New Musicologies, Old Musicologies: Ethnomusicology and the Study of Western Music*

By Jonathan P. J. Stock

Introduction

Ethnomusicology currently engages with the study of Western music in two principal ways. On the one hand, there are specific ethnomusicological studies that focus on aspects of Western musical traditions. Examples include Paul Berliner’s analysis of improvisation in jazz (1994), Philip Bohlman’s study of chamber music as ethnic music in contemporary Israel (1991), and the examinations of music schools and conservatories by Bruno Nettl (1995) and Henry Kingsbury (1988). These works, in and of themselves, offer explicit and direct indication of what an ethnomusicological approach to Western music involves and what manner of insights can be produced thereby. Second, and more diffusely, ethnomusicological research plays into the study of Western music through musicologists’ adoption, adaptation, and application of ethnomusicological techniques and concepts: some musicologists have drawn from specific ethnographies of non-Western musical traditions, and others have made recourse to the standard texts of ethnomusicological theory and practice (such as Merriam 1964 and Nettl 1983). Conference presentations, seminars, conversations, and, especially in the case of younger scholars, courses taken as part of their academic training also provide channels of contact between the repertory of scholarly ideas and procedures developed primarily for the explanation of non-Western musics and the field of Western musical studies. The titles of such publications as Nicholas Cook’s Music, Imagination, and Culture (1990) and Peter Jeffery’s Re-Envisioning Past Musical Cultures: Ethnomusicology in the Study of Gregorian Chant (1992) are clear in their referencing to this particular field of academic endeavor.

Nonetheless, despite musicology’s recent expansion into cultural models of musical interpretation, it remains rare for musicologists to draw on existing ethnomusicological approaches or theories. It is almost as if the new musicologists and critical musicologists would prefer to invent their own theories of social and cultural contextualization than consider those already developed in ethnomusicological research. Kay Kaufman Shelemay writes:

While I applaud its efforts, the “new musicology” . . . seems not so startlingly new, at least not to someone familiar with the last half
century of ethnomusicological research, not to mention consider­able earlier work in historical musicology itself that engaged fully with issues relating to culture, society, and politics. I am delighted that “new musicology” has moved full force to consider­ations of mu­sic and culture, but I marvel at the oversight of decades of ethnomusicological scholarship long concerned with these same themes (1996a:21; see also Shelemay 1996b, Qureshi 1995).

The aim of the first section of this paper is to look in more detail at this apparent musicological avoidance of ethnomusicological materials, methods, and theories. Mainly through the assessment of specific examples, seven differences in the perspectives and scope of traditional musicology and ethnomusicology are exposed: the initial scope of each discipline; their respective scholarly and cultural perspectives; their distinct target readerships; their divergent historical practices; the disparate units of study deemed typical in each approach; the possession in each field of a con­trasting set of central concepts; and the employment by musicologists and ethnomusicologists of dissimilar forms of authority (see figure 1). In fact, the assemblage of ideas underpinning each discipline might perhaps be more happily illustrated with a diagram in the form of a web, network, or cluster. Nonetheless, it is here set out as a list so that each aspect can be discussed in turn. By traditional musicology (hereafter “musicology”) in fig. 1 and the accompanying discussion, I refer mostly to what we might today more formally identify as historical musicology. Much of the follow­ing discussion, however, applies in part to the field of music theory (“mu­sic analysis” in Britain) as well. By traditional ethnomusicology (below “ethnomusicology”), I refer in the main to research of living musical tradi­tions; again, however, part of this portrait may apply to the more text­based strains of “historical ethnomusicology.”

In the second part of this article I examine certain recent trends in musicology. Here the objective is to assess how far these new trends relate to ethnomusicological and older musicological work. I will argue that there is much further to go in creating a genuinely “new” musicology. Finally, and in light of the previous two sections, I suggest three key as­pects of current ethnomusicological approaches which, in my view, might prove useful to those interested in developing new means of approaching Western musical culture. These are only briefly discussed, since the musi­cologist who wishes to benefit directly from existing work on non-Western musics may have to adjust quite considerably his or her habitual imaginings of “music” and its study; while such a process (which, incidentally, has significant logistical implications) can certainly be encouraged, it cannot be forced or unduly hurried.
CURRENT MUSICOLGY

Figure 1: Historical areas of distinction between traditional musicology and ethnomusicology.

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<th>ETHNOMUSICOLGY</th>
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<td>2. perspectives</td>
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<td>4. historical practices</td>
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<td>preservation of disappearing</td>
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<td>5. typical units of study</td>
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<td>change (once seen as bad),</td>
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<td>social function,</td>
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<td>(declining)</td>
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<td>7. distinct forms of</td>
<td>scholar’s authority as</td>
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<td>authority</td>
<td>cultural expert</td>
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Differences

In the first half of this century, geographical and social demarcation was perhaps the most immediate way in which musicological scholarship was distinguished from that in ethnomusicology. This, the first area of distinction on fig. 1, needs little amplification: musicologists studied Western art music, ethnomusicologists (or, more properly at that time, comparative musicologists) examined folk music. In fact, the early ethnomusicologists were in some cases unsure as to whether or not European folk music fell within their frame of reference, or how exactly they
should refer to research on Oriental art music traditions. Despite these concerns, however, the fundamental divisions in the organization of our present disciplines of musical scholarship have reflected this initial divide, with Western music scholarship on the one side and other kinds of music scholarship in a rather heterogeneous assemblage on the other.

The separation of those studying music into two more-or-less distinct scholarly traditions has had a number of results, of which perhaps the most apparent today is that given as the second point on fig. 1, the rise of distinct scholarly perspectives. When musicologists and ethnomusicologists talk about "music," the resonances they find in this short word can be strikingly disparate. I will dwell on this point at some length, since it is fundamental to the remainder of the essay.

Joseph Kerman almost got it right in that now infamous passage of Contemplating Music where he announced that "Western music is just too different" to be compared with non-Western musics and hence to yield up much to ethnomusicological modes of investigation (1985:174). I say "almost" because the problem is not that Western music is too different—or even different, as we shall see below; the issue is rather that musicology is just too different. Or, to put this more neutrally, ethnomusicology and musicology are just too different. Kerman, to give him his due, has heard of ethnomusicology, even if he seems (unnecessarily) concerned that it challenges his authority to interpret the music of past cultures. (I will return to this point below.) In Britain, on the other hand, it remains commonplace for musicologists to leave the conference chamber when an ethnomusicology session begins and to write as if other musical traditions do not exist. 3

John Rink, for instance, opens a review of Jonathan Dunsby's book Performing Music: Shared Concerns with the sentence, "Only in the last ten years or so has musical performance started to attract the range and level of scholarly attention it has always merited but inconsistently received" (1996:253). Actually, much ethnomusicology is intimately concerned with issues of musical performance; some of it even refers quite explicitly to the Western art music tradition. But neither Rink nor Dunsby makes any mention of this large body of published research. Ethnomusicology is effectively "written out" of the history of music research.

Barry Cooper, to give a second example, asks in a recent article in The Musical Times why there have been no studies of children's music, other than those designed to tell children how to compose, and then proceeds to list five features he believes children's music might have (1996:6). Once again, those familiar with the ethnomusicological literature (not to mention work in music education—see, for instance, Davies 1992) will know that there has been a substantial amount of publication on this very topic,
and, incidentally, that the first of Cooper's five features (that we might expect children's music to be simpler than that created by adults) was already challenged in John Blacking's *Venda Children's Songs* (1967).

It probably appears unkind to point at particular examples. However, in this paper I argue that musicology and ethnomusicology are actually much more different than their five shared syllables might lead us to think. There exist significant voids in perspective and practice between the two disciplines. To fully expose these areas of disjunction, I refer to specific examples and concentrate on the areas of each discipline where these differences are most clearly expressed.

These two examples, then, illustrate a general characteristic of musicology—that it is quite acceptable for a scholar of Western classical music to write about "music" as if other musical traditions, even those of the West, do not exist. These writers see no need, either in their titles or their remarks on the respective states of the field, to mention the restricted focus of their views. Technically, Dunsby's book might be more appropriately renamed something like *Performing Western Classical Music*, while Rink's review could more accurately begin, "Only in the last ten years or so has musical performance in the Western art music tradition started to attract the range and level of scholarly attention it has always merited but inconsistently received." Omission of qualifying statements like these presumably indicates that for these writers (and their intended readers) "music" essentially means "Western art music." (Incidentally, one of the effects of such rhetorical structures is to sideline other forms of music—as well as the scholarship that describes them—whether or not the authors in question specifically intend it.)

In contrast, the whole discipline of ethnomusicology rests on the assumption that "music," or human musical practice, is shared by different cultures (see, for example, Kaemmer 1993:1-27). According to ethnomusicological theory, this practice is articulated differently from one social group to another in ways that speak of, and to, the distinct characteristics of social organization in these societies. Not only do all societies make music, but the results of the study of one group may be relevant in reaching an understanding of another; in the words of John Blacking, it is all "humanly organized sound" (1973:3-31). By way of analogy, to the ethnomusicologist looking over at the field of musicology, it is as if those who study gorillas do so marvellously but without reference to the work of those who study chimpanzees, orangutans, and the other apes.

The musicologist would perhaps see this as an unfair analogy. Apes are actual living creatures; music is more properly a concept. As a concept, music belongs not so much to the natural world as to the cultural domain—in this case, that of the West. If other cultures, this argument...
continues, have some form of activity which the Western or Westernized observer considers "music," then this is coincidence and self-deception; the foreign activity is not "music," but just looks or sounds somewhat like it. The assumed relationship between the foreign activity and the Western concept is not some deeper human commonality, but a fiction in the mind of that particular observer. To adapt Kerman's earlier dictum, Western "music" is different.

This argument seems attractive at first, and some ethnomusicologists have been tempted to go along with it (see, for instance, Gourlay 1984:36). It is certainly true that concepts of music are not uniform across the globe and that ethnomusicologists have studied forms of activity that those who practice it would not admit to their own nearest-equivalent category to "music," if they have one at all. Studies of Quran cantillation offer a classic instance of a form the practitioners insist is not "music." In this respect, Bruno Nettl has referred to ethnomusicologists as "gluttons," consuming anything and everything that fits into both local and external notions of music (1983:24-25).

Despite their acknowledgment of—and interest in—variety in local conceptualizations of "music," ethnomusicologists still insist on the validity of a general, global concept of music. In doing so, they typically take the word "music" to refer to a broad network of musical thinking, musical behavior, and musical sound (Merriam 1964:32–33). In delineating a particular "music," the ethnomusicologist seeks to introduce the characteristics of observed musical activity and to show how these fall, if at all, into native categories. There is a broader sense of the scope of musical study than that habitually (and tacitly) employed in much of the musicology of the past and the present. For the musicologist, "music" is typically an unproblematic word, although it is still flexible enough to be applied in a number of different contexts (see also Kingsbury 1988). As we have already seen, "music" may stand in as an abbreviation for Western art music. In other cases, "the music" means exactly what ethnomusicologists might label "the musical sound," and in yet further situations, "the music" means simply "the score" or "the notes." Anthony Seeger offers a sample list of the readings an ethnomusicologist might bring to this same term:

Music is much more than just the sounds captured on a tape recorder. Music is an intention to make something called music (or structured similarly to what we call music) as opposed to other kinds of sounds. It is an ability to formulate strings of sounds accepted by members of a given society as music (or whatever they call it). Music is the construction and use of sound-producing instruments. It is the use of the body to produce and accompany the sounds. Music is an
emotion that accompanies the production of, the appreciation of, and the participation in a performance. Music is also, of course, the sounds themselves after they are produced. Yet it is intention as well as realization; it is emotion and value as well as structure and form (1987:xiv).

Many present-day musicologists would happily accept the above list, no doubt, but it seems unlikely that they would expect to write about all of these aspects in a single publication, whereas the ethnomusicologist might well aspire to. In normal usage, then, the notion of “music” means something rather different in each discipline. I emphasize this not to criticize musicology’s focus, but to note the distinct traditional modes of operation and perspective of each discipline. These habitual practices and perspectives need to be uncovered because they shape the kinds of work music scholars produce and the ways in which we view our own field and perceive each other’s.

One implication of the above is that when we apply this ethnomusicological view of “music” to Western musical culture, we are compelled to abandon the idea that Western music is somehow different in kind from all other types of music. There are so many commonalities of musical thought, practice, and sound (see also Harwood 1976) that we can be as confident in employing the global generalizations “music” or “musics” as we are “language” and “religion.” If this is so, the claim “Western music is different” is uncomfortably akin to that of the zealot who insists on viewing the holders of other faiths as an undifferentiated mass of infidels. Or, to put it another way, every kind of music is different, but Western music is no more different from African music, say, than Chinese or Indonesian music is from North American Indian. Four-day long operas and lute manuscripts are found in Beijing and Nara as well as in Bayreuth and Venice. The logical conclusion of this whole train of thought is that musicology’s areas of difference from ethnomusicology are not simply a function of the music itself: if ethnomusicological methods are applicable to the musics of Vietnam and Venezuela, then there is no reason why they could not be applied to that of Vienna.

Kerman’s claim that Western music resists ethnomusicological investigation has collapsed. Nonetheless, there are other reasons why the musicologist might elect to set aside musical evidence from other cultures. After all, a willingness to acknowledge that ethnomusicology might conceivably be able to shed light on Western art music is not the same as taking an active interest in the music of other traditions or believing its study can make any contribution to the better understanding of Western music itself. Perhaps one of the most important of these reasons is given
as the third area of distinction shown in fig. 1. This is the question of target readership, those to whom music scholars address their writings. Both musicologists and ethnomusicologists write primarily for an international academic audience, but a crucial difference is that musicologists write for others who themselves already know the music in question, or could reasonably be expected to do so. Musicologists write for other cultural insiders. Ethnomusicologists, on the other hand, are much more likely to address those whose contact with the particular music culture is limited, possibly consisting only of material channelled through the ethnomusicologist himself. The musicologist, then, can assume—and leave implicit—a great deal of shared musical context with his or her audience. The ethnomusicologist, conversely, cannot, unless writing in a highly specialized journal. Indeed, an ethnomusicological author may consider it necessary to devote considerable effort to the establishment and demonstration of a shared musical context in which to present the specific findings of a paper. Such papers might be likened to sandwiches: on each side are slices of theory, while the filling is a specific case study demonstrating that theory in action. In principle, another case study might have done just as well.

As an example, I would cite Philip Schuyler’s important paper on Yemeni views on music (1990). Given that this article is published in *Ethnomusicology*, the leading journal in the discipline of the same name, the author can assume a certain familiarity with the aims and techniques of the discipline on the part of his readership. Nonetheless, as Schuyler knows, ethnomusicologists work on many different musical cultures and are accustomed to receiving a theoretical justification for the paper along with its content. Thus, Schuyler begins by contextualizing his study with reference to Baron Rodolphe d’Erlanger’s earlier work on Arabic music. He then briefly contrasts Yemeni and Western views on the question of whether there could exist a theory for Yemeni song, which links into an account of the history of the science of music in Arab scholarship. It is only on the third page of his article that Schuyler first fully reveals the aim of his paper (setting aside, of course, the title): “In this article I would like to look at theory from the perspective of three groups of Yemeni musicians,” and, even then, he takes another two-and-a-half pages to clarify the identity of each group. To point this out is not to accuse Schuyler of procrastination; on the contrary, his paper is concisely written and his contextual explanations very elegantly handled indeed. This illustrates, rather, the amount of theoretical positioning typically found in ethnomusicological papers.

By way of contrast, we might look at a pair of musicological accounts, beginning with a study by David Greer of manuscript additions in Ameri-
can-domiciled early English printed music (1996). The author immediately begins with his survey of printed scores: "One of the musical treasures in the Huntington Library is the sole surviving copy of the first edition of Parthenia, published ca. 1612–13 and containing keyboard music by Bull, Byrd, and Gibbons." There is almost no contextualization at all. Greer does not tell us what printed music sources are or remind us of previous studies of these; he does not try to persuade us that these specific scores are interesting or worthy of study, either in themselves or as exemplars of some broader issue. He assumes we know all this already and so immediately begins with what we do not already know. Few explicit theoretical ideas are offered up for potential use by, say, someone studying early Chinese printed scores or nineteenth-century piano editions. Instead, the whole frame of reference of the article is carefully indicated by its title.

The same sense of focus may also be found in my second example, Tim Carter's study of laments prepared by Claudio Monteverdi and Sigismondo d’India for the wedding festivities in December 1628 of Duke Odoardo Farnese and Margherita de'Medici (Carter 1996). Carter's paper is rich in historical (and musical) detail, describing such aspects as the intrigues surrounding the commissioning of music for the wedding. But, like Greer, Carter makes no effort to provide a theoretical justification for his work. Also, neither musicologist engages in any cultural cross-referencing (which could mean between the distinct musical cultures of different periods in the history of Western music just as much as those separated by geographical location). These may or may not be representative examples of musicological writing, but what is self-evident is that these two papers can be published without overt theoretical contextualization on the part of either author. Of course, this is not to say that these articles do not rest on particular ideological positions or that they have been written without recourse to certain theories. (Again, I stress once more that to document this tendency is not to criticize it, but to point out that these authors are able to assume their target audience is already conversant with the intellectual context in question.)

Writing for different kinds of audiences points to a fourth difference between the two disciplines: their distinct historical practices. According to Eugene Helm (1994:17–19) and Don Randel (1992:14), musicologists most usually concentrated until a generation ago on the practical issues of the reconstruction and interpretation of lost repertories. Many ethnomusicologists, at a similar level of generalization, formerly worked to document and preserve disappearing cultures. Given such distinct areas of focus, we can readily understand why ethnomusicological writings were not much referred to by musicologists or vice versa. This distinct historical heritage remains an issue because the values of an academic discipline
quickly become enshrined in its literature and its standard methods. Even though many members of these disciplines now express common musical interests, they are still expected to accumulate mastery of their discipline’s canonic literature and associated scholarly technique. Historical practice plays a central role in the training of new (ethno)musicologists, both in terms of providing specific texts with which the new scholar can interact and in offering a generalized sense of where the boundaries of the discipline normally lie. Here I refer to boundaries in ideas and methodology just as much as in repertory. The development of a body of canonic literature and thought is clearly essential to the establishment of disciplinary focus, and music scholars have continually subjected their own canons to critique and renewal, so the process of canonization need not be regarded as wholly, or even largely, negative. Even so, one of the canon’s effects is to guide and inform our reading and thinking, which must necessarily be selective, since there is such a mass of music-related information available. From this point of view one might propose that Rink, Dunsby, and Cooper fail to refer to ethnomusicological texts not through disdain, willful disregard, or a jealous desire to suppress this body of academic thought, but because of their deep internalization of a habitual musicological perspective that renders this literature, or its pertinence, invisible to them.7

A fifth difference also arises from the distinct intellectual heritages and foci of these two disciplines. This point of difference might be referred to as the “typical unit of study.” While musicologists have usually focused on individual composers and written scores (or their idealized performance), ethnomusicologists have emphasized “performers” (interpreted in both the musical sense and anthropologically to mean all those taking a role in a particular musical tradition) and the music event (the occasion at which some form of musical interaction takes place—see Stone 1982), as well as the actual sound structures produced during these periods of musical activity. By way of partial illustration, figure 2 compares the tables of contents of two recent monographs, each one a significant example from its field (Zaslaw 1989; Turino 1993).

As can be seen, each book assesses a major genre of instrumental ensemble music created by a migrant musician or musicians. A comparative reading of these books would suggest certain other points of contact. Nonetheless, in the case of Zaslaw’s book on Mozart’s symphonies the focus is placed on the written works of an individual composer, while Turino’s study of Peruvian music looks primarily at the particular social contexts surrounding the performances of two contrasting panpipe ensembles.

A sixth difference is that of central concepts. This category of differ-
Figure 2: Tables of contents from sample monographs in musicology and ethnomusicology (chapter numbers and appendices omitted).

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<tr>
<th><strong>ZASLAW, MOZART’S SYMPHONIES</strong></th>
<th><strong>TURINO, MOVING AWAY FROM SILENCE</strong></th>
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<td>Meanings for Mozart’s Symphonies</td>
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<td>From Lima to Conima: The Residents Return Home</td>
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</table>

ence, like its predecessor, could also be explained as a subset of the question of historical practices. Central concepts in traditional musicological writings might perhaps be listed as “the individual” and (often) “the idio­syncratic” (referring both to works and “genius” composers); notions of historical progress, influence, and musical development; and the autonomy...
and formal unity of great music. (Several of these concepts are now discredited or declining.) An equivalent listing for traditional ethnomusicology would place the culture in the space occupied by the individual composer in musicology’s list. It follows that the ideal in a study of a music culture was once to describe typical, average, shared, or transmitted musical practice, and not the works or lives of the unusually innovative minority.  

Change was viewed by many as a problem. In an echo of the musicological emphasis on the autonomy and abstractness of great music, each non-Western music culture was seen as being special and unique: just as early musicologists disdained programmatic pieces, so early ethnomusicologists stepped carefully around syncretic genres. Furthermore, music was investigated (and praised) for its social role, and explanations of music concentrated on how musical performance enacted or created social structure. In some ways, when early folk music scholars—the predecessors of today’s ethnomusicologists—developed a list of interests they appear to have created the alter ego of those aspects valued by contemporaneous musicologists. While classical music was individually created by a known culture-hero, folk music was communal and anonymous; where classical music showed a distinct sense of historical development, folk music was essentially unchanging, although distinct versions of tunes proliferated from performer to performer and event to event; if classical music was written down, true folk music was transmitted orally; where one was composed, the other must ideally be either memorized or improvised; and where music analysis in the former sought to demonstrate structural unity quite independent of any particular social setting, that in the latter set out to expose social function (see also Bohlman 1988:69–72). In their construction of this reactive conceptual cluster, the folk music scholars revealed just how partial their escape was from Western conceptualizations of music.

Since the widespread rise in the 1960s of anthropological-style fieldwork investigation, and with the benefit of reminders that other traditions are not simply the “non-West” or the “non-classical,” many of these views have been challenged, rejected, or redefined. Ethnomusicology, like musicology, has changed. Unfortunately, these changes appear not to have been noticed by all music scholars; see, for example, the wholly outdated characterization of ethnomusicology in Shepherd (1993:63–64), or Richard Middleton’s critique of ethnomusicological perspectives (1990:146–54), which rests on just two pieces of folk music research from the 1960s (one of them highly controversial even then within ethnomusicology). The danger of misleading accounts like those of Shepherd and Middleton is that they are read and accepted as representations of present-day practice by trainee musicologists. This problem aside, it remains true today (and is readily experienced among the shelves of a well-stocked academic music
library) that each discipline revolves around a distinct set of central values and interests. The impact of these theoretical concepts and themes on the form and characteristics of musical writing in each discipline cannot be underestimated.

I wish to consider a seventh and final area of disciplinary non-congruence. Like the preceding two, this one rests on and refers back to those already discussed. The final generalized difference is the question of authority and representation: Who is speaking in a scholarly musical account, on whose behalf are their voices raised, and whose interests are served by the insights they are offering? (Just as the previous pair of differences is bound up with the historical practices of each discipline, so does this one interconnect with issues such as perspective and target readership.)

Of course, both musicology and ethnomusicology have much in common with respect to their attitude toward questions of authority, but there are also elements specific to each discipline, and I will concentrate on these singular elements. Thus, while acknowledging that both musicologist and ethnomusicologist rely on a common body of scholarly conventions, I will examine the role of folk evaluation in ethnomusicology and that of the expert view in musicology.

At its best, folk evaluation is not just the assemblage of colorful anecdotes in order to add local flavor to ethnomusicological analyses of music-making; rather, the opinions of different cultural insiders themselves is the primary means through which the ethnomusicologist sets out to relate one of these aspects—sound, for instance—to another. Since the ethnomusicologist approaches the culture or group in question as a learner, he or she typically seeks to reach an understanding of other individuals' views and values. Ethnomusicologists may explain why a particular informant considers a musical performance "bad," but—in distinction to the musicologist—rarely offer these opinions themselves.

Anthony Seeger's investigation of the characteristic pitch-rise in Suyá Amazonian Indian song offers a nice example of the employment of folk evaluation to link musical sound to the society's musical concepts. Encountering a recording made by a researcher who had visited the Suyá some years earlier, Seeger noticed that the song was both lower in pitch than any he had heard before and also sounded a bit slow. Suspecting a dubbing error, Seeger made a copy which he took back to the Amazon on his next field trip. Playing it one evening, the village men listened attentively, telling him it was beautiful. "That is the way the Suyá really sang in the old days," they said. Later, through various tests, Seeger became certain that the recording was indeed faulty; by inference, the Suyá may not have sung that way in the old days. In this case, their interpretation was based on false premises, but their error was in no sense a dead end,
because the Suyá men’s enthusiastic reactions to the recording revealed their belief in the “deep throats” of their ancestors, a central ingredient in their aesthetic of song. This insight was doubly valuable, in that the Suyá were not normally minded to theorize about their music-making (Seeger 1987:97–100).

The musicologist, on the other hand, speaks from a position of personal authority. As a musical expert within the culture in question, the musicologist (and particularly the theorist) typically sees little need to consult with, say, members of the nearest symphony orchestra, their managers, or their audiences before composing a paper on Beethoven’s symphonies. Until recently, it was generally the musicologist’s own representation of Beethoven’s symphony that mattered, and not that of performing musicians or their followers (see also Cook 1995–96). To point this out is not to accuse the musicologist of elitism; on the contrary, when he or she provides specialist insights into aspects of Western musical heritage the musicologist acts as a responsible member of society, sharing his or her expert learning with the musical community as a whole. The musicologist thus assumes a role as educator, a shaper of ideas about certain kinds of music, which no other musician can so effectively fulfill.

The ethnomusicologist has this responsibility too, but, as the discussion of folk evaluation will have shown, is typically involved in a more visible dynamic of representation, speaking not only for him- or herself but also on behalf of those whose music they study. This is sometimes misunderstood. For instance, in an article considering canons, Kerman cites Blacking’s statement that “an anthropological approach to the study of all musical systems makes more sense than analyses of the patterns of sound as things in themselves” (Blacking 1973:vii) and then responds:

Again there is something quixotic about this attack. It may be that Gregorian chant as we now know is best studied in terms of Frankish culture and politics and that country music yields most as an expression of everything that Robert Altman put into Nashville. But if nineteenth-century music is to be approached on the same basis, that is, in terms of its own culture and ideology, the force exerted by the canon must be recognized. . . . We shall certainly not feel bound to study and appreciate this music exclusively in the terms it evolved for itself (Kerman 1994:42).

Blacking makes no claim for exclusivity, nor does he propose that living musical traditions are to be explained solely in terms of the cultural context of their period of origin. These are Kerman’s fantasies, summoned up to frighten impressionable musicologists. To be honest, an “anthropologi-
cal approach” to music cannot—by definition—mean an analysis “exclusively in the terms [the music culture has] evolved for itself”; it has to mean an approach that is more-or-less informed by anthropological theory and method. Just a few pages later in the source cited by Kerman, Blacking gives an example of what he means:

If, for example, all members of an African society are able to perform and listen intelligently to their own indigenous music, and if this unwritten music, when analyzed in its social and cultural context, can be shown to have a similar range of effects on people and to be based on intellectual and musical processes that are found in the so-called “art” music of Europe, we must ask why apparently general musical abilities should be restricted to a chosen few in societies supposed to be culturally more advanced (1973:4).

In other words, Blacking does not suggest that analysis can only go as far as social and cultural boundaries, but that careful, contextually-grounded analyses can throw up more general human questions about the making of music. Kerman, a tireless advocate of “music criticism,” misunderstands this, fearing perhaps that ethnomusicology challenges his own authority to critique a wide historical range of Western art music. If this is so, Kerman is wrong. What Blacking is arguing against (apart from elitist views of musical talent in Western society) is an earlier ethnomusicological approach where the musical sounds of one cultural group were measured against those of another. The ethnomusicologist might argue that just as the Suya reactions to Seeger’s faulty recording revealed much about their own conceptualizations of music, so Kerman’s Lied criticism says something about him as a musicologist socially and culturally situated in the late twentieth century, as well as about nineteenth-century German song. This is not to rob him of his authority, only to locate it as distinct from a nineteenth-century voice. Kerman doesn’t claim to be the voice of the nineteenth-century, so he need not feel threatened. It is true that some ethnomusicologists, as some historians, are less interested in what the present-day critic has to say than in the views of the cultural insiders themselves, but despite their championing of insider knowledge, ethnomusicologists still expect the expert to provide the argument.

In all, seven interlinked areas of distinction between musicology and ethnomusicology have been discussed. As has been seen, there are areas in which the two disciplines are not simply dissimilar but diametrically opposed. If the above is an accurate summary, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that ethnomusicologists on the one hand, and musicologists on the other, are regularly asking such different questions that there
is little they can do to offer each other specific help. With the rise of new trends within musicology, however, this situation has begun to change.

Ethnomusicology and the New Musicologies

Over the past ten or more years, increasing numbers of scholars from musicological backgrounds have begun to take a greater interest in the broader questions of how music actually works in (Western) society. In doing so, they have questioned the received notions of the masterpiece and "master-repertory," some of them moving away from the heartland of traditional musicology to consider other musical genres and styles. The ideology underlying the musicological canon has also been subjected to considerable scrutiny and review. Names like "new musicology" in the United States and "critical musicology" in Britain have appeared, though these terms suggest a uniformity of perspective among the scholars concerned that has yet to cohere, and indeed for which they themselves may not entirely wish.11

These new musicological trends might be summarized as falling into two main categories. On the one hand, much work has been devoted to the reinterpretation of music and musical styles with which musicological readers were already familiar (or thought they were). Lawrence Kramer's book on nineteenth-century music, for instance, examines the standard figures of Beethoven, Chopin, Liszt, Wagner, and Wolf (Kramer 1990), while composers whose music is particularly studied among the essays collected in the influential volume *Music and Society* (Leppert and McClary 1987) are Bach and Chopin. On the other hand, and as the latter volume also illustrates, there has been a simultaneous move to expand the repertory of music studied by the academy. Here, the most striking aspects have been the rehabilitation of the music and lives of numerous women composers and the application of new musicological tools to many aspects of popular music, once primarily the reserve of sociologists. A particularly impressive instance of the latter trend is Robert Walser's study of heavy metal music and culture (1993).

At the same time, and as mentioned at the beginning of this article, a number of ethnomusicologists have devoted concentrated attention to Western musical traditions. What makes their work different from earlier ethnomusicological commentary on Western music is that this earlier work had mainly consisted of the suggestion of parallels (and divergences) between studies of non-Western musics and Western art music, which was generally carried out to illustrate a theoretical or methodological question (e.g., Blacking 1973, 1987; Nettl 1983). Now, however, there has begun to arise a new trend of writings that specifically focus on individual Western musical traditions. Henry Kingsbury's study of the music conservatory is
perhaps one of the most stimulating publications within this field to date (Kingsbury 1988). It is probably fair to say that these new ethnomusicological studies have generally concentrated more on aspects of musical conceptualization and behavior than on the explanation of the actual sound structures of individual Western pieces or performances.

We might wish to interpret the move by the new musicology into sociocultural domains and the simultaneous appearance of ethnomusicologies of the West as the drawing together of these two modes of musical scholarship. It is just as probable, however, that what we are seeing is each discipline in more-or-less uncoordinated expansion. If this is so, overlap is coincidental, as new intellectual territories are staked out in the fields of academe, and dialogue is likely to be fraught with misperceptions.

Certainly it is true that despite the ongoing process of disciplinary self-reflection in every form of music scholarship, some of the deep-seated ideologies in each discipline remain influential. For instance, commenting on the state of Korean traditional culture, ethnomusicologist Keith Howard, himself no enemy of musical change, slips into a traditional ethnomusicological lament of this very process: “Unfortunately, traditions until recently considered old fashioned, boring, and heathen, tend to have undergone restructuring to package them more appropriately for the new world” (1989:vi). If we pause to consider what is happening here in Howard’s description, we see only Koreans adapting their musical practices to better suit their contemporary lives, an equation that supports the standard ethnomusicological contention that musical structures are intimately tied to patterns of social life. Nonetheless, Howard’s “unfortunately” articulates an older view, in which “authentic” traditions were valued above those sullied by contact with the modern, urban world.

Turning to musicology for a second example, we might consider Nadine Hubbs’s article “Music of the ‘Fourth Gender’: Morrissey and the Sexual Politics of Melodic Contour.” The very title of this paper signifies its allegiance to new musicology, both by asserting a link between gender constructions and musical structure and by placing this examination in the arena of popular music. But Hubbs soon reveals the grip of an older musicological belief: “It is ironic that the music receives less attention than any other aspect of Morrissey’s work,” she writes, “for it is indeed the music that fosters audiences’ most powerful connections. But such silence remains the norm for popular music criticism in general” (Hubbs 1996:271). I refer here to Hubbs’s utilization of the term “music” when what I think she properly means is “music sound.”

To make this observation is not mere pedantry, because the irony to which Hubbs refers might just as well result not from an unwillingness of popular music criticism to engage with “music” but from Hubbs’s own
inherited employment of a traditional musicological reading of this term. This is not to say that there should be no scholarly attempt to come to
terms with technical aspects of musical sound in popular music, or to deny
the importance of musical sound in shaping audience response—here
Hubbs echoes the call of other musicologists who have turned to examine
popular music. It is to say that if we want to investigate “music” as social
process (the encoding of sexual politics in melodic contour, for example)
we cannot assume that a traditional musicological reading of “music” is
necessarily pertinent to an analysis of the social group in question. In­
stead, we have to learn—perhaps through participation, observation, and
dialogue—how the individuals and groups involved make sense in and of
these songs.¹²

Once we can establish what “music” is, we can then determine whether
melodic contour is a viable analytical unit and whether or not it is deemed
able of bearing notions of sexual politics. If it is so deemed, we need to
identify those for whom this notion is meaningful. If, on the other hand,
melodic contour is not separated from other musical features by the com­
menity of musicians and audiences, this tells us that its analysis—while still
valid for specialist musicological or compositional purposes—is unlikely to
tell us anything about the musical negotiation of sexual politics in the
given social context. Tim Rice’s model of ethnomusicological enquiry would
likely serve just as well as a checklist for the socially oriented musicologist,
in that it identifies key areas that need to be discussed and interrelated in
a study of this kind. Rice asks, “How do people historically construct,
socially maintain, and individually create and experience music?”

Some musicologists are clearly already asking questions like this. In
1984, for example, Gary Tomlinson wrote an important article outlining
the potential of anthropological modes of enquiry for musicology. One of
Tomlinson’s key points was to call on music scholars to make the “effort to
converse with other cultures and times” (1984:362). New musicology, how­
ever, often appears resistant to such calls, remaining close to the models
of older musicological discourse. A case in point is provided by the femi­
nist music criticism proposed by Susan McClary in her book Feminine End­
ings (1991). This seems to me particularly ironic, since McClary claims
that she is herself “involved with examining the premises of inherited
conventions, with calling them into question, with attempting to reas­
semble them in ways that make a difference within the discourse itself”
(1991:19). To complete this section of the essay, I will look in a little more
detail at McClary’s discourse, showing how it confirms and sustains exist­
ing conventions rather than developing anything new.

McClary opens her book by drawing parallels between the Bluebeard
myth and her own search for musical meaning. She then begins to link her quest to her status as a woman. This is a useful point at which to begin a consideration of the reliance of her work on conventional musicological approaches:

As a woman in musicology ... I have been granted access by my mentors to an astonishing cultural legacy: musical repertories from all of history and the entire globe, repertories of extraordinary beauty, power, and formal sophistication. It might be argued that I ought to be grateful, since there has only been one stipulation in the bargain—namely that I never ask what any of it means, that I content myself with structural analysis and empirical research (1991:4).

While it is true that academic mentors can, sometimes unreasonably, prevent a graduate student from selecting a particular dissertation topic or approach and recommend against publication of a book or paper, the argument that female musicologists are obliged to avoid the research of musical meaning is problematic. Furthermore, the notion of such a stipulation rests uneasily with the claim that these same musicological gatekeepers granted the author access to non-Western musics. Given that much research on these musics was (and is) concerned with the investigation of what music meant in particular societies, it seems curious that McClary was introduced to these musics at all. Scholars who desire to suppress the study of musical meaning would surely protect their students from the potentially corrupting influence of studies of non-Western music. Presumably, then, McClary means some particular kind of "meaning" distinct from those already established in the musicological and ethnomusicological agendas. Fortunately, she carries on to give a clearer indication of the object of her quest:

Yet what I desired to know about music has always been quite different from what I have been able to find out in the authorized accounts transmitted in classrooms, textbooks, or musicological research. I was drawn to music because it is the most compelling cultural form I know. I wanted evidence that the overwhelming responses I experience with music are not just in my own head, but rather are shared.

... I soon discovered, however, that musicology fastidiously declares issues of musical signification to be off-limits to those engaged in legitimate scholarship. It has seized disciplinary control over the study of music and has prohibited the asking of even the most fundamental questions concerning meaning. Something terribly important is
being hidden away by the profession, and I have always wanted to know why (1991:4).

Here McClary—like Rink and Cooper—effects a kind of disciplinary cleansing, disposing silently offstage of the ethnomusicologists, music sociologists, music psychologists, and other inconvenient "others." This is unfortunate, since these music scholars have ideas to offer in the investigation of musical meaning. More to the point for present purposes, we note that the author "wanted evidence that the overwhelming responses I experience with music are not just in my own head, but rather are shared." In other words, McClary's quest is not to discover how music comes to be meaningful for certain socially and historically situated individuals and groups, but rather for corroboration of the "meaning" she already feels.

As such, and in common with a long line of musicological progenitors, McClary posits personal experience of music as the source of her authority to speak. In constructing an art-reflects-life reading of the first movement of Tchaikovsky's Fourth Symphony, for instance, the author notes that her account of one section does not "jibe with Tchaikovsky's. He ascribes nothing negative to this part of the piece" (1991:72). Musicology for McClary, like Kerman's criticism, retains the Old Testament model of insights handed down from the expert specialist. (As I intimated before, this is not in itself a flaw: musicology has a vital and continuing role within its present cultural bounds as a mode of specialist instruction and encouragement for the musically interested members of Western society.)

Other aspects of traditional musicology appear alongside conventional patterns of expert representation in this body of feminist music criticism. McClary's championing of her own interpretation of the Tchaikovsky symphony, for instance, can also be explained as part of her attempt to demonstrate the encoding of gender narratives within musical structure. Explanation of these narratives then forms a kind of reconstruction and interpretation of lost, or in this case misunderstood, repertory, a further characteristic of conventional musicological enquiry. Further, McClary, in conjunction with the usual practice of her musicological elders, restricts herself to commentary on Western music alone (albeit to a fairly wide range of styles).

McClary is also at pains to concentrate on exceptional musical individuals. As in standard musicology, McClary's culture heroes are largely those whom she can establish as composers. In the course of an essay on Madonna, for example, McClary tells us, "I will be writing of Madonna in a way that assigns considerable credit and responsibility to her as a creator of texts" (1991:149). My point is not necessarily to dispute Madonna's personal agency in the creation of her own aural and visual imagery, but simply to note that it is only in standard musicological writing that Ma-
donna would need justification as an original composer at all. A conventional ethnomusicological approach to Madonna, by way of contrast, would tend to read her first and foremost as a "performer." Such a reading is not necessarily preferable to that offered by McClary, but the fact that it is possible underscores McClary's internalization of the standard rhetorical conventions of traditional musicology. A genuinely new musicology would not simply extend the habitual means of evaluation to a few new subjects.

Typically, the music created by these individuals is, whenever the medium allows (and as traditional musicology prefers), discussed in terms of idealized performances. McClary tells us, for example, that Donizetti's already-mad Lucia di Lammermoor can "even take time out to tease out her lines sensually, willfully" (1991:96). Comments on specific performance interpretations—do singers actually take time out?—are given only rarely, and generally in the endnotes rather than in the main text. Again, this is a conventional mode of musicological address, one that reinforces the "instructional" character of the author's expert readings.

We find also a focus in McClary's writing on particular musical works, the standard musicological unit of study. We might observe that if Western musical tradition "works" in terms of works, the analyst can hardly be expected to set these aside. Nonetheless, a glance at the traditional ethnomusicological equivalent is suggestive. The Western music tradition unfolds not only as a series of works but also as a series of music events: performances, rehearsals, auditions, lessons, discussions, readings, etc. An author who claims an interest in "examining the premises of inherited conventions, with calling them into question, with attempting to reassemble them in ways that make a difference within the discourse itself" seems to have missed yet another opportunity to do just that.

In short, all the features of standard musicological discourse also characterize McClary's writing. This is not to say that her writing is bad, but only to identify her innovations as shifts of emphasis within an established tradition rather than the start of something new. My critique of McClary's book has so far concentrated on how she couches her message, but to close this review of a work that some consider one of the key new musicological texts, I will briefly discuss an aspect of the message itself.

During her analysis of Madonna's "Live to Tell," McClary reads the fade-out ending of this song (leaving D [minor]–F major oscillations unresolved) as a strategic resistance to misogynist narrative closure, one of Madonna's armory of "brave new musical procedures" (1991:160–61). Fade-outs over an oscillating bass are a standard feature in music of this kind; the Beach Boys, whom I had not previously envisaged as masters of feminist narrative discourse, do this in "California Girls," which perhaps brings a new irony to this particular song. If such fade-outs are standard devices,
then it follows that the potential of that in “Live to Tell” to signify in the terms McClary suggests is seriously diminished. We might do well to raise questions about the status of the work here: where exactly does a pop song end, for instance (particularly given many radio disc jockeys’ practice of fading songs out to introduce the next track)? To argue by analogy, in an individual lied, there is little dispute over where the song ends. In a song cycle like Dichterliebe, on the other hand, keyboard postludes sometimes also function to prepare the way for the start of the next song. A good analysis of a song from a cycle thus takes into account its position in the set, the preparation that precedes it, and its role in setting up the next song. In certain cases, a cycle is through-composed, such that the piano postlude to one song becomes also the prelude to the next. “Live to Tell” is not part of a nineteenth-century song cycle, whether through-composed or otherwise; on the other hand, neither is it a nineteenth-century solo song, and its fade-out may not be best analyzed as the finite codetta of such a piece.

More generally, although I hear the chords McClary identifies, I find it hard to hear this song as tonal in the sense of her analysis: if the initial D is a submediant (relative minor) preparation for an overall tonic of F major, McClary’s whole analysis folds in on itself. On the other hand, before proposing either tonal reading, I would first want to be convinced that the harmonic language of popular music works in the same way as the progressive tonality found in common-practice art works. If not, the idea of D–F oscillation needs to be entirely rethought. McClary is attached to this notion because her book sets out to illustrate, among other themes, the encoding of gender and sexuality within (Western) musical language. In doing so, she draws on the narratological schema of Teresa de Lauretis and others (McClary 1991:12–17). When McClary applies this theory (i.e., all stories boil down to a male hero’s conquest of a feminine other) to music, she makes several assumptions: that it is correct; that Western culture has only one essential idea; that music bears meaning of the same order as that contained in words; that tonality is the primary musical feature in which this meaning inheres; and that music ranging from Monteverdi to Madonna is subject to the same tonal procedure. While some of these assumptions might be challenged, it occurs to me that this whole set of suppositions might be strengthened through some form of cross-cultural amplification. Oppression of women is not a uniquely Western phenomenon, and neither is the encoding of cultural values in musical structure. If we could show how this process of encipherment occurred elsewhere, we would be better placed to understand what is special and different about its operation in Western musical traditions. Unless, that is, Western music is different, which is where we came in.
McClary's musicology, then, remains entirely concerned with Western music, ignoring research on other musical traditions, even where this may be pertinent to her own examinations of musical meaning. If McClary's work is representative of certain trends in new musicology, then its newness lies only in the expansion of the disciplinary frame of reference to include music by women and popular music. In other senses, much remains in common with older strains of musicology. Those who dislike the term "new musicology" are indeed right to do so.

Coda

If some genuinely new form of musicology is required, there are three primary areas where it might productively draw on ethnomusicology. The first of these is in arming musicologists with an expanded view of music as an interrelated cluster of concepts, behaviors, and sounds activated in (and activating) specific individual, social, and historical contexts. It will be self-evident that the scholar able to discover what "music" is among a particular social group is well placed to assess questions of value and change within that music or society. Equally, the musicologist who analyzes what musicians and others actually do in particular musical instances, and how these individuals explain what they do, is likely to gain enlightening perspectives on the sounds that emerge on these occasions. Ethnomusicologists have been addressing questions like these for quite some time already, and their existing literature contains a considerable amount of material of potential utility to the musicologist interested in formulating questions that say something about (rather than to) fellow members of Western society.

There is also reassurance in this literature for those who fear, perhaps like Kerman, that allowing other voices into our accounts must necessarily erode the musicologist's traditional mode of address as cultural authority. It is true that, impelled by the exigencies of investigating unfamiliar traditions, ethnomusicologists have discovered the voices of "the people themselves" to bear information that is different in kind, rather than simply deficient in quality, from the voice of the specialist scholar, and that customary modes of research in ethnomusicology raise questions of authority and representation that are directly relevant to many in the field of musicology. Nonetheless, the value of the informed expert's view has not been rejected; what has resulted is a clearer demarcation, where necessary, of the scholar's voice from those of the musicians and others involved in the music-making itself, and a greater sense of the context within which their dialogue arose. Ethnomusicological approaches to Western music, then, will not replace musicological ones, but supplement them, allowing the music scholar access to a broader selection of perspectives from which to write.
Secondly, if it is accepted that folk evaluation provides a kind of information not otherwise available to music scholars and that this information can be of value to the musicologist in certain cases, then it follows that scholars will also have to learn how to elicit and process this information, and how to come to terms with their own involvement in its production. Ethnomusicology offers the socially oriented musicologist access to a rich bank of experience in the methodologies and theories of research through personal participation. Such an approach could certainly be more widely exploited in the study of Western musical forms as created, performed, and received in contemporary society. Indeed, there are many forms of music in Western society that have yet to be written about from a historical perspective and for which printed scores and written documentation are rare. Church bell ringing, musicals, and amateur popular music offer but three diverse examples, but it would also be possible to gain new perspectives on what it actually means to perform or listen to the standard concert repertory in today's society. In these cases, personal participation (performing as part of the musical ensemble) may be not only the best way but the sole way for the musicologist to gather material. Again, we can note that there is little threat to the conventional methods of traditional music history and analysis here. As before, ethnomusicology promises a supplementation of approaches, and access to rich, new, firsthand material; it does not close off existing options.

Thirdly, it is clear from remarks earlier in this essay that music can be studied as a general part of human life. Lévi-Strauss has referred to music as "the supreme mystery of the science of man" (1970:18). At times, musicologists may wish to employ their in-depth knowledge of aspects of Western music in order to generate more general notions about how music works as a part of human life. Or, conversely, they may wish to use such general notions as already exist in order to assess what is special and different about the culture-specific example they have in mind. Since we have a much richer knowledge of Western art music than of any of humanity's many other musical styles, musicologists are, in fact, well positioned to lead investigation into the pan-human aspects of music making. At such moments, however, they will need to draw on evidence of musical traditions from across the rest of the world. To do this, they will require access to a spectrum of writings and recordings of world music, and enough grasp of ethnomusicological theory to be able to confidently apply this material to their own ends.

Once again, there is here no particular threat to the traditional musicologist who wishes to remain in the culturally bounded role of an educator who reflects (more-or-less philosophically) on aspects of the Western art music tradition. There is, however, perhaps an indirect threat. The
provision of sufficient training for musicologists in ethnomusicological theory and practice requires a certain level of institutional support, and often expansion in one area threatens to prohibit expansion in another. Institutions without existing expertise in ethnomusicology will have to consider whether that discipline’s contribution is worth its price. Often, however, this is difficult to do. In Britain, for instance, the majority of universities and conservatories have yet to appoint (and show little sign of appointing) an ethnomusicologist to their staffs; library holdings are extremely limited outside a few enclaves. The music student who independently decides to seek an exposure to other musical traditions and pertinent scholarly perspectives has a hard time locating materials and informed guidance within this extensive field. Those who are never told by their teachers that such a thing as ethnomusicology actually exists and might be helpful to them can be hardly be blamed if they graduate and start work in musicology believing ethnomusicology to be peripheral, yet these are the people who will have to decide whether or not to establish new posts in this field.

By several accounts, it appears that American music students are generally advantaged in this respect. As such, they are well placed to develop truly new forms of musicology. The recent diversification of traditional musicology has laid the groundwork for the serious consideration by musicologists of ethnomusicological theory and practice. As we have seen, ethnomusicology is unlikely to contribute to the solution of every musicological problem; the two approaches remain too different. Only in certain domains, such as the three outlined above, does it offer assistance to the scholar of Western music. Nonetheless—and in distinction to certain of the trends that have so far appeared, in which perspectives are borrowed from literary theory and other non-musical disciplines—a musicology empowered by ethnomusicology has the advantage that it draws from another approach centered on key issues of music itself. We are, in fact, at a moment of some opportunity.

Notes

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1. Some object to the term “new musicology,” but for the sake of convenience I will employ it nonetheless, without inverted commas.

2. An accessible historical overview of the rise of ethnomusicology is provided by Myers (1992).
3. I refer mainly to the British musicological situation in certain sections of this article not because I necessarily wish to single out British(-based) musicology for criticism, but simply because this is the musicological community with which I am most familiar. Similarities and disparities elsewhere are best judged by the informed reader; certainly, Bernard Harrison has suggested to me that the issues outlined here are very closely tied to trends in Anglo-American scholarship that are not replicated in Continental Europe.

4. See also Blacking (1992:302), Merriam (1964:147–50), and Nettl (1983:342–44). Music psychologists have also put considerable effort into studying the musical activities of children. That this research is invisible to Cooper may follow from the indication in his article that his primary interest is in uncovering "masterworks."

5. Gourlay argues not so much for the abandonment of cross-cultural studies of music as for the establishment of an even broader concept, embracing other performance media such as dance and ritual.

6. Kofi Agawu has recently pointed to the Western reification of a notion of "African rhythm" (1995). The construction of such mental frameworks surely also arises from the belief that music from other parts of the world must inherently be different from that of the West: Africans do not have rhythm; they have "African rhythm."

7. Incidentally, ethnomusicologists are likely to be at an advantage here, since musicology is much bigger, and harder to disregard. In Britain it is also difficult to take an undergraduate degree in music—one of the primary routes into specialist studies in ethnomusicology—without encountering many of the standard musicological sources. (As far as I am aware, there is only one U.K. undergraduate program purely in ethnomusicology, itself only a year old.)

8. For further discussion of the study of the individual in ethnomusicology see, for instance, Rice (1994:8–9) and Stock (1996:1–3).

9. One reader has kindly reminded me of work in reception history, which forms an exception here, one that lies closer in some respects to ethnomusicological patterns of authority and representation. If we used this mode of writing to discuss contemporary concerts, lessons, record store purchases, etc., we would entirely match the ethnomusicological model. Notwithstanding this exception, I would generally characterize musicological insights as those offered to other cultural insiders as expert interpretations "from above" (although it is possible that this terminology is overly redolent of royalist Britain; it certainly seems to have dismayed at least one egalitarian U.S. reader).

10. Merriam, although hardly the chief representative of this trend, provides an accessible example, offering a statistical analysis of (Western) intervals as found in the musics of various American cultures (1964:300–02). In Blacking's case, it was his experience of Venda music, where improvised melodic transpositions were not only common but stylistically essential, that inspired his calls against the acontextual comparison of interval counts from around the world.

11. In Britain the critical musicology grouping presently provides a forum for a diverse range of individuals. Scholars of popular music are there in force, as are music theorists, feminists, and sociologists. There are also composers, music edu-
cationists, psychologists, performance specialists, and the occasional ethnomusicologist. This informal portrait arises from my own attendance at critical musicology meetings since 1993.

12. During the last two years undergraduate students of mine have interviewed approximately 400 "non-musicians" for their views on what "music" is. While opinions differ from one subject to another, it is clear that many of those questioned have a far broader sense of this term than do formally trained music students. If the same is true for Morrissey and his audiences, "the music" may not mean only the sound structures of Morrissey's performances, but a field of action and interaction between performer and audience, a system of behaviors including on- and offstage "performing" (again, in the anthropological sense of the term even more than in the musicological), sets of lyrics and the manner in which they are delivered, selection of instruments and effects, particular sites where the songs are heard, and the way the critic comes to feel while experiencing these songs, as well as much else.

13. Of the 58 U.K. music departments assessed in a 1996 national research exercise, less than one quarter have an ethnomusicologist on their staff. Only two or three of these 58 departments employ more than one full-time ethnomusicologist. (Very few ethnomusicologists are found in U.K. departments of anthropology, folklore, or area studies.)

14. The opposite is also true, of course, but many ethnomusicologists are already drawing on musicological work; theoretical and methodological perspectives are already flowing smoothly in this direction. Additionally, both ethnomusicologists and musicologists will likely wish to know more about recent discoveries in the field of music psychology, which seems to offer much that could be fruitfully employed in the development of new forms of musical enquiry.

References
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