BROTHERS WITHOUT BORDERS? : INVESTIGATING PROCESSES OF NORM EVOLUTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

Anna Mysliwiec

The international Muslim Brotherhood is occasionally characterized by American commentators, especially those with right-wing leanings, as a radical Islamist movement on par with al-Qaeda: transnational, ambitious, and therefore inherently threatening to U.S. interests. Following the Gaza flotilla crisis in June 2010, Thomas Joscelyn commented in the Weekly Standard: “The more one looks into the details of the flotilla the more it becomes clear that the Brotherhood used the humanitarian mission for its own purpose, namely, to assist its Palestinian branch—Hamas.”

Joscelyn paints a picture of a tight-knit, well-organized movement, a many-headed hydra that could pop up anywhere to accomplish its own nefarious ends.

The reality is quite different. Although branches of the Muslim Brotherhood are active in over seventy countries, coordination among them is loose and each national branch focuses on domestic issues rather than transnational ones. In fact it is the loose nature of the network structure and the focus on domestic politics that accounts for much of the Brotherhood’s success. Nathan Brown has debunked the notion that the Brotherhood is tightly organized internationally, instead describing it as “a tame framework for a group of loosely linked, ideologically similar movements that recognize each other, swap stories and experiences in occasional meetings, and happily subscribe to a formally international ideology without giving it much priority.”

He notes, however, that many members do refer to the Brotherhood “way of doing things.”

Brown’s account does not, however, examine the landscape of Brotherhood ideology. For example, has evolution in the philo-

Anna Mysliwiec is a senior at Middlebury College majoring in Middle East studies with a focus in political science. Her post-graduate plans are yet to be determined but will hopefully include another stint in the Middle East or North Africa.
sophical approach of one Brotherhood caused new norms to develop in the others? In recent years, the Brotherhoods in Egypt, Jordan, and Syria have all given increasing attention to matters of liberal reform, human rights, and democracy in their platforms. In this analysis, I ask two related questions: (a) to what extent have Muslim Brotherhood branches adopted the language and practice of civil and political rights and (b) have such norms “cascaded” within the movement, or are they the result of strategic calculations based on local political context? While it has been established that the Brotherhood’s various national branches are sometimes at odds with each other despite their common ideology, little has been written on how that ideology varies and evolves within the international movement. Because the normative model advanced by the Brotherhood forms a significant part of its international impact, the human rights framework allows us to consider how the Muslim Brotherhood has interacted with another major transnational trend: the rise of human rights norms and the networks that have succeeded in institutionalizing them. In this analysis, I will examine the stances of the Brotherhoods in Egypt, Jordan, and Syria toward human rights and liberalism, and in doing so will examine the extent to which these result from domestic opportunities and constraints as opposed to normative changes within the international network.

The fact that many of the Brotherhood’s national branches have fought to remain intact despite immense repression—as in the case of Syria—suggests that there may be something uniquely compelling about the Brotherhood “way of doing things.” Nevertheless, the literature on political Islam suggests that the strategy of a given organization depends on political opportunity structures, particularly the extent that the group is able to participate in politics. While international linkages may inform the choices of national Brotherhoods, strategic choices shaped by fluctuations in the domestic political landscape play a larger role. The ability of Islamist networks to embed themselves in the structures and concerns of a society largely determines their success, and the Brotherhood has proven itself to be uniquely capable of that task.
THE BROTHERHOOD IN CONTEXTUAL PERSPECTIVE

It is not immediately obvious where the international Muslim Brotherhood fits on the spectrum of global non-state actors. While some commentators insist that it maintains ties to terrorism, it is not a terrorist network. Nor is there a Muslim institutional equivalent to the Catholic Church in world politics, as Islam has historically had no single power center. It is perhaps more similar to transnational advocacy networks, as theorized by Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink. Like networks organized around liberal democratic values, moderate Islamist discourses embodied in the Muslim Brotherhood provide individuals with a language through which they can make claims about their rights—one that resonates with common religious, philosophical, and cultural ideas—and provides a means of resistance against the prevailing, often abusive political order. While the literature on normative change tends to focus on actors and networks promoting liberal—and predominantly Western—norms, “liberalism is only one possible ideological framework that can be used for framing political action.”

Political Islam provides a competing normative framework, offering both “ideational resources and material support” that individuals can access to make political claims. In all of its manifestations, the Muslim Brotherhood has offered a powerful source of opposition to the secular state. In the Egyptian context, in terms of “both political power and ‘civil society’ … the Islamists seem to be the most robust possible alternative to the present regime.” Members of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood are on the front lines in the struggle for civil and political rights and are often imprisoned for their attempts to participate in politics. For example, the Egyptian Brotherhood provided important organizational resources to sustain the recent revolution that forced former President Hosni Mubarak from power. Despite the strength of their normative claim, Muslim Brotherhood-associated groups challenge states through participation in political life.

Islamism is a “movement of movements”: “its overarching
A common goal is the establishment or reinforcement of Islamic laws and norms as the solution to economic, political, and cultural crises.” With fifty-three member states, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) is one of the more visible transnational Islamic actors, but it is deeply divided, reflecting regional conflict among its members. State-centric “conservative contenders” like the OIC have failed to provide meaningful transnational leadership. The real transnational Muslim community exists at the level of civil society, with movements creating change at the domestic level.

As the oldest Islamist organization in the world, the Muslim Brotherhood represents one of the most important strains of transnational Islamic activity—one that differs significantly from the terrorist networks that receive more attention in the American media. As part of the constellation of transnational Muslim civil society, it represents a global network of religious activists . . . who communicate with each other, feed off each other’s ideas, collectively develop religious ideologies with political significance, perhaps aid each other with funds, and . . . form transnational groups whose main intellectual referent derives from religious dogma.

Many of the most significant transnational linkages have been “transnational popular movements whose struggles were primarily against their own rulers rather than the West per se,” and the Muslim Brotherhood is foremost among these organizations. If we put the far-fetched goal of a caliphate to the side, the existence of transnational Islam seems to not pose a threat to the state system.

**THE INTERNATIONAL MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD**

The Muslim Brotherhood has established chapters in over seventy countries. After the organization had become firmly established in Egypt, Egyptian activists traveled outward to establish branches across the Middle East and international students studying at Al-Azhar University in Cairo brought the ideas of Hassan al-Banna, the Brotherhood’s founder, back to their native countries. Chapters consequently sprung up in Djibouti in 1933 and in Syria,
Palestine, and Jordan in 1946. Early in the organization’s history, the various national branches collaborated on international projects, as when the Brotherhoods in Jerusalem, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan participated alongside the regular forces of Arab armies during the 1948 war.

The International Organization is headed by a “general guide” who also serves as the head of the Egyptian organization. Most national chapters, headed by a “general supervisor,” belong to this international body, though some are no longer officially affiliated. The Egypt chapter attempted to tighten coordination in the 1980s but met stiff resistance from other chapters. The Egyptians soon accepted, as Sudanese Brother Hasan al-Turabi warned, that “you cannot run the world from Cairo.” When national Brotherhoods have sought the intervention of the International Organization in internal debates, its slow and confusing responses have sometimes rendered its leadership irrelevant. The national chapters are thus “parallel and fraternal movements,” and when they do influence each other, it is often in a bilateral fashion. It is thus more useful to think of the Brotherhood as a network rather than a tightly coordinated organization. The branches of the Muslim Brotherhood occasionally come into direct conflict with each other, as when the majority of national chapters supported Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, provoking the incensed departure of the Kuwaiti Brothers. Likewise, during the occupation of Iraq, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood refused to deal with American officials, while members of its Iraqi counterpart participated in (and won) American-sponsored elections for Parliament. Clearly, the Brotherhood’s flexibility in adapting to various national contexts has contributed to its success. It is important to note however, that despite the fact the various Brotherhood organizations disagree about some particular tactics, all abstain from “global jihad” and work through democratic processes when possible.

In an interview with the newspaper *Asharq Alawsat*, Dr. Kamal al Helbawi, a spokesman for the Brotherhood in the West, noted that the Brotherhood works primarily through “meetings, continuous consultations, exchange of experience, networking and
joint efforts.” The Brothers also meet at weddings, funerals, and other social occasions. Delineating exactly where the Brotherhood starts and ends proves difficult, as the Egyptian chapter inspired a variety of movements that maintain varying degrees of intimacy with the flagship organization. While it can be difficult to say precisely when the Brotherhood in one country influenced the actions of Brothers in another, whether to reinforce Brotherhood ideology or to encourage a certain course of action, it is nevertheless clear that communication does occur. One such example is the Danish cartoon controversy: “[the Brotherhood’s] transnational networks helped spread the word about the cartoons, [and] all branches officially called for peaceful protest.”

Brotherhood organizations called for dialogue between Muslims and non-Muslims, whereas jihadi groups chose more confrontational forms of protest. While national Brotherhoods may occasionally diverge from the peaceful norm, this example suggests that the Brotherhood is indeed bound together by certain values. The transnational mobility of individuals in the era of globalization has undoubtedly influenced the Brotherhood’s stances as well. Jordanian Brother Ishaq al-Farhan rejected the dar al-islam/dar al-harb dichotomy that once divided the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds: “This distinction is historical because in the past Muslims inhabited in one place and non-Muslims in another... But now it does not make much sense to divide the world in terms of this duality. There are many Muslims who ... are American citizens.” Furthermore, Brothers who have migrated may influence the politics of their countries of origin:

In order to understand how agenda setting and the evolution of political strategy work in Middle Eastern-based Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, for example, one needs today to pay as much (if not more) attention to Brotherhood supporters within Europe’s Muslim population as one does to the group’s formal leadership in Egypt.

Globalization and immigration are thus among the factors that shape normative evolution within the Muslim Brotherhood. Thus, while I will argue that changes in domestic opportunity structures drive Brotherhood adoption of new strategies and norms, the role
of the international network in shaping the ideological choices of the Brotherhoods cannot be discounted.

THE FLAGSHIP ORGANIZATION: THE EGYPTIAN MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

Founded by schoolteacher Hassan al-Banna in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood during its apolitical early years focused on building membership and providing humanitarian aid, eventually fielding candidates in Egypt’s 1941 parliamentary elections. However, an attempt on Nasser’s life by the Brotherhood’s paramilitary apparatus led to severe imprisonment and torture for the Brothers.25 In response to this repression, Brotherhood philosopher Sayyid Qutb argued that the Egyptian state was a legitimate target of jihad. Hasan al-Hudaybi, who succeeded al-Banna as the head of the Egypt chapter, disagreed, and his more moderate view prevailed. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood renounced the use of violence in the 1970s and has embraced the democratic process. Although the Brotherhood was illegal under Egypt’s Emergency Law, its candidates ran for office as independents and in 2005 won 20 percent of parliamentary seats,26 although they were blocked from repeating this success by unfair elections in November 2010.

In the 1980s, the Brotherhood began to ally with the Wafd, Liberal, and Labor parties, indicating a willingness to compromise on ideology in order to forge coalitions with secular groups. However, the Brotherhood continued to be reluctant to state its political goals, citing the political climate but probably also out of a desire to avoid internal ideological splits.27 In the 1980s and 1990s, the Brotherhood became prominent in student elections and its younger reform-minded members won majorities on the governing boards of most major professional syndicates.28 Due partly to pressure from the United States, the Egyptian government held relatively free elections in 2005, in which President Mubarak ran for reelection. In the run-up to elections, the Brotherhood published a “Reform Initiative” and ultimately won 88 out of 444 seats. The heavy media coverage during and since the elections served to en-
courage the Brotherhood to articulate its stance more clearly. This movement toward moderation resulted both from new opportunities in the political system and from an evolution in the Brotherhood’s leadership as younger, reformist members have increasingly made their voices heard. Imprisonment, torture, and death sentences during the Nasserite era soured the old guard of the Brotherhood toward formal politics, causing them to prioritize religious work and eschew coalition building. The political experience of the new guard, on the other hand, was their leadership of student groups in the Sadat era, when they gained experience in forging coalitions with secular student groups. Over the course of a few short weeks following the January 15, 2011 “day of rage” a popular uprising led to Mubarak’s resignation from office on February 11, which ended decades of authoritarian leadership in Egypt. While secular opposition groups started the Tahrir Square protests without the initial participation of the Brotherhood, younger Brothers ultimately prompted the organization to play a key role in sustaining the protests. The Brotherhood organized emergency medical clinics and established checkpoints to prevent Mubarak supporters from fomenting unrest. It called for protests to remain peaceful, eschewed the use of controversial religious slogans, and announced its support for secular activist Muhammad ElBaradei as spokesman for the opposition. Its actions suggest a willingness to work in close partnership with secular groups and to subordinate its own goals to those of the broader struggle for democracy.

However, many question the Brotherhood’s commitment to democracy. The phrase “one man, one vote, one time” has come to embody the concerns of many that an election that brings the Brotherhood to power will be the last election. Clifford May of the National Review wondered: “Do the Egyptians demonstrating in Tahrir Square appreciate how threatening the Muslim Brotherhood is to the freedom they hope to win?” Several authors, however, point to signs that the commitment is genuine. The fact that the Brotherhood’s political vision does not perfectly coincide with a liberal democratic one—and their openness about this fact—suggests that they are committed to democracy, but one centered
around the community rather than the individual.\textsuperscript{35} Likewise, following the relatively free 2005 elections, the Mubarak regime cracked down hard on the movement—this was especially evident in the November 2010 elections, in which no Brotherhood-affiliated candidates were seated. Despite these challenges the Brotherhood has maintained its commitment to democracy, an action that “speaks more clearly than would similar talk of democracy at a time when electoral victory seemed within reach.”\textsuperscript{36} Despite calls within the movement to abandon political participation in favor of charitable work, it continued to participate in democratic politics, running candidates in the June 2007 Shura Council elections despite government interference.\textsuperscript{37} Essam al-Erian, chief of the Muslim Brotherhood’s political bureau, defended the decision on the grounds that it served to delegitimize the regime. Thus, while there is evidence to suggest that the Brotherhood’s commitment to democracy is genuine, comments like al-Erian’s suggest that the Brotherhood might only be committed to democracy when it serves their interests. Given the level of secrecy surrounding Brotherhood operations, it is nearly impossible to ascertain which is the case. Following Mubarak’s resignation, the Brotherhood did state its intention to form a political party once a democracy has been established.\textsuperscript{38}

Egyptian Islamists, including prominent Brotherhood leaders, have produced a rich philosophy of governance.\textsuperscript{39} For these thinkers, the state is instituted in order to create the Muslim community through the implementation of sharia law, which has historically served as a constraint on state power. Ultimate power resides with the community, which chooses a leader and has a contract with him.\textsuperscript{40} Moderate Islamists call for an independent judiciary, civil society organizations, and a multi-party system “in which each party offers a different view regarding the best strategy for . . . implementing sharia.”\textsuperscript{41} Islamist thinkers derive a wide range of civil and political rights from the Islamic principle of justice, including life, dignity, property, security, freedom, equality, and the accountability of the ruler.\textsuperscript{42} While arguing that a woman or a Coptic Christian cannot become head of state, they emphasize
that minority rights would be protected in an Islamic state, as religious diversity comes from God. Unlike liberal democrats, however, the Brothers see the state as a transformative—rather than a threatening—institution, responsible for creating good Muslim citizens and a moral community, and they therefore authorize it to interfere quite robustly in citizens’ private lives.

In addition to its apparent commitment to democracy, the Brotherhood has increasingly focused on human rights. Under Mubarak, the Egyptian government committed serious human rights violations in the name of its Emergency Law, closing down mosques, limiting the right of association, and making arbitrary detentions. While a human rights movement with transnational linkages developed, spearheaded by the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, the Mubarak regime largely succeeded in discrediting secular activists as inauthentic and cutting off their access to external networks. Some Islamists share Mubarak’s view, criticizing “human rights dependency” on Western organizations.

In the 1980s, the syndicates were beset by a lack of transparency, the absence of a clear decision-making process, and financial mismanagement, problems that leading Brothers of the new guard, building on their experiences as student activists, tackled after winning majorities on the syndicate boards. In the 1990s, Brothers formed human rights committees in professional associations and began to advocate on behalf of members suffering persecution, as well as campaign against the Emergency Law. Critics sometimes suggest that “Islamists are only interested in human rights when it is their supporters who . . . are suffering persecution.” However, the case of the professional associations suggests that institutional changes created by Islamists may also benefit non-Islamists. Thanks to Islamist participation, the Egyptian Bar Association’s already impressive “involvement with Islamist human rights concerns became more visible.” Many Islamists even served on the executive board of the secular Egyptian Organization for Human Rights. This activism was not lost on the Mubarak regime, however, and Islamist human rights activism was cut short following the arrest of many of its leaders in 1995 and 1996. The regime had
a vested interest in cutting off the nascent ties between Islamist and secular human rights activists, just as it did when it shut down the centrist Hizb al-Wasat, a party formed by younger Brothers that developed ties with non-Islamist actors. In 2004, likely in response to increased political openness in the run-up to the 2005 elections, the Brotherhood formed its own human rights committee, led by lawyer Abdul Monem Abdul Maqsoud, to monitor violations against prisoners and detainees, student rights, and acts of discrimination. Of thirty committee members, only two belong to the Brotherhood, suggesting a commitment to defending the rights of all Egyptians, regardless of membership in the Brotherhood.

Transnational linkages have played some role in shaping the Brotherhood’s philosophy. Concerns about dependence on Western organizations notwithstanding, the Muslim Brotherhood’s official English website illustrates its increasing focus on human rights and its attempt to link to international advocacy organizations. At the time of this writing, the articles included on the “Human Rights” page link to reports from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Reporters Without Borders. Nor do liberal organizations provide the only option for transnational linkages. The London-based Islamic Human Rights Commission called upon its members to demand that the November 2010 elections be free and fair. Despite its shortcomings, the human rights movement “can take credit for having changed the way governments talk about their citizens and the expectations that citizens have of the way they should be treated by their government” and even the illiberal governments of the Middle East speak of upholding the rights of their citizens. That principle extends to the Muslim Brotherhood as well. Pressure from the United States under the Bush administration spurred the Egyptian state to greater political openness that created space for Brotherhood participation, and attention to international opinion in this environment undoubtedly served to reinforce the Brotherhood’s commitment to democratic norms. The transnational mobility of individual Brothers and the norms they encountered in the process have likely played a role as well. However, it would be unfair to attribute liberal democratic
thinking within the Brotherhood solely to the ascension of international norms. Islamic thought has a rich democratic tradition, as Bruce Rutherford and others have demonstrated. Furthermore, greater attention to democracy would not have been possible without internal changes in the Brotherhood, especially the rise of the new guard of politically minded reformers. The Brotherhood’s adherence to democracy despite repression reflects the strength of its normative commitments. Because of its historical suppression, it is impossible to know how much support the Muslim Brotherhood will mobilize in the freer system that is still taking shape in Egypt.\textsuperscript{54} It is possible that it will no longer attract the numbers it did prior to the surge in organized secular opposition. Yet, just as greater political openness prompted the Brotherhood to clarify its views in 2005, the formation of a political party will undoubtedly require the Brotherhood to further clarify its views, including positions on human rights and liberal norms.\textsuperscript{55}

SYRIA

The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood has had substantially less freedom to operate than its sister organizations in Jordan and Egypt. Founded when Egyptian Muslim Brothers took a promotional tour through Syria in the 1930s, it initially participated in parliamentary politics after Syria gained independence.\textsuperscript{56} In 1963, the Ba’th party, dominated by the Shi’a-identified ‘Alawis, seized power and dissolved the parliamentary system. Scholars of political Islam often argue that political exclusion radicalizes Islamist groups, while inclusion can foster moderation. Prevented from participating in the political system, the Syrian Brothers turned to violence. After a Brotherhood revolt in Hama in 1964, relations further deteriorated throughout the 1970s as the movement assassinated senior military and Ba’th figures.\textsuperscript{57} The Syrian regime consequently detained and tortured thousands of Brothers,\textsuperscript{58} and the severe repression isolated the organization internationally.\textsuperscript{59} Law No. 49 of 1980 made mere membership in the Brotherhood punishable by death.\textsuperscript{60} After the massacre at Hama in February
most of the movement’s main leaders moved outside of Syria and headquarters were set up in London. The Syrian Brothers initially supported the Iranian revolution, but with the alliance between Khomeini’s Iran and the Shi’a-leaning Asad’s Syria, the Brotherhood came to condemn Iran. “The support [the Brotherhood receives] from some Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, depends upon the relations between these countries and Syria,” and for that reason donors are more likely to give the Brothers leeway in their dealings with the regime when relations are bad. Because the boundaries of political Islam are shaped by state interactions, interstate relations serve to open and close the gateways to international support for the Muslim Brotherhood.

When Ali Al-Bayanouni became general guide of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in 1996, he “shifted the Brotherhood from armed struggle to political and media efforts against the regime” and expressed willingness to engage its leadership. This change in the Brotherhood’s stance preceded the accession of Hafez’s son Bashar in 2000, indicating that al-Bayanouni’s leadership was just as critical as the following changes in the political environment. With his promises of a new era of public freedoms and human rights, Bashar al-Asad’s accession to power seemed to provide a further opportunity for the Brotherhood. In its “Gentlemen’s Statement for Political Action,” it finally renounced violence—decades after the Egyptian Brotherhood—and emphasized that the modern state must be built on a contract between ruler and ruled. Starting in 2006, the Muslim Brotherhood participated in the National Salvation Front (NSF), an alliance with secular opposition groups in an “all-embracing movement for reform,” controversially led by former Vice President ’Abd al-Halim Khaddam, who had been responsible for violence against the Brotherhood. As a result, the United States became willing to engage with the Brotherhood and the NSF on election monitoring and civil society promotion. The NSF’s priority in its relationship with the United States was to exert pressure on al-Asad Asad’s regime to improve its human rights record.

Israel’s invasion of Gaza in 2008 was a watershed event that
put the Syrian Brotherhood in a difficult position: it was their Shi’ite adversaries who were supporting the Palestinians who in the Brotherhood’s mind ought to have been the Brotherhood’s cause célèbre. The Brotherhood consequently suspended its actions against the government and stated its desire to return to Syria to work with the regime. It has since withdrawn from the NSF in favor of a more accommodationist stance toward the regime, recognizing that its outsider status had made it irrelevant in Syrian society. The Brotherhood may have also acted in response to the United States, whose relations with the Asad regime have thawed.

Ali Sadreddin al-Bayanouni, who now lives in London, serves as an important leader of the Syrian Brotherhood. He has stated that “the Brotherhood has a very moderate understanding of Islam” and advocates for the rights of women and minorities, as well as for pluralist politics. Accordingly, for the Brotherhood, it appears that the moderation of recent years has been caused by changes in internal leadership (Bayanouni’s election), shifting political opportunity (Asad’s ascension and changing U.S. policy), and a simple exhaustion of the prior course of violent opposition. The translation of ideology into practice is not consistent across the transnational Muslim Brotherhood: the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood continued to use violence against the regime into the 1980s, while the Egyptian branch had renounced violence and was enjoying the fruits of Sadat’s relaxation of restraints. The Brotherhood’s preference for moderation was evidently not strong enough to override domestic constraints. Rather than accepting their inability to participate, as they might have done if a peaceful approach was their primary concern, the Syrian Brothers continued to pursue power through decidedly less-than-moderate means. On the other hand, it is remarkable that despite a history of repression and exclusion from politics, the Syrian chapter has returned to the moderate philosophy with which it began its historical trajectory.

JORDAN

The Jordanian Brotherhood enjoys a long history of accom-
modation with the regime—although this pattern has changed in recent years—and has consequently led a peaceful and moderate movement. Egyptian preachers founded the organization in the 1940s and 1950s. Although Egyptian leadership initially controlled the movement, the Jordanian Brothers elected their own leaders following Nasser’s crackdown. The group dominated elections in 1989 and espoused many rights associated with democratic governance during the following session of parliament. In 1993, it formed the Islamic Action Front (IAF) to act as its political wing.

Like the Egyptian chapter, the Jordanian Brotherhood argues that democracy is inherently Islamic. It has highly democratic internal operations, perhaps more so than any other party in the Middle East; party leaders are elected by the membership and experience a high degree of turnover. “In earlier years, the Jordanian Islamist movement was something of a trendsetter for its Arab counterparts, since the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood ... always placed great stress on political freedoms.” It is conceivable that because Jordan offered greater freedom to participate in politics, the Jordanian Brotherhood’s articulation of political freedoms gave the other organizations a model to which to aspire. The IAF issued a document highlighting a new reform program in October 2005, “following the lead of their Egyptian and Syrian counterparts” and capitalizing on a moment of political openness in the region. While opportunity structures clearly play a role, we cannot disregard the possibility of experience sharing among the national Brotherhoods. The document was “so full of liberal and democratic ideas and language that a leader of a secular opposition party was forced to confess that it differed little from the programs of other parties.” Nevertheless, the Jordanian Brotherhood has paid comparatively less attention to liberal reform issues in recent years, and instead has focused on international issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, due partly to its substantial Palestinian membership. Like the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the movement is internally divided over the question of whether it should opt for a cooperative relationship with the regime or adopt a more openly critical stance. If network norms played a larger role, we
might expect to see more resounding support for liberal reform.

**DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS**

The preceding cases suggest that domestic opportunities, internal leadership shifts, and international pressures combine to motivate the Brotherhood to develop and publicize positions in favor of liberal reform at particular historical moments. Relative liberalization of the political system allowed the Egyptian Brotherhood to compete, and public scrutiny of its positions encouraged the articulation of liberal, democratic values. Its organizational resources served to sustain the Egyptian revolution, in which it cooperated with the secular opposition and put the goal of Egyptian democracy above its organizational interests. The succession of Bashar al-Asad provided new opportunities for the Syrian Brothers to participate in politics, encouraging the development of a policy of moderation toward the regime. Domestic opportunity structures are critical in influencing the Brotherhood’s commitments to democratic participation, but exclusion need not always preclude moderation. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood continued to articulate its faith in democracy despite hardship after 2005, while political exclusion induced the Syrian branch to decades of violence. This experience points to the “stickiness” of normative commitments: having published a reform platform in 2005, the Egyptian Brotherhood could hardly renege on its written belief in democracy. Conversely, the 1970s-era Syrian Muslim Brotherhood was not limited by any prior commitments to non-violence. Now that the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood has formally renounced violence, it seems likely that it will not defect. Organizational choices, even if adopted for instrumental reasons, may end up carrying normative weight. The ascendancy of reform-minded elements of an organization’s leadership can dictate its priorities, as with the increasing influence of the new guard within the Egyptian Brotherhood and the election of al-Bayanouni in Syria. In Jordan, conversely, the Brotherhood’s growing constituency of young Palestinians is shifting its emphasis from domestic to international issues.
It also appears likely that connections among the Brotherhood have helped create a trend toward moderation and liberal norms. International linkages are based largely on personal relationships, however, and it is therefore difficult to determine the role played by transnational communication among the Brothers. It also seems probable that the Egyptian and Syrian Brotherhood’s publication of reform platforms induced Jordan to do so as well, and that Brothers living in the West have further encouraged moderation. But while the international Muslim Brotherhood may strive for an ideal of peaceful political participation, changes in domestic opportunities and constraints will influence how—and whether—the national chapters enact that norm at a particular historical moment. The Brotherhood’s international organization cannot explain the branches’ changes in attitudes toward reform over time.

Increasing support within the Brotherhood for liberal reform has come in part from external networks that support those values. The decision of the Egyptian Brotherhood to initiate a human rights discourse and form committees modeled on committees in secular civil society complicates Adamson’s portrayal of the two distinct, closed ideological systems of global liberalism and political Islam. While material and institutional bases support both political Islam and global liberalism, it is a reality of the international system that certain institutions are stronger than others, and that therefore one network may eventually obtain dominance. Ideologies may gravitate toward the stronger underlying material structure, articulating the norms that are essential to gaining access to its resources. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has therefore emphasized human rights partly to convince the West of its good intentions and to take advantage of greater political openness which, not coincidentally, was created through Western pressure. This analysis thus suggests an opportunity for further research into how competing ideological frameworks can serve to influence one another.

The domestic orientation of the Muslim Brotherhood has been critical to its success. Islam, unlike the Catholic Church, has always been decentralized: it has “adjusted to a territorially demarcated international system” within the broader Islamic com-
Higher organizational integration among the national chapters might have impeded their efforts to build a broad social base in each country. Thus, the most successful transnational Islamist movements are those that subordinate their international orientation to local political concerns, gaining legitimacy among a country’s population. Contrary to Joscelyn’s belief, the claim that an organization has ties to the Brotherhood means little without an understanding of how it has developed in that particular context.

The importance of attention to domestic context is not unique to the work of Islamist organizations; it is also critical for transnational advocacy networks whose campaigns may fail if they do not take local realities into account. The preeminence of domestic politics is therefore not unique to transnational Islam. Despite globalization, Monshipouri argues, “human identity has remained national.” Repression has further reinforced the primacy of domestic politics in the Middle East and North Africa, and the Brotherhood has been shaped by the adverse political context in which it operates, more so in Egypt and Syria than in the comparatively friendly Jordan. Egyptian Brothers have often been prevented from leaving the country, limiting their opportunities for transnational work. Indeed, despite greater integration into the international system from the ratification of human rights treaties, Middle Eastern and North African states have increasingly violated human rights and repressed the civil society actors that defend them, often in the process severing the ties of activists to the international community. As a result, national leaders seem to insist that “state power must remain central to our analyses of social movement transnationalism.” The reality is that in Arab countries where the oldest and best-established Islamist groups operate, the regimes are not conducive to transnational civil society.

CONCLUSION

This paper has sought to contribute to an understanding of the Muslim Brotherhood as a global non-state actor. The Brotherhood has shown significantly “more staying power and better or-
ganizational skills” on the domestic level than other international Islamist movements. While there has been a movement within the network toward a greater acceptance of human rights and liberal norms, these trends have not developed as a result of entrepreneurship by one organization that has worked to “sell” the idea to its counterparts. Instead, political opportunities and leadership shifts have created conditions that allow the Muslim Brotherhood branches in Egypt, Syria, and Jordan to enact these moderate values, which in turn may become “sticky.” Nevertheless, the informal communication and idea sharing that occurs between Brothers likely plays a role as well. This recent convergence toward a relatively liberal, democratic model is due both to communication and political learning among the Brotherhoods and to international pressure for liberalization throughout the region.

The experience of the Muslim Brotherhood suggests that in order to be successful in transforming the political order, Islamist organizations must adapt to domestic contexts at the expense of their transnational ties. Ironically, the most effective transnational political Muslim organization is one that has entrenched itself in domestic matters. Ultimately, the Muslim Brotherhood—and the slew of moderate Islamist organizations that follow its model across the Arab and Muslim worlds—will have greater influence on international politics than smaller, more tightly-organized groups like al-Qaeda. While al-Qaeda may succeed in making states reorganize their security strategies, it is unlikely to create meaningful political change without embedding itself in the domestic context. The Muslim Brotherhood may have great impact on individuals whose loyalties to their governments are already compromised due to repression, and on the future of state power in the Muslim world. In addition to exerting pressure for reform, the Muslim Brotherhood has increasingly adopted the language of human rights. The Egyptian branch has recently demonstrated the vital—and peaceful—role the Brotherhood can play in democratization. Despite the staying power of Arab regimes, the opposition and growing normative commitments of the Brotherhood are indeed powerful forces for liberal change in the region.
Notes

21 Leiken and Brooke, “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood,” 117.
22 Leiken and Brooke, “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood,” 117.
29 Mohammed Zahid and Michael Medley, “Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt & Sudan,”
30 Zahid and Medley, 203.
46 Zahid and Medley, 703.
47 Hicks, “Islamist Human Rights Activism,” 372.
48 Hicks, “Islamist Human Rights Activism,” 367.
49 Hicks, “Islamist Human Rights Activism,” 367.
53 Hicks, “Islamist Human Rights Activism,” 365.
54 Cobban, “The Men of Qasr el-Aini Street.”
63 Talhamy, “The Syrian Muslim Brothers,” 570.
64 Talhamy, “The Syrian Muslim Brothers,” 579.
66 Human Rights Watch, “A Wasted Decade.”
67 Ziadeh, “The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria.”
70 Talhamy, “The Syrian Muslim Brothers,” 578.
72 Solomon, “To Check Syria.”
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