Religious Parties in the Political Systems of Pakistan and Israel
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1. Political Legitimation and Ideology

The relationship between religion, politics and the nation-state is in this paper closely linked to the principles that create political legitimation and the basic character of a state. The analysis of this entanglement seems to be necessary, especially due to the popular belief that in the light of the de-colonization process Pakistan and Israel, after 1947 and 1948, represent the sole states that after a legacy of British rule came into existence on the basis of religion or rather, only because of their religion. This paper is to identify the main principles of legitimation understood as the state's ideology on which these states were originally based but at the same time generated intrinsic tensions for their future development. Further, the framework that allows religion to play an essential role not only in the state's ideological setup but also in society and politics will be defined. Two main factors might illustrate these tensions. Firstly, the concepts of statehood of the movement that promoted the creation of the state defined its legitimacy as the dominant agency from the pre-state period to the state formation until the establishment of power structures in which it implemented its agenda. Mullahs and rabbis as “potential rulemakers” were accommodated by the cultural mechanism of consensus regarding the essence of state legitimacy as a state that had been founded on the basis of universalistic principles, providing different legal frameworks and institutions of law that – in terms of democratic freedom and equality - apply to all citizens. Simultaneously, particularistic national-religious elements represent a historical and doctrinal continuity with traditions of Judaism and Islam. The basic duality of particularism and universalism inherent in Judaism and Islam has been reproduced in the making of the states and is incorporated into the foundations of statehood.

1 Data used in this paper is in parts drawn from interviews conducted during fieldwork, supported by Konrad Adenauer Foundation, in Pakistan and India (June 2008 and June to August 2009) and Israel/Palestinian Territories (December 2009 to January 2010) with representatives of political and religious parties, non-parliamentary wings, civil bureaucracy, governmental think tanks, faith-based organizations/NGOs, military, media and diplomats, scholars and intellectuals.

2 Apart from this vague image of confessional artificial ‘twin-states’, with the exception of one article there has been no systematic comparative analysis until now. See Kumaraswamy, P. R.: The Strangely Parallel Careers of Israel and Pakistan. In: The Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 4, Nr. 2, 1997.

Politically, the mechanism of power sharing aimed at integrate the religious sector to a limited degree into the political culture in order to maintain social control. Secondly, this specific political, cultural and ideological framework and the impact of nationalism respectively its ability to subvert and integrate religion in its ideological setting had been conceived more in secular, rather than religious terms by their leaders who were supposed to be personally irreligious. Nonetheless, the religious repertoire as part of the civic culture has been mobilized by the governmental sector and religious groups for different reasons. A state that came into being on the basis of religious nationalism raises a series of complex questions regarding the definition of ‘citizenship’ and its specific boundaries and requirements for substantive participation: ‘Who is a Muslim?’ and ‘who is a Jew?’ and because of this a legally full-privileged citizen of the state, that grants considerable privileges to specific segments of its Muslim or Jewish majority population. Issues touching the most intimate and individual level of citizenship – marriage, divorce, prayers in public spaces etc. - often arise from disputes between different religious schools of thought. These theologic and intellectual discourses mark significant sectarian lines between religious groups. Because of the lack of a central religious authority and a codified religious legal corpus, that is accepted by all religious groups and sects, a vacuum of interpretation provides ground for various doctrines.

2. State and Religious Sector

In order to reflect the second dimension, the following will discuss the main determinants of religion in the state and what role religious parties play in this discourse. Until the states of Pakistan and Israel had been proclaimed independent on 14 August 1947 and 14 May 1948, the political processes that lead to these events, had been the arena in which various groups tried to implement their conceptualizations for the new states competing against each other. Facing the realities of the new established states, the religious parties had to re-think their position towards the new political elite.

2.1 Pakistan

In Pakistan, the process of constitution making lasted until 1973. Until that time, the majority of the

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4 The character of a state's civic culture refers to several factors such as class, gender, race, caste, region, ethnicity, religion etc. that can represent politically salient concepts for shared identities or can be the markers generating the basis for separation and conflict. Similarly, ‘political culture’ can be characterized as a process of transforming ideas, institutions and values between state and society into modernity and is accompanied by ‘cultural secularization’. Though the concept of ‘civic culture’ shares the assumption that a political culture is participative and pre-dominantly secular, it is inseparably intertwined with ‘non-secular positions and belief systems' and seems therefore more adequate in this study. Cit. Seitz, Werner: Die politische Kultur und ihre Beziehung zum Abstimmungsverhalten. Eine Begriffsgeschichte und Methodenkritik. Zürich: Realotopia, 1997, p. 93. Regarding the political and social stability of state-society relations, civic culture represents the ideal type of congruency between modernity and tradition to maximize stability and state integrity. See Gabriel Almond / Verba, Sidney (Eds.): The Civic Culture. Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Newbury Park: Sage Publ., (1963) 1989, pp. 13/14.
religious scholars (‘ulamā’) had supported the nationalist movement of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, that promoted the new state of Pakistan. The stumbling block in the discourse on how Pakistan came into existence is the two-fold legacy that was based, firstly, on the belief that the preservation and development of Muslim culture and economy would not be achieved in a Hindu-dominated post-colonial India (Two-Nations-Theory) and, secondly, on a semi-religious philosophy that, pioneered by Muhammad Iqbal and Jinnah, offered the ground for what Aziz calls ‘a national belief’. Though religiously inspired or at least mobilizing Islamic symbols, ideas and slogans – searching for historical continuity of the Muslims on the sub-continent, neither the advocates of the Pakistan Movement nor their opponents offered an inclusive concept of Islam in the state: 'Who is to determine a nation’s Islamic path- the head of state, bureaucrats, the `ulema, intellectuals?'

What crystallized out as a master narrative suggests that the right of self-determination as a fundamental right of all human beings was the basic idea behind the paradigm of two primordial nations, each searching for its own path of self-determination. Hence, partition as a consequence of the concept of Two-Nations was an imperative for the Muslim leadership to exercise this right and „to help the two nations, the Hindus and the Muslims, to live in peace and harmony.“ According to this argumentation, the Hindu majority in the Indian National Congress refused to collaborate with the leadership of Tehrik-e-Pakistan (Pakistan Movement/ Freedom Movement) who gained constitutional guaranties for the Muslim minority in a united India. The decision for partition and the creation of Pakistan was therefore an act of 'self-defense' against the various attempts to create a Hindu hegemony in India.

History writing on the sub-continent and numerous works of Western scholars that have evolved around the events of partition and independence have cultivated a biased academic discourse:

Historiography on Pakistan, inclusive of themes such as the debate on Muslim identity, the struggle for independence, the relationship between the centre and the provinces, the uneven in-

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terface between state and civil society or the country’s external relationships, especially with India, has tended to be Islamic-centric. Pakistani and other observers, in their own separate ways, have tried to disentangle the problematic of Islam both in the achievement and the subsequent nation-building project.\(^9\)

The fundamental question, whether the Father of the Nation, himself a Western-educated Shia, intended to design Pakistan as a secular state or as a state with a dominant role of religion, can not satisfactorily be answered since his intellectual legacy, mainly his speeches, leaves much room for interpretation. Therefore, the political and private life of Mohammad Ali Jinnah has become a matter of considerable debate that had been initiated by Bolitho's *Jinnah, Creator of Pakistan*, published and sponsored by the Government of Pakistan in 1950 and culminated recently when in 2009 the expulsion of the Indian BJP politician Jaswant Singh from the party followed his *Jinnah: India-Partition. Independence*, in which he lauded Jinnah as a 'good Indian' in contrast to the pro-partition stance of Jawaharlal Nehru.\(^10\)

Among different theories focusing more on the political process that resulted in the creation of Pakistan, Hamza Alavi’s salariat theory should be taken into account, claiming that the Pakistan Movement was not a purely religious movement, but represented a consensus of diverse Muslim ethnic groups, more in pursuit of explicit material goals, which Jinnah had to compromise. To include these “diverse Muslim ethnic groups from different regions of India, representing different social strata and interests”\(^11\) was a political demand to gain a stable basis of support. This backbone of 'Muslim nationalism' was mainly constituted by those strata of Indian colonial society, that as urban professionals were supposed to be integrated in the colonial state apparatus. Before they joined Jinnah, they had experienced Indian nationalist ideas and claimed more representative self-government. Based on regional ethnic identities, especially the Punjab, Bengal and Uttar Pradesh salariat supported the Movement under the banner of a Muslim identity which lost its legitimacy as soon as the state was founded. Most dominantly involved was the salariat of Punjab which is until now overrepresented in military and civil-bureaucracy in contrast to the Bengali salariats that were under-represented when the state was established.\(^12\) The dynamic of Muslim nationalism as an integ-

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12 Ibid., pp. 24-27.
rating force that, with the support of the salariat, eventually ensured the political survival of a small elitist group as against other groups (e.g. Unionist Party), lost its mobilizing power and an Islamic Ideology was promoted as the amalgam between a Weltanschauung of a primordial Muslim nation and its religious traditions:

The state [...] should create such conditions as are most conducive to translating the idea-system – that is, their cherished ideals – into social action. It should help in building a 'good society', like the Greeks – except that this society has to be based upon the Islamic value-system, the system which Pakistanis fervidly believe in. The state should thus help its people in leading the Islamic way of life.13

This diffuse concept of Islamic or Pakistan Ideology (Nazariya-e-Pakistan) is until today part of a legal and political debate that frequently arises on the basis of the Constitution of 197314, where the notion of Pakistan Ideology in reference to Art. 2 (Islam as state religion) and Art. 227 (Quran and Sunnah) tends to be interpreted as an affirmation of the state's pure Islamic character by some religious-political parties whereas, more on an individual basis, other parliamentarians claim to define the concrete character of this ideology in terms of its democratic, modernist and secular character.15

As far as the representatives of religious groups and their stance to the movement are concerned, one has to differentiate between the groups and their inner disputes whether to join or to refuse Jinnah's party: “Practically every Muslim group and organization in the Indian subcontinent that was specifically religious – Islamic – was hostile to Jinnah and the Muslim League, and strongly opposed the Pakistan movement”16, is an arguable statement but is still of relevance when taking into consideration that when the state of Pakistan became reality – like almost all political parties – religious parties had to accept its civic culture. In order to uphold the legitimacy which was needed to participate in the political process, the commitment to the “ideas and ideals of Quaid-e-Azam”, who died in 1948, was obligatory.17 This created a serious dilemma for those factions who had opposed Jinnah during the pre-state era: Basically Jama'at-e Islami, whose amir and founder, Mawlana Mawdudi, had not hidden his hostile attitude towards the idea of a territorial nationalism in contrast to the transnational concept of the ummah, made several attempts to revise its past.18 Since the re-

16 Cit. Ibid, p. 21.
sponse of the Muslim masses to the programme of the movement was very poor – in the elections of 1936/37, All India Muslim League was defeated disastrously - the leadership tried to win the support of the religious groups of the different schools of thought and involved the ‘ulamâ’, masha’ikh and pirs for their potential of mobilizing members of the traditional religious institutions. The religious scholars purposed the legal implementation of Islam in the new independent state. On their first political platform, the All India Sunni Conference (1925), Brelwi ‘ulama’ voted for the support of Jinnah's platform, campaigned for the League and issued *fatawa* in favour of the League candidates.\(^{19}\) In contrast to this, the official political body of the Deobandis, Jam‘iyyat al ‘Ulama’-e Hind (JUH), joined the Congress in 1940 and supported the idea of a 'Composite Nationalism' (*Mut-tahida Qawmiyyat*), that promoted a collective position of Hindus, Muslims and minorities towards the British, gaining a united India. This was a reaction to the League's Lahore Resolution (1940) that demanded a constitutional rearrangement, arguing Indian Muslims to be considered as a nation rather than a minority.\(^{20}\)

After independence, nevertheless, the question of the role of religion in Pakistan was not yet answered during the constitution-making years between 1947-1956. The Constituent Assembly drafted the Objective Resolution in 1949, where democratic principles should be followed according to Islamic values and principles. A 22-points Islamic program, agreed on by 31 ‘ulamâ’ of different factions was presented to the political leadership but it remained unclear how to legally integrate these points into a modern constitution. In 1956, Field Marshall Ayub Khan passed a constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Only six years later the power of the religious opposition became obvious, when Ayub withdrew the title 'Islamic' in order to design a secular image of the country in the light of the Cold War, where both ideological blocs tried to win allies in the Third World. Not only had Ayub to reinstate the Islam label in 1963, moreover, the religious parties mobilized country-wide protest against his regime activating again the 'religious card' under the slogan “Stop innovation!”\(^{21}\).

But it was during the presidency of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, when in 1973 the 'Islamic' Constitution was


\(^{20}\) 'Muslim nationalism' was supported by a small faction of ‘ulama’ who had split off from JUH. See Pirzada, Sayyid A. S.: The Politics of the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford Univ. Press, 2000, p. 2ff.

\(^{21}\) The protests were the response to the attempts of Ayub to modernize and secularize the academic institutions and to introduce an Islamic system of birth control (Muslim Family Law Ordinance (MFLO), 15 July, 1961). See Jaffrelot, Christophe (Ed.): Le Pakistan. Paris: Fayard, 2000, p. 127.
passed, trying to appease the religious sector by a specific framework whereby all laws had to be in conformity with the injunctions of Islam. The Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) was the advisory body that suggests until today recommendations on religious matters to the political leadership. It was at that time when Bhutto responded to the pressure of the religious parties and declared the community of the Ahmadiyya as non-muslims and began to promote his 'Islamic Socialism'. This new design of Islam alienated not only the US-administration that feared a pro-Communist Pakistan but also the religious parties that, with the support of the army, set up a joint opposition, Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), against the 'un-islamic' Bhutto regime in 1977. The coup d'etat of General Zia ul-Haq that followed the same year, was applauded at least by the leaders of JI and JUI, Mawlana Mawdudi and Mufti Mahmud. Zia, himself a puristic believer – referred to as 'our fundamentalist friend in Islamabad' by the CIA staff that cooperated with him during the Afghan Jihad against the Soviet Union\(^\text{22}\) - saw the founding of Pakistan as the fulfillment of a religiously motivated idea and therefore made Islam the essence of the state: “Pakistan is like Israel, an ideological state. Take out the Judaism from Israel and it will fall like a house of cards. Take Islam out of Pakistan and make it a secular state; it would collapse.”\(^\text{23}\) Some delegates of JI played a crucial role in Zia's cabinet, and were actively involved into the planning of Islamization (\textit{Nizam-i-Mustafa}).\(^\text{24}\) The successor of Mawlana Mawdudi and new amir of JI, Mian Tufail Mohammad who was born in the same village and belonged, like Zia, to the tribe of the Ara'in Bara-dari became a willing partner and profiteer of the military regime. As the extended arm of Islamabad's regional strategic agenda, the JI and a faction of JUI, backed by the military government and the security apparatus, could expand their educational infrastructure and set-up a belt of religious schools (\textit{dini madaris}), seminaries and mosques in the north-western tribal area (NWFP) alongside the Afghan border. These institutions became effective centers of Sunni religious teaching but dwarfed the infrastructure linked to the brelwi movement and the Shia. In the strategic framework of the Afghanistan War, this effective Sunni-belt became the recruiting pool for volunteer fighters that soon were involved in what was called a \textit{jihad} for the first time by the Pakistani \textit{‘ulama’} Mawlana 'Abdul Haq and Mawlna Mufti Mahmud (JUI).\(^\text{25}\)

The religious parties of Pakistan were seen more as strategic tools in domestic parliament and 'cam-


\(^{24}\) For instance Kurshid Ahmad, Chairman of the Institute of Policy Studies, an influential think tank of JI, former Minister of Planning and Development, served as a Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission from 1978 to 1979.

pus politics' and the regional agenda, e.g. during the Afghan War and in Kashmere, rather than seri-
ous competitors in the political game. The strategy of governmental support for selected religious
groups under the era of Zia, that ended in 1988, was continued by subsequent governments.

2.2 Israel
The Zionist groups that were committed to the idea of a territorial and political Jewish state were
not only predominantly secular, but they emphasized the demand to radically break with traditional
Judaism and the period of exile, associated with the stereotype of the 'Ghetto Jew'. Only the estab-
lishment of a state for the Jewish people could guarantee for the protection against repressions and
antisemitism. 'Leaving the Ghetto' of Europe and settling land was the amalgam that had held the
various Zionist groups together since not only the question where the Jewish State was to be foun-
ded divided the different camps.26

The Zionists of the World Zionist Organization (WZO) had ever been confronted by the European
Orthodoxy, that refused the idea of a Jewish nation-state, built by human hands before the interven-
tion of the Messiah – “Our nation is a nation only through its Torah”27. In this respect, the cultural
Zionism of Achad Ha'am aimed at forming a new Hebrew cultural framework for the immigrants to
Palestine. Arts, language, academia and literature were the grounds on which a new type of Hebrew
self-understanding – the Hebrew 'Muscle Jew' - emerged. This clear distinction between secular and
religious perished, when a minority of rabbis joined the Zionist project and religious Zionism was
invented. From the orthodox point of view, this form combined the requirements of tradition and of
the political ideology of creating a state for Jews in Palestine without contradiction.28 In regard to
the messianic element of traditional Orthodox thought, a new dynamic became acute when during
the 1920's, the chief rabbi of the Yeshuv (Jewish community in Palestine) Abraham Yitzhak HaCo-
hen Cook (1865-1937) declared the Zionist endeavor and the desired Jewish state a pre-stage on the
way to redemption and the advent of the Messiah. This messianic conception of the state as “God's
presence in the world” and other teachings of Rabbi Cook strongly influenced the emergence of re-
ligious Zionist groups and the settler movement after the Six-Days-War (1967).

Until that war the monopoly on religious issues had been maintained by the Ashkenazi Haredim.
Twenty years earlier, in the discourse on the political legitimation of the state, the role of Judaism

27 Cit. Saadia Gaon, in: Dieckhoff, Alain: The Invention of a Nation. Zionist Thought and the Making of Modern Is-
and its expression had become a practical matter since many Zionist leaders, involved in the negotiations in the light of independence, led by Ben-Gurion, agreed on the point that Judaism needed to be formalized but advocated a strict division between state and religion. Others voted for the implementation of Halacha as the guiding and legitimizing principle of the state. The religious-political groups, basically represented by the Ashkenazi Agudat Yisrael, demanded the perpetuation of the status quo of the Yeshuv – religious jurisdiction, including matters of personal status (marriage, divorce) would continue to be directed by the Chief Rabbinate under Jewish halachic law. In return for political support, Ben-Gurion accepted further demands regarding Sabbath, Kashrut laws, autonomy of religious education and representation in the High Court.

The period from 1977 to 1996 illustrated not only a deeper involvement of religious issues in domestic and foreign policy but also deep struggles within the religious parties vis-à-vis their ideological and ethnic setup and religious leadership and the competition between the national-religious (religious-Zionist) and the ultra-orthodox bloc. This competition became obvious when the religious-political landscape was more and more fragmented by splits and mergers. The diversification caused by the rise of new competitors in the religious sector is most impressively illustrated by the emergence of Shas in 1984: The autonomy of the religious education system, which is run independently of the state school system, but with state funds, and veto power on religious legislation had always been part of coalition agreements which in return implied a non-involvement in the government's decision on war and peace. Especially in the Ashkenazi-dominated Haredi world, the newcomers from Edot HaMitzrach - the entire orthodox and non-orthodox Oriental Jewish community from Northern Africa and the Middle East - were soon perceived as a serious threat as they claimed the same political benefits in return for joining the ruling coalition. NRP and its ultra-orthodox counterparts Agudat Yisrael (Ashkenazi Chassidic stream), Degal HaTorah (Ashkenazi Lithuanian stream) and Shas also shared substantial power in various ministries as well as eco-

29 The Judges Act of Knesset was adopted in 1953.
31 Tami (1981) and Matzad (1984) split from NRP and rejoined in 1988. Traditionally, though mixed in its ranks, NRP is more Ashkenazi-oriented. More significant was the split of Shas from Agudat Yisrael in 1984 which was a Sephardic response to the Ashkenazi dominance predominantly for ethnic reasons. Later, in 1992, the two Ashkenazi parties, Aguda together with Degel HaTorah, formed United Torah Judaism (UTJ).
33 Beside the new political arrangement of the religious bloc, the supremacy of Ashkenazi orthodox scholarship which was based on the traditional education system of the Yeshiva, formed in Eastern Europe, had to compromise with an emerging Sephardic scholarship. See The Jerusalem Post International Ed.: Rising Star, April 22-28, 1984.
34 Agudat Yisrael and Degel HaTorah represent the traditional Eastern European (Ashkenazi) Haredi society. Until 1990, when the two streams united in the Knesset, they were historical rivals, due to different religious clashes between their leaders (Rebbe, Rav). At that time, their spiritual leader from the smaller Lithuanian wing, Rabbi...
conomic and political institutions. In this context, the control of the Ministry of Religious Affairs as well as the implementation of Israel's Chief Rabbinate - constituted by an Ashkenazi and a Sephardi Rabbi - became main issues in religious politics.\textsuperscript{35}

From 1996 onwards, a change within the religious parties, and the rise of a new generation of politicians can be identified within the groups' hierarchies. Although Israel has ever been an immigration state and “melting pot”, the increased number of Jews from the former Soviet Union arriving in Israel during the 1990's challenged the state's potential in terms of the immigrants' absorption and socioeconomic integration. Avigdor Lieberman, who immigrated from Moldova to Israel in 1978 and soon entered political life in the Likud created a political representation of the Russian immigrants when he founded Yisrael Beitenu in 1999. In the very same year the party took four seats in the Fifteenth Knesset. The electoral success of Yisrael Beitenu - similar to the rise of Shas - demonstrated the power of identity and ethnic politics and the loyalty of Israel's marginalized communities. Traditional constituencies of the National Religious Party and the right-wing list Ichud Leumi, especially among the settlers, were attracted by Lieberman's secular nationalist program. Finally, when Lieberman became Foreign Minister in the Netanyahu cabinet after the elections in 2009, the overlapping of secular and religious concepts of nationalism in the parties' agendas became apparent.\textsuperscript{36} The Second Intifada (Al-Aqsa Intifada, 2000-2005) provoked a political turn in Israel's national security and policies and spurred new areas of conflict between elements of the religious right and the Israeli state that culminated with the Gaza disengagement in 2005 and tightened a new cleavage in Israel's society based on different interpretations of the territorial issue. Earlier, from 1978 to 1982, this climate of confrontation between a geo-theological reasoning on the one hand versus a logic, based on national security as well as diplomatic concerns on the other hand had materialized in the protests against the Sinai withdrawal and again, in 2009, affected the decision by the Netanyahu government for a freeze of settlements.

The national-religious camp which is on the political level represented by the National Religious Party (NRP)- today's New Mafdal party HaBayit HaYehudi- since the 1970's, when the Young Generation faction gained control of the party, has used its political power and defined a new party

\textsuperscript{35} Eliezer Shach, was seen by both streams as the ultimate rabbinical authority.

\textsuperscript{36} The current cabinet is with 30 ministers, among them several ministers without portfolio, the largest in the parliamentary history of Israel. Due to what Asher Arian calls the “chaotic nature” of the Israeli political system, the low two-percent qualifying threshold for elections, and therefore a large number of parties and difficulties in forming governments made the distribution of cabinet positions important in coalition deals. Among the religious parties, only Shas and NRP MKs serve in ministerial positions since the Ashkenazi parties traditionally refuse to get involved in the process of political decision making in the Zionist state.
agenda by forcing the settlements in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. Through education and settlements, organizations such as Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful) and the Movement for the Greater Land of Israel, ought to strengthen the Jewish character of the state and have attained many achievements in this specific arena.37

Under Zevulun Hammer and Yehuda Ben Meir, religious leaders of Gush Emunim were placed on the NRP's list of candidates such as Rabbi Chaim Druckman, one of the leading religious authorities in the settlements.38 Druckman represented a generation of orthodox religious scholars who graduated from the Yeshiva Mercaz HaRav, which is considered to be one of the most influential religious institutions in orthodox Judaism. Founded by Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook (1865-1935) - the father of Rabbi Zvi Kook who became the spiritual mentor of Gush Emunim - in 1924 in Jerusalem, the Mercaz and the attitude of its graduates shifted away from an integrative and liberal orthodox view to a hardliner position in regard to the Israeli-Palestinian relations and the settlement policy which they interpreted as a natural and historical right of the “Congregation of Israel”.39 Sharing the coalition with the new elected Likud government of Prime Minister Menachem Begin was for NRP a logical step. In an electoral-based context, the antagonism of weak electoral results and the party's social power become obvious, since NRP decreased in popularity from an initial success in 1977 with twelve seats to a power loss in 1984 with only four seats.40

When the right-wing Likud, including the former Herut party, entered the political game and three decades of Labor rule ended, Begin proceeded to implement ideological elements of the Revisionist Zionists' framework41 into what Ilan Peleg considers a “neo-Revionist” framework.42 The Revisionist Movement, an extreme rightist stream within Zionism under the leadership of Vladimir Ze'ev Jabotinsky (1880-1940), ought to protect the Jewish communities in Europe from the threat of anti-

37 Although there are only a few ultra-orthodox settlements in the Westbank, statistics show that the Haredi population in this settlements constitutes 26 percent of the total Jewish settler population (289,600, July 2009) in the Westbank. The Haredi communities in this area are therefore the seconded largest compared to the settlements of national-religious (25 percent), secular (16 percent) and mixed communities (33 percent). See ICG Middle East Report: Israel’s Religious Right and the Question of Settlements. No. 89, 2009, pp. 12-16 and Appendix B, Map of religious composition of settlements, p. 40.
38 See Bradley, 1985, pp. 54-57.
39 For the ideology of Rabbi Zvi Cook and Messianism, see Ravitzky, Aviezer: Messianism, Zionism, and Jewish Religious Radicalism. Chicago (a.o.): The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1996, pp. 80-96.
semitism and was influenced by European nationalism and elements of fascism. As one of Jabotinsky's students and admirers Menachem Begin internalized the paradigm of “building a wall of iron” around the Israeli state. This included the vision of Eretz Yisrael as the expanded Land of Israel dedicated to the Jewish people by God. Politically, the Greater Israel ideology was transformed into an ultra-nationalist agenda and became the core of right-wing foreign politics and a strong component of Israel's military-security setup. Although Likud never had a similar organizational strength possessed by Labor parties and leftist groups, Labor lacked to oppose the strong territorial component of the rightist ideology. The expansion and protection of the land and the call for “tenable borders” became predominant in the elections of 1977: The success of the Arab armies during the first days of Yom Kippur War (6.10.-24.10.1973) created a powerful trauma in the nation's psyche and memory. Large parts of the Israeli public were attracted by the hawkish neo-Revisionist attitude. During his tenures, Begin offered more than just symbolic gestures towards the national-religious right and the ultra-orthodox leadership. Soon, after his election victory he met with Rabbi Zvi Yehuda HaCohen Kook, the spiritual father of Gush Emunim, and Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson, the highest authority of Chabad-Chassidism.

Facing an evident movement of the political system rightward and an ideological radicalization of the Israeli society, the religious-nationalist position of NRP's hardliners towards the settlements became more acceptable for the new political mainstream. Vice versa, the support of the new cabinet for the establishment of new settlements in the Westbank, announced by Begin and the new agriculture minister Ariel Sharon immediately after the elections, was highly appreciated by the settlers of Gush Emunim. Although, a semi-official support for Israeli settlers existed in a similar manner under the rule of Labor before Likud came into power, the national-religious activists' rhetoric against

43 The commitment of Likud leaders to the Revisionist thought and to “one of the intellectual giants in the annals of Zionism” becomes obvious in a number of parliamentary rituals. Cit. Address by PM Benjamin Netanyahu to Knesset Session in Memory of Ze’ev Jabotinsky, July 22, 2009, released by Knesset Publ. Division.

44 According to the memoirs of a student of Kook’s Mercaz HaRav who attended the reception, “he [Begin] came as if to Canossa, as if this man, Tvi Yehuda, was God’s representative. Suddenly the Prime Minister kneels and bows before Tvi Yehuda. Imagine for yourself what all the students standing there and watching this surrealistic scene where thinking.” Cit. in Lustick, 1988, p. 37.

45 Rabbi Schneerson (1902-1996) - referred to by his followers as the “Lubavitcher Rebbe” - although moderate in many aspects of Halachic interpretations, said that evacuation of Jewish land is illegal according to Halachic law.

the demanded withdrawal from the Sinai territory - “not an inch!” - provided a shared oppositional position for religious and secular nationalists to the plan and even polarized the political left. Parallel to the Sinai withdrawal that followed the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty of 1979, Gush Emunim, after it came into existence in February 1974, concentrated its settlement activities in the Westbank. It changed from a “silent consent”, in its method hidden and with no media coverage - according to Defense Minister Shimon Peres, the IDF did neither help them nor hinder them - into an official recognition by the new right-wing government of 1977.

The first settlements in the Yesha region were initiated by Gush Emunim activists. Though the organization formally vanished, Eretz Yisrael remained the main ideological pillar of the settlers' worldview and the successor organization Yesha Council. The Council is the local administrative body of the Westbank settlements and coordinates municipal as well as security issues. It provides a political channel through which the settlers' interests are communicated to the Knesset. The commitment to the state's Zionism, especially to its army is documented by the high number of recruits from the Westbank settlements, who join – after having completed the three-years of compulsory service – the elite units of the IDF and officer candidate courses.

The religious Zionist “movement of concrete redemption in our time” highlights an active Jewish engagement in the process of redemption (Yesha) of the people and the land of Israel:

The Messiah […] is not responsible for the plant and the growth of the fruit, but rather for its ripening. The concrete, historical Beginning we are witnessing today hast not come about through a personal redeemer, but through our collective activity and the changes that have taken place in our character as a people.

This imperative of action is linked to the belief in a post-Zionist messianic age. This sort of three-way connection between God, the People of Israel and the Torah is not exclusively religious-Zionist since it is a basic belief, shared by the Haredi interpretation and many secular Israelis and even anti-

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49 Serving in these units, especially in the higher ranks of the legendary Golani and Paratrooper Brigades, was during the period of the socialist pioneer spirit which marked the 1950's and 1960's strictly limited to the Kibbutzim youth. From the 1970's to the present more and more graduates from the settlements serve in the units and reflect a social as well as ideological change. Interview Gideon Spiro, Founder Yesh Gvul, Tel Aviv 11.01.2010; and Arian, 2005, pp. 88/89.
51 Ibid., p. 79.
In contrast to this, the idea of messianic redemption - which finds its strongest expression in the ideology of religious Zionism - will become more evident when considering the meaning of the Israeli state in the light of the anti-Zionists:

Seeing the coming of Zionism and the founding of the state of Israel as an opportunity for Jews to improve their situation, but not as the beginning of redemption. [...] [They] will avoid any contact with the state, since they see it not only as illegitimate, but as an act of blasphemy. For them the state is still a place of exile, until the coming of the Messiah.  

Unlike the interpretation of the state as “the beginning of redemption”, the idea of the Land implies an attribution of religious dimensions to a concrete geography within a cultural process of “mapping”. Kippenberg and von Stuckrad state that in this geo-theology, a grading according to the holiness and religious purity of a geographic place is central for the interpretation of Eretz Yisrael as the holy land with Jerusalem and the “lost Temple” in its center. In the Temple's holiest circle the manifestation of God (Schechinah) is still present and also manifested in the Hebrew Bible, the Torah. According to the messianic belief, which was promoted by Rabbi Zvi Kook, historical events such as the Balfour-Declaration (1917), the existence of the Israeli state, the Six Days War (June 1967) and the conquest and settlement of the country are steps within the process of redemption which will lead the Jewish People into a Messianic Age in which a third temple will be constructed.  

3. Religious-political Parties  
Looking at the political history of Pakistan and Israel, religious organizations and activists are involved not only in issues restricted to purely religious disputes, but they have testified their ability to mobilize particular sectors of society on religious, ethnic and political grounds. Especially the ethnic factor in combination with a religious agenda, brought by a new dynamic in the political systems of Pakistan and Israel. Given an exclusive setup of both political communities and their institutions that was maintained in essence the political dominance by one ethno-national group – Ashkenazi Jews linked to secular Zionism in Israel and in Pakistan old Punjabi families more liberal in their Islamic tradition and stemming from the urban salariat class and the military – was challenged by the engagement of new competitors on the political scene. Exemplary is in the Israeli case the rise of the Sephardi Guardians of the Torah (Shas) during the 1980's as the reaction of the Sephardi minority to a social, economic and scholarly marginalization in the Israeli State. However,
it was a generation of young rabbis, stemming predominantly from a Middle Eastern Sephardi milieu whose split from the Askenazi mother party Agudat Yisrael was basically induced by scholarly arguments and sectarian disputes. Their claim of restoring the 'Sephardi crown to its ancient glory' ought primarily to restore the prestige of the Sephardi seminaries and Torah schools (yeshivot), rather than to create a political platform to represent a 'Sephardi identity' – a term that had in fact never been used in Israel before Shas entered the political community. In Pakistan, the political organizations of the Deobandi, Jam‘iyyat-e ‘Ulama’-e Islam, together with the Jama‘at-i Islami, the self-proclaimed 'Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution' and three other religious parties of the Shia, the Brelwis, the Ahl-e-Hadith formed the political alliance Muttahida Majlis-e Amal (MMA). The results of the 2002 national and provincial elections of about 18 percent for the MMA that took over the government in the North-Wester Frontier Province and participated in the Balochistan government was based on an intensive mobilization of ethnic identities in the border area, namely the Pakhtuns. The Pakhtuns were from the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom (October 2001) involved in the war against the US Army in Afghanistan, therefore, anti-American resentments are still strong and were systematically activated by the religious-parties. The religious card of the game - 'Islam in danger' - to the present is frequently activated.

Generally, religious parties fulfill those legal conditions that apply to secular political parties and are in terms of analysis structurally not distinct from political parties.\(^{55}\) Therefore, they participate in the civic culture and have to accommodate their program with the principles of legitimacy – especially the religious component of a state's ideology - to which they frequently refer. For instance, due to the paradigm of the State of Israel as a Jewish state on the basis of the Jewish cultural and religious heritage no secular political party would distance itself from the religious symbolism which is materialized in various official ceremonies and rituals in the Israeli political arena. In the same way, with the exception of the Ashkenazi ultra-orthodox party Agudat Yisrael (today's alliance United Torah Judaism) no party that identifies itself at least to a certain extent with religion, would not label itself as “Super-Zionist”\(^{56}\) and as loyal to state and nation. The case of Agudat Yisrael is exceptional since the party and its Council of Torah Sages refuses the Zionist State of Israel but holds seats in the Knesset. Some functionaries lead ministries, but under the title of a 'Deputy Minister' (MK Yaakov Litzman, former chairman of the Finance Committee of Knesset), which expresses the maximum of commitment to the Zionist state, the haredim are willing to show. In Pakistan, the same phenomenon can be observed when ethnic-nationalist parties that


\(^{56}\) Interview Rabbi Nissim Ze'ev, Founder Shas, Jerusalem, 04.01.2010.
themselves in the past from Islamic phrases, increasingly refer to Islamic values and traditions and share their expressions in public life, e.g. when leaders of the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM)\textsuperscript{57}, a party that promoted to rights of the Indian Muslim immigrants to Pakistan (muhajirun) after Partition in 1947, join the Shia processions at the occasion of Muharram.

The religious repertoire is activated not only by parties that are traditionally supposed to be religious and originate from a religious school of thought with a specific ideology. Rather, secular parties accumulate religious elements within the field of political competition as a source of legitimacy in a civic culture that is strongly influenced by religious values. It is, as Marty puts it, the “religio-secular” world of our times that is “neither exclusively secular not exclusively religious, but rather a complex combination of both the religious and the secular, with religious and secular phenomenon occurring at the same time in individuals, in groups, and in societies”\textsuperscript{58}. In return, religious political groups accumulate secular elements while promoting a doctrinaire religious agenda. This is due to the secular electoral 'rules of the game' and necessary to open the ranks of a party platform for members and supporters of other religious, political and social milieus and to mobilize them as voters in order to maximize their chances of entering governing coalitions.\textsuperscript{59}

As Demerath and Williams emphasized, the secular ruling elite uses religion to pursue power but tries to distance itself from religion as soon as the power structures have been consolidated.\textsuperscript{60} This policy of keeping religion at arm's length is illustrated by various cases in Pakistan and Israel the political leadership frequently gains the support of religious leaders. Though we could state that these gestures are more symbolic, the traditional religious sector has learned to capitalize this dependence and claims in return pragmatic political concessions. For instance, following a rabbi and asking for his spiritual support is not exceptional in Israeli politics. Private audiences at the residences of former Israeli Chief Rabbi Ovadia Yussuf, the spiritual master (maran) of Shas, are an inherent part of Israeli political culture. In the case of Kadima leader Tzipi Livni this ritual became a

\textsuperscript{57} Formerly Muhajir Quami Movement. According to some analysts, MQM dropped the ethnic Muhajir marker to strengthen its claim of national competitiveness and to open its ideological also for the wider religious symbolism. See Budhani, Azmat Ali [a.o.]: The Open City: Social Networks and Violence in Karachi. In: Crises States Working Papers, No. 2, 2010, pp. 4-7.


\textsuperscript{59} In addition, many parties that can be located somewhere in between secular and religious ideological positions, found organizations that later become semi-autonomous units, e.g. Jama'at-e Islami and its student wing IJT, Gush Emunim and NRP. In addition to this, they 'integrate political activity with social and spiritual life. Seen as part of this web of associations with overlapping affiliations, religious parties appear more like membership groups than other parties', cit. Rosenblum, Nancy L.: Religious Parties, Religious Political Identity, and the Cold Shoulder of Liberal Democratic Thought, p. 33. In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2003, pp. 23-53.

very challenging issue when Rabbi Ovadia refused to receive the female Kadima leader in the middle of the 2009 polls election campaign, when Livni refused to accept the demands of Shas to re-extend the financial support for the religious education system and the subsidiaries for families that was before drastically reduced by then Minister of Finance Benjamin Netanyahu (Likud). In Pakistan, Islamic missionary movements such as Tanzeem ul-Ikhwan and Tablighi Jama'at and high position representatives of the military and civic bureaucracy have cultivated frequent circles for prayers (zikr). These gatherings were initiated by General Zia but have become strong networks were the religious leaders meet local politicians, generals, former Chiefs of the Army Staff and former Directors of ISI - or in the words of the former leader of JI, Qazi Hussain Ahmad: “These generals decided against the colonial legacy of the Britishers and the military rulers but for the Islamic tradition of Pakistan.”61

Generalizing, the instrumentalization of religious parties by the state aims at 1) marginalizing competing mainstream parties, 2) appeasing the religious sector by power sharing in the government or limited legal, political or institutional concessions, 3) gaining social and financial control over the institutions of the traditional religious sector (see Jamal Malik's 'Colonialization of Islam'62), 4) legitimizing rule by religious means and symbols and 5) integrating religious groups as a proxy force in the regional geo-strategic agenda ('state sponsorship'63).

Conclusion

Scholars of many disciplines and the increasing number of studies in the field of religion and politics tend to focus on 1) the reasons behind the dominant role of religion in societies in the light of the secularization paradigm and 2) the impact of the bearer of religion, religious parties on domestic and international politics. Implicit to this is often a trend to contrast the Western-styled liberal democratic thought with the emergence of religious-political parties and non-parliamentary partisan movements not least to a religious-based threat to democracy. However, in the case of this study, one has to take into account that religious groups in Pakistan and Israel from the beginning were actively involved in the negotiations with the political leadership on the religious character of the future state. While both states have consciously avoided a theocratic model of statehood, in both countries the initially reluctant religious sector has successfully gained disproportionate political and discourse power. Considering the concept of 'religious nationalism' by Mark Juergensmeyer and

61 Interview Qazi Hussain Ahmad, former amir Jama'at-i-Islami, Lahore, 21.08.2009.
Peter van der Veer\textsuperscript{64}, religious actors have to be seen not only as players in the political arena but also as shaping powers and important agents of nation building. In contrast to this, e.g. in most countries of the Muslim world, where religious groups gained power, they were systematically excluded from the political process. As nations in the making, Pakistan and Israel had to create identities, impose languages, and contend with artificial boundaries. Although Israel and Pakistan came into existence to serve as a homeland for all Jews and all Indian Muslims, this \textit{raison d’être} is challenged by the fact that more Jews and Indian Muslims live outside the national territory than inside, suggesting that these national enterprises are far from complete.