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Cores of non-atomic market games

Amarante, Massimiliano; Maccheroni, Fabio; Marinacci, M.; Montrucchio, L.

We study the cores of non-atomic market games, a class of transferable utility cooperative games introduced by Aumann and Shapley [2], and, more in general, of those games that admit a na-continuous and concave extension to the set of ideal coalitions, studied by Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz [12]. We show that the core of such games is norm compact and we provide some representation results. We also give a Multiple Priors interpretation of some of our results.We study the cores of non-atomic market games, a class of transferable utility cooperative.

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Academic Units
Economics
Publisher
Department of Economics, Columbia University
Series
Department of Economics Discussion Papers, 0506-10
Published Here
March 25, 2011

Notes

October 2005