Detecting Targeted Attacks Using Shadow Honeypots

Anagnostakis, Kostas G.; Sidiroglou, Stelios; Akritidis, Periklis; Xinidis, Konstantinos; Markatos, Evangelos; Keromytis, Angelos D.

We present Shadow Honeypots, a novel hybrid architecture that combines the best features of honeypots and anomaly detection. At a high level, we use a variety of anomaly detectors to monitor all traffic to a protected network/service. Traffic that is considered anomalous is processed by a "shadow honeypot'' to determine the accuracy of the anomaly prediction. The shadow is an instance of the protected software that shares all internal state with a regular ("production'') instance of the application, and is instrumented to detect potential attacks. Attacks against the shadow are caught, and any incurred state changes are discarded. Legitimate traffic that was misclassified will be validated by the shadow and will be handled correctly by the system transparently to the end user. The outcome of processing a request by the shadow is used to filter future attack instances and could be used to update the anomaly detector. Our architecture allows system designers to fine-tune systems for performance, since false positives will be filtered by the shadow. Contrary to regular honeypots, our architecture can be used both for server and client applications. We demonstrate the feasibility of our approach in a proof-of-concept implementation of the Shadow Honeypot architecture for the Apache web server and the Mozilla Firefox browser. We show that despite a considerable overhead in the instrumentation of the shadow honeypot (up to 20% for Apache), the overall impact on the system is diminished by the ability to minimize the rate of false-positives.



Also Published In

Proceedings of the 14th USENIX Security Symposium: July 31-August 5, 2005, Baltimore, MD, USA
USENIX Association

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Academic Units
Computer Science
Published Here
March 14, 2012