

Democracy and Nation Formation:  
National Identity Change and Dual Identity in Taiwan, 1991-2011

Shiau-Chi Shen

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy  
in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

2013

© 2013

Shiau-Chi Shen

All rights reserved

# ABSTRACT

Democracy and Nation Formation:

National Identity Change and Dual Identity in Taiwan, 1991-2011

Shiau-Chi Shen

As has been the case in many newly democratized countries, the transition to democracy in Taiwan entailed nationalist competition and the aggravation of ethnic conflict. Much research has shown that national identities among the general populace have experienced radical change. The Chinese national identity no longer occupies a dominant position, while the Taiwanese national identity is rapidly rising. The popular view is that democratization provides a political space for this nascent Taiwanese identity to challenge, and eventually replace, orthodox Chinese identity. This view, however, overlooks the very important phenomenon that, especially in the stage following the democratic transition, most people held dual national identity, i.e. both Taiwanese and Chinese national identities. This phenomenon presents a puzzle to the study of national identity in Taiwan, and in general as well. Why, in the fierce confrontation between two national identities in national politics, would most people prefer to see Taiwanese and Chinese national identities as compatible and show their allegiance to both?

This dissertation challenges the assumption in previous research that the nature of national identity is exclusive—that it represents an either-or choice or attitude. This assumption has led to the incorrect view that the decline of Chinese national identity and the rise of Taiwanese national identity are two sides of the same coin. Contrary to this

conventional view, this study shows that the trajectory of the two identities are actually different processes which have occurred during different historical stages and in different international environments, and that they are the results of different political forces.

Taiwanese national identity started to rise in the early 1990's. Chinese national identity, however, began to decline only after 2000. The past two decades thus witnessed a great proportion of people with dual identity.

This study focuses on the factors of state and politics, rather than history and ethnicity, to explain the rise of Taiwanese national identity, and also the phenomenon of dual identity. It is contended that the ethnic base of Taiwanese national identity, with its particular history and language, which has been much emphasized by many political and cultural elites, as well as scholars, constitutes only one route of nation formation. The other more important route is through political participation in the democratic regime. While democratic institutions and practices redefine the de jure territory of the state (the Republic of China), democratic citizenship provides a new base for collective self-understanding. Through participation in democratic political processes, identification with the Taiwan-wide political community is cultivated among the populace. The Taiwanese national identity engendered through this route does not challenge the ethnicity upon which the Chinese national identity is based. It thus is able to co-exist with Chinese national identity. The decline of Chinese national identity is hence not the result of the rise of Taiwanese identity, but of the rise of China. It is argued that the dominance of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the international community along with its staunch One China Principle has removed the important component of the Republic of China (ROC) from the Chinese national identity in Taiwan. Chinese unification now

means the elimination of the ROC and to be ruled by the PRC. People who have identified with the ROC no longer opt for a unified great China and hence forgo their Chinese national identity.

Based on the study of the phenomenon of dual identity in Taiwan, this dissertation proposes two important theoretical findings. First, contrary to the popular view among the students of nationalism and nationalist politics, it argues that democratization mitigates rather than exacerbates identity politics. Secondly, dual identity is difficult to sustain if the larger nation pursues a state that denies political autonomy to the small nation.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables

List of Figures

|   |    |
|---|----|
| Chapter 1 .....   | 1  |
| Introduction.....   | 1  |
| What is the “National Identity Question” in Taiwan? .....                                 | 1  |
| <b>Definition of Nation</b> .....   | 2  |
| <b>The Entanglement of National Identity and the Unification-Independence Issue</b> ..... | 3  |
| <b>The Role Nationalism Played in Taiwan’s Political Development</b> .....                | 5  |
| <b>Ethnicity in Taiwan</b> .....  | 7  |
| National Identity Change: Public Opinion.....   | 9  |
| Puzzle.....   | 11 |
| Dual Identity in a Comparative Perspective .....  | 14 |
| Research Questions and Hypotheses .....   | 17 |
| Research Design.....  | 22 |
| Theory: Nation, State, and Democracy.....   | 26 |
| Chapter Arrangement and a Brief Sketch of the Argument.....                               | 32 |
| Possible Theoretical Contributions and Political Implications.....                        | 36 |
| Dynamics of National Identity Change in Taiwan, 1991-2008:.....                           | 39 |
| Conceptualization, Measurement, Trends, and Two Phases.....                               | 39 |
| Conventional Measurements.....  | 40 |
| Conceptualization and Operationalization.....   | 47 |
| Validity of the Proposed Measurement.....   | 58 |
| <b>Two Conventional Perspectives</b> .....  | 67 |
| <b>Two Trends</b> .....   | 68 |
| The Dynamics of National Identity Change in Taiwan, 1991-2008.....                        | 72 |
| Two Phases of National Identity Change.....   | 76 |
| Conclusion .....  | 79 |
| Chapter 3 .....   | 82 |
| Dual National Identity and Democratic Participation:.....                                 | 82 |

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| Explaining the Rise of Taiwanese National Identity, 1991-2000 .....               | 82  |
| Current Studies on the Rise of Taiwanese National Identity .....                  | 83  |
| <b>Theory 1: Taiwanese Nation as a Product of Elite</b>                           |     |
| <b>Construction/Mobilization</b> .....  | 83  |
| <b>Theory 2: Taiwanese Nation as Hidden Seed in the Mud of</b>                    |     |
| <b>Authoritarianism</b> .....   | 85  |
| <b>Ethno-nationalism: The Exclusive Taiwanese National Identity</b> .....         | 89  |
| A Puzzling Situation .....  | 89  |
| The Research Question .....   | 91  |
| The Phenomenon of Dual Identity .....   | 92  |
| Democratic Participation and the Rise of an Inclusive Taiwanese National Identity | 96  |
| <b>Democracy and National Identity</b> .....                                      | 98  |
| <b>An Island-wide Public Sphere and Shared Political Culture</b> .....            | 99  |
| Empirical Analysis .....  | 103 |
| <b>Data Source</b> .....  | 104 |
| <b>Description of the Main Variable, National Identity</b> .....                  | 104 |
| <b>Empirical Support of Proposed Arguments</b> .....                              | 105 |
| Statistical Tests .....   | 116 |
| <b>A Test of Existing Theories (Model I, Model II, Model III)</b> .....           | 117 |
| <b>A Test of Theory Proposed by This Research (Model A)</b> .....                 | 121 |
| Conclusion .....  | 124 |
| Chapter 4 .....   | 137 |
| ROC State and the Imagined Chinese Community: .....                               | 137 |
| The Rise of China and the Decline of Chinese National Identity, 2003-11 .....     | 137 |
| The Impact of a Rising China on Taiwan’s National Identity .....                  | 139 |
| <b>China’s Rise</b> .....   | 139 |
| <b>A Puzzling Situation</b> .....   | 142 |
| <b>Proposed Hypotheses</b> .....  | 144 |
| Chinese Nationalism and the ROC State .....                                       | 145 |
| <b>Chinese Nationalism in the Mainland, 1911-1949</b> .....                       | 147 |
| <b>Chinese Nationalism in Taiwan</b> .....  | 149 |
| <b>Nationalisms in a Divided Nation</b> .....                                     | 150 |
| <b>The ROC and the Chinese Nation</b> .....                                       | 154 |
| The Political Impact of China’s Rise .....  | 156 |
| <b>Interviews</b> .....   | 159 |
| The China Factor: an Empirical Analysis .....                                     | 166 |

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| <b>Data Source and the Dependent Variable</b> .....                      | 167 |
| <b>Political, Cultural, and Economic Factors</b> .....                   | 167 |
| <b>The Decline of Dual Identity and the Rise of the Status Quo</b> ..... | 169 |
| Conclusion .....   | 172 |
| Chapter 5 .....  | 179 |
| Conclusion: toward a State Theory of Nationalism.....                    | 179 |
| Bibliography .....   | 191 |



## LIST OF TABLES

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| Table 1.1: Change in the Unification-Independence Stances, 1992-2012  | 10  |
| Table 2.1: National Identity of Taiwan's Public, 1991-2008  | 46  |
| Table 2.2: Typology of National Identity in Taiwan  | 50  |
| Table 2.3: National Identity and Education, 1996  | 55  |
| Table 2.4: National Identity and Education, 2000  | 55  |
| Table 2.5: National Identity and Political Interests, 1996, 2000  | 56  |
| Table 2.6: Chi-Square Tests of the hypothesis that there is no association<br>between the proposed measurement of national identity and a<br>respondent's self-identity | 59  |
| Table 2.7: National Identity and Self-Identity, 1993-2008   | 65  |
| Table 2.8: National Identity and Unification-Independence Preference,<br>1991-2008  | 66  |
| Table 3.1: Self-Identification* and National Identity, 1993, 1996, 1999, 2000   | 128 |
| Table 3.2: Territory and Population of the ROC, 1996  | 128 |
| Table 3.3: Legitimate Boundary of Political Sovereignty, 1996, 1999   | 129 |
| Table 3.4: Imagined Chinese Community in Taiwan, 1996a, 1996b, 1999, 2000   | 129 |
| Table 3.5: Characters of Taiwanese National Identities in Taiwan, 2000  | 130 |
| Table 3.6: Attitudes on Liberal and democratic Value in Taiwan*, 1993, 1996,<br>1999  | 131 |
| Table 3.7: Attitudes on Liberal Value and Constitutionalism in Taiwan,<br>1993,1996a, 1999  | 132 |

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| Table 3.8: Attitudes on Democratic Practices, Procedures, and Processes in<br>Taiwan, 2000 | 133 |
| Table 3.9: Comparison of Three Regression Models of National Identity in<br>Taiwan, 2000   | 135 |
| Table 3.10: Regression Model of Factors Influence National Identity in Taiwan,<br>2000     | 136 |
| Table 4.1: Frequency of the term “Rise of China” on Taiwan’s Internet Search               | 175 |
| Table 4.2: Ethno-Cultural Affinity and Chinese National Identity in Taiwan,<br>2000        | 175 |
| Table 4.3: ROC State and Chinese National Identity in Taiwan, 2000, 2003                   | 176 |
| Table 4.4: Attitudes on “One Country, Two Systems” in Taiwan*, 2001-2008                   | 176 |
| Table 4.5: Factors of China on Chinese National Identity, 2010                             | 177 |
| Table 4.6: China Factor and National Identity in Taiwan, 2011                              | 178 |

## LIST OF FIGURES

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| Figure 1.1: Change in Self-Identification, 1991-2012                                       | 9   |
| Figure 2.1: Trends of National Identity in Taiwan, 1991-2008                               | 68  |
| Figure 2.2: Trends of Unification-Independence preference in Taiwan, 1992-2009             | 68  |
| Figure 2.3: Trend of Taiwanese National Identity, 1991-2008                                | 69  |
| Figure 2.4: Trend of Chinese National Identity, 1991-2008                                  | 69  |
| Figure 2.5: Trends of Taiwanese and of Chinese National Identity in Taiwan,<br>1991-2008   | 70  |
| Figure 2.6: Dynamics of National Identity in Taiwan, 1991-2008                             | 72  |
| Figure 2.7: Patterns of National Identity Change in Phase I, 1991-2000                     | 77  |
| Figure 2.8: Patterns of National Identity Change in Phase II, 2001-2012                    | 78  |
| Figure 3.1: Two-Level Prospect of the Components of Popular National Identity<br>in Taiwan | 134 |
| Figure 3.2: A Causal Model of Taiwanese National Identity Formation in<br>Taiwan           | 134 |

# Chapter 1

## Introduction

### What is the “National Identity Question” in Taiwan?

Since Taiwan’s transition to democracy in the late 1980s<sup>1</sup>, the “national identity question” (*guojia rentong wenti*) has been one of the most often observed and commented upon terms in the media, political discourse, and academic studies. The national identity question is the question concerning the fact that people in Taiwan have different views on which nation they belong to, who their compatriots are, and what the territorial boundaries of their country should be.

Taiwan’s national identity question is not different from the “stateness problem”<sup>2</sup> that some European and post-communist countries have encountered. However, the case of Taiwan is distinct from these polities in that the native nationalist movement is competing for people’s allegiance not with one single state but with two Chinese states.

---

<sup>1</sup> Studies on Taiwan’s political development have a consensus to define the breakthrough of democratic transition in 1986, the year when the opposition party was illegally founded, while the authoritarian regime decided not to suppress it. For studies on Taiwan’s political liberalization and democratic transition, please see (Cheng 1989; Cheng and Haggard 1992; Chou and Nathan 1987; Lin 1998; Tien 1996; Wu and Cheng 2011).

<sup>2</sup> A “stateness” problem is defined by Linz and Stepan as “a significant proportion of the population does not accept the boundaries of the territorial state (whether constituted democratically or not) as a legitimate political unit to which they owe obedience” (Linz and Stepan 1996, p.16).

Taiwan's national identity question hence involves not only center-periphery (and/or majority-minority) struggles, but also the triadic relationship among the native Taiwanese nationalist movement (*Taidu yundong*), the Republic of China (ROC), and the People's Republic of China (PRC). This distinctive feature is important for understanding the dynamics of national identity question in Taiwan since the 1990s.

### **Definition of Nation**

Nation in this study is defined as a group or community of people who see themselves as distinct in term of culture, history, principles, or institutions, and who also aspire to self-rule in a political system (mostly a sovereign state). The most widely used definition of nationalism and nation is by Ernest Gellner. He defines nationalism as "primarily a political principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent" (Gellner 1983:1). Accordingly, nation is a cultural group which acquires a state (Gellner 1983).<sup>3</sup> Snyder (2000) broadens Gellner's definition to include groups which are not based on common culture but based on political institutions or political principles as nations. Under Snyder's definition, groups which seek some forms of political autonomy (if not a sovereign state) are also defined as nations. Following Snyder's definition, the definition of nation in this study is not limited to ethnic or

---

<sup>3</sup> Gellner (1983) defines nations in term of culture and will. But he does not see nations as awakened ethnic groups. Nor does he see nationality as an inherent attribute of humanity. Rather, he argues that nationalisms create nations in the process of industrialization. Nations are modern artifacts. Nationalism sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometime invents nation, and obliterates pre-existing cultures. Gellner's definition was shared by other students of nationalism, such as Hobsbawm (1990), Anderson (1991), and Breuilly (1994). In the literature, their works are put in the category of the "constructivist" in opposition to primordialist. The primordialist camp sees nations as ancient and deeply rooted in human history and experience (Connor 1978, 1994; Geertz 1973; Isaacs 1975). Some of them agree that the doctrine that nation is the legitimate base of state is modern, but they also argue that nations have a primordial origin (Armstrong 1982; Connor 1994; Greenfeld 1992; Smith 1986). Nationalism represents "the transformation and universalisation of a pre-existing political and social norm" Smith (1983a, p. 280). Most major works in the studies of nationalism are collected and edited in Hutchinson and Smith (1994).

cultural group. This definition provides rooms for both liberal nationalism and civic nationalism. It also distinguishes nations clearly from ethnic groups. Only those groups seeking political autonomy are nations. These two elements of nation, i.e. civic nature of nation and the claim of political autonomy are essential to understand the origin and dynamics of Taiwan's national identity question.

### **The Entanglement of National Identity and the Unification-Independence Issue**

“*Guojia rentong*,” in Taiwan's political discourse and academic research, simultaneously involves two concepts: national identity (*menzu rentong*) and the issue of unification and independence (*tongdu yiti*). National identity refers to one's self-identification, based upon which one assumes he/she belongs to a certain nation. The issue of unification and independence (the Unification-Independence issue) refers to political claims surrounding Taiwan's future political status, i.e. whether Taiwan should be united with China or claim independence.

National identity and the Unification-Independence issue are different concepts. One's attitude towards Taiwan's future political status is not necessarily based on her/his national identity. Pragmatic considerations might have a significant bearing on this, sometimes even changing one's attitudes toward unification and independence. Comparative studies on separatist movements have found that the economy is an important factor in the development of nationalist movements. First, demands for independent statehood usually come from the richer areas of a country. Second, when a country faces economic crisis, it often confronts simultaneously the challenge of competing nationalism. In her study of regional secessionisms in the Russian

Federation, Giuliano (2000) argues that individuals' job opportunities explain the change in popular support for nationalism and separatism. When new jobs and opportunities were created by Russia's economic liberalization in the early to mid-1990s, popular support for separatism declined in Tatarstan. Tatarstans changed their goal from seeking ethnic economic equality to pursuing personal material gain and professional advancement within the newly evolving order. In addition to material interests, political resources also have a significant effect on popular support for nationalist movements. Linz and Stepan (1992) suggest that the sequence of elections is crucial to the relationship between peripheral nationalisms and the unitary state. In Spain, they argue, since the first election after the democratic transition was union-wide, all-union parties and all-union agendas were thus strengthened. They demonstrate with empirical data that the percentage of the population in Catalonia and Basque wanting to go independent decreased significantly after the 1979 referendum on devolution. As governments were established with Catalan and Basque nationalist parties in office, popular sentiment for independence also began to decline.

Theoretically, national identity and the Unification-Independence issue are different concepts. Empirically, they do not always go in the same direction. When one's attitude towards Taiwan's future political status is not based on national identity, his/her position may be understood as policy preference. However, Taiwan's political development had entangled the two concepts together. For most people on the island, their attitudes towards Taiwan's future political status are largely an expression of their particular national identity, which is less likely to change because of material interests. For the Chinese nationalists, Chinese unification is the inherent mission shared by all

Chinese. Supporting Taiwanese independence is an act of betraying the ancestors (*beizu uangdian*). The Taiwanese nationalists tend to think along the lines of the phrase “Taiwan is for Taiwanese only” (*Taiwan shi Taiwanren de Taiwan*) coined by nationalist intellectuals under the Japanese colonialism. For them, Taiwan has never been, and should not be, a part of China. Only those having no love for Taiwan and no loyalty to Taiwan opt for unification with the Mainland China.

### **The Role Nationalism Played in Taiwan’s Political Development**

The history of Taiwan’s political development can be divided into three periods: colonialism under Japan (1895-1945), authoritarianism by the nationalist Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) (1945- 1991)<sup>4</sup>, and democratic era (since the 1990s)<sup>5</sup>. Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895 after Imperial Qing Dynasty was defeated in the Sino-Japanese war.<sup>6</sup> Japanese colonial administration institutionalized a series of nation-building programs, i.e. the policy of *Dōka* (assimilation) in 1915-1937 and the *Kōminka* movement (Japanization) in 1937-1945, aiming to cultivate Taiwanese into loyal subjects

---

<sup>4</sup> Martial law was lifted in 1987. Nevertheless, only until 1991 when the Temporary Provisions was lifted and the first general election was held, challenges to the authoritarian KMT and the one Chinese ideology were treated as illegal and illegitimate.

<sup>5</sup> When a country experiencing democratic transition becomes a mature democracy? Some scholars say that democracy is consolidated when it becomes “the only game in town” which means no significant political party or social group can imagine acting outside the democratic institutions. In another words, no political actor seeks to come to power by means other than winning a free and fair election (Linz and Stepan 1996; Przeworski 1991). Some uses the “two turnover test”, which says that democracy becomes stable when power has transferred twice as a result of free and fair elections (Huntington 1991). Taiwan held the first general election (National Assembly election) in 1991, the first Legislative election in 1992, the first (also the last) direct election of the governor of Taiwan Province in 1994, and the first Presidential election in 1996. Taiwan had its first power turnover in 2000 when the candidate of the Democratic Progressive Party won the presidency, and the second turnover in 2008 when the KMT candidate won the election.

<sup>6</sup> The Treaty of Shimonoseki signed in 1898 at the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese war included the receding of Taiwan to Japan. Thereafter Taiwan was a colony of Japan until the end of World War II.



of the Japanese Emperor (Chen 1984; Ching 2001; Lamley 1970-1971). However, a Taiwanese consciousness emerged as a reaction against colonial policies of unequal treatment (Fix 1993; Wu 2003). It is still under dispute if the Taiwanese consciousness developed during this period of Japanese colonial rule was national identity in its nature (Chen 2008). But even if it was, as shown by many intellectuals at the time, it had an ambivalent relation with Chinese national identity.<sup>7</sup>

The end of the Second World War released Taiwanese from fifty years of Japanese colonialism. But, it immediately placed the population onto the battleground of Chinese civil war. The KMT regime lost the Chinese civil war and retreated to Taiwan in 1949.<sup>8</sup> It established an authoritarian party-state on the island. The émigré regime legitimized its party dictatorship in terms of the Chinese nationalist project. The KMT was founded on the idea of Chinese nationalism.<sup>9</sup> The irredentist claim of “retaking the mainland back and uniting the Chinese nation-state” justified the practice of martial law and the deprivation of political rights. As the KMT regime rooted its legitimacy in terms of Chinese nationalism, destroying its legitimacy became the main strategy political opposition adopted to overthrow the authoritarian regime. During the period of political liberalization in the 1980s, an opposition movement, the *Dangwei* (literally, outside the party) movement, and later the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), constructed a

---

<sup>7</sup> Chapter 3 provides a review on the studies of Taiwanese nationalism under Japanese colonialism.

<sup>8</sup> In 1949, the nationalist Chinese KMT with 1.5 million people withdrew from the mainland to Taiwan which had an indigenous population of seven millions.

<sup>9</sup> According to Article 2 of the KMT charter, the Kuomintang shall be “a revolutionary and democratic political party charged with the mission of completing the national revolution... recovering the Chinese mainland... promoting Chinese culture.” For a detailed description of the history and development of the nationalist Chinese Kuomintang, see (Hughes 1997; Wachman 1994b).

Taiwanese nationalist discourses to challenge the official Chinese ideology. The Taiwanese nationalist discourses proclaim that Taiwan is a distinct nation with its own history and culture; what the Taiwanese pursue is not the eventual unification with the Chinese mainland but autonomy and independence for the Taiwanese people. In 1991, the DPP included in its party platform a plank identifying the island as “The Republic of Taiwan with independent sovereignty.” It was the most articulate proclamation of a native Taiwanese nationalist movement. The proclamation was a call to the people to replace orthodox Chinese nationalism with a new nation equipped with a new state. The confrontation of the two nationalisms in political arena not only makes Taiwan’s national identity become entangled with the issue of unification and independence. Political party competition also goes along the line of nationalist politics.<sup>10</sup>

### **Ethnicity in Taiwan**

To understand the national identity question, one needs also to understand the ethnic situation in Taiwan. As in many other cases of nationalism and nationalist politics, ethnicity and ethnic politics are very important factors. But for the case of Taiwan, these factors must be clearly and carefully differentiated from nationalist politics. There are two ethnic groups who have played important roles in the contemporary politics of the country: native Taiwanese and mainlanders.<sup>11</sup> They also constituted, for a time,

---

<sup>10</sup> Many researches reveal a close relationship between popular party identity/ party support and their national identities (Shyu 1996; Wachman 1994b; Wang 1998; Wu 1993). A recent study however argues that the close relation between party support and support for Taiwan independence is no longer evident (Qi 2012).

<sup>11</sup> Both native Taiwanese and mainlanders are ethnic Han. Before ethnic Han migrated to Taiwan in the 17<sup>th</sup> century, Taiwanese aborigines had already lived on the island. The indigenous peoples of Taiwan are estimated to constitute about 2% of the population. The identity issue of Taiwanese aborigines is about

important constituencies for national identities.<sup>12</sup> The native Taiwanese, or *benshengren* (literally the local residents of Taiwan Province), are those whose ancestors immigrate to the island from Southern China from the early 17<sup>th</sup> century to 1895, the year the island was ceded to Japan. The island was under the rule of the Japanese colonial regime for fifty years, until Japan receded the territory in 1945 to the KMT regime led by Chiang Kai-shek. The native Taiwanese are composed of two sub-groups, Hakka and Holo. They constitute around 85 percent of the population of the island (Holo and Hakka constitute about 73%, and 12% respectively). Although Hakka and Holo use different mother languages, they share the same historical experience and memory. As Weber pointed out, ethnic groups in some cases are based on, and consolidated by, the historical “memories of colonization and migration” (Weber 1978: 398). A previous research also found that their political attitudes, including party support, self-identity, national identity, and distrust of the mainlanders, are nearly identical between the two groups (Chang 1994; Wang 1998; Wu 2002a). Hakka and Holo hence can be included in the group of “native Taiwanese” vis-à-vis the Chinese mainlanders. Mainlanders or *weishengren* (literally residents from outside the Taiwan Province) are those who moved with the KMT regime to the island after the Chinese Nationalist government was defeated by the Chinese Communists in 1949. They (and their offspring) now estimate to constitute about 13 percent of the population. During the four decades of authoritarian rule by the KMT, the Chinese mainlanders controlled all governmental, military, and cultural apparatuses,

---


culture and recognition issues. They play little role in party politics. They also seem less concerned with the nationalist issue of unification and independent. For study on the identity issue of Taiwanese aborigines, see (Brown 1996, 2004).

<sup>12</sup> For further studies on the relationship between ethnicity and national identity in Taiwan, see (Chang 1993; Shen and Wu 2008; Shen 2010; Wu 2002a).

including schools and mass media. The regime's cruel repression during the uprising on February 28, 1947, in which many native Taiwanese cultural and political elites lost their lives, added another factor to the tensions and hostilities between native Taiwanese and mainlanders. Although mainlanders no longer dominate national politics after the democratic transition in the late 1980's, they still wield great influence in the mass media and educational institutions.

### National Identity Change: Public Opinion

Figure 1.1: Change in Self-Identification, 1991-2012



Data Sources: 1989: United Daily News, 1989.11.29. 1992-2012: Election Study Center, N.C.C.U., important political attitude trend distribution

Taiwan's national identity experienced a sea change after democratization. Within two decades, national identities among the general populace on the island had changed rapidly. Various surveys conducted by different institutions captured the same trends of

national identity shift. The trends are: the rise of Taiwanese national identity and the decline of Chinese national identity.

*Figure 1.1* illustrates that in 1989, more than half of the population in Taiwan identified themselves as “Only Chinese”; however, in 2012, less than three percent of the population held an “Only Chinese” identity. On the contrary, the number of people who self-identify as “Only Taiwanese” doubled within 10 years from 16 percent in 1989 to 36 percent in 1996 (see *Figure 1.1*). Since 2009, more than half of the population on the island reported an “Only Taiwanese” self-identity; the percentage kept rising in the following years. In 2012, around 54 percent of the population on the island identified themselves as “Only Taiwanese” (see *Figure 1.1*).

*Table 1.1: Change in the Unification-Independence Stances, 1992-2012*

|      | Unification | Maintaining the<br>Status Quo | Independence | No Opinion<br>/DK |
|------|-------------|-------------------------------|--------------|-------------------|
| 1992 | 45.1        | 25.4                          | 13.0         | 16.6              |
| 1994 | 20.0        | 48.3                          | 11.1         | 20.5              |
| 1995 | 22.0        | 41.8                          | 11.6         | 26.3              |
| 1996 | 25.6        | 45.8                          | 15.0         | 13.6              |
| 1997 | 20.7        | 48.2                          | 17.2         | 14.0              |
| 1998 | 17.5        | 46.7                          | 18.9         | 16.8              |
| 1999 | 20.4        | 48.8                          | 19.8         | 10.9              |
| 2000 | 21.0        | 47.1                          | 10.3         | 21.7              |
| 2001 | 20.8        | 51.0                          | 15.5         | 12.7              |
| 2002 | 18.6        | 50.3                          | 18.2         | 14.7              |
| 2003 | 13.2        | 52.6                          | 21.3         | 12.9              |
| 2004 | 12.7        | 55.9                          | 19.9         | 11.6              |
| 2005 | 14.1        | 57.0                          | 20.3         | 8.6               |
| 2006 | 14.4        | 58.4                          | 19.6         | 7.5               |
| 2007 | 11.6        | 55.6                          | 21.3         | 11.4              |
| 2008 | 9.8         | 57.6                          | 27.5         | 6.2               |
| 2009 | 9.5         | 60.7                          | 22.0         | 7.9               |
| 2010 | 10.2        | 61.3                          | 22.3         | 6.2               |
| 2011 | 10.3        | 61.2                          | 20.2         | 8.2               |
| 2012 | 9.8         | 63.2                          | 29.6         | 7.4               |

*Data Source: 1992: Taiwan Social Image Survey 1991; 1994-2012: Election Study Center, N.C.C.U., important political attitude trend distribution.*

In addition to the shift of popular self-identity, the other aspect of Taiwan's national identity, that is, popular attitudes toward Taiwan's future status also had undergone radical change. In 1992, about 45 percent of the population preferred unification to independence; the percentage dropped to a single digit number in 2012 (see *Table 1.1*). Conversely, in two decades, the percentage of people who favor independence had increased from thirteen in 1992 to about thirty in 2012 (see *Table 1.1*).

### **Puzzle**

This phenomenon of national identity shift in a short period of time has gained great attention from the political arena as well as academia. How should this change be understood? The focus of most studies is drawn to the striking trends found in public opinion surveys, i.e. the ascendance of Taiwanese national identity and the decline of Chinese national identity. Two popular theories offer very different explanations, one from a top-down perspective and the other from a bottom-up perspective.<sup>13</sup> The elite constructivist theory sees the rise of Taiwanese national identity as a product of native political elites in their pursuit for political power. In challenging the ruling legitimacy of the KMT regime, they successfully mobilized, or even invented, the Taiwanese consciousness to replace the orthodox Chinese consciousness (Hsiau 1999; Wang 1996). The primordialist theory contends that Taiwanese consciousness was born of the repression of first the Japanese colonialism and then the KMT's authoritarianism, which

---

<sup>13</sup> A review on the general theory of constructivism and primordialism is provided in fn.3.

together have dominated Taiwanese society for close to a century. This Taiwanese national consciousness, engendered by inequality under two regimes, was allowed to be freely articulated only after the democratic transition (Chang 2004; Ho and Liu 2002; Lin 2000; Wachman 1994a; Wu 1996). Nevertheless, these two theoretical perspectives share the view that with the rise of this Taiwanese consciousness, the Chinese consciousness correspondingly receded. Chu and Lin (2001) conclude that after democratic transition, “Taiwan had emerged as a closely bound community with a distinctive ethnic, cultural, and historical identity”. Taiwan is seen as a case where a native nationalist movement had successfully forged a nationalizing state.

The perspective that the Taiwanese nationalist movement triumphed over orthodox Chinese national identity, although popular, is challenged by the fact that even if most people no longer favor unification, independence has not prevailed (see *Table 1.1*). Surveys have consistently found the prevalent preference is for the “status quo”. As *Table 1.1* demonstrates, since 1994, “maintaining the status quo” had superseded “unification” and become the dominant category of popular preference on the unification-independence issue.

But how can this phenomenon be explained? One possible explanation is that the fear of military retaliation from Beijing hinders the formation of preferences for people who hold Taiwanese national identity such that they are unlikely to opt for Taiwan independence. This explanation indicates the drawbacks of using respondents’ preference of unification or independence to measure their national identities since their true attitudes toward unification and independence might be concealed under some practical considerations. This dissertation, however, argues that it is caused by a

measurement problem. The current measurement of national identity assumes, wrongly in my perspective, that the Taiwanese national identity and the Chinese one are mutually exclusive. This assumption prevents one from sketching a complete picture of national identities among the general populace. A new measurement is proposed in this dissertation. By adopting the new measurement, this study finds that those who opt for the status quo actually occupy a very small segment of the population. In fact, a majority of the population supported independence for Taiwan. Meanwhile, more than half of them also supported Chinese unification (*see Figure 2.3 & Figure 2.4*).

Considering Taiwan's political history and that antagonist rhetoric has prevailed in the political arena, it is not surprising that most studies of Taiwan's national identity are preoccupied with the surge of Taiwanese national identity and the waning of Chinese national identity. Focusing exclusively on these two trends, however, ignores an important episode of national identity change in Taiwan. The episode is as follows: with the rapid decline of Chinese national identity and the soaring ascendance of Taiwanese national identity, there also emerged a dual national identity. *Figure 1.1* illustrates not only the growth of people who identified themselves as "Only Taiwanese", but also that most people in Taiwan identified themselves as "Both Taiwanese and Chinese". The number of people who identified themselves as "Both Taiwanese and Chinese" had increased rapidly from 26% in 1898 to 46% in 1992 and remained above 40% over the following two decades (*see Figure 1.1*). It is the modal category of popular self-identity in the poll surveys conducted between 1992 and 2007 (*see Figure 1.1*).



This important phenomenon of dual identity so far has rarely been tackled.<sup>14</sup> The inability to address this phenomenon may be due to the fact that previous studies rely too much on the nationalist paradigm, which presumes a notion of “either-or” identity and the contradictory nature of different nationalities in a pluralist society.

The rise of dual identity in the 1990s creates a dilemma for the understanding of national identity change in Taiwan. If, as much research has assumed, to challenge the dominance of Chinese nationalism, the native Taiwanese nationalist movement forged a Taiwanese nation basing on a “core ethnics”<sup>15</sup>, or if the Taiwanese consciousness sprang from the experience of repression and hence was a reaction against domination by the Chinese, why did the decline of ‘Only Chinese’ self-identity among the population result not only in the rise of the exclusive Taiwanese identity, but also in the emergence of a dual identity? Why did confrontations between the two nationalisms in the political arena become more fervent along with successive electoral contests, yet gain little resonance from the populace? Why is the emerging Taiwanese national identity among the general populace in Taiwan neither in conflict with Chinese national identity nor replacing it?

## **Dual Identity in a Comparative Perspective**

---

<sup>14</sup> The phenomenon of multiple identities in some other cases, with its importance both to real politics and to the theoretical understanding of nationalism, has already gained some attention from the students of nationalism. For these studies, please see (Bluhm 1973; Laitin 1998; Linz and Stepan 1996; Linz et al. 2007; Miller 2000; Moon 2008; Stepan et al. 2010).

<sup>15</sup> (Smith 1986, 1991).

The phenomenon of dual identity in Taiwan is not exceptional around the world. As David Miller (2000) observes, in those countries where there are “nested nationalities,” people usually hold dual-level national identities. They tend to think of themselves as belonging to two communities without experiencing schizophrenia. These countries are Belgium, Britain, Canada, Spain and Switzerland. Linz and Stepan (1996) define these countries as “state-nations” and argue that most of their citizens tend to have multiple and complementary identities. When people in Spain are asked “Which of the following sentences would you identify with most?” in polls, “Spanish and Basque/Catalan/etc.” is the most popular self-description. The same is true in Belgium (Linz et al. 2007:66-69).

Three conditional factors are given by Miller (2000) to explain this phenomenon of compatible existence of different national identities: cultural overlap, mutual economic advantage, and interwoven history. He argues that these factors helped forge a common British national identity. Linz, Stepan, and Yadav (2007), on the other hand, emphasize the role of political leadership in forging dual identity. They argue that certain political engineering, especially “asymmetrical federalism,” helps create a sense of belonging with respect to the state-wide political community, while also simultaneously safeguarding the pre-existing politically activated diversity in Spain, Belgium and India.

These studies show clearly that the idea of dual national identities is not a form of bigamy, and empirically, the phenomenon of dual identity has prevailed in some countries. More importantly, these studies suggest that a particular type of national identity which has little, if any, ethno-cultural character is also possible.

Nevertheless, the case of Taiwan is different in two respects. First, the larger

community in other cases is the state, while in Taiwan the state is the smaller community, contained in the larger community of nation. Second, for those cases of dual identity in other areas, identification with the smaller community is pre-existent. What needs to be explained is the emergence of identification with the larger political community. For the case of Taiwan, however, identification with the larger community, i.e. the orthodox Chinese national identity, has long been present. The research interest of this dissertation hence is the formation of the identification with the smaller community along with the continual identification with the larger one. With this in mind, the case of Austria might be used to throw some light on our work.

The first Austrian republic was established in 1918 and defined as part of the German nation in its Constitution. During the interwar era, many Austrians were inclined very much toward unification with Germans, with whom they had the same language and culture. An Austrian nation emerged only after the Second World War, following the defeat of the Nazis and the exposure of their crimes. The rise of the Austrian consciousness, however, was neither due to, nor resulted in, the development of antagonism toward Germans. Rather, as Bluhm's study (1973) shows, most Austrians during the late 1950s and the 1960s upheld a "double identity," retaining traditional their cultural identity as Germans along with a strong attachment to the Austrian political community. Austria's experience demonstrates that new national identity need not be based on the idea of a cultural nation. Nevertheless, the object and content of German identity in this case was the traditional German language and culture. Most Austrians replied "no" to the statement that "Austria and Germany should be united" in the polls (Bluhm 1973: 223). Taiwan's experience is different from the Austria case in that in the

polls conducted in the 1990s, around 60 percent of respondents responded “yes” to the statement “If Taiwan and the Chinese mainland were comparable in their economic, societal, and political conditions; then the two sides should be unified into one country” (see *Figure 2.4*). The survey data illustrates that the Chinese national identity of Taiwanese people was not just an attachment to the Chinese “high culture”<sup>16</sup>. Nevertheless, the Austrian experience suggests that without political engineering connecting to a larger nation, the German nation in this case, a sense of belonging to the larger political community (Germany) cannot be created only by cultural or linguistic affinity. Austrians’ identification with the German nation hence changed from a national/political identity (pursuing unification before the 1950s) to a cultural identity. The Austrian experience is inspiring in this respect in helping us to understand the decline of dual identity in Taiwan since 2003 (see *Figure 2.6*). The decline of dual identity was mainly the result of the decay of Chinese national identity (see *Figure 2.4*).

## Research Questions and Hypotheses

Taiwan’s experience poses an important puzzle to the study of nationalism. Since transition to democracy, the rivalry between the two nationalisms grew more intense, while people on the island did not consider the two national identities as antagonistic. Taiwan’s case is very different from the East European countries and the successor states of the former Soviet Unions, where the transition to democracy was by and large

---

<sup>16</sup> I used the term “high culture” in the sense defined by Gellner (1983).

accompanied by the triumph of native nationalist movements. The new Taiwanese national identity was formed not in confrontation with but rather compatible with the existing Chinese national identity. Most of the population in Taiwan had dual national identity.

This phenomenon of dual identity is unexplained and hard to reconcile with the existing literature. Since the literature on nationalism treats national identities as if they are mutually exclusive, it provides no answer to the phenomenon of dual identity generally, and to the dynamics of national identity shift in Taiwan specifically. The nationalist paradigm is inherent in current studies on Taiwan's national identity. Their presumption that the emerging Taiwanese national identity is in conflict with the orthodox Chinese national identity makes them blind to the phenomenon that a large portion of the people in Taiwan have identified themselves with both the Chinese nation and the Taiwanese nation. The phenomenon of dual identity poses important questions for the study of the dynamics of national identity change in Taiwan. Why, along with the rivalry of the two nationalisms in political competitions, has a major proportion of the population identified themselves with both the Chinese and the Taiwanese nations? What are the forces which have caused national identity shift? And what is the nature of the rising Taiwanese national identity?

To answer these questions, this study proposes to bring Chinese national identity back to the analysis of the national identity shift in Taiwan. Most work on Taiwan's national identity change focuses primarily on the analysis and explanation of the rise of Taiwanese national identity. Very few studies deal with the problem of Chinese national identity. They assume the rise of Taiwanese national identity suggests that

Chinese national identity was losing ground and was replaced by Taiwanese national identity in the 1990s. This research questions these assumptions. First of all, this study challenges the nationalist paradigm underlying these assumptions which treats national identities as mutually exclusive. Different from previous research, I argue that Chinese national identity and Taiwanese national identity are not presumably contradictory, and that the national identity of the populace should not be seen as an either-or choice between the two nationalities. Moreover, I suggest that the two trends of national identity change in Taiwan after democratic transition, i.e. the ascending trend of Taiwanese national identity and the descending trend of Chinese national identity, should not be understood as the two faces of the same coin. The rise of Taiwanese national identity should not be presumed to have caused the decline of the Chinese national identity. Rather, this study proposes to examine the waxing of Taiwanese identity and the waning of Chinese identity as two separate trajectories in which different mechanisms explain their dynamics respectively.

Hypothesis 1: The conventional thinking that holds different national identities to be incompatible is theoretically improper and empirically untrue.

Hypothesis 1.1: Chinese national identity and Taiwanese national identity are not mutually exclusive.

Hypothesis 2: The relationship between different national identities in a single state is not competitive in nature.

Hypothesis 2.1: The rise of Taiwanese national identity and the decay of Chinese national identity are two different processes occurring in different

stages.

What explains the rise of Taiwanese national identity after democratic transition in the 1990s? Most studies adopt a perspective of ethno-nationalism and argue that the frequent and large-scale ethnic mobilization by the native elites in order to gain political support during the early stage of democratization contributed to the surge of Taiwanese national identity in the 1990s. This study suggests that this ethno-cultural account tells only a partial story, and proposes a theory involving two paths of Taiwanese national identity formation. In addition to the ethno-cultural path, there is a political participatory path. The surge of Taiwanese national identity was partly caused by nationalist ethnic mobilization. However, the main force was a response to democratic transformation. Democratic institutions and practice not only redefine the ROC's de jure territory. Democratic citizenship provides a new basis, different from nationalist ethno-cultural sources, for collective self-understanding. Through participation in democratic political processes, identification with the Taiwan-wide political community has been cultivated among the population on the island. Identification with the Taiwanese political community is not based on an ethnicity and culture different from those of Chinese. Hence, it does not challenge the ethnic mythology upon which the Chinese national identity is based. This is the reason why Taiwanese national identity is able to co-exist with Chinese national identity.

Hypothesis 3: Democratization mitigates rather than exacerbates identity politics by creating a public sphere where citizens participate equally in

deliberation to resolve state-wide affairs, which engenders identification with the state.

Hypothesis 3.1: The rise of Taiwanese national identity is a product of the transition to democracy. National identity is engendered through popular democratic political participation.

If the new Taiwanese national identity formed after democratization does not challenge existing Chinese national identity, why have Chinese national identity experienced a decline since 2000? This dissertation argues the wane of Chinese national identity was a response to the rise of the PRC in international institutions. The dominance of the PRC in the international community along with its staunch One China Principle have fostered in the minds of the people in Taiwan a strong connection between the Chinese nation and the People's Republic of China. The Chinese national identity hence is deprived of the element of the Republic of China, which had been an important component of the Chinese national identity in Taiwan. The Chinese nationalism of the KMT's official ideology is a Chinese nation represented solely by the ROC state, the territory of which includes not only Taiwan but also mainland China. The transition to democracy did not destroy this vision. The ROC, now a democratic state, was still expected to rule great China one day, when the whole Chinese nation could be unified into a free, democratic, and prosperous nation. The rise of the PRC however has turned this vision into a grand illusion. There will no more be a great China, but only the People's Republic of China. Chinese unification will result in the disappearance of the ROC state. Rather than the fulfillment of self-rule, unification now means being ruled



by another state (the PRC).

Hypothesis 4: Dual national identity is difficult to sustain if the larger nation pursues a state that denies political autonomy to the small nation.

Hypothesis 4.1: The decay of Chinese national identity was a response to the rise of the PRC. The imbalance of power between the ROC and the PRC made those who identify with the ROC state no longer accept a unified great China.

## **Research Design**

The following is a brief description of the research projects entailed by and data collected for the writing of this dissertation. This dissertation obtained three types of data, namely, data from cross-sectional surveys, data from panel surveys, and data from in-depth interviews.

One major source of survey data was acquired from the Survey Research Data Archive (SRDA) at Academia Sinica in Taiwan (<http://srda.sinica.edu.tw/>). These datasets includes two survey data sets from “General Survey of Social Image in Taiwan.” The two face-to-face surveys were conducted by the Research Center for Humanities and Social Sciences at Academia Sinica and sponsored by the National Science Council of the ROC. The data sets I used are: The Social Image Survey of June 1991 with a sample size of 1618, and The Social Image Survey of July 1994 with a sample size of 1589. I

collected three data sets from the “Taiwan Social Change Survey.” The surveys were conducted by the Institute of Sociology at Academia Sinica in Taiwan, and financed by the National Science Council of the ROC. The datasets include the following three: (1) Taiwan Social Change Survey, 3rd Poll of the 4th Term, 1998. The sample size is 1798. (2) Follow-up telephone poll of the above poll, 2000 (sample size 1152). (3) Taiwan Social Change Survey, 4th Poll of the 4th Term, 2003. The sample size is 2016. I also collected five datasets from the “Political Change and Electoral Behavior Survey.” This is a long-term nation-wide interview survey project. All the face-to-face interviews are conducted months after national general elections. The Political Science Department at National Taiwan University and that of Soochow University take turns carrying out the project, which is financed by the National Science Council, ROC. These surveys are: (1) The 1992 Legislative Election Survey, conducted by the Political Science Department at National Taiwan University in 1993. The sample is size 1398. (2) The 1995 Legislative Election Survey, conducted by the Political Science Department at National Taiwan University in 1996. The sample size is 1383. (3) The 1996 Presidential Election Survey, conducted by the Political Science Department at Soochow University in 1996. The sample size is 1406. (4) The 1998 Legislative Election Survey, conducted by the Political Science Department at National Taiwan University in 1999. The sample size is 1375. (5) The 2000 Presidential Election Survey, conducted by the Political Science Department at Soochow University in 2000. The sample size is 1409.

Survey data was also collected from the Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study (TEDS) of the Election Study Center at the National Chengchi University in Taiwan (<http://www.tedsnet.org>). The two face-to-face surveys used in this dissertation

are: the “Study of Election and Democratization in Taiwan: the 2004 Presidential Election House Interview Survey” (TEDS 2004P). The total sample is 1823. The second is the “Study of Election and Democratization in Taiwan, A Four-year Plan (IV), 2005-2008: the 2008 Presidential Election House Interview Survey” (TEDS 2008P). The total sample is 1905.

This dissertation also includes data collected from two telephone surveys, focusing on national identity. The first telephone poll is the “Analysis the Unification and Independence Preference of Taiwan’s Public”, sponsored by the National Science Council of the ROC. The principal conductor of this project is Professor Yu Cheng-hua at the National Chengchi University. The survey was conducted in October, 2010 with a sample size of 1132. The second telephone poll is the “China Impact Survey I”, conducted in January 2011 by the “China Impact Group” of the Institute of Sociology at Academia Sinica. The total sample size of the survey is 1217.

This dissertation obtained a panel dataset conducted by Professor Wu Nai-teh of the Institute of Sociology at the Academia Sinica. Two surveys each interviewed the same interviewees composed the panel data. The survey conducted in 1998 was the Taiwan Social Change Survey, 3rd Poll of the 4th Term, conducted in 1998. The total sample of the survey is 1798. The other is the follow-up survey conducted in 2000. The follow-up survey had a success rate of 64 percent, and its sample size is 1152. This dissertation utilizes the panel dataset in order to create the sample for conducting in-depth interviews.

This dissertation used interview methods to supplement quantitative data gathered from survey research. This research assumes that interviews would illuminate certain

aspects to my study that are less accessible through survey data. Firstly, since the ‘national identity question’ used to be a highly controversial and sensitive issue under authoritarian rule in Taiwan, people might be reluctant to engage in discussion or hide their true opinions when they answer survey questions (especially in the case of telephone surveys since the respondents do not know who is asking these questions and for what purposes). In-depth interviews, on the one hand, give the respondents a chance to understand the researcher herself/himself and the purpose of the interview. Furthermore, in-depth interviews give the researcher an opportunity to explore further the different attitudes of the respondents underneath the “yes/agree” or “not/disagree” answers obtained from the survey questions. In addition, in-depth interviews allow for discussion to be carried out in an informal and comfortable environment (mostly the informant’s house), and thus increase the possibility of getting reliable information. Secondly, very few consensuses have been reached about the proper questions to ask in surveys in order to test the concept of national identity in Taiwan. The discussion format of the interviews ensures that participants talk in their own language, rather than reacting to the questions and language of the questionnaire. This, in turn, enhances the likelihood of new and unexpected findings and conclusions emerging from focus group analyses. As my research is interest in explaining why people’s national identity had changed, the target of my interviews was those individuals whose national identity had changed. From the panel dataset, I selected those individuals whose national identities had changed from 1998 to 2000. I conducted twenty-five interviews over a six-month field trip to Taiwan in 2003. A paper copy of questionnaire was given to them to complete after open-ended discussions.

## **Theory: Nation, State, and Democracy**

The notion of the nation, as well as nationalism and nationalist movement, can only be conceived in relation to the notion of the state. As Hobsbawm (1990) points out it is pointless to discuss nation/nationality except insofar as it relates to the modern territorial state. The notion of the state can either refer to the Weberian notion of an administrative and legal order which possesses a monopoly of authoritative power, or to “political community,” in which a group of people, citizens, are held together in a given territory and interact through sovereign political institutions. Nationalism as the political principle of congruence between nation and state requires that a nation not be separated and ruled by different states, and also that different nations should not be ruled by a single state. John Breuilly (1994) points out there are three different historical processes that may fulfill this political principle. Firstly, there is the process of separation, in which a nation tries to break away from its present state, such as the cases of Magyar and Greece. There is also the process of reform, in which a nation reforms the state in the nationalist direction as in the cases of Japan and Turkey. Lastly, there is the process of unification, in which a nation unites with another state to form a single nation state, as is the case with Germany and Italy. All three of those processes aim at achieving the congruence of nation and state. The study of the nation and nationalism thus cannot be done without bringing in the state. As Breuilly claims staunchly, “the modern state and modern state system offer the key to an understanding of nationalism.”

(Breuilly 1994: 2).

But if the state is the key to understanding nationalism, what holds the key? Although nationalism can be adequately defined as a nation in search of an independent and sovereign state, the theoretical relationship between nation and state and the historical trajectories in which the two are made in congruence remain very problematic. Many students of nationalism, among them Anthony D. Smith being the most prolific, focus their studies on the issue of how the nation is formed on the basis of cultural and ethnic identities, and how it then demand its own state in the name of the nation already formed (Smith 1986, 1991). Some are more inclined to take the nation, or nation formation, as a product of state, or an administrative unit with state power, rather than viewing state building as the project of an already-formed nation (Anderson 1991; Breuilly 1994; Brubaker 1996; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Hobsbawm 1990; Marx 1998, 2003). John Breuilly (1994) starts from how the political environment of the modern world, in which states representing societies with their own cultures, having sovereignty over particular territories, and also competing with each other, have given rise to nationalist ideology . Without this modern state system, many nationalist movements would not have emerged, or at least not have taken the form of nationalism and become aimed at the establishment of independent states.

Some other scholars have gone down to the level of how states have contributed to the formation of nations. Benedict Anderson (1991) in his famous work shows how nations in Latin America, although being imagined communities, were formed along the lines of administrative units under the former Spanish empire. Rogers Brubaker (1996) argues that nationalisms in the former Soviet Russia were engendered and consolidated

by the policy of institutionalized social/national categories under the Soviet republics. Philip G. Roeder (2007) in his world-wide survey of why some nationalist movements succeeded and why others failed in building independent nation states argues for the importance of the role of the former “segmented states” in nation formation.

This dissertation follows this line of thought to study two entangled national identities, the Chinese and the Taiwanese, in Taiwan. This study is intended to add another case, not a deviant one, but rather a very unique and interesting one, to the state paradigm. It is hoped that this research will not only provide a better understanding of the nationalist phenomenon in Taiwan, but will also enrich the institutionalism theory of nation formation in the study of nationalism. Because the issue of national identity has been the most salient in the country’s national politics, it has been studied by many local and foreign scholars. But the important role of the state in (Taiwanese) nation formation and (Chinese) national de-formation is often ignored. To be sure, the role of the (authoritarian) state in engendering (Chinese) national identity has been mentioned. The indoctrination of national identity by the state’s educational institutions is a universal phenomenon. It is well noted that the global prevalence of national identity has gone hand in hand with the establishment of compulsory education in the modern world. The indoctrination of Chinese national identity by the KMT authoritarian regime for four decades may have played an important role in the forging of Chinese national identity, at least before the democratic transition of the country.

But the situation in Taiwan concerning the relationship between nation and state is much more complicated as far as the rise of Taiwanese national identity in competition with the orthodox Chinese identity is concerned. First of all, there are already two

different nations, the orthodox Chinese nation and the nascent Taiwanese nation. Secondly, there are three different states, two existent with another imagined, and each competing with the others. Bringing the state into the analysis of the nationalist phenomenon in Taiwan is only the first step. This study will discuss how different states play various roles in conditioning the decline of one national identity and nurturing the rise of another.

In studying the relationship between the state and the nation, the particular institution of the state at the particular historical moment cannot be ignored. This study focuses on the role of democracy in forging national identity. The relation between democracy and nationalism has been an important issue both in the theory of nationalism and in modern political thought. Since democracy and nationalism both made their appearance in the 19th century, the relationship between the two has become an important issue among political thinkers. It is evident that there is a strong connection between the ideas of democracy and nationalism. As Liah Greenfeld points out, “the idea of popular sovereignty—the literal meaning of democracy—is also the idea which lies at the basis of nationalism.”(Greenfeld 1993: 329) It was also partly the democratic implications of nationalism that drew people under colonial rule to support nationalist movements (Emerson 1954; Wallerstein 1966).

But the problem of democracy and nationalism is more than the connection of ideas. The more important issue is whether democracy can accommodate plural national identities. John S. Mill (1952) has argued that democracy cannot survive in a society divided by different national communities. When people are divided, they are unlikely to be united to resist to government’s tendency to abuse the power. According to Mill,



even rational discussion of public policies and united public opinion are impossible in the divided society. Many social scientists seemed deeply influenced by Mill's perspective in this regard. Rupert Emerson (1967) argued that democracy needs an affectionate framework sustained by identity consensus to tolerate political differences. In his pioneering essay on democratic transition, Dankward Rustow (1970) took settled national identity as one of the preconditions for democratization. On the other hand, Jack Snyder (2000) argues for reverse causality, insisting that democratic transition in a society divided by national identity only works to intensify identity division, which in turn will plague the new democracy. Both of these lines of thought project a seamy picture concerning the relation between democracy and nationalism.

The perspective of this dissertation however is much more optimistic. It argues that, at least for the case of Taiwan, the issue is not whether democracy can accommodate plural national identities. Rather, the issue is how democracy can help create a unified national identity. This study hopes to show that democratic institutions with popular political participation have helped form a new Taiwanese national identity. It further argues that the nascent Taiwanese identity forged by democratic institutions and participation is largely civic in nature, i.e. an identity characterized by a political community composed of equal citizens.

The distinction between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism is nearly as old as the study of nationalism. The pioneer of the study of nationalism Han Kohn differentiated Eastern nationalism from Western nationalism in his work published in 1945 (Kohn 1945). Kohn's typology was later transformed into ethnic and civic nationalism and has been one of the most debated issues in the studies of nationalism.

Some would argue that the typology is a false differentiation since nearly all national identities are based on both ideas. Another controversy centers on the issue of whether the national identity of the United States a case of civic nationalism. A main argument of this dissertation is that nations formed under a democratic state are more likely to take the form of civic nationalism, while those formed under non-democratic and colonial states are inclined toward ethnic nationalism. This dissertation will show that under the KMT's authoritarianism and also in the early stage of the democratic transition in the late 1980s, the Taiwanese national identity appealed strongly to Taiwanese ethnicity and culture. Because an appeal to ethnicity and culture was the only possible tool for mobilizing national identity, ethnic nationalism became the main mode in the era. It was also a period of ethnic tension in Taiwan's politics. But as democracy advanced and full political participation was experienced by the entire polity, Taiwanese national identity began to be conceived as a civic identity with political community. Although some people still maintain an ethnic notion of Taiwanese nation, the civic one seems to become a mainstream.

A phenomenon side by side with the growth of civic Taiwanese national identity is the existence of a large portion of people holding dual identity. The issue of dual identity has been studied by the students of nationalism in the context of other areas of the world. David Laitin (1998), in his study of national identity in the former Soviet Republics, observed that some Russians in Estonia held dual identity. He argues that people's "identity projects" are more complicated than making either-or choice between pair of identity alternatives. He further contends that multiple identities can co-exist within a person only in so far as choice is not necessary.

Nevertheless, as discussed above, the case of Taiwan is different in two respects. Firstly, the larger community in other cases is the state, while in Taiwan the state is the smaller community, contained in a larger community of nation. Dual identity in other areas of the world is engendered by the situation that a politically activated national identity, based on the culture and particular history of some ethnic group, is embedded in a larger state-wide political community. The dual identity in such cases is the combination of cultural identity of a smaller nation and the political identity of a larger state, or state community. The case of dual identity in Taiwan, however, is a combination of the political identity of a small state, or political community and the identity of a larger nation. Secondly, for those cases of dual identity in other areas, identification with the smaller community is pre-existent. What needs to be explained is the emergence of identification with the larger political community. In the case of Taiwan, however, identification with the larger community, i.e. the orthodox Chinese national identity, has long been present. The object of current research is the formation of identification with the smaller community along with continual identification with the larger one. The core question concerning dual identity in Taiwan thus is to explain the particular political and historical situations that gave rise to this strange mode of dual identity and also to analyze how it changes with the political environment.

## **Chapter Arrangement and a Brief Sketch of the Argument**

This study aims to explore the forces which have driven national identity change

among the general populace in Taiwan. The first task is to portray correctly the trends of Taiwan's national identity shift over the past two decades. Leading studies present partial and conflicting pictures of the dynamics of national identity shift in Taiwan. The conventional view focusing on the rapid and steady growth of Taiwanese national identity portrays the victory of Taiwanese ethno-nationalism. It claims a Taiwanese-centered national identity replaced a Chinese-centered national identity and became the consensus among Taiwan's public (Chu and Lin 2001; Corcuff 2002; Wang and Liu 2004). Another view says that the stagnation of the Taiwanese nationalist movement indicates that the rising Taiwanese identity was not dominant yet and was still in contention with the orthodox Chinese identity. The rivalry of the two nationalisms has made Taiwan a deeply divided society (Wu 2002a, 2005a). In addition to the two views, other studies propose a static picture of Taiwan's national identity. Pinpointing the prevalence of a popular preference for the status quo over almost two decades, some studies state that the national identity of Taiwan's public has not changed much. They argue that the fact that the majority of the population prefers neither unification nor independence indicates that most people have no national identity. Some assume the majority were pragmatists whose choice of Taiwan's future status is based on material calculation (Chu 2004; Jiang 1998; Rigger 2000). Others assume the national identity of Taiwan's public is chaotic because the struggles of the two nationalisms have confused most people by giving them conflicting ideas about which nation they belong to.<sup>17</sup>

What best characterize the dynamics of Taiwan's national identity over the past two decades: the continuing struggle of two antagonistic nationalisms, or the conversion of national identity from orthodox Chinese nationalism to Taiwanese nationalism, or the

---

<sup>17</sup> Corcuff (2004) argues that it is the case for the mainlanders in Taiwan.

triumph of pragmatism/rationalism, or a chaotic society with confused national identity? Finding the answer to this question is the first step toward grasping Taiwan's national identity problem. Failure to envisage the dynamics of Taiwan's national identity correctly would result in a misunderstanding of the process itself and the implications of the dynamics of national identity change after democratic transition, as well as the nature of the rising Taiwanese identity, and the forces which have caused the change. Chapter Two is devoted to the task of characterizing the dynamics of national identity change in Taiwan. As every empirical study of political attitudes among the general populace starts from the measurement of the attitudes concerned, the next chapter will begin with a discussion of the problem of measuring national identity in Taiwan. Several different strategies of measurement have been attempted by local scholars. The means of measurement adopted in this dissertation is a modification of one of them. The modification is based on the assumption that Taiwanese national identity and the Chinese one are not mutually exclusive. A two-level framework is also proposed in the chapter to analyze the different patterns occurring in different stages, of the rise of Taiwanese national identity and the decline of Chinese one. This framework also opens the door for observation of the puzzling phenomenon of dual identity.

The main focus of Chapter Three is the important phenomenon of dual identity. In order to understand dual identity, it requests the analysis of the rising Taiwanese national identity. A popular view among local scholars holds that Taiwanese national identity was nurtured throughout the island's history of domination. It thus is very much based on the Taiwanese ethnic identity. This chapter proposed a quite different view. It argues that a different type of Taiwanese national identity was engendered after the

democratic transition in the late 1980's by the popular political participation. This new type of Taiwanese identity is civic in nature. Verifying the civic nature of Taiwanese identity with the empirical data collected in the poll surveys from 1990 to 2000. This chapter then proceeds to analyze dual identity. It will point out the particularity of dual identity in Taiwan in a comparative perspective taking into account its counterparts in other areas of the world. This particularity is a product of orthodox Chinese national identity, which has been around since the island was incorporated into the Chinese nation and its ROC state after World War Two.

Chapter Four shows and explains the decline of dual identity. This decline is not the result of the polarization of identity politics, but rather the decline of Chinese national identity. It is argued that the decline of Chinese national identity is caused by the imbalance of power between two Chinese states, or more precisely the rise of China in the international community and cross-strait relations. As the more powerful Chinese state, the PRC, tries to undermine the lesser Chinese state, the ROC, many people under the latter start to give up their Chinese national identity. As the ROC was rendered an outcast and subjected to bullying in the international community, the Chinese national identity it embodies has also lost its appeal. The fact that the decline of Chinese national identity has accompanied the rise of China also shows that Chinese national identity, at least among people in Taiwan, is not based on (or at least not solely based on) Chinese culture and history, as many people have wrongly assumed. This phenomenon has many implications not only for the theory of nationalism, concerning the relation between state and nation, but also for the future of cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan.

## **Possible Theoretical Contributions and Political Implications**

The study of nationalism cannot be separated from that of the state. In studying nationalist movements under colonialism, students of nationalism have taken the state as the target, or product, of nationalism. As the discussion above shows, a different approach has emerged lately, one that emphasizes the important role of the state not only in creating national identity among its citizens but also in conditioning the formation of a new nation.

The situation in Taiwan concerning the relation between the nation and the state is much more complicated. Two different nations, the orthodox Chinese nation and the nascent Taiwanese nation are entangled with three different states, two existent and another imagined. These states play various roles in conditioning the decline of one national identity and nurturing the rise of another national identity. On the other hand, the particular role each state plays is also conditioned by historical factors and the larger political environment. The factor of the state in nation formation thus goes beyond the conventional and simplified perspectives of either taking the state as a product of nationalism or seeing it as what engenders the nation. The theoretical perspective of this dissertation is that the state and the nation are like fellow travelers in the historical journey of a society. Sometimes they dispute with each other, but most of the time each conditions the behavior of each other. Together they decide the destiny of a society.

Another theoretical implication of this dissertation concerns the relationship between

democracy and nationalist politics. As mentioned above, the relationship between democracy and nationalism has been an important issue both in the theory of nationalism and in modern political thought. Some have argued that democracy cannot survive in a society divided by national identity. Others have contended that homogeneous national identity is a precondition for democratic transition. Some have even argued that the transition to democracy will only intensify nationalist divisions and escalate conflicts between different nationalist camps. The perspective in this dissertation is opposite to this pessimistic view. The dissertation argues that democratic institutions with popular political participation have helped form a new Taiwanese national identity that is based on identification with the political community. It also shows with empirical data that democratic participation did ease tensions in nationalist politics by facilitate the emergence of a consensus of political identity among the general populace. Liberal democracy and nationalism are the most important ideologies of the modern world. This dissertation proposes that we may want to reconsider the relationship between the two. Many areas in the world are still plagued by divided identity, either ethnic or national. If the argument of this dissertation is correct, then we should welcome and encourage the coming of liberal democracy rather than preventing it.

The Beijing government seems to misunderstand both the nature of Taiwanese national identity and the nature of Chinese national identity (in Taiwan). Taiwanese national identity, as espoused by many if not all Taiwanese, in fact is compatible and not in conflict with the Chinese national identity. After the democratic transition, a majority of people in Taiwan identified with two nations, one being the political community in which they share and actively participate and the other being the Chinese nation. But,



the Chinese nation they identify with is not the ethnic notion of a Chinese nation to which the Beijing government subscribes. It thus makes little sense to the people in Taiwan to claim, as the Beijing government does that “since we are all Chinese, we should pursue a unified China.” The allegiance of Chinese nationalists in Taiwan is to the state of the Republic of China, which is not to be destroyed and replaced by the People’s Republic of China. Therefore, it is a perverse strategy of the Beijing government in its pursuit of unification to bully the ROC in the international community. The strategy fails to consolidate the Chinese identity of people in Taiwan. It in fact works to diminish it.

By contrast, the segment of the population oriented toward the status quo, that is, who are inclined toward neither unification nor independence has significantly increased. Yet, the most important of all is the fact that, as emphasized above, the rise of China along with the deep economic integration between two sides has failed to lure people in Taiwan to maintain or adopt a Chinese national identity. This fact has important implications for the future of cross-strait relations.

## Chapter 2

### **Dynamics of National Identity Change in Taiwan, 1991-2008: Conceptualization, Measurement, Trends, and Two Phases**

Students of nationalism and identity politics share the view that the central problem of studying national identity in Taiwan is how best to conceptualize and measure national identity. So far, however, they have been unable to arrive at a consensus on these issues.<sup>18</sup> Three methods have been used in poll surveys to measure national identity. The first section of this chapter reviews these three methods. It also discusses why all of them are inadequate measurements of national identity and hence fail to detect the dynamics of national identity change in Taiwan. They share in common an incorrect presumption that the Taiwanese and Chinese national identities are mutually exclusive. This chapter then proposes a new measurement which allows for the compatibility of the two national identities. The proposed research design is discussed in detail in the second section. The third section is devoted to a discussion of the validity of the proposed measurement. Also discussed in this section is the efficacy of the proposed measurement as compared to the two conventional measurements in studying national identity politics in Taiwan. The last two sections present the empirical findings from the

---

<sup>18</sup> Shelley Rigger (1999/2000) has reviewed the different conceptualizations and measurements used in survey research to study Taiwan's national identity.

new method of measurement. The first finding serves as empirical evidence showing that the two conventional views of national identity change in Taiwan are not correct. It also shows the advantages of the new measurement. The second finding is that Taiwanese national identity did not surge at the cost of Chinese national identity. The third finding is the rise and fall in the number of people belonging to the group with dual national identity in the past two decades. Basing on these findings, the dynamics of national identity change in Taiwan can be differentiated into three distinct periods: the dominance of Chinese nationalism before 1992, the rise of dual identity from 1994 to 2000, and the decay of Chinese national identity after 2000. This chapter is concluded with a section which proposes research hypotheses on how to characterize the observed change and how to explain the different patterns of change as well as the forces causing national identity change.

### **Conventional Measurements**

The earliest strategy in measuring national identity in the poll surveys is to ask respondents the question “Do you consider yourself to be ‘Only Taiwanese’, ‘Only Chinese’, or ‘Both Taiwanese and Chinese’ [*Qingwen ni renwei ziji shi Taiwan-ren, Zhongguo-ren, huo zhe ji shi Taiwan-ren ye shi Zhongguo-ren?*]”.

The measurement was first introduced by Chang Mao-kui and Hsiao Hsing-huang in 1987 in a survey of political attitudes among college students (Chang and Hsiao 1987). It was widely adopted in later poll surveys on general population. It was the first

attempt to go beyond the objective status of the ethnic background (*shengji*, literally provincial origin) prescribed by the state at the time in order to capture the subjective dimension of national identity. Having successfully done so, the measurement was a breakthrough in the study of national identity in Taiwan. But this measurement based on self-identification as Taiwanese or Chinese is not adequate to probe the national identity question in Taiwan. First of all, “Taiwanese” in the common usage is synonymous with *benshengren*.<sup>19</sup> The term’s opposite is *weishengren*. Some scholars therefore adopted it as a more adequate measurement of ethnic identity rather than national identity (Wu 1996; You 1996). An additional problem of the measure is that when people say they are “Taiwanese,” what they are referring to is quite ambiguous (Wang and Sun 1996). They may be using the term to denote the concept of Taiwanese nationality (vis-à-vis Chinese) or of ethnicity (vis-à-vis mainlanders), or they may be indicating that they conceive of themselves as citizens of Taiwan (whatever the state is). In some usages, the term may even connote a notion of local residency (like New Yorkers). Many people in Taiwan use the term in different contexts.

The second measurement design uses preference for Taiwanese independence or Chinese unification as an indicator of national identity. The question “What is your preference regarding Taiwan’s future, unification or independence is posed to respondents. This unification-independence preference later developed into several variations.<sup>20</sup> One version pushes those respondents who opt for neither independence

---

<sup>19</sup> The term *benshengren* is translated as “Taiwanese” in the English literature. Nevertheless, the term “Taiwanese” may also refer to ROC citizens, people residing in Taiwan. To prevent conceptual confusion, this dissertation translates the term *benshengren* as “native Taiwanese” instead of “Taiwanese”.

<sup>20</sup> For an evaluation of the different measurements of popular attitudes towards the issue of independence and unification, see (Hsieh and Niou 2005).

nor unification but the status quo to make a choice by posing the follow-up question: “If the status quo cannot be maintained, do you prefer independence or unification.”

The exact wordings of the question are: There are debates about Taiwan’s future. Some people favor Taiwan independence; others favor unification. What is your opinion about Taiwan’s future [*Guonei duiyu Taiwan qiantu de wenti you henduo zhenglun, youren renwei weilai Taiwan duli bijiao hao, youren renwei liangan tongyi bijiao hao. Qingwen ni de yijian zenyang*]. If the respondent answers “maintaining the status quo”, he or she will be asked a follow-up question “If the status quo cannot be maintained, do you choose independence or unification [*Ruguo xianzhuang wufa weichi, ni de xuanze shi?*]”.

Another version asks respondents to locate their preferences on a six-point scale: “immediate unification”, “immediate independence”, “status quo now, unification later”, “status quo now, independence later”, “status quo now, decision later”, and “status quo indefinitely”. The exact wordings of the question are “There are different opinions about Taiwan’s future in relation to mainland China. Which of the following option do you prefer? “immediate unification”, “immediate independence”, “status quo now, unification later”, “status quo now, independence later”, “status quo now, decision later”, and “status quo indefinitely” [*Guanyu Taiwan han dalu de guanxi, qingwen ni bijiao pianxiang na yi zhong? jinkuai tongyi; jinkuai duli; weichi xianzhuang, yihou zouxiang tongyi; weichi xianzhuang yihou zouxiang duli; weichi xianzhuang, kan qingxing zai jueding tongyi huo duli; yongyuan weichi xianzhuang.*]

Using preferences for unification or independence as the measurement of national identity is straightforward. It also avoids the problems caused by different meanings

inherent in the word “Taiwanese.” But this measurement is not without its own problems. The most serious one is shown by the fact that many poll surveys up to the present, whether conducted by news media or by academics, have consistently found that most respondents favor not unification or independence but the status quo (see *Table 1.1*). Some researchers suggest that the fact that the dominant proportion among the respondents favors the status quo is because their true national identities are obscured or have been blocked by pragmatic consideration (Chu 2004; Keng et al. 2009; Wang and Liu 2004; Wu 1993). As for those inclined toward Taiwanese nationalism, in the face of the threat of military attack from Beijing if independence is declared, they would rather prefer the status quo to Taiwan independence for the time being. In the same vein, those inclined toward Chinese nationalism may also opt for the status quo rather than unification because China lags significantly behind Taiwan in terms of economic and political development. The intervention of these factors causes a great segment of people, whether inclined to Taiwanese nationalism or Chinese nationalism, to opt for the status quo. Thus, we cannot simply claim that those opting for the status quo lack any national identity.

The third design for the measurement of national identity was developed by Wu Nai-teh (1993). In order to induce the respondents to reveal their true national identity, Wu’s measurement eliminated those factors which contribute to pragmatic reasoning from the questions it posed to respondents. It asks them two questions at the same time.

The first question is “Some people say if Taiwan could maintain peaceful relations with China declaring independence, Taiwan should become an independent country. Do you agree? [*Ruguo Taiwan xuanbu duli zhihou rengran keyi han zhonggong weichi*

*heping de guanxi, name Taiwan jiu yinggai duli chengwei yige xin de guojia?]*”

The second question is “Some people say if mainland China were comparable with Taiwan in terms of the economic, social, and political developments, then the two sides should be unified into one country. Do you agree? [*Ruguo Zhongguo dalu han Taiwan, zai jingji, shehui, zhengzhi ge fangmian tiaojian xiangdang, name liang'an jiu yinggai tongyi. Qingwen ni de kanfa ruhe?*]”

After the true national identity of respondents is revealed, Wu then cross-tabulates the replies from these two questions into four different groups: among them “Taiwanese nationalists” (those who agree with the first question but disagree with the second question), “Chinese nationalists” (those disagree with the first question but agree with the second question), “Pragmatists” (those who agree with both questions), and “Conservatives” (those who disagree with both questions).<sup>21</sup> Since this method was proposed in 1993, it has been widely employed by empirical studies to measure national identities of the general population in Taiwan (Chu 2004; Marsh 2002; Niou 2004, 2005; Shyu 1996; Shen and Wu 2008; Wang 1998; Wu 1993, 1996, 2002a, 2005a).

In controlling the factors preventing respondents from expressing their true attitudes on the issue of unification and independence, Wu’s method makes a significant advancement in the measuring national identity in Taiwan. However, Wu’s research exhibits a problem similar to that of other methods. The problem is their presumption of an either-or notion of national identity. Thus, even if Wu’s method captures four attitudes, it identifies only those who treat Chinese national identity and Taiwanese national identity as mutually exclusive as possessing a national identity. They are Taiwanese nationalists, who want independence if it will not bring war and oppose

---

<sup>21</sup> For a detailed discussion of the logic underlying this measurement, please see (Wu 1993).

unification even if Taiwan and mainland China are compatible in terms of economic, societal, and political development, and Chinese nationalists, who want unification if the two sides of the strait are compatible in terms of economic, societal, and political development and who oppose independence even if it is peaceful. The other two groups, those who want both unification and independence and those who reject both, are taken as lacking any national identity. When this method was first used in a 1992 survey, it was found that less than half (47%) of the respondents had a particular national identity (Wu 1993:46). When this measurement was repeated in many subsequent poll surveys, the proportion of those presumed of having national identity (I+II in *Table 2.1*) even decreased (38% in 1993, 38% in 1996, 39% in 1998, and 43% in 2000, see *Table 2.1*). Wu's measurement is intended to uncover the hidden identity of the majority supporting the status quo. Nevertheless, it ends up finding that more than half of the population in Taiwan lacked any national identity (53% in 1992, 62% in 1993, 62% in 1996, 61% in 1998, 57% in 2000, 56% in 2004, and 53% in 2008, see *Table 2.1*). Is it really true that over half of the population in Taiwan lacked any particular national identity? It does not seem to be a realistic picture that the majority of the population of a country should be without any national identity. This dissertation contends that odd set of findings is attributable is the failure of the current measurements to reveal people's national identity. The reason behind this failure is the presumption that national identities are mutually exclusive. A new method based on a different presumption of national identity politics is needed.



Table 2.1: National Identity of Taiwan's Public, 1991-2008

|                               |       | Chinese Unification if no disparity |               |             | N (%)       |            |
|-------------------------------|-------|-------------------------------------|---------------|-------------|-------------|------------|
|                               |       | Agree                               | No Answer     | Disagree    | Total       |            |
| Taiwan Independence if no war | 1991  |                                     |               | I 116 (9.3) | 456 (36.7)  |            |
|                               | 1993  |                                     |               | 138 (10.3)  | 506 (37.7)  |            |
|                               | 1996  |                                     |               | 296 (21.3)  | 874 (62.8)  |            |
|                               | 1998  | Agree                               | No Answer     | Disagree    | Total       |            |
|                               | 2000  |                                     |               | 396 (22.4)  | 1116 (63.2) |            |
|                               | 2004  |                                     |               | 338 (24.0)  | 858 (60.9)  |            |
|                               | 2008  |                                     |               | 525 (28.8)  | 1025 (56.2) |            |
|                               |       |                                     |               | 662 (34.8)  | 1097 (57.6) |            |
|                               |       |                                     |               | 12 (1.0)    | 139 (11.2)  |            |
|                               |       |                                     |               | 18 (1.3)    | 339 (25.2)  |            |
|                               |       |                                     |               | 9 (1.4)     | 238 (17.1)  |            |
|                               |       | No Answer                           |               |             | 225 (12.7)  |            |
|                               |       |                                     |               | 8 (0.6)     | 168 (11.9)  |            |
|                               |       |                                     |               | 31 (1.7)    | 257 (14.1)  |            |
|                               |       |                                     |               | 37 (1.9)    | 233 (12.2)  |            |
|                               |       |                                     | II 472 (38.0) | 39 (3.1)    | 137 (11.0)  | 648 (52.1) |
|                               |       |                                     | 371 (27.6)    | 27 (2.0)    | 100 (7.4)   | 498 (37.1) |
|                               |       |                                     | 235 (16.9)    | 5 (0.4)     | 40 (2.9)    | 280 (20.1) |
|                               |       |                                     | 297 (16.8)    | 27 (1.5)    | 102 (5.8)   | 426 (24.1) |
|                               |       | Disagree                            |               |             | 93 (6.6)    | 383 (27.2) |
|                               |       |                                     |               | 222 (12.2)  | 541 (29.7)  |            |
|                               |       |                                     |               | 297 (15.6)  | 574 (30.1)  |            |
|                               |       |                                     |               | 265 (21.3)  | 1243 (100)  |            |
|                               |       |                                     |               | 256 (19.1)  | 1343 (100)  |            |
|                               |       |                                     |               | 355 (25.5)  | 1382 (100)  |            |
|                               | Total | 1000(56.6)                          | 243 (13.8)    | 524 (29.7)  | 1767 (100)  |            |
|                               |       | 790 (56.1)                          | 180 (12.8)    | 439 (31.2)  | 1409 (100)  |            |
|                               |       | 744 (40.8)                          | 301 (16.5)    | 778 (42.7)  | 1823 (100)  |            |
|                               |       | 631 (33.1)                          | 277 (14.5)    | 996 (52.3)  | 1904 (100)  |            |

Data Source: 1991: General Survey of Social Attitudes in Taiwan in 1991, 1993: the 1992 Legislative Election Survey, 1996: the 1996 Presidential Election Survey, 1998: Taiwan Social Change Survey, 4<sup>th</sup> Poll of the 4<sup>th</sup> Term, 2000: the 2000 Presidential Election Survey, 2004: TEDS 2004P, 2008: TEDS 2008P.

- I. Taiwanese Nationalist Identity (Taiwanese Nationalist)
- II. Chinese Nationalist Identity (Chinese Nationalist)

## Conceptualization and Operationalization

The nation, in its modern definition, refers to a population that has the right to demand independent statehood. Despite whatever may have been ancient about the nation, the era of nationalism and the principle of national self-determination have transformed the term nation as to be the base for political legitimacy of the modern state (Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1990; Anderson 1991). Nation, therefore, is a political term, and different from the concept of *ethnie*, used by Anthony Smith (Smith 1986, 1991), which is demarcated by cultural (and/or linguistic) boundaries. (According to Max Weber, an ethnic group may also be based on shared historical experience.) Nations and ethnic groups are sometimes very hard to differentiate (Connor 1994). But conceptually, they are different. One contends to remain a cultural group, while the other demands, sometimes desperately, its own state.

Taiwan's national identity problem (*guojia rentong wenti*) is a "stateness" problem. The problem is not so much about the dispute over whether the population on the island is ethnologically or culturally different from the population of mainland China; rather, the dispute is in essence related to the boundaries of the territory of the state as a legitimate political unit. People with a Chinese national identity display a preference for a single state that encompasses the whole Chinese nation. They support unification because for them, the territorial boundary of a legitimate political unit should include both Taiwan and the Chinese mainland. People with a Taiwanese national identity want an independent Taiwan because they see the territory of Taiwan as constituting a legitimate

political unit.

As discussed in Chapter one, in Taiwan's political history and recent political development we may witness the entanglement of national identity with the issue of unification and independence. Most research about Taiwan's national identity thus defines and measures national identity as popular attitudes regarding the issue of unification and independence. The most popular method measures national identity as popular preferences for unification or independence in the context of Taiwan's future. The problem with this measurement is that although in Taiwan's political context national identity involves the issue of unification and independence, a respondent's unification-independence preference might not truly reflect her/his national identity. Due to interference from some factors in the current situation, respondents' answers to the question of their unification-independence preference might be based on their realistic considerations rather than their national identities. Under current configuration of cross-strait relations, when a respondent who has a Taiwanese national identity answers a question about her/his unification-independence preference, the fear of PRC military attack might prevent her/him from choosing independence. Similarly, a respondent with a Chinese national identity might not prefer unification because her/his concerns about the existing disparity in economic, societal, and political conditions between the two sides of the strait. This problem can be corrected by controlling for the factor of realistic consideration. After controlling for interfering factors, respondents' attitudes toward unification and independence become expressions of their national identities.

My research design entails adopting Wu's two hypothetical questions regarding respondents' attitudes toward unification and independence as proxies to measure

Chinese national identity and Taiwanese national identity respectively.

The question that measures Chinese national identity asks the respondents “Some people say if mainland China is comparable with Taiwan in terms of economic, social, and political developments, then the two sides should be unified into one country. Do you agree?” The question measuring Taiwanese national identity asks the respondents “Some people say if Taiwan could maintain peaceful relations with China and declare independence, Taiwan should become an independent country. Do you agree?”

There are two advantages to adopting these hypothetical questions in order to measure the national identity of Taiwan’s public. First, the hypothetical questions give respondents a chance to express their national identities by controlling for intervening factors. Since the hypothetical questions are able to dismiss respondents’ pragmatic concerns about the contingencies of independence and unification, they reveal respondents’ wishes/true attitudes concerning Taiwan’s statehood. Second, these two questions have been consistently adopted in most poll surveys since 1991. Using them, instead of creating new ones, allows us to examine and analyze the long-term trend of national identity change since the early 1990s.

Nevertheless, a new typology of national identity in Taiwan based on new research assumptions is needed. As pointed out in the previous section, the failure of current methods to detect the national identities of the populace in Taiwan is due to that research’s either-or presumption concerning national identities. Under the assumption that Chinese national identity and Taiwanese national identity are mutually exclusive, current research finds that more than half of the population in Taiwan does not have any national identity and investigates only those who see Chinese national identity and

Taiwanese national identity as antagonistic to each other. These studies thus capture a limited picture of national identity politics in Taiwan. My study rejects the either-or notion of national identity and argues that Chinese national identity and Taiwanese national identity are not to be presumed contradictory to each other. Different from current measurement techniques, this research will not locate a respondent's national identity on a bipolar spectrum in which Chinese national identity and Taiwanese national identity are the two extremes. Rather, this study proposes to measure Taiwanese national identity and Chinese national identity separately. By relaxing the mutually exclusive assumption of national identity, the proposed method creates an opportunity to detect the existence of multiple and complementary national identities.

Table 2.2: Typology of National Identity in Taiwan

|   |     | Chinese National Identity<br><i>(Chinese Unification If No Economic, Societal, and Political Disparity)</i> |  |
|---|-----|---|--|
|   |     | No  | Yes  |
| Taiwanese National Identity<br><i>(Taiwan Independence If No Military Threat)</i> | Yes | (I)<br>Taiwanese Nationalist/<br>Exclusive Taiwanese Identity   | (III)<br><b>Dual National Identity</b>                     |
|   | No  | (IV)<br>Status Quo  | (II)<br>Chinese Nationalist/<br>Exclusive Chinese Identity |

The new typology of national identity proposed in this study includes all possible relationships between Taiwanese national identity and Chinese national identity (see Table 2.2). There are four types of national identity to be observed in Taiwan depending on how respondents perceive the relationship between Chinese national identity and Taiwanese national identity. Both the types in the first category (upper-left cell) and the second category (lower-right cell) conceive of the two identities as

contradictory and mutually exclusive. Those in the first category would reject unification with China even if the economic, social, and political developments between two sides of the strait were comparable. These respondents' refusal to accept unification even after all the realistic obstacles have been removed apparently suggests that their refusal is not due to pragmatic reasoning but to the absence of Chinese national identity. In the meantime, their support for Taiwan independence reveals their Taiwanese national identity. Having a Taiwanese national identity without a Chinese national identity, those in this category seem to hold an exclusive Taiwanese national identity. This study defines them as "Taiwanese nationalists." Likewise, the second category of respondents which opts for unification with China but not for Taiwan independence even under favorable conditions can be categorized as "Chinese nationalist." The fact that they object to Taiwan independence even if no war is provoked shows that their objection to independence is not due to realistic concerns. Since they have a Chinese identity without a Taiwanese identity, it seems that the respondents in this category possess exclusively Chinese national identities. This study defines them as "Chinese nationalists."

In contrast, those in the third category (upper-right cell), who give positive answer to both questions, do not think the relationship between Taiwanese and Chinese identities is antagonistic. In their minds the two are just compatible and can co-exist. Respondents in this category seem to exhibit both national identities. This study defines them as people possessing "dual national identity".

Previous studies, nevertheless, interpreted them as being without any national identity. They were thus given the name "pragmatists" (Shyu 1996; Wu 1993), or

“rationalists” (Chu 2004). Conceptually, it is illogical to interpret their attitudes as pragmatic or realistic. As the two hypothetical questions are designed to eliminate pragmatic/realistic reasoning underlying one’s attitudes toward unification and independence, people’s responses to the two questions actually reveal their true attitudes toward unification and independence (that is their national identities). To put it more specifically, those who have a Taiwanese national identity might not support independence and instead prefer maintaining the status quo because of pragmatic reasoning, i.e. the threat of military attack from the PRC if independence is declared. As a result, we cannot tell whether people prefer the status quo because of a lack of Taiwanese national identity or because of pragmatic reasoning. However, as the hypothetical questions have removed their realistic concerns (independence can be achieved peacefully), their responses to the hypothetical question reflect not pragmatic reasoning but their national identity. Thus, for those who have a Taiwanese national identity, if there is no need to consider realistic obstacles, their attitude toward independence would be to support it. It is illogical to say that their support for independence is pragmatic. The same logic applies to Chinese national identity. Those who have a Chinese national identity might not support unification but instead prefer maintaining the status quo because of pragmatic reasoning, i.e. China lags largely behind Taiwan in economic, social, and political development. As a result, we cannot tell whether the fact that people prefer the status quo is because they lack a Chinese national identity or because of pragmatic reasoning. However, since the hypothetical question has removed their realistic concerns (the two sides of the strait are comparable in development), their responses to the hypothetical question reflect their national identity

and not pragmatic reasoning. Thus, for those who have a Chinese national identity, if there were no need to consider realistic obstacles, their attitude toward unification would be to supporting it. It is illogical to say that their support for unification is pragmatic. If a respondent's support for independence is an expression of her or his Taiwanese national identity and if a respondent's support for unification is an expression of her or his Chinese national identity, why would a respondent who supports both be viewed as a pragmatist instead as of having both Taiwanese and Chinese national identity?

Empirically, the hypothesis that interprets respondents whose true attitude of supporting both unification and independence as having dual identity is supported by survey data. *Table 2.7* contains the cross-tabulations of respondents' self-identity and the proposed measurement of national identity from 1993 to 2008. The 2000 data in *Table 2.7* illustrates that if obstacles were no longer to exist, around 58% of those respondents who support both independence and unification would have a dual self-identify as "Both Taiwanese and Chinese" (see *Table 2.7*). This finding suggests that the group of respondents who approves of both independence and unification under their respective favored circumstances are, as my research correctly defines, people holding dual national identity. (Further discussion can be found in the next section about the validity of the proposed measurement.)

Another challenge to the definition of the dual identity category would be as to whether it is possible that respondents agreed to both unification and independence not because they had dual national identity but due to their confusion, ignorance, or a sort of thoughtless of giving answers without really paying attention. Conceptually, it is possible; however, empirical data rejects this hypothesis. First of all, the data shows



that this category consistently contained a large number of people over the past 17 years (30% in 1991, 49% in 1996, 44% in 1998, 41% in 2000, 26% in 2003, and 23% in 2008, see *Figure 2.6*). It is hard to imagine that such a large number of people (sometime around half of the population) would give illogical and meaningless answers. Secondly, the data shows that most respondents in this category have good educational backgrounds. In 1996, 60.3 percent (35.3%+25%) of respondents who belonged to this category had a median level of education (12-15 years of education) or high level of education (above 15 years of education) (see *Table 2.3*). In 2000, 63 percent of respondents who belonged to this category had a median or high level of education (see *Table 2.4*). We would not expect that people with good educational backgrounds would give ignorant or thoughtless answers. Thirdly, the data shows that most respondents in this category pay good attention to political news. In 1996, 45.3% of respondents who belonged to this category often watched political news from television programs, 29.2% of them watched sometimes, 21.7% of them seldom watched, and only 3.8% of them never watched TV news (see *Table 2.5*). In 2000, 54.4% of respondents who belonged to this category often watched political news from television programs, and 28.9% of them watched sometimes (see *Table 2.5*). They also pay attention to political news in newspapers and magazines. In 1996, 45.3% of respondents belonging to this category often read political news in newspapers and magazines, and 22.8% of them read sometimes (see *Table 2.5*). In 2000, 41.4% of respondents who belonged to this category often read political news in newspapers and magazines, and 30.7% of them read sometimes (see *Table 2.5*). We would not expect that people who are concerned about politics and well informed would give thoughtless or ignorant answers.

Table 2.3: National Identity and Education, 1996 N (%)

| Row<br>Column           | National Identity              |                                |                              |                               |                        |
|-------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------|
|                         | Taiwanese<br>Nationalist       | Dual<br>Identity               | Status Quo                   | Chinese<br>Nationalist        | Total                  |
| Low<br>(<12 years)      | 139<br>(31.2)<br><b>(47.1)</b> | 217<br>(48.8)<br><b>(39.7)</b> | 16<br>(3.6)<br><b>(40.0)</b> | 73<br>(16.4)<br><b>(31.1)</b> | 445<br>(100)<br>(39.8) |
| Median<br>(12-16 years) | 77<br>(22.0)<br>(26.1)         | 193<br>(55.1)<br>(35.3)        | 9<br>(2.6)<br>(22.5)         | 71<br>(20.3)<br>(30.2)        | 350<br>(100)<br>(31.3) |
| High (>16)              | 79<br>(24.5)<br>(26.8)         | 137<br>(42.5)<br>(25.0)        | 15<br>(4.7)<br>(37.5)        | 91<br>(28.3)<br>(38.7)        | 322<br>(100)<br>(28.8) |
| Total                   | 295<br>(26.4)<br>(100)         | 547<br>(49.0)<br>(100)         | 40<br>(3.6)<br>(100)         | 235<br>(21.0)<br>(100)        | 1117<br>(100)<br>(100) |

*Data Source: the 1996 Presidential Election Survey*

Table 2.4: National Identity and Education, 2000 N (%)

| Row<br>Column           | National Identity              |                                |                              |                               |                        |
|-------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------|
|                         | Taiwanese<br>Nationalist       | Dual<br>Identity               | Status Quo                   | Chinese<br>Nationalist        | Total                  |
| Low<br>(<12 years)      | 122<br>(28.8)<br><b>(36.2)</b> | 176<br>(41.5)<br><b>(36.3)</b> | 34<br>(8.0)<br><b>(36.6)</b> | 92<br>(21.7)<br><b>(33.9)</b> | 424<br>(100)<br>(35.8) |
| Median<br>(12-16 years) | 171<br>(28.5)<br>(50.7)        | 248<br>(41.3)<br>(51.1)        | 43<br>(7.2)<br>(46.2)        | 138<br>(23.0)<br>(50.9)       | 600<br>(100)<br>(50.6) |
| High (>16)              | 44<br>(27.2)<br>(13.1)         | 61<br>(37.7)<br>(12.6)         | 16<br>(9.9)<br>(17.2)        | 41<br>(25.3)<br>(15.1)        | 162<br>(100)<br>(13.7) |
| Total                   | 337<br>(28.4)<br>(100)         | 485<br>(40.9)<br>(100)         | 93<br>(7.8)<br>(100)         | 271<br>(22.8)<br>(100)        | 1186<br>(100)<br>(100) |

*Data Source: TEDS 2000P*

Table 2.5: National Identity and Political Interests, 1996, 2000

| Row<br>Column | National Identity        |                         |                         |                         |                         |                         |                       |                       |                        |                        |
|---------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
|               | Taiwanese<br>Nationalist |                         | Dual Identity           |                         | Chinese<br>Nationalist  |                         | Status Quo            |                       | Total                  |                        |
|               | 1996                     | 2000                    | 1996                    | 2000                    | 1996                    | 2000                    | 1996                  | 2000                  | 1996                   | 2000                   |
| TV news       |                          |                         |                         |                         |                         |                         |                       |                       |                        |                        |
| Often         | 141<br>(27.9)<br>(47.3)  | 199<br>(28.8)<br>(58.9) | 248<br>(49.0)<br>(45.3) | 264<br>(38.2)<br>(54.4) | 101<br>(20.0)<br>(42.6) | 166<br>(24.0)<br>(61.0) | 16<br>(3.2)<br>(40.0) | 63<br>(9.1)<br>(67.7) | 506<br>(100)<br>(45.1) | 692<br>(100)<br>(58.2) |
| Sometimes     | 85<br>(26.1)<br>(28.5)   | 96<br>(29.3)<br>(28.4)  | 160<br>(49.1)<br>(29.2) | 140<br>(42.7)<br>(28.9) | 72<br>(22.1)<br>(30.4)  | 70<br>(21.3)<br>(25.7)  | 9<br>(2.8)<br>(22.5)  | 22<br>(6.7)<br>(23.7) | 326<br>(100)<br>(29.0) | 328<br>(100)<br>(27.6) |
| Seldom        | 62<br>(25.4)<br>(20.8)   | 33<br>(25.0)<br>(9.8)   | 119<br>(48.8)<br>(21.7) | 61<br>(46.2)<br>(12.6)  | 50<br>(20.5)<br>(21.1)  | 30<br>(22.7)<br>(11.0)  | 13<br>(5.3)<br>(32.5) | 8<br>(6.1)<br>(8.6)   | 244<br>(100)<br>(21.7) | 132<br>(100)<br>(11.1) |
| never         | 10<br>(21.3)<br>(3.4)    | 10<br>(27.8)<br>(3.0)   | 21<br>(44.7)<br>(3.8)   | 20<br>(55.6)<br>(4.1)   | 14<br>(29.8)<br>(5.9)   | 6<br>(16.7)<br>(2.2)    | 2<br>(4.3)<br>(5.0)   | 0<br>(.0)<br>(.0)     | 47<br>(100)<br>(4.2)   | 36<br>(100)<br>(3.0)   |
| Total         | 298<br>(26.5)<br>(100)   | 338<br>(28.5)<br>(100)  | 548<br>(48.8)<br>(100)  | 485<br>(40.8)<br>(100)  | 237<br>(21.1)<br>(100)  | 272<br>(22.9)<br>(100)  | 40<br>(3.6)<br>(100)  | 93<br>(7.8)<br>(100)  | 1123<br>(100)<br>(100) | 1188<br>(100)<br>(100) |
| Newspaper     |                          |                         |                         |                         |                         |                         |                       |                       |                        |                        |
| Often         | 125<br>(25.8)<br>(41.9)  | 150<br>(29.1)<br>(44.4) | 248<br>(51.2)<br>(45.3) | 201<br>(39.0)<br>(41.4) | 98<br>(20.2)<br>(41.4)  | 120<br>(23.3)<br>(44.1) | 13<br>(2.7)<br>(32.5) | 45<br>(8.7)<br>(48.4) | 484<br>(100)<br>(43.1) | 516<br>(100)<br>(43.4) |
| Sometimes     | 72<br>(26.7)<br>(24.2)   | 101<br>(28.9)<br>(29.9) | 125<br>(46.3)<br>(22.8) | 149<br>(42.7)<br>(30.7) | 64<br>(23.7)<br>(27.0)  | 73<br>(20.9)<br>(26.8)  | 9<br>(3.3)<br>(22.5)  | 26<br>(7.4)<br>(28.0) | 270<br>(100)<br>(24.0) | 349<br>(100)<br>(29.4) |
| Seldom        | 57<br>(25.7)<br>(19.1)   | 42<br>(25.8)<br>(12.4)  | 110<br>(49.5)<br>(20.1) | 65<br>(39.9)<br>(13.4)  | 45<br>(20.3)<br>(19.0)  | 45<br>(27.6)<br>(16.5)  | 10<br>(4.5)<br>(25.0) | 11<br>(6.7)<br>(11.8) | 222<br>(100)<br>(19.8) | 163<br>(100)<br>(13.7) |
| never         | 44<br>(29.9)<br>(14.8)   | 45<br>(28.1)<br>(13.3)  | 65<br>(44.2)<br>(11.9)  | 70<br>(43.8)<br>(14.4)  | 30<br>(20.4)<br>(12.7)  | 34<br>(21.3)<br>(12.4)  | 8<br>(5.4)<br>(20.0)  | 11<br>(6.9)<br>(11.8) | 147<br>(100)<br>(13.1) | 160<br>(100)<br>(13.5) |
| Total         | 298<br>(26.5)<br>(100)   | 338<br>(28.5)<br>(100)  | 548<br>(48.8)<br>(100)  | 485<br>(40.8)<br>(100)  | 237<br>(21.1)<br>(100)  | 272<br>(22.9)<br>(100)  | 40<br>(3.6)<br>(100)  | 93<br>(7.8)<br>(100)  | 1123<br>(100)<br>(100) | 1188<br>(100)<br>(100) |

Data Source: 1996: the 1996 Presidential Election Survey, 2000: TEDS 2000P

Respondents in the fourth category (lower-left cell) seem not to hold any combination of the two national identities. They do not hope for Taiwan independence or Chinese unification. However, I do not assume they lack any national identity. Thus, this study will not define them as having no identity. Furthermore, this study will not label them as “conservatives,” who do not want to change or are even afraid of doing so (Chu 2004; Shyu 1996; Wu 1993, 1996). Since respondents in this category want neither independence nor unification, they will be defined as the “status quo.” Respondents in the status quo category might have Chinese national identity. What prevents them from supporting unification might not be some realistic consideration, such as economic, cultural, or political disparity. Instead, it might be the case that they do not support unification because they prefer the idea of a certain form of unification (for example, a loose confederation). They thus will not accept unification if it is under the domination of the PRC. Or, they might have Taiwanese national identity. What prevents them from supporting independence might not be the fear of war, but the fact that they think Taiwan is already an independent state and what is needed is garnering more international recognition instead of changing the state’s name. Thus, theoretically, it is possible that they have national identities but that the two hypothetical questions fail to reveal their national identities. This was not the case before 2003. *Figure 2.6* illustrates that the status quo group contained a very small number of people (4% in 1996, 7% in 1998, and 8% in 2000). The fact that more than ninety percent of the respondents (96% in 1996, 93% in 1998, and 92% in 2000) can be categorized as belonging to one national identity group indicates the efficacy of the two hypothetical questions in measuring national identity (see *Figure 2.6*). The small number of people in this

category also raises another question: is it possible that respondents answered “no” to both questions due to their ignorance, or out of thoughtless by giving answers without really paying attention? As this category was insignificant during the period of 1991 to 2000, this study will not interpret their attitudes for this period. However, as *Figure 2.6* shows, since 2003, this category has gained considerable significance. Twenty percent of the respondents in 2003 and nineteen percent of those in 2008 belonged to this category (see *Figure 2.6*). Thus, their attitudes will be discussed for the period after 2003. Was their rejection of both unification and independence because of the absence of Taiwanese national identity and Chinese national identity, because of their identification with the status quo, or because of the inability of the two hypothetical questions to reveal their national identities?

### **Validity of the Proposed Measurement**

The validity of the proposed measurement of national identity can be examined by attending to its correlation with the self-identity of the populace. *Table 2.6* is the Chi-Square test of the association between self-identity and the proposed measurement of national identity. The fact that the Pearson Chi-Square statistics of the 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004 and 2008 data are all significant ( $p < .000$ ) proves that respondents’ self-identity is associated with their national identity (see *Table 2.6*). The test suggests that although the questions used as a proxy of national identity are not on their face about identity, their association with the self-identity question indicates that these questions are indeed about

identity.

*Table 2.6: Chi-Square Tests of the Correlation between the Proposed Measurement of National Identity and a Respondent's Self-Identity, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008*

| Pearson Chi-Square | Value   | df | Significance |
|--------------------|---------|----|--------------|
| 1993               | 145.201 | 6  | .000         |
| 1996               | 200.083 | 6  | .000         |
| 2000               | 161.667 | 6  | .000         |
| 2004               | 230.444 | 6  | .000         |
| 2008               | 247.722 | 6  | .000         |

*Data Source: 1993: the 1992 Legislative Election Survey, 1996: the 1995 Legislative Election Survey, 2000: the 2000 Presidential Election Survey, 2004: TEDS 2004P, 2008: TEDS 2008P.*

The questioning that the proposed measurement is not about identity can be further examined by cross-tabulating the proposed measurement of national identity with the measurement on self-identity. *Table 2.7* contains the cross-tabulations of respondents' national identities with their self-identities from 1993 to 2008. *Table 2.7* reveals some important information. First, it shows that people who had a Taiwanese self-identity were more likely to support independence (have a Taiwanese national identity); meanwhile those who had a Chinese self-identity were more likely to support unification (have a Chinese national identity). The 1993 data of *Table 2.7* illustrates that 75 percent of those respondents who identified themselves as "Only Taiwanese" had a Taiwanese national identity (28.6% were Taiwanese nationalists and 46.8% held dual identity). The data from the subsequent years consistently shows a correlation between the respondents' self-identity and their national identity. In 1996, around 80 percent (43.4% +36.3%) of those who had an "Only Taiwanese" self-identity had a Taiwanese national identity. In 2000, 85 percent (45.8% + 39.3%) of those who had an "Only Taiwanese" self-identity had a Taiwanese national identity. In 2004, 81.5 percent (54.6% + 26.9%) of those who had an "Only Taiwanese" self-identity had a Taiwanese national identity.

And in 2008, 78 percent (59.3% + 18.6%) of those who had an “Only Taiwanese” self-identity had a Taiwanese national identity. Likewise, most respondents who identified themselves as “Only Chinese”, (81% in 1993, 81% in 1996, 79% in 2000, 63% in 2003, and 70% in 2008) had a Chinese national identity (either an exclusive Chinese national identity (Chinese nationalist) or an inclusive Chinese national identity (dual identity)). These findings suggest that because respondents’ true attitudes toward unification and independence (the proposed measurement of national identity) are closely related to their self-identity, their attitudes are not simply opinions on specific public policy. Instead, they are an expression of their national identity.

Second, *Table 2.7* illustrates that most respondents with dual national identity had a dual self-identity as “Both Taiwanese and Chinese” (46.4% in 1996, 57.8% in 2000, 53% in 2004, and 50.8% in 2008) instead of an “Only Taiwanese” self-identity (36% in 1996, 34% in 2000, 40.8% in 2004, and 42.3% in 2008) or an “only Chinese” self-identity (17.6% in 1996, 8.1% in 2000, 6.2% in 2004, and 6.9% in 2008). These findings (among those who support both independence and unification, a bigger proportion had dual self-identity) suggest that the group of respondents who approve of both independence and unification under their respective favored circumstances are, as my research correctly defined, people possessing dual national identity. Their responses to the two hypothetical questions are made on the basis of their national identities rather than out of confusion, ignorance, or a bias toward saying yes to every question.

Last but not least, *Table 2.7* indicates that the meaning of “Taiwanese” and “Chinese” has changed during the period of 1993 to 2008. The percentage of respondents whose self-identity was “Only Taiwanese” possessing exclusive Taiwanese

national identity (Taiwanese nationalists) increased from 28.6% in 1993 to 43.4% in 1996, then to 45.8% in 2000, 54.6% in 2004, and 59.3% in 2008. That is to say, in 1993, less than 30 percent of those respondents who identified themselves as “Only Taiwanese” were Taiwanese nationalists (who supported independence but disapproved of unification). However, in 2008, around 60 percent of respondents who identified themselves as “Only Taiwanese” were Taiwanese nationalists (who supported independence but disapproved of unification). The increase in the number of Taiwanese nationalists among respondents who had an “Only Taiwanese” self-identity suggests that when people said they were “Only Taiwanese”, the meaning of the term “Taiwanese” had changed over time and become more of a national concept of independent statehood than an ethnic concept. By contrast, the percentage of respondents whose self-identify was “Only Chinese” having an exclusive Chinese national identity decreased from 57.4% in 1993 to 54.6% in 1996, and then further to 50% in 2000, 45.7% in 2004, and eventually all the way down to 35.6% in 2008. More specifically, in 1993, around 60 percent of respondents who identified themselves as “Only Chinese” were Chinese nationalists (who supported unification but disapproved independence). However, in 2008 less than 36 percent of respondents who identified themselves as “Only Chinese” were Chinese nationalists (who supported unification but disapproved independence). The decrease in the number Chinese nationalists among people who had an “Only Chinese” self-identity suggests that when people said they were “Only Chinese”, what “Chinese” connoted changed from being a political concept of a Chinese nation (*zhonghua minzu*) to a cultural concept of being ethnic Chinese (*huaren*). These findings suggest that using the self-identity question to study national identity in Taiwan is problematic. As *Table 2.7*



indicates, the meaning of “Taiwanese” or “Chinese” changed between 1993 and 2008. Using one’s Taiwanese or Chinese self-identity as a proxy for national identity would make it difficult, if not impossible, to understand the shift of national identity in Taiwan during the past two decades. Since although the data indicates that the self-identity of the population in Taiwan had changed over the past two decades, it is hard to know whether the observed change was due to changes to people’s national identities or because the meaning of being “Taiwanese” or “Chinese” had changed. *Table 2.7* demonstrates the advantage of the proposed measurement over measurement based on self-identity to studying the dynamics of national identity change in Taiwan.

*Table 2.8* examines the questioning that the proposed questions measure not national identity but policy preference. *Table 2.8* contains cross-tabulations of the proposed measurement of national identity with the question of public preference on the issue of unification and independence during the period between 1991 and 2008. *Table 2.8* reveals some interesting findings. *Table 2.8* shows that in 1991, when asked “If Taiwan and the mainland were compatible in terms of economic, societal, and political development, do you agree the two sides should be united into one state”, 51.5 percent (47.4% + 4.1%) of the respondents who preferred independence approved of unification. These finding suggests that some people preferred independence to unification not because they were Taiwanese nationalists pursuing their own state independent from the Chinese state, but because the existing huge difference between the two straits prevented them from choosing unification. In the same vein, *Table 2.8* shows that in 1991, when asked “if independence can be achieved peacefully”, 23.7 percent (1.5% + 22.2%) of the people who preferred unification indicated that they would approve of independence.

This finding suggests that some people preferred unification to independence not because they were Chinese nationalists pursuing one united Chinese state but because under current circumstances, independence cannot be achieved without PRC military attack. Thus, the question asking respondents' position on the unification-vs-independence spectrum is not a measurement of national identity but of policy preference. The respondents choose unification or independence not necessarily based on their national identity but more likely based on their pragmatic concerns and realistic calculations. As the question asking popular preference on the issue of unification and independence is a policy preference question, the inconsistency between this question and the proposed measurement indicates that the proposed measurement is not about policy preference.

Is the proposed measurement a measurement of national identity since the proposed questions had controlled for the interference of realistic considerations? *Table 2.8* shows that although not all of them preferred independence, very few of those who truly want independence but not unification (we defined them as having exclusive Taiwanese national identity) chose unification (1.8% in 1996, 4.9% in 2000, 3.9% in 2004, and 2.6% in 2008). The data suggests that respondents who had no Chinese national identity might prefer independence (based on their national identity) or the status quo (based on their realistic considerations). Nevertheless, they were not likely to prefer unification. Similarly, although not all of them preferred unification, very few of those who truly want unification but not independence (we defined them as having exclusive Chinese national identity) preferred independence (1.5% in 1991, 2.2% in 1996, 1.9% in 2000, 6.3% in 2004, and 1.7% in 2008) (see *Table 2.8*). The data suggests that, those respondents who had no Taiwanese national identity might prefer unification (based on

their national identity) or the status quo (based on their realistic consideration).

Nevertheless, they did not prefer independence. In contrast, some of those who truly want both unification and independence (we defined them as having dual national identities) preferred independence (28.3% in 1991, 19.6% in 1996, 22.8% in 2000, 22.9% in 2004, and 13.2% in 2008), others preferred unification (45.1% in 1991, 13.2% in 1996, 25.4% in 2000, 22.4% in 2004, and 21.4% in 2008), and still another portion preferred maintaining the status quo (26.6% in 1991, 67.2% in 1996, 51.8% in 2000, 54.7% in 2004, and 65.4% in 2008) (see *Table 2.8*). Their preferences varied because they might have different concerns and calculations. Even so, unlike those with exclusive national identity, they did not exclude unification or independence from their preferences. Their difference can be explained by taking into consideration the fact that they have different national identities. People who have exclusive Taiwanese national identity exclude unification from their set of preferred options because they lack Chinese national identity. Similarly, people who have exclusive Chinese national identity exclude independence from their options because they lack Taiwanese national identity. However, for people who have both Taiwanese and Chinese national identities, either unification or independence can be their preference. Because they identify with both the Chinese nation and the Taiwanese nation, they would not see unification or independence as leading to the creation of an illegitimate political unit. These findings suggest that the proposed measurement is a measurement of national identity.

Table 2.7: National Identity and Self-Identity, 1993-2008

| Row/Column                       |      | National Identity           |                             |                      |                      | Total               | N (%) |
|----------------------------------|------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|-------|
|                                  |      | Taiwanese Nationalist       | Dual Identity               | Status Quo           | Chinese Nationalist  |                     |       |
| Self-Identity                    |      |                             |                             |                      |                      |                     |       |
| Taiwanese                        | 1993 | 71<br>(28.6) <b>(52.6)</b>  | 116<br>(46.8) <b>(34.9)</b> | 22<br>(8.9) (22.4)   | 39<br>(15.7) (10.6)  | 248<br>(100) (26.6) |       |
|                                  | 1996 | 154<br>(43.4) <b>(67.0)</b> | 129<br>(36.3) <b>(36.0)</b> | 31<br>(8.7) (31.0)   | 41<br>(11.5) (12.6)  | 355<br>(100) (35.0) |       |
|                                  | 2000 | 190<br>(45.8) <b>(56.9)</b> | 163<br>(39.3) <b>(34.0)</b> | 20<br>(4.8) (22.2)   | 42<br>(10.1) (15.6)  | 621<br>(100) (53.0) |       |
|                                  | 2004 | 360<br>(54.6) <b>(68.6)</b> | 177<br>(26.9) <b>(40.8)</b> | 72<br>(10.9) (33.2)  | 50<br>(7.6) (18.7)   | 659<br>(100) (45.7) |       |
|                                  | 2008 | 488<br>(59.3) <b>(74.3)</b> | 153<br>(18.6) <b>(42.3)</b> | 129<br>(15.7) (43.6) | 53<br>(6.4) (22.2)   | 823<br>(100) (53.0) |       |
| Both<br>Taiwanese and<br>Chinese | 1993 | 31<br>(10.4) (23.0)         | 126<br>(42.4) <b>(38.0)</b> | 34<br>(11.4) (34.7)  | 106<br>(35.7) (28.9) | 297<br>(100) (31.9) |       |
|                                  | 1996 | 55<br>(13.2) (23.9)         | 166<br>(39.7) <b>(46.4)</b> | 44<br>(10.5) (44.0)  | 153<br>(36.6) (47.1) | 418<br>(100) (41.3) |       |
|                                  | 2000 | 130<br>(20.9) (38.9)        | 277<br>(44.6) <b>(57.8)</b> | 55<br>(8.9) (61.1)   | 159<br>(25.6) (59.1) | 621<br>(100) (53.0) |       |
|                                  | 2004 | 154<br>(22.3) (29.3)        | 230<br>(33.3) <b>(53.0)</b> | 132<br>(19.1) (60.8) | 174<br>(25.2) (65.2) | 690<br>(100) (47.8) |       |
|                                  | 2008 | 160<br>(24.3) (24.4)        | 184<br>(28.0) <b>(50.8)</b> | 154<br>(23.4) (52.0) | 160<br>(24.3) (66.9) | 658<br>(100) (42.3) |       |
| Chinese                          | 1993 | 33<br>(8.5) (24.4)          | 90<br>(23.3) <b>(27.1)</b>  | 42<br>(10.9) (42.9)  | 222<br>(57.4) (60.5) | 387<br>(100) (41.5) |       |
|                                  | 1996 | 21<br>(8.8) (9.1)           | 63<br>(26.3) <b>(17.6)</b>  | 25<br>(10.4) (25.0)  | 131<br>(54.6) (40.3) | 240<br>(100) (23.7) |       |
|                                  | 2000 | 14<br>(10.3) (4.2)          | 39<br>(28.7) <b>(8.1)</b>   | 15<br>(11.0) (16.7)  | 68<br>(50.0) (25.3)  | 136<br>(100) (11.6) |       |
|                                  | 2004 | 11<br>(11.7) (2.1)          | 27<br>(28.7) <b>(6.2)</b>   | 13<br>(13.8) (6.0)   | 43<br>(45.7) (16.1)  | 94<br>(100) (6.5)   |       |
|                                  | 2008 | 9<br>(12.3) (1.4)           | 25<br>(34.2) <b>(6.9)</b>   | 13<br>(17.8) (4.4)   | 26<br>(35.6) (10.9)  | 73<br>(100) (4.7)   |       |
| Total                            | 1993 | 135<br>(14.5)               | 332<br>(35.6)               | 98<br>(10.5)         | 367<br>(39.4)        | 932<br>(100)        |       |
|                                  | 1996 | 230<br>(22.7)               | 358<br>(35.3)               | 100<br>(9.9)         | 325<br>(32.1)        | 1013<br>(100)       |       |
|                                  | 2000 | 334<br>(28.5)               | 479<br>(40.9)               | 90<br>(7.7)          | 269<br>(23.0)        | 1172<br>(100)       |       |
|                                  | 2004 | 525<br>(36.4)               | 434<br>(30.1)               | 217<br>(15.0)        | 267<br>(18.5)        | 1443<br>(100)       |       |
|                                  | 2008 | 657<br>(42.3)               | 362<br>(23.3)               | 296<br>(19.0)        | 239<br>(15.4)        | 1554<br>(100)       |       |

Data Source: 1993: the 1992 Legislative Election Survey, 1996: the 1995 Legislative Election Survey, 2000: the 2000 Presidential Election Survey, 2004: TEDS2004P, 2008: TEDS 2008P.

Table 2.8: National Identity and Unification-Independence Preference, 1991-2008 N (%)

| Row/Column   | U-I Preference | National Identity           |                             |                             |                             | Total                      |
|--------------|----------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|
|              |                | Taiwanese Nationalism       | Dual Identity               | Status Quo                  | Chinese Nationalism         |                            |
| Independence | 1991           | 71<br>(41.5) (67.0)         | 81<br>(47.4) (28.3)         | 12<br>(7.0) (9.6)           | 7<br>(4.1) (1.5)            | 171<br>(100) (17.6)        |
|              | 1996           | 150<br>(57.3) (52.6)        | 101<br>(38.5) (19.6)        | 6<br>(2.3) (16.7)           | 5<br>(1.9) (2.2)            | 262<br>(100) (24.6)        |
|              | 2000           | 167<br>(57.0) (51.4)        | 104<br>(35.5) (22.8)        | 17<br>(5.8) (18.9)          | 5<br>(1.7) (1.9)            | 293<br>(100) (25.9)        |
|              | 2004           | 277<br>(67.1) (53.4)        | 98<br>(23.7) (22.9)         | 21<br>(5.1) (9.7)           | 17<br>(4.1) (6.3)           | 413<br>(100) (28.8)        |
|              | 2008           | 315<br>(77.8) (48.4)        | 48<br>(11.9) (13.2)         | 38<br>(9.4) (13.0)          | 4<br>(1.0) (1.7)            | 405<br>(100) (26.2)        |
|              | Status Quo     | 1991                        | 26<br><b>(11.8)</b> (24.5)  | 76<br><b>(34.4)</b> (26.6)  | 45<br><b>(20.4)</b> (36.0)  | 74<br><b>(33.5)</b> (16.2) |
| 1996         |                | 130<br><b>(20.8)</b> (45.6) | 347<br><b>(55.5)</b> (67.2) | 22<br><b>(3.5)</b> (61.1)   | 126<br><b>(20.2)</b> (55.0) | 625<br>(100) (58.6)        |
| 2000         |                | 142<br><b>(24.4)</b> (43.7) | 236<br><b>(40.6)</b> (51.8) | 62<br><b>(10.7)</b> (68.9)  | 141<br><b>(24.3)</b> (53.8) | 581<br>(100) (51.3)        |
| 2004         |                | 222<br><b>(29.2)</b> (42.8) | 234<br><b>(30.7)</b> (54.7) | 176<br><b>(23.1)</b> (81.1) | 129<br><b>(17.0)</b> (47.4) | 761<br>(100) (53.0)        |
| 2008         |                | 319<br><b>(34.7)</b> (49.0) | 238<br><b>(25.9)</b> (65.4) | 223<br><b>(24.3)</b> (76.4) | 138<br><b>(15.0)</b> (57.5) | 918<br>(100) (59.3)        |
| Unification  |                | 1991                        | 9<br>(1.5) (8.5)            | 129<br>(22.2) (45.1)        | 68<br>(11.7) (54.4)         | 375<br>(64.5) (82.2)       |
|              | 1996           | 5<br>(2.8) (1.8)            | 68<br>(38.0) (13.2)         | 8<br>(4.5) (22.2)           | 98<br>(54.7) (42.8)         | 179<br>(100) (16.8)        |
|              | 2000           | 16<br>(6.2) (4.9)           | 116<br>(44.8) (25.4)        | 11<br>(4.2) (12.2)          | 116<br>(44.8) (44.3)        | 259<br>(100) (22.9)        |
|              | 2004           | 20<br>(7.6) (3.9)           | 96<br>(36.6) (22.4)         | 20<br>(7.6) (9.2)           | 126<br>(48.1) (46.3)        | 262<br>(100) (18.2)        |
|              | 2008           | 17<br>(7.6) (2.6)           | 78<br>(34.8) (21.4)         | 31<br>(13.8) (10.6)         | 98<br>(43.8) (40.8)         | 224<br>(100) (14.5)        |
|              |                | 1991                        | 106<br>(10.9)               | 286<br>(29.4)               | 125<br>(12.8)               | 456<br>(46.9)              |
|              | 1996           | 285<br>(26.7)               | 516<br>(48.4)               | 36<br>(3.4)                 | 229<br>(21.5)               | 1066<br>(100)              |
|              | 2000           | 325<br>(28.7)               | 456<br>(40.2)               | 90<br>(7.9)                 | 262<br>(23.1)               | 1133<br>(100)              |
|              | 2004           | 519<br>(36.1)               | 428<br>(29.8)               | 217<br>(15.1)               | 27<br>(2) (18.9)            | 1436<br>(100)              |
|              | 2008           | 651<br>(42.1)               | 364<br>(23.5)               | 292<br>(18.9)               | 240<br>(15.5)               | 1547<br>(100)              |


Data Source: 1991: General Survey of Social Attitudes 1991, 1996: the 1996 Presidential Election Survey, 2000: the 2000 Presidential Election Survey, 2004: TEDS2004P, 2008: TEDS 2008P.

## Trends of National Identity in Taiwan, 1991-2008

### Two Conventional Perspectives


Because it assumes that Taiwanese national identity and Chinese national identity are mutually exclusive, the conventional paradigm places them at two opposite poles on the same dimension. This paradigm has led in the studies of nationalism and identity politics to two popular conclusions concerning the dynamics of identity change in Taiwan. These two conclusions, however, offer contradictory scenarios for identity politics. The first conclusive finding focused on the antagonistic relationship between Taiwanese identity and Chinese identity, as presented in *Figure 2.1*. Highlighting the rapid shrinking of the Chinese nationalist group along with the continued expansion of the Taiwanese nationalist group, the first conclusion arrived at was that the rise of Taiwanese nationalism caused the decline of Chinese nationalism in the mid-1990s. It thus concluded that the change of national identity in Taiwan could be understood as one in which the emerging Taiwanese identity supplanted the orthodox Chinese identity. The second conclusion arrived at is a static picture of Taiwan's national identity politics (see *Figure 2.2*). Using the findings from polls in many different years that indicated that most people consistently picked the status quo over Taiwan independence and Chinese unification in their replies, it is claimed that the national identity of the general population in Taiwan has not changed much because most people desire neither an independent Taiwan nor Chinese unification. Which conclusion correctly captures the dynamics of Taiwan's national identity politics?

Figure 2.1: Trends of National Identity in Taiwan, 1991-2008



Data Source: 1991: *General Survey of Social Attitudes in Taiwan in 1991*, 1993: *the 1992 Legislative Election Survey*, 1996: *the 1996 Presidential Election Survey*, 1998: *Taiwan Social Change Survey, 4<sup>th</sup> Poll of the 4<sup>th</sup> Term*, 2000: *the 2000 Presidential Election Survey*, 2004: *TEDS 2004P*, 2008: *TEDS 2008P*.

Figure 2.2: Trends of Unification-Independence preference in Taiwan, 1992-2009




Data Source: *Election Study Center, N.C.C.U., important political attitude trend distribution.*

## Two Trends

The analysis in this study suggests that neither is correct. With different presumptions and theoretical hypotheses, this study offers a very different picture from the conventional one. The core argument of this study is that Taiwanese national identity and Chinese national identity should not be seen as contradictory to each other. Their dynamics hence should be analyzed using a two-level framework. Basing on this


new perspective, this study measures Taiwanese national identity and Chinese national identity individually. Utilizing the data collected from various nationwide surveys conducted during 1991-2008, *Figure 2.3* and *Figure 2.4* illustrate the trends of Taiwanese identity and Chinese identity respectively.

*Figure 2.3: Trend of Taiwanese National Identity, 1991-2008*



*Data Source: 1991: General Survey of Social Attitudes in Taiwan in 1991, 1993: the 1992 Legislative Election Survey, 1994: General Survey of Social Image 1994, 1996: the 1996 Presidential Election Survey, 1998: Taiwan Social Change Survey, 3<sup>rd</sup> Poll of the 4<sup>th</sup> Term, 2000: the 2000 Presidential Election Survey, 2003 Taiwan Social Change Survey, 4<sup>th</sup> Poll of the 4<sup>th</sup> Term, 2008: TEDS 2008P.*

*Figure 2.4: Trend of Chinese National Identity, 1991-2008*




*Data Source: same as Figure 2.3*



Contrary to the static picture represented in *Figure 2.2*, both Taiwanese identity and Chinese identity experienced a great change as shown in *Figure 2.3* and *Figure 2.4*. These findings also reject the second conclusion that both independence and unification gained little support from Taiwan's public. As *Figure 2.3* demonstrates, since 1996, independence has gained continuing support from more than half of the population in Taiwan. On the other hand, *Figure 2.4* shows that the majority continued to subscribe to Chinese unification until 2000.

Information provided by *Figure 2.3* and *Figure 2.4* shows that the first conclusion from previous studies is correct: the national identity of Taiwan's public has largely changed. But those figures depict a quite different mode of change. Two figures are combined in *Figure 2.5* to show the point more clearly.

*Figure 2.5: Trends of Taiwanese and of Chinese National Identity in Taiwan, 1991-2008*



*Data Source: 1991: General Survey of Social Attitudes in Taiwan in 1991, 1993: the 1992 Legislative Election Survey, 1994: General Survey of Social Image 1994, 1996: the 1996 Presidential Election Survey, 1998: Taiwan Social Change Survey, 3<sup>rd</sup> Poll of the 4<sup>th</sup> Term, 2000: the 2000 Presidential Election Survey, 2003 Taiwan Social Change Survey, 4<sup>th</sup> Poll of the 4<sup>th</sup> Term, 2008: TEDS 2008P.*


Comparing *Figure 2.5* and *Figure 2.1* it becomes evident that the modes of change

that the two figures reveal are different. *Figure 2.1* proposes a nationalist mode of identity conversion inasmuch as it shows that since 1996, Taiwanese national identity had replaced Chinese national identity. Information provided in *Figure 2.5* suggests that the argument that Taiwanese identity had supplanted Chinese identity is incorrect. As the figure shows, the growth of popular approval of independence and the decline of popular acceptance of unification did not concur. Furthermore, it also shows that Taiwanese national identity did not surge at the cost of Chinese national identity. Taiwanese national identity experienced its most significant growth during the period between 1991 and 1996, when Chinese national identity did not much decline. The majority of the population retained their support for unification (66.5% in 1991 and 60% in 1996). Although Chinese national identity began to decline after 2000, the decline was not due to the triumph of the Taiwanese nationalist movement. During the period of decline of Chinese identity, popular support for independence did not grow. Taiwanese national identity even declined as the Chinese national identity did.

These findings show clearly that both conventional perspectives are inadequate to understand national identity change in Taiwan. A new perspective with a new form of measurement is required for the analysis of the national identity phenomenon in Taiwan, one which can explain the relationship between the two national identities, as well as the trend of change for each national identity. The empirical data seems to support the hypothesis of this study that the two national identities are compatible and hence can co-exist among the same persons. In addition, the trend of change of Taiwanese national identity and Chinese national identity should be analyzed as two different processes.

## The Dynamics of National Identity Change in Taiwan, 1991-2008

Figure 2.6: Dynamics of National Identity in Taiwan, 1991-2008



Data Source: 1991: *General Survey of Social Attitudes in Taiwan in 1991*, 1996: *the 1996 Presidential Election Survey*, 1998: *Taiwan Social Change Survey, 3<sup>rd</sup> Poll of the 4<sup>th</sup> Term*, 2000: *the 2000 Presidential Election Survey*, 2003 *Taiwan Social Change Survey, 4<sup>th</sup> Poll of the 4<sup>th</sup> Term*, 2008: *TEDS 2008P*.

Using the typology of national identity developed in this study, *Figure 2.6* depicts the dynamics of national identity in Taiwan from 1991 to 2008. The figure contains six graphs, each illustrating the distribution of different types, or categories, of national identity in one specific year. In each case, the category located in the lower-right corner represents those who agree with unification but not independence. They are “Chinese nationalists” holding an “exclusive Chinese national identity.” The category that could be considered opposite to it is located in the upper-left corner. This category represents those who agree with independence but not unification. They are “Taiwanese nationalists” who hold an “exclusive Taiwanese national identity.” The category located in the upper

right corner includes those who possess “dual identity,” because they agree with both independence and unification. The category in the lower-left corner is labeled as people for the “status quo,” since they reject both unification and independence.

The six graphs in *Figure 2.6* provide us with some important information. First of all, statistical information is provided in *Figure 2.6* to challenge the assumption that Chinese national identity and Taiwanese national identity are mutually exclusive. The dotted line is the predicted regression line proposed by the contradictory hypothesis. The solid line is the estimated regression line obtained from empirical data. These two lines are very different in all eight graphs. This difference indicates the inadequacy of the assumption that the two identities are in contradiction. The smooth slope of the actual regression line obtained from empirical data suggests that the two identities are weakly negatively related, meaning that for some people, the two identities are in conflict, but for most others, they are not.

Second, these graphs demonstrate the advantages the proposed two-level perspective has over the conventional perspective. The graphs in *Figure 2.6* reveal that, except for the year 1991, the dotted line (conventional measurements) captured less than half of the respondents in the 1990s. Therefore, the trends detected in conventional approaches could only apply to less than half of the population. Actually, one major criticism of Wu’s measurement is precisely that a large portion of respondents were excluded from analysis because they were by definition people without a national identity (Rigger 1999/2000). On the other hand, the other approach, the one entailing a unification-independence spectrum, has repeatedly found that a great part of the population (around 50%) were for the status quo instead of independence or unification

(see *Figure 2.2*). However, both the observed status-quo predominance and the inference of a static trend of national identity change (the continuing predominance of the status-quo attitude) are misleading. *Figure 2.6* demonstrates that those who are left out by the spectrum in fact comprise two groups with opposite attitudes. The status-quo group which rejects unification and independence is located at the lower-left corner. The other group at the upper-right corner accepts both unification and independence. In fact, *Figure 2.6* reveals that the attitude preferring maintaining the status quo is the smaller part of that sizeable block in the 1990s (13% in 1991, 4% in 1996, 7% in 1998 and 8% in 2000).

Third, the information provided by *Figure 2.6* supports the hypothesis that the two national identities are not necessarily in juxtaposed with one another. *Figure 2.5* precisely indicates that the rising Taiwanese national identity did not replace the orthodox Chinese national identity. They actually co-existed in Taiwanese society. *Figure 2.6* further demonstrates that the co-existence was not antagonistic as has been supposed by previous studies. The two can be compatible or even complementary. The existence of the upper-right circle in each graph indicates that people may possess both Taiwanese national identity and Chinese national identity at the same time.

Last but not least, *Figure 2.6* captures the dynamics of national identity in Taiwan in the post-transition period from 1991 to 2008. It confirms previous studies' discovery that the exclusive Taiwanese identity was on the rise, illustrated by the fact that the circle in the upper-left corner of each graph became bigger and bigger as time went by (11% in 1991, 27% in 1996, 28% in 1998, 28% in 2000, 34% in 2003, and 42% in 2008 (see *Figure 2.6*). More importantly, the figure reveals a trend that was overlooked in the

previous studies, namely the rise and decline of the group with dual identity during this period. In the first few years following the democratic transition, this group accounted for less than one third of the population. But within five years of the transition, in 1996, almost half of the population belonged to the group of dual identity. It however this did not last long. The size of the group dropped rapidly after 2000. In 2000, 41 percent of the population exhibited dual identity. The percentage dropped to 26% in 2003, and further to 23% in 2008 (*Figure 2.6*).

But most importantly, *Figure 2.6* illustrates the three different patterns of distribution of national identity groups in different periods. In the beginning of the 1990s, the largest group comprised those with a Chinese nationalist identity (46%). Very few people (11%) possessed a Taiwanese national identity during this period. Over three quarters (46%+30%) of the population supported Chinese unification. During that same period of time, around 60 percent (46%+13%) of the population rejected the idea of an independent Taiwan. The mode of national identity politics during the transition period was characterized by the dominance of Chinese nationalist identity. The second pattern of national identity distribution was characterized by the rise and dominance of dual identity from 1994 to 2000. The domination of the dual identity group means that most people during that period did not see Taiwanese national identity and Chinese national identity as conflicting. Rather, they identified with both a Taiwanese nation and a Chinese nation. The period since 2003 witnessed the third pattern of national identity distribution. The dual identity group was no longer predominant, and the status quo group was no longer insignificant. The growth of the status quo group means that both Taiwan independence and Chinese unification lost their

appeal for Taiwanese people.


## **Two Phases of National Identity Change**

The purpose of this study is to examine the forces behind the changes to national identity among the general population in Taiwan after the democratic transition. The first requirement of this endeavor is to portray correctly the trend of national identity change over the past two decades. It is demonstrated in this chapter that the reason previous studies failed to present a correct picture is that they used the wrong way to measure national identity. A two-level perspective is proposed in this study. The new perspective leads us to adopt different ways of measurement of national identity, a fact which has several advantages. First, while the previous measurements capture less than half of the respondents, or population, the new measurement includes all respondents, or population, in its analysis. Second, the new measurement covers two important groups, which were neglected by previous measurements. Third, the new method provides a comprehensive picture of the trends surrounding national identity after democratic transition in Taiwan. It is also able to differentiate between three different patterns in the change of national identity over the past two decades.

Below, the forces that form these three different modes of national identity politics will be discussed. The change of national identity in Taiwan over the past two decades developed over two transitional phases. Each phase has its distinct patterns of change. The hypotheses concerning the patterns of national identity change in both phases are

presented in graph form in *Figure 2.7* and *Figure 2.8*.


*Figure 2.7: Patterns of National Identity Change in Phase I, 1991-2000*



The first phase is characterized as the rise of Taiwanese national identity, and lasted throughout the whole decade of 1990s. The pattern of change in this first phase entailed the replacement of dominant Chinese nationalist identity by dual national identity. As illustrated by *Figure 2.7*, the change was caused mainly by a shift of attitudes among Chinese nationalists concerning the issue of Taiwan independence. They acquired a new Taiwanese national identity. A small part of them discarded their previous Chinese national identity to become Taiwanese nationalists. But most of them, having retained their Chinese national identity, acquired a new Taiwanese national identity. The thickness of the arrows in the graphs indicates the difference in size. The upward arrows show that the main direction of change in the first phase is the rise of Taiwanese national identity. The bold line in the first graph indicates that the main direction of change was from Chinese nationalist to dual national identity. It suggests the continual and stable presence of Chinese national identity, notwithstanding the rise of Taiwanese national identity.



Figure 2.8: Patterns of National Identity Change in Phase II, 2001-2011



The second phase is characterized as the decay of Chinese national identity. The second phase covered the period from 2001 to 2011. During this phase, dual national identity no longer accounted for a large segment among the population. As illustrated in *Figure 2.8*, the direction of change is from dual national identity to Taiwanese nationalism and support for the status quo. This change was caused by the shift in attitude among those with dual identity concerning unification with China. They shifted their attitudes from supporting unification to opposing it. A larger part of them also changed their attitudes to support Taiwan independence. The two leftward arrows show the pattern of national identity change, characterized by the decline of Chinese national identity. In this phase, the enduring presence of popular support for unification dwindled away.

This research proposes two models of national identity change. The first model tackles the rise of Taiwanese national identity in the first phase. It suggests that the surge of Taiwanese national identity in the 1990s cannot be fully explained by the Taiwanese nationalist movement because what is witnessed in this phase is not only the

growth of Taiwanese nationalists but also the increase of people with dual identity. The first model includes several research questions. First, why was the rise of Taiwanese national identity not in conflict with orthodox Chinese national identity, but instead able to co-exist with it? Second, what was the main force behind the rise of Taiwanese national identity if the Taiwanese nationalist movement was not the major force? And, through what mechanism did this force affect national identity change? Third, what is the nature of the nascent Taiwanese national identity? These issues will be explored in Chapter 3.

The second model depicting national identity change concerns the diminishing of dual identity during the second phase. The core idea of this model is that the diminishing of dual identity was mainly due to the decline of Chinese national identity. The decline of Chinese national identity cannot be explained by the rise of the Taiwanese nationalist movement since popular support for independence remained stable. The second model thus contains the research question of what caused the spectacular decline of Chinese national identity, an identity which used to be a strong and stable ideological force in Taiwan. These issues will be explored in Chapter 4.

## **Conclusion**

The empirical study of nationalism should start from the measuring of national identity. Only through appropriate measurement can we arrive at a correct explanation of the nationalist phenomenon, including its nature, basis, and the trends surrounding its

change. Three different strategies to measure national identity have been proposed by Taiwanese scholars. One is measuring by self-identification as Chinese, Taiwanese, or both. Another entails measuring by preference for Chinese unification or Taiwan independence. This research uses a third strategy of measurement with some modification on the assumption that among a significant proportion of people, Taiwanese and Chinese national identities are not mutually exclusive. Four main categories of national identity are derived from this modified measurement: Taiwanese nationalist, Chinese nationalist, dual national identity, and status quo.

The category of dual national identity emerges when we define the two national identities as not mutually exclusive. Their compatibility is an important assumption of this study. This assumption allows us to detect more clearly the trends and the dynamics of national identity change among the general populace in the country. Assuming the compatibility of two national identities, this chapter proposed a two-level framework to expose the different modes of change of the two national identities, one which has been overlooked previously by the one-dimensional view of national identity. It is demonstrated with empirical data in this chapter that the nascent Taiwanese national identity did not surge at the cost of Chinese nationalism.

More specifically, two different phases can be distinguished concerning the pattern of national identity change during the last two decades. The first phase, which roughly spanned the time from the democratic transition to the late 1990s, witnessed the replacement of dominant Chinese nationalism by dual national identity. It was the result of former Chinese nationalists, who did not forsake the Chinese identity they had long held, adopting a new Taiwanese identity. The second phase, roughly from 2001 to 2011,

is characterized by the decline of Chinese national identity. To understand the nationalist politics of the country, it is contended in this research, one needs to understand these two different modes of national identity change, firstly the acquisition of a new Taiwanese national identity without giving up the old Chinese national identity, and then, the decline of Chinese national identity. These two different modes of change were the result of changes in the political environment, both domestic and international.

The next chapter will examine the advent of Taiwanese national identity. It will differentiate between two different types, or bases, of Taiwanese identity. One is ethnic in nature and the other civic. The former was nurtured under the KMT authoritarian regime, while the latter was born of the democratic political participation. The civic type of Taiwanese nationalism also helps us understand the important phenomenon of dual national identity.

## **Chapter 3**

### **Dual National Identity and Democratic Participation:**

#### **Explaining the Rise of Taiwanese National Identity, 1991-2000**

Students of Taiwan's political development cannot fail to observe that the process of democratization was entangled with the rise of Taiwanese the nationalist movement and this movement's struggle against orthodox Chinese nationalism. Different theories have been proposed to explain the emergence of Taiwanese national identity. Their views are even more varied when it comes to the relationship between the rise of Taiwanese national identity and democratization. This chapter will begin with a review of current studies of Taiwanese national identity and Taiwan's nationalist politics. In this section, I will point out several puzzling questions related to the nationalist phenomenon that previous research has neglected to acknowledge, much less, tackle. One of the puzzles is the existence of a large segment of the population that has possesses dual national identity since the mid-1990s. Its existence is one of the most interesting and theoretically important issues evident in Taiwan's nationalist phenomenon. The second section is devoted to the discussion of dual national identity. It is argued that dual national identity emerged out of the development of a new "inclusive" Taiwanese national identity, and that this inclusive Taiwanese identity is compatible with Chinese national identity. The chapter will then pose the theoretically and politically important

question of why an inclusive national identity, rather than the exclusive type which is a commonplace for nationalism, emerged with the process of democratization. More precisely, the question can be put as why democratic political process helped nurture an inclusive Taiwanese identity, side by side with an exclusive Taiwanese identity and Chinese identity? The third section proposes a causal theory of how democratization in Taiwan transformed the national identity of the people on the island and engendered a special pattern of identity change in the country. The contribution of democracy to the formation of national identity lies not only in providing a base on which different ethnic groups are combined into a single citizenry with equal status, but also in forging a sentiment of common destiny through a “we-feeling” attached to the state-wide political community among the citizens. Democratic practice creates a public sphere where people on the island recognize and communicate with each other, and are encouraged to participate in the deliberation and resolution of community-wide affairs. Through widespread political participation, an identity attached to the island-wide political community was formed. The emergence of the public sphere has turned the island from a place of “my residence” (a territory unit) into “my country” (a political community), and the inhabitants on the island into fellow citizens (co-nationals). The last section analyzes empirical survey data to support the above theory and hypotheses.

## **Current Studies on the Rise of Taiwanese National Identity**

### **Theory 1: Taiwanese Nation as a Product of Elite Construction/Mobilization**

It is a popular view that nationalism and nationalist conflict are born out of the process of democratization. In his study of the correlation between democratization and nationalist conflicts, Snyder (2000) argues that in most societies, there is no long-standing popular nationalist rivalry before democratization. It is usually democratization that produces nationalism. According to the scenario he outlines, popular nationalism arises at the initial stage of democratization as a consequence of the nationalist appeals by political elites vying for popular support. Most studies of Taiwan's national identity seem to share the same view. The emergence of Taiwanese nationalism in the 1980s is interpreted mainly as the product of political elites' manipulation intended to mobilize native Taiwanese in the context of these elites' power contest with the dominant Chinese mainlanders (Chu and Lin 2001; Hsiao 1999, 2000; Lin 1998; Wang 1996).

For example, Wang (1996) tries to demonstrate the important role of the political opposition in forging a Taiwanese nation. He argues that the failure of the opposition before 1980s was due to popular acceptance of Chinese ideology which justified the KMT's authoritarianism. The success of political opposition in the late 1980s can be attributed to their strategic changing of their political claim from political democratization to "Taiwanization" or "indigenization" [*bentuhua*]. The claim of "Taiwanization", i.e. a claim set in the principle of self-determination and Taiwan independence, successfully challenged Chinese nationalism, the base of legitimacy for the KMT's rule. The content and the context of the mass rallies organized by political opposition indicate, Wang concludes, the deliberate attempts by the political opposition

to “build and spread the ‘ethnic myths’ of Taiwanese nationalism. “The nation which political opposition constructed was a ‘Taiwanese’ nation, and the enemy of this Taiwanese nation was the KMT’s ‘émigré regime.’ Taiwanese can restore the glory of their nation only after the KMT regime breaks down” (Wang 1996:183).

The “artifact” nature of the Taiwanese nation is also presumed in Hsiau’s work (Hsiau 1999, 2000). Its main theme of that research is that Taiwanese nationalism is exceptional in the historical sequence of nationalist movements. In all nationalist movements, cultural identity formed long before the political mobilization of nationalist movements. But in Taiwan, Hsiau argues, cultural nationalism followed the lead of political opposition. According to him, Taiwanese cultural nationalism did not emerge until native intellectuals were mobilized by political dissidents advocating the creation of a new Taiwanese state to replace the Republic of China. The construction of “the Taiwanese nation” occurred only after the Kaohsiung Incident of 1979 when mobilized pro-independence intellectuals tried to “authenticate their political assertions and identity by creating collective symbols and reclaiming a particular national tradition, literature, and history” (Hsiau 1999:42).

### **Theory 2: Taiwanese Nation as Hidden Seed in the Mud of Authoritarianism**

While the above studies see the Taiwanese nation as something constructed by opposition political elites during the stage of democratic transition, other studies see it as a force formed from in a bottom-up manner either during the Japanese colonial era or during KMT authoritarian rule. Some research traces the origin of the Taiwanese nation back to the anti-colonial struggle against the Japanese rule (Chang 2003; Lai et al. 1991;



Wu 2001). Utilizing Anderson's analysis of the Creole nationalisms in the eighteenth century (1991), Wu Rwei-Ren (2003) argued that a Taiwan-wide administrative unit created by the Japanese colonial system helped to shape Taiwan as an "imagined political community" among the native Taiwanese .

Others, however, argue that the Taiwanese consciousness that emerged under colonialism was a reaction to Japanese assimilation. The Taiwanese actually were conceived of at that time as being Chinese. The turning point in the formation of a distinct Taiwanese nation was the post-war period, especially after the February 28 uprising (Chen 2008). For most native Taiwanese, the end of Japanese colonial rule did conclude the difficult situation of their identity being sandwiched between Han Chinese and Japanese citizens.<sup>22</sup> However, the Nationalist government from the "motherland" brought not equality and self-rule to the people on the island but domestic colonization. Discrimination, corruption, and economic exploitation at the hands of the new "motherland government" administration drove the frustrated Taiwanese to participate in an island-wide uprising on February 28, 1947. The Nationalist regime responded with a bloody military crackdown. Thousands of native Taiwanese were killed,<sup>23</sup> among them many native political and cultural elites. The whole episode is referred to as the '228 Incident'.<sup>24</sup> Many scholars argue that it was only after experiencing the slaughter during

---

<sup>22</sup> Wu Zhuo-liu wrote a famous novel in Japanese in 1956 to describe the resentment of native Taiwanese and their search for belonging during that period. This work has been translated in English; see (Wu 2005b).

<sup>23</sup> The precise number of death tolls is still the subject of debate. Estimates run from one thousand to ten thousand. The official document released in 1992 puts the number at about eighteen thousand to twenty-eight thousand.

<sup>24</sup> A detail description of the event can be found in (Lai et al. 1991), and (Hughes 1997, especially Ch.2).

the event and the following terror that Taiwanese ethnic consciousness was transformed into a distinct Taiwanese national identity with the political aspiration of achieving independence (Chen 2008; Wakabayashi 1994). Still other studies argue that it was the authoritarian rule of the KMT's émigré regime that lasted over four decades which had a decisive effect on the formation of the Taiwanese nation (Wachman 1994b; Wu 1993). In 1949, the Chinese communists announced the establishment of the People's Republic of China in Beijing after they defeated the KMT regime and forced it into exile onto the island. Until the late 1980s, the KMT ruled the island with an authoritarian party-state system. Martial law was implemented and lasted for over four decades. Political participation on the national level was severely restricted, if not totally blocked, for native Taiwanese. The KMT legitimized its party dictatorship in terms of Chinese nationalism, based on and legitimized by the ideology of "legitimacy succession" (or "constitutional legacy") [*fa-tong*]. Although the KMT had lost the whole mainland China to the Chinese communists, it still upheld the 'One China' principle with the claim that the ROC government was the sole legitimate state of the whole Chinese nation. In accordance with the KMT's claim of *de jure* sovereignty, the "*fa-tong*" system implemented a set of political arrangements to maintain the structure of government regulated by the ROC Constitution adopted in 1948 in mainland China. The general elections on the national level were thus suspended until unification could occur. The representatives elected in 1947 and 1948 in the mainland were not to be replaced, as they represented the sovereign will of the Chinese nation.<sup>25</sup> The "*Chinese fa-tong*" on Taiwan created a political system in which political power was controlled by the Mainlanders. The native Taiwanese, who comprised the majority of the population,

---

<sup>25</sup> For a detailed analysis of the KMT authoritarian regime, see (Lin 1998).

were excluded from this political system. This political system thus was defined by Wu Rwei-Ren (Wu 2002b) as “ethnic authoritarianism” or “settler colonialism”. In addition to the deprivation of political rights, the Chinese nationalist regime also deprived native Taiwanese of dignity and recognition with its cultural policies, as Chang (2003) has argued. The Mandarin high culture imposed by the state-sponsored re-sinicization programs humiliated native Taiwanese, whose languages, accents, and tastes were treated as inferior. As Berlin (Berlin and Hardy 1997) pointed out, “nationalism springs from a wounded or outraged sense of human dignity, the desire for recognition.” Some studies argue that the agony the native Taiwanese suffered under a Mainlander-dominated authoritarian regime was the major source from which a distinct Taiwanese ethnic consciousness arose. Based on this ethnic consciousness, a Taiwanese nation was formed in juxtaposition to the Chinese identity of the émigré regime (Wu 1993; Wachman 1994b).

Although these studies date the birth of a Taiwan nation differently, they share the common view that the absence of a Taiwanese nationalist movement on the island prior to the 1980s was not because of the nonexistence of a Taiwanese nation, but due to the severe political repression of the authoritarian regime. The burgeoning identity nevertheless can be found in many “hidden transcripts” (Scott 1990). As soon as the authoritarian regime loosened its control, the Taiwanese nation was revived. The political liberalization in the 1980’s allowed a political space for this national identity to surface in the public political discourse where it began to struggle with the Chinese ideology. Rather than inventing the Taiwanese nation, political opposition served as its spokesperson and attempted to make “the official view of Taiwan’s political status

conform to the attitude most Taiwanese have about their national identity” (Wachman 1994b:6).

### **Ethno-nationalism: The Exclusive Taiwanese National Identity**

The two theories share the same view of an ethnic notion of the Taiwanese nation. From their perspective, regardless of whether the Taiwanese nation was formed during the long history of colonial repression or was constructed by the native elite as they competed for political power, the resultant “rediscovered” or “invented” nation is assumed to be based on a “core ethnic.” Underlying their theories is the idea that Taiwanese is a different nation from the Chinese nation [*zhong-hua min-zu*]. In addition, these studies argue that at the heart of this Taiwanese consciousness is a great sense of victimization from the oppression of Chinese rule. Taiwanese national identity thus is forged as a struggle against the dominant Chinese national identity. Mobilized to fight against Chinese identity, its aim is to replace the latter.

### **A Puzzling Situation**

According to the reviving theory, the arrival of Taiwanese national identity mainly consisted in the awakening of a long-suppressed Taiwanese consciousness. This theory fares better when used to explain ethnic politics in Taiwan. The long-suppressed Taiwanese ethnic identity was given full expression after the democratic transition and transfer of political power from Chinese mainlanders to native Taiwanese politicians

immediately after democratic transition. But, the theory does not help explain why the new emerging nation which invoked strong Taiwanese national sentiment failed to convert most native people into Taiwanese nationalists and bring about their rejection of unification with China and acceptance of an independent state. The poll surveys on the general population conducted in the decade following the democratic transition indicate that the proportion of Taiwanese nationalists seemed to be contained under the ceiling of 30 percent during the 1990s (see *Figure 2.6*). This failure of conversion shows how Taiwan's case differs from the experience of former Soviet republics in Eastern Europe where the transition to democracy also brought about a triumph of native nationalist movements.

On the other hand, the elite-construction/manipulation argument sees the rise of Taiwanese national identity as the result of ethnic mobilization by native elites against the Chinese ideology of the KMT regime. Their rhetoric targeted at the Chinese/KMT includes the assertions that the Taiwanese are not Chinese, the Taiwanese nation has its own history and culture which were long suppressed by the Chinese émigré regime, and that Taiwan's future should not be predetermined but should instead be decided by the Taiwanese people. This theoretical perspective might explain well why the national identity issue has been the most salient, if not the only, issue in political discourse and also in every national election campaign since the democratic transition. This theory, however, says nothing about the fact that, contrary to the intention of native political and cultural elites to replace orthodox Chinese national identity with the new notion of the Taiwanese nation, a large portion of the population in Taiwan does not see the two national identities as in conflict (see *Figure 2.6*). These two theoretical perspectives

encounter different problems when trying to cope with reality, but these problems have the same source. They share the same mistaken assumption of an ethnic notion of a Taiwanese nation. If we assume the ascendant Taiwanese national identity is exclusive in nature, this can hardly be explained.

### **The Research Question**

This dissertation proposes a new measurement that allows both an antagonism between and compatibility of the two national identities. It is found in Chapter 2 that the rise of Taiwanese national identity in the 1990s was accompanied by the emergence of the phenomenon of dual identity. The survey data illustrates that after democratic transition, the number of people with dual national identity increased to become a very significant proportion (49% in 1996, 44% in 1998, and 41% in 2000), even larger than that of people with an exclusive Taiwanese national identity (27% in 1996, 28% in 1998, and 28% in 2000) (see *Figure 2.6*). The phenomenon of dual identity poses important questions for the study of the dynamics of national identity change in Taiwan. Why, when faced with the rivalry of two competing nationalisms, would a major proportion of the population not choose either one of them but instead identify themselves with both the Chinese and the Taiwanese nations? What forces account for the shift in national identity? And, what is the nature of the rising Taiwanese national identity?

I propose in this dissertation that ethnicity explains only one of the paths for forging Taiwanese national identity, and a minor one indeed. Via this path, an exclusive

Taiwanese identity supplanted the orthodox Chinese nationalist identity. But, the other major and in fact more important path that most people in Taiwan have traced entailed their shift from an exclusive Chinese nationalist identity to a dual national identity (see Figure 2.7). This path of national identity change is totally ignored in previous studies. The chapter explores this neglected path. But, before examining this particular path by which most Taiwanese have arrived at Taiwanese national identity, I will first discuss the phenomenon of dual nation identity.

### **The Phenomenon of Dual Identity**

Taiwan is not exceptional in having the phenomenon of dual identity. However, as I has discussed in the introductory chapter, the phenomenon of dual identity in other areas of the world is engendered by the fact that a politically activate national identity based on the culture and particular history of some ethnic group is embedded in a larger state-wide political community. Dual identity in such cases is the combination of the cultural identity of a smaller nation with the political identity of a larger state, or state community. The case of dual identity in Taiwan, however, is different. It is a combination of the political identity of a small state, or political community, and the identity of a larger nation. The core question concerning dual identity in Taiwan thus calls for us to explain the particular political and historical situations that have given rise to this mode of dual identity and also to analyze how it has changes along with the political environment.

## **Civic Nation**

This dissertation argues that the new Taiwanese national identity in essence consists in a sense of belonging to the Taiwan-wide political community. But in reality this belonging is not based on a Taiwanese ethnic-cultural nation distinct from a Chinese nation, along the lines that some native cultural and political elites have attempted to forge it and many researchers have also suggested. If the new Taiwanese nation is not based on an ethno-cultural notion, what is the basis of the identification with the Taiwan-wide political community? For those cases in which people have dual national identities, some theorists take the civic constitution as the likely answer to this question.<sup>26</sup> A civic nation is not based on a common descent, history, language, culture, etc. It is consolidated by the people's recognition of the authority of a constitutional framework. And, the legitimacy of the polity in the civic nation relies not on prior-existent ethno-cultural ties, but on constitutional principles (Brubaker 1992, 1996; Greenfeld 1992; Kohn 1956, 1957; Smith 1983b).

Some political theorists have criticized the idea of civic nationalism and constitutional patriotism arguing that as a “universalist forms” of political allegiance they may not accrue loyalty and identity from members of a particular nation (Calhoun 1993; Kymlicka 1999; Miller 1995; Yack 1996). If the source of political identity is solely citizens' attachment to democratic principles and human rights, then, the critics ask, how does one account for loyalty to one particular democratic polity over the other? The purpose of this study is not to join the debate on the normative issue of what a desirable

---

<sup>26</sup> Beiner (1999) argues that what Habermas labeled “constitutional patriotism” is a synonym for what others called “civic nationalism”.



Taiwanese national identity should be.<sup>27</sup> Nor will I engage with the theorizing of constitutional patriotism as an allegiance to the democratic process rather than to abstract principles (Ciaran 2003; Muller 2007). This study contends that the new Taiwanese identity is civic and political in nature. But, this does not mean that once the polity provides a liberal constitution and inclusive democratic institutions, it will follow that people who value democratic principles and liberal values will identify with it.<sup>28</sup>

Taiwanese national identity is not just the recognition of the authority of a constitutional or political framework. From my in-depth interviews, it is apparent that persons who approved of Taiwan independence as well as unification with the Chinese mainland assuming preferable conditions, all gave negative responses to the question asking if possible would they agree to Taiwan's joining of the United State or Japan to form a single country. Their responses show clearly that people who approve of both unification and independence are not, as some researchers assumed, pragmatists or rationalists who have no committee to any particular political community. Furthermore, their refusal to join advanced democratic countries seems to suggest that the basis of Taiwanese national identity is not simply universal democratic principles.

### **The Imagined/Imaginary Begonia and Sweet Potato**

The term "China" has different meanings depending on the context. In the West, it simply means the country now ruled by the Chinese Communist Party, the country ruled by the KMT from 1912 to 1949, or the country ruled by the Qing Dynasty before that.

---

<sup>27</sup> This normative question has been explored by Jiang Yi-huah (1998).

<sup>28</sup> For adopting the liberal argument to Taiwan, see (Jiang 1998: esp. Ch.5, Ch.6).

It is a concept that include the territory and the government (or state) ruling that territory. But in Taiwan, the term is used differently, and with various meanings depending on the context of the conversation or discourse. When speaking of China, one is referring to the abstract notion of China with its long history and particular culture. It does not necessarily mean the People's Republic of China, which is only the current state of this nation. Many people in Taiwan of course do not accept the PRC, at least until recently, as the legitimate state of China. Many still think that the Republic of China, which the KMT built in 1912, should be the state of China. The notion of China in this sense is similar to that of the Chinese nation.

This study argues that the phenomenon of dual identity in Taiwan during the 1990s suggests that most people began to think of themselves as belonging to two political communities. One is the ROC, whose geographical boundary is portrayed as a “begonia” that encompasses mainland China, Taiwan, and Mongolia<sup>29</sup> as its “inherent territory”. The other is Taiwan, whose geographical shape is often described as a resembling a “sweet potato.” Chinese national identity was cultivated by the nationalist KMT regime for the purposes of its state-building project. A Chinese nation was “imagined” on the basis of a common origin, a shared history, and a common culture/language.<sup>30</sup> A detail analysis of Chinese national identity will be put forth in Chapter 4. There are two kinds of Taiwanese national identity that we may identify. One with an exclusive nature is based on a distinctive ethno-cultural community. This

---

<sup>29</sup> The government of the ROC refused to recognize the independence of Mongolia and claimed that the area of the “outer Mongolia” belongs to the territory of the ROC. It was not until 2012 that the ROC government officially acknowledged that Mongolia is not ROC's territory. The PRC recognized an independent Mongolia in 1949.

<sup>30</sup> For researches on Chinese nationalism, see (Hughes 1997).

exclusive Taiwanese national identity, antagonistic to the Chinese national identity, has gained much attention in the political discourse as well as in academic research. Conceiving of Taiwanese national identity solely in ethnic-cultural terms cannot explain the fact that most people acquired a dual national identity in the 1990s. This also makes it difficult to explain the continued presence of Chinese national identity. This study explores the other Taiwanese national identity that has been totally overlooked to present. It is argued that the new Taiwanese national identity is more of a form of identification with a Taiwan-wide political community rather than with a Taiwanese ethno-cultural community. The source of this new Taiwanese identity seems to be the institutions of the state. But it is not the constitution or the inclusive democratic institutions and procedures per se that most people identify with. The identification with the new Taiwan nation also involves a “we” feeling with respect to the Taiwan-wide political community. This “we” feeling is the product of the democratic political institutions and processes.

## **Democratic Participation and the Rise of an Inclusive Taiwanese National Identity**

How could a territorial unit be turned into a political community? Benedict Anderson (1991) in his famous work argued that national identity in colonial Latin America was largely cultivated through the “pilgrimage” of local political elites. As pilgrimage was largely confined to the colonial administrative unit, travelling gave

political elites a sense of local identity. The pilgrimage also provided elites with a chance to meet with their counterparts in different places in the same administrative unit. A sense of co-national-ness thus was forged among those local elites, who came to realize that they shared a common destiny with people they met in their travels more so than with people in the Peninsula. Both the land travelled and the elites met were confined to the administrative unit. The unit thus became the boundary of their identity, and also that of the future nation.

In Anderson's description, while the national identity of the political elites was forged through this experience of political "participation," the identity of the common people was formed through cultural participation in the form of the consumption of mass media and novels, which forged an imagined community among their readers. Anderson's work suggests that democracy provides the common people a new route to national identity formation. Before the advent of democratic regimes, political participation was limited to political elites who constituted only a very small part of the population. The national identity among ordinary people thus depended very much either on common blood or ethnic identity (Smith 1991), and/or on language (high culture) (Anderson 1991; Gellner 1983). But with the emergence of democratic regimes, these people acquired the chance to participate in politics. Through participation in routine democratic process, ordinary people are able to imagine themselves as members of a particular political community. The political community becomes the boundary for a nation. Citizens in that particular political community are also transformed into members of that particular nation.

## **Democracy and National Identity**

The relationship between democracy and national identity has been conceived of quite differently in previous studies of democracy and democratic theories. Many scholars have argued for the precondition for a feasible democracy as the existence of a legitimate national community. As Rustow (1970) has argued, for a democracy to work, or to be sustained over time, “the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to.” Some even argue that without the prior existence of a common national identity, a democracy cannot emerge (Almond and Verba 1971). In this scenario, even if a democratic state strives to emerge, it will not be consolidated when national identity is divided among the people, and the least so in the case of a separatist nationalist movement. Some even argue that the process of democratic transition may only mobilize the previous dormant national identity and give rise to national conflict (Snyder 2000).

Recently, however, some scholars have begun to notice the fact that some democracies with multi-nations do work well. The robustness of the multi-national democracy is contributed to in large part by the deliberate choices and political strategies adopted by political elites. If political elites choose to accommodate rather than reject the politically activate identity division with federalism, especially “asymmetrical federalism,” the divisiveness surrounding identity might not jeopardize the democratic regime. With this constitutional design, some form of civic identification with the state may even be formed (Linz et al. 2007).

### **An Island-wide Public Sphere and Shared Political Culture**

No observer of Taiwan's politics will fail to notice the rapid surge of Taiwanese national identity in the 1990s. As stated above, I contend that the rise of a new Taiwanese national identity is very much an effect of democratization. But what are the specific mechanisms that cause the emergence of this new identity? In the next section, I will discuss how the emergence of the public sphere serves as the mechanism which links democratization and the rise of the new national identity.

Habermas (1996), in his theory of constitutional patriotism, argues that in a "post-traditional society", unconditional identification, whether to a nation or to a historically specific constitution, will be replaced by dynamic processes of identity-formation. The dynamics of identity-formation constitute a collective learning process in which citizens are asked to reflect critically upon the existing traditions and institutions in the name of universal norms and principles. What is necessary for the formation of this "post-conventional identity" is a public sphere where open-ended communication is able to exist. Although in the early version of Habermas's theory, the communicative processes is located outside political institutions (Cronin 2003), his idea of the public sphere as a public space for identity-in-formation among citizens furthers our understanding of the formation of the new Taiwanese national identity after democratization.

Likewise, as it happened in Taiwan, the public sphere has provided people with a chance to recognize each other as free and equal citizens, to engage in political and legal learning processes, and to make decisions collectively, if not cooperatively, concerning the future of a common life. This process of collective participation and

decision-making is essential for the formation of a new Taiwanese national identity. This privileged site became available only once Taiwan became a democracy in the 1990s. Before democratic transition, society was under very the tight social and political control of the KMT party-state. Political participation was repressed and limited to a small amount of elites. New political parties were not allowed to form. Channels for public political expression were strictly blocked. Elections were limited to the local level, election campaigns were severely constrained to the advantage of the ruling elites. Involvement in public and political affairs was not encouraged and was sometimes even punished. Most people were kept silent. Parents advised children not to “talk about politics” for fear of being reported by their neighbors or schoolmates. Public debates on policy and political affairs were totally absent. Establishment of the opposition party in 1986 was a democratic breakthrough. Unlike in 1960, the KMT did not repress this movement and Taiwan entered a phase of democratization. With the lifting of the ban on the establishment of new political parties and new mass media, martial law was lifted in 1987. New laws were instituted to codify rights protected by the constitution. People in Taiwan were provided legal channels for public political expression and began to enjoy freedoms of speech, assembly, and association. Institutionalization of democratic citizenship is the necessarily condition for a population to participate in political life. Nevertheless, what is essential for the emergence of public space in Taiwan is the opening of elections on the national level. The two national representative bodies of the central government, the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan, had never been reelected in four decades, witnessed open elections in 1991 and 1992, respectively. The mayors of Taipei City and Kaohsiung, and the

governor of Taiwan Province, which were previously appointed by the central government, were elected by popular vote in 1994. And most importantly, the president was also elected by popular vote in 1996. The mechanism of how state-wide elections contribute to state integration at the elite level has been addressed by other scholars (Linz and Stepan 1992; Linz et al. 2007; Lin 1998). Our current focus is on the mass level. If a nation is a “daily plebiscite” (Renan 1990), it is the general public who makes the decision to form or remain in the nation. Elections encourage widespread political participation. The populace shows its enthusiasm by choosing congressional representatives and especially by electing the leader of the country. The voting turnout was 72 percent for the first Legislative Yuan election in 1992, 76 percent for the first presidential election in 1996, and about 83 percent for the second presidential election in 2000, which resulted in a power turnover.<sup>31</sup>

A by-product of the electoral reform was the rapid growth in amount and popularity of the television talk shows, which allowed politicians and pundits to discuss current political issues. Ordinary people were also invited to call in to express their opinions on politicians, policies, and public issues. Many people in Taiwan watched these talk show programs almost every evening. During the 1990s, general elections were held almost every year. These island-wide elections created a public sphere, which allowed the populace on the island to participate in the political process through mass media reports, television call-in shows, political campaigns, and interest group mobilizations. Popular participation in the political process helped form a common space and time among the citizens of Taiwan. What people read and discussed was the same: the same statements from politicians, the same public policies, and the same political issues and social events.

---

<sup>31</sup> Data is from Central Election Commission. <http://web.cec.gov.tw/bin/home.php>



This common space is congruent with the territory of the island. People in Taiwan see their concerns and problems as occurring within the boundaries of the island. The solutions are also to be found within the boundaries of this political community and within the framework of state institutions.

An attachment to Taiwan as a legitimate political community is constantly formed among the citizens on the island through daily political practice (Billig 1995). The notion of “we” is also created. At the core of this “we feeling” is a trust in compatriots and state institutions, the latter of which is the product of democratic political institutions and processes. For the case of Taiwan, two turn-over were fundamental to the formation of mutual trust among citizens and the formation of popular trust in the state institutions.<sup>32</sup> The first power turnover occurred in the 2000 presidential election when the KMT ended its 50 years of rule on the island and peacefully handed power to the DPP. The 2008 presidential election marked the second turnover as the DPP lost the presidential election and turned power over to the KMT. Popular trust in democratic institutions was consolidated during these two handovers of power. Popular consent to electoral results cultivates mutual trust among the populace since they are certain that people on the island will comply with the decision made collectively. Trust in democratic institutions and in compatriots is essential to people’s loyalty to the political community. It constitutes the foundation of the willingness to live together and to act cooperatively to solve communal problems. In addition to trust, popular participation in democratic processes also creates a shared political culture, which was absent amongst the citizens of Taiwan. In a 1998 survey, when asked, “No matter what the position is

---

<sup>32</sup> Huntington used two-turnover as an indicator to evaluate whether a democracy is consolidated. See (Huntington 1991, page 266-268).

of a political party, as long as it wins the election, we should accept the electoral result,” approximately 58 percent of the respondents disagreed and only 36 percent of them approved.<sup>33</sup> The survey was conducted two years before the first power takeover in the 2000. But when the DPP won the election with less than 40 percent of the vote, the electoral result was accepted by all citizens. The survey data indicates that a shared democratic culture is not inherent to Taiwanese society; rather, it is the product of learning collectively from participating in the political processes.

With the institutionalization of egalitarian citizenship and widespread political participation, an island-wide public sphere was formed. The public sphere provides a common space for people on the island to understand and communicate with one another. It also allows people to engage in the legal and political learning processes together and to make decisions collectively. Additionally, the public sphere cultivates mutual trust and shared political culture, which form the “we feeling” as well as the attachment to the political community among the general populace. Popular participation in the public sphere constitutes the dynamic process of national identity formation in Taiwan. The emergence of the public sphere has turned the island from a territory unit for residence into a political community and has made the inhabitants on the island into fellow citizens (compatriots).

## **Empirical Analysis**

---

<sup>33</sup> Data source is from Taiwan Social Change Survey, period 3, no.4, 1998, Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica, Taiwan.

### **Data Source<sup>34</sup>**

The data used in the analysis in this chapter includes seven public surveys conducted by academia research institutes. The data sets are listed below: The Social Image Survey, July 1991, conducted in 1991, The 1992 Legislative Election Survey conducted in 1993, The 1995 Legislative Election Survey conducted in 1996 The 1996 Presidential Election Survey conducted in 1996, Taiwan Social Change Survey, 3<sup>rd</sup> Poll of the 4<sup>th</sup> Term conducted in 1998, The 1998 Legislative Election Survey conducted in 1999, and The 2000 Presidential Election Survey conducted in 2000.

### **Description of the Main Variable, National Identity<sup>35</sup>**

This research operationalizes the concept of national identity in Taiwan based on two theoretical perspectives: first, national identity should not be presumed as mutually exclusive. Thus, Taiwanese national identity and Chinese national identity is measured separately. Second, people's national identities are usually covered by practical considerations. Thus, the measurement of national identity needs to control the circumstantial effects. Two questions are used to create the dependent variable.

The first question is "Some people say if Taiwan could maintain peaceful relations with China after declaring independence, Taiwan should go independent. Do you agree?" The second question is "Some people say if mainland China is comparable with Taiwan in the economic, social, and political developments, then the two sides should be unified into one country. Do you agree?" The variable of national identity has four categories: Taiwanese Nationalist, Chinese Nationalist, Dual Identity, and Identification with the

---

<sup>34</sup> A detailed description of all the survey datasets used in this dissertation is provided in chapter one.

<sup>35</sup> For a detailed description of the measurement and the different types of national identity in Taiwan, please refer to chapter two.

Status Quo.

### **Empirical Support of Proposed Arguments**

This chapter first argues for the two-route formation of a Taiwanese nation during the process of democratization in the 1990s. There are two paths that forge Taiwanese national identity. Ethnicity explains one; via this path an exclusive Taiwanese national identity supplants the orthodox Chinese nationalist identity. Most people in Taiwan experienced the other path. This path creates an inclusive Taiwanese national identity that is compatible with the existing Chinese national identity. This chapter further argues that the inclusive Taiwanese identity is based on popular identification with the Taiwan-wide political community. Democratic political participation explains the mechanism underlying the formation of inclusive Taiwanese national identity. A Taiwan-wide political community has been gradually formed among the people with dual identity, likely through the establishment of democratic institutions and political participation in democratic and electoral processes.

The findings of *Table 3.1* support the argument of the two routes. The last row of *Table 3.1* illustrates that with the decline of Chinese nationalists, there was not only a growth in the percentage of Taiwanese nationalists who held an exclusive Taiwanese national identity but, more significantly, the rise of people holding dual identity. Taiwanese nationalists increased from 14.5% in 1993, to 26.7% in 1996, and to 27.6% in 1999. The percentage of people who held dual identity increased from 35.6% in 1993, to 48.7% in 1996, and to 44.5% in 1999. Note that since 1996 dual identity superseded Chinese nationalism and became the modal category of popular national identity.

*Table 3.1* also demonstrates the exclusive-vs.-inclusive nature of the two Taiwanese national identities. *Table 3.1* is the cross-tabulation of respondents' self-identification with their national identity. Among the people who held a Taiwanese nationalist identity, more than half of them identified themselves as "Only Taiwanese" (52.6 % in 1993, 65.4% in 1996, 61% in 1999, and 56.9% in 2000). Unlike Taiwanese nationalists, people with dual identity increasingly identified themselves as "Both Taiwanese and Chinese" (38% in 1993, 47.9% in 1996, 54.1% in 1998, and 57.8% in 2000). The high proportion of Taiwanese nationalists who identified themselves as "Only Taiwanese" indicates that Taiwanese national identity is based on a distinct ethnic consciousness that classifies Taiwanese and Chinese as two different groups. The findings also suggest the inclusive nature of dual identity. Among people with dual national identity, more and more of them identified themselves as Taiwanese without rejecting their existing Chinese self-identity.

The characters of the dual identity are demonstrated by *Table 3.2*, *Table 3.3* and *Table 3.4*. This chapter argues that the emergence of dual identity results from a combination of political identity of a small state (a Taiwan-wide political community) within the identity of a larger nation (Chinese nation).

*Table 3.2* illustrates that a Taiwan-wide political community has gradually formed among people with dual identity. Two questions are used to measure how the respondents perceive the territory and the population of the Republic of China (ROC), respectively. These questions are: (1) In our society, some people think that the territory of the ROC covers Taiwan and the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu, while others think that the territory of the ROC includes the Mainland China. What is your opinion? (2)

In our society, some people think that the people of the ROC refer to the population of Taiwan, while others think it includes the population in the Chinese mainland. What is your opinion? Using data from the 1996 Presidential Election Survey conducted after the first presidential election in the March of 1996, *Table 3.2* shows that 60.5% among those with dual identity viewed the territory of the ROC is Taiwan only; and 67.2% of them viewed the population of the ROC includes only the population on the island. The argument that a Taiwan-wide political community has been formed among the people with dual identity will be more persuasive if we compare them to those holding only Chinese national identity. For the Chinese nationalists, around 70 percent of them believed that the territory of the ROC included Taiwan and the Mainland China; 60 percent of them believed the population of the ROC included the 1.2 billion of people of the Chinese mainland (see *Table 3.2*).

*Table 3.3* further demonstrates that those hold dual identity believe that the Taiwan-wide political community should have sovereignty. They have developed loyalty to the Taiwan-wide political community. *Table 3.3* is the cross-tabulation of national identity with the question that measures the boundaries of the nation with that of the respondents who perceive as having sovereignty. The question ask the respondents “In our society, some people think that only the 21 million people of Taiwan have the right to determine Taiwan’s future, while others think that people in the mainland also have the right to determine Taiwan’s future. Who you think has the right to determine the future of Taiwan?” Among the people holding dual identity, 85% of them in 1996 and 88% of them in 1999 thought that only the 21 million people of Taiwan have the right to determine Taiwan’s future (see *Table 3.3*).

These findings from *Table 3.2* and *Table 3.3* indicate that a Taiwan-wide political community has gradually formed among the people with dual identity. Compared with the people who only hold Chinese national identity, those with dual identity identified more strongly with a Taiwan-wide political community and considered Taiwan to be the legitimate boundary of political sovereignty.

On the other hand, as illustrated by *Table 3.4*, the Chinese nation was still relevant for those with dual identity even after the formation of a Taiwan-wide political community. *Table 3.4* is the cross-tabulation of national identity with the questions measuring respondents' identification with the larger Chinese nation. These questions are (1) In our Society, some people think "China" includes Taiwan and the Mainland China, while some people think China includes only the Mainland China. What is your opinion? (2) Do you agree the following statement "Reclaiming China's lost land is the divine mission of every Chinese"? (3) Do you agree the following statement "No matter how big differences between Taiwan and the Mainland China, we should overcome the differences so to achieve the unification of the Chinese state"? It is important to emphasize here that "China" in ordinary language in Taiwanese society does not equate the People's Republic of China (PRC), although nowadays that is what China commonly means.

*Table 3.4* reveals that people holding different national identities perceived the boundary of the Chinese state differently. For those with dual identity, 65% of them in 1996 and 62% of them in 1999 thought that "China" includes both Taiwan and mainland China. Their perception of state boundaries in the imagined Chinese community did not change even after they formed an identity with a Taiwan-wide political community.

The phenomenon of the continued idea of an imagined Chinese community among the people with dual identity is more evident in comparison to those who solely hold Taiwanese national identity. Among Taiwanese nationalists, 67.8% of them in 1996 and 64.7% of them in 1999 thought that “China” refers only to mainland China. In addition, *Table 3.4* illustrates that the Chinese national identity, which people with dual identity upheld, is not merely an ethno-cultural identity. Their Chinese identity seems to involve a political concept. Among people with dual identity, 63.5% of them and 56.3% in 1996 and 1999, respectively, were Chinese irredentists and agreed with the statement “Reclaiming China’s lost land is the divine mission of every Chinese.” Additionally, the majority of them agreed with the Chinese nationalist claim of “No matter how big differences between Taiwan and the mainland, we should overcome the differences so to achieve the unification of the Chinese state.” The corresponding percentages are 55.9 % in 1996, 56.8 % in 1999, and 64% in 2000.

These empirical findings demonstrate the continued presence of an imagined Chinese community among the people with dual identity. They also reject two currently popular theories of dual identity. The first conventional theory argues that the two identities upheld by those with dual identity are different in nature. Chinese identity is ethnic and cultural, while Taiwanese identity is political. Therefore, the two are not contradictory. It explains why people are able to hold both Chinese and Taiwanese identities at the same time. But the responses given by those with dual identity seem to reject this political-*cum*-cultural theory of dual identity. Their replies show that the majority of those with dual identity were actually Chinese irredentists subscribing to the political mission of (Chinese) state integration. The second conventional theory argues



that people hold two identities based on pragmatic calculation. They leave options open and do not choose until some conditions emerge that make one option more beneficial to their interests. The replies of those with dual identity to the nationalist political claim seem to reject this explanation. They show that most people with dual identities are willing to accept unification even with huge differences between the two sides of the strait.

*Table 3.5* illustrates the different natures of the two Taiwanese national identities. This chapter argues that the two Taiwanese national identities forged via different paths after the democratic transition are different. The exclusive Taiwanese national identity is ethnic in nature, while the inclusive Taiwanese national identity (contained in the group of dual identity) is civic in nature. The first section of *Table 3.5* is a presentation of the ethnic component of Taiwanese national identity. Question 1 asks the respondents if they agree with the statement “For Taiwanese to control their own destiny, they must break their relations with China and forge a common community of the 23 million of people on the island.” In 2000, around 60 percent (57.8%) of people with a Taiwanese nationalist identity agreed on this statement. Question 2 asks the respondents if they agree with the statement “Chinese history belongs to China. We should invent Taiwan’s own history.” More than 70 percent (71.7%) of people with a Taiwanese nationalist identity agreed on this statement in 2000. The finding of *Table 3.5* indicates that the Taiwanese nationalist identity is based on a distinct notion of Taiwanese ethnicity. It reveals that for most Taiwanese nationalists, the Chinese nation is an “other,” if not a barrier, to the formation of their own nation. Forging a new Taiwanese nation requires Taiwan to differentiate its history and culture from the Chinese nation. Thus, for

Taiwanese nationalists, the relationship between the Chinese nation and a Taiwanese nation is conflicting and competitive. The mission of Taiwanese nationalism thus is to replace orthodox Chinese national identity. But for those with dual identity, the story is quite different. As *Table 3.5* shows, for those with dual identity, around 60 percent did not want to break ties with China for the sake of forming a Taiwanese nation. For them, their Taiwanese national identity seems not to be based on a distinct Taiwanese culture or history.

If, as *Table 3.5* suggests, Taiwanese national identity held by those with dual identity has little ethnic flavor, what then is its composition? The figures in the second section of *Table 3.5* suggest that their Taiwanese national identity is based on political and civic notions. Question 3 asks the respondents if they agree with the statement “China is China. Taiwan is Taiwan. Taiwan wants to pursue political autonomy. China (PRC) has no right to intervene.” Around 80 percent (78.6%) of those with dual identity agreed with this statement. This finding suggests that for most people with dual identity, Taiwan is a political community. Its distinctiveness from the PRC is also firmly established. Replies to Question 4 further illustrate how those with dual identity perceive the relationship between Taiwan and China/PRC as two separate political communities. The question asks the respondents if they approve the policy statement of “the two states thesis” (proposed by Li Deng-hui’s government) that says “the relation between Taiwan and the mainland is a ‘special state-to-state relationship.’”<sup>36</sup> Among those with dual identity, 67% approved the statement of a state-to-state relation. In contrast, 48% of those who identified with the status quo and 32% of Chinese nationalists

---

<sup>36</sup> The wordings of the question are: some people propose “the two states thesis”, treating the relation between Taiwan and the Mainland as a “special state-to-state relationship,” Do you support this policy?

agreed with this statement. The high approval rate for those with dual identity clearly showed that their Taiwanese national identity is based on a Taiwan-wide political community. The Taiwan that they conceive is a political community possessing political sovereignty with equal status to the other Chinese state (the PRC).

The main interest of this chapter is how we should explain the rise of the other type of Taiwanese identity that is characterized by its inclusive and political nature. Many have explained the origin of this inclusive and political Taiwanese identity by using liberal values and constitutional principles. Figures in *Table 3.6* and *Table 3.7* can serve as empirical evidence to see if this explanation holds.

*Table 3.6* presents an overall picture concerning the liberal and democratic values among different categories of nationalist group. A group of eight questions were posed in the surveys of 1993, 1996 and 1998. These surveys explored the liberal and democratic values among general population. These questions are as followed: (1) Woman should not play a part in political activities as man. (2) State affairs, important or trivial, should follow the decisions of the head of the government, since he functions as the head of the family. (3) Criminals involving brutal crimes should be punished immediately; no need to go through the complex procedures of a trial. (4) There should be consensus; otherwise our society will be unstable. (5) Whether an opinion can be broadcasted to our society should be decided by the government. (6) If different civil organizations appear in one local community, the stability and harmony of this community would be affected. (7) Government will achieve no huge accomplishment if it is check by the legislature. (8) Judges should accept opinions from the administration when a significant case is brought to trial. The respondents were asked to provide their

opinions concerning these statements on a 6-point scale. Figures in *Table 3.6* shows that people with dual identity did not score higher, in terms of means, on the eight democratic and liberal values. *Table 3.7* further shows the different attitudes of national identity groups on liberal and constitutional principles during the 1990s. Question 1 asks the respondents if they agree with the statement “Criminals committing brutal crimes should be punished immediately, without having to go through the complex procedures of judicial trial.” Question 2 asks if they agree with the statement “Judges should accept opinions from the administrations when a significant case is brought to trial.” *Table 3.7* reveals that liberal values and democratic ideas are not yet rooted in Taiwanese society and that those with dual identity did not perform better. The data in *Table 3.7* indicates that, for people with dual identity, their attitudes on liberal values and democratic ideas did not develop along with the process of democratization in the 1990s. In 1993, around 60 percent of those with dual identity disapproved the violation of human rights. In 1999, the percentage dropped, rather than increased, to 40.9%. Regarding the issue of judicial independence, the basic principle of constitutionalism, about 72 percent of those with dual identity valued the principle in 1993. It, however, dropped during the 1990s to 65.5% in 1999. In addition, these figures in *Table 3.7* suggest that those with dual identity were not more liberal or democratic than those in other nationalist groups. In 1999, the percentages of those with positive attitudes toward the liberal value of procedural justice amongst Taiwanese nationalists, people with dual identity, people identified with status quo, and Chinese nationalists were 47%, 41%, 52%, and 46% respectively; people with dual identity had the lowest percentage. In 1999, the percentages of positive attitude toward the democratic principles of the balance of powers

among Taiwanese nationalists, people with dual identity, people identified with the status quo, and Chinese nationalists were 72%, 66%, 64%, and 70% respectively; people with dual identity had the second lowest number. The findings from *Table 3.6* and *Table 3.7* seem to reject the hypothesis that people acquired a Taiwanese national identity in the 1990s because the country had instituted a democratic constitution and began to respect liberal values.

This study argues that democratization in Taiwan wields a great impact on the formation of new Taiwanese national identity. It is not through the attachment to the abstract democratic values and principles, however. Rather, there is an attachment to the political community. The collective participation processes as well as the concrete practices and institutions that make participation in a political community possible and meaningful created this attachment. Democratic institutions and practices created a public sphere in which people on the island can recognize and communicate each other. This public sphere also encouraged Taiwanese to participate in the deliberation and resolution of island-wide affairs. Through participation in routine democratic processes, people were able to imagine themselves as members of a particular political community. The political community gradually became the boundary for a nation. Citizens in this particular political community were also transformed into members of this particular nation.

*Table 3.2* and *Table 3.8* provide evidence to support this theoretical perspective. *Table 3.2* presents findings from two surveys conducted in 1996. One (1996a) was conducted before the first presidential election, while the other (1996b) was done after the first presidential election. By comparing the findings from these two surveys, we

find that within only few months the perception of the territory and the population of the ROC had changed significantly. For those with dual identity, the percentage of respondents who thought that ROC territory only included Taiwan increased from 52 percent to 61 percent. The percentage who believed that the population of the ROC was only composed of people in Taiwan also increased from 57 percent to 67 percent during these few months. As these two surveys were conducted by the same research team and the question wordings being exactly the same, the change of percentage seems to suggest that the first presidential election by popular vote and participating in the electoral process helped the formation of a Taiwan-wide political community.

Figures in *Table 3.8* also confirm the effect of democratic political process on the formation of identity. Question 1 of *Table 3.8* asks respondents to evaluate how democratic the country currently is on a 0-10 scale; “0” represents full dictatorship, while “10” represents full democracy. Question 2 of *Table 3.8* asks the respondents to evaluate how satisfied they are with the practice of democratic politics in Taiwan on a 0-10 scale, from extremely unsatisfied to extremely satisfied. Figures in the table reveal that those with a new Taiwanese identity (dual identity) were more inclined to perceive democratic politics as being close to full democracy. On the other hand, as the responses to Question 2 reveal, those with dual identity were more satisfied with the practice of democracy in Taiwan. Questions 3, 4, and 5 in *Table 3.8* ask respondents’ opinions of the electoral process of the 2000 presidential election and its impact: “The presidential election had advanced democratic progress in Taiwan;” “The presidential election had caused political instability and societal disturbance;” “The presidential election had strengthened the legitimacy of the government.” Compared with those

lacking Taiwanese national identity, the opinion of those with dual identity was more positive. They are also more inclined to think the elections help advance democracy and ruling legitimacy.

## Statistical Tests

This chapter explains why the national identities of the general populace changed in Taiwan during the 1990s. I have shown in the discussion above why the conventional theory that attempts to explain the change regarding national identities by the replacement of Chinese national identity with Taiwanese ethnic consciousness is not complete and satisfactory. This explanation at its best captures only part of the story. This research project forgoes the mutually exclusive presumption underlying the conventional theory and proposed to study the dynamics of national identity change in Taiwan with a two-level frame. *Figure 3.1* presents the two components of national identity in Taiwan, which have been discussed and demonstrated with empirical support in previous sections. I also argued that the new Taiwanese national identity that emerged during the process of democratization is composed of two different types with different contents. One of them, ignored by the previous studies, not only has little ethnic character and but is also compatible with the existing Chinese national identity. This national identity is formed by participation in the democratic processes. This identity is basically conceptually parasitic on the Taiwan-wide political community as well as the institutions and procedures that define the boundary of the particular political

community. These arguments are theorized into *Figure 3.2*. *Figure 3.2* presents the proposed two-paths theory of Taiwanese national identity formation.

The following section provides a statistical test of the conventional theory and the theory proposed by this research project. The method adopted is multi-nominal logistic regression. The data used is the 2000 Presidential Election Survey conducted in 2000.

### **A Test of Existing Theories (Model I, Model II, Model III)**

Model I in *Table 3.9* tests the primordial theory of national identity, which assumes an ethnic core of national identity. The dependent variable is national identity. The model takes dual identity as the baseline comparison group. The independent variables include: age, education, family income, and ethnic background. Model I shows that the ethnic background of the respondents had a statistically significant effect on their national identity in 2000. The coefficients of Model I show that being a native Taiwanese [*benshengren*] increased the likelihood of having Taiwanese nationalist identity, as opposed to dual identity. On the other hand, being a Chinese mainlander [*waishengren*] increased the likelihood of having a Chinese nationalist identity, as opposed to dual identity.

Model II in *Table 3.9* tests the theory that the chief basis of Taiwanese national identity is ethnic Taiwanese consciousness. The dependent variable is national identity. Model II also uses dual identity as the baseline comparison group. It adds a categorical variable of self-identity with three categories including: “Only Taiwanese,” “Only Chinese,” and “Both Taiwanese and Chinese.” The reference group of this variable is “Only Taiwanese.” It is offered as an independent variable along with all of the



independent ones in Model I. Model II shows that self-identification does have a statistically significant effect on national identity for 2000. Furthermore, compared with the group self-identified as “Only Taiwanese”, the group self-identifying as “Both Taiwanese and Chinese” is less inclined toward Taiwanese nationalist identity as opposed to dual identity (The Relative Risk Ratio is 0.42.) On the other hand, compared also with the group of “Only Taiwanese”, the group with the self-identification of “Only Chinese” is more inclined to Chinese nationalist identity as opposed to dual identity (The Relative Risk Ratio is 5.77).

Model III in *Table 3.9* includes some more independent variables in accordance with three theoretical perspectives. The first perspective proposed by some liberal constitutionalists argues that the base of Taiwanese national identity is democratic values and principles. The variable of democratic values and principle is measured by the following question: “of the following three views, which view do you agree with more?” (1) Democracy is always the best political system. (2) Under certain conditions, dictatorship is better than democracy. (3) For me, every political system is the same.

The second perspective proposed by this dissertation argues that the Taiwanese nation and the Chinese nation each contain two essences, ethnic and political. Two variables are created to operationalize the ethnic essence of Taiwanese-ness, “Taiwan complex, ethnic origin (*Taiwan Jie, shengji*)” and “Taiwan complex, ethnic Chinese (*Taiwan Jie, zhonghua minzu*).”<sup>37</sup> The variable, “Taiwan complex, ethnic origin”, is measured by the question “Do you agree the following statement or not? If they do not

---

<sup>37</sup> “Taiwan complex” (*Taiwan Jie*) and “Chinese complex” (*Zhongguo Jie*) are the terms used in both popular discourse and academic study to describe the ethnic essence of the national identity question in Taiwan.

identify with Taiwan, those mainlanders who have grown up in Taiwan should go back to the mainland.” The variable, “Taiwan complex, ethnic Chinese” is measured by the question “Do you agree? For Taiwanese to control their own destiny, they must break off their relations with China and forge a ‘community of common destiny’ among the 23 million people?” The political notion of Taiwanese-ness is operationalized by the variable of “Political Sovereignty” measuring by the question “Do you agree the statements China is China. Taiwan is Taiwan. Taiwan wants to pursue political autonomy. China has no right to intervene.” Similarly, two variables are created to operationalize the ethnic essence of Chinese-ness, “Chinese complex, ethnic glory” measuring by the question “Do you agree: No matter how backward China is, I am proud of is being a Chinese.”, and “Chinese complex, betrayer” measuring by the question “Do you agree: The view that ‘Taiwanese is not Chinese’ is unforgivable?” The political notion of Chinese-ness is operationalized by two variables, “Political Unification” and “Economic Integration”. The variable of “Political Integration” is measured by the question: Do you agree “No matter how huge differences between Taiwan and the mainland, we should overcome the differences in order to accomplish the unification of the Chinese nation.” The variable of “Economic Integration” is measurement by the question: Do you agree the following statement or not “Taiwan needs to be integrated with the mainland to become prosperity”.

The third perspective proposed by this dissertation argues that an attachment to the Taiwan-wide political community is developed through participating in democratic procedures and processes. This model creates a variable labeled “Participatory Attachment” that measures popular attitudes about democratic procedures. It is created

with questions about the following three statements: “The 2000 presidential election advanced democratic progress in Taiwan.”, “The 2000 presidential election strengthened the perception of Taiwanese as the masters of this country.”, and “The presidential election strengthened the legitimacy of the government.”

Model III shows two things. First of all, it supports my hypotheses in this research. Three factors, i.e. the perception of Chineseness, the perception of Taiwanese-ness, and attachment to democratic procedures, all have statistically significant effects on national identity. The upper part of Model III is the comparison between Taiwanese nationalist identity and dual identity. It reveals that the two variables, “Political Unification” and “Economic integration”, both had statistically significant effect on people’s national identity. The coefficients in this part tell us that people whose notion of Chinese-ness is political in its essence are less inclined to hold a dual national identity as compared to holding a Taiwanese nationalist identity. In other words, the expected risk of having a Taiwanese nationalist identity is lower for people who have positive attitudes about political unification and economic integration. The Relative Risk Ratios are 0.39, and 0.43 respectively. The lower part of Model III is the comparison between Chinese nationalist identity and dual identity. It shows that the effects of “Political Sovereignty” and “Participatory Attachment” are statistically significant. The coefficient informs us that people whose notion of Taiwanese-ness is political in essence are less inclined to have a Chinese nationalist identity compared to holding dual identity. In other words, the expected risk of staying in the Chinese nationalist group (rather than the dual identity group) is lower for people who have positive attitudes toward Taiwan’s sovereignty. The Relative Risk Ratio is 0.50. Besides, positive attitudes toward democratic

procedures and processes have a statistically significant effect on people's national identity. The coefficient informs us that the likelihood of staying in the group of Chinese nationalists (as compared to group of dual identity) is low for people who had a positive attitude toward democratic procedures and processes. The Relative Risk Ratio is 0.82. Additionally, the effect of self-identification as "Only Chinese" (compared to "Only Taiwanese") was statistically significant. Having self-identity as "Only Chinese" increases the likelihood of holding a Chinese nationalist identity rather than having dual national identity (The Relative Risk Rate 4.4). The overall effect of self-identification is statistically significant ( $p=0.0067$ ).

The second thing Model III shows is that both the primordial and civic notions of national identity are unrelated. As figures in the model reveal, when other variables are controlled, the variable of ethnicity no longer exhibits a statistically significant effect on national identity. This discovery suggests that relationship between ethnic origin [*shen-ji*] and national identity is spurious. The statistical test of Model III also rejects the hypothesis that the inclusive nature of Taiwanese national identity is based on belief in democratic values. It shows that the variable of democratic values and principles has no statistically significant effect on popular national identity.

### **A Test of Theory Proposed by This Research (Model A)**

Finally, I propose a model to explain the national identity of general population in Taiwan (see *Table 3.10*). Model A conceptualizes the arguments of this research. In the model, three factors are proposed as having major effects on the formation of Taiwanese national identity during the process of democratization. They are: popular

perception of Chinese-ness (whether it is ethnic or political in essence), popular perception of Taiwanese-ness (whether it is ethnic or political in essence), and popular attachment to democratic procedures and processes. These three factors are operationalized into six independent variables. The ethnic notion of Chinese-ness is measured by the variable of “Chinese Complex, ethnic betrayer”. The political notion of Chinese-ness is measured by the two variables labeled as “Political Unification” and “Economic Integration” respectively. The ethnic notion of Taiwanese-ness is measured by the variable “Taiwanese Complex, ethnic Chinese”. The political notion of Taiwanese-ness is measured by the “Political Sovereignty” variable. The factor of popular attachment to democratic procedures and process is operationalized by the variable, “Participatory Attachment”.

The variable of self-identity is not included in the model, although Model III shows that self-identification had a significant effect on national identity. The reason is as follows. The effect of self-identity on national identity has been examined in Model II. Model A replaces the variable of self-identity with popular perceptions of Chineseness and Taiwanese-ness. Comparing the Pseudo R-squares of Model II (0.0682) with those of Model A (0.1817) suggests that the variables of popular perception of Chineseness and Taiwanese-ness have more explanatory power than the variable of self-identity. In addition, if we add the variable of self-identity to Model A, the Pseudo R-squares are 0.1934. It proves that the contribution of the self-identity variable is very little. Theoretically, as Figure 3.1 illustrates, this research proposes that the effect of self-identity on national identity is mainly explained by one’s perception of Chineseness and Taiwanese-ness. That is to say, how people perceive Taiwanese-ness and Chineseness

will influence how they identify themselves. If they adopt an ethno-national notion of Taiwanese-ness, they are more likely to identify themselves as “Taiwanese only.” If they adopt a political notion of Taiwanese-ness, and perceive Chinese-ness nationally, they are more likely to exhibit the self-identity of “both Taiwanese and Chinese”. Empirically the contribution of the variable of self-identity is very limited. And statistically, the self-identity variable might cause a collinearity problem. This is the reason the proposed model opts to leave out this variable.

The likelihood ratio chi-square of 327.39 with a p-value  $<0.0000$  informs us that Model A as a whole fits significantly better than an empty model. Model A is better than Model I and Model II since the Pseudo R-square of Model A is 0.1817, much higher than the Pseudo R-squares of Model I (0.0308) and Model II (0.0682).

*Table 3.10* proves three things. Firstly, the proposed three factors, namely popular perceptions of Taiwanese-ness, popular perceptions of Chinese-ness, and popular attachment to democratic procedures and processes, all had statistically significant effects on people’s national identity in Taiwan. Secondly, national identity in Taiwan contains two dimensions. The variation in national identities depends on popular perceptions of both Taiwanese-ness and Chinese-ness. The coefficients of *Table 3.10* demonstrate that Taiwanese nationalists and people with dual identity shared the same perception of Taiwanese-ness. The major factor that explained their variation in national identity was their perception of Chinese-ness. The idea of a political notion of Chinese-ness, with unification with the mainland as the ultimate goal and economic integration helpful to the prosperity of Taiwan’s future, decreased the likelihood of holding Taiwanese nationalist identity as compared to holding dual identity (RRR=.4226 and .4147 respectively). On

the other hand, the coefficients of *Table 3.10* also illustrate that Chinese nationalists and people with dual national identity shared the political notion of Chinese-ness. Nevertheless, they differed when it came to their perceptions of the ethno-essence of the Chinese nation. This finding will be elaborated on in the next chapter devoted to Chinese national identity. More importantly, the main factor that had an influence on whether people held dual national identity or Chinese nationalist identity was their perception of Taiwanese-ness. The idea of a political notion of Taiwanese-ness, with Taiwan as a community with political autonomy and sovereignty, decreased the likelihood of staying in the group of Chinese nationalists, as compared to the group of dual national identity (RRR=.4986). Last but not least, the conception of a political notion of Taiwanese-ness is based on popular attachment to democratic procedures and processes. People who are attached to participatory democratic procedures and processes are more inclined toward dual national identity, as compared to those holding a Chinese nationalist identity (RRR=.817).

## **Conclusion**

This chapter focuses on the explanation of the rise of Taiwanese nationalism. It starts by examining the current theories or perspectives, which are quite popular among the observers of nationalism in Taiwan. One perspective contends that Taiwanese national identity was formed first under Japanese colonialism and later the KMT's authoritarianism. It gained its expression only with the democratic transition in the late

1980s. Another theory argues that Taiwanese national identity is based on Taiwanese ethnic identity, which is a reaction against the repression of Taiwanese language, history, and culture under the KMT's rule. There is some degree of truth to both theories. But they at best account for only a small part of the nationalist phenomenon in Taiwan. The first theory can say nothing about the different paths of the growth of Taiwanese national identity in the two decades following the democratic transition. The second theory ignores the important fact that Taiwanese ethnic identity constitutes only part of the basis of Taiwanese national identity. More importantly, a significant segment of people who hold Taiwanese ethnic identity also possess Chinese national identity. A new perspective seems needed to account for both the basis and the particular contours of Taiwanese national identity. This chapter tries to propose a more comprehensive theory of Taiwanese nationalism able to account for its basis, content, and particular trajectory.

In understanding Taiwanese nationalism, it is necessary to tackle the phenomenon of dual identity. Dual identity is totally ignored in current studies because they presume that Chinese national identity and Taiwanese national identity are in opposition to one another and also in competition. It is true that for some people they are opposite identities and hence are not compatible with each other. But for even more people, this is not the case. As survey data from the past two decades show, many people continue to possess dual identity during this long period. Recognizing and understanding the phenomenon of dual identity is the key to understanding Taiwanese national identity.

In explaining dual identity, it becomes apparent that there are two different kinds of Taiwanese national identity. One is based on a distinctive ethno-cultural community. This ethno-cultural base makes the identity exclusive. The other kind, which is has



more recently begun to emerge and develop, is based on identification with a Taiwan-wide political community, which is the product of democratic political institutions and processes. Popular participation in the political process helped to form a common space and time for the citizens in Taiwan. People began to see their concerns and problems as happening within the boundaries of the island, and to feel that the solutions were to be found also within the boundaries of this political community and within the institutional frameworks of the state. An attachment to Taiwan as a legitimate political community thus is constantly formed among the citizens through daily political practice.

The formation of this new type of national identity with a civic nature is not necessarily in conflict with Chinese national identity. This is why many people hold two national identities at the same time. Chinese national identity was cultivated by the nationalist KMT regime during its authoritarian rule for four decades in service of its state-building project. A Chinese nation was “imagined” on the basis of a common origin, a shared history, and a common culture and language. As the survey data presented in this chapter show, the Chinese national identity is compatible with Taiwanese national identity. Together they form the basis of dual identity in a significant segment of population. This dual identity, both parts of which exist on the national level, is unique when compared with its counterparts in other areas of the world in the sense that both parts of it are identify with respective states. Therefore, dual identity, rather than presenting itself as a puzzling nationalist phenomenon in Taiwan, actually holds the key to its own understanding. But the explanation of Taiwanese nationalism will be incomplete without also analyzing the rise and decline of Chinese

nationalism, which has been the dominant ideology in Taiwan's identity politics. It has also had a great influence on, and at the same time has been influenced by, Taiwanese nationalism. An explanation of Chinese nationalism will be offered in chapter four.

Table 3.1: Self-Identification\* and National Identity, 1993, 1996, 1999, 2000 % (N)

|                                |      | Taiwanese<br>Nationalist | Dual<br>Identity | Status<br>Quo | Chinese<br>Nationalism | Total     |
|--------------------------------|------|--------------------------|------------------|---------------|------------------------|-----------|
| <b>I. Self-identification*</b> |      |                          |                  |               |                        |           |
| Only                           | 1993 | 52.6(71)                 | 34.9(116)        | 22.4(22)      | 10.6(39)               | 26.6(248) |
| Taiwanese                      | 1996 | 65.4(193)                | 35.1(189)        | 20.0(8)       | 15.1(35)               | 38.4(425) |
|                                | 1999 | 61.0(238)                | 36.6(230)        | 42.0(42)      | 17.7(52)               | 39.8(562) |
|                                | 2000 | 56.9(190)                | 34.0(163)        | 22.2(20)      | 15.6(42)               | 35.4(415) |
| Both                           | 1993 | 23.0(31)                 | 38.0(126)        | 34.7(34)      | 28.9(106)              | 31.9(297) |
| Taiwanese                      | 1996 | 30.2(89)                 | 47.9(258)        | 62.5(25)      | 53.4(124)              | 44.8(496) |
| and Chinese                    | 1999 | 35.9(140)                | 54.1(340)        | 42.0(42)      | 58.8(173)              | 49.2(695) |
|                                | 2000 | 38.9(130)                | 57.8(277)        | 61.1(55)      | 59.1(159)              | 53.0(621) |
| Only Chinese                   | 1993 | 24.4(33)                 | 27.1(90)         | 42.9(42)      | 60.5(222)              | 41.5(387) |
|                                | 1996 | 4.4(13)                  | 17.1(92)         | 17.5(7)       | 31.5(73)               | 16.7(185) |
|                                | 1999 | 3.1(12)                  | 9.4(59)          | 16.0(16)      | 23.5(69)               | 11.0(156) |
|                                | 2000 | 4.2(14)                  | 8.1(39)          | 16.7(15)      | 25.3(68)               | 11.6(136) |
| Total                          | 1993 | 14.5(135)                | 35.6(332)        | 10.5(98)      | 39.4(367)              | 100(932)  |
|                                | 1996 | 26.7(295)                | 48.7(539)        | 3.6(40)       | 21.0(232)              | 100(1106) |
|                                | 1999 | 27.6(390)                | 44.5(629)        | 7.1(100)      | 20.8(294)              | 100(1413) |
|                                | 2000 | 28.5(334)                | 40.9(479)        | 7.7(100)      | 23.0(269)              | 100(1172) |

Data Source: 1993: The 1992 Legislative Election Survey, 1996: the 1996 Presidential Election Survey, 1999: The 1998 Legislative Election Survey, 2000: the Presidential Election Survey.

\* The wordings of the question: "In our society, some people identify themselves as Chinese; other people identify themselves as Taiwanese. Do you identify yourself as Taiwanese, Chinese, or Both Taiwanese and Chinese?"

Table 3.2: Territory and Population of the ROC, 1996 % (N)

|   |       | Taiwanese<br>Nationalist | Dual<br>Identity | Status<br>Quo | Chinese<br>Nationalist | Total     |
|---|-------|--------------------------|------------------|---------------|------------------------|-----------|
| <b>The territory of the ROC covers Taiwan only or includes the Chinese mainland?</b>                                  |       |                          |                  |               |                        |           |
| Taiwan  | 1996a | 80.9(169)                | 52.2(167)        | 47.6(40)      | 19.9(63)               | 47.3(439) |
|   | 1996b | 88.5(246)                | 60.5(305)        | 47.4(18)      | 31.0(71)               | 61.0(640) |
| Taiwan and<br>mainland  | 1996a | 19.1(40)                 | 47.8(153)        | 52.4(44)      | 80.1(253)              | 52.7(490) |
|   | 1996b | 11.5(32)                 | 39.5(199)        | 52.6(20)      | 69.0(158)              | 39.0(409) |
| Total   | 1996a | 22.5(209)                | 34.4(320)        | 9.0(84)       | 34.0(316)              | 100(929)  |
|   | 1996b | 27.0(278)                | 48(504)          | 3.6(38)       | 22.0(229)              | (1049)    |
| <b>The people of the ROC refer to the population on the island or include the population in the Chinese mainland?</b> |       |                          |                  |               |                        |           |
| Only the people<br>on Taiwan  | 1996a | 82.4(178)                | 56.9(186)        | 52.9(45)      | 26.8(83)               | 52.5(492) |
|   | 1996b | 91.2(258)                | 67.2(220)        | 57.9(22)      | 39.7(89)               | 67.5(718) |
| Include the people in<br>the mainland   | 1996a | 17.6(38)                 | 43.1(141)        | 47.1(40)      | 73.2(227)              | 47.5(446) |
|   | 1996b | 8.8(25)                  | 32.8(107)        | 42.1(16)      | 60.3(135)              | 21.1(225) |
| Total   | 1996a | 23.0(216)                | 34.9(327)        | 9.1(85)       | 33.0(310)              | 100(938)  |
|   | 1996b | 26.9(283)                | 49.6(519)        | 3.5(38)       | 21(224)                | (1064)    |

Data Source: 1996a: The 1995 Legislative Election. 1996b: The 1996 Presidential Election Survey.

Table 3.3: Legitimate Boundary of Political Sovereignty, 1996, 1999 % (N)

|  |      | Taiwanese<br>Nationalist | Dual<br>Identity | Status<br>Quo | Chinese<br>Nationalist | Total      |
|--|------|--------------------------|------------------|---------------|------------------------|------------|
| Who do you think have the right to determine the future of Taiwan? |      |                          |                  |               |                        |            |
| Only the people<br>on the island                                   | 1996 | 97.2(278)                | <b>85.0(441)</b> | 73.7(28)      | 67.3(150)              | 84.1(897)  |
|  | 1999 | 95.4(375)                | <b>88.4(558)</b> | 86.1(87)      | 74.8(214)              | 87.5(1235) |
| Include the people<br>in the mainland                              | 1996 | 2.8(8)                   | 15.0(78)         | 26.3(10)      | 32.7(73)               | 15.9(169)  |
|  | 1999 | 4.6(18)                  | 11.6(73)         | 13.9(14)      | 25.3(72)               | 12.5(176)  |
| Total  | 1996 | 26.8(286)                | 48.6(519)        | 3.5(38)       | 20.9(223)              | (1066)     |
|  | 1999 | 27.8(393)                | 44.7(631)        | 7.1(101)      | 20.2(286)              | (1411)     |

Data Source: 1996: The 1996 Presidential Election Survey. 1999: The 1998 Legislative Election Survey

Table 3.4: Imagined Chinese Community in Taiwan, 1996a, 1996b, 1999, 2000 % (N)

|  |       | Taiwanese<br>Nationalist | Dual<br>Identity | Status<br>Quo | Chinese<br>Nationalist | Total     |
|--|-------|--------------------------|------------------|---------------|------------------------|-----------|
| <b>Q1. Do you think "China" include Taiwan and Mainland, or just refers to Mainland?</b>   |       |                          |                  |               |                        |           |
| Taiwan and<br>Mainland   | 1996a | 32.2(69)                 | <b>64.7(202)</b> | 67.8(61)      | 90.7(284)              | 66.3(616) |
|  | 1999  | 35.3(100)                | <b>61.9(224)</b> | 71.4(100)     | 84.4(178)              | 60.4(602) |
| Mainland   | 1996a | <b>67.8(145)</b>         | 35.3(110)        | 32.2(29)      | 9.3(29)                | 33.7(313) |
|  | 1999  | <b>64.7(183)</b>         | 38.1(138)        | 28.6(40)      | 15.6(33)               | 39.6(394) |
| Total  | 1996a | 23.0(214)                | 33.6(312)        | 9.7(90)       | 33.7(313)              | 100(929)  |
|  | 1999  | 28.4(283)                | 36.3(362)        | 14.1(140)     | 21.2(211)              | 100(996)  |
| <b>Q2. Reclaiming China's lost land is the divine mission of every Chinese.</b>  |       |                          |                  |               |                        |           |
| Agree  | 1996a | 31.7(65)                 | <b>63.5(202)</b> | 58.1(50)      | 78.2(237)              | 60.7(554) |
|  | 1999  | 32.0(86)                 | <b>56.3(192)</b> | 61.3(76)      | 67.1(139)              | 52.4(493) |
| Disagree   | 1996a | <b>68.3(140)</b>         | 36.5(116)        | 41.9(36)      | 21.8(66)               | 39.3(358) |
|  | 1999  | <b>68.0(183)</b>         | 43.7(149)        | 38.7(48)      | 32.9(68)               | 47.6(448) |
| Total  | 1996a | 22.5(205)                | 34.9(318)        | 9.4(86)       | 33.2(303)              | 100(912)  |
|  | 1999  | 28.6(269)                | 36.2(341)        | 13.2(124)     | 22.0(207)              | 100(941)  |
| <b>Q3. No matter how the great difference between Taiwan and mainland, we should overcome it and pursue the unification of the Chinese nation.</b> |       |                          |                  |               |                        |           |
| Agree  | 1996b | 25.6(71)                 | <b>55.9(292)</b> | 55.0(22)      | 79.4(185)              | 53.2(570) |
|  | 1999  | 12.1(34)                 | <b>56.8(193)</b> | 57.7(75)      | 78.8(160)              | 51.3(487) |
|  | 2000  | 23.8(77)                 | <b>64.0(291)</b> | 43.5(37)      | 83.1(212)              | 55.2(617) |
| Disagree   | 1996b | <b>74.5(206)</b>         | 44.1(230)        | 45.0(18)      | 20.6(48)               | 46.8(502) |
|  | 1999  | <b>78.7(218)</b>         | 43.2(147)        | 42.3(55)      | 21.2(43)               | 48.7(463) |
|  | 2000  | <b>76.2(246)</b>         | 36.4(164)        | 56.5(48)      | 16.9(43)               | 44.8(501) |
| Total  | 1996b | 21.2(277)                | 48.7(522)        | 3.7(40)       | 21.7(233)              | 100(1072) |
|  | 1999  | 29.2(277)                | 35.8(340)        | 14.1(130)     | 21.4(203)              | 100(950)  |
|  | 2000  | 28.9(323)                | 40.7(455)        | 7.6(85)       | 22.8(255)              | 100(1118) |

Data Source: 1996a: The 1995 Legislative Election Survey. 1996b: The 1996 Presidential Election Survey. 1999: The 1998 Legislative Election Survey. 2000: The 200 Presidential Election Survey.

Table 3.5: Characters of Taiwanese National Identities in Taiwan, 2000

|   | Taiwanese<br>Nationalist | Dual<br>Identity | Status<br>Quo | Chinese<br>Nationalist | %(N)      |
|---|--------------------------|------------------|---------------|------------------------|-----------|
| <b>Ethnicity</b>  |                          |                  |               |                        |           |
| Q1. Forging a Taiwanese nation by breaking any relation with China                                    |                          |                  |               |                        |           |
| Agree   | 57.8(177)                | 39.3(176)        | 33.3(27)      | 17.9(46)               | 39.0(423) |
| Disagree  | 42.2(129)                | 60.7(267)        | 66.7(54)      | 82.1(210)              | 61.0(661) |
| Total   | 28.2(306)                | 40.6(440)        | 7.5(81)       | 23.7(257)              | 100(1084) |
| Q2. Chinese history belongs to China; we should invent Taiwan's own history.                          |                          |                  |               |                        |           |
| Agree   | 71.7(226)                | 55.6(250)        | 43.5(37)      | 26.9(66)               | 52.9(579) |
| Disagree  | 28.3(89)                 | 44.4(200)        | 56.5(48)      | 73.1(179)              | 47.1(516) |
| Total   | 28.8(315)                | 41.1(450)        | 7.8(85)       | 22.4(245)              | 100(1095) |
| <b>Sovereignty</b>  |                          |                  |               |                        |           |
| Q3. Taiwan pursues political autonomy; China has no right to intervene.                               |                          |                  |               |                        |           |
| Agree   | 92.9(302)                | 78.6(357)        | 62.2(51)      | 43.3(106)              | 73.8(817) |
| Disagree  | 7.1(23)                  | 21.4(97)         | 37.8(31)      | 56.7(139)              | 26.2(290) |
| Total   | 29.4(326)                | 41.0(454)        | 7.4(82)       | 22.1(245)              | 100(1107) |
| Q4. Do you approve the policy of defining Taiwan-China relation as "special state to state relation?" |                          |                  |               |                        |           |
| Approve   | 78.1(203)                | 67.0(233)        | 48.4(30)      | 31.7(66)               | 60.6(532) |
| Disapprove  | 21.9(57)                 | 33.0(115)        | 51.6(32)      | 68.3(142)              | 39.4(346) |
| Total   | 29.6(260)                | 39.6(348)        | 7.1(62)       | 23.7(208)              | 100(878)  |

Data Source: The 2000 Presidential Election Survey.

Table 3.6: Attitudes on Liberal and democratic Value in Taiwan\*, 1993, 1996, 1999

| Year                         |      | Q1     | Q2     | Q3     | Q4     | Q5     | Q6     | Q7     | Q8     |
|------------------------------|------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| <b>Taiwanese Nationalist</b> |      |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| 1993                         | Mean | 3.8261 | 3.9706 | 3.0000 | 2.3259 | 3.4545 | 2.6791 | 2.9680 | 3.5484 |
|                              | N    | 138    | 136    | 136    | 135    | 132    | 134    | 125    | 124    |
|                              | SD   | 1.4892 | 1.3049 | 1.7680 | 1.7270 | 1.4481 | 1.6388 | 1.6010 | 1.6197 |
| 1996                         | Mean | 4.0219 | 3.9649 | 3.0132 | 2.5435 | 3.7182 | 3.2096 | 2.7600 | 2.9764 |
|                              | N    | 228    | 228    | 228    | 230    | 220    | 229    | 225    | 212    |
|                              | SD   | 1.3551 | 1.3336 | 1.8571 | 1.8134 | 1.4751 | 1.6329 | 1.6757 | 1.5376 |
| 1999                         | Mean | 4.1071 | 3.6743 | 2.2908 | 2.4570 | 3.4228 | 2.4615 | 2.4349 | 3.5086 |
|                              | N    | 308    | 304    | 306    | 302    | 298    | 299    | 2925   | 291    |
|                              | SD   | 1.1882 | 1.4080 | 1.7806 | 1.7281 | 1.4269 | 1.6387 | 1.5573 | 1.4864 |
| <b>Dual Identity</b>         |      |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| 1993                         | Mean | 4.1085 | 3.7463 | 2.8408 | 2.0952 | 3.4780 | 2.9292 | 2.8312 | 3.6460 |
|                              | N    | 341    | 335    | 333    | 336    | 318    | 325    | 314    | 322    |
|                              | SD   | 1.2753 | 1.4656 | 1.9236 | 1.7610 | 1.4422 | 1.5902 | 1.6146 | 1.6153 |
| 1996                         | Mean | 3.9358 | 3.6061 | 2.8571 | 2.1373 | 3.4018 | 2.7714 | 2.4330 | 2.5569 |
|                              | N    | 358    | 358    | 357    | 357    | 341    | 350    | 351    | 343    |
|                              | SD   | 1.2384 | 1.4604 | 1.7876 | 1.6745 | 1.3911 | 1.6840 | 1.6372 | 1.5659 |
| 1999                         | Mean | 4.0923 | 3.5116 | 2.0935 | 2.1693 | 3.2231 | 2.3476 | 2.3832 | 3.3316 |
|                              | N    | 390    | 387    | 385    | 384    | 381    | 374    | 368    | 374    |
|                              | SD   | 1.1547 | 1.4984 | 1.8474 | 1.7312 | 1.5269 | 1.6116 | 1.5458 | 1.6446 |
| <b>Status Quo</b>            |      |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| 1993                         | Mean | 4.0200 | 3.3200 | 3.0104 | 2.0200 | 3.2842 | 2.8389 | 2.7500 | 3.4130 |
|                              | N    | 100    | 100    | 96     | 100    | 95     | 99     | 92     | 92     |
|                              | SD   | 1.1457 | 1.5819 | 1.7259 | 1.7579 | 1.5064 | 1.5431 | 1.7137 | 1.6250 |
| 1996                         | Mean | 3.9358 | 3.6061 | 2.8571 | 2.1373 | 3.4018 | 2.7714 | 2.4330 | 2.5569 |
|                              | N    | 358    | 358    | 357    | 357    | 341    | 350    | 351    | 343    |
|                              | SD   | 1.2384 | 1.4604 | 1.6745 | 1.6745 | 1.3911 | 1.6840 | 1.6372 | 1.5659 |
| 1999                         | Mean | 3.9379 | 3.5342 | 2.4552 | 2.5000 | 3.4196 | 2.4825 | 2.5441 | 3.2336 |
|                              | N    | 145    | 146    | 145    | 144    | 143    | 143    | 136    | 137    |
|                              | SD   | 1.1620 | 1.4052 | 1.9038 | 1.7739 | 1.3759 | 1.5827 | 1.4900 | 1.5916 |
| <b>Chinese Nationalist</b>   |      |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| 1993                         | Mean | 4.1897 | 3.4931 | 2.9672 | 1.8599 | 3.3989 | 2.8389 | 2.7606 | 3.5909 |
|                              | N    | 369    | 363    | 366    | 364    | 351    | 360    | 355    | 352    |
|                              | SD   | 1.1780 | 1.5965 | 1.9171 | 1.7564 | 1.5176 | 1.6031 | 1.6694 | 1.5717 |
| 1996                         | Mean | 4.1319 | 3.6327 | 2.9938 | 2.2523 | 3.5246 | 2.8962 | 2.3981 | 2.7222 |
|                              | N    | 326    | 324    | 322    | 321    | 305    | 318    | 319    | 90     |
|                              | SD   | 1.1277 | 1.4156 | 1.7964 | 1.7611 | 1.3979 | 1.6733 | 1.6883 | 1.5937 |
| 1999                         | Mean | 3.8682 | 3.5046 | 2.2603 | 2.1528 | 3.2322 | 2.2676 | 2.3793 | 3.4686 |
|                              | N    | 220    | 218    | 219    | 216    | 211    | 213    | 203    | 207    |
|                              | SD   | 1.2842 | 1.4849 | 1.8125 | 1.6395 | 1.5486 | 1.5956 | 1.5792 | 1.5257 |
| <b>Total</b>                 |      |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |        |
| 1993                         | Mean | 4.0897 | 3.6349 | 2.9313 | 2.0289 | 3.4230 | 2.8562 | 2.8138 | 3.5865 |
|                              | N    | 948    | 934    | 931    | 935    | 896    | 918    | 886    | 890    |
|                              | SD   | 1.4892 | 1.5196 | 1.8778 | 1.7585 | 1.4785 | 1.5971 | 1.6441 | 1.5985 |
| 1996                         | Mean | 4.0020 | 3.7137 | 2.9622 | 2.2679 | 3.5260 | 2.9195 | 2.5005 | 2.7024 |
|                              | N    | 1010   | 1006   | 1000   | 1004   | 962    | 994    | 993    | 951    |
|                              | SD   | 1.2576 | 1.4156 | 1.7922 | 1.7389 | 1.4193 | 1.6766 | 1.6620 | 1.5863 |
| 1999                         | Mean | 4.0292 | 3.5602 | 2.2351 | 2.2945 | 3.3098 | 2.3829 | 2.4194 | 3.3974 |
|                              | N    | 1.63   | 1055   | 1055   | 1046   | 1033   | 1029   | 999    | 1009   |
|                              | SD   | 1.1956 | 1.4571 | 1.8305 | 1.7221 | 1.4840 | 1.6119 | 1.5472 | 1.5696 |

Data Source: 1993: the 1992 Legislative Election Survey, 1996: the Presidential Election Survey, 1999: the 1998 Legislative Election Survey.

Table 3.7: Attitudes on Liberal Value and Constitutionalism in Taiwan, 1993, 1996a, 1999 % (N)

|   |       | Taiwanese<br>Nationalist | Dual<br>Identity  | Status Quo       | Chinese<br>Nationalist | Total             |
|---|-------|--------------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------------|-------------------|
| <b>Human Right Protection</b>   |       |                          |                   |                  |                        |                   |
| <b>Q1. Criminals committing brutal crimes should be punished immediately, without having to go through the complex procedures of judicial trial</b> |       |                          |                   |                  |                        |                   |
| Disagree  | 1993  | 63.8(88)                 | <b>58.4</b> (199) | 64.0(64)         | 63.3(235)              | 61.7(586)         |
|   | 1996a | 62.7(146)                | 60.2(218)         | 66.0(66)         | 65.0(214)              | 62.9(644)         |
|   | 1999  | <b>47.1</b> (146)        | <b>40.9</b> (160) | <b>52.3</b> (78) | <b>45.7</b> (102)      | <b>45.3</b> (486) |
| Agree   | 1993  | 34.8(48)                 | 39.3(136)         | 32.0(32)         | 35.3(131)              | 36.3(345)         |
|   | 1996a | 35.2(82)                 | 38.4(139)         | 27.0(27)         | 32.8(108)              | 34.8(356)         |
|   | 1999  | 51.6(160)                | 57.5(225)         | 45.0(67)         | 52.5(117)              | 53.0(569)         |
| No Opinion  | 1993  | 1.4(2)                   | 2.3(8)            | 4.0(4)           | 1.3(5)                 | 2.0(19)           |
|   | 1996a | 2.1(5)                   | 1.4(5)            | 7.0(7)           | 2.1(7)                 | 2.3(24)           |
|   | 1999  | 1.3(4)                   | 1.5(6)            | 2.7(4)           | 1.8(4)                 | 1.7(18)           |
| Total   | 1993  | 14.5(138)                | 35.9(341)         | 10.5(100)        | 39.1(371)              | 100(950)          |
|   | 1996b | 22.8(233)                | 35.4(362)         | 9.8(100)         | 32.1(329)              | 100(1024)         |
|   | 1999  | 28.9(310)                | 36.4(391)         | 13.9(149)        | 20.8(223)              | 100(1073)         |
| <b>Jurisdiction Independence</b>  |       |                          |                   |                  |                        |                   |
| <b>Q2. Judges should accept opinions from the administrations when a significant case is brought to trial.</b>                                      |       |                          |                   |                  |                        |                   |
| Disagree  | 1993  | 66.7(92)                 | <b>71.8</b> (245) | 70.0(70)         | 72.8(270)              | 71.3(677)         |
|   | 1996a | 68.7(160)                | 64.1(232)         | 63.0(63)         | 66.6(219)              | 65.8(674)         |
|   | 1999  | <b>71.6</b> (221)        | <b>65.5</b> (256) | <b>63.8</b> (95) | <b>69.5</b> (155)      | <b>67.8</b> (727) |
| Agree   | 1993  | 23.2(32)                 | 22.6(77)          | 22.0(22)         | 22.1(82)               | 22.4(213)         |
|   | 1996a | 23.2(54)                 | 29.0(105)         | 26.0(26)         | 26.1(86)               | 26.5(271)         |
|   | 1999  | 22.3(69)                 | 30.2(118)         | 28.2(42)         | 23.3(53)               | 26.2(281)         |
| No Opinion  | 1993  | 10.1(14)                 | 5.6(19)           | 8.0(8)           | 5.1(19)                | 6.3(60)           |
|   | 1996a | 8.2(19)                  | 6.9(25)           | 11.0(11)         | 7.3(24)                | 7.7(79)           |
|   | 1999  | 6.1(19)                  | 4.3(17)           | 8.1(12)          | 7.2(16)                | 6.0(64)           |
| Total   | 1993  | 14.5(138)                | 35.9(341)         | 10.5(100)        | 39.1(371)              | 100(950)          |
|   | 1996b | 22.8(233)                | 35.4(362)         | 9.8(100)         | 32.1(329)              | 100(1024)         |
|   | 1999  | 28.9(310)                | 36.4(391)         | 13.9(149)        | 20.8(223)              | 100(1073)         |

Data Source: 1993: the 1992 Legislative Election Survey, 1996a: The 1995 Legislative Election Survey. 1996b: The 1996 Presidential Election Survey. 1999: The 1998 Legislative Election Survey.

Table 3.8: Attitudes on Democratic Practices, Procedures, and Processes in Taiwan, 2000 % (N)

|  | Taiwanese<br>Nationalist | Dual<br>Identity  | Status<br>Quo | Chinese<br>Nationalist | Total     |
|--|--------------------------|-------------------|---------------|------------------------|-----------|
| <b>Evaluation on Democratic Practices</b>  |                          |                   |               |                        |           |
| Q1. How democratic our country is now? (on a 0-10 scale)                                 |                          |                   |               |                        |           |
| Close to Dictatorship (0-4)  | 6.4(19)                  | 7.6(33)           | 12.9(11)      | 11.6(28)               | 8.6(91)   |
| In between (5)   | 25.6(76)                 | 22.0(96)          | 17.6(15)      | 23.6(57)               | 23.0(244) |
| Close to Democracy (6-10)  | 68.0(202)                | <b>70.4</b> (307) | 69.4(59)      | 64.9(157)              | 68.4(725) |
| Total  | 28.0(297)                | 41.1(436)         | 8.0(85)       | 22.8(242)              | 100(1060) |
| Q2. Are you satisfied with the practice of democracy in Taiwan? (on a 0-10 scale)        |                          |                   |               |                        |           |
| Not satisfied (0-4)  | 19.3(62)                 | 20.4(93)          | 27.5(25)      | 27.3(70)               | 22.3(250) |
| Satisfied (5)  | 37.7(120)                | 33.8(154)         | 35.2(32)      | 32.0(82)               | 34.6(389) |
| Very Satisfy (6-10)  | 43.0(138)                | <b>45.7</b> (208) | 37.4(34)      | 40.6(104)              | 43.1(484) |
| Total  | 28.6(321)                | 40.5(455)         | 8.1(91)       | 22.8(256)              | 100(1123) |
| <b>Attitudes on Electoral Processes and Impacts</b>                                      |                          |                   |               |                        |           |
| Q3. The presidential election had advanced democratic progress in Taiwan.                |                          |                   |               |                        |           |
| Agree  | 88.6(287)                | <b>87.6</b> (406) | 80.2(71)      | 74.5(193)              | 84.3(950) |
| Disagree   | 11.4(37)                 | 12.4(57)          | 19.8(17)      | 25.5(66)               | 15.7(177) |
| Total  | 28.7(324)                | 40.6(458)         | 7.6(86)       | 23.0(259)              | 100(1127) |
| Q4. The presidential election had caused political instability and societal disturbance. |                          |                   |               |                        |           |
| Agree  | 30.7(99)                 | 39.5(181)         | 53.5(46)      | 41.1(106)              | 38.4(433) |
| Disagree   | 69.3(233)                | <b>60.5</b> (279) | 46.5(40)      | 58.9(152)              | 61.6(694) |
| Total  | 28.6(322)                | 40.9(461)         | 7.6(86)       | 22.9(258)              | 100(1127) |
| Q5. The presidential election had strengthened the legitimacy of the government.         |                          |                   |               |                        |           |
| Agree  | 78.5(223)                | <b>74.8</b> (303) | 69.9(58)      | 62.9(60)               | 72.8(725) |
| Disagree   | 21.5(61)                 | 25.2(102)         | 30.1(25)      | 37.1(83)               | 27.2(271) |
| Total  | 28.5(284)                | 40.7(405)         | 8.3(83)       | 22.5(224)              | 100(996)  |

Data Source: The 2000 Presidential Election Survey.



Figure 3.1: Two-Level Prospect of the Components of Popular National Identity in Taiwan




Figure 3.2: A Causal Model of Taiwanese National Identity Formation in Taiwan




Table 3.9: Comparison of Three Regression Models of National Identity in Taiwan, 2000

| National Identity                                 | Model I         |       | Model II        |       | Model III       |       |
|---|-----------------|-------|-----------------|-------|-----------------|-------|
|   | Pseudo R2=.0308 |       | Pseudo R2=.0682 |       | Pseudo R2=.2041 |       |
|   | Coefficient     | RRR   | Coefficient     | RRR   | Coefficient     | RRR   |
| Taiwanese Nationalist (compared to dual identity) |                 |       |                 |       |                 |       |
| Constant  | -.146           |       | .168            |       | 2.236           |       |
| Native (benshenren)                               | .686*           | 1.99  | .473            | 1.60  | .341            | 1.41  |
| Age   | -.012           | .99   | -.011           | .98   | -.016           | .98   |
| Education   | -.003           | .99   | .025            | 1.03  | .011            | 1.01  |
| Income  | -.043*          | .96   | -.044*          | .96   | -.061*          | .94   |
| Self Identity (“Only Taiwanese” as the baseline)  |                 |       |                 |       |                 |       |
| Both  |                 |       | -.852***        | .43   | -.057           | .94   |
| Only Chinese                                      |                 |       | -.757*          | .47   | -.126           | .88   |
| Chinese Complex, ethnic glory                     |                 |       |                 |       | .029            | 1.03  |
| Chinese Complex, betrayer                         |                 |       |                 |       | .102            | 1.11  |
| Political Unification                             |                 |       |                 |       | -.938***        | .39   |
| Economic Integration                              |                 |       |                 |       | -.852***        | .43   |
| Taiwanese Complex, ethnic origin                  |                 |       |                 |       | -.032           | .97   |
| Taiwanese Complex, ethnic Chinese                 |                 |       |                 |       | -.114           | .89   |
| Political Sovereignty                             |                 |       |                 |       | .249            | 1.28  |
| Democratic Value                                  |                 |       |                 |       | -.019           | .98   |
| Participatory Attachment                          |                 |       |                 |       | .022            | 1.02  |
| Chinese Nationalist (compared to dual identity)   |                 |       |                 |       |                 |       |
| Constant  | -2.307          |       | -2.871          |       | -.909           |       |
| Native (benshenren)                               | -.652**         | .5219 | -.410           | .664  | -.019           | .980  |
| Age   | .033            | 1.034 | .031***         | 1.031 | .027**          | 1.027 |
| Education   | .063***         | 1.065 | .049            | 1.051 | .035            | 1.035 |
| Income  | .004*           | 1.004 | .006            | 1.006 | .008            | 1.008 |
| Self Identity (“Only Taiwanese” as the baseline)  |                 |       |                 |       |                 |       |
| Both  |                 |       | .612**          | 1.844 | .494            | 1.639 |
| Only Chinese                                      |                 |       | 1.753***        | 5.773 | 1.491**         | 4.439 |
| Chinese Complex, ethnic glory                     |                 |       |                 |       | -.295           | .745  |
| Chinese Complex, betrayer                         |                 |       |                 |       | .399**          | 1.490 |
| Political Unification                             |                 |       |                 |       | .318            | 1.374 |
| Economic Integration                              |                 |       |                 |       | .002            | 1.002 |
| Taiwanese Complex, ethnic origin                  |                 |       |                 |       | -.099           | .906  |
| Taiwanese Complex, ethnic Chinese                 |                 |       |                 |       | -.099           | .905  |
| Sovereignty                                       |                 |       |                 |       | -.682***        | .505  |
| Democratic Value                                  |                 |       |                 |       | .000            | 1.000 |
| Participatory Attachment                          |                 |       |                 |       | -.196*          | .822  |

\* $<.05$ , \*\* $<.01$ , \*\*\* $<.001$

Table 3.10: Regression Model of Factors Influence National Identity in Taiwan, 2000

| National Identity  | Model A          |               |
|--|------------------|---------------|
|  | Coefficient      | RRR           |
| <b>Taiwanese Nationalist</b> (compared to dual identity) |                  |               |
| Constant   | 2.3411*          |               |
| Age  | -.0171           | .9830         |
| Education  | .0046            | 1.0046        |
| Income   | -.0606*          | .9411         |
| Chinese Complex, ethnic betrayer                         | .0878            | 1.0918        |
| Political Unification                                    | <b>-.8612***</b> | <b>.4226</b>  |
| Economic Integration                                     | <b>-.8800***</b> | <b>.4147</b>  |
| Taiwanese Complex, ethnic Chinese                        | -.0428           | .9580         |
| Political Sovereignty                                    | .2275            | 1.2555        |
| Participatory Attachment                                 | .0341            | 1.0347        |
| <b>Chinese Nationalist</b> (compared to dual identity)   |                  |               |
| Constant   | -1.5067          |               |
| Age  | .0289**          | 1.0293        |
| Education  | .0551            | 1.0567        |
| Income   | .0189            | 1.0191        |
| Chinese Complex, ethnic betrayer                         | <b>.4740**</b>   | <b>1.6065</b> |
| Political Unification                                    | .2909            | 1.3377        |
| Economic Integration                                     | .0421            | 1.0430        |
| Taiwanese Complex, ethnic Chinese                        | -.1921           | .8251         |
| Political Sovereignty                                    | <b>-.6958***</b> | <b>.4986</b>  |
| Participatory Attachment                                 | <b>-.2010*</b>   | <b>.8178</b>  |
| N=715  |                  |               |
| Pseudo R2= 0.1817  |                  |               |
| Log likelihood=-737.00143                                |                  |               |
| * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001                            |                  |               |

## **Chapter 4**

### **ROC State and the Imagined Chinese Community:**

#### **The Rise of China and the Decline of Chinese National Identity, 2003-11**

With the rise of China in the last decade or so, the China factor has had an increasingly strong impact on Taiwan's politics and on the nation identity of its people as well. The functionalist theoretical perspective presumes that economic integration has a spillover effect that will eventually lead to political integration. This theory seems overly simplistic and doesn't take into account many important factors. As Deutsch argued long ago, economic transaction alone is not enough to cause political integration, which often requires a deep philosophical or ideological commitment to integration (Deutsch 1988). In the case of Taiwan, this role of this deep ideological commitment may be filled by the Chinese identity found among many people. This chapter argues that this Chinese identity-based commitment to political integration is, nevertheless, significantly hampered by the rigid position of the PRC government on "One China," as well as the behaviors of its officials. The rise of China, which at the first sight seem to provide considerable economic inducement to the people in Taiwan, will only further damage the commitment to political integration. It will also diminish the Chinese national identity among Taiwan's people and their support for unification with the Chinese mainland.

Since 2000, the most salient feature of the trends related to national identity in Taiwan has been the decline of Chinese national identity. In order to explain the decline of Chinese national identity, this chapter proposes quite a different theoretical perspective from the conventional view that the rise of China will incentivize people in Taiwan to identify with the Chinese nation. It postulates that the influential role of China in international politics appeals greatly to some people in Taiwan. The rise of China is likely to strengthen the identity of those who already have a Chinese identity, and to convert those who previously did not have a Chinese identity into Chinese nationalists as well. Many, especially those inclined toward Taiwanese identity, are worried by this scenario. We contend in this chapter that this speculation is based on the mistaken presumption regarding the nature of Chinese national identity among people in Taiwan. The chapter offers a quite different scenario. The rise of China will only diminish Chinese national identity. This scenario points to a very important phenomenon that has been totally overlooked: the complicated relationship between the state (of the Republic of China) and the (Chinese) nation. Historically, the Chinese nation was very much the creation of the ROC state. But strikingly enough, with the rise of the PRC we witness for the first time that people are willing to sacrifice the integrity of nation, with which they still strongly identify, to accept a separate state. The strong identity of the ROC state partly explains the decline of Chinese identity and the growth of the proportion of people among the general population who express a preference for the status quo.

To explain this phenomenon, this chapter proposes quite a different profile of Chinese national identity, which is based on information from intensive interviews of those who have vacated their previous Chinese national identity. The chapter will also

use data collected from poll surveys conducted in recent years to show that the portrait we give to Chinese national identity is largely confirmed by the trends revealed in those polls. It will then show why the nature of Chinese national identity is such that it will only be weakened and diminished by the coming of a strong China.

## **The Impact of a Rising China on Taiwan's National Identity**

### **China's Rise**

The growing power of China manifests in various ways. In terms of the economy, China has achieved a rapid and consistent growth, with an annual GD growth rate of roughly 10% since 1978 when its socialist economy was liberalized under Deng Xiaoping's leadership. It surpassed Japan in 2010 to become the world's second largest economy. It is now the largest state holder of the U.S. debt. As early as 2003, Goldman Sachs in its "Global Economics Paper, No. 99" projected that in less than 40 years, the economies of Brazil, Russia, India, and China combined could be larger than the G6 countries, and China that could overtake the U.S. as the largest world economy.<sup>38</sup> The report was widely covered in Taiwan's media. The widely circulated *Business Weekly* [Shangye Zhoukan] devoted two special issues, based on Goldman Sachs' report, to the topic, focusing especially on the rise of China. One article in the series was titled "China to Overtake USA as Number 1 in 2041."<sup>39</sup>

---

<sup>38</sup> <http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/topics/brics/brics-reports-pdfs/brics-dream.pdf>

<sup>39</sup> *Business Weekly* No. 901(Feb. 28, 2005), No. 904 (March 21, 2005).

China's economic power also brought for the country an influential position in international politics. China's national defense budget has grown by around 15% annually since 1989. With its strong military establishment, China has become the dominant military power in the South Asian region. Chinese expansion has also been perceived as representing a "long-term danger" to the security interests of the United States, or so a paper in *Policy Review* published as early as 1992 claimed. The paper, however, advised that the US aim for an active engagement with China and eschew the containment model that it applied in the face of Soviet imperialism during the Cold War (Munro 1992). This paper, with its clear message of a strong China, was also widely cited in Chinese news media.

In the face of deep international concern over China's new power, especially among the neighboring countries, the Chinese government promoted the idea of "peaceful rising" (of China) internationally. Echoing a speech given by Zheng Bijian, a high-ranking official in charge of party propaganda, at the Boao Forum for Asia in November 2003, China's premier Wen Jiabao said in his speech one month later at Harvard University that "Today's China is a great nation, reforming, liberated, and peacefully rising.... Tomorrow's China will be a great nation, peace loving and full of hope." Two years later, the Central Television Station launched the documentary series "The Rise of Great Nations." The series gained much attention in Taiwan's media. It was also put on the market for sale and rental. Peaceful or not, the rise of China was evident. The "rise of China" has also become a common phrase. The *Global Language Monitor* reported in 2009 that its research into the Internet, the blogosphere (including social media), and the top 50,000 print and electronic media sites found that

---

the “rise of China” was the top news story of the decade. It was 400% more prevalent than the runner up “Iraqi War”.<sup>40</sup>

The rising power of China takes is evident not only in the international arena but also in cross-strait relations. In 2005, China surpassed the United States and Japan to become Taiwan’s largest export market. Taiwan’s economy benefited from the economic growth of China. In 1991, only 9 percent of Taiwan’s exports were to the Chinese market. The percentage increased rapidly to 28% in 2005, and 31% in 2010.<sup>41</sup> In 2010, the trade surplus on the part of Taiwan reached US\$77.17 billion, and Taiwan’s investment in China reached US \$97.32 billion (Gong 2011). In June 2010, President Ma Ying-jeou signed the ECFA (Economic Coordination Framework Agreement) with Beijing government. It was expected to further boost the already significant bilateral trade between the two sides of the Strait and also greatly increase Taiwan’s investment in China. Since the KMT’s candidate Ma Ying-jeou won the 2008 presidential election, his government has pursued a policy of active engagement with China. President Ma’s cross-strait policy has invited attacked from the DPP, which claims that Ma and the KMT are selling the country to the PRC. Behind these attacks lies great concern and worry that the next step following economic integration will be political unification. The concern is not without basis, as Chen Yun-lin, the president of the Chinese Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits, said implicitly during his visit to Taiwan in 2009

---

<sup>40</sup> <http://www.languagemonitor.com/top-words-2/top-news-stories-of-the-decade/>

<sup>41</sup> Data source is from ROC national statistics. <http://ebas1.ebas.gov.tw/pxweb/Dialog/statfile9L.asp>



that the negotiation between two sides should be “economic first, then political.”<sup>42</sup>

As China has garnered an influential position in the international politics, and Taiwan’s economy has been largely integrated into Chinese markets, many people from both political and academic fields have expressed concern. Will the effects of economic cooperation spillover into political arena? Will the rising power of China in the international economy and Taiwan’s increasing economic dependency on the Chinese market affect the national identity of the Taiwanese people, causing them to lean more toward support for unification with the Chinese Mainland? The dominant perspective is that the ascendant Taiwanese identity might be stifled by the rise of China and economic integration between two sides of the Strait. The concern with, or perhaps more accurately, the curiosity about how the new phase in cross-strait relations would effect the the national identity of Taiwan’s people might be part of the motivation behind the formation in 2011 of a study group, The China Impact Research Team, at the Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica. The team has so far conducted two phone poll surveys exploring, among many other issues, China’s impact on the national identity of the general population. The first survey found that a dominant portion of respondents agreed that Taiwan’s economic growth depended very much on economic relations with China. But on the other hand and more importantly, Taiwanese national identity showed no sign of decline compared to the findings from previous poll surveys in the past two decades (Wu 2012).

### **A Puzzling Situation**

These findings are interesting and important indeed. But focusing exclusively on

---

<sup>42</sup> *China Times*, December 22, 2009.

Taiwanese national identity, the above study totally ignored a no less important phenomenon: the decline of Chinese identity even during a stage when most people believe, rightly or wrongly, that Taiwan's future prosperity relies very much on China (see *Figure 2.4* in Chapter 2). This oversight is due to a theoretical perspective, which, firstly, sees national identities as mutually exclusive. This perspective assumes that Taiwanese national identity and Chinese national identity are mutually exclusive. Thus, the surge of Taiwanese identity in the 1990s, according to this perspective, could only mean the decline of the Chinese identity. The study hence stopped at finding that Taiwanese national identity did not suffer a decline, albeit without salient growth either.

This dissertation forgoes the above either-or notion of national identity and also the ungrounded assumption that the rise of Taiwanese national identity and the decline of Chinese identity are the two faces of the same coin. It argues that Taiwanese national identity and Chinese national identity should not be treated as contradictory with each other, and that because of this, their dynamics should be analyzed under a two dimensional frame.<sup>43</sup> With this new perspective, this study has three important findings. First, the rise of Taiwanese national identity did not coincide with the decline of Chinese national identity (see *Figure 2.5*). Second, Taiwanese identity increased rapidly in the 1990s, and remained stable in the 2000s (see *Figure 2.3*). In addition, when Taiwanese identity experienced a rapid surge, the majority of the population in Taiwan still maintained a Chinese identity (see *Figure 2.4*). Third, and more importantly, the persistence of Chinese identity did not continue over time. It has experienced a continual decline since 2003. As demonstrated in *Figure 2.4*, the percentage of people who held a Chinese national identity dropped rapidly from 57% in 2000 to 44% in 2003,

---

<sup>43</sup> See Chapter 2 for a detailed analysis of the measurement methods used in this research.

and then to 33% in 2008.

The neglect of the trend of decline of Chinese national identity in previous studies may be the result of another mistaken assumption. It is wrongly assumed that if the growing power of China in international politics and the increasing embeddedness of Taiwan's economy in the Chinese market have any impact on Chinese identity, the impact is most likely positive, i.e. attracting people to Chinese national identity (Chu 2004; Wu 2005a). But, empirical findings point to just the opposite direction of change brought about by the influence of the China factor. In fact, the growing power of China was accompanied by the decline of Chinese national identity. How do we explain the puzzling state of affairs that the increasing embeddedness of Taiwan's economy in the Chinese market has actually coincided with the wane of Chinese national identity in Taiwan? Due to the above two false presumptions, previous research has failed to detect this puzzling phenomenon, much less account for it.

### **Proposed Hypotheses**

This study calls into question the functionalist assumption that economic transaction has the spillover effect of promoting political integration. As Deutsch argued long time ago, economic transaction alone is not enough to cause political integration, which requires a deep philosophical or ideological commitment to integration (Deutsch 1988). In the case of Taiwan, Chinese identity seems to provide deep ideological commitment. It is, however, greatly damaged by the PRC government's behavior and its rigid adherence to the notion of "one China." The rise of China further diminishes the Chinese national identity and popular support for unification in Taiwan.

The rise of China has been a very popular terms in Taiwan. Googling the phrase “Rise of China” in Taiwan’s websites yields data showing that the prevalence of the phrase has greatly increased since 2005 (see *Table 4.1*). The trends surrounding this issue and the timing of its emergence as salient in Taiwan are congruent with the decreasing trend of Chinese national identity. This congruence provides empirical support to a causal explanation of the decline of Chinese national identity in Taiwan. Why does the PRC’s “One China Principle” not strengthen the commitment to political unification? Why does it lead to the decline of Chinese identity instead? To answer these question, a major aspect of Chinese national identity in Taiwan needs to be brought to the fore. This is the fact that the essence of Chinese national identity in Taiwan is the bond to the ROC state, originating not from a sense of cultural affinity but rather from the hatred of subjugation. The efforts by the PRC’s government to denounce the status of the ROC only strengthen this bond to the ROC state. Because the PRC’s nationalist agenda is so rigid and exclusive as to leave no room for ROC identity, the PRC’s version of Chinese nationalism is perceived to be a unification dominated by communist dictatorship for those people with a bond to the ROC. Recognition of China’s rising power and its version of the “One China Principle” thus function to undermine the commitment to unification. The result is the waning of Chinese national identity on the island.

### **Chinese Nationalism and the ROC State**

Nationalism, as defined by Breuilly, is a “political movement seeking or exercising state power and justifying such action with nationalist arguments”(Breuilly 1994: 2). Although this definition contains two kinds of nationalism, one seeking state power and the other exercising it, Breuilly, like most scholars of nationalism, focuses mainly on nationalist oppositions to the state (Ibid.:8). In most studies of Taiwan’s national identity to date, Taiwanese nationalism targets the ROC state for elimination. It is obvious that Taiwanese nationalism, which demands a new state (a “Republic of Taiwan”), is in opposition to the ROC. Many people inclined to Taiwanese nationalist identity find it very difficult to accept the ROC as the legitimate state for Taiwan. In the DPP’s (Democratic Progressive Party) public rallies and ceremonies, the national anthem of the ROC has never been sung, nor has the national flag ever been exhibited. The supporters of Taiwanese nationalism have indeed found themselves in an awkward position when the national flag of the ROC has been subject to the sustained and targeted opposition of the Chinese government and Chinese citizens in the context of international events. The DPP party chairman Su Chen-chang was severely criticized for supporting the national flag when it was pulled down from London streets during the 2012 Olympic games, apparently under pressure from the Chinese government,.

When we focus exclusively on Taiwanese nationalists’ opposition to the ROC, its relationship to Chinese national identity is easily overlooked. Chinese nationalism is largely conceived of as only a notion demanding the unification of the “Chinese Nation” [zhonghua minzu]. In contrast, this dissertation argues that Chinese nationalism is a state-led nationalism in which the ROC is the state both representing and engendering the Chinese nation. Rejai and Cynthia distinguish between two historical patterns of

nationalism based on the interplay between nation and state. The first pattern is the experience of the developed Western countries in which the sentiment of national identity developed prior to the crystallization of the structure of political authority. The relationship between nation and state is characterized by the nation's precedence over and shaping of the state. The other pattern is the experience of many Asian and Africa countries. Therein, political sovereignty preceded national identity. The sequence is thus reversed: the state preceded and created the nation (Rejai and Cynthia 1969).

Chinese nationalism follows the second pattern. The ROC state was the creator of the Chinese nation, and was employed to sustain state authority and to accelerate state-directed modernization. Fitzgerald argues that China is a "nationless state"; there is no concept of Chinese nation (Fitzgerald 1996). The notion of the "Chinese Nation" was created by the ROC state. For this kind of "state-nation", the integrative cement is seldom cultural affinity. Rather, it resides in political and economic bonds (Rejai and Cynthia 1969). The political dimension of Chinese nationalism, however, has rarely been analyzed. This dissertation argues that the object (**identificand**) of popular attachment to the Chinese community is more the ROC state than the ethno-Chinese nation. The bond to the ROC state that separates the outsider (mainly the Chinese communists) from the insider originates not from a sense of ethno-cultural identity but from the hatred of subjugation.

### **Chinese Nationalism in the Mainland, 1911-1949**

When the ROC was founded in 1911, the prevalent sentiments regarding affiliation with place and government were primordial and parochial identities. The notion of a

Chinese nation had not developed at that stage. As a matter of fact, the official ideology of the revolutionary Kuomintang (KMT) or Nationalist Party up to the eve of the breakdown of the Qing Dynasty was Han nationalism. This entailed the driving out of the Manchus and the recovery of China. The Chinese Nation, the notion of a single Chinese nation composed of five ethnic groups, was very much the creation of the ROC and did not come until later during the 1920s. And, according to Johnson, it was not until the 1930s during the war against Japan, that the notion of a Chinese nation began to penetrate rural areas (Johnson 1962: 5). Since the revolution of 1911, the central mission of the KMT was to construct a modern state, although in this endeavor they had little success. Their main concerns were to achieve firmer control of the central government and extend their authority beyond coastal regions to warlord-controlled areas. To do this, it needed support from commercial and manufacturing interests to finance military buildup. Because the KMT lacked resource and authority in warlord areas, it was able to achieve territorial gains by making compromises with the political elites in the peripheries rather than by replacing warlords with its own people. As Hughes has pointed out, facing a society fragmented by parochial bonds of clan ties, political elites of the new state realized the need for a nation-building program to sustain the state authority and to promote the shift of popular loyalty to the central state (Hughes 1997: 7). In this political situation, nationalist ideology emphasized the coordination among diverse interests rather than social mobilization (Breuille 1994: 231-34).<sup>44</sup> Nationalist ideology played the role of garnering support for the KMT regime from groups with diverse political interests. Mass action to some extent was incompatible with the strategy of

---

<sup>44</sup> Anthony Marx also points out the coordinate function of nationalism. See (Marx 1998).

coordination as it might undermine the authoritarian-mode linkages the KMT regime had established.<sup>45</sup> The state-building process and the nation-building program of the KMT, however, were interrupted by an eight-year war against Japan and civil war against communists which followed.

### **Chinese Nationalism in Taiwan**

In 1950, the KMT resumed the process of state-building not in its homeland but on a newly acquired island. The end of the Second World War released Taiwan from fifty years of Japanese colonization. But, it also placed Taiwan on the battleground of the Chinese Civil War. In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party announced the establishment of the PRC in Beijing while Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT retreated to Taiwan, and relocated the central government of the ROC to Taipei. Taiwan began to serve a dual role as both a province of the republic state and the sole representative of the Chinese nation. The political situations the KMT encountered on the island were to some extent similar to those it did in mainland China. Their major objectives were still to bring the central government firmly under its control and recover the territory under the control of the communists. But the KMT was better equipped this time. An official nationalist ideology [sanmin zhuyi]<sup>46</sup> and a military-dominated authoritarian

---

<sup>45</sup> Authoritarian reform nationalism had also appeared in Shogun Japan and in Turkey. By Breuille's definition, authoritarian reform nationalism is the specific response from new modern states with a strong center aiming at reconstructing state power by adopting nationalist ideology to coordinate different political claims (Breuille 1994, Ch. 11).

<sup>46</sup> Beginning in 1924, Sun Yat-sen gave a series lectures on Chinese nationalism which were published under the title *Sanmin Zhuyi* (Three Principles of the People). He proposed a program for a revolution in three phases, namely a military stage, a tutelary stage in which the party exercises dictatorship until society becomes familiar with the new ideology of liberal democracy, and finally a constitutional government. This blueprint, which was officially promulgated as the Nation-building Program of the National Government



regime had been developed during its nationalist movement on the mainland. More importantly, the major obstacle of coordinating a set of diverse political interests they encountered on the mainland was removed. As the regime migrated to this new land, warlords, landlords, and the red-hat merchants all lost their assets and depended upon the regime to bring them back to their land and property. In addition, in Taiwan, a recently decolonized society, the political power of local elites and autonomous business interests had not developed yet.

There were also other new political problems. In the new political situation, a strong state apparatus was no longer sufficient for the survival of the KMT regime, whose legitimacy was questioned by the people in the new territory. Those territories previously under the control of warlords were taken by the communists to establish a new state, which challenged the legal status of the ROC. In addition, unlike in coastal China where the KMT regime had enjoyed well-established connections, Taiwanese society and the state were new to one another. Chinese nationalism became an important tool of legitimation for the survival of the KMT regime island, as some scholars have pointed out (Wu and Cheng 2011). What has not been explained yet is how the KMT could legitimize the authority of the state by appealing to Chinese nationalism in a divided nation. How was the KMT to foster popular loyalty to the ROC state in the name of the Chinese nation when the PRC was also a Chinese state?

### **Nationalisms in a Divided Nation**

Taiwan's situation is not exceptional; it is similar to those of Germany and Korea,

---

was adopted by the KMT government to legitimize party dictatorship in terms of the mission of achieving territorial integrity of the Chinese nation-state. The Three Principles of the People became a state ideology under Article 1 of the ROC Constitution adopted in 1947.

which were divided into two separate states during the Cold War. To cultivate national identity when the nation is divided, the architect of nationalism needs to find other basis with which to substitute cultural identity. In West Germany, the concept of *Verfassungspatriotismus* was proposed by Dolf Sternberger in 1970 as “a kind of civic reason that would make citizens identify with the democratic state.” (Muller 2007: 21) It is argued that the general population identification with West Germany was based on their attachment to the Constitution. As Muller pointed out, Sternberger’s constitutional patriotism did not exclude the populace in East Germany since they legally remained citizens of the Federal Republic. In theory, they were also subject to its constitution (Muller 2007: 25). In South Korea, a recent study pointed out that a new national identity figuring South Koreans as dutiful subjects of the Republic of Korea emerged during the economic development period (Moon 2008). The developmental state fostered economic interdependence by creating a variety of Administered Mass Organizations to mobilize South Koreans to participate in these organizations and economic development projects (Moon 2008: 5-6).

In Taiwan, similar to the cases of West Germany and South Korea, the state served as the object of identification. Chinese nationalism had been adopted to legitimize state authority. Partly due to the situation of a divided nation, the cement for consolidating popular identification with the state could not be the cultural bond. More importantly, although Chinese Hans constituted 95 percent of the population on the island, Chinese culture and language (Mandarin) were new to the local people, who had been under Japanese colonialism for a half century. When the national central government moved to the island in 1949, it had only been five years since the island was integrated into the

territory of the ROC. The formula for identification thus had to be political in nature, rather than cultural. The idea of the ROC as the legitimate China and a sense of hatred for subjugation (rejection of communist Soviet domination) became the new formula for forging national identity.

Chinese ideology emphasizes that the legal status of the ROC claiming that the ROC was the sole legitimate government of the Chinese nation and had de jure sovereignty over the Chinese territory. To make this claim credible despite the existence of the PRC, international endorsement was essential. In 1950, the ambassador of the ROC to the United Nations asserted at the meeting of the UN Security Council that Soviet Russia's proposal to dismiss the ROC from the UN was an act of invasion. He stated that the Beijing regime was a puppet regime of the Soviet Union since not a single member of the communist government was elected by the Chinese people and none of its rules and laws was approved by the Chinese people or their representatives (Guo shi guan 2000: 64-67). In addition to denouncing the PRC's status, nationalist principles were adopted to legitimize the legal status of the ROC. In the same statement to the UN, ambassador Chiang declared, "my government is produced according to the Chinese constitution. The constitution was passed by the National Assembly held by the representatives of the Chinese people. The government is led by a president and vice-president who were elected by the National Assembly. The Executive Yuan is responsible to the Legislature Yuan which is composed of seven hundred popular elected legislators." (Guo shi guan 2000: 66). The same statement was reiterated during the following two decades as a response to questions over the ROC's right to represent the legitimate China.<sup>47</sup>

---

<sup>47</sup> This argument does not ignore the decisive role of geopolitics in settling the status of the ROC in the international arena. The outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950 and the Cold War changed the US's

Ambassador Chiang's statement to the UN made it clear that the claim of the ROC to represent the legitimate China was based on the Chinese *fatong*, which referred to the ROC Constitution and the national government produced by the Constitution. When the KMT regime retreated to Taiwan in 1949, it brought with it the ROC state apparatus: a constitution approved by elected representatives in 1946 and a central government composed of hundreds of national representatives elected in 1947 from various constituencies in mainland China. The continuation of these constitutional institutions in Taiwan and recognition of the legal status of the ROC enabled the KMT to apply Chinese nationalism to legitimize its authority in Taiwan.

In addition to legitimizing the authority of the ROC state in Taiwan, Chinese nationalism also served to distinguish it from the outsider, the Chinese communists (CCP). The Chinese communists were labeled puppets of Soviet imperialism. Anti-communism [*fangong kang'e*] hence was enshrined as a nationalist mission seeking territorial integrity in resistance to foreign intervention. The claim for national survival against foreign invaders was not new to the mainlanders who fled with the KMT regime to Taiwan during 1949-50. This claim had been the main theme of Chinese nationalism ever since its birth. It began with the crisis of the Qing Dynasty under the pressure of Western powers and was strengthened with the Japanese invasion. Their lives and memories of most mainlanders were marked by endless fleeing and parting with family members caused by foreign invasions. The hatred of native Taiwanese for foreign

---

attitude and ensured international recognition of the legal status of the ROC. Nevertheless, the moral basis of the KMT regime is worthy of consideration for two reasons. First, although Chiang Kai-shek knew well that only a world war would change the civil war situation to his advantage, its arrival was beyond the KMT's control. What the Nationalists could do was project a cause to their émigré communities in foreign countries hoping they would influence foreign policy. Second, although the moral cause might have a limited effect on the formulation of foreign policy, it would serve as a means to justify an existing policy, especially for countries where the administration was facing a strong public.

invasion was similar even though they had never suffering foreign invasions after having been colonized by Japanese for fifty years. The bond to the ROC state therefore was not based on a sense of ethno-cultural identity, but rather on the hatred of subjugation.

### **The ROC and the Chinese Nation**

*Table 4.2* suggests that ethno-cultural identity is not an essential basis for people in Taiwan to identify themselves with the Chinese nation, especially for those who possess dual national identity. The responses to Question 1 show that only 36 percent of people with dual identity agreed with the statement “Taiwanese are Chinese and the view that Taiwanese are not Chinese is unforgivable.” Their identification with the Chinese nation apparently was apparently not based on primordial origins. Nor was the sharing of the same culture and history the source of their identification with the Chinese nation. Replies to Question 2 showed that less than half of people with dual identity objected to the view that Taiwan’s history is different from Chinese history. Compared with Chinese nationalists who overwhelmingly (73%) rejected the view that Taiwan’s history is different from Chinese history, people with dual national identity conceived of the Chinese nation as resting on a political and not ethnic and cultural basis.

More importantly, the figures in *Table 4.3* demonstrate that the ROC state, rather than the cultural Chinese nation, was the major object of identification for people with Chinese national identity in Taiwan. Even long after the seat for China in the UN was taken by the PRC in 1971, and most countries in the world recognized the PRC as the state for China and established formal diplomatic ties with it, the idea that the ROC was the legitimate state for the Chinese nation still held sway in Taiwan among those who had

Chinese national identity. In 2003, when asked, “If the two sides of the Strait are to be unified, what name should be adopted?” 67 percent of the respondents holding dual identity and 56 percent of Chinese nationalists picked the ROC (see *Table 4.3*).

Excluding the response of “Decided in the future,” 84 percent of those with dual identity and 86 percent of Chinese nationalists selected ROC as the name for the unified Chinese nation (see *Table 4.3*). The PRC earned very little allegiance. Only 5 percent among those with dual identity and 2 percent among Chinese nationalists picked PRC for name of a unified China (see *Table 4.3*). Even excluding the choice of “Decided in the Future,” the percentages in the two groups were 6% and 3% (see *Table 4.3*).

These figures might explain why the PRC’s proposal of the “one country two systems” formula, which had been successfully applied to Hong Kong, showed very little popularity in Taiwan (see *Table 4.4*). In addition to favoring the ROC as the state for a unified China, those with Chinese national identity also strongly hoped to raise the status of the ROC in the international community. The respondents were asked in poll in 2000, “Some people think the tension in the cross-Strait tensions comes from our government’s effort to raise the ROC’s status in the international community. To avoid irritating the PRC, our government should suspend such efforts (such as applying to join the UN, and state visits by the President.) Other people think our government should keep up its efforts to gain international recognition, no matter what reaction the PRC would have. What is your opinion?” *Table 4.3* shows that around 90 percent (89.4%) of those with dual identity and 86 percent (86.3%) of Chinese nationalists supported government’s effort to raise the status of the ROC state in the international community even if it will cause tensions in the cross-Strait relationship.

### **The Political Impact of China's Rise**

For the people in Taiwan, China's rise was much more than a phenomenon involving a shift in the balance of power in international politics. What emerged with China's growing economic and political power was the PRC's exclusive Chinese nationalism, a nationalism which has inhibited Taiwan's claim to any national identity (including the Chinese one) in the world community. If China's rapidly expanding economy brought great opportunities for Taiwan's economy, China's rise was also a source of worry and concerns regarding the status of the ROC. Seemingly with the intention of making a reality of the concerns of the Taiwan's people, the Beijing government has been using its powerful position to challenge the ROC's status in the international arena. One of the most salient cases may be China's efforts to obstruct Taipei's application for membership in the World Health Organization in 2003 in the midst of SARS epidemic. The first case of SARS in Taiwan was found in early March 2003. The next month, a public hospital was close down, and hundreds of it patients, nurses, and doctors were quarantined within the confines of the hospital. The epidemic became a statewide crisis. Taipei applied to the World Health Organization for membership in May, hoping that the sharing of information concerning the epidemic with the world medical community might be of some help to solve the crisis. The application was swiftly blocked by the Beijing government. Its representative, the Vice-Premier and Minister of Health Wu Yi, called Taipei's application in her speech to the general

assembly “a shameful farce.” “As a province of China,” she said, “Taiwan is not qualified to be a member nor to be an observer to participate the activities of the organization.... If Taiwan wants to participate in any activity of the WHO, it has to be under the permission and arrangement of Chinese central government.” Worse still, when asked by a reporter about the needs of twenty three million people in Taiwan, a PRC official rudely replied, “It was already rejected.” “Who cares about you?” The story was widely reported in Taiwan’s media, and the film clip replayed many times on all TV channels. Two days later, Taiwan was listed by the organization as an infected zone.

To people in Taiwan, these PRC officials’ comments were certainly a humiliation and caused fierce irritation. The frequent humiliation caused by the Beijing government and some of its people may significantly contribute to the growth of the Taiwanese nationalist movement (Dittmer 2005). What has been overlooked is that the PRC’s exclusive and rigid version of the “one China principle”, which it has promoted in hopes of forcing the island to identify with the Chinese nation, has ironically been damaging to the commitment to unification among those people who held a Chinese national identity in Taiwan. As this dissertation has argued, the essence of Chinese national identity in Taiwan is the bond to the ROC state. Beijing’s effort to denounce the status of the ROC would only strengthen the attachment to the ROC state. This mechanism was demonstrated by the overwhelming support among those people who held a Chinese national identity for efforts to raise the ROC’s status in the international community even if damaging to cross-strait relations (see *Figure 4.2*). Moreover, Beijing’s behavior demonstrated to the people on the island that the PRC’s nationalist agenda is not only



exclusive but also rigid in nature. The events in the wake of SARS showed clearly that even on matters concerning the health of the whole population, the PRC would not allow any flexibility on the status of the ROC. Since the PRC's Chinese nationalism leaves no room for ROC identity, in the eyes of those people who feel attached to the ROC, unification under the PRC's nationalist agenda means domination by communist dictatorship. Both the recognition of China's rising power and the dominance of the PRC's version of "one China principle" are considerably damaging to the commitment of people in Taiwan to unification. These have also resulted in the waning of Chinese national identity on the island.

As early as 1998, Hu Chi-chiang, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the KMT government, openly complained in a press conference that the Beijing government had been trying very hard to bully Taiwan in the international community. Its aim was to achieve a state of "Zero Diplomacy" on the part of the ROC. Hu also warned Beijing that its policy would only bring about "Zero Unification" for two sides of the Strait (*United Evening News* 1998/12/30). After 2000, under the DPP government, China's bullying efforts were greatly escalated. To cite only a small number of incidents, Taiwan's representatives to the WHO's Conference on the Post-Tsunami Health Situation were rejected for attendance of the meetings in 2005, albeit with formal invitations and official registration. In 2005 the official titles of all of Taiwan's representatives to the World Trade Organization were eliminated from the official roster book. In the 2006 annual report of the World Economic Forum, Taiwan's membership name was changed into Taiwan, China. In the WTO's Conference on the Fishery Subsidy in Geneva, Taiwan was listed as "Taiwan Province, China" in all official documents. In 2007 the

high school students who had won two gold medals and two bronze medals in the International Biology Olympiad held in Canada wept in front of the press because Taiwan's national flag was removed from the assembly hall. Similar stories were published once for a while in Taiwan's media. They all lead to the growing popular understanding that unification with the mainland means domination by the PRC.

It was also during this period that we witnessed a steady decline of Chinese national identity in Taiwan. Contrary to the conventional view that the rapid growth of the Chinese economy removed the practical obstacles to unification, and that a strong China would induce people in Taiwan to identify with it order to be citizens of a powerful nation, the fact is that a powerful China works only to diminish the Chinese identity among the general populace. Figure 2.5 illustrates that in the early 1990's when social scientists began to conduct national poll surveys on national identity, high percentages of respondents expressed that they would like to see unification with China under the favorable scenario of political and economic parity between Taiwan and the rest of China. The percentages of those who would want to go independent without risking war in the first few years, 67 percent in 1991 and 58 percent in 1993, represented a doubling of these numbers (originally 37% and 38% respectively). By the year 2000, the percentage of those with a Chinese national identity remained roughly constant around 60 percent. But in the years after 2003, in what amounts to a radical break, this declined with a precipitous around 30 percent. It went down to 44 percent in 2003, and further to 33 percent in 2008.

## **Interviews**

The above explanation is supported by the information collected from intensive interviews with people who discarded their Chinese national identity. In my 2003 study of changes in national identity, I selected some respondents who changed their national identity from a panel study of poll surveys in 1998 and 2000 for intensive interviews in 2003. The respondents resided in various parts of the country, from the far south of Pingtung County to Metropolitan Taipei and northern extremity of Keelung, a harbor city. They also belonged to different occupations. Their change of national identity during these years occurred in various patterns. Some had possessed Chinese national identity in 1998 but acquired in 2000 an additional Taiwanese national identity such that they exhibited dual identities. Some had dual identities in 1998 but dropped the Chinese national identity in 2000 to become Taiwanese nationalists. Others identified as Chinese nationalists in 1998, but dropped their former identity such that they then supported maintaining the status quo or becoming Taiwanese nationalists. The information collected from the intensive interviews with those who dropped their Chinese national identity seems consistent with the theory that Chinese national identity was mainly based on a bond to the ROC state. The rise of China as a factor contributing to the decline of Chinese national identity is also confirmed.

Informant No.24, a college graduate in his forties, was an employee in the finance sector of an international cargo company. A New Party supporter, he was a Chinese nationalist in 1998. When asked why he supports the New Party, he replied, “the New Party is the defender of the Republic of China.” His bond to the ROC state also explained his rejection of Taiwan independence. When asked “if Taiwan independence will not provoke war with China, would you support it?” he replies “I will not accept a

Republic of Taiwan, but if the country after the independence is still called the Republic of China, I will accept it.”

Informant No.15, a college graduate in her forties, was running an afterschool program for primary school students in suburban Taipei. As a native Taiwanese, she has no high regard for mainlander parents, who often give her a hard time when unsatisfied with her performance in taking care of their children. Being a longtime KMT supporter, she held dual identities in 1998, but gave up her Chinese national identity in 2000. She is now in the status quo group, rejecting both unification and independence. “I am a Chinese and an ‘ROC person’ [zhonghua minguo ren],” she claimed.

So, I do not support Taiwan independence. I am for “one country two systems.” But my idea is different from the situation of Hong Kong. Hong Kong is China’s puppet. Taiwan should have its independent territory, and not have to report to Beijing on every matter.

No matter what kind of arrangement is settled in the future, Taiwan should be an independent entity, with its independent institutions and without any restraint from China. I am not saying I am not Chinese. But I am against unification. Yes, I am a Chinese. But, I do not want Taiwan to become their province.

Asked what the name of the nation should be if the two sides end up unifying in the future, she replies definitely the “Republic of China.” Her identification with the ROC state seems quite strong. Her answer suggests that the reason she agreed with unification in 1998 was because the idea of the Republic of China encompassing the whole Chinese nation was in her mind. But since the rise of Communist China has made that impossible, she lost her commitment to unification. She now does “not want

Taiwan to become their province.” She supports “one country two systems.” But in her interpretation, it is more like “one China, two Chinese states.” Her identification with the ROC state also prevents her from supporting independence. She says, “even if most countries do not recognize the Republic of China, there is no need for a Republic of Taiwan. We are Chinese; our country is the Republic of China.” For her, the international isolation of the ROC is no reason for giving up her identification with it.

Informant No. 32 says the first priority of the government is to “make the world to recognize our Republic of China.” He is a native Hakka college graduate working for a high-tech company. His case shows most clearly the strength of the ROC identity in forming Chinese national identity. Several times during the interview he denied that he was a Taiwanese. Instead, he would rather be called an “ROC person [zhonghua minguo ren].” What greatly troubles him is that when he was abroad he had to say he was from Taiwan, because no one knew what Republic of China was, and most often they confused the Republic of China with People’s Republic of China. He had been a Chinese nationalist in the previous survey. But in an interview in 2003, he belonged to the status quo group. Asked why he was against unification, he said:

Unification now involves a problem; the problem is it is no longer under our control. Since childhood we have been told we are the Republic of China. Unification now would cause a contradiction because we will become the People’s Republic of China. My opinion is that we should be the Republic of China.

Since he is such a staunch supporter of the ROC, his acceptance of unification with China owes to the fact that he imagined the ROC as being the state for the unified Chinese nation. When that was impossible, he rejected without hesitation the idea of

unification.

The above two respondents, who maintained a strong attachment to the ROC state when interviewed in 2003, changed their attitudes about the future of their nation from unification to the status quo. What factor may explain the change? Informant No. 29 says explicitly that:

China does not identify with us. They think we are just a small island. After having contact with the mainland, I no longer wanted unification. China is very strong and we are small. China is just like a boss in a big company. Whatever he promises to give, he can always change his mind and take back.

In his fifties, this man worked as an engineering designer for a computer hardware maker. He was in the category of Chinese nationalist in 1998, but shifted to the category of dual identity in 2000. When interviewed in 2003, he showed himself to be a supporter of the status quo. At the time of interview, he did not support unification because after having lived and worked in China for couple of years he discovered that “China is stronger”, and “China does not identify with us.”

When asked if his rejection of unification is due to the fact that China does not treat Taiwan in a friendly manner regarding the status of the ROC, he says,

Yes, exactly. But even if they [the PRC] were friendly now, I would not believe in them.... We will benefit more from independence than from unification because under an independent Taiwan, we can decide our own policy. Thus, I want de facto independence, but nominal unification.

But what does his “nominal unification” mean? He replies,

In the future for the younger generation, if they consider their own interests, they will not want unification because unification means domination by dictatorship.... Unification should only be nominal. Taiwan can still have its sovereignty. China should not infringe on our rights.

His idea of “de facto independence, nominal unification” seems to be a form of “two Chinese states.” Because of the rise of China and Beijing’s staunch position of forcing Taiwan to accept its version of unification, he changed his previous Chinese nationalist position to defending the status quo. Later in the interview, he even uses Tibet as an example in his reply to the question “Why do you still accept an independent Taiwan although you think Taiwanese are also Chinese?” He says,

Just like Tibet, if the very basic spiritual life cannot be secured, of course they want independence. It is understandable under dictatorship.

The same factor motivated the change of national identity among other informants such as Informant No. 60. He is in his forties and working as an engineer in a high-tech industry. Like Informant No. 29 above, he was Chinese nationalist in 1998, but shifted to the category of dual identity in 2000. Interviewed in 2003, he shows himself to be a supporter of the status quo.

We are Chinese, but Chinese need not stay in the same state. As long as you are under oppression, you can seek independence. Mongolia is one case; Tibet is another. Unlike Tibet, we are not un-free. But the Beijing government imprisons us diplomatically.

Mainland China is now a great power. Neither their government nor their people recognize the status of the ROC. They think Taiwan is theirs. But, according to Chinese history, Taiwan belongs to the ROC. They occupied the Chinese mainland. The current situation is two divided sovereignty states.

The most salient effect of China's rise on Chinese identity may be in the case of Informant No. 49. Our informant, a native Taiwanese with a college degree in his thirties, worked for a bank. His replies in the 2000 poll revealed that he was a Chinese nationalist, accepting unification with China and rejecting Taiwan independence even under the favorable condition that no war would be provoked. But in the interview in 2003, he opted for the status quo. That is, he no longer accepted unification even if China were to become a democratic country. He says there is no need for Taiwan to declare itself a new independent country, since China cares about it so much. Neither is unification a good option, because "unification with China will definitely result in the situation that Taiwan is unified [by the PRC]."

But why did he agree with unification with China in the previous survey? His reply to the question of historical memory in the intensive interview suggested that what he had in mind several years ago was a unified China with the ROC as its state. The only things he could think of as worth being included in history textbooks were Sun Yat-sen's persistent revolutionary endeavors and the valuable things embedded in Chinese nation—five thousand years of history, traditional culture, and the beautiful landscape. Nevertheless, to him, only the ROC has preserved the Chinese national heritage. Mainland China under 50 years of communist rule had developed a different culture. All these ideas, including a ROC state for a unified Chinese nation, however



were all diminished by the rise of China. Once the ROC cannot recover mainland China, he no longer opts for unification.

The information collected from the focus group interviews demonstrates that the decline of the Chinese national identity among many people in Taiwan is less due to the idea that the Taiwanese constitute a unique nation and thus should have a state of its own. The predominance of the PRC's "one China principle" is what causes those who held a Chinese national identity in the 1990s to forgo their wishes for a unified Chinese state. The trend of declining Chinese national identity is actually linked to the rise of China. This finding runs counter to the expectation by many people that, because one of the missions of nationalism is to achieve national glory, the rise of China should compel the people of Taiwan to identify with a powerful China. This expectation largely ignores the fact that the Chinese identity of some people in Taiwan is based on an attachment to the ROC state. The rise of China with its growing influence in international politics has made the PRC's nationalist agenda dominate the prospect of unification. Under the PRC's agenda, the ROC has no standing in a unified Chinese state. When our informants with Chinese national identity began to realize this, they changed their preference regarding the future of their nation from unification to defend the ROC by maintaining the status quo and at the same time hoping to raise the status of the ROC in the international community.

### **The China Factor: an Empirical Analysis**

### **Data Source and the Dependent Variable**

This section uses survey data to examine the proposed argument and the findings from the focus group interviews. Data used in this section was collected in the following two research projects: the survey of the research project “Analysis of the Unification and Independence Preference of Taiwan’s Public,” and the “China Impact Survey.”<sup>48</sup> These surveys used the same question to measure Chinese national identity. The question is “Some people say that if mainland China is comparable with Taiwan in terms of economic, social, and political developments, then the two sides should be unified into one country. Do you agree?”<sup>49</sup> In 2010, 41.3 percent of respondents wanted unification if the two sides of the strait were under similar economic, social, and political conditions. 53.2 percent of respondents disagreed with the statement (see *Table 4.5*).

### **Political, Cultural, and Economic Factors**

*Table 4.5* presents information about how the China factor affects Chinese national identity in Taiwan. The first two questions examine the cultural and economic dimensions of the China factor. The first question asked the interviewees “some people say that Taiwanese culture is Chinese culture, while some others said that Taiwanese culture and Chinese culture are two entirely different cultures. Which statement do you agree with?” The two statements received a similar degree of support. 46.4 percent of respondents agreed with the statement that Taiwanese culture is Chinese culture, while

---

<sup>48</sup> For detailed information from the survey datasets, see Chapter One.

<sup>49</sup> A discussion of measurement methods can be found in chapter two.

45.6 percent of respondents agreed with the statement that the two cultures are fully different (see *Table 4.5*). Among those respondents who think Taiwanese culture belongs to Chinese culture, about half (55.1%) had a Chinese national identity. However, 39.7% of respondents who thought that Taiwanese culture is Chinese culture disapproved of unification (see *Table 4.5*).

The second question asked interviewees “Is it possible that the mainland’s future economy will be better than Taiwan’s economy?” Most respondents (83.4%) thought that China’s future economy would be better than Taiwan’s. Nevertheless, among them, less than half (45.1%) had a Chinese national identity (support unification) (see *Table 4.5*).

It seems that Chinese cultural affinity is not sufficient for the forming of people’s attachment to the Chinese political community. Question 4 asked interviewees “Is your impression of mainland China good or bad?” 32.5 percent of respondents said that they have a good impression, while 52.8 percent of respondents had a bad impression of the mainland China (see *Table 4.5*). Among those who had a bad impression, 71.6 percent rejected unification even if the mainland were to be comparable with Taiwan in terms of economic, social, and political development (see *Table 4.5*). Question 5 asked the interviewees “Do you trust the government of mainland China?” Only 10.8 percent of respondents had trust in the Beijing government. 83.7 percent of respondents said they do not trust mainland China (see *Table 4.5*). Among those who do not trust the Beijing government, 60.5 percent rejected unification (see *Table 4.5*). Question 4 and Question 5 shown in *Table 4.5* reveal that the Beijing government with all its efforts to push Taiwan toward unification actually resulted in pushing Taiwan away from unification.

The PRC's behavior intentioned to suppress the ROC's status in the international arena created a bad image for people in Taiwan, and did nothing to win their trust. A impression on the mainland and lack of trust in the government of the mainland had negative effect on Chinese national identity as they had harmed populace's attachment to the Chinese community and their commitment to Chinese unification.

The information provided by the intensive interviews is consistent with the findings from poll survey data analysis.

### **The Decline of Dual Identity and the Rise of the Status Quo**

In addition to the trend of declining Chinese national identity since 2003, *Figure 2.6* also illustrates the patterns of national identity change in the general population. The proportion of those with dual national identity has decreased rapidly. People with dual national identity used to be the largest group in the 1990s. But after 2000, the size of the group shrank drastically from 41% in 2000 to 26% in 2003 and then to 23% in 2008. A recent survey conducted in 2011 shows that this group only constituted ten percent of the sample (see *Table 4.5*). Meanwhile, the proportion in the Taiwanese nationalist group increased from 28% in 2000 to 34% in 2003 and eventually to 42% in 2008. But the most significant trend was the great expansion of the status quo group, those who want neither independence nor unification. This group used to be very small. In the 1990s it accounted for less than ten percent of the population. But its size grew tremendously since 2003, from 8% in 2000 to 20% in 2003 and 19% in 2008. The 2011 poll shows 31 percent of the sample to be in this group (see *Table 4.5*).

What explains the rapid shrinking of the dual identity group and at the same time the

surge of the status quo group? Why do people who used to identify with the Chinese nation no longer want unification with the Chinese mainland? The information provided by the intensive interviews suggests that the main factor causing this change is related to ROC state identity. *Table 4.6* provides support to the findings from the intensive interviews. The numbers therein show that the dual identity group (whose members accept unification with China) does not differ from the status quo group (those who reject unification) in terms of ethnic and cultural identity or in terms of the economic dimensions of national identity. About the same proportion of the two groups (70.8 percent for the dual identity group and 65.8 percent for the status quo group) agreed that people in Taiwan and mainland China share the same ethnic origins and the same culture (see *Table 4.6*). Ethno-cultural identity cannot explain the variance in their attitudes concerning Chinese unification. For both groups, material benefits and pragmatic reasoning seem to have no effect on national identity. *Table 4.5* shows that they agreed that cross-strait economic transactions will benefit Taiwan's economy (the percentages for dual identity and the status quo being 82% and 81% respectively) (see *Table 4.5*). Neither does economic integration with China have a significantly different impact on the personal welfare of these two groups. The group supporting the status quo (rejecting unification) even has a higher proportion of respondents reporting that cross-strait economic transactions have a positive impact on their family welfare, 44% of them compared to 39% for the dual identity group (see *Table 4.6*). On the issue of whether respondents thought that China's economic development in the future would outpace Taiwan's, the two groups show little difference, 77% for the dual identity group and 74% for the status quo group (see *Table 4.6*). These figures suggest that neither

ethnic-cultural identity nor material interest is the basis of Chinese national identity. These factors cannot explain the difference behind the holding of dual identity and support for the status quo.

The attitude that differentiates the two groups, one for the unification the other against it, is political in nature. When asked to evaluate whether mainland Chinese treat people with respect, 74.9% of the status quo group gives negative scores, while much less of the dual identity group does so (see *Table 4.6*). The question is designed to measure Taiwanese people's evaluation of the level of civility of the Chinese. But it can also be interpreted as showing how Taiwanese think Chinese would respect the will of others, including people in Taiwan.

The information collective from the focus group interviews suggests that most people in Taiwan see Beijing's actions intended to prevent the ROC from participating in international institutions as "unfriendly", "oppressive", and displaying no respect for the will of the people in Taiwan. And the reason for their rejection of unification was expressed as the notion that China does not "identify with us." The figures in *Table 4.6* seems to suggest that those people who recognized the PRC's as "unfriendly" and as having no respect for the will of the people in Taiwan were more likely to reject unification. Furthermore, *Table 4.6* shows that the more significant difference in attitude between the two groups is their evaluation of the prospects for China's democracy. In the dual identity group, 63.9% think that China will become democratic in the future. Only 46% in the status quo group, however, believe so (see *Table 4.6*). Democracy is always an important factor in Taiwanese people's consideration of unification. Democracy is important not only because many want to live only under a

democratic regime, but also because only through democracy can Taiwan's interests and the identity of its people be articulated. As Informant No.6 made clear, "if the mainland becomes democratic, they will respect our will and rights. They will not as they are doing now force us to accept their version of unification." For those people with an attachment to the ROC state, when the mainland becomes democratic, unification would no longer mean the end of the ROC because under a democratic regime, the form and name of a unified Chinese state could be discussed and negotiated.

## **Conclusion**

It is impossible to fully understand the nature and particular trajectory of Taiwanese nationalism and nationalist politics in Taiwan without understanding the Chinese national identity in the country. On the other hand, because Chinese national identity is an important factor in cross-strait relations, the analysis of its future, especially under the impact of the rise of China, will have many political implications. With the rise of China, many people in Taiwan are worried that the growth of Taiwanese nationalism will be halted and people will be drawn to Chinese national identity. The Beijing government hopes that the economic integration of the two sides will eventually lead to political assimilation.

The data collected by poll surveys suggests that the pessimism of Taiwanese nationalists and optimism of the Beijing government are both ungrounded. It has been revealed in previous studies that the economic integration between two countries in the

recent decade did has not encroached upon Taiwanese identity. This chapter further exposes that Chinese national identity actually declined with the rise of China. In order to understand this puzzle, we need to understand the nature of Chinese national identity among the general populace in Taiwan. With that understanding, we can also better comprehend its “competitor,” or counterpart, Taiwanese nationalism.

Historically the Chinese nation began to be constructed by the ROC in the 1920s. Unlike in the case of nation-states, the Chinese nation is largely a state-nation, or state-led nation. The state, the ROC, has not only engendered the Chinese nation, but also always been its legitimate representative in the mind of many people in Taiwan. Because scholars of nationalist politics in Taiwan wrongly assume that Chinese national identity is based on Chinese culture and its long and glorious history, this particular relationship between the Chinese nation and the ROC state has been largely overlooked among observers of Chinese nationalism. This relationship actually holds the key to understanding the decline of Chinese national identity during the rise of China. It is shown in this chapter that the Chinese national identity among people in Taiwan is not based on cultural and historical legacies. Rather it is the state, the ROC, which constitutes the base of Chinese national identity. But, with the rise of China, the ROC state, with which the Chinese nationalists identify, is bullied and ostracized by the strong power China now enjoys in international politics. Since the Chinese nation and ROC state are like two sides of the same coin, the belittling of the ROC state also means the belittling of the Chinese nation. As the survey data presented in this chapter shows, the rapid decline of Chinese national identity occurred during the late 2000s, when the rise of China largely made its imprint in international politics. This was also the period when



the Beijing government actively engaged in bullying Taiwan in the international community.

The decline of Chinese national identity also affects dual identity and had ramifications for nationalist politics in Taiwan. People with dual identity used to constitute the largest category among the various nationalist groups. With the decline of Chinese national identity, it has now shrunk to around only 10 percent of the population. By contrast, the segment of the status quo group that is neither inclined toward unification nor independence has significantly increased. But the most important of all is the fact that, as emphasized above, the rise of China along with deepening economic integration between the two sides has failed to convince people in Taiwan to align with Chinese national identity. This fact has important implications for the future of cross-strait relations.

Table 4.1: Frequency of the term “Rise of China” on Taiwan’s Internet Search

| Year | Counts |
|------|--------|
| 1992 | 0      |
| 1993 | 1      |
| 1994 | 3      |
| 1995 | 1      |
| 1996 | 182    |
| 1997 | 182    |
| 1998 | 182    |
| 1999 | 182    |
| 2000 | 182    |
| 2001 | 238    |
| 2002 | 118    |
| 2003 | 71     |
| 2004 | 172    |
| 2005 | 827    |
| 2006 | 1,150  |
| 2007 | 1,950  |
| 2008 | 3,170  |
| 2009 | 4,030  |
| 2010 | 5,930  |
| 2011 | 13,300 |
| 2012 | 38,300 |

Table 4.2: Ethno-Cultural Affinity and Chinese National Identity in Taiwan, 2000 % (N)

|   |      | Taiwanese<br>Nationalist | Dual<br>Identity | Status Quo | Chinese<br>Nationalist | Total     |
|---|------|--------------------------|------------------|------------|------------------------|-----------|
| Q1. The view that “Taiwanese is not Chinese” is unforgiving.                |      |                          |                  |            |                        |           |
| Agree   | 2000 | 29.5(92)                 | <b>36.1(161)</b> | 47.8(43)   | <b>63.0(162)</b>       | 41.4(457) |
| Disagree  | 2000 | 70.5(220)                | 63.9(285)        | 52.5(47)   | 37.0(95)               | 58.6(648) |
| Total   | 2000 | (312)                    | (446)            | (90)       | (257)                  | (1105)    |
| Q2. Chinese history belong to China, We should create Taiwan’s own history. |      |                          |                  |            |                        |           |
| Agree   | 2000 | 71.7(226)                | 55.6(250)        | 43.5(37)   | 26.9(66)               | 52.9(579) |
| Disagree  | 2000 | 28.3(89)                 | <b>44.4(200)</b> | 56.5(48)   | <b>73.1(179)</b>       | 47.1(516) |
| Total   | 2000 | (315)                    | (450)            | (85)       | (245)                  | (1095)    |

Data Source: the 2000 Presidential Election

Table 4.3: ROC State and Chinese National Identity in Taiwan, 2000, 2003 % (N)

|                              | Taiwanese Nationalist | Dual Identity      | Status Quo | Chinese Nationalist | Total  |
|------------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|------------|---------------------|--------|
| Name after Unification* 2003 |                       |                    |            |                     |        |
| ROC                          | NA                    | <b>(280)</b>       | NA         | <b>(107)</b>        | (445)  |
|                              |                       | <b>67.0 [84.1]</b> |            | <b>55.9 [86.4]</b>  | 62.4   |
| PRC                          | NA                    | (20)               | NA         | (84)                | (26)   |
|                              |                       | 4.8 [6.0]          |            | 2.0 [3.1]           | 3.6    |
| Chinese Federation           | NA                    | (33)               | NA         | (13)                | (53)   |
|                              |                       | 7.9 [9.9]          |            | 6.8 [10.5]          | 7.4    |
| Decided in the Future        | NA                    | (85)               | NA         | (67)                | (189)  |
|                              |                       | 20.3 [na]          |            | 35.3 [na]           | 26.5   |
| Total                        | NA                    | (418)              | NA         | (191)               | (713)  |
| International Status** 2000  |                       |                    |            |                     |        |
| Pursue ROC Status            | (288)                 | <b>(390)</b>       | (71)       | <b>(208)</b>        | (957)  |
|                              | 94.4                  | <b>89.4</b>        | 86.6       | <b>86.3</b>         | 89.9   |
| Suspend Such Effort          | (17)                  | (46)               | (11)       | (33)                | (107)  |
|                              | 5.6                   | 10.6               | 13.4       | 13.7                | 10.1   |
| Total                        | (305)                 | (436)              | (82)       | (241)               | (1064) |

Data Source: 2000: the Presidential Election Survey, 2003: Taiwan Social Change Survey, 4<sup>th</sup> poll of the 4<sup>th</sup> Term.

\* The 2003 questionnaire asked only those respondents who answered they want unification the following question: "If, in the future, the two sides of the Strait would be unified, they should be unified under which name?"

\*\*The 2000 questionnaire asked "Some people think the cross-Strait tension is due to our government's effort to raise ROC's status in the international arena; to prevent irritating the PRC, our government should suspend such effort (such as applying for joining the UN, diplomatic visits by the President.) Other people think our government should keep the effort to gain international recognition, no matter what reaction the PRC would have. What is your opinion?"

Table 4.4: Attitudes on "One Country, Two Systems" in Taiwan\*, 2001-2008

|        | Agree | Disagree | No opinion/<br>Reuse to Answer | Total  |
|--------|-------|----------|--------------------------------|--------|
| 2001.6 | 10.6% | 75.2%    | 14.2%                          | N=1069 |
| 2002.7 | 10.8% | 70.2%    | 19.0%                          | N=1091 |
| 2003.5 | 10.3% | 72.6%    | 17.0%                          | N=1082 |
| 2004.7 | 9.4%  | 73.6%    | 17.0%                          | N=1153 |
| 2005.8 | 11.4% | 72.6%    | 16.0%                          | N=1096 |
| 2006.5 | 13.3% | 76.3%    | 10.4%                          | N=1068 |
| 2007.8 | 14.8% | 67.8%    | 17.4%                          | N=1095 |
| 2008.8 | 8.1%  | 81.8%    | 10.1%                          | N=1094 |

Data Source: Mainland Affairs Council (MAC). These public polls were conducted by the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University.  
<http://www.mac.gov.tw/np.asp?ctNode=6331&mp=1>

\*Question: Regarding cross-Strait relation, China proposes "one country, two systems" which treats Taiwan as their local government under the rule of the PRC. The ROC will no longer exist. Do you agree the proposal of "one country, two systems" or not?

Table 4.5: Factors of China on Chinese National Identity, 2010

| Raw/ Column   | Unification if the two sides are comparable in all aspects |                     |                    | % (N)<br>Total |
|---|--|---------------------|--------------------|----------------|
|   | Agree  | Disagree            | Depends/No Opinion |                |
| Q1. Taiwan's Culture belongs to Chinese Culture         |  |                     |                    |                |
| Agree   | (253)<br>55.1/62.0   | (182)<br>39.7/ 34.6 | (24)<br>5.2/43.6   | 46.4(459)      |
| Disagree  | (136)<br>30.2/33.3   | (296)<br>65.6/56.3  | (19)<br>4.2/34.5   | 45.6(451)      |
| Depends/ No Opinion                                     | (19)<br>24.1/4.7   | (48)<br>60.8/9.1    | (12)<br>15.2/21.8  | 8.0(79)        |
| Total   | 41.3(408)  | 53.2(526)           | 5.6(55)            | 100.0(989)     |
| Q2. China's future economy will be better than Taiwan.  |  |                     |                    |                |
| Possible  | (362)<br>45.1/91.9   | (401)<br>50.0/77.3  | (39)<br>4.9/79.6   | 83.4(802)      |
| Not possible  | (26)<br>20.5/6.6   | (97)<br>76.4/18.7   | (4)<br>3.1/8.2     | 13.2(127)      |
| Total   | 41.0(394)  | 54.0(519)           | 5.1(49)            | 100.0(962)     |
| Q3. China will become a liberal and democratic country. |  |                     |                    |                |
| Possible  | (235)<br>55.2/58.5   | (165)<br>38.7/31.3  | (26)<br>6.1/56.5   | 43.7(426)      |
| Not possible  | (155)<br>30.0/38.6   | (347)<br>67.2/65.8  | (14)<br>2.7/30.4   | 52.9(516)      |
| Depends/ No Opinion                                     | (12)<br>36.4/3.0   | (15)<br>45.5/2.8    | (6)<br>18.2/13.0   | 3.4(33)        |
| Total   | 41.2(402)  | 54.1(527)           | 4.7(46)            | 100.0(975)     |
| Q4. Impression on the mainland China                    |  |                     |                    |                |
| Good  | (215)<br>64.2/52.1   | (96)<br>28.7/17.1   | (24)<br>7.2/41.4   | 32.5(335)      |
| Bad   | (138)<br>25.3/33.4   | (390)<br>71.6/69.5  | (17)<br>3.1/29.3   | 52.8(545)      |
| Depends/ No Opinion                                     | (60)<br>39.5/14.5  | (75)<br>49.3/13.4   | (17)<br>11.2/29.3  | 14.7(152)      |
| Total   | 40.0(413)  | 54.4(561)           | 5.6(58)            | 100.0(1032)    |
| Q5. Trust in the government of the mainland China       |  |                     |                    |                |
| Trust   | (69)<br>70.1/18.8  | (25)<br>23.4/4.6    | (7)<br>6.5/16.3    | 10.8(107)      |
| Not Trust   | (278)<br>36.3/75.4   | (500)<br>60.5/91.4  | (27)<br>3.3/62.8   | 83.7(827)      |
| Depends/ No Opinion                                     | (21)<br>42.6/5.8   | (22)<br>40.7/4.0    | (9)<br>16.7/20.9   | 5.5(54)        |
| Total   | 40.3(368)  | 55.4(547)           | 4.4(43)            | 100.0(988)     |

Data Source: Survey "Analysis the Unification and Independence Preference of Taiwan's Public"

Table 4.6: China Factor and National Identity in Taiwan, 2011

|   | Taiwanese<br>Nationalist | Dual<br>Identity | Status<br>Quo    | Chinese<br>Nationalist | %(N)      |
|---|--------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------------|-----------|
| <b>I. Ethno-cultural Dimension</b>  |                          |                  |                  |                        |           |
| People in Taiwan and in mainland China share the same ethnic origin and same culture. |                          |                  |                  |                        |           |
| Agree   | 51.5(223)                | <b>70.8(68)</b>  | <b>65.8(198)</b> | 84.3(118)              | 62.6(607) |
| Disagree  | 48.5(210)                | 29.2(28)         | 34.2(103)        | 15.7(22)               | 37.4(363) |
| Total   | (433)                    | (96)             | (301)            | (140)                  | (970)     |
| <b>II. Economic Dimension</b>   |                          |                  |                  |                        |           |
| Q1 the effect of cross-Strait economic transaction on Taiwan's economic development   |                          |                  |                  |                        |           |
| Positive  | 47.3(169)                | <b>82.4(75)</b>  | <b>80.7(226)</b> | 96.1(124)              | 69.3(594) |
| Negative  | 51.0(182)                | 16.5(15)         | 18.9(53)         | 3.9(5)                 | 29.8(255) |
| No Effect   | 1.7(6)                   | 1.1(1)           | 0.4(1)           | 0(0)                   | 0.9(8)    |
| Total   | (357)                    | (91)             | (280)            | (129)                  | (857)     |
| Q2 the effect of cross-Strait economic transaction on personal economic condition     |                          |                  |                  |                        |           |
| Positive  | 20.7(82)                 | <b>39.3(35)</b>  | <b>44.4(123)</b> | 49.6(60)               | 33.9(300) |
| Negative  | 51.1(203)                | 28.1(25)         | 26.4(73)         | 14.9(18)               | 36.1(319) |
| No Effect   | 28.2(112)                | 32.6(29)         | 29.2(81)         | 35.5(43)               | 30.0(265) |
| Total   | (397)                    | (89)             | (277)            | (121)                  | (884)     |
| Q3 China will keep rapid economic growth  |                          |                  |                  |                        |           |
| Agree   | 73.6(315)                | <b>76.5(75)</b>  | <b>74.3(223)</b> | 83.5(111)              | 75.5(724) |
| Disagree  | 26.4(113)                | 23.5(23)         | 25.7(77)         | 16.5(22)               | 24.5(235) |
| Total   | (428)                    | (98)             | (300)            | (133)                  | (959)     |
| <b>III. Political Dimension</b>   |                          |                  |                  |                        |           |
| Q1 the Chinese society in the mainland treat others with respect                      |                          |                  |                  |                        |           |
| Bad   | 76.6(333)                | 63.9(62)         | 74.9(221)        | 51.8(71)               | 71.3(687) |
| In-between  | 18.6(81)                 | 28.9(28)         | 20.0(59)         | 32.8(45)               | 22.1(213) |
| Good  | 4.8(21)                  | 7.2(7)           | 5.1(15)          | 15.3(21)               | 6.6(64)   |
| Total   | (435)                    | (97)             | (295)            | (137)                  | (964)     |
| Q2 China will become democratic   |                          |                  |                  |                        |           |
| Agree   | 37.0(159)                | <b>62.5(60)</b>  | <b>45.8(137)</b> | 69.7(92)               | 46.8(448) |
| Disagree  | 63.0(271)                | 37.5(36)         | 54.2(162)        | 30.3(40)               | 53.2(509) |
| Total   | 44.9 (430)               | 10.0 (96)        | 31.2 (299)       | 13.8(132)              | 100(957)  |

Data Source: The 2011 China Impact Survey

## Chapter 5

### **Conclusion: toward a State Theory of Nationalism**

With its salience in Taiwan's national politics, the issue of national identity has gained wide attention from both the general public and social scientists, local and international. Many important findings have already been made. Aided and inspired by the previous research, the dissertation offers a new explanation of the nationalist phenomenon in Taiwan. This new perspective may appropriately be called a state theory of nationalism. The theory contends that one of the two types of Taiwanese national identity is based on identification with the political community in Taiwan. It is also engendered through democratic political participation. The state thus constitutes the core element whether in the definition or in the formation of Taiwanese national identity. This notion of national identity has been largely overlooked in previous research. On the other hand, the new perspective also defines Chinese national identity in terms of the state. The basis of Chinese national identity among people in Taiwan is mainly their identification with the state of the Republic of China, rather than with Chinese ethnicity, culture and history. Only in light of this new theory can we explain some puzzling aspects of the nationalist phenomena in Taiwan, such as the compatibility of two national identities in a large segment of the population and the decline of Chinese identity with the rise of China. Given the importance of this issue to Taiwan's national

politics and relations with China, we hope the new perspective will prove to hold great relevance for the understanding of current politics and the prospects for the future in both of these spheres. The study of nationalism has grown into an important area in the social sciences in recent decades. We also hope the theory proposed in this study may shed some new light on the theory of nationalism.

The first new perspective proposed in this study is the two-dimensional view of national identity. Faced with the obvious competition between Taiwanese national identity and Chinese identity, all previous research had presumed that the two are incompatible and mutually exclusive. The fact that Taiwanese identity is on the rise while Chinese identity is in decline has reinforced this one-dimensional view. According to this perspective, Taiwanese identity and Chinese identity lie at the opposite poles of a single dimension or spectrum. One grows at the cost of the other. We have seen in the previous chapters that this one-dimensional view, in which the two national identities are viewed as incompatible, may serve as a sound basis for understanding the nationalist part of the population and, especially, those cultural and political elites who advocate a new national identity or defend the old national identity. But this perspective leaves out a large proportion of the population, which is composed of two different groups.

One group that is left out comprises those who agree with both Chinese unification and Taiwan independence under favorable conditions. The persistence of the one-dimensional view in the literature to date may explain why, after the innovative measurement of national identity by Wu was proposed and frequently used for two decades, few studied this group, which accounted for a large segment of the population.

Those few who have tackled this group however identified them as “pragmatists”, “realists”, or “rationalists. They wrongly presumed them to be lacking any particular national identity and stopped short of any serious analysis thereof. If they are pragmatists or rationalists without any particular national identity, one may ask how we should explain the fact that Chinese identity continued to decline as China became more powerful and Taiwan’s economic growth became more dependent on integration with China. Those who can accept both Chinese unification and Taiwanese independence, or even people in Taiwan generally, are certainly not pragmatists or rationalists, who, lacking any particular national identity, opt for any situation which would further their material interests.

The second group left out in the previous research is made up of people who reject both Chinese unification and Taiwan independence. Compared to the former group, it is even less studied. In categorizing this group as having a preference for the status quo, much previous research has assumed that they also lack any national identity. As the data from poll surveys reveal, the size of this group has expanded greatly in the recent years. If we see them as lacking national identity, the tremendous growth of this group is a puzzle indeed. Why, as the Taiwanese identity gains ground among the general population, would many people rapidly give up their national identity? Using a different theoretical perspective, this study has also tried to explain this striking phenomenon of recent years.

We propose a two-dimensional view to categorize the first group of people and offer a more comprehensive and theoretical explanation of trends related to national identity. In our perspective, those accepting both Chinese unification and Taiwan independence do



not lack national identity. On the contrary, they possess both Chinese and Taiwanese national identities at the same time. Although this study largely focuses on two groups of people left out in the previous research, it is not intended only to compensate the block missing when the one-dimensional view is employed. We believe the study of this group may yield significant insight into the theory of nationalism in general.

The idea at the core of our two-dimensional view of national identity in Taiwan is that, contrary to conventional and popular perspectives, Chinese identity and Taiwanese identity are not two poles on the same spectrum, existent on the same level of identity. Thus, neither rises nor declines at the cost of or benefit to the other. We have shown with empirical data in Chapter 2 that the two national identities changed according to their own courses and according to different patterns. Taiwanese national identity exhibited the most salient growth from 1991 to 1996. Chinese national identity did not decline at all during this period. On the other hand, even when views expressing rejection of Chinese unification increased, the acceptance of Taiwan independence did not grow with it.

Based on this two-dimensional view, a typology of four categories of nationalist groups is developed in this study: Taiwanese nationalist (exclusive Taiwanese national identity), Chinese nationalist (exclusive Chinese national identity), dual identity (inclusive of Taiwanese national identity and Chinese national identity), and the status quo. The advantages of our typology are apparent when compared to the conventional one-dimensional view. The one-dimensional view captures only three categories of nationalist group: Taiwanese nationalist, Chinese nationalist, and status quo. These three groups accounted for less than half of the population in almost every year studied.

Yet, nearly all previous research focused on these three groups. The studies' portrayal of national identity was thus limited to less than half of the population, and therefore very much biased. Besides, it is obviously problematic to assume that more than half of the population in a country does not possess any national identity.

A two-level view allows us to do more than offer a comprehensive picture of various attitudes regarding national identity among the general populace. It also reveals different modes of change during three different periods. The first period, the democratic transition, witnessed the domination of Chinese national identity. During the second period, roughly from 1995 to 2000, the category of dual identity represented the largest segment of the population. But during the third period, the category of dual identity decreased rapidly, while the number of those supporting the status quo experienced significant growth. Based on these different modes of identity formation, we are able to embark on a new theoretical approach to analyze the national identity phenomenon in Taiwan.

We begin this theoretical endeavor with the trends of change. The three modes of identity formation mentioned above were the result of two trends of identity change in two different phases. During the first phase, roughly corresponding to the 1990s, the trend of change was the growth of dual identity, which chiefly resulted from attitude change among Chinese nationalists. They shifted from rejecting Taiwan independence to accepting it. Many of them, however, came to accept Taiwanese identity without forsaking Chinese national identity. But interestingly enough, the main trend during the second phase, from 2001 to 2012, was the rapid shrinking of the group with dual identity, which had grown tremendously in the previous phase. The contraction of this group

largely resulted from a change in their attitude that led them to forgo their wish for unification with the Chinese mainland.

Three mutually related research questions, or quandaries, come to light when these modes of identity formation and trends of change are acknowledged and taken into account. The first, lying at the core of current research, is the question of why the ascendance of Taiwanese identity is able to coexist with the stability of orthodox Chinese identity. The two national identities are often seen as juxtaposed and hence in competition with each other. Our empirical data, however, shows that they are very much compatible in a sizeable portion of population. This significant phenomenon has been totally overlooked by previous research that is based on the conventional theory of nationalism, which puts so much emphasis on the cultural and political difference between “we” and “they.” A new theoretical perspective on national identities in Taiwan is needed to adequately explain this important phenomenon. The second research question, related to the first one, concerns the nature of Taiwanese identity. If the two national identities are compatible with each other, then their nature and bases, at least for those possessed by people in Taiwan, deserve further examination from a different theoretical perspective. Besides, the modes of identity formation and trends of change described above suggest that the driving force behind identity change is not the rise of Taiwanese nationalism, as often assumed. It may be largely ascribed to attitude change among people with Chinese national identity. They came to accept a new Taiwanese identity without forsaking the Chinese identity from the first phase, and thus helped to form a large group characterized by dual identity. But now, in the second phase, they are more inclined to opt for the status quo, rejecting Taiwan independence

and Chinese unification alike. This change compels us to rethink the nature of their new Taiwanese national identity.

The third question concerns the nature of Chinese identity held by people in Taiwan. Why do they reject Chinese identity at a time when China has been elevated to the status of a strong power both politically and economically? Their Chinese national identity was strong only when China lagged far behind Taiwan. This puzzling situation also compels us to develop an understanding of Chinese identity different from the conventional wisdom, at least for Chinese identity in Taiwan,. The answers to these three questions, or puzzles, may hopefully lead to a new theoretical perspective regarding the nature and basis of national identity and nationalism.

To solve the first puzzle related to the compatibility of Taiwanese and Chinese national identities, a theory of dual identity is proposed in this study. To be sure, Taiwan is not the only case where we may observe the existence of multiple and complementary identities. Students of nationalism have noticed its existence in Belgium, Canada, Britain, and Spain, where people develop and simultaneously maintain two different identities, a political one with the state and a cultural and ethnic one with the nation. But the case of Taiwan is unique in two aspects. Firstly, while in other areas the cultural community is embedded in a larger political community, i.e. the state, in the case of Taiwan, the state is smaller and is included in a larger national community. Secondly, while in other areas the mission of the nationalist project is to forge a larger (than cultural) political community, in the case of Taiwan, it is to form a smaller (than national) political community.

It begins with differentiating two types of Taiwanese national identity. One is the

conventional exclusive nationalism, which is based on ethnic-cultural identity. Nearly all previous research focused on this traditional type of nationalism. But the Taiwanese national identity among those with dual identity, we contend, is of the other type. It is based more on identification with the Taiwan-wide political community. Political, rather than ethnic-cultural, in its nature, it is close to the notion of civic nationalism. But, it is wholly to be found in the identification with the idea of constitutionalism or democratic values, as many students of civic nationalism presume. Rather, we assume, this identity affiliated with a political community is engendered through the process of democratic participation through public discourses as well as electoral engagement in national politics. A public sphere composed of equal citizens, or co-nationals, thus is created. The public sphere in which each one has a stake is confined to the particular territory of the political community. The transition to democracy thus provides members of the political community who do not or cannot identify with Taiwanese ethnicity, culture, or history with a different route to the formation of national identity. Our analysis of the empirical data collected from seven national poll surveys in the past two decades also illuminates the different bases, political vs. ethnic-cultural, of these two types of Taiwanese nationalism.

It is this new type of Taiwanese national identity, based on identification with the political community and engendered through the process of democratic participation that is compatible with Chinese national identity. Different from the traditional notion of nation, it does not imply a unique nation in want of an independent state. Rather, the nation is conceived as a political community in the present tense, which is compatible with a political community (a unified China) in the future tense. This dual identity we

found in Taiwan is thus different from its counterparts in other areas where the dual identity is composed of an identity with a cultural nation combined with identity with a state. Some observers of nationalism in Taiwan also assume, mistakenly, that the two identities upheld by people with dual identity are different in nature, the Chinese one ethnic-cultural and the Taiwanese one political. According to our theoretical perspective, which is supported by the empirical data, both identities may be said to be an identification with a state, the present Taiwan state and future Chinese state.

Chinese identity has had a long life in Taiwan. The incorrect assumption that Chinese identity is mainly based on Chinese ethnicity, culture and history may be caused by two facts. The first is the close affiliation between Taiwanese and Chinese cultures, including proximate languages and religions, the Han origin of the people, and historical legacy. During the four decades of the KMT's authoritarian rule, partly for the purpose of legitimizing its rule, Chinese nationalism was upheld the official nationalism. It was imposed by educational institutions and governmental propaganda. Faced with the puzzling fact that Chinese national identity continued to persist with the rise of Taiwanese identity, many assumed that Chinese identity was ethnic-cultural in nature. But as the information collected from in-depth interviews reveals, Chinese identity, like its counterpart Taiwanese identity, is also about the state. The Chinese identity that many people in Taiwan exhibit is based on an identification with the ROC state. It is because of this identification with the ROC state, which has long represented the Chinese nation, that many people in Taiwan agree with Chinese unification. It is because after the rise of China, the ROC cannot represent the whole Chinese nation that many people dropped their Chinese national identity. To be sure, the policies of the Beijing

Government have also done much to encourage the decline of Chinese national identity. First, as the ROC state lies at the core of Chinese national identity, belittling it in the international community hampers Chinese national identity. Secondly, by eliminating the ROC in the future unified China, the Beijing government also hinders their hope for a unified China. Beijing's appeal to the common ethnicity and culture of two peoples hence misses the whole point and does not help the unification at all. Many in Taiwan use the case of American independence to counter its appeal. Most importantly, the Chinese national identity among people in Taiwan is not based on Chinese ethnicity and culture.

As the above discussion suggests, the relationship between the state and the nation is an essential element of our state-centered theory of nationalism. Nationalism is often defined, especially in work by social scientists, as the demand of a nation or a nation-in-formation for an independent and sovereign state. The aspiration for a state is the most important, if not the only, mission of nationalism. It differentiates nationalist movement from ethnic mobilization. On the other hand, the nation is also conceived of as an artifact manufactured by the state. There are so many cases in which nation is deliberately engendered by the state, as epitomized by the famous exclamation of an Italian politician in parliament right after the unified Italy was established: "We have made Italy. Now let us start making Italians." The element of the state is always to be found in both nationalist movements and nation formation, and also the research on nationalism.

But, the role of the state in our study is different in two ways. The first difference concerns the role of the state in engendering the nation. The scenario is mostly that the

state engenders the nation through public policies, whether this be indoctrination in educational institutions or through governmental propaganda. It is a deliberate action by the state, or rather of political elites. But according to our perspective, the role of state in forging national identity is not through deliberate and intentional actions or policies. What is needed from the state to form national identity is the provision of equal and democratic participation in national politics, which turns citizens into co-nationals in the context of the individual's political conversation with all others. Inasmuch as this conversation and collective decision-making is constrained in a particular (state) territory, the territory of the political community also becomes the boundary of nation.

When the state business becomes the ground in which the nation grows, it is not surprising that the state also comes to function as the basis of national identity. This is the second characteristic concerning the role the state plays in our perspective. In the traditional perspective of conventional theories, the state is the object the nation strives to achieve. The object of identification is the nation, rather than the state. But in our perspective, the state can be an object of identification. Nation and state in this sense are hard to differentiate from each other. National identity becomes identity associated with a certain political community, either Taiwan or mainland China. Only with this conception of national identity can the phenomenon of dual identity be explained. The existence of this political community-based nation calls for a different understanding of nationalism. As a new phenomenon, it also requires further and more intensive study. I believe a careful study of this phenomenon found in the case of Taiwan may shed light on the theory of nationalism. What is left out in this study and requires more research is further investigation of the group supporting the status quo. I believe that the national



identity of this group is very much like the one possessed by those with dual identity, i.e. a national identity formed by and based on political community. Right or wrong, this group the size of which is growing in the recent years deserves more attention.

## Bibliography

- Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. 1971. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Anderson, Benedict. 1991. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. New York: Verso.
- Armstrong, John. 1982. *Nations before Nationalism*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Beiner, Ronald, ed. 1999. *Theorizing Nationalism*. Albany: State University of New York Press
- Berlin, Isaiah, and Henry Hardy. 1997. *The sense of reality : studies in ideas and their history*. 1st Farrar, Straus and Giroux ed. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux.
- Billig, Michael. 1995. *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage Publication.
- Bluhm, William T. 1973. *Building An Austrian Nation: The Political Integration of A Western State*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
- Breuilly, John. 1994. *Nationalism and the State*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Brown, Melissa J. 2004. *Is Taiwan Chinese? The Impact of Culture, Power, and Migration on Changing Identities*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press.
- , ed. 1996. *Negotiating ethnicities in China and Taiwan*. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, Center for Chinese Studies.
- Brubaker, Rogers. 1992. *Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- . 1996. *Nationalism reframed : nationhood and the national question in the new Europe*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Calhoun, Craig. 1993. "Nationalism and Ethnicity." *Annual Review of Sociology* 19:211-39.
- Chang, Mau-kuei. 1994. "Toward an Understanding of Sheng-chi Wen-ti in Taiwan, Focusing on Changes after Political Liberalization  
" In *Ethnicity in Taiwan: Social, Historical and Cultural Perspectives*, ed. C.-m. Chen and S.-m. Huang. Taipei: Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica.
- . 2003. "On the Origins and Transformation of Taiwanese National Idneity." In *Religion and the Formation of Taiwanese Identities*, ed. P. R. Katz and R. M. A. New York: Palgrave Macmilliam.
- . 2004. "Understanding Contending Nationalist Identities: Reading Ernest Gellner and Benedit Anderson from Taiwan." In *Democratization and Identity: Regimes and Ethnicity in East and Southeast Asia*, ed. S. Henders. Lanham: Lexington Books.
- , ed. 1993. *Zugun guanxi yu guojia rentong (Ethnic Relation and National Identity)*. Taipei.
- Chang, Mau-kuei, and Hsin-huang Hsiao. 1987. "Daxuesheng de 'zhongguojie' yu

- 'Taiwanjie': ziwo rending yu tonghun guannian de fenxi (The 'Chinese Complex' and 'Taiwanese Complex' of University Students: An Analysis of Self-Identification and Intermarriage Concepts)." *Zhongguo Luntan (China Tribune)* 289:34-53.
- Chen, I-te Edward. 1984. "The Attempt to Integrate the Empire: Legal Perspectives." In *The Japanese colonial empire, 1895-1945*, ed. R. H. Myers, M. R. Peattie, J. Zhen and Joint Committee on Japanese Studies. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Chen, Tsui-lien. 2008. *Taiwanren de dikang yu rentong, 1920-50* Taipei: Yuanliu.
- Cheng, Tun-jen 1989. "Democratizing the Quasi-Lennist Regime in Taiwan." *World Politics* 41 (July):471-99.
- Cheng, Tun-jen, and Stephan Haggard, eds. 1992. *Political Change in Taiwan*. Boulder Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Ching, Leo. 2001. *Becoming Japanese: Colonial Taiwan and the Poltiics of Identity Formation*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Chou, Yangsun, and Andrew J. Nathan. 1987. "Democratizing Transition in Taiwan." *Asian Survey* 27 (3):277-99.
- Chu, Yun-han. 2004. "Taiwan's National Identity Politics and The Prospect of Cross-Strait Relations." *Asian Survey* 44 (4):484-512.
- Chu, Yun-han, and Jih-wen Lin. 2001. "Political Development in the 20th century Taiwan: State building, Regime Transformation and the Construction of National Identity." *The China Quarterly* 165:102-29.
- Ciaran, Cronin. 2003. "Democracy and Collective Identity." *The European Journal of Philosophy* 11 (1):1-28.
- Connor, Walker. 1978. "A nation is a nation, is a state, is an ethnic group, is a... ." *Ethnic and racial studies* 1:377-400.
- . 1994. *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Corcuff, Stephane. 2002. "The Symbolic Dimension of Democatization and the Transition of National Identity under Lee Teng-hui." In *Memories of the Future: National Idneity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan*, ed. S. Corcuff. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.
- . 2004. *Fenghe rinuan. Taiwan Wwaishengren yu quojia rentong de zhuanbian (Ligt wind, warm sun.Taiwan's Mainlanders and the National Identity Transition)*. Taipei: Yunchen Wenhua.
- Cronin, Ciaran 2003. "Democracy and Collective Identity: In Defense of Constitutional Patriotism." *European Journal of Philosophy* 11 (1):1-28.
- Deutsch, K. 1988. *The Analysis of International Relations*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Dittmer, Lowell. 2005. "Taiwan's Aim-Inhibited Quest for Identity and the China Factor." *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 40 (1/2):71-90.
- Emerson, Rupert. 1954. "Paradox of Asian Nationalism." *Journal of Asian Studies* 13 (2):131-42.
- . 1967. *From Empire to Nation*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Fitzgerald, John. 1996. *Awakening China : politics, culture, and class in the Nationalist Revolution*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Fix, L. Douglas. 1993. *Taiwanese Nationalism and Its Late Colonial Context*, Department

- of History, University of California at Berkeley.
- Geertz, Clifford. 1973. *The interpretation of cultures; selected essays*. New York: Basic Books.
- Gellner, Ernest 1983. *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
- Giuliano, Elise. 2000. Paths to the Decline of Nationalism: Ethnic Politics in the Republics of Russia, Department of Political Science, The University of Chicago.
- Gong, Ming-hsin. 2011. "liangan jingmao de jihui yu taiozhan (The Opportunity and Challenge of the Cross-Strait Economic Tie and Trade)." In *Two Decades of Straits Exchange Foundation and Win-win for Two Sides of the Strait*. Taipei.
- Greenfeld, Liah. 1992. *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.
- . 1993. "Nationalism and Democracy: the Nature of the Relationship and the Case of England, France, and Russia " *Research on Democracy and Society* vol. 327-351.
- Guo shi guan, ed. 2000. *Yi ge Zhongguo lun shu shi liao hui bian (One China Discourse)*. Vol. 1. Taipei: Guo shi guan.
- Habermas, Jurgen. 1996. "Citizenship and National Identity." In *Between Facts and Norms*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Ho, Szu-yin, and I-Chou Liu. 2002. "The Taiwanese/Chinese identity of the Taiwan People." *American Asian Review* 20 (2):29-74.
- Hobsbawm, E. J. 1990. *Nations and nationalism since 1780 : programme, myth, reality*. Cambridge [England] ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hobsbawm, Eric, and Terence Ranger. 1983. "The Invention of tradition." Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hsiau, A-chin. 1999. "1980 niandai yilai Taiwan wenhua minzu zhuyi de fazhan: yi 'Taiwan (minzu) wenxue' weizhu de fenxi (The Development of Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism since the 1980s)." *Taiwan shehuixue yanjiu (Taiwan Sociology Research)* 3:1-51.
- . 2000. *Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism*. London: Routledge.
- Hsieh, John Fuh-sheng, and M.S. Emerson Niou. 2005. "Measuring Taiwanese Public Opinion on Taiwanese Independence " *The China Quarterly* 181:158-68.
- Hughes, Christopher. 1997. *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: National identity and status in international society*. New York: Routledge.
- Huntington, Samuel. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Pres.
- Hutchinson, John, and Anthony D. Smith. 1994. *Nationalism*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.
- Isaacs, Harold R. 1975. *Idols of the tribe : group identity and political change*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Jiang, Yi-huah. 1998. *zhiou zuyi minzu zhuyi yu guojia rentong (Liberalism, Nationalism, and National Identity)*. Taipei: Yangzi wenhua.
- Johnson, Charlmers. 1962. *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China 1937-1945*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
- Keng, Shu, Cha-Wei Liu, and Lu-Hui Chen. 2009. "Dapo weichi xianzhuang de misi: Taiwan minzhong tongdu xuanze zhong linian yu shiwu de liangan (Between Principle and Pragmatism: The Unification-Independence Choice of the Taiwan

- People)." *Taiwan zhengzhi xuekan (Taiwanese Political Science Review)* 13 (2):3-56.
- Kohn, Hans. 1945. *The idea of nationalism : a study in its origins and background*. New York: Macmillan Co.
- . 1956. *Nationalism and Liberty: The Swiss Example*. London: George Allen & Unwin.
- . 1957. *American Nationalism: An Interpretive Essay*. Westport CT: Greenwood Press.
- Kymlicka, Will. 1999. "Misunderstanding Nationalism." In *Theorizing Nationalism*, ed. R. Beiner. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Lai, Tse-han, Raymond Myers, and Wou Wei. 1991. *A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Laitin, David D. 1998. *Identity in formation : the Russian-speaking populations in the near abroad*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Lamley, Harry. 1970-1971. "Assimilation Efforts in Colonial Taiwan: The Fate of the 1914 Movement." *Monumenta Serica* XXIX.
- Lin, Cha-Long. 1998. *Paths to Democracy: Taiwan in Comparative Perspective*, Department of Political Science, Yale University.
- Lin, Chia-lung. 2000. "The Political Formation of Taiwanese Nationalism." In *Memories of the Future: National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan*, ed. S. Corcuff. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.
- Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. 1992. "Political Identities and Electoral Sequences: Spain, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia." *Daedalus* 121 (2):123-39.
- . 1996. *Problems of democratic transition and consolidation : southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Linz, Juan J., Alfred Stepan, and Yogendra Yadav. 2007. "'Nation State' or 'State Nation?': India in Comparative Perspective." In *Democracy and Diversity: India and the American Experience*, ed. K. S. Bajpai. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Marsh, Robert. 2002. "National Identity and Ethnicity in Taiwan." In *Memories of the Future: National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan*, ed. S. Corcuff. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe.
- Marx, Anthony W. 1998. *Making Race and Nation: A Comparison of South Africa, the United States, and Brazil*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2003. *Faith in Nation: Exclusionary Origins of Nationalism*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Mill, John S. . 1952. "Representative Government." Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica.
- Miller, David. 1995. *On Nationality*. New York: Oxford University.
- . 2000. *Citizenship and National Identity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Moon, Sangseok. 2008. *Mechanism of Mass Mobilization and Creating State Citizens During the Economic Development Period: A Case Study of South Korea*, Sociology, The University of Texas at Austin
- Muller, Jan-Werner. 2007. *Constitutional Patriotism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press
- Munro, Ross M. 1992. "Wakening Dragon: The Real Danger in Asia is From China." *Policy Review*.

- Niou, Emerson M.S. 2004. "Understanding Taiwan Independence and Its Political Implications " *Asian Survey* 44 (4):555-67.
- . 2005. "A New Measure of Preferences on the Independence-Unification Issue in Taiwan." *Journal of Asian and Africa Studies* 40:91-104.
- Przeworski, Adam. 1991. *Democracy and the market : political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Qi, Dongtao. 2012. "Divergent Popular Support for the DPP and the Taiwanese Independence Movement, 2000-2012." *Journal of Contemporary China* 21 (78):973-91.
- Rejai, Mostafa, and Enloe H. Cynthia. 1969. "Nation-States and State-Nations." *International Studies Quarterly* 13 (2):140-58.
- Renan, Ernest. 1990. "What is a Nation." In *Nation and Narration*, ed. H. K. Bhabha. London: Routledge.
- Rigger, Shelley. 1999/2000. "Social Science and National Identity: A Critique." *Pacific Affairs* 72 (4):537-52.
- . 2000. "Taiwan's Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and "Taiwanese Nationalism"." *Policy Studies* 26.
- Roeder, Philip G. 2007. *Where nation-states come from : institutional change in the age of nationalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Rustow, Dankwart A. 1970. "Transition to Democracy: A Dynamic Model." *Comparative Politics* 2 (3):337-63.
- Scott, James C. 1990. *Domination and the arts of resistance : hidden transcripts*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Shen, Shiau-chi. 2010. "gutu yu jiauan: tan siuo waishengren guojia rentong de liang ge nei han (Fatherland and Homeland: Exploring the two components of mainlanders' national identity)." In *Guojia yu rentong: yi xie waishengren de guan dian (Nation and Identity: Perspectives of some waishengren)* ed. M. Chang. Taipei: qiongxue.
- Shen, Shiau-chi, and Nai-teh Wu. 2008. "Ethnic and Civic Nationalisms: Two Roads to the Formation of a Taiwanese Nation " In *The "One China" Dilemma*, ed. P. C. Chow. New York: Palgrave.
- Shyu, Hao-yan. 1996. "Taiwan xuanmin de guojia rentong yu dangpai toupiao xingwei : 1991 zhi 1993 nianjian de shizheng yanjiu jieguo (National Identity and Partisan Vote-Choices in Taiwan: Evidence from Survey Data between 1991 and 1993) ." *Taiwan zhengzhixue kan (Taiwanese Political Science Review)* 1:85-128.
- Smith, Anthony D. 1983a. "Book Review: Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism!" *Millennium*:280-82.
- . 1983b. *State and Nation in the Third World: The Western State and African Nationalism*. Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books LTD.
- . 1986. *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- . 1991. *National identity*. Reno: University of Nevada Press.
- Snyder, Jack. 2000. *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*. New York: W.W.Norton.
- Stepan, Alfred C., Juan J. Linz, and Yogendra Yadav. 2010. *Crafting State-Nations : India and other multinational democracies*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University

- Press.
- Tien, Hung-Mao, ed. 1996. *Taiwan's Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave*. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe.
- Wachman, Alan M. 1994a. "Competing Identities in Taiwan." In *The Other Taiwan: 1945 to the Present* ed. M. A. Rubinstein. New York and London: An East Gate Book.
- . 1994b. *Taiwan: national identity and democratization*. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.
- Wakabayashi, Masatake. 1994. *Taiwan: Fenlie Guojia yu Minzhuhua (Taiwan: Divided State and Democratization)*. Translated by J.-z. 洪. Hong and P.-x. 許. Xu. Taipei: Yuedan Press.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel, ed. 1966. *Social Change: the Colonial Situation*. New York, Sydney: John Wiley & Sons.
- Wang, Fu-chang. 1996. "Taiwan Fandui Yundong de Gongshi Dongyuan: 1979 -1989 Liangci Tiaozhan de Bijiao (Consensus Mobilization of the Political Oppoitoin in Taiwan: Comparing To Waves of Challenges, 1979-1989)." *Taiwan zhengzhixue kan (Taiwanese Political Science Review)* 1:129-210.
- . 1998. "Zuqun Yishi, Minzu Zhuyi, yu Zhengdang Zhichi: 1990 Niandai Taiwan de Zuqun Zhengzhi (Ethic Consciousness, Nationalism, and Pary Politics: Ethnic Politics in Taiwan in the 1990s)." *Taiwan Shehuixue Yanjiu (Taiwanese Sociological Review)* 2:1-45.
- Wang, Ja-Ing, and Tong-Wen Sun. 1996. "Guozu Rentong de Jiegou yu Chonggou: Taiwan Dangqian de Zhuti Jingyan (The Deconstruction and Reconstruction of National Identity: Tawain's Current Subjective Experience)." *Zhengzhi Kexue Luncong (Political Science Review)* 7:321-54.
- Wang, T.Y., and I-chou Liu. 2004. "Contending Identities in Taiwan: Implication for Cross-Strait Relations." *Asian Survey* 44 (4):568-90.
- Weber, Marx. 1978. *Economy and Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Wu, Nai-teh. 1993. "Guojia rentong yu zhengdang zhichi: Taiwan zhengdang jingzhng de shehui jichu (Party Support And National Identities: Social Cleavages and Party Competition in Taiwan)." *Zhongyang yanjiuyuan minzuxue yanjiusuo jika (Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica)* 74:33-61.
- . 1996. "Zhiyou Zhuyi han Zuqun Rentong: Souxun Taiwan Minzu Zhuyi de Yishi Xingtai Jichu (Liberalism, Ethnic Identity and Taiwanese Nationalism)." *Taiwan zhengzhixue kan (Taiwanese Political Science Review)* 1:5-39.
- . 2002a. "Rentong chongtu yu zhengzhi xinren: xianjieduan Taiwan zuqun zhengzhi de hexin nanti (Identity Conflict and Political Trust)." *Taiwan shehuixue ken (Taiwanese Sociology)* 4:75-118.
- . 2005a. "Aiqing yu mianbao: tance Taiwan minzhong guojia rentong de biandong ( Bread and Love: Exploring National Identity Change of Taiwan's Public) ." *Taiwan zhengzhixue kan (Taiwanese Political Science Review)* 9 (2):5-39.
- . 2012. "Will Economic Integration Lead to Political Assimilation?" In *National Identity and Economic Interest: Taiwan's Competing Options and Its Implication for Regional Stability*, ed. P. Chow. New York: Palgrave.
- Wu, Nai-teh, and Tun-jen Cheng. 2011. "Democratization as a Legitimacy Formula: The KMT and Political Change in Taiwan." In *Political Legitimacy in Asia:*

- Challenges for Leaders*, ed. J. Kane and H. Patapan. New York: Palgrave.
- Wu, Rwei-Ren. 2001. "Taiwan bixushi tairan de Taiwan (Taiwan Must Belong to Taiwanese - the Discourses of Anti-colonial Struggles and Taiwanese Nation-State, 1919-1923)." In *Minzu zhuyi yu liangan guanxi (Nationalism and Cross-Strait relations)* ed. C.-L. Lin and Y. Zheng. Taipei: Xin Ziran.
- . 2002b. "Toward a Pragmatic Nationalism: Democratization and Taiwan's Passive Revolution " In *Memories of the Future: National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan*, ed. S. Corcuff. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.
- . 2003. *The Formosan Ideology: Oriental Colonialism and the Rise of Taiwanese Nationalism, 1895-1945*, Political Science, University of Chicago.
- Wu, Zhuoliu. 2005b. *Orphan of Asia*. Translated by I. Mentzas. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Yack, Bernard. 1996. "The Myth of the Civic Nation." *Critical Review* 10 (2):193-211.
- You, Ying-lung. 1996. "Taiwan Zuqun Rentong de Zhengzhi Xinli Fenxi (Ethnic Identity and Political Cognition: An Analysis of Taiwanese Voters)." *Taiwan zhenghixue ken (Taiwanese Political Science Review)* 1:41-84.