Promises under Pressure: Reassurance and Burden-Sharing in Asymmetric Alliances

Brian Dylan Blankenship

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

2018
ABSTRACT

Promises under Pressure: Reassurance and Burden-Sharing in Asymmetric Alliances

Brian Dylan Blankenship

Great power patrons frequently reassure allies of their protection, whether by stationing troops abroad, visiting allied countries, or making public statements. In the case of the United States, observers and practitioners alike have emphasized the need to instill confidence in U.S. allies. However, allied reassurance is fundamentally puzzling because it gives away a key source of bargaining leverage: the threat of abandonment. Patrons should ideally strive to limit the extent to which they are perceived as committed to allies, lest they encourage allies to free-ride on their protection and contribute little to the common defense. Existing literature tends to either treat reassurance as a secondary effect of deterrence, or to focus on understanding how patrons can reassure their allies rather than why. Studies that do provide explanations for reassurance, for their part, often regard reassurance as strategically suboptimal, and emphasize domestic political factors that drive reassurance. The causes of reassurance are thus poorly understood.

I argue that although reassurance can have adverse consequences, patrons have incentives to reassure to the extent that allies have the capacity to exit the alliance. The more credible an ally’s threat to pursue outside options, and the more costs that doing so would impose on the patron, the more reassurance it will receive. Patrons thus face a dilemma, trading off between withholding reassurance to drive hard bargains with allies and reassuring allies to dissuade them from exiting the alliance. This dilemma may be mitigated, however, if a patron can make its assurances conditional on allied burden-
sharing by combining its assurances with threats of abandonment. These threats are more potent to the extent that a patron faces domestic pressure to retrench from its foreign commitments, and that allies face severe threat environments. I test the theory using a mixed-method approach that combines statistical analysis of an original dataset on American reassurance and allied burden-sharing between 1950 and 2010 with qualitative historical case studies.

In Chapters 1 and 2, I introduce the concepts of alliance reassurance and burden-sharing and review the literature on both concepts. I argue that reassurance is puzzling in light of existing theories of alliance bargaining which stress the threat of abandonment as a source of leverage. The “reassurance dilemma” that patrons face, however, is that withholding reassurance may encourage allies to distance themselves from the alliance and seek outside options.

In Chapter 3, I present a theory of bargaining leverage in asymmetric alliances in order to identify the conditions under which this dilemma is most severe—and thus to explain variation in patron reassurance and allied burden-sharing. I posit that reassurance serves the purpose of discouraging allies from leaving the alliance; the more credible allies’ threats of exit, the more reassurance they will receive. However, patrons can make their assurances conditional on allies’ burden-sharing efforts if their own threat of exiting the alliance is credible as well. I present a simple formal model illustrating both the tradeoffs between reassurance and burden-sharing, as well as the conditions under which patrons
are more likely to reassure and allies are more likely to increase their contributions to the alliance. I then introduce hypotheses for testing the theory’s observable implications.

Chapter 4 presents the quantitative analysis on the determinants of patron reassurance and allied burden-sharing. First, using an original dataset of U.S. reassurance collected and analyzed with automated text analysis, I use statistical models to identify correlates of U.S. willingness to offer reassurances. Second, I study allied burden-sharing using data on allies’ military spending, support for U.S. military bases, and participation in U.S. foreign military interventions.

In Chapters 5-8, I conduct case studies on U.S. reassurance and burden-sharing pressure toward West Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom during the 1960s and 1970s. Process-tracing of these cases shows that the United States saw reassurance as a way of discouraging its allies from pursuing outside options—in particular nuclear weapons and rapprochement with the Soviet Union. However, the United States was simultaneously able to extract significant burden-sharing efforts, especially from West Germany and South Korea owing to their geographic vulnerability, and during the early 1970s due to doubts about U.S. reliability in the aftermath of the Vietnam War.

Finally, Chapter 9 concludes with a summary of the analysis, as well as a discussion of implications and avenues for future research. My findings suggest that by withholding reassurance and deliberately casting doubt on its protection, a patron makes its allies prone to reconsidering their reliance on it and to instead pursue outside options.
Table of Contents

List of Charts, Graphs, and Illustrations ii
Acknowledgements iii

Chapter 1: Introduction 1
Chapter 2: Reassurance and Burden-Sharing in Alliances 14
Chapter 3: The Strategic Logic of Reassurance and Burden-Sharing 31
Chapter 4: Quantitative Analysis: Reassurance and Burden-Sharing in U.S. Alliances 82
Chapter 5: From Tough Love to a Soft Touch: The U.S.-West German Alliance, 1961-1974 113
Chapter 6: Burden-Sharing in the Special Relationship: The U.S.-UK Alliance, 1961-1976 146
Chapter 7: “They Live at Our Sufferance”: The U.S.-ROK Alliance, 1965-1976 169
Chapter 8: The U.S.-Japan Alliance in the Era of the Guam Doctrine, 1965-1976 196
Chapter 9: Conclusion 216

Bibliography 223

Appendix A1: Supplementary Quantitative Analysis 242
Appendix A2: Presidential Statements Codebook 269
List of Charts, Graphs, Illustrations

Tables

Table 3.1: Comparison of my theory to that of Snyder (1997). 44
Table 3.2: Summary of theory. 45
Table 3.3: Observable implications of the theory. 50
Table 3.4: Mechanisms by which H1-H6 affect patron reassurance and allied burden-sharing. 73
Table 3.5: U.S. allies included in the sample, Correlates of War list. 79
Table 4.1: Main results for variation in reassurance across allies. 92
Table 4.2: Main results for variation in reassurance over time. 93
Table 4.3: Results for the relationship between material and political constraints. 95
Table 4.4: Results for the causal mechanisms. 96
Table 4.5: Results for change in military expenditures over time. 104
Table 4.6: Results for logarithmized military expenditures. 106
Table 4.7: Results for military expenditures as a percentage of GDP. 107
Table 4.8: Results for allied support for U.S. invasion of Iraq. 110
Table 4.9: Results for host-nation support, 1995-2002. 111

Diagrams

Figure 3.1: The Reassurance and Burden-Sharing Game 51
Figure 3.2: Resource constraints and reassurance. 61
Acknowledgements

I owe a debt to more people than I can possibly recall for this project. First and foremost has been my advisor, Robert Jervis. Professor Jervis’s consistent support, feedback, and guidance was invaluable during all stages of the project. I hope some of his intellectual curiosity and breadth of knowledge has rubbed off on me. The project benefitted from the guidance and feedback of numerous other faculty, both at Columbia and outside it: Richard Betts, Jon Brown, Allison Carnegie, Han Dorussen, Page Fortna, Nikhar Gaikwad, Joel Hillison, Koji Kagotani, Josh Kertzer, Raymond Kuo, Alexander Lanoszka, Roseanne McManus, Tonya Putnam, Jack Snyder, Dina Spechler, Johannes Urpelainen, and Keren Yarhi-Milo.

I would like to thank many of my Columbia colleagues who both provided enormously helpful feedback and helped keep me in good spirits—including, but not limited to: Seung Cho, Alex de la Paz, Rob Goodman, Kate Jackson, Matt Kantrowitz, Jeff Lax, Erik Lin-Greenberg, Shawn Lonergan, Renanah Miles, Theo Milonopoulos, and Asli Saygili. Similar thanks go to the many friends I met during my time at the Summer Workshop for the Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy (SWAMOS), the Institute for Qualitative and Multi-Method Research (IQMR), and the RAND Corporation, including: Ben Denison, Alex Evans, Jean Nava, Cullen Nutt, Reid Pauly, Mara Pillinger, Mike Poznansky, Jen Spindel, Alex Stark, and Arzan Tarapore. Finally, I would like to thank my friends outside of academia—Shadman Ahmed, Nathan Berbesque, Alex Brueggman, Spencer Chenhall, Melissa Durkin, Ryan Huffman, Salman Iqbal, Warwick Mannington, Al Wood—for reminding me of life beyond work. Last but hardly least, I would like to thank Olivia Warschaw for making the past year truly special.

Additionally, I am grateful for funding I received from the Smith Richardson Foundation (SRF grant #2016-1050), the Weatherhead East Asian Institute, and the Columbia University Political Science Department. I would also like to thank Ned Brose, Alex Campbell, and Jamie Withorne for their research assistance.

Finally, this all would have been impossible if not for my mother, Mary Ellen, and my sister Brooke. I dedicate this dissertation to you, and to the memory of my father, Curtis, who passed away in the beginning of my first year and could not see this project’s completion.
To Mom, Brooke, and Olivia
Chapter 1

Introduction

“The blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S. Congress, and in the American body politic writ large, to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources...to be serious and capable partners in their own defense.”

—Secretary of Defense Robert Gates

“Free riders aggravate me.”

—Barack Obama

“[Hillary Clinton] comes out and said, we love our allies, we think our allies are great. Well, it’s awfully hard to get them to pay up when you have somebody saying we think how great they are.”

—Donald Trump

1.1 The Puzzle of Reassurance

In a May 2017 visit to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) headquarters, U.S. President Donald Trump declined to affirm his support of NATO’s Article 5, which obligates its members to come to each others’ defense. Indeed, this was no accident; in his speech, Trump deliberately


removed a passage expressing his support for Article 5.\textsuperscript{5} U.S. allies – as well as members of Trump’s own administration – were taken aback, with German Chancellor Angela Merkel arguing that it was time for Europeans to “really take our fate into our own hands.”\textsuperscript{6}

In the wake of the uproar surrounding Trump’s speech – and his treatment of allies more generally – one question that has largely been neglected is why one should even expect the United States to reassure its allies in the first place. Indeed, reassurance is fundamentally puzzling because it surrenders a key source of bargaining power: the threat of abandonment. Bargaining leverage within an alliance depends on the credibility of states’ threats to abandon their partners, and thus great power patrons should limit the extent to which they are perceived as committed to their allies (Snyder, 1997; Jervis, 1997: ch. 5; Crawford, 2003).\textsuperscript{7} Reassurance measures, however, are intended to have exactly the opposite effect. Why, then, would a patron deliberately weaken its bargaining position?

Other stands of literature similarly suggest that reassurance can have undesirable consequences. Theories on defense burden-sharing in asymmetric alliances stress that as long as a great power’s protection is relatively assured, allies have little incentive to increase their military contributions (Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966; Oneal, 1990; Palmer, 1990\textsuperscript{a,b}; Sandler, 1993). By reassuring them, the patron effectively encourages its allies to free-ride. Furthermore, reassuring allies can run the risk of moral hazard. Allies confident in their patron’s support may be prone to take risks such as confronting their adversaries because they expect that the patron will bail them out, thus increasing the probability that the patron will be entrapped or entangled in allies’ conflicts (Christensen and Snyder, 1990; Fearon, 1997; Posen, 2014). In the years leading up to World War I, for ex-

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{7}Macdonald (1992) also shows that the United States has used the threat of abandonment to pressure allies into domestic political reform.
\end{itemize}
ample, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov cautioned against reassuring Serbia of Russia’s support too strongly, lest the Serbian government be encouraged to take a more intransigent stance vis-à-vis its territorial disputes with Austria-Hungary. He lamented that this was rendered more challenging by the attitudes of other senior Russian officials – including the ambassador to Serbia – whose support for Serbia’s pan-Slavic ambitions in the Balkans ran the risk of encouraging Serbian adventurism (Jelavich, 1991: 244-245, 250).

The puzzle of reassurance is only magnified in asymmetric alliances. In his seminal book, Waltz (1979) argues that unlike in symmetric alliances between great powers, where each ally is a crucial component of the overall balance of power, in asymmetric alliances weak states are comparatively much less important, as their allegiance is less likely to influence the course of a war. Recent scholarship suggests that great powers can shape their alliance treaties and withhold support from their allies as a means of reducing the risks of moral hazard (Kim, 2011a; Benson, 2012; Mattes, 2012). Beckley (2015: 19), for one, claims that the United States “is unlikely to incur major costs to display loyalty to allies that depend on U.S. protection and patronage for their survival,” as none of its allies are inherently important for its own security. This asymmetry becomes even more pronounced in bipolar and unipolar systems, where the gap between the capabilities of the superpowers and other states is even wider and small states have even fewer patrons to choose from (Snyder, 1997; Kim, 2016). It may be understandable, then, that Walt (2005: 242) would conclude: “the credibility of U.S. commitments is not [the United States’] problem”; rather, it is “a problem for those who are dependent on U.S. help.”

Yet Trump’s treatment of allies has come as such a surprise because reassuring allies has, in fact, been historically common in U.S. foreign policy. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, for one, argued that “both the size and the specific elements of [American] forces are driven more by the need to reassure those that we protect under the nuclear umbrella than by U.S. requirements alone” (Murdock et al., 2009: 9). Since 1945, the United States has stationed hundreds of thousands of troops on allied soil, and U.S. officials make countless foreign visits
and public statements to demonstrate interest in and support for American partners (Lebovic and Saunders, 2016). Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, for example, made such an effort to communicate U.S. commitment through numerous overseas trips that the New York Times dubbed him the “secretary of reassurance” in the summer of 2015.8

Indeed, the historical record is replete with examples of weaker allies extracting support despite their patron’s reluctance. U.S. policymakers during the early years of the Cold War, for example, did not envision the U.S. troop presence in Europe as permanent, with Dwight Eisenhower arguing that “If in ten years, all American troops stationed in Europe for national defense purposes have not been returned to the United States, then this whole project will have failed” (Sheetz, 1999: 32). Nevertheless, allies resisted American withdrawal, leading to what Zimmermann (2009) calls the “improbable permanence” of the U.S. troop presence. Similarly, East Germany was able to pressure a reluctant Soviet Union into building the Berlin Wall by threatening to align itself more closely with China (Harrison, 2005; Crump, 2015).

However, reassurance remains understudied in the scholarly literature. Academic studies often treat great power patrons’ use of reassurance as a byproduct of deterrence, where the primary intended audiences are adversaries (Schelling, 1966; Morgan, 1983; Benson, Meirowitz, and Ramsay, 2014; McManus, 2017). To the extent that the academic literature has considered reassurance, it has largely been in the context of how states reassure their allies rather than why. Policy prescriptions, for their part, tend to either deny the importance of reassurance (e.g., Posen, 2014) or assume its importance and focus on how to reassure allies (e.g., Flournoy and Davidson, 2012).9 As a result, existing literature has not offered a theory of reassurance.

---


9Every U.S. National Security Strategy document since 2000, for example, emphasizes the need to reassure American allies.
1.2 Argument

In this dissertation, I address the following questions: What explains variation in great powers’ use of reassurance measures toward allies? And under what conditions can patrons make their protection conditional on allied burden-sharing? Here, I define reassurance as acts made by a patron that are intended to convince an ally that its assistance will be forthcoming in the event of an attack from another state. In other words, assurances are intended to reduce allies’ fears of patron abandonment.\textsuperscript{10} The theory I present here is intended to be generalizeable; however, for reasons discussed below I focus on American alliances. Thus I use the terms “patron” and “United States” interchangeably.

Although reassurance can have adverse consequences, patrons have incentives to reassure to the extent that allies can credibly threaten to exit the alliance. By exit, I refer to attempts by states in an alliance to loosen themselves from the partnership by pursuing outside options. In its most extreme form, alliance exit can take the form of treaty abrogation, allying with a hostile third party, or a refusal to provide support in wartime. More commonly, patrons fear that their allies will take more incremental steps that allow them to distance themselves from the alliance by exploiting outside options. The more credible an ally’s threat to pursue outside options, and the more costs that doing so would impose on the patron, the more incentive patrons have to reassure allies.

Patrons face a dilemma, trading off between withholding reassurance to drive hard bargains and reduce free-riding, on the one hand, and reassuring allies to discourage them from pursuing outside options, on the other. This dilemma can be mitigated, however, if a patron can make its assurances conditional on allied burden-sharing by combining its assurances with threats of abandonment. Like those of its allies, the patron’s threats are more potent to the extent that they are both credible and salient to its allies.

Thus, reassurance and burden-sharing are the product of bargaining, where each side’s leverage

\textsuperscript{10}Notably, this definition excludes measures taken to support allies who are already under attack.
is shaped by its threat of exit. Studying the effects of exit, however, is difficult owing to the issue of endogeneity. An ally’s desire for outside options may be a function of its patron’s behavior – including its use of reassurance (or lack thereof) – and states are also likely to anticipate the risk of exit and tailor their actions accordingly. As such, I look at factors affecting the propensity of patrons and allies to exit.

I focus on four factors that shape the costs and credibility of patrons’ and allies’ threats of exit. First, the credibility of allies’ outside options is shaped by their latent military and nuclear power, as well as the availability of alternative allies. Allies with more military power, nuclear latency, and a larger number of partners to choose from are better able to ensure their security unilaterally by undergoing conventional military arming, obtaining nuclear weapons, or forging partnerships with third parties. The patron will thus have greater incentive to reassure them. Second, allies’ strategic value shapes both how potent their threats of exit are, as well as how easily the patron can afford to abandon them. Allies which have intrinsic value to the patron – such as those with larger economies and latent military power – will be able to evade burden-sharing pressure.

Both of these propositions make distinctive predictions from the economic theory of alliances proposed by Olson and Zeckhauser (1966), which is the dominant explanation for alliance burden-sharing. Based on the logic of collective goods, the economic theory of alliance suggests that larger partners in an alliance will pay a disproportionate share of the alliance’s defense burden, as these states’ contributions will be the most crucial to the attainment of the collective good. However, when one puts reassurance and burden-sharing into a bargaining framework, a central challenge for the patron is that allies which can contribute more may also have more credible outside options, while the patron’s own threat of abandonment may lack credibility owing to their strategic value. Thus, powerful allies may be able to extract significant assurance measures and may not be as likely to shoulder as disproportionately great a portion of the alliance’s burdens as the logic of collective goods might otherwise suggest.

Third, when the patron faces constraints on its resources due to costly foreign wars or economic
hardship, its threat of abandonment is inherently more credible. This also creates uncertainty about its reliability, however, which reduces allies’ expected benefits of continuing to rely upon it. As a result, when the patron faces resource constraints, it must reassure allies to discourage them from exiting, but it will also be better able to extract burden-sharing efforts from them. In effect, the patron will be able to use a “good cop-bad cop routine” in which it reassures allies while simultaneously using the threat of “involuntary defection” due to domestic pressure in order to put burden-sharing pressure on allies (Putnam, 1988).

Fourth is the alliance’s threat environment. The effect of external threat on bargaining power within the alliance depends on which partners perceive the threat more severely. When the patron’s perception of threat is higher, its threat of exit will be less credible, thus inhibiting its ability to make its protection conditional on allied burden-sharing. When allies’ threat perception is more acute, however, patrons will better able to effectively coerce allies into increasing their burden-sharing contributions, as the costs allies would incur from being abandoned are higher.

I test the theory by studying the behavior of the United States toward its allies, using an original dataset of U.S. reassurance that includes public statements, diplomatic visits, foreign troop deployments, and joint military exercises from 1950-2010, as well as a dataset of allied burden-sharing that includes allied military spending, support for U.S. bases, and participation in U.S. military interventions. Second, I conduct detailed historical case studies on U.S. reassurance and burden-sharing pressure toward West Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom during the 1960s and 1970s.

1.3 Contributions

This study makes four contributions. The first is to the literature on alliance bargaining. A number of studies have discussed tactics smaller allies can use to influence their patrons – including lobbying in the patron’s domestic politics (Keohane, 1971) and ingratiating themselves (Handel, 1981: 139-146). Yet there has been comparatively less emphasis devoted to the conditions under which
allies can influence patrons – and vice-versa. Moreover, existing work is often descriptive (Park, 1975; Bar-Siman-Tov, 1980; Handel, 1981) or mono-causal (Macdonald, 1992).

While the threat of exit has been invoked by scholars seeking to understand bargaining leverage between allies, empirical testing is limited and almost entirely qualitative (Jervis, 1997; Harrison, 2005; Fang and Ramsay, 2010; Urpelainen, 2012). Snyder (1984, 1997), for his part, focuses on bargaining in symmetric alliances among great powers in multipolarity, while Dittmer (1981) and Schweller (1998) focus on situations with three actors, arguing that there is great advantage in playing the role of the “pivot” that has better relations with the other parties than they do with each other. Crawford (2003) builds upon these to argue that states attempting to play the pivot between two adversaries have an easier task in doing so when their targets have no other options for support.

Moreover, existing studies have not attempted to identify the conditions under which the threat of exit is systematically more or less potent, or to understand why some allies have outside options while others do not. Looking for which allies are pursuing an outside option – whether in the form of nuclear weapons, an alternative patron, or something else – risks conflating cause with effect, as allies may seek to exploit an outside option because they do not feel reassured. This raises the problem of endogeneity. One exception is Kim (2016), who also provides the only quantitative evidence on the relationship between outside options and alliance bargaining outcomes. However, he focuses primarily on the polarity of the system as the crucial determinant of allies’ outside options – a very coarse measure, which not only cannot explain variation within a given distribution of power, but which also makes the assumption that all great powers are credible alternative security providers.\(^{11}\)

Second, I contribute to the literature on alliance design. A number of scholars have argued that the formal design of an alliance pact – for example, whether it contains provisions for economic linkage or joint military coordination – can greatly affect its ability to deter adversaries and dis-

\(^{11}\) Additionally, Lake (1999) and Cooley and Spruyt (2009) argue that partners with “specific assets” have more potent threats of exit.
courage defection (Morrow, 1994; Leeds and Anac, 2005; Long and Leeds, 2006; Poast, 2013). Yet work seeking to explain variation in alliance commitments is surprisingly rare; moreover, few studies focus on how bargaining leverage can shape alliance design, and those that do implicitly assume that great powers can have their way when dealing with smaller allies. Kim (2011a) argues that patrons can reduce their risk of entrapment and entanglement by increasing the precision of the language in their alliance pacts, while Benson (2012) claims that ambiguity can have the same effect. Beckley (2015) similarly argues that patrons can generally distance themselves from their commitments enough to avoid being undesirably entangled in allies’ conflicts. Finally, Mattes (2012) finds that allies’ reputations for honoring their commitments shape whether their partners insist on design choices that increase the barriers to defection.12 However, the assumption running throughout these studies is that, in Mattes’s words, “minor powers... might be unable to force more costly alliance designs given their limited bargaining power” (Mattes, 2012: 680). In explicitly focusing on how bargaining shapes alliance commitments outside the context of explicit treaty provisions, this study suggests avenues for further research on how bargaining might also shape formal alliance design.

I also contribute more broadly to scholarly understanding of the role – and shortcomings – of alliance treaties in international relations. Formalizing an alliance is itself a form of dyadic reassurance, given the costs entailed in breaking a commitment (Morrow, 1994, 2000; Leeds, 2003a; Miller, 2003) and the increased transparency and mechanisms for dispute resolution that alliances bring (Weitsman, 2004; Bearce, Flanagan, and Floros, 2006). However, formal changes in alliance pacts are quite rare, while reassurance, burden-sharing, and fears of defection are much more variable. Moreover, a state’s likelihood of actually following through on its pledge is always in doubt given the anarchic nature of the international system and states’ incentives for avoiding the costs of war, and even if allies are confident in the present, there is no guarantee that the patron’s commit-

---

12 Chiba, Johnson, and Leeds (2015) also argue that democracies will favor flexible commitments in order to avoid potential future domestic punishment for violating the alliance’s terms, while Kuo (2014) studies the systemic diffusion of “dominant” alliance features.
ment will remain steadfast indefinitely. Informal signaling and hands-tying mechanisms are thus a necessary and common means for patrons to shore up partners’ faith in their commitments.

Third, I inform the literature on nuclear nonproliferation. Studies here have long focused on the correlates of proliferation, and until recently have often used alliances with a great power or nuclear-armed state as a dichotomous explanatory variable (Meyer, 1984; Sagan, 1996; Singh and Way, 2004; Jo and Gartzke, 2007; Bleek, 2010). Recent scholarship, however, has focused attention on security guarantees as a constraint on proliferation behavior (Bleek and Lorber, 2014; Reiter, 2014), and has begun to explore the conditions under which alliances with great powers have discouraged states from pursuing nuclear weapons (Knopf, 2012; Lanoszka, 2014). In particular, the extent to which the United States has coupled its promises of protection with threats of abandonment to keep its allies from obtaining nuclear weapons has been the subject of growing interest (Miller, 2014a,b; Gavin, 2015; Gerzhoy, 2015). I contribute to this scholarship by placing nuclear nonproliferation in the broader context of alliance politics, emphasizing that while allies may be able to leverage the threat of obtaining nuclear weapons to extract assurances, the patron’s efforts to keep its allies from acquiring nuclear weapons only compose one bargaining dimension among many.

Finally, the literature on free-riding and burden-sharing in asymmetric alliances has almost exclusively focused on three questions: first, whether smaller allies free-ride more than larger allies (Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966; Palmer, 1990a; Sandler, 1993; Plümper and Neumayer, 2015); second, whether alliance benefits such as deterrence and defense are truly “public” goods (Sandler, 1977; Murdoch and Sandler, 1984; Oneal and Elrod, 1989; Palmer, 1990b; Goldstein, 1995; Lanoszka, 2015); and third, how factors outside the context of the alliance itself may influence allies’ defense efforts (Russett, 1970; Oneal, 1990; Palmer, 1990a,b). However, with few exceptions, the literature has not emphasized the conditions under which great power patrons pressure their allies to pick up the burden. Rather, studies generally adopt at most a tacit bargaining framework in which allies’ military expenditures are assumed to be responsive to changes in the military
expenditures of the largest member (e.g., Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966; Palmer, 1990a,b; Sandler, 1993; Plümper and Neumayer, 2015). This dissertation, by contrast, explicitly focuses on why and when patrons have bargaining leverage for extracting burden-sharing.

1.4 Scope Conditions

In this dissertation I am interested in asymmetric alliances between great powers and non-great powers. In practice, I limit the analysis to the United States and its allies. Ideally, I would include the Soviet Union’s alliances in addition to American alliances. However, there are arguably at least two differences between their blocs that render comparisons problematic. First, participation in the American alliance system was voluntary rather than coerced. Second, Soviet allies were comparatively more concerned with internal threats than external ones (Harrison, 2005). (This is to say nothing of data availability issues, which are more prominent for the Soviet Union and its allies.) However, although I do not explicitly study Soviet alliances, Nelson (1986) presents evidence suggesting that Soviet allies which were more dependent on the Soviet Union shared more of the defense burden, and that the period of increased Soviet-American cooperation during détente in the early 1970s featured comparatively more equitable allied burden-sharing in the Warsaw Pact. These findings are consistent with my argument that allied contributions are influenced by the costs and probability of patron abandonment. Similarly, Crump (2015) shows that some Soviet allies were at times able to exploit the Sino-Soviet split beginning in the 1960s in order to put pressure on the Soviets by using the “China option.”

Focusing on the United States presents a few problems that may limit my ability to generalize from these findings. First, as a democracy, domestic lobbying and interest group politics may play a unique role in U.S. foreign policy, especially given the diffuse nature of the U.S. political system. Moreover, the literature on democratic alliance credibility stresses that democratic allies may be

13Exceptions are Lake (2009), who argues that great powers can leverage allies’ dependence as a means of extracting burden-sharing but does not explore the conditions under which allies’ vulnerability to abandonment is more severe; Lee and Heo (2002), who focus on American burden-sharing pressure on South Korea; and Lanoszka (2015), who argues that patrons may refrain from burden-sharing pressure in order to maintain allies’ loyalty.
uniquely trustworthy given their transparency and checks and balances (Gaubatz, 1996; Leeds, Mattes, and Vogel, 2009) – though others claim that the large array of domestic actors, frequent leadership turnover, and the fickle nature of public opinion may actually make them uniquely untrustworthy (Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2004). Thus, as a democratic ally the United States’ need to reassure may be distinctive.

Second, the fact that the U.S. alliance system is largely an alliance of democracies raises the question of whether its intra-alliance politics are largely a function of the democratic peace. This could potentially mean that reassurance is much more driven by normative considerations than in other alliances (Doyle, 1986; Dixon, 1994; Russett, 1994; Owen, 1997). However, this is far from clear, as many argue that the democratic peace can be attributed more to democracies’ transparency and ability to signal their intentions (Fearon, 1994; Kydd, 1997; Schultz, 1998), or to democratic toughness (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999; Reiter and Stam, 2002), rather than to shared norms and values. However, the fact remains that there has been substantial variation in the United States’ willingness to reassure and threaten, as well as to demand contributions from, its allies. Moreover, I test my argument against alternative explanations emphasizing the role of domestic politics in driving reassurance.

Third, the United States is geographically remote from the vast majority of its allies (and adversaries), and thus its ability to directly dominate or conquer and control wayward allies is much less than that of a contiguous, continental power such as the Soviet Union (Levy and Thompson, 2010). Thus, reassurance and threats of abandonment likely play a greater role in U.S. alliances than in alliances of coercion. Moreover, having local partners may be especially important for the United States given the expenses that a geographically remote power must incur to project power, burden-sharing may be more important in U.S. alliances (Mearsheimer, 2001).

Finally, I focus on formal alliances. In addition to creating a tractable sample that is not *ad hoc*, limiting the universe of cases to formal allies allows me to impose a number of scope conditions. First, it establishes a baseline of prior commitment, as treaty allies can most reasonably expect
to be reassured in the first place. Moreover, formal allies are likely to share common defense interests and threat perceptions, which is not necessarily the case among informal allies, or “allies of convenience” (Resnick, 2010). Second, it limits the sample to relationships in which allies receive guarantees of protection, rather than solely material benefits such as aid and arms.\textsuperscript{14}

\section*{1.5 Road Map}

In the next chapter, I further develop the concepts of reassurance and burden-sharing, and describe the trade-off that exists between the two. This trade-off produces what I call the “reassurance dilemma,” wherein the actions patrons use to maintain the loyalty of its allies (reassurance) discourage allies from investing in the alliance (burden-sharing). In Chapter 3, I lay out a theory of great power reassurance and allied burden-sharing in asymmetric alliances, including a discussion of alternative explanations and research design. Chapter 4 contains quantitative tests of my hypotheses using data on American statements, diplomatic visits, and troop levels as well as allied burden-sharing from 1950-2010 while in Chapters 5-8 I conduct my case studies of U.S. reassurance and burden-sharing pressure toward West Germany, the United Kingdom, South Korea, and Japan. Finally, I conclude with a summary of the findings, as well as a discussion of implications and avenues for future research, in Chapter 9.

\textsuperscript{14}See Pettyjohn (2012: 100-105) and Pettyjohn and Vick (2013: 50-57) on “transactional” relationships.
Chapter 2

Reassurance and Burden-Sharing in Alliances

In the previous chapter, I introduced the concept of reassurance and argued that existing theories suggest great power patrons should seek to limit their level of commitment to allies to discourage free-riding, minimize moral hazard, and make allies more willing to concede on other issues. In this chapter, I further develop the concept of reassurance and discuss its relationship to the distribution of costs and burdens in an alliance, and review the existing literature on reassurance and burden-sharing. I then proceed to describe the trade-offs inherent in what I call the “reassurance dilemma” – namely, that patrons face a choice between reassuring allies in order to sustain alliance cohesion, and withholding reassurance in order to spread the burden of the alliance more equally.

2.1 Existing Literature on Reassurance and Burden-Sharing

2.1.1 Reassurance

Reassurance is largely absent from the literature on alliances. Instead, most research studies the causes and consequences of alliance formation. Here, the alliance itself is treated as the assurance (Morrow, 1994, 2000), with scholars then seeking to identify whether the existence and institutional design of an alliance affect a number of outcomes of interest, including conflict initiation (Leeds, 2003b; Leeds and Anac, 2005; Long and Leeds, 2006; Benson, 2011), nuclear proliferation (Singh and Way, 2004; Jo and Gartzke, 2007; Bleek and Lorber, 2014; Reiter, 2014), and
balancing or bandwagoning behavior (Walt, 1987; Jervis, 1991; Labs, 1992). By contrast, there is little research on reassurance after an alliance is formed.\(^1\)

Deterrence theory, for its part, treats commitment signals not as targeted at allies, but rather as ways to deter adversaries (e.g., Morgan, 1983). This is because many of the same measures that are used to credibly show commitment to allies also have the effect of signaling the patron’s commitment to adversary countries (Snyder, 1997). In this view, reassurance is effectively a byproduct of deterrence rather than an objective in its own right. Indeed, Benson, Meirowitz, and Ramsay (2014) argue that the risk of moral hazard may even be desirable, as it increases the alliance’s deterrent value.

To the extent that existing literature has studied reassurance, it has largely fallen into one of two discordant camps: those that treat it as suboptimal, and those that assume its importance. Some claim that lobbying by domestic political constituencies and foreign actors can pressure policymakers to undertake policies that benefit a particular ally, including reassurance measures (Keohane, 1971; Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007). This line of scholarship is closely related to claims that reassurance is essentially irrational (e.g., Walt, 2005; Posen, 2014), as it suggests that reassurance does not follow its own strategic logic. Fearon (1997), for one, argues that one potential explanation for why states may elect not to tie their hands in crises is that doing so can lead to moral hazard problems in the alliance. Other scholars, for their part, focus on explaining which tools great powers use to signal support to allies (McManus and Yarhi-Milo, 2017). Little research exists, however, which focuses on explaining the use or non-use of reassurance.

### 2.1.2 Burden-Sharing

The existing literature is largely pessimistic on the prospects for burden-sharing. For one, scholars have argued that alliances between great powers and weaker states feature an asymmetric exchange of goods. In such partnerships, the great power provides security for the alliance, while the weaker

\(^1\)One recent exception is Lanoszka (2014), who argues that perceptions of alliance unreliability can lead states to pursue nuclear weapons.
power provides “autonomy” to the great power. This autonomy can take a number of forms, from hosting the great power’s military bases to general support for its foreign policy (Morrow, 1991). In this perspective, burden-sharing in asymmetric is limited almost by definition; the great power tacitly agrees to accept the costs of providing security in exchange for weaker states’ loyalty (Lake, 2009). Lanoszka (2015), for his part, similarly argues that allied “free-riding” may in some cases be the result of a “nuclear bargain,” in which the patron acquiesces to low levels of allied contributions in exchange for allies’ willingness to not pursue nuclear weapons.

A second strand of literature more directly focuses on explaining variation in burden-sharing outcomes, and draws on the logic of collective goods (e.g., Olson, 1965). In a seminal article, Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) argued that smaller countries tend to under-contribute to public goods – such as collective defense in an alliance – because their contributions are unlikely to be pivotal in order for the good to be provided (Plümper and Neumayer, 2015). In other words, smaller allies do not contribute as much because their contributions are less likely to matter. Other scholars have built upon this insight to discuss conditions under which the logic of collective goods is more or less applicable to describing an alliance. The first of these are situations in which security ceases to be a public good from which all members benefit and instead becomes a good from which some countries benefit more than others, or from which some can be excluded altogether. In particular, some scholars argued that NATO’s shift toward a strategy of “Flexible Response” during the 1960s and 1970s, in which the alliance would rely more on conventional defenses against an attack by the Warsaw Pact, and away from a “Massive Retaliation” approach that relied heavily on the threat of nuclear attack, meant that the strength of each ally’s military forces would be more important as a deterrent since they could not count on an overwhelming, automatic response from the alliance (Murdoch and Sandler, 1984). Second, allies may spend more on defense than the logic of collective goods would predict because they are pursuing their own “private” goods from which their other partners do not benefit – such as maintaining colonial empires or competing with rivals that they do not share with their allies (Oneal and Elrod, 1989; Oneal, 1990).
There is an alternative explanation, however, which has been largely understudied in the existing literature on burden-sharing and which suggests less pessimistic conclusions for burden-sharing: coercive bargaining. Patrons need not simply accept the level of effort their allies provide; rather, they may attempt to pressure them to do more. Indeed, Snidal (1985: 587) noted that powerful states can coerce their weaker allies such that the latter do not free-ride. But the conditions under which coercion is more or less effective remain under-theorized and under-tested. Perhaps the most notable exception to this is the study by Fang and Ramsay (2010), who argue that a patron can drive a harder bargain with its partners when it can more easily find alternative partners. They claim that such circumstances are most likely during periods of détente with adversaries, as here it is easier for a patron to cooperate with states outside of its existing allies. Similarly, Lee and Heo (2002) focus on factors that have shaped bargaining leverage in the U.S.-South Korea alliance, such as threat and domestic politics, but they focus only on this one case.

2.1.3 Reassurance and Burden-Sharing

Existing theories on the relationship between reassurance and burden-sharing, in turn, lead to contradictory expectations. On the one hand are scholars who subscribe to the free-riding model, which holds that alliances reduce weaker allies’ incentives to provide for their own security (Posen, 2014). Much of the literature on burden-sharing in asymmetric alliances – which by-and-large focuses on NATO – falls into this camp, with scholars arguing that larger allies tend to be exploited by smaller allies (e.g., Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966; Plümper and Neumayer, 2015). Indeed, some scholars emphasize that because alliances between great powers and non-great powers involve an asymmetric exchange of goods, with the former providing security so the latter do not have to, reassurance and burden-sharing have a negative relationship by design (Morrow, 1991, 1993; Lake, 2007, 2009).

Others claim that reassurance is an inducement for burden-sharing. This argument can take one of two forms: the first is that allies are unlikely to step up and do more for themselves unless
their patron leads the way (e.g., Flournoy and Davidson, 2012), and the second is that the patron can use conditional assurances to exchange protection for burden-sharing (e.g., Lake, 1999). The former view essentially denies that there is a reassurance and burden-sharing trade-off, while the latter suggests that outcomes are subject to bargaining.

The empirical evidence for a straightforward, purely negative relationship between reassurance and burden-sharing is mixed at best. Machain and Morgan (2013) find that countries hosting U.S. troop deployments have fewer military personnel and Lake (2007) finds that countries dependent on U.S. protection spend less on defense. By contrast, Allen, VanDusky-Allen, and Flynn (2016) find that the presence of U.S. troops is associated with higher military expenditures among NATO allies, while Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger (1994) find that U.S. troop presence was associated with contributions to the 1991 Gulf War. Indeed, while there are cases in which U.S. protection almost certainly discouraged its allies from making significant efforts toward self-defense – perhaps most famously Japan, whose constitution imposes numerous restrictions on its military arming, and Iceland, whose membership in NATO came with the assurance that it would not need to have a military – there are yet other cases in which allies hosting tens or hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops still contributed a great deal to their own security, such as West Germany and South Korea.

The theory I present runs counter both to the view that reassurance and burden-sharing are always at odds and to the view that there is no trade-off. Instead, I build upon arguments that focus on burden-sharing as a bargaining outcome. Existing studies on burden-sharing note that the fear of abandonment may make burden-sharing more likely, yet they do not systematically identify the conditions under which this fear is more or less intense (Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, 1994; Fang and Ramsay, 2010). This dissertation offers a unified theory both of the conditions under which patrons reassure and those under which their assurances can be made conditional upon allied burden-sharing.
2.2 Reassurance in Military Alliances

2.2.1 The Functions of Alliances

The international politics literature largely treats alliances as means for states to bolster their security or gain influence over partners. In terms of security, alliances represent a means of “capability-aggregation” with which states maximize their relative power vis-à-vis adversaries (Waltz, 1979; Snyder, 1984, 1997; Walt, 1987; Schweller, 1994). Alternatively, alliances can provide states with other benefits, including side payments such as basing access (Morrow, 1991) or opportunities to restrain their partners (Schroeder, 1976; Weitsman, 2004). This is most common in asymmetric alliances between great powers and non-great powers, where each party provides and receives a different good. Morrow (1991) famously argued that asymmetric alliances provide security to weak states and autonomy to strong states. Weak states need security but can do little to improve the security of a great power, so great powers act as patrons and provide them with protection in exchange for other foreign policy concessions. These can take the form of loyalty and support for the patron’s foreign policy ventures, the granting of military bases, and a refusal to cooperate with the patron’s adversaries.

Alliances, in these views, form when they are needed and dissolve when they are not. Others have contested this point, arguing that alliances, like other institutions, can change their functions over time (Wallander, 2000). But whether an alliance changes over time or not, it is unlikely that all members will ever be fully confident in it. In an anarchic international system, no higher authority can force partners to cooperate, and parties to an alliance are likely to be concerned about both whether or not their partners will actually assist them and the amount of assistance they will bring to bear.

Even scholars emphasizing the importance of ideology as a cause of alliance formation invoke mutual interest and common threat perception as causal mechanisms (Barnett, 1996; Owen, 1997; Haas, 2005).
2.2.2 The Need for Reassurance

In principle, alliance treaties bind their signatories to support each other, and are often considered the strongest means by which partners can assure each other about their commitments to do so (Morrow, 1994, 2000). In practice, however, alliance treaties are an imperfect means of assurance. First, the terms of an alliance are rarely, if ever, so unambiguous as to remove all doubt about whether a patron would be obligated to act, or whether it could instead justify non-intervention by appealing to the situation’s extenuating or unique circumstances (Leeds et al., 2002; Benson, 2012; Mattes, 2012). Even if patrons do follow through, the timing and amount of their support is subject to their own discretion (Beckley, 2015). The language in U.S. alliance treaties is universally vague, and leaves loopholes such that policymakers can avoid being forced to intervene. Even NATO’s Article 5, for example, only obligates each member to undertake “such action as it deems necessary” in the event that one of its partners comes under attack. Similarly, other U.S. alliance treaties only ask that signatories act in ways consistent with their “constitutional processes” (Rapp-Hooper, 2015: 27-31).

Second, alliances’ terms tend to be quite static, while concerns about alliance reliability are dynamic. Out of the 207 alliances listed between 1945 and 2003 in the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset, only 19 of them entered into a “second phase” with altered provisions (Leeds et al., 2002) – and only two of these were alliances in which United States was a member. Moreover, alliances can be abrogated, and the patron’s interests, capabilities, and intentions can change over time, and may be difficult to observe (Leeds, 2003a; Leeds and Savun, 2007; McManus, 2017). Indeed, Siverson and King (1980) find that alliances are less likely to be honored the longer they last, while other studies show that leadership turnover can reduce alliance

---

3 As Harlan Cleveland (U.S. Ambassador to NATO, 1965-1969) put it: “There is nothing automatic or mechanical [about the NATO security guarantee]...Like the United States Constitution, the Treaty does not try to legislative what will happen...that is left to whatever political men are in charge when the questions arise” (Cleveland, 1970: 78).

4 These were the Helsinki Accord in 1975, which became the Paris Charter in 1990; and NATO between 1949 and 1951.
reliability (Leeds, 2003a; Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2004; Leeds, Mattes, and Vogel, 2009). Finally, the primary obligation of an alliance – support during wartime – is not an ongoing process where compliance can be verified. A patron’s willingness to carry out its promise can only be determined once it has been tested, at which point it is too late for the partner that has been cheated.

As such, allies are likely to require frequent reaffirmation of their patron’s continued commitment. U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower, for example, described France as having “an almost hysterical fear that we and the British will one day pull out of Western Europe” (Sloan, 2016: 39). Continual reassurance thus serves a similar function as verification mechanisms do for other kinds of international treaties – namely, for a state to convince its partners that it is committed to honoring its obligations. Reassurance can take the form of public promises of commitment, military forces deployed on allied soil, or high-profile diplomatic visits, to name just a few. These serve to bolster allies’ confidence by indicating the patron’s continued commitment to defending them, whether by demonstrating its willingness to incur costs on their behalf or by putting its reputation among international and domestic observers on the line (Schelling, 1966; Fearon, 1997).

2.2.3 Forms of Reassurance

Since there are many forms that assurances can take, and because I present a general theory on the sources of reassurance, I look at reassurance more broadly rather than focusing on any one form. As a number of studies have noted, when one action can be substituted for another in foreign policy, testing for the determinants of any one of them is incomplete, and can potentially produce misleading inferences if one does not account for the possibility of substitution (Most and Starr, 1984; Starr, 2000; Clark, Nordstrom, and Reed, 2008). In particular, in this study I focus on three forms of reassurance: symbolic assurances such as verbal promises and diplomatic visits; joint military exercises; and troop deployments. When they are used, the three are likely to be used in similar ways and thus follow similar patterns.

Symbolic assurances such as verbal reaffirmations of the patron’s commitment or diplomatic
visits to the ally are in some sense “cheap talk.” However, they are not totally cost-free, especially if done in public, since they can have the effect of tying the patron’s hands by creating reputational costs if it does not follow through (Guisinger and Smith, 2002; Sartori, 2002, 2005). While the patron already has a very public commitment in the form of its alliance treaties, rhetorical reinforcement of that commitment serves to renew it over time, and also signals that the patron intends to maintain its alliance treaties (McManus, 2014; Lebovic and Saunders, 2016). Moreover, assurances related to (for example) the patron’s troop deployments – such as promises not to withdraw troops or to consult the ally before any movement of the patron’s troops in the future – create new reputational costs in addition to those that exist alongside the commitment to protect. Finally, even if allies are reasonably confident in their patron’s commitment – whether owing to high perceived ex ante probability of honoring its commitment, or to the effects of other forms of reassurances (such as troop deployments or inter-operable military forces) – continual, even ritualized promises are necessary if only because they are likely to be expected, and thus their absence would be noticeable (Jervis, 1970: e.g., 81-82).

Second, joint military exercises (JMEs) are potentially reassuring insofar as they help bind the patron’s and the ally’s fighting ability together. The alliance literature has argued that the more coordinated and institutionalized an alliance is, the more durable and credible it will be (Morrow, 1994, 2000; Leeds, 2003a; Leeds and Anac, 2005). Moreover, JMEs are risky because they carry the potential to provoke adversaries, who may see the patron’s and ally’s military exercises as designed to bolster their ability to go on the offensive – and even as a means of concealing an imminent attack (Blackwill and Legro, 1989; D’Orazio, 2012). This risk sends a costly signal of the patron’s resolve to allies (Fearon, 1997).

Third, troop deployments are powerful signals of reassurance. For one, they act as a “tripwire” device that automatically entangles the patron’s forces in an attack on the ally (Schelling, 1966: 47). Having its own forces on allies’ territory gives the patron “skin in the game,” and puts its

---

5On the costliness of private promises, see Yarhi-Milo (2013).
own forces at similar amount of risk as those of its ally (Lanoszka and Hunzeker, 2016). Once it has suffered casualties, the patron is likely to face domestic pressure to intervene. Moreover, the patrons military forces represent scarce resources; by tying them down in any one location, the patron cannot use them in another area.

Fourth, the patron can give allies input into its policies by establishing mechanisms for allied consultation. By doing so, the patron can assuage allies’ fears of abandonment by conveying information about its intentions and allow allies a voice in alliance policies (Rapp-Hooper, 2015: ch. 5). Perhaps the most notable example in recent decades has been NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), which provided information to allies about U.S. nuclear strategy while also giving them a seat at the table in targeting and strategy (Buteux, 1983; Rapp-Hooper, 2015: 236-259). At the very least, such schemes aim to provide allies with insight – if not necessarily input – into the patron’s decision-making and strategy.

Finally, while I do not consider them in this study, material assistance such as aid and arms sales can, in principle, represent a form of reassurance. Aid and arms can represent costly signals of the patron’s willingness to protect its allies insofar as they increase allies’ military power relative to third parties, which in turn raises the risk of entrapment by enabling allies to operate more independently (Sullivan, Tessman, and Li, 2011; Yarhi-Milo, Lanoszka, and Cooper, 2016). Spindel (2017) similarly argues that arms transfers send a signal of reassurance to the extent that they are prestigious weapons. Moreover, a number of studies show that once, institutionalized, military assistance can be difficult to cut off promptly (Lai, 2003; Krause, 2004; Borghard, 2014), thus diminishing the patron’s leverage over allies. At the same time, however, it is not clear that arms sales and military aid actually represent reassurance. Instead, it is just as likely – if not more so – that military assistance represents a means of “buck-passing.” Providing allies with the means to defend themselves serves as a means of allowing the patron to do less, which is opposite from a signal of reassurance.
2.3 Alliance Reassurance vs. Adversary Deterrence

The requirements for alliance reassurance and its more widely studied counterpart, adversary deterrence, are not necessarily identical and indeed may even be at odds. At first glance, one might expect that rational allies would be reassured to the extent that the adversary is deterred – no more, no less. However, British Secretary of State for Defence Denis Healey famously claimed that it “takes only five percent credibility...to deter...but ninety-five percent credibility to reassure” (Healey, 1989: 243), and while the “Healey Theorem” remains empirically unverified, a number of international relations theories and historical examples suggest that reassurance and deterrence operate differently. For one, allies and adversaries may perceive signals differently; a longstanding body of political psychology literature shows that actors’ interpretations of signals may not always – or even often – overlap, and may not correspond to the sender’s intended meaning (Jervis, 1970, 1976, 2002a; Quek, 2016). Writing most directly on the differences between allied and adversary perceptions, Mercer (1996) argues that the difficulty of reassurance can be explained by attribution error, wherein allies tend to ascribe beneficial patron behavior to the dictates of the situation while at the same time attributing actions by the patron which run counter to their interests to the patron’s fundamentally flawed character. Thus allies are always ready to assume the worst about their patrons. Similarly, prospect theory suggests that people are far more willing to accept risks to avoid losses than they are to make gains, which may explain why adversaries are easier to deter from seeking gains but allies are difficult to reassure that they will not incur losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). More generally, allies must consider not only whether adversaries are likely to be deterred, but also what is likely to happen if deterrence fails. Even if an ally knew exactly how credible an adversary considered the patron’s commitment to be, it may have a different assessment of that credibility, and it could also be concerned about the timing and amount of patron assistance in wartime (Howard, 1982).

The evidence is clear that patrons often put great emphasis on reassuring allies even when they
perceive little-to-no deterrence benefit. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, American President John F. Kennedy made a secret arrangement to withdraw U.S. nuclear missiles from Turkey in exchange for the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. In doing so, Kennedy sought to save face among allies but notably not in the eyes of the United States’ primary adversary, thus deliberately reassuring allies without any corresponding deterrence benefit (Jervis, 2015: esp. p. 26). More recently, in 2014 the United States launched its “European Reassurance Initiative” (ERI) designed to assuage potential concerns about the U.S. commitment among NATO members in the wake of Russia’s involvement in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea. It was only in subsequent years that the United States began to shift toward a more deterrence-oriented posture, symbolized in the ERI’s being renamed the “European Deterrence Initiative.” Initially, its focus was on getting any equipment, personnel, and supplies it could onto the territory of allies in Eastern Europe in order to signal U.S. commitment – even if these forces were militarily ineffective and highly vulnerable to Russian anti-access area-denial capabilities.6 Thus, while the actions patrons take to reassure allies may be the same as those used to deter adversaries, the motivation for those actions can vary significantly across cases.

2.4 Burden-Sharing in Alliances

In much the same way that allies will seek to ensure that their patron remains invested in their defense, the patron will seek to ensure that its allies invest in their own defense, as well as in the alliance’s common goals. Failing this, the patron runs the risk of having to over-invest in the alliance in order to maintain the alliance’s capability for adequate deterrence and defense.

Walter Lippmann famously argued that foreign policy “consists in bringing into balance, with a comfortable surplus of power in reserve, the nation’s commitments and the nation’s power” (Lippmann, 1943: 9). Yet the path to this balance is not straightforward. The resources necessary

---

for filling the “gap” between capabilities are not always available, whether because commitments have outpaced capabilities or because domestic conditions have sapped the state’s ability to invest in its capabilities.

One means by which the gap can be bridged is through forming alliances. When compared to building up one’s own armaments, relying on the capabilities of other countries represents an inexpensive means of strengthening deterrence and defense (Morrow, 1993). The utility of alliances, however, depends on the extent to which allies actually contribute to the common defense. This points to both the importance and the challenges of “burden-sharing.” Every member of an alliance reaps some reward from its partners’ contributions to the common defense, but investments into the alliance are costly. Allies have incentives to free-ride, insofar as they can devote those resources toward domestic consumption and other priorities.

A lack of burden-sharing can carry risks for the patron. These include the potential of over-extension and economic decline if the patron is forced to overspend in order to make up for the shortfall (Gilpin, 1981; Kennedy, 1987). Free-riding can even cause the alliance to fail to achieve its objective(s) if the patron is unable to contribute enough by itself (Christensen, 2011: 11). Thus, partners engage in frequent negotiation over who pays for the alliance.

2.4.1 Burden-Sharing in U.S. Foreign Policy

Disagreements over burden-sharing have been a part of most U.S. alliances since their creation. Once allies in Europe and East Asia had recovered from World War II, U.S. officials hoped to pass many of the costs of deterring Communist expansion onto them. Dwight Eisenhower, for one, sought to economize on defense spending as part of his “New Look” policy, and allied burden-sharing was one of the crucial means to this end.

During the 1960s, the most prominent item on the burden-sharing agenda was the cost of stationing U.S. troops in the Federal Republic of Germany. The costs of local procurement for supplies exacerbated the U.S. trade deficit and contributed to the outflow of gold from the United
States throughout the 1960s. As a result, beginning in 1961 the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany entered into a series of biannual arrangements in which the West Germans purchased hundreds of millions (in some cases billions) of dollars of U.S. weapons in order to offset American costs. Once President Nixon took the U.S. dollar off the gold standard in 1971, the necessity for these “offset” arrangements decreased. But the desire for burden-sharing did not; if anything, it increased. Congressional efforts to reduce the level of U.S. forces from abroad – both from Europe and East Asia – provided new impetus for burden-sharing.

After the Cold War, there was a brief flurry of Congressional interest in burden-sharing and cost reduction in the early part of the 1990s. By-and-large, however, interest in burden-sharing was periodic, coinciding with major U.S. military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. This began to change during the 2010s, particularly after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Subsequently, burden-sharing rose near the top of the U.S. foreign policy agenda in the wake of Donald Trump’s election as president. Trump referred to NATO as “obsolete,” cast doubt on whether U.S. forces should remain in Japan and South Korea, and indicated that the United States should only defend allies that pay their “fair share.”

2.5 The Relationship between Reassurance and Burden-Sharing

There is an inherent tension between reassurance and burden-sharing. Alliances represent an exchange of goods, wherein both partners decide that relying in part on each others’ (albeit uncertain) support is preferable to pure self-reliance (Morrow, 1993). In the case of asymmetric alliances, where a patron provides security for its allies so that they can then provide less of it for themselves, this tension is ever starker. Reassuring allies thus diminishes their incentives to provide for their own defense.

---

It is perhaps not surprising, then, that Donald Trump – both as a candidate and as President – proved reluctant to reassure U.S. allies. Trump argued in July 2016 that the United States should be prepared “to walk” away from its commitments in order to put pressure on its partners, and during his third presidential debate with Hillary Clinton claimed that “it’s awfully hard to get [the allies] to pay up when you have somebody saying we think how great they are.”

His preoccupation with burden-sharing among U.S. allies, and his corresponding attempts to cast doubt on U.S. protection, reflect the tension between reassurance and burden-sharing. But this is only the most recent manifestation of the problem. Historically, other policymakers in the United States have also recognized this tension and taken steps to limit reassurance as a means of encouraging allied burden-sharing. In the case of West Germany, for example, the United States frequently threatened troop withdrawals as a means of putting pressure on the Germans to offset the costs of the U.S. deployments in the early 1960s. Similarly, the United States withdrew one-third of its forces from South Korea in the early 1970s while coupling its withdrawals with demands for burden-sharing.

### 2.5.1 The Reassurance Dilemma

One might thus conclude that reassurance is suboptimal, and that patrons are best served by casting their protection into doubt. The reality is not so simple, however. Because the patron’s side of the bargain entails providing protection to its allies, if that protection comes into doubt then allies have less reason to honor their end of the bargain: namely, to remain loyal to the patron by siding with it against its adversaries, providing basing access, and supporting its other foreign policy priorities (Morrow, 1991; Lake, 2009). The patron thus faces a dilemma. It must choose between withholding reassurance to maximize burden-sharing, on the one hand, and providing reassurance to ensure that allies have incentives to remain loyal to it, on the other.

Directly studying the relationship between reassurance and burden-sharing is difficult, how-

---

ever. The first two problems are methodological. Any relationship that exists between patron reassurance and allied burden-sharing may be spurious. For example, U.S. troop presence is likely to be correlated with threat, which may have an independent effect on allied military spending. Second, the relationship between reassurance and burden-sharing may be endogenous; patrons may withhold reassurance from allies which are under-contributing and then reward them with assurances of protection once they have increased their efforts.

The third problem is theoretical – even if troops are present, allies may fear (and, indeed, the patron may threaten) that they will be withdrawn. It is difficult to know, for example, whether a large U.S. troop presence in a country indicates that the host is highly dependent on the United States, or whether it is instead the United States that is dependent upon the host. Indeed, while Lake (2007, 2009) and Machain and Morgan (2013) find that states which host U.S. troops have lower defense contributions, Allen, VanDusky-Allen, and Flynn (2016) show that NATO allies’ defense efforts are positively related to U.S. military presence. Moreover, Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger (1994) find that states with a large U.S. military presence – which they treat as a proxy for partners’ dependence on the United States – were more likely to contribute to the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War.

As such, rather than directing studying the effect of reassurance on burden-sharing, I instead seek to establish conditions under which they are likely to vary in the same or opposite directions. Indeed, as I discuss in greater detail, many of the same factors that make reassurance more necessary also make burden-sharing more possible, allowing the patron to more easily couple its assurances with threats of abandonment in order to effectively make reassurance conditional on burden-sharing.

In the following chapter, I delve more deeply into the reassurance dilemma, identifying both the conditions under which it is most severe – and, by extension, the conditions under which patrons have greatest need to reassure allies – as well as conditions under which the dilemma can be mitigated by combining reassurance with threats of abandonment to encourage burden-sharing.
while simultaneously discouraging allies from seeking outside options.
Chapter 3

The Strategic Logic of Reassurance and Burden-Sharing

In this chapter, I lay out a theory of bargaining leverage in asymmetric alliances, which I argue can explain variation both in allies’ ability to extract assurance measures and patrons’ ability to make their protection conditional upon allied burden-sharing. To preview the argument, I claim that each state will be to extract its desired behavior from its partner – which for the ally is reassurance and for the patron is burden-sharing – to the extent that it can both credibly threaten to exit the alliance and impose high costs on its partner by exiting. Thus, allies with credible threats of exit will be able to demand maximal reassurance, while the patron will be able to demand maximal burden-sharing when its own threat of exit is credible and from allies that are in greatest need of its protection.

3.1 Bargaining in Military Alliances

3.1.1 Commitment, Dependence, and Leverage

Alliances are mutually beneficial to their partners, but the distribution of benefits and costs is rarely even and is subject to bargaining. In asymmetric alliances where the partner gives up autonomy to the patron in exchange for protection, this bargaining – whether done tacitly or explicitly – often involves smaller states using the threat of reclaiming autonomy in order to extract credible reaffirmations of their patron’s protection, or reassurance. Similarly, patrons can attempt to use the threat of reducing the protection they provide in order attain maximum burden-sharing from allies.
In the existing literature, bargaining power within an alliance is said to depend on the partners’ relative degrees of dependence upon and commitment to the alliance. Dependence refers to how badly each side needs its partner’s help, and hinges upon: “(1) a state’s need for military assistance, (2) the degree to which the ally fills that need, and (3) alternative ways of meeting the need” (Snyder, 1997: 167). States which are more dependent on the alliance have less bargaining power, as their opportunity costs to leaving the alliance are higher. An ally’s degree of commitment, in turn, refers to the extent to which it is inclined to fulfill its promises to support or assist its partner.\(^1\) Greater degrees of commitment reduce a state’s leverage over its allies by reducing its ability to threaten defection as a means of driving a hard bargain. Snyder (1997) distinguishes two general sources of commitment: incentives to uphold a reputation for reliability, and incentives for protecting the partner that would exist even in the absence of an alliance agreement (such as keeping an ally’s resources out of the hands of an adversary). Additionally, domestic political pressure and ideological affinity can shape commitment to an alliance. If leaders will be badly punished for defecting, or if the ally has a compatible governing ideology while the adversary has an antithetical one, then the partners are more likely to be committed to each other (Haas, 2005; Resnick, 2010).

Allies that seek to maximize their bargaining leverage should avoid seeming totally committed to their partner and keep their options open, as they can then use the threat of defection to drive a harder bargain. Britain, for example, felt compelled to support France and Russia in the years immediately before and during World War I out of fear that its partners might defect from the alliance and make a separate understanding with Germany (Jervis, 1997: 193-194; Rapp-Hooper, 2014). Similarly, by attaching strict conditions on its support, the United States was able to promote democratic reform in the Philippines during the early 1950s (Macdonald, 1992). More generally, a country which is able to maneuver into the role of the “pivot” between two states whose relations

\(^1\)As Snyder (1997: 169) puts it: “Dependence stems from the benefits provided by the partner; commitment, from promises made to the partner.”
are more adversarial with each other than with itself is often able to extract concessions from one or both sides – whether in the form of side payments such as territory or in the form of the non-use of force (Crawford, 2003, 2011; Izumikawa, 2013). Finally, the literature on entrapment suggests that patrons can mitigate the problem of moral hazard to the extent that they are able to make their commitments vague and distance themselves from their allies (Kim, 2011a; Benson, 2012; Beckley, 2015).

In asymmetric alliances, the stronger patron will seek to ensure that its weaker allies remain dependent upon it, while at the same time limiting its commitment in order to maximize its bargaining leverage. Allies, for their part, will seek to ensure that their patron remains committed to them while simultaneously trying to avoid becoming too dependent on the patron’s protection (Cha, 2016: 20-28). When one applies this logic to reassurance and burden-sharing, this means that too much reassurance reduces allies’ incentives for burden-sharing. The patron will, in the absence of coercive pressure, be forced to pay a disproportionate amount of the burden, since allies may have little reason to contribute more than what is demanded from them, as their comparative weakness means that their burden-sharing efforts are unlikely to be decisive to the alliance’s overall military power (Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966). Thus, the patron has incentives to limit its assurances in order to avoid being taken advantage of.2

The countervailing challenge that creates a dilemma for the patron, however, is that allies are free agents which can choose to leave the alliance if the patron’s commitment is too weak, or if it attempts to shift too much of the defense burden onto them. The patron is thus forced to trade-off between withholding reassurance to encourage burden-sharing and providing reassurance to encourage dependence – and, in turn, loyalty. In the following sections of this chapter I explore this dilemma by presenting a theory which explains both variation in allies’ ability to extract reassurance as well as variation in patrons’ ability to make their assurances conditional on allied

---

2 As Handel (1981: 122) puts it: “From the point of view of the stronger ally, it is an advantage to leave its commitment somewhat ambiguous in order to avoid manipulation by the weaker state.”
burden-sharing.

3.2 Theory: Exit, Reassurance, and Coercive Burden-Sharing

The stronger and weaker partners of an asymmetric alliance thus face unique problems. The patron’s challenge is to avoid seeming overly committed, lest it encourage free-riding, while also discouraging allies from leaving the alliance. For the ally, however, its challenge is to avoid being overly dependent on its patron for support while also trying to remain protected. Thus, a great deal of the bargaining in asymmetric alliances – whether done tacitly or explicitly – involves smaller states seeking reassurance from their patron, and the patron seeking to maintain the loyalty of its allies while simultaneously discouraging free-riding.

In much of international politics, bargaining takes place in the shadow of force (Fearon, 1995; Powell, 1999). However, the threat of force is less credible as a coercive tool in alliance politics, as war is likely to only fracture the partnership and weaken both partners, thus working against burden-sharing and undermining deterrence. Moreover, in asymmetric alliances, the weaker protégé can by definition hardly hope to defeat its patron in war. Instead, alliance bargaining takes place in the shadow of “exit.” States which can more credibly threaten to leave the alliance or pursue outside options hold a bargaining advantage over their partners.

In a bargaining perspective, allies’ ability to extract reassurance, and patrons’ ability to extract burden-sharing, will depend on the credibility of their threats to exit the alliance, as well as on the costs that exit would impose on their partners. The economics literature on bargaining stresses that actors trying to strike a favorable bargain benefit from being able to credibly threaten to walk away from the deal (e.g., Hirschman, 1970; Rubinstein, 1982; Chikte and Deshmukh, 1987). When a state can threaten to leave an alliance upon which its partner relies heavily, that state has the leverage to extract compensation from its partner in exchange for continued loyalty.

The credibility of a patron’s threat of abandonment is shaped by far more than just the level of reassurance it provides. As a result, the extent to which reassurance and burden-sharing are posi-
tively or negatively correlated depends in large part on whether the patron can couple its assurances with threats. When a patron’s threat to abandon allies is credible *ex ante*, it can afford to reassure its allies without worrying as much about free-riding. Indeed, the literature on coercion shows that reassurance is equally as important as threats in making for effective coercion, although it is much less studied (Davis, 2000; Sechser, 2007; Carnegie, 2015; Gerzhoy, 2015). The target of coercive bargaining needs to know that if it gives in, its partner will simply punish it anyway (Schelling, 1966). Thus, reassurance can actually be a positive tool that is used to increase burden-sharing, though only if it is backed up by threats. These threats do not necessarily need to be explicit, and indeed may be most effective if they are not. Allies are likely to consider how likely patron abandonment is, and thus their burden-sharing efforts will in no small part be a reaction to the patron’s latent threat of abandonment.

3.2.1 What is Exit?

By exit, I refer to attempts by states in an alliance to loosen themselves from the partnership and reduce the benefits they provide to their partners. For allies, exit takes the form of efforts to reclaim their autonomy and pursue a foreign policy more independent of the patron, while for patrons exit takes the form of efforts to reduce the security it provides. Exiting the alliance is more credible to the extent that a state has attractive outside options for meeting their security and/or autonomy needs.

Violation or abrogation of the alliance treaty are only the most extreme forms of exit; a party to an alliance need not expect that its partner will outright terminate the partnership. Rather, exit is a spectrum, and states may fear the consequences of the more moderate step of their partners “distancing” themselves from the alliance. Distancing is undesirable for two reasons. The first is that the perception of disunity may weaken deterrence by tempting adversaries to drive a wedge between the allies or by emboldening them to behave more aggressively (Weitsman, 2004; Crawford, 2011). Second, distancing raises questions about the amount of support that the partner will
furnish. Allies may fear that the patron will give only minimal support if they are attacked, while the patron may anticipate that more autonomous allies will be less likely to provide basing rights, less likely to support its foreign policy initiatives, and more likely to come to a separate understanding with adversaries (Lake, 2009). In early 2018, for example, steps toward détente between North and South Korea – including North Korea’s participation in the Winter Olympics and discussions of potential bilateral talks – worried many in the United States, who feared that such a rapprochement might undermine South Korea’s support for the United States’ preferred policy of putting military and economic pressure on the North.³

Two general forms of outside options are available to alliance partners: self-sufficiency and search. In the case of the former, states reduce their need for partners. Allies, for example, can attempt to increase their own military capabilities such that they no longer need protection. Patrons, for their part, can reduce their need for loyal allies by pursuing a more unilateral or isolationist foreign policy, and by striking a deal with adversaries. In terms of search, patrons and allies can seek alternative partners.

While the types of outside options weaker allies can pursue – ranging from nuclearization, to neutrality, to finding other countries to rely on for support – are diverse, and in many cases will not be the precursor to actual alliance termination, their causes are fundamentally similar, and they share common features that will make them worrisome to the patron. First, all of the forms of exit I discuss reduce allies’ dependence on the patron. This, in turn, makes them less likely to cave into its pressure in the future, and gives them less incentive to be automatically loyal. As a result, a patron has good reason to discourage allies from pursuing any of these options. Second, allies will be most prone to consider all of these forms of exit when relying on the patron’s protection becomes less attractive – whether because the patron seems unreliable, because the severity of the threat environment makes trusting the patron risky, or because the barriers to exit decrease. I am

ultimately agnostic as to which form of exit allies will be most likely to pursue in a given situation. Indeed, in many cases, allies can pursue multiple options in tandem, such as unilateral military arming coupled with efforts at rapprochement with adversaries. Nevertheless, I treat the threat of all forms of exit as a key driver of patron reassurance.

3.2.2 Ally Outside Options

Search

The first measure allies can take to reduce their dependence on their patron and lower the barriers to exiting the alliance is to move closer to a third party. This can be either another great power or a non-great power – including but not limited to allies’ or the patron’s adversaries. Indeed, even in a bipolar system, in which the other great power is likely to be a threat, or in a unipolar system, in which the patron is the only great power, it is not impossible for allies to form other alliances, pursue nonalignment, or even simply to come to an understanding with third parties in which they make concessions in exchange for safety (Rothstein, 1968: 26-28; Kim, 2016). Even if an adversary is hostile to the patron, it is not necessarily hostile or an imminent threat at all times to all of the patron’s allies, particularly if they come to an independent rapprochement with it. Allies may be willing to accommodate adversaries if the threat is great enough or the prospect of outside help is remote (Walt, 1987; Jervis, 1991: 40; Labs, 1992). In the wake of the U.S.-China rapprochement during the 1970s, for example, Taiwan made an effort to play the “Soviet card” in its relations with the United States by entertaining contacts with the Soviet Union in order to signal its search for outside options. Moreover, even if they stop short of aligning with an adversary, allies can use improved relations with the adversary as a means to the end of pursuing a more neutral, nonaligned foreign policy (Schroeder, 1994).

Allied efforts to settle differences with and move closer to adversaries will be a source of

---

concern for the patron since, in the most extreme case, doing so may represent a precursor to switching sides. Even short of that, however, a patron will oppose allies’ independent attempts at détente with the adversary because they: 1) represent a threat to its leadership of its alliances; 2) run the risk of undermining deterrence by signaling discord within the alliance; and 3) potentially reduce its control of its other allies by encouraging them to distance themselves from the patron as well (Liska, 1962: esp. ch. 5; Lake, 1999: 140-141). By unilaterally coming to an understanding with the adversary, allies reduce the patron’s ability to present a unified front and bargain with the adversary from a position of strength, and potentially undermine deterrence by indicating their desire to improve relations and reduce tensions. American fears that Japan might undermine the United States’ efforts to contain China and defend Taiwan led to the “Yoshida Letter” in 1952, in which the Japanese – under pressure from U.S. officials – agreed not to strike a separate treaty with Beijing (Swenson-Wright, 2005: 87-88). Moreover, the ability of an ally to rely on a third-party – even one that is not fundamentally hostile to the patron – will diminish the patron’s ability to control that ally. Indeed, during the early 1970s American policymakers were extremely skeptical of West Germany’s independent efforts toward improving relations with the Communist bloc, for fear that its rapprochement would undercut the United States’ own negotiations with the Soviet Union, undermine NATO unity, and that it could even be a harbinger of a more assertive, neutral Germany (Scott, 2011: 42-48).

Self-Sufficiency

Although weaker partners in asymmetric alliances are almost by definition dependent upon the protection of their patrons, in some circumstances they may be able to threaten to improve their security not by improving relations with a third party, but by standing alone against states that threaten them. The capacity for self-reliance decreases allies’ dependence on their patron by decreasing the opportunity costs they face for breaking the alliance, thus diminishing the patron’s bargaining power and rendering allies more capable of extracting reassurance measures. Here, re-
assurance serves as a means for patrons to restrain their allies (Schroeder, 1976; Weitsman, 2004). Many studies emphasize that allies can restrain their partners in large part because the benefits of the alliance can be held hostage for leverage, which might suggest that reassurance would be detrimental to restraint (Gelpi, 1999; Pressman, 2008; Owsiak and Frazier, 2014; Cha, 2016). Nevertheless, reassurance can serve as a means to the end of restraint insofar as it discourages allies from pursuing the outside option of their own independent military arming, or from undertaking preventive attacks out of insecurity (Christensen, 1999; Art, 2003; Monteiro, 2014).

The goal of discouraging exit via self-reliance is at odds with the goal of burden-sharing, and as discussed previously creates a dilemma for patrons seeking to devolve responsibility to local partners. In this way, the patron’s challenge is like that of the policymaker seeking to delegate authority to bureaucrats to improve efficiency. While delegation enables principals (patrons) to relieve their own burden, it runs the risk of empowering agents (allies) which may then not behave in ways consistent with the principal’s preferences (Epstein and O’Halloran, 1999). Yet the patron’s challenge is even more severe, owing to the anarchic nature of the international system; unlike legislators, patrons cannot create binding laws enforceable by a higher authority in order to keep its allies in line (Waltz, 1959, 1979).

In principle, American policymakers have at times been in favor of increased allied independence. Presidents as far back as Dwight Eisenhower, for example, have supported the enterprise of self-reliance in Europe, Japan, and elsewhere in the hopes that it would allow the United States to pass more of the burden of defending their regions onto them (Osgood, 1968; Sheetz, 1999). In practice, however, actual allied self-reliance has often been met with ambivalence or even opposition. Allied independence is risky, as allies which become less dependent on U.S. protection also have less incentive to follow its lead. For example, despite the “Guam Doctrine” that called

---

5 As Liska (1962: 36) put it: “The task of restraining is made easier when the commitment is not automatic.” See also the moral hazard literature discussed above (Kim, 2011a; Benson, 2012; Beckley, 2015).

6 On the means policymakers can use to monitor the behavior of bureaucratic agents, see McCubbins and Schwartz (1984).
for increased allied responsibility, the Nixon Administration was reluctant to retrench and devolve responsibility to Japan for fear that it would then move into a more neutral, re-militarized position (Komine, 2014). The administration also found that Australian and Southeast Asian assertiveness often took the form of efforts to circumvent or even oppose U.S. foreign policy (McMahon, 1999: 170-175; Curran, 2014). Similarly, in the post-Cold War environment, despite the potential burden-sharing benefits, U.S. policymakers were apprehensive at the prospect of a united Europe’s defense capabilities, and were skeptical of the European Defense Identity (EDI) in the 1990s and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in the 2000s (Howorth and Keeler, 2003; Posen, 2006). Indeed, even the Trump Administration, despite its insistence on European burden-sharing, expressed concern about efforts by European allies to coordinate more in their own defense, including through the creation of a European Defense Fund, fearing that the Europeans might use their own defense cooperation as a substitute for NATO.⁷

While exit via conventional military self-reliance will be difficult for most (though not all) allies, nuclear weapons represent a means by which they can unilaterally ensure their survival even in the presence of an overwhelming conventional foe (Waltz, 1981; Jervis, 1989). Indeed, the United States and Soviet Union placed great emphasis on arresting the spread of nuclear weapons, particularly from the 1960s onward (Gavin, 2015). More generally, patrons will be uneasy about the possession of nuclear weapons by their allies for at least three reasons. First, nuclearization decreases allies’ dependence, making them more capable of acting unilaterally and reducing patrons’ leverage by rendering them less able to threaten or coerce those allies in the future (Kroenig, 2010). The example of France illustrates this logic well, as France’s independent nuclear arsenal reduced its dependence on NATO and allowed it to withdraw its forces from NATO’s unified command in 1966. This not only weakened the combined military capabilities available under NATO’s direct command, but also raised the prospect that the French might remain neutral in the event

---

of a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict in Central Europe, preferring instead to rely on its independent nuclear deterrent (Yost, 1985a: 1-13; Yost, 1985b: 2-5, 32-33).

Second, proliferation potentially raises the risk of nuclear war – whether accidental or intentional – by increasing the number of independent actors possessing nuclear weapons (Sagan, 1995); by potentially emboldening nuclear-armed states to behave more aggressively (Bell, 2015); and by raising the specter of preventive war by a third party. Third, proliferation may beget further proliferation, both by undermining the norm of nonproliferation and by increasing the insecurity of neighboring non-nuclear states (Monteiro and Debs, 2014). Indeed, there is a great deal of mounting evidence showing that the United States put considerable pressure on its allies to refrain from gaining independent nuclear capabilities (Miller, 2014a, b; Gerzhoy, 2015). However, this gives potentially nuclear-capable allies leverage to extract assurances by threatening nuclearization.8

3.2.3 Patron Outside Options

Search

One option available to the patron is find other allies with which it can replace its current partners. All else being equal, the patron’s threat to abandon an ally becomes more credible to the extent that losing the ally does not mean losing the good that ally provides. Around the time of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, for example, the United States was able to secure the support of states in eastern Europe – such as Poland and the Baltic states – even though traditional allies such as France and Germany refused to participate. Similarly, during the 1980s the United States was able to turn to alignment with China as a supplement to – and, in the case of Taiwan, arguably as a replacement for – its other alliances in Asia. The option of search becomes less credible to the extent that the ally is of great strategic value, as in such cases it cannot be as easily replaced (Lake, 1999; Cooley and

---

8The cases in which allies with a potential nuclear option have extracted U.S. security assurances are numerous, and includes Germany (Gerzhoy, 2015), Israel (Cohen, 1998), Italy (Levite, 2002), Japan (Samuels and Schoff, 2015), South Korea (Gul Hong, 2011), and Ukraine (Einhorn, 2015). The United States also proposed creating a multilateral nuclear force for NATO in an effort to discourage independent nuclear programs in Europe (discussed in greater detail in Chapters 5-6.)
Spruyt, 2009). West Germany and Japan during the Cold War, for example, represented enormous prizes by virtue of the size of their economies and their latent military potential, the loss of which would have greatly undermined the United States’ position in Europe and East Asia by not only reducing its ability to maintain a forward presence, but also by removing their military resources from the combined clout of the U.S. bloc.

Similarly, a patron can reduce dependence on its allies by pursuing rapprochement with its adversaries. This improves its security environment and thus inherently reduces the raison d’être of its alliances. The patron is thus more free to pursue policies independent of its alliances, and even to shed those alliances. This was the fear of many U.S. allies especially during the 1970s, when the United States pursued détente with the Soviet Union and China (Fang and Ramsay, 2010; Yarhi-Milo, Lanozka, and Cooper, 2016). Similarly, almost immediately in the aftermath of the news that U.S. President Donald Trump had agreed to hold a summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un to discuss North Korea’s nuclear weapons, observers worried that Trump might be willing to “trade away” the U.S.-South Korean alliance or settle for an arrangement in which North Korea only kept only its shorter-range missiles that were incapable of striking the U.S. homeland.9

**Self-Sufficiency**

Patrons can also decide to forgo the autonomy benefits of an alliance by pursuing a more unilateral foreign policy, thus reducing their need for allies in the first place. For one, a patron may decide to “go it alone” and rely on its own capability to manage threats and project power rather than cooperating with allies (Voeten, 2001; Posen, 2006). Posen (2003, 2014), for example, has argued that the United States’ “Command of the Commons” gives it the freedom to project power unilaterally. Alternatively but related, the patron may decide to retreat into isolationism, devolving most or all of the responsibility for protecting its interests and maintaining regional balances of power to local partners. This approach, however, hinges on the patron’s ability to find an ally that is both willing

---

and able to contain expansionist states in its region, and which has foreign policy interests that align with the patron’s own (Haynes, 2015).

3.3 What Factors Shape the Threat of Exit?

In focusing on the threat of exit, one potential issue that arises is reverse causality, as states may be more likely to exit the alliance if their partners are not providing them with sufficient reassurance (in the case of allies) or burden-sharing effort (in the case of patrons). Moreover, allies and patrons should be anticipating each others’ risk of exit and moving to discourage it. Thus, I focus on ex ante factors that shape partners’ threats of exit, as well as the cost each state can impose on its partner by exiting.

In order for a state’s threat of exit to act as a potent source of bargaining leverage, it must be both credible and salient to its partner. Exit is credible when the benefits a state expects from the alliance are low while the costs are high, as well as when outside options are readily available. In turn, a state’s threat of exit will be more salient to its partner to the extent that the partner needs either security (in the ally’s case) or autonomy (in the patron’s case).

Snyder’s (1997) argument that bargaining leverage is a function of dependence and commitment requires some amendment when applied to asymmetric alliances, where the patron provides security to its allies while allies give up autonomy to their patron. In such asymmetric partnerships, allies are not always (or even often) expected to come to their patron’s defense; rather, the guarantee is by-and-large one-directional (Morrow, 1991; Rapp-Hooper, 2015). In asymmetric alliances, the weaker partner can more easily threaten to leave the alliance when the security benefits of the alliance are low and the costs of giving up autonomy are high, while its threat of exit carries more weight to the extent that the autonomy benefits it provides are valuable to the patron. As for the patron, its threat to abandon allies is more credible to the extent that the autonomy benefits of the alliance are low, while the costs of providing security are high. Patrons’ threats are more salient when the ally is more vulnerable and in need of protection.
Thus, in a variation on Snyder’s (1997) criteria for bargaining leverage, I propose the following factors which can explain bargaining over reassurance and burden-sharing in asymmetric alliances. For the patron, the credibility of its threats to abandon allies is a function of: 1) its autonomy needs; 2) the extent to which allies provide valuable autonomy benefits; 3) its outside options. Additionally, I would expect that the costs and benefits of providing security play an important role in determining whether the patron prefers to abandon its allies. Finally, the patron’s threats of abandonment are more salient to allies that have greater security needs.

As for allies, the credibility their own threats of exit depend on: 1) their need for security; 2) the extent to which the patron actually provides that security; 3) their outside options. Similarly, allies can more credibly threaten to pursue outside options to the extent that giving up autonomy is costly. The salience of these threats, in turn, hinges on the extent to which the patron needs the autonomy benefits they provide.

A comparison of my theory to that of Snyder (1997) can be found in Table 3.1, while a general summary of the theory can be found in Table 3.2. Here the “Potency” of a state’s threat of exit is a combination that threat’s credibility and salience to its partner. Additionally, a summary of the observable implications of the theory – which in turn serves as a preview into my testable hypotheses – can be found in Table 3.3.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potency of Ally Exit</th>
<th>Potency of Patron Exit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>Higher Reassurance, High Burden-Sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Low Reassurance, Low Burden-Sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>High Reassurance, Low Burden-Sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Low Reassurance, Low Burden-Sharing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2: Summary of theory.

3.3.1 Allies

Credibility

The credibility of allies’ threat of exit is a function of the security benefits of the alliance, the costs of giving up autonomy, and the availability of outside options. The security benefits an ally expects from the alliance depend both on how badly it needs security and on the patron’s willingness and ability to meet those needs. States enter alliances with the expectation that their partner(s) will provide them with certain benefits – though the certainty with which these will be provided is always in question, given the anarchic nature of the international system. The net benefits an ally expects from an alliance thus stem in large part from its perception of the patron’s reliability. The less an ally expects the patron to actually be willing or able to follow through on its promises – whether due to the patron’s past behavior (Miller, 2003; Gibler, 2008; Crescenzi et al., 2012), to signals from its domestic audiences (Schultz, 1998), or to its inability to project power, to name just a few – the less valuable the patron is (Selden, 2013). Thailand, for example, responded to fears about U.S. reliability in the early 1970s by reaching out to the Communist bloc and distancing itself from the United States, and also by cooperating more closely with other states in Southeast Asia (McMahon, 1999: 158-159, 170-173). South Korea and Taiwan similarly attempted to pursue nuclear weapons during this same time period.

Threat, however, has an indeterminate effect on the credibility of allies’ threats to leave the alliance. On the one hand, threat makes the alliance more necessary, which reduces allies’ incentives to leave the alliance. For allies, threat creates insecurity that renders them in need of protection.
This makes the alliance beneficial for it and diminishes its likelihood of seeking to distance itself from the alliance. Allies which face a high likelihood of being conquered will find it difficult to pursue outside options, whether by obtaining nuclear weapons, pursuing a conventional arms buildup, or simply adopting a policy of neutrality. These measures may not only be insufficient for deterring the adversary, but they may also carry great risk. The adversary would likely seek to forestall the proliferation of nuclear weapons to its non-friendly neighbors, and would also be more likely to demand a “pound of flesh” from a state seeking to secure a promise of non-aggression from it in the form of territorial concessions or policy influence. During the Cold War this was the position of Finland, which maintained independence in exchange for allowing the Soviet Union to have a great deal of influence over Finnish foreign policy and domestic politics. Moreover, even if allies are able to reach rapprochement with adversaries on fairly equitable terms, there is nothing to guarantee that the adversary will not seek to coerce it in the future (Fearon, 1995).

But threat also increases’ allies security needs, which is likely to make allies question whether the alliance is adequate to meet those needs. By surrendering some autonomy and relying on the patron for security, the ally risks jeopardizing its survival if the patron’s protection becomes inadequate for its security needs. While threat does indeed make it risky for allies to forgo the patron’s protection, threat also makes outside options more attractive to reclaim autonomy and bridge the potential gap between the ally’s security needs and the patron’s protection. Allies facing a high likelihood of being conquered by one of the patron’s enemies may be better served by keeping open the option to strike a separate deal with the adversary, obtain nuclear weapons, or pursue another outside option in order to hedge their bets. Unlike the patron, allies facing high levels of threat may have little incentive to balance against rather than bandwagon with threats. Indeed, even authors arguing that states prefer to balance against threats rather than bandwagon with them have claimed this applies most readily – if not exclusively – to great powers rather than to non-great powers (Walt, 1987; Snyder, 1997; Mearsheimer, 2001).10

10See also Rothstein (1968: 26-28) on how weakness creates incentives for nonalignment and accommodating adversary.
For allies, standing firm against adversaries is only desirable to the extent that doing so makes survival more likely than rapprochement with the adversary (or other outside options), even if doing so involves concessions. But giving up autonomy to the patron can jeopardize allies’ security by putting them “in the adversary’s sights” and foreclosing their ability to pursue friendly relations with the adversary (Snyder, 1997). The higher the perceived threat, the more incentives allies have to cultivate outside options to hedge their bets while remaining under the patron’s protection. Unless it is assured of patron protection, an ally may prefer to take its chances by unilaterally arming itself or by placating the adversary than to place its fate wholly in the patron’s hands. Thus, allies which perceive higher levels of threat may or may not be better able to extract assurances from their patron; the effect is theoretically indeterminate.

Finally, allies’ threats of exit are more credible when outside options are readily available. In particular, pursuing outside options becomes more attractive to the extent that the ally has the capability to defend itself and has alternative security partners to choose from. Allies which can more easily pursue nuclear weapons, rely on third parties for security, or pursue a course of nonalignment or neutrality can more easily meet their security needs without the patron’s protection. Thus, the more available options allies have, the more credible their threat to leave the alliance is, and the more reassurance they will receive.

**Salience**

Allies are also able to extract more reassurance from their patron to the extent that the patron needs the alliance. In particular, an ally can inflict more harm on a patron to the extent that it is strategically valuable to the patron. Some allies will be inherently more valuable than others, whether due to their geo-strategic locations or to the resources they can bring to bear on the patron’s behalf (Lake, 1999). Chamberlain (2014), for example, finds that American and Soviet arms transfers to the Middle East were in large part driven by recipients’ strategic value – measured using oil

---

Sary. Jervis (1991: 40) and Labs (1992) qualify the argument but still emphasize that high levels of threat or a perceived dearth of outside support give states incentives to accommodate or even bandwagon with adversaries.
production and geographic location – as both superpowers sought to sway more valuable partners to their side.

Additionally, allies’ threats of exit will be more salient to the extent that the patron perceives a high level of threat. In such circumstances, patrons have a greater need to attract partners to its side in order to keep them from aligning with adversaries, add their strength to its own coalition, and facilitate its efforts to project power. Allies can exploit this opportunity to extract assurances of protection from it. As Handel (1981: 149) puts it: “the readiness on the part of the super powers to pay almost any price to keep their primacy and alliance systems intact create[s] a situation in which weak states could enjoy defense and protection while at the same time reducing their own defense expenditures.”

3.3.2 Patrons

Credibility

Much like its allies, the alliance is more valuable to the patron when it perceives a higher level of threat. The more a patron faces the prospect of threat from a great power competitor, the more beneficial it is to have foreign security commitments rather than abandon its allies. Otherwise, it runs the risk of encouraging its adversaries to expand their influence – and even to dominate their regions if they have the capability. For the patron, threat generates incentives to check the expansion of its adversaries in order to prevent them from upending regional balances of power. When the patron perceives a high level of threat from an adversary, it has less incentive to remain aloof from its allies, or else risk tempting the adversary to take its chances and attack a seemingly disunited alliance that does not have the patron’s full commitment. The patron has more incentives to remain actively engaged in allies’ defense when it has an adversary that is able and willing to become a regional hegemon or a peer competitor (Waltz, 1979; Walt, 1987; Mearsheimer, 2001; Montgomery, 2016).

This in turn reduces the credibility of the patron’s threats of abandonment. Indeed, Christensen
(2011) argues that alliance disunity – including over issues of burden-sharing – can tempt adversaries into attacking, presenting evidence from competition between the U.S. and Communist alliance systems in East Asia. Because running such a risk is more dangerous when relations with the adversary are more hostile, allies can effectively exploit the patron’s reluctance to drive a hard bargain with them during such periods (Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, 1973: chs. 3-4; Fang and Ramsay, 2010).

Second, the credibility of a patron’s threat of abandonment will be shaped by the extent to which the patron has other allies it can turn to which fulfill its needs. In asymmetric alliances, the patron is unlikely to “need” any of its allies in the way that great powers in symmetric alliances do, simply due to the power disparity between the patron and its allies (Waltz, 1979; Christensen and Snyder, 1990; Snyder, 1997). Nevertheless, some allies will have “specific assets” that the patron is hard-pressed to find elsewhere (Lake, 1999: 9), such as its geostrategic location or the economic and military resources it brings to the alliance. Moreover, the patron will have greater interest in keeping these allies’ assets out of the hands of adversaries.

Finally, while providing security is beneficial to the extent that doing so discourages adversaries from expanding, it is also costly to provide security. Extending security guarantees risks entangling the patron in costly local conflicts, while the peacetime costs of maintaining military readiness for the sake of its alliances (e.g., a sizable standing military or foreign-deployed forces) represent a steady drain on the patron’s financial and manpower resources. I would expect the costs of providing security to allies to become less tenable to the extent that the patron faces constraints on the resources it is able to devote to its foreign commitments. The more strain on those resources, the more costly maintaining its partnerships will be – even if the alliances are otherwise highly beneficial.
|
|---|---|
| **Theoretical Concept** | **Determined by** |
| 1) Need for Autonomy | Patron’s Threat Perception |
| 2) Value of Allies’ Autonomy | Ally’s Strategic Value |
| 3) Outside Options for Autonomy | Ally’s Asset Specificity |
| 4) Benefits/Costs of Providing Security | Patron Resource Constraints |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Patron Credibility</strong></th>
<th><strong>Ally Credibility</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Need for Security</td>
<td>Ally’s Threat Perception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Value of Patron’s Security Provision</td>
<td>Patron’s Reliability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Outside Options for Security</td>
<td>Latent Military/Nuclear Potential; Alternative Partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Benefits/Costs of Giving Up Autonomy</td>
<td>Ally’s Threat Perception</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Patron Salience</strong></th>
<th><strong>Ally Salience</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security benefits provided by patron</td>
<td>Ally’s threat perception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy benefits provided by ally</td>
<td>Ally’s strategic value to patron; Patron’s threat perception</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3: Observable implications of the theory.

**Salience**

Additionally, the patron’s threat of exit is more salient to the extent that allies have greater need for the security it provides. Specifically, I would expect allies with more dangerous threat environments to be more responsive to the patron’s threats. Such allies are more exposed to the costs of being abandoned, and have a higher need for security. The patron’s threat of abandonment thus carries more weight for them.

**3.3.3 A Simple Formal Model**

I illustrate the logic of the theory in a simple two-stage, two-player game depicted in Figure 3.1. In this model, the patron firsts decides whether to reassure (R) or not reassure (∼R), and the ally then decides on its level of effort – whether to burden-share (B), maintain the status quo (SQ), or exit to pursue an outside option (E). These choices are of course stylized; in reality, reassurance is a matter of degree rather than a binary decision, and allies may pursue multiple options simultaneously. In this game, the patron always prefers that its allies increase their burden-sharing efforts rather than free-ride, while allied exit is the worst possible outcome for it. Additionally, allies always prefer to be reassured.
Figure 3.1: The Reassurance and Burden-Sharing Game

I first turn to the patron’s payoffs. As long as the ally does not exit, the patron receives the benefit of collective defense \( D \). When it reassures its ally, it receives a cost from the reassurance \( C_P \). Finally, when its ally increases its burden-sharing effort, the patron receives a benefit \( C_A \) equivalent to the cost of burden-sharing to the ally.

As for the ally’s payoffs, it receives patron protection \( P \) in all scenarios where it does not exit. This payoff is a composite of the benefits and costs of relying on the patron relative to other means of achieving security. This benefit will be higher to the extent that the ally does not have attractive outside options. An ally receives this benefit with a given probability \( 1 - \alpha \) when the patron reassures and \( 1 - \gamma \) when the patron does not reassure. \( \alpha \) and \( \gamma \) refer to the ex ante probability of patron abandonment (as perceived by the ally) and \( 0 < \alpha < \gamma < 1 \), as the ally’s confidence in the patron will be higher when the patron reassures than when it does not. When the ally shares more of the burden it suffers a cost \( C_A \) in the form of more resources devoted to the alliance. However, free-riding (i.e., pursuing the status quo) also entails a cost \( F \), which refers to the risk and vulnerability the ally incurs by doing nothing and relying on the patron’s commitment. This cost will be lower for allies which perceive a lower level of threat, and is weighted by the probability of patron abandonment (\( \alpha \) or \( \gamma \)) – that is, the probability that the ally will be forced to stand alone in a time of need.
Implications

A few implications of the model follow. First, reassuring reduces the attractiveness of exit for allies relative to burden-sharing and free-riding, but also reduces the attractiveness of burden-sharing relative to free-riding. This illustrates the reassurance dilemma: reassurance serves to maintain alliance cohesion, but also undermines burden-sharing.

Second, when holding reassurance constant, allies are more likely to free-ride relative to burden-sharing when: 1) the probability of patron exit ($\alpha$ and $\gamma$) is lower; and 2) allies’ vulnerability to threat ($F$) is lower. Allies are more likely to free-ride relative to exit when: 1) the probability of patron exit ($\alpha$ and $\gamma$) is lower; and 2) the net benefits of remaining loyal to the patron ($P$) are higher. Allies are more likely to burden-share relative to exit when 1) the net benefits of remaining loyal to the patron ($P$) are higher; and 2) the probability of patron exit ($\alpha$ and $\gamma$) is lower.

As for the conditions under which allies are likely to prefer (R,B) to (R,SQ) and (R,E) – that is, the conditions under which allies are likely to burden-share even if they are reassured – this can occur in three ways. (Proofs can be found in the appendix.) First, when there is a high $F$, high $P$, and high $\alpha$, and thus when the patron has a credible threat of exit, the ally is vulnerable, and the net benefits of patron protection are high. South Korea during the early 1970s illustrates this, as it was highly dependent on U.S. protection and its outside options were limited. Its levels of burden-sharing contributions were thus consistently high. Nevertheless, concerns about U.S. reliability led it to pursue nuclear weapons – which, in turn, led to more U.S. reassurance. Second, when there is a high $F$, low $P$, and low $\alpha$, and thus when the patron has a low threat of exit, the ally is vulnerable, and the net benefits of patron protection are low. An example would be West Germany during the late 1950s and early 1960s; concerns about U.S. reliability were not yet as severe as they would be during the 1970s, but West Germany’s vulnerability to attack gave the United States enormous burden-sharing leverage, while the FRG’s capacity for exit – inherent in its latent military power and latent nuclear weapons capability – also allowed it to extract U.S. assurances. Third, when
there is a high $F$, high $P$, and low $\alpha$, and thus when the patron has a limited threat of exit, the ally is vulnerable, and the net benefits of patron protection are high. Turkey, for example, needed U.S. protection and was directly contiguous to the Soviet Union, but the United States also had an inherent stake in protecting Turkey in order to keep the Bosporus Straits out of Soviet control.

Finally, higher values of $\alpha$ and $\gamma$ – which act as my proxies for the \textit{ex ante} credibility of the patron’s threats of abandonment – increase the likelihood of both reassurance and burden-sharing. Any factor that makes the patron’s threat of abandonment inherently more credible is also likely to make allies suspicious of its long-term reliability.$^{11}$ That is, \textit{factors which increase the patron’s ability to threaten abandonment for the purposes of burden-sharing also increase the need for reassurance}. This is consistent with the claims of scholars who argue that coercive threats must be combined with assurances for maximum effectiveness (Davis, 2000; Carnegie, 2015). Moreover, it suggests that the correlation between reassurance and burden-sharing is likely to be more complicated than existing studies which look for a negative or positive correlation allow (Lake, 2007, 2009; Machain and Morgan, 2013; Allen, VanDusky-Allen, and Flynn, 2016).

3.4 \textbf{Testable Hypotheses}

The credibility of allies’ threats to exit the alliance is thus shaped by their assessments of how the benefits of the alliance compare with the benefits of seeking alternative means of ensuring their security. More concretely, I expect that allies’ threats of exit are shaped by their \textit{perception of the patron’s reliability} and the \textit{availability of outside options}. The salience of these threats of exit, in turn, is determined by how much the patron needs the alliance – which I argue is determined by allies’ strategic value to the patron, and by the patron’s perception of threat. Thus, allies are more likely to receive reassurance when they have credible outside options; when they see the patron as unreliable; and when the ally is of great value to the patron.

$^{11}$Sechser (2010) makes a similar argument about what he calls “Goliath’s Curse,” wherein a powerful state may be unable to coerce weaker states because it cannot credibly commit to refrain from making additional demands or threats in the future.
As for the patron, its ability to threaten abandonment determines its ability to make its protection conditional on burden-sharing. Specifically, the credibility of the patron’s threats of abandonment depends on its own perception of threat, the extent to which it faces resource constraints and pressure to retrench from its foreign commitments, and how strategically valuable the ally is. Its threats of abandonment are more salient to allies to the extent that they perceive high levels of external threat.

In terms of observable implications, then, I focus on four factors that shape reassurance and/or burden-sharing. The first is the availability of outside options for allies. Each partner can more credibly threaten to exit the alliance to the extent that it has attractive outside options. Allies with significant latent military potential, a latent nuclear weapons capability, and alternative alliance partners can more easily afford to leave the alliance and go their own way, thus forcing the patron to reassure them more. Similarly, the patron’s outside options are shaped by the assets allies provide to the alliance (i.e., their strategic value). The patron will not be able to as easily abandon allies that have considerable economic and military resources, or which are in geostrategically important locations, as in such cases the patron’s alternatives are limited and it has a greater stake in these allies’ security.

Third, when the patron faces resource constraints brought about by economic hardship or costly foreign wars, its threat of abandonment is more ex ante credible, as maintaining a foreign military presence and waging wars become less sustainable. As a result, these constraints facilitate the patron’s burden-sharing pressure. However, because such uncertainty makes the patron more inherently unreliable, it reduces allies’ incentives to give up their autonomy in exchange for promises of protection, thus making allies’ threat of exit more credible as well. This, in turn, forces the patron to reassure its allies or else risk losing their loyalty. Under conditions of resource constraints, then, I expect that reassurance and burden-sharing will increase in tandem.

Finally, the external threat environment faced by the alliance can have multiple mechanisms by which it influences reassurance and burden-sharing. Higher levels of threat increase the costs that
the patron can impose on allies by abandoning them, which favors more burden-sharing. At the same time, however, threat may also reduce the credibility of the patron’s threat of abandonment by rendering the autonomy benefits of the alliance more salient and diminishing the patron’s ability to act unilaterally.

3.4.1 Allies’ Outside Options

Outside options are difficult to measure \textit{a priori}, especially in a generalizable way, as they are always context-specific.\textsuperscript{12} As discussed above, allies’ outside options can take the form of either self-sufficiency, a search for alternative partners, or a combination of the two. Thus, I would expect that allies which can more credibly threaten to pursue these options will receive more reassurance. Specifically, allies with significant \textit{latent military power}, a \textit{latent nuclear weapons capability}, and a greater number of \textit{alternative security partners} have stronger outside options.

First, allies with greater conventional military potential can more easily pursue a nonaligned, autonomous foreign policy, whether by relying on their own military power or by aligning with other states. While they may not be able to defeat a great power by themselves, powerful allies can more credibly threaten to impose significant costs on an invader (Mearsheimer, 1983). Moreover, stronger allies are better equipped to engage with adversaries on more semi-equal terms, and are not as vulnerable to the bullying or coercion which might otherwise make them reluctant to negotiate bilaterally or proceed without the patron’s protection. They can thus more easily pursue neutrality without having to bandwagon or make asymmetric concessions (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2007). Moreover, larger allies have more sizable internal markets and are likely to be less dependent on international trade (Rector, 2009: 20-21). U.S. concerns about German and Japanese neutralism, for example, pervaded the Cold War, and were part of the driving force behind the U.S.

\textsuperscript{12}Note that for the purposes of parsimony the theory I present focuses on systemic factors that make it easier or more difficult for states to exit an alliance. In doing so I abstract away from measures which states can take to “manufacture” commitment or dependence, such as through military inter-operability that makes partners better able to fight together but less able to fight alone (Morrow, 1994; Leeds and Anac, 2005). When states are systematically more capable of exit, this may in fact incentivize their partners to seek such binding measures (Mattes, 2012).
presence in Europe and the Western Pacific (Trachtenberg, 1999; Komine, 2014).

Second, the credibility of allies’ threats to pursue nuclear weapons is a function of both their conventional military strength and whether they have the latent capacity to build nuclear weapons. Conventionally powerful allies have a more credible threat of obtaining nuclear weapons for two reasons. For one, they have greater resources with which they can attempt to develop nuclear weapons. Second, their greater conventional strength renders them more able to deter preventive attacks on their nuclear programs (Fuhrmann and Kreps, 2010; Monteiro and Debs, 2014). States with a latent nuclear capacity, in turn, can more quickly obtain nuclear weapons. Fuhrmann and Tkach (2015) even find that nuclear latency itself may deter attacks.

Finally, allies with more partners to choose from can more easily meet their security needs by relying on third parties. Specifying which allies have more viable alternative security partners is difficult \textit{a priori}, as states can choose their partners based on expedient circumstances. Kim (2016) argues that system polarity dictates allies’ outside options; the more great power poles there are, the more alternative security providers allies can choose from. Yet this is a coarse measure, one that is not only quite slow-moving and entirely country-invariant, but which rules out alliances between non-great powers. Alternatively, in Lake’s (2009) conceptualization of security hierarchy, he treats alternative allies as his indicator of outside options. Because of my focus on the post-World War II period, I follow Lake in defining alternative alliances not in terms of polarity but in terms of states’ number of other allies.

This leads to the following set of hypotheses:

\textbf{Hypothesis 1.} Allies with stronger outside options will receive more reassurance from their patron.

\textbf{Hypothesis 1a.} Allies with greater latent military power will receive more reassurance.

\textbf{Hypothesis 1b.} Allies with a latent nuclear weapons capability will receive more reassurance.

\textbf{Hypothesis 1c.} Allies with more alternative allies will receive more reassurance.
3.4.2 Allies’ Strategic Value

The availability of outside options for the patron, in turn, is driven by the extent to which its allies possess strategically valuable assets that make them difficult to replace (Lake, 1999; Cooley and Spruyt, 2009; Rector, 2009). When a patron has few options for local partners, its threat to abandon allies is less credible, and therefore its ability to pressure allies for burden-sharing is diminished. Allies’ strategic value can take the form of their geographic location or resources (Chamberlain, 2014).

In particular, the resources of more powerful allies – those with larger economies and potential military strength – make them more strategically valuable to the patron. In bargaining with these allies, the United States may not have any other options to turn to which can fulfill the same function, thus reducing its ability to threaten abandonment. When allies are more valuable, the patron will have more “commitment-by-interest” in protecting them (Snyder, 1997: 169). Indeed, Danilovic (2002) finds that great powers’ deterrent threats are more effective in regions that are of greater intrinsic interest to them. Thus, because they are so valuable, the patron’s threat to abandon more powerful allies may lack credibility. This suggests that the patron may have little leverage over them when it comes to burden-sharing.13

As for the effect of strategic value on reassurance, on the one hand these allies’ intrinsic value makes their threats to exit the alliance more salient to the patron. I would thus expect that the patron will reassure strategically valuable allies more because it does not want to lose them. At the same time, however, because the patron does have an inherent interest in these allies’ security, they are likely to be more confident that it will protect them (cf. Danilovic, 2002). They may thus not need to be reassured, as the patron’s likelihood of abandoning them is lower. As a result, while strategically valuable allies are likely to be able to leverage the patron’s dependence on their assets to extract other forms of support, the effect of strategic value on reassurance is somewhat

---

13A similar logic may apply to allies rich in natural resources; however, this does not apply to most formal U.S. allies (Chamberlain, 2014).
Hypothesis 2a. Allies with greater economic resources will receive neither more nor less reassurance.

Hypothesis 2b. Allies with greater economic resources will contribute less for burden-sharing.

Hypothesis 2b partly runs counter to the conventional wisdom on burden-sharing in asymmetric alliances. In the logic of collective goods, larger allies should be more likely to share a higher portion of the defense burden. They not only have more resources to devote to defense, but also can also potentially affect the overall level of deterrence through their efforts (Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966). These countervailing mechanisms – one based on a bargaining framework, the other based on a public goods framework – may help explain why the correlation between defense effort and GDP was not always as strong among U.S. allies during the Cold War as the logic of collective goods would suggest (cf. Oneal, 1990).

Additionally, I would expect that the patron will have a less credible threat to abandon allies in geostrategically valuable locations. Having access to such locations – and denying them to adversaries – allows the patron to project power while restricting its adversary’s ability to do so. Turkey, for example, controls the Bosporus strait, which serves to connect the Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea. As a result, Russian and Soviet attempts to project naval power from the Black Sea faced potential interdiction, thus serving to make Turkey strategically valuable for not only Russia, but also any adversary seeking to deny it access to the Mediterranean (Chamberlain, 2014). Likewise, U.S. bases in the Western Pacific allowed it to contest Soviet attempts to project power using its Pacific Fleet (Desch, 1989; Lake, 1999).

Hypothesis 3a. Geostrategically valuable allies will receive neither more nor less reassurance.

Hypothesis 3b. Geostrategically valuable allies will contribute less for burden-sharing.

It is difficult to specify a priori which allies have the greatest geostrategic value, as this is inherently dependent on the patron’s foreign policy priorities. Moreover, geostrategic value has
most often been invoked to explain bargaining leverage over military basing (Cooley and Spruyt, 2009), where many hosts are not U.S. allies and the relationship is based more on the transactional exchange of material goods (such as aid and arms) rather than guarantees of security (Pettyjohn, 2012). In most alliances, the United States cares not only about maintaining its military bases, but in ensuring that its partners are not conquered – whether or not it has a presence on the ally’s territory.

Nevertheless, it is reasonable to expect that preventing the adversary from conquering or otherwise gaining access to allies’ territory will be more vital in some cases than others. In particular, I would expect that allies situated at key maritime chokepoints will be more valuable. Maintaining the ability to interdict the adversary’s naval forces and maritime trade at such points during wartime would be compromised if the adversary seized the ally’s territory, if the ally broke away from the alliance, or even if the ally simply denied the patron the right to operate on its territory. The patron’s threat to abandon strategically valuable allies is thus less believable. Moreover, the patron is likely to fear that if the ally distances itself from the alliance, it may be more likely to grant the adversary military access on its territory.

### 3.4.3 Patron Resource Constraints

Additionally, when the patron faces strain on its resources and pressure to retrench from its foreign commitments, its reliability becomes inherently more suspect. Resource constraints, whether they are the result of economic hardship, rising debt, or costly foreign wars, weaken the patron by diminishing its ability to exert influence in the international system. Great powers can do only as much as their resources allow, and attempting to maintain their current level of military might or foreign commitments during periods of reduced resources can run the risk of over-extension (MacDonald and Parent, 2011). Similarly, resource constraints are likely to sap the patron’s appetite for foreign entanglements. It is during times of weakness that great powers are most sensitive to the costs of overseas engagement and to face internal pressure to prioritize domestic issues at the
This, in turn, encourages allies to hedge their bets, and thus forces the patron to use reassurance measures. As Selden (2013: 339) puts it, “a United States that demonstrates a lack of will to defend its hegemony would not be as valuable a security partner.” As a result, when the patron is seen as unreliable by its allies, it must offset this perception through reassurance in order to discourage them from pursuing outside options. During the 1950s, for example, the Eisenhower Administration sought to reassure U.S. allies that its “New Look” approach, in which the United States would rein in its defense spending and foreign commitments in the aftermath of the Korean War, did not imply a weakening of the U.S. commitment. This was done in large part to dissuade allies from pursuing independent nuclear arsenals (Sloan, 2016: 38-39).

At the same time, during periods of resource constraints the United States will be more tempted to place burden-sharing pressure on its allies so that it can reduce its own costs (Haynes, 2015). When U.S. policymakers have intrinsic incentives to retrench, they can use those incentives to put burden-sharing pressure on allies. Leaders can claim that the United States’ commitment is not entirely in their hands, and that allies must contribute more to the common defense in order to both appease U.S. domestic audiences clamoring for retrenchment and condemning allied “free-riding,” and to offset the United States’ reduced ability to provide security. Resource constraints and/or domestic sensitivity to the costs of foreign entanglements will tempt the patron to rely more on the efforts of its allies as a substitution for its own efforts.

Resource constraints influences patron reassurance and allied burden-sharing via two mechanisms. The first of these is “involuntary defection” – the possibility that factors beyond policymakers’ control will force them to renege on their commitments (Putnam, 1988). When policymakers face domestic pressure to retrench by reducing either defense spending or their country’s overseas

---

14 The literature on resource constraints and great power retrenchment is voluminous (see, e.g., Gilpin, 1981; Kennedy, 1987; Friedberg, 1988; MacDonald and Parent, 2011).

15 This is closely related to the concept of “inside options” in bargaining models, which refer to the benefits that an actor can reap from contesting or prolonging a bargain (Gould and Winters, 2007: 9-10).
Figure 3.2: Resource constraints and reassurance.

military presence, exit becomes more attractive for allies. For one, the costs of maintaining foreign commitments at their present level may become less tenable due to budgetary constraints brought on by economic hardship or the loss of blood and treasure in foreign wars. Moreover, resource constraints are likely to prompt domestic audiences to favor retrenchment and be more wary of foreign entanglements due to war weariness and a desire to prioritize spending for domestic consumption (Chapman, McDonald, and Moser, 2015). A long line of research suggests that protracted, costly wars sap domestic political support for foreign entanglements (Mueller, 1973; Mack, 1975; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler, 2009).

Unlike executives, who represent the entire country and thus uniquely have incentives to pursue policies which are in the “national interest,” domestic actors have fewer incentives to pursue policies that benefits others and instead have incentives to pursue their own interests (Howell, 2013). As such, domestic actors have greater freedom to vilify foreign policies that are costly without offering direct benefits to their constituents (Milner and Tingley, 2015). Policies designed to protect allies outside the context of direct fighting are one such example. Unlike the actual use of combat forces in wartime – in which informational asymmetries are likely to empower executives and for which there is a clearer motivation to have military forces abroad – the use of scarce resources to reassure allies can instead have the appearance of a “hand out” and raise concerns about free-riding to domestic actors.

Resource constraints thus increase policymakers’ leverage for persuading allies to expand their
burden-sharing efforts. Even for allies that do not host U.S. troops, pressure on U.S. commitments will be disconcerting, as it will be perceived as diminishing the likelihood that the United States would intervene to protect them, both by reducing its willingness to intervene (due to domestic pressure) as well as its ability (due to shrinking resources). Domestic isolationism effectively makes reassurance less costly from a bargaining perspective, as allies less certain of U.S. commitment can be expected to be less prone to free-ride even if they are reassured. Pressure to retrench allows patrons to effectively combine implicit (even unintended or unwanted) threats of defection with promises of continued commitment if the ally complies.\(^\text{16}\)

At the same time, however, resource constraints can make the U.S. threat of exit too credible by making it appear less reliable. This reduces allies’ expected value of relying on the United States, and thus encourages them to pursue outside options. Indeed, Lanoszka (2014) finds that U.S. allies are more likely to consider nuclear weapons in the wake of a major withdrawal of American troops. South Korea and Taiwan, for example, began pursuing nuclear weapons in response to U.S. retrenchment from East Asia during the 1970s and ceased pursuit only in response to strong American pressure. Similarly, allies may be more inclined to improve relations with adversaries when their patron’s commitment seems tenuous. The Nixon Administration feared that Congressional and public pressure in the wake of the Vietnam War – most notably in the form of a series of amendments and resolutions sponsored by Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, which called for withdrawing significant numbers of U.S. troops from Europe (Williams, 1985) – might lead allies to move closer to the Soviet Union. U.S. officials thus used considerable reassurance measures to counteract the voices of domestic actors.

Second, constraints on the exercise of U.S. power create incentives for it to pursue détente with or accommodate its adversaries in order to avoid over-extension and buy time until it can reassert itself (Treisman, 2004). Indeed, this was part of the logic behind Mikhail Gorbachev’s pursuit of détente with the West during the 1980s (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2000; Schweller and Wohlforth, \(^\text{16}\)On the importance of combining threats and assurances, see Schelling (1966), Davis (2000), and Carnegie (2015).
2000), as well as Richard Nixon’s opening to China and détente with the Soviet Union during the 1970s. Détente with the adversary makes the patron’s threat of exit more credible by reducing its deterrence needs, and thus reducing the value of its alliances. This increases the patron’s influence over allied burden-sharing. Fang and Ramsay (2010) argue that allies’ value to the United States diminishes when relations between the United States and the adversary are less tense, and that as a result allies increase their burden-sharing in response to the credibility of U.S. exit.

However, patron-adversary détente is also likely to encourage allied exit, as allies will fear being “sold out” as part of a deal between the great powers. During the late 1960s and 1970s, many U.S. allies, despite seeing merits in the relaxation of tensions between the Eastern and Western blocs, feared that if dictated by the United States, détente could be the precursor to the United States striking a deal with the Soviet Union or China at the expense of their own interests. Thus, even though the level of adversary threat will be lower, the United States will paradoxically have to reassure its allies more during periods where it pursues détente with adversaries (cf. Yarhi-Milo, Lanoszka, and Cooper, 2016).

It is important to note that setbacks such as costly foreign wars or economic hardship are certainly not the only reason why domestic actors may favor retrenchment. However, for the purpose of establishing causation, focusing on the effects of exogenous shocks is preferable to studying the effects of, for example, public opinion, which could be endogenous to the level of U.S. assurances or to allied defense efforts. Domestic actors may favor making demands of allies or withdrawing troops because they are responding to perceived allied free-riding or “excessive” U.S. reassurance, and thus in such cases the direction of causality could be reversed.

Hypothesis 4. When a patron faces resource constraints, it will use more reassurance, but will also make its assurances more conditional on allied burden-sharing.

3.4.4 The Countervailing Effects of Adversary Threat

Although alliances may serve a number of functions for their members, ranging from fostering general transparency and conflict management among the allies themselves (Schroeder, 1976; Weits-
man, 2004; Bearce, Flanagan, and Floros, 2006) to gaining influence and establishing control over their partners (Morrow, 1991; Pressman, 2008; Cha, 2016), all alliance relationships will inevitably be shaped by the threat environment, as states exist in anarchy and alliances are a key means of cooperation in the face of threat (Waltz, 1979; Walt, 1987; Snyder, 1997).

The role of adversary threat in driving reassurance is well-discussed in the literature, as many existing arguments treat allied reassurance as largely a second-order effect of adversary deterrence (Schelling, 1966; Morgan, 1983; Fearon, 1997). Moreover, the act of reassurance to some extent presumes the existence of a threat. This may not always necessarily be the case, as the patron may seek to reassure allies not only of their safety against present threats, but also that its commitment will endure in the case that threats emerge in the future. Nevertheless, one might reasonably expect that the need for reassurance intensifies to the extent that an ally faces greater levels of threat to its security. Additionally, the patron may use gestures of support to not only reassure its allies, but also to deter adversaries, and this latter need is also likely to be more intense when the level of perceived threat from those adversaries is elevated (McManus, 2014).

However, my theory suggests that there are countervailing mechanisms through which threat might influence reassurance, such that the relationship may be indeterminate. Threat can shape each side’s credibility of exit and the cost it can impose by exiting. The effect of threat is thus partly a question of which partner perceives the threat more acutely – the ally or the patron. A state’s bargaining power is reduced when it perceives a high level of threat, as that increases its dependence on the alliance. When a state’s partner perceives a higher threat level, however, the state’s bargaining power increases (Snyder, 1997). In the following two sections I discuss the effects of threat on reassurance and burden-sharing, respectively.

**Threat and Reassurance**

Threat has an indeterminate effect on reassurance, as there are numerous offsetting mechanisms through which threat shapes allies’ threats of exit. First, threat increases’ allies security needs.
While this makes the alliance more valuable and the pursuit of outside options more risky, thus decreasing the credibility of allies’ threat to leave the alliance, it also makes relying solely on the alliance more risky, thus giving allies incentive to consider pursuing outside options. Indeed, it was likely in no small part due to its margin of security that France was able to withdraw from NATO’s unified military command and seek to maintain an option of “non-belligerence” in the event of a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict in Central Europe (Yost, 1985a: 1-13; Yost, 1985b: 2-5, 32-33).

Nevertheless, it is difficult to say a priori whether allies facing high threat or low threat will be more likely to exit the alliance. Under conditions of high threat, allies may prefer to exercise autonomy by seeking alternative means of meeting their security needs. Low-threat allies may conclude that the alliance is of little utility, while high-threat allies may conclude that relying on the alliance alone is too risky.

Second, as for the patron’s perception of threat, in a high-threat environment the patron does not necessarily have to reassure its allies in order to discourage them from leaving the alliance. The patron’s commitment is more automatic when it perceives a high level of threat because it has more incentive to keep allies from being conquered by an adversary. By contrast, allies are more likely to doubt the patron’s reliability – and thus to consider outside options – when it perceives a low level of threat. In such circumstances the patron has less need to take an active role in checking the expansion of an adversary and can more easily afford to shed its alliances (Walt, 2009).

At the same time, however, when the patron perceives a high level of threat, allies’ threats of exit will also have more salience to it. This gives the patron incentive to reassure them in order to keep them in its camp. In circumstances where the patron is seeking to isolate an adversary and discourage its neighbors from aligning or cooperating with it, allies may be able to use this to their advantage by extorting the patron into providing assurances of protection.

**Hypothesis 5.** Threat has an indeterminate effect on reassurance.

Thus, I do not lay out specific hypotheses on the relationship between threat and reassurance.
Nonetheless, threat is an important omitted variable which it is important to control for when I attempt to demonstrate the explanatory power of the factors I focus on here.

**Threat and Burden-Sharing**

The effect of threat on burden-sharing will depend on whether the threat is felt more acutely by the patron or by the ally, as the effect of patrons’ and allies’ threat perceptions cut in different directions. While threat raises the consequences of abandonment for allies, it may also undermine the credibility of abandonment for the patron. When the patron perceives a high level of threat and the ally a low level of threat, the patron’s leverage for extracting burden-sharing is minimal. In such circumstances, the patron’s threat to abandon allies not only lacks credibility, but it also lacks consequences for allies. The patron is by definition the most disproportionately powerful member of the alliance, and as such its ability to pass the back to its allies is limited (Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966; Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001). This is especially the case when an adversary poses a high level of threat to its neighbors, as allies may lack the capability to manage the threat themselves. Moreover, the patron has incentive to contain the expansion of hostile regional powers, lest they become even more of a threat in the future (Walt, 1987; Montgomery, 2016).

By contrast, the patron’s threats of abandonment will be quite salient when the ally perceives a high level of threat while the patron perceives a low level of threat. As described above, I expect that a patron’s leverage for burden-sharing will be shaped by the level of damage it can impose by abandoning an ally. This, in turn, is a function of how much worse-off an ally would be if it were suddenly left without the patron’s protection. Allies will thus be more vulnerable to coercive burden-sharing pressure to the extent that they have a high perception of external threat.

The challenge to making empirical predictions is that there is likely to be a strong correlation between patrons’ and allies’ threat perceptions. Walt (1987) famously argued that threat is a function of capabilities, intentions, and geography. Capabilities are a constant between patrons and allies, and it is difficult to say *a priori* the conditions under which patrons’ and allies’ perceptions
of adversary intentions are likely to diverge. Thus, I argue that geography is the best-suited to making empirical predictions for its effect on burden-sharing, as it is a constant for the patron but varies significantly between allies.

I begin first with the effects of adversary intentions and capabilities. States infer information about the desires and plans of other states largely from their behavior – in other words, how they treat other states. Benign behaviors such as unilaterally giving up contested territory or engaging in arms control suggest benign motives (Kydd, 1997, 2005; Glaser, 2010). By contrast, acts of aggression such as seizing territory from other states suggest expansionist motives and a disregard for international norms (Cohen, 1979; Walt, 1987; Ambrosio, 2017).

Importantly, hostile adversary intentions may be endogenous. Not only can states shape their own environments – for example, by pursuing rapprochement with their rivals (Rasler, Thompson, and Ganguly, 2013; Akcinaroglu, Radziszewski, and Diehl, 2014) – but adversaries may also change their behavior in response to the level of reassurance and cohesion in the alliance (Morrow, 1994; Leeds, 2003; Fuhrmann and Sechser, 2014). As such, in order to assess the effects of intentions, it is necessary to focus on events and factors that affect perceptions of adversary intentions but which are outside of the control of the patron and its allies.

Instances of adversary aggression toward non-allied third parties are one such behavior. Non-allies do not benefit from the patron’s extended deterrent commitment, and thus aggressive acts toward them will be all but impossible to predict or deter. These events signal information about the adversary’s willingness to use coercive force but are unrelated to the alliance. The Soviet invasions of Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Afghanistan (1979), for example, all generated increased American threat perception. Because these provocations were related to the domestic affairs of each target and the countries involved did not enjoy U.S. security guarantees, one can treat them as exogenous shocks to the intra-alliance dynamics of the U.S. alliances.

17 Using military arming as an indicator of intentions, however, is problematic, as it risks conflating the intentions inferred by the behavior with the capabilities generated by the arming.
In the case of the invasion of Afghanistan, for example, the importance the United States placed on resisting the Soviets gave Pakistan an enormous bargaining chip that it was able to exchange for American aid packages and even acquiescence to Pakistan’s development of nuclear weapons (Rabinowitz and Miller, 2015: 77). Similarly, in the wake of the invasion the United States was unable to pressure its NATO allies into greater defense effort with much success. As Lundestad (2003: 212) puts it, by strengthening the U.S. commitment to and presence in Europe, the Reagan Administration “took away much of the incentive for the Europeans to increase their conventional strength.” Similarly, as I show in the case studies, European allies responded to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 with only token measures toward burden-sharing. Instead, what the invasion brought was a temporary silencing of voices within the United States pushing for retrenchment from Europe, thus taking the pressure off the allies.

As for adversary capabilities, they have a similarly indeterminate effect on burden-sharing. On the one hand, the more capabilities an adversary has, the greater the costs that the patron can impose on its allies by exiting; the threat of being left to stand alone against a weak adversary will have little potency. On the other hand, if an adversary is powerful enough to pose a serious threat to the states around it, the patron’s threat of exit may lack credibility. The more powerful an adversary, the greater the risk that it could dominate its region in the patron’s absence (Mearsheimer, 2001; Montgomery, 2016). The balance of power between the patron and adversaries is essentially constant in multipolar and bipolar systems, where the patron’s adversaries are peer competitor great powers. Thus, for my purposes studying the effects of adversary capabilities is more meaningful in the context of unipolarity (i.e., the post-Cold War period), where the United States has faced a diverse array of adversaries across regions that vary in terms of their capabilities.

Third and finally, with geography one can make clearer empirical predictions than with capabilities and intentions. The patron’s proximity to the adversary is constant, and thus variation in its

---

perception of threat at any given time can be explained little by geography. Allies, however, differ in terms of how proximate they are to the adversary, as well as in whether they share a border with it.

Geographic proximity directly exposes allies to the costs of abandonment. As a result, the patron will be able to more effectively wield the threat of exit against geographically vulnerable allies – and thus to more effectively demand burden-sharing. By contrast, allies which are far from danger may be able to easily free-ride on the protection the patron provides to allies on the frontlines. Moreover, vulnerable allies are more likely to see independent military strength both as a necessary hedge in the case of patron abandonment and as a crucial component of the alliance’s overall deterrent capacity vis-à-vis the adversary.

During the Cold War, vulnerable allies such as South Korea, Turkey, and West Germany tended to be quite susceptible to U.S. burden-sharing pressure despite receiving more assurance measures. Turkey, for example, hosted a substantial number of U.S. forces, but was among the largest contributors to NATO – including its “second largest land force” (Uslu, 2003: ch. 4; quote at p. 101). Indeed, it is telling that many smaller U.S. allies that have faced comparatively higher levels of threat, including South Korea and the “new NATO allies” in Eastern Europe such as Poland and the Baltic states, have often punched above their weight in assisting U.S. military interventions in, for example, Vietnam and Iraq (Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger, 1994; Yong Lee, 2011).

By contrast, states that are not immediately proximate to a major source of threat are less likely to accept burden-sharing costs. During the Cold War, distant U.S. allies often found it easier to resist U.S. pressure. Portugal, for example, contributed little to NATO for much of the 1950s through the 1970s, as it was far more concerned with protecting its overseas empire – and indeed even threatened to hold its bases in the Azores hostage from the United States as a means

---

19 Iran and Pakistan, highly vulnerable owing to their position on the Soviet border, are somewhat special cases due to their lack of clear formal security guarantees from the United States. However, the U.S. provided “reassurance” in the form of military aid and arms sales, but did lean heavily on them to essentially take care of their regions on their own, without direct U.S. involvement (Kux, 2001; Zanchetta, 2014).
of gaining American acquiescence (Vasconcelos, 1988). Japan proved more resistant to U.S. burden-sharing pressure during the Cold War than was South Korea or West Germany, in no small part because Japan’s margin of security was much greater due to its being separated from the Asian mainland by water, and because South Korea provided a buffer for it. As a result – and often to the frustration of U.S. officials – the Japanese have spent relatively little of their GDP on their self-defense (Swenson-Wright, 2005: ch. 6).

The same even goes for the United States’ Anglo-Saxon allies; despite their history of strong support for it, the United States found it difficult to coerce them when their support was not voluntarily forthcoming (Handel, 1981: 139-141). During the 1970s, the United States realized it had few levers with which it could coerce Australia into supporting its policies in the Asia-Pacific by virtue of its margin of security, which afforded Australia the option of both ignoring U.S. preferences and of reaching out to China and the Soviet Union with little risk (Curran, 2014). New Zealand’s expulsion from the ANZUS alliance in 1986, the result of its refusal to allow American nuclear-armed submarines into its waters, also illustrates the comparative looseness that characterizes ties between patrons and remote allies (Catalinac, 2010). Similarly, U.S. policymakers saw few means of deterring Canadian troop withdrawals from West Germany during the Nixon Administration. Finally, as I show in Chapter 6, the United States had limited capability to coerce the United Kingdom; despite threats to cut off intelligence and nuclear cooperation, it was unable to compel the British into forestalling defense cuts or delaying retrenchment from their imperial holdings in Asia.


Hypothesis 6. Geographically vulnerable allies will contribute more for burden-sharing.

3.4.5 The Risk of Nuclear Retaliation

One factor I have not yet discussed is the existence of nuclear weapons. There is good reason to expect that the risk of nuclear retaliation might have a different effect on reassurance and burden-sharing than threat perception caused by other adversary capabilities, in ways consistent with my theory’s focus on intra-alliance bargaining via threats of exit. When the patron faces the risk of being attacked with nuclear weapons as a result of honoring its foreign commitments, the preventive logic of proactively deterring expansion by adversaries in order to prevent them from dominating their regions is turned on its head. The patron’s promise to uphold its commitments becomes inherently less believable when it faces the risk of nuclear retaliation, as entering into conflict with a nuclear-armed adversary carries the potential to bring the patron’s home territory under nuclear attack.

Allies are likely to question whether the patron would put its own population at risk of nuclear attack. A long line of scholarship holds that conflict between nuclear-armed powers has become nearly unthinkable, as there is no conceivable benefit which could outweigh the costs of a nuclear war (Waltz, 1981; Jervis, 1989). Indeed, doubts about the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence commitments have been endemic since the early years of the Cold War. Schelling (1966), for one, took it as his starting point that the threat to accept nuclear annihilation as the price of honoring one’s commitments and preventing adversary expansion was inherently difficult to believe. A common refrain throughout the Cold War was that the United States could not be trusted to “sacrifice Washington, New York, and Chicago for Bonn, Paris, and London” (Fergusson, 2003: 156). During the 1960s and through the 1970s, for example, in response to the growth of the Soviet nuclear arsenal U.S. policymakers began moving away from its doctrine of “Massive Retaliation,” which called for responding to Soviet aggression with an overwhelming nuclear attack, and toward a policy of “Flexible Response,” in which NATO would have a variety of options, including con-
ventional defense and the use of tactical nuclear weapons (Freedman, 2003: chs. 6, 19). Many allies were uneasy with this change, as it gave the United States options to keep the U.S. homeland safe from nuclear retaliation, thus signaling that it did not place enough value on the security of Europe to put its own cities at risk (Freedman, 2003: 221, 275-277, 279-281; Rapp-Hooper, 2015: 237-238). U.S. allies effectively feared that Flexible Response would decouple the defense of Europe and the defense of the United States, thus allowing the Americans to spare their cities if a Soviet invasion was not repelled using conventional forces and tactical nuclear weapons (Sandler and Forbes, 1980; Howard, 1982).

On the one hand, this inherent unreliability gives allies less incentive to remain loyal to it rather than to pursue outside options as means of bolstering their security. One might thus expect that the greater the possibility the patron will face nuclear retaliation as a result of upholding its alliance commitments, the more reassurance it will provide to allies. On the other hand, because allies will be more inclined to doubt the patron’s protection, they may be more susceptible to its burden-sharing pressure. U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, for example, argued that the end of U.S. nuclear dominance meant that Japan needed to increase its conventional forces, and implicitly referencing the threat of abandonment by stating that “A nuclear exchange is not a defense operation we [the Americans] would want to undertake.”

Testing the effects of the risk of nuclear retaliation, however, is difficult. This is in large part because the United States has faced a nuclear-armed adversary for virtually the entire period under study. Moreover, other potential ways of measuring the risk, such as the relative balance of nuclear weapons, are not ideal because once an adversary has obtained a sufficient large and dispersed arsenal that it can launch a nuclear strike even after absorbing a first strike from the patron it is not clear how and to what extent the risk of nuclear retaliation would be shaped by changes in the nuclear balance – nor is it clear what that second-strike threshold would necessarily be (Waltz,

Table 3.4: Mechanisms by which H1-H6 affect patron reassurance and allied burden-sharing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Ally Credibility</th>
<th>Ally Salience</th>
<th>Patron Credibility</th>
<th>Patron Salience</th>
<th>Net Effect (Reassurance)</th>
<th>Net Effect (Burden-Sharing)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ally outside options (H1)</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally strategic value (H2-H3)</td>
<td>↓</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>↓</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patron resource constraints (H4)</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>↑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally vulnerability (H6)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>↑</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>↑</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1981; Jervis, 1989). Indeed, existing evidence on the benefits of nuclear superiority is mixed (Betts, 1987; Sechser and Fuhrmann, 2013, 2017; Kroenig, 2013). Thus, while I do not incorporate it into the main portion of the analysis, I do control for the nuclear balance in the quantitative analysis, while also looking for evidence in the case studies that U.S. policymakers sought to reassure allies that were worried about the U.S.-Soviet nuclear balance.

3.5 Alternative Explanations

Additionally, I pit my hypotheses against other potential explanations. One alternative explanation is legitimacy. That is, U.S. reassurance could be driven by a “logic of appropriateness” rather than a “logic of consequences” (Hurd, 1999). This could particularly be the case given the arguable existence of a “Security Community” in the post-Cold War period (Wendt, 1999; Jervis, 2002b). But, especially since it is the United States and its allies that make up the Security Community, this factor will be largely constant across allies – except to the extent that allies are more or less democratic (as discussed below) – and thus cannot explain variation in reassurance. Thus, I consider three other possible explanations that could explain variation in the United States’ use of reassuring measures toward allies: U.S. domestic politics; ally domestic politics; and the desire to deter adversaries.

3.5.1 U.S. Domestic Politics

First, some authors have pointed to the ability of allies to influence U.S. policies from within by engaging in lobbying efforts, both at the grassroots level via public relations campaigns and by
directly attempting to promote their agendas through pressure groups (Keohane, 1971; Bar-Siman-Tov, 1980; Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007). That is, some allies may have a systematically greater capacity for exerting “voice” over U.S. policy (Hirschman, 1970). These arguments suggest that allies which are able to gain a major presence in U.S. domestic politics – whether in the form of direct government-to-government lobbying, or in the form of emigrants that have taken residence in the United States – are likely to receive reassurance measures due to their out-sized influence.

**Alternative Hypothesis 1** (Lobbying). States with more clout in U.S. domestic politics (e.g., a sizable diaspora or a significant lobbying presence) will receive more reassurance.

Second, reassurance may vary based on U.S. leaders’ electoral incentives. For one, sitting presidents’ partisanship may influence their use of reassurance. In American politics, Democrats are often seen as more in favor of dovish and multilateral foreign policies, while Republicans are hawkish and favor unilateralism (Chanley, 1999; Narizny, 2003; Whitten and Williams, 2011). Moreover, presidents may reassure allies more or less depending on their electoral cycles. Presidents facing imminent re-election may be less likely to use reassurance because they are distracted by their campaigns. Alternatively, however, presidents facing re-election may use reassurance in an effort to project leadership and signal competence to the electorate. Finally, presidents may be more or less likely to reassure allies during their second terms, when they do not have to worry about re-election. Indeed, Lebovic and Saunders (2016) find that second-term presidents visit foreign countries more often, which they attribute to presidents’ seeking to cement their personal legacies as statesmen.

**Alternative Hypothesis 2** (Partisanship). The United States will use reassurance more (less) when the president is a Democrat.

**Alternative Hypothesis 3** (Re-election Years). The United States will use reassurance less during presidents’ re-election years.

**Alternative Hypothesis 4** (Lame-Duck Presidents). The United States will use reassurance more during presidents’ second (lame-duck) terms.
3.5.2 Ally Domestic Politics

As for allied domestic politics, the logic of the democratic peace suggests that, for normative and ideological reasons, policymakers in democracies are more likely to trust each other, and to value the survival of other democracies. Arguments vary somewhat, but this affinity has been attributed to democracies’ predilection for peaceful resolution of disputes (Doyle, 1986; Russett, 1994; Dixon, 1994), and to feelings of ideological similarity among democratic publics (Haas, 2005, 2014; Gartzke and Weisiger, 2013). Even if policymakers themselves do not hold their democratic allies in high regard, domestic audiences – and especially pro-democracy groups and human rights advocates – are likely to favor democratic allies over more autocratic ones (Owen, 1997). For my purposes, the implication is that U.S. policymakers may be more likely to reassure other democracies, whether due to domestic pressure or to their own ideological proclivities, in order to show favoritism toward their democratic allies. Indeed, McManus and Yarhi-Milo (2017) find that the United States is more likely to issue public signals of support such as visits to its democratic allies than its autocratic allies, as it faces domestic constraints against publicly supporting autocracies.

Alternative Hypothesis 5 (Regime Type). Democracies will receive more reassurance.

Second, it is possible that allies which have governing ideologies compatible with those of adversaries may be more likely to exit. For one, U.S. allies with left-wing governments may have been regarded as more prone to seeking détente with the Soviet Union. Left-wing governments could be expected to perceive a lower degree of threat from the Communist bloc, and thus to be less dependent on the United States and less opposed to an understanding with the Soviet Union (Liska, 1962: 90, 187, 191; Haas, 2005, 2014). More generally, a great deal of research suggests that left-wing parties have more dovish foreign policy preferences than right-wing parties, and thus

24 Others, however, have attributed the absence of war between democracies to the logic of political survival, wherein democracies choose only to fight opponents against which they are likely to win – i.e., non-democracies (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999; Reiter and Stam, 2002).
will be less likely to take a hard line and more likely to make concessions to adversaries (Budge and Hofferbert, 1990; Russett, 1990; Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge, 1994; Eichenberg, 1996; Schultz, 2001; Palmer, London, and Regan, 2004; Foster, 2008; Clark, Fordham, and Nordstrom, 2011).

Indeed, there are numerous examples where the United States saw the presence of a left-wing government in foreign states as a potential precursor to their tilting closer to the Soviet Union. In Japan, for one, anti-American sentiment was generally associated with the Social Democratic Party (JSP) and the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), which were skeptical of the alliance with the United States (Greene, 1975: 23; Welfield, 1988: 283-284, 292). By contrast, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was much more staunchly anti-communist and in favor of maintaining the alliance with the United States, and U.S. decision-makers doubted that the LDP could reconcile with communism and the Soviet Union (Simon, 1974: 126; Welfield, 1988: 291, 295-296, 299, 306, 317, 335; Cha, 1999: 104; Zubok, 2013: 61). Similarly, left-wing governments in Greece were seen as being at high risk of moving closer to the Soviet Union, thus diminishing American leverage and increasing the United States’ need for continual effort to keep Greece tied to NATO (Crawford, 2003; Pelt, 2006).

The potential problem with this explanation is that left-wing governments with a desire to pursue rapprochement with the Communist bloc may come to power because of perceptions of U.S. unreliability. Indeed, as I show in the case studies, the Social Democrats came to power in West Germany in 1967-1969 in no small part because of dissatisfaction with the country’s dependence on the United States. Similarly, Italian Communists invoked the possibility of American withdrawal as reason to distance Italy from the United States (Fornasier, 2012: ch. 18). Thus, while it is an entirely plausible explanation, left-wing influence may be in part endogenous to the patron’s use of assurances and threats – as well as to more general perceptions of its credibility. Moreover, it is possible that U.S. policymakers may prefer to punish left-wing governments by withholding

---

25 On U.S. support for right-wing regimes more generally, see Schmitz (1999).
Alternative Hypothesis 6 (Political Ideology). Allies with left-wing governments will receive more reassurance and contribute less for burden-sharing.

3.5.3 Pure Deterrence

Third, the logic of deterrence theory would expect that both reassurance and burden-sharing would be positively related to the level of threat posed by adversaries. While H5 and H6 emphasize the role of threat, their predictions stem from my expectations about how threat influences intra-alliance bargaining. This alternative explanation, by contrast, essentially ignores alliance politics and bases its predictions on extra-alliance dynamics with the adversary, with allied partners increasing or decreasing their efforts based on how much the adversary needs to be deterred.

Alternative Hypothesis 7 (Pure Deterrence). Reassurance and burden-sharing will both be higher when adversary threat is higher.

3.6 Methodology

This dissertation represents the first systematic attempt to study the determinants of reassurance and coercive burden-sharing. I use both quantitative and qualitative methods in order to maximize my leverage on the hypotheses. The quantitative tests allow me to show that my hypotheses have their intended effects in the population of U.S. allies, while case studies allow me to investigate their causal mechanisms in order to verify that reassurance and burden-sharing were indeed the product of a bargaining process – tacit or explicit – and that policymakers modified their behavior based on expectations about allied exit.

3.6.1 Quantitative Analysis

I test the theory first by quantitatively studying the relationship between U.S. resource constraints and allied exit options, on the one hand, and U.S. reassurance, on the other. The unit of analysis is the U.S. ally-year. My sample runs from 1950-2012 and includes all states that are defined as having defense pacts or ententes with the United States in Version 4.1 of the Correlates of
War’s Formal Alliances Dataset (Gibler, 2009). These alliances are all “written agreement[s] that identify[ ] at least the members and the obligations of each alliance member” (Gibler and Sarkees, 2004: 212). Specifically, “defense pacts commit states to intervene militarily on the side of any treaty partner that is attacked,” while ententes “pledge consultation and/or cooperation in a crisis, including armed attack” (p. 215). While imperfect – the list excludes some informal U.S. allies such as Israel (except during 1981-1991), Saudi Arabia, and post-1979 Taiwan, as well as wartime partners such as South Vietnam – this coding by-and-large captures the peacetime alliances that I am interested in here.

However, I exclude U.S. allies in the Americas – both Canada, to which the United States is allied through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Latin American countries, many of which it is allied to through the Organization of American States (OAS). This is because these countries were not subject to direct threat of attack from the Communist bloc – only to internal subversion, which is not my focus. Moreover, they were within the U.S. Monroe Doctrine sphere of influence, and did not share many adversaries with the United States – aside from (in some cases) the Soviet Union, from which they were quite far.26

In the next chapter, I describe the dataset I created in order to test my theory, which includes new data on U.S. presidential statements of reassurance, foreign visits, joint military exercises, and foreign troop deployments. I also test the propositions on allied burden-sharing using data on allies’ military spending, financial compensation for U.S. bases, and support for U.S. foreign military interventions.

3.6.2 Qualitative Analysis

In addition to quantitative tests, I also marshal qualitative historical evidence to better uncover the causal logic of the hypotheses. While the quantitative evidence allows me to uncover broad pat-

---

26 One exception is Canada; but the results are robust to the inclusion of Canada – and to the exclusion of Liberia, the United States’ only formal African ally.
Table 3.5: U.S. allies included in the sample, Correlates of War list.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>2009-</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>2004-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1951-</td>
<td>Liberia (entente)</td>
<td>1959-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1949-</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>2004-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>2004-</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1949-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>2009-</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1949-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>1999-</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1951-1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1949-</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1949-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>2004-</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>(entente, 1954-1958; defense pact, 1959-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1949-</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1951-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1954-</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1999-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1951-</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1949-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1999-</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>2004-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>1949-</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>2004-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran (entente)</td>
<td>1958-1979</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>2004-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel (entente)</td>
<td>1981-1991</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>1954-1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1949-</td>
<td>Thailand (entente)</td>
<td>1954-1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1951-</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1951-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea, Republic of</td>
<td>1953-</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1949-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
terns, case studies allow me to use process-tracing in order to better assess why U.S. policymakers used reassurance measures, as well as why allies shared in the defense burden. Moreover, since burden-sharing pressure (rather than simply actual allied contributions) is difficult to capture in a quantitative analysis, case studies are essential if I am to determine whether the United States did in fact make threats (explicitly or implicitly) in order to induce its allies into sharing more of the defense burden. I rely primarily upon declassified U.S. government documents, supplemented with secondary historical and contemporary observer texts.

I examine U.S. reassurance and burden-sharing pressure toward the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the United Kingdom, Japan, and South Korea from the mid-1960s through the mid-1970s. The within- and between-case comparisons of these cases provide significant variation on the key independent variables, and allow me to trace their effects on U.S. reassurance and burden-sharing pressure. First, regarding H1, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom were three of the United States’ most powerful allies, and each of them had at the very least a latent nuclear weapons capability – and, in the case of the United Kingdom, an actual nuclear arsenal. These three allies thus had comparatively more credible threats to exit the alliance, and can be expected to have been prioritized for reassurance when compared to a weaker ally such as South Korea. Second, I expect that South Korea and West Germany will have been comparatively more vulnerable to U.S. burden-sharing pressure than Japan and Britain because of their direct contiguity to communist states (H6).

Additionally, these cases feature within-case variation on H5 and H4. NATO was subjected to the shock of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 (H5), which generated an increased level of American reassurance, but also produced little movement toward burden-sharing among the Europeans. As for H4, the costs of Vietnam led to increasing retrenchment pressure from the U.S. Congress, exemplified in the amendments and resolutions sponsored by Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield. The result was increased uncertainty about the credibility of the U.S. commitment – and, in turn, increased willingness to consider outside options such as nuclearization.
or neutralism. As such, the United States went to great lengths to reassure its allies – even in Asia, despite the “Guam Doctrine” – and was reluctant to threaten abandonment despite the retrenchment pressure it faced. However, policymakers also sought to use Congressional pressure as a lever to extract allied burden-sharing, often to considerable success.

Finally, these cases feature extreme values on many of my independent variables. Such cases are useful for tracing the logic of hypotheses because they are the cases in which one would expect the theory’s causal mechanisms to operate the most strongly (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994; George and Bennett, 2005; Lieberman, 2005; Seawright, 2016). West Germany and Japan have an extreme value on the independent variable for H1 (latent military power), as they had large economies and populations, and thus greater capacity for exit and self-help. The United Kingdom, for its part, started as a powerful ally, and one that was quite strategically valuable by virtue of its network of overseas bases, but grew significantly weaker – and thus less valuable – over time. West Germany and South Korea have an extreme value on H6 by virtue of their land border with the Communist bloc, while the United Kingdom also has an extreme value on H6 in the opposite direction by virtue of its considerable distance from the “front-line.” Finally, because the costs of the Vietnam War generated such intense pressure on the United States’ ability to sustain its commitments and deep domestic divisions over its role in the world, it is an ideal time period for investigating the effects of resource constraints and domestic retrenchment pressure on U.S. reassurance and allied burden-sharing.
Chapter 4

Quantitative Analysis: Reassurance and Burden-Sharing in U.S. Alliances

In this chapter, I perform statistical tests of the hypotheses derived in the previous chapter. The first half evaluates the determinants of U.S. reassurance, while the second half focuses on the hypotheses pertaining to burden-sharing. Overall, I find considerable support for the hypotheses.

4.1 Research Design: Reassurance

I test the hypotheses on reassurance using a cross-national dataset of U.S. reassurance between 1950 and 2010. The unit of analysis is the U.S. ally-year, and my sample includes all states defined as having defense pacts or ententes with the United States in Version 4.1 of the Correlates of War’s Formal Alliances Dataset (Gibler, 2009).

4.1.1 Threats to Inference

In studying the effects of the threat of exit on U.S. reassurance, there are three primary threats to making inferences about the relationship. The first is endogeneity. It is possible, indeed likely, that allies may make threats or attempts to exit the alliance in response to a lack of reassurance, and thus the causality of the relationship could run in reverse. As a result, I do not use attempts to pursue outside options as my independent variables. Instead I focus on factors that affect allies’
ex ante ability to credibly exit. These factors are observable by both parties, thus allowing them to tailor their behavior in anticipation of the other’s actions.¹

The second is unobserved variation across countries and regions. The threat environment allies face is likely to vary considerably across regions due to their differences in geography – such as whether allies are separated from their neighbors by water, their proximity to the United States, and their proximity to U.S. adversaries. In addition, the type of alliance and the number of U.S. allies varies significantly across regions; whereas it had a tight multilateral alliance (NATO) with numerous states in Europe, it had bilateral pacts (excluding SEATO) with a smaller number of allies in Asia and the Middle East. Cha (2009, 2016) argues that multilateral allies can better threaten to exit the alliance because they can rely on each other. Thus, alliance size and the number of regional allies the United States has may be important omitted variables as well. As such, I always include country or region fixed effects in my models.

Third is change over time. It may be the case that U.S. assurances universally increase or decrease over time in ways not captured by the control variables, and thus the estimated effects for the independent variables might be biased if they are correlated with these secular trends.² In order to account for temporal trends, I always include one of the following: linear, squared, and cubic time trends; year fixed effects; or decade fixed effects.

### 4.1.2 Dependent Variable

For my dependent variable I use instances of public statements and diplomatic visits made by U.S. officials to allied countries. I argue that statements and visits best capture the theoretical concept of reassurance for a quantitative analysis. Even if allies are reasonably confident in their patron’s commitment, continual rhetorical assurances are necessary if only because they are likely to be

---

¹One may be concerned that the factors discussed in H1b and H1c – latent nuclear capacity and independent alliances – may be partly endogenous to reassurance. Nevertheless, while these results should be interpreted with some caution, the potential for endogeneity is reduced both because these factors do not directly capture allies’ efforts to pursue outside options, and because they vary extremely little over time.

²The over-time trend in U.S. reassurance can be found in Figure A1.1, and shows that there has indeed been a gradual uptick in reassurance over time, especially after the 1950s and early 1960s.
expected, and thus their absence would be noticeable – and all the more so if they have reason to doubt the patron’s reliability (Jervis, 1970: e.g., 81-82). In the case studies, I examine additional means of reassurance that are harder to capture in a quantitative analysis, including nuclear and conventional military doctrine, consultations, and private statements.

While not as costly a signal as more tangible measures such as foreign-deployed troops, statements and visits are far from costless. The time leaders spend visiting other countries or making public statements of support is time not spent on other priorities (Lebovic and Saunders, 2016). Moreover such public signals are likely to generate some expectation of support on the part of allies, domestic audiences, and other international audiences (Schelling, 1966; Fearon, 1994; McManus, 2014). Signals of support, especially if done in public, can thus have the effect of tying the patron’s hands by creating reputational costs if it does not follow through (Guisinger and Smith, 2002; Sartori, 2002, 2005). Indeed, McManus (2017) finds that visits and statements of support from major powers decrease the likelihood of attack against their protégés.

The evidence suggests that both U.S. allies and U.S. policymakers take statements and visits of support very seriously. For example, the South Koreans interpreted Vice President Walter Mondale’s decision to visit Tokyo but not Seoul in early 1977 as a signal of U.S. disinterest in their country (Lee and Sato, 1982: 107-108). Similarly, U.S. officials in the Nixon Administration feared that Defense Secretary James Schlesinger’s statement that the United States would be “automatically” involved in the event of a North Korean attack would be misread by the South Koreans as a stronger statement of support than intended (Oberdorfer, 1997: 13-14).

Moreover, other measures of reassurance are even more imperfect, first of all because of data availability. For one, troop deployments change very little over time, and are skewed by a number of outlier countries that account for a large percentage of the total number of troops. Similarly, data on military exercises are not widely available until the late 1970s (D’Orazio, 2013). Second, statements and visits are the most direct form of reassurance. Troop deployments and military exercises can be multi-purpose, and used not only for reassurance but also for power projection
and building partner fighting capacity. Military aid may also in some cases represent a reassuring signal, but is just as likely to be a way of helping allies do more for themselves rather than rely on U.S. protection.

Using text from U.S. presidential statements, I hand-coded instances of public presidential declarations of reassurance between 1950 and 2010. With the paragraph as the unit of analysis, I summed the number of statements a president made toward each ally in a given year that expressed a reaffirmation of the United States’ commitment to protect it. My data on U.S. presidential statements come from the American Presidency Project (Peters and Woolley, 2016). Second, I collected data on U.S. President and Secretary of State visits to foreign countries from the U.S. Department of State (2017). I then sum statements and visits together to create my measure of reassurance. As a check on the validity of my measure, I compare it to codings of promises, assurances, and visits from two existing datasets. The first is the World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) dataset, available for 1965-1990, which codes New York Times articles (McClelland, 1999; Tomlinson, 2001). The second is an extension of the WEIS dataset for 1990-2004 coded by King and Lowe (2003a,b), who machine-code Reuters articles. The correlation between my coding of reassurance and these measures are quite high – 0.421 for the 1965-1989 period using the WEIS coding, and 0.662 for the 1990-2004 period using the King and Lowe coding.4

4.1.3 Independent Variables

Allies’ Outside Options

Allies’ latent conventional military power is captured using their logarithmized gross domestic product (GDP). This captures the total resources available to allies for their own self-defense. Data

---


4Statements and visits are also correlated with U.S. troop deployments and military exercises, even though the latter two are slow-moving over time. Correlation matrices for the Cold War and post-Cold War periods can be found in Tables A1.2 and A1.3 in the appendix, respectively.
come from version 8.0 of the Penn World Table (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer, 2015), extended by Gleditsch (2002). As robustness checks I use alternative proxies – namely allies’ population and their Correlates of War Composite Indicator of National Capabilities (CINC) scores.

Second, following the convention in the literature (Fuhrmann and Tkach, 2015; Mehta and Whitlark, 2017), I measure whether allies have a latent nuclear weapons capability using a dummy variable, which takes a value of 1 if the ally has an operational nuclear reactor (pilot- or lab-scale), and 0 otherwise.\(^5\) Nuclear latency data are from Fuhrmann and Tkach (2015).

Third, following Lake’s (2009) measure of alternative alliances, I use the number of independent alliances an ally has – i.e., those not shared with the United States. The distribution of this variable is skewed by a number of outliers with many independent alliances, so I take the natural logarithm. Importantly, however, the commonality or divergence of an ally’s alliance portfolio with that of the United States may influence reassurance not because it shapes the credibility of their outside options, but because it reflects the underlying degree to which the ally and the United States have common interests (Signorino and Ritter, 1999). Thus, I also control for the percentage of alliances that the ally shares with the United States.

U.S. Resource Constraints

My first proxy for resource constraints captures the aftermath of protracted, costly foreign wars. I use a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 during the tenures of presidents who oversaw the end of the wars in Korea (Eisenhower, 1953-1960), Vietnam (Nixon/Ford, 1969-1976), and Iraq and Afghanistan (Obama, 2009-2016) – and 0 otherwise. This is an attractive proxy because I expect resource constraints and concerns about U.S. reliability to be high both during the later stages of a costly foreign war, after years of fighting have inflicted losses in blood and treasure, and for a time thereafter, while policymakers and the public recover from the war and the armed forces rebuild their strength. Second, I measure economic hardship using U.S. GDP growth. Economic

\(^5\)This measure includes allies that obtained nuclear weapons (United Kingdom, France, Israel, Pakistan), but the results hold when separating these states out.
contractions constrain government revenues, while war can similarly divert resources from the economy, increase the deficit and debt, contribute to inflation, and lead to shortages in military manpower (Rockoff, 2012: esp. 27-42).

**Ally Strategic Value**

In order to measure allies’ strategic value, I create a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if an ally is positioned near a key maritime chokepoint. In particular, I include the following countries: Japan; Turkey; United Kingdom; Spain; South Korea; Denmark; Norway. In the post-Cold War I also include Estonia due to its position between St. Petersburg and the Baltic Sea. Access to these countries facilitated U.S. efforts to project power near adversary (Soviet/Russian, Chinese, and North Korean) shores, while simultaneously allowing it to create a bottleneck through which adversary ships traveling from its territory to the open seas would need to pass. Thus, having access to countries at key maritime chokepoints allowed the United States to both project power itself and secure its own maritime trade while simultaneously hindering adversaries’ ability to project power and exposing adversaries’ maritime trade to interdiction.

4.1.4 **Control Variables**

Additionally, I include a number of controls, all of which (except those which are time-invariant or are dummy variables for specific years) are lagged by one year to ameliorate concerns about simultaneity bias.

**External Threat**

First, I control for the level of threat posed by shared adversaries, which one might expect to drive allies’ need for reassurance – and the patron’s desire to supply it – in the first place. From a purely

---


7The results are also robust to the inclusion of the Philippines and Australia.
deterrence perspective, the patron should be more likely to send signals of support to its allies in the context of high threat environments in order to send a strong deterrent signal to the alliance’s shared adversaries. I use five variables to account for the level of threat from shared adversaries – which I define as the Soviet Union during the bipolar Cold War period (1950-1989), and then China (for U.S. allies in East Asia and the Western Pacific) and Russia (for allies elsewhere) during the post-Cold War period.

The first is adversary conflict involvement with U.S. allies. This is coded as the number of MIDs in a given year between the adversary and each ally, with each MID weighted by its maximum level of hostility. MID data come from version 4.1 of the Correlates of War’s Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset (Palmer et al., 2015). Second, I control for the level of adversary hostility with the United States. This is coded in the same way as ally-adversary conflict involvement. Both of these variables are likely to be somewhat endogenous to reassurance but they may nevertheless be important omitted variables.

Next, I include a dummy indicator for instances in which an adversary – or one of its proxies at its behest – invaded and occupied the territory of a country not allied with the United States. During the Cold War, there were four such instances: Korea (1950), Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Afghanistan (1979). Additionally, after the Cold War I also include the Russo-Georgian War in 2008. These events are likely to have influenced U.S. and allied threat perception because they represented instances of clear aggression, and because these states did not benefit from U.S. protection, adversary behavior in these cases can be considered more plausibly exogenous to U.S. reassurance. I code the first year of each of these instances as 1, as well as the following two years, as I would expect U.S. reassurance to have increased in response to the initial shock of the attacks.⁸

Finally, I include two measures of allies’ geographic proximity to adversaries. The first is a

⁸The one exception is Afghanistan, which began in December 1979, and thus I also code the year 1982 as 1. See appendix for more details.
dummy variable indicating whether the ally shares a land border with a member of the Soviet bloc (during the Cold War), or with Russia or China (during the post-Cold War). 9 Data come from version 3.1 of the Correlates of War’s Direct Contiguity dataset (Stinnett et al., 2002). 10 The second is the ally’s proximity to the centers of adversary military power, which for allies in East Asia I treat as Beijing, both because of its location in China and because of its proximity to the center of Soviet military power in the Far East, and for allies everywhere else I treat as Warsaw, owing to its proximity to the center of Soviet military power in Europe. During the post-Cold War I use distance to Moscow instead of Warsaw, as the Russian western frontier was pushed to the east. This is measured as the distance between the ally’s capital city to either Beijing or Warsaw/Moscow (in kilometers). Capital city distance data come from Gleditsch and Ward (2001).

**Economic Development**

Second, I control for allies’ level of economic development using their logarithmized GDP per capita. Wealthier, more developed allies may receive more attention from the United States, both in terms of visits and statements, because they are more economically important to U.S. interests (Lebovic and Saunders, 2016). Data are from Gleditsch (2002).

**Alliance Type**

Finally, I also control for alliance type by including a dummy variable for whether the country is allied to the United States via a defense pact, which carries an explicit guarantee of assistance, or via an entente, which does not. These differences in terms may produce different expectations of reassurance.

9 The Soviet bloc includes all members of the Warsaw Pact, as well as China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and (starting in 1976) Laos and Cambodia.

4.1.5 Model Specification

Because my dependent variable is a count of the number of U.S. reassurance statements and visits, I employ count regression models. The distribution of the dependent variable is somewhat over-dispersed, however, which suggests that a negative binomial model is more appropriate than the basic Poisson model (Hausman, Hall, and Griliches, 1984; Cameron and Trivedi, 1986). The three negative binomial regression equations I use are specified as follows:

\[
\text{Assurances}_{i,t} = \exp(\beta_1 \text{GDP}_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 \text{NuclearLatency}_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 \text{AlternativeAllies}_{i,t-1} \\
+ \beta_4 \text{GeostrategicLocation}_{i,t} + \gamma \text{X}_{i,t-1} + \mu_i + \zeta_t + \epsilon_{i,t})
\] (4.1)

\[
\text{Assurances}_{i,t} = \exp(\beta_1 \text{Postwar}_{i,t} + \beta_2 \text{USGrowth}_{i,t} + \gamma \text{X}_{i,t-1} + \mu_i \\
+ \text{Time}_t + \text{Time}^2_t + \text{Time}^3_t + \epsilon_{i,t})
\] (4.2)

where \(i\) indexes countries, \(t\) indexes years, Postwar is a dummy variable indicating the aftermath of a protracted U.S. foreign war, USGrowth indicates U.S. GDP growth, GDP represents the logarithmized value of the ally’s gross domestic product, NuclearLatency represents whether an ally has an operational pilot- or lab-scale nuclear reactor, AlternativeAllies represents the logarithmized number of the ally’s independent alliances, GeostrategicLocation is a dummy variable indicating allies in geostrategically valuable locations, X is a dummy variable indicating allies in geostrategically valuable locations, X is a vector of control variables, \(\mu_i\) is a vector of country or region fixed effects, \(\zeta_t\) is a vector of year fixed effects, Time is the number of years that have elapsed since the beginning of the sample, and \(\epsilon_{i,t}\) is a stochastic error term. I employ standard errors clustered by country throughout.11

4.2 Results: Reassurance

The econometric results provide support for my propositions. U.S. allies with stronger outside options, measured using latent military and nuclear potential as well as alternative alliance partners,

---

11Summary statistics can be found in Table A1.1 in the appendix. As a robustness check, I also cluster standard errors by year, since some of the independent variables vary at the year level.
receive significantly more reassurance. Additionally, the United States goes to greater lengths to reassure its allies when it faces resource and political constraints that bring its reliability into question. Finally, I find that these factors provide a stronger explanation for U.S. reassurance than adversary threat, U.S. domestic politics, or the domestic politics of the ally.

Table 4.1 focuses on explaining variation in reassurance across allies and tests Hypotheses 1-3a. Model 1 contains only the primary independent variables, while Model 2 adds additional controls which vary at the country-level. Both models include year and region fixed effects in order to account for temporal and spatial heterogeneity. The results support the expectations of H1 and H2; the United States reassures larger allies and those with latent nuclear capacity more. The results for independent alliances (H1c) are similarly positive but weaker, only reaching statistical significance at the 0.1 level.

However, the United States does not appear to reassure allies in geostrategically valuable locations more. One potential explanation is that the patron simply does not need to reassure strategically valuable allies as much, as these allies are likely to know that the United States is unlikely to abandon them owing to its intrinsic interest in their security and in keeping them aligned with itself. This would be consistent with the general thrust of the theory; in the formal model I presented, allies’ perceptions of the patron’s reliability (\(\alpha\) and \(\gamma\)) determined whether they would be likely to exit the alliance. Indeed, H2a and H3a predicted a largely null effect of strategic value on reassurance.

Next, Table 4.2 focuses on variation over time to test H4. Both models include country fixed effects and linear, squared, and cubic time trends, while Model 2 also includes the year-level control variables.\(^{12}\) These results provide support for both Hypotheses 2 and 3. The aftermath of costly foreign wars and periods of economic hardship both feature more reassurance. Specifically, the United States uses about 25% more reassurance during postwar years, while each one percent

\(^{12}\)Due to collinearity, time-invariant variables (such as U.S. GDP growth) cannot be included alongside country fixed effects, while country-invariant variables (such as geography) cannot be included with year fixed effects.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Statements+Visits</th>
<th>(2) Statements+Visits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GDP (log)</strong></td>
<td>0.337***</td>
<td>0.357***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nuclear latency</strong></td>
<td>0.442*</td>
<td>0.449*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.204)</td>
<td>(0.208)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent alliances (log)</strong></td>
<td>0.262</td>
<td>0.270+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.170)</td>
<td>(0.153)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Geostrategic location</strong></td>
<td>-0.154</td>
<td>-0.173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.223)</td>
<td>(0.230)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Common alliances (%)</strong></td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>0.218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.399)</td>
<td>(0.316)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GDPpc (log)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.148)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Distance to adversary</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Land border w/ adversary</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.200)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Entente</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.316)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ally-Adversary hostility</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.059*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country FE</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>T,T2,T3</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Region FE</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year FE</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>1357</td>
<td>1345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Log-likelihood</strong></td>
<td>-1827.191</td>
<td>-1790.651</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.  
+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4.1: Main results for variation in reassurance across allies.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Statements+Visits</th>
<th>(2) Statements+Visits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>0.247*</td>
<td>0.211*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.109)</td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US GDP growth</td>
<td>-0.026*</td>
<td>-0.033*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversary aggression</td>
<td>-0.054</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.091)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US-Adversary hostility</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally-Adversary hostility</td>
<td>0.058*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T,T2,T3</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region FE</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year FE</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1373</td>
<td>1373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>-1764.394</td>
<td>-1760.681</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

Table 4.2: Main results for variation in reassurance over time.

A reduction in U.S. GDP is associated with about 3% more reassurance.

As for the controls, wealth and alliance type do not have a statistically significant effect on U.S. reassurance. Notably, the coefficients on the threat variables other than ally-adversary hostility are negative or statistically insignificant, suggesting that aggressive adversary behavior is not the sole or even the most important driver of reassurance. This is consistent with H5 but is in direct contradiction to “pure deterrence” explanations for reassurance, which focus on signaling vis-à-vis adversaries rather than allies. This increases my confidence that the results are driven by a logic of reassurance.

4.2.1 Causal Mechanisms

Next, I provide evidence to support the causal mechanisms behind H4. In particular, I would expect resource constraints to be associated with political constraints, declines in U.S. military spending, and the U.S. pursuit of détente with the Soviet Union. First, in order to capture domestic pressure, I coded Congressional bills. Using a dataset of bills from the Policy Agendas Project, I took a

13http://www.comparativeagendas.net/ (accessed August 15, 2016). The data used here were originally collected by Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, with the support of National Science Foundation grant numbers SBR 9320922 and 0111611, and are distributed through the Department of Government at the University of Texas at

93
subset of bills pertaining to U.S. alliances and then hand-coded them, creating a count variable for “retrenchment bills.” These are bills that either call for troop reductions from allied territory, assert congressional authority over the executive’s ability to use force on allied territory, or which put pressure on allies to contribute more for burden-sharing. This is an attractive measure first of all because Congress has a more direct role in foreign policy than does the public. While the electorate can in theory punish or reward policymakers based on whether they act in ways consistent with public opinion, Congress can directly shape policy by passing laws and by appropriating (or not appropriating) funds (Milner and Tingley, 2015). Second, research suggests that public opinion on foreign affairs responds to elite cues (Zaller, 1992; Berinsky, 2007). Finally, annual public opinion data on foreign policy are difficult to come by, particularly during the early years of the Cold War (Chanley, 1999).

Second, I create a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the United States reduced its military spending in a given year.\textsuperscript{14} Third, in order to capture US-Soviet relations, I use event data from the WEIS dataset between 1965 and 1989, employing the commonly-used weighting scheme proposed by Goldstein (1992) to assign values to U.S.-Soviet interactions based on how conflictual or cooperative they are. Higher scores indicate more cooperative relations.

Table 4.3 shows that domestic retrenchment pressure occurs most often during periods of resource constraints – and, in particular, during the aftermath of foreign wars. The results for U.S. military spending and détente can be found in Table 4.4. Models 1 and 2 use logistic regression to show that postwar periods and economic hardship are associated with declines in military spending. Models 3 and 4, in turn, show that in the wake of costly foreign wars and domestic pressure, the United States pursued détente with the Soviet Union. These findings support the expectations of Hypothesis 4, as they suggest that resource and political constraints put pressure on the United

### Table 4.3: Results for the relationship between material and political constraints.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Congressional retrenchment bills</th>
<th>(2) Congressional retrenchment bills</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>US GDP growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.499**</td>
<td>-0.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.541)</td>
<td>(0.109)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US GDP growth</td>
<td>Adversary aggression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.096</td>
<td>0.855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.109)</td>
<td>(1.645)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alleviation Adversary hostility</td>
<td>US-Adversary hostility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.535</td>
<td>0.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.335)</td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alleviation Adversary hostility (year-mean)</td>
<td>0.535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.335)</td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T,T(^2),T(^3)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>-39.546</td>
<td>-38.166</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses. \( \dagger \) p < 0.10, \( * \) p < 0.05, \( ** \) p < 0.01, \( *** \) p < 0.001

States to retrench and seek rapprochement with its adversaries.

#### 4.2.2 Robustness Checks

Next, I subject the results to a variety of robustness tests. I do so first of all by adding more control variables to account for the threat environment. First, I control for adversary capabilities, using the Soviet Union’s CINC score between 1950 and 1989, as well as Russia’s and China’s since 1990. Second, I control for the U.S.-adversary nuclear balance, measured as the ratio of adversary nuclear weapons to U.S. nuclear weapons.\(^15\) Third, I control for the number of MIDs an ally was involved in during a given year with all states (rather than solely shared adversaries), weighted by the hostility level of each MID. The results in Tables A1.4 and A1.5 show that the findings are robust to controlling for these variables.\(^16\)


\(^16\)The results are also robust to the inclusion of decade fixed effects, as well as to the use of a lagged dependent variable. See Tables A1.6-A1.8 in the appendix.
Table 4.4: Results for the causal mechanisms.

Second, I use alternative proxies to capture my independent variables. For allies’ latent conventional military power (H1a), I replace allies’ log GDP with both their log population and CINC scores. Table A1.9 replicates the main results from Model 2 of Table 4.1 using these measures, and the original findings remain intact. As for the aftermath of costly foreign wars (H4), instead of postwar presidencies I include a dummy variable indicating years in which the United States withdrew troops from a protracted foreign war.\textsuperscript{17} Table A1.10 replicates Models 1-2 of Table 4.2 after replacing the postwar dummy variable with the war withdrawal dummy variable. The coefficients on war withdrawals remain positive, similar in magnitude, and at or near statistical significance.

Finally, I also use different measures for my dependent variable. First, I operationalize reassurance using the number of U.S. troops deployed on an ally’s territory, with data on U.S. forces obtained from Kane (2006). Table A1.11 presents ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results using logarithmized troop numbers as the dependent variable. The level of U.S. troops does not vary much over time, however, and so I focus largely on explaining cross-national variation. These

\textsuperscript{17}Troop level data are from Kane (2006).
results show that more powerful allies and allies with a latent nuclear capability hosted significantly more U.S. troops. Second, I use allies’ military exercises with the United States as the dependent variable, employing exercise data for 1977-2004 from D’Orazio (2013). Tables A1.12 and A1.13 show the results, which are largely consistent with those from using statements and visits as the dependent variable.

4.2.3 Alternative Explanation: Domestic Politics

My theory treats reassurance as the result of bargaining, whether tacit or explicit, wherein a patron reassures its allies to the extent that they can credibly threaten to pursue outside options. Alternatively, however, as discussed in the previous chapter, reassurance could be the product of non-strategic factors such as the domestic politics of the ally or of the United States. Thus, in Tables A1.14 and A1.15 I control for factors capturing features of both ally and U.S. domestic politics. First, to measure allies’ regime type I include their composite Polity score, which ranges from -10 (fully autocratic) to +10 (fully democratic).\(^\text{18}\) Additionally, I measure allies’ political ideology using the percentage of seats in their legislature that are controlled by left-wing parties.\(^\text{19}\) For U.S. domestic politics, I include three dummy variables – one for whether a given year was one in which a sitting president sought re-election, another for whether a year took place during a president’s second term, and a third for whether the president was a Democrat. The results show that, even after controlling for these variables, H1-H4 receive considerable support. As for the alternative explanations, U.S. presidents use less reassurance during their re-election years, while presidential partisanship and second-term status, as well as ally regime type, have no effect.

---

\(^{18}\)Data are from the Polity IV Project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2011; Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers, 2014).

\(^{19}\)To measure left-wing influence in government, I use the percentage of parliamentary seats controlled by left-wing parties. Data come from the Comparative Manifestos Project (Lehmann et al., 2015). For non-democratic allies, this variable takes the value of 0.
4.3 Research Design: Burden-Sharing

Next, I conduct a similar analysis using many of the same independent variables but focusing on explaining allied burden-sharing instead of U.S. reassurance. The unit of analysis is again the ally-year, and the sample runs from 1960-2012 and includes all states that are defined as having defense pacts or ententes with the United States by the Correlates of War (Gibler, 2009).20

4.3.1 Dependent Variable

My primary dependent variable is allies’ level of burden-sharing effort, measured using their military expenditures in constant 2005 dollars. Data on expenditures come from version 5.0 of the Correlates of War’s National Material Capabilities (NMC) dataset and are used from 1960-2012 (Singer, 1987). In order to assess variation in military spending over time for H4, I use annual variation in allies’ expenditures, measured as a percentage of the previous year’s spending. For cross-national variation, I instead use allies’ absolute amount of spending. I then take the natural logarithm, as the distribution of military spending is somewhat skewed. In alternative models I also use allies’ military spending as a percentage of GDP as a measure of the defense burden. This is particularly important for testing the effects of allies’ GDP, which I would expect to be associated with higher defense spending overall, but not with a disproportionately larger share of the overall defense burden, as per H2b.

While military spending is a somewhat coarse measure of allied burden-sharing, given that it does not separate independent allied arming from efforts which are explicit alliance contributions, it is the most widely available measures for cross-national analysis. Moreover, while some military spending may be purely internal balancing for allies’ own purposes rather than direct alliance contributions, this may in some cases be exactly what the United States seeks: for allies to do more

---

20My sample only begins in 1960 because the 1950s were largely a rebuilding decade for U.S. allies, during which burden-sharing was not a realistic possibility. Moreover, as shown in Figure A1.2, allied military spending barely changed at all during the 1950s. Again, I exclude U.S. allies in the Americas – both Canada, to which the United States is allied through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Latin American countries, many of which it is allied to through the Organization of American States (OAS).
for themselves.

4.3.2 Independent Variables

Two of my sets of independent variables – namely, U.S. resource constraints and allied strategic value – are the same as the previous analysis on reassurance: postwar presidencies; U.S. GDP growth; allies’ economic resources; and allies’ geostrategic locations. However, for burden-sharing I also add an additional covariate: allies’ geographic vulnerability to adversaries.

Ally Vulnerability

I measure geographic vulnerability to threat by using a composite measure that captures both whether the ally shares a land border with an adversary country and its distance from the adversary’s capital. The first component is a dummy variable indicating whether the ally shares a land border with a member of the Communist bloc (during the Cold War) or Russia, China, or North Korea (during the post-Cold War period).\(^{21}\) Data come from version 3.1 of the Correlates of War’s Direct Contiguity dataset (Stinnett et al., 2002).\(^ {22}\) The second component is the ally’s proximity to adversaries. In particular, I measure allies’ proximity to Beijing for those in East Asia because of its proximity to the center of Soviet military power in the Far East, and for allies everywhere else I treat as Warsaw, owing to its proximity to the center of Soviet military power in the European theater. In 1990 I use Moscow instead of Warsaw, as the Russian frontier moved eastward following the collapse of the Communist bloc. This second component is measured as the inverse of the distance between the ally’s capital city to either Beijing or Warsaw (in kilometers), normalized to be between 0 and 1. Capital city data come from Gleditsch and Ward (2001). The composite measure thus varies between 0 (New Zealand; Liberia) and 2 (South Korea; West Germany).

---

\(^{21}\) The Soviet bloc includes all members of the Warsaw Pact, as well as China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and (starting in 1976) Laos and Cambodia.

4.3.3 Control Variables

Economic and Political Characteristics

In addition to allies’ overall economic size, I account for allies’ annual GDP growth – measured as a percentage of the previous year’s GDP – as economies not strained by recession may be able to spend more. Data come from version 8.0 of the Penn World Table (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer, 2015), with data extended to include more countries and years by Gleditsch (2002).

Second, I control for allies’ economic development, using GDP per capita. Allies which have greater resources at their disposal might be expected to spend more on defense (Goldsmith, 2003). Alternatively, economically developed countries may instead prefer to focus their spending on domestic welfare. Data are logarithmized and in constant 2005 U.S. dollars, and come from Gleditsch (2002).

Next, I control for allies’ regime type. Democratic states are more accountable to their populations than are autocratic states, and a large body of literature finds that democracies on average spend less on their militaries than non-democracies (Garfinkel, 1994; Goldsmith, 2003; Fordham and Walker, 2005; Carter and Palmer, 2015). To measure regime type I use the Polity score, with data from the Polity IV version (Marshall and Jaggers, 2011; Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers, 2014).

Security Environment

Additionally, because allies may tailor their defense efforts based on their perceptions of threat, I also control for numerous factors that shape allies’ security environments. The first of these are the adversary’s capabilities, which I measure using its Composite Indicator of National Capabilities (CINC) score. Here, I define the primary adversary of the alliance as the Soviet Union during the bipolar Cold War period (1950-1989), and then China (for U.S. allies in East Asia) and Russia (for allies elsewhere) during the post-Cold War period. Because the Soviet Union’s CINC score exhibits barely any variation between 1960 and 1989, however, I only include this variable during the post-Cold War period. Data come from version 5.0 of the Correlates of War’s National Material
Capabilities (NMC) dataset (Singer, 1987)

Second, I control for factors which capture the degree to which the adversary is likely to be seen as hostile by the United States and its allies. The first of these is a dummy indicator for instances in which the adversary invaded and occupied a non-U.S. ally. During the Cold War portion of the sample, there were two such instances: Czechoslovakia (1968) and Afghanistan (1979). Additionally, during the post-Cold War I also include the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008. These events are likely to have influenced U.S. and allied threat perception because they represented instances of clear aggression. Moreover, focusing on non-U.S. allies gets around the issue of endogeneity, as an adversary’s willingness to behave aggressively toward U.S. allies is likely to be affected by perceptions of U.S. credibility. I create a dummy variable in which I code the first year of each of these instances as 1, as well as the following two years, as I would expect allied burden-sharing to have decreased in response to the initial shock of the attacks.  

Additionally, I control for both the level of hostility between the adversary and the United States, and the level of hostility between the adversary and each ally. This is coded as the number of MID s in a given year between the adversary and the United States or the ally, with each MID weighted by its maximum level of hostility. MID data come from version 4.1 of the Correlates of War’s Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset (Palmer et al., 2015).

Third, I control for the level of threat that allies face from states other than U.S. adversaries using several measures. The first of these is each ally’s conflict environment, which I account for by controlling for either its number of foreign policy rivals and/or the number of MID s it was involved in with non-adversary countries, weighted by the MID s’ hostility level. Rivalry data are from Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006). Finally, I control for whether an ally had colonial possessions in a given year. The literature on burden-sharing notes that states which pursue “private goods” –

---

23The one exception is Afghanistan, which began in December 1979, and thus I also include the year 1982. See appendix for more details. Note that I exclude North Vietnam’s conquest of South Vietnam in 1975, as that represented the culmination of a longstanding civil war – and one in which the United States had been involved. However, the results are robust to its inclusion.
those unrelated to the purpose of the alliance – are likely to spend more on defense. Allies’ efforts to exert control over their colonial possessions were one such good, as doing so was extraneous to defending against the threats allies shared in common with the United States (Oneal and Elrod, 1989; Oneal, 1990). I code this variable as a dummy which takes the value of 1 for the following country-years: Belgium (through 1962); France (through 1977); Portugal (through 1975); Spain (through 1968); and United Kingdom (through 1984). Data on colonial possessions come from version 1.0 of the Issue Correlates of War’s Colonial History Data Set (Hensel, 2014).

Unobserved Heterogeneity

Finally, consistent with existing literature (e.g., Carter and Palmer (2015) and Plümper and Neu-mayer (2015)), in some models I include a lagged dependent variable in order to account for the slow-moving, dynamic nature of military spending and to correct for serial correlation. However, because including a lagged dependent variable turns the models into dynamic models, it makes estimating the effects of time-invariant variables (e.g., geography) difficult. Thus, to estimate the effects of such variables I also include models that remove the lagged DV and instead include region fixed effects as well as year fixed effects in order to account for unobserved temporal and spatial heterogeneity.

4.3.4 Model Specification

Because I use two variations of the dependent variable – one capturing change in military spending over time, the other capturing variation across countries – I include different control variables depending on the dependent variable. In the models which analyze change in military spending over time and include a lagged dependent variable, I exclude those controls which are slow-moving or time-invariant, such as geography, regime type, and colonial holdings. Similarly, in the models which assess cross-national variation in military spending and include region and year fixed effects exclude those controls which are country-invariant. Nevertheless, the results are robust to including these additional controls.
The regression equation I use to test change over time is as follows:

\[
\Delta \text{Milex}_{i,t} = \beta_1 \text{Postwar}_{i,t} + \beta_2 \text{USGDPGrowth}_{i,t} + \beta_3 \Delta \text{Milex}_{i,t-1} + \gamma \text{X}_{i,t-1} + \epsilon_{i,t}
\]

where \( i \) indexes countries, \( t \) indexes years, \( \text{Postwar} \) is a dummy variable indicating the aftermath of a protracted U.S. foreign war, \( \text{USGDPGrowth} \) indicates U.S. GDP growth, \( \Delta \text{Milex} \) represents the change in allies’ military expenditures, \( \text{X}_{i,t-1} \) is a vector of control variables, and \( \epsilon_{i,t} \) is a stochastic error term. In some models I include country fixed effects in place of the lagged dependent variable. I employ standard errors clustered by country throughout. Additionally, the model specification I use to test H3a/H3b and H6 is the following:

\[
\text{Milex}_{i,t} = \beta_1 \text{Vulnerability}_{i,t} + \beta_2 \text{GDP}_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 \text{GeostrategicLocation}_{i,t} + \gamma \text{X}_{i,t-1} + \zeta_t + \mu_i + \epsilon_{i,t}
\]

where \( i \) indexes countries, \( t \) indexes years, \( \text{Vulnerability} \) is a composite variable of allies’ proximity to the adversary, \( \text{GDP} \) represents the logarithized value of the ally’s gross domestic product, \( \text{GeostrategicLocation} \) is a dummy variable indicating allies in geostrategically valuable locations, \( \text{Milex} \) represents allies’ logarithized military expenditures \( \text{X}_{i,t-1} \) is a vector of control variables, \( \zeta_t \) is a vector of year fixed effects, \( \mu_i \) is a vector of region fixed effects, and \( \epsilon_{i,t} \) is a stochastic error term. I employ standard errors clustered by country throughout.24

4.4 Results: Burden-Sharing

The results provide strong support for Hypotheses 2b–4 and 6. The results suggest that allies increase their military spending in the aftermath of U.S. foreign wars and in the wake of U.S. economic downturns. Similarly, geographically vulnerable allies spend considerably more on their defense. Finally, the results show that allies do not increase their military spending during periods of elevated hostility between the United States and adversaries, and indeed may even decrease their defense expenditures.

---

24Summary statistics can be found in Table A1.16.
Table 4.5: Results for change in military expenditures over time.

Table 4.5 focuses on explaining change in military spending over time and uses percent annual change in expenditures as the dependent variable. Models 1-4 include only Cold War observations (through 1989), while Models 5-8 include the full sample through 2012. Models 2 and 4 include a linear time trend in order to capture secular changes over time. Models 2 and 6 control for the number of foreign policy rivals an ally has, while Models 3 and 7 control for ally MID involvement. Models 4 and 8, in turn, control for both, though the two are highly correlated. The results show that the aftermath of U.S. foreign wars is associated with annual changes in allied military spending that are four percent higher than in other periods. Similarly, each one percent decrease in U.S. GDP is associated with about a one percent increase in allied military spending. The results are similar in the Cold War and in the full sample.

As for the control variables, threat does not have a uniform effect on burden-sharing, let alone a uniformly positive one. On the contrary, the results show that in the aftermath of the Soviet
invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, as well as the Russian invasion of Georgia, allies reduced their military spending by around seven percent. This is direct contrast to what balance of power theory might suggest, as my findings show that the possibility of U.S. abandonment is a far better predictor of allied burden-sharing than the objective threat environment.

Table 4.6, in turn, shows that geographically vulnerable allies spend substantially more on defense than more remote allies. In terms of substantive effects, the most vulnerable allies (those scoring a two on the index) spend about 92% more on defense more than the least vulnerable allies in Model 1. Additionally, allies in geostrategically valuable locations spend around 24% less on defense on average. This supports the expectations of H3b, as it suggests that these allies are less willing to contribute to the common defense because the patron’s threat of abandonment over them is less credible. These findings hold across a variety of model specifications, as well as both in the Cold War and in the full sample.

As for allies with more resources (H2b), Table 4.7 shows that, contrary to the expectations of the collective goods logic of burden-sharing, larger allies do not shoulder a disproportionately larger share of the defense burden than smaller allies. The coefficient on the log GDP variable is statistically insignificant and is most models is actually negative. This provides illustrative support for my the theory while simultaneously providing disconfirming evidence for what has been the dominant explanation for burden-sharing since Olson and Zeckhauser (1966).

In sum, then, the results support H2b-H4 and H6. Allies spend more on defense in the aftermath of costly U.S. foreign wars and in the wake of U.S. hardship, while the allies most vulnerable to attack tend to spend more as well. By contrast, strategically valuable allies – against which the United States does not have as credible a threat of abandonment – spend less.

4.4.1 Further Analysis

Notably, however, these results are stronger during the Cold War than after. This is unsurprising for a number of reasons, however. The first is that the nature of the threat environment faced
Table 4.6: Results for logarithmized military expenditures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cold War</th>
<th>Full Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>0.327** (0.116)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geostrategic location</td>
<td>-0.281+ (0.141)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth</td>
<td>0.007 (0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (log)</td>
<td>1.064*** (0.117)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDPpc (log)</td>
<td>0.111 (0.164)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial power</td>
<td>0.804** (0.226)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally-adversary hostility</td>
<td>-0.003 (0.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivalries (lag)</td>
<td>0.109 (0.083)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally MIDs</td>
<td>0.043+ (0.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>0.001 (0.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entente</td>
<td>0.184 (0.469)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.928</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
+p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
Cold War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>0.007*</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.006*</td>
<td>0.005*</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.005*</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.005*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geostrategic location</td>
<td>-0.009*</td>
<td>-0.014*</td>
<td>-0.010*</td>
<td>-0.009*</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-0.009*</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.009*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (log)</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDPpc (log)</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial power</td>
<td>0.025**</td>
<td>0.015**</td>
<td>0.019**</td>
<td>0.020**</td>
<td>0.022**</td>
<td>0.020**</td>
<td>0.019**</td>
<td>0.020**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally-adversary hostility</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivalries (lag)</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally MIDs</td>
<td>0.002*</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entente</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>653</td>
<td>653</td>
<td>653</td>
<td>913</td>
<td>1168</td>
<td>913</td>
<td>1168</td>
<td>913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.287</td>
<td>0.329</td>
<td>0.346</td>
<td>0.292</td>
<td>0.259</td>
<td>0.277</td>
<td>0.286</td>
<td>0.292</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.

*p < 0.10,* * p < 0.05,** *p < 0.01,** ** p < 0.001

Table 4.7: Results for military expenditures as a percentage of GDP.
by U.S. alliances changed dramatically after the Cold War ended. Indeed, a number of scholars and policymakers predicted and even recommended that the United States would shed its alliances (e.g., Mearsheimer, 1990). Second, the nature of alliance burden-sharing underwent a shift, with the United States placing less emphasis on military spending and planning for conventional conflicts against peer competitors, and more emphasis on peacekeeping and stabilization operations (Dorussen, Kirchner, and Sperling, 2009; Zyla, 2015).

Third is the change in U.S. global defense posture. Beginning in the 1990s and continuing in the 2000s, U.S. policymakers placed less emphasis on planning for Cold War-style conflicts involving large numbers of forces on both sides. Instead, U.S. officials sought more flexibility in being able to rapidly project power to a larger number of potential locations, including the Middle East and Africa. As part of this, the United States increasingly sought military access in states where it had not previously had it – and often in the form of smaller facilities such as forward operating sites (FOSs) and cooperative security locations (CSLs) rather than large, Cold War style bases (main operating bases, or MOBs). Similarly, the United States increasingly looked to its allies to contribute troops to U.S. foreign military interventions – which not coincidentally also became more numerous after the Soviet Union’s collapse – such as Iraq in 1990-91 and 2003, Afghanistan, Libya, Kosovo, and Bosnia (Kreps, 2010).

In order to probe the extent to which the theory is able to explain burden-sharing in the post-Cold War period, I employ data on other forms of allied burden-sharing that have become more prominent since 1990. In particular, I assess whether allies with severe threat perceptions are more likely to: 1) support the United States’ foreign military interventions; and 2) provide compensation to the United States for its bases. To assess the former, I look at whether allies contributed to the United States’ war in Iraq (2003) – namely, whether they were members of its “coalition of the willing” in 2003, as well as whether they contributed troops at all during the period 2003-2009.

For an overview of the shift in U.S. global posture during the 1990s and 2000s, see Pettyjohn (2012: 83-96) and Henry (2006).
Iraq is an ideal test case for the theory when compared to the United States’ other major military interventions in the post-Cold War: the Gulf War (1990), Yugoslavia (1990s), Afghanistan (2001), and Libya (2011). The former two were largely over-determined, as the Gulf War received authorization from the UN Security Council while the war in Afghanistan invoked NATO’s Article V. Support for operations in and around the former Yugoslavia and in Libya was similarly concentrated in Europe (and, in the case of the latter, Southern Europe), due to geographic proximity. The invasion of Iraq, by contrast, was politically contentious and featured an *ad hoc* coalition of states from a variety of regions.

Table 4.8 contains the results for allied support for the invasion of Iraq. The dependent variable in Model 1 is a dummy variable indicating whether a country was a member of the “coalition of the willing” in 2003, while in Model 2 it is a dummy variable indicating whether a country contributed troops during 2003-2009. I estimate these models using logistic regression models, while controlling for allies’ size, wealth, and regime type. These results show that vulnerable allies were more likely to contribute troops and to be members of the coalition of the willing, though the results for the latter are not quite statistically significant.

Additionally, the U.S. Department of Defense has data on allies’ “host nation support” (HNS) between 1995 and 2002, which capture the compensation provided to the United States by states’ hosting U.S. troops. I deflate these data to constant 2005 U.S. dollars, and then logarithmize them. Table 4.9 presents the HNS results for the nine countries with an average of 1,000 U.S. troops or more between 1995 and 2002. These findings again show that vulnerable allies burden-share more on average.

---


27Data on allied troop contributions are from Carney (2011). Annual data are not available, however, and so these data are not time-series.


29Belgium, Germany, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Spain, South Korea, Turkey, United Kingdom.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iraq coalition of the willing</td>
<td>Iraq troop contributor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>2.006*</td>
<td>3.691**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.086)</td>
<td>(1.393)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDPpc (log)</td>
<td>-5.718**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.164)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geostrategic location</td>
<td>2.934*</td>
<td>2.783*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.453)</td>
<td>(1.230)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>2.016**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.703)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDPpc (log), country-mean</td>
<td></td>
<td>-3.345**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.203)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity, country-mean</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.789**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.933)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (log)</td>
<td>0.857</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.641)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (log), country-mean</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.506)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>-8.829</td>
<td>-10.420</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

Table 4.8: Results for allied support for U.S. invasion of Iraq. Coalition of the willing results are for the year 2003, while the troop participation variable captures whether an ally contributed troops between 2003 and 2009.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HNS (log)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (log)</td>
<td>1.775**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.408)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDPpc (log)</td>
<td>4.995+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.510)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>2.047*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.757)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geostrategic location</td>
<td>0.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.190)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally-adversary hostility</td>
<td>-0.124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>-0.144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.211)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.690</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.

+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 4.9: Results for host-nation support, 1995-2002. Sample limited to country-years in which an ally had > 1000 U.S. troops on its territory.
4.4.2 Robustness Checks

Next, I subject the initial results to a variety of additional robustness tests. First, in place of the postwar presidencies dummy variable, I use a dummy variable to indicate years in which the United States withdrew troops from a protracted foreign war (Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan).\(^{30}\) Second, I cluster standard errors by year instead of by country, as the independent variables for H4 vary at the year level. Third, I add a linear time trend to the models from Table 4.5 in order to account for any secular temporal trends. Fourth, I control for the U.S.-Soviet nuclear balance, measured using the ratio of Soviet-to-U.S. nuclear weapons. A number of scholars have argued that the condition of nuclear parity undermined the credibility of the United States’ commitment to defend its allies by making a disarming counterforce strike less feasible, thus rendering the use of nuclear weapons less believable by increasing the risk of retaliation against U.S. cities (e.g., Howard, 1982). Thus one might expect that nuclear parity would also be conducive to allied burden-sharing. Fifth, I control for allies’ governing ideology by adding a variable to the models which captures the percentage of legislative seats held by left-wing parties. The models can be found in Tables A1.19 and A1.20 in the appendix, and show that the results from these tests are consistent with the findings from the main analysis.

\(^{30}\)Troop data are from Kane (2006).
Chapter 5

From Tough Love to a Soft Touch: The U.S.-West German Alliance, 1961-1974

5.1 Case Overview

The “German problem” was arguably only second in importance to containing the Communist bloc in U.S. foreign policy throughout the Cold War. Keeping the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) tied to the Western bloc was a near-constant concern among policymakers in both the United States and other NATO allies; as Secretary General Hastings Ismay put it, the purpose of NATO was “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down” (Reynolds, 1994: 13). As such, American security assurances to West Germany were crucial as a means of not only directly deterring Soviet aggression, but also of ensuring NATO unity and preventing the emergence of a neutral Germany that could play the Western and Eastern blocs against each other, and even threaten its neighbors once more (Trachtenberg, 1999: esp. pp. 321-322). West Germany was “the fulcrum of the European balance of power,” as a U.S. embassy telegram put it.\(^1\) Indeed, since World War II Germany has hosted the largest number of peacetime U.S. foreign-deployed forces. However, although the FRG’s latent military power afforded it significant \textit{ex ante} capability for

exit in the form of Soviet rapprochement or nuclearization, its proximity to the center of Soviet military power also gave the United States a significant amount of leverage over it. While German exit was a significant concern, it was less attractive so long as the American commitment was credible. As such, while the United States was judicious in its use of assurances, it was frequently able to secure German burden-sharing concessions.

These coercive efforts were both facilitated and complicated by the presence of voices within the United States which called for reducing the U.S. footprint in Europe and forcing allies to increase their share of the burden. On the one hand, U.S. leaders – particularly in the Nixon Administration – were able to use this domestic pressure as a means of making credible threats to the FRG. On the other hand, however, this domestic pressure threatened to make the U.S. commitment seem sufficiently unreliable as to encourage West Germany to take its chances and reduce its reliance on U.S. protection by either obtaining nuclear weapons or moving closer to the Soviet Union. As a result, U.S. policymakers used significant reassurance to counterbalance the signals of unreliability emanating from domestic audiences.

My theory would predict very high levels of U.S. reassurance toward the FRG, particularly during the late 1960s and early 1970s. West Germany’s nuclear latency and conventional military potential made it at high risk of exit, thus forcing the United States to reassure it. But the FRG’s capacity for exit should also have been balanced by the United States’, which was quite potent owing to West Germany’s vulnerability to attack by the Soviet Union.

Additionally, I anticipate intense West German interest in outside options during the later years of the Johnson Administration and during the Nixon Administration, owing to concern about U.S. unreliability in the wake of the Vietnam War and accompanying domestic isolationism. As such, I would expect to see even greater preoccupation with reassuring the FRG under Nixon (and, to a lesser extent, Johnson) than under Kennedy. At the same time, however, resource constraints and retrenchment pressure stemming from the costs of fighting in Vietnam should have facilitated U.S. efforts to extract burden-sharing.

Despite granting West Germany enormous levels of reassurance in the form of hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops, the United States placed an enormous amount of pressure on the FRG and frequently threatened to withhold its assurances. These threats were used to both prevent West Germany from obtaining nuclear weapons and to extract burden-sharing. Because of the FRG’s vulnerability, these threats were quite successful, with the United States sustaining West Germany’s non-nuclear status and convincing the FRG to offset the costs of U.S. troop deployments by purchasing American arms.

5.2.1 Reassurance and the FRG’s Outside Options

High U.S. troop levels in West Germany were the result of two factors: its geographic position and its latent capacity for exit. Fears of German neutralism and nuclearization pervaded the Cold War, with concerns about the “German problem” dating back to the first days after World War II and driving much of American reassurance behavior toward West Germany and toward NATO more generally. As a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) put it in 1969: “The Alliance provides security for West Germany against the USSR, while relieving the anxieties Western Europe would have about independent German military power.”

Richard Nixon similarly highlighted the importance of reassuring Germany when he remarked in a May 1971 a conversation with his advisors that “as a freshman Congressman he saw three reasons for NATO: the threat from the Soviet Union, the weakness of Western Europe and the need for a home for the Germans,” arguing that “one could perhaps debate the first two of the original reasons for NATO, but the third still existed.”

Indeed, part of the initial bargain of the FRG’s entry into NATO in 1955 involved its pledge to never pro-

---


duce nuclear weapons coupled with British and American pledges to maintain troops in Germany (Kelleher, 1975: 23, 28).

Kennedy and Johnson were far more preoccupied with precluding German nuclearization – and proliferation more generally – than Dwight Eisenhower. Unlike Eisenhower, who saw the sharing of nuclear weapons as a way to satisfy allied concerns and spread the burden of common defense more equally (Trachtenberg, 1999: chs. 5-6), Kennedy and Johnson opposed the FRG’s control over U.S. nuclear weapons, and instead saw nuclear sharing as a way to discourage proliferation. Kennedy was even willing to collude with the Soviets, offering German nonproliferation in exchange for a maintenance of the status quo over Berlin. As such, Kennedy not only cracked down on allies’ *de facto* control of American nuclear weapons on their territory, but also shelved future plans for sharing American weapons.

As I expect, American opposition to proliferation stemmed from three sources. First was the fear that having too many actors with control over nuclear weapons could both increase the risk of “accidental” nuclear war in a crisis and make coordinating on the use of nuclear weapons more difficult (Lepgold, 1990: 123). Second was the fear of preventive Soviet attack, which was especially pronounced in the case of the FRG given the depth of Soviet opposition to a nuclear-armed Germany (Trachtenberg, 1999: 202-204, 239, 305). Third, American policymakers expected that a nuclear-armed Germany would be less dependent on the United States, and thus emboldened to pursue a more independent foreign policy and more difficult to control (Trachtenberg, 1999: 219-221). As Johnson put it, the point of nuclear sharing was “to keep the Germans with us and keep their hand off the trigger,” describing to British Prime Minister Harold Wilson a scenario in which another Hitler could rise to power (Schwartz, 2003: 44-45).

Fears about German nuclearization, inherent in its size and latent power, were exacerbated by the FRG’s ambiguous nuclear behavior. This included covert nuclear cooperation with France

(and, briefly in the 1950s, Italy), skepticism of nonproliferation treaties such as the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s refusal to renounce the possibility of West Germany obtaining nuclear weapons despite the 1954 Brussels Treaty prohibiting it from possessing them (Lanoszka, 2014: 84, 90-91, 95-96, 106; Gerzhoy, 2015: 109-110, 112-114). Secretary of State Rusk argued “that latent intention [for nuclearization] exists that any responsible German leader must keep possibility in back of mind as possible answer to future contingencies for which no concrete anticipation now required” (Lanoszka, 2014: 91). Indeed, German leaders intentionally used ambiguity as a bargaining chip in order to secure American assurances and nuclear sharing.\(^5\) Adenauer declared in 1955 that the FRG could not indefinitely remain an “atomic protectorate” (Trachtenberg, 1999: 231), while Minister of Defense Franz Strauss made a veiled threat in 1961 that, without some form of nuclear sharing, France and Britain “could easily find followers” seeking to become nuclear states (Kelleher, 1975: 186). FRG officials held out from supporting the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and attempted to make their support conditional on nuclear sharing and consultation (Haftendorn, 1996: 141, 151-152).

American policymakers debated over potential avenues for nuclear cooperation without directly facilitating the development of independent national nuclear weapons programs or inflaming tensions with the Soviets (Kelleher, 1975: 95, 124, 128, 136-139, 154, 180-183, 186, 203, 229, 235-237, 241). While Kennedy and Johnson moved away from direct nuclear sharing in the form of giving allies control over U.S. weapons, they still recognized that retaining it in some form was a useful way of reassuring the FRG and discouraging it from pursuing nuclear weapons unilaterally. To this end, both administrations focused on creating a NATO Multilateral Force (MLF), first proposed in the closing days of Eisenhower’s presidency, in which the United States would retain a veto. They hoped that the MLF would allow for centralized American control while also reducing allies’ incentives to develop their own nuclear arsenals (Trachtenberg, 1999: 213-215, 208).

Kennedy admitted in private that the MLF was “merely a façade” designed to discourage allied – and particularly West German – nuclearization (Trachtenberg, 1999: 314). Undersecretary of State George Ball similarly described the MLF as a way of “giving the Germans a legitimate role in the defense of the Alliance, but ‘on a leash’” (Haftendorn, 1996: 121).

Kennedy’s Military Representative Maxwell Taylor wrote to him that the creation of a Multilateral Force would be a crucial means of ensuring that West Germany remained tied to NATO and non-nuclear: “If West Germany is to continue to be a contented non-nuclear member of NATO....West Germans need reassurance not only through the provision of this NATO nuclear force but also through evidence of a determination to use all NATO atomic weapons under certain predetermined conditions which will satisfy German security requirements.” The operative phrase here was “all NATO” weapons, as this would include the U.S. arsenal. Additionally, Secretary of State Dean Rusk noted that “While there was little present German insistence on nuclear capability, future pressures could bring about dangerous change in German attitude unless solution reached which Germany could reconcile with her national interest. MLF would give Germany both propinquity to weapons and share in control which should satisfy German aspirations for [a] long time to come.” Rusk made this same observation on numerous occasions – including in his discussions with French President Charles de Gaulle – arguing that the MLF “was a means of preventing the Germans from developing in the future a national weapon.”

Johnson’s Special Assistant Robert Komer put the matter directly: “What better way to reassure Bonn than to give it a finger on the

---


8 Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany, October 29, 1964, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 13, pp. 93-95.

nuclear trigger, or at least a greater sense of nuclear participation?"\(^{10}\)

The MLF was never implemented, however, as a result of Soviet, French, and British opposition, as well as skepticism from the U.S. Congress, and by early 1966 the concept was effectively dead. As an alternative, the Johnson Administration instead turned to creating a NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) that would give allies greater access to information on U.S. nuclear strategy (Kelleher, 1975: 247, 249-257; Gerzhoy, 2015: 118-121). Although the NPG did not give allies control over U.S. policy, it did give them a seat at the table of nuclear decision-making and insight into U.S. nuclear policy (Buteux, 1983: 194-196; Rapp-Hooper, 2015: 236-259). As part of its effort to coerce the FRG into signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1966-1968 the Johnson Administration assured the FRG that the NPT’s stipulations were compatible with the NPG, as the new Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger and Foreign Minister Willy Brandt publicly insisted that the FRG’s adherence to the treaty was contingent upon the NATO security guarantee (Mackby and Slocombe, 2004: 190, 192-195, 199).

In addition to nuclear sharing and consultation, the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations used an extensive set of reassurance measures as part of their efforts to discourage German nuclearization. Kennedy reassured Adenauer in April 1961 that “the United States was prepared and determined to stand by its commitments.”\(^{11}\) To secure the FRG’s signature to the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) in 1963 he promised to keep six American divisions in Germany (Gerzhoy, 2015: 117), while Rusk assured German policymakers that the security of the United States and its allies was “indivisible” (Trachtenberg, 1999: 317).

Subsequent administrations’ shift away from Eisenhower’s more permissive attitude toward allied proliferation and nuclear sharing required moving away from Eisenhower’s intention of reducing the U.S. footprint in Europe (Trachtenberg, 1999: 283-284, 321). The fundamental trade-off

---


they faced was that, as long as preventing German nuclearization remained a U.S. foreign policy priority, the FRG would continue to need considerable assurances – including a substantial U.S. troop presence. This was ultimately the course they chose, and the one followed by subsequent administrations as well, and U.S. troop levels remained stable until the end of the Cold War.

5.2.2 U.S. Threats of Abandonment

But although Kennedy and Johnson were willing to accept that reassurance was the price that would be paid for nonproliferation, they also proved willing to threaten the FRG to the same end. As Bundy put it: “We are bound to pay the price of leadership. We may as well have some of its advantages” (Trachtenberg, 1999: 303). Thus, while the FRG’s threat of nuclearization enabled it to extract considerable American assurances, it did not shield it from American pressure. U.S. Ambassador McGhee noted that “we would withdraw our forces and support for Germany” if Bonn attempted to go nuclear.12

American nonproliferation pressure was brought to bear on two occasions in particular. The first of these was in 1962-63, as the Kennedy Administration sought to both quash the incipient, covert Franco-German nuclear cooperation that was taking shape and secure the FRG’s signature of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). During a meeting with the French Cultural Minister André Malraux, Kennedy threatened that “the United States would like nothing better than to leave [Europe]” if France and Germany continued on their present course, and made similar threats to Adenauer (Gerzhoy, 2015: 114).13 He asserted that if the French and Germans were expecting the United States to continue to defend Europe despite their nuclear programs, “they are asking and expecting things that have never been and never will be” (Trachtenberg, 1999: 375). As a result, when the FRG ratified the Élysée Treaty with France, which established regular diplomatic consultation between the two countries, it added a preamble reaffirming its commitment to its relationship

with the United States, and it signed the LTBT as well (Trachtenberg, 1999: 394-397; Gerzhoy, 2015: 114-117). Second, U.S. policymakers similarly threatened to abandon the FRG in order to coerce it into joining the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), warning of the likelihood of a Soviet preventive attack if the FRG pursued nuclear weapons and the United States withdrew its support.  

Nevertheless, when West Germany ratified the NPT in 1969, it requested and received a public reaffirmation of the U.S. commitment to NATO by Secretary of State William Rogers.

In addition to nuclearization, U.S. policymakers sought to discourage West Germany from moving closer to the Soviet Union and distancing itself from NATO (Lepgold, 1990: ch. 5). In the words of a former adviser, Kennedy “was very conscious of the possibility that given a few turns or twists of events, you could be headed back into another situation where Germany could again become a menace” (quoted in Lanoszka (2014: 90)), while the American Secretary-General of NATO pointed out in 1962 that “There was clearly a sense of the growing military strength of the Federal Republic and the beginnings of a wave of nationalism.”

American officials opposed to the push for troop withdrawals – or threats to move in that direction – argued against them on the grounds that the troop presence served to tie the Germans to NATO, and that without them the FRG was likely to pursue a more independent course that leaned more heavily on France and the Soviet Union (Gavin, 2004: 114, 154-155). The flip side of Germany’s – and Europe’s – stunning economic growth since 1945 was that although burden-sharing was now conceivable, the FRG was now less dependent on the United States, and thus more able to go its own way (Kaplan, 1999: 155-156).

---


5.2.3 FRG Burden-Sharing

Although the FRG’s capacity for exit allowed it to extract U.S. assurances, its vulnerability to attack from the Soviet Union also gave the United States significant leverage. It was able to combine its assurances with threats of abandonment in order to coerce the West Germans into burden-sharing.

By the early 1960s, U.S. policymakers increasingly expected the now-recovered European NATO members to contribute more to the common defense. Kennedy, Johnson, and their Defense Secretary Robert McNamara placed great emphasis on reducing the costs of the U.S. overseas presence. However, this goal was in tension with the United States’ emerging strategic concept of “Flexible Response,” wherein it sought to reduce its reliance on the threat of massive nuclear retaliation against Soviet cities to deter Soviet expansion by giving NATO more options in the form of conventional armaments and tactical nuclear weapons. In doing so, it would not only put the U.S. homeland in less danger, but also make the threat of escalation more credible. The problem was that the Germans and other Europeans were skeptical of NATO’s capacity to defeat a Soviet invasion without recourse to strategic nuclear weapons, and were also loath to fight another conventional or tactical nuclear war on their soil (Kissinger, 1979: 82-83, 391-393). They were thus unlikely to pick up the conventional military slack on their own accord. As such, in an effort to maintain and improve NATO’s position in the conventional balance of power, throughout the 1960s the United States put significant pressure on West Germany and the other European countries to both improve their own capabilities and to “offset” the foreign exchange costs incurred by the American presence, which was exacerbated by the existence of the gold standard. The result was a series of biannual agreements beginning in 1961 in which the FRG agreed to purchase American military equipment as a means of compensation.

U.S. pressure on the FRG for the purposes of obtaining burden-sharing was frequently accompanied by threats of abandonment. Policymakers in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations ex-
licitly linked U.S. troop levels to German compensation, and were often brutally straightforward with their pressure. If the United States was to maintain its troop presence, it “was an ‘absolute necessity’” for the FRG to provide offset (Gavin, 2004: 135, 141, quote at p. 139). Kennedy directed that “we should get ready with actions to squeeze Europe,” in response to allied free-riding and to French efforts to assist the Germans in their nuclear efforts (Trachtenberg, 1999: 374). Kennedy argued that “we should be prepared to reduce quickly, if we so decided, our military forces in Germany” in order to cut costs and put pressure on the Europeans to do more for themselves, remarking that “We cannot continue to pay for the military protection of Europe while the NATO states are not paying their fair share and living off the ‘fat of the land.’”

117 Secretary McNamara was an especially vocal proponent of troop withdrawals, telling FRG Defense Minister Kai-Uwe von Hassel that “America cannot carry this burden [of defense] if it couldn’t reduce this deficit” via offset payments, and led the way in crafting plans for withdrawals (Gavin, 2004: 103-108; quote at p. 111). National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy later advised Johnson that Chancellor Ludwig Erhard “should be left in no doubt” that the continuation of American deployments was contingent on offset (Lepgold, 1990: 129, quote at p. 127). In a phone conversation with McNamara, Johnson similarly recommended putting pressure on Erhard: “Looks like to me, we ought to take advantage of this opportunity to make him tell us that he cannot afford to have our troops there.”

118 As a result, the United States was able to attain biannual offset agreements with the FRG of over $1 billion in 1961 and 1963, which served to both reduce the American deficit and build up the West German military with American arms – and which accompanied a more general increase in German defense spending and in the size of the German army (Lepgold, 1990: 127; Gavin, 2004: 112-113; Creswell and Kollmer, 2013: 84). Johnson continued to put pressure on, explicitly


linking FRG offset with the continued presence of U.S. troops. McNamara and other officials made very explicit threats to the Germans that without offset, withdrawals would follow (Gavin, 2004: 135, 139, 141, 147, 151; Zimmermann, 2009: 15; Lanoszka, 2014: 107).

The willingness of FRG policymakers to cave into American demands was largely influenced by West Germany’s position as the NATO ally most exposed to Soviet attack. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and his successors pursued burden-sharing not only to hedge against the possibility of abandonment but also to explicitly curry favor with the United States (Kelleher, 1975: 37, 44, 55, 75, 77-78, 91, 93). Numerous statements by U.S. policymakers – both among themselves and to FRG officials – make it clear that they recognized and were willing to exploit the FRG’s vulnerable position. Secretary of State Dean Rusk cautioned the German ambassador in January 1963 that geography made it very dangerous for the FRG to risk defying the United States (Trachtenberg, 1999: 375), while in 1968 Rostow similarly stressed the “simple fact” of German vulnerability in order to coerce the FRG into signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). 19 The State Department put the matter quite bluntly in an internal memorandum as well: “The Germans know their security depends on the U.S. umbrella.” 20 A 1969 report argued that the FRG’s bargaining power was restricted by its “geographic position – an exposed country, with a contiguous border with the Soviet bloc.” 21

By comparison, the United States had few levers with which it could employ similar coercion against the French, as France was much less vulnerable to a Soviet attack by virtue of its position in the rear of Western Europe. Kennedy recognized that “there was ‘not much we can do about France,’” owing to its geographic insulation, but indicated he was unafraid to use the “threat of withdrawal” to put pressure on the FRG for the purposes of coercing it into ceasing its nuclear

20 Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Bowie) to Secretary of State Rusk, July 20, 1967, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 13, p. 598.
cooperation efforts with France, signing on to nonproliferation treaties, and offsetting U.S. deployments (Trachtenberg, 1999: 373-375, quotes at p. 374). Indeed, FRG policymakers hesitated in moving too close to France in part because they feared – with no small help from American urging – that France could more easily come to an understanding with the Soviet Union by virtue of its more insulated position (Powaski, 1994: 72). They were also not nearly as willing to risk American displeasure, instead preferring to use the French “option” as a hedge against U.S. unreliability without fully embracing cooperation with France (Kelleher, 1975: 127, 149, 151-153).

Importantly, however, U.S. pressure on the FRG was coupled with the explicit assurance that, given offset, American troops would remain (Lepgold, 1990: 119-120). The FRG enjoyed considerable U.S. assurances in the form of: (1) the largest number of U.S. foreign-deployed troops of any peacetime ally throughout the Cold War; (2) constant private and public assurances that troops would remain and the NATO security guarantee would be honored in the event of Soviet aggression; and (3) plans for giving the FRG partial control – or at least input – over the use of American nuclear weapons.

5.3 1967-1969: Mansfield and Czechoslovakia Change the Game

5.3.1 Retrenchment Pressure and the Need for Reassurance

Resource constraints during the late 1960s and early 1970s, stemming in large part from the costs of the Vietnam War, intensified the need for reassurance. Allies increasingly doubted the reliability of U.S. protection, and as a result became more interested in exploring outside options to reduce their dependence on the United States. U.S. military spending declined throughout much of the decade, and President Nixon proclaimed the “Nixon Doctrine,” which stressed that allies would hold the primary responsibility when it came to defending themselves (Nixon, 1971: 5). Nixon noted that “the American people have grown somewhat weary...of international burdens,” and argued that “The Nixon Doctrine will enable us to remain committed in ways that we can sustain” (Nixon, 1971: 7, 8).
Moreover, the year 1966 saw the first major congressional resolution by Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield to cut U.S. forces in Europe, which was followed up by similar resolutions in 1967, 1969, and 1974, as well as by the Mansfield Amendments in 1971 and 1973-74, which also proposed troop reductions (Kaplan, 1999: 138; Lázár, 2003: 3, 24, 34). Other congressional proposals were less dramatic, but still very much intent on withdrawing troops and demanding that West Germany and NATO make greater contributions (Williams, 1985: 150-151), while the National Commitments Resolution of 1969 and the War Powers Act of 1973 sought to limit the president’s ability to deploy U.S. forces abroad without congressional approval. Mansfield and other proponents of troop withdrawals, including Senators Stuart Symington and William Fulbright, argued that the costs from Vietnam made stationing hundreds of thousands of troops in Europe unsustainable, and favored prioritizing domestic spending (Williams, 1985: 142, 162, 170; Kissinger, 1979: 939-940). Additionally, sluggish economic growth coupled with a mounting balance of payments and trade deficit provided further impetus for troop withdrawals as a cost-saving measure (Williams, 1985: 200-201). Both Brandt and NATO Secretariat Manilo Brosio warned in 1971 that troop withdrawals would destroy Europe’s faith in the United States (Kissinger, 1979: 945). As a consequence, the Johnson (and later Nixon) administration used considerable reassurance to discourage the FRG’s pursuit of outside options.

Indeed, the FRG’s interest in its outside options increased as U.S. reliability came into question. The first of these was its nuclear option German leaders implicitly linked potential nuclearization with concerns about American credibility, particularly as Congressional pressure escalated (Gavin, 2004: 142-144, 149, 162, 164; Gerzhoy, 2015: 121-123). American fears of German exit became more pronounced as evidence mounted that the FRG was, in fact, “reexamining [its] relations to the United States and to NATO” (Gavin, 2004: 143) and considering increased cooperation with France in late 1966 (Gavin, 2004: 154-155). Previously the French option had been less attractive, as it could not offer the kind of protection the United States could. But with the American commitment in doubt the FRG’s other options were becoming increasingly attractive (Powaski, 1994:
71-72; Haftendorn, 1996: 154-155; Gavin, 2004: 112-113). More generally, the Johnson administration feared that French behavior, particularly its withdrawal from NATO’s military command, could represent a model that other NATO allies might follow if they saw the U.S. commitment as unreliable (Lepgold, 1990: 144, 147).

What also gave U.S. policymakers pause was the FRG’s “Soviet option” and the fear of German neutralism that came with it. This option was related to the FRG’s nuclear option insofar as the FRG’s size and military potential made its threat of exit more credible in both cases. However, the two options were also somewhat incompatible, as the Soviet Union vehemently opposed German nuclearization (Kelleher, 1975: esp. pp. 131, 267). Indeed, the credibility of the FRG’s Soviet option was enhanced by its ultimate abandonment of the nuclear option (Lanoszka, 2014: 113-116).

Fears of German neutralism and the FRG’s Soviet option were especially intense during the later Johnson years and during the Nixon Administration because of the domestic retrenchment pressure that policymakers faced. While there was a more general concern that allies in Europe and Asia could seek to either obtain nuclear weapons or pursue closer ties with the Communist bloc, these concerns were magnified in the German case because of its economic and latent military power, which not only made the threat of German neutralism and nuclearization more credible, but also made the consequences of “losing” Germany more severe to NATO. One State Department report argued that threats of American withdrawal would likely push the Germans into the arms of the Soviet Union, which could ultimately deprive NATO of its second most powerful member, and other policymakers – including McNamara – began to increasingly come to the same conclusion (Gavin, 2004: 154-155, 176-177). Ambassador George McGhee warned that if the United States seemed on the verge of withdrawing troops, West Germany “would be forced to reorient its basic security policy,” which “could take the form of...a ‘go-it-alone’ nationalism or efforts to accommodate itself to the Soviets.”

After Erhard’s government fell at the end of 1966 and the Social Democrats increased their share of power, with Willy Brandt as Foreign Minister and Kurt Kiesinger as Chancellor in 1967 (Kaplan, 1999: 139; Gavin, 2004: 141, 156-157). When Brandt became Chancellor in 1969, trends toward Soviet rapprochement accelerated in the form of Ostpolitik (discussed in more detail below). Brandt had argued in 1968 that “West Germany cannot really depend on the Americans” (Trachtenberg, 2012: 167), and as a result pursued rapprochement with East Germany and the Soviet Union to reduce the FRG’s dependence on the United States.

The result was increased U.S. reassurance measures in order to offset the perception that withdrawal was coming “no matter what the Germans offered” (Schwartz, 2003: 156). For one, American policymakers increasingly went to great lengths to assure NATO allies that there would be no unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe. During offset negotiations at the end of 1966, policymakers began to reconsider taking a hard-line with the FRG due to concerns that a perception of U.S. unreliability might “confirm the opinion that NATO is falling apart” as a result of domestic pressures within the United States, and thus the United States agreed to drop the link it had previously insisted on between U.S. troop levels and German willingness to offset them (Gavin, 2004: 144, 151). Throughout the remainder of 1967-68, the Johnson Administration continued to balk at the prospect of threatening troop withdrawals, as they feared that doing so would only further encourage the FRG to reach out to the Soviet Union – as had begun to occur under Kiesinger’s leadership – and attempt to exploit its ties with France (Gavin, 2004: 176-177). As a result, the 1967 offset agreement was considerably less than hoped for, and represented a decrease from the previous agreement (Lepgold, 1990: 147; Kaplan, 1999: 139-140; Gavin, 2004: 162-163).

5.3.2 Retrenchment Pressure and Burden-Sharing Leverage

Yet while they were opposed to withdrawing troops, thus adding fuel to the fire of perceived U.S. unreliability, policymakers used domestic pressure as a means of persuading allies to increase their burden-sharing efforts. Johnson pointed to voices in Congress and the public calling for reduced
U.S. presence and more allied burden-sharing in Europe, and sought to use offset as a way to quell these voices (Zimmermann, 1996: 337, 339-340). In effect, policymakers attempted to play the role of a “good cop,” allowing the pressure from their domestic audiences to play the “bad cop” that would push allies to contribute more to the common defense – both in terms of offset and defense efforts more generally (FRUS v41, Docs 48, 71, 76). Johnson presented allied burden-sharing as a means of appeasing Congress (Gavin, 2004: 151, 160-161; Zimmermann, 2009: 17-18), and although he increasingly hesitated to make direct ultimatums, his administration issued ambiguous signals about U.S. deployments in an effort to induce allied efforts to comply with Congressional demands (Lepgold, 1990: 150-151; Zimmermann, 2009: 23).

Implicit in U.S. assurances was the threat that, if allies did not increase their efforts, the United States would have difficulty avoiding troop withdrawals. Numerous U.S. officials made statements to the effect that, while the United States had every intention of maintaining its troop levels, this was conditional upon allies’ willingness to share in the burden.\(^{23}\) Johnson told his representative to offset negotiations John McCloy in early 1967 that “In the absence of a financial solution...Congressional and public opinion would be intense, and the Germans should recognize that the situation might get out of hand” (Lepgold, 1990: 146). When McCloy asked whether Johnson could “hold the line” against withdrawals if the FRG agreed to offset, he replied: “Perhaps, but you have to go over there and find out what they will do” (Schwartz, 2003: 155). In his own meeting with Kiesinger, Johnson stressed that, although “he wanted to be friends with Germany,” voices in Congress were asking “Why should we keep on maintaining our troops there?” (Schwartz, 2003: 163). Indeed, as the FRG weighed defense cuts in July 1967, Mansfield publicly put pressure on both Johnson and on West German officials to avoid such measures, and as a result the FRG backpedaled. In October, pressure from other U.S. senators helped push the Europeans into launching the European Defence Improvement Programme, which devoted an extra billion dollars of military spending over the next five years for the European NATO allies (Williams, 1985:

In late 1968, however, the situation changed with the Soviet Union’s invasion of Czechoslovakia. The lull in Soviet provocation in Europe after the Berlin Crisis of 1961-63 had led many within the United States to see an opportunity to reduce the U.S. presence – to pursue what Kaplan (1999: 122) calls a “benign neglect” of Europe (Zimmermann, 2009: 14; Lanoszka, 2014: 103). Indeed, the comparatively more friendly tone of Soviet-American relations generated unease in Bonn, raising German concerns about being sold out by the United States as part of a superpower settlement (Kelleher, 1975: 260; Trachtenberg, 1999: 231).

Yet the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia led to a temporary lull in domestic pressure for withdrawal. Indeed, even Mansfield paused his efforts in Congress as a result of heightened concern about the Soviet threat (Williams, 1985: 158-159; Brady, 2004: 139). Moreover, the United States increased military maneuvers in Central Europe and rotated two mechanized infantry brigades into West Germany (Blechman and Kaplan, 1978: 499-500). A telegram from the U.S. embassy in Bonn to Secretary of State William Rogers argued in favor of reassurance on the grounds that without it, the Europeans might “search for accommodation” with the Soviets.

As a result, although the United States pushed the Europeans – including the FRG – to increase their efforts as a result of the Soviet invasion, this pressure amounted to little. Despite U.S. re-

---


27 As one intelligence memorandum put it in November 1968: “So far the European allies have responded to the events in Czechoslovakia with far more promise than performance. Among the four or five that have pledged concrete new contributions, only Greece has offered anything approximating a clear net gain for the alliance. Belgium, for its part, has offered only to ‘postpone’ impending troop cutbacks in West Germany; Britain has pledged further commitments which represent almost nothing new for the common defense; and West Germany, with most to fear from the Soviets, has refrained from making any substantial gesture.” Intelligence Memorandum No. 2049/68, “The Response of the
quests for a 15% increase in German defense spending after Czechoslovakia, “the Germans plan an increase of only about 3%, to be used largely for pay and benefit increases.”

Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird argued in a letter to Nixon, “The FRG...does not make a defense effort commensurate with its strength.”

and pointed out that, “frankly, many people in Congress had expected a bigger European response to the Czechoslovakian invasion than we got. So far as dollars and cents are concerned, there has not been that much of a response.”

The invasion of Czechoslovakia “led few of the allies to disavow the goal of ‘peaceful engagement’ with the Soviet bloc,” and did not slow down Brandt’s push for rapprochement with the Eastern bloc (Trachtenberg, 2012: 174-175). Indeed, the Soviet willingness to use force even confirmed Brandt’s desire for Ostpolitik (Blechman and Kaplan, 1978: 504-505).

5.4 1969-1974: Ostpolitik and American Retrenchment

Concerns about Congressional pressure and German exit only deepened in the Nixon administration. Rather than proposing non-binding resolutions as he had in previous years, Mansfield for the first time introduced in 1971 what would be binding legislation mandating troop reductions, and did so again in 1973. These attempts were ultimately defeated but nevertheless caused enormous consternation both within the Nixon administration and among the NATO allies. More generally, Congress forced defense cuts while simultaneously increasing domestic spending (Kissinger, 1979: 213-215; Lepgold, 1990: 147-148).

The Nixon Administration was increasingly reluctant to withhold reassurance. Policymakers feared that the FRG’s unfolding detente with the Eastern bloc reduced U.S. leverage for burden-
sharing, as it not only made using threats of abandonment dangerous, but it also reduced the FRG’s perception of threat from the Soviets (Powskii, 1994: 87; Gavin, 2004: 176-171, 190-191; Zimmermann, 2009: 24). This is not to say that there was no burden-sharing pressure; U.S. officials continued to use the threat of involuntary defection due to domestic pressure in order to coerce the FRG. However, the pressure was used with much more caution, and was paired with considerable reassurance (Powskii, 1994; Kaplan, 1999: 156-157).

In addition to domestic pressure from Mansfield and others, what also raised concerns about U.S. unreliability was the American effort toward detente with the Soviet Union – which included the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaties in 1972 and 1979 (SALT I and SALT II, respectively), as well as efforts toward Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) from Europe. These efforts were in no small part motivated by the costs of Vietnam, which made reducing tensions more attractive as a means of decreasing the probability of war and containing the arms race attractive as a means of cutting costs (Haftendorn, 1996: 155-156). Yet detente similarly raised concerns on the part of allies, who feared that the result could be a U.S.-Soviet bargain in which allied interests were sold out in order for the superpowers to make themselves more secure (Powskii, 1994: 98-99, 102-103; Kaplan, 1999: 116-117). In particular, since the defense of Europe relied heavily on the threat of nuclear retaliation, the U.S.-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War in 1973 raised concerns about U.S. willingness to escalate. Similarly, the West Germans resented the concerted US-Soviet push for a nonproliferation treaty, which they saw as discriminatory and as evidence that the United States attached more importance to its relations with its adversary than to the well-being of its allies; Kiesinger, for one, called it “atomic complicity” (Haftendorn, 1996: 154, 159; quote at p. 159).

---


The Germans feared that, if done bilaterally and without consultation, these efforts might ignore allied interests and even provide cover for a U.S.-Soviet grand bargain. Discouraging allies from pursuing their own, separate versions of detente with the Soviet Union thus required reassuring them that the United States would not sell them out, and consulting and informing them on decisions made (Kissinger, 1979: 382-383, 386). National Security Adviser (later Secretary of State) Henry Kissinger put the matter well in his memoirs: “in times of relaxing tension, they [the Europeans] dreaded a US-Soviet condominium” (Kissinger, 1979: 94). Indeed, in 1973 Mansfield cited the comparatively less tense relations that had prevailed since the Cuban Missile Crisis (the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia aside) as evidence that Soviet intentions no longer demanded a massive U.S. presence in Europe (Williams, 1985: 215-216).

Decision-makers in the Nixon Administration feared that West Germany – as well as the other members of NATO – were likely to undertake “increasing accommodation to the Russians on political and economic issues” in response to their perceptions of U.S. unreliability. They worried that this process could incite a trend toward “Finlandization,” with allies distancing themselves from the United States and becoming increasingly willing to defer to Soviet interests (Lepgold, 1990: 138). Kissinger wrote in 1969 that allies were likely to drift toward the Soviets if they perceived imminent U.S. retrenchment (Zimmermann, 2009: 20), and warned in 1971 of the likelihood “that Europe will seek nuclear autonomy or will move in the direction of Finland or possibly do both things simultaneously” if American withdrawal seemed imminent.

As a result, policymakers turned to strong reassurance as a means of counteracting the percep-

---

34 Telegram from U.S. embassy (Bonn) to Rogers and Hillenbrand, “Recent FRG Views on MBFR,” June 1971, Folder “Germany, Vol. IX [3 of 3],” NSC Files, Country Files, Box 685, RMNL.

35 Telegram from U.S. embassy (Bonn) to Rogers, “US-German MBFR Consultations,” June 1971, Folder “Germany, Vol. IX [3 of 3],” NSC Files, Country Files, Box 685, RMNL.


tion of U.S. retrenchment, and vigorously opposed the efforts by Mansfield and others in Congress. Nixon, for one, claimed in his 1970 report on foreign policy that the United States would no sooner withdraw from Europe than from Alaska (Cha, 1999: 69). His first visit as President in February-March 1969 was to Europe, during which his primary objective was to “affirm our commitment to NATO” (Kissinger, 1979: 88-89). He then visited again the following year, strongly reaffirming the United States’ commitment to defend NATO (Kissinger, 1979: 921-922). While in Ireland (ironically not a NATO member), he promised that the United States would not make any unilateral withdrawals (Williams, 1985: 165). Nixon declared the NATO security guarantee to be “unique” and “irreplaceable” (Lepgold, 1990: 149; Gavin, 2004: 190), and proclaimed that “the United States will, under no circumstances, reduce, unilaterally, its commitment to NATO.” The administration further stressed that it would consult and inform the NATO allies on bilateral U.S.-Soviet negotiations on arms control and other issues. In this way, the administration followed the approach favored by Hillenbrand, who argued that “Statements by both the President and [Secretary of State Rogers] can still do much to influence European attitudes toward this country, given their continuing psychological need for assurances from us.” These assurances are particularly striking when one compares them to U.S. threats during the 1950s and 1960s, when troop withdrawals were not being ruled out (Kelleher, 1975: 135) and officials in the Kennedy Administration explicitly stated that they would have no qualms pulling out of Europe if the FRG did not cooperate (Gerzhoy, 2015: 114).

U.S. officials stressed the need for reassurance in private and among themselves as well.

---

38 Telegram from U.S. embassy to William Rogers, “Allied Consultation on SALT,” June 1969, NSC Files, Country Files, Box 681, RMNL; “Memorandum of Conversation between President Nixon and Chancellor Kiesinger at the White House,” August 7, 1969, NSC Files, Country Files, Box 682, RMNL.


They feared that withdrawals would encourage Finlandization among NATO allies and undermine American bargaining leverage with the Soviets (Kaplan, 1999: 151-153).⁴² Officials hesitated to threaten withdrawals as Johnson had, for fear of “erod[ing] German confidence in our security commitments.”⁴³ Kissinger asserted that “one thing we must avoid is any arm-twisting of the Germans,” for fear of encouraging German neutralism (Gavin, 2004: 190-191), while Laird and U.S. Representative to NATO David Kennedy similarly counseled that Nixon go out of his way to emphasize that troop withdrawals would not be forthcoming.⁴⁴ An NSC paper further argued that troop withdrawals “would be strongly resisted by the Allies, would cause them to doubt U.S. credibility, and would probably remove their incentive to maintain present forces, much less make force improvements,” recognizing that unilateral withdrawals, particularly during a time of retrenchment pressure, would expend the United States’ bargaining chip.⁴⁵ This problem was particularly acute with regards to Germany, due to the fear of renewed German militarism. Nixon “remembered that as a freshman Congressman he saw three reasons for NATO: the threat from the Soviet Union, the weakness of Western Europe and the need for a home for the Germans,” and argued that while “one could perhaps debate the first two of the original reasons for NATO, but the third still existed.”⁴⁶

Footnotes:


⁴⁶ Memorandum for the Record, “The President’s Meeting with Former High Government Officials and Military Offi-
Nixon dropped the link that made troop levels conditional on offset, firmly decided in 1970 to maintain U.S. force levels in Europe, and optimized U.S. conventional forces for combat in the European theater (Lepgold, 1990: 149; Gavin, 2004: 190; Robb, 2014: 132). Furthermore, Nixon abandoned the “two-and-a-half war” concept which held that the United States should be prepared to simultaneously fight a major war with Soviet Union in Europe, a major war with China in Asia, and a smaller war elsewhere. Instead, he replaced it with a one-and-a-half war strategy to fight only one major war and one smaller war simultaneously, with Europe considered the theater in which a major war might be fought (Kissinger, 1979: 220-222).

Nixon argued against troop withdrawals on the grounds that “The key to what we do is what effect does it have on Germany....Some Europeans would think to move toward the Russians because they are uneasy about more US reductions,” and his advisers – including Secretary Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe Andrew Goodpaster, and NATO Ambassador Robert Ellsworth – agreed that “reductions would push [the FRG] toward the Russians.” Nixon further posited that “the effect [of withdrawals] would be catastrophic” on Germany, potentially setting off a chain of events in which “the Germans left the fold and the umbilical cord [was] cut.” A 1971 State Department memo argued that “From the top of Norway to the tip of Italy there is a growing conviction that the United States will disengage from Europe,” further arguing that the FRG was likely to show “increasing accommodation to the Russians on political and economic issues.”

Preoccupation with German neutralism became especially acute as the Social Democrats increased their electoral share in late 1966 and again in 1969, and as Social Democrat Willy Brandt became Chancellor in 1969. Brandt’s new government was far more open to pursuing rapprochement on the Mansfield Amendment,” May 13, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, p. 275.


ment with the Soviets and to normalizing relations with East Germany, and in short order began pursuing a policy of Ostpolitik that emphasized rapprochement with the Communist bloc (Powaski, 1994: 80). Brandt linked American domestic pressure to doubts about American reliability, and he became more assertive in standing up to American pressure.\(^5^0\) In response to the Mansfield Amendment in 1971, Brandt publicly proclaimed doubt in the viability of the U.S. commitment to NATO (Powaski, 1994: 90-91). U.S. policymakers feared that other allies might take the same course if the American commitment continued to be in doubt (Lepgold, 1990: 153).\(^5^1\) Assistant Secretary of State Martin Hillenbrand argued that “developments in the United States could jeopardize” Brandt’s willingness to rely on the United States, and pointed to “a recent poll showing fifty percent of the population favoring such a neutralist position between East and West.”\(^5^2\) Indeed, German officials explicitly used the Soviet option in order to extract U.S. assurances. In a meeting with Laird, West German Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt “made a strong plea for maintaining a substantial US troop presence in Europe,” and warned that “if the US cuts its troop level, Germany and other European countries would inevitably begin to accommodate with the East.”\(^5^3\)

The Nixon Administration’s concerns with Ostpolitik were twofold. The first was that a more independent foreign policy course could eventually result in a nationalistic FRG that felt less tied to and dependent upon the United States, and more willing to play both sides of the Cold War (Lepgold, 1990: 153; Klitzing, 2009: 80, 91-92; Juneau, 2011: 279, 281-282). A desire for rapprochement with the Soviet Union was not in itself unreasonable; however, as Kissinger put it, “we have to distinguish between the things that have already happened in Ostpolitik and the

\(^{50}\)Memorandum for the Record, “Luncheon Conversation Between Henry Kissinger and Egon Bahr, April 8, 1970,” April 8, 1970, Folder “Germany, Vol. IV [1 of 2], NSC Files, Country Files, Box 683, RMNL.


\(^{52}\)Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hillenbrand) to Secretary of State Rogers, “Tensions in US Relations with Europe,” November 15, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, p. 324.

\(^{53}\)Telegram from U.S. Embassy (Bonn) to William Rogers, “Secretary Laird’s Talk with FRG Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt,” June 1970, Folder “Germany, Vol. V [2 of 2],” NSC Files, Country Files, Box 683, RMNL.
longer term danger. What has happened up to now is not dangerous. What the long-term change may be is another matter.”54 Kissinger’s fear was that “The Germans may also become so engaged in their Eastern policy that their commitment to West European unity may decline,” and even “create a momentum that may shake Germany’s domestic stability and un hinge its international position” that would lead it to lapse into neutralism (Juneau, 2011: 281).55 A December 1969 National Intelligence Estimate raised the possibility that “Bonn may become less inclined to defer to Western interests and views” due to its rapprochement with the Soviets.56

Writing ten years later, Kissinger argued that:

Detente was difficult to manage for the other Western allies because it might encourage euphoria, be confused with psychotherapy, and fail to insist on Soviet reciprocity. But for Bonn all these dangers were compounded because the Soviet Union in effect held 17 million Germans hostage....On one occasion I said to an associate that I dreaded the moment when ‘no German Chancellor can afford the hostility of the Soviet Union.’ (Kissinger, 1982: 145-146)

Second, policymakers thought a unilateral German detente with the Communist bloc would undermine NATO cohesion and undercut American leadership in the Western bloc, thus also reducing the United States’ bargaining leverage with the Soviet Union. This was particularly undesirable during a period in which it was trying to negotiate with the Soviets for nuclear arms control and Mutual Balanced Force Reductions in Europe (Powsk i, 1994: 96-97; Klitzing, 2009: 84, 87, 97, 101, 103-104, 108; Juneau, 2011: 278, 281, 284, 286). As Kissinger told the State Secretary at


55In a memo to Nixon, Kissinger argued that his worry “stems not so much from the broad purpose which Brandt wants,” but from the possibility that Ostpolitik could create “momentum and will lead Brandt into dangerous concessions.” Henry Kissinger to Richard Nixon, “Brandt’s Eastern Policy,” February 16, 1970, Folder “Germany, Vol. IV [1 of 2],” NSC Files, Country Files, Box 683, RMNL.

the West German Foreign Office, “If there is to be a policy of detente with the USSR, then we will do it” (Juneau, 2011: 284). A 1972 NIE argued that “Alliance unity is likely to become even harder to maintain as...the Soviets have direct opportunity to play upon Western disagreements.”\(^57\) Nixon emphasized to Brandt that “If [the Soviets] can weaken the NATO Alliance” by dividing the Germans and the Americans, ”it will be a great accomplishment for them.”\(^58\)

At the same time, the Nixon Administration hesitated from sending blatant signals of displeasure to the FRG over Ostpolitik. This was in large part because of the concern that breaking with Brandt might accelerate the FRG’s desire for rapprochement and push it into pursuing an even more independent foreign policy, but also because Nixon sought to avoid giving the impression of disunity within NATO, which would only further undercut the United States’ ability to bargain with the Soviets (Powaski, 1994: 97; Klitzing, 2009: 91-93, 100-101, 110; Juneau, 2011: 283-289). As such, the administration’s position was “to try to get on board and get something for the US” rather than openly break with the FRG (Juneau, 2011: 287) – though they were wary of openly endorsing Ostpolitik for fear of undermining the Christian Democrats’ opposition to it within the FRG (Juneau, 2011: 291). This position extended to avoiding troop withdrawals, as administration officials feared that withdrawals would “play into the hands of those who support Ostpolitik.”\(^59\) Kissinger put the matter quite simply: “We face this dilemma: We can’t afford to oppose Brandt but we can’t support his policy too strongly either.”\(^60\)

However, although the Nixon administration put great emphasis on reassuring the FRG, it still exerted burden-sharing pressure via threats of involuntary defection. As Lepgold (1990: 143) puts it: Nixon and Kissinger “appeased domestic pressures just enough...to contain them.” Kissinger


recommended “emphasiz[ing] our commitment to maintain strong American forces in Europe” while simultaneously pointing out “that Congressional support in the United States required proportionate contributions from our allies” (Kissinger, 1979: 386). A 1970 NSC paper similarly prescribed that U.S. policymakers “reaffirm our intention to maintain and improve US forces in Europe, if the Europeans do their share in improving their forces.”\(^61\) Kissinger admitted that the primary motivation for offset was not economic but rather political, arguing that “in real terms...we would get very little additional balance of payments help even from our maximum position [in negotiations].” As such, although skeptical of offset’s economic utility, Kissinger nevertheless argued that “we should maintain a fairly tough position in this stage. We will face renewed Congressional pressure...if we do not get a substantially better offset than the previous Administration.”\(^62\)

Indeed, at a meeting with NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers in April 1969, Nixon warned that “it would be very popular for him to announce a reduction of the US defense program, or to announce the withdrawal of divisions from Europe,”\(^63\) and he stressed privately that “They’ve just got to believe that the situation is serious. A Mansfield resolution will surely pass if they don’t make a bigger effort.”\(^64\) Similarly, Laird wrote to Nixon that “I would judge the need to be for a nice balance between (i) reassurances about the American commitment to NATO, which are clearly in order, and (ii) polite reservations in response to any invitations to ‘stabilize’ (i.e., freeze) US force levels in Europe, which might pose serious Congressional and policy problems,” thus allowing the United States to effectively balance threat and assurance.\(^65\) The U.S. ambassador to West Germany framed the matter quite straightforwardly to Brandt, making clear “the administration’s intent to


maintain substantial US forces in Europe, although at the same time pointing to heavy pressures in certain quarters in the US for reduction. To counter these latter pressures, it was vitally important that Germany and other European countries do everything possible to improve their own defense contribution.”

Kissinger similarly told Brandt in September 1973 that although “we are trying to stem” Congressional pressure, “the more offset we can get, the more it will help,” while Nixon made a speech in March 1974 in which he argued that the Europeans “will find it almost impossible to get Congressional support for continued American presence at present levels” if the Europeans did not increase their efforts and pursued economic integration that excluded the United States (Williams, 1985: 239).

A December 1971 State Department memo pointed to the importance of combining threats and assurances as a means of obtaining this allied burden-sharing: “These steps to share a greater proportion of the common defense burden are a tangible earnest of European intent to meet the terms of the President’s 1970 pledge, repeated at this NATO meeting, and warmly welcomed, that the US would maintain and improve its forces in Europe, provided the Allies do likewise.”

Similarly, during the buildup to the 1972-73 offset arrangement, in June 1971 Sonnenfeldt recommended to Kissinger that the United States use the Mansfield Amendment as a means of putting pressure on the Germans, but adding that “we have no intention whatsoever of a repetition of the Erhard crisis.”

During the “Year of Europe” in 1973, in which the administration attempted to create a new Atlantic Charter and strike a grand bargain with allies on the issues of trade and defense burden-sharing, U.S. officials repeatedly emphasized that it was in the Europeans’ interest to make

---


69 Helmut Sonnenfeldt, “Your Meeting with Ambassador Pauls, Wednesday at 12,” June 1, 1971, Folder “Germany, Vol. IX [2 of 3],” NSC Files, Country Files, Box 685, RMNL.
concessions, lest they empower domestic proponents of troop withdrawals in the United States.\(^{70}\)

The result was increased offset payments in 1969 and 1972-73 to the tune of over $1.5 billion and over $2 billion, respectively, as well as increased allied military contributions, as the FRG and other NATO allies sought to defuse Congressional pressure (Kissinger, 1979: 400; Lepgold, 1990: 153-154; Powaski, 1994: 93; Kaplan, 1999: 155-157).\(^{71}\) Additionally, the Jackson-Nunn Amendment in Congress in 1973 re-established the link between U.S. troop levels and offset that Nixon had dropped in 1970, thus ultimately reducing the immediate need for withdrawals – as evidenced by the abrupt decline of Mansfield’s ability to gain support for withdrawals after 1973 (Williams, 1985: 252-253). Similarly, days after Nixon’s March 1974 speech the United States and the FRG made another offset agreement that fully covered U.S. costs (Williams, 1985: 239-241).\(^{72}\)

Indeed the evidence overwhelmingly suggests that the FRG and other NATO members very much took domestic constraints in the United States seriously. One U.S. official even hypothesized in 1969 that the Europeans saw “their defense requirements primarily in terms of what they need to provide to keep the Americans committed” (Hunt, 2015: 313). During the Johnson administration, the West German ambassador reported that a number of factors, including the war in Vietnam and the “neo-isolationist trend,” that made major troop withdrawals quite possible (Gavin, 2012: 48). In 1970 the West Germans requested “an indication...of the minimum European defense contribution we will need...in order to constrain budgetary and congressional pressures.”\(^{73}\) Moreover, the


\(^{72}\)State Department Briefing Paper, “President Nixon’s Visit to Brussels,” June 1974, Folder “NAC Summit - Brussels The President,” NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Country Files, Box 54, RMNL.

\(^{73}\)Telegram from U.S. Embassy (Bonn) to William Rogers, “Defense Burden Sharing,” June 1970, Folder “Germany,
Germans became far more amenable to burden-sharing efforts in 1971, after Mansfield introduced his first piece of binding legislation to cut U.S. troops in Europe by 50% in the form of an amendment to the Selective Service bill. Whereas in October 1970, the Germans had taken a somewhat hard-line on burden-sharing\(^{74}\), German willingness to raise offset payments and burden-sharing increased significantly in mid-1971.\(^{75}\)

### 5.5 Alternative Explanations

#### 5.5.1 German Domestic Politics

Before becoming a major influence on German foreign policy at the end of the decade, the Social Democrats had been proponents of rapprochement with the Communist bloc since the mid-1960s (Ninkovich, 2004: 123). In October 1966, Ludwig Erhard’s government fell in no small part because of his willingness to cave in to American pressure over offset, even in the face of German economic woes that year. In the “Grand Coalition” that followed under Chancellor Kiesinger, the Social Democrats had a more prominent role, with Willy Brandt becoming Foreign Minister. The first signs of detente started under Kiesinger, but did not truly take off until Brandt became Chancellor in 1969, when Ostpolitik became a cornerstone of West German foreign policy (Powaski, 1994: 80; Lanoszka, 2014: 113-114).

Indeed, there is evidence that U.S. policymakers recognized the Social Democrats’ ideology as a source of the problem. Nixon and Kissinger saw the center-right Christian Democrats as more reliable partners than Brandt’s Social Democrats, with Nixon saying that “I don’t want to hurt our...

---


friends in Germany by catering to that son of a bitch [by endorsing Ostpolitik]” (Klitzing, 2009: 103), referring to Brandt, and that “any non-socialist government would be better” (Juneau, 2011: 284). The generalization extended beyond the FRG as well. As Laird put it: “I am afraid it would take little persuasion to cause many of the Socialist countries of NATO to reach an accommodation with the USSR, which looks more and more like the ‘good guy’ in their eyes.”

In sum, then, Social Democratic rule did correlate with American unease and increased FRG willingness to reach out to the Soviets. However, since the Social Democrats gained power in part because of U.S. threats – and because of perceived U.S. unreliability – left-wing influence in the FRG was in part endogenous to broader trends affecting U.S. reassurance behavior and burden-sharing pressure, and to those behaviors themselves. Thus, while ideology is certainly part of the story in explaining why the FRG’s Soviet option became more credible in the late 1960s and early 1970s, its causal role is difficult to clearly establish.

5.6 Conclusion

To summarize, I have shown that the FRG received an enormous number of reassurance measures from the United States – in the form of U.S. troop deployments, steps toward nuclear sharing, and countless public and private promises. These assurances were directly linked to fears of German exit – exacerbated by the FRG’s latent military power and by the costs of Vietnam. At the same time, however, the FRG’s vulnerability to abandonment and U.S. retrenchment pressure forced the FRG to satisfy American expectations for burden-sharing.

Similarly, this case provides at best mixed support for the alternative explanations. Aside from the Congressional retrenchment pressure, which was of concern to all U.S. allies, there was no significant lobbying on behalf of the FRG in particular that shaped U.S. reassurance or burden-sharing pressure. Regarding the role of German domestic politics, this case does suggest that U.S. policymakers’ expectations about the likelihood of FRG exit were influenced by the left-leaning

---

character of German governments from 1967-74. At the same time, however, the evidence suggests that German policymakers were reacting to perceptions of U.S. unreliability that resulted from the Mansfield Amendments and associated retrenchment pressure, and that left-wing influence was in part a reaction to dissatisfaction with the United States.
Chapter 6

Burden-Sharing in the Special Relationship: The U.S.-UK Alliance, 1961-1976

6.1 Case Overview

From the earliest days of the Cold War, British policymakers realized that in light of U.S. and Soviet strength, their country would be unable to play the role of a great power as it had for centuries. Nevertheless, Britain’s importance to the United States, and one of the foundations of the “special relationship” between the two countries, was its unique role as the loyal ally with the single greatest overseas military presence, which took pressure off the United States. This made the UK strategically valuable, which in turn gave it bargaining leverage, helping it garner U.S. assistance for its nuclear program and, later, bailouts that would allow Britain to avoid devaluing the pound and reducing its defense expenditures and overseas commitments.

By the mid-1960s, Britain’s position had eroded considerably from what it had been prior to World War II. While the United States initially responded by trying to prop up the British economy, ballooning British deficits and shrinking defense spending soon made it clear that Britain’s ability to maintain its global role was rapidly diminishing. The United States tried to use its support for the British pound – both unilaterally and through international financial institutions – as a
lever to influence the UK’s continued presence abroad (Schwartz, 2003: 82). These included a package of almost $1 billion in credits ($400 million of which came directly from the United States) in 1965, as well as a grant from the United States in 1966 (Schwartz, 2003: 82, 146). Indeed, part of the impetus for arrangements with West Germany to offset the foreign exchange costs of stationing troops through military purchases was Britain’s threat to not only withdraw its forces from Germany, but to retrench from Asia as well if it was not compensated. In 1967 the United States was again forced to come to Britain’s aid, making up for some of the offset shortfall that West Germany was unable to pay due to its own budgetary woes (Schwartz, 2003: 155-159; Gavin, 2004: 162-163; Priest, 2006: 133; Gill, 2014: 156).

Ultimately, the American approach of using “carrots” was unsuccessful. British defense budgets were cut during much of the latter half of the 1960s, shrinking from 6.3% of GDP in 1960 to 4.6% in 1970. As a result of economic difficulties, at the end of 1967 Britain devalued the pound and then in January 1968 announced that it would be accelerating the withdrawal of the 90,000 forces it had stationed “east of Suez” in the Middle East and Asia, essentially leaving the defense of these areas to the United States by March 1971 (Schwartz, 2003: 191-199; Priest, 2006: 141-142). Despite U.S. urging, the decision was not reversed.

As such, the “carrots” approach was abandoned as it became clear that Britain’s value as an ally

---


had diminished considerably. Indeed, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird even proposed threatening U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe in 1970 in order to put pressure on the British, though this approach was rejected by others on the grounds that it was unlikely to be successful and would only cause tensions at a time when Atlantic relations were already strained by the Vietnam War and the prospect of U.S. retrenchment (Robb, 2014: 30-33). When Britain proposed further defense cuts in 1974-76, the Ford Administration weighed options that included threats of cutting off American nuclear cooperation and intelligence sharing. While these threats were unsuccessful, the United States did not attempt to bail Britain out as it had during the mid-1960s – even when UK policymakers sought U.S. help in securing a loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Hughes and Robb, 2013: 896-899; Robb, 2014: 143-149).

In this case, my hypotheses lead me to expect that the UK’s economic and military strength would have made it extremely valuable to the United States, thus allowing it to extract considerable support. However, because it was insulated from conventional attack owing to its distance and water buffer, and because Britain was of great strategic value due to its network of overseas bases, Britain’s need for reassurances against conventional attack should have been fairly low, thus leading it to prefer other forms of support – including nuclear assistance and consultation. Additionally, its secure position should have insulated it from U.S. burden-sharing pressure. Ultimately, Britain’s economic decline over the course of the 1960s and into the 1970s should have reduced both its level of burden-sharing effort and its strategic value to the United States, thus diminishing the need for a “special relationship” and making the United States more likely to apply significant burden-sharing pressure.

6.2 1961-1967: British Decline and the United States’ Search for Leverage

The United Kingdom’s primary leverage came in the threat to “go it alone” – both in its nuclear weapons program, and in its conventional military posture. Because it was so much more removed from the threat of attack than most U.S. allies, Britain did not need as much reassurance against
the threat of Soviet invasion. However, because of its size, Britain was able to obtain a number of concessions from the United States, most notably nuclear assistance and consultation as well as financial bailout packages, by leveraging its value and threatening to reduce its foreign presence and leave the defense of Asia (and West Germany) to the United States.

First, much to the chagrin of other NATO allies such as France, Italy, and West Germany, Britain was able to obtain preferential nuclear cooperation with the United States. The U.S. representative to NATO pointed out that Britain’s position as “one of our most important allies” was the primary motivation behind the “UK having been given preferred position with regard to receiving information and equipment from US in atomic and missiles field.” As Britain’s relative power declined, however, U.S. enthusiasm for nuclear collaboration diminished.

When John F. Kennedy assumed the presidency in 1961, however, the United States began to turn strongly against allied possession of independent nuclear arsenals. As a result his administration was ambivalent about nuclear assistance to the United Kingdom – a concern exacerbated by France’s resentment of the Anglo-American nuclear partnership. The administration canceled further sales of the AGM-48 Skybolt ballistic missile to Britain, largely due to the missile’s technical problems but also partly out of ambivalence regarding Britain’s independent possession of nuclear weapons. This led to a crisis in U.S.-UK relations that culminated in the Nassau Conference in December 1962 (Clark, 1994: 297-301, 305, 362-363).

When the British stood firm and asserted that their nuclear program would continue with or without U.S. assistance, Kennedy relented and as a compromise committed to providing Polaris nuclear submarines, calculating that it was better that Britain remain at least somewhat dependent

---


on U.S. assistance and that Britain would ultimately acquiesce to making its nuclear arsenal a part of the proposed Multilateral Force (MLF) for NATO.6 While the United Kingdom did heavily rely on the United States for its ballistic missiles and, subsequently, its nuclear submarines, it nevertheless had its own bomber force and was willing to push forward alone – with French assistance, if possible (Neustadt, 1999: 71-73, 85-87, 110; Dumbrell, 2006: 174; Gill, 2014: 48).7

Kennedy sought to avoid a major rupture in U.S.-UK relations which might undermine Prime Minister Harold Macmillan’s government and strengthen “neutralist” voices – particularly those in the Labour Party. As a pre-Nassau report put it, if the Conservative government fell, its successor might indulge “in dangerous illusions regarding East-West relations, would wish to spend more on social welfare and less on defense” and even “drift toward the Scandinavian position of part-participant, part-spectator with regard to the Atlantic community” (Clark, 1994: 409-410, quotes at p. 410). Moreover, as a State Department memo cautioned prior to the Nassau Conference, “we still rely heavily on British real estate all over the world, from Christmas Island to Holy Loch; we should carefully consider the possible consequences of an estrangement of this relationship.”8 The American position was thus explicitly influenced by Britain’s threat of exit, which was rendered particularly salient because of its strategic value – its capabilities, its global presence, and the territory it provided for U.S. military bases.

Although the Americans tried to force Britain into committing its nuclear arsenal to the MLF at Nassau, British policymakers used the threat of “reassessing their global defense posture” if they were not allowed to keep an independent arsenal. While the Nassau Agreement did officially assign Britain’s Polaris submarines to a “multilateral force,” in practice the British resisted giving up control in subsequent years (Neustadt, 1999: 91-92, 94, 99). They thus avoided having their

---


7Indeed, in the early 1960s, Britain revised its nuclear targeting to destroy only ten Soviet cities rather than the original forty, thus reducing its independent deterrent needs (Clark, 1994: 382-394).

deterrent subsumed under the MLF (Priest, 2006: 31, 34-35, 40, 42, 47-48, 52). This pattern persisted into the Johnson Administration as well, with preferential nuclear cooperation being maintained in order to avoid a major break between the two allies that would only lead Britain to continue its nuclear weapons program on its own. Under Prime Minister Harold Wilson, who came to power in October 1964, Britain also exploited Johnson’s fear of British retrenchment east of Suez, which had become especially undesirable as a result of U.S. preoccupation with the Vietnam War (Middeke, 2001: 152), to keep U.S. pressure for British integration into the MLF at bay (Kelleher, 1975: 145, 253-254; Schwartz, 2003: 62-63; Priest, 2006: 77, 87-88, 93-94; Gill, 2014: 100-101, 123-124, 134). Additionally, Johnson formally reassured Britain that it would be consulted before a use of nuclear weapons by the United States, a promise which was later reaffirmed by the Nixon Administration.

British opposition was a major contributing factor to the end of the MLF concept. Bundy pointed to seven reasons why the MLF should be left for dead, the first being “a deeply reluctant and essentially unpersuaded Great Britain” (Priest, 2006: 106). Johnson was unwilling “to kick mother England out the door into the cold while I bring the Kaiser into the sitting room” (ibid., p. 108). In place of the MLF, Wilson counter-proposed the creation of an Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF), in which Britain would have a veto over the use of the multilateral arsenal and in which West Germany would not have access to nuclear weapons. While the ANF never came into being – and, indeed, may have been designed just as much to kill the MLF as it was a serious proposal in its own right – neither did the MLF (Haftendorn, 1996: esp. 121-122, 137-139). Thus British

---


policymakers got their wish: continued preferential nuclear cooperation with the United States, and no German control of nuclear weapons (Priest, 2006: 93-94, 101-103, 106-112; Dumbrell, 2006: 176-177). In place of the MLF, the United States created the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), which would create a regular forum for consultation over nuclear weapons use and targeting (Priest, 2006: 116-117, 120-121; Gill, 2014: 100-101).\(^\text{11}\)

Second, Britain’s position as the only U.S. ally with global military reach gave it enormous leeway in making demands for economic assistance. Most notably, these included American efforts to support the British pound such as direct bailout packages and efforts through international institutions such as the IMF. U.S. policymakers feared that if Britain was not bailed out, there was little stopping it from devaluing the pound and withdrawing from Asia; Undersecretary of State George Ball, for one, emphasized that Britain’s threat of retrenchment militated against trying to drive a hard deal with it (Dumbrell, 1996: 223; Gill, 2014: 84, 123-124). Johnson Administration officials explicitly tied their concessions to Britain – including nuclear cooperation and financial support – to its “importance,” but noted that this importance might not continue beyond “the short-term” as British decline continued (Dumbrell, 1996: 217-218).

The United Kingdom’s defense budget dropped precipitously in the 1960s, and it retrenched from its deployments “east of Suez” much faster than the United States wished, accelerating from a mid-1970s timetable to 1971. Indeed, during the early 1960s Britain proved resistant to a conventional build-up, despite the insistence of the Kennedy Administration.\(^\text{12}\) As Britain prepared its Defence Review under the new Labour government led by Wilson in 1965-66, it was in the midst of a prolonged economic crisis revolving around its balance of payments deficit.\(^\text{13}\) As such, fiscal

---


\(^{13}\) A comprehensive account of the crises surrounding the balance of payments and price of sterling can be found in O’Hara (2003).
realities soon produced deep defense cuts and considerable debate within the United Kingdom over the merits of the east of Suez commitments (Priest, 2006: 123-126).14

U.S. pressure under Johnson was strikingly light. The American response was not to threaten abandonment, but rather to bail Britain out, and U.S. officials refrained from making American support conditional upon the British presence in Asia or on British assistance in the Vietnam War (Dumbrell, 1996: 219-220, 222; Schwartz, 2003: 62-63, 82; Priest, 2006: 123-124; Hughes and Robb, 2013: 871).15 In spite of pressure from some officials – including Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy – Johnson hesitated to explicitly make the massive multilateral bailout package Britain received a *quid pro quo* for Britain’s continued presence east of Suez (Gill, 2014: 123-124, 134-136, 156, 158). Again during 1967, as the British were leaning toward planning withdrawal from east of Suez by the mid-1970s, the Americans only asked Britain to “avoid taking, or in any event making public in any way, basic decisions at this point on withdrawal by the mid-1970’s,” without bringing any hard pressure to bear.16 Even when Britain announced its devaluation of the pound in late 1967, followed by the January 1968 announcement that its retrenchment east of Suez would be accelerated from 1975 to 1971, American expressed only expressed disappointment with the British decision (Dumbrell, 1996: 222-223, 227-230).17 A letter from Johnson to Wilson is worth quoting at length:


Although the decision must, of course, be your own, I can only wonder if you and all of your associates have taken fully into account the direct and indirect consequences. While the hour is late, I urge you and your colleagues once more to review the alternatives before you take these irrevocable steps. Even a prolongation of your presence in the Far East and the Persian Gulf until other stable arrangements can be put in place would be of help at this very difficult time for all of us.\(^\text{18}\)

U.S. policymakers recognized that there was little the United States could do, aside from further bailouts, to keep Britain from cutting spending and withdrawing from east of Suez. State Department officials acknowledged in 1967 that the British “will do what they will do” and that there was “no real prospect that the process [of retrenchment] can or will be halted” (O’Hara, 2003: 275). Treasury Secretary Henry Fowler came to a similar conclusion in June 1966, pointing out that the United States essentially faced the choice of leaving Britain to its own devices – which would almost certainly mean a devaluation of the pound and further cuts – and additional “bail money.”\(^\text{19}\)

### 6.3 1967-1970: Diminished British Stature, Diminished British Leverage

While Britain was insulated from U.S. pressure by geography, its economic and military decline did ultimately reduce its bargaining leverage. By retrenching from east of Suez, it effectively played its hand, and was increasingly coming to be seen by American officials more as one ally among many rather than having a “special” place in U.S. foreign policy (Hynes, 2009: 11-12). After Britain’s decision to accelerate its east of Suez withdrawal, decision-makers in the Johnson and Nixon administrations no longer felt compelled to provide as many favors and were less reluctant to apply significant pressure on the United Kingdom. A Central Intelligence Agency report noted

---


in early 1969 that Britain’s defense cuts had reduced “Britain’s credit as an ally,” while a 1969 National Intelligence Estimate similarly claimed that “The ‘special relationship’ with the US has lost much of its psychological hold,” in Britain, adding that it “in any case no longer confers upon the UK any indispensable benefits.”

Indeed, even by late 1967, it was apparent that British retrenchment was inevitable, and as a result U.S. policymakers’ willingness to give Britain what it wanted diminished considerably (Dumbrell, 1996: 227-230). U.S. policymakers had realized earlier that Britain was on the decline; Johnson had said in December 1964 that “Britain is not that important anymore” (Schwartz, 2003: 49), and Britain’s recurring currency crises, defense cuts, and ultimately its announcement it would be withdrawing from east of Suez solidified this perception (Schwartz, 2003: 67, 71). As a result, policymakers increasingly questioned the value of the special relationship; by 1967, U.S. Ambassador David Bruce argued that “the so-called Anglo-American special relationship” was “little more than sentimental terminology,” while Rusk and Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford agreed in 1968 that Britain’s retrenchment represented a turning point in the relationship (Dumbrell, 1996: 219). When the Tories came to power, Prime Minister Edward Heath promised to keep some forces east of Suez; however, he reneged on this pledge the following year.

Developments on the U.S. side also put strain on the relationship. The costs of fighting the war in Vietnam led many in the U.S. Congress and public to increasingly favor a reduced U.S.

---


overseas presence – both in Europe and in Asia. Regarding Europe, this most notably took the form of a series of resolutions and amendments during the years 1966-74 sponsored by Senator Mike Mansfield, proposing massive reductions in U.S. troops stationed in Europe (Williams, 1985: 142, 162, 170; Kaplan, 1999: 138; Zimmermann, 2009: 16). In a May 1970 memo to Kissinger, senior NSC staffer Helmut Sonnenfeldt pointed to British concerns about Vietnam, writing that Defence Minister Denis Healey “is deeply disturbed by what he feels has happened to our elan; he is quite persuaded...that we will be unable if not unwilling to maintain our force levels in Europe and he sees our commitments as eroding.” Sonnenfeldt added that Healey believed “the longer we stay and the more we bleed [in Vietnam] the stronger the impulse toward isolationism and the danger of domestic upheaval.”

But domestic actors within the United States provided policymakers with a way of putting effective burden-sharing pressure on its allies – including Britain. Policymakers carefully leveraged the possibility of withdrawal in order to encourage increased defense effort by Britain (and NATO more generally). During a North Atlantic Council meeting in November 1968, Rusk used the threat of domestic “isolationism” as a means of pressuring allies to increase their efforts, while Kissinger similarly argued in a meeting of the Defense Program Review Committee Meeting in August 1971 that the Europeans needed “to believe that the situation is serious,” adding that “A Mansfield resolution will surely pass if they don’t make a bigger effort.” In his February 1970 Foreign Policy Report to Congress, Nixon argued that Europe needed to make more of an effort for its own defense. Indeed, in June 1970 Britain’s Under-Secretary at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office argued in favor of increasing European defense efforts in order to “reduce[e] US domestic pressure for withdrawals” and “mitigate[e] the impact of such withdrawals as occur” (Hynes, 2009:

14-15). Secretary of State Rogers told British Foreign Minister Alec Douglas-Home that because of Congress, “we have a serious problem and we can use all the help we can get in solving it.”

As a result, the downward trend in British defense spending during the late 1960s reversed in 1970-72. Nevertheless, they focused their efforts on improving their own forces rather than making contributions to NATO infrastructure, much to the chagrin of the other NATO members (including the FRG) that sought to pool their resources. More generally, European defense budgets increased during the early 1970s.

The Soviet Union’s invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 undercut these efforts, however. U.S. officials were now in agreement on the need for a show of strength to deter further Soviet aggression (Priest, 2006: 150-152). As President Lyndon Johnson put it: “Czechoslovakia provided some time” during which domestic pressure would be muted. Yet this also limited the incentives of allies – including the United Kingdom – to do more themselves. While the NATO allies supported the United States’ push for allied unity after the invasion, their actual military re-


30 State Department Briefing Paper, “President Nixon’s Visit to Brussels,” June 1974, Folder “NAC Summit - Brussels The President,” NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Country Files, Box 54, RMNL.


32 Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Johnson, March 22, 1968, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 12, p. 629.
responses were largely symbolic.\textsuperscript{33} A Central Intelligence Agency memorandum noted in November that “the European allies have responded to the events in Czechoslovakia with far more promise than performance....Britain has pledged further commitments which represent almost nothing new for the common defense.”\textsuperscript{34} New British contributions were regarded as “bottom of the barrel,” while the United Kingdom refused such U.S. requests as permanent commitment of the aircraft carrier \textit{HMS Ark Royal} to NATO (Priest, 2006: 151-152; quote at p. 151). Another report in early 1969 came to a similar conclusion:

As for Britain, the pullback from east of Suez does not necessarily have as a corollary an expanded military input into the alliance. Despite an expected realignment of forces in the Mediterranean, the army’s strength in Europe will not increase, and the Royal Air Force of the 1970s will be hard-pressed to assume a much larger role than at present. By 1970, when London intends to have demobilized more than 75,000 men, its armed forces will quite possibly rank fifth in size in Western Europe.\textsuperscript{35}

\section*{6.4 1969-1976: Strains on the Special Relationship}

Domestic pressure produced significant concern among Europeans about the credibility of the U.S. commitment in the early 1970s. The United Kingdom’s increased interest in the European Economic Community (EC) stemmed in no small part from concerns about the U.S. commitment to NATO (Hynes, 2009: 139-140).\textsuperscript{36} British policymakers saw joining the EC as a way to bargain

\begin{footnotesize}


\end{footnotesize}
with the United States “from a single position, and as far as possible with a single voice” (Hynes, 2009: 79-80; quote at p. 79). Despite initially favoring British membership in the EC, the Nixon Administration became concerned that both the EC and Britain were becoming increasingly willing to not only challenge U.S. economic interests but also to undermine the United States’ position in Europe. Britain increasingly put less value on the special relationship, and doubted the United States’ “long term staying power” (Hynes, 2009: 59-60, 75, 78; quote at p. 60).

In February 1971, Nixon expressed reservations about EC trade policies in his Foreign Policy Report to Congress, arguing that the Community needed to consider the United States’ “legitimate economic interests” (Hynes, 2009: 27). Of particular concern was the EC’s unified tariff on imported goods, as well as its preferential trade agreements with non-EC members such as Spain and Israel (Kissinger, 1982: 135). Treasury Secretary John Connally similarly declared in May that EC protectionism, defense free-riding, and foreign exchange restrictions were unsustainable in an era of shrinking U.S. resources (Hynes, 2009: 29). In an effort to cope with U.S. economic conditions, Nixon announced in August that the dollar would be taken off the gold standard, causing great consternation among U.S. partners.

Additionally, the Nixon administration feared that the NATO allies might drift from the United States and go their own way, becoming more willing to seek separate, “bilateral” rapprochement with the Communist bloc or pursue nuclear weapons (Robb, 2014: 49). Commenting on the Mansfield proposals, Kissinger argued that “our withdrawal will mean that Europe will seek nuclear autonomy or will move in the direction of Finland or possibly do both things simultaneously.” Assistant Secretary of State Martin Hillenbrand similarly reported that “Many Europeans


believe that the failure of the United States to achieve victory in Vietnam has caused American disenchantment with foreigners and less willingness to meet Alliance responsibilities,” and arguing that in the absence of reassurance, “we can expect from them [Europe]...increasing accommodation to the Russians on political and economic issues.”

The fear that allies might seek to independently strike deals with the Soviet Union extended to Britain as well. In the aftermath of a NATO Ministers meeting in May 1970, Kissinger wrote to Nixon that “several of the Allies, led by the British, want to come out...with a very forward looking approach to the Soviets on a European Conference and on balanced force reduction proposals. We have tried to combat this drift.”

In addition to unilateral U.S. troop withdrawals, what concerned the European allies was the United States’ efforts at detente with the Communist bloc, about which they felt inadequately consulted and informed. In particular, the British resented being left out as the United States pursued the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the Soviets and the opening to China (Hynes, 2009: 37, 51, 60-61, 63-64). They feared these efforts could be precursors to further deals that sold out the interests of U.S. allies in favor of reducing the risk of war for the United States (Kissinger, 1982: 147-148).

As a result, U.S. policymakers went to great lengths to reassure not only Britain but all the NATO allies. This first of all took the form of vigorous opposition to Congressional pressure for troop withdrawals, combined with assurances to Europe that such withdrawals would not occur. Later that year, Nixon made the decision to maintain U.S. troop levels despite Congressional pressure for withdrawal.

---


41 Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, “Secretary Rogers’ Plans for the NATO Meeting,” May 26, 1970, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 41, p. 156.


43 National Security Decision Memorandum 95, “U.S. Strategy and Forces for NATO,” November 25, 1970, FRUS,
– that is, no withdrawal of U.S. forces that was not also accompanied by a withdrawal of Soviet forces – and that decisions on mutual force reductions with the Soviet Union (Mutual Balanced Force Reductions, or MBFR) would not be made without allied consultation (see, e.g., FRUS Nixonv43, Docs 48, 74, 85). In a visit to the UK in fall 1970, Nixon reassured the new British Prime Minister Heath of the U.S. commitment, and then during a visit by Heath in February 1973, Nixon again promised that “You can be sure...that we will stay in Europe as long as I am here” (Hynes, 2009: 79, 93; quote at p. 93). Nixon’s successor Gerald Ford similarly promised that “the United States remains committed to playing a responsible role of leadership in the world,” and that he would “not permit the Congress or any other entity to tie our hands.” In a memo to Ford in May 1975, Kissinger wrote that “your reassurances of U.S. fidelity to its NATO commitments will be taken as meaning that the U.S. has no intention of unilaterally drawing down its military strength in Europe.”

Additionally, U.S. policymakers attempted to reassure the UK that detente would not sacrifice

161
the interests of U.S. allies.\footnote{Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, “Your Breakfast with Denis Healey, November 13, 1969,” November 10, 1969, Folder “United Kingdom, Vol. II [1 of 4],” NSC Files, Country Files, Box 726, RMNL; Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, “Wilson’s Brief on SALT,” January 26, 1970, Folder “United Kingdom, Vol. I [3 of 3],” NSC Files, Country Files, Box 726, RMNL; Telegram from U.S. embassy (London) to Secretary Rogers, “Wilson Visit - SALT,” January 1970, Folder “United Kingdom, Vol. II [1 of 4],” NSC Files, Country Files, Box 726, RMNL.} Upon announcing an upcoming Moscow summit for SALT, Nixon argued in October 1971 that it would not come “at the expense of any other nation,” and promised “extensive consultation” (Hynes, 2009: 37). Reiterating this promise the following month, Nixon stressed that the United States would not “abandon or put aside any existing relationships” in the name of “a relaxation of tensions” (Hynes, 2009: 51). Nixon and Heath similarly held a summit in Bermuda in December, during which Nixon sought to assuage British concerns about U.S. reliability and a lack of consultation, while Kissinger promised to consult the British on negotiations for the U.S.-Soviet Agreement for the Prevention of Nuclear War.\footnote{Memorandum of Conversation, “Nuclear Understanding; UK Deterrent, Modernization,” August 10, 1972, Folder “UK Memcons (Originals) [1 of 2],” NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Country Files, Box 62, RMNL.} However, despite numerous assurances, the British continued to have suspicions about the secrecy with which the United States pursued its bilateral détente with the Soviets, as well as about the U.S. commitment in the face of rising domestic isolationism (Hynes, 2009: 53-57, 65-68, 115-116).

Aside from trade and relations with the Soviet Union, the other major point of contention was burden-sharing. In light of the strains on U.S. resources, as well as pressure from Congress, increased efforts by the Europeans was seen as a crucial way to not only defuse domestic isolationism within the United States, but also to maintain NATO’s ability to defend against Soviet conventional attack. Nixon explicitly attempted to link the staying power of the U.S. commitment to allied burden-sharing efforts (Nichter, 2015: 11-12, 112-113, 138). Laird, who despite initial opposition to troop reductions later favored threatening withdrawal as a means of burden-sharing pressure, asserted that while “reassurances” were “clearly in order,” the United States should not “freeze” U.S. force levels, as this “might pose serious Congressional and policy problems for us” (Hughes and Robb, 2013: 876; Robb, 2014: 53).\footnote{Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon, “NATO Defense Issues,” February 20, 1969, Box 726, RMNL.} Indeed, limited reductions from Europe were


In an attempt to deal with all of these matters simultaneously, the Nixon Administration launched its “Year of Europe” initiative in 1973. The Americans hoped to link all of these issues into “one ball of wax,” as Nixon put it, and create a new Atlantic Charter (Hynes, 2009: 89). In April 1973, Kissinger delivered a speech hailing in the Year of Europe, in which he reassured the Europeans of the U.S. commitment but stressed the need for burden-sharing and the avoidance of preferential EC trade policies. The speech was not well-received, however, as the Europeans saw it as pedantic.
and (largely correctly) as a veiled attempt at using U.S. security leverage for economic coercion (Hynes, 2009: 79-81, 86, 97, 100-102, 169).

Nixon and Kissinger repeatedly pushed for increased European defense efforts – both to improve their own forces and to offset U.S. costs for stationing troops – with Nixon claiming in a May 1973 speech to Congress that the Europeans need “to provide for their own defenses” (Hynes, 2009: 115). This pressure largely took the form of a “good cop-bad cop routine,” in which American officials used the retrenchment pressure they faced from domestic audiences as leverage while simultaneously reassuring the UK of the United States’ long-term commitment. U.S. officials warned of a tide of “neo-isolationism” if the Europeans did not increase their efforts (Hynes, 2009: 132-133, 140, 163). Kissinger argued that “regional egoism” in economics could not continue to coexist along “integrated defense” in security (Hynes, 2009: 127), with Sonnenfeldt recommending that Kissinger warn the British that “if NATO cannot come together” on burden-sharing, “then the chances of unilateral [American reductions] will rise.”

As it had recently joined the EC, Nixon and Kissinger hoped Britain would act as an advocate for the American position among the other Community members. However, the British were skeptical, fearing not only U.S. security linkage but also an attempt to weaken EC unity. Heath was far more committed to Britain’s role in Europe, and less so to its role as a close partner to the United States, than his predecessors, and was unwilling to jeopardize EC unity for the sake of loyalty to the Americans. As such, on July 23, 1973, the UK and other EC foreign ministers agreed to exchange with each other any information they received from the United States bilaterally, thus presenting the United States with a united front (Scott, 2011: 156-157).

Shortly thereafter in August 1973, Kissinger ordered a cessation to U.S.-UK intelligence cooperation in order to coerce Prime Minister Edward Heath into backing the United States’ positions in the EC regarding trade disputes and burden-sharing, with Nixon arguing that there would be “no

53 Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, “Your Meeting with Sir Alec Douglas Home,” September 20, 1973, Folder “United Kingdom, Oct. 72-Sep. 73,” NSC Files, Country Files, Box 730, RMNL.
more special relations.” American officials also sent ambiguous signals about continued support for Britain’s Polaris nuclear submarine (Hughes and Robb, 2013: 881-883, quote at p. 881). Pressure in this case was successful, with Britain reversing course and taking the lead in lobbying on the United States’ behalf and not only dealing with the United States bilaterally, but also providing the United States with information about its own multilateral dealings with the EC (Robb, 2014: 89-90). The threat to cut off cooperation was used again later in 1973 in order to bring Britain into line on the U.S. position in the Yom Kippur War. Kissinger referred to these measures as “punishment” that would teach British policymakers a “lesson” not to oppose the United States (Hughes and Robb, 2013: 885).

Because Britain was no longer as valuable, Nixon and Kissinger felt little hesitation in using threats to apply pressure on it. Nevertheless, the Year of Europe initiative came to little, and the following year Britain again proved willing to cut its defense efforts. Due in part to the domestic retrenchment pressure it faced, the United States had been more effective in deterring further reductions in British effort during the Nixon Administration. But upon Wilson’s return to office amid economic hardship in 1974-76, Britain again weighted defense cuts. The Ford Administration found itself without an effective means of coercion, as Congressional pressure declined after 1973 (Williams, 1985: ch. 8). The proposed cuts amounted to around 1.5% of GDP, with a forty thousand reduction in manpower. While policymakers weighed their options – including threats by Kissinger and Defense Secretary James Schlesinger to cut off nuclear and intelligence cooperation – ultimately the United States could again do little to compel the British aside from pleas and verbal and written reprimands. As a result, Britain proceeded with several rounds of defense

---

54 As a 1976 State Department memo put it: “It would be possible to picture a UK so pressed economically as to be ineffective in many of the areas, military, economic and diplomatic, where we have cooperated in the past.” See Memo from John J. Crowley, Jr. to various recipients, “Policy Objectives Toward the UK,” May 24, 1976, Folder “United Kingdom, 1976 (5) WH,” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs Staff Files, Box 40, GRFL.

55 Kissinger to Nixon, “Your Meeting with British Prime Minister Harold Wilson,” June 26, 1974, Folder “Meeting with NATO Heads of Government Briefing Papers,” NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Country Files, Box 54, RMNL.

cuts (Hughes and Robb, 2013: 893-900). However, U.S. officials did attempt to use the specter of Congressional reaction as a means of encouraging UK defense spending, and British cuts were largely directed at non-NATO British comments (i.e., those in Asia), which were considered lower priority.

Nevertheless, the Ford Administration declined to provide any kind of assistance, and in 1976 also refused to use its influence in the IMF to let the United Kingdom off the hook in cutting public spending in exchange for a loan (Hughes and Robb, 2013: 887-888, 893-900). Ford declined to help Britain on the grounds that it was no longer important enough to justify bailing it out (Robb, 2014: ch. 5). But threats were also unsuccessful in this case, as Britain made steep defense cuts and Ford had little choice but to accept them.

1974, Folder “United Kingdom - State Department Telegrams from SECSTATE - NODIS (1),” National Security Adviser’s Files, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 15, GRFL.


60 Memorandum of Conversation, “Middle East; Concorde; Law of the Sea; UK Defense Review; Mildenhall Agreement; Nuclear Materials,” January 31, 1975, Box 9, National Security Adviser Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977, GRFL.
6.5 Alternative Explanations

6.5.1 British Domestic Politics

In terms of alternative explanations, there is some evidence that U.S. officials perceived left-wing parties in Britain as more likely to seek outside options. U.S. officials were somewhat suspicious of the left-wing Labour Party in Britain, seeing it as being more prone to seek accommodation and take a softer line with the Soviet Union. Part of the Kennedy Administration’s hesitation in cutting off preferential nuclear cooperation with Britain was the fear that the pro-U.S. Tories might lose power. Indeed, some within the Central Intelligence Agency even considered Labour PM Harold Wilson a “Soviet Asset” (Kissinger, 1979: 91; Dumbrell, 1996: 213-215, 216; quote at p. 213; Priest, 2006: 80). The U.S. ambassador to Britain wrote in October 1964 that “The greatest single danger, provided he is satisfied otherwise, to an agreement with Mr. Wilson on the principle of British adhesion to the MLF...will, in my estimation, spring from his over sanguine views of what concessions might be obtained from the Soviet Govt in the security field.”

When Edward Heath and the conservative Tories came to power in 1970, Nixon and Kissinger expected this to herald in an era of closer U.S.-UK ties and more reluctance on the part of the British to pursue accommodation with the Soviets (Hynes, 2009: 11). Kissinger wrote to Nixon, saying that “the Tories will be more skeptical than Labor of the possibilities for fruitful negotiations with the Soviets,” adding that “the Conservatives...may be less timid in pressing the Soviet Union.” Nixon and Kissinger also expected the Tories to be more accommodating on Vietnam and Britain’s east of Suez retrenchment.

Nevertheless, even though Johnson and Nixon expected Labour to be a less reliable ally than the Tories, Heath ultimately proved more frustrating than Wilson (Kissinger, 1999: 606-607). Heath preferred to cultivate closer ties with the EC over the United States, and before the United States applied considerable pressure, Heath actively opposed U.S. efforts during the Year of Europe to use U.S. protection as a bargaining chip. Thus, while Wilson and the Labour Party were more enthusiastic for defense cuts, it was under Heath and the Tories that Anglo-American relations reached their low-point.

6.6 Conclusion

In summary, the case of U.S.-UK bargaining over reassurance and burden-sharing supports the predictions of the theory. Due to the margin of security afforded to it by geography and by its strategic value, Britain was able to resist U.S. burden-sharing pressure during much of the 1960s under Johnson and then again during the Ford Administration. Moreover, as the U.S. ally with the greatest capacity for power projection, the United Kingdom was able to exert considerable sway in extracting not only U.S. assurances on consultation over the use of nuclear weapons, but also U.S. nuclear cooperation and financial assistance. While the Nixon Administration found greater success in burden-sharing pressure and was less willing to refrain from explicit coercion, even during the height of Congressional retrenchment pressure Britain only held the line against further defense cuts.

Thus, the United States’ use of reassurance and other forms of compensation were very much driven by the United Kingdom’s threat of exit, while British obstinacy was a function of the margin of security it enjoyed – a position only somewhat tempered by increased probability of U.S. abandonment in the wake of Vietnam.
“They Live at Our Sufferance”: The U.S.-ROK Alliance, 1965-1976

7.1 Case Overview

The U.S. alliance with the Republic of Korea (ROK) dated to 1953, when the two countries signed a Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT). Due to its land border with North Korea and its proximity both to China and to the Soviet Far East, South Korea was highly vulnerable to U.S. threats of abandonment. This rendered it susceptible to U.S. burden-sharing pressure, but also allowed it to enjoy considerable U.S. reassurance, including the deployment of about sixty thousand American troops after the end of the Korean War. Moreover, South Korea’s isolation and small size relative to its neighbors made it highly dependent on U.S. support, as it had no realistic potential for exiting the alliance. Although it attempted to pursue nuclear weapons in the 1970s, its attempt demonstrated just how much leverage the United States had, as the ROK’s dependence made U.S. pressure highly effective.

As a result of its dependence, South Korean burden-sharing was very high during the 1960s and 1970s (McLaurin, 1988: 179). During the Vietnam War, South Korea was the second largest contributor of foreign forces fighting on behalf of South Vietnam after the United States. Its motivation for participating was in large part to remain in the good graces of the United States and gain
a bargaining chip with which it could extract U.S. concessions such as military and economic aid – though it was unable to force the United States to revise the MDT to stipulate that “an attack on Korea would be regarded as an attack on the United States.”

In the late 1960s, South Korean fears of U.S. abandonment intensified. Owing to the costs of Vietnam, U.S. policymakers in the Johnson and then Nixon administrations faced pressure to retrench and reduce U.S. foreign commitments. Two North Korean provocations in early 1968 – an assassination attempt on ROK President Park Chung-Hee and the seizure of the USS Pueblo – met with (from the ROK’s perspective) little U.S. response, with the United States launching bilateral talks with North Korea for the return of the Pueblo’s crew and pressuring ROK officials not to retaliate for the assassination attempt. In 1969, Richard Nixon began withdrawing U.S. forces from South Vietnam, and proclaimed the “Guam Doctrine” in July 1969, which held that allies would be expected to do more for their own defense. In turn, Nixon in 1970 announced the withdrawal of one of the U.S. divisions in South Korea, and then the following year revealed that he would be traveling to China in 1972, much to the shock of U.S. allies in East Asia. These developments further served to heighten feelings of unease among the South Koreans, owing not only to the reduction of U.S. commitment they implied, but also to the unilateral, non-consultative way in which the events unfolded.

South Korea did receive assurances of U.S. support, but also faced considerable threats of abandonment for the purposes of burden-sharing pressure. U.S. officials repeatedly affirmed the American commitment to South Korea’s security even as they made partial troop withdrawals. Moreover, the United States contributed $1.5 billion in military assistance to ROK military modernization over 1971-1977. In 1975, President Gerald Ford proclaimed a “Pacific Doctrine” which promised allies that the U.S. would remain engaged in Asia despite withdrawal from Vietnam, and launched what became the annual Team Spirit military exercises in 1976. Defense Secretary James

---

Schlesinger publicly claimed in 1975 that U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea could be used to defend the ROK.

In contrast to Europe, however, the United States never promised that its withdrawals would cease; U.S. officials would only claim that there were no current plans for further withdrawals. Similar to Europe, though, policymakers used the domestic pressure they faced from the public and Congress in order to put pressure on the ROK, indicating that U.S. withdrawal and South Korean burden-sharing were essential, lest Congress force even deeper withdrawals or cuts to U.S. material assistance. Indeed, even after South Korea was suspected of having a nuclear weapons program, U.S. officials continued to put significant burden-sharing pressure on South Korea to great success, and Ford’s successor Jimmy Carter even announced a plan to withdraw all U.S. troops from Korea – though these plans were later scuttled due to revised estimates of the threat posed by North Korea.

In this case, my theory would lead me to expect that South Korea’s relatively small size would inhibit its capacity for exiting its alliance with the United States. As a result, U.S. assurances should be more equivocal and less frequent, and its willingness to withdraw troops should be fairly high in the absence of a clear and compelling threat of invasion of the ROK. Similarly, South Korea’s geographic vulnerability to attack should have facilitated U.S. efforts to extract burden-sharing by threatening abandonment. Finally, the costs of the Vietnam War should have put pressure on the United States to place more of the defense burden on South Korea and do less itself, while also pursuing rapprochement with its regional adversaries. However, because these factors bring U.S. reliability into question, U.S. policymakers should have used reassurance to offset ROK perceptions that the U.S. commitment was inherently not credible.

7.2  Reassurance and ROK Participation in Vietnam, 1964-1967

The first U.S. requests for South Korean participation in the Vietnam War came in May and December 1964, upon which South Korea sent just over two thousand noncombat troops. Then in
early 1965, South Korea agreed to send one combat division. Park saw involvement in Vietnam as a way of ingratiating SK with the United States, and indeed he gained a number of concessions. The United States defrayed the costs of stationing the South Korean forces in Vietnam and transporting them there, increased its military aid to South Korea, and promised not to withdraw troops from South Korea without prior consultation (Yong Lee, 2011: 409-413). However, American officials refused to entertain revising the Mutual Defense Treaty to guarantee that U.S. assistance would be automatically forthcoming in the event of an attack on South Korea, arguing that “it was not possible under our constitutional system for the President to change the treaty commitment which we had with Korea, even if he wished to do so.” As the situation in Vietnam deteriorated in 1966, the United States requested and secured an additional division of South Korean forces to Vietnam, in exchange for more economic and military assistance. Park again sought to reopen the issue of revising the MDT, but the United States refused. Instead, the Johnson Administration dispatched Vice President Hubert Humphrey, who privately assured Park that U.S. assistance would be automatic the event of a North Korean attack but declined to revisit the MDT issue (Yong Lee, 2011: 416-419).

This, however, was the limit on South Korea’s bargaining power. Indeed, at the heart of South Korean participation was not the exercise of South Korean influence on U.S. decision-making, but rather the exercise of U.S. influence on ROK decision-making. U.S. policymakers made it very clear that the United States “could not make any commitment to keep any specific number of troops in any specific locality for any specific period of time,” nor “give assurance of the maintenance of any specific level of military assistance.” Rather, they only promised that “our commitment to their defense is absolute under the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty, and that we would certainly consult with them on any changes in force levels which might be dictated by our regional and

---

Moreover, American officials threatened to withdraw U.S. troops from Korea in the absence of ROK participation in South Vietnam (Yong Lee, 2011: 410). In April 1968, for example, Johnson’s Special Assistant Walt Rostow noted in a letter to Johnson that “We have told them many times that we have no plan to reduce the general level of our ground forces [in South Korea]—by implication as long as they have forces in Viet-Nam. Suggest you repeat that we have no plan to reduce our ground forces under present circumstances, but avoid going further than promising full consultation...on any later plan concerning ground forces.”¹⁵ U.S. envoy Cyrus Vance similarly told Park during his early 1968 trip “that were they even to consider removing troops from South Vietnam we would pull ours out of Korea.”¹⁶

### 7.3 American Retrenchment and Détente, 1968-1974

The costs of the Vietnam War, in tandem with the advent of nuclear parity with the Soviet Union and recognition of animosity between the Soviets and the Chinese, contributed to a shift in U.S. foreign policy that dramatically affected South Korea’s calculations of U.S. credibility. This first of all took the form of a reduced U.S. overseas footprint, particularly in Asia. Second, the United States pursued détente with both the Soviet Union and China. In the following section, I discuss these two developments in turn, and then discuss how they influenced the need for U.S. reassurance as well as American leverage for burden-sharing.

---


7.3.1 The Guam Doctrine

In the 1960s, U.S. domestic pressure had been largely a non-factor, with the U.S.-ROK alliance largely flying under the radar of domestic audiences (Lee and Heo, 2002: 82-83). As the costs of Vietnam mounted, however, the Nixon administration faced obstacles to maintaining U.S. commitments, both from the U.S. Congress and public and from a constrained pool of resources and manpower. Public opinion increasingly favored reduced U.S. involvement in international affairs and lower defense spending, while there were a series of Congressional resolutions and amendments during the late 1960s and early 1970s – most notably those of Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield – proposing reductions in the U.S. footprint abroad. The focus of these proposals was on burden-sharing and U.S. troop deployments in Europe, given the larger U.S. peacetime presence there, but they reflected an increasing preoccupation with burden-sharing and the costs of the United States’ foreign commitments more generally. Indeed, many in Congress favored troop withdrawals from Korea.

Moreover, Congress forced the largest defense cuts since the 1950s, and in 1973 passed the War Powers Act that limited the President’s ability to wage war without congressional approval (Lee and Heo, 2002: 87-89, 102-104).

In response, in July 1969 Nixon described what became known as the Guam Doctrine, in which allies would be expected to carry more of the burden for their own defense. The goal of such an approach was two-fold: to rein in the costs of U.S. commitments and to reduce the probability of entanglement in future conflicts (Nam, 1986: 83). The hallmark of the Guam Doctrine was a reduced U.S. footprint. Nixon promised that the United States would assist its allies if they were attacked, but reserved the right to decide how much assistance would be forthcoming, as well as whether that assistance would take the form of direct involvement or simply financial and military assistance. Indeed, Nixon even hinted that reconsidering “some of the relationships and practices that are vestiges of the past” was not out of the question (Nam, 1986: 70-72, 100; quote at p. 72).

---

As part of the Guam Doctrine, Nixon announced in March 1970 that one of the American divisions deployed in South Korea would be withdrawn, without any prior consultation with ROK officials and despite his having told Park in August 1969 that he opposed troop withdrawals. By 1972, the U.S. presence on the peninsula had fallen from around 60,000 personnel to around 40,000. Moreover, U.S. forces by-and-large pulled away from the Demilitarized Zone, thus allowing the United States to avoid immediate engagement if North Korea attacked (Kim, 2001: 55). Administration officials made frequent reference, both internally and to the South Koreans, to the Congressional retrenchment pressure they faced. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird similarly told Congress in 1971 that U.S. ground forces should not fight in another war in Asia, and internally pushed for further withdrawals (Hayes, 1991: 55-56; Cha, 1999: 111). Laird’s successor James Schlesinger similarly pushed to make U.S. forces in South Korea a “mobile reserve” based outside of Korea that could be used elsewhere in the region (Nam, 1986: 83). As compensation for the reduced U.S. presence, the Nixon Administration agreed to give $1.5 billion to assist South Korea’s Five-Year Military Modernization Plan over 1971-1975 (Nam, 1986: 101).

These developments caused enormous consternation within the ROK. Park saw the Guam Doctrine and U.S. withdrawal as a sign of reduced commitment, and was concerned about the reluctance with which Congress disbursed the military aid that had been promised to South Korea. He resented the unilateral, non-consultative way in which the United States proceeded with reducing its footprint in Asia (Cha, 1999: 111-112). More generally, Park saw dwindling U.S. support for South Vietnam – and, after it began rapprochement with China, Taiwan – as potential harbingers for what might be in his country’s own future (McLaurin, 1988: 170-171).

---


10 Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, December 22, 1971, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 19
7.3.2 Unilateral U.S. Détente with the Communist World

Also raising fears of abandonment in South Korea was the United States’ perceived soft line toward North Korea and China – which not coincidentally came at a time in which it was bogged down in Vietnam and facing domestic pressure for retrenchment. Because of the cumulative costs and ongoing strain of the Vietnam War, the United States wanted to avoid responding to regional provocations (North Korean or otherwise) that would increase the risk of yet another war in Asia (Simmons, 1978: 6-13, 25-27; Nam, 1986: 83-85). In January 1968, North Korea took two provocative actions: first, North Korean infiltrators attempted to assassinate Park at the Blue House, and then a few days later abducted the spy ship USS Pueblo. In response, the United States started bilateral negotiations without South Korean representation for the return of the Pueblo, and put serious pressure on the ROK to refrain from any kind of retaliation – much to the chagrin of Park (Nam, 1986: 86; Yong Lee, 2011: 420-421). Then in April 1969, the United States made no retaliation upon North Korea’s shooting down of the U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft (Simmons, 1978: 21-33; Cha, 1999: 63-65).

The United States’ responses to these provocations – restraint coupled with private, bilateral negotiations – unnerved the South Koreans. ROK officials resented what they saw as the United States’ almost exclusive emphasis on the Pueblo at the expense of concern over safeguarding Park from future assassination attempts (Cha, 1999: 65). A letter from Ambassador William Porter in February 1968 reported that “Park doubted both the resolve of the United States and her commitment in Korea, partially because of U.S. involvement in [Southeast Asia] and partially because of alleged delays in providing military equipment to ROK military forces and in modernizing those forces. He objected to the bilateral discussions at Panmunjom between U.S. and North Korean representatives since he considered them demeaning to the U.S. and therefore to the ROKG.”

The U.S. opening to China similarly contributed to ROK feelings insecurity. Reduced Sino-
American tensions fostered a fear of abandonment among American allies, as they diminished the value of U.S. partners by removing the United States’ primary adversary in East Asia (Lee and Heo, 2002: 76-77, 93-94). According to a U.S. Senate fact-finding group, Park saw “the new U.S. policy to China” as a sign “that U.S. interest in Asia...was decreasing” (Cha, 1999: 110). The ROK’s fear was that the United States would be either lured into a false sense of security that would lead it to reduce its military commitment to South Korea, or that it would be tempted to deliberately sell out South Korean interests in broader negotiations with China (Nam, 1986: 126). In particular, ROK officials expected that China might ask the United States to remove its forces from the Korean peninsula (Kim, 2001: 55).

Indeed, Nixon saw détente as a means of reducing the need for a U.S. footprint in Asia and thus bringing the costs of U.S. commitments in line with its resources (Nam, 1986: 68-69, 109-111, 114). As a result of its diminished threat perception in Asia, the United States shifted to a strategy of preparing to fight one major war (in Europe) and one limited war (in Asia), rather than two major wars (one in Europe and one in Asia) and one limited war. In turn, this facilitated the United States’ efforts to withdraw troops from South Korea, as U.S. foreign policy in East Asia no longer centered around “the containment of the Soviet Union and China,” as Nixon put it in a 1972 foreign policy report (Nam, 1986: 75, 78, 81, 126; quote at p. 81).

In December 1971, months after Nixon announced he would be traveling to China and in the wake of the troop withdrawals, Park declared a state of emergency and sought emergency presidential powers. The U.S. ambassador Philip Habib described the situation that month: “Park felt that they could no longer be assured of an American military presence....President Park believed ROK needed to be prepared for any contingency.” He made a similar appraisal in December 1972:

President Park is determined to move toward a policy of greater ”self-reliance,” diplo-


matically, economically and militarily. Concern over the great powers, including the U.S., is a clear theme in Park’s justification for his domestic political actions as well as the South-North dialogue. However, Park’s view of self-reliance, paradoxically, includes a desire and an expressed need for the U.S. presence and assistance to continue—at least in the short run. His concern that we will reduce our aid program, withdraw our troops sooner than he would like, and his doubt over the firmness of our treaty commitment, come to the surface from time to time. Generally speaking, he wishes to hold on to these elements of strength for as long as he can, expecting they will diminish as time goes on.  

7.3.3 U.S. Reassurance

To offset the perception of unreliability created by its troop withdrawals, domestic pressure, and unilateral détente with Communist adversaries, the United States took steps to reassure South Korea of the U.S. commitment—albeit in a highly limited, restrained way. U.S. policymakers repeatedly assured ROK officials both privately and publicly that the United States would not abandon Korea, and that future troop withdrawals would involve prior consultation with South Korean officials (Nam, 1986: 125-126; Cha, 1999: 112). Nixon met with Park in August 1969 in order to reassure him that the United States remained willing and able to protect South Korea despite the beginning of withdrawal from Vietnam. Ambassador Porter told Park that increased U.S.

---


16 Rogers to Nixon, “Your Meeting with President Park Chung Hee of Korea, August 21, 1969, 11:30 a.m.,” Folder “Background Papers Korean Visit, August 19, 1969,” NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Country Files, Box 102, Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California [hereafter RMNL]. Nixon personally wrote to
military assistance was the “result of USG desire to reassure ROKG and people of our continuing concern for their safety, even though we are withdrawing some troops.”

The Commander of U.S. Pacific Command similarly wrote to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in late 1966 that calls in the Senate for troop withdrawals were “taken very seriously by the ROK Govt,” and thus South Korea needed “frequent reassurances of our interest and support.”

Former Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance was sent as a special envoy in the wake of the assassination attempt on Park and the capture of the Pueblo in order to allay South Korean fears that the United States was striking a deal with the North Koreans for the return of U.S. sailors at the exclusion of ROK concerns about North Korean infiltration. Johnson Administration officials saw doing so as necessary in order to help deter Park from undertaking any kind of unilateral retaliation, and these assurances were combined with warnings that the United States would not back South Korea if it went on the offensive. July 1971 saw the first of what would become annual defense minister-level meetings (the Security Consultative Meetings) in order to assuage ROK fears about not being consulted on U.S. policy toward the peninsula (Nam, 1986: 86; Jang, 2016: 512). Moreover, the United States reassured the South Koreans that the opening to China


Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler), October 10, 1966, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 29 (Part 1), p. 197.


Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for
did not mean a reduction in South Korea’s importance, and that it refused to negotiate with China on the U.S.-ROK alliance.  

Similarly, the United States launched two new military exercises with South Korea in 1969 and 1971 to demonstrate the U.S. capability for power projection (Cha, 1999: 67).

Nevertheless, South Korea’s dependence mitigated the extent to which U.S. officials cared to reassure it. There was little concern about South Korean realignment, as it by and large continued to see the Communist countries as highly threatening and détente as dangerous. While a December 1970 National Intelligence Estimate noted that while the ROK was “edging cautiously toward a different relationship with neutralist and even communist states,” in response to perceived U.S. unreliability and to “US efforts to improve relations with the Soviet Union,” the estimate noted that this development was “likely to remain a matter of very small steps, far behind those of most other non-communist states” owing to the high level of threat South Korea still faced. North Korean provocations continued unabated despite a joint communique between the North and South in July 1972 in which both sides pledged to pursue unification peacefully (Cha, 1999: 130-133). One option the South Koreans did seriously pursue was nuclear weapons, as I discuss in the next section, but the United States did not seriously suspect the ROK had a nuclear weapons program until 1974-75.

U.S. officials recognized the extent of South Korean dependence. A paper by the State De-

---


partment’s Policy Planning Staff put the matter quite directly in June 1968: “ROK leaders will be unhappy over the withdrawal of the two US divisions and the prospect that other forces would eventually follow, but in time they would realize that they had no rational alternative but to go along....we can probably continue to rely on ROK dependence on US logistic support to inhibit any rash adventures.”24 Similarly, Nixon remarked in April 1971 that the South Koreans “live at our sufferance.”25 Ambassador Porter made this point when discussing the troop withdrawals with Kissinger in March 1970, arguing that “we could swing the option which we wanted. The ROKs would go into their usual banging tactics, but could be held.”26 Again in December 1971, as Park was seeking emergency powers, the next ambassador Philip Habib argued that Park “is perceptive enough to see that we can accelerate the American disengagement that he fears, and we can play on that fear. He should therefore understand if he uses powers granted to him under other than clearest evidence of serious emergency, no assurance can be given that U.S. people, Congress, and administration will continue to provide him with moral and material support they have given in the past.”27

As a result, reassurance was limited. U.S. policymakers refused to rule out future troop withdrawals (Nam, 1986: 77-79, 97-99) and did not consult the South Koreans before making the decision to withdraw the division in 1970 (Yong Lee, 2011: 423). Internally, the Nixon administration continually weighed the merits of further withdrawals. Indeed, in March 1970, National Security Decision Memorandum 48 proposed that “the feasibility and timing of further reductions in the U.S. military presence in Korea should be thoroughly evaluated.”28 The officials who favored


further withdrawals included Secretary of State William Rogers29 and Defense Secretaries Melvin Laird and James Schlesinger (Hayes, 1991: 55-56; Oberdorfer, 1997: 86). The U.S. embassy team recommended in December 1972 to “frankly point out that our MAP and U.S. force levels are not immutable. They are based on ongoing assessments of the threat and on the ability of ROK to bear the costs of its defense.”30

Nixon sought to maintain flexibility in his decisions on force levels in Korea, making them on an effectively annual basis.31 In December 1969, Nixon asked for “a plan developed now to bring about the ROK take over,” adding that eventually the United States would “provide a trip wire and air and sea support only” (Hunt, 2015: 349). When Park wrote a personal message pleading with Nixon not to sell out South Korea on his trip to China, Nixon failed to respond for several months – even then only reaffirming the U.S. commitment – and refused to hold a summit with Park (Oberdorfer, 1997: 13-14).

To the South Koreans, U.S. officials gave ambiguous assurances on troop levels. Even Kissinger, who internally opposed Laird and Schlesinger’s plans for further withdrawals in the absence of a peace agreement on the Korean peninsula, told the ROK Prime Minister in December 1970 that “in principle he could see the possibility of a Korean withdrawal, for example in the case of a peace settlement.”32 Vice President Spiro Agnew even claimed during a visit in August 1970 that “all U.S. forces were to be withdrawn within 5 years anyway” (Nam, 1986: 78). Schlesinger similarly

---


refused to make any promises on troop levels during his July 1971 trip.\textsuperscript{33} When U.S. officials did make assurances, they were always short-term. A joint agreed minutes in October 1970 stated that “the United States confirms that, based on present conditions, it does not plan or intend to reduce the number its troops stationed in Korea,”\textsuperscript{34} while Kissinger and Nixon made similar promises throughout the early 1970s to the effect that the United States did not currently have plans to withdraw, or that the United States would not change troop levels through 1973 or 1974.\textsuperscript{35} Encouraging progress in efforts toward a peace agreement between North and South Korea in mid-1972 and into 1973 led Nixon and Kissinger to temporarily put the brakes on further troop withdrawals, however.\textsuperscript{36} Kissinger told the ROK Foreign Minister in February 1973 that troop levels “might fluctuate a few thousand one way or another, but would remain essentially the same.”\textsuperscript{37} However, U.S. assurances on troop levels continued to pertain only to the very short-term.\textsuperscript{38}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{34}Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea, October 26, 1970, \textit{FRUS}, 1969-1976, Vol. 19 (Part 1), p. 188.
\item \textsuperscript{35}Memo from Smyser to Kissinger, “Your Meeting with South Korean Foreign Minister Kim on March 20, 1974 at 6:00pm,” March 19, 1974, Folder “Korea (3),” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box 5, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan [hereafter GRFL].
\end{itemize}
7.3.4 South Korean Burden-Sharing

In the wake of perceived American unreliability, Park became less cooperative on participating in Vietnam. He refused to send a third combat division or further civilian deployments. Nevertheless, South Korea was unable to leverage its troop deployments in Vietnam to forestall U.S. withdrawals from the Korean peninsula, as the Nixon Administration withdrew one of its divisions stationed in South Korea in 1970-71, would not rule out further withdrawals, and refused to negotiate with South Korea exchanging U.S. presence in South Korea for South Korean presence in South Vietnam. Rather, the ROK was again only able to use its continued presence in Vietnam to help it extract U.S. economic and military assistance (Yong Lee, 2011: 421-424). Indeed, some within the administration – most notably Secretary of Defense Laird – saw the return of South Korean forces from Vietnam as a means of justifying further U.S. withdrawals from Korea (Hunt, 2015: 354-355).

More generally, the Nixon and Ford Administrations applied considerable burden-sharing pressure. Allied self-reliance was a hallmark of the Nixon Doctrine, with Nixon and other officials emphasizing that allies would be responsible for taking care of their own defense (Nam, 1986: 67, 78, 97). In a letter to Park, Nixon wrote in May 1970 that “it is reasonable to expect [allies] to assume more of the responsibility for their own defense and specifically to provide the bulk of the manpower required for that purpose.” Similarly, in a marked and much-criticized semantic change from previous statements, the joint U.S.-ROK communique from the annual Security Consultative Conference (SCC) in July 1970 recommended that “the forces defending the Republic

---


of Korea must remain alert and strong,” whereas previous SCC statements had emphasized that “Republic of Korea and American forces stationed in Korea must remain strong and alert” (Cha, 1999: 66). Nixon stressed that the United States would “place a greater defense burden on the Koreans” as the United States reduced its footprint, and used $1.5 billion in aid between 1971-77 to assist South Korean military modernization (Lee and Heo, 2002: 99). Ford similarly promised that although “I will continue to urge Congress to support allies like South Korea,” Congress was “not as cooperative as I would have hoped.”

In response to both direct U.S. pressure and concerns about U.S. reliability South Korea took dramatic steps toward military self-reliance. Park built up a reserve force of 2.5 million soldiers, increased the South Korean defense budget from 3.9% of GDP in 1969 to over four percent of GDP during the first half of the 1970s, and pursued a five-year military modernization in 1971-75 (Nam, 1986: 101; Lee and Heo, 2002: 38-40, 100-101; Yong Lee, 2011: 421). Moreover, while the Nixon Administration used an injection of military assistance to help South Korea make up for the shortfall that would be left behind by a reduced U.S. presence, from the mid-1970s onward U.S. aid dramatically shrank as a percentage of South Korean military spending, down from to 99% in 1961, to 49.7% in 1971, to effectively zero percent in 1978 (Lee and Heo, 2002: 74, 100). Instead of grant military aid, the United States shifted more toward the use of foreign military sales (FMS), in which South Korea would receive credit for the purchase of American arms (McLaurin, 1988: 177-178).

7.4 Showdown over the South Korean Nuclear Program, 1975-1976

South Korean fears of abandonment did not abate in the mid-1970s. The United States’ withdrawal from Vietnam, in tandem with the U.S. Congress’s refusal to continue providing material assistance to South Vietnam, made South Korean policymakers nervous, with the ROK Defense Minister issuing a formal request for assurances that the abandonment of South Vietnam would not impact

---

41 Memorandum of Conversation, “South Korean Dependence on US Support,” November 22, 1974, Folder “President Ford Memcons (1),” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box 16, GRFL.
U.S. protection of South Korea (Cha, 1999: 148). More generally, Congressional pressure for limitations on the U.S. footprint abroad, as well as on defense spending and military aid, continued to cause unease within the ROK (McLaurin, 1988: 170, 176; Lee and Heo, 2002: 102-103).

The fall of Saigon in 1975 further worried the ROK, with the National Assembly passing a resolution asking that the United States “demonstrate by deeds its firm determination not to commit the same failure on the Korean peninsula as it did on the Indochinese peninsula” (Cha, 1999: 149). 42 A telegram from the U.S. embassy in South Korea described the situation in Seoul in April 1975: “focal point of concern is Congressional attitudes and fear that in conflict situation Congress (and American public) may – as in case [in] Vietnam – deny funds and use of us forces needed to defend Korea and even force US troop withdrawals before then.” 43

In response to perceived U.S. unreliability, South Korea attempted to obtain nuclear weapons during the 1970s. However, its attempt further demonstrated just how limited its capacity for exit was – as well as how potent the U.S. threat of exit could be. As Nam (1986: 79) puts it, South Korea’s challenge was that “Although the ROK could no longer count on a firm U.S. conventional commitment, it did not wish to live without the U.S. shield,” and thus outside options provided a means of bolstering South Korean security despite U.S. unreliability and despite the high level of threat it faced.

Park made the decision to pursue nuclear weapons in November 1971, and South Korea proceeded to secure nuclear assistance from France and Canada and plan the creation of ballistic missiles (Gul Hong, 2011: 488, 491-492, 494-495). India’s nuclear test in May 1974 brought proliferation to the top of the U.S. agenda, leading American officials to review other potential countries that might be on the path toward or at risk of pursuing nuclear weapons. In late 1974, the

42 According to Lieutenant General James F. Hollingsworth, who was in command of the ROK/U.S. I Corps in Seoul during 1973, Park had asked him “Are you going to do the same thing here you did in Vietnam?” (Oberdorfer, 1997: 61).

United States detected the South Korean deals for plutonium reprocessing capabilities with France and Canada, and proceeded to scrutinize South Korea’s nuclear activities (Gul Hong, 2011: 496-497). The United States saw South Korean proliferation as a potential trigger for a regional nuclear arms race that could result in North Korea and Japan obtaining nuclear weapons. Similarly, South Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons would reduce its dependence on the United States – and, in turn, U.S. leverage (Nam, 1986: 106; Gul Hong, 2011: 497-498).

Initial U.S. diplomatic efforts to discourage South Korean nuclearization and persuade South Korea to cancel construction of its reprocessing plant included warnings that the United States would not tolerate ROK acquisition of nuclear weapons and might cancel U.S. nuclear assistance (Oberdorfer, 1997: 71). These attempts failed, however, and as a result the United States eventually issued an ultimatum in December 1975 that the “whole range of security and political relationships” between the United States and South Korea would be jeopardized if it did not cancel the reprocessing deal with France (Gul Hong, 2011: 501). The next month, the deal was canceled (Gul Hong, 2011: 498-503). Similar threats were made by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in May 1976 (Oberdorfer, 1997: 72). This clearly demonstrated the leverage the United States had over South Korea, owing to the latter’s vulnerability to U.S. abandonment and its limited capacity for exit.

7.4.1 U.S. Reassurance

While the United States used considerable pressure to coerce the ROK into nuclear abstention, it also coupled its pressure with considerable reassurance of the U.S. commitment throughout 1974-1976 (Lee and Sato, 1982: 102-103; Lanoszka, 2014: 215). Continued protection of South Korea, including the U.S. troop presence on the peninsula, was seen by American officials as a way to discourage South Korean nuclearization (Nam, 1986: 106). Both the Department of State and

---

the Department of Defense recognized that the ROK’s nuclear weapons program was a reaction to perceived U.S. unreliability (Lanoszka, 2014: 213).\textsuperscript{45} Ambassador Sneider argued in April 1975 that the fall of Saigon was shaking South Korean confidence in the United States, and in June advocated making very “clear to the Koreans what the prospects are for a continued, long-term U.S. military presence,” as uncertainty only encouraged Park “into preparations for what he sees as our eventual withdrawal...which include internal repression and plans for the development of nuclear weapons” (Oberdorfer, 1997: 64-65, quote at p. 65).\textsuperscript{46} U.S. officials turned to “pointing up the differences between Vietnam and Korea, with respect to the internal situations in both countries the nature of the us commitments, and their different strategic positions” in order to counteract South Korean fears that the ROK might receive the same treatment as South Vietnam.\textsuperscript{47} A memorandum from the Central Intelligence Agency in August 1977 similarly argued that “the withdrawal of all US nuclear weapons will clearly strengthen [Park’s] determination to move toward military self-reliance.”\textsuperscript{48}

U.S. officials became less equivocal in their assurances of troop levels in South Korea as well. Kissinger told the South Koreans in March 1974 that there would be no further withdrawals (Hayes, 1991: 56), and when Ford visited Seoul in November 1974 he promised Park that there was “no intention of withdrawing U.S. personnel from Korea.”\textsuperscript{49} Ford gave similar assurances when the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{46} Telegram from Kissinger to U.S. Embassy (Seoul), “ROK Plans to Develop Nuclear Weapons and Missiles,” March 1975, Folder “Korea - State Department Telegrams from SECSTATE - NODIS (3),” National Security Adviser’s Files, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 11, GRFL.
\item \textsuperscript{47} Telegram 2685 From the Embassy in the Republic of Korea to the Department of State, “ROK Views of US Security Commitment,” April 18, 1975, \textit{FRUS}, 1969-1976, Vol. E-12, Doc. 267. See also Memorandum from Kissinger to Ford, “Meeting with the Speaker of the South Korean National Assembly Chung Il-Kwon,” May 8, 1975, Folder “President Ford Memcons (1),” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box 16, GRFL.
\end{itemize}
South Korean National Assembly Speaker visited the White House in May 1975. Additionally, Defense Secretary James Schlesinger publicly declared in July 1975 that the United States had nuclear weapons in South Korea and hinted toward their potential use if South Korea was attacked (Hayes, 1991: 60). He then visited Seoul in August 1975, telling the South Koreans there would be “no basic changes over the next five years” in U.S. troop levels (Oberdorfer, 1997: 67). In December 1975, during a visit to Hawaii Ford proclaimed what he called a “Pacific Doctrine” reaffirmed the United States’ engagement in the region, stating that “World stability and our own security depend upon our Asian commitments” and argued that the U.S. troop presence Korea was a guarantee of U.S. protection. Similarly, June 1976 saw the first of what became the annual Team Spirit joint military exercises between the United States and the ROK, and later that year Ford decided that “until further notice there should be no further withdrawals...from Korea without his explicit approval” (Cha, 1999: 146-149).

Indeed, the evidence suggests that Park saw the threat to obtain nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip the ROK could use to extract security assurances from the United States (Nam, 1986: 103-104). Beginning in 1975, ROK officials explicitly threatened that their country might go nuclear if the U.S. commitment was in doubt (Reiss, 1988: ch. 3; Cha, 1999: 113; Gul Hong, 2011: 494, 501-502, 506-509). Park told a group of American journalists in June 1975 that “We have the capability [to obtain nuclear weapons],” and that “If the U.S. nuclear umbrella were to be removed,

1.


51 Memorandum for the Record, “Meeting with President Pak Chung Hee in Seoul, Korea 27 August 1975,” September 2, 1975, Folder “Korea (10),” National Security Adviser’s Files, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 9, GRFL.


53 Memo from Scowcroft to Schlesinger, “Troop and Equipment Withdrawals from Korea,” December 1976, Folder “Korea (20),” National Security Adviser’s Files, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 10, GRFL.
we have to start developing our nuclear capability to save ourselves” (Oberdorfer, 1997: 71).

Nevertheless, while the U.S. used such assurances to induce South Korean nuclear restraint, internally U.S. officials still saw the U.S. presence as finite. U.S. officials feared that Schlesinger’s pledge of “automatic” American involvement in a North Korean invasion, as well as his promise that American troop levels would not change in the near future, went further than intended and would be misread by the South Koreans.

U.S. officials refused a request to allow the South Korean ambassador to meet with the Vice President in August 1974, and numerous U.S. officials – including the U.S. ambassador Richard Sneider – “floated the idea of U.S. troop reductions.” Even Kissinger, among the most consistent opponents of further withdrawals, anticipated withdrawing troops after a peace agreement between North Korea and South Korea had been settled (Hayes, 1991: 55-56; Oberdorfer, 1997: 86; Lanoszka, 2014: 214). Kissinger suggested in a meeting with Department of State officials in January 1975 that “I would say that South Korea, within five years, would be substantially left alone by us.” Jimmy Carter even planned to withdraw all U.S. forces from Korea, and he only canceled the plan after sustained opposition from the Army and other officials, who objected that doing so would leave South Korea too exposed to attack – particularly in light of new intelligence showing larger numbers of North Korean tanks than had been known about previously (Nam, 1986: 54-55).

---

55 Memo from Barnes to Scowcroft, “Secretary Schlesinger’s Discussions in Seoul,” September 29, 1975, Folder “Korea (12),” National Security Adviser’s Files, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 9, GRFL.
56 Memo from Davis to Marsh, “South Korean Ambassador’s Request to Call on the Vice President,” August 2, 1974, Folder “Korea (6),” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box 5, GRFL; Memo from Froebe to Snowcroft, “Your Meeting with Ambassador Sneider on September 12, 1974, at 2:30pm,” September 11, 1974, Folder “Korea (6),” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box 5, GRFL.
While Carter sought to reassure Japan that U.S. withdrawals from Korea would not endanger it, he did little to reassure South Korea, sending Vice President Walter Mondale to Tokyo in January 1977 to reassure Japan, but notably not to Seoul (Lee and Sato, 1982: 107-108).

Given the forceful U.S. response during 1975-1976 to force the ROK nuclear program’s termination, one important question that arises is why the United States did not use more reassurance to discourage South Korea from pursuing nuclear weapons in the first place. Based on evidence currently available – though admittedly some of the documentation from the Nixon-Ford period remains classified – there is little indication that either President worried about South Korean nuclearization prior to 1975, and especially prior to the Indian nuclear test in May 1974. Thus it would seem that the Nixon and Ford administrations underestimated either the ROK’s willingness or ability to go the nuclear route. Indeed, doing so was not unreasonable, as the United States had a variety of powerful levers it could use to try and induce South Korean nuclear restraint – all of which it threatened to use. The ROK was highly dependent on the United States for trade, investment, protection, and for its nuclear energy needs (Lanoszka, 2014: 215). Even in April 1975, U.S. officials recognized the extent of South Korea’s dependence. A telegram from the U.S. embassy reported that “there is no present alternative to continued dependence on us. In short run, Korea has no other policy options, with any dependence on Japan particularly out of question.” Nevertheless, it is admittedly somewhat puzzling that U.S. officials did not infer the possibility of South Korean nuclearization in light of the ROK’s precarious security environment and numerous pleas by South Korean officials for reassurance.

### 7.4.2 South Korean Burden-Sharing

Although the United States went to great lengths to deter South Korean nuclearization, this did not prevent it from simultaneously extracting a significant amount of additional burden-sharing from

---

the ROK. Ford and other U.S. officials continued to invoke the threat to U.S. commitment posed by Congress.\textsuperscript{60} Kissinger noted that Ford’s visit to Korea in November 1974 was to “reaffirm for Seoul our commitment...while providing the Korean leadership with a direct appreciation of our reduced resources.”\textsuperscript{61} In 1974, Park levied a ten percent income tax to fund defense spending, doubled military expenditures from $714 million in 1975 to $1.5 billion in 1976, and continued to increase spending throughout the late 1970s (McLaurin, 1988: 179; Cha, 1999: 148-149; Gul Hong, 2011: 487-488). By 1979, South Korea’s defense spending as a percentage of GDP totaled almost six percent (Lee and Heo, 2002: 99-101).

7.5 Alternative Explanations

7.5.1 U.S. Domestic Politics

There is evidence of South Korean lobbying in U.S. domestic politics. As the ROK grew increasingly uneasy about the U.S. commitment, the Korean government turned to lobbying as an alternative means to diplomacy for pressuring the U.S. government into policies favorable to it.\textsuperscript{62} Most notably Park provided funds to South Korean lobbyist Tong Sun Park, who then provided bribes to numerous U.S. Congressmen in order to discourage U.S. retrenchment from Korea. The scheme blew up in 1976, however, and became known as the “Koreagate” scandal (Nam, 1986: 156-157; Moon, 1988: 111-112; Kim, 2011b: 473-476). Given that it was the Congress which was the most consistent source of pressure for limiting or reducing the U.S. footprint in South Korea, however, and also consistently delayed implementation of U.S. military aid in the 1970s, it is difficult to make the case that ROK lobbying had a great effect on U.S. reassurance or burden-sharing.


\textsuperscript{61}Memo from Kissinger to Ford, “Your Visit to Korea,” October 1974, Folder “Korea (7),” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box 5, GRFL.

\textsuperscript{62}Memorandum for the President, “Visit of Korean National Assemblymen,” undated [June 1975], Folder “Korea (8),” National Security Adviser’s Files, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 9, GRFL.
pressure.

Indeed, on the contrary, there is evidence that South Korea’s human rights record and Park’s authoritarian tendencies, in addition to the Koreagate scandal, cost South Korea in Congress. Park’s repression escalated during the mid-1970s as he instituted the yushin system, which concentrated power in the president, eliminated the National Assembly, and cracked down on dissent. This was a direct result to an increased perception of threat in the ROK owing to reduced U.S. presence (Oberdorfer, 1997: 37-41; Kim, 2011b: 459-460). As a result, calls for reducing U.S. material assistance intensified in Congress and among human rights groups, thus delaying implementation of U.S. assistance for South Korea’s five-year modernization plan (Moon, 1988: 111; Cha, 1999: 112, 286-287; Kim, 2011b: 462-464).63

Nevertheless, because Congressional pressure for withdrawal was arguably just as strong vis-à-vis Europe as South Korea – if not stronger – South Korea’s regime type would not seem to be a crucial factor in U.S. reassurance and burden-sharing pressure toward South Korea. Moreover, while South Korea’s human rights record and attempted bribery made Congress reluctant to appropriate military aid, Carter actually faced enormous opposition from Congress – encouraged by a number of officials in the Defense and State Departments – to his withdrawal plan (Sungjoo, 1980: 1079-1080; Hayes, 1991: 77-79; Oberdorfer, 1997: 88-93, 103). Indeed, when Carter first began calling for troop withdrawals, the South Koreans did not take him very seriously in part because they assumed he would be restrained from enacting his campaign pledges (Lee and Sato, 1982: 105).

While policymakers in the Nixon and Ford administrations were concerned about Park’s repression, this was generally only the case to the extent that they feared it might influence Congressional

63 Kissinger to Ford, “Future U.S. Military Assistance to South Korea,” January 3, 1975, FRUS, Vol. E-12, Doc. 260; Memorandum of Conversation, “Korean and other Subjects,” June 12, 1975, FRUS, Vol. E-12, Doc. 269; Telegram 9567 From Embassy in the Republic of Korea to the Department of State, “Kim Case and Its Aftermath in Korea,” December 3, 1976, FRUS, Vol. E-12, Doc. 290; Memo from Froebe to Scowcroft, “Request by Eight Congressmen to Call on the President Prior to His Visit to South Korea,” November 5, 1974, Folder “Korea (7),” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box 5, GRFL.
pressure or South Korea’s domestic stability – not because of normative concerns.\textsuperscript{64} Indeed, the Nixon administration deliberately attempted to remain on the sidelines with regards to the \textit{yushin} repression (Oberdorfer, 1997: 37-41). Ford also told Park that “we don’t agree with some of his oppressive domestic tactics,” but also admitted that “on the other hand, it doesn’t hurt to have a strong leader in that part of the country.”\textsuperscript{65} Similar sentiments existed in Congress, with conservatives being concerned with \textit{yushin} not because of its effects on human rights \textit{per se}, but rather because of its potential deleterious effects on South Korean stability and security (Kim, 2011\textit{b}: 462-465).

Thus, from 1964-1976 there is only limited evidence that either amity or animus toward South Korea played a significant role in U.S. reassurance or burden-sharing pressure. Moreover, any such effects were dwarfed by the roles played by South Korea’s vulnerability and limited capacity for exit, and by more general U.S. domestic retrenchment pressure.

\textbf{7.5.2 ROK Domestic Politics}

As the preceding discussion suggests, Park was staunchly anti-Communist and without left-wing tendencies. He used the prospect of U.S. withdrawal to solidify his hold on power, declare a state of emergency in 1971, and justify his use of repression under the revised \textit{yushin} constitution beginning in 1972 (Nam, 1986: 125, 156-157). Thus, the evidence does not allow me to rule out the possibility that the ideology of the Park regime reduced fears in the United States about the possibility of the ROK moving closer to the Communist bloc.


7.6 Conclusion

In conclusion, South Korea was highly vulnerable to U.S. burden-sharing pressure by virtue of its geographic exposure to attack. Its comparatively small size, in turn, minimized its threat of exit, thus reducing its capacity for extracting U.S. security assurances – even despite its threat to pursue nuclear weapons. Finally, retrenchment pressure further facilitated the ability of the Nixon and Ford administrations to demand increased defense effort from the ROK. As a result, South Korean burden-sharing was quite high throughout the 1960s and 1970s, with ROK forces making up the second largest contingent of foreign soldiers fighting on behalf of South Vietnam and South Korean defense budgets skyrocketing as U.S. retrenchment became a more credible possibility. Moreover, U.S. policymakers were reluctant to reassure the ROK by foreclosing the possibility of future troop withdrawals for much of the 1960s and 1970s, and many officials – including both Secretaries of Defense under Nixon as well as President Carter – favored pulling out most if not all U.S. forces.

Thus, the case of U.S.-ROK bargaining supports my theory’s expectations. Additionally, the South Korean case provides at best limited evidence for alternative explanations. While Park’s authoritarian tendencies and human rights abuses did raise concern among U.S. policymakers, and also led to Congressional opposition to military aid for the ROK, it was strategic concerns – particularly the level of threat posed by North Korea and the desire to keep the costs of U.S. commitments down via allied burden-sharing – that ultimately determined U.S. reassurance toward South Korea. Moreover, South Korea’s threat of exit may have been inhibited because, unlike U.S. allies in Europe, it lacked other multilateral allies that it could turn to. However, U.S. policymakers not only tolerated better ties between the ROK and Japan; they actively encouraged them.
Chapter 8

The U.S.-Japan Alliance in the Era of the Guam Doctrine, 1965-1976

8.1 Case Overview

After the end of World War II, the United States sought to ensure that Japan would not threaten its neighbors again, while simultaneously trying to keep Japan from aligning with the Communist bloc. It did so initially through occupation, which lasted until 1952 when the two countries signed a Mutual Security Treaty (MST). In 1960, the MST was revised to ensure that the United States was obligated to protect Japan – though Japan had no such obligation to defend U.S. possessions (Greene, 1975: 30-33). Japan was considered to be the United States’ primary ally in East Asia by virtue of its economic and potential military might.¹ In addition to the commitment formalized in the MST, the United States also stationed tens of thousands of forces on Japanese territory, in large part to reassure the Japanese of U.S. protection. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, for example, argued in favor of the U.S. presence in Japan because “even relatively small” withdrawals “might severely undermine the confidence of Japan in our determination to maintain strong defenses in

¹Kissinger to Rockefeller, “Courtesy Call on Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Miki,” August 6, 1975, Folder “Prime Minister Miki of Japan, August 6-7, 1975 (4),” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box 22, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan [hereafter GRFL].
the Far East, and thus weaken its desire to maintain its Free World alignment.”2 The U.S. presence also provided additional forces that could be deployed elsewhere in the event of conflict on the Asian mainland. Indeed, as I discuss below, one of the United States’ motivations for keeping a large presence in South Korea was to assure Japan that the buffer between it and Communist North Korea would remain intact.

Japanese burden-sharing, however, was very limited. Japan’s constitution did not allow it to maintain military forces for purposes other than self-defense, and thus its defense spending was always at a very low level of its gross domestic product (GDP) and it did not provide forces to assist the United States in the Vietnam War despite Japanese policymakers’ support for the war as a measure to stop the spread of communism. Indeed, under the MST Japan was responsible only for the defense of its own home territory. This relatively low level of burden-sharing was facilitated by Japan’s secure position, as it was separated from Asia by the Sea of Japan, and was more powerful than its closest rival, the People’s Republic of China.

This situation appeared on the verge of change, however, during the late 1960s and 1970s, when the costs of Vietnam put pressure on the United States to retrench and demand more from its allies. In 1969, President Richard Nixon began large-scale withdrawals of U.S. troops from Vietnam and also announced the “Guam Doctrine,” which proclaimed that allies would be responsible for shouldering more of the burden for their own defense. As a result, Japan moderately increased its defense spending and contemplated a more far-reaching shift toward autonomous defense and even nuclear weapons acquisition.

Nevertheless, despite Japan’s objectively large capacity for burden-sharing, U.S. officials refrained from demanding self-sufficiency or even significantly greater effort for fear that doing so would lead Japan to move closer to the Soviet Union and even potentially revive Japanese militarism. The United States reassured Japan that the Guam Doctrine would not mean a reduction in the U.S. commitment to Japan’s (or East Asia’s) defense, and that the American détente with the

Soviet Union and more amicable ties with China would not involve sacrificing Japanese interests. Thus, the Japanese unilateralism that U.S. policymakers feared ultimately never came to fruition.

I expect fairly high levels of U.S. reassurance but relatively low levels of Japanese burden-sharing. While Japan had numerous exit options owing to its latent power – including nuclear and conventional self-reliance, as well as neutralism vis-a-vis the Soviets and the Chinese – it was also far safer from attack than contiguous allies such as South Korea. But constraints on U.S. resources due to the costs of Vietnam should have put pressure on the United States to retrench, which in turn should have led to more Japanese burden-sharing but also more U.S. reassurance as American policymakers increasingly feared Japanese exit.


Japan’s separation from mainland Asia and its distance from the center of Soviet military power in Eastern Europe considerably insulated it from the threat of conventional attack. As a result, Japan’s vulnerability to threat, and to U.S. burden-sharing pressure, was quite low – as was its need for reassurance. Throughout much of the late 1950s and early 1960s, many Japanese saw no real threat to their security due to both their favorable geographic and to the buffer that U.S. forces in South Korea (and, for a time, South Vietnam) gave it (Greene, 1975: 39-41; Cha, 1999: 71, 75-77).3 The Japanese public, as well as the left-wing parties – the Social Democrats (JSP) and Communists (JCP) – saw little need for a U.S. military presence, and the JSP even questioned the need for armed forces at all (Greene, 1975: 5-6, 8, 23).

When China obtained nuclear weapons in late 1964, Japan now faced a potential threat to its homeland. As a result, Japanese policymakers began both internally discussing the merits of ob-

---

taining nuclear weapons and seeking external reassurance from the United States that it would protect East Asia – including Vietnam, Korea, and Taiwan – using its nuclear weapons. Japanese officials were also deliberately ambiguous to U.S. officials about Japan’s nuclear intentions despite making a joint communique in 1965 affirming Japan’s non-nuclear status (Lanoszka, 2014: 164-166). In July 1966, for example, in a conversation with Secretary of State Rusk, Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato pointed out that “Now that Communist China has a nuclear capability...arguments have appeared in Japan that Japan would need nuclear weapons for its own defense.”4 While discussions about potential nuclearization did not proceed into action, these considerations re-emerged in the late 1960s as the United States seemed poised to retrench from East Asia. Moreover, the United States used considerable reassurance to discourage Japanese nuclearization.

8.2.1 U.S. Reassurance

Before, during, and after the Johnson administration, the United States saw the U.S. security guarantee as a way to discourage Japan from becoming either a neutral competitor or a nuclear-armed state – or both. Japan’s latent military strength, in addition to its history of expansion, contributed greatly to fears in both East Asia and the United States that the Japanese would, left to their own devices, pursue their security unilaterally in a way that might not serve U.S. interests and threaten the region. These included obtaining nuclear weapons, charting a neutral course in the Cold War in which it moved closer to the Communist powers, and pursuing independent, unilateral conventional arming. In August 1964, writing on challenges in U.S.-Japan trade disputes (specifically wool) the U.S. ambassador wrote that “gradual growth of defense consciousness in Japan and willingness consider larger role in Asian affairs is inevitably being accompanied by revival of some degree of Japanese nationalism,” adding that “it is essential...to recognize that irritations aroused

by international economic issues could help deflect this nationalism into less desirable channels.”

U.S. officials explicitly used reassurance to discourage Japan from pursuing outside options. Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs William Bundy wrote to Secretary of State Rusk in January 1965 that “We must insure that the U.S.-Japan military partnership remains more attractive to Japan than the alternatives of military non-alignment or independent defense measures,” while the U.S. ambassador similarly wrote in July on the importance that “Japanese industrial potential does not drift to the Communist side or into a position of neutrality.” Thus the ambassador had concluded in December 1964: “We must...be very watchful of any tendencies in Japan to doubt the firmness of U.S. defense commitments or the value of our nuclear deterrent in defense of Free World positions in Asia and in particular Japan. In this regard we must be alert to any weakening of Japan’s current position and stance in the face of Chicom nuclear-weapon rattling.”

After China’s nuclearization in 1964, Johnson administration officials reassured Japan on the credibility of the U.S. commitment – including on the use of U.S. nuclear weapons to defend Japan in the case of a nuclear attack. Johnson visited Japan in January 1965, during which he and Prime Minister Sato issued a joint communique that publicly “reaffirm[ed] the United States’ determination to abide by its commitment under the treaty to defend Japan against any armed attack from the outside” (Greene, 1975: 33). During a meeting with Sato in November 1967, Johnson reaffirmed – at Sato’s request – this promise to defend Japan from nuclear attack.

10Memorandum of Conversation, “Balance of Payments; Japanese Role in Asia and Views Toward Vietnam; Sato’s
8.2.2  Japanese Burden-Sharing

As a result of its geographic position, Japan was relatively insulated from U.S. burden-sharing pressure. Chinese power projection capabilities were minimal, and the Soviet Union did not have substantial air and naval forces in the Far East until the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, many Japanese officials saw the two Communist powers as too preoccupied with each other to pose an immediate threat to Japan (Welfield, 1988: 364). Many Japanese saw little threat to their security and were ambivalent about the need for a U.S. troop presence at all – particularly ground forces (Welfield, 1988: 143; Lanoszka, 2014: 145, 157-158). Indeed, a 1974 State Department Briefing Paper argued that “in the absence of any perceptible direct military threats to Japan proper, the U.S.-Japan security arrangement came to be appreciated principally as a means of honoring US defense commitments to other allies.”

Moreover, while American officials did attempt to encourage increased Japanese efforts, they were reluctant to press the matter too far. While Bundy noted in November 1964 that “we have quite properly stepped up pressures on Japan to increase significantly its assumption of international responsibilities,” U.S. officials realized that U.S. protection – even if it discouraged Japanese burden-sharing – was a key factor in keeping Japan from sliding back into militarism or moving closer to the Communist bloc (Lanoszka, 2014: 159-160). American officials recognized


12 US Information Agency, “US-Japan Security Relations: Their Place in US Strategic Thinking,” November 1974, Folder “President Ford’s Trip to Tokyo, November 1974 (3),” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box 18, GRFL.

the delicate balancing act of trying to keep Japan tied to the United States while also assuming more responsibility for its own defense. As Bundy put it: “any government which proposed a sharp expansion of defense expenditures would risk its early replacement, in all probability by a more neutralist government less likely to ensure Japan’s continued, effective Free World alignment,” adding that the “Japanese might be tempted by the nuclear route.”¹⁴ U.S. burden-sharing pressure on Japan thus proceeded with great caution. A memo from Rusk to Johnson in November 1967 captured the reassurance dilemma well: “Fundamentally, we want Japan as a partner—not as a rival—in Asia, but as partner sharing the political and economic burdens of regional responsibility. While we do not now seek a greater Japanese military role, other than in its own defense, Japan’s actions should contribute to—and not detract from—effective fulfillment of our military and security commitments to Asia.”¹⁵ As a result, Japanese defense effort was low relative to its economic size.

Japan similarly did not offset the costs of U.S. deployments nearly as much as West Germany. Much to the frustration of American policymakers in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, the Japanese preferred to put their defense spending toward domestic production of arms and equipment rather than toward purchases of U.S. materiel.¹⁶ In 1963, for example, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric argued that of the over $300 million in costs, “Realistic military sales/cooperative logistics goals for offset would be $50 million for FY 64, $100 million for FY 65, and $150 million for FY 66.”¹⁷

---


8.3 The Era of U.S. Retrenchment, 1967-1976

In March 1968, Johnson announced a deescalation of the war in Vietnam, raising Japanese fears of abandonment (Lanoszka, 2014: 166-167) and leading many in Japan to favor “a more independent foreign policy” that would “loosen” Japan from the United States.\textsuperscript{18} As the costs of the Vietnam War mounted, the Johnson and Nixon administrations faced considerable pressure to retrench from U.S. foreign commitments. These took the form of numerous Congressional resolutions and amendments to reduce the U.S. overseas military presence and demand increased allied burden-sharing, as well as Congressional reluctance to continue providing material assistance to a number of U.S. allies – most notably South Vietnam and South Korea, in Asia. Moreover, the War Powers Act in 1973 increased Congressional influence over the President’s ability to conduct overseas military operations. The Japanese took notice; the State Department’s country director for Japan noted in April 1968 that “U.S. balance of payments difficulties, the Tet offensive, the Pueblo incident, domestic disorders and the President’s March 31 speech are all cited as evidences of American weakness” in Japan, and that the Japanese were concerned that U.S. foreign policy “is constantly swinging with the whims of public opinion.”\textsuperscript{19} A telegram from the U.S. embassy in May similarly reported that “Racial violence and social unrest in America have roused concern over basic stability of American society,” and argued that domestic volatility within the United States, in addition to Johnson’s refusal to run for re-election, might create in Japan a momentum to more seriously consider both nuclear weapons and “more than very gradual acceleration of buildup in Japan’s own defense which has been case over last few years,” which could “be accompanied by assertive nationalist overtones and aggressive demands for phase down of U.S. bases.”\textsuperscript{20}


Japanese fears of abandonment only intensified after Nixon announced the Guam Doctrine in July 1969, which proclaimed that allies would be expected to do more for their own self-defense. Nixon and Kissinger saw the emergence of a “multipolar” era and sought to pass more of the costs of regional defense onto allies and reduce U.S. involvement in future conflicts in Asia (Greene, 1975: 14-15; Cha, 1999: 69-72). The following year, the United States began to withdraw tens of thousands of troops from Japan and South Korea, further alarming the Japanese. In response, Japan and South Korea issued a joint communique in July 1970, in which they asserted that “U.S. military presence is a key factor in safeguarding the security of the Far East” (Cha, 1999: 71). After the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, the Japanese formally requested reassurance of U.S. protection (Cha, 1999: 147).

Also causing great consternation in Japan was the United States’ rapprochement with the Communist bloc – including its sudden, unilateral opening to China. Japan feared that improved relations between the United States and the Communist powers might be the precursor to a superpower condominium in which Japanese interests would be sold out by U.S. policymakers seeking to reduce the possibility of war for the United States. In effect, Japanese officials feared a decoupling of U.S. and Japanese security interests. As Ambassador Johnson put it, Japan feared being presented with a “fait accompli in matters concerning Japanese interests.” State Department Director of Policy Planning Winston Lord similarly noted in a memo to Kissinger that the Japanese had “apprehensions that understandings between the U.S. and USSR may reduce the danger of Great Power confrontations without removing the possibilities of local conflict.”

Moreover, Japan feared that détente might encourage the Communist powers to move against

---

21 As Nixon put it in Guam: “Asia is for Asians...We must avoid the kind of policy that will make countries in Asia so dependent upon us that we are dragged into conflicts such as the one we have in Vietnam” (Cha, 1999: 61).


23 Memorandum from Lord to Kissinger, “Highlights of the 19th U.S.-Japan Planning Talks and My Trip to Korea,” July 31, 1974, Folder “Japan (4),” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box 4, GRFL.
it. Johnson’s Special Assistant Walt Rostow summarized the Japanese position in March 1967: “it doesn’t want us buddying up too close to either Communist China or the U.S.S.R.–especially the latter, because of its greater relative strength.” As such, the opening to China shocked the Japanese, who were not consulted and were barely notified prior to Nixon’s July 1971 speech in which he announced his upcoming visit to China. Conservatives in the LDP felt particularly betrayed in light of their loyalty to the United States, with Sato claiming the Americans “let me down” and resenting being left out of the loop of U.S.-China negotiations during Nixon’s trip in February 1972 (Greene, 1975: 11; Welfield, 1988: 295, 309-310; quote at p. 295; Cha, 1999: 104, 107).

Additionally, the Japanese feared that nuclear parity with the Soviet Union reduced the credibility of the U.S. security guarantee. The Japanese suspected that the risk of nuclear retaliation would make the United States reluctant to go to war on Japan’s behalf, as well as encourage it to pursue détente. Indeed, agreements such as the US-Soviet Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement, which provided for great power consultation in situations of elevated risk of nuclear war, raised suspicions about a great power condominium and questions about U.S. willingness to go to war on its allies’ behalf.

As a result, many in Japan began to consider pursuing a more independent foreign policy, one less dependent on the United States. For one, Japan pursued better relations with China and the Soviet Union (Greene, 1975: 8, 10-11, 19, 21). Even Japanese Conservatives, traditionally char-

24 Attachment to Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, March 1, 1967, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 29 (Part 2), p. 166.
25 Fred Greene, “US Relations with Japan,” October 1974, Folder “Japan - NSSM 172 (9),” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box 4, GRFL, pp. 5-6.
26 Memo from Kissinger to Nixon, “Meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka,” July 31, 1973, Folder “Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka of Japan, July 31-August 1, 1975 (3),” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box 21, GRFL.
27 “Japan Adjust to an Era of Multipolarity in Asia,” April 21, 1972, Folder “Japan, March 6 - June 6, 1972 [4 of 5],” NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 102, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California [hereafter RMNL]; Holdridge to Kissinger, “Your Meetings with Tanaka and Ohira,” August 10, 1972, Folder “Japan, June 13, 1972 –,” NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Country Files, Box 102, RMNL.
acterized by intense anti-communism and loyalty to the United States, shifted to favor pursuing rapprochement with the Communist bloc (Welfield, 1988: 296-298, 300, 314, 316-317, 318-319, 320, 323, 329, 334-336). This ultimately led to the September 1972 restoration of diplomatic ties between Japan and China, as well as to numerous high-level visits between Soviet and Japanese officials (Cha, 1999: 103-105; Komine, 2014: 116).\textsuperscript{28} Japanese threat perceptions, in turn, diminished due to the improvement in relations with the Communist bloc – though they increased in the late 1970s after the fall of South Vietnam and plans were put on the table for U.S. withdrawal from Korea (Greene, 1975: 8, 10; Cha, 1999: 108-109, 147, 152-154).


\textbf{8.3.1 U.S. Reassurance}

American policymakers saw Japan as a potentially dominant power and competitor in East Asia (Zubok, 2013: 56). As such, the United States sought to avoid unleashing Japan and used reassurance to discourage it from re-militarizing. U.S. fears of Japanese nuclearization and neutralism intensified during the 1970s, as Japan’s concern about the reliability of the United States grew. Nixon and Kissinger worried that Japan might be tempted to reconsider its loyalty to the United States in the wake of the Guam Doctrine, U.S. retrenchment from East Asia, the sudden U.S. opening to China, and resource and political constraints in the United States more generally. The State

\textsuperscript{28}Sonnenfeldt and Hyland to Kissinger, “Soviet-Japanese Relations,” April 7, 1972, Folder “HAK's Japan Visit June 1972 Talking Points JUSEC Luncheon [6 of 7],” “NSC Files, HAK Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 21, RMNL.
Department argued that the United States needed to “reassure” Japan in order to discourage it from “acting independently” (Komine, 2014: 106). A 1974 State Department study similarly argued that “alternative foreign policy orientations may become more attractive to Japan,” which included “non-alignment, independent nationalism, or close political ties with China or the Soviet Union.”

Indeed, American officials reassured Japan that the Guam Doctrine and the emergence of a “multipolar” era in which the United States would expect more from its allies did not mean that U.S. protection would diminish (Greene, 1975: 14; Welfield, 1988: 330-332; Cha, 1999: 69). Secretary of State William Rogers reassured the Japanese in July 1973 that the United States would not abandon South Korea and thus leave Japan exposed to attack (Cha, 1999: 106), and that same year Nixon met with Prime Minister Tanaka and issued a joint communique in which the United States promised to remain engaged and physically present in the Western Pacific (Greene, 1975: 105). In the aftermath of the opening to China, the Nixon administration assured Japan that there had been and would be no “secret deals” between China and the United States that affected Japanese interests (Cha, 1999: 108). Ford made his first overseas trip as President to Japan in November 1974, during which he assured his hosts that the United States remained committed to Japan’s defense and to the security of the Pacific region. After the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, which greatly worried Japan, President Ford announced the “Pacific Doctrine,” in which he reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to defending allies in the Pacific and promised to keep its presence in the Asia-Pacific (Cha, 1999: 146-147; Komine, 2014: 122).

---

29 Memorandum from Richard Finn to Winston Lord, “Study on Forces at Work in Japan,” April 23, 1974, Folder “Japan - NSSM 172 (5),” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box 4, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan [hereafter GRFL], pp. 7-18, quote at pp. 7-8.

30 “Your Schedule and Talking Points for Your Meetings with the Japanese Leaders,” Folder “Henry A. Kissinger’s Trip to Japan - Talking Points,” NSC Files, HAK Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 22, RMNL.

31 Memorandum of Conversation, “President Ford -Prime Minister Tanaka First Meeting,” November 19, 1974, Box 7, National Security Adviser Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977, GRFL; Memorandum from Kissinger to Ford, “Your Visit to Japan,” Folder “President Ford’s Trip to Tokyo, November 1974 (1),” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box 18, GRFL.

32 Memorandum from Kissinger to Ford, “Japanese Prime Minister Miki’s Visit to Washington August 5-6: Recommended Basic Approach,” Folder “Prime Minister Miki of Japan, August 6-7, 1975 (3),” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box 18, GRFL.

207
The need to reduce Japan’s incentives for unilateral military arming or for reaching out to the Soviet Union was a key justification American officials gave to the Chinese for the U.S. alliance with and continued presence in Japan (Welfield, 1988: 252-253, 289, 332; Zubok, 2013; Komine, 2014: 105-108, 113, 118). Nixon told the Chinese that the United States was “opposed to Japan moving in as the U.S. moves out, but we cannot guarantee that. And if we had no defense arrangement with Japan, we would have no influence where that is concerned” (Komine, 2014: 108-109). Kissinger similarly called Japanese efforts to move closer to the Soviets “very dangerous” (Komine, 2014: 118).

American officials also worried about the prospect of Japanese nuclearization. Such fears were not only stoked by Japan’s reluctance to ratify the NPT, and U.S. officials’ awareness of Japanese concerns about American reliability, but also by Japan’s economic and industrial capacity (Greene, 1975: 95-98; Komine, 2014: 95, 115. American officials in both the Johnson and Nixon administrations worked hard to secure Japan’s ratification of the NPT (Campbell and Sunohara, 2004: 222). The central component of this effort was reassurance, as Japan’s primary concern was obtaining a guarantee of protection against nuclear attack.33 In contrast to cases such as West Germany and South Korea, where the United States wielded frequent and blunt threats of abandonment to discourage proliferation, U.S. officials put very little direct pressure on Japan. This is as my theory would expect, as Japan was not only becoming an economic giant, unlike South Korea, but its vulnerability to abandonment was also far less than either Germany or Korea. During his trip to Japan in June 1972, Kissinger stressed the importance that the United States placed on Japanese NPT ratification, and reassured Japanese officials of the U.S. commitment.34 In a conversation with the Japanese foreign minister in May 1974, Nixon claimed that although

---

33 Memorandum of Conversation, “Overall View of US-Japan Relations and Global Situation,” April 10, 1975, Folder “Japan (5),” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box 4, GRFL.

34 Johnson to Kissinger, June 7, 1972, Folder “Japan, March 6 - June 6, 1972 [2 of 5],” NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 102, RMNL.

208
the U.S. opposed proliferation, “I would not indicate what Japan should do.” In April 1975, the Japanese minister of foreign affairs visited Washington and came away with a public statement of three U.S. assurances: that the alliance would be maintained long-term, that the United States would be willing to wage nuclear war on Japan’s behalf, and that the United States would “take charge” if Japan was attacked (Lanoszka, 2014: 183-184).

Many who argued against troop withdrawals from Korea did so on the grounds that they would make Japan less secure and lead it to pursue outside options – particularly nuclearization. Indeed, Ford reassured Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Miki in August 1975 that the United States would retain its troop presence in South Korea, while Kissinger similarly told his Japanese counterpart in May 1975 that “the security of Japan is the principle reason for our commitment to defend Korea.” When President Jimmy Carter proposed to withdraw U.S. forces in the late 1970s, the Japanese were alarmed, and a number of officials in the State and Defense Departments moved to undermine the plan in (Hayes, 1991: 59, 72, 74-76; Cha, 1999: 148, 152-154). As the House Armed Services Committee (1978: 12) put it: “In the absence of the buffer currently provided by the ROK, Japan, which is generally regarded as vital to U.S. interests...would be faced with the choice of submission to Communist pressure or massive rearmament, probably including nuclear weapons.” As such, Carter sent Vice President Walter Mondale to Tokyo – but notably not to Seoul – to reassure the Japanese (Lee and Sato, 1982: 107-108).

35 Memorandum of Conversation, May 21, 1974, Box 4, National Security Adviser Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977, Gerald Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan. However, the United States’ relatively light pressure was not the result of ambivalence about the goal of nonproliferation; Kissinger’s talking points for his own meeting with the Japanese foreign minister included reaffirming that “U.S. interest in Japanese ratification [of the NPT] remains high.” Briefing Memorandum from Robert Ingersoll to Kissinger, “Your Meeting with Foreign Minister Ohira Monday, May 20, 1974,” May 1974, Folder “Japan (2),” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box 3, GRFL.

36 Memorandum of Conversation, “President’s Second Meeting with Prime Minister Miki,” August 6, 1975, Box 14, National Security Adviser Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977, GRFL; Memorandum of Conversation, “Secretary’s Meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Miyazawa,” May 27, 1975, Folder “Kissinger Memcons (4),” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box 14, GRFL.
8.3.2 Japanese Burden-Sharing

Japanese fears of abandonment led them to increase their military spending (Cha, 1999: 72; Lanoszka, 2014: 166-167). U.S. policymakers particularly in the Nixon administration sought to make Japan bear a greater defense burden; indeed, this was the hallmark of the Guam Doctrine (Greene, 1975: 78; Cha, 1999: 69-72; Komine, 2014: 88, 93). As Nixon put it to Tanaka in May 1973, “an economic giant cannot remain a political pygmy” (Komine, 2014: 114). This pressure for increased Japanese burden-sharing continued into the Ford administration (Komine, 2014: 117). Much of this pressure came from Congress (Greene, 1975: 80-81), and U.S. officials used this pressure in order to impress upon the Japanese the need for increased burden-sharing, making frequent reference to how Congress might react if Japan did not step up.\(^{37}\)

However, there was a great deal of ambivalence about burden-sharing pressure on Japan, and about the steps Japan was taking to boost its defense effort. American policymakers recognized that the United States could not continue to shoulder the burden as it had previously but also feared that Japanese re-armament and U.S. retrenchment could produce a nuclear, neutral Japan (Greene, 1975: 80-81, 87-91; Welfield, 1988: 447; Komine, 2014: 95-97, 102, 114, 116). Rogers wrote to Nixon regarding U.S. troop withdrawals from Korea that “While some concern on the part of the Japanese is healthy,” it was essential “not to cross over the line that would cause the Japanese to have such doubts about our deterrent capabilities and intentions with respect to Japan and the rest of the area.”\(^{38}\)

As a result, Nixon only sought “moderate increases and qualitative improvements in Japan’s defense efforts, while avoiding any pressure on her to develop substantially larger forces or to play

---


a larger national security role” (Komine, 2014: 96, 112). During Kissinger’s visit in June 1972, he spoke to the question of burden-sharing, declaring to the Japan-US Economic Council that “We are not trying to push Japan into anything. We believe that what the Japanese do will be in terms of their own judgment of their national interests.” He struck the same tone in private, telling Minister of Foreign Affairs Takeo Fukuda that “we are not pushing Japan into rearmament,” and that the United States did not “have any intention of pushing Japan into a military role.” Ultimately, while Japanese military spending increased, it remained under one percent of gross domestic product.

Fears of renewed Japanese militarism did not come to fruition, in no small part due to a combination of Japan’s geographic position, U.S. reassurance, and the United States’ reluctance to push Japan too much for self-reliance (Komine, 2014: 126-127). U.S. policy was to encourage “Japan to continue to improve gradually its conventional military capability for the defense of its territory, but to avoid any regional security role.” More generally, Japanese perceptions of threat were quite low as a result of the country’s separation from the Asian mainland. However, in the


40 “HAK Statement Before Japan-US Economic Council,” June 8, 1972, Folder “HAK’s Japan Visit June 1972 Talking Points JUSEC Luncheon [1 of 7],” NSC Files, HAK Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 21, RMNL. See also Kissinger to Nixon, “My Trip to Japan,” June 19, 1972, Folder “HAK’s Japan Visit June 1972 Talking Points JUSEC Luncheon [2 of 7],” NSC Files, HAK Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 21, RMNL.

41 Memorandum of Conversation, “Mr. Kissinger’s Discussion of U.S.-Japan Political and Economic Relations with Mr. Fukuda,” June 11, 1972, Folder “Japan Trip Memcons – The President,” NSC Files, HAK Office Files, HAK Trip Files, Box 22, RMNL.

42 One reason Japan did not continuously protest proposed U.S. withdrawals from Korea in the late 1970s was Japanese officials’ fears that doing so might lead the Americans to insist that Japan contribute to the defense of South Korea (Lee and Sato, 1982: 107).

43 Memorandum from W.R. Smyser to Robert Ingersoll, “List of Objectives for Japan NSSM,” April 4, 1974, Folder “Japan - NSSM 172 (1),” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box 4, GRFL.

44 Memorandum from Richard Finn to Winston Lord, “Study on Forces at Work in Japan,” April 23, 1974, Folder “Japan - NSSM 172 (5),” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box 4, GRFL, pp. 4-6; Philip Habib to Brent Scowcroft, “Submission of Response to NSSM 210,” October 21, 1974, Folder “Japan - NSSM 210,” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box 5, GRFL, pp. 66-70.

211
next decade the Soviet Union’s growing strength in the Far East – including a large navy that could allow to project power in the Pacific – became an increasingly large concern among the Japanese.45

8.4 Alternative Explanations

8.4.1 U.S. Domestic Politics

There is no evidence that lobbying played a significant role in U.S. reassurance or burden-sharing pressure toward Japan, nor is there much evidence that Japan’s status as a democracy afforded it significant advantages. While it was indeed the most democratic of the United States’ East Asian allies, Japan was also the most strategically valuable, and it is this latter characteristic that U.S. officials most often emphasized. In any case, Japan’s regime type did not insulate it from being vilified by domestic audiences within the United States due to the large trade surplus it ran and to its low level of defense effort relative to its gross domestic product. Domestic resentment within the United States “that Japan was getting a free ride on defense from U.S. workers and taxpayers” was common during the Cold War and contributed to pro-retrenchment sentiment (Stone, 1999: 254).

Indeed, there was considerable protectionist sentiment in Congress and among U.S. manufacturers and farmers who would have to compete with Japanese imports.46 The combination of Japan’s economic resurgence, its subsequent competition with U.S. products, and its relatively low defense burden also reduced Congress’s appetite for aid to Japan.47

45 Memorandum of Conversation, “President Ford - Prime Minister Tanaka - Second Meeting,” November 20, 1974, Folder “President Ford Memcons (1),” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box 16, GRFL; “Japanese Perceptions of the Asian Military Balance,” June 23, 1976, Folder “Japan (11),” National Security Adviser’s Files, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific,” Box 6, GRFL.


8.4.2 Japanese Domestic Politics

In Japanese politics, the dominant conservative party – the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) – was solidly pro-American during the 1960s (Welfield, 1988: 295-296, 299, 317, 335). By contrast, the major left-wing parties – the Social Democratic Party (JSP) and the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) – were far more skeptical of U.S. protection and more in favor of pursuing a more non-aligned foreign policy. The JSP even favored having little to no armed forces, while the JCP leaned toward armed neutrality in the Cold War (Greene, 1975: 7-9, 21, 23-24). Indeed, the United States feared leftist influence in Japan, and on several occasions during the 1950s and 1960s provided financial and other support to conservative Japanese politicians (Lanoszka, 2014: 162).48

A Department of State Guidelines Paper in early 1962 noted that “rule by the Socialists...would not only completely reverse the present trend of U.S.-Japan relations but could also precipitate a major and decisive power shift in Asia toward the Communist bloc with other Asian nations also swinging to a Communist-oriented neutralism.”49

The Ambassador to Japan noted in a July 1965 letter to Secretary of State Rusk that “the leadership of the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party” kept Japan aligned with the United States, but warned that a growth of left-wing influence could jeopardize this.50 A State Department study in 1974 similarly concluded that “a left-wing government in Japan...would probably be inclined to abrogate the Security Treaty.”51 Indeed, the left-wing parties vocally opposed the U.S. war in Vietnam, despite the Japanese government’s support for the war.

American concerns about Japanese exit were indeed positively correlated with the strength of left-wing influence in Japanese politics. During the early 1970s, the Socialists and Communists

51Memorandum from Richard Finn to Winston Lord, “Study on Forces at Work in Japan,” April 23, 1974, Folder “Japan - NSSM 172 (5),” National Security Adviser’s Files, NSC East Asia and Pacific Affairs Staff Files, Box 4, GRFL, p. 41.
gained a great deal of ground in local and national elections, forming the backbone of the “League for Restoration of Ties with China” in the National Diet. In 1972, after Nixon visited Beijing, Sato’s government fell, and opinion in the public and the Diet shifted more in favor toward rapprochement with China – which finally happened in September under Sato’s successor Tanaka. The JSP and JCP gained more seats in December 1972 (Welfield, 1988: 283-284, 292, 311-314, 320, 323, 329).

However, the strength of left-wing parties was largely endogenous to Japanese concerns with U.S. reliability. Socialist and Communist influence increased in large part because U.S. retrenchment from East Asia and its sudden, non-consultative opening to China made a more independent foreign policy seem more attractive to the Japanese. Indeed, the U.S. Ambassador to Japan had argued in late 1962 that troop withdrawals would “make the Japanese feel that we were abandoning them” and “seriously damage the position of the present pro-American conservative leadership in Japan.” 52 Foreign Minister Kishi warned the United States in 1966 that withdrawals from Korea would lead to Socialist gains in Japan. 53 Even the LDP began to de-emphasize the importance of the U.S. alliance in the late 1960s and early 1970s and increasingly favored an independent foreign policy; conservatives felt that despite their loyalty they had been let down by the United States (Greene, 1975: 11 Welfield, 1988: 329). During the 1969 election, for example, in the wake of widespread concerns about American reliability, many LDP candidates indicated in campaign speeches that the alliance with the United States was only “a temporary evil” (Curtis, 1970: 863).

In short, then, while left-wing parties did tend to be more in favor of exit than right-wing parties in Japan, the relative influence of leftist parties was largely a function of perceived U.S. unreliability. Moreover, when the U.S. commitment seemed increasingly in doubt, even the conservatives questioned the wisdom of remaining loyal to and dependent upon the United States.

---

8.5 Conclusion

As I expect, concern about Japanese exit motivated the United States to provide considerable assurances that the U.S. commitment to protect Japan was credible and durable. The credibility of this threat of exit grew during the 1970s, as pressure to retrench and reduce the costs of U.S. commitments mounted, and as the United States pursued détente with its Communist rivals, in the wake of the Vietnam War. This, in turn, generated significant worry that Japan might move closer to China and the Soviet Union and also pursue an autonomous defense buildup that included obtaining nuclear weapons, thus leading the United States to reassure Japan even as it halfheartedly encouraged increased Japanese burden-sharing. The United States’ ability to coerce Japan into making a higher defense effort was thus undercut by its concern that too much devolution would lead Japan to go its own way, as well as by Japan’s relatively secure geographic position – the result of its being separated from the Asian mainland by water.

Additionally, the combination of Japan’s latent military potential and geography, and U.S. retrenchment pressure, provide more explanatory power for U.S. reassurance and burden-sharing pressure than do alternative explanations. Japan was not able to profit good feeling in U.S. domestic politics owing to either direct lobbying efforts or to its democratic status. Indeed, on the contrary, Japan was often vilified by American domestic actors due to its comparatively low defense burden and to the U.S.-Japan trade deficit. Moreover, even though left-wing influence in Japanese politics raised concerns about Japan leaving the alliance, it was in fact concern with U.S. unreliability – raised by U.S. retrenchment and détente with the Communist world – that made left-wing parties’ positions favoring increased independence from the United States more attractive in Japanese politics.
Chapter 9

Conclusion

9.1 Summary

This dissertation was motivated by one central puzzle: why do great powers go to great lengths to reassure their allies of their protection, when doing so can have negative consequences that include free-riding and moral hazard problems? In order to address this, I investigated two primary research questions: 1) under what conditions do great powers reassure their allies; and 2) under what conditions are great powers able to make their protection conditional on allied burden-sharing? I argued that reassurance is the result of bargaining – whether tacit or explicit – and that it is largely preventive in nature, designed to discourage allies from pursuing outside options and exiting the alliance. Additionally, allies are most likely to increasing their burden-sharing contributions when the patron has a credible threat of abandonment over them. Thus, reassurance and burden-sharing need not be at odds as long as the patron can combine its assurances with threats of abandonment.

I argued that several key factors shape bargains over reassurance and burden-sharing. First, the availability of outside options for both allies and the patron determines how easily they can find alternative sources of support. The more outside options allies have, the greater incentive the patron has to reassure them. Similarly, when the patron has outside options it can more credibly threaten to abandon allies and thus coerce them into greater burden-sharing contributions. Second, allies
with strategic value to the patron are both more capable of extracting reassurance and better able to deflect burden-sharing pressure. Strategically valuable allies have more potent threats to exit the alliance, while the patron’s threat to abandon them is less credible because they are intrinsically important to its interests.

Third, when the patron faces resource constraints that bring its reliability into question, reassurance and burden-sharing are both likely to rise in tandem. In such circumstances, the patron’s threat of abandonment is more inherently credible, as maintaining its alliances becomes more costly. At the same time, however, allies are likely to question the patron’s staying power, and are thus likely to consider outside options if the patron does not reassure them.

Finally, the external threat environment can shape burden-sharing outcomes, but its effect depends on whether it is allies or the patron that perceive the threat more severely. When allies’ perception of threat is elevated, the patron’s threat of abandonment carries more weight for them as the consequences of being abandoned are more severe, and may include loss of territory or independence. The patron is thus better positioned to make its protection conditional on their burden-sharing efforts. By contrast, when the patron’s perception of threat increases, its threat of abandonment becomes less credible, as abandoning allies means potentially ceding ground to adversaries who might encroach upon them.

I tested the theory using a mixed-methods approach that combined econometric analysis with historical case studies, using data on U.S. alliances since World War II. The quantitative results showed that allies with stronger outside options receive more reassurance, while the United States increased its reassurance during periods of resource constraints, when allies questioned its reliability. As for burden-sharing, the results suggest that the United States has a more difficult time pressuring strategically valuable allies into higher contributions, as the U.S. threat to abandon these allies is not as credible. By contrast, allies that are geographically vulnerable tend to spend more on defense. Additionally, while periods of resource constraints featured more reassurance, they also featured more burden-sharing, with allies responding to the increased probability of U.S.
abandonment.

As for the case studies, all four cases showed the deep concern U.S. policymakers had about the possibility of allies pursuing nuclear weapons, seeking rapprochement with the Communist bloc, and distancing themselves from their alliance with the United States. U.S. officials thus used reassurance to maintain allies’ loyalty and discourage them from exploiting outside options. Similarly, resource and political constraints during the late 1960s and early 1970s, brought about by the costs of Vietnam and an ailing U.S. economy, raised concerns about U.S. reliability. This facilitated U.S. efforts to encourage allied burden-sharing, but nevertheless led U.S. policymakers to reassure their allies in an effort to discourage them from seeking nuclear weapons and unilateral détente with the Communist bloc.

Third, the cases of South Korea and West Germany show the leverage the United States had over allies that were geographically contiguous to adversary states. By contrast, the United States proved unwilling or unable to coerce the United Kingdom and Japan into making higher burden-sharing contributions. Fourth, evidence from the UK and West German cases suggest that the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was not associated with increased allied contributions. By contrast, in the aftermath of the invasion, the elevated U.S. perception of threat reduced allies’ incentives for increased burden-sharing. Finally, the strategic value of West Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom provided these allies with bargaining leverage that they were able to convert into high levels of U.S. support, as well as lower burden-sharing contributions than they might have otherwise made. This was especially notable in the case of the UK, on which the United States depended heavily for basing access – and, until the 1970s, for its presence “east of Suez.”

9.2 Avenues for Future Research

In addition to providing and empirically testing a theory of reassurance and burden-sharing, this study suggests numerous avenues for future research. A number of scholars have argued that the formal design of an alliance pact – for example, whether it contains provisions for economic
linkage or joint military coordination – can greatly affect its perceived credibility (Morrow, 1994; Leeds and Anac, 2005; Long and Leeds, 2006). Yet work seeking to explain variation in alliance treaties is rare. Moreover, few studies focus on how bargaining leverage can shape alliance design, and those that do implicitly assume that great powers can have their way (Kim, 2011a; Benson, 2012; Mattes, 2012). In focusing on how bargaining shapes informal commitments, this study suggests avenues for further research on how bargaining might also shape formal alliance design.

Second, future research could shed light on the effectiveness of reassurance measures. This dissertation has focused on explaining the causes and consequences of reassurance in asymmetric alliances, but has been largely agnostic on the question of which forms of reassurance are the most effective. Further work could identify the conditions under which assurances actually render allies more confident in a patron’s protection.

Third, additional research could be done on the conditions under which burden-sharing is a salient political issue to domestic actors, as well as how much burden-sharing is “enough” to deter major calls for putting pressure on allies. Work here could be a useful blend of international relations scholarship with the subfields of comparative or American politics. Moreover, psychological scholarship could provide micro-foundations to help understand demands for “fairness” (Kertzer and Rathbun, 2015).1

Finally, more work remains to be done on how reassurance can be used – or withheld – as a means of restraining allies. As many other authors have pointed out, alliance restraint is largely understudied (Weitsman, 2004; Pressman, 2008; Cha, 2009). While this dissertation largely focuses on conditional reassurances in the context of burden-sharing, additional studies could focus more directly on how patrons use threats and assurances to control their allies’ aggression. As I argue here, reassurance can actually work as a means of discouraging allies from risky behavior by making them more secure. However, as other scholars have pointed out, reassurance may in some cases foster moral hazard (Fearon, 1997; Kim, 2011a; Benson, 2012; Posen, 2014). Future

1I thank Josh Kertzer for making this suggestion.
research could shed light on the conditions under which reassurance leads to either outcome, particularly in the context of crisis diplomacy, as this dissertation is focused largely on reassurance outside the context of immediate crises.

9.3 Policy Implications

The project also carries policy implications. In the wake of Donald Trump’s presidency, a number of allies have expressed doubts about the credibility of U.S. commitments. My findings suggest that withholding reassurance and deliberately casting doubt on U.S. protection makes allies prone to reconsider their reliance on the United States and instead pursue outside options. Indeed, evidence suggests that U.S. partners may be doing just that, with NATO allies increasingly debating the merits of an independent European nuclear deterrent. Similarly, the credibility of the U.S. alliance has come into question in South Korea and Japan, with a September 2017 poll showing that a majority of South Koreans favored obtaining nuclear weapons.

The United States’ network of alliances carries a number of purported benefits, including the ability to project power, deter adversaries, and mitigate regional security dilemmas. Yet there is little systematic understanding of how the United States maintains its alliances, or of how costly it is to maintain them. These questions are even more pertinent in the era of the Trump administration, in which many alliances are in doubt, allies are looking for reassurance, and burden-sharing is a major U.S. foreign policy priority. This study provides insights into how bargains over reassurance and burden-sharing have been made in the past, and therefore informs policymakers on how to navigate this period of change.

Additionally, this study helps clarify the conditions under which burden-sharing pressure is

---


more or less likely to achieve success. Reassurance need not be detrimental to burden-sharing; rather, when used in tandem with threats of abandonment in the case of noncompliance, it plays a central role in inducing allies to contribute more. This is especially the case during periods in which patrons face pressure to retrench and reduce their commitments. In such circumstances, the patron’s challenge is not one of convincing allies that it will reduce its commitment if the ally does not comply, but rather one of convincing them that it will not reduce its level of commitment if they do comply. Otherwise, allies may hedge and avoid increasing their share of the burden, in the hope of exchanging burden-sharing effort for assurances of the patron’s continued commitment rather than giving the patron an excuse to retrench. Henry Kissinger put the problem well in his memoir: “The greater the pressures for troop withdrawals in the United States, the greater the disinclination of our allies to augment their military establishments lest they justify further American withdrawals” (Kissinger, 1979: 394).

\section*{9.4 Broader Implications}

Beyond contributions to the academic literature, this study carries a number of larger implications for our understanding of international politics. For one, this dissertation contributes to why great powers – and in particular the United States – have gone to great lengths to render allies confident in their protection. Reassurance has been argued by some to be suboptimal and potentially irrational (Walt, 2005, 2009; Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007; Posen, 2014). But this analysis suggests that both policy prescriptions for reassurance and policy prescriptions for disengagement are often incomplete. Reassurance is not an unmitigated good; however, at the same time, arguments that treat reassurance and free-riding as directly related, and which in turn portray reassurance as suboptimal and prescribe disengagement as a recipe for increased allied burden-sharing, are misleading. The patron’s level of assurance and allies’ level of burden-sharing should be considered the product of

\footnote{On the importance of combining threats and assurances, see Schelling (1966), Davis (2000), and Sechser (2007).

\footnote{Doug Bandow, “President Shouldn’t Reassure Europe,” CATO Institute, June 3, 2014; Justin Logan, “Japan: The Ultimate Free Rider?” National Interest, April 29, 2015.}
strategic interaction and bargaining; neither should necessarily be considered as suboptimal, but rather as a reflection of the bargaining power of both sides. Moreover, patrons can use reassurance as a *quid pro quo* for allies to support them in ways that they might not otherwise – for example, in assisting the patron’s foreign military interventions or fighting its local adversaries for it. Reduced reassurance may reduce allies’ incentive to rely on the United States, and instead encourage them to pursue more independent foreign policies which may not align with U.S. interests.

More broadly, the project contributes to understanding how great powers determine their alliance commitments, as well as how costly these commitments are. Classic works in the international relations literature argue that free-riding is inherent in great powers’ alliances with weaker partners, and that the costs of maintaining these asymmetric partnerships can even contribute to overextension and long-term economic decline (Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966; Gilpin, 1981). This insight, in turn, has contributed to debate over the course of U.S. grand strategy. On the one hand are scholars who prescribe retrenchment as a way to mitigate free-riding and rein in the costs of U.S. commitments (Gholz, Press, and Sapolsky, 1997; MacDonald and Parent, 2011; Posen, 2014). Others, by contrast, argue that the consequences of free-riding are overstated, and that the benefits of alliances far outweigh their costs (Norrlof, 2010; Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth, 2012). My project adds to this debate by studying not only how great powers maintain cohesion and loyalty in their alliances, but also how and under what conditions they are able to do so while simultaneously minimizing free-riding.
Bibliography


Crescenzi, Mark J.C., Jacob D. Kathman, Katja B. Kleinberg, and Reed M. Wood. 2012. “Relia-


URL: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/


University Press.
Kroenig, Matthew. 2010. *Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear


URL: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/


URL: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu


109.


URL: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/


URL: http://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/travels


Atlantic Highlands, NJ: The Athlone Press.


Appendix A1

Supplementary Quantitative Analysis

A1.1 Data Description: Reassurance

- Table A1.1 contains various summary statistics for my variables.
- Tables A1.2 and A1.3 provide pairwise correlation coefficients between various measures of reassurance during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, respectively.
- Figure A1.1 shows the over-time trend of annual U.S. statements and visits.
### Table A1.1: Summary statistics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Statements+Visits</td>
<td>1.213</td>
<td>1.798</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>0.352</td>
<td>0.478</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US GDP growth</td>
<td>3.083</td>
<td>2.508</td>
<td>-3.588</td>
<td>7.754</td>
<td>1406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (log)</td>
<td>25.632</td>
<td>1.818</td>
<td>19.495</td>
<td>29.039</td>
<td>1438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear latency</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.444</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent alliances (log)</td>
<td>1.054</td>
<td>0.516</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.497</td>
<td>1450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent alliances</td>
<td>2.437</td>
<td>2.984</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US-Adversary hostility</td>
<td>4.229</td>
<td>5.04</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally-Adversary hostility</td>
<td>0.523</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDPpc (log)</td>
<td>9.24</td>
<td>1.075</td>
<td>4.889</td>
<td>10.996</td>
<td>1438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land border w/ adversary</td>
<td>0.189</td>
<td>0.392</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance to adversary</td>
<td>2714.352</td>
<td>2226.39</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>10691</td>
<td>1464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entente</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>0.282</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1479</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table A1.2: Correlations between measures of reassurance, Cold War period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Statements+Visits</th>
<th>Reassurance (WEIS)</th>
<th>Troops (log)</th>
<th>JMEs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Statements+Visits</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reassurance (WEIS)</td>
<td>0.421</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops (log)</td>
<td>0.265</td>
<td>0.293</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMEs</td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.414</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table A1.3: Correlations between measures of reassurance, post-Cold War period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Statements+Visits</th>
<th>Reassurances (KingLowe)</th>
<th>Troops (log)</th>
<th>JMEs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Statements+Visits</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reassurances (KingLowe)</td>
<td>0.662</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops (log)</td>
<td>0.413</td>
<td>0.507</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMEs</td>
<td>0.242</td>
<td>0.242</td>
<td>0.401</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A1.2: Correlations between measures of reassurance, Cold War period.

Table A1.3: Correlations between measures of reassurance, post-Cold War period.
Figure A1.1: U.S. statements and visits over time.
A1.2 Robustness Checks: Reassurance

- Tables A1.4 and A1.5 add more control variables to the main results from Tables 4.1 and 4.2.
- Table A1.6 adds a lagged dependent variable to the main results from Table 4.2.\(^1\)
- Tables A1.7 and A1.8 add decade fixed effects to the main results from Tables 4.1 and 4.2.
- Table A1.9 and uses alternative proxies for allied latent military potential: their logarithmized population and CINC scores. Data on population are from Gleditsch (2002), while the CINC score comes from version 4.0 of the Correlates of War’s National Material Capabilities dataset (Singer, 1987).
- Table A1.10 uses an alternative proxy for the aftermath of foreign wars: namely, a dummy variable indicating whether a year was on in which the United States withdrew troops from Korea (1953-1954), Vietnam (1969-1975), or Iraq (2008-2010).
- Table A1.11 runs the analysis using the logarithmized number of U.S. foreign-deployed troops on allied territory as the dependent variable.
- Tables A1.12 and A1.13 run the analysis using joint military exercises (JMEs) as the dependent variable. The results for H4 are somewhat weaker than when using statements and visits, which is likely due to the smaller number of observations; these hypotheses rely on annual variation, and thus reducing the number of years in the sample reduces the power of the analysis.
- Tables A1.14 and A1.15 add variables that capture alternative explanations (presidential partisanship; presidential election cycles; ally regime type; ally political ideology) to the main results from Tables 4.1 and 4.2.

\(^1\)The variables used to test H1-H3 vary little, if at all, over time, and thus cannot be included with a lagged dependent variable.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Statements+Visits</th>
<th>(2) Statements+Visits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP (log)</td>
<td>0.345***</td>
<td>0.360***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear latency</td>
<td>0.397*</td>
<td>0.415*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.193)</td>
<td>(0.202)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent alliances (log)</td>
<td>0.173</td>
<td>0.179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.160)</td>
<td>(0.146)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common alliances (%)</td>
<td>0.172</td>
<td>0.198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.387)</td>
<td>(0.313)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDPpc (log)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.143)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geostrategic location</td>
<td>-0.209</td>
<td>-0.220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.206)</td>
<td>(0.222)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance to adversary</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land border w/ adversary</td>
<td>-0.087</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.189)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entente</td>
<td>0.393</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.316)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally-Adversary hostility</td>
<td>0.057*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDs</td>
<td>0.048**</td>
<td>0.037*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country FE</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T,T2,T3</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1357</td>
<td>1345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>-1817.394</td>
<td>-1784.829</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. \( ^{+}p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 \)

Table A1.4: Results for variation in reassurance across allies, with additional control variables.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Statements+Visits</th>
<th>(2) Statements+Visits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>0.256* (0.108)</td>
<td>0.214* (0.123)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US GDP growth</td>
<td>-0.026* (0.013)</td>
<td>-0.030* (0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversary aggression</td>
<td>-0.040 (0.095)</td>
<td>-0.009 (0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US-Adversary hostility</td>
<td>-0.009 (0.008)</td>
<td>0.060* (0.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally-Adversary hostility</td>
<td>0.009 (0.008)</td>
<td>0.009 (0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversary/US nuclear balance</td>
<td>-0.133 (0.151)</td>
<td>-0.075 (0.159)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDs</td>
<td>0.025* (0.011)</td>
<td>0.024* (0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversary CINC</td>
<td>2.077+ (1.215)</td>
<td>2.422* (1.086)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T,T2,T3</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region FE</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year FE</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1373</td>
<td>1373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>-1759.596</td>
<td>-1755.695</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. \( ^* p < 0.10, ^* p < 0.05, ^{**} p < 0.01, ^{***} p < 0.001 \)

Table A1.5: Results for variation in reassurance over time, with additional control variables.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Statements+Visits</th>
<th>(2) Statements+Visits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>0.233*</td>
<td>0.205*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
<td>(0.116)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US GDP growth</td>
<td>-0.024*</td>
<td>-0.032*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversary aggression</td>
<td>-0.061</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.096)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US-Adversary hostility</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally-Adversary hostility</td>
<td>0.058*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statements+Visits (lag)</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T,T2,T3</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region FE</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year FE</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1346</td>
<td>1346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>-1738.881</td>
<td>-1735.279</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

Table A1.6: Results for variation in reassurance over time, including a lagged dependent variable.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Statements+Visits</th>
<th>(2) Statements+Visits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP (log)</td>
<td>0.342***</td>
<td>0.361***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear latency</td>
<td>0.441*</td>
<td>0.445*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.210)</td>
<td>(0.212)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent alliances (log)</td>
<td>0.199</td>
<td>0.212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.176)</td>
<td>(0.160)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common alliances (%)</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.403)</td>
<td>(0.320)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geostrategic location</td>
<td>-0.170</td>
<td>-0.193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.229)</td>
<td>(0.238)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDPpc (log)</td>
<td>-0.105</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.143)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance to adversary</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land border w/ adversary</td>
<td>-0.070</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.207)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entente</td>
<td>0.486</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.315)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally-Adversary hostility</td>
<td>0.043*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T,T2,T3</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region FE</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year FE</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decade FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1357</td>
<td>1345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>-1866.015</td>
<td>-1830.884</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10,* p < 0.05,** p < 0.01,*** p < 0.001

Table A1.7: Results for variation in reassurance across allies, including decade fixed effects instead of time trends or year fixed effects.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Statements+Visits</th>
<th>(2) Statements+Visits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>0.234*</td>
<td>0.214*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.106)</td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US GDP growth</td>
<td>-0.020*</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversary aggression</td>
<td>-0.040</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.102)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US-Adversary hostility</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally-Adversary hostility</td>
<td>0.062**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T,T2,T3</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region FE</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year FE</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decade FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1373</td>
<td>1373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>-1769.677</td>
<td>-1765.037</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

Table A1.8: Results for variation in reassurance over time, including decade fixed effects instead of time trends or year fixed effects.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Statements+Visits</th>
<th>(2) Statements+Visits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (log)</td>
<td>0.359***</td>
<td>39.597***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td>(6.698)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>0.445*</td>
<td>0.437*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.208)</td>
<td>(0.212)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear latency</td>
<td>0.272+</td>
<td>0.254+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.153)</td>
<td>(0.138)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent alliances (log)</td>
<td>0.222</td>
<td>0.316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.319)</td>
<td>(0.266)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common alliances (%)</td>
<td>0.445</td>
<td>0.533+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.316)</td>
<td>(0.278)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geostrategic location</td>
<td>-0.174</td>
<td>-0.224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.230)</td>
<td>(0.196)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDPpc (log)</td>
<td>0.251+</td>
<td>-0.257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.133)</td>
<td>(0.158)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance to adversary</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land border w/ adversary</td>
<td>-0.067</td>
<td>-0.097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.200)</td>
<td>(0.213)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entente</td>
<td>0.494</td>
<td>0.533+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.316)</td>
<td>(0.278)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally-Adversary hostility</td>
<td>0.059*</td>
<td>0.059*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                                | No                    | No                    |
| Country FE                     |                       |                       |
| T,T2,T3                        | No                    | No                    |
| Region FE                      | Yes                   | Yes                   |
| Year FE                        | Yes                   | Yes                   |
| N                              | 1343                  | 1343                  |
| Log-likelihood                 | -1789.102             | -1778.188             |

Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. ^p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

Table A1.9: Results for variation in reassurance across allies, using alternative proxies for allies’ latent military power.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Statements+Visits</th>
<th>(2) Statements+Visits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War withdrawal (dummy)</td>
<td>0.184*</td>
<td>0.149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.093)</td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US GDP growth</td>
<td>-0.028*</td>
<td>-0.033*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversary aggression</td>
<td>-0.065</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.093)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US-Adversary hostility</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally-Adversary hostility</td>
<td>0.061**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T,T2,T3</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region FE</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year FE</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1373</td>
<td>1373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>-1766.247</td>
<td>-1761.876</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. $^+ p < 0.10, ^* p < 0.05, ^{**} p < 0.01, ^{***} p < 0.001$

Table A1.10: Results for variation in reassurance over time, using war withdrawal as a proxy for the aftermath of costly foreign wars.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Troops (log)</td>
<td>Troops (log)</td>
<td>Troops (log)</td>
<td>Troops (log)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (log)</td>
<td>1.039*</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.964*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.434)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.460)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear latency</td>
<td>2.403**</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.843</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.850)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.682)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent alliances (log)</td>
<td>1.093</td>
<td>-0.790</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.993)</td>
<td>(1.135)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common alliances (%)</td>
<td>1.557</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.380)</td>
<td>(1.960)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geostrategic location</td>
<td>-0.066</td>
<td>0.722</td>
<td>0.605</td>
<td>-0.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.821)</td>
<td>(1.013)</td>
<td>(1.235)</td>
<td>(0.783)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDPpc (log)</td>
<td>-0.806+</td>
<td>-0.898</td>
<td>-0.132</td>
<td>-1.112+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.446)</td>
<td>(0.588)</td>
<td>(0.681)</td>
<td>(0.447)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance to adversary</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land border w/ adversary</td>
<td>0.943</td>
<td>1.031</td>
<td>1.086</td>
<td>0.810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.647)</td>
<td>(0.968)</td>
<td>(1.220)</td>
<td>(0.603)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entente</td>
<td>-0.917</td>
<td>-1.060</td>
<td>-0.490</td>
<td>-1.256+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.614)</td>
<td>(0.935)</td>
<td>(0.889)</td>
<td>(0.740)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally-Adversary hostility</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.081)</td>
<td>(0.091)</td>
<td>(0.092)</td>
<td>(0.085)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                                | (1)                     | (2)                      | (3)                      | (4)                      |
|                                | No                      | No                       | No                       | No                       |
| Country FE                    |                         |                         |                          |                          |
| T,T2,T3                      | No                      | No                       | No                       | No                       |
| Region FE                    | Yes                     | Yes                      | Yes                      | Yes                      |
| Year FE                      | Yes                     | Yes                      | Yes                      | Yes                      |
| N                             | 1422                    | 1422                     | 1405                     | 1405                     |
| Log-likelihood               | -2967.157               | -3144.654                | -3214.369                | -2910.805                |

Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10,* p < 0.05,** p < 0.01,*** p < 0.001

Table A1.11: Results for variation in reassurance across allies, using logarithmized foreign-deployed U.S. troops as the dependent variable.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) JMEs</th>
<th>(2) JMEs</th>
<th>(3) JMEs</th>
<th>(4) JMEs</th>
<th>(5) JMEs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP (log)</td>
<td>0.350***</td>
<td>0.262***</td>
<td>0.255***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td>(0.068)</td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear latency</td>
<td>0.772***</td>
<td>0.290</td>
<td>0.429+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.165)</td>
<td>(0.219)</td>
<td>(0.244)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent alliances (log)</td>
<td>0.656*</td>
<td>0.131</td>
<td>-0.178</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.306)</td>
<td>(0.310)</td>
<td>(0.292)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common alliances (%)</td>
<td>0.537</td>
<td>0.388</td>
<td>-0.267</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.741)</td>
<td>(0.668)</td>
<td>(0.546)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geostrategic location</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.380*</td>
<td>0.411</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>0.206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.195)</td>
<td>(0.161)</td>
<td>(0.301)</td>
<td>(0.161)</td>
<td>(0.159)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDPpc (log)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.157</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.150)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance to adversary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land border w/ adversary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.059</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.208)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entente</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-2.150***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.462)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally-Adversary hostility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country FE</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T,T2,T3</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>-934.442</td>
<td>-963.109</td>
<td>-1002.139</td>
<td>-928.588</td>
<td>-898.459</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

Table A1.12: Main results for variation in reassurance across allies, using joint military exercises as the dependent variable.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) JMEs</th>
<th>(2) JMEs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US GDP growth</td>
<td>-0.021*</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversary aggression</td>
<td>0.150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.107)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US-Adversary hostility</td>
<td>0.024*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally-Adversary hostility</td>
<td>-0.080**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T,T2,T3</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region FE</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year FE</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>-936.580</td>
<td>-931.352</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. †p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

Table A1.13: Main results for variation in reassurance over time, using joint military exercises as the dependent variable.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Statements+Visits</th>
<th>(2) Statements+Visits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP (log)</td>
<td>0.344***</td>
<td>0.368***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
<td>(0.068)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear latency</td>
<td>0.431*</td>
<td>0.417*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.214)</td>
<td>(0.206)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent alliances (log)</td>
<td>0.265</td>
<td>0.298*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.171)</td>
<td>(0.149)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common alliances (%)</td>
<td>0.252</td>
<td>0.303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.405)</td>
<td>(0.301)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geostrategic location</td>
<td>-0.185</td>
<td>-0.196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.232)</td>
<td>(0.237)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDPpc (log)</td>
<td>-0.152</td>
<td>-0.152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.159)</td>
<td>(0.159)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance to adversary</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land border w/ adversary</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.210)</td>
<td>(0.210)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entente</td>
<td>0.608</td>
<td>0.608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.371)</td>
<td>(0.371)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally-Adversary hostility</td>
<td>0.060*</td>
<td>0.060*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-wing seats</td>
<td>-0.791+</td>
<td>-0.579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.479)</td>
<td>(0.473)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country FE</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T,T2,T3</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1296</td>
<td>1284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>-1781.876</td>
<td>-1745.992</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, ****p < 0.001

Table A1.14: Main results for variation in reassurance across allies, controlling for alternative explanations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Statements+Visits</th>
<th>(2) Statements+Visits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>0.299**</td>
<td>0.244+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.108)</td>
<td>(0.127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US GDP growth</td>
<td>-0.021+</td>
<td>-0.025+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversary aggression</td>
<td>-0.054</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.083)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US-Adversary hostility</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally-Adversary hostility</td>
<td>0.060*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.084)</td>
<td>(0.091)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-election year</td>
<td>-0.227***</td>
<td>-0.240***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
<td>(0.068)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lame duck President</td>
<td>-0.080</td>
<td>-0.101+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-wing seats</td>
<td>-0.531*</td>
<td>-0.581*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.250)</td>
<td>(0.238)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country FE</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T,T2,T3</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region FE</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year FE</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1311</td>
<td>1311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>-1719.452</td>
<td>-1715.359</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

Table A1.15: Main results for variation in reassurance over time, controlling for alternative explanations.
A1.3 Data Description: Burden-Sharing

- Table A1.16 contains various summary statistics for my variables. Table A1.17 provides pairwise correlation coefficients between my independent and dependent variables.

- Table A1.18 shows the correlation between my independent variables and control variables.

- Figure A1.2 shows the over-time trends of the average annual value of allied military spending.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Δ Milex (%)</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.189</td>
<td>-0.959</td>
<td>1.989</td>
<td>1197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milex (log)</td>
<td>21.18</td>
<td>4.375</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24.852</td>
<td>1242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milex</td>
<td>10167.822</td>
<td>14416.196</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>62073.395</td>
<td>1242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth</td>
<td>3.853</td>
<td>7.38</td>
<td>-51.651</td>
<td>139.259</td>
<td>1226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversary aggression</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.384</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td>0.289</td>
<td>0.454</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US GDP growth</td>
<td>3.018</td>
<td>2.396</td>
<td>-3.588</td>
<td>7.654</td>
<td>1226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US-Adversary conflict</td>
<td>4.567</td>
<td>4.999</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally-adversary hostility</td>
<td>0.547</td>
<td>1.477</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivalries (lag)</td>
<td>1.333</td>
<td>1.501</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally MID's</td>
<td>1.966</td>
<td>3.378</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversary CINC</td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.218</td>
<td>1289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geostrategic location</td>
<td>0.312</td>
<td>0.463</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entente</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>0.283</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (log)</td>
<td>25.774</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>19.495</td>
<td>29.039</td>
<td>1258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDPpc (log)</td>
<td>9.343</td>
<td>1.057</td>
<td>4.889</td>
<td>10.996</td>
<td>1258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td>0.538</td>
<td>0.563</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial power</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.214</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>6.722</td>
<td>5.966</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1236</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A1.16: Summary statistics.
Table A1.17: Correlations between primary dependent and independent variables.
Table A1.18: Correlations between independent variables and control variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.171</td>
<td>-0.437</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>-0.094</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>-0.125</td>
<td>-0.108</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.580</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.254</td>
<td>0.403</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>-0.020</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
<td>-0.038</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>-0.043</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>0.408</td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>-0.144</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.047</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-0.041</td>
<td>-0.078</td>
<td>-0.162</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.248</td>
<td>-0.079</td>
<td>0.313</td>
<td>-0.402</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.158</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>-0.135</td>
<td>-0.236</td>
<td>-0.099</td>
<td>-0.241</td>
<td>-0.171</td>
<td>-0.266</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>-0.494</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>-0.047</td>
<td>0.320</td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.191</td>
<td>-0.150</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>-0.122</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.116</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>-0.085</td>
<td>-0.109</td>
<td>-0.205</td>
<td>-0.068</td>
<td>-0.209</td>
<td>-0.188</td>
<td>-0.283</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>-0.512</td>
<td>0.369</td>
<td>0.656</td>
<td>-0.136</td>
<td>-0.100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table above shows the correlations between the independent variables and control variables. The values in the table represent the correlation coefficients between each pair of variables. The correlations range from -1 to 1, where 1 indicates a perfect positive correlation, 0 indicates no correlation, and -1 indicates a perfect negative correlation.
Figure A1.2: Allied military spending over time.
A1.4 Robustness Checks: Burden-Sharing

- Table A1.19 uses a variety of different model specifications. Models 1-2 use a dummy variable to indicate years in which the United States withdrew troops from a protracted foreign war (Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan) in place of postwar U.S. presidencies to measure the aftermath of foreign wars. Models 3-4 cluster standard errors by year instead of by country. Models 5-6 add a linear time trend to account for any secular temporal trends. Models 7-8 control for the U.S.-Soviet nuclear balance, measured using the ratio of Soviet-to-U.S. nuclear weapons.

- Table A1.20 controls for a key alternative explanation: allies’ political ideology. I do so by adding a variable to the models which captures the percentage of legislative seats held by left-wing parties. To measure left-wing influence in government, I use the percentage of parliamentary seats controlled by left-wing parties. Data come from the Comparative Manifestos Project (Lehmann et al., 2015). For non-democratic allies, this variable takes the value of 0.
Table A1.19: Results for change in military expenditures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cold War</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Full Sample</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>∆ Milex (%)</td>
<td>0.065*</td>
<td>0.050*</td>
<td>0.046+</td>
<td>0.043+</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War withdrawal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postwar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US GDP growth</td>
<td>-0.009*</td>
<td>-0.005*</td>
<td>-0.009**</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.010*</td>
<td>-0.006**</td>
<td>-0.010*</td>
<td>-0.006**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversary aggression</td>
<td>-0.078**</td>
<td>-0.091**</td>
<td>-0.068**</td>
<td>-0.081*</td>
<td>-0.072**</td>
<td>-0.079**</td>
<td>-0.070**</td>
<td>-0.073**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US-Adversary conflict</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally-adversary hostility</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.007**</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.007*</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.007*</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.007*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.**

*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, ****p < 0.001
\[
\begin{array}{lcccc}
 & (1) & (2) & (3) & (4) \\
\hline
\Delta \text{Milex (lag)} & -0.000^{***} & -0.000^{***} & & \\
 & (0.000) & (0.000) & & \\
\Delta \text{Milex (\% lag)} & 0.130^{**} & 0.073^{+} & & \\
 & (0.038) & (0.039) & & \\
GDP growth & 0.002 & 0.002 & 0.007 & 0.012^{**} \\
 & (0.002) & (0.001) & (0.007) & (0.004) \\
Adversary aggression & -0.066^{**} & -0.080^{**} & & \\
 & (0.023) & (0.024) & & \\
Postwar & 0.032^{+} & 0.023 & & \\
 & (0.018) & (0.019) & & \\
US GDP growth & -0.009^{*} & -0.006^{**} & & \\
 & (0.004) & (0.002) & & \\
US-Adversary conflict & 0.002 & 0.001 & & \\
 & (0.001) & (0.001) & & \\
Ally-adversary hostility & -0.004 & -0.008^{*} & -0.003 & 0.011 \\
 & (0.003) & (0.003) & (0.032) & (0.022) \\
Geostrategic location & -0.285^{*} & -0.164 & & \\
 & (0.139) & (0.135) & & \\
Entente & 0.197 & 0.165 & & \\
 & (0.472) & (0.494) & & \\
GDP (log) & 1.064^{***} & 1.096^{***} & & \\
 & (0.116) & (0.073) & & \\
GDPpc (log) & 0.102 & 0.141 & & \\
 & (0.159) & (0.148) & & \\
Vulnerability & 0.337^{*} & 0.209^{+} & & \\
 & (0.123) & (0.116) & & \\
Colonial power & 0.813^{**} & 0.705^{**} & & \\
 & (0.229) & (0.201) & & \\
Polity & -0.001 & -0.012 & & \\
 & (0.023) & (0.019) & & \\
Left-wing seats & -0.113^{***} & -0.067^{**} & 0.178 & 0.389 \\
 & (0.026) & (0.022) & (0.427) & (0.325) \\
Adversary CINC & 0.300^{**} & & & \\
 & & (0.103) & & \\
\hline
\text{Region FE} & No & No & Yes & Yes \\
\text{Year FE} & No & No & Yes & Yes \\
N & 653 & 1133 & 653 & 1168 \\
R^2 & 0.080 & 0.066 & 0.928 & 0.930 \\
\end{array}
\]

Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item $p < 0.10,$ $^+ p < 0.05,$ $^{**} p < 0.01,$ $^{***} p < 0.001$
\end{itemize}}

Table A1.20: Controlling for alternative explanation.
A1.5 Regional Classifications

In this paper I follow the Correlates of War’s regional classifications – but with two changes. First, COW codes Pakistan as being in the same region as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines, but for my purposes Pakistan has a significantly different threat environment. Thus, I create a separate region for the countries of Central and South Asia (including Pakistan). Second, COW codes Oceania as being a separate region from East Asia, but for my purposes their security environments were similar. Thus, I code Australia and New Zealand as being in the same region as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines.

As robustness checks, I also code Pakistan as being in the Middle East (along with Turkey, Israel, Iraq, and Iran) and Australia and New Zealand as being a separate region. I also use COW’s regional classifications as given without any changes. The results are not sensitive to the regional codings.

A1.6 Coding

- Promises and visits
  - Source: World Event Interaction Survey (WEIS) (McClelland, 1999; Tomlinson, 2001)
    - Years: 1965-1989
    - Events included in the measurement: Promise Own Policy Support (PRM1) + Promise Material Support (PRM2) + Promise Other Future Support (PRM3) + Assure/Reassure (PRM4) + Visit (CNS2)
  - Sources: American Presidency Project for statements (Peters and Woolley, 2016)\(^2\); and U.S. Department of State (2017) for visits
    - Years: 1950-2010

---

Statements are coded as reassurance if they focus on:

• Strength of U.S. commitment/protection/presence
• Strength of the relationship
• The need to strengthen U.S. commitment or the relationship
• U.S.’s willingness, ability, resolve to protect the ally
• A reaffirmation of U.S. commitment/protection/presence
• Reassurance of the U.S. commitment/protection/presence
• Importance of the alliance or of common/mutual defense
• Not generic statements of warmness, friendship, or positive relations. Paragraphs indicating U.S. “support” for the ally only coded as reassurance if they take place alongside discussions of the alliance commitment or treaty.

Visits include all foreign trips made by the President and Secretary of State

- Congressional retrenchment bills
  - Source: Policy Agendas Project
  - Years: 1950-2014
  - Sample of bills limited to bills related to alliances. Using this sub-sample, I hand-code bills, coding bills as retrenchment bills if they fit any of the following criteria:
    • Bills calling for troop reductions from an ally
    • Bills asserting congressional authority over the use of force on allied territory
    • Bills calling for putting pressure on allies for burden-sharing

---

3 See supplementary codebook for additional details.
4 http://www.comparativeagendas.net/ (accessed August 15, 2016). The data used here were originally collected by Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, with the support of National Science Foundation grant numbers SBR 9320922 and 0111611, and are distributed through the Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. Neither NSF nor the original collectors of the data bear any responsibility for the analysis reported here.
A1.7 Proofs for Formal Model

A1.7.1 Pairwise payoff comparisons for the ally, given R or ∼R

(R,B) > (R,SQ) if: \((1 - \alpha)P - C_A > (1 - \alpha)P - \alpha F \Rightarrow C_A < \alpha F\)

(∼R,B) > (∼R,SQ) if: \((1 - \gamma)P - C_A > (1 - \gamma)P - \gamma F \Rightarrow C_A < \gamma F\)

(R,B) > (R,E) if: \((1 - \alpha)P - C_A > 0 \Rightarrow (1 - \alpha)P > C_A\)

(∼R,B) > (∼R,E) if: \((1 - \gamma)P - C_A > 0 \Rightarrow (1 - \gamma)P > C_A\)

(R,SQ) > (R,E) if: \((1 - \alpha)P - \alpha F > 0 \Rightarrow (1 - \alpha)P > \alpha F\)

(∼R,SQ) > (∼R,E) if: \((1 - \gamma)P - \gamma F > 0 \Rightarrow (1 - \gamma)P > \gamma F\)

A1.7.2 When do allies burden-share even when the patron reassures?

(R,B) > (R,SQ) and (R,B) > (R,E) if:

1. \(C_A < \alpha F\)

and

2. \((1 - \alpha)P > C_A\)

For a fixed level of burden-sharing \((C_A)\), these two conditions can hold in four possible combinations of \(F\), \(P\), and \(\alpha\). First, a high \(F\), low \(\alpha\), and high \(P\) – a high level of vulnerability, low risk of abandonment, and low availability of outside options. Second, a high \(F\), high \(P\), and high \(\alpha\) – a high level of vulnerability, low availability of outside options, and high risk of abandonment. Third, a high \(F\), low \(\alpha\), and low \(P\) – a high level of vulnerability, low risk of abandonment, and high availability of outside options. Fourth, a low \(F\), high \(\alpha\), and high \(P\) – low vulnerability, high risk of abandonment, and low availability of outside options.

268
Appendix A2

Presidential Statements Codebook

A2.1 General procedures

Using two undergraduate research assistants from Columbia University, I coded paragraphs taken from presidential speeches in which the President mentions a foreign country. The paragraphs are organized by country and year; there is a separate text file for each country in every year between 1950-2010. Taking these paragraphs, we then ascertained whether they contained a statement of reassurance, which is defined in the project as “acts that are intended to have the effect of convincing an ally that U.S. assistance will be forthcoming in the event of an attack on the ally by an external actor.”

A2.2 Coding rules

In order to be coded as reassurance, a paragraph must contain strong emphasis on at least one of the following:

1. Strength of U.S. commitment/protection/presence

2. Strength of the relationship

I had the RAs overlap over a number of country-years – 613, or nearly half of statement country-years – and intercoder reliability was quite high, with a correlation of 0.69 and Krippendorf’s alpha of 0.67. RAs were given full discretion in their coding, and in cases where they could not make a determination, I made a judgment.
3. The need to strengthen U.S. commitment or the relationship

4. U.S.’s willingness, ability, resolve to protect the ally

5. A reaffirmation of U.S. commitment/protection/presence

6. Reassurance of the U.S. commitment/protection/presence

7. Importance of the alliance or of common/mutual defense

Not included are paragraphs that are generic statements of warmness, friendship, or positive relations. Paragraphs indicating U.S. “support” for the ally are only be coded as reassurance if they take place alongside discussions of the alliance commitment or treaty.

A2.3 Examples of reassurance

“Australia is especially close to the hearts of Americans throughout our country... We sincerely appreciate Australia’s support for our foreign policy. We assure you that the United States will remain a strong and faithful ally, worthy of Australia’s trust.” – President Ford, July 27, 1976 (courtesy of the appendix from McManus, 2017)

“The two Presidents agreed that the Republic of Korea forces and American forces stationed in Korea must maintain a high degree of strength and readiness in order to deter aggression. President Ford reaffirmed the determination of the United States to render prompt and effective assistance to repel armed attack against the Republic of Korea in accordance with the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 between the Republic of Korea and the United States. In this connection, President Ford assured President Park that the United States has no plan to reduce the present level of United States forces in Korea.” – President Ford, November 22, 1974

“We welcome this success of our postwar policies. This Administration does not view our allies as pieces in an American Grand Design. We have accepted, for example, France’s desire to
maintain an independent posture in world affairs, and have strengthened our bilateral relations. In 1970, two other allies were vigorously taking the initiative in diplomacy. Chancellor Brandt pursued West Germany’s Eastern Policy, seeking reconciliation with Germany’s neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe, Prime Minister Heath, in his Guildhall address on November 16, declared his intention to see that British policies are determined by British interests.” – President Nixon, 1971

“Turkey has continued her steady progress toward self-sustaining growth, and has remained a staunch NATO ally. She deserves our continued support.” – President Johnson, 1966

A2.4 Not examples of reassurance

“There’s an old saying that when North Americans meet Argentines, they look into a mirror. I’ve felt that. Much here seems familiar: the cattle, the seas of grass, the love of liberty, the shared belief in the dignity of the individual, our common European roots and shared colonial past, the warm energy and the spirit of the people.”– President Bush, December 5, 1990 (courtesy of the appendix from McManus, 2017)

“The President and the Prime Minister expressed gratification at the opportunity presented by the Prime Minister’s visit for furthering their personal as well as official friendship symbolizing the cordiality of relations between the American and Australian people.” – President Kennedy, 1962 (courtesy of the appendix from McManus, 2017)

“Because New Zealand and the United States of America and other peace-loving nations all over the world have recognized that nations just must help each other, the peoples of the world tonight have made great progress in their struggle for a better life for all human beings.” – President Johnson, 1968
“We are very proud of our staunch and our farsighted and our courageous friends in New Zealand. You have never wavered. You have never grown soft. You have never feared.” – President Johnson, 1968

“I know that our meetings, Mr. President, will reinforce the traditional bonds of affection and cooperation between our two countries, thus contributing to our goals of peace and prosperity for Italy, for the United States, and for all nations.” – President Ford, 1975