Academic Commons

Reports

The relation between implementability and the core

Miyagawa, Eiichi

This paper proves a simple and general theorem on resource-allocation mechanisms that achieve Pareto efficiency. We say that a mechanism (game form) is normal if at any action profile, an agent who obtains his endowments neither pays nor receives a positive amount. In the context of auctions, this simply means that losers receive no bill. We prove that for any normal mechanism, if its Nash equilibrium allocations are Pareto efficient for all preference profiles, then the equilibrium allocations are necessarily in the core. The result holds for a large class of allocation problems in which monetary transfers are feasible and the consumption space is discrete except for the space of transfers. Examples include auctions with any number of objects, economies with indivisible public goods, marriage problems, and coalition formation.

Subjects

Files

More About This Work

Academic Units
Economics
Publisher
Department of Economics, Columbia University
Series
Department of Economics Discussion Papers, 0102-64
Published Here
March 23, 2011

Notes

June 2002