Empire Displaced: Ottoman-Habsburg Forced Migration and the Near Eastern Crisis,
1875-1878

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ABSTRACT

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This dissertation examines the case of 250-300,000 largely Orthodox Christian refugees who fled Ottoman Bosnia and Hercegovina for the Habsburg Empire during the uprisings of 1875-1878. The violence during this period started out as a peasant uprising, but over the course of three years cascaded into revolts and violence across the Ottoman Balkans and led to a major European diplomatic crisis. The Treaty of Berlin of 1878, which ended the violence, reconfigured the political geography of the Balkans, making the former Ottoman provinces of Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia independent; giving a sweeping autonomy to Bulgaria, and handing over to Austria-Hungary the administration of a nominally Ottoman Bosnia and Hercegovina. Refugees played an under-appreciated role in the international and domestic politics of the period, and this dissertation argues that forced migration was in fact one of the key considerations of Great Power diplomacy. Forced migration offered a means to measure degree of violence, and control over population movement offered a way for empires to lay claims to legitimacy. In a similar manner, philanthropists and international humanitarians used forced migration to build and advocate for their own civic spheres. The dissertation argues that during this period,
the modern category of “refugee” was defined as states developed processes to manage refugees domestically and to create international policies for refugee aid and return.
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Over the course of the summer and fall of 1875, a series of small skirmishes between Orthodox Christian peasants and their Muslims landlords in the southern reaches of Ottoman Hercegovina gradually coalesced, strengthened, and expanded into an organized insurgency that quickly extended across Hercegovina, and then, by mid-August, spread to Bosnia. In the following three years, the insurgency in Bosnia and Hercegovina fluctuated in strength and influence, but failed—despite the efforts of numerous activists and the interventions of neighboring states and empires—to develop a coherent ideology or unified nationalist agenda. What began as a peasant uprising protesting high taxes, bureaucratic venality and perceived injustice made worse by a bad harvest never entirely lost the disarray of its humble beginnings. Various leaders and groups never fully agreed on basic questions over the legitimacy of Ottoman rule, the position of the Muslim elite and landowners, or the role and influence of neighboring Serbia, Montenegro, or Austria-Hungary.

The uprisings also triggered a series of larger, more violent events in the Ottoman Balkans: April 1876 saw a Bulgarian nationalist uprising in the Ottoman Danube province, followed by the so-called Bulgarian Horrors; in July 1876 war broke out

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between Serbia, Montenegro, and the Ottoman Empire; and in April 1877 the Russian Empire declared war against the Ottomans. When the final peace was settled in 1878, Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro all won true independence, Bulgaria a near-independent autonomy, and Bosnia and Hercegovina were placed under Austro-Hungarian administration while the Sultan retained nominal sovereignty. The Berlin Treaty of 1878 discarded the post-Crimean War commitment to non-intervention in Ottoman domestic affairs and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, replacing those principles with the recognition of successor states, military occupation, and European administration of Ottoman territories. Although the Ottoman flag still flew in large parts of the Balkans, after the Berlin Treaty the majority of the Ottoman Balkans—"Turkey in Europe"—ceased to exist.

The violence that remapped the peninsula’s political geography also fundamentally altered its demographics. Forced population displacement and the death of non-combatants reached a level unprecedented in modern European history. Forced migration began with the early days of the violence in Hercegovina, and over the three years, some 250,000 mainly Orthodox Christians took flight from Bosnia and Hercegovina—amounting to about one fifth of the provinces’ total population and nearly one half of the Orthodox population. Tens of thousands of these refugees went to Serbia and Montenegro; in Montenegro especially refugees from Hercegovina took part in the war

2 Montenegro, while part of the Ottoman Empire, had never really been incorporated into it. Romania and Serbia had been under Ottoman suzerainty since the 1860s. Serbia paid tribute to the Sultan, but the last Ottoman garrison withdrew from the Belgrade fortress of Kalemegdan in early 1867. Leften Stavros Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453 (New York: Rinehart & Company, 1958). 257.
against the Ottoman Empire. The vast majority of the refugees from Bosnia and Hercegovina, however, fled to the Austro-Hungarian provinces of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia, where they were incorporated into a massive, state-run, refugee-aid project. Elsewhere in the Balkans, most notably in the Danube and Edirne provinces that would become Bulgaria, by 1877 the opposite movement could be seen, but to a much greater extreme. During the Russian-Ottoman war of 1877-1878, perhaps 1.5 million Muslims fled the provinces, going deeper into the Ottoman Empire and often being resettled in Anatolia. Another 250-300,000 Muslims from the Eastern Balkans are thought to have died. Displacement took place across the entire Balkans during these years, just as civilian death and forced migration was endemic to the Ottoman/Russian front in the eastern Ottoman Empire.

Nevertheless, the subject of this dissertation is this first group of refugees—the Christians of Bosnia and Hercegovina and their flight, mainly to Austria-Hungary. While significantly smaller than the mass of Bulgarian refugees, the case of refugees from Bosnia and Hercegovina presents a unique set of circumstances that plots a transitional moment in the history of the refugee and asylum and, more broadly, the idea of “population politics.” By looking at the refugee question of 1875-1878 from the vantage of state-run refugee aid, civic activism and humanitarian aid, and the development of


both domestic and international refugee policies, this dissertation argues that refugees offered states and civic groups not just challenges, but opportunities. The large number of refugees posed a wide range of security, financial, public health, and domestic political problems to the Habsburg Empire in particular, and the refugees’ very existence was an indictment of the Ottoman Empire’s ability to rule its European provinces. Refugees stood as the international face of an insurgency that the Ottoman government insisted was domestic. Even though it quickly became clear that insurgents were using Habsburg territory to stage their operations, that large sections of the Habsburg public along the border actively supported the insurgency, and that weapons and supplies were being smuggled to the insurgency across Habsburg territory often with the support of local Habsburg officials, refugees came to be understood as a measure of the Ottoman’s failure to govern. At the same time that the flight of refugees was direct evidence of the weakening of Ottoman domestic legitimacy, the refugees also endangered the Ottoman’s diplomatic legitimacy among Europe’s Great Powers by internationalizing a domestic disturbance and endangering Ottoman commitments to the equal protection of its subjects under the terms of the 1856 Treaty of Paris.\footnote{The importance of the Treaty of Paris will be discussed below, but the articles of interest are seven and nine: Article VII: Admission of the Sublime Porte into the European System. Guarantee of Independence of Ottoman Empire. Her majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, His Majesty the Emperor of the French, His Majesty the King of Prussia, His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, and His Majesty the King of Sardinia, declare the Sublime Porte admitted to participate in the advantages of the public law and system (Concert) of Europe. Their Majesties engage, each on his part, to respect the Independence and the Territorial Integrity of the Ottoman Empire; Guarantee in common the strict observance of that engagement; and will, in consequence, consider any act tending to its violation as a question of general interest. Article IX: Amelioration of Condition of Christian Population of Ottoman Empire. His Imperial Majesty the Sultan having, in his constant solicitude for the welfare of his subjects, issued a Firman, which, while ameliorating their conditions without distinction of Religion or Race, records his generous intentions towards the Christian population of his Empire, and wishing to give a further proof of his sentiments in that respect, has resolved to communicate to the Contracting Parties the said Firman, emanating spontaneously from his Sovereign Will.}
In important respects, the circumstances of flight for the Bosnian and Hercegovinian refugees of 1875-1878 are similar to those from subsequent forced migrations in the late nineteenth and in the twentieth century. These were mass movements, for example, and people fled out of fear of violence rather than because of political beliefs; confession as a presumed marker of state loyalty (and increasingly as a marker of national identity) was also a factor. Yet the scholarly study of refugees has largely neglected late nineteenth and even early twentieth century mass refugee movements, instead seeing the nineteenth century as an era of political refugees, and the phenomenon of mass refugee displacement as a subject properly belonging to the era following the Great War.

This view is to some extent a function of genealogy. The scholarly study of mass refugees effectively began at the end of the interwar period, was largely engaged with political questions, and was shaped by urgent issues of nationalism, minorities, state-formation, and sovereignty. In the post-war period, scholarly attention increasingly turned to refugee movements in the “third world,” and came from a widening range of disciplines, including sociology, anthropology, demography, and political science, not to mention from aid workers, policy-makers and other practitioners. This is the scholarly

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*Non-interference of Allies in Internal Affairs of Ottoman Empire*. The Contracting Powers recognise the high value of this communication. It is clearly understood that it cannot, in any case, give to the said Powers the right to interfere, either collectively or separately, in the relations of His Majesty the Sultan with his subjects, nor in the Internal Administration of his Empire.


6 The turn to the third world was slow to come. It is often assumed that the European post-war refugee crisis was globalized in the 1960s, after it was essentially solved in Europe and, not coincidently, when de-colonization was in full swing. Pamela Ballinger points out, however, that the refugee question was “already global in nature” in the early postwar period, with displacement stretching from “from Europe to Palestine to India to eastern Asia and beyond.” Pamela Ballinger, “Entangled or ‘Extruded’ Histories?
community that makes up the new, not entirely coherent, field of refugee studies.\textsuperscript{7} As a consequence of the disciplinary breadth, the literature on the refugee and “refugeedom” is vast.\textsuperscript{8} The specifically historical literature of the refugee and refugeedom is limited, however, and until recently it has mainly been political scientists who have written that history. Nevertheless, there has been a highly productive scholarly discussion, shifting from an interwar focus on legal and definitional problems seeking an international legal solution to the contemporary crisis to a post-war interrogation of the refugee, the nation-state, sovereignty, and international institutions.\textsuperscript{9}

Hannah Arendt’s is likely the most famous of the post-war analyses of the refugee problem. Her work ties the selfish agendas of new nation-states and what she saw as a bankrupt interwar legal framework to the dependency of individuals’ human rights on the whims of the nation-state, and therefore how the condition of rightlessness accompanied that of statelessness. Implicitly criticizing much of the interwar and immediate postwar writing, she argues that states’ main concern was how to resolve refugees’ legal status so that they might be deported. Arendt’s view of refugees as an international pathology has, along with the nation-state context, become a central assumption for much of the top-

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\textsuperscript{7} Malkki sees refugee studies emerging in particular from international relations, international organization, and development studies Liisa H. Malkki, “Refugees and Exile: From ‘Refugee Studies’ to the National Order of Things,” \textit{Annual Review of Anthropology} 24(1995).
\end{flushright}

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\textsuperscript{8} I take the term “refugeedom” from Peter Gatrell’s excellent work on refugees in the Russian Empire. Peter Gatrell, \textit{A Whole Empire Walking: Refugees in Russia during World War I} (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005). 4.
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\textsuperscript{9} Typical of the interwar genre is Louise Holborn, “Legal Status of Political Refugees, 1920-1938,” \textit{American Journal of International Law} 32, no. 4 (1938). There were also many quantitative studies designed to help prepare for repatriation, devise aid schemes, etc. See for example Eugene M. Kulischer, \textit{The Displacement of Population in Europe} (Montreal: International Labour Office; P.S. King & Staples, Ltd., 1943).
\end{flushright}
down work on the refugee. The not-so-neatly bifurcated approach to the question of the refugee takes as its starting point either the question of nation-states and national sovereignty, or the functioning of an international “refugee regime.”

Historians have largely adopted these positions and are producing a body of work that examines the ways in which forced migration—or, especially since the wars of Yugoslav succession, what is frequently called “ethnic cleansing”—has been not only the result of the disasters and upheavals of war, but also put to political use in the creation of nation states. At the same time, increasing interest in the history of international organizations has yielded work on the League of Nations’ involvement in refugee affairs, as well as a growing body of work looking at the role of refugees and the establishment

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10 Claudena Skran, for example, is less interested in refugees per se than she is in their value in testing the efficacy of the League of Nations as an international regime; Aristide Zolberg and others have looked at them in the context of nation-state production, and more recently, Emma Haddad has advanced the argument by dispensing with the notion of refugeedom as a pathology, and simply a constitutive element of state-generation. Claudena M. Skran, Refugees in Inter-War Europe: The Emergence of a Regime (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Aristide R. Zolberg, Astrid Suhrke, and Sergio Aguayo, Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Emma Haddad, The Refugee in International Society: Between Sovereigns, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

of international organizations during post-war European reconstruction. A third approach, still in the making, is social-historical. Drawing off of work by anthropologists and sociologists, this work tries to analyze the social and cultural effect of displacement while getting at the subjective experience of refugees themselves.

Almost entirely absent from this work is a discussion of nineteenth century refugees; when they are mentioned, factual inaccuracies and a narrow focus on the European experience leave little solid ground for traction. There are of course some good reasons for drawing a line between nineteenth and twentieth century refugees. The former are, for example, best known as exiles of conscience rather than victims of their own faith or nationality. Yet the post-1848 neo-absolutism in central Europe effectively ended the era of the political refugee, and the period thereafter remains under-examined.


13 Peter Gatrell is the best know practitioner and advocate of this work. From the social sciences, the anthropologist Liisa Malkki has been most influential.

14 For Nevzat Soguk, “refugees remained unimportant or were of little or no concern to the host countries, for they did not represent any drastic disruptions for the host countries. This was to last until the first quarter of the twentieth century [...]” Claudena Skran dismisses the importance of earlier movements because it was only in the twentieth century that refugee movements “attracted the attention of political leaders and became international issues.” Nevzat Soguk, *States and Strangers: Refugees and Displacements of Statecraft*, Borderlines (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999). 63.; Skran, *Refugees in Inter-War Europe: The Emergence of a Regime*: 13. This view oversimplifies the status, nature and type of European refugees in the nineteenth century. It also completely disregards the mass movements of Muslims from the expanding Russian Empire to the Ottoman Empire throughout the nineteenth century. Whether these people were refugees or subjects of a “population transfer” as Mark Pinson states would be an arguable question, but it is never raised. Mark Pinson, “Demographic Warfare: An Aspect of Ottoman and Russian Policy, 1854-1866” (Dissertation, Harvard, 1970).

15 One of the few good studies of nineteenth century continental refugee policies is Herbert Reiter, *Politisches Asyl im 19. Jahrhundert*, Historische Forschungen (Berlin: Duncker & Humboldt, 1992). Sylvia Hahn’s article, while instructive, relies mainly on Reiter’s findings. Sylvia Hahn, “... über die Grenze
of World War I obscures the story of forced migration in this earlier era, and reinforces the idea of the refugee largely as a problem of the nation-state—a problem that policymakers sought to solve by establishing international institutions and creating a regime.

This dissertation suggests, however, that the modernity of the mass refugee should not be seen exclusively as a phenomenon of the nation-state, or even as a sign of the inevitable end of the imperial system and the fragmentation of empires into new nation states. Instead, the refugee was also a tool for imperial legitimacy both internationally and domestically. Where the interwar refugee question came under the auspices and control of new international organizations under the League of Nations, the refugees from Bosnia and Hercegovina were inscribed into treaty law and the subject of high diplomacy, and their simple existence posed a threat to the international status of the Ottoman Empire in the European system. Returning and resettling the refugees in their villages would be incontestable evidence for the re-establishment of Ottoman central government legitimacy in provinces that had a long tradition of rebelling against central government rule. By the same token, at the end of the three-year uprising, the question of refugee return was also strong evidence in the Habsburg case for occupying and

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16 Seymour Martin Lipset points out that a “crisis of legitimacy is a crisis of change,” and while he discusses it in the context of democratic societies, his very useful Weberian take on legitimacy is germane to the Ottoman (and subsequently Habsburg) situation in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Legitimacy, argues Lipset, involves “the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society.” Seymour Martin Lipset, “Social Conflict, Legitimacy, and Democracy,” in Legitimacy and the State, ed. William Connolly (New York: New York University Press, 1984). Clark points out that domestic legitimacy has always contained an international aspect and vice-versa; he sees as an essential aspect of international legitimacy what Dunne calls “rules for identifying who gets to count as a member” and “what conduct is appropriate.” See Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). Also Tim Dunne, “Sociological Investigations: Instrumental, Legitimist, and Coerceive Interpretations of International Society,” Millennium 30, no. 1 (2001). Cited in Clark.
administering the Ottoman provinces. Furthermore, woven into these claims for refugee control as an index of legitimate rule was another thread—that of civic activism. The refugee cause created a series of unique opportunities in Habsburg civic life that expanded the activities of local philanthropists, activists, and nation-builders, while also providing unprecedented access to the world of international humanitarianism. For local activists, humanitarianism provided a powerful new language with which to argue a case that questioned the legitimacy of imperial government altogether.

Despite the continuities that can be seen between the later nineteenth-century mass refugees and those of the interwar, fundamental differences in both the larger contexts and immediate circumstances of flight must be noted. Large-scale refugee movements stretched back well before the uprising in Bosnia and Hercegovina, of course. Europe had not infrequently seen civilian populations abandon their lives and fortunes to flee armed violence, and empires had a long tradition of forcing mass population movements. Even the Habsburg military border (Militärgrenze) in Croatia-Slavonia and Dalmatia was peopled with Orthodox Christian refugees whom the Habsburg state had settled along the border to defend against Ottoman military attacks and, as required, to turn their military defenses against pestilence and disease by maintaining a 1,000km cordon sanitaire. Yet

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17 Recent contemporary examples included a total of around 130,000 refugees during the Franco-Prussian war, along with the death of some 20,000, arrest of an additional 35,000 and the flight of another 45,000 Parisian communards in 1871. See Haddad, The Refugee in International Society: Between Sovereigns: 56. Also Michael R. Marrus, The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985). 24.

18 On the military border, see the classic English-language study Gunther Erich Rothenberg, The Military Border in Croatia, 1740-1881: A Study of an Imperial Institution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966). Much greater detail, especially on the earlier development of the border and its economic and social aspects is in Karl Kaser, Freier Bauer und Soldat: die Militarisierung der agrarischen Gesellschaft und der kroatisch-slawanischen Militärgrenze (1535-1881), Zur Kunde Südosteuropas (Wien: Böhlau, 1997). The essays in Dragutin Pavličević, ed. Vojna Krajina: Povijesni Pregled-Historiografija-Rasprave (Zagreb: 1984) are also useful. The role of the military border as a cordon sanitaire is of no small importance to the development of the infrastructure of border control, and the Habsburg ability to police its border with the
Fikret Adanır’s observation that even though the Ottoman Empire “pursued an active population politics that did not exclude the forced displacement of entire population groups [...] ethnically or religiously homogeneous structures could hardly form the goal of imperial population politics,” largely holds true for other empires in the nineteenth century.\(^{19}\) Indeed, despite the religious confession of the great majority of the refugees from Bosnia and Hercegovina, they cannot easily be categorized as what the refugee scholar Aristide Zolberg calls the “classic type”—refugees who fled either as a result of political activity or because they belonged to a group the state singled out for persecution.\(^{20}\) Instead, they most closely resemble a third category Zolberg describes: the “refugee as mere victim [...] displaced by societal or international violence that is not necessarily directed at them as individuals but makes life in their own country impossible.”\(^{21}\) Zolberg’s are the categories of international regimes and political science. The reality of refugee identity was, and remains, more complicated—even if the idea of the refugee as a political dissident has receded (although not entirely vanished) since the


\(^{20}\) Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo, Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World: 30.

\(^{21}\) Ibid.
end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, whatever the reasons for flight, the common thread in the general understanding of the refugee is as a “mere victim.”

Victimhood as the primary or even exclusive characteristic of the refugee is new. Goethe described a “sorry train of exiles [...] in the hot dust of mid-day” in the opening lines of *Hermann and Dorothea*, but his *Conversations of German Refugees*, hosted by the elegant Baroness von C., is more *Decameron* than it is conversations among Displaced Persons in United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration camps after World War II. The dominant ideal type of refugee-as-victim took hold, I argue, during the period 1875-1878 in a process that involved both the concrete application of policies, the wranglings of diplomacy, a struggle to define and control the rhetoric of displacement, and the meaning of and legitimate responses to victimhood. Ironically for a set of conflicts in which Christian European intervention was in part predicated on the idea of Balkan Christians suffering under the “Ottoman Yoke,” the refining of the refugee experience into the pure crystal of victimhood began with the Christians of Bosnia and Hercegovina, but was perfected by the mass flight of Bulgarian Muslims ahead of the Russian army and from Bulgarian *chetas* in 1877. Small but active with the start of the Bosnian and Hercegovinian refugee movements, foreign voluntary aid groups multiplied in size and activity in response to the Bulgarian events. With the permission of their

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23 Groups such as the “Bosnian and Herzegovinian Fugitives and Orphan Relief Fund” started not long after the outbreak of violence; later British organizations more closely resembled the old London Greek Committee. The publication of Gladstone’s pamphlet on the “Bulgarian Horrors” mobilized large sections of British society in particular; the killings also helped to mobilize the Russian population, which raised money to aid Balkan Christians, and eventually sent large numbers of volunteers—including a decorated war hero—to fight Ottoman forces in Serbia. B. H. Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans* (London: Archon Books, 1962). 156-59, 94.
home governments, members of Istanbul’s foreign diplomatic corps became deeply involved in the management of volunteers and distribution of aid.  

Images published in the foreign press illustrate the before and after. Figure A, originally published in the Graphic magazine, is “Herzegovinian Refugees at Ragusa.” Figure B, originally published in Zimmerman’s Geschichte des orientalischen Krieges von 1876-1878, tells an intimate story of suffering—women and a baby, the weak of the world, set among cold mountains and predatory nature. Figure C completes the triptych: the quantity, not quality, of trainloads of refugees gives the image force.

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24 For a Habsburg example, see Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv/HHStA (Vienna). PA XII box 126, Zichy to Andrássy 23 I 1878.

25 The role of the press and especially imagery in the creation of the humanitarian sentiment has been long-discussed and figures into the discussion of many specific instances; broader discussions can be found in Thomas Laqueur, “Bodies, Details, and the Humanitarian Narrative,” in The New Cultural History, ed. Lynn Hunt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). See also Susan Sontag, On Photography (New York: Picador, 2001) as well as her subsequent revision in Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others (New York: Picador, 2004).


27 Dorothy Anderson, Miss Irby and Her Friends (London: Hutchinson, 1966).
None of the above argument is to deny real suffering, to deny that for centuries before the uprising the suffering of displacement had gone unrecognized, or to claim that from the very start of the uprising refugeedom didn’t also involve victimhood. Austro-Hungarian authorities periodically interviewed the Bosnians and Hercegovinians as they crossed over to Habsburg territory, and the refugees’ narratives are dotted with persecution misery. This dissertation works directly with some transcripts of these interviews from 1876; Ilija Kecmanović has published transcripts (translated from German into Bosnian) of Habsburg interviews of refugees in fall 1875. The interviews themselves were highly programmatic, and judging from the repeated use of set phrases and stock descriptions, the transcripts reflect the interpretations of the interviewer and stenographer as much as the descriptions of the individual refugee. Nevertheless, within weeks after it started, the violence had escalated to such a point it is clear that fear for life and property was very real. Not clear from the transcripts—though quite clear by 1876—is the extent to which refugees were fleeing violence directed at them by the insurgents themselves.

The refugee movements of 1875-1878 came with a rapidity and were of a size for which there was no precedent in modern Europe (as will be discussed below, this was not the case in the Ottoman Empire). Consequently, there was no institutional infrastructure for managing the refugees and containing the political fallout from such a mass migration. There were however standards of management based on custom at the border and international law. Borderland practice kept largely to the framework of the

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28 Ilija Kecmanović, Izjave bosanskih izbjeglica o razlozima njihovog bjegstva iz Bosne u avgustu i septembru 1875. godine: (građa iz državnog arhiva u Zagrebu), Naučno društvo SR Bosne i Hercegovine (Sarajevo: S.n., 1964). Copies of the originals exist in both the Vienna Kriegsarchiv/KA and the Hrvatski Državni Arhiv/HDA.

29 See the discussion in Chapter Three.
expectations of international law, but focused on local specifics: how border-crossers were to be treated on arrival, escorted away from the border, and the extent to which they would receive help from the state. At the same time, since at least the Congress of Vienna both Habsburg and Ottoman central governments had been attempting to devolve to local officials responsibility for managing border crossings and defusing potential conflicts before they escalated to larger political problems. With a few exceptions, these efforts had been largely unsuccessful.

### Naming a category, creating policy

*Flüchtling, Flüchtende, Emigrant, Fugitiv, Malcontent; Mülteci, Muhacir, Firarî; Izbeglica, Begunac; Réfugié, Émigré, Fugitif; Refugee, Emigrant, Fugitive.* The names were not yet fixed and the palette of meanings had many subtle shades, whether emphasizing the stasis of the *Flüchtling* or the urgent movement of the *Flüchtende* or distinguishing between *Mülteci* and the *Muhacir*, which imperfectly mapped the difference between non-Muslims and Muslims. Imbricated with these and not mutually

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30 By 1875, these standards had been most clearly articulated in an imperial rescript from 1854, a copy of which can be found in KA 51-4/12, 1875.

31 On the resurrection of earlier efforts to devolve power to border officials during the uprising, see Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (Istanbul)/BOA Hariciye Nezareti Siyasi Kışım Evrakı/HR.SYS box 239, folder 2. Also see Lothar Maier, “Die Grenze zwischen dem Habsburgerreich und Bosnien um 1830. Von einem Versuch, eine friedlose Region zu befrieden,” *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 51, no. 3 (2003). George Gavrilis, who has studied border control along the Ottoman/Greek border after Greek independence, argues convincingly for the greater efficacy of decentralized border control over standardized systems developed by central government. See George Gavrilis, “Border Guards and High States: Toward a Theory of Boundary Regimes” (Dissertation, Columbia, 2004).

32 The difference between *Mülteci* and *Muhacir* is not explicitly discussed in any of the material I have found from this period. By the early twentieth century, however, Ottoman bureaucracy acknowledged and defined the differences. The 1913 *İskan-i Muhacirin Nizamnamesi* (Regulation on the Settlement of Refugees) split *muhacir* into two groups, the first having obtained permission to renounce their nationality, and the second, who arrived as *mülteci* and had subsequently successfully petitioned for the status of *muhacir*, presumably in order to obtain financial support and other perquisites. By 1918, Hamdi Bey, the general director of the *Aşair ve Muhacirin Müduriyet-i Umumiyesi* (General Directorate for Tribes and
exclusive were the names of violent men: *Insurgent, Asi, Ustanik* (and sometimes *Ustaša*); *Rebelle*; *Insurgent*. At any given moment characteristics of groups of people were either clear or thought possible to determine, but in non-Ottoman Europe during the 1870s, discrete new categories began to be distilled out of the fluid meanings and connotations of these many old words. The nature of the mass refugee, and of refugeedom, was becoming fixed.

What is a refugee? It is a central question in much of the scholarly literature, especially the literature of refugee studies that has developed in the past decades. It is also an important element in refugee historiography, especially work that focuses on the history of the refugee since the Second World War. This holds true even for some of the most recent work on post-war refugee history. To be sure, the familiar “melange of bleak images” helps to make “determining conceptually (if not politically) who is, or is not, a refugee [appear] to be a relatively simple matter.” But the transformation from an interwar approach to refugees based on group identity to a postwar individualization of refugee identity not coincidently reflects the broader shift from minority rights and protection to the post-war rise of human rights. This transformation brought with it a proliferation of definitions from the international community and regional organizations.

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Refugees) made a clearer distinction, saying “We call mültecî all people without regard to religion who have fled into the interior, that is across the border, from land that the enemy has invaded in the war. However, those who have left the territory of another state because of an agreement we call muhacir.” Quoted in Fuat Dündar, *İttihat ve Terakki’nin Müslümanları iskân politikası, 1913-1918*, 1. bask. ed., Araştırma-inceleme dizisi (Çağaloğlu, İstanbul: İletişim, 2001). 227-28.

33 See, for example, Pamela Ballinger’s study of “national refugees” and their in/exclusion from post-war practice and scholarship. Ballinger writes, “the key tension that plagues […] discussions of refugees [is] how to distinguish so-called forced from voluntary migration or ‘political’ from ‘economic’ migrants” Ballinger, “Entangled or ‘Extruded’ Histories? Displacement, National Refugees, and Repatriation after the Second World War.”

such as the Organization of African Unity. James Hathaway has argued that since World War One, the definition of the refugee has undergone three fundamental changes. In this schematic, refugees were first seen in juridical terms (1920-1935) as people who had lost their freedom of international movement because their own governments no longer protect them. Second, refugees came to be viewed in social terms (1935-1939), including in the definition of refugee “victims of broad-based social and political upheaval, whether or not there were problems of international legal status.” The focus of the juridical period was reversed, from the legal consequence to the social cause of flight. Finally, in the period 1938-1950 (although it largely holds true for the period thereafter), the refugee came to be defined in individualist terms—that is, based not on the situation of a group’s status, but based on the individual’s relationship with the state. The key post-war definition of the refugee is from the 1951 United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which considered as a refugee someone who “As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his


37 Ibid., 367.

38 Ibid.
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.”

The above definitions mattered. Refugee status had an ethical and moral dimension in part because “the attribution of refugee status is designed to provide grounds for a claim to some entitlement—relief, admission, and the like.” Refugee status incorporated people whose very existence defied the rationale of the territorialized and sovereign nation-state into the broader international system. The idea of the refugee was also highly contingent. While the 1951 convention explicitly included in its definition all those who had achieved interwar refugee status, the convention’s minimum definition included as legitimate causes for flight only events in Europe.

These definitions are modified codifications of reality, which is, of course, one reason the definitions change and are fought over. In their focus on policy, the words reflect state intent, “political choice, and ethical judgment”; most of all, though, they reflect states’ desire to limit immigration. A contention of my work, however, is that the modern idea of the refugee emerged as much through the domestic practice of refugee aid and population management as it did through international policy. Through her studies of identity formation among refugees from Rwanda, Liisa Malkki’s work demonstrates how different types of refugee aid practice can help to create different types of refugee

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41 Signatory states could choose whether they would consider “events occurring before 1 January 1951” to mean “events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951” or “events occurring in Europe or elsewhere before 1 January 1951.”

42 Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo, Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World: 3-4.
subjectivities. At the same time, the practices of refugee aid and population management helped to create and define the “objective” category of the refugee: how states managed refugees in part determined how they saw refugees.

In the case of the refugees from Bosnia and Hercegovina, two different threads of refugee management must be considered. The first of these is the domestic management of refugee populations, both as part of central-government policy-making decisions as well as local variations and implementation. The second strand is diplomacy and foreign policy, where one of the most basic characteristics of the refugee—the crossing of an international border—becomes a central question. These two threads can hardly be disentangled, and are entwined with yet a third: the role of non-state actors, who are engaged at the local, imperial, and international level, yet stand outside of the state, sometimes competing with and sometimes complementing state activities.

With regard to the domestic or internal management of refugee populations, it was Habsburg policy-making that played the central role. Ottoman policies within Bosnia and Hercegovina as well as insurgent paramilitary activities certainly contributed to creating refugees, but there does not appear to have been an overarching Ottoman policy towards the refugees themselves. By contemporary standards, the definition of a refugee from Bosnia and Hercegovina that Austria-Hungary outlined through practice was relatively simple. In addition to having crossed an imperial border, refugees were people who became manageable. They were people who had been disarmed at the border and received by the appropriate imperial and local officials. Their livestock, if they brought

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any, had first been quarantined and then later released to them.\textsuperscript{44} Importantly, they were also people whose presence and location were recorded and who had been incorporated into an elaborate bureaucratic system that discouraged them from migrating within the Habsburg Empire. This system revolved around dispensing refugee aid, and placing refugees in the houses of local residents.\textsuperscript{45} The decision to distribute or withhold aid from individuals created its own set of categories. Regardless of what officials decided, one outcome remained the same: officials recorded the refugees, where they came from, where they lived while on Habsburg territory, their gender and age, and in the case of men, whether or not they were able to work. State knowledge of the refugee was extensive and intensive, and the process of acquiring that knowledge forced refugees into a specific and dependent relation with the state. Habsburg officials maintained this relationship through a combination of surveillance and bribery. Officials in towns and counties maintained head-counts, and the distribution of aid itself required refugees regularly to appear, in person, at assemblies where aid was distributed.

The financial burden to the empire of maintaining refugees was a recurrent theme throughout the period of the uprising. By the start of the winter in 1875, Anton von Mollinary, the Zagreb-based general in charge of the military border, was in open conflict

\textsuperscript{44} Throughout the period, livestock remained an urgent question of public health and marketplace distortion because of oversupply. The first 22,000 refugees to cross onto Habsburg territory brought with them 30,000 animals Mollinary, \textit{Sechsundvierzig Jahre im österreich-ungarischen Heere, 1833-1879}, 2: 291. Livestock was also a marker of relative wealth among refugees and therefore determined whether or not the refugees qualified for aid. They also remained an ongoing subject of debate over customs and trade tariffs that carried through until well after the occupation; refugees were expected to pay an import duty on their livestock, for example, although local authorities claimed it was only levied when the animal was slaughtered. Finanz Archiv/FA (Vienna) 4.1 PR 192, 06 XII 1876. By the time of the occupation, imperial officials worried the Hungarian government might levy export duties on returning families, as well. HHStA PA XL, box 208, folder “Sitzungs Protokolle der Comission für die angelegenheiten in Bosnien und der Herzegowina,” 9 X 1879.

\textsuperscript{45} The nature and extent of the aid, as well as the Habsburg state management of refugees, will be discussed in detail in Chapter One.
with officials in Vienna over the cost of refugee aid.\textsuperscript{46} With a perspective modified by the intimacy of abject need in the borderlands under his control, he argued with limited success for the expansion of aid during the winter months. By the same token, the nominal cost to the state budget became a political tool for members of parliament and the press, as well as for the government, while provincial leaders complained about food-price inflation in areas with large numbers of refugees and demanded increased central government spending and better sanitary conditions.\textsuperscript{47} Refugee aid was expensive. Mollinary made his first request for additional money to support refugees within the first month after the start of the refugee flows, and by the end of 1875, the Habsburg government had spent 475,000fl on refugee aid, and would spend over 10,000,000fl by the start of the occupation—and these figures do not include extra costs to the bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{48} By comparison, in the first seven years of Habsburg administration the annual effective revenues of the two provinces remained under 10,000,000fl.\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{46} Mollinary, \textit{Sechsundvierzig Jahre im österreich-ungarischen Heere, 1833-1879}, 2: 281-308.

\textsuperscript{47} See the interpellation of Lorenz Monti from Dalmatia, 13 XII 1876 Reichsrat Austria, Abgeordnetenhaus, “Stenographische Protokolle über die Sitzungen des Hauses der Abgeordneten des österreichischen Reichsrathes. VIII Session.,” (Vienna: Kaiserlich-königliche Hof und Staatsdruckerei, 1878), 7476-77. Also Michael Klaić, 6 XI 1877, ibid., IX: 9980. These interpellations are also discussed in Gustav Kolmer, \textit{Parlament und Verfassung in Österreich}, 8 vols., vol. 2 (Wein und Leipzig: C. Fromme, 1902). 425-26.


\textsuperscript{49} Peter F. Sugar, \textit{Industrialization of Bosnia-Hercegovina 1878-1918} (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1963). 231. Bosnian and Hercegovinian tax revenue was low during the period of the uprising and for a while thereafter, thanks in part to the devastation of agricultural land during the uprising. Ferdo Hauptmann, \textit{Die Österreichisch-Ungarische Herrschaft in Bosnien und der Hercegovina 1878-1918: Wirtschaftspolitik und Wirtschaftsentwicklung}, Zur Kunde Südosteuropas (Graz: Institut für Geschichte der Universität Graz, 1983). Nevertheless, low revenues were not merely part of the long-term effect of a shrunken wartime economy. As Michael Palairet has pointed out, the re-orientation of the Balkan economies away from the Ottoman Empire led to medium term contraction due to the loss of Ottoman urban markets. M. R. Palairet, \textit{The Balkan Economies c. 1800-1914: Evolution Without Development} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997). This was particularly true for Bosnia’s main resources, which under Ottoman rule were largely agricultural products and forestry. See \textit{Vilayet-i Bosna (Salname)},
The Habsburg government had many reasons to limit the mobility of refugees once they arrived. Preventing refugees from returning to the Ottoman provinces to fight in the insurgency and thereby endangering Austria-Hungary’s formal claims of neutrality was an important consideration, as were concerns over criminality and the spread of infectious disease. Nevertheless, limiting refugee movement was to a large extent intended to limit costs to the state. By restricting movement from community to community, Habsburg officials hoped to prevent refugees from collecting more than their allotted share of aid, which remained a problem throughout the three-year period, as well as minimizing the rampant corruption among officials who distributed the aid. At the same time, the financial concerns along with the complicated structure of Habsburg

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51 The issue of refugees returning in order to fight is an old, and ongoing, concern. See for example Howard Adelman, “Why Refugee Warriors are Threats,” Journal of Conflict Studies 18, no. 1 (1998).

52 On corruption, see for example, Evans’ observations in Arthur Evans, Illyrian letters: A Revised Selection of Correspondence from the Illyrian Provinces of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania, Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia, Addressed to the Manchester Guardian During the Year 1877 (Longmans, Green, & Co., 1878). Collecting more aid than deserved was also a problem among the displaced Hercegovinian Muslims from Nikšić; see Chapter Four.
borderland government provided a further reason for restrictions on movement. Within this framework, the geographical distribution of refugees from the perspective of high government mattered. Movement from one area to another redistributed burden in ways that, if the movement was large enough, could require complicated re-allocations of aid money from military to civil administrative bodies. Refugees submitted numerous requests to relocate, sometimes based on the desire to be closer to other family members who had fled as well, and sometimes because of rumors that conditions, work opportunities, or the level of state aid were better in another area.\(^{53}\) Such requests, it seems, were rarely honored.

**Refugees and the Ottoman State**

Just as domestic policies of population management and categorization for the purposes of state aid and control helped to give shape and meaning to the modern mass refugee, the necessary condition of refugeeedom was international exile. The refugee was (and remains) at heart the product not simply of violence, but of the international system—of interstate relations. With regard to the refugees from Bosnia and Hercegovina, it was the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires that shaped the relevant diplomatic landscape. The other Great Powers, along with Serbia and Montenegro, were interested parties. While for Britain the Bosnian and Hercegovinian refugee question was important insofar as refugee politics shaped Habsburg-Ottoman diplomacy, Russia was in fact engaged in the international politics of the refugee. Its consuls in Belgrade, Cetinje, and Dubrovnik actively provided support to the insurgency, distributed aid to the refugees and helped to

\(^{53}\) In some cases, rumors also encouraged fixity. See Chapter Three.
arrange the establishment of Red Cross ambulances in Montenegro. The extent to which these activities should be seen as part of an over-arching government policy is, however, unclear. It was the Habsburg-Ottoman relationship that shaped the foreign policy and international presence of the refugees from Bosnia and Hercegovina.

The refugee as a category further draws the Ottoman Empire into the nineteenth-century international system, both as an interested party whose actions helped to affirm or undermine international expectations, and also as a diplomatic partner. To be sure, the technologies of refugee aid and population management in the Habsburg Empire drew off its own tradition, and the nature of civic humanitarianism in the Habsburg lands was shaped by the experience of Christian Europe. But in the 1870s, the Ottoman Empire was intimately involved not simply in the production of mass refugee movements, but in defining mass refugeedom and in creating international expectations regarding refugees. At the international level, it was the Ottoman interaction with the other Great Powers—and the Habsburg Empire in particular—that became definitive. Ottoman and Habsburg diplomacy created an international policy for refugees, and the gradual emergence of norms and expectations cannot be understood without the Ottoman Empire. That this was the case should come as little surprise, especially given the central importance of the Muslim flight in 1877-1878. But the fact that the refugees from the Bulgarian provinces also included Circassians, Tatars and others who had been settled there over the previous three decades attests to an easy-to-overlook fact: out of all Europe’s Great Powers in the late nineteenth century, it was the Ottoman Empire that had by far the most experience in managing large-scale population movements, aid efforts, and settlement programs.
Migration—especially in the form of nomadism—was central to the Ottoman historical experience, and even in the late nineteenth century was still a contemporary question. According to one mid-century government report, the majority of the central Anatolian population was living a nomadic life.\textsuperscript{54} Migration had played a large part in Ottoman expansionism especially into the Balkans, where Yörüks—Muslim nomadic tribes whose presence pre-dated the Ottomans—were moved and settled “at times under the initiative of the central government [...] for security reasons or in order to expand the revenue base by reclaiming new lands for agriculture.”\textsuperscript{55}

The state’s relation to nomadism was uneasy, however, and included periodic rounds of forced sedentarization, which became an increasingly important element of nineteenth-century Ottoman population politics. The reasons for the sedentarization policies of the nineteenth century were multiple. Long-standing interests such as improving tax-collection remained, but were also overshadowed by more recent and urgent concerns over imperial reform. In the early nineteenth century nomadism had begun to expand again, with tribes growing in size and political strength. Just as the Ottoman government began its major push for centralization, tribal strength in some areas was steadily increasing, with some tribes acting as if “they had all but seceded from the empire.”\textsuperscript{56} The Ottomans had pinned their hopes for economic growth to the agricultural


\textsuperscript{55} İnalçık also argues that the very name \textit{Yörü} is an administrative name deriving from \textit{yörü-} or \textit{yürü-} (to walk), and that it was subsequently adopted by the nomads themselves. Halil İnalcık, “The Yuruk: Their Origins, Expansion and Economic Role,” in \textit{The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire}, ed. Halil İnalcık (Bloomington: Indiana University Turkish Studies, 1993).

sector, and where nomads had once been seen as vital intermediaries in agriculture, they were now considered to be a hindrance to expanded agricultural output. In this light, nomadism appeared to be a fundamental obstacle to the modernization Ottoman officials saw as necessary for the survival of the empire.

Reşat Kasaba cautions that even in the late Ottoman Empire, nomadism and sedentarism were not mutually exclusive categories but instead reflect what he calls “mobility-in-stasis”: the persistence of some migratory patterns even as various forms of temporary—usually seasonal—sedentarism took hold. Perhaps to the chagrin of Istanbul officials, nomadism continued to be part of Ottoman modernity, even playing a role in modernization itself. The Ottoman center viewed “the elimination of the state of savagery and ignorance of the nomads” as necessary to modernization, and the nomads themselves as a primitive people in need of a colonial “civilizing mission.”

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58 Expanding further on the question of modernization, Kasaba uses the relationship between the Ottoman state and nomadic tribes to challenge James Scott’s view of states and societies in an antagonistic relationship with each other to argue that the persistence of mobility—albeit within a more limited sphere—be viewed not as explicitly oppositional: numerous tribes managed to maintain their migratory lives despite the intrusion of the state, but it is not clear “when and under what conditions we can see such efforts as stemming directly and exclusively from sources that were completely independent of the Ottoman state.” Looking at Ottoman philanthropy, Nadir Özbek argues that even Kasaba’s view goes too far by assuming a clear distinction between state and society. See ibid., 41-44. Also James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998) and James C. Scott, “La montagne et la liberté, ou Pourquoi les civilisations ne savent pas grimper,” Critique Internationale 3(2001), cited in Kasaba. Also Nadir Özbek, “Philanthropic Activity, Ottoman Patriotism, and the Hamidian Regime, 1876-1909,” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 37 (2005).

was that because of institutional weakness, the state came to depend on nomadic or semi-nomadic (largely Kurdish) tribes to ensure another aspect of state modernization, namely the maintenance of the eastern Anatolian borders. The Ottomans co-opted and selectively supported some tribes and tribal leaders, offering educational opportunities and, through the formation of a militia in the 1890s, the imprimatur of state power. These steps went well beyond securing the border, though, and were also intended to re-integrate the seemingly ungovernable eastern Anatolian regions into the empire. By allowing tribes to seize land from the distrusted Armenian peasantry, suggests Janet Klein, the state was not only “weakening the ‘internal enemies’ in the threatened borderland,” but providing “material incentives for the Kurdish tribes to settle and remain loyal to the sultan and the empire.” The civilizing mission and its corollary of sedentarization were the essence of this particular aspect of Ottoman modernization. Control over population mobility became a central feature of late Ottoman claims on legitimacy.

The Ottoman’s ongoing efforts at nomadic sedentarization had created a strong intellectual and technological infrastructure for the management of mobility. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the state began using these tools to manage refugees who were arriving from Russia and the Caucuses. In many ways, the tactics and the goals differed little from those associated with nomadic sedentarization, and indeed

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60 Janet Klein, *The Margins of Empire: Kurdish Militias in the Ottoman Tribal Zone* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011). Eugene Rogan sees the tribal schools, the Aşiret Mektebi, as an outstanding part of the Ottoman state’s efforts to incorporate the tribes not just into the political system, but as a means to “advance the state-sanctioned supranational identities of Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism...” Eugene L. Rogan, “Aşiret Mektebi: Abdülhamid II’s School for Tribes (1892-1907),” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 28, no. 1 (1996).

61 Klein, *The Margins of Empire: Kurdish Militias in the Ottoman Tribal Zone*: 4-5.

62 Makdisi, “Ottoman Orientalism.”
the Ottoman experience with refugees may have informed some of the state’s approaches to nomads. Muslim refugees represented for the Ottomans both a burden and an opportunity. There is little evidence of a sustained or comprehensive central government approach to managing refugees prior to the Crimean War, but already with the earliest efforts at such a policy we can see the shape of later refugee-settlement plans—not just of those implemented on behalf of the Bulgarian refugees from 1877-1878, but also of the plans developed for returning and resettling the Christian refugees from Bosnia and Hercegovina. The earliest articulation of such a refugee policy is instructions sent to the governor of Silistre on 3 May 1856 on how to manage the growing number of Crimean Tatars arriving in the vilayet by land and sea. The Porte sent two thousand kise of akçe to Silistre to pay for a series of aid projects. In addition to receiving an agricultural tax holiday for ten years, the refugees would be exempt from military service for twenty-five years. They were to be settled in villages near to each other and close to rivers or lakes for access to fresh water, and the government would build houses using locally available material and with local labor. Money to help refugees pay for housing and agricultural

63 One of the more remarkable central government initiatives to settle nomads came in 1864, when Ahmet Cevdet Paşa was sent to southern Anatolia in command of the Fırka-i İslahiyye (Reform Division), an army tasked with breaking tribal opposition to government rule. The army largely succeeded in its military goals, but also went much further: to accommodate the settling tribesmembers, the army built new housing in existing villages and towns, created entirely new towns (for example Hassa, Izziyе, Osmaniye, and Reyhanlı), and “created administrative councils, built schools and government offices, paid the salaries of teachers and müftis, and set up a defense force in each of these towns.” Kasaba, A Moveable Empire: Ottoman Nomads, Migrants, and Refugees: 101-02.

64 Eren sketches the pattern up through to the time of his study, noting that the aid principles “evoke parts of the principles of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees” Ahmet Cevat Eren, Türkiye’de Göç ve Göçmen Meseleleri (İstanbul: Nurgök Matbaası, 1966). 40. Eren claims that this first set of instructions subsequently had a great influence on the general history of the refugee, although he offers no mechanism for how this might be the case.
supplies would also be provided. The general outline of these aid programs remained constant throughout the period, and also closely adhered to the terms for a refugee repatriation program the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires agreed to in 1876.

As important as the nature of aid—materials for building shelter and starting agriculture, as well as temporary exemption from normal obligations to the state—was the intent of the aid, and the manner in which refugees fit in with the larger project of settlement, sedentarization, and the territorialization of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans were interested not just in the welfare of the refugees and the local population, but also in the possibility of using refugees to strengthen the empire. Initially, this meant settling Muslim refugees in areas along the Ottoman border with Russia. Similar to the Habsburg Grenzer, these settlers would provide a first line of defense against invasion. But it was also hoped that increasing the specifically Muslim population in the border areas would discourage Russia from making territorial claims based on confessional demographics.

After the Crimean War, however, a number of factors led to reconsideration. Most obviously, border areas especially in the Balkans were slowly filling up with people, and as they did, tensions between the native population, older settlers, and the newcomers

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66 Russia also pursued similar goals. See, for example, Alexander Bitis, “The 1828–1829 Russo-Turkish War and the Resettlement of Balkan Peoples into Novorossiia,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 53, no. 4 (2005).


began to rise. The Ottomans tried various techniques to prevent conflict, including isolating groups to their own villages (as was the case with the refugees in Silistre), or breaking apart refugee groups and settling them among the local population in an effort to force assimilation. There were already elements of social engineering in this, and the title alone of Mark Pinson’s dissertation, “Demographic Warfare,” gives an indication of the extent of Ottoman (and Russian) population politics when it came to forced migration. By 1860, however, the buckling of regional aid efforts under the ever-growing mass of refugees as well as the large number of refugees arriving in Istanbul led the central government to establish the *Muhacirin Komisyonu*, the Refugee Commission. It was a high-level commission and attracted experienced officials.

The treatment of refugees by the authorities, writes Nora Lafi, offers “many indications of the very conception of imperial governance.” And while the Refugee Commission’s activities, successes and failures have been well studied elsewhere, it is the broader issues that are pertinent here. Conceptually and institutionally, starting in the 1860s and early 1870s, the Commission moved refugee management closer to the process

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70 There were a number of close links between the Commission and the military, which had also been, prior to the Commission’s establishment, an important actor in refugee management. The Habsburg army filled a similar role on the Austro-Hungarian side of the Bosnian-Croatian border. Both cases may in part be explained by the historical accident of proximity. An open, and potentially fruitful, question is to what extent the military played a role in the development of refugee management technologies because of its experience in moving around and supplying large numbers of people.


72 The most thorough study of the Refugee Commission is Cuthell, “The Muhacirin Komisyonu: an Agent in the Transformation of Ottoman Anatolia 1860-1866.” Also useful, especially for the developments leading up to the establishment of the Commission is Eren, *Türkiye’de Göç ve Göçmen Meseleleri*. 
of nomadic settlement; by the early twentieth century, the categories were almost entirely incorporated. The Muslim refugee became part of the Ottoman government’s modernization and civilizing mission in eastern Anatolia, and the central government used the opportunity the refugees provided to experiment and find “scientific principles” for establishing new towns, increasing agricultural production, breaking down old social ties, and bringing nomads and refugees into the “circle of civilization”.73 There were knock-on effects, too. Settling refugees meant finding empty land on which to put them; this in turn opened up a whole series of questions regarding land claims, usage rights, and the very idea of empty land. Terzibaşoğlu convincingly argues that in some cases, the process of refugee settlement actually forced peasants into expanding their agricultural production in order to maintain claims to land by working it, and also led nomads into settling as a pre-emptive way of preventing the state from moving refugees onto land nomads claimed for their own use.74 Over time, the two processes became so intertwined that the relationship was institutionalized. By 1914, the Refugee Commission and other agencies responsible for settling nomads had been subsumed under the Aşair ve Muhacirin Müduriyet-i Umumiyesi—the General Directorate for Tribes and Refugees.75

Nineteenth-century states for the most part did not want to shed their population; indeed, as far as international law was concerned in the early nineteenth century, “protection against the depopulation of the state, especially through prevention of emigration” could be considered a central obligation to the state’s right of self-


74 Ibid., 26-27.

75 Cengiz Orhonlu, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Aşiretlerin İskanı (İstanbul: Eren Yayıncılık ve Kitapçılık, 1987). 119-20.
preservation.\textsuperscript{76} This began to change towards the end of the century, although very slowly. Even as some international jurists began referring to the individual right of emigration, the English laws against expatriation, for example, were only struck down in 1870.\textsuperscript{77} In the Ottoman case, the situation was clearly different. To be sure, Ottoman population loss in the nineteenth century was large, however these declines were due not to emigration, but to territorial losses. Instead, the empire as a whole was Europe’s largest immigrant country and during much of the reform era, it actively encouraged immigration as part of its broader agricultural modernization project.\textsuperscript{78} In this manner, immigration, sedentarization, and the settlement of refugees from beyond the imperial borders became central considerations in the Ottoman’s tactics for consolidating central government power over the empire’s territories, and maintaining its legitimacy not just domestically, but internationally.

**Refugees in the International Context**

For the Ottomans, the nineteenth century was the century of the refugee, and the century had entrenched the idea of refugees not just as a population to be managed, but as a population that the modern state actually could manage. In this context, policy towards the emigration of refugees from Bosnia and Hercegovina fit closely with the schemes the state already had developed. With regard to management, repatriating and resettling the refugees who had fled Bosnia and Hercegovina differed little from the Muslim refugees

\textsuperscript{76} Johann Ludwig Klüber, Europäisches völkerrecht, (Stuttgart1821). paragraph 39. Emphasis in original.


who had been fleeing to the Ottoman Empire. The Refugee Commission’s activities had been suspended after the death of its director, Muammer Paşa, just months before the uprising in Bosnia and Hercegovina began. Yet in Spring 1876, when the Ottoman central government, in conjunction with Austria-Hungary, established commissions to return and resettle the refugees who had fled, the structure of the commissions, the cooperation between central government and local officials, the concern with transportation, housing and health—as well as the solutions for dealing with these questions—all demonstrate continuity with earlier practice. At least from the standpoint of managing the return of the Bosnian and Hercegovinian refugees, then, the decades of Ottoman experience with refugees shaped the way in which international policies of refugee management were arranged.

In this way, Ottoman-Habsburg bilateralism developed an international refugee policy—effectively a standard for the management and control of refugees and an expectation that refugees would be returned and resettled. Safety would be guaranteed, and through it, the multi-confessional status quo ante of the imperial provinces would be restored. Moreover, an expectation of management and control of refugees on the one hand, and their return, resettlement, and the restoration of the imperial demographic structure on the other hand, was built into multilateral international agreements. Austria-Hungary in particular made refugee return a cornerstone of multiple diplomatic

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79 The original Muhacirin Komisyonu disbanded first in 1865, then reconstituted in various forms, finally re-established as a commission in the 1870s, only to be disbanded again in March 1875, upon the death of the Commission’s director, Muammer Paşa. The Commission’s functions did not, however, vanish and a much smaller group of officials was attached to the Zaptije Nezareti (Gendermerie). In 1877, in response to the influx of Balkan refugees, a new commission was established, the İlane-i Muhacirin Komisyonu, or Refugee Aid Commission. Kocacık, “Balkanlar’dan Anadolu’ya Yönelik Göçler (1878-1890),” 158-59.
proposals.\textsuperscript{80} The refugee question was not simply an issue for the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, but had become a broader concern of Great Power diplomacy; refugees were to be one of the yardsticks with which to measure not just the violence on the ground, but the stability of the European system.

Although it had not been institutionalized in the way it would be during the interwar period, the nineteenth century did develop an international “refugee regime.” The scholarly focus on the institutionalization of international refugee management during the interwar period has obscured the sophistication and internationalism of nineteenth-century refugee policies. In the process, the focus on the early twentieth century has arrogated the development of a refugee regime to the European powers during the interwar—it was, after all, the failure to deal with Europe’s interwar refugees that led to the still Eurocentric 1951 Convention and to the creation first of the International Refugee Organization, and then of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. In fact, the example of the late nineteenth century reveals the extent to which the Ottoman Empire figured into the development of international refugee policy. Indeed, the middle of the nineteenth century was marked by a well-developed body of international law regarding a “right of asylum.”\textsuperscript{81} While this right was a European invention, the Ottoman Empire laid claim to it and used the right of asylum as one of many tools for

\textsuperscript{80} While refugees were not an explicit element of the so-called Andrásy Note, they were the central topic in the later Berlin Memorandum, and continued to re-appear in diplomatic negotiations and agreements throughout the period under consideration.

\textsuperscript{81} The existence of a developed legal tradition regarding refugees goes largely unmentioned in general works on refugee history, such as those by Michael Marrus or Zolberg. In fact, there is very little secondary literature on the policies and practices of nineteenth-century continental asylum law; one of the few in-depth studies is Reiter, \textit{Politisches Asyl im 19. Jahrhundert}. Further obscuring matters is the tendency to see mid-nineteenth-century refugees as “in some sense gentry”—which the majority clearly was not. Marrus, \textit{The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century}: 20.
international policy. By the time of the uprisings, the Ottoman experience with refugees contributed greatly to the shape of Great Power refugee diplomacy.

For nineteenth-century legal scholars, the “right of asylum” was a question that balanced an international system of criminal punishment with questions of sovereignty and the dangers of foreign criminal law not serving the interests of justice. The concept of this right had developed largely in response to a perceived need to differentiate between common and “political” criminals. The right of asylum, in this case, was not an individual right to asylum, but a sovereign right to grant or to withhold the extradition of an individual accused of a crime.\(^{82}\) For much of the nineteenth century, there had been a wide range—although leaning towards liberal—of asylum policies across Europe.\(^ {83}\) Conservative reaction to the revolutions of 1848 began to change that, and by 1853, the German jurist Robert Mohl was able to describe a much more conservative division of European states, separated into three camps according to their asylum policies. Britain (and the United States) saw granting asylum to fugitives as a duty. Most European states—among them France, Belgium, Switzerland and Russia—were more restrictive, and would surrender individuals charged with common crimes, but would surrender those accused of political crimes only in extreme circumstances or by treaty. The last group of states Mohl identified comprised Austria, Prussia, German confederate states, and

\(^{82}\) As Hedley Bull pointed out, even now neither customary nor treaty law carries a general obligation to admit refugees. What has changed, however, is that refugees now carry a right of non-refoulement—that is, there is a positive obligation not to return refugees to the place they fled if it would endanger them. Hedley Bull, “Forward,” in *Refugees in International Relations*, ed. Alexander Betts and Gil Loescher (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

\(^{83}\) See for example the discussion in Reiter, *Politisches Asyl im 19. Jahrhundert*. 36
Naples. These were willing to surrender individuals accused of crimes both common and political. Prussian policy called for automatic extradition.

What is important here for our purposes is less the specifics of states’ policies, but rather the broader point: the asylum question was one of sovereign preference and comity among nations. That is, it existed as a tacit international system to control and manage cross-border population movements without endangering European stability. To be sure, this was non-binding and states routinely made decisions based on short- or long-term policy interests. Yet the sovereign right was taken seriously, and it was the Ottoman Empire that demonstrated the system’s resilience when it accepted Polish and Hungarian refugees after 1848. Russia and Austria both demanded the extradition of their subjects to stand trial, and the demands were framed within the terms of treaty law. Russia referred to the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, by the terms of which neither power was to shelter anyone accused of treason or capital offences on the other power’s territory. For their part, the Habsburgs appealed based on the treaties of Passarowitz and Belgrade, which banned the powers from sheltering fugitives.

In both cases, the Ottoman Sultan refused to surrender the refugees, and received the strong support of Britain and France in this decision—in fact, the two powers were willing to back the Sultan’s decision with their navies. In a note quoted by admiring

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86 The Habsburg Empire, for example, lifted its general policy on extradition in the case of refugees from the second Polish uprising in 1830 by allowing them travel to Vienna, where they could then apply for visas to France.
nineteenth-century jurists, Lord Palmerston argued that based on the laws of hospitality, humanity and the general feelings of mankind that bound “all independent states,” any state that surrendered political refugees would “be deservedly and universally stigmatised as degraded and dishonored.” The German jurist Franz von Holtzendorff saw the willingness of the “Islamic government” to protect Christians against despotic Christian states as a source of European sympathy for the Ottoman Empire during the Crimean War. Hyperbolic, perhaps, but a telling point. Holtzendorff drew a broader lesson about civilization from the Ottoman refusal to extradite. Not only were there “civilized despots” in Europe, but countries that “typically count as uncivilized” can nevertheless display “political honor.”

For Ottoman statesmen, control over nomads and refugees was central to the process of state-building and the consolidation of domestic rule. At the same time, however, Ottoman asylum policies and international practice with regard to refugees both affirmed the empire’s presence on the world stage, and helped to shape and develop the nature of international efforts and expectations. Ottoman insistence on its sovereign right to protect Hungarian and Polish refugees was verging on anachronistic in a Europe where asylum policies had already begun turning more conservative. Nevertheless, in the very act of assertion, the Ottoman Empire was demanding—and received—an informal, de facto recognition of its place within the European system and its prerogatives under


international law. Circumstances had changed by 1875-1878, however. The refugees from Bosnia and Hercegovina were different not just because they were leaving the Ottoman Empire rather than entering it, but also because they were almost exclusively Orthodox Christians. The Ottoman international position had also changed, and the fact that it was Christians who had fled immediately threw into doubt the empire’s ability to meet the terms of the Treaty of Paris of 1856, which “had been signed by all the powers, including the Ottoman Empire as a newly admitted member of the Concert of Europe, and [...] gave international sanction to the territorial and integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire.” As Roderic Davison points out, the treaty “had served as the rock upon which Ottoman foreign policy was built.” The Bosnian and Hercegovinian refugees became a focal point for imperial and nation-state international aspirations on the one hand, and the ability of the Ottoman Empire to maintain its position in the Concert of Europe and to claim the international right to the non-intervention of foreign powers that the Concert guaranteed—indeed, to Ottoman’s international legitimacy.

The actual terms of the Habsburg-Ottoman negotiations over refugees—the development of a regime—need to be considered in this light. At one level, it was Austria-Hungary that held all the cards and stood at the center of the diplomatic stage during much of the crisis. During the first year of the crisis, the Habsburg foreign

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90 Historians typically date the Ottoman entry into the European “family of nations” to its formal entrance into the Concert of Europe with the Treaty of Paris of 1856. While this assessment is certainly not untrue, it marginalizes the extensive history of treaty law and various forms of interaction and protection that existed between the Ottoman Empire and the Great Powers. See for example Hugh McKinnon Wood, “The Treaty of Paris and Turkey’s Status in International Law,” *The American Journal of International Law* 37, no. 2 (1943) and Gerrit W. Gong, *The Standard of “Civilization” in International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). 106-19. The refugee question of 1848 should be viewed in light of this longer tradition.

minister, Count Gyula Andrássy, followed a two-track course, (discussed in greater detail below). The big diplomacy—the formulation of Great Power policy memoranda and demands, representations at the Sublime Porte, and coordination among the other powers—was largely aimed at maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and helping the Porte quell the insurgency. A key part of this involved repeated, and largely successful, dilutions of Russian proposals intended to establish for the Ottoman Balkan provinces an autonomy that would eventually lead to independence. The second track for Austria-Hungary was direct discussion with the Ottomans over concrete measures that should be taken to end the crisis, and return the refugees. To be sure, much of the big diplomacy was at heart negotiations over measures. But it was direct talks with the Ottomans that established the realm of possibility, and in spring 1876, it was direct talks that established the procedures for managing and returning refugees. Briefly, these included Austro-Hungarian guarantees that their border officials maintain Habsburg neutrality by preventing the formation of armed bands on its territory; that the Ottomans ensure the security of the refugees as they returned, and provide them with the necessary tools for resettlement and return. Committees would be established. It remains unclear just how the broad shape of the refugee return process was created—the earliest description of the basic terms comes from Andrássy, but also reference an earlier Ottoman plan that he deemed premature given the violence. Nevertheless, the specifics that were finally agreed to were Ottoman, and they very clearly built off the long Ottoman experience with refugee resettlement. Drawing on local experience from earlier rebellions in Bosnia and Hercegovina, the Ottoman central government also issued a blanket amnesty to the refugees who had fled. And by demanding that returnees come
back unarmed, the Habsburg-Ottoman return process invented a bureaucratic category of the refugee as, if not a victim, then at least by definition, politically harmless.

The Uprising: Local Events and International Repercussions

Throughout the nineteenth century, the Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and Hercegovina resisted numerous attempts by the central government to exert its authority. In the first half of the century armed clashes between local power-holders and the Ottoman army were common, as the janissaries, local notables and kapetans—local military administrators who held a hereditary office—fought to maintain their privileges against the encroachments of government centralization. Central government military victories were usually short-lived, and it was not until the arrival in August 1850 of Ömer Paşa Latas, a Habsburg-born convert to Islam and respected Ottoman military commander, that Ottoman authorities were able to make any headway on reform. Latas’ position as Bosnia’s new governor was political, but his mission to impose tanzimat reforms on local elite landowners and other entrenched interest groups was effectively military in nature. The reforms he brought with him were greeted with violence, and over the coming months Latas fought and won thirteen battles with local Muslims, killing some 2,500, imprisoning many others, and sending 154 of the most prominent to Istanbul for trial.92 One of the chief outcomes of Latas’ success was the gradual reconfiguration of confessional relations within Bosnia and Hercegovina. In particular, the tanzimat and the governors who subsequently implemented it (with greater or, often, lesser skill) fostered

and encouraged local Christian communities, in part to demonstrate to the Great Powers the Ottoman commitment to the welfare of its Christian subjects.\(^93\)

As important as the role of Ottoman reform was in improving the position of both Orthodox and Catholics in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was the role of outside groups—national activists and secret societies from Serbia and Austria-Hungary, but also the Serbian and Habsburg governments—that made the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Christians of such great importance to Ottoman administrators. For decades prior to the 1875-1878 uprising intellectuals, politicians, and activists in Serbia, Croatia-Dalmatia and to a lesser extent in Montenegro cooperated or worked individually to encourage a Bosnian national revolution. For Croatians, including the activist Bishop Strossmayer, early concrete steps did not lead far. Instead, Serbia took the leadership role in encouraging revolution. By the 1860s the Serbian government was supporting the activities of numerous national activists across Bosnia and Herzegovina, but with little to show for the undertaking: efforts to encourage rebellion failed miserably, and even when the 1875 uprising began, nationalist activists were unable to determine its tone. The Bosnian and Herzegovinian uprisings involved the Great Powers for many reasons, but it was the threat of a greatly-expanded Serbian state and the potential for greater Russian


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influence in the region that lay beneath much of Austro-Hungarian politics during the period.\(^\text{94}\)

In 1875, Bosnia and Hercegovina actually saw not one, but two discrete uprisings. The first one began in Hercegovina; the second one began not long thereafter in Bosnia. Hercegovina had a long history as an independent province under the Ottoman Empire; at the time of the uprising however, it had been incorporated as a district of the province of Bosnia.\(^\text{95}\) Yet despite the administrative organization, Bosnia and Hercegovina remained in many ways separate from each other, and it wasn’t until the Ottoman forces in Bosnia were mobilized to suppress the uprising in Hercegovina that the Bosnians learned of the events to their south.\(^\text{96}\) Exactly when the uprising started is open to interpretation; for the Serbian historian Dušan Berić, for example, the uprising began with guerilla action in late 1874 and early 1875, and developed into a broader rebellion through the spring and early summer of 1875.\(^\text{97}\) In this view the critical month was April, not coincidently the month of Habsburg Emperor Franz Josef’s visit to Dalmatia (“Now it [will catch on fire],” thought Mollinary when he heard of the Emperor’s intended visit).\(^\text{98}\) Contemporary observers saw, and many subsequent historians have seen the insurgency as starting much later. To Gabriel Rodich, a general in the Habsburg army and the governor of Dalmatia,


\(^{95}\) In 1876, the organizational structure changed, and Hercegovina achieved *vilayet* status, ostensibly to make it easier for the Ottoman administration to address the specific needs of the region; the decision was subsequently reversed.

\(^{96}\) Ekmečić, *Ustanak u Bosni 1875-1878*.


the insurgency seemed to begin at the start of July 1875, when a handful of Christians fled the town of Dračevo onto Habsburg soil.\textsuperscript{99} For August Šenoa, the Croatian poet, the uprising began in Gabela, near the border with Dalmatia.\textsuperscript{100}

Seen from afar, the first sign of trouble in Hercegovina was refugees. Around 120 Orthodox Christians, claiming persecution by their Muslims landlords and protesting taxes being levied against them despite near-starvation conditions in the district, fled from the area around Nevesinje—deeper in to Hercegovina than Dračevo or Gabela—across the border to Montenegro. The Montenegrin Prince, Nikola Petrović-Njegoš, asked Austria-Hungary for financial help to support the refugees and to mediate with Ottoman authorities for their return.\textsuperscript{101} Nevesinje was not an altogether unlikely place for the uprising to begin, but the circumstances also illustrate the extent to which the uprising from the very beginning was embedded in larger regional processes. As Hannes Grandits has convincing argued in a close analysis of the insurrection’s outbreak, it was the involvement of \textit{hajduks} and other brigands who crossed into Hercegovina from Montenegro, as well as some nationalist activists in Mostar, who succeeded in leveraging local dissatisfaction into full-scale violence.\textsuperscript{102}

\textsuperscript{99} HHStA.PA XII 1875-1876, box 234, folder “Korr. mit FZM Rodich u. d. Statthalterei in Zara, 1875-1876,” 02 VII 1875, Statthalterei Dalmatiens/SHD Zara to Ministerium des Äusseren/MdÄ.

\textsuperscript{100} August Šenoa, “Munja od Gabela,” \textit{Vienac: Zabavi i Pouci}, 28 VIII 1875. This misunderstanding has taken hold in some of the historiography; See Jelena Milojković-Djurić, \textit{The Eastern Question and the Voices of Reason: Austria-Hungary, Russia, and the Balkan States 1875-1908} (Boulder: East European Monographs, 2002). 12.


Indeed, the outbreak of violence arguably testified to the success of local Ottoman administration. After several elders from villages near Nevesinje refused to pay taxes in early summer of 1875, the Bosnian vali sent a high-level commission to meet with the men and discuss a non-violent resolution to their complaints. In May and June the meetings with the commissions seemed to be working. The Ottoman authorities countered the villagers’ complaints over tax burdens worsened by two years of bad harvests with offers of greater local autonomy, lower taxes, and salaried employment in the Ottoman border guards. While the villagers were favorably disposed, brigands operating from Montenegrin territories had little interest in the stabilization of circumstances in Nevesinje. Prince Nikola was offering them tentative support as part of his broader campaign to overthrow Ottoman rule; Nikola was also trying to instrumentalize the returning refugees. The brigands themselves appear to have thought that instability would make their raids easier and more profitable. It was in these circumstances that an attack on a caravan that killed five Muslim merchants led first to the Ottomans deploying more zaptiyes to Nevesinje, followed by more violence and subsequent escalation. Not two weeks after the caravan attack, the violence had escalated to the point that Mićo Ljubibratić, a Hercegovinian expatriate, could return to Nevesinje and impose the first organizational structure to what became a broader uprising. Nikola was ill-equipped to control the course of the uprising, but it did fit into his general goals for gaining independence by weakening the Ottoman hold on neighboring territories. The uprising also began to attract foreign volunteers and revolutionaries, many of whom entered Hercegovina, along with weapons and supplies, via Dubrovnik and other Austro-Hungarian ports. With sympathies strong in Montenegro, Dalmatia, Serbia and
elsewhere, the localized violence in the area around Nevesinje quickly had outsized repercussions.\textsuperscript{103}

\textbf{The Diplomatic Framework}

Much of this dissertation considers events on the ground, at the local level. Nevertheless, local events forced international policies, which subsequently framed local events, and the diplomacy of the period must be considered. The diplomatic engagement with Ottoman affairs in Bosnia and Hercegovina began as an effort to prevent the expansion of the conflict and quickly revealed the tensions in the European Concert. These only worsened as the insurgency wore on and the number and interest level of other European states involved increased, leading to new alignments and entrenching existing positions. Diplomacy created a negative feedback loop of sorts, in which the efforts of foreign offices to win real reforms and re-establish order in the provinces made the reforms’ success only more important, and therefore all the more demanding of further diplomacy.

The literature on the diplomacy of the Eastern Crisis is vast. It typically frames the period not truly as an Ottoman question, but as a diplomatic question for the other Great Powers: how to manage the end of “Turkey in Europe” without going to war; how to create viable nation-states while maintaining or developing alliances and spheres of influence in the Balkans and the Middle East. According to this narrative, the Ottoman state was acted upon but rarely acted itself; when Ottoman statesmen made decisions they did so under the influence of one diplomat or another and in any case their decisions were

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid.
most likely errant. This image is not altogether unfair to Ottoman history. Nevertheless, it obscures many of the areas in which the Ottoman Empire remained a legitimate negotiating partner, and can overlook many of the same faults among the other Great Powers.

This is particularly the case with the diplomacy of late 1875 and the first half of 1876, which was punctuated by a series of measures—all of them initiated by Russia and subsequently softened by Austria-Hungary—designed to end the violence in the Ottoman’s Balkan provinces. An ineffective mission of foreign consuls was sent to the provinces, followed by the first formal diplomatic representation in the form of the “Andrássy Note.” This was followed by the so-called Berlin Memorandum, which fell apart thanks to Great Power discord.

In 1875, the consular mission’s great achievement had been to break long-standing European promises of non-intervention in Ottoman domestic affairs while maintaining the appearance of not having done so. In mid-August, each of the powers designated a consul for the mission and sent them to Bosnia and Hercegovina. The mission was a Russian initiative, and was originally intended to give the consuls negotiating powers with the insurgents. Andrássy avoided any possible expansion of Russian influence by stripping the consuls of any real power. In doing so he was able to claim the mission was not a violation of Ottoman sovereign power. The consuls were there to encourage the insurgents to lay down their arms, not to mediate between the insurgents and the Ottoman

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104 Hanioğlu’s excellent and sober analysis re-emphasizes the very real economic, political, and social weaknesses of the Ottoman state, and the effect this had on the state’s agency in international affairs. M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, 1st paperback ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).
government. They would not even be permitted to hear complaints; for that purpose, the Ottomans were to send their own commissioner.105

Framed in this manner, Andrássy hoped the consular mission would satisfy Russian desires for intervention while remaining a palatable diplomatic measure to the Ottoman government. It did neither, but with the violence continuing unabated, the Ottoman government had little choice other than to assent. On 22 August, the Porte responded to the proposals in terms that seemingly put victims, and refugees, in the foreground. Out of the “sentiments of humanity,” the Ottoman ambassador to Britain wrote, “and wanting above all to avoid bloodshed and maintain peace, the imperial government has accepted this proposal as a last attempt at appeasement.”106 The consular mission did not satisfy the insurgents, either, and the consuls could do little to dissuade the insurgents from fighting. Instead, the “real result of that mission was to encourage the insurgents to pursue the struggle, as it gave them proof that the Powers were not indifferent to their cause.”107

The consular mission as Andrássy had revised it was almost meaningless diplomatically. Accredited foreign consuls already had the right to move around the provinces, and the presence of an Ottoman emissary only undermined their position. The follow-up to the mission was the Andrássy Note, which followed a similar period of diplomatic wrangling that had preceded the consular mission. Again, the idea of the note originated in Russia, and again Andrássy stripped it of any force. The Note was circulated


to the Great Powers on 30 December 1875 and after several weeks in the other European courts, was presented to the Porte a month later, on 31 January 1876. The note reiterated that the consular mission had not been direct intervention in Ottoman affairs in violation of the Treaty of Paris, and claimed the same for itself, carefully avoiding all meddling, and guarding the “dignity, rights and authority of the [Sultan].” The note concerned itself exclusively with Ottoman implementation of pre-existing commitments to reform. It asked only for the enforcement of Ottoman guarantees for religious liberty, reform of the system of tax-farming and land-tenure. The note’s only innovation was to demand a monitoring system: the election of mixed commissions to oversee reforms. Andrássy had explicitly framed the note to express the concerns of all the Great Powers over the violence in the insurgent provinces. Ottoman acceptance of the note would be taken as a moral commitment not simply to the Sultan’s Christian subjects, but to the Great Powers themselves. There was no mention of Austria-Hungary’s more narrow concern, the refugees. With the exception of the final point, which demanded provincial taxes be used exclusively in the provinces, Sultan Abdülaziz approved the note on 13 February 1876.

The Andrássy Note was ineffective. Neither its terms nor the implicit Great Power guarantee of reforms convinced the insurgents to lay down their arms and the refugees to go home, or enabled the Ottoman central government to implement reforms. The failure of the Note, combined with the killing in early May of the French and German consuls in Thessaloniki led to the Berlin Memorandum—proposal put forward exclusively by Germany, Russia and Austria-Hungary. For the first time, however, the Berlin

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Memorandum explicitly discussed refugees. In fact, at its most basic level, it framed the Eastern Question as a question of refugees. The memo argued that because the Porte had officially communicated its agreement to the terms of the Andrássy Note, the Great Powers had acquired the “moral right” to watch over the execution of the note’s terms. They had also acquired an obligation—that of “insisting that the Insurgents and Refugees should second this work of pacification by terminating the struggle and returning home.”¹⁰⁹ This was to be accomplished by means of a two-month armistice. During this time, the Ottoman state would supply material to rebuild houses and churches, as well as food for subsistence. It would also distribute aid via mixed Muslim-Christian commissions. This was all to happen under foreign consular supervision.¹¹⁰ It was these terms, in part, that prevented Britain from agreeing to the Berlin Memorandum. Benjamin Disraeli, the British Prime Minister, believed it “impossible for the Sultan to reconstruct the houses and churches of the insurgents, or to find food for the refugees,” and that a relief commission as proposed would be a “huge system of indiscriminate almsgiving, totally beyond the power of the Porte to effect, and utterly demoralizing to any country.”¹¹¹ The refugee question had become the stuff of high diplomacy, and the diplomatic solution to it, Disraeli worried, would break the Ottoman state.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 2459-63.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Disraeli quoted in Harris, A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878: The First Year: 307. The language fits nearly identically with that of the British response to the Berlin Memorandum, Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty; Showing the Various Political and Territorial Changes Which Have Taken Place Since the General Peace of 1814, 4: 2464-68. Ottoman and consular officials made numerous attempts to calculate the costs of returning the refugees and maintaining them for a full year, until the following harvest season. Vasa Efendi, the reform commissioner in Hercegovina, reckoned the sum at two million Turkish Pounds. Document 491, Holmes to Derby, 20 III 1876. “Further Correspondence Respecting Affairs in the Herzegovina,” British Foreign Office Confidential Print (London: British Foreign Office, 1876).
Up to the middle of 1876 the diplomacy focused to a great extent on the issue of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Austria-Hungary tried to link the growing violence in the provinces and the refugee question together as a subject of Great Power negotiations. By late spring and early summer however, the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina had metastasized, with new violence springing up across the Balkans. The so-called Bulgarian Horrors were drawn to Europe’s attention in June and July 1876 through the reports of Edwin Pears and Januarius MacGahan, leading to outrage in Europe and a growing anti-Ottoman sentiment, especially in relatively turcophile Britain. At the start of May, Christian mobs in Thessaloniki seized a girl who was converting to Islam; one day later, Muslims attacked and killed the German and French consuls, who had been offering the girl protection. In Istanbul, Abdülaziz replaced Nedim Paşa with Mehmed Ruşdi Paşa as Grand Vizier, and Hussein Avni Paşa was sent to the military office.

On 30 May 1876—the same day the Berlin Memorandum was to be presented to the Sultan, a reformist wing within the Ottoman government deposed Abdülaziz and installed Murad V. Two weeks later a Circassian refugee broke into a meeting of the Council of Ministers and began to shoot, killing Hussein Avni and Rasid Paşa. On 2 July 1876, Serbia began military operations against Ottoman forces along its borders. In a matter of two months, the troubles in the Balkans had gone from a seemingly containable uprising in Bosnia and Herzegovina to war in Serbia, an uprising in Bulgaria, and a diplomatic rupture that threatened another all-European war. As important as the refugee

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question in Bosnia and Hercegovina had been in the early days of the uprising, the outbreak of war between Serbia and the Ottoman Empire forced a re-orientation of Great Power diplomacy. Its failure and Ottoman diplomatic assertiveness despite a weakening domestic environment eventually brought Russia to war with the Ottoman Empire, and the Russian army almost to the gates of Istanbul.

The Berlin Memorandum spelled out the stabilization of Bosnia and Hercegovina based on a ceasefire and refugee return and was the pinnacle of refugee diplomacy during the uprising. Although the memorandum set terms that were invoked in later negotiations, it was not until the preparatory negotiations for the Berlin Congress that refugees would return as a central feature of Great Power negotiations. The failure of the memorandum, notes Langer, marked a turning-point in the crisis after which Russia was unable to restrain Serbia and Montenegro’s action.\(^{114}\) Great Britain had broken “the European Concert, whatever it was worth.”\(^{115}\) Up until the memorandum, diplomacy had centered on the re-establishment of the \textit{status quo ante} in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Henceforth, international negotiations sought to end the Serbian-Ottoman war and to prevent Russia from entering into war with either Austria-Hungary or the Ottoman Empire. For the time being, Disraeli’s rejection of the memorandum seemed to have prevented Istanbul from being “‘garrisoned by Russia, and the Turkish fleet [from being] placed under Russian protection’”\(^{116}\). The refugee question was big enough to break the Concert of Europe.

\(^{114}\) Ibid., 83.


\(^{116}\) Disraeli, quoted in Langer, \textit{European Alliances and Alignments 1871-1890}. 86.
Russia and Austria-Hungary quickly began mending fences after Serbia went to war with the Ottoman Empire. On 8 July 1876, a week after Serbia’s declaration of war, the two empires struck a secret, verbal deal over the outcome of the war. According to the terms of the Reichstadt agreement, an Ottoman victory would result in no net gain for the empire, but also the introduction of reforms based on the Andrásy Note. An Ottoman defeat, however would divide the Balkans. Serbian and Montenegrin territorial expansion would be limited, thereby assuaging Habsburg concerns over the creation of a large south-Slavic state. Russia would occupy Bessarabia and some territorial extension in Asia Minor. Minus some territory that would go to Serbia and Montenegro, Austria-Hungary would get Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹¹⁷ The terms of Reichstadt were subsequently refined in two secret conventions in 1877, as Russia moved ever closer to war with the Ottoman Empire. The Habsburgs were to offer Russia a benevolent neutrality, and would be allowed to occupy and then annex Bosnia and Herzegovina at a time convenient to them. In case of a Russian victory, the eastern Balkan vilayets might become independent states but a large Slavic state would not be formed. Istanbul could become a free city.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁷ Reichstadt was a verbal agreement that was later written down by Andrásy and Gorchakov, the Russian foreign minister. There are two written versions of the text and they are at odds with each other on several points, including the exact amount of Bosnia and Herzegovina Austria-Hungary would occupy. The central concern though, remains the same: the division of the Balkans according to Russo-Habsburg interests. The texts are printed side-by-side in Sumner, Russia and the Balkans.

¹¹⁸ These agreements were the Budapest Conventions, agreed first on 15 January 1877, with a second, more detailed addition from 18 March 1877, but antedated to 15 January. Both conventions also made Serbia, Montenegro and the Sancak of Novi Pazar a neutral zone neither power could invade and limited any military action by Serbia and Montenegro—Russia had, “at least by implication, recognized Serbia as falling with the orbit of Habsburg power.” M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question, 1774-1923: A Study in International Relations (New York: Macmillan; St. Martin’s Press, 1966). 193-94. The full text of both conventions may be found in Alfred Francis Pribram, The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary 1879-1914 (New York: H. Fertig, 1967). Benevolent neutrality meant Austria-Hungary pledged itself to “paralyze, so far as this lies in its power, efforts at intervention or collective mediation which might be attempted by other Powers,” would accept the closing of the Danube as a necessary and temporary measure, and would use its rails and rolling stock to provide humanitarian assistance and temporary ambulances to wounded Russian troops. Ibid., 195-97.
At Reichstadt, Austria-Hungary had won a guarantee for a step that Andrásy, at least, did not yet want to take. Despite the pressure from within the government and from Emperor Franz Josef himself, Andrásy’s foreign policy through 1876 and into the early months of 1877 still focused on the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire. On the surface, Reichstadt appears to have been a deal in which, as Mihailo Stojanović writes, “the latent antagonistic interests which divided Russia and Austria in Bosnia found satisfaction in the break-up of Turkey.”\(^{119}\) Yet the agreement is best seen as a contingency plan that guaranteed the Habsburg southern border against the formation of a large Slavic state, and the further encroachment of Russian sympathy.

By the end of 1876, Bosnia and Hercegovina were no longer the primary question in the Eastern Crisis. The violence continued and refugees kept fleeing from the provinces throughout 1877, but the problems in the provinces had already been defined by international agreement if not circumstances on the ground, and so too had the range of possible solutions. Failing an Ottoman-led restoration of peace, the Andrásy Note and the Berlin Memorandum served as clear guidelines and expectations for the Great Powers. Reichstadt, though secret, had to some extent quarantined the Bosnian and Hercegovinian question from Habsburg-Russian relations. Serbian military setbacks did, however, strain the Reichstadt agreement: growing pan-Slavic pressure on the Russian government was pushing for a unilateral Russian intervention that could, depending on its outcome, have resulted in a Russian war with Austria-Hungary.\(^{120}\)


\(^{120}\) Anderson, *The Eastern Question, 1774-1923: A Study in International Relations*: 186-88.
In the event, it did not come to war. Neither Bosnia and Herzegovina nor the refugees figured prominently in the big diplomatic events leading up to the Berlin Congress. Instead of war, Serbia’s military setbacks led to a Great Power conference in Istanbul at the end of 1876 to which the Ottomans agreed only under the threat of Russian military action. The so-called Constantinople Conference (Tersane in Turkish, after the actual location of the conference) bundled the Bosnian and Hercegovinian question into a larger packet of reforms for the Ottoman Empire and the Balkans in particular. Indeed, the real questions in Constantinople were about the shape of an autonomous Bulgaria (and therefore the extent of Russian influence in the Balkans) and how it would be governed.\textsuperscript{121} For all of the provinces the Great Powers demanded, among other things, the introduction of an international commission that would approve the appointment of governors for five-year terms and monitor the implementation of reforms, mixed representative assemblies.\textsuperscript{122} Specific to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Powers wanted improvements to the agricultural system and the acquisition of land by the state for refugee repatriation. The legwork for these demands had all been conducted before the actual conference began, and in the absence of Ottoman delegates. When the conference officially started, however, the Ottomans surprised the Great Powers by announcing a constitution as well as a representative imperial parliament; they also rejected the terms...

\textsuperscript{121} The centrality of the Constantinople Conference to the establishment of Bulgaria is frequently underestimated. The big debates over the division of Bulgaria into two provinces, over Russian oversight, and governing structures took place in Constantinople, not in Berlin; this would later prove to be an annoyance for Austria-Hungary (see Chapter Four). The San Stefano preliminary treaty, in this respect, reflected Russia’s aspirations going into the Constantinople Conference; Berlin more closely represented the outcome of the Conference. For an overlooked but insightful analysis, see William Gauld, “The Making of Bulgaria,” History X (1925).

\textsuperscript{122} These assemblies already existed and were, contrary to contemporary understanding, not entirely dysfunctional. See Grandits, “Violent Social Disintegration: A Nation-Building Strategy in Late-Ottoman Herzegovina.”
laid before them.\textsuperscript{123} Ironically, it seems that several months later, it was the parliament that became the obstacle to agreeing to much watered-down terms that might have prevented war with Russia. The young Abdülhamid, installed in September as the last of 1876’s three sultans, later claimed it was the Bosnian deputies in particular who prevented him from reaching an agreement with the Great Powers: the Bosnians refused any territorial concessions to Montenegro.\textsuperscript{124}

Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire on 24 April 1877, claiming that it did so only in order to carry out the Great Power decisions the Ottomans had repeatedly rejected. The Ottoman army was able to stall the Russian advance at the fortress in Plevna, which held out against the Russian siege from July to December; after Plevna fell the Russian forces advanced quickly. They reached Edirne by the end of January, when an armistice was signed; but the army continued its advance, stopping just short of Istanbul on 23 February 1878 in the village of San Stefano, now Yeşilköy. The terms of the preliminary peace of San Stefano were harsh. In addition to independence for Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia, territorial revisions would further encroach on Ottoman lands. Russia claimed territorial indemnities for itself including parts of Dobrudja it planned to trade with Romania for parts of Bessarabia. Ottoman fortresses on the Danube were to be destroyed. Russia imposed its maximalist vision for a greater Bulgaria as an autonomous tributary principality with a Christian government. Bosnia and Hercegovina were to be administered according to the terms set forth at the


Constantinople Conference, with any modifications being agreed to by the Porte, Russia and Austria-Hungary. Until 1 March 1880, the Bosnian and Hercegovinian tax revenues would be “exclusively applied to indemnify the families of refugees and inhabitants, victims of recent events, without distinction of race or creed...” Refugees were back on the agenda, but the “Ottoman Empire in Europe was practically annihilated.”

The other Great Powers very quickly demanded revisions to Russia’s proposed settlement, and it was for this purpose a congress was called in Berlin in May and June of 1878. The terms of the Berlin Treaty and the negotiations leading up to it are discussed in detail in Chapter Four of this thesis, with a particular focus on how refugees fit into the tactics and the larger strategic goals of Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. Much of the scholarly literature on the Berlin Treaty is both good and dated; recent work has tended to view the Berlin Treaty as a turning point: one that established the world of nation-states and, therefore, ethnic cleansing or, viewed from the other direction, one that institutionalized the idea of minority protection—with all of its weaknesses. There is a lot of truth to this assessment, and the failures of the post-Berlin order are evident. Yet there is also an oversimplification that accompanies some of this analysis. Most basically, there is a tendency to overlook the fact that, however narrow the purpose, the Berlin Treaty succeeded in its main mission. The terms of the treaty prevented a major European

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125 Edward Hertslet, *The Map of Europe by Treaty; Showing the Various Political and Territorial Changes Which Have Taken Place Since the General Peace of 1814*, vol. 4. 2672-2696.


war for thirty-six years—making it much more durable than either of the Paris Treaties that flanked it, and nearly as long lasting as the decision at the Congress of Vienna.

Continuing in this vein, it is easy to overlook the very conservative aspect of the Berlin Treaty. Yes, it did create new nation-states, and it was devastating to the Ottoman Empire. The Balkans had been some of the Empire’s richest territories, and their loss shifted the economic and geographical center of the empire east. The demographic changes—in particular the concentration of the Muslim population—had wide-ranging effects on the empire’s political and social development. Yet the goal in Berlin was not to dismantle the imperial order, but to preserve it. One way of doing this was through the use of “autonomy.” In the scholarly literature on Berlin autonomy is often equated with independence, but it most clearly was not. From the Constantinople Conference forward, the nature and dimensions of autonomy—cultural, administrative, or political—were constantly debated. Similarly, the territorial and boundary revisions in the Balkans under the treaty of Berlin were to a great extent not based on a “national principle”—and were at the time understood in this manner. The extent to which territorial revision at Berlin appeared to be much more like traditional post-conflict horse-trading than the creation of national boundaries infuriated the Russians, who had argued in Constantinople and again in San Stefano for a “national” Bulgaria:

Count Schouvaloff adds that Lord Salisbury’s desire to see religious liberty extended as much as possible in [European and Asian provinces of the Ottoman Empire] appears to him quite justifiable. His Excellency would wish that mention should be made in the Protocol of his adhesion to the wish of the British Plenipotentiary, and remarks that the Congress, having sought to efface ethnographical frontiers, and to replace them by
commercial and strategic frontiers, the Plenipotentiaries of Russia are all the more anxious that these frontiers should not become religious barriers.\textsuperscript{128}

It is in this light that the Habsburg occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina should be seen, and that the repatriation and return of the provinces’ refugees should be understood. The occupation of the provinces while they remained under Ottoman sovereignty was cynical, and the Habsburgs wasted no time in making themselves feel at home. At the same time, however, the occupation was deeply conservative: there was, for example, no major revision to the provinces’ boundaries, and the repatriation of the refugees was an expectation after the occupation just as it had been before the occupation. If Berlin was an attempt to modify an imperial system in order to preserve it, refugee return was part of an attempt to preserve a demographic order.

**Organization of the Dissertation**

This dissertation is arranged chronologically and thematically, thanks in part to the fact that the central themes under consideration arose at different points during the course of the uprising. As a result, there are occasional and necessary overlaps in the contents of the individual chapters.

Chapter One examines Austria-Hungary’s establishment of a state-run refugee aid regime. It looks at the historical precedents of the refugee aid program by examining the state system from several different angles. Arguing that the program was constrained by costs, domestic politics, and international considerations, the chapter explores how state refugee aid developed from earlier schemes that, while aimed at helping people crossing

\textsuperscript{128} “Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin with the Protocols of the Congress,” House of Commons Command Papers (London, 1878), 93.
to Austro-Hungarian soil from Bosnia and Hercegovina, had only been applied in much smaller refugee events. The refugee aid system worked much like poor aid and brought with it a similar set of expectations including fixity of the recipient and the expectation that the “able-bodied” must work. The chapter also suggests the political dimension of refugee aid played an important role in domestic expectations and diplomatic undertakings.

Chapter Two takes up the question of civic refugee aid on the Habsburg side of the border and its relationship both to the state and to the broader “international community.” The chapter examines the activities of local philanthropists and refugee aid committees, many of which were active in supporting the insurgency along with aiding the refugees. Secular philanthropic organizations were only beginning to emerge in Croatia at the time of the uprising, and non-state refugee aid became closely intertwined with this process. Yet it is the links between philanthropic societies, the insurgency itself, and foreign humanitarians that form the core part of this chapter. By examining the ways in which local and foreign humanitarians worked together to determine the nature of humanitarian aid and the extent of what civic activism could provide, the chapter argues that local circumstances helped to define the very nature of “humanitarianism,” and the extent to which it should limit itself to caritative initiatives for “innocent victims,” or should be viewed as a proper part of violent paramilitary resistance.

Chapter Three is a case study in refugee management, and examines the joint Habsburg-Ottoman effort to return and resettle refugees back in Bosnia and Hercegovina in the first half of 1876. It is particularly concerned with the interaction between the international commitments and bilateral diplomatic processes between the Habsburg and
the Ottoman Empires on the one hand, and the reality of efforts by the central
governments to manage the various populations along their shared borders and
successfully to carry out the repatriation. The chapter sees both governments’ inability to
control events and even the activities of their own officials along the border as a key
obstacle to the success of the repatriation undertaking, along with fundamental lack of
understanding of the extreme nature of the situation. The Habsburg and Ottoman hope
that diplomatic agreements and Great Power guarantees of security would encourage the
refugees to return home were misplaced. Nevertheless, the plans that were put in place to
enable the return and resettlement of the refugees helped not only to define the nature of
the refugee problem, but also to create bureaucratic expectations and definitions for the
“refugee” as a category.

The period between the outbreak of war between Serbia and the Ottoman Empire to
the closing days of the Russian-Ottoman War saw little change in the situation for the
Bosnian and Hercegovinian refugees on Habsburg territory. Their relative importance on
the international stage was minor in comparison with the events taking place in the
eastern Balkans. Chapter Four skips forward to late 1877 to pick up the narrative in the
closing days of the Russian-Ottoman War, when the mass flow of Muslim refugees from
Bulgaria had all but obscured the visibility and the international importance of the
Bosnian and Hercegovinian refugees. This chapter argues, however, that the refugee
question became a central point in Habsburg arguments for the legitimacy and necessity
of its occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina as would be framed in the Berlin Treaty.
Refugees were a language of convenience and conviction that, it was hoped, would
overcome domestic opposition to an occupation, while also strong-arming the Ottoman
leadership into “inviting” a Habsburg occupation. With the claim for an effective refugee return as a cornerstone of Habsburg legitimacy in the provinces, carrying out that return became an earlier and vital goal of the new Habsburg authorities. The chapter considers the circumstances, difficulties, and ultimate success of the final repatriation.
Chapter One

State-sponsored Refugee Aid:

The Tensions of a Regime

On 2 July 1875, the district commissioner of the Dalmatian border-town of Metković sent an urgent cable about disturbances in the neighboring Ottoman-held Hercegovina to Gabriel Rodich, the Governor-General of Dalmatia. The night before, two Muslims had reportedly attacked the Hercegovinian town of Dračevo, and although the attack was repelled, they had promised to come back another night “with a large number of Turks to [kill] all of the Christians.” After the attack, two of Dračevo’s young men had fled to join the insurgency, which at the time was just days old and still loosely organized. Before they left, the villagers also charged these men with escorting the women and children of the town across the border to safety. The commissioner in Metković had asked Rodich for instructions on what to do should Christians “flee to our territory.”

In his report to the Foreign Minister Andrássy, Rodich interpreted the event primarily as a security matter: “In expectation of further orders, I am telegraphing that Christians, after putting down their weapons, should not be denied passage [across the

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1 HHStA.PA XII 1875-1876, box 234, folder “Korr. mit FZM Rodich u. d. Statthaltierei in Zara, 1875-1876,” 02 VII 1875, Statthaltierei Dalmatiens/SHD Zara to Ministerium des Äusseren/MdÄ.
border], but in case of threatening news, I nevertheless believe that the military should be deployed to Metković in order to maintain our neutrality.”\(^2\) The foreign ministry approved the terms of refuge, as well as the planned deployment. Two days later, Rodich sent two companies of soldiers from Dubrovnik to Metković.\(^3\) Neither the flight nor the dispatch of troops to the border was out of the ordinary. Cross-border flight was not uncommon and there had been similar unrest before, most recently in 1873, but also in 1862, 1858, 1842 and earlier.\(^4\) The news from Metković brought no indication of the large-scale flight of refugees to Austro-Hungarian territory not just from Hercegovina, but also Bosnia. There was no indication that within a matter of months, General Anton von Mollinary, the commander of Croatia’s Military Border with Bosnia, would have cause to report that the “gravest event [of the uprising would] indisputably be the massive entry of Bosnian refugees onto Austrian-Hungarian soil, in a way it has not yet happened in this century.”\(^5\)

As more refugees arrived, regional officials began to make available regular cash payments to refugees for the purchase of food and other necessities. Although the central government responded quickly to the initial need by sending money, the initial response was haphazard. The response relied on precedents set during earlier small-scale crossings of refugees to the Habsburg side, and it was based on the assumption that the current

\(^2\) HHStA PA XII 1875-1876, box 234, folder “Korr. mit FZM Rodich u. d. Statthalterei in Zara, 1875-1876” 02 VII 1875, SHD Zara to MdÄ.

\(^3\) HHStA PA XII 1875-1876, box 234, folder “Korr. mit FZM Rodich u. d. Statthalterei in Zara, 1875-1876” 05 VII 1875, SHD Zara to MdÄ.


\(^5\) HHStA PA XL 1875, box 133, folder “Agramer Generalcommando,” 23 IX 1875, General Kommando/GK Agram to Hofburg.
refugees would soon return home. At first, the central government did not develop an 
over-arching policy towards aid, nor did it put in place a centralized infrastructure for its 
distribution. Instead, it exercised control mainly with its purse strings, and allowed local 
officials leeway regarding who was given aid and how money was spent. Over the three 
years from the start of the uprising in 1875 to the Austro-Hungarian military occupation 
of Bosnia and Hercegovina in 1878, the government spent over ten million gulden on aid.6

Yet despite the public aid effort and the work of private charities, the suffering was 
great. Payments, especially in winter, were seldom sufficient to stave off hunger; 
epidemic diseases thrived in over-populated borderlands, and ravaged the starving, the 
shelterless, and the weak. When government officials began to produce detailed statistics 
in 1876, the data showed mortality rates among the refugees of 7-10%, although it is 
unclear how reliable these data are.7 In his memoir, Mollinary refers to a mortality rate—
at least early on—of 22%.8 Others estimated the rate to be even greater. Paulina Irby, a 
British do-gooder who worked with refugees and established schools for their children,

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6 This figure is from Mollinary’s memoir; Finance Ministry Archives are not complete but can confirm:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>475,810fl 09.0kr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876</td>
<td>2,122,097fl 00.5kr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>519,727fl 52.0kr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1877</td>
<td>3,200,000fl 00.0kr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>900,000fl 00.0kr</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


7 FA 4.1 PR 95, 08 I 1877, Krauss to MdÄ, et al. Some of these figures were also made public. The Zagreb-based newspaper *Obzor* published tables showing refugee population and death rates by county, based on data Mollinary provided. *Obzor* 152, 6 VII 1876. Quoted in Dragutin Pavličević, “Odbori za pomaganje i bosanski prebjezi u sjevernoj Hrvatskoj tijekom Bosansko-Hercegovačkog ustanka 1875-1878,” *Radovi (Sveučilište u Zagrebu—Institut za Hrvatsku Povijest)* 7(1975): 242-43. Pavličević points out that the data came from only those counties in military Croatia with the largest number of refugees.

put the mortality rate as high as 50%. Contextualizing such numbers is difficult. Interior Minister Josef Lasser response to the Imperial Finance Minister Leopold von Hofmann’s concerns over increasing costs as winter approached was telling: “The answer to the question, how much and what kind of subventions should be made available, and to what level suffering can be brought,” wrote Lasser, “is first of all a matter of foreign policy [...]” From the perspective of the government, absolute numbers mattered little. The need for government aid was not to be judged according to any direct measure such as the success or failure of keeping people alive, but rather by the indirect measure of just how much suffering the international political situation would allow.

This tension between foreign policy and domestic affairs would be the defining characteristic of the Austro-Hungarian refugee aid project throughout the period under consideration. For Andrássy’s diplomacy, co-operating with the Ottomans to pacify the insurgent provinces and return the refugees was the primary concern. But the necessity of responding to the growing number of refugees who were actually present on Habsburg soil, were in need of help, and were unwilling to return to Ottoman territory was an

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9 Evans, *Ilyrian letters: A Revised Selection of Correspondence from the Ilyrian Provinces of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania, Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia, Addressed to the Manchester Guardian During the Year 1877*. This last number seems suspiciously high. Irby was in the business of raising money for her efforts, and high numbers could only have helped her cause. Moreover, she was assisted in her efforts by Florence Nightingale, the Grand Dame of Britain’s humanitarian export industry. Nightingale at one point crossed out a bit of copy from one of Irby’s reports that she found to be unsatisfactorily harrowing, writing below it “How many lies I have told.” See Anderson, *Miss Irby and Her Friends*.

10 Prisoners of war—another large and temporary population requiring care—offer one possibility for comparison. The range is great: French POWs in Bavaria during the Franco-Prussian war had a mortality rate of 3.8%; In the Great War, the rate ranged from about 3% for German POWs in Britain to some 20% for Austro-Hungarians in Russia. For the Franco-Prussian case, see Katja Mitze, “Seit der babylonischen Gefangenschaft hat die Welt Nichts derart erlebt,” in *In der Hand des Feindes: Kriegsgefangenschaft von der Antike bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg*, ed. Rüdiger Overmans (Köln: Böhlau, 1999), 247. For POWs in the Great War, see Rüdiger Overmans, “In der Hand des Feindes: Geschichtsschreibung zur Kriegsgefangenschaft von der Antike bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg,” in *In der Hand des Feindes: Kriegsgefangenschaft von der Antike bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg*, 9.

11 FA 4.1 PR 159, 28 XI 1876, Ministerium des Inneres/MI to RFM.
inseparable aspect of this foreign policy. As this chapter demonstrates, Andrásy saw aid itself as a potential tool of foreign policy. Used properly, the alleviation of suffering could encourage the gratitude of the refugees toward the Habsburg Empire. This in turn would strengthen Austria-Hungary’s strategic position in the Balkans not only with regard to the Ottoman Empire, but also with regard to the growing Serbian irredentism and Russia’s efforts to broaden its sphere of influence.

At the same time, the international nature of the refugee flight circumscribed the domestic response to the refugees. Many Ottoman subjects—even those in need—who crossed to the Habsburg border saw the category of “refugee” as a useful expedient while they organized paramilitary actions and sorties back into Bosnia and Herzegovina. When regional officials began distributing aid to the needy, it became apparent that in the new circumstances of mass flight and disorganized cross-border violence, the international characteristics of the refugee had not yet been determined. The question of definition was, however, vital and played directly into Habsburg foreign policy making and international responsibilities. The problem was how to distinguish between refugee and rebel. The first response, taken as a matter of course, was to collapse any distinction between the two by making further participation in the rebellion impossible. All who crossed over onto Austro-Hungarian territory were to be disarmed and removed from the immediate border zone. The policy did not end cross-border traffic, and officials in Vienna were aware that implementation had been a failure. Nevertheless, the foreign ministry needed to maintain Habsburg neutrality with regard to the insurgency, and the policy did express a commitment, at least in form, to international laws of neutrality.
Neutrality became a key consideration in Habsburg refugee policy. Just one year before the uprising started, an international conference in Brussels had produced a “Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War,” an unratified document that nevertheless reflected a new sentiment on the part of European states towards a multi-lateral regulation of such matters as occupation, weaponry, the obligations and rights of neutral parties, and the treatment of prisoners of war. The new international consciousness of neutral powers’ obligations re-invigorated long-standing general practice, including a “growth in importance of the principle that neutral sovereigns must take scrupulous care to prevent their territories from being used by one belligerent as a base of hostile operations against the other.” The inability to control exactly this sort of activity dogged Austria-Hungary throughout the uprising, and weakened its diplomatic position. Andrásy and other central government officials may have framed their concern over the failure to enforce border controls in the language of international obligations, but these very obligations would also help to fix patterns of refugee aid and population management that would persist throughout the uprising.

International expectations may have demanded a refugee management based on border control, but domestic policy also placed limitations on refugee management. Andrásy’s expectation that the refugees would not long remain in Austria-Hungary thwarted any long-term planning for their care. The devastating effects of this were evident in the death rate of the refugees, but more pertinently for leaders in Vienna, in the


ledgers of the finance ministry. The 1873 stock-market crash and European economic downturn had further undermined the already weak financial stability of the Empire. The foreign ministry had some discretionary funds available to help pay for refugee aid, but the complicated politics of the dual monarchy’s parliamentary system made securing large sums over the long term difficult. In these circumstances, finances were a central consideration in refugee aid policy and the limiting factor in its development. The hard truth was that as far as domestic policy was concerned, the main way the central government viewed refugees was as a budgetary issue. This concern over expenditures on refugee aid was myopic to the point of being self-defeating, and the unwillingness or political inability of the government to make plans even for the medium term ultimately incurred further costs, for the care of refugees, for the care of the local population, and for ancillaries such as public health measures.

The regional officials were the most familiar with the sentiment of the local and fleeing populations, and with their material needs. It was General Mollinary who had first grasped that the rapid population increase in the Croatian and Dalmatian borderlands would, without government intervention, undermine social stability and endanger public health and safety. Andrássy acknowledged the danger, but gave it little priority as he worked towards a diplomatic solution, which failed in part because he had turned a blind eye to the warnings from regional officials that the refugees would not return under the terms they had been offered. The failure did, however, force the government to pay greater attention to the actual situation on the ground. In late 1876, it sent an inspector to the borderlands to obtain both an independent assessment of the condition of the refugees, and an evaluation of the systemic problems in the provision of aid. For the
central authorities this was an attempt to make the refugee population and the emergency aid project more legible, in the hopes that efficiencies might be found and costs reduced. The results of the inspection were surprising, and ultimately resulted in even higher costs to the state budget. But the inspection also marked a sort of turning point, where the government began to come to terms with the nature of its obligations for aid, as well as the nature of a new and thoroughly modern phenomenon: the mass exodus of refugees “in a way it has not yet happened in this century”, and even more, in a way that struck at the core of the nineteenth century notion of the refugee as the individual seeker of political asylum.

In his history of the Bosnian uprising, Milorad Ekmečić dates the actual start of the uprising not to July or August 1875 with the outbreak of a broader insurgency, but to April of that year, “when the first noticeable indication of [this] process was the flight of several peasant families [...] to the Austro-Hungarian side.”14 The first evidence of an uprising was not an outbreak of violence, but the flight of refugees.

From early on, Austro-Hungarian officials kept reasonably detailed records of the number of people who crossed over the border onto Habsburg territory, and the shift in the magnitude of the problem is neatly illustrated not just in the numbers themselves, but also in the way the bureaucracy kept track of them. Initially, Rodich and Mollinary reported to the foreign and war ministries in Vienna the number of refugees who crossed over during any given event, but as these grew in frequency and size, this was changed to

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reporting the numbers on a regular basis. Officials standardized the system of reporting to
the point that mechanically-reproduced blank tables and forms were distributed
throughout the provinces for local officials to fill in. The data on arriving refugees were
detailed, including the location and time of their entry onto Habsburg territory, their point
of departure, the number of people broken down into families, women, children, and
men. Later on, record-keepers further broke down the male population by their ability to
work or not. Some tables also recorded the number of livestock the refugees brought with
them.

By late September the Military Border alone had 23,000 refugees under Mollinary’s
charge, and there was no sign of a slowdown ahead. As a result, public spending on the
refugees grew rapidly, and the sheer number of people crowding the borderlands
threatened to undermine the security and health of the local population. There was a clear
and urgent need for some sort of long-term, aggressive solution to the problem. What
such a solution would look like, however, was another matter.

Austro-Hungarian management of the refugee crisis was multivalent, and all levels
of the bureaucracy were involved, from village administrators who counted heads and
helped distribute cash through Mollinary and Rodich, the senior officers on the ground,
up to Andrássy and Hofmann in the ministries in Vienna. Yet despite this bureaucratic
vertical integration, there were strong differences between Vienna on the one side and
Zagreb and Zadar on the other when it came to the goals of refugee policy-making, to the
sorts of pressures and priorities that formed these, and even to the simple understanding
of the nature of the situation. This gulf, however understandable or even necessary,
became one of the most important characteristics of the debate over what the best course
of action in aiding the refugees would be. For Vienna, the refugees were part of a greater problem of Ottoman weakness and a looming Balkan power vacuum. Although the Habsburg government took it for granted that it would offer the refugees some sort of support, the types of long-term solutions it sought were based on diplomacy and negotiated settlement. For the officials stationed in the border regions, the refugees were a problem much greater than had been expected, representing everything from an economic drain to a public health and security threat. While they too could hope for a negotiated solution, they were confronted by the limited means and the urgency of need far more than by the mechanics of Great Power diplomacy. The concern expressed in the solution from the region was to make aid sustainable by making refugees more self-sufficient. These modes of understanding were delimited early, and the solutions that were proposed reflect not only two competing sets of priorities among the actors involved, but also two competing sets of knowledge about the problem and the range of possibilities for a solution.

Mollinary was the first to put together a cogent and forward-thinking program for the management of the crisis. It came as early as September 1875, embedded in a situation report drafted at the request of the Emperor. Although much of the report was devoted to a sort of rough-and-ready assessment of refugee numbers, their origin, and the policy measures taken so far, Mollinary also provided a detailed analysis of the dangers inherent to the situation, and how the not-too-distant future was likely to unfold if the government did not take more aggressive measures. The essence of the argument was that the successes of the previous month in aiding and caring for refugees were not the result of a successful refugee aid program. Instead, these minor victories had been contingent
on a variety of external factors, and these, the report argued, would soon change for the worse. In the early stages of the crisis, the local population had warmly received the refugees, which Mollinary attributed to the locals’ compassion for their suffering Christian brothers. Surpluses of food were made available, as were places to sleep, and with an unusually abundant harvest of plums and maize in Slavonia, there was also seasonal agricultural work available for those able to accept it. The refugees, in turn, were grateful and respectful; the authorities received few complaints about crimes that refugees might have committed. What had been created, it seemed, was a sort of virtuous circle of generosity eliciting gratitude. Between the state aid and money sent to the refugees from private support committees, both in the region and abroad, efforts so far had been “successful at protecting even the poorest among them from adversity and want.”

The medium-term outlook, however, was grim. As the weather turned raw and the surplus food started to run out, Mollinary expected the locals would become stingier and the refugees more belligerent. Already, he had been forced to raise the base daily aliment from 7 kreuzer (kr) to 10kr, because the concentrations of people and aid money had started to feed through into localized inflation that would soon, he expected, adversely affect the local population’s buying power. The aid program as it had so far taken shape, he argued, would soon be unsustainable. As he explained to Andrássy, “irrespective of the material sacrifice that both the state and the population has made [...], this refugee invasion, as unexpected as it is massive, has suddenly created situations and relationships

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15 HHStA PA XL 1875, box 133, folder “Agramer Generalcommando,” 23 IX 1875, GK Agram to Hofburg.
which in the interests of the border region demand a rapid and satisfactory solution or regulation.”

There were any number of foreseeable problems. The housing stock was fine for warm weather, for example, but in winter, the local tradition had it that everybody would “retreat to a communal living- and sleeping-room. As a general rule, this is the only room that is heated and livable in winter.” There was no reason to expect local families would invite refugees to move into these crowded rooms, even if space were available. The refugees had brought with them many head of livestock, and these were believed to have been the vector for an outbreak of epizootic disease in three small villages in the Gradiška district. The epidemic had shut down livestock exports from the border region to much of the rest of the empire, and although local trade in animals remained lively, worries about disease were further depressing prices that were already low due to oversupply. Adverse market conditions, in turn, cast even larger doubt over the refugees’ ability to sustain themselves in the future. Mollinary also expected a drop in private donations as the numbers and length of stay grew would soon add further strains. The result of all this, he argued, would be twofold. First, crime would escalate as “numerous thieves and robber-bands are recruited from among the refugees.” And second, the state would have to pay higher alimentations, “which for the time being are only paid out to relatively few refugees, but presumably will need to be increased as soon as the refugees have eaten up their own provisions, and as soon as what the locals give them from their surpluses is depleted.”

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16 HHStA PA XL 1875, box 133, folder “Agramer Generalcommando,” 26 IX 1875, GK Agram to MdÄ.

17 HHStA PA XL 1875, box 133, folder “Agramer Generalcommando,” 23 IX 1875, GK Agram to Hofburg.
Mollinary based his report on direct observation and interviews that he and his agents had conducted with over 200 refugees. These interviews had convinced him that if the situation in Bosnia and Hercegovina had been dire enough for thousands of people to pull up stakes and head north to an uncertain future, then “at least in regard to the majority of the refugees, a timely return to their homes is not to be expected.” From this insight, and based on his expectation that circumstances would soon worsen, Mollinary proposed to the emperor that the government allow the refugees to settle on Habsburg territory. He suggested three possibilities: the establishment of independent colonies in sparsely populated areas; the attachment of semi-independent colonies to pre-existing villages; and finally the settlement of refugees in the existing population. The first two would lead to refugee self-sufficiency; with the third, refugees would “earn their support [from the state] by contracting as day laborers and etc.” He argued for the proposals based on historical precedent, and cited over a dozen examples of such colonization in the area, spanning from 1535 up to 1791.

Andrássy strenuously objected to any sort of colonization, and by the middle of October, he had denounced the plan to the emperor, and sent a critical analysis to Mollinary. Although he rejected the colonization plans out of hand, Andrássy never actually disputed the main thrust of the Mollinary report. He understood the implications

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18 These reports have been collected and published by Ilija Kecmanović. The line of questioning in the interviews is formalized, and for the most part focuses on what the refugees experienced in Bosnia. Many interviews were used to gain military intelligence. See Kecmanović, Izjave bosanskih izbjeglica o razlozima njihovog bjegstva iz Bosne u avgustu i septembru 1875. godine: (grada iz državnog arhiva u Zagrebu).

19 HHStA PA XL 1875, box 133, folder “Agramer Generalcommando,” 23 IX 1875, GK Agram to Hofburg.

20 HHStA PA XL 1875, box 133, folder “Agramer Generalcommando,” 23 IX 1875, GK Agram to Hofburg.
and dangers to public health and domestic social stability that Mollinary was predicting, and he even went so far as to compliment Mollinary for his detailed knowledge of refugee affairs. The cost of maintaining the refugees was an urgent and very real concern, taken up by the finance ministry and the parliamentary delegations, and financial matters figure prominently in the archival record. By November, even Minister-President Adolf Auersperg had accepted that Austria-Hungary’s parlous finances demanded an acceleration of the refugee return process, and he found himself “increasingly in agreement with the view of [Andrássy] and the finance minister, that in the interests of the finances, measures in this direction can only be very desirable.”²¹ Although Andrássy repeatedly used the empire’s financial difficulties to justify repatriation, the potential financial burden of colonization was conspicuously absent from the list of reasons for rejecting Mollinary’s plan. Cost, it seems, was not a viable argument against colonization, and a year later it would be claimed that maintenance was cheaper than coercion: an inspector sent to the border regions would report that “closing the border against further crossings would be practically impossible and would require much greater outlays than do the subventions [...].”²²

Instead of money, the real objection to the colonization plan was one of both domestic and international politics, and Andrássy wrote to Mollinary that “as your Excellency is no doubt aware, in situations similar to those today, the colonization question was a repeated subject of multiple and sober discussion, and [...] even the most

²¹ HHStA PA XL 1875, box 133, folder “k.k. Minister-Praesident fuerst Auersperg,” 6 XI 1875, Auersperg to MdÄ.

²² FA 4.1 PR 95, 08 I 1877, Krauss to MdÄ, et al.
benevolent intentions of the government in this direction constantly failed when it came to the practical execution.”

One potential problem was the moral hazard of providing permanent refuge, and the possibility that a generous refugee aid program might actually attract people who otherwise would not have left their homes. The Emperor mentioned the possibility of such a pull factor with regard to the care of soldiers who were expected to cross over after the outbreak of the Serbian-Ottoman war in 1876, but it seems here that Franz Josef, ever the soldier himself, was less worried about straining the budget than he was about tempting otherwise honorable soldiers into “effeminate” actions such as desertion and flight. Andrássy, in a similar context, was a bit more explicit about the danger with regard to civilians, and wrote, “we would only run the danger of encouraging the refugees to cross over, if we should not decisively and consequently reject any claims [to aid] greater than the marginal necessity.” The concern was limited; the refugees’ general privation on Habsburg territory may already have been considered deterrent enough.

Push factors loomed larger. Andrássy perceived in the colonization plan a potential opportunity that he was certain the Ottomans would try to exploit. He wrote to Mollinary:

Now, it is hard to doubt that the Porte would exploit an action of ours such as the one you have endorsed [colonization], simply as a newly available opportunity to dispose of, as far as possible, the Christian population of their insurgent provinces, and through that to secure a numeric majority in favor of the Muslim element. A politics of the Porte that corresponds to that of Russia after its subjugation of the Caucasus and forces the Christians to emigrate would in no way be in our interests.

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23 HHStA PA XL 1875, box 133. folder “Agramer Generalcommando,” 23 X 1875, MdÄ to GK Agram.

24 For Franz Josef’s fear of luring soldiers into effeminacy, see Best, *Humanity in Warfar*, 157.


26 HHStA PA XL 1875, box 133, folder “Agramer Generalcommando,” 23 X 1875, MdÄ to GK Agram.
In the draft for a note sent to Auersperg on the same day, he went so far as to suggest a possible Ottoman “resettlement of the provinces” with Muslims, although this was crossed out of the final version. As Andrássy made clear in his note to Mollinary, this was not a humanitarian concern, but a strategic matter.

With [a population transfer], the only thing we would gain is that these people would be driven from places of residence where they can be and are of use to us, to residences where they could be only of questionable value to us. I must therefore emphasize that the refugees who are currently on Austro-Hungarian territory are to return to their home as soon as possible.

To Minister-President Auersperg, he described the population in Bosnia as “useful,” and able to “forward our interests”—as long as it remained at home and did not flee to Austria-Hungary.

From early on, Andrássy perceived not just the strategic importance of population movement, but also the propaganda power of aid. This understanding of the refugee population and, more generally, of the population of the insurgent provinces would become a definitive and abiding one. It was not an exclusionary definition; that is, seeing these populations in these terms did not on its own eliminate the possibility of seeing them as victims in humanitarian need. But the differences in approach encapsulated in the colonization versus repatriation debate illustrate an essential discrepancy: where officials near the border sought to address the forms of need, officials in Vienna were preoccupied

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27 HHStA PA XL 1875, box 133, folder “k.k. Minister-Praesident fuerst Auersperg,” 23 X 1875 MdÄ to Auersperg.

28 HHStA PA XL 1875, box 133, folder “Agramer Generalcommando,” 23 X 1875, MdÄ to GK Agram.

29 HHStA PA XL 1875, box 133, folder, “k.k. Minister-Praesident fuerst Auersperg,” 23 X 1875, MdÄ to Auersperg. Unlike the previous passage from this document, these words are not crossed out.
with the function of the needy. From the earliest days of the crisis, function was a
deciding factor in much of Andrássy’s thinking. This became particularly clear in early
September 1875, when Rodich relayed to Andrássy a request from Prince Nikola of
Montenegro for help in caring for the refugees then fleeing to what was, at the time, still
an Ottoman principality. Andrássy rejected Rodich’s suggestion that in the interests of
maintaining neutrality, Austria-Hungary would be best off secretly to “grant cash
subsidies and leave it to the prince to distribute.”

Nikola’s record of abusing Austro-
Hungarian cash aid was surely a factor in this, but Andrássy’s decision was mainly
motivated by his concern with keeping up appearances, and not only with the Porte.
Andrássy thought it best to send food, not money, to Montenegro, and as he wrote to
Rodich, “keeping this a secret is not necessary with regard to Turkey, and with regard to
the Christians it is downright undesirable.”

A day later, as they were clearing up the
details of the shipment, he reiterated that “this support in any case has to be in natura and
the shipment should not be dispatched in secret, but publicly, moreover very publicly.”

The strategy was designed to prevent Nikola from using the aid to boost his own
popularity among fugitive Hercegovinians, and Andrássy reported to the Emperor “it is
not our business to advance this agenda. We can [provide aid], however only with the

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30 HHStA PA XII, box 237, Varia Turquie V, 10 IX 1875, SHD Zara to MdÄ.

31 Wertheimer writes that Nikola had in the past secretly used Austro-Hungarian money to curry favor with
Albanians. Eduard Wertheimer, Graf Julius Andrássy, sein Leben und seine Zeit nach ungedruckten
Quellen, 3 vols., vol. 2 (Stuttgart: Deutsche verlags-anstalt, 1910). 266.

32 HHStA PA XII, box 237, Varia Turquie V, 10 IX 1875, MdÄ to SHD Zara.

33 HHStA PA XII, box 237, Varia Turquie V, 10 IX 1875, MdÄ to SHD Zara.
proviso that those affected by it know that the prince of Montenegro can help them only as long as Your Majesty helps them.”

The central flaw in Mollinary’s colonization plan was neither the financial cost, nor the threat of domestic instability, nor even the supposed past failures of similar attempts. It was that the international circumstances made it impossible. Andrássy’s early worries that the Ottomans would use the emigration to consolidate their hold on the provinces were unfounded. It was quickly apparent the real danger to the international system lay instead in the weakening or loss of Ottoman loss of control over the provinces. Colonization would destroy any hope of returning to the status quo ante. The only real proof of effective Ottoman rule was repatriation, which had the added advantage of further extending Austria-Hungary’s sphere of influence by sending the refugees home praising “Austria’s great Emperor for the blessings he had given them.” Or at least that was what was intended. In a remarkable failure to take account of Habsburg subjects’ moral and material support for the insurgency, of the often willful violation of border control protocol by local Habsburg officials, of the refugees resistance to return, and of their mistrust of the Ottoman capability to reform, Andrássy’s repatriation effort collapsed by mid-1876, not only underscoring the government’s inability to control the refugee population, but leaving it saddled with a fragmented and inefficient aid program of dubious value.

For officials in Vienna, the failure of the repatriation attempt marked a turning point. Although the ministers never seem to have given up hope that they might force a

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34 From an unprinted presentation, quoted in Wertheimer, *Graf Julius Andrassy, sein Leben und seine Zeit nach ungedruckten Quellen*, 2: 266.

35 Harris, *A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878: The First Year*: 347.
repatriation, and each subsequent spring saw renewed efforts, the failures of 1876 point to
the limits imposed by types of knowledge. Despite Mollinary’s warnings, the central
government did not come to terms with the reality that the refugees mistrusted Ottoman
reform promises and were resistant to going home. The failure of repatriation also
emphasized the need for a long-term approach to the care of refugees, and a greater
involvement of the central government in these activities. In the autumn of 1875,
Andrássy had rejected Mollinary’s proposals for the establishment of refugee colonies,
and in so doing had effectively rejected any medium- or long-term planning that focused
on the care and maintenance of the refugees. In the absence of such planning, however, a
variety of locally-specific systems for aid had developed, fed by constant payments from
the central government budget. The repatriation failure underlined the importance of this
aid, and forced the central government to re-consider its policies towards maintaining the
refugee population already on its soil.

The central government’s decision to outsource emergency relief to regional authorities
while it directed its efforts at repatriation offered the immediate and concrete advantage
of flexibility in the provision of aid. Just as Mollinary and Rodich were in a better
position to assess the likely success of terms of repatriation than were officials in Vienna,
they were also clearly better positioned to manage the rapidly changing demands of
refugee populations for emergency relief. Decentralization had a number of unintended
consequences, however, including sharp regional variations in aid levels and services,
and burgeoning costs that central government officials suspected were the result of
corruption and faulty distribution procedures as much as they were simply a manifestation of a growing refugee population.

The government had been providing emergency aid for the refugees from the earliest days of the crisis. Aid money initially came from the budget of the foreign ministry, and was transferred to regional officials—Mollinary and Rodich—for subsequent distribution to the refugees. Most aid was in fact provided to the refugees in the form of cash payments, and although the foreign aid to Prince Nikola of Montenegro clearly demonstrates that other forms of aid, such as food, were at least conceivable at the time, paying out cash seems to have been the current and accepted best practice. This was true of the cash aid payments made to earlier waves of Bosnian refugees in the Military Border and which would ultimately serve as a model for the system that developed there in 1875-1878; other contemporary examples of cash aid being used in other locations and contexts also exist. In Galicia, for example, the government was providing exclusively cash subsidies to villagers in the wake of a particularly bad harvest.36

For the refugees from Bosnia and Hercegovina, the central government did have some policy-related restrictions in place, and Andrássy’s concerns over the establishment of colonies or settlements may help to explain why the government provided very little in the way of housing for the refugees. But for the most part, Vienna’s control over Mollinary and Rodich was effected through financial measures, and there are numerous examples of either Mollinary or Rodich complaining of the need for funding over and above the budget that Vienna had already approved. There were also examples of

36 See, for example, a discussion of raising the aid package from 200,000fl to as much as 700,000fl in: Reichsrat Austria, Abgeordnetenhaus, *Stenographische Protokolle über die Sitzungen des Hauses der Abgeordneten des österreichischen Reichsrathes. VIII Session.* (Vienna: Kaiserlich-königliche Hof und Staatsdruckerei, 1876). 194 Sitzung der 8 Session, 29 II 1876.
autonomous, even defiant action. In November 1875, Mollinary had asked permission to transfer supplies of wool and fabric in the form of “unusable or barely usable blankets” from the local military warehouses to the refugees, who could “patch [the rags] into clothing that, after all, can still serve for the winter.” He also planned to use surplus wool to make a traditional moccasin called the opanka, which could be sold at a discount to refugees, or given to them in exchange for a corresponding deduction from their subsidies. Yet despite his hope that he could get a volume discount, the Minister of War was unwilling to let go of the used rags at anything but the market price—a slap in the face that was accompanied by Finance Minister Hofmann’s caution that approval for the plan would only come under the condition that “this cause [...] will not increase the foreign ministry’s expenditures.” For his part, Mollinary seems to have interpreted the warning liberally, and after buying the rags, he used foreign ministry aid money to buy an additional 1,600 useable blankets—at 85kr each—for distribution among the refugees as well. “...In the event that in the region under the command of this office the available supplies of expendable wool blankets is insufficient for the intended purpose, I will allow myself [...] to turn to other [military] bedding warehouses” and then, he wrote, he would present Vienna with the paperwork.

37 Mollinary planned to turn the border jails into opanka factories, although it is unclear whether he ever managed to do this. He intended then to sell the opanka at 95kr per pair, instead of the going rate of 1f 70kr per pair. The wool rags he proposed to buy from armories under his command at or below the surplus price of 23f 50kr per Zentner. KA Praes. Reihe 1875 90-1/6, 22 XI 1875, GK Agram to Kriegsministerium/RKM.

38 KA Praes. Reihe, 1875 90-1/6, 22 XI 1875, GK Agram to RKM; 27 XI 1875, RKM to GK Agram; KA Praes. Reihe, 1875 90-1/7, 01 XII 1875, MdÄ to RKM.

39 KA Praes. Reihe, 1875 90-1/6, 09 XII 1875, GK Agram to RKM.
Aid was a burden to the central government, and the costs of it played a role in policy-making at all levels. Although the shape of emergency relief was, in the broadest sense, outlined by the central government, the development of specific policy was for the most part determined at the regional level. There was a great variety in the methods of aid distribution, the levels of aid provided, and the efficacy of the aid. The death rate, that crude but essential metric for efficacy, varied considerably across the region. The fact was, the central government had little control over what was going on in the regions other than through finances. When the repatriation effort of 1876 collapsed, the government found itself faced with keeping the refugees on Austro-Hungarian aid for another winter, almost certainly sending the budget spiraling out of control, too. In an effort to limit the autonomy of action in the regions and to minimize the costs of refugee aid for another winter, Andrásy and Finance Minister Hofmann sent an inspector to tour the border regions. Baron Karl Krauss would function as an intermediary of sorts, a representative of the central government among regional officials. He became, in effect, Andrásy’s eyes in the region.

Although those first dispatches from Metković point to the beginnings of refugee aid for Hercegovinians arriving to Dalmatia, it is unclear just when officials in the military border began distributing aid to refugees arriving from Bosnia. By 22 August 1875, however, Mollinary referred to the existence of “norms [of care] for Christian refugees,” which apparently included a daily aliment of 7kr per person. Mollinary was drawing on earlier experiences with Bosnian refugees as a basis for his aid efforts, and requested

40 HHStA PA XL 1875, box 133, folder “Agramer Generalcommando,” 22 VIII 1875, GK Agram to MdÄ.
from the ministry of war in Vienna a copy of a rescript that laid down a rough set of regulations for dealing with refugees. This document had originally been sent to Military Border officials in 1854, following the “hard actions” of a certain Major Zezić against refugees—or potential refugees; it is unclear whether the people mentioned in the document ever made it to Habsburg territory. The instructions explicitly stated that Bosnian refugees were to be allowed over the border; “the selfsame shall not be forced to return to Turkey—just as they will not be hindered, if they voluntarily choose to go back to the other side.” Moreover, the document also points to a pre-existing tradition of handing out aid money: “The daily aliment of 4kr and respectively 2kr for children can, as always, be paid to the completely destitute arrivals.”

Officials distributed aid money according to families’ actual and anticipated need. It was expected that able-bodied refugees would work and earn their keep, while the state took care of those who were not expected to do so—the infirm, the elderly, women and children. Furthermore, aid was not provided to refugees who were capable of supporting themselves from the material goods they brought with them. This category was not fixed, and after exhausting their resources, refugees would then qualify for aid. Officials took into consideration any items that could be eaten or sold, but the most typical means of

41 A copy of the rescript is included in the folder KA 51-4/12, 1875. The 7kr (which would later be raised to 10kr) that Mollinary was paying in 1875 would have been the figure for adult refugees. Although the 50% discount for children remained standard between 1854 and the entire period under study, the sums are not directly comparable. The 4kr/2kr figure from 1854 is based on so-called Convention Currency; while the 7kr is based on the Gulden after it was revalued in 1857 against the North German Thaler. 4kr (CC) would have been worth 4.2kr (AC). Josef Reautschnig, *Geld, Gestern und Heute. Eine Dokumentation über das Geldwesen und die Währung in Österreich*, [1. Aufl.] ed. (Graz, Wien, München,: Universal Verlags- und Vertriebsgesellschaft, 1966). 31.
support was probably animals. Between 16 August and 19 September, 22,734 refugees crossed into Croatia and Slavonia; they brought with them 27,264 head of livestock.\textsuperscript{42}

Different methods for payment to refugees developed in the various regions, indicating little central control over the means of distribution. Although these differences seem to have been present from the start, as pressure for fiscal responsibility and cost cutting built, they became an increasing concern: “As far as the monitoring, the payment modalities, and the allocation of the assistance are concerned, it is to be noted that in Croatia and the Military Border all of the necessary precautions are being observed, in order to [...] prevent double participation and to get [the refugees] their assistance undiminished.”\textsuperscript{43} According to the established procedure in these two areas, officials gave the head of each refugee family a certificate on which every change of residence or aid status was to be recorded. Payments were made every ten days, although this was subsequently switched to fortnightly in order to ease the strain on over-worked local officials.\textsuperscript{44} The payment commissions were composed of the municipal board, two town elders, as well as two members of the local refugee community. In order to receive their aliment, refugees would present their certificate to the commission, which was not only subject to unannounced visits from higher military or political authorities, but also “took responsibility for the identity and the actual presence of the family members and for the payment through their signature.”\textsuperscript{45} Starting in the summer of 1876, the government also

\textsuperscript{42} HHStA PA XL 1875, box 133, folder “Agramer Generalcommando,” 23 IX 1875, GK Agram to Hofburg.

\textsuperscript{43} FA 4.1 PR 95, 08 I 1877, Krauss to MdÄ, et al.

\textsuperscript{44} FA 4.1 PR 198, 05 XII 1876, GK Agram to RFM.

\textsuperscript{45} FA 4.1 PR 95, 08 I 1877, Krauss to MdÄ, et al.
introduced the payment of *Schlafkreuzer*, or “bed-pence” which were seen as a means of transferring money to locals who housed refugees, as well as propping up the actual aid income of the refugees themselves. There was a special payment list for *Schlafkreuzer*, which were paid out on a monthly basis according to the status of refugees and only with confirmation from a landlord or other local provider of housing.\(^\text{46}\)

A different method developed in Dalmatia, where it was claimed that a system “involving a lot of paperwork would encounter local difficulties.”\(^\text{47}\) In the localities of Benkovac, Kotor and Knin, officials paid out the subsidies to the heads of refugee families at designated locations as a lump sum, rather than basing payments on headcount. In the area around Dubrovnik, the inaccessibility of the villages where the refugees lived made such a system impossible. Instead, the municipal chief, typically with the assistance of a member of the Gendarmerie, would take care of subsidy payments in individual districts. In the municipality of Dubrovnik, local authorities took care of the aid distribution directly. Frequently, it was noted, the subsidies in Dalmatia were “paid out by one person”—and therefore without any oversight.\(^\text{48}\)

In addition to differences among the method of payments, the amounts paid out also varied. While data lack for 1875, by 1876 there was a broad range to aid levels. In Civil Croatia, all refugees, regardless of status, received the full amount of 10kr per head per day. In Military Croatia, only those refugees unable to work—including women and children—received aid. The able-bodied, regardless of their actual employment status,

\(^\text{46}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{47}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{48}\) Ibid.
did not qualify. Finally, despite the harsh circumstances that awaited refugees in Dalmatia—or perhaps partly as a root cause of them—fugitive Hercegovinians typically received during the summer months anything from 3.5kr to 5kr. For that amount, refugees were unable to purchase sufficient maize to live on. Moreover, at least according to Arthur Evans, the correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, a number of refugees in Dalmatia were simply left out of the system: Austrian authorities “refused to register many [refugees] who live too near the Bosnian frontier” he wrote, and as a result, they “receive nothing at all.” And even for those who did receive aid, their “pittance is cut down by the villany and corruption of the official underlings who distribute it.”

Housing was a perennial problem, and particularly so in Dalmatia, where refugees lived out in the open, in tents, magazines, and even caves in the hills. Approaches to housing the refugees varied among the regions. In civil and military Croatia, for example, refugees were for the most part expected to make their own arrangements. The government essentially relied on the generosity of the local population to make space available in its own homes; *Schlafkreuzer* encouraged this. The situation in Dalmatia was somewhat different. There, the local population was either less willing or less able to lodge refugees than was its Croatian counterpart. As a result, refugees often ended up living in camps or other communal situations. In Dubrovnik, for example, some refugees

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49 Evans, *Illyrian letters: A Revised Selection of Correspondence from the Illyrian Provinces of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania, Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia, Addressed to the Manchester Guardian During the Year 1877*: 4.

were housed in the military hospital, which had previously served as a quarantine station. In winter, one of the market halls was also converted into a residence hotel.\textsuperscript{51} Other refugees were put into dormitories, known by the Turkish word \textit{han}, while refugees also established large tent-camps outside of the city walls. Among the tent camps, there was one on the Ploča, just outside the southern gate to the city, and another one north of the city. This encampment was visible to passengers arriving in Dubrovnik by sea, and even managed to become something of a tourist attraction, “counting for many as a truly interesting excursion, which never lacked for nerve-wracking circumstances.”\textsuperscript{52} Further out—and especially in the mountains—refugees lived in mean huts of stone or maize stalks they built for themselves.\textsuperscript{53}

The government’s unwillingness directly to provide housing for the refugees was a source of ongoing privation. The decision was based both on finances as well as the concern that such housing might offer a disincentive to return to Bosnia or Hercegovina. In the event, it was the local solutions and decisions that counted. Some of these, for example the use of the military hospital in Dubrovnik, were decisions taken by municipal officials responding to the needs of residents as much as the newcomers. The Military Border town of Petrinja, for example, took it upon itself to erect barracks capable of housing up to 640 people.\textsuperscript{54} The structure and possibilities of the Habsburg aid program

\textsuperscript{51} FA 4.1 PR 95, 08 I 1877, Krauss to MdÄ, et al.


\textsuperscript{53} FA 4.1 PR 95, 08 I 1877, Krauss to MdÄ, et al.

also created new opportunities. In Dalmatia, for instance, there were examples of refugees building their own huts in order to house themselves, but also in order to raise their alimentation by accepting Schlafkreuzer from other refugees.55

When the pacification and repatriation effort crumbled in 1876, Austro-Hungarian officials were confronted with the unwelcome prospect that the refugees would remain on Habsburg territory for another winter. This possibility raised a whole new set of questions, many of which were prompted by the troubles that the emergency relief program had encountered in the previous winter: from the start there had been concerns with fraud and the possible diversion of funds for purposes more warlike than feeding and clothing refugees. Disease also appears to have been rampant, and by early January 1876, some 700 people had died of various illnesses in the Lika district of Dalmatia alone.56 It was this period about which Mollinary later wrote that the death rate exceeded 22%, or one in every five.57

In Vienna, however, Foreign Minister Andrássy had already promised the budget committee of the Austrian and Hungarian parliamentary delegations a steady decrease and rapid end to the subsidies.58 That had been while he was still convinced that he could force a repatriation. But after the collapse of the return efforts, we can see two distinct

55 FA 4.1 PR 930b, 29 XI 1876, MdÄ to SHD Zara.
57 Mollinary, Sechsundvierzig Jahre im österreich-ungarischen Heere, 1833-1879, 2: 292.
shifts taking place in the dynamics of aid. In autumn, Mollinary and Rodich started to focus on the expectation that the refugees would remain on Austro-Hungarian soil through the winter, and that in order to maintain any sort of well-being, the aid effort would need to expand. Vienna’s goals were clearly at odds with this. Andrásy had already gone one round with the delegations, and he clearly did not relish the thought of trying to squeeze more money from them. There were also growing concerns about how the aid money was being spent, and he and Finance Minister Hofmann set about doing what they could to limit expenditures by exercising greater control and oversight over the entire aid process.

In September 1876, the central government initiated what would prove to be the most fundamental change, reflecting as it did both a general philosophy and a pragmatic goal. Mollinary had been receiving monthly payments of 100,000fl for the refugees, paid at the start of the month. But on 20 September, he reported that the most recent payment was depleted, and that he would need an additional 200,000fl. The number of refugees had reached 50,513; there was no reason to think they would return and every reason to think they would stay the winter; and come winter, aid would need to go to all refugees, regardless of their ability to earn, in order to head off disease and threats to public safety. As plausible as these reasons seemed, Andrásy wrote to Hofmann that he was considering rejecting them. “In no way am I inclined to accept the pronounced necessity [Mollinary claims] for the distribution of aid to all refugees regardless of their ability to earn, because the title of Bosnian refugee alone still does not carry with it a right to 10kr

59 Andrásy enumerates Mollinary’s concerns in a memo to Hofmann. FA 4.1 PR 5463, 27 IX 1876, MdÄ to RFM.
per head, and it is the duty of able-bodied men to seek employment.” He proposed instead tightening requirements, and perhaps even sending an inspectorate to the region to investigate the situation. And he rejected the additional 200,000fl payment, asking what Hofmann thought about a 100,000fl payment instead.

Up to this point the practice had been to encourage the able-bodied to seek work. Aid was given to those who could not work, and at least in the winter, to those who were physically capable of working, but had found no work to do. Yet until September 1876, this particular means of subdividing the refugee population had not actually been codified as an official policy measure. Rather, local officials maintained a certain degree of control over the process and were able to exercise some freedom in determining what sort of aid it was necessary to give and to whom. Hofmann’s response to Andrásy’s note closes that gap. “In my [...] view,” he wrote, “all refugees should be officially consigned to one of two groups, namely the Erwerbsfähig [those capable of earning] and the Erwerbsunfähig [those incapable of it].” Once that had been accomplished,

the alimentation would be distributed unconditionally to the Erwerbsunfähigen, while it would be paid to the Erwerbsfähigen only conditionally, and only until they found employment or were assigned it. The political organs in conjunction with the municipal representatives would hold responsibility for assigning work, and refugees who declined work that had been allotted to them would immediately lose their subvention.

Hofmann agreed with the idea of sending an official down to Croatia and Dalmatia. But “with regard to the unexpected additional payment [...] there is in my opinion no urgent

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60 FA 4.1 PR 5463, 27 IX 1876, MdÄ to RFM.

61 FA 4.1 PR ad 5463, 27 IX 1876, RFM to MdÄ. At various times, there were suggestions circulated that the government start public works projects such as road building that would employ the refugees and allow them to earn back the alimentations they received. I have found no evidence so far of any serious efforts in this direction.
need to release it immediately. Rather, its release should be dependent on the report that
the planned commissioner should prepare as soon as possible.”

Even as Vienna tried to contain costs, Mollinary and Rodich were coming under
increasing pressure to expand the aid programs. The pressure came from local officials
who dealt directly with refugees, and it came primarily as a result of a rapidly worsening
situation. Indeed, in early October 1876, Mollinary had sought to justify his requests for
more money by warning of a threatening “calamity as a result of insufficient food” for the
refugees, and argued that it was necessary to extend the alimentation payments to
Erwerbsfähigen as well. By the end of the month, he reported that in “the administrative
districts Unter Lapac, Udbina and Gračac [there had been] an alarming outbreak of
various epidemic diseases, such as typhus fever, smallpox, dysentery and etc.”

Rodich, facing similar problems in Dalmatia, had suggested at the start of October
that should it be necessary for the refugees to winter in Dalmatia, the government should
build barracks for them in addition to providing firewood and clothing, as well as
doubling the maximum alimentation to 20kr. In a note to Interior Minister Lasser,
Hofmann suggested rejecting the request, in part because “it is not entirely appropriate to
equip the refugees in such a manner that they feel positively settled in.” Nevertheless, his
response was not simply an automatic reaction against expanding refugee access to aid. It
was a reaction against expanding above-the-line, on-budget aid programs, and in an effort
to increase subsidies without upsetting the aid budget that had been approved, Hofmann

62 FA 4.1 PR ad 5463, 27 IX 1876, RFM to MdÄ.
63 FA 4.1 PR 198, 05 XII 1876, GK Agram to RFM.
went so far as to ask Lasser if there might not be another possibility, by having the interior ministry, for example, pay for public works projects that would provide job opportunities for *erwerbsfähig* refugees—a suggestion that Lasser said was not possible.64

It was the reports filed back by the central government’s own inspector, however, that undermined Vienna’s ability to cut spending. Krauss, the investigative commissioner proposed back in September 1876, left on his tour in early November and in a series of reports presented a broad and frank picture of the situation in Dalmatia, Croatia and the Military Border. It was these reports, prepared by an envoy of the central government, and not the regular updates provided by the regional administrators, that would compel the government to expand the aid program. The investigation resulted in several extra-budgetary deals to relieve general suffering, as well as an overall recommendation of additional spending on aid of 39,900fl per month.

The effectiveness of these reports in loosening purse strings was the result of several factors. Foremost among these was the collocation of witnessed suffering and governmental power. Krauss arrived in the region with not only an assignment to report, but also with some power to make and execute policy decisions. Moreover, he was in direct contact not just with the government, but with the Emperor, who, for example, authorized an agreement between Krauss, acting for the central government, and the city of Dubrovnik, by which the city would shoulder some of the responsibilities of aid distribution during the winter months. Krauss’s final report also differed from the sort of regular updates that Andrássy and Hofmann would have seen coming from the region up

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64 See FA 4.1 PR 159, 15 X 1876, RFM to MdI for an outline of the original Rodich request and Hofmann’s rejection; Lasser’s response is to be found in FA 4.1 PR 159, 28 X 1876, MdI to RFM.
to this point. It was significantly longer than earlier reports, running to 27 handwritten pages, and was a litany of concrete details of what has been done, what has worked, and what remains to be done. The situation had indeed worsened considerably, and as Mollinary would complain, Krauss showed up after more than two months had gone by without the central government providing any additional aid.

Krauss did not restrict his investigation to the situation of the refugees. The problem was of course central to his consideration, but he contextualized it further with the existing and potential knock-on effects of having such a large and sudden population growth with little physical or social infrastructure to support them. The crux of Krauss’s arguments relied as much on the danger to Habsburg subjects as it did on the misery of the refugees. Much of Krauss’s reporting focused on the sorts of description of aid payment methods and housing opportunities that have been discussed above. But he also went well beyond simple description of the situation and what had been done, and explored the possible reasons why “with such a large expenditure for the refugees, there is nevertheless constant complaining about the insufficiency of the subventions, and in reality the suffering of the refugees can grow to the point of an outbreak of epidemic typhus.”65 One of the key issues, he argued, was the unavailability of work. Because the refugee population was divided into groups that either received or did not receive subsidies based on their physical ability to work, the local labor market directly effected their standard of living. Krauss claimed that many of the refugees were unwilling to work; indeed he proposed that refugee families in Dalmatia who build their own huts should continue to draw Schlafkreuzer in the hope that “indolent refugees are animated to

65 FA 4.1 PR 95, 08 I 1877, Krauss to MdÄ, et al.
useful work that will bring them advantages.” The primary problem, he argued, was that the work available tended to be agricultural and therefore seasonal. Yet even during the summer months, employment was not guaranteed—especially in Military Croatia, where there was already a large excess of workers. The situation there had been particularly bad until Hofmann’s September decision; not only was there little work, but able-bodied refugees unable to find work still did not qualify for aid. That left them dependent on those family members who did qualify, which meant “in fact, nobody there receives the maximum subvention, but rather a significantly reduced payment.”

Malnutrition was the most immediate result of this, which in turn caused or aggravated the problems with disease. In Knin, in Dalmatia, the smallpox outbreak had reached epidemic proportions, and Rodich had obtained permission from Andrássy to dispatch a doctor with medicine, as well as to set the subvention at 10kr per person regardless of their situation. In Unter Lapac, Udbina and Gračac, where Mollinary had warned of typhus, doctors were also distributing medicine and the subventions had been raised. But in a short time, of 12,200 refugees, typhus had killed 413. The overall mortality rate in the Military Border was running at 8.83%. That was significantly lower than the 22% that Mollinary had talked about in the early days of the crisis, but it was still high, and the winter was just beginning. There were no data for Dalmatia, but Krauss wrote that he “found no family that had not mourned several deaths, and not one hut in which there was not at least one sick child.” He estimated mortality at a minimum of 10%.

66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
Also worrisome was that the typhus epidemic had killed a further 469 Habsburg subjects, out of a total population of 19,000. In the early phases of the crisis, the threat to the domestic population from the refugee crisis had been primarily conceived of in political terms: the refugees, it had been feared, would be a destabilizing element in Austria-Hungary, just as Austro-Hungarian citizens were contributing to the destabilization of Bosnia and Hercegovina. As early as October 1875, Mollinary’s memo to the Emperor had already proposed an alternative economic and public health framework for understanding the threat that the refugee population posed. Krauss’s report—coming a year after the initial forecasts—confirmed the outline of Mollinary’s predictions.

The sheer fact of a rapidly increased population density played havoc with the existing physical and economic infrastructure. In Civil Croatia, the 25,810 refugees meant an 18.5% increase to the existing population of 180,516; in Military Croatia, 53,474 refugees increased the population of 263,177 by 21%; and in the four districts of Dalmatia, there were 31,634 refugees among 126,500 locals, meaning that the population had grown by 24%. For Krauss, it was not the overall data that were particularly worrisome, but the local concentrations of refugees that these data did not reflect. Because of an Austro-Hungarian policy that forbid foreign clergy from practicing on Habsburg territory, refugees frequently ended up clustering in villages where they could find local clergy to tend to their spiritual needs.68 Other factors, such as geography or the overall hospitality of the local population certainly also played a role in determining local settlement patterns. Regardless of the reason, in some areas, the concentrations were

68 Ibid.
extremely high. In typhus-afflicted Udbina, the population density increased by almost 50%. In Stermica-Golubac in Dalmatia, there were 552 houses with 3,029 locals and another 7,829 refugees packed in; the Dalmatian village of Trnova, with 187 residents in 29 houses, was also housing 858 refugees.

With the cash-based aid regime firmly anchoring its recipients in the local economy, Krauss did not fail to see the deleterious effects of inflation about which Mollinary had warned over a year before. Inflation, Krauss pointed out, was affecting not just the refugees, but everybody, just as the increase in the number of livestock and the scarcity of good pasture was hurting all the animals. In some parts of Dalmatia there was not enough well-water to meet the new demand. He also pointed to serious, and fundamental changes in the micro-economies of villages in the border regions. “All along the border,” he reported, “there are stretches of land where the population lived in great harmony with the Turks on the other side, and had a robust trade, or held leases over property. The insurrection and its results have destroyed all of these relationships.” Only a handful of suppliers, most of them shipping goods to the insurgency, were still doing well. “Originally a victim of circumstance, the refugees are now a burden to all.”

Andrássy had rejected colonization for strategic reasons, but in the absence of an alternative, the Croatian and Dalmatian borderlands were nevertheless faced with a refugee settlement that had become an unmanageable burden on the budget. Krauss’s mission in the region was to bring a certain degree of order and standardization into the refugee aid regime, with the apparent expectation that in the long run this would allow for a reduction of the budgetary outlays. The results were, in fact, the opposite. Although his

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69 FA 4.1 PR 95, 08 I 1877, Krauss to MdÄ, et al.
reports pointed to a number of areas where better controls would likely reduce the
outlays, the overall effect was to increase the costs of refugee aid. This was justified by
paying attention not merely to the monetary costs of the refugees, but also to the social
costs of hosting them. By recasting the refugee crisis as one that was also a threat to the
domestic population—as Mollinary had warned it would be—his reports provided the
supporting evidence needed to justify the increase in payments, and to place the care of
the refugee population at the center of government concern.

The Krauss report marked a turning point in the care and treatment of the Bosnian and
Hercegovinian refugees. It was a formal conclusion to a process that began with
Andrássy’s failed attempt at orchestrating the mass return of refugees the previous spring;
an admission by the central government that refugee repatriation was neither simple nor
imminent, and that the problems refugees posed would require a commitment to
management as well. The Krauss report points to a sort of normalization of refugee aid. It
is the moment where the central government expanded its monitoring of regional aid
efforts to a level that it found acceptable. The compromise was financial and political,
motivated on the one hand by pressure from the delegations to introduce cost-cutting
measures, and on the other by the political circumstances of aid and the complex
calculations of the tolerable limits of privation. The degree to which the refugees
burdened imperial finances and the physical and political stability of the domestic
population warrants a modification to Interior Minister Lasser’s observation: the answer
to the question of what levels of suffering can be tolerated is that it is a matter of both
foreign and domestic policy.
The *de facto* settlement of refugees took place despite Andrássy’s objections. The debate over resettlement or repatriation had not been simply a debate over two very different policy options; it had also been the central discussion in the search for what is now called a “durable solution”—a solution to the refugee problem that addresses the long-term needs of both the refugees and the societies hosting them. A durable solution differs from emergency relief in that it seeks over the medium term to end refugees’ reliance on charity, and over the long term to re-establish them in the state system.\textsuperscript{70} If successful, either Mollinary’s or Andrássy’s proposal would have created exactly these medium and long-term conditions. In the event, however, the circumstances of the aid-funded settlement after the repatriation failure lacked any shred of durability.

Andrássy’s fixation on repatriation was rooted in his diplomacy, where the re-establishment of Ottoman state power in Bosnia and Herzegovina had been the first priority. Diplomatic concerns doubtless colored Andrássy’s understanding of the refugee crisis, just as the refugees’ nearness colored Mollinary’s understanding of the situation. For both men, the aid program was a means to an end; whether that end was the sustainability of emergency relief or the conservation of diplomatic options and entrenchment of power in a rapidly changing political environment depended on point of view—on ways of seeing. In this context, James Scott’s concept of legibility becomes most intriguing, in part because it speaks to the types of knowledge available to particular actors.\textsuperscript{71} Not only was Austro-Hungarian refugee aid policy characterized in the beginning by a lack of efforts to make the refugee population legible, but some of its

\textsuperscript{70} Skran, *Refugees in Inter-War Europe: The Emergence of a Regime*: 146.

\textsuperscript{71} Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. 

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most spectacular failures—the repatriation plan for example—were built in part on flawed understandings of the population. This misapprehension of reality resulted from Andrássy’s unwillingness—or inability—to engage with and believe specific aspects of the reports coming from Zagreb and Zadar. There were any number of reasons for this. Rodich was considered to be an activist Slav-sympathizer; the central government was unwilling to meet the financial demands of the regional heads; it has also been suggested that Andrássy neither liked nor trusted Mollinary. Whether out of unwillingness or inability, the result was that what was manifestly clear in the regions was essentially unknowable in Vienna.

These factors put Krauss and his reports in a particularly interesting and vital position, effectively bridging the knowledge gap. As a high-ranking commissioner sent by Vienna, not only was he in contact with the emperor, but he had the authority to make decisions, including those that would increase the cost of refugee relief. His mission was an explicit attempt to “see.” Like people, states concentrate on the issues that are most pressing, and as Scott points out, the processes of simplification necessary to measuring and quantifying a population—to making them legible—deal for the most part with utilitarian facts. Krauss was highly selective in what he looked at—his reports were utilitarian in nature—and when quantifying the refugees’ impact on Austria-Hungary, he did so in terms of cost: the cost to the budget and the cost to society. He was aided in his effort by the growing availability of data, as the increased attention paid to the refugee populations led regional officials to start describing the refugees in statistical terms that

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72 Wertheimer, Graf Julius Andrássy, sein Leben und seine Zeit nach ungedruckten Quellen, 2.

73 Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed: 80. Scott points to other characteristics, including: documentary, static, aggregate, and standardized.
also focused on cost. The regions broke down the populations in different ways, but to the same effect. In Dalmatia, the question was how many received subventions, while in the Military border, the question was how many were *erwerbsfähig* and how many *erwerbsunfähig*. Either way, the real issue was how much had been or needed to be paid out. Ability to earn stood as a proxy for ineligibility for state support.

This chapter has concentrated on how refugees were treated in Austria-Hungary—the mechanisms of emergency relief in the first half of the Bosnian and Hercegovinian uprising, examining the types of aid, the means of distribution and the administrative and political limitations on these efforts. Yet in the context of this aid effort, there is another discrete question: what were refugees treated as? This differs slightly from “how were they treated?” in that it asks what the historical precedents were for the care of the unprecedented. Where did these ideas of refugee relief come from, and what did they mean? Furthermore, it speaks to the origins of this category refugee and the methods by which it was “made up”—what Ian Hacking calls the “vector of labeling from above.”

One of the most important links is the nexus between the sort of emergency relief provided by regional officials and traditions of poor aid. Until the middle of the nineteenth century, the trend across continental Europe had been towards a strong state role in welfare and poor aid, a role that was both required and affirmed by the importance of institutionalization. By the middle of the century, this had started to change. Peter Mandler argued that by the nineteenth century, charity was typically seen to have mostly

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74 Compare, for example, two charts, the first submitted from GK Agram, the second from Zara: KA Praes. Reihe, 1878 51, 18 I 1878, and KA Praes. Reihe, 1878 46, 15 I 1878.

a symbolic value. After an expansion of charity during economic transition of the
eighteenth century, provisions for the poor “were now scaled back or repealed altogether.
Even if municipal authorities had wanted to pursue the eighteenth century fashion for
institutionalization, relieving the poor ‘indoors’ in return for productive labor, they would
not have been able to cope with the numbers now involved.”76

One of the key factors in this change was a switch from “indoor” relief—that is,
institutionalization—to “outdoor” relief, where recipients were not confined. This switch
did not, by necessity, eliminate the role of the state in poor aid. In Austria-Hungary, for
example, small organizations for helping the poor flourished, although many of them also
drew on government funds to do their work.77 But the switch did favor smaller
organizations. Stuart Woolf argues that with the switch to outdoor aid, the question
always remained whether recipients might not be cheating donors. The efficacy of the aid
depended on the reliability of local knowledge of need.78 Concomitant with this came
worries over the corruptive or demoralizing potential of aid: the concern that providing it
might increase the number of poor; the concern that if it provided anything more than the
bare minimum, it would make laze-abouts of all.79

The premise of poor aid was not a necessary condition for the ultimate shape of the
Austro-Hungarian state refugee aid project. We don’t need the traditions of charity to

76 Peter Mandler, “Poverty and Charity in the Nineteenth-Century Metropolis: An Introduction,” in The
Uses of Charity: The Poor on Relief in the Nineteenth-Century Metropolis, ed. Peter Mandler (Philadelphia:

77 See, for example, “Das Armenwesen in Wien und die Armenpflege im Jahrzehnt 1863-1872,”
Statistisches Monatschrift 1(1876).

78 S. J. Woolf, The Poor in Western Europe in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries (London: Methuen,
1986), 33, 34.

79 Ibid., 34ff.
explain the state’s concern with the monitoring of need at a very local level, nor do we need these traditions to explain the fear of being cheated, or the minimal (at times insufficient) levels of aid provided. Nevertheless, the patterns of government aid distribution fit nicely within the framework, and the division of refugees into erwerbsfähig and erwerbs unfähig corresponds well with the dominant notions in the late nineteenth century of the “deserving” and the “undeserving” poor. But most importantly, it also seems that from the start, refugee aid had in fact been seen as a sort of “poor aid” to refugees: the rescript of 1854, after all, offered aid to “destitute” arrivals, while the general policy in 1875-1878 of letting refugees first exhaust their own resources before receiving refugee aid makes it clear poverty, and not simply being a refugee, was the necessary, although insufficient, condition of aid.

If poor aid can help explain the patterns and priorities of emergency relief at the regional level, the changing standards for neutral powers and new obligations towards prisoners of war discussed in the introduction help to contextualize Vienna’s response to the situation, and the circumstances that helped delineate how it would perceive the refugees. The persistent question of identity—the gray indeterminacy between refugee and rebel—were an important factor. Habsburg foreign policy situated the moment of state control at the border. Regulations, however poorly enforced, called for officials to disarm refugees when they entered Habsburg territory, and prohibit their armed return to the Ottoman Empire. By controlling the mobility of Ottoman subjects on Habsburg

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80 Mandler writes that the assumption was often that “the able-bodied male should be able to support his family and that relief would be extended only to a narrow category of “deserving” poor. In many places, orphans, widows, and the aged and infirm were judged to be deserving prima facie and thus eligible for limited doles [...]” Mandler, “Poverty and Charity in the Nineteenth-Century Metropolis: An Introduction,” 13.
territory, the state effectively tried to create a single identity for all who crossed—the refugee. The refugee aid program itself recapitulated this; the sole bureaucratic distinction to be made was between the erwerbsfähig and erwerbsunfähig.

By the middle of 1876 it was becoming apparent that the obligations of a neutral Austria-Hungary were set to grow more complex. War in Serbia promised to force a variety of people across the border, including civilian refugees, non-military and military combatants. If they were civilians, the military would escort them to one of several locations, where they would be handed over to civilian authorities.81 These refugees were to receive a daily aliment of 10kr for adults and 5kr for children, a level of aid equal to the standards that the government applied for refugees from Bosnia and Hercegovina. In keeping with the policy of neutrality, combatants were to be dealt with as a special case. Austria-Hungary lacked a set policy for this matter, and as a result applied the military’s policy towards prisoners of war—treatment equivalent to that which a soldier would receive. The transport of combatants away from the border was “to take place according to the principles of other troop transports.”82 Payments would start at the level of the salary (plus the “bread fee”) of an infantryman and move all the way up to that of a General, who would be entitled to four gulden daily.83

81 Andrássy mentions Taranebes, Lugos, Temesvar and Beckerek. KA Praes. Reihe, 1876 1748b/Dep II, 17 VII 1876.

82 KA Praes. Reihe, 1876 77-1/4, 19. VII. 1876. Combatants crossing into Hungary were to be taken to Arad; those entering Croatia and Slavonia to Peterwardein (Petrovaradin), Esseg (Osijek) and Karlstadt (Karlovac); those into Dalmatia were to be sent to Klagenfurt.

83 KA Praes. Reihe, 1748b/Dep II, 17 VII 1876. MdÄ to K. Hung. Min Pres. This list is described in the note as being subject to the “highest empowerment of His Majesty”. There is no explicit mention later that these were indeed adopted; however, as they are in accordance with the billeting rules that the government ultimately applied to this category of foreigner, it can be assumed that the figures held.
Andrássy and Artur Bylandt-Rheidt, the minister of war, agreed on a definition of combatants that would overcome some of the problems that had dogged the Germans in France in 1870-1871 by simply not distinguishing among “Serbian troops or franc-tireurs enlisted under military discipline.”84 The latter, Bylandt-Rheidt would later write, compose “an integrated part of the Serbian army. Therefore these, when forced onto [our] territory, are to be treated as combatants (military personal).”85 In contrast, “even when organized militarily, Bosnian, Bulgarian or Hercegovinian insurgent detachments must be strictly distinguished [from the Serbs]”86 While Bylandt-Rheidt was mainly concerned with those involved in the Serbian struggle, the implications of these distinctions appear to have reached well beyond the Serbian theater. A more encompassing note from the foreign ministry, for example, drew the distinction in strict legal terms: the Bosnian and Hercegovinian insurgents “stand outside of a legal connection to a recognized military power, have under international law an indefinable character, and are considered to be insurgents by the authorities of the state on whose territory they are currently active.”87

Under the latest standards of neutrality, the insurgents would need to be returned to the hands of the Ottoman government. Yet the reality, as we have seen, was rather different. One of the outcomes of this round of correspondence in the run-up to the Serbian-Turkish war was that insurgent leaders were to be treated in the same manner as were soldiers who crossed over. The result was that a rebel leader such as Mićo Ljubibratić, apprehended by Austro-Hungarian authorities on a Habsburg territory, ended

84 KA Praes. Reihe, 1876 77-1/4, 19. VII. 1876.
85 KA Praes. Reihe, 1876 77-1/13, 05 VIII 1876. RKM to Regional commanders.
86 KA Praes. Reihe, 1876 77-1/13, 05 VIII 1876. RKM to Regional commanders. Emphasis original.
87 KA Praes. Reihe, 1876, 26 VII 1876. MdÄ to RKM.
up spending the remainder of the uprising interned “on his honor” in Graz, neither extradited nor returned to Ottoman hands. At the same time, he and a handful of other insurgent leaders were “to be placed in the category of refugee,” which ultimately became the stopgap category for captured members of the insurgency. 88 Because of their legal situation, Bylandt-Rheidt ordered that “the members of such detachments cannot be viewed as combatants, and when they cross over to our territory, are to be treated analogously to the civilians who flee here [...] Following successful disarmament, they are to be led to the locations designated for the reception of “refugees” and handed over to the civilian authorities.” 89

This blurring in care and treatment mirrors the uncertainties of identity. One of the greatest differences in the management of the refugees from 1875-1878 and those who were covered by the rescript of 1854 is that members of the former group were, theoretically, prevented from returning voluntarily. For the central government, one of the objectives since the start of the uprising had been to make this population neutral, and this lumping together of the two main categories of people crossing over onto Austro-Hungarian territory was, in the end, a functional necessity that despite the realities of the porous border, allowed the Austro-Hungarian government to maintain neutrality by administratively conflating the insurgent with the refugee. This blurring of identity worked in both directions, however. It also offered, in the shape of prisoners of war, functional models for the care and management of large, temporary populations.

88 FA 4.1 PR 443, 19 I 1877, MdÄ to RFM.
89 KA Praes. Reihe, 1876 77-1/13, 05 VIII 1876. RKM to Regional commanders. Quotation marks original.
These methods of looking at and managing refugees in 1875-1878 put them in sharp contrast with previous refugee populations. Although there are examples of large population movements in the region earlier—Mollinary called it the greatest refugee event of the century, but Dragutin Pavličević writes that it was the largest population movement in the region since the sixteenth century—the majority of refugee events up to this point had been significantly smaller. 90 For the most part refugees had been people looking for political asylum, and migrations had been small enough that states could see them as individuals; could deal with their applications for political asylum on a case-by-case basis. 91 The prospects for asylum seekers in Austria-Hungary seemed generally good, and until the middle of the nineteenth century, the empire remained quite open to immigrants. By the end of the century, neither Austria nor Hungary had special laws on extradition, which was instead regulated by treaties, criminal law, and in some cases precedent. 92

Yet regardless of the relative laxity of Austro-Hungarian regulations with respect to political refugees, the law was nevertheless built on a simple assumption: that the state retained not only the right, but the ability to make decisions about whether it would permit refugees to remain on its territory. This had, in fact, also held earlier for Bosnian


refugees. Indeed, in the absence of bilateral extradition treaties between the Ottoman Empire and Austria-Hungary, Ottoman Christians seem to have enjoyed a certain level of protection in Austria-Hungary that was unavailable to others. And although the religion of the refugees that arrived in the southern borderlands in 1875-1878 was certainly important, its meaning to the requirements of refugee management should not be overestimated: the government in Vienna explicitly ordered that any Muslims arriving on Habsburg territory would be given equal care.93

Andrássy’s inability to repatriate the refugees from Bosnia and Hercegovina set them apart from earlier refugees. Unlike the criminals, political exiles and intellectuals who tended to make use of the system of political asylum throughout much of the nineteenth century, these had hijacked the state’s right to make decisions over asylum or extradition; they represented a challenge to the government’s sovereignty.94 The sheer number of them dwarfed virtually all prior refugee events, and the circumstances of their exile—the armed uprising of civilians, Austria-Hungary’s aspirations in the Balkans, and the changes to international standards—created and demanded new responses, while effectively placing them in a new, unique category. They had become the “refugee” in the modern sense of the word.

93 FA 4.1 PR 916, 27 IX 1878. RFM to MdÄ.

Chapter Two

Humanitarian Violence:
Civic Aid, International Support, and the Meaning of
Humanitarian Need

The Ottoman-Habsburg border had long been witness to Ottoman subjects fleeing to Austria-Hungary and then returning back to Bosnia and Hercegovina. But the flight of twenty-four orthodox Christian merchants from Bosanska Gradiška in the Banja Luka district of Bosnia to Habsburg territory on June 15 1873 prefigured several key elements of the mass crossings that would take place starting in 1875. The Bosanska Gradiška refugees’ complaints and fears were confined to specific local circumstances in a way that would not be the case two years later. Their largely ineffective attempts to voice their complaints to audiences beyond the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires nevertheless demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of how to internationalize their concerns. Where the Bosanska Gradiška refugees made direct appeals to the European Great Powers, this chapter demonstrates that starting in 1875, it was civic mobilization at the local level that succeeded in internationalizing the plight of refugees from Ottoman Bosnia and Hercegovina. But it was in the language of humanitarianism, not diplomacy, that this internationalization took place. The meaning of humanitarianism was
unclear and unstable and local activists and civic groups were able to exploit the fluidity of the concept for their own means. What did become clear however was that humanitarianism created opportunities outside of diplomacy and international relations. As such it also represented a challenge to the international order itself.

The merchants’ flight from Bosanska Gradiška came after several years of escalating Christian-Muslim violent crime in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1870, as attacks from brigands increased in the countryside and the city, a mixed commission of Muslims, Orthodox, and Catholic Christians submitted to the Sublime Porte over 170 petitions complaining about unfair taxation, corruption, insecurity and other matters.\(^1\) The problem was not the lack of laws on the books, but the regional government’s failure to enforce the laws that already existed. The commissioners requested the Sultan recall Safvet Paša, the governor of Bosnia.\(^2\) Rumors that the Ottoman Empire might lease—or even sell—Bosnia and Herzegovina to Serbia spread, as did violence between the Muslim and Christian communities.\(^3\) Local officials in Bosanska Gradiška denied a request to install a larger bell in the Orthodox church, and a number of fires broke out in the Orthodox section of town.\(^4\)

Throughout this, the Orthodox community in Bosanska Gradiška sought help from beyond the Ottoman Empire. Orthodox communities in Novi Sad, Belgrade, and even in Russia followed the events closely. After the fires, a small committee from the Orthodox community met with the

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1. There are numerous examples of such petitions in the Ottoman archives. For an example from late 1873 see Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Tercüme Odası, box 457, folder 15.

2. Safvet Paša was \textit{vali} from May 19 1869 to April 27 1871. See Salih Sidki Muvekkit Hadžihuseinovič, \textit{Povijest Bosne} [Tarih-i Bosna], trans. Abdullah Polimac, 2 vols., vol. 2 (Sarajevo: El-Kalem, Gazi Husrev-begova biblioteka, 1999).

3. Čubrilovič, \textit{Bosanski Ustanak 1875-1878}: 35.

4. Ibid., 36.
Habsburg vice-consul in Banja Luka. With the murder in early October 1872 of Jovan Naumović, the Christian business agent of a Sarajevo purveyor to the Ottoman military, Christian merchants in Banja Luka submitted petitions for an investigation to the Sublime Porte. They also petitioned the Habsburg vice-consul, asking that Austria-Hungary take extra-territorial measures to guaranty their safety in the Ottoman Empire. Tension escalated when an Ottoman investigator, sent in response to the troubles, concluded not only were the complaints unfounded, but the Habsburg vice-consul was colluding with the petitioners to incite an uprising. In May 1873, the murder of the younger wife of a certain Hadži Ahmed in the town of Varzar Vakuf, also in the Banja Luka district, gave occasion for the local police to imprison a number of the town’s Christian merchants. This was quickly followed by the beheading of the supposed perpetrator, Ostoja Zuhora. When word reached the merchants of Bosanska Gradiška that Ottoman officials thought the Habsburg vice-consul incited the entire incident, and that they too were implicated because of their previous associations with him, the merchants fled north across the Sava river to the safety of Habsburg territory.

The act of crossing the border immediately internationalized the situation in Bosanska Gradiška, but the impact of the events was different for each of the involved parties. For the Habsburg Empire the Bosanska Gradiška refugees were a problem of international law and diplomacy. For the Ottomans they posed both diplomatic difficulties and challenged the authority of local Ottoman administration. For the refugees, their flight and the circumstances leading up to it offered a podium from which to make sweeping claims for international

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6 Čubrilović, Bosanski Ustanak 1875-1878: 34-38.
protection that went beyond the Ottoman and Habsburg Empire and invoked the entire European state system.

By the second half of the nineteenth century the “refugee” as a subject of international law was well-defined, even if the term “refugee” usually did not refer to a Balkan merchant, but to an asylum-seeking European revolutionary—a political criminal in one country, yet “martyr of freedom” in another.\(^7\) With the arrival of the Bosanska Gradiška refugees, the Habsburg response followed the formal practices and expectations that customarily pertained to this more clearly defined category of political refugees.\(^8\) Border authorities interviewed the merchants and then, “according to the existing directives,” sent them to the town of Požega, some 20 kilometers from the border.\(^9\) Habsburg Foreign Minister Andrásy argued it was Austria-Hungary’s sole obligation to “afford protection to foreigners who cross to our territory in search of the same.”\(^10\) At the same time, the *Internierung*—internment—of the refugees to Požega would honor another expectation of international asylum law, namely that states offering refuge prevent asylees from engaging in any cross-border activities that might provoke their home government.\(^11\)

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\(^8\) This includes the removal of refugees from the immediate border area; more broadly it includes the state’s right to afford protection to individuals and to decide on the appropriate moment for return. These and other standards would be codified by the Institut de Droit international in the 1880s. See James Lorimer, *The Institutes of the Law of Nations: A Treatise of the Jural Relations of Separate Political Communities*, 2 vols., vol. 1 (London: W. Blackwood and Sons, 1883). 334-47.


\(^10\) Document 11, Andrásy to Mollinary, 29 VII 1873. Ibid.

\(^11\) Document 11, Andrásy to Mollinary, 29 VII 1873. Ibid. Mustafa Asim Paşa would complain that the refugees were not successfully detained in Požega and had returned to Stari Gradiška in Croatia, directly across the Sava river from Bosanska Gradiška. See Document 9, Theodorovich to Andrásy 24 VII 1873. Ibid.
The similarities between the Bosanska Gradiška merchants and the traditional political refugee stopped at formalities of care. Andrásy was unwilling to accord the merchants any political character out of fear it might legitimize their plight as an international question rather than a local disturbance. Such a possibility existed “if it even appeared that we a priori view their complaints as legitimate and take it upon ourselves to intervene formally.”12 It was not the task of the Habsburg government, he wrote, to “involve itself in the disputes of individual Turkish subjects with their individual local officials, and to dictate to the Porte the terms on which the return of the refugees will depend [...].”13

By the end of June, the Ottoman government initiated an investigation into the circumstances of the flight. Mehmed Raşid Paşa, the foreign minister, had received a report from Mustafa Asim Paşa, the Bosnian governor, that the merchants were part of a revolutionary committee and they had fled after local authorities found them out; more worrisome were allegations that the Habsburg vice-consul in Banja Luka was involved in pan-Slavic agitation. Raşid Paşa dispatched Mustafa Asim Paşa to Banja Luka to investigate the whole affair further, promising the Habsburg envoy in Istanbul that if need be a special commissioner would also be sent to ensure impartiality. In view of the accusations of Habsburg consular misbehavior, Raşid Paşa also asked that Theodorovich, the Habsburg general consul in Sarajevo, accompany the governor on the trip to Banja Luka and submit a separate report.14

The findings of these two parallel investigations were contradictory, and precipitated a diplomatic crisis that overshadowed any imperial concerns about the refugees themselves,

12 Document 12, Andrásy to Mollinary, 30 VII 1873. Ibid.
13 Document 11, Andrásy to Mollinary, 29 VII 1873. Ibid.
14 Document 5, Ludolf to Andrásy, 30 VI 1873. Ibid.
resulted in the Habsburg withdrawal of its vice-consul and the Ottoman removal of key
provincial officials, including the governor. In late September, Mustafa Asim Paşa submitted to
the Porte his report on the events in the Banja Luka district. The governor exonerated local
Ottoman officials of any wrong-doing and denied any anti-Christian activities by the local
Muslim population. Theodorovich, who had been reporting to Vienna during the investigation,
submitted his final report to the Porte as well. He sharply criticized the Ottoman investigative
techniques and questioned Mustafa Asim Paşa’s findings, saying that from the very start the
governor had conducted his investigation to demonstrate his preconception that all of the
Christian complaints were ungrounded.15 The Porte responded by sending to the Habsburg envoy
in Istanbul a “fierce denunciation of [Habsburg] consular officers in Bosnia, who are depicted as
agitators of the disquiet and propagators of the pan-Slavic movement,” and went as far as
accusing Theodorovich himself of being party to anti-government activities.16

Andrássy was furious. Writing to his envoy in Istanbul, he described the Porte as wanting
to imitate the example of the refugees by submitting a sweeping indictment of Habsburg
behavior. By doing so, the Porte “managed to produce a result that every effort” of the Bosanska
Gradiška refugees failed to achieve: “to transform into an international issue a question of
internal administration” in which Austria-Hungary, despite being a neighboring state, should
have played only an incidental role.17 From the start, Andrássy had suspected the refugees’
claims were greatly exaggerated and likely inspired by provocateurs. He had been willing to

15 Document 17, Theodorovich to Andrássy, 13 VIII 1873. Ibid.

16 Document 20, Zaluski to Andrássy, 3 X 1873. Ibid. The Habsburg Empire did not have representation in Istanbul
at the ambassadorial level until the arrival of County Zichy in 1874—an indication to the other Great Powers that
Andrássy was interested in greater engagement in “Eastern Affairs.” See Henry George Elliot and Gertrude Elliot,
Some Revolutions and Other Diplomatic Experiences (New York: Dutton, 1922). 205.

support the Ottomans’ original attempt at inducing refugee return through a simple guarantee of safety. The Ottoman memorandum changed that by imbricating the refugee question with those of diplomacy. Informing the Porte that the Habsburg vice-consul had already been recalled to Vienna, he demanded the Porte recall Emin Effendi, the sub-governor of Gradiška, and Kamil Bey, the head of the Banja Luka district, and insisted on an explicit apology. Should the Porte not meet these demands, Andrássy would recall his envoy.  

The internationalization that Andrássy spoke of was limited, and while it was occasioned by the flight of the refugees, it was the result of diplomatic missteps rather than their proximate cause. It was not persecution of Bosnia’s Christian population that led the Habsburg government to strengthen its demands against the Ottoman government. Well after Theodorovich’s highly critical reports on Mustafa Asim Paşa’s investigation of the events in Banja Luka, Andrássy remained reluctant to involve Austria-Hungary in Ottoman affairs. His cover note to Count Zalusky in Istanbul for the refugee memorandum reflects this reluctance, based largely on political considerations. “A certain tendency [on the part of the refugees] to use the undeniable crimes and especially the events in Bosanska Gradiška and Banja Luka for political purposes cannot be ignored,” he wrote, yet noted only that “administration and judicature in Bosnia do appear to be in need of some improvements.” Andrássy concluded the note by further emphasizing the Habsburg unwillingness to get involved. After recommending the Ottomans take necessary measures, he entrusted the problem to the “wisdom and sense of justice of the

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18 Document 21, Andrássy to Ludolf, 21 X 1873. Ibid.
19 Document 19, Andrássy to Zalusky 30 IX 1873. Ibid.
Porte.” With that, the Habsburg government was all the less willing to take further steps, because “an ostensible intervention from our side could possibly encourage the agitation.”\(^{20}\)

Habsburg policy was circumspect at all levels. Despite repeated demands and requests from the refugees for the assurances of not just a safe return but also an amnesty upon their return, at no time were Habsburg authorities willing to pressure the Ottoman government on the point. It was not until early January 1874 that Andrássy instructed Theodorovich to have the new \textit{vali} forward the instructions for safe return to officials in Gradiška, as the refugees would not return before this happened.\(^{21}\) The amnesty was limited to the act of flight and did not extend to common crimes (of which the majority of the refugees were accused).\(^{22}\) Moreover, Austria-Hungary was more parsimonious with aid to the refugees than the expectations of political asylum would indicate. Andrássy worried any generosity in that regard would be rewarded with more refugees, and was willing only to provide the Gradiška merchants with enough money to pay for their transport back home, and throughout the course of their stay they had been offered no help for subsistence—a fact about which they complained, hoping that Andrássy “would not permit [them], as protectees of his Majesty the Emperor, to die of hunger on Austrian territory.”\(^{23}\)

As treacherous as it was, diplomacy did eventually work. By the end of January 1874, the refugees were heading home and the incident could be viewed as “laid to rest.”\(^{24}\) But the essence

\(^{20}\) Document 19, Andrássy to Zalusky 30 IX 1873. Ibid.
\(^{21}\) Document 33, Andrássy to Theodorovich. 3 I 1874. Ibid.
\(^{22}\) Document 29, Andrássy to Hungarian Minister President Szlavny, 4 XI 1873. Ibid.
\(^{23}\) Archive of the Nacionalna i univerzetitska biblioteka Bosne i Hercegovine/NUB BiH, box 107, 6/21 1873. Refugees to Andrássy, 23 I 1874.
of the refugees’ complaint—that the Ottoman Empire was incapable of guaranteeing not just the equality, but the physical safety of its Christian subjects—went straight to the core of Great Power concerns about the Ottoman Empire. The refugees wanted a more thorough diplomatic engagement with the Ottoman Empire that they got, and for them it wasn’t their flight across the Habsburg-Ottoman border that had created an international incident—it was the fear of persecution and the Ottoman state’s inability to control local actors. The refugees argued that the Sultan’s failure to guarantee the safety of his Christian subjects was not simply a domestic problem, but an international one. The day after Andrássy warned against giving the refugees’ claims even an appearance of legitimacy, Vaso Vidović, the elected representative of the Bosanska Gradiška refugees, submitted to the Habsburg Emperor the memorandum “On the Current Situation and the Suffering of the Christians.”

The memo was received coolly. The Habsburg Emperor simply forwarded it to Andrássy, who had already seen it; the British ambassador did not take it seriously; and the Italian representative suggested Vidović would have better luck if he met with the Russian ambassador.

Nevertheless, the note demonstrates a sort of well-informed naïveté that took treaty declarations seriously and viewed the signatories as powers to be petitioned. Based on

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26 Čubrilović, Bosanski Ustanak 1875-1878: 40.
treaty drafts written prior to the Ottoman’s pre-emptive promulgation of the Imperial Reform Edict of 1856 (*Islahat Fermanı*), the refugees argued that, counter to Article Nine of the Treaty of Paris, which banned foreign intervention in Ottoman domestic affairs, it was “beyond doubt that the signatory Christian powers, based on the nature of the matter itself, and also the aim and goal of the Paris Treaty, had the complete right to protect” Ottoman Christians.

There can thus be no doubt that the only legitimate way for the Christians in Turkey [...] to be rescued is for them to turn to the Christian guaranteeing Great Powers of the Treaty of Paris, and no doubt that these moreover have, in the name of all Christendom and Humanity, the moral right, yea the moral obligation to offer their protection [...] even if it is not in the form of a formal intervention, then at least in an advisory manner—and [this is also] in the best interests of Turkey.  

The Bosanska Gradiška refugees saw in the international system a morally responsible system, and the claims they made on it were done so in the name of the preservation of the system and its constituent parts. The refugees kept their complaints detailed and specific, and in conclusion demanded that Istanbul send to Bosnia and Herzegovina an independent commission to investigate their claims, their persecutors be brought to trial and punished, Christians be allowed to vote for representation in councils, and finally that they be granted an amnesty and assured a safe return home. The demands make it clear that the refugees sought nothing more than to use the existing international system for the restoration of imperial order *within* the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, the rhetorical appeals to Christianity and humanity were limited, and kept strictly within the architecture of international affairs: they expected the Sultan to

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“extend or widen” the rights of his Christian subjects “in a timely fashion, in the spirit of humanity and civilization.”

1875

The difference between the Bosanska Gradiška refugees and the mass flight of refugees that began in 1875 was not—at least at first—this local understanding of Ottoman domestic responsibilities in the context of the international legal framework, but more simply the scale of the flight and with it the size and the scope of the response. The Ottomans were unable to stop the uprising and Austria-Hungary became increasingly involved in the care of the refugees and the maintenance of border integrity. The instability the uprising and the refugees imposed on the international order started to matter as friction grew among various state and non-state interests, and aggressive foreign engagement seemed increasingly urgent.

The first foreign intervention in the Bosnian and Hercegovinian crisis was a multi-lateral consular mission to investigate the problems and the Ottoman response to them on the ground. The Ottomans were understandably reluctant to undergo the injury to their sovereignty that such a consular mission entailed. But the matter was made all the more delicate by tensions between the Russian goal for some sort of eventual autonomy for Bosnia and Hercegovina, and the Austro-Hungarian resistance to any effort to destabilize the Ottoman Empire. Fearing Russian influence in a neighboring province, Andrássy carefully circumscribed the mission by preventing the consuls from direct involvement in any insurgent-Ottoman negotiations. The restriction limited any real influence the mission had in ending the violence, but from a more narrow

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Habsburg view, the restriction also helped to thwart Russia’s efforts to make itself indispensable to Ottoman-Christian insurgent negotiations.²⁹

At the same time the Great Powers began shaping a diplomatic approach to the problem, processes of definition began to take place. The scale of the refugee flight and the poverty and misery that accompanied it led to a process of defining the refugee as a humanitarian subject. Even as Habsburg authorities were using policy and force to stabilize and manage refugees and the “refugee crisis”, the refugees themselves—and those they appointed to represent them to the Habsburg Empire as their immediate protector and to the international community—were trying to define the terms by which they would be understood—the extent and the shape of their humanitarian subjectivity.

Recent work has asked us to lay greater importance on the European periphery in the shaping of the global order that emerged after the First World War. One of the key points has been a fundamental re-evaluation of the theory, law, practice and meaning of sovereignty in the nineteenth and twentieth century, and especially how encounters at the periphery shaped or caused theoretical and legalistic formulations and revisions.³⁰ Eric Weitz has characterized the transition from the “Vienna to the Paris system” as the transformation from “dynastic legitimacy

²⁹ Harris, A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878: The First Year: 75.

³⁰ Antony Anghie has argued that the colonial encounter was central to shaping the way Europeans conceived the very idea of sovereignty; see Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law, Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Balakrishnan Rajagopal is even more forceful, arguing “the architecture of modern international law has been ineluctably shaped by popular, grassroots resistance from the Third World,” in Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law From Below: Development, Social Movements, and Third World Resistance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 45. For Cemil Aydin, the Ottoman Empire was able to use the language of international law not only to argue its case, but to force changes in it. Cemil Aydin, “The End of the Ottoman Empire and the International History of Decolonization,” in Center for International History (Columbia University 2010). The relationship worked in reverse, as well. Milena Methodieva’s recent dissertation argues that Bulgaria, for example, sought to adhere to international expectations—including for minorities—in an effort to legitimize its place on the international stage; in doing so, it valorized the same laws it sought to follow. Milena Bogomilova Methodieva, “Reform, Politics and Culture Among the Muslims in Bulgaria, 1878-1908” (Dissertation, Princeton University, 2010).
and state sovereignty within clearly defined borders [to] populations and an ideal of state sovereignty rooted in national homogeneity.” This is the history of minority protection, failed interwar minority rights regimes and the postwar rise of human rights, which Weitz neatly ties to the questions of managing the imperial periphery raised at the “two Berlins”—the Berlin Congress of 1878 where the Great Powers tried to manage the challenges of the failing Ottoman Empire, and the Berlin Conference of 1884, which divided the African continent among the imperial powers.

Treaties and conferences were an important site of these reconfigurations; the loci at which new thinking and the persistence of old thinking came into force. They were also a forum where non-Europeans tried to join the game and influence its outcome. As Cemil Aydin has argued, this was true for the Ottoman Empire, which came to the Berlin Congress well prepared to argue its case in the language of existing treaties and international law. As much as the Berlin Congress of 1878 was a step towards Weitz’s Paris system of nation-states and minority protection, the Ottoman Empire was nevertheless an empire, and its participation at Berlin also invokes elements of the dynastic “Vienna System.” By Paris the new architecture of the international system—especially the idea of national self-determination—had, as Erez Manela has demonstrated, reached well beyond the boundaries of existing states, and provided a new language with which subject peoples could articulate claims.

Humanitarianism was another available language. In the historiography it is most often jumbled into analyses of human rights, a natural and important step that nevertheless occludes

32 Aydn, “The End of the Ottoman Empire and the International History of Decolonization.”
humanitarianism as specific discourse that could create frameworks for understanding state/subject relationships at and beyond the European periphery. Humanitarianism was an important interface between the violence at the European periphery and the moral-political inertias at the center. Focusing on Germany, Margaret Anderson has pointed to a multiplicity of narratives with regard to anti-Armenian violence in the Ottoman Empire at the end of the nineteenth century, and in particular the question of whether violent people could also deserve sympathy.34 The refugees of Bosnia and Hercegovina were similarly suspect and faced similar questions. Habsburg border officials disarmed refugees when they crossed over to Austro-Hungarian territory, but many refugees still participated in the insurgency. Nevertheless, in the Bosnian and Hercegovinian case a humanitarian subjectivity was an important representational face to the outside world. Local actors used the familiar tropes of brutal oppression, the bloodthirsty Turk, a proud, ancient nation under the Ottoman yoke, and slavery as a means to seize and to define the narrative of humanitarianism in the Balkans.

This chapter contends that this process of self-definition of refugees as a “humanitarian problem” and refugees’ ability to define and to manipulate this problem to the world beyond the immediate border zone was an essential aspect of the European core’s encounter with the violence in the Balkans from 1875-1878. On the face of it, this should come as little surprise to those familiar with Gladstone and the “Bulgarian Horrors.” Yet whatever the symbolic strength and historical impact of that particular moment, the situation this chapter considers represents something more subtle: the efforts and ability of the refugees and their supporters to work with and manipulate the principal dichotomy embedded in their humanitarian subjectivity, namely the tension between displaced victim and insurgent activist.

In the case of the Bosnian refugees in Croatia, self-definition was closely linked to a broad infrastructure for aid to refugees and to the insurgency. The involvement of this deeper, more organized level of social activism played an important role in the ability of refugees and activists to project their message. The ability to define refugees as an international problem, and the ability—or at least effort—to control the content and shape of this definition relied on the contingencies of local circumstances. The refugee crisis took place at a moment of rapid social and political change in Croatia, where a new political liberalism was taking hold after the 1867 Austro-Hungarian Compromise reconfigured the Habsburg Empire. The consolidation and growing strength of a new bourgeois associational life was vital to the “humanitarianization” of the refugee crisis: secular, civic charity was the direct predecessor to the humanitarian project along the border, and the individuals, institutions and techniques of civic refugee aid all drew directly from charitable societies. At the same time, this process of defining a humanitarian subjectivity was shaped by—and helped to exacerbate—the domestic tensions that accompanied these new forms of civic activism.

The development of a civic and associational life in the Habsburg Empire is often seen as a marker—as it is in the case of Germany—of the strength of the rising bourgeoisie. In the Habsburg case, associational life was also a key center for national activism and differentiation.

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35 The stakes in the Habsburg debate are different than in the German debate. The main questions for Habsburg historians are about the stability of empire, not the rise of Nazism. For the classic discussion of the bourgeoisie in Germany, see David Blackbourn’s half of the now-classic critique of the Sonderweg thesis. David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984).

36 Debates over the ascendance and stability of political nationalism have driven the study of associational life in the Habsburg Empire, and a wide variety of associations can be viewed as playing important roles in this process. The historian Jiri Pokorny, for example, includes singing, sport, student and reading associations under the rubric “Nationale Bildungsvereine.” See Pokorny, Jiri. “Vereine, Verbände und Parteien in den böhmischen Ländern. A: Vereine und Parteien in Böhmen” in Helmut Rumpler and Peter Urbanitsch, Politische Öffentlichkeit und Zivilgesellschaft. 1 Teilband. Vereine, Parteien und Interessenverbände als Träger der politischen Partizipation, Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918 (Vienna: Verlag der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2006). 619-37.
Associational life was at once divisive and unifying. On the one hand, clubs and groups functioned as the space where local identities fractured into stronger national affiliations; on the other hand, once split, they were an axis around which national groups could coalesce, even superseding other affiliations, such as class.\textsuperscript{37}

The Dalmatian čitaonica, or reading rooms, were a good example of this. Reading rooms began forming even before 1848, but under neo-absolutism became the backbone of national movements, differentiating themselves first between Slavic and Italian groups, and then later into Croatian or Serbian. The reading room “Casino” in Kotor was founded in 1844, changed its name in 1880 to Slavjanski dom (Slavic House), and in 1884 to Hrvatski dom (Croatian House); in 1880 Kotor’s other reading room, Slavanska čitaonica (Slavic Reading Room), changed its name to Srpska čitaonica (Serbian Reading Room).\textsuperscript{38} The Dubrovnik Narodna štioniča (National Reading Room), which in 1875 established a committee for aid to the uprising and refugees, fractured not long after the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina in 1878. To be sure, nationalist political movements and activists for the most part had little interest in destroying the empire.\textsuperscript{39} Nevertheless, not all Habsburg political nationalism was equal, and its threat could be

\textsuperscript{37} Jeremy King has illustrated this well with the replacement of local identities by stronger national affiliations in Bohemia, where conflict over the introduction of bilingual education at previously German language schools led, in 1861, to the division of the local choir into the German Liedertafel and the Czech Beseda. The division was subsequently reflected in the foundation of other specifically German and Czech clubs. These associations were also integrative—they were consciously used to build a national identity and a cohesion that, for example in the case of the Deutsche Böhmerwaldbund, could extend beyond limited class interests or even gender divisions. Jeremy King, Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848-1948 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002). 24, 51-66.


\textsuperscript{39} As Gary Cohen has neatly summarized, “put simply, a polity that permitted and in many ways abetted the flowering of vigorous nationalist political movements, an abundance of political parties and interest groups, and a multifarious and assertive political press could not have been so immobile or paralytic that only war and revolution
viewed differently from the perspective of the borderlands. There was, after all, no Czech Piedmont. For Austria-Hungary’s south Slavs, however, there was always Serbia.

Humanitarian organizations did not necessarily fall along national lines, despite—or perhaps because—of the charged national environment along the border. Nevertheless, associations and organizations could and did form the basis for the humanitarian representation of refugees, for the definition of their subjectivity, and for the way this subjectivity was mediated with the outside world—creating both dependence on and opposition to civic mobilization. Given the unique circumstances of a weakened Habsburg Empire humanitarianism of the sort that evolved along the border was necessary, invaluable, and for the Habsburgs, deeply worrisome.

The rise of aid committees
The immediate Habsburg response to the arrival of refugees discussed in Chapter One had been a policy reflex driven by international obligations and, in the case of the small sums of money distributed to refugees from the Ottoman Empire, concerns over domestic stability. Regardless of the empathies of officials along the border, the aid response was demanded by protocol, not sentiment. A true humanitarian mobilization happened instead at the provincial level, in the Habsburg borderlands. There, after the arcane internal politics of Austria-Hungary thwarted an attempt in the provincial parliament to develop an autonomous local aid program, an increasingly active bourgeois associational and charitable life enabled the long-term development of private committees and societies into the center-points of humanitarian activity.

“Official” humanitarianism was limited to the milieu in which it was conceived and to its intended subject: the military. The only explicit reference to humanitarian motivations in the Habsburg archives comes when Andrássy, in “the interest of humanity” permits the transport of wounded Ottoman troops across Habsburg soil, even though it could be perceived as a possible violation of Habsburg neutrality. This narrow interpretation of humanitarianism is perhaps most clearly illustrated by the refusal of the Vienna Red Cross Committee to succor the wounded who had crossed to Habsburg territory. In lockstep with the attitude of Artur Bylandt-Rheidt, the Habsburg Minister of War, that the insurgents “stand outside of a legal connection to a recognized military power, [and] have under international law an indefinable character [...]”, the Vienna Committee reported to the International Committee in Geneva that its statutes prevented it from acting on behalf of refugees and wounded insurgents on Habsburg territory. That decision irked members of the International Committee in Geneva, who described as a “question of principle” the strange situation in which “injured fighters on the territory of a state included in the network of the Red Cross” had no neutral body to intervene on their behalf. Nevertheless, the role of the Red Cross was clear, and clearly limited to the regular military. Its members could find no precedent to invoke on behalf of wounded insurgents.

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40 For the bellicose origins of humanitarian law and the limited purview of the International Committee of the Red Cross see Best, Humanity in Warfare.

41 On Bylandt-Reidt, see KA Praes. Reihe, 1876, 26 VII 1876. The Vienna Committee not only washed its hands of responsibility, but seems to have been willfully ignorant of the situation in Hercegovina and the activities in the Habsburg borderlands. In the same letter it also denied knowledge of Gabriel Wesselitzky, a leading activist who had already made the rounds of the diplomatic corps in Vienna and had an audience with Andrássy. For the contents of the Committee’s letter, see “Séance du 25 octobre 1875” in Jean-François Pitteloud et al., Procès-verbaux des séances du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge: 17 février 1863-28 août 1914, Documents pour servir à l’histoire de la Croix-Rouge et du Croissant-Rouge, (Genève: Société Henry Dunant: Comité international de la Croix-Rouge, 1999). 364-66.

An international “humanitarian” response developed informally. Even well after the start of the uprising, it was not necessarily clear whether refugees would become “humanitarian subjects,” or would remain, as had happened in previous refugee movements along these borders, the recipients of strictly local charity. Despite some disconcerting reports from the border zone, in the early days of the uprising the refugees’ situation did not necessarily seem dire. As late as October 1875, The Graphic, a British periodical, ran an article about refugees in Dubrovnik written by Arthur Evans, a seasoned Balkan traveler who would remain in Dalmatia throughout the uprising. In this report, he described a scene of relative well-being. His small portrait of Dubrovnik does not evince a town in crisis, but rather the fluidity of the Habsburg borderlands, where refugee women sold their jewelry to buy weapons for their husbands at the same time “Turks” were buying salt, corn and fodder for the Sultan’s troops—an image entirely at odds with the Dubrovnik of the following spring, which “had the appearance of a city at open war with Turkey.”

Evans wrote that instead of the “half-starved miserable wretches” he had expected to find, the refugees were “well fed; they did not seem at all forlorn, and with their light white handkerchiefs and chemises they presented a picture of cleanliness which would have put to shame the squalor of many an Italian Dalmatian.” The accompanying illustration, in which men stand in idle conversation and women sit holding their infants completes the image. Evans’ refugees are well supported by an “Austrian government [that] allows each family on an average twenty kreutzers a day, and the commune of Ragusa makes up the amount to thirty-six kreutzers

43 Evans eventually started reporting for the Manchester Guardian and developed a strong pro-insurgent sentiment.
[which is] sufficient to support life... These refugees are not humanitarian subjects; they are the well-off beneficiaries of charity and a civic obligation—the “hospitality of the Ragusans.”

This hospitality was actually a good deal more complicated than an additional sixteen kreuzers daily paid out from the city coffers. Especially in the early days of the crisis, some (but not all) communities throughout the Habsburg border zone did indeed use communal funds to aid the refugees in a variety of ways. Cash subsidies were not uncommon, and many communities supplied refugees with food, or allowed them to gather wood or graze livestock on communal lands. The town of Petrinja took it upon itself to erect barracks capable of housing up to 640 people—one of the few examples of a mass-housing solution during the period.

These examples were exceptions, however, and most communities were unable to offer to the refugees help along the lines of traditional communal poor-aid. Instead, non-state refugee aid relied directly on another new practice—the charitable association. Embedded within Croatia’s developing associational life and bourgeois culture, these civic institutions served as a model for popular refugee aid efforts, and in so doing helped to create, if only temporarily, new solidarities within Croatian civic life. The urban business and political elite aligned in common cause with the rural peasantry, and at a time of growing Croat-Serb tension served as a tenuous node of unity in purpose.

45 Evans, Through Bosnia and the Herzegóvina on Foot During the Insurrection, August and September 1875: 430.

46 The Graphic article is cited in Evans’ book. Ibid., 428-29.

47 Julije Grabovac, whose work is the most authoritative for Dalmatia during this period, does not mention any communal support for the refugees in Dubrovnik, and in any case Evans greatly inflates the figures he gives. As discussed in Chapter One, the Habsburg state payment was 7kr/day, raised to 10kr with the onset of winter. See Julije Grabovac, Dalmacija i hercegovacko-bosanski ustanak 1875-1878, Biblioteka znanstvenih djela (Split: Knjizevni krug Split, 1991).

The specific associational form that became the central institution for the raising, consolidating and distributing of all aid that did not come from the Imperial Habsburg government in Vienna was the odbor—the committee. Aid committees in most cities and larger towns were established and began to operate almost immediately after the start of the uprising, and continued their work throughout the period under consideration. As the principal organ of private aid, the committees served as the point at which the refugees’ humanitarian subjectivity came to be defined. The committees linked local aid efforts with organized regional interests and ultimately served as the exclusive points of connection between foreign humanitarian aid and local distribution. They were also almost always tied to or the same as another type of committee: those offering direct help to the insurgency.\footnote{Pavličević, “Odbori za pomaganje i bosanski prebjezi u sjevernoj Hrvatskoj tijekom Bosansko-Hercegovačkog ustanaka 1875-1878.”} In this way the committees linked Croatia’s business and political elite with the uprising itself and with longer, localized traditions of cross-border involvement in Bosnian and Hercegovinian violence. Particularly in Dalmatia, the aid committees seem at first to have been formed almost reflexively, drawing on past experience of uprisings and population movements along the Habsburg-Ottoman border, before quickly becoming entrenched in the associational structures of Croatian society.

As early as 20 July 1875, community leaders in the Dalmatian capital Zadar announced to the governor of Dalmatia, Baron Gabriel Rodich, the formation of a “society for the collection of voluntary contributions to support families of the Hercegovinian insurgents who cross over to Dalmatia.”\footnote{Grabovac, Dalmacija i hercegovacko-bosanski ustanak 1875-1878: 56.} Not formally announced to Rodich—yet brazenly announced in the main Zadar paper, Narodni List—was the establishment of an association specifically dedicated to collecting money for the insurgency itself. Within days of the newspaper announcement, associations to
help both the fleeing families and the insurgency itself appeared in cities and towns across Dalmatia, from Makarska to Dubrovnik. With the support of Narodni List, the numerous societies across Dalmatia were vertically organized under the Zadar associations. By autumn, a single “Central Society” had been formed.

Whatever support these associations gave to the insurgents themselves, they also did provide help to the refugees. Habsburg authorities, however, found the immediate ligature of aid to rebel and to refugee particularly disconcerting. From the first report that Hercegovinians were fleeing across the border into Dalmatia, Andrássy had recognized in the refugees—and in the insurgency itself—a threat to Habsburg neutrality toward the Ottoman Empire during what remained at the time a strictly internal disturbance. Andrássy immediately approved the dispatch of a military unit to the border region in response to the flight. Two and a half weeks later, with the question of border integrity and Habsburg neutrality still at the top of the agenda, Rodich sent a circular to district heads that agitation and the formation of societies should be prevented as much as possible.

In fact, the Austro-Hungarian authorities were in a quandary. With the continuing violence in Hercegovina and the expansion of the uprising to Bosnia in August 1875, it became obvious that the Ottoman Empire would be unable to suppress the insurgency quickly, that the number of refugees on Habsburg soil would continue to grow, and that the modest refugee aid program the

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51 Ibid.

52 Ibid., 75.


54 Grabovac, Dalmacija i hercegovacko-bosanski ustanak 1875-1878: 57.
state had enacted would quickly be overwhelmed. As discussed in Chapter One, the cost of long-term refugee aid strained the Empire’s internal politics as much as it did the shaky finances. The situation in Civil Croatia, which belonged to the Hungarian half of the Empire, was particular problematic. In the face of Hungarian anti-Slavic truculence, the aid societies were a political and financial pressure valve for the Foreign Ministry. In September 1875, Andrássy instructed the provincial government in Zagreb to offer refugees in Civil Croatia the standard state subvention only when “voluntary contributions to their support do not suffice.” Budapest strengthened the language before forwarding the order on to the provincial government in Zagreb, ordering that local officials be “most frugal” with their expenses. Iván Mažuranić, the governor of Civil Croatia, came under strong pressure from within his party to aid refugees using discretionary provincial money. Mažuranić resisted, surmising—probably correctly—that any decision in the Croatian provincial diet to pay the costs of refugee aid could be seen as parliamentary overreach and would offer Hungary an opportunity to dissolve the diet and revoke the little autonomy Croatia had won in the previous decade.

In these circumstances, and despite the potential threat that private, non-state aid associations posed to Austro-Hungarian neutrality, the Habsburg Empire entered into an uneasy

55 KA 51-4/12, 1875. 27 VIII 1875.
56 HDA. Zemeljska Vlada—Odjel zu unutarnje poslove/UOZV box 242, 17010, 21 VIII 1875 and 3 IX 1875.
57 HDA-UOZV box 242, 17010, 21 VIII 1875 and 3 IX 1875. The instructions from Zagreb to regional officials echoed those from Budapest; in none of these documents are there explicit instructions on how to balance private and public aid.
58 Milan Makanec, a member of the governing party, led the push for direct Croatian aid to the refugees. Makanec argued that if the Sabor was unwilling to help “suffering brothers”, it really did not matter if the parliament was dissolved. Makanec’s relevant interpellations can be found in the minutes for the third sitting of the diet, August 26 1875, and the fifth sitting, August 29 1875. Saborski dnevnik kraljevinah Hrvatske, Slavonije, i Dalmacije. Godina 1875-1878, (Zagreb: Tisk Kralj. Zemaljske Tiskare, 1900). Although the historian Dragutin Pavličević’s main goal is to demonstrate that Catholic Croats also helped the uprising, his work lucidly handles the interrelations and tensions between “official” and “unofficial” Croatia. See Pavličević, “Odbori za pomaganje i bosanski prebjezi u sjevernoj Hrvatskoj tijekom Bosansko-Hercegovačkog ustanka 1875-1878.”
condominium with civil society over the care of refugees. Since the first law on associations came into force during the neo-absolutist years that followed 1848, successive revisions—strictly limited to non-political associations—had led to piecemeal liberalization.\(^{59}\) As an example of the efficacy and extent of social good that associations could produce, the refugee aid societies that appeared throughout Croatia immediately after the start of the uprising represent some of the most sophisticated of their kind. As an example of the dangers that nominally a-political associations could pose during this period of gradual liberalization, these societies were unsurpassed.

The period of the uprising saw an unprecedented expansion of associational activity. The refugee aid associations drew directly from a model the few existing charitable institutions had developed over the previous decades. These aid associations were wholly a product of a rising Croatian bourgeoisie that had found for the first time, in the figure of Mažuranić, a liberal leader with sufficient political and cultural power to launch a serious project of administrative and social reform. Despite restrictions, organizations to raise money for needy students or volunteer fire departments had existed for several decades, and were slowly proliferating in the second half of the nineteenth century. This was especially the case with the growing number of women’s societies, which officials tended to view in a favorable light.\(^{60}\) In 1872, the schoolteacher Marija Jambrišak founded a so-called ladies’ association to raise money for a girls’ school, and there was a similar society, backed by Josip Juraj Strossmayer, the influential Bishop of Đakovo, for

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\(^{59}\) The most comprehensive survey of associational life in the Habsburg Empire is Rumpler and Urbanitsch, *Politische Öffentlichkeit und Zivilgesellschaft. 1 Teilband. Vereine, Parteien und Interessenverbände als Träger der politischen Partizipation.*

the construction of a university in Zagreb. Also in 1872, the new caritative association Dobrotvor (Philanthropist) was founded “to take care of their city with bourgeois love.” The biggest caritative society was the Društvo čovječnosti (Humanitarian Society), founded in 1841. Along with the smaller interest groups, the Humanitarian Society introduced into the Croatian public sphere a variety of fund-raising techniques, including charity performances, fundraising drives in newspapers, and gala balls.

These tools for raising money and the consciousness of the urban bourgeoisie point to one of the hallmarks of this period: a shift in the nature of charitable associations, in which the nobility and the clergy played a less important role. Where previously the character of charitable associations had been religious and their aim had been to raise money for the church to retain or redistribute as it saw fit, the associations of the late nineteenth century were increasingly secular, even if the intentions of their aid remained largely the same. For example, in the relatively wealthy Slavonian town of Požega, of nine philanthropic foundations established between 1799 and 1909, only three were set up by people independent of the church—and the first of these was established in 1861.

In this sense, the advent of the refugee aid societies can be neatly slotted into the development of associational life more generally. With the first flight of Bosnians onto Croatian

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64 Zaklada Hranilović-Knežević—Markovičkina was established in 1861 to support the poor of the city; Zaklada porodice dra. Mije Reiner was approved in 1905, and Zaklada Teodora pl. Kraljevića was founded in 1909. The latter two of these were connected with nobility; only the first was founded by a commoner, who proceeded to establish a special fund for the hospital because the city “spared me from [the obligation of] military quartering.” See Julije Kempf, Požega Zemljiopisne Bilješke iz okoline i Prilozi za Povijest Slob. Kr. Grada Podega I Požeške Županije (Požega: Hrvatske Tiskare I Knjižare, 1910). 432-39.
soil, a “Ladies’ Committee” was formed in Zagreb to collect food and clothing for distribution to the “suffering Bosnian” peasantry. To be sure, the president of the committee was Comtessa Clotilde Buratti, who lived in the “ivory tower” of wealth and nobility. But the 23 other members were not nobility. Some of the women were from prominent Zagreb families or, like Marija Hatz, entrepreneurs in their own right. Others however, were neither.

There was precedent for this type of committee. During a smaller uprising in 1862, a ladies’ committee had been formed to send aid to “suffering brothers in Montenegro and Hercegovina.” The outstanding difference between the 1862 and 1875 committees was not just one of size, but of membership. Only one of the 24 members of the 1875 committee, Barbara Mrazović, had been involved in the eight-member 1862 committee. Some of the difference in size and interest may be explained by a possible greater interest in the uprising itself, or the larger degree of suffering. But a decade’s worth of associational activity and the rise of the liberal bourgeoisie cannot be ignored as an explanation. Moreover, this breadth of interest went beyond the insular world of the Zagreb elite. One of the changes that the uprising—and the refugee crisis in particular—brought to associational life in Croatia can be deduced from articles in the local newspapers. Charitable and refugee aid associations periodically published thank-you lists of donors in the newspapers, and in these lists it is not the great size of a few large donations that stand out. Rather, it is the large number of the many small donations, often under one forint, that are most conspicuous. The crisis did not simply mobilize the bourgeoisie to form

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67 “Das Damencomite” op. cit.
68 Benyovsky, “Dobrotvorna gospojinska (ženska) društva u Hrvatskoj od osnivanja do Prvog svjetskog rata,” 77. and “Das Damencomite.”
associations. It mobilized broad swaths of the larger public and the poor to contribute what spare change they had in a way that until 1875 only the church had been able to do.

With the start of the uprising, the state seems to have granted permission to establish aid societies based on members’ promises and their reputation. In mid-August 1875, the deputy head of the county assembly in Ruma (in present-day Vojvodina) requested instructions following the formation of a society to collect contributions for the Hercegovinians crossing into Dalmatia—at the opposite end of Croatia. There could not be “any type of obstacle” to the formation of the association, the Zagreb authorities responded, “because these refugees are wounded and are a great burden to [Dalmatian] society.” And while the deputy head would be responsible for monitoring the association’s activities, such supervision was based not on any real inspection, but rather on the reputation of its members. It was the deputy head’s “task to judge if the members of this association are sufficiently reliable people and [to judge] the security of the aid; that the collected donations under their management are used for the purpose intended.”

Authorities were ill-equipped to police this outburst of activity. In Civil Croatia, the office for internal affairs and finance, which was responsible for monitoring the activities and operations of associations, was notorious for “unsatisfactory supervision by the political authorities.” Although the committees themselves were difficult to monitor, the state maintained a telegraphic monopoly that allowed officials in the Military Border to insert

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69 HDA-UOZV, box 240, number 15282. 13 VIII 1875.
70 HDA-UOZV, box 240, number 14408. 14 VIII 1875.
71 HDA-UOZV, box 240. 14 VIII 1875.
72 Robert Parnica, “Filantropija u Hrvatskoj u drugoj polovini XIX. I početkom XX. Stoljeća (zaklade u javnom i privatnom životu),” Historijski zbornik 53(2000): 117. Parnica’s work covers a later period, but these had long been chronic, structural problems.
themselves into all non-cash financial transfers.73 Wired transfers were guaranteed at both ends by the state. While there are some examples of money nominally intended for refugees sent directly to individuals who were active and known supporters of the insurgency, for the most part transfers went directly into the hands of state officials along the border, and it was these officials who carried out the final distribution to the refugees.74

The state used the leeway afforded to it. In June 1876 Josip Mahalović, the Archbishop of Zagreb, sent 350 forints to the civilian government for distribution among the refugees in Croatia-Slavonia. The money had been raised by the editors of the Catholic-conservative newspaper Čeh in Prague from “friends of the suffering Christian Yugoslavs in the struggle with the Turks” and was to be distributed specifically among Catholics. Few of the Bosnian and Hercegovinian refugees were Catholic, and the government ignored the instructions. Not only did it determine how the money was to be apportioned among eight districts and the city of Zagreb, it also broadened the scope: the money was to be distributed not specifically among “suffering Catholics,” but rather among “the poorest of the … Bosnian refugees.”75

Ilija Guteša, God and Savior

The government of Civil Croatia granted permission for the establishment in Zagreb of an association “for the collection of voluntary contributions for suffering Hercegovinians” on 1

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73 It appears that the Finance Ministry at first wanted all cash transfers for aid to be controlled centrally through Vienna before being sent on to final distribution among refugees. This system was not implemented. HDA, Carsko-kraljevsko Zapovjedništvo u Zagrebu kao krajška zemaljska upravna oblast/CUVK box 871, 248.

74 Whether the money was spent on the insurgency, actually went to refugees, or was a mix of both is unclear. See HDA-CUVK, box 1036, folder 5-1 1877 for an example; the records of the Nova Gradiška society are the most complete and give a good idea of the breadth of activity. NUB BiH, box 363, folder “Ustanak Srba u Bos. Krajini 1875-1877.”

75 HDA-UOZV, box 465, 12346. 28 VII 1876.
August 1875. The following day the Zagreb newspaper *Obzor* published the Zagreb Committee’s first formal call for contributions. On 5 August the Croatian Federation of Singers published in the German-language newspaper *Agramer Zeitung* an appeal that all Croatian singing clubs hold concerts to benefit the “suffering families of our blood-related Hercegovinian relatives who fled to Dalmatia,” and to send the donations to the treasurer of the Zagreb Committee. Money sent to the Committee, it had already been emphasized, would go “exclusively and only to supporting” the refugees. Within a week of calling for contributions, the Zagreb committee sent its first 1,000 forints to Dalmatia. Within a month the committee had collected 11,000 forints.

The Zagreb Committee quickly became one of the most important of the Croatian aid societies, and was the most intimate institutional connection between the uprising and the elite of Croatian politics and business. It received money from well-known industrialists, writers such as August Šenoa, the mayor of Zagreb, and even from the commander of the Habsburg military border. While Mažuranić may have blocked the effort to distribute provincial discretionary funds for refugee support, he was also one of the earliest donors to the Committee, as was Milan Makanec, the *Sabor* member who had first called for an official fund. Political opponents within the narrow confines of a barely autonomous parliament, yet united in purpose and support for an aid society: this was exactly what officials in Vienna—and even more so in Budapest—

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76 HDA-UOZV, box 240, 14408. 1 VIII 1875.
77 *Obzor* 176, 2 VIII 1875.
78 *Agramer Zeitung* 177, 5 VIII 1875.
79 *Agramer Zeitung* 176, 4 VIII 1875.
81 Ibid. For the mayor, see *Agramer Zeitung* 184, 12 VIII 1875.
feared from associational life. The Zagreb Committee was also buying and smuggling weapons and supplies to the insurgency.\(^{82}\) Although the committee could not advertise this, it was an open secret in Zagreb from the very start—and Mažuranić surely knew where some of his money was going.

The committee seems to have carried out its activities relatively undisturbed until March 1876, when the Habsburg and the Ottoman Empires began their joint campaign for pacification of the insurgency and an official repatriation of the refugees (See Chapter Three). On 3 March 1876, Mažuranić sent a long letter to the Zagreb City Council, outlining a five-point agreement with the Foreign Ministry in Vienna that would govern the conduct of Habsburg subjects during the pacification and repatriation process. The directive is most enlightening not for what it says, but for what it repeats. Vienna’s frequently renewed orders to prevent armed bands of insurgents from using Habsburg territory as a base of operations in Bosnia and Hercegovina only illustrate the large gap between order and execution. For officials in Zagreb, the first and second paragraphs were the most relevant. The first demanded strict control over agitation in the press. The beginning of the second paragraph read, “political societies, organized for the purpose of direct or indirect support of the uprising, will not be tolerated...”\(^{83}\) These orders from Vienna were clearly the reason that four days earlier, on 29 February, Mažuranić had ordered the Zagreb Committee to supply receipts and accounts for its activities.\(^{84}\)

As Mažuranić explained to a city council member, the Zagreb Committee’s permission extended only to helping refugees, and if there was even the “smallest evidence that the money

\(^{82}\) Pavličević, “Odbori za pomaganje i bosanski prebjezi u sjevernoj Hrvatskoj tijekom Bosansko-Hercegovačkog ustanka 1875-1878.”

\(^{83}\) Hrvatski Državni Arhiv u Zagrebu/HR-DAZG, Gradsko Poglavarstvo Zagreb—Predsjedništvo/GPZ. Sl broj 7, 3 III 1876.

\(^{84}\) HR-DAZG GPZ. Sl. broj 8, 29 II 1876.
collected went to support the uprising in Bosnia or in Hercegovina, the unpleasant situation would arrive that the [committee’s] permission would be retracted, and the society would be disbanded.” Šime Mazzura, a lawyer and merchant originally from Dalmatia and the head of the Zagreb committee, ultimately did provide some records, although in comparison with the thousands of forints the committee had distributed, the small sums he accounted for were insignificant. The documentary record of the Zagreb Committee effectively ends at this point, and there may well have been more material. What is known is that the Committee was not disbanded—it remained an active public institution and was frequently mentioned in newspaper articles.

In this flurry of activity about the Committee, Mažuranić singled out one man in particular: Ilija Guteša, who Mažuranić said should be warned “to avoid all contact, either direct or indirect, with insurgents in Bosnia,” and who was brought in for an interview with the Zagreb police. Guteša had been a hero of 1848, was elected to the Sabor in 1861, and had been elected three times to the Orthodox Serbian Church council, an official organ that was, among other things, responsible for Serbian education. Guteša was also the vice-president of the Zagreb Committee and by far its most visible member. He embodied most perfectly the various strands of civic activity along the border during the uprising. Guteša had long before the start of the uprising been among the most active of the elite Zagreb do-gooders. He was a member of Društvo čovječnosti, a founding member and later president of Dobrotvor, and a tireless organizer of aid and support for people in need. His understanding of the meaning of charity was broad, extending from a sense of local obligation to more distant causes—in 1874 he raised 20,000

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85 HR-DAZG GPZ. Sl. broj 11. 11 III 1876.

86 HR-DAZG GPZ. Sl. broj 6. 6 III 1876; Obzor 7 III 1876.
forints in Zagreb to help farmers in the impoverished Lika district after a particularly bad harvest.\footnote{HR-DAZG, Osobni Fond Guteša Ilija/OFGI. Doc 30, 1894; unnumbered, undated biographical document. Mirjana Gross points out that during this period, malnutrition was not uncommon among rural populations. Mirjana Gross, \textit{Die Anfänge des modernen Kroatien: Gesellschaft, Politik und Kultur in Zivil-Kroatien und -Slawonien in den ersten dreissig Jahren nach 1848}, Anton Gindely Reihe (Wien: Böhlau, 1993). 152.} Guteša himself was an Orthodox Christian from Lika, and his charitable deeds in this case were clearly motivated by this close connection. His activities during the uprising were effectively an extrapolation of his efforts from 1874, encompassing the length of the Habsburg-Ottoman border zone. At the same time that he extended his range of aid activity, he was also among the most important connections between local activities and foreign do-gooders in Croatia, throughout the Habsburg Empire and beyond. It was these contacts—in particular with two British women, Adelina Paulina Irby and Priscilla Johnston—that helped Guteša to project need abroad. Finally, he did not restrict his activity to caritative aid. He was a gun-runner, helped to organize insurgent bands and tried to establish a provisional government for Bosnia and Hercegovina. Indeed, following the Habsburg occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina he was considered dangerous enough that he was permanently banned from entry.\footnote{HR-DAZG OFGI unnumbered.} As much as the Habsburg Foreign Ministry may have wanted to prevent these latter activities (especially during the 1876 repatriation effort), his support for refugees and his support of violence were intimately bound up with each other, even interdependent. For people such as Guteša, they both existed in the same conceptual space of “humanitarianism.”

The Zagreb Committee, and Guteša in particular, served as one of several nodes in what was, despite the rapid establishment of committees throughout the region, a highly centralized refugee aid program. In addition to collecting money in Zagreb proper, clubs and fundraisers elsewhere in the region sent their money to the Zagreb committee—even from Sisak, which was
much closer to the border than Zagreb, and was itself a temporary home to many refugees. The Zagreb Committee published appeals for funds in newspapers such as *Obzor*, and editorial offices themselves collected contributions that were subsequently forwarded to the Zagreb Committee. The wide catchment basin extended also to recipients of aid, and money from Zagreb flowed to refugees along the entire length of the border with Bosnia and Hercegovina.

Refugees also came to Zagreb to appeal directly for help. By 1877 local support for refugees was waning along the border as hunger, disease and “donor fatigue” set in. An *Obzor* correspondent from Sisak described the misery along the border as the worst yet, saying that despite earlier generosity from both Croats and Serbs, there were no longer any “true friends” of the refugees. Requests for help would be answered with “Go to Guteša in Zagreb, he’s your god and savior!” The refugees did just that. Encouraged by a misprint in the daily newspaper *Primorac*, which claimed one of Guteša’s contacts had received 412,775 forints in donations—instead of the actual 4127.75 forints, “old men and women who could barely drag themselves there, women with half-starving, naked infants suckling at their empty breasts, children, unclothed and naked,” came to Zagreb in groups of 50 to 100, their bodies “shaking from frost and disease, starvation staring from their vacant eyes.” On arrival, they joined a growing encampment in the old city, in sight of the *Sabor* and across from Guteša’s store at Number 79, St Mark’s Square, where, it was claimed, they received some bread, cloth, a small amount of money, and surely most importantly, a glass of strong Balkan fruit brandy—*rakija*.

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89 *Obzor* 59, 13 III 1877.

90 *Obzor* 298, 31 XII 1877.

91 On the misprint, see Vladimir Krasić, *Ustanak u Bosni od 1875. do 1878 god.*, Građa za noviju srpsku istoriju rata za oslobodjenje (Novi Sad1884). 102. The quote is from the *Kroatische Post*, 14 III 1878, in HR-DAZG OFGI, 35.

92 Ibid.
The collapse of popular domestic support for refugee aid by 1877 was not unique to Sisak. Newspapers continued to print lists of donors throughout the course of the uprising, but donations from domestic sources gradually decreased. As they did, the relative importance of foreign financial and material aid increased.

In the fall of 1875, a British woman by the name of Adeline Paulina Irby presented herself to Guteša with a letter of introduction from the prominent Serbian politician and diplomat, Filip Hristić. Irby would likely have been known to Guteša even before they met: she had established and run a school for Christian girls in Sarajevo in the 1860s, and when the uprising started, she and many of her students evacuated to Croatia. Irby and her partner, Priscilla Johnston, returned to England via Croatia and sent five of their pupils, all orphans, to continue their education in Prague. The decision was not uncontroversial. Even from their days in Sarajevo, Irby and Johnston had been suspected—without foundation—of wanting to convert orphaned Orthodox girls to Protestantism, and these accusations continued to resurface throughout the period and cast a shadow over some of Guteša’s activities as well.

In England, Irby and Johnston established what would become the largest individual humanitarian undertaking for the refugees. The “Bosnian & Herzegovinian Fugitives and Orphan Relief Fund” officially distributed £40,912 3s. 4d. in cash donations, goods, and materials. It had

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93 While Pavličević may be correct in arguing that popular support for the insurgency waned in Croatia because after the start of the Serbo-Turkish war the aid committees became increasingly “Serbified,” the argument is less convincing when it comes to refugee aid. Pavličević, “Odbori za pomaganje i bosanski prebjezi u sjevernoj Hrvatskoj tijekom Bosansko-Hercegovačkog ustanka 1875-1878.”

94 *Obzor* 6, 10 I 1876, *Agramer Zeitung* 13, 18 I 1876.

influential backers, including Florence Nightingale and the Archbishop of Canterbury.\textsuperscript{96} Irby’s original intention had been strictly to limit the “aid to children, and chiefly to the education of the children, but [Irby and Johnston] found it practically impossible to refuse relief in food and clothing to the wretched and starving fathers and mothers.”\textsuperscript{97} Irby and Johnston were at first based in the Slavonian town of Pakrac, and then later resettled in Knin, in the harsher environment of Dalmatia’s Dinaric mountains. Friends collected used clothing and goods in Britain, which Irby and Johnston imported and distributed to refugees, along with small amounts of food and money. At the start of 1876, Irby and Johnston established their first schools for orphaned refugee children in the area around Pakrac. By February they had opened two schools; by June 1876 they had added another five schools, with over 300 pupils.\textsuperscript{98} Ultimately, Irby and Johnston established some twenty schools, and hoped that once the violence ended and the refugees returned, the teachers and the pupils from their schools would form the vanguard of Bosnian education.\textsuperscript{99}

Strictly speaking, Guteša and Irby were not colleagues, although their worlds overlapped and they remained in close contact throughout the course of the uprising. They were “always exchanging their ideas about the fastest and most effective means to help the poor Bosnians who crossed over” to Habsburg soil.\textsuperscript{100} At times this exchange took a concrete and consequential form, for example when Guteša helped to obtain materials for the first school in Pakrac. When

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\textsuperscript{97} Irby, “Bosnian and Herzegovinian Fugitives and Orphan Relief Fund,” 19.

\textsuperscript{98} These figures are from Anderson, \textit{Miss Irby and Her Friends}: 109, 14.


\textsuperscript{100} Krasić, \textit{Ustanak u Bosni od 1875. do 1878 god.}: 101.
\end{flushleft}
Irby and Johnston first arrived in Croatia. It was Guteša who toured the border with them, and it was Guteša, already well known among the refugees, who helped to dispel the suspicion among many refugees that Irby and Johnston would spirit away the orphans as part of their Protestant missionary work.  

By 1877, Guteša had become the contact man for foreign do-gooders, and was himself actively recruiting help from abroad. He was in contact with Edward A. Freeman, the British historian, and traveled heavily in the border zone with Adolf Vischer-Sarasin, a humanitarian activist from Switzerland. Guteša also toured the border zone with Lord Campbell, who frequently spoke on the Eastern Crisis and who, Guteša hoped, would present a memorandum to the parliament upon his return.  

At the same time, Guteša expanded his call for aid to the foreign public. From the very start of the uprising, he had received money and goods from donors across the Habsburg Empire. These came mainly from the Slavic lands, where newspapers and committees raised aid in a similar manner to those in Croatia itself. Pan-Slavic groups in Russia and Serbia also sent money to the insurgency. This worried the Habsburg authorities, and in the early days of the uprising, Guteša had to defend himself against accusations he was secretly receiving Russian money. Yet by late 1877, Austria-Hungary was more certain of its diplomatic position vis-a-vis Serbia and Russia, and Guteša was openly printing appeals in Russian and Serbian newspapers for help for the refugees. Encouraged by a donation from Mathilde Frank in Gernsbach-Baden, Guteša published “Aufruf an die deutsche Nation!” in March, 1878, and “Les fugitifs de Bosnie et

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101 Agramer Zeitung 13, 1811 1876.

102 Krasić, Ustanak u Bosni od 1875. do 1878 god.: 101.

103 Obzor 237, 16 X 1877.
d’Hercegovine. Appel a la nation française” in May. Support for the refugees came from surprising places: a Slavic “patriotic society” in San Francisco sent a donation, asking only that it receive the lyrics to some “patriotic songs” in return.¹⁰⁴

The humanitarians’ stars shone bright during the crisis of 1875-1878. Irby and Johnston became minor celebrities and by 1876 it was no longer even necessary to refer to them by name; they were simply the Beneficent English Ladies. Irby was the “angel of the Serbian wretches,” and a “mother to the nation.”¹⁰⁵ Indeed, her legacy is mapped on to the physiognomy of Sarajevo itself: the street on which the original school for girls stood is now called “Mis Irbina.” The situation was similar with Guteša, a man who did more for the refugees than “the strength of his will and his body” could make possible, and who was immortalized in traditional epic song for supporting the Christian peasants, the raya.¹⁰⁶

He sent help to the raya who had fled
The hungry raya receive it
And gratefully thank the man.
And to the greatest Guteša Ilija
Who had made a mighty effort for them,
God pay him for his effort!
To your health, brother! Live long!
How many children did you feed
And how many suffering old people in the mountains


¹⁰⁵ Jelena Lazarević, Engleskinje u Srpskom Narodu (Belgrade: Beogradska Ženskog Društva, 1929).

¹⁰⁶ Obzor 30, 7 II 1877.
And how did you fight for suffering Serbian mothers?
For the nation you were a glorious visage,
And your spirit reigns over the raya!
Now your song has been composed,
And you will be celebrated until judgment day. 107

The Humanitarianism of Violence

Good deeds were only one side of the humanitarian equation along the Habsburg-Ottoman border. As much as Guteša pled for material and cash support for the refugees in the local and foreign press, and as much clothing and cash Irby and Johnston received from their supporters in Britain, the entire humanitarian project was fundamentally inseparable from the aims and activities of the insurgents and the nationalization of the uprising. Foreign support for the insurgency and for refugee aid was often indistinguishable, came from many of the same organizations out of near-identical emotional or political motivations, and was distributed along the border by many of the same people. The internationalization of aid strengthened existing local ties to the outside world and helped to create new ones. Pan-Slavism and Serbian nationalism—or the fear of them—lent an additional weight to the importance of these ties in the eyes of all participants. This included Habsburg authorities, who became even more concerned when Serbia and the Ottoman Empire went to war in July 1876. The Habsburg authorities were, with good reason, deeply suspicious of the “humanitarians.” And yet to a great extent the health and well-being of the refugees—and by extension the local population—on Habsburg soil

107 Krasić, Ustanak u Bosni od 1875. do 1878 god.: 112.
depended on foreign aid. More than once, officials in Zagreb found it necessary to publish in the local newspapers public thank-yous of the following sort: “The General Command finds itself obliged [...] to express its warmest thanks to the noble-hearted ladies for this humanitarian action on behalf of the suffering refugees.”

Irby herself had alluded to the problem early on: distinguishing rebel from refugee was nearly impossible, and often no distinction could be made. Her claim that “every Bosnian child’s father, brother, or uncle is an insurgent” was hyperbolic. Refugee statistics kept by Habsburg officials point to roughly equal numbers of male and female refugees, and whatever the deficiencies of Habsburg border control, clearly not all of the men were going back and forth across the border to fight in the insurgency. Yet from the very start, she also projected an image of herself as what one might call a “pure humanitarian,” insisting that “one of our hardest tasks was the absolute necessity we were under to refuse helping [the insurgents] in any way to buy arms and ammunition; to have done so would have been to compromise our whole special work.” She admitted, however, to caring for—at the request of some of her subscribers—a “few sick wounded men.”

Habsburg concern over the possible dual purpose of Irby and Johnston’s aid mission along the border lasted throughout the period of the uprising. The distrust was deep-seated and mutual. Irby was not an unknown quantity when she arrived in Croatia. In the 1860s she had traveled extensively in Slavic lands of the Habsburg Empire with Georgina Muir MacKenzie. During this journey, encounters with Slovak national activists as well as Czech intellectuals such as

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108 *Agramer Zeitung* 10, 14 I 1876.


110 Ibid.
František Palacký had earned them police surveillance and, in the town of Smokovec in the Slovakian Tatras, a brief arrest.\textsuperscript{111} The experience imprinted on both women strong Slavic sympathies that remained with them throughout.\textsuperscript{112} In Sarajevo, Irby’s educational activity centered on Orthodox Christian pupils, which further buttressed her reputation as a Slavophile, while also giving it a specifically Serbian tinge.

Irby’s sympathies for the Orthodox population of Bosnia and Hercegovina transferred directly to her aid for the largely Orthodox refugees. The work sometimes put her in direct conflict with authorities in Civil Croatia, which since the Austro-Hungarian compromise of 1867 had belonged to the strongly anti-Slavic Hungarian half of the Habsburg Empire. It was on the territory of Civil Croatia that her extensive school-building project aroused fears of Serbian nationalism, and her material and financial aid to the refugees raised suspicion that she was helping the insurgency. In both cases, Irby’s associates did little to inspire the confidence and trust of the authorities, who put a number of obstacles in her way.

Irby, who later spoke favorably of Robert College, a missionary school in Istanbul, and its role in the “preparation for Bulgarian freedom” clearly understood the revolutionary potential of education.\textsuperscript{113} When she started her schools for refugee orphans in Croatia, she threw herself into the center of the Croatian national debate, where education had become, according to the historian Mirjana Gross, the main reason for the collapse of the political accommodation

\textsuperscript{111} Anderson, Miss Irby and Her Friends: 7-8. Irby had good connections in Prague from her earlier travels “in the Slavonic provinces.” It was in Prague, under the advice of Palacký, that Irby and Mackenzie first decided to travel the Balkans. See Vaclav Žaček, “Pomoć engleskih “Panslavenki” jugoslavenskim emancipatorskim naporima 60-tih i 70-ih godina XIX stoljeća,” in Naučni skup 100-godišnjice ustanaka u Bosni i Hercegovini, drugim Balkanskim zemljama i istočnoj krizi 1875-1878. godine, ed. Hamdija Čemerlić, Milošek Ekmelić, and Rade Petrović (Sarajevo: Akademija nauka i umjetnosti Bosne i Hercegovine, 1977).

\textsuperscript{112} MacKenzie would later say that if she were ever in the “position to help a Slav, she would do it” see \textemdash, “Pomoć engleskih “Panslavenki” jugoslavenskim emancipatorskim naporima 60-tih i 70-ih godina XIX stoljeća,” 122.

\textsuperscript{113} Irby, “English Orphanage and Training School in Bosnia, 1869-1892,” 901.
between the Croatian and Serbian elite.\textsuperscript{114} Although there is no evidence that she saw the schools as tools for direct anti-Habsburg activity, she wanted to provide her pupils with a Serbian education. Textbooks were for the most part in Cyrillic, and “the only ‘reading books,’ so called [that the pupils] use are the New Testament and the Serb ‘National Songs.’”\textsuperscript{115} For Irby and Johnston, the schools were a cornerstone of a civilizing mission that would entrench and buttress Bosnian Serb culture, by returning to Bosnia a cohort of well-trained schoolmasters.

Concerns over the activities of the schools became acute after the start of the Serbian-Ottoman war. The problems were heightened because of the man Irby and Johnston had chosen to run their schools. Demeter Josić was the headmaster of the preparatory school for Orthodox Serb teachers in Pakrac, which Irby and Johnston had established with the support of a wealthy Serb merchant.\textsuperscript{116} Because of his experience and his connection with the community, Josić was a good choice. But on 25 July 1876, Josić and an assistant teacher were arrested on suspicion of treason.\textsuperscript{117} The charges were ultimately dropped, but the connection between Irby’s schools and men who were very likely involved in pro-Serb activism was established. Authorities quickly put Irby’s schools under the supervision of a Catholic priest. Irby found the situation so restrictive that in 1877 she chose to shut down all of the schools in Civil Croatia.\textsuperscript{118}

Josić was not the only suspicious character with whom Irby and Johnston associated. In 1877, Irby reported that although they had “obtained the aid of native Austrian residents of well-


\textsuperscript{115} Irby, “Bosnian and Herzegovinian Fugitives and Orphan Relief Fund,” 20.

\textsuperscript{116} Irby, “Work Among the Bosnian Fugitives,” 639-40.

\textsuperscript{117} Krasić, \textit{Ustanak u Bosni od 1875. do 1878 god.}: 92-94.

\textsuperscript{118} Irby, “English Orphanage and Training School in Bosnia, 1869-1892.”
known and unimpeachable honesty,” she had never given financial support to committees that supported the insurgency.\textsuperscript{119} They did, however, work closely with people who were active in the insurgency. One of their most trusted employees for aid distribution along the border zone was Peter Uzelac, who throughout 1875 had been an insurgent leader. Uzelac was among the better-educated of the insurgents. He stood out for his moderation, and by 1878 was supporting the Habsburg occupation of Bosnia.\textsuperscript{120} Nevertheless, during a February, 1877 tour of Dalmatia in which he distributed aid for Irby and Johnston, The Military Border General Command in Zagreb ordered district offices to keep their eye on this “middle-man for the English ladies Irby and Johnston’s […] plan to distribute food and clothing to the Bosnian refugees…” Local officials were not to put any unjustified arbitrary obstacles in Uzelac’s way, but were to “observe him and warn him away from any unpermitted agitation [among the refugees].”\textsuperscript{121}

Habsburg authorities continued to have difficulty distinguishing refugee aid from support to the insurgency. One reason for this was refugees and rebels themselves were often indistinguishable—Irby’s claim that “every Bosnian child’s father, brother, or uncle is an insurgent” was exaggerated, but illustrative.\textsuperscript{122} Refugee identity was bound up with suffering as much as it was with armed insurgency, and the nomenclature reflected the lack of clarity not in the nature of activity per se, but in the nature of identity. Indeed, the categories themselves were unstable and constantly shifted: depending on any number of factors, people could claim refugee

\textsuperscript{119} Irby, “Bosnian and Herzegovinian Fugitives and Orphan Relief Fund,” 24.

\textsuperscript{120} Uzelac carried his “religious indifference so far,” as to have claimed on several occasions, “Oh, if the Christians of Bosnia would only turn Mahometans, that would be better than these miserable feuds.” Evans, \textit{Illyrian letters: A Revised Selection of Correspondence from the Illyrian Provinces of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania, Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia, Addressed to the Manchester Guardian During the Year 1877}: 8.

\textsuperscript{121} HDA-CUVK box 20, folder 206 1877, 26 II 1877.

\textsuperscript{122} Irby, “Work Among the Bosnian Fugitives,” 641.
status at one point, join the insurgency at another, abandon the insurgency at a later date to rejoin refugee populations, or seek to straddle both identities. The Zagreb committee’s early documents consistently referred to those who crossed to Habsburg territory as “Hajduks.” It was a freighted term that implied the refugees’ relationship to violence, yet its usage presented no obstacle to the operation of the committee, which had to limit its activities to supporting refugees, not the insurgency.

The official target of the Zagreb committee, the so-called suffering Hercegovinians, was innocuous enough, but in Dalmatia it was understood that the central committee in Zadar was supporting not just Hercegovinians who had crossed over to Dalmatia, but also the uprising itself. The daily newspaper Narodni List was a key node of activity for the Zadar committee, responsible for publicizing committee activities locally and abroad, co-ordinating the arrival of international volunteers, and collecting the “charity that fell like hail from all corners of Dalmatia” and abroad. The Committee, Biankini wrote, was “like a ministry” that divided up activities into various spheres of responsibility.123

Habsburg policy assumed a binary—insurgent or refugee—inconsistent with reality. The prohibition of aid to the former and approval of help for the latter seemed reasonable at either end of the spectrum, but the definitional area in between was not only a functional and conceptual link between the two extremes, it also created opportunities within the system. The Dalmatian committees illustrated this well. Narodni List’s appeal for the establishment of aid committees to help “our suffering brothers from Hercegovina” was intended to help refugees, but even more so to help the insurgency. Habsburg policy towards the insurgency as well as the ability to enforce associational laws meant Narodni List cautiously elided differences and in an

apparent effort to whitewash the committees’ activities, pointed out that “the authorities will not be able to ban this philanthropic activity.”\textsuperscript{124} The historian Julije Grabovac argues the subsequent establishment of a committee to help the uprising by a number of locals not known for “patriotic” political activity was likely a ploy to “cast off any risk of suspicion” by Habsburg authorities about the “actual aims” of the committee.\textsuperscript{125}

It makes sense, however to take the claims of humanitarianism and philanthropy seriously. Of course, they served as a necessary legal cover that fooled nobody. But in the context of an anti-Ottoman uprising of “brother Hercegovinians,” humanitarianism and paramilitary support were not mutually exclusive, and the former cannot simply be dismissed as what Grabovac described as “only a screen for the real activities of the aid committees.”\textsuperscript{126} The Dubrovnik committee was mostly involved in supporting the insurgency with money, clothes and war supplies, while the “Ladies’ Committee” took responsibility for helping the refugees.\textsuperscript{127} The division of labor was not entirely clear, however, and Ladies’ Committees not only depended on the committees to help the insurgency, but often provided aid to the uprising directly.\textsuperscript{128}

Humanitarianism and paramilitary support were complementary, and the humanitarian sensibility extended to, and even included, anti-Ottoman violence.

Guteša was also an active supporter of the insurgency. His support was central to the establishment and supplying of an insurgent band on Croatian soil, he organized and was one of

\textsuperscript{124} The legality of forming these committees was an important question; at the founding of the Dubrovnik committee, the district chief of Dubrovnik explained the laws carefully. Grabovac, \textit{Dalmacija i hercegovacko-bosanski ustanak 1875-1878}: 55, 59.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid., 56.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid., 59.
\textsuperscript{127} Petrović, “Djelovanje dubrovačkog odbora za pomaganje hercegovačkih ustanika 1875-1878 godine.”
\textsuperscript{128} Benyovsky, “Dobrotvorna gospojinska (ženska) društva u Hrvatskoj od osnivanja do Prvog svjetskog rata.”
the few literate members of a short-lived Bosnian provisional government, received money from
Russia and at the behest of the Belgrade committee bought arms for insurgents in Slavonia. The
centrality of his character in both the insurgency and humanitarianism points to the structural
intersection between the two activities. Across Croatia, aid to both refugees and insurgents relied
on the same supply lines. This can be seen in Irby and Johnston’s reliance on Uzelac for the
distribution of aid. It can also be seen in Guteša’s connections with committees across Croatia.
He worked closely with the committee to support the insurgency in the Croatian town of Nova
Gradiška (across the Sava river from Bosanska Gradiška). The Nova Gradiška committee was
the most important support committee for the insurgency in northern Bosnia, and was led by
Vaso Vidović, who had been one of the refugees from 1873.129 The committee received money,
food and weapons from Guteša; also on the committee’s well-kept ledgers were shipments of
clothing and food for refugees—sent by Irby and Johnston.130

**Defining Necessity**

Humanitarian sentiment was conceptually and geographically broad throughout the period. In
early 1877, Irby and Johnston were still making emotional appeals to the British public for
support, and newspapers in Croatia and abroad were tugging at readers’ emotions with vivid
descriptions of suffering complimented by impassioned requests for aid. Guteša was still
publishing an occasional appeal to the public in the Zagreb papers, and had begun the campaign
for foreign aid discussed above. In April, he wrote a “memorandum to the parliament and nation

129 Pavličević, “Odbori za pomaganje i bosanski prebjezi u sjevernoj Hrvatskoj tijekom Bosansko-Hercegovačkog
ustanka 1875-1878.”

of England” in the name of the Bosnian refugees, which he most likely hoped his friend Lord Campbell would introduce.  

In some respects, the appeal harks back to 1873: Guteša’s refugees were asking firstly for the “English nation’s” help in the establishment of an effective and beneficent administration in Bosnia and Hercegovina that could end the “Turkish barbarities” and introduce the rule of law. Secondly, they were asking for financial support upon their return home so they might at least avoid starvation while re-establishing their farms and rebuilding their houses.

Yet the tenor and tactics of the request also show sharp differences from 1873. Certainly Guteša’s refugees were appealing—though not explicitly—for an international intervention that went beyond the restoration of fairness of Ottoman rule. But the appeal from 1877 is at a level of abstraction that would not have served the specific, legalized framework of the demands from 1873. Where the earlier document outlined specific events and the actors involved, individuals and specific events are all but absent from the 1877 plea. Instead, the broad forces of “animal barbarianism” are at work on an entire people. To be sure, there are detailed descriptions in which, for example, “innocent children are roasted, and their parents are forced to eat from their meat.” But these grisly details lack any context other than the “inhumanity” of the “Turk.”

Guteša’s refugees were bound in that classic humanitarian cause, “slavery.” With the situation framed in these terms, there was no hope the Sultan was capable of anything in the 1873 “spirit of humanity and civilization.”

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131 Obzor 83, 11 IV 1877.

132 Obzor 83, 11 IV 1877.

133 Obzor 83, 11 IV 1877.
The memorandum also abstracted the intended audience and the self-image of the refugees. This was no longer a petition that assumed a vertical dependence, but an appeal that implied a horizontal equality. The refugees were targeting not the heads of state of the guaranteeing powers of the Treaty of Paris, but the human sympathies of the “English Nation.” In doing so, they claimed a national identity for the people of Bosnia and Hercegovina—as “the only nation on God’s earth whose slavery and suffering was so long and terrible.” From the outset the refugees lay claim to the nation—that most modern embodiment of humanity and, following the model of Germany and Italy, progress.

Purged of specificity, the appeal became universal. Space still remained for the individual, however, and the plea mentioned two by name. Irby and Johnston were the corporal realization of the English Nation and those who supported them in their “Christian and philanthropic tasks.” Irby and Johnston were testimony to the “humanity and Christian love” of the sons and daughters of the English nation, and it is through this that the two humanitarians were the agents of fundamental change, not just for Christians, but for European modernity—the Christian Nation.

Guteša’s memorandum argued for humanitarianism as a force for change in international politics, and it used a sentimental public appeal to try to effect concrete changes to Britain’s eastern policy. The claims of humanity were of course malleable, and along the border, insurgent leaders were demanding Austria-Hungary return the weapons they took from refugees so the refugees might return home. These valences were in fact dependent on each other, both to give meaning to humanitarianism itself, and also to add a humanitarian narrative layer to the violence.
Chapter Three

Diplomacy, Implementation, and the Failure of the Spring Repatriation Effort, 1876

Ragusa, March 15, 1876. AFFAIRS are worse than ever. Austria apparently is making efforts for pacification, but without visible success. Russian Agents more and more active in preventing submission, but [Russian] Consul Jonin himself less openly. Return of refugees almost impossible, from want of money and provisions. No money at Mostar. Insurrection as vigorous as ever. Turks defeated again near Piva. Army terribly reduced by famine and sickness. Soldiers forced to carry provisions themselves; no transport animals. I hope to leave for Mostar to-morrow.¹

The early months of 1876 marked a turning point for Habsburg-Ottoman relations and the question of refugees. Since the start of the uprising in the summer of 1875, Austria-Hungary had taken two largely discreet approaches to the refugees, and to the uprising more broadly. The first of these approaches was the management of refugee movement and the distribution of aid. The presence of refugees on Habsburg soil also strained domestic politics and was another area that revealed conflicting agendas within the Empire, both between the center and periphery, but also between the Austrian and the Hungarian sides of the dual monarchy. The centralization of aid and management policies was necessary given the size of the problem and the large sums of money involved.

¹ Document 393, Holmes to Derby, 15 III 1876. “Further Correspondence Respecting Affairs in the Herzegovina.”
Refugee policy and support came from the joint Austrian and Hungarian Foreign Ministry, and execution of policy most immediately involved the Ministry of War—another joint institution. Beyond the joint imperial structures, other official efforts to support the refugees did not get far, as shown by the Croatian diet’s failed attempt to budget for refugee aid (see Chapter Two). The centralization also depoliticized the refugee question as much as possible domestically by identifying refugees as a largely bureaucratic and logistical problem. The nature of this bureaucratic response emerged from the encounter between the long institutional history of managing and responding to Ottoman subjects fleeing to Habsburg territory on the one hand, and the new international context on the other (see Chapter One).

The second approach was diplomacy. The refugees had, after all, turned an Ottoman domestic affair into an international question. The subjects of neighboring states and polities such as the Habsburg Empire, Montenegro, and Serbia became directly involved not just in refugee affairs, but also participated in the organized violence of the insurgency against the Bosnian and Hercegovinian Muslim elite, and against the Ottoman state itself. Pan-Slavists, revolutionaries and activists from farther afield became involved, too. All this served to internationalize the uprising further and to blur the lines between innocent victims of violence who had fled the insurgent provinces, and active members of the insurgency who were temporarily exploiting the relative safety to be found in neighboring states.

The internationalization of the uprising was from the very start correctly seen by the insurgents as something that could only help the lot of Bosnia and Hercegovina’s Christian population. Internationalization of the uprising enabled the official involvement
of the other Great Powers in Ottoman affairs, and by opening up questions agreed to in the Treaty of Paris, it threatened to destabilize the international system—and therefore de facto required Great Power involvement. Refugees, insurgents, and the strained integrity of the Habsburg-Ottoman border directly endangered European peace.

This chapter focuses on a brief period in the late winter of 1875 and the spring and early summer of 1876 when the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires began a bi-lateral process that merged and sought to solve simultaneously two concerns. The first of these concerns was the expanding diplomatic crisis resulting from the failure to end the insurgency and to stanch the flow of refugees across the Ottoman border. Equally troublesome for the two neighbors was the threat of domestic instability caused by a mounting refugee problem on the Habsburg side of the border, coupled with the crisis of legitimacy that a long-term absence of the Christian population would cause on the Ottoman side of the border. The chapter argues that as it was envisioned in Vienna and Istanbul, the official pacification and repatriation process designed to solve these problems was undermined by European diplomacy, especially that of Austria-Hungary itself, and was inefficient from the start. The corruption and weakness of Ottoman government institutions in the insurgent provinces, the government’s concomitant inability to make good on any of its reform promises led to consistently worsening terms of repatriation at the local level. The troubles were exacerbated by the Ottoman government’s bankruptcy, which among other things left Ottoman soldiers selling their weapons and scavenging for clothes and food, and left Ottoman repatriation officials unable to fulfill any of the material promises to returning refugees. On the Habsburg side of the border, the repatriation project was crippled by an increasingly Slavic public
mobilization in support of the uprising, enabled by the inability or unwillingness of public officials to enforce domestic restrictions. Border officials failed to establish and enforce the strict border controls envisioned in Vienna, which would have partially de-internationalized the crisis and also ensured Austro-Hungarian neutrality with regard to the uprising. All of this fed into a process where the failure of the repatriation project led to Austria-Hungary turning away from the effort altogether, and by the second half of 1876 entering into negotiations with Russia over how to end Ottoman sovereignty over Bosnia and Hercegovina without causing the outbreak of a general European war.

This is not a novel argument. What this chapter will do, however, is to use a case study of these months to re-position the refugee question at the very center of the diplomatic and domestic concerns of the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires. The first half of 1876 turned mass refugee movements, perhaps for the first time, into a question of international policy. In January 1876, in the midst of a winter of strained budgets and high refugee mortality, Andrássy said that his main concern was not Ottoman reform per se, but refugee return.² Even if the reforms lasted only temporarily, a permanent return would be sufficient proof of Ottoman integrity; if the refugees returned again it would warrant direct Habsburg intervention in the form of an occupation. Andrássy functionally and conceptually merged refugee return with the success of Ottoman reforms; repatriation became a proxy for, and the primary indicator of, the success of pacification and the re-establishment of Ottoman control over the provinces. Successful and permanent return and resettlement—not durable and effective institutional and legal reforms—defined successful pacification and reforms.

² Mollinary, Sechsundvierzig Jahre im österreich-ungarischen Heere, 1833-1879, 2: 296.
This case study points to a number of consequences of the repatriation effort, including that for the first time, a generalized definition of a modern, mass-movement refugee emerged, if only tentatively. While surely tacitly understood at the time, it was the detailed fourteen article repatriation instructions the Sublime Porte sent to its border officials and repatriation commissioners that explicitly parsed the Ottoman subjects who had fled to neighboring states into different groups. In doing so the instructions created an exclusive typology of “the refugee” as a victim of violence.

Of more immediate and basic consequence to the refugees was that the formal repatriation effort intensified the violence of the insurgents against refugees who were preparing to return or already had returned; it also intensified insurgent violence against Orthodox Christian peasants who had remained in their villages, in and effort to force their exile. It is difficult to reckon the extent to which peasants fled in the face of Muslim or Christian violence against them. And while the uprising started with Christian violence, it is also difficult to determine the extent to which attacks on the peasantry were primary violence, or retaliatory. Yet what does become clear is the real and persistent threat of violence by Christian insurgents against Christian villagers and peasants. This alone is not surprising, but the fact of this violence smudges the clean lines of a nationalist narrative with additional, and more particularistic categories of identity. That the peasantry should fall victim to both Muslim and Christian attacks and efforts to prevent their return only underlines the extent to which this linkage between repatriation and reform success held true for all the parties involved. With this in mind, the hallmark of the repatriation process was not the process itself, nor was it the failure of the process.
Instead, it was the intensified tactical instrumentalization of the refugee to achieve strategic goals.

The Berlin Memorandum implicitly framed the refugee question in terms of the integrity of the Treaty of Paris, and explicitly moved refugees to the center of multilateral international politics. Yet solving the problem of refugees had been the subject of intense Ottoman-Habsburg diplomatic relations almost from the very start of the crisis. In fact, by the time the contents of the Berlin Memorandum were made public, a bilateral agreement on a formal joint Ottoman-Habsburg effort to repatriate the refugees and resettle them in their homes was months old. As this chapter demonstrates, the refugee question was an area in which both the Habsburg and the Ottoman side were able to negotiate policies, in part because their interests were mutual. It was also an area where the Ottomans had significant although often ham-fisted influence over policy-making. Both sides saw refugee repatriation as the key marker of the end of the insurgency, and the fundamental proof of the efficacy of Ottoman reforms. At the same time, they both suffered—albeit to a different extent—from an inability to coerce refugees or insurgents, and even an inability to control the actions of their own representatives on the ground.

It was the Ottomans themselves who first linked pacification and repatriation into a single policy goal. Facing the insult of the consular mission, the Ottoman government unilaterally initiated a program of pacification and repatriation in a last-ditch attempt to prevent the foreign powers from sending their consuls on a formal inspection tour of the insurgency. The failure of this attempt to negotiate the insurgents into submission and repatriate the refugees, not to mention the near certainty of the consular investigation,
made expedient a stronger militarized effort at pacification. For Ottoman officials, repatriation was an essential policy goal. It reflected their conviction that refugee flows to neighboring territories would not only further internationalize a domestic conflict, but also were a palpable indication not just of Ottoman rule in the provinces, but the way Ottoman rule was seen abroad.

Pacification and refugee return as a unified goal quickly became orthodoxy, and the twin projects of re-establishing peace and returning the refugees to their homes came to be seen as interdependent. A successful end to the violence in Bosnia and Hercegovina was a necessary condition for the return of refugees, and a successful return of the refugees would serve as proof that the violence in the provinces had, in fact, been brought to an end. Disregarding the emphasis the Andrássy Note placed on Ottoman reform, Andrássy told the Ottoman ambassador in Vienna, Arifi Paşa, that care should be taken “above all for the repatriation of the refugees,” and that the question of reforms could be postponed until afterwards.³ The Austrian historian Horst Haselsteiner has written that it was with the failure to repatriate the refugees, “one could say above all [this failure]—that all of the pacification efforts of Austria-Hungary collapsed.”⁴

The bilateral plan was made formal at the end of February with the Ottoman publication of the terms of repatriation that had been agreed with the Habsburg Empire. This detailed set of instructions was to be distributed to Ottoman provincial officials and to special commissioners the central government appointed. It required cross-border

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³ Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (Istanbul)/BOA Hariciye Nezareti Siyasi Kısım Evrakı/HR.SYS box 246 #6101 28 II 1876.

cooperation and contained provisions for security, public health and the reconstruction of villages. To a great degree these instructions prefigured the broader demands of the Berlin Memorandum. As with the Memorandum, the repatriation effort these instructions inaugurated was viewed skeptically by statesmen, diplomats and consular officials alike. They doubted refugees would find the terms attractive or find the Habsburg threat to end the distribution of aid sufficiently compelling to return. The repatriation effort was undermined by foreign influences, opposed by insurgents, and in many cases rejected by the refugees themselves. It was also a cornerstone of bilateral Ottoman-Habsburg diplomatic relations and efforts to re-establish Ottoman authority in the provinces, prevent further weakening of the Ottoman Empire, and maintain European peace. Although well known in the European capitals, the effort was an intimate and exclusive affair between neighbors.

The effort very concretely linked high diplomacy with domestic conditions and local administration, from regional capitals down to the most remote village. The infrastructure of Habsburg state administration became the executor of Habsburg foreign policy and a major actor in Ottoman domestic affairs. This exposed European diplomacy and international stability not just to truculent insurgents and circumspect refugees, but also to the capacities and whims of official and unofficial representatives of the state at the smallest level of villages to the more powerful biases and executive influence of regional officials. There were many valences to the joint Habsburg-Ottoman pacification and repatriation effort, but the nucleus was not simply a concern for the well-being of the refugees. Instead, it was a concern for the well-being of the international system of empire itself.
The Preconditions of Return

At the start of the uprisings, the Ottoman government was ill-prepared for the strain on its own central structures and competing interests or on its marginal ability to govern in the provinces in the first place. The execution of *tanzimat* reforms and centralization had been particularly difficult in the provinces. Other than during the halcyon days immediately following Omar Paşa Latas’ seemingly decisive blow against the power of the entrenched and restive Bosnian *kapetans*, the interests of Muslim land-owners held the local Ottoman administration captive. Military deployment in the years prior to the uprising was low, and the Porte largely failed to push through serious reforms.

The lesson of the merchant refugees from 1874 was not just that Istanbul appointed corrupt or incompetent governors, but that the office itself was weak. Two decades after the provincial capital was moved to Sarajevo from the ineffective isolation of its fortified redoubt in Travnik, it was still the local notables who held sway in provincial politics. The Porte was unable, or unwilling, to take the steps necessary to reassert central government control. Instead of addressing structural problems it reverted to largely symbolic changes of administration: Bosnia and Hercegovina had ten different governors from 1869-1875, including one who never even made the trip to Sarajevo.5

The Porte did make one major administrative change prior to the repatriation process: in December 1875, it divided Bosnia and Hercegovina into two separate

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provinces. It was not an unprecedented decision. Hercegovina had only recently been incorporated into the provincial administration of Bosnia—possibly as a district of Bosnia by 1846, although it may have existed independently as late as 1865. The consular corps in Bosnia voiced its opinion on the change largely in its silence. Ibrahim Tepić makes no note of any Russian response and there is scant indication of a serious Habsburg response. The British ambassador in Istanbul, Henry Elliot, entertained “much doubt of the expediency of this division,” although he saw that “arguments of weight may be urged in its favour. In the Vilayet of the Herzegovina the Christians will be in so large a majority that in Provincial Councils, if at all fairly elected, they should have a preponderating voice, whilst in Bosnia it is Mussulmans who will be strengthened by the separation.”

Gerrymandering was in fact the Porte’s intention. It worried more about the Hercegovinian uprising than the Bosnian; Hercegovina had a long restive past, and the government in Istanbul hoped that a pacification in the southern province would quickly end the uprising to the north. The administrative division created a new set of opportunities. Server Paşa, about whom the British consul in Mostar wrote that “no man has done so much to deprive the Christians of all confidence in reform [...]” was recalled

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6 This appears to have been an accompaniment to the Reform Ferman of 12 December 1875. See Čubrilović, Bosanski Ustanak 1875-1878: 103-04.


8 Ibrahim Tepić, Bosna i Hercegovina u ruskim izvorima, 1856-1878, Biblioteka Kulturno nasljeđe (Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša, 1988).

9 Document 79, Elliot to Derby. 30 XII 1875 “Further Correspondence Respecting Affairs in the Herzegovina.”
to Istanbul.\textsuperscript{10}
Mehmed Rauf Paşa, who had served as governor and military commander of the unified provinces for about two months, was replaced in Sarajevo by İbrahim Bey, and appointed interim governor of Hercegovina; İbrahim was then replaced on 24 January 1876 by Ali Paşa, who had been serving as ambassador in France.\textsuperscript{11} The districts of Gacko, Bilece and Trebinje, where the uprising had been centered, were administratively separated from Mostar and placed under the authority of Konstan Efendi, a Christian.\textsuperscript{12}

All of these changes, however, were overshadowed by a military appointment: Muṣir Ahmed Muhtar Paşa, who had earned his reputation and title in Yemen, was to replace Rauf as military commander of the two provinces. The appointment marked a change in the military’s tactics against the insurgency. Rauf had simultaneously pursued a military and a negotiated settlement; in late December 1875 he sent Konstan to Istanbul in the hopes of convincing the Porte to negotiate with Montenegro for its support to end the uprising. At the same time, Rauf had hoped to build his forces at Banjani (in present-day Montenegro) for the winter, where “he could have succoured the indigent and rendered the task of those who remained in arms much more difficult, as they would have been deprived of the shelter they now obtain there.”\textsuperscript{13}

The arrival of Muhtar Paşa heralded a new course for the Porte, however. Authorities in Sarajevo were seemingly incapable of reining in the influence of powerful landowners over local officials or

\textsuperscript{10} Document 110, Holmes to Elliot. 6 I 1876. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{11} On the careers of Mehmed Rauf and İbrahim, see Hadžihuseinović, \textit{Povijest Bosne}, 2: 1201-36.

\textsuperscript{12} Čubrilović, \textit{Bosanski Ustanak 1875-1878}: 103-04.

\textsuperscript{13} Document 110, Holmes to Elliot. 6 I 1876 “Further Correspondence Respecting Affairs in the Herzegovina.”
curbing their abuses of power (and the local population’s violence towards Christians), and the gendermerie and the military had so far failed to suppress the uprising or limit insurgent violence towards Muslims, Christians, and their property. By appointing Muhtar Paşa, the Porte was invoking the successful tactics of Omer Paşa Latas. The appointment meant “no more and no less than the Sublime Porte was determined to defeat the uprising [exclusively] with military force [...]”

By the start of the return and resettlement process, there was little evidence of a reversal of military fortune under Muhtar Paşa’s leadership. Large-scale insurgent violence had in fact subsided, although attacks on Ottoman military and civil targets in Hercegovina continued. In the Bosnian borderlands even though low-level violence and incursions persisted, the region was relatively peaceful up through March. For the most part however, these moments of relative calm were the result of winter cold. Moreover, a set of reports submitted to Anton Mollinary, the commander of the military border, illustrate the extent to which this low-level violence and the failure of reforms, not clashes between the Ottoman military and organized bands of insurgents, were the major obstacles to refugee return.

In late February, as the empires were preparing for the official repatriation, Mollinary had sent Alfred Boić, the First Lieutenant Commissioner for Turkish Refugees, to tour the border zone and report back on the conditions for return. Boić spent most of the month of March traveling and reporting, and while his reports offer snapshots of

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15 Ćubrilović, Bosanski Ustanak 1875-1878.

16 Also referred to as “kk Conzipist Commissaer fuer bosnische fluechtlinge.” Boić’s reports are to be found inside HDA Spisi o Bos. Ustanka box 12 #253. 28 II 1876.
current conditions, many of his observations reflected long-standing issues. For the most part, his reports concerned the Habsburg side, but he closely followed the situation across the border in Bosnia. On several occasions he crossed over to the Ottoman province, where he met with Habsburg and local Ottoman officials. In Bosnian Kostajnica he watched eight militia divisions conduct exercises, and judged them to be in good shape, reasonably well disciplined and similarly clothed but differently shoed. These last points, it seems, were intended as military intelligence: the existence of a uniform was a key marker of the regular (and hence internationally protected) soldier. Despite the clothing, Boić reported that the Redifs, compared to “our troops, are francstireur, but not military.”¹⁷

The Boić reports neatly illustrate many of the problems that the repatriation program would have to overcome for it to succeed. At the most basic level, even if there was little in the way of organized insurgent activity, violence on the Ottoman side of the border continued to drive refugees across to Habsburg territory. Habsburg district heads in Petrinja reported that refugees crossed the “dry border” daily and were pursued right up to the border.¹⁸ The situation in Croatian Kostajnica was similar. There is no doubt that the situation on the Ottoman side of the border was in many places grim, and in Petrinja local officials with whom Boić met unanimously assured him the refugees would rather die of starvation on Habsburg soil than return.¹⁹ The refugees correctly blamed the begs for many of the ills in the insurgent provinces; they also saw the begs as the

¹⁷ HDA Spisi o Bos. Ustanka box 12 #345. 1 III 1876.

¹⁸ Ibid. The “dry border” was in contrast to most of the Bosnian-Habsburg border, which followed the Una and the Sava rivers.

¹⁹ Ibid.
instigators of Muslim violence against them. At the same time, however, they trusted the local Ottoman officials as little as they did the begs. As had been the case with the renegade kapetans a half century before, centrally-appointed Ottoman officials were largely incapable of controlling the activities of the begs. For many officials it wasn’t even a question of controlling the begs. Boić reported the reason that as late as March the Ottoman reform ferma still hadn’t been published in northwest Bosnia was that local Ottoman officials were afraid to do so.20

As the contents of the reform ferma became known in the northwestern heartland of the Bosnian uprising, violence by the local Muslim population increased. Ekmečić has interpreted the violence in terms of class struggle that ultimately broke down along religious lines. He has argued the anti-reform violence broke out only with the formal announcement of the reforms in provincial centers such as Bihać and Banja Luka, and that even the rising of the lower classes of Muslims were led by sipahis and begs.21 In Bihać, violence erupted during the announcement of the reforms, despite the earlier deployment of regular army soldiers.22 Indeed, the anti-reform protest was marked by opposition to the central reform elements of the ferma, in particular the core idea of “equality” among the religions, as well as any intrusion by the state into the question of agricultural relations between landowner and tenant farmer.23

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20 Ibid. The contents of the reforms had been published in the official newspaper Bosna at the start of the year, and the ferma itself was announced in Sarajevo on 1 February 1876. Document 295, Freeman to Derby 3 II 1876. “Further Correspondence Respecting Affairs in the Herzegovina.”

21 Ekmečić, Ustanak u Bosni 1875-1878: 177-79.

22 Ibid., 178.

23 Document 56, Freeman to Derby 30 XII 1875 “Further Correspondence Respecting Affairs in the Herzegovina.” Cited in Ekmečić, Ustanak u Bosni 1875-1878: 177.
Class struggle certainly explained some of the violent response to the announcement of the reforms, and it keeps in context the big picture of the fundamentally conservative goals of Bosnia’s Muslim landowners. But it also underemphasizes the legacy of and ongoing tense relations between the center and the periphery. As much as the beks supposedly wanted to “restore the feudal system that existed formerly in these provinces,” the larger point was that it was the central government that prevented them from doing so—that local administrators indirectly caused “the present insurrection by maladministration, and by stirring up the mutual hatred and jealousy of Christians and and Turks.”

And while Boić was not able to confirm the rumors, Bosnian Christians from several different towns claimed that the beks from the area around Kostajnica sent a telegram to the Sultan, swearing their fealty but protesting the reforms, and promising that were the Sultan to repeal the reforms, they would “hold on to Bosnia for him.”

Throughout the winter the violence in Kostajnica had been constant, but at a low level. On 25 January 1876, the magistrate and the Deputy sub-governor of Kostajnica reported to officials in Bihač that twenty insurgents had crossed over the border from the Habsburg side and stolen nine head of draft animals from “loyal Christians” in the village of Demirovac, where they burned eighteen carts of hay and one house as well as its barn. On 8 February, the county governor in Bihač forwarded to the governor in Sarajevo another report from Kostajnica. After the insurgents had destroyed the watchtower in Johova the previous autumn, the Ottoman border guards began

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24 Document 56, Freeman to Derby 30 XII 1875 “Further Correspondence Respecting Affairs in the Herzegovina.”

25 HDA Spisi o Bos. Ustanka box 12 #345. 1 III 1876.

construction on a fortified shelter in the town of Dubica. They abandoned construction with the onset of winter, intending to return in the spring. But on 28 January 1876 insurgents crossed over from the Habsburg side, burned down the fortifications, tore down the chimney, and then destroyed a nearby bridge. Days later, insurgents crossed over again and stole seven head of oxen from villagers in Gornje Grad; on their way back, the insurgents burned several stacks of hay that had been collected for the desetina (tithe). The villagers of Gornje Grad demanded that an official letter on the matter be sent to Habsburg authorities.27

Yet the geographic distribution of the violence was uneven. Even as the Christian peasants were being attacked in the county of Bihać, elsewhere along the border refugees were returning voluntarily—or were being attacked by insurgents to prevent them from doing so.28 Events in Bihać also demonstrated how contingent on local circumstances the violence actually was. Boić’s reports also include protocols of interviews he conducted with several refugees, including an interview with Mile Zec, a refugee from the village of Rujiška, in the Kostajnica district of Bihać. Zec had fled with his family to Habsburg territory during the night of 2 March 1876.29 The fifty other residents of Rujiška had fled the previous autumn. Only Zec and his family stayed on. In his statement to Boić, Zec said, “my Sipahi Mustajbeg emboldened me and asked that I stay.”30 Exactly why Zec was willing to remain when the others fled is unclear, although one reason may have been

27 Document 63 Kostajnica to Bihać 29 I 1876. Ibid.
28 BOA HR.SYS box 239 folder 1, 09 II 1876.
29 HDA Spisi o Bos. Ustanka box 12 #345. 3 III 1876.
30 Ibid.
his apparent passivity: “I remained peaceful and did my work as a farmer.”31 By the spring, Zec’s situation was no longer tenable. Tensions had mounted throughout the winter, and then, on 28 February, while Zec and his brother were plowing his field, a “band of Turks” appeared and started shooting at them.32 The two farmers fled and hid in the bushes, and when they returned home their families told them that the bands had stolen almost everything. The final push towards flight came from Zec’s Muslim landowner, a member of the very class said to be provoking the excesses: “My beg Alibeg told me himself to flee after I complained to him that the Turks had shot at me, saying ‘it is not be possible for me to help you because it would mean I might be killed’”33 Even Zec’s Muslim protectors now needed protection.

The Boić reports also offer a nuanced picture of the state of affairs on the Habsburg side of the border in the period prior to the repatriation effort. Most broadly, the Habsburg Empire faced a limited ability to control its borders—insurgents used its territory to stage attacks, and aid groups of the sort discussed in Chapter Two actively helped the rebels. The Habsburg’s porous southern border attracted the full range of what the historian Dragutin Pavličević has described as “revolutionaries, soldiers, adventurists, desperadoes, vagabonds, agents, spies and thieves of all nationalities.”34

Along the military border, Mollinary was an effective and disciplined officer who dealt with both military and civilian administrators along the border. And while his officers were for the most part reliable, members of the civil service played a decisive

31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
role but were—whether out of pro-uprising sympathies, nationalism, conflicting interests or because they were simply schlampig—less trustworthy. In Zemun, the border-town across the Sava River from Belgrade, the mayor was considered loyal largely because his private businesses had collapsed and he lived solely off his salary as a civic official. Nevertheless, the state police “could not offer, for many reasons, their approval of him; he is by birth a so-called Serb, has property in the Principality [of Serbia] and cannot always mask his sympathy for the Serbian cause.”35 Moreover, the mayor’s good intentions could easily be undermined by other local officials. The recently-appointed police commissioner also offered “no guarantee that our state interests would be appraised in accordance with the circumstances.”36

The situation in Croatian Kostajnica appeared to be completely different. Boić praised the district chief Paić, who was following Mollinary’s instructions to an extent well beyond the requirements of his office. Boić thought these efforts were instrumental in the retreat of armed insurgents from the “sites of their activities without the application of any kind of forceful measures, and also [that] for the future the [integrity] of our territory is secured.”37

Even the efforts of a man such as Paić only went so far. In Kostajnica alone—in addition to insurgents and their leaders—Boić reported there were two Russians with valid papers. Beyond that, however, were Serbian and Russian agents, who pretend to be newspaper correspondents although they were actually the former; “an intelligent Pole, I

35 HDA Spisi o Bos. Ustanka box 12 #253. 20 III 1876.
36 Ibid.
37 HDA Spisi o Bos. Ustanka box 12 #253. 6 III 1876.
think his name is Soroczinsky, a former Austrian officer, these people, who are either agitators, spies or revolutionaries, will be dealt with according to the high orders [...] and placed under surveillance, warned, expelled, and even deported.”

Dalmatian authorities exercised much less control over the border-zone than did those along the military border. Local administrators and even high-ranking officials generally sympathized with the insurgents, to the point that even in Dubrovnik, General Jovanovich allowed armed insurgents to “openly move about the neighbourhood of this town without any interference on the part of the military.” Baron Rodich, the Dalmatian governor, set the tone. Although he followed his orders, Rodich was well-known for his strong support of the insurgents’ cause. Josef Koetschet a Swiss private physician turned dragoman and part-time negotiator for the Hercegovinian governor, told a British consul that Rodich’s “manner and demeanour in executing Count Andrássy’s instructions were amply sufficient to destroy all the effects of the language which had been put into his [Rodich’s] mouth at Vienna.” As the repatriation effort failed to get underway towards the end of March 1876, Hercegovinia’s new governor, Ali Paşa, became justifiably convinced that if Rodich so desired he could end the insurrection by directly confronting the chiefs and also effect a successful repatriation.

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38 HDA Spisi o Bos. Ustanka box 12 #253. 1 III 1876.

39 Document 402, Monson to Buchanan. 11 III 1876. “Further Correspondence Respecting Affairs in the Herzegovina.”

40 Document 402, Monson to Buchanan. 11 III 1876. Ibid.

41 Monson thought, probably correctly, that Ali overestimated Rodich’s powers. But the broader point about Rodich’s unwillingness to exert the entire force of his office holds true. Document 524, Monson to Derby, 28 III 1876 Ibid.
In the early spring of 1876, neither the Ottoman nor the Habsburg Imperial authorities were able to exercise a great deal of control over their borderlands. To be sure, the situation on the Ottoman side of the border was more chaotic, with an armed insurgency, a weak provincial government in hock to independent and powerful local landowners, an ill-equipped and small military deployment under a new general with no knowledge of the region, and a persistent outflow of refugees. The situation was far better for the Habsburgs even if there were long-term concerns about domestic stability should the refugees not return home. Vienna nevertheless had command and control problems: local officials were often less than responsive to orders from Vienna, and in some cases simply defiant, while the borderland population was often sympathetic to the insurgency; smuggling of weapons and supplies to the insurgency was endemic and armed bands raided Ottoman territory in direct violation of the expectations of Habsburg neutrality. The Habsburg army, too, was woefully under-deployed to guard its long border on rough terrain, or to prevent smuggling and the landing of supplies on the craggy Dalmatian coast. These were the local circumstances that the clumsy tools of Great Power diplomacy and Habsburg-Ottoman negotiations had to overcome.

Preparing the Return

On 26 January 1876, five days before Zichy presented the Andrassy Note to the Porte, Andrassy sent his ambassador an outline proposal for Habsburg-Ottoman co-operation over refugee repatriation. Austria sought two guarantees for the refugees. The first of these was a general amnesty, which by the 1870s was a now-familiar tool of the Ottoman
state to encourage people to end insurrectionary activity and to return home.\textsuperscript{42} The second was a guarantee that the Ottoman authorities protect Christian inhabitants “against all of the violence and barbarity that Muslim resentment could drive.” Additionally, Andrásy asked the Porte to consider what he called temporary measures: providing the necessary materials to rebuild homes and churches, providing peasants with the necessary means to restart agriculture, and granting a discount on taxes for one or two years.\textsuperscript{43} These ideas were not new, and had been circulating at least since Fall 1875. For example, in Andrásy’s rejection of Mollinary’s proposal to establish colonies for refugees in Croatia (see the discussion in Chapter One), the foreign minister had briefly outlined what he saw as the necessary terms of an effective repatriation: “Offhand, I mention the general main points that I foresee, for example the introduction of an entirely unmolested return, the provision of materials for the reconstruction of the destroyed buildings, the distribution of seed for the next planting, and the introduction of tax freedom. These are, roughly, the concessions that I plan to win for the refugees.”\textsuperscript{44}

The 1876 outline Andrásy sent to Zichy actually came as the result of Ottoman prodding. The Ottoman government had for some time recognized the urgency of repatriation, even asking Austria-Hungary to use its “influence to begin the return of

\textsuperscript{42} In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Ottoman government had offered amnesty on several occasions, most notably to those involved in the “Vukalović Uprisings” of the 1860s—including to Luka Vukalović himself. Amnesty could also be granted for crimes unrelated to insurgency, as was the case with the merchants from Gradiška discussed in Chapter Two. For the Vukalović uprisings, see Hannes Grandits’ thorough study of late-Ottoman Herzegovina, especially 587-608. Hannes Grandits, \textit{Herrschaft und Loyalität in der späotosmanischen Gesellschaft} (Vienna: Böhlau, 2008).

\textsuperscript{43} BOA HR.SYS box 246, 26 I 1876.

\textsuperscript{44} HHStA Politisches Archiv/PA XL 1875, box 133, folder “Agramer Generalcommando,” 23 X 1875, MdÄ to GK Agram.
Andrássy had shunned active involvement in repatriating refugees so far, out of a “feeling of humanity” and the fear that an organized and coercive return would deliver the refugees into the hands of “carnage and misery.” The terms of the Andrássy Note appear to have been a guarantee sufficient to alleviate Andrássy’s concerns and, he hoped, those of the refugees. This was part of the point of the Note: Andrássy hoped that by positioning the Great Powers as guarantors of Ottoman reform, the Note would overcome insurgent and refugee objections that Ottoman government reform promises were worthless because the state was too weak to implement reforms.

Andrássy asked Zichy to present the repatriation proposal to the Porte after the Ottomans accepted the Andrássy Note itself. It is unclear exactly what sort of help with refugee return the Porte had asked for prior to this proposal, but the context and the terms of the proposal are illustrative. Neither the Habsburg nor the Ottoman side clearly distinguished between insurgent and refugee. That such a distinction existed is implicit, but the granting of a blanket amnesty—for crimes committed rather than the simple act of flight—recognized the overlap between the two extremes of victim and victimizer. The specific worry over retribution by Muslim subjects underlined this, even though Orthodox insurgent violence against refugees posed an increasing danger. The proposal points to bilateral discussions between Andrássy and Raşid Paşa, the Ottoman foreign minister, which ran parallel to but separate from Andrássy’s great-power negotiations over his Note.

45 BOA HR.SYS box 246, 26 I 1876.
46 BOA HR.SYS box 246, 26 I 1876.
47 HDA Spisi o Bos. Ustanka box 12 #253. 28 II 1876.
48 BOA HR.SYS box 246, 26 I 1876.
The Andrássy Note was presented to the Porte accompanied by promises from the foreign minister that Austria-Hungary would maintain a strict neutrality with regard to the uprising. This included preventing Habsburg subjects from supporting the uprising, ending the smuggling of weapons and war materiel across Habsburg territory, and cracking down on suspected foreign agitators—such as the Russians Boić had found in Kostajnica. Most importantly, neutrality meant maintaining a sort of “turnstile” policy on the border: allowing Ottoman subjects to seek refuge by crossing to Habsburg territory, but preventing them from returning.

Vienna issued explicit orders to strengthen border control in late February 1876. They were included in the same set of instructions reiterating restrictions on associational life and the press that were discussed in Chapter Two. Andrássy’s orders did not in fact contain special instructions on how to deal with specific categories of people; instead he singled out foreigners: “Because the insurgents [include foreign supporters] your excellency is to discourage with energetic measures the stay of individuals or the gathering together of such foreigners, who certainly have revolutionary tendencies, and to banish them from our territory without reservation.”

Mollinary interpreted these orders strictly in his instructions to officials in the military border. He reiterated the policy towards foreigners—by which was meant, it seems, individuals who were neither Habsburg subjects nor from the insurgent Ottoman territories—and added further that if there was any doubt about an individual, they were

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49 Andrássy’s terse orders to Mollinary are dated 21 II 1876; see Haselsteiner, “Andrássys Pazifizierungsversuch im Februar/März 1876,” 197-99. The following discussion is based on Mollinary’s much-elaborated instructions sent to all high officials in his purview: district leaders, mayors, offices of the senior public prosecutor, district attorneys and the Serezaner Corps (Gendermerie) Command. HDA Spisi o Bos. Ustanka box 12 #253. 28 II 1876.

50 Ibid., 198.
to be taken into provisional custody. These were the instructions that district leader Paić executed so effectively.\textsuperscript{51} Mollinary’s other instructions largely conformed with international expectations to maintain neutrality in the case of conflict in a neighboring state. The ban on the export of weapons to the insurgent provinces continued, and any weapons bound for the insurgency were to be confiscated.\textsuperscript{52} To prevent the assemblage of armed bands, regional officials were to disarm individuals who might join together, whether or not they were Habsburg subjects. Those individuals arrested while crossing over to join the insurrection or having been repelled back onto Habsburg territory, and who had committed no punishable crime on either side of the border, were to be sent towards the interior and their leaders placed under special observation.\textsuperscript{53} This procedure, called \textit{Internierung}, or internment, kept any of the arrested individuals within the established system of refugee management. It placed insurgents and refugees into the same functional category of aid-recipients; similarly, insurgents and refugees had the same limitations on movement as existed for refugees by allowing for a temporary documentation of the refugees and their legal travel towards designated locations at a distance from the border.\textsuperscript{54} 

\textsuperscript{51} HDA Spisi o Bos. Ustanka box 12 #253. 6 III 1876.

\textsuperscript{52} The original ban on weapons and munitions confiscation dated to 27 VIII 1875. HDA Spisi o Bos. Ustanka box 12 #253. 28 II 1876.

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{54} Although in a few cases internment was accompanied by some sort of detention, for the most part the term was used in a legal sense; as a duty of a neutral power under Article 11 of the Hague Convention of 1907:
A neutral Power which receives on its territory troops belonging to the belligerent armies shall intern them, as far as possible, at a distance from the theatre of war.
It may keep them in camps and even confine them in fortresses or in places set apart for this purpose.
It shall decide whether officers can be left at liberty on giving their parole not to leave the neutral territory without permission.
From the very start of the uprising, internment was part of the Habsburg response to individuals crossing over from the Ottoman side of the border. Officials removed refugees from the immediate border zone to a “safe distance,” although the meaning of “safe distance” was unclear. International custom held one mile to be sufficient, a distance that perhaps made sense with regard to soldiers of a disciplined regular army, but was irrelevant in the context of the Habsburg-Ottoman border: the individuals were not regular soldiers but peasant subjects who did not stand under the authority of a commanding officer and who could easily move back and forth across the border. Moreover, many of the refugees never even made it one mile into the interior, instead finding space to stay in villages right along the border.

Mollinary’s instructions on internment made the informality of these expectations concrete. They called for the refugees to be interned to at least one mile from the border, although under certain and specific circumstances the instructions allowed for local discretion: in the case of refugees who had demonstrated good behavior, the Bezirksvorsteher or the mayor could grant an exception and allow refugees to remain up to a half mile from the border. The exception would only be granted “because of sickness or wounds or for other humanitarian reasons and [only] for the period during which these reasons [remain valid], and the affected refugees must nevertheless be given a certificate and kept, in the appropriate manner, under watch.”

At first, Ottoman officials on the ground and the British ambassador in Istanbul were confident that Austria-Hungary would be able to deliver on its commitment to police the border effectively. Server Paşa, the minister of public works and one of the

55 HDA Spisi o Bos. Ustanka box 12 #253. 28 II 1876.
Ottoman officials sent to accompany foreign consuls during their original “mission” in August, 1875, was satisfied with Andrássy’s promises that the border would be sealed and Habsburg officials would prevent armed insurgent bands from returning to Ottoman territory and threatening peaceful refugee repatriation. In Istanbul, the Ottoman’s own experience encouraged such optimism. Six years earlier the Ottoman military had prevented violence in Hercegovina from spilling over into Habsburg Dalmatia. Danış Efendi, the Ottoman consul in Dubrovnik, had inspired additional confidence with a favorable report that said local authorities were increasingly willing to maintain the neutrality Andrássy had promised to the Porte at the start of February. Danış was an astute observer of the local situation, and although he complained about problems at the border, he argued that if Vienna’s orders were followed correctly, the insurgency would soon end, making way for repatriation.

It quickly became clear the Habsburg authorities were unable or unwilling to end border violations. Austria-Hungary’s failure to do so throughout the uprising was a failure to meet the expectations and responsibilities of neutrality and a major, arguably decisive, factor in the ultimate failure of the mass repatriation process. Anticipating the obstacles that lay ahead, the liberal Vienna newspaper Neue Freie Presse demanded that Dalmatian authorities maintain an effective, “no longer make-believe neutrality” by introducing an effective border control and finally targeting “the agitation committees in

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56 The comparison was a lousy one; the violence of 1869 was limited both in scale and geographical distribution. Grandits, Herrschaft und Loyalität in der späotosmanischen Gesellschaft: 582-608.

57 On Andrássy’s renewed commitment to maintain neutrality in response to increasing cross-border violence, See BOA HR.SYS box 246 #58, Arifi to Raşid, 31 I 1876, and the response, #42744, Raşid to Arifi 2 II 1876. Danış Efendi’s report is HR.SYS box 346 #472, Danış to Arifi, 19 II 1876.

58 BOA, HR.SYS box 346 #472, Danış to Arifi, 19 II 1876.
Ragusa and other places” and their “outrageous activities [that are] counter to international law.”

Reporting directly to London, Monson wrote General Jovanovich had repeatedly admitted the Habsburg military presence in Dalmatia was “utterly insufficient to maintain a strict observance of neutrality along the frontier,” and had the government threatened to dismiss officials who failed to carry out their orders, “the contraband trade in arms and munitions of war carried on through Montenegro by Russian agents and Russian money would have been prevented,” and the insurgency quickly ended. Instead, even those high-level civil and military officials who “obey the base letter of the orders received from Vienna, take care to show, by the manner in which they execute them, that they do so against their own inclinations.”

For its part, the Porte had already taken two important administrative steps to prepare for the repatriation process. These were intended to enable co-operation between Ottoman and Habsburg officials and to overcome the inertia of the existing local administration in Bosnia and Hercegovina. The first step was an apparent effort to give local officials the power to negotiate directly with Habsburg officials without having to resort to higher-level diplomatic channels. Bosnia and Hercegovina already had governors with the power to conduct limited foreign affairs concerning their province.

59 Neue Freie Presse, 1 III 1876.

60 Document 719, Monson to Derby, 22 IV 1876. “Further Correspondence Respecting Affairs in the Herzegovina.”

61 The Porte had already made a similar, although more drastic when it split Scutari off from Yanina as its own distinct vilayet and then appointed Ahmed Hamdi Paşa as vali. Ahmed Hamdi had been serving as Commander in Chief in Bosnia, and it was thought his appointment would be followed by the dispatch of Ottoman regular troops as a safeguard against neighboring Montenegro. Nevertheless, another reason for the appointment was that as vali, he could communicate directly with Nikola to resolve misunderstandings. Prior to the establishment of the new vilayet, the mutasarrıf had to communicate through the vali in Yanina—an unnecessary additional layer of bureaucracy. Document 78, Elliot to Derby, 30 XII 1875. Ibid.
The task at hand however specifically required the cross-border co-operation of lower-level bureaucrats, among other things in order to “win more time.”\(^6\) Andrásy had cleared away personnel and protocol questions in his notes to Mollinary and Rodich, where he informed them that he had appointed Konrad Wassitch as a consul without portfolio, and that Habsburg officials would be dealing directly with their Ottoman counterparts.\(^6\) Analogous instructions regarding bilateral co-operation of local officials are not available in the archival record for the Ottoman side. Nevertheless, it seems the Porte did not take lightly the decision to devolve power to local administrators. Instead, it relied on historical precedent, referring back—as had Mollinary when he first began the state-backed refugee aid project in 1875 (see Chapter One)—to precedents set in 1854. At some point in 1876 an official at the Ottoman foreign ministry resent a set of March 1854 instructions giving local officials in Bosnia the power to work directly with their Habsburg counterparts, based on the Habsburg ambassador’s agreement to a Sultanic proposal for conflicts that could break out along the Bosnian and Hercegovinian borders “being arranged and solved at the location by direct agreement between [Ottoman and Habsburg] state officials.”\(^6\)

The invocation of historical precedent reflected both conceptual and administrative continuities that speak to Ottoman foreign politics and the ongoing domestic challenges of reform and rule of Bosnia. The devolution of international relations to local administrators in 1876 placed the co-operative repatriation process within the longer-

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\(^6\) HHStA GK Sarajevo. box 245, #165. Theodorovich to Banja Luka, Livno, Brčka. 14 III 1876.

\(^6\) Haselsteiner, “Andrássys Pazifizierungsversuch im Februar/März 1876.”

\(^6\) BOA HR.SYS box 239, folder 2.
range history of the province as a borderland—in constant contact with the neighboring empire on the one hand, and fiercely protective of any autonomies it could win from the central government on the other hand.

In 1854 two sides agreed to localized cross-border co-operation in response not to an internal crisis within Bosnia and Hercegovina, but to the Crimean War, which drained resources out of the Ottoman local administration. With the outbreak of the war, all but one military commander in Bosnia was sent east; only Ferik Avni Paşa, who subsequently suffered a stroke, remained in Sarajevo. Austria, too, was busy reconfiguring its military deployment. Its principal worry was domestic nationalist revolution on its southern borders, where a potentially restive mix of Hungarian and Slavic populations, were of particular concern. It had been building up troops along its southern border in Slavonia, particularly in the east towards Belgrade, since Russia occupied the Ottoman Danubian Provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia in May 1853. By the time Britain and France officially joined the fighting in 1854, Austria was planning to mobilize 150,000 troops in Slavonia up to its borders with Serbia.

Given the circumstances, devolution of cross-border affairs to local officials was welcome. It seems likely, then, that the proximate cause of the agreement to manage conflicts locally was the contingencies of international relations. But the agreement was not simply the result of the latest crisis in the Near East, and should be read as something more than the two empires simply making the best of a bad situation by minimizing the


administrative strain of cross-border violence. The document reveals an Ottoman
government sufficiently confident in the sovereignty of the central government over the
province’s local elite, and in the abilities of local officials on both banks of the Sava
River to defuse conflicts to the extent that they would not blow up into larger problems.

This had not always been the case; similar efforts to devolve power had failed in the
1830s because of the strength of local elites over central government representatives, and
because of their financial interests in supporting cross-border brigandage.\(^{68}\) The 1854
agreement came at the pinnacle of *tanzimat*-era central government power over Bosnia,
thanks to the Ottoman general Omar Paşa Latas’ decisive 1851 defeat of rebelling
Muslim elites and their subsequent exile to Anatolia. In 1854, at least, the success of
Ottoman reforms—imposed with violence, to be sure—could be measured not just by the
ability of the central government and strong governors to implement change, but by their
willingness to delegate cross-border relations to minor local officials along the Ottoman-
Habsburg frontier.

The situation in 1876 was more reminiscent of the 1830s than of 1854, however. In
fact, some of the characters harkened back to that earlier era, because many of the
Muslim elites had subsequently returned from their Anatolian exile and reintegrated
themselves into Ottoman state structures.\(^{69}\) With the subsequent failure of reforms and
the inefficacy of central government power in Bosnia and the Hercegovina (see

\(^{68}\) The hope was, as the historian Lothar Maier succinctly put it, that an agreement “would institutionalize
normal daily relations between both sides of the border officials, so that in the future an escaped cow could
no longer hold the breath of the governments and diplomatic apparatus of two great powers.” Maier, “Die
Grenze zwischen dem Habsburgerreich und Bosnien um 1830. Von einem Versuch, eine friedlose Region
to befrieden,” 384.

\(^{69}\) Where they would again cause trouble for the central government. Koetschet and Grassl, *Osman Pascha,
der letzte grosse Wesier Bosniens, und seine Nachfolger*: 5-6.
introduction), there was little hope the government could enforce the changes necessary to induce return by using the existing structures. Therefore the second big administrative step the Porte took in preparation for the joint repatriation process was to appoint the two commissioners who would lead the Implementation Commissions in Bosnia and in Hercegovina.\textsuperscript{70} These appointments met the final term of the Andrássy Note, and the Porte sincerely hoped the commissioners could manage the same lazy, venal, and sometimes malicious local officials whose inefficacy had exacerbated the crisis. These were the officials who would now be entrusted with the additional responsibility of implementing the repatriation process.

The Porte appointed high-level and reliable officials to the Commission. İbrahim Haydar Efendi, who had served as Ottoman ambassador to Vienna in 1865-1870, was sent to Bosnia. Pasco Vasa Efendi, an Albanian Christian who had previous experience in Hercegovina and had been serving at the court of appeals, was sent to Mostar. Upon arrival, they two men were immediately to set up an administrative council made up of Muslim and non-Muslim members who would receive 1,500 kuruş.\textsuperscript{71} The commissioners would serve as quasi governors. This was not a problem in Hercegovina, which had been separated from Bosnia in part to manage the crisis, and therefore had no entrenched gubernatorial regime. Vasa and Ali, the new governor, seemed to be of like minds and abilities. In Bosnia, however, Haydar found himself in less favorable circumstances and would struggle against local authorities who, according to the Habsburg general consul

\textsuperscript{70} BOA, İrade-i Meclis-i Mahsusa/İ.MMS box 54 folder 2388, 18 I 1293 (14 II 1876).

\textsuperscript{71} BOA, İ.MMS box 54 folder 2388, 18 I 1293 (14 II 1876).
lamented, “do not carry out even precise orders received from Constantinople.”

Haydar’s position was at odds with the existing provincial leadership, and even İbrahim Paşa, the governor, stymied his reform plans.

Raşid Paşa drew up the final instructions for the repatriation of the refugees himself. The Sultan, who had already rejected the last of the Andrássy Note’s five points, was reluctant to move any faster or far forward than necessary, and vacillated for several days. He finally approved the instructions, in their entirety, on 29 February 1876. Zichy was very impressed, and noted approvingly that they conformed to all of the recommendations that came from Vienna. He wrote to Andrássy that the instructions were of the type “that would be sought for in the annals of Turkish history and administration only in vain.” With misplaced confidence, he noted “nothing else remains to be wished for other than the selfsame be faithfully carried out.”

The repatriation instructions Haydar and Vasa brought with them contained fourteen articles and the Sultan had ordered “the thing that will be considered most on the arrival of these refugees is their being protected from the treatment considered to be the reason for their complaints.” From the outset, the instructions did what Habsburg officials had failed to do: explicitly define the meaning of “refugee.” Only two types of individuals would be afforded protection during the repatriation and resettlement process

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72 BOA HR.SYS box 246 #58, Arifi to Raşid, 31 I 1876.

73 BOA, Dosya Usulü İrade Tasnifi/DUIT, 138/17. 03 II 1293 (29 II 1876).


75 Document 243, Zichy to Andrássy, 3 III 1876. Ibid.

76 BOA, DUIT, 138/17. 03 II 1293 (29 II 1876).
laid out in the instructions—those who either on the promises or under the threat from the insurgents joined their bands, and those families who were forcibly removed from their homes by insurgents. Those individuals who had left their homes due to the insurrection would be granted a general amnesty if they returned within the space of four weeks from the time it was officially declared.\textsuperscript{77}

Members of the commission would meet returnees at the border. Their identities would be checked based on name and place of birth, and any foreign agitators would be turned away. After \textit{katibs} (secretaries) recorded the return, the head of each family would be issued traveling papers, and the refugees would be escorted under protection to their villages. For those individuals who were too sick or weak to travel, the implementation commission would set up temporary hospitals and other facilities; once healthy enough to travel they would be processed in the appropriate manner. The government was to supply all returning refugees with sufficient provisions for their return, and they would continue to receive them until they had rebuilt their homes and finished their first harvest. The government would provide lumber from state forests to rebuild their houses, and additional supplies for the reconstruction of any churches that had been destroyed; it would furthermore provide the necessary tools for reconstruction and seed corn for the coming agricultural season. Refugees would be exempt from paying tithes for one year, and taxes for two.\textsuperscript{78}

The instructions were a comprehensive plan not merely to repatriate refugees safely and to filter out any insurgents. They were a reconstruction plan for the entire province

\textsuperscript{77} BOA, DUİT, 138/17. 03 II 1293 (29 II 1876).

\textsuperscript{78} BOA, DUİT, 138/17. 03 II 1293 (29 II 1876).
and the same benefits accorded to the refugees would be offered to the “Muslims and Christians who had been tractable and obedient during this affair and who have suffered devastation and ruin because of this war,” even if they never fled the provinces.\textsuperscript{79} The Ottoman government understood the refugee question not simply in terms of the military necessity of creating peaceful conditions for return. It also saw the question in social terms that addressed the entire population, both Muslim and Christian.

\textbf{Repatriation and its Discontents}

The repatriation plan marked a high-point of cross-border co-operation. Within weeks of its announcement in February 1876, provincial officials began establishing the required checkpoints on the Ottoman side of the border in Bosnia and in Hercegovina. At both the imperial and the provincial levels, there were numerous obstacles that thwarted the official, co-operative repatriation effort. Both the Habsburg and the Ottoman sides were, from the very start, blinded by their conviction that the negotiated agreements and Great Power guarantees were sufficient to overcome refugees’ distrust of the Ottoman government and their reluctance to return home. Beyond this, the Ottoman government especially failed at implementation. Having defaulted on its foreign debt interest payments in October 1875, the Ottoman state was near bankruptcy and incapable of providing the money it promised for reconstruction. The lack of money also directly affected security: the army had no animals for transportation, soldiers were poorly

\textsuperscript{79} BOA, DUİT, 138/17. 03 II 1293 (29 II 1876).
clothed, lacked supplies, and were frequently reduced to selling their weapons (often to insurgents) to buy food.  

As the rest of this chapter will show, other problems were specific to each of the provinces. Enforcement varied on the Habsburg side of the border. The mountainous Dalmatian/Hercegovinian border was exceptionally porous, and the lenient attitude of Rodich, the Dalmatian governor, meant the supply of weapons and war material never stopped. Insurgents harried the Ottoman army, Ottoman repatriation officials, and returning refugees. Mollinary, by contrast, seems to have been more willing than Rodich to enforce border controls—or at least was not as invested in the insurgents’ success as Rodich. While people and weapons moved easily across the Croatian/Slavonian border with Bosnia, the insurgents were less brazen and found less support on the Habsburg side than they did in Dalmatia. The obstacles to repatriation in Hercegovina strongly reflected the local circumstances, especially the strength of the insurgency in Hercegovina and the long-standing cultural ties to Dalmatia and Montenegro that helped to support the uprising. The Hercegovinian case is particularly good for demonstrating some of the obstacles to repatriation at the start of the process on both sides of the border. It clearly demonstrates, furthermore, the effect of central government problems on the repatriation process: the lack of security and money along with infighting in Istanbul left the governor and the repatriation commissioner hard-pressed to carry out the plans and doubtful of support from the central government. After looking at the situation in Hercegovina, the chapter will turn to the process in Bosnia, where the problems in the central government were compounded and amplified by Haydar’s prolonged power struggle with the

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80 Document 393, Holmes to Derby, 15 III 1876. “Further Correspondence Respecting Affairs in the Herzegovina.”
governor. When İbrahim was finally sacked, Haydar pursued the repatriation agenda with renewed vigor and continued his efforts, however futile, until late autumn.

By the middle of March, the Habsburg military authorities in Dalmatia had dispatched an official to villages on the Austro-Hungarian side of the border to explain to refugees the terms of the return process. As an added inducement to return, they were informed that their subventions would be withdrawn. Danış Efendi, the Ottoman General Consul in Ragusa, went so far as to pay for the return to Venice of some thirty Italian revolutionaries who were expected to cause problems during the repatriation process.81

Despite the encouragement, many refugees remained unwilling to return. On both sides of the border the imperial governments had trouble executing central policies. Andrásy struggled against high-level officials in Dalmatia—many of whom strongly supported the insurgency, while the Ottomans faced obstructionism and bureaucratic incompetence on their side of the borders. In Hercegovina, for example, the announcement of amnesty, tax reductions and guaranties of security to those refugees who returned within a four-week period was printed late and circulated only after a full week of the amnesty period had already passed.82 Competent local officials were arbitrarily replaced. The key Ottoman figures in the repatriation process, while generally regarded as efficient, were also recent arrivals unfamiliar with the local conditions. Ali Paşa, the new provincial governor, had just arrived from his embassy position in Paris, while Vasa Efendi, the new reform commissioner for Hercegovina, arrived at the start of

81 BOA DUIT 138.22, 19 II 1293 (16 III 1876).

82 Harris, A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878: The First Year: 251.
the repatriation process. Neither of the men could be certain where their mission stood with regard either to the ability of the government in Istanbul to support the process politically and materially, or to the willingness of Habsburg authorities to cooperate.

Ali and Vasa would be disappointed on both counts. In early May, Konrad Wassitch, the Austro-Hungarian General Consul in Mostar and leader of the Habsburg repatriation efforts reported that of the promised construction supplies, farm equipment, food and seed, Ali had so far only been able to deliver the seed.\(^3\) The delays continued. By the end of May, Vasa had managed to assure the delivery of building supplies to a distribution center, but was also under increasing strain, and told Wassitch that despite promises, they were receiving little support from Istanbul.\(^4\)

The Ottoman provincial officials were not alone in their inability to live up to the agreed terms of the repatriation process. Although the Habsburg Empire was not wracked with troubles in the central government the way the Ottomans were, the apparent efficacy of its civil and military bureaucracies had been captured by local interests and sympathies. In the hands of the insurgents and local officials, controlling refugee repatriation was an important tool in undermining the success of unwelcome diplomatic agreements.

Habsburg administrative problems started at the highest levels of the local authorities in Dalmatia. Andrássy justifiably worried that any violence on either side of the border could halt the repatriation process, and ordered that the border be well-patrolled and insurgent groups prevented from using Habsburg soil as a launching ground.

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\(^3\) HHStA, PA VII, Mostar, box 3. Mission Wassitch, 12 V 1876.

for attacks into Ottoman territory or against returning refugees. Gabriel Rodich, the Governor-General of Dalmatia, was an ambivalent executor of Vienna’s wishes, however. On the one hand, he had proved to be a strong and effective advocate for refugee (and by proxy, also insurgent) interests, and had conducted earnest negotiations with the refugees to convince them to return home. On the other hand, Rodich was reluctant to enforce border controls, and was willing to tolerate open violence by insurgent bands on Habsburg territory against refugees who wanted to return. Dalmatia itself remained a headquarters and staging ground for the uprising; Dubrovnik cafes were favored meeting places for leaders of the insurgency, and the city “had the appearance of a city lying in open war against Turkey.”

In these circumstances, few refugees were returning via official means. The discrepancy between the thousands of refugees on Habsburg soil and the number who took part in the formal repatriation is telling: in the first days after the process started in Dalmatia, Ottoman officials processed 11 families—a total of 70 individuals—at repatriation stations. It was for this reason that Ali, “who will hardly be able to produce for the Porte a list of 500 voluntary and officially returning refugees, speaks so poorly about Dalmatia.”

Instead of official repatriation, however, some refugees were returning, village-by-village, without registering with the authorities. The residents of the Hercegovinian village of Popovopolje were a case in point, illustrating the diversity of local situations.

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85 Harris, A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878: The First Year: 246.
Popovopolje had been the site of a Muslim attack the previous fall that left seven villagers dead; the remainder fled to Dalmatia. By the spring of 1876, the villages were largely under the control of a small band of insurgents. When the pacification and repatriation process began in early April, Habsburg and Ottoman authorities viewed Popovopolje as high-priority. Despite the events of the previous fall, the conditions for return were not inauspicious. Unlike many other villages nearby, the insurgents had not burned down Popovopolje. The insurgent bands that claimed control of it seemed to be operating independently from the larger movement. Reports indicated that many residents of the village were anxious to go home.\(^88\)

In early May, a Habsburg official in Dubrovnik reported that some 600 refugees from Popovopolje were preparing to return, while in the border town of Metković another 400 were ready to return.\(^89\) Their return however, also stood as a pointed reminder of the limited ability of policies developed between Vienna and Istanbul to effect the situation on the ground, because their return took place against the will of Ottoman repatriation authorities, and under the worried eye of Wassitch, who was convinced “the pacification was an illusion, and the repatriation an absurdity”\(^90\)

The situation was the result of the Ottoman’s weak military presence and the simple fact that the military and the civilian authorities—especially the repatriation commission—had competing priorities and worked at cross-purposes. The Porte had indeed promised the military would provide security for returning refugees, but this did

\(^{88}\) HHStA, PA VII, Mostar, box 3. Mission Wassitch, 12 V 1876.

\(^{89}\) HHStA, PA VII, Mostar, box 3. Mission Wassitch, 12 V 1876.

not happen. Muhtar Paşa had marked the start of the repatriation process by violating a provisional armistice within days of its being agreed.\textsuperscript{91} In early May, Ali had requested that the Ottoman army clear the insurgents out of the border area. This help was not forthcoming: the Ottoman forces in the region were already stretched to near the breaking point; they had run out of food over the winter, lacked basic supplies, and were involved in active fighting along the border with Montenegro. Muhtar had more urgent concerns and no troops to spare.\textsuperscript{92} This undermined Habsburg support for the repatriation process, which was conditional on the Ottoman ability to guarantee security for the refugees. Consul Wassitch reported to Vienna that this had not been achieved. “Nothing is more likely than the insurgents applying all sorts of pressure following the formal handover of returning refugees, and the latter, when possible, postponing the formal return.”\textsuperscript{93}

The inability to coordinate operations with the military put Ali in the unwelcome situation of having to oppose repatriation out of concerns over security, and therefore accountability. From the Ottoman standpoint it was a sound argument: the entire repatriation process was vulnerable, and any attack on refugees who had returned—either from Muslim residents bent on revenge, or from Christian insurgents who had started the violence—would be clear proof of Ottoman failure, and would elicit a strong rebuke from the other Great Powers.

At the same time Ali needed to process as many refugees as possible through the repatriation centers to prove the success of the Ottoman reform effort. For the residents of

\textsuperscript{91} Harris, \textit{A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878: The First Year}; 245.

\textsuperscript{92} HHStA, PA VII, Mostar, box 3. Mission Wassitch, 15 V 1876.

\textsuperscript{93} HHStA, PA VII, Mostar, box 3. Mission Wassitch, 15 V 1876.
Popovopolje this meant their return would be circuitous, inconvenient, and mediated by low-level Ottoman bureaucrats of questionable competence and doubtful conviction. Their predicament worsened when Ottoman authorities announced that they had moved the planned repatriation center from a nearby town to the more distant Trebinje, and demanded that the residents of Popovopolje who had already come home, settled in, and started farming, head to Trebinje and announce themselves for official repatriation. Although the peasants had the necessary farm equipment and even sufficient seed to start the season, they would have to depend on the Ottoman state for grain until their crops were ready for harvest. And the only way to get that was to leave their houses, fields, and livestock unattended and endangered while they went to Trebinje to register for a repatriation they had already completed. The actual implementation of the rules and mechanisms for managing refugee return threatened to define them out of the category of refugee.

The situation drew a sharp rebuke from Wassitch, who told Ali it appeared “the Turkish authorities view the repatriation not so much as a measure necessary in the interest of humanity and the re-establishment of an orderly situation, as they saw it as a coup diplomatique that would allow them to assert that there no longer was an insurrection [...]”94 In the face of such criticism, Ali relented somewhat, and replied to Wassitch he could promise the refugees safe asylum in Trebinje, and would be able to send a commission to Popovopolje to distribute food. He did not, however, have the resources to defend the residents of Popovopolje against attack. Aid would only come if the residents were willing to accept responsibility for their own security.

94 HHStA, PA VII, Mostar, box 3. Mission Wassitch, 1 VI 1876.
The successes of this type of unofficial return were small when compared to the refugee problem as a whole. It is unclear to what extent they were permanent, or whether the residents of Popovopolje, as a municipal official in Metković had predicted, did in fact return to Dalmatia at the first sign of trouble. Whether they remained or not, the simple fact of unofficial return was a strong indictment of the official repatriation process itself. The failure of the Habsburg-supported Ottoman effort to pacify was without doubt the single most important obstacle to a successful refugee return. Fear of violence was a strong disincentive, and as one refugee leader put it to Rodich, the refugees would rather be thrown “directly into the [sea] than if you were to hunt us across your border.” Yet a lack of security was not the sole obstacle. Even during the fighting and in the face of violence aimed directly at them, refugees did take advantage of the leaky borders to return on their own—a fact attested to in the archives as much by the occasional report of voluntary return as by the increasingly frequent reports of attacks against returning refugees.

In the event, Andrássy’s concern that providing anything but minimal aid would encourage peasants to leave the insurgent provinces and to remain on Austro-Hungarian territory did not hold true. The inverse, however, did. Even after the government withdrew the refugees’ subvention as part of its agreement with the Ottomans to encourage return, the vast majority of refugees still refused to go home. In this respect, the residents of Popovopolje were surprising outliers. Some refugees had been able to

96 HHStA PA XII 1875-1876, box 228, 08 III 1876.
97 See, for example, BOA HR.SYS 239/1 09. II. 1876.
98 KA PR 1748b/Dep II, 17 VII 1876.
build stable lives on the Austro-Hungarian side of the border, settling in as Mollinary had originally suggested: they found jobs, places to live, and places to pasture their livestock. More than that, repatriation was contested among the refugees themselves, and the opportunity to return home revealed divisions among them. In Metković, the preparations by some refugee families formally to repatriate themselves led to streetfighting with refugee groups trying to prevent returns.99

By May, the reform commissioners had renewed hopes the central government might overcome the failures in supplies, preparation, efficacy and political will that had paralyzed the Ottoman side of the project. As Russia, Austria-Hungary and Germany met in Berlin and drafted the Memorandum, the British consul in Mostar reported “a general pause in affairs in expectation of what may result from the meeting [...]”100 Yet just at this moment, stuttering leadership in Istanbul only undermined the efficacy of the repatriation commissions. In early May, Nedim Paşa, the Grand Vizier, relieved Ali as governor of Hercegovina and thereby prompted Vasa to announce his resignation as repatriation commissioner.101 The hiatus was brief—the Sultan removed Nedim from the Vizierate on 15 May, and Ali was immediately reinstated as governor of Hercegovina. Vasa then withdrew his resignation as well. As much as the incident demonstrated the allegiance and unity of purpose between Ali and Vasa, it was further damaging evidence that the leadership in Istanbul struggled to maintain its course.


100 Document 163, Holmes to Derby, 19 V 1876 “Further Correspondence Respecting Affairs in the Herzegovina,” British Foreign Office Confidential Print (London: British Foreign Office, 1876).

Nedim’s ouster had less of a direct effect on Haydar Efendi in Bosnia. Unlike Ali, Haydar’s job had not been at risk, but the change was a welcome sign for a potentially renewed repatriation effort. Like Ali and Vasa, Haydar had been struggling to effect repatriation since the start of spring. He had arrived in Sarajevo on 13 March, and been quickly dismayed at the situation on the ground. In February, the Porte had responded to rumors that most of the refugees were returning by requesting detailed accounts of the number of refugees who had fled, and the number who had returned. Muhtar, whose military command included both Hercegovina and Bosnia, lived up to his reputation as someone who embellished his own achievements, and reported that refugee return was in fact already taking place and the outlook was good. More reliable reports from the provinces suggested otherwise. Two days after Haydar embarked for Sarajevo, a report from Bosnia arrived at the Porte, saying that of the 26,140 people who had fled, fewer than one in ten had returned. The evident lack of progress surprised Haydar when he arrived in the region. He had travelled to Sarajevo by way of the Habsburg/Ottoman border town of Brod, where leaders of several refugee groups overwhelmed him with the extent of their needs—of the necessary outlay in supplies and feed and manpower in protecting them during their return. Moreover, none of the obligations the repatriation instructions outlined had been met. The officials that Server Paşa had said would provide the local knowledge and language expertise necessary to carry through the repatriation

102 BOA, DUİT, 138/21. 04 II 1293 (1 III 1876).
103 BOA, DUİT, 138/18. 05 II 1293 (2 III 1876).
104 Document 434, Buchanan to Derby, 18 III 1876. “Further Correspondence Respecting Affairs in the Herzegovina.”
had not been appointed, and none of the promised food, tools or reconstruction materials existed.105

From the moment of Haydar’s arrival, İbrahim Paşa, the governor of Bosnia, passively and actively undermined the new commissioner’s efforts to implement repatriation and reform. İbrahim’s elevation to governor in January had been celebrated by the more conservative members of Bosnia’s Muslim elite, who quickly gained influence over him.106 By the time of Haydar’s arrival, İbrahim had done nothing to prepare the terrain for reform, preferring instead to while away time in his harem and curry favor with the same begs Haydar would have to win over to implement reform, and who by mid-March had petitioned Istanbul for Haydar’s removal.107 Predictions that the two men would end up openly antagonistic proved true. As a commissioner Haydar lacked executive authority, and İbrahim refused to wield it. The governor only reluctantly promised to execute the reforms, but was ultimately unwilling to provide the necessary support to protect or supply the returning refugees.108 Haydar had been mounted “on a horse whose reins were held by the vali.”109

Despite this serious hindrance, Haydar quickly set to work establishing the local administrative infrastructure as per his instructions. In mid-March he asked Habsburg General Consul Theodorovich for suggestions about whom he should appoint as the

105 Ibid.

106 Document 375, Freeman to Derby, 2 III 1876. “Further Correspondence Respecting Affairs in the Herzegovina.”

107 Document 375, Freeman to Derby, 2 III 1876 and Document 487, Freeman to Derby, 16 III 1876. Ibid., HHStA, GK Sarajevo Reservat Akten, box 245 #21, Theodorovich to various. 24 III 1876.

108 HDA Spisi o Bos. Ustanka, box 14, 34. 25 V 1876.

109 Document 487, Freeman to Derby, 16 III 1876. “Further Correspondence Respecting Affairs in the Herzegovina.”
Christian member of the commission. Theodorovich recommended the Vienna-educated Banja Luka merchant Jovo Bilbija, who had been one of the 1873 refugees (see Chapter Two). Theodorovich thought him to be both respected among his compatriots as well as of a moderate disposition. Theodorovich erred on the second point; Bilbija was ideologically aligned with the Serbian government and Boić, in his report from 1 March, referred to the necessity of making both of the Bilbija brothers “harmless.” Not surprisingly, Bilbija turned down the job.

Haydar did not begin serious efforts at repatriation until May. A tour of the border region planned for late March or early April never took place despite Theodorovich’s offer to supply Haydar with the consulate’s official Dragoman. The renewal of insurgent activity along the border was certainly one obstacle. Along the Sava river, which marks Bosnia’s northern border with Croatia, “revolutionary committees operated in public,” stopping and frequently confiscating or destroying goods transported along the river, and forcibly preventing the “return of emigrant families who manifest the desire to return to their country.”

Haydar spent his first month in Sarajevo establishing the commission, which began holding its first regular meetings in early May. The commission made a little progress on refugee repatriation, securing the care of refugees returning to the Bihač Sancak. Mainly, however, it devoted its time to questions regarding taxation, in particular to the implementation and collection of taxes. This was a thorny issue. The provincial coffers

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110 HHStA, GK Sarajevo Reservat Akten, box 245 #21, Theodorovich to various. 24 III 1876.
111 HDA Spisi o Bos. Ustanka box 12 #345. 1 III 1876. Ekmečić, Ustanak u Bosni 1875-1878: 142.
112 HHStA, GK Sarajevo Reservat Akten, box 245 #21, Theodorovich to various. 24 III 1876.
113 BOA HR.SYS box 239, folder 1. 09 II 1876.
were almost empty, while abuses and corruption assured a large tax burden on the population but little government revenue. Moreover, policies themselves were unclear and subject to change. Particularly with regard to tax policy, the central government issued orders that conflicted with earlier promises, subsequently revoked them, and again reinstated them.

İbrahim was truculent, and only executed the commission’s decisions to the extent necessary to meet his minimum responsibility. 114 Haydar was pleased with even this level of progress, but the Habsburg general consul deflated him by pointing to the lack of money to implement the decisions, the lack of competent officials, and the need for strict monitoring of the return process. This was especially true in Bihać where the county governor was known for his unreliability. İbrahim’s reiteration to regional officials of the need to follow the letter of the law, noted Theodorovich, would do little to curb the arbitrary enforcement of law which henceforth “will certainly happen all the more because the Vali himself [as numerous examples demonstrate] leaves the legal decrees unenforced, even avoiding direct Vizierial orders.”115 By late May, İbrahim’s obstructionism had prevented reform and repatriation to such an extent that Haydar formally complained to the Porte, accusing İbrahim of failing to deliver the amnesty proclamation fast enough and directly contradicting the terms of the December reform ferman.116 To the Habsburg consul in Sarajevo, Haydar confided that if he continued in

114 HDA Spisi o Bos. Ustanka, box 14, 34. 25 V 1876.
115 HDA Spisi o Bos. Ustanka, box 14, 34. 25 V 1876.
116 BOA HR.SYS 238/55, 24 V 1876.
such a powerless position, even if the governor was replaced he would resign his post as commissioner.\textsuperscript{117}

The deposing of Abdülaziz on 30 May 1876 and his replacement by Murad V killed any official presentation of the Berlin Memorandum to the Porte. That said, the Memorandum clearly had unofficial repercussions and prompted a renewed Ottoman vigor over the repatriation process. This manifested itself most concretely when Sultan Murad V, wishing to “inaugurate his reign with fair and spectacular measure of healing that demonstrated his feelings of leniency and great concern for his people” turned his compassionate gaze towards his “subjects who strayed from Bosnia and Hercegovina.”\textsuperscript{118}

On 5 June, the Porte sent instructions to Haydar and Vasa to announce a six-week halt to all military operations in the provinces and a blanket amnesty to all those who returned during the period and presented themselves to the local authorities.\textsuperscript{119}

The announcement was not whole-heartedly welcomed among the Great Powers. Andrássy had indeed hoped the change of leadership in Istanbul would lead to positive developments in the provinces, and suggesting he would be willing to abandon other points from the Berlin Conference, had already recommended a brief eight-day cease fire to come to terms with the insurgents.\textsuperscript{120} Despite the similarities, the Ottoman announcement irked Andrássy because Austria-Hungary had only been informed post-

\textsuperscript{117} HDA Spisi o Bos. Ustanka, box 14, 34. 25 V 1876.

\textsuperscript{118} Document 156, Raşid to Musurus, 5 VI 1876. “Further Correspondence Respecting Affairs in the Herzegovina.”

\textsuperscript{119} BOA DU İTİ box 138 folder 43, 12 V 1293 (5 VI 1876).

\textsuperscript{120} Andrássy also seems to have viewed this as a good opportunity for the Ottomans to turn their military attention away from the insurgents and towards an increasingly bellicose Serbia. Document 207, Buchanan to Derby, 3 VI 1876 and Document 352 Harris-Gastrell to Buchanan, 5 VI 1876. “Further Correspondence Respecting Affairs in the Herzegovina.”
facto and because he thought it undermined the legitimacy of the Great Power’s moral obligation to the insurgents and refugees as guarantors of reform.\textsuperscript{121}

There was a rejuvenation of Ottoman repatriation efforts leading up to and accompanying the official announcement of the amnesty. On 3 June, an official by the name of Derviš Efendi was sent by the sub-governor of Dervent and the civic head of Bosanski Brod to the Habsburg side to entreat the refugees to return, while amnesty proclamations by the sub-governors of Dervent and Berbir were sent to Brod and Novi Gradiška on the Habsburg side. Neither of these efforts had any effect, and with several days to go before the official amnesty announcement, the local Habsburg officials completely refused to distribute the unsigned and possibly unauthorized proclamations.\textsuperscript{122}

The following day, Haydar sent a sharp telegram to the foreign ministry requesting Istanbul send the sums required to procure “provisions needed by the refugees who will return.”\textsuperscript{123} The message revealed again the military as a fundamental weaknesses to the Ottoman repatriation effort. Referring to repatriation instructions sent to the county governor along the border, Haydar complained that the supplies of food and seed corn intended for distribution to the returning refugees had instead been “entirely exhausted and consumed by the army sent to Bihač and Banja Luka.”\textsuperscript{124}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Andrássy was not the only one annoyed; French Foreign Minister Louis Decazes thought the terms of the Berlin Memorandum should have been taken into consideration, even though “the Porte had no official cognizance” of the document at the time of the declaration. Document 266, Lyons to Derby, 6 VI 1876. Ibid.
\item HDA Spisi o Bos. Ustanka, box 14, 718. 12 VI 1876.
\item BOA Hariciye Tercüme Odası/HR.TO box 553, folder 18. 4 VI 1876.
\item BOA HR.TO box 553, folder 18. 4 VI 1876. Already in April, the Ottoman army could no longer pay its suppliers and was running low on food. Although one British military observer optimistically noted that Ottoman soldiers could live on shoe-leather, the reality was very different, with soldiers selling their possessions for food, and eating their exhausted pack animals. See for example Document 636, Freeman to Derby, 14 IV 1876. “Further Correspondence Respecting Affairs in the Herzegovina.”
\end{enumerate}
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Theodorovich, the Habsburg consul in Sarajevo, doubted the process would succeed. He sent Haydar a list of questions that help to clarify the exact nature of the return process and the Habsburg concerns about potential pitfalls. First, the Habsburg consul wanted to understand the specific terms of the general amnesty, and in particular whether it would forgive all acts “between the insurgents and the refugees on one hand, and the Muslims and Christians who remained [in Bosnia and Hercegovina] on the other hand,” and that had taken place since 8 August 1875, the day the first Redifs were called up—and that nothing would be forwarded to a civil or penal court. Second, Theodorovich wanted to know how the authorities would guarantee security for refugees returning to the counties of Bihać and Banja Luka, where public safety had still not been re-established, and whether a sufficient number of zaptiyes would be deployed for this purpose. Third, whether the border locations for the receipt and care of the refugees had already been determined.

The fourth and fifth questions focused on what was—other than the provision of security—considered to be the main Ottoman weakness and obstacle to return: the provision of the material goods and opportunities necessary for the returned refugees to restart cultivation and survive the remainder of the season until harvest. Theodorovich pointed out domestic supplies were so low, the military had to import food and animal fodder from abroad. Given that, he wanted to know, what and how much food and seed could be supplied to returning refugees? Would construction and farming tools be supplied? What about draft animals for those refugees who no longer had any? Land was

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125 The following details are drawn from HHStA, GK Sarajevo Reservat Akten, box 245 #310, Theodorovich to Haydar, 4 VI 1876.
the other big concern. The state owned none that it could lease to refugees, so all arrangements had to be made with local landlords. Land and property ownership had already caused problems in Hercegovina, where the Ottoman state had expected landowners to contribute materially to the reconstruction of returnees’ houses, only to have them refuse. Theodorovich wanted to know whether the begs and agas had now made concrete commitments to lease tillable soil, and whether the refugees would be sent to land as far away from their previous location as possible in order to prevent “acts of revenge and other unavoidable” incidents. Sixth and finally, the Habsburg consul wanted to know if Haydar would be traveling to the border zones himself, or whether he planned to send representatives who knew Bosnian.

Haydar responded to these questions at length, but with little detail. He remained vague with regard to the nature of the amnesty itself, saying simply that the “emigrants” have a six-week period from the date of publication of the edict, to submit their obeisance and to a settlement of their complaints before the authorities. Without going into specifics, he said the government would take responsibility for the security of life and property, but asked the Austro-Hungarian authorities to prevent the return of certain individuals who could endanger the process. On the third point, Haydar relinquished the initiative and expected the Habsburgs authorities to determine repatriation points. With regard to the provision of supplies, Haydar requested that the Habsburg authorities provide him with detailed lists of returning refugees. The distribution of seed and building supplies would, it seems, take place on location after the refugees returned, and an exact knowledge of the numbers returning would make the process more efficient. The

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126 The following discussion is drawn from HHStA, GK Sarajevo Reservat Akten, box 245 #341, Haydar to Theodorovich, 9 VI 1876.
Ottoman authorities could not give provide the numbers for how many individuals had lived on the properties of individual *begs* and *agas*, as “before the uprising not enough consideration was taken with regard to a sufficiently regulated relationship between landowner and tenant.” Nevertheless, Haydar promised that no returnees would be homeless or without provisions. As evidence for the government’s abilities, he pointed out that those refugees who had already returned had been provided wood from state forests, nails, and for children up to the age of fifteen, 100 *dirhem* of corn and for those over fifteen, one-half *okka* of corn as well as seed corn for the next harvest. Haydar had already answered Theodorovich’s sixth question, and was preparing for a trip to the border-zone that might bring him as far Zagreb. Nevertheless, he did emphasize the need for local Ottoman officials’ effective and honest performance of their duties. The tension between the concreteness of Theodorovich’s questions and Haydar’s vague answers is telling, and reflected a general source of frustration for foreign consuls—the Ottoman inability not just to execute plans, but to establish a clear course of action.

Haydar also forwarded to Theodorovich the specific instructions, which were remarkable largely for their similarity with February’s more extensive instructions. The instructions again divided the population into two categories. The rebels and others who, after being threatened, joined the uprising out of fear; and those who “led off their families in order to relieve themselves of the insurgents’ oppression.”

The document resembles the February instructions almost perfectly, with plans to write down the names and villages of the returnees, reject those who were foreigners, offer medical care and security for returnees as well as supplies to re-establish their lives and farms. Indeed, the

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127 HHStA, GK Sarajevo Reservat Akten, box 245 #341, Haydar to Theodorovich, 9 VI 1876.
only major change is that the new plan explicitly states the reception committee itself—not just the implementation commission in Sarajevo—was to include both Muslims and Christians.128

Theodorovich had in fact already requested the lists Haydar wanted. It is likely that prior informal discussions between Theodorovich and Haydar had taken place with regard to these lists, as Theodorovich’s request both precedes that of Haydar and conforms exactly to Haydar’s request.129 On 5 June, Theodorovich had asked Mollinary to forward complete descriptions of the families who were returning with a detailed list of their possessions; an exact description of their last place of residence in Bosnia including the village, the district, and the county as well as the name of the abandoned landholder; and finally the border locations where Habsburg authorities were to assemble refugees for repatriation.130 Suprisingly, given the otherwise minimal involvement of Theodorovich with affairs in Hercegovina, he sent an identical request to Rodich, in Dalmatia.131 Neither Mollinary nor Rodich supplied such lists. District heads had basic problems in finding refugees, who for reasons that will be discussed below often hid when officials tried assembling them for headcounts. Yet the main reason that lists were not forthcoming was the refugees’ simple unwillingness to return home, especially at a time when families continued to flee from the Ottoman provinces to Austria-Hungary.

Precipitous changes in Istanbul had little direct effect, either positive or negative, on the repatriation process along the Ottoman-Habsburg border. On 13 June the Porte finally

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128 HHStA, GK Sarajevo Reservat Akten, box 245 #341, Haydar to Theodorovich, 9 VI 1876.
129 HHStA, GK Sarajevo Reservat Akten, box 245 #313, Theodorovich to Mollinary, 5 VI 1876.
130 HHStA, GK Sarajevo Reservat Akten, box 245 #313, Theodorovich to Mollinary, 5 VI 1876.
131 HHStA, GK Sarajevo Reservat Akten, box 245 #39, Theodorovich to Andrassy, 9 VI 1876.
acknowledged the repeated complaints from Haydar and the consular corps in Bosnia and removed İbrahim as governor of Bosnia, sharply criticizing him for his failure to “meet the extraordinary degree of importance of the Bosnian question.” İbrahim’s replacement was Manastırlı Mehmed Nazif Paşa. In the event, the new governor did not arrive in Sarajevo until 7 July 1876, and the immediate effect of the replacement seems to have been negligible. Also negligible to local repatriation efforts was the effect of the murders, on 15 June, of War Minister Hussein Avni Paşa and Foreign Minister Mehmet Raşid Paşa by a Circassian officer.

As much as events in Istanbul further destabilized the Ottoman Empire and its diplomatic position, local factors and the efficacy of administrators on both sides of the Ottoman-Habsburg border were the predominant influence on the repatriation process. With Haydar’s dispatch of 1000 copies of the amnesty proclamation to Mollinary for distribution to refugees on the Habsburg side of the border, Theodorovich reported to Vienna that he had advised Haydar to send emissaries to the border who “so far have not given a reason to cause mistrust” among the refugee populations. Haydar wanted to go personally, but sickness prevented him from doing so. In his place, he sent two emissaries to the border town of Brod, where more refugees had recently crossed to the Habsburg side.

132 BOA, İMMS box 54 folder 2427. 20 V 1293 (13 VI 1876). Nazif served as Vali until May, 1877, when he was replaced by Üsküdarlı Ahmed Mazhar Paşa. Hadžihuseinović, Povijest Bosne, 2: 1237-75.

133 Ibid., 1237.

134 HDA Spisi o Bos. Ustanka, box 14, folder 760. İbrahim to Mollinary 17 VI 1876, and Theodorovich to Andrássy, 17 VI 1876.

135 HHStA, GK Sarajevo Reservat Akten, box 245 #43, Theodorovich to Andrássy, 22 VI 1876.
Abdullah Efendi and Mehmed-Beg Kapetanović, a well-respected Muslim landowner and a member of the commission, arrived at Bosanski Brod at the end of June. After spending several days in Bosanski Brod, Mehmed, along with the sub-governor of Derventa and the civic head of Bosanski Brod, asked Adolf Müller, the mayor of Slavonski Brod on the Habsburg side of the border to arrange an audience with 41 heads of refugee families who Mehmed had asked to meet. The meeting took place on 3 July. Mehmed announced the amnesty and reforms, and guaranteed the safety of returning refugees. None of the assembled refugees agreed to return. There was little new in the reasons the refugees gave for refusing to return: they did not believe Ottoman authorities would this time be able to live up to their guarantees of equality and justice and security; they still feared that the “the best Turk” could plunder, abuse, and even kill them without fear of punishment, while from the “worst Turk” a simple denunciation would be sufficient to have them thrown into the most horrible of prisons.

Underlying all these concerns was the broader basic fear of violence. Some of this fear was based on rumors, which appear to have been endemic in the refugee population—the refugees told Mehmed, for example, that Muslims had recently been parading around Bosanski Brod and entertaining themselves with the severed heads of Ottoman Christian subjects, although even in the anti-Ottoman press there is no evidence to support the claim. There were of course very good reasons to be afraid, particularly

136 Arhiv Bosna i Hercegovina/ABIH, VK Mostar 1861, box 237, #44 1876, Theodorovich to Andrassy. 30 VI 1876.

137 The below discussion is based on HDA, Spisi o Bos. Ustanka, box 14, folder 787. Müller to Mollinary, 4 VII 1876.

138 HDA, Spisi o Bos. Ustanka, box 14, folder 787. Müller to Mollinary, 4 VII 1876.
from retributive violence by landowners and their Muslim tenants, from attacks by Başibozuks, and even from attacks by the regular army.

What is clear, however, is that refugees’ individual or collective decision to return was not just an existential question, but an intensely political decision. In a diplomatic environment where the Great Powers—Austria-Hungary and the Three Emperor’s League especially—equated refugee return with domestic stability and saw it as proof of a successful pacification, large-scale return would clearly represent for the Ottoman central government a diplomatic victory as well as one over centrifugal movements in the insurgent provinces. Conversely, the failure of refugees to return vouched for the strength of local interests over the central government. This seems to have been the case with Muslim violence especially when viewed within Bosnia and Hercegovina’s history of repeated efforts by its Muslim elite to seize greater autonomy from the central government. Much of the evidence for this is indirect and filtered through the experience of refugees. The testimonies recorded by Boić reveal a complex picture of the violence that shows a specificity and variety at the local level and even among different landowners. Although Boić was uncertain about the veracity of refugees’ claims that members of the Muslim elite had telegrammed the Sultan for permission to deal with the insurgency in their own manner, such claims must be taken seriously.

At the same time, however, insurgents used violence and the threat of violence to prevent refugees from returning. Fears of Muslim violence against returning refugees are insufficient to explain the general lack of return. While the number of refugees who informally returned was tiny in comparison to the total size of the refugee population, the fact that such return was not geographically isolated indicates that refugees from many
parts of Bosnia had minimal worries about retributive violence from Muslims. Voluntary returns were even happening in Hercegovina, where the violence was most intense. The return of refugees from Popovopolje, where Muslims killed villagers in the fall of 1875, is the most compelling example of this. The very fact that insurgents resorted to violence to prevent refugee repatriation indicates there was an even more widespread assumption among refugees that return was sufficiently safe.

This major role that insurgent threats and violence played in preventing refugee return is manifested in the architecture and wording of the imperial repatriation project itself, and documented in reports coming from consuls and Ottoman officials on the ground. At the level of imperial policy, insurgents were held culpable by both the Ottoman and the Habsburg Empires. On the Ottoman side, this can be seen in the two-tier typology of the refugee in the first lines of the repatriation instructions from late February as well as those issued at the start of the six-week amnesty. Similarly, the Habsburg government’s proposal that repatriation begin with Catholic refugees returning to predominantly Catholic areas because they were less likely to be harmed and their houses had suffered less damage points to the problem of insurgent violence against refugees. 139

By late June and early July, the agricultural window for refugees to plant seed when they returned had effectively closed. In a 25 June note to the governor in Sarajevo, the administrative council pointed out that stores of maize that had been set aside for returning refugees (and apparently saved from army confiscation) were beginning to rot, but that the refugees could be supplied with seed from the new harvest, which would be brought in within 20-30 days. Even with the new harvest there would not be sufficient

139 See, for example, HHStA GK Sarajevo. box 245, #165. Theodorovich to Banja Luka, Livno, Brčka. 14 III 1876.
supplies for the winter, however, and the government would be forced to buy seed abroad.\textsuperscript{140} Had repatriation worked at the start of the growing season, the state would theoretically have only needed to support the returnees until the harvest came in. A return in the late summer however would require support for an entire year: through the winter, the spring and the following summer until harvest time. The financial burden of return would be extreme, and the inflationary pressure of limited domestic supplies of food would further increase costs.

Political windows were closing, too. The looming threat and then outbreak of war between Serbia and the Ottoman Empire forced a fundamental shift in Habsburg foreign policy, which began to countenance territorial aggrandizement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. War and policy shifts had limited direct effects on the refugee repatriation process. But the reorientation of Ottoman military and political energy towards Serbia and the gradual shift in Habsburg diplomatic priorities and calculations helped to strengthen a parallel shift in Austria-Hungary’s approach to the refugees—from refugee repatriation to refugee management.

Austro-Hungarian authorities had always tried to control refugees and their movements after the arrival on Habsburg soil. Border officials were to maintain Habsburg neutrality by removing refugees from within one mile of the border, and they were also responsible for settling refugees in villages, caring for and monitoring them, and maintaining public security. By early summer, however, the system as it existed was becoming untenable and any hopes for an immediate and efficient repatriation were quickly fading. The refugees were becoming an increasingly heavy financial burden,

\textsuperscript{140} Document 103, Administrative council to Namjesnik, 25 VI 1876. Škapur and Aličić, \textit{Turski dokumenti o ustanku u Potkozarju 1875-1878}. 214
there was overcrowding in many border districts, and this contributed to outbreaks of contagious diseases such as cholera, small pox, and rinderpest. In response, the central government ordered a new round of internment on an unprecedented scale, envisioning the transportation of tens of thousands of refugees from the border zones to new locations deeper in Habsburg territory—the so-called Provinzial. The process of mass internment was logistically complex, administratively disruptive, locally resisted, and broadly criticised. For many of the refugees, it was also deadly.

The first report of the large-scale transport of refugees away from the border was published in Obzor 23 June 1876, in a report filed from Sisak. It seems, however, that internment started several weeks before the report first appeared. From the foreign ministry, Leopold von Hofmann responded to an 18 June note from Zagreb, saying he had asked the Hungarian Minister President to make available 100,000 gulden in order to cover either the expenses of more refugees crossing over from Bosnia, or the costs of an eventual repatriation. Hofmann emphasized, however, that the money was not intended to cover the alimentation costs in July. Indeed, he envisioned a marked reduction in the overall costs of taking care of the refugees. The foreign ministry expected every able-bodied man to seek out work “in the same manner as our own subjects,” and should there be no work available where the refugee was staying—as was largely the case in the immediate border zone—he was to be relocated to a district in which work was available. It was not lost on Habsburg officials that men who were “able-bodied” were able not just for work, but also for joining the insurrection. “The closer the refugees are together, the closer they live to the border, the more possible is disorder and the more difficult it is to

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redress the problem on the spot. A radical step against this is the relocation of those 
refugees who are able-bodied into the Provinzial, farther from the border, where not only 
their surveillance but also their earning [enough to support themselves] will be easier.\(^\text{142}\)

This “radical step” would prove to be difficult and costly. The transport of refugees to Sisak, the subject of the original reports in the media, illustrates the many obstacles to the successful internment of large numbers of refugees from the border. Over the course of several days thousands of refugees, traveling in columns on foot and in transport wagons, many with their livestock in tow, arrived in Sisak and awaited further transport to further internment locations. Even with boats continuously transporting refugees across the Sava from Sisak towards Galdova, the refugees filled the streets and every public space. Local bakers could not keep up with demand, there were reports of looting, and “three thousand women, children and old people overnighted in the open on city meadows,” in the rain.\(^\text{143}\) The rapid arrival of such large numbers of people overwhelmed city district officials, who immediately complained to Ivan Mažuranić, the governor of Croatia, in Zagreb.\(^\text{144}\) With that, officials in Sisak refused to receive more refugees until Mažuranić decided what to do.

The decision in Sisak to block all further arrival of refugees had immediate consequences in towns such as Dubica and Dvor, where many of the early transports had originated. It had taken local officials four days and all of the available manpower to assemble the refugees for the first of the planned transports at the collection point, in the

\(^{142}\) HDA Carsko-kraljevsko Zapovjedništvo u Zagrebu kao krajčka zemaljska upravna oblast/CUVK 996, 28 VI 1876.


\(^{144}\) Ibid.
village of Rujevac. Even then, the district council complained they had only been able to bring together several hundred refugees. And just when the transport was finally ready, a telegram arrived from Sisak saying officials there were no longer accepting refugee transports. The district council, complaining about the difficulties posed by the civil authorities in Sisak, informed Zagreb that after spending four days assembling refugees in the cold and in terrible conditions in Rujevac, he would now send them back to the villages and towns where they had originally been settled and registered as refugees.\textsuperscript{145}

The refugee transports themselves were intended to be dispatched from collection points every third day, and were large-scale operations. In late July, the seventh transport of refugees organized by Dvor left the collection point at Rujevac with 1004 individuals and 491 head of livestock on 75 wagons including those for children and baggage, as well as ten additional support wagons and an escort.\textsuperscript{146} The sheer size of these transports was, however, only partly to blame for the problems in Sisak and other points further removed from the border. Administrative and communication problems made the difficult situation far worse. In the Dvor-Sisak transports, for example, refugees from the district of Dvor were gathered at Rujevac, a distance of several kilometers from the border, at the intersection of two main roads. From Rujevac, they were transported due north towards Petrinja. In the town of Jabukovac, in the Petrinja district, the transport was restocked with new support wagons and would then continue on to Sisak—the first gathering point outside of the military border, in Civil Croatia. Sisak served as a sort of distribution

\textsuperscript{145} HDA CUVK PR 849, box 947, 27 VI 1876.

\textsuperscript{146} HDA CUVK PR 1040, box 948, 28 VII 1876.
center, from which refugees would be sent to various final destinations further towards the interior, such as Bjelovar.

Delays in assembling refugees at the collection point in Rujevac, combined with bad communications with Dvor made the transfer of responsibility from the district office in Dvor to Petrinja difficult to co-ordinate. Karl Frank, the district head in Dvor, complained about mixed signals from Petrinja and Sisak. In a sharply-worded note to the General Command in Zagreb, Frank requested of the General Command, the district office in Petrinja and the county office in Sisak that his office receive full support and be seen as the single official body “which in a half-way humane manner can move this mass of people, can take care of it, and with the best possible protection and consideration of unexpected events can set them in motion.” Frank complained that he spent the whole time in constant exchange of telegrams with Sisak, and if he didn’t keep the transports up exactly on the schedule of every three days, the offices there would complain. The pace was too fast for officials at the mid-point in Petrinja, however, who would complain that they did not have enough time to send support wagons to Jabukovac. As a result, the transport would not arrive on time in Sisak and because of that, the whole undertaking would be cancelled out of administrative considerations. Mollinary agreed to delegate broad powers to Frank, but it seems to have helped little. On 18 July the district office in Petrinja informed Zagreb that for the second time officials in Dvor failed to inform them a transport had departed, making it impossible for Petrinja to ready their wagons for the transfer. The Petrinja offices notified Zagreb that they had sent an official south to

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147 HDA CUVK PR 952, box 948, 13 VII 1876.

148 HDA CUVK PR 952, box 948, 13 VII 1876.
Jabukovac—a town along the route from Dvor—who would announce the impending arrivals of future transports.\(^{149}\) Such problems, exacerbated by the continuing influx of new refugees from Bosnia, continued throughout August, with Sisak periodically stopping all transports because of strained capacity.\(^{150}\)

The greatest difficulty, however, lay with the unwillingness or inability of the refugees themselves to relocate further towards the interior. Many refugees had leased farmland along the border and were unwilling to abandon their fields. Local merchants and peddlers had made good profits from the refugees, and in an effort to prevent the refugees from leaving spread rumors that they were to be transferred to swampy unarable land in the Hungarian *puszta*—and not allowed to return home to Bosnia.\(^{151}\) Ironically, many of the able-bodied refugees feared the forced relocation so much they fled into the woods and mountains when military and civil officials came to collect them, at times even fleeing back into Bosnia.\(^{152}\)

Illness was the worst of the problems. Among the tensions between Dvor and Sisak was the condition of the refugees on the transports. In early July, officials in Sisak complained that in the transport that arrived on 4 July 1876 there were 17 children sick with smallpox, a pregnant woman who gave birth on the night of her arrival, a mother and child who died en route and a number of other sick, seven of whom were so ill they

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\(^{149}\) HDA CUVK PR 979, box 948, 18 VII 1876.

\(^{150}\) See for example, HDA CUVK PR 1178, box 948, 24 VIII 1876, and HDA CUVK PR 1246, box 948, 28 VIII 1876.

\(^{151}\) HDA CUVK PR 849, box 947, 27 VI 1876, see also PR 987, box 948, 16 VII 1876.

\(^{152}\) HDA CUVK PR 987, box 948, 16 VII 1876.
could not be moved.\textsuperscript{153} Disease and sickness not only made it difficult to move individuals, but with many families having at least one sick member, it was difficult to separate the healthy from the unhealthy.\textsuperscript{154} Even after Habsburg authorities had moved thousands of refugees towards the interior, there were many thousand more who avoided moving, whether for legitimate reasons or for illegal purposes.

**Conclusion**

Hopes for a successful repatriation effectively died at about the same time the Ottoman government announced its six-week amnesty. By the time Mehmed-Beg Kapetanović was announcing the amnesty to refugees gathered in Brod, Habsburg border officials had already begun the elaborate, time-consuming process of internment. Even if circumstances had changed and repatriation was suddenly possible, the internment process would have been difficult to reverse. The case never presented itself. Serbia’s declaration of war against the Ottoman Empire on 30 June 1876 only reinforced the Habsburg’s desire to maintain neutrality and keep refugees away from the border. The Ottoman amnesty was not even four weeks old.

The repatriation project failed for a host of reasons. Mollinary’s dismissive comment that Andrássy didn’t understand what was going on along the border underestimated the Foreign Minister’s awareness of the conditions along the border. Andrássy’s error was in trusting his own border officials and overestimating the coercive strength of Great Power commitments over insurgents and refugees. Diplomacy and

\textsuperscript{153} HDA CUVK PR 896, box 947, 8 VII 1876.

\textsuperscript{154} HDA CUVK PR 849, box 947, 27 VI 1876.
bilateral agreements failed because as one of the parties involved, the Ottoman Empire was incapable of re-establishing public faith in its ability to rule, while neither Christians nor many Muslims were particularly interested in the re-establishment of strong central government control over the two provinces.

Finally, the strength of embedded interests and the specificity of local contingency was insuperable. It is important to note that neither the Muslim population nor the Orthodox and Catholic Christians wanted to permanently prevent the refugees from returning. Far more important were the immediate interests of the interested parties and their ability to exercise force. Neither the Christian insurgents nor the Muslim population saw profit in allowing the refugees to return, even when the absence of the peasant refugees guaranteed another year of failed crops. The violence between the two groups sprung from the same sources and had similar motives—minimizing, though not abolishing, the real and the nominal power of the Ottoman Central government over affairs in the two provinces.

By the end of summer, a formal repatriation effort became a sort of mannerism entirely disconnected from the reality on the ground. Refugee diplomacy had failed, yet communication and instructions continued. In October 1876, Haydar wrote to Theodorovich to ask if it would be possible for both sides to restart the repatriation process. The Habsburg consul forwarded the request to Andrássy, and also to Mollinary, who by this time had done extensive political and infrastructural preparation for the winter months. It was Mollinary, not Andrássy, who responded to the request. With the conviction that the refugees would not return, Mollinary refused to initiate another cross-
border return effort, resigning himself instead to the “difficulties that another over-wintering of the refugees” would cause.\textsuperscript{155}

\textsuperscript{155} HHStA, GK Sarajevo Reservat Akten, box 245 #382, Mollinary to Theodorovich, 19 X 1876.
Chapter Four
Refugee Diplomacy and the Creation of a Habsburg
Bosnia and Hercegovina

The thesis that a nationally and confessionally un-homogeneous state such as Turkey has no right to existence in today’s Europe should be applied with caution, because the logic leads us further to the point that, when Turkey collapses and on its grave is placed not the crescent, but the cross, this should also carry the simple inscription like you see by burials in the countryside: *Hodie mihi, cras tibi*.\(^1\)

Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire on 24 April 1877, and having secured passage through Romania, the first Russian soldiers crossed the Danube onto Ottoman territory in late June. The Russian army advanced rapidly against the better-armed but poorly commanded Ottoman troops through July, until the Ottomans stopped the Russian advance at the fortified city of Plevna. It took another four months for Plevna to fall, and the Ottoman fortress did so only after Russia called in help from Romania.\(^2\) Afterwards, the Russian army moved forward rapidly. At the end of January, the Ottoman army signed an armistice in Edirne, but the Russian army continued its advance, halting only

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under direct British threat, when it reached the Marmaran village of San Stefano (now Yeşilköy) on the outskirts of Istanbul. The preliminary peace treaty signed at San Stefano was the pinnacle of Russia’s Balkan politics. It awarded independence to Montenegro, Serbia, and Romania, assured an autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and created the “Greater Bulgaria” Russia had envisioned during the Constantinople Conference—not an independent state, but an autonomous Ottoman province under a Christian prince, in which Russia would help to draft a new organic law and maintain commissioners to help implement it, as well as maintain an occupying army of no more than 50,000 men.

The Berlin Treaty revised San Stefano, and in the process Austria-Hungary gained the authority to occupy and administer Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the Ottoman Empire retaining formal sovereignty. Historians have often viewed the Habsburg acquisition of Bosnia and Herzegovina as the culmination of a long-term expansionist policy, starting with an 1856 memo from Josef Radetzky, the Habsburg General, demanding the addition of a strategic hinterland, through 1869 plans by Franz Josef and Archduke Albrecht for a complete annexation, possibly to make up for lost Italian territories, and on to the uprising itself. Secret agreements with Russia—first at

3 Langer, European Alliances and Alignments 1871-1890: 129-36.

4 Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty; Showing the Various Political and Territorial Changes Which Have Taken Place Since the General Peace of 1814, 4: 2672-96. For comparison with the proposals at the Constantinople Conference, see Gauld, “The Making of Bulgaria.”

Reichstadt, then at Budapest—over the division of Balkan territory support this view, as does the porosity of the Habsburg-Ottoman border to insurgents and weapons; in this account the pro-insurgency activism of officials and military officers on the border should be seen as an elemental part of the broader Habsburg Balkan policy. Less clear, but more likely, is that even with the general idea of an annexation floating about, Andrássy fought truly to preserve the Ottoman status quo until rather late in the game. From this standpoint, secret agreements with Russia over territorial divisions are best seen as contingency plans, and the pro-insurgency activities of military officers or local officials on the border reflected either the war ministry’s long-standing bias towards a seizure of territory, the limits of central government control over actors at the periphery, or both.

What is clear, however, is that after San Stefano Andrássy had no other option than to force a Habsburg occupation or annexation of the Ottoman provinces if he was to maintain Austria-Hungary’s economic and political influence in the region, thwart Serbian and Montenegrin expansionism, and meet his Emperor’s expectations. Chief among these obstacles to Habsburg expansion were the Ottomans themselves, but also the complications of Habsburg domestic politics. In both these cases, refugees were a linchpin of Andrássy’s argument for occupation—the need to get them off Habsburg territory by returning them was central to his domestic argument; the need for the

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6 Text for both “Budapest Conventions” between Russia and Austria-Hungary, which awarded Bosnia and Hercegovina to the Habsburgs in the case of a Russian war with the Ottoman Empire, may be found in Pribram and Coolidge, *The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary 1879-1914*: 191-203.

refugees to be returned home in order to stabilize and bring peace back to the provinces was central to his international argument. Once the occupation took place and the provinces were under Habsburg control, refugee return became one of the first priorities of the new transitional government the Habsburgs established.

The war between the Russian and Ottoman Empires fundamentally changed the volume and the tenor of the Balkan refugee question. Where the Serbian-Ottoman war of 1876 had led to some displacement, largely of Muslims, the Russian-Ottoman war caused the largest and most rapid refugee movement in Balkan history. In the fighting of 1877-1878, 250-300,000 Muslims were killed, and another 1.5 million fled deeper into the Ottoman Empire. To be sure, the issue of Bosnian and Hercegovinian refugees remained important to the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires. Yet the Russian advances—particularly after the Ottoman fortress at Plevna finally fell—took clear precedence in government circles. This was true diplomatically: the sweep through the Balkans very nearly precipitated a much larger European war, and no matter what the negotiated outcome would finally be, the war represented a fundamental change in the structure of the European system of states. The Bulgarian case was the counterpoint to Bosnia and Hercegovina: Bulgaria was where the population politics after the violence were part and parcel of nation-state formation rather than, as in the example of Bosnia and Hercegovina, part of the preservation of an imperial system of rule.

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8 Karpat, *Ottoman Population, 1830-1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics*: 75. Justin McCarthy is more conservative. He estimates about one million Muslims fled. Many of these were Circassians and Tatars who had been previously settled in Bulgarian lands. About 500,000 refugees remained in permanent exile. McCarthy, *Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922*: 81-94.
A detailed analysis of the refugee question in the Eastern Balkans is beyond the scope of this study, but a comparison with the case of Bosnia and Hercegovina helps to explain why, in the spring of 1878, Andrássy thought the broader refugee issue could be a persuasive component in negotiations with the Ottomans over an eventual Habsburg occupation. A comparison also helps to demonstrate the extent to which the political meaning and broad repercussions of massive forced migration were not yet altogether clear. The risks were apparent—and as we will see, Andrássy exploited in his diplomacy the potential dangers of what he argued was a Russian effort to empty Bulgaria of Muslims. But the formation of exclusionary nation-states was not yet understood to be the almost inevitable corollary to massive forced migration. Indeed, Bulgaria gained autonomy, not independence. While it is tempting to equate autonomy with independence, the difference mattered.\(^9\) It mattered symbolically for the Bulgarians and it mattered technically for the Russians who saw autonomy as a determined step towards independence.\(^10\) It also mattered greatly for the Ottomans, who not only maintained nominal title to the land (autonomy as a conservative solution), but were able to use questions of territory, sovereignty and demographics to their advantage in diplomatic negotiations.

The refugee crisis that emerged during the Russian-Ottoman War was far more acute and shockingly visible than the steady flow of refugees out of Bosnia and Hercegovina. The war started with the Russian army crossing the Danube on 23 June 1877, and Muslims who fled the Russians’ first, rapid advances often resettled in the

\(^9\) A more recent example of equating the two is in Hakan Yavuz’s introduction to Yavuz and Sluglett, *War and Diplomacy: The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 and the Treaty of Berlin*.


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southern Danubian provinces. By September, areas under control of the Russian army had been depopulated of Muslims, with crops rotting in the fields. The process started over again after the Ottoman fortress at Plevna fell. The devastating winter flight took place mostly on foot, but railroad and wagon trains helped to speed removal, in the process concentrating refugees in urban areas. By spring 1878, Edirne alone housed 30,000 refugees, with more scattered elsewhere throughout the Balkans. Throughout, refugees poured into Istanbul as well, where they became the subject of lurid newspaper reports and graphic illustrations of the misery, and broad public concern across Europe. “It would require the pen of a de Quincey to picture the horrors of that winter exodus,” wrote George Washburn, the president of the American missionary Robert College, before attempting the task himself. Including Ottoman soldiers, some 300,000 refugees arrived in Istanbul. The streets were crowded with refugees and even Istanbul’s elite—including high officials such as Said Paşa (İngiliz), Safvet Paşa, and Aarifi Paşa—opened

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11 Fawcett to Layard, 19 IX 1877, Document 357 “Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Turkey,” British Foreign Office Confidential Print (London: British Foreign Office, 1877).


13 British newspapers were especially graphic in their representation; a number of images (many from the Illustrated London News) are reproduced in Bilâl N. Şimşir, Rumeli’den Türk göçleri: belgeler = Emigrations turques des Balkans: documents = Turkish emigrations from the Balkans: documents, vol. 1, Atatürk kültür, dil ve Tarih yüksek kurumu Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları Dizi XVI (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1989), and Russes et Turcs. La guerre d’Orient. Illustrations par les meilleurs artistes. Portraits, combats, batailles, vues, cartes, etc., vol. 2 (París: Librairie de la Société Anonyme de Publications Periodiques, 1878).


15 Numbers varied. Foreign consuls estimated the number of non-military refugees at around 160,000. See Ibid. and Şimşir, Rumeli’den Türk göçleri: belgeler = Emigrations turques des Balkans: documents = Turkish emigrations from the Balkans: documents, 1.
up their homes to house them.\textsuperscript{16} Four to five thousand alone were housed in the Hagia Sophia mosque; the wife of the British ambassador established a small-pox hospital; and the entire foreign diplomatic corps met regularly to discuss the refugee crisis in the city, ways to ameliorate it, and the dangers—not least to public safety, but also to trade and commerce should an epidemic disease shut down the port—the crisis posed.\textsuperscript{17}

Historians have most typically viewed this flight of refugees not merely as a characteristic of the Russian-Ottoman war, but as an intended consequence. Subsequent events in the Balkans, such as the Balkan Wars, surely inform this view, propped up by now-familiar documents such as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s \textit{Report of the International Commission on the Balkan Wars}.\textsuperscript{18} The outcome also seemed pre-determined. The Russian-Habsburg conflict over the shape of the Balkans pitted the Habsburg desire to exercise indirect influence in the region by maintaining a weakened Ottoman Empire against the Russian vision of autonomous territories that would, it was assumed, turn into nation-states.\textsuperscript{19} San Stefano’s vision for a Greater Bulgaria appeared to be the fulfillment of plans that emerged from the Constantinople Conference at the end of 1876—which were, in turn, based on the national principle as embodied in the extent of the Bulgarian exarchate and the latest ethnographic studies of Heinrich Kiepert, a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} See ibid., 183-84, 260-64. Also Henry Layard, \textit{The Queen’s Ambassador to the Sultan: Memoirs of Sir Henry A. Layard’s Constantinople Embassy, 1877-1880}. 58, 62, 78, 84.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Stojanović, \textit{The Great Powers and the Balkans, 1875-1878}.\
\end{itemize}
German cartographer.\textsuperscript{20} Finally, historians have relied extensively on British archival evidence, resulting in a slanted view of events.\textsuperscript{21}

Counter-narratives have gone relatively unheeded. Recently, however, Peter Holquist has argued that as much as the consequence of the war was massive dislocation and death, a demographic redistribution was not the intent or even desire of Russian civil and military officials. Instead, Russian authorities were heavily invested in the prosecution of war based on recently codified—but by no means universally accepted—laws of war. The maintenance of the Muslim population was an important part of this new approach.\textsuperscript{22} Occupying authorities issued directives guaranteeing the freedoms and securities of the non-Orthodox populations, and although Russian soldiers’ anti-Muslim violence was not infrequent, the army generally tried to secure conquered territory and protect the local population: “Rather than seeking to ethnically cleanse the new Bulgaria, Russian forces actively sought to return Muslim inhabitants to these regions.”\textsuperscript{23}

Robert College’s Washburn was not an eyewitness, but became convinced of the generally

\textsuperscript{20} Heinrich Kiepert, “Ethnographische Übersicht des europäischen Orients,” (Berlin 1876). Published in D. Rizoff, ed. \textit{Die Bulgaren in ihren historischen, ethnographischen und politischen Grenzen (Atlas mit 40 Landkarten)} (Berlin: Wilhelm Greve, 1917), 43-44. Zichy found the whole procedure at Constantinople outrageous and accused the Russians of using maps, drawings, and charts to overwhelm the other delegates. He blamed especially the American consul-general and part-time journalist, Eugene Schuyler, whom he dismissed simply as a “foreign newspaper correspondent.” HHStA PA XII box 127, sheet 58 recto/verso.


\textsuperscript{22} Holquist, “The Russian Empire as ‘Civilized Nation’: International Law as Principle and Practice in Imperial Russia, 1874-1878.”

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 32.
benignant intentions of the Russian army and related stories of Russian soldiers helping
refugees and saving infants whose starving parents left them behind to die. 24

The level of human misery in Bulgaria had no counterpart in Bosnia and
Hercegovina. Throughout most of the three-year uprising, the forms and goals of the
violence distinguished themselves sharply from what happened in Bulgaria. Certainly
Muslims did flee Bosnia and Hercegovina during the three years of the insurgency—
mainly going south, deeper into the Ottoman Empire—but despite the insurgent violence
in Bosnia and Hercegovina being driven by Orthodox Christians, it was largely the
Christians, not the Muslims, who took flight because of the insurgency. 25

The effect of the insurgency on the Muslim population of the provinces should not
be underestimated, but as with the case of Bulgaria, it was not autochthonous violence
that led to large-scale displacement but rather military invasion. In the case of Bosnia and
Hercegovina, mass movements, as small and measured as they were in comparison to
those in Bulgaria, were the result of Montenegrin forces entering southern Hercegovina
in mid-1877. In a manner similar to the Bulgarian question, the near-forgotten story of
the fall of the Ottoman fortified town of Nikšić on 8 September 1877 complicates the
binary images of nation-state formation and “ethnic cleansing.” The fall of Nikšić was
one of Montenegro’s most important military victories, and resulted in what was
probably the largest single mass departure of Muslim refugees in Bosnia and
Hercegovina during the entire uprising. Yet despite the violence that preceded the flight,
the departure of the refugees appears to have been, for the most part, orderly. Moreover,

24 Washburn, Fifty Years in Constantinople and Reflections of Robert College: 129.

25 Şimsir, Rumeli’den Türk göçleri: belgeler = Emigrations turques des Balkans: documents = Turkish
emigrations from the Balkans: documents, 1.
many Muslim families subsequently returned. Nikšić was the Ottoman fortified town just
north of the Montenegrin border that Muhtar Paşa had spent much of 1876 fighting to
replenish and it continued to be a central focus of Ottoman military tactics in
Hercegovina throughout the uprising.26 When it finally fell after a forty-five day siege,
Montenegro’s Prince Nikola Petrović-Njegoš offered generous terms of surrender. They
included a guarantee that those Muslims who remained in Nikšić would be secure in their
possessions, have freedom to practice their religion, and enjoy the same privileges as
other Montenegrin subjects. Those who chose to leave, on the other hand, would be
guaranteed security up to the Montenegrin border, and would be able to take their
belongings with them.27

The population of the town itself was around 2,000, most of whom were Muslim
landowners, with many more Muslims living in the town’s immediate vicinity.28 The vast
majority of the residents left after the fortress fell to the Montenegrin troops, although the
circumstances of their departure are not completely clear. Jovan Ivović, who points out

26 See Chapter Three. Freeman commented on the surrender that “the whole struggle in Herzegovina for the
past two years, before as well as since the declaration of war by Montenegro, has been little else than a
series of expeditions to force this pass and carry succour to the garrison and people of Nichsich. The blood
and treasure thus expended has been enormous, and, especially, the last expedition under Suleiman Pasha
seems to have been a most needless sacrifice of life, at a moment when every available man was required to
defend another part of the Empire against a more redoubtable foe.” Document 324, Freeman to Derby, 13 IX 1877.
“Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Turkey,” British Foreign Office Confidential Print (London: British Foreign Office, 1877). The town and its environs consisted of “the ramshackle
citadel, the scattered city, and seven detached forts.” Evans, Illyrian letters: A Revised Selection of
Correspondence from the Illyrian Provinces of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania, Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia, Addressed to the Manchester Guardian During the Year 1877: 182.

27 Evans, Illyrian letters: A Revised Selection of Correspondence from the Illyrian Provinces of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania, Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia, Addressed to the Manchester Guardian During the Year 1877: 177-81.

28 The number is supplied by consul Freeman in Document 324, Freeman to Derby, 13 IX 1877. “Further
Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Turkey.” Ivović describes the make-up of the population in
Jovan Ivović, “Raseljavanje nikšićkih muslimana,” Istorijski Zapis: organ Istoriskog instituta i Društva
that the town was subsequently open for settlement because all of its Muslim population departed, only poorly quantifies the exact number who left. Although a memoir of the period says thirty houses were abandoned, Montenegrin government documents say only nineteen houses stood empty; Ivović says the number could have been up to forty houses—although given the size of the subsequent emigration, it is difficult to determine what the number of houses actually means.29

What is clear is Nikola did take steps to prevent the emigration, including appointing a Muslim kapetan for the town. These efforts largely failed. Ivović attributes the continued departure of Muslims to the destruction of feudal relations that hit the town’s landowners hard, as well as to the Montenegrin government’s inability to quell the Montenegrins’ religious hatred towards the Nikšić Muslims.30 Ottoman authorities, military officers and the refugees themselves did, however, speak highly of the humane treatment they received from Nikola and Montenegrin soldiers, and the refugees in fact received military protection as they headed either north into Hercegovina, or south towards Albania.31 The Montenegrins, for their part, blamed the departures on fear of reprisals should the Ottomans return.32

A more rounded picture of the flight from Nikšić comes from the few Habsburg and Ottoman documents available. The Habsburg consul in Mostar reckoned the number of

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29 Ivović, “Raseljavanje nikišičkih muslimana,” 210. See also P. Šobajić, Nikšić-Onogošć, ed. Ž M

30 Less convincingly, Ivović also claims that a ban on wearing the fez, along with the “religious fanaticism,” led the Muslims to leave. Jovan Ivović, “Raseljavanje nikišičkih muslimana,” Istorijski Zapis: organ Istoriskog instituta i Društva istoričara SR Crne Gore 1, no. 5/6 (1948): 364-65.


Muslim refugees who fled Nikšić to be about 2,400; an additional 1,200 refugees subsequently fled as Montenegrin forces entered the Hercegovinian towns of Bilek and Gacko. At the start of December, about two thirds of the refugees remained in Hercegovina: 1,300 were in Mostar and its environs, 350 in Ljubuski, 500 in Krojnica, and 200 in Pocitelj. The remainder had moved on to Bosnia, where some of them subsequently joined the anti-occupation insurgency. After the Berlin Congress, many Muslims from Nikšić ultimately returned, to some extent restoring the Muslim character of the town.

Reflecting both the absolute and relative size of the flight in comparison with the mass movements out of Bulgaria, Ottoman authorities did not incorporate the refugees from Nikšić into the centralized refugee aid system run by the Muhacirin Komisyonu (Refugee Commission.) Instead, local authorities were independently responsible for helping the refugees. Unlike with the Habsburg aid program, the aid consisted largely of food—half an oka of cornmeal per person, per day. Those men who had been on a military or other official payroll prior to the fall of Nikšić were to continue receiving a monthly pay of 15 piasters. Housing was a more contentious issue. In Mostar, officials ordered a number of houses simply to be cleared of their occupants in order to make

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33 FA PR. MdA to RFM 37/Pr 1878, 15 I 1878.


36 FA PR, MdA to Finanz Ministerium 37/Pr 1878, 15 I 1878.
space for the refugees.\textsuperscript{37} The Habsburg Consul in Mostar complained it was Christians who were forced to leave their houses, and forced to leave in an entirely arbitrary manner. Among these were, supposedly, several Habsburg subjects.\textsuperscript{38} Although some Nikšić residents may have started returning home almost immediately after leaving, many remained on the local dole through the first half of 1878, and possibly even later. At least in one respect, some of the refugees from Nikšić were similar to some of their Christian counterparts in Dalmatia: in May 1878, local authorities found some of the Nikšić refugees were cheating local commissioners to get more daily rations. In response, the Ottoman interior ministry ordered that the refugees be continuously observed; those refugees who repented would, however, be given a monthly allowance of 250 \textit{guruş}—to be distributed directly by the local commission.\textsuperscript{39}

Both the Bulgarian and the Bosnian and Hercegovinian cases demonstrate the soft edges of territorialized nationalism, and more particularly the extent to which even in the violence of war the differences between the nation-state (or autonomous province in the case of Bulgaria) and the empire that preceded it were ones of gradation, not sharp lines. Post-Berlin Bulgaria, for example, maintained a large Muslim population, and developed from the Ottoman millet model complicated systems of religious autonomies to maintain it.\textsuperscript{40} To be sure, Bulgaria after the Berlin Congress was marked by anti-Muslim violence

\textsuperscript{37} FA PR, MdA to Finanz Ministerium 37/Pr 1878, 15 I 1878.

\textsuperscript{38} Ottoman authorities denied any Habsburg subjects were removed. See HHStA, Consulat und Gesandtschaft Archiv, box 221. Vilayet to Sarajevo General Consulate, 13 Zilka 1294 (20 XI 1877) and 29 \textit{Şevval} (6 XI 1877). Also see HHStA, Consulat und Gesandtschaft Archiv, box 221 971, Mostar to Sarajevo General Consulate, 25 IX 1877.

\textsuperscript{39} BOA Dahiliye İdare 768 62545. 1295 Ca 15 (18 V 1878).

at the local level and a pervasive structural exclusion of Muslims—for example, in the
exclusive use of language in the Bulgarian parliament. Nevertheless, the Bulgarian
leadership at least was invested in meeting the expectations of the Berlin Treaty, as a
means to demonstrate and secure the international legitimacy for their newly autonomous
province.\textsuperscript{41}

Muslim refugees from Bulgaria—and also from Bosnia and Hercegovina after the
Habsburg occupation—posed several challenges for the Ottoman Empire. The technical
side of mass refugee immigration was overwhelming, and sufficient to sap the life out of
the Ottoman statesmen who faced it. At the same time, refugees also opened deeper
questions about the nature of the Ottoman Empire and its relationship with its Muslim
and non-Muslim subjects. After the Congress of Berlin the need to return Bulgarian
refugees (many of whom were, in fact, Christian) became an international orthodoxy,
framed not just in the explicit language of opportunity in the Berlin Treaty, but as the
natural expectations of diplomats and the general public.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{41} Methodieva, “Reform, Politics and Culture Among the Muslims in Bulgaria, 1878-1908.” and
Methodieva, “The Muslims in Bulgaria and Ottoman-Bulgarian Relations, 1878-1908: Three Perspectives,”

\textsuperscript{42} The Berlin Treaty (and indeed, San Stefano as well) did not demand refugee return, but did demand
circumstances that would encourage it. Article IV called for an organic law that would take into
consideration the rights and interests of non-Bulgar populations. Article V guaranteed to all religious creeds
and confessions “enjoyment of civil and political rights, admission to public employments, functions, and
honours, or the exercise of the various professions and industries in any locality whatsoever.” Freedom of
religion was guaranteed, including the hierarchical organization of the different communions and their
relations with their spiritual chiefs. Finally, Article XII guaranteed Muslim property rights even for those
individuals who had left Bulgaria, as long as the property was farmed or administered for them. See
Hertslet, \textit{The Map of Europe by Treaty: Showing the Various Political and Territorial Changes Which
Have Taken Place Since the General Peace of 1814}, 4: 2769-73. On diplomatic responses and public
opinion, see Şimşir, \textit{Rumeli'den Türk göçleri: belgeler = Emigrations turques des Balkans: documents =
Turkish emigrations from the Balkans: documents}, 1.
What was not a matter of course in either case, however, was whether the Ottomans themselves would see the refugee question in this manner. Indeed, the Ottoman leadership appeared willing, at least in the beginning, to take a pragmatic and even somewhat flexible approach to what should be done with Bulgarian Muslims. Safvet Paşa led the Ottoman delegation at the San Stefano negotiations and argued strongly for the repatriation of Bulgarian Muslim refugees. As with the Berlin Treaty, San Stefano ultimately did include language that would enable return, although Russia was unwilling to help the process—suggesting at first that Muslims should not even be allowed to remain in Bulgaria. Safvet countered with a much more radical proposal: that Bulgaria extend south only as far as the Balkan mountains as per the “Lesser Bulgaria” solution first outlined at the Constantinople Conference, but that the Muslims living north of the Balkan range would exchange places with the Bulgarians living on Ottoman territory south of the Balkans. This would not be the last time a Bulgarian-Ottoman population exchange was on the table. In context, the exchange is better understood as progeny of the mid-nineteenth century strategic resettlement of Tatars and Circassians along Ottoman border zones than as the progenitor of later Ottoman ethnic cleansing. Nevertheless, Safvet’s suggestion does demonstrate a growing awareness of the ties between a specifically Muslim population and state legitimacy. For example, the question of Muslim refugees from Bosnia and Hercegovina in the wake of the Habsburg occupation had similar contours. The Ottoman council of ministers initially supported Muslim emigration from the occupied provinces and wanted to help Muslims leave if

they wanted. Ottoman officials also recognized preserving a Muslim population was essential to maintaining Ottoman claims for sovereignty in the provinces.\footnote{Kemal Karpat, “The Migration of the Bosnian Muslims to the Ottoman State, 1878-1914: an Account Based on Turkish Sources,” in \textit{Ottoman Bosnia: a History in Peril}, ed. Markus Koller and Kemal Karpat (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004).}

**Habsburg Domestic Opposition**

Ottoman uncertainties over what to do about Muslim refugees did not extend to the Orthodox Christians of Bosnia and Hercegovina. Perhaps the future of the Muslim population of the Bulgarian provinces could be debated, but there was no such possibility with the Bosnian and Hercegovinian Christians, whose condition the Sultan was bound to improve and protect according to the Treaty of Paris.\footnote{Article IX, Treaty of Paris, Hertslet, \textit{The Map of Europe by Treaty; Showing the Various Political and Territorial Changes Which Have Taken Place Since the General Peace of 1814}, 2: 1255.} The ability to return the refugees was a near-explicit demand of the one document the Ottoman state counted on to ensure Ottoman international legitimacy.\footnote{Davison, “The Ottoman Empire and the Congress of Berlin.”} And by spring 1878, the possibility the Ottomans might lose Bosnia and Hercegovina—provinces that, after all, had not been conquered by Russia and still contained a large majority Muslim population—became increasingly clear in Istanbul. From the Habsburg side, the ability to return the refugees, simultaneously lifting the burden off the state coffers and off the residents of the borderlands, remained a top priority regardless of what policy was pursued. For both Empires, then, the expectation of return and resettlement remained a fixed point of Ottoman-Habsburg bilateral diplomacy and helped to frame domestic and foreign policy.
Despite its unfavorable terms, San Stefano removed some of the uncertainties over Habsburg options and approaches. For Andrássy, it brought the palace’s aspirations of territorial expansion into Bosnia and Hercegovina in line with diplomatic reality. The Ottoman defeat and Russian demands made further discussion of Ottoman reforms to the provinces all but pointless. In a note to Zichy that tellingly fails to consider the Ottoman diplomatic position, Andrássy pointed out that because the Russian terms were very “unfavorable” for France and Britain, “the view that there will remain no other option for us than to seize possession of Bosnia and Hercegovina is again coming to the fore.”

The preliminary peace of San Stefano awarded to Bosnia and Hercegovina the autonomy suggested at the Constantinople Conference—self-government, with a governor appointed by the Porte on approval of the guaranteeing powers and overseen by an international commission. In fact, it left the provinces in a sort of limbo: from the standpoint of the Ottomans and the insurgents, San Stefano did not impose peace in the provinces; from the standpoint of the provinces’ neighbors the autonomy represented only an instability that, depending on how it was viewed, was either a threat or an opportunity.

Habsburg public and political discourse labeled the autonomy proposed in San Stefano as a threat. As soon as details of the treaty and the potential autonomy for Bosnia


48 Article XIV of the Preliminary Peace Treaty of San Stefano. Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty: Showing the Various Political and Territorial Changes Which Have Taken Place Since the General Peace of 1814, 4: 2672-96. See also the minutes of the preliminary meetings—those held prior to the inclusion of the Ottoman representatives—of the plenipotentiaries at Constantinople, enclosed in Document 112, Salisbury to Derby, 22 XII 1876. Turkey. No. 2 (1877). Correspondence Respecting the Conference at Constantinople and the affairs of Turkey: 1876-1877, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers (London. 1877). 90-112.
and Hercegovina were leaked to the press in February 1878, anti-occupation liberals in the Austrian parliament demanded the government confirm the reports, asking whether the government thought the treaty was in alignment with Habsburg interests in the Balkans, and if not, how the government would protect those interests. The preliminary treaty forced the question of what would happen with the two provinces, and by relation what would happen to the refugees on Habsburg soil. Throughout the three years of insurgency, Andrásy had consistently argued in public that Austria-Hungary had no intention of annexing or occupying the two provinces. Few in Vienna or Budapest believed him. While a clarity of intent to occupy the provinces is debatable in the period leading up to the Russian-Ottoman war, by 1878 Andrásy had decided the only possible course of action was to occupy or annex Bosnia and Hercegovina. In public, however, he continued to deny any intention to move into Bosnia and Hercegovina.

Andrássy faced two major obstacles to occupation. Not only was the Ottoman Empire reluctant to forfeit sovereignty over a territory it had ruled for centuries, but despite the sharp divisions in Habsburg public opinion over an occupation, the public tilted strongly against territorial expansion. Andrásy thought that a Great Power mandate to occupy and secure the provinces and then to carry out refugee repatriation would encourage public support. On the international front, at least, the outlook was positive—

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49 Philip Stephan Snyder, “Bosnia and Hercegovina in Cisleithanian Politics, 1878-1879” (Dissertation, University of Texas, 1974), 87.

50 In an unprepared speech to the delegations on 10 December 1877, Andrássy tried to defend his Balkan foreign policy without publicly revealing what exactly those policies were. In the process he (most likely accidentally) alluded to an eventual occupation, pointing out to his critics that his policies had not damaged Habsburg standing: for once the empire might gain a province, not lose one. Stenographisch Sitzungsprotokolle der Delegation des Reichsrathes, X Sitzung, (Vienna: Kaiserlich-königliche Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1878). 20-23. Cited in Snyder, “Bosnia and Hercegovina in Cisleithanian Politics, 1878-1879,” 84.
the strongest support he received for an occupation came from the other Great Powers. While still a general secret, Russia had agreed Austria-Hungary could have full discretion in the provinces; by spring 1878 even England was assuring the Ottomans they had little hope of retaining ownership of the provinces. Andrássy’s efforts on the other two fronts, however, relied heavily on the politicisation of refugees. He used—to moderate effect—the burden of refugees and the security and social threats they posed to convince the general public that an occupation was the only solution to the problem. And as will be discussed later in this chapter, employing the question of refugee return was the central negotiating tactic when it came to securing the other term Andrássy thought might win public support for his policies: an Ottoman invitation for the Habsburg military to occupy two provinces.

Convincing the Habsburg public to support an occupation promised to be a difficult job. In Cislethania, the general political lines of support and opposition to an interventionist policy of any sort had been apparent from the very start of the uprising in 1875. While the Eastern Crisis was a major problem unto itself, it also quickly became yet another parliamentary tool employed in long-standing arguments over taxation, the extent of government centralization, education, social programs, the church, and more. To these conflicts was added the further complication that the decennial renewal of the economic terms of the Ausgleich—and hence a struggle not only between both halves of the empire, but among the parties within each half—came up for debate in 1876-1877.

From the perspective of the public and the political elite, one of the core issues was demographic: what responsibilities, if any, did the Habsburg Empire have towards a neighboring population of Slavic Christians, and how might taking action change
domestic stability? The contours of the debate were already discernable in a fall 1875 parliamentary interpellation from Josef Fanderlik, a Moravian member of parliament, who, after saying that Habsburg Slavs sympathized with their Balkan brethren, demanded to know what the government was doing to create a “satisfactory political situation” in the Balkans. 51 Parliament’s Slavic members found common cause with its conservatives. In a contentious parliamentary debate in November 1876, after Russian intervention abruptly ended renewed Ottoman-Serbian hostilities, Karl Sigmund Hohenwart, a conservative federalist, joined the Slavs in denouncing any action that allied Austria-Hungary with the Ottoman Empire or could leave Habsburg troops fighting against Slavs in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Hohenwart lashed out against recalcitrant liberals stymieing a “cultural mission which we have to fulfill in the east,” in order to advance “not only the material interests of the people, but also those higher spiritual interests for which mankind lives and works.” 52 Hohenwart was by no means alone with his views; by the time of the occupation, the trope of a Habsburg mission civilisatrice had become well established. 53

51 Sosnosky, Die Balkanpolitik Österreich-Ungarns seit 1866, 1: 174.

52 Quoted in Snyder, “Bosnia and Hercegovina in Cisleithanian Politics, 1878-1879,” 73.

53 “Oesterreichischer Reichsrat,” Neue Freie Presse, 7 XI 1876. On the cultural mission, see for example the exhortations of an armchair Bosnian expert: Joseph Freiherr von Helfert, Bosnisches (Vienna: Manzschens Hof-Verlags und Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1879). The ideology of the civilizing mission in Bosnia and Hercegovina helped to spark a brief historiographical interest in post-colonial approaches to the Habsburg empire as a whole. See especially Johannes Feichtinger, Ursula Prutsch, and Moritz Csáky, eds., Habsburg Postcolonial: Machtstrukturen und kollekatives Gedächtnis (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2003). Bosnia and Hercegovina remains the most successful subject for this approach. Clemens Ruthner has pushed for a volume that focuses on these two provinces; see Clemens Ruthner et al., eds., WechselWirkungen: Austria-Hungary, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Balkans, 1878-1918 (New York: Peter Lang, Forthcoming).
Austrian conservatives increasingly painted the liberal opponents to an expansionist policy as unpatriotic.\textsuperscript{54} Days after Fanderlik’s October 1875 exhortation to support Slavic interests, 112 liberal members of parliament submitted a series of questions, asking finally whether the imperial government was using its influence to ensure that, in the event of a general war in the Balkans, peace would be preserved for Austria-Hungary and the “quest to acquire foreign territory” would be restrained.\textsuperscript{55} Financial concerns weighed heavily for them, especially for a party still stinging from the financial crisis of 1873. For a club that was being torn apart by quarrels over domestic policy, opposition to an occupation offered rare common ground.\textsuperscript{56} Indeed, after the occupation was an established fact, it was liberals’ long-standing unwillingness to support it—combined with demands that parliament be allowed to approve the Berlin Treaty before it release additional money for running the new provinces—that helped to precipitate, in late 1878, a ministerial crisis that would end liberal rule of the Cisleithanian government.\textsuperscript{57}

\textsuperscript{54} Kolmer, \textit{Parlament und Verfassung in Österreich}, 2: 425.


\textsuperscript{56} On disagreements within the party, see Ernst Plener, \textit{Erinnerungen von Ernst Plener}, vol. 2 (Stuttgart und Leipzig: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1921). 98-119.

\textsuperscript{57} A.J.P. Taylor’s is still an excellent overview of the liberal moment in English; A. J. P. Taylor, \textit{The Habsburg Monarchy 1809-1918: A History of the Austrian Empire and Austria-Hungary} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976). 141-55. Early interpretations saw the liberal stance towards the occupation as either a principled move that could have avoided subsequent national problems, or a “narrow-minded chandler’s standpoint [bent on] the destruction of the monarchy’s prestige.” Sosnosky, \textit{Die Balkanpolitik Österreich-Ungarns seit 1866}, 1: 178. Robert Kann revises these approaches, emphasizing the occupation as simply a proximate cause of the liberals’ collapse, pointing out the issue looked very different at the time: an expansion of the Slav population of the empire, had it been accompanied with the necessary constitutional reforms the liberals might have achieved, could well have eased national tensions. Robert A Kann, \textit{Das Nationalitätenproblem der Habsburgermonarchie: Geschichte und Ideengehalt der nationalen Bestrebungen vom Vormärz bis zur Auflösung des Reiches im Jahre 1918}, vol. 1 (Graz-Köln: Hermann Böhlaus Nachf., 1964). 95. Boyer is more critical of the liberal response to the occupation; John W. Boyer, \textit{Political Radicalism in Late Imperial Vienna: Origins of the Christian Social Movement}, 1848-
Embedded within their opposition was the German liberals’ deep concern over the addition of more Slavs to the monarchy, a concern based less on the sort of bigotry that later emerged from the liberal ranks than on concerns over government, administration and the potential fifth column of Russian pan-Slavism.

Immediate concerns over governmentality were less the case in Hungary, where a deeply-rooted anti-Slav sentiment augmented Magyar Turcophilia in the parliament and public. The Neue Freie Presse had it right when the newspaper claimed “the weight of that incomprehensible force that one calls public opinion falls nowhere more than in international questions.”58 Whereas in Austria, public opinion on the Eastern Crisis and Bosnia and Hercegovina in particular was expressed in parliament and in the press, in Hungary it went well beyond the strong parliamentary opposition: the public had direct ties with the Ottoman Empire, and people took to the streets. Ottoman-Magyar sympathy ran deep, and during the Eastern Crisis extra-political activities built on these warm feelings and strengthened ties. Hungarians served in the Ottoman armies and worked as medics in the field; Hungarian students organized meetings in Budapest and Vienna to support the Ottoman Empire after war broke out with Russia, while others helped send to school the children of Muslims who had fled to Hungary in the course of the Russo-Ottoman War.59 Other actions were more symbolic, but for an imperial government increasingly worried about parliamentary and public pressure on its foreign policy,

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58 “Oesterreichischer Reichsrat.”

59 BOA HR.SYS 18 XI 1876, 176/4; on children at school, see HR.SYS 18 XII 1877, 176/33.
perhaps more disturbing. Two almost simultaneous events highlighted the worries: the return of the so-called Corviviana, and the visit to Budapest of a delegation of fifteen softas, or religious students, from Istanbul.

In April 1877, the Porte sent Mustafa Tahsin Bey (later the ambassador to the United States) to Hungary to return the Corviviana—thirty-five codices which the Ottomans had removed from the library of the Hungarian King, Hunyadi Mátyás (Matthias Corvinus, ruled 1458-1490) while Hungary was under Ottoman rule. The Hungarians portrayed the event as strictly cultural, but it had clear undertones of cultural diplomacy. Tahsin, while not a member of the Vienna diplomatic corps, was an official of the Ottoman government, and he carried with him not just the codices, but a letter to the rector of the university in Budapest from Safvet Paşa, saying that in returning the codices, the Sultan wanted to offer “new proof of the friendship and respect that should make an unbreakable tie between the [Ottoman and Hungarian] people”.

The codices arrived on 28 April 1877 in Budapest, where the mayor, university rector, museum director, and a minister of parliament received them. Tahsin did not accompany the books to Budapest. Andrássy viewed Tahsin’s proposed trip to Budapest not merely as the inappropriate and meddlesome activity of a foreign power, but also worried it was inflammatory, and he forbade Tahsin from going.

In addition to Tahsin and the Corviviana, Andrássy faced another delicate question. Due to arrive in Budapest one day after the codices was a group of fifteen religious

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students from Istanbul. This was in fact a separate event from the delivery of the codices; the students had been invited on an exchange program that had sent Hungarian students to Istanbul earlier in the year.\(^{62}\) Practically, however, the arrival of the *softas* was an extension of the codices’ return. When word had reached Budapest that Tahsin would not be accompanying the Corviviana to Budapest, a number of organizations that had intended to receive him at the train station decided to delay their formal reception until the arrival of the *softas* on the following day. Groups from across Transleithania turned out to meet the students, including delegations from Cluj, Győr, Košice, Debreczin, Solt, and Kecskemét. Telegrams arrived from Nagy-Koros, Bratislava, Gran, Nagy-Kallo, Nyíregyháza, Szegedin, and Nove Zamky.\(^{63}\) The scene at the arrival of the students was frenzied. Large sums of money had been raised from financial institutions, landowners, and regular citizens, and the students were paraded from the train station to the center of the city, followed by wagons, floats, citizens, and even farmers—dressed in Hungarian national costume, and wearing fezzes. At a reception, one of the visitors gave a speech in which, accompanied by unceasing cheers, he pointed to the “perfidy of Russia’s pan-Slavic activities, which even in its own country crushed all emotions of conscience and personal freedom, but nevertheless behind the mask of humanity carries to its neighbors revolution, quarreling, and war.”\(^{64}\) Including the number of people who stood on their balconies or watched from the windows, the liberal, anti-occupation daily *Neue Freie Presse* estimated that some 50,000 people came out to celebrate.\(^{65}\)

\(^{62}\) “Die Ankunft der Softas in Pest,” *Neue Freie Presse*, 30 IV 1877.

\(^{63}\) “Die Mission Tahsin Beys.”

\(^{64}\) Ibid.

\(^{65}\) “Die Ankunft der Softas in Pest.”
Public worry about an occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina manifested itself differently in social and political disturbances in each half of the empire. Against this backdrop, Andrássy went to the Delegations in spring, 1878, to ask for money. Less than a week after the signing of San Stefano, the Habsburg government requested it be allotted the hefty sum of 60 million gulden. Andrássy did not give a specific reason for the request; indeed, he went out of his way again to assure the public the government was not preparing to occupy Bosnia and Hercegovina. As proof of the claim, the government pointed out the sum was much larger than would be needed for a military occupation—a pointless statement to begin with, but even less meaningful given that the sum was far too little for an effective occupation. “Too much to die for, and too little to live,” was how one member of the Habsburg family described it.

The refugee question played directly into the public debate on money. The delegations approved the 60 million gulden on 21 March 1878, and two days later approved an additional credit of 5.9 million gulden to pay off debts incurred for refugee support from 1876, 1877, and for the first four months of 1878. Throughout the whole procedure, refugees became a way of justifying expenses and what was clearly an intended occupation. Domestic critics—especially the liberal daily Neue Freie Presse—hammered Andrássy for the cynicism in a series of blunt reports. Referring to an article in the Pester Lloyd that discussed the ways in which the Habsburg government was pressurizing the Ottomans, the Neue Freie Presse commented “the farce of an occupation

66 Sosnosky, Die Balkanpolitik Österreich-Ungarns seit 1866, 1: 176-77.
68 Sosnosky, Die Balkanpolitik Österreich-Ungarns seit 1866, 1: 178.
of Bosnia out of concern for the refugee is being spun with unbelievable perseverance."

The *Neue Freie Presse* described as an “ingenious pretext” the claim in the pro-

occupation *Budapester Correspondenz* that “if we do not want to continue suffering from

this great plague [...] there is no other means than by entering Bosnia with the appropriate

number of troops and, as soon as the necessary measures are taken, to repatriate the

refugees with force.” The *Presse’s* criticism culminated in a long piece on the decision

department of the delegations:

Public opinion has spoken so frequently and strongly against an occupation of Bosnia,
insofar as it is not a necessary part of a military or political operation against Russia, that
[the government] sought for a pretense with which [it] could justify this occupation to the

public. One such pretense was luckily found. The refugees from Bosnia and Hercegovina
demand continued care from the resources of our monarchy, and they have generated
costs that up to now add up to six million gulden. The delegations are not ready to
appropriate further money for this care; but they have pointlessly approved [...] another
sixty million. So we mobilize and use the sixty million for the purpose of escorting the

refugees back to Bosnia and Hercegovina, so that we save the extra one or two million
we would need for [the refugees]? The long-sought pretext for marching into Bosnia has
been found, and moreover in a form that is idiosyncratically consistent with the savings
tendencies of both parliaments. One spends the sixty million that was in any case allotted
to spare having to allot a million for the refugees!

### Negotiating an occupation

For all of the above reasons—massive forced migration of Muslims in the eastern

Balkans, Russia’s intended massive recalibration of the European balance of power, the

continuing flight of Orthodox refugees from Bosnia and Hercegovina as well as new

movements of Muslims within the provinces, and the fissure in Habsburg public opinion

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69 *Neue Freie Presse*, 3 V 1878.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid.
over the question of Bosnia and Hercegovina—refugees and the language of refugee return became an effective tool of foreign and domestic politics in post-San Stefano negotiations. For a domestic audience, common agreement on the need to return the refugees potentially offered the imperial government a way to make occupation look more attractive, while by 1878 consent to an occupation from other Great Powers, especially Britain, included consideration of the large number of refugees on its territory. And when it came to direct negotiations with the Ottomans to win an invitation for an occupation, Andrássy found in the refugee question what he perceived to be a powerful instrument to achieve Habsburg strategic goals.

Refugee return was clearly in the interests of both the Habsburg and the Ottoman Empires. Andrássy wanted to convince the Ottomans the repatriation process could be carried out only under Habsburg direction, and therefore an Austro-Hungarian occupation of the provinces was, in fact, in the best interests of the Ottoman Empire. Refugees were the crux of the argument for occupation. Refugee return was vital for economic growth, political stability and the re-establishment of the status quo ante, and for preventing any further actions by Serbia and Montenegro. As such, return should be seen as the most important step to be taken in Bosnia and Hercegovina, regardless of how it was carried out or by whom. Over three years the Ottomans had been unable to pacify the provinces and return the refugees. Andrássy saw demanding refugee return as a safe way to strong-arm the Ottomans into conceding to an occupation. Repatriation was a cynical tool in the foreign minister’s hands, but in the weeks of intensive diplomacy leading up the Berlin Congress the Ottomans took it very seriously. The question of refugee return was, as Andrássy framed it, once again a means to lay claim to sovereign control of a territory.
Andrássy hoped to have a deal worked out with the Ottomans prior to the meeting in Berlin. In late March 1878, while holding one-on-one meetings with Ignatiev in Vienna to discuss revisions to San Stefano, the Habsburg foreign minister laid out a diplomatic course in a lengthy set of instructions to Zichy in Istanbul.\footnote{72} He made clear the tactic was to convince the Ottomans their interests were in alignment with those of the Habsburg Empire.\footnote{73} Although Ignatiev had agreed to an occupation, Andrássy instructed Zichy to make his case based on the San Stefano terms for Bosnia and Hercegovina, particularly the two-year tax break and the introduction of autonomy. Andrássy expressed concern the tax-break would extend Russia’s influence even further because it would have secured for the insurgents “a reward [for their uprising] in the form of compensation for damages.”\footnote{74} Zichy was to argue to the Porte that the Great Powers would all agree the Ottomans would immediately have to realize in Bosnia and Hercegovina the “recommendations from the Constantinople Conference; that the entire circa 230,000-person mass of refugees be returned at the cost of the Porte.”\footnote{75} Such a repatriation, if the Ottoman Empire was in any position to carry it out, could succeed only with great sacrifice, Andrássy argued. In an autonomous Bosnia and Hercegovina, the Muslims alone would bear the financial burden, but the underlying agrarian questions that had sparked the uprising in the first place would remain unsolved. This, Andrássy claimed,

\footnote{72} The two quickly reached an impasse over a series of territorial revisions Andrássy—and subsequently the other Great Powers—wanted to make to San Stefano. In fact, the only thing Andrássy and Ignatiev could agree on were those terms that had been laid out in Budapest—the return of Bessarabia to Russia, and the handing over of Bosnia and Hercegovina to the Habsburg Empire. Medlicott, *The Congress of Berlin and After: A Diplomatic History of the Near Eastern Settlement 1878-1880*: 14.

\footnote{73} HHStA PA XII box 131, Weisungen. Andrássy to Zichy, 28 III 1878.

\footnote{74} HHStA PA XII box 131, Weisungen. Andrássy to Zichy, 28 III 1878.

\footnote{75} HHStA PA XII box 131, Weisungen. Andrássy to Zichy, 28 III 1878.
would most likely lead to a renewal of the insurgency, a division of the provinces between Serbia and Montenegro, the renewal of the “Slavic question” for the Habsburgs, and “new convulsions for the Ottomans that would certainly bring about their rapid and definitive demise.” The only thing that could prevent such calamities from happening was the “occupation of the neighboring Turkish lands.”

Zichy was to inform the Porte Austria-Hungary had no desire further to weaken the Ottoman Empire through such an occupation. This was surely true—there was little profit to be had in undermining the Ottoman Empire still more, as it could only strengthen the new states and open the Balkans up to greater Russian influence. Yet Andrássy instructed Zichy to use both the carrot and the stick. Zichy was to make clear to Ottoman officials in Istanbul there existed only two possibilities for the Porte. First, the Ottomans could allow Austria-Hungary free hand in taking any measures in Bosnia and Hercegovina necessary to preserve Habsburg interests, in which case Austria-Hungary would go to Berlin and fight to maintain Ottoman territory in Europe. Second, should the Ottomans choose a “wrong politics and instead of protecting the heart of their Empire [Bulgaria], waste the rest of their energy on maintaining a vain appearance of authority in a distant borderland,” Austria-Hungary would be forced to act alone, without offering any protection for Ottoman interests at the Berlin Congress. The lessons of Bulgaria were to be absolutely clear: while in the past a Habsburg move into Bosnia and Hercegovina seemed like it would only bring with it more problems, Andrássy wanted to caution the

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76 HHStA PA XII box 131, Weisungen. Andrássy to Zichy, 28 III 1878.
77 HHStA PA XII box 131, Weisungen. Andrássy to Zichy, 28 III 1878.
78 HHStA PA XII box 131, Weisungen. Andrássy to Zichy, 28 III 1878.
Porte that “today it is about protecting the Muslim population [of Bosnia and Hercegovina] from total extermination.”

One week later, in early April 1878, Andrássy instructed Zichy to keep up the pressure and to illustrate the dangers of not following Austro-Hungarian advice. San Stefano’s promises of territorial expansion had invigorated Montenegro, which now had “in sight the definitive removal of the Muslim refugees, of which there are supposed to be 20,000 in [Shkodër].” Andrássy urged the Porte to demand the unmolested return and reintegration of the refugees; any change to the facts on the ground might support the terms of San Stefano at Berlin. The Habsburg foreign minister suggested that until a final resolution to this and other open questions was reached, the Ottomans should not withdraw their troops from areas still under Ottoman military control. San Stefano demanded a withdrawal but as Andrássy pointed out, the treaty fixed no deadline.

This was population diplomacy. Forced migration—its initiation, prevention, and solution—became a valuable chip on the bargaining table for the Habsburg and the Ottoman Empires leading up to the Berlin Congress. Andrássy’s support for a smaller Bulgaria was in the interest of both empires, but as he asked Zichy to explain, no matter what shape Bulgaria ultimately took, Austria-Hungary placed great importance on the demand that the Muslims who lived there would be “guaranteed the same rights and freedoms as those that were demanded, or should be demanded, for Christians in the Turkish provinces.” Muslim minority protection was the logical outcome of the

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79 HHStA PA XII box 131, Weisungen. Andrássy to Zichy, 28 III 1878.
80 HHStA PA XII box 131, Weisungen. Andrássy to Zichy, 08 IV 1878.
81 HHStA PA XII box 131, Weisungen. Andrássy to Zichy, 08 IV 1878.
82 HHStA PA XII box 131, Weisungen. Andrássy to Zichy, 07 IV 1878.
Habsburg *Realpolitik* of Bosnia and Hercegovina, and the thought launched Andrássy into a fantastical rhapsody of a secure multi-confessional future. In contrast to Russia’s plans for Bulgaria, an Austro-Hungarian administration of Bosnia and Hercegovina would “afford Muslims the most complete protection of their religion and property.”

The occupation would demonstrate that a truly peaceful coexistence and equality among Christians and Muslims was attainable, and that “the well-being of one element did not demand the oppression or eradication of the other.” Criticizing a European belief in the “doctrine of the incompatibility of the Cross and the Crescent,” Andrássy argued that the realization of such coexistence would have an importance that stretched well beyond Ottoman borders, and would “achieve a greater guarantee of the secure continued existence of the Turkish Empire in Europe than could be attained through European controls or intervention.”

At the start of May 1878, Andrássy had gathered the diplomatic strength to force the moment to its crisis. His instructions to Baron Herbert, the Charge d’affaires in Istanbul, clearly laid out the role of refugee return in the argument for occupying Bosnia and Hercegovina. The parliamentary delegations would not approve any more funds to support the refugees on Habsburg soil, and a return under the terms of San Stefano would be a Russian triumph that would put the refugees immediately “on top of a movement...”

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83 HHStA PA XII box 131, Weisungen. Andrássy to Zichy, 07 IV 1878.

84 HHStA PA XII box 131, Weisungen. Andrássy to Zichy, 07 IV 1878.

85 HHStA PA XII box 131, Weisungen. Andrássy to Zichy, 07 IV 1878.

86 Zichy was attending his son’s wedding in Hungary. HHStA PA XII box 131, Weisungen. Andrássy to Herbert, 02 V 1878.
and would create new difficulties for us and the Porte."\(^{87}\) No matter what the Ottoman response and regardless of whether the Porte could or would make the necessary guarantees for a successful repatriation, refugee return was the question that would force Austria-Hungary’s hand.\(^{88}\) Three years experience, plus recent correspondence with Mažuranić in Croatia and Mollinary and Rodich along the Habsburg-Ottoman border made it all but certain the Ottomans would not be able to offer terms that would induce the refugees to return. The local population wanted the refugees to leave, while smuggling and other crime had become common. Refugees in the district of Gora told Mollinary that if the government cut aid to induce return, the “lack of income and foodstuffs would force them to create robber-bands,” while others insisted they would go home only under Christian rule.\(^{89}\)

Secure in the knowledge the Ottomans would not be able to return the refugees, on 2 May 1878, Andrásy instructed that the Porte be given an ultimatum. The Ottoman Empire must either immediately provide the refugees with all of the typical supplies necessary for return and reconstruction, and be prepared to guarantee Austria-Hungary, with “complete certainty,” of the Ottoman ability to meet its promises and provide for a secure repatriation, or,

\(^{87}\) HHStA PA XII box 131, Weisungen. Andrásy to Herbert, 02 V 1878.

\(^{88}\) HHStA PAXII box 131 Weisungen, Andrásy to Zichy, 15 IV 1878. Privately, Andrásy told Zichy that Austria-Hungary would not give up on the question of repatriation and that ultimately it would be easy to achieve repatriation “and much more” with Russia’s help if in exchange, Austria-Hungary gave Russia free rein in the Bulgarian question.

\(^{89}\) Document 147, Mažuranić to Andrásy, 24 IV 1878, and Document 145, Rodich to Andrásy, 23 IV 1878. Actenstücke aus den correspondenzen des kais. Und kön. Gemeinsamen Ministeriums des Äussern über Orientalische Angelegenheiten (vom 7. April 1877 bis 3. November 1878), (Wien: K.K. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1878). Rodich did not respond to Andrásy’s enquiry until the middle of May, but he too dismissed the possibility of return based on the discussed terms.
It must decide to leave the repatriation of the refugees to us, and for which we would, by way of a loan, meet all of the costs and carry out whatever is necessary with our own resources. The refugees would return under the protection of our troops, who would at the same time be tasked, possibly with the co-operation of the Turkish troops already in the provinces, with the establishment of peace in these provinces and for the maintenance of order until all of the questions are resolved. We would not oppose a declaration by the Porte that these provisional measures would not prejudice [Ottoman] sovereignty.90

The cause of refugee return was thus linked to one of the most distinctive legal characteristics of the occupation—the maintenance of nominal Ottoman sovereignty.

Ottoman officials clearly understood that the question of refugee repatriation was what Andrássy described to Zichy as a “plausible pretext.”91 But they also took the language of return seriously: an occupation could be prevented by the re-establishment of the status quo ante bellum. In this manner, the diplomatic focus on refugee return created an opportunity, however limited, to sway international public opinion, isolate Austria-Hungary, and perhaps convince Britain to block a Great Power mandate for a Habsburg occupation.

The Ottomans moved quickly. Members of the council of ministers disagreed over how to respond. Although Sadik Paşa, the minister of the interior, seemed willing to accept an occupation under the terms offered, the majority of members was opposed. The Habsburg argument could also be flipped with the suggestion that the Ottoman Empire should undertake a repatriation on its own, but only if Austria-Hungary would commit to preventing the refugees from returning to Habsburg territory.92 At the same time the

90 The final sentence originally read “We would be prepared to declare to the Porte that through this provisional occupation the territorial question would not be prejudiced.” This formulation apparently was subsequently revised. HHStA PA XII box 131, Weisungen. Andrássy to Herbert, 02 V 1878.

91 An excuse that, Andrássy noted, was nevertheless insufficient for Austro-Hungarian strategic goals. HHStA PAXII box 131 Weisungen, Andrássy to Zichy, 14 V 1878.

92 Document 1084, Herbert to Andrássy, 6 V 1878 and Document 1087, Herbert to Andrássy, 8 V 1878. Novotny, Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des Berliner Kongresses 1878.
council was debating, officials took two additional steps. First, they asked Ahmed Mazhar Paşa, the Ottoman governor in Sarajevo, to investigate the feasibility of an Ottoman-led return and resettlement program. Second, they tried to secure the necessary funding for a return. Even before the Habsburg ultimatum, the Ottomans had been trying to negotiate the early re-payment of 4.3 million Francs they had advanced to the Danube Commission in 1856 to pay for improvements to the waterway. Originally, the Ottomans said the money would be used to support the Muslim refugees from the Balkans who were in Istanbul and Anatolia. After the ultimatum, however, it was decided the money should instead be redirected to save Bosnia and Herzegovina from Habsburg hands by returning its refugees.

The Ottomans were disappointed on both accounts. After meeting with local officials and notables, Mazhar reported from Sarajevo there were neither the supplies, money nor personnel necessary for repatriation. The British member of the Danube Commission said it would be impossible to advance any funds to the Ottomans for any purposes, no matter how noble. Indeed, it was at this point the British ambassador in Istanbul was instructed to tell the Porte it should accept the occupation as the price of Habsburg support for a smaller Bulgaria. Within a week of receiving the ultimatum, Safvet sent a letter to Mahmud Es’ad Paşa, the Ottoman ambassador to Vienna, that repeated, almost verbatim, the terms outlined in the original Habsburg proposal: a

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94 Salisbury helpfully also pointed out that “hitherto any disaster happening to Porte has resulted from disregarding English advice, and that England is very scrupulous of giving advice which may lead Porte into danger.” Document 175, Salisbury to Layard, 7 V 1878. Ibid.

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temporary occupation with military protection for returning refugees, a loan to pay for their resettlement needs, and the preservation of Ottoman sovereignty.95

**The Road to Sarajevo**

When the Habsburg occupation forces entered Bosnia and Hercegovina on 29 July 1878, they met with a violent resistance that military and civil leadership had not expected based on generally optimistic consular reports. San Stefano had raised the possibility of Bosnia and Hercegovina achieving some form of autonomy, and in the months since it was signed, Ottoman central government control over the provinces had effectively collapsed. The local administration, once incompetent and dismissive, had become virtually paralyzed: officials were either trying to relocate elsewhere in the empire, or were, like Ahmed Mazhar and his secretary Konstan Paşa, securing support for leadership positions in a new local government.96 Into this void stepped first a committee led by local notables. By the time the terms of the Berlin Treaty—and specifically of Austria-Hungary’s permission to occupy the provinces—became known, real power lay in the hands of the loosely-organized militia that fought the occupation. For its part, the Ottoman army was barely functional—unable to put down the anti-occupation insurgency, incapable of maintaining ranks, and barely able to guard the governor’s

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95 The document is an enclosure to a 10 May 1878 note from Andrássy to Zichy saying Austria-Hungary agreed with the terms as described in the note to Es’ad. HHStA PA XII Gesandtschaftsarchiv, box 439, 10 V 1878.

96 Koetschet, *Aus Bosniens letzter Türkenzeit*. Konstan, who had earlier worked in Hercegovina (see Chapter Three) was a Christian, although there is some disagreement over his denomination. Most have described him as Greek Orthodox. Herkalović describes Konstan as Armenian. Thomas Herkalović, *Vorgeschichte der Occupation Bosniens und der Herzegovina* (Zagreb: Milojoj Majcen, 1906). 68. See also Ćubrilović, *Bosanski Ustanak 1875-1878*: 103-04.
For most of the uprising and during the Russian-Ottoman war, the provincial capital of Sarajevo had “offered an image of quiet idyll.” Everything changed in the first half of 1878, however, and by the end of July, the city had undergone what Robert Donia describes as a “revolution.” Sarajevans were preparing for a post-Ottoman order.

At the start of January 1878, Konrad Wassitch, the former Habsburg repatriation official in Hercegovina, replaced Theodorovich as the General Consul in Sarajevo. Wassitch was an old Sarajevo hand, having worked in the consul from 1859-1861, and his reports counted among the most reliable from Sarajevo’s consular corps. Within a month, he had a very clear assessment of the situation: the provincial administration had “no authority, and the population [had] lost its confidence in the government.”

Watching a crowd of Sarajevans exiting the Imperial Mosque, Mazhar commented, “If our government wants to hold on to Bosnia at all, it has to do what it used to do and exile all of those blockheads to Anatolia without mercy or compassion, because with them, all progress and all cultural work is impossible.”

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100 HHStA Personalia. Wassitch. See also ibid.


Sarajevo on 18 May 1877 and had little chance to build a support base; his general disdain for the population only undermined his situation further.

The Ottoman military’s position was at least as critical, and by the time the armed insurgency broke out in June it seemed unlikely Ottoman soldiers would be able to defend their own armories, having barely withstood crowds rushing the governor’s residence.103 The soldiers were poorly trained and poorly outfitted; they were also often loyal not to their commanders but to the locals. Out of twenty-three Ottoman battalions, nineteen comprised exclusively local soldiers who were, for the most part, stationed near their homes. Two more battalions were mixed. By the start of July, 1878, Hafiz Paşa, the Ottoman military commander, had only two true “Turkish battalions” at his disposal.104 The military itself was socially destabilizing, too. In the past three years, the Muslim population of Bosnia and Hercegovina had supplied the troops for 32 battalions of regular soldiers and numerous Bašbozuk and by the start of 1878, there were few able-bodied men left to conscript.105 Inflation meant the money that families of conscripted Muslim merchants received was sufficient only to buy enough bread for one person for about ten days.106 In February 1878, a group of soldiers’ wives assembled in the government building and demanded Mazhar sink the bread prices, while others blocked his path on

103 Ibid., 14. See also Wassitch to Andrássy, 15 VII 1878. Document 97, Gavranović, Bosna i Hercegovina u doba austrougarske ocupacije 1878. god.

104 Kreševljaković, Sarajevo u doba okupacije Bosne 1878.: 14. See also Wassitch to Andrássy, 15 VII 1878. Document 97, Gavranović, Bosna i Hercegovina u doba austrougarske ocupacije 1878. god.

105 Wassitch compared this to Austria-Hungary maintaining three million soldiers fully mobilized through for three years. It was rare to see a healthy young Muslim on the street who wasn’t in uniform. Wassitch to Andrássy, 15 II 1878. Document 12, Gavranović, Bosna i Hercegovina u doba austrougarske ocupacije 1878. god. Conscription rates were so low that Salih Paşa, the mutessarif of Banja Luka, imprisoned 50 notables who refused to join, only to have Mazhar order their release, fearing such a punishment would only increase opposition to the administration. Wassitch to Andrássy, 15 II 1878. Document 12, ibid.

106 Ibid.
the open street and demanded bread for themselves and the children they brought with them. Wives had submitted written petitions in the past; in March 1878, when Mazhar told a group of wives he could do nothing for them because the Ottoman Empire was under attack from its enemies, a Muslim refugee from Nikšić responded, “It isn’t the foreigners, but the Ottomans who have attacked the empire. You are the enemy of the empire.”

As far as these failures of the imperial institutions went, they do not seem to have had a major direct impact on the process of refugee return that took place after the occupation. Habsburg plans envisioned working with Ottoman officials in the repatriation process, and in most cases this appears either to have been possible or in cases when it was not possible, to have had no serious negative impact on repatriation. Instead, it was the formation first of an autonomous quasi-government, followed by the armed insurgency, that really set the terms under which the Habsburg occupation took place. Public pressure on the civil and military administration had been growing, even if public interests were divided, though less by confession than by class.

As early as February, 1878, local Muslim notables were meeting in private and discussing the situation. Although some saw an end to Ottoman rule as an opportunity to regain independence and return to a feudal order, most supported an occupation as a means to preserve the social, political, and economic stability that was the root of their interests. Moderate local notables such as Mehmed Beg Kapetanović, who in 1876 had

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107 In May of the same year, soldiers’ wives also petitioned for an increase in the daily rations for their husbands in the barracks. Herkalović, Vorgeschichte der Occupation Bosniens und der Herzegovina: 84.


109 On February 27, five Muslim elites were reported to the police for holding such a meeting several days before; although one of the people reported was a Beg from Rogatica, the other was Hoca Jamaković, who
unsuccessfully tried to secure the repatriation of refugees from Croatia, were measured voices in the ears of both Ottoman administrators and the foreign consular corps, and the inspiration for Wassitch’s sunny consular reports back to Vienna. In May 1878, the notables still had enough influence to co-opt a popular movement that was pushing for the establishment of an assembly that would run the provincial government, banish Christian officials and rule in accord with şeriat. In the event, the assembly was established, but it lacked any executive power, comprised largely the elite, and was empowered solely to investigate the complaints that had led to its establishment in the first place. The assembly was also broadly representative: when it met on 8 June, it had twenty nine seats. For Sarajevo, there were twelve seats for Muslims, two each for Orthodox and Catholics, and one for Jews. The remaining twelve seats were for one Muslim and one Christian member from each of six sancaks: Banja Luka, Bihać, Mostar, Travnik, Zenica and Zvornik. Because of the cost of travel and board, these seats were never filled.

By the end of June, the assembly could boast two main achievements. First, the simple presence of a deliberative body, especially one that demonstrated flexibility by would later become an important figure in the resistance to the occupation. See Herkalović, Vorgeschichte der Occupation Bosniens und der Herzegovina: 112. Also Wassitch to Andrássy, 4 VIII 1878. Document 166, Gavranović, Bosna i Hercegovina u doba austrougarske ocupacije 1878. god.

110 See Wassitch to Andrássy: 15 II 1878, 4 IV 1878, 20 IV 1878, 7 VII 1878.

111 Koetschet, Aus Bosniens letzter Türkenzeit: 76-77; see also Wassitch to Andrássy, 6 VI 1878. Document 44, Gavranović, Bosna i Hercegovina u doba austrougarske ocupacije 1878. god. The demands may have been an effort by Mazhar to orchestrate the popular removal of Konstan Paşa, his chief rival for a leadership position in an autonomous Bosnia and Herzegovina. Wassitch told Andrássy that Mazhar was a catalyst of the movement, and had approached the chief imam of the Gazi Husref Beg Mosque for his help in building popular support for a plan that would exclude non-Muslims from civic officialdom.

112 Wassitch to Andrássy, 12 VI 1878. Document 46, Gavranović, Bosna i Hercegovina u doba austrougarske ocupacije 1878. god.
admitting new Orthodox members, preserved at least some social cohesion. Second—and this certainly helped to maintain stability—the assembly was a forum that reduced political intrigue elsewhere in the provincial government.\textsuperscript{113} Despite that, the assembly was not able to withstand the news, which arrived in Sarajevo on 3 July 1878, that Austria-Hungary, “at the request of England and Russia,” had been unanimously given a “mandate immediately to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina militarily and to assume the administration of these provinces.”\textsuperscript{114}

Wassitch’s initial investigations left him optimistic. While not unanimous, Sarajevo’s elite, and especially its Muslim elite, supported a Habsburg occupation for pragmatic and deeply conservative reasons. Serbia had for decades been gradually pushing out its Muslim population, and large groups of Muslims in eastern Bosnia were recently displaced from Serbia.\textsuperscript{115} Bosnia’s incorporation into Serbia was unthinkable. And as attractive as a sweeping autonomy was, the continuation of a form of imperial

\textsuperscript{113} In many ways, the assembly simply recapitulated the structure of the Ottoman provincial assembly. Many of the assembly’s members were closely tied to imperial government in one way or another, including Sunula Effendi Sokolović (attorney), Ragib Effendi (magistrate), Assim effendi Rigiaić (provincial councilor) and Mehmed Beg Kapetanović, a member of the short-lived Hamidian parliament. Peter Sacija, a Catholic, was also a member of parliament; the Orthodox Petraki Petrović was a military supplier, as was the Jewish member, Salomon Effendi. The remaining members were the Sarajevo mufti Mustafa Effendi and the imam Kaučija; Mustajbeg Fadilpašić, a rich and influential landowner who had recently returned from exile in Istanbul; the landowners Mahmud Effendi Muftić, Mustafa Effendi Šarić and Sabit Effendi Hasanagić; the Muslim merchants Ahmed Effendi Svrzo and Muhamed Aga Kapitanović; the Orthodox merchant Demeter Jeftanović, and the Franciscan Fra Grgo Martić. At the meeting on 10 June, the Orthodox members protested their confession was under-represented, and as a result assembly membership was broadened to include the merchants Risto Bessara, Jacob Trifković, and Georg Damjanović. Wassitch to Andrássy, 12 VI 1878. Document 46, ibid.

\textsuperscript{114} Andrássy to Wassitch, 2 VII 1878. Document 65, ibid.

rule was not just the preservation of the familiar, but the only hope for the preservation of the prerogatives of the elite.116

Yet Sarajevo’s elite were quickly isolated. Despite repeated requests, Mazhar did not receive instructions from Istanbul. In the uncertain environment, the assembly voted to enlarge itself; in the process it took as a member Salih Vilajatović, better known as Hadži Lojo, who would become the charismatic leader of the organized insurgency against the occupation and against the maintenance or restoration of Ottoman imperial rule. The assembly took on a broader governing role and more populist aspect. It moved its location from the governor’s residence to a building directly across from the Gazi Husrev mosque, and began its “transition from a nascent representative body under elite Muslim leadership to a group of activists under the influence of the conservative religious establishment and lower-class Muslims.”117 The assembly’s focus turned to mobilizing militarily against the occupation, and within days most of the local notables and landowners had walked out. This left Vilajatović in control of the assembly, effectively the only functioning governing body in Bosnia and Hercegovina, and one pitted against not just a Habsburg occupation, but also against the Ottoman Empire.

**The occupation and transitional government**

Major General Stefan Jovanovich led the XVIII Infantry into Hercegovina on 29 July 1878 and quickly reached and secured Mostar. The XIII Army, commanded by General of the Artillery Josef Phillipovich, entered Bosnia at three different points along the Sava

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River and headed south. Leading the middle column from Slavonski Brod, Phillipovich finally entered Sarajevo on 19 August. It took another two months for the army to subdue the last pocket of resistance to the occupation, and when the fortress in Klauša, in the far northwestern corner of Bosnia, finally fell on 20 October 1878, the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina had cost the Habsburg army 5,000 wounded, missing, or dead soldiers, with an additional 2,000 soldiers who subsequently died from wounds or disease. This was far from the “single company of Husars” and a “marching band” Andrássy claimed would be sufficient for the occupation.

The most immediate effect of the occupation on the refugee situation was that it created more refugees—in this case, largely Muslims fleeing the occupying army. Many of them were lower-level Ottoman administrators and bureaucrats who fled either deeper into Ottoman territory, or even to Serbia, where around 3,000 were waiting for some form of transportation to elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire. Many were peasants or others who had been involved in the insurgency; others had simply fled.

Habsburg authorities pursued the same strategy as the Ottomans had in the three years leading up to the occupation. As the occupation operations ground on and refugee movement out of the two provinces continued unabated, the Habsburg foreign ministry reached an agreement with Serbia, which was already struggling under the burden of the

118 Sosnosky, Die Balkanpolitik Österreich-Ungarns seit 1866, 1: 205-86. A great deal has been written on the course of the occupation from various angles. The definitive contemporary account is from the war ministry itself, Kriegsarchiv Austria, Die occupation Bosniens und der Hercegovina durch k.k.truppen im jahre 1878 (Wien1879). A number of soldiers also wrote popular accounts, for example Joseph Beck, Banjaluka-Jajce, vol. 4, Unsere truppen in Bosnien und der Herzegowina, 1878. Einzeldarstellungen. 4 (Wien,Leipzig: C.W. Stern, 1908), and Georg Freiherr von Holtz, Von Brod bis Sarajevo, vol. Bd.2, Unsere Truppen in Bosnien und der Herzegowina 1878. Einzeldarstellungen (Wien: C. W. Stern, 1907).

Orthodox refugees it had been sheltering, to control the flight. Any armed bands would be disarmed and then interned; any armed regular army units who failed to put down their weapons would be treated as enemy; unarmed refugees, women and children would be offered protection but would be required to provide their own support, and Serb civilians would not help refugees cross over. The refugees were to be offered an amnesty to induce their return, and the Habsburg consul in Belgrade was to prepare for returns.

Also for the first time during the uprising, the occupation led to a significant number of Muslim refugees crossing onto Habsburg territory. The reasons for this movement are difficult to determine, and the actual number of refugees involved is not clear, although it was large enough for the Habsburg government to issue policy directives. These were based on instructions issued to border officials in 1876 in preparation for large numbers of Ottoman soldiers, irregulars, and Muslim civilians from Serbia or Montenegro crossing to the Habsburg side during the Serbian war with the Ottoman Empire. Framed as policies regarding treatment of prisoners of war, the orders established a clear and explicit equality of treatment and management for all individuals, regardless of religion. Equal treatment of Muslim non-combatants was implicit in these instructions, although best articulated with regard to combatants.

121 KA PR 51-6/147, Wrede to Andrásy, 23 IX 1878.
123 KA 3718 PR 77-1/4 19 VII 1876 RKM to Agram, Zara, Temesvar, budapest, hermanstadt. See also KA 77-1/18, 17 VIII 1876, GK Graz to RKM and RKM 77-1/18, 26 VIII 1876 RKM to MdA.
By the time of the occupation, the identical treatment of Muslim refugees was, as Mollinary put it, a *Grundsatz*—a basic principle.\(^{124}\) Once the occupation was underway, the new refugees were subject to surveillance and moved more systematically to pre-established internment locations than had been the case earlier. Nevertheless, the treatment of Muslims did not substantively differ from that of Christians. On 24 August 1878, the General Command in Zagreb requested from the War Ministry instructions for managing Muslim refugees from “the interior of Bosnia near Berbir [Bosanska Gradiška]” who had requested permission to cross the border onto Croatian territory.\(^{125}\) From Zadar, Rodich submitted a similar request with regard to anti-occupation Christian insurgents in Dalmatia.\(^{126}\) Artur Bylandt-Rheidt, the Minister of War, reiterated the 1876 instructions and specifically that—as long as the number of refugees remained low—they were to be interned in Civil Croatia proper.\(^{127}\) Should the number of Muslim refugees increase, Mollinary was to send them to the same Hungarian districts that had been prepared to receive refugees during the Serbian-Ottoman War. Officials in these locations, the minister thought, were already well prepared to receive Muslim refugees.\(^ {128}\) In Dalmatia, the Christian insurgents and “as the case may be, Muslim or other refugees”

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\(^{124}\) Mollinary appears not to have been informed that Alagic had already left the border zone. HDA UOZV box 244 11769, 10 VI 1877.

\(^{125}\) Berbir was another name for Bosanska Gradiška; by the late nineteenth century the name was not in common usage.

\(^{126}\) KA 813/Pr 1878 RKM to MdA, 29 VIII 1878.

\(^{127}\) KA 813/Pr 1878 RKM to MdA, 29 VIII 1878.

\(^{128}\) The chosen districts were Bacs, Baranya, Tolna, Somogy and Zala. Only Zala had not been prepared for Muslim refugees in 1876. It is tempting, of course, to conclude Hungarian locations were preferable to other locations in Civil Croatia because of Hungarian Turcophilia. KA 813/Pr 1878 RKM to MdA, 29 VIII 1878.
were to be interned in Dalmatia.\textsuperscript{129} Like two years earlier, should many people cross over from Hercegovina, plans were in place to transport them for internment in Krajn, Carinthia, or southern Styria.\textsuperscript{130}

Regardless of creed or the date on which they crossed over, these refugees were viewed as belonging to the same larger group of refugees. This was true not just in management but also finance. After the joint minister of finance questioned how Muslim refugees in particular should be accounted for, Andrássy explained “[the fact that] Muslims are also to be found among these refugees should not prevent the payments for them as well as for the Christian refugees being taken from the allocations” made for Bosnian and Hercegovinian refugees in general.\textsuperscript{131}

Immediate responsibility for running the newly-occupied provinces fell to the military, but on 16 and 25 September 1878—six weeks after Phillipovich had entered Sarajevo, but well before the Habsburg Army had finished military operations against the armed resistance—Franz Josef signed two orders establishing in Vienna a joint Commission for Affairs in Bosnia and Hercegovina. The Commission started out as a provisional solution to establish civil government under political and judicial organs of the empire, with the first task being establishing the security of “life and property of the residents, and for this special attention was paid to the organization of a gendermerie.”\textsuperscript{132}

\textsuperscript{129} KA 813/Pr 1878 RKM to MdA, 29 VIII 1878.

\textsuperscript{130} KA 813/Pr 1878 RKM to MdA, 29 VIII 1878.

\textsuperscript{131} KA 813/Pr 1878 MdA to RFM, 13 IX 1878

The commission quickly became first a transitional government and then, finally, the legitimate provincial government for the new provinces.\textsuperscript{133}

The commission worked for five months under the immediate auspices of the Foreign Ministry before its activities were subsumed into the Imperial Finance Ministry at the end of February, 1879 and ultimately eliminated in June, 1880. The commission was an Austro-Hungarian institution to its core, with representatives from each of the three common ministries and both halves of the Empire, and meetings held in both Vienna and Budapest. The commission was tasked in the first instance with defining the Sarajevo Army commander’s role as head of the Bosnian and Hercegovinian civil bureaucracy; it was the main advisory body to the foreign ministry on affairs in the new provinces and it mediated between the provincial leadership in Sarajevo and all levels of imperial and royal government.\textsuperscript{134} The repatriation of refugees was a central task of the commission from the very start.

Peter Sugar has characterized the commission as “ineffective.”\textsuperscript{135} It suffered from numerous structural problems: other parts of the bureaucracy seconded officials to the commission, but at least in the case of the Austrian and Hungarian governments did not provide or pay for staff. Moreover, commission members maintained other responsibilities in their respective governments. The imperial finance ministry then lent

\textsuperscript{133} There is a vast literature on Habsburg-occupied Bosnia and Hercegovina. For structural questions related to the creation of new political infrastructure, the best description is Eduard Eichler, \textit{Das Justizwesen Bosniens und der Hercegovina} (Wien: Landesregierung von für Bosnien und die Hercegovina, 1889). Despite the volume and range of work on the period, few studies deal directly and exclusively with the administration itself. Only one secondary work has addressed the establishment of the Habsburg civil administration in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Unfortunately unavailable to me, this dissertation is Walter Rojik, “Die Einrichtung der öffentlichen Verwaltung in Bosnien und der Herzegovina durch Österreich-Ungarn nach der Occupation im Jahre 1878” (Dissertation, Universität Wien, 1980).

\textsuperscript{134} Eichler, \textit{Das Justizwesen Bosniens und der Hercegovina}: 114-15.

\textsuperscript{135} Sugar, \textit{Industrialization of Bosnia-Hercegovina 1878-1918}: 27.
members of its own staff to the commission.\textsuperscript{136} It was not a long jump from this set-up to the removal of the commission into the imperial finance ministry itself with the purpose of the “achievement of an active and energetic Executive of all the administrative affairs of Bosnia and Hercegovina in the hands of the joint ministry.”\textsuperscript{137}

The supposed inefficacy of the commission, however, had far less to do with the body per se than it did with the awkward structure of the Habsburg Empire itself and the persistent opposition to the occupation among the populace. The incorporation of the commission into the finance ministry overcame some of the structural problems created when the commission was first established. This was the beginning of the process that would turn Bosnia and Hercegovina into Austria-Hungary’s only true “Imperial” territories. It was also the process by which the civil administration of Bosnia and Hercegovina became administratively and physically ensconced in the imperial finance ministry, where it remained—an extra-territorial government. Most importantly, however, it isolated the provincial administration from representative bodies of the Habsburg Empire. The head of the provincial government was the Imperial finance minister, and as one of the three common ministers was not responsible to the parliaments in either half of the Empire, but to the delegations—which met once yearly.\textsuperscript{138} As Sugar points out, the principles outlined in the imperial order that created this administrative structure emphasized the administration was to handle all questions in “agreement with the governments of the two territories of the Austro-Hungarian

\textsuperscript{136} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{137} Eichler, \textit{Das Justizwesen Bosniens und der Hercegovina}: 116.

\textsuperscript{138} Sugar, \textit{Industrialization of Bosnia-Hercegovina 1878-1918}: 28.
Monarchy.” The structure effectively gave the finance minister/governor free hand to rule Bosnia and Hercegovina as he saw fit, without any checks on administrative abuse.

Prior to its incorporation into the finance ministry, the commission had been established as an organ of the foreign ministry, which set the early tone of the commission’s work by appointing as the chairman Josef Schwégel—the Sectionschef (section chief; the highest bureaucratic appointment) in the foreign ministry, a trusted colleague of Andrásy, and a former General Consul in Alexandria and in Istanbul. The other members of the commission were Rudolf Borowiczka von Themen, representing the War Ministry, Alexander Mérey von Kaposmérő, representing the imperial finance ministry, Emil von Gödel-Lannoy representing the Austrian government, and Ludwig von Jekelfalussy, representing the Hungarian government. Occasional participants included familiar Balkan hands such as Karl Krauss, who was chief of the Bureau for Bosnia and Hercegovina in the foreign ministry, and Konrad Wassitch.

Refugee repatriation came up for discussion at the second sitting of the commission, and remained constantly near the top of the agenda. The urgency of repatriation was impressed on the commission from the very start. Coming from the foreign ministry, Schwégel was of course well-acquainted with the political and financial pressure to repatriate; moreover, the primacy of repatriation to the occupation authorities had been clear from the very start. Regardless of whether refugee repatriation was a legitimate

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139 Ibid. The imperial edict is reprinted in Appendix I of the same, pages 223-224.


141 Participants are listed at the start of the protocol for each meeting. See HHStA PA XL, box 208, folder “Sitzungs Protokolle der Comission für die angelegenheiten in Bosnien und der Herzegowina.”
reason for the occupation or a cynical argument veneering territorial aggrandizement with humanitarian necessity, the priority of repatriation remained clear. In late April 1878, while Andrásy was using the refugee question to force the Ottoman hand in negotiations over an occupation, the foreign ministry circulated a “Memorandum about the most urgent precautions in case of an occupation of the Bosnian territory with regard to the first administrative and judicial and subsequently policing arrangements.”\(^{142}\) The memo first laid out the two possible forms an occupation might take—either with the agreement of the Ottoman empire “under the title of a positive guarantee for the secure repatriation of [the refugees] and then for the re-establishment” of peace and order, or—either with or without the agreement of the Ottoman Empire—an occupation that tended more towards a “formal seizure.”\(^{143}\) In the first case, the Habsburg’s “main task” would be providing security for the repatriation; in the second instance, in addition to the security preparations, an “Austro-Hungarian administrative and judicial apparatus” would be substituted for the Ottoman administration and, it is clear, create the circumstances for a successful and stable refugee return.\(^{144}\)

The Commission often restricted its administrative agenda to high-level imperial concerns, leaving the more practical questions to General Phillipovich. This was particularly the case with the refugee question, where the Commission dealt most directly with the international and financial aspects. Officials at the border—both on the old Croatian-Slavonian and Dalmatian side as well as the Bosnian and Hercegovenian side—

\(^{142}\) HHStA PA XL box 208, folder “Zur Organisirung Bosniens und Herzegowinas,” 1 V 1878.

\(^{143}\) HHStA PA XL box 208, folder “Zur Organisirung Bosniens und Herzegowinas,” 1 V 1878.

\(^{144}\) HHStA PA XL box 208, folder “Zur Organisirung Bosniens und Herzegowinas,” 1 V 1878.
took responsibility not simply for repatriating the refugees, but also for planning and orchestrating the process. The general guidelines for repatriation were hardly new, and included providing returnees with the tools and materials to rebuild their houses, seed corn for the coming year, and sufficient food to last until harvest. The planning and operations were new, however. Previous experiences with trying to move large numbers of people informed the procedures that officials developed for the 1878 repatriation, and Habsburg control over administration on both sides of the border allowed for much greater cross-border cooperation and decentralization than had previously been possible.

While repatriation of refugees from Croatia-Slavonia and Dalmatia was urgent, the first topic that came up in Commission discussions about refugees was Hercegovinian refugees not in Dalmatia, but in Montenegro. True to form, the awkward structure of Habsburg domestic politics posed an early hurdle for the commission when the Austrian and the Hungarian commissioners were unwilling to address the question of refugees in Montenegro because it was properly answered by the joint foreign ministry. Schwegel overcame Gödel-Lannoy and Jekelfalussy’s objections by convincing them they were in no way expected to make binding statements, but the issue was the first manifestation in the commission’s work of the vitriolic public debates about how to incorporate Bosnia and Hercegovina into the Habsburg Empire’s brittle dualism.

Relying on a report from the Dubrovnik mayor, Buddisavljević, the Commission suggested the repatriation of these refugees should happen through the month of October,

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145 HHStA PA XL, box 208, folder “Sitzungs Protokolle der Comission für die angelegenheiten in Bosnien und der Herzegowina.” 2 X 1878.
146 HHStA PA XL, box 208, folder “Sitzungs Protokolle der Comission für die angelegenheiten in Bosnien und der Herzegowina.” 5 X 1878.
147 Schwegel, Spomini in Pisma: 260.
along with the return of refugees currently in Dubrovnik, Kotor and Metković. The numbers were large; in the three Dalmatian districts there were approximately 17,000 refugees, while an estimated 21,000 refugees were in Montenegro. The refugees in Montenegro, however, posed additional questions. First, according to a telegram to Andrássy from the Habsburg consul in Cetinje, a disproportionately large number of the Hercegovinian refugees had been involved in the insurgency. Moreover, many had joined in Montenegro’s fight against the Ottoman Empire. Eight battalions of 500-800 Hercegovinians, “the majority in connection with the actual Montenegrin army, had fought under Montenegrin sign and flag and stood not far behind the Montenegrin battalions as far as competency.” The question for the repatriation program, thought Thoemel, was how to return these refugees—”the most striking personification of the Hercegovinian insurrection”—and at the same time to break the feelings of solidarity they had developed towards Montenegro.

The refugees in Montenegro also posed a broader international question. Russia had been paying to support them, and had been involved with Montenegro’s refugee affairs from early on in the uprising. Like the refugees themselves, Russian aid for refugees and aid for the insurgency was often indistinguishable. It was well known that Jonin, the Russian consul in Dubrovnik, was funneling money to the insurgents, but he was also helping to support refugees in Montenegro—as well as, it was rumored, to support

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148 At the time, Kotor was part of the Habsburg Empire. It now belongs to Montenegro.  
149 HDA Spisi o Bos. Ustanka, box 21, #2433. 8 X 1878.  
151 Document 260, von Thoemel to Andrássy, 19 X 1878. Ibid.
refugees on Habsburg soil. And, as noted in Chapter One, the Habsburgs themselves used aid they provided to Montenegro as a form of propaganda. Throughout the uprising, refugees had been not just the subject of humanitarian aid, but also the site of imperial competition for influence and sympathy. By October, 1878, however, Russian and Habsburg involvement in refugee aid in Montenegro had taken on an entirely different tone, and become a narrow question of financial responsibility. Aid turned out to be a singularly expensive and unreliable way of currying favor among refugees, and the Habsburg Empire had long since been cutting spending to all but the minimum, including eliminating most of its aid to refugees in Montenegro.

The Habsburg occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, however, reframed the question into one of financial responsibility for refugee aid and repatriation. Interestingly, international norms appear effectively to have been suspended. The expectation would have been that the refugees’ home country would reimburse the costs of aid incurred to the host. This was, as mentioned above, one element of Andrássy’s argument against the Ottoman Empire retaining full control over Bosnia and Hercegovina. Yet in the case of the refugees in Montenegro, the Ottomans appear not to have been held responsible, and Montenegro seems not to have made any claims against Austria-Hungary after the occupation. Not even Russia, which had been carrying the burden of the refugees in Montenegro, demanded payment for its outlays—despite having supported the refugees well after the decision over Bosnia and Hercegovina at Berlin. The only disagreement arose over a two-week period at the start of November 1878: Russia’s representative in Montenegro had paid refugee subventions through 12 November 1878, but learned after
the fact he only had permission to pay them through 27 October 1878. Austria-Hungary had to make up the difference, amounting to 15,000fl.\(^{152}\)

This sum was relatively minor, but the fact the topic was under discussion for weeks points to the increasing urgency and complexity of financing repatriation. In March 1878, the delegations had approved the government’s past expenditures on refugee aid and agreed to the government’s request for an additional 780,000fl for the first quarter of 1878; with the commission up and running in October and the army command prepared to start the repatriation process, its initial request to the joint ministry was for 330,000fl exclusively for food.\(^{153}\) Officials along the border began estimating repatriation costs. In Zagreb, the border command estimated that food, together with the transport of individuals, animals, and baggage from across Croatia-Slavonia to designated repatriation stations along the border with Bosnia would cost 415,000fl—a sum that included neither refugees from Dalmatia and Montenegro, nor additional costs of settling them in Bosnia.\(^{154}\) By mid-November, Phillipovich in Sarajevo requested an additional 188,000fl for food for the returning refugees; two weeks later the Finance Ministry released a further 100,000fl to authorities in Brod to pay for repatriation.\(^{155}\)

An uneasy tension had been established between Bosnia and Herzegovina’s new quasi-government and the officials on the ground arranging repatriation and—in the case

\(^{152}\) The period is 15 October-1 November (old style). HHStA PA XL, box 208, folder “Sitzungs Protokolle der Comission für die angelegenheiten in Bosnien und der Herzegowina.” 23 I 1879.

\(^{153}\) HHStA PA XL, box 208, folder “Sitzungs Protokolle der Comission für die angelegenheiten in Bosnien und der Herzegowina.” 5 X 1878.

\(^{154}\) HDA UOZV 21453, 27 X 1878

\(^{155}\) HHStA PA XL, box 208, folder “Sitzungs Protokolle der Comission für die angelegenheiten in Bosnien und der Herzegowina.” 16 XI 1878, and “Sitzungs Protokolle der Comission für die angelegenheiten in Bosnien und der Herzegowina.” 30 XI 1878.
of Phillipovich—actually administering the provinces. The government had officially ordered repatriation to start on 15 October 1878, with the expectation that it would be finished by the end of November.156 The Habsburg administrators worked with those Ottoman administrators who remained, but for the most part the repatriation effort involved Habsburg officials on both sides of the border who had developed a detailed schedule to orchestrate the fastest, most effective movement of large numbers of people. Repatriation commissioners were to be sent to the locations in Bosnia and Hercegovina, where they would work together with landowners and local officials to resettle the refugees and, importantly, to return them to their previous land tenures.157 The agrarian question remained a troublesome one, as the refugees were busy trying to confuse the existing ownership and tenancy relationships—not hard to do as contracts were unavailable for many of them.158 On paper at least, the plans were thorough and clearly designed to address the many technical obstacles that had arisen during previous repatriation efforts.159 The army was to assign officials to meet the refugees at the cross-over points on the border and to escort them towards the interior; transportation would be arranged “stepwise” so that as soon as one group departed, another would be preparing for departure so that “individual groups [could] be passed on to the Bosnian authorities without interruption.”160 By the first week of November, these locations and the schedule had been fixed.161

156 HDA UOZV 2094, 18 X 1878. Spisi o Bos. Ustanka, box 21, #797, 20 X 1878.
157 HDA Spisi o Bos. Ustanka, box 21, #2433. 8 X 1878.
158 HHStA PA XL, box 208, folder “Zur Organisirung Bosniens und Herzegowinas.” 30 XI 1878.
159 HDA Spisi o Bos. Ustanka, box 21, #2439. 27 X 1878.
160 HDA Spisi o Bos. Ustanka, box 21, #2439. 27 X 1878.
It had been clear from the start that the repatriation was going to be costly; what was unexpected, however, was that the process of repatriation would begin at the same time the Sava and Una Rivers burst their banks in “[the type of] floods that had not happened in over a century.”\textsuperscript{162} By the middle of December, 79 villages on the Croatian side were under water, officials were trying to save their own people, too, and sheets of ice were forming across the flooded area.\textsuperscript{163} While 102,000 refugees—38,000 to Hercegovina and 64,000 to Bosnia—had already been returned by the middle of December, finishing the job in Bosnia would take much longer than expected.\textsuperscript{164}

The delays caused by flooding put local administrators who were sensitive to the needs of the refugees and the opinion of the local communities at loggerheads with the imperial government and the Commission for Affairs in Bosnia and Hercegovina. In Bosnia, the repatriation process had really only begun on 9 November, but by 13 November, the first reports were arriving from Sarajevo and Zagreb that flooding was slowing down repatriation: communication between Novi and Gradiška was no longer possible; transport was dangerous; refugees and their bags were left sitting out in the elements. Three refugees had already died; three women suffered miscarriages, and the

\textsuperscript{161} HDA Spisi o Bos. Ustanka, box 21, #2581. 6 XI 1878.
\textsuperscript{162} HDA Spisi o Bos. Ustanka, box 21, #2709. 19 XII 1878.
\textsuperscript{163} HDA Spisi o Bos. Ustanka, box 21, #2709. 19 XII 1878.
\textsuperscript{164} HHStA PA XL, box 208, folder “Sitzungs Protokolle der Comission für die angelegenheiten in Bosnien und der Herzegowina.” 17 XII 1878.
conditions at the reception point in Gradiška were inhumane.  

The Commission responded to Phillipovich in a firm, accusatory, passive-voice:

We regret the unanticipated hold-ups caused by current weather conditions, but hope that henceforth all difficulties will allow themselves to be quickly removed and that with the mobilization of all [our] forces, the task of repatriation will be carried out according to plan. We appreciate all humanitarian considerations and individual cases, the same can, in special circumstances that are worth taking note of, be taken into consideration; but the more important and compelling momentum, which the return of the refuges imperiously demands, cannot be subordinated to these [humanitarian] considerations.

For the Commission, the question was political, but also economic. By mid-December, the costs had reached well beyond what had been offered from the delegations, originally anticipated at the time of the occupation, or forecast in subsequent revisions. The only money available would be to draw a credit retroactively from the money set aside for the military administration in Bosnia and Hercegovina for 1879. The potential delays only made matters worse. Because the repatriation had started so late, even winter planting was no longer a possibility; because of this refugee families would spend much of the next year on the dole, waiting for harvest. The new Habsburg government, while more effective than the Ottoman administration before it, was still not in a position to accept and process all of the returning refugees. The additional costs for the two provinces were estimated to be 1,359,247fl.

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165 HHStA PA XL, box 208, folder “Sitzungs Protokolle der Comission für die angelegenheiten in Bosnien und der Herzegowina.” 16 XI 1878. Also, HDA Spisi o Bos. Ustanka, box 21, #2709. 19 XII 1878.

166 HHStA PA XL, box 208, folder “Sitzungs Protokolle der Comission für die angelegenheiten in Bosnien und der Herzegowina.” 16 XI 1878.

167 HHStA PA XL, box 208, folder “Sitzungs Protokolle der Comission für die angelegenheiten in Bosnien und der Herzegowina.” 17 XII 1878.

168 HHStA PA XL, box 208, folder “Sitzungs Protokolle der Comission für die angelegenheiten in Bosnien und der Herzegowina.” 23 I 1879.
solution was to saddle the new provinces with the costs by charging them as provincial
debt to the Habsburg imperial government. It was a bookkeeping trick, and the cost of
three years of refugee aid and repatriation was roughly equivalent to the entire expected
provincial revenues for the coming year.\textsuperscript{169} It was also part of the penny-wise, pound-
foolish thinking that Phillipovich was convinced would undermine the Habsburg political
position in the new provinces. Responding to the Commission’s demand that
humanitarian considerations be subordinated to the necessity of repatriation, he argued
that the Habsburg government had spent three years caring for the refugees for political
and humanitarian reasons, and that if the refugees were to be repatriated in
“circumstances which [would] lead to their certain demise,” it would mean “abandoning
in the last decisive moment the final political success and humanitarian reputation that
[would have been] achieved at the expense of \textit{Guldens}, only in the name of saving
\textit{Kreuzers}.”\textsuperscript{170}

In the last year of the uprising, refugees were a central feature of the diplomatic
wrangling over how to revise the map of Ottoman Europe. The Russian-Ottoman war had
unleashed a wave of refugee movements unparalleled in their size, thereby unveiling a
new model of forced migration and national-territorial change. The events in the eastern
Balkans were an example that Austria-Hungary employed to argue for the necessity of a
Habsburg occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, and they also formed an essential part
of the argument the Habsburg government made to the domestic population.

\textsuperscript{169} Sugar, \textit{Industrialization of Bosnia-Hercegovina 1878-1918}: Appendix.

\textsuperscript{170} HDA Spisi o Bos. Ustanka, box 21, #2709. 19 XII 1878.
were a central consideration in the occupation, and with the establishment of the transitional government, returning and resettling refugees was a key element of the Habsburg efforts to legitimize their rule in the occupied territories.
Conclusion

The Ottoman Empire and Austria-Hungary did not completely settle diplomatic matters over Bosnia and Hercegovina until April 1879, as the final repatriation process was drawing to a close. Last-minute negotiations in Berlin to obtain Ottoman permission for an occupation had resulted in a secret agreement that guaranteed the occupation would not diminish the sovereign rights of the Sultan, that the occupation would not be permanent, and that the details of the occupation were to be agreed in a separate treaty.¹ Furthermore it was agreed the Ottomans would not make these terms public.² For the most part, subsequent negotiations for the separate agreement on the occupation revolved around a Habsburg military presence in the strategically-located Sancak of Novi Pazar, and whether Austria-Hungary would be willing to include an explicit statement on the provisional nature of its presence in Bosnia and Hercegovina.³

As freighted as these questions were with Great Power strategizing and Ottoman concerns over sovereignty, solutions were found—even if only on paper. The remarkable thing about the Ottoman-Habsburg convention of 21 April 1878, however, was that it once again kicked the resolution of a population question further down the road. Article VI read simply “The question of the treatment of the inhabitants of Bosnia and


²Ibid.

³Ibid., 262-89.
Herzegovina sojourning or travelling outside these provinces, shall be regulated subsequently by a special arrangement.”

The convention explicitly assured that “the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in no way [affects] the rights of Sovereignty of his Imperial Majesty the Sultan over these provinces [...].” Yet the heart of the disagreement actually was about sovereignty, as framed with regard to population. Austria-Hungary insisted that Bosnians and Hercegovinians be considered in light of the capitulations—that is, when traveling elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire, the principle of extra-territoriality would hold, and they would be subject to Habsburg, not Ottoman law. One reason for this was that Austria-Hungary wanted individuals who had taken up arms against the Habsburg occupation regime to stand trial before a Habsburg court, and to guard against the possibility Ottoman authorities might not hold them accountable. From the Ottoman standpoint, the claim contradicted the Habsburg’s recognition of Sultanic sovereignty, and the capitulations did not apply to a population still technically Ottoman. The potential repercussions of accepting the capitulations were serious. The Sultan was unwilling to countenance the possibility that a Muslim Ottoman subject might be found guilty in a Habsburg court and sit in an Austro-Hungarian prison. He worried that the many Bosnians in the bureaucracy and in the harem might be held to Habsburg law. And he wondered, since the Habsburgs recognized the kadi courts in Bosnia and Hercegovina,

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4 Hertslet, *The Map of Europe by Treaty; Showing the Various Political and Territorial Changes Which Have Taken Place Since the General Peace of 1814*, 4: 2857.

5 Ibid., 2855.

6 HHStA PAXII box 258, Liasse VI/1 1879 I-V. Andrásy to Zichy, 23 III 1879

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why should Muslim residents have access to that system when at home, but not when they leave Bosnia and Hercegovina?\(^7\)

In the margins of a later, undated Habsburg document that discusses a resolution to the status of Bosnians and Hercegovinians, an official scrawled “did it happen?”\(^8\) The answer appears to be no, a supplemental agreement never was signed; indeed, it seems the subject was dropped entirely. Certainly there were reasons to come to terms over the legal status of Bosnians and Hercegovinians elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire. Bosnians and Hercegovinians—not all of them Muslims—began to leave for other parts of the Ottoman Empire as soon as the Habsburg occupation began, and the emigration continued throughout the period of the occupation. Justin McCarthy suggests the Muslim population of Bosnia and Hercegovina dropped by over 200,000 from 1870 to 1879—about one third of the Muslim population—and estimates that about 20% of the Muslim population died over the same period.\(^9\) Kemal Karpat argues that 80-100,000 Muslims left Bosnia and Hercegovina for the Ottoman Empire during 1878-1912.\(^10\) A reckless and brutal Habsburg army crackdown on Muslims only encouraged further emigration.

Emigration was not a desired effect of the occupation, however; in fact, Habsburg planning as well as discourse clearly counted on a Muslim population. In part, retaining a Muslim population was an administrative question: preserving the provincial elite was a

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\(^7\) HHStA PAXII box 258, Liasse VI/1 1879 I-V. Zichy to Andrásy, 11 III 1879

\(^8\) HHStA PAXII box 258, Liasse VI/1 1879 I-V. 1879


\(^10\) Karpat, “The Migration of the Bosnian Muslims to the Ottoman State, 1878-1914: an Account Based on Turkish Sources.”
necessary and important tactic for re-establishing provincial affairs. Waking the Muslim peasantry from their dark slumber was an attractive and righteous goal for the new Habsburg civilizing mission. But the issue went further than that, and the Habsburg Empire’s ability to maintain a Muslim population in the new provinces was the litmus test for its ability to rule. The bureaucratic expression of the need to maintain a Muslim population went well beyond the Habsburg Empire’s investment in cultural, religious, and educational institutions in the provinces: through to the early years of the twentieth century, Habsburg consular officials in Anatolia repeatedly tried to organize returns of Bosnians and Hercegovinians, and were frequently asked to help those who wanted to return.\footnote{See the many documents on this in HHStA Gesandtschaftsarchiv, box 439 Constantinople 1878-1908, B3 and B3a.}

The Ottoman response to this emigration was mixed, but confirms the general shape of imperial population politics, even while drawing off the long Ottoman tradition of settling Muslims in border provinces. Although the council of ministers wanted to help Muslims escape Habsburg rule, it also recognized that preserving a Muslim population was essential to maintaining Ottoman claims for sovereignty in the provinces; furthermore, it would limit Habsburg possibilities for colonization.\footnote{Karpat, “The Migration of the Bosnian Muslims to the Ottoman State, 1878-1914: an Account Based on Turkish Sources.”} By 1904, the Ottoman government had suspended the issuance of residency permits for Bosnian and Hercegovinians looking to move elsewhere in the empire.\footnote{HHStA Gesandtschaftsarchiv, box 439 Constantinople 1878-1908, B3a “Bosnien 1883-1905,” 6 VIII 1904.} Ultimately, despite the large-scale flight of Muslims, a large number of them returned as well. Proportionate to the size of the Muslim population, emigration from Bosnia and Hercegovina was the smallest
among the Balkan states, and return migration was the largest. Moreover, the process continued even after Austria-Hungary formally annexed the provinces in 1908: With the outbreak of the Balkan Wars, thousands of Bosnian and Hercegovinian emigrants living elsewhere in the Ottoman Balkans sought safety in returning to Austro-Hungarian Bosnia and Hercegovina.

The Habsburg occupation did not bring neat closure to the refugee question in Croatia-Slavonia and Dalmatia, either. Orphans and possible orphans continued to be a big problem. Many stayed in Croatia immediately after the occupation, but were ultimately returned to the new provinces regardless of whether they had family there or not. Foreign do-gooders were involved to some extent, especially with the help of the local philanthropist Ilija Guteša. Both Paulina Irby and Guteša found themselves in awkward positions after the occupation, too. While Irby remained in Bosnia, she stood under constant surveillance as someone who had “intimate relationships with Belgrade and St. Petersburg” and was an “active agent of that English politics that under the leadership of Gladstone has promoted Russian interests.” Guteša’s situation was equally awkward. When the last commander of the Military Border left Zagreb in 1881, he sent a note of thanks to Guteša for all of his good work, especially in helping the refugees from Bosnia and Hercegovina. At the same time, however, after the occupation

14 Karpat, “The Migration of the Bosnian Muslims to the Ottoman State, 1878-1914: an Account Based on Turkish Sources.”


16 See for example HDA UOZV box 464, 27916. 5 XII 1880.

took place Guteša was never given permission to enter or travel in the two new provinces.\textsuperscript{18}

This dissertation has focused narrowly on a group of Christian refugees who fled the Ottoman Empire for the Habsburg Empire during 1875-1878. Their flight was a prelude to and testimony of the violence that would spread across the Balkans during those years, and force a fundamental redrawing of the peninsula’s political geography in 1878. Their flight also came at a time of rising—yet far from coherent—nationalist sentiment. To be sure, this was a Europe-wide phenomenon, but in the Balkans, where a relatively narrow elite class was actively and aggressively trying to nationalize Christian populations living under Ottoman rule, the “national struggle” had the potential for violence, and the violence drew the interests and influences of outside groups—other states for certain, but also non-state actors, be they volunteer soldiers, agitators, or foreign “humanitarians.” The period is often spoken of with reference to the “national aspirations” of various groups or principalities such as Serbia. In fact, what is most remarkable in the case of Bosnia and Hercegovina is both the population’s resistance to external nationalist agitation, and also the stubborn persistence of the imperial imaginary. There were of course calls for independence, or for the merging of the provinces in whole or in part with their neighbors. Yet until very late in the period, leaders of the uprising and their spokesmen demanded reforms and some form of autonomy within the Ottoman Empire, not independence from it. Among the refugees the sentiment is less clear. Certainly reports to Vienna included testimonies from refugees who said they would not return until the provinces were Habsburg; how representative this was of broader sentiment is

\textsuperscript{18} DAZG, Osobni Fond Guteša Ilija, box 1, 20. V III 1881.
impossible to determine, although there is plenty of evidence of voluntary refugee return, even if it was only temporary.

We are accustomed to thinking of nation-states drawing their legitimacy from their citizenry. Especially in the Balkans, where the process involved chipping away at empire rather than Italo-Germanic agglutination, we are also accustomed to thinking of nation-state formation as involving processes for which there are numerous felicitous phrases: “death and exile,” the “unmixing of peoples,” “ethnic cleansing.” I would suggest that in the face of these murderous processes, it was maintaining the mixed and the dirty, the entangled populations, that served as a marker of legitimate imperial rule. For the Ottomans this was certainly the case with specific regard to Bosnia and Hercegovina. Troubles for Ottoman Christians meant international trouble for the Ottoman Empire, Treaty of Paris agreement on non-intervention notwithstanding. At the same time, the steady loss of the Ottoman Christian population and the concentration of its Muslim population challenged the empire’s self-conception and helped to provoke, under Abdülhamid, domestic crises of legitimacy. Population was a marker for “multi-ethnic” Austria-Hungary, as well, and in Bosnia and Hercegovina, the Habsburg Empire found refugee populations to be domestically destabilizing, but internationally almost opportune—in the eyes of Andrásy and others, the Habsburg ability to return the refugees could be claimed as reason enough for an occupation. From this standpoint, the subsequent departure of Bosnian Muslims was disastrous. There were of course daunting questions of Great Power politics at play, and these surely did much to define the course of events during the Eastern Crisis. The refugees from Bosnia and Hercegovina were not an Ottoman problem, they were a systemic problem. At issue was not just the question of
the legitimacy of Ottoman rule in Bosnia and Hercegovina, but the legitimacy of the imperial system more broadly.

Given the size of the refugee movements in question, and the technologies that could be brought to bear on the refugee problem, it is not surprising that this period also saw the creation of new, bureaucratized systems of refugee aid and control. The management of refugee populations was as much about controlling movement as it was about meeting refugees’ existential needs. To chart the development and extent of these systems is to chart how decisions are made about people and who is included or excluded. Habsburg refugee management techniques included forced sedentarization and mandatory disarmament as part of a broader approach designed to neutralize any threat the refugees might pose. These patterns were then recapitulated in the repatriation agreements between the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires. Relations between local and foreign humanitarians furthered this process of classifying and categorizing in a similar manner, but the repercussions could be felt in other directions: the meeting of foreign and local philanthropists also resulted in a struggle over what the meaning of humanitarianism actually was and, again, to what extent victimhood would be the exclusive category for definition. The struggles over definitions and meaning were of course very contingent and the definitions were unstable at the time. That, at least, remains true: the dilemmas of humanitarian aid and the meaning of refugeedom are still open topics.
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