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Room assignment-rent division: A market approach

Abdulkadiroglu, Atila; Sonmez, Tayfun; Unver, M. Utku

A group of friends consider renting a house but they shall first agree on how to allocate its rooms and share the rent. We propose an auction mechanism for room assignment-rent division problems which mimics the market mechanism. Our auction mechanism is efficient, envy-free, individually-rational and it yields a non-negative price to each room whenever that is possible with envy-freeness.

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Academic Units
Economics
Publisher
Department of Economics, Columbia University
Series
Department of Economics Discussion Papers, 0102-11
Published Here
March 22, 2011

Notes

February 2002

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