Penser les Conflits Locaux: L'Échec de l'Intervention Internationale au Congo
This chapter takes stock of the international intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo in order to explain why it failed to end violence in the eastern provinces. Based on field observations in the Congo, document analysis and over 330 interviews, it demonstrates that massive violence continued between 2003 and 2008 in part because of the presence of local conflict. The international actors left these local tensions to fester because they perceived them as a consequence of broader problems and as a humanitarian issue. International actors thus focused on national and regional reconciliation, especially through the organization of "free and fair elections," and they passed onto each other the responsibility of working on violence at the local level. They paid attention to local issues only in case of shocking events or when they realized that micro and macro tensions were linked. As a result, they neglected many critical local conflicts, which regularly erupted into major crises.
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Also Published In
- L'Afrique des Grands Lacs: 12, Annuaire 2007-2008
More About This Work
- Academic Units
- Political Science (Barnard College)
- Published Here
- March 6, 2012
Preferred citation: Severine Autesserre, “Penser les Conflits Locaux: L’Échec de l’Intervention Internationale au Congo (Understanding Local Conflicts: the Failure of the International Intervention in the Congo)," L’Afrique des Grands Lacs: Annuaire 2007-2008, Paris: L’Harmattan, pp. 179-196, 2008.