Nationalist China in the Postcolonial Philippines: Diasporic Anticommunism, Shared Sovereignty, and Ideological Chineseness, 1945-1970s

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ABSTRACT

Nationalist China in the Postcolonial Philippines: Diasporic Anticommunism, Shared Sovereignty, and Ideological Chineseness, 1945-1970s

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This dissertation explains how the Republic of China (ROC), overseas Chinese (huaqiao), and the Philippines, sometimes but not always working with each other, produced and opposed the threat of Chinese communism from the end of World War II to the mid-1970s. It is not a history of US-led anticommunist efforts with respect to the Chinese diaspora, but rather an intra-Asian social and cultural history of anticommunism and nation-building that liberates two close US allies from US-centric historiographies and juxtaposes them with each other and the huaqiao community that they claimed. Three principal arguments flow from this focus on intra-Asian anticommunism. First, I challenge narrowly territorialized understandings of Chinese nationalism by arguing that Taiwan engaged in diasporic nation-building in the Philippines. Whether by helping the Philippine military identify Chinese communists or by mobilizing Philippine huaqiao in support of Taiwan, the ROC carved out a semi-sovereign sphere of influence for itself within a foreign country. It did so through institutions such as schools, the Kuomintang (KMT), and the Philippine-Chinese Anti-Communist League, which functioned transnationally and locally to embed the ROC into Chinese society and connect huaqiao to Taiwan. Through these groups, the ROC shaped the experiences of a national community beyond its territorial boundaries and represented itself as the legitimate “China” in the world.

Second, drawing upon political theory, I argue that the anticommunist relationship between the ROC, the Philippines, and the Philippine Chinese constituted a form of what I call shared, non-territorial sovereignty. Nationalist China did not secure influence over Chinese in the Philippines
by exerting military or economic pressure, as a neocolonial regime might. Vast disparities in power
did not obtain between Manila and Taipei, as they did between them and Washington. Rather, for
reasons of law, culture, linguistic incapacity, and ideology, the Philippines selectively outsourced
the management of its Chinese residents to the ROC. In turn, both depended on the Chinese being
able to govern themselves with state support, coercive and otherwise. The Philippine Chinese, as
in colonial times, were thus semi-autonomous actors who participated in the construction of shared
sovereignty after World War II by forging ties with states to advance their anticommunist agenda.
This three-way relationship provides a framework for thinking about postcolonial sovereignty in
East Asia that focuses on relations of relative equality between states and the relative autonomy of
the Chinese as a minority population, rather than between dominant and dominated or in terms of
territory.

Nationalist China and the Philippines’ nation-building projects had profound consequences
for the Philippine Chinese. While these peoples were in many respects acted upon by the ROC and
Philippine states through legal and coercive means, they by no means lacked agency. Rather, they
performed their agency as consensual participants in making anticommunism. In focusing on them,
the dissertation shifts from international and transnational history to social and cultural history and
the history of civic life. Existing scholarship, whether in the social sciences or Sinophone Studies,
largely depicts the postcolonial hua subject as a non-ideological businessman or cultural producer.
I argue, by contrast, that the overseas Chinese could be eminently ideological and politically active.
From informing on suspected Chinese communists to the ROC and Philippine states to proclaiming
their loyalties to the ROC and Chiang Kai-shek, anticommunist social practices enabled Philippine
huaqiao to come to terms with being legally disadvantaged and ideologically suspect minorities in
their country of residence. Unlike racial and cultural Chineseness, which they could or would not
give up, they could and did choose to behave ideologically; and in doing so, they legitimized their community to the Philippine state and Filipino society.
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Introduction

Some ten years after the formation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the American journalist and Hong Kong correspondent for Newsweek Robert S. Elegant raised the grim prospect of a Chinese communist takeover of Southeast Asia in a book titled The Dragon’s Seed. In vividly Orientalist prose, he warned that Chinese communities in the region were the conduits for what he believed was the expansion of “modern Chinese imperialism.” The PRC was “capturing the close-knit Chinese communities abroad and deploying them as vanguards for the spiritual aggression of the Marxian-Maoist creed and as skirmishers for the armed aggression of the ‘People’s Liberation Army’ and its auxiliary units,” he declared. Indissolubly bound to China by culture and blood and estranged from indigenous Southeast Asians, the overseas Chinese, or huaqiao 华僑, were willing accomplices in Beijing’s campaign to achieve “physical and spiritual dominion” over Nanyang. In fact, he went so far as to assert that the “Communists have nearly taken the hua-chiao” because of Western inaction and the preoccupation of regions governments with other problems.¹

Elegant was not alone in positing a conspiracy by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to penetrate Southeast Asia’s Chinese communities and undermine the sovereignty of states that had just won their independence from Western and Japanese colonial rule. US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles wrote in December 1958 that the PRC, in league with the Soviet Union, was “bearing down hard on the free Asian countries with its massive weight of numbers, its rising military power, and its infiltration among overseas Chinese.”² The United States’ allies in East and Southeast Asia were equally alarmed. In the Philippines, intelligence briefings from the late 1940s and early 1950s

teem with fears of local Chinese as “fifth columnists,” reports of CCP agents and propaganda being smuggled into the country, and wildly inaccurate estimates of number of Chinese communists and their sympathizers residing there. Most vociferous of all in claiming that the CCP was expanding into Nanyang was the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. In the decades that followed its flight from the mainland, the Nationalist state churned out a steady stream of propaganda that sought to unmask what one short tract from 1954 called the *Communist Bandits’ Plot Against the Overseas Chinese* (*Gongfei dui huaqiao zhi yinmou 共匪對華僑之陰謀*). In it, ROC propagandists accused the PRC not only of crimes against overseas Chinese who had returned to the mainland, or *guiqiao* 歸僑, but also of conspiring with Russian imperialists (*E di* 俄帝) to corrupt Chinese living abroad and, through them, destabilize Southeast Asian nation-states from within.

We know today that American, Southeast Asian, and Nationalist China’s fears of a rampant Maoist neocolonialism and of *huaqiao* as fifth columnists, working to advance the PRC’s agenda, were vastly overblown. Many overseas Chinese, it is true, regarded the PRC highly, most famously the Singaporean businessman Tan Kah Kee, who returned to China in 1950 and contributed much to the economic and educational development of Fujian. Pro-communist factions and newspapers were to be found in most Chinese communities outside China, particularly in Sukarno’s Indonesia, but also in Thailand. And in Malaysia, of course, local Chinese were at the forefront of the Malayan Communist Party’s (MCP) decades-long insurgency, starting in 1948, against first the British and then the postcolonial government. But the MCP’s allegiances lay with Malaysia, rather than China. It had no ties to the PRC and was swiftly marginalized as a genuine threat to security by the British

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3 See, for example, File 007, Box 5, Folder 7: National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (1948), Elpidio Quirino Papers, Filipinas Heritage Library [FHL], Ayala Museum, Manila.

and conservative Chinese in the peninsula. Support for the PRC among Southeast Asia’s huaqiao was almost everywhere contested and circumscribed by some combination of rival Chinese groups, Taiwan, colonial and postcolonial states, and the United States. Mao’s China did not even exercise sustained influence over the Chinese in North Vietnam, except when it was given great latitude to organize Chinese education from 1954 to 1958. Far from seeking to subvert new Southeast Asian nations, the PRC was keen to strengthen its relations with them in the name of solidarity with the global South. This meant explicitly encouraging huaqiao to become citizens of their countries of residence, adopt integrative practices such as intermarriage, and limit their pro-PRC activities by the end of the 1950s. As the PRC turned inwards and towards domestic mobilization, it likewise disengaged from the Chinese diaspora, and, in one scholar’s words, “decolonized” from Southeast Asia. It did not so much have a policy towards huaqiao living overseas as towards guiqiao, whom it often struggled to incorporate into the socialist body politic.

Pending fresh archival discoveries, scholars of modern China in the world will likely search in vain for evidence of the Chinese abroad as fifth columnists acting on behalf of the PRC, or of anything close to the sort of influence over huaqiao which anticommunists believed that the PRC enjoyed. From the end of World War II to the mid-1970s, the Chinese state with the strongest and

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8 Fitzgerald, China and the Overseas Chinese, 74. For a similar view from a leading PRC scholar of the overseas Chinese, see Zhuang Guotu 庄国土, Huaqiao huaren yu zhongguo de guanxi 华侨华人与中国的关系 (Guangzhou: Guangdong gaodeng jiaoyu chubanshe, 2001), 251-252.

most unchallenged ties to any huaqiao community in Southeast Asia was, ironically, the ROC on Taiwan. Nationalist China had itself been a victim of Western and Japanese imperialism and was a tenacious and vituperative opponent of supposed Maoist subversion. A client of the United States after 1949, it survived because of US military and economic aid. Yet its history and vulnerability did not inhibit its willingness to become involved in overseas Chinese affairs so much as stimulate it. Displaced from mainland China, the Kuomintang (KMT) regime laid claim to persons whom it considered “Chinese nationals” by law, culture, and blood, regardless of where they resided, in the name of protecting their rights and interests and in the hopes of securing their support in its quest to counterattack the mainland.

Nowhere else in Southeast Asia – quite possibly the world – was overseas Chinese support for Nationalist China more visible and entrenched than in the Philippines. By the end of the 1940s, with the CCP on the verge of victory in the Chinese Civil War, the Chinese communist movement in the former US colony was all but over, its leaders mostly driven out of the country and back to China. Henceforth, even as an indigenous communist insurgency – the Hukbalahap Insurgency – swept Central Luzon, the Philippine-Chinese community came to be dominated by the local branch of the KMT and, through it, the ROC. Collaboration between local Chinese, ROC officials and the Philippine military – but not the United States – facilitated the arrests of Chinese Red suspects and their deportation to Taiwan as ROC nationals under the Philippines’ 1940 Immigration Law. And unlike elsewhere in Southeast Asia, schools, newspapers, chambers of commerce, and other civic organizations in the Philippines after 1949 were not contested between leftist and rightist Chinese factions until after Manila recognized Beijing in 1975. Instead, pro-Taiwan institutions such as the KMT – which historians usually associate only with China and Taiwan – Philippine-Chinese Anti-Communist League, Chiang Kai-shek High School (later, College), Great China Press and Kong
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_Li Po_ papers, and Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry multiplied, connecting the Philippine Chinese to the ROC. Overlapping in function and membership, they structured civic life, suppressed heterodox views, and helped generate a uniform, civic-ideological identity for the community. In 1958, the Deputy Chairman of the ROC’s Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission (Qiaowu weiyuan hui 僑務委員會, or OCAC) Li Pusheng 李樸生 hailed the KMT’s branch in the Philippines as among the most energetic and its members as the most committed to anticommunism in the world. Notwithstanding the alarmist propaganda that OCAC churned out for the purposes of legitimizing Taiwan, his was a view shared by many ROC officials at the time.

This dissertation explains how the ROC, overseas Chinese, and the Philippines, sometimes but not always working with each other, produced and opposed the threat of Chinese communism from the end of World War II to the mid-1970s. It is not, as this synopsis makes clear, a history of US anticommunist efforts with respect to the overseas Chinese. It is, rather, an intra-Asian, social and cultural history of anticommunism and nation-building that liberates two close US allies from US-centric historiographies and juxtaposes them with each other and the _huaqiao_ community that they claimed. Three central arguments flow from this focus on intra-Asian anticommunism. First, I challenge narrowly territorialized understandings of Chinese nationalism by arguing that Taiwan engaged in diasporic nation-building in the Philippines. Whether by helping the Philippine military identify Chinese communists or by mobilizing Philippine _huaqiao_ in support of Taiwan, the ROC carved out a semi-sovereign sphere of influence for itself within a foreign country. It did so through institutions such as schools, the KMT, and the Chinese Anti-Communist League, which functioned transnationally and locally to embed the Nationalist state into Chinese society and connect _huaqiao_

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10 Li Pusheng 李樸生, _Wo ke pei de huaqiao pengyou_ 我可佩的華僑朋友 (Taipei: Zhengzhong shuju, 1958), 34.
to Taiwan. Through such groups, the ROC shaped the experiences of a national community beyond its territorial boundaries and represented itself to the world as the legitimate “China.”

Second, drawing upon political theory, I argue that the anticommunist relationship between the ROC, the Philippines, and the Philippine Chinese constituted a form of what I call shared, non-territorial sovereignty. Nationalist China did not secure influence over Chinese in the Philippines by exerting military or economic pressure, as a neocolonial regime might. Vast disparities in power did not obtain between Manila and Taipei, as they did between them and Washington. Rather, for reasons of law, culture, linguistic incapacity, and ideology, the Philippines selectively outsourced the management of its Chinese residents to the ROC. In turn, both depended on the Chinese being able to govern themselves with state support, coercive and otherwise. The Philippine Chinese, as in colonial times, were thus semi-autonomous actors who participated in the construction of shared sovereignty after World War II by forging ties with states to advance their anticommunist agenda. This three-way relationship provides a framework for thinking about postcolonial sovereignty in East Asia that focuses on relations of relative equality between states and the relative autonomy of the Chinese as a minority population, rather than between dominant and dominated or in terms of territory.

Nationalist China and the Philippines’ nation-building projects had profound consequences for the Philippine Chinese. While these peoples were in many respects acted upon by the ROC and Philippine states through legal and coercive means, they by no means lacked agency. Rather, they performed their agency as consensual participants in making anticommunism. In focusing on them, the dissertation shifts from international and transnational history to social and cultural history and the history of civic life. Existing scholarship, whether in the social sciences or Sinophone Studies, largely depicts the postcolonial hua subject as a non-ideological businessman or cultural producer.
I argue, by contrast, that the overseas Chinese could be eminently ideological and politically active. From informing on suspected Chinese communists to the ROC and Philippine states to proclaiming their loyalties to the ROC and Chiang Kai-shek, anticommunist social practices enabled Philippine huaqiao to come to terms with being legally disadvantaged and ideologically suspect minorities in their country of residence. Unlike racial and cultural Chineseness, which they could or would not give up, they could and did choose to behave ideologically; and in doing so, they legitimized their community to the Philippine state and Filipino society.

**The Philippine Chinese: ethnicity, culture, and nationality**

In the context of the period from 1945 to around 1970, I use “Philippine Chinese” to refer to residents of the country who regarded themselves as culturally Chinese and / or were perceived as such by Filipinos. More often than not, they were nationals of the ROC, although some could be Philippine citizens. Being Chinese in the Philippines, in other words, was partly about ethnicity culture and partly about nationality. It involved self-identification, but also how one was identified and categorized by Filipinos and the Philippine and ROC states: one could see oneself as a Filipino, and yet be seen by Filipinos as Chinese. According to one estimate, 85 percent of them were either born in southern Fujian (Minnan 閩南) in the late 19th and early 20th century or traced their ancestry there, while the other 15 percent were from Guangdong. In turn, 90 percent of those from Minnan were from Jinjiang, Nan’an, and Hui’an counties in Quanzhou prefecture, with those from Jinjiang

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outnumbering those from the other two by an almost two-to-one ratio.\textsuperscript{12} No Chinese dialect group was as dominant in any other Southeast Asian country.\textsuperscript{13} Consequently, a modified version of the Southern min dialect, Minnanhua or Hokkien, served as the lingua franca for the whole community, with many Cantonese speaking it.\textsuperscript{14} Language aside, Chinese were distinguishable from Filipinos by the civic organizations that they were a part of such as their unique dual-language schools, clan associations, and chambers of commerce; and customs such as ancestor worship and endogamous marriage. In emphasizing the capacity of persons to identify themselves as Chinese, my definition can also include Chinese mestizos, persons of mixed Chinese and Spanish or Filipino blood whom the Spanish colonial state considered “Chinese,” at a time when the number of “pure” Chinese was small. Over the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, growing numbers of new Chinese immigrants, mostly from Minnan, slowly drove these mestizos out of wholesaling and retailing. American colonial rule then legally recategorized mestizos as “Filipinos” to enable the implementation of the Chinese Exclusion Act, which targeted the new Chinese immigrants. Mestizos, therefore, were Philippine rather than ROC citizens. However, they could choose to play up the Chineseness of their identity, especially when interacting with other Chinese.


\textsuperscript{13} See G. William Skinner, “Report on the Chinese in Southeast Asia,” Southeast Asia Program, Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University, December 1950, 80. Skinner places the number of Philippine Chinese in 1950 who were from Fujian at a mere 70 percent, but this figure is still the highest among all dialect groups in different countries in the region. The 1996 Quanzhou City Overseas Chinese Gazetteer has the proportion of Philippine Chinese from Fujian province in 1939 at 80 percent and from Quanzhou at 75 percent. See Quanzhou shi huaqiao zhi bianzuan weiyuanhui (ed.), \textit{Quanzhou shi huaqiao zhi} 泉州市华侨志 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui chubanshe, 1996), 11.

\textsuperscript{14} Amyot, \textit{The Manila Chinese}, 54.
Ethno-cultural distinctions between “Chinese” and “Filipinos,” especially in Manila, grew wider during the late 19th century and the decades of US colonial rule. Chinese Exclusion, although unable to prevent Chinese migrants from entering the country, kept them occupationally separate from Filipinos and reinforced the association between ethnicity and economic occupation. Unlike the Spanish, US colonialists also discouraged intermarriage between legally defined racial groups to create a homogeneous Filipino nation that was loyal to the United States. Filipino and Chinese nationalisms both had a similarly delineating impact on ethno-cultural categories. While Filipino nationalists mostly targeted the Spanish state, they also opposed “alien” domination of the colonial economy. Widespread stereotypes of the Chinese as wealthy, corrupt businessmen, but also opium smokers, secret society members, and petty criminals crystallized during the late 19th century, were reinforced under US rule, and continued into the postcolonial period. Efforts by the Chinese state (imperial and republican), reformers, and revolutionaries to forge closer ties with overseas Chinese communities throughout this period reinforced how the Philippine Chinese understood themselves vis-à-vis Filipinos. In response to developments in both states, Philippine-Chinese elites adopted what Edgar Wickberg has called a “policy of organization and signification of their community.” Considered a community by others, he writes, “so they considered themselves.”

Ethnically and culturally distinct from Filipinos, most Chinese in the Philippines after 1946 were also citizens of the ROC and remained so until the late 1970s, regardless of where they were born. Throughout Southeast Asia, the transition from colonial empire to nation-state necessitated

15 See Chu, *The Chinese and Chinese Mestizos of Manila*, 292-294, on how Chinese found creative ways around the Chinese Exclusion Act in order to enter the Philippines.


17 Wickberg, *The Chinese in Philippine Life 1850-1898*, 147, 204.
that new states draw clear-cut, legal distinctions between nationals and non-nationals within their territories. Everyone had to have a nationality and those categorized as nationals be made to adhere to the cultural and civic norms of the dominant ethnic group. The largest non-indigenous minority community in these new nations posed a unique problem because of their economic status, ties to China, and cultural distinctiveness. How were they to be incorporated into the nation? Should and could they be?

All Southeast Asian states provided pathways to citizenship for the Chinese and sought, to varying extents, to integrate or assimilate them into new national communities. In British Malaya, for example, Chinese politicians’ bargaining efforts ensured that the constitution of 1957 laid down clear provisions for citizenship for all local Chinese.\textsuperscript{18} In Thailand, postwar anti-Chinese measures were replaced by nationality, electoral, and military service legislation after 1956 that reaffirmed the state’s historical commitment to the political integration and cultural assimilation of its Chinese population.\textsuperscript{19} Postwar Philippine governments, however, were much less willing and able to push for such measures until the 1970s. Chinese schools, for example, a common target for all states in the region, were relatively untouched in the Philippines. Underpinning Manila’s non-intervention in Chinese cultural affairs was its treatment of the Chinese as foreign aliens in accordance with the ROC’s 1929 Nationality Law. Based on the principle of \textit{jus sanguinis} (bloodright) and in effect in Taiwan until 2000, it categorized practically anyone born to a Chinese father, dead or alive, or to a Chinese mother and unknown or dead father as a “Chinese national.”\textsuperscript{20} For instance, the children

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of a Filipino woman and Chinese man were categorized as such. In April 1947, Manila signed a Treaty of Amity with Nanjing that, in defining the rights and privileges of Philippine and Chinese nationals in each other’s territories, signaled the Philippines’ implicit acceptance of its Chinese as citizens of the ROC. In September, the Supreme Court affirmed the Philippines’ commitment to *jus sanguinis* citizenship in its ruling on the case of *Jose Tan Chong vs. The Secretary of Labor*. Born in San Pablo, Laguna in 1915 to a Chinese father and Filipina mother, Tan Chong had been denied entry into the Philippines in 1940 after spending the previous 15 years in China. Set to be deported, he sued for a writ of habeas corpus and secured his release from the Secretary of Labor, only for the Solicitor-General to appeal the decision on the eve of World War II. After the war, the Court took up this appeal and reversed its earlier decision, arguing that despite being born in the Philippines, Tan Chong was a Chinese national because he had not spent his youth in his country of birth and thus lacked intangible, cultural attributes of citizenship such as “knowledge and pride of the country’s past.” Citizenship was a “political status” and something that the citizen had to be proud of. The Court thus legitimized the same principle of *jus sanguinis* that formed the basis of how the ROC defined nationality.

Considerable obstacles stood in the way of the average Chinese resident becoming a citizen of the Philippines under the provisions of the 1939 Revised Naturalization Law. The naturalization process was “prohibitively complex, costly, unsure, and slow,” one critic wrote in 1974. It required the applicant, whether born in the Philippines or not, to not only be able to “speak and write English or Spanish and any one of the principal Philippine languages,” but also own real estate worth not less than 5,000 pesos, or “must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation.”

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Those who, during their residence in the country, had “not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos,” among other subjective criteria, were not allowed to be naturalized. Applicants were required to file a declaration of intent to become a citizen with the Bureau of Justice a year before petitioning the Court of First Instance in his province. The petition had to be approved by multiple government agencies and the petitioner was questioned extensively by the court before he obtained his certificate of naturalization. Wealthy Chinese usually bribed their way through this process; those without the means to do so had little incentive to seek naturalization. The majority of Chinese thus remained nationals of the ROC until after President Ferdinand Marcos simplified the process of naturalization, nationalized Chinese private schools, and established relations with the PRC by decree in 1975.

Rethinking anticommunism in Cold War Asia: intra-Asian relations, society, and culture

Except for those on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), studies of Cold War anticommunist relations in East and Southeast Asia largely examine the United States’ ties to countries such as Taiwan, the Philippines, South Vietnam, South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia. While histories of these states show that Asian actors such as the KMT opposed communism long before the postwar era, indigenous anticommunism movements are mostly treated as national(ist) phenomena that had neither an interest in nor the capacity for organizing across territorial borders. In this conventional narrative, it is US military and developmental aid, cultural programming, and counterinsurgency techniques that “regionalized” anticommunism and successfully contained the

Cold War enemy throughout most of Southeast Asia, except in Indochina. We might label this the “hub-and-spokes” model of anticommunism, which hews closely to Odd Arne Westad’s definition of the Cold War as a global contest for ideological supremacy between the United States and Soviet Union. While scholarly works based on this model have long ceased to treat those at the end of the spokes as passive clients of the United States, they remain focused on explaining the American impact on Asian states and societies.

There is, of course, little denying the political, economic, and cultural scope of the US Cold War project in Asia and the close ties between the United States and the ROC and the Philippines. We know, too, that the United States was actively involved in propagandizing against communism among Southeast Asia’s Chinese. Yet US hegemony in the region did not preclude the existence of relationships between Asian actors (as opposed to between Asian actors and the United States). Neither was such hegemony quite as all-encompassing and uniform as the concept suggests. In the postwar Philippines, the United States was fixated on the Huk problem. But there is little evidence from either US or ROC archives to show that it played an active role in the affairs of the Philippine Chinese, even when it came to prosecuting communists. In December 1952, the arrest of some 300...
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Chinese communist suspects by the Philippine military came as a great surprise to the United States, which played no role in the operation (it turned out that practically all those arrested were innocent). One reason for US non-involvement in Philippine-Chinese society was its small size – an estimated 270,000, or 1.2 percent of the Philippine population of 22.3 million, in 1959.\footnote{Skinner, “Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia,” 137.} A second was that the Chinese were scarcely involved in the Huk movement and had no track record of being a threat to social and political order. Though not uninterested in the Chinese, the United States was content to monitor them from a distance and allow the Philippines and ROC to manage them.

The dissertation then, dispenses with the US-centric, hub-and-spokes model in favor of an intra-Asian understanding of Cold War-era anticommunism. In doing so, it draws inspiration from a growing body of scholarship on the PRC in Asia and the transnational practices of socialist and non-aligned actors – on, for example, Vietnamese revolutionary networks in Thailand, PRC-North Vietnam ties, and Indonesian intellectuals’ relations with the PRC.\footnote{Respectively, Christopher Goscha, \textit{Thailand and the Southeast Asian Networks of the Vietnamese Revolution, 1885-1954} (London: Curzon Books, 1999); Qiang Zhai, \textit{China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975} (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Hong Liu, \textit{China and the Shaping of Indonesia, 1949-1965} (Singapore: NUS Press, 2011).} Animated by anticolonialism, notions of working-class solidarity, and internationalism, left-wing states and movements (broadly defined) lend themselves naturally to understanding intra-Asian connections in a postcolonial and Cold War setting. The right, conversely, is usually associated with the nation-state, whose integrity it sought to protect against deracinated, cosmopolitan transnationals. Yet if the left operated across borders, it stands to reason that their enemies did so as well, mimicking and opposing them at the same time. Underpinned by institutions such as the KMT, anticommunism, I show, was a powerful driving force for international and transnational organizing in support of nationalism.\footnote{On right-wing transnationalism, see Martin Durham and Margaret Power (ed.), \textit{New Perspectives on the Transnational Right} (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).}
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Decoupling Asian anticommunism from the United States shifts our focus away from the Cold War as a US imperial project and calls attention instead to the agency and ambitions of states such as the Philippines and Taiwan and communities such as the Philippine Chinese. In this regard, my work resembles that of Edward Miller’s on South Vietnamese Premier Ngô Đình Diệm, whom Miller argues sought to modernize Vietnam along Confucian and Catholic lines and relied less on the United States to consolidate his power than his family’s established political networks. Diệm and his regime derived material resources from the United States and broadly aligned themselves with US Cold War goals in the country. Yet he was fundamentally interested not in advancing US interests, except when the coincided with his, but in implementing his idiosyncratic vision of what a modern and democratic Vietnam, neither liberal nor communist, should look like, even if it meant conflict with his Cold War patron. Comparable motivations drove other allies of the United States in the wider East Asian region, from South Korea to Taiwan to Indonesia. For these reasons, they entered into relationships with each other.

This dissertation also departs from standard Cold War narratives by focusing not on interstate relations, high diplomacy, and geopolitics. Rather, building on a rich body of scholarship on the social and cultural history of the Cold War in Asia, I explore the effects of ROC and Philippine intervention in the Philippine-Chinese community in pursuit of anticommunist goals and how, in Masuda Hajimu’s words, “the ‘reality’ of the Cold War was produced and consolidated, and why numerous people joined in.” The anticommunism that I examine assumed two dimensions. As a

29 Miller, Misalliance, 15.

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form of coercion, it revolved around the detention and deportation of suspected or actual Chinese communists by the Philippine state, whether in collaboration with ROC officials and local Chinese actors – or not. From KMT members to criminals, such actors played important roles in campaigns against Chinese by forging intelligence and informing on them to the authorities, whether for profit and status, because of personal vendettas, or in response to perceived violations of the ideological status quo. Anticommunism was also characterized by the transformation of Chinese associational life in the Philippines along ideological lines, with Nationalist China coming to play a leading role in shaping it. This entailed the creation of institutions aimed at propagating anticommunism, such as the Philippine-Chinese Anti-Communist League; the reorienting of existing ones, from schools to the Chinese community’s governing organizations, in support of this ideology; and coordination between Chinese groups, the ROC and Philippine states, and Filipino and global anticommunists. It encompassed the circulation of propaganda as well as the staging of propagandistic rituals such as visits to Taiwan and ideologically-charged theatrical performances. In consuming and enacting anticommunism, Philippine-Chinese actors learned to think and feel in certain ways about Taiwan, China, and being Chinese, and adapted themselves to life in the Philippines.

Diasporic nation-building: Nationalist China, the KMT, and huaqiao

From the late 1920s to the postwar decades, the ROC can claim to be an intra-Asian actor par excellence because of the attention it paid to diasporic nation-building and the institutions that it possessed to do so. Nationalist China had long regarded the Chinese in the Philippines and other huaqiao as members of a deterritorialized Chinese nation in order to fashion itself to the world as the legitimate representative of these peoples. The KMT had been ejected from mainland China in 1949 in humiliating circumstances. Despite a coveted seat at the United Nations and support from
the United States, the regime was corrupt and dysfunctional, and lacked legitimacy in the eyes of many among the “free” world. Part of improving its reputation involved a wholesale reorganization of the party, local-level political reforms, and land reform and community development – all of which took place on Taiwan,\textsuperscript{31} and was made known worldwide. To enhance its standing, and not just among states, the ROC also persisted in seeking the loyalties and material resources of persons whom it identified as \textit{huaqiao} to the Nationalist cause; in return, it would provide them with legal, financial, and cultural support, and protect them from the discriminatory policies of foreign states. Chinese reformers had coined the neologism \textit{huaqiao} (“Chinese sojourner”) in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century to emphasize belonging to a transnational ethno-cultural \textit{hua} community, temporary displacement from an imagined Chinese motherland, and thus sojourners’ basic affinities for China, rather than the localities where they happened to reside.\textsuperscript{32} The Qing government’s 1909 Nationality Law, upon which the ROC’s 1929 law was based, gave legal expression to the racial and cultural assumptions inherent in the term. Reformers and nationalists persisted in employing it in their quests to realize a future China. They recognized, as Prasenjit Duara argues, that while territorial nationalism is the sole legitimate expression of sovereignty in the modern world, it is an inadequate basis for enabling identification with the nation-state. All nationalisms therefore make use of more exclusive or wider narratives of historical community, based on common race, language, or culture, to create affective identification between the people and the nation.\textsuperscript{33} In this way, Chinese abroad, previously branded traitors to the dynasty, were rehabilitated as members of the nation.

\textsuperscript{31} For a summary of these political and economic reforms, Ramon H. Myers and Hsiao-ting Lin, \textit{Breaking with the Past: The Kuomintang Central Reform Committee on Taiwan, 1950-52} (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2007).


Officials narratives of the ROC depict overseas Chinese communities and the anti-imperial precursors of the KMT such as the Tongmenghui that they established as playing a central role in the formation of the new Republic.\textsuperscript{34} For this reason, Sun Yat-sen, himself a Chinese sojourner, is supposed to have described \textit{huaqiao} as the “mother of the revolution” (\textit{geming zhi mu} 華僑革命之母) – a phrase that persists to this day in both China and Taiwan.\textsuperscript{35} Such mythologizing became a prominent feature of the KMT’s efforts to cultivate the overseas Chinese after it was reorganized along Leninist lines and came to power in 1927. During the Nanjing Decade (1928-37), branches of the KMT were established across Southeast Asia and the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission (\textit{Qiaowu weiyuan hui} 僑務委員會, or OCAC) formed as a ministry-level agency to promote closer affinities between \textit{huaqiao} and the ROC, especially by shaping overseas Chinese education along party-approved lines, and encouraging investments in China. If diplomatic ties between China and Southeast Asian governments constituted a formal sphere of relations between one Asian state and others, then branches of the party and the schools, newspapers, and persons affiliated to it belonged to an informal, transnational sphere of interactions that connected the state to \textit{huaqiao} communities. The Nanjing years, then, laid down an essential infrastructure for diasporic nation-building, while also helping to generate a vocabulary with which the state framed its approach to overseas Chinese affairs, or \textit{qiaowu}, in the decades to come. Conflict between the KMT and CCP during this period also paved the way for the Civil War and the ROC’s mobilization of Chinese peoples in opposition to the PRC after 1949.

\textsuperscript{34} See, for example, \textit{Zhongguo Guomindang zai haiwai yibai nian} 中國國民黨在海外一百年 (Taipei: Haiwai chubanshe, 1994), 56-102.

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The Second Sino-Japanese War was a watershed moment for diasporic nation-building and, despite the United Front between the KMT and CCP, anticommunism. *Huaqiao* such as Tan Kah Kee became a crucial source of material and propaganda support for the ROC as it sought external Asian allies in its struggle against Japan.\(^{36}\) The overseas Chinese would remain a core constituency for the ROC after 1945 and 1949, as the state sought to transform *huaqiao* opposition to Japan into antipathy towards the CCP, which it depicted as both an internal problem of “bandits” seeking the overthrow of legitimate authority and a “puppet” of the Soviet Union. The War of Resistance also sharpened legal and cultural distinctions between friend and enemy for the KMT and CCP. It was during the war that the Nationalists enacted what Yun Xia describes as a “body of politically and morally charged laws against *hanjian* [漢奸; literally, traitors to the Han race] and mobilized the people to identify and strike down those judged likely to betray the nation.”\(^{37}\) *Hanjian* referred to Chinese who had collaborated with the Japanese and included *huaqiao*. After 1945, as Xia shows, Chiang Kai-shek described Mao Zedong and Zhu De as the “greatest and most characteristic of all *hanjian*.”\(^{38}\) Nationalist attitudes forged during one war transferred easily to the next. Partly for this reason, the period from 1937 to the 1950s in first China and then Taiwan can be considered a single “long war,” to use Rebecca Nedostup’s expression, rather than a series of discrete conflicts.\(^{39}\)

Understanding the ROC’s promotion of anticommunist nationalism among *huaqiao* after 1949, I suggest, requires a longer-term historical perspective than this “long war.” For most of its

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\(^{38}\) Xia, *Down with Traitors*, 181.

existence until it relinquished any pretenses of counterattacking China, the ROC was a territorially incomplete and partially sovereign state threatened by Western, Japanese, and Soviet imperialists from without and warlords, hanjian, and communists from within. During the Sino-Japanese War and prior to the Northern Expedition, the party controlled only part of the mainland; after 1949, it controlled none of it. Qiaowu and the institutional presence of the KMT abroad helped to remedy this incompleteness. In effect, the state compensated for a chronic lack of Westphalian sovereignty by claiming popular sovereignty over members of a Chinese nation that it imagined transnationally. In postcolonial countries such as the Philippines that tolerated the ROC’s involvement in overseas Chinese communities, anticommunist qiaowu constituted an expansion of Nationalist sovereignty in non-territorial terms and thus represented a fundamental continuity with prewar nation-building policies.

Recognizing these continuities and the historical importance that the ROC assigned to the overseas Chinese can help scholars rethink what it means to study the KMT and China in the world, in addition to challenging US-centric narratives of Cold War Asia. Histories of the party emphasize its nation-building efforts in China during the Nanjing Decade and Taiwan after 1945 and 1949.

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But, except for a handful of works on qiaowu, the KMT in Malaya and Australia, and former KMT troops in the Sino-Burmese borderlands, scholars tend not to treat the party as an overseas Chinese or transnational actor.\textsuperscript{41} Meanwhile, narratives of the PRC’s diplomatic and cultural relations with the socialist bloc, Third World, and United States, and of Maoism and the Cultural Revolution as global phenomena, dominate the study of China in the world.\textsuperscript{42} Yet, as we have seen, the “China” that was most active in cultivating ethnic Chinese abroad was the ROC. For more than two decades after 1949, “China” was a contested and plural signifier for states and Chinese peoples across the world. Scholars should eschew, as literary theorist Christopher Lupke has argued, “a hypostasized and positivistic notion of ‘China’ as synonymous with mainland China.”\textsuperscript{43} “China” has not always stood for the PRC, as it has since the PRC entered the United Nations on October 25, 1971. In fact, until then, Nationalist ideologues in Taiwan, the Philippines, and globally rejected any association between a polity that they denounced as the “communist bandit regime” (gongfei zhengquan 共匪政權) and Chineseness, whether in terms of citizenship, culture, or nation-statehood. They sought to ensure instead that these individual and civilizational qualities of Chineseness inhered solely in


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the Nationalist party-state, in the hopes that it might someday reclaim the mainland from the CCP. The notion of China as their homeland remained foremost in the cultural imaginaries of many who believed themselves as displaced from it. That their desires for a counterattack were never realized, that Taiwan became ultimately marginalized in international affairs, and that a distinct Taiwanese consciousness has emerged should not blind historians to how the ROC and its diasporic loyalists produced their own meanings of China and Chineseness well before the rise of the PRC to global preeminence in our time. In the 1950s and 1960s, just as in the early 20th century, rival ideological movements, operating in a climate of political crisis, proffered divergent visions of an ideal China and sought to actualize them with the support of the overseas Chinese. This transnational struggle to define China and Chineseness and the ROC’s role in it can be said to exemplify modern Chinese history.

Shared, non-territorial sovereignty: the Philippine state and its Chinese population

Of the few scholars who have commented on the ROC’s ties to the overseas Chinese, two have explicitly characterized it, in passing, as a version of colonialism. In 1972, Stephen Fitzgerald argued not only that the PRC “decolonized” from Southeast Asia with respect to the Chinese there, but also that the “nearest approach to a simple colonial position on China’s relations with Chinese in Southeast Asia was represented by the policies of the Kuomintang, which regarded jurisdiction over Chinese abroad as a right and responsibility of the Chinese government; in effect, a question of the internal affairs of China.”44 Decades later, Philip Kuhn cited Fitzgerald to make an identical claim about the KMT’s “attempt to exercise a kind of colonialism” through its overseas branches.45

44 Fitzgerald, China and the Overseas Chinese, 76.

45 Philip A. Kuhn, Chinese Among Others: Emigration in Modern Times (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 268.
Neither, however, substantiated his claim. Perhaps both had in mind here similarities between the KMT’s position on the overseas Chinese and Western colonial powers’ assertion of extraterritorial rights in Chinese treaty ports from the mid-19th century onwards.

Did Nationalist China, despite its anti-imperialist rhetoric, exercise (neo)colonial influence in the Philippines after 1945? In Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah’s definition of the term, a society under neocolonialism is in theory independent and possesses “all the outward trappings of international sovereignty”; in reality, though, “its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside.” President Sukarno’s broadsides against the Dutch over Irian Jaya and the British over the formation of Malaysia and his mobilization of the Indonesian military against both states also show that accusations of neocolonialism were a powerful rhetorical device in the hands of politicians at the time. It has proven a versatile category of scholarly analysis as well. It is well-established, for example, in scholarship on Taiwanese identity as a “nationalist” response to KMT “mainlander” rule after 1945 and CCP rule in Xinjiang and Tibet. Cultural theorist Kuan-Hsing Chen argues that President Lee Teng-hui’s 1994 call for Taiwanese investment in Southeast Asia manifested “an inchoate ideological desire for a Taiwanese subempire” that state-driven capitalist expansion in the region in the 1980s had fueled. In the Philippines, neocolonialism commonly


refers to American military bases, meddling in elections, and control over trade policy after 1946.\textsuperscript{49} Capitalism, territoriality, the loss of sovereignty, and unequal relations of power characterize this phenomenon.

Evaluated in relation to these features, Nationalist China’s presence in the Philippines and role in the creation of anticommunism were in no way (neo)colonial. Unlike in the 1980s, the ROC was not an expansionist capitalist power in the period under scrutiny; it neither hoped nor was able to induce any major transfers of wealth from the Philippines to itself in partnership with Philippine-Chinese capital. Whatever successes it enjoyed at land reform and export-oriented industrialization did not translate into influence over the Philippines’ economic policy. Needless to say, there were no Taiwanese equivalents of Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Base – or the extraterritorial enclaves that characterized Western colonial rule in treaty-port China. However much the KMT was capable of imposing itself over Taiwan and the offshore island chains of Quemoy, Matsu, and Penghu, the ROC was weak internationally. Having been recognized by the United States and United Nations, it could project influence beyond Taiwan’s borders as a legitimate state, as it did, for example, by promoting agricultural development in Southeast Asia and Africa beginning in the 1960s.\textsuperscript{50} But to describe its influence over the Philippine Chinese as “neocolonial” diminishes the agency, first, of the Philippines in negotiating with the ROC the nature and extent of this influence and, second, of the Philippine Chinese themselves as semi-autonomous non-state actors. Anticommunist relations


between these actors were thus premised, ironically, on the same spirit of equality and ideological solidarity that characterized the PRC’s ties with North Korea, North Vietnam, Indonesia, and India.

My dissertation adapts political scientist Stephen Krasner’s concept of shared sovereignty to explain the anticommunist relationship between the ROC, the Philippines, and huaqiao society. Krasner uses it to describe a voluntary agreement between recognized national political authorities and an external actor such as another state or a regional and international organization. It is not, he emphasizes, something to be imposed. As historical examples, Krasner cites the Ottoman Empire’s creation of a Council of the Public Debt in 1881 to share management of its internal revenues with its Western European creditors; as well as how West Germany voluntarily gave the NATO powers expansive authority over their troops on its own territory in exchange for being able to arm itself.51 The postcolonial Philippines might be added to this list of cases. There remains some debate as to whether the Philippine state was “weak” vis-à-vis a powerful oligarchy of landed elites,52 but more relevant here was its limited capacity to intervene in Chinese society because of language and law. Its coercive organs lacked knowledge of the Chinese language and thus were unable to interrogate Chinese communist suspects, read Chinese sources (such as supposed CCP propaganda), regulate schools (which it feared as breeding grounds for communism), and propagandize to local Chinese without “outsourced” help. These limitations, its designation of the Chinese as aliens, and a shared anticommunist world view, meant that it was appropriate and necessary to allow the ROC to exert significant influence over the Chinese.


52 The revisionist view is best expressed by political scientist John T. Sidel, who argues that that Philippines has a relatively weak developmental state, but is strong as a “complex set of predatory mechanisms for the private exploitation and accumulation of the archipelago’s human, natural, and monetary resources.” Sidel, Capital, Coercion, and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 146.
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None of this is to imply that the Philippines adopted a non-interventionist approach towards the Chinese question. It could not, given the importance of Chinese affairs to its national security and identity. In December 1952, as mentioned previously, the Philippine military arrested around 300 Chinese communist suspects without consulting the ROC beforehand. Nationalistic politicians were particularly keen on curbing what they regarded as Chinese dominance of the economy; they achieved success in this regard in 1954, with the passing of legislation that “Filipinized” the retail trade. There was a comparable but – until the advent of martial law in 1972 – unsuccessful attempt to nationalize Chinese education and bring private Chinese schools into the ambit of the state. The ROC objected to all three measures. While Nationalist China and the Philippines may have shared sovereignty over Chinese society, the boundaries between their spheres of influence were unclear and, the Treaty of Amity aside, minimally defined by law: here, I diverge from Krasner’s legalistic understanding of shared sovereignty.53 The susceptibility of the bureaucratic and legal process in the Philippines to political pressures ensured that there was always space for bargaining between Taipei and Manila over issues related to Chinese society, as we will see when examining how the December 1952 episode was eventually resolved.

More than this, we must account for the Philippine Chinese as non-state participants in this three-way relationship. Their importance to the postcolonial state and relative autonomy from state control can be traced to colonial-era arrangements. From the Malay states to the Dutch East Indies to the Spanish Philippines, weak and understaffed colonial regimes lacked the personnel and skills to directly exploit native populations economically. They thus delegated the collection of taxes for goods, services, and markets (especially those related to gambling, liquor, prostitution, and opium)

53 Krasner, “The Case for Shared Sovereignty,” 76.
to monopolistic Chinese tax farms that guaranteed part of what they collected to the state.\textsuperscript{54} In the Philippines, US rule abolished these revenue farms and curbed Chinese migration. But Exclusion also institutionalized the colonial state’s legal and cultural understanding of non-mestizo Chinese as foreigners and thus as largely the responsibility of their elites and the Chinese Consul in Manila. It facilitated Chinese domination of key trade and occupational sectors such as retailing, and both reinforced kinship-based migration patterns and reengineered them to fill specific market niches. The US authorities, unlike their British or French counterparts, also adopted a more lenient attitude towards Chinese political organizations such as the Tongmenghui and KMT. In the same way that the Americans favored cooperation with established Filipino elites, so too did they seek to cultivate \textit{huaqiao} elites to ensure the profitability of the colonial economy.\textsuperscript{55} Consequently, Chinese society developed governing institutions such as the General Chamber of Commerce to manage their own affairs and connect elites to the colonial state and China. The postcolonial and the Cold War period witnessed more extensive attempts at state intervention in this society, especially in commerce and trade. But, perhaps more so than anywhere else in Southeast Asia, it was also marked by continuity. Much like the United States before it, the independent Philippines persisted in treating the Chinese as aliens, leaving their governing organizations intact, recognizing the Chinese state’s sovereignty over them, and outsourcing important state functions to the Chinese themselves and their political representatives. At the same time, it reserved the right to intervene in Chinese society in the name of national interests. This society was, in other words, a space of overlapping, contested, and non-territorial sovereignty within a territorialized nation-state.

\textsuperscript{54} Kuhn, \textit{Chinese Among Others}, 75.

\textsuperscript{55} Wilson, \textit{Ambition and Identity}, 141, 147, 153, 167, 176.
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Ideology and self-representation among the Philippine Chinese

The Philippine Chinese are this dissertation’s third principal actor. In focusing on them, I argue that anticommunism was integral to Chinese civic life and how they represented themselves to the Philippine and ROC states and their fellow Chinese. In the context of postcolonial and Cold War Southeast Asia, the Chinese “identity” that I am interested in was thus ideological in the sense of being attuned towards the politics of the Cold War and the China-Taiwan split; and performative and institutionalized as opposed to a matter of personal belief.

Conventional scholarly wisdom holds that enthusiasm for China-centered politics among huaqiao increased during the Nanjing Decade, peaked during the Second Sino-Japanese War, and then declined thereafter because of the Civil War, which sowed confusion among nationalist ranks; the disruption of migration networks connecting China to Southeast Asia; and the assimilationist policies of states that also weakened political and cultural affinities between huaqiao and China. For these reasons, scholarship on the Chinese in postwar Southeast Asia tends to assume that they lost interest in China-centered politics. It focuses instead on their responses to state-sponsored anti-Chinese policies and efforts to forge “ethnic identities appropriate to pluralist polities,” usually in “some sort of hybrid formulation,” in the words of Adam McKeown. Studies on the Philippines, are no different, written as many of them have been by social scientists and civil activists seeking to integrate “Tsinos” (Chinese-Filipinos) into mainstream Philippine society.

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58 Young, college-educated Chinese formed Pagkakaisa Sa Pag-unlad (Unity for Progress) in 1970 to push for *jus soli* citizenship and Chinese integration into Philippine society. See Charles McCarthy (ed.), *Philippine-Chinese Profile: Essays & Studies* (Manila: Pagkakaisa Sa Pag-unlad, 1974) for an introduction to the concerns of this group. Relevant scholarly monographs here include Amyot, *The Manila Chinese*; Gerald A. McBeath, *Political Integration of the Philippine Chinese* (Berkeley: Center for South and Southeast Asia Studies, 1973); and John T. Omohundro,
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The emergence of Sinophone Studies, a subfield of Chinese literary studies that examines, in part, Sinitic language communities and cultures outside China, has contributed much to how we understand the construction of Chineseness beyond China’s borders. Yet Cold War politics and ideology remain incidental to how scholars of the Sinophone approach cultural production and to historians and social scientists of the diaspora in postcolonial Southeast Asia. For the latter group, the basic figure of interest, as multiple works on the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the preeminent Chinese organization in the country from 1954 onwards, remains the merchant capitalist. The Chinese businessman, in the words of anthropologist Donald Nonini, have been elevated to “the status of the ne plus ultra” figure required for the understanding of “overseas Chinese culture.” His class interests are depicted as synonymous with those of the entire community, to the exclusion of other social actors such as intellectuals or professionals. He was political only to the extent that he sought positions of leadership within the community and to forge mutually beneficial ties with local politicians that enhanced his business interests. While he may have engaged in Chinese nationalist politics in the early years of the Republic and the War of Resistance, the times had changed. Returning to mainland China, where he faced persecution as a member of the capitalist bourgeoisie, was out of the question. Recognizing that his future lay with

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his country of residence, he sought to cope with the discriminatory and nationalist policies toward his family and community that his new political masters had implemented.

My dissertation revises this composite portrait of the stereotypical overseas Chinese subject. If Nonini’s response to the scholarly overemphasis on businessmen is to focus on Chinese workers, mine is to look also at intellectuals, diplomats, military officials, politicians, teachers, war veterans, and even criminals, loosely bound together by a commitment, authentic or not, to anticommunism and supporting the ROC. Far from being indifferent to the ideological politics of China vs. Taiwan, these diverse social actors exploited it in response to anti-Chinese sentiment and legislation. If, as Caroline Hau argues, the Chinese in the Philippines were racially territorialized as aliens loyal to China under US colonial rule, then their racial and territorial foreignness assumed an ideological dimension after 1945, especially after the outbreak of the Huk Rebellion and the CCP’s victory in the Civil War. Filipino elites identified communism as an “un-Filipino” and foreign ideology that was hostile to democracy and inclined towards violent authoritarianism. Discriminated against for their economic success and cultural and ethnic distinctiveness, the Chinese were also suspected of ideological heterodoxy and vulnerable to being blackmailed, arrested, and deported on charges of communism. As nationals of one state and residents of another, they thus aligned themselves with the ideologies of these states to fashion themselves as “good Philippine residents and good Chinese citizens.”

Ideology was thus more than a question of individual belief and unbelief, and Chineseness more than a matter of ethnicity and culture, narrowly defined. Numerous Philippine Chinese, KMT

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members in particular, were true anticommonsists and believers in the ROC, despite its setback in 1949; others were not. What matters is that they acted in ways that signaled to their fellow Chinese, Filipinos, and the ROC the right beliefs, irrespective of how deeply-held these beliefs were. Ethnocultural aspects of being Chinese such as one’s physiognomy, customs, and language were difficult if not impossible to shed. Ideology, by contrast, was performative. Anticommmunist practices, from creating civic institutions to organizing fundraising drives in support of the ROC to informing on alleged Chinese to the state helped Chinese mitigate Filipino racial and cultural prejudices toward them by emphasizing their civic credentials; they could also elevate certain individuals’ or factions’ reputations within the community, frequently at the expense of others’.

Anticommmunist civic activism among the Chinese in the Philippines mostly entailed shows of support for Nationalist China and criticisms of the “bandit regime” on mainland China. In this manner, the Philippine Chinese were unlike their counterparts in countries such as Malaysia, where the anticommmunism of the Malaysian Chinese Association was rapidly localized after the banning of the KMT in 1949 and not oriented towards the politics of China and Taiwan. In the Philippines, integrationist policies were limited, which meant that the Chinese there were foreign nationals and thus officially disbarred from domestic political activities such as running for office. (Needless to say, this was no obstacle to political lobbying and relationships of convenience between Chinese leaders and Filipino politicians.) China-centered politics thus lasted longer there than elsewhere as the only politics that the Chinese could legally participate in. Furthermore, such politics served the needs of the community as defined by its business as well as intellectual elites. For example, the

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64 The British believed that the KMT in Malaya was an “obstacle to the political progress of the Chinese in Malaya. It stands for Chinese nationalism and cannot give leadership in the pursuit of political rights for Chinese in this country. The increased activity of the Chinese Consuls also militates against any attempt at the Malayanization of the Chinese.” Yong and McKenna, *The Kuomintang Movement in British Malaya 1912-1949*, 219.
ROC’s promotion of “traditional Chinese culture” as an ideological bulwark against communism appealed to conservative educators seeking to resist the Filipinization of Chinese schools and youth. Identifying with a particular Chinese government, historian Andrew Wilson writes, reinforced the community’s Chinese identity, legitimized its elites, and promoted community cohesion in the face of rising anti-Chinese sentiment in the Philippines and uncertainty over the future of China.\(^6^5\) He was describing the turn of the 20\(^{th}\) century, but his insights on the importance of external sources of authority to local Chinese leaders apply just as much to the period after 1945, when comparable conditions obtained.

**Structure of the dissertation**

This dissertation explores the three-way anticommunist relationship between the ROC, the Philippines, and the Philippine Chinese across seven chapters, each of which develops one or more of the arguments on diasporic nation-building, shared, non-territorial sovereignty, and ideological, performative Chineseness.

Chapter 1, “The Making of Shared Sovereignty,” examines the conflict between right-wing and communist Chinese factions in the first three years after World War II, as both sides sought to come to terms with the Japanese occupation, the Chinese Civil War, and the politics of the newly-independent Philippines. While such tensions were not unique to this country, they persisted longer elsewhere in the region. In the Philippines, they were resolved by late 1948 in favor of the KMT-dominated right, a vanguard for the consolidation of Nationalist Chinese sovereignty in the country. I explain how this came about, focusing first on the different constituencies within the Philippines that each faction sought to mobilize and the different ways in which the Chinese left and right were

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connected to China. I then turn to the left’s concurrent conflicts with the KMT and Philippine state from mid-late 1945 onwards that coalesced into a collaborative relationship between the latter two against the first. The chapter ends by explaining how the signing of a Treaty of Amity between the two countries in 1947 legitimized Nationalist China’s influence in the Philippines.

Chapter 2, “In the Name of Anticommunism,” builds on scholarship by social and cultural historians of the Cold War by explaining how three groups of Chinese actors – the first associated with the KMT, the second involved in the Philippine-Chinese United Organization in Support of Anti-Communist Movement, and the third a gang of criminals employed by the Philippine military – exploited the anticommunist and Sinophobic political climate in the Philippines in the late 1940s and early 1950s. With Chinese communism there all but over as an organized movement, Chinese anticommunism became more than about identifying and rooting out subversives, supporting the ROC, and ideological authenticity. I argue that it also consisted of a diverse and flexible repertoire of practices, from crime to civic associationism, that Chinese elites and their challengers employed to bolster their reputations, enrich themselves, ingratiate themselves with the Philippine authorities, and pursue personal vendettas against their alleged communist enemies. By examining Philippine-Chinese efforts at what I call ideological accommodation within the contexts of the Cold War and Philippine nation-building, this chapter shows how Chinese integrated ideology into their identities as minorities in a newly-independent Southeast Asian state after World War II.

At the heart of Chapter 3, “Making Communists,” are two interconnected episodes in the early-mid-1950s involving the detention and trial of local Chinese on charges of being communists: the December 1952 jinqiao an 禁僑案, which saw around 300, mostly innocent, persons arrested; and the Cebu “reading club” affair from the mid-1950s involving a group of high school students who self-radicalized. I use these two episodes to explain how the multi-stage process of generating
intelligence on *huaqiao* communist suspects and rendering them legible to the Philippine and ROC states was susceptible to disinformation and manipulation. In the *jingqiao an*, the Philippine military relied on the inadequate and flawed evidence gathered by its main Chinese operative, and also the intentionally misleading testimony of the person whom she helped apprehend. In the Cebu reading club case, the ROC struggled to reconcile the inconsistent and self-exculpatory testimonies of the students, who downplayed their participation in the reading club and attempted to shift the blame to others in the hopes of mitigating their sentences. The deportation process was equally vulnerable to political maneuvering by the ROC and Chinese elites, who, caught unaware by the *jingqiao an*, mounted an extensive legal battle and lobbying campaign from 1953 to 1961 to secure the release of the innocent.

The next two chapters examine manifestations of social and cultural anticommunism and the ROC’s ties to Philippine-Chinese institutions. Chapter 4, “Networking Ideology,” argues for a structural and networked understanding of the ideological uniformity that came to characterize the Philippine-Chinese community from the mid-1950s onwards. Starting in 1954 with the formation of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry, leaders consolidated the social foundations of anticommunism in response to developments such as the *jingqiao an* and the Philippine government’s efforts to regulate Chinese education and commerce. Governance of the community was henceforth concentrated in five institutions and in the hands of a small group of elites who defined its priorities. High among these priorities was propagating anticommunism, a potent centripetal force and worldview that Filipinos, local Chinese, and the ROC could identify with. The chapter first explains the establishment of the Federation and the restructuring of Chinese society in the mid-1950s. It then focuses on two institutions – Chiang Kai-shek High School and the Philippine-Chinese Anti-Communist League – that helped propagate anticommunism, connect
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Chinese in the Philippines to Nationalist China, and, in the case of the latter, integrate Philippine-Chinese anticommunists into networks of like-minded ideologues in the Philippines and globally.

Chapter 5, “Experiencing the Nation-State,” examines the group visits which Chinese civic institutions in the Philippines organized to Taiwan, more of which came from the Philippines than from any other country. I argue that these visits were a means by which the ROC projected itself to the world as a sovereign polity and recreated aspects of being a “homeland” to diasporic Chinese. For the ROC state, the visits were a form of what I call experiential nationalism, whereby huaqiao immersed themselves in the culture and traditions of this substitute homeland, beheld firsthand the progress towards modernity and democracy that it was making, matched descriptions of Taiwan with a carefully curated reality, and internalized particular ways of knowing and feeling about the Chinese nation. Similar to the anticommmunist rallies, rituals, and public performances that huaqiao in the Philippines participated in, these visits were a type of discursive practice that integrated the vocabulary of ideology with its material forms to shape perceptions of the ROC, China, and being Chinese. By focusing on three such visits, I also argue that those who organized and went on them understood them in different ways and manifested diverse understandings of patriotism and what the ROC stood for. As highly publicized community events in the Philippines and Taiwan, these visits were displays of Chinese elites’ and non-elites anticommmunist and patriotic credentials. Yet many who visited Taiwan truly believed in the historical mission of the Nationalist regime, despite and because of the Civil War. For Chinese educators, the ROC’s promotion of Chinese culture as an ideological bulwark against communism also aligned with concurrent efforts by Chinese in the Philippines to defend the autonomy of their schools and improve Chinese education in response to Filipinization. Taiwan was attractive to them not as a bastion of anticommmunism, but as a source of professional expertise.
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The final chapters constitute a two-part history of the most infamous episode in relations between Nationalist China and the Philippines: the Yuyitung affair. On May 4, 1970, Quintin and Rizal Yuyitung, the Publisher and Editor respectively of the *Chinese Commercial News* (*Huaqiao shangbao* 華僑商報, or CCN), were arrested and deported to Taiwan on charges of printing pro-communist propaganda in their newspaper, despite still being on trial before the Deportation Board. No episode illustrates more vividly how Nationalist China and the Philippines shared sovereignty over Philippine-Chinese society to construct the “Chinese communist.” Chapter 6, “A Government Within a Government,” explains how the Yuyitungs were the victims of a secret campaign against them orchestrated by the Philippine military and a “Nationalist Chinese bloc” that comprised KMT ideologues and ROC officials in both Taiwan and the Philippines. This bloc collected, forged, and interpreted evidence to assist the military in making a legal case for the deportation of the brothers as pro-communist. I argue further that despite the Yuyitungs’ innocence, most, if not all, anti-CCN actors not only employed anticommunism as a strategy to oppose the paper, but also truly believed that it supported communism. In the context of a society in which anticommunism had become the ideological status quo, the paper’s centrist and independent editorial policy came across to hardline rightists as intolerably leftist.

Chapter 7, “A Humane Sovereignty,” focuses on the ROC’s public relations campaign in reaction to the deportation of the Yuyitungs to Taiwan and their trial there on August 14, 1970. In sentencing Quintin to only two years of reformatory education and Rizal to three, the ROC hoped to signal its responsiveness to international public opinion and shore up its position in the world at a critical time in its history. In doing so, however, it satisfied neither the hardline Philippine KMT, who believed that the sentences were too lenient, nor Taiwan’s most vocal critic, the International Press Institute (IPI), which campaigned long and hard for the release of the brothers on the grounds...
of press freedom and human rights. Although what mattered most to Nationalist China in the early 1970s were its United Nations seat and ties with the United States, it also valued its membership of international civil society and relations with smaller states and overseas Chinese societies. I use the ROC’s attempts to appease the Philippine KMT and the IPI to explain how the ROC exploited a crisis to consolidate its sovereignty and claims to membership of the international community.
Decades after leaving the Philippines for China, a man named Xie Dezhou 謝德周 recalled the years that he had worked as an employee of the Modern Bookstore at the junction of Magdalena and Soler Streets in Manila’s Chinatown. Founded by two former anti-Japanese resistance leaders, “Modern” specialized in progressive, patriotic, and internationalist literature, from translations of Shakespeare, Tolstoy, and other Western classics to works by contemporary Chinese authors such as Lu Xun, Guo Moruo, Mao Dun, Ba Jin, Marxist philosopher Ai Siqi, and world historian Zhou Gucheng. Through its contacts in Shanghai, the bookstore provided its readers with Soviet texts in Chinese translation and overseas Chinese newspapers from the United States, Cuba, and Singapore. During the Chinese Civil War, it imported pro-communist publications from Hong Kong exposing the corruption and reactionary activities of the KMT and extolling the achievements of the CCP in the “liberated areas” of northern China. Journalists, students, and patriotic businessmen flocked to the store to purchase periodicals and had them delivered to their homes; several female high school students even returned to China after being inspired by a short book that they had bought there. By the end of 1948, however, this bookstore and the social and cultural organs of Chinese society that had sustained it were no more. Facing persecution by the Philippine authorities and the KMT, most communist huaqiao leaders and many of their followers had departed for or been deported to their homeland. Xie Dezhou was one such participant in this ideological exodus, although we know not the timing or circumstances of his leaving. 

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The flight of Xie and others in the late 1940s brought to a close a brief, vicious, and poorly-understood period of conflict between the Chinese communists and the KMT in the early postwar Philippines. From the end of World War II there in March 1945 to late 1947, the Chinese left was openly active in the islands, emboldened by its resistance to the Japanese and the difficulties faced by the Philippine state in reconstituting itself. As in China, it came to blows with the KMT, which likewise had faced down Japan and was seeking to expand its influence in the country. Yet in 1948, with the Hukbalahap rebellion and Chinese Civil War well underway, Chinese communism in the former US colony was all but spent as a political force. Several Chinese radicals went underground in the Philippines, throwing in their lot with the Huks; most left for the more propitious ideological climes of Hong Kong or China. Conversely, while the KMT would be driven from mainland China the following year, it had established a sovereign foothold in the state closest to its future base of operations in Taiwan.

How did this come about? This chapter begins by exploring the prewar origins of the KMT and Chinese communist movement that emerged from the Japanese occupation of the Philippines to contest each other for influence. Caroline Hau describes members of the latter as “revolutionary cosmopolitans.” Animated by what they called the “spirit of internationalism,” they ranged across the colonial world in support of national liberation movements and to promote solidarities between leftist forces, even while privileging the long-term project of radical revolution in China that they ultimately committed themselves to in the late 1940s.² Theirs was a Chinese nationalism inflected by Marxist notions of working-class solidarity, anticolonialism, and internationalism, rather than vice-versa. I adopt this framework to explain Chinese leftists’ engagement with the politics of both

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China and the Philippines after 1945, while modifying its insights into the transnational workings of Chinese revolutionaries to describe the KMT. Informed by a conception of the Chinese nation as transcending China’s territorial boundaries, KMT activists sought to mobilize overseas Chinese communities in support of what they considered the true Chinese revolution, likewise centered on China. In the Philippine context, these “right-wing cosmopolitans” differed from their communist adversaries in two ways, however. First, they focused exclusively on mobilizing local Chinese and were not affiliated to Filipino social actors, as Chinese leftists were to Filipino labor and the Huks. Second, whereas KMT branches and chapters overseas were institutionally connected to the party-state in China, the Chinese communist movement abroad was driven by individuals who identified with the CCP, rather than being a CCP-sponsored project.

Chapter 1 then turns to the Chinese left’s concurrent conflicts with the KMT and Philippine state from mid-late 1945. The communists’ extrajudicial pursuit of supposed Chinese collaborators, many of whom were KMT members or supporters, precipitated a violent struggle between the two sides for influence over Chinese society. Simultaneously, Chinese leftists’ perceived interference in Philippine domestic politics in opposition to anti-Chinese legislation and to the administration’s tolerance of collaboration antagonized the future President of the country and his supporters. The KMT exploited the communists’ clash with the state and the anti-Chinese political environment in the country to its advantage by positioning itself as a force for social stability – the “right” kind of Chinese – and collaborating with the Philippine authorities to construct and oppose the “Chinese communist problem” from late 1945 to mid-1946. Starting in the fall of 1946, the campaign against them intensified, causing Chinese leftist institutions to shut down and forcing their leaders to leave the country. The chapter ends by explaining how the signing of a Treaty of Amity between the two countries in 1947 effectively legitimized Nationalist China’s sovereign influence in the Philippines.
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We know much about how left and right Chinese militia organizations resisted the Japanese, but much less about how they clashed with each other after it during a period that connects the end of World War II, the messy transition from Japanese to American to Filipino rule, and the start of the Cold War. As Xie’s recollections suggest, this was a vibrant time for Chinese newspapers and periodicals on the left and right, even though many were financially strapped and thus short-lived. But with little attempt having been made to preserve them, only their fragments have survived and most have been lost to humidity and neglect. English-language publications from this period, such as the tabloid newspapers that trafficked in lurid tales of crime and violence involving the Chinese, are similarly lacking. To reconstruct the oftentimes bloody conflict between the KMT and Chinese communism in the Philippines, therefore, this chapter relies on party records and the reminiscences of former guerrillas, in particular those compiled by Gong Taoyi, the General Manager of the leading communist newspaper after the war, the *Chinese Guide* (*Huaqiao daobao* 華僑導報); it supplements them with insights from existing scholarship and sources such as American military records and the remains of newspapers and periodicals from this period. To do so requires coming to terms with a mediascape that is often as vague about the details of this struggle as it is bifurcated between narratives of a heroic and innocent Chinese left and predatory right on the one hand and a terroristic communism and triumphant KMT on the other.

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4 Gong Taoyi (ed.), *Feilübin huaqiao kangri douzheng jishi* 菲律宾华侨抗日斗争纪实 (Beijing: Zhongguo guoji guangbo chubanshe, 1997); *Feilübin huaqiao kangri aiguo yinghun lu* 菲律宾华侨抗日爱国英魂录 (Beijing: Huawen chubanshe, 2001); *Feilübin huaqiao guiqiao aiguo danxin lu*. 
Right-wing cosmopolitans: the KMT in the Philippines before 1945

On March 2, 1947, the KMT’s headquarters (zongzhibu 總支部) in the Philippines was re-opened, following its destruction during World War II, to a gathering of 1,200 people at Benavidez Street in Manila’s Chinatown. Presiding over the re-opening ceremony, the Chinese Consul (later Ambassador) Chen Chih-ping 陳質平 stressed the inseparability of the KMT and overseas Chinese, hailing the latter as “vanguard troops” (xianfeng budui 先鋒部隊) of the former and calling upon those present to preserve the party’s glorious history, propagate the Three Principles of the People, and “carry forward [the Sanminzhuyi] into the world” (hongyang yu shijie 弘揚於世界). The next speaker was the founder and Principal of Chiang Kai-shek High School (Zhongzheng zhongxue 中正中學, or CKSHS) and KMT Central Executive Committee (CEC) member Ong Chuan Seng 王泉笙. Then 61, Ong recalled that he had been present at the formation of the zongzhibu on October 10, 1921, the tenth anniversary of the founding of the ROC. Looking backwards, he traced the history of the KMT in the Philippines to the creation of Tongmenghui reading clubs in the country before 1911; reflecting on the work to be done, he described the KMT’s nation-building project as entering its third stage, that of creating a constitutional government. To commemorate the occasion and remind the attendees of their responsibilities to the Chinese nation, Chiang personally issued an “instructional phrase” (xunci 訓詞) exhorting them to “collectively encourage loyalty” (tong li zhongcheng 同勵忠誠).5

The ceremony, the genealogies and ideas it invoked, and those present at it – from Chen to Ong to Chiang – remind us that the KMT’s leaders conceived of the Chinese nation as transcending

the territorial boundaries of China itself and that its loyalists beyond these borders were connected to China by language, culture, and also bureaucracy. Yet overseas KMT branches were not simply extensions of the party-state in China. Despite the close ideological affinities between the “center” (zhongyang 中央) and periphery and the guidance provided by one to the other from the late 1920s onwards, party organs in states such as the Philippines enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy from centralized control. Founded and run by businessmen and intellectuals, many of whom would end up assuming positions of leadership within the central KMT apparatus, party branches abroad were simultaneously embedded in local politics and society and oriented towards Nanjing or Chongqing. Geographically removed from the center, they strove to implement its guidelines and doctrine, but could also exploit their separation from China to consolidate their own spheres of influence, and were also frequently constrained by the sovereignty and laws of foreign states.

With its reorganization along democratic centralist lines in the mid-1920s, the KMT began mobilizing huaqiao communities in support of its campaign to unify a country riven by warlordism and instability. By the party’s Second Congress in 1926, zongzhibu had been established in French Indochina, the Dutch East Indies, British Malaya and Burma, the Philippines, and Siam, with 300 smaller branch offices (zhibu) and chapters (fenbu 分部) under them and a membership of 31,000. These institutions constituted a pyramidal structure that, on paper, connected Chinese communities in all but the smallest towns to Nanjing. After capturing the state in 1927, the KMT intensified its efforts to strengthen ties between the center and periphery chiefly through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, and Overseas Party Affairs Department. By 1934, paralleling the growth of anti-Japanese sentiment in China, the number of KMT organizations and
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members in Southeast Asia had doubled. In the Philippines, where the US colonial state tolerated its presence, the KMT was afforded the freedom to entrench itself in Chinese education, a system of dual-language private schools that local party members supported with subsidies from Nanjing. Following the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, wealthy huaqiao businessmen formed the Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement to boycott Japanese goods, invest in China, and raise funds for the war effort. Despite being one of the smallest Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, the Philippine Chinese contributed more per capita to National Salvation from November 1938 to October 1939 than their fellow Chinese elsewhere in the region, including those in Malaya. The War of Resistance, as the party branded it, also brought about a surge in efforts to mobilize students in China and abroad through organizations such as the Three Principles’ Youth Corps (Sanminzhuyi qingnian tuan 三民主義青年團, or SQT), whose members swore an oath of allegiance to the Generalissimo himself. CKSHS had been founded in 1939 for the same purpose.

The three principal KMT-affiliated groups that were created prior to or during the Japanese invasion of the Philippines from late 1941 to April 1942 reflected the multiplicity of connections between Philippine-Chinese society and the party in China, as well as the persistence of factional

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7 Yung Li, *The Huaqiao Warriors*, 57.

8 The Philippine census of 1939 found that of the 16,000,303 people surveyed, only 0.7 percent or 117,487 of them were ROC citizens. Commission of the Census, Commonwealth of the Philippines, *Census of the Philippines: 1939*, Vol. II: *Summary for the Philippines and General Report for the Censuses of Population and Agriculture* (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1941), 394.


differences within the party in shaping these relations. In May 1941, Chiang Kai-shek dispatched the Zhangzhou-born Lin Tso-mei 林作梅 to Manila to establish the Philippine branch of the SQT, the Philippine Chinese Youth Wartime Special Services Corps (Feilibin huaqiao qingnian zhanshi tebie gongzuo zongdui 菲律賓華僑青年戰時特別工作總隊), whose members were mostly drawn from KMT-controlled high schools in Manila such as CKSHS. The second of these organizations, the Chinese Overseas Wartime Hsuehkan Militia (Huaqiao zhanshi Xuegan tuan 華僑戰時血幹團, or COWHM), was founded in March 1942 as the “Loyal Soul Fraternity” (Huaqiao zhonghun she 華僑忠魂社) by several Philippine-Chinese men who had undergone basic military training at the 13th Reserve Officers Training Camp in Nanping, Fujian; it came under the nominal leadership of Lin’s second-in-command in the Tebie zongdui, Lee Hai-jo 李海若, in July 1944.12 Both these groups focused on anti-Japanese propaganda during the occupation, but the COWHM also engaged in active combat alongside US forces during the battle for Manila.13 Third, there was the Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines (Feilibin huaqiao yiyongjun 菲律賓華僑義勇軍, or CVP). Founded in 1937 as the military wing of the zongzhibu, the CVP was commanded by Shih I-Sheng 施逸生, a graduate of the Central Political and Military Academy in Chongqing who arrived in the islands in the mid-1930s to train the CVP. Shih became a Standing Committee member of the zongzhibu

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11 A fourth, putatively right-wing organization, the Pekek Squadron or Poji tuan 迫擊團, split from the COWHM in mid-1943 and later worked with the communist Wha Chi, but we know little about this rather small group and will not discuss it here. See Yung Li, The Huaqiao Warriors, 126-129, for more on the Squadron.

12 Yung Li, The Huaqiao Warriors, 117-118, 129.

13 Yung Li, The Huaqiao Warriors, 117-125; “Brief History – The Development of the COWHM,” Series IV, Box 6, Folder: Guerrillas, Chinese, Manuel A. Roxas Papers, University Archives and Records Depository [UARD], University of the Philippines, Diliman.
and its Secretary-General a few years after the war. The CVP was supported by the ROC Consulate in Manila and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce.\textsuperscript{14}

Ideological similarities between these three groups notwithstanding, important differences existed between them that illuminate the structural complexity and factionalism of the organization that historians refer to using the collective term “KMT.” The COWHM was essentially a grassroots militia group. Despite Lee’s becoming its commander in July 1944, Loyal Soul’s founder retained effective control of the organization. The other two groups were affiliated to separate and rivalrous constituencies within the party, resulting in competition between them for influence. Lin Tso-mei’s \textit{Tebie zongdui} and its parent SQT had had comparatively little grounding in local Chinese society compared to the CVP and Philippine KMT. As Lin explained in 1993, when the CEC sent him to the Philippines to establish the Youth Corps, it covered all his expenses for three years to guarantee that the Corps was financially independent and did not have to rely on local Chinese businessmen for support. Lin was backed by Ong Chuan Seng, but did not consider himself an overseas Chinese and was not welcomed by the \textit{zongzhibu} despite being Chiang’s representative. Legitimized by the ROC Consul and the Chamber of Commerce, Shih and his CVP colleague Koa Chun-te 林俊智, the \textit{zongzhibu}’s first postwar Secretary-General from 1945 to 1948, had built up a power base of their own in the country and resented Lin for usurping what they saw as their rightful prerogative of preparing Philippine-Chinese youth to fight the Japanese enemy.\textsuperscript{15}

Shih and Koa, who had both recently arrived in the Philippines from China, were members of a KMT faction that the SQT had been establish to supplant. In 1936, Mah Soo-Lay 马树礼, an

\textsuperscript{14} Yung Li, \textit{The Huaqiao Warriors}, 135.

Accounting student at the University of Santo Tomas, founded a branch of the Renaissance Society (Fuxingshe 復興社), a satellite group of the secretive, “Confucian fascist” Forceful Action Society (Lixingshe 力行社), in Manila.\textsuperscript{16} Mah, born in Jiangsu and previously a journalist and educator in Malaya, returned to China in 1939, but not before “laying the foundation for today’s work in the Philippines,” as he wrote in his unofficial memoirs many decades later. Among those inducted into the Philippine Fuxingshe in 1936 were Shih, Koa, and other younger KMT members frustrated by what they considered the conservatism of older party leaders such as Ong Chuan Seng at the time.\textsuperscript{17} Two years later, to resolve infighting within the KMT, Chiang Kai-shek established the SQT and dissolved the two main factions that stood in the way of party unity, the CC Clique and Blue Shirts. Soon after, the Blue Shirts officially disbanded their front groups such as the Lixingshe.\textsuperscript{18}

The Lin-Shih rivalry, which the underground struggle against Japan had briefly put on hold, was resolved in favor of the latter when Chongqing recalled Lin to China in May 1945. (Lin spent most of the next three decades in Taiwan, but returned to the Philippines following his retirement in 1974 to work in Davao, first as a Taiji teacher and then a principal.\textsuperscript{19}) With Manila still in ruins, the Overseas Party Affairs Department sent an agent to Manila to oversee the reconstruction of the party around a core group of members who had fought the Japanese. By mid-late June, KMT zhibu in the Manila area and Luzon, together with the fenbu under them, had been reestablished. A ten-


\textsuperscript{17} My information on Mah’s role in the founding of the Fuxingshe cell comes from a unpublished version of his memoirs, which I date to around 1969 based on the official appointments that he held, the list of which ends in that year. See Mah Soo-Lay Papers, Box 18, HILA. None of the materials in these 60 boxes of papers are indexed.

\textsuperscript{18} Liu, “Indoctrinating the Youth,” 62.

\textsuperscript{19} Chang et al. (ed.), \textit{The Reminiscences of the Chinese in the Philippines}, 80.
man reorganization committee had been formed that included Shih and Sy En 施性水, who would soon become President of the Chamber of Commerce. Shih and two businessmen, Say Kok Chuan 史國銓 and Chua Lamco 蔡功南, were appointed to serve as Standing Committee members of the zongzhibu; Koa became Secretary-General. All five men – Shih, Koa, Say, Chua, and Sy – were members of the Fuxingshe cell that Mah had founded in 1936.

Many problems remained for the KMT as it sought to reestablish itself in Chinese society in the months following the liberation of Manila in March. The ROC Consulate was understaffed and the acting Consul unpopular among Chinese, while the Chinese Chamber of Commerce was yet to recover fully from the war. Fires and looting had caused major losses of property for Chinese shop owners, who, in the absence of leadership from either the ROC or the Chamber of Commerce, had few means of seeking compensation from the American military authorities. Within the party, tensions persisted between the three main anti-Japanese groups. An intelligence report from April described them as boasting about their wartime achievements through their respective print organs and vying against each other for leadership of the party and to win over local Chinese. Worse still was that three of its members had collaborated with the Japanese during the occupation, including Justo Cabo Chan 曾廷泉, the zongzhibu’s prewar propaganda chief and a leading supporter of the anti-Japanese boycott movement in the late 1930s. Cabo Chan had served as the President of the puppet Chinese Association (Huaqiao xiehui 華僑協會, or CA) and was accused by the zongzhibu

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21 Yung Li, The Huaqiao Warriors, 58.
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of forming a Chinese special forces group to hunt down Shih, Koa, and others. Lastly, there were the Chinese communists.

**Revolutionary cosmopolitans: the Chinese left between China and the Philippines**

Much like for the right, the Sino-Japanese War marked a turning point for the Chinese left in the Philippines. Earlier initiatives by Chinese workers and intellectuals to organize themselves had proven ineffectual in extracting concessions from a colonial state and capitalist class (Filipino, American, and Chinese) that were deeply hostile to labor movements; establishment suppression of the left was especially acute and successful following the collapse of the first KMT-CCP united front in 1927 and the formation of the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) in 1930. Within the Chinese community, tensions between employers and employees were inhibited by the extension of the Chinese Exclusion Act to the Philippines in 1902, which critically affected the demographics and dynamics of Chinese society in the country. In barring Chinese laborers, the Act limited the inflow of “working-class” Chinese to persons who gained employment as clerks and shopkeepers’ assistants of their kinsmen already in the Philippines. For this reason, Yung Li Yuk-wai has argued that Chinese society there lacked an genuine proletarian base upon which to build an effective and large-scale communist movement and that kinship ties helped smooth over class relations between Chinese merchants and their employees.

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22 “Feidao qiaoping 菲島僑情,” April 28, 1945, Te 特 5/32.1; “Zhu Fei zongzhibu muqian renshi zuzhi ji gongzuo qingxing qingbao 駐菲總支部目前人事組織及工作情形情報,” June 19, 1945, Te 19/1.10; “Guangfu hou zhi Feilübin jinkuang qingbao 光復后之菲律賓近況情報,” June 19, 1945, Te 19/1.12, KMT Archives.


24 Yung Li, *The Huaqiao Warriors*, 63-64.
The War and formation of the second KMT-CCP united front in 1937 allowed the Chinese left to operate more openly in the Philippines, while also channeling its energies toward opposing Japan rather than capitalism. The PKP, which had been banned in 1931, was legalized in 1937. On Labor Day the following year, Chinese leftists established the Philippine-Chinese United Workers Union (*Feilübin huaqiao ge laogong tuanti lianhehui* 菲律賓華僑各勞工團體聯合會, or Lo Lian Hui), which joined the Congress Proletario di Filipinas, or COF (Proletariat), the same trade union congress from which the PKP was birthed in 1930.25 Uniting over forty smaller groups under one umbrella organization, the Lo Lian Hui avoided confrontations with the state and capital, focusing instead on anti-Japanese propaganda, raising funds for the (CCP’s) war effort, and encouraging its members to return to China to fight.26

Chinese leftist leaders were mobile nationalists similar to the likes of Mah Soo-lay, Shih I-Sheng, and Lin Tso-mei. Whether born in China or the Philippines, they moved readily (though often illegally) between one and the other in the period leading up to Japan’s invasion of Southeast Asia in 1941. Some were part of an even wider socialist network that encompassed East Asia and the non-Asian world, and used what they learned from more established communist parties to build revolutionary capacity throughout Nanyang. Lee Yungshaw 李永孝, also known as Li Bingxiang 李炳祥, was a Manila-born Cantonese who served as Soviet adviser Mikhail Borodin’s interpreter during the first KMT-CCP united front from 1924 to 1927, after whose collapse he fled to Manila.27 Lee’s comrade, Co Keng Sing 許敬誠 (Xu Li 許立), had been at the forefront of overseas Chinese

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25 Yung Li, *The Huaqiao Warriors*, 63-64.


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labor organizing in the Philippines for over a decade when he and Lee helped establish the Lo Lian Hui in 1938. Born in 1905 in Jinjiang, Co spent his formative years in Hong Kong before beginning work in Manila in 1925. He was never tied to the Philippines and the left’s institutions there. From 1930 to 1935, he traveled between Manila, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Xiamen, Malang in East Java, and the Soviet Union, where he spent four months taking intensive classes in Marxism. Three days before the Japanese captured Manila, Co and 400 other Chinese leftists evacuated the city with the help of Filipino peasant leaders for the mountains of Central Luzon, where they organized the anti-Japanese resistance.28

Yet while the leaders of the Chinese left and right may have moved back and forth between China and the Philippines, the organizations they belonged to reflected the different forms assumed by Chinese nationalism beyond the mainland and their different social bases. No institutional links existed between the Lo Lian Hui and the CCP, which in its struggle for survival in China had few resources to commit to overseas Chinese mobilization. If the Philippine KMT was part of a larger, vertically-organized transnational institution, nominally bound to a higher leadership in China, and backed by the Chinese state, the Union derived only inspiration and ideological precepts from the CCP. Individuals such as Co and Lee Yungshaw literally embodied the ties between the China and the overseas Chinese left. In the Philippines, the KMT was a pillar of Chinese society, integrated as it was into two key community institutions: schools, most of which it controlled, and chambers of commerce, which financed the party. The Lo Lian Hui did not lack for an institutional presence, but it counted only a few businessmen and the secretive Hongmen 洪門 organization as its Chinese

supporters.\textsuperscript{29} Through the COF (Proletariat), it was connected more to Filipino communism than to Chinese society.

By late 1942, three guerrilla organizations had emerged from the Chinese labor movement. The first and most famous of them, the Philippine-Chinese Anti-Japanese Force (\textit{Feilübin huaqiao kangri zhidui} 菲律賓華僑抗日支隊 or Wha Chi), was affiliated to the peasant-based Hukbalahap movement in Central Luzon and commanded by Wong Kiat 黃傑.\textsuperscript{30} The second, closely linked to first, was the Philippine-Chinese Anti-Japanese Volunteer Corps (\textit{Feilübin huaqiao kangri chujian yiyongjun} 菲律賓華僑抗日锄奸義勇隊, or Kang Chu), a Hongmen organization led by Kho Chi Meng 許志猛. Finally, working mostly underground in Manila but with a significant presence in Iloilo was the organization that Co Keng Sing commanded, the Philippine-Chinese Anti-Japanese and Anti-Puppets League (\textit{Feilübin huaqiao kangri fanjian da tongmeng} 菲律賓華僑抗日反奸大同盟, or Kang Fan). Based in the capital, the Kang Fan and Wha Chi’s Manila unit were especially active in attacking members of the CA.\textsuperscript{31} From mid-late 1945, Chinese resistance groups on the left and right demobilized under the watchful eye of the US military authorities. The COWHM did so in April, for instance, becoming a veterans association; the Wha Chi stood down in September.\textsuperscript{32} For the Kang Fan, demobilization meant politics by other means. In September, it renamed itself the Philippine-Chinese Democratic League (or Alliance) (\textit{Feilübin huaqiao minzhu da tongmeng}

\textsuperscript{29} Yung Li, \textit{The Huaqiao Warriors}, 61.


\textsuperscript{31} Yung Li, \textit{The Huaqiao Warriors}, 81-101.

\textsuperscript{32} “A Brief History of the COWHM Supplementary, Chapter III,” Series IV, Box 6, Folder: Guerrillas, Chinese, Roxas Papers, UARD; Liang and Cai, \textit{The Wha Chi Memoirs}, 96.
Chinese intracommunal conflict and the problem of collaboration

For Chinese resistance organizations on the left and right, Japan’s defeat in the Philippines in early 1945 and the power vacuum in Chinese society that it created was an opportunity to expand their influence and settle old scores through new means. Tensions between the KMT and Chinese left in were nothing new, but they now assumed social forms free from the constraints of colonial rule. From 1937 to 1941, during a period in which the Nationalists and communists were supposed to be working together against Japan, the Lo Lian Hui persisted in attacking the KMT government for corruption. Legal disputes between communist leaders and the KMT had also broken out, most when the Lo Lian Hui printed leaflets accusing Shih I-Sheng of intending to disrupt its Labor Day celebrations in 1941. Shih took this case to court and accused Co Keng Sing of libel. The case had not been settled when the Japanese invaded.\(^{35}\) After the occupation, conflict between the KMT and Chinese left was reignited, beginning on Labor Day in 1945.

The participants in this conflict and their memorializers represent the events of the day very differently. Co Keng Sing’s official biography, published in 1995 by the Quanzhou-based Xu (Co) clan association of the Philippines on the 90\(^{th}\) anniversary of his birth, describes in hyperbolic and

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34 Huang Wei 黃薇 and Gong Taoyi 龔陶怡, *Fengyu rensheng* 風雨人生 (Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 2000), 133.

vague language the mass rally that the Kang Fan organized to mark the occasion. The parade that followed is described as celebrating the Philippines’ retrocession and manifesting the “formidable strength of anti-Japanese progressive forces” (kangri jinbu liliang de qiangda 抗日进步力量的强大). It was the “grandest of its kind since the founding of the Philippine nation” (Feilübin jianguo yihou zui shengda de yici 菲律宾建国以后最盛大的一次) and an unforgettable occasion for those involved.\(^\text{36}\)

The Philippine KMT’s official representation of events, by contrast, was written after 1949 and retroactively incorporated them into an expansive, righteous narrative of anticommunism going back to before the Civil War. In a lengthy report to the Seventh National Party Congress in October 1952, the zongzhibu traced the beginning of its “period of bloody struggle” (xuedou shiqi 血鬥時期) with the communists in the Philippines to that day. Kang Fan and Wha Chi protesters, it said, openly called for the murder of ROC consular officials, prompting the CVP and COWHM to stage a counter-protest in their defense.\(^\text{37}\) A CVP member and future KMT zongzhibu Secretary-General wrote in his memoirs that the communists affixed a cartoon of two caged turtles with their heads in their shells to mock the Consul for lying low during the war, after which they loudly demanded that all “turtles be overthrown” (dadao wugui 打到烏龜).\(^\text{38}\)

This imaginative insult points to one of the main sources of friction between the KMT and communists in the early post-occupation period: wartime behavior – in this case, the ROC Consul’s apparent inaction – that the left perceived as insufficiently patriotic and in some cases tantamount

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\(^{36}\) Liu (ed.), Xu Li tongzhi zhuisi jinian kan 1905-1995, 106.


\(^{38}\) Cua Siok Po 柯叔寶, Fendou rensheng 奮鬥人生 (Taipei: Liming wenhua shiye gufen youxian gongsi, 1982), 60.
to collaboration, but that the right did not. Official responsibility for identifying and apprehending Chinese collaborators lay with the US military’s Counter-Intelligence Commission (CIC) and their sentencing, after their deportation to China, with the ROC. By July 1946, a total of 146 Chinese residents in the country had been detained and scheduled for deportation as “undesirable aliens.”

Communist groups in particular, however, were able and willing to bypass these legal procedures in pursuit of retributive justice on their own terms. To complicate matters further, the incorporation of KMT members or individuals affiliated with the party such as Cabo Chan and the ROC Consul into the category of “collaborator” blurred the distinction between anti-collaborationism and anti-rightism. This brought the left into direct conflict with the KMT, giving each faction an opportunity to contest the other for influence within the community.

As they had during the occupation, communist groups after it persisted in targeting persons they believed to be collaborators for assassination, including many members of the KMT. At least two people, including a former member of the Japanese military police, were killed in such a way immediately after liberation, as a wave of violence, kidnappings, and blackmailing began to sweep Chinese society.

Contrary to the KMT, however, such disorder can hardly be attributed solely to the communists acting in concert against innocent Chinese. The postwar Philippines was awash in nearly a million infantry weapons from the occupation and the bloody US campaign to retake the country. Unable to recover most of these loose firearms, the state ceded its coercive capacities to provincial warlords, peasant guerrillas, and street thugs and struggled to prevent the country from becoming embedded in wider arms-trafficking networks that supplied buyers as far away as Israel.

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and Argentina. Chinese resistance fighters and criminal elements seized upon these weapons and the absence of a functioning police force to carry out individual acts of retribution and exploit the vulnerability of members of Chinese society.

To purge collaborators, the Chinese left also established, on May 30, an Anti-Collaboration Commission, which they described to the US military as a body to “help the government authorities to distinguish the Chinese traitors under the Japanese regime from that of loyal ones.” Cabo Chan was summoned to appear before this body shortly after. During the occupation, he had led a small guerrilla group in the mountains of Luzon until the Japanese threatened his family and forced him out of hiding in November 1943. He then became President of the CA a year later and in December 1944, nearly suffered the fate of his predecessor when the Kang Fan attempted to assassinate him. A second Chinese leader that the Commission sought was Yu Khe Thai, owner of Yutivo and Sons, one of the largest Chinese hardware companies in the Philippines. Though not a KMT member, Yu had been at the forefront of the National Salvation Movement before 1941 like Cabo Chan and in 1939 was had helped finance the founding of CKSHS. He was among the first Chinese to be arrested and jailed at the start of the occupation. On the Emperor’s birthday in April 1943, Japan granted Yu and several other Chinese leaders amnesty in return for a public show of gratitude.

42 “What we have done after the surrender of the Japanese (July-November 1945),” Record Group [RG] 407: Records of the Adjutant General’s Office, 1917-, Series: Guerrilla Unit Recognition Files, 1941-1948, Box 323, Folder: 105 Phil Chinese Anti-Japanese Vol Corps (Wa-Chi Unit), National Archives and Records Administration [NARA], College Park, Maryland.
towards Japan and promise to cooperate with the regime.\textsuperscript{45} Yu was forced to become the secretary of the CA after his release and was also threatened by the Kang Fan. Both Cabo Chan – who was in the custody of the CIC at the time – and Yu did not attend their trial before the Commission.\textsuperscript{46}

Fearing communist attacks on its members and supporters, the KMT adopted a flexible and pragmatic approach to the issue of collaboration, in effect anticipating the arguments of historians who have called for an understanding of the phenomenon based on the “choices and consequences of local actors in the changing political, normative, and material contexts of a conquered society.”\textsuperscript{47} For communists, for whom even non-resistance deserved opprobrium, those such as Yu and Cabo Chan who had surrendered to the Japanese during the occupation automatically forfeited their right to return as community leaders, even if they had acted under duress. This moral binary, if enforced, would have sapped the foundations of KMT influence in the Philippines by delegitimizing – if not entirely eliminating – some of its key financial supporters. The KMT, through its own Committee for the Investigation of Collaborators and the Maintenance of Peace and Order, argued that only those who had caused or sought to cause harm or death to their fellow Chinese ought to be regarded as collaborators.\textsuperscript{48} Based on this definition, Yu was deemed innocent for having used his position of leadership within the CA to protect the community. On April 15, 1945, Ong Chuan Seng wrote to the Secretary-General of the CEC, Wu Tiecheng 吳鐵城, describing Yu as a patriot who should be rewarded for his contributions to the War of Resistance and conveniently omitting any mention

\textsuperscript{45} Yung Li, \textit{The Huaqiao Warriors}, 159.

\textsuperscript{46} Tan, \textit{The Chinese in the Philippines during the Japanese Occupation}, 96-97, 101.


\textsuperscript{48} Chu-Pei Chen, “Chinese and the War in the Philippines,” Ms. submitted to Institute of Pacific Relations (c. 1948), 51, Library of Congress.
of his involvement in the CA.\footnote{“Wang Quansheng zhi Wu Tiecheng han 王泉笙致吳鐵城函,” April 15, 1945, Te 31/43.75, KMT Archives.} Cabo Chan was a trickier case. Rightly or wrongly, party members considered him guilty, but they were content to allow the US authorities to try him. When the CIC released him on the grounds that it lacked the evidence to convict and deport him, he was allowed to simply retreat from public life.

The KMT focused instead on the communist problem, as its struggle with the left expanded and intracommunal conflict in the Philippines began increasingly to resemble the situation in China. To counter the Anti-Collaboration Commission, which it blamed for acts of violence and blackmail against numerous Chinese, including the politically-motivated murder of the manager of the party newspaper, the *Great China Press* (*Dahua ribao* 大華日報), the party formed a paramilitary group under the auspices of the CVP.\footnote{“Zhu Feilübin zongzhibu dangwu gongzuo baogaoshu,” KMT Records, HILA.} Clashes between the Chinese left and right began erupting beyond Manila. Following the establishment of a branch of the Anti-Collaboration Commission in Iloilo, for example, the KMT assisted local authorities in October 1945 in arresting the entire leadership of the Iloilo Kang Fan on charges of disturbing the peace, and it was only after the legal testimony of fellow Kang Fan member Chen Qinghai 陈清海 that were they released.\footnote{Gong (ed.), *Feilübin huaqiao kangri aiguo yinghun dan*, 217.}

For its part, the CIC quickly grew frustrated with what it perceived as the communists and KMT’s usurpation of its authority and the violence that had erupted from the clashes between them. On July 18, 1945, seeking an end to killings carried out by secret assassination squads in Manila’s Chinatown, the CIC’s Chinese Section convened a meeting of representatives from both parties’ anti-collaboration commissions along with the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, Homicide Squad, and Provost Marshal’s Office. It stated that while it did not “sponsor, encourage or recognize” any
Chinese organization over the other, it was the “only one duly authorized and constituted authority for the investigation, apprehension and incarceration of Japanese collaborators” in Manila. Local Chinese should turn over information on collaborators to the CIC and not publish accusations of collaboration or conduct any investigations themselves. All present, including Kho Chi Meng on the left, Chua Lamco and Lee Hai-jo on the right, and the Chamber of Commerce’s representative Sy En, signed these provisions.52

However, the meeting did little to stop violence from continuing or the communists from continuing to pursuing collaborators. In August, the CIC reported that despite being warned not to conduct its own investigations, the Anti-Collaboration Commission had put Yu Khe Thai (again) and Say Kok Chuan on trial. Like Yu, Say had been imprisoned by the Japanese and then released in 1943 on the condition that he thank the Emperor and cooperate with the occupying regime. The trial of the two men did not go ahead after the CIC and military police broke up the proceedings. In response, the Chinese Guide and Chinese Commercial Bulletin (Qiaoshang gongbao 僑商公報, the Kang Chu’s newspaper) denounced the CIC as “fascistic” and “Japanese Kempeitai-like,” even accusing it of taking bribes.53 In December 1945, KMT member Vicente Dy Sun 李峻峰 received a letter from the Commission that demanded 200,000 pesos, or else he would be killed.54 He hired a bodyguard, reported the threat to the police, survived, and rose through the ranks of the Chamber

52 “Monthly Situation Report No. 2, July 1945,” RG 496: Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and United States Army Forces, Pacific (World War II), Series: Monthly Reports of Counter-Intelligence Corps Area #1 1945, Box 445, Folder: July 1945, NARA.

53 “Monthly Situation Report No. 3, August 1945,” RG 496, Series: Monthly Reports of Counter-Intelligence Corps Area #1 1945, Box 445, Folder: August 1945, NARA.

of Commerce to become its President many years later. That same month, a bomb exploded at the New England Hotel and Restaurant in Manila, whose owner had earlier been threatened by KMT elements for employing communists. The party’s headquarters officially denied any responsibility for the bombing and declared that its members had been instructed to act in a law-abiding manner in accordance with the central government’s instructions.55

**The Chinese left and Philippine domestic politics after the war**

For the Chinese left, seeking to expand its influence in the Philippines, the state presented as enticing a target as the KMT in the early postwar period. Anti-Chinese nationalism, a perennial problem for Chinese society, resurfaced immediately after the occupation. At the very first postwar special session of Congress from June to July 1945, the House of Representatives introduced two bills (House Bill [H.B.] Nos. 100 and 160) aimed at “nationalizing” the retail trade by restricting putative “alien” (i.e. Chinese) dominance of the domestic economy. Its Committee on Commerce and Industry consolidated them into a single bill, H.B. No. 355, which it unanimously approved on July 13 and that reached the Senate on August 20. On September 15, after minor changes, the bill was sent to President Sergio Osmeña for his approval.56

As the left’s attacks on the CIC suggest, collaboration was just as much a source of friction between Chinese communists and the Philippine and US authorities as it was between them and the KMT. Despite the CIC’s arrest of prominent collaborators such as Jorge Vargas and Jose Laurel along with the cabinet members of Laurel’s Second Philippine Republic (1943-45), many of these

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politicians had eluded justice in the eyes of the left and simply resumed their political careers after
the war. The most prominent offender was Senate President Manuel Roxas, who had briefly served
as Laurel’s “food czar” in 1944 after resisting earlier entreaties by the Japanese to join the colonial
administration. Roxas, Osmeña’s main political rival within the divided Nacionalista Party after
the war, would contest and defeat Osmeña in the first postwar elections in April 1946 to become
the first President of the independent Philippines. But he was only able to do so because he never
went on trial for collaboration. After arresting them in the spring 1945, the CIC transferred Roxas
and other members of Laurel’s wartime cabinet over to the Philippine government. In accordance
with Washington’s policy on collaboration, a People’s Court was established to try them. However,
Roxas was personally pardoned by General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Allied Commander
in the Southwest Pacific Area, contravening his own government’s legal protocol. With MacArthur
having undermined Osmeña’s authority, Roxas and his congressional supporters were able to sap
the functioning of the People’s Court by denying it the funding and officials needed to ensure its
effectiveness. Roxas was also under attack for being soft on collaborators because two of his sons
were implicated in pro-Japanese activities during the war.58

The left’s anger at what it perceived was the establishment’s failure to deal effectively with
collaborators was compounded by the arrest in late February of 16 Huk leaders, including the top
two commanders Luis Taruc and Casto Alejandrino, for allegedly failing to cooperate with the US
military in San Fernando, Pampanga.59 Demonstrations in support of the arrested Huk leaders and

57 David Joel Steinberg, *Philippine Collaboration in World War II* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1967), 107.


Littlefield, 2002), 112.
in opposition to Osmeña government multiplied. The largest, involving over 20,000 protesters and sponsored by the newly-formed DA, took place on September 23, 1945 in Manila, scarcely a week after H.B. No. 355 had reached Osmeña’s office. Waving red flags and Maoist and Stalinist slogans, the demonstrators marched to Malacañang Palace and demanded that the President release Taruc, Alejandrino, and the remaining Huk leaders, and take action against “traitors.” Among them were around 1,000 Chinese, who demanded “the removal of collaborators from Congress which caused a strain in Philippine-Chinese relations by passing anti-Chinese laws,” according to the Daily News tabloid. During the rally, Co Keng Sing spoke in English, exhorting Chinese workers and peasants to unite against what he called the remnants of fascism in the country. He conflated the Chinese left’s anti-fascism and opposition to anti-Chinese legislation, attacking Congress for “doing what Hitler did to the Jews.”

A week later, Co expounded on his remarks in an article entitled “We Demand Justice” in the New China Review, the Chinese Guide’s English supplement. Co claimed that there were only 25 non-collaborators out of 95 congressmen. Roxas, he said, despite being a cabinet member under Laurel and concurrently head of the economic planning board, had not only regained his position as a congressman, but also had the “nerve” to run for President of the Philippines. To distract the people from their wartime activities, Congress and the Senate, with the aid of the pro-Roxas Daily News, had launched an anti-Chinese campaign to “please those who have racial prejudice so that they can maintain their political positions. This method is similar to what Fuehrer Hitler tried on the Jews.” Although the Chinese, as foreigners, had no right to interfere in Philippine politics, they

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60 “Feidao zhi Wu Tiecheng han bao 菲島致吳鐵城函報,” October 10, 1945, Te 特 5/1.29, KMT Archives; “1,000 Chinese in Huk Parade,” Daily News, September 25, 1945, 1. Taruc, who was released on September 30, mentions the September 23 protests in his memoir, and estimates the number of protesters at 50,000. See Taruc, Born of the People (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1953), 211.
had the right to demand justice against collaborators because they had suffered during the war and played their part alongside Filipinos in fighting the Japanese. Co also criticized the United States for rehabilitating collaborators. The article ended by calling for unity in Chinese society, which, it declared ominously, could only be obtained by “wiping out Chinese collaborators.”

Roxas and his allies in Congress and in the media wasted no time in striking back against Co’s speech and Chinese participation in the protests. On September 25, the front page of the *Daily News* featured the headline “1,000 Chinese in Huk Parade.” Its editorial excoriated these Chinese for interfering in the domestic political affairs of the Philippines, labeled them “undesirable aliens,” and demanded that the President arrest and deport them immediately. Osmeña, who had apparently “received them on the grounds of Malacañan and kowtowed to them,” was denounced by the same paper the following day as the “Chinese puppet leader.” Roxas himself demanded the expulsion of Chinese “who are not needed in the country” and the House formed a committee to investigate Chinese involvement in the protests. Co, however, was nowhere to be found when the sergeant-at-arms of the House went searching for him on September 29, and did not show up at the committee’s hearings the next day. On October 10, Co reemerged and was subpoenaed to attend the hearings – but did not. To the dismay of Roxas’s supporters and the KMT, nothing came of the investigation. Frustrated by Manila’s inadequate efforts to prosecute collaborators, according to a November 19 KMT report on the protest and its aftermath, the United States refused to support the committee. Filipino anti-Chinese nationalists, meanwhile, were dealt a setback when the President vetoed H.B.

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63 “Zhu Manila zong lingshi guan shang waijiaobu cheng 駐馬尼拉總領事館上外交部呈,” November 19, 1945, Te 5/1.32, KMT Archives.
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No. 355 on October 16, citing the incompatibility of protectionist measures with the Philippines’ membership of the United Nations and commitment to internationalism. 64

The “Chinese communist problem,” crime, and state-KMT collaboration

By late 1945, Co’s repeated evasions of the state and the Kang Fan’s involvement in the September 23 protests would have crystallized in Roxas’s mind the emerging “Chinese communist problem” and how it figured into his own political ambitions. The DA, a political coalition of Huks and various leftist groups, including the Kang Fan, endorsed Osmeña for the Presidency. Despite reservations about the incumbent President, DA leaders saw Roxas as a fascist and collaborator. 65 Conveniently for Roxas, therefore, any future anticommunist initiatives would double up as an act of retribution against Osmeña’s supporters, among whom were Chinese leftists.

As Senate President, he was not lacking for sources of information on the Chinese left and its ties to Filipino communists. Sometime after September 23, Roxas received a document entitled “Big Head of the Chinese Communist Party.” In it were the names of eight Chinese communists, including Dy Eng Hao, the “Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (Cantonese)” who “Speak [sic] Chinese, English, Tagalog & Spanish”; Wong Kiat of the Wha Chi; the Chinese Guide’s Smin Chang; and Co Keng Sing, “Alias Gam Kim Seng,” who “Delivered speech of Sunday against the Congress of the Philippines at Malacañang. Has a case before the war not yet finished up to now. Charges brought to him by the Chinese Nationalist Party.” 66 The Guide and Commercial Bulletin

64 Agpalo, The Political Process and the Nationalization of the Retail Trade in the Philippines, 38.
65 Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion, 141.
66 “Big Head of the Chinese Communist Party,” October 29, 1945, Series IV, Box 8, Folder: Chinese Communists 1945-1946, Roxas Papers, UARD.
were also listed. The oddly ungrammatical English of this typewritten and anonymously authored text seem to indicate that it was composed by a non-native speaker, very likely a Chinese person.

In the same box as this document in the Roxas Papers at the University of the Philippines is a letter entitled “Deport Undesirable Chinese.” Its author, one Chua Peng Leong, claimed to be representing “Chinese neutrals and residents of Manila,” and his missive was intended for the US authorities. The letter is typewritten in excellent English on plain paper, and has no return address or date. “1945” and the acronym “MIS” have been added by hand in its margins, which suggests that the Philippines’ Military Intelligence Service forwarded it to Roxas (or vice-versa). It begins with a powerful thesis: the “Real disturbers of the peace,” it claims, are the Chinese communists, who were not only participating actively in local politics, but committing kidnapping, robbery, and murder, “sometimes in connivance with Filipino gangsters and hoodlums.” Chua accuses them of collaborating with Japan and deceiving the CIC into thinking that they were fighting the Japanese. Unsurprisingly, leading Chinese Reds were also in league with the Huks, and had connections with the Soviet Union and the CCP. Having collected one million pesos thus far through means such as kidnapping and extortion, local Chinese Reds had “extended their power and influence” over the Huks and together with them formed the DA to transform the Philippines into an “instrument of communism.” This organization was “sowing the seeds of discontent, terrorism, and banditry, with murders here and there.” The letter ends with a plea to the American authorities, on behalf of “all law-abiding and peaceful Chinese and Filipino citizens,” to act swiftly against this menace.67

What are we to make of this letter? On the one hand, it contains just enough factual details, such as the names of Chinese communist leaders and their organizations (the “Hua Chee,” “Khong

67 “Deport Undesirable Chinese,” 1945, Series IV, Box 8, Folder: Chinese Communists 1945-1946, Roxas Papers, UARD.
Huan,” and “Khong Thu”), as well as a list of the various secret societies they were in league with, to persuade the reader of its author’s familiarity with Chinese affairs. Besides this, however, much of the intelligence in this letter is exaggerated, dubious, or impossible to corroborate. Its principal effect was to play to Filipino and American prejudices toward the local Chinese population while attributing its illegality and criminality to a specific ideological faction, thus distinguishing clearly between “good” and “bad” Chinese. For example, while there is nothing to suggest that the Chinese communists collaborated with the Japanese or controlled the Huks, these assertions resonated with perceptions of the Chinese as self-serving and stoked fears of communism as a “foreign” influence. Similarly, by claiming that the communists engaged in kidnapping, robbery, and murder and were linked to Filipino and Chinese gangsters, the letter reinforced stereotypes of the Chinese as inclined towards criminal behavior. Whether or not Chua, whose signature features at the end of the letter, was an actual person or not is unclear. Declaring themselves to be law-abiding “neutrals,” in effect, distanced the author and those he represented from communal politics and framed their letter as born of mere civic-mindedness.

As its conflict with the Chinese left worsened, the KMT sought increasingly to prove itself useful to the coercive organs of the Philippine state and pin the blame for criminal behavior on the communists. While the provenance of this letter is unknown, its blurring of the distinction between communism and gangsterism and its provision of intelligence to the authorities are consistent with this broader trend. By early 1946, incidences of kidnapping and blackmail in Manila’s Chinatown had reached epidemic proportions, much to the frustration of the metropolitan police. On March 2, the *Philippines Free Press*, the country’s oldest news weekly, reported that wealthy Chinese were being blackmailed into handing over large sums of money to Chinese gangsters. Pretending to be guerrillas, they targeted individuals who had profited from buying and selling war materiel to the
Japanese and informed their intended victims that only by contributing to the resistance could they “redeem” themselves. If their targets failed to do so within a day, they would be shot, or kidnapped and then killed.\textsuperscript{68} One such person to be kidnapped was KMT member and the deputy manager of the \textit{Great China Press}, Cai Yunqin 蔡雲欽, who was allegedly told by his kidnappers that he was a “reactionary by nature” (\textit{fandong chengxing} 反動成性) and deserved to be killed. He was set to be drowned, but remarkably, although we know not how, escaped to tell his tale.\textsuperscript{69}

For the KMT, an organization committed to protecting the interests of Chinese abroad and seeking to expand its influence in the Philippines, it was politically expedient not just to help the police tackle criminal activities, but also to attribute such behavior to communism. Chinese society was something of a black box to law enforcement officials. Linguistic and cultural barriers between Filipinos and Chinese made crimes involving the former uniquely difficult to solve. As Manila’s exasperated Chief of Police Angel Tuazon explained to the \textit{Philippines Free Press} in May 1946, in response to the kidnapping spree, “Tracking down Chinese criminals, particularly the murderers, in Manila is like chasing the legendary will-o’-the-wisp. It is next to impossible to get them for the simple reason that both the victims and their relatives – even if they personally know the culprits – refuse to talk. Mortal fear of violent reprisal from the killer or killers grips them and keeps their lips closed.” Unable to understand Chinese, policemen usually faced what he called a “blank wall” when investigating Chinese suspects and witnesses, who insisted on speaking Chinese even if they knew Tagalog well.\textsuperscript{70} The KMT helped bridge this informational divide by reorganizing one of its


\textsuperscript{69} “Cai Yunqin bei bang sha busui 蔡云欽被綁殺不遂,” \textit{Dahan hun yuekan} 大漢魂月刊, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1946), 20; “Zhu Feilübin zongzhibu dangwu gongzuo baogaoshu,” KMT Records, HILA.

special forces teams and establishing a communications network with the authorities in opposition to Chinese criminals and communists.\textsuperscript{71} In this manner, the KMT rendered Chinese society legible to its host government and insinuated itself into the coercive apparatus of the state.

KMT intelligence reports and propaganda from mid-late 1946 give us a sense of how party members assessed the threat of communism during a critical period in both Chinese and Philippine history that spanned Roxas’s election to the Presidency and the outbreak of the Civil War in China and armed conflict between the Philippine state and the Huks. Chinese communists were believed to be providing the Soviet Union with confidential military and political information, encouraging the Huks to adopt Sinophobic attitudes, and establishing base areas in Central Luzon to retreat to in difficult circumstances.\textsuperscript{72} In October, three months after Chiang Kai-shek launched a large-scale attack on the CCP in north China, the zongzhibu relaunched its occupation-era publication, \textit{Dahan hun} 大漢魂 (\textit{Soul of the Great Han}) as a monthly news magazine. In its inaugural issue, Secretary General Koa Chun-te warned that where once hanjian had operated covertly, the new hanjian were behaving boldly and ostentatiously and using democracy as a cover to propagate their “treasonous theory” (maiguo lilun 賣國理論). With the ROC having failed to demobilize “bandit special agents” (feite 匪特), a “Red disaster” (chihuo 赤禍) and “new imperialism” (xin diguo zhuyi 新帝國主義) were menacing all corners of the globe and threatening World War III. The party had thus revived \textit{Dahan hun} to confront this new enemy of the Chinese nation.\textsuperscript{73}

\textsuperscript{71} “Zhu Feilübin zongzhibu dangwu gongzuo baogaoshu,” KMT Records, HILA.

\textsuperscript{72} “Feidao gongdang zuzhi jigji huodong diaocha zhuobao 菲島共黨組織機構及活動調查專報,” April 1946, Te 5/1.36; “Zhongyang haiwaibu zhi waijiaobu han 中央海外部致外交部函,” April 11, 1946, Te 5/1.33, KMT Archives.

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Koa’s richly suggestive language here suggests that the KMT was grappling with how to define its communist enemy. It dovetailed with contemporaneous fears of communism as a global threat and anticipated the Cold War. It also evoked the KMT’s revolutionary, anti-imperial heritage and earlier struggles against Western and especially Japanese colonialism: Koa employed the same term used to describe Chinese collaborators during the War of Resistance – *hanjian* – to represent the communists. Finally, he described the communists as *fei*, a term that the KMT attached to the CCP during the Nanjing Decade and resurrected during the Civil War to serve as the main signifier of Chinese (and Russian) communism in its propaganda.74 (The CCP likewise described the KMT after 1949 as *fei*.) In using it, Koa drew comparisons between the CCP and anti-dynastic “bandits” from imperial times such as the Taiping rebels to delegitimize the former and legitimize the ROC. Like Chua Peng Leong’s letter to Roxas, he constructed a link between crime and communism that informed the KMT’s collaboration with the state to police Chinese society. It was no coincidence that the same issue of the magazine featured articles on how the COWHM had helped capture 13 kidnappers (*bangfei* 绑匪) and on Cai Yunqin’s kidnapping by a separate gang of *fei*. Both pieces heavily implied that the *fei* in question were communists: the former declared *fei* (not *bangfei*) to be the biggest enemy of both wealthy and poor Chinese, while the latter, as we have seen, described the kidnappers as accusing Cai of being a reactionary.75


The September 5 Incident and the decline of the Chinese left

As fears of communism grew, the ideological climate in the Philippines shifted decisively rightwards and in favor of the KMT. Relations between the Filipino left and the state deteriorated swiftly following the presidential and congressional elections in April 1946. At the new President’s orders, Huk leader Luis Taruc and five other DA candidates were prevented from taking their seats in the House on charges of electoral fraud and terrorism. Subsequently, clashes between the Huks and the police in Central Luzon, which served as Roxas’s pretext for banning Taruc and the others from Congress, worsened. Anti-Chinese sentiment was also on the rise, the failure of earlier efforts to nationalize the retail trade only serving to galvanize populist politicians such as Senator Vicente Sotto of Cebu, who alleged that Chinese economic practices such as remitting money to China and black marketeering were making the Philippines a “weak nation.” Sotto also protested the growing number of Chinese entering the islands illegally following the start of the Civil War, believing it to be “one of the gravest national problems today.”

The fall of 1946, recalled the daughter of Kang Chu leader Young Ching-tong 楊靜桐, saw “reactionary forces starting to intensify” (fan dòng shì lì kāi shǐ xiāozhāng 反动势力开始嚣张) and marked the beginning of the end for Chinese communism in the Philippines. For both sides, the turning point was what the KMT later called simply as the “September 5 Incident.” It had been a long time in coming. In May, while visiting Washington, Roxas told the ROC’s Ambassador to the United States that there were many Chinese communists in his country who were functioning

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77 Gong (ed.), Feilübin huaqiao kangri aiguo yinghun lu, 191.

78 “Zhu Feilübin zongzhibu dangwu gongzuo baogaoshu,” KMT Records, HILA.
as intermediaries between Moscow and the Huks and were using terrorist methods to attack other Chinese. The President and the ROC Consul in Manila Tuan Mao-lan 段茂澜 sought cooperation between their states against these Reds, in the interests of protecting the ROC’s overseas citizens. Roxas, on his part, believed that it would not be difficult to find legal reasons to deport the Reds.\(^7\)

The arrests that took place on September 5 followed swiftly on the heels of the “pacification” campaign that Roxas had launched against the Huks in Central Luzon in August.\(^8\) That evening, military policemen raided the offices of the *Chinese Guide* and *Chinese Commercial Bulletin*, as well as Union High School, the Chinese Labor Federation, the Hong Kwong Institute, and several other sites of (supposed) communist activity. The entire circulation staff of the *Chinese Guide* was detained, as was Young, who was teaching at the Hongmen-run Institute. Around 61 persons were arrested over the next two days and their residences and shops searched. However, this operation proved unsuccessful. While its underlying intent was to identify communists for deportation, mere communist sympathies, as evidenced for example by the editorial policies of the newspapers, were insufficient grounds for doing so at this point in time before Roxas outlawed the Huks in 1948. To prosecute and deport the arrested, the state required evidence of active interference in the internal politics of the Philippines, such as involvement in the Huk movement, or of other violations of the law and forms of criminal activity. For this reason, those arrested were questioned about ties to the Huks, the organizations they belonged to, whether or not they had legal residence papers, and what they had done during the occupation. Its agents found no such evidence, forcing Roxas into halting the arrests and ordering those arrested released. The Palace subsequently explained that the raids


\(^8\) Kerkvliet, *The Huk Rebellion*, 189.
were conducted in response to complaints that “lawless elements,” some involved in a kidnapping ring, were regular visitors at the places raided, and stressed that it had no desire to become involved in political disputes within Chinese society so long as they did not touch on domestic affairs.\(^{81}\)

All signs point to Shih I-Sheng and the CVP’s direct role in the raids. Witnesses identified Chinese agents involved in them as active KMT members, while according to *Chinese Commercial News* reporters, Shih was present at military police headquarters after the arrests.\(^{82}\) Detainees who were released a few days later told the *Manila Times* that they had been subjected to third-degree torture by those agents, among whom was a member of the “Overseas Chinese Volunteer Corps.”\(^{83}\) Shih denied any role in the raids in response to accusations in the left-wing Chinese media.\(^{84}\) Six years later, in summarizing its achievements to the Seventh National Party Congress, the *zongzhibu* smugly described the incident as a KMT “plot” (\(ymou\) 陰謀) against the communists.\(^{85}\)

September 5, although an embarrassing climbdown for the Roxas government at the time, in hindsight represented for Chinese communists the start of what they described as a campaign of “White Terror” against them.\(^{86}\) Two days later, in what appears to have been an unrelated episode, a Chinese Democratic League member and schoolteacher in the provinces, Wang Jiawai 王家外, was seized and killed by the authorities in a raid on the local League headquarters, sparking calls

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\(^{82}\) Tan, *The Chinese in the Philippines during the Japanese Occupation*, 110.

\(^{83}\) “Palace orders MPs to stop Chinese raids,” *Manila Times*, September 7, 1946, 16.

\(^{84}\) “Feidao huaqiao yu gongdang baozhi zaoyao zhongshang Shi Yisheng fouren yu souchashi youguan 菲島華僑與共黨報紙造謠中傷施逸生否認搜查事有關,” *Jiaotongbu Jinpuqu tielu guanliju ribao*, No. 164 (September 10, 1946), 3.

\(^{85}\) “Zhu Feilübin zongzhibu dangwu gongzuo baogaoshu,” KMT Records, HILA.

\(^{86}\) Gong (ed.), *Feilübin huaqiao kangri aiguo yinghun lu*, 191.
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for justice and protests against the authorities from the League, Lo Lian Hui, and Chinese Guide. Wang’s body was shipped to Manila, where an autopsy proved that he had been shot. A week after his murder, he received a martyr’s funeral in Manila, at which the Lo Lian Hui’s Secretary-General, Shen Fushui 沈福水, angrily denounced the KMT and Philippine government for collaborating to oppress local Chinese. The legal case that Wang’s supporters brought before the courts was never settled, according to Shen’s account, our only extant record of what happened. But it drove home to the Chinese left that they had to be on their guard going forward.\(^\text{87}\) While Shen provides no hard evidence of KMT involvement in Wang’s death, party records make it clear that armed force was used to purge communists from the schools.\(^\text{88}\)

Violence against leftists aside, the KMT also consolidated its hold over the school system by providing funding, through businessmen affiliated with the party, for the building of facilities, and by assisting schools in vetting applicants for teaching jobs at the start of each academic year.\(^\text{89}\) Where appropriate, it also assisted the state in its legal prosecution of alleged Chinese supporters of the Huks. In 1947, the Principal and four members of the Board of Directors of Kipsi Primary School (Jishi xiaoxue 及時小學) in Batangas City were arrested and charged with aiding the Huks and organizing communist activities at the school. All five men were connected to the Lo Lian Hui and Kang Fan. At their trial before the Deportation Board in Manila, one of the witnesses for the prosecution was the KMT’s Huang Dingming 黃鼎銘, whom Shen described as a collaborator. In his account of the “Five Chinese communists” (Wu huagong 五華共) case, Shen denounced KMT

\(^\text{87}\) Shen, “Feilübin huaqiao ge laogong tuanti lianhehui de zhanmen licheng,” 124-126.

\(^\text{88}\) “Zhu Feilübin zongzhibu dangwu gongzuo baogaoshu,” KMT Records, HILA.

\(^\text{89}\) “Zhu Feilübin zongzhibu dangwu gongzuo baogaoshu,” KMT Records, HILA.
members in Southern Luzon for having either gone into hiding during the Japanese occupation or, in Huang’s case, thrown in their lot with the enemy. Its reputation there low, the party thus sought to claim the region from the left by collaborating with the state. But the trial did not go as planned. Lawyers for the defendants succeeded in appealing the Board’s initial guilty verdict to the Supreme Court, delaying the outcome of their trial. When, in July 1949, they were finally deported to KMT-controlled Xiamen, the Lo Lian Hui worked out a deal with a KMT official and former Philippine resident who realized that his party’s demise was nigh and was looking to switch sides. To prove his new loyalties, this official agreed to identify the five men not as *huagong*, but as KMT members who had fallen victim to an intra-party feud. Four swiftly left Xiamen, but the fifth remained and was soon re-apprehended by a KMT special agent and sent to Taiwan before the CCP captured the city in October.\(^90\)

Growing fears of being killed, harassed, or arrested and then deported into the hands of the KMT in China limited the spaces for Chinese communist activity and led many leftists during this period to leave the Philippines of their own accord. In the spring of 1947, Gong Taoyi traveled to Hong Kong in his capacity as General Manager of the *Chinese Guide* to meet Co Keng Sing, who had relocated there in September 1946, and other communist leaders.\(^91\) The *Guide* was struggling financially. Its subscribers and advertisers were being intimidated into pulling their support for the paper, according to Gong. Advice from Co, fellow resistance fighter Du Ai 杜埃, and their contacts among Hong Kong’s left-wing newspapers on how best to save the *Guide* was not lacking. Upon returning to Manila, Gong implemented some of their suggestions to cut operating costs and boost

\(^{90}\) Shen, “Feilübin huaqiao ge laogong tuanti lianhehui de zhanmen licheng,” 127-130; “Zhu Feilübin zongzhibu dangwu gongzuo baogaoshu,” KMT Records, HILA.

\(^{91}\) Liu (ed.), *Xu Li tongzhi zhuishi jinian kan 1905-1995*, 107.
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its subscriptions and advertising revenue, ensuring that the newspaper survived until its five-year anniversary in April. Later that year, however, the Philippine authorities, supported by the KMT, stepped up their harassment of Gong’s wife, Huang Wei 黃薇, who had become the paper’s editor-in-chief after her predecessor Smin Chang 張思明 left for China. Accused of being a communist and Soviet surrogate and faced with deportation to Xiamen, Gong and Huang decided to shut down the Guide. On October 30, shortly after its final issue had gone to print, Philippine military police came to the Guide’s offices searching for the couple, but were told that they had left the building. Both left the country for Hong Kong shortly afterwards.92 The Chinese Commercial Bulletin, the left’s other main media organ, closed down in that same year as well.93

As anticommunism in the Philippines intensifies and the Chinese Civil War tilted in favor of the CCP after 1947, most Chinese communist leaders fled the Philippines for China, usually via Hong Kong, as Gong has documented. He, Huang, and Co all departed Hong Kong for China in early 1949, on the eve of the CCP’s victory, and went on to serve as members of the CCP’s United Work Front Department while living within the same residential compound in Beijing. During the Cultural Revolution, they and other returned overseas Chinese from the Philippines were accused of counterrevolutionary behavior and persecuted for their cosmopolitanism. A Gang of Four agent in Fujian compared the Wha Chi to a “lychee tree which bore fruits with red skin, white meat, and black hearts.”94 Huang and Gong were taken into custody for investigation by the CCP, with Gong allowed to return home during the evenings and on Sundays to care for their young child. Co Keng


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Sing suffered the most. Denounced as a reactionary for having cooperated with Filipinos and the US military during the war, he fell ill and was admitted to hospital, where Gong would secretly go to see him. In 1968, after being discharged and despite not having recovered completely, Co was sentenced to hard labor in first Heilongjiang and then Henan. In 1973, Gong was in Beijing when he found out that Co had passed away two years earlier on August 8.\textsuperscript{95}

\textbf{Conclusion: citizenship, diplomacy, and the consolidation of shared sovereignty}

Around half a year after the KMT’s headquarters reopened in Manila and Gong Taoyi fled the Philippines for Hong Kong, the party’s “bloody struggle” with the Chinese left was effectively over, and never again would it have to confront an organized Chinese communist movement there. That Philippine political and military elites were anticomunist only partially explains the KMT’s ascendancy and subsequent dominance of civic life among local Chinese. More important was that the establishment tolerated and in some cases welcomed the presence of this foreign political party on its soil. Comparisons with Malaysia are instructive here. From 1948 onwards, the colonial state confronted an anticolonial insurgency led by ethnic Chinese communists. Yet in May 1949, Britain banned the KMT from the country, judging the party’s goal of promoting closer ties between local Chinese and China as inimical to the creation of a Malayan civic consciousness.\textsuperscript{96} A year later, it even switched recognition from the ROC to the newly-founded PRC. Fearing foreign involvement in Malayan Chinese affairs, the British were determined to combat Chinese communism on their

\textsuperscript{95} Gong (ed.), \textit{Feilübin huaqiao kangri aiguo danxin lu}, 255.

\textsuperscript{96} “Memorandum to Executive Council. Policy Towards the KMT,” August 19, 1952, 10-11, Colonial Office Records 1022 / 198, National University of Singapore Library. I am grateful to Wen-Qing Ngoei for sending me these materials. On Britain’s decision to ban the KMT from Malaya, see C. F. Yong and R. B. McKenna, \textit{The Kuomintang Movement in British Malaya 1912-1949} (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1990), 220.
own terms without having to rely on the KMT. Having developed its capacity to surveil and police Malaya’s large and strategically important Chinese population over more than a century of colonial rule, Britain had little need for the party.

Far fewer Chinese lived in the Philippines, by contrast: 270,000 to peninsular Malaya and Singapore’s total of 3.3 million in 1959, by one estimate. Partly because of its own immigration policies, the American colonial state had little need for specialized institutions akin to the Chinese Protectorate in Singapore, Penang, and Malacca to manage Chinese society in the Philippines. Its postcolonial successor thus lacked the linguistic resources and expertise to combat what appeared to be the growing Chinese communist problem in the aftermath of World War II. For these reasons, it willingly outsourced part of its intelligence-gathering and coercive capacities to the KMT (and, as we will see, not only the KMT). More fundamental to this sharing of sovereignty was the state’s inaction on questions of citizenship and integration. Save for the few who had successfully become naturalized citizens of the Philippines, the majority of ethnic Chinese in the country, regardless of their place of birth, were ROC nationals. It thus followed that the ROC and its ruling party should enjoy sovereignty over persons that were both perceived as ethno-culturally distinct from Filipinos as well as citizens of a foreign state by law.

Following World War II, the KMT served as a vanguard for the consolidation of Nationalist Chinese influence in the Philippines; subsequent diplomatic developments between the two states created the legal basis for such influence. While the KMT as an overseas institution was not a mere appendage of the ROC, its fortunes were intimately connected to those of the Nationalist state and thus affected by the diplomatic relationships that the ROC entered into. It is not a coincidence that

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the three Southeast Asian countries that the KMT was the most active in after World War II were the Philippines, Thailand, and South Vietnam, all of which not only were anticommunist but also recognized the ROC. Following the establishment of formal ties between them immediately after the Philippines’ independence on July 4, 1946, the two states began negotiating a Treaty of Amity to “re-assert the friendly relations of the two nations” and “define the rights and privileges of one in the territory of the other,” as one ROC diplomat put it. On April 18, 1947, Roxas and the new ROC Ambassador Chen Chih-ping 陳質平 signed this Treaty, a short statement of principles that both countries’ legislatures later ratified and that was meant to guide the relationship going forward.

The first paragraph of the sixth of its ten articles read:

> The nationals of each of the high contracting parties shall be accorded, in the territories of the other, the liberty to establish schools for the education of their children, and shall enjoy freedom of peaceful assembly and association, of publication, of worship and religion, of burial and building cemeteries, upon the same terms as the nationals of any third country in accordance with the laws and regulations of the other.99

In effect, Article 6 reproduced US colonial policy by legitimizing the autonomy of Chinese schools in the Philippines from state interference. Since the vast majority of these private institutions were, as they had been before the war, run by the KMT in conjunction with provincial Chinese chambers of commerce, it also implicitly legitimized the party’s de facto hegemony over Chinese education. As an institution that promoted the interests of “Chinese nationals,” the KMT was itself legitimized by this article’s guarantees of freedom of assembly and association for such nationals, as were the other civic anticommunist organizations that Nationalist China sponsored.


In the Name of Anticommunism:
Chinese Practices of Ideological Accommodation in the Early Cold War Philippines

On January 28, 1954, The Bullseye newspaper in Manila printed a letter to President Ramon Magsaysay from a “group of non-political but patriotic local Chinese merchants” who had resided in the islands for over 20 years and come to regard the Philippines as their “second mother country.” Its author, Lim Tian Seng, said that the purpose of the letter was to point out “bad elements among the local Chinese who have utilized convenient facilities accommodated to them by some corrupt government officials to enrich themselves.” He singled out two individuals for special blame. The first he did not name, but described simply as a “naturalized alien whose citizenship is even now under question and whose notoriety is so well-known to the Filipinos as well as the Chinese that no further introduction is necessary.” Lim identified the second man as the former KMT Secretary-General in the Philippines, Sy Yek Sheng. This was of course none other than Shih I-Sheng, whom we last encountered helping Philippine military police raid suspected communist institutions on September 5, 1946. Lim proceeded to describe how Shih blackmailed wealthy Chinese. According to Lim, Shih simply picked up the telephone and called someone whom he knew to be well-off. Exploiting his KMT credentials, he claimed to have connections with the Philippine military and told his victim that someone had reported to the authorities that he was a communist or communist sympathizer. Shih then offered to clear this person’s name if he paid Shih 10,000, 30,000, or 50,000 pesos, depending on how wealthy he was. Shih had made, by a “very conservative estimation,” no less than half a million pesos from this scheme and, though no longer the party’s Secretary-General, remained in the country as “head of the Chinese Volunteers of the Philippines Fraternity.”

Lim also claimed that during the previous week, “thousands of local Chinese commercial establishments received by mail supposed communist propaganda literature in Chinese, sealed in
envelopes allegedly issued by the ‘Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party in the Philippines.’” Reasoning that such a large quantity of propaganda could not have been mailed by actual Chinese communists because of the government’s “relentless” anticommmunist policies and Chinese Reds’ lack of organization in the country, he concluded that the materials must have been forged. The real culprits, he conjectured, were “well-organized racketeers” who hoped to deceive the state into believing that Chinese communists were active again and profit from any arrests that it might make. “We have reasons to believe,” he said, that there were many “Chinese operatives” in the Department of National Defense (DND) who were in league with these racketeers and had been feeding their Filipino superiors “biased and inaccurate or even false and malicious” reports on the activities and ideological leanings of local Chinese. The letter then mentioned the Philippine military’s mass arrests of over 300 Chinese on December 27, 1952, on charges of communism. At least 170 detainees had been released, revealing that the DND was relying on flawed intelligence. In concluding, Lim modestly hoped that no further arrests would be made unless they were well-supported by substantial evidence.\(^1\)

Lim had more in common with Shih and the “Chinese operatives” who had infiltrated the DND than his letter to the newly-elected President condemning them suggests. Blackmail, forgery, rumor-mongering, and similar criminal or ethically questionable behavior aimed at tearing down the reputation of men like Lim by having them identified as communists. In a twisted way, Shih

\(^1\)“Dear Mr. President,” *The Bullseye*, January 28, 1954, in Ramon Magsaysay Scrapbook, Vol. 2 (January 22-February 19, 1954), 168, Asian Library, Ramon Magsaysay Center [RMC], Manila. The propaganda materials that Lim says were received through the mail were entitled “Appeal of Philippine Overseas Chinese Communist Party to All Chinese in the Philippines for Unity in Opposing U.S.-Sino-Philippine Reactionaries and for Fight of Liberation” (dated December 28, 1953) and “Further Statement of Philippine Overseas Chinese Communist Party to All Chinese People Recommendation [sic] for Chinese Investment in National Construction” (dated January 1, 1954). See “Chinese Communist Party Propaganda Documents,” February 4, 1954, CIA-RDP80-00810A003500700009-7, Central Intelligence Agency Records Search Tool [CREST], National Archives and Records Administration [NARA], College Park, Maryland. There is no indication in this brief report if the materials were authentic or forgeries.
and these operatives were practicing anticommunism in the name of Filipino national values. Until exposed, they were perceived as anticommunists or as helping anticommunism. Similarly, Lim’s carefully worded letter was a performance of his ideological affinities. By informing on his fellow Chinese to the public, which was not a common occurrence at the time, Lim was playing to Filipino prejudices toward the Chinese and proved that he was a “patriotic” Chinese merchant who regarded the Philippines as his “second mother country.” Lim understood “patriotism” as a civic disposition, unrelated to his place of birth or nationality, neither of which we know. He might not have spoken Tagalog or been able to pass off as racially Filipino. But, in exposing the criminal methods of Shih and the operatives, he was enacting his opposition to corruption and strengthening the Magsaysay administration’s capacity to distinguish between genuine and fake Reds.

The practices that I describe above were a response to and component of the anticommunist, anti-Chinese political, cultural, and social environment in the early post-independence Philippines. Most Chinese there, unlike Filipinos, did not experience the struggle against communism as direct US intervention in their daily lives. As the anthropologist Heonik Kwon suggests, the global Cold War manifested itself as multiple, locally specific historical realities, from material and symbolic forms such as fallout shelters to less materially tangible and more socially diffused forms such as kinship relations. For local Chinese, the ideological bifurcation that characterized manifestations of this global reality was imbricated with Sinophobia. In a climate thick with fears of communism, the Chinese, and Chinese communism, but largely devoid of actual Chinese Reds, anticommunism for the likes of Lim and Shih was more than about rooting out subversives, ideological authenticity, and believing in Chiang Kai-shek. It was, in many instances, a flexible repertoire of practices, from crime to civic associationism, that traditional Chinese elites like Lim and their challengers such as

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Shih employed to enhance their reputations as “anticommunists,” pursue vendettas against alleged communists, and come to terms with being Chinese in the Philippines from the late 1940s to early 1950s.

By examining Philippine-Chinese practices of what I call ideological accommodation in the contexts of the Cold War and Philippine nation-building, this chapter shows how local Chinese integrated ideology into their identities as minorities in a newly-independent Southeast Asian state after World War II. My concern in this chapter is not with issues such as citizenship, education, or the informal arrangements between Chinese businessmen and native political elites which enabled the former to flourish despite discriminatory economic legislation; nor do I focus exclusively on elites. A narrow focus on elite responses to the legal and policy frameworks that enabled economic and cultural “anti-Sinitism” risks overlooking the roles of extra-legal phenomena and the political environment in molding Chinese strategies of adaptation. Ideological accommodation frequently drew upon familiar practices such as the cultivation of patron-client relationships between Chinese and Filipino politicians; it also gave rise to distinctively “anticommunist” practices such as rumormongering and the forging of communist propaganda to incriminate innocent individuals and one’s enemies. In all instances, Chinese actors evinced a clear awareness of social power structures, the Philippines’ alignment and relations with the United States, and the similarly intimate ties between Chinese in the country and the ROC.

By “accommodation,” I do not mean that anticommunism was only reactive and that those involved were at the mercy of the Philippine government or international forces. Rather, it was a productive strategy, in which members of Chinese society competed with each other to accumulate anticommunism as a kind of resource and achieve social prominence. The Philippine state figured into their calculations as an arbiter of such prominence, a legal and coercive institution, and source
of patronage. Yet as we will see, it also depended on these actors for intelligence and, consequently, was often the one being manipulated.

The chapter begins by describing how anticommunism and Sinophobia became intertwined in the Philippines during a period when the “Cold War” as a social and cultural reality was being constructed and consolidated globally.³ Fears of Chinese communism preoccupied the Philippine state and Chinese society; anticommunism and anti-Chinese sentiment were becoming integral to official ideas of Filipino identity. The Chinese therefore sought accommodation with this identity: by adopting ideologically correct positions, they created opportunities for social and political gain and lessened Filipinos’ suspicions of them. I then examine the ideological practices of three groups of actors that represented different institutions, factions, and classes within Chinese society. First, I discuss the Philippine-Chinese United Organization in Support of Anti-Communist Movement, which Chinese elites such as the businessmen Alfonso Sycip established to raise funds and conduct propaganda activities in support of anticommunism. The next sections describe individuals whose practices mimicked the elite’s and each other’s and threatened the established social order: Shih I-Sheng and a Korean-Chinese doctor named Edward Lim, both of whom derived their social status from their affiliation with the KMT; and a gang of “Chinese operatives,” led by one Antonio Chua Cruz 蔡彬慶, which the DND had employed to gather intelligence on the Chinese community.

Anticommunism and Sinophobia in the early Cold War Philippines

As Chapter 1 has explained, the Chinese communist movement in the Philippines declined rapidly in influence from September 1946 to the end of 1947. By 1948, faced with an increasingly
unfavorable political environment there, its leaders had mostly left the country to wage the Chinese Civil War. Where once left-wing organizations such as the Kang Fan and Lo Lian Hui had operated in the open, only a small and secretive fragment of the movement remained. Yet precisely because Chinese communism had disappeared from public life, fears of this phenomenon in the Philippines persisted. Communism in general appeared to be in the ascendancy throughout Asia from the late 1940s to early 1950s, not least in the Philippines, where the Huk insurgency had been in full swing since 1946. Communist uprisings, some more short-lived than others, erupted in Malaya, Burma, and Indonesia in 1948, seemingly at the instigation of the Soviet Union through the Calcutta Youth Conference in February. In Vietnam, the French colonial state had been at war with the Vietminh since 1946. In China, the CCP was on the verge of winning the Civil War against the KMT. When the PRC entered the Korean War in 1950, therefore, Chinese communism had become a distinct, territorialized, and racialized subset of the global Red threat.

In the Philippines, Filipino fears of Chinese communism in the late 1940s and early 1950s were inseparable from anxieties over the country’s porous borders and immigration policy. State officials and politicians feared that communists lurked among the 2,700 or so Chinese “overstaying temporary visitors” who had entered the islands during the Civil War and then refused to leave for China after their three-month visitor visas had expired. Reports from the period by the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA) lay bare the state’s fears that pro-communist Chinese smugglers and corrupt local officials were facilitating the inflow of CCP propaganda, together with

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gold, drugs, and similar contraband into the country and the outflow of foreign exchange and illicit arms to China. CCP agents were believed to have entered the country to join up with local Chinese communists and the Huks and to infiltrate Chinese society. Immigration Commissioner Engracio Fabre testified to the House Committee on Un-Filipino Activities (CUFA) in October 1948 that of the 561 known communist agents in the islands, at least 50 were Chinese, some of them “prominent socially and in business.”6 In language that typified Filipino fears of the Chinese as fifth columnists, an intelligence report declared that “if nothing is effectively done in advance” to stop the “Chinese Menace,” the Philippines “may later become a “Little China.””7 A similar report asserted, without supporting evidence, that “Of the officially estimated 200,000 Chinese residents in the Philippines, 36,000 have been identified as communists and communist sympathizers. This figure exceeds even the native communist forces.”8 In 1951, Magsaysay, then Secretary of National Defense, reduced this figure to a still alarmingly high 30,000.9

Officials perceived Chinese communism as a subset of the wider “Chinese problem” in the country. Sinophobia and anticommunism were distinct but overlapping phenomena that the Cold War and Filipino nationalism helped join together, thereby compounding fears of “alien” economic dominance, moral degeneracy, and insularity – stereotypes going back to US colonial times.10 In

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7 File 002, Box 14, Folder 6: Interior, Department of the (Philippine Constabulary), Elpidio Quirino Papers, Filipinas Heritage Library [FHL], Ayala Museum, Manila.

8 File 007, Box 5, Folder 7: National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (1948), Quirino Papers, FHL.


Filipino eyes, the Chinese were racially “passive and individualistic in temperament,” but capable of being “energized by propaganda,” and hence susceptible to indoctrination.\(^{11}\) Local Chinese had “nurtured their ties with the motherland, operate cohesively as a race, and in many instances claim dual citizenship.” Their “unassimilability and their financial or commercial influence make them effective instruments of probable aggressive Chinese foreign policy,” wrote NICA in 1948.\(^{12}\) The “Chinese problem,” then, was not only inseparable from the “China problem,” but in many respects – contra Philip Kuhn’s view – essential to it.\(^{13}\) Race and nationality became inseparable aspects of Chineseness in the eyes of Filipinos.

Populist expressions of these frequently inconsistent anti-Chinese prejudices took multiple forms. Politicians and journalists frequently inveighed against Chinese in the newspapers to drum up support for their election campaigns and boost their readership respectively. On the legislative front, congressmen and lobbying organizations such as the Filipino Retail Merchants Association and Filipino Economic Emancipation Organization persisted with their campaign to curb perceived Chinese dominance of the Philippine economy. In 1954, despite countervailing efforts by Chinese merchants, the President enacted Republic Act No. 1180, the Retail Trade Nationalization Act. By forbidding non-Filipinos or corporations not wholly owned by Filipinos from engaging in the retail business, the Act dealt a blow to Chinese commerce, most of which was concentrated in the retail sector.\(^{14}\)

\(^{11}\) File 006, Box 5, Folder 7, Quirino Papers, FHL.

\(^{12}\) File 007, Box 5, Folder 7, Quirino Papers, FHL.

\(^{13}\) Philip A. Kuhn, *Chinese Among Others: Emigration in Modern Times* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), 300.

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Political violence against Chinese after the war did not manifest itself in the form of anti-Chinese riots and intercommunal conflict, the likes of which had happened under Spanish rule and would occur in Indonesia and Malaysia. Rather, individual Chinese were frequently the targets of corrupt, unscrupulous, or simply clueless representatives of the state. The metropolitan police were known to raid Chinese commercial establishments, carrying with them search warrants and small quantities of opium, ammunition, and Chinese communist propaganda. If the merchants refused to pay them off, the police pretended to have found such contraband on their premises and proceeded to arrest them.\(^\text{15}\) Intelligence agencies and the police were also ignorant of the Chinese language and thus subcontracted the gathering of intelligence on Chinese society to local Chinese, rendering themselves vulnerable to inaccurate or fabricated reports on alleged communists. Because of their legal status as citizens of the ROC, Chinese arrested by the state, if found guilty by the Deportation Board, were deported as foreign nationals to China or, after 1949, Taiwan. Police criminality was such a serious matter that it went all the way up to the ROC Foreign Minister George Yeh himself, who complained to a Philippine official in Taipei in April 1951 that the police “act in such a way that the Chinese people live in a constant fear. They have instilled a feeling of insecurity among the Chinese nationals and a reign of terror spread among them.”\(^\text{16}\)

The prospect of being extorted, arrested, and even deported by the state was among a host of fears for Chinese the time. From the 1950s onwards, an external threat manifested itself in the form of what local Chinese believed were demands for money from communist officials in China. In response to a foreign exchange crisis, the Philippine Central Bank imposed controls on foreign

\(^{15}\) Political Secretary Edward E. Rice to Charge d’Affaires Vinton Chapin, November 24, 1950, RG 84, Series: Classified General Records, 1946-1961, Box 33, Folder: 370 Public Order and Safety, National Archives and Records Administration [NARA], College Park.

\(^{16}\) “Lü Fei buliang huaqiao,” Vol. 3, 98, 020-010708-0018, March 5-May 27, 1951, AH.
exchange in December 1949, which forbade the remitting of money to one’s relatives in China—a prohibition that Chinese circumvented by channeling the remittances through third-party brokers in Hong Kong.\(^\text{17}\) It became increasingly common after the disruption of these remittance networks and the onset of CCP rule for Chinese to receive letters from their relatives in China, written at the instigation of CCP officials, asking for further sums, either small amounts on a regular basis or an immediate large lump-sum.\(^\text{18}\) At least half of those who had received such threats, a KMT member informed the US Embassy in Manila, acceded to these demands, fearing for their relatives if they did not.\(^\text{19}\) Reporting them to the Philippine authorities was not an option because of the illegality of remitting money overseas and the charges of aiding the CCP that could easily be leveled against them for doing so.

From the late 1940s onwards, it thus became expedient for Chinese to adopt anticommunist positions in their everyday lives. As the actions of anti-Chinese politicians, corrupt policemen, and Chinese communists suggests, opportunities abounded from the late 1940s onwards for individuals or groups—even from beyond the country—to profit from the social instability caused by Filipino anti-Chinese prejudices and fears of communism. In the absence of authentic Chinese communist threats to national security, anticommunism became a new and valorized ideological resource that Chinese competed with each other to accumulate and transform into social and political gains. For them, practicing anticommunism signaled to the state their conformity, despite being foreigners,)


\(^{19}\) R. A. Spruance to State Department, April 1, 1952, RG 84, Series: Classified General Records, 1946-1961, Box 32, Folder: 350.21 Chinese Communists, NARA.
to a national identity that this state had redefined in ideological terms. As anti-Chinese legislation and institutions such as CUFA made abundantly clear, to be Filipino during this period was to not be Chinese or communist. ROC citizenship and ethno-cultural markers of Chinese identity such as language, customs, and physical features were difficult if not impossible to shed. Ideology on the other hand was a positive quality of being Filipino and easy to show off.

Chamber, party, and embassy: centers of influence in postwar Chinese society

By the early 1950s, commercial elites had regained their leadership of Chinese society and were eager to jump onboard the anticommunist bandwagon. Communism, whose proponents had sought and failed to persecute these elites for their supposed collaboration with the Japanese during the war, had made no ideological inroads among them for this reason. More clear-cut instances of collaboration had been dealt with by the US and Philippine authorities and guilty persons deported to China. Seemingly little had changed about the composition and leadership of the elite. As before the war, commercial wealth, generated in sectors such as banking, insurance, manufacturing, and particularly retailing, remained the leading criterion of social status. Except for those who had died during Japanese rule, nearly all of those who had held leadership positions before the war within the community’s governing organization, the Philippine Chinese General Chamber of Commerce (Feilübin Minlila zhonghua shanghui 菲律賓岷里拉中華商會), had been reinstated after the war, including its President, Alfonso Sycip 薛芬士.20

Founded in 1908, the General Chamber had long been dominated by what political scientist James Blaker calls “traditionalists”: men such as Sycip and his brother Albino 薛敏老, for whom

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leadership was chiefly about maintaining a single organization for arbitrating internal community disputes, mediating between the community and Philippine government, and preserving traditional Chinese values. Insofar as they identified themselves as “Chinese” and retained ties to China, they did so primarily in a cultural sense, and in order to enhance their own influence and prestige within the Philippines. While he errs in describing these “traditionalists” as apolitical – for what could be more political than the maintenance of power within a given community? – he draws an important, if overly schematic, distinction between them and their “nationalist” competitors. This latter group, comprising KMT members, was politically and economically oriented towards China and sought to leverage the financial and political resources of Chinese society to affect the mainland.21

By the late 1940s, traditionalism and the avoidance of nationalist politics were increasingly unviable options for Chinese leaders like Sycip. Business as usual was no longer possible. The rise of anti-Chinese nationalism, seemingly inexorable, threatened the livelihood of Chinese merchants and, by extension, called into question the ability of their representatives to protect their interests and negotiate effectively with the state. The ubiquity of anticommunist discourse in the Philippines incentivized elites into taking sides in what was, in 1949, very much an ongoing conflict between the KMT and CCP for China’s future. In this environment, the Chamber could not prevent itself from yielding influence to the KMT and ROC Embassy, which had emerged as alternative centers of power within Chinese society. The party’s growing influence in the Philippines, despite events in China, derived from its leading role in combating the Chinese left and the thickening of ROC-Philippine relations after the Treaty of Amity in 1947. It was reflected in the increased presence of KMT members such as Sy En and Yao Shiong Shio 姚迺崑 and other dedicated anticommunists

such as Yu Khe Thai among its leadership. Sy would succeed Sycip as President of the Chamber in 1950. The party and the Chamber were not and would never become a single organization; nor would the former ever supplant the latter as the community’s governing body. But four years later, the Chamber would be overtaken at the head of Chinese society by the KMT-dominated Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry, an institution that infused the traditional mandate of the older General Chamber with Nationalist ideology. Its formation and the concurrent withdrawal of an older generation of leaders (such as Sycip) from public life signaled the definitive collapse of traditionalism as a political position and a major victory for the party in its efforts to institutionalize itself overseas.

The KMT was also expanding as an organization within the Philippines. In its report to the Seventh National Party Congress in Taiwan in October 1952, the zongzhibu described the period from 1948 onwards, following its “bloody struggle” with the left from 1945 to 1947, as one of first “bitterly holding on” (kucheng 苦撑) and then “flourishing” (pengbo 蓬勃). At 7,369 in late 1952, the party’s membership was within several hundred of its prewar peak. 13 zhibu had been formed throughout the archipelago, with a further 128 fenbu underneath them. Party activities ranged from fundraising campaigns in support of Nationalist troops to instructional classes for party cadres to the organizing of “observation and study” (kaocha 考察) visits to Taiwan from June 1950 onwards.

In the opposite direction, from Nanjing or Taipei to Manila, flowed guidance on how to coordinate ideological activism between the periphery and the center: detailed instructions, for example, on using the term gongfei and suffix “fei” in party newspapers when referring the CCP and its leaders.

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From 1948 onwards, two of the Philippines’ four Chinese dailies, the Kong Li Po (Gongli bao 公理報) and Great China Press (Dazhonghua ribao 大中華日報), with a readership of about 10,000, served as the party’s main propaganda organs. Among Chinese schools, the party estimated that it had very close ties to 84 out of 136 boards of directors. These schools, together with provincial chambers of commerce, constituted the twin pillars of KMT strength in the Philippines.

Also growing in strength at the time was the Nationalist Embassy, an institution that traced its origins to the establishment of a Chinese Consulate in the Philippines in 1898. Following the Treaty of Amity, ROC-Philippine relations received a further boost in July 1949 when Chiang Kai-shek, having just resigned as President of the ROC in January, visited the Philippines as Chairman of the KMT and at the invitation of President Elpidio Quirino to discuss preliminary plans for an anticommmunist “Pacific Pact,” similar to NATO. Though nothing came of these plans, the optics of this visit and Chiang’s continuing identification with the ROC as a quasi-head of state enhanced the ROC’s reputation in the Philippines and stimulated anticommmunist initiatives among Chinese leaders. Buoyed by the strong diplomatic ties and in keeping with the ROC’s emphasis on overseas Chinese affairs as a central aspect of its foreign policy, the Embassy took it upon itself to speak up on issues relating to Chinese society, from opposing legal restrictions on “alien” economic activity to showing its support for the Philippine government’s efforts to root out communists and other

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23 The Dazhonghua ribao was formed from the merger of the Dahua ribao and Chiang Kai-shek Daily (Zhongzheng ribao 中正日報) in 1948.


“undesirables.”\(^{27}\) Compared to the Embassy, the Chamber came across as quiescent and ineffectual. The expanding influence of the KMT and Embassy, on top of fears of Chinese communism locally and abroad, brought about a more explicit ideological stance on the part of the Chinese community.

**The Philippine-Chinese United Organization in Support of Anti-Communist Movement**

Founded in January 1951, the awkwardly-titled Philippine-Chinese United Organization in Support of Anti-Communist Movement (*Feilübin huaqiao fangong kang’e houyuanhui* 菲律賓華僑反共抗俄後援會, or ACM) was one of the most visible efforts by Chinese leaders in the 1950s to bolster their credentials as good anticommunists and loyal Philippine residents. The ACM was formed at the height of an anti-Red conjuncture of events in East Asia, including the White Terror in Taiwan and formation of CUFA, that the Chinese Civil War, the outbreak of the Korean War, and China’s entry into the latter helped create. In the Philippines, government-led anticomunist initiatives such as CUFA were reinforced by different forms of civic associationism, including the Philippine Anti-Communist League (PACL), a organization founded and led by retired US Army Major Frank Tenny and dominated by Americans and Filipinos. Following the visit of a Philippine-Chinese delegation to Taiwan in August 1950 – the first of its kind by a *huaqiao* community – the ROC Ambassador Chen Chih-ping urged those who had gone on the trip to form an anticomunist organization, which would “display the facts of their anticommunism” (*biaoxian huaqiao fangong zhi shishi* 表現華僑反共之事實) to the Philippine state.\(^{28}\) The objective of the ACM, he explained in an official news release, was to “redouble and coordinate the efforts of the Chinese nationals in


the Philippines in aiding their legitimate government, now temporarily seated in Taiwan, to which they have all along manifested their loyalty, in its determined struggle against this evil force of Communist aggression.” As the first organization of its kind among overseas Chinese, it was meant to inspire Chinese in other countries to “[unite] together in the same manner so as to achieve greater strength to bring about the early defeat of Communism.” The ACM welcomed Filipinos. It had secured the support of President Quirino and its 25 Standing Committee members were approved by Chiang Kai-Shek himself; these 25 then nominated the Executive Committee and chaired its four subcommittees.

Backed by the ROC Embassy, the ACM united under the banner of “anticommunism and resisting Russia” (fangong kang’e 反共抗俄) members of the two largest Chinese organizations in the country. Alfonso Sycip, who had just stepped down as President of the General Chamber in 1950 after a record eight consecutive terms in office and ten in total (1934-1935; 1937-1941; 1946-1949), was elected the Movement’s Chairman. Although not a KMT member, he was very much the ideal person to lead an organization that sought to gain favor with both the Philippine and ROC governments. Born in the Philippines in 1883 and fluent in both English and Chinese, Sycip was a naturalized Philippine citizen, and one of the richest men in the country, having made his fortune from the import and export business. During the occupation, he was detained by the Japanese for a year and then released on account of his old age. Unlike his counterparts who were forced to join the Chinese Association, Sycip fled to remote Fuga Island, where he remained until the end of the

29 “Feihua fangong kang’e zonghui,” Vol. 1, 25, IMH Archives.


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war. He was also on personal terms with Filipino and ROC politicians, including Chiang, whom he was known to have met with in Taipei to plead for the release of innocent Chinese charged with being communists.

Until the 1950s, however, Sycip had never been very nationalistic, certainly not compared to party ideologues. At the height of the Second Sino-Japanese War, he only reluctantly supported the campaign to boycott Japanese goods that more ideological, KMT-aligned Chinese leaders had pressured the Chamber to launch. In 1939, with the boycott taking its toll on Chinese commerce, Sycip told a gathering of Chinese businessmen that they should “regain their primary mission [as businessmen]” and “must not be excessively indulged in military and political affairs.” After the war, Sycip resumed his leadership of the General Chamber and remained disengaged from China politics until 1951, his friendship with Chiang notwithstanding. Only after becoming Chairman of the ACM did he start taking firm ideological positions in public, and thus it is in the context of the political climate of the times that his shift in public behavior must be understood.

Among the ACM’s four Vice-Chairmen were the incumbent President of the Chamber, Sy En, and Gonzalo Gawhok 吳金聘, who had led the August 1950 delegation to Taiwan. Sycip, Sy, Vice-Chairmen Yu Khe Thai and Yao Shiong Shio, and Standing Committee member Peter Lim 林為白 were official advisers to the ROC Embassy on matters concerning the Chinese community such as communist infiltration, criminal activity, and the guilt or innocence of Chinese charged by the state with being communists or criminals. The remaining Standing Committee members were

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mostly businessmen and General Chamber members, except for those who represented the media and education, two other important sectors of Chinese society. These included Go Puan Seng 吳重生, Publisher of the Fookien Times (Xinmin ribao 新閩日報), which Sycip had helped found in 1925, and Ong Chuan Seng. Shih I-Sheng, the zongzhibu’s Secretary-General at the time, was also on the Standing Committee.\(^\text{35}\) He and 11 others, including Sy, Yao, Gawhok, and Ong, were also members of the KMT, whose principal figures in the Philippines were all part of the ACM.

Following its founding, the ACM focused on fundraising in support of the ROC, building its membership beyond Manila, and propagandizing in support of anticommunism in both the ROC and the Philippines. According to its charter, branches would be asked to make monthly and special “national salvation” contributions to its general headquarters in Manila. Chen Chih-ping, the ROC Ambassador, estimated that five million pesos could be raised this way. Some of this money would be channeled secretly to Taiwan, bypassing the foreign exchange controls that the Philippines had put in place.\(^\text{36}\) Chinese leaders had also earmarked a significant portion of these contributions for President Quirino’s National Peace Fund, which had been established in September 1950 to solicit private donations in support of operations against the Huks.\(^\text{37}\) Contributions to such projects were a straightforward means by which wealthy Chinese proved their value to their host government, performed good citizenship, and assuaged Filipino doubts about their political inclinations.

The highlight of the ACM’s early years was its tour of the southern Philippines from March 27 to April 5, 1951 led by Sycip, Sy, Yao, and ROC Ambassador Chen Chih-ping. The tour aimed

\(^{35}\) “Feihua fangong kang’e zonghui,” Vol. 1, 13-14, IMH Archives.

\(^{36}\) “Feihua fangong kang’e zonghui,” Vol. 1, 53, IMH Archives.

to establish branches of the organization in provinces like Iloilo, Cebu, Davao, and Cotabato (much in the same way that the KMT had done with its own branches), induct new members, and raise funds for the ROC through schemes such as the selling of “patriotic bonds” (aiguo gongzhai 愛國公債). Chen did not specify in his report how much had been raised, but said instead that the results of the tour were not quantifiable and that the tour had made an enduring impact on anticommunist cooperation between the two governments.\(^\text{38}\) Statistics compiled by the ROC’s Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission indicate that the Philippine Chinese made 251,096.14 US dollars in “patriotic voluntary contributions” (aiguo zidong juanxian 愛國自動捐獻) to the ROC in 1951 – the highest amount by far among all Chinese communities overseas that year.\(^\text{39}\)

The ACM also propagandized in local newspapers to raise its profile among Chinese and Filipinos. Go Puan Seng’s *Fookien Times Yearbook* was a favorite platform because it was a dual-language publication and ideal for reaching out to a wide audience. As the designated spokesperson for the ACM, Sycip took frequently to the pages of the *Yearbook* to inveigh against communism, drawing upon a common pool of talking points that the ROC used to reach out to overseas Chinese communities. In its 1952 edition, for example, he wrote about “The Role of the Overseas Chinese in the Worldwide Struggle against Communism.” Besides urging huaqiao in the Philippines and elsewhere to strengthen their anticommunist beliefs, help the authorities root out communism, and assist Taiwan in every possible way, he also criticized other Southeast Asian governments for not recognizing and reacting to the Red threat “in as clear and as energetic a manner as the Philippines.” The same piece also allowed Sycip to update readers on ACM’s achievements. Since its formation,

\(^{38}\) “Feihua fangong kang’e zonghui,” Vol. 1, 81-82, IMH Archives.

\(^{39}\) *Qiaowu tongji* 僑務統計 (Taipei: Qiaowu weiyuanhui tongjishi, 1964), 68.
it had formed 50 provincial chapters and begun an “extensive educational campaign,” comprising sponsoring newspaper articles, distributing literature, and hosting speakers in Chinese schools.\(^{40}\) A year later, he wrote another hortatory piece called “An Appeal to the People of Free Nations,” which contained practical suggestions on how ordinary people could help their governments fight communism. One was helping people who had been “forced to become Communists return to the fold of democracy.” The other was reporting communists to the authorities. But, Sycip cautioned, with one eye on the Philippine situation, it was important to avoid false accusations.\(^{41}\)

For Philippine Chinese like Sycip and other members of the ACM’s Standing Committee, anticommunism as an ideology and socio-political movement (the elimination of communists from the Philippines; the retaking of China from the CCP) was inseparable from the fashioning of one’s public identity as a “respectable,” ideologically correct “alien.” The complex relationship between these commitments was evident at a Committee meeting in December 1951 that Ambassador Chen attended and reported on. Materials that shed light on the internal workings of such organizations are hard to come by; Chen’s report thus deserves close scrutiny for what it says about the sensitivity of Chinese actors to the ideological climate and how important being perceived in the right way to the right authorities was to the ACM.

The occasion for the meeting seems to have been Britain’s continued recognition of the PRC despite Winston Churchill’s becoming Prime Minister for the second time in October 1951. The main topic for discussion at the meeting was not, however, Churchill’s “betrayal” (\textit{chumai} 卖) of the ROC, but Sy En’s proposal that the ACM change its English name to that of a charitable

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organization in case the PRC entered the United Nations and Manila recognized Beijing. Were this scenario to unfold, the Movement, under a different registered name, would still be able to collect donations from Chinese to support anticommunism in the Philippines and Taiwan. Sy’s pragmatic suggestion met with impassioned reactions from the other Standing Committee members. Dy Huan Chay 李煥彩, the only other person who supported it, believed that it would help protect Chinese society and was in accordance with popular views. Most, however, resolutely opposed this change. Chen denounced Sy as “myopic” (yanguang duanshi 眼光短視) and his proposal as a “cowardly compromise” (pasi tuoxie 怕死妥協), as he was obliged to do as a representative of the ROC. Yao Shiong Shio said that since the ACM’s aimed to oppose communism, a change in its name would render it meaningless; in any case, Chiang had appointed the Committee and thus had the final say on the proposal. Say Kok Chuan asserted that acting in response to what he called “Anglo-French imperialist schemes to sell out Taiwan” would signal to others that the Philippine Chinese had flip-flopped. Chen echoed this concern when he said that since Quirino had approved the organization, changing its name would suggest to both the ROC and Philippines that the ACM’s core ideology had changed. In the end, the ACM did not change its name at that time. The last word belonged to Sycip, who acknowledged Sy and Say’s concerns but sided with the status quo. “Whatever happens to Taiwan in the future,” he said, “we Chinese in the Philippines should adhere to the Philippine environment. As it is an anticommunist country, the name of the organization does not need to be changed.”

Despite the accusations of cowardice that Chen and Yao leveled against Sy and Dy, the dispute was not between pragmatists and ideologues. It should be read instead as an affirmation of

42 “Feihua fangong kang’e zonghui,” Vol. 1, 115-118, IMH Archives.
how anticommunist credentials mattered to Philippine-Chinese elites in the early 1950s. Both sides at the meeting were ideologues and pragmatically concerned about the optical significance of their organization’s English name to the Filipino public. Their heated discussion was based on a mutual acknowledgement of anticommunism’s importance at the time. Where they differed was over the expediency of this name change and the relationship between local and international developments. Sy and his opponents disagreed over whether or not a change in name, given the ROC’s uncertain international status, served common anticommunist aims or indicated weakness and cowardice. Sycip’s summary remarks reminded everyone present that official attitudes toward communism in the Philippines should take precedence over the ROC’s status. Retaining “anticommunism” was pragmatic in view of the ideological position of the Philippine government and the perception of ideological commitment that the organization wished to create.

**Criminal anticommunists: Shih I-Sheng, Edward Lim, and the KMT**

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, challenges to the social order and reputation of Chinese elites in the Philippines came from within and beyond the elite class, manifesting themselves in a variety of forms ranging from smuggling and profiteering to blackmail and gossip-mongering. The efforts of elites to burnish their reputations as law-abiding residents of the country and to inoculate themselves against charges of criminal or communist activities were a perpetual uphill struggle. The next two sections examine the dynamics of this struggle by focusing on those who practiced anticommunism in their own, oftentimes illegal ways, coming into conflict with established elites in the process.

Two such men, Shih I-Sheng and Edward Lim, emerged from within the KMT. Chapter 1 has described Shih’s exploits during the Japanese occupation as commander of the party’s Chinese
 Volunteers in the Philippines (CVP), his role in helping rebuild the Philippine KMT after the war, and involvement in the September 5, 1946 raids on alleged Chinese communist organizations. He served as the party’s Secretary-General from 1948 to October 1951, when his criminal activities and duplicity finally caught up with him and he resigned from his position before going on a “world tour” of the United States, Central and Latin America, Europe, and Southeast Asia. Shih returned to the Philippines in April 1952 and remained on the party’s Executive Committee well into the 1950s.43

Edward Lim, Shih’s contemporary, hailed from a very different background. Lim claimed to have been born in Shanghai, but ROC and American sources suggest that he was instead born in Pyongyang and grew up in China. Having studied pharmacy in the United States, Lim served in the US army in World War I and then returned to China to practice medicine. Prior to arriving in the Philippines around the same time as Shih did, he served as a doctor with the rank of Lieutenant-General under pro-Chiang warlord Yang Sen, through which he acquired a Chinese passport and became involved in KMT intelligence activities. He spent World War II in the company of anti-Japanese guerrillas on Panay island, and engaged in anti-Japanese broadcasting. Because of his fluency in Chinese and English, the KMT employed him after the war as an intermediary between the party and the Philippine government. Until June 27, 1950, he was, in his own words, the party’s “General Secretary of Foreign Relations” (Waiwu zongganshi 外務總幹事), but was then demoted to a “liaison officer” after claiming to speak on behalf of the entire party to the government. Our trail on him runs cold around the same time that Shih left for the United States, at which point Lim, once described as “thoroughly pro-American” by US intelligence, was now under investigation by
the Philippine authorities on suspicions of being a communist. The outcome of this investigation is unknown, but Lim does not appear to have been arrested and deported to Taiwan. He likely remained in the Philippines and faded into obscurity, beyond the grasp of its justice system as so many were.\footnote{Feidao dangwu ji qingnian yundong 菲島黨務及青年運動, 5-9, 11, 020-010799-0081, July 19, 1950-February 7, 1952, AH; Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarters Philippine Command Clifford L. Sawyer to US Military Attache, January 29, 1949, RG 165: Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, Series: Security Classified Correspondence Relating to Military Attaches, 1938-1949, Box 189, Folder: MA Philippines: 080, Philippine China Cultural Association, NARA.}

Shih and Lim were not typical KMT members like Sy En or Yao Shiong Shio whose social status owed chiefly to their commercial wealth.\footnote{60.5 percent of Philippine KMT members in October 1952 were in commerce, according to the party’s report that month to the Seventh National Party Congress in Taipei. “Zhu Feilübin zongzhibu dangwu gongzuo baogaoshu,” KMT Records, HILA.} Each was a relative latecomer to the Philippines. Shih was less of an outsider than Lim was because he and over 80 percent of Philippine Chinese at the time were from southern Fujian.\footnote{Chu, Chinese and the Chinese Mestizos of Manila, 25.} With a common surname (施) that he shared with the likes of Sy En, Shih may have had relatives and have benefited from the services of his clan association in the country.\footnote{On Chinese clan associations, see Amyot, The Manila Chinese, 83-106, and Chinben See, “Chinese Clanship in the Philippine Setting,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 12 (1981): 224-247.} But neither he nor Lim were members of the General Chamber of Commerce and possessed the wealth that was needed to forge durable social ties: regardless of what commercial dealings they had, both were basically political operatives rather than merchants. Descriptions of Shih make it clear that he was never accepted as an insider, even by his own party. US intelligence denigrated him as a “thorough-going opportunist whose proprietary attitude toward the party has been a matter of concern to the Chinese Embassy,” possessing an “arrogant personality,” and being
disliked by the Chamber\textsuperscript{48} His own Embassy described him as a “swindler and bluffer” (zhao\_yao zhua\_ngpian 招搖撞騙) fond of “speculation” (mai\_kong mai\_kong 買空賣空), claiming that he only became a KMT Standing Committee member and then Secretary-General because others were too busy running their own businesses and organizations to devote their full attention to party affairs. Moreover, they hoped that Shih’s “foolhardy and extravagant” (yuyong hao\_chu feng\_tou 愚勇好出風頭) behavior might be useful to them. Consequently, left to run the party, Shih frequently got away with issuing orders contrary to party regulations, without the prior knowledge or consent of his fellow Standing Committee members.\textsuperscript{49}

What Shih and Lim did have going for them were affiliation with the KMT and skills that were valuable to the state at a time of heightened ideological tensions in the Philippines. By virtue of his guerrilla activities during the occupation, Shih had built up connections with US and Filipino military and intelligence officials that he would continue to exploit in the years to come. His party’s reputation was high among the police and intelligence agencies because of its role in helping them combat the Chinese left after the war.

Shih’s background as both an anticommunist and intelligence operative helped him carve out a special but temporary role for himself within Philippine society. Although he did not hold a leadership position in the ACM, he represented the Chinese community in Frank Tenny’s PACL, which he was a Vice-Chairman of. Through the PACL, Shih cultivated ties with leading Filipino anticommunists such as Colonel Agustin Gabriel of NICA and CUFA Chairman Tito V. Tizon.\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{48} Cowen, “The ‘Philippine-Chinese United Organization in Support of Anti-Communist Movement,’” NARA; 1135\textsuperscript{th} Counter-Intelligence Corps Detachment to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, January 29, 1948, RG 165, Series: Security Classified Correspondence Relating to Military Attaches, 1938-1949, Box 189, Folder: MA Philippines: 080, Philippine China Cultural Association, NARA.

\textsuperscript{49} “Feidao dangwu ji qingnian yundong,” 185-187, AH.

becoming the go-to person within the Philippine intelligence community on Chinese communism. To burnish his reputation even further, Shih was also the Publisher of *Free China Magazine*, which was staffed by KMT members and written in English so as to keep his contacts in the government abreast of the party’s propaganda work and cooperation with the authorities. Its “Double Tenth” issue in 1951 featured photographs of Shih donating radio sets to the Philippine Army and gifts of food, wine, and cigarettes to Philippine soldiers returning from Korea. Shih was also described as participating, alongside Tenny, in a PACL rally in Tacloban, Leyte.\(^{51}\) Much like Sycip’s articles in the *Fookien Times Yearbook*, print publications such as *Free China Magazine* were less about their content than maintaining the visibility of particular individuals and institutions. But whereas Sycip and the ACM targeted a general public, Shih’s audience was more specific. Lacking Sycip’s wealth and connections to Chinese and Filipino society, Shih sought to impress a different social circle from Sycip’s.

From the late 1940s, by which time the Chinese communists in the Philippines had left the country or gone underground, the intelligence Shih that provided to his Filipino contacts was poor at best and often maliciously false. Invited by Tizon to testify before CUFA on June 18, 1950, Shih avoided any analysis of Chinese communism and lapsed into fearmongering. Corruption within the Philippine government was similar to that in China three years earlier, he declared. The security situation in the islands was so bad that in three years time, “the Philippines will be overcome by the communists.” The Philippine government, he said, “cannot deal with the Huks. If we Chinese were allowed to do so, we would be able to get rid of them in a very short time.” This was a self-aggrandizing boast aimed at fueling the anticommunist climate that Shih’s social status and career

depended on. Substantiating his claims with good evidence proved problematic. On one occasion, Shih claimed that the CCP had secreted a staggering 200 million US dollars into the Philippines.\textsuperscript{52}

On another, he wrote to the US Embassy warning that a hundred or more Chinese communists, mostly Wha Chi guerrillas, were posing as security guards at Clark Air Base and were stealing and selling arms to the Huks. Shih provided no evidence to back up this claim and did not respond to a request for details on these alleged Reds. Four days later, the Embassy received a verbatim copy of the same letter, on the same KMT letterhead, signed by Edward Lim, who likewise said nothing more about it.\textsuperscript{53}

When Shih did furnish the authorities with lists of Chinese communists, the names on them were of individuals whom he was unable to extort money from or against whom he had a grudge.\textsuperscript{54} Shih’s criminal activities were intertwined with more respectable anticommunist practices such as civic associationism, self-fashioning through the media, and information-mongering because the social and political gains resulting from these practices put him in a position of power vis-à-vis other Chinese. As KMT Secretary-General, his words carried weight among those in the Philippine state with the coercive, legal, and illegal means to affect Chinese society. Lim Tian Seng’s letter to Magsaysay shows that Chinese at the time knew well that Shih was well-connected to Philippine intelligence and military officials. Lacking these connections, his targets often found it simpler to pay him off rather than risk being harassed, arrested, and deported by the authorities: an instance

\textsuperscript{52} “Feidao dangwu ji qingnian yundong,” 25-28, 186, AH.

\textsuperscript{53} Shih I-Sheng to First Secretary Edward Earl Rice, June 5, 1950; Edward Lim to Rice, June 9, 1950, RG 84, Series: Classified General Records, 1946-1961, Box 32, Folder: 350.21 Communism in the Philippines, January 1950-June 1951, NARA.

\textsuperscript{54} “Feidao dangwu ji qingnian yundong,” 186, AH.
of how, in the early 1950s Philippines, losing personal wealth to a blackmailer was preferable to risking one’s reputation as a law-abiding, non-communist Chinese resident of the country.

The importance of reputation to Chinese individuals and organizations in the Philippines was underscored once again by Shih’s downfall, which was brought about by a combination of his own missteps, internal feuding within the KMT, and cooperation between the Philippine and ROC authorities. Sometime in the middle of 1951, Pua Chin Tao 潘行素, leader of the Philippine chapter of the Chinese Youth Anticommunist and Resist Russia League, accused Shih of breaking the law. Shih, who was by then already under investigation by the government, retorted in typical fashion by forging a communist memorandum featuring the signatures of well-known Philippine-Chinese Reds who had fled to China, and placing it in Pua’s possession. The letter “revealed” that Chinese communists had infiltrated military intelligence and had established an assassination squad whose targets included four Philippine politicians and Shih himself. It also spoke of a submarine base on Hainan Island that the CCP planned to use to conduct covert operations in Vietnam, the Philippines, Singapore, and other parts of Southeast Asia. When the Philippine authorities obtained this letter, they suspected that Shih was behind it and sought the Embassy’s cooperation in dealing with him. Unlike cases of suspected communists or other “undesirables,” Shih’s case involved the highest-ranking KMT official in the Philippines. By sanctioning his deportation to Taiwan, as the DND hoped to do, the Embassy would have compromised the reputation of the KMT in the country even further at a difficult time for the party, Taiwan, and Chinese society. Citing an ancient proverb on the need for “brothers quarrelling at home” to “join forces against external attacks” (xiongdi xi qiang, wai yu qi wu 兄弟鬩墻, 外御其侮), it decided not to support Shih’s deportation. Instead, it advised the rest of the Standing Committee to urge Shih to resign as Secretary-General and asked
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the Philippine government to allow him to leave the country.\textsuperscript{55} Separately, a committee of KMT elders from Taiwan, including Chiang Ching-kuo, intervened in the quarrel between Pua and Shih and persuaded each to withdraw his accusation against the other.\textsuperscript{56}

The case of Edward Lim offers useful parallels with Shih’s and, in particular, sheds further light on the roles of the media and publicity in the self-fashioning of one’s identity as a Chinese “leader,” or qiaoling 僑領, in the Philippines. Many Chinese, wrote KMT educator Chen Lieh-fu 陳烈甫 on his first visit to the country in 1948, described themselves or were described as qiaoling, owing to the proliferation of Chinese social organizations there.\textsuperscript{57} Lim was one such self-described qiaoling. In January 1947, at the urging of then-KMT Secretary-General Koa Chun-te, he founded the Philippines-China Cultural Association (\textit{Zhong Fei wenhua xiehui 中菲文化協會}, or PCCA) to “promote trust and understanding” between Chinese and Filipinos through the study of Tagalog, Chinese, and the history, customs, and culture of both countries, and by helping Filipino students in pursuing their higher education in China. On paper, the PCCA boasted impressive credentials. Secretary of the Interior and hardline anticommunist Jose Zulueta served as its President and Lim its Secretary. Also on its Board of Directors were the likes of Yu Khe Thai, Chua Lamco, Mayor of Manila Valeriano E. Fugoso, Justice Alexander Reyes, Albino Sycip, Senator Quintin Paredes, and Manila’s Chief of Police Lamberto T. Javalera. Its regular members included KMT bigwigs such as Shih, military police commanders, provincial governors, educators, and journalists. It had

\textsuperscript{55} “Feidao dangwu ji qingnian yundong,” 186-187, 205. AH.

\textsuperscript{56} “Zhonggaihui di erjiuqi ci huiyi jilu 中改會第二九七次會議記錄,” Minutes of the Central Reform Committee Meetings, 6.4-2 Reel 7, File ID: 31.7, February 19, 1952, KMT Records, HILA.

\textsuperscript{57} Chen Lieh-fu 陳烈甫, \textit{Feiyou guangan ji 菲遊觀感記} (Xiamen: Nanyang tongxunshe, 1948), 47.
branches in the provinces and was supported by the KMT and Embassy, although not the Chamber of Commerce.\textsuperscript{58}

The PCCA also published a monthly magazine, the \textit{Philippines-China Cultural Journal}, which featured poems, fiction (including a serialized version of Lim’s novel, “Two Beauties of the South”), inspirational quotations, and articles on assorted topics such as Philippine-China relations, opera in the Philippines, and “Manchuria, China’s Mindanao.” Lim’s contributions to the journal included “Oriental Democracy,” which argued that democratic freedoms had taken root in ancient China, and “Why Americans are Reluctant to Help China.” The latter, written in late 1947 reflected the darkening, conspiratorial mood among ROC partisans at the time. It warned that if China fell to the CCP, the rest of Asia would soon follow, and spoke of the American government and society being “honey-combed with Moscow-paid agents” seeking their destruction. The journal was not explicitly political in the way that \textit{Free China Magazine} was. Anticommunism was, rather, both the subject of occasional pieces such as the above and encoded into several others, from ‘Oriental Democracy’ to Chinese proverbs emphasizing filial piety to an essay on the role of women in the ROC’s war effort to an article by Madame Chiang Kai-shek’s on the New Life Movement.\textsuperscript{59}

Beyond publishing this journal and establishing provincial branches, the PCCA did little. In the provinces, PCCA activities seem to have been occasions for Lim to eat, drink, and socialize with Filipino and Chinese officials. In practice, promoting “trust and understanding” between the two ethnic groups was limited to the forging of personal ties between the PCCA’s founder and a

\textsuperscript{58} Sawyer to US Military Attache, January 29, 1949, RG 165, Series: Security Classified Correspondence Relating to Military Attaches, 1938-1949, Box 189, Folder: MA Philippines: 080, Philippine China Cultural Association, NARA.

few of its supporters like Zulueta whose patronage kept the association afloat and who might also pen the occasional article for its journal. The vast majority of its members, including the likes of Albino Sycip and Chua Lamco, appear to have contributed nothing to it except their names. By the time Lim was demoted from his position within the KMT in June 1950, it was apparent that the PCCA was one front among several for Lim’s illegal activities. The erstwhile KMT “General Secretary of Foreign Relations” also headed two other professional-sounding organizations, the “Southeast Asia Association” and the “Edward Lim Hospital” in Davao, where Lim owned only a small drugstore). Through them, Lim extorted around 50,000 pesos from Chinese residents in the southern Philippines. His modus operandi was virtually identical to Shih’s. The Embassy obtained a letter that he wrote to one of his victims, which went simply as follows:

Recently, someone has reported to the Defense Department that you have close connections to underground communist agents. I heard that the Department has ordered your arrest. I am shocked at this news and hope to reach a compromise with the authorities before this happens. What are your views on this? Please reply to my letter as soon as possible.\(^{60}\)

More so than Shih, Lim participated actively in the culture of intelligence-trafficking and rumor-mongering within Chinese society at the time. One of his many targets, it appears, was Shih himself – although sadly, no further details are available on this conflict. Ambassador Chen Chih- ping was also on the receiving end of Lim’s accusations during the period when Lim was under investigation by the Philippine and ROC authorities. In October 1950, Lim reported to NICA that a communist agent was working in the Embassy to facilitate the escape of Chinese communists from the Philippines, and had secured his employment on the recommendation of Chen’s Jinan University classmate Young Ching-tong, a former Chinese communist leader in the Philippines. Two months later, Lim retracted this claim and instead accused the Embassy, the KMT, and the

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\(^{60}\) “Feidao dangwu ji qingnian yundong,” 71, AH.
Chamber of shielding a man named Gordon Lee, whom the Philippine authorities had found guilty of smuggling arms to China and would soon deport to Taiwan. By April 1951, Lim’s accusatory counteroffensive against his persecutors had fizzled out. A last-ditch appeal by his son Daniel to, of all people, Soong Meiling, was met with a firm response from Chen to Soong detailing Lim’s crimes. In a doubly ironic twist, Lim, by all accounts a committed Nationalist, was now tarred with the same brush that he had used against others despite a conspicuous lack of evidence proving that he was a communist.

The threat from “society”: Antonio Chua Cruz and his Chinese operatives

Shih and Lim’s personal rivalry, as exemplified by the identical letters that each sent to the US Embassy in quick succession, sheds light on the competitive, mimetic nature of anticommunist accumulation in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Anticommunism was not a limited resource, the scramble for which yielded only overt social conflict with clear winners and losers. Organizations such as the Chinese Anti-Communist Movement and the PCCA could coexist with each other and overlap in membership and social function, without mutual antagonism. Yet certain practices of accumulation such as finger-pointing and rumor-mongering did result in social gains for some at the expense of others and could likewise backfire on their exponents, as the downfall of Shih and Lim shows. Providing intelligence to the authorities on Chinese communism was inherently risky and competitive because no one person or group enjoyed a monopoly on access to these authorities and inaccurate intelligence could result in a swift reversal of one’s social status. The state’s limited capacity to surveil the Chinese community created opportunities for all manner of Chinese social

61 File 001, Box 6, Folder 3: National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (January 1951), Quirino Papers, FHL.

62 “Feidao dangwu ji qingnian yundong,” 211-212, 215, AH.
actors to prove their utility their country of residence and further their own social and political ambitions in the process.

One such group of actors was, until November 1951, employed by the Military Intelligence Service and led by Antonio Chua Cruz. Born in Jinjiang as Cai Wobai 蔡我柏, Cruz was banished from his home village at the age of 16 for an unspecified crime and subsequently joined a gang in Shishi that menaced villages in Fujian and engaged in smuggling along the southern coast of China. After the leader of this gang was arrested in 1932, Cruz escaped to the Philippines, where his father lived, and registered himself as Cai Jie 蔡捷. Multiple such aliases and the absence of standardized Romanized forms of their Chinese names made it difficult for the state to keep tabs on persons like him. Cruz later faked his Philippine citizenship and obtained a fake passport. During World War II, he headed the overseas department of the puppet Chinese Association and profited from helping Japanese naval intelligence against the Chinese resistance. Immediately following the war, he was shot by several Chinese snipers for collaboration, but survived to further his career in crime.63

Cruz’s postwar criminal network started from the very top of the military establishment in Major-General Calixto Duque, the Chief of Staff of the Philippine Armed Forces. Besides Duque, Cruz also counted among his friends Secretary of Justice Jose Bengzon, Senators Mariano Cuenco and Macario Peralta, and Speaker of the House Eugenio Perez. How he forged these friendships is unclear. The intelligence gathered on him by the ROC Embassy describes his “beautiful” Filipina second wife as being close to Bengzon and implies that she played no small role in her husband’s social prominence. Through his personal ties to Duque, Cruz secured the appointment of George Co 許劍峰, Ching Boc 莊興提, and Celestino Cua 柯翠山 as MIS agents at a time when it badly

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needed Chinese speakers. Claiming that they had in their possession a list of 3,000 communists that their new employer had furnished them with, and working closely with a Filipino MIS agent named De la Pena, Cruz’s associates engaged in the blackmail and extortion of money from local Chinese, proceeds from which went to Cruz’s own organization and into the pockets of Duque and his crony, Chief of Intelligence Ismael Lapus. By late 1951, Cruz’s gang had obtained 1.5 million pesos in this manner. Besides these activities, Cruz’s gang also reported on the ROC and KMT’s activities in the Philippines to MIS, in effect helping the military play off one group of informants against another and avoid overdependence on any particular source.64

Cruz’s other anticommunist practices after 1945 also resembled those of Lim and Shih, except that there is no evidence to suggest that he had any ounce of belief in the Nationalist cause. A self-founded, appropriately-titled social organization, the Free Asia Publishing House, served as the pretext for Cruz to strong-arm individuals into paying him money – in this case advertising fees for its journal, the Free Asia Magazine – or be denounced as a communist to the state.65 At a time when visits to Taiwan were becoming increasingly popular in the Philippines, Cruz planned one for Filipino journalists in the name of promoting “Sino-Philippine relations” and promised to pay a part of their traveling costs. When the ROC Embassy refused to grant him clearance for the trip, Cruz not only pocketed the money that the unsuspecting journalists had given him, but also retaliated against Chen Chih-ping, an easy target for criminals like him and Edward Lim.66 In June

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66 “Lü Fei buliang huaqiao,” Vol. 5, 73, AH.
1951, he leaked rumors to *The Bullseye* tabloid that the ACM was harboring communists and that Chen had promised the five million pesos that he had received from the Chinese community during the early years of the Korean War to the Movement. Chen, it turned out, had friends on the paper’s board of directors, who withdrew the article immediately.\(^\text{67}\)

Several months after his failed attack on Chen, Cruz met his political demise. In late 1951, Cruz’s associates were arrested and Cruz himself, not for the first time, targeted for assassination – this time via a bomb. After surviving yet again an attempt on his life, he reported to the authorities that cigarette tycoon and ACM member Peter Lim was responsible for it. Lim had apparently paid a communist called Tang Huancheng 唐煥成 to kill Cruz, but this would-be assassin was one of Cruz’s lackeys at the Free China Publishing House whom Cruz was quite willing to betray to save his own skin. When the authorities arrested Tang at his home, they found 18 telegrams about secret arbitrage agreements with communist banks in Hong Kong. Tang, defending himself, said that the Cruz had forged these telegrams to extort money from Chinese businessmen. He also declared that he had refused Cruz’s attempts to bribe him into confessing that the documents were authentic and that Lim had ordered the bombing. In desperation, Cruz first accused a CVP member – whom he said was a communist, despite his membership in a KMT organization – and then special agents of the Embassy of trying to assassinate him. Who actually did so and who ordered it will remain a mystery. But by this point, the government had figured him out and, after an investigation, charged him for forging his identification documents and on multiple counts of bribery and blackmail. In January 1952, Cruz was arrested and sent before the Deportation Board, which ordered him to be deported to Taiwan.\(^\text{68}\)

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\(^\text{67}\) "Cai Binqing ni fadong Fei jizhetuan lai Tai 蔡彬慶擬發動菲記者團來台," 10-12, 020-010702-0021, May 3-July 6, 1951, AH.

\(^\text{68}\) “Lü Fei buliang huaqiao,” Vol. 5, 75, AH.
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It was symptomatic of the political environment in the Philippines at the time that criminals who made a living from accusing others of being communists frequently ended up labeled as Reds themselves. Cruz himself merely “lacked a patriotic and national mentality” (haowu guojia minzu guannian 毫無國家民族觀念), according to the ROC authorities, but his associates were accused of being communists and former members of the Wha Chi. In its recommendation to the President that he deport them, the Deportation Board said that they had propagandized and solicited contributions for Chinese communists in the Philippines, attended their meetings, and maintained relations with Chinese Reds previously based there. Ching Boc and Celestino Cua were charged with employing blackmail and forgery to extort money from an Ong Wei Hong, who, after refusing to pay the men, was arrested by the police for having in his possession a (forged) communist pamphlet. Ching and Cua were also reported to have delivered to one Lim Po the equivalent of one million renminbi for remittance to China, and then demanded from Lim 10,000 pesos to “fix” his violation of exchange control regulations; the amount would be used to bribe not only MIS chiefs but also Magsaysay. George Co and six other unnamed men had also posed as MIS agents and threatened to arrest the wife of a Chinese businessman unless she paid them – which she did. Police raids on their houses had yielded large quantities of guns and ammunition, which they did not have licenses for.69

Conclusion

Coming from very different class backgrounds, Alfonso Sycip, Shih I-Sheng, Edward Lim, and Antonio Chua Cruz participated in the creation of a highly localized Cold War social order in the early postcolonial Philippines. Of them, perhaps Shih and Lim were true Cold Warriors, given

69 “Lü Fei buliang huaqiao,” Vol. 6, 96-97, AH.
their involvement in the KMT. But how far they were committed to eradicating communism and to the ROC’s counterattack against mainland China is besides the point. I argue here that Chinese anticommunism as a social phenomenon was more than about opposing real Chinese communists. It was also a strategy by which huaqiao adapted to being minority residents of a country that was hostile to communism and often also to its Chinese population. At a time when Filipino suspicions of Chinese as “un-Filipino” communists ran high, Sycip, Shih, Lim, and Cruz engaged in practices of ideological accommodation to forge reputations as anticommunists in the eyes of their host state and to exploit the political environment for personal and social gain. While they might never have been able to overcome their racial and cultural distinctiveness, they could perform their conformity to Filipino norms and prove themselves useful to anticommunism as a nation-building project.

This chapter has examined multiple practices of ideological accommodation that cut across the social classes and factions that the four principal actors represented. Through civic associations such as the Philippine-Chinese United Organization in Support of Anti-Communist Movement and Lim’s Philippines-China Cultural Association, local Chinese secured the patronage of Filipino and ROC politicians and officials and raised their profiles as qiaoling in Philippine-Chinese society. English-language propaganda served a similarly legitimizing purpose. Through the *Fookien Times Yearbook*, *Free China Magazine*, and the *Philippines-China Cultural Journal*, Sycip, Shih, and Lim ensured their visibility in the public sphere and fashioned proof of their ideological credentials to a wide audience.

Ideological accommodation had a darker side and was a source of social conflict, as Shih, Lim, and Cruz’s criminal and ethically dubious activities thoroughly illustrate. Organizations such as the PCCA and Cruz’s Free Asia Publishing House masked various forms of criminal activity in the name of anticommunism. Acting as providers of intelligence on Chinese communism to MIS,
Shih, Lim, and Cruz insinuated themselves into positions of power over their fellow Chinese that their non-elite social backgrounds would not normally have allowed them to hold. By leveraging the institutions that they were affiliated to (such as the KMT) and their connections with the state, they blackmailed other Chinese, threatening to accuse their targeted victims of being communists and planting forged evidence if they did not pay up. As the preceding sections have shown, even the likes of ROC Ambassador Chen Chih-ping and ACM Standing Committee member Peter Lim were vulnerable to being smeared as communists or communist sympathizers. Elites like them and Sycip were well aware of the harm that false accusations could pose to their reputation in society, and acted to ensure that their ideological credentials were beyond reproach. The respectable and criminal dimensions of anticommunism were, in this sense, inseparable.

Criminal anticommunists were of course not the only ones to accuse local Chinese of being communists. Chief among these accusers was the Philippine state itself, with whom the likes of such as Shih, Lim, and Cruz collaborated in different ways. The end of their careers and formation of the ACM as a bulwark against threats to the reputation of elites did not put an end to the disorder caused by false accusations. The culture of disinformation that they helped create persisted because state security organs remained dependent on intermediaries such as them to surveil Chinese society and continued to be vulnerable to inaccurate intelligence. No sooner had these men been dealt with than Chinese society was rocked by the mass arrest of around 300 Chinese on December 27, 1952. We turn to these arrests in the next chapter.
Chapter 3

Making Communists:
Mass Arrests, Disinformation, and the Politics of Anticommunism in the Philippines and
Taiwan, 1952-1961

On December 27, 1952, Philippine military forces fanned out across the archipelago and, over the course of that day, arrested some 300 Chinese on charges of being communists. Well over half of these men – 185, according to ROC Ambassador Chen Chih-ping – were detained in Manila, with the remaining arrests taking place in Bicol, Cebu, Iloilo, and Central Luzon. ¹ Raids of Chinese homes and workplaces by the authorities were frequent occurrences in the Philippines at the time. In the populist imagination, the Chinese were inclined towards crime and therefore wealthy. Their supposed racial traits and objectively precarious legal status as non-nationals made the harassment of them by law enforcement officials endemic and profitable. Less frequent, though still common enough, were the detention and deportation of Chinese for everything from black marketeering to running illegal gambling and prostitution dens to illegal entry to engaging in communist activities. What distinguished December 27 from previous arrests was partly its scale, itself a function of the country’s intensified anticommunist drive under Defense Secretary Magsaysay. Never before had the authorities seized so many alleged Reds – Chinese or otherwise – all at once; in one journalist’s assessment, this was, “without doubt, the greatest single operation yet attempted” by the Military Intelligence Service.² Yet because of how what Chinese society called the jinqiao an (literally, the


“case of the detention of huaqiao”) unfolded over the next nine years, never again would such an operation, on such a scale and involving only the Philippine military and not the ROC, take place. The *jingqiao an* was also distinctive because MIS claimed to have arrested the leaders of a secretive organization known as the Chinese Bureau.  

As things turned out, none of the 300 or so *jingqiao* were guilty of the charges against them; many were members of the KMT and Chinese Anti-Communist Movement. Approximately half were released in mid-1953, just before Deportation Board hearings against the remaining detainees began. More would be found innocent over time, but only in late December 1961 did the final few *jingqiao* secure their freedom thanks to the lobbying efforts of the ROC Embassy and local Chinese leaders over the past nine years. The only communist to be implicated in this case was Koa Chian 柯千, a courier for the Chinese Bureau, who in fact had been arrested in April 1952. His testimony to MIS, when he was under duress, authenticated the evidence it needed to conduct the December 27 arrests, and he was deported on July 26, 1957. On the ROC air force plane with Koa to Taiwan that day were three men, Lao Han Keng 劉漢卿, Sy Bun Chiong 施文章, and Go Chi Kok 吳志國, and a 20-year old woman, Sy Yan Wan 施燕婉. They had been high school students in Cebu in the early 1950s and members of a leftist reading club, which, in response to the *jingqiao an*, they renamed the Philippine-Chinese Communist Party (*Feilübin huaqiao gongchandang* 菲律賓華僑共產黨, or PCCP). In July 1954, they were arrested, their cases becoming intertwined with that of the *jingqiao*. Nine other members of this organization, which was unrelated to the Chinese Bureau, were arrested in early 1962.

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Chapter 3 is the first to examine a key procedural feature of the anticommunist relationship between the ROC and the Philippines. This involved the arrests of suspected Chinese communists (gongxian 共嫌), their trial by the Deportation Board, and their deportation to Taiwan, where they were sentenced as “Chinese nationals.” We have seen in the previous chapter how the likes of Shih I-Sheng, Edward Lim, and Antonio Chua Cruz exploited the Philippine authorities’ state’s reliance on local Chinese informants for information on “communists” in their midst. I use the jinqiao an and Cebu reading club episode to expand on this insight and explain how the multi-stage process of producing intelligence on gongxian and rendering them legible to both states was susceptible to disinformation and manipulation. In identifying, arresting, and seeking to deport the jinqiao, MIS relied not only on the inadequate and flawed evidence gathered by its main Chinese operative, but also the intentionally misleading testimony of the person whom she helped apprehend, Koa Chian. In the Cebu reading club case, the ROC struggled to reconcile the inconsistent and self-exculpatory testimonies of Lao Han Keng, Sy Bun Chiong, Go Chi Kok, and Sy Yan Wan, who downplayed their participation in the PCCP and attempted to shift the blame to others in the hopes of mitigating their sentences. I contextualize their tactics in relation to a repertoire of practices that the Chinese employed to confound state authority in the Philippines and the United States.

The deportation process was equally vulnerable to political maneuvering by the ROC and Chinese elites. The chapter’s secondary focus is on how Nationalist diplomats and huaqiao leaders responded to the arrests, the jinqiao an in particular, from 1953 to 1961. Both parties were caught completely unaware by the December 1952 arrests, which had been planned and executed entirely by the Philippine military for the purpose of legitimizing itself. This “anticommunism,” instead of furthering ROC and huaqiao interests, threatened the Chinese community and thus the reputations
of those invested in protecting them, necessitating bargaining with the Philippine President in order to secure the release of the innocent.

To contextualize the process by which the Philippines identified and prosecuted gongxian, this chapter first explains how Chinese society’s relative opacity to the state and Chinese practices of evading state authority presented an informational challenge for Manila and Taipei at the height of the Cold War. Focusing on the figure of Koa Chian, I then describe what became of the Chinese communist movement in the Philippines after the departure of most of its leaders from the country in the late 1940s. Next, the chapter narrates how MIS carried out its operation against the jinqiao in the months leading up to December 27, 1952, and how the Cebu reading club was founded and its members apprehended by the military in July 1954. Finally, I explain how ROC diplomats and Chinese leaders negotiated the release of the innocent jinqiao after December 27, 1952.

**Knowing and prosecuting Chinese communists**

Chinese society in the postcolonial Philippines did not lend itself well to probing by forces external to it, to being “seen” by the state, as James Scott might put it.\(^5\) Well before then, as Richard Chu has shown, the boundaries between “Chinese” and “Filipino” identities, once more permeable, had hardened.\(^6\) Social relations between these now distinct ethnic groups were complicated by the concentration of political power in the hands of the latter, and the perceived economic dominance of the former. The Jesuit anthropologist Jacques Amyot, who conducted fieldwork on the Chinese in Manila in the late 1950s, described in his pioneering book on the subject how

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Few peoples are more sensitive about their privacy than the Chinese. The walls of their compounds and the heavily padlocked doors of their institutions are not only intended as protection against bandits. They also ensure the privacy of a sanctum against outsiders. To a Chinese, any non-Chinese is a barbarian to a certain extent.

Amyot partially attributed the unintelligibility of Chinese society to outsiders to very real fears of exploitation by Filipinos – fears that the jinqiao an would have reinforced by the time he started his research. “To a Chinese,” Amyot argued, “all Filipinos are out to take advantage of him.” Any “nonauthorized foreigner who becomes curious about him is suspected of being a spy of some sort for Filipino officialdom which is considered to be ever seeking new ways of exploiting [him].” As a consequence, “exact statistics on Chinese personnel, institutions, enterprise, income, and the like are extremely unreliable.” To the extent that Chinese-Filipino interactions took place, whether in schools or through commercial dealings, they were largely dictated by the advantages to be gained: the goodwill and protection of, for instance, the mayor, congressman, or chief of police.

Language and institutions were significant barriers for outsiders, whether Filipino, Western, and even Chinese – who sought to acquire information on Philippine-Chinese society. Most local Chinese traced their ancestry to three counties in Quanzhou province and spoke a creolized version of Hokkien in combination with some Tagalog and Cantonese. ROC officials such as Chen Chih-ping, who was born in Hainan to a scholar-gentry family, did not speak this lingua franca and thus stood apart from the community by virtue of their profession and language. In the 1950s, fluency in Tagalog and English among lower-class Chinese was not widespread, limiting communication


between them and Filipinos and renderingd the likes of Koa Chian difficult subjects to interrogate. For outsiders, whether states and scholars, gathering and validating knowledge on Chinese society was difficult without intermediaries to serve as interpreters and arrange for meetings with insiders. Even the print media could prove opaque, despite in principle being accessible to anyone familiar with the Chinese script. Sociologist George Weightman, who like Amyot conducted fieldwork in the Philippines in the 1950s and read Chinese, commented that transliterations of English-language terms in Chinese newspapers were frequently non-standard and based on Hokkien. To save printed space and also conceal information from outsiders, many articles were also presented in an oblique and truncated fashion with their contexts omitted; important articles were often buried in obscure sections of the paper. For Weightman, intermediaries were necessary not simply as translators, but also to explain, for example, the long-running intracommunal feuds that underlay what appeared in print.10

Legal disputes within Chinese society, as opposed to between Chinese and Filipinos, were typically resolved within that society, Amyot argued, without relying on the legal mechanisms of the Philippine state. In part this was a question of citizenship. Court trials were also expensive and time-consuming and the judicial process was shot through with corruption and bureaucratic inertia. Disputes were thus customarily settled via arbitration, before the leaders of one’s clan association, with the prospect of ostracism usually sufficient to secure the litigants’ acceptance of their elders’ verdicts. If serious enough, or depending on the persons involved, disputes were referred upwards to the chamber of commerce or ROC Embassy. Only after these attempts at mediation failed were disputes referred to Philippine courts of law.11 Needless to say, except for the Embassy, which had


obligations to a formal state bureaucracy, none of the other mediating institutions have kept records of these disputes that are open to non-members such as researchers and the general public. Indeed, it may be that such records do not exist at all, and that arbitration was essentially a form of verbal communication, limited to within the “walls of their compounds and the heavily padlocked doors of their institutions.”

More than a matter of language, culture, or institutions, Chinese attitudes toward the state were shaped by the circumstances in which many Chinese entered the Philippines in the first place. For many, the very act of becoming part of Chinese society required circumventing state authority. During the Chinese Civil War, for example, the quota for Chinese immigrants seeking permanent residence in the country and who did not have kinship ties to Philippine citizens or past Philippine citizenship was only 500 annually; in June 1950, this number was reduced to 50. As mentioned in Chapter 2, some 2,700 Chinese fleeing the Civil War bypassed these quotas by entering the country on visitor or student visas, finding refuge with their relatives, and then refusing to leave after their visas had expired. Migrants employed these and other practices to overcome Chinese Exclusion. Some simply smuggled themselves into the country. Others were coached by immigration brokers on how to answer questions from immigration officers that “proved” they had lived in the country during Spanish rule and were thus legally eligible to enter it. One could purchase forged certificates of residence from unscrupulous customs officials. The most sophisticated mechanism for evading Exclusion, writes Madeline Hsu, was what she and other scholars of Chinese immigration call the “paper sons” strategy, which involved entering US territory as the son (or grandson) of a resident.


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This involved a Chinese resident of the Philippines registering the names of his sons with the state. However, some of these names were fictitious and could be purchased and used by anyone wishing to send a son, under the age of 21, to the country. Those who entered illegally thus possessed actual and registered names, the latter of which were indicated in their landing and registration certificates and constituted their “official,” state-sanctioned identity.\(^\text{14}\) Naming practices thus represented yet another means by which Chinese accommodated themselves to legal scrutiny. As we will see, such practices could also be used to avoid the state entirely.

For the Philippines and Nationalist China and to a lesser extent the United States, Chinese society’s defensive opacity to outsiders was a problem to be solved in the age of anticommunism. National security interests necessitated devising methods of knowing this society, authenticating information on it, and then intervening in it. Episodes involving accusations of communism, as the activities of Shih I-Sheng, Edward Lim, and Antonio Chua Cruz suggest, were too important to be left to Chinese society to resolve. Such intermediaries played a vital role in helping the Philippine state come to terms with the “Chinese communist problem.” Sometimes in the employ of this state, they also operated apart from it and volunteered their skills to it (and the United States), conscious of the material and symbolic benefits that these ties would yield. They were indispensable despite the complications that arose from the authorities’ reliance on them.

Among these three states, the United States was the least well-informed and interventionist when it came to Chinese communism in the Philippines. Fears among US high officials of Chinese communism in Southeast Asia in general were widespread even before the CCP’s 1949 victory in the Civil War, and originated in British racial attitudes toward the overseas Chinese before World

War II.\textsuperscript{15} In the 1950s, at the height of the American Cold War in Asia, the US Information Service (USIS) and the Asia Foundation flooded the region with propaganda targeted at Chinese, seeking to counter similar efforts by the PRC.\textsuperscript{16} In the Philippines, US intelligence agents certainly did not lack for information on Chinese communists and possessed detailed reports on the organization, members, and activities of groups such as the Kang Fan, Lo Lian Hui, and Democratic Alliance.\textsuperscript{17} But relative to the Huk insurgency, Chinese communism was a minor irritant: not more than two to three percent of a Chinese population of 200,000, estimated the Central Intelligence Agency in August 1950, had communist affiliations and most established Chinese businessmen were strongly pro-American.\textsuperscript{18}

The US was largely content, therefore, to entrust its Philippine and ROC allies – two of its closest in Asia – with generating and sharing intelligence on Philippine-Chinese communism and acting against this dormant threat. But, as we will see, the Philippines did not always divulge what it knew to either the US or ROC. Although the US employed its own intermediaries, none of them furnished it with useful intelligence. One such informant was Julio Tan, a journalist and translator for the KMT-controlled \textit{Great China Press} from 1947 to 1961. Tan, who speaks English, Tagalog, and Minnanhua fluently, was approached in a restaurant in Manila sometime in the 1950s – he has


\textsuperscript{17} See, for example, “Chinese Communist [sic] in the Philippine Islands,” December 15, 1947, Record Group [RG] 165: Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, Series: Security Classified Correspondence Relating to Military Attaches, 1938-1949, Box 199, Folder: 350.9 Intelligence Studies, NARA.

\textsuperscript{18} “Political Alignment of Chinese in Philippines,” August 21, 1950, CIA-RDP82-00457R005600430001-6, CREST, NARA.
forgotten exactly when – by a US Air Force Colonel named George Fong and asked if he wanted to work for US intelligence. Every day for the next one or two years, Tan would drive his jeep to the US Embassy on Roxas Boulevard to discuss developments in Chinese society. But never once was Tan able to provide his other employee with evidence of a communist threat from within that society. He perceived no such threat and regarded the United States as not serious about surveilling the local Chinese population, since everyone knew that he was moonlighting for the Americans.\textsuperscript{19} Because of its relative lack of interest in the Chinese communist problem, the \textit{jinqiao an} came as a great shock to the United States, a CIA agent privately told Chen Chih-ping after December 27. America had nothing to do with it, he said.\textsuperscript{20}

The ROC, by contrast, was keenly interested in Philippine-Chinese society and the Chinese communist problem. Overseas Chinese affairs, or \textit{qiaowu}, remained essential to Nationalist China in its campaign to “oppose communism and resist Russia” after 1949. From the names of Chinese communist leaders to their organizations, the basic intelligence that Embassy agents gathered was generally accurate. Like the Philippines and United States, the ROC knew that most of the Chinese communist movement’s leaders had fled the country in 1948, existing organizations had disbanded, and the remaining members had gone underground. It differed from these other countries in being more concerned about the communist threat to Chinese society than to the national security of the Philippines in general. Subversion, for Nationalist China in the Philippines, was about communists cultivating ties with Chinese leaders; fueling the flames of intracommunal disputes; hindering the ROC’s fundraising efforts while soliciting money of their own through community organizations;

\textsuperscript{19} Julio Tan, interview with author, June 8 and 12, 2016, Manila. George Fong was working for the US Air Force’s Office of Special Investigations and took part in interrogation sessions with Lao Han Keng and Go Chi Kok in September 1954. See “\textit{Lü Fei huaqiao gongxian},” Vol. 3, 35, IMH Archives.

\textsuperscript{20} “\textit{Lü Fei huaqiao gongxian},” Vol. 1, 52, IMH Archives.
delaying the passing of anticommunist measures by these organizations; and deceiving youth into leaving the Philippines for China.²¹

Yet even its understanding of the problem was limited. As we will see in the next section, in late 1951, well after US and Philippine intelligence had come to know about the Chinese Bureau, the ROC was in the dark about it. While US-Philippine intelligence cooperation against the Huks was systematized and well-funded, the sharing of information between the ROC and the other two states on Chinese communism in the Philippines took place on an ad hoc basis until several years after the jinqiao an. Chen Chih-ping was not only unaware of the Bureau, but only came to know about the arrests on the afternoon December 27 through a phone call from Magsaysay, who, it later transpired, had also been kept in the dark about them until the last minute.²² Distrust between the Embassy and Philippine security agencies exacerbated the poor coordination between them against their common enemy. The Embassy had to harmonize its mission to protect ROC nationals in the Philippines with its ideological commitment to anticommunism. Fearing that MIS, an agency with a track record of employing criminals, would use or even fabricate information on communism to harass Chinese society, the ROC was frequently reluctant to provide such information.²³

The Embassy also lacked the resources and manpower to infiltrate the Chinese communist movement. It obtained its intelligence from three sources, none of which were completely adequate. The first consisted of individuals who had been expelled from communist organizations in the late 1940s, after the structural changes that these groups had undertaken, and who now worked for the

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²¹ “Gongdang xianyi fenzi qingbao,” 29-33, AH.

²² “Lü Fei huaqiao gongxian,” Vol. 1, 44, IMH Archives; In Re Chin Sang, et. als., Respondents, Case No. R-489: Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum (Manila: Quisumbing, Sycip, Quisumbing & Salazar, January 4, 1954), 2, American Historical Collection [AHC], Ateneo de Manila University.

²³ “Lü Fei huaqiao gongxian,” Vol. 1, 70, IMH Archives.
ROC. But their knowledge of the movement ended in 1947 or thereabouts. The Embassy also made use of “general reports” (yiban baogao 一般報告) and “general surveys of the Chinese situation” (yiban qiaoqing guancha 一般僑情觀察), both of which were routed through Chinese society and its institutions such as the KMT and Anti-Communist Movement.\(^{24}\) This created the same problem of dependency on frequently unreliable intermediaries with their own agendas. Tensions between the Embassy, KMT, and Chinese leaders further complicated the Embassy’s ability to understand local Chinese communism.

State security agencies in Taiwan, in turn, depended on the Embassy for intelligence which they could use to prosecute communist suspects that the Philippines deported there. According to the Philippines’ Immigration Act of 1940, “aliens” found to be “undesirable” were to be deported. Where to was a different question. Section 38 of the Act stated that a criminal alien “shall, at the option of the Commissioner of Immigration, be removed to the country whence he came, or to the foreign port at which he embarked for the Philippines, or to the country of his nativity or of which he is a citizen or subject, or to the country in which he resided prior to coming to the Philippines.”\(^{25}\) In principle, a Chinese could be deported to a place of his choosing, but customarily, he was sent back to his country of citizenship and / or birth – China – via Xiamen, where the Philippines had a consulate. Much depended on political will rather than formal legal procedure.

The ROC’s flight to Taiwan in late 1949 complicated the deportation process considerably. Deportation to mainland China under PRC rule was no longer possible, since the process depended on the existence of relations between the Philippines and the receiving state, as well as the consent

\(^{24}\) “Gongdang xianyi fenzi qingbao,” 42, AH.

of the latter. On paper, the ROC was agreeable to accepting what both sides described in 1950 as “Chinese nationals who are truly obnoxious characters, the notorious examples of the undesirable elements and whose conduct is detrimental to the interests of [both states]… upon the certification of the Chinese Embassy.” But in practice, the ROC was reluctant to accept deportees who were not high-value communist suspects because, as Chen Chih-ping put it rather vaguely in 1953, the “situation [on Taiwan] is extremely difficult” (chujing shi shifen kunnan 處境是十分苦難). The problem of the “overstaying temporary visitors,” which would become the longest-running legal dispute between the two countries, was not resolved for over two decades. This was partly because successive Philippine administrations failed to devise a solution to the problem and partly because the ROC, asserting its sovereignty as a state, refused to accept deportees who had only overstayed their visitor visas. Among the reasons it cited were overcrowding and the war footing that Taiwan was on.

The ROC Embassy was thus empowered to serve as a bureaucratic screen when it came to the deportation of Chinese to Taiwan. As the official conduit for the transmission of information between the ROC and the Philippine states, it was tasked with compiling evidence on the suspects from multiple sources, attending to the logistics of the deportation, and obtaining its government’s authorization to have them deported to Taiwan. As the ROC state depended on it for information on potential deportees and the Philippine state depended on it to complete the deportation process,

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27 “Lü Fei huaqiao gongxian,” Vol. 6, 10, 062.6/0004, May-December 1953, IMH Archives.


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the Embassy was thus in a position to delay or expedite deportation depending on how it perceived the persons in question. After being deported to Taiwan, the suspects were formally tried in a court of law as deportation hearings were, technically, not a criminal justice procedure and deportation thus not a criminal punishment.\(^{30}\) Taiwanese courts, usually military ones, were thus the final stage in the lengthy process by which gongxian in the Philippines were identified, arrested, interrogated, tried, deported, identified again, and prosecuted.

**Koa Chian and the Chinese Bureau: Chinese communism in the Philippines after 1948**

One person to have undergone this process was Koa Chian, whose testimonies to MIS after his capture in April 1952 and his interrogation by ROC officials after his deportation offer valuable insights into the fate of Chinese communism in the Philippines after the late 1940s. Koa was from Fujian and arrived in the Philippines in 1937. Where and when he was born is unclear. During one of his first interrogation sessions, he claimed to be 29 and have been born in Xiamen, which would have made his year of birth 1922 or 1923.\(^{31}\) But in 1957, when in custody on Taiwan, he said that he was originally from Quanzhou and 26 when he left China.\(^{32}\) Arriving as a legal immigrant, Koa studied at various night schools and worked at the general store of his older male patrilineal cousin during the day. In 1941, he joined the *Chinese Commercial News* as a typesetter. At Nanyang High School before the occupation, he took part in an organization called the Chinese Youth Association, otherwise known as the Chinese Students’ Anti-Japanese Association (*Feiübin huaqiao xuesheng*

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\(^{31}\) “Lü Fei huaqiao gongxian,” Vol. 3, 74, IMH Archives.

\(^{32}\) “Lü Fei buliang huaqiao,” Vol. 8, 84, AH.
kangri fanjian da tongmeng 菲律賓華僑學生抗日反奸大同盟), becoming one of its leaders, but claimed not to know that it was communist at the time. After the war, Koa represented his school in reorganizing the Chinese Youth Association, becoming aware in the second half of 1945 that it was in fact the Education Department of the Chinese Communist Party’s Overseas Chinese Bureau in the Philippines (Zhongguo gongchandang Feilübin huaqiao ju 中國共產黨菲律賓華僑局).33

At this point, Koa was not a fully-fledged Chinese Bureau member, as full membership, in true Leninist fashion, required that one first be observed and then approved by existing party cadres. In 1947, with his general goods business faring poorly, Koa became a primary school teacher for a year. He eventually entered the ranks of the Bureau, most likely in 1948, having apparently been coerced into doing so by another member, who had discussed with him the favorable situation for the CCP in China and threatened to harm him if he did not join the group. Between 1948 and 1950, Koa worked again for the Chinese Commercial News and studied English at the Araneta Institute of Agriculture in Malabon. In June 1951, Koa was promoted to head of propaganda.34

The Philippine authorities and, through them, US intelligence had known about the Chinese Bureau since documents seized by the military in raids on Huk centers in Manila in October 1950 revealed the existence of a “Chinese Branch” or “Chinese Board” of the PKP.35 Consisting of high-level communications among PKP leaders, these materials helped MIS initiate its subsequent two-year operation against the Bureau culminating in the December 27, 1952 arrests, but do not seem to have been shared with ROC officials. The Bureau represented what became of the Chinese left

33 “Lü Fei huaqiao gongxian,” Vol. 3, 74-87, IMH Archives; “Lü Fei buliang huaqiao,” Vol. 8, 84, AH.

34 “Lü Fei huaqiao gongxian,” Vol. 3, 74-87, IMH Archives; “Lü Fei buliang huaqiao,” Vol. 8, 84, AH.

35 “Relationship of Philippine Communist Party with Chinese Communists in the Philippines,” May 18, 1951, CIA-RDP82-00457R007400100007-6, Central Intelligence Agency Records Search Tool [CREST], National Archives and Records Administration [NARA], College Park, Maryland.
in the Philippines after the exodus of prominent Red leaders such as Co Keng Sing, Young Ching-tong, and Wong Kiat to Hong Kong and China in the late 1940s. It did not, as the military declared shortly after the arrests, date back to the Wha Chi, but was rather nominally separate from this and other more well-known and more active Chinese communist organizations in the country such as the Democratic League, Kang Fan, and Lo Lian Hui. In 1948, the Bureau assumed the leadership of the Chinese communist movement, supported members of these other organizations financially, and absorbed some them into its ranks. In March 1950, PKP leaders estimated that membership of the Bureau was around 200, but in August 1952, Koa put this number at 400.

Based on the October 1950 documents, US intelligence conjectured that while the Bureau was affiliated to the PKP, it probably enjoyed a closer relationship with the CCP in China. Tensions between the PKP and Bureau were many and communication between them lacking. Strategically, the Bureau and the Huks were at odds. “Many CBs want to go back home,” the PKP’s Secretariat reported in March 1950, and many did so without permission from the Secretariat; others, despite not leaving for China, remained unhappy and became “discontented and talkative.” As the Bureau focused on “mobilizing comrades and followers back to China to join the officer training class,” it lacked a “complete, over-all plan and concrete organizational measures” and “did not mobilize our whole Party to discuss this problem fully.” Luis Taruc himself commented that the PKP’s Chinese “comrade-advisors” had an “over-zealous desire for continuous attacks on the enemy,” motivated by “national opportunism.” In late 1951, following the seizure of an additional collection of PKP

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39 “Relationship of Philippine Communist Party with Chinese Communists in the Philippines,” CREST, NARA.

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materials in September, US agents asserted that a split had emerged between the PKP and Chinese Bureau going back to the early post-liberation period. Chauvinistic and believing themselves more well-versed in Marxist theory than their Filipino comrades, Bureau members consistently refused to disclose provide financial and organizational reports to the PKP’s leadership.\(^{40}\) Koa confirmed this split, if not its specific details, when he stated that while Bureau members had to agree to be placed under the PKP and paid monthly dues to the party in “theory,” they “did not like to follow the theory concerned.”\(^{41}\) He explained that the Bureau aimed primarily to unite Philippine Chinese in support of the CCP and only secondarily to help the PKP liberate the Philippines from American neocolonialism and establish a new government of national capitalists, intellectuals, laborers, and peasants. The role of the Bureau in the PKP’s armed insurgency was thus “purely spiritual, moral, and financial,” and should the PKP achieve its aim, the Bureau would call upon Chinese to follow the country’s new laws.\(^{42}\) Koa and PKP leaders’ remarks about the Bureau thus support Caroline Hau’s argument that Chinese communists in the Philippines were fundamentally oriented towards China, despite what she calls their “revolutionary cosmopolitanism.”

As with earlier Chinese communist groups in the Philippines such as the Lo Lian Hui, the Bureau had no institutional ties to the CCP. Its connections with the mainland were limited to, first, the smuggling of money by local Chinese banks and other legal businesses to China, typically via Hong Kong. Second, through the mail, the Bureau obtained communist propaganda for distribution. Third, it received news on China through CCP radio broadcasts. Finally, it helped Chinese leave

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\(^{40}\) “Document Containing March 1951 Resolution of Philippine Communist Party Political Bureau on Chinese Bureau,” November 14, 1951, CIA-RDP82-00457R00920011001-0, CREST, NARA.

\(^{41}\) “Lü Fei huaqiao gongxian,” Vol. 3, 84, 112, IMH Archives.

\(^{42}\) “Lü Fei huaqiao gongxian,” Vol. 3, 99-100, IMH Archives.
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the Philippines for the PRC. These links were fragile and easily disrupted, as a survey of Philippine intelligence reports on efforts to curb Chinese smuggling in the late 1940s and early 1950s suggests. Koa said that following the outbreak of the Korean War, the Bureau stopped receiving propaganda from China via the mail.43

Within the Philippines, the Bureau scraped by on what little money it could raise from its members and supporters, aided by the extreme secrecy with which it operated. Party members paid dues, but according to Koa could pay any amount they wished to give. Bureau sympathizers were also to be found throughout the country and belonged to a group called the Merchants’ Association, which the Bureau’s Organization Department controlled. The Bureau also conducted fundraising campaigns in support of the CCP in China and to help its members in need of financial assistance because of unemployment or illness. Koa named three such campaigns: first, to help the People’s Liberation Army buy food and second, to fund the Bureau’s own expenses; he does not elaborate on the third. Money was also supposed to be sent to the PKP, but raids on the Central Post Office apparently prevented this.44

Koa was aware of others in the Bureau – or at least he was in August 1952. In April, during one of his first interrogations, he claimed to know little about its inner workings. The Bureau had five main departments – Secretariat, Education, Organization, Finance, and Communications – but Koa said then that he did not know their heads.45 By August, however, Koa’s tune had changed, in reaction to being tortured. Koa confessed to being head of Education, and other names began to come forth: the Bureau’s Secretary was Chi Sen, and its Communications head was Bong Ah. Two


45 “Lü Fei huaqiao gongxian,” Vol. 3, 80-81, IMH Archives.
other men, Eng Sek and Kia Sen, were youth committee members, while “Lee,” one of Koa’s first contacts in the Bureau, was Ng Le Chiao, head of the Organization Department. While the Bureau as a whole never held group meetings, Koa occasionally met Chi Sen, Eng Sek, Bong Ah, and Kia Sen at rendezvous points throughout Manila that he drew on a map for his interrogator. He also identified photos that were shown to him of several other Bureau members, including Eng Sek and Bong Ah. These were the names of individuals that MIS later believed that it had apprehended, but in fact had not.

Philippine military intelligence and the production of the Chinese communist suspect

By narrating how MIS caught Koa Chian and planned the December 27 arrests, this chapter now explains how the Philippine state produced Chinese communist suspects from the fragments of material and oral evidence that it gathered. It shows, also, how civilian-military tensions shaped the intelligence gathering process; how Chinese communists communicated to avoid the state; and how the Chinese language and Chinese social practices complicated the efforts of the state to know communists.

In 1948, Koa became a regular member of the Chinese Bureau, and was taught the tenets of its underground work by one Tan It. He began using the alias of “Yu,” or 楊仁倫, in his daily life and “Benito” in his underground activities. In 1950, before leaving Manila for Visayas, Tan introduced Koa to his new contact, whom Koa knew only as “Lee” and suspected of being one of the Bureau’s leaders. Lee (or Ng Le Chiao, as Koa later revealed to MIS) gave him the task of


47 “Lü Fei huaqiao gongxian,” Vol. 3, 80, IMH Archives.

liaising with the Huks through Koa’s former English teacher, Purificacion Bolatao y Feleo, whom he had known since 1946. Feleo may have been related to or the wife of late Huk leader Juan Feleo, and it was through her that Koa met Tessie, one of Taruc’s couriers in July 1951. Together, Koa and Tessie traveled to meet with the Huk leader in the Sierra Madre mountains of Central Luzon.49 Koa stayed there for an unknown period of time, and remained in contact with Taruc as the Bureau and the PKP sought to mend their relations. In September, Koa informed Taruc that “We are now operating our work smoothly,” including in his letter 800 pesos for the Huks.50

In March 1952, Feleo informed Koa that Taruc again wished to meet with him and would send a courier to guide him to Taruc’s hideout. On March 29, Koa met with this courier, a teenager nicknamed “Baby Zenaida,” at Feleo’s house. Tessie, it transpired, was wanted by MIS and would not be coming to Manila anymore. After discussing “Uncle” Taruc’s whereabouts and the situation in the mountains, Zenaida agreed that she would take him to Taruc. Two weeks later, on April 13, Zenaida and Koa met at the junction of Paseo de Azcárraga (renamed Recto Avenue in 1961) and Ylaya Street on the outskirts of Chinatown. Koa was then having his shoes shined near a magazine stand and when he saw Zenaida, motioned her inside a nearby bus station. Koa told her to wait for him while he went to fetch his belongings, but on his way home was arrested by three MIS agents.51

Baby Zenaida, it turned out, was also a MIS agent. Her original name seems to have been Profiteza Que, but she also went by Portetezar Que, Bobing Que, Paping, and Esa Zenaid, and her Chinese name was either Guo Zhubao 郭珠寶 or Guo Xiuzhi 郭秀治, according an ROC Embassy

51 “Lü Fei huaqiao gongxian,” Vol. 3, 71-72, 95, IMH Archives.
operative. Born in Laoang City in Samar province to a Chinese father from Zhangzhou and Filipina mother, she attended Laoang Chinese School for three years and had been to Zhangzhou as a child. In 1948, she relocated to Manila with her father, a businessman. Thereafter, she started working for MIS and joined a counterintelligence team under Captain Cristobal Irlanda that began planning an operation against the Chinese Bureau in late 1950, following the seizure of Huk documents in Manila. “Benito” was among the names mentioned in these materials. A captured member of the Hukbalahap informed MIS that Benito was Chinese, giving MIS a lead to pursue.

Irlanda selected Zenaida to infiltrate the Bureau, but she almost certainly only managed to snare Koa Chian. Testifying before the Deportation Board during its trials of the *jingqiao* that began in July 1953, Zenaida said that she made contact with Feleo on March 25, four days before meeting Koa, and used a forged letter to Koa, supposedly from Luis Taruc, to deceive Feleo into believing that she was Taruc’s courier. This first part of her account is consistent with what Koa testified to MIS. But the next part of her testimony is barely believable. After Koa was arrested, Zenaida said that she continued to enjoy Feleo’s trust and even took part in a meeting of the Bureau’s top leaders in Feleo’s home. Posing as Taruc’s representative, she apparently gained the trust of these leaders during her very first encounter with the Bureau. Starting at the very top, she worked her way down

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53 Irlanda is described by William J. Pomeroy, an American communist who joined the Huks and was interrogated by Irlanda after his capture by the Philippine government in 1952, as “a big man with rather boyishly handsome features, usually with a self-assured smirk. He is known for his ruthlessness, and is reputed to have tortured many of our fellow prisoners and killed many of our comrades during raids. He is typical of many of the intelligence officers we meet. With the little-educated peasant or worker in our movement, he is brutal and domineering, with those of intellectual development, he seeks to appear urbane and their intellectual match or superior.” Pomeroy, *Bilanggo: Life as a Political Prisoner in the Philippines, 1952-1962* (Diliman: University of the Philippines Press, 2009), 104.

54 “Lü Fei huaqiao gongxian,” Vol. 1, 39, IMH Archives.

its organizational structure and quickly familiarized herself with its rank and file. At the trials, she claimed to identify most of the *jingqiao* based on her knowledge of them before their arrests. When pressed, however, she admitted to meeting 90 of them only once and for about five minutes each, 21 of them twice, and only 13 four or more times. The physical evidence that MIS presented was similarly inadequate. Despite claiming to have seized “cartloads of documents” on December 27, all that MIS had to show the Board were Horlicks bottles, comic magazines, altered dresses, typed letters, and a few peso bills.\(^\text{56}\) These were meant to prove that Zenaida had infiltrated the Bureau.

Remarkably, this was the only material evidence that Irlanda’s team had gathered in its six-month investigation of the Bureau and preparations for December 27. Another investigator claimed to have had contact with various *jingqiao*, but upon questioning, admitted that he had neither spoken to them or observed them engaging in communist activities. Bizarrely, he said that he did not know that MIS was planning to arrest them.\(^\text{57}\) All in all, as the respondents’ lawyers put it in December 1953 in a motion to dismiss the case against their clients:

> Capt. Irlanda and his team bored us for six months with stories of how they conducted their surveillance and investigation. They bored us through not [sic] less than 20 witnesses who saw people talk to people but did not hear what they said. They saw no respondents in subversive activity. They saw no respondent in more compromising places than their own homes and places of employment. After those six months, one would think it was a crime to talk to one’s countrymen in their homes and store. They bored us with how they did it. They did not tell us what they found – for they found none [emphasis theirs].\(^\text{58}\)

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\(^{56}\) “347 Chinese Red Suspects Nabbed In Surprise Raid,” 26; *In Re Chin Sang, et. als., Respondents, Case No. R-489: Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum*, 6, 26-28, 38-39, 69, AHC.

\(^{57}\) “Lü Fei huaqiao gongxian,” Vol. 7, 55, IMH Archives.

\(^{58}\) “Lü Fei huaqiao gongxian,” Vol. 7, 70, IMH Archives.
Given the manifest inadequacies of MIS’s case that the Deportation Board trials revealed, how did Irlanda and his team generate the names of the 300 or so huaqiao whom they arrested? And what motivated them to pursue what was, in retrospect, an ill-conceived operation?

In the 1950s Philippines, anticommunism was the pretext of choice for self-aggrandizing (often unscrupulous) actors looking to augment their political reputations. As it was with Chinese actors, so too was it with MIS. A portion of the list comprised Chinese that MIS suspected of non-ideological crimes such as arson and insurance fraud, smuggling, prostitution, and illegal entry or overstaying their entry visas. MIS wanted them deported to Taiwan and to not have the state bear the long-term costs of incarcerating them. However, it often lacked the evidence to prove that they had committed such crimes. Furthermore, as it was Nationalist China’s policy after 1949 to accept only those deportees that were communist suspects and not all “undesirable aliens,” MIS had the incentive of tarring these regular criminals with the same ideological brush.

MIS also perceived its own reputation and autonomy as an intelligence organization to be at stake in this case, according to Chen Chih-ping. In the early 1950s, prior to the jinqiao an, MIS had no record of identifying and eliminating foreign communist threats to the Philippines, despite the existence of these threats to be common “knowledge” within the intelligence community. The organization’s operating costs were high and its political enemies many. During the 1951 Senate, gubernatorial, and mayoral elections, the military, then under Magsaysay, refused to take political sides and in doing so angered members of the incumbent Liberal Party, which Magsaysay was still a member of. In 1952, citing costs, a faction of Liberals congressmen sought to veto MIS’s budget for the fiscal year and cripple an agency that Chen called Magsaysay’s “political capital” (zhengzhi

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Rather than the Defense Secretary, it was Armed Forces Chief of Staff Calixto Duque and MIS head Colonel Ismael Lapus who took the lead in responding to this political threat. Duque, Antonio Chua Cruz’s military patron, had filled MIS with his loyalists such as Lapus. He, Lapus, and Naval Captain Rafael Pargas secretly began planning a large-scale counterintelligence operation against undesirable Chinese that they codenamed “Operation Chopsuy.” They presented their plan to President Elpidio Quirino, but he was too busy with affairs of state to bother with it.60

Unnoticed by Quirino, Irlanda’s team went about compiling the list of names it needed to launch Chopsuy and prove MIS’s usefulness to the state. Some of these names the agency already had from its investigation into non-ideological crimes. The capture of Koa Chian allowed MIS to pad its list with “real” communists. Through Koa, MIS came to know about the Bureau’s leaders, including Chi Sen, Ng Le Chiao, Bong Ah, Eng Sek, Kia Sen, as well as other “communists” who may or may not have been affiliated to the Bureau. We do not know how many names in total Koa provided, but he put his name to at least three written confessions during the eight months leading up to the mass arrests. Copies of the forged letter to Koa from Taruc were delivered to the addresses that he mentioned, and agents dispatched to secretly take photos of the people living there. Names were also extracted from other sources, including a CCP agent from Hong Kong who had entered the Philippines from North Borneo and, after traversing the entire length of the country, was caught trying to leave Batanes for Taiwan, where he had planned to link up with underground communists. Chen named names before retracting his confession entirely, but MIS used what he had originally confessed.61 Ambassador Chen also attributed part of the blame for the December 27 arrests to an

60 “Lü Fei huaqiao gongxian,” Vol. 1, 41–42, IMH Archives.
ethnic Chinese MIS interpreter and interrogator, Felix Bonaobra, who had provided many names to MIS and later tortured the arrested Chinese into confessing crimes that they had not committed.62

Consolidating a list of suspects’ names was one thing; apprehending the individuals named was another entirely. The suspects did not resist arrest, but many were not whom MIS thought they were. Koa, it turned out, did not expose the Bureau and its leadership. Rather, under pressure, he supplied his captors with the names of communists who had left the country, died, or already been outed. Many of the names that he provided were incomplete; sometimes he gave only last names, but not first names, and at other times first but not last names.63 Koa’s English was poor, but as far as we know he was interrogated only in English and not in Hokkien. He lied to protect himself and the Bureau, but could not have known then that the intelligence he provided to MIS would result in the mass arrests of innocent Chinese. When he did find out, he felt remorseful – at least this is what he told ROC officials several years later.64

Koa certainly deceived MIS, but more fundamentally, the agency lacked an understanding of Minnanhua, the Chinese written script, and in particular how Chinese identified themselves to the Philippine authorities. Consider the names of the Bureau’s leaders. In Koa’s statements to MIS, he identified the Secretary of the Bureau as “Chi Sen,” which was how his interrogator, a Captain Laconico, phonetically transcribed Koa’s verbal response. After the arrests, however, this person became known, in the Philippines Free Press and legal records, as “Chin Sang.”65 The actual man

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63 “Lü Fei huaqiao gongxian,” Vol. 5, 231, IMH Archives.

64 “Lü Fei buliang huaqiao,” Vol. 8, 85, AH.

65 See “347 Chinese Red Suspects Nabbed In Surprise Raid,” 26; and In Re Chin Sang, et. als., Respondents, Case No. R-489: Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum, AHC.
arrested was a carpenter who went by the Chinese characters 黃積池 and whose name in his alien registration certificate was indeed “Chin Sang.” But the actual communist that Koa was referring to was 黃自新, also a carpenter. This person’s registered English name was not “Chi Sen,” despite its close phonetic correspondence with his Chinese name, but “Lee At,” and he had left the country in June 1951. MIS detained “Chin Sang” because of what it perceived were phonetic similarities between “Chin Sang” (黃積池) and “Chi Sen” (黃自新 / “Lee At”). If MIS did have agents such as Bonaobra who knew Chinese, it did not consult with them on matters of language and translation, as it made similar mistakes when arresting the other leaders of the Bureau. Nor was it familiar with how Chinese in the Philippines often kept multiple aliases in both English and Chinese and relied on either forged registration certificates or those of dead people in order to “legally” remain in the Philippines under its restrictive immigration laws, both during and after American rule.

As ROC intelligence showed, MIS similarly misidentified the heads of the Organization, Communications, and Finance Departments. The men MIS arrested were 林景安, 李文允, and 王詩桐, who were registered as “Ng Le Chiao,” “Dy Bon Un,” and “Yu Dy” respectively. The first, whom Koa had known originally as “Lee,” had four Chinese aliases – 李煥來, 蔡煥來, 李文法, and 李清玉 – and was registered as “Toh Chu.” He had left the Philippines in January 1951. It is likely that MIS had brought up “Ng Le Chiao” when interrogating Koa about “Lee,” and that Koa had simply affirmed that the two were the same person. The man Koa named as Communications head was “Bong Ah,” who lived at 543 Elcano Street. This was the former address of communist guerrilla 張羅綱, whose name sounded like “Bong Ah” in Minnanhua; so too, unfortunately, did

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“Dy Bon Un”/ 李文允, whom MIS insisted was “Bong Ah.” Finally, Koa named the head of the Finance Department as “Yu Lan,” and said that he was a fluent English speaker. ROC intelligence conjectured that Koa was referring to 陳有任; MIS ended up arresting a “Yu Dy”/ 王詩桐, who spoke no English and was a common laborer with only a third-grade education. A summary of the Bureau leaders named by Koa and the persons mistaken for them and arrested by MIS is found in Table 1.67

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank in Bureau</th>
<th>Persons mistakenly arrested</th>
<th>Actual communists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chinese name(s)</td>
<td>Registered name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>黃積池</td>
<td>Chin Sang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization head</td>
<td>林景安</td>
<td>Ng Le Chiao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications head</td>
<td>李文允</td>
<td>Dy Bon Un</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance head</td>
<td>王詩桐</td>
<td>Yu Dy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chinese name(s)</td>
<td>Registered name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>黃自新</td>
<td>Lee At</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>李煥來, 蔡煥來, 李文法, 李清玉</td>
<td>Toh Chu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>張羅綱</td>
<td>[Unknown]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>陳有任</td>
<td>Yu Lan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Partial list of Chinese Bureau leaders named by Koa Chian from April-August 1952 and the persons mistaken for them and arrested by MIS on December 27.

Collectively, Koa Chian’s insights into the Chinese Bureau, his interrogation by MIS, and the agency’s missteps in arresting Chin Sang and others highlight the politicized, methodologically flawed process by which the Philippine stated, through unreliable agents such as Zenaida, gathered intelligence on suspected Chinese communists; how communists such as Koa communicated with each other and the Huks and evaded being captured or known by the state; and third, how Chinese naming conventions and the Chinese language in its written and spoken forms hindered outsiders seeking to understand Chinese society for political ends.

As in Chapter 2, which explained how anticommunism entailed the public performance of one’s ideological credentials, the preceding discussion on names, writing, and language highlights the interplay between what Frederick Cooper and Rogers Brubaker have called self-identification and external identification. Self-identification involved attachment to China, the Philippines, the KMT, one’s kinsmen, and the chamber of commerce. But private expressions of such attachments do not concern us. What does is how self-identification necessarily existed in a dialectical relation to external persons or institutions; how, therefore, external identification depended partly on how individuals identified themselves. In their everyday interactions with fellow members of the same ethnic group, Chinese identified themselves in Hokkien by certain names or fragments of names – “Yu” and “Lee,” for example – which may have been aliases. In representing themselves in writing to other Chinese, they were known as “楊仁倫,” “黃積池,” and so on. In conversing with Filipinos, they may have used invented English names such as “Benito” or “Antonio Cruz,” or the names in their registration certificates such as “Lee At,” “Toh Chu,” and “Yu Lan.” To the Philippine state, bureaucratic procedures imposed singular, English-language identities upon Chinese migrants that were at odds with their own naming practices. But the production of registered names was not a one-way process. The state did not invent these names. By forging their registration certificates or appropriating those of the deceased and then providing them to the state as “proof” of their status as legal aliens, the Chinese did.

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From narratives into legal subjects: the Cebu reading club case

December 27, 1952 had multiple aftereffects for Chinese society in the Philippines, one of which was the decision by a group of Chinese high school students in Cebu to commit themselves fully to communism. Among them were Lao Han Keng, Sy Bun Chiong, Go Chi Kok, and Sy Yan Wan, whose interrogation records and testimonies to MIS and the Taiwanese authorities allow us to know the activities and history of their group. But even more so than Koa’s statements to MIS, their narratives, given at different times to different authorities, are riddled with gaps, ambiguities, and contradictions. Like Koa’s, their accounts both aided and subverted the intelligence gathering process. What follows is a reconstruction of their experiences, after which I examine how the ROC state engaged in this same reconstructive process in order to produce legal subjects from firsthand narratives of Chinese communism.

By late 1952, all four persons had joined a reading club in Cebu City whose members went on weekly outings to discuss left-wing literature and engage in self-criticism and mutual criticism of each other. The de facto leader of this club at the time seems to have been Chiu Siok Tuan, who proposed changing its name to the Philippine-Chinese Communist Party in response to the state’s anti-Chinese policies. The PCCP’s founding took place in June 1953 as an entirely sui generis organization with no ties to either the CCP or the PKP, unlike the Chinese Bureau.

Lao recalled that he and other members rented a house in Cebu in which they hung up pictures of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao, participated in a founding ceremony, and mimeographed their own membership cards. Each member was also given a number – Lao was No. 503, Sy Yan Wan No.

69 “Lü Fei buliang huaqiao,” Vol. 8, 86, AH.


71 “Lü Fei buliang huaqiao,” Vol. 8, 86, AH.
20, and Sy Bun Chiong No. 22.\textsuperscript{72} Thereafter, until the mid-1954, they and others met at the “party headquarters” to attend and deliver lectures and discuss communist pamphlets and magazines that they obtained from Hong Kong by mail.\textsuperscript{73}

In the middle of 1954, their “training” complete, Lao and three female party members, Lim Yan Yan 林燕燕, Ang Giok Lun 洪玉润, and Uy Bee Siong 黄美嫦 embarked on their very first mission as young, self-radicalized communists. Their target was Sun Yat-sen High School in Iloilo City, which they posed as students of and looked to infiltrate. Partly because of their inexperience and suspicious behavior, they were quickly found out by the Iloilo branch of the KMT on July 9. Through their relatives in Iloilo, the party contacted their parents, who flew to Iloilo the following day to pick up their wayward children and escort them back to Cebu. A search by the KMT of their quarters in Iloilo yielded training manuals, a copy of the PCCP’s constitution, propaganda, and letters from Lao to the others. Yet with Deportation Board hearings against the \textit{jinqiao} still ongoing, the KMT chose not to report them to the Philippine authorities for fear of upsetting Chinese society even further. Handing them over would also deprive it of the chance to interrogate them and learn more about their activities and organizational structure; information, for the time being, remained within Chinese circles. Instead, it had them write confessions in English and Chinese and promise not to repeat their actions, or be turned over to the state along with this evidence. Lao was shown a letter that he had written to Lim, Ang, and Uy exhorting them to remain steadfast in the face of difficulty, after which he confessed to being a communist. The KMT then counselled him “not to live this kind of life” and released him with a guarantee of good behavior from his father, a ranking

\begin{footnotes}
\item[73] “Lü Fei huaqiao gongxian,” Vol. 3, 176, IMH Archives.
\end{footnotes}
KMT member in Cebu. The three female students were also taken in by their parents and watched
over by the Embassy.\textsuperscript{74}

Professional revolutionaries these students were not: for one, the paper trail they left behind
suggests that, unlike members of the Chinese Bureau, they had little idea of how to operate covertly
in an ideological environment that was hostile to them. However much they may have trained and
identified as communists, their backgrounds suggest reasons for participating in the reading club
and PCCP beyond a deep-seated belief in revolution and socialism. Lao (or so he claimed) had no
prior involvement in in communist activities before entering the Philippines in 1949 as a legal
quota immigrant.\textsuperscript{75} His relationship with his father was strained. In April 1953, Lao found himself
out of work and left home because he was too ashamed to stay with his father. Through the reading
club, Lao and Sy Yan Wan fell in love, and when she was beaten by her father in July that year,
she left home temporarily to live with Lao, who was nine years older than her.\textsuperscript{76} Sy’s father, David
Sy Gaisano 施維雄, also occupied a prominent social position as a son of the matriarch of one of
Cebu’s wealthiest families.\textsuperscript{77} After being arrested, Sy Yan Wan was asked by MIS why she had
joined the party. She responded simply: “I want adventure, sir.”\textsuperscript{78}

Lao and Sy’s relationship, far from being incidental to this narrative, helps explain why the
two, along with Sy Bun Chiong, were arrested later that July. At that time, Sy Yan Wan was living

\textsuperscript{74}“Qijie zhongweihui gongzuo huiyi di 96 ci huiyi jilu 七屆中委會工作會議第 96 次會議記錄,” Records of the
Seventh National Working Committee, 7.4 Reel 6, File ID: 96, September 3, 1954, Zhongguo Guomindang
Records [KMT Records], Hoover Institution Library and Archives [HILA], Stanford, California; “Lü Fei huaqiao gongxian,”
Vol. 3, 169-170, IMH Archives.

\textsuperscript{75}“Lü Fei buliang huaqiao,” Vol. 8, 86, AH.

\textsuperscript{76}“Lü Fei huaqiao gongxian,” Vol. 3, 168, IMH Archives.

\textsuperscript{77}“Lü Fei huaqiao gongxian,” Vol. 3, 254-255, IMH Archives.

\textsuperscript{78}“Lü Fei huaqiao gongxian,” Vol. 3, 156, IMH Archives.
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with her relatives in Manila. Although she may have trained as a PCCP member, she had not been given any assignments. Once free of the KMT’s clutches thanks to the intervention of his father, Lao went immediately to Manila to find her, knowing that Lim Yan Yan had revealed her existence and that of other party members to the KMT. Following this breaking of his promise to the KMT and his father, the party decided to turn over information on him to the Philippine authorities and let them arrest him. In Manila, Lao reunited not only with Sy Yan Wan, but also Sy Bun Chiong, who had been sent there on a separate mission to infiltrate Philippine Chinese High School; later, an agent of the PCCP contacted him and gave him orders to mail letters to Chinese residents across the country denouncing Magsaysay’s anti-Chinese economic policies. He ended up moving in with Lao and Sy. Fearing an impending crackdown on the PCCP, the three decided to destroy Sy Bun Chiong’s letters and flee Manila for Mount Banahaw, a Huk stronghold in Quezon Province then under siege by the Philippine military. But in their hurry to leave, they were not able to dispose of all the letters, which were later seized by MIS. They made it as far as Lucban, a city at the foot of Mount Banahaw that was crawling with troops. There, on the night of July 27, the military found them roaming around suspiciously and arrested them.

Other (although not all) PCCP members were arrested over the next year and a half. 14 of them, including Lim Yan Yan, Ang Giok Lun, and Uy Bee Siong, were detained in various cities throughout the islands on November 26, 1955. A ROC official attributed the timing of the latter to the government’s desire to make a strong political statement following the 1955 midterm elections and to compensate for setbacks in the jinqiao an. Go Chi Kok was arrested on July 29 in Manila.

79 “Qijie zhongweihui gongzuo huiyi di 96 ci huiyi jilu,” KMT Records, HILA.
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His narrative of his participation in the organization does not square with the others’. Go claimed to MIS, testified before the Deportation Board, and told the Taiwanese authorities that he had left the reading club in January 1953 because he had come to realize the true nature of the organization. To MIS, he said that he had been reading USIS propaganda, resulting in this realization. Go also singled out Lao as the organization’s founder and leader, as well as a rival for the affections of Sy Yan Wan. Lao, according to Go, was a bona fide communist agent from China, became harshly critical of Go’s failure to rid himself of his “petty bourgeois tail” (小資產階級尾巴), and forbade any talk of romantic love between Go and Sy, saying that love was selfish and would hurt the morale of the organization. This, he said, was Lao’s ploy to separate him from Sy. When Go wished to quit the club, Lao threatened to kill him.82 No such details are forthcoming in Lao’s account, which in fact describes Go as a PCCP leader.83 Go’s relative lack of credibility, especially with regards to the length and extent of his involvement in the group, is evident not so much from Lao’s account, but Sy Bun Chiong’s. Sy had no vendetta against Lao or Go, but like Lao, identifies Go as a leader of the reading club and PCCP – an instructor of his and Lao’s.84

Discrepancies, ambiguities, and gaps in the narratives of Lao, Sy, Sy, and Go went beyond Go’s role in the organization. Who, for example, were the party’s leaders – and what did leadership entail? Chiu Siok Tuan, as both Lao and Sy Bun Chiong noted, passed away from illness in April 1954. According to Sy, Go Chi Kok and Go Ka Sing 吳家聲 (who was arrested on November 26, 1955) succeeded her. But the individual who gave him orders to infiltrate Philippine Chinese High


School in Manila and mail the letters was a mysterious person called Go Chui Lim, or “Lao Tok,” who was never arrested (and whose name in Chinese characters we do not know). Lao Han Keng stated to MIS that Go Chui Lim as the highest ranking member of the organization, but in another interview a few weeks later, he claimed that Lim Yan Yan had succeeded Chiu as leader. Neither he nor Sy mentioned Go Chui Lim in relation to the training that they received.

After July 1957, when Lao, Sy, Sy, and Go were deported to Taiwan, sifting and evaluating their accounts became the ROC’s problem. Unlike the Philippines, for which deportation applied equally to all undesirable behavior by aliens, the ROC sought to dispense proportional justice and thus needed to weigh the relative gravity of their communist activities. Their narratives had to be transmuted into a usable hierarchy of guilt and responsibility: communist “leaders,” for example, had to be dealt with more severely than mere followers. Thus the ROC determined that Lao was the leader of the organization because of the letters that he had written to Lim Yan Yan in Iloilo instructing her on the principles of their struggle that the Iloilo KMT had confiscated in early July 1954. From these letters, which Lao confirmed that he had written, Taiwan’s Garrison-General Headquarters concluded that Lao became the leader of the PCCP after Chiu Siok Tuan’s death and was responsible for printing the anti-Magsaysay propaganda that Sy Bun Chiong was supposed to distribute. In sentencing Lao, Taiwan leaned heavily on Go Chi Kok’s accusations against Lao, treating Go’s testimony as trustworthy and using it as the standard with which to evaluate Lao’s. The Garrison-General believed that Go had left the club before it became the PCCP and his claim that Lao had told him about his communist activities in China before 1949, because none of Lao,

86 “Fei pohuo huaqiao xuesheng feidie zuzhi,” Vol. 1, 22-25, IMH Archives.
87 “Lü Fei buliang huaqiao,” Vol. 8, 155-157, AH.
Sy, or Sy had mentioned Go as a PCCP member in their statements to the Taiwanese authorities. But in the documentation that the Philippine government had generated on these suspects, which the ROC explicitly stated that it possessed, Lao and Sy Bun Chiong mentioned Go multiple times as a leader or instructor of the party. If the ROC was aware of these documents, it chose to ignore them. Lao (together with Koa Chian) was given a death sentence on September 15, 1959 that was later commuted to life imprisonment; Sy Bun Chiong’s life sentence was reduced to a decade; and Sy Yan Wan’s seven years in jail to six – the reasons for which we will examine in the next section. Go Chi Kok, meanwhile, was sentenced to an unknown period of reformatory education, or ganhua 感化, for apparently having quit the reading club early on.

In the absence of a fuller documentary record, including the testimonies of the later group of detainees and the materials confiscated from their premises (such as the letters Lao wrote to Lim and the propaganda Sy was supposed to mail), ascertaining what actually happened is impossible; this might conceivably be so even if we did have them. But what concerns us here is not the “truth”; it is, rather, how heterogeneous narratives and the fallibility and agency of individuals complicated the ROC’s efforts to dispense justice. Whether intentionally or otherwise, the narratives that Lao, Go, and Sy Bun Chiong (less so Sy Yan Wan) provided to MIS, the Deportation Board, and the Taiwanese authorities contained gaps and inconsistencies. Part of the explanation may simply have been the time that elapsed between the statements that they provided to each investigative agency: three years passed between their arrest in July 1954 and deportation to Taiwan in July 1957, and it was not until March 1960 that Taiwan rendered its revised and final verdicts on their case. How were questions to them framed and what pressures or blandishments were they subjected to? These

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88 “Lü Fei buliang huaqiao,” Vol. 8, 87-91, AH.

89 “Lü Fei buliang huaqiao,” Vol. 8, 153-157, 200-203, AH.
cannot be answered based on the existing written record. Self-interest and the desire to minimize one’s punishment by downplaying one’s agency, shifting the blame, and giving one’s interrogators what they were looking for also figured into how they represented themselves to the authorities. Go’s strategy from the outset, which he maintained with remarkable consistency across time and to different questioners, was to accuse Lao of being not only the organization’s mastermind, but also a bad person. By describing Lao as a communist agent from China, Go played on the ROC’s preexisting beliefs about the PRC’s subversive activities in Southeast Asia, and also the corrupting influence of communism on one’s character. The other detainees were not without their own tactics. Lao, for example, claimed to MIS after his arrest on July 27 that he had given up his “communistic activities” under advice from the KMT and was hoping for a chance to redeem himself.90 Sy Yan Wan made a similar (and perhaps heartfelt) plea for leniency when she spoke of her love for Lao and desire for adventure and said that “I no longer want to be a communist” after her arrest.91

The PCCP and Chinese Bureau – one a group of self-radicalized Chinese students and the other a secretive underground organization – were all that remained of Chinese communism in the Philippines after the likes of Co Keng Sing, Gong Taoyi, and other leaders had fled the country in the late 1940s. However much Philippine and ROC officials may have feared that a transnational network of Chinese communist agents had implanted itself in the archipelago, links between these two groups and mainland China ranged from minimal to nonexistent. As with the CCP, so too with the PKP, for which institutional ties to the likes of the Kang Fan and Wha Chi were very much a thing of the past by the time Koa Chian traveled to meet with Luis Taruc for the first time in July 1951. At least in the Philippines, if not elsewhere in Southeast Asia as well, Chinese communism’s

influence lay chiefly in its ideals, accessible remotely via print and radio, and capacity to motivate others, rather than any organizational strength.

**Rectifying anticommunism: resolving the jinqiao an and Cebu reading club case**

This final section of this chapter turns to how ROC officials and Philippine-Chinese leaders responded to the jinqiao an and Cebu students’ arrests from 1953 all the way up to the final days of Carlos Garcia’s presidency in December 1961, when the 99 jinqiao still out on bail were finally cleared of any wrongdoing. Examining how these initially separate episodes were brought together and jointly resolved shows how the ROC and its overseas Chinese partners reconciled their shared goal of opposing communism with that of safeguarding the interests of Chinese society. It provides unusually detailed insight into how the ROC negotiated its place in the postwar world through the overseas Chinese communities it claimed to protect and by navigating the murky waters of another country’s domestic politics.

After being informed about the December 27 arrests on the afternoon that they took place, the ROC Embassy issued a statement to Chinese residents calling for calm, contacted the relatives of the arrested, and sent officials to Camp Murphy to reassure the detainees of the ROC’s support and ask that they abide by camp protocol. With Quirino having suspended habeas corpus by decree on October 20, 1950, the suspects could be detained without trial indefinitely. Within three days, however, 18 suspects were released, and the military’s operation began to unravel. The Embassy initiated its own investigation of the suspects, and by early February had recommended that 118

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of them be released. Among these men were individuals with unimpeachable anticomunist civic credentials. Qua Chi Peng 柯子冰, for example, was the President of the Legaspi Chinese Chamber of Commerce and the Legaspi chapter of the Chinese Anti-Communist Movement, and a Standing Committee member of the KMT in Bicol; in October 1952, he had traveled to Taipei to attend the inaugural Overseas Chinese Conference there; Lao Kiat 劉賢吉 was the President of the Tabaco Chamber and also a ranking member of the Bicol KMT and his local Anti-Communist Movement chapter. Chen wrote to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that it is “beyond any doubt that they have ever been Communist sympathizers,” and hoped for their swift release. The long delay in releasing them had “occasioned great privations” for them and their families, most of which were of limited means.  

In May 1953, with the military having completed its interrogation of the suspects, formal charges were filed against 152 of them, including Qua and Lao, before the Deportation Board. Right after the arrests, the Embassy had joined with Chinese community leaders from various civic organizations, including the KMT, General Chamber of Commerce, Anti-Communist Movement, and Chinese Welfare Association in forming a “united working group to support of the innocent jinqiao” (Ge huaqiao tuanti yuanzhu wugu jinqiao lianhe xiaozu 各華僑團體援助無辜禁僑聯合小組). Led by Welfare Association President Yu Khe Thai, the working group hired the law firm of Quisumbing, Sycip, Quisumbing, and Salazar to represent the respondents. The Sycip family member here was Alexander, son of Albino and nephew of Alfonso, who, as President of the Anti-

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Communist Movement, was a member of the xiaozu. Sycip served as legal adviser to the Embassy and his firm was often contracted by the Chinese community in cases involving Chinese and the Philippine state.

What followed was the longest and most complex case in the Deportation Board’s history. The hearings alone lasted for one and a half years from July 1953 to January 1955. 97 During this period, 34 jinqiao were freed on January 23, 1954, and 105, including Qua, released on bail shortly afterwards; members of the xiaozu raised funds and even contributed their own money to help the respondents post bail. 98 Of these 105, five would have charges dropped against them in the coming years, while one would pass away. The respondents’ attorneys, as explained earlier in the chapter, based their defense on the questionable veracity of Baby Zenaida and MIS’s investigation prior to December 27. Following the conclusion of these hearings in January 1955, the Board turned to the 13 individuals who remained in detention at Camp Murphy and had not been allowed to post bail. These were the accused leaders of the Chinese Bureau, including Koa Chian, Lao Kiat, Chin Sang, Ng Le Chiao, Dy Bon Un, and Yu Dy. 99

A decision, whether on these 13 persons or the 99 out on bail, was not forthcoming for the next one and a half years, much to the dismay of the jinqiao themselves, ROC officials and Chinese

97 “Lü Fei huaxiao gongxian,” Vol. 2, 93, IMH Archives.


99 Most narratives, including Tang Tack’s, Liu Chi-tien’s, and Chang Tsun-wu and Ong Kok-Chung’s, have the number of jinqiao who were put on trial at 152 and who were released on bail at 99, but if we take add this number to the 34 who were released and the 13 who remained in custody, the total is only 146. See Tang, Wo zai Shang Zong sanshixinian, 80; Liu Chi-tien 劉芝田, ZhongFei guanxi shi 中菲關係史 (Taipei: Zhengzhong shuju, 1964), 732-733; and Chang Tsun-wu 張存武 and Ong Kok-Chung 王國璋, Feihua shanglian zonghui zhi xingshuai xu yanbian 華商聯總會之興衰與演變 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan yatai yanjiu jishu, 2002), 29. The only archival evidence to account for the remaining six individuals is the first of two executive orders from President Garcia in December 1961, in which charges against five of them are said to have been “disposed of;” while one is said to have passed away. See “Lü Fei huaxiao gongxian,” Vol. 4, 145, 062.6/0008, December 1952-November 1962, IMH Archives. This document does not specify when the five were “disposed of,” or when the other person passed away.
leaders, and the military officials such as Ismael Lapus who had hatched Operation Chopsuy in an effort to prove their utility to their political masters – a group that now included Magsaysay, who had become President on December 30, 1953. Part of the reason for the delay was the changing composition of the three-man Deportation Board and the sheer volume of paperwork that had been generated over the course of the hearings. In July 1956, new ROC Ambassador Chen Chih-mai 陳之邁 estimated that records of the hearings amounted to 11,626 pages, a quantity of information that Board members could not possibly be familiar with in great detail in their efforts to grasp the Chinese problem.\(^\text{100}\)

As time passed, ROC officials in the Philippines and Taiwan became increasingly anxious about the harmful effects of the jinqiao an on their struggle against communism and the reputation that the ROC was trying to uphold as a protector of overseas Chinese communities and its nationals. From early on, Chen Chih-ping believed that the arrests had dealt a blow to the ROC’s ideological struggle and exposed the weaknesses of the KMT and Anti-Communist League.\(^\text{101}\) The tribulations of the jinqiao did not escape notice on Taiwan either, and not only among state and party agencies such as the Foreign Ministry and Third Section of the KMT Central Committee that specialized in overseas Chinese affairs. At the second meeting of the ROC’s First National Assembly in February 1954, delegate Huang He-de 黃和德, who had spent an extended period of time in the Philippines, delivered a detailed report on the Chinese in the islands, a section of which focused on the jinqiao an. His report crystallized a general sense of impatience among ROC legislators over the seeming lack of progress of the case. Claiming that Chinese communists must have infiltrated MIS for the

\(^{100}\) “Lü Fei huaqiao gongxian,” Vol. 2, 110, IMH Archives.

\(^{101}\) “Lü Fei huaqiao gongxian,” Vol. 1, 53, IMH Archives.
arrests to have taken place, he proceeded to denounce the Embassy for not taking the case seriously and supporting the detainees sufficiently, and thus for damaging the morale of the ROC’s 200,000 or so *huaqiao* compatriots in the Philippines.\(^{102}\) Antipathy in Taiwan towards the Embassy was so widespread even before then that in December 1953, Alexander Sycip’s law firm took the unusual step of writing to Foreign Minister George Yeh to defend how the Embassy had conducted itself.\(^{103}\)

Efforts by Chinese leaders and the ROC over the course of 1955 and 1956 to have the 99 *jinqiao* out on bail released entirely and 12 out of the 13 persons still in detention – excluding Koa Chian – released on bail proved unsuccessful. Magsaysay, Vice-President and Foreign Secretary Garcia, and Secretary of Justice Pedro Tuazon were amenable to this, but bureaucratic inertia and the military’s insistence that Chinese communism continued to pose a grave security threat to the country prevented any progress from being made; the July 1954 and November 1955 Cebu reading club arrests only seemed to confirm this. Precisely because of these fears, more successful during this period were attempts to institutionalize intelligence cooperation between the two states, a move that both sides welcomed. According to an agreement that they signed sometime in July, Embassy personnel with special training in intelligence would serve as consultants to MIS on the acquisition and evaluation of information on Chinese communists in the Philippines, after which the military reserved the right to act as it saw fit.\(^{104}\) For the ROC, this meant being able to interpose its own agents in the Philippine state’s information space. As a political gesture, it would hopefully come in useful in future bargaining over the *jinqiao*.

\(^{102}\) “Feilübin qiaoqing baogao,” KMT Archives.

\(^{103}\) “Lü Fei huaqiao gongxian,” Vol. 2, 10-14, IMH Archives.

\(^{104}\) “Fei pohuo huaqiao xuesheng feidie zuzhi,” Vol. 1, 176-177, IMH Archives.
In the fall of 1956, the Deportation Board finally delivered its verdict on the 13 *jinqiao*, recommending to Magsaysay that 11 of them be deported and two – Yu Dy and Li De-di 李德低 – released entirely. Following the President’s deportation order on December 26, attorneys for the remaining *jinqiao* appealed to Magsaysay and presented fresh evidence to the Board, asking it to re-try the case. 当 the Board rejected this request in May 1957, the ROC gave up trying to resolve the case through legal means and attempted instead a political bargain. In that same month, President Garcia – Magsaysay had died in a plane crash on March 17 – issued a deportation order for Lao Han Keng, Sy Yan Wan, Sy Bun Chiong, and Go Chi Kok, whose ideological guilt was not in question. In consultation with the *xiaozu*, the Embassy proposed that the four Cebu students together with Koa Chian be deported to Taiwan, in return for which Garcia would release the ten innocent *jinqiao* into the custody of the Embassy under the personal guarantee of the Ambassador, and on the condition that any or all of them would be produced within 48 hours if so required by the Philippine government. 当 Garcia was agreeable to this, and on July 26, Koa, Lao, Sy, Sy, and Go were deported to Taiwan. But this was not before the five of them threatened to commit suicide, using poison, knives, and metal rods that they had somehow obtained. Philippine police eventually used tear gas to subdue them and force them onto the ROC military aircraft that had been sent to return them to their “motherland.”

The ten still in detention would have to wait another year before being released. Domestic politics and bureaucratic obstacles again proved complicating factors. Presidential elections were

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set for the end of 1957. The release order that Garcia issued on September 6, a Friday, reached the Immigration Bureau after its working hours, allowing military officials to meet with him over the weekend and persuade him to delay the order. The opposition Liberal Party, it said, would try to use their release against him; other members of Garcia’s Nacionalista Party, including its chairman, Senator Eulogio Rodriguez, shared the same concerns. Garcia promised that he would free them after the election, regardless of its outcome, and as a sign of his good faith instructed that Dy Bon Un be allowed to seek hospital treatment for having fallen seriously ill during his confinement. Following Garcia’s reelection, the number of imprisoned jinqiao dwindled further as Chin Sang and Pan Sigu 潘四姑, through their lawyers, petitioned successfully to self-deport to Hong Kong. The President finally fulfilled his end of the bargain by ordering the last seven jinqiao released on bail on September 3, 1958. Despite legally not being fully free, they do not appear to have ever again gone before the Deportation Board.

Three years later, and only a few days before he stepped down as President, Garcia ordered the 99 respondents in Deportation Cases Nos. 488 and 489 freed on December 15 and 19, 1961 respectively, citing the inadequate evidence against them that Baby Zenaida and Felix Bonaobra had provided to the Board. The remaining 14 Cebu reading club / PCCP members who had been arrested in late November 1955 also met their fates then. While their objective involvement in a communist organization could not be denied, their youth, naivete, and vulnerability to propaganda rendered them sympathetic figures in the eyes of both the military and Chinese community leaders.

110 “Lü Fei huaqiao gongxian,” Vol. 4, 21, IMH Archives; Tang, Wo zai Shang Zong sanshinian, 82-83.
111 “Lü Fei huaqiao gongxian,” Vol. 4, 145-148, IMH Archives; a more detailed and firsthand account of how they were released can be found in Tang, Wo zai Shang Zong sanshinian, 83-85.
Both parties tried to persuade the students to confess and apologize for their crimes, and forswear communism. An English ex-communist, Douglas Hyde, even addressed them on the evils of the ideology.\textsuperscript{112} In 1960, the two states reached an agreement over how best to manage their situation: the Philippines would deport them, but in principle, allow them back into the country if Taiwan subjected them to *ganhua*.\textsuperscript{113} In December 1961, Garcia proceeded to order 12 of the 14 deported, excluding Uy Bee Siong and Go Siok King 吳淑瓊, only to modify his order further and free three additional persons, Ong Suy Tin 王瑞珍, Ong Suy Eng 王瑞英, and Ang Siok San. In releasing Go, Garcia said that she appeared to have joined the club out of a desire to be close to its leader, Lao Han Keng, whom she deeply loved, and not because of its ideology. She was therefore the “victim of an uncontrollable affection for a man.”\textsuperscript{114}

Koa Chian, Lao Han Keng, Sy Yan Wan, Sy Bun Chiong, and Go Chi Kok were sentenced differently in Taiwan. As mentioned, Go received *ganhua*, although how long he was subjected to it remains unclear, while Koa, Lao, Sy, and Sy had their preliminary sentences reduced within the space of six months, from September 1959 to March 1960. Some credit for this must go to their family and attorneys, who persisted in seeking compassionate treatment of them, this time by the ROC. Go’s mother, for example, wrote a heartfelt plea directly to Chiang Kai-shek himself, while Sy Bun Chiong father made a similar appeal through the ROC Embassy.\textsuperscript{115} Social status, personal connections, and ideological credentials could help amplify these appeals. Sy Yan Wan’s father,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{112} “Fei pohuo huaqiao xuesheng feidie zuzhi,” Vol. 2, 4-5, 005.8/0002, November 1958-March 1962, IMH Archives.
  \item \textsuperscript{113} “Fei pohuo huaqiao xuesheng feidie zuzhi,” Vol. 2, 42, IMH Archives.
  \item \textsuperscript{114} “Fei pohuo huaqiao xuesheng feidie zuzhi,” Vol. 2, 82-83, IMH Archives.
  \item \textsuperscript{115} “Lü Fei huaqiao gongxian,” Vol. 3, 228, IMH Archives; “Lü Fei buliang huaqiao,” Vol. 8, 168-169, AH.
\end{itemize}
arranged for his good friend, the lawyer and senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco, together with kinsman and ex-Chinese Chamber of Commerce President Sy En, to meet with Chen Chih-mai four days after his daughter’s deportation. Lao Han Keng’s father hoped that his involvement in the KMT and Chinese Anti-Communist League would help mitigate Lao’s sentence. As for Koa, who had no relatives to speak up for him, Alexander Sycip argued that he had not only been tortured into providing names to MIS, but had later openly confessed to falsifying his testimony. In fact, Chinese leaders believed that it was only with his help that the innocent jinqiao were freed. In its appeal to the Defense Ministry, upon whose judgement the case rested, the Embassy expressed its view that the death penalty for Lao and Koa would damage the ROC’s reputation among Chinese in the Philippines. A more lenient sentence might help the relatives of the accused and Chinese society feel “gratitude and respect” (gandai 感戴) towards the state and strengthen their “affection towards their motherland” (xiangwang zuguo zhi qing 嚮往祖國之情).

Conclusion

By focusing on the jinqiao an and Cebu reading club episodes that spanned the period from 1952 to 1961, this chapter has explained how the arrest, trial, and deportation of suspected Chinese communists in the Philippines was vulnerable to manipulation by and disinformation from nearly all those involved. MIS and its principal Chinese agent, Profiteza Que (aka Baby Zenaida), sought to incriminate the jinqiao by presenting the Deportation Board with inadequate and false evidence in the hopes of legitimizing themselves to Filipino politicians. Chinese Bureau member Koa Chian,


117 “Lü Fei buliang huaqiao,” Vol. 8, 176-177, AH.

118 “Lü Fei buliang huaqiao,” Vol. 8, 161-165, AH.
the solitary communist that MIS apprehended, proceeded to mislead his captors by providing them with incomplete names, or those of persons who had left the Philippines, already been exposed, or passed away; MIS was confounded, too, by Chinese naming practices and how Chinese identified themselves to the Philippine state. Lao Han Keng, Sy Bun Chiong, Go Chi Kok, and Sy Yan Wan, the four Cebu high school students who formed a communist reading club in the aftermath of the December 27, 1952 arrests, attempted to shift the blame to each other after they were detained in the hopes of reducing their sentences in Taiwan. Finally, ROC officials and local Chinese leaders worked behind the scenes by lobbying successive Philippine presidents to secure the release of the jinqiao. Nine years after their arrests, the last of the jinqiao still out on bail were finally exonerated.
Networking Ideology: Anticommunism and the Restructuring of Philippine-Chinese Society in the 1950s

On January 21, 1972, exactly a month before US President Richard Nixon visited the PRC, the sixth volume of *Youth World* (*Shijie qingnian* 世界青年) was published in the Philippines by the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry. In it was an assortment of essays, poems, short fiction, photographs, and illustrations, many explicitly ideological in nature, others implicitly so. Articles on international affairs updated readers on geopolitical developments. These included the translation of a speech that Anthony Kubek, an extreme right-wing US political scientist with ties to the pro-Chiang “China Lobby” and a former visiting professor in Taiwan, had delivered during his recent visit to the Philippines.¹ In it, the author of such McCarthyite polemics as *How the Far East was Lost: American Policy and the Creation of Communist China, 1941-1949* (1963) and *Communism at Pearl Harbor: How the Communists Helped to Bring on Pearl Harbor and Open Up Asia to Communization* (1959) warned that Red subversion posed a greater threat to the United States in 1972 than ever before because of, not despite, the PRC’s entry into the United Nations half a year earlier.

Complementing these analyses were pieces that transposed what the ROC and its advocates considered a global struggle against communism into personalized, localized, and sentimentalized registers. For example, an unnamed 60-year-old Jinjiang native who had managed to visit his ailing mother in China described the poverty, backwardness, and despair that had greeted him upon his bittersweet return to his hometown. It is unclear how far his narrative was genuine or embellished

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from generic tropes about mainland China in KMT propaganda. Still more concrete than this was an essay towards the end of the volume entitled “I Love the Republic of China” (Wo ai Zhonghua minguo 我愛中華民國). Its author, Cai Liyi 蔡麗意, was a student at one of the country’s premier Chinese schools, Chiang Kai-shek College (Zhongzheng xueyuan 中正學院, or CKSC; Chiang Kai-shek High School until 1965). The essay waxed lyrical about her love for Chinese history and bemoaned the communists’ role in dividing the Chinese nation into two. Despite being born in the Philippines, she declared that her “person, blood, bones, skin, and heart in particular” (wo de ren, wo de xue, wo de gutou, pifu, tebie shi wo de xin 我的人, 我的血, 我的骨頭、皮膚, 特別是我的心) forever belonged to the ROC, her ancestral land, or zuguo 祖國. In concluding, she confidently declared, repeating a standard KMT talking point, that the communists would soon be vanquished and that the ROC would imminently unite Chinese all around the world to reconquer the mainland.  

It is easy, in hindsight, to read these three pieces as embodying the ROC and its supporters’ futile, reactionary defiance of the international situation in the early 1970s. However, in the context of Philippine-Chinese society (perhaps even more so than Taiwanese society), the views that they expressed reflected the ideological mainstream as defined by the makers of Chinese civic opinion and would not be out of place in a school classroom, speech, or newspaper at virtually any moment from the 1950s to the mid-1970s. By comparison, Filipino society during this same period, despite the conservatism of its elites and the state, was a space for considerable ideological contention and much more receptive to leftist – even pro-PRC – perspectives. Collectively, these articles are also noteworthy for highlighting the connections between international and localized manifestations of anticommunism; they suggest that readers of Shijie qingnian were supposed to imagine themselves

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2 Shijie qingnian 世界青年, Vol. 6, January 21, 1972, Chinben See Memorial Library, Kaisa Heritage Center [KHC], Manila.
as part of a transnational ideological community and as participating in a struggle simultaneously personal, China-centric, and global. This and other editions of the magazine and publications like it reveal that while not every aspect of Chinese social and cultural life in the Philippines may have revolved around the reproduction and transmission of anticommunist ideas, the threads of ideology were woven into the fabric of civic affairs and cannot be disentangled from it.

How do we understand such outward ideological uniformity and how was it sustained over time and across different social fields? Earlier chapters have shown how the shutting down of left-wing publications such as the *Chinese Guide* in the immediate postwar years deprived the Chinese public of genuine ideological diversity. In a deeply anticommunist country that was grappling with its own communist threat, fears of both communist subversion and being identified as a communist or communist sympathizer, which in turn could result in harassment by the police and, worse still, arrest and deportation helped confine heterodox opinions to private spaces and verbal interactions. The *jingqiao an* and Cebu students’ affair made clear the consequences of even being suspected of ideological heterodoxy, and were exceptional cases that proved the rule. Anticommunism was thus a strategy of ideological accommodation, a means by which politically vulnerable ethnic minorities performed Philippine national values and cultivated useful relations with Filipinos. Most Chinese were, likely, anticommunist, but what mattered more than what they believed in was being seen as ideologically correct by persons and institutions of authority.

Building on earlier chapters, Chapter 4 argues for a structural and networked understanding of ideological uniformity within the Philippine-Chinese community from the mid-1950s onwards. The social foundations of anticommunism were already strong. Starting in 1954 with the formation of the Shang Zong, or Federation, commercial and cultural elites consolidated them in response to developments such as the *jingqiao an* and the Philippine government’s attempts to regulate Chinese
education and commerce. Community governance was henceforth concentrated in five institutions and in the hands of a small group of leaders that defined the community’s priorities. High among these priorities was the propagation of anticommunism, a potent centripetal force and worldview that Filipinos, local Chinese, and the ROC could identify with. Collectively, the Shang Zong; KMT; General Association of Chinese Schools (Feilübin huaqiao xuexiao lianhe zonghui 菲律賓華僑學校聯合總會, or Xiao Zong); Philippine-Chinese Anti-Communist League (Feilübin huaqiao fangong kang’e zonghui 菲律賓華僑反共抗俄總會, or PCACL); and Grand Family Association (Feilübin ge zongqin hui lianhehui 菲律賓各宗親會聯合會, or Zong Lian) – the “Big Five,” as they were known – overlapped in leadership, facilitated negotiations with the Philippine state and public relations with Filipino society, and enabled the rapid diffusion of anticommunist ideology and practices across social domains.

This chapter also shows that Philippine-Chinese anticommunists belonged to a network of institutions and actors that connected them to like-minded ideologues among Filipinos and in the ROC and other countries. If, as anthropologist Susan Bayly has suggested, Indian and Vietnamese intellectuals in the 1970s and 1980s were members of a “worldwide socialist ecumene” that was characterized by “a set of broadly inclusive moral, emotional, and even aesthetic dispositions,”3 then Chinese activists in the Philippines and the individuals and organizations that they were linked to participated in what we might describe as a transnational “anticommunist ecumene.” This space of interaction was highly institutionalized and networked and not limited to intellectuals. Rather, it united intellectuals, businessmen, students, military officials, and politicians under the banner of a global ideology and straddled the boundaries between state and society. Like Chinese nationalists

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in the first half of the 20th century, who deployed what Prasenjit Duara has called “wider narratives of historical community, based on common race, language, or culture” to encourage an “affective identification” with the Chinese nation, pro-ROC ideologues in the Philippines after 1949 sought to encourage the “right” dispositions among local Chinese and mobilize them in support of “China” by situating the national struggle against communism within a wider ideological landscape.¹

In what follows, I first explain how developments within and beyond the Philippines such as the jinqiao an, Filipinization, and anticommunist regionalism contributed to the establishment of the Federation, Xiao Zong, and PCACL from 1954 to 1957 and strengthened Chinese society’s commitment to and capacity to propagate anticommunism. Partly by focusing on CKSHS, this first half of the chapter also explores how Chinese education served as a social and cultural foundation for the anticommunist movement and linked Chinese in the Philippines to Taiwan. The second half of the chapter then turns to the expansion and activities of the PCACL in the mid-late 1950s as a way of showing how anticommunist networks functioned to infuse Chinese civic life with ideology.

Restructuring community governance: the Shang Zong

The events of December 27, 1952 and their long, drawn-out aftermath can be seen as part of a series of uncoordinated efforts by the postwar Philippine state to exercise greater sovereignty over its Chinese population and align it more closely with Filipino national interests. In the 1950s, interventions into trade and commerce, education, and individual security helped effect a top-down restructuring of Chinese society, beginning in 1954 with the displacement of the General Chamber of Commerce from its position of leadership. Anticommunism was integral to social reorganization.

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Whereas linguistic and physiognomic differences, separate school systems, de jure differences in nationality, and internalized prejudices on both sides made ethno-cultural divisions between them difficult to bridge, ideology served as a common ground for Chinese and Filipinos, elites and non-elites. Anticommunism united individual nationalities, but unlike communism did not presume to render nationality irrelevant. To an extent, it also helped mitigate factional tensions within Chinese society that social restructuring reproduced and exacerbated. For such reasons, anticommunism, a ubiquitous component of Chinese public life in the Philippines since the end of World War II, was amplified and institutionalized to a much greater degree than before from the mid-1950s onwards.

The impact of Filipinization was most acutely felt in trade and commerce, which Filipino nationalists long believed the Chinese dominated. As Chapter 1 has shown, attempts to pass anti-Chinese economic and social legislation were made at the first postwar special session of Congress in mid-1945. The failure of H. B. No. 355 in October 1945 at the hands of President Osmeña only emboldened the nationalization lobby, whose efforts intensified in the years that followed. Similar bills – seven individual bills and one that consolidated four of them – were introduced during the first sessions of the First (1946-1949) and Second Congresses (1950-1953). None were passed, but following Ramon Magsaysay’s election and the Nacionalista Party’s overwhelming victory in the presidential and legislative elections of 1953, the political climate shifted decisively in favor of nationalization. Unlike his lawyerly predecessors, two of whom had vetoed nationalization bills out of concern for their international ramifications and constitutionality, Magsaysay was inclined towards populism and far less concerned about legal subtleties. In the first half of 1954, during the first session of the Third Congress (1954-1957), congressmen and senators capitalized on the new

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president’s receptiveness towards nationalization and introduced a total of 47 bills targeting “alien”
control of economic and social sectors and covering everything from the retail trade to universities
to duck rearing. With Magsaysay’s support, and despite concerted opposition from Chinese leaders
and the ROC, one such bill was eventually signed into law on June 19, 1954 as Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 1180. The Retail Trade Nationalization Act, as it became known as, effectively provided that
existing alien retailers would be permitted to continue business until their deaths, but corporations
involved in retailing that were not 100 percent owned by Filipinos were to close down in a decade.
Legal efforts by the newly-formed Federation to have the Act overturned failed when the Supreme
Court upheld it in its May 31, 1957 verdict on the case of Lao H. Ichong, et al. vs. Jaime Hernandez,
et. al. Further restrictions on foreign economic activity followed under the “Filipino First” policy
of Magsaysay’s successor, Carlos Garcia, much to the dismay of the Chinese community.

The Shang Zong, founded on March 29, 1954, was born of and into an atmosphere of crisis
in Chinese society that the jinqiao an and the unrelenting stream of nationalization bills since 1945
had created. The Federation’s official history and memoirs of Tang Tack 鄧英達, the Zamboanga
Chinese Chamber of Commerce President and a founding member and first Secretary of the Shang
Zong, rationalize the movement towards federation from the late 1940s onwards as an attempt to
establish an integrated leadership structure for Chinese society that would safeguard the interests
of trade and commercial associations across the country more effectively than the Manila-centered

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6 Agpalo, *The Political Process and the Nationalization of the Retail Trade in the Philippines*, 93-133. The text of
R.A. No. 1180 can be found at [http://www.chanrobles.com/republicacts/republicactno1180.html](http://www.chanrobles.com/republicacts/republicactno1180.html). It was only
repealed in 2000 with the passing of R.A. No. 8762, the Retail Trade Liberalization Law.

7 Theresa Chong Carino, *Chinese Big Business in the Philippines: Political Leadership and Change* (Singapore:
Times Academic Press, 1998), 33; Agpalo, *The Political Process and the Nationalization of the Retail Trade in the
Philippines*, 224-255. The Supreme Court’s verdict on *Lao H. Ichong, et al. vs. Jaime Hernandez, et. al.* can be read
Chapter 4

General Chamber did. The absence of such a body to promote the unity of all Chinese in the islands, in Tang’s view, had reduced Chinese society in the aftermath of the 1952 mass arrests to what he called, using Sun Yat-sen’s well-worn expression, a “sheet of loose sand” (yi pan sansha 一盤散沙). At meetings of Chinese chamber of commerce representatives from across the Philippines in October 1947, January 1951, and November 1952 in Manila, proposals to establish such an entity failed to gain traction because of opposition from the General Chamber’s leaders.8 The Chamber’s own account, published after the establishment of the Shang Zong, explained that while proposals to form a pan-Philippine governing organization for all Chinese had merits, some businessmen opposed them because, first, the Chinese population was too dispersed to be governed by a single, top-down body and was better represented by local institutions; second, civic organizations ought not to be structured like government agencies; and third, having members of this organization meet regularly in Manila would inconvenience them.9

In early-mid-1953, following the jinqiao an and before the Third Congress, dissenters from within the Chamber renewed their push for a unified, inclusive governing body, beginning with a speech by the President of the Manila Chinese General Store Association Wang Guolai 王國來 on March 19 to its newly-elected board members. In the months that followed, a secretive campaign comprising figures from various Chinese trade and commercial organizations in Manila gathered strength, with the youthful and charismatic President of the Sugar and Rice Association (and future

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Shang Zong President) Antonio Roxas Chua 蔡文華 emerging as an early leader of this movement. Roxas Chua and others decided that they needed the support of respected and influential Chamber members to, as Tang Tack put it, “begin the uprising” (jie gan er qi 揭竿而起).\(^\text{10}\) The three senior leaders they turned to were Yu Khe Thai, Peter Lim, and Yao Shiong Shio: Yu was Chairman of the Chinese Welfare Association and an adviser to the Chamber; Lim was on its board of directors; and Yao was its Vice-President.\(^\text{11}\)

Roxas Chua, Yu, Lim, and Yao proceeded to hold discussions with both General Chamber President Sy En and ROC Ambassador Chen Chih-ping about expanding the Chamber to include all Chinese trade and commercial organizations in the Philippines, rather than only chambers of commerce. Neither Sy nor Chen proved receptive to their proposal: Chen in fact counter-proposed the establishment of a sole governing body that included not only chambers of commerce, but also the Chinese Welfare Association, Cantonese Association, KMT, and Anti-Communist Movement. To circumvent these obstacles, the pro-federation group leaked information on its meetings with Sy and Chen to the Great China Press and Kong Li Po, the two KMT newspapers. Public opinion and growing calls from Chinese businessmen in support of the movement had their desired effect of forcing Chen to shift his stance and Sy to agree, at least verbally, to back the new organization. Subsequent discussions between the pro-federation movement and the Chamber, however, suggest that the Chamber hoped to govern the new grouping rather than be reduced to one among the many hundreds of Chinese associations that the federation hoped to represent. The split between the two factions was eventually resolved by popular referendum at a three-day meeting of representatives

\(^{10}\) Tang, Wo zai Shang Zong sanshinian, 9.

\(^{11}\) Philippine Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, Golden Book 1955, Chinese section, Jia (9).
from Chinese trade and commercial organizations across the country from March 26-29 in Manila. A last-ditch attempt by the Chamber to have its 16 directors automatically installed on the board of the Federation was thwarted. Elections for the board showed the Chamber’s loss of reputation, with Yu, Lim, Yao, and Roxas Chua garnering the most votes, in that order, and Sy coming in only fifth – enough to secure a place on the board alongside a few other Chamber loyalists.\footnote{Tang, \textit{Wo zai Shang Zong sanshinian}, 4; Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry, \textit{The Philippine Chinese Decennial Book 1954-1974} [\textit{Shang Zong ershi nian: Feihua shanglian zonghui chengli ershi zhounian jinian tekan} 商總二十年: 菲華商聯總會成立二十週年紀念特刊] (Manila, 1974), Chinese section, 90-94.} Yet despite this conciliatory gesture, the Chamber refused to join the Shang Zong until 1968, by which point Sy had passed away. In 1991, the Chamber quit the Shang Zong.\footnote{Carino, \textit{Chinese Big Business in the Philippines}, 79-82.} It remains separate from and in the shadow of the Federation today.

Official and semi-official narratives of the Federation depict its formation as a principled, forward-looking, and popular response to the elitism, insularity, and inadequacies of the General Chamber. Other accounts, including those of contemporary scholars of the Shang Zong, are more attentive to power dynamics. In Chen Chih-ping’s analysis, for example, Yu Khe Thai, Peter Lim, Yao Shiong Shio, and Antonio Roxas Chua belonged to what he called the “party – that is to say, KMT – faction in opposition to Sy En, Alfonso Sycip, Dy Huan Chay, and Chamber loyalists. For Chen, the formation of the Federation represented the culmination of a long-running feud between the Chamber and KMT for control over the Chinese community. In other words, as Sy exclaimed angrily after coming in only fifth in the board elections, the Shang Zong was a KMT organ.\footnote{“Huashang zonghui 華商總會,” Vol. 1, 180, 062.2/0001, October 1953-October 1954, Institute of Modern History [IMH] Archives, Academia Sinica, Taipei.} Two
historians of the Federation make this very argument, although neither appears to have read Chen’s report. With both the ROC Foreign Ministry archives and the KMT Archives themselves featuring little of the KMT point of view, the degree to which the party exerted influence over proceedings may never be known. What is clear is that the party supported the formation of the Federation, and that this signaled a renewed commitment on the part of Chinese business elites to anticommunism and Nationalist China. On March 28 and 29, the Great China Press, run by former KMT Secretary-General Koa Chun-te, ran articles praising President Magsaysay’s speech at the opening ceremony of the Shang Zong. Addressing an audience of businessmen and traders, Magsaysay said very little about economic affairs and focused on exhorting the community to do more to oppose communism. “You cannot combat this menace by wishing that it will disappear, by merely standing with folded arms and hoping it will never disturb you. You can defeat it only by constant vigilance and action,” he declared; “your duty is to unite in the struggle against Communism regardless of the differences that may divide you in other matters…In a community as large as yours, there are bound to be a few who spoil the reputation of the many. Clean your own house of these undesirable elements and you will achieve stronger unity with your Filipino neighbors.” In fewer than 800 words, the President made it clear to Chinese leaders and ROC officials in attendance what his administration expected of them, in view of the ongoing trials of the jinqiao – presumably the “few who spoil the reputation of the many.” In describing anticommunism as a unifying force within the community

15 Carino, Chinese Big Business in the Philippines, 23-28; Zhu Dongqin 朱东芹, Chongtu yu ronghe: Feihua shanglian zonghui yu zhanhou Feihua shehui de fazhan 冲突与融合: 菲华商联总会与战后菲华社会的发展 (Xiamen: Xiamen daxue chubanshe, 2005), 48-49.

and between Chinese and Filipinos, Magsaysay even provided Chinese leaders with a ready-made justification for intensifying their ideological activism. His speech came as no surprise to the Shang Zong’s leaders, as ROC Embassy Counsellor Chow Shu-kai 周書楷 had met them and US officials beforehand to prepare several talking points for the President. Magsaysay elected to use only the first, on anticomunism.  

The *Great China Press* concurred with Magsaysay’s thinly-veiled criticism of the Chinese community. So-called Philippine-Chinese leaders, it said on March 28, enjoyed boasting that they were the foremost anticommmunists in Southeast Asia, but this claim deceived both themselves and others. Its editorial on March 29 went further. The speech was a warning, it said; failure to heed it would result in dire consequences for the community. Responsibility for the lack of an active and united Chinese anticommmunist movement in the Philippines lay primarily with the ROC Embassy, which had provided ineffectual leadership by not heeding calls to reform the existing Philippine-Chinese United Organization in Support of Anti-Communist Movement. That these reforms took place within the next two years under the leadership of the Federation suggests not only that KMT influenced the Federation, but that the two organizations shared ideological goals.

While the KMT certainly supported the Shang Zong in the hopes of revitalizing the Chinese Anti-Communist Movement, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that the party was the prime mover behind the Federation or that the Federation was a party organ. The very distinction between “party” and “Chamber” factions that Chen Chih-ping makes is problematic. Sy, for example, was a Standing Committee member of the KMT zongzhibu in 1953, together with Yao, Chua Lamco,

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17 “Huashang zonghui,” Vol. 1, 185-189, IMH Archives.

Gonzalo Gawhok, and Dee Haw Gim 李孝錦, but neither Gawhok nor Dee was on the Federation’s first board of directors.\(^{19}\) Moreover, as their biographies in the 1953 *Philippine-Chinese Business Guide & Pictorial Directory* show, Yu and Lim were not members of the KMT.\(^{20}\) Scholars have explained that Sy did not belong to the “party” faction because he was indifferent to its affairs and involvement in the Chamber; conversely, Yu, despite not being a party member, was supported by the party because he was a strong and respected leader.\(^{21}\) Be that as it may, the official narrative of the founding of the Shang Zong begins not with the so-called “party faction” (which is never referred to as such) but with frustration among less prominent Chinese businessmen such as Wang Guolai over the inadequacies of the Chamber; Yu, Lim, Yao, and Roxas Chua only come on board the movement after it had begun. Finally, to the extent that the secretive KMT headquarters made itself visible to the public and to Taipei, there is no evidence of animosity towards the Chamber – only, as the *Great China Press* articles suggest, the Embassy. In its report to the Seventh National Party Congress in Taiwan in October 1952, the zongzhibu even described KMT members in the Chamber as “our party’s most outstanding and ready-made citizen diplomats” (*bendang zui youxiu er xiancheng zhi guomin waijiao rencai 本黨最優秀而現成之國民外交人才*).\(^{22}\) The Federation,

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in short, was not a KMT organization, as Pao Shih-tien 鮑事天, a party member and the longtime Principal of CKSC put it in 1993; the party only backed it.23

**Chinese education, anticommunism, and Filipinization**

Filipinization, like manifestations of anti-Chinese nationalism elsewhere in Southeast Asia in the 1950s and 1960s, made itself felt just as much in education as in commercial affairs. Unlike the drawn-out and ultimately successful campaign to curb Chinese involvement in the retail trade, however, state intervention in the Chinese cultural sphere took place rapidly, but with little success. Underpinned by longstanding Filipino concerns over the foreignness and supposed unassimilable nature of the Chinese population, it was triggered by fears of communism that the *jingqiao an* and arrests of Sy Yan Wan, Sy Bun Chiong, and Lao Han Keng in July 1954 had stoked. In early 1955, responding to a report by the Committee on Un-Filipino Activities alleging communist infiltration of Chinese schools, the Board of National Education created a committee, chaired by Director of Private Schools Jesus Perpiñan, to investigate the Chinese school system and recommend a course of action.24

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23 Chang Tsun-wu 張存武, Chu Hong-yuan 朱浤源, Dory Poa 潘露莉, and Lin Shu-hui 林淑慧 (ed.), *The Reminiscences of the Chinese in the Philippines* 菲律賓華僑華人訪問記錄 (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1996), 200. My analysis of the Shang Zong’s relationship to the KMT most resembles Chang and Ong, *Feihua shanglian zonghui zhi xingshuai yu yanbian*, 47-49. But while the authors suggest that the clash between the Roxas Chua, Yu, Yao, and Lim faction and the Sy faction was solely a power struggle for control over the community and had little to do with the KMT and ideological bent of the General Chamber, I argue that the party supported the Shang Zong, while the subsequent intensification of anticommunism in Chinese society implied dissatisfaction with the ideological status quo.

On August 16, Perpiñan’s committee issued its report, which affirmed the need for greater government control of the Philippines’ estimated 160 or so Chinese private schools, only a handful of which had registered with the Department of Education. These schools were unique in Southeast Asia for being dual-language institutions whose students usually sat for classes in Chinese in the morning and in English in the afternoon, with the Chinese curriculum set by Nationalist China and the English curriculum by the Bureau of Private Schools. The “Perpiñan Report” described the former, not inaccurately, as a “separate and complete system of education aimed at the training of the students for good Chinese citizenship” and whose every aspect – from programs of instruction to course materials to teacher qualifications – was supervised by the ROC. With recent intelligence reports “tending to show the danger of subversive influences infiltrating these courses,” Philippine supervision of them was a necessity. The committee was adamant, furthermore, that the Chinese curriculum came under the jurisdiction of the Philippine state, for while the 1947 Treaty of Amity had guaranteed Chinese nationals the right to establish schools for their children, it also subjected the exercise of this right to Philippine law. Specifically, the committee cited Article XIV, Section 5 of the Philippine constitution, which placed all educational institutions under the supervision of the state, and Commonwealth Act No. 180 (1936), which made it punishable by law to operate a private school or college without prior approval from the authorities. For the committee, in other words, it was not a question of whether the state had sovereignty over Chinese-language education, but how to persuade Chinese schools to recognize this sovereignty, and then to exercise it. Beyond

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the Department of Education, there were even some government officials, such as the Immigration Commissioner, who called for all Chinese schools in the country to be shut down.\textsuperscript{28}

Led by Pao Shih-tien, Chinese educators and the ROC reacted swiftly to the report and to the possibility that Chinese schools in the Philippines would soon be closed down. Time and again, in both English and Chinese, Pao maintained that Chinese schools were no obstacle to assimilation. To the contrary, he believed that by admitting Filipinos “without any discrimination or hesitation,” promoting interactions between Chinese and Filipino students and teachers, and teaching Filipino and Chinese history and culture, these schools facilitated interracial understanding and hastened assimilation.\textsuperscript{29} As for the belief that they fostered divided loyalties among their Chinese students, Pao noted that these students were citizens of the ROC and permanent residents of the Philippines by law, and that naturalization was a difficult and expensive procedure. Therefore, schools should not be blamed for “simply doing what they should do” and preparing students to be “good citizens of China” – on top, of course, of teaching subjects that had been prescribed by the Department of Education such as Philippine History and Government and Philippine Social Life. Referring to the Treaty of Amity and earlier legislation, Pao argued that there was no basis in law to abolish Chinese schools and that doing so would amount to confiscating private property without just compensation and thus a violation of the constitution.\textsuperscript{30} A final argument that he and others advanced to justify the continuation of Chinese schools was that they were bastions of anticommunism and that their (Chinese) students were utterly loyal to Nationalist China. There was “absolutely no possibility of

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item Jiang, \textit{Zhanhou Feilübin huawen jiaoyu yanjiu} (1945-1976), 146.
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red infiltration into these schools,” which were “the vanguards of the anti-Communist movement,” he would say on multiple occasions, dismissing the Cebu reading club arrests and other evidence to the contrary as isolated incidents.31

Following Perpiñán’s report, discussions commenced between the two states and Chinese educators on how to address the concerns over sovereignty and security that it raised. In December, a memorandum of understanding between Vice-President Garcia and the new ROC Ambassador laid out the terms of cooperation between both sides going forward. All Chinese schools operating in the Philippines that had not been registered, as well as any schools that were to be established, had to be registered with the Bureau of Private Schools. Furthermore, while they had the freedom to teach any subjects that were required by the ROC, in accordance with the Treaty of Amity, they also had to meet minimum curricular standards required of Philippine public and private schools. To ensure this, a joint technical committee was formed to draw up a new curriculum for all Chinese schools. This went into effect in the 1956-57 school year and did away with separate Chinese and English departments, integrating Chinese and English subjects into a single program of study.32

As state interventions in Chinese education in Southeast Asia went, this was far from being radical and disruptive. While Pao and ROC officials believed that the revised curriculum allocated too many hours per week to classes in English, relative to those in Chinese,33 they emerged from discussions with the Department of Education relieved and feeling that, in Pao’s words, “the rain

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31 Pao, “Chinese Schools in the Philippines,” 186; Pao, Yang hao ji, 55.
33 The Department of Education required that Chinese primary school students sit for 1,100-1,175 minutes of classes in English and 800-870 minutes of classes in Chinese, and secondary school students 1,200-1,400 minutes of English classes and 900-1,000 minutes of Chinese classes, per week. Jiang, Zhanhou Feilübin huawen jiaoyu yanjiu (1945-1976), 196.
had passed and the sky was clear” (*yuguo tianqing* 雨過天晴). Still, fears remained that the state, having succeeded at nationalizing the retail trade, would encroach further on Chinese education in the future. Developments elsewhere in Southeast Asia portended more extreme measures. Thailand, for example, had closed all Chinese secondary schools after 1948 and limited Chinese education to the primary level only. South Vietnam, another ally of the ROC, followed up on its August 1956 requirement that all Chinese in Vietnam obtain Vietnamese citizenship by mandating that Chinese schools adopt Vietnamese as the sole language of instruction, employ Vietnamese principals, and place Vietnamese teachers in positions of responsibility. While these measures proved unworkable in the long-term, their immediate impact was Vietnamese-Chinese leaders’ decision to shut down all Chinese schools for six months. These events could not escape the attention of ROC officials and Chinese in the Philippines; CKSHS students even started a campaign to raise awareness of the plight of the Vietnamese Chinese and collect donations to help them relocate to Taiwan.

Similar to what Chinese businessmen had done in 1954, Chinese educators worked swiftly to federate themselves in response to Filipinization and present a common front to the Philippine authorities. On April 15, 1957, 131 Chinese principals or school representatives from ten regions and 54 provinces or cities gathered at the Nationalist Chinese Embassy for a four-day conference, which Pao chaired. Its outcome was the formation of the General Association of Chinese Schools, or Xiao Zong, which joined the KMT, Federation, and PCACL as the fourth Chinese organization.

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34 Pao, *Yang hao ji*, 61.


36 *Zhongzheng xuesheng* 中正學生, Vol. 66, October 1957, Chinese section, 36, KHC.

37 Pao, *Yang hao ji*, 61.
to span the Philippines, and whose constitution was drafted by the Embassy.  

The joint declaration issued by the attendees signaled the organization’s priorities. The Chinese nation – the declaration used *minzu* 民族 here to reflect a deterritorialized conception of this community – was under attack by “Red imperialism” (*chise diguo zhuyi* 赤色帝國主義). It thus fell upon educators to unite and train the next generation of youths to fight for the recovery and restoration of their homeland. Only after this ritualized gesture towards the ideological status quo did the declaration turn towards the history of Chinese education in the Philippines. In a revealingly chauvinistic expression, it stated that had Chinese schools not existed, *huaqiao* youth in the country would have long since become “barbarians” (*yi* 夷).  

**Chinese education and the foundations and propagation of anticommunism**

As this declaration implies, Philippine Department of Education officials were quite correct in believing that Chinese schools were largely a force for malintegration. In his 1973 study of the Chinese community, American social scientist Gerald McBeath concluded that the school system represented “the last stand of Chinese communalism,” a view shared by supporters of integration such as the Chinese-Filipino activist Teresita Ang See and Jesuit priest Charles J. McCarthy, both of whom were active in the movement for *jus soli* citizenship in the early 1970s. Ang See, whose siblings all attended either the Anglo-Chinese School or CKSC, has described these institutions as “bastions of ultraconservatism and ethnocentrism.”  

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39 *Feilübin huaqiao xuexiao diyi ci daibiao dahui zhukan* 菲律賓華僑學校第一次代表大會專刊, April 12, 1957, 1, National Central Library [NCL], Taipei.

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outspoken criticism of the school system was from the Chinese Commercial News, which had long supported Chinese integration into Filipino society. From August 31 to October 19, 1958, the CCN published an eight-part series of articles on “The Bankruptcy of Chauvinistic Education” (Pochan de shawen zhuyi de jiaoyu 破產的沙文主義的教育), which attacked Chinese schools’ inattention to English instruction and dogmatic adherence to an outmoded form of nationalist education, and called for a complete overhaul of the system to meet the needs of a rapidly-changing society.\textsuperscript{41} (As we will see in Chapter 6, publishing such articles would lead to adverse consequences for the CCN.) It is easy to find in Chinese-language texts not meant for Filipino consumption ample evidence of the chauvinism that these advocates of ethno-cultural integration were alluding to. For example, in a 1958 book on Chinese education in the Philippines, the Principal of Cebu Eastern High School, Chen Lieh-fu, described overseas Chinese and Southeast Asians as completely different from each other owing to differences in climate. Efforts by Southeast Asian states to assimilate their Chinese populations would not succeed because China possessed a “more advanced and mature” (jiao gao jiao chengshu 較高較成熟) civilization that had successfully Sinicized the Manchus despite their superior military strength.\textsuperscript{42}

Why, then, did the Filipinization of Chinese schools in 1956 leave their Chinese-language curriculum essentially untouched? One reason was that, as Perpiñan admitted, the Department of Education lacked the funds to hire Chinese-speaking employees and thus had no actual means of

\textsuperscript{41} The articles are summarized in McBeath, \textit{Political Integration of the Philippine Chinese}, 100-103.

\textsuperscript{42} Chen Lieh-fu, \textit{Feilübin huaqiao jiaoyu} 菲律賓華僑教育 (Taipei: Haiwai chubanshe, 1958), 1, 4-5.
supervising the Chinese-language curriculum, let alone design a new one.\textsuperscript{43} This limitation typified the Philippines’ partial and contested sovereignty over Chinese society. Another reason was that, as political scientist Robert Tilman has argued, Philippine politicians by and large did not believe that assimilating local Chinese was possible and emphasized anticommunism over assimilation. In their view, “the one way to make certain that the Chinese schools are anti-communist is to permit the Nationalist government to oversee them,” even if this entailed perpetuating cultural differences between Chinese and Filipinos.\textsuperscript{44}

Tilman implies here that Philippine officialdom regarded Chinese schools as ethnically and culturally malintegrative for the same reason that it saw them as a bulwark against leftist influence: ROC control over them. This is broadly accurate. While only a minority of schools such as Chiang Kai-shek and Cebu Eastern were led by principals who were strongly supported by or members of the KMT, the zongzhibu (and after 1956, the PCACL and Xiao Zong) played an instrumental role in vetting the large majority of Chinese-language teachers for approval by the ROC Embassy; the party was even responsible for hiring at sectarian schools run by Catholic, Protestant, and Buddhist missions. In the absence of a sufficient number of qualified Chinese teachers in the country, some schools even employed teachers from Taiwan. Such practices ensured that teachers were politically innocuous at worst or KMT hardliners at best.\textsuperscript{45}

Moreover, in the Philippines and most of Southeast Asia at the time, Chinese schools made use of textbooks that originated from Taiwan and were issued by government-operated publishers.


\textsuperscript{44} Robert O. Tilman, “Philippine Chinese Students,” unpublished mss., Chapter 4, 4-5, KHC.

\textsuperscript{45} McBeath, Political Integration of the Philippine Chinese, 86-88, 99-100; Jiang, Zhanhou Feilübin huawen jiaoyu yanjiu (1945-1976), 77.
such as the Cheng Chung Book Company (Zhengzhong shuju 正中書局) for primary school texts and the World Book Company (Shijie shuju 世界書局) for secondary school texts.\textsuperscript{46} Taiwan also supplied teachers with instructional materials through book series such as “Textbooks for Nanyang Chinese Schools” (Nanyang huaqiao xueiao jiaokeshu 南洋華僑教科書) and “Overseas Series” (Haiwai wenku 海外文庫), the latter of which included Chen Lieh-fu’s 1957 book Philippines and China (Feilübin yu Zhongguo 菲律賓與中國).\textsuperscript{47} Such works were ideological, but not in the same way that Cai Liyi’s essay “I Love the Republic of China” and anticommunist polemics by the likes of Anthony Kubek were. Tilman’s analysis of student textbooks found that they tended to present factual material in a straightforward and didactic manner and contained little overt political content. Instead, they indirectly supported the Nationalist cause. Textbooks for Civics (Gongmin 公民), for example, reminded students to greet their parents in the morning and evening, bow to show respect to their elders, be punctual, and cover their mouths when yawning. Letter-writing exercises, which consumed a large proportion of students’ curricular time, reinforced these injunctions by exposing students to model letters between children and their parents and teachers featuring exhortations to embrace thrift, industriousness, filial piety, and other traditional “Chinese” virtues.\textsuperscript{48}

Moral traditionalism and proper personal conduct had been staple features of KMT-issued textbooks since the Nanjing Decade and especially since the New Life Movement that Chiang Kai-shek launched in February 1934, eight months before the end of the KMT’s campaign against the

\textsuperscript{46} Tilman, “Philippine Chinese Students,” Chapter 4, 19-20; Philippine Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, \textit{Golden Book 1955}, English section, 89-90.


\textsuperscript{48} Tilman, “Philippine Chinese Students,” Chapter 4, 23-25.
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Jiangxi Soviet. KMT ideologues recognized then, as they did after 1949, that the struggle against communism was also a struggle over how Chinese society should be organized and thus over what it meant to be Chinese. For the KMT, which had evolved into a counterrevolutionary party by the 1930s, this entailed weaponizing “tradition” to regenerate the national essence and distinguish its vision of China from the CCP’s. If communism targeted feudalism, the bourgeoisie, landlords, and other aspects of the old society for elimination, the KMT would seek to impart moral and ethical values appropriate to the preservation of social order. It believed (not unlike its Qing predecessors) that hierarchical interpersonal relations and respect for parents, elders, and teachers would translate into an acceptance of established political authority: the “rightful” government of China, but also, depending on circumstance, the governments of countries where Chinese people happened to live. Civics lessons and letter-writing exercises, in this spirit, were supposed to inoculate Chinese youth against the germs of radical leftism.

Chinese schools in the Philippines were thus at the very least non-communist institutions by virtue of the teachers and textbooks that they employed, the close ties to the KMT and the ROC that these personnel and teaching materials embodied, and the political environment in which they operated. KMT-run schools went even further than this by mobilizing students and teachers against communism and strengthening their ties with Nationalist China.

For a glimpse into how schools propagated anticommunism and were linked to Taiwan, let us first turn to CKSHS in October 1957, just after the establishment of the Xiao Zong; later sections of the chapter will examine the PCACL’s role in this. Chiang Kai-shek’s latest book, Soviet Russia

in China had been published earlier in the year. It argued that a Nationalist counterattack against the Chinese mainland was the key to stopping the Soviet drive for world domination. All that was required from the West was moral and some material support, but not any military support. Instead, Nationalist troops and anticommunist Asian peoples would spearhead the offensive, joining forces with the Chinese masses once a beachhead had been established on the mainland. In the Philippines, the Xiao Zong purchased copies for all Chinese schools, and at CKSHS, one of only two schools outside Taiwan to be named after Chiang (the other being Chung Cheng High School in Singapore), the book became something of a canonical text for students and teachers. Multiple volumes were put on display in the school library for borrowing; every teacher received a copy and was asked to read it and encourage students to do so. History and Civics teachers were told to incorporate it as supplementary material into their lessons, while Chinese Literature teachers were to assign it as an extracurricular reading for the semester and have students write book reports on it. Lastly, students would be divided into groups and participate in a competition to test one’s knowledge of the text. Should they wish, they could also take part in a community-wide essay contest on the book, jointly organized by the PCACL, KMT, and Xiao Zong.

The October 1957 edition of the CKSHS Student Journal (Zhongzheng xuesheng 中正學生), which reported on these efforts to promote Chiang’s book, provides considerable evidence of the school’s special, multifaceted relationship with Taiwan. One news item noted that the Overseas

52 Zhongzheng xuesheng, Vol. 66, Chinese section, 33, KHC; Anti-Communist Movement, Chapter IX, ISEAS Library.
Chinese Affairs Commission had approved changes to the board of directors’ constitution. Another reported that students and teachers were responding enthusiastically to fundraising campaigns and donation drives such as the Generalissimo’s appeal for a “cultural counterattack” (wenhua fangong 文化反攻) against China and the KMT zongzhibu’s call for donations of books, which would be airdropped onto the mainland. The magazine also listed the names of 36 recent graduates who were going on to pursue university degrees in Taiwan. One of these graduates, Zheng Tingting 鄭婷婷, would even be attending National Taiwan Normal University to study History and Literature with financial support from her alma mater. Zheng had topped an examination to select the recipient of this scholarship, which stipulated that she would return to teach at CKSHS after graduating from university. The school planned to continue with this scheme to improve the quality of its teachers and incorporate alumni into its staff.\(^5\)

The Journal also published student essays to reward with a place in the spotlight what the school considered well-written and ideologically correct prose. One of the essays that stood out in this issue was “My recollections of studying at a school in the mainland bandit province” (Wo zai dalu feiqu xuexiao dushu de huiyi 我在大陸匪區學校讀書的回憶), by a first-year junior middle school student, Wu Shengmin 吳聖敏. As becomes quickly apparent from reading this essay, Wu almost certainly did not ever attend school in China, as we are not told where the school was, its name, or when, how long, and at what level he studied there. Nor do we ever learn how he managed at such a young age to leave the PRC for the Philippines. Such details mattered little. Although we do not know the circumstances in which this essay was written, it was likely an in-class assignment, the point of which was to have students reproduce propagandistic stereotypes about the horrors of

\(^{53}\) Zhongzheng xuesheng, Vol. 66, Chinese section, 33-35, KHC.
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student life under communist rule. CKSHS students were bombarded with such stereotypes in the classroom and beyond on a constant basis, and may have absorbed them by reading tracts such as *A True Account of How the Communist Bandits have Brought Disaster upon the Overseas Chinese* (*Gongfei huoqiao shilu* 共匪禍僑實錄) and *How the Chinese Communists Treat Overseas Chinese Students* (*Zhonggong zenyang duidai qiaosheng* 中共怎樣對待僑生), published in 1955 and 1956 respectively and likely available in the school library.\(^54\) For example, his essay made sure to refer to the “Zhu-Mao bandit gang” (*Zhu-Mao feibang* 朱毛匪幫) that ruled China. He described being forced to learn Russian, read works on agricultural production, and participate in a Young Pioneers’ team that had its members praise the CCP at every opportunity; after falling sick for two months, he said that he returned to school only to be criticized by his peers for being lazy. This drove him to flee the mainland for the “path of freedom” (*ziyou de daolu* 自由的道路), which he was able to do because of the sacrifices of his paternal aunt. In short, while this essay, like Cai Liyi’s, may not have signaled any intrinsic commitment to anticommunism, it exemplified how the language and assumptions of this ideology circulated through Chinese schools and entered into daily usage.\(^55\)

**Transnational anticommunism and the founding of the PCACL**

Neither the Shang Zong nor Chinese schools existed only to promote anticommunism. The commercial and intellectual constituencies that they represented, however, acknowledged the need for Chinese society to do so as a way of legitimizing itself to an increasingly interventionist state; connecting Chinese and Filipinos through a shared, participatory ideology; and generating a new,

\(^{54}\) *Gongfei huoqiao shilu* 共匪禍僑實錄 (Taipei: Haiwai chubanshe, 1955); *Zhonggong zenyang duidai qiaosheng* 中共怎樣對待僑生 (Taipei: Haiwai chubanshe, 1956).

\(^{55}\) *Zhongzheng xuesheng*, Vol. 66, Chinese section, 28, KHC.
contextually relevant form of communal solidarity. This was evident in the creation of the PCACL in September 1956. By the end of decade, following the formation of the Grand Family Association in March 1958, anticommunism had taken its place alongside commerce (the Federation), culture and the nation (the KMT), education (the Xiao Zong), and clanship ties (the Zong Lian) as a central concern of the community.

The origins of the PCACL, more so than that of the Federation and Xiao Zong, lie both in and beyond the Philippines. The United Organization in Support of Anti-Communist Movement, had done little except pad the resumes of its members, and after the jinqiao an came under attack from the ROC Ambassador for being an organization that existed “in name only” (youning wushi). Calls to revitalize the Chinese anticommunist movement were made at the very first meeting of the 1954 Shang Zong conference, partly in response to Magsaysay’s speech earlier that day. It was not until two years later, however, that discussions began in earnest between Chinese leaders and the ROC to form the PCACL.

The occasion that sparked these discussions was the second meeting of the Asian Peoples’ Anti-Communist League (APACL) in Manila in March 1956. Formed in June 1954 by Taiwan and South Korea (but without US input), the APACL was a transnational organization of activists from across Asia that met annually to denounce the evils of communism and neutralism and exhort its members and the world to redouble their efforts against the Soviet Union and its puppets in China, North Korea, and North Vietnam. Individual chapters of the APACL, based at the time in Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines, South Vietnam, Hong Kong, Macao, and the Ryukyus, coordinated propaganda activities among like-minded government and civic groups in their countries or cities.

The APACL chapter in the Philippines, for example, was connected to the state security apparatus through Undersecretary of Defense Jose M. Crisol, among other military and defense officials, and headed by Catholic intellectual Jose Ma. Hernandez, an admirer of Taiwan and staunch defender of Chinese education in the Philippines. Through civic organizations such as the Philippine Anti-Communist League and links with the ROC state, Chinese anticommunists in the country became part of this network of ideologues that transcended ethnic and national divisions, the local and the transnational, and the boundaries between state and society. Three “local” Chinese were members of the Philippine delegation at the Manila meeting of the League, including the General Chamber’s Sy En, who was then a Vice-Chairman of the Chinese Anti-Communist Movement, and four were part of the ROC delegation, including Tang Tack and Cua Siok Po 柯叔寶, a writer, newspaperman, former guerrilla, and Secretary-General of the Philippine KMT. Meanwhile, among the “experts” on communism who attended the meeting was one “Colonel” Shih I-Sheng.57 His antics in the late 1940s and early 1950s seemingly forgotten, Shih had reentered public life after his “world tour” and was even elected to the Shang Zong’s first board of directors.58

The rising tide of Asian anticommunism in the mid-1950s and special relationship between Taiwan and the Philippine Chinese impelled reform of the Chinese Anti-Communist Movement. Following a speech by APACL Chairman and ex-ROC Interior Minister Ku Cheng-kang 谷正綱 calling on the Movement to intensify its activities, ROC Ambassador Chen Chih-mai and Ku met


58 Tang, Wo zai Shang Zong sanshinian, 4.
with Chinese leaders to plan the establishment of the PCACL.\textsuperscript{59} Transnational in outlook, Chinese anticommunism in the Philippines was also entangled in the politics of the local. If the formation of the Shang Zong two years earlier had exacerbated Chinese society’s divisions, then the PCACL could help mitigate them by offering General Chamber members such as Sy En a seat at its table. Under the banner of ideology, trade, commercial, and clan disputes and the animosity between the KMT and the Chamber might be temporarily set aside; no Chinese, after all, would dare to claim public opposition to anticommunism. Sy and Dy Huan Chay were thus both involved in organizing the PCACL, with Sy maintaining his reputation as one of the leaders of Chinese anticommunism in the Philippines by participating in the preparatory committee of the PCACL. He even secured a place on its five-man Standing Committee (which also included Yu Khe Thai, Chua Lamco, Yao Shiong Shio, and Peter Lim), despite finishing in 19\textsuperscript{th} place out of 60 in the PCACL’s elections in September.\textsuperscript{60} In that same year, the Federation even invited the Chamber to become part of it, but Sy rejected this offer.\textsuperscript{61}

Another, less obvious social division that the PCACL transcended was between Chinese society’s commercial members, as represented by the Shang Zong, and its intelligentsia, consisting of journalists and educators such as the Publisher of the \textit{Fookien Times} Go Puan Seng and Principal of Chinese Patriotic School (\textit{Huaqiao aigung xuexiao} 華僑愛國學校) in Manila Liu Chi-tien 劉芝田, author of a monumental 900-page history of China-Philippine relations published in Taiwan

\textsuperscript{59} “Feihua fangong kang’e zonghui 華僑反共抗俄總會,” Vol. 1, 182, 062.2/0004, December 1950-December 1959, IMH Archives.

\textsuperscript{60} “Feihua fangong kang’e zonghui,” Vol. 1, 132, IMH Archives; \textit{Shang Zong yuebao} 商總月報, Vol. 1, No. 9 (September 1956), 75, KHC.

\textsuperscript{61} Carino, \textit{Chinese Big Business in the Philippines}, 78.
by Cheng Chung Book Company in 1964.\footnote{Liu Chi-tien, \textit{ZhongFei guanxi shi} 中菲關係史 (Taipei: Zhengzhong shuju, 1964).} Another such person to join the PCACL was Pao Shih-tien, who had completed his Ph.D. in Education from the University of Santo Tomas in 1955. Born in Hubei, Pao neither spoke Hokkien nor owned any businesses, and was thus twice removed from the commercial mainstream of Philippine-Chinese society. His ideological credentials, on the other hand, were immaculate. Having taught at the KMT’s political reeducation school in Nanchang in 1935, Pao helped establish CKSHS in 1939 alongside Ong Chuan Seng, one of the founders of the KMT in the Philippines. During the Japanese occupation, he drafted the constitution of the Chinese Overseas Wartime Hsuehkan Militia. After the war, when the KMT recalled Ong to China to serve on the Legislative Yuan, Pao became the school’s acting Principal and then its Principal after Yu Khe Thai stepped down in 1959.\footnote{Chang et al. (ed.), \textit{The Reminiscences of the Chinese in the Philippines}, 190-194.} In the years that followed, Pao championed Chinese education, led the struggle against educational Filipinization, strengthened educational ties between Chinese society and Nationalist China, and fortified CKSHS as an anticommmunist stronghold; his greatest achievement, after years of negotiations with the Philippine government, was the transformation of the school into a college in 1965. By integrating the likes of Pao, Go, Liu, and Cua into its ranks, the PCACL drew upon their expertise in cultural propaganda to ensure that vital spheres of Chinese public life were filled with the right kind of information.

Yet, even as it attempted to reconcile with the General Chamber on the grounds of ideology and to integrate itself into the cultural sphere, the PCACL also reflected the power shifts that had taken place between individuals and institutions in Chinese society, as well as its efforts to reach out to the Filipino establishment. Alfonso Sycip, for example, for many years the President of the General Chamber, resigned as Chairman of the Chinese Anti-Communist Movement in April 1956,
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citing work and old age (he was 73).\textsuperscript{64} Yu Khe Thai, who served as President of the Federation for a record four two-year terms (1954-1962), became Chairman of the PCACL while continuing to head the Chinese Welfare Association; following Ong’s death in 1956, he was Principal of CKSHS for three years while also serving as Chairman of its Board of Directors. He and other Federation leaders, together with intellectuals like Pao and Cua Siok Po – who served as one of the PCACL’s three Deputy Secretaries and later its Secretary – came to dominate the upper echelons of political, economic, and cultural power in Chinese society across a network of interlocking civic institutions that was the densest in Southeast Asia at the time: according to OCAC in 1956, the ratio of Chinese civic organizations to the size of the Chinese population in the Philippines was 1 to 20 (5 percent), compared to a mere 1 to 143 (0.7 percent) in second-placed Burma and 1 to 250 (0.4 percent) in Malaya.\textsuperscript{65}

Like the APACL meeting in March, the three-day inaugural convention of the PCACL in September 1956 was a transnational moment that straddled the boundaries between the state and society. As a social occasion hosted by the ROC Embassy, it was an opportunity for Chinese elites to cultivate officials in the Magsaysay administration and represent their ideological bona fides to their host country. In this way, the ceremonial dimensions of anticommunism were not incidental to or separate from its substance. As Jacques Amyot’s fieldwork in Manila in the 1950s suggests, Chinese gatherings to which Filipinos were invited were fundamentally transactional in nature and dictated by the advantages to be gained from associating with the right people.\textsuperscript{66} Jose Crisol, Jose Hernandez, and Ku Cheng-kang were present, as was a US Embassy representative, all of whom

\textsuperscript{64} “Feihua fangong kang’e zonghui,” Vol. 1, 123, IMH Archives.

\textsuperscript{65} Liang Ziheng 梁子衡, Huaqiao shehui yanjiu 華僑社會研究 (Hong Kong: Haichao chubanshe, 1958), 74, 80.

\textsuperscript{66} Amyot, The Manila Chinese, 77.
spoke to the 310 delegates from 182 organizations across the country that had gathered in Manila. In what typified the global dimensions of high-profile ideological occasions such as this, messages of congratulation and well-wishes poured in from Chiang, Magsaysay, Garcia, and dozens of other politicians, military officials, and right-wing civil society groups in the Philippines, Taiwan, the United States – including members of the pro-Taiwan “China Lobby” that Anthony Kubek was a part of – and other participants in the global anticommunist ecumene.\(^67\) Coming just a few months after, as Chapter 3 has shown, the ROC Embassy had agreed to second intelligence agents to serve as consultants to MIS, the convention symbolically affirmed the closer anticommunist ties between Manila, Taipei, and Chinese society that Magsaysay had called for in his speech to the Shang Zong in 1954. In the context of the jinqiao an, an important step towards finding a political solution to the case was winning over the likes of Crisol and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Jesus Vargas, who spoke at the convention.

Preparatory meetings held in the six months leading up to the first PCACL convention, as well as meetings during the convention itself, make it clear how Chinese leaders understood the problem of communism and wished their reformed organization would develop in the context of developments in the Philippines and elsewhere. In keeping with the trend towards expanding the membership of leadership organizations, the preparatory committee agreed from the outset that the KMT, Shang Zong, General Chamber, schools, kinship associations, Cantonese Association, and Women’s Association were to be represented within the League.\(^68\) In September, the convention’s agenda stressed the importance of cultural propaganda and the media in the PCACL’s future work.

\(^67\) *Anti-Communist Movement*, Chapter I: Organization of the Philippine-Chinese Anti-Communist League, ISEAS Library.

\(^68\) “Feihua fangong kang’e zonghui,” Vol. 1, 183, IMH Archives.
For instance, the assembled delegates agreed in principle to increase the volume of anticommunist periodicals then in circulation – *Shijie qingnian* becoming one of them – and to establish a radio station specifically for anticommunist broadcasting. Other proposals that passed muster involved the use of praise and censure as tactics to shape civic and political attitudes. The delegates agreed, for example, to commend Singapore’s Chief Minister Lim Yew Hock for his crackdown on leftist trade unions, teachers, and students, in the hope of encouraging a similarly vigilant stance against the dormant but ever-present threat of communist subversion in the Philippines.\(^69\)

By the end of the 1950s, therefore, the Big Five, through institutions such as CKSHS, had come to define Chinese civic identity in the Philippines. They were led by a small group of elites and overlapped in structure and function, allowing for the rapid propagation of ideology across the social spheres they stood for. Redundancy, rather than specialization, was essential to ideological uniformity. Both the PCACL and KMT – the “KMT Cultural Association” (*Guomindang wenhua xiehui* 國民黨文化協會),\(^70\) as it was renamed in the early 1960s – treated culture as an important, if vaguely-defined domain of influence, with schools, clan associations, and the media becoming spaces to be saturated with “traditional Chinese culture” and explicitly anticommunist messaging. With the Chinese community heavily institutionalized and hierarchically structured, its elites were able to mobilize its members more effectively in support of ideological objectives. Funds, in the form of Federation membership fees for example, were easily channeled into propaganda events, publicity for which could be disseminated rapidly through the Shang Zong, the KMT, newspapers, and schools. With the likes of Pao and Cua at the forefront of the PCACL, the institutions that they helmed, CKSHS and the KMT *zongzhibu*, provided convenient, symbolically meaningful venues

\(^{69}\) “Feihua fangong kang’e zonghui,” Vol. 1, 185, IMH Archives.

\(^{70}\) McBeath, *Political Integration of the Philippine Chinese*, 51.
and captive audiences of party members or students for large-scale League events. Beyond Manila, Chinese schools, chambers of commerce, and party branches that often occupied the same building and were indistinguishable from each other became the structural foundation for PCACL branches. A provincial chamber of commerce or school event might double up as a PCACL rally, for instance. In these ways, networks, institutions, and elites them helped integrate anticommunism into Chinese civic life.

**Culture, ceremony, and the expansion of the PCACL beyond Manila**

This chapter now turns to how the PCACL entrenched itself across the Philippines and the activities that it sponsored to promote anticommunism and ideological coherence among ordinary huaqiao. Chiefly (although not only) through the League’s activities in its first year, I emphasize two interrelated features of its civic anticommunism. First, it was a connective phenomenon that linked Chinese in the islands to each other and to Filipinos, thereby helping to foster goodwill and ideological solidarity within Chinese society and between ethnic groups, as well as to the global and Nationalist Chinese anticommunist struggles, which Chinese in the Philippines were expected to identify with and contribute to. Second, the PCACL molded Philippine-Chinese subjects, youth and students especially, through a shared vocabulary and the techniques of public spectacle, active participation in rituals and performances, and rewards: discursive practices that fused the language of anticommunism with its material and social forms.71

High on the list of priorities of the PCACL was ensuring that Chinese beyond Manila were institutionally incorporated into the new organization, much as provincial chambers of commerce

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and trade associations had been into the Shang Zong. From the *jingqiao an* to the Cebu reading club arrests, recent events made clear to rightist Chinese that communism was a pan-Philippine problem, and that anticommunism had to be similarly broad in geographical scope. Outside the capital, state capacity, border security, and the influence of Shang Zong elites in Manila were weaker. Well into the 1960s, provincial Chinese continued to be involved in trans-border smuggling networks, which could be depicted as an ideological problem because of how they connected the Philippines to the Chinese mainland via Hong Kong, the south China coast, and even North Borneo, thus serving as channels for the inflow of propaganda, arms, and other subversive elements – including communist agents – into the islands. A delegate from Bacolod City, for example, urged the PCACL convention to stop Chinese brokers in the provinces from trafficking in communist goods, although the report on his proposal did not specify what sorts of products he was referring to.\(^{72}\) And, as Chapter 3 has shown, part of the blame for the *jingqiao an* lay with a CCP agent from Hong Kong, Chen Jiading, whose false testimony the military harvested for names of individuals to arrest.

To stimulate excitement in the PCACL and pave the way for the formation of chapters in the provinces, the League created a traveling performing arts troupe to tour Northern Luzon during the summer school holidays in 1957 and raise awareness of anticommunism. Enthusiasm for this troupe appears to have come from the bottom-up, with the Chinese Students’ General Association proposing such an event to the PCACL shortly after the League convention in 1956.\(^{73}\) Cua Siok Po and six other culturally-inclined PCACL members, with logistical support from its Secretariat, were in charge of organizing this troupe. More important than what it performed and how it was received was how it mobilized different sectors of the Chinese community in pursuit of a common

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\(^{72}\) “Feihua fangong kang’e zonghuı’,” Vol. 1, 185, IMH Archives.

\(^{73}\) *Anti-Communist Movement*, Chapter III: Youth Participation in the Anti-Communist Movement, ISEAS Library.
ideological goal. Active participation in producing, and not just consuming, propaganda mattered because it was measurable, socially visible, and could help inculcate and reinforce the correct civic ideological dispositions in those involved. As with Chinese cultural events in general, businessmen funded the troupe, eager as ever to show off their patronage of the arts and ideological credentials; the Rice and Sugar Association even supplied uniforms for its members. Five of its members were from the PCACL Secretariat (Cua and others on the organizing committee did not travel with the troupe), with Fernando Chua serving as troupe leader. The remaining 20 were Chinese performers drawn from the Philippine-Chinese Youth Military Service Fraternity, KMT Artistic Propaganda Troupe, Manila Amateur Dramatic Guild, and Philippine-Chinese Youth Educational Center. With the help of local dramatists and directors, the troupe decided to stage two main items: a skit, “Hell on Earth” (Renjian diyu 人間地獄), and a traditional Chinese opera entitled Da bu gang 大補缸. Other items that the troupe prepared included magic acts, harmonica solos, comic dialogues, and the screening of documentary films.

Artistic performances were a staple of PCACL events going forward. Besides encouraging participation in the production of anticommunist discourse and bolstering the attendance, they also allegorized the evils of communism and complemented the speeches and lectures that also featured at these events. Although its exact contents are unknown, “Hell on Earth,” was a frequent trope in Nationalist propaganda and a clear reference to communist rule in China. Its writer, Chu I-Hsiung 朱一雄, was a professor at Far Eastern University and a reliable producer of cultural propaganda for the PCACL. The interlude to a February 22, 1958 Anti-Communist and Salvation Rally by the League in Manila, for instance, was centered on another of his plays, “The Spring Breeze Comes

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74 Anti-Communist Movement, Chapter IV: The League’s Initial Efforts in Support of Mainland People, ISEAS Library.
Once Again on the South Bank of the River," which students and teachers from CKSHS performed in front of Sy En, Fernando Chua, and their Vice-Principal, Pao Shih-tien, the three speakers at the rally. As described in a report on the event, this play “tells of the miserable life of Chinese teachers and students who live on the South Bank of the Yangtze River under…Communist tyrannical rule. These intelligentsia gradually find themselves unable to endure the suffocating life which is totally different from the life they knew before. Finally, they are able to get away from the Communist occupied area and breathe again the free air in the free land.”

On May 8, 1957, the troupe set off on its 16-day tour of Northern Luzon. A day earlier, its members were given a ritualistic sendoff at an anticommmunist propaganda meeting at the KMT’s headquarters in Manila. There, in a gesture that symbolized the conferral of authority by the ROC state on its national subjects, Ambassador Chen Chih-mai presented Chua with the troupe’s official flag in an ceremony presided over by the Deputy Chairman of the KMT Central Committee’s Third Section, Chen Yuan 陳元, who was visiting the Philippines at the time. To drive home the wider significance of the tour, Chen Yuan also gave a lecture entitled “An Appeal to the Human Race to Save Itself” (Renlei zijiu de huyu 人類自救的呼籲), in which he denounced Chinese communists for being Soviet puppets and using violence and deception to enslave the Chinese people. Warming to a familiar theme in Nationalist propaganda, Chen identified three groups of enemies: dictators behind the Iron Curtain; “hired thugs” (yingquan 鷹犬) from communist states who had infiltrated free societies to do the bidding of these dictators; and indigenous communists.

Civic ceremonies overseen by ROC officials and the vocabulary of enslavement, thuggery, raoluan, “hell on earth,” “hired thugs,” and infiltration on a worldwide scale became increasingly

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75 “Philippine Chinese Anti-Communist and Salvation Rally Held in Manila,” *The Pacific Review*, April 1958, 31-32, American Historical Collection [AHC], Ateneo de Manila University, Manila.
widespread from the late 1950s onwards as anticommunism became a category of Chinese social life. Through these rituals and tropes, the ROC state, personified by the likes of Chen and Chen as well as the ubiquitous visages of Chiang Kai-shek and Sun Yat-sen, sought to bind its overseas subjects more closely to the Chinese nation and normalize anticommunism as a mode of thinking and feeling. What the performers genuinely thought about Chen’s speech, the tour, and politics is unknowable. As Chen probably lectured in Mandarin, it may be that native Hokkien speakers did not fully understand him. Some may have been encouraged to join the troupe by parents, relatives, classmates, teachers, or clan leaders, or done so out of an interest in the arts, drama, and Chinese culture. Those involved in the Military Service Fraternity and KMT Propaganda Troupe may have been committed to the tour’s ideological premises. But above all, they knew what roles they were supposed to perform: those of overseas Chinese participants in a global anticommunist movement spearheaded by the ROC.

The official report on the tour (unsurprisingly) depicts it as a great success. Stopping in 15 cities or towns in Northern Luzon with significant Chinese populations, the troupe performed to crowds of, allegedly, over a thousand people each time, including Filipino politicians and military officials. If the performances in themselves were meant partly as entertainment and were no doubt consumed as such by many among the audience, the presence of the troupe and Shang Zong leaders such as Fernando Chua in the provinces as semi-official emissaries of the ROC state was ultimately about institution-building and ideological mobilization. Accordingly, the troupe made sure to meet with local Chinese leaders to encourage the formation of provincial chapters of the PCACL, with exchanges of anticommunist memorabilia signifying the commitment of all involved – producers,
performers, and audience members – to the cause. To encourage such behavior, OCAC presented
troupe members upon their return to Manila with copies of Chiang Kai-shek’s illustrated biography
and letters of commendation, tokens of the ROC government’s concern for them.77 Through such
symbolically meaningful rewards, the PCACL and similar social institutions incentivized the right
ideological behavior among Chinese youth and accorded participation in anticommunist, pro-ROC
events prestige and recognition.

In the years following the founding of the PCACL and the troupe’s tour of Northern Luzon,
anticommunist Chinese periodicals reported on growing public enthusiasm for the League beyond
Manila. The October 1957 edition of the English-language *Pacific Review*, for example, described
the founding of PCACL chapters in three cities in Northern and Central Luzon: San Fernando in
the province of Pampanga (in July 1957), which the troupe had visited, Siain in Quezon (in August
1957), and Olongapo in Zambales (in September 1957), with the last becoming the 26th branch of
the League to be (re)formed in the past year. The founding ceremonies for these chapters resembled
each other. Chen Chih-mai attended all of them as the official representative of the ROC at these
events. Accompanying him on most of his visits, to impress upon participants the civic-diplomatic
nature of these occasions were PCACL and Federation leaders: Yu Khe Thai, Shih I-Sheng, and
Tang Tack at San Fernando, Yao Shiong Shio and Tang at Siain. To emphasize the League’s role
as a bridge between ethnic groups, Chinese leaders and students and Filipino provincial governors
and military commanders welcomed and interacted with the visitors from Manila. Congratulatory
and hortatory messages from President Garcia and ROC and Filipino officials reminded all present

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of how their work performed a vital service to not only the Philippine nation, but also in defense of what Garcia’s message to the Zambales PCACL called “the democratic way of life.”

Ceremony, spectacle, and public performances also characterized the formation of PCACL chapters and its activities going forward. In Pampanga, Siain, and Olongapo, Chen presided over mass induction ceremonies for new members of these chapters in conference halls festooned with ROC and Philippine flags and portraits of Chiang, Garcia, Sun Yat-sen, and José Rizal in order to reinforce the solemnity of the occasion. To reaffirm ties between Chinese elites in Manila and the provinces, PCACL leaders presented their provincial counterparts with tokens such as the chapters’ official seals. Newspapers, journals, and the newsletters and special commemorative volumes of civic associations publicized the founding of these chapters, their activities, and their participants, registering the presence of the League and its associated individuals in the public imagination.⁷⁸

**Beyond the Iron Curtain: the world in the Chinese anticommunist imagination**

This next section of the chapter focuses on the campaign the PCACL sponsored in 1957 in support of the peoples behind the Iron Curtain and in response to the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, which, along with events elsewhere, the ROC and Philippine-Chinese anticommunists interpreted as prefiguring communism’s downfall. Through this campaign, I explain how global, Taiwanese, Filipino, and Philippine-Chinese anticommunisms articulated with each other in the Philippines, and how the League brought home to the Chinese community the realities of communist rule.

Communism, as framed by the PCACL, its ROC patrons, and right-wing anticommunists in general was a transnational problem: a function of the Soviet Union’s imperial designs on “free

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⁷⁸ “PCACL, Pampanga Chapter, Inaugurated in San Fernando”; “Ambassador Chen Attends Inauguration of PCACL, Quezon Chapter”; “PCACL Chapter in Zambales Inaugurated,” *The Pacific Review*, October 1957, 19-23, 33, AHC.
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societies,” its accomplices in China and elsewhere, porous borders, and the lack of vigilance and awareness of communism’s depredations within these societies. Ideologues inflected this problem differently. Anthony Kubek, for example, believed that the Soviet Union was responsible for Pearl Harbor. For the ROC and its supporters in the Philippines, communism was primarily about the fates of territorial China under Mao’s “bandit gang” and the Chinese nation as a deterritorialized ethno-cultural community. As with the activities they sponsored, the speeches of PCACL leaders made clear the relationship between anticommunism as both a global and a Chinese movement. At the February 1958 Anti-Communist and Salvation Rally in Manila, for example, Pao Shih-tien expounded on the platform of the newly-formed Overseas Chinese United Salvation Association in Taiwan. Anticommunism, he declared, began with “self-salvation” and ended with “saving the whole world.” Asia, he said, was a vital cornerstone for the security of the world and the recovery of China the “only path towards checking Communist expansion in Asia and rescuing its peoples from enslavement.” It was thus incumbent upon all Asian peoples to put aside their differences in nationality, religion, and party affiliation, reject neutralism, and give their full support to the ROC in its campaign to recover mainland China. At the same time, he called for greater solidarity within overseas Chinese societies and higher standards for Chinese education, a means of promoting “our age-old tradition of character development,” as well as newspapers.

The language of “salvation” here is notable for its historical overtones. “National Salvation” (Jiuguo 救國) was how the ROC state branded the anti-Japanese movement that erupted in China

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80 “Philippine Chinese Anti-Communist and Salvation Rally Held in Manila,” *The Pacific Review*, April 1958, 31-32, AHC.
after 1937, to which overseas Chinese contributed significantly. By casting the struggle against communism after 1949 in comparable terms, the ROC and its huaqiao loyalists looked to situate anticommunism within a longer genealogy of patriotic movements in defense of the Chinese nation and its legitimate government, with imperialistic communism replacing imperial Japan as China’s enemy. Yet by dropping “national” from “salvation,” while retaining its Chinese dimensions, pro-ROC ideologues transformed anticommunism into a less exclusive discursive space, allowing it to take onboard Chinese and non-Chinese. More than that, by depicting anticommunism as a global movement with Asian and Chinese characteristics, men like Pao hoped to promote affinity among Philippine-Chinese youth and students with the ROC through ideological causes that transcended national boundaries, and, vice-versa, with global anticommunism through the ROC.

Anticommunist movements, the ROC’s in particular, consistently emphasized the coming collapse of communism in the hopes of mobilizing peoples against it. In Taiwanese rhetoric, for example, the “bandit regime of Mao” (Maofei zhengquan 毛匪政權) was forever in crisis, and the ROC military’s “counterattack” (fangong 反攻) against the regime perpetually imminent. As Mao was depicted as puppet of the Soviets, at least until the Sino-Soviet split became too obvious for ROC propagandists to ignore, cracks anywhere in the Soviet imperial edifice could be interpreted as prefiguring the fall of the entire structure. In 1957, the PCACL seized upon the failed Hungarian Revolution against Soviet rule in late 1956 to mobilize Chinese society in opposition to both global communism and the PRC. Through the visit of six Hungarian “freedom fighters” to the Philippines,
the League hoped to provide Chinese with firsthand accounts of the struggle against communism and channel the resulting social energies toward the fight against Mao.

Demonstrations in support of the uprising and in opposition to the Soviet Union took place through to September 1957, when the Hungarian visit took place. In December 1956, for example, 2,600 Chiang Kai-shek High School students took part in a mass rally on school grounds to express solidarity with the Hungarian people, during which Pao described the revolution as the death-knell for communism and urged all those present to “live up to the spirit of President Chiang and lend determined support to all anti-Communist movements.”

Hungary quickly became something of a rallying point for anticommunists globally, especially after the pro-Chiang Time magazine named the Hungarian freedom fighter its 1956 “Man of the Year,” while newspapers in Taiwan provided detailed coverage of events in Hungary. In March 1956, the League sponsored a week-long series of activities in support of the peoples behind the Iron Curtain, the Hungarians especially. During that week, the PCACL flooded the Chinese media and civic sphere with special commemorative volumes, cartoons, newspaper articles, slideshows, posters, and pro-Hungary, anti-Soviet speeches; Pao and Fernando Chua held a press conference to publicize these activities. The week culminated in simultaneous mass gatherings across the country; in Manila, some 3,000 people were reported to have shown up to witness, among other items, a thousand-student mass chorus and “Hungary’s Mother” (Xiongyali de muqin 匈牙利的母親). Written specially for the occasion by local Chinese dramatist Chen Bing Sun 陳明勳 and performed by the KMT Propaganda Troupe, this play told

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82 Anti-Communist Movement, Chapter VI: The Hungarian Revolution, ISEAS Library.

83 See the cover of Time, Vol. 69, Issue 1, January 7, 1957, and especially the article in it, “Freedom’s Choice.”
the “true story of a mother who sacrificed her youngest and only remaining son for the interest and honor of her country” during the Hungarian Revolution.\(^{84}\)

By September, Chinese youth in the Philippines had been primed to receive the Hungarians and regard the global, Filipino, and Nationalist Chinese anticommunist movements as intertwined. In June, for instance, the PCACL swiftly proclaimed its support for Garcia’s Anti-Subversion Act (R.A. No. 1700), which outlawed the Communist Party of the Philippines and similar associations on the grounds that they constituted an “organized conspiracy” to overthrow the Philippine state.\(^{85}\) The League not only backed R.A. No. 1700, but also declared its intention to help the authorities implement it.\(^{86}\) A month later, it organized another mobilization week, this time in support of what it called the “mainland anti-tyrannical movement” that had emerged in response to Mao’s Hundred Flowers Campaign and that portended the fall of the CCP. As ever, in their speeches to large and enthusiastic crowds, PCACL propagandists were keen to highlight the interconnectedness of one anticommunist struggle to the other. Cua Siok Po, for instance, spoke of an “anti-Communist tide” that had risen in the preceding five months and “extended from the Danube to the Yellow River,” while Jose Hernandez, an honorary member of the League, cited Soviet Russia in China, in calling for Taiwan, South Vietnam, and South Korea to unite against their respective communist foes.\(^{87}\)

Little is known about the visiting Hungarians except their names and occupations, and that they did so from Taiwan, moving from one “free” Asian state to another within the anticommunist


\(^{87}\) *Anti-Communist Movement*, Chapter X: The Farce of Communist Democratization, ISEAS Library.
ecumene. In the Philippines, like foreign heads of state or politicians, they were granted audiences with the President and Foreign Secretary and accompanied wherever they went by Chen Chih-mai and local Chinese leaders. Chinese anticommunist practices in the Philippines were anything if not repetitive. As we might expect, they visited CKSC, a hub and symbol of ideological fervor within Chinese society. The rally held on the third and final night of their visit featured a second staging of “Hungary’s Mother” and, as was customary, a speech by a Filipino politician, this time Senator Francisco Rodrigo, a member of Catholic Action, the right-wing religious organization that Jose Hernandez was President of. It also reinforced the same themes of global ideological identity and the unity of the Chinese and Hungarian anticommunist struggles that earlier campaigns in the year had promoted. At it, for example, Chua Lamco invoked human rights as an underlying principle of anticommunism and said that the ROC and Hungarian people were on board the “same storm-tossed ship” (风雨同舟). Chen even asserted that the Hungarian Revolution had “inspired and brought about demonstrations, riots, and uprisings all over the mainland of China.”

Finally, it was the turn of three Hungarians to speak. As reported in PCACL propaganda, they did not only describe their firsthand experiences of the Revolution and denounce communism, and had much to say about Taiwan and the Chinese experience. Nurse Csilla Biro spoke about the high standard of living and the “wonderful progress” that Taiwan had made in economic, industrial, and agricultural development during her three-week stay there. In recounting the Revolution, she made it a special point to mention how mainland Chinese students studying in Budapest had joined with Hungarians in their demonstrations. Graduate student Csaba Mezei charged communism for

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Chapter 4

bringing the “evils of materialism” to Hungary and the was also full of praise for Taiwan, which he previously thought was “just a military base.” After his visit there, however, he “realized how wrong the conception was” and declared that the “people in Taiwan are now happy in their life of freedom and prosperity.” Finally, the author and musician Jeno Platthy held forth on the evils of communism, claiming among other things that the Hungarian “puppet government” had signed a contract to deliver 85,000 Hungarian youths to the Soviet Union and PRC as forced laborers. As a public spectacle, the Hungarians’ visit tripled up as a condemnation of global communism, a call for unity by different national peoples against it, and an advertisement for the ROC. Like much of the PCACL’s campaigns, it embedded Taiwan’s and the overseas Chinese anticommunist struggle within a wider ideological movement and exploited the gravity of the global situation to drum up huaqiao support for Nationalist China.

Over the 1960s, the PCACL flourished, diversifying its activities and expanding into every realm of Chinese cultural life. By 1970, the number of provincial chapters and civic organizations, including the other four Big Five, that were part of the PCACL was close to 200. From 1958 to 1967, fundraising campaigns yielded a total of over three million pesos in support of the League’s activities and in response to Taiwan’s calls for voluntary contributions by overseas Chinese to the ongoing cause of national salvation. Summer ideological activities were routinized in the form of seminars and workshops on Chinese culture that structured the free time of students and teachers. Such activities organized the calendar of Chinese civic life partly around celebrating the ROC and its leaders, national culture, and ideology, on both regular occasions such as National Day (October 10), Overseas Chinese Day (October 21), and Chiang Kai-shek’s birthday (October 31), or special

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occasions such as Chiang’s reelection as ROC President in May 1966 and the 100th anniversary of Sun Yat-sen’s birthday on November 12 that same year. By ensuring that such events were well-publicized, print and radio propaganda helped sustain anticommunism. The PCACL continued to connect like-minded individuals and institutions in the Philippines and Taiwan to each other, and to global networks of anticommunism. Under its auspices, organized group visits to Taiwan, which the next chapter examines, took place regularly, typically in conjunction with regular or one-off events on what had become a shared civic calendar between the ROC and the Philippine Chinese. Exemplary anticommunist visitors to the Philippines, such as PRC fighter pilots who had defected by flying to Taiwan, remained convenient mouthpieces for the anticommunist cause. In 1961, the PCACL again welcomed the APACL to Manila for its annual meeting; its members continued to be active in regional and global anticommunist organizations such as the APACL’s 1967 successor, the World Anti-Communist League.90

Conclusion

By the late 1950s, Chinese society in the Philippines had been restructured in response to Filipino anti-Chinese economic and cultural nationalism and the mass arrests earlier in the decade. Leadership of this society now lay with a small group of elites and five organizations that spanned the country, represented the community, and defined its interests. Anticommunism was one such interest. It transcended national, ethnic, and cultural differences, helped Chinese prove themselves as upstanding residents of their host country, and connected them to Nationalist China, expanding

its sovereignty over them. With Chinese schools such as CKSHS serving as its foundation and the newly-formed PCACL as its propagator-in-chief, anticommunism came to dominate civic life. By examining its expansion across the Philippines and its campaigns to support anticommunist causes both locally and globally, I show how the PCACL engaged with Chinese society and youth through public spectacle, ritual, and a common ideological vocabulary, and by encouraging and rewarding participation in anticommunist cultural activities.

Networks and connections are at the heart of this chapter. In restructuring Chinese society, businessmen such as Yu Khe Thai and educators such as Pao Shih-tien positioned themselves at the forefront of multiple, overlapping civic institutions with a stake in promoting anticommunism. PCACL events in Manila and the provinces united Chinese and Filipinos against a common enemy. Chapter 4 has also shown how CKSHS and the PCACL were connected not only to Taiwan, but to global anticommunist institutions and actors such as the APACL and the Hungarian “freedom fighters” – participants in what I call an “anticommunist ecumene.” Global anticommunism helped catalyze the formation of the PCACL and supplied wider narratives of ideological solidarity which League events drew on to justify and mobilize support for the struggle against communism in the Philippines, by Nationalist China, and by other peoples of the world.
Chapter 5

Experiencing the Nation-State:
Philippine-Chinese Visits to Taiwan and the Politics of Transnationalism, 1958-1971

We have returned, bearing
On our shoulders the dust of a drifting life,
A warm longing in our bosom, and
A heart that wants to return home but cannot.

Home, sucked into a black iron curtain, blocking sun and sky;
Bodies, drifting in the Philippines, haunted by turbid waves;
Five hundred thousand pairs of teary eyes place their hopes,
Their hopes on you —— free ancestral land, our mother!
You must stand up for freedom and justice!

Retake freedom from the grasp of the devils;
With justice, comfort the people who wander in foreign lands;
Let tomorrow’s timely rain,
Fall upon the drought of five hundred million hearts……

We have returned, to breathe in your
Fresh smell, to kiss your
Fragrant soil, we
Shake the dust from our bodies, and with
A rigging of iron, here
Anchor our ——

One hope, and
One loyalty!

— Cua Siok Po, “We HaveReturned — Arriving in Taiwan” [我們回來了 — 抵臺] (1950)\(^1\)

In August 1950, Cua Siok Po and 45 other Philippine Chinese became part of the very first overseas Chinese delegation to visit Taiwan since the supposed end of the Civil War. There, they met with the Chiang family and other ROC leaders, donated money, radios, and towels to the ROC military, and traveled to Quemoy, the island cluster at the frontline of the KMT’s ongoing struggle

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to reclaim the Chinese mainland.\(^2\) A man inclined towards literary expression, Cua was so moved that he wrote a series of poems about what he experienced in Taiwan and Quemoy and published them in the March 1953 edition of *Wenyi chuangzuo* 文藝創作, a literary magazine that had been established in 1951 by the KMT’s Committee on Chinese Literature and Art Awards (*Zhonghua wenyi jiangjin weiyuan hui* 中華文藝獎金委員會) to promote cultural anticommunism.\(^3\) The first of these eight poems is reproduced and translated above. In it, the 30-year-old Cua depicts his visit to Taiwan as that by an overseas Chinese sojourner who has been “drifting in the Philippines” and has returned to smell and touch the “fragrant soil” of his “free ancestral land, our mother.” With his “home” having fallen to the communist “devils” and behind a “black iron curtain,” he sees the ROC as the sole hope for the half a billion Chinese in “foreign lands” seeking “freedom and justice.”

The poem is overflowing with seemingly straightforward ideological sentiments, but also betrays a fundamental tension over what Taiwan and China meant to the author, at the time a rising young party member in the Philippines. Intentionally or otherwise, he grapples with a fundamental challenge that KMT propagandists like him faced in signifying the ROC to the Chinese diaspora after 1949. Cua situates his “home” in China and laments that he wants to return there, but cannot. Like many Southeast Asian huaqiao, he did not trace his ancestry to Taiwan or its offshore islands, but to Fujian province on the mainland, now under the control of the CCP. Yet, he also uses what would become a ubiquitous term in Chinese anticommunist rhetoric, *ziyou zuguo* (“free ancestral

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\(^2\)“Bendang cedong Feilübin huaqiao huiguo weilao jingguo 本黨策動菲律賓華僑囘國慰勞經過,” Central Reform Committee Archive, 6.4-1 Reel 8, File ID: 215, September 14, 1950, Zhongguo Guomindang Records [KMT Records], Hoover Institution Library and Archives [HILA].

\(^3\) Cua, *Song dahan hun*, 5. On the Committee on Chinese Literature and Art Awards and the KMT’s promotion of literary and cultural anticommunism in early Cold War Taiwan, see Xiaojue Wang, *Modernity with a Cold War Face: Reimagining the Nation in Chinese Literature Across the 1949 Divide* (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Asia Center, 2013), 44-53.
land,” “free motherland,” or “free homeland”) to describe Taiwan. Cua has never previously been to Taiwan, but nonetheless says that he is “returning” to it and cherishes the sensory and emotional experience of doing so. He thus invests in the act of visiting what was not his jia with an affective intensity that we typically find in a sojourner’s description of returning to his hometown or native place. His verse makes jia and zuguo overlap in meaning, but cannot make them one and the same thing. If the ROC could not be the former, it could at least represent itself as the latter to Chinese people everywhere.

Philippine-Chinese visits to the ROC were intended to further this goal. Except in several years when the majority ethnic (and questionably “overseas”) Chinese societies of Hong Kong and Macao came in first, huaqiao groups in the Philippines organized the most “homecoming” (huiguo 回國) visits to the ROC annually from 1950 to 1970,4 whether to “bring greetings and gifts to the troops” (laojun 勞軍), “pay their respects” (zhijing 致敬) to ROC leaders, or “observe and study” (kaocha 考察) the development of their ziyou zuguo. Featuring planned itineraries, sponsored by overseas Chinese civic organizations, and supported by the KMT and state organs such as OCAC and the Foreign Ministry, these visits were part of a repertoire of diasporic nation-building policies that the ROC employed to compete with the PRC for legitimacy. From the Big Five to schools to native-place, commercial, and veterans’ associations, nearly every Philippine-Chinese institution organized them. An average Chinese person growing up in the Philippines from the 1950s onwards would very likely have gone on these tours or taken part in summer activities in Taiwan at least once, especially if from Manila. For the businessmen who funded them and the elites, both cultural and commercial, who led them, they were a recurring item on their civic calendars and virtually a

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4 Qiaowu tongji 僑務統計 (Taipei: Qiaowu weiyuanhui tongjishi, 1964), 22-25.
social, cultural, and political obligation. Like the textbooks that Chinese schools in the Philippines relied on and the Philippine-Chinese high school graduates who went on to study in Taiwan, these visits helped constitute the dense web of linkages between the ROC and its most ardent huaqiao supporters in Southeast Asia.

I argue in this chapter that these visits were a means by which the ROC projected itself to the world as a sovereign polity – a de facto nation-state – and recreated aspects of being a zuguo to the overseas Chinese. For state propagandists, the visits were a form of what I call experiential nationalism, whereby huaqiao immersed themselves in the culture and traditions of this substitute “homeland,” beheld firsthand the progress towards modernity and democracy that it was making, matched textual and visual descriptions of Taiwan with a carefully curated reality, and internalized certain ways of knowing and feeling about the Chinese nation. Similar to the anticommunist rallies, rituals, and public performances that huaqiao in the Philippines participated in, these visits were a type of discursive practice that integrated the language of ideology with its material forms to shape perceptions of Taiwan, China, and being Chinese.

Those who organized and went on visits to Taiwan, I argue, understood them in different ways that manifested diverse understandings of patriotism and what the ROC stood for. As highly publicized community events in the Philippines and Taiwan, these visits were visible displays of Chinese elites’ and non-elites anticommunist and patriotic credentials. Yet as Cua’s poem suggests, many who visited Taiwan truly believed in the historical mission of the Nationalist regime, despite and because of the Civil War. Some traced their loyalties back to World War II and imagined the anticommunist struggle as an extension of the KMT’s historical mission to unify China against its foreign enemies. For others, with mainland China in the grip of a Soviet puppet regime (or so they believed) and inaccessible, Taiwan became the object of their affinities for a particular notion of
“home.” The ROC’s promotion of Chinese culture as an ideological bulwark against communism also aligned with concurrent efforts by Chinese in the Philippines to defend the autonomy of their schools and improve Chinese education in response to Filipinization. For these educators, Taiwan was attractive to them not as a bastion of anticommunism, but as a source of professional expertise.

The visits in question are nothing if not well-documented in the yearbooks and newsletters of civic organizations and, in particular, “special commemorative volumes” (jinian tekan 紀念特刊) and reports that visiting groups published as souvenirs for their participants, and to document their experiences. Featuring itineraries, photographs, delegation lists, rules of conduct, sponsors’ advertisements, day-by-day travel narratives, and well-wishes from community leaders and ROC officials, these materials yield valuable insights into the who, when, what, why, and how of these tours. As texts that were produced by and circulated within two anticommunist societies, they also (un)intentionally reproduce the tropes and rhetoric of ROC nationalism. For this reason, they are powerful examples of non-state propaganda and the cultural dominance of anticommunism in each society. Reading them closely and contextually allows us to see beyond their propagandistic aims and reconstruct the interests and motivations of those who organized and went on the tours.

Combining analysis and narrative, this chapter seeks to capture the richness of these source materials, the contexts in which they were published, the perspectives of those who went on them or who had a stake in the trips, and the itineraries of the trips themselves. I begin by situating them within the context of the PRC and ROC’s global contest for overseas Chinese capital, remittances, and bodies – a struggle to control Chinese transnationalism and press it into the service of the state. I then show how overseas Chinese visits to Taiwan and the policies and texts associated with them were meant to represent the ROC to the world as a sovereign, nation-state-like polity and pseudo-homeland for Chinese people. I pay close attention here to an OCAC-issued guidebook for visiting
huaqiao to illuminate the rhetorical and practical strategies surrounding these visits that helped the ROC create the image of itself as the authentic “China.”

The next three sections of the chapter focus on the visits themselves. In the first of these sections, I examine a visit by leading members of the Philippine-Chinese Anti-Communist League, including Cua Siok Po, in October and November 1958, focusing on their trip to Quemoy and how native-place sentiment and affective ties shaped their affinities for the ROC. Second, I turn to a delegation of primary schools teachers which took part in an intensive teacher training program in Taiwan in the summer of 1967: I use this visit to discuss how the ROC state sought to discipline visiting overseas Chinese, and how practical and professional concerns underpinned pro-Taiwan sentiments. Third and finally, I describe a series of trips by one particular organization, the Chinese Overseas Wartime Hsuehkan Militia’s Veterans’ Association (VA), to Taiwan. For its members, I show that anticommunism was constitutive of a deep-seated, historically-informed patriotism, but not the only element of their relationship to the ROC.

**Capital, persons, and propaganda: the PRC-ROC struggle over Chinese transnationalism**

From the late Qing onwards, monarchists, reformers, and revolutionaries alike sought not only to stimulate transnational inflows of Chinese people and capital into China for state-building purpose, but also to imbue such flows with political meaning in their propaganda. The post-1949 CCP and KMT, in this regard, were no different, except that each wished to channel the movement of huaqiao and their money towards separate territorial-ideological polities. During the Cold War, the “China” a person of Chinese ancestry traveled to and invested in signaled his political loyalties. By promoting certain forms of Chinese mobility, the PRC and ROC used Chinese transnationalism to authenticate their claims to represent the Chinese nation.
In terms of investment, neither the PRC nor ROC could claim much success until the 1960s. Most overseas Chinese capital after 1949, if it did leave Southeast Asia, flowed into Hong Kong, whose free port status, low taxes and secure colonial legal system gave it an unassailable edge over China and Taiwan until decades later. Moreover, despite restrictions on Chinese economic activity in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, business opportunities for ethnic Chinese in Malaysia, the country with the largest Chinese population in the region, expanded. China’s efforts to attract huaqiao capital were also limited by mistrust between its officials and potential investors, and the aggressive tactics that the former employed to pressure the latter.\(^5\) These reflected and contributed to growing suspicions of returned overseas Chinese, persons whose foreign and class background rendered them incompatible with demands for continuous revolution. For these reasons, according to one estimate, overseas Chinese investment companies in China may have raised a total of only $100 million from the early 1950s until they were disbanded during the Cultural Revolution.\(^6\)

Large-scale capital aside, the CCP was also keen to tap into overseas Chinese remittances, which would help overcome the American-led embargo on trade with China by providing the state with an alternative source of foreign exchange. Its efforts to nationalize a large and well-organized private remittance sector, however, were never completely successful, with illicit remittance firms continuing to operate out of Hong Kong well into the late 1950s. Furthermore, many huaqiao were reluctant to remit money to China, fearing that communist cadres would confiscate it. These fears persisted despite efforts by the state in 1955 to guarantee the right of families to receive and dispose


of overseas remittances as they wished.\(^7\) Perhaps unsurprisingly, as Chun-hsi Wu has shown, only about 30 percent of such remittances that were transferred through Hong Kong after 1949 actually made it back to mainland China; most simply remained in Hong Kong.\(^8\)

Taiwan’s economy, meanwhile, was driven by some $100 million in US non-military aid per year from 1951 to 1964 and had no actual need for foreign capital until the 1960s.\(^9\) Policies to attract *huaqiao* investment in the 1950s were thus limited and their effects inhibited by Taiwan’s strategy of import-substitution industrialization. Only in the late 1950s, at the urging of the United States, did ROC planners embrace export promotion and foreign capital in anticipation of the end of US aid in 1965. Comprehensive changes to a set of older regulations for *huaqiao* investment in March 1960 and the enactment of a Statute for the Encouragement of Investment that September increased the inflow of overseas Chinese investment from $1.13 million in 1960 to $8.3 million in 1961.\(^10\) By the end of 1963, the cumulative value of all 212 *huaqiao* investment projects, according to official statistics, was $60.3 million. 21 of these projects, totaling $13.2 million, were from the Philippines; the average value of each Philippine-Chinese project was over three times that of each Hong Kong Chinese project.\(^11\)

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11 *Qiaowu tongji*, 66.
Chapter 5

Investment and other monetary figures such as the above were frequently incorporated into publications intended for consumption beyond China and Taiwan, and given an ideological twist. The English-language, bi-monthly *Free China Review* featured a regular section on *huaqiao* affairs that paid increasing attention after 1960 to investment and its political significance. Its November 1, 1961 issue, for example, not only stated that overseas Chinese investment since 1951 amounted to an “impressive” $66,840,000, but also compared this act of “participating enthusiastically in the economic buildup of their mother country” with how *huaqiao* “helped finance Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary movement to overthrow the Manchus.”

In this way, state propagandists imagined continuities between the ROC in 1961 and its founding 50 years earlier and invested self-interested economic behavior with patriotic, historical meaning.

The movement of Chinese persons was also significant to both Chinas. The PRC’s OCAC, for example, arranged tours and set up special hotels for visiting overseas Chinese. In the 1950s, most of these tours originated from Hong Kong and Macao and featured visits to ancestral villages and meetings with officials in Beijing to discuss prospects for trade and investment. On a longer-term or even permanent basis, 500,000 to 600,000 overseas Chinese returned to China from 1950 to 1961, whether because of family ties, patriotism, or – particularly in the case of Indonesia – in response to the anti-Chinese policies of Southeast Asian governments. Tan Kah Kee 陳嘉庚, the rubber tycoon and de facto leader of the Singaporean Chinese community, was perhaps the most famous of these *guiqiao*. After returning in 1950, he enjoyed a relatively comfortable career in the

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12 “Overseas Chinese,” *Free China Review*, November 1, 1961. This and other issues of the publication are available online at http://taiwantoday.tw/.


government and was given a state funeral in 1961 in recognition of his contributions to economic and educational reconstruction in Fujian.\(^\text{15}\) Despite the disillusionment and discrimination that less prominent *guiqiao* than Tan later experienced, leading to the departure of around a sixth of them via Hong Kong for Southeast Asia before 1964, their return journeys were spun as an ideological victory for the New China.\(^\text{16}\)

Eager to compete for Chinese bodies, the ROC persisted – albeit selectively – in admitting Chinese into Taiwan despite the threefold increase in its population since 1900 and the influx of 900,000 to 1.15 million people from the mainland during the latter part of the Civil War.\(^\text{17}\) These included refugees from Hong Kong, around 150,000 of whom were resettled in Taiwan with aid from the United States from 1949 to early 1954; students, welcomed under a program to promote educational opportunities in Taiwan for Southeast Asian Chinese; and, most famously, over 14,000 Chinese prisoners of war from Korea who were repatriated to Taiwan. This was nearly double the number of those who went back to China.\(^\text{18}\) The “return” of these POWs was a propaganda coup for the ROC, which quickly designated January 23, 1954, the day that they arrived in Taiwan, “Freedom Day.” This was later rebranded “World Freedom Day” by the World Anti-Communist

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\(^\text{17}\) Taiwan’s population figures are taken from Te-Tsui Chang, “Land Utilization on Taiwan,” *Land Economics* 28.4 (1952): 362. Figures for the number of people who followed the KMT across the Taiwan Strait during the Civil War are based on Meng Hsuan Yang, “The Great Exodus: Sojourn, Nostalgia, Return, and Identity Formation of Chinese Mainlanders in Taiwan, 1940s-2000s” (Ph.D. diss., University of British Columbia, 2012), 59.

League; it is still celebrated today by the WACL’s successor, the World League for Freedom and Democracy.

**Strategies of sovereignty: “Free China” as territory, text and, experience**

Philippine-Chinese visits to Taiwan were thus one front in the ROC’s struggle to politicize the movement of Chinese people to its advantage. These visits and the propaganda associated with them worked on multiple levels to produce the ROC as a territorially sovereign polity and a nation-like *zuguo* for members of a global Chinese nation. To begin with, the very act of regulating the mobility of persons whom the ROC claimed as its nationals constituted proof of its capacities as a state, despite the chaos that had engulfed it during the Civil War. As Meredith Oyen has shown in her recent study of US-Chinese migration diplomacy, even after relocating to Taiwan, the KMT continued its postwar policy of investigating and approving all potential emigrants before granting them a passport, whether or not they resided in Taiwan. This allowed it to maintain the illusion of control over the transnational communities that linked their government to that of the United States and to improve US opinions of China and the Chinese by ensuring that only the most desirable people were allowed to emigrate.19 Similar procedures and logic applied to Chinese seeking entry into Taiwan. Fearing overpopulation and communist infiltration, the ROC admitted only a small number of refugees from Hong Kong despite lobbying on their behalf and a 1954 survey showing that 70.4 percent of the 988,545 refugees who were willing to emigrate from Hong Kong hoped to

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19 Oyen, *The Diplomacy of Migration*, 105-106.
Chapter 5

be resettled in the ROC.\textsuperscript{20} It persistently refused to accept the deportation to Taiwan of the 2,700 “overstaying temporary visitors” for the same reason.\textsuperscript{21}

In the late 1950s, with the situation in Taiwan stabilized, the ROC was willing to simplify the bureaucratic procedures that overseas Chinese needed to undergo to visit Taiwan. In 1957, the Executive Yuan promulgated a revised series of “Regulations Governing Entering and Exiting the Taiwan Region During the Period of Communist Rebellion” (\textit{Kanluan shiqi Taiwan diqu rujing chujing banfa} 剃亂時期臺灣地區入境出境辦法). Under these regulations, prospective \textit{huaqiao} visitors from countries such as the Philippines that had diplomatic relations with the ROC filled in a basic application form and, through their local ROC consulate or embassy, submitted it to OCAC together with any supporting documents. OCAC then obtained the approval of various government agencies before requesting that the Foreign Ministry authorize the embassy or consulate to affix a “homecoming endorsement” (\textit{huiguo jiaqian} 回國加簽) to applicants’ passports. Ethnic Chinese living in countries that did not recognize the ROC filled in the same application, but submitted it to OCAC through legal, pro-ROC Chinese organizations rather than via a consulate and received an entry permit instead of a \textit{huiguo jiaqian}. Visits fell into seven categories, related to both purpose and the visitors’ places of residence: 1) investment; 2) higher education; 3) “individual” visits (by Chinese leaders, schools, and other organizations for business, sightseeing, and \textit{kaocha}, as well as by transit passengers); 4) \textit{kaocha} missions from Hong Kong or countries without diplomatic ties

\textsuperscript{20} This 988,545 figure represented 39.8 percent of the total refugee population in Hong Kong at the time; 52.5 percent of this population hoped to settle permanently in Hong Kong, 0.4 percent were willing to return to China, and 7.3 percent claimed to be indifferent. Oyen, \textit{The Diplomacy of Migration}, 162-163.

\textsuperscript{21} Cheung Shing Kit, “Immigrating Visitors: the Case of Overstaying Chinese in the Philippines, 1947-75” (M.Phil. thesis, University of Hong Kong, 1997), 10-15. The case dragged on for decades despite continuous efforts by both governments to resolve the issue. It was finally resolved following Marcos’s decision to simplify the Philippines’ naturalization laws by decree in 1975, a move that allowed the overstayers (and the many other Chinese who were legally ROC nationals) to acquire Philippine citizenship.
to the ROC; 5) investment and business trips from Hong Kong; 6) emigration; 7) visiting relatives and family. Visits by Philippine Chinese belonged to the third category and were relatively simple to organize, as they required only four photographs of each applicant on top of the basic application form.²²

Well before the 1950s, such practices of border control and categorization that once worked to exclude Chinese and other Asian peoples from white settler nations such as the United States, Canada, and Australia had been universalized as what Adam McKeown has called the “foundation of sovereignty…for all states within the international system.”²³ In this regard, the ROC differed only in degree, not in kind, from the white settler nations whose exclusion laws it once vehemently opposed, and postcolonial states such as the Philippines that placed similar restrictions on Chinese mobility. Ironically, as Oyen has pointed out, common security concerns meant that it was just as difficult for Chinese abroad to gain entry to Taiwan as the United States in the early-mid-1950s.²⁴ This was doubly ironic given that the ROC legally identified these people as its nationals, but did not allow them to enter their supposed zuguo freely. For the Nationalist government, the regulation of overseas Chinese mobility helped secure Taiwan’s borders against communist infiltration and avoid overpopulation, thereby projecting the sort of competency that earlier, corrupt incarnations of the ROC lacked. They also demonstrated its sovereignty over an ethno-cultural community and highlighted desirable patriotic activities such as investment, attending university, kaocha missions, and even visiting one’s relatives.

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²² Qiaobao huiguo guanguang zhinan 僑胞回國觀光指南 (Taipei: Qiaowu weiyuanhui, September 1958), 3-7.


²⁴ Oyen, The Diplomacy of Migration, 106.
To better understand how these visits were supposed to function, let us turn now from their role in shoring up Taiwan’s territorial sovereignty to the textual strategies surrounding them that the ROC and its supporters employed in order to represent Taiwan to the world. These strategies are evident in a “Guidebook for Overseas Compatriots Returning to the Homeland for Sightseeing” (Qiaobao huiguo guanguang zhinan 僑胞回國觀光指南), which OCAC published in 1958 as part of its propaganda war with the PRC for overseas Chinese loyalties. Much of what OCAC, the state-controlled media in Taiwan, and pro-ROC Philippine-Chinese organizations published aimed at denigrating the PRC while proclaiming the ROC’s achievements in industry, self-government, agriculture, education, and military and cultural affairs. This text is slightly different, as it contains both practical information and propagandistic elements, with the distinction between the two not always clear-cut. Overseas Chinese looking to visit Taiwan found within this pocket-sized volume everything from copies of the basic application form to the rules on permitted and prohibited items in one’s hand carry luggage to the recently-issued regulations on entering and exiting the ROC for its overseas nationals. The last of eight appendices lists the 16 foreign consular services in Taipei and contact details, starting with the most important of them, the US Embassy.

To reinforce this aura of facticity, the Guidebook also features multiple chapters on various aspects of the ROC within a global context. Its first chapter surveys Taiwan’s physical and human geographical features. We are informed of the exact physical dimensions and contours of the island,

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26 The 16 were: the American Embassy; Apostolic Internunciature Legation; Belgian Consulate; Brazilian Embassy; British Vice-Consulate; Dominican Embassy; French Embassy; Japanese Embassy; Korean Embassy; Panamanian Embassy; Philippine Embassy; Spanish Embassy; Royal Thai Embassy; Turkish Embassy; Venezuela Legation; and Vietnam Embassy.
its climate, industries, special local products, population, administrative divisions, main cities, and transportation infrastructure. Interpolated into these facts were remarks on Taiwan’s “fertile soil” (turang feiwo 土壤肥沃), “enchanting” (yinren rusheng 引人入勝) natural landscape, “honest and hardworking citizens” (renmin qinpu 人民勤樸), and “favorable foundations” (lianghao jichu 良好基礎) for further industrial development. The chapter describes Taiwan’s local produce as being valued by global markets and the island as connected via sea and air to cities in Asia and the rest of the world. It concludes with a standard geopolitical account of Taiwan as a “model province of the Three Principles of the People” (Sanminzhuyi de mofan sheng 三民主義的模範省), the “base of the anticommmunist revolution to recover and build the nation” (fangong geming fuguo jianguo de jidi 反共革命復國建國的基地), and the “Free World’s protective barrier against communism and invasion” (Ziyou shijie fangong, fanqinlüe de pingzhang 自由世界反共、反侵略的屏障).27 Those wishing to know more could read chapters five to nine, which provided detailed information on governance, industry, transportation, education, media, and natural scenery.

Like much ROC propaganda, including the jinian tekan and reports that later sections will examine, the Guidebook depicts Taiwan as a place of modernity, democracy, culture, and natural beauty. Its chapter on governance and politics, for example, makes no mention of martial law and instead emphasized local county and municipal elections that the KMT had begun implementing in Taiwan from January 1951 onwards,28 calling them “ample evidence of democratic politics and the spirit of the rule of law” (minzhu zhengzhi he fazhi jingshen de chongfen biaoxian 民主政治

27 Qiaobao huiguo guanguang zhinan, 1-2.

28 Ramon Myers and Hsiao-ting Lin, Breaking with the Past: The Kuomintang Central Reform Committee on Taiwan, 1950-52 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2007), 14.
Citizens enjoyed freedom of expression and the press (or so it claims), while overseas Chinese students attending universities in Taiwan were “nurtured in the culture of their motherland and trained intellectually” (zuguo wenhua de xuntao he zhineng de xunlian 祖國文化的熏陶和智能的訓練). Finally, chapter nine, the last and longest, describes Taiwan’s eight natural wonders, such as the cloud sea of Alishan, Sun-Moon Lake, and the fishermen’s lights of Penghu, as well as other tourist destinations in cities such as Taipei and Taichung. Besides being of practical use to prospective huaqiao visitors, therefore, the Guidebook also establishes Taiwan’s ontological presence in the world by bombarding readers with lists of places, products, and modes of transportation; data on economic production, huaqiao university students, and newspapers; and the measurements of mountains, highways, and forests.

But what was Taiwan supposed to be as a political entity? The text, like other such works of ROC propaganda, shifts between multiple registers of representation. Expressions such as “A Short Introduction to Taiwan Province” (Taiwan sheng jianjie 臺灣省簡介), “model province of the Three Principles of the People,” and “Regulations Governing Entering and Exiting the Taiwan Region” refer to Taiwan as a “province” (sheng 省) or “region” (diqu 地區) of the ROC. At all times, however, it embeds such legal nomenclature within a broader, ambiguous discourse on the nation. Terms such as Ziyou Zhongguo, zuguo, and even Zhongguo are frequently used instead of “Taiwan,” particularly in publications with a more aggressively propagandistic stance. Huaqiao visits there were literally a “return to the nation [motherland / homeland].” Yet “Taiwan province”

29 Qiaobao huiguo guanguang zhinan, 17.
30 Qiaobao huiguo guanguang zhinan, 29-30.
31 Qiaobao huiguo guanguang zhinan, 30-36.
and “Free China” were never synonymous with each other. The former was part of a nation-state, while the latter is never explicitly described as such. Consumers of such propaganda were expected to deduce that the rest of China was not only “unfree,” but also not a nation-state. The “communist bandit regime” (gongfei zhengquan 共匪政權) of Mao and puppet of Soviet imperialism, in ROC rhetoric, was beholden to a foreign power and therefore not authentically Chinese; lacked popular sovereignty over the Chinese people, whom it simply tyrannized into submission; could not meet society’s basic needs; and was not recognized by the United Nations. By embodying qualities that the PRC lacked, the ROC called attention to how it resembled a nation-state, despite being, legally, a province.

Two factors explain the use of “Free China” and “motherland” on top of “Taiwan province” and “region.” The first is that nationalist, ideological, and culturalist conceptions of Taiwan were supposed to both be more appealing to overseas Chinese visitors, and instill in them a specific set of patriotic affinities. At the heart of the ROC’s qiaowu was the politically-charged label, huaqiao. Literally “Chinese sojourner,” the term first emerged in the late 19th century and was ratified with the promulgation of China’s first Nationality Law in 1909. As scholars such as Wang Gungwu and Prasenjit Duara have observed, the term redefined those who had left China as temporary absentees from home, thus giving Chinese migration and even settlement overseas legitimacy. As an emotive term, it reminded overseas Chinese that they owed their allegiance to China and the Qing state (and after 1911, the Republic of China) and entailed certain legal rights and responsibilities toward the Chinese state.32 Needless to say, although Nationalist claims upon the Chinese abroad rested

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on idealized assumptions about how so-called “sojourners” understood their relationship to China, it was politically advantageous after 1949 to keep huaqiao and zuguo in circulation. Propagandists hoped that the unprecedented levels of overseas Chinese support for the ROC during the Second Sino-Japanese and Pacific Wars would carry over into the post-1949 period – that, in other words, “Free China” would serve as an acceptable substitute for the entire China.

Geopolitics also helps us explain this discursive ambiguity. By 1958, the year in which the Guidebook was published, Chiang Kai-shek had long since given up hope of “counterattacking” (fangong 反攻) China in his lifetime. But, as his biographer Jay Taylor notes, he continued talking up this and the other fangong (反共, anticommunism) to maintain military and mainlander civilian morale and because they helped rationalize Nationalist rule over the island.33 The terminological confusion reflected a growing uncertainty among KMT stalwarts over whether or not retaking the mainland or fortifying “fortress” Taiwan against the PRC ought to be the goal of the state. “Taiwan province” implied that the island was a temporary seat of the ROC government, as Chongqing had been during the Second Sino-Japanese War, while “Free China,” with its connotations of “nation-state-ness,” left open the possibility that Taiwan was a legitimate nation-like polity unto itself and not dependent on a larger territorial entity for validation. In effect, having multiple signifiers for Taiwan allowed the ROC to hedge its political bets during two decades of declining international recognition.

Notably absent in this Guidebook and other similar works of propaganda are references to Taiwan as a jia for overseas Chinese – it could approximate a “homeland” for them in other words, but not be their “home.” In the Chinese sojourning tradition, which Cua's poem draws from, the

idea of *jia* was intimately associated with one’s native place. Where one was born was a “critical component of personal identity in traditional China, and geographic origin was generally the first matter of inquiry among strangers, the first characteristic recorded about a person (after name and pseudonyms), and the first fact to be ascertained regarding individuals coming before the law,” as Bryna Goodman puts it. “Home” was a specific village or city which sojourners were supposed to return to for marriage, mourning, retirement, and burial, and to which they sent their remittances.34 No amount of propaganda could alter the fact that the vast majority of overseas Chinese were not born in Taiwan and persuade them to conceive of it as their home; only traces of *jia* could be found there in the form of native-place connections. In fact, the very legitimacy of the post-1949 ROC was based on establishing that Taiwan was *not* a home, but a place from which one’s native places in China, “sucked into a black iron curtain,” could be reclaimed from the CCP.

For ROC supporters and propagandists on both sides of the Luzon Strait, textual strategies were a necessary but insufficient means of producing Taiwan’s place in the world. Taiwan had to be experienced directly, not just vicariously, so as to establish virtuous circle between rhetoric and reality. As a KMT member Chen Lieh-fu, the principal of Cebu Eastern High School and a prolific author on overseas Chinese education said on the occasion of his school’s basketball team’s visit to the ROC in May 1968, it was not enough for Philippine Chinese youth to read about their *zuguo* in textbooks and magazines. Their visit allowed them to “set foot on the territory [literally, “rivers and mountains”] of their motherland for the first time, as well as appreciate its scenery and famous

34 Bryna Goodman, *Native Place, City, and Nation: Regional Networks and Identities in Shanghai, 1853-1937* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 4-5.
historical sites” (初次踏上祖国之河山, 欣賞風光勝跡 chuci tashang zuguo zhi heshan, xinshang fengguang shengji). \(^{35}\)

Upon setting foot on Taiwan, overseas Chinese delegations adhered to itineraries designed to reinforce propagandistic depictions of “Free China.” While these itineraries varied according to the composition and purpose of individual tours, they shared many common items and were always well-regulated. Government and party officials accompanied the tours and answered questions that the participants had about the ROC. Most trips also required that their members abide by a written code of conduct. Besides having to dress appropriately and be on their best behavior, they also had to remain with the group at all times, except during designated and limited periods of free activity, or unless given special permission to leave the group by their leaders. Even during their free time, socializing with locals was forbidden. Other than designated spokesmen, no one else was allowed to issue public statements or speak to the media.

Items on their itineraries fell into the very same categories that were used to organize the Guidebook. Tours of factories, schools, model villages, military bases, and infrastructural projects such as highways showcased the role of the state in modernizing the island. Some delegations were even given permission to visit Quemoy, which was under military rule because of its proximity to the mainland and tendency to get shelled by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Visits to cultural, and historical locations such as the National Palace Museum, Sun-Moon Lake, and Yangmingshan foregrounded the ROC’s role in preserving traditional Chinese culture and the Taiwanese natural landscape as an ahistorical, organic embodiment of the Chinese nation. Visiting Philippine Chinese also met with state and party officials, other visiting huaqiao groups, and even Chiang himself –

\(^{35}\) “Feilübin Suwu dongfang lanquidui huiguo laojun bisai jinian tekan 菲律賓宿務東方籃球隊回國勞軍比賽紀念特刊,” unpaginated mss., Chinben See Memorial Library, Kaisa Heritage Center [KHC], Manila.
the flesh-and-blood incarnation of the Republic. Like factories and mountains, he gave overseas Chinese something tangible to identify with. Meetings with him were highly ritualized and often involved the presentation of gifts or monetary contributions as a gesture of respect and appreciation, followed by photo-taking. After experiencing the Chinese nation, they returned to their countries of residence to report favorably on their time in Taiwan, reinforcing the relationship between text and experience in the process. Tours were supposed to unfold in this way. The next three sections, in describing three tours, expand on the strategies outlined above and complicate propagandistic understandings of them in the Philippine-Chinese and Taiwanese print media.

**Quemoy on show: the Philippine-Chinese Anti-Communist League’s tour of Taiwan in 1958**

Two years after its formation, the PCACL coordinated with other members of the Big Five to bring greetings and gifts to the troops and congratulate Chiang Kai-shek on his 72nd birthday on October 31. The tour lasted from October 10 to November 3. October was the most popular month for visits to Taiwan by overseas Chinese, as it encompassed not only Chiang’s birthday, but also the ROC’s National Day on October 10 (“Double Tenth”) and Overseas Chinese Day on October 21. That the PRC’s own National Day fell on October 1 meant that the ROC could steal attention from its rival right afterwards. In 1958, the October celebrations took on a particular significance, as they came immediately after the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis from late August to late September. The PRC’s four-week artillery bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu contributed to a sharp increase in “patriotic voluntary contributions” by overseas Chinese to Taiwan from $130,500.52 in 1957 to $388,031.87 in 1958 and $957,483.52 in 1959 – an all-time record.36

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36 *Qiaowu tongji*, 68-69.
As President of the Shang Zong, Yu Khe Thai was the natural choice to lead the 24-person (22 men and two women) PCACL delegation to Taiwan. Four out of the five Standing Committee members of the League went on the tour: Yu, Vice-Presidents Chua Lamco and Sy En, and Yao Shiong Shio. The remaining participants represented, in addition to the Shang Zong and General Chamber, branches of the KMT and PCACL in Manila and beyond, Cantonese Association, Xiao Zong, Women’s Association, Great China Press, and Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines, the KMT-controlled anti-Japanese guerrilla force during World War II, now a veterans’ organization. Given the symbolic importance of October and the defense of Quemoy and Matsu to the ROC and its supporters, there was also widespread media coverage of the tour.37

Our chief source of information on the trip, a “special volume” published after the occasion by the PCACL, centers the tour on the multiple contributions by the visiting Philippine Chinese to the ROC’s defense of its offshore islands. Monetary support amounted to nearly three million New Taiwan Dollars (NTD) in individual and organizational donations, which Yu and Chua presented to Chiang on the final day of the tour.38 Tour members, along with other visiting huaqiao, also met with and offered comfort and encouragement to wounded soldiers and refugees from Quemoy and Matsu who had been relocated to Taiwan itself; each soldier received 50 NTD from the delegates, while each refugee received 20 NTD and second-hand clothing.39 Interviews with and speeches to the media also figured frequently on the tour’s packed itinerary, as befitting an event whose main purpose was to showcase the ROC to the world and drum up support for the Nationalist regime.

37 “Feilübin huaqiao gejie huiguolaojun tuan zhushou laojun tekan 菲律賓華僑各界回國勞軍團祝壽勞軍特刊,” 6, KHC.

38 “Feilübin huaqiao gejie huiguolaojun tuan zhushou laojun tekan,” 21, KHC. Three million NTD was around 75,000 US dollars at the time. The approximately 40 to 1 NTD-USD exchange rate in the late 1950s is from Michael Szonyi, Cold War Island: Quemoy on the Front Line (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), xiv.

39 “Feilübin huaqiao gejie huiguolaojun tuan zhushou laojun tekan,” 14, 17, KHC.
press conference in Taipei allowed Sy, Cua Siok Po, and Fernando Chua to explain the significance of their Quemoy trip and efforts to support ROC troops on the frontlines, while also giving Chen Nanying 陳南英 – one of the tour’s two female delegates – an opportunity to describe the activities of the Philippine-Chinese Women’s Association.\(^\text{40}\) The KMT-run China Broadcasting Corporation also invited Yu to deliver a radio address to overseas Chinese and people on the mainland, in which he praised the government for bringing about improvements in people’s lives, including those of local Taiwanese. He declared that a counterattack against the mainland was inevitable and hinged on the morale of their mainland compatriots. Yu concluded his broadcast on an empathetic note. Despite living overseas, Chinese like him felt the suffering of the Chinese people because of family members and friends who remained on the mainland and the CCP’s destruction of ancestral tombs. Separated from their homes and kin, they, like their tongbao, ardently wished for the recovery of China.\(^\text{41}\)

The highlight of the tour was a day trip to Quemoy on October 16 – ten days after the PRC had announced that it was suspending its bombardment – by six of the 24 delegates: Sy En, Chua Lamco, Fernando Chua, Cua Siok Po, Tang Tack, and Ren Jiaming 任家銘, a deputy chairman of the Cantonese Association. Located several miles off the coast of southern Fujian, and visible (on a clear day) from Xiamen, Quemoy, as Michael Szonyi writes in his study of Cold War geopolitics and everyday life there, symbolized the ROC’s commitment to anticommunism and its sovereignty over more than just the island of Taiwan.\(^\text{42}\) If Taiwan was supposed to be a “model province” of the ROC, then Quemoy was a “model county” of that province: a microcosm of Taiwan, but ruled

\(^\text{40}\) “Feilübin huaqiao gejie huiguo laojun tuan zhushou laojun tekan,” 15, KHC.

\(^\text{41}\) “Feilübin huaqiao gejie huiguo laojun tuan zhushou laojun tekan,” 4-5, KHC.

\(^\text{42}\) Szonyi, Cold War Island, 26.
by the military rather than the KMT. Because of its proximity to southern Fujian, native residents of Quemoy also spoke Minnanhua, albeit a different sub-dialect of it. Cua’s three-page account of the visit in the “special volume,” made no mention of social and economic development, focusing rather on affective, native-place, and geo-material ties between the visitors and “Free China” at a time of crisis for their “homeland.” His travelogue opened by contrasting areas of the island that had been shelled by PLA artillery with those that had not. As his jeep wound its way across the island towards the frontlines, he described how an pastoral landscape of paved roads, green fields, and smiling children gave way to a hellish one of scorched trees, destroyed houses, bomb craters, and unexploded shells. Nonetheless, soldiers and locals’ morale had not been dampened:

Under the strong sun, the wind and dust blew ever so fiercely and stained our white shirts yellow. Our brothers, topless, were busy digging trenches and constructing fortifications, preparing to welcome a greater battle and victory after this first victorious round.

Accompanied by the chairman of OCAC, officials from the military and county, and the media, Cua and the others toured the frontlines and met with residents of the villages most affected by the shelling. In what was very likely a prearranged meeting, the delegates “encountered” an old woman in the village of Yangshan who said that she had a son in the Philippines. When Cua asked what she wished to tell her son, she said that she hoped he would send some money to help rebuild their home and maybe come to see it. In her smile, Cua said that he saw his own dear mother, who was living in a state of poverty just across the sea in Jinjiang – his ancestral home, now behind the Iron Curtain of CCP rule. The tour members also met with a young soldier and presented him with a gift from his father, who was a Standing Committee member of the Philippine KMT. The young man asked them to tell his father that the artillery fire had “tempered” (磨煉 molian) him and made him healthier in mind and body. Cua, who had served on the Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines
during the Japanese occupation, described the act of this son of an overseas Chinese leader fighting on the frontlines as having a value greater than any monetary donation. He described shaking hands with him as the “highest honor” (*wushang guangrong* 無上光荣) for the delegates.⁴³

Affective, native-place, and geo-material connections continued to inform the delegation’s remaining activities on Quemoy. Cua gave a speech to the military radio station there calling on his compatriots in Fujian to rise up against Soviet imperialism and join ROC troops in retaking the mainland when the time came. The army likely broadcasted the speech across the narrow strip of water between Quemoy and Xiamen through large loudspeakers.⁴⁴ To complement their monetary contributions, the tour also presented local officials with a book of well-wishes for the soldiers and a compilation of letters for residents of the islands; some may have come from the few Philippine Chinese who traced their ancestry there.⁴⁵ Just before they left Quemoy, Cua described Fernando Chua as busy taking photographs and gathering flowers and soil samples as souvenirs; Tang Tack, ROC flag in hand, was deep in conversation with several soldiers in various Chinese dialects; and Ren Jiaming, during his chat with a ROC artilleryman from Guangdong province, gave a thumbs-up gesture and repeatedly exclaimed “Guangdong spirit!” (*Guangdong jingshen* 廣東精神).⁴⁶

However much their tour of Quemoy was guided by the state, and despite media coverage of it, we should not dismiss these moments of melodrama or the sentiments expressed in Cua’s narrative (and poetry) as utterly contrived and merely for display’s sake. For Chinese communities

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⁴³ “Feilūbin huaqiao gejie huiguo laojun tuan zhushou laojun tekan,” 10-11, KHC.

⁴⁴ See Szonyi, *Cold War Island*, 95, on the ROC’s propaganda techniques on Quemoy.


⁴⁶ “Feilūbin huaqiao gejie huiguo laojun tuan zhushou laojun tekan,” 12.
abroad that were historically accustomed to being connected to China, being separated from one’s family and native place by a regime that reportedly wrecked ancestral tombs was no trifling matter. When Cua spoke of his mother just across the sea in Jinjiang; or when the *Fookien Times* reporter who accompanied the tour wrote that tour members (figuratively) saw their hometowns from the top of Mashan, the northernmost point of Quemoy, each was expressing the sort of yearning for China that the ROC, native-place associations, and collective and individual memories sustained. China remained embedded within the imaginaries of people like them not despite their separation from China, but because of it. The young Chinese from the Philippines who volunteered as soldiers and nurses to defend Quemoy did so out of a complex affinity for the ROC and their hometowns, rather than the straightforward patriotism that official ROC propaganda ascribed to them. Decades after Chinese nationalism was supposed to have superseded all sub-national forms of identification, provincial and dialect-group affinities – “Guangdong spirit!” – continued to manifest themselves at unexpected times. As Goodman reminds us, love for one’s native place was virtuous because it helped constitute and strengthen the larger political polity of China. There was no incompatibility between love for one’s hometown and the nation, as the former was a building block of the latter.

From the point of view of media coverage and *aiguo zidong juankuan* by overseas Chinese to the ROC, the PCACL’s tour of Taiwan and visit to Quemoy can be considered something of a success for the Nationalist regime. Propaganda and visibility, however, worked also for the benefit of Philippine-Chinese elites, who were eager to proclaim the record-breaking amount of *juankuan* that they helped collect that year. Regular visits to “Free China,” on top of efforts to institutionalize

47 “Jinmen laojun ji 金門勞軍記,” *Fookien Times*, October 28, 1958, Overseas Chinese Clippings Database [OCCD], Hong Kong Baptist University.

Chapter 5

Chinese anticommunism and socialize with politicians and officials in the Philippines, effectively inoculated them from charges of ideological deviance; it was precisely this institutionalization that enabled such an effective fundraising campaign. Yet, as their tour of Quemoy suggests, ideological accommodation and social self-interests must be married to deep-seated and complex affinities for “China” if we are to fully grasp the motivations of these elites and the intricacies of their support for the ROC.

The nation, through instruction: Philippine-Chinese primary school teachers visit Taiwan

Visits by Chinese in the Philippines to Taiwan clustered around two periods in the calendar year. Elites visited in October to join in the festivities surrounding “Double Tenth” and Chiang’s birthday, while students, teachers, and principals went during the summer holidays to take part in military-style training camps and educational seminars and programs organized by agencies such as OCAC and the China Youth Corps. Moving down the social scale from elites to school officials, this section focuses on the month-long visit of 57 Philippine-Chinese teachers from May 21-June 21, 1967, during which they visited schools, met with ROC officials, and took part in an intensive, three-week training program for Chinese teachers at an educational facility in Panchiao, outside Taipei. Following the end of this program on June 10, they remained in Taiwan to visit additional schools and government agencies. By engaging in a close reading of the report that they published after their visit, I explain how Chinese education served as a common discursive space for practical and ideological concerns, and those of both the ROC state and Chinese society in the Philippines. I also describe how this program disciplined their behavior and worked to incorporate individuals into an idealized national community while teasing out how the teachers themselves understood their time in Taiwan.
Sponsored by the ROC Embassy and General Association of Chinese Schools, this visit by the “Philippine-Chinese Primary School Teachers’ Homecoming, Inspection, and Advanced Study Group” (Feilübin huaqiao xiaoxue jiaoshi huiguo kaocha jinxiu tuan 菲律賓華僑小學教師回國考察進修團) took place in the context of efforts in both Taiwan and the Philippines to strengthen Chinese education. On November 12, 1966, the centenary of Sun Yat-sen’s birth, Chiang Kai-shek launched the Cultural Renaissance Movement (Zhonghua wenhua fuxing yundong 中華文化復興運動) in reaction to the Cultural Revolution in the PRC. In the words of anthropologist Allen Chun, the campaign sought to “lead people to believe that [a] spirit of cultural consciousness was the key to the fate of the nation in all other respects.” With the support of the state, an “all-encompassing culture industry” emerged in Taiwan to promote the Confucian classics; encourage a new literary and art movement based upon ethics, democracy, and science; preserve historical artifacts; finance tourism; construct cultural infrastructure such as art galleries and museums; and – like the KMT’s New Life Movement three decades earlier – inculcate in students and citizens conservative ethical values and “correct” social and individual behavior such as thrift, punctuality, and filial piety. In schools, courses on citizenship, morality, military education, and the Chinese classics became an integral part of the school curriculum and were reinforced by essay and speech competitions, study groups, and artistic performances beyond it.49 One US scholar at the time dismissed it a “clear-cut failure” and “either completely ignored by most intellectuals, except for those currying favor, or it is considered an embarrassing joke.”50 By contrast, Chinese elites in the Philippines welcomed the


Movement. Those involved in Chinese education, including businessmen who patronized schools and the arts, eagerly incorporated its principles into school curricula and reproduced the language of cultural renewal in their proclamations of support for the ROC and addresses to the community.

Chinese educators like Pao Shih-tien, a vociferous promoter of the Renaissance Movement, had their own reasons for adopting a defensive cultural posture. While Chinese elites remained in control of Chinese-language education after the mid-1950s, the threat of more extreme measures was ever-present. In May 1964, for example, the Immigration Commissioner proposed closing all Chinese schools by August.\textsuperscript{51} Pao and other conservatives responded by fortifying their resistance to educational Filipinization through the newly-established Xiao Zong and schools such as Chiang Kai-shek College, by lobbying the Philippine government to preserve the status quo, and through closer ties with the ROC, which had long sought to distinguish itself as a provider of expertise on Chinese education and guardian of Chinese traditions. At their core, therefore, summer training programs for Chinese teachers in Taiwan were eminently practical in nature and meant to improve the quality of pedagogy and teaching materials in overseas Chinese schools. For these teachers, culture was less an abstract concept than a means by which they made their professional living.

More so than tours of Taiwan and Quemoy by Shang Zong and PCACL elites, educational training programs allowed for closer state supervision of the visiting huaqiao, a more specialized itinerary, and more meaningful interactions between the visitors and Taiwanese officials. For three weeks, the 57 school teachers and principals enrolled in the Panchiao National Schools’ Teacher Training Program (\textit{Banqiao guomin xuebao jiaoshi jiangxi hui} 板橋國民學校教師講習會) were subjected to a kind of Foucauldian disciplinary regime, a panoptical, prison-like discursive space

but without the element of criminality. At Panchiao, they were not so much explicitly indoctrinated in anticommunism as conditioned to think, feel, act, and even speak like exemplary ROC citizens, thereby indirectly fortifying them against the ideology of the enemy.52

Unusually, for such a large Chinese visit to Taiwan from the Philippines, the members of this particular group were not accompanied by any senior community leaders. This was most likely because the visit itself was planned in haste and had to compete for members with the many other huiguo groups that summer. They were, however, given the customary ceremonial send-off by the ROC Ambassador and representatives of their sponsoring organization (in this case the Xiao Zong) in Manila.53 The participants in the training program were instead led by Pan Zhaoying 潘肇英, the 51-year old head of moral education at Anglo-Chinese School (Zhongxi xuexiao 中西學校) in Manila, the oldest Chinese school in the country. Of the 57, only 14, including Pan, were men, and three were naturalized Philippine citizens. Most were in their twenties. Only one was a principal, and the rest either teachers or department heads like Pan. He was also one of the few to have more than a high school education. In total, they represented 39 schools from across the Philippines.54

Established in May 1956, the Panchiao campus was unremarkable in its layout, consisting of a few buildings clustered around a common area and parade ground. The disciplinary effects of the program lay in its code of conduct for trainees and how their daily schedules, from sunrise to sunset, were organized both within and beyond this space. Codes of conduct for the members of


53 “Feilübin huaqiao xiaoxue jiaoshi huiguo kaocha jinxiu tuan baogaoshu” 菲律賓華僑小學教師回國考察進修團報告書, 8, KHC.

54 “Feilübin huaqiao xiaoxue jiaoshi huiguo kaocha jinxiu tuan baogaoshu,” 32-36, KHC.
organized visits to Taiwan were commonplace no matter what their age, as mentioned earlier. This particular visit imposed upon participants an additional set of 22 requirements, in keeping with the broad aims of the Cultural Renaissance and with the regimentation and militarization of Taiwanese society that had taken place since the KMT’s declaration of martial law in 1947. Wearing pajamas and slippers outside the residential quarters, smoking, spitting, littering, and speaking loudly were forbidden. Above and beyond these basic expectations, trainees were also supposed to be “sincere and humble” (chengken xuxin 誠懇虛心), “conscientiously self-evaluate” (renzhen jiantao 認真檢討) themselves, and “accept criticism” (jieshou piping 接受批評). While eating, they not only were not to waste food, but were to “maintain a cheerful mood” (baochi yukuai xinqing 保持愉快心情) and a “good deportment” (lianghao yitai 良好儀態). Conversations had to be in Mandarin.\(^{55}\) This was a notable requirement, as trainees may have been more used to speaking Minnanhua in their schools and among peers and lacked verbal proficiency in the “national language” (Guoyu 國語).

By the time their training began on May 23, a day after they arrived in Taiwan, participants in the program had been made fully aware of what was expected of them. On the morning of May 21, the trainees gathered at Liberty Hall, the headquarters of the KMT zongzhibu in Manila. There, before they made their way to the airport, a Xiao Zong member instructed them to read an article in the Great China Press on the meaning of their trip. Upon arriving in Taipei, they were whisked off to Panchiao by OCAC and divided into groups of around six; each group was then assigned its own living quarters. In the afternoon, OCAC, the KMT’s Overseas Chinese section, and the China Youth Corps hosted the visitors to reception-cum-symposium on the Cultural Renaissance, during

\(^{55}\) “Feilübin huaqiao xiaoxue jiaoshi huiguo kaocha jinxiu tuan baogaoshu,” 31, KHC.
which they swore an oath to the Movement and were officially inducted into it. The following day, the Panchiao program’s director, Gao Zi 高梓, introduced them to the program, its rules, and the campus facilities.  

The training program began on May 23 and ended on June 10, running each day from early in the morning to the evening, except on Saturday afternoons and Sundays, which were designated periods of free activity. Six days a week, the trainees were woken up at 6 by a bell and the sound of martial music, had breakfast, and participated en masse in physical exercises (zaocao 早操) set to music and lasting for about 50 minutes. Usually, this was followed by a “reading and instruction” (duxun 讀訊) session, for which trainees read out loud from their assigned readings or delivered short speeches. However, on Saturdays, instead of duxun, their living quarters were inspected for cleanliness. At 8, an hour before classes started, the trainees took part in a flag-raising ceremony and sang the national anthem, after which they cleaned their quarters, classrooms, common room, and dining hall. Teachers, program staff, and director Gao joined in this collective effort to order their working and living environments. Educated at Mills College in California and the University of Wisconsin, Gao was a well-known educational reformer in China and Taiwan and advocate of physical education. A panoptical authority figure, she ate with and got to know the trainees, who described her relationship with them as of a mother to her children. But they also called her a stern lecturer, whom they revered. On one occasion, after some trainees informed her that others were not singing the national anthem loudly enough, Gao reminded the entire delegation at flag-raising ceremony.

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56 “Feilübin huaqiao xiaoxue jiaoshi huiguo kaocha jinxiu tuan baogaoshu,” 89, KHC.
the following day of the need to do so as an expression of their “patriotic zeal” (aiguo rechen 愛國熱忱).\footnote{58 \textit{“Feilübin huaqiao xiaoxue jiaoshi huiguo kaocha jinxiu tuan baogaoshu,”} 4, 40, 88, 90, KHC.}

From 9 in the morning to the late afternoon, the trainees visited schools in the Taipei area that specialized in pedagogical methods such as teaching composition to first-graders or the use of music and singing in the classroom; attended small-group classes at Panchiao, taught by instructors from local universities, on teaching everything from mathematics to moral education; and went for lectures on topics such as the foundations of Chinese culture, psychological health, modern history and the spirit of national education, and trends in modern education. Some of these sessions were more explicitly ideological than others. On each of the two Mondays of the program, the trainees participated in a meeting of the entire school to hear guest lectures on “The Three Principles of the People and the Construction of Taiwan” (on May 29) and “An Analysis of the Communist Bandit Situation” (June 5). They also received visitors, whose presence helped to keep them on their best behavior: Pao Shih-tien, for example, stopped by on May 26 to show his support for the program, while Taiwanese journalists from the \textit{Credit News} (Zhengxin xinwen bao 微信新聞報) did so on June 1. On weekday evenings, the program organized cultural and recreational activities and taught them, for instance, Chinese dance.\footnote{59 \textit{“Feilübin huaqiao xiaoxue jiaoshi huiguo kaocha jinxiu tuan baogaoshu,”} 37-40, 91-92, KHC.}

How did participants in the training program remember their time in the ROC? The report that they published in January 1968, suggests that the teachers’ dominant understanding of Taiwan was as a source of pedagogical skills and ideas that they could adopt to become better teachers and educators. The report itself is evidence of their pragmatic approach to cultural work. As opposed
to shorter *jinian tekan*, this report is 100 pages long. Besides serving a commemorative purpose, it was meant to be useful. Most of it consists of detailed writeups on the classes they took, teaching methods they learned, and schools they inspected. Little is said about the foundations of Chinese culture, “The Three Principles of the People and the Construction of Taiwan,” or “An Analysis of the Communist Bandit Situation.” As their afterword to the volume makes clear, they hoped that, through the Xiao Zong and Embassy, the report would be distributed to Chinese schools across the Philippines so as to motivate teachers and help raise standards of Chinese education there.\(^{60}\) Quite remarkably, anticommunism and counterattacking the mainland are not explicitly mentioned at all throughout it – not even by ROC Ambassador to the Philippines Han Lih-wu 杭立武 or Gao Zi in their forewords to the report.

At another level, the visit was about individual memories of everyday life that had little to do with classes or school visits, and that sometimes worked against the ideological messaging and disciplinary techniques of the Panchiao program. In her recollections of the visit that were printed in the report, 46-year old Bai Yueying 白月英 recalled the complete lack of coordination that she and others displayed during their dance-like *zaocao* regimens. While she dutifully recorded what she had learned about teaching, she also fondly remembered playing badminton with other trainees, talking with them in the evenings when their classes were over, the scenes of rural life that they observed around them, and listening at night to the wind blowing. Mishaps, tragedies, and comic episodes punctuated their weekly routine. A trainee’s father passed away. Another was bitten by a dog and had to go for a blood test. On a Sunday sightseeing trip to Wulai, a group of teachers was caught in a torrential downpour while making its way down a mountain and ended up thoroughly

\(^{60}\) “Feilübin huaqiao xiaoxue jiaoshi huiguox kaocha jinxiu tuan baogaoshu,” 100, KHC.
soaked. Indeed, if there is a common thread that runs through how different trainees recalled their time in Taiwan, it is not anticommunism, but rain.⁶¹

None of this is to suggest that patriotism, culture, and ideology did not figure into how the trainees understood their time in Taiwan. Indeed, Shi Wenrui 施文瑞, a 40-year old teacher at Sun Yat-sen High School in Iloilo, framed his experience of the trip in more orthodox ideological terms. In his recollection of the visit, he wrote that he had always wanted to “return to the embrace of his motherland” (hui dao zuguo de huaibao 回到祖國的懷抱) and see for himself Taiwan’s military, economic, and educational progress. The great strides that his zuguo had made in education were unimaginable to someone like him living in the Philippines, he said. Children in Taiwan were so fortunate to have their families, schools, and society united in support of them. His only regret was that, because of time constraints, he had not been able to observe Taiwan’s military development.

A conventional understanding of Chinese culture and the roles of educators in promoting it is also evident in the foreword to the report. Here, the Cultural Renaissance Movement receives its only explicit mention throughout the volume. Like Shi’s recollections, the foreword draws extensively on stock descriptions of Taiwan and overseas Chinese visits to Taiwan: the “smell of its fragrant soil” (tudi de xinxiang qiwei 土地的馨香氣味); the sincerity and warmth of their compatriots on the motherland; Taiwan’s scenic beauty and great development; hearing, seeing, and feeling their zuguo. It is as if the teachers recognized the importance of couching their experiences in a common ideological language, irrespective of what Taiwan meant to them individually.

⁶¹ “Feilübin huaqiao xiaoxue jiaoshi huiguo kaocha jinxiu tuan baogaoshu,” 38, 88, 91, KHC.
Serving the nation: the Hsuehkan Militia Veterans’ Association and the ROC

Among Chinese civic groups in the Philippines, few were as enthusiastic about visiting the ROC than the COWHM Veterans’ Association. This, at least, is how its members hoped to be seen by the public, and in particular by the Taiwanese government and media. On the occasion of the ROC’s 60th National Day celebrations in October 1971, the VA delegation’s deputy leader Wang Tiannian 王天年 proudly declared that this was the tenth visit by the COWHM to Taiwan since 1954, making it the champion among all huaqiao organizations in the world. ROC officials and journalists who contributed to the VA’s huiguotekan were full of praise for the organization. One radio journalist said that the Association enjoyed an “unmatched reputation” (wubide shengyu 無比的聲譽) among soldiers and civilians in Taiwan for its deeds during World War II, outstanding support for anticommunism, and achievements in “joint service” (lianhefuwu 聯合服務) to the ROC. In 1970, a representative of the ROC’s Overseas Chinese News Service hailed the group for not only meeting with military and government officials and participating in guanguang, zhijing, and laojun activities, as most visiting huaqiao did, but for going out into the Taiwanese countryside to (jointly) “serve the people” (weirenminfuwu 為人民服務) and contributing their money and labor to building the Chinese nation.

To understand the COWHM’s relationship with the ROC and the significance of its visits to Taiwan requires that we go back to its transition from a militia to civic organization after World War II. Following the Japanese occupation, the COWHM and other Philippine-Chinese guerrilla

62 “Feilübin Xuegan tuan di shisi fenbu huiguo zhijing tuan tekan 菲律賓血幹團第十四分部回國致敬團特刊” [“COWHM Veterans Association 14th Branch Good Will Troupe”], 21, KHC.

63 “Feilübin Xuegan tuan di shisan fenbu erdu huiguo fuwu tuan jinian tekan 菲律賓血幹團第十三分部二度回國服務團紀念特刊” [“COWHM Veterans Association, 13th Branch Souvenir Issue”], A-6, A-7, KHC.
groups on the left and the right demobilized. The Chinese Youth Wartime Special Services Corps, or Tebie zongdui, was a branch of the Three Principles’ Youth Corps in China, and having fulfilled its wartime mission, was disbanded entirely, while the Chinese Volunteers, the paramilitary branch of the KMT zongzhibu in the Philippines, merged with the party. The Hsuehkan Militia, the most decorated of these three rightist groups,\(^{64}\) transformed itself into a veterans’ group with branches across the country, joined the Filipino Veterans’ Association, and promoted cultural activities and education. To help Chinese youth who had joined the resistance and whose education had been cut short by the war as a result, as well as to prevent communist subversion, the VA founded Loyalty Night School (Danxin yexiao 丹心夜校), an auxiliary educational institution for high schoolers. Through it, a self-governing “student brigade” (xuesheng dadui 學生大隊) was formed to sponsor patriotic and cultural events in schools, ranging from music and drama performances to badminton tournaments to anticommunist rallies. Comprising both individuals who had fought against Japan and students who joined the VA after the war, the brigade also organized regular, though not annual, visits to Taiwan, starting in 1954.\(^{65}\)

The COWHM VA, a member of the PCACL,\(^{66}\) was as anticommunist and pro-ROC as any Chinese civic institution in the Philippines at the time. But if it stood within and was emblematic of the ideological mainstream, it was structurally removed from the leading institutions of Chinese society. Unlike most such Chinese civic groups, its visits to Taiwan were not conducted under the


\(^{65}\) “Feilübin Xuegan tuan di shisi fenbu huiguo zhijing tuan tekan,” 7-8, KHC.

\(^{66}\) “Feihua fangong kang’e zonghui diwu ci quanFei daibiao dahui gongzuo baogaoshu 菲華反共抗俄總會第五次全菲代表大會工作報告書,” 10, June 1968-September 1970, 21 [page is unnumbered, but comes after page 20], KHC.
auspices of or sponsored by the League, KMT, Shang Zong, or similar community organizations. Notably absent from the *tekan* that it published in the late 1960s and early 1970s to commemorate its visits to Taiwan are the well-wishes and exhortations from local Chinese leaders and the ROC Ambassador that are typically found in this textual genre. No major community figure features on the lists of advisers of the *dadui* and editorial board members for these *tekan*. Individual brigade members appear to have financed the printing of these volumes and the trips themselves from their own pockets, bypassing the patronage of local Chinese elites.\(^67\) The only messages of support in them are from party and state officials and journalists in Taiwan, including Cua Siok Po, who by 1968 had left the Philippines to become Deputy Chairman of the KMT Central Committee’s Third Section. Like the lack of explicit references to anticommunism and counterattack in the Panchiao training program report, the absence of the usual community elites from these volumes, and from the leadership of the VA, suggests that COWHM veterans understood and performed their affinity to the ROC in their own ways.

The language of the *tekan* highlights how VA members, in particular those who had fought against the Japanese during the war, saw themselves as participants in a continuous struggle against enemies of the Chinese nation and foreign obstacles standing in the way of a unified, territorially-whole China under the KMT’s leadership: first the “Japanese invaders” (*Rikou* 日寇), and then the “communist bandits” and “Soviet puppet regime” of Mao. To sustain overseas Chinese support for Nationalist China during the Civil War and afterwards, ROC propaganda promoted this long-term historical perspective of *huaqiao* as the “mother of the revolution” (*huaqiao wei geming zhi mu* 華

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\(^67\) “Feilübin Xuegan tuan di shisi fenbu huiguozhijing tuan tekan,” 10, 44, KHC; “Feilübin Xuegan tuan di shisan fenbu erdu huiguo fuwu tuan jinian tekan,” A-21, A-22, KHC; “Feilübin Xuegan tuan di shisan fenbu huiguo minzhong fuwu laojun tuan jinian tekan 菲律賓血幹團第十三分部回國民眾服務勞軍團紀念特刊” [“COWHM Veterans Association, 13th Branch Souvenir Issue”], 15, 27-28, KHC. Note that the second and third of these volumes have the same given English name.
僑為革命之母), a phrase that Sun Yat-sen supposedly said. But by the 1960s, if not earlier, we find few attempts at drawing such continuities in the civic language of Chinese patriotism in the Philippines. No such references to the War of Resistance are found in the tekan from the PCACL’s visit in 1958, for example. The struggle against Japan had receded in popular memory; Japan and the ROC had enjoyed diplomatic relations since 1952; and the Cold War was in full force. From the Taiwan Strait Crises to the Great Leap Forward to the Cultural Revolution, pro-ROC huaqiao did not lack for developments with which to manufacture patriotism and outrage against the CCP. Anticommunism increasingly came to define what it meant to love one’s homeland, not to mention what it meant to be an ideologically-correct alien in the Philippines.

COWHM veterans embraced this ideology as a component of their patriotism, a disposition that sprung from their earlier service to the nation. Yet anti-Japanese sentiments remained integral to their worldview. In October 1971, Wang Tiannian wrote grimly that the international situation had worsened. He was not referring primarily to the ROC’s loss of its United Nations seat or Richard Nixon’s forthcoming visit to China, but to the agreement between the United States and Japan on June 17, in which the former relinquished all rights and interests under Article 3 of the San Francisco Treaty of 1952, transferring sovereignty of Okinawa, the Ryukyus, and the Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands to Japan while retaining its bases on Okinawa. As both the ROC and the PRC claimed the Diaoyu Islands as “Chinese” territory, the United States’ decision angered its partisans. In denouncing this unjust violation of the ROC’s sovereignty, Wang resurrected the language of World War II, claiming that the United States and Japan were “collaborating to annex” (goujie

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68 Recent scholarship suggests that Sun never said huaqiao wei geming zhi mu. Instead, the phrase appeared in print in the late 1920s after the Northern Expedition and became popularized in the 1930s, when conflict with Japan loomed. See Huang Jianli, “Umbilical Ties: The Framing of the Overseas Chinese as the Mother of the Revolution,” *Frontiers of History in China* 6 (2011): 183-228.
qintun 勾結侵吞) the ROC’s “sacred territory” (shensheng lingtu 神聖領土).\textsuperscript{69} To underscore the emotional resonance of this decision with its members, the VA published two articles on World War II in the tekan for that visit. One was a firsthand account of the Japanese military’s massacre of around 600 Chinese in San Pablo, Laguna, in early 1945, while the other was a polemic, written under the pseudonym of “old man of the Diaoyu Islands” (Diao sou 釣叟), pledging to protect the Islands and warning that in the near future, a unified China would prioritize retaking them from Japan.\textsuperscript{70}

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the VA enacted its affinities to the ROC state differently from other visiting huaqiao. In August 1968, responding to the KMT’s call for “joint service,” 19 members of the VA headed for Taiwan to “serve the people,” spending a month touring rural areas of the island. Appreciative ROC officials-cum-propagandists noted in their well-wishes to the VA that this was an unprecedented act, as most overseas Chinese visitors interacted with ROC officials and soldiers in urban, built, and militarized environments, rather than with ordinary people in the countryside. In total, VA members visited 130 villages and towns in the counties of Taipei, Yilan, Nantou, Tainan, and Kaohsiung, where they donated medicine and household items to farmers and villagers, provided scholarships to schoolchildren, and even helped build houses. To complement and emphasize the wider significance of these activities, delegation leader Cai Anluo 蔡安洛 gave speeches on communism, in both Mandarin or Minnanhua, to various county- and town-level civic associations on each day of the tour. For their contributions to the nation, the KMT Fifth Section,

\textsuperscript{69} “Feilübin Xuegan tuan di shisi fenbu huiguo zhijing tuan tekan,” 21, KHC.

\textsuperscript{70} “Feilübin Xuegan tuan di shisi fenbu huiguo zhijing tuan tekan,” 27-29, KHC.
which oversaw social movements and associations, presented them honorary certificates of merit and the delegation as a whole with a plaque from Chiang Kai-shek.\textsuperscript{71}

Not long after returning to the Philippines, Cai contacted the Fifth Section and proposed contributing towards a large-scale construction project in Taiwan with some 200,000 NTD that the VA had raised. Working with the Cai and the VA, the Fifth Section decided that these funds would go towards the rebuilding of Yuehe 樂合, an urban village (li 里) of 144 plains aborigines (pingdi shanbao 平地山胞) in the urban township (zhen 鎮) of Yuli 玉里 in Hualien county. A year later, in October 1969, with VA members in attendance, construction began on new houses for Yuehe’s 21 indigenous families, whose existing homes were located at the foot of a mountain and were at risk of being destroyed by landslides and flooding. In November 1970, Cai revisited Yuehe to find it a picture of modernity and happiness, according to the Director-General of the Fifth Section who accompanied him. Houses were now made of brick and reinforced by steel, to minimize earthquake from damage; modern sanitary facilities and a freshwater reservoir had been built. On the doors of each home were inscribed the names of Cai and other huaqiao who had given back to their nation.\textsuperscript{72}

**Conclusion**

This chapter has used Philippine-Chinese visits to Taiwan to explain how the ROC sought to represent itself to the world and shape how visiting huaqiao understood Taiwan and its struggle against communism. Through these visits, I argue, the ROC fashioned for itself qualities associated with the nation-state as a political form and cultural community in an effort to represent itself to

\textsuperscript{71}“Fei Xuegan tuan fenbu laojun tuan zuo fanguo,” *United Daily News*, August 1, 1968, 2; “Feilübin Xuegan tuan di shisan fenbu erdu huigu fuwu tuan jinian tekan,” A-3, A-8, A-9, A-10, KHC.

\textsuperscript{72}“Feilübin Xuegan tuan di shisan fenbu erdu huigu fuwu tuan jinian tekan,” A-2, A-3, A-4, KHC.
Chapter 5

the world as a substitute *zuguo* for overseas Chinese. The first half of this chapter shows that visits and the textual propaganda on them were constitutive of a larger struggle between the PRC and ROC to politicize Chinese transnationalism by directing Chinese people and capital towards either mainland or Taiwan. For Nationalist China, controlling and categorizing the inflow of its nationals were necessary for security purposes, and also a way of performing its sovereignty over Taiwan’s borders and asserting a universally-recognized attribute of state-ness. Publications associated with overseas Chinese visits such as the Guidebook that I examine factualized Taiwan’s presence in the world as a nation-like polity. While references to Taiwan as a *sheng* and *diqu* exposed the ROC’s territorial incompleteness and the uncertainty over its geopolitical future, propagandists retained the use of terms such as *Zhongguo* and *zuguo* to appeal to overseas Chinese visitors and legitimize the KMT-ROC party-state. Shifting my focus from rhetorical to practical strategies, I then describe the itinerary of a typical visit to explain how visits provided *huaqiao* with a firsthand glimpse of the development of “Free China.” Text and experience were meant to reinforce each other to help overseas Chinese internalize certain dispositions toward the nation when visiting the ROC.

The second part of this chapter focuses on how three different groups of Philippine Chinese visitors experienced “Free China,” and on their diverse relationships to the ROC. In examining the visit of PCACL leaders to Taiwan and Quemoy in October and November 1958, shortly after the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, I show that native-place sentiment and nostalgia for their home on the mainland underpinned many Philippine-Chinese elites support for their *zuguo*. For the primary school teachers who spent a month in the summer of 1967 learning pedagogy and visiting schools, the ROC was a provider of educational expertise and professional training. In the twin contexts of the Cultural Renaissance Movement and efforts by the Philippine state to nationalize Chinese schools, Chinese education became a common grounds for ideological and practical interests, with
teacher training at Panchiao serving as a means by which the ROC disciplined visiting *huaqiao*. Finally, members of the COWHM VA understood anticommunism in relation to their services to the ROC during World War II, and as an aspect of their patriotism. This patriotism did not express itself in anticommunist practices alone, but also in the forms of anti-Japanese attitudes and “joint service” to the people of Taiwan.
On the evening of May 4, 1970, agents of the Immigration Bureau detained Quintin 于長城 and Rizal Yuyitung 于長庚, respectively the Publisher and Editor of the *Chinese Commercial News*, at the Manila Overseas Press Club (MOPC). The CCN was, at the time, probably the most widely-read Chinese newspaper in the Philippines. The Yuyitungs had been, since March 24, on trial by the Deportation Board for having purportedly published pro-communist articles in their newspaper, and were then out on bail. Eight years earlier, they and ten other CCN employees had been arrested and charged with comparable offences. On May 14, 1968, they published an apology and retraction, and the Board dropped its case against them, placing them on probation instead. In March 1970, however, President Marcos resurrected these charges, claiming that the brothers had reverted to their former ways. This time, they would not escape the two regimes that opposed them.

With their hearings ongoing, and without being allowed to contact their lawyers or family members or even gather their belongings, they were bundled onboard a Philippine Airforce plane in the early hours of May 5 and deported to Taiwan as ROC nationals, by order of Marcos himself. On August 14, after a hearing that lasted only three and a half hours and was covered by the world media, a military tribunal found them guilty; Quintin was sentenced to two years of reformatory education and Rizal to three.

The case of the Yuyitungs bears superficial resemblance to that of the *jingqiao* in 1952 and Cebu students in 1954. Like the former, the brothers were not communists, and like the latter, they were

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were deported to Taiwan in what amounted to a perverse kind of “homecoming” for two persons who had been born in the Philippines and were only citizens of the ROC by virtue of their “Chinese” – in fact, Manchu – ancestry. Unlike previously, however, the Philippine military acted against the Yuyitungs with the full support of the ROC and local KMT ideologues, who had long sought their deportation. For liberal Filipino journalists, Quintin and Rizal’s persecution by the party and ROC signaled nothing less than de facto ROC encroachment upon Philippine sovereignty. On April 27, 1970, for example, Ernesto Granada of the *Manila Chronicle* described the KMT as “practically a government within a government in this country.”

The day after they were deported, Napoleon G. Rama of the *Philippines Free Press* denounced his country for having “degenerated into a puppet of a puppet.” Not to be outdone, the *People’s Daily* in the PRC excoriated the “reactionary” and “increasingly fascist” Philippine state for “openly collaborating” with the “Chiang Kai-shek bandit gang” to “persecute” the brothers. As we will see in Chapter 7, the second of two on the Yuyitung affair, these were sentiments shared by liberals and more radical types the world over.

While the Cold War rhetoric of puppetry goes overboard by denying the Philippines agency in its relationship with Taiwan, Rama and others’ claims of ROC involvement in the deportation of the brothers are broadly true. No episode illustrates more vividly how Nationalist China and the Philippines shared sovereignty over the Philippine-Chinese community to construct the “Chinese communist” as a legal subject and attack this imaginary common foe. Complementing Chapter 4, the CCN affair is similarly a rich case study with which to analyze the ideological texture of this

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3 Yuyitung (ed.), *The Case of the Yuyitung Brothers*, 258.

community and the institutions that sustained it. The paper’s nonconformist approach to reporting
news on China suggests that despite the ubiquity of anticommunism, print media provided a rare
informational space for the ideological orthodoxy of Chinese society to be contested. At the same
time, the case makes clear how representatives of the status quo thought and acted in response to
perceived challenges to their rigid worldview.

Scholarship analyzing the campaign against the CCN, however, is virtually non-existent. Most of what we know about the affair comes only by way of journalists and political activists in
the Philippines and beyond who defended the Yuyitungs in the name of press freedom, denounced
the Marcos and Chiang regimes, and lobbied for the brothers be released from Taiwan. Years later,
Rizal Yuyitung compiled a selection of articles into The Case of the Yuyitung Brothers: Philippine
Press Freedom Under Siege. This volume, together with his own recollections, as told in a series
of interviews to scholars from the Institute of Modern History (IMH) at Academia Sinica in 1993,
are our two main published sources on the Yuyitung affair today. But they do not explain the anti-
CCN side of the story: how, for instance, the KMT, Embassy, and military worked together behind
the scenes to persecute the brothers. It is here that the largely untapped records of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MOFA) archives in Taiwan come in invaluable – their own gaps and prejudices
notwithstanding.

5 The two exceptions are Yang Hsiu-chin 杨秀菁, “Feilübin ‘Huaqiao shangbao’ an yu xinwen ziyou wenti 菲律宾
《華僑商報》案與新聞自由問題,” Zhengda shicui 9 (2005): 145-179, which focuses on the CCN affair as it
relates to the issue of press freedom in Taiwan; and Zhao et al., Feilübin huawen baoshi gao. Other monographs
have examined the affair in relation to questions of citizenship and identity among the Chinese overseas, but without
probing the ROC and Philippine KMT’s involvement in it. See Shao Dan, “Chinese by Definition: Nationality Law,
The Chinese Question: Ethnicity, Nation, and Region in and Beyond the Philippines (Singapore: NUS Press, 2014),
91-136.

6 Yuyitung (ed.), The Case of the Yuyitung Brothers; Chang Tsun-wu 張存武, Chu Hong-yuan 朱宏源, Dory Poa 潘
露莉, and Lin Shu-hui 林淑慧 (ed.), The Reminiscences of the Chinese in the Philippines 菲律賓華僑華人訪問記
Chapter 6

This chapter, the first of two on the Yuyitung affair, explains how and why the KMT in the Philippines and Taiwan and ROC officials in both countries – which I refer to as a “Nationalist Chinese bloc” – colluded with the Philippine military and, in 1970, Marcos and a small number of his cronies, against the CCN. Drawing on the published sources mentioned above and also archival materials from Taiwan and the United States, I show that this bloc gathered, forged, and interpreted evidence to assist the military in making a case to the Deportation Board for deporting the brothers in 1962 and 1970. It supplied the linguistic and cultural resources needed for the Yuyitungs to be identified as pro-communist Chinese “aliens” and exerted political pressure on Philippine officials and politicians such as Marcos from behind the scenes. The Philippine military, on its part, fronted the campaign and supplied the coercive means and legal justification needed to bring the brothers into the fold of the state. In December 1952, the absence of such collaboration and the military’s dependence on unreliable sources of intelligence destabilized Chinese society and threatened the reputation of institutions that claimed to defend its interests. The anti-CCN campaign showed that by the 1960s, these institutions, the KMT and Embassy, had successfully arrogated to themselves the power to determine the ideological guilt of Chinese in the country; in this sense, they did indeed constitute a “government within a government.”

I also explain why the Nationalist Chinese bloc and Philippine state acted against the CCN. As we will see, the CCN’s support for Chinese integration and criticisms of Chinese schools were at odds with the chauvinistic worldview of KMT intellectuals such as Cua Siok Po and his former colleague at the Great China Press, Hsin Kwan-chue邢光祖. Personal vendettas and community politics likely impelled some, among them the President of the Shang Zong, to seek the destruction of the paper. And in the context of the political turmoil that engulfed the Philippines in early 1970, Marcos may have ordered the brothers’ deportation as a way of paving the way for his declaration
of martial law two years later. These are the motivations that Rizal Yuyitun and supporters of the CCN have cited to explain the campaign against it. Evidence from the MOFA archives, however, shows that those involved in the campaign against the CCN focused exclusively on exposing it as a pro-communist mouthpiece, or even a communist organ; nothing in these hundreds of pages of documentation suggests that factors such as the CCN’s views on integration mattered at all. I argue, therefore, that most anti-CCN actors not only employed anticommunism as a strategy for opposing the CCN, but also believed that the newspaper supported communism. Individuals associated with it had been deported to Taïwan as communist suspects. Most of all, its self-proclaimed independent, centralist editorial policy was perceived as pro-Beijing in the context of a largely illiberal society in which anticommunism was regnant and communism was supposedly ever looking for ways to infiltrate it. By reprinting articles on China from foreign wire agencies that indirectly cited official PRC news agencies and their ideologically-incorrect language, for example, the CCN was seen as reporting favorably on the PRC and thus suspect. A common, oftentimes *a priori* conviction in the paper’s communist sympathies sustained opposition to it across the years and across the multiple factions that comprised the anti-CCN coalition. Its members did not see themselves as framing the innocent, but as prosecuting the guilty through any means necessary, including the manipulation of intelligence to make a more persuasive legal case for deportation.

**The CCN and the KMT, 1937-1950**

The *Chinese Commercial News* was founded in October 1919 as the monthly journal of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce and edited by Yu Yi-tung 于以同, a school teacher from China who had become the Chamber’s Secretary-General. In 1922, with the financial backing of the lumber magnate and Chamber President Dee C. Chuan 李清泉, it became a daily, independent
paper. Except during the Japanese occupation, and despite the prosecution of Quintin and Rizal in the 1960s and 1970s, it remained in circulation for half a century until the onset of martial law in 1972; in 1986, it resumed publication. Yu Yi-tung did not survive the occupation. For refusing to propagandize on behalf of the Japanese, he was executed and the newspaper closed in early 1942. In April 1945, shortly after Manila’s liberation, the paper was resurrected by Yu’s four children: Quintin, Rizal, Helen, and Tiong Nay. By the 1960s, it had become the largest of the four Chinese dailies in the country, and remains a staple of the Chinese community today.  

In his 1965 study of Chinese newspapers in the Philippines, political scientist James Blaker described the CCN as a prototypically “Type II,” or “internal-political” paper that was established in response to developments not in China, but in the countries where huaqiao lived – in the CCN’s case, less the May Fourth Movement and more the 1919 Bookkeeping Law, which stipulated that business records were to be kept only in English, Spanish, or a Filipino dialect and thus threatened the economic livelihood of most Chinese merchants. By the 1960s, long after the pre-1949 heyday of Chinese print journalism in the country, the CCN was the only such paper of its type remaining. Unlike “Type I” or “external-political” papers such as the two KMT organs the Great China Press and Kong Li Po (not to mention the now-defunct Chinese Guide), the CCN adopted what its editors considered a centrist and non-partisan approach to reporting the news.  

By the late 1930s, the CCN’s purported objectivity and non-partisanship had fallen out of step with a polarized political climate in China and among Chinese nationalist circles in Southeast Asia.  

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Asia. During the Second Sino-Japanese War, Rizal recalled, while the *Fookien Times* only reported that Chinese troops were victorious, the CCN reported both Japan’s victories and defeats and relied on news dispatches from both the ROC’s Central News Agency (*Zhongyang tongxunshe* 中央通訊社, or CNA) and the Associated Press. If the latter cited Japanese government sources, the CCN translated them without modifying their original language, however derogatory towards the ROC it might be; it maintained the same policy of indirectly quoting PRC news agencies. Consequently, despite supporting the War of Resistance against Japan, the CCN became a “traitorous” newspaper to KMT loyalists in the Philippines. 9 Shortly after World War II, the CCN’s determination to avoid taking sides in the Civil War saw it caught in the middle of a vicious war of words between leftist and rightist Chinese newspapers. Pro-communist outlets such as the *Chinese Guide* regarded it as a “running dog of the rightists,” while to pro-Chiang papers such as the *Kong Li Po, Chung Cheng Daily News, Great China Press*, and *Chungking Times*, it was insufficiently pro-KMT. 10 With the collapse of the radical Chinese left and its media organs by the late 1940s, Chinese public opinion in the Philippines shifted rightwards and the CCN assumed its position at the leftmost extreme of a very narrow ideological spectrum. Well before 1962, if the Yuyitungs are to be believed, their paper had fallen afoul of ideological extremists. “There is a Chinese group that has tried for years, even before the war, to undercut my family and our newspaper,” Quintin said in an interview with the *Free Press* in 1962, shortly after the arrests. “For upholding the policy of truthful reporting my paper has offended many in the Chinese community,” he claimed, in a thinly-veiled reference to the KMT. 11

9 Yuyitung (ed.), *The Case of the Yuyitung Brothers*, ii.


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Over the course of the KMT’s long war with the Japanese and Communists from the 1930s onwards, therefore, the CCN acquired a reputation for ideological unreliability that informed how a generation of KMT partisans perceived it. The CCN’s “objective” journalism ran contrary to the policies of a censorious, state-controlled media regime, the fascistic cult of personality surrounding Chiang Kai-shek, and institutions such as the Jiangxi Political School in Nanchang and the Central Military Academy in Nanjing and Chengdu that trained and indoctrinated party cadres. Had the paper circulated in China during the 1930s, it would have been shut down by the Nationalist state for propagating ideas “discordant with the Three Principles of the People and People’s Revolution” and subjected to violent attacks by Blue Shirts and CC Clique members. Illiberal attitudes toward the press and the institutions that fostered such illiberalism were essentially transplanted to Taiwan after the War of Resistance. There, after 1949, they found fertile ground in a society under martial law that was being mobilized – and whose elites sought to mobilize huaqiao – to counterattack the mainland and defeat a communist enemy whose modus operandi involved propagating “subversive” ideologies such as neutralism and “peaceful coexistence.” Many of the most strident opponents of the CCN, as we will see, were products of this ideological nexus.

The CCN’s first postwar encounter with the authorities appears to have taken place in mid-1950, when Quintin Yuyitung left Manila on a cruise ship for a two-week tour of Hong Kong and Tokyo. Upon returning to the Philippines on June 12, he was interrogated by MIS and his luggage searched. According to a US Air Force intelligence agent present at the interrogation, Quintin said


that he had traveled to Hong Kong to buy typecasting equipment for the newspaper. The search of his belongings yielded nothing of note. British intelligence had subjected him to similar procedures upon his arrival in Hong Kong, and had shadowed him. American agents who trailed him in Japan said that he was on a sightseeing tour organized by the Japan Travel Bureau and also found nothing suspicious about his behavior. Allan Charak, the Air Force agent who reported on him, called him the “suspected head of the Chinese Communist Party in Manila.” Charak’s source was Counsellor Chow Shu-kai of the ROC Embassy, who claimed that Quintin was planning to meet with high-ranking communist leaders in Hong Kong and Tokyo to exchange documents with them. Chow’s informant, in turn, was a “highly reliable person in the Chinese Nationalist Party organization in Manila.”

Several months after Quintin returned from his cruise, and following Ramon Magsaysay’s appointment as Secretary of National Defense in August 1950, three men associated with the CCN were arrested by the military as part of a fresh wave of crackdowns on Chinese undesirables in the country. Lim Hua Sin 林華新 had worked for the CCN as a translator after the war and had been attached to the ROC Consulate and Embassy; Ma Piao Ping 馬飄萍 was then the CCN’s circulation manager; and Pao Kee Tung 鮑居東 was Ma’s business partner and a writer for the paper. All three were accused of being communist propagandists. Rizal Yuyitung blamed the local KMT for plotting against the paper. Over 40 years after the arrest of his employees, he insisted that Lim’s only crime, according to a conversation that Rizal had with Immigration Commissioner Engracio

14 Record Group [RG] 319: Records of the Army Staff, 1903-2009, Series: Intelligence and Investigative Dossiers Personal Files, ca. 1977-ca. 2004, Box 877, Folder: YU, Yi Tung Quin Tin - XA544488, National Archives and Records Administration [NARA], College Park, Maryland.

Fabre, was to translate an article for the newspaper reflecting on Eleanor Roosevelt’s plans to visit Moscow.\textsuperscript{16} The actual offending evidence consisted, first, of an article by Lim in the CCN in 1946 ironically entitled “I became left-leaning,” in which he declared that he had no connections with any political parties and claimed, prophetically, that anyone at the time who identified as a centrist risked being called a communist. Lim’s diary, however, revealed that he was in financial difficulty and thus had sought to sell arms and ammunition to the Hukbalahap.\textsuperscript{17} The deportation case against Ma was based on a master list of communists that the Philippine military had obtained, most likely from the KMT, and on sworn statements that he was an active communist. Pao owned a bookstore at Ongpin Street that sold communist propaganda and testified that Ma was aware of all the books and magazines stocked there. The KMT and Embassy further believed that Pao’s “habitual words and actions” (\textit{pingsu yanxing} 平素言行) made him a suspect.\textsuperscript{18} Lim, Ma, Pao, and other Chinese were deported to Taiwan in early 1951 as the anti-Chinese Red scare in the Philippines escalated. In January 1952, Taiwan sentenced Lim to an undisclosed period of political reeducation; Ma was tried in July 1953 and found innocent, while Pao was sentenced to seven years in jail.\textsuperscript{19} In profiling Lim, Taiwan’s Public Security Bureau (\textit{Guojia anquan ju} 國家安全局) branded the CCN a centrist paper that had been attacked by the \textit{Chinese Guide} and the \textit{Great China Press}. Lim had not joined

\textsuperscript{16} Chang et al. (ed.), \textit{The Reminiscences of the Chinese in the Philippines}, 321. Rizal’s recollections here are inaccurate, as Eleanor Roosevelt’s visit to Moscow took place in 1957.


\textsuperscript{19} “Lü Fei buliang huaqiao,” Vol. 6, 140-142, AH.
any illegal organizations, it concluded. Nonetheless, because he had considered selling materiel to
the communists, “his thinking is clearly biased” (sixiang xian you pianpo 思想顯有偏頗).20

The Taiwanese state, as distinct from the KMT and ROC officials in the Philippines, was
evidently skeptical then of claims that the CCN was a communist publication, even if it was within
its power to find persons who had worked or written for the paper ideologically suspect according
to the standards of martial law. If Rizal Yuyitung is to be believed, all three men, and not just Ma,
were released shortly after being deported and started families and businesses on Taiwan instead
of returning to the Philippines.21 While ROC sources do not reveal if Lim and Pao were released,
it is clear from them that a handful within the Taiwanese government were concerned that the ROC
had erred in accepting their deportation. At this time, a critical mass of evidence needed to prove
that the Yuyitungs and the paper in general were ideologically undesirable did not yet exist.

Over the 1950s, and particularly from 1960 to 1962, ROC partisans in the Philippines grew
increasingly convinced that the CCN was pro-communist, expanding the basis of their belief from
guilt by association with specific individuals to include what they considered the heterodox ideas
and bad faith of the paper itself. For instance, the known fact that Koa Chian – an actual communist,
unlike Lim, Ma, or Pao – had worked for the CCN before and after World War II did not appear
to matter much. Anti-CCN sentiment, rather, took the form of objections to the content of the paper.
In September 1956, at the first convention of the PCACL, among the many items on the delegates’
agenda was a proposal by a representative of the Co (Xu) clan association, Xu Junwu 許君武, to
censure the paper for its “pro-communist opinions and attitudes and confusing what Chinese saw

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and heard” (tangong yanlun taidu raoluan huaqiao shiting 袒共言論態度擾亂華僑視聽). After much discussion, the motion passed.\textsuperscript{22} Unfortunately, we do not know exactly what they discussed behind closed doors, or what Xu’s background was. Two years later, a ROC-KMT anticommunist working group in the Philippines, convened by the ROC Ambassador, adopted identical language in discussing how best to persuade the CCN to change its “communist-leaning opinions” (qing fei yanjun 傾匪言論).\textsuperscript{23} We can infer what their objections may have been from the two main factors that Rizal cited as causing antipathy towards the CCN.

**Undermining Chineseness? The CCN and Chinese integration in the Philippines**

In recalling his life to interviewers from IMH in the early 1990s, Rizal attributed the CCN’s non-conformist positions to his family’s unusual ethnic background. Born in Manila rather than in Fujian, the brothers were also not Han Chinese, but Manchus. “Our background and family history,” he told them, “would not allow us to take extreme positions. We were unenthusiastic about politics, especially Quintin. Once, when angry, he said to me that the CCN should simply not publish front page international news or supplements.”\textsuperscript{24} But political it certainly was – just not with respect to international affairs. As Chapter 4 has shown, the CCN advocated Chinese integration into Filipino society. It began doing so as early as June 1952 with the publication in its Sunday supplement, the *Chinese Weekly* (*Huaqiao zhoukan* 華僑周刊), of a two-part article, “The Road Ahead for Chinese

\textsuperscript{22}“Feihua fangong kang’e zonghui 菲華反共抗俄總會,” Vol. 1, 185, 062.2/0004, December 1950-December 1959, Institute of Modern History [IMH] Archives, Academia Sinica, Taipei.

\textsuperscript{23}“Tai (48) yang mizi di 001 hao Zhang Lisheng, Zheng Yanfen cheng 台(48)央秘字第 001 號張厲生、鄭彥棻呈,” Zongcai piqian 总裁批文 48/0001, December 31, 1958, KMT Archives, Taipei.

\textsuperscript{24}Chang et al. (ed.), *The Reminiscences of the Chinese in the Philippines*, 317.
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Society” (“Huaqiao shehui de luxiang” 華僑社會的路向). Written under a pseudonym by literary editor Go Eng Guan 吳永源, it criticized the China-oriented “provincialism” (xiangtu zhuyi 鄉土主義) of most of his compatriots. Returning to China was not a realistic option. Instead, Go called on the Chinese to contribute their skills and talent to the Philippines and for the weaving of cultural Chineseness into the multi-ethnic fabric of the Philippine nation.25 A steady stream of such pieces followed. While critical of the state’s discriminatory economic policies, the CCN took the unusual position of encouraging a kind of self-Filipinization from the bottom-up. Starting in 1960, usually under a pseudonym, Rizal himself took to the pages of the Weekly to promote the “metamorphosis” (tuibian 蛻變) of Chinese into Filipinos, a process that would entail not simply the acquisition of formal citizenship by Chinese, but also the “hybridization” (hunhua 混化) of Chinese and Filipino cultures through, for instance, the widespread adoption of Filipino languages by Chinese and the relegation of Chinese to a secondary tongue.26

The CCN’s calls for integration were ahead of the times and out of place in the 1950s and early 1960s. Philippine citizenship remained difficult and expensive to obtain, and there were no efforts to push for the simplification of the naturalization process among either Filipino politicians or Chinese elites. As Rizal explained, the belief that “if you were born Chinese, you would die and become a Chinese ghost” (sheng wei Zhongguo ren si wei Zhongguo hun 生為中國人死為中國鬼) was too deeply embedded in how Chinese, Filipinos, and Americans in the country understood Chinese identity. Quintin was outgoing, persuasive, and well-connected, and was able to win over


26 Zhao et al., Feilübin huawen baoshi gao, 172-174. See, for example, “Shi tuibian de shihou le 蛻變的時候了,” Chinese Commercial News [CCN], November 27, 1960, 3; “Hunhua er bushi tonghua 混化而不是同化,” CCN, March 12, 1961, 3.
many to the CCN’s side, but the brothers’ efforts met with resistance from Chinese intellectuals affiliated with the KMT, in particular Hsin Kwan-chue, editor-in-chief of the *Great China Press*. Born in Jiangsu, Hsin first arrived in the Philippines in 1946 as the CNA’s editorial director, having previously worked in China as a journalist and propagandist for the KMT. Throughout the course of a long career in China, the Philippines, and Taiwan, he published dozens of volumes of poems and literary criticism in praise of an essentialized Chinese culture. Hsin wrote frequently for the *Press* under the suitably conservative pen name of Sima Guang and condemned the Yuyitungs for “forgetting their roots” (*shu dian wang zu* 数典忘祖) in advocating integration.

It is not difficult to understand why Hsin and other KMT cultural warriors in the Philippines such as Cua Siok Po (a close associate of Hsin’s at the *Great China Press* and in the party) opposed Chinese integration and the CCN’s support for it. For intellectual conservatives like Hsin and Cua (a graduate of the Chongqing Central Training Group in 1939), cultural Filipinization meant the loss of Chineseness and threatened Chinese-language education, the foundation of KMT influence in the country. As identities underwent *hunhua*, so the logic of cultural chauvinism went, as so too did identification with the ROC – the self-appointed guardian of Chinese “tradition” at the time – diminish, depriving Taiwan of support from its overseas nationals.

To compound the Yuyitungs’ relationship with the KMT, from the mid-1950s, supporting the integration of Southeast Asia’s Chinese became the official policy of the PRC as it sought to

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29 Zhao et al., *Feilübin huawen baoshi gao*, 171.
30 Cua Siok Po 柯叔寶, *Fendou rensheng* 奮鬥人生 (Taipei: Liming wenhua shiye gufen youxian gongsi, 1982), 47.
win over non-aligned countries and allay their fears of local Chinese populations as potential fifth columnists. In December 1956, Zhou Enlai gave a speech in Burma making it clear that all Chinese abroad could unilaterally renounce their PRC citizenship. By the end of 1957, the PRC had shifted from merely giving them this choice to actively encouraging them to become local citizens, limit their pro-PRC activities, and adopt integrative practices such as intermarriage.\footnote{Stephen Fitzgerald, \textit{China and the Overseas Chinese: A Study of Peking’s Changing Policy, 1949-1970} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 135, 141-143.} We do not know if the Yuyitungs’ and other CCN contributors’ thinking on integration was influenced by the PRC – there is no mention of this in Rizal and Quintin’s public utterances – or if the KMT believed that such influence existed, but the party cannot have failed to notice the broad similarities between the CCN’s position and the PRC’s. Advocating integration could certainly have been perceived as a “communist-leaning opinion.”

Rizal, Quintin, and their lawyers were adamant that the CCN’s support for integration was a key reason for the Philippine KMT’s and ROC’s hostility towards the paper. Beyond their own statements, however, there is no evidence from ROC archives to show that the Nationalist Chinese bloc used integration to oppose the Yuyitungs during the Deportation Board trials in 1962 or 1970, or at the Taipei military court in 1970.\footnote{Taiwanese historian Yang Hsiu-chin, the only other scholar to have done work on the Yuyitung affair using ROC MOFA sources, arrives at the same conclusion in “Feilübin ‘Huaqiao shangbao’ an yu xinwen ziyou wenti,” 155-156. The Yuyitungs’ attorney during their 1962 Deportation Board trial, Alexander Sycip, argued that the CCN’s support for integration explained ROC and KMT hostility towards the paper, but this claim received no further attention. See “Huaqiao shangbao an,” Vol. 3, 60, 020-010708-0069, May 8-August 27, 1962, AH.} The ROC government’s policy on integration, as opposed to that of individual KMT ideologues such as Hsin, was never explicitly articulated. While Taiwan neither abrogated its Nationality Law nor relinquished its claims over Chinese abroad, as the PRC did, it did not officially consider advocating \textit{hunhua} or even \textit{tonghua} 同化 (assimilation) as anti-
ROCS and pro-communist behavior. A legal argument against the CCN on such grounds would not have persuaded the ROC to accept the Yuyitungs, and neither would the Deportation Board have entertained such evidence; integration was a pro-Filipino position, after all.

**Undermining anticommunism? The CCN and the Chinese media in the Philippines**

While opposition to integration may have driven many among the KMT to oppose the CCN, it cannot explain the Philippine military’s and ROC Embassy’s involvement. Their campaign was centered on anticommunism. As an ideological lens through which they apprehended social reality and the justification and strategy for persecuting the Yuyitungs, it united these factions. The CCN’s reporting on mainland China evinced pro-communist tendencies in their eyes and would serve as a necessary (albeit insufficient) evidentiary basis for their case against the paper.

In his IMH interviews, Rizal Yuyitung explained that the CCN was neither a leftist nor a rightist newspaper and was chiefly concerned with reporting on issues of interest to local Chinese businessmen. It encouraged integration, for instance, as the most realistic solution to anti-Chinese economic nationalism. Not being a KMT organ, unlike the Great China Press or Kong Li Po, the paper cherished its independence and felt no compulsion to toe the Nationalist line. Ideologically, the CCN also differed from the Fookien Times, which was independently-run, but whose founder and publisher Go Puan Seng was a committed anticommunist. International news tended to receive less attention than local news, but increased in proportion to the latter during the 1950s as the CCN sought to bolster its appeal. In reporting on China, it did so in the belief that, irrespective of the KMT-CCP split, readers had the right to know what was truly happening there because they had relatives on the mainland and many had been born there. At the time, however, neither English nor

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33 Zhao et al., *Feilübin huawen baoshi gao*, 167.
Chinese newspapers in the Philippines had direct access to the PRC’s official news agency, Xinhua. Chinese papers, including the CCN, obtained most of their news on China from the ROC’s Central News Agency, while English-language papers also relied on international news agencies such as Reuters, Agence France-Presse (AFP), United Press International (UPI), and the Associated Press, all of which subscribed to Xinhua. Unlike the other three Chinese dailies, the CCN translated and published these agencies’ articles verbatim to offer a diversity of perspectives on China, much as it had done with respect to Japan before the war. On the few occasions that Filipinos publicly visited China, the CCN also provided coverage. For instance, Rizal recalled that when a group of Filipino journalists travelled to China (he did not say when), the CCN translated their report, which provided both favorable and critical views of the PRC.

The CCN’s reliance on multiple news sources in covering China resembled that of English papers in the Philippines and, in that context, was unremarkable. From the standpoint of the KMT in the Philippines and ROC officials there, however, indirectly reproducing official PRC sources was unacceptable. A news item such as “Red China navy rated strongest in the Far East” was “pro-communist” simply because it reported positively on the PRC. Provenance mattered not. The frame of reference for pro-ROC ideologues was the tightly-censored media scene on martial-law Taiwan, where “balanced” reportage on China was non-existent and considered antithetical to the nation-building project because it “confused what Chinese saw and heard,” to quote Xu Junwu (slightly out of context); neutralism, as PCACL propagandists reminded local Chinese, was a Trojan horse for communism. By the end of the 1940s and certainly by the mid-1950s, Nationalist organs such

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34 Chang et al. (ed.), *The Reminiscences of the Chinese in the Philippines*, 316.
35 Chang et al. (ed.), *The Reminiscences of the Chinese in the Philippines*, 327. Two such visits took place, once in 1964 and the other in 1967, during the Cultural Revolution. See Zhao et al., *Feilübin huawen baoshi gao*, 155-156.
as the KMT, PCACL, CKSC, and Embassy had mostly succeeded in recreating an informational environment within Chinese society in the Philippines that was similar to Taiwan’s, as Chapter 4 has shown.

A constant and prominent obstacle to the ideological monopoly of anticommunism was the country’s most widely-read Chinese newspaper. The CCN did not merely print news on China not from the CNA. It also violated the linguistic-ideological guidelines that the central KMT imposed on the media in Taiwan and required all organs of the state and party at home and abroad adopt. In July 1947, the KMT stipulated that all official correspondence, press releases, and newspapers refer to the CCP solely as *gongfei*, an announcement that the ROC authorities consolidated into a comprehensive set of guidelines for “rectifying the names” (*zhengming* 正名) to reflect the “true” nature of the CCP, PRC, Soviet Union, and Soviet and Chinese leaders and delegitimize Chinese communism. For instance, “fei” was to be attached as a suffix to the last names of Mao and other CCP leaders, while the PRC was always supposed to be the “communist bandit regime” (*gongfei zhengquan*), never *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo*.36 In the Philippines, the KMT, party newspapers, the *Fookien Times*, and Chinese civic organizations more generally adhered strictly to this naming policy, blanketing Chinese public discourse with KMT-approved ideological signifiers. The CCN did not observe these strictures. As a matter of principle, it kept the original language of any news dispatches that it reprinted, including that of the KMT and CNA. Thus in translating and publishing articles from AFP and other international wire agencies, it did not employ the rhetoric of banditry. Mao was Mao, and Beijing was Beijing (“Northern Capital”), which Taiwan persisted in naming “Beiping” (“Northern Peace”) in order to maintain the fiction that Nanjing (“Southern Capital”)

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remained the true capital of China. The Philippine KMT did not accept this, Rizal said. “It believed that you had to use ‘Beiping.’ If you used ‘Beijing,’ you were recognizing the CCP; if you did not use ‘Mao-bandit,’ ‘Mao-traitor’ [zei 賊], and similar language, you were a leftist, a communist.”  

To make matters worse for the CCN, in indirectly citing PRC news sources, it also often ended up publishing pejorative descriptions of Chiang Kai-shek, whom the PRC denounced as a “bandit” in exactly the same way that the ROC disparaged Mao. For instance, it republished a UPI article on May 17, 1962 that quoted a PRC news release attacking Chiang Kai-shek’s “bandit gang” (feibang) on Taiwan and Chiang as a “cruel bandit” (canfei 殘匪).  

To maintain its editorial independence, the CCN also refused to allow the KMT to dictate how it should publish the party’s news items. Rizal explained that in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the KMT zongzhibu and overseas Chinese section of the Central Committee regularly issued press releases to the CCN with instructions on which page to print them on, how much space they should take up, and the size of the headline. When the Yuyitungs persistently refused to comply with the KMT, the party stopped issuing the CCN with its news releases in the late 1950s and pressured the CNA into cancelling the CCN’s subscription to it in 1969. This forced the CCN to depend only on international wire agencies for its news on mainland China.

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37 Chang et al. (ed.), The Reminiscences of the Chinese in the Philippines, 326.

38 “Huaqiao shangbao an,” Vol. 3, 60, AH.


41 Chang et al. (ed.), The Reminiscences of the Chinese in the Philippines, 322.
In condemning the KMT, Rizal’s recollections reveal the gulf in attitudes between the CCN and KMT toward the role of the media in society and how “China” should be represented in print. A good liberal, Rizal was committed to fairness and balance in reporting the news and a free and independent press. He had only scorn for what he considered the servility of other Chinese papers toward the Nationalist government and their meddlesome pursuit of ideological uniformity: he and Quintin approached the news as a Filipino journalist might. Yet he acknowledged that his enemies’ belief in the CCN’s guilt was genuine, however much he knew that his paper was innocent. KMT ideologues were not only intolerant of deviations from official naming policy, but had been trained to ascribe such deviations to ill intent and communist scheming. *Gongfei* were, after all, ubiquitous, and constantly seeking to subvert overseas Chinese societies. In the Philippines, the *jinqiao an* and absence of an active Chinese communist movement since the late 1940s only heightened fears on the part of right-wing Chinese (and Filipinos) of a hidden Red menace—whose outward signs they were convinced they had identified in the early 1960s.

**The Philippine military, the Nationalist Chinese bloc, and the arrest of the Yuyitungs in 1962**

Quintin and Rizal Yuyitung were arrested for the first time in the early hours of March 8, 1962, together with ten CCN staffers; two additional CCN employees on the military’s wanted list of 14 names were never caught. Quintin, Rizal recalled, was dragged out of bed at home and taken to the offices of the CCN, which the military ransacked. Finding nothing of note, they returned the next evening and found a letter to Quintin from Li Weihan 李維漢, head of the United Work Front Department (*Tongyi zhanxian gongzuo bu* 统一战线工作部) of the CCP (in his IMH interviews, Rizal mistakenly identified Li as the head of the Chinese communists in the Philippines). Rizal’s house was also raided. In his retelling, the Filipino officer in charge of the raid was “very polite.”
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The problem was that he “didn’t understand a thing about communism. They confiscated several hundred of my books, because they believed that so long as someone’s last name ended with ‘ski,’ he was a communist. What a joke!” Most of the people arrested were released the following day, but Rizal was detained for two weeks and Quintin for six months. Even after both were freed, they had to remain within a ten-mile radius of Manila and report to a police station once a week.42

MOFA records allow us to reconstruct how these arrests came about and the motivations of the Embassy, KMT, and Philippine military in opposing the CCN. As Quintin’s brush with the law in 1950 and the deportation of Ma, Lim, and Pao suggest, MIS had long suspected the paper of being communist. In the years leading up to March 8, 1962, the Embassy reported, MIS began gathering incriminating evidence and surveilling key figures associated with the CCN.43 In August through September 1961, it formed a special working group to accelerate its operations and invited four leading party members, Cua Siok Po, the KMT’s Deputy Secretary-General S. C. Lim 林樹燦, the Kong Li Po’s General Manager Cheng Kim Tiao 莊金朝, and the Great China Press’s Koa Chun-te, to join it.44 Several months later, the Embassy came onboard the campaign at the asking of MIS and formed its own working group to discuss how best local Chinese and ROC officials ought to cooperate with MIS and how to represent the case to the media and Chinese public. Cua and Lim were also members of this second group.45

All involved took it as a given that the CCN was pro-communist; if there were dissenting views, they are not to be found in the archives. MIS believed that the CCN directly subscribed to

42 Chang et al. (ed.), The Reminiscences of the Chinese in the Philippines, 324-325.
43 “Huaqiao shangbao an,” Vol. 1, 135, AH.
44 “Huaqiao shangbao an,” Vol. 1, 173, AH.
45 “Huaqiao shangbao an,” Vol. 1, 82, AH.
Xinhua and was willfully publishing CCP propaganda, as its arrest warrant for the Yuyitungs and their employees shows.\textsuperscript{46} Agence France-Presse, it claimed, was simply a front that the CCN used to pretend that its Xinhua pieces were second-hand.\textsuperscript{47} ROC Ambassador Tuan Mao-lan admitted in a private conversation with Alfonso Sycip that while he did not read the paper closely every day, his general impression was that it leaned towards the communists.\textsuperscript{48} On February 3, 1962, just over a month before the arrests, the Embassy’s working group stated emphatically that cooperating with the Philippine authorities to eliminate the CCN was the “most concrete and important work” (\textit{zui shiji er you zhongda de gongzuo} 最實際而又重大的工作) against communists overseas. For the Nationalist Chinese bloc, the issue was not whether the CCN was guilty, but the optics and legality of the case and its ramifications for Chinese society. It was essential, the party and Embassy agreed, that they work closely with the military to avoid implicating innocent Chinese and any repeat of the \textit{jinqiao an}.\textsuperscript{49} Equally vital was ensuring that the Philippines take the initiative and act legally; Nationalist Chinese assistance be rendered in secret so as to avoid accusations of meddling in the Philippines’ internal affairs; and the arrests be framed as an anticommunist operation and nothing more.\textsuperscript{50}

In the months before March 8, 1962, the Embassy’s working group provided four forms of assistance to MIS. First, it vetted the original list of 27 suspects that MIS drew up and advised it to cut the list down to 14 names, lest the arrests be seen as targeting Chinese society in general as

\textsuperscript{46} “Huaqiao shangbao an,” Vol. 1, 99-100, AH.

\textsuperscript{47} “Huaqiao shangbao an,” Vol. 1, 82, AH.

\textsuperscript{48} “Huaqiao shangbao an,” Vol. 1, 55, AH.

\textsuperscript{49} “Huaqiao shangbao an,” Vol. 1, 137, AH.

\textsuperscript{50} “Huaqiao shangbao an,” Vol. 1, 82-85, 173, AH.
opposed to key figures in the CCN. Second, the Embassy secured the approval of the ROC to have the suspects deported to Taiwan. Third, in January 1962, the working group covered the Kong Li Po’s subscription to AFP so that the military could cross-reference its dispatches with CCN articles. Finally, to make up for MIS’s lack of manpower and translators, Embassy staffers helped translate three years’ worth of the CCN’s “pro-communist” articles, which later served as evidence for the prosecution.\(^{51}\)

Also working against the CCN behind the scenes was Hsin Kwan-chue, whom MIS invited to serve as its principal translator before the Embassy joined the campaign. Ideological differences aside, Hsin had an unusually personal relationship with the CCN. According to Rizal Yuyitung, Hsin bore a grudge against the paper for running stories about his opera singer wife and exposing him as a plagiarist.\(^{52}\) A propagandist and literary critic, he was also involved in intelligence work. In early-mid-1960, Hsin turned over to Narciso Ramos, the Philippines’ Ambassador to the ROC, a cache of documents purportedly detailing the activities and structure of the Chinese communist party in the Philippines from 1926 to 1956 or 1958. At Ramos’s request, he wrote a report on these documents that circulated widely and was highly regarded within the intelligence community. How Hsin obtained – if indeed, he simply “obtained” – these materials and what they actually contained are unknown, but, according to Ramos, he sought no material reward for handing them over. Nor was he financially compensated for translating thousands of CCN news items in the three months leading up to March 8 and sorting through and translating CCN staffers’ books and documents that were seized.\(^{53}\)

\(^{51}\) “Huaqiao shangbao an,” Vol. 1, 55, 84-87, 136, AH.

\(^{52}\) Chang et al. (ed.), The Reminiscences of the Chinese in the Philippines, 328; Zhao et al., Feiřūn huawen baoshi gao, 183-184.

Hsin not only believed that the CCN was a pro-communist organ, but also had the incentive and means to seek the paper’s destruction. His involvement helps us explain why the military acted against the paper when it did. Hsin’s plagiarism scandal broke in 1959. In 1960, he reported on Chinese communism in the Philippines to the Philippine authorities and very likely implicated the CCN by highlighting its reporting on China. In 1961, MIS, whose longstanding suspicions of the paper Hsin’s report confirmed, invited him and his fellow KMT members Cua, Lim, Cheng, and Koa to help them construct a legal case centered on the selection, translation, and interpretation of the CCN’s “pro-Beijing” articles. Given his close ties with these four men through the KMT, Great China Press, and PCACL, Hsin cannot have acted alone. If the Embassy and, through it, the ROC state were aware of the KMT’s plot, their records do not say.

The 1962 trial of the Yuyitungs and its aftermath

To make its case for deporting the Yuyitungs, the military submitted a total of 1,916 items of evidence to the Deportation Board, most of which consisted of articles that Hsin and Embassy staffers had translated. Also included as evidence were several “anti-Filipino” cartoons and poems, books and periodicals that MIS had confiscated, Kong Li Po editorials, a report by Narciso Ramos, statements by the Shang Zong and PCACL denouncing the CCN as communist, and a December 15, 1961 letter from Li Weihan that MIS “found” in Quintin’s home study. The anti-CCN plotters evidently felt the need to produce as wide a range of evidence as possible in the hope that some, if not all, of it would prove persuasive. Li Weihan’s letter was key, because it was the only first-hand

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54 Zhao et al., Feilübin huawen baoshi gao, 184.

“proof” of ties between the CCP and the CCN. In this letter, Li addressed Quintin as “Comrade Chang-Chen” and praised him, Rizal, and 21 other individuals (who were mostly CCN employees) for working hard over the past year before criticizing them for not keeping pace with changing times. It was clear that “reactionary forces have been greatly expanding” with the Liberal Party’s victory in the November 1961 presidential elections and the growing strength of the “Chiang Kai-shek clique” in the Philippines. That year, “no prominent Chinese and Filipinos have come to visit and to inspect the Fatherland.” The letter, written mostly in simplified Chinese, concluded with Li instructing Quintin and the others to “discuss humbly the reasons why you cannot keep pace with change of environs” and to submit a plan for 1962 to him for endorsement. Quintin denied having seen it before and knowing its origins.

The letter was almost certainly a forgery, given how it was “discovered” a day after Quintin was arrested, when he had been removed from his home. Rizal was certain that it was the product of collaboration between the KMT and the military. That 23 names were squeezed onto a one-page letter suggests that it was fabricated and planted specifically to incriminate the entire CCN staff, he argued. Whoever forged it must have had knowledge of the CCP’s organizational structure and propaganda, as Li Weihan was indeed head of the United Work Front Department at the time. It resembled internal CCP missives and propaganda in style and content, and its use of simplified Chinese characters further “proved” that it originated in the PRC. Hsin was likely behind it. With his background as a propagandist and counter-intelligence agent, recent record of “obtaining” such documents, and enmity towards the CCN, he had both the motivation and means to forge the letter.

56 “Huaqiao shangbao an,” Vol. 1, 60-61, AH.
57 “Huaqiao shangbao an,” Vol. 3, 58, 60-63, AH.
58 Chang et al. (ed.), The Reminiscences of the Chinese in the Philippines, 324.
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Hsin himself was a witness for the prosecution, but appears not to have not commented on the Li Weihan letter. Instead, he was introduced as a specialist on the Chinese language and tasked with explaining to the Board why the CCN’s published output was pro-communist. According to Rizal, Hsin indicted the CCN for using simplified Chinese in its news items and publishing news items from Xinhua. But, Rizal said in response to Hsin, the CCN did not use simplified characters, because the type for its printers consisted only of traditional characters. The only character it used that could even be considered simplified was yi (traditional: 藝; simplified 艺), which it printed in its cursive form (芸) because of how complex its traditional form was. Hsin insisted that this was a simplified character, despite clear differences between its simplified and cursive forms. Quintin and his lawyer, Alexander Sycip (ironically, the ROC Embassy’s legal adviser until he was forced to resign from the position during the trial because of a conflict of interest) deftly handled Hsin’s accusation that the CCN printed CCP propaganda, explaining that it was an independent paper that published news on mainland China because its readers were interested in developments there. It did so through foreign wire agencies rather than the CNA because it did not want to print anything that had previously been vetted by a government. Commenting on the news item “Red China navy rated strongest in the Far East,” Quintin told the Deportation Board that “a reporter is not on the side of A in a basketball game against B simply because he reported that A won the game.”

Instead of Hsin, the prosecution called on a Hong Kong-based “authority” on communism named Chao Ching Win 周鯨文 to analyze Li Weihan’s letter and testify against the CCN. (Rizal did not mention Chao to his IMH interviewers, despite recalling the letter in detail.) The Embassy’s

59 Chang et al. (ed.), The Reminiscences of the Chinese in the Philippines, 326.

working group had recommended Chao as an expert witness and also paid for Chao’s two visits to the Philippines and his living expenses there, amounting to around 800 US dollars. Chao had no formal affiliation with the KMT or the ROC state and had never been to the Philippines previously, which explains why the prosecution felt that he would be a more credible witness. Born in Liaoning and educated in Tokyo, Michigan, and London, Chao helped found the China Democratic League, a coalition of political parties that sought a “third way” between the KMT and the CCP, in 1941. In December 1956, having attended the first two People’s Political Consultative Conferences in the PRC, he defected to Hong Kong. There, he wrote a bestselling critique of the CCP entitled Ten Stormy Years 風暴十年, which was translated into English, Japanese, and Korean; re-founded in 1958 a journal called Modern Critique, which he had originally set up in 1937; and established in 1960 the Mainland Research Institute, which published an English-language intelligence digest on the PRC and employed refugee intellectuals like him.61

In his testimony, Chao informed the Deportation Board that, while part of the Democratic League, he had met Li Weihan previously, and that his research in Hong Kong proved that Li was indeed head of the United Work Front Department. Li had either penned the letter himself or gotten someone else to write it for him, Chao believed. Everything about it – its letterhead, seal, use of simplified characters, and style – was identical to CCP documents.62 He was adamant that the CCN was a Red organ, despite having no previous history with the paper. But he had different standards of legal proof from the Board, which remained skeptical of his interpretation of the evidence. Chao


quickly became frustrated with his limited influence over proceedings. During his second visit to the Philippines, during which he gave a series of lectures to the military on the CCP’s united front activities, he bemoaned the prosecution’s poor preparation, the Board’s limited understanding of the case, Filipinos’ lack of understanding of communism in general, and his minimal contact with Philippine KMT members and local Chinese. After testifying, an exasperated Chao told Koa Chun-te that Koa had find someone from Taiwan knowledgeable about the CCP to continue Chao’s work. You have to win the case, he declared, as a loss would have a huge impact on Chinese overseas in the future. Ironically, he said that it was acceptable to “make up a little evidence” (造點證據) and “treat [the Yuyitungs] a little unfairly” (冤屈他們一點). In other countries, based on evidence such as Li Weihan’s letter, they would have been found guilty much earlier. He said much the same to a Philippine military official and warned him not to release them. Before returning to Hong Kong, Chao accused one of the three Deportation Board members (he did not say who) as well as the English-language media, which had reported sympathetically on the CCN, of having been bribed by communists.  

In late 1962, the Deportation Board concluded its hearings and found the Yuyitungs guilty of “printing communistic news items and offensive cartoons and articles” from 1949 to 1962. It rejected, however, other pieces of evidence and arguments, including Li Weihan’s letter. Rather than simply recommending to the President that he deport the Yuyitungs, the Board suggested that if the brothers apologized for their actions, they be allowed to remain in the Philippines on a five-year probation period. With the fate of the Yuyitungs out of the hands of the Board, the Nationalist

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63 “Huaqiao shangbao an,” Vol. 3, 218-222, AH.

64 “Mageshi tongzong weihe qianpei Yu shi xiongdi,” 2, undated mss., Chinben See Memorial Library, Kaisa Heritage Center [KHC], Manila.
Chinese bloc and Philippine military turned to Malacañang in the hopes of persuading Macapagal to ignore this proviso and deport them as quickly as possible. But his executive order never came, despite multiple lobbying attempts, including a long memorandum on April 2, 1963 attacking the Yuyitungs from Ramos to Macapagal. Wary of being seen as meddling in the Philippines’ internal affairs, the Nationalist Chinese bloc ensured that it communicated with the President through the proper channels and relied on intermediaries such as Ramos and Marcos Soliman, Macapagal’s high school classmate and the head of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, in the hopes of persuading him. Macapagal’s thinking on the case is largely unknown, except for an undated conversation he had with Tuan Mao-lan. After hearing Tuan’s case for deporting the Yuyitungs, the President asked if they would be sentenced to death in Taiwan. Tuan said that they would only receive reformatory education, to help them turn over a new leaf. Macapagal was unconvinced by Tuan’s assurances and commented that the Philippines had only sentenced Huk leader Luis Taruc to life imprisonment, while communist propagandists were only jailed. On his mind were concerns about how the fate of the Yuyitungs and his complicity in their fate would affect his own political fortunes. Tuan came away from this exchange determined to work harder to persuade the President and Deportation Board.

In February 1965, almost three years on from the arrests, a report by the Embassy working group stated that Macapagal was willing to deport the Yuyitungs, but on the condition that Taiwan pay two million pesos (approximately USD 51,200) and send an airplane to pick up the brothers.

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67 “Huaqiao shangbao an,” Vol. 5, 210, AH.

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This money may have been earmarked for Macapagal’s reelection campaign later that year, and it was not forthcoming. The President, either too distracted by the impending elections or afraid of how any decision on his part would play out with the electorate and the opposition Nacionalistas, was quite happy to stymie the anti-CCN bloc even further. After his defeat in November, the case passed into the hands of his successor.

Marcos, like Macapagal, did not prioritize the Yuyitung case, at least during his first term in office. His inaction, the ROC Embassy conjectured, was down to an unwillingness to offend the English-language media – among whom the Yuyitungs had many friends and supporters – and be seen as violating freedom of the press.68 When Marcos eventually acted in 1968, he went with the recommendation of the Deportation Board and insisted that the Yuyitungs apologize for and retract the offending articles, so that they might be put on probation. Although they were at first unwilling to apologize because they had done nothing wrong, their friends persuaded them to, so that they could get on with their lives.69 The CCN published their apology in English and Chinese on May 14, 1968. The Nationalist Chinese bloc treated this as proof of the CCN’s guilt, and stepped up its surveillance of the paper in the hopes of finding fresh opportunities to act against it.70

The First Quarter Storm and the Thunderbolt Plan

In early 1970, leftist opposition to the once-popular Marcos administration surged. After lying dormant for many years since the end of the Huk Rebellion, Filipino communism had found

68 “Yu shi xiongdi qianpei (jianbao ziliao),” Vol. 1, 12-14, AH.

69 Chang et al. (ed.), The Reminiscences of the Chinese in the Philippines, 327; Yuyitung (ed.), The Case of the Yuyitung Brothers, vi.

70 “Yu shi xiongdi qianpei (jianbao ziliao),” Vol. 1, 12-14, AH.
a new lease of life with the re-establishment of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) in December 1968, along Maoist lines, and the creation of its armed wing, the New People’s Army, in March 1969. Marcos was reelected by a large margin in November 1969 thanks to what Alfred McCoy calls “an exceptional surge in violence and blatant vote buying.”\textsuperscript{71} In early 1970, Marcos’s popularity, especially among younger Filipinos, nosedived in response to a post-election financial crisis and austerity measures. In what became known as the “First Quarter Storm,” leftist student demonstrations erupted in Manila against Marcos and his American patrons, beginning with the visit of US Vice-President Spiro Agnew in late December the previous year and continuing well beyond then. On January 30, clashes between protesters and the police near Malacañang Palace led to six students being killed and hundreds more injured.\textsuperscript{72} For the first time in the Philippines’ independent history, Filipino anti-Chinese sentiment manifested itself in the form of social protests against the ROC and Chinese, rather than as economic or cultural legislation enacted by the state. On February 27, around 200 protesters gathered in front the ROC Embassy on Dewey Boulevard waving huge portraits of Mao Zedong and Che Guevara, and demanding that Taiwan resolve the “irritants” in its relationship with the Philippines.\textsuperscript{73}

\textsuperscript{71} Alfred W. McCoy, \textit{Policing America’s Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State} (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 390.


\textsuperscript{73} According to the manifesto of Makabansa sa Pugad Lawin, one of the protesting groups, these irritants were Taiwan’s refusal to accept the deportation of 109 ethnic Chinese detainees that were being held on Engineering Island at the time; its tolerance of illegal fishing by Taiwanese fishermen in Philippine waters; and the longstanding problem of the “overstaying temporary visitors.” See “Feiguo xuesheng shiwei 菲國學生示威,” Vol. 1, 113, 020-010709-0013, February 2, 1970-July 16, 1971. As for the 109 Chinese detained on Engineering Island, they were deported in mid-March. See “Yu shi xiongdi qianpei (jianbao ziliao), Vol. 1, 122, AH.
of Ambassador Patrick Sun 孙碧奇’s office. During this period, there were also minor occurrences of vandalism against businesses and cars in Chinatown.74

Not surprisingly, everyone from Marcos to members of the Philippine political and military establishment to right-wing Chinese and Filipinos were convinced that a Maoist plot against the Philippine and other Asian governments was underway, especially after January 30. The journalist Jose F. Lacaba reported that a policeman had called the events of that day an “insurrection,” while the President had labelled them “a revolt by local Maoist Communists” and “act of rebellion and subversion.”75 Fanning the flames of hysteria, the Philippine Anti-Communist Movement declared that Congress, the University of the Philippines (UP), and “practically all government offices had been infiltrated by subversive elements.”76 For Nationalist China, which had long staked part of its international reputation on understanding and combatting communism, social instability, left-wing anti-Chinese populism, and the resurgence of the CPP presented it with a golden opportunity to press its case against the Yuyitungs and ingratiate itself with Marcos and the military. As Chao Ching Win’s comments during the first CCN trial in 1962 indicate, Chinese anticommunists long believed that Filipinos did not grasp the magnitude of the threat facing them. This was evident in what Nationalist officials believed was the police’s sluggish and excessively tolerant response to the protests in front of the Embassy. Not only did the police arrive a whole 45 minutes after being contacted, but they made no attempt to disperse the demonstrators or have them stop waving Mao and Che’s portraits. In lodging its complaint with the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Embassy

74 “Feiguo xuesheng shiwei,” Vol. 1, 110-112, AH.
said that it would never allow Chinese nationalists to wave portraits of Huk leaders in front of the Philippine Embassy in Taipei. Taiwan’s expertise was therefore needed to help the Philippines come to terms with this resurgent Maoist menace.

The anti-CCN campaign had in fact restarted prior to the First Quarter Storm, which proved to be as unexpectedly beneficial to Marcos’s political ambitions as it was to the ROC’s long-term goal of ridding Chinese public discourse of ideological heterodoxy. As the case dragged on over the course of the 1960s, state and party officials in Taiwan and the Philippines came increasingly to view the paper as a threat that had to be dealt with in such a way that it had “no way of continuing to exist” (wufa jixu shengcun 無法繼續生存); failing to do so would harm their reputation. Just over half a year after the Yuyitungs apologized, the Nationalist Chinese bloc sprung into action again, prompted by what it saw as continuing textual evidence of the CCN’s communist tendencies and the paper’s violation of the conditions of its probation. Unlike in the early 1960s, when it is unclear precisely what or whose actions prompted the Philippine military to launch its operation against the CCN, the initiative this time can clearly be attributed to the KMT. In January 1969, the party launched what it called its “Thunderbolt Plan” (Leiting jihua 雷霆計劃) and, together with the Embassy and Great China Press, resumed compiling and translating articles from the CCN to prove that it persisted in publishing pro-communist propaganda. Left-wing anti-Marcos and anti-

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77 “Feiguo xuesheng shiwei,” Vol. 1, 110-112, AH.

78 “Huaqiao shangbao an,” Vol. 4, 59, AH.

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Chinese demonstrations during the First Quarter Storm reinforced long-held assumptions among Chinese rightists of a Chinese communist plot to destabilize the Philippines and allowed them to pin this social unrest onto the CCN.

The Thunderbolt Plan unfolded on multiple fronts in early 1970 as part of a multi-faceted campaign by the Embassy and local Chinese leaders to protect Chinese property, clarify the ROC’s efforts to resolve problems in the diplomatic relationship, and strengthen ROC-Philippine relations on the basis of a shared commitment to anticommunism. At the official level, Sun was tasked with meeting Marcos and offering ROC and Philippine-Chinese aid in combating the Maoist problem. The first recorded meeting between Sun and Marcos on this issue took place on February 6, during which Sun briefly mentioned the CCN’s role in fanning the flames of anti-government unrest. In response, Marcos said only that he had “also heard about this.” By then, the Thunderbolt planners had likely nearly completed their translation of the CCN’s articles for the benefit of the military.

Unlike in 1962, the KMT in Taiwan, and not only the party’s main branch in the Philippines, was actively involved in the overall Nationalist Chinese campaign against the Yuyitungs in 1970, chiefly through the Central Committee’s Third Section, which was responsible for huaqiao affairs. Thunderbolt was a transnational project that shows the reach of the KMT as an institution across state boundaries and the role of “cosmopolitan conservatives” in the making of overseas Chinese policy. The Third Section appears to have initiated Thunderbolt. It was chaired by Mah Soo-Lay, whom we last encountered in Chapter 1 as a founder of a Fuxingshe cell in the Philippines in 1936 that included Koa Chun-te, whom Mah maintained his friendship with and kept informed about.

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80 “Yu shi xiongdi qianpei (jianbao ziliao),” Vol. 1, 106, AH.
the CCN case.\textsuperscript{81} (Mah was also friends with Marcos’s chief Chinese business crony, Ralph Nubla 高祖儒 – who was not a KMT member – and in 1966 was invited to the President’s inauguration.\textsuperscript{82})

Its Deputy Chairman was Cua Siok Po, who had assumed this appointment and gone to Taiwan in November 1967.\textsuperscript{83} In early 1970, Cua revisited the Philippines to rally the party there and “patriotic Chinese” behind the Plan. Joining him there from Taiwan was Hsin Kwan-chue, who had left his position at the Great China Press in 1968 to become a visiting professor of foreign languages and literature at the Political Warfare Cadres Academy in Taipei, whose mission was to train political commissars loyal to the regime who would be assigned to military units.\textsuperscript{84} Because of his intimate ties to MIS, Hsin was tasked with encouraging the Philippine military to renew its operation against the Yuyitungs and to assist it in doing so.\textsuperscript{85}

Rizal Yuyitung’s recollections identify four Philippine KMT members who comprised the anti-CCN group in 1970. Cheng Kim Tiao and S. C. Lim, who was now the Secretary-General of the party, were again involved. The other two were Chen Ruishi 陳瑞時, a journalist for the Great China Press, and Cai Jingfu 蔡景福, who had succeeded Hsin as editor-in-chief of the Press and Cua as PCACL Secretary in 1968.\textsuperscript{86} A journalist and author cut from the same ideological cloth as

\textsuperscript{81} Handwritten letter from Mah Soo-Lay to Koa Chun-te, undated, Box 22, MSLP, HILA; Handwritten letter from Mah Soo-Lay to Koa Chun, te, undated, Box 25, MSLP, HILA.

\textsuperscript{82} Typewritten letter from Mah Soo-Lay to Ferdinand Marcos, January 4, 1966, Box 21, MSLP, HILA, 21; Letter from Mah Soo-Lay to Mr. Pastor, September 14, 1964, Box 52, MSLP, HILA.


\textsuperscript{85} “Feiguo xuesheng shiwei,” Vol. 1, 192-200, AH; Mah Soo-Lay, “Feilübin shiwei baoluan fazhan zhong Huaqiao shangbao an zhi zhixing ji jinhou zai Fei gongzuo fangzhen,” Box 20, MSLP, HILA.

\textsuperscript{86} Cai Jingfu 蔡景福, Liuzai ZhongFei menghuan jian 六載中菲夢幻間 (Taipei: Zhaoming chubanshe, 1978), 259.
Hsin, Cai bore a personal grudge against the CCN’s international affairs editor Tan Chin Hian 陳振賢, said Rizal, for having attacked Cai in the paper over the latter’s personal life.\(^87\) Along with Cua, Cai had acted as a witness for the prosecution in 1962.\(^88\) In apportioning the blame for his and Quintin’s arrest in 1970, Rizal did not mention Hsin, Cua, and Mah at all, but he recalled that someone from Taipei flew into the Philippines to testify that the CCN was a CCP mouthpiece. He described Koa Chun-te as a peripheral figure who had sent a messenger to inform the brothers after they were arrested that “I have nothing to do with this incident, which is the doing of another small group.” Koa, Rizal claimed, “very clearly did not approve of fabricating evidence against the CCN. He had spent many years in the Philippines and was quite familiar with us.”\(^89\) This is a puzzling exoneration of someone who had participated in the operation against the CCN in 1962 and who, because of his seniority within the party and ownership of the *Great China Press*, had close ties to most if not all of the party members involved in both the Philippines and Taiwan. Koa was also close to Narciso Ramos,\(^90\) who pushed insistently for the Yuyitungs to be deported during and after the 1962 trial.

Rizal also accused Antonio Roxas Chua, President of the Shang Zong from 1970 to 1974, of actively seeking the Yuyitungs’ deportation. As with his accusations against Cheng, Lim, Chen, and Cai, this claim is hard to corroborate. Cultural conservatives associated with the KMT, PCACL, *Kong Li Po*, and *Great China Press* were the driving force in both 1962 and 1970, with the business

\(^87\) Chang et al. (ed.), *The Reminiscences of the Chinese in the Philippines*, 337.


\(^89\) Chang et al. (ed.), *The Reminiscences of the Chinese in the Philippines*, 336-337.

\(^90\) Julio Tan, interview with author, June 8 and 12, 2016, Manila.
community as represented by the Federation playing a supporting role. The Shang Zong’s quarrel with the CCN can be traced back to a war of words between them that erupted in 1960 following Rizal’s criticism of the chamber’s lackluster response to Filipinization. This conflict prompted the Shang Zong to censure the CCN at its annual meeting. Two years later, Secretary Tang Tack, who had issued the chamber’s response to the CCN, was among a small handful of Federation members to step forward as witnesses for the prosecution and accuse the CCN of being pro-communist to the Deportation Board. It is thus entirely plausible, despite his absence from MOFA records on the Yuyitungs, that Roxas Chua pressed for their deportation, and not only for ideological reasons. In 1968, when Ralph Nubla was running for his second term as Shang Zong President, a clique of KMT members within the Shang Zong tried to unseat him and have Roxas Chua elected instead. Marcos backed his good friend Nubla, who remained President for two more years, after which his unwritten two-term limit expired and Roxas Chua succeeded him on November 25, 1970. Roxas Chua cannot therefore have used his leadership of the Federation to advocate deportation, but may have done so anyway in an effort to ingratiate himself with Marcos. And among KMT members in Taipei, it was common knowledge that Marcos made his decisions concerning the case based on intelligence from Chinese leaders.

Marcos ordered the arrest of the Yuyitungs on March 23. In his interviews with IMH, Rizal stated that the newly-appointed Secretary of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile wrote a report to the President, who then had Enrile take action against them. But in his memoirs, Enrile said that

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91 Zhao et al., Feilübin huawen baoshi gao, 151-152.


93 “Feiguo xuesheng shiwei,” Vol. 1, 190-191, AH.

an intelligence report from the military had prompted Marcos to have him “revive the deportation case against Quintin and Rizal.” Irrespective of whether or Marcos or Enrile initiated the arrest, it is clear that, by then, Thunderbolt’s planners had finished compiling evidence against the CCN and presented their findings to the military.

The President’s rationale for arresting them is not hard to grasp. Excerpts from his diaries show that Marcos had given serious consideration to declaring martial law during the First Quarter Storm, especially after January 30; on February 17, he wrote that “I have that feeling of certainty that I will end up with dictatorial powers if the situation continues – and the situation will continue.” Seeing himself surrounded by enemies, Marcos was especially hostile to leftist journalists such as Joaquin “Chino” Roces of the Manila Times, Teodoro Locsin of the Free Press, and I. P. Soliongco and Ernesto Granada of the Manila Chronicle – newspapermen “busy placing the government in disrepute and holding it in contempt before the people” by blaming it for the unrest and criticizing its policies toward the protesters. In the privacy of Malacañang, he lashed out at them as communist sympathizers, if not outright communists. Locsin “had always written sympathetically of Mao Tse Tung”; Granada “happily refers to me as snake-like” and “probably knows that he is suspected as a communist by me. And so too does I. P. Soliongco.” Marcos did not seem to think that the CPP was receiving external military aid – that is to say, from China – but he was quite willing to believe that communists and their fellow travelers in the Philippine media were lending rhetorical aid and legitimacy to “rebellion and subversion.” His was not a very different ideological logic from the ROC and KMT’s, in this sense. When either Enrile or the military reported to Marcos on the CCN,


their allegations would have jibed with his conspiratorial state of mind. Moreover, acting against the CCN allowed him not only to rid the country of supposed subversives, but also test the waters before declaring martial law. Ceferino “Joker” Arroyo, one of the Yuyitungs’ lawyers, argued that Marcos’s prosecution of the brothers was one of the “principal conditioning methods” with which he prepared the people to accept Proclamation No. 1081 on September 23, 1972. While he did not believe that he could directly assault the Filipino media, he reckoned – incorrectly, as it turned out – that no one would care if he arrested and then deported two Chinese journalists whose paper was read only by a small fraction of the country’s population.97

The 1970 Deportation Board trial of the Yuyitungs

While Deportation Board hearings for Chinese and other aliens were procedurally similar in some respects to court trials for Philippine citizens, the fate of those who underwent the former lay exclusively with the Executive.98 For example, Marcos could have easily rejected the Board’s earlier recommendation to grant conditional probation to the Yuyitungs and ordered them deported instead. Well aware of these discretionary powers and also his ability to determine the composition of the Board, the President would have been certain of the outcome of the CCN case in 1970 before it began. To ensure that the Board recommended deportation and that he would simply be seen as adhering to its verdict, Marcos instructed that only Immigration Commissioner Edmundo Reyes – his appointee – conduct the hearings beginning on March 24, as opposed to a conventional three-

97 Yuyitung (ed.), The Case of the Yuyitung Brothers, xvi.

man panel. Despite protests by the Yuyitungs’ lawyers, the Court of First Instance ruled that it was well within the President’s rights to appoint one person to oversee the hearings.\footnote{Yuyitung (ed.), \textit{The Case of the Yuyitung Brothers}, 28.}

The evidence presented by the prosecution consisted of the military’s intelligence report and 68 CCN articles from November 9, 1968 to March 6, 1970 that Thunderbolt’s planners had collected and translated.\footnote{Yuyitung (ed.), \textit{The Case of the Yuyitung Brothers}, 35.} 47 of these were from foreign wire services, and the remaining 21 from the Philippine News Service.\footnote{Yuyitung (ed.), \textit{The Case of the Yuyitung Brothers}, xxiv.} The report combined previous evidence against the CCN (such as the Li Weihan letter, which Rizal remembers was dredged up again) with an assortment of fresh charges, among them that Quintin, as a lecturer at the Asian Center of UP from December 1969 to April 1970, had used his lectures to spread Maoism; that they had secretly funded Maoist student leaders at UP; and that they had remitted money illegally to mainland China (presumably, because of latent sympathies with the communist regime). Quintin in fact had not lectured at UP, but had merely sat in on the lectures of Antonio Araneta, Jr., as a “resource person.” Araneta and several Asian Center students confirmed this as witnesses before the Board. Other UP students whom the brothers were said to have financed testified that they did not know them at all, had met them only once and not received money from them, or had never visited the MOPC, where they were reported to have met the Yuyitungs.\footnote{Yuyitung (ed.), \textit{The Case of the Yuyitung Brothers}, 32-33.} The illegal remittances charge proved to be just as unfounded. As Rizal recalled:\footnote{Chang et al. (ed.), \textit{The Reminiscences of the Chinese in the Philippines}, 327.}

A person whose last name was “Lee” said we had helped him send money to his children in China. In other words, we had violated the law. But this Mr. Lee, when questioned, did not dare to say his parents’ names and could not describe the surroundings of his residence.
in Manila. I remember a Western newspaper jokingly referring to him as “the worst KMT special agent.”

The first of two “expert” witnesses for the prosecution was one Captain Romualdo Dizon, a “specialist on China” who admitted during his cross-examination to not knowing Chinese.\(^\text{104}\) He also confessed to having nothing to do with the intelligence report on which he was supposed to testify. The report was signed by a Major Pedro Baldanero, who had simply collected a number of shorter reports from various agents and certified them as true copies of the originals. Although Dizon was adamant that these shorter reports were reliable, the prosecution refused to disclose the original agents’ identities, preventing the defense from being able to cross-examine them.\(^\text{105}\)

Provenance and context mattered little to the prosecution. Its second key witness was Hsin Kwan-chue, who flew in from Taipei as an honored guest of the Philippine military to reprise his role as interpreter-in-chief of the CCN’s “pro-communist” articles. Hsin engaged in a close reading of the news items that Thunderbolt had gathered and indicted the CCN based on its use of “leftist” terms such as “fascism,” “imperialism,” “feudalism,” “protracted struggle,” “serve the people,” “Beijing” and “People’s Republic of China,” dismissing as irrelevant the origins of these terms in foreign news dispatches and factual reports on China’s domestic affairs.\(^\text{106}\)

Neither Dizon nor Hsin proved a persuasive witness, to say the least. The reporters present during the hearings recorded a quite extraordinary exchange between Hsin and Juan Quijano, one of the Yuyitungs’ defense lawyers, ostensibly about press freedom in Taiwan, but which quickly devolved into a remarkable act of self-sabotage by Hsin.\(^\text{107}\)

\(^\text{104}\) Chang et al. (ed.), The Reminiscences of the Chinese in the Philippines, 336.

\(^\text{105}\) Yuyitung (ed.), The Case of the Yuyitung Brothers, 29-30.

\(^\text{106}\) Yuyitung (ed.), The Case of the Yuyitung Brothers, xxv.

\(^\text{107}\) Yuyitung (ed.), The Case of the Yuyitung Brothers, 30-31.
“You will agree with me,” [said] Attorney Quijano on cross-examination, “that in Taipeh [sic], in Taiwan, your newspapers do not enjoy the full freedom of the press.”

“We enjoy fullest freedom of press,” replied Professor Hsin, “so much as you enjoy right here. The only thing you see, we do it not upon the censorship of the government but upon the agreement of the editors.”

Quijano: “Can you publish in Taipeh an article severely or savagely criticizing General Chiang Kai-shek?”

Hsin: “This is...this belongs to a different tradition. We Chinese...”
Quijano: “No, no, just answer my question.”
Hsin: “We never do that.”
Quijano: “You never do that. That’s the answer there.”
Hsin: “Simply because our tradition is different.”
Quijano: “You never do that.”
Hsin: “Now would we do that? You see, I hate these people who do that.”
Quijano: “Now, suppose there is an editor in Taipeh whose sentiment is different from yours, whose guts or courage is different from yours, will he be free to criticize General Chiang Kai-shek savagely, the way our newspapers criticize our President?”
Hsin: “Mr. Attorney, your question is hypothetical, you see. I don’t want to...”
Quijano: “No, my question is not hypothetical...”
Hsin: “There is nothing wrong with President Chiang Kai-shek! Why should the people start attacking him? There’s no reason!”

Commissioner Reyes may have been tasked with finding the Yuyitungs guilty and expediting their deportation, but even he had to acknowledge the poverty of Dizon and Hsin’s testimonies. Quijano and the other members of the Yuyitungs’ legal team, Juan T. David, Joker Arroyo, and Napoleon Rama, succeeded at having the witnesses’ testimonies discarded.108

The evidentiary basis for prosecution thus narrowed to the MIS intelligence report and the 68 CCN’s articles. On the question of press freedom, the prosecution argued that Quintin and Rizal, as ROC citizens, did not possess the same rights as Philippine journalists, but the defense countered that there was nothing in the constitution which limited such freedom to only Philippine citizens.109

The urgent need to deliver a guilty verdict was compounded by the brothers’ declarations on April

108 Yuyitung (ed.), The Case of the Yuyitung Brothers, xxv.

109 Yuyitung (ed.), The Case of the Yuyitung Brothers, 36.
25 and 26 that they were renouncing their “Chinese” citizenship in protest against the ROC and KMT’s persecution of them – a declaration that Taipei had to officially approve before they could become legally stateless.\textsuperscript{110} By then, as ROC sources clearly show, their guilt was \textit{fait accompli.} Taiwan had already agreed to accept them, and the logistics of deportation were already being discussed. The Department of National Defense had originally hoped to deport them on April 21, but Rizal had fallen sick on April 18, and the trial had not ended as early as hoped because of the Yuyitungs’ legal team’s efforts before the Deportation Board.\textsuperscript{111} Marcos, fed up by the delays and confident of being able to legally defend his decision, ordered the Yuyitungs re-arrested on May 4 and deported the morning after.

\textbf{Conclusion}

The Yuyitungs and their supporters have long known that the KMT and ROC collaborated with Philippine military intelligence against the CCN in 1962 and 1970, as newspaper reports from the time and the reminiscences of Rizal Yuyitung in 1993 make clear. This chapter explains how and why so many different actors – from MIS to the KMT to Marcos – in both the Philippines and Taiwan persisted in opposing the CCN over such an extended period of time. Making use of ROC archives in addition to published sources on the affair, it describes how the KMT, ROC Embassy, and Philippine military twice manufactured a legal argument for deportation centered on the “pro-communist” articles which the CCN published. Keen to avoid a repeat of the \textit{jingqiao an} and ensure that the coercive powers of the Philippine state were exercised only upon the “guilty,” Nationalist

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{110}“Benbao bianji Yu Changgeng zuo gongzheng zhengqu mingnian xiuxian jieshou tusheng huaren cheng Fei gongmin 本報編輯于長庚昨供證爭取明年修憲接受土生華人成菲公民，” CCN, April 25, 1970, 7; “Yu Changcheng gongbu fangqi Zhonghua minguo de guoji 于長城公佈放棄中華民國的國籍，” CCN, Apr 26, 1970, 7.

\textsuperscript{111}“Yu shi xiongdi qianpei (jianbao ziliao),” Vol. 1, 35, 48-50, AH.}
Chapter 6

Chinese actors interpolated themselves into this state, working behind the scenes to construct and interpret the evidence needed to indict the Yuyitungs as undesirables. When they were deported, they believed that they had eliminated a threat to their transnational ideological project.

This chapter has also examined the motivations of the different factions that came together to persecute the Yuyitungs and persisted in doing so over the eight years between 1962 and 1970. The CCN’s support for Chinese integration into Philippine society, Rizal claimed, rankled right-wing Chinese chauvinists such as Hsin Kwan-chue, a key figure in the anti-CCN campaign across the two Deportation Board hearings. Hsin and the likes of Antonio Roxas Chua and Marcos may have also sought to destroy the CCN for reasons that went beyond their perceptions of its political leanings such as personal grudges, political ambitions. Yet ideology was central to their campaign. Anticommunism anchored their strategy and served as a rhetorical cudgel with which to publicly denounce the Yuyitungs; it is the sole motivating factor that all involved in the conspiracy shared. Between longstanding fears of communist subversion – which the First Quarter Storm heightened – and the overwhelmingly pro-ROC nature of most Chinese civic discourse in the Philippines, they had ample reason to perceive the paper as ideologically heterodox. The CCN was guilty through its association with persons who had been deported to Taiwan previously as undesirable aliens and because reactionary ideologues such as Hsin, Cua Siok Po, Chao Ching Win, Mah Soo-Lay, and others saw it not as centrist and independent, but as pro-communist. Convinced of its fundamental guilt, the paper’s enemies were willing to go to great lengths to achieve their goal of deporting the Yuyitungs, even if this meant, as Chao put it, “making up a little evidence” and “treating them a little unfairly.
A Humane Sovereignty:
Nationalist China’s Public Relations Campaign in Response to the Yuyitung Affair, 1970-1972

The saga of the Yuyitungs entered a new phase with the brothers’ deportation to Taiwan on May 5, 1970. In the period leading up to and following Quintin and Rizal’s trial before a military tribunal on August 14,\(^1\) CCN supporters from the Philippines and the International Press Institute (IPI) in particular mounted a staunch defense of the paper and lobbied unsuccessfully for Taiwan to release them in the name of press freedom and human rights. Liberal anti-ROC sentiment in the Philippines and within IPI ranks placed “Free China” under intense international scrutiny at a time when its all-important United Nations seat was taken away from it. The ROC could not but seek to justify its actions (and the Philippines’) to the world as those of a sovereign, law-abiding, and democratic “nation-state.” Yet neither could it ignore global public opinion entirely. The relatively lenient sentence that the ROC handed down to the brothers and the manner with which it treated them during their time on Taiwan owed much to its desire to appear flexible and humane in the eyes of international society. This satisfied no one. Liberals remained incensed that the Yuyitungs had been sentenced at all, while KMT hardliners in the Philippines contended (not incorrectly) that the ROC had caved in to the IPI’s lobbying by only having them undergo reformatory education.

Picking up from where the previous one left off, this chapter examines the ROC’s public relations campaign in response to the deportation of the Yuyitungs and to their trial in Taiwan. It begins by describing Nationalist China’s relations with the world in the early 1970s and with the IPI. I then examine Philippine and international responses to the deportation and verdict, before analyzing the campaign itself. In this section, I first focus on ROC-IPI relations and the lobbying

\(^1\) In the chronology of events provided by Rizal Yuyitung (ed.), *The Case of the Yuyitung Brothers: Philippine Press Freedom Under Siege* (Manila: Yuyitung Foundation, 2000), the date for the trial is mistakenly given as August 24.
efforts of newspaperman and “citizen-diplomat” Wang Tih-wu 王惕吾, and then the relationship between the ROC and the Philippine KMT. The campaign concluded, ambiguously, in late 1972 with the end of Quintin’s two-year period of reeducation. Taiwan’s handling of the Yuyitung affair from early 1970 to the end of 1972 resulted in its IPI committee being derecognized for four years and a near-fatal fracturing of its relationship with the KMT in the Philippines. More importantly, the campaign offers a different and virtually unstudied perspective on the ROC in the world from high diplomacy, US-Taiwan relations, and the East Asian regional economy. While its ties to the United States and its United Nations seat were of the greatest importance to the ROC, it also valued its ties to overseas Chinese communities and its membership of what might be called international civil society. This was a space of interaction comprising institutions in fields such as human rights, humanitarian relief, developmental assistance, environmental protection, and cultural exchange, which crossed borders and were established by private individuals and groups rather than the state. The messy aftermath of the Yuyitung affair provides detailed insight into how the ROC negotiated both relationships simultaneously and exploited an international crisis to shore up its sovereignty and place in the world.

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Nationalist China in the world in the early 1970s: beyond geopolitics and capitalism

Only a few iconic dates seem to matter as far as studies of the ROC’s relations with the rest of the world in the 1970s are concerned. In July 1971, US National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger visited China on a secret trip aimed at normalizing ties between the United States and its longtime Cold War enemy, and on October 25, Mao’s China replaced Chiang’s China in the United Nations. The following year, from February 21 to 28, Richard Nixon traveled to the PRC. As a political scientist put it, this ended the post-Civil War “golden age” of Taiwan’s foreign policy and marked the start of a period of “diplomatic isolation,” which lasted until newly-democratic Taiwan began practicing “pragmatic diplomacy” from 1988 until the present. This narrative treats all of Taiwan’s efforts in the world up to 1971 as focused on maintaining its UN seat and relations with the United States. Only after 1971, as more and more countries switched Chinas and Taiwan lost its place among international bodies such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, did the ROC begin exploring unofficial, economic and cultural relations with its former diplomatic partners (including, after 1975, the Philippines).

A somewhat different, but also US-centered narrative of Taiwan in the world emphasizes its place in the regional capitalist economy. As Bruce Cumings argues, borrowing from Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-systems approach, Taiwan and South Korea emerged as a vital periphery of a non-territorial US capitalist imperium in East Asia after World War II. Japan, both states’ former colonial overlord, occupied a crucial semi-peripheral role in this international division of labor. As Japan’s economy developed rapidly thanks to US economic and military aid, it moved through a

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5 Hickey, Foreign Policy Making in Taiwan, 11-12.
classic product-cycle industrialization pattern, with Taiwan and South Korea following in its wake. In shifting from heavy to high-technology industry, Japan passed down its now-outdated heavy industrial equipment and expertise to its former colonies, boosting their industrialization drives. This, in Cumings’s view, offers a more systemic and less mono-national perspective on the East Asian “economic miracle” after 1960.6

In the early 1970s, the ROC’s place in the world was simultaneously more and less certain than it was two decades earlier. After two cross-strait crises in the first decade of KMT rule on Taiwan, no overt PRC military threats against the ROC surfaced during the 1960s. The Sino-Soviet Split and Cultural Revolution had largely weakened the PRC’s reputation internationally, except among social movements worldwide that were attracted to radical Maoism. Taiwan’s increasingly globalized, export-oriented economy was booming: foreign investment in 1969 exceeded the total amount of grants made in any single year of US economic aid. In that same year, exports accounted for 25 percent of Taiwan’s GNP and amounted to one billion US dollars for the first time.7 At the United Nations, diplomatic efforts to have the ROC kicked out had stalled, thanks to continued US support. On November 11, 1969, in what had become an annual affair, the General Assembly voted 56-48 (with 21 abstentions) against ejecting Taiwan and admitting the PRC. Among African states, more recognized Taipei than Beijing.8

There were also signs that the diplomatic tides were turning against the ROC. Since 1950, the number of countries that recognized the PRC had steadily increased. In 1969, rumors were that

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8 Plummer, “Taiwan,” 24.
Canada and Italy, among others, would switch Chinas – which both did in late 1970. Well before then, argues Chiang’s biographer, the Generalissimo would have been aware that secret exchanges between Washington and Beijing had been taking place through intermediaries such as Pakistan. Outwardly, the United States was showing signs of relaxing its hardline stance towards the PRC by issuing passports for travel there and allowing the import of a limited amount of PRC-made products. And in November 1969, it quietly ended its 19-year patrol of the Taiwan Strait, which had become a symbol of its commitment to Chiang.

The mainstream US-Taiwan narrative is a necessary context for the narrative that I sketch here. So too is the ROC’s long history of engagement with the world, going all the way back to a period that Frank Dikötter controversially labels an “Age of Openness.” As Dikötter argues, China before 1949 was an active participant in the international community through organizations such as the League of Nations, and in “almost every major international conference in a whole range of fields, from penal reform to human genetics.” Though not necessarily inspired by Dikötter, other scholars have also begun exploring the ROC’s place in the post-1949 world from perspectives such as, for example, Taiwan’s role in promoting agricultural development in the Third World through initiatives such as Operation Vanguard, which offered Taiwanese technical expertise (supported by US funding), to African nations in exchange for diplomatic support. Overseas Chinese visits

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12 Frank Dikötter, The Age of Openness: China before Mao (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2008), 55, 57.

to Taiwan, as explained in Chapter 5, together with tours of Free China for other groups of foreign
visitors, served similarly propagandistic ends. But while huiguo visits were shows of strength, the
ROC’s campaign in response to the Yuyitung affair highlighted its vulnerability.

Taiwan, press freedom, and the IPI before 1970

The IPI, the international nongovernmental organization at the heart of this chapter, was
founded in 1951 in Zurich by a small group of editors from fifteen countries for the purposes of
improving the flow of news between nations, obtaining better access to the news, and protecting
freedom of the press.14 None of its national committees were drawn from Second World countries,
making the IPI an attractive organization for the anticommunist ROC. In June 1969, the executive
committee of the IPI, with approval from its general assembly, accredited a national committee for
the ROC at the institute’s annual general meeting in Ottawa. This was not the first time the ROC
had applied to join the IPI. In December 1960, the IPI rejected Taiwan’s application because it had
shuttered the liberal and ironically titled Free China journal and jailed its editor-in-chief Lei Chen
雷震 for attempting to organize a new political party.15 Nine years later, the IPI relented thanks to
the lobbying of Wang Tih-wu, founder and owner of the United Daily News (Lianhebao 聯合報,
or UDN). The Zhejiang-born Wang was no mere private citizen, but a graduate of the Whampoa
Military Academy who had served as director of security for Chiang Kai-shek’s official residence.
As UDN owner, he was involved in high-level party and state affairs as a KMT Central Committee
member. The UDN was one of the two major “privately-owned” papers in Taiwan at the time, but,


like all media outlets under martial law, practiced self-censorship and faithfully toed the official anticommunist line. The state restricted the ownership of private newspapers such as the UDN to “reliable” persons such as Wang, and it was common for the military and KMT to call publishers and editors to suggest how to treat certain stories.\(^{16}\)

Wang and his paper exemplified the blurring of lines between the state, party, and society that the KMT sought to achieve in China and Taiwan. Like Hsin Kwan-chue, Koa Chun-te, and Mah Soo-Lay, Wang was a journalist and party member with a background in military affairs, and saw little tension between reporting the news and serving the interests of his party, state, and nation. Good KMT and military man that he was, Wang strongly believed in uniting the interests of his newspaper and those of the nation, so that the paper could serve as a “social instrument” (*shehui gongqi* 社會公器).\(^{17}\) He envisioned the *Lianhe bao* not as “official” (*guan* 官) or “privately-owned” (*minying* 民營), leftist, rightist, or centrist, but as an “honest and decent” (*zhengpai* 正派) private paper.\(^{18}\) In his memoirs, he declared that he supported a free press and he had opposed the state’s proposed amendments to the Publishing Act in 1958 because they violated press freedom. But he also asserted that this freedom must be united with the national interest and “the most ideal balance found” (*zuijia pingheng* 最佳平衡) found between the two. His military training convinced him that national interests took priority over the interests of the individual and the newspaper, and of


the importance of the “solidarity of the whole and collective strength” (zhengti de tuanjie yu jiti liliang 整體的團結與集體力量). 19

Wang’s success in persuading the IPI to admit the ROC into its ranks in 1969 will come as a surprise to anyone familiar with the ROC’s human rights record under martial law. Article 11 of its constitution of 1947 guaranteed “freedom of speech, teaching, writing, and publication,” but all such freedoms were heavily circumscribed under martial law. 20 In 1969, while human rights was not yet the global phenomenon that it would become by the late 1970s, 21 Taiwan’s authoritarianism and restrictions on free speech were well-known within Western circles. Amnesty International’s 1969-1970 annual report, for example, criticized the “draconian legislation enacted by the Chiang-Kai-Shek Government, not only to curb left-wing opposition, but also to discourage all forms of independent Formosan opinion and expression.” 22 The case of Chen Yu-hsi was ample evidence of this. In February 1968, Chen, a Taiwanese graduate student in Economics and East-West Center fellow at the University of Hawaii (UH), was arrested in Taiwan for writing “seditious” articles in a Japanese newspaper and reading PRC newspapers and protesting against the Vietnam War while in Hawaii. 23 Chen’s arrest was met by protests at UH, and a fellow student even traveled all the way to Taiwan in a failed attempt to observe Chen’s trial. 24 Responding in an underground student

19 Wang, Wo yu xinwen shiye, 9-10.


publication to East-West Center officials’ claim that the United States had no business interfering in Taiwan’s internal affairs, another of Chen’s supporters asserted that “Taiwan is not a sovereign nation” because it belonged to China, could not exist without US military and financial aid, and in 1947 had revolted against “mainland intruder Shanghai Jack.” These were precisely the kinds of perceptions that the ROC sought to dispel.

The IPI was not unaware of the ROC’s transgressions against press freedom. In 1964, the sole member of the IPI in Taiwan at the time, Stanway Cheng, wrote in the IPI’s monthly bulletin that the greatest threat to press freedom on Taiwan was “self-censorship caused by fear of official sensitivity or repercussions for printing something objectionable.” But the Editor and Director of the English-language *China News* also claimed that there was no official press censorship on the island and that a “thriving private, independent press, which is often critical of government policies, is in operation.” Cheng concluded that given the state of martial law, the press enjoyed a “relative degree of freedom, although sometimes this limited freedom is challenged and threatened.”

Wang Tih-wu eventually persuaded the IPI to recognize a national committee for the ROC. In one of his memoirs, he says that he had begun lobbying the Institute in 1964 for this recognition, which he believed would enable ROC papers to occupy a more prominent position internationally and compete with their Western and Japanese counterparts. A weak nation, he philosophized, had neither foreign relations nor a newspaper industry. Two years later, Wang gave a well-publicized speech at the IPI’s annual general meeting in New Delhi in which he described the progress the

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Chapter 7

ROC had made in press freedom – but to no avail. In the buildup to Ottawa in 1969, Wang sensed that he stood a good chance of realizing his aim. The number of ROC journalists participating in the general meeting was increasing by the year. Wang’s reputation among IPI members had been boosted in 1968 with his role in the establishment of the Chinese Language Press Institute, an IPI-backed organization. Before the Ottawa meeting, Wang met with the IPI executive committee in Zurich, and wrote to each of its members individually asking for their support. Despite opposition from the United States and several Western European countries, the committee voted to recognize the ROC, noting that while it was impressed with the “great improvements” that Taiwan had made, it was not fully satisfied with the state of press freedom on Taiwan and expected further progress.

Wang was voted chairman of his country’s national IPI committee and became the ROC’s de facto representative to the global media.

The Yuyitungs, public opinion, and popular protest in the Philippines in 1970

Beyond the Chinese-language press, the Yuyitung case attracted considerable attention in the English-language media, which came down mostly on the side of the brothers. At the time, the Philippines was one of the few countries in Asia with a genuinely free press and without emergency political regulations limiting press freedom. Anti-Marcos sentiment and the historically high regard for press freedom in the Philippines meant that local newspapers found themselves in the unusual position of being able to defend “Chinese” persons and a core tenet of national identity at

29 Wang, Wo yu xinwen shiye, 121-125.
30 Righter, IPI The Undivided Word, 129.
the same time. Fluent in English and supportive of integration, the Yuyitungs were also on friendly terms with Filipino politicians and journalists, the more socially outgoing Quintin in particular. In 1969, he served as President of the Manila Overseas Press Club, and in 1970 as its Treasurer.

No news outlet was more vocal in its defense of the CCN than the *Philippines Free Press* (PFP) the country’s oldest news weekly and a supporter of the Yuyitungs going all the way back to March 1962. Napoleon Rama, the PFP’s chief political writer, conducted what appears to have been the first and only interview with Quintin on his arrest. The interview featured in the March 24, 1962 edition of the PFP, and portions of it were translated and published in the CCN that same day. 31 Eight years later, Rama was not only one of the most outspoken critics of how the ROC and Marcos handled of the case, but also a member of the Yuyitungs’ legal team before the Deportation Board. With its weekly format and close ties to the Yuyitungs, the PFP was able to provide detailed investigative coverage of the CCN case. Because of how different the circumstances surrounding the case were this time compared to in 1962, the PFP was also joined in its campaign by prominent journalists such as the MOPC President Maximo Soliven, National Press Club President Antonio Zumel, and Joaquin Roces, founder of the country’s leading broadsheet, the *Manila Times*.

Liberals and radicals alike condemned Marcos’s actions, which they perceived (rightly) as a portent of much worse to come. Six days after the deportation, the PKP’s youth arm, Malayang Pagkakaisa ng Kabataang Pilipino (Free Union of Filipino Youth, or MPKP), issued a manifesto, “The Moving Finger of Imperialist Diktat: The Yuyitung Case.” In it, MPKP denounced Marcos for enacting a “hitlerite [sic] policy of repression” that “shocked even more conservative sections of the press and bureaucracy.” The manifesto then pivoted from Marcos’s ties to the “KMT pirates”

31 The interview, which featured in the March 24, 1962 edition of the PFP, is reprinted in Yuyitung (ed.), *The Case of the Yuyitung Brothers*, 4-12.
in Taipei to a full-throated attack on US imperialism, the “No. 1 enemy of the Filipino people” and prime mover of what had happened.\textsuperscript{32} On May 12, the Movement for a Democratic Philippines organized a protest at Agrifina Circle in Rizal Park in Manila to demand “Justice for the Yuyitung Brothers” in language virtually identical to the MPKP’s.\textsuperscript{33}

A notable exception to left-wing denunciations of Marcos, the KMT, and Taiwan was the \textit{Manila Bulletin}, which was run by a Wang Tih-wu-like figure in Brigadier-General Hans Menzi, a Swiss-Filipino émigré and crony of Marcos’s. Menzi was also the chairman of his country’s IPI committee. In its editorial on May 19, the \textit{Bulletin} made what was becoming a standard argument in defense of the deportation and trial. After May 4, the Philippine and ROC states treated the guilt of the Yuyitungs as beyond question in their public remarks on the case and sought to focus the world’s attention on the legality of their actions instead. In response to human rights arguments, the editorial asserted that the issue here was not freedom of the press, which was not absolute, but national security, which (of course) was. The Yuyitungs were deported to Taiwan and not a country of their choice because “our laws require that deportable aliens be sent back to their country of citizenship. While they were born here, they had not exerted any effort to become Filipino citizens.” Furthermore, although they had renounced their “Chinese” citizenship on April 25, the ROC was yet to approve this. Legally, they thus were still Nationalist Chinese. Menzi would later comment that “there was absolutely no infringement of the freedom of the press” and that President Marcos had done nothing wrong.\textsuperscript{34}


\textsuperscript{33} Yuyitung (ed.), \textit{The Case of the Yuyitung Brothers}, 51-53; “Feiguo xuesheng shiwei,” Vol. 1, 205, AH.

\textsuperscript{34} “Yu shi xiongdi qianpei (jianbao ziliao) 于氏兄弟遣配 (剪報資料),” Vol. 1, 309, 020-010710-0007, August 6, 1966-September 27, 1970, AH.
Perhaps surprised by the outcry that his actions had provoked and ever eager to polish his public image, Marcos held a press conference on May 20 to defend himself. He said that although there may have been a “lack of humanity and compassion” in deporting the Yuyitungs, they had received “full due process of law.” As a concession to his critics, Marcos cleverly shifted some of the blame away from himself and onto Immigration Commissioner Edmundo Reyes, who was also present at the conference. Marcos said that he had reprimanded Reyes for not allowing them to see their families before they were deported, calling Reyes’s actions “unduly harsh.” Still, Marcos equivocated, Reyes had “not violated any of their individual rights under the law.” The brothers “knew from the start that they were faced with deportation, and their families knew this as well. Their departure was not as sudden as we would like to think.”

“A most successful international public relations service”

International (as opposed to merely domestic) condemnation of the Philippines certainly existed, but with the Yuyitungs’ fate in the hands of the ROC after May 4, the global spotlight was very much on the latter rather than the former. For Taiwan, it was similarly if not more important to be perceived as respecting public opinion and acting in accordance with legal and democratic norms, given its questionable legitimacy of the ROC as a polity. Accordingly, the ROC took steps to limit “negative impressions” (buliang yinxiang 不良印象) of its actions among the international media. A small, meaningful rhetorical gesture that its official propaganda organs adopted right after the deportation, for example, was to avoid referring to the Yuyitungs as fei before their trial on Taiwan, lest the state be perceived as prejudicing the judicial process and predetermining their

35 Yu shi xiongdi qianpei (jianbao ziliao),” Vol. 3, 121, 020-010710-0009, May 7-21, 1970, AH.

36 “Yu shi xiongdi qianpei (jianbao ziliao),” Vol. 1, 79, AH.
guilt.\textsuperscript{37} The ROC was also determined not to cave into international pressure and compromise what it believed was its sovereign right to judge its nationals. Despite perceptions that a military tribunal would deliver a harsher sentence (worst of all, the death penalty) than a civilian court, for instance, the state stuck to its original decision to conduct a military trial. Whether or not the trial took place in a military or civilian court did not matter, since either would have to adhere to the articles of martial law. By not changing its mind, Taiwan would show that it was not influenced by external pressure and had adopted a firm position on the case. A change in venue also risked upsetting the Philippine government and anticommmunist Philippine Chinese, the ROC’s staunchest supporters, who might misunderstand the switch as implying leniency.\textsuperscript{38}

As for the verdict, liberal fears that the Yuyitungs would be sentenced to death were, in hindsight, overblown. However much the ROC claimed the Yuyitungs as “Chinese nationals,” the case was never about legal formalities. The brothers were clearly not going to be found innocent and released – not when the ROC had invested so much effort into proving their guilt and had its relations with both Marcos and Philippine KMT hardliners to worry about. Yet the death penalty or even a lengthy jail sentence was equally as unrealistic an option. A death sentence, hypothesized the ROC Embassy in Manila, would attract condemnation from multiple quarters, undermine the ROC’s international position, and serve as propaganda fodder for the PRC.\textsuperscript{39}

International condemnation of the ROC came swiftly following the deportation. Amnesty International, at the time far from being a household name, mobilized liberals from North America, Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand into bombarding Chiang Kai-shek with postcards


\textsuperscript{38} “Yu shi xiongdi qianpei (jianbao ziliao),” Vol. 1, 191-192, AH.

\textsuperscript{39} “Yu shi xiongdi qianpei (jianbao ziliao),” Vol. 1, 302, AH.
and letters calling for the Yuyitungs’ release; in 1971, Amnesty chose the brothers as its prisoners of conscience for the year. Beyond the Philippines, Asian voices in support of the brothers figured less prominently, but were certainly present: Chiang received a telegram from the Penang branch of the Malayan People’s Party, for example, denouncing the deportation as an “unjust act and clear violation of the declaration of human rights.”40 The only organized and concerted international opposition to the ROC, however, came from the IPI, owing to the particular nature of the case, the ROC’s recent and conditional admission into the body, and close ties between the Yuyitungs, the Philippine supporters, and foreign journalists. By chance, not only was the IPI’s 19th annual general assembly in 1970 held in nearby Hong Kong in mid-May, but the post-assembly tour included a three-day visit to Taiwan arranged by Wang Tih-wu.41 Hans Menzi presented on the contents of the secret military intelligence report on the brothers during the assembly,42 but this only prompted censure from the gathered delegates.

The ROC exploited the post-assembly tour as an opportunity to reassure the IPI that it was committed to freedom of the press and to show off Free China to some of the makers of global public opinion. Not unlike high-level overseas Chinese fact-finding or tribute missions from the Philippines and elsewhere, the delegates toured Quemoy, Taroko Gorge, and the Palace Museum, and met Premier Yen Chia-kan, Vice-Premier Chiang Ching-kuo, and Chiang Kai-shek himself. The elder Chiang personally reassured them that the ROC practiced and guaranteed press freedom. On May 22, the Garrison-General Headquarters even took the unprecedented step of allowing the four members of a special IPI tasked with investigating the Yuyitung affair to visit the brothers:

42 Yuyitung (ed.), The Case of the Yuyitung Brothers, 306.
these were Hans Kluthe, the immediate past chairman of the IPI; Ernest Meyer, the IPI’s executive
director; Barry Bingham, Sr., another former chairman and the publisher of the Louisville-based
Courier-Journal and Times; and Maximo Soliven. The found that the brothers were being treated
well. Over the course of the four-day junket, reported Wang’s UDN, ROC IPI members carefully
explained Taiwan’s position to their counterparts and dispelled their suspicions surrounding the
case. For example, some IPI members had apparently “maintained that the Yuyitung brothers were
no longer alive,” or that they would be court-martialed. By the final day of their visit, however, a
“harmonious atmosphere” had emerged between Taiwan and the IPI delegates, who had begun to
“realize the basic attitude of the ROC Government in upholding rule by law and respecting human
rights.” The article concluded, triumphantly, that: “For the first time in twenty-one years, the ROC
performed a most successful service in international public relations.”

The IPI was placated for the time being, and the ROC’s public relations campaign off to a
good start. Beyond this confident façade, though, Taiwanese officials were unhappy at the IPI’s
interventionist behavior and the complications that it had resulted in. The ROC Embassy’s press
officer in Manila even conjectured that the CIA was pulling the strings from behind the scenes. In
a speculative memo on August 10, he accused Quintin of working with the CIA to disrupt US-
ROC ties, based on a confession that Quintin had apparently made during his detention about his
friendly relations with CIA agents in Manila. It was the CIA that was instigating the US, French,
and West German IPI committees’ hostility towards the ROC. The press officer even compared
the brothers to Peng Ming-min, the Taiwanese independence leader who had escaped from Taiwan

43 Ma K’o-jen, “A Most Successful International Public Relations Service,” Lien Ho Pao, Taipei, June 2, 1970,
Record Group [RG] 59, Series: Subject Files, 1951-1978, Box 11, Folder: POL 29 Yuyitung Brothers (Lot File
75D76), National Archives and Records Administration [NARA], College Park, Maryland.
in late January 1970.\textsuperscript{44} (Rizal in fact opposed Taiwanese independence, which he believed was a foreign-driven movement.\textsuperscript{45}) By helping Peng escape and working covertly to have the Yuyitungs freed, the CIA was hoping to make them heroes in the eyes of the 20 million Chinese overseas.\textsuperscript{46} There is no follow-up to this speculative memo. In 1993, Rizal claimed the exact opposite: that the CIA assisted Marcos in having him and his brother deported.\textsuperscript{47}

In the absence of evidence from either the US or ROC archives, we need not pursue these contradictory accusations further. Coming well before Kissinger’s first visit to China in June 1971, the press officer’s remarks are best understood as evidence of the ROC’s anxieties about its place in the world and fears that its most powerful ally for the past two decades was actively seeking to undermine it. His logic is hard to follow: why would the CIA want to burnish the reputation of the Yuyitungs among \textit{huajiao}, of all constituencies? The very mention of the overseas Chinese here is puzzling, but also indicative of the importance that Nationalist China placed on its ethno-cultural compatriots abroad. In this particular case, Western public opinion and the views of the diaspora were perpetually intertwined.

Though not as pressing a concern as it would become in mid-1972, the ROC also kept an eye on the Philippine KMT’s obvious unhappiness with the ROC’s accommodation of the IPI. The Yuyitungs were the main subject for discussion at the KMT’s annual meeting in Manila in mid-July, during which party members expressed their hopes that the government would adhere strictly

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\item \textsuperscript{46} “Yu shi xiongdi,” Vol. 4, 020-091300-0022, 1971, AH.
\item \textsuperscript{47} Chang et al. (ed.), \textit{The Reminiscences of the Chinese in the Philippines}, 349.
\end{itemize}
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to the letter of the law in prosecuting the brothers. In their report to Taipei, they rehashed many of the arguments that had been used previously against the CCN and cited recent anti-ROC articles in the *Chinese Weekly* as further proof of its pro-communist leanings. These included: “Taiwan is a second-rate colony of the United States and Japan” (“Taiwan shi Mei Ri de ci zhimindi 台灣是美日的次殖民地”); “The KMT is a party of plunder” (“Zhongguo guomindang shi ‘gua’ mindang 中國國民黨是刮民黨”); and “Taiwan is a small feudal dynasty” (“Taiwan dangdi shi fengjian xiao huangchao 台灣當地是封建小皇朝”). As for public opinion, the party dismissed the speculation that Western newspapers had been engaging in with regards to the case and reassured Taipei that they had quietened down recently. It also criticized the ROC for indulging the world’s media and warned that any softening of the sentence would be tantamount to mocking the Philippine state and would damage the anticommunist spirit of loyal overseas Chinese.48

Sadly, the ROC archives do not yield insights into the deliberations that were taking place behind the scenes over how best to respond to both the IPI and Philippine KMT hardliners. Every outward indication in the buildup to and aftermath of the trial, however, suggests that the ROC took the latter’s support almost for granted and was more interested in placating the former than the latter. It would do so by passing a sentence that was as humane as legally permissible, but that simultaneously asserted its sovereign right to judge the guilt or innocence of its national subjects. If Rizal Yuyitung’s 1993 interviews with researchers from the Institute of Modern History are to be believed, the ROC quickly realized, upon taking the brothers in, that they were innocent. Taipei acted according to what the Philippine KMT reported, he said; the ROC Embassy would not speak up for them because it dared not offend party “scoundrels” (*ditou she* 地頭蛇). “But when our case

48 “Yu shi xiongdi qianpei (jianbao ziliao),” Vol. 2, 132-133, AH.
Chapter 7

reached the highest levels of government, it required them to collect intelligence from different sources, and from this intelligence they came to realize that we were not communists,” he asserted. Someone – he does not say whom – had also told them that ROC intelligence agents in Hong Kong, Tokyo, and the PRC had gone through the materials that the Philippine military (with the assistance of the Thunderbolt planners had provided to the ROC, and found no evidence that the Yuyitungs were communists. All the charges were fabricated: “The Taiwan Garrison-General Headquarters also sent agents to Manila to infiltrate the newspaper, and found nothing. It decided we had been the victim of a malicious plot and were completely innocent.”

Rizal’s claims here, like many others he made in his interviews, cannot be verified, as the archival record contains no dissenting views on the Yuyitungs. Whatever disagreements over the severity of their sentence may have arisen, their guilt was beyond question. It may be, of course, that state and party came overwhelmingly to believe that the brothers were innocent and proceeded to expunge all such incriminating evidence from its archives. A more likely scenario is that certain individuals and agencies within the party-state’s bureaucracy were skeptical of the arguments and evidence against the Yuyitungs, and that such doubts were incorporated into the decision-making process, but kept off the record. This view is supported by what a man whom Rizal identifies only as General Wu, the deputy chief of staff of the Garrison-General, told him over dinner just before he was about to be released on August 16, 1973. Wu – or rather Rizal, recalling his conversation with Wu 20 years earlier – did not explicitly state that he believed the brothers to be innocent, but said instead that

You don’t know the real story behind this incident. Pressure came from multiple directions, and it could not be individually handled. It’s clear is that the different groups involved did not get what they wanted, but that was because they had no alternative. Those KMT people in the Philippines, from the outset, heavily pressurized the central KMT to have you two

executed. But the IPI and the world media strongly advocated for you to be freed, and urged that you be declared innocent and released immediately. We at the Garrison-General were stuck in between. This was the best compromise.\(^{50}\)

**The August 14 trial**

The trial of the Yuyitungs by a three-man military tribunal in Taipei on August 14, 1970, was notable for being open to the public, as well as lasting for only four hours. In attendance were IPI chairman Aw Sian (adopted daughter of the “Tiger Balm” tycoon and philanthropist Aw Boon Haw), Barry Bingham, Juan Quijano, the CCN’s new publisher and one of the Yuyitungs’ lawyers, Amnesty International observers,\(^{51}\) and around 60 ROC and international journalists. Several days earlier, ROC Embassy officials in Manila had informed the wives of Rizal and Quintin that they could apply for a visa to attend the trial, but neither did so.\(^{52}\)

During the trial, Rizal and Quintin, fully aware that their guilt had already been decided, adopted an apologetic stance towards the tribunal to secure a more lenient verdict. Rizal said that because he had grown up in the Philippines, he was “not aware of the situation of his fatherland and might have committed mistakes.” Despite having read some of Mao’s works, he asserted that his thinking had not been affected by them and that his reasons for publishing news from CCP-controlled areas were solely to maintain and increase his paper’s readership. Having spent three months in Taipei, he had a “better understanding of the situation of his mother country now” and hoped that the ROC would “forgive him for his past mistakes.” Quintin also contended that he had no intention of aiding the CCP and that the CCN published what it did for the sake of “professional

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\(^{50}\) Chang et al. (ed.), *The Reminiscences of the Chinese in the Philippines*, 353.


\(^{52}\) “Yu shi xiongdi,” Vol. 1, AH.
competition,” since English-language newspapers in the Philippines published articles by foreign wire services quoting PRC news sources. Their assigned lawyer, Wang Shan-hsiang, recapitulated several familiar arguments in his defense of the CCN, including the fact that the CCN had never subscribed to Xinhua and had only ever published direct, unaltered translations from foreign wire services. The Yuyitungs, he argued, could not be found guilty because their violation of the ROC’s sedition laws was unintentional. Wang further claimed that the Yuyitungs were patriots because they had repeatedly but unsuccessfully applied to enter the ROC and because they were born to a patriotic father who had been executed by the Japanese.

The ROC public prosecutor maintained that intentions were irrelevant and repeatedly cited a signed confession made by Quintin and Rizal during their interrogation in Taiwan, in which they admitted to knowing beforehand that all the materials that they published were “for the benefit of Chinese Communist propaganda.” No record of this confession is to be found. It was very likely something that the Yuyitungs consented to in return for a less severe sentence; and given that Rizal stated on several occasions how well-treated they were by the ROC authorities, such a confession was not obtained through coercive means. The prosecutor used it to counter the defense’s argument for unintentionality. He claimed that because the brothers knew full well that the CCP was a “rebel organization” and that the news articles they published would benefit CCP propaganda, they were therefore accomplices to an objectively seditious act, regardless of their purposes and innermost beliefs. Freedom of the press was no excuse for such a report; and in any case the brothers were citizens of the ROC, under whose laws they were being tried.53

Following the prosecution’s summing up, the Yuyitungs chose not to argue their case any further, thus allowing the tribunal to deliver a swift verdict. It found that, in 1968, the brothers had

“redoubled their efforts in propaganda articles for the benefit of the Chinese Communist rebels in [the CCN and Chinese Weekly]. Prominent spaces were devoted to false and over exaggerated [sic] reports on Peiping’s military, political, economic, cultural, scientific and industrial activities.” The accused had admitted to investigators that their publications “have been 100 per cent pro-Peiping in the last few years.” Therefore, as ROC nationals by law, they were guilty of violating the Statute for the Punishment of Seditious Acts even though their offenses were committed abroad. However, as the brothers “lacked knowledge of Chinese Communist schemes and atrocities” and had “shown signs of sincere repentance since their arrest and deportation to Taiwan,” they were to be “given an opportunity to reform themselves.”

Citizen diplomacy: Wang Tih-wu and the IPI, August-November 1970

Having staked its international reputation on the optics and outcome of the trial, the ROC would have been disappointed by the largely negative responses to it. With the First Quarter Storm still fresh in its institutional memory, Philippine officialdom considered the verdict too lenient and an incitement to left-wing unrest. Jolly Bugarin, the chief of the National Bureau of Investigation, expressed the views of many within the military and intelligence community when he said that the sentence encouraged communist activity. He even alleged that Filipino communists were plotting to assassinate ROC Embassy officials, a sensational claim that protests after the deportation had done nothing to dispel. An unnamed member of the military’s working group on the CCN echoed Bugarin’s views, saying that the verdict “disheartened” them. Why, he asked, had the tribunal not adhered strictly to the letter of the law and sentenced the Yuyitungs to jail for at least seven years?

54 “Yu shi xiongdi,” Vol. 1, AH.

55 “Yu shi xiongdi qianpei (jianbao ziliao),” Vol. 1, 200-201, AH.
For the left, the openness with which Nationalist China had conducted itself, arguments for
the primacy of national security interests, and the relative benevolence of the verdict mattered little.
Press freedom had been violated; the trial was a farce; and only the immediate and unconditional
release of the Yuyitungs would compensate for the injustice committed against them. Hoping to
exploit the ROC’s susceptibility to public opinion, IPI executive director Ernest Meyer petitioned
Chiang Kai-shek on August 25 to grant an official pardon the brothers on his birthday, October 31.
A “humanitarian gesture of this nature would have a tremendous effect on world public opinion
which would reflect greatly on your government and would be considered as a real sign of the
respect of your government for freedom of the press of which the [IPI] is the careful watchdog all
over the world,” he said. Juan Quijano and Joker Arroyo, another of the CCN’s lawyers, also wrote
directly to Chiang, having heard Wang Shan-hsiang’s advice that an appeal might take too long
and had little chance of succeeding. Their letter centered on freedom of speech and criticized the
state for denying the brothers access to their lawyers for three months before speeding through the
actual trial, all with scant regard for due process. In addition, they sought to “Filipinize” the case
by denying that the ROC had any sovereignty over two persons who had renounced their “Chinese”
citizenship and committed their supposed offence in the Philippines.56

The task of explaining the ROC’s actions to the world, and to the IPI in particular, fell to
Wang Tih-wu, the most famous Free Chinese newspaperman in the world. Slightly over a month
after the trial, Wang produced a detailed, footnoted statement on the Yuyitung affair for the benefit
of the IPI, whose executive committee would be meeting in Zurich in October to discuss the case.
His aim was to “present the facts about the case and offer explanations on some questions that
arose from it,” but the report was far from being a full and honest account of what had transpired.

56 “Yu shi xiongdi,” Vol. 2, AH.
Wang misidentified the Philippine Defense Secretary as Armed Forces Chief of Staff Manuel Yan, not Juan Ponce Enrile. Although Wang summed up both sides’ arguments during the military trial in Taiwan, he said little about the contentious nature of the Deportation Board hearings in the Philippines from March to May, or that the brothers were deported before these hearings concluded. By emphasizing the formal legality of proceedings, Wang sought to deflect attention from more fundamental considerations of justice and the thorny problem of intent. His report concluded by noting that reformatory education was the “most lenient [sentence] possible” under ROC law; for sedition cases, the verdict showed “unprecedented leniency.” The IPI had done its utmost to ensure an open and fair trial and secure favorable treatment for the brothers, but ultimately, the ROC’s “life and death struggle with communists” had to override liberal ideals. Wang criticized the IPI’s absolute commitment to a free press. Seeing as the IPI did not accredit journalists from communist countries because of these countries’ suppression of individual freedoms, did it then also defend communist propaganda advocating a political system opposed to such freedoms?57

Meyer was dissatisfied with Wang’s report. In his response to Wang on September 24, he focused on the illegitimacy and inhumaneness of the ROC’s sovereign claims upon the Yuyitungs. Returning to a familiar talking point among the brothers’ supporters, he questioned Taiwan’s right to try them for having supposedly committed crimes against the Philippine state. He accused the ROC of violating international law, according to which extradition in “political cases” was not permissible. Taiwan and the Philippines collaborated to deport the brothers because their “crimes” were insufficient grounds for conviction in the latter, which had a long tradition of press freedom. Reformatory education bore a disturbing similarity to the “usual brainwashing in communist trials,” and the “confessions and expressions of satisfaction of the prisoners resemble too much the usual

57 “Yu shi xiongdi,” Vol. 2, AH.
confessions of totalitarian practices to be accepted by people really devoted to the principles of human rights.” He concluded prophetically: “No country and no regime in the world – not even the very powerful ones – can afford to ignore the great currents of world public opinion. I really wonder, therefore, if the distribution of [your report] on the Yuyitung case will not have an effect very contrary to what you want it to have.”

Seeking reassurances that it had acted legally, the ROC submitted Wang’s report and some primary evidence to Harold Riegelman of the New York law firm Nordlinger, Riegelman, Benatar, and Charney. Riegelman had been a counsel to the ROC Embassy in New York since 1938 and in 1948 was awarded the ROC’s highest civilian honor for services rendered during World War II. After 1949, he became part of the China Lobby and chaired an organization called the “Committee to Defend America by Aiding Anti-Communist China.” On October 14, 1970, just before the IPI executive committee’s meeting in Zurich, he reassured I-cheng Loh, the director of the Chinese Information Service in New York, that “there is a sound basis in international law on which the Yuyitung brothers could be tried and convicted of sedition by a military tribunal for acts committed by them outside the Republic of China.” Unlike Ernest Meyer, Riegelman believed that it was a “clearly enunciated and universally accepted principal [sic] of international law that a nation has jurisdiction over its citizens where a treasonous act is committed against the nation, irrespective of where such act is committed.” After conducting an “unbiased review,” he concluded that their “newspaper was pro-Communist and their extra-newspaper activities were Communist-inspired,

58 “Yu shi xiongdi,” Vol. 2, AH.


if not Communist-financed.” But the 25 articles cited as evidence could only be seen as seditious in the context of these external activities. Riegelman advised the ROC to translate and refute these pieces for the benefit of the IPI, as well as show that the CCN published only negative news reports about the ROC (and positive ones about the PRC) by international wire services. He concluded by hailing the ROC as a “democratic nation” and criticizing the tendency of Western journalists to overreact when it came to perceived violations of press freedom.61

Undeterred by Meyer’s criticisms, Wang Tih-wu persisted in trying to win over his good friend in the hopes that Meyer would be able to influence proceedings at Zurich. On October 6, he left Taiwan for Tokyo, where he lobbied members of the Japan IPI committee; the Japanese were not going to Switzerland because of a prior commitment, but agreed to issue a statement in support of Taiwan. On October 9, Wang arrived in Zurich and met with Meyer, who explained how the 12 other national committees attending the meeting stood on the case. Britain, which had tried to prevent the IPI from accrediting the ROC in June 1969, was most opposed to the ROC and was seeking to derecognize. Canada, Finland, India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and the United States were also unhappy, although none had opposed the admission of the ROC into the IPI. Fearing the worse, Wang reiterated that the ROC’s magnanimous handling of the case was proof enough of its respect for the IPI’s efforts to protect freedom of the press. He also attacked the UK IPI for distorting the “facts” surrounding the case and interfering in Taiwan’s sovereign affairs in a most undemocratic manner.

Meyer was not unsympathetic to his friend’s predicament and sought a solution to the case that would help effect the Yuyitungs’ release, while enabling the ROC to remain in the IPI. Meyer informed Wang that the majority of delegates appreciated Wang’s good faith attempt at mediating

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61 “Yu shi xiongdi,” Vol. 2, AH.
between his government and the IPI, and that they were also unhappy with how the UK committee had been conducting itself. If Wang promised to do his utmost to have the ROC free the Yuyitungs, Meyer would dissuade others from expelling Taiwan. As the meeting drew near, Wang and Meyer stepped up their lobbying efforts. Wang traveled to West Germany to speak to Hans Kluthe and Aw Sian, and also phoned the US delegation, which he won over. Meyer met with other countries’ delegates, who slowly came around to the ROC’s point of view. In the two days before the meeting, Meyer arranged for Wang to dine with the executive committee and representatives from various national committees. He also advised Wang on how to act during the meeting: Wang ought not to bring up the affair, but allow Meyer to do it. If Britain motioned to expel the ROC, South Korea would propose that its IPI delegates, together with Britain, Japan, and South Africa’s, visit Taiwan to inspect the situation there first before deciding. Wang was also not to discuss the legality of the case, but to put forth a political solution that he and Meyer had agreed on.62

This political solution was as follows: the IPI would first seek the Philippines’ agreement to support the release of the Yuyitungs. The IPI would also ask Singapore to accept the brothers, as the city-state had informed the IPI its willingness to do so before the August 14 trial.63 They would also promise not to criticize the ROC or Philippine governments in print any further. Only if both Singapore and the Philippines were agreeable would the IPI request the ROC to free them. Wang saw this as an acceptable compromise, as any action by Taipei was dependent first on how Manila and Singapore reacted. In his report to the ROC authorities, Wang expressed his hope that

62 “Yu shi xiongdi,” Vol. 2, AH.

63 In his 1993 interviews, Rizal claims that Quintin’s friend, Manila Times publisher Joaquin Roces, had arranged for them to be given asylum in Singapore prior to their deportation from Manila. See Chang et al. (ed.), The Reminiscences of the Chinese in the Philippines, 338. On May 18, 1970, in Hong Kong, Singapore’s Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam told IPI members that Singapore was willing to accept the Yuyitungs if the Philippine government allowed it. See “Yu shi xiongdi qianpei (jianbao ziliao),” Vol. 1, 307, AH.
the ROC would release the brothers if the Philippines and Singapore agreed to their sides of the deal. Ever the newsman-cum-propagandist, he suggested that this bargain would reflect well on the ROC and dispel any lingering doubts that IPI members had about the ROC’s commitment to press freedom and constitutional democracy.64

During the meeting, after Meyer raised the Yuyitung case, Britain tried but failed to have the IPI derecognize the ROC. In Wang’s narrative of what happened, Canada, Sri Lanka, and India “went through the motions” (xu ying gushi 虛應故事) in supporting Britain; the United States and West Germany called for fairness; Pakistan and Israel did not really understand what was going on; and South Korea and Japan, in a welcome display of Asian anticommunist solidarity, defended the ROC and the ROC IPI’s handling of the case. Wang ascribed the ROC’s success to four factors: IPI delegates’ fundamental belief in the ROC’s commitment to press freedom, despite their verbal criticisms of its behavior; Wang’s report, which allowed delegates to better understand the case; the backing of Kluthe, Aw, and the IPI national committees of the United States, South Korea, and Japan; and the delegates’ visit to Taiwan in late May, which convinced its members of the ROC’s determination to build a democracy and constitutional government.”65

The deliberations surrounding this deal that took place at the highest levels of government in the ROC and the Philippines are largely unknown to us. Marcos appears to have asked Edmundo Reyes in late October 1970 to give the proposal careful attention so as not to harm ROC-Philippine relations, according to a memo from the Philippine KMT that was circulated among state and party agencies in Taiwan. His final decision is unknown, but according to Wang, Meyer planned to visit

64 “Yu shi xiongdi,” Vol. 2, AH.

65 “Yu shi xiongdi,” Vol. 2, AH. Wang’s narrative is also found in another of his memoirs, Lianhe bao sanshinian de fazhan 聯合報三十年的發展 (Taipei: Lianhe bao she, 1981), 276-277.
Taiwan on November 9 to lobby for the Yuyitungs’ release, which suggests that Marcos may have been on board and content to let the brothers find asylum in Singapore. Taiwan at that time was still deliberating on how to react, Wang wrote. Legally, although there were provisions in the 1957 law on “Procedures for Consigning Communists to Reformatory Education During the Period of Communist Rebellion” (Kanluan shiqi feidie jiaofu ganhua banfa 破亂時期匪諜交付感化辦法), the minimum length for ganhua was one year, according to the 1963 “Law on Implementing Public Security Measures” (Baoan chufen zhixing fa 保安處分執行法). To complicate matters further, ganhua was not a “penalty for a criminal offence” (xingfa 刑罰), but rather, as the latter law stated, a “public security measure.” The unique legal status of ganhua would make it difficult for Chiang to issue a special pardon to the Yuyitungs, which, according to the “Law on Pardons” (Shemian fa 蘊免法) of 1954, was only meant for “those found guilty of crimes” (shou zuixing zhi xuangaozhe 受罪刑之宣告者).

In mid-November, Meyer, Wang, Aw, Juan Quijano, and an interpreter met in Hong Kong to work out an agreement on the CCN’s editorial policy going forward. The ROC’s lack of a firm response at this time was almost certainly a calculated ploy to extract more concessions from the CCN, as subsequent events show. However deep-seated their belief in press freedom was, Meyer and Quijano prioritized the release of the Yuyitungs, even if it meant censoring the CCN. Quijano, the paper’s new publisher, stated that he had instructed his editorial board to adopt a “factual and objective attitude” on all matters concerning the ROC. He conceded that the CCN’s coverage of Taiwan in the past few months sometimes displayed “resentment,” but denied that this had to do with ideology and was because of “emotional dissatisfaction” with the detention of the Yuyitungs.

As a sign of his goodwill, he said that he had told the CCN to carry advertisements congratulating the ROC on its National Day. He also brought all copies of the paper from September and October to the Hong Kong meeting for Wang to scrutinize. Wang, skimming through the copies, observed that there were still some instances in which the CCN reported the news in a manner “antagonistic to the Chinese Government.” For example, he noted that a report on a visit that the brothers made to Taipei described them as being “marched” by their superintendent to “parade” them before the public. Quijano reassured Wang that he would repeat his instructions and supervise the paper more carefully than in past so that his editors “[respected] the understanding of strictly objective news coverage without any systematic hostility and malicious criticism.”

**Illusions of victory: Taiwan, the CCN, and the IPI in 1971**

The gentlemen’s agreement that Wang, Quijano, Meyer, and Sun signed in Hong Kong on November 17, 1970 marked a victory for the ROC in its long-running conflict with the CCN, but offered only temporary respite from the scrutiny of global public opinion. With Quijano having promised to “moderate” the paper’s editorial policy towards Taiwan in the hopes of securing the Yuyitungs’ early release, the ROC was at long last in a position to censor the paper, after decades of trying. If, as Rizal claims, the majority of state and party agencies in Taiwan had indeed come to realize that the Yuyitungs was innocent of the charges against them, Mah Soo-Lay’s behavior after the Hong Kong meeting certainly did not reflect this belief; if anything, the increasingly (and understandably) hostile attitude of the CCN to Taiwan after the deportation of the Yuyitungs only reinforced the ROC authorities’ suspicions of the paper. In the months that followed, Mah assumed the role of censor-in-chief and would frequently send news clippings from the CCN that he found

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67 “Yu shi xiongdi,” Vol. 2, AH.
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objectionable to Wang, who then forwarded them with an explanation to Quijano and, occasionally, Meyer. It fell upon Quijano, a lawyer with no previous journalistic experience or knowledge of his paper’s working language, to convince his staff to adopt a more “objective” and less hostile attitude towards the government that had just jailed their former editor and publisher.

As Wang’s objections to the article on the “parading” of the Yuyitungs shows, the selection of some of these articles reflected little more than KMT media policy and the hypersensitivity of propagandists like Mah towards any perceived slight against their party and state and the ROC’s position in the world. Some of these slights amounted to little more than clever and intentionally irreverent wordplay. An article in the Jan 17, 1971 Chinese Weekly, for example, substituted the character min 民 (people) in Sanminzhuyi with mian 眠 (sleep), which prompted a stern message from Wang to Quijano on respecting the Three Principles and on the author’s “malicious” (e’yì 惡意) motivations. Other items were problematic, as the CCN’s items over the decades had been, for simply reporting unfavorable news on the ROC. On January 11, for example, it published a cartoon depicting the ROC’s ex-ambassadors to Italy, Chile, and Canada carrying their embassies’ signs on their backs and dejectedly making their way back to Taiwan. Staunch KMT supporter that he was, Wang told Quijano and Meyer that based on journalistic standards in Taiwan, the cartoon was a “malicious” attempt to ridicule the ROC’s international setbacks. Meyer, upon receiving Wang’s complaint, expressed his complete bewilderment that the cartoon and “rather factual article” that accompanied it could be considered an expression of “systematic hostility” towards Taiwan. Such items would be seen as “most normal” in Western countries. To make his point, Meyer attached a cartoon from The Guardian depicting the British Prime Minister Edward Heath at a meeting of the

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68 “Si jiao ba jiao shier jiao,” CCN, January 17, 1971, 2.

69 CCN, January 11, 1971, 2.
Commonwealth Heads of Government in “a position which – I am afraid – in your country would have justified a trial for Communist propaganda. I am sure that [Heath] just smiled when he saw the cartoon.”

Quijano, on his part, made a good faith attempt to placate Wang and his political masters by repeatedly informing him that he had instructed his editors to report on news about China in a more impartial manner. On the offending cartoon, for example, he acknowledged that it may have caused readers to think that the CCN was prejudiced against the ROC and said that it should not have been published. In that same reply to Wang, he even attached a letter that he had written to his staff asking that they moderate their views. In a meeting with the Yuyitungs in early January, he even asked them to make a similar request, but the brothers said that they had already done so and were reluctant to be seen as undermining Quijano’s authority as publisher. Ultimately, though, Quijano could do little: “as I do not know Chinese, I do not understand what the CCN is publishing on a daily basis.” The CCN’s new editor informed Quijano in a long memorandum that while the editorial board was willing to avoid printing “subjective” or “critical” headlines or captions about the ROC, it believed that nothing it did would ever satisfy KMT censors. Wang’s constant requests infringed upon freedom of the press. Balanced coverage of both Nationalist and Communist China was impossible given their vastly different sizes and how foreign wire services (which the CCN depended on) overwhelmingly focused on the latter. Furthermore, if other Philippine newspapers printed news that the ROC considered taboo, the CCN was obliged to follow suit for the sake of its readership. Finally, as the ROC’s Central News Agency had stopped issuing its releases to the CCN, the paper had access to very few sources of positive news about the ROC.

Wang Tih-wu, like Quijano, was but an intermediary with little influence over how his side felt. Although a product of the same media regime as Mah, Wang tried his best to fulfill his end of
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the bargain and have the Yuyitungs’ release brought forward. Even as he faithfully conveyed his government’s views to Quijano, he also tried to persuade his bosses that Quijano was sincere about changing the paper’s editorial policy towards Taiwan. He even suggested that a friendlier attitude on the part of Philippine-Chinese society towards the CCN might cause the paper to become more anticommunist, and that the CNA consider restoring its ties with the CCN. His entreaties fell on deaf ears. Mah was never convinced that Quijano was sincere about trying to change the paper’s “anti-ROC” position, as it persisted in publishing what he considered pro-communist propaganda, despite Wang’s intercessions.

As the months passed and the Yuyitungs remained in detention despite the best efforts of Quijano and Wang, discontent among anti-ROC members of the IPI resurfaced. Meyer, who had played such an important role in Zurich in October 1970 in swaying delegates to the ROC’s side, could no longer influence proceedings as he once did and appeared to be swinging back to the side of the IPI. In December, he cautioned Wang that the IPI would likely call an extraordinary meeting to propose a resolution to the effect that “continued recognition of a national IPI committee in the ROC was irreconcilable with the constitutional principles and ideals of the organization.” The longer a “positive decision” was delayed, the “tougher reactions would be.” In the first two months of 1971, the Yuyitung case came up at the general meetings of both the West German and French IPI committees. By late February, Meyer warned Wang that “strong ill-feeling” towards the ROC was growing. A letter from IPI vice-chairman Aatos Erkko of Finland warned that if the Yuyitungs were not released by the IPI’s annual general meeting in Helsinki in June, the IPI would have to seriously consider the ROC and Philippines’ membership. “From now on,” Meyer told his friend Wang, “things are out of my control. I deeply regret that all our patient endeavors for an acceptable
solution to this case were in vain.” Meyer’s appeals to Cheng Pao-nan, the ROC’s UN Ambassador to Geneva, were unsuccessful in persuading the ROC to change its stance.\(^7^0\)

As things turned out, Wang was able to delay the expulsion of the ROC’s IPI committee until October. In the buildup to Helsinki, Wang embarked on yet another lobbying campaign in an attempt to secure support for the ROC’s actions, traveling to Japan, Hong Kong, and South Korea and meeting with Meyer and Aw in preparation for the meeting. This time, the anti- and pro-ROC factions were clearly divided between Asia and the West, with the United States initially leading the charge against Taiwan, and Japan assuming the mantle of the ROC’s principle defender. After a succession of stormy meetings from June 6-9, during which Wang, Aw, and Japanese delegate Susumu Ejiri each threatened to resign from the IPI if the ROC committee was derecognized, the executive committee tabled a motion calling for the Philippines and ROC to expedite a deal that would see the Yuyitungs released and allowed back into the Philippines if they met certain criteria laid out by Manila. This was a variation on the political solution that Meyer and Wang had verbally agreed on before the Zurich meeting in 1970, but which had not been officially incorporated into the motions passed at that meeting. The main difference was that the Yuyitungs were now to be readmitted into the Philippines rather than exiled to Singapore. At Helsinki, Hans Menzi informed the IPI that Marcos was willing to accept them if they publicly apologized (again) to the Philippine government and people, completely overhaul the CCN’s ideological position, and promise to be “good citizens” going forward; Napoleon Rama interpreted Menzi’s announcement as Marcos’s attempt to pass the buck to Taipei and stave off criticism from the foreign media, whose favorable opinions he constantly sought.\(^7^1\) Wang was asked to convey Marcos’s criteria to his government.

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\(^7^1\) Yuyitung (ed.), *The Case of the Yuyitung Brothers*, 306.
and continue trying to persuade the ROC to relent. The motion passed, despite European attempts to have the ROC IPI committee suspended for a year, or until the Yuyitungs were released.\textsuperscript{72}

Wang had won yet another temporary reprieve for the ROC IPI, but at considerable cost to his personal wellbeing. Two days after the Helsinki meeting ended, an exhausted Wang flew to Hamburg, where he fell gravely ill and had to be admitted into hospital for a blocked blood vessel in his brain. Rather than receiving medical treatment there and then, he flew straight back to Taipei to hold a press conference explaining how he had safeguarded the ROC’s membership of the IPI, and only afterwards underwent treatment. No agreement between the ROC and the Philippines was forthcoming in the subsequent weeks and months, however, and on October 22, 1971 in Zurich – three days before the PRC was admitted into the United Nations – the IPI executive committee derecognized the ROC.\textsuperscript{73} After recovering from his near-fatal brush with death, Wang resumed his lobbying efforts and in June 1975 secured the re-recognition of the ROC’s IPI committee.\textsuperscript{74}

\textbf{The center holds: the Philippine KMT’s reaction to Quintin Yuyitung’s release}

The internationalization of the Yuyitung affair and the conflict between the ROC and IPI offer a unique vantage point from which to consider the ROC’s position in the world just prior to its expulsion from the United Nations. Wang Tih-wu’s indefatigable attempts to depict the ROC’s treatment of the Yuyitungs as just and humane, and to maintain the ROC’s membership of the IPI, highlight Taiwan’s sensitivity to global public opinion and desire to be perceived by international civil society as a nation-state-like polity fully capable of exercising sovereign rights over its own

\textsuperscript{72} Wang, \textit{Lianhe bao sanshinian de fazhan}, 283-289.


\textsuperscript{74} Wang, \textit{Wo yu xinwen shiye}, 128-129.
“citizens.” A full account of the ROC’s response to the affair must also address relations between Taiwan and both the Philippine government and the Philippine KMT. As we have seen, relations between the ROC and the Marcos regime eventually came to revolve around a political solution to the affair that would see Taiwan release the brothers if the Philippines accepted them back. No such deal came about because Quintin and Rizal were not willing to meet the criteria that Marcos had laid out.

Relations between the ROC-KMT party-state in Taiwan and the Philippine KMT came to the forefront of the former’s international public relations campaign as Quintin Yuyitung’s two-year period of reformatory education drew to a close. As August 16, 1972 neared, state and party officials began debating whether or not to allow him to leave Taiwan. As previously, deliberations over this issue revolved around more than just formal legal procedures. Legally, and in the absence of precedent, Garrison-General Headquarters believed that Quintin should remain on the island. An August 8 KMT Central Committee meeting, which Mah Soo-Lay attended, agreed on this point, but also that the government need not inform Quintin explicitly about this, since they figured that he probably did not expect to leave anyway. Mah was tasked with helping Quintin to find work in Taiwan and arranging for his wife to visit him. The same meeting also sketched a plan to manage the media. There was no need for the ROC to comment on the matter of Quintin’s leaving Taiwan; if pressed, it ought simply to say that he had not applied to do so. If foreign journalists sought to interview him, the state would have a UDN journalist sit in on that interview, and have it published first in the two English-language newspapers in Taiwan, but not in the Chinese-language media.75

On August 16, Quintin was released from the reformatory education facility at Panchiao. As there was no possibility of his returning to the Philippines, the US IPI national committee, one

75 “Yu shi xiongdi,” Vol. 4, AH.
of the staunchest supporters of the Yuyitungs, invited him to the United States and began working with the State Department to obtain a visa for him. This was reported in the August 15 edition of the *Manila Times*, which also mentioned that, according to “official sources,” the ROC had reached a “preliminary decision” not to let Quintin leave Taiwan. A Chinese Information Service press release that same day, in keeping with the state’s media plan, mentioned nothing about this. Yet, it soon became apparent that Taiwan could not simply adhere to its original plan and disregard the US IPI’s invitation to Quintin and the State Department’s involvement. On August 18, the UDN reported that Quintin was considering visiting the United States. Several days later, Frederick Chien, head of the Government Information Office, informally told a US official in Taipei that he was aware of Quintin’s “job offer” in the United States and “there would be no difficulty with his leaving to accept it,” except that he first needed a ROC passport. The same memo that mentioned Chien’s remarks noted that while the ROC did not customarily allow former political prisoners to leave Taiwan, it was “stung” by the bad publicity that it had received and was willing to let Quintin do so to avoid further criticism and improve its relations with the IPI.

Already unhappy at what it perceived was the ROC’s excessively lenient treatment of the brothers and weakness in the face of pressure from the IPI, the Philippine KMT reacted to news of Quintin’s being allowed to leave Taiwan by threatening to resign from the Central Committee. In its view, the ROC had shown disregard for its own laws and the rule of law in its handling of

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76 Yuyitung (ed.), *The Case of the Yuyitung Brothers*, 317.

77 “News from China: Quintin Yuyitung completes 2 year reformatory term,” August 15, 1972, RG 59, Series: Subject Files, 1951-1978, Box 11, Folder: POL 29 Yuyitung Brothers (Lot File 75D76), NARA.


79 “Memorandum from Leo Moser to Marshall Green, Subject: Status of Quintin Yuyitung,” August 23, 1972, RG 59, Series: Subject Files, 1951-1978, Box 11, Folder: POL 29 Yuyitung Brothers (Lot File 75D76), NARA.
the case. Based on how the CCN continued to depict the ROC in its articles, party hardliners also believed that the paper’s pro-communist behavior had only intensified and that it was incapable of reforming itself. Were Quintin to return to the Philippines after being released, he would no doubt resume propagandizing on behalf of the CCP. All in all, party members in the Philippines felt that Taipei’s management of the Yuyitung affair was having a dispiriting effect on their anticommunist efforts.

The Central Committee responded to this unprecedented crisis in intra-party relations by dispatching Cua Siok Po, still Deputy Chairman of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, to the Philippines from September 5-10 to justify Taipei’s behavior to his former Manila comrades. Cua’s lengthy report to his superiors is the clearest available evidence of how international public opinion, as manifested through the IPI, decisively shaped the ROC’s handling of the Yuyitung affair after May 1970, and specifically, its decision to let Quintin leave Taiwan. Together with the ROC Ambassador Liu Chieh 劉鍇 and elders such as James Lee 李治民, Pao Shih-tien, and Koa Chun-te, Cua spent his first three days there meeting with disgruntled party members individually. On September 8, he addressed a meeting of about 40 KMT leaders in Manila. After praising the Philippine KMT for its “resolute fighting spirit” (douzhi jianqiang 鬥志堅強) and “firm stance” (lichang jianjue 立場堅決), Cua explained that Taipei had decided to allow Quintin to leave the country in response to the “current international environment” (dangqian guoji huanjing 當前國際環境), and to snuff out the plot against the ROC by leftist IPI members. Quintin would not be allowed to return to the Philippines, he assured them.

Cua’s appeal for understanding and assurances about Quintin were sufficient to persuade the Philippine KMT to withdraw its resignation. In its written response to Cua, the party called for improved cooperation between the KMT Central Committee in Taipei and its Philippine branch at
this uncertain time for the ROC, particularly in areas such as propaganda, the media, and outreach to Filipinos. Juan Quijano, who had to shoulder part of the blame for the CCN’s continuing pro-communist views, was to be denied entry into Taiwan. Finally, party members expressed doubts that two years of reformatory education had changed Quintin’s political beliefs and said that they deeply regretted how international public opinion had played such a decisive role in his release. Going forward, they urged Taipei to ignore public pressure when handling Rizal. They hoped that if Rizal remained obstinate in his political views in a year’s time, he would continue undergoing ganhua, and that Taipei would consult closely with them. Not doing so, it claimed hyperbolically, would precipitate the “complete disintegration” (quanmian wajie 全面瓦解) of the KMT in the Philippines.80

Conclusion

Following his release from detention, Quintin remained in Taiwan for several months to secure a ROC passport and a visitor’s visa to the United States through the US Embassy in Taipei. On November 11, Chiang Ching-kuo himself authorized Quintin’s departure,81 and on December 8, Quintin left Taipei for San Francisco, where he was joined by Quijano.82 A year later, Rizal was released from detention with little fanfare and joined his brother in the United States. Unlike a year earlier, there were no protests from the Philippine KMT this time around. Rizal eventually settled down in Toronto. He and Quintin would eventually return to the Philippines in 1986, after Marcos

80 “Yu shi xiongdi qianpei (jianbao ziliao),” Vol. 2, 278, AH.
81 “Yu shi xiongdi,” Vol. 4, AH.
was overthrown, to help restart the newspaper, which remains in print today. Quintin passed away in San Francisco in 1990, and Rizal in Toronto in 2007.

This chapter has examined the two-year public relations campaign that the ROC waged in response to the deportation of the Yuyitungs to Taiwan and their trial and detention there. With its focus on the ROC’s responses to the IPI and sensitivity to international public opinion, Wang Tih-wu’s “citizen diplomacy,” and efforts by the KMT to prevent the secession of its Philippine branch, the preceding narrative offers an alternative framework for thinking about the ROC in the world during a critical moment in its history. That well-known history, centered on US-ROC relations, Taiwan’s struggle to maintain its seat at the United Nations, and the ROC as an emerging capitalist economy, has overshadowed its equally determined attempts to uphold its reputation as sovereign, just, and “free” in the eyes of international civil society. These were the qualities that it sought to project onto the global stage through by managing the Yuyitung affair. The “world” that the ROC interacted with to validate itself consisted not only of nation-states, but also of overseas Chinese communities, overseas party branches, and organizations such as the IPI; and the “ROC” that did so comprised not only state bureaucrats and party officials, but also “private” actors such as Wang who were just as committed to the Nationalist state as the likes of Mah Soo-Lay and Cua Siok Po were. In its calculations, this regime realized that it could not simply release the Yuyitungs, despite the IPI’s pressures upon it, for it had staked its legitimacy as a sovereign polity on anticomununism and legal claims upon its “nationals” overseas. But, with the international environment shifting in opposition to it, the ROC adopt a relatively lenient attitude towards the Yuyitungs’ alleged crimes. It sought to exercise its sovereignty in a manner that it regarded as humane and that demonstrated sensitivity to global public opinion. This was the compromise that Taiwan hoped would satisfy all
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parties with a stake in the fate of the brothers – the IPI, the Philippine KMT, and the Philippines – but which did not.
The deportation of the Yuyitungs to Taiwan exemplified the collaborative anticommunist relationship and sharing of sovereignty between the ROC, Philippines, and Philippine Chinese and represented their greatest “triumph” in the struggle against a largely imaginary Chinese communist enemy. Yet by the time Rizal was released from Panchiao in the fall of 1973, if not earlier, it was clear to all except the most blinkered ROC supporters that the political tides had turned irrevocably against the ROC, both internationally and in the Philippines. From 1973-1975, Nationalist Chinese influence in what was previously one of its staunchest allies in Asia declined precipitously in the face of Sino-US rapprochement and the PRC’s admission into the United Nations, executive power in the Philippines, and long-term generational changes in Philippine-Chinese society. Within these five years, Chinese schools were Filipinized, Manila switched recognition from Taipei to Beijing, and the naturalization process for resident aliens was vastly simplified.

The first pillar of ROC influence in the Philippines to crumble was its control over Chinese education. As we have seen in Chapter 4, the state’s previous efforts in the mid-1950s to supervise Chinese schools had left their Chinese-language curriculum and thus the ROC’s all-important role in shaping it essentially untouched. Educational Filipinization, however, remained on the political agenda, and would be brought up again during the Constitutional Convention from 1971-1972 that Marcos had convened in order to extend his stay in office beyond the two-term limit stipulated in the 1935 Commonwealth Constitution.¹ Over the course of the Convention, 38 distinct resolutions recommended provisions to Filipinize or suppress Chinese schools. After much debate, both within the Committee on Education and on the Convention floor, the proposed constitution was amended

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to reflect widespread support for educational Filipinization among the political establishment. In April 1973, seven months into martial law, Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 176 instructing the Education Department to implement Article XV, Section 8 of the new constitution. Henceforth, all educational institutions were not only placed under the supervision of the state, but also had to be owned solely by Philippine citizens or corporations that were controlled by a 60 percent Filipino majority. No schools were to be established exclusively for aliens, or any school offer a curriculum exclusively for aliens. The Chinese curriculum, patterned after Taiwan’s, was cancelled, and the teaching of Chinese made optional and only as a foreign language. All Chinese schools were given until the end of the 1976-1977 school year to meet these requirements. With the stroke of a pen, Marcos had unilaterally abrogated the ROC’s “liberty to establish schools for the education of their children,” as spelled out in the 1947 Treaty of Amity.

The severing of diplomatic ties between Taiwan and the Philippines and the establishment of Philippine-China relations soon followed in 1975; the groundwork for this had been laid during the preceding decade. After entering office, Marcos almost immediately lifted a ban on Philippine citizens traveling to socialist countries in the hope of diversifying his country’s trade relations. By March 1974, the Philippines had normalized relations with Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Mongolia. Trade between the Philippines and these states, along with the Soviet Union and the PRC, had reached some $80 million, with China accounting for nearly half the total volume. China, which had recently discovered large deposits of oil in Heilongjiang, was

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a potential source of discounted oil imports at a time of volatility in global energy markets; Marcos also feared that the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries would curb oil exports to the Philippines in retaliation for the military’s armed operations against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in Mindanao. Apart from economic concerns, Marcos also believed that opening up relations with China would bring to an end its provision of weapons to and rhetorical support for the Maoist Communist Party of the Philippines and its New People’s Army.\(^5\)

Marcos adopted a consultative approach towards normalization and sought the opinions of former Foreign Secretary Salvador Lopez, Armed Forces Chief of Staff Romeo Espino, and former Ambassador to the ROC Narciso Ramos. All three men cautioned against it and believed that doing so would allow the PRC to expand its influence among the local Chinese population. The President, not totally convinced by their arguments, sought a further opinion from Benito Lim, a lecturer in contemporary China at the University of the Philippines. Marcos asked Lim for his views on mass naturalization, which the President believed had to be part of any plan to establish ties with China so as to limit the PRC’s influence over Chinese in the country. Lim, who had previously failed in his application for citizenship because he could not afford to pay the bribe that the presiding judge had demanded, advocated this policy. With Marcos’s backing, Lim conducted a survey under the auspices of the Philippine Center for Advanced Studies at UP to investigate local Chinese attitudes toward citizenship, the PRC, and Chinese schools. The results dispelled any fears that the Chinese could be vulnerable to PRC influence. 85 percent of those surveyed expressed fears of communism and 90 percent preferred to become Philippine rather than PRC citizens. Acting upon these results,

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Marcos issued a Letter of Instruction on April 11, 1975 that simplified the previously cumbersome naturalization process for aliens by vesting the power to approve all applications for naturalization in a special committee chaired by the Solicitor-General.\(^6\) Five years later, in 1980, it had received 43,180 applications; by comparison, only 579 petitions for citizenship were filed through the courts from 1969-1974.\(^7\) On June 7, 1975, Marcos went on a five-day official visit to China, and on June 9, the PRC and the Philippines recognized each other. During his visit, posters of Mao and Chinese flags were prominently displayed in some establishments in Chinatown.\(^8\) Even five years earlier, this would have been unthinkable.

In part, as the above narrative suggests, the decline of Nationalist Chinese influence in the Philippines was brought about by geopolitical shifts and presidential decision-making. Martial law made it possible for policies to be enacted into law without recourse to the legislature. More than this, the concentration of power in Marcos’s hands and his willingness to use it against his enemies effectively silenced any potential opposition among Chinese leaders to his policies and encouraged instead a deepening of patron-client ties. Within days of declaring martial law, Marcos ordered the military to detain Federation President Antonio Roxas Chua, prompting an emergency meeting of Shang Zong leaders and ROC officials. Through his close friend and former Shang Zong President Ralph Nubla, Marcos conveyed his wish for the Federation to openly declare its support for martial law, help bring down prices, and comply with regulations and decrees – in return for Roxas Chua’s release. A formal resolution addressing all three demands swiftly followed. Over time, the Shang

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\(^6\) Aguilar, “Interview with Benito Lim,” 396-405.


\(^8\) Carino, *Chinese Big Business in the Philippines*, 57.
Zong came to identify Marcos’s continued stay in power with the protection of Philippine-Chinese business interests. Crime and extortion against Chinese decreased, at least in the first few years of martial law. With Congress dissolved, anti-Chinese economic nationalization bills could no longer be passed. Politics was simplified: all that mattered for the Federation’s leadership was cultivating its relationship to one man. As they had closely aligned themselves with the anticommunist goals of the state in the 1950s and 1960s, so too did they accommodate themselves to the realities of the martial law years.

The shift away from Nationalist China in the early-mid 1970s was underpinned by longer-term social changes. Benito Lim’s survey suggested that most Philippine Chinese were either non- or anticommunist: decades of exposure to KMT propaganda and living in a highly anticommunist country had contributed to this. Where the ROC and its loyalists ultimately failed was in hindering acculturation into Filipino society and in maintaining identification between younger Chinese and the Nationalist state. The rearguard action of Pao Shih-tien and other conservative educators from the mid-1950s onwards; educational visits to the “homeland”; textbooks; PCACL rallies; Chinese elites’ embrace of the Cultural Renaissance – none was able to sustain the ethnocentrism that ROC influence depended on. The US political scientist Robert Tilman found in 1970 that many Chinese high school students had difficulty reading and writing Chinese characters and few read Chinese newspapers or periodicals except those prescribed in school. Even among those fluent in Chinese, attitudes were changing. In that same year, young ethnic Chinese university graduates – including a few who had studied at Chiang Kai-shek College – formed the civic organization Pagkakaisa sa Pag-unlad (Unity for Progress) to advocate for *jus soli* citizenship and the Filipinization of Chinese

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schools at the Constitutional Convention. If the *Chinese Commercial News*’s calls for integration seemed out of place in the 1950s, they were now gaining increasingly widespread acceptance.

A further challenge to the established ideological order emerged from among the relatively few and hitherto marginalized members of the Federation who favored closer relations with China, whether because of ideological or cultural affinities. In 1970, as the political winds were beginning to shift, several of these businessmen – including former CCN literary editor Go Eng Guan – came together to establish the Filipino-Chinese Amity Club (*Feihua lianyi hui* 菲華聯誼會), which soon formed branches across the country. After 1975, the Amity Club was able to operate more openly and cultivated as one of its patrons First Lady Imelda Marcos, thereby undermining the previously exclusive access to Malacañang Palace that the Shang Zong had enjoyed.

The conservatives did not go quietly, however. Although Pagkakaisa’s calls for citizenship based on *jus soli* were backed by some Shang Zong members, its support for the Filipinization of Chinese schools proved highly unpopular. Pagkakaisa founding member Teresita Ang See recalls that when her late husband, Chinben See, gave a lecture on educational Filipinization at CKSC, he was “almost literally thrown out” of the establishment. Marcos’s decision to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing proved just as controversial. Officially, the Federation supported this move. But when the newly-emboldened but still small pro-PRC faction, including Amity Club members, insisted on replacing the ROC flag inside Federation headquarters with a PRC one, the dominant pro-Taiwan leadership held a special meeting and decided that only the Philippine flag was to be

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displayed. The Federation’s President Yao Shiong Shio and the four Vice-Presidents threatened to resign if this gesture of defiance did not carry the day. With the dispute roiling Chinatown, Marcos himself intervened, urging the warring groups to resolve their differences amicably. He indicated that while he would respect the decision to display the Philippine and PRC flags inside the building, only the former ought to be flown outside it. One of the most outspoken members of the pro-PRC faction was eventually suspended from the Shang Zong after launching a campaign in the Chinese press against it. (In another time and age, he might have been reported to the military and deported to Taiwan.) The Amity Club, although patronized by the First Lady, was not supported by the new PRC Embassy, which – unlike its predecessor – was careful not to become involved in community politics. Consequently, pro-Beijing views needed time to gain acceptance. The Federation held out against recognizing the PRC until 1994, when 55 of its members officially visited China as part of a larger trade mission to various Northeast Asian countries. Immediately after leaving China, they proceeded to Taipei, where they assured ROC officials that the close ties between them, built up over the previous four decades, would persist. Ever attentive to the importance of symbolism, they spent an equal amount of time – ten days – in both Taiwan and China.\(^\text{14}\)

Where it had previously flourished largely unopposed, the Philippine KMT was now forced to accept a more circumscribed role in the Chinese community. Just as the ROC Embassy became the Pacific Economic and Cultural Center in 1975 and, in 1989, the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office, the KMT renamed itself the Filipino-Chinese Cultural and Economic Association (Feihua wenhua jingji zonghui 菲華文化經濟總會, or Wen Zong).\(^\text{15}\) Its two newspapers, the Great China

\(^{14}\) Carino, *Chinese Big Business in the Philippines*, 57-58; 91-92.

\(^{15}\) The Facebook page of the Wen Zong is, tellingly, http://www.facebook.com/kuomintang.ph. As of writing, the organization’s official website, http://www.fccea.org.ph, is down.
Conclusion

*Press* and *Kong Li Po*, were forced to merge into the *United Daily News* (*Lianhe ribao*, 聯合日報; no relation to the Wang Tih-wu’s paper) in 1973 and scale back on supporting Taiwan, for example. Its grip on Chinese education was loosened. Yet, the fundamental goals of the party remained the same, which were to “win the hearts of our overseas compatriots” (*zhengqu qiaobao xiangxin*, 爭取僑胞向心) by promoting Chinese culture, and to champion democracy, according to the KMT *zongzhibu*’s longtime Secretary-General (and conspirator against the Yuyitungs), S. C. Lim. Party stalwarts such as him held fast to the belief that most Philippine Chinese were lovers of freedom and democracy and thus steadfast supporters of Taiwan. On their part, Lim and others proved more conservative than Taiwan’s leaders in their attitudes toward the PRC. The *zongzhibu* disapproved of high-level visits by Taiwanese officials to the mainland, for example, and for a time, local KMT members holding committee appointments who wished to do so had to first inform the party. While the vocabulary of “communist banditry” and “counterattacking the mainland” was soon abandoned, anticommunism remained the organization’s raison d’être. We must maintain our anticommunist stance, Lim told a group of interviewers from Academia Sinica in 1993, and oppose the application of the communist system to China; this was something that “we could not give up” (*buneng fangqi*, 不能放棄), regardless of what other Chinese in the Philippines believed in.16

Today, Chinese society in the Philippines is largely unrecognizable from half a century ago. The Federation is thoroughly pro-China and the majority of Chinese-Filipinos, born and raised in the country, are citizens of the Philippines and integrated into Filipino society. Schools no longer rally students around the cause of *fangong kang’e*, or spend half a day teaching a Chinese-language

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sylabus imported from Taiwan. Although nativist sentiments have certainly not gone away, anti-
Chinese attitudes manifest themselves these days largely in opposition to the PRC’s expansion into
what Manila officially refers to as the “West Philippine Sea,” rather than against Chinese-Filipinos.
Many such “Tsinoys” travel to and do business in China – the PRC – but none are deported there.
Yet as S. C. Lim’s remarks above imply, the legacy of Nationalist China’s anticommunist qiaowu
in the Philippines is everywhere to be found. It is institutionalized, for example, in the Wen Zong,
which remains at Liberty Hall at 820 Benavidez Street in Manila’s Chinatown, where the party has
been since being re-opened in March 1947. Just down the street is the United Daily News, and ten
minutes away by foot is another quintessentially pro-Taiwan institution, Chiang Kai-shek College.
The Chinese Commercial News has been in business since the collapse of the Marcos dictatorship
in 1986, when Quintin and Rizal returned to the Philippines to help resurrect the paper. It continues
to be run by the Yuyitung family today; the events of 1962 and 1970 remain etched in the memory
of former CCN staff members. Older Chinese-Filipinos like them recall an earlier era when “China”
was Taiwan, being “Chinese” meant being a ROC national, and the Philippine military and police
victimized innocent members of the community in the name of anticommunism. Julio Tan, whom
I interviewed in June 2016, worked for the Great China Press and remembers Koa Chun-te as the
“nicest” of all his employers, Shih I-Sheng as someone whom people laughed at, and Hsin Kwan-
chue as “very fond of girls.”

Nationalist China’s history of anticommunist qiaowu in the Philippines and the Philippine
state and huaqiao society’s contributions to this enterprise can also be reconstructed from a textual
corpus that spans Taiwan, the Philippines, and the United States and that integrates state archives
on the one hand with those of the Philippine-Chinese community on the other. Making use of these

17 Julio Tan, interview with author, June 8 and 12, 2016, Manila.
and other materials, this dissertation has argued for the centrality of diasporic nation-building and intra-Asian connections, rather than US-Taiwan relations, to understanding the ROC in the Cold War world; that the relationship between its principal actors in opposition to the largely imaginary threat of Chinese communism constituted a form of what I call shared, non-territorial sovereignty; and that anticommunist social and cultural practices enabled individuals whom scholars typically consider as uninterested in Cold War politics to perform their ideological credentials and come to terms with being ethno-cultural minorities in their country of residence.
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