \text{ or if } a_i = a_{d2}, a_j = a_c \end{cases}$$

Guarantor payoffs are a function of its type t , its message m given t , and the conflict parties' actions a in response to message m , given their beliefs about the guarantor's type t . A guarantor that gives a guarantee ($m = m_y$) and has the capacity to fulfill that guarantee ($t = 1$) receives payoffs that depend on the conflict parties' decision to cooperate (a_c) or defect (a_d). In τ_2 the guarantor receives benefits u if the conflict parties cooperate. In τ_4 , regardless of the conflict parties' actions, the implementation process will be guaranteed and the guarantor receives benefits u' as well as reputational benefits, r , from following through on their guarantee.

If one or both conflict parties defect on agreement implementation (a_d), the guarantor's costs of fulfilling a guarantee increase by a factor $\gamma > 1$ to γc .

$$U_G(t_1, m_y, a_i) = \begin{cases} u + u' - c + r & \text{if } a_{i,j} = a_c \\ u + u' - \gamma c + r & \text{if } a_{i,j} = a_{d4} \text{ or } a_i = a_c, a_j = a_{d4} \\ u' - \gamma c + r & \text{if } a_{i,j} = a_{d2} \text{ or } a_i = a_c, a_j = a_{d2} \end{cases}$$

A guarantor that does not have the capacity to fulfill a guarantee faces reputational costs r in τ_4 , but still receives benefits u if the conflict parties cooperate in τ_2 .

$$U_G(t_2, m_y, a_i) = \begin{cases} u + u' - r & \text{if } a_{i,j} = a_c \\ u - r & \text{if } a_{i,j} = a_{d4} \text{ or } a_i = a_c, a_j = a_{d4} \\ -r & \text{if } a_{i,j} = a_{d2} \text{ or } a_i = a_c, a_j = a_{d2} \end{cases}$$

Regardless of type t , a guarantor's payoffs for not giving a guarantee are a direct function of the conflict parties' actions and amount to u or $u + u'$ depending on whether cooperation continues only through τ_2 or through τ_4 . Payoffs amount to 0 when cooperation fails at the start.

$$U_G(t_1, m_n, a_i) = U_G(t_2, m_n, a_i) = \begin{cases} u + u' & \text{if } a_{i,j} = a_c \\ u & \text{if } a_{i,j} = a_{d4} \text{ or } a_i = a_c, a_j = a_{d4} \\ 0 & \text{if } a_{i,j} = a_{d2} \text{ or } a_i = a_c, a_j = a_{d2} \end{cases}$$

A.3 Equilibrium Strategies

Optimal strategies for the guarantor and the conflict parties can be identified by employing the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept. A PBE requires Bayesian updating on the equilibrium path and sequential rationality. More precisely, a weak PBE implies that beliefs are formed based on strategies by applying Bayes' Rule and that strategies are optimal given these beliefs. In the context of this model, a weak PBE requires that the guarantor's message is a best response to the optimal strategies of the conflict parties and their beliefs, that the conflict parties' strategies are optimal given their beliefs about the guarantor's type, and that their beliefs are consistent with the guarantor's optimal strategy based on Bayes' Rule. The equilibrium requires that all conflict parties share the same beliefs about the guarantor's type, a condition that considerably simplifies the analysis of the model without restricting its significance.²⁸¹

There are different types of PBE in signaling games. In a separating equilibrium each type t sends only one message m , which fully identifies type t . Consider first the guarantor's strategy where G gives a guarantee if it has the capacity to fulfill it and does not give a guarantee if it does not have the capacity to fulfill it: G truthfully sends message $m = m_y$ if $t = 1$ and $m = m_n$ if $t = 2$. The conflict parties' beliefs about G 's type are the basis for their response and are established by applying Bayes' Rule based on G 's strategy.

$$\Pr(t = 1|m = m_y) = \frac{\Pr(m = m_y|t = 1) \Pr(t = 1)}{\Pr(m = m_y)} = \frac{1p}{p} = 1$$

²⁸¹ Banks (1991, 8).

$$\Pr(t = 1|m = m_n) = \frac{\Pr(m = m_n|t = 1) \Pr(t = 1)}{\Pr(m = m_n)} = \frac{0p}{1 - p} = 0$$

$$\Pr(t = 2|m = m_n) = \frac{\Pr(m = m_n|t = 2) \Pr(t = 2)}{\Pr(m = m_n)} = \frac{1(1 - p)}{1 - p} = 1$$

$$\Pr(t = 2|m = m_y) = \frac{\Pr(m = m_y|t = 2) \Pr(t = 2)}{\Pr(m = m_y)} = \frac{0(1 - p)}{p} = 0$$

Given these beliefs the conflict parties, P_i , are able to fully separate t_1 from t_2 , and are aware of the guarantor's capacity to fulfill a guarantee or lack thereof. Given that

$U_{P_i}(t_1, m_y, a_c) > U_{P_i}(t_1, m_y, a_d)$, they will select $a_i = a_c$ if they observe $m = m_y$. Given that

$U_{P_i}(t_2, m_n, a_c) < U_{P_i}(t_2, m_n, a_d)$, P_i will choose $a_i = a_d$ if they observe $m = m_n$. G 's truthful strategy is optimal given the conflict parties' strategy and beliefs, since

$$U_G(t_1, m_y, a_c) > U_G(t_1, m_n, a_c) \text{ and } U_G(t_2, m_n, a_d) > U_G(t_2, m_y, a_d).$$

Consider next the possibility of a separating equilibrium based on a non-truthful strategy, where G sends message $m = m_n$ if $t = 1$ and $m = m_y$ if $t = 2$. The conflict parties' beliefs

regarding G 's type are given by $\Pr(t = 1|m = m_n) = 1$, $\Pr(t = 1|m = m_y) = 0$,

$\Pr(t = 2|m = m_y) = 1$, and $\Pr(t = 2|m = m_n) = 0$. Given these beliefs, P_i is able to fully

separate t_1 from t_2 . Since $U_{P_i}(t_1, m_n, a_d) > U_{P_i}(t_1, m_n, a_c)$ and

$U_{P_i}(t_2, m_y, a_d) > U_{P_i}(t_2, m_y, a_c)$, P_i selects $a = a_d$ regardless of whether they observe

$m = m_n$ or $m = m_y$. G 's strategy is not optimal given P_i 's strategy and beliefs, since

$U_G(t_1, m_n, a_d) < U_G(t_1, m_y, a_d)$ and $U_G(t_2, m_y, a_d) < U_G(t_2, m_n, a_d)$; a non-truthful separating equilibrium does not exist.

In a pooling equilibrium both types of guarantor send the same message. Consider the case where G sends message $m = m_y$ if $t = 1$ and if $t = 2$. Conflict parties learn nothing about G 's type, and posterior and prior beliefs are equal ($p(t_i|m) = p(t_i)$).

$$\Pr(t = 1|m = m_y) = \frac{\Pr(m = m_y|t = 1) \Pr(t = 1)}{\Pr(m = m_y)} = \frac{1p}{1} = p$$

$$\Pr(t = 2|m = m_y) = \frac{\Pr(m = m_y|t = 2) \Pr(t = 2)}{\Pr(m = m_y)} = \frac{1(1 - p)}{1} = 1 - p$$

If P_i observes $m = m_n$ off the equilibrium path, the beliefs of P_i at these information sets cannot be calculated using Bayes' Rule, since $\Pr(m = m_n) = 0$. Beliefs at these nodes are arbitrarily assigned; assume that $z = \Pr(t = 1|m = m_n) = p$ and $1 - z = \Pr(t = 2|m = m_n) = 1 - p$. Optimal strategies are identified based on P_i 's expected utilities and depend on P_i 's beliefs.

$$EU_{P_i}(a_c|m_y) = p \cdot (v') + (1 - p) \cdot (-k) = p(v') - k + p(k)$$

$$EU_{P_i}(a_d|m_y) = p \cdot (v' - k) + (1 - p) \cdot (0) = p(v') - p(k)$$

In response to $m = m_y$, P_i cooperates if $EU_{P_i}(a_c|m_y) \geq EU_{P_i}(a_d|m_y)$, i.e. if $p \geq 1/2$.

In response to $m = m_n$, P_i 's expected utilities are given by $EU_{P_i}(a_c|m_n) = -k$ and $EU_{P_i}(a_d|m_n) = 0$. $EU_{P_i}(a_d|m_n) > EU_{P_i}(a_c|m_n)$, i.e. a_d strictly dominates a_c , and P_i will defect if it observes $m = m_n$. P_i 's beliefs are constructed based on G 's strategy, and P_i 's strategy is an optimal response given those beliefs.

This pooling equilibrium exists if and only if neither type of G has an incentive to deviate. If type t_2 deviated and sent $m = m_n$ instead, P_i 's off-equilibrium path beliefs stipulate that it will defect ($a = a_d$). Type t_2 's payoffs would decrease from $U_G(t_2, m_y, a_c) = u - r$ to $U_G(t_2, m_n, a_d) = 0$, provided that $u > r$. Similarly, if type t_1 sent $m = m_n$ instead of $m = m_y$, P_i will choose $a = a_d$, and t_1 's payoffs would decrease as well, i.e. $U_G(t_1, m_n, a_d) < U_G(t_1, m_y, a_c)$. In both cases G has no incentive to deviate; its strategy to always send $m = m_y$ is dominant and thus an equilibrium strategy. This pooling equilibrium exists if and only if $u > r$; i.e. if reputational costs do not outweigh the benefits a type t_2 guarantor derives from short-term conflict party cooperation. In other words, if the costs of pretending to be t_1 are not high enough both types send m_y .²⁸² The equilibrium analysis produces the following propositions.

Proposition 1.1. *There exists a separating equilibrium for the specified game, identified by the triple (g^*, h^*, μ^*) . It is based on P_i 's beliefs, μ^* , that message m fully and truthfully identifies G 's type: $\mu^*(t_1|m_y; t_2|m_n)$. P_i 's strategy, h^* , is optimal given these beliefs:*

$h^(a_c|m_y; a_d|m_n)$. G 's strategy, g^* , is optimal given h^*, μ^* : $g^*(m_y|t_1; m_n|t_2)$.*

²⁸² With respect to a pooling equilibrium where G always sends $m = m_n$, if type t_1 deviated and sent $m = m_y$ instead, P_i 's off-equilibrium path beliefs imply that it will choose $a = a_c$ if $p \geq 1/2$, and a comparison of payoffs yields that $U_G(t_1, m_y, a_c) > U_G(t_1, m_n, a_d)$. If $p < 1/2$, P_i selects $a = a_d$, and again $U_G(t_1, m_y, a_d) > U_G(t_1, m_n, a_d)$. In both cases G 's strategy is dominated and for G to always send $m = m_n$ regardless of its type is not an equilibrium strategy.

Proposition 1.2. *There exists a pooling equilibrium in which P_i 's prior and posterior beliefs μ^* are equal: $Pr(t = 1|m = m_y) = p$ and $Pr(t = 2|m = m_y) = 1 - p$. P_i 's strategy for τ_2 , h_2^* , is optimal given these beliefs: $h_2^*(a_c|m_y; a_d|m_n)$ if $p \geq 1/2$. Following the revelation in τ_3 of G 's type, P_i 's strategy for τ_4 updates to: $h_4^*(a_c|m_y, t_1; a_d|m_y, t_2)$. G 's strategy, g^* , is optimal given h^*, μ^* , and iff $u > r$: $g^*(m_y|t_1; m_y|t_2)$.*

A.3.1 Guarantor Capacity

G considers its capacity to fulfill a guarantee before giving one. Sending message m_y implies costs for either type of G . Type t_1 faces fulfillment costs c , which have to be outweighed by the sum of benefits derived from supporting the agreement process, u and u' (if the conflict parties choose a_c), and reputational benefits r , in order for t_1 to give a guarantee. Type t_2 will pay reputational costs r when it is revealed that it does not have the capacity to fulfill the guarantee. However, regardless of G 's type, sending message m_y encourages P_i to select a_c at τ_2 , given a mutual preference for a negotiated agreement and for avoiding cost k imposed by t_1 upon guarantee fulfillment ($U_P(t_1, m_y, a_c) > U_P(t_1, m_y, a_d)$). Hence, t_2 compares benefits u derived from the effects of sending m_y to reputational costs r that it is certain to incur. If $u > r$, t_2 will send m_y , otherwise it will send m_n . If $a_i = a_d$, t_1 's guarantee fulfillment costs increase to (γc) , and t_1 's utilities decrease: $U_G(u + u' - c + r) > U_G(u' - \gamma c + r)$. If $a_i = a_d$, type t_2 's guarantee costs increase and utilities decrease: $U_G(u - r) > U_G(-r)$. Sending m_y encourages P_i to choose $a_i = a_c$, at least until G 's type is revealed at τ_3 , thereby increasing G 's benefits regardless of its type.

Proposition 2. *In the equilibriums specified in propositions 1.1 and 1.2, $U_G(t_1, m_y, a_c) > U_G(t_1, m_n, a_d)$ and $U_G(t_2, m_y, a_c) > U_G(t_2, m_n, a_d) > U_G(t_2, m_y, a_d)$. Type t_1 only sends truthful message m_y , while t_2 sends m_y if $u > r$ and m_n otherwise.*

A.3.2 Conflict Party Commitment Problems

$P_{i,j}$ choose a simultaneously and under incomplete information given the lack of trust and limited knowledge regarding each other's preferences. Given their security concerns, the conflict parties are unable to commit to implementing an agreed settlement. As in a Prisoners' Dilemma game, P_i prefers $a_i = a_d$. For P_i , $a_i = a_d$ strictly dominates $a_i = a_c$ unless G sends message m_y and P_i 's beliefs equal $\mu(m_y|t_1)$.

Proposition 3. *In the equilibriums specified in propositions 1.1 and 1.2, except when the conflict parties' beliefs equal $\mu(m_y|t_1)$, P_i 's optimal response to message m given any other belief $\mu(m|t)$ is given by $h * (a_d|m_{y,n})$.*

A.3.3 Conflict Party Preferences

The equilibriums specified in propositions 1.1 and 1.2 are based on the assumption that the conflict parties mutually prefer to resolve the conflict with a negotiated settlement. If a guarantor gives a guarantee and credibly signals its capacity to fulfill it on the ground the optimal response for the conflict parties, P_i , is to cooperate in implementing the agreement, since

$U_P(t_1, m_y, a_c) > U_P(t_1, m_y, a_d)$. The assumption implies that any defection by a conflict party is

a result of insecurity and distrust, especially during the time when a mission in fulfillment of a guarantee has not yet been deployed. However, even though conflict parties negotiate an agreement and pledge to implement it, their true preferences might be different. This section will present an extension of the model that relaxes the assumption above and takes the possibility into account that one or more of the conflict parties prefer renewed fighting to a negotiated settlement in anticipation of a more advantageous outcome.

If the guarantor gives a guarantee and signals its capacity to fulfill it, the payoffs for the conflict parties depend on their interest in keeping agreement implementation on track. Suppose that q , such that $0 > q > 1$, measures the probability that at least one of the conflict parties spoils the implementation process in hopes of forcing a return to the negotiation table or settling the conflict by military means, i.e. $U_P(W) > U_P(I)$. Parameter q is a function of the degree of deliberate obstruction by P_i of the implementation process.²⁸³ Defection in response to insecurity differs conceptually from an intentional attempt to actively spoil the implementation process with the aim of settling the conflict outside of an agreement. As the support of the conflict parties for the agreement decreases, q increases. With $q \rightarrow 1$, spoilers default on $a_i = a_d$, actively obstruct the implementation process, and impede the effectiveness of a guarantee. Given the absence of an effective guarantee, P_i 's payoffs for derailing implementation tend toward 0 or k , depending on whether P_j defects as well or cooperates unaware of P_i 's intentions. The utilities for the conflict parties when $t = 1$ and $m = m_y$ are given by

²⁸³ Conflict parties committed to derailing the implementation process are likely to spoil it soon after the guarantee is given; violating an existing ceasefire before a guarantee is fulfilled on the ground might prevent it from becoming fully deployed.

$$U_{P_i}(t_1, m_y, a_i) = \begin{cases} (1 - q)(u) & \text{if } a_{i,j} = a_c \\ (1 - q)(u - k) & \text{if } a_{i,j} = a_d \\ (q)(-k) + (1 - q)(u) & \text{if } a_i = a_c \text{ and } a_j = a_d \\ (q)(k) + (1 - q)(u - k) & \text{if } a_i = a_d \text{ and } a_j = a_c \end{cases}$$

Similarly, given $m = m_y$ and $t = 1$, guarantor payoffs depend on the probability q that the conflict parties prefer renewed conflict to the agreement and actively seek to spoil the implementation process and impede an effective guarantee. If one or both conflict parties actively spoil agreement implementation ($q = 1, a = a_d$) and thereby cause the guarantee to fail, the guarantor pays the highest fulfillment costs $\gamma^2 c$, where $\gamma > 1$, does not bear any reputational costs since the guarantee was fulfilled, but also does not earn reputational benefits as the guarantee was not successful, and does not receive utility u given that agreement implementation breaks down.

$$U_G(t_1, m_y, a_i) = \begin{cases} (1 - q)(u - c + r) & \text{if } a_{i,j} = a_c \\ q(-\gamma^2 c) + (1 - q)(u - \gamma c + r) & \text{if } a_{i,j} = a_d \text{ or } a_i = a_c \text{ and } a_j = a_d \end{cases}$$

Given the updated payoffs for $U_{P_i}(t_1, m_y, a_i)$ and $U_G(t_1, m_y, a_i)$ introduced above and the utilities for the remaining strategies presented with the basic model, this section will examine equilibrium strategies under the assumption that one or both conflict parties prefer to spoil agreement implementation, i.e. $q = 1$. Consider first the separating strategy presented in proposition 1.1 where G chooses $g(m = m_y | t = 1)$ and $g(m = m_n | t = 2)$. The conflict parties' beliefs about G 's type are given by $\Pr(t = 1 | m = m_y) = 1$, $\Pr(t = 1 | m = m_n) = 0$, $\Pr(t = 2 | m = m_n) = 1$, $\Pr(t = 2 | m = m_y) = 0$, i.e. they are able to fully separate t_1 from t_2 .

Given that for the spoiler $U_{P_i}(t_1, m_y, a_d) > U_{P_i}(t_1, m_y, a_c)$ and $U_{P_i}(t_2, m_n, a_d) > U_{P_i}(t_2, m_n, a_c)$, the conflict parties will select $a_i = a_d$ if they observe $m = m_y$ or $m = m_n$ and cause the guarantee to fail regardless of the other conflict party's response. G 's strategy is no longer optimal given the conflict parties' strategy and beliefs, since $U_G(t_1, m_y, a_d) < U_G(t_1, m_n, a_d)$. Sending message m_y is strictly more costly for either type of G than sending m_n .

In response to a non-truthful separating strategy, where G sends message $m = m_n$ if $t = 1$ and $m = m_y$ if $t = 2$, the spoilers will default again on $a_i = a_d$ regardless of whether they observe $m = m_n$ or $m = m_y$, given that $U_{P_i}(t_1, m_n, a_d) > U_{P_i}(t_1, m_n, a_c)$ and $U_{P_i}(t_2, m_y, a_d) > U_{P_i}(t_2, m_y, a_c)$. G 's strategy is not optimal given P_i 's strategy and beliefs, since $U_G(t_2, m_y, a_d) < U_G(t_2, m_n, a_d)$; a non-truthful separating equilibrium does not exist.

Now consider a pooling strategy where G sends message $m = m_n$ if $t = 1$ and if $t = 2$. The conflict parties are unable to update their beliefs regarding G 's type; their prior and posterior beliefs are equal and given by $Pr(t = 1|m = m_n) = p$ and $Pr(t = 2|m = m_n) = 1 - p$. Assume P_i 's beliefs as $Pr(t = 1|m = m_y) = p$ and $Pr(t = 2|m = m_y) = 1 - p$ if P_i observes $m = m_y$ off the equilibrium path. Based on expected utilities, $EU_{P_i}(a_c|m_n) = EU_{P_i}(a_c|m_y) = -k$ and $EU_{P_i}(a_d|m_n) = EU_{P_i}(a_d|m_y) = 0$, a_d strictly dominates a_c , and P_i will defect regardless of m . With respect to G 's strategy to always send $m = m_n$, if type t_1 deviated and sent $m = m_y$ instead, P_i 's off-equilibrium path beliefs result in $a_i = a_d$, and a comparison of payoffs yields that $U_G(t_1, m_y, a_d) < U_G(t_1, m_n, a_d)$. G has no incentive to deviate; its pooling strategy to always send $m = m_n$ is an equilibrium strategy. However, the alternative pooling strategy, presented in proposition 1.2, to always send $m = m_y$ is strictly dominated. If either

type sent $m = m_n$, P_i would defect ($a_i = a_d$), and G 's payoffs would increase as a result of deviating so that $U_G(t_1, m_n, a_d) > U_G(t_1, m_y, a_d)$ and $U_G(t_2, m_n, a_d) > U_G(t_2, m_y, a_d)$.

Proposition 4. *There exists one pooling equilibrium under the assumption that $q=1$, identified by the triple (g^*, p^*, μ^*) . It is based on P_i 's beliefs $\mu^*(t_1|m_n = p; t_2|m_n = 1 - p)$. P_i 's strategy, h^* , is optimal given these beliefs: $h^*(a_d|m_n)$. G 's strategy, g^* , is optimal given h^*, μ^* : $g^*(m_n|t_1; m_n|t_2)$.*

Incomplete information regarding the long-term costs of an empty guarantee promise implies potential inefficiencies of the identified pooling equilibrium, in which a potential guarantor gives a guarantee regardless of its capacity to fulfill it on the ground. In terms of total welfare, an empty guarantee can give rise to long-term costs to guarantors and conflict parties that outweigh any benefits they may receive from it. The arguments underlying the capacity hypothesis point to important negative effects of failing to fulfill a guarantee. Extension work will study the long-term effects of guarantees on the peace process and explore further the conditions under which the identified equilibriums may not always be efficient.

APPENDIX B

Robustness Check Regression Results

	Third-Party Guarantees		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
UN	3.0258*** (0.391)	3.2056*** (0.346)	2.9015*** (0.388)
Regional IGO	1.5258*** (0.414)	1.7002*** (0.402)	1.5443*** (0.378)
Trade	0.0192*** (0.007)	0.0213*** (0.008)	0.0197*** (0.005)
Annual Fatalities	0.0971*** (0.034)	0.0853*** (0.033)	0.1747*** (0.027)
Contiguous Conflict	0.5616* (0.340)	0.5030* (0.301)	0.5915 (0.416)
Ethnic Conflict	1.8438*** (0.458)	1.9640*** (0.502)	2.5065*** (0.859)
Total Fatalities	-0.0831*** (0.025)	-0.1018*** (0.037)	-0.1428* (0.086)
Rebels Stronger	-1.3954 (1.727)	-1.1645 (1.578)	-1.1740 (0.856)
Rebels Weaker	-0.2873 (0.466)	0.0019 (0.439)	-0.4279** (0.178)
2 Conflict Dyads	0.3301 (0.490)	0.2844 (0.676)	
3-4 Conflict Dyads	-1.8989** (0.923)	-1.9164* (1.084)	
5 Conflict Dyads	-0.2409 (0.615)	-0.8772 (0.685)	
6-13 Conflict Dyads	0.1404 (0.769)	-0.2080 (0.914)	
>13 Conflict Dyads	-0.1453 (0.705)	-0.9456 (0.969)	

Peace Agreement Comprehensiveness			0.0266*
			(0.014)
Natural Resource Financing	0.6275**	0.5868*	1.7546**
	(0.271)	(0.346)	(0.871)
Negotiations	1.2533***		
	(0.355)		
Peace Agreement	1.0791***	1.2174***	
	(0.242)	(0.249)	
Youth Unemployment	0.0599***	0.0600***	0.0480
	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.030)
Infant Mortality	0.0143***	0.0134***	
	(0.005)	(0.004)	
Conflict Duration	-0.0084	0.0052	-0.0328
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.020)
Conflict Over Government	2.1751***	2.5512***	2.5705***
	(0.455)	(0.715)	(0.817)
Democracy	0.0326	-0.0105	-0.0129
	(0.056)	(0.048)	(0.058)
Constant	-13.0226***	-12.1601***	-10.1859***
	(2.189)	(2.094)	(1.924)
Number of Observations	13,615	6,567	2,579

Logistic regression results based on all data (model 1), data restricted to observations that experienced negotiations (model 2) and peace agreement (model 3). Coefficients, robust standard errors (two-way clustered by subregion and potential guarantor) in parentheses. Statistically significant at the *0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01 level.

Table B.1: Third-party guarantees (clustered by subregion)

	Third-Party Guarantees		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
UN	2.9416*** (0.602)	3.1376*** (0.623)	3.1534*** (0.600)
Regional IGO	1.4872** (0.581)	1.7549*** (0.609)	1.5471** (0.609)
Trade	0.0271*** (0.009)	0.0247** (0.010)	0.0107*** (0.002)
Annual Fatalities	0.0798*** (0.004)	0.0785*** (0.024)	0.2117*** (0.065)
Contiguous Conflict	0.5859 (0.447)	0.4477 (0.643)	1.0295 (0.626)
Ethnic Conflict	2.1887*** (0.537)	2.2601*** (0.617)	2.1098*** (0.665)
Total Fatalities	0.0362 (0.094)	0.0314 (0.111)	-0.0856 (0.112)
Rebels Stronger	1.1018 (1.705)	1.1174 (1.476)	-0.9797* (0.507)
Rebels Weaker	-0.2404 (0.645)	-0.0301 (0.548)	-0.2464** (0.113)
2 Conflict Dyads	0.5209 (1.082)	0.3984 (0.974)	
3-4 Conflict Dyads	-2.1146* (1.198)	-2.1509* (1.173)	
5 Conflict Dyads	0.4695 (0.945)	-0.0152 (1.019)	
6-13 Conflict Dyads	1.1680 (0.970)	1.0080 (1.134)	
>13 Conflict Dyads	1.0461 (1.119)	0.7300 (1.317)	
Peace Agreement Comprehensiveness			0.0954*** (0.029)
Natural Resource Financing	0.9789** (0.474)	0.9524* (0.529)	1.9688*** (0.649)

Negotiations	1.1201** (0.482)		
Peace Agreement	0.8779* (0.451)	1.0437** (0.422)	
Youth Unemployment	0.0790*** (0.027)	0.0785** (0.031)	
Infant Mortality	0.0175** (0.008)	0.0152* (0.009)	-0.0119** (0.005)
Conflict Duration	-0.0243 (0.032)	-0.0249 (0.032)	-0.0375 (0.023)
Conflict Over Government	2.1219*** (0.444)	2.2938*** (0.590)	2.6850*** (0.940)
Democracy	0.0529 (0.041)	0.0117 (0.042)	0.0257 (0.033)
Constant	-15.2107*** (2.121)	-13.9557*** (2.132)	-9.7994*** (0.755)
Number of Observations	11,176	5,561	2,633

Logistic regression results based on all data (model 1), data restricted to observations that experienced negotiations (model 2) and peace agreement (model 3). Data in models 1 and 2 is furthermore restricted to observations with annual battle-related deaths of $\leq 5,000$, total battle-related deaths of $\leq 5,000$, trade as a percentage of GDP equal to ≤ 100 ; in model 3 data is restricted to observations with 30 or fewer peace agreement provisions. Coefficients, robust standard errors (two-way clustered by conflict state and potential guarantor) in parentheses. Statistically significant at the *0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01 level.

Table B.2: Third-party guarantees (restricted data)

	Third-Party Guarantees		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
UN	3.2616*** (0.483)	3.4081*** (0.511)	3.3283*** (0.684)
Regional IGO	1.7459*** (0.491)	1.7514*** (0.512)	1.7136*** (0.633)
Trade	0.0133*** (0.001)	0.0122*** (0.001)	0.0174*** (0.002)
Annual Fatalities	0.1452 (0.125)	0.0889 (0.094)	-0.0030 (0.098)
Contiguous Conflict	0.4514 (0.784)	0.2956 (0.563)	1.2770 (1.000)
Ethnic Conflict	1.1036* (0.575)	1.0133 (0.647)	0.7345 (0.535)
Total Fatalities	0.0536 (0.099)	0.0809 (0.080)	0.0850* (0.049)
Rebels Stronger	-0.3575 (0.828)		
Rebels Weaker	-0.1892 (0.427)		
2 Conflict Dyads	0.2495 (0.931)	-0.0143 (0.803)	
3-4 Conflict Dyads	-1.1553 (1.269)	-1.0088 (1.130)	
5 Conflict Dyads	-0.5567 (0.739)	-0.5584 (0.658)	
6-13 Conflict Dyads	-0.1658 (0.843)	-0.2413 (0.644)	
>13 Conflict Dyads	-1.0265 (0.864)	-1.2518** (0.595)	
Peace Agreement Comprehensiveness			0.0339** (0.013)
Natural Resource Financing	0.6417** (0.280)	0.7097*** (0.195)	1.0185*** (0.317)

Negotiations	1.9648*** (0.518)		
Peace Agreement	1.2956*** (0.417)	1.4071*** (0.411)	
Youth Unemployment	0.0707*** (0.017)	0.0876*** (0.021)	0.0929*** (0.031)
Infant Mortality	0.0078 (0.005)	0.0106** (0.005)	-0.0023 (0.004)
Conflict Duration	-0.0004 (0.024)	0.0032 (0.020)	-0.0180 (0.015)
Conflict Over Government	0.8135 (0.809)	0.5747 (0.653)	1.3859 (1.115)
Democracy	-0.0312 (0.037)	-0.0607* (0.033)	0.0743 (0.057)
Constant	-11.5860*** (1.499)	-9.7120*** (1.229)	-9.3394*** (2.121)
Number of Observations	2,164	1,754	756

Logistic regression results based on all data (model 1), data restricted to observations that experienced negotiations (model 2) and peace agreement (model 3). Data collapsed to dyad level. Coefficients, robust standard errors (two-way clustered by conflict state and potential guarantor) in parentheses. Statistically significant at the *0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01 level.

Table B.3: Third-party guarantees (dyad level)

	Third-Party Guarantees		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
UN	3.6350*** (0.411)	3.5781*** (0.422)	3.8914*** (0.505)
Regional IGO	2.0145*** (0.473)	2.0256*** (0.473)	2.0569*** (0.487)
Trade	0.0154*** (0.005)	0.0121** (0.006)	0.0111** (0.004)
Annual Fatalities	1.1360** (0.534)	1.1001** (0.537)	0.1619 (0.507)
Contiguous Conflict	0.2109 (0.754)	0.0802 (0.783)	1.0845* (0.626)
Ethnic Conflict	0.5038 (0.835)	0.4280 (0.891)	0.4023 (0.735)
Total Fatalities	-0.7967 (0.533)	-0.8030 (0.543)	-0.1348 (0.462)
Rebels Stronger	-1.2193 (1.059)	-1.0211 (0.987)	
Rebels Weaker	-1.5688* (0.906)	-1.4932 (1.072)	
2 Conflict Dyads	0.0325 (0.814)	-0.4272 (0.612)	
3-4 Conflict Dyads	0.1923 (1.112)	0.1482 (1.144)	
5 Conflict Dyads	0.2465 (0.699)	0.2321 (0.725)	
6-13 Conflict Dyads	1.1666 (0.938)	1.1044 (1.031)	
>13 Conflict Dyads	1.0545 (1.023)	0.9104 (1.227)	
Peace Agreement Comprehensiveness			0.0555*** (0.017)
Natural Resource Financing	-0.0770 (0.569)	-0.0766 (0.608)	1.8757*** (0.528)

Negotiations	2.3807***		
	(0.511)		
Peace Agreement	0.5762	0.7666	
	(0.613)	(0.657)	
Youth Unemployment	0.0585**	0.0787***	0.0567***
	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.002)
Infant Mortality	0.0120**	0.0135**	-0.0067
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)
Conflict Duration	-0.0069	-0.0116	-0.0278
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Conflict Over Government	-0.0393	-0.1049	-0.5566
	(0.706)	(0.707)	(0.515)
Democracy	0.0086	-0.0123	-0.1044**
	(0.051)	(0.065)	(0.053)
Constant	-10.2280***	-7.4494***	-5.7389***
	(1.023)	(0.896)	(1.172)
Number of Observations	928	727	383

Logistic regression results based on all data (model 1), data restricted to observations that experienced negotiations (model 2) and peace agreement (model 3). Data collapsed to conflict level. Coefficients, robust standard errors (two-way clustered by conflict state and potential guarantor) in parentheses. Statistically significant at the *0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01 level.

Table B.4: Third-party guarantees (conflict level)

Third-Party Guarantees		
	Regional Organization	State
Trade	0.0111 (0.007)	0.0157** (0.007)
Annual Fatalities	0.1181*** (0.028)	-0.0083 (0.117)
Contiguous Conflict	1.0366*** (0.350)	-0.6842 (0.856)
Military Spending	-0.0525 (0.167)	-0.3287 (0.285)
Ethnic Conflict	0.8594** (0.408)	1.7771* (0.973)
Total Fatalities	-0.1013*** (0.019)	0.1167 (0.180)
Negotiations	2.3871*** (0.739)	-0.3550 (0.767)
Peace Agreement	0.6383** (0.295)	1.8935*** (0.627)
Infant Mortality	0.0115 (0.007)	-0.0044 (0.011)
Conflict Duration	0.0037 (0.005)	-0.0779*** (0.018)
Conflict Over Government	1.3114* (0.674)	0.8615 (0.777)
Democracy	0.0461 (0.042)	-0.0296 (0.031)
Constant	-9.9522*** (2.437)	-4.7036* (2.625)
Number of Observations	3,940	10,142

Logistic regression results for regional organizations (model 1) and states (model 2). Coefficients, robust standard errors (two-way clustered by subregion and potential guarantor) in parentheses. Statistically significant at the *0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01 level.

Table B.5: Third-party guarantees and guarantor capacity (clustered by subregion)

	Third-Party Guarantees	
	Regional Organization	State
Trade	0.0110** (0.004)	0.0157* (0.008)
Annual Fatalities	0.1169*** (0.012)	-0.0083 (0.113)
Contiguous Conflict	1.0578** (0.432)	-0.6842 (0.631)
Military Spending	-0.0429 (0.141)	-0.3287 (0.281)
Ethnic Conflict	0.8496** (0.398)	1.7771* (1.072)
Total Fatalities	-0.0964*** (0.036)	0.1167 (0.172)
Negotiations	2.3783*** (0.825)	-0.3550 (0.611)
Peace Agreement	0.6295** (0.314)	1.8935*** (0.678)
Infant Mortality	0.0113*** (0.004)	-0.0044 (0.007)
Conflict Duration	0.0048 (0.008)	-0.0779*** (0.024)
Conflict Over Government	1.3032* (0.712)	0.8615 (0.815)
Democracy	0.0492*** (0.003)	-0.0296 (0.041)
Constant	-10.0482*** (2.066)	-4.7036* (2.688)
Number of Observations	3,741	10,142

Logistic regression results for regional organizations (model 1) and states (model 2). Data restricted to observations with military spending \leq \$900,000. Coefficients, robust standard errors (two-way clustered by conflict state and potential guarantor) in parentheses. Statistically significant at the *0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01 level.

Table B.6: Third-party guarantees and guarantor capacity (restricted data)

	Third-Party Guarantees	
	Regional Organization	State
Trade	0.0106 (0.007)	0.0131** (0.006)
Annual Fatalities	0.2382* (0.126)	-0.4028* (0.219)
Contiguous Conflict		-2.1998*** (0.723)
Military Spending	-0.0636 (0.148)	-0.3275 (0.235)
Ethnic Conflict	0.6670 (0.433)	1.3499 (1.024)
Total Fatalities	0.0636 (0.085)	0.7324** (0.365)
Negotiations	1.7896** (0.818)	0.2291 (0.762)
Peace Agreement	1.2258** (0.550)	3.2885*** (0.701)
Infant Mortality	0.0075** (0.003)	-0.0096 (0.008)
Conflict Duration	-0.0057 (0.006)	-0.0610*** (0.018)
Conflict Over Government	-0.0010 (0.758)	-0.4483 (0.930)
Democracy	0.0336** (0.016)	-0.0467 (0.052)
Constant	-7.7459*** (1.722)	-3.5483 (2.375)
Number of Observations	756	1,765

Logistic regression results for regional organizations (model 1) and states (model 2). Data collapsed to dyad level. Coefficients, robust standard errors (two-way clustered by conflict state and potential guarantor) in parentheses. Statistically significant at the *0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01 level.

Table B.7: Third-party guarantees and guarantor capacity (dyad level)

Third-Party Guarantees		
	Regional Organization	State
Trade	0.0042 (0.009)	0.0387*** (0.011)
Annual Fatalities	1.7471** (0.690)	-1.5212*** (0.504)
Contiguous Conflict		-2.5049*** (0.667)
Military Spending	0.0655 (0.123)	-0.2262 (0.174)
Ethnic Conflict	1.1112 (0.811)	0.7037 (1.224)
Total Fatalities	-1.2624** (0.617)	1.7384*** (0.559)
Peace Agreement	0.6761 (0.886)	2.9678*** (0.714)
Infant Mortality	0.0151* (0.009)	-0.0135 (0.013)
Conflict Duration	-0.0031 (0.017)	-0.0246 (0.027)
Conflict Over Government	0.2310 (0.811)	-0.0493 (0.734)
Democracy	0.0623 (0.051)	-0.0703 (0.104)
Constant	-8.0601*** (1.738)	-6.2559*** (2.265)
Number of Observations	276	665

Logistic regression results for regional organizations (model 1) and states (model 2). Data collapsed to conflict level. Coefficients, robust standard errors (two-way clustered by conflict state and potential guarantor) in parentheses. Statistically significant at the *0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01 level.

Table B.8: Third-party guarantees and guarantor capacity (conflict level)

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	Trans- parency Guarantee	Support Guarantee	Enforcement Guarantee	Trans- parency Guarantee	Support Guarantee	Enforcement Guarantee	Trans- parency Guarantee	Support Guarantee	Enforcement Guarantee
UN	2.702*** (-0.474)	3.026*** (-0.505)	1.178*** (-0.099)						
Regional IGO				0.192 (-0.912)	0.420 (-0.986)	1.067* (-0.556)			
State							-2.760*** (-0.674)	-4.344*** (-1.092)	-1.731** (-0.682)
Trade	0.009 (-0.007)	0.029*** (-0.007)	0.018*** (-0.005)	0.007 (-0.006)	0.0136** (-0.007)	0.0234*** (-0.003)	0.008 (-0.006)	0.013 (-0.011)	0.017*** (-0.005)
Annual Fatalities	0.097** (-0.048)	0.091 (-0.085)	0.122 (-0.107)	0.096*** (-0.027)	0.139 (-0.102)	0.025 (-0.056)	0.094** (-0.047)		0.119 (-0.104)
Contiguous Conflict							-0.154 (-0.431)	-0.602 (-0.655)	
Ethnic Conflict	1.504*** (-0.35)	2.033*** (-0.506)	0.991 (-0.685)	1.153*** (-0.442)	1.399** (-0.566)	1.418** (-0.658)	1.708*** (-0.333)	1.159* (-0.670)	1.116* (-0.624)
Total Fatalities	0.112 (-0.091)	-0.101 (-0.066)	-0.259 (-0.168)	0.114** (-0.056)	-0.001 (-0.051)	-0.119 (-0.125)	0.111 (-0.096)		-0.264 (-0.183)
Rebels Stronger	-0.657 (-0.718)	-2.237*** (-0.729)			-1.105** (-0.474)	-2.689*** (-0.674)	-0.281 (-0.772)	-0.698 (-0.889)	
Rebels Weaker	-0.904** (-0.382)	-0.225 (-0.359)	0.177 (-0.552)	-0.544 (-0.339)		-0.660** (-0.288)	-0.758 (-0.553)	0.247 (-0.332)	0.179 (-0.502)

Natural Resource Financing				0.375	0.091	0.171	0.573	0.219	0.320
				(-0.244)	(-0.524)	(-0.453)	(-0.352)	(-0.543)	(-0.625)
Negotiations	1.832***	2.898***	1.393*				1.788***	3.310***	1.353*
	(-0.487)	(-0.527)	(-0.807)				(-0.481)	(-0.619)	(-0.782)
Peace Agreement	0.943***	1.295***	1.293**	1.425***	1.883***	1.576***	0.841***	0.923***	1.288**
	(-0.174)	(-0.277)	(-0.519)	(-0.124)	(-0.379)	(-0.365)	(-0.199)	(-0.277)	(-0.515)
Youth Unemployment	0.092***	0.091**	0.033				0.093***	0.069***	0.036
	(-0.020)	(-0.041)	(-0.057)				(-0.021)	(-0.019)	(-0.057)
Infant Mortality	0.024***	0.027**	0.021	0.000	0.001	0.023***	0.019***	0.012	0.020
	(-0.007)	(-0.014)	(-0.014)	(-0.005)	(-0.009)	(-0.009)	(-0.003)	(-0.009)	(-0.014)
Conflict Duration		0.042	0.017	-0.005	-0.001	0.017		0.005	0.017
		(-0.032)	(-0.038)	(-0.015)	(-0.029)	(-0.035)		(-0.034)	(-0.039)
Conflict Over Government	0.584	2.191***		0.800	1.809***		0.651	1.596***	
	(-0.611)	(-0.451)		(-0.609)	(-0.673)		(-0.643)	(-0.591)	
Democracy	-0.021	-0.031	-0.070	-0.060**		-0.072	-0.025		-0.069
	(-0.028)	(-0.029)	(-0.044)	(-0.027)		(-0.056)	(-0.022)		(-0.049)
Constant	-13.185***	-17.617***	-10.191***	-8.164***	-9.948***	-9.608***	-11.326***	-11.996***	-9.252***
	(-1.188)	(-2.882)	(-2.744)	(-1.077)	(-1.636)	(-1.337)	(-0.936)	(-1.888)	(-2.662)
Number of Observations	13,615	13,615	13,615	14,802	14,901	14,802	13,615	14,658	13,615

Logistic regression. Guarantees coded individually in a set of binomial variables: 104 transparency guarantees (47 in categorical variable used in main model), 67 DDR guarantees (41 in categorical variable), 50 security guarantees in binomial and categorical variable. Coefficients, robust standard errors (two-way clustered by conflict state and potential guarantor) in parentheses. Statistically significant at the *0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01 level.

Table B.9: Third-party guarantee type (logistic regression)

	One Guarantor	Multiple Guarantors
Trade	0.0373 (0.028)	0.1416** (0.072)
Annual Fatalities	1.6065 (1.128)	-2.3223* (1.361)
Contiguous Conflict	0.2669 (1.042)	16.3606*** (2.116)
Ethnic Conflict	-1.3169 (1.090)	0.7477 (1.676)
Total Fatalities	-1.2945 (0.946)	3.0825** (1.524)
Natural Resource Financing	1.2855 (1.566)	-1.7486 (3.835)
Negotiations	1.6192 (1.493)	3.4249* (1.961)
Peace Agreement	0.6653 (0.971)	0.7270 (1.757)
Youth Unemployment	0.0674 (0.055)	0.0615 (0.116)
Infant Mortality	0.0054 (0.016)	0.0770* (0.042)
Conflict Duration	0.0519 (0.040)	-0.0007 (0.066)
Conflict Over Government	-0.7026 (1.119)	-1.0637 (1.888)
Democracy	0.0957 (0.099)	-0.1705 (0.125)
Constant	-7.2565** (3.664)	-39.9298*** (11.102)
Number of Observations	62	62

Multinomial logistic regression results for one guarantor (model 1) and two or more guarantors (model 2); reference category is *no guarantee*. Unit of observation is the conflict (data collapsed to conflict level without potential guarantors). Data restricted to observations with annual battle-related deaths of $\leq 5,000$, total

battle-related deaths of $\leq 5,000$, trade as a percentage of GDP equal to ≤ 100 . Coefficients, robust standard errors (clustered by conflict state) in parentheses. Statistically significant at the *0.10, ** 0.05, *** 0.01 level.

Table B.10: Multiple guarantors (restricted data)