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Markets, Arbitrage and Social Choices

Chichilnisky, Graciela

The paper establishes a clear connection between equilibrium theory and social choice theory by showing that, for a well defined social choice problem, the conditions which are necessary and sufficient to establish existence of a competitive equilibrium. We define a condition of limited arbitrage on the preferences and the endowments of an Arrow-Debreu economy. This bounds the utility gains that the traders can afford from their initial endowments. Theorem 2 proves that limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a social choice rule which allocates society's resources among individuals in a manner which depends continuously and anonymously on their preferences over allocations, and which respects unanimity. Limited arbitrage is also necessary and sufficient for the existence of a competitive equilibrium in the Arrow-Debreu economy, with or without bounds on short sales, Theorem 7. Theorem 4 proves that any market allocation can be achieved as a social choice allocation, i.e. an allocation which is maximal among all feasible allocations according to a social preference defined via a social choice rule which is continuous, anonymous and respects unanimity.

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Academic Units
Economics
Publisher
Department of Economics, Columbia University
Series
Department of Economics Discussion Papers, 649
Published Here
February 17, 2011

Notes

December 1992.

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