Alone, Together:
An examination of the organizational capacity of the Stuyvesant Town and Peter Cooper Village Tenants’ Association

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Peter Harrison
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Columbia University
Introduction

On February 4, 2006, after over sixty years of owning and operating Stuyvesant Town and Peter Cooper Village (STPCV) in the Lower East Side of Manhattan, MetLife sold the property to Tishman Speyer for $5.4b in what remains the largest residential real estate deal in the history of the United States. The complex, representing 110 buildings and over 25,000 residents narrowly concentrated across 80 acres, was about to be undergo the greatest existential threat that its cherished middleclass identity had ever faced. Residents and observers alike anticipated that Tishman’s overt plan of converting the property to market-rate luxury housing would result in mass displacement, the frenzied erosion of rent-stabilized housing, a permanently high turnover rate of units, and the complete unmaking of the community. With a seemingly endless supply of financial capital behind it, in the midst of a bullish real estate market, Tishman appeared to be on an unstoppable march - building-by-building, unit-by-unit, and resident-by-resident. The last great concentration of middleclass housing in Manhattan was sure to disappear and with it, perhaps, the very idea of affordable housing in the core of New York City.

However, that’s not what happened. In fact, no one in 2006 living in or lusting for the complex could have predicted the story that emerged over the next six years. The real estate market burst before the ink dried on the deal between MetLife and Tishman, followed by the collapse of the financial markets, and Tishman was gone from the property by the end of 2009. By 2011, all 11,000 units were rent-stabilized
and even the laws themselves were renewed and moderately strengthened for the first time in a generation. As of this writing in the spring of 2013, the residents of STPCV are now in a tenable position to buy the property themselves, backed by powerful law firms, financial advisors, and capital investors. How did this dramatic turn of events happen? Who made it happen?

This paper will examine the central player in this story – the Stuyvesant Town and Peter Cooper Village Tenants Organization (TA) - and its role in this dramatic turn of events. I will examine the forty-year history of this all-volunteer organization and how its successes and failures have turned it into the prominent force that it is today. Specifically, I intend to measure the organizational strength of the TA and determine what factors have given it the ability to leverage political influence with elected officials and financial interests in New York City. This examination will focus primarily on how the TA has been managing the crisis facing the property over the past six years – the purchase by Tishman Speyer in 2006, up through the present attempts to obtain the property from its creditor, CW Capital. Though direct collective action, community organizing, political opportunities, and financially-savvy partnerships, this small, tight-knit community group with limited funds has organized a large and diverse population of 25,000 people through a lengthy, complicated legal and financial battle – all while going through the most rapid and dramatic demographic shift the complex has seen in its entire seventy years. How has the TA cultivated its organization and relevance and, perhaps most importantly
for the TA, has it been able to embrace these demographic changes while still representing its middleclass identity?

This paper will use the efforts of the TA to draw on the external threat of Tishman Speyer’s mismanagement of the property and subsequent bankruptcy to unify the residents (while at the same time using this legitimacy to garner access and support from elected officials and other financial interests) in order to examine the theoretical framework of collective action and community organizing - in particular I will examine how the TA has organized itself and the residents of STPCV, what strategy and tactics it has used, and how they have measured the success of their efforts. I will also attempt to determine if the historical goals of the TA – to preserve its middle-class identity and affordability – have remained important factors in their organizing efforts even as it has moved passed its traditional residential make-up and attempts to buy the property.

By determining how the TA has conducted its organizing efforts, I hope to demonstrate that even when controlling for the unique spatial and historical nature of the property, the theatrical concepts of community organizing and community empowerment to be discussed can in practice be effective tools for any community to define its own goals, capitalize on existing community assets and implement its own placemaking vision. That such a small volunteer organization spread thinly through a large population can be successful in organizing can, I trust, be seen as a model for other communities, regardless of size and capacity, with similar concerns
over their collective or individual futures. The hope of this paper is also to serve as a model for the TA itself, as these findings will be equally relevant for the future of the organization as it attempts to purchase the property. This purchase has the potential to put extreme pressure on the association's stated goals of affordability and commitment to community and its ability to remain coherently organized will be a major factor in the outcome of this process.
CHAPTER 1
“Mama Met”
The historical background of Stuyvesant Town and Peter Cooper Village and its Tenants Association

In this chapter I will give brief histories of the Stuyvesant Town and Peter Cooper Village complex (STPCV) and the TA in order to provide the context for what factors led to the formation of the middle-class identity they both represent. Finally, as this paper intends to focus on the years following the 2006 sale of the property to the present, I will discuss the major events of this period, including Tishman’s bankruptcy and departure, the Roberts decision, and the current efforts by the TA to purchase the property. I will also provide a history of rent control laws in New York City and State, which will be crucial to understanding some of the larger issues the TA organizes around and what some of their experiences have been through the years and legislative battles.

History of Rent Control in New York City

Significant amounts of literature has been written on the potential economic consequences of rent control (Glaeser, 2003; Olsen, 1965; Ellickson, 1991) and some on the social policy benefits (Radin, 1986) but for my purposes, I intend to give a comprehensive historical background of the legislative history of rent control laws in New York City and New York State. As this paper is an examination of the organizational capacity of the TA, the economic and political conditions surrounding rent control/ rent stabilization laws are pertinent to its activities and thus my
analysis. However, given the restraints inherent in this exercise, I will focus on the political rather than economic impact of these laws.

Rent Control laws first came into existence in November 1943 as part of the US Emergency Price Act of 1942, freezing prices at their March 1943 levels. This measure was taken during World War II to prevent “speculative, unwarranted, or abnormal” rent increases that could negatively impact the war effort.\(^1\) Though intended to last only during the duration of the war, the program was extended through the Federal Housing and Rent Act of 1947 because of the unprecedented housing shortage caused by a lack of new construction going back to the Depression. The act called for all buildings constructed after 1947 to be exempt from rent controls. While the federal legislature expired in 1950, it was replaced in New York State by the New York Emergency Housing Act of 1950, which took over the administration of rent control for an estimated 2.5 million units across the state (85% of which were in NYC) by setting up the Temporary State Housing Rent Commission.\(^2\) Over the next decade the state experienced several limited episodes of decontrol of vacant apartments but political tensions between the city and state ultimately led to the city obtaining control of rent control under the Emergency Housing Act of 1962, creating the city’s Rent Control Division within the Department of Housing Preservation and Development (Gyourko and Linnerman, 1987).

\(^1\) History of Rent Regulation in New York State 1943-1993. New York Division of Housing and Community Renewal. Retrieved 02/21/2013
\(^2\) DHCR
The next major development occurred during the Vietnam War where, nationally, inflation rose and local construction slumped, slashing the vacancy rates to 1.3%, leading to a severe escalation in rental prices throughout non-controlled units. This led the city to enact the Rent Stabilization Law of 1969 (Gyourko and Linerman, 1987). The act created a tier of controlled units with significant differences from rent-controlled apartments and was designed to be more adjustable to market pressures by creating the Rent Guideline Board to review periodic price changes. This also led to the first major local reform of controlled units in 1970 with the creation of the Maximum Base Rent (MBR) which was a system set up to use a mathematical formula to adjust prices based on the estimated operating cost of the unit (DHCR).

In the early 1970s under Governor Rockefeller the state began to write legislature designed to decontrol apartments voluntarily vacated after 1970 and passed the “Urstadt Law” designed to limit any (but mainly NYC) municipality’s ability to create rent control laws more stringent than the current state's laws. The result of these measures: 300,000 controlled apartments and 88,000 stabilized apartments became market rate units (MaKee, 2008).

With the increased pressure on the controlled and stabilized housing stock along with high inflation and little new construction, the political tension on the state caused by significant rises in housing costs led Rockefeller to reverse course and sign the Emergency Tenant Protection Act of 1974 which further protected
controlled and stabilized units during a housing emergency - meaning a vacancy rate under 5% in a given county - and removed the provisions of vacancy decontrol on units built between 1969 and 1973, raising the amount of units under protection for the first time.

The status quo remained for the next decade until the real estate market began to rebound and pressure to decontrol again began to rally in Albany. This led to the Omnibus Housing Act of 1983 that put all four laws on rent control (The Emergency House Rent Control Law of 1950, The Local Emergency Rental Control Act of 1962, the Rent Stabilization Law of 1969, and the Emergency Tenant Protection Act of 1974) back under state control and put greater limits on what the Rent Guideline Board could prevent in price adjustments (DHCR). This would mark the last time that the city had any local power over the rent laws (MaKee, 2008).

Through the remainder of the 1980s, the rent laws were extended as-is every two years, as there was little political pressure from a weakened real estate industry. Beginning with the Rent Regulation Reform Act of 1993, however, the power began to shift back to real estate and landlords. The law would include a larger pool of vacant units that could be deregulated and any unit at a certain rent level with residents making over a certain combined income, resulting in a significant loss of controlled apartments. In 1997 during the infamous Great Rent War, State Senate Majority Leader Joe Bruno attempted to end all rent regulations, and though he was ultimately blocked by a coalition of tenants and Democrats, the six year extender
further weakened controls on vacant units and units at certain rents and incomes (MaKee, 2008). The renewal in 2003 followed a similar political story but the price increases for existing tenants rose dramatically. In total, over the course of the 35 years between 1970 and 2005, more than 500,000 controlled apartments were decontrolled. I will discuss the more recent developments with rent laws (most notably the 2011 campaign) in greater detail later in this chapter during the 2006-to-present section.

**History of Stuyvesant Town and Peter Cooper Village**

STPCV shares its origin with the rent control laws as it too was conceived and constructed due of the housing shortage experienced during World War II. The complex was envisioned by master-planner Robert Moses during the early stages of the war as a home for returning veterans and was seen as a chance to test Moses’ model of “slum clearance” in the housing sector. Moses, the Parks Commissioner at the time (along many other notable titles) enlisted MetLife to fund the $50m project by promising city, state and some federal subsidies – notably the promise of tax abatements for maintaining certain levels of affordability (Caro, 1974). The 80-acre site chosen on the east side of lower Manhattan from 14th Street to 23th Street North to south and east to west from 1st Ave to Ave C encompassed a neighborhood of low-rise tenement houses, light factories, two theaters and four gas storage tanks called the Gas House District. The Board of Estimates approved the plan over the opposition of residents and even some government officials citing the discomfort with a privately owned “walled city” in the heart of New York without any schools or
other public amenities.\(^3\) As the complex was reserved for returning veterans (and only white veterans)\(^4\), MetLife set up a Tenant Relocation Bureau for current residents of the condemned area, though it is unclear what happened to the number of displaced residents (estimated in 1945 at 11,000). Construction started soon after and the first residents moved in to apartments on August 1, 1947.\(^5\)

Contrary to popular knowledge, given that the construction of the complex occurred largely after 1947 (The complex was completed by 1950) STPCV was not initially protected under rent control laws. It would not see this designation until the Rent Stabilization Act of 1969, when all of the units were retroactively rent stabilized. Up until that point, MetLife dictated rents based on the initial agreement outlined by the state law written by Moses and leases/renewals based on their discretion.\(^6\)

Through the following two decades, while much of the surrounding neighborhoods deteriorated during the city's fiscal crisis of the mid 1970s, STPVC remained a

\(^3\) Ironically, two tenant organizations formed by residents who would be displaced united to oppose the demolition of their neighborhood until at least the end of the war. They were they the United Tenants League and the Stuyvesant Tenants League. Mayor La Guardia and Governor Dewey ignored their requests - an ominous start to tenant organizing in the neighborhood. (NYT)

\(^4\) *Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp.*, 299 NY 512 (1949) was the first case in New York brought against racial discrimination in housing. Charles Abrams, the noted fair housing writer and early advocate of the NYCHA argued the case, but the courts ruled against the plaintive - three black WWII veterans – saying the state could not compel a private entity-regardless of receiving state subsidies - to force access to certain tenants based on civil rights. The complex would not be legally desegregated until 1969 (CONFIRM) Pritchett


\(^6\) New York Urban Redevelopment Corporation Law (Pritchett)
bastion of middleclass housing in Manhattan - a tight-knit, still largely homogenous population consisting of many MetLife employees along with doctors, teachers, firefighters and the like. The population remained stable over multiple generations as the first generation of tenants born in the complex often remained to start families in other apartments. This trend would begin to change due to the natural aging of the original population as older residents left units and later increased dramatically as the property was sold to Tishman Speyer in 2006.

History of the Stuyvesant Town and Peter Cooper Village Tenants Association

This section is designed to provide a basic timeline of the TAs activities from its founding until 2006 to provide the historical context pertaining to the organization. I will go into greater detail about how the organization functioned during this period compared with today.

The Stuyvesant Town Tenants Association, as it was originally known, formed and incorporated in 1971 when several residents (and veterans) led by a resident named Charlie Lyman became aware of the issues facing the renewal of the Rent Stabilization Act of 1969 that incorporated STPCV two years before.

“The vacancy decontrol legislation and tax abatement being discussed in Albany were the two primary issues drawing people’s attention on the complex at the time as they were seen as direct threats to the affordability of the complex. It was a real pocket book issue. It had a good following.” – Al Doyle, former TA President, Board Member

These two issues would be proposed and ultimately included in a watered down form in the Emergency Tenant Act of 1974. The original organization was a mixture
of civic organization and social group as it held meetings in the small circle of members’ apartments to discuss actions to take for the upcoming legislative season. This resulted in the first attempts to contact members throughout the complex (via personal contact over phone or knocking on neighbors doors) and led to a limited but successful campaign to contact their elected leaders in Albany. Though it was a small organization at its inception, what cannot be underestimated is the difficulty of organizing in the complex at the time. MetLife was perceived as a benevolent dictator– but a dictator none-the-less. The residents at the time were largely content with the services and the rents but were fearful of being noticed by MetLife because it held the power of renewal over each resident.

“Yes, we called MetLife, Mama Met. Lots of MetLife employees lived here, including the property manager. There was a strong connection between the property and company, there was always a feeling that it was a positive force.” - Council Member Dan Garodnick

“We always had a problem organizing against MetLife. There was always a fear of Mama Met. They were a good landlord, but if you got too many tags, they would refuse to renewal your lease.” – Al Doyle

Though the Rent Stabilization Act included provisions concerning tenant protection and outlets, which prepped the ground for the TA to form, there was still a long held psychological barrier among many residents to organizing against MetLife.

After the initial organizing around the ETPA of 1974, the organization was largely dormant (a trend that would remain the case for most of its history) until the Omnibus Act in 1984, when it attempted to organize the complex against the bill to lobby Albany and the elected leaders.
“We had a good resurgence during the RGB period, but we didn’t have the tools we have today.” – Al Doyle

Though the rent laws were extended as is through the remainder of the 1980s, the TA began to fight MetLife directly. This shift started over major capital improvements (MCIs) which were projects carried out by MetLife on the complex whose costs were passed down through an increase in rents amortized over a varying time period.

“In 1990 we got some MCI reform because the political winds were right during Governor Cuomo’s tenure and the Republicans didn’t want to lose the Senate. So they changed the formula. They were amortized over 84 months instead of 60 months, resulting in smaller rent increases per month. “ – Al Doyle

In 1993, during the Rent Regulation Reform Act campaign, the TA saw another spike in volunteers and decided to reincorporate as the Stuyvesant Town and Peter Cooper Village Tenants Association, which remains its name to date. This period, including the Great Rent Wars of 1997 and the Rent Renewal Law of 2003 saw many legislative defeats for rent laws and corresponded with the real estate market gaining steam, putting increased pressure on tenants and tenants groups. The TA expanded its board to 9 members and maintained a small, dedicated group of building captains; however their activities were relatively light during the off-peak legislative years. In 2005-2006, a group of market-rate tenants led by future Council Member Dan Garodnick, a life-long resident, began a market-rate organization that quickly became encompassed with the traditional TA, creating an infusion of younger and largely newer residents to the organization. The timing could not have been more helpful when, in beginning in 2006, MetLife abruptly announced its
decision to sell the property, putting the TA in scramble-mode as it faced its most severe crisis (and opportunity) as an organization.

2006-to Present

MetLife’s announcement to sell STPCV was a shock not only to residents, but also to the real estate industry and the city overall. Not only was the scale unprecedented, but the speed and secrecy in which MetLife was able to formulate a plan and to announce it revealed the fact that they were planning the move for some time and had managed to keep it quiet from everyone – including the TA. The timing of the deal, at the peak of the market – proved to be prophetic for MetLife.

The TA, caught off guard initially, worked aggressively with a coalition of elected officials, including the now elected Council Member Garodnick, to put together a bid to buy the property. Through their organizing efforts they were able to put together $4.5b for the property through a combination of state and local union pensions. The long-term stated goal for the TA was to convert STPCV into a single, self-controlled co-op, which, as was hoped, would guarantee the affordability and stable identity of the complex. Despite a promising bid and political support, their efforts failed.

When MetLife sold the 110-building STPCV complex to Tishman in 2006 for $5.4 billion, it was the largest residential real estate deal in the history of the United States – and the first residential property owned by Tishman, which out bid the TAs’
collective efforts by close to $900m. After Tishman Speyer vastly out-bid the TA and bought the property (along with The Pam-Am Building), every effort was made to convert rent-controlled units to market-rates by intimidating older residents and forcing out other residents who were not named on leases. Major shifts in demographics (both natural aging and manufactured displacement) dramatically began to reshape the make-up of residents over the following six years, potentially undermining the TAs’ base and ability to organize.

However, Tishman underestimated the organizational strength of the TA and in 2008-09, three major events presented the TA with an opportunity to flex its muscle and again pursue its goal of purchasing the property. First, the real estate bubble burst, resulting in the loss of over half of the property’s value. Second, not long after, Tishman filed for bankruptcy because it was unable to service its debt from the rent roles in light of the loss of value, forcing it to leave the property to its creditor by 2009. And third, also in 2009, a class action lawsuit against the property filed on behalf of market-rate tenants in over 4,000 apartments, commonly referred to as the Roberts decision, came down in the resident’s favor, retroactively rent-stabilizing those units along with all other units in the complex. Though the TA was not directly involved with the Roberts decision, the effect of the case brought in a flood of supporters and volunteers to the organization, further solidifying its ability to speak for the complex as a whole. Far from undermining the TA, Tishman’s

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ownership revitalized the organization by garnering it positive press, bringing newer residents into the fray and giving it an even more direct opportunity to purchase the property. In effect, capitalizing on external economic forces and its own organizational clout, the TA was able to take on and defeat one of the biggest real-estate development firms in the world.

With the indirect victory enjoyed from the Roberts decision – one that was shared by other tenants across the city - the TA was able to direct attention towards securing two major direct victories in the years immediately following the decision. Beginning in the summer of 2010, the TA launched an aggressive unit-by-unit Unity Pledge Drive to alert residents about the issues at stake, the long-standing goals of the TA and their request for a signed pledge of support. The efforts, conducted by groups of volunteers in every building eventually secured over 7,000 pledges from 11,000 units. This remarkable show of solidarity furthered the TA's presence around the complex and strengthened its power politically on the city and state level, increasing its ability to leverage a stake in the process of buying the property from Tishman.

The second victory occurred with the Rent Regulation Renewal (R3) campaign in 2011, which, supplemented by extensive organizing efforts by the TA – from bus trips to Albany, rallies at City Hall, and thousands of post cards to every major elected leader - for the first time in a generation, rent laws were renewed and strengthened to reflect the court’s decision in the Roberts case. The 4,000 units that
were previously market-rate were not officially included in the rent-stabilized pool and the laws are on the books for another five years until 2015.

Despite the resent surge in support and the tangible victories secured by the TA, the organization has the larger goal of purchasing the property in its sights. This goal remains elusive as of this paper’s writing. For all the power the TA has gained, it cannot force CW Capital, representing the bondholders of the failed Tishman deal, to come to the table, let alone sell the property. It can also not predict what outcomes the more than 25,000 residents ultimately will want if given the opportunity to pursue multiple options. The immediate future remains uncertain for the TA and if 2006 is any lesson market realities might still push it aside despite its best efforts. If it does secure a bid to purchase the property, even more challenging questions remain concerning conversation, long-term affordability and capital improvements. I will address these issues and their implications in the concluding chapter.
CHAPTER 2  
“Organizing Was Brought to Another Level”  
Literature Review and Research Design

The intention of this thesis is to determine the organizational capacity of the Stuyvesant Town and Peter Cooper Village Tenants Association (TA). Because the capacity of an organization is a direct function of participation, measuring this capacity requires understanding the theoretical framework that underpins civic organizations – the factors that lead to citizen participation, the motivations that sustain their structure and the tools that they use to pursue their agenda - and how to measure their success/failure. In this regard, I will first give a synopsis of some pertinent collection action theories to help understand the root causes that lead a community to self-organize. I will then explore elements of organizational theory to help rationalize the physical structure of an all-volunteer group - particularly what sustains a group over a long period of time. Next, I will review the measurements that have been used in previous studies to analyze the efficacy of volunteer organizations. Finally I will layout how I tend to use this theoretical framework to approach my research into the TA.

Causes and Consequences of Collective Action

Extensive research has been conducted into why a community organization forms and how they attempt to balance the theoretical challenges inherent in a volunteer organization (Olsen, 1965; Cunningham and Kotler, 1983; Oliver, 1997) Olson, the grandfather of collective action theory, argues that collective action is inherently
irrational because, particularly in large groups, each group member has a lower share of the benefits; it becomes less likely that anybody's share of the benefits exceed the costs; the organizational costs also rise as the group expands, weakening the potential for personal gains (Olson, 1965). Because collective action is largely defined by providing a non-exclusive public good, there must be compelling incentives to attract the rational individual, otherwise the ‘free-rider’ option becomes more attractive (Olsen, 1965).

Several criticisms emerge from this theory. Olson approaches his theory as a rational economic model, but fails to acknowledge that the act of participation itself provides utility to certain individuals, allowing for them to join a movement without attempting to control the process or gain personally beyond the initial social utility (Oliver, 1993). Indeed, Olson views the collective group as a given and fails to address the different contributions individual actors make towards an organization and how these contributions create the collective group over time (Oliver, 1993; Oliver and Maxwell, 1988). Second, given the time of Olsen’s writing, he could not have foreseen the evolution of social media platforms that significantly lower the costs to an organization or to an individual to join or contribute (Shirky, 2011). This has resulted in the potential for greater involvement from a broader segment of a given population on the one hand, and, on the other, can allow an organization to focus its capital – social or economic – on its agenda rather than its sustainability.
Oliver recognizes the limits of Olsen’s theory by pointing out the “S”-shaped curve of the production function curve of collective action and how there will be cycles of free-ridership as issues flare up, but the organization must be sustained by a small, heterogeneous group that is highly motivated and highly capable (Oliver, 1985). In this sense, at times free-ridership benefits the organization because it can count on larger participation when major action is required, but can shed excess capacity when needed, particularly when a smaller, more motivated group is needed to make strategic and tactical decisions – in effect, the organization can selectively free-ride on free-ridership. Collective action is seen in this theory as a product of the leadership’s active control and guidance as opposed to a passive reaction from an aggrieved mob. The elasticity of an organization becomes a major source of its strength or weakness - an organization’s ability to retain its core structure becomes as important, if not more important, during the low-participation period as it does the high-visibility and high- participation periods.

**Determinants for Participation in Neighborhood Organizations**

A more recent segment of literature specifically surrounding neighborhood organizations begins to describe the factors that motivate residents to participate; most of this literature focuses on poor inner city neighborhoods and public housing tenants associations (Oliver, 1984; Berry, Portney, Thompson, 1993; Conway and Hachen, 2005; Sampson, 2012) There are four broad factors that emerge from this literature as determinants that inform my research into STPCV – neighborhood ties,
grievances, resource availability, and perceived efficacy (Conway and Hachen, 2005).

**Neighborhood Ties**

Across all forms of neighborhood organizations – from civic groups to tenant associations – the literature suggests that a major factor in the success or failure of these groups to attract participation is the depth and scope of the interpersonal ties between members and non-member residents (potential members) as well as the ties between members and other political or civic organizations outside of the neighborhood. (Olsen, 1965; Perlstadt, Fonseca, Hogan, 1989; Granovetter, 1985, McAdam and Paulsen, 1993, Conway and Hachen, 2005).

There are several potential explanations for neighborhood ties that create different participation levels in groups. The conventional wisdom concerning neighborhood ties shows that they are stronger among residents who have lived in a given area for a long time, resulting in a larger pool of contacts whom might be involved in an organization, creating more chances for becoming aware of participation opportunities (Olsen, 1965; Perlstad, Fonseca, Hogan, 1989). Longer tenured residents are also believed to be more likely to participate because of the large investment they have made in their locational choice, giving them a larger incentive to participate (Nachmias and Palen, 1986) as well as the trust that they have built up with other members of the community (Putnam, 1995; Fukuyama, 1995; Andrews, 2009).
Another factor present in determining neighborhood ties is the socio-economic background of members and how they representative they are of the broader neighborhood (Martin, 2003). It has been argued that individuals with greater educational backgrounds will be more likely to participate in civic organizations (Oliver, 1984, Olsen 1989). It is also suggested that highly educated residents are more likely to be active members than just token members (Oliver, 1989, Reingold, 1995).

The implication of these theories is that less tenured, less educated and even less social residents are unlikely to participate in civic organizations because they are either not aware of the opportunities from their lack of social ties or are uninterested because they do not expect to be long-term residents. Attracting these types of residents is often a major challenge for neighborhood organizations and a potential source of weakness as a population grows, ages, or changes (Conway and Hachen, 2005).

Overall, neighborhood ties as a result of longer residency periods and greater social contacts are expected to have a positive impact on the level of participation in a neighborhood group and a positive affect on their organizational capacity.

**Grievances**

Grievances are natural rallying points for civic organizations and often serve as the inciting incident for their formation. However, the literature overwhelming qualifies
the importance of grievances by demonstrating that by themselves, they are not a strong enough factor to sustain an organization over time (Olsen, 1989; Oropesa, 1992). Grievances, particularly the acute kind associated with rent-hikes or environmental damage are more likely to be addressed over a shorter period of time than the more smoldering kinds of grievances associated with poor services or steady neighborhood decline. This reality results in two outcomes for an organization, both of which potentially undermine its long-term prospects: the issue is addressed and resolved, leaving the founding impetuous irrelevant or the issue is intractable, leaving the organization consistently unfulfilled and undermined by skeptical residents.

Where grievances work as a positive factor on resident participation is the opportunity to build long-term social ties with others (Olsen, 1989; Martin, 2003). The initial grievance draws in diverse residents who may not have had previous contact with other residents and a bond is formed as the grievance is addressed. If the grievance is successfully resolved, or even in some cases when it is not, the secondary benefit of building deeper social ties can have a larger, more long-term impact for an organization than the initial grievance that created the contact. (Conway and Hachen, 2005).

The importance of a grievance is obviously subject to its size and scale. The literature generally states that how well an organization responds to the grievance is as much based on how it can sustain the interest of participants beyond the scope of the incident or its resolution (Oliver, 1984; Olsen, 1989; Larsen, Harlan, and Bolin,
This implies that a successful organization requires a constant high-level of capacity unrelated to specific grievances. Whether this further implies that an organization must exist outside of any grievances or, inversely, must exist in a constant state of grievances is unclear, but the question has a large impact on how important participation is for an organization’s capacity.

**Resources and Constraints**

The literature on the organizational structure and tactics of community groups focuses on the systems surrounding community movements as the central driving organizational force rather than the social psychology view that movements are grievance-driven. (Olsen, 1965; McCarthy and Zald, 1973, 1977; McAdam, 1996). Specifically, the theories of resource mobilization and political opportunity use the assumption that because it is irrational for an individual to join a movement, there must be some mechanisms employed by the organization to attract and retain members if the default setting for social movements is inaction (Olsen, 1965). The literature asserts that participation is directly related to how well an organization leverages its major resources – education, time, and money (Conway and Hachen, 2005).

Resource mobilization theories categorize social movements by assessing three phases (1) the types and sources of resources (e.g. social (education and time) and financial capital) (2) the relation with the media, authorities (e.g. political and
financial) and other third parties and (3) and the interaction among other movements (McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977). This differs from the grievance-driven idea of framing a movement and instead presents these grievances as pre-conditions for a pro-active social movement model. Building on the work of Oliver, these theories assume that an organization is heterogeneous and highly motivated regardless of its size, which gives it greater flexibility in acquiring resources or overcoming restraints.

The political opportunity theory is of particular interest in my research because it attempts to build a theoretical framework for measuring the “structure of political opportunities,” which is a central resource that I am attempting to measure (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 2001). The argument outlines a consensual list of key components:

1. The relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system
2. The stability or instability of the broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity
3. The presence of absence of elite allies
4. The state’s capacity or propensity for repression

This theory dictates a process of political engagement that is central to the success of a social movement. The political opportunity theory assumes implicitly that the end goal is an adjustment of the existing political system as opposed to redefining the system (Tilly, 2004). This does not mean that certain opportunities do not involve protesting the system or rejecting aspects of it, but these are tactics rather than end goals. The problem with this assumption is that the definition of political
structure – or the system - can be static and does not change over time even though the situation in the ground often does, leaving the basis for analysis unclear (Goodwin and Jasper, 2004). So, although the theory states that engaging in the political system is necessary, it does not clearly define what the system is or what engaging it means. This is an important distinction because as an organization endures over long periods of time – even decades – the political structure is bound to change, thus putting into question the relevance of an organization's capacity, its tactics, or even its original goals while it engages with that system.

**Efficacy and Results**

The literature on efficacy defines the term broadly as a person’s sense of their ability to influence important outcomes in their life (Conway and Hachen, 2005; Broadman and Robert, 2000). The level of participation in a neighborhood organization is seen to have a positive connection with the sense that 1) their joining of the organization will have an affect on circumstances and 2) the system itself is open enough to be affected (demonstrating the political opportunity theory). Measuring the efficacy of an organization becomes clearer when focusing on the results of an organization's efforts (Oliver, 1989; Conway and Hachen, 2005). The perception that an organization achieves tangible results – from smaller quality of life issues to larger existential issues – has a major impact on the level of participation as residents become more trusting of the organization's ability to deliver on promises and to allocate a resident’s time and money efficiently (Putnam,
2004.) This has the external affect as well of raising an organization’s profile for other entities, be it political or social, enhancing its capacity.

Most of the reviewed theories on collective action and community organizing stress the importance of having a small, motivated core group to initialize a movement and to sustain it through its various life-cycles. The ability to find, pick, or maintain strong leadership is the most important factor (and the most important resource) in the success of establishing and maintaining a group that in turn attracts other residents (Dreier, 1996). Particularly at the grass-roots level, when a movement is just forming, the emergence of leaders with the right balance of vision, focus, and commitment can make the difference between success and failure both in the short-term and the long-term (Pilisuk, 1996). If a movement demonstrates from the onset that it has clear goals formed by strong leadership, the likelihood of successfully building an organization that will outlive its first generation of leaders (and, in some cases, goals) is thought to be significantly greater though there currently lacks enough data and research from a quantitative standpoint to assert this empirically (Drier, 1996).

An interesting counter-line of literature concerning efficacy shows that in all-volunteer forces, the leadership of the organization often becomes involved because of the fear that no one else will (Oliver, 1989). This perception potentially creates a leadership that resents or excludes casual members. The need for early leaders to take control of an organization must be balanced with framing the issue and the
organization as an open, inclusive movement (Martin, 2003). In either case, a high level of efficacy that an organization has and encourages in members has a positive affect on the participation in an organization.

The theories and scholarly writing on collective action and community organization present a clear framework in which to measure the effectiveness of the TA. Stuyvesant Town and Peter Cooper Village as a complex offers a unique ability for a controlled case study to test these theories because it is physically large, but uniform and geographically isolated meaning that the TA serves as both a tenant association and a larger neighborhood organization. This diversity is rare in the literature of community organizing and offers a chance to see which description best fits the organization.

**Research Design**

With the theoretical framework in place, I will now give a description of how I organized my attempt to study the TA and to measure its organizational capacity. I began my examination by asking for and gaining access to archival TA literature and press articles relating to the property in order to establish the historical arch of its organizational capacity over the past forty years. This provided the necessary context to understand what the initial TA members were responding to when they formed in 1971 and how they crafted their strategies. The intention was to be able to measure what changes in capacity and focus (or both) the organization has experienced throughout the following four decades up until its present attempts to
purchase the property. I hoped to prove that these goals have stayed remarkably similar despite changes in the city and the residents of STPCV, which could help explain the enduring relevance of the TA as an organizing force. I also hoped to understand if these goals reflected the will of the larger pool of non-member residents and how they will determine the future steps of the TA.

Because I planned to focus this study on the TA’s actions primarily during the time period from 2006 to the present, corresponding with the purchase of the property by Tishman and its subsequent bankruptcy, I decided to gather this data through three channels:

1.) One-on-one interviews with selected members of the TA (~10) elected officials and tenant activists (~5) and non-TA member residents (~5)
2.) Surveying anonymous residents (~100) of the property through a 20-question Survey Monkey link posted on the TA Facebook page.
3) Demographic data collected through the census and Policy Map.

These interviews and the survey were designed to be used to understand how the TA makes decisions, how they execute them and how they (and others) measure their effectiveness. This offered the possibility for meaningful insight into what dynamic(s) exist to sustain the TA’s physical manpower and strategic focus – be it common interests and/or identity, political or financial connections, strong leadership structures, civic responsibility, etc. They were also intended to reveal, through the interviews with elected officials and non-members, how external actors view their organization and its goals.
I was ultimately unable to carry out my original intention of providing a 20-question multiple-answer survey directly to residents on the TA email list, which limited my pool of data. The TA has a strict policy of protecting their members from third-party contact and attempt to reduce the amount of emails they send out as much as possible. I was able to gain access to the TA Facebook page and post the link to the survey with a short introduction post every few days for three weeks in January and February 2013. The TA Facebook page has approximately 700 members and roughly 15% of those responded to my survey.

I have alluded to the political access cultivated by the TA, demonstrated not only through Council Member Garodnick, but also through local, state and federal officials and tenant activists who have repeatedly visited the property and attended TA meetings over the course of the past six years. I was able to conduct interviews (most in-person with several over the phone) ranging from 30-60 minutes with some of these elected officials and other tenant activists, as well as selected TA members (some board members, some regular volunteers) in order to understand what value each sees in having a strong relationship with the TA and how these relationships were established.

In doing these one-on-one interviews, I hoped to understand where along the line the TA gained political access and to what extent it was the actions of the TA that determined that access and not outside political realities. Part of my assumption was that the STPCV property is a meaningful political symbol of the increasingly rare middleclass neighborhood in Manhattan and that the TA has effectively leverage this status to gain permanent political weight. It remains to be seen if this
political weight can translate into a successful bid to buy the property, as the previous attempt in 2006 failed. I was eager to discover what lessons the TA has learned from the past and what its strategies are for the current attempt. Assessing their role in this process, from their failures to successes, provided significant value towards determining the level of their organizational strength.

In addition to establishing how the TA is organized and how it has gained political access, I also aimed to study how it has been able to maintain its organizational strength within the complex in spite of unprecedented changes in the demographic and economic make-up of residents, particularly since 2006. These changes involved natural aging of the population, but also demonstrated the concentrated efforts of Tishman to force out older residents or illegal sub-letters in order to encourage shorter-tenured leases in order to flip apartments.

I conducted several one-on-one interviews in-person ranging from 30-40 minutes with less-tenured residents - particularly younger residents selected through the TA Facebook page and randomly selected residents solicited on-property.

In addition to interviewing non-TA residents, I turned to census data as well as data provided in PolicyMap and other NYC-sourced demographic data to examine the impact of these changes on the traditional population. I hoped to prove that 1) there was in fact a dramatic and deliberate change in population beginning in 2006,
resulting in a significantly higher proportion of younger, less tenured residents and 2) that this change has not undermined the strength of the TA as it stands now.

It was (and is) my hope that by establishing the theoretical framework that informs how the TA has organized itself and established its relationships with residents and elected officials, larger lessons about community organizing and community empowerment can be taken from the experience of the TA in STPCV. Notably that any community regardless of its size, location, and economic make-up has a set of unique assets - physically, temporally and most importantly, socially - in which it can create a shared sense of place to organize around and exert meaningful influence over its future.
Chapter 3
“Well, Everyone is a Member of the TA”
Participation at various levels of the TA

The core agenda of any civic or neighborhood organization is to communicate its goals, to motivate its members around those goals, and to target and pursue opportunities to achieve those goals. How deep the social ties are of a civic organization goes a long way towards determining its ability to succeed in its core agenda. Strong social ties are the crucial foundation that allows for a broader network to emerge and they tend to emerge in a neighborhood that has long tenured residents – perhaps through multiple generations – that allows social bonding to occur organically over time (Conway and Hachen, 2005). As this social network forms and expands, it becomes more likely that residents will know someone involved with their neighborhood organization and to trust their opinion about it. This creates an awareness of not only the organization, but also the issues that are central to the organization. This in turn leads to a greater likelihood of more residents joining. A neighborhood with weak social ties – either through high-turn over or lack of contact – tends to struggle with organizing because it does not have the social network in place to build trust and access.

Stuyvesant Town and Peter Cooper Village has had a long history of deep social ties amongst its residents. This is not surprising given the narrow demographic – returning white World War II veterans and their families – in which the complex
was intended for when it was built. According to the 1950 US Census, when the complex was largely built out and filled, the population was 31,173 residents in 11,630 households. Of that number, over 90% of adults were married, 20% of residents were children under 5 and about 1.3% were over 65. Because the complex was initially racially restricted, there were only about 110 black residents. By contrast, as of the 2010 Census, the population has dipped to 21,688 reflecting the loss of households with children; the children under 5 represent 3.3% while the number of residents over 65 has risen to 19%. And though no racial discrimination has played a role in residency since the 1950s, the population remains about 75% white. For more detailed demographic information, I have provided four charts in the Appendix section at the end of this document.

This population trend, which I will discuss in detail throughout my analysis, demonstrates that the population has largely remained in place through multiple generations, creating the grounds for deep social ties across a large portion of the community. This trend also demonstrates the commonly held perception that has come to define the complex – that there are two distinct population pools with limited social ties to each other: original tenants (and their family members who have remained in place) and newer tenants - younger, unmarried residents who tend not to remain in the complex for long.

“The biggest challenge [for the TA] is the fact that you have the rent stabilized, the old line tenants, and new market rate tenants and just getting people to understand that we have common goals and common areas of interest. That’s the biggest problem.” – Al Doyle, TA board member / former President
One the one hand, the long-tenured residents of the complex represent a major source of strength and capacity for the TA and on the other, the (growing) population of less tenured residents represents a practical barrier to growing the organization and perhaps a potential long-term weakening of the TA's capacity. Bridging this gap, or at least balancing it, has become a central goal of the TA and one that deserves special attention particularly if this trend continues or accelerates.

**Measuring Participation**

For the purpose of this thesis, I have attempted to place the participation of residents into four categories:

- **High** - defined as being an active member of the TA either by attending the majority of meetings, volunteering consistently, and holding a position on the TA Board.
- **Mid** - defined as being on the TA, the email list, attending some meetings and doing some volunteering and being a dues-paying member
- **Low** - defined specifically as being on the TA email list, but not attending meetings or volunteering and not necessarily being a dues-paying member
- **None** – no contact with the TA

Attempting to gather statistically significant information for this project during a limited time frame from a complex with a population of 21,000 was obviously a challenging prospect. I have based much of my analysis on the interviews that I have conducted with TA members and non-member residents backed with supplemental data gathered from the survey that I posted on the TA Facebook page over two months in the spring. Much of my finds match the literature on resident participation outlined in the previous chapter.
High Participation

“I've lived in Peter Cooper my whole life.” – John Marsh, current TA President

“I was born here. Shortly after we moved to 450 East 20th Street and were original tenants there. My parents died in that apartment. I moved in with my wife, got an apartment, and have been here my whole life.” - Al Doyle

“I moved in in 1988. My sister lives here; I had an aunt and uncle who lived here, another uncle. So too me, it’s a community; it’s a family.” – Margaret Salacan, TA board member.

The universal truth of participation in any civic organization is that it relies on a small nucleus of highly active members (Oliver, 1989). This is true of the TA as well. The TA Board currently stands at 15 elected-members who have a general meeting once a month in a rotating member’s apartment and usually draws 13-14 members typically.9

“We have a monthly board meeting. We have a standing executive committee that can meet and act between board meetings. We have a legal, maintenance, communications committee that meet individually based on the will of the chairs of those committees. I wish those committees would be more active than they are sometimes, but we’re all volunteers. We all have jobs, lives, and family and so forth. There are just some folks that give more time than others. The Association will always be the sum of the efforts of its leadership and its members.” - John Marsh

The board, with the exception of a few members, is made up of individuals well into their 50s or above who have been living in the complex either for their entire lives or for a significant amount of time, and wish to stay indefinitely (though there is a divide between those who wish to buy and rent indefinitely.) Some of the members

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9 At various times the operating management firm has allowed the TA to use the community center for meetings. Currently, under Compass Rock management, who took over the management of the property in the fall of 2013 have not allowed them access.
have grown up together and have formed deep social connections before even coming involved with the TA and are well known among the other residents. Given their long-standing tenure in the complex, the current leadership has been involved with the TA in some cases for over thirty years and have strong ties to the founding members, creating a continuance that is rare among many civic organizations. Much of the early years of the TA's organizing centered on friends and neighbors who got together socially and then began to organize.

“Back then, in fact, I think it was almost easier, because it was more personable. Back then, [organizing] was a phone call or a knock on the door... ‘Hey how ye’ doin’, haven’t seen you in a while’ that kind of thing.” - Al Doyle

Within the TA board, there is an even smaller group that performs the majority of the day-to-day work. John Marsh, the President of the TA, who helped organize the current volunteer network, NeighborNet, manages the website, keeps tabs on all of the committees, emails members with questions, manages the member email database and coordinates all meetings with members and elected officials. Margaret has taken over much of the data-input on members, helps with all mailings and manages the volunteer network.

“I think part of [organizing] is the amount of energy given to it by our leadership. We’re very lucky to have people like Margaret. She took my structure, kept it together, and built on it. She’s really good at asking people for help and getting people to agree.” - John Marsh

Margaret and John estimate that they put in anywhere from 20 to 40 hours a week on the TA depending on whether there is a mailing campaign or a meeting coming up. This amount of labor is no small matter for a volunteer organization. It takes a long time, even with technological help, to input member information to the database for renewals, to create content for and print copies of bulletins, flyers or
postcards, to schedule the annual general meeting and to invite member/residents/elected officials.

“We have a much larger voice [than before 2006.] We’re the largest tenant association in New York State, probably the country and we’re all volunteers. We don’t have one paid person. We work from our homes, we don’t have an office. We used to have a storage space, but that’s gone [flooded during Super Storm Sandy.]” – Margaret Salacan

There is an intense need for human capital for a tenant organization to function and this responsibility inevitably falls on a small portion of the group, even among the high level participants. The TA has demonstrated that it has a competent and dedicated core of volunteers that fills this demand.

“A lot [of TAs] get started because a few people really want to do this. But a lot of leaders in buildings, one or two people start and can hold on only for a period of time. Now, 10 or 15 people can hold it? That’s a different story. That’s a totally different story and a really different TA.” – Katie Goldstein, Senior Organizer, Tenants & Neighbors

**Mid-Level Participation**

This next tier of participation represents the majority of the TA’s active volunteers who are called on sporadically to distribute mailings, flyers, etc. and to help at meetings. The TA has always had an informal level of building leaders, or captains, but the system became much more robust in the wake of Tishman’s bankruptcy. Each of the 110 buildings has at least one member that is on the network email list that receives email blasts as issues come up and materials need to be distributed. They then pick up bundles of flyers counted out for each building and either distribute the materials themselves, or coordinate with other TA volunteers in the building through the network. The turn around time from the first email blast to the
last building getting distributed has come down to less than two weeks – an impressive feat for an all-volunteer force that has to cover over 11,000 apartments.

This group of volunteers represents a wider demographic both in age and tenure on the property. Many are long-time residents, or wish to be, but are less likely to be lifetime residents. A small portion is made up of newer residents with young families who are eager to become involved in their neighborhood and represent a highly desired demographic for the TA to attract:

“I’ll be honest with you. When I first moved into Stuyvesant Town [in 2009], I didn’t know much about it. I wanted to live downtown. I didn’t know anyone who lived there. A year later, walking down the street, I saw Dan [Garodnick] and all these reporters at [the Roberts Press Conference] at the Stuyvesant Town Cove. I had always been civic minded, but didn’t have time before my daughter was old enough. There was a table with people saying we need volunteer captains. What’s that? Does my building have one? No? Sign me up!” – Kirstin Aadahl, TA board member.

Despite the broader range of participants, the majority of TA volunteers at this level are all professionals and tend to be more likely to become involved in civic organizations (Conway and Hachen, 2005.) Indeed, Council Member Dan Garodnick, a life-long resident, fell into this category himself:

“I was aware of the TA as early as when I was in high school, but I didn't become involved until a few years before I ran for office. There was this developing group of market rate tenants, now formerly market rate, who didn't really have the same historical connection as your traditionally stabilized tenants. So I pulled together this ‘Market Rate Tenant Network’ that was an informal subset of the TA in 2004, which quickly became formally folded into the traditional TA.” - Council Member Garodnick

Though these participants are consistent volunteers, the nature of the commitment means that there are long periods of time where they are dormant. The volunteer network is usually only activated when a mailing or flyer needs to be distributed
and the frequency varies as issues like the Unity Pledge Drive or rent laws come up in Albany.

**Low Level of Participation**

I have deemed the segment of participants as Low Level if they are signed up for the email list, or have signed the Unity Pledge in 2010, but do not volunteer during distribution cycles or attend annual meetings. Though I was not able to learn the number of people on the TA email list, it is safe to say that this represents the largest pool of residents that participate at any level. Nearly 75% of the respondents to my Facebook survey fall into this category. Though these participants are unlikely to be actively involved, they still represent an important element of the TA as they are more likely to be dues-paying members than not. 61% of my respondents are dues-paying members, while, again, only a small fraction of those people attend meetings regularly or volunteers to distribute flyers. At $35 per apartment per year, this pool represents the brunt of the funding base. Because they are on the email list, they are more likely to be aware of issues and events and can easily shift into the mid-level of participation as issues flare up.

“The vast bulk [of tenants] are not active. They'll pay, but they’re not gonna wanna show up for meetings.” – Sue Sussman, tenant activist.

Many of these participants were pulled in during the Unity Pledge Drive. This pledge, carried out over the summer of 2010, resulted in close to 7,000 of the 11,000 units signing up. This was a significant development for the TA as they were no able to honestly claim that they represent the super-majority of the complex. It also represented the culmination of efforts to formalize the volunteer network and
communication structure of the TA. It also had the added benefit of contacting every household and drawing in more volunteers and more members.

No Participation

“Well, everyone is a member of the TA. We represent the entire community.” – John Marsh

The segment of the population that does not participate comes with a caveat, pertaining to the quote above. Anyone can be in the TA – even people who don't live in the complex but want to support it. So, though this pool of residents does not participate at any level, they are actively considered members by the TA and can participate at any level at any time.

Based on the Unity Pledge Drive numbers, there are 4,000 households that fall into this category. Though a certain portion of this population represents vacant apartments\(^{10}\), disabled residents, or residents who were not available to sign the pledge, there is still a segment that actively does not wish to participate in the TA. Through anecdotal information gathered from other TA volunteers and my own experiences on the complex, though some of these residents appear to be older and even longer-tenured, the majority of this group represents the younger, more

\(^{10}\) I have been unable to determine the rate of vacancy in the complex, after repeated attempts to contact through management and other sources. The TA has met similar resistance from management. This number matters because of the vacancy decontrol allowances under the rent stabilization laws, which allows for a vacant apartment’s rent to be raise by 20%. The higher number of vacancies result in higher rents and less tenured residents.
transient population of residents that were unwilling to join the TA either because they feel unattached or do not expect to be in the complex for long.

“If I’m not involved, or don’t know, why would I give my opinion? I don’t have a right. I guess it is clearly impacting me, but I don’t feel my input would make a difference. There are benefits for me being in, but are they noticeable? If my rent went up by $1600, yes, I would notice. But I’d be out in two months – Bushwick here I come.” – Kevin Lopez, Stuyvesant Town resident.

This segment reveals the major issue regarding participation for the TA – how to attract the attention and effort of younger residents who are not as invested in the long-term welfare of the complex. The reality is that there is only so much the TA can do. Their focus on quality of life issues (particularly in the aftermath of Super Storm Sandy) has a broad impact for all residents regardless of tenure, but the free-rider affect means that these residents can still benefit without becoming involved and are often unaware of these efforts to begin with. The implicit concern for the TA as it looks towards the future of the property is the size of this non-participating population. If the transient population grows as much as it has over the last six years it could represent a sea change in the make up of the community.

“There’s gotta be something we can do [to attract younger residents.] The problem with transient tenants is that this isn't home. It’s not their home. Why would they want to invest their time?” – Margaret Salacan

Though virtually all members of the TA want to attract younger residents and are convinced that they have as much invested as older residents, the efforts to actively attract this demographic have been limited. Though my survey is admittedly a small sample size and one already filtered by an interest in the TA, there are some signs that this population can be tapped into. 10% of the residents poled were between 20-29 though only half were TA members – 75% have been living in the complex for
five years or under. 37% of those plan to stay between 1-5 years and 13% 5-10 years and another 13% indefinitely. The possibility of a new, younger generation of residents and families entering the property, as some evidence at the mid-level of participation begins to demonstrate, is a great hope of the TA.

“If we buy the property, we’d look for families and responsible young adults who like the community and the open spaces, the neighbor to neighbor interactions, the people who stick around. Transiency is the enemy.” – John Marsh

As outlined in the literature review concerning participation levels, the majority of the day-to-day work and strategic planning of the TA is conducted by a very small, highly dedicated group of individuals with deep social ties to the complex. Without this deep network to pull from, the TA’s capacity to communicate with residents and to organize their agenda would be difficult to achieve.

The TA has proved successful at leveraging the participation of its highly motivated members into creating a sustainable network that can increase and decrease the level of other members’ participation as needed. Having the second tier of participation is just as crucial to distributing the TA’s message and agenda.

Where it remains less successful is garnering the participation of younger, less tenured tenants. The gap is perhaps less generational than aspirational as much of this demographic does not view STPCV as a long-term housing choice. The TA can do more to attract this constituency, but it might be better served in attempting to block the increase in apartment flipping if it wishes to sustain the community involvement it has experienced over the previous generations.
Chapter 4
“The Wolf at the Door”
Grievances and the TA’s response

Grievances, as categorized by Conway and Hachen, are when a person or group perceives the current situation or social conditions to be at odds with their expectations or values of their society (Conway and Hachen, 2005.) Much of the literature suggests that once controlled for certain factors, the importance of grievances in determining participation in a civic organization is significantly reduced. My research with the TA has resulted in a more nuanced view of the impact of grievances on the structural capacity of the organization. The inner core of the TA responsible for the majority of the day-to-day operations that sustain the organization are motivated by a more complex set of factors – neighborhood fidelity, civic responsibility, personal interest – beyond the basic grievances that attracted each individual member originally. In addition, grievances tend to lead to a higher-level of overall participation, but this relationship does not automatically result in stronger or more affective capacity. Often times a bloated organization can buckle under its own weight as strategies get bogged down in attempts to build consensus. On the other hand, as would be expected, the flare-up of a major grievance results in an influx of tenant involvement and with it greater resources that directly lead to a major spike in the organizational capacity. Given the size of the STPCV complex, and the number of volunteers and resources needed to reach all of its residents, a spike in participation predictably have a positive impact on the capacity of the TA. This pattern of spikes of participation, which has been present with the TA for its entire
history, would suggest that major grievances are the primary inciting incident that sparks a tenant (particularly a new tenant, as was the case for many after Roberts) to become active with the TA and that these spikes generally correspond directly with a need for greater capacity. In the absence of such grievances, participation and capacity tends to retract.

“Membership tends to ebb and flow. It depends on when the wolf is at the door, and how big the wolf is.” – John Marsh, TA President.

How the TA prioritizes and responds to the early stages of flare-ups of grievances is an important indicator of its organizational capacity. After studying the TA’s history and speaking with residents and members, I have grouped the various grievances experienced by the complex into two broad categories that I will discuss in further detail using specific examples. These categories are existential grievances (issues that tend to result in massive TA action and participation) and non-existential grievances (issues that do not tend to result in large scale participation.) The temptation, at least initially, was to view these grievances temporally as occurring acutely or chronically, but as I discovered with certain issues, such as renewing rent regulation laws, though some grievances are chronic issues in the sense that they reoccur over time, they are in practice acute issues because of the immediacy that they tend to appear due to external forces, necessitating a rapid response from the TA.

This chapter will address the major grievances registered by the TA and will describe how they responded as an organization. I will discuss the specific
strategies and resources deployed to address them in Chapter 5 and will measure the outcomes of these responses in Chapter 6 when I discuss efficacy.

**Existential Grievances**

**Rent Regulation Renewal Campaigns**

There are few more existential grievances than those that result from a dramatic shift in one's financial situation. For a tenants’ organization, there are no more existential grievances than rent “hikes.” Naturally, the TA has seen its largest levels of participation and greatest exertion of capacity during a period when there is great uncertainty about rents. When rent regulation laws come up for renewal in Albany – most notoriously during the so-called Great Rent Wars spawned by State Senator Joe Bruno in 1997 – the TA increases its activities in terms of recruiting volunteers, sending mailings, flyer distribution, organizing tenant meetings, coordinating with other tenant organizations and advocates, and planning rallies in Albany.

“We were a rag tag organization for a long time. We’d organize around an issue, but once it was over, we’d be like minutemen [and disperse]. When Joe Bruno scared the living daylights out of people, we had more people step up and stick around.” – Al Doyle, board member / former TA President

These instances are where the TA can flex its organizational muscle and leverage the long-standing social capital of connections around the complex to motivate tenants, rally the pre-established relationships with elected leaders and advocates, and craft exposure to the media, given its size and historic symbol as a major source of affordable housing in Manhattan. It is easily the most important issue that the TA undertakes regularly. The respondents to my survey saw protecting rent laws as the
organization’s highest priority out of five possibilities - appearing first 31% of the time.

The most recent renewal campaign occurred in 2011, as briefly discussed in Chapter 1. The rent laws are traditionally a major political football in Albany and though they have always been renewed, they are often done so at the midnight hour and after long periods of posturing and negotiating. The balance of power is generally tipped against tenant activists in Albany given the population balance of the legislature granting significant power to upstate representatives, largely Republicans, who do not have many tenants in their districts. Coupled with the financial clout of the landlord and real estate lobby downstate, the ability to renew these laws is often challenged and is never a given. Though there have been various shifts in the balance of power over the years, the last fifteen have seen major defeats from the tenant perspective as laws have been weakened as they have been renewed, resulting in more vacancy decontrols and price thresholds allowing for rent increases.

“It used to be every two years [when rent law were renewed] then in 1993, it went to four years. In 1997, it went to six. Then in 2003 to eight. In 2011, we wanted a three-year extender, but Governor Cuomo didn’t want them coming up in an election year, so we got four. The Real Estate Lobby wanted a fourteen year extender, until 2025, but leaving vacancy decontrol. So by 2025, there’d be nothing left and there’s a real threat the laws wouldn’t get renewed.” – Michael McKee, tenant organizer, Tenant PAC.

Though the rent regulation renewals follow a similar formula regardless of the year and regardless of the results, the sale and subsequent bankruptcy of Tishman Speyer that occurred before the 2011 legislative season was an unprecedented
crisis that drew in a significant amount of resident volunteers and media attention to the TA. This event had a major impact on the TA’s 2011 renewal campaign as it rewarded the TA with a previously unseen amount of momentum as an organization to address this grievance.

“In ’97 there was a big wolf in Joe Bruno when he said he was going to end rent regulation and that was like a war cry. They’ve since learned not to be so loud. Death by a thousand cuts. One tenant at a time.” – John Marsh

Though the rent regulation laws were renewed in 2011 until 2015, I will go into more detail about the campaign in later chapters. The major take home point of this grievance is that it is a continuous, exhausting process and has been a source of major capacity-building for the TA over the years. It has also created a long smoldering debate between those in the complex who want to end their reliance on these laws (by buying the property) and those who want to continue to fight as tenants and use the considerable size of the complex to the movement’s advantage to maintain its affordability. This debate will only intensify over the next few years as the chance to purchase the property becomes more tangible. I will discuss this in my concluding chapter in detail.

“There’s no better way to stand up to a landlord than to be the landlord.” – Steven Newmark, TA board member

“Different things motivate different people. You have the converters who don’t understand rent regulations, all they see at the end of the line is the opportunity to buy their apartments and in some cases sell quickly. For some, older renters, its about having a greater sense of control over what happens and restoring that hometown feeling we used to have when Met was running the place.” – John Marsh

**Tishman Speyer Purchase and Bankruptcy**
The aforementioned bankruptcy of Tishman was perhaps the greatest existential crisis faced by the complex and the TA. For the first thirty years of the TA’s existence, MetLife had been the benevolent dictator of the complex and was generally perceived positively by the vast majority of residents.

“There were so many MetLife employees here, it was really like small family, a small town. Met tended to ignore the TA because we were fighting MCIs [Major Capital Improvements] and that was that. They treated the people well.” – John Marsh

This began to change with some of the controversies over wiring, keycard access, and major capital improvements during the latter days of their tenure as owners, but nothing prepared the TA for MetLife’s abrupt decision to sell in 2006.

“Met[Life] played everything close to vest. They figured every angle. They sold the property, along with The Pan-Am Building I believe, right at the height of the market. They were a formidable force. Everyone had to work quickly. Dan really took the lead on [trying to buy the property]. He did a lot of research and his colleagues on the Council were really helpful. We were introduced to Troutman and Sanders who were famous for switching The West Village Houses into Co-Ops [In 2006] and we put together a $4.5b bid.... It was a stellar effort, I don’t think there was anything more we could have done.” – Al Doyle

Though the TA was quick to respond to the crisis, and put together a competitive bid with money from state pensions and other local funds, they were outbid by Tishman by $900 million and were presented with the first ever transition of ownership. It became clear to most observers that the deal rested on the rapid increase of market-rate apartments. Tishman went to work on two fronts that would become sources of major grievances for tenants: remodeling the complex in an attempt to brand it as luxury living and attracting short-tenured student residents. Beginning in 2006, the influx of younger residents, many of them students from New York University,
began to change the dynamic of the traditional population, further increasing the pressure on residents and leading more towards the TA for answers.\textsuperscript{11}

“We had never had another owner than MetLife. Tishman started doing things that were unhealthy for the property – like flipping apartments, dorm-type apartments renting to college kids. It raised a lot of red flags and got more people vocal and involved.” – Margaret Salacan

The TA began what has easily been its longest stretch of major activity during this period both to address the corresponding grievances brought by NYU students – late night parties, trashed hallways or elevators – and to rally against Tishman’s tactics aimed at displacing older tenants in order to convert units to market rates.

In 2009, when it became clear that Tishman was going to face major finance shortcomings, the TA responded with an aggressive campaign to organize tenants for the potential of their leaving the property. When Tishman finally defaulted, the TA responded by organizing its massive Unity Pledge Drive in 2010 as described in the previous chapter, outlying the grievances endured during the Tishman reign and pledging to steer the process towards an amicable result for the property.

“I always had a vision that we could have a structure [NeighborNet] with captains in every building, a team in every building. That didn’t come to light until we had an issue that motivated people to become captains.” – John Marsh

“It really picked up steam when Tishman walked away from the property. Roberts was still lingering out there, but we were ownerless. When CW Capital came in, they seemed to do the same things that Tishman was doing, but really disregarded the quality of life. Churning more apartments, putting more people in apartments, stressing the buildings, the services.” – Margaret Salacan

\textsuperscript{11} According to the ACS 2011, 20-24 year olds represents 15.8\% of the population of Stuyvesant Town, which is more than double the overall rate in NYC, suggesting some validity to residents’ concerns over a high concentration of younger residents over the last 5 years. See Chart 1 in Appendix.
Roberts Decision

In 2006, eight market-rate residents of Stuyvesant Town filed a lawsuit against the property claiming that they were illegally charged market rates while the owners received J-51 tax rebates on capital improvements. Though the TA did not have any standing in the case, its outcome was closely monitored because it would have a huge impact on the TA’s agenda and therefore its capacity. If the case were dismissed, 4,400 units in STPCV (and thousands more across the city) would be permanently converted to market-rate. If the court’s ruled in the plaintiff’s favor, then these units would stand to be retroactively rent-stabilized, significantly changing the financial and political fortunes of the property in the TA’s favor.

“We all thought it would lose. I thought it would lose.” – Al Doyle

“[I’d] been saying to sue for years about the J-51 rebates, but it’s a matter of standing. The TA is not a party to the lawsuit, only the tenants who sued. I think a lot of people argued against it. Dan [Garodnick] argued against it. I think, my memory is that he thought it would lose.” – Michael MaKee

Not pursuing the Roberts case was in part a matter of standing, but as these above quotes reveal, it is also is an interesting example perhaps of the internally perceived limit of the TA’s capacity. The cost and timeframe, in addition to standing, might have deterred the TA from pursuing it. In retrospect, it was a huge victory for the TA, but at the time [2006] given the focus on the bid, it was impossible for the TA to pursue both. Residents’ perception of the TA’s role in Roberts reflects this – in my survey 40% of respondents did not know what the TA’s role in the case was and 31% thought it had little or no affect.
Though members of the TA were originally reluctant to see the suit go through for fear of losing the case, in March 2009, after the real estate bubble burst and in the midst of Tishman preparing to default, the court came down in favor of tenants, instantly retroactively causing 4,400 apartments to become rent stabilized. No doubt the decision had a major impact on the financial standing of Tishman, but it also created a new set of tenants who were impacted by rent regulation laws and the continuing appeals of the case. 43% of residents polled in my survey were members of the Roberts decision who had previously been in market-rate apartments. This created a new source of tenants, particularly younger tenants, and a new front of grievances as the uncertainty surrounding the differences between preferential rents and legal rents experienced across the suit class played out over the next several years. The TA became intimately involved in the communication with and organization of these new stabilized tenants.

“The Roberts win was a big deal. It swelled the ranks. But the TA, John and Margaret, were very smart to institutionalize it, to make sure the folks coming on board would stay on board. And they did. We have most of the same building captains fro 2009, when this happened. That was four years ago.” – Steven Newmark

As the case nears its completion (as of February 2013, the case was settled, though follow up lawsuits may be in the works) the impact on rents and in many cases the dramatic increases that could be enacted mid-lease, continue to be a major source of anxiety for tenants. The TA’s ability to communicate quickly and comprehensively during the Roberts period to keep residents informed has been a positive example of the TA’s capacity to handle grievances and turn them into opportunities to improve the organization and the property.
Non-Existential Grievances

“We try to address [day-to-day issues] as much as the conversion. The day-to-day quality of life is important. The issues of laundry rooms, bed bugs, these are important to people.” – Al Doyle

Though the grievances that attract massive participation have been in a period of high-activity the last few years, there have been a number of smaller grievances that have taken the TA’s attention historically and continue to be areas of focus. These issues - such as the bed bug registry, the fire door violation list collected and sent to the New York City Fire Department, the campaign for free replacement access cards, free access to the trunk storage space, laundry machine petitions - tend not to garner as much attention from casual residents, but they still affect many residents. In my survey the second highest priority at 28% was monitoring maintenance. Often times these types of issues are where major strategic debates occur for the TA. If a particular grievance is seen as too costly placed against the potential for success or scale of those affected, the TA might opt not to pursue it. Conversely, if a grievance is widespread (such as faulty laundry machines) but has a relatively low cost to vocalize, the TA will pursue it regardless of potential outcomes. This area has the highest potential to be a universally popular goal of the TA for all residents.

Major Capital Improvements (MCIs)

Major capital improvements are projects undertaken by a property owner that are intended to create physical improvements be it through piping wiring, or structural maintenance. Under New York law, the nature of these projects allows for some of the cost to be passed on to tenants in the form or rent increases over time. They are
historically a major source of tenant-landlord conflict and can happen on a building-by-building scale, resulting in the involvement of certain tenants while excluding others.

“When MCIs came about in the early 80s, not exactly sure when, the Association would fight MCIs. That’s pretty much all they did, very narrow, only fought MCIs. [In 2003] we got 74% of Peter Cooper Village to sign a petition against the electrical MCI. That was when they came in with these surface mount boxes in the kitchen and ran new wiring through the walls, replacing the old cloth wiring. At the same time, they ran RCI cable through every apartment. We [thought] that was wrong. It was okay that they did that, but what they did, they got a lot of money back from RCI and still collected MCIs…. We lost.” – John Marsh

It is rare that MCIs come down in the favor of tenants across the board and in many cases the argument against them are hard to sustain - and in certain cases tenants welcome the upgrades, resulting in a smaller level or participation and capacity. The legality of charging tenants for the improvements, or, more specifically, how much to charge is a constant source of grievance. The TA has had some successes, notably in 1993, but overall this is a battle that the TA does not often win.

**Quality of Life Issues**

Another source of non-existent grievances concerns quality of life issues such as noise complaints or lapses in services. Quality of life issues are seen as a potential bridge grievance to attracting younger, less tenured tenants to the TA as these issues affect all residents. A recent and on-going example is the increase in noise complaints as a result of the larger number of younger residents.

“When initially, when we were moving in an old woman was in the elevator and said ‘Hope you don’t make noise’ and that was that. Now we’re really good friends with her…. [Now] I can hear the music thumping, whereas when we moved in it was very quiet. Even outside, now I hear ‘Woo-Hoo!’ That probably happened two or three years ago [2010]. I remember having the conversation that it was starting to change.
That’s when they were really doubling down trying to make it luxury living.” – Katie Kaplar, Stuyvesant Town resident.

The nature of this problem, though widely regarded as a major grievance by tenants according to the TA survey conducted before the general meeting on January 26, 2013 at Baruch College, involves smaller segments of buildings at any given time, resulting in a case-by-case handling of the issue. The TA receives calls at its Call Center and alerts management to specific cases. In most cases, however, complaints are lodged with Public Safety directly and are only handled by the TA in repeated incidences. Though it represents a basic quality-of-life issue, this grievance, the by-product of the dramatic demographic change occurring in the property, could truly be considered an existential crisis as it reflects the potential future of the property. Many residents, regardless of tenure, are deeply concerned about this, even as it affects certain pockets of the property differently. The TA has limited capacity to change this status quo and continues to put pressure on management to report these issues.

**Super Storm Sandy Abatements**

A more recent non-existential grievance concerns rent abatements resulting from Super Storm Sandy, which occurred on October 28, 2012 and severely damaged a number of buildings, leaving the entire complex (and most of Lower Manhattan) without power for over a week. In some cases, elevators and laundry services have not been restored in buildings as of the date of this writing.

“We’re gonna send out another big blitz [sent on February 12, 2013] – the attorney for the TA is gonna file a predict notice on rent reductions due to Sandy, basically saying that management needs to fix certain things within a ten day period or we’re
goanna file for a rent reduction. But that doesn’t happen on a building-wide basis; each tenant has to sign up for that. We’re gonna target the worst hit buildings first, so we’re gonna try to get a kit out via email to people we have emails for and for people that we don’t, we’re gonna be walking and knocking on doors. We’ll compile the information and send it in.” – Margaret Salacan

This again is a grievance that affects only a limited amount of residents, but is a major expenditure of TA resources. In this case, the TA weighed the cost of the proceedings against the need of residents and decided that it was necessary to go forward.

Though some of the literature has downplayed the importance of grievances in predicting participation in civic organizations, the history of STPCV has shown a more nuanced picture. Though they do not appear to sustain the involvement of the core members compared to other factors, grievances, particularly existential grievances, are major sources of capacity building for the TA, as they tend to attract greater numbers of volunteers, paid members, and external attention. The unique grievances facing the complex since 2006 have resulted in the greatest stretch of capacity growth that the TA has ever experienced. The research suggests that without these grievances, the TA would not be as large or as prominent; it would simply not need to be.
Along with participation levels, the resources at the disposal of a civic organization and the constraints that they work against are important elements that positively or negatively affect the organization’s capacity. The most important resources for a civic organization are time, money, and knowledge (Conway and Hachen, 2005.)

Time is considered the physical volunteer hours that must be put in to make the organization function. This is by far the most important resource at an organization’s disposal – the greater the capacity demanded for a given purpose, the greater the amount of time needed by members. Next, knowledge in this setting means the organizational knowledge and technical skills held internally by members. Finally, money is often limited in an all-volunteer setting, and thus its allocation becomes a more important measurement of capacity than the raw amount collected. Its importance as a resource can actually be overstated when compared the importance of time and knowledge. Though all three factors are important, my research into the TA has revealed that time and knowledge have proven to have a greater positive affect on capacity than how much funding the TA has at its disposal. Conversely the constraints experienced in time and education have a greater negative affect on the capacity of the TA than the lack of funds.

**Time (Volunteer Hours)**

“What one often finds, you find someone who has a lot of time on their hand. It usually means they are retired. It’s hard to get young people or with families involved unless they are directly affected.” – Sue Sussman, tenant activist
“It takes a lot of work. If you have a full-time job, it’s exhausting. So I would say that because we can devote some more time to it, we have made it stronger, we can tackle more issues.” – Margaret Salacan

Some literature concerning the resources of civic organizations assume that residents with young children or disabilities, older residents, or professional residents are less likely to have the time to give to an organization (Conway, 2005). This is universally true amongst most levels of participants with children, generally true among low to mid-level participants of the TA, but not true amongst the handful of high-level participants making up the core of members. These individuals, particularly John and Margaret, put in anywhere between 20-40 hours a week for the TA while maintaining full-time or part-time employment.

There are two broad categories of responsibilities – tactical and strategic - that call for different time commitments for members. Tactical responsibilities include the day-to-day operations of the TA and include items such as updating the member email database; creating content for email blasts, flyers, and mailings; printing out the corresponding materials; organizing distributions with the volunteer network, NeighborNet; and monitoring their online presence through their website and their Facebook page. These are all time-intensive activities and occur regularly, demanding consistent authorship. These tasks tend to be handled by a handful of board members that devote a significant amount of time and energy.

Strategic responsibilities include items that do not occur on a day-to-day basis such as organizing board meetings; sub-committee meetings, and rallies; planning the
annual general meeting; planning legal actions to be taken by the TA. The rest of the board members that make of the remaining members of the high-level participants typically share the responsibility for these responsibilities. They attend the monthly board meeting and various sub-committees that meet based on workload and the desire of the committee chair. The number of hours that these individuals commit per week varies greatly depending on what issues are on the agenda.

There is a large gap between the time committed by board members and general members. From my survey, 61% of the respondents were dues-paying TA members, 72% are on the TA email list, but 76% rarely or never attend TA meetings. This is partly by design and partly by the nature of a person’s motivation to volunteer. The demographics of the 15-member board are revealing and speak to the assumption that participants with young children are less likely to be high-level participants. For the TA, 13 of the 15 board members either have no children or grown children - only two board members have young children. Of the remaining 13, 5 are retired. This demographic reality allows for board members to focus more time on the TA than the average member.

The mid-level network of volunteers are more varied in age and household. Many of them do in fact have children and became involved with the TA while becoming involved with parent networks in the complex through a Facebook page or play groups. These volunteers devote their time more sporadically to the TA and can go months without being activated.
“‘I’ve always been civic minded, but I didn’t have time before my daughter was old enough. For someone like me, recruiting does involve Facebook. Within the community [parents] have their own Stuytown groups, like parent groups, so when I can, I don’t force it, but I do try to get info out to people because it’s a huge number of people, people who I’ve never met before, so it’s a good way to get word out to younger people with families. Its who needs to get involved.” – Kirsten Aadahl, board member.

This has the advantage of keeping interested members involved without over-taxing their commitment. The ability for the TA to expand and retract its members time commitments at this level demonstrates a sophistication that comes from years of operating and knowing what works for the organization’s capacity and the individual members.

“[Successful TAs] have been ones that have made use of people’s time very well, moving along the campaign, thing are happening and people are really excited to be apart of it. That’s really important. People having the opportunity to participate over time. Maybe people start at the beginning, but others move in and want to be a part of this. That’s important.” – Katie Goldstein, Senior Organizer, Tenants & Neighbors

From the discussions that I conducted with members, during times of high activity, there is never a lack of volunteer power. The weak link appears in the build-up to a high activity period, such as the annual meeting, when a large time burden falls on the small core of board members who handle both the tactical and strategic responsibilities.

“We don’t have an office. It makes it more difficult. We can’t have interns without an office. It would be golden. But if we’re doing a smaller mailing, like 100-200, I use my own printer. Everything is done electronically. John does the majority of the set-up.” – Margaret Salacan

Knowledge (Member Skillset)

As with any all-volunteer organization, the TA lives and dies on the labor and skillset of its volunteers. Research suggests that highly educated residents tend to
become more civically involved, creating a broad pool of knowledge to draw from (Oliver, 1989). This knowledge has several major impacts on the capacity of civic organizations – access to skills and expertise, an expanded social and professional network to draw from, and greater awareness of and involvement in the political process.

“A lot of organizations start out strong or are strong because of one leader...but they can get burned out. Building leadership and the skills that follow that are a hard issue.” – Sue Sussman.

Over 70% of the working population in the complex is in management-related fields.\(^{12}\) Having access to these skills and expertise can significantly increase the capacity of an organization without adding structural costs. John, the President of the TA, works in web security and designed and maintains the website, starting in 2000, which would cost thousands of dollars to seek outside of the organization. Margaret, who worked for several airlines in data management, maintains the member database, which would also cost a significant amount of money in labor.

“We have a number of lawyers on the board. That allows a lot of things to get kicked around either at the board meeting or via email without going to the paid attorney. That’s huge....When the board increased [in 2010] that brought in a lot of different personalities, a lot of different skillsets. With me and Kirstin, that brought in a lot of technical skills.” - Margaret Salacan

“Tishman doing what they were doing, and then leaving the property, that really galvanized the TA. The organizing was brought to another level. I helped out a little bit with that, because I had experience from Obama’s [2008] campaign. I brought some of that to John’s attention and made suggestions. We had always had a building captain structure, but we really took it to another level.” – Steven Newmark, board member

Having an educated professional volunteer pool creates a broad network of contacts that the TA is able to draw from. Because the majority of residents of STPCV are

\(^{12}\) See Chart 4 in Appendix.
professionals in service industries, the TA has connections to legal and financial services that greatly enhance its capacity to negotiate for the possible purchase of the property. By having a professional competency internally, the TA knows what it wants from legal and financial partners and has the capacity to seek it out through its network.

Finally, a highly educated volunteer force increases the likelihood of political access as this demographic of people tend to be more politically involved. Many of the TA members are active in politics on the city, state, and federal level having participated in campaigns and fundraisers for many candidates.

“I met Al [Doyle] when he was on the board at Tenants and Neighbors and I was on staff, probably in the mid 80s. The reason Al and John got involved with TandN is because we do lobbying, elections. The TA has never functioned that way. They don’t endorse.” – Michael MaKee, tenant organizer

Also, having a strong relationship with Council Member Dan Garodnick, a lifelong resident of the complex, is a unique advantage and one that the TA has been able to benefit from as he has worked closely with the TA on the potential purchase of the property and other issues.

“[In the 2006 bid] Dan took a real lead there. He did a lot of research, his colleagues in the Council were very helpful, he introduced us to a number of people, and Troutman and Sanders, who really knocked our socks off.” – Al Doyle

“There are tenants who work for large unions in Stuytown, and social justice, non-profits - media, PR, city employees live there, Community Board 6 members live there, even electeds like Dan. They have a big advantage because they have a broad diversity of residents as well as the numerical advantage of people living there.” – State Senator Brad Hoylman

These connections benefit the TA’s capacity directly because they lead to a greater awareness of the details within the TA’s issues and because they lead to access to
the political players, making it more likely that they can impact the debate. The TA has leveraged the political knowledge of its members into an affective political capacity best witnessed during the recent annual TA meeting when seven elected officials attended and spoke in support of the TA. This has the added benefit of displaying a relevance of the TA’s access to resources to other residents in the complex. In my survey, nearly 64% of residents viewed the TA as having some to significant amounts of political influence. I will discuss this political influence in greater detail in the next chapter, but this is a product of well-organized resources.

“The prominence of the TA on the property itself [is] very important, the amount of public attention, the fact that they are professionals who sincerely believe they are on the right track, doing the right thing. It has allowed the TA to work with professional advisors, who are the most consistent with the TA’s stated goals.” – Council Member Dan Garodnick.

Money [Fundraising and Allocation]

As previously stated, money has less of an impact on capacity than time and knowledge, but it remains an important, if limited, resource. The TA is a 501(c)(4) non-profit organization and collects most of its revenue from the $35 dues paid per household per year and from larger individual donations from members and residents. At various points in the organization’s history they have received grants from city and state organizations but have lapsed in this stream of funding as restrictions on lobbying have increased in Albany and the city. There is currently an attempt underway to apply for these grants again, though the time-intensive process has not been a top priority for the TA.

“We’re trying to get more grants. We’re not as successful. I just think we’re not very good at it. We’ll get better. It’s not having the resources to pursue. We used to have some government grants, from the state or the city, but we lost access when we
started doing some political stuff. We have opened a 501 c (3), which is not political, so we’re going through the paperwork. It’s taking longer than we’d like. It’s mostly from dues. And also donations. Some people give us $100, $200 at a time.” – Steven Newmark

I was not able to obtain an operating budget from members of the TA as they requested to keep that information private, just as they wished to keep their membership role private. I will not attempt to make an estimate of their revenue, but because membership dues are $35 per year per unit, it is likely that they have tens of thousands of dollars to work with. They do not have office space and do not pay any salaries as an all-volunteer force, so there overhead costs have historically been low.

As for what potential access the TA has to money from the complex, it helps to look at the average income for the entire complex to gain some context. The overall economic picture of STPCV reveals that the complex is slightly better off than the average New Yorker, though Peter Cooper Village tends to skew even higher. The median income in Stuyvesant Town is $114,000 and in Peter Cooper Village it is $143,000 compared to the NYC mean of $80,000. Interestingly, the mean in Manhattan is $127,000 highlighting how difficult it is to afford to live on the island as a middleclass family.  

The mailing or distribution of materials is another consistent cost center for the TA, but it remains their most effective way to communicate with residents, particularly non-members. My survey revealed that 46% of respondents first heard about the TA through flyers. It further stated that 45% see the TA as somewhat visible and

13 See Chart 3 in Appendix.
26% as highly visible. The value of these mailings appears to vastly outweigh the cost both in time and money for the TA.

“I read them all. Or I skim the headlines. If it looks like something that really affects me, I’ll ask my neighbor who is active about it for more details.” - Katie Kaplar

Though the costs rise significantly during rent renewal campaigns, even in off years there are several major mailings usually concerning updates along with membership renewals. Prior to 2000, the TA would send out its monthly bulletin to TA members that listed upcoming issues or meetings, local news in the community and with the management, and renewal forms. This bulletin shifted online when John came on and first created the website and then the email list, significantly reducing the overhead, but increasing the human capital costs needed to monitor the system.

“In 2011, for the Rent Renewal Campaign, we mobilized early. We did bus trips to Albany, postcard campaigns, stood on street corners, and it got through. After that, we didn’t just let the network die. We continued to communicate more with the entire complex. We now try to send renewals quarterly with a list of things we’ve done, things we’re working on. People hear from us pretty regularly.” – Margaret Salacan

The number of mailings has increased significantly during the last few years in response to the Tishman Speyer bankruptcy, the Roberts decision, and the potential to purchase the property. From a low of sending out one or two mailings a year, this period has seen as many as two a month, particularly during 2009-2010. These mailings are time-intensive to create, and the cost of printing thousands, particularly of the postcards to Albany, is considerable.

“We try to be careful about our printing costs. If it’s 100 or 200, I’ll print them out. If it’s in the 1000s or a bundle of postcards, we get it done by a place on 22nd Street, that does it very reasonably. But the renewal letters, they’re more specialized, because we personalize them. We put your name, your address, how many dues you
have paid, when you paid, and we enclose a return envelope. That’s why we get such a good response, but it’s more expensive. We get them done at a place in Queens, I think? But everything is done electronically now. John does the majority of the set-up, so we don’t have to pay for that.” – Margaret Salacan

Their other major cost, and by far the most taxing single event for the TA to plan, is the annual meeting, which is attended by hundreds of residents and most if not all local elected officials. The cost of the meeting involves renting out space (usually the auditorium at Baruch College) large enough to hold up to a thousand people, buying advertising for the meeting in Town & Village and other publications, hiring a ASL interrupter, and hiring someone to record and stream the meeting online for residents who can’t attend.

The most recent TA meeting on January 26th, was held at the auditorium in Baruch College and attracted over 600 residents. There was also a separate meeting for residents affected by the Roberts decision held earlier in the day. In addition to the cost of the meeting, it also requires a large pool of volunteers to man the sign-in tables, be ushers to help people sit down and to collect audience responses during the Q-and-A period and to set up and breakdown.

Though the mailings and flyers are the most consistent cost, and the annual meeting the most visible, the cost of retaining a legal counselor, Alexander Smith, is the single biggest budget allocation each year. The attorney works with the TA on any potential filings on behalf of tenants. The decision to consult their counsel comes after debate amongst the board whether to take action or not. Much of the decision rests with the cost associated with any action.
“Someone will present an idea, someone is violating New York State Law. Let’s look into it, let’s look at what we want to do. Cost is a factor – how much do we want to spend on this? We have outside council, we consult them and we have our legal committee decide if we want to move forward. We go to the lawyer and he might say, ‘here’s the deal, it’s gonna be a letter, an action, a simple petition to file, if it goes to trial it will be a few thousand dollars. We weigh the cost-benefit. If he comes back and says, well it’s gonna be a big trial, $50k, we might not do it. We’d weigh the cost-benefit and probably wouldn’t do it.” – Steven Newmark

As addressed in the previous chapter, sometimes this cost can mean that the TA decides against taking legal action, as in the case of the Roberts decision. They have currently decided to go ahead with the rent abatement filing, though it is early in the process. In addition to retaining counsel, they have retained further legal and financial counsel for the prospective bid to purchase the property, but those fees will be assessed on the completion of any deal.

“We met Paul Weiss [through Council Member Garodnick] and were very impressed. And they really set us up with the financial firms. It was an exhaustive process. The entire board sat through 7-8 hours of interviews with firms that wanted to assist the TA in buying the property. We wanted experience, access to capital, restricting debt, that’s what we really needed. Paul Weis and Moelis was really our filter through maybe 60 different entities, but we ultimately settled with Brookfield. We liked their steady band, long-term view. Their access to capital, extreme credibility and no history of bad or shaky deals, that kind of thing.” – John Marsh

The financial resources of the TA are not as significant to their capacity as the time and knowledge of its members, but it does influence the causes that the TA undertakes and limits the ability to address other concerns as the trade-off of insourcing labor results in opportunity costs.

The resources available to a civic organization directly impact its level of capacity. Without enough members who have the time and the knowledge to devote to the cause, regardless of how much money they have available, the TA would not be able
to function on any meaningful level and would not be able to organize on so many fronts. The advantage of the TA when compared to other organizations, perhaps surprisingly, is not the physical size of the population, but the consistency of highly competent and motivated members taking on the majority of responsibilities. Any organization that relies too heavily on individual members for leadership and organization run the risk of falling apart in the absence of those members. The TA has acquired not only the resources to function at a high level, but have also transitioned through several generations of leadership and member involvement. This ability to regenerate and evolve over a long period of time shows the strength of the TA's capacity as an organization and speaks to its likely sustainability in the years ahead – if it can continue to attract newer generations of equally committed and competent members.
Efficacy is here defined as the perception of a person’s power to impact their circumstances as well as the perception that a given political or social structure is capable of being amended. It is important for an organization to create a high level of efficacy because it encourages wider participation and a more ambitious agenda. Individuals are more likely to become involved with an organization that they see achieving tangible results, big or small. Higher efficacy therefore has a positive impact on an organization’s capacity.

The literature on organizations’ efficacy center around its impact on participation (Conway, 2005; Oliver, 1989) though there is limited research on how to measure efficacy itself, particularly around establishing the relationship between the perception of an organization’s efficacy and its actual results. Despite this, in my research I found that the TA is acutely aware of the importance of efficacy on its capacity and much of their organizing, particularly their messaging, is designed to highlight its positive affect. In a very real and basic sense, the TA's ability to establish its efficacy is the most important function of its capacity. Without a sense that the TA is producing meaningful results for the complex, residents will not support it, politicians will ignore it, and its relevance would come into question.
In this chapter, I will attempt to measure the TA’s efficacy by focusing on three fields where it attempts to project efficacy – the strength of its internal structure, its presence in the complex, and its political influence. By examining how the TA perceives its effect on these fields along with how residents and non-residents perceive them, I hope to establish an accurate understanding of the relationship between the TA’s capacity and its results.

**Perception of Internal Strength**

How the TA projects its own structure – and that structure’s ability to advocate for the complex – and how its members perceives its strength offers an important insight into the TA’s efficacy. If a significant gap exists - if the TA projects a certain strength that its members do not think it actually has - it would suggest that the TA has weak levels of efficacy. On the other hand, if most of its members think the TA’s messaging accurately reflects its structure, this would suggest a high level of efficacy. My research reveals that the TA’s members have a positive sense of efficacy based on having struck a balance between a realistic assessment of its capacity and the external forces affecting it and an optimistic outlook towards its future based on previous successes and mutually positive reinforcement.

“The real power of a growing TA is whether or not they can accomplish things quickly, if they have wins. A win can even be something small like getting a bulletin board. ‘Wow, we’ve got a bulletin board now. Something is happening here.’ So doing small things, to build momentum around to see what can happen. ‘Oh, this is working. This is worth my time. This is something I want to be a part of.” – Katie Goldstein, Senior Organizer, Tenants & Neighbors

It is not surprising to find positive efficacy within the organization as it takes a significant amount of commitment to remain active. This level of involvement
would simply not be sustainable if the TA members did not have a sense that the organization was strong or that they were making some positive impact. What is particularly interesting is the perception of the TA’s strength at different levels of involvement - there appears to be very little difference between board members and casual volunteers. 26% of respondents view the TA as ‘highly visible’ across the property and another 44% view it as ‘somewhat visible.’ This visibility is a sign that the TA is reaching a wide audience in the complex and that its volunteers see this as a positive for its capacity. One could easily imagine a scenario where a volunteer sustains a high-level of efficacy on the front-lines talking to residents, while a board member, exposed to more of the limitations and push back from external forces, would experience lower levels. Though variances exist across all spectrums of involvement, the overriding sense of members is that the TA has built a strong organization, amassed some notable victories, and remains a powerful and relevant player in its own future.

“We continue to be active. When I put out a message to building leaders now, it’s amazing the response that I get. What happened is, the board now has faces. It used to just be Al, Susan, no one really knew anyone else. John is a known face around here now. I’m becoming better known, people stop me on the street. But it’s good, because people feel like they have a venue, they have an outlet – they have a voice.”

- Margaret Salacan, TA Board Member

The positive efficacy comes from experiencing tangible victories. Three stand out over the last few years –the 2010 Unity Pledge Drive in the wake of the Roberts decision, the 2011 Rent Regulation Renewal (R3) campaign and recent quality of life issues, including those surrounding Super Storm Sandy.
Though it is important to restate that the TA was not directly involved with the *Roberts* case, the decision was a victory for all residents and has been a galvanizing force that the TA has been successful in translating into increased capacity. *Roberts*, along with Titman’s bankrupt, led to the largest pledge drive ever undertaken by the TA as an organization as I have described in previous chapters – a huge swell of volunteers organized into building leaders, zone leaders and complex leaders, canvassed the property for several weeks obtaining signed pledges from over 7,000 of the 11,000 units. This achieved two significant goals for the TA – it greatly increased its capacity by adding volunteers, creating a robust volunteer network that has remained in place, which I have already discussed in pervious chapters, and, second, it demonstrated to external parties the TAs capacity to organize residents around it. This has led every major party interested in purchasing the property to approach the TA and to seek its support.14

“They are an important organization in the city. When they are out expressing their support for an issue, it lends a certain level of credibility and weight. They are a valued partner in the tenant movement and one of the few residential communities that can deliver support in a significant way.” – Council Member Dan Garodnick

The capacity and momentum built during the Unity Pledge Drive resulted in the TA’s most robust legislative lobbying efforts during the renewal campaign in 2011. The result of this effort was a rare victory on the legislative front. The renewed laws protected more units from decontrol and extended the period of protection for another 4 years. It has been considered the first tenant victory in nearly 15 years.

“We sent thousands of postcards up to Albany. We did it in waves. The first was yellow, I think. Then the line green. We sent them to [Governor] Cuomo, [State Senator] Skelos, and [Speaker] Silver because we wanted everyone to be getting postcards. And they acknowledged that there were floods of yellow and green coming into Albany. It got their attention and that’s something that we can do. We sent busloads of people to Albany, which is very helpful.” – Margaret Salacan

These victories, though complex and involving a number of factors, were impacted directly by the TAs involvement. Having big, loud victories are rare for civic organizations, particularly tenant organizations, so these instances have had a huge impact on the perception of the TA’s efficacy internally, which has allowed it to accurately project it’s power externally.

**Perception of Non-Member Residents**

The TA has expanded significantly during the last few years given the unprecedented crises that have occurred since MetLife sold the property. It has been able to point to real victories as examples of its effectiveness in advocating for the property. That being said, whether this increased capacity has led to the perception of a higher level of efficacy from non-member residents is less clear. The challenge of claiming to speak for an entire complex and actually showing that ability is daunting and has had limitations. When asked in my survey if the TA represented the broader goals of the community 34% responded very well and 34% responded somewhat well. This reflects the broad view of residents involved with the TA on whatever level and is a positive sign of efficacy within the organization. However, the level of efficacy as viewed by non-member residents appears to vary greatly.
“I do find [the TA] valuable. This is just my perception, but I see them as a very small but vocal group that whatever management company comes in, since there have been like three so far [she moved in 2007] they keep pressure on them and can make their lives a living hell. It allows us to kind of free ride, I guess. But I almost see them as so extreme, that’s why I talk to my neighbor [Paula, a TA volunteer] because she can interrupt for me. For me, I know her, I know she’s active, she’s realistic. For whatever reason, I don’t think the TA is realistic in what it expects to get done." Katie Kaplar, Stuyvesant Town resident.

This reality stems from the belief that there are two distinct and mutually-exclusive groups of tenants – younger market-raters and older stabilized tenants has taken hold through much of the complex, including members of the TA. This has resulted in two developments that potentially undermine the TA’s efficacy through out the complex – the internal TA view that bridging this gap might be impossible and the non-member view that the TA does not represent them (or that they are not aware of the TA.)

“My impression of STPCV is different than what it was a few years ago for other campaigns. There is a much younger population, a lot of students, the concern is that they may not be as connected with their neighborhood. The population is less focused on its own self-interest because it might only be here for a few years. It’s up to the TA to continue its advocacy to makes its influence more widely known.” – Senator Brad Hoylman

Without having clear membership numbers from the TA or residential profiles from the property, it is difficult to establish the raw size of the TA or the size of the younger, transient population. The perception, shared even by younger residents that I interviewed, is that the transient population is increasing and changing the nature of the property. This trend is not reversing anytime soon. It is simply unrealistic to expect the phenomena to stop under the current ownership – the incentives are too high for management to discourage younger residents.

“We receive a number of questions from residents about NYU kids, which still seems to be troubling people a great deal and they want to know what can be done about
it. The TA brings to the attention of management as often as possible the situations that develop like the noise and other issues that students bring. But in terms of actually controlling, being able to do away with NYU leases, that possibility is really only ours when we own the property.” – Susan Steinberg, TA Chair speaking at January 26th, 2013 Annual Meeting

“The only people who are going to be able to afford to live here will be NYU kids whose dorm alternatives are $1400 per room on campus anyway, tiny little boxes. It makes sense for them [to move to STPCV]. NYU should just buy the place and turn it into dorms. I never understood that. It’s perfect for NYU.” – Katie Kaplar.

It is also unrealistic to expect this demographic to become involved with the TA given the lack of permanency. The TA has not been able to produce any answers to this problem and the only realistic hope to fundamentally change this is to buy the property and control the entry process. Of the non-member residents that I interviewed and from the poll that I conducted on the Facebook page, many of them questioned the TA’s efficacy and its ability to overcome the larger financial realities of the property.

“The TA, I thought it was interesting. I kind of wanted to get involved, but some of the people that I talked to ended up turning me off because it seemed like a lot of effort for something that was basically a pipe dream, like buying the property. What would that process be? ‘Well, when they agree to do this, then agree to do that, we do this, and so on, and, probably from being a banker, I thought ‘Wow, you just went five steps too far into the future that will never happen.” – Kevin Lopez, Stuyvesant Town resident.

Some residents feel that the TA only represents older, wealthier residents who are rent controlled. Others are unaware of the TA’s activities or goals. The fundamental truth that began to emerge from this group of people is that a resident who does not expect to stay for a long time is going to be uninterested in or even skeptical of the TA. If this population represents the future of the complex, the relevancy of the TA in the long-term could be seriously undermined. TA members are aware of this and
express a deep concern about it. Solving it will take a radical realignment of its standing.

“The best approach [to younger residents] is the polite approach, when you have a situation when they just don’t care because they’re not here for a the long run. The problem is that they have to want to stay, otherwise it's pointless. Why engage someone who is only going to live here for one year? We want to know our neighbors.... If we don’t convert [the property] the base will die and it will be an unknown. I can't see it being a very pleasant place to live, as it is today. Its still pretty decent today.” – John Marsh, President of TA

**Political Influence**

While facing a potential long-term crisis with younger residents, currently, the TA enjoys a significant amount of political access. State and local elected officials always attend the TA’s annual meeting and often appear at the complex in conjunction with press conferences concerning the property. There are several unique factors that have lead to this access – the physical number of votes in the complex, its symbolic significance as middleclass and affordable housing in New York City, and its long-cultivated network of connections. This political access has had a positive effect on the TA’s efficacy both internally and externally as it fortifies the image that the TA is a serious player that can exert influence on the political process because it commands the attention of elected leaders.

A primary factor, and a unique one for sure, relating to the TA’s political influence is the presence of Council Member Garodnick around the complex. As a life long resident, when he first ran for and was elected to the City Council in 2006, his experience on the complex and with his neighbors made him a huge ally for the complex and its issues.
“I think Dan is the first Council Member from Stuytown, which is huge. If you go back and not have someone from the property, it would be awful. He's a good cheerleader and that’s what you want. Someone who is a strong advocate, who will continue to fight, put pressure on Albany, other elected officials. We got lucky that he is saying another four years [for his third term, beginning in Jan 1. 2014]” – Steven Newmark, TA Board Member

“It was Dan’s leadership that really made a difference. Dan pushed us to consider buying the place and it was Dan who put together the army of volunteers in 2006 for the Pledge Drive, which got just about every apartment. MetLife didn’t treat us with any respect, but that quickly changed when we started making noise.” – John Marsh

“There are a lot of votes there, a lot of people who are politically engaged. It’s not a monolith, people don’t necessarily vote in a block. But they will not vote for people they don’t believe are good on their issues. I think it’s in a class of its own.” – Council Member Garodnick

As Council Member Garodnick points out, the TA has created its political access mainly because residents of STPCV vote in large numbers, consistently. It’s geographical concentration and large population of voters makes it an obvious place to campaign in and a necessary stop for all local candidates. Though the TA does not officially endorse candidates, individual board members can and their endorsement can carry a significant weight amongst residents. Like many voting districts across the country, the boundaries of the district containing the complex effectively create a one-party system making the Democratic primary the only truly contested race. In this environment, effectively courting a significant neighborhood like STPCV can make or break a candidate. The TA knows this and has historically held debates or offered candidates pledges concerning their issues. The high political involvement of residents of the complex suggest a high efficacy level and the TA has been able to leverage this into greater access to these candidates resulting in greater influence in the outcomes of policy decisions made by these officials.
“It’s a very important voting block in my district. I stood on street corners for weeks on end because I needed to get to know the residents…. The TA is one of the best, most highly structured advocacy groups in the city. They are a reliable voting block, active in local politics. They have clear issues that are extremely relative. Any candidate should take them serious and do their best to represent their concerns.” – Senator Brad Hoylman

Because of the historical circumstances creating the complex, STPCV has taken on a broad symbolic value that many elected leaders wish to tap into. Affordable housing for working class families is a universally winning platform and being seen as an active partner with the TA is a box most city and statewide officials wish to check off. For example, during the most recent TA annual meeting on January 26, 2013, in addition to Council member Garodnick, State Senator Brad Hoylman, State Assemblyman Brian Kavanagh, Congresswoman Maloney all spoke for a few minutes about the issues concerning the TA, praising it and its members for the work they have done advocating for the property and affordable housing issues in general. In addition, two of the four major Democratic candidates for the 2013 New York City mayoral campaign, Speaker Christine Quinn and Public Advocate Bill de Blasio both came to the meeting (at different times) and spoke. Having so many elected officials at the meeting is a testament to the political access and influence created by the TA and demonstrates a high level of efficacy.

“[STPCV] is the largest and most important concentration of affordable housing in the city…and it must be preserved. For a lot of other people defending the notion of housing for everyone, your fights, your constant victories are an encouragement throughout the city.” Public Advocate Bill de Blasio speaking at the Annual Meeting, 01/26/13.

“[The response to Sandy] speaks to a community that is well organized, looks out for each other, knows who to call, and has great elected officials. Your victories are first and foremost great for this community, but they have been an enormous shot in the arm for tenant associations in ever community in every borough. Cuz you guys are the ultimate David and Goliath story, and you’ve won, and you’re winning. You’ve
made a bigger difference than you could ever imagine.” – Council Speaker Christine Quinn, speaking at Annual Meeting, 01/26/13

No doubt the TA is savvy about garnering political access (particularly in city-wide election year) but having access to elected leaders does not guarantee results as the political context in Albany is often stacked against well-meaning city officials. The TA has also sought out alliances and partnerships with other tenant groups such as TenantPAC, where several TA board members also have seats on the board, and Friends and Neighbors.

“A lot of city elected have been great allies. It’s a larger group, but the balance of power in Albany is the issue. The real estate industry is so powerful; we don’t have the balance we need. The leader of the housing committee [Senator Katharine Young] has more cows than people in her district.” – Katie Goldstein, Senior Organizer, Tenants & Neighbors

Both non-profit organizations lobby for stronger tenant protection laws and have worked with the TA for years. This network affect has led to some of the recent successes in Albany. Having such a large footprint as an organization given its size and history has given the TA a lot of clout with other tenant groups in the city. This increases the TA’s efficacy because it is seen as a model to strive for while it can also benefit from the pooled resources of the greater tenant movement.

Even though the TA has considerable access to political groups, they are aware of the external forces that can undermine its efficacy. The 2006 purchase by Tishman showed the limitation of political support as it came down to basic dollars - $900 million more dollars, specifically.

“Someone has to be willing to sell to you if you want to move forward, so no buyer is on an equal playing field with a seller who doesn’t want to sell. All we have been trying to do is be clear to CW Capital and the bondholders that we have the ability to
make them whole and have a broad support from the community and elected officials.” – Council Member Dan Garodnick

“Having political access doesn’t hurt. Dan and Brad and Brain [Kavanagh] could be very helpful to CW in this process. It doesn’t make sense to have enemies and we don’t need them as enemies. The fact that we have a good relationship [with the elected officials] is a good bridge.” – Al Doyle, TA board member/ former President

The TA has learned from this experience and put together a group of financial and legal advisors to give the TA a more credible chance to buy the property. The current property manager, CW Capital, has expressed interest in working with the TA on previous occasions given the political allies of the TA, but most recently conversations have stalled.

“In August 2010 they wanted to work with us, embraced our principles and then by November 2010 they started to step away from us, I guess, deciding that they were worried that somewhere down the road a bondholder could sue them for not getting the best deal…. We’re here, we’re ready, we would like to deal with them. They could be talking to Donald Trump, anybody, but they’re not talking to us unfortunately.” – Al Doyle

There is a calculation going on about the market value of the property that ‘trumps’ any efficacy on the TA’s end, regardless of how high it is. No one seems sure what will happen, but the power is firmly in CW Capital’s hands at the writing of this thesis. Given the rapid rebound of the NYC housing market, the victory from 2011 could easily be a footnote in the long breakdown of rent control laws. The reality is that, despite the TA’s best efforts and come what may in the future, over the last six years a significant amount of long-tenured residents and affordable units have disappeared.

“An enormous amount of damage has been done to the affordability of the housing stock. You can’t undo all of that. It cannot be done.” – Michael MaKee, tenant organizer, Tenant PAC
Without high levels of efficacy, the TA would not be able to sustain its core of highly motivated members, nor would it be able to attract the volunteers who make up the mid-to-low levels of participation that sustains it in high activity periods. Efficacy can be projected through aggressive messaging, but it cannot be sustained without tangible victories, however big or small. In the past few years, the TA has had enough victories to point to that demonstrate a realistic and positive sense of efficacy internally that has translated to a corresponding perception of efficacy externally. Though it has notable problems with certain demographics of residents and limitations due to political and financial circumstances, the TA has translated its efficacy into a strong, sustainable capacity.
Chapter 7
“*We Won’t Go Away*”
Conclusion and recommendations

This paper has attempted to measure the organizational capacity of the Stuyvesant Town and Peter Cooper Village Tenants Association. From the organization’s beginnings in 1971 with social meetings amongst WWII veterans and their families, to today’s highly organized and technically sophisticated network, the TA has experienced many iterations and fluctuations in its capacity over the years. In the last six, the TA’s capacity has grown to new levels in response to the unprecedented pressures facing the complex. Though I have made the case that the TA has established a high-level of capacity – by articulating its goals clearly, by building a sustainable structure to pursue them, and by achieving measurable victories concerning them – it is important to understand the unique factors that have led to this capacity. Though I have argued that the theoretical concepts surrounding the TA are universal, it is not an easily transferable model to other tenant and civic organizations, nor does its past and current successes even present us with a model that will easily translate into the future of the complex as they attempt to purchase it.

STPCV is a unique setting both for its size and because of its origin. There are not many building complexes that cover 110 uniformly designed buildings and 25,000 residents condensed across 80 acres. By being built specifically as affordable housing for returning World War II veterans, the complex was the product of a
grand, unprecedented urban experiment in public-private partnerships. (It is very likely that if the project had been delayed even a few years, it would have never been built as residents and capital started flowing to the suburbs by the 1950s.) The complex created an instantly identifiable neighborhood with an instantly definable character. In this regard, though the TA was formed from an organic process over time, the elements leading to this formation were decidedly inorganic and difficult to repeat or perhaps even sustain over time. Regardless, the TA has used its historical narrative to its advantage as a source of organizing residential support and political support and has used them as sources of legitimacy and capacity building. Maintaining the elements that led to this capacity is the great challenge ahead for the TA.

**Neighborhood Ties and Participation Levels**

The TA has historically been able to muster a large amount of resident participation, particularly in times of great physical-capacity needs. They have done this by attracting a small hardcore group of high-level participants that give a large amount of time and energy, creating the baseline for the organization. With the work of these individuals, when the time comes to call for others to step up for distributions or rallies, they have a physical structure and agenda in place ready to meet the challenge. In between these high levels of activity, this small group maintains targeted communications that reminds people of the TA’s issues, goals, and victories. Attracting high-level participants is vital to an organization’s capacity. Without a highly dedicated group at the helm, the organization will never create the
baseline structure to meet the needs of residents during large or small battles. This lack of capacity would result in little to no participation and thus no power to influence external forces. The human capital of the TA, its leaders and volunteers, remain its greatest strength.

Finding the next generation of leaders will be a major test for the organization. My limited survey has shown that there is a breed of newer residents that share the same values – preserving its affordability and sense of community - of the traditional TA. Reaching out to them, as they have most effectively through flyers and social media, is a start, but it must take the next step of organizing new networks of residents through social gatherings or professional networking events. The precedent set by Council Member Garodnick’s Market Rate Tenant Network is an example of how subsets of new tenants can fall into the larger sphere of the TA. Only a handful of new residents with similar interests as the board members would be required to start a new chapter in recruiting and evolving the membership. This is a vital step as standing by hoping to prevent young residents from entering the complex is unlikely to succeed.

**Grievances**

Without a raison d’être, no organization could create or sustain its capacity. The TA has had its share of large and small grievances over the years, from trunk storage access, through fighting MCI’s and rent laws, to facing new ownership, that have resulted in periods of high-activity and low-activity. The underlying reality is that
far from resolving these grievances, many of them are intractable and represent the seeds for future grievances, such as noise complaints from students evolving into the larger and more dramatic demographic issue facing the property. As one victory or defeat settles in, another issue inevitably crops up. This has given the TA an immense amount of experience in organizing around issues, big or small. Most recently with the sale of the property and Tishman’s doomed tenure, the TA has faced its most existential grievance. Because of its history of handling all types of issues, it had the capacity to address these larger issues without stumbling internally or missing opportunities externally to garner support from residents, elected officials, tenant movement activists and even financial and legal entities. The TA has historically been quick to anticipate and respond to the broader grievances of residents, garnering it with greater support and appreciation.

Two steps must be taken for the TA to continue to handle its grievances. It must first continue to expand its quality-of-life focus, which affects all tenants as new management firms without history on the property come and go. It has picked populist issues, such as noise complaints and key-card access replacements, to focus on that can rally even short-term residents. With so much on the TA’s plate, it must carve out more capacity exclusively for this purpose, perhaps a simple reorganization of the maintenance committee into a more visible community affairs committee would begin to help. Expanding their social media platform around these issues, including perhaps a tumblr account containing pictures of fire doors or trash and the like, could draw in a lot of non-member residents attention.
Second, it must continue to expand its involvement with the broader tenant movement, of which it is a significant presence in already. The challenge of organizing many different associations, activists, and agendas is beyond one all-volunteer group’s capacity, but the TA can use its immense influence, as outlined in this paper, to force the campaign closer together outside of the standard Tenant Lobby Day protests in Albany. Giving the tenant movement a larger visibility might bring together a huge number of tenants in this city around simple protections that can effectively counter the real estate lobby upstate.

Resources

As I have discussed, money is often a serious limitation in volunteer organizations and the TA is not without significant financial restraints. This matters less when the core membership of a group, such as the TA’s, has the time to devote to it, a high education level and wide pool of professional skillsets to create its capacity. The TA has been fortunate to have a deep pool of professionals on its board and among its ranks that offer a variety of technical, legal, and political skills and networks to pull from. This has allowed it to sustain a large formal capacity and to pursue its goals more ambitiously and professionally. Just as every neighborhood has certain civic assets, each will have a unique set of social assets. Regardless of money levels, if an organization such as the TA has members willing to donate a large amount of time or has a great amount of skills, it will have a strong foundation to build up capacity and influence.
Maintaining this level of competency into the next phase of the complex’s history is essential to maintaining the TA’s capacity. It’s ability to add skillsets to meet the possible challenges – which might include buying and managing the property – will be tested greatly. It must maintain its accountability, transparency and accessibility by continuing to draw in new voices to the TA, particularly on the elected board, which will serve to expand the options for the property’s future. Purchasing the property might be the best option, but there are many options that must be explored diligently in order to move forward on any single plan. Finding the time to explore these options in addition to consulting with the TA’s financial, political, and legal partners is a central responsibility of the organization and will serve all residents well.

**Efficacy**

Every organization must have tangible results to measure itself by – big or small, victory or defeat. If an organization wishes to sustain or grow its capacity, it cannot be an abstraction that never shows accountability to its members. If a group has victories, it can build greater capacity by encouraging more people to join. The TA has been in existence since 1971 and has a long list of both victories and defeats concerning its issues. It has had enough meaningful victories, particularly over the last six years to give its organization's capacity a high level of validation within the TA, from other residents, and external forces.
Where it is less successful, in terms of recruiting younger, more transient residents, it is perhaps a product more of circumstance than of effort. No amount of success can attract a resident’s attention who is uninterested in the future of the property. Tackling this issue from the macro-level as opposed to the micro-level may be the only solution. There are already encouraging signs on the property. Some of these younger residents turn into young families, interested in staying on the property and getting involved. Some young professionals turn into building captains with fresh ideas, skills (and legs.)

Attracting a younger generation of residents to the TA is rightly seen as a major priority by the board. However, the uncertainty surrounding the future of the complex does not just impact older residents’ perceptions. A clearer sense of the property’s future and why it matters to the broader picture of affordability across New York City, would go a long way to attracting this segment of the population, because it will impact them wherever they choose to live.

**The TA’s role in the Future of STPCV**

The last six years have seen the greatest upheaval the community has endured since the Gas Light District was torn down to build the complex in the later 1940s. Though no bulldozers have been involved this time around, the number of lives affected and the number of people displaced could have an equally scaring impact on the community. Many people that I spoke with acknowledge that regardless of whether the TA can buy the property or whether the *Roberts* decision protects rent
regulations for a long period of time, a permanent change has taken place in the complex. It is no longer the family-driven neighborhood that defined it for so long. The economic incentives of renting to shorter-term residents, attracting large pools of students - though not exclusively - has begun to have noticeable affects on the residential make-up of the complex, many of them having been viewed negatively by residents old and new alike. As rental rates have continued to reach new highs across the city, regardless of the broader national economic climate, this picture will not change in the near future. The TA’s official view is that the only foreseeable measure that could counter this trend is to purchase of the property.

That the TA agrees that it must purchase the property – current estimates price it at around $3 billion – in order to truly control its destiny speaks not only to the TA’s commendable capacity to be in that position, but also to the challenges and obstacles that the TA has endured over the years and continue to face as tenants. The rights of tenants have never been valued in our economic and political system as much as those of owners. Many people question the right of tenants to seek rent protections or to interfere in the market at any level. That many commentators view rent stabilized tenants - many of them older retired residents living solely on social security - as “takers” in the face of the overwhelming amounts of tax subsidies, - numbering in the hundreds of millions of dollars in the city through programs like the 421(a) benefits - to private developers and landlords is an affront to logic and calls for a greater debate than can be detailed here.
The irony of the TA’s position is if it successfully purchases the property, which remains in question as of this writing, it would remove over 11,000 units from the rent roles and the broader tenant movement. Even in owning the property, the economics of the deal would call for an unknown amount of units to flip to market rate. The number of resulting affordable housing units remains largely unknown. It is conceivable the any deal to purchase the property would result in a net loss of affordable units. Whether this would further undermine the community or stabilize it remains a question for the bar as much as a for the boardroom – no one knows and everyone has an opinion.

Can the TA stop the trend toward transience; stop the reliance on unpredictable rent laws from Albany, and stop the erosion of the community by buying the property? The last purchase of the property at an overheated value provides a cautionary tale to any would-be buyer, including the TA. Would the TA have been better or worse off had it successfully bought the property in 2006? It is hard to argue that it would be given its own lofty bid and how the market turned.

The question of purchasing the property is not just one of finance. Purchasing the property presents an entirely unknown landscape concerning the TA’s fundamental goals of preserving the affordability of the complex and its middleclass, family-centric identity. Again, the reality is no one knows how many units need to flip to market rate to make purchasing the property work. Without having a clear sense of how any proposal would affect those goals, it is fair to ask if the TA has the
responsibility to explore alternative options that would include tangible opportunities to maintain affordability and the middleclass identity. Options such as community land trusts, co-ops, mutual housing associations, even housing development fund co-ops, could be explored that might serve these principles more faithfully. Would any of these have a political or financial life in the current real estate climate? I am skeptical that they would. The complexity of any deal requires so many legal, financial, and political partners with potentially differing visions of the future of the property that it becomes even more important for the TA to remain true to its core values as a guiding light. There is a strong possibility that at some point in the near future, when a concrete outline of a deal emerges, the TA might have to choose between preserving its values and purchasing the property. No amount of capacity building can prepare an organization for such a choice.

What if the TA chooses its values over purchasing? What will the future hold for rent regulation laws in 2015 and beyond? Despite the victories won in 2011, the state of tenant protection is perpetually unsettled and might be as much of a fight against time as it is against the real estate lobby as older residents leave rent controlled units. It is unlikely that the political dynamic in Albany will alter significantly in the next few cycles. Is the TA better served to remove the complex from the debate altogether or to work with its partners in the movement to expand participation to all tenants – protected or not? Could universal rent renewal, citywide-tiered rent stabilization, and limits to subsidies to private developers become viable political and economic options with a stronger tenant movement? The TA has been an
important player in the tenants’ movement for a number of years and its exit from the theater and the loss of its capacity would undoubtedly be a major blow. There are some voices within the TA and within the broader movement that argue that remaining a rental property better serves the TA’s values in the long run. Without having a clear picture of a deal to purchase the property, these voices remain in the minority. Only more information will alter this dynamic one way or the other.

The questions facing the TA as it moves forward are constantly evolving and the answers are far from clear, even within the TA. What is universally accepted and agreed upon is that the TA has survived for so long because it has been willing and able to face these types of difficult questions and tackle these challenges with a sense of shared history, purpose, and hope. They have shown that they can adapt to changing circumstances by maintaining their core principles while welcoming new faces and new ideas. This resiliency has been a hallmark of their capacity for forty years. If how they have channeled that resiliency during the previous six years is any indication, then perhaps the next phase of the TA’s life, which will no doubt be its most perilous, will also be a cause for and source of hope.

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Appendix
Charts

- All information is from the American Community Study (ACS) 2011 conducted by the US Census Bureau
- Stuyvesant Town is conterminous with Census Tract 44
- Peter Cooper Village is conterminous with Census Tract 60

Chart 1: Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population (2011)</th>
<th>New York County</th>
<th>Stuyvesant Town</th>
<th>Peter Cooper Village</th>
<th>New York City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Estimate</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Estimate</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEX AND AGE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>1,588,257</td>
<td>1,588,257</td>
<td>17,224</td>
<td>17,224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>746,858</td>
<td>47.0%</td>
<td>7,530</td>
<td>43.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>841,399</td>
<td>53.0%</td>
<td>9,694</td>
<td>56.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Under 5 years</td>
<td>78,866</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 to 9 years</td>
<td>60,612</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 to 14 years</td>
<td>60,587</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 to 19 years</td>
<td>78,072</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 to 24 years</td>
<td>137,008</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>2,730</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>25 to 34 years</td>
<td>341,751</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
<td>3,570</td>
<td>20.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 to 44 years</td>
<td>240,069</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
<td>1,875</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
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<td>45 to 54 years</td>
<td>203,331</td>
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<td>2,336</td>
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<tr>
<td>55 to 59 years</td>
<td>93,753</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>1,124</td>
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<tr>
<td>60 to 64 years</td>
<td>82,966</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>65 to 74 years</td>
<td>112,650</td>
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<td>1,526</td>
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<tr>
<td>75 to 84 years</td>
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<tr>
<td>85 years and over</td>
<td>29,995</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>507</td>
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<tr>
<td>Race/Ethnicity (2011)</td>
<td>New York County</td>
<td>Stuyvesant Town</td>
<td>Peter Cooper Village</td>
<td>New York City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Estimate</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Estimate</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One race</td>
<td>1,529,371</td>
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<td>16,826</td>
<td>97.7%</td>
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<td>White</td>
<td>896,499</td>
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<td>12,533</td>
<td>72.8%</td>
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<td>Black or African American</td>
<td>246,752</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>873</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Indian and Alaska Native</td>
<td>5,421</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>176,594</td>
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<td>16.2%</td>
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<td>Asian Indian</td>
<td>25,092</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>94,876</td>
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<td>668</td>
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<td>Filipino</td>
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<td>415</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
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<td>0.9%</td>
<td>69</td>
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<td>Korean</td>
<td>18,299</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese</td>
<td>2,863</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asian</td>
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<td>409</td>
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<td>Some other race</td>
<td>203,656</td>
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<td>617</td>
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<td>Two or more races</td>
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<td>398</td>
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<td>White and Black or African American</td>
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<td>1.2%</td>
<td>29</td>
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<tr>
<td>White and American Indian and Alaska Native</td>
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<tr>
<td>White and Asian</td>
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<td>Black or African American and American Indian and Alaska Native</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Race alone or in combination with one or more other races</td>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>1,588,257</td>
<td>1,588,257</td>
<td>17,224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>12,901</td>
<td>74.9%</td>
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<td>American Indian and Alaska Native</td>
<td>14,302</td>
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<td>Asian</td>
<td>194,346</td>
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<td>Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander</td>
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<td>0.0%</td>
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<td>220,045</td>
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<td>705</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
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**HISPANIC OR**
### LATINO AND RACE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Hispanic or Latino (of any race)</th>
<th>Mexican</th>
<th>Puerto Rican</th>
<th>Cuban</th>
<th>Other Hispanic or Latino</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>1,588,257</td>
<td>407,066</td>
<td>43,454</td>
<td>113,538</td>
<td>11,275</td>
<td>238,799</td>
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<td>1,588,257</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mexicans</td>
<td>1,042</td>
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<td>1.0%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Ricans</td>
<td>532</td>
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<td>0.9%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
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<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cubans</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Hispanic or Latinos</td>
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<td>6.3%</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>340</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,201,511</td>
<td>28.4%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
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### Chart 3: Income

#### Income (2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income (2011)</th>
<th>New York County</th>
<th>Stuyvesant Town</th>
<th>Peter Cooper Village</th>
<th>New York City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Estimate</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Estimate</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total households</td>
<td>733,393</td>
<td>733,393</td>
<td>8,094</td>
<td>8,094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than $10,000</td>
<td>73,248</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>$10,000 to $14,999</td>
<td>39,686</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$15,000 to $24,999</td>
<td>62,141</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$25,000 to $34,999</td>
<td>53,629</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$35,000 to $49,999</td>
<td>66,385</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>746</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$50,000 to $74,999</td>
<td>98,650</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>1,078</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>$75,000 to $99,999</td>
<td>71,626</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>1,164</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$100,000 to $149,999</td>
<td>93,464</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>1,347</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$150,000 to $199,999</td>
<td>52,483</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>1,066</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$200,000 or more</td>
<td>122,081</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
<td>1,059</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median household income (dollars)</td>
<td>67,204</td>
<td>(X)</td>
<td>88,595</td>
<td>(X)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean household income (dollars)</td>
<td>127,411</td>
<td>(X)</td>
<td>114,115</td>
<td>(X)</td>
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## Chart 4: Occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation (2011)</th>
<th>New York County</th>
<th>Stuyvesant Town</th>
<th>Peter Cooper Village</th>
<th>New York City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Estimate</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Estimate</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OCCUPATION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian employed population 16 years and over</td>
<td>846,255</td>
<td>846,255</td>
<td>9,585</td>
<td>9,585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management, business, science, and arts occupations</td>
<td>488,167</td>
<td>57.7%</td>
<td>6,464</td>
<td>67.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service occupations</td>
<td>118,025</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales and office occupations</td>
<td>184,468</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>2,282</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural resources, construction, and maintenance occupations</td>
<td>16,744</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production, transportation, and material moving occupations</td>
<td>38,851</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INDUSTRY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian employed population 16 years and over</td>
<td>846,255</td>
<td>846,255</td>
<td>9,585</td>
<td>9,585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, and mining</td>
<td>827</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>13,968</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>45</td>
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<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>30,902</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wholesale trade</td>
<td>19,055</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail trade</td>
<td>63,936</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation and warehousing, and utilities</td>
<td>21,211</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>55,351</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance and insurance, and real estate and rental and leasing</td>
<td>142,028</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
<td>1,675</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional, scientific, and management, and administrative and waste management services</td>
<td>159,979</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>2,277</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational services,</td>
<td>185,933</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>2,146</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry Description</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and health care and social assistance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts, entertainment, and recreation, and accommodation and food services</td>
<td>90,711</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>968</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public administration</td>
<td>24,597</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other services, except public administration</td>
<td>37,757</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other services, except public administration</td>
<td>37,757</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private wage and salary workers</td>
<td>698,265</td>
<td>82.5%</td>
<td>7,527</td>
<td>78.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government workers</td>
<td>78,660</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>1,290</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed in own not incorporated business workers</td>
<td>68,503</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>758</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unpaid family workers</td>
<td>827</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
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</table>

CLASS OF WORKER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS OF WORKER</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civilian employed population 16 years and over</td>
<td>846,255</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>9,585</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>1,975</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private wage and salary workers</td>
<td>698,265</td>
<td>82.5%</td>
<td>7,527</td>
<td>78.5%</td>
<td>1,506</td>
<td>76.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government workers</td>
<td>78,660</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>1,290</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed in own not incorporated business workers</td>
<td>68,503</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>758</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unpaid family workers</td>
<td>827</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>