PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS | IRAQ
EFFECTIVE REVIEW, PLANNING, & STANDARDS OF PRACTICE

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Wednesday 16 May 2012

The initial PRT (Provincial Reconstruction Team) effort in Iraq commenced in earnest throughout 2005 and early 2006. The intended process of facilitating provincial capacity, although, met a number of obstacles throughout its execution. A key inquiry of the following text has been what have been the threats to the operational capacity of PRTs in meeting the mission of ‘capacity development’? Have existing efforts to identify the mission, organization, and effectiveness of PRTs allowed for the identification of logistical, physical, and organizational threats to PRT operations? Could the resulting area of foci, as identifying the threats to the operational capacity of PRTs, allow for the ability remediate areas of weakness to the existing PRT mission of ‘capacity development’?
Acknowledgements

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Glossary

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<td>AO</td>
<td>Area of Operations</td>
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<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
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<td>CALL</td>
<td>Center for Army Lessons Learned</td>
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<td>CM</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
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<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counter Insurgency</td>
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<td>DD</td>
<td>Defense Directive</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>United States Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOJ</td>
<td>United States Department of Justice</td>
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<td>DOS</td>
<td>United States Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOB</td>
<td>Forward Operating Base</td>
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<td>GAO</td>
<td>United States Government Accounting Office</td>
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<td>ID</td>
<td>International Development</td>
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<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<td>IRMO</td>
<td>Iraq Reconstruction Management Office</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>MOS</td>
<td>Military Occupational Specialty</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NSPD</td>
<td>National Security Presidential Directive</td>
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<td>OIG</td>
<td>Office of the Inspector General</td>
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<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<td>RAND</td>
<td>Research and Development Corporation</td>
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<td>SIGIR</td>
<td>Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Subject Matter Expert(ise)</td>
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<tr>
<td>USACE</td>
<td>United States Army Corps of Engineers</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>USDA</td>
<td>United States Department of Agriculture</td>
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Introduction

“PRTs are intended to be interim structures, after a PRT has achieved its goal of improving stability, it may be dismantled to allow for traditional development efforts to occur.”

“To accomplish their missions, PRTs engage in and fund a variety of activities, such as developing the capacity of local governments through engagement with local stakeholders; promoting budget execution, business development, agriculture, public health initiatives, and governance; and supporting the delivery of basic social services.”

1

The initial PRT (Provincial Reconstruction Team) effort in Iraq commenced in earnest throughout 2005 and early 2006. Aiming to increase the developmental capacity of local government level in all Iraqi provinces, PRTs were uniquely composed of civilian and military personnel to address the mission of ‘capacity development’ within the battle space the existing combat operations of Operation Iraqi Freedom. In contrast to the existing backdrop, the targeted geographic signature of the PRT effort was to occur at the human scale, in support of one of the PRT’s intended goals, to support the expansion and decentralization of government services.

A resulting, yet initial, question of the following body of research was, as follows: How effective were Provincial Reconstruction Teams in pursuing reconstruction and development activities, present to ongoing military operations? Pursuant to measuring the effectiveness of selected PRT initiatives, a subsequent inquiry has required the identification of present conflicts threatening the operational capacity of the PRT. One such threat, as an exemplar, may lie in personnel qualifications, selection, and mix.

________________________

Within the initial year of operations, although, obstacles towards the execution of PRT selected development initiatives confronted the PRT mission. The task, which once could have been summarily considered post conflict development, soon became focused on supporting stabilization initiatives in an active military intervention. Stabilization efforts, in turn, would thereafter support the instruments to allow for ‘capacity development’. Respectively, the creation of a successful diplomatic effort focused on nation building, grew from an effort with modest goals to one charged with marked challenges. As a result, the encountered obstacles to the operational capacity of PRTs, to meet the intended mission of the newly formed CM (Civilian Military) units, catalyzed the assessment of threats to PRT personnel, mission, and capability.

At the core, the nature of the PRT process was to manage the rapid mobilization of resources, to tackle long term development issues. The mission to strengthen local governance, although, was identified as the catalyst to strengthen future development initiatives. In doing so, increasing the legitimacy of local centers of power would address the drivers of instability stalling provincial capacity, consequent to territorial conflict. Selected areas of focus were to include local security, infrastructure, and basic social services.

The intended process of facilitating provincial capacity, although, met a number of obstacles throughout its execution. Overcoming the complications of managing the PRT based development effort has, as a result, been the focus of ongoing and past research. Attention has been given to the internal challenges in the organization, staffing, and funding of PRTs in Iraq. The benefit of research into the organization, staffing, and funding of PRTs has been to perform an analysis of the initial threats to the structure and methods pursued under the PRT effort in Iraq.

The aforementioned course of research which I identify and seek to engage in the following body of work, although, addresses an issue greater than the singular discussion of PRTs in Iraq. The addressed issues, consequently, should be of critical
interest to the segment of international development, interrogating the efficacy of
development efforts situated in active military interventions, whether they are pursued
by relief, humanitarian, or non-governmental organizations. The result of the research
should determine what courses of organizational behavior are most successful amongst
civilian and military planners, when confronted with the responsibility of increasing
‘capacity development’ at the provincial and district level. This may include, but is not
limited to, supporting local governance, delivering key services, such as sanitation
services, light infrastructure, and providing population security amidst insurgent activity.

Research Question

Though, beyond the direct measures of PRT output lays the research question of the
current text: How effective were Provincial Reconstruction Teams in pursuing
reconstruction and development activities, present to ongoing military operations? To
answer this question, although, a key inquiry of the following text has been, what have
been the threats to the operational capacity of PRTs in meeting the mission of ‘capacity
development’?

Have existing efforts to identify the mission, organization, and effectiveness of PRTs
allowed for the identification of logistical, physical, and organizational threats to PRT
operations? This inquiry, although, results in the requirement to comprehensively
identify the PRT itself, through existing literature, in order to identify the unit and
mission, whether it be reconstruction, nation building, or local security.

Hypothesis

The hypothesis of research at present, although, will not and cannot directly address the
answer to the research question: How effective were Provincial Reconstruction Teams
in pursuing reconstruction and development activities, present to ongoing military
operations and to a further extent, what have been the threats to the operational
capacity of PRTs in meeting the mission of ‘capacity development’?

The hypothesis will be drawn from the review and inquiry of extant literature respective to PRT engagements in Iraq from 2005 – 2010.

Withstanding a lack of access to metrics which measure and serve as the indicators of PRT output, a study sourced in periodic research of PRTs from multiple authors would nevertheless allow for a comprehensive identification of the limitations, constraints, and threats to the operational capacity of PRTs. Further, the lack of direct access to the measured indicators of PRT output will greater allows a focus to be drawn on the internal challenges in the organization, staffing, and funding of PRTs in Iraq.

The hypothesis will be tested through the collection and analysis of qualitative data, as outlined by the research methodology of the current text.

Should the assumptions underlying the hypothesis prove incorrect, a review of existing criticism should not allow for a comprehensive view of threats to the operational capacity of PRTs and disallow for suggested areas of focus. In the opposite case, a positive result would yield resulting comprehensive areas of foci, as identifying the threats to the operational capacity of PRTs, would allow for the ability remEDIATE areas of weakness to the existing PRT mission of ‘capacity development’.
Notes

Impacts on Planning & International Development

The pursuit of PRTs on behalf of allied interests in Iraq and neighboring regions, for several years, has allowed for the rich availability of data and best practices. Although the nature of data may be qualitative in nature, as well as conceived to address policy goals and program advancement, the extent of available materials implicitly allows for additional review.

Lessons learned through the lifecycle of PRTs could contribute to several areas of planning and international development, including, but not limited to acclimation to the supra-experiential, a further allowance for the development of cultural sensitivities, the application of existing methodologies in situ, and conversely the immediate opportunity to locally source apropos programs. The cumulative effects of lessons culled from past practices, as can be drawn from PRTs, should result in the exercise of identifying forgone opportunities for increased situational awareness, organizational insight, and corrective measures.

An analysis of the PRT process further identifies a particular suite, and the diversity thereof, of skills addressed in professional practice. In the case of participation within the PRT process, professional competencies are required as well as acclimation to a continued exposure in the field. A review of the strengths and shortcomings of the process may also illustrate individual areas where further training may be required prior to the regime of work required in the PRT process. This may include, but is not limited to, the rapid and competent execution of, field collection (land use inventories), economic analysis, demography, and an ability to integrate with non SME personnel, requiring the ability to negotiate as in the highly political practice of planning in the public sector.
This additional inquiry also addresses a practice that extends beyond the traditional notion of public/private sector management; development of urban and rural assets. Although still representative of a practice to focus on areas of investment and disinvestment, growth and contraction, the identified practice herein has occurred in the midst of conflict and regional/local hostilities. The parallel, at once, could portend an expansion in the field of professional practice under international development.

The extended and here discussed situation of professionals working within the vein of planning, seeks to identify international development as, first, the complex network of stakeholders, both global, national, regional, and local; the identification also, implicitly, seeks to affirm the marked congress of civilian and military pursuits.
Critical Questions

The application of measures concerning traditional development and planning efforts against PRTs can assist in revealing not only the difficulties of the PRT process, but potential areas of improvement as well. The following concerns include queries which could be made of the process as an initial method of critical reasoning during the initial stages of development. The inquiries should also be considered throughout subsequent research of singular areas of the PRT process, as will occur herein. Each question, although positioned for context, could easily become purposed an additional study.

- What are the short term and long term effects of conflict parallel development efforts?

- Can net positive long term effects be reached through the application of short term skills and financing?

- How does the PRT model define and target military security versus human security; economic, social, and political security?

- How does the selected personnel mix reflect the given methods of development practiced under a PRT?

- Does the PRT model address long term development efforts to normalize the lives of those who have endured cycles of social calamity?

- How does the PRT model take into account the incorporation of existing institutions and the requirement for capacity in human capital and skills in assisting development?
• Does the PRT effort address the critical concern of instability and the loss of growth as a result of the given course of DDR in Iraq?

• Does the PRT support and enforce the creation of employment as a method of counterinsurgency?

• How does the PRT process address the demobilized and their future relationship to existing institutions?

In the case of PRTs, establishing the context of those efforts remains of critical importance. It will serve to demonstrate the absence where further research is necessary, if performed against the framework of traditional development.
Literature Review

The provision for a working body of knowledge regarding Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) requires a review of existing literature regarding the practice. It will attempt to establish the field of study through the identification of actors and their inquiries. This includes, but is not limited to queries regarding the actors, practices, and results. The goal of the review is to establish the context of the field of study. It also demonstrates the absence where further research is necessary, if performed against the framework of existing research. This would be fulfilled through the research question posed though an additional study.

In the case of PRTs, establishing the context of study is of critical importance. The methods by which research is performed on the activity, as is the case with many state sponsored activities, follows an established chain of events by which inquiry and discovery occurs as a chronology.

The following, prior to the literature review itself, is to a limited extent the context in which research of PRTs has occurred, as organized by the state and as pursued by varying interests.
Research of PRTs

Research into the Provincial Reconstruction Team and its internal processes is both limited and rich for a unique set of limitations. Because the PRT is an extension of the United States Government, both its civil and military services, it is promised a certain amount of oversight, congressional inquiry, and funding. At the same time, due to the frequently compartmentalized nature of detailed military action, inquiry into the government practices can become challenging and limit the types of actors and organizations whom are able to provide a context of the practices.

The limitations which parallel inquiry into the PRT development and implementation process both limit and catalyze a certain brand of research. The primary actors, whom are at minimum capable of executing a faithful and permissive inquiry into the process, derive primarily from the public sector, including government offices, public officials, and a limited set of public actors.

Research into government practice and PRTs ostensibly, requires a methodology for material discovery that may not parallel common academic practices. Often, certain government and military practices, and their documentation, are neither public facing or become popularly detailed in the media. Yet, as often also guided by strict procedure, it is possible through the familiarity of government offices and organizations which maintain the resources, personnel, and reserved interests, to interrogate these government practices through content analysis.

Research of PRTs, and civil/ military actions, catalyze a limited set of interests, from government auditing, national security, and congressional oversight. As the nature of the inquiry corresponds to the interests of the intervening actor, the results parallel a certain set of interests, through testimony, figures, and expectations. The level of detail also becomes commensurate with the level of scrutiny applied, whereby a scheduled
briefing may reveal less of a particular government practice than congressional testimony. To properly detail the whole nature of PRTs and similar phenomena, it becomes necessary to review several sources of research to draw a comprehensive image of PRT activities. It also becomes necessary to draw from several published sources of research, in addition to documentation requisite of government practice, to properly identify the sources and origin of certain facts.

Actors which have played a key role in detailing the activities of PRTs include, but are not limited to, the United States Government Accounting Office, the National Security Research Division | RAND, the Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction | United States Department of State, the United States Department of Defense, the Commission of Wartime Contracting, and the Senate Committee for Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs. Each has played a role in detailing relevant operational details of PRT activities and has identified the respective context where shortcomings have occurred.

Because the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) is a joint venture between select federal agencies, e.g. United States Department of State, United States Department of Justice, United States Department of Agriculture, and United States Department of Defense, it is uniquely a civilian/ military venture operating within the same environs which are occupied by predominantly military personnel. Therefore, the PRT can be classified as a tandem instrument for reconstruction and security instrument in foreign theaters of operation.
**Discovery**

Because the operation of PRTs occurs in a space that may not be publicly accessible, by physical or information gathering methods, the methods of inquiry into PRTs are limited to particular channels as with many state functions.

The execution of a state supported foreign intervention, especially those which contain a component of military activity in addition to diplomatic efforts, separate components which focus on direct action, public, and civil affairs. Their distinction is so to effectively sever the functions of the mission and public relations.

In this respect, the efforts are not always symmetrical in personnel strength, as is common with military activity wherein delegated authority to public relations is not as great as the achievement of mission objectives themselves. This disparity can be identified in the time requirements of PRT activity itself and the briefing which details the respective activity. It is also due in part to the often classified nature of discreet military activities and the necessity to maintain operational security.

This is evident in the order and procession of Department of Defense briefings held on region specific military activities. These briefings can be understood as one of the initial steps in the development of research related to the state activity. Scheduled briefings held by the Department of Defense, in the Pentagon Briefing Room, have primarily occurred before an audience of reporters to news organizations and the like. It is in this setting that information related to reconstruction related activities in Iraq is first held as a forum. It also represents the first public attempt to reconstruct a diagram of the foreign activity.

In this setting, certain questions are addressed in detail and others are given a summary response on the direction of certain activities. In regards to PRT activity, the
site of operations may be addressed wherein the details of operations themselves are not readily in discussion. This may be due to the disconnect between public affairs and the apparatus itself, operational security, or the common difficulty to express the nuance of security activities as sound bites.

The public facing result, as seen respective to chronology, summarily describes PRTs, addressing briefly the who, what, when, where, why, and how, performed in the absence of a granular level of detail. Although, it is not at that time sufficient to draw an assessment, that classifies, identifies, and properly gauges the effects of PRT activity. It is neither possible to address the planning, practices, and review of the reconstruction effort, in these early stages of interrogation.

The aforementioned represents the first wave of inquiry. Subsequent measures that detail state sponsored PRT activities include, but are not limited to, congressional testimony, government oversight, and interagency assessments. It is in these later stages of inquiry that the second wave of actors, whom bear interest in the inquiry of the state sponsored activity in question, are afforded the opportunity to question activities in greater detail. This is due in part to their permanency and stake in the interest. It is in this period that interrogating practices from actors, such as government organizations and interagency panels, assume the role previously held by reporting organizations.
Resulting Research Typologies

Due to the aforementioned methods of discovery, which may channel responses particular to the inquiry, paired already to the selective interest of a unique organization, the likelihood of compendium resulting from the discreet inquiry of any particular organization is unlikely. The resulting research typologies, rather, have drawn their focus on an area of limited scope, as rendered their mission, personnel, and resources.

Although the tenets for a summary review of existing literature remain the same, (e.g. what is the field of study, who are the researchers, what are the questions), the resulting review is less a comparative analysis than a synthesis of discreet units of discovery. The following threading of these findings allows for the summary account of PRTs, their functions, purpose, interrogators, and effects.

The following is a review of research focused on the study of PRTs in Iraq and to an extent, Afghanistan, as conducted by the public and private sector.
Concepts and Development

In the intended focus of the following course of research to identify how the personnel selection of the PRT unit is able to support the broader target of post conflict reconstruction and development, one requisite is the review of sources which have identified the scope of the PRT process in the aforementioned respect. In identifying the development of the PRT unit, the formation of Civilian Military relations prior to operations in Iraq speaks to the intentions of succeeding PRT efforts.

In the Journal of Development and Social Transformation, as part of an assessment of the Provincial Reconstruction Team concept prior to the deployment of personnel in Iraq, Robert Borders identifies the origins of the PRT as the creation of discreet CM Civilian-Military Units. These units were developed to address the needs of conflict interim and post conflict development. 2 The article further provides a scope of PRT origins, purpose, and an au courant operational picture of PRT activity prior to their deployment in Iraq.

For the purposes of portraying the intended linear relationship between personnel and field specializations, selections from the text will be drawn to characterize the positive relationship between personnel selection and CM|PRT activity.

An initial argument in support of the CM involvement in the delivery of aid, whether it function as provisions for security, services, or traditional development is simply the expressed need for a vehicle that can perform in post conflict and conflict interim environments. 3 This need would withstand the criticism that the delivery of aid through

2 “In response to the need for action in expediting the post-conflict reconstruction process in Afghanistan, the United States and its coalition partners created specialized civil-military (CM) units known as Provincial Reconstruction Teams, or PRT’s as they are commonly referred to.” (p. 5 Borders)

3 “The intent of this paper is to offer a pragmatic argument in support of the PRT concept being employed
CM units is solely purposed to serve foreign policy interests. 4

The impetus to align relief efforts, whether they were to target security or aid, with civilian efforts was meant to counter key criticisms of a sole military effort to redress aid, relief, and reconstruction. These criticisms primarily extended to the lack of expertise, duplication of efforts, and the militarization of what has been understood as humanitarian spaces. 5 In the juxtaposition of civilian and military efforts, CM efforts would be able to achieve a return on increased security through COIN efforts as well as deliver instruments of aid in a secured environment. It is for these reasons, the CM effort was determined to be an expressed need where singular NGO efforts would be unable to perform and pursue traditional development efforts in active zones of conflict.

in Afghanistan as a model for post-conflict reconstruction and development, despite objections from some practitioners within the international aid community who view it as the embodiment of what they term the “new humanitarianism” or politicization of aid.” (p.5 Borders)

4 “The objection is to the government’s use of aid and development as a vehicle to reinforce strategic policy objectives. From a humanitarian viewpoint, this objection is congruous with the sacrosanct principle that aid must be provided strictly on the basis of need, with “no strings attached.” (p.5 Borders)

5 “The opposition from the non-government organization (NGO) community to the PRT concept can generally be summed up in six major points:

1. It violates the central humanitarian tenet that aid must be provided in a neutral and impartial manner based solely on the criteria of need, i.e., aid should not be politicized.
2. It is a further encroachment of “humanitarian space” traditionally occupied by the NGO community.
3. The use of soldiers in humanitarian aid projects blurs the lines of distinction between non-combatant aid workers and soldiers, thereby placing NGO personnel at greater risk.
4. It is cost-ineffective and a duplication of services and projects already available and provided by the international aid community.
5. The military does not have the capacity for this type of work and their efforts actually create more harm than good, jeopardizing long-term development projects and relationships with the local people.
6. It distracts the military from its primary mission and responsibility of providing security.” (p.6 Borders)
Further, although extant criticism identifies the increased costs of facilitating reconstruction and development efforts through the use of CM| PRTs, an anticipated purpose of the original CM units would only be directed at operations where neither NGOs would be or willing to operate. As a circumstance of conflict interim and post conflict development, security concerns are cited as the factor which would preclude the potential overlap of PRT and NGO activity.  

In the resulting areas targeted for CM activity, speaking to the functions which the CM unit would best perform, the activities to which the CM units would be tasked would speak directly to their composition as a unit of mixed personnel. Of the key functions which the CM unit may be able to perform, one is the facilitation of civil governance functions. This ability is borne from the inclusion of civilian personnel, selected for their experience in public sector services and governance. The integrity of civil military relations is further maintained in facilitating local governance through additional training on institutional operations, regional expertise, and local knowledge.

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6 “In a February 2003 report, critics say that in addition to a lack of expertise and the fact that development projects are viewed as a public relations exercise, they go on to make the point that NGO’s and locals are a much cheaper alternative to reconstruction than bringing in the military (ReliefWeb: IRIN, February 2003). Absent any hard statistical data or activity-based costing metric to verify this claim, presumably critics are inferring that overhead costs are generally greater for the military than for aid organizations. This may be true, but without an equivalent comparison of all true associated costs, it is impossible to offer an objective argument to support this contention. Another related point that deserves mention is that PRT’s also use local labor and they predominantly operate in areas where NGO’s either will not, or cannot operate because of security concerns.” (p.6)7 Borders

7 “Therefore it is necessary to provide a brief overview on the topic of military civil-affairs (CA) units from which the PRT concept was borne. CA units differ from regular military forces in that they are designed and trained to facilitate civil-governance functions and public sector services, as opposed to troops and units that are equipped and trained to conduct combat operations.” (p.7 Borders)

8 “CA units are designed and specially trained to facilitate coordination between military and civilian authorities in order to deconflict operational matters (civil or military) that can impact one or more key players involved in the reconstruction effort. An excerpt from that table follows:
The intended performance in targeting civil and governance functions would be assisted not only through the inclusion of civilian staff, but through use of reservists, in respect to selected military personnel. The selection of reservists would bring additional skills to the CM unit, whom would possess both military and civilian skills. These skills could include, but would not be limited to, social services, public works, and education. 9 The identification and inclusion of atypical military personnel, in respect to additional skillsets, would further support the integrative environment of military and specialized

- The use of forces (units and personnel) possessing an in-depth understanding of politico-military, economic, and social aspects of countries or regional areas where military forces are employed;

- Civil military operational planning and execution by DoD, non-DoD, multinational, nongovernmental organizations/private voluntary organizations, and other agencies through estimates of operational impacts on civilian populace, resources, and institutions in areas where military forces are employed (Joint Publication 3-57, p.62).

While military CA units are comprised of soldiers, they are not combat-troops in the traditional sense, nor are they trained as such. They have a unique skill set, or Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), designed to provide commanders in the field with resident technical capability and expertise on all matters related to civil affairs.” (p. 8 Borders)

9 “Reserve CA units throughout the United States actively target their recruitment at individuals who already possess the functional specialty skills outlined in Joint Publication 3-57 such as:

Public administration areas such as law enforcement and emergency services, health, labor, legal, welfare, finance, and education; areas of economics and commerce such as property control, supply and logistics, food and agriculture; public facilities skill areas such as public works and utilities, public communications, and public transportation; other functional specialty areas include cultural affairs, civil information, and even arts, monuments, and archives (Joint Publication 3-57, p.34).

Referring back to the previous point concerning the range of skills required in this field, and the breadth of experience that many reserve soldiers bring to active duty from their civilian jobs, it is apparent that CA soldiers are atypical troops.” (p. 8 Borders)
To support the intended mission of a new CM unit, logistical support was determined to also include combat troops as well as CMOC Civil Military Operations Center. The provision for additional resources would constitute areas in which non-military actors would be unable to perform. A key consideration would be the inclusion of a security force contingent to secure the selected activities of reservist CA (Civil Affairs) soldiers. Further, the selection of determined activities for the selected CA and combat personnel reflected the integration of both traditional and specialized military personnel. Withstanding either the hostile or stabilized nature respective to the selected area of operations under the duress of armed conflict, the combined efforts of CA and combat personnel would de-conflict such activities as the coordination of the reconstruction effort, the identification of potential projects, village assessments, and the coordination of regional activities.  

Specific to activities explicitly targeted at development efforts, proposed CM units were to be positioned to facilitate the coordination of regional reconstruction activities. In the case of Afghanistan, the deployment of CM units would pursue activities to include, but

10 “The following information was presented during the meeting that was attended by several NGO representatives, as well as members of the U.S. and U.K. embassies, the UN, ICRC and donors who attended to hear the Provisional Joint Regional Team concept as it was called at that time (Stapleton, 2003, p.15). The teams were to range in size from 50 to 100 people, consisting of CA soldiers, a civil-military operation center (CMOC) headquarters to coordinate and control reconstruction activities, and a security force contingent (i.e. combat troops). The CA soldiers were listed as reservists with a variety of backgrounds and skills such as doctors, lawyers, engineers, economists, telecommunications experts, and civil aviation professionals. Their stated mission was to:

• Coordinate the reconstruction effort
• Identify potential projects
• Conduct village assessments
• Coordinate activities of those engaged in the reconstruction process such as the NGO’s, the Afghan Transitional Authority, and Coalition forces (Stapleton, 2003, pp.6-7).” (p.9 Borders)
not be limited to, “function as an information sharing node to facilitate information sharing”, “facilitate conditions for reconstruction to encourage movement of pledged funds”, and to “extend the influence of the Afghan Transitional Authority outside of Kabul”. 11 Respective to activities focused on the management and coordination of reconstruction, the CM| PRT concept would further place CA soldiers whose civilian skills extended beyond technical proficiencies, to professional competencies.

Beyond the provision of reserved skills from which the PRT would be able to target specified goals, the formation of PRT unit was also meant to support parallel operations through indirect influence. 12 In this respect, the selected application of resources would bolster influence in the district, province, and region. An additional intent PRT activity would be cooperation with local government, in turn further strengthening the legitimacy of local and centralized government. In an instance, such as one may be drawn in Afghanistan, where the extension and legitimization of centralized government would be of critical interest, the appropriate situation of PRTs would anticipate such benefits. Secondary effects would also increase the facility of performing military operations within the PRTs sphere of influence, should they be necessary.

11 “Military officials also provided an update on the mission and role the teams were expected to play in the reconstruction process, which at that time were to:

• Extend the influence of the Afghan Transitional Authority outside of Kabul
• Expand the work of I-NGO’s and IO’s beyond Kabul
• Facilitate conditions for reconstruction to encourage movement of pledged funds
• Function as an information-sharing node to facilitate information sharing (Conference Minutes, 2003, pp.5-7).” (p.9 Borders)

12 “In geo-political terms, the PRT’s serve as a point of spreading influence for the central government. Metaphorically, their reach will generate concentric circles of influence and at some point those circles will meet. However, across Afghanistan, there are different stages of military operations. In some areas active pursuit of Al Qaeda continues, in others Phase IV reconstruction operations could be underway. This is the complex nature of Afghanistan right now” (Conference Minutes, 2003, pp.5-7).” (p.9 Borders)
An identified concession in the deployment and evaluation of CM| PRT units is the anticipated lack of data regarding unit operations and respective measures of performance. The dearth would be attributed to collection requirements, analysis requirements, as well as the often classified nature of active military activities. 13

Withstanding the projected lack of data regarding the discreet activities, standards of practice, and effectiveness of CM| PRT operations, an identified need for the brand of units persists. The necessity for CM units primarily point to the potential lack of security in areas where NGOs may wish to conduct activities 14, the lack of personnel requirements on behalf of non-military actors wishing to pursue activities in hostile climates 15, and the prepared state of state actors to assume CM| PRT activities au courant 16.

13 “Unfortunately this is a new subject and although the teams, in one form or another, have been around for over two years there is not a great deal of hard data on the topic available in open source. Currently, for example, there are no published studies available to compare differences between two or more regions based on the presence or absence of a PRT. It will take some time before this type of data is collected, sorted, and in some cases declassified and available for query in open source.” (p.9 Borders)

14 “Those who would continue to argue this point on the basis of idealism should consider two points. First, radical extremists don’t respect NGO neutrality or independence any more than they do government authority.” (p. 10 Borders)

15 “First, the location for PRT placement is selected on the basis of where NGO’s are currently unable to operate and provide services because of the security situation. In addition, the military changed its operating procedures and uniform requirements based on input from NGO’s in order to ensure the Afghan people can make the distinction.” (p. 10 Borders)

16 “The argument that the military does not have the capacity to engage in humanitarian or civil affairs, given the level of technical expertise and skills that the CA soldiers and their interagency counterparts bring to the table, is overstated. Even so, the military has taken the advice of the aid community and shifted away from the quick impact projects they initially focused on, to larger projects beyond the capacity of the NGO’s such as major transportation infrastructure projects.” (p. 11 Borders)
Ultimately, the CM| PRT concept has not sought to monopolize conflict interim activities, but rather provide a cadre of critical activities under the prepared coverage of state actors. The concept is in effect an initial instrument prior to a transition to ISAF forces, traditional development efforts, and the self-governance provided for under anticipated democratic activity. ¹⁷

Speaking to the flexibility and application of the CM| PRT concept in Iraq, Borders supports the effort through its conception, application in Afghanistan, as well as its potential for use in the Iraqi theatre of operations.

“The PRT concept currently employed in Afghanistan has proven to be a flexible model for post-conflict reconstruction that the United States and its allies have endorsed and to which they remain committed. PRT’s are a unique blend of development and security, and are the result of an evolutionary process that continues to date. The fact that it is still a work-in-progress should encourage those who oppose it in principle to engage the CM community and influence its future development to ensure all stakeholder interests, concerns, and mutually shared objectives are acknowledged and incorporated into the model. This last point is especially pertinent given the current reconstruction efforts in Iraq and the potential for applying the PRT model there as well.

As the security situation in Iraq stabilizes and the priority of effort shifts back towards reconstruction, development, and civil governance functions, some form of the PRT model and lessons learned from Afghanistan will undoubtedly be employed to facilitate those efforts. As transition of power from the occupying Coalition Provisional Authority

¹⁷ “The PRT’s in concert with regular security forces are designed to create the conditions for “humanitarian space” in order to facilitate the efforts of NGO’s, not remove them from the equation. In short, the PRT concept is designed to provide the tactical and operational bridge necessary to implement the strategic goal of a gradual transition of functions and authority from the Coalition to the interim Afghan government and ultimately to an elected democracy.” (p.11 Borders)
to an interim Iraqi government authority occurs, and the new Iraqi government seeks to provide critical services for its citizens, the PRT’s can play an important role in facilitating that process. They must play a role because the teams are one proven tool in a post-war environment where the kit bag of options is unfortunately limited given the difficult post-war paradox of providing security on the one hand, and critical aid and development on the other. There are no easy answers, but there is hope and opportunity for the future. The PRT’s are a part of the solution, not the problem. “ (p. 11 Borders) 18

18 “The PRT concept currently employed in Afghanistan has proven to be a flexible model for post-conflict reconstruction that the United States and its allies have endorsed and to which they remain committed. PRT’s are a unique blend of development and security, and are the result of an evolutionary process that continues to date. The fact that it is still a work-in-progress should encourage those who oppose it in principle to engage the CM community and influence its future development to ensure all stakeholder interests, concerns, and mutually shared objectives are acknowledged and incorporated into the model. This last point is especially pertinent given the current reconstruction efforts in Iraq and the potential for applying the PRT model there as well.

As the security situation in Iraq stabilizes and the priority of effort shifts back towards reconstruction, development, and civil governance functions, some form of the PRT model and lessons learned from Afghanistan will undoubtedly be employed to facilitate those efforts. As transition of power from the occupying Coalition Provisional Authority to an interim Iraqi government authority occurs, and the new Iraqi government seeks to provide critical services for its citizens, the PRT’s can play an important role in facilitating that process. They must play a role because the teams are one proven tool in a post-war environment where the kit bag of options is unfortunately limited given the difficult post-war paradox of providing security on the one hand, and critical aid and development on the other. There are no easy answers, but there is hope and opportunity for the future. The PRT’s are a part of the solution, not the problem.” (p. 11 Borders)
Research Design

The selected research methodology will focus on the selection of qualitative data drawn from secondary sources which have sought to, comprehensively, identify the scope of PRT operations and their potential to identify best practices for PRT operations.

Prior to the design of a research methodology, based on the extent to which the research question may address, the development of a datum model is necessary to identify the limits of relevant datum. The identification of relevant datum will also serve to guide and narrow the selection of source material for the purposes of datum extraction.

A projected, sample, model is defined below, it targets the likely areas from which datum will be drawn during the data collection, data selection, and data analysis phases.
Fig. 1. Sample Qualitative Datum Model
An initial step in the research design is the clear identification of the research question, as stated above and below:

What have been the threats to the operational capacity of PRTs in meeting the mission of ‘capacity development’?

The second step is the collection of source material. These may be reports as produced by, but not limited to:

Office of the Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
Center for Army Lessons Learned
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, Committee on Armed Services | U.S. House of Representatives
Journal of Development and Social Transformation
Strategic Studies Institute | United States Army
National Security Research Division | RAND Corporation
Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction | United States Department of State
United States Department of Defense
Commission of Wartime Contracting
Senate Committee for Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs

From the, ultimately, selected sources, the extraction of qualitative datum will then occur, identifying (available) pieces of information that help to define the scope of operations, such as:

- What is a PRT?
- What are the personnel types present in the PRT?
- Are the personnel SME, federal, or military?
• What is the personnel mix within the PRT?
• What is the balance between present personnel types?
• What skills are present amongst the PRT personnel?
• What is the range of skills present in the PRT, respective to PRT missions?

• What does a PRT do?
• What operations are common to occur within a PRT?
• Do the operations reflect political, social, or economic ends?
• What are sample durations of operations conducted by a PRT?
• Are operation lengths an exception or a rule?
• What are the stated goals of sample PRT operations?
• Do operation specific goals reflect mission goals?
• What are the common operational costs to PRT operations?
• How clear are costs identified in PRT operations?

• How does a PRT accomplish its mission?
• What is the leadership structure of a PRT?
• Is the given model of leadership the standard among PRTs?
• How do PRTs manage the planning, delivery, and execution of aid?
• Is the execution of aid done within the PRT or externally (contractors)?
• How does a PRT manage its available resources?
• How does a PRT manage its human capital and material resources?

The identification of the aforementioned level of detail will then allow a comparative analysis of the collected sources and their respective datum. The clear identification of datum form the selected sources would demonstrate where information gaps exist in the review and reporting of PRT operations. Respective to the policy interests of the researching organization, parallels may or may not appear to be drawn between the identified datum and projected mission of PRT operations.
In turn, efficacies and shortcomings will be read from the analysis of collected data | sources, withstanding any information gaps that may appear from any singular source. The final step is the here identified best practices, regarding the mission, structure, and operations of PRTs. The, then, comparison of cumulative best practices, against the guidance of the individual selection of sources will address the capabilities of existing research to comprehensively identify the scope of PRT operations and the potential to identify best practices for PRT operations.

A figure detailing the execution of the research design is included below:
Fig. 2. Research Design
Because the research design will be document based, it will focus on secondary sources. It is this collection of evidence that will support discovery meant to address the research question. These secondary resources will be extant published documents regarding PRT operations in Iraq. The organizations from which secondary sources will be drawn have made their reports regarding PRT operations in Iraq publicly available. The resources will not require special permissions to become accessible.

In addition, the selected process will not require interviews with key actors and stakeholders. The explicit use of secondary sources, although, will not directly exclude key data made available through actors and stakeholders, as many of the publicly available secondary resources are records of congressional testimony and interviews.

The geographic scale of the research design has also been limited to data discussed in regards to PRT operations in Iraq, although research regarding PRT activity extends to both recent theaters of PRT operations, including Afghanistan. The unique selection of research regarding Iraq will allow for the exclusion of social, economic, and political factors exclusive to PRTs in Afghanistan.

The selected method of data analysis will focus on qualitative data and the development of qualitative data from secondary sources. The method will rely on the analysis of content included therein, the extracted datum, and the development of qualitative measures to allow for the meta-analysis of the qualitative datum. The selected method analysis best addresses the research question, which aims to identify and qualify the competence in methods of review of PRT operations.

The schedule for the selected course of research will be representative of several stages. The stages will include data collection, data selection, and data analysis. The period of data collection will focus on the collection of, publicly available, secondary resources from pertinent authors and research organizations, concerning the deployment and performance of PRTs in Iraq. The period of data selection will focus on
the detailed review of selected resources. As the method of data analysis will focus on
the development of qualitative measures from the selected secondary sources, the
following stages will be dependent on the thorough execution of the data selection
phase. The terminal stage in the research schedule, data analysis, will perform
comparative operations against data selected in order to best address the research
question.
Selected Qualitative Data

Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq
Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
SIG-06-034
Sunday 29 October 2006

As of October 2006, the Office of the Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction has reported on the status of the PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team program in Iraq, through SIG-06-34.

The absence of the Hussein regime had one effect, to which the Provincial Reconstruction Team has sought to address, the opportunity of “… empowering inexperienced local officials to manage the delivery of provincial government services.”

As a reaction to the vacuum and decentralization of power, National Security Presidential Directives 36 and 44, issued 11 May 2004 and 07 December 2005 respectively, allowed for the theoretical development of CM civilian military units tasked to increase Iraqi capacity at the local level. The effects of quickly targeting the decentralized governmental elements of a free Iraq would strengthen municipal governments, communities, and the likelihood of democratic processes in the currently fragile state.

To perform the tasks of capacity development, civilian agency personnel and military personnel would compose CM civilian | military units, to assist in the development of

19 “The decentralization of authority that the Coalition Provisional Authority initiated following the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime had the effect of empowering inexperienced local officials to manage the delivery of provincial government services.” (p. 1 SIG-06-034)

20 “National Security Presidential Directives 36 and 44 provided the policy and organizational framework for U.S. civilian-military organizations to implement nation building programs”. (p. 1 SIG-06-034)
governmental capacity to independently perform economic affairs, political autonomy, and infrastructure development. 21 Although the intent of operations would target several, key, areas of municipal interest, the selected term of art for the goal and measure of operations would be ‘capacity development’. 22

It is important to note audit SIG-06-034, although a measure of the PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team program in Iraq, was not meant to identify the performance measures which rate the effectiveness of PRT efforts. Rather, the audit is an identification of the capabilities and obstacles PRTs have encountered in the initial year of operations. 23 A key element of the assessment to consider was whether participating agencies had the capacity to effectively coordinate their programs, deployments, and operations. 24

In identifying the particular requirements of each PRT, the unique political climate of the individual provinces would determine the specifications of the assigned PRT, respective to size, location, and operations. 25 The schedule of PRT operations would persist in the

21 “Integrated and multidisciplinary teams composed of U.S. civilian and military personnel and locally employed Iraqi staff were to train, coach, and mentor provincial governments in core competencies of governance, economic development, rule of law, and infrastructure development. This audit report examines the status of the PRT Program in Iraq.” (pp. ii SIG-06-034)

22 “Though referred to under the umbrella term reconstruction, the initiative’s primary purpose is capacity development.” (p. 1 SIG-06-034)

23 “This report did not assess the performance of the PRTs—only the ability of the PRTs to meet the mission. We intend to assess the performance of the PRTs during 2007.” (p. ii SIG-06-034)

24 Are participating organizations effectively coordinating their programs and operational support? (p. ii SIG-06-034)

25 PRT staffing is dependent on the needs and circumstances of the individual province. A team may have up to 100 members; including approximately 30 locally employed staff. (p. 1 SIG-06-034)
designated area of operations toward a period until which the capacity of local government expresses operational autonomy, sufficient enough to continue under the umbrella of traditional development aid. 26

Summarily, SIG-06-034 identifies the initial achievements in the rapid development of the CM units, but stresses to identify the difficulty of performing development efforts in the conflict interim environs in which Iraq persists. The threats to the PRT mission faced through the logistical coordination of multiple agencies, the integration of civilian and military personnel, and the array of security threats on behalf of anti-coalitions forces, have all presented unique challenges to the execution of PRT operations. 27 In an early challenge, respective to personnel, SIG-06-034 identifies the difficulty in the DoS staffing of civilian positions. 28 The result and one which bore critically on the early performance of PRTs was the staffing of civilian vacancies with DoD CA civil affairs personnel. As a consequence, many of the critical skills required within the civilian positions were supplanted with the alternate set of expertise possessed by civil affairs personnel.

To confront the broad range of challenges faced in the deployment and operation of

26 During the first two years, the PRTs are to support provincial government capacity development. As the provincial governments demonstrate increased capability to govern and manage their security environment, thereby reducing the role of coalition forces in the provinces, then each PRT would transition to a traditional USAID training program to develop local governance capacity for the remaining two years. (p. 2 SIG-06-034)

27 Many obstacles have been overcome, but many remain, such as the ever-changing security situation, the difficulty of integrating civilian and military personnel, the lack of a finalized agreement on PRT operational requirements and responsibilities, a lag in funding resources, and the difficulty in recruiting and retaining qualified civilian personnel. (p. ii SIG-06-034)

28 We also noted that when DoS had difficulty filling many civilian positions, DoD filled the gap by providing military civil affairs personnel for the vacant PRT positions. (p. iii SIG-06-034)
PRTs, SIGIR-06-034 has also developed a series of recommendations as of the publication of the audit.

Following is a series of key areas of interest within SIGIR-06-034.

Security & Constraints

Limitations to the security of CM personnel and operations play a pivotal role in the assessment of PRTs by SIGIR-06-034. Because the capability of personnel to engage in expected lines of business, provincial activities, as well as engagement with local stakeholders determines the success of the PRT mission, establishing a stable AOR area of operations is critical to that success. 29

A key identification of the audit is the requirement of PRT personnel to regularly interact with Iraqi stakeholders to successfully meet the mission requirement of capacity development. 30 Though given the existing security climate, a key obstacle in the pursuit of PRT activities has been the existing threats of meeting openly with Iraqi stakeholders by anti-coalition forces. The result has been the opinion of the audit that insufficient contact has occurred to meet mission requirements as of 2006. 31

29 The unstable security environment in Iraq touches every aspect of the PRT mission. Because of security concerns, face-to-face meetings between provincial government officials and PRT personnel are often limited and, in some cases, do not occur. PRT members are at particular risk when traveling to and from their engagements with their Iraqi counterparts, as are provincial government officials and local Iraqi staff working with the PRT. (p. 5 SIG-06-034)

30 The PRT Program’s effectiveness depends on regular interaction of PRT members with local Iraqis in their respective seats of government. (p. 5 SIG-06-034)

31 Many of the PRT members we interviewed believed that they had insufficient contact with their Iraqi counterparts. When security concerns prevented face-to-face meetings, they used email and cell phones when available. (p. 5 SIG-06-034)
The threat, to the initial line of operations, also extends to succeeding linkages in the PRT goal of increasing local capacity, in respect to economic development, population security, and infrastructure. As of 2006, the existing security climate also precluded a number of investments in local Iraqi capacity on behalf of international actors.  

Additional security constraints have been experienced on meeting the mission requirement of capacity development in the form of obstacles to community engagement. The result has required the ingenuity of PRT personnel to conduct their lines of business according to alternate methods, clandestinely, or not at all. One such example has been the meeting of PRT and government officials outside of the province and AOR area of operations where the PRT was meant to conduct activities. 

These initial obstacles have led to the fortification of ground transport, requiring armored vehicles as well as armed personnel, i.e. “shooters”. The exposure and threats to personnel has also restricted US PRT personnel to rely on transport provided by US personnel, negating available transport of coalition partners similarly engaged in the PRT effort.  

32 A key objective of the PRTs is economic development and job creation, with a focus on encouraging increased engagement by Iraqis with the international business community. (p. 5 SIG-06-034)  

33 Also, according to USAID officials, training programs to develop local governance capacity for Anbar, Salah ad Din, and Diyala provincial government officials are often conducted outside the respective provinces because of security concerns. (p. 6 SIG-06-034)  

34 Movement requirements include a minimum of three armored vehicles and eight “shooters” trained in protection duties. (p. 6 SIG-06-034)  

35 The U.S. Embassy ruled that movement security provided by coalition partners did not meet U.S. security requirements and therefore prohibited U.S. personnel from traveling with them. (p. 6 SIG-06-034)
As of August 2006, during a one week period in August, anti-coalition forces employed the use of IED improvised explosive devices against three separate PRT based at Salah ad Din. 36 Due to the increased fragility of ground transport and threats to personnel, SIGIR-06-034 has identified the increased use of air transport for personnel carrying out PRT activities in several provinces. 37

Security remains a key threat to the success of the PRT mission, as mitigating the overall exposure of PRT personnel and activities remains a key concern as of September 2006. 38 The current security, as of the production of the audit, not only remained a concern, the security of the province beyond the tenure of PRT activity, as well as the personal security of Iraqi collaborators has been an identified concern.

Coordination

Within a year of the commencement of initial PRT operations, one issue to quickly arise was the delegation of operational costs respective to PRT activity. As determined through the MNF-I Multi National Force | Iraq, DoS was delegated the core responsibilities of the execution of duties and ostensibly the financing of PRTs. Further, an initial ruling, on behalf of the MNF-I, identified the limited role DoD would assume in meeting the operational and maintenance costs of PRT activity. 39

36 For example, during a seven-day period in mid-August, explosive devices hit three different convoys carrying Salah ad Din PRT members en route to meetings with provincial officials. (p. 7 SIG-06-034)

37 In addition, because of the increased threat to U.S. personnel in the south central region of Iraq, travel by civilian PRT members to several provinces in the region now takes place primarily by air. (p. 7 SIG-06-034)

38 U.S. Embassy security officials also told us that they were concerned about the overall physical safety of unarmed civilian PRT members because of their exposed state when interacting with provincial government officials. (p. 7 SIG-06-034)

39 However, in April 2006, the MNC-I Staff Judge Advocate ruled that DoS is responsible for the PRT
The special function of the identifying the ruling, although the audit does not apply evaluative measures to efficiency of appropriated monies pursuant to PRT activities, is to demonstrate the initial limitations and lack of flexibility in the operational coordination of PRTs as early as 2005. Although delays in operations were eventually resolved, the initial constraints regarding funding prove for one example regarding the critical importance of allowing for flexibility in shared CM unit development, on behalf of civilian and military actors.

The constraints experienced by PRT operations and civilian | military coordination were not only determined by the delegation of authorities as determined by MNF-I, but also a lack of executive cooperation between DoS and DoD, as related to specifications respective to the PRT mission. The lack of an initial agreement between civilian and military leadership precluded the absence of specifics such as, but not limited to, facilities, life support, communications, management services, and supplies.  

Doctrine and Leadership

Beyond the assertion that the initial limitations of PRT activity were foundational and coordinative, SIGIR-06-034 further speaks to the limited, if key, complications of civilian and military integration. The audit draws focus on the challenges experienced by DoS | DoD as related to doctrine and leadership.

mission and that DoD operations and maintenance funds could not be used to support PRTs. (p. 8 SIG-06-034)

40 The lack of an overall memorandum of agreement had serious ramifications. The lines of authority and coordination between U.S. Embassy and military components were never spelled out and agreed upon, and the operational support mechanisms the PRTs are dependent upon at military bases—i.e. facilities, life support, communications, management services, and supplies—were not settled upon. (p. 8 SIGIR-06-034)
One such challenge was the integration of civilian and military personnel. Although the intent of a number of National Security Presidential Directives and Defense Directives was to determine the concept of operations regarding the mission of CM units, the policy documents summarily omit the finite identification of personnel selection, coordination, and organizational collaboration. CM units, although discussed on several occasions as directed by civilian personnel withstanding an equal partnership in military integration and support, would only meet the challenges specific to an absence of explicit legal provision for the direction of DoD personnel by civilian authority.

The challenges of civilian and military integration not only extended the formal coordination of personnel, but also to the, inevitable, stove piping experienced as the result of integrating organizations whose institutional behavior could be as indoctrinate as with DoS and DoD. SIGIR-06-034 cites one example, although also a consequence of the constraints regarding civilian staffing, wherein “…commanders viewed capacity development in provincial governments as too vague a mission. For example, in Anbar province, the military commander did not support the PRT mission, would not provide resources, such as transportation, and excluded PRT members from attending

41 Both DoS and DoD face the challenge of integrating their operations and organizational cultures to enable their civilian and military personnel to work jointly. (p. 8 SIG-06-034)

42 Thus, without specific operational guidance and delegation of authorities in accordance with Title 10 of the U.S. Code, they are restricted from supporting the PRT mission. These officers explained that Title 10 gives the Secretary of Defense authority, direction, and control over DoD and that a specific delegation of authority is required for military personnel to fall under DoS operational control.6 But DoS officials said that it was never intended for civilian team leaders to exercise command authority over the military forces assigned to the PRT; the civilian PRT team leader only has supervisory authority to direct the local activities of those forces. We believe that Defense Directive 3000.05 allows civilian-military PRT teams. Thus, we believe additional clarification on the use and management of joint civilian military PRTs is necessary. (p. 9 SIG-06-034)
meetings with other government officials.” 43

Resources

As of 2006, in addition to assessments regarding the execution of PRT activity, operational capability similarly has been a subject of review of SIGIR-06-034. An initial constraint regarding operational capability, also reflected as a tenet of CM coordination, was the lack of a provision for an MOA regarding the logistical support of PRTs between DoS and DoD. 44

Although this provision, or there a lack of, would detail such coordinative CM issues such as PRT infrastructure, facilities, and logistics, it would also have been benefit to identify the base operational capability of a PRT. In several cases, PRT activity, as of 2006, remained severely constrained as a result of lack of access to basic administrative supplies and services. 45 Although this limitation stemmed from an initial lack of funding and supplies, its negative bearing on operational capability becomes critical in both an environment where a baseline operational capability is not established

43 Yet other commanders viewed capacity development in provincial governments as too vague a mission. For example, in Anbar province, the military commander did not support the PRT mission, would not provide resources, such as transportation, and excluded PRT members from attending meetings with other government officials. (p. 10 SIGIR-06-034)

44 The lack of a DoS-DoD memorandum of agreement is a major impediment to smooth PRT operations, as evidenced in the uneven infrastructure and logistical support for PRTs located at the military’s forward-operating bases. (p. 12 SIG-06-034)

45 During visits to the PRTs at Ninawa, Ta’imm, Salah ad Din, and Diyala, we catalogued recurring support problems. These include inadequate office space; limited phones, computers, printers, copiers, internet access, and information technology support; and shortages of such basic office supplies as printer cartridges, paper, pens, and pencils. (p. 12 SIG-06-034)
and PRT activity occurs prior to meeting the predetermined capability. 46

As a result, methods of improvisation would become common to satisfy the operational capability of PRTs, regarding even the provision for items such as office supplies. 47 Further, there existed a broad consensus amongst PRT leadership, as of 2006, that baseline support regarding infrastructure, logistics, and resources should be met prior to the commencement of PRT activities. 48

Staffing

The Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction sheds a particular light on human capital resources early in the development of Provincial Reconstruction Teams. The early conditions of PRT staffing are of importance as the long term effects of personnel selection defined the CM units future opportunities and constraints.

Irrespective to the implicit difficulties of humanitarian organizations conducting relief within conflict interim environments, PRTs experienced early the bottlenecks of developing operations in areas of need. SIGIR-06-034 identifies the challenge faced by DoS in attracting internal personnel to staff positions where civilian expertise remained a requisite. 49 One contributing factor was the inherent danger, whether perceived or

46 The PRTs lacked funding and logistical supply resources. (p. 12 SIG-06-034)

47 PRT members stressed that obtaining office items was a continuous problem. Their only recourse as to use personal funds to purchase office supplies at the base exchange. (p. 12 SIG-06-034)

48 The consensus among the interviewed PRT leaders was that no PRT should be started until the requisite operational and infrastructure support were in place. (p. 12 SIG-06-034)

49 DoS’s inability to attract qualified civilians to fill positions in Baghdad has been a continuous challenge throughout Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Attracting civilians to serve at the PRTs in austere and dangerous locations has proved even more difficult. (p. 15 SIG-06-034)
real, in conducting operations in the concurrent theater of war, Operation Iraqi Freedom. Such core civilian positions that largely remained unstaffed as of 2006 in many PRTs were the rule of law, political officer, and program manager positions.  

In 2006, the resulting dearth of staffed civilian positions led to the DoD asserting the role of staffing vacancies, whether administrative or professional in nature, with CA personnel. The effects of staffing open positions with DoD personnel, although clearing constraints as related to a lack of personnel, allowed for a new set of limitations as implicit in charging CA personnel with economic, agricultural, and governmental advisory roles. As early as 2006, SIGIR-06-034 identifies the difficulties with the aforementioned action, as it maintains an absence of professional skillsets and expertise that would be further possessed through the careful selection of civilian personnel.  

As a corrective measure, as of the publication of SIGIR-06-034, the audit has suggested the preemptive development of skill set requirements of civilian positions to best position the DoD in the conditional staffing of civilian positions with CA personnel.  

Conclusion and Recommendations

50 Although we could not obtain staffing data for this period, NCT personnel reported that they were unable to fill many core PRT positions—rule of law, political officer, and program manager. (p. 15 SIG-06-034)

51 To compensate for the lack of civilians, DoD stepped up and provided numerous military civil affairs personnel to fill the void for many of the vacant PRT Program positions. (p. 15 SIG-06-034)

52 The military infusion of personnel enabled the PRTs to function, but many personnel did not possess the full range of needed skills. (p. 15 SIG-06-034)

53 However, we believe specifying skills set requirements would allow the military to better identify, train, and assign civil affairs personnel to match the skills needed at PRTs. (p. 15 SIG-06-034)
The audit concludes through an identification of the demonstrated and future potential of the PRT program in Iraq to perform capacity development at the provincial level. The identified achievements have been met through the flexibility of personnel to operate in conditions fraught with setbacks, delays, and shortfalls. The process, although, is admittedly complicated by challenges, threats, and weaknesses in the program.

Systematic improvements to the program which would have a bare a comprehensive impact on operational capability include increased communication between civilian and military agencies, the development of long term comprehensive operational plans, and the further development of procedures respective to human capital resources.

54 On balance, the PRT experience in Iraq demonstrates individual successes arising from individual efforts and improvisations, which allowed some PRTs to move forward with their capacity-development mission. (p. 17 SIG-06-034)

55 The Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq provides the best opportunity for U.S. government experts to provide grassroots support in the development of local governance capacity in Iraq. Despite very difficult operating conditions, creating the PRTs in the short a period of time is a noteworthy achievement and was directly related to effective senior leadership at the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office and to the Commanding General, MNC-I. Complicating the U.S.-led PRT program are the lingering issues concerning the PRT mission and civilian-military integration, which, in part, have led to set-backs, operational delays, and resource shortfalls. (p. 18 SIG-06-034)

56 Similarly, executing an effective PRT Program in Iraq would have been greatly enhanced if DoS and DoD shared a common understanding of their respective roles and responsibilities. (p. 17 SIG-06-034)

57 3. Develop detailed plans for completing and sustaining the PRTs, including clearly defined objectives and performance measures; milestones for achieving stated objectives; future funding requirements; and a strategy for sustaining results and successfully transitioning the program to USAID.(p. 18 SIG-06-034)

58 6. Specify-skill set requirements for civil affairs personnel at PRTs to enable better training, selection, and assignment. (p. 19 SIG-06-034)
Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence: Lessons Learned and Best Practices
National Security Research Division | RAND
2008

The NSRD (National Security Research Division) at RAND (Research and Development) Corporation, in the secondary stages of discovery regarding PRTs, prior to 2008, draw focus on PRTs as essentially militarized security activities which have been tasked to perform civilian operations. In response to interests such as, what are key questions regarding PRTs and what remains unknown regarding the nature of their activities, NSRD RAND summarily identifies their purpose as shoring the theater's stability for conventional military operations. NSRD continues to identify recommendations in light of these considerations. 59

The PRT workforce composition identified by NSRD RAND relies on the foundation provided by military personnel. The focus drawn on security alludes the difficulty of the PRTs that would be then composed of primarily civilian personnel, in action and engagement with local populations. The estimation drawn by NSRD RAND also assumes that security might not only become a requirement to ensure the safety of civilian personnel, but also a mechanism necessary to provide security to the participant population from its own embedded insurgency. 60

NSRD RAND does not go as far to identify sample compositions of PRT personnel as

59 Typically, a PRT consists of a joint civil-military leadership group representing the Department of State, USAID, and DoD, supported by a core unit of military security providers that defend the PRT itself, if needed, and help provide limited protection for local populations prepared to work with the PRT or the broader Operation Iraqi Freedom or ISAF mission. (p.33 RAND)

60 Amalgamated with the PRT are experts and specialists, some military, some nonmilitary, whose role according to this view is to work effectively with the local leadership and populations in a wide range of activities that can include mentoring local government officials, gathering intelligence, building mutually trusting relationships, meeting some of the basic needs of local populations, and serving as cadre elements for more-ambitious construction, infrastructure, and other nation-building projects. (p.33 RAND)
well as their quantity. This element, is although necessary to identify the shortcomings of PRT activity. The effectiveness described therein, regarding municipal level activities such as local political development, basic social services, and infrastructure improvements, depends on the ability of personnel to perform under an expressed knowledge of regional and subject matter expertise. Although, military personnel may express a cadre of knowledge, it is the inclusion of civilian personnel placed therein for the purpose of facilitating activities specific to their expertise respective to an appropriate chain of command that may transform the security apparatus to one focused reconstruction and development. It does not appear from the assessment produced by NSRD RAND, which also fails to identify the sample models of command and leadership in PRTs.

NSRD RAND further categorically seats PRTs under the efforts of counterinsurgency and not within the scope of reconstruction. As evident in years of written counterinsurgency doctrine, the winning of hearts and minds is a contrast to coercion, which lies on the opposite end of doctrine. The tactics of coercion, which NSRD RAND does not go so far to identify as the vehicle of counterinsurgency which PRTs may provide, is primarily a show of military force meant to suppress insurgent activity through pervasive military action. As made evident through current counterinsurgency doctrine and ongoing military operations, coercion is neither a tactic that has seen recently deployment or seen as one effective in countering Iraqi insurgency activity. 61

It can then be interpreted that the PRT is a vehicle whom deploys diplomatic efforts to include, social services, light infrastructure, and local security, as tools in support of larger diplomatic goals. This is also true of many counterinsurgency efforts. It does not point to the deployment of PRTs as a method of traditional development goals, outside and after the cessation of military activities. Activities and services that occur under a

61 The PRT is at the center of efforts to gain the support of the population’s hearts and minds for its government. (p.33 RAND)
PRT, then can be understood in service of military goals such as stabilization and peace.

NSRD RAND has also clearly identified the primarily military composition of PRTs. Yet, their allusion to the moire appearance of civilian | military distinctions and the likelihood that the pursuit of civilian tasks has been assumed by the military personnel within the PRT has all but been assured through earlier estimations of personnel composition. 62

The NSRD RAND assessment on population security comes to identify the difficulty that a reconstruction component composed primarily of civilian personnel would have performing PRT functions without military security. In this assessment, their security would be become a perennial issue, at both the site of operations and their stay. Although, the assessment that PRTs would be a successful tool in the absence of an insurgency is of limited value, as PRTs are primarily composed, in terms of percentages, of military personnel. The caveat that PRTs also operate from FOBs all but dictates that the PRT will be operating in an area with some level of insurgent activity. In this environment, the conclusion that can be drawn from NSRD RAND it would be necessary for PRTs to live and travel within a conventional military construct.

63

The assessment made by NSRD RAND also identifies the complications in previously being able to address the skills necessary to effectively accomplish mission objectives held by the PRT. The assessment also speaks to the difficulty of cooperation regarding the execution of operational tasks, managing resources, and maintaining balance

62 Another view is that PRTs amount to a militarization of civilian tasks and have led to a blurring of the distinction between political-military and humanitarian objectives. (p.33 RAND)

63 If an insurgency has already taken root, then the PRT model gains credence as a useful tool. If it has not—according to this view—then the military should focus on creating enough ambient security so that civilians do not need to live and travel in a military cocoon. (p.34 RAND)
between military and civilian personnel. It is also this difficulty which would be experienced in establishing a clear chain of command between civilian and military personnel, again regarding resources, planning, and execution. The allusion to executing mission objectives through the process of trial and error speaks to the disconnect between the planning stages and the end result of PRT activity.  

What is established through the earlier findings of NSRD RAND is the primarily military composition of PRTs and their ability to militarize civilian tasks. What is missing is an assessment of the discreet PRTs ability to perform diplomatic tasks, as a primarily military apparatus. This estimation, again, and the success thereof, would require the availability of skills requisite to nation building in respect to experience with transitional governmental organizations. It is unclear whether PRTs, as they have been composed, are capable of addressing these matters at the municipal level. 

The further recommendations of NSRD RAND, requesting the establishment of guidelines for PRT creation and activity at the Department of State falls short of suggesting models outright. The further suggestion of best practices, to include regional training, does not address at the personnel level, what resources would become necessary to accomplish stated goals.

It is possible these estimations are exactly that, given the aforementioned nature of ______________________

64 The best decisions regarding the best combination of tasks to be performed, skills to be deployed, balance to be struck between military and non- military personnel, and size and resources of a PRT will be made by those on the ground, often as the result of trial and error. (p.34 RAND)

65 The activities of PRTs need to be fully transparent to the host government and conducted in cooperation with it. Indeed, much of the benefits gained through a PRT effort, however successful in the short term, may be lost if the host nation’s leadership is not engaged in the process and does not experience direct benefit. This process can be aided by continuity in foreign personnel. (p.34 RAND)

66 DoD, the Department of State, and USAID need jointly to develop clear and precise doctrine about the missions, structure, operations, and activities of a PRT or similar civil-military model. (p.35 RAND)
inquiry regarding state sponsored activities abroad. At no point, is the operational picture and the extent of situational awareness under which NSRD RAND has performed the study is indicated.

In respect to the literature review itself, and the extent in which research of PRTs has occurred, as organized by the state and as pursued by varying interests, given the area of study, it becomes necessary to further review such as congressional testimony and interagency assessments. As stated, the pursuit would demonstrate the absence where further research is necessary, if performed against the framework of existing research. This would be fulfilled through the comparative analysis of existing research, wherein the research question will be informed.
In addition to the commonly identified function of PRT activity as a joint civilian military function, meant to increase local provincial capacity and function, CALL | Center for Army Lessons Learned further identifies the concept of operations, operational guidance, and implementation respective to existing activities, as of 2008.

**Concept of Operations**

Unique to PRT operations, as identified by CALL, is the climate in which the CM units are meant to operate. PRTs should demonstrate the ability to perform operations within a vacuum of power, resources, and internal stability. In effect, they are meant to occupy and subsequently leverage their own resources, as well as local resources, to eliminate the vacuum of instability.  

The mitigation of instability shall be met with program activities which facilitate reconstruction. Reconstruction, although, does not simply speak to the support of physical planning activities as well as the development of infrastructure. As identified by CALL, the provision of basic services, supporting economic activity, as well assuring the integration of local government were functions meant to facilitate stability and reconstruction. An additional element of the PRT mission is to increase the

67 PRTs perform a vital role in occupying the vacuum caused by a weak government presence and hence deter agents of instability. The PRT focuses on three elements of stabilization and reconstruction. (p. 5 CALL)

68 Facilitates reconstruction that begins to: Provide basic services.
developmental capacity of the host nation, to allow for international efforts to succeed within traditional development efforts. 69

In respect to personnel, PRT operations should require an appropriate number of civilian personnel equipped with the core competencies to address stabilization, reconstruction, and development. 70 The personnel mix, although, will ultimately depend on the particular nature of the AOR and the operation types necessary to increase stability in the province. 71 Because of the unique personnel compositions which may exist amongst PRTs, the CM units are positioned to deliver a comprehensive conflict assessment of the AOR, in order to increase stabilization. 72

Cost

Provide an economic system that supports the people.
Gain popular buy-in for change and support of the representative government.
Ensure popular expectations for international assistance are met or abated. (p. 5 CALL)

69 The PRT’s role is to ensure international efforts are in line with the host nation’s development intentions and, in doing so, assess and, if possible, mitigate the constraints to development. (p. 5 CALL)

70 This evolution in execution of the PRT mission requires a change in focus and an increased number of civilians with core competencies to address the development aspects of stabilization and reconstruction. (p. 6 CALL)

71 Operations are dynamic and may not progress in a linear manner. Different parts of a country may require different combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability operations to transition from violent conflict toward stability and ultimately to peace. (p. 7 CALL)

72 Because of the combined capabilities of the diplomacy, military, and development components, PRTs are able to stabilize these areas. When the capabilities brought by the military component of the PRT are no longer needed, the military component can withdraw, and the diplomatic and development components can revert to more traditional means to pursue their aims. (p. 6 CALL)
In respect to the cost, the CALL identifies the prohibitive nature of conducting PRT operations when done so inefficiently. Limiting the unnecessary use of personnel, equipment, and logistical services should be considered in conducting operations. Due to the high costs associated with extraneous PRT activity, it remains imperative that PRT activities solely focus on meeting mission requirements and avoiding measures which do not directly assist in the function of doing so. 73

Intent

The initial intent upon the establishment of a PRT should be the assessment of local centers of power as well as the needs of the local community. The ability to identify the former will assist the PRT in the further determination of the issues with which it should be tasked, as well as the challenges it will face in conducting operations. 74 One critical element of the assessment should be the time frames by which the PRT may reasonable expect to conduct activities, the expected tenure of the PRT itself, as well as the definition of the AOR area of responsibility. 75

Principles

73 PRTs are extremely expensive in terms of personnel, maintenance, and activity costs. Therefore, it is incumbent on the embassy country team, military chain of command, troop-contributing nations, participating agencies, and PRT leadership teams to keep PRTs focused on their ultimate goal and avoid all activities that do not directly contribute to accomplishing their mission. (p. 7 CALL)

74 Once the PRT is established, the leadership must gain access to local power centers and assess the environment to determine the issues the PRT should address, as well as the challenges and obstacles impacting on these issues. (p. 8 CALL)

75 The PRT develops an implementation plan guided by the provincial stability strategy, based on a realistic time frame, for the anticipated tenure of the PRT and the dynamics of the area of responsibility (AOR). (p. 8 CALL)
Although a PRT is not identified as a standalone development institution, CALL suggests the principle by which the units may be most effective is to function as though they were. The process by which a PRT should assume and devolve responsibilities within their AOR should strongly center on the initial assessment of the AOR. The assessment would inform how a PRT should “conceive, plan, coordinate, and execute” determined initiatives.  

In conducting PRT operations, CALL identifies the critical importance of local integration with PRT actions. In this respect, ensuring credit and activities are pursued by local stakeholders with the support of PRT personnel whenever possible should be considered a priority.

Similarly, PRTs should be aware of the tenure under which they may be able to operate. This includes an awareness of an exit strategy, wherein responsibilities for the AOR may be transferred to succeeding development authorities or local centers of power.

Risks & Threats

CALL identifies one risk to the operation of PRT activity that is neither determined by the effectiveness of operations or operations themselves, but through the perception of activities by external actors. Due to the unique mission of the PRT to perform ‘capacity

76 The primary activities of the PRT are to conceive, plan, coordinate, and execute reconstruction and initial development projects and programs. Though PRTs are not development institutions per se, PRTs should adhere to the following principles to the extent possible. (p. 8 CALL)

77 It is extremely important to link all PRT actions to governing bodies and local institutions as much as possible. Balance is the key; it may be preferable to have a local solution that is less optimal than a PRT solution. (p. 9 CALL)

78 As host-nation governing bodies gain capacity and effectiveness, the PRT should cede responsibility for what has to be done. (p. 9 CALL)
development’, special consideration must be given to application of performance metrics to PRT operations. It is also for this reason, external actors should bear in mind the operations of PRTs may not be in the position to be uniquely judged by standard development metrics and output indicators.  

A risk which again speaks to the need to accurately perform an initial assessment of the local centers of power is the continued need to integrate all activities locally. Pursuing the role will also require the balancing of civilian and military staff to perform both military and non-military programs that may ensure the success of selected development initiatives. The need for both military and non-military programs to ensure the success of PRT operations places an emphasis on the requisite that a balance and presence of both personnel types is necessary. Although the execution of professional programs requires the participation of civilian personnel, the presence of military personnel is not solely to ensure these activities may occur in a secure environment. The successful cooperation of civilian and military personnel should primarily focus on the successful completion of designated activities.

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79 As with any diplomatic, defense, or development institution, there is a danger that PRTs may fall prey to pressure to deliver immediate but inappropriate proxy indicators of progress, including number of projects completed or quantity of funds expended. Perhaps what is not so clear is that some indicators that are considered effects within the development community are really only outputs for a PRT. For example, the development community may consider an increase in literacy or a decrease in child mortality to be an effect. (p. 9 CALL)

80 The integration and alignment of civilian and military efforts are crucial to successful stability and reconstruction operations. PRTs must focus on supporting the host nation’s local governments and the populace across the stabilization and reconstruction sectors. This support requires balancing an emphasis on nonmilitary programs with the measured use of force. (p. 10 CALL)

81 Political, social, and economic programs are most commonly and appropriately associated with civilian organizations and expertise. However, effective implementation of these programs is more important than who performs the tasks. Civilian organizations bring expertise that complements that of military forces. At the same time, civilian capabilities cannot be employed effectively without the security that military forces provide. (p. 10 CALL)
Similarly respective to personnel action, the risks to PRT continuity of operations during the turnover of personnel remains high. The gaps to service and local knowledge during personnel turnover is a threat to the continued mission of the PRT. It should remain the responsibility of civilian agencies to monitor, assess, and deploy personnel to avoid large personnel turnovers. The same is true for PRT leadership, wherein executive and deputy positions should experience staggered personnel turnover.  

An additional risk experienced in the course of PRT operations is initially determining the sources of conflict in the AOR. In addition to identifying the local centers of power, identifying and mitigating the causes of conflict would contribute to the successive development of local economic, governmental, and socio-political capacity. As an example, CALL identifies that conflict may occur as a result of, but not be limited to, “including resource competition, tribal/ethnic clashes, insurgency, criminal elements, and political instability.”

Objectives

Beyond the principles by which a PRT should operate and the awareness of risks that may threat the PRT mission, CALL identifies the requirement that operations must be

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82 The various agencies involved in providing team members must ensure there are not gaps in functional coverage or a wholesale turnover of personnel over long deployments. Either of these will result in the PRT losing valuable understanding of the environment and could affect relationships with the local government and the people as a whole. Try to avoid rotating leadership positions (team leader and deputy team leader) at the same time. (p. 11 CALL)

83 Determine the causes and means of conflict, including resource competition, tribal/ethnic clashes, insurgency, criminal elements, and political instability; identify the triggers or opportunities to instigate conflict; determine ways to affect the causes and triggers; identify ways to mitigate or resolve the conflict; increase capacity of civil society and legitimate traditional processes to adjudicate and deter conflict. (p. 12 CALL)
readily defined by their end objective. It is through a design of operations that supports the end objectives that may best meet the mission of the PRT.

A key objective, against which operations will occur, must be the assertion that ‘capacity development’ will best occur through a deep integration with local leadership. An initial step in the objective would be increasing the legitimacy of local leadership, to better facilitate the efforts sought to be stood by the PRT, through local centers of power. 84

In addition, the development of job creation protocols within the scope of increasing institutional capacity would further the opportunity to similarly tie informal, formal, and official local actors. Employment instruments would have the capacity to be positioned through formal officials, as mediated through community leaders, employing local labor. Ideally, the programs would have the ability to engage such PRT supported activities such infrastructure activities, commercial development, as well as road improvements. 85

A concluding element of the PRT concept is the ideal that personnel and PRT cooperation should cease in the rear of provincial activities. A critical element of ensuring the success of provincial activities is allowing for “host nation ownership” of development activities. The dual function of the reared position of PRT personnel are to bolster the legitimacy of local actors as well as stand the capability of local capability. 86

84 Build individual, organizational, and structural capacity to provide public safety and basic services such as sewage, water, electrical, trash–health. Where relevant, tie legitimate, informal governance (traditional) leaders to nascent formal government organizations and tie appropriate reconstruction and stability projects to legitimate governing bodies. (p. 12 CALL)

85 Develop job creation programs for infrastructure activities; provide micro lending as soon as practicable; tie road improvements to commercial as well as political integration; and create value-added facilities to improve agriculture and natural resource capabilities within the local absorptive capacity. (p. 13 CALL)

86 Lead from behind, ensuring host-nation ownership. Promote host-nation primacy and legitimacy.
The aforementioned objectives are meant to be met through a series of local collaboration strategies identified by CALL.

“Actively engage with the governor, host-nation central government officials, the local communities and population through provincial councils, provincial development committees, and other established and traditional bodies.

Facilitate the visibility of the host-nation government’s presence in the province by assisting official visits to remote districts and villages (e.g., transportation and communications).

Promise only what you can deliver; manage expectations (under promise and over deliver). Never promise unless the money or assets are in hand. Even interest in a topic or project can be interpreted as a “promise.”

Plan sustainability at the outset.”

However, at times, it may be necessary to illustrate that the United States is doing something for the people (remember and respect that the operational pace will be that of the host nation). (p. 13 CALL)

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87 Actively engage with the governor, host-nation central government officials, the local communities and population through provincial councils, provincial development committees, and other established and traditional bodies.

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Promise only what you can deliver; manage expectations (under promise and over deliver). Never promise unless the money or assets are in hand. Even interest in a topic or project can be interpreted as a “promise.”

Plan sustainability at the outset. (p. 13 CALL)
Operational Guidance

One area where operational guidance may persist beyond the formation of the PRT exists in the area of leadership. As of 2010, the National Command Authority in Iraq maintained the authority to designate the leadership authority of the individual PRT to either civilian or military personnel. Cause for the contingency was attributed to the unique climates that may be faced in the distinct provincial setting, whether conflict, conflict interim, or post conflict.

“In a situation where active combat is expected or underway, the Department of Defense (DOD) may be the lead with other agencies in a supporting role. Where the environment is clearly post conflict and instability has diminished, the lead shifts to the Department of State (DOS), which is responsible for coordinating the efforts of other civilian departments and agencies.”

CALL, although, identifies that the individual PRT must have the ability to refine and execute operational guidance developed at higher levels of administration exterior to the AOR. The PRT, respective to its situation at the provincial level, has the unique ability to identify local objectives as they arise. To efficiently operate and assign resources, personnel, and directives, the PRT must have the capability to refine operational guidance, withstanding that it support existing strategic goals.

[88] In a situation where active combat is expected or underway, the Department of Defense (DOD) may be the lead with other agencies in a supporting role. Where the environment is clearly post conflict and instability has diminished, the lead shifts to the Department of State (DOS), which is responsible for coordinating the efforts of other civilian departments and agencies. (p. 15 CALL)

[89] Therefore, PRTs play an important role in informing and refining operational guidance from intermediate or higher headquarters and ensuring the local objectives are effective, attainable, and aligned with operational and strategic goals. (p. 16 CALL)
Because the PRT is locally rooted, it provides the essential function of demonstrating ground conditions at the finest scale. The immediate nature ground conditions provide a level of situational awareness that may be overseen exterior to the AOR. As a result, the accurate assessment of the local environs assists in the development of local, regional, and national PRT efforts. Further, the level of ability to demonstrate progress on initiatives developed at the administrative level serves as a critical indicator in shaping successive coordination efforts. 90

Yet, the PRT program should remain an initiative that truly functions as a joint civilian military effort, operations unique to the character of the particular province. CALL accedes that the PRT mission, given an assessment of the AOR, may require a primary focus on such divergent actions, under the umbrella of ‘capacity development’, as counterinsurgency, reconciliation, or economic development, thus requiring the delegation of leadership authority to a civilian or military command. 91

Implementation

Assistant to the concept of operations and objectives by which PRT activity will occur, CALL provides an assessment of the implementation of the PRT process, as indicative of requisite personnel, planning, and execution efforts.

As identified in the concept of operations, a necessary initial step in the implementation of PRT activities is the sound analysis on contributing factors to instability within the

90 The PRT is an important “ground truth” check on interagency coordination at higher levels; if differing guidance cannot be integrated at the PRT level, it may well be indicative of disjointed coordination or planning at the regional or national level. (p. 16 CALL)

91 The PRT program is a priority joint DOS/DOD initiative to bolster moderates, support U.S. counterinsurgency strategy, promote reconciliation, shape the political environment, support economic development, and build the capacity of Iraqi provincial governments to hasten the transition to Iraqi self-sufficiency. (p. 17 CALL)
AOR. Having, conditionally, identified the drivers, PRTs will become most effective in developing a multiyear plan shaped on suppressing the catalysts of instability and increasing capacity. 92 Successively, the placement of appropriate civilian and military personnel to address the drivers will be critical to the planning and execution of the successive multiyear planning phase.

It is stressed that PRTs should be prepared to address drivers to instability that include, but are not limited to, tribal competition, insurgency, or weak local institutions. 93 In effect, it is a requirement of the PRT to determine and understand the drivers of instability, as to reduce conflict within the AOR. 94 The assessment will require the ability of personnel to identify the source and effect of variable threats on the social, political, and economic networks of the local population. 95

A shortfall which should be avoided in the execution of planning efforts is the development of institutional memory, disregarding the imperative to persist in a cyclical revision of a multiyear plans as local conditions require. Further, a critical element of

92 However, a consensus is emerging that PRTs are most effective when they develop a multiyear plan of action based on their mission analysis and shaped by their analysis of what is driving instability and conflict in their area. (p. 19 CALL)

93 The assessment should strive to determine the key impediments to achieving mission success. There may be instability based on tribal competition, conflict perpetrated by criminal or insurgent activities, or weak local institutions that prevent effective extension of the national government. (p. 19 CALL)

94 The PRT’s job is to understand what is causing the instability and conflict in its area so that its interventions can reduce conflict and promote a more stable environment. (p. 20 CALL)

95 The PRT needs to assess the potential drivers of instability and conflict in its AOR. These may include resource competition, sectarian animosity, ethnic violence, lack of meaningful economic opportunity, and culturally sanctioned vendettas. This assessment entails mapping the social, cultural, political, and economic networks the population lives with daily. The mapping is not a doctoral dissertation, but it should touch on the key aspects of the environment that impact the level of conflict. (p. 21 CALL)
stable continuity of operations is developing a contingency for unavoidable personnel turnover, as rotations occur. The contingency would address increasing the ownership of existing personnel activities on behalf of incoming personnel, as existing personnel rotations may conclude. Increasing the impact of successive ownership, existing personnel should perform a review of existing planning initiatives prior to the conclusion of rotations. 96

A necessary tenet of the CM unit, in the revision of existing planning efforts, is the collaboration of all agencies active within the PRT, whether representative of local, regional, or national interests. 97 Although building capacity at the district and provincial level is the focus of the PRT, the CM unit remains an integral instrument of informal regional and national decision making. The demonstration of local knowledge assists in developing a level of situational awareness that otherwise may go unrepresented at administrative levels, save for local knowledge regarding traditional combat operations. 98

96 The strategy can and should be reviewed and routinely revised, particularly before unit rotations or large personnel turnovers or as guidance or conditions change. (p. 20 CALL)

97 The PRT is an interagency team and needs to plan as a team. Ideally, the PRT’s planning team should include functional, regional, and planning experts representing all the agencies active in the PRT. (p. 20 CALL)

98 Building governmental capacity above the provincial level is clearly beyond the scope of the PRT and is the responsibility of the national-level program; however, the PRT is best positioned to understand the specific needs within the province, district, or regional area within its responsibility and use the information to design local programs and inform national-level planning. While every situation is different, local governments often need help developing processes for citizen input, prioritizing government programs and projects, implementing budgeting processes, and establishing public security capabilities. Keep in mind that not all institutions are governmental; building the capacity of traditional governing mechanisms and civil society (religious groups, business institutions, and political parties) may also be required. (p. 22(23 CALL)
The continued attention to changing objectives within the AOR must persist as long as PRT operations remain active. The ability to balance simultaneous objectives also acts as a determinant of success for PRT operations. The inquiry of resource allocation is not only the applies to the selection of objectives, but how to accomplish the given objective, whether population security, government infrastructure, or social welfare.  

In respect to performance monitoring, CALL assesses both the utility and difficulty of providing metrics that measure the output of development. The ability to self-identify performance within the PRT allows the unit to adapt, as the measure of existing activities may demonstrate impacts or inefficiencies. Although, traditional indicators of output may have the ability to speak to quantitative measures of development, they are unable to address the qualitative impacts of the PRT mission. Because priority is placed on ‘capacity development’ within the PRT, focus is drawn on factors such as the degrees of local ownership, political stability, and true access to social services. For these reasons, traditional performance measures may not exist, or be applicable, to the PRT effort.

99 The PRT constantly needs to balance conflicting goals. Is effective direct intervention in local disputes more important than efforts to increase the capacity of local security forces? Should limited reconstruction funds be used to build necessary government infrastructure or to increase the general population’s general welfare? (p. 30 CALL)

100 The purposes of performance monitoring are to gather and present systematic, analytic information for the PRT’s own use in assessing the impact and effects of its efforts; to inform decision makers up the chain of command; and to report to Congress and the public. (p. 30 CALL)

101 Output is usually easiest to measure (e.g., number of wells drilled, schools built, and police trained), but it does not measure the effects the PRT is trying to achieve. Outcomes or intermediate effects (e.g., how many have access to clean water, growth in school enrollment, and public perception of police) and longer-term impacts of activities on the overall situation (e.g., impact of wells on local power structure, perception of education’s impact on social values or economic prospects, impact of police training on public security, and support for the government) may require more creativity. (p. 31 CALL)
CALL also identifies that PRTs are subject to a high rate of personnel turnover. Although civilians generally serve a year of duty, the intermittency of changes to details and assignments subject PRTs to improvisation. The distance and infrequent exposure experienced by personnel within the PRT whose resources are drawn in several directions, as well as the turnover of personnel, contribute to the loss of expertise that reduces the efficiency of PRT operations.  

As a consequence of frequent personnel turnover, the period of deployment for civilian personnel also contributes to the limitations of PRT activity. To address the limited time frame in which civilian personnel are able to engage effectively, CALL identifies a series of measures aimed at increasing personnel effectiveness in the AOR. One are which represents a significant threat to PRT operations has been maintaining continuity of operations through the persistent rotation of CM personnel. One method to address the threat to program continuity and personnel effectiveness can be to increase training in critical areas prior to deployment. These areas include, but are not limited to, increasing the depth of personnel briefing on previous activities, building in personnel overlap, and allowing for critical language and sensitivity training prior to deployment.  

102 PRT staff is subject to a high rate of turnover. Civilians generally serve 12 months but often have gaps between assignments, while core military members serve 12 months and often have assignment overlaps. However, some military members may only serve six months. Unfortunately, changes in personnel often result in changes in PRT direction, objectives, and programs. Without a long-term plan, new arrivals are left to improvise their own programs, drawing on their own expertise, which results in choppy and ineffective PRT programming that wastes time and resources. (p. 32 CALL)  

103 A long-term common operational picture and strategic implementation plan assists with continuity. During their pre-deployment training, PRT members should strive to understand the specific area analysis and implementation plan provided by their predecessors. The new PRT should be aware of the causes of instability and conflict; strategies and implementation interventions, programs, activities, and measures of effectiveness as they relate to its work; the objectives of the maneuver brigade and other PRTs in the particular region; and the longer term U.S. government provincial goals and objectives. In addition to forwarding the planning documents, PRTs and military teams should complete the following tasks during the last month of deployment:
Capture their experiences (both lessons learned and good practices) and present them to the incoming PRT, maneuver commanders and staffs, and implementing partners.

Send materials from briefings to military and civilian PRT training units in the United States to update training materials.

Attend and assist with the training of incoming teams and overlap with their successors, if possible. Highlight particularly valuable lessons learned on how to work in the environment, how to be a team player with civilian/military teams, how to engage the local community appropriately, and how to alter programming based on local input while making it complementary to the PRT’s and the maneuver commander’s goals. (p. 32|33 CALL)
Findings & Analysis

Scope & Methodology

The reason I have selected multiple sources of data, whether authored by SIGIR, CALL, or RAND, has been to have the ability to discuss PRT operations as they have occurred in planning, execution, and review through the initial years of the effort in Iraq. The role assumed by multiple sources of data has been the allowance to identify, extract, and amalgamate the parsed areas of interest, should they have been present in the review of PRT operations by unique stakeholders.

As a reaction, the application of a selected methodology, such as meta-analysis, has allowed for the ability to select and extract qualitative datum from unique sources, in support of an arching framework of inquiry, related but exterior to the source. The grouped identification of selected datum, from the selected sources of data, has been to demonstrate a strong pattern, respective to the related interests of the area of research. It is my expectation that the process has, to a marginal extent, mitigated the weaknesses associated with static data, correspondent to a single period of inquiry, duration, and place.

I project the ability, and freedom, to interpret variably sourced data would allow for an alternative method to engage in a discourse of areas of opportunity, strengths, and threats to PRT operations. The goal has not been to identify finite measures of improvement or concrete actions to improve the efficiency of either extant or future PRT operations. The goal has been to develop areas of focus where leadership may target and allocate the necessary measures of inquiry, personnel, and resources. The result, herein enumerated, is the potential measure of inquiry on which CM leadership could draw focus in future CM engagements.

The amendments to organizational behavior could potentially represent, as it is the
expectation of the current body of research, organizational changes to decision making within the AOR, increasing the operational capability of CM | PRT efforts.
Observations

In addressing the ability of the Provincial Reconstruction Team to meet the needs of ‘capacity development’ through the use of civilian and military personnel, data respective to past operational capability has been selected to demonstrate the breadth of PRT activity. Simultaneously, the unique selection of references to operational capabilities has been grouped to illustrate the character of civilian military capabilities, likewise respective to ‘capacity development’.

A critical return of characterizing civilian military capabilities has been the dialogue which operates with and against the data, in the form of further inquiries of existing assessments and operations.

The following are areas of focus on which I have particular attention, seeking to develop additional attention on a given aspect of PRT operational capability. Withstanding the analysis of multiple sources of data, subject to the context of increasing PRT operational capabilities, the following inquiries are representative of areas that should be given additional attention. Inquiries have been grouped according to areas of focus.

Mission

- Does the ability to build local capacity occur provided only a linear reduction in conflict, drivers of instability?
- What development metrics may be applied to PRT activities, if at all, withstanding the concession traditional output indicators are not applicable?

Operations

- What should be the base operational capability of a PRT, regarding, but not
limited to:

- Access to agency sourced funding?
- Access to transport?
- Access to material goods?
- Access to local centers of power?

- Can standing a PRT prior to administrative and operational capability justified?
- What are the determinants in the defining the ‘effective’ boundaries of the AOR?

- What is the established threshold, if at all, of personnel count for an established PRT?

  - Can a PRT operate in the absence of civilian personnel?
  - Does the PRT operational capability maintained in the absence of DoS, USAID personnel?
  - Is the converse true; is there a threshold at which a PRT become too large to maintain effectiveness, respective to operational capability?

- How does intelligence, sourced external to the PRT, assist PRT operational capability?

  - What is the level of intelligence required by PRT?
  - Does the PRT, and staff through varying depths of operations, have access to sufficient levels of intelligence?

- What instruments are in place to determine drivers of instability?
- Does the availability of personnel, resources determine drivers of instability addressed in PRT operations?
• Is it possible to focus on multiple objectives, simultaneously, within a single AOR?
• Given the identification of a key objective, such as the suppression of insurgency within the AOR, what are the constraints of targeting additional objectives?

Personnel

• What are the instruments that will be used to address difficulties, in future CM engagements, in initially identifying DoS staff to fill civilian positions?
• What are the long term effects of initially staffing, open, civilian positions with military personnel?
• Would the further specification of skill set requirements for a civil affairs officer, for the purposes of staffing an open civilian position, mitigate the loss associated with the open position; would the same action represent a marginal gain against an expedient staffing of CA personnel?
• How do you mitigate the loss of local knowledge direction that may occur with periodic rotations to civilian and military staff?
• What are the knowledge retention instruments in place to minimize, unintended, interpretive freedom to existing multi-year plans?
• What is the role of private contractors in the delivery of PRT initiatives?
• What are the unique obstacles of their involvement in accomplishing the intended of the PRT?

Coordination

• How much flexibility should be built into initial MOAs regarding CM engagements, if present at all, towards authority, operations, and maintenance?

Resources
• How do resources available to combat operations at the respective base of operations, affect PRT operational capability, whether formally or informally?

Integration

• If the development of local capacity requires a catalyst to increase political will amongst local stakeholders, how does the CM unit assign levels of prioritization to informal, formal, and local officials?

• What are the direct incentives for the participation of local stakeholders?
  
  ▪ Do the incentives vary for informal leaders, formal leaders, or local government officials?
  ▪ Does the timeline at which stakeholders are engaged, if at all, vary; similarly, does the schedule at which they receive incentives vary?

• What are the instruments of accountability in the delegation of employment programs to local centers of power, whether informal, formal, or local officials?
• What are the associated risks of indirectly tasking the execution of initiatives planned at the administrative level of the PRT?
• Does the cumulative benefit of political integration outweigh the risks of contracting inefficiency?

Doctrine

• To what extent did National Security Presidential Directives 36 | 44 and Defense Directive 3000.05 ultimately determine and provide insight to terminal organizational behavior and organization?
Analysis

At an initial point of my research where interest lied in determining how PRTs were able to implement development and infrastructure activities in conflict interim and post conflict environments. As a result, the research question was positioned to identify how do PRTs, as CM civilian military units, accomplish this mission in terms of personnel selection, mix, and situation? The initial step was looking at the CM units and determining the approach to light infrastructure and economic development, amongst a cadre of additional development activities with the given civilian military integration.

Although, in identifying literature that spoke to PRT activities, the nature of research sensibly moved beyond estimating performance metrics for the CM unit’s ability to perform reconstruction and development. A key reason for the transition was the visible focus of PRT activities, rather, on 'capacity development'.

This has been a strong area of focus in the review of PRT operational capability, beyond performance metrics that are meant to measure the aggregate output of PRT initiatives. The difficulty of measuring output must also be made against operational activities that may be exterior to the PRT itself. Rather, the identification of whether a PRT is equipped with the necessary resources, positioned to meet the mission, and ability to maintain an operational capacity would be the appropriate measure of evaluation.

This has been the focus of my research, selection of data, and subject of my analysis. What are the threats and opportunities to the operational capacity of the PRT, respective to meeting the core mission requirement of capacity development? In the previous section, I have offered a number of inquiries to be measured against the unique areas of PRT operational capability. In the following subheadings, I offer considerations made of PRT operations, directed at the increase operational capability.
Analysis II

**Workforce**

Personnel
Recruitment Constraints
Personnel & Regional Assessments
Subject Matter Expertise
CM Occupational Skills Balance
Workforce Balance
Contractors

**Organization**

Drivers of Instability
Project Selection
Coordination
Resources
Sustainability
Personnel

Personnel preparedness should also be an area of concern in addressing the operational capability of the PRT. Instruments that may be able to address workforce preparedness may be myriad, but several are a key concern in maintaining the operational capability of PRT personnel.

One area of focus should deliberate on the structure of personnel rotations. In this respect, a period of induction and discharge should be accounted for in identifying the period of peak effectiveness. Because this may reduce the period of peak effectiveness from 12 mos. to 8 mos., duties, expectations, and partner initiatives must account for the characteristics of individual personnel rotations.

In addition, personnel turnover should be an area of concern, to receive focus in past and future CM engagements. The underlying concern to personnel turnover is mitigating the loss of local knowledge and expertise upon the departure of PRT personnel. Assuring a return on investment in developing best practices for CM | PRT engagements should not only be limited to the development of doctrine, posterior to operations. Increasing organization wide access to instruments which may increase operational capability would lie in the capture of personnel expertise and lessons learned, beyond their departure. This not only speaks to the development of literature, graphic materials, and the informal transmission of knowledge between personnel, but also to the scheduling of rotations. It is imperative, if possible, that an allowance be issued for the overlap of personnel tasked to complementary duties, if not positions. In an operational capacity, civilian personnel must also possess the flexibilities that preclude humanitarian organizations from operating in the AOR and make military personnel suited to undertake activities therein. The flexibilities possessed by personnel must extend to maintaining an active interest in ground level activities as well as the willingness to engage local stakeholders in an open dialogue in which credibility is established. This credibility may extend to the development of trust, the appropriate
nature of the intended course of action, as well as the demonstration of long term benefits that local ownership would allow.

Respective to both civilian and military personnel, access to critical language skills, whether through additional training or through ready access to an interpreter is a crucial element to ensuring the operational capability of a PRT. Due to the emphasis on local operations and “ground truth” within the PRT mission, the ability to communicate with informal, formal, and local officials within the AOR does not have a substitute. The ability to communicate directly with local Iraqi actors would increase the credibility of PRT personnel as well as the legitimacy, and likelihood of local ownership, of operations. All levels of personnel, for which it is a requisite to interact with local Iraqi actors, should receive ready access to critical language skills. In the case of additional training, both permanent civilian staff and contractors should receive language training prior to deployment. If additional training is not possible, the PRT should be staffed with interpreters whose sole responsibility is facilitating PRT operations. The PRT cannot be expected to properly function with resources, such as interpreters, shared with traditional combat operations staff similarly stationed at the base of operations.
Recruitment Constraints

In addition to the respective constraints of deploying existing personnel, the prior recruitment of federal personnel must be considered a contributing factor to increasing the operational capabilities of the civilian component in respective CM operations. Changes to the recruitment practices of personnel anticipated to engage in CM operations will address a number of the constraints experienced by the DoS including, but not limited to:

- Addressing the difficulty of recruiting personnel for postings in current zones of conflict;
- Deploying experienced personnel to address cadre of unique ‘capacity development’ issues;
- Determining personnel base to best integrate into CM environment;

Targeting the three areas of threat to the successful deployment and tasking of civilian personnel to CM operations may rely on the restructuring of multiple recruitment practices at DoS regarding personnel meant to operate in CM engagements. One method to address the constraints of an existing workforce tasked to wholly address future CM engagements would be the further development of a contingent workforce within DoS meant to specialize in CM engagements. The development, although, of a contingent force within DoS meant to prepare, deploy, and integrate into CM engagements would rely upon the prior changes to the planning, recruitment, and organization of incoming personnel.

The development of a contingent force within DoS would rely on targeting several areas of weakness, including, but not limited to:

- Contingent Force Planning
- Recruitment
• Personnel
• Skills | Expertise

Contingent Force Planning

• Develop contingency units for strategic regions;
• Model existing efforts to strategic regions;
• Increase recruitment of regional | development professionals;
• Address potential threats to acquisition, training, and deployment of personnel;

Recruitment

• Identify pre-existing gaps in necessary personnel;
• Develop future needs applicant pool;
• Increase personnel willingness to travel;
• Target veteran military officers;

• Increase incentives associated with recruitment of temporary federal employee targeted at critical posts;
  ▪ Under temporary contracts; increase added value;
  ▪ Facilitate transition to permanent status;
  ▪ Allow for critical language skill training;

• Respective to future recruitment of permanent personnel; increase factors leading to high needs service;
  ▪ Pair federal service with requisite deployment clause;

Personnel
• Identify existing human capital assets for deployment; CM engagements;
• Address existing workforce balance;
  ▪ Propensity for middle and senior level personnel to deploy to critical posts in CM engagements;

Skills | Expertise

Additionally, the development of a contingent force, meant to address the unique qualifications of civilian personnel tasked to CM engagements, will require the assistance of sample competency requirements as an instrument for use in personnel selection. A competency model, meant to address the requisite flexibilities of conflict interim development, should be prepared as a measure of recruitment into a contingent force within DoS.

• Develop workforce competency model;
  ▪ Identify applicable education | career experiences;
  ▪ Demonstrates required flexibilities, adaptability,
  ▪ Distinguish hierarchy of personnel qualifications;
  ▪ Identify critical areas of expertise;
    o Civilian Military relations;
    o Local governance;
    o Regional knowledge;
    o Language skills;
    o Economic development;
    o Agriculture;
    o Physical planning;
• Maintain flexibility in the workforce to operate; transfer skills to necessary regions;
• To counterbalance the influence of career military personnel tasked to security and logistics, civilian personnel must be able to integrate seamlessly into a
military unit abroad, actively engaged in hostile and/ or denied territory;
Personnel & Regional Assessments

To address threats to personnel qualifications, the coordination of PRT civilian personnel must be based upon an effective character assessment of the region in which operations will occur. Prior knowledge of the particular province, respective forward operating base, and sites to which civilian personnel will be deployed would be invaluable in becoming familiar with the AORs demography, urban areas, topography, natural resources, infrastructure, road networks, etc. Additionally, personnel awareness, upon their arrival and throughout their stay, regarding the condition, security, and threats to the tasked AOR would be greatly increased. As a result, the prior knowledge of the AOR will increase the likelihood of success in the key planning, organization, and execution of deployed efforts.
Subject Matter Expertise

The inclusion of subject matter expertise is also a critical component to the success of PRTs. Further, given the particular character of the AOR, the personnel mix of civilian professionals, whether from USACE, DoS, DoA, DoJ, and USAID will vary from PRT to PRT. Particular attention must be given by leadership to the effectiveness the placement, of a subject matter expert, will bear in an AOR. Additionally, attention must be given to whether resources, personnel, and logistical support are in place to capitalize on the SME. Failure to do so may see the effective or ineffective placement of an SME whom is bound by constraints in the pursuit of their duties.
CM Occupational Skills Balance

If the opportunity is available, the selection of civilian personnel assigned to a contingent force, CM units, or PRTs should reflect a complementary to the makeup of DoD personnel with which civilian personnel will be paired. This is inclusive of, but not limited to, accounting for military occupational specialties and any relevant experience of paired military personnel within the contingent force. This is also to include specific activities, districts, and previous civilian personnel with which the team has performed.
Workforce Balance

A critical area of interest should be maintaining a balance between civilian and military personnel. This balance, although, does not speak to a specific percentage of civilian and military personnel, rather a requisite to maintain an expected order within operations and maintenance, that would be lost with the unexpected influx of civilian or military personnel. The ad hoc injection of personnel not only increases the requisite time burden of increased coordination, but also the level of resources that may not be met with facility, given current operational capabilities. In this respect, given the particular character of the AOR in which a PRT operates, it may be suitable that the CM unit maintain a 35/65 mix and it is this character which should not be disrupted, in either balance or quantity, given the associated risks of destabilizing existing operations. One such risk is the increased division and cloistering of civilian and military personnel within their own.
Contractors

PRT initiatives should be planned in anticipation of risks associated with implementing partners, outside of the PRT chain of command. The delegation of tasks within the advanced phases of a PRT borne initiative to an implementing partner, especially in respect to physical planning activities, should have the opportunities and threats to the action weighed prior to the devolution of responsibility.

Withstanding the discharge of executable activities, where resources and personnel do not allow for the direct implementation of PRT initiatives, there should exist an environment of increased monitoring and evaluation of implementing partners and contractors. Although PRT personnel may not persist in being directly responsible for the execution of planned initiatives, especially as related to physical planning activities, assisting in a supervisory role to initiative partners further ensures the legitimacy of existing local partnerships and the opportunity for a greater level of future participation with local stakeholders.
Drivers of Instability

Respective to obstacles which threat the operational capabilities of the PRT, an initial action is the assessment of local centers of power, as well as the identification of drivers of instability within the AOR. The latter is representative of an area on which there must be shared consensus amongst civilian and military personnel. The agreement on extant drivers of instability within the AOR not only prevents the fracturing of resources and personnel, but maintains an alignment on mission critical tasks. To accomplish an agreement on drivers of instability, civilian and military must either be prepared to adopt a similar framework for the assessment of instability or maintain a preparedness to develop consensus between competitive assessments of instability.

In addition, the PRT must also internalize the possibility that a CM presence is also representative of a driver of instability. The presence of personnel, resources, and an active security element, given the particular character of the AOR, may otherwise increase drivers for instability beyond their natural course. An additional risk, with the influx of resources appropriated for community development, is the disaggregation and fracturing of centers of power, in order to compete for existing resources. Therefore, the difficulty, or inability to self-identify as a driver of instability, whether or not it is the case, denies the PRT critical element in being able to decision making regarding the mitigation of conflict and initiatives towards ‘capacity development’.
Project Selection

An additional area of focus to counter an existing obstacle confronting the operational capacity of PRT is the accurate targeting of CM initiatives.

One method to improve the accuracy of targeting may be through the increased pursuit of Iraqi initiated projects. This method requires the coordination of personnel, not only within the PRT, within the FOB to communicate local knowledge acquired at ground level. Withstanding the ability to communicate, through a translator or through personal ability, key pieces of information such as, but not limited to, disruption to civilian life, community infrastructure, and local industries would assist in targeting successful PRT initiatives.

In one instance, the accurate targeting of CM initiatives will work towards catalyzing economic development in the target area. PRT led initiatives have the capability to revitalize depressed industries that have been destabilized by conflict and community fragmentation. The resulting intervention may see increases in local employment, an improved community fabric, as well as a future increase in cooperation with coalition forces.
Coordination

Inherently, the successful coordination of CM operations has, does, and will require the unobstructed cooperation between civilian and military personnel. A critical effect of cooperation is not only the allowance for increased coordination between personnel; it is the insight that allows the discreet personnel within a PRT, tasked to a particular duty, that allows personnel to grant focus to their work, assured and informed of a similar fidelity to partner operations within the PRT.
Resources

In addition to the influx of personnel, the operational capability of a PRT depends on the ability to ensure that resources do not exceed the capacity of personnel within the PRT. An abundance of resources can potentially represent a threat to the coordination, cooperation, and abilities of a PRT. This is not to say that resources should, and can only, either be negated or misallocated. An existing contingency, whether it be a graded variant of existing operations, may assist in the management of additional resources. As opposed to the resources themselves, in absence of the contingency, the preparedness provided for through a contingency also decreases the risks and burdens associated with the expedient, and requisite, expenditure of available resources.
Sustainability

The effectiveness of activities pursued by the PRT must also adhere to the simplified concept of sustainability. Beyond the discussion of industrial efficiencies, carbon neutrality, and resource management, the selected initiatives of the PRT must appreciate the local context. Projects must have the ability to persist and sustain themselves beyond the departure of the PRT. This not only speaks to physical practices such as the development of infrastructure which maintains a purpose within the AOR, but to the installment of political instruments which will remain viable beyond the terminal date of coalition support. This would be accomplished through the local ownership and operation of, previously, PRT supported activities. The practice of developing sustainable initiatives must speak to a fundamental understanding of local history, culture, and community networks. Similarly, the effects of mirror imaging must be avoided in the identification of projects, to avoid solutions, although preferable in situ elsewhere, are a misallocation of resources, personnel, and time in the given AOR. The pursuit of such projects also risk desertion, cultural insensitivity, or the inefficient metamorphosis of local customs and practices.
Concluding Remarks

In the previous thesis, I have identified a number of areas upon which future civilian and military personnel will be able to draw focus regarding the operational capacity of Provincial Reconstruction Teams. I, although, understand that the preceding body of inquiry has focused on efforts that have undergone a series of transformations since the production of reports upon which I have focused, the period in which I have conducted research, and the publication of the text at hand.

It is my hope that the current text has been able to draw further attention to the critical period, found in the early stages of development in civilian | military engagements. In addition, it is my expectation that I have noted, in some part, the diverse role which non-combat operations may assume in military engagements. In the current role, strengthening local government, increasing access to infrastructure, as well as economic development.

The need for additional research on the civilian military unit continues. The application of similar lines of effort, as applied through the PRT, can only be expected to reappear as method to strengthen the platform of future military engagements. For this reason, I expect the lessons of international development, the cadre of respective professionals, and civilian federal personnel to further play a pivotal role within future theaters of conflict. In doing so, civilian | military efforts will assume, not a subordinate but, a partnered role, in planning, personnel, and deployment.
Bibliography


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01 Illustrative Note

The following cartographic documents are included for illustrative purposes only. They are not meant to serve as operational or planning documents. The following cartographic documents are only meant to broadly contextualize geographic, geopolitical, and features of interest. The documents have been developed in ESRI ArcGIS 10 using data made publicly available as of March 2012.
Base Map | Iraq | Major & Minor Routes
Base Map | Iraq | Populated Places | 10 km. Radius
12 Base Map | Iraq | PRT | Provincial Reconstruction Teams
16 Base Map | Iraq | PRT | 15 & 60 & 120 km. Radius
Base Map | Iraq | Populated Places | Within PRT 15 km.
Base Map | Iraq | Populated Places | Names | Within PRT 15 km.
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23 Base Map | Iraq | Populated Places | Names | Within PRT 120 km.
30  Base Map | Iraq | Incident Activity | PRT | Within 120 km.
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