

**INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH AND POLICY
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
WORKING PAPERS**

**POLICY SPACE AND VOTING COALITIONS IN CONGRESS:
THE BEARING OF POLICY ON POLITICS, 1930-1954**

**Ira Katznelson
Columbia University**

**John Lapinski
Yale University**

**Rose Razaghian
Columbia University**

August 2001

ISERP WORKING PAPER 01-02

ISERP
Institute for Social and Economic Research and Policy

Prepared for presentation at the Annual Political Science Association Meeting in San Francisco, August 31, 2001. Please do not cite this version without Permission. Comments would be warmly welcomed to iik1@columbia.edu, john.lapinski@yale.edu, and rr222@columbia.edu.

Abstract

The question of how the substance of politics helps shape legislative coalitions and bases of support has been displaced from the center of studies of Congress since the publication of pioneering work in the 1960s and early 1970s. Seeking to revive this research program, we apply an original coding scheme in tandem with a factor analytic analysis of voting and policy space to the period spanning the last years of the Hoover presidency to the start of Eisenhower's. Investigating legislator parameters—the dimensions of voting space—and roll call parameters—the dimensions of policy space—the paper confirms the strong independent impact of the substance of policy on the political decisions of legislators and reveals an issue-specific concatenation of party and region that altered over the course of the period.

Keywords: Congress, public policy, New Deal, roll calls, political parties, South

I. Introduction

As systematic behavioral studies of Congress hit their stride in the 1960s and 1970s, the question of how policy makes politics promised to produce fruitful links joining realistic analytical accounts of the substance of American politics to richly-textured narrative histories and to central questions raised by political theorists about representation in liberal and democratic theory. Pioneering work by Lowi (1964, 1970, 1972) and Mayhew (1966) complemented earlier studies on party and regional bases of roll call behavior (Turner 1970 [1950]) to consider how variation in clusters of policies under consideration in Congress affected the choices and partisanship of its members.

Asking how farm issues, urban questions, labor concerns, and Western regional matters distinguished roll call behavior, shaped voting blocs, defined coalitions, and facilitated understanding of the two major parties, Mayhew's first book probed how the content of public policy, understood in terms familiar to the politicians themselves, influenced outcomes and explained variation in a compressed historical period spanning 1947 to 1962. He discovered important variations characterizing different issues and parties and appealed to constituency characteristics and the abilities of the parties to forge inclusive coalitions as key factors shaping member behavior.

Concurrently, Lowi began to publish a series of articles taking up the same theme of discerning the determination of politics by policy. By contrast to Mayhew's self-consciously limited scope of time, issue choice, roll call selection, and theoretical claim—his book was situated as a probe of how substance and history might matter—Lowi aimed at a vastly more ambitious and inclusive project, that of a parsimonious classification of policy arenas (first characterized famously as distributive, regulatory, and redistributive) capable of defining 'arenas of power' and placing a vast array of case studies across American politics in time. Each type of issue, he hypothesized, elicits different definitions of interest, different relations among interests, and different relations between interests and government. On this basis, he generated a deductive typology projecting outcomes from types of policy with respect to units of action (individuals, groups, associations), types of relations among units (log-rolling, coalitions, peak associations and social classes), structures of power (non-conflictual, pluralistic, and conflictual), as well predictions as relative stability, loci of decision, and patterns of implementation. For Lowi, politics made policy in the most comprehensive manner.

Neither of these two early initiatives or the lines of research they advocated moved ahead quite as robustly as these authors had hoped or we, in retrospect, would have wished. Mayhew soon went on to address other themes, not least member rationality and the electoral connection (1974), returning later to issues of substance in the context of assessing legislative significance and the impact of divided government. The mantle of his *Party Loyalty* was taken up primarily by Clausen (1973; Clausen and Cheney 1970¹) and Sinclair (1978,1982) who applied Clausen's influential coding scheme to probe how member behavior varied across its categories. Hampered in part by the level of aggregation of this classification, a subject to which we return, and in part by largely descriptive objectives, this line of analysis soon petered out. So, too, did Lowi's promised research program, at least in its most programmatic and systematic incarnations, arguably for similar reasons concerning coding. If Clausen's categorization suffered from too few 'ordinary language' types, lumping where splitting was needed, Lowi's far more abstract scheme proved very difficult to operationalize crisply. Today, this body of work about the impact

¹ Yes, Vice-President Cheney, then a young, aspiring political scientist.

of policy substance on congressional behavior is relatively dormant. Though we now understand a good deal about how voting, opinion, lobbying, and other forms of participation shape outcomes with determinate contours and content. (MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1989; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995), we know rather less about reciprocal causation. In the main, scholars of Congress have turned to other subjects, including the electoral connection, the role of information, gridlock and divided government, delegation, and institutional change.

We should like to revivify the lineage of inquiry that asks whether and how the substance of policy issues shapes behavior by representatives and thus how alterations to the policy agenda shape patterns of partisan and regional representation. The questions this tradition of scholarship forcefully asked a generation ago are too important descriptively, theoretically, and analytically to leave out of consideration today. Indeed, the challenges Lowi posed still stand: to find a way of coding policy “to suggest generalizations sufficiently close to the data to be relevant and sufficiently abstract to be subject to more broadly theoretical treatment,” and to probe, via such an approach, how “a political relationship is determined by the type of policy at stake, so that for every policy there is likely to be a distinctive type of political relationship.” (Lowi 1964: 688)

For all the gains produced by the past quarter-century of congressional studies, this research agenda concerning the place of policy in history continues to remain elusive. Earlier work on the substance of congressional behavior reached an impasse because it could not surmount the limits imposed on empirical analysis by bulky classification schemes. Later work lost interest in the policy makes politics question for more fundamental reasons. Poole and Rosenthal’s history of roll-call voting (1997), as a leading instance, mainly skips over the policy makes politics question despite its inductive coding scheme with 99 categories. Their immense achievement giving us purchase on the content of the issue space as gauged in many thousands of roll calls over the long haul of American history, suggests that these concerns belong on the periphery of congressional studies. For if a single ideological dimension defined by strong loyalty to one of two main political parties has been the central and nearly unwavering hallmark of congressional behavior irrespective of policy content across the full range of American history, then it makes little sense to ask how different policy arenas convene dissimilar patterns of partisanship and choice. The book’s strategy of aggregating roll calls has the effect of highlighting and discovering similarities despite differences rather than the reverse. Their concern to demonstrate the power of a low-, usually one-, dimensional spatial model to account for roll call voting tends to obscure differences across policy domains. And when they tackle specific policy issues like the minimum wage or interstate commerce they tend to do so one issue at a time outside of the ken of any approach to classification. Moreover, on the basis of a close look at the 95th House they explicitly reject Clausen’s argument that congressional voting can be parsed into five substantive policy arenas, finding that, empirically, his categories “represent highly related, not distinct, dimensions.” (Poole and Rosenthal 1997: 56) Though their test is confined to one brief moment and limited by Clausen’s coding, Poole and Rosenthal reinforce their one-dimensional portrait by concluding that different policy issues do not produce variety in member behavior.

This paper confronts both roadblocks. As every student of policy in Congress knows, appropriate coding is the *sine qua non* for linking substantive policies to the behavior of members. We apply an original coding scheme that is far more fine-grained than prior attempts to classify congressional roll calls in order to interpret policy space in a way not possible in the past because of a lack of knowledge about, or attention to, the policy content of individual roll call votes. Utilizing this new tool, we return to themes central both to the older ‘policy makes politics’ literature and more recent concerns with the issue of dimensionality by mapping the substantive content of policy space in a more nuanced, precise, and historically-specific manner. In so doing, we revisit the low-dimensionality argument of Poole and Rosenthal and the challenge to it by

Heckman and Snyder (1997) who question the vision of single-vector politics on the basis of their analysis of the post World War II period, finding that “at least five and perhaps as many as eight attributes are required to rationalize congressional voting patterns” when a search is mounted for specific policy issues in which more than one dimension is required to account robustly for roll call voting. This discovery led them to conclude that a multidimensional framework is essential to predict votes in specific policy domains, including defense, agriculture, abortion, and civil rights.² (Heckman and Snyder 1997: 145, 160, 176-180)

It did not escape Poole and Rosenthal’s notice that at some (in their view, atypical) historical moments, a second dimension differentiating members by region helps to account for roll call behavior. During the Civil War and Reconstruction, they observe, votes on slavery and civil rights were structured highly on the first dimension since issues of race and section defined party differences. This overlap continued through the anti-lynching debates of the early 1920s. But in the 1940’s, beginning with the 80th Congress, a second dimension began to differentiate southerners from nonsoutherners on civil rights votes, a pattern they attribute “to the emergence of a three-party system in the late 1930s—nonsouthern Democrats, southern Democrats, Republicans—brought about by race.” (Poole and Rosenthal 1997:110, 46)

If grudging and cramped, this discussion by Poole and Rosenthal also is suggestive. As they recognize, the Roosevelt-Truman years, the domain we have chosen for this probe, were pivotal for just these questions. Yet, curiously, their work, like the massive scholarship by historians on this period of Democratic party hegemony and its strange bedfellows coalition of north and south (Leuchtenburg 1963; Brinkley 1995; Kennedy 1999), tends to treat regional questions only when civil rights issues themselves come up. Otherwise, they consider the legislative enactments of New Deal as the product of a simple one-dimensional issue space. This standard story, we will see, is incomplete.

² This debate about dimensionality bears directly on long-vexing issues in the history of American political culture, especially as they pivot on Hartz’s famous claim that Lockean political liberalism has structured a one-dimensional issue space from the Founding onward. By contrast, Smith recently has counterposed a ‘multiple traditions’ approach to American political culture stressing the quasi-independent influence of ascriptive racism, thus calling into question whether liberalism, understood as Hartz did, actually has served as the singular master theme of American political culture and ideas. (Smith 1997) Building on Tocqueville, Hartz had underscored the importance of the absence of feudalism and an ancien regime, treating political liberalism as so uncontested as to appear as a fact of nature. Racial hierarchy and oppression, as Gunnar Myrdal stressed in his classic *An American Dilemma* (1944), might contradict its central values, but America’s liberal creed grounded in Enlightenment values of reason and regard for the human individual, he, too, believed to be secure atop the country’s value hierarchy. Focusing on the interpretation of statutes by the federal judiciary, Smith demonstrates the enduring power of racial illiberalism, concluding that a “bitter blend” of liberalism and racism is the key to understanding American political thought and practice. (Smith 1997: 104) Smith’s analysis of jurisprudence effectively upbraids Hartz effectively for his neglect of racism, but the absence of congressional analysis in Smith’s work exacts a price. As the site of representation, the national legislature, after all, is American democracy’s most liberal site. Not surprisingly, it was in Congress that deliberations at least as noteworthy as those in the courts have been undertaken to define the properties, contours, limits, and advances of American liberalism and its relationship to race and region. In Congress, where legislative compromise almost always is necessary, historically-specific resolutions to the terms of connection between liberalism and racism, were developed within the embrace of liberal rules of representation and governance. It is such negotiated settlements in specific policy areas we wish to understand better and with a degree of precision not yet achieved in this literature on American political thought and culture.

To more fully come to grips with these questions, we extend the debate on policy, politics, and dimensionality back to the defining moment in American political history spanning the last years of the Hoover presidency to the start of Eisenhower's. Working within a temporal framework that cuts across the pre- and post-1945 divide characteristic of congressional studies, we extend the range of empirical evidence available to assess considerations of issue and voting space, but without any *a priori* expectation that the patterns we discover will be replicated in different historical epochs. Indeed, a central thrust of our orientation is to underscore the historicity of politics by showing how both historical changes on a large scale and variations to the substance of policy under consideration in distinct epochs matter deeply. The extended New Deal era is a particularly appealing research site to probe these matters. Though it is intrinsically important to American political history, we know very little about policy and congressional behavior at this key juncture. Not just scholarship by political scientists, but the massive body of work by historians on this period has focused very little on this subject matter; even the best historical work on such themes as the emergence of a conservative coalition of Republicans and southern Democrats (Patterson 1966; Patterson 1967; Porter 1980; Young 1956) tends to be written in narrative form, bill by bill, about a limited number of congresses, rendering their conclusions difficult to assay or confirm. This period also is an important moment to explore disputes about the dimensionality of issue space. This time of immense challenge and policy innovation was marked by strong party and ideological polarization, giving us strong reasons to expect confirmation of the one-dimensional view. Yet this era also encompassed the last decades of the system V.O. Key (1949) described in *Southern Politics* in which a wholly distinct southern electoral system sent 'solid south' Democratic representatives to Congress who made guardianship of the 'southern way of life' a high, often highest, priority. Therefore, it also is reasonable to expect a second dimension based on region and inscribed by race to play a key role in structuring member behavior. But when and under what conditions it might do so is not obvious.

Taking this era as our site of inquiry and applying our new coding scheme in tandem with a factor analytic analysis of voting and policy space, we present systematic, quantitative evidence that probes, and confirms, the effect of policy on politics and that illuminates the period's important shifts in the impact of party and region. We investigate both legislator parameters—the dimensions of voting space—and roll call parameters—the dimensions of policy space and discover strong confirmation of the independent impact of the substance of policy on the political decisions of legislators, and we detect an issue-specific concatenation of party and region that altered over the course of the period. This discovery of changing coalitions over this time period accompanied by shifts to the substance of the policy space almost certainly is marked by the reciprocal causation alluded to in the original policy and politics congressional literature. In this configuration, it is clear that the effect of policy on politics and simultaneous changes in voting and policy space are not coincidental. More specifically, we find that:

- (1) From year to year, individual legislator preferences do not change very much. There is much short-term stability. Yet both as new members enter Congress and especially as historical circumstances alter and different issues come to the fore with the effect of changing the content of voting space, the ideal positions of legislators, new and old, alter. Variations in subject matter advance and sanction different, often dramatically distinct, features of roll-call behavior. Over time, the constellation of preferences does change and different coalitions form in Congress.
- (2) The changing preferences of representatives cannot be represented by one dimension alone. At least two, at times three, are necessary.

- (3) The policy content of the dimensions changes over time. In addition (more tentatively), it may not be the case that economic policies always load on the first dimension and issues of race on the second. We discover at least one candidate (the 81st House) as this kind of exception to the general rule. Treading carefully in interpreting the substantive content of factor loadings, we find it plausible that even in the same historical epoch the substantive content of the first dimension might change from one Congress to the next either in subtle ways depending on which policies come to the fore as agendas alter, or, more radically, when the most basic content defining issue space itself can vary.

II. Coding Roll Calls to Study Public Policy

These relationships cannot be observed, of course, without being able to parse policy into meaningful discrete categories, a task we have undertaken. Such a classification is a necessary step, of course, to understand cleavages among party and region in Congress by policy area. To investigate whether and how policy makes politics we have constructed a data set based on all roll calls in our period that allows us to identify legislation by policy category. Though we report here only on the House, we have coded all roll calls (5,252)—2,168 for the House and 3,084 for the Senate—from the 72nd Congress elected in 1930 through the 83rd Congress elected in 1952.³ (See Table 1).

In this effort, we are extending such prior analyses as those by Clausen and Cheney (1970) to demonstrate the distinct existence and effects of economic and social welfare policy dimensions (hypothesizing the former is influenced more by partisan differences and the latter by constituency constraints) or by Sinclair (1978) to show how policy content affected a shift from partisan to regional voting between 1933 to 1956. These works rely on Clausen's five-tier policy coding. Unfortunately, this approach aggregates excessively, making it difficult, at times impossible, to specify the independent impact of important policy differences. (Clausen 1973) By inserting labor votes inside the category of social welfare, for example, the scheme obscures the distinctiveness of roll call behavior in this policy domain (Katznelson, Geiger, and Kryder 1993; Poole and Rosenthal 1997: 111), thus, for example, making suspect the findings in Clausen and Cheney (1970) that lump them together under the this single banner. Other extant approaches to coding err on the other side, amounting to long inductive lists. Poole and Rosenthal's coding

³ An analysis of the Senate roll calls is planned for a subsequent paper. Our coding procedure was as follows. After reading the ICPSR codebook description, we looked up each roll call in the *Congressional Record* and cross-checked the description in the codebook. While ICPSR descriptions often were accurate, there were multiple instances when this description was insufficient for a policy coding. For example, for votes on amendments, the amendments were for the most part undefined in the codebooks and only the *CR* could provide information on the substantive policy. Given the description of the vote in the codebook and *CR*, we coded each roll call according to our coding scheme. The sequence of the coding followed the coding scheme. First, we coded by the first tier. The second tier then was selected from the subset of the first tier. And, finally, the third tier was chosen from the subset of the second tier. For example, a vote on adding one District Court would first be coded as *organization and scope* since it pertains directly to the organization and scope of the government. The second tier would then most appropriately be *government organization*, and the third tier, *judiciary*. To ensure that our coding scheme is robust, we have begun to conduct inter-coder reliability tests. Specifically, to date, one research assistant, who had not coded before, independently coded a 10% sample of all roll calls coded, a total 525 votes. Comparing the two sets of coded roll calls, there was 82.3% agreement. A research team of 5 followed-up by discussing disagreements and ambiguities, reached consensus about particular coding decisions, and then applied the rules arrived at to all the other germane roll calls.

scheme's extensive but unsorted inventory of policies, as an instance, yields such anomalies as categories for World War I and the Korean War but not for World War II, and an oddly non-equivalent set of classifications, placing 'Mediterranean pirates,' 'slavery,' and 'public works' on the same scale. (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997: 259-262)

Instead, we code congressional roll calls by policy area guided by visible criteria for the assemblage of categories. The approach we have adopted (see Appendix 1) is detailed enough to discriminate clusters of policy, avoiding problems of overaggregation, yet not so lengthy as to cease to be based on clear categorizations. The coding scheme thus provides policy classifications that can be applied and combined at different levels of aggregation, thus avoiding the pitfalls of approaches that either are too broad or too detailed and unwieldy. We arrange policies in three layered tiers, each, in turn, more differentiated than the prior level. The first tier incorporates broad categories, including *sovereignty*, the very existence, boundaries, and membership of the national regime; *organization and scope*, encompassing the regime's formal and informal institutions, terms of participation, and substantive reach; and the more familiar categories of *international relations* and *domestic affairs*. Each of these large classes further is divided into a subset (*organization and scope*, for example, is partitioned into three second tier categories: *government organization*, *representation*, and *constitutional amendments*). Each second tier category, in turn, is elaborated in fine-grained detail in a third tier of policy distinctions. Thus, as an illustration, *government organization* at this level includes *congressional organization*, *executive organization*, *impeachment/misconduct*, and *judiciary*. This approach to policy coding assigns a discrete policy code for each roll call in each tier.

Our data set was constructed by applying this approach to classification. Table 2 lists the number of roll calls coded for a given subset of policies. One notable pattern is that *government organization*, a centerpiece issue in the 1930s and 1940s, is prevalent throughout the period. A second is how long *civil rights* questions were kept off the agenda, not making it to the floor of the House until the late 1930s. Third, while *defense*, *geopolitics*, and *international political economy* votes come up throughout the period, we see the expected distinct increase in the early 1940s, one maintained throughout the remainder of the decade into the Cold War. Finally, *infrastructure/public works*, *public-works employment*, and *social insurance* are strongly prevalent during the early 1930s, as we would expect in the early years of the Depression and the start of the New Deal. Broadly, then, the sorting achieved by our coding is consistent with the huge historiography on the New Deal concerning when we should expect certain policies to be prevalent on the agenda in Congress.

III. Voting Space

Empirical research on Congress, especially the bulk of estimation and application of spatial voting models, often requires a measure of the ideal points or preference parameters of members. Our research estimates rankings of policy space along with preference scores for members of Congress. We have estimated the ideal points for each legislator using principal component analysis. We utilize Heckman and Snyder's linear scaling method (essentially factor loadings) they substitute for Poole and Rosenthal's non-linear NOMINATE model, which, they argue, better allows for "formal methods for determining the effective dimensionality or rank of the [roll call] attribute space." (Heckman and Snyder 1997: 143) Complicating this debate about method is the work of Clinton and Meirowitz (forthcoming) showing that existing preference estimation procedures do not fully incorporate the full structure of spatial voting models. Here, though, we are not particularly concerned with a determination of whether Heckman and Snyder scores or

Poole and Rosenthal's NOMINATE scores are superior, especially as both methods produce preference parameters that usually correlate at an extremely high level. In our Congresses, in any event, the linear estimation of ideal points is highly correlated with Poole and Rosenthal's NOMINATE (DW) scores. As Table 3 indicates, the correlations for the first dimension are all above 0.90. The correlations on the second dimension are lower, but still hover around 0.80.⁴

During the course of our period, the preferences of legislators proved quite stable from one Congress to the next. The findings reported in Table 4 presenting the correlations of ideal points in consecutive Congresses show all correlations on the first dimension to be above 0.93 indicating that with respect to the primary dimension member preferences did not change considerably (though the second dimension is not as highly correlated, the pairs still average 0.74). These results are consistent with other studies which also discover that members tend not to change the basis of their vote choice over the course of their congressional careers. (Poole 1998)

As it turns out, though, this pattern of short-term stability is consistent with important considerable shifts to the composition of legislator ideal points over time either because new members change the overall pattern or because the ideal positions of individual member may change within the voting space across time as the result of a number of potential mechanisms. These may include shifts in district composition as the result of redistricting, changing party strategies or, transformations to the policy agenda. It is the latter that interests us most here. Consider, as an example, the issue of civil rights Poole and Rosenthal rightly identify as crucial to the emergence of southern Democrats as a semi-autonomous voting bloc. During the 1930s, the Democratic party managed its strange bedfellows coalition of northern immigrant, ethnic, urban, and labor supporters linked to southern, native, Protestant, rural, voters in an age of Jim Crow and exclusion of blacks from the franchise by keeping civil rights legislation off the agenda and by excluding farm workers and maids, key categories of black workers, from every major piece of New Deal legislation, including the Wagner Act, Social Security, and the Fair Labor Standards Act. During the Second World War, this equilibrium was disturbed by demographic shifts that began to make African-Americans a significant voting bloc outside the South for the first time, by successful labor organizing conducted both by the AFL and CIO in the South, often on a multiracial basis, by the earliest victories on behalf of fair employment in war production achieved by a nascent civil rights movement, by the extension of absentee voting rights to soldiers of all races fighting overseas in what still was a segregated military, and by the Supreme Court decision in 1944 to outlaw the white primary. As the racial *status quo* began to be dislodged with the coming to the fore of civil rights issues, members from the Jim Crow South, unwilling to adjust their ideal points, increasingly were at odds with fellow Democrats. The result of this shift was the emergence effectively of a three-party Congress composed of southern Democrats, non-southern Democrats, and Republicans who did not align exclusively in a one-dimensional voting space.

We can discern this process of separation and the autonomous emergence of a southern Democratic bloc in Figures 1 to 12 that visually represent ideal point plots of legislators on the first and second dimension for the 72nd through the 83^d House.⁵ At the start of this period until the end of Roosevelt's first term, the Democrats can be seen to cluster together on the left side of the voting space while the Republicans occupy the right. By the 75th, 76th, and 77th House,

⁴ Clinton and Meirowitz's ideal points correlate at the .80 level or higher both with NOMINATE and with Heckman and Snyder's factor analysis.

⁵ Republicans are always on the right of the first dimension; southern Democrats on the top of the second dimension.

elected in the last three elections before American participation in the Second World War, southern Democrats clearly are partially removed from their nonsouthern colleagues, now concentrated at the top of the second dimension (a period, we will see, when labor votes were second, not first, dimension issues, since for southern members they were concerned with the heart of the political economy of segregation). Still, southern and northern members remained aligned on the first dimension, clearly distinct from Republicans. Subsequently, however, southern members not only can be observed to move away from nonsouthern Democrats on the second dimension, but they noticeably also are in motion along the first dimension in the conservative direction. By the 82nd House, the last during the presidency of Harry Truman, the three groupings had become distinct party-like clusters, forming a triangle of preferences. Southern Democrats now were at odds both from nonsouthern Democrats and Republicans on the second dimension. At the same time, while nonsouthern Democrats and Republicans were aligned on the second dimension, they were divided on the first.⁶

This transformation to dimensionality and partisanship under the impact of changes to the policy universe thus was more extended temporally and substantively than Poole and Rosenthal indicate. More generally, the development of what, in effect, was a three-party system makes it clear that congressional voting space cannot be represented as if the first dimension is always regnant or without close investigation of the second, or higher, dimensions in a manner closely in tune with an understanding of historical developments. At the same time, it cautions historians that their objects of analysis should be more substantively fine-grained and more temporally and institutionally precise.

IV. Policy Space

A powerful way to move in this direction is to examine the dimensionality of policy space not only by asking how many dimensions are necessary to define it but by also utilizing a detailed policy coding scheme like the one we have developed to provide a substantive interpretation of the content of the roll call parameters.

To identify the number of dimensions of the policy space, we first calculated the factor loadings without any restrictions on the number of factors, essentially allowing the program to choose the number of parameters. Table 5 lists the up to the first six eigenvalues when calculated for each Congress along with the proportion of the variance explained by each new dimension. While the number of dimensions estimated for various Congresses ranged from a high of 14 to a low of 2, we kept only the number of dimensions that explain at least 10 per cent of the variance (this number is somewhat *ad hoc*, picked because it is possible that some of the variance being explained by higher dimensions is the result of error, but by placing the threshold here we can be reasonably assured something real is going on).

The results are striking. In only two Congresses, the 76th and 79th, is over 80 per cent of the variance accounted for by the first dimension, and even in these outlier instances a strong second dimension is present in the policy space. The 77th and 81st also were characterized only by two parameters above our 10 per cent threshold, but the second dimension does much more of the work. And in the remaining seven Congresses—the 72nd, 73rd, 74th, 75th, 78th, 80th, 82nd, and 83rd—three dimensions were significantly present. Of course, these findings open up more

⁶ Interestingly, with the results of the 1952 election, southern Democrats temporarily moved back toward the left side of the first dimension while remaining in a distinct position on the second.

questions than they answer, providing us with a much more variegated puzzle than Poole and Rosenthal's leaner portrayal or Heckman and Snyder's more plentiful one. Once again, these results strongly indicate that both temporality and policy content matter a great deal, in ways we now can begin to try to understand.⁷

In order to identify the substantive content of the policy space, we reestimated the factor loadings along with rotated factors (orthogonal). These loadings, as they match up to roll call votes, then are used to identify the types of policies that characterize each dimension. In order to make this connection between high factor loadings on a given dimension and the substance of the policy, we have constructed a data set that allows us to identify legislation by policy category. The results are reported in Table 6, a first-cut effort to match policy content to factor scores in order to identify the policy content of these dimensions. We proceeded by identifying the roll calls that scored high on the dimensions above our threshold of 10 per cent, and, for each group, matched them with our substantive coding (utilizing our most detailed level, the third tier codings). This method allowed us to systematically identify each dimension, taking advantage of independently coded roll calls.

There is quite a range of relationships between the policy content of congressional roll calls and the dimensionality of voting behavior by members. Three features stand out most prominently to challenge future scholarship. First, only in about half the issues can roll call behavior be accounted for exclusively by the dominant first dimension. The other policy areas either require two parameters or load high on the second or third dimension. Second, there is a good deal of variation both in the issues coming to the fore and in the relative dimensional coherence of different Congresses. Underneath aggregate patterns of behavior lies a great diversity defined by variation both in time and substance. Third, though there is a high consistency in the way a given issues loads from one Congress to another, there are interesting instances where the meaning of a particular policy area appears to vary (as examples, immigration issues appear regularly as a second dimension question, but once as a third dimension issue; and economic regulation, in the first three New Deal Congresses, appears, respectively, as a combination of the first and third, the second and first, and the third dimension). At minimum, such findings are guides to much more finely distinguished analysis both by political scientists and historians than has been possible heretofore.

⁷ In addition to the amount of variance explained by each factor, we also have calculated the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). This test shows that increasing the number of dimensions improves the fit of the model. Furthermore, the improvement in fit, from one dimension to the next, does not drop off significantly after the first dimension. In fact, for many Congresses, the fit improves considerably from one to two dimensions as well as from two to three dimensions. These findings provide support for the argument that a unidimensional policy space is not sufficient, while a more than three-dimensional policy space does not provide a good fit for the New Deal-Fair Deal Congresses.

Although Heckman and Snyder claim that Poole and Rosenthal rely upon "ad hoc" measures to test for dimensionality, we believe that no single test is sufficient evidence to determine the attribute space of roll call voting. Methods such as proportional reduction in error (Poole and Rosenthal 1997) and formal statistical tests, which produce "rigorous statistical criterion for estimating the rank of the model" (Heckman and Snyder 199: 157) all have limitations. Thus the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) model which we utilize and is one of the tests proposed by Heckman and Snyder estimates nearly twice as many factors (7 to 8 compared to 3 to 4) for the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), they also advocate. Whether one test is more appropriate than the other is an open question.

V. Dimensional Content

Overall, based on the application of factor analysis to our data, we have found that distinct groups of policies load high on different factors, that in most cases these patterns persist across most Congresses, and that in this epoch two or three (rather than one or multiple) dimensions are needed to account for roll call behavior. A basic assumption commonly accepted at face value is that the first dimension represents party and ideology while the second connotes region (as factor analysis is entirely inductive, naming of dimensions always is a coding act by researchers). Based on the pattern we discern in Table 6 as well as our investigation, in particular, of civil rights roll calls ('African-Americans' and 'Voting Rights' in Table 6), we are not convinced of this persistence of content throughout. That is, we are no longer sure that the first factor can be described persistently in terms of party and left-right ideology. In particular, we briefly examine the coalitions that formed around civil rights and how such coalitions can affect the substantive interpretation of the factor loadings. Civil rights policy provides a good basis for this analysis since, as noted, we have quite a strong historical understanding of how such questions helped split the Democratic party by region, opening possibilities for nonsouthern Democrats to align with Republicans in opposition to southern Democrats

To test whether this coalition is represented in voting patterns we have estimated several probit regressions on civil rights roll calls. Our dependent variable is the vote on the bill. In addition to a constant, we also include two independent variables: southern and nonsouthern Democrats. We treat southerners as members who represent the eleven state South: the old Confederacy of Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. Nonsouthern Democrats are members who are Democrats and represent constituencies in other states. Since almost all southern legislators are Democrats, we do not include an interaction effect between region and Democrat. We anticipate southern Democrats to vote in opposition to nonsouthern Democrats and Republicans on civil rights questions.

One striking pattern immediately becomes apparent. Contradicting the expected outcome, southerners and nonsouthern Democrats voted together throughout the 75th, 76th, 77th, and 78th Congresses. In fact, they significantly opposed Republicans on 10 out of 13 civil rights votes. This is suggestive of the willingness of nonsouthern Democrats to suspend their civil rights preferences in order to maintain a common party front where possible with their southern coalition partners in the Democratic party at the time the New Deal was legislating its most significant domestic policy initiatives. Strikingly, this pattern began to change in the 79th Congress. While Republicans continued to oppose southern Democrats, nonsouthern Democrats did not vote significantly as a group in either direction. By the 81st Congress non-southern Democrats and Republicans, voting together on 5 out of 9 roll calls and had begun to compose a civil rights coalition in opposition to southern Democrats.

These results suggest that high first loadings on civil rights votes in the early Congresses indeed were the result of party line voting. But these findings also suggest that high loadings on the first factor in later Congresses, particularly the 81st, may (we underscore 'may' since we continue to be both surprised and intrigued by this result) represent regional rather than party divisions. A close look at the results in Table 6 matching of dimensionality and policy content for this Congress (one of only two where the variance in member behavior is accounted for by two dimensions exclusively) provides some confirmation. We can note that whereas civil rights issues load on the first dimension, a host of policy questions that ordinarily are thought to be party/ideology issues—including the tariff, social insurance, appropriations, and fiscal policy—load here on the second.

This counterintuitive pattern supports the hypothesis that *in this particular Congress the first dimension in fact denotes region rather than party*. Even if, as we believe, this inversion in content is contained in this single instance, there is a more general lesson to be learned. When, and if, comparable patterns emerge in roll call data, scholars must take care to be very cautious when interpreting the substantive meaning of particular factor loadings.

VI. Concluding Coda

We trust we have shown not only that it is possible to find our way back to the question of whether, and how, policy makes politics, but what the payoffs might look like. We have demonstrated that the subject can be revived by moving beyond two impediments: the absence of usable coding schemes with which to organize the universe of public policy issues considered by Congress and the tendency to aggregate roll calls without attention to policy, thus leading to broadly general conclusions about voting dimensionality which, while accurate, also can manage to be misleading.

Clearing away these barriers, we have discerned changes to patterns of roll call behavior from the 1930s to the early 1950s that complement but move beyond familiar portraits of the stability in the behavior of legislators. We have found important variations over time both to the content of voting space and the ideal positions of individual legislators. We have ascertained that two, sometimes three, but not fewer or more dimensions are required to capture most of the variation in legislative voting behavior. We have identified shifts from Congress to Congress in the intersection of policy content and the dimensionality of member voting. And, more tentatively, we have raised questions about the continuity of the content defining the dimensions of policy voting.

Proceeding by joining a historical and substantive sensibility to analytical studies of Congress, we have attempted, in short, to move beyond the too limited (and, to our taste, too ahistorical) debate about one dimension or many to more precise and focused questions about the manner in which history and policy content matter to fundamental issues in political representation. We conclude, most broadly, that yes, policy does make politics, but not in ways that either are obvious or necessarily persist across time. If the substance of policy matters, so, too, does policy history in a manner far more fine-grained and challenging than most scholars of Congress (or historians) have yet to credit or take into account. Clearly, there is much work that systematic students of congressional behavior, political historians, and students of American political development might perform together.

Bibliography

- Brinkley, Alan. 1995. *The End of Reform*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Burnham, Walter Dean. 1970. *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Clausen, Aage. 1973. *How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Clausen, Aage and Richard B. Cheney. 1970. "A Comparative Analysis of Senate House Voting on Economic and Welfare Policy, 1953-1964." 44 (1): 138-152.
- Clinton, Joshua D. and Adam Meirowitz. Forthcoming. "A Note Relating Ideal Point Estimates to the Spatial Model." *Political Analysis*.
- Cragg, J. and Donald S. 1995. "Factor Analysis Under More General Unknown Form." In G.S. Maddala, P.C.B. Phillips, and T.N. Srinivasan, eds., *Advances in Econometrics and Quantitative Economics*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Basil Blackwell.
- Cragg, J. and Donald S. 1996. "Inferring The Rank of A Matrix." *Journal of Econometrics*. 76: 223-251.
- Hartz, Louis. 1955. *The Liberal Tradition in America; an Interpretation of American Political Thought since the Revolution*. New York: Harcourt Brace.
- Heckman, James J. and James M. Snyder, Jr. 1997. "Linear Probability Models of the Demand for Attributes with an Empirical Application to Estimating the Preferences of Legislators." *RAND Journal of Economics*. 28(0): 142-189.
- Katznelson, Ira, Kim Geiger, and Daniel Kryder. 1993. "Limiting Liberalism: The Southern Veto in Congress, 1933-1950." *Political Science Quarterly*. 108(2): 283-306.
- Kennedy, David M. 1999. *Freedom From Fear: The American People In Depression and War, 1929-1945*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Key, V.O. 1949. *Southern Politics in State and Nation*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Leuchtenburg, William E. 1948. "Farewell to the New Deal: The Lingering of a Fable." *The New Leader*.
- Leuchtenburg, William E. 1963. *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Lowi, Theodore J. 1964. "American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory." *World Politics*. 16(4): 677-715.
- Lowi, Theodore J. 1970. "Decision Making vs. Policy Making: Toward an Antidote for Technocracy." *Public Administration Review*. 30: 314-325.

- Lowi, Theodore J. 1972. "Four Systems of Policy, Politics, and Choice." *Public Administration Review*. 32: 298-310.
- MacKuen, Michael B., Robert S. Erikson, James A. Stimson. 1989. "Macropartisanship." *The American Political Science Review*. 83(4): 1125-1142.
- Mayhew, David R. 1974. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Mayhew, David R. 1966. *Party Loyalty Among Congressmen; the Difference Between Democrats and Republicans, 1947-1962*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Myrdal, Gunnar. 1944. *An American Dilemma; the Negro Problem and Modern Democracy*. New York: Harper & Brothers.
- Patterson, James T. 1966. "A Conservative Coalition Forms in Congress, 1933-1939." *The Journal of American History*. 52 (4): 757-772.
- Patterson, James T. 1967. *Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal: The Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933-1939*. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press.
- Poole, Keith T. 1968. "Changing Minds? Not in Congress!" Unpublished manuscript.
- Poole, Keith T. and Howard Rosenthal. 1997. *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Porter, David L. 1980. *Congress and the Waning of the New Deal*. Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press.
- Shelly II, Mack. 1983. *The Permanent Majority: The Conservative Coalition in the United States Congress*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- Sinclair, Barbara. 1978. "From Party Voting to Regional Fragmentation: The House of Representatives." *American Politics Quarterly*. 6: 125-46
- Sinclair, Barbara. 1982. *Congressional Realignment, 1925-1978*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Smith, Rogers M. 1997. *Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in US History*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Stimson, James A., Michael B. MacKuen, Robert S. Erikson. 1995. "Dynamic Representation." *The American Political Science Review*. 89(3): 543-565.
- Turner, Julius. 1970 [1950]. *Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress* (revised edition by Edward V. Scheiner, Jr.). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Roland Young. 1956. *Congressional Politics in the Second World War*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Table 1: Number of Roll calls Coded by Congress												
Congress:	72nd	73rd	74th	75th	76th	77th	78th	79th	80th	81st	82nd	83rd
House	123	143	212	158	227	152	156	231	163	275	181	147
Senate	280	228	193	174	266	192	220	244	248	455	313	271

Table 2: Frequency of Roll calls in the House Coded by Policy Area (Sub-set of Policies)												
Congress:	72nd	73rd	74th	75th	76th	77th	78th	79th	80th	81st	82nd	83rd
Civil Rights	0	0	0	4	2	3	3	4	1	9	0	0
Gov't Org.	18	13	17	22	22	5	19	20	14	23	19	15
Defense	5	1	6	3	16	26	3	17	4	10	14	3
Geopolitics	4	6	11	4	14	13	14	13	13	30	23	13
I.P.E.	5	3	4	3	7	1	2	8	5	13	3	5
Farmers/Farmin g Support	7	10	8	7	7	9	11	3	4	8	5	6
Infrastructure/P ublic Works	2	5	14	2	3	0	1	4	0	4	4	10
Wage/Price Controls	0	0	0	0	0	5	4	22	4	5	14	0
Labor Markets/Unions	0	3	0	8	10	4	2	14	6	10	3	4
Public-Works Employment	2	4	2	5	3	2	0	1	0	0	0	0
Social Insurance	0	4	5	1	3	0	0	3	3	6	3	5

Table 3
Pearson Correlation: Linear Estimation of Ideal Points and NOMINATE (DW)
House of Representatives

Congress	1st Dimension	2nd Dimension
72 nd	0.97	0.90
73 rd	0.96	0.41
74 th	0.97	0.44
75 th	0.97	0.77
76 th	0.97	0.85
77 th	0.94	0.90
78 th	0.97	0.94
79 th	0.97	0.94
80 th	0.91	0.83
81 st	0.95	0.94
82 nd	0.96	0.93
83 rd	0.91	0.86

Table 4
Pearson Correlation: Steadiness of Ideal Points Over Time
House of Representatives

Congresses	1st Dimension	2nd Dimension	Number of Legislators
72, 73	0.96	0.045	256
73, 74	0.95	0.80	318
74, 75	0.96	0.31	325
75, 76	0.98	0.88	293
76, 77	0.98	0.91	339
77, 78	0.95	0.91	315
78, 79	0.96	0.92	331
79, 80	0.96	0.81	308
80, 81	0.95	0.84	299
81, 82	0.97	0.92	353
82, 83	0.93	0.84	332

Table 5: Dimensions of the Policy Space by Congress

Congress	72nd		73rd		74th		75th		76th		77th	
Dim.'s Estimated	9		7		5		5		2		4	
Dim.'s Selected	3		3		3		3		2		2	
Dimension	<i>Eigenvalue</i>	<i>Proportion</i>	<i>Eigenvalue</i>	<i>Proportion</i>	<i>Eigenvalue</i>	<i>Proportion</i>	<i>Eigenvalue</i>	<i>Proportion</i>	<i>Eigenvalue</i>	<i>Proportion</i>	<i>Eigenvalue</i>	<i>Proportion</i>
1	37.27	0.34	65.41	0.51	109.56	0.57	66.91	0.50	138.50	0.84	57.94	0.59
2	23.20	0.21	19.97	0.15	33.47	0.17	34.58	0.26	25.49	0.15	22.17	0.22
3	11.08	0.10	13.15	0.10	19.69	0.10	16.25	0.12			9.55	0.09
4	9.76	0.09	11.06	0.08	14.97	0.07	7.32	0.05			7.33	0.07
5	8.20	0.07	8.12	0.06	11.29	0.05	6.92	0.05				
6	6.63	0.06	5.43	0.04								
Congress	78th		79th		80th		81st		82nd		83rd	
Dim.'s Estimated	6		2		5		3		5		14	
Dim.'s Selected	3		2		3		2		3		3	
Dimension	<i>Eigenvalue</i>	<i>Proportion</i>	<i>Eigenvalue</i>	<i>Proportion</i>	<i>Eigenvalue</i>	<i>Proportion</i>	<i>Eigenvalue</i>	<i>Proportion</i>	<i>Eigenvalue</i>	<i>Proportion</i>	<i>Eigenvalue</i>	<i>Proportion</i>
1	61.86	0.58	102.75	0.83	51.54	0.40	118.34	0.60	84.04	0.55	38.43	0.34
2	17.00	0.16	20.24	0.16	33.98	0.26	72.53	0.37	27.38	0.18	17.63	0.16
3	11.68	0.11			26.60	0.20	4.11	0.02	18.58	0.12	11.19	0.10
4	7.02	0.06			8.46	0.06			12.14	0.08	6.97	0.06
5	4.72	0.04			6.39	0.05			8.84	0.05	6.17	0.05
6	2.69	0.02									5.62	0.05

Table 6: Policy Content by Congress		
Congress	Dimension	Policy Content
72 1931-32	1 1, 2 1, 3 2, 1 2 2, 3 3, 2 3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Elections • Diplomacy • Trade/Tariffs • Farmers/Farming Support • Post-Office • Monetary • Military Pensions/Benefits, Public-Works Employment • Social Regulation • Business/Capital Markets • Congressional Organization, Executive Organization • Immigration and Naturalization • Civilian Health • Appropriations • Defense Organization • Transfers
73 1933-34	1 1, 2 1, 3 2 2, 3 3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Territories and Colonies • Congressional Organization • Elections • Agricultural Technology • Post-Office • Appropriations, Business/Capital Markets • Social Insurance • Diplomacy • Trade/Tariffs • Infrastructure • Appropriations, Fiscal/Taxation, Bus./Capital Markets, Monetary • Farmers/Farming Support • Corporatism • Economic Regulation • Impeachment/Misconduct • Labor Markets/Unions • Immigration and Naturalization
74 1935-36	1 1, 2 2, 1 3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Executive Organization • Diplomacy/Intelligence • Tariff • Farmers/Farming Support • Corporatism, Infrastructure/Public Works, National Resources • Appropriations, Fiscal/Taxation, Monetary, Business/Capital Markets • Social Insurance, Housing, Military Pensions, Public-Works Employment • Defense Organization • Transportation • Naval Organization, Military Installations • Economic Regulation • Groups and Interests

<p>75 1937-38</p>	<p>1</p> <p>1, 2</p> <p>1, 3</p> <p>2</p> <p>2, 1</p> <p>3, 1</p> <p>3</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • African-Americans • Executive Organization • Elections • Tariff • Agricultural technology • Transportation • National Resources • Fiscal/Taxation, Labor Markets/Unions • Business/Capital Markets • Housing • Indian Removal and Compensation • Congressional Organization, Judiciary • Environment, Infrastructure • Social Insurance, Transfers • Appropriations • Public-Works Employment • Navy Organization • Farmers/Farming Support • Economic Regulation
<p>76 1939-40</p>	<p>1</p> <p>2, 1</p> <p>2</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Loyalty • African-Americans • Indian Removal and Compensation, Territories and Colonies • Executive Organization, Judiciary, Impeachment/Misconduct • Elections, Census/Appportionment • Navy, Defense Organization • Diplomacy, Foreign Aid, Trade/Tariffs • Agricultural Technology, Farmers/Farming Support • Infrastructure, Transportation, Social Knowledge • Appropriations, Monetary, Bus./Capital Markets, Fiscal/Taxation • Housing, Military Pensions, Public-Works Employment • Commemorations and National Culture • National Resources • Immigration and Naturalization • Congressional Organization • Conscription/Enlistment • Environment • Labor Markets/Unions • Children, Social Insurance, Transfers
<p>77 1941-42</p>	<p>1</p> <p>1, 2</p> <p>2, 1</p> <p>2</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Voting Rights • Executive Organization • Census/Appportionment • Navy Organization • Diplomacy • Tariff • Corporatism, Transportation • Monetary, Business/Capital Markets • Farmers/Farming Support • Appropriations • Economic Regulation • Immigration and Naturalization

<p>78 1943-44</p>	<p>1</p> <p>2, 1</p> <p>2</p> <p>1, 3</p> <p>3</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Voting Rights • Diplomacy/Intelligence • Agricultural Technology, Farmers/Farming Support, Fishing and Livestock • National Resources, Transportation, Wages and Price Controls • Appropriations • Housing • International Organization • Congressional Organization, Judiciary • Labor Markets/Unions • Crime • Executive Organization • Fiscal Taxation • Defense Organization
<p>79 1945-46</p>	<p>1</p> <p>1, 2</p> <p>1, 2</p> <p>2</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Loyalty • African-Americans, Voting Rights • Judiciary • Census/Apportionment • Conscription, Defense Organization • Diplomacy, Foreign Aid • Tariff • Agricultural Technology, Farmers/Farming Support • Corporatism, Interstate Compacts/Federalism, Infrastructure, National Resources, Post-Office, Wage and Price Controls • Appropriations, Economic Regulation • Public Works Employment • Executive Organization • Economic International Organizations • Transportation • Business/Capital Markets • Social Insurance • Housing • Immigration and Naturalization • Labor Markets/Unions
<p>80 1947-48</p>	<p>1</p> <p>1, 2</p> <p>1, 3</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tariffs • Agricultural Technology, Farmers/Farming Support, Fishing and Livestock • Appropriations, Business/Capital Markets, Fiscal/Taxation, Economic Regulation • Housing, Social Insurance • Wage and Price Controls • Loyalty • Labor Markets/Unions • Defense Organization

<p>81 1949-50</p>	<p>1</p> <p>1, 2</p> <p>2, 1</p> <p>2</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • African-Americans, Voting Rights • State Admission/Union Composition • Federalism and Terms of Office • Conscription, Navy Organization • Foreign Aid, International Organizations • Post-Office, Wage and Price Controls, Social Knowledge • Congressional Organization • Labor Markets/Unions, Economic Regulation • Housing, Military Pensions/Benefits • Diplomacy • Indian Removal and Compensation • Infrastructure, National Resources • Commemorations and National Culture • Executive Organization, Judiciary • Groups and Interests • Defense Organization • Tariff • Farmers/Farming Support • Transportation • Appropriations, Fiscal/Taxation • Disaster, Education, Social Insurance
<p>82 1951-52</p>	<p>1</p> <p>1, 2</p> <p>2, 1</p> <p>2</p> <p>2, 3</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Executive Organization, Judiciary • Defense Organization • Foreign Aid • Agricultural Technology • Environment, Infrastructure/Public Works, National Resources • Appropriations, Fiscal/Taxation • Housing • Diplomacy/Intelligence • Wage and Price Controls • Trade/Tariffs • Farmers/Farming Support • Immigration and Naturalization • Congressional Organization • Labor Markets/Unions
<p>83 1953-54</p>	<p>1</p> <p>1, 2</p> <p>1, 3</p> <p>2, 1</p> <p>2</p> <p>3, 2</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Congressional Organization, Executive Organization • Air Force Organization • Infrastructure • Fiscal/Taxation, Economic Regulation • Education, Military Pensions • Farmers/Farming Support • Appropriations, Business/Capital Markets • Tariffs • Labor Markets/Unions • Social Insurance • Interstate Compacts/Federalism • Housing • Diplomacy

Figure 1: 72nd House Legislator Ideal Points




Figure 2: 73rd House Legislator Ideal Points




Figure 3: 74th House Legislator Ideal Points




Figure 4: 75th House Legislator Ideal Points




Figure 5: 76th House Legislator Ideal Points




Figure 6: 77th House Legislator Ideal Points




Figure 7: 78th House Legislator Ideal Points




Figure 8: 79th House Legislator Ideal Points




Figure 9: 80th House Legislator Ideal Points




Figure 10: 81st House Legislator Ideal Points




Figure 11: 82nd House Legislator Ideal Points





Figure 12: 83rd House Legislator Ideal Points



Appendix 1: Policy Classification by Levels

Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3
A. Sovereignty	<p>(1) <u>Liberty</u>:</p> <p>(2) <u>Membership and Nation</u>:</p> <p>(3) <u>Civil Rights</u>:</p> <p>(4) <u>Boundaries</u>:</p>	<p>(Loyalty) (Religion)</p> <p>(Commemorations and National Culture) (Immigration and Naturalization)</p> <p>(African-Americans) (Native Americans) (Other minority groups) (Women) (Voting Rights)</p> <p>(Frontier settlement) (Indian removal and compensation) (State admission/Union Composition) (Territories and Colonies)</p>
B. Organization and Scope	<p>(5) <u>Government Organization</u>:</p> <p>(6) <u>Representation</u>:</p> <p>(7) <u>Constitutional Amendments</u>:</p>	<p>(Congressional organization) (Executive organization) (Impeachment/misconduct) (Judiciary)</p> <p>(Census/Apportionment) (Elections) (Groups and interests)</p> <p>(Federalism and terms of office) (Political participation and rights) (Other)</p>

<p>D. Domestic Affairs</p>	<p>(11) <u>Agriculture and Food:</u></p> <p>(12) <u>Planning and Resources:</u></p> <p>(13) <u>Political Economy:</u></p> <p>(14) <u>Social Policy:</u></p>	<p>(Agricultural technology) (Farmers/Farming Support) (Fishing and Livestock)</p> <p>(Corporatism) (Environment) (Infrastructure/public works) (National resources) (Social knowledge) (Post-office) (Transportation) (Wage and price controls) (Interstate compacts/Federalism)</p> <p>(Appropriations) (Omnibus) (Business/Capital Markets) (Fiscal/taxation) (Labor markets/Unions) (Monetary) (Regulation, Economic)</p> <p>(Children/youth) (Crime) (Disaster) (Education) (Handicapped/Disabilities) (Health, Civilian) (Housing) (Military Pensions/benefits) (Public-works employment) (Regulation, Social) (Social Insurance) (Transfers) (Urban affairs)</p>
<p><i>E. District of Columbia</i></p>		
<p><i>F. Housekeeping</i></p>		
<p><i>G. Quasi-private</i></p>		

Recent ISERP Working Papers

01-01 "Pathways of Property Transformation: Enterprise Network Careers in Hungary, 1988-2000 Outline of an Analytic Strategy," David Stark, Sociology, Columbia and Balázs Vedres, Sociology, Columbia

01-02 "Policy Space and voting Coalitions in Congress: the Bearing of Policy on Politics, 1930-1954," Ira Katznelson, John Lapinski, and Rose Razaghian, Political Science, Columbia

01-03 "Doing Fractions: An analysis of Partisan ship in Post-Socialist Russia," Andrew D. Buck, Sociology, Columbia

01-04 "Opposite-Sex Twins and Adolescent Same-Sex Attraction," Peter Bearman, Sociology/ISERP and Hannah Brückner, Sociology, Yale

01-05 "On the Uneven Evolution of Human Know-How," Richard R. Nelson, Business/SIPA, Columbia

01-06 "Self-Control for the Righteous: toward a Theory of Luxury Pre-Commitment," Ran Kivetz, Business, Columbia and Itamar Simonson, Business, Stanford

01-07 "Distributing Intelligence and Organizing Diversity in New Media Projects," Monique Girard, ISERP, Columbia and David Stark, Sociology, Columbia

01-08 "Agricultural Biotechnology's Complementary Intellectual Assets," Gregory D. Graff, Agricultural and Resource Economics, Berkeley, Gordon C. Rausser, Agricultural Economics, Berkeley and Arthur A. Small, SIPA/Earth Institute, Columbia

EDITORIAL BOARD

Karen Barkey, Sociology

Peter Bearman, Sociology/ISERP

Alan Brinkley, History

Charles Cameron, Political Science

Alessandra Casella, Economics

Ester Fuchs, Political Science/SIPA

John Huber, Political Science

Ira Katznelson, Political
Science/History

Herbert Klein, History

Mary Clare Lennon, Public Health

Mahmood Mamdani, Anthropology

Marianthi Markatou, Statistics

William McAllister, ISERP

Kathryn Neckerman, ISERP

Richard Nelson, Business/SIPA

Elliot Sclar, Architecture, Planning
and Preservation/SIPA

Seymour Spilerman, Sociology

Charles Tilly, Sociology

Harrison White, Sociology

ADMINISTRATION

Peter Bearman, Director

Kathryn Neckerman, Associate Director

Leslie Wright, Assistant Director

Institute for Social and Economic

Research and Policy

Columbia University

International Affairs Building

420 West 118 Street, 8th Floor

Mail Code 3355

New York, NY 10027

telephone: 212-854-3081

facsimile: 212-854-8925

e-mail: iserp@columbia.edu

URL: <http://www.columbia.edu/cu/iserp>

