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Sovereign Debt: Notes on Debtor Incentives to Repay Debt

Spiegel, Shari

This paper discusses the assertion that debtors always want to repay their debts -- because the cost of not doing so is extremely high; when in fact there is little evidence behind this assertion.

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More About This Work

Academic Units
Initiative for Policy Dialogue
Publisher
Initiative for Policy Dialogue
Series
Initiative for Policy Dialogue Working Paper Series
Published Here
February 3, 2010

Notes

The opinions expressed in these papers represent those of the author(s) and not The Initiative for Policy Dialogue. These papers are unpublished and have not been peer reviewed. Please do not cite without explicit permission from the author(s).

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