Academic Commons

Reports

College admissions with affirmative action

Abdulkadiroglu, Atila

This paper first shows that when colleges' preferences are substitutable there does not exist any stable matching mechanism that makes truthful revelation of preferences a dominant strategy for every student. The paper introduces student types and captures colleges' preferences for affirmative action via type-specific quotas: A college always prefers a set of students that respects its type-specific quotas to another set that violates them. Then it shows that the student-applying deferred acceptance mechanism makes truthful revelation of preferences a dominant strategy for every student if each college's preferences satisfy responsiveness over acceptable sets of students that respect its type-specific quotas. These results have direct policy implications in several entry-level labor markets (Roth 1991). Furthermore, a fairness notion and the related incentive theory developed here is applied to controlled choice in the context of public school choice by Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003).

Files

More About This Work

Academic Units
Economics
Publisher
Department of Economics, Columbia University
Series
Department of Economics Discussion Papers, 0203-19
Published Here
March 24, 2011

Notes

July 2003