Beyond the Veto:
Chinese Diplomacy in the United Nations Security Council

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ABSTRACT

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Once described as a “diligent apprentice,” China has emerged in the early 21st century as an active and sometimes contentious participant in the UN Security Council. For the U.S., China has complicated decision-making on a range of issues, including North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Burma, Zimbabwe and Libya. China’s material interests in several of these “pariah states” has raised problems for attempts to target such regimes through the Council and its powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Yet China’s positions on these cases have been mixed. It has sometimes aligned with the U.S. (as it did on Libya), and has, at other times, stood in opposition (as on Burma). This study seeks to explain the variance. Drawing on an array of sources, it weighs five hypotheses against the empirical record. These explanations are centered on two sets of factors. First are the strategic risks of cooperation, i.e. the chance that coercion will harm China’s interests. Second are the political ramifications, i.e. the potential costs to China’s relations with the U.S., regional stakeholders and others associated with particular positions.

Prefaced by a historical narrative of China’s changing role in the Council from 1971 through 2011, the analysis covers eight cases, spanning China’s diplomacy on North Korea, Iran, Sudan, Burma and Zimbabwe. Five are positive cases, insofar as Beijing supported U.S.-backed resolutions. These include the issues of North Korea and Iran. Three are negative cases, in which China maintained opposition. These include proposed sanctions on Sudan in 2007, and draft resolutions on Burma and Zimbabwe.
The primary conclusion is that both strategic and political explanations can provide insight into the development of China’s positions. Specifically, China’s bargaining power is at its greatest when credible outside options exist and when there is a division in attitudes towards the legitimacy of the preferences of the U.S. and its allies, and weakest under the opposite conditions. From a policy point of view, the U.S. will have to craft nimble diplomatic strategies and carefully assess when to proceed versus when to yield. However, Washington can assume that China will remain a status-quo oriented, and relatively predictable, participant within the UNSC.
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“The well-bred, throbbing sound that goes on behind the Bauhaus façade of the United Nations is not the air conditioning. It is the pulse of politics.”
-Alastair Cooke, British journalist (1953)

Introduction

Two recent episodes illustrate the constraints on U.S. influence in the UN Security Council (UNSC). First, the U.S. was unable to secure a Council statement condemning the November 22, 2010, North Korean artillery barrage of Yeonpyeong Island, a Yellow Sea territory controlled by South Korea, which resulted in the deaths of two civilians and two military personnel. Following a month of consultations, in which members diverged over North Korea’s culpability and the possibility that a statement could incite further tensions, the Council abandoned attempts to issue a formal response. According to U.S. Ambassador Susan E. Rice, “I think it’s safe to predict that the gaps that remain are unlikely to be bridged.” Washington had been unable to gather sufficient support to criticize, let alone substantively respond to, a military attack against one of its own allies.

Second, on March 17, 2011, the U.S., along with allies Britain and France, was barely able to muster 10 votes in favor of a no-fly zone on Libya. The resolution was intended to prevent the killing of civilians, following an uprising against the rule of Muammar el-Qaddafi based in the eastern city of Benghazi. Qaddafi had previously pledged to show “no mercy” as his forces were poised to kill the rebels and their

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sympathizers. Five states—the so-called BRIC nations of Brazil, Russia, India and China, as well as Germany—abstained. According to David Bosco, the probable reasons that China and Russia did not simply veto the resolution were that they didn’t care enough about the issue, and that they may have even “liked the idea of the West spending time and resources in Libya.” The tenuousness of the vote underscored the limits on U.S. diplomatic power in the Council.

However, these vignettes are not meant to suggest that U.S. influence had waned a decade into the 21st century, or even that its leverage was on a downward trajectory. The U.S. had been able to secure sweeping sanctions against Libya, including an International Criminal Court indictment of Qaddafi, in February 2011. It had obtained sanctions against North Korea in 2006 and 2009, Iran four times between 2006 and 2010, Eritrea in 2009, and Côte D’Ivoire in 2010, among others. Rather, the point is that U.S. influence in the Council is constrained. Though preponderant in overall indices of military and economic power, the U.S. may not desire or be able to use those resources to its advantage in particular settings. Opponents, with goals and capabilities of their own, may be able to impede the U.S. in the UNSC or any other international institution.

This study examines the contours of U.S. influence in the Security Council through an investigation of the positions of one of its principal interlocutors—China. As a

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3 “Gaddafi Tells Benghazi His Army Is Coming Tonight,” Al-Arabiya, March 17, 2011.


veto-holding member of the UNSC with increasing economic and political stakes in many of the regimes that the U.S. has targeted through the Council, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has the prerogative, and potentially the resolve, to prevent the U.S. from achieving its objectives. Yet China’s cooperativeness vis-à-vis the U.S. has varied. In some cases (such as Iran), it has agreed to punish its own partner; in others (such as Burma), it has not. Identifying the reasons for that variance is necessary to explain why China sometimes endorses the U.S. position, and why it sometimes says “no.”

The argument developed in this study is that China’s cooperativeness depends on both strategic and political factors. Strategically, China is more likely to agree with U.S. calls for coercion when other options, such as mediation, have failed, and when concessions have been made that protect China’s material interests. Politically, it is more likely to support the U.S. when the costs of opposition are high. This is so when the issue is of major importance to the U.S., when Russia has favored the U.S. position, and when key regional stakeholders have offered their support as well. Conversely, China tends to oppose the U.S. when these conditions are not present. The larger point is that Council negotiations do not turn purely on the issue at hand, but are also embedded in broader political relationships. It is necessary to refer to both sets of factors in order to understand why states adopt the positions they do.

The introduction proceeds in three sections. The first establishes the significance of the Security Council as a venue for international cooperation on a range of issues, and its relevance for the U.S. The second defends the selection of China as the sole object of inquiry, explaining why policymakers and observers of Council politics in general should
devote more attention to China’s positions therein. The third section provides an outline for the following chapters and previews the conclusions.

**The Security Council in World Politics**

The Security Council has emerged as a central forum for the adjudication of threats to international peace and security in the two decades since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, it has become a site in which the very definition of what constitutes a “threat” has evolved, such that the Council has become engaged in a wider range of problems than in prior years. For the U.S., working within this institution involves a combination of political and strategic benefits, which are likely to increase as the U.S. places more emphasis on multilateralism.

The Security Council, like the Council of the League of Nations which preceded it, is a “collective security” decision-making organization. As a concept, collective security rests on the principle of universality, or “all against one.” As Inis Claude explains,

> The scheme is collective in the fullest sense; it purports to provide security for all states, by the action of all states, against all states which might challenge the existing order by the arbitrary unleashing of their power… Ideal collective security… offer[s] the certainty, backed by legal obligation, that any aggressor would be confronted with collective sanctions.

Collective security contrasts both the idea of self-help, in which states individually respond, or prepare to respond, to aggression, and with the concept of alliances, in which blocs of states are formed to balance potentially aggressive outsiders.

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7 Quoted in Ibid, 119.
During the Cold War, the UNSC played only an auxiliary role in world politics. The Council held an average of 67.5 public meetings per year between 1946 and 1989. Through 1989, only eight resolutions were passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, while sanctions against just two states (South Africa and Southern Rhodesia) were imposed. The Council approved 18 peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in its first 45 years. These followed a “traditional” model, in which the goal was to provide a buffer between belligerents, but not to address the fundamental causes of conflict. An example is the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which has patrolled the Israeli-Lebanon border since 1978.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the institution has taken a more prominent role in collective security. Between 1990 and 2008, the Council met, on average, 166.1 times per year. It passed 423 resolutions under Chapter VII (i.e., 34.9% of 1213 resolutions in

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8 The Security Council itself is constituted under Chapter V of the UN Charter, which confers on the Council the “primary responsibility of international peace and security.” Chapter VII provides the Council the authority to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,” and permits it to authorize tools, including sanctions and the use of force, to “maintain or restore international peace and security.” The text of the UN Charter can be found online, at: http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml.

9 Sanctions against Southern Rhodesia were imposed by Resolution 253 (1968) and terminated by Resolution 460 (1979), while those against South Africa were imposed by Resolution 421 (1977) and terminated by Resolution 919 (1994).

10 According to Fravel, the “traditional model of peacekeeping emphasizes consent and impartiality, which in turn require the nonuse of force and establishment following the conclusion of a ceasefire.” M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Attitude Toward UN Peacekeeping Operations Since 1989,” Asian Survey 36 (1996), 1104-5.

11 The mandate authorizing UNIFIL specified three functions: (1) confirming Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon; (2) the restoration of international peace; and (3) aiding the Lebanese government in re-establishing authority in the area that had been occupied by Israel during its brief incursion in March, 1978. Further background on UNIFIL can be found online, at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/background.shtml.
total). It imposed sanctions on more than 20 states, including Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, Congo, Sierra Leone, North Korea, Iran and Afghanistan. During the same period, it authorized 45 PKOs, in states such as Rwanda, Haiti, Kosovo, East Timor, and Sudan. These missions have evolved from a traditional model to a set of practices described as the “new interventionism.” Centered on preventive action and peace-building, these operations trained police forces, supervised elections, demobilized combatants, strengthened the rule of law, and protected human rights, among other functions. Table 1 illustrates the growth of the UNSC’s role in post-Cold War era politics.

### Table 1: The UNSC Before and After the Cold War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1946-1989</th>
<th>1990-2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNSC official meetings/year</td>
<td>67.5 (N=2903)</td>
<td>166.1 (N=3156)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vetoes/Year</td>
<td>5.3 (N=207, 1946-1985)</td>
<td>2.4 (N=56, 1986-2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vetoes/All Votes</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolutions/Year</td>
<td>15 (N=646)</td>
<td>63.8 (N=1213)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter VII Resolutions/Year</td>
<td>.19 (N=8)</td>
<td>22.3 (N=423)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Sanctions Committees</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New PKOS/year</td>
<td>.42 (N=18)</td>
<td>2.4 (N=45)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Council’s expanded role can be attributed to three factors. First was the collapse of the Soviet Union. This meant that superpower rivalry was no longer channeled into Council politics, resulting in heavy veto use. Indeed, the rate of vetoes

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12 These data were compiled through a reading of every resolution since 1990, utilizing the UN’s Official Document System, online at: http://documents.un.org.


declined from 26.3% of votes between 1946 and 1985 (N=207) to 2.4% between 1986 and 2009 (N=56). Decisions were more likely to be made through private consultations among the five permanent members (the “P5,” i.e. the U.S., Russia, China, France and Britain), with input from the ten non-permanent members (the “E10,” each elected for two-year terms through the UN General Assembly), and other interested parties.

Although the P5 faced internal disagreements, the institution was able to operate with less open friction with the end of the Cold War.

Second was the spread of armed conflict in the 1990s and 2000s. While the incidence of international war declined, the number and intensity of intrastate conflicts increased, beginning in the early 1980s, peaking at more than 50 conflicts in 1993, and then declining somewhat to about 30 per year in the 2000s. As Boutros Boutros-Ghali wrote in his 1992 report, *An Agenda for Peace*, the persistence of armed conflicts required the UN’s “urgent involvement to try to prevent, contain and bring them to an end.” Though hampered by budget constraints and the perceived apathy of its members, the Council authorized PKOs with increasing numbers of troops (rising from 17,900 in

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17 Data derived from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, Version 4-2009, available online, at: [http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/Armed-Conflicts-Version-X-2009/](http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/Armed-Conflicts-Version-X-2009/). Armed conflicts are defined here as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.” See: UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, Version 4-2009, Section 2.1, online at the website cited above.

1989 to over 90,000 in 2009), and approved military interventions in Haiti, Somalia, Iraq and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{19}

Third was an evolving interpretation of “threats” as applicable under the UN Charter. Boutros-Ghali noted a “changing context,” in which factors such as poverty, disease, oppression, and proliferation were creating new insecurities.\textsuperscript{20} In 2004, a panel commissioned by his successor, Kofi Annan, pointed to similar sources of disorder, arguing that Chapter VII measures, including the use of force, should be used to respond to both external and internal threats.\textsuperscript{21} In 2005, representatives of 191 UN member states signed the World Summit Outcome Document, which enshrined the “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine. This doctrine held that the Council may use coercive measures to protect civilians in the event of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, or crimes against humanity.\textsuperscript{22} This implied a broader role for the UNSC, though, as reported in this study, the limits of the Council’s jurisdiction have been debated in cases such as Burma and Zimbabwe.

\textsuperscript{19} Regarding financial limitations, the UN peacekeeping budget in 2008 stood at $7.1 billion, which was approximately 15% of New York City’s annual budget. For arguments about UNSC apathy, see: Christine Gray, “A Crisis of Legitimacy for the UN Collective Security System?” \textit{International and Comparative Law Quarterly} 56 (2007), 157 and Smith, \textit{Politics and Processes}, 169.

\textsuperscript{20} Boutros-Ghali, \textit{An Agenda for Peace}. Available online, at: \url{http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html}.

\textsuperscript{21} \textit{A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility}, Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (New York: United Nations, 2004), passim. Kofi Annan echoed the High-Level Panel’s conclusion in a report to the General Assembly: The threats to peace and security in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century include not just international peace and conflict, but civil violence, organized crime, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. They also include poverty, deadly infectious disease and environmental degradation since these can have equally catastrophic consequences. All of these threats can cause death or lessen life chances on a large scale. All of them can undermine States as the basic unit of the international system.


\textsuperscript{22} The text of the relevant paragraphs may be found online at: \url{http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=398}. 

For the U.S., working within the Security Council has offered several benefits. First is that UNSC authorization for U.S. decisions, especially with respect to the use of force, is useful in terms of “collective legitimation.” Given the legal basis provided by a Council mandate, foreign governments may be more inclined to support U.S. policy and contribute to political or military coalitions. The lack of a clear mandate may not prevent the U.S. from acting, as in the case of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, but it likely does increase the costs of doing so. That the U.S., driven by officials such as Colin Powell, sought a resolution in that instance demonstrates that even a relatively unilateralist administration sees authorization as a desired good. In cases such as the no-fly zone on Libya in March 2011, Council approval may be a *sine qua non* of U.S. intervention.

Second is that the Council can assist the U.S. in placing pressure on regimes that defy international human rights norms or pose external security challenges. The U.S. can, and does, impose unilateral sanctions on a number of regimes, including North Korea, Iran, Burma, Sudan, Belarus and others. However, seeking further, multilateral sanctions may be useful in two ways. First is in providing a legal basis for actors, such as the EU, to increase their own financial and other restrictions. Second is in involving all

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26 The list and specifications of U.S. sanctions programs can be found online, at: [http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/Programs.aspx](http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/Programs.aspx).
UN member states, including those, like China, which may be in a relatively stronger position to exert effective pressure. Though systematic research on the efficacy of contemporary UN sanctions is lacking, there is some evidence that measures can be effective in some situations.\(^{27}\) Moreover, seeking sanctions in itself addresses the perception of apathy on the part of the major powers.\(^{28}\)

Third, the Council offers the possibility of distributing the burdens of managing conflicts to a wider range of actors. While the U.S. contributes significantly to the UN budget (22% in 2010, compared to 3.2% for China), it subsidizes PKOs, which reduce the need for deployments of U.S. troops in conflict zones, especially in sub-Saharan Africa.\(^{29}\) Propelled by financial, training and other motives, states such as Pakistan, Nigeria and Jordan provide the large share of troops, in contrast to marginal contributions by developed countries.\(^{30}\) Burden sharing is especially useful for a U.S. military that is already stretched thin in Afghanistan and Iraq, and facing severe budgetary constraints in the wake of the 2008 global recession.

\(^{27}\) Much of the current debate about sanctions revolves around the utility of ‘smart,’ or targeted sanctions, as opposed to comprehensive economic sanctions. Drezner finds that the former are “more humane” but “less effective” than the latter, but acknowledges that further research is required (as much of the current evidence is based on the single case of Iraq). Daniel W. Drezner, “Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice,” *International Studies Review* 13 (2011), 96-108. Moreover, as Meghan L. O’Sullivan points out, the effectiveness of sanctions depends on their goals, and different goals require different sanctions regimes. Meghan L. O’Sullivan, “Iran and the Great Sanctions Debate,” *The Washington Quarterly* 33 (2010), 7-21.

\(^{28}\) Drezner, “Sanctions Sometimes Smart,” 104.

\(^{29}\) State contributions to the 2010 regular UN budget can be found at: [http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/Member_States_Assessment_for_Regular_Budget_for_2010.pdf](http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/Member_States_Assessment_for_Regular_Budget_for_2010.pdf).

\(^{30}\) For instance, in January 2011, the largest troop contributors for UN missions were: Pakistan (10,672 troops), Bangladesh (10,380), India (8,680), and Nigeria (5,873). States such as these are often located near to conflict zones and receive generous UN funding, in addition to training and other benefits. The U.S. was in 65th place with 98 troops deployed. A breakdown of troop contributors by state is available at: [http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml).
Finally, the trend in U.S. policy appears to be towards a greater embrace of the UN as a valued collective security institution. Despite few references to the UN in either his 2002 or 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS) documents, George W. Bush pursued Security Council decisions on a range of issues, from North Korea to Iran to Darfur. For his part, Barack Obama underscored his commitment to the UNSC in his May 2010 NSS:

We need a UN capable of fulfilling its founding purpose—maintaining international peace and security, promoting global cooperation, and enhancing human rights. To this end, we are paying our bills. We are intensifying efforts with partners on and outside the UN Security Council to ensure timely, robust, and credible Council action to address threats to peace and security.

Obama put a fine point on this preference by upgrading the status of the U.S. ambassador to the UN to a Cabinet-level post, and has channeled U.S. diplomacy through the institution on issues ranging from North Korea and Iran, to Côte D’Ivoire, to Libya. Though multilateralism in a post-Obama world is uncertain, the costs of unilateral action suggest that the U.S. will likely continue to prefer to work through the UNSC to address shared challenges.

Why China?


A constraint on pursuing policy goals through the Security Council is that the U.S., on occasion, faces resistance from other participants. According to UNSC voting rules, resolutions require the support of at least nine of the 15 members. A negative vote by any of the permanent members is sufficient to block approval of a resolution.\(^3\)\(^3\) If the preference is for a unanimous outcome, affirmative votes by all 15 members are necessary. Presidential Statements, which are sometimes used in lieu of a resolution, but are usually not regarded to carry the same legal weight, require the consent of all 15 members.\(^3\)\(^4\) In order to determine whether its objectives are feasible, and to develop ways to diminish potential opposition, the U.S. needs to understand the positions of its interlocutors in the Council.

Assessing the prospects for cooperation in the UNSC should focus on the P5, given veto power, the transient composition of the E10, and the reality that proposals are generally initiated and deliberated by the P5 prior to the involvement of other actors.\(^3\)\(^5\) Within the P5, the U.S. can often count on the support of Britain and France, due to consonant strategic and ideological interests.\(^3\)\(^6\) From the vantage point of cooperation,

\(^3\)\(^3\) The rules governing the membership, agenda, leadership and voting of the Council are contained in the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, last revised in 1982. These can be found online, at: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/scrules.htm.

\(^3\)\(^4\) The exact legal status of Presidential Statements is subject to interpretation. As we will see in Chapter 3, there was disagreement about whether or not the April 2009 statement responding to a North Korean ‘satellite launch’ was legally binding. In general, though, Presidential Statements are considered a less authoritative response by the Council. An even weaker form is a ‘Press Statement.’

\(^3\)\(^5\) Mohammad Ayoob refers to this type of consensus-driven decision-making among a small group of key states as “unipolarized multipolarity,” borrowing the phrase from Barry Buzan. His contention is that a continuation of this practice will be seen as a “new form of collective imperialism” by those states are excluded, and is unlikely to be durable over the long-term. Mohammad Ayoob, “Squaring the Circle: Collective Security in a System of States,” in Collective Security in a Changing World, ed. Thomas G. Weiss. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 54-8.

\(^3\)\(^6\) This, of course, is not always the case. France’s dissent on the U.S. pursuit of a resolution authorizing its invasion of Iraq in 2003 is an example.
then, attention has centered on the two non-Western permanent members. For instance, T.V. Paul suggests that China and Russia took a common position against Washington on Kosovo in 1999 and Iraq in 2003 in an attempt to “soft balance” against U.S. power.\footnote{37} Indeed, the present study observes that the two countries have taken similar positions on a range of issues.\footnote{38}

However, China and Russia do not constitute a voting bloc in the UNSC. Moscow did not support China’s two 1990s-era vetoes,\footnote{39} while China did not back Russia’s 2009 veto of a motion to extend the UN mission in Georgia. Moreover, China is only slightly more likely to vote with Russia than it is with the U.S., as detailed in Chapter 1. A more salient point is that the two countries play different roles on different issues. For instance, it was China, not Russia, which impeded a Council response to North Korea’s November 2010 attack of Yeonpyeong Island.\footnote{40} As discussed in Chapter 6, Russia’s last-minute objections, rather than Chinese resistance, was a decisive reason for the Council’s failure to impose sanctions on Zimbabwe in July 2008.\footnote{41} Even if they do sometimes coincide, the preferences of China and Russia can, and should, be assessed separately.


\footnote{38} However, the goal is not to discern whether these positions were or were not intended to ‘soft balance’ against the U.S. As Keir Lieber and Gerard Alexander point out, the behavior claimed to constitute “soft balancing” “seems identical to normal diplomatic friction.” Keir A. Lieber and Gerard Alexander, “Waiting for Balancing: Why the World is not Pushing Back,” \textit{International Security} 30 (2005), 109.

\footnote{39} These concerned the issues of Guatemala (1997) and Macedonia (1999) and are discussed in Chapter 1.

\footnote{40} “China Thwarts UN Action Against North Korea: Diplomats,” \textit{Agence France Presse} (hereafter: \textit{AFP}), December 1, 2010.

\footnote{41} In a more general sense, Bruce Jones argues that there is unlikely to be a static bloc lined in opposition to the U.S. across global issues. Divisions among the BRIC countries (or any potential challengers to the U.S., for that matter) should not be downplayed. In the context of China-Russia relations, for instance, he notes that China condemned Russia’s annexation of South Ossetia, thereby aligning with the U.S. Jones, “Largest Minority Stakeholder,” pp. 6-9.
In this context, a case can be made for a primary focus on China. The argument is based on five factors. First, though only a rough guide to influence in specific institutions, the PRC holds several advantages over Russia in aggregate indicators of power. In 2010, China’s GDP was valued at $9.87 trillion, having grown at 10.3% from the previous year, ranking third in the world. Russia had a $2.23 trillion economy, a 3.8% growth rate, ranked seventh.\(^42\) China’s military budget was estimated by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) at $98.8 billion in 2009, a 15% increase from 2008, while Russia’s military budget was $61 billion, an increase of less than 5%.\(^43\) China had the largest military in the world, with 2.3 million troops in 2007, while Russia counted just over 1 million personnel.\(^44\) China’s population in 2009 was about 1.35 billion, nearly ten times greater than Russia’s 141 million.\(^45\)

Second, within the Security Council, China poses a particular challenge given its interests in the types of states targeted by the U.S. As a measure, Figure 1 compares the aggregate trade between China and Russia with the nine states that earned the lowest score (a “7”) in the 2010 Freedom House survey of political and civil rights: Burma, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Sudan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.\(^46\) As of 2011, the U.S. had placed unilateral financial sanctions on five of

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\(^44\) Data Derived from the Correlates of War Project, National Materials Capabilities dataset, version 4.0. Available at: [http://www.correlatesofwar.org/](http://www.correlatesofwar.org/).


\(^46\) The ranking is based on a battery of political and civil rights indicators. A composite score for each country, from 1 (“Free”) through 7 (“Not Free”) is then generated. The report has been published annually since 2002. It is available online, at: [http://www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org).
these countries,\textsuperscript{47} and the UNSC had imposed sanctions on five as well.\textsuperscript{48} China had total trade valued at more than $1 billion with six of these countries,\textsuperscript{49} while Russia topped the $1 billion mark with only Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. China’s trade surpassed Russia’s in all cases except for the two former Soviet republics. Based on material interests, China has stronger reasons than Russia to object to U.S.-backed plans to punish states with poor human rights records.

![Figure 1: China, Russia Trade with Nine Illiberal States (2009)](image)

Source: UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade)

The third reason concerns arms. The most compelling reason to examine closely Russia’s role in the Council is its status as an arms supplier. According to SIPRI, Russian

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{47} Burma, Libya, North Korea, Somalia and Sudan. Source: U.S. Treasury Department. \url{http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/Programs.aspx}.
\item \textsuperscript{48} Eritrea, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, and Sudan. For details, see: \url{http://www.un.org/sc/committees/}.
\item \textsuperscript{49} Specifically: Burma ($2,907,364,915), Equatorial Guinea ($1,413,495,293), Libya ($5,176,795,570), North Korea ($2,680,766,630), Sudan ($6,390,213,958), and Uzbekistan ($1,909,957,469). Turkmenistan was close to the $1 billion mark, at $954,190,772.
\end{itemize}
arms sales in 2010 amounted to about $9.8 billion, while Chinese sales stood at about $2.3 billion.\textsuperscript{50} However, two factors mitigate the significance of these figures. First, Russian sales rose by 17.6\% between 2005 and 2010, while Chinese sales increased by 370\% during the same period.\textsuperscript{51} Proposed arms embargoes may meet stiffer Chinese resistance in future debates. Second, the U.S. government had expressed concern about PRC assistance in missile technology, which is typically a proscribed item in UN sanctions, especially towards proliferators such as North Korea, Iran, Libya and Pakistan. Similar concerns were not noted with regard to Russia.\textsuperscript{52}

Fourth, a focus on China does not preclude discussion of the role of Russia or any other influential participant in Security Council negotiations. On the contrary, an assessment of the behavior of one state necessarily invites discussion of the positions of others. One of the explanations for China’s cooperativeness with the U.S. developed in Chapter 2 and considered in later chapters is that China’s support for U.S. goals is influenced by Russia’s preferences. The involvement of the P3, non-permanent members, and other interested parties are likewise included, because they can, and, in some cases, do, affect China’s positions. In a sense, a focused examination of a particular actor serves as a fixed vantage point from which the processes of cooperation in the Council writ

\textsuperscript{50} SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, online at: \url{http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers}. SIPRI lists amounts in constant (1990) dollars. These have been adjusted to reflect value in 2009 dollars.

\textsuperscript{51} In constant (1990) dollars, Russian arms sales, as calculated by SIPRI, increased from $5.1 billion to $6 billion, while China’s sales grew from $303 million to $1.4 billion.

\textsuperscript{52} A major reason for the disparate analyses was that Russia was a participant in the Missile Technology Control Regime, which specifies and monitors export controls on sales of missile-related items, while China had not joined this regime. \textit{Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments} (Washington: U.S. Department of State, 2010), 89-91. See also: Shirley A. Kan, \textit{China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues} (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2011), passim.
large can be observed. This contributes to the modest, but growing, literature on decision-making in the UNSC.\footnote{Previous accounts have typically discussed single cases. This includes Thompson, Channels of Power, David Malone, The International Struggle Over Iraq: Politics in the UN Security Council, 1980-2005 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), David Malone, Decision-Making in the UN Security Council: The Case of Haiti, 1990-1997 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), and Cameron R. Hume, The United Nations, Iran and Iraq (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994). Other works have taken the Council itself as an object of inquiry, examining the organization’s role in the postwar world. See: David Bosco, Five to Rule Them All: The UN Security Council and the Making of the Modern World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) and Hurd, After Anarchy. An advantage of the present study is that it provides a comparison of decision-making across a series of cases and, of course, shines a spotlight on China’s role. Case selection and methodology is covered in Chapter 2.}

American power in the UNSC, but in the larger sense of filling substance into the outlines of what the international order will look like in the middle decades of the 21st century.

**Chapter Outline**

The study begins with a profile of China’s role in the Security Council between 1971 and 2011. The argument in Chapter 1 is that China has maintained “strategic restraint” in the organization, in which positive relations with the superpowers, and the U.S. since the end of the Cold War, were prioritized over ideological misgivings. China rarely exercised its veto power, and did so only when it perceived that major interests were at stake. In the 2000s, though, the PRC began to take a more active role in Council affairs. In one sense, this meant fostering goodwill through greater participation in UN peacekeeping missions. In another, it meant a growing inclination to use its influence to affect the course of debates on a series of “pariah” states, such as North Korea, Iran, and Sudan. The reason was that China’s growing material interests in these states clashed with the strategic and normative goals of the U.S. and its partners.

Chapter 2 defines the empirical puzzle and develops the explanatory framework used in subsequent chapters. The puzzle is that China’s cooperativeness with the U.S. on pariah states has been uneven. In some cases, Beijing has acquiesced to sanctions or other types of pressure, while in others it has opposed Council interference. The chapter generates five hypotheses, grounded in the general literature on negotiations, as well as the specific literatures on the UN and Chinese foreign policy. The hypotheses are that China will be more likely to cooperate with the U.S. when: (1) alternative dispute

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56 This term is used throughout simply as a space-saving device, not in the sense of policy argumentation. Moreover, it follows standard usage in social science literature. See, e.g., Robert E. Harkavy, “Pariah States and Nuclear Proliferation,” *International Organization* 35 (1981), 135-163.
resolution mechanisms, such as UN mediation, have failed; (2) the U.S. has made
concessions or side-payments that limit the risks of agreement for China; (3) Washington
has applied high-level diplomatic pressure on Beijing; (4) Russia’s position has shifted
towards the U.S.; and (5) regional stakeholders have endorsed the U.S. position.

The following four chapters apply these hypotheses to eight cases, five of which
involved an agreement between the U.S. and China, and three of which were left
unresolved. Each chapter starts with a description of China’s “dilemma” in the case,
provides a historical background, weighs the hypotheses against the empirical record, and
states the conclusions. Chapter 3 presents four mini-case studies of negotiations on North
Korea between 2006 and 2009, in each of which China was able to reach a consensus
with the U.S. Chapter 4 considers the Iranian nuclear issue, asking why Beijing
acquiesced to a fourth round of sanctions in 2010 after months of resistance. Chapter 5
covers the Darfur issue through the lens of China’s objections to sanctions as a way to
prod Khartoum to accept UN peacekeepers in the spring of 2007. Chapter 6 is a paired
comparison of China’s two most recent vetoes, on Myanmar in 2007 and Zimbabwe in
2008, and asks why China departed from its normal practice of veto avoidance.

The analysis finds broad, but not unequivocal, support for the five hypotheses.
The availability of mediation is associated with Chinese resistance to sanctions, though
the PRC seems to put stock in dubious mediation efforts on cases where it does not
perceive the need for an urgent response, such as Burma. Concessions do help to assuage
China’s concerns, but there are cases, such as Darfur, in which the U.S. prefers not to
enter into substantive talks with the PRC in the first place. U.S. diplomatic pressure does
have an impact, though works best when there is an external shock, such as a provocative
missile test by North Korea. Russia’s positions do matter, although, on cases like Iran, Beijing has maintained opposition to the U.S. even when Moscow has warmed to Washington’s viewpoint. Regional stakeholders are also influential, as South Africa’s role on Zimbabwe makes clear, though the question of which states possess influence in which cases remains.

The conclusion makes three points. First, with some exceptions, the five explanations can each provide insight into China’s positions relative to the U.S. The implication is that, in reaching decisions, states are concerned not only with the issue at hand, but also with the consequences for their relationships with the other major actors in the negotiations. An implication of this finding, which merits further research, is that bargaining power among veto holders is contingent on both the availability of outside options and on the distribution of attitudes towards the legitimacy of specific proposals. Second, from a policy angle, the U.S. must develop strategies aimed at both the strategic and political bases of its interlocutors’ positions. Third, despite its growing use of power within the Council, the analysis is that China will likely continue to act as a status-quo oriented power in the Security Council.
Chapter 1

Strategic Restraint:
China’s Participation in the UN Security Council, 1971-2011

Introduction

In the first decade of the 21st century, China became entangled in a series of diplomatic disputes with the U.S. in the Security Council. Between 2006 and 2010, Beijing used its influence to weaken resolutions addressing North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests, and “diluted” sanctions targeted at Iran’s nuclear program. In 2004 and 2005, China sparred with the West on the issue of Darfur, threatening to veto sanctions on Sudan’s oil industry, and acquiesced only to an arms embargo on non-governmental entities. In 2007, the PRC vetoed a non-binding statement of concern about political repression in Burma driven by the Bush administration. The following year, China vetoed proposed sanctions on Zimbabwe in the wake of electoral violence in that country.

China’s contentious positions in the UNSC elicited pointed remarks from some Western observers. In 2006, James Traub wrote in the New York Times Magazine that

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58 The term “West” used throughout refers primarily to the United States and its principal diplomatic partners in the UNSC, especially the United Kingdom and France. It may also include Western non-permanent members, such as Germany, or even non-Western states, such as Japan, which generally support the U.S. position on particular negotiations. It does not imply the existence of a monolithic Western bloc, nor does it preclude the possibility of divergences among the P3 or other parties from time to time.


China used power to “protect abusive regimes with which it is on friendly terms,” and that “China is prepared to play the role of ‘spoiler’” on issues such as Sudan and Iran. In addition, some commentators have connected China’s behavior in the UNSC with a broader trend towards “assertiveness” vis-à-vis the West on topics ranging from climate change, to human rights, trade and currency policy. Andrew Small has opined that China’s counterparts have been surprised by “the brashness with which Beijing now asserts its interests—and its willingness to prevail, even at the expense of appearing the villain.” John Pomfret contends that “China’s increasingly anti-Western tone” casts doubt on the “long-held assumption…that a more powerful and prosperous China would be more positively inclined toward Western values and systems.”

Chinese assertiveness in the UNSC is not unprecedented. On a few occasions during the Cold War and in the 1990s, China cast “no” votes or blocked the approval of particular resolutions until its requests were fulfilled. For example, in 1981 China defeated Western attempts to grant Kurt Waldheim a third term as UN Secretary General, using its veto power 16 times to support a candidate from the developing world. In the 1990s, China threatened to, or actually did, veto the extension of a handful of UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) that became entangled with the issue of Taiwan,

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watered down a resolution during the 1993-94 North Korean nuclear crisis and withheld support for UN authorization of the first Gulf War until certain demands were met.

However, diplomatic confrontation between China and the U.S. has been uncommon. When it disagreed with the positions of the U.S. or others, China typically opted to disassociate itself through abstentions and polemics. Although it did use its veto power sporadically, this was more the exception than the rule. Indeed, China’s co-negotiators took it for granted that Beijing would not actively resist proposals. As David Bosco notes,

> U.S. diplomats often counted on Beijing’s willingness to abstain, even on resolutions it disliked, rather than appear isolated or stand in the way of agreement among the other permanent members.\(^{66}\)

Broadly speaking, China’s participation in the Council until the 21st century was restrained, measured and largely acquiescent.

This chapter underlines the anomalous nature of China’s contentiousness in 21st century debates on pariah states, and explains the general trajectory in China’s UNSC diplomacy from passive to active.

China’s restraint through the end of the 20th century can be explained as a strategic conclusion that intransigence was not in China’s national interest. The reasons were several: inexperience in the early 1970s and the need to watch and learn how the institution operated; the emphasis on modernization that resulted from China’s reform program starting in the late 1970s, which necessitated maintaining positive ties with the U.S. and others; the imperative not to be obstructive in the 1990s as a means to resurrect China’s image after the Tiananmen Square crisis; and, throughout, the lack of significant

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\(^{66}\) Bosco, *Five to Rule Them All*, 247.
economic or political stakes in the issues brought to the Security Council. By contrast, China emerged from the wings in the 21st century as both an ardent supporter of causes, such as UN peacekeeping, and as a defender of increasingly broad and complex national interests in pariah states, such as North Korea, Iran, Sudan and Myanmar.

**Objecting from the Sidelines: The Cold War Years, 1971-1989**

On October 29, 1971, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 2758, which transferred representation of the seat granted to the “Republic of China” under Article 23 of the UN Charter to the PRC. This meant that control of the “China seat” shifted from Taipei to Beijing. Two weeks later, a delegation led by Vice Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua arrived in New York to assume what it regarded as its “rightful seat” (*hefa xiwei*) in the UN. For most of the following 18 years, China’s role in the UN, including the Security Council, was centered on promoting the “revolutionary” principles of anti-hegemonism and self-determination, often in opposition to the positions of both superpowers. However, China rarely directly confronted either the U.S. or the USSR, instead making its point by refusing to participate in votes and through rhetoric. As Samuel Kim argues, China’s opposition was “more verbal than real.”67 By the 1980s, though, China had abandoned the practice of non-participation and cut down the frequency of its speeches on controversial topics.

**The Road to New York: 1949-1971**

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had sought UN membership from the moment it prevailed in the Chinese civil war and established the PRC in 1949. On

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67 Kim, *China, the United Nations and World Order*, 216.
October 1, Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai declared that accession to the UN “[is symbolic] as a badge of sovereignty and legitimizes the government and its status as a great power,” and sent a series of cables to the UN Secretariat arguing that the new government in Beijing should be represented. The Soviet Union declared its support, and the U.S. stated that it would not veto Beijing’s request if it were put to a vote.

However, having intervened in the Korean War in October 1950, the PRC found itself at odds both with the U.S. and with the UN itself, under whose auspices the U.S.-led counter-offensive against North Korea was waged. As Bosco observes, “Had China abstained from the Korean War, it likely would have joined the UN much earlier.”

During the following two decades, the PRC was excluded from the UN primarily through the diplomatic maneuvering of the United States. U.S. strategy in this respect followed three tracks: first, ensuring that its allies would vote against proposals to admit China in the General Assembly; second, from 1961, sponsoring resolutions that the issue of China’s membership be considered as an “important question” and thus require a two-thirds supermajority in the GA, lowering its chance of success; and, third, in the late 1960s, advocating a plan whereby both Taiwan and China would be represented, which, as a violation of the “one China” principle, Beijing would never accept.

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69 Byron S.J. Weng, Peking’s UN Policy (New York: Praeger, 1972), 73-5.

70 Ibid, 76-7.


72 Bosco, Five to Rule Them All, 120.

A second reason for China’s delayed admission was the effects of the Cultural Revolution. The radicalization of domestic politics in 1966 led China to announce a number of “prerequisites,” such as the “expulsion of all imperialist countries” from the UN and a resolution denouncing the U.S. as an “aggressor” in the Korean War. Making such demands rendered China’s bid for membership politically infeasible.

However, by the late 1960s, several changes laid the basis for China’s entry. First was that decolonization, particularly in Africa, led to a number of newly independent states. This changed the composition of the UN such that, by 1965, about 76% of its members hailed from the developing world, which tended to support China’s cause. Second, recognizing the PRC’s size, status as a nuclear power, and growing weight in world affairs, U.S. allies such as Italy, Austria, and Canada switched their recognition from Taipei to Beijing, and began to support the latter’s bid for UN representation. Third, mounting tensions between China and the Soviet Union, heightened by the latter’s invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, prompted Beijing to abandon its “prerequisites” and conclude that a UN seat might be useful in checking Soviet “hegemonism.” Fourth, perhaps most decisively, the U.S., led by Henry Kissinger, had entered into secret negotiations with China in July 1971, which undermined U.S. efforts in the UN to

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75 Li, “Mao Zedong zhuzhang Zhongguo bujiyu jinru Lianheguo yuanyin tansuo,” 38.

76 The dates of recognition are as follows: Canada: October 13, 1970; Italy: November 6, 1970; and Austria: May 28, 1971. U.S. allies (and UNSC permanent members) Britain and France had previously recognized the PRC, on January 6, 1950, and January 27, 1964, respectively.

77 This included bilateral contacts between China and states such as France and Cambodia, designed to shore up support for China’s bid for UN membership. Kim, “The People’s Republic in the United Nations,” 302-3; Kim, China and the United Nations, 100-2.
preserve the “China seat” for the ROC on Taiwan. Thus, by 1971, the U.S. could no longer muster sufficient opposition, and the GA was able to pass Resolution 2758 by a vote of 76 in favor, 35 opposed, and 17 abstentions.

Upon receiving this news, the Chinese leadership assembled a delegation led by Vice Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua. At the suggestion of Zhou Enlai, then-ambassador to Canada Huang Hua was selected to represent the PRC in the Security Council. In his memoirs, Qiao Guanhua relates that, en route to New York, a journalist asked him how the Chinese delegation would launch its work in the UN. Qiao responded,

To tell the truth, we’re quite unfamiliar with this institution. We need to honestly study and become familiar as soon as possible, so that China can carry out its duties as a permanent member of the Security Council.

This echoed what Chairman Mao had told the delegation privately a few days earlier: China needed to adopt the attitude of a “student,” avoid “rushing into battle unprepared,” and “meticulously” consider the complex issues with which it would soon be faced before making decisions. Such pragmatism would guide China’s behavior in the Security Council for years afterwards.

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79 Following the election of Richard Nixon in 1968, the U.S. also began to change its attitude about containment towards China. In a 1967 Foreign Affairs article, candidate Nixon argued against immediate UN admission for China, but stated that “taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to forever leave China outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors.” Richard M. Nixon, “Asia After Vietnam,” Foreign Affairs 46 (1967), 121.

80 Qiao Guanhua, Zai Lianheguo de rizi (Life in the UN) (Taiyuan, China: Beiyue Wenyi Chubanshe, 1998), 32.

81 Ibid, 41.

82 Ibid, 36. Indeed, as Zhou Enlai remarked in 1971: “We do not have too much knowledge about the United Nations and are not too conversant with the situation which has arisen within the United Nations. We must not be indiscreet and haphazard.” Quoted in Choedon, China and the United Nations, 17.
Leaning toward the Third World: 1971-1979

Three characteristics defined China’s participation in the UNSC in the years between 1971 and 1979. First was its tactic of not participating in votes on resolutions toward which it professed ideological misgivings, generally on the establishment or extension of PKOs. These included missions to monitor ceasefires between Israel and Egypt, Syria and Lebanon (respectively, the second UN Emergency Force [UNEF II], the UN Disengagement Observer Force [UNDOF] and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon [UNIFIL]), and between Turkish and Greek Cypriots (the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus [UNFICYP]). China either abstained or refrained from casting any vote, by using what it labeled the “fifth voting style” (diwu toupiao fangshi), on 63 occasions (or 32.3% of all votes) during this period. For reference, non-participation functioned as a form of abstention, allowing China to register its presence and to give justificatory speeches.

However, China dropped non-participation in favor of the more conventional device of formally abstaining in the 1980s. Table 2 offers a summary of China’s voting behavior compared to the other permanent members.

Table 2: P5 Voting in the Security Council, 1971-1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Votes N=195</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Soviet Union</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>76.4%</td>
<td>85.1%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>88.2%</td>
<td>83.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstentions or Non-Participation</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

83 Yin He, China’s Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations (Stockholm: Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2007), 20n19. The other four “voting styles” are voting affirmatively, using the veto, formally abstaining, and being absent from the vote altogether. On China’s voting behavior in the 1970s, see also: Morphet, “China as a Permanent Member of the Security Council,” 154-8.
Abstention and non-participation was a way for China to disassociate itself from UN peacekeeping in particular. Most such votes concerned the four operations listed above. The PRC’s grievances in the 1970s flowed from the perception that PKOs might be used as an instrument through which the superpowers could exercise political influence in areas such as Africa and the Middle East. Wang Yizhou, a scholar at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, attributes China’s negative attitude toward peacekeeping during the 1970s to its experience on the receiving end of United Nations forces during the Korean War. Wang also notes that China viewed UN intervention in the Congo in the 1960s, and Cyprus from 1964 onwards, as a pretext for U.S. geopolitical ambitions.\(^{84}\)

Along with voting, China’s representatives criticized PKOs in numerous public sessions of the UNSC. For instance, on October 25, 1973, Ambassador Huang Hua made the following remarks in light of the Council’s decision to establish UNEF II, which was meant to monitor the ceasefire declared between Israel and Egypt following the Yom Kippur War:

> The dispatch of a United Nations Emergency Force will be of no avail. Instead, it will leave infinite evil consequences in its wake, turning sovereign Arab states in the Middle East into an area of international control... Is not South Korea a living example? China

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has always been opposed to the dispatch of the so-called ‘peacekeeping forces.’ We maintain the same position with regard to the present situation in the Middle East. Such a practice can only pave the way for further international intervention and control, with the superpowers as the behind-the-scenes boss.  

Similar themes of anti-hegemonism and self-determination were echoed throughout China’s rhetoric on PKOS in the 1970s.

A second characteristic of China’s behavior during this decade was its support for proposals by Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) states to condemn, and promote political change in, both Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. These proposals were generally critical of the Western powers for their support of the two “racist” and “illegal” regimes. The U.S. and the U.K. vetoed a number of draft resolutions and abstained on several others. The result was that China’s voting affinity with the West on these issues was quite low. Between 1971 and 1979, for example, China’s voting affinity with the U.S. on resolutions pertaining to Southern Rhodesia and South Africa was only 29.2% (7 out of 24). In comparison, China’s overall voting affinity with the U.S. during these years was 46% (91 out of 195).

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86 See, inter alia, speeches on Cyprus (S/PV.1612, December 13, 1971); the conflict between Israel and Syria, and the subsequent establishment of UNDOF (S/PV.1774, May 31, 1974); the creation of UNIFIL (S/PV.2074, March 19, 1978); and the initial mandate of UNTAG in Namibia (S/PV.2087, September 29, 1978).

87 The Non-Aligned Movement consisted of a large number of “Third World” states, primarily in Asia and Africa, which sought not to align with either superpower during the Cold War and promoted principles of anti-hegemonism, decolonization and self-determination. For a general introduction, see: Richard L. Jackson, The Non-Aligned, the UN and the Superpowers (New York: Praeger, 1983).

88 Voting affinity refers to the share of identical votes between a pair of states in a given set of votes. In total, Western permanent members vetoed nine draft resolutions on the issues of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia during the 1970s. In five cases, the U.K. exercised a unilateral veto, with the U.S. and France abstaining; in three cases, the U.S., U.K. and France exercised a triple veto; and in one case, the U.S. and
Rhetorically supporting the liberation movement in Southern Rhodesia and opposing apartheid in South Africa was another means through which China could express solidarity with the NAM countries. For example, on September 29, 1972, the Council considered a proposal by Guinea, Somalia and Sudan, which called on the U.K. to release political prisoners, call a constitutional convention, and take other steps to promote liberation. Following a veto by the U.K., Huang Hua said the following:

…the British Government has once again shown that it stands completely on the side of the white racist regime of [Ian] Smith and that it deliberately supports the latter in perpetuating its brutal colonialist rule over 5 million Zimbabwe people...The people of Zimbabwe and the rest of Africa will surely draw the necessary lesson there-from and will further unite themselves to carry out the necessary struggles and to put an end, with their own hands, to the brutal rule of the Smith racist regime.

Like its polemics on peacekeeping, China used its position as a permanent member to pledge its support for the NAM and distinguish itself from what it saw as the unjustifiable positions of the Western powers.

A third key feature of China’s diplomatic behavior in the UNSC in the 1970s was its infrequent veto use. As Table 2 demonstrates, China voted against only two proposals between 1971 and 1979, compared to seven for France, seven for the Soviet Union, 12 for the U.K., and 18 for the U.S.

Both of China’s vetoes occurred in 1972. In August, the Council considered a request by Bangladesh for UN membership. China rejected this application on account of the U.K. exercised a joint veto, with France abstaining. In 15 other cases, the P3 states abstained. China voted in favor of each of these draft resolutions.

80 SC, Verbatim, S/PV.1666 (September 29, 1972), 15.
a request by its ally, Pakistan, to use Bangladesh as a bargaining chip in Islamabad’s attempts to gain the return of 90,000 prisoners of war held in India. Huang Hua, in his speech, also noted that Indian troops, supported by the Soviet Union, remained in Bangladesh, and thus admitting the latter to the UN while under the occupation by foreign forces was “untenable from a legal point of view.” In 1974, a three-way agreement between Pakistan, Bangladesh and India was signed, and China expressed no objections when the issue of Bangladesh’s membership was raised later that year.

In September 1972, China, along with the Soviet Union, vetoed a proposal submitted by Belgium, France, Italy and the U.K. to modify the language of a draft written by three NAM states to condemn the Israeli use of force in the Middle East. Huang Hua’s rationale for the veto was that the amendment “fails to condemn Israeli Zionism for its aggressive acts” against Syria and Lebanon. This veto is unusual in that China did not have any obvious interests at stake in the vote, aside from lending support to the NAM. It is possible that China decided to use its veto because it was insulated by the concurrent negative vote of the Soviet Union, as well as by support from every NAM non-permanent member on the Council. Even then, however, China may have realized that it had gone too far. On ten votes on the Middle East over the following five years,

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94 SC, Verbatim, S/PV.1662 (September 10, 1972), 17.

95 Specifically, at the request of India, the Western amendment was voted on by paragraph. In total, three votes were taken. China and the USSR were joined by Somalia, Guinea, Sudan and Yugoslavia on all of these sub-votes, and by India on two. The U.S. ambassador, George H.W. Bush, leveled specific criticism against Somalia, which had been the driving force behind the original draft, rather than China and Russia. See: Ibid, 16.
China opted not to participate and state its position rhetorically rather than use its veto power.\textsuperscript{96}

There are two viable explanations for China’s general restraint in exercising its veto power during the 1970s. First is that China was operating in a new organizational environment in which it was not familiar with the actors, rules, constraints, and main issues. Under these conditions, it was pragmatic for China to act as a “diligent apprentice, mastering her new trade and adjusting her crude ideological preconceptions to the institutional milieu.”\textsuperscript{97} This conforms to Qiao Guanhua’s perspective, as discussed above. Nevertheless, this argument is weakened by the fact that, as the decade wore on and the PRC acquired experience, China did not become more assertive in the sense of wielding its veto substantively to affect agenda items; it did not use its veto after 1972 and instead preferred to make its opinions known polemically.\textsuperscript{98}

The second explanation is that, in most of the topics covered by the Council at the time, China’s national interests, if any, were peripheral. Aside from the issue of Bangladesh, the PRC, which was then an autarkic country wary of formal alliances, had no major political or economic stakes in the issues at hand, from Lebanon to Cyprus to

\textsuperscript{96} These votes, which occurred from 1973 to 1978, mainly covered the authorization and extension of UNEF II, UNDOF and UNIFIL. Other resolutions more closely resembled the one China vetoed in 1972, as more general statements about Israeli policy. For instance, in January 1976, the Security Council considered a resolution calling on Israel to cede the territory it had gained in the 1967 war. China’s representative, Huang Hua, stated that the language used in the resolution might be used to “create pretexts for its policy of aggression and expansion.” See: SC, Verbatim, S/PV.1879 (January 25, 1976), 8. Huang did not participate in the vote.


\textsuperscript{98} Behind the scenes, China’s diplomats came across as uncommunicative. According to one diplomat, The Chinese tactics as practiced by Ambassador Huang...[are] to listen and to ask questions—sometimes many questions—but seldom answer any questions put to them that would indicate in the slightest in which way they were even leaning. So it became very frustrating. Quoted in Kim, China, the United Nations, and World Order, 213.
southern Africa. A Chinese diplomat said that his country was “a bit indifferent;” at the time, it was a “poor, closed country, and didn’t care [about the outcome].”

Regarding PKOs, one scholar writes that the “lack of political or economic interests” helps to explain China’s “inactive policy.” Wang Yizhou argues that China’s goals were rather to use its rhetorical power to support the NAM, which it did many times, and to use the UN as a conduit through which to forge formal diplomatic ties with states. Indeed, from 1971 to 1979, some 57 countries switched their recognition from Taipei to Beijing.

*The Silent Power: 1980-1989*

In its second decade on the Council, China scaled back its rhetorical opposition to the West and preferred largely to sit in the wings. This is evident in three respects. First, beginning with its vote in favor of an extension of UNFICYP’s mandate in December 1981, China abandoned its practice of not participating in votes on peacekeeping operations, and voted in favor of every draft related to PKOs considered in the 1980s. As a result, China’s voting affinity with the U.S. climbed from 46% in the 1970s to 73%

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102 This does not include an additional eight countries that switched recognition in 1971 prior to China’s admission to the UN.

103 The direct cause of this shift was that China faced criticism in the General Assembly for its failure to contribute to the PKO budget since 1971. Under Article 19 of the UN Charter, any state may be stripped of its voting privileges in the GA for budgetary arrears. In exchange for revising its policy on peacekeeping, the GA passed a resolution in December, 1981, stating that China would not be held accountable under Article 19. Morphet: “China as a Permanent Member of the Security Council,” 164.
in the 1980s (153 of 209 votes). China’s rate of non-participation and abstentions dropped from 32.3% in the 1970s to 6.2% in the 1980s; only France had a lower share of abstentions, at 2%. In addition, from September 1983 until the end of the decade China cast only affirmative votes. Table 3 presents the combined voting data for the P5 in the 1980s.

Table 3: P5 Voting in the Security Council, 1980-1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Votes N=209</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Soviet Union</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>77.5%</td>
<td>91.9%</td>
<td>93.8%</td>
<td>95.7%</td>
<td>90.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstentions or Non-Participation</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vetoes</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>.5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Second, China significantly reduced its use of the Council as a platform for rhetorical opposition to superpower hegemony. For instance, in January 1980, China chose not to cast a vote on a U.S. proposal to impose sanctions on Iran in light of the ongoing hostage crisis. While using the opportunity to remark on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, China’s delegate, Chen Chu, had no negative words for the U.S., stating

104 By comparison, China’s voting affinity with the Soviet Union was higher in both periods: 66% between 1971 and 1979, and 87.6% from 1981-1989. The difference can largely be explained by the USSR’s support for Third World-sponsored resolutions against Southern Rhodesia (in the 1970s) and South Africa, including the issue of Namibia (from 1977 to 1988).

105 After its decision, in December 1981, to support extensions for PKOs, China cast only two abstentions. These were on Resolution 502 (April 3, 1982), which demanded Argentina’s withdrawal from the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands; and Draft Resolution 15966, Rev. 1 (September 12, 1983), which condemned the Soviet destruction of a South Korean commercial airliner (the draft was vetoed by the USSR).
only that sanctions “may not necessarily lead to the relaxation of tensions and the release of hostages.”¹⁰⁶ Moreover, of the 14 votes on the issue of South Africa conducted between 1981 and 1988, China’s delegate offered remarks on only one occasion. On July 26, 1985, Qian Yongnian,¹⁰⁷ urged the Council to “adopt various measures of sanctions against South Africa and to support the heroic struggle of the South African people against apartheid.”¹⁰⁸ No specific criticism was leveled against the U.S. or the U.K. for their role in the matter.¹⁰⁹ In 13 other cases, China made no comment whatsoever.

Third, China did not cast any negative votes in the 1980s.¹¹⁰ China was alone among the P5 in this respect, having contributed not one of the 32 vetoes made by the permanent members combined. Indeed, China did not use its veto in any instance between 1972 and 1997.

The major reason for China’s relative silence in the 1980s was that it subordinated its ideological misgivings to the more pressing need to maintain positive ties with the U.S. and with the UN system, both of which it viewed as indispensable to the goals of


¹⁰⁷ Qian Yongnian was then a relatively low-ranking official with the title of Minister in the Chinese mission, specializing in African affairs (he eventually rose to the position of Vice Foreign Minister in the 2000s). It was, and is, unusual for any representative of any state below the rank of Deputy Permanent Representative to make speeches in the Security Council.

¹⁰⁸ SC, Verbatim, S/PV.2602 (July 26, 1985), 7.

¹⁰⁹ In two cases in which China abstained during the 1980s, its representative made speeches but did not advance any principled arguments. First, in April 1982, Ambassador Ling Qing simply “took note of” the position of the non-aligned countries to justify his abstention on a resolution calling for Argentina’s withdrawal from the Falklands (and did not criticize the U.K.). See: SC, Verbatim, S/PV.2350 (April 3, 1982), 23. Second, on September 12, 1983, Ling Qing even more circuitously cited “the serious dispute over certain aspects of the incident” to explain his abstention on a draft resolution to condemn the USSR’s destruction of a South Korean airliner, most likely to avoid having to take a firm stand with either the U.S. and its allies or the Soviet bloc. See: SC, Verbatim, S/PV.2476 (September 12, 1983), 9.

¹¹⁰ It did, however, use its veto power during private deliberations on nomination of the Secretary General. See below.
modernizing its domestic economy, acquiring advanced technology, and opening, in a limited fashion, its market to foreign trade and investment. Thus, China adopted a “differentiated and flexible policy” (qubie duidaide linghuo lichang) in the United Nations, whereby it would abandon its opposition to peacekeeping; contribute to the PKO budget; participate in subsidiary bodies, such as the Disarmament Commission and the Human Rights Commission; and refrain from rhetorical attacks against the superpowers. This was part of Deng Xiaoping’s broader “independent foreign policy of peace” (duli zizhude heping waijiao zhengce), announced in September 1982, through which amicable relations with major states and institutions, such as the UN and the IMF, would be prioritized over ideological struggle.

However, China did assert itself on one issue during this decade. In late 1981, the PRC blocked the appointment of Kurt Waldheim to a third term as Secretary General of the UN, favoring Tanzanian candidate Salim A. Salim. The result was a prolonged clash with the U.S., which favored Waldheim and used its own influence to block

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114 China had also voted against Waldheim in early balloting in 1971 and 1976, but shifted course once its show of support for the NAM had been made. Bernard D. Nossiter, “China Suggests Compromise on UN Job,” *New York Times*, November 28, 1981.
Salim. Bosco attributes China’s position to its general support for the Third World during the period. However, as we have seen, China tended not to confront the U.S. when it did not have major interests at stake, relying primarily on abstentions and oratory. A more plausible explanation is that China used this situation to express its grievances with Ronald Reagan’s decision to consider selling advanced weapons to Taiwan and to pursue what the PRC believed was a “two China policy.” The intrusion of the Taiwan issue would pose increasing difficulties for the PRC in its Council diplomacy in the 1990s.

Principled Flexibility: The Post-Cold War Era, 1990-1999

In the post-Cold War era, China’s commitment to the principles of sovereignty and the non-use of force in world politics were tested by an increasingly interventionist UN. In most instances, China demurred to the West, recording its objections but not maneuvering to obstruct proposals even when its favored norms were jeopardized. The reasons were that the PRC sought to rehabilitate its reputation in the wake of the Tiananmen Square crisis and preserve positive ties with the sole remaining superpower. Samuel Kim writes that China’s “code of conduct was to be firm in principle but flexible

115 Article 97 of the UN Charter provides that the General Assembly will approve a candidate for the post of Secretary General based on a nomination from the Security Council. According to Rule 48 of the Security Council’s Provisional Rules of Procedure, voting for the Secretary General is the only situation in which non-recorded votes may be taken. Hence, China’s vetoes in 1981 are generally not tabulated in voting statistics.

116 Bosco, Five to Rule Them All, 142.

117 Louis Witznitzer, “Waldheim Caught in US-Sino Crossfire,” Christian Science Monitor, December 7, 1981. The impasse was eventually resolved when Waldheim took himself out of contention for the position and a dark-horse candidate, Javier Perez de Cuellar of Peru, was selected. The more fundamental disagreement between China and the U.S. was resolved, for the time being, by the signing of a Joint Communiqué in August, 1982, whereby the U.S. pledged not to sell arms to Taiwan at a quantitative or qualitative level beyond that of “recent years.”
in application” when its political and ideological objectives clashed. However, in a limited number of cases, when its national interests were involved, China did utilize its veto power and risk facing the opprobrium of the very states with which it wished to ingratiate itself.

China’s overall voting pattern in the 1990s different little from the 1980s. As illustrated in Table 4, its rate of assent was about the same (93.1% in the 1990s versus 93.8% in the 1980s), while its rate of abstentions was slightly higher (6.5% versus 6.2%). Notably, its voting affinity with the U.S. jumped from 73% in the 1980s to 92.1% (591 of 642 votes). In part, this reflected the tendency of the P5 to close ranks, usually bringing texts to a vote only when consensus among the five had been reached. Scholars have also noted a degree of normative convergence among the major powers on questions related to sovereignty versus non-intervention. As Allen Carlson argues, China’s position on sovereignty did become more nuanced and flexible in the 1990s. Nevertheless, in relation to the other permanent members, China was more likely to express a dissenting opinion through abstentions, doing so 42 times over the decade. This was more than twice the number of the next most frequent dissenter, Russia, and far higher than the P3 combined.

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Table 4: P5 Voting in the Security Council, 1990-1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Votes N=642</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>USSR/Russia</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>98.9%</td>
<td>96.4%</td>
<td>93.1%</td>
<td>99.7%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstentions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>.3%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>.3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vetoes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>.8%</td>
<td>.5%</td>
<td>.3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NB: Data are inclusive from the beginning of 1990 through the end of 1999. Sources: Official Document System (ODS) of the United Nations; UN Bibliographic Information System (UNBISnet).

More specifically, China’s tendency to prioritize political relations with the U.S., except in instances in which major interests were at stake, was evident in its behavior on three sets of issues in the 1990s: peacekeeping, the use of force, and sanctions.

**Peacekeeping**

Although China had come to support PKOs in principle in the early 1980s, changes in the nature of peacekeeping during the following decade created new concerns. In his 1992 report, *An Agenda for Peace*, Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali wrote that the goal of UN intervention after the Cold War would not simply be to patrol borders, but to “address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression” via “preventive deployment”, “post-conflict peace-building,” and more heavily-armed units that would “respond to outright aggression, imminent or actual.”

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122 Ibid, passim. In terms of scope and size, peacekeeping surpassed its previous boundaries as well. In the 45 years prior to 1990, the UN authorized 18 missions; between 1990 and 1999 alone, it approved 35. At its Cold War peak in 1962, there were 26,500 ‘blue helmets’ in the field; personnel in the 1990s reached a high point of 78,800 in 1993. A list of historical and current PKOs are available from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, online at: [http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/list.shtml](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/list.shtml); Figures on UN
such as Rwanda and Bosnia, UN missions in the 1990s were broader, more frequent, and more complex than at any point during the Cold War. As Courtney Smith argues, the Council “redefined what can count as a threat to international peace and security and a proper subject of international intervention.”

China was wary about the expanding size and mandate of PKOs in the 1990s, but mainly expressed its reservations through rhetoric. For instance, in June 1995, a number of Western states proposed creating a “rapid reaction force” of some 12,500 troops within the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) operating in the former Yugoslavia. Concerned about the precedent that might be set by such a decision, China’s representative, Qin Huasun, abstained from the vote and said that:

A United Nations peace-keeping operation, as the name indicates, is for the purpose of keeping peace rather than fighting…The establishment of this [rapid reaction] force is for the purpose of enforcement actions and brings about a de facto change to the peace-keeping status of UNPROFOR. Once the force is put into operation, it is bound to become a party to the conflict, thus depriving UNPROFOR of its status as a peace-keeping force.

Similar concerns included the lack of consent of all parties prior to implementation of PKOs, the intertwining of PKOs with human rights, and fear that certain operations might infringe on the territorial integrity of states.

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125 For instance, in September 1992, the Security Council adopted Resolution 776, which enlarged the size and strength of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia. China’s representative,
Beyond rhetoric, however, the PRC did little to actively challenge the West on these matters. The main reason for this restraint appears to have been reputational. In particular, Chinese leaders in the 1990s were aware that their nation’s image needed to be restored in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen Square crisis, the fallout of which included sanctions on the PRC imposed by the U.S. and the European Community, as well as a degree of concern by neighboring states. As Allen Carlson writes,

“...an interest in playing the role of ‘good citizen’ on the international stage has led the Chinese to acquiesce to a series of interventions about which many in Beijing have real reservations.”

Moreover, in a few cases, the PRC did not simply refrain from opposing the West, but actively contributed personnel. This is reflected in its dispatch, from 1992 to 1993, of

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Li Daoyu, abstained and explained that his vote was based in part on the lack of “express consent of the parties concerned” for the operation. See: SC, Verbatim, S/PV.3114 (September 14, 1992), 12. Similarly, in June 1994, China’s Deputy Permanent Representative, Chen Jian, noted that a French proposal to augment the ongoing operation in Rwanda did not guarantee consent of the belligerents, and abstained from voting on what would become SCR 929. See: SC, Verbatim, S/PV.3392 (June 22, 1994), 4.

See, e.g., the speech of China’s Deputy Permanent Representative, Wang Xuexian, explaining China’s abstention on a proposal to add a Human Rights Office to the UN Observer Mission in Georgia. SC, Verbatim, S/PV.3707 (October 22, 1996), 2.

For instance, in March 1997 the UNSC authorized the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to deploy a multinational force to Albania; Qin Huasun argued that the problem is mainly an “internal affair” and “for the Security Council to authorize action in a country because of strife resulting from the internal affairs of that country is inconsistent with the provisions of the United Nations Charter.” SC, Verbatim, S/PV.3758 (March 28, 1997), 2-3.

As Ann Kent notes, in the context of human rights, the PRC’s drive to improve its image “does not mean that China has internalized international norms, but that it is prepared to be more pragmatic about its interests than its statements of principles would suggest, and to make tactical adaptations.” Ann Kent, *China, the United Nations and Human Rights: The Limits of Compliance* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 358; Su Changhe, a professor at the Shanghai Foreign Studies University, also notes that breaking out of its post-1989 isolation was a main driver of China’s strategy in the 1990s (interview, September 2009).

several hundred engineers and observers to the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).\textsuperscript{130}

Nevertheless, China did exercise its veto power on a handful of peacekeeping-related issues in the 1990s. In each case, the issue was not peacekeeping itself but rather the brewing diplomatic hostilities between China and Taiwan. First, in February 1995, China introduced a proposal to drastically scale down the size of the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) from about 6,000 to 1,000 personnel and threatened to veto any other plan. This was a result of the invitation from Port-a-Prince for Taiwan’s vice president to attend the inauguration ceremony for Haiti’s new president, René Préval.\textsuperscript{131} Owing to the opposition of the other 14 members of the Council, and especially to the opinion among Latin American members of the NAM that the PRC was acting unreasonably, China eventually agreed to a Canada-sponsored compromise to only modestly reduce the strength of UNMIH.\textsuperscript{132}

Second, in January 1997, China vetoed a resolution to deploy military observers to monitor a ceasefire that had recently been declared in Guatemala’s long-running civil war. The problem for the PRC was that Guatemala recognized Taiwan, had supported efforts to have the question of possible Taiwanese membership in UN placed on the General Assembly’s agenda since 1993, and had most recently invited Taiwan’s foreign minister

\textsuperscript{130} In addition to UNTAC, China also dispatched troops to seven other PKOs in the 1990s, but the number of personnel in any of these did not exceed 20. For a detailed list of China’s PKO commitments in the 1990s, see: James Reilly and Bates Gill, “Sovereignty, Intervention and Peacekeeping: The View from Beijing,” \textit{Survival} 42 (2000), 45.


to attend the signing of the peace agreement in Guatemala City.\textsuperscript{133} Explaining his veto, Qin Huasun was candid about his government’s position:

The Guatemalan authorities cannot expect to have the cooperation of China in the Security Council while taking actions to infringe upon China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. No country’s peace process should be at the expense of another country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.\textsuperscript{134}

However, following ten days of negotiations, China and Guatemala reached an agreement, whereby the latter promised to drop its support for Taiwan’s annual UN application.\textsuperscript{135}

On January 20, the military observer mission was approved unanimously.

Third, in February 1999, China vetoed an extension of the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia, which had been created in 1995 as part of the larger program of peace restoration in the Balkans. In his remarks, Qin Huasun did not mention that Macedonia had recently switched its diplomatic recognition from Beijing to Taipei, nor did he mention the Taiwan issue at all. Rather, he claimed that, because the situation in Macedonia “has apparently stabilized in the past few years,” UNPREDEP was no longer necessary, and its resources should be spent on other operations.\textsuperscript{136} However, observers attributed China’s decision to Taiwan.\textsuperscript{137} For instance,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{133} Zhao, 	extit{Jiangou heping}, 172-4.
  \item \textsuperscript{134} SC, Verbatim, S/PV.3730 (January 10, 1997), 20.
  \item \textsuperscript{135} In addition to China’s efforts, it was reported that the U.S. and several other states pressured Guatemala to concede to the PRC’s demands so that the observer mission could be approved. John M. Goshko, “China Backs UN Monitors for Guatemala,” \textit{Washington Post}, January 21, 1997.
  \item \textsuperscript{136} SC, Verbatim, S/PV.3982 (February 25, 1999), 6-7.
\end{itemize}
the Canadian representative, Robert Fowler, said that China’s action appeared to be “compelled by bilateral concerns unrelated to UNPREDEP.” As Zhao Lei, a scholar at the Central Party School in Beijing, writes, “the purpose behind China’s two vetoes was to protect national sovereignty and dignity.”

The issues of Haiti, Guatemala and Macedonia, in themselves, were each peripheral to China’s national interests. China’s assertive posture can instead be understood in the context of deteriorating cross-Straits relations in the mid-1990s, in which Taiwan’s president, Lee Teng-hui, adopted what Beijing saw as a “splitist” approach in comparison to his conciliatory posture in the 1980s and early 1990s. This was evidenced by Lee’s promulgating a “two states theory” (liangguo lun) of cross-Straits relations, making pro-independence remarks on a trip to the U.S., and seeking a more visible profile in international politics, including the UN. China’s behavior in the UN made sense as a way to display a willingness to pay a public cost—going so far as to cast solo vetoes on otherwise uncontroversial subjects in the Security Council—to punish states that welcomed Lee’s overtures for closer official ties.

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138 Fowler also blamed the government of Macedonia for precipitating the “bilateral dispute” and called China’s veto use “unfortunate and inappropriate.” SC, Verbatim, S/PV.3982 (February 25, 1999), 7.

139 Zhao, *Jianguo heping*, 177. See also: Pang, “China’s Changing Attitudes to UN Peacekeeping,” 100; Reilly and Gill, “Sovereignty, Intervention and Peacekeeping,” 47.


142 In a sense, these diplomatic battles were skirmishes in the larger contest with the U.S. during the 1990s, in which China feared that U.S. military and diplomatic support for Taipei would embolden Lee and diminish Beijing’s chances of achieving a settlement under the rubric of its one country/two systems (yiguo liangzhi) approach.
The Use of Force

In several cases during the 1990s, China expressed concerns about UNSC authorization for the use of force. China adopted the position that military action, especially by the U.S. and its allies in situations in which no external threat existed, might erode the norm of sovereignty. Pragmatic and historical factors lay beneath this opposition. First, the PRC worried that a weakening of sovereignty might ultimately create a pretext for external influence in Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan and other parts of China’s own restive territory.143 Second, as Wu Xinbo explains, China’s emphasis on sovereignty was based in its own experience of exploitation by foreign imperialists in the 19th and 20th centuries. There was a conviction that stronger states, especially the U.S., might use intervention to encircle or weaken China.144 Nonetheless, due to its desire to rehabilitate relations with the U.S., and the international community writ large, in the wake of Tiananmen, the PRC was reluctant to use its veto power to actually prevent intervention.

China’s rhetoric betrays its anxiety about the use of force. In December 1992, the PRC voted in favor of Resolution 794, which approved the U.S.-led Unified Task Force in Somalia, but its representative, Li Daoyu, said that the measure “may adversely affect the collective role” of the UN, and voted affirmatively only due to the “unique situation” prevailing in Somalia.145 18 months later, China abstained on a French-sponsored request


145 SC, Verbatim, S/PV.3145 (December 3, 1992), 17.
to authorize Operation Turquoise in Rwanda, noting that the consent of all parties had not been received, and that the “experience and lessons” of Somalia cautioned against military action.¹⁴⁶ A month later, China abstained on Resolution 940, which laid the basis for Operation Uphold Democracy, in Haiti, executed by the U.S. military. China’s ambassador, Li Zhaoxing, said that this would set a “dangerous precedent” and would “not contribute to a fundamental solution” to the problem.¹⁴⁷

In 1999, the U.S. and its NATO allies sought, but did not receive, the UN’s blessing for Operation Allied Force, the air war in Serbia. One might expect that China, leery about the excessive use of force by the U.S., would have taken concrete actions to prevent UN approval for this request. However, Colin Keating, New Zealand’s UN representative in the 1990s, notes that China took a “backseat role” to Russia during the negotiations. Warren Hoge, then a New York Times correspondent at the UN, recalls that China did not want to “make waves” on the issue.¹⁴⁸ Indeed, it was mainly Russian opposition that prevented a resolution, which makes sense given Moscow’s more obvious strategic interests in preventing Western military occupation in the Balkans.¹⁴⁹ Remarkably, even after a NATO warplane destroyed China’s embassy in Belgrade during the war, China did not use its veto power to forestall U.S.-led efforts to authorize KFOR,

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¹⁴⁸ Interviews, New York, January 2010.
¹⁴⁹ Bosco, Five to Rule Them All, 209-214. In particular, Bosco cites then-British Foreign Minister Robin Cook, who said that “The only thing that has blocked us until now has been the prospect of a Russian veto.” Quoted in Ibid., 212.
the NATO peacekeeping mission in Kosovo relying, instead, on rhetoric to air its grievances.150

China’s restraint in these cases is attributable to three factors. First, as with PKOs, China sought to improve its standing with the international community, and would have been hard pressed to do this while simultaneously obstructing humanitarian missions of the type executed in Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti.151 Second, Chinese leaders recognized that the PRC lacked the strength to resist U.S. “hegemonism” in the 1990s, and that its primary purpose, modernization, would be better served by maintaining positive ties with the U.S. and its allies. Deng Xiaoping himself reportedly told Central Committee members in December 1990:

A few Third World countries would like China to raise its profile [in the UN], but China must not do so; this is a basic national policy. Our strength is insufficient to take on such a role…China always stands on the side of the Third World and resists hegemonism, but must not take the lead.152

150 In particular, China’s Deputy Permanent Representative, Shen Guofang, abstained on the vote leading to Resolution 1244, and made impassioned remarks about NATO’s deleterious actions. In his speech, Shen said that,

This war, waged in the name of humanitarianism, has in fact produced the greatest humanitarian catastrophe in post-Second World War Europe and has seriously undermined peace and stability in the Balkans. Naturally, it has been met with strong international condemnation.

SC, Verbatim, S/PV.4011 (June 10, 1999), 8.

151 Nigel Thalakada, for instance, writes that China’s acquiescence on issues such as these was part of a “persistent effort to ingratiate itself with certain members of the international community, especially the U.S. and other members of the Western bloc.” Thalakada, “China’s Voting Pattern in the Security Council,” 87.

152 Quoted in Zheng, Gaige kaifang yilaide zhongguo waijiao, 17. The perspective that Zheng, a professor and vice president at the China Foreign Affairs University, relates, is part of a broader strategic rubric known as taoguang yanghui, part of a summary of Deng’s strategic thought as formulated in the early 1990s by then-Foreign Minister Qian Qichen. Taoguang Yanghui is usually translated into English as “hiding one’s capabilities and biding one’s time.” In this circumstance, however, it might be conceived of as “placing strategic priorities above ideological beliefs.”
Third, China had no major strategic interests at stake in any of the states mentioned above, in terms of geography, trade or alliance relations. As Zhao Lei writes, when national interests are not at stake, China tends to explicate its principles but adopt a “detached attitude” (chaotuode taidu) in terms of actively pursuing an alternative agenda.  

The one instance in which China did adopt an assertive position was during the run-up to the Gulf War in 1990. In order to secure approval of a UN mandate for its offensive in Iraq, the U.S. went to great lengths to acquire the support, or at least acquiescence, of the other 14 members of the UNSC. The PRC was ambivalent about the U.S. proposal, opposed to the use of force in principle, but also against Iraq’s breach of Kuwait’s sovereignty. Beijing initially resisted U.S. overtures, not because it saw military action as a threat to its interests, but because it saw a chance to extract important concessions from the U.S. To gain China’s consent, the U.S. agreed to resume high-level exchanges with Beijing, which had been suspended in 1989; four days after the vote, the World Bank, presumably influenced by the U.S., released a $114.3 million loan to support rural industries in the PRC. Both decisions helped China to ease its way out of the international isolation created a year earlier by the Tiananmen crackdown.

Sanctions


155 The U.S. was apparently unclear about whether China’s obligation under the tit-for-tat deal was to vote in favor of the resolution (SCR 678, November 29, 1990) or merely to abstain. The U.S. was dissatisfied with China’s abstention, but President Bush’s desire to resume positive relations with Beijing overrode this concern, and high-level exchanges were resumed. James Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton (New York: Vintage, 1998), 248-9.

156 The World Bank loan was that organization’s first to China for any project other than “basic human needs” since Tiananmen. Thalakada, “China’s Voting Pattern in the Security Council,” 103-4.
During the 1990s, the Security Council made heavier use of sanctions against states and, in some cases, non-state actors. Whereas the Council had enacted only two sanctions regimes during the entire Cold War (on South Africa and Southern Rhodesia), it established 11 between 1990 and 1999.\textsuperscript{157} It also considered, but did not impose, sanctions on other parties, including North Korea and one side in the civil war in Cambodia. As with PKOs, China voiced concerns about the use of sanctions, but rarely used its veto power to alter the substance of proposals. During the decade, China abstained on 16 relevant votes. These are listed in Table 5.

### Table 5: Chinese Abstentions on Sanctions-Related Votes in the 1990s\textsuperscript{158}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Res.</th>
<th>Vote</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3/31/1992</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Imposes aviation, arms embargo due to concerns about Libyan-sponsored terrorism</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>10,0,5</td>
<td>PR Li Daoyu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/30/1992</td>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>Imposes economic, aviation, arms, cultural embargoes on Serbia and Montenegro (the FRY)</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>13,0,2</td>
<td>PR Li Daoyu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/9/1992</td>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>Bans military flights in FRY airspace</td>
<td>781</td>
<td>14,0,1</td>
<td>DPR Jin Yongjian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/16/1992</td>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>Demands end to external interference (from the FRY) in Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>787</td>
<td>13,0,2</td>
<td>PR Li Daoyu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/30/1992</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Threatens measures against Party of Democratic Kampuchea for failure to meet obligations under Paris Treaty</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>14,0,1</td>
<td>PR Li Daoyu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/31/1993</td>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>Extends ban on military flights</td>
<td>816</td>
<td>14,0,1</td>
<td>DPR Chen Jian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/17/1993</td>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>Threatens sanctions on Bosnian Serbs for continued violence</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>13,0,2</td>
<td>DPR Chen Jian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/11/1993</td>
<td>N. Korea</td>
<td>Calls on DPRK to rejoin Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>13,0,2</td>
<td>PR Li Zhaoxing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/11/1993</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Imposes economic and financial sanctions on Libya for failure to comply with previous resolutions</td>
<td>883</td>
<td>11,0,4</td>
<td>PR Li Zhaoxing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{157} A full listing of sanctions committees established by the Security Council can be found online, at: \url{http://www.un.org/sc/committees/}.

\textsuperscript{158} The Appendix provides a full account of Chinese abstentions from 1971 to 2009, including a summary of the principles cited in the justificatory speeches.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Country/Region</th>
<th>Action Description</th>
<th>Resolution</th>
<th>Russian Vote</th>
<th>Permanent Representative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12/2/1994</td>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>Affirms that economic measures adopted under SCR 820 be enforced</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Russian veto</td>
<td>PR Li Zhaoxing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/21/1995</td>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>Extends partial suspension of particular measures against the FRY</td>
<td>988</td>
<td>13,0,2</td>
<td>PR Li Zhaoxing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/26/1996</td>
<td>Ethiopia-Sudan</td>
<td>Imposes sanctions on Sudan in relation to failure to extradite suspects</td>
<td>1054</td>
<td>14,0,1</td>
<td>PR Qin Huasun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/16/1996</td>
<td>Ethiopia-Sudan</td>
<td>Imposes aviation sanctions on Sudan for non-compliance with SCR 1054</td>
<td>1070</td>
<td>13,0,2</td>
<td>PR Qin Huasun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/20/1997</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Threatens travel ban on Iraq for failure to cooperate with UNSCOM</td>
<td>1134</td>
<td>10,0,5</td>
<td>Counselor Liu Jieyi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/31/1998</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>Imposes arms embargo on FRY due to situation in Kosovo</td>
<td>1160</td>
<td>14,0,1</td>
<td>DPR Shen Guofang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/14/1998</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>Demands FRY comply with OSCE and NATO missions in Kosovo</td>
<td>1203</td>
<td>13,0,2</td>
<td>PR Qin Huasun</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NB: Purpose describes only the aspects of the proposal relevant to sanctions; some are omnibus proposals that also deal with other subjects, such as peacekeeping. Voting is written as “yes, no, abstain.” PR=permanent representative; DPR=deputy permanent representative. Sources: Official Document System (ODS) of the United Nations; UN Bibliographic Information System (UNBISnet).

Rhetorically, almost without exception, China opposed the threat or use of sanctions on the grounds that coercion tends to be counterproductive. For instance, in March 1992 the UN authorized sanctions on Libya in relation to the latter’s intransigence over international legal proceedings following the Lockerbie bombings. Justifying his abstention, China’s delegate, Li Daoyu, said that:

> In principle we do not support the Security Council imposing sanctions against Libya, because sanctions will not settle the question but will rather complicate the issue further, aggravate regional tensions and have serious economic consequences for the countries concerned in the region.\(^{159}\)

Similarly, in April 1993, the Council threatened to impose an array of sanctions on Bosnian Serbs for their reluctance to participate in a peace settlement. Ambassador Chen Jian objected on the basis that,

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\(^{159}\) SC, Verbatim, S/PV.3069 (March 31, 1992), 52.
The actions authorized by the resolution will not only bring suffering to the people in the country…but also be gravely detrimental to the economies of the third countries implementing such sanctions provisions.”

In May 1994, China endorsed sanctions on Haiti, which were meant to help restore President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power, but did so only under the “highly unique circumstances now prevailing [there],” and stated that its vote “does not presuppose any change in our position” on sanctions.

In disassociating itself from sanctions resolutions, China was sometimes able to rely on sympathetic speeches and votes from other states on the Security Council. The PRC cast sole abstentions on less than one-third of votes (5 of 16). More broadly, China stood alone on only 15 of its 42 abstentions in the 1990s. On several occasions, China was joined by non-permanent members, such as Cuba, Yemen, Zimbabwe, and Pakistan, which held various similar reservations regarding the appropriateness and effectiveness of sanctions.

A notable trend that developed in this respect was a normative alignment between China and Russia, both of which were wary in general about the excessive application of coercion (both the use of force and sanctions) by the U.S. and its allies. On sanctions votes, Russia abstained with China five times in the 1990s, on issues including Bosnia,

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162 To illustrate, in April 1993, Russia joined China in abstaining on Western-sponsored sanctions against the FRY. Ambassador Yuli Vorontsov argued that Serbia should be given “one last chance” to comply with international demands and that the Russian Federation had “serious misgivings about the possible negative consequences of the kind of haste we are showing today.” SC, Verbatim, S/PV.3200 (April 17, 1993), 11-12.
Sudan, Iraq and Kosovo. However, despite its concerns, China did not use its veto power to block the approval of these resolutions.

China’s restraint on sanctions was likely a product of two interrelated factors. First was that, as with PKOs and the use of force, it was reluctant to actively challenge the West at a time when it sought to rehabilitate its reputation and positive relations with the U.S. and other developed countries. Acquiescing on sanctions on “pariahs,” such as Libya, Haiti and Serbia was a way to maintain its image as a positive actor on the world stage. Second, the price paid by China to do so was not high. With the exception of Afghanistan, none of the targeted states were geographically contiguous with the PRC, and so China did not need to worry excessively about negative spillover effects. China’s economic relations with these states were also somewhat low; the only case in which China’s bilateral trade exceeded $100 million at the time sanctions were imposed was Libya. In addition, there is little evidence of the PRC carrying out military sales to any state subjected to UN measures in the 1990s.

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163 The sanctions resolutions on which both China and Russia abstained in the 1990s were SCR 820 (April 17, 1993) on Bosnia; SCR 988 (April 21, 1995) on Bosnia; SCR 1070 (August 16, 1996) on Sudan; SCR 1134 (October 20, 1997) on Iraq; and SCR 1203 (October 14, 1998) on Kosovo.

164 In October, 1999, the Council passed SCR 1267, which placed various restrictions (including on aviation and finances) on the Taliban and al-Qaeda. China did not have diplomatic relations with the Taliban, and the sanctions in questions were not territorial in nature (e.g. an arms embargo on Afghanistan), though China does share a small land border with Afghanistan in the extreme west of the country.

165 Of the states targeted in the 1990s, five (Angola, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone) were in sub-Saharan Africa, two (Libya and Iraq) were in the Middle East, one (the FRY) was in Europe, one (Haiti) was in Latin America, and one (Afghanistan) was in Central Asia.

166 However, this was primarily in the petroleum sector, which was excluded from the scope of the sanctions regime and, in any case, China had yet to establish its ‘go out’ policy to secure natural resources from abroad. In 1991, China’s aggregate trade with Libya was $107,174,271. Source: UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UNComtrade). Figures for 1992 (when sanctions were imposed) are not available. Other states with non-negligible trade at the time of sanctions imposition were the former Yugoslavia ($83,701,595 in 1992, though this figure actually dropped during the decade to a mere $14,958,121 in 1996) and Sudan ($86,732,227, mostly from oil sales to China, though sanctions on Sudan were limited to a handful of actors that were not cooperating in attempts to extradite suspects in the
The notable exception was China’s attitude towards pressure against North Korea in 1993 and 1994. In March 1993, the DPRK announced that it would withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and refuse inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In response, the U.S. circulated a draft stating that North Korea should not withdraw from the NPT and ought to allow the IAEA to continue inspections. Concerned about a destabilizing North Korean response, China refused to countenance a pivotal clause calling for “further Security Council action” if the DPRK continued to waver on the NPT and reject cooperation with the IAEA.\footnote{168} China, with Pakistan, subsequently abstained on the weaker final text of what would become Resolution 825. In his remarks, Ambassador Li Zhaoxing stated that the issue should be dealt with by the IAEA, as Council involvement might “lead to the intensification and escalation” of tensions on the Korean peninsula.\footnote{169}

A year later, following a suspension of its announcement that it would withdraw from the NPT and some progress on inspections, North Korea again denied the IAEA access to several nuclear sites. The U.S. once more tried to gather support for a resolution prodding the DPRK with the threat of “further action.” However, this time China was not willing to acquiesce to any resolution, but only to a less authoritative Presidential

\footnote{167} The one exception appears to be Sudan. Specifically, according to the SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, China delivered seven F-7M fighters to Sudan in 1997, though even this was not affected by UN measures, which did not include a ban on arms transfers. The database makes no mention of arms sales to any other state subjected to UN sanctions in the 1990s.


\footnote{169} SC, Verbatim, S/PV.3212 (May 11, 1993), 43.
Statement, which asked the DPRK to cooperate with the IAEA and to resume peaceful
dialogue. During this episode, Washington’s top China diplomat, Winston Lord, said
that “China is acting on Korea in its own self-interest” and that the main reason why the
U.S. didn’t pursue a stronger response was the concern that China might try to “obstruct
the international consensus.” The 1993-4 North Korean crisis presaged China’s more
assertive role in the 2000s on debates connected to a series of pariah states.

In sum, China continued to practice strategic restraint in the UNSC in the 1990s.
Though it occasionally exercised power when its interests on matters such as Taiwan or
North Korea were threatened, it generally prioritized positive relations with the U.S. This
made sense in light of China’s desire to rebuild its reputation after Tiananmen and further
integrate itself into the international community. China’s diplomatic rhetoric did note
objections on the grounds of protecting sovereignty and opposing potentially ineffective
sanctions, though these concerns did not translate into substantive efforts to resist
intervention.

Into the Fray: The Dawn of the 21st Century, 2000-2011

In the early 21st century, China moved beyond a restrained posture and toward a
more active role in the Council. This manifested itself in two distinct ways. First, the
PRC made notable contributions in terms of support for UN peacekeeping operations.
China’s motivation in doing so was to improve its image as a responsible power,
especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Second, China took a more active and, on occasion,

contentious role in negotiations on how to address the challenges created by a series of pariah states, including North Korea, Iran, Sudan, Burma and Zimbabwe. As it had done on occasion since the 1970s, China used influence in negotiations when it perceived that major interests were jeopardized.

Convergence

In the aggregate, China’s voting behavior in the UNSC at the outset of the 21st century was virtually indistinguishable from its peers. Of the 636 votes that took place between 2000 and 2009, China voted affirmatively 97.8% of the time, abstained on only 12 ballots and used its veto twice. Its abstention rate was slightly higher than the U.S. (1.9% versus 1.3%), while its veto rate was somewhat lower (.3% versus 1.4%). As it had begun to do in the 1990s, the P5 closed ranks even further in the 2000s, such that unanimous voting outcomes were the norm. Overall, 94% of votes (598 of 636) received support from all five of the permanent members. Table 6 illustrates the voting behavior of the P5 over the course of these ten years.

Table 6: P5 Voting in the Security Council, 2000-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Votes N=636</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>97.3%</td>
<td>97.8%</td>
<td>97.8%</td>
<td>99.4%</td>
<td>98.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstentions</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>1.57%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>.63%</td>
<td>1.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vetoes</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>.63%</td>
<td>.3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NB: Data are inclusive from the beginning of 2000 through the end of 2009. Sources: Official Document System (ODS) of the United Nations; UN Bibliographic Information System (UNBISnet).

Moreover, China’s voting affinity with the U.S. continued to increase. The two countries agreed on 95.3% (606 of 636) of votes in the 2000s, up from 92.1% (591 of 642)
in the previous decade. This was slightly lower than China’s affinity with Russia, which reached 98.4% in the 2000s (626 of 636), continuing the trend of comparative Sino-Russian agreement. Figure 2, below, shows the convergence of China’s voting positions with those of the U.S. and Russia in the four decades since the PRC was admitted to the Council.

Figure 2: China’s Voting Affinity with the U.S. and Russia, 1971-2009

Sources: Official Document System (ODS) of the United Nations; UN Bibliographic Information System (UNBISnet).

At the same time, China’s rhetorical objections largely disappeared. To illustrate, in the 1990s, China’s representative had made comments in 43 of 52 (82.7%) sanctions-related votes, stressing civilian costs, sovereignty and other principles. By contrast, in the 2000s, remarks were issued in only 21 of 99 votes on sanctions (21.2%). Additionally, not all of the speeches were meant to disassociate China from the decision. In November 2004, for instance, the UNSC authorized an arms embargo and other measures against the government of Côte D’Ivoire, which had staged an attack on French peacekeepers in the
country. China’s ambassador, Wang Guangya, said that the PRC “favors further Council action” due to the “current serious situation” in the country, noting that this was also the position of the African Union.172

There are four mutually-compatible ways of explaining this convergence between China and the West. First is that China’s attitudes on interventionism, to a degree, became more similar to those of the U.S. and others.173 Zhang Guihong, director of the UN studies program at Fudan University, recalls that China, in 2005, supported the World Summit Outcome Document, which condoned collective action to halt genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and war crimes. In doing so, China abandoned any pretense of supporting an absolutist notion of sovereignty.174 It would be misleading, however, to argue that the PRC has come to support the West on uninvited intervention when the issue does not fall into one of the above-cited categories, such as the more routine political violence that occurred in Myanmar and Zimbabwe.175 One Chinese diplomat states that sovereignty remains the “most important rule of international relations.”176


173 For instance, Xing Yue and Zhan Yijia of Tsinghua University argue that China’s evolving identity as a status-quo power, and thus its perception of its own interests, led to greater affinity with the U.S. in Security Council votes. Xing Yue and Zhan Yijia, “Xin shenfen, xin liyi, xin waijiao,” (“New Identity, New Interests, New Diplomacy”), *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi* (*Contemporary International Relations*), No. 11, 2006, 22. This is also the opinion of Chen Xue, a scholar at the Shanghai Institutes of International Studies, and Su Changhe, a professor at the Shanghai Foreign Studies University (interviews, September, 2009). See also: Chengqiu Wu, “Sovereignty, Human Rights and Responsibility,” *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 15 (2010), 71-97.

174 Interview, Shanghai, September 2009.


Second, some of the disagreement about the scope of peacekeeping that existed in the 1990s was rendered irrelevant as PKOs were scaled back in the 2000s. Numerically, whereas the Council approved 35 missions in the 1990s, it authorized only 10 in the 2000s. In a qualitative sense, the missions that were established in the 2000s largely fit the model of “peace support operations,” in which the UN would only intervene after a “pivotal state,” such as the U.S., or a regional organization, such as NATO or the African Union, had secured the environment from a military point of view. The result of this transformation was that China’s concern about PKOs becoming mired in ongoing violence was diminished, and it could thus lend its approval to operations of the type conducted in East Timor, Sierra Leone, Côte D’Ivoire and elsewhere.

Third is that China’s positions have tended not to be influenced by the issue of Taiwan, as they were in earlier periods. One exception is that, in September 2003, the PRC held up an operation in Liberia until that state switched its diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. In general, however, the Taiwan issue was of decreasing relevance simply because, aside from Haiti, the UN did not have any PKOs in the

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177 Of course, several missions begun in the 1990s persisted into the following decade. As of mid-2010, there were a total of 16 current PKOs, employing more than 100,000 personnel. Data drawn from the UN Department of Peacekeeping, online at: [http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/).

178 This transformation was precipitated by the 2000 Brahimi Report, which was ordered by Secretary General Kofi Annan to assess PKOs and recommend changes in light of problems associated with situations like Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia. The full report was issued as UN General Assembly Document A/55/305 (August 21, 2000), and can be found online at: [http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations](http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations). For a discussion, see: Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams and Stuart Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping* (Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 2004), 87-8, and Stähle, “China’s Shifting Attitude Towards United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,” 647-650.

179 Specifically, China withheld support for a twelve-month mandate for the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), created to stabilize the country after the resignation of Charles Taylor until the new government promised to switch recognition, which it did about one month after UNMIL was authorized. After the diplomatic switch, China itself contributed 500 troops and offered economic aid to the country, Evan S. Medeiros, *China’s International Behavior: Activism, Opportunism, and Diversification* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), 185.
dwindling number of states that recognized Taiwan in the 2000s. China even overlooked Haiti’s ties with Taiwan, as Beijing “appeared to recognize the benefits of a less punitive and more incentive-based strategy.” Moreover, with the 2008 election of Ma Ying-jeou as Taiwan’s President, the two sides declared a “diplomatic truce” whereby the PRC would refrain from prying away Taipei’s few remaining partners.

A fourth plausible reason for convergence arises from the political dynamics of the UN itself. Specifically, the P5 have faced a growing lobby from states such as India, Germany and Japan to permit changes in the membership of the Council that would better reflect the changing distribution of global power. Each of the current permanent members has an incentive to forestall reform, which would either mean a weakening of their veto rights; a larger, more unwieldy, and less effective institution; or both. To preserve its stake in what Barry Buzan terms a system of “unipolarized multipolarity,” then, China might opt to subjugate its ideological objections to the imperative of P5 unity both in terms of voting and in refraining from making dissenting speeches. Although

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180 *China’s Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping*, 18.

181 Indeed, in August 2008, Beijing declined Paraguay’s offer to switch its diplomatic recognition, most likely as a way to protect the rapprochement in its relations with Taiwan. Qiang Xin, “Beyond Power Politics: Institution-Building and Mainland China’s Taiwan Policy Transition,” *Journal of Contemporary China* 19 (2010), 536-7.

182 In the mid-2000s, two reform camps emerged among non-P5 major powers. One, known as the G4 (Japan, Germany, India and Brazil) submitted a proposal to the GA that would have added six permanent, but non-veto-holding spots to the Council, as well as the addition of four non-permanent spots, raising the membership of the UNSC to 25. A second group, known as Uniting for Consensus and driven by Pakistan, Argentina, South Korea and others, called for the addition of ten non-permanent positions, likewise raising the total to 25. Due to internal divisions among these groups, as well as the lack of full support by all five current permanent members, which hold veto power over UNSC reform, neither proposal gained much traction. Nevertheless, calls for a Security Council that better reflects changes in the distribution of power since 1945 have remained and grown louder in the past several years.

internal divisions among the reformers have reduced pressures on the P5, it is still arguably in the interests of the five to present a façade of unity to the world.184

Responsible Stakeholder: China and Peacekeeping in the 2000s

A second noticeable feature of China’s UN diplomacy in the early 21st century has been its contributions to PKOs. As we have seen, China came to support peacekeeping in principle in the 1980s and offered a small number of personnel to missions in the 1990s. However, in the 2000s, China significantly expanded the overall size of its peacekeeping contingent, rising from 98 at the end of 2000 to 2,136 at the end of 2009. By the end of 2009, China had personnel deployed in ten of the UN’s 19 ongoing operations, stretching from Haiti to Lebanon to Sudan. Among all contributing states, China’s rank was 15. In comparison to the other P5 states, China ranked first and, among G20 nations, it ranked fourth (behind Italy, India and South Africa).185 Overall, China sent more than 10,000 “blue helmets” to 22 missions in the years between 1989 and 2009, with the large majority participating since 2003.186 Figure 3 shows the annual levels of China’s troop contributions.

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185 Data are drawn from the UN Department of Peacekeeping, online at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/.

186 China’s Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping, 1.
China’s financial contributions to the UN peacekeeping budget grew accordingly in the 2000s. From a level of about .9% in the 1990s, China’s share of the overall PKO budget rose to above 3% in 2008, which is notable since the budget itself grew from $2.5 billion in 2000 to over $8 billion in 2008.\(^{187}\) This marked the highest rate of Chinese appropriations since the mid-1970s, when the PRC, in an effort to establish itself as a leader of developing states in the UN, subsidized about 5% of the institution’s budget.\(^{188}\) It should be mentioned, though, that China still lagged well behind the U.S., Britain and France both in absolute terms and accounting for GDP.\(^{189}\) Among the P5, China in the

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\(^{187}\) Ibid, 7-8.


\(^{189}\) In specific, in 2008, Britain and France both appropriated an amount equal to .02% of GDP, the U.S. .01%, China .005%, and Russia .006%. As a share of the PKO budget, the U.S. contributed about 26%, Britain 7.8%, France 7.4%, China 3%, and Russia 1.4%. *China’s Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping*, 8.
early 2000s surpassed Russia, whose contributions declined sharply from early 1990s levels of nearly 10%.  

Tactically, China’s evolution from acquiescence to active participation in PKOs can be attributed to the operational experience gained by the military, police and other forces it sends into the field. As Drew Thompson points out, overseas missions allow the Chinese armed forces to “learn from other nation’s systems,” including in the medical, logistical, and engineering areas. China is reportedly especially interested in participating in missions in which it is able to work directly with units seconded from advanced militaries, such as France or the U.S. Knowing how new technologies and practices can be applied to a complex and dangerous environment can also enhance China’s ability to respond to domestic crises, such as the Sichuan earthquake or the Tibetan riots, both of which occurred in 2008.

At a strategic level, China’s transition from restraint to action is related to a larger effort to enhance its image as a “responsible” power. This motive can be divided into two components. First, within host countries, China has sought to make a positive impression on the citizens and elites with which its personnel are in direct contact, countering images of China as exploitative and harmful and facilitating China’s economic objectives, such as securing natural resources, in areas such as sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia. PKOs, then, fit into larger diplomatic “charm offensives” which also include elements

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190 Peng, “Cong huifei bianhua kan Zhongguo yu Lianheguo guanxide yanbian,” 49.
192 China’s Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping, 15.
ranging from debt forgiveness, to high-level exchanges, government scholarships, and infrastructure development aid.\footnote{See: Jonathan Holslag, et al., “Chinese Resources and Energy Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Report for the Development Committee of the European Parliament, March 19, 2007, 13-19; Joshua Kurlantzick, \textit{Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World} (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), xi. The results of China’s efforts at the local level appear to have been mixed. On one hand, some leaders, such as the President of Liberia, have noted the “quality and professionalism” of Chinese personnel (\textit{China’s Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping}, 13). However, because China is but one, moderate contributor to large multinational missions, its role can be overlooked. For instance, Miwa Hirano, a scholar who conducted fieldwork with UN operations in Cambodia, notes that most locals “didn’t even know that Chinese were involved in the situation” (Comments at a panel on “Chinese Peacekeeping: Linkage Between Theory and Practice,” International Studies Association Annual Meeting, February 20, 2010).}

Second, participation in PKOs buttresses China’s self-characterization as a “responsible great power” (\textit{fuzerende daguo}) that assumes public obligations commensurate with its growing size and resources.\footnote{Men Honghua, “Zhongguo heping jueqi de guoji zhanl üe kuangjia” (The International Strategic Context of China’s Peaceful Rise), \textit{Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi} (World Economic and Politics) No. 6 (2004); Zheng Bijian, “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great Power Status,” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 84 (2005), 18-24; on PKOs in specific, see: Yin, \textit{China’s Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations}, 51.} By doing so, Beijing can address not only concerns that China’s rise poses a threat to the international system, but also demands that it contribute to efforts to resolve global challenges such as poverty, famine, environmental damage, and so on.\footnote{For instance, Michael Fullilove wrote in 2006 that China “must start to conceive of its interests in a broader way than it has in the past, and accept its duty to help nurture the international system it aspires to lead.” Michael Fullilove, “Angel or Dragon? China and the United Nations,” \textit{The National Interest} 85 (2006), 70. See also: Robert Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” Speech to the National Committee on United States-China Relations, September 21, 2005. Available online, at: \url{http://www.ncuscr.org/files/2005Gala_RobertZoellick_Whither_China1.pdf}.} Chinese leaders have thus trumpeted their country’s more active role in the UN. In April 2008, for instance, Hu Jintao told Asian delegates to the annual Boao Forum on Hainan Island that “China is now a key participant in the international system,” is “actively involved in international and regional affairs,” and [has] earnestly fulfilled its international responsibilities.” As evidence, he cited the fact that...
China was ranked as “the largest troop-contributing country among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.”

Broader still, some mainland Chinese scholars have suggested that China’s growing role in peacekeeping is not merely instrumental, but also a result of a change in the country’s identity. The argument is that, through decades of increasingly close interaction with other states and with bodies such as the UN, China has come to be moved not only by its own interests but also by the interests of the larger world. It acts responsibly not simply because it might accrue a reputational benefit, but because it is ethical to do so. This interpretation takes advantage of the theoretical notion that a state’s identity and resulting sense of interests can change on account of socializing experiences with other actors. However, since the PRC has distinct utilitarian reasons to adopt a more active approach toward PKOs, which are to assuage fears and earn diplomatic capital, it is difficult to separate out whatever normative motives might inform this trend in China’s UN behavior.


197 Zhao Lei, a scholar at the Central Party School, has been a prolific advocate of this notion. See; Zhao, “Zhongguo yu Lianheguo: Lilun kuangjia, yanjin moxing fenxi;” Zhao, Jiangou heping, passim; Zhao Lei, “Zhongguo dui Lianheguo guannian dingwei de lishi shanbian” (On the Historical Evolution of China’s Ideas Towards the UN), Yinshan Xuekan (Yinshan Academic Journal) 20 (2007). For an application of the evolving identity thesis to China’s participation in the UN’s peacekeeping efforts in Sudan, see: Luo Jianbo and Jiang Hengkun, “Daerfuer weiji yu Zhongguo zai Feizhou de guojia xingxiang suzao” (The Darfur Crisis and the Molding of China’s National Image in Africa), Xin Yuanjian (New Thinking) 3 (2008). Luo is also a scholar at the Central Party School.


199 Indeed, the strongest evidence that socialization has occurred would be a situation in which the actor in question has material reasons not to adopt the practice in question. This is the basis of Iain Johnston’s research design in his treatment of China’s socialization in international organizations, especially those
Assertion: Diplomatic Discord and the Pariah States

As discussed earlier, China became engaged in protracted contests with the U.S. and its allies over the disposition of problems caused by several pariah states in the mid-to-late 2000s. These included North Korea, Iran, Sudan, Myanmar, Zimbabwe and Libya. In relation to previous decades, China’s willingness to resist parts or, in some cases, the entirety, of the U.S. platform was frequent and tenacious. The details of these cases will be described in subsequent chapters, but the short version is that China pushed for a less expansive response to the Iranian and North Korean nuclear problems than the West preferred; limited the scope of sanctions on Sudan and equivocated about a PKO in Darfur without Khartoum’s consent; and rejected out of hand efforts to place pressure on Zimbabwe and Burma, arguing instead that continued peaceful mediation would be a more effective strategy.  

It is important to note that China’s contentiousness did not extend to every state that was targeted by the UN in the 2000s. In several instances, there was no evidence that the PRC opposed the use of sanctions against regimes. These included Eritrea and Ethiopia from 2000 to 2001, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) since 2003, Côte D’Ivoire since 2004, and Eritrea since 2009. The PRC did abstain on the imposition of sanctions against Eritrea in 2009, but there is no indication that it used influence behind related to arms control. See: Alastair Iain Johnston, *Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008). However, a case can still be made that subscribing to arms control treaties did serve China’s material interests by creating a more stable international environment. See: Andrew Nathan, Review of *Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000*, by Alastair Iain Johnston, in *Foreign Affairs* 88 (2009). Available online at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/64645/Asia%20and%20Pacific.

200 The case of Libya will be briefly addressed in the conclusion.
the scenes to affect the type of measures vis-à-vis that government. More discretely, China voted for sanctions against Congo, but has failed to supply details regarding PRC arms sales to the DRC to the UNSC Committee charged with monitoring implementation, leading observers to question China’s commitment to sanctions in that country.

Table 7 provides an overview of China’s strategic relations with the nine countries subjected to sanctions in between 2000 and 2011. The table illustrates that China’s interests in these states varied. In instances in which the PRC had very little at stake, it usually did not adopt a contentious posture either during negotiations or in the voting stage. China had formal diplomatic relations with all nine countries. It conducted large-scale arms transfers to Sudan, Iran and Myanmar; lesser transfers to the DRC and Zimbabwe; and no recorded transfers to Eritrea, Ethiopia, Côte D’Ivoire or North Korea during the decade. Its total trade with targets at the time punitive action was first considered ranged from about $40 million (Eritrea in 2009) to about $14.5 billion (Iran in 2006). China’s trade level with Sudan, North Korea, Iran, Myanmar, Libya and the DRC all topped $1 billion at some point in the 2000s, while its trade with Eritrea, Ethiopia, Côte D’Ivoire, and Zimbabwe fell far short of that mark.

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201 Measures were imposed on Eritrea in an effort to stem conflict in the Horn of Africa which had contributed to instability in Somalia and resulting acts of piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Chinese Ambassador Zhang Yesui emphasized the need for continuing political mediation in this case, saying that sanctions “should not replace diplomatic efforts to resolve disputes through dialogue and negotiation.” SC, Verbatim, S/PV.6254 (December 23, 2009), 4.


203 This table includes only those states which were initially targeted in 2000 or later. Several sanctions regimes initiated in the 1990s were still in effect in the 2000s, including those on Iraq, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Angola. In addition, it excludes measures against non-state actors in Iraq (i.e. members of the ex-government in 2003) and Lebanon (suspects involved in the death of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005).
Table 7: PRC Economic and Military Relations with Targeted States, 2000-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Nature</th>
<th>Bilateral trade (first instance)</th>
<th>Bilateral trade (end or in 2009)</th>
<th>Arms transfers during sanctions period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>2006-present</td>
<td>Arms embargo (focused on nuclear/missile technology), travel ban, asset freeze</td>
<td>14,447,407,814 (2006)</td>
<td>21,205,234,393 (2009)</td>
<td>anti-ship missiles, IFVs, portable SAMs (various types, delivery dates and quantities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar (vetoed)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Would have called for halt to military attacks on civilians (no mention of sanctions)</td>
<td>2,078,258,436 (2007)</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
<td>naval guns, antiship missiles, fire control radar (various types, delivery dates, and quantities, 2002-2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>2009-present</td>
<td>Arms embargo, travel ban, asset freeze</td>
<td>39,900,430 (2009)</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
<td>No Record</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>2011-present</td>
<td>Arms embargo, travel ban, asset freeze, no-fly zone</td>
<td>5,176,795,570 (2009)</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
<td>No Record</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Official Document System (ODS) of the United Nations; UN Bibliographic Information System (UNBISnet); UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database; SIPRI Arms Transfer Database. NB: Most recent data for Libya was 2009.

There are three reasons why China used power to shape the outcome of UN action on the DPRK, Iran, Sudan, Burma and Zimbabwe, but not the others. First is
Two of the nine states (North Korea and Burma) are geographically contiguous with the PRC. With respect to the former, China feared that overly aggressive measures against Pyongyang might result in regime collapse, which could in turn lead to a massive influx of refugees into China’s Northeast. North Korea also serves as a strategic buffer between China and South Korea, a U.S. ally and host to some 25,000 U.S. troops, and so Beijing has an incentive not to distance itself too far from the DPRK. Burma, for its part, is a gateway to the Indian Ocean and a partner in China’s strategy to improve its relative naval capabilities in the region. In addition, China has also been concerned about the possibility of refugees flowing into its Southwest as a result of outside pressure on that state. The PRC thus has an incentive to prevent Western meddling, including via UNSC pressure against the military junta.

Second is China’s dependency on energy imports, which are increasingly critical to the growth of China’s domestic economy. China is cautious of aggressive UN action.

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204 Recall that from 1971 to 2006, the UNSC did not consider sanctions on any state ringing China’s periphery. A partial exception is the Taliban, which was targeted in 1999.


206 This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. Andrew Scobell, China and North Korea: From Comrades-in-Arms to Allies at Arms’ Length (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2004), 4-9.


since this might cause domestic or regional instability which might threaten its supplies, and might strain its political relations with key partners. As John Bolton writes, China’s Large and growing demand for energy has been and will increasingly be a driver of its foreign policy, leading it to seek assured sources of supply around the world. China’s solicitude for undesirable and threatening governments like those of Iran, Sudan and Burma can be explained in large measure by its desire to support governments that can help China achieve its broader objective of energy security.\(^{209}\)

This point applies particularly to Iran and Sudan, which were the 3\(^{\text{rd}}\) and 6\(^{\text{th}}\) largest suppliers of China’s petroleum imports in the first half of 2009, and which the PRC holds large equity stakes in national petroleum corporations.\(^{210}\) Moreover, Iran serves the additional strategic role of major supplier of liquid natural gas.\(^{211}\)

Third is China’s diplomatic partnership with Russia in Council negotiations. As we have seen, the two non-Western permanent members supported each other on a number of sanctions-related votes in the 1990s. Some scholars have described a tendency of China and Russia to oppose U.S. intervention in the UNSC as “soft balancing.”\(^{212}\)

Regarding pariah states, UN diplomats refer to a condominium among the two powers to support each other when their respective national interests are at stake. Specifically,


\(^{210}\) Data drawn from the U.S. Energy Information Administration, online at: [http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/China/Oil.html](http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/China/Oil.html). In addition, Libya was China’s 10\(^{\text{th}}\)-ranking source of foreign oil in 2009.


\(^{212}\) See, e.g., Paul, “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy.” Paul (62-4) focuses especially on Sino-Russian disagreement with NATO on the issue of Kosovo in the 1990s. He also portrays China as a member, albeit a tangential one, of the coalition of states that opposed a resolution in 2002 to authorize the U.S. to use force against Iraq (64-70).
Russia followed China’s lead on the DPRK and vice-versa on Iran.\textsuperscript{213} Similarly, Russia supported China’s resistance to U.S. plans to punish Myanmar in 2007, while Beijing appeared to return the favor by voting with Moscow against a Western-sponsored draft on Zimbabwe the following year.\textsuperscript{214} Such behavior, though perhaps confined to a few highly significant issues, runs contrary to the image of normative convergence among the P5 states.\textsuperscript{215}

In sum, in contrast to its prior restraint, China emerged as an active participant in UNSC affairs at the dawn of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. On one hand, it took a prominent role as a contributor to PKOs. Aimed in part at burnishing China’s credentials as a responsible actor, this has generally been welcomed by the international community. On the other hand, China was enmeshed in contentious negotiations on how to respond to a number of pariah states, especially those in which it held strategic or economic interests. The impression of China as a “diligent apprentice” had given way to that of a complex actor: one that contributed, but also worked with increasing frequency to oppose U.S. goals.

**Conclusion**

A diplomat in China’s UN mission recently remarked that his “personal view” is that the U.S. is still the “leader of the world,” that “no country can challenge it,” and that

\textsuperscript{213} However, observers also note that China seemed to take the lead in opposing elements of Western proposals on Iran in 2010. Interviews with senior diplomats, a P3 permanent mission to the UN, February 2010.

\textsuperscript{214} This will be explored in greater depth in subsequent chapters. However, to preview, China did not express particularly strong reservations to sanctions against Zimbabwe; rather, the PRC declared its intention to use its veto only after Russia did so. In the eyes of Western diplomats, Russia was attempting to reassert itself as a key player in P5 negotiations and used Zimbabwe as an excuse to do so.

\textsuperscript{215} On the other hand, Colin Keating, a former New Zealand UN representative, cautions that there is no evidence that China and Russia are “cooking up deals” to oppose the West, but does state that there have been “closer relations and practical cooperation on many issues” between the two states. Interview with Colin Keating, New York, January 2010.
This will remain true for at least the next twenty years.\textsuperscript{216} This opinion contains elements of both fact and fiction. It is true that the PRC was reluctant to confront the U.S. in the Security Council in the forty years between 1971 and 2011. China acquiesced to proposals on topics ranging from peacekeeping, to sanctions, to the use of force by the U.S. At times, it disassociated itself from the West by means of abstentions and polemics in public debates, but did not use its veto power unless it had clear material interests in the outcome.

China’s restraint can be attributed to a simple pragmatism. In its formative years, it adopted an attitude of watching and learning, rather than “going into battle unprepared.” It did not choose to clash with the U.S. or the USSR when it did not have obvious economic or political stakes in the outcome of negotiations. Moreover, the PRC has placed a premium on positive relations with other major powers. As Ambassador Charles Freeman writes, the PRC often makes “tactical sacrifices in order to avoid giving offense in the interest of achieving longer-term strategic gains in relations with other member states.”\textsuperscript{217} This was as true in the 1980s, when China prioritized positive relations with the developed world over ideological struggle, as it was in the 1990s, when it tempered its concerns about sovereignty and intervention with the aim of resurrecting its status as an integral member of the international community after the Tiananmen crisis.

Moreover, in a sense, China’s need to exercise restraint dissipated as its tolerance for intervention grew. This is especially relevant to PKOs, in which China’s position evolved from principled resistance in the 1970s, to begrudging acceptance in the 1980s,

\textsuperscript{216} Interview, Permanent Mission of China to the UN, January 2010.

to limited participation in the 1990s, to active contributions in the early 21st century. It is debatable, and perhaps not resolvable from an analytical point of view, whether this evolution can be explained by a utilitarian desire for recognition, by a process of socialization, or both. The point is that disassociation, including by way of abstentions, became a much less prominent part of China’s behavior in the UN than it once was.

The fiction of the Chinese diplomat’s comment is that, historically, Beijing has not been hesitant to confront the U.S. in cases in which national interests were at stake. As Shen Dingli, a professor at Fudan University, suggests, China is “principled on security.” His meaning is that the PRC can overlook purely normative concerns, but does not refrain from using the tools at its disposal to achieve goals that significantly impact the country’s survival and prosperity.\(^{218}\) In the Council, China used its veto power on matters that became entangled with its alliance with Pakistan, its struggle with Taiwan, and the stability of the Korean Peninsula. It has challenged the West on a series of pariah states, including the DPRK, Iran, Sudan, Burma and Zimbabwe, absorbing unvarnished criticism from Western observers and fuelling a narrative of China as an increasingly “assertive” power in the 21st century. In short, it did what it had to do.

###

It is one thing to point out that the PRC has been willing to challenge the U.S. or others when its national interests have been affected. This much is clear from the historical record. It is more difficult to explain why China’s positions in Security Council debates on subjects such as North Korea, Sudan and Iran evolved from initial resistance to eventual agreement with the U.S. Similarly, the reasons why China was not willing to

\(^{218}\) Interview with Shen Dingli, Fudan University, Shanghai, September 2009.
move towards a consensus on Myanmar and Zimbabwe are also opaque. To explain the nuances within China’s contentiousness, we have to understand the mechanics that influence the extent to which states become prone to compromise. The next chapter identifies the PRC’s mixed record of cooperativeness on pariah states as a puzzle, and develops a series of hypotheses to account for the variance.
Chapter 2

The Pariah Puzzle:
Five Explanations for China’s Positions in the Security Council

Introduction

Despite its gradual acceptance of peacekeeping, intervention with host country approval, and punitive measures against non-state actors, such as terrorists, China has become relatively confrontational in UNSC debates on how to respond to pariah states. As discussed in the previous chapter, the U.S. and its partners have been increasingly willing to use the coercive authority available to the Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to pressure a series of pariah states to reform their behavior. These states have included North Korea, Iran, Sudan, Myanmar, Zimbabwe and Libya. In some cases, such as military provocation by the DPRK or Iranian nuclear development, the offense was a traditional, external security threat. In others, such as political repression in Burma or threats against civilians in Libya, the West appeared to be propelled by a desire to prevent humanitarian disasters, which were perceived to be actionable under the “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine.\(^\text{219}\)

Motivated by a variety of political and economic interests in these regimes, China has not unreservedly accepted Western plans to use coercion through the Council. As a result, the PRC has used its influence as a veto-holding member to weaken some proposals and reject others out of hand. Yet, the PRC has ultimately granted its imprimatur to some proposals. These have ranged from non-binding Presidential Statements (PRSTs) on states such as Burma and Zimbabwe to sanctions, including those

\(^{219}\) For a description of the “R2P” doctrine, please refer to the Introduction.
against Iran in 2010 and Libya in 2011. China’s contentiousness has been bounded, not absolute.

A number of empirical questions flow from China’s mixed record of support vis-à-vis the U.S. First, what factors can help explain its willingness either to consent to UNSC decisions against targeted regimes, or to block such initiatives? In other words, under what conditions is China amenable to compromise, and when is it not? Second, why, during the course of specific negotiations, does China’s stance sometimes change from opposition to support? Third, based on this analysis what policy options are available to the U.S. or others to influence China’s positions?

This chapter develops five hypotheses intended to explain the puzzle of China’s mixed cooperation on pariah states. Two center on aspects of the issue under negotiation itself. These are that China is more likely to endorse U.S. calls for pressure when (1) alternate dispute resolution methods, including dialogue and bilateral pressure, have been tried and failed; and (2) the U.S. and its partners have been willing to make concessions that address key Chinese concerns, such as about the scope of sanctions. Three hypotheses center on the broader political dynamics in which UNSC deliberators are enmeshed. These are that (1) China is more likely to cooperate on issues of central concern to the U.S. than on peripheral ones, such as those driven purely by ideological concerns; (2) China should become more amenable to compromise if Russia’s position has shifted towards the West, as the PRC desires not to be isolated among the P5; and (3) Beijing is likely to follow the major regional stakeholders, who may be most likely to reward China for its support, and to punish it for not following suit.
The chapter proceeds in the following three sections. The first defines and explains the dependent variable, which is China’s cooperativeness with the U.S. on negotiations related to pariah states. It identifies the puzzle that, despite interests in each of these regimes, the PRC has had a mixed record of support for punitive measures against them. The second section develops the hypotheses, as outlined above. This section draws from the conceptual building blocks provided by the general literature on negotiations, as well as the more specific literatures on Council politics and Chinese foreign policy. The third section comments on the research design and potential limitations to the approach.

**Beyond Votes: Outcomes in the Security Council**

In essence, the positions of states towards some initiative within the Security Council can be described as “cooperative” or “not cooperative.” This terminology is not meant to ascribe normative values to either choice, but merely to capture the state’s relative position at a particular moment. It also does not imply a reactionary orientation; China, for instance, might resist a certain proposal while advancing its own. However, since plans to apply pressure on the pariah states were typically driven by the U.S. and its supporters (such as the U.K. and France), it makes sense to describe China’s positions in terms of cooperativeness. The distinction is meaningful because, with its veto, China’s cooperation is necessary for the Council to act; its opposition is sufficient to prevent the Council from acting.

Analytically, cooperation in the Security Council can be defined in the negative, as the lack of opposition to a particular proposal. China cooperates when it does not block a PRST, or when it votes in favor of, or abstains on, a resolution. Punitive resolutions
range from warnings to highly invasive sanctions, covering arms, travel, financial or other elements.\footnote{For a discussion, see: Luck, \textit{UN Security Council}, Chapters 5-6.} The UN Charter also provides the Council the right to authorize force, though this is not applicable to any of the cases described here.

Tables 8 and 9 illustrate the variances in China’s voting behavior on major decisions related to states identified in Chapter 1 as those in which the PRC has major interests. China cooperated with the West by endorsing PRSTs on North Korea, Myanmar, and Zimbabwe, by abstaining on a series of resolutions on Darfur, and by voting in favor of resolutions on North Korea and Iran.\footnote{Table 8 is intended only to list pivotal decisions; it does not cover every decision (positive or negative) on the five cases surveyed.}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Case} & \textbf{Talks Start} & \textbf{Talks End} & \textbf{Result (*=sanctions)} & \textbf{China’s Vote} \\
\hline
DPRK & July 6, 2006 & July 15, 2006 & 1695 & Yes \\
DPRK & April 7, 2009 & April 13, 2009 & PRST 2009/7 & N/A \\
DPRK & May 25, 2009 & June 12, 2009 & 1874* & Yes \\
DPRK & June 4, 2010 & July 9, 2010 & PRST 2010/13 & N/A \\
Iran & Sept. 22, 2006 & Dec. 23, 2006 & 1737* & Yes \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Table 8: Selected Positive Cases}
\end{table}


\footnote{Gerard Aziakou, “Security Council to Discuss Tough Sanctions on North Korea,” \textit{AFP}, October 10, 2006.}

\footnote{“U.S. Seeks Strong U.N. Response to N.K. Launch,” \textit{Korea Herald}, April 8, 2009.}

\footnote{Tony Harnden and Malcolm Moore, “International Outrage at North Korea’s Nuclear Weapon Test,” \textit{The Daily Telegraph} (London), May 26, 2009.}

\footnote{“South Korea Refers Ship Sinking to UN Security Council,” \textit{AFP}, June 4, 2010.}

\footnote{“Major Power Diplomats to Meet Friday on Iran Sanctions,” \textit{AFP}, September 22, 2006. The meeting was held in New York on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly opening session.}
Conversely, a non-cooperative position reflects opposition either to a PRST or to a draft resolution. Veto use represents the most apparent form of noncooperation, though,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Vote</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Feb. 26, 2007</td>
<td>Mar. 24, 2007</td>
<td>1747*</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Jan. 28, 2008</td>
<td>Mar. 3, 2008</td>
<td>1803*</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>March 4, 2010</td>
<td>June 9, 2010</td>
<td>1835*</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Sept. 9, 2004</td>
<td>Sept. 18, 2004</td>
<td>1564*</td>
<td>Abstain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Feb. 17, 2005</td>
<td>Mar. 19, 2005</td>
<td>1591*</td>
<td>Abstain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Aug. 17, 2006</td>
<td>Aug. 31, 2006</td>
<td>1706</td>
<td>Abstain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Oct. 5, 2007</td>
<td>Oct. 11, 2007</td>
<td>PRST 2007/37</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>June 23, 2008</td>
<td>June 23, 2008</td>
<td>PRST 2008/23</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>March 14, 2011</td>
<td>March 17, 2011</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Abstain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

228 “US and Allies Want Speedy Iran Sanctions Resolution,” *AFP*, February 27, 2007. The decision to begin negotiations on a second round of sanctions was taken at a meeting of the P5+1 political directors in London.

229 “UN Takes Up Further Iran Sanctions,” *UPI*, January 28, 2008. The U.S., Britain and France had agreed to postpone discussions on a third round of sanctions the previous September, pending the release of a periodic IAEA report.


236 Due to its recentness at the time of writing, Libya is not covered in this study. However, it would be a worthy case study in a future analysis.


as previously noted, China has rarely exercised this option. More common is resistance during the negotiating process, which, in turn, may lead to two outcomes.

First is that a specific proposal is never brought to a vote. For instance, the U.S. chose not to pursue sanctions against Sudan in the spring of 2007 owing, in part, to resistance by China. Due to Chinese objections, the U.S. did not table resolutions on Burma’s recalcitrant position towards international aid in the wake of Cyclone Nargis in 2009, on violence towards civilians in the Sri Lankan civil war in 2009, or on North Korea’s attack on Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010. Table 9 provides a sample of “non-outcomes,” due either to veto use or withdrawn proposals.

**Table 9: Selected Negative Cases**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Proposal Contents</th>
<th>Vote?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Nov., 2010</td>
<td>Condemnation of DPRK attack on Yeonpyeong Island, calling it a violation of prior resolutions</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>Jan. 12, 2007</td>
<td>Draft called on junta to release Aung San Suu Kyi and all political prisoners, engage in political reform.</td>
<td>Yes (veto by China/Russia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>Sept., 2009</td>
<td>Discussion of a proposal to authorize shipments of humanitarian aid over the objections of the junta, following Cyclone</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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239 This will be addressed in Chapter 5.

240 According to Colum Lynch, the U.S. was able only to secure consent by China and Russia to hold discussion about Sri Lanka “in the UN basement.” Email correspondence with Colum Lynch, February 2010. See also: Colum Lynch, “U.S. Faces Doubts About Leadership on Human Rights,” *Washington Post*, September 22, 2009.

241 However, the UNSC did release a “press statement” that expressed “grave concern over the worsening humanitarian situation” in Sri Lanka, and called on the rebel group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, to cease fighting. SC Document SC/9659 (May 13, 2009).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>May, 2009</td>
<td>Limited discussion of possible sanctions or ICC involvement, following government attacks on Tamil civilians.</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>April-May, 2007</td>
<td>Expansion of arms embargo, ban on “offensive military flights,” sanctions on individuals charged with human rights violations.</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>July 11, 2008</td>
<td>Arms embargo, travel and financial restrictions on Mugabe and 13 other government officials.</td>
<td>Yes (veto by China/Russia)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Second is that proposals are modified by their sponsors so as to draw support. Positions, of course, can change during the course of negotiations. For instance, China initially rejected a Japanese draft resolution on North Korea’s nuclear test in June 2009, but eventually agreed to a compromise approach.244

It should be emphasized that most contention occurs well before the voting stage. Council observers have described the informal interactions that precede public discussion of agenda items.245 Plans to punish pariah states typically originated with the U.S. and its partners, especially the U.K. and France. Proposals are then brought to the non-Western permanent members, China and Russia, and discussed informally, often at the missions of the relevant states or other places on the fringes of the UN. Disputation of the issue may then follow several courses, as described above. Only if, and when, the parties have agreed to the text of a PRST or resolution is it formally circulated, discussed and acted on.

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243 China, Russia and others were reportedly adamant that Sri Lanka be kept off the Council’s agenda to the point that they would not consent to a briefing on the situation by Ban Ki-moon. Matthew Russell Lee, “On Sri Lanka, UN’s Dodging Comes Home to Roost, UK Could Have Put on Council Agenda,” *InnerCity Press*, May 29, 2009.

244 This will be addressed in Chapter 3.

This process is intentionally opaque, designed to shield the actors from political interference and maintain a façade of Council unity in public, which usually serves the interests of all five permanent members.246

Since a state’s position relative to another can be described as cooperative or not cooperative at any particular point during the negotiating process, it is possible to identify countless “outcomes.” From a pragmatic angle, however, it is only necessary to describe cooperativeness at two points: at the beginning and end of negotiations. In each case studied here, China’s opening position was resistant vis-à-vis the initial proposal of the West. This is unremarkable for two reasons. First is that the U.S. tends to seek far more pressure against pariah states than what China is willing to tolerate in principle, if an agreement can be reached at all. Second, China has a variety of material interests in these states, which means that it will be conflicted about the use of punitive measures. What’s interesting is where the parties ended up. Were the sides able to compromise, or were they left with a non-outcome (i.e., a shelved proposal or a veto)? The puzzle, then, is explaining why China was sometimes able to reach an agreement with the U.S., and sometimes not.

Analysis can be further divided into two forms. First is cross-case comparison. This type of assessment focuses on the reasons why an actor maintained opposition to a decision in one instance, but was able to agree in another. For example, why did China veto a U.S.-drafted resolution on Myanmar in January 2007, only to agree to a condemnatory PRST against the junta the following October? Why did it support an arms

246 Hawkins, Silence of the Security Council, 25-6; Prantl, The UN Security Council and Informal Groups of States, 29-30; Smith, Politics and Processes, 240-242. As observed in Chapter 1, the reason why non-transparency serves the interests of the P5 is that it preserves the credibility of the five as a capable decision-making collective, which is of increasing concern given the pressure by India, Japan, Germany and others for a permanent seat at the table.
embargo on Sudan in 2005 but oppose one against Zimbabwe in 2008? Second is within-case analysis, which examines changes in position during the stages of a specific negotiation cycle. Why did China first oppose, and then come to support, a second round of sanctions on the DPRK in June 2009, or a fourth round on Iran in June 2010? Both types of analysis target the puzzle, which is explaining the variance in cooperation.

In this context, a sensible analytical framework would provide some insight into the conditions that tend to be associated with variance in China’s positions. It would be useful both in explaining differences across cases, and shifts within single cases. In addition, it would be falsifiable, open to independent verification and refutation. Finally, it would be general enough as to be applicable to similar cases, but not so broad as to lose the ability to account for a large share of the variance in the cases that are examined. The next section develops a framework based on these standards, and is followed by a discussion of methods and limitations.

Five Explanations

International relations theorists have demonstrated that cooperation between states is possible when each party perceives gains that exceed the potential costs. Robert Jervis observed in 1978 that “wars would be much more frequent…if they were less risky and costly, and if peaceful intercourse did not provide rich benefits.”247 Robert Keohane also argued that “attainment of the gains from pursuing complementary policies depends on cooperation,” and noted that institutions facilitate cooperation by reducing transaction

costs, providing information, and offering “rules of thumb” to guide national bureaucracies. 248 Abram and Antonia Chayes go even farther, and assert that institutions themselves may help to generate cooperation by modifying preferences and persuading parties to comply with the norms embedded within regimes. 249

If these accounts are correct, then the reasons for China’s cooperativeness with the U.S. in Security Council negotiations should be based on an expectation of acquiring some advantage, or at least avoiding some loss. The question, then, is what types of considerations can help to explain the decision. The following sections develop a series of hypotheses that are intended to account for the variance. They were assembled in two ways. First is through partial induction, in which a survey of the cases led to a number of “hunches” about the types of variables that appeared to be influencing China’s positions. Second was through a canvassing of a variety of relevant literatures, particularly in the areas of Chinese foreign policy, prior studies of United Nations decision-making, and broader research on negotiations that has appeared in the disciplines of organizational psychology, management, and others.

Partial induction and reference to external research both pointed to a basic distinction in the types of interests that should have an effect on how the PRC developed its positions during the course of UNSC negotiations. First are interests in the issues themselves. In particular, we would expect China to question the efficacy of the proposal under consideration given the available alternatives, and to weigh the potential risks to


China’s interests in the regimes in question if a particular resolution was approved. Second are interests in maintaining positive political relations with others engaged in the deliberations. This includes not only the U.S. and its allies, but also Russia and the key regional stakeholders. The following sections generate five hypotheses based on this distinction.

*Weighing Alternatives*

A major axis of contention between China, Russia and the Western powers with respect to pariah states is how the challenges posed by these regimes can be most effectively addressed. The PRC has recognized that the instability generated by states like North Korea and Sudan can negatively affect its own interests, and has acquiesced to various forms of external intervention in response. The problem is that the West typically defaults on the application of multilateral pressure as a preferred strategy, while the PRC tends to place more emphasis on bilateral contacts and non-coercive mediation. Hence, cooperativeness should result from constraints on these alternate pathways, such that punitive action becomes a goal shared by the P5.

(1) Sovereignty and Stability

Chapter 1 noted that China often finessed the norm of sovereignty in the UNSC because it had little at stake and wished to enhance its credentials as a responsible power, especially after 1989. This flexibility is apparent even in instances in which China has powerful economic or political motives to shield the state in question. The reason is that these states have jeopardized stability which is, fundamentally, at the core of China’s post-Mao grand strategy. The essence of Deng Xiaoping’s strategic thought is that,
“stability is the highest priority for the interests of China…The essential condition for
China to reach its goal of development is to have a stable, peaceful international
environment.”

Given its basic strategic interests in sustained economic growth and a peaceful
international environment, China pays close attention to how the behavior of states like
North Korea, Sudan and Burma affects both internal and external political stability.
Domestic instability and violence may threaten China’s economic interests, especially its
access to oil, natural gas or other vital commodities; the ability of states to repay loans; or
even the lives of a growing number Chinese citizens abroad engaged in diplomacy,
construction, trade or other tasks. As Jonathan Holslag suggests, internal disorder
might also precipitate Western-led military intervention, which would reduce China’s
“clout” in sought-after markets.

Additionally, the PRC is aware that domestic disorder may mutate into regional
threats. Instability in Myanmar, for instance, has led to refugee flows, drug smuggling,
money laundering and other cross-border issues. The situation in Darfur is another case
in point. Internecine violence there is problematic both because it threatens PRC
investments and the lives of Chinese workers, and because it has the potential to spill
over into Chad, another area where China is seeking to improve its access to energy
resources. According to the International Crisis Group, “Beijing is learning to avoid the

University, 2000), 34.

251 China’s Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping, 17.


253 Li Chenyang and Lye Liang Fook, “China’s Policies towards Myanmar: A Successful Model for
perils of entrusting its energy security to unpopular and, in many cases, fragile, regimes.” 254 A Chinese UN diplomat acknowledges the dilemmas posed by pariah states, noting that “in this context, sovereignty cannot be respected.” 255

China also has compelling reasons not to dismiss the external provocations of states such as North Korea. Concerns that the development of nuclear weapons technology, and its means of delivery, might spark regional conflict, invite a U.S. military response, and thereby threaten China’s commercial and strategic interests both in Northeast Asia and in the Middle East have been commonly cited as a reason for China’s unwillingness to inflexibly shield these two states from intervention. 256 Similarly, the PRC seeks to preserve the integrity of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which strengthens China’s own power and prestige by minimizing the number of states permitted to possess nuclear weapons. 257 As a Chinese diplomat observes:

Traditionally, the development of weapons of mass destruction and missiles has been the decision of a sovereign nation. China has developed its own nuclear weapons and missile capability according to this argument. Yet, Beijing now considers its


255 Interview, Permanent Mission of China to the UN, January 2010. In addition, as Marc Lanteigne points out, China “faces a host of non-traditional security threats which may adversely affect its desire for sustained regional stability. These include…separatism, terrorism, and extremism, all of which may be imported to China from abroad, as well as the smuggling of arms drugs and persons, piracy and maritime security.” Marc Lanteigne, China and International Institutions (London: Routledge, 2005), 154.


commitment to regional stability and international nonproliferation regimes to be high priorities. In a time of globalization, China’s economic and security interests have become intertwined with securing a stable peripheral environment and a peaceful world. Consequently, China has to adjust its traditionally held value of an abstract and absolute sovereignty.258

In Krasnerian fashion, China’s attachment to sovereignty is attenuated even—and perhaps especially—with respect to states in which it has major interests.259

(2) The Dilemma of Coercion

In the context of negotiations on pariah states, the issue is not necessarily disagreement about the existence of a problem, but rather divergent attitudes about the means through which problems should be addressed. The U.S. and its partners typically prefer to rely on sanctions to motivate recalcitrant regimes to change their behavior, whereas the PRC, Russia and others often prefer a less confrontational modality. For China, this means either bilateral pressure, peaceful dialogue (including efforts carried out by regional or ad-hoc groups), or both. China’s formal position on sanctions is that they be applied “with prudence on the precondition that all peaceful means have been exhausted,” although, once enacted, all states have a responsibility to implement them.260

As noted in the previous chapter, the PRC has argued since the early 1990s that sanctions tend to be counterproductive. This claim can be disaggregated into several parts, each of which provides a reason for China to treat punitive action cautiously. First is the

258 Interview, Permanent Mission of China to the UN, January 2010.


belief that pressure will further destabilize already fragile regimes, leading to state collapse and ultimately harming China’s own strategic interests. For instance, on the DPRK some Chinese experts have argued that sanctions would cause the regime to implode, which in turn would generate a refugee crisis and perhaps lead U.S. troops to fill the void along China’s northeastern periphery.\textsuperscript{261} Colin Keating suggests that China drew a parallel between the collapse of the USSR under external pressure and the potential implosion of Sudan or the DPRK as a result of UNSC interference.\textsuperscript{262}

Second is the concern that states subjected to harsh penalties might react provocatively and ignite regional tensions, which may spiral out of control and, once again, ultimately harm China’s interests. For instance, the belief that sanctions might cause Pyongyang to become “more aggressive and unpredictable” was a reason for China to resist measures against North Korea in 2006.\textsuperscript{263}

A third, related factor is that the U.S. or others might seek to use resolutions as a justification for the use of force. Hua Liming, a retired Chinese ambassador to Iran, writes that sanctions against Tehran might be used as a pretext for U.S. or Israeli airstrikes.\textsuperscript{264} Fear about the possibility of unauthorized escalation was exacerbated by the

\textsuperscript{261} Shaded of Red, 17. Ye Hailin, a Northeast Asia specialist at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, claims that the “border issue,” meaning both the prospect of U.S. and South Korean control of territory above the 38th parallel and the possibility of a refugee influx into China’s northeast, is “more important” strategically than the goal of non-proliferation in the Korean Peninsula (interview, July 2009).

\textsuperscript{262} Interview with Colin Keating, Executive Director, The Security Council Report, February 2010.


\textsuperscript{264} Hua Liming, “Yilang he wenti: MeiYi de weixian boyi.” (The Iran Nuclear Issue: Dangerous Games of the U.S. and Iran) Jiefang Ribao (PLA Daily), Sept. 23, 2007.
U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, leading to considerable debate about the precise legal phrasing of resolutions.\textsuperscript{265}

Fourth is the view that ineffectual decisions weaken the Security Council’s authority and only encourage wrongdoers by providing evidence that the international community is not prepared to act decisively. Shen Dingli, a professor at Fudan University in Shanghai, argues that the Council’s inability to mete out effective punishment on one state, such as North Korea, can become a signal to others, such as Iran, that they too can behave with indemnity.\textsuperscript{266}

(3) Shifting Alternatives

In contrast to multilateral pressure, China tends to favor two alternate conflict resolution types. First is dialogue, in which parties try to reach a mediated settlement without the threat of punishment. This may include representatives of the UN (“good offices” missions of the Secretary-General), regional organizations (such as the African Union or ASEAN), or ad-hoc processes (e.g., the Six-Party Talks on the DPRK or the E3+3 on Iran).\textsuperscript{267} There are several reasons for this preference, including: a belief that only negotiations, and not pressure, can resolve the underlying causes of conflict;\textsuperscript{268} the

\textsuperscript{265} Interview with Western diplomat, January 2010.

\textsuperscript{266} Shen Dingli, “Yilang buhui wei jueyi suo yafu,” (Iran is Unlikely to be Overpowered by [UNSC] Resolutions), \textit{Dongfang Zaobao} (Oriental Morning Post), March 27, 2007.

\textsuperscript{267} The Six-Party Talks included the DPRK, the U.S, Russia, China, Japan and South Korea; the E3+3 (also sometimes known as the P5+1) processes included the U.S., Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany.

\textsuperscript{268} This is a point frequently made in Chinese diplomatic rhetoric, even when simultaneously agreeing to sanctions or other measures. For instance, in June 2009, China’s UN ambassador Zhang Yesui reaffirmed the importance of the Six-Party Talks while voting for a second round of sanctions on Pyongyang. Zhang argued that:

[China remains] of the view that Security Council actions are not all about sanctions and that political and diplomatic means are the only way to resolve the relevant issues, achieve the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and safeguard peace and stability in Northeast Asia.
desire to preserve positive relations with the target state, or with regional or other actors which support mediation;\textsuperscript{269} avoidance of economic costs that would result from sanctions;\textsuperscript{270} and the opportunity for China to play an appreciated role as a mediator in cases such as the Six-Party Talks.\textsuperscript{271}

The second route is through bilateral pressure. Specifically, the PRC might make threats or warnings to encourage the target to reform its behavior. The benefits of this avenue would be avoiding the pitfalls of sanctions while adding needed “sticks” to negotiation efforts, as well as responding to international calls for China to use its unique influence on pariah states as a “responsible stakeholder” in the international system.\textsuperscript{272} For example, Ian Holliday describes China as a “low-level interventionist power” on Myanmar, “nudging the junta in a reformist direction” through quiet diplomacy.\textsuperscript{273} Others have observed China’s efforts to use economic leverage to influence the behavior of the Zimbabwean government, “even in the absence of strong international pressure to do so.”\textsuperscript{274}

\textsuperscript{269} Maintenance of ties with other major stakeholders is related to the second explanatory factor, described in the next section.

\textsuperscript{270} This includes not only the actual costs that China would have to absorb by implementing sanctions, but also the indirect costs that might result from unintended consequences, as described above.

\textsuperscript{271} In the cases covered here, China played a noted role on the DPRK as host of the Six-Party Talks, and Iran as a member of the E3+3.

\textsuperscript{272} The downside, however, is that by using its influence in this manner, China may (a) alienate the regime and (b) generate expectations that it cannot meet, thus inviting further criticism. A point made repeatedly in interviews with Chinese scholars is that Westerners have exaggerated the extent of China’s influence on the DPRK, Sudan and others, and should lower their expectations.


\textsuperscript{274} Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small, “China’s New Dictatorship Diplomacy.”
However, for various reasons both alternatives may be untenable. States such as North Korea and Iran may engage in dialogue solely to delay coercion while work on nuclear programs continues unabated, or they may reject them entirely. In terms of domestic politics, the Burmese junta may accept brief visits by the Secretary General’s Special Representative without delivering progress on political reform objectives, or it may deny the envoy access to opposition leaders, such as Aung San Suu Kyi. The government in Khartoum may reject private appeals by the PRC to permit UN peacekeepers to deploy to Darfur, just as Robert Mugabe may resist bilateral efforts to discourage crackdowns on political opponents. In short, alternative processes can fail to achieve their intended goals.

The degree to which China is willing to cooperate with the U.S. to punish recalcitrant states should depend on the prospects offered by these alternate mechanisms. In other words, Beijing should be more cooperative the fewer external options exist, and vice versa. This theorem is analogous to the proposition that states engaged in armed conflict are more likely to submit to negotiations the dimmer their perceptions of the gains of continued fighting. I. William Zartman writes that “parties must be convinced that bilateral efforts are better than unilateral efforts.”275 A “ripe moment” for cooperation exists when parties believe that the remaining alternatives are inferior to negotiation with one another.276 Thus:


**Hypothesis 1:** China should be more willing to cooperate with efforts to punish pariah states the fewer opportunities exist for multilateral dialogue and bilateral intervention and, conversely, China should be less willing to cooperate the more such alternatives exist.

Two cases illustrate how the changing structure of alternatives impacts the decision-making of states in Security Council negotiations. First is Britain’s decision to shift from opposition to support for pressure against Southern Rhodesia in 1965. In late 1963, the UK, preferring to use bilateral channels, vetoed a resolution that would have “invited” it not to transfer sovereignty to its colony without a representative government in place, or sell arms to the regime.\(^{277}\) When, in November 1965, Ian Smith’s government declared independence without Britain’s consent, the UK changed its position and agreed to a Security Council resolution\(^ {278}\) which requested states to terminate economic relations with Salisbury.\(^{279}\) The closing of the bilateral avenue made Security Council involvement a relatively appealing option.

Second was the willingness of Colombia, then a non-permanent member of the Council, to support UNSC sanctions and the use of force against Iraq in 1990 and 1991. Colombia held reservations about coercion due to its experience with U.S. hegemonism.

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\(^{277}\) The draft resolution was sponsored by Ghana, Morocco and the Philippines (SC Document S/5425/Rev.1) and was defeated on September 11, 1963.

\(^{278}\) The resolution was SCR 217. Nevertheless, even this resolution was diluted so as simply to “call upon” states to enforce its provisions.

in the Western Hemisphere, and attempted to broker a deal whereby the issue of Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait would be mediated by the General Assembly, as opposed to the Security Council.\textsuperscript{280} However, this initiative failed, both because of provisions in the UN Charter which grant the Council precedence in handling crises, and because of sentiment within the General Assembly that such a move would damage the UN itself.\textsuperscript{281} As a result, Colombia opted to support the U.S.’s more punitive approach.

Responses to Flexibility

There are two ways in which the issue itself may enter into China’s decision-making calculus. First is in terms of the structure of alternatives, as discussed above. The second is through the anticipated consequences of a specific proposal for China’s general interests in stability, in addition to more specific interests in economic relations with the state in question. The extent to which China perceives a strategic risk in cooperating with the U.S. is bound up in the flexibility Washington has demonstrated in assuaging China’s concerns. It is more likely that China will cooperate if the U.S. is willing to alter, or “weaken,” its plans in order to generate consensus.

(1) Forms of Accommodation

Sergey Lavrov, a former Russian ambassador to the UN, has written that mutual concessions and accommodation both within the P5 and in the Security Council at large is a necessary and common occurrence in the process of reaching deals. Russia’s “key task” is to protect its “national interests,” but, “those can only be advanced when they are

\textsuperscript{280} Hume, The United Nations, Iran, and Iraq, 207-9.

\textsuperscript{281} Malone, The International Struggle Over Iraq, 65-7.
harmonized with the interests of others.” What is voted on is not a “maximalist position,” but rather

…a more moderate one, adjusted for consideration by a body with many clashing points of view, and whose work is to search for compromise, concession, exchanges, and ways to untie a knot. 282

In general, there are two ways in which a Council member may be compensated for the risks it expects to incur as a result of a decision. First is by amending the text of a draft. For instance, to reduce concerns about the escalation of conflicts, the U.S. might delete references to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, replace decisive measures with discretionary ones,283 or change the form from a resolution to a PRST, which is usually considered a less forceful response that does not carry the weight of international law.284 For instance, during deliberations prior to the 2003 Iraq War, the U.S. agreed to a French proposal that violations of prior resolutions would lead to “serious consequences,” but that the use of force would have to be authorized by a second resolution.285

In the context of sanctions resolutions, a sponsor might eliminate items that would harm the commercial or political interests of a reluctant state. This is particularly relevant


283 For instance, we will see in Chapters 3 and 4 how the U.S. used non-mandatory language on cargo inspections vis-à-vis sanctions on North Korea and Iran to reduce Chinese and Russian concerns about the potential for conflict.

284 PRSTs may also be preferable when the goal of the sponsors is to preserve Council unity in the face of possible dissension on a recorded vote. The reason is that PRSTs may only be issued with the consent of all 15 members of the Council, while resolutions can be passed with ‘no’ votes by as many as six non-permanent members, provided that all five permanent members vote in favor.

285 This agreement led to Resolution 1441, which provided Iraq with a “final opportunity” to carry out its inspection requirements under Resolution 687 by granting unconditional access to IAEA inspectors within 30 days. The U.S. had wanted an ‘automatic trigger’ that would have authorized force after the deadline, but opposition from France, Spain, Romania and others prevented this. Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 222-3; Thompson, Channels of Power, 141-2.
to China in the 2000s, given its expanding and deepening stakes in countries like Iran, Sudan and Burma. As a result, the U.S. can promote consensus by opting not to press for restrictions on entities that would cause major harm to the PRC. For example, in March 2005, the U.S. omitted from a draft resolution reference to Sudan’s oil industry in a bid to reduce the burden on China, a move which likely averted a veto. A sponsor might also elect not to target high officials or others with whom China (or another Council member) would like to preserve a working relationship.

The second form of accommodation is tradeoffs in other areas. In theory, one of the reasons why states act through formal organizations is the ability to coordinate side-payments, and to share information about whether parties have fulfilled their obligations under the terms of the agreement. For instance, to secure votes to authorize the use of force against Iraq in late 1990, the U.S. offered debt forgiveness and development aid to several ambivalent Security Council members, including China. Another example is Russia’s support for U.S. military intervention in Haiti in 1994, likely given in response for U.S. approval of a Russian-led peacekeeping force in Georgia. The U.S. or others

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287 For instance, Resolution 1591 (March 2005) on Sudan did not mention any individuals; when the U.S. sought measures against four individuals in April, 2006, it encountered Chinese intransigence. However, the four included only one, relatively lowly-ranked government official (the others being militia commanders). China ultimately abstained. Warren Hoge, “U.S. Envoy to Expose 4 Sudanese in U.N. Debate About Darfur,” New York Times, April 18, 2006.


290 As Malone writes, however, the “extent of trading between the U.S. and Russia has been impossible to determine.” Malone, Decision-making in the UN Security Council, 128.
might also offer guarantees, such as by arranging alternative sources of oil should sanctions result in a loss of access to a particular state’s supplies.  

(2) Reasons for Flexibility

Three reasons might propel a sponsor to make concessions during the course of negotiations. First is the assessment that doing so may be sufficient to compensate the putative loser for the risk it is assuming by agreeing to a specific action. This is especially relevant to veto-wielding states. Chu Shulong, a professor at Tsinghua University, writes that, in the case of Iran, U.S. admonitions that China behave “responsibly” could not make up for potential losses. Chu poses several rhetorical questions to argue that Beijing would not agree to further sanctions on Tehran in the absence of compensation:

The Chinese government can afford to give up some of its interests with Iran, but the big question is “why?” Why should China sacrifice and bare the cost of deteriorating relations with Iran? Why is it necessary? Is it a fact that Iran is a serious threat to the region or to the world that China must act with others against such a threat? What are China’s incentives when it sacrifices its relations with Iran?  

In short, the purpose of offering concessions is to alter the strategic calculus by making the risks of pressure less severe.

Second is the conviction that negotiation strategies are reciprocal; that is, that the behavior of one actor, in itself, can elicit similar behavior in its opposite number. In the context of labor negotiations, the practice of management making a “first and final offer” can generate resentment on the part of a union, resulting in the latter dismissing the

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291 This is particularly relevant to negotiations on Iran in 2010, and is discussed in Chapter 4.

notion that productive negotiations are feasible at all—even if bargaining space does actually exist.\textsuperscript{293} Conversely, adopting a conciliatory posture, in the form of dropping low-priority goals, expressing a willingness to modify demands, and maintaining ongoing dialogue, can communicate the message that the actor is willing to concede something of value, and, if successful, will prompt the other side to do likewise, and so on, until an agreement is struck.\textsuperscript{294}

The third reason is that concessions provide leaders a face-saving way to reach a compromise. Organizational psychology research has demonstrated that negotiators are likely to become more competitive, and less willing to compromise, the more social capital they stand to lose in front of their peers.\textsuperscript{295} Compensation allows would-be compromisers to construe the result of negotiations as a victory, or at least as a draw, overcoming internal resistance. As Peter Hays Gries argues in the context of Chinese diplomacy, “face” (\textit{mianzi}) is not simply about national dignity; it is also about enabling moderate actors to appease hardliners, such as those in the military. For leaders, reputation is crucial, since “their social credit at home depends on it.”\textsuperscript{296} In effect, there is

\begin{itemize}
  \item Dean G. Pruitt and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, \textit{Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement} (New York: Random House, 1986), 161-2. Of course, in reality, both sides have an incentive to inflate their initial positions to allow room for low-cost concessions, and will exaggerate the importance of those concessions. Still, the goal is to begin a process of mutual concessions that would be unlikely if a rigid, maximalist opening position were adhered to. Arthur S. Lall, \textit{Modern International Negotiation: Practice and Promise} (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), 304-311; Fred C. Iklé, \textit{How Nations Negotiate} (New York: Praeger, 1967), 68-9.
\end{itemize}
a mutually-reinforcing logic of concessions that works at both the international and domestic levels.

(3) Constraints on Concessions

Despite the benefits of accommodation, there are costs as well. The first is simply that the required concessions are unacceptably high to the proposer. For instance, Beijing might be strongly opposed to a draft on political repression in a state of strategic importance. To bolster its position, it might publicly threaten a veto and line up allies, including Russia. Although the U.S. might be able to convince the PRC to abstain by weakening the draft, that option might be unattractive for one of two reasons. First is that the outcome would be so weak as to have no effect on the target state’s behavior. Second, it might be considered a diplomatic failure domestically. The typical strategy would be to refrain from substantive negotiations in the first place.

Second is that there may be incentives to suggest or push drafts without the hope or expectation of approval. For instance, the U.S. apparently sought UN approval for the use of force against Iraq in late 2002 not because it thought such an outcome likely, but because doing so was a condition for Britain’s participation in the coalition. Forcing a vote that the U.S. knows will fail, as it did on Burma and Zimbabwe, might be driven by the desire to shame intransigent members of the Council and to make a public statement

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298 As negotiation theorists put it, there must be a “perceived integrative potential” for substantive talks to occur. As implied by the term, feasibility is built partly on perceptions of the other side’s position, and partly on the reality of the situation. Pruitt and Rubin, Social Conflict, 35-6; Alan C. Filley, Interpersonal Conflict Resolution (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, 1975), 60-1.
of values.\footnote{This is discussed further in Chapter 6.} Alternately, the U.S. might bluff; that is, suggesting that it intends to seek a resolution in order to compel a state to cease some behavior, without the actual intention of paying the costs associated with following through.\footnote{This is discussed with reference to sanctions on Sudan in Chapter 5.} Hence, inflexibility might be the result of an actor valuing symbolism over substance.

Third, flexibility without limits can have negative reputational effects. Although offering to make concessions can elicit a conciliatory response, doing so can also lead the opposite party to raise its demands, seeking more and more in return for less and less. A related problem is that the actor may desire to cultivate a long-term reputation of firmness to enhance its credibility in future negotiations.\footnote{David A. Lax and James Sebenius, “The Manager as Negotiator,” in Negotiation Theory and Practice, ed. John Breslin and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, (Cambridge, MA: Program on Negotiation, Harvard Law School, 1993), 161-3.} For these reasons, deliberators have developed several tactics, such as making concessions contingent on reciprocal acts, alternating between yielding and firmness, and issuing “first and final” offers.\footnote{I. William Zartman and Maureen Berman, The Practical Negotiator (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 171-2; Dean G. Pruitt, “Strategic Choice in Negotiation,” in Negotiation Theory and Practice, ed. John Breslin and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (Cambridge, MA: Program on Negotiation, Harvard Law School, 1993), 27.} Parties that are concerned more with their reputation than with the substance of the issue at hand are especially unlikely to offer sufficient concessions to reach agreement.

The point is that China’s cooperativeness is contingent on the willingness of the U.S. to engage substantively and to demonstrate a willingness to compensate the PRC for the economic, political or other costs that it expects to incur as a result of agreement. When the U.S. adopts a more rigid posture, we would expect China to resist cooperation. Thus:
Hypothesis 2: China is more likely to cooperate the more flexible the U.S. is in terms of the content of negotiations; it is less likely to cooperate the more rigid and inflexible the position of the U.S.

Political Interests

As noted in the previous chapter, one reason for China’s strategic restraint in the Security Council in the 1990s was a desire to maintain positive relations with the U.S. and other developed countries. Doing so was unproblematic in most cases, since the PRC had very little to lose materially by acquiescing to Western goals on sanctions, peacekeeping and the use of force. In the early 21st century, the PRC also pays attention to the political costs and benefits of its choices in Council deliberations. However, given its broadening political and economic interests, it has to take into account the positions of a wider range of actors when determining its own stance.

Parties to any type of negotiation, from labor talks to interstate diplomacy, not only have to be concerned with the issue at hand, but also how their positions might impact the quality of their relations with their counterparts.303 In general, positive relations enhance mutual trust, communications, and reciprocity in other domains, while negative relations generate suspicions, debilitate communications, and stall cooperation.304 An actor might also desire to preserve positive ties with co-negotiators


simply because he or she values the esteem of acceptance in a particular reference group, or, more instrumentally, due to the belief that maintaining one’s good standing vis-à-vis another is an advantageous and strategically sound policy. Social and utilitarian motives may operate in tandem.

However, the argument here is not that China weighs the balance of opinions in the Council per se, but rather the positions of states and regional bodies with strong interests in the case at hand. The two are not the same, as some Council members (e.g., non-permanent ones) may have very little at stake, and thus not be particularly interested in whether the PRC cooperates or not, while some actors outside the Council (such as regional powers) may have much to lose depending on how the Council acts and, as a result, hold China accountable for the outcome. Moreover, Iain Johnston’s argument that China is apt to be affected by social rewards within an institution is only intended to work when the PRC is a newcomer; we would not expect China to be overly sensitive to its status within the Council some 40 years after its admission.


Johnston, Social States, Chapter 3.

The U.S. and Russia, which are UNSC members, likely do fit into the PRC’s assessments, but this has more to do with China’s bilateral stakes in these states than the fact that they happen to be fellow Council members, as explained below. The U.K. and France are also important for similar reasons, i.e. that the PRC values its ties with these states and with the EU as a whole.

Indeed, novice-ness is a main criterion that socialization theorists have identified in terms of the extent to which a state is susceptible to the influence of others within a particular international organization. See:
In this context, we would expect that China’s positions on pariah states would be affected by three sets of actors: the U.S., Russia, and regional stakeholders. The reasons for each are given in the following sections.

(1) Relations with the United States

Chapter 1 observed that China generally prioritized positive relations with the U.S. in the Security Council over its ideological divergences with the positions taken by the U.S. on matters such as peacekeeping and sanctions. The reason was that the U.S. was a key element in China’s grand strategy, first in balancing the Soviet Union and, then, in the reform era, as an economic partner. The importance of the U.S. in China’s decision-making did not wane in the early 21st century. As Yong Deng and Thomas Moore have argued,

At the outset of the new millennium, China’s international behavior is increasingly motivated by a desire to maintain the status quo by seeking stable relations with the United States as the world’s sole current superpower and by promoting China’s gradual rise in the international system.\(^{309}\)

Similarly, Jia Qingguo, a professor at Beijing University, writes that “China’s current leaders attach great importance to the relationship and believe that it is in China’s best interests to develop a constructive strategic partnership with the United States.”\(^{310}\)

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More specifically, there are several reasons why the U.S. should prominently factor into China’s political calculations. First, Chinese experts note that, despite narrowing, the balance of power still favors the U.S. and that it is in China’s interests not to disrupt relations while the latter is in a relatively weak position.  

Second, the U.S. is a pivotal military actor in East Asia, due to its own presence and alliances with Japan, South Korea, and others, and exercises influence over issues such as maritime security and the status of Taiwan. Third, the PRC continues to depend on the U.S. a major export market, source of investment capital, and access to advanced technology and higher education.  

Fourth, the U.S. is a partner on a swath of transnational issues, from piracy, to terrorism, non-proliferation, and clean energy. Yang Jiemian, president of the Shanghai Institutes of International Studies, writes that “common interests and common responsibilities” lies at the heart of the bilateral relationship. These reasons do not mean that China has not taken steps to hedge against the U.S.; it only implies that U.S. views on matters taken up in the Security Council are likely taken very seriously in Beijing.

311 Wang, Zhongguo duiwai guanxi zhuaxing 30 nian, 110-2.
Nevertheless, the magnitude of U.S. interests in topics considered in the UNSC is variable. Matters such as North Korean military aggression affect U.S. security interests in a more direct way than, for instance, political repression in Burma. Beijing is aware that the costs of opposing the U.S. are likely to be much higher on issues considered to be priorities in Washington than those that are driven purely by ideological goals, and should adjust its own positions accordingly. For instance, John Garver notes that China suspended nuclear cooperation with Iran in the 1990s due to the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear program to a U.S. ally, Israel. China did not disengage from cooperation with Pakistan’s nuclear program, since that issue did not pose as central a threat to U.S. interests.  

The expectation is that U.S. pressure is likely to be more effective on issues of major importance to the U.S. An observable implication of this is that the U.S. will use high-level diplomacy, including intervention at the presidential level, on key priorities. China should be more likely to cooperate when the U.S. has signaled its interests in this way than on those issues that the U.S. has not prioritized in the bilateral relationship.

**Hypothesis 3:** China is likely to cooperate when it is subject to high-level U.S. pressure. By contrast, U.S. pressure will be less effective when it has not made the issue a central element of the bilateral relationship.

(2) Relations with Russia

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316 Garver, *China and Iran*, 233-4. This point is similar to a major theme in Evan S. Medeiros’s discussion of China’s participation in international non-proliferation regimes. His argument is that China was most likely to cooperate “during periods when China placed a high value on improving U.S.-China relations to further its economic and foreign policy goals.” The difference is that, in the present discussion, China should be more sensitive to the U.S. positions on issues of higher strategic importance to the U.S. See; Evan S. Medeiros, *Reluctant Restraint: The Evolution of China’s Non-proliferation Policies and Practices, 1980-2004* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 14.
In addition to the U.S., Russia should also factor into China’s political calculus. This is based on a number of interests. First, since the early 1990s, Russia has acted as a major arms supplier to the PRC, although by the late 2000s the vitality of that interaction had waned, owing to a stronger defense base in China and concerns in Russia about the strategic implications of supply the most advanced weaponry to its neighbor.\textsuperscript{317} Second is that Russia serves as a critical source of oil and natural gas, and this will only increase with the construction of an oil pipeline through Eastern Siberia to China that was completed in September, 2010.\textsuperscript{318} Third, Moscow is a potential strategic counterweight to U.S. presence in Central Asia, as well as an ally on issues such as Taiwan, Xinjiang, and human rights.\textsuperscript{319} In general, China is susceptible to Russian influence in the UNSC since it wishes not to upset this “axis of convenience.”\textsuperscript{320}

Beyond the bilateral relationship, Russia should play a particularly important role in China’s decision-making as the only other non-Western permanent member. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Moscow and Beijing tend to grant sympathetic votes

\textsuperscript{317} Richard Weitz, \textit{China-Russia Security Relations: Strategic Parallelism without Partnership or Passion?} (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), 33.

\textsuperscript{318} The Eastern Siberia Pipeline spur runs from the Amur River to Daqing, in Heilongjiang Province. It is expected to increase Russian oil exports to China by 60%. Robert Ross, “The Rise of Russia, Sino-Russian Relations, and U.S. Security Policy,” Brief, Royal Danish Defense College, June, 2009, 6. Available online, at: \texttt{http://forsvaret.dk/FAK/Publikationer/Briefs/Documents/TheRiseofRussiaSino-RussianRelationsandUSSecurityPolicy.pdf}.

\textsuperscript{319} Yong Deng, \textit{China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 138-150.

\textsuperscript{320} Bobo Lo, \textit{Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing and the New Geopolitics} (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 180-3. This does not imply that the Sino-Russian relationship is without significant problems as well. For instance, Russia is concerned about China’s growth and potential influence in Central Asia; the ecological consequences of Chinese industrialization; and intellectual theft, including in the defense sector. See: Elizabeth Wishnick, “Why a ‘Strategic Partnership’? The View from China,” in \textit{The Future of China-Russia Relations}, ed. James Bellacqua (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2010), 70-2.
to each other when one or the other’s interests are threatened. China has tried not to be isolated within the P5 and should be more likely to cooperate with the U.S. and others when Russia, for its own reasons, has either supported the U.S. position or has indicated that it may be moving in that direction. Indeed, U.S. officials appear to have subscribed to the notion that China wishes not to be in a position where it would have to cast a lone veto. One senior State Department official reports that U.S. practice is generally to “cut Russia out first and leave China isolated.”

Thus:

**Hypothesis 4:** China is more likely to cooperate when it is isolated among the permanent members of the Security Council, and especially when Russia has chosen to cooperate.

(3) Relations with Regional Stakeholders

Beyond the U.S. and Russia, China is subject to political pressure from a variety of other states. The exact mix of states that might influence China’s positions varies depending on the issue. In general, it is the neighbors of the target state, other regional powers, and additional external actors heavily engaged in negotiations that are likely to weigh in China’s political calculus. On the DPRK, China likely considers the attitudes of the other members of the Six-Party Talks: South Korea and Japan, as well as the U.S. and Russia. On Iran, we would expect it to take into account the positions of the other members of the “E3+3:” France, Germany and Britain (in addition to Russia and the U.S.), and regional actors, such as Israel and Saudi Arabia.

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321 Interview with State Department official, Washington, DC, November 2010. This point was also made in several other interviews with U.S. officials and commentators. However, another diplomat, with extensive experience working with China in the UNSC, notes that the assumption that China more or less follows Russia’s position “is melting away,” due to China’s growing confidence. Interview with official, U.S. Permanent Mission to the UN, New York, February 2010.
As regards Sudan and Zimbabwe, the PRC likely assesses political relations with major states, such as South Africa, and with the African Union, which aggregates the views of dozens of African states and serves as a political actor in its own right.\textsuperscript{322} Colin Keating suggests that, in deliberating African cases, China has paid closer attention to regional opinion than to the sentiments of the great powers.\textsuperscript{323} While the West was driven largely by human rights concerns, local actors had to be wary about the direct consequences of UN action or inaction as well, such as refugee flows or dangers to AU peacekeepers. This translated into resolve, which is a major contributor to any form of international pressure.\textsuperscript{324} African views would also have been important to China based on the latter’s interests in the continent, such as preserving access to vital resources, expanding markets, and maintaining diplomatic support in human rights, trade, and other multilateral bodies where votes matter.\textsuperscript{325}

On Myanmar, the key regional stakeholder is ASEAN. Like the AU, ASEAN represents frontline states to the conflict, such as Thailand, which naturally hold major interests in how the resolve is settled. In addition, China likely believes that “regional institutions have the primary right to speak on the issues that directly concern them,” a normative tenet buttressed by the \textit{realpolitik} calculation that supporting bodies like

\textsuperscript{322} The aggregation of the views of numerous African states into a pressure bloc is not unprecedented in Council history. For instance, Boyd notes that British decision-making on whether to consent to sanctions on Southern Rhodesia in 1966 was informed by “unrelenting pressure” by African members of the British Commonwealth, a situation that led, in part, to Britain’s ratcheting up of pressure by threatening to consent to sanctions. Boyd, \textit{Fifteen Men on a Powder Keg}, 244-6.

\textsuperscript{323} Interview with Colin Keating, Executive Director, The Security Council Report, February 2010.


\textsuperscript{325} This was especially important in light of the “Go Out” (Zou Chuqu) policy announced in 2004, in which Chinese firms were encouraged to promote exports to, and acquire access to resources in, developing regions such as sub-Saharan Africa. See: Zheng, \textit{Gaige kaifang yilai de zhongguo waijiao}, 191-5.
ASEAN diminishes perceptions of China as a threat and increases the likelihood that these states will lean towards Beijing instead of Washington in the competition for influence in Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{326} ASEAN might also be sympathetic to China’s preference for dialogue and quiet diplomacy, and provide useful cover in the face of Western pressure.\textsuperscript{327}

As a rule, we would expect that the chance of Chinese cooperativeness in the UNSC would increase the greater the support among regional stakeholders for U.S. proposals, while dissent would reduce this probability both by complicating the political stakes of cooperation and by offering public support for decisions to resist made on other grounds.

**Hypothesis 5:** The greater the support among the regional stakeholders for the U.S. position on pariah states, the more likely it is that China will cooperate; conversely, the more division, the higher the chance that China will not cooperate.

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The preceding discussion outlined two general factors likely to influence the extent to which the PRC cooperates with the U.S. and its partners in UNSC deliberations. First is the issue itself. Two hypotheses were developed to test the idea that China’s positions are based on aspects of the issues. The first concerns the structure of alternatives, noting that the PRC typically prefers options that do not involve multilateral


\textsuperscript{327} *China’s Myanmar Dilemma*, 25.
pressure on its partners. The second is based on the straightforward observation that states are more receptive to proposals that mitigate risks than those which do not. A second set of interests involves political relations with other major actors. For China, this includes the U.S., Russia and regional stakeholders. The point is that China’s position should not be based only on the issues, but should also take into account how cooperation will affect its relations with these actors. Table 10 lists the five hypotheses.

**Table 10: Hypotheses**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interests Targeted</th>
<th>H</th>
<th>Expectation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic stakes in pariah states as affected by the relative attractiveness and elements of punitive proposals in the UNSC.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>China should be more willing to cooperate with efforts to punish pariah states the fewer opportunities exist for multilateral dialogue and bilateral intervention and, conversely, China should be less willing to cooperate the more such alternatives exist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>China is more likely to cooperate the more flexible the U.S. is in terms of the content of negotiations; it is less likely to cooperate the more rigid and inflexible the position of the U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political stakes in maintaining positive ties with the U.S. and the major regional stakeholders, in addition to avoiding isolation within the UNSC.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>China is likely to cooperate when it is subject to U.S. pressure, as indicated by high-level diplomatic intervention. China is less likely to cooperate when the issue has not been prioritized in the U.S.-China bilateral relationship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>China is more likely to cooperate when it is isolated among the permanent members of the Security Council, and especially when Russia has chosen to cooperate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>The greater the support among the regional stakeholders for multilateral pressure, the more likely it is that China will cooperate; the more division, the higher the chance that China will not cooperate.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Methods and Limitations**

The analytical objective is to weigh the hypotheses developed above against the historical record. A small-N, case study approach is appropriate for two reasons. First, the universe of cases is small. As argued in the previous chapter, China is rarely assertive in
Security Council negotiations, confronting the U.S. and its allies only when major interests are at stake. The puzzle raised in this chapter is even narrower: what can explain variance in China’s approach to North Korea, Iran, Sudan, Burma and Zimbabwe? The theoretical reason for focusing on these cases is that it allows us to bracket domestic-level factors that have changed over time, including the composition of the leadership and the nature of the decision-making process, and instead look at the role of external conditions. The policy reason is that these cases are recent and, in general, important to the U.S. and other states on strategic and humanitarian grounds.

The following chapters disaggregate these cases into distinct decisions. Chapter 3 studies China’s behavior on four UNSC decisions related to the DPRK (i.e., responses to North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009); Chapter 4 centers on the diplomatic encounters on Iran that occurred over the course of several months and culminated in fourth round of sanctions in June, 2010; Chapter 5 addresses why the Council did not pass sanctions as a means to pressure the Sudanese government to accept UN peacekeepers in Darfur in the spring of 2007; and Chapter 6 deals with China’s vetoes on Burma (2007) and Zimbabwe (2008). In short, these cases represent an even smaller slice than the list of major decisions reported in Tables 8 and 9 above.

The methodological justification for considering these particular cases is that they facilitate both intra-case and cross-case comparison. In five of these eight decisions, China resisted but ultimately was able to forge consensus with the U.S. This allows us to ask which external factors changed in the interlude. Did preferred alternatives close? Did the U.S. use high-level diplomacy? Did Russia’s position change first? And so on. In

328 This is consistent with Mill’s ‘method of difference,’ which narrows the parameters to a small set in order to trace differences in outcomes.
three cases (the Sudanese non-outcome, and the vetoes on Burma and Zimbabwe), China was unable to reach agreement. Were the factors which seemed to explain change in the positive cases absent in the negative ones? Comparison across cases thus offers a second form of evidence. The latter analysis will be taken up in the concluding chapter.

The second reason to use a small-N approach is that the explanatory framework calls for close scrutiny across a broad and complex range of strategic, political and diplomatic factors. Some of these, including alternative processes, bilateral exchanges with the U.S., and the positions of regional stakeholders, require attention to developments far outside the bounds of the Council, while others, including the nature of Russian and U.S. diplomacy, demand close analysis of interactions within it. Examining how, and the extent to which, any of these changed between the beginning and end of negotiations calls for thorough process-tracing, which is an investigation of the steps leading from initial conditions to outcomes. It allows us to gauge causal arguments, identify interactions between the independent variables, and identify factors that were not part of the original expectations.\(^{329}\)

In testing the hypotheses, reference to a wide variety of sources is useful. First, the secondary literature on the political context of the eight decisions is informative. Second, publications from the Chinese scholarly community are useful in assessing PRC perceptions of the issues, as are interviews with Chinese scholars. Newspapers and newswires, accessible through Lexis-Nexis Academic and the World News Connection,

contain a wealth of applicable data on the negotiations themselves, as well as on the political relations assessed. UN documents, such as transcripts of public meetings and the texts of resolutions, are helpful in describing the outcomes, and are also available online. Interviews with diplomats, particularly from the U.S. and Chinese delegations, offer a window into the process. The analysis borrows liberally from each of these sources.\footnote{330}

As a final note, there are two main limitations to the analytical framework developed in this chapter. First is that it is not possible to entirely dismiss the role of domestic politics, especially at the elite level. Despite the absence of a general ideological or leadership transition in the period covered, significant personnel changes did occur at the 17th Party Congress in October 2007, affecting the composition of the Politburo Standing Committee, the top-level Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group and other relevant actors.\footnote{331} The influence of specific state-owned enterprises, bureaucratic agencies, individual policymakers, and so on, is left out, as is the role of nationalism and public sentiment in general.

The response is fourfold. First are limits on sources. Given the opacity of China’s foreign policy process, it would not be feasible to obtain accurate data about the role of elite politics or other domestic factors. Second, even if it were, adding these dimensions would lead to a cluttered analysis, reducing the parsimony of the framework. Third, from a policy perspective, tracing the effects of external factors is probably more valuable. International variables, such as the mix of pressure and flexibility in U.S. strategy, are manipulable while domestic ones, as a rule, are not.

\footnote{330}{For additional information about sources, please refer to the Bibliography.}

\footnote{331}{Thanks to Cheng Li for pointing out changes in the FALSG. Four of the ten decisions occurred before the 17th Party Congress, and six after.}
Fourth, there is little reason to believe that domestic turbulence had much of a role in how these issues were handled in contrast to policy during the Cultural Revolution, for instance.\textsuperscript{332} Moreover, it is dubious that major political changes between 2006 and 2010 that could account for changes in China’s positions in the UNSC. There was no top leadership transition within China, with Hu Jintao having been installed in key posts by September 2004. There did not seem to be any infighting associated with the 17\textsuperscript{th} Party Congress in 2007 that may have impacted foreign policy.\textsuperscript{333} The PRC was represented at the UN by a series of ambassadors during this period, but it is doubtful that individual differences affected China’s positions. Key rulings would have been up to Hu and others in Beijing.\textsuperscript{334}

The second limitation is that the external validity of the argument is narrow. The hypotheses are meant to illuminate Chinese behavior on a specific set of issues in a given institution at a particular moment in time. The expectations may also apply to the broader, but still limited, universe of cases in which the eight decisions are situated (such as China’s decision-making on the first three rounds of sanctions of Iran), but start to lose their value with changes in the protagonist (e.g. replacing China with Russia), setting (trading the Security Council for the G20, for instance), or time period (such as

\textsuperscript{332} See, e.g., Andrew J. Nathan, “A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics,” \textit{China Quarterly} 53 (1973), 34-66. A more recent foreign policy case in which scholars have considered the role of domestic politics as independent from external factors was the 1995-6 Taiwan Straits crisis. See: You Ji, “Making Sense of War Games in the Taiwan Strait,” \textit{Journal of Contemporary China} 6 (1997), 287-305.


\textsuperscript{334} Wang Guangya served from August 2003 to October 2008; Zhang Yesui from October 2008 to March 2010; and Li Baodong from June 2010. Decisions on critical issues such as Iran and North Korea would likely have been made collectively within the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG), chaired by Hu Jintao.
substituting the Mao era for the early 21st century). The argument would be almost completely irrelevant with changes across more than one of these categories.

This problem is mitigated in two ways. First is that the framework is designed to explain a small set of cases that happen to be politically and analytically interesting; its intended value lies precisely in its accounting of a large share of the variance in a limited number of cases, not in an attempt to explain a fraction of the variance in a vast population of cases. Second is that, from a theoretical perspective, the argument applies conceptual building blocks from the broad negotiation literature (including the structure of alternatives, concession tolerance, and relational interests), which have rarely been utilized in diplomatic studies. This set of concepts can be used to help untangle other puzzles as they appear on the empirical scene.

Conclusion

This chapter began with the observation that China tends to act assertively in the Security Council when it has major interests at stake, and posed the question: why does the PRC cooperate at times with the U.S. even in cases in which it does have material interests, such as the five pariah states examined in this study? What can explain the variance? Posing the question does not imply the view that China should cooperate with the U.S., or refuse to cooperate for that matter. Rather, the object is constructed in this way simply because it has been the U.S., and its allies, that have pushed for punitive action against the DPRK, Sudan, and so on, and it is reasonable to examine the reasons why others might cooperate with these efforts when those parties have reasons not to.

The explanations posited in this chapter are based on a disaggregation of interests in negotiations into two types: interests in the issues themselves, and those in states’
political relations with the main participants. From this framework, five hypotheses were developed. The first two concern the substantive issues, and predict that China will cooperate with the U.S. when preferred alternatives to pressure have failed and when key risks have been mitigated. The second three concern political interests, expecting that China will be more likely to cooperate when the U.S. has major interests at stake, when Russia has shifted towards the West, leaving China isolated among the P5, and when regional stakeholders have offered their support for the U.S. position.

The final section proposed a small-N research design, focused on a close examination of eight cases, five in which China was willing to cooperate, and three in which it refused to do so. The discussion noted that a variety of sources are helpful in carrying out the analysis. It also addressed two potential limitations to the framework, namely that it does not account for domestic-level sources of change, and that it is not easily generalizable beyond the subject of China’s diplomacy in the UNSC.

The following chapters address China’s positions on the problems of North Korea, Iran, Sudan, Myanmar and Zimbabwe respectively. The five hypotheses developed in this chapter are applied to each of these cases, leveraged against the empirical record. The analytical objective is to demonstrate the extent to which the hypotheses developed in this chapter are a useful way to account for China’s varied positions, and to discern the relative importance of two conceptually interesting variables—issues and relations—in PRC decision-making in the UNSC.
Chapter 3
Pressuring Pyongyang: China’s Positions on North Korea in the UNSC, 2006 and 2009

Introduction

On December 5, 2010, Hu Jintao and Barack Obama held a phone conversation on the subject of North Korea’s recent artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island, a Yellow Sea territory controlled by South Korea. Hu reportedly told the U.S. president: “The Korean Peninsula has a very fragile security situation. If not dealt with properly, tensions could well rise…or spin out of control.”

Hu’s comment reflects the basic dilemma that has confronted China in international negotiations on North Korea. On the one hand, China recognizes that Pyongyang’s behavior threatens PRC interests. Zhang Liangui, a professor at the Central Party School in Beijing, writes that a nuclear North Korea would harm China in three ways: first, by undermining the NPT, which preserves stability by keeping the number of nuclear weapons-holding states to a minimum; second, by generating an arms race in East Asia, which may even include Taiwan; third, in the sense that an accident may cause direct damage to China’s northeast. Zhao Lei, another scholar at the Central Party School, submits that, despite China’s historical alliance with the DPRK, its “main interest is in non-proliferation.” Shen Dingli, a professor at Fudan University in Shanghai, adds that DPRK provocations may complicate the power balance in Northeast Asia by driving

337 Interview with Zhao Lei, Central Party School, Beijing, July 2009.
South Korea and Japan closer to the U.S., which itself may seek to play a more prominent military role in the region.\textsuperscript{338}

On the other hand, China is concerned that U.S. proposals to punish the DPRK may be counterproductive. One reason that the PRC was unwilling to heed the suggestions of the Bush administration and use strong bilateral pressure on North Korea was the fear that this might precipitate a regime collapse, which in turn would involve a destabilizing refugee flow into northeastern China.\textsuperscript{339} Moreover, Beijing is worried about the possibility that sanctions, or other types of pressure, may cause Pyongyang to act even more provocatively, leading to the very outcome that coercion was meant to prevent.\textsuperscript{340} An additional source of skepticism is that pressure might cause the PRC to lose whatever limited influence it already had on the DPRK, causing an already fragile situation to become even more perilous.\textsuperscript{341}

Thus, when the issue of North Korea has been raised in the Security Council, China has treaded cautiously. It has been hesitant to support the full range of measures sought by the U.S. and Japan, including a general arms embargo and mandatory cargo inspections, fearing that such provisions might either contribute to the regime’s internal demise, or begin an escalatory chain of events ending with U.S. military strikes. However, the PRC has not entirely dismissed a role for the UNSC. In a series of decisions beginning in the summer of 2006, the Council agreed to condemn Pyongyang, and to

\textsuperscript{338} Shen Dingli, “Can Sanctions Stop Proliferation?” \textit{The Washington Quarterly} 31 (2008), 95.

\textsuperscript{339} \textit{Shades of Red}, 44.


\textsuperscript{341} Zhang Qingmin, a professor at Beijing University, says that China’s “bind” is that, if it hews too closely to the U.S., it “risks damaging its relations with Pyongyang,” which it needs to encourage North Korea gradually to open itself to the world. Interview, Beijing University, November 2009.
“incentivize” it to return to the negotiating table through an arms embargo, financial restrictions, proscription of nuclear and ballistic missile tests, voluntary cargo inspections, and other means.

This chapter applies the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2 to the North Korean case. It asks why China was able to compromise with the U.S. The argument is fourfold. First, alternative routes, in particular the Six-Party Talks and bilateral pressure, had failed, making UNSC action a preferred option. Second, the U.S. was able to accommodate the PRC’s major concerns regarding both the form and substance of the decisions. Third, the U.S. leveraged the shock of North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests to encourage Beijing to agree to proposals drafted by Washington and its allies. Fourth, two major regional powers, Japan and South Korea, generally supported the U.S. position, adding political pressure for China to cooperate. The discussion also suggests that Russia played a marginal role, and likely was not a primary factor in China’s political calculus.

The chapter develops this argument in five sections. The first provides a background of the DPRK nuclear issue, and sketches the outcomes to be explained. The second covers the Council’s response to North Korea’s ballistic missile tests in July, 2006. The third addresses the North’s October 2006 nuclear test, and the UNSC response, Resolution 1718. The fourth discusses the PRST that was issued after a “satellite launch,” suspected to be a disguised long-range missile test, in April, 2009. The fifth assesses the negotiations leading to Resolution 1874, passed after the DPRK’s second nuclear test in May, 2009. The conclusion summarizes the findings, and states the implications for cooperation in UNSC negotiations.
Background

The evolution of North Korea’s nuclear program, and the international community’s response to it, has taken place primarily outside of the Security Council. The DPRK signed the NPT in 1985 and, following the finalization of a Safeguards Agreement in 1992, the IAEA conducted inspections of DPRK nuclear sites for two years. In October 1994, Washington and Pyongyang negotiated an Agreed Framework which would have required the latter to abandon its nuclear programs in return for international energy assistance. In the mid-1990s, the DPRK carried out talks with the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), which had been created by the U.S., South Korea and others to facilitate the Agreed Framework’s objectives. After it admitted the existence of a secret nuclear weapons program in October 2002, North Korea entered into multilateral discussions on disarmament with the U.S., China, Russia, South Korea and Japan. Six rounds of the Six-Party Talks (6PT) took place between August 2003 and their eventual collapse in April 2009.

Prior to 2006, the Security Council was involved in the issue only twice. In May 1993, it passed Resolution 825 in response to the DPRK’s announcement that it would withdraw from the NPT and eject IAEA inspectors, requesting that Pyongyang

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342 For a description of North Korea’s interactions with the IAEA, see the factsheet: “IAEA and DPRK” at: http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaDprk/fact_sheet_may2003.shtml.


“reconsider,” and asking states to “encourage” it to “respond positively.”

In September 1998, the body issued a Press Statement (a device considered even less authoritative than a PRST) that voiced “concern” about the North’s August 31 missile launch over the Sea of Japan, urging “restraint” by all countries concerned. China, seeking to avoid the prospect of sanctions, diluted both the 1993 and 1998 decisions, and, with Russia, prevented any response to Pyongyang’s 2002 revelation and its subsequent decision to withdraw from the NPT. Instead, the PRC used its influence to prompt North Korea to join the 6PT, which Beijing offered to host.

The Council’s reticence ended in July 2006. On the 5th, the DPRK launched seven ballistic missiles that landed in Japanese territorial waters. Six of these were short-range missiles and one was believed to be a long-range Taepodong-2 rocket, which might have been capable of hitting parts of the U.S. On the 15th, the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1695, which condemned the launches, demanded the suspension of all ballistic missile-related programs, called on states to “exercise vigilance” in terms of arms transfers to and from North Korea, and urged the latter to return to the 6PT. After the vote, Wang Guangya said that China was “gravely

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349 “N. Korea Launches 7 Missiles,” Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo), July 6, 2006. The exact range is unknown, as the long-range missile in question failed after 42 seconds in flight. Some analysts, however, argued that it might have been capable of hitting parts of Alaska or at least the U.S. Pacific territory of Guam. Barbara Demick, “With Few N. Korea Facts, A Rumor Got Launched,” Los Angeles Times, July 7, 2006.
concerned about the newly emerged complicating factor on the Korean peninsula,” and “opposed to any further tension” there.\footnote{SC, Verbatim, S/PV.5490 (July 15, 2006), 5.}

On October 3, 2006, North Korea announced that it would soon carry out a nuclear test,\footnote{On October 6, the Security Council issued a PRST which warned the North that “such a test would bring universal condemnation” and urged it to return to the 6PT. SC Document S/PRST/2006/41 (October 6, 2006).} which it did six days later.\footnote{KCNA, the official North Korean news agency, reported that the “U.S. extreme threat of a nuclear war and sanctions and pressure compel the DPRK to conduct a nuclear test, an essential process for bolstering [its] nuclear deterrent.” Quoted in Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Planning Nuclear Weapons Test,” \textit{International Herald Tribune}, October 4, 2006.} The blast was so small that scientists debated whether the test was successful, though the DPRK media celebrated an “historical event that has brought our military and our people great joy.”\footnote{Anthony Faiola, Glenn Kessler, and Dafna Linzer, “N. Korea Claims Nuclear Test,” \textit{Washington Post}, October 9, 2006.} On the 14\textsuperscript{th}, the UNSC unanimously passed Resolution 1718, which imposed an embargo on a range of arms, including artillery, tanks, and WMD-related items, as well as on luxury goods.\footnote{SC Document S/RES/1718 (October 14, 2006), 2-3.} In addition, it called for voluntary cargo inspections, but ruled out the use of force. The resolution also authorized restrictions on North Korean firms and individuals associated with WMD programs, but left the designation of these to a UNSC committee (the “1718 Committee”) that would establish guidelines and monitor enforcement.\footnote{Ibid, 4-5. The 1718 Committee’s activities are detailed on its website: \url{http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/index.shtml}.} After the vote, Wang stated that the test was “not conducive to peace and stability in Northeast Asia,” and that the PRC supported a “firm and appropriate” response. However, he also noted

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{SC, Verbatim, S/PV.5490 (July 15, 2006), 5.}
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\item \footnote{Anthony Faiola, Glenn Kessler, and Dafna Linzer, “N. Korea Claims Nuclear Test,” \textit{Washington Post}, October 9, 2006.}
\item \footnote{SC Document S/RES/1718 (October 14, 2006), 2-3.}
\item \footnote{Ibid, 4-5. The 1718 Committee’s activities are detailed on its website: \url{http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/index.shtml}.}
\end{itemize}
reservations about cargo inspections and urged states to “adopt a prudent and responsible attitude in this regard.”

Following an additional two-and-a-half years of inconclusive multilateral dialogue, North Korea launched what it purported to be a communications satellite on April 5, 2009. Since the launch employed ballistic missile technology, the U.S. and its allies argued that this constituted a breach of Resolution 1718. On the 13th, the Security Council issued a PRST which said that the launch was in “contravention” of the previous resolution and ordered the 1718 Committee to designate “entities and goods” that would be subject to restrictions. In a press conference afterwards, China’s UN ambassador, Zhang Yesui, said that the response should be “cautious and proportionate,” and made clear that the PRC did not favor another resolution or the imposition of further sanctions.

357 SC, Verbatim, S/PV.5551 (October 14, 2006), 4.

358 The U.S. government denied that any North Korean satellite had entered orbit, and that the launch had been a failed test of a Taepodong-2 ballistic missile. Meanwhile, the KCNA purported that the satellite was orbiting normally and transmitting “immortal revolutionary songs.” Na Jeong-ju, “NK Satellite Fails to Enter Orbit,” Korea Times, April 5, 2009.

359 SC Document S/PRST/2009/7. On the 24th, the 1718 Committee designated three North Korean firms as subject to financial restrictions as provided in Paragraph 8(d) of Resolution 1718. For details, see: “List of Entities, Goods and Individuals Subject to the Measures Imposed by Paragraph 8 of Resolution 1718 (2006),” accessible at: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/pdf/List%202016%20July%202009.pdf. Other firms and individuals were added to the list following the May, 2009, nuclear test.

On May 25, 2009, North Korea conducted a second nuclear test and fired several short-range ballistic missiles. There was agreement among experts that the explosion was larger than in 2006, but some doubted that it yielded the force of a “Hiroshima-style” blast. On June 12, the UNSC unanimously approved Resolution 1874, which condemned the incident, called on states to carry out inspections of vessels suspected of transporting proscribed items, and widened existing arms and economic measures.

Zhang emphasized China’s “firm opposition” to the test, but reiterated Beijing’s concerns about cargo inspections. In particular, he urged states to “act prudently” and “refrain from any word or deed that could exacerbate the conflict. Under no circumstances should force be used.”

Table 11: Key Dates in UNSC Negotiations on North Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 11, 1993</td>
<td>UNSC passes Resolution 825 13-2 (China and Pakistan abstain), urging DPRK not to withdraw from the NPT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 15, 2006</td>
<td>UNSC passes Resolution 1695 15-0, demanding suspension of ballistic missile programs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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361 The KCNA’s official justification was that, “The nuclear technology will help us not only bolster nuclear deterrence for self-defense, but also strengthen peace and security on the Korean peninsula and surrounding areas.” Quoted in Na Jeong-ju, “South Condemns NK’s 2nd Nuke Test,” Korea Times, May 25, 2009.


363 SC Document S/RES/1874 (June 12, 2009). Paragraphs 11-17 outline the procedures through which states are to conduct inspections, but does not authorize the use of force if the vessel in question refuses. Like Resolution 1718, 1874 was passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, specifically citing Article 41, which deals with measures short of the use of force.

364 SC, Verbatim, S/PV.6141 (June 12, 2009), 3. Alan Romberg argued that China’s response was relatively restrained in comparison to its harsher reaction to the 2006 test. In particular, the PRC did not use the term “flagrantly” (hanran) to describe the North’s actions. Romberg, “China and North Korea,” available at: http://www.nautilus.org/projects/dprk-policy/Romberg.pdf.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 3, 2006</td>
<td>DPRK announces imminent nuclear test.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 6, 2006</td>
<td>UNSC issues PRST warning DPRK not to conduct nuclear test.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 9, 2006</td>
<td>DPRK carries out first nuclear test; UNSC holds emergency session.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 14, 2006</td>
<td>UNSC passes Resolution 1718 15-0, imposing arms embargo and creating sanctions committee to list violators.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 14, 2009</td>
<td>DPRK announces intention to launch satellite using Taepodong-2 rocket.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 5, 2009</td>
<td>DPRK conducts satellite launch; UNSC holds emergency session.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 13, 2009</td>
<td>UNSC issues PRST condemning launch and instructing 1718 Committee to designate individuals and firms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 25, 2009</td>
<td>DPRK conducts second nuclear test; UNSC holds emergency session.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 12, 2009</td>
<td>UNSC passes Resolution 1874 15-0, widening arms embargo and laying out procedures for conducting cargo inspections.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

China’s willingness to agree to two rounds of sanctions, in addition to other decisions on North Korea, is surprising in light of three factors. First is the risk that pressure might frustrate the chances for productive dialogue with Pyongyang. Indeed, the April 2009 PRST was used as a pretext for the DPRK’s withdrawal from the 6PT.\(^{365}\) China had preferred the 6PT as a peaceful and effective route to nuclear non-proliferation, a way to demonstrate its leadership in regional security affairs, and as a means to avoid an escalation of tensions by the U.S. and Japan.\(^{366}\) Second, siding with the U.S. might have harmed Beijing’s relations with Pyongyang, reducing the former’s ability to coax the latter into good-faith engagement in the 6PT.\(^{367}\) Third, alienating North Korea might have led to a spiral of conflict between the DPRK and its neighbors, and perhaps even to

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\(^{365}\) The DPRK’s decision to withdraw from the 6PT came on April 14, one day after the issuance of the PRST. In announcing the withdrawal, the DPRK Foreign Ministry called the PRST an “unbearable insult” to the Korean people. The real motive, however, is less clear and may have been driven by the need for Kim Jong-il to appear defiant to facilitate a transition of leadership to his son, Kim Jong-un. Mark Landler, “North Korea says it will Halt Talks and Restart its Nuclear Program,” *New York Times*, April 14, 2009.


\(^{367}\) Interview with Prof. Zhang Qingmin, Beijing University, November 2009. Moreover, as Brian Frederking notes, China used its influence to encourage the DPRK to attend several rounds of the 6PT between 2003 and 2005. Frederking, *The United States and the Security Council*, 121-2.
China’s worst case scenario: regime collapse, an influx of refugees, and military conflict.\textsuperscript{368}

The following sections test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2 against China’s record of cooperation on four decisions related to North Korea: the adoption of Resolutions 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), and the April, 2009, PRST. In short, the expectations are that the PRC should have moved towards cooperation with the U.S. as preferred options failed, as the U.S. made concessions that addressed China’s major political and economic concerns, and as the political stakes mediated in favor of cooperation (through U.S. diplomatic pressure; changes in Russia’s position; and the attitudes of the other regional stakeholders, notably Japan and the ROK).

**Call for Restraint: Resolution 1695**

China’s initial reaction to North Korea’s test firing of seven ballistic missiles on July 5, 2006, was muted. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesman Liu Jianchao urged “all parties” to “remain calm and exercise restraint,” and said that China would play a “constructive role” in the matter.\textsuperscript{369} Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, in a call to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice the same day, likewise emphasized “restraint” and asked for “more meetings,” which prompted Rice to report to the U.S. ambassador in


New York, John Bolton, that “We’ve got a China problem.” On the 6th, Hu Jintao, speaking with George W. Bush, said that China was “deeply concerned” about the situation and noted the PRC’s commitment to the 6PT, but refrained from committing to efforts to punish the DPRK.  

Indeed, China’s opening position in the UN was to seek a PRST along the lines of the statement issued after the 1998 missile tests. This position was seconded by Russia. Meanwhile, Japan, supported by the U.S., circulated a draft resolution that would have urged the North to return to the 6PT and imposed sanctions on the North’s missile industry. The outcome, ten days later, was a compromise resolution that did not explicitly cite Chapter VII or require sanctions, but did reference the Council’s “special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,” condemned the tests and called on states to exercise “vigilance” in their arms transactions with the DPRK. Given its hesitance, why did the PRC move towards the U.S. position that a resolution was required?

Narrowing Alternatives

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370 Bolton, Surrender Is Not an Option, 293.


374 This language echoed Article 24 of Chapter V of the Charter, which invests the Council with the “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,” which in turn references “specific powers” under Chapter VII among others. SC Document S/RES/1695 (July 15, 2006), 2.
Hypothesis 1 is that multilateral dialogue and bilateral pressure had proven ineffective, opening the way for a punitive response. In this case, we need to assess both the status of the 6PT and China’s bilateral interactions with Pyongyang. First, the 6PT had been stalled for six months prior to the July crisis. In September 2005, the six parties had agreed to a Joint Statement, under which the North promised to abandon its nuclear program in return for a U.S. guarantee not to attack the DPRK. International energy assistance would be discussed at a later date.\textsuperscript{375} The parties met again in November, with Pyongyang rejecting U.S. calls to close its principal nuclear reactor at Yongbyon.\textsuperscript{376}

Additionally, in late 2005 the U.S. Treasury Department had begun to target banks with ties to North Korea. In September, it publicized a link between a Macau bank, Banco Delta Asia, and a DPRK money laundering operation, resulting in the bank’s collapse and the freezing of accounts in other institutions. This complicated the 6PT as North Korea demanded the removal of constraints on its overseas accounts as a precondition for fulfilling its obligations under the Joint Statement.\textsuperscript{377} In March 2006, North Korean officials met with their U.S. counterparts at the UN and reiterated this position. While the U.S. argued that there was no connection between the 6PT and the financial investigations, this did not appease the North. Following the March talks, a U.S.

\textsuperscript{375} Virginie Grzelczyk, “Six Party Talks and Negotiation Strategy: When Do We Get There?” \textit{International Negotiation} 14 (2009), 105; Chung, “China’s Approaches,” 750.

\textsuperscript{376} “Nuclear Talks Stalemate after North Korea Rejects U.S. Call to Close Reactor,” \textit{AFP}, November 11, 2005.

congressman reported that “the six-party process is beginning to appear moribund.” In fact, the 6PT would not resume until December, 2006.

In late June, likely in a gambit to coerce the U.S. into bilateral talks, Pyongyang declared a right to conduct intercontinental ballistic missile tests, and intelligence reports showed that the DPRK was preparing to launch a Taepodong-2 rocket. The U.S. and Japan both averred that a test would lead to a response by the UNSC. On the 22nd, an MFA spokesperson said, “We are very concerned about the current situation. We hope all parties can do more in the interest of regional peace and stability.” Six days later, in a joint press conference with Australian Prime Minister John Howard, Wen Jiabao stated that he hoped that “the various parties will proceed from the greater interest of maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula and refrain from taking measures that will worsen the situation.”

It is unclear whether China sent private messages as well, but the DPRK went ahead with the test a week after Wen’s remarks.

Afterwards, China attempted to pressure North Korea to return to the 6PT. Hu Jintao and other leaders signaled displeasure by not mentioning the 45th anniversary of the PRC-DPRK defense treaty on July 11, and China failed to offer any assistance for flooding that occurred in North Korea in early July. More directly, Vice Foreign

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378 The lawmaker in question was Rep. Jim Leach, chairman of the House International Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. Glenn Kessler, “N. Korea Sets Terms for Return to Nuclear Talks,” *Washington Post*, March 9, 2006. Moreover, in April, 2006, North Korea reiterated this demand, with its chief nuclear negotiator saying that “the minute we have the funds [released]…I will be at the talks.” “N. Korea Offers Nuclear Talks Deal,” *BBC News*, April 13, 2006.


382 Swaine, “China’s North Korea Dilemma,” 3-4.
Minister Wu Dawei, China’s 6PT representative, was dispatched to Pyongyang on the 8th for consultations with his counterpart, Kim Kye-gwan, intending to secure a moratorium on further missile tests, which would have reduced the need for the UNSC to intervene. Wu returned on July 14 with no agreements, leading Japan’s UN ambassador, Kenzo Oshima, to comment that China seemed “desperate” and that the trip had been an “embarrassment.” More charitably, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill said that Beijing “sent a good delegation up to Pyongyang, showed a real interest in trying to work with the DPRK, but it does not appear to have been reciprocated.” With the 6PT stalled and bilateral pressure ineffective, China was primed to move closer to the U.S. position.

Concessions and Risk-Reduction

A second explanation is that concessions during the negotiating process should enhance the prospects of Chinese cooperativeness. Since North Korea’s October 2002 admission of a clandestine uranium enrichment program, the Bush Administration had advocated multilateral dialogue. It viewed the matter as a “neighborhood problem” and sought the aid of China in particular, which the U.S. believed held considerable leverage over Pyongyang. This was apparent in the July crisis. On the 6th, Bush said that,


Diplomacy takes a while, particularly when you’re dealing with a variety of partners.

And so, we’re spending time diplomatically making sure that voice is unified. These problems won’t be solved overnight.  

The next day, Bush observed that “If you want to solve a problem diplomatically, you need partners to do so,” and acknowledged China’s significance in this endeavor, saying: “They’ve got some influence in that neighborhood.”

As mentioned, the U.S. did not seek to force a vote on Tokyo’s July 5 draft, but allowed the PRC to attempt to pressure the DPRK bilaterally. In New York, Bolton offered only qualified support for the Japanese draft, saying that, “I don’t doubt there will be some changes” as the talks progress. The U.S. accommodated China’s concerns in two respects during talks between the 13th and 15th. Specifically, the U.S. and Japan dropped their bids for a Chapter VII reference and deleted references to mandatory sanctions, instead agreeing merely to call upon states to exercise restraint in their arms sales with the DPRK. Washington sought to avoid a veto, as Wang Guangya had warned that both Chapter VII and sanctions were “red lines” that Beijing would not cross. Rice agreed to drop those demands, primarily in order to have a deal reached

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before the opening of the G8 summit in St. Petersburg on the 15\textsuperscript{th}.\footnote{Bolton, \textit{Surrender Is Not An Option}, 302. Bolton himself had a mixed reaction, glad that a resolution was reached but upset that the U.S. was “caving in before the threat of a Chinese veto.” Ibid. Asked about this concession, a senior U.S. official said that the “special responsibility” clause was “our way” of invoking Chapter VII and “China’s way of avoiding it.” Interview, senior U.S. official, January 2010.} Afterwards, she said that, “It’s a remarkable resolution, and with an affirmative Chinese vote,” and that “We really, now, have a coalition.”\footnote{“Bush, Hu to Meet as US Thanks China for Support on N. Korea,” \textit{AFP}, July 16, 2006.}

\textit{Political Pressure}

Politically, three hypotheses expect that China’s decision is tied to the positions of other actors. Hypothesis 3 is that China is more likely to cooperate when Washington uses high-level diplomatic pressure. The initial U.S. posture was not to push China on a Security Council resolution, but rather to wait for the result of its bilateral effort.\footnote{In fact, the U.S. had been urging both China and South Korea to use influence on Pyongyang since the missile threats began in late June. See: “Seoul, Beijing Can Assert Constructive Influence on N.K.: White House,” \textit{Yonhap} (Seoul), June 28, 2006.} The key conversation appears to have been between Christopher Hill, Li Zhaoxing and Wu Dawei in Beijing on July 7. The Chinese officials informed Hill about plans to exert direct pressure on Pyongyang, though were not specific about how they planned to do that.\footnote{Luis Ramirez, “U.S. Envoy Urges China, Asian Nations to Speak with One Voice to North Korea,” \textit{Voice of America}, July 7, 2006.} The same day, the U.S. opted not to force a vote on Tokyo’s draft resolution, yielding to China’s request to seek a bilateral settlement.\footnote{Michael Abramowitz and Colum Lynch, “After Missiles, Calls Go Out: Bush Tries to Rally Other Nations to Condemn North Korean Launches,” \textit{Washington Post}, July 7, 2006; “Update Report No. 3,” Security Council Report, July 7, 2006. Available at: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLemTlsG/b.1838427/k.307C/Update_Report_No3brNort h_Koreabr7_July_2006.htm.} Three days later, Nicholas
Burns, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, said that both Russia and China “have a responsibility to use their influence with North Korea.”

When the Chinese mission returned without having reached a deal, the PRC and Russia introduced a draft resolution tougher than their earlier proposed PRST. It “strongly” deplored the tests and called on states to “exercise vigilance” in selling arms to North Korea. To an extent, this preempted U.S. pressure, with Bolton referring to the draft as “a significant step” and “important.” However, the U.S. and Japan were dissatisfied with elements of this proposal. On July 14, Bolton was asked what he would do if China did not move closer to the U.S. position, and responded that,

...there comes a point where you have to make a decision that putting what is a fair, not harsh, not punitive resolution before the Council to decide, and let the world see what people vote.”

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396 Foster Klug, “U.S. Urges China to Pressure North Korea,” Associated Press, July 10, 2006. Burns’s comments reflected the argument developed by Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’s that China should be a “responsible stakeholder.” Indeed, speaking just two days after the Joint Statement was signed in September, 2005, Zoellick argued that China’s “most pressing opportunity” to be a “responsible stakeholder” was on the North Korean issue. In a sense, China’s response to the missile event became something akin to a test of its ‘responsibility.’ Robert Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” Remarks to the National Committee on United States-China Relations, September 21, 2005. Available at: http://www.ncuscr.org/files/2005Gala_RobertZoellick_Whither_China1.pdf.


398 Ibid.

399 “Ambassador Bolton Speaks on Draft Resolution on North Korea,” US Fed News, July 14, 2006. Later that day, Bolton made a similar comment: “If there is going to be a veto, there comes a time when countries have to go into that chamber and raise their hand.” Nick Wadhams, “U.S. Pushes for Speedy North Korea Vote Despite China Threat,” AP, July 15, 2006. The explanation for this is that Rice instructed Bolton to push for a vote on the 14th or 15th, “even if it meant a Chinese veto.” Bolton, Surrender Is Not An Option, 300-301.
The threat of a forced vote might have factored into China’s consent on the “special responsibility” language, though the PRC maintained its opposition to mandatory sanctions or any explicit reference to Chapter VII.

Hypothesis 4 is that a shift in Russia’s position towards the West increases the likelihood of Chinese cooperation. Russia’s reaction to the missile test was mild. While the Foreign Ministry expressed “serious concern,” Moscow’s UN ambassador, Vitaly Churkin, cautioned the international community against “whipping up emotions too much.”\(^\text{400}\) Russia supported China’s bid for a 1998-style PRST and then, on July 12, joined China in proposing a draft resolution meant to counter Tokyo’s more forceful proposition.\(^\text{401}\) Notably, on the 15\(^\text{th}\), Japan tried to pry Russia away through an appeal from Junichiro Koizumi to Vladimir Putin in advance of the St. Petersburg G8 summit, though Putin declined to commit to Japan’s draft.\(^\text{402}\) In his speech following the passage of Resolution 1695, Churkin stated that he and his “Chinese partners” had met the West “halfway.”\(^\text{403}\) There is no evidence that Moscow considered breaking with Beijing, leaving the latter isolated. Thus, Hypothesis 4 cannot be confirmed in this case.

Hypothesis 5 is that China is more likely to cooperate the greater the support among the regional stakeholders for the U.S. position. As noted, Japan advocated a

\(^{400}\) However, there were subtle differences between the Russian and Chinese reactions. For instance, Russia urged “North Korea” to “exercise restraint” while China urged “all parties” to do the same. These differences, however, do not appear to have affected the common diplomatic approach taken by the two. “Russia Has ‘Serious Concern’ over North Korean Missile Launches,” AFP, July 5, 2006.

\(^{401}\) “China, Russia Offer Compromise UN Resolution on North Korea,” AFP, July 12, 2006.

\(^{402}\) “Japan Seeks Russian Support for Tough UN Resolution Against N. Korea,” AFP, July 15, 2006. The Chinese media later reported that Koizumi had pressed Putin for an abstention, leaving China in the unfavorable position of having to cast a lone veto. Yan Shengwo, “Cong chaoxian daodan shijian kan ‘qiangying’ de anpei waijiao,” (Viewing Abe’s ‘Hardening’ Foreign Policy through the North Korean Missile Affair), Guangming Ribao, July 21, 2006.

\(^{403}\) SC, Verbatim, S/PV.5490 (July 15, 2006), 6.
coercive route from the start. On July 5, Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe said that, “We will consider all possible sanctions.” In New York, Japan lobbied for a draft resolution, framed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which would have imposed financial measures targeting North Korea’s missile program. Tokyo’s draft was laid aside while the PRC sought to orchestrate a deal with North Korea bilaterally. Following Koizumi’s failed attempt to secure Russian support, Japan decided to abandon its demand for sanctions and, along with the U.S., drop its proposal for a Chapter VII reference.

South Korea was more cautious. Seoul’s initial reaction was to express “deep regret” and call the test an “unwise act.” On the 5th, Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon spoke with his Chinese counterpart, with both sides calling for patience and restraint. On the 8th, Chun Yung-woo, the ROK’s envoy to the 6PT, said that, “It’s time to focus on diplomacy rather than coercive measures.” Four days later, Ban split with the U.S. and Japan and buttressed the PRC position by saying that Chapter VII might have a “negative impact” on the situation. Once the Wu Dawei mission failed, Seoul agreed to a “unified warning,” but reiterated its opposition to sanctions. Although South Korea

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405 Cooper and Hoge, “U.S. Seeks Strong Measures to Warn the North Koreans.”
was not a member of the Council, its position likely gave China some political cover to oppose the most assertive parts of the U.S.-Japanese approach. In sum, the regional stakeholders were divided, with the ROK sympathetic to China, and Japan advocating a more forceful response. Given this division, it is difficult to infer an impact on China’s political calculus in the direction of cooperation with the U.S.

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Following the vote, North Korea’s UN representative, Pak Gil Yon, called the decision “unjustifiable and gangster-like,” warning that the North would take “stronger physical actions in other forms should any other country dare to…put pressure on it.” China was willing to risk such a reaction for several reasons. First, both the 6PT and bilateral efforts had stalled, rendering Council action a relatively attractive option. Second, the U.S. made concessions to mollify the PRC’s main concerns. As a Western diplomat pointed out, “Both sides made concessions in the interests of sending a firm, united message to Pyongyang.” Third, U.S. and Japanese pressure may have factored into China’s decision to move past its initial bid for a PRST, and agree to a resolution. However, Resolution 1695 was insufficient to prevent an escalation in tensions the next fall.

**Imposing Sanctions: Resolution 1718**

In contrast to the July crisis, China’s reaction to North Korea’s nuclear test on October 9 was direct and severe. The MFA said that “China expresses resolute opposition


to the DPRK flagrantly carrying out a nuclear test in defiance of the international community." The use of the term “flagrantly” (hanran) was notable, since it had previously been used to denote outrage at incidents including the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and the Japanese Prime Minister’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. Hu and Li almost immediately reiterated the thrust of the MFA statement in calls with Bush and Rice, respectively. Following an emergency session of the Council, Bolton referred to the PRC when he said that he “didn’t see any protectors of North Korea in that room this morning.”

On October 11, Wang Guangya conceded that there would have to be “some punitive action,” though it ought to be “appropriate” and confined to “nuclear- and missile-related areas.” Three days later, he cast an affirmative vote for Resolution 1718. This document exceeded the “red lines” that Beijing had established during the July negotiations insofar as it referred to Chapter VII and authorized a series of sanctions. The measures covered arms and luxury goods, and made provisions for restrictions on firms and individuals to be specified by the newly formed 1718 Committee. In fact, there is no record of China pushing any clear alternative to the U.S.-led proposal as it had, with

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414 The statement also directly called on North Korea to “cease any activities that would lead to a deterioration of the situation and return to the Six-Party Talks.” “Zhonghua Renmin Waijiaobu Shengming,” (MFA Statement), October 9, 2006. Accessible at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/zzxx/t275346.htm.

415 It was reported that Hu Jintao personally approved this language. Glser and Liang, “North Korea,” 172.

416 “China Resolutely Opposes DPRK’s Nuclear Test,” Xinhua, October 9, 2006.


Russia, three months earlier. Given China’s concerns about the risks of sanctions, and its prior position on North Korea, why was it willing to agree to this escalation of pressure?

*Narrowing Alternatives*

Between July and October, China had made several unsuccessful efforts to encourage North Korea to return to the 6PT. In a joint press conference with Bush on July 17, Hu reiterated the need to quickly resume the talks. 419 Ten days later, on the sidelines of an ASEAN conference in Kuala Lumpur, Li Zhaoxing tried to convince his DPRK counterpart, Paek Nam-sun, to attend a meeting of the six nations, but Paek declined. 420 On September 1, Wu Dawei told a visiting Japanese official that China would continue to persuade the DPRK to return to the 6PT. 421 Later that month, China sent food and fuel to help relieve flood damage in the North, perhaps as an inducement to coax Pyongyang back into the diplomatic arena. 422 None of these approaches yielded any tangible results.

Following North Korea’s October 3 announcement of a planned nuclear test, China tried to signal its opposition in several ways. In New York, Wang Guangya said

419 “Chinese President Calls for Early Resumption of Six-Party Talks,” *Xinhua*, July 17, 2006. Meanwhile, Kim Jong-il reportedly referred to China and Russia as “unreliable” at a meeting of DPRK leaders held on July 18, which might have signaled a weakening of China’s leverage. “N. Korea Calls China, Russia ‘Unreliable,’ Report,” *Yonhap* (Seoul), August 27, 2006.


422 “China Provides N. Korea with Relief Goods, First Shipment Since Missile Tests,” *Yonhap* (Seoul), September 21, 2006. Since late August, there had been rumors that a visit by Kim Jong-il to China was imminent. This was based apparently on sightings of Kim’s train near the Chinese border. It is plausible that negotiations for a Hu-Kim meeting had fallen through, though there is no direct evidence for this. “China Says No Visit by Kim,” *AFP*, September 14, 2006.
that “for bad behavior in this world, no one is going to protect [the DPRK].” On the 5th, Li Zhaoxing warned Pyongyang’s ambassador in Beijing that a test would lead to “serious consequences.” A day later, China agreed to a PRST that stated that a nuclear test would “represent a clear threat to international peace and security,” and that the Council would “act consistent with its responsibility” under the UN Charter, language which indicated a punitive response. On the 8th, China and Japan held their first summit-level meeting in 18 months in Beijing and expressed “deep concern.” Japan’s new Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, said that “I think North Korea is closely watching this summit,” given the prior rift on the issue between Beijing and Tokyo.

The October 9 test led to pessimism in Beijing about the prospects for the 6PT and about China’s bilateral influence. As late as September, analysts contended that multilateral dialogue remained viable. Cui Liru, a scholar at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), argued that the talks were the most “realistic option” even after the North refused to participate. However, after the test, analysts came to a different conclusion. Jia Qingguo, a professor at Beijing University,

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424 Meanwhile, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that his government was “working with the leadership of North Korea to stop steps that could negatively impact the situation.” Betsy Pisik, “China Sharply Rebukes N. Korea,” Straits Times (Singapore), October 6, 2006.


426 “China, Japan Express ‘Deep Concern’ at N. Korea Nuclear Plans,” AFP (October 8, 2006).

argued that the chances of the 6PT resuming were now “quite slim.” Zhang Liangui, a professor at the Central Party School, said the test meant that “the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula has been completely broken,” and that “promoting dialogue with North Korea as the only way was a mistake. That mistake has given North Korea time to develop a nuclear weapon.”

Similar attitudes surrounded China’s bilateral leverage vis-à-vis the North. Taking note of a long-term trend of divergence between the two countries, Shi Yinhong, a professor at People’s University in Beijing, suggested that “relations between North Korea and China have continued to worsen and have actually reached a record low.” According to Zhu Feng, a professor at Beijing University, “The test shows that Pyongyang has been genuinely indifferent to China’s continuous opposition and warnings against the DPRK’s pursuit of nuclear weapons” and referred to the North’s intransigence as “no less than a slap in China’s face.” Hu Jintao himself was reportedly vexed by “Kim’s defiance of China’s counsel and interests.”

The narrowing structure of alternatives can help to explain China’s decision to endorse sanctions five days after the nuclear test. Publicly, the MFA denied that the test

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433 Glaser and Liang, “North Korea,” 175.
should be “regarded as a failure of the six-party mechanism,” and said that the PRC would continue to seek “good-neighborly relations” with the DPRK. Behind this rhetoric, a Foreign Ministry official privately admitted that the international community would have to follow a dual-track approach, combining inducements with pressure, saying that “the two wheels must work together.” How the punitive track should be designed, though, was a matter of debate between China, the U.S. and others.

Concessions and Risk-Reduction

After the nuclear test, Bush and Rice consulted with their counterparts from China, Russia, Japan and South Korea, and agreed to take up the matter in the Security Council. A State Department spokesman said that “there will be a lot of conversations about how to approach this diplomatically.” In fact, in the ensuing five days there would be 23 meetings of the P3 and P5 combined. On the 11th, Bush reiterated U.S. support for a diplomatic agreement, saying that, “We’ll continue working to make sure that we give diplomacy a full opportunity to succeed.” Meanwhile, trying to ease concerns that the U.S. might opt for a military solution, Rice said that, although the use of force is never “taken off the table,” “there is no intention to attack or invade [the DPRK].” While it


436 Glaser and Liang, “China and North Korea,” 175.


pushed for a swift vote, the U.S. was prepared to make a number of concessions to reach consensus.

In particular, the U.S. relaxed its position in two broad areas. First was on aspects of the phrasing connected with a potential escalation of pressure. The U.S. agreed to reference Article 41 of Chapter VII, which authorizes “non-military” tools, such as sanctions, in order to clarify that the resolution does not warrant the use of force.\footnote{Article 41 of Chapter VII specifies non-military instruments, while Article 42 outlines the use of force. The U.S. had originally sought a blanket Chapter VII reference, but was satisfied with the more specific citation of Article 41. “North Korea,” Security Council Report, November 2006. Available online, at: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.gIKWLeMTlsG/b.2193653/k.2D09/November_2006brNorth_Korea.htm.} For a similar reason, the U.S. removed language mandating a review after 30 days and deleted a clause that the Council “shall be prepared to take such further action as may be needed at that time.”\footnote{“Text of U.S. Draft Resolution on North Korea’s Nuclear Test and Japanese Proposals,” AP, October 10, 2006.} The U.S. also adjusted its position on cargo inspections. Specifically, it added a caveat that interdiction of vessels suspected of carrying proscribed items would be “in accordance with [states’] national authorities and legislation.”\footnote{Ibid and SC Document S/RES/1718, 3.} This legitimized China’s avowal not to conduct inspections on the grounds that doing so might lead to unintended hostilities.\footnote{The U.S. had argued that it already had the authority to inspect ships suspected of carrying nuclear-related items on the high seas through the Proliferation Security Initiative, an international agreement that the U.S. orchestrated in 2003. China was not a signatory to this agreement.}

Second, the U.S. narrowed the substance of the resolution. In its original draft, the U.S. proposed a general arms embargo, but later qualified the text so that only heavy weapons, such as tanks and artillery, in addition to nuclear- and missile-related
technology, were targeted. China could then carry on its sales of light weapons with the DPRK. Moreover, Washington initially sought financial measures on illicit activities, including money laundering, counterfeiting and narcotics sales. However, it dropped this proposal on account of the PRC’s desire to keep the focus squarely on the nuclear issue. Shen Dingli praises Resolution 1718 as “limited primarily to specifically tailored areas without touching civilian and economic dimensions. This carefully crafted sanctions strategy serves as effective leverage against Pyongyang.”

Political Pressure

The initial U.S. position was to seek a broad array of sanctions under Chapter VII, covering all arms, dual-use items and luxury goods, and calling on states to inspect suspicious cargo to and from the DPRK. Wang received instructions on the 10th to oppose each of these elements. According to Bolton, “For all of our thanks to China for years of ‘effort’ in the Six-Party Talks, what China was really prepared to do...was precious little.” While Bolton said nothing about this divergence in public, he did indicate that the U.S. would seek a “strong” and “swift” response.

The next day, Rice

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449 Bolton, Surrender Is Not An Option, 305.

450 Specifically, a reporter asked Bolton what the “sticking points” between the U.S. and China were. Bolton responded: “Well, I don’t want to get into the specifics. I think we’ve got some general guidance
agreed to seek a vote on the 13th, not letting the “shock value” of the test dissipate too much. On the 12th, Bolton relayed this objective to his counterparts and, later, to the press, saying that “we shouldn’t allow more meetings and more meetings to be an excuse for inaction.”

The same day, on a previously scheduled trip, China’s State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan discussed the North Korean situation in Washington with Bush, Rice, Hill, and others. Tang had already backed away from China’s opening position, telling Bush that China would agree to sanctions on WMD-related programs. Referring to the meeting, U.S. Deputy National Security Adviser J.D. Crouch said that, “I think it’s a very major step and a positive step that we now have all the major players in this arguing, in fact, for a strong resolution.” By the afternoon of the 12th, Wang had informed Bolton that China would not veto the U.S. draft, though held out the possibility that it might abstain. The firmness of the U.S. position, coupled with the lack of viable alternatives, likely resulted in China’s move in the direction of cooperation.


451 Bolton, Surrender Is Not An Option, 306. The U.S. ultimately relaxed this timetable by one day, primarily to accommodate Chinese concerns.


Like China, Russia strongly criticized the nuclear test. Both were also wary about the possibility of further escalation. However, the two states were not in sync in terms of objecting to the U.S. proposal. Whereas China had aired its main concerns early in the process, Russia waited until near the end to state its reservations. In particular, on the 13th, Churkin raised objections to parts of the language on cargo inspections and the specific types of weapons that would be sanctioned. Nevertheless, Bolton refused to make concessions on these points and proceeded with the vote, with Russia’s voting status in doubt until the end. China did not second Russia’s position as it had done during the July negotiations. By this point, China’s own concerns had already been satisfactorily addressed, and it had little to gain by engaging in last-minute diplomatic brinkmanship with Russia.

Along with the U.S., Japan sought to “immediately start deliberations on a resolution for stern measures.” Japan, which attended meetings of the P5, as well as consultations among the P3, desired a range of actions against North Korea that surpassed even the opening U.S. position. In addition to arms sanctions and cargo inspections, Tokyo also asked for a broad economic embargo, restrictions on port visits by North Korean ships, mention of the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea, and a travel

455 On the 9th, Putin said that “Russia unconditionally condemns the test carried out by the Korean People’s Democratic Republic.” “Russia Condemns ‘5-15 Kiloton’ North Korean Nuclear Test,” AFP, October 9, 2006. Indeed, Russia shares a border with the DPRK and was concerned about ecological fallout from the incident. Nick Coleman, “PRC’s Tang Jiaxuan Meets Russia’s Putin on Discussing DPRK Issue,” Hong Kong AFP, October 14, 2006. WNC reference: 200610141477.1_77f400b3e5adf083.


457 Tang Jiaxuan met with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov on the 14th, after the former’s trip to Washington. It is unclear whether this encounter had any impact on Russia’s decision-making, though presumably Churkin would not have cast a solo veto given the level of international support for a resolution.

ban on high-level DPRK officials. Indeed, during the negotiations, the U.S. added Japan’s call for a travel ban to its requests in return for concessions on two issues of greater importance to the PRC and Russia: cargo inspections and financial sanctions. However, Japan ultimately dropped the goals not supported by the U.S. and hewed closely to Washington’s position.

As regards regional dynamics, the main shift was in South Korea’s approach. Roh Moo-hyun, who had encouraged dialogue with the DPRK since his election as president in 2003, said that Seoul would “increasingly find it difficult to stick to its engagement policy towards North Korea.” Ban told Rice on the 9th that the ROK would support “stern” measures, though would not endorse a military response. Two days later, Roh called for a mix of “strong sanctions” and “peaceful dialogue,” and said that “we should strategically mix the two.” Not long after, the PRC agreed to the U.S. push for sanctions and said that it would not use its veto. Based on the timing, it is possible that Roh’s statements had an impact in China’s decision to back away from its initial opposition to sanctions.


460 Edith Lederer, “New U.S. Draft Resolution Adds Travel Ban but Softens Language [on] Cargo Inspections and Financial Sanctions,” AP, October 12, 2006. The travel ban was ultimately adopted, although no individuals were designated by the 1718 Committee until 2009.


464 On the 13th, Roh met with Hu and Beijing, for the first time in nearly a year, and the two affirmed the strategy of combining sanctions with continued engagement. “Seoul, Beijing to Pursue Mixture of Sanctions and Dialogue Toward N. Korea,” Yonhap (Seoul), October 14, 2006.
Following the vote, Pak Gil Yon again condemned the body as “gangster-like,” and threatened to take “physical countermeasures” if further pressure were applied. Several reasons can help to explain China’s decision to lean to the U.S. side following the nuclear test. In terms of the issue itself, the 6PT remained stalled and bilateral pressure had failed to prevent the nuclear test, leaving a UNSC response as a preferred alternative. In addition, the U.S. was willing to make guarantees that limited the scope of the resolution’s authority and adequately addressed China’s main concerns about the scope of the resolution. In political terms, the U.S. capitalized on the shock value of the event and pushed for a swift vote, which added pressure on the PRC not to obfuscate. In contrast to their prior division, Japan and South Korea both supported sanctions, placing regional pressure on the PRC to follow suit.

Adjusting Sanctions: The 2009 PRST

On April 5, 2009, North Korea conducted what it claimed was a “satellite launch,” but which observers believed was a disguised test of a long-range ballistic missile. The latter would have been a violation of Resolution 1718, which banned ballistic missile and nuclear tests. China initially expressed no opinion, saying only that it had “noted” the launch and “noted” the reaction of “the relevant parties.” In New York,

465 SC, Verbatim, S/PV.5551 (October 14, 2006), 7-8.

466 The U.S., Britain and Japan, in particular, were quick to describe the launch as an unlawful missile test. Jean Lee and Jae-soon Chang, “N. Korea Launches Rocket, Defying World Pressure,” AP, April 5, 2009.

467 “China Urges Restraint After N. Korea Rocket Launch: Govt,” AFP, April 5, 2009. Earlier in the day, MFA spokesperson refused to comment saying that he would issue a statement “as soon as possible.” “China Quiet on N. Korea Rocket Launch,” AFP, April 5, 2009.
China’s ambassador, Zhang Yesui, proposed a press statement, which is considered weaker than a PRST or a resolution, and not legally binding. On the 7th, the MFA said that the UNSC should “react cautiously,” and that the issue concerned the “right of all countries to the peaceful use of outer space,” indicating that the PRC did not see the launch as a missile test. On the 9th, Zhang said that “We still need time to discuss the format.”

After a week of consultations among the P5 and Japan, the Council approved a PRST that condemned the launch and described it as in “contravention” of Resolution 1718. It also instructed the 1718 Committee to “adjust” the measures adopted in 2006 through the designation of specific individuals and entities, resulting in the listing of three North Korean firms connected with the missile industry. Despite its form, this PRST had an impact both by setting a precedent that purported satellite launches would be treated as missile tests and by starting the process of specifying sanctions on the DPRK. In light of its opening position, why was the PRC willing to approve such a statement?

Narrowing Alternatives

In the two years following the 2006 nuclear test, the Six-Party Talks managed to achieve a number of concrete objectives. In February, 2007, the DPRK agreed to close
the Yongbyon facility in return for energy assistance and a renewed promise for
normalized relations with the U.S. In July, after the U.S. had released funds from
Banco Delta Asia that had been frozen in 2005, the North announced that it had shut
down the Yongbyon reactor. By late October 2008, the DPRK had destroyed the reactor’s
cooling tower, in return for Pyongyang’s removal from the U.S. list of state sponsors of
terrorism. However, in December, the parties failed to reach an accord on the verification
procedures to be used by the IAEA. The talks had ground to a halt by the end of the Bush
Administration.

On February 24, 2009, North Korea announced an imminent satellite launch,
which the U.S. and others viewed as a pretext for a ballistic missile test. China’s public
reaction was to “note” the announcement and encourage the sides to “make concerted
efforts” to resume the 6PT. At the same time, Wu Dawei was dispatched to North
Korea to deliver a “message of concern” about the planned test. This mission evidently
had no impact, with the DPRK’s deputy UN ambassador stating soon afterwards that,
“It’s only a matter of time” until the launch would occur. On the 28th, the foreign
ministers of China and Japan met in Beijing and agreed to urge Pyongyang not to follow

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474 Haggard and Noland, “North Korea in 2007,” 104-5.
478 “Diplomatic Efforts on N. Korea Gain Pace, Refreshed by New Envoys,” Yonhap (Seoul), February 27, 2009.
through, though they did not mention how they would do so.\footnote{“Japan, China Agree to Seek N. Korea’s Restraint on Missile,” \textit{Jiji Press Ticker Service} (Tokyo), March 1, 2009. On March 4, Obama’s special envoy for North Korea, Stephen Bosworth, met with Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi in Beijing, and said, “We both believe it would not be a good idea to have a missile launch.” “China, U.S. Opposed to N. Korean Missile Launch: Envoy,” \textit{AFP}, March 4, 2009.} Three weeks later, Hu met with North Korea’s Prime Minister, Kim Yong-il, encouraging the latter to return to the 6PT.\footnote{It is unclear if the missile issue came up during this encounter or, if so, how it was addressed. At least, the implication of Hu’s message was that a launch would be counterproductive from the perspective of restarting the 6PT. “N. Korean Premier Meets Chinese President,” \textit{AP}, March 19, 2009.} By the time that the DPRK carried out its test, it was clear that both the 6PT and bilateral efforts had failed. This laid the basis for China’s willingness to consider the issue in the Council. However, unlike the nuclear test, the PRC was not willing to countenance a resolution. The U.S. would have to make concessions in order to guarantee China’s endorsement.

\textit{Concessions and Risk-Reduction}

The Obama Administration continued its predecessor’s mixed strategy towards North Korea, combining efforts at multilateral dialogue with pressure.\footnote{Curtis H. Martin, “Barack Obama and North Korea: A Study in Presidential Transition,” \textit{Pacific Focus} 25 (2010), 181-210.} After the launch, Bosworth reiterated this approach by stressing both U.S. commitment to the 6PT process and the need to punish DPRK violations.\footnote{Choe Sang-hun and David Sanger, “Defying World, North Koreans Launch Rocket,” \textit{New York Times}, April 5, 2009.} Following an initial session on the 5\textsuperscript{th}, in which divergent perspectives were stated, Rice described the need for reconciliation:

We’re now in the process of going into smaller group consultations with key member states to try to forge an agreement on both the form and the substance of the appropriate response. So this is a process that will take at a minimum some days. If people think
about an analogy, the Security Council—indeed, the United Nations—is not much
different than our Congress. It takes time to gain agreement on a piece of legislation—
or in the case of the Security Council, a statement or a resolution.\textsuperscript{483}

Rice’s comment indicated that, having considered the positions of China and Russia, the
U.S. had lowered its sights and was not going to insist on a new resolution, but would be
open to a statement instead.\textsuperscript{484}

Indeed, Washington elicited China’s cooperation through concessions on both
form and substance. By the 9\textsuperscript{th}, the U.S. had largely acquiesced to a draft PRST circulated
by the PRC. This represented a compromise on form between China’s call for a press
statement and the U.S.-Japanese pursuit of a resolution.\textsuperscript{485} One factor that arguably made
this agreement palatable to the U.S. is the ambiguous international legal status of PRSTs.
Though sometimes described as “non-binding,” Rice explained that the U.S. does view
such documents, “broadly speaking” as binding. Rice even asserted that the statement
was “more than binding,” since it made provisions for a tightening of sanctions through
the 1718 Committee.\textsuperscript{486} This remark was likely made to defuse criticism that the
administration had failed to secure a strong response in one of its first foreign policy
crises.


\textsuperscript{484} This was also reflected in the State Department spokesman’s comments on the 6\textsuperscript{th}. Asked if the U.S.
would demand a new resolution, the spokesman said only that “Well, we’ll have to see how that plays
out…the process is going to evolve in New York.” \textit{“State Department Regular Briefing,” US Fed News},
April 6, 2009.

\textsuperscript{485} Yoshikazu Shirakawa, “China Offers Compromise on N. Korea,” \textit{Daily Yomiuri} (Tokyo), April 11,
2009.

Substantively, the U.S. conceded ground on two issues. First was how to characterize what the DPRK had actually done. At first, China subscribed to the DPRK’s claim that it had launched a satellite, which might have been interpreted as legitimate under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. However, the U.S. defined it as a “missile launch,” which would be a clear violation of Resolution 1718. The two reconciled their views by agreeing simply to refer to a “launch.” Second was how to portray the legality of the incident. The U.S. wanted to refer to it as a “violation” of Resolution 1718, while the PRC’s preferred to say that it was “not in conformity with” that resolution. The term “contravenes” was settled on. As in prior cases, the U.S. eased away from its opening gambit in order to guarantee unanimity.

**Political Pressure**

The U.S. position was that even an authentic satellite launch would violate Resolution 1718, as this would necessarily involve the use of banned missile technology. On April 5, UN Ambassador Susan Rice said that the U.S. would seek the “most appropriate and strong response we can possibly get,” and would attempt to “toughen

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487 Specifically, the MFA argued that the “issue…involves the right of all countries to the peaceful use of outer space.” “China Urges Cautious UN Reaction to DPRK ‘Rocket’ Launch,” Xinhua, April 7, 2009.

488 On April 6, the State Department spokesman referred to a North Korean “missile launch” three times. “State Department Regular Briefing,” US Fed News, April 6, 2009.

489 Rice explained that “The draft text characterizes this as a launch, and we have all agreed on this language subject to the full agreement of the entire Security Council and we think it captures any launch.” “Media Stakeout with Ambassador Susan Rice,” US Fed News, April 11, 2009.

490 UK Ambassador to the UN John Sawers relates the deliberation as such: “Well, we spent some time discussing various ways of describing this launch and we settled on it being in contravention of Resolution 1718. I think it’s pretty clear what contravenes means. I don’t want to elaborate…but a number [of terms] formally were looked at and this was considered one we could all rally to. It makes quite clear that this is against the provisions of Resolution 1718, and so that much is clear.” “Media Stakeout with Ambassador John Sawers,” Federal News Service, April 11, 2009.
existing regimes” and “add to” Resolution 1718.\footnote{This Week with George Stephanopolous, Federal News Service, April 5, 2009.}  Asked by George Stephanopolous if the U.S. was “prepared to pressure China” to do that, Rice responded only that “we’re working with China,” while conceding that “there have been times when we have differed as to the best means of achieving [progress on denuclearization].”  Following this, Rice said little publicly until April 11, when the U.S. introduced a draft PRST that was the product of compromise among the P5 and Japan. Unlike Bolton, Rice did not use the media to escalate pressure on China or others for a decision.

However, in private, the U.S. leveraged two major arguments. First was that Obama, on April 5, had delivered a major speech on non-proliferation in Prague, in which he said that “North Korea broke the rules,” that “rules must be binding,” that “words must mean something,” and that “now is the time for a strong international response.”  This pledge, coming as it did in the midst of the crisis, meant that U.S. diplomats could argue that, politically, the U.S. could not accept a weak response.\footnote{Ibid. Rice also appeared on the CBS Early Show and PBS News Hours on April 6.}  Second, the Administration had demonstrated a commitment to the 6PT, recently dispatching new special envoy Stephen Bosworth to the region. At the UN, diplomats pointed out that engagement was politically risky, and that the failure of the UN to


\footnote{Formally, the U.S. had narrowed its “win set” according to Putnam’s analysis of international bargaining. Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42 (1988), 427-460.}
produce a strong document might tip the scales against multilateralism, a prospect that China would have inferred to mean a more hawkish approach.\textsuperscript{495}

Beyond direct pressure, the U.S. could have tied China’s cooperativeness on the launch to efforts to enhance U.S.-China relations. Specifically, on April 1, on the margins of the G20 summit in London, Hu and Obama announced the creation of a Strategic and Economic Dialogue (SED), which represented a broader initiative to solidify cooperation across a range of shared issues. The PRC, then, would likely not have wished to prejudice this effort with a major disagreement about North Korea.\textsuperscript{496} Of course, this also gave the U.S. an incentive to demonstrate flexibility. Nevertheless, the juxtaposition of the London meeting, the Prague speech, and the intransigence demonstrated by Pyongyang likely meant that the U.S. position in the Council was treated seriously by Beijing.

For its part, Russia followed China’s cautious approach. Moscow urged “restraint” prior to, and just after, the launch.\textsuperscript{497} On April 5, it joined China in opposing efforts by the Council to issue a condemnatory statement.\textsuperscript{498} On the 8\textsuperscript{th}, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that, while Russia was “concerned,” any “threat of sanctions would be

\textsuperscript{495} As one diplomat noted, “The U.S. couldn’t just accept a wimpy response.” Interview with Western diplomat, New York, January 2010.

\textsuperscript{496} \textit{Shades of Red}, 12.

\textsuperscript{497} “Russia Urges N. Korea to Show Restraint in Rocket Launch,” \textit{RIA Novosti} (Moscow), April 2, 2009; “Russia Calls for Restraint after North Korea Rocket Launch,” \textit{RIA Novosti} (Moscow), April 5, 2009. In addition, on March 13, Deputy Foreign Minister Alexei Borodavkin expressed concern about the possibility of an accident, noting that prior launches had been “chaotic.” “Russia Urges North Korea to Refrain from Rocket Launch,” \textit{AFP}, March 27, 2009.

\textsuperscript{498} The Council was split on whether to issue an immediate response, with the U.S, Britain, France and Japan in favor, and China, Russia, Vietnam, Libya and Uganda opposed. “UN Security Council Split Over North Korean ‘Satellite’ Launch,” \textit{RIA Novosti} (Moscow), April 6, 2009.
counterproductive.” The next day, the Foreign Ministry said that sanctions would “isolate and embitter North Korea even more,” and lead to “retaliatory measures.” In addition, Russia supported China’s initial bid for a press statement, as opposed to a PRST or another resolution, and backed the PRC when, on the 11th, it circulated a draft PRST. While its support offered the PRC some leverage to resist the West’s more ambitious plan for a new resolution, there is no evidence that Russia contemplated or did switch its position before the PRC did so. Thus, Hypothesis 4 cannot be confirmed.

As in 2006, Japan preferred a somewhat stronger response than the U.S. A week after the DPRK’s announcement, Tokyo said that it would pursue another UNSC resolution. Bosworth, in talks with Japanese officials on March 6, said only that the U.S. would respond “in a common fashion,” without explicitly agreeing to seek a resolution. After the launch, the U.S. did in fact support Japan’s proposal for a resolution, but soon abandoned this effort in the face of Chinese and Russian opposition. On April 9, the U.S. circulated a draft PRST, while Japan remained fixed on a resolution. Japan also reportedly sought to designate 10 DPRK firms as violators of

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499 “Moscow Opposes Sanctions Against N. Korea Over Rocket Launch,” RIA Novosti (Moscow), April 8, 2009.
500 “Russia Warns New UN Sanctions Could Embitter North Korea,” RIA Novosti (Moscow), April 9, 2009.
504 Mari Yamaguchi, “Japan Ramps Up Sanctions Against N. Korea for Rocket,” AP, April 10, 2009. Within the P3+Japan consultations, Japan argued that a resolution was necessary for domestic political reasons. Interview with Western diplomat, January 2010.
Resolution 1718, which the U.S. thought politically unrealistic.\(^{505}\) It was not until the 10\(^{th}\) that Japan capitulated and agreed to the U.S. draft.\(^{506}\) As in July 2006, Japan pushed for the sternest approach.

South Korea hewed closely to the U.S. position during the negotiations. This is not surprising, given the tougher policy on North Korea taken by President Lee Myung-bak.\(^{507}\) As with the U.S., the ROK’s position all along was that a satellite launch would violate Resolution 1718. On the sidelines of the G20 summit in London, Lee and Obama agreed to push for a resolution if the DPRK followed through with the launch.\(^{508}\) On April 5, the ROK’s UN ambassador, Park In-kook, called for a “rapid and enormous response” from the UNSC.\(^{509}\) On the 7\(^{th}\), attempting to buttress the U.S. position, Lee asked a Chinese delegation led by Politburo Standing Committee member Li Changchun to “play a large role” in responding to the launch.\(^{510}\) South Korea was a second regional

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\(^{505}\) Japan dispatched Vice Foreign Minister Shintaro Ito to New York to redouble its press for a resolution. Ito said that without a strong response, the “existence of the Security Council as a meaningful institution will become doubtful.” John Heilprin, “Japan, U.S. Differ on Punishing N. Korea,” AP, April 10, 2009.


\(^{507}\) Specifically, Lee’s foreign policy agenda, known as the “MB Doctrine,” emphasized closer relations with the U.S. and a “clear emphasis” on denuclearization as a precondition for talks with the North. Sung Ho Kim, “Korea’s Conservatives Strike Back: An Uncertain Revolution in Seoul,” Global Asia 3 (2008), 81.

\(^{508}\) “Lee, Obama Agree to Seek Sanctions if N. Korea Fires Rocket,” Yonhap (Seoul), April 3, 2009.

\(^{509}\) “UNSC Ends 1\(^{st}\) Day Session on N. Korean Launch Without Agreement: Sources,” Yonhap (Seoul), April 5, 2009. Seoul later echoed Washington in exhibiting flexibility, with its Foreign Minister stating on the 6\(^{th}\) that “there will be an outcome in one form or another.” “S. Korea to Consult with UN Council on N. Korean Rocket Launch,” Yonhap (Seoul), April 6, 2009.

stakeholder that supported the U.S. position, placing an added degree of pressure on Beijing.  

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A day after the PRST was read, North Korea vowed that it “will never participate” in the 6PT, nor would it be “bound to any agreement” of the talks. Once again, the PRC had made a choice that alienated the DPRK. This can be explained by four reasons. First, the 6PT had been deadlocked for four months, and bilateral efforts to encourage Pyongyang to return had failed. Second, the U.S. was willing to soften the form and substance of the draft in order to reach a consensus. Third, politically, the U.S. harnessed Obama’s Prague speech and the upgrading of ties with the PRC to gain China’s support for a “strong” response. Fourth, Japan and, importantly, South Korea, were in line with the U.S. position, adding additional pressure on Beijing. As with the missile tests three years earlier, though, Council unity was insufficient to prevent an escalation of tensions on the Korean Peninsula in the months ahead.

Further Measures: Resolution 1874

China’s initial response to the second nuclear test, on May 25, was that North Korea had “ignored universal opposition” and that the PRC was “resolutely opposed to it.” An MFA spokesman also referred to China’s “normal state-to-state relations” with

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the DPRK, softer in tone than the usual references to North Korea as an ally. The same day, during an emergency session of the Council, China agreed to a statement which branded the test a “clear violation” of Resolution 1718, and said that the body would “start working immediately” on a new resolution. Nevertheless, as of the 29th, Zhang Yesui had not received instructions from Beijing as to the nature of the response to which it would agree. Despite its rhetoric, China was proceeding cautiously at the outset of negotiations.

Resolution 1874 was passed unanimously on June 12, though the P5, with Japan and South Korea, had virtually agreed to the text a week earlier. The main contribution of this resolution was that it outlined a procedure by which cargo inspections would take place, yet it did not stipulate the use of force to conduct inspections. It also called on states to impose financial measures against firms connected with the North’s WMD-related programs, and, as it had in April, asked the 1718 Committee to designate additional entities and individuals that would be subject to restrictions. This resulted in

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515 “Media Stakeout with Ambassador Vitaly Churkin,” Federal News Service, May 25, 2009. Churkin was speaking in his capacity as Council president for May, though his remarks were not a formal PRST.


517 A few additional details, especially related to the language around cargo inspections, had yet to be fully agreed on; the P5+2 also needed time to circulate the draft to the non-permanent members.

518 In brief, the resolution calls on states to conduct inspections with the approval of the state under whose flag the ship is registered. If that state does not consent, the details are to be reported to the 1718 Committee. The procedures are covered in operative paragraphs 11-17. SC Document S/RES/1874 (June 12, 2009), 3.

519 These are specified in operative paragraphs 18-20 and 24, respectively. Ibid, 4.
five firms and five individuals being added to the sanctions list in July.\textsuperscript{520} What factors can help explain China’s approval of this increase in pressure on the DPRK?

\textit{Narrowing Alternatives}

Following the April PRST, the prospects for a resumption of the 6PT continued to deteriorate. On April 18, the North Korean media said that the country would “bolster its nuclear deterrent for self-defense” as a “guarantee for the protection of the country’s sovereignty.”\textsuperscript{521} Five days later, Lavrov visited the DPRK and was informed that the North “no longer needs” the 6PT.\textsuperscript{522} Pyongyang added pressure on the 29\textsuperscript{th} by demanding that the UNSC apologize for the PRST or risk further nuclear and missile tests\textsuperscript{523} U.S. efforts, including offering the chance for bilateral dialogue within the context of the 6PT\textsuperscript{524} and authorizing funds for energy transfers to the North, were similarly rejected.\textsuperscript{525} By the beginning of May, Hillary Clinton had told Congress that she believed a resumption of the 6PT was “implausible if not impossible.”\textsuperscript{526}

\textsuperscript{520} The firms are primarily trading companies connected with North Korea’s acquisition of military technology, while the individuals are mainly affiliated with the nuclear program. The list is available on the 1718 Committee’s website: \url{http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/pdf/List%2016%20July%202009.pdf}.

\textsuperscript{521} “North Korea Renews Threat to ‘Bolster Nuclear Deterrent,’” \textit{AFP}, April 19, 2009.


\textsuperscript{523} “N. Korea Threatens Nuclear, Missile Tests,” \textit{Yonhap} (Seoul), April 30, 2009.

\textsuperscript{524} “U.S. Renews Willingness to Talk One-on-One with N. Korea,” \textit{Kyodo} (Tokyo), May 8, 2009.

\textsuperscript{525} The U.S. had authorized $98 million for heavy fuel oil that would be dispersed if the North took steps to disable its nuclear facilities and returned to the 6PT. As Clinton told the Senate, the “ball is in the North Korean court, and we are not concerned about chasing after North Korea, about offering concessions to North Korea.” “Clinton Says U.S. Will Not ‘Chase’ North Korea with ‘Concessions,’” \textit{Yonhap} (Seoul), May 15, 2009.”

\textsuperscript{526} “U.S. Not to Give Aid to N. Korea without Nuke Talks Progress: Clinton,” \textit{Yonhap} (Seoul), May 1, 2009.
In contrast with prior episodes, China did not make a major public effort to dissuade the North. DPRK Foreign Minister Pak Ui-chun met with Vice Foreign Minister Wang Guangya in late April and possibly with Yang Jiechi a month later. On May 7, Beijing appeared to consider sending a “special envoy” to North Korea, but that trip either did not occur or was not reported. The absence of a high-level delegation provides some evidence that Beijing did not view the bilateral route optimistically, preferring not to return, once again, empty handed. Privately, China promoted the use of the “lever of economic development” to motivate the 6PT, despite the U.S. having ruled out unconditional concessions, and argued that U.S-DPRK dialogue was the “only way to make progress,” thus shifting the diplomatic burden to Pyongyang and Washington, and away from itself.

The May 25 nuclear test drew negative reactions among Chinese commentators. Zhang Jingwei, a scholar at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, asserted that the DPRK is a “regime without fundamental rationality,” and that “its flip flops have exhausted China’s goodwill and patience. There is no point endorsing such a ‘friend.’” Wang Zaibang and Li Jun, scholars at CICIR, argued later that North Korea had taken advantage of China’s tolerance, and “continually raised the asking price” without worry

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527 The later meeting was not confirmed. “North Korean Foreign Minister Returns Home after Month-long Trip,” Yonhap (Seoul), May 20, 2009.

528 The envoy in question was rumored in the South Korean media to be either Yang Jiechi or the International Liaison Department’s Wang Jiarui. “China May Send Envoy to North Korea to ‘Discuss Nuclear Issues,’” Chosun Ilbo (Seoul), May 8, 2009. After the nuclear test, British UN ambassador John Sawer claimed that, “We believe [the PRC] took action to dissuade the North Koreans from going down [the nuclear] path and their advice was brushed aside.” It is unclear, however, on what evidence this assertion was based. Edith Lederer, “UN Draft Urges N. Korea Sanctions Enforcement,” AP, May 29, 2009.

about any “serious consequences” if it did not honor its commitments.\footnote{Wang Zaibang and Li Jun, “Chaoxian erci heshi tanyuan yu wajiao sikao,” (The Origins of North Korea’s Second Nuclear Test and Thoughts for Foreign Policy), \textit{Xiandai Guoji Guanxi} (Contemporary International Relations), 7 (2009), 39-40.} An editorial in the populist newspaper \textit{Global Times} said that, “North Korea has only itself to blame for its plight. Its nuclear fantasy drove the country to behave irrationally and drift further from reality.”\footnote{“Editorial: Sanctions Hopefully Disillusion N. Korea,” \textit{Global Times} (Beijing), June 12, 2009.} These remarks echoed the harsh tone used by the MFA.

However, scholars were divided on the question of further sanctions. A survey of 20 foreign affairs experts conducted by \textit{Global Times} found that half were in favor of new measures, while half were opposed.\footnote{“Duoming Zhongguo zhiming xuezhe zhichu geng jia yanli de zhicai Chaoxian,” (Many Well-known Chinese Scholars Support Ramping up Sanctions on North Korea), \textit{Huanqiu Shibao} (Global Times), May 26, 2009. The article did not specify which scholars it had polled, or the exact questions asked. Available (in Chinese) at: \url{http://world.huanqiu.com/roll/2009-05/471241.html}.} Liu Jianyong, a Tsinghua University professor, argued that, if it joined in a punitive response, China would risk conceding its role as a “contact man” between the DPRK and the West.\footnote{Cha and Kessler, \textit{Washington Post}, May 28, 2009.} Sun Zhe, another Tsinghua professor, said that the MFA’s rhetoric was “symbolic,” and denied that the government would adopt a much harder approach towards North Korea.\footnote{Qiu Wei and Zhou Zhiran, “Sanctions Against N. Korea Hardly Effective: Analyst,” \textit{Global Times} (Beijing), June 12, 2009. Available online at: \url{http://en.huanqiu.com/world/top-photo/2009-06/436493_2.html}.} Zhang Liangui, who had supported sanctions after the 2006 test, lamented that “North Korea has no fear of economic and political sanctions,” and doubted that the Council would be able to pass a resolution strong enough to change Kim Jong-il’s goals.\footnote{Ibid. Zhang supported a far more coercive response, suggesting that China should suspend food and oil deliveries to coerce the DPRK back to negotiations, or else relent and allow the North to possess nuclear weapons. Zhang Liangui, “Xianshi kaishi wei dajia shangke” (Reality Has Started to Give Everyone a Lesson), \textit{Shijie Zhishi} (World Knowledge), June 8, 2009. Another commentator, retired general Xu}
to consider a new resolution, debate continued about the usefulness of sanctions vis-à-vis diplomacy.

*Concessions and Risk-Reduction*

As it had in April, the U.S. initially lowered expectations for quick results by stressing the need for patience as differences among the negotiators were resolved. On May 26, the day after the nuclear test, Rice said that “our discussions and deliberations will indeed take some time. We are thinking through complicated issues that require very careful consideration.” Notably, the initial draft circulated by the U.S. on May 28 omitted a paragraph that would have named specific measures, leaving the details to be filled in through discussions involving representatives from the P5, Japan and South Korea. After consultations, Rice said that the process would be “complicated and we need to be in touch with our capitals repeatedly. And this is one that we work to get right rather than to pop out prematurely.”

The major concession made by the U.S. to guarantee China’s support regarded cargo inspections. Although Resolution 1874 outlined a procedure for inspections, it did...

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Guangyu, opined that sanctions would cause the 6PT to “fall apart,” implying a belief that the talks had not already collapsed. Wang Yen-che, “Without a Strong Power of Persuasion, the Mainland is Concerned about North Korea’s Nuclear Threat,” Ming Pao (Hong Kong), May 30, 2009. WNC reference: 200905301477.1_ade200ac2af69d6b.


537 The paragraph in question was Paragraph 8. A note at the bottom of the draft reads: “Discussion Options for Potential Inclusion in Resolution [future op8]”. This means that the drafters had decided to omit the details and, instead, leave it for further discussions. The draft is available at: http://www.innercitypress.com/sc1dprk052809.pdf.

538 Edith Lederer, “Diplomat: Expanded NK Sanctions Proposed,” May 28, 2009). Similarly, the State Department spokesman cautioned that, “This is not something that we’re going to be able to come up with in the next day or two. I’m not going to put a timetable on it.” “U.S. Working with UNSC Members for Possible Sanctions: State Dept.,” Yonhap (Seoul), May 29, 2009.
not require states to conduct them nor did it authorize states to use force. At an experts-
level meeting on May 29, the U.S. broached the possibility of mandatory inspections,
reportedly proposing that the word “compulsory” be used. However, China quickly made
clear that it would agree only to language “calling upon” states to interdict suspected
vessels.\footnote{7 Key UN Members Continue Talks to Iron Out Gaps Over N. Korea Resolution,” \textit{Kyodo} (Tokyo), May 29, 2009.} One participant recalled that there were some “moments of frankness” with the
PRC about the issue.\footnote{Interview with Western diplomat, February 2010.} In addition, the U.S. initially wanted the resolution framed
broadly under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, but, as with Resolution 1718, the PRC was
granted a specific reference to Article 41, which was meant to emphasize that the use of
force was not implied in the text.\footnote{Yoshikazu Shirakawa, “Draft UNSC Resolution OKs Forcible Checks of DPRK Ships,” \textit{Daily Yomiuri} (Tokyo), May 30, 2009.}

Several other features of the U.S. draft also assuaged Chinese concerns. First was
an exemption for sales of light arms to North Korea, as had also been included in
Resolution 1718.\footnote{Colum Lynch, “UN Panel Adopts Wider Sanctions on North Korea,” \textit{Washington Post}, June 12, 2009.} This is notable since the U.S. had originally suggested a general arms
embargo.\footnote{Yoshikazu Shirakawa, “Japan, U.S. Compile Draft UN Resolution on DPRK,” \textit{Daily Yomiuri} (Tokyo), May 29, 2009.} Second, as in the April PRST, the draft left the designation of targeted
entities up to the 1718 Committee, which operates by consensus. As a member of that
Committee, the PRC was reassured that it would be able to keep top-level DPRK officials
off the list. Third, the proposal called for the establishment of a panel of seven experts
that would assist the Committee in monitoring enforcement. This arrangement suited the
PRC since it would be represented on this panel as well and, as such hold sway over how the resolution would be implemented.\textsuperscript{544}

\textit{Political Pressure}

As it had in April, the U.S. refrained from publically pressuring the PRC. In fact, there is little evidence of an abrasive U.S. posture during the negotiating process itself. After the nuclear test, a U.S. official said he was “pleasantly surprised” with China’s cooperativeness, taking note of the vitriolic tone of China’s initial reaction.\textsuperscript{545} It is possible that the PRC simply assumed that not to cooperate would be so damaging to its relations with the U.S. that it decided not to pursue an overly assertive position. A Western diplomat argues that Resolution 1874 can be attributed to China “valuing bilateral relations with the U.S. more than the crazy aunt in the attic (i.e. North Korea).”\textsuperscript{546} For instance, China might have wanted to avoid a downturn in relations just as the SED was set to begin in July.\textsuperscript{547}

More concretely, the U.S. worked to coordinate its position with South Korea and Japan, and thus present a united position to Beijing. On May 25, Obama held

\textsuperscript{544} \textit{Shades of Red}, 13. Indeed, the Panel of Experts seems not to have played any role except to issue a “final report” in November, 2010. This report recognized that the designation of only a small number of individuals and firms by the 1718 Committee “seriously understate the number of known entities and individuals engaged in proscribed activities,” but could do nothing except invite states to submit additional lists. SC Document S/2010/571 (November 5, 2010), 5.


\textsuperscript{546} Interview with Western diplomat, New York, February 2010.

\textsuperscript{547} In addition, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner visited Beijing during the peak of the negotiating process, from May 31 to June 2, and met with Hu Jintao, in advance of the first SED meeting. Two weeks earlier, Treasury had decided not to label China a currency manipulator, which could have elevated tensions in the economic relationship. Bonnie Glaser, “U.S.-China Relations: Laying the Groundwork for Greater Cooperation,” \textit{Comparative Connections} 11:2 (July 2009).
conversations with Lee Myung-bak and Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso, with both agreeing to the need to pursue a new UNSC resolution.548 South Korea’s strategy, in particular, converged with the U.S. as Seoul decided to join the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative, which involved a consortium of states that agreed to interdict vessels suspected of carrying banned nuclear-related items.549 On the 30th, a U.S. delegation to a regional security conference in Singapore, led by Defense Secretary Robert Gates, held a dialogue with counterparts from Japan and the ROK, calling for “genuinely tough sanctions” and aligning their positions just as negotiations in New York were beginning.550

High-level diplomacy between the U.S. and its allies continued in the first week of June, as the details of a new resolution were being deliberated at the UN. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg visited Seoul and Tokyo, discussing the need for a unified approach. In Seoul, Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan said that a “strong resolution should come out soon to show the will of the international community to address the North’s provocations properly.”551 On the 5th, Clinton met with Yu in Washington, discussing U.S.-ROK cooperation on the DPRK issue.552 The same day, Steinberg held consultations in Beijing with Yang Jiechi, Dai Bingguo and others,


550 This took place during the annual Shangri-la Dialogue; Gates also met with Deputy PLA Chief of Staff Ma Xiaotian, and presumably conveyed the U.S. call for harsh sanctions. Elisabeth Bumiller, “Gates Issues Warning to North Korea,” New York Times, May 31, 2009.

551 “South Korea Urges UN to Adopt Strong Resolution on North Nuclear Test,” Yonhap (Seoul), June 5, 2009.

552 The same day, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner met with his counterpart in Seoul, focused on the matter of financial sanctions.
presenting his case only after internal divisions among the U.S., Japan and South Korea had been bridged.\textsuperscript{553} By targeting “Beijing’s aversion to being diplomatically isolated,” the U.S. was able to leverage indirect pressure on the PRC.\textsuperscript{554}

Like China, Russia expressed strong misgivings about the nuclear test. Soon after the detonation, Churkin said that Moscow was “prepared to support a strong resolution.”\textsuperscript{555} However, through June 5, there is no indication that Russia played a significant role in the negotiations. Indeed, the impression of one diplomat was the Russia felt “unnerved” and marginalized by the close cooperation between the U.S. and China.\textsuperscript{556} Churkin himself later described the process as such: “There was much discussion between the U.S. and Chinese delegations, and some of the issues were thrashed out between those delegations before they came to us.”\textsuperscript{557} Rather, Russia raised objections to the language on cargo inspections towards the end of the negotiations, after the P5, Japan and South Korea had already submitted a draft to the full Council. According to one observer, Churkin “drove everyone nuts.”\textsuperscript{558} As in October 2006, China had nothing to gain by supporting Russia’s last-minute demands.

\textsuperscript{553} Other participants included Vice Foreign Ministers Wang Guangya, Wu Dawei and He Yafei. “Senior Chinese, U.S. Diplomats Talk on Korean Peninsular Situation,” Xinhua, June 5, 2009.

\textsuperscript{554} Shades of Red, 20.

\textsuperscript{555} “Russia Ready for Strong Resolution on N. Korea,” RIA Novosti (Moscow), May 27, 2009.

\textsuperscript{556} Interview, Western diplomat, New York, February 2010.

\textsuperscript{557} “Russia’s UN Ambassador Says North Korea Resolution Demonstrates Common Interests,” Charlie Rose Show Transcripts, June 11, 2009.

\textsuperscript{558} Interview, Western diplomat, February 2010. A comparison of the June 5 draft text and the final text of Resolution 1874 shows only superficial changes on the relevant paragraphs (i.e. 11 through 17 in both versions). In particular, the word “decides” in paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 was replaced with “calls upon” in the final version. However, this did not change the meaning of the passages as inspections, in both cases, would be left up to individual states to carry out (and in neither case would force be authorized). The text of the June 5 draft is available at: http://www.innercitypress.com/sc2dprk060509.pdf.
Politically, the situation was ripe for compromise. The U.S. seized the drama of the nuclear test to enhance its cooperation with Japan and South Korea, and then presenting a unified case for a resolution to Beijing. Russia’s position was out of sync with the rest, and the PRC did not advance an alternative to the U.S.-sponsored draft.

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As in the past, the unanimous approval of Resolution 1874 led to a hostile response from the DPRK. In this case, the reaction was the launch of a series of ballistic missiles on July 4, and additional bellicose rhetoric from Pyongyang. China’s approval can be attributed to several factors. On the issue itself, the nuclear test diminished prospects for a resumption of the 6PT or for effective bilateral diplomacy. In addition, the U.S. was willing to carve out concessions on the substance of the resolution that assuaged China’s concerns over the use of force, the scope of the resolution and the delegation of implementation authority to a body that the PRC could influence. Politically, given the salience of the issue to the U.S. and its allies, it would have been difficult for the PRC to reject a resolution out of hand.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has assessed China’s positions in four UNSC decisions on North Korea through the lens of the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2. To recap, the decisions were: Resolution 1695 (2006), which called on states to exercise “vigilance” in their arms transactions with the DPRK; Resolution 1718 (2006), which, among other things, imposed an arms embargo and called for cargo inspections; the PRST of April, 2009, which instructed the 1718 Committee to designate specific entities as subject to

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559 “N. Korea Fires Seven Ballistic Missiles in Violation of UN Resolutions,” *Yonhap* (Seoul), July 5, 2009.
restrictions; and Resolution 1874 (2009), which elaborated on the procedures for cargo inspections, tightened financial measures, and instructed the Committee to specify additional individuals and firms for the embargo list. The PRC voted in favor of all three resolutions and consented to the PRST.

In a sense, China’s behavior was surprising, since UNSC decisions invariably caused an increase of tensions on the Korean Peninsula. However, four factors can help to account for cooperativeness. Hypothesis 1, that cooperation is associated with a narrowing of the available alternatives, is borne out in each case. North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests all came after the 6PT had stalled; this is not surprising, since those tests were likely intended to encourage a resumption of diplomacy on Pyongyang’s terms. In the first three cases, Beijing had tried to avert a crisis through high-level contacts with the North, but had been rebuffed. By June, 2009, it did not make a significant effort to do so, perhaps under the assumption that dissuasion was unlikely to be effective. With alternative routes blocked, consideration in the Council became a preferred option.

Hypothesis 2 is that concessions contribute to China’s cooperativeness by lowering the perceived risks. Indeed, the U.S. was willing to make concessions, especially in terms of the legal phrasing (e.g. by not directly citing Chapter VII in the July 2006 case), the use of force (by not seeking mandatory inspections of cargo ships), and the scope of sanctions (such as by exempting light arms). The U.S. preferred weakened decisions to the risk of a Chinese or Russian veto, however remote a possibility that might have been. In addition, there is an apparent interaction with Hypothesis 1. The magnitude of the DPRK’s provocations shuttered alternative options not only for China, but also for the U.S. Washington made concessions because,
unwilling to fathom a military strike, it put stock in multilateral pressure to coerce Pyongyang back to the negotiating table, and was thus prepared to meet its counterparts in the middle.

In terms of broader political relationships, Hypothesis 3 is that China is more likely to cooperate if the U.S. utilizes high-level diplomatic pressure. The shock of the missile and nuclear tests created a favorable context for U.S. diplomacy, since China was amenable to a punitive response. In addition, the PRC had clear stakes in the bilateral relationship and was predisposed to cooperate no matter what level of pressure was employed. However, the U.S. did use political leverage to secure the best deal possible. This involved overt tactics, such as Bolton’s suggestions that he might ask for a vote regardless of China’s position, and less direct ones, such as the argument in 2009 that the public would not have accepted a weak resolution. These efforts were buttressed by frequent high-level exchanges, driving home the importance the U.S. attached to the matter. In addition, the U.S. was able to coordinate a unified response with its major East Asian allies, Japan and South Korea. This was especially apparent after the second nuclear test.

Hypothesis 4 is that cooperation is linked to a change in Russia’s position. In general, Russia was not a pivotal actor in these negotiations and gained attention only by issuing last-minute demands in October 2006 and June 2009, which were not supported by China. Like the other main actors, Russia took North Korea’s provocations seriously, and there was never any doubt that it would be receptive to some type of UNSC response. Russia was sympathetic to China’s calls for restraint, and supported a softer opening position during the July, 2006 and April, 2009 crises. However, there is no evidence that
Russia switched its position first, leaving China isolated and therefore politically vulnerable. Hence, this hypothesis cannot be confirmed in any of the cases.

Hypothesis 5 is that China’s cooperativeness is tied to regional support for the U.S. position. The key regional actors in this instance were Japan and South Korea. Japan was a non-permanent member of the Council, while Seoul was also an active participant, particularly in the 2009 cases. Both of these states broadly supported the U.S. drive for a strong Council response, though the ROK was more closely aligned with Beijing after the first missile test, while Japan pushed for an even more assertive response than the U.S. in the first three cases. Following the 2006 nuclear test, and, especially after the election of Lee Myung-bak, Seoul appeared more closely aligned with Washington. There is also an interaction with Hypothesis 3, insofar as the U.S. was able to multiply the power of its own message through coordination with its allies.

In sum, four of the five hypotheses can explain China’s final positions on this series of negotiations. Strategically, its options had narrowed such that compromise in the UNSC was a preferred option. Moreover, flexibility by the sponsor assuaged concerns and, perhaps, made the compromise more acceptable domestically. Politically, the combination of support from the U.S. and its allies created an incentive for movement toward the Western position. Russia’s role has less explanatory power since it did not switch positions before the PRC. These findings are tabulated below.

<table>
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<th>Table 12: Summary of Findings</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Narrowing Alternatives</td>
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<td>1. Narrowing Alternatives</td>
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### Measures imposed by the Security Council have not been effective in securing nonproliferation, nor have they prevented further acts of provocation by the North. In March 2010, the ROK destroyer *Cheonan* sank, resulting in the loss of 46 sailors. This was attributed to a North Korean torpedo attack.\(^{560}\) In November 2010, Pyongyang revealed the existence of a large-scale uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon, surprising observers.\(^{561}\) Soon afterwards, the DPRK launched an artillery barrage on an ROK-controlled island in the Yellow Sea, killing four.\(^{562}\) The North’s strategic rationale for pursuing nuclear weapons, domestic political reasons for aggression connected with the political succession, and ongoing concerns about the enforcement of sanctions

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<tr>
<td>4. Russia’s Positions Change</td>
<td>No. Russia supported Chinese initial position</td>
<td>No. Russia made late demands after China had consented</td>
<td>No. Russia supported press statement idea.</td>
<td>No. Russia made late demands after P5+2 consults</td>
</tr>
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\(^{560}\) While the cause of the incident was initially ambiguous, a U.S.-led investigation determined that North Korea was responsible in May, 2010. For context, see: Leon V. Sigal, “Primer—North Korea, South Korea, and the United States: Reading Between the Lines of the *Cheonan* Attack,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 66 (2010), 35-44.


\(^{562}\) “N. Korea Fires Artillery onto S. Korean Island,” *Yonhap* (Seoul), November 24, 2010.
resolutions, produced a situation in which UNSC pressure was of limited usefulness.\textsuperscript{563}

By the end of 2010, analysts remained pessimistic about the prospects for peace on the Korean Peninsula.\textsuperscript{564}

However, from the perspective of cooperation, the four cases discussed in this chapter suggest that harmonization of views is possible under certain conditions: narrowing alternatives, concessions aimed at the most skeptical decision-makers, high-level U.S. pressure, and agreement among the regional stakeholders. Behind all of these factors was the drama of the North’s tests, in disregard of regional stability, and in open defiance of UNSC decisions. In the absence of a driving external shock, though, cooperation becomes more complex. Just as the Council was deliberating the DPRK, it was also considering the problem of Iran’s nuclear program. Unlike Pyongyang, Tehran claimed that its goal was peaceful energy use, as guaranteed by the NPT. It did not conduct nuclear tests or indiscriminately fire missiles over neighbors’ territory. Reaching compromise in the UNSC was a much lengthier, more nettlesome process. It is to this case that we now turn.

\textsuperscript{563} After Resolution 1874 was passed, Shen Dengli opined that sanctions are unenforceable (specifically citing luxury goods), ineffective, and even counterproductive in the sense that the DPRK will infer that its aggressiveness will not be met with a painful response. Shen Dingli, “Chaoxian he wenti de qianjing,” (Prospects for the North Korean Nuclear Issue), \textit{Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Bao} (Social Science Daily), July 23, 2009. See also: Marcus Noland, “The (Non-) Impact of UN Sanctions on North Korea,” \textit{Asia Policy} 7 (2009), 61-88; Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, “Sanctioning North Korea: The Political Economy of Denuclearization and Proliferation,” \textit{Asian Survey} 50 (2010), 539-568.

Chapter 4

The Tehran Tangle:

Introduction

Similar to North Korea, China’s strategic dilemma on Iran is how to maintain regional stability in light of potentially destabilizing Western attempts to impose sanctions. On one hand, China values regional stability with regard to the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). The reason is straightforward: the PRC is aware that its growing dependence on energy supplies renders any conflict between Iran, the U.S., Israel, or other parties, a direct threat to its own strategic and economic wellbeing. In 2009, Iran ranked as China’s third-largest source of foreign oil, behind Saudi Arabia and Angola.\(^{565}\) China also has long-term contracts to purchase Iranian liquefied natural gas, and has been a key player in the modernization and development of Iran’s oil and gas industry.\(^{566}\) Moreover, China’s total trade with Iran climbed from $10.1 Billion in 2005 to $27.8 Billion in 2008, before tapering off somewhat. China’s trade volume in 2009 ($21.1 Billion) was still nearly three times as high as the other four members of the P5 combined ($7.8 Billion).\(^{567}\)

The issue of Iran’s nuclear program complicates the prospects for stability.

Beijing is concerned about Iran’s non-compliance with IAEA requests and the prospect

\(^{565}\) Iran provided China with about 11\% of its imported oil in 2009 (463,000 barrels/day out of roughly 4 million barrels/day). Data courtesy of the U.S. Energy Information Administration, online at: http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/China/Oil.html.


\(^{567}\) In 2009, Russia’s total trade with Iran stood at $3.06 billion, France $3.43 billion, the U.S. $350.5 million, and the U.K. $905.4 million. Data are derived from the UNComtrade.
that Tehran might eventually produce a nuclear weapon. One Chinese diplomat argues that the PRC once thought of nuclear weapons development as a sovereign right, but that it “now considers its commitment to regional stability and international nonproliferation regimes to be [higher] priorities.” Shen Dingli writes that, “Beijing appears to believe that the emergence of a regional nuclear power or a nuclear arms race in the region would destabilize the Middle East.” Yin Gang, a scholar at CASS, argues that, “If Iran had a nuclear deterrent, other countries in the region would seek a new balance and seek to follow suit.” Yin warns of a “big war in the Middle East” as a possible consequence.

However, China is skeptical of the use of sanctions, both unilaterally and by the Security Council, as an effective way of preventing nuclear proliferation. Li Weijian, a scholar at SIIS, submits that sanctions may radicalize the Iranian population and increase pressure on leaders to resist cooperation with the international community. Hua Liming, a former PRC envoy to Iran, similarly opines that increasing sanctions would “gradually lead to a confrontational situation” in which Tehran would become even more intransigent vis-à-vis the IAEA and likely withdraw from the NPT. Though it had consented to three rounds of sanctions between 2006 and 2008, Beijing’s growing economic interests in Iran, coupled with doubts about the efficacy of sanctions, made


571 Li Weijian, “Wan ‘Mao-shu Youxi’ zhi hou Yilang hui Aida ma?” (Will Iran Take a Beating After the ‘Cat and Mouse Game’ Has Been Played?) Xinmin Wanbao (Xinmin Evening News), April 6, 2007.

572 Hua Liming, “Yilang he wenti jiqi dui daguo guanxi de yingxiang” (The Iranian Nuclear Issue and its Effects on Great Power Relations), Heping yu Fazhan (Peace and Development) 2 (2010), 37.
consensus on a fourth round in June, 2010 especially problematic. This chapter asks why China ultimately agreed.

The argument is that five factors influenced China’s approval on what became Resolution 1929. First is that Iran had adopted an intransigent posture with respect to the IAEA and the international contact group seeking to mediate the problem.\(^{573}\) The outcome was not an automatic shift in China’s position, but rather a gradual increase in political pressure on China to consent to further sanctions. Second, the U.S. made concessions that reduced the key risks that China associated with sanctions, especially regarding Iran’s energy sector. Third, Washington used sustained diplomacy to clarify that the issue affected a “core interest” of the U.S. This worked because China’s ties with the U.S. were, in effect, more important than those with Iran. Fourth, Russia moved towards the view that sanctions were needed, meaning that the PRC was isolated among the P5. Fifth, additional stakeholders, such as France and Germany, as well as Israel and Saudi Arabia, supported the U.S. position and, at times, leveled pressure on Beijing.

The chapter proceeds in four main sections. The first provides a background of the Iranian nuclear issue from 2002 to the beginning of the debate on a fourth resolution in late 2009, showing that China gradually became a more active participant in negotiations as its interests in the IRI broadened. The second section covers the course of negotiations with Iran in 2009 and 2010, demonstrating that the primarily negative outcome of these processes did not have a direct impact on China’s support for sanctions. The third briefly discusses efforts made to assuage Chinese concerns through side payments (in particular, allusions that China’s oil supply would be “guaranteed” in the

\(^{573}\) This group was known as the "E3+3" (that is, France, Germany, Britain, the U.S., Russia and China). It is also referred to as the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UNSC plus Germany).
event of a Middle East crisis) and concessions on the text of the resolution. The fourth reports the growing support for sanctions by a number of key actors, including the U.S., Russia, the EU powers, Israel and Saudi Arabia, and shows how several of these parties interceded with China in an attempt to change its political and strategic calculations. The conclusion summarizes the argument and specifies the implications for cooperation.

Background: 2002-2009

The sequence of events leading to Resolution 1929 began in August 2002, when the existence of a secret uranium enrichment program in Iran was made public. The prospect of sanctions as a way to manage the nuclear issue was first raised in November 2004, after the IAEA was unable to confirm that “there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran,” and noted a “pattern of concealment.” The PRC denied requests by the U.S. and Britain to have the issue reported to the Security Council on the basis that doing so would complicate the IAEA’s efforts. This position was bolstered by an agreement in Paris the same month between the EU3 (Britain, France and Germany) and Iran, under which the latter would suspend uranium enrichment and agree to IAEA verification. However, Li Zhaoxing, in a meeting with his Iranian counterpart, declined to state unequivocally that the PRC would veto a resolution if the matter were brought

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576 The European delegation also included a representative of the EU. The text of the ‘Paris Agreement’ can be found on the IAEA’s website, at: [http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/eu_iran14112004.shtml](http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/eu_iran14112004.shtml).
before the Council. Rather, Li’s message was that China would oppose the use of pressure if Tehran complied with IAEA mandates and thereby assuaged concerns about the nature of its nuclear program.\footnote{Garver, China and Iran, 162-5.}

The EU3-Iran diplomatic track made little progress in 2005, as Tehran rejected Europe’s prime objective of a permanent cessation of uranium enrichment.\footnote{For a discussion, see: Pierre Dupont, “The EU-Iran Dialogue in the Context of the Ongoing Nuclear Crisis,” Central European Journal of International and Security Studies 3 (2009), 101-3.} In January 2006, Iran’s enrichment facility at Natanz was reactivated and cooperation with the IAEA was suspended, prompting the EU3 to seek a UNSC referral. On February 4, China voted in an IAEA session to transfer the issue to the Council, though Wang Guangya said that the PRC “prefers to have the EU3 continue” talks with Iran to “find a long-term solution on this issue.”\footnote{“China Prefers Diplomatic Solution to Iran Nuclear Issue,” Xinhua, February 6, 2006.} The next month, the P5 agreed to a PRST calling on Iran to suspend enrichment and directing the IAEA Director General to submit a report on compliance within 30 days.\footnote{SC Document S/PRST/2006/15 (March 29, 2006).} Due to Chinese and Russian objections, the text had been altered to remove a description of the problem as a “threat to international peace and security.” The two states feared this might act as a trigger for sanctions, to which both were opposed.\footnote{Warren Hoge, “UN Council Urges Iran to Halt Atom Activity,” New York Times, March 30, 2006. See also: Bolton, Surrender Is Not An Option, 324-5.} Explaining China’s reason for a restrained reaction, Dai Bingguo remarked, “The Chinese side feels there has already been enough turmoil in the Middle East. We don’t need any more turmoil.”\footnote{Joel Brinkley, “Rice Floats the Idea of UN Sanctions on Iran, but China and Russia Reject It,” New York Times, March 31, 2006.}
### Table 13: Key Dates in UNSC Negotiations on Iran, 2006-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tr>
<td>February 4, 2006</td>
<td>Iran withdraws from IAEA’s Additional Protocol on verification; IAEA votes to “report” situation to Security Council.</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 29, 2006</td>
<td>Security Council issues PRST calling for suspension of uranium enrichment and directing IAEA to issue report within 30 days.</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 31, 2006</td>
<td>Council unanimously approves Resolution 1696 threatening further measures for continued non-compliance with IAEA requests.</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 23, 2006</td>
<td>Council passes Resolution 1737 (14-1, Qatar voting no) imposing ban on sales of nuclear-related goods and other measures.</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 24, 2007</td>
<td>Council unanimously approves Resolution 1747, banning Iranian arms exports, calling for vigilance on arms sales to Iran, and other measures.</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 3, 2008</td>
<td>Council passes Resolution 1803 (14-0-1, Indonesia abstaining), calling for cargo inspections and enacting other measures.</td>
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<tr>
<td>September 27, 2008</td>
<td>Council unanimously approves Resolution 1835, urging Iran to comply with obligations “fully and without delay.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 15, 2010</td>
<td>Substantive negotiations begin in New York on fourth round of sanctions, based on U.S. draft resolution initially circulated in January.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 19, 2010</td>
<td>Agreement on text reached between E3+3 states, draft submitted to non-permanent members for consideration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 9, 2010</td>
<td>Council approves Resolution 1929 (12-2-1, Turkey and Brazil opposed, Lebanon abstaining), banning arms sales to Iran among other measures.</td>
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</table>

The IAEA report was delivered to the Council on April 28. The conclusion was that the body was “unable to make progress in its efforts to provide assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.”\(^{583}\) Five days later, the UK and France circulated a draft resolution, framed under Chapter VII, which suggested that the UNSC would consider “further measures” if Iran continued to resist IAEA requests.\(^{584}\) However, Russia and China saw such action as premature, instead backing a new package of incentives that had been issued by the reformed negotiating collective,

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584 The text of the draft resolution can be found through the Lawyer’s Committee on Nuclear Policy. Online, at: [http://lcnp.org/disarmament/iran/draftresUNSC03may.pdf](http://lcnp.org/disarmament/iran/draftresUNSC03may.pdf).
the “E3+3” (i.e. the Europeans plus China, Russia and the U.S.). Among other things, this would have exchanged a suspension of UNSC consideration of the problem for suspension of enrichment. Beijing’s sanguine assessment was that the proposal might “serve as a basis for all sides to rapidly restore negotiations and provide conditions for resolving differences through negotiations.” On June 16, in Beijing, Hu Jintao urged Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to respond to the six-party proposal, and reaffirmed China’s commitment to the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

However, by late July, Iran had rejected this initiative. Britain and France, with the support of the U.S., again formulated a draft resolution on the lines of the text that had failed three months before. Requesting amendments to ensure that sanctions would not be an automatic next step, China and Russia voted in favor of Resolution 1696.

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585 Bolton, Surrender Is Not An Option, 327.
586 The proposal also mentioned international support for the construction of light water reactors in Iran, and an affirmation of Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear energy use under the NPT. It also mentioned the possibility of an agreement whereby Russia would provide enrichment services on behalf of Iran. In addition to suspending enrichment, Iran would have had to agree to cooperate with the IAEA and implement the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, which is a comprehensive form of inspections. The proposal was submitted as a letter from the French UN ambassador to the president of the Security Council, and is available as SC Document S/2006/521 (July 13, 2006).
587 The quote is from Tang Guoqiang, China’s ambassador to the UN office in Vienna, site of the IAEA. “China Urges Iran to Respond Positively to Six-Power Proposal,” Xinhua, June 15, 2006.
589 The reasons were complex, owing in part to the imbalance of the proposal, which demanded a concrete concession from Iran (uranium enrichment) for the mere promise of a reciprocal gesture (international assistance), and in part to Iran’s support for Hezbollah in the ongoing crisis in Lebanon, which made compromise with the West on any issue domestically unpalatable. For a discussion, see: Anthony Wanis-St. John, “Nuclear Negotiations: Iran, the EU (and the US),” unpublished paper, 2007. Available at: http://www.aupeace.org/files/Wanis_IranEUandUS2007S.pdf.
590 Warren Hoge, “U.N. Sets Aug. 31 Deadline for Iran to End Uranium Work,” New York Times, August 1, 2006. In addition, it is possible that the near-simultaneous failure of diplomacy on North Korea (which led to Resolution 1695) also predisposed Russia and China to support a more assertive response on Iran.
Like the March PRST, an IAEA report within 30 days was mandated. The resolution warned that, if Iran did not comply with IAEA verification requirements, the Council would seek to “adopt appropriate measures” under Article 41 of Chapter VII, which includes sanctions. In his remarks after the vote, Liu Zhenmin urged Iran to “attach importance to the extensive appeals and expectations of the international community,” and “earnestly implement the requirements of this resolution,” even as he stressed China’s preference that the matter be settled through mediation.

The IAEA report requested by the Security Council was released on August 31. In it, the Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei, found that Iran had not suspended uranium enrichment and had continued to resist full cooperation with investigators. Over the next four months, the E3+3 debated what measures to authorize as punishment for non-compliance. Progress was stalled by divisions among the actors, with the U.S. advocating the toughest approach, Russia and China the most lenient, and the Europeans in between. John Bolton criticizes, in particular, the Europeans, who he writes had made “preemptive concessions” vis-à-vis Russia in the hope that doing so “would speed up the process of reaching agreement on a resolution,” a strategy Bolton describes as “delusional.” Lack of consensus persisted even after the IAEA submitted another

591 In the same paragraph, like to assuage Russian and Chinese concerns about escalation, the text emphasized that “further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary.” SC Document S/RES/1696 (July 31, 2006), 3.


critical report to the Council on November 14, and Ahmadinejad announced plans to expand vastly Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity.

In December, the U.S. and its European partners made a series of concessions to secure the support of Russia, which had emerged as the major obstacle to a sanctions resolution. References to the construction of a nuclear power plant at Bushehr were omitted, due to Russia’s long-standing involvement in that project. The Western text also allowed that a travel ban on Iranian nuclear officials would be optional, rather than mandatory, in order to satisfy a Russian demand. Various exemptions to proposed financial restrictions on targeted individuals were also approved, over the objections of Bolton and others. China’s role in these encounters appears to have been mainly to second Russia’s position. Bolton confines China’s role in one meeting to “basically”

596 Specifically, the November 14 Director General’s report on Iran noted a continuing lack of transparency and cooperation with IAEA inspectors. IAEA BG Document GOV/2006/64 (November 14, 2006).

597 Ahmadinejad said that Iran planned to increase enrichment capacity at Natanz to 60,000 centrifuges, which would be sufficient to make nuclear fuel on an industrial scale. Stuart Williams, “Ahmadinejad Says Iran Ready for ‘Final Nuclear Step,’” AFP, November 16, 2006. For reference, about 1,800 centrifuges are sufficient to make enough highly-enriched uranium for one nuclear warhead per year. See: David Albright, “When Could Iran Get the Bomb?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 62 (2006), 26-33.

598 For instance, Bolton writes that, at a December 6 meeting, Western officials were “looking to give Russia almost anything in order to get a resolution.” Bolton, Surrender Is Not An Option, 339.


600 Edith Lederer, “Britain, France Circulate Revised UN Sanctions Resolution on Iran, Expect Approval Friday,” AP, December 21, 2006.

agreeing with the Russian argument, “although, mercifully, [the Chinese diplomat] was brief.”

After significant delay, the UNSC approved Resolution 1737 on December 23, 2006. The resolution placed a ban on the export of nuclear technology to Iran, instituted a voluntary travel ban on individuals connected with the nuclear program, authorized financial sanctions on firms and individuals in the nuclear and ballistic missile industries, created a monitoring committee (similar to the 1718 Committee on North Korea), and threatened further action if Iran remained in non-compliance of IAEA directives after 60 days. Wang Guangya bemoaned Iran’s lack of “flexibility,” though reiterated the principle that “dialogue and negotiation are the fundamental, indeed the only, way out,” and that the IAEA, not the UNSC, was the “principal mechanism for dealing with this issue.”

On February 22, 2007, ElBaradei reported that Iran had continued to enrich uranium at the Natanz facility and refused to provide details required for verification purposes. Talks on a second round of sanctions commenced soon after, with discussions occurring primarily between high-ranking officials in the capitals of E3+3 countries. The U.S. and its partners sought a ban on arms sales to Iran and limits on

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603 An Appendix to the Resolution specified ten entities, and 12 individuals, that would be subjected to financial restrictions. SC Document S/RES/1737 (December 23, 2006), 8-9.
605 SC, Verbatim, S/PV.5612 (December 23, 2006), 7. In tepid language, and in contrast to the more forceful terms used two months earlier with regard to North Korea, Wang described Iran’s non-compliance as “regrettable and disappointing” (in the Chinese version, ling ren yihan he shiwang). The Chinese version of Security Council Document S/PV.5612 is available through UNBisnet.
export credits for firms engaged in commercial deals in that country. This posed particular problems for the PRC, which had existing contracts to supply the IRI with various weapons, including anti-ship and surface-to-air missiles. China’s exports as a whole had increased dramatically, rising from a value of $713 million in 2000 to $7.29 billion in 2007. As a result, on March 9, Wang Guangya said that he did not “see the need to expand [the measures] to an arms embargo” and objected to a prohibition on export credits.

However, a second round of sanctions was passed unanimously on March 24. The contribution of Resolution 1747 was to proscribe Iranian arms exports and to list an additional 13 organizations and 15 individuals that would be subject to financial restrictions. In order to guarantee Russian and Chinese consent, the West agreed merely to call for “vigilance” in arms sales to Iran and to omit a ban on export credits. As he had in December, Wang expressed “disappointment” in Iran’s decisions, and emphasized the role of the IAEA as the “main framework” through which the issue could...

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607 Alexandra Olson, “Major Powers Struggle to Agree on New Sanctions Against Iran,” AP (March 9, 2007).

608 For instance, according to the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, China contracted in 2005 to supply Iran with 550 QW-2 portable surface-to-air missiles, with delivery dates between 2006 and 2009.

609 Data derived from UNComtrade. Russia also supplied various arms to Iran, though its overall exports were $2.9 billion in 2007. The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database lists contracts to deliver 29 SA-15 surface-to-air missile systems, to be used in part to defend Iran’s nuclear facilities, with a value of $700 million.

610 The Western draft had called for a ban on “new commitments for grants, loans and credits to the (Iranian) government and state-owned institutions,” except for humanitarian purposes. Gerard Aziakou, “China, Russia Voice New Reservations about Tighter UN Sanctions on Iran,” AFP, March 9, 2007.

611 The entities include nuclear research facilities, defense manufacturers, and one bank with ties to nuclear and missile-related programs. The individuals include several high officials of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, including its deputy commander. See: SC Document S/RES/1747 (March 24, 2007), Annex I.

be resolved. Yet Wang also tellingly added that sanctions should “neither harm the Iranian people nor affect normal economic, trade and financial exchanges between Iran and other countries.” One reading of this is as a signal that China would not endorse an endless progression of sanctions on Iran at the expense of its own economic and strategic interests.

In May, the IAEA again concluded that Iran had not suspended enrichment, nor had it provided sufficient data to corroborate the “exclusively peaceful nature” of its nuclear program. However, momentum for a third round of sanctions was slowed by a deal struck in July between the IAEA and Iran under which Tehran would allow inspectors to return to the heavy water facility at Arak and provide additional documentation regarding the nuclear program. In August, the two sides announced a timeline under which Iran’s pledges would be carried out. This development provided China and Russia leverage to argue, at a ministerial conference in September, that consideration of additional sanctions should be delayed until the next IAEA report was distributed in November.

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613 SC, Verbatim, S/PV.5647 (March 24, 2007), 12.
614 Ibid, 11.
616 Iran also promised to grant the IAEA broader access to historical records regarding prior experiments with plutonium. George Jahn, “In Compromise, Iran Agrees to Allow UN Nuclear Monitor to Inspect Reactor,” AP, July 14, 2007. The U.S., however, rejected this plan as it did not require Iran to suspend enrichment, a core element of the E3+3 position. Farhad Pouladi, “Iran in UN Atomic Agreement, US Unimpressed,” AFP, August 22, 2007.
618 U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns, who played a key role in the diplomatic exchanges among the E3+3, said at the time that “the alchemy of the group is such that anything is going to be a compromise.” Helene Cooper, “Split in Group Delays Vote on Sanctions Against Iran,” New York Times, September 29, 2007.
That report, which again noted Iran’s noncompliance, provided a window of opportunity for the Western powers.\(^{619}\) Aware of China’s growing economic stakes in Iran, Washington focused on persuading Beijing not to stall. On November 16, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns argued that,

> We need China to join the effort and agree to have the next meeting. We’re concerned that China’s trade has increased significantly with Iran. It’s incongruous for China to continue to sell arms to Iran and become Iran’s top trade partner. We’ve advised the Chinese to take a much more resolute role.\(^{620}\)

Similarly, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Zalmay Khalilzad said that “there has been dragging of feet by the Chinese,” a charge which Wang Guangya rejected.\(^{621}\) In mid-December, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson criticized China’s state petroleum firm Sinopec for investing $2 Billion in the development of Iran’s Yadavaran oil field, saying that such an activity “flies in the face of the spirit of the UN sanctions that China supported.”\(^{622}\)

By January, 2008, both the U.S. and Iranians were leveling diplomatic pressure on the PRC. On the 17\(^{\text{th}}\) Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili, visited Beijing and attempted to convince Yang Jiechi that Tehran’s nuclear ambitions were peaceful. Meanwhile, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte made contrary arguments to

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Yang, Dai Bingguo and others during the U.S.-China Senior Dialogue in Guiyang.\footnote{Christopher Bodeen, “U.S., Iranian Envoys Lobby Chinese Leaders Over Proposed New Sanctions on Tehran,” \textit{AP}, January 18, 2008.} Perhaps as a further inducement for support, Negroponte condemned Taiwan’s recent referendum on UN membership and issued only a mild critique of the trade deficit between the U.S. and China.\footnote{“U.S. Official Says Taiwan’s Referendum for UN Membership a Mistake, Provocation,” \textit{Xinhua}, January 17, 2008.} The decisiveness of Negroponte’s visit is unclear, but by January 22 China had agreed to the general outlines of a third sanctions resolution.\footnote{“Elements of New UN Sanctions Package Agreed by Six Major Powers,” \textit{AFP}, January 25, 2008.}

Movement towards further UNSC sanctions was spurred by an Iranian rocket launch on February 4 that the U.S. and, notably, Russia were concerned might be a test of ballistic missile technology,\footnote{According to Iran, the rocket launch was intended as an experiment in satellite technology. However, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov remarked that it “adds to general suspicions of Iran regarding its potential desire to build nuclear weapons. Long-range missiles are one of the components of such weapons. That causes concern.” “Reports: Top Russian Diplomat Voices Concern about Iranian Missile Tests,” \textit{AP}, February 6, 2008.} as well as by another critical IAEA report on February 15.\footnote{The report, like previous ones, reported that Iran had not suspended uranium enrichment, as mandated by Security Council resolutions, had not accepted the Additional Protocol for verification, and had not provided certain materials related to past programs. IAEA BG Document GOV/2008/4 (February 22, 2008), 10.} On February 26, Condoleezza Rice met with Yang in Beijing, with the latter stating that the “dual-track approach” of incentives and pressure should be sustained.\footnote{“China, U.S. Discuss Iran Nuclear Impasse,” \textit{AFP}, February 26, 2008.} However, growing Chinese commercial interests circumscribed the extent of the sanctions pursued by the Western sponsors. On the 28\textsuperscript{th}, the PRC reiterated that measures should not “undermine normal trade and economic relations with Iran.” This qualification came just as China’s National Offshore Oil Corporation announced a $16 Billion contract to
develop Iran’s North Pars gas field.\(^{629}\) Additionally, China’s imports of energy supplies from Iran grew from $9.03 Billion in 2006 to $16.8 Billion in 2008.\(^{630}\)

The final agreement, Resolution 1803, was approved on March 3 by a vote of 14 in favor and one abstention (Indonesia). The resolution proscribed the sale of certain “dual use” items to Iran, imposed a travel ban on five officials associated with the nuclear program, and extended financial restrictions to a further 13 individuals.\(^{631}\) However, provisions regarding export credits, transactions with two Iranian banks, and cargo inspections were all voluntary, and the West had to omit sanctions on the Revolutionary Guards Corps.\(^{632}\) No mention was made of the energy sector or other industries not directly related to the nuclear program. As he had a year earlier, Wang repeated his observation that the sanctions “are not targeted at the Iranian people and will not affect normal economic and financial activities between Iran and other countries.”\(^{633}\) Meanwhile, an MFA spokesman said that “China has not changed its position” on sanctions and that diplomacy “remains the best way out.”\(^{634}\)

Over the next year and a half, calls for additional sanctions receded as the E3+3 concentrated on the diplomatic track. On June 12, 2008, the EU’s foreign policy chief,


\(^{630}\) Technically, this reflects growth in “mineral fuels and mineral oils” as defined by UNComtrade. In each year, Iran accounted for roughly 10% of China’s total energy imports (which stood at $169.3 billion in 2008). In addition, in 2008 China was Iran’s second-largest source of imports (and largest export market), according to the 2008 \textit{CIA World Factbook}.


Javier Solana, delivered a letter to the Iranian Foreign Minister on behalf of the six powers that laid out several “possible areas of cooperation” that might form the basis of a long-term compromise with the IRI, such as support for construction of a light-water reactor and provision of a reliable nuclear fuel supply. Iran responded in August with a request for further details, a reply that was viewed in the West as dilatory, and which led the Council, on September 27, to approve Resolution 1835, reaffirming prior resolutions and called on Iran to comply. On October 5, Iran rejected the overture by stating that it would not cease enrichment regardless of the incentives offered. In November, the IAEA reported continued noncompliance.

Nevertheless, negotiation remained prioritized at the outset of the Obama administration. In February, 2009, Obama remarked that, “If countries like Iran are willing to unclench their fist, they will find an extended hand from us.” This was soon followed by hints that the U.S. would support “direct engagement” with Tehran. In early March, the U.S. agreed to a mild statement by the E3+3 that requested Iran to

\[\text{Note: This section continues with additional text.}\]

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635 Other areas included cooperation in trade, agriculture, civil aviation, and support for WTO membership. The content of the letter was similar to the package of incentives offered in June 2006. The letter was released as IAEA Information Circular INFCIRC/730 (July 1, 2008), available at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2008/infcirc730.pdf.


637 The resolution was passed unanimously. SC Document S/RES/1835 (September 27, 2008).


adhere to prior UNSC resolutions without threatening penalties if it did not. The next month, Washington said it would send envoys to six-party discussions with Iran, which it had largely avoided during the Bush administration. In early July, despite the turmoil surrounding Iran’s disputed presidential election the previous month, Obama repeated an offer to engage in direct talks.

With the U.S. and Europe pursuing dialogue during this period, China’s role was mainly to encourage ongoing efforts. For instance, in November, 2008, Tang Guoqiang, the PRC delegate to the UN office in Vienna, noted “important opportunities” for “solving the Iranian nuclear issue through dialogue and negotiation.” In April, 2009, the MFA stated that, “China encourages Iran to make active contact with [the E3+3] in a bid to seek a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution” to the issue. In mid-June, just as the electoral crisis in Tehran was erupting, a Chinese diplomat in New York argued that there was a “rare opportunity” to restart negotiations, and that “China always believes that resolving this issue through diplomatic means is in the interest of peace and

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643 According to Hillary Clinton, “We believe that pursuing very careful engagement on a range of issues that affect our interests and the interests of Iran makes sense. There is nothing more important than trying to convince Iran to cease its efforts to obtain a nuclear weapon.” Matthew Lee, “U.S. to Attend Group Nuclear Talks with Iran,” AP, April 9, 2009.


645 “China Advocates Peaceful Solution to Iranian Nuclear Issue,” Xinhua, November 28, 2008. In addition, in October, Wen Jiabao had stressed the importance of negotiation with Iran’s vice president, Parviz Davoodi, on the sidelines of a Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting in Kazakhstan. “Chinese Premier Meets with Iranian Vice President,” Xinhua, October 30, 2008.

646 “China Glad to See Improvement of U.S.-Iran Relations,” Xinhua, April 9, 2009.
security in the Middle East and is in the common interest of the international community.” 647

Patience by the Western powers, however, had dissipated by mid-July. A joint statement issued by the G8 countries following a summit in Italy set a deadline for September 15 for Iran to engage in negotiations or face the possibility of increased sanctions. Obama asserted that the U.S. was “not going to just wait indefinitely” for Iran to respond. 648 With Western strategy reverting to a punitive approach, the basis of a diplomatic confrontation with China was laid. Unlike prior cases, which were resolved relatively quickly, it would take nine months for the P5 to secure an agreement on added pressure against Tehran.

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On June 9, 2010, the UNSC approved Resolution 1929 by a vote of 12 in favor, two (Turkey and Brazil) opposed, and one (Lebanon) abstaining. Like the three that had preceded it since 2006, the aim of this resolution was to pressure the IRI to suspend uranium enrichment activities and comply with IAEA inspection guidelines. Among other things, it mandated that Iran not acquire interests in uranium mining abroad; proscribed sales to Iran of several types of weapons, including tanks, warships, missiles and attack helicopters; authorized cargo inspections, with the consent of the flag state; and permitted (though did not require) action against Iranian firms and banks, which

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647 The official was La Yifan, a senior diplomat at the Chinese Permanent Mission to the UN. “China Calls for Resolving Iranian Nuclear Issue Through Negotiations,” Xinhua, June 15, 2009.

provided a legal basis for European states to impose unilateral sanctions. In addition, the resolution specified 40 firms and one individual that would be subject to financial restrictions, including those affiliated with the Revolutionary Guard Corps and the national shipping company.

China’s UN ambassador, Li Baodong, noted that the PRC had been “earnestly and constructively engaged in the consultations” leading up to the vote, and had “worked vigorously” to promote measures that were “appropriate, incremental, clearly targeted and commensurate with the actual practices of Iran in the nuclear field.” Chen Qiufa, China’s representative to the IAEA, urged Iran to abide by the resolution and take steps to “restore the confidence of the international community” in the peaceful nature of its nuclear program.

This rhetoric incensed Tehran. Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, said that China’s support for Resolution 1929 would “affect its standing in the Muslim world.” On June 12, a key Iranian parliamentarian threatened reverse sanctions on both Russia and China. Another legislator referred to China as “Washington’s errand boy” and suggested that Tehran reduce Beijing’s clout by limiting

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650 The individual listed was Javad Rahiqi, head of the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center. The entities are specified in Annexes I through III of the resolution. SC Document S/RES/1929 (June 9, 2010).

651 SC, Verbatim, S/PV.6335 (June 9, 2010), 11.


654 The official was Abdollah Ka’bi, deputy head of the parliament’s Energy Commission. “Iran Threatens Russia, China with Reciprocal Sanctions,” FARS News Agency (Tehran), June 12, 2010.
How can we explain China’s support for sanctions against a state in which it had significant, and growing, material interests?

Narrowing Alternatives

Hypothesis 1 is that multilateral negotiations and bilateral contacts had proven ineffective, opening the way to a punitive response. In this instance, we need to assess the progress of the E3+3 and associated international efforts, as well as China’s own pressure on Iran to comply with IAEA guidelines. In the fall of 2009, there was a reasonable prospect that diplomacy might have been a viable way to change Iran’s position. On September 1, Jalili said that, in order to “ease common concerns in the international arena,” Iran would present a response to the sextet’s June 2008 incentive proposal. At the same time, Chinese analysts professed optimism that dialogue might yield results. Ni Ruchi, deputy director of the MFA’s Iran Division, told a U.S. official that the June electoral violence had left the Iranian regime in a “weakened position” and that, as a result, it would be more amenable to seeking a compromise with the E3+3.

Iran’s overture led to mixed results. On one hand, the five-page document submitted by Tehran to the six averred a “readiness to embark on comprehensive, all-encompassing and constructive negotiations,” but omitted mention of the core problem of uranium enrichment. This left the U.S. and the Europeans dissatisfied. On the other


hand, it did lead to direct talks between the various parties. Specifically, Javier Solana was able to arrange a meeting between Iran and representatives of the E3+3 countries for October 1 in Geneva. Perhaps seeking to lower expectations, though, Dai Bingguo advised Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg on September 29 that “one meeting would not be able to resolve all problems,” while also suggesting that the PRC would “work in its own way” to convince Iran to abandon uranium enrichment and comply with the IAEA.

The results of the Geneva meeting were initially encouraging. The main achievement was that Iran agreed “in principle” (i.e., without a formal commitment) to ship most of its uranium supply to Russia for enrichment, and to allow IAEA staff to investigate a recently-disclosed enrichment facility in the city of Qom. Obama expressed cautious optimism at the outcome, referring to it as a “constructive beginning” that must be followed by “constructive action by the Iranian government.” Cheng Jingye, head of the MFA’s Arms Control Department, said that China “appreciates the flexibility shown by all sides,” and that the parties should “push forward the process of dialogue.”

To sustain the momentum, Wen Jiabao, on October 15, reportedly urged


659 Under the terms of the arrangement, Iran would ship its uranium stock to Russia, which would then enrich it to a higher level (i.e. from about 4% to 19.75%). In addition, France would agree to take the Russian-enriched uranium and covert it into fuel rods that would be used to power the Tehran Research Reactor, which is used to create isotopes for medical imaging. See: “Senior Official on P5+1 Talks in Geneva,” U.S. Mission to the UN in Geneva Background Briefing, October 1, 2009. Available at: http://geneva.usmission.gov/2009/10/02/p51-backgrounder/.

660 “Remarks by the President on the Meeting of the P5+1 Regarding Iran,” White House, Office of the Press Secretary, October 1, 2009. Available at: http://geneva.usmission.gov/2009/10/01/president-p51/.

Iran’s First Vice President, Mohammad Reza Rahimi, to cooperate with the multilateral effort, and stressed PRC opposition to Iran’s development of nuclear weapons.

On October 22, a follow-up meeting was held in Vienna, during which Iran again agreed “in principle” to the nuclear swap arrangement.\textsuperscript{662} China was guardedly optimistic, noting that “some progress has been achieved in [the] Iran nuclear fuel talks” and that Beijing welcomed the “gradual implementation of the consensus” that had been reached.\textsuperscript{663} However, the situation began to deteriorate when Iran missed an October 24 deadline to formally accept the offer. A U.S. official drew a parallel to the DPRK:
“There’s every possibility that the Iranian strategy here is to follow the North Korean playbook. Drag it out. Reach partial agreements. Find reasons not to ship out the fuel.”\textsuperscript{664}

In early November, Iran’s Foreign Minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, issued a response, saying that “we have some technical and economic considerations” that would best be addressed by establishing a “technical commission.”\textsuperscript{665} At the end of the month, the IAEA’s Board of Governors, including China and Russia, passed a resolution, as it had in February 2006, reporting the matter to the Security Council.\textsuperscript{666}

The next months boded poorly for a settlement. After the IAEA resolution was approved, Iran responded by claiming, apparently disingenuously given technical


\textsuperscript{666} Specifically, the IAEA Board of Governors noted “with serious concern that Iran continues to defy the requirements and obligations contained in the relevant” IAEA reports and UNSC resolutions. IAEA BG Document GOV/2009/82 (November 27, 2009), 1.
constraints, that it would build ten new enrichment facilities. Soon after, the U.S. reminded Iran of a deadline of December 31 that had been set earlier in the Obama Administration for Tehran to follow UNSC resolutions or face additional pressure. Iran’s reaction was to issue an “ultimatum” for the U.S. to agree to a counter-proposal by January 31 that would involve a much smaller fuel swap than that proposed in Geneva. After suggesting, in early February, that Tehran might be amenable to the original deal, Ahmadinejad reversed course and announced on the 11th that the Natanz facility had already begun to enrich uranium to a level of 20%, which Western observers noted had no “civilian-use justification,” and put Iran “on the cusp” on a capacity to manufacture highly-enriched uranium, used in nuclear warheads. This was met almost immediately with a critical report from the new IAEA Director General, Yukiya Amano.

A final flurry of diplomatic activity occurred after the P5 and Germany had come to a near consensus on the terms of a fourth resolution in late April. On the 19th, Mottaki said that Iran would be willing to discuss anew the terms of a nuclear swap deal, and, with Ahmadinejad, set about visiting the capitals of UNSC members. On May 7,

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668 Lachlan Carmichael, “U.S. Turns Up Heat on Iran over Nuclear Program, Rights,” AFP, December 12, 2009. Moreover, on December 10, the chairman of the Iran Sanctions Committee informed the UNSC that there had been three reported violations by Iran of Resolution 1747’s provisions regarding arms exports. SC, Verbatim, S/PV.6235 (December 10, 2009).

669 Alternatively, Tehran said that it would buy enriched fuel from the West. In either case, the proposal was a non-starter because it would have left Iran with an unacceptably large amount of uranium. Ali Akbar Dareini, “Iran Warns West It Will Make Its Own Nuclear Fuel,” AP, January 3, 2010.


671 IAEA BG Document GOV/2010/10 (February 18, 2010).

672 Precisely, Mottaki promised to consult with all UNSC capitals “except one,” presumably the U.S. (with which Iran had no formal diplomatic relations). Nasser Karimi, “Iran: Nuclear Fuel Swap a Chance to Boost Trust,” AP, April 20, 2010. Of particular note, on the 25th, Mottaki met with Amano and Austrian
Mottaki invited Council delegates to a dinner at the Iranian Mission in New York and reiterated his message that Iran was open to an agreement. The problem was that the overture did not reflect a change in Iran’s underlying position regarding enrichment. According to one diplomat, “We literally heard nothing new.” One week later, Tehran announced that it would increase its capacity at Natanz to purify uranium to a level of 20%, seemingly confirming suspicions. Iran did ultimately agree to a swap agreement with Brazil and Turkey in May, but this was discounted by the E3+3 on the grounds that it permitted Iran to continue to enrich to higher levels and covered only about half of Iran’s uranium stockpile.

Despite the lack of progress, China continued to advocate diplomacy during the first four months of 2010. In January, Zhang Yesui argued that, “This is not the right time or right moment for sanctions, because diplomatic efforts are still going on.” In February, Yang Jiechi opined that discussion of sanctions might “stand in the way of finding a diplomatic solution.” A month later, China’s deputy UN ambassador, Liu


675 According to a U.S. official, for the deal to be viable, Iran “will still have to take additional steps to assure the international community of its peaceful intentions, including complying with five UN Security Council resolutions it is currently violating.” Ali Akbar Dareini and George Jahn, “Iran Deal to Ship Uranium Abroad Meets Skepticism,” *AP*, May 17, 2010; Glenn Kessler and Tom Erdbrink, “Iran Reaches Nuclear Deal with Brazil and Turkey,” *New York Times*, May 18, 2010.


Zhenmin, posited that the “window for contact and dialogue is not closed,” and that “there is still room for diplomatic efforts.” In early April, Yang again urged “relevant parties to step up diplomatic efforts and show flexibility.” On April 20, a day after Mottaki announced Iran’s latest effort to avoid sanctions, the MFA said that the “door for dialogue and trust” remained open. Indeed, a dynamic emerged by which Iranian allusions to agreement became pretexts for China’s refusal to discuss of sanctions. One analysis noted that, “on average, Beijing issued a response statement within four days, each time strongly calling for stepped-up diplomacy.”

There are two reasons why the failure of multilateral dialogue did not lead ineluctably to a change in China’s position on sanctions. First was that Iran never clearly stepped over a “red line” and produced highly-enriched uranium or, like North Korea, actually carried out a nuclear detonation in defiance of the international community. As Xu Jin, a scholar at CASS, points out, this weakened the political and legal basis for sanctions. Second was that China did not appear to treat the risk that Iran might soon acquire nuclear weapons seriously. As the International Crisis Group argued in February,
Most Chinese analysts are unconvinced that Iran will possess the ability to enhance [uranium] to the level sufficient for building nuclear weapons in the near future despite its claims to the contrary.\footnote{The Iran Nuclear Issue, 3. As Zalmay Khalilzad, former U.S. ambassador to the UN, had pointed out in September, “[The Chinese] threat perception on this issue is different from ours.” Michael Wines, “China’s Ties with Iran Complicate Diplomacy,” \textit{New York Times}, September 30, 2009.}

Sanctions, then, were not an attractive alternative to further dialogue, however infeasible the latter appeared to be.

However, Beijing did attempt to use its own influence to persuade Tehran to adjust its position.\footnote{This is elaborated on in the following section.} In early March, China, along with Russia, dispatched envoys to Iran with the purpose of convincing the regime to agree to the fuel-swap plan and accept IAEA verification requests. According to a Western diplomat, “the Chinese said they got a response from the Iranians to wait a little longer and they will come up with something. But they didn’t get anything in the end.”\footnote{“China: Russia, China Push Iran to Change Nuclear Stance,” \textit{Tendersinfo}, March 25, 2010. Moreover, one Russian diplomat reported that there was “less and less room for diplomatic maneuvering” as a result of Iran’s resistance during the encounter. The report does not specify who took part in this exchange, when exactly it occurred, or what specifically was covered. Ellen Barry and Andrew Kramer, “Iran Resisting New Pressure from Russia and China,” \textit{International Herald Tribune}, March 26, 2010.} This may have informed Liu Zhenmin’s remarks at the Security Council on March 4 in which he said that China was committed to a “dual-track” strategy, including both incentives and pressure, and urged Tehran to remove “doubts” by cooperating with the IAEA. This marked a slight easing of China’s position vis-à-vis Iran.\footnote{However, Liu also remarked that there is “still room for diplomatic efforts.” SC, Verbatim, S/PV.6280 (March 4, 2010), 8. See also: John Pomfret and Colum Lynch, “U.S. Criticized on Iran Sanctions,” \textit{Washington Post}, March 5, 2010.} Later, on April 1, Jalili met with Dai Bingguo and Yang Jiechi
in Beijing, with no clear outcome. It is possible that this encounter weighed on China’s decision later in April to engage in sanctions negotiations, though it is unclear whether or how Beijing attempted to influence Jalili or other Iranian officials.

In sum, the evidence that a narrowing of alternatives affected China’s shift of position on sanctions is mixed. In a bilateral sense, China’s efforts are obscure, though might have factored into its endorsement of sanctions in the spring of 2010. Multilaterally, there is a significant time lag between the breakdown of E3+3 negotiations in October 2009 and China’s decision to engage in talks on sanctions in April 2010. A missing factor was urgency. Even as it rejected international proposals, Iran did not develop or test nuclear weapons. Rather, the link appears to be indirect. That is, Iran’s recalcitrance led to broad support for a hardened response, including among the U.S., Russia, Saudi Arabia and others, which, in turn, created rising political pressure on the PRC to alter its position.

Concessions and Risk Reduction

Hypothesis 2 is that China is more likely to consider punitive measures against its partners if the U.S. or other takes step to reduce the risks the PRC incurs from doing so, through side-payments, substantive concessions or both. Regarding side-payments, a component of U.S. strategy was to persuade China that other Middle Eastern oil and natural gas producers would fill any gap left by a cutoff of Iranian energy supplies as a result of the fallout of another resolution. A benefit of this approach was that it made sense for both Saudi Arabia, which was seeking long-term investment in its oil products

688 A terse Chinese news release simply stated that the parties had had a “frank and in-depth exchange on China-Iran relations and issues of mutual concern.” “Chinese State Council Meets with Iran’s Chief Nuclear Negotiator,” Xinhua, April 1, 2009.
given a decline in U.S. purchases, and China, which had an incentive to lower its
dependence on Iran given the political risk attached. Senior U.S. officials Jeffrey Bader
and Dennis Ross floated the idea of a formal energy guarantee in Beijing in November
2009, though this did not have an immediate impact on China’s position regarding
sanctions.  

During the winter of 2010, representatives of two Gulf States suggested a
willingness to enhance bilateral cooperation with China as an incentive for Beijing to
adopt a tougher policy in the Security Council. In January, the Saudi Deputy Foreign
Minister claimed that, in a meeting with Yang Jiechi, he had noted Chinese concerns
about access to reliable energy supplies and indicated the possibility that Saudi Arabia
might help fill the gap, though no “explicit bargain” was discussed. The next month, the
Foreign Minister of the United Arab Emirates, which also advocated new sanctions on
Iran, said that he had made a similar argument in conversations with Chinese officials,
but recognized that it would be difficult for China to reduce reliance on the IRI given the
scale of its interest there. Whatever the veracity of these claims, China likely viewed
deepening ties with Gulf States as a hedge against Iranian unpredictability.

689 Chris Zambelis, “Shifting Sands in the Gulf: The Iran Calculus in China-Saudi Arabia Relations,” China

690 Ross was a senior adviser at the State Department on Middle East issues, while Bader was Senior
Director for Asia on the National Security Council staff. John Pomfret and Joby Warrick, “Before Obama’s
Visit, NSC Warned Leaders of Mideast Turmoil,” Washington Post, November 26, 2010. The idea to
provide energy guarantees was reportedly conceived by Ross, who may have raised it as a possibility
during April, 2009 visits to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. “U.S. Envoy Arrives in Saudi Arabia,” RTT

691 During Yang’s visit to Riyadh in January, 2010, for instance, a deal was reached whereby bilateral trade
the UAE, oil exports to China increased nearly three-fold between 2009 and the first quarter of 2010, which
indicates a rising dependence if not the result of a quid-pro-quo regarding Iran. David Ignatius, “Putting the
The U.S. effort to secure China’s consent through energy assurances was most directly observable in the spring. As one Chinese analyst put it, U.S. officials had repeatedly told their interlocutors in Beijing that, in the event of a crisis, “the oil that has been shipped to China from Iran will be replaced by oil from other countries in the Middle East.” For instance, during his exchange with Hu on April 12, Obama said that the U.S. was “sensitive to China’s energy needs” and would collaborate with the PRC to ensure Beijing’s oil supply should it be threatened as a result of sanctions. In a press conference, Obama further stated that, “Iran is an oil-producing state. I think that, you know, a lot of countries around the world have trade relationships with Iran. And we’re mindful of that.” The exact nature of the guarantee, if any, is unclear. However, combined with growing political pressure to act it is possible that this gesture did factor into Hu’s risk assessment.

Concessions during the negotiating process itself also played a role in finalizing an agreement on sanctions. The U.S. circulated a draft among its allies at the beginning of March. The substance included several stringent elements. In particular, it sought to restrict Tehran’s access to capital markets, place embargoes on Iran’s shipping and air cargo industries, and toughen measures on foreign insurance of oil imports and exports. These proposals were all dropped at the request of Britain, France and Germany, which

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believed that both China and Russia would oppose them. In effect, the U.S. had made what Bolton had referred to in 2006 as “preemptive concessions” in order to table a draft that would have a stronger chance of approval.

When it did engage in substantive talks among the E3+3 states in late March, the U.S. recognized that it might have to make further amendments to ensure support. As Susan Rice said in an interview on the 31st,

There’s not one meeting where it’s done, poof. It’s a process of consultation and negotiation among the P5 [plus Germany] in the first instance and in very close consultation as well with the other elected ten members of the Security Council. This is a complex issue with countries having very diverse perspectives and diverse interests and it will take tough negotiation to get the strongest possible text.

Nevertheless, negotiations did proceed. In the first two weeks of April, diplomats focused their attention on the arms embargo, financial restrictions, cargo inspections, the energy sector, and the Revolutionary Guards Corps. Still wary of agreeing to a fourth resolution, China adopted a standoffish posture. One diplomat recorded that, “In general, the Chinese ambassador did not want to discuss the specifics of the text,” allowing that the PRC had indicated its opposition to energy-related sanctions.

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By April 14, delegates from the E3+3 were holding “intense meetings almost daily.” On the 16th, the U.S. circulated a new draft that removed any mention of limits on investment in Iran’s energy industry, which China had opposed. Four days later, Li Baodong submitted a list of requested amendments to the draft at a six-party meeting held at the Chinese Mission. This was followed by a consultation among the P3 and Germany, and then by a meeting between Li and Rice on the 20th. It is unclear what changes were made, but the outcome was promising to the U.S. On the 22nd, Biden announced that, “China will agree to sanctions.”

At this point, as discussed above, Iran had begun its final diplomatic push to prevent sanctions, which allowed the PRC to seek a pause in deliberations. However, this proved temporary as Tehran did not address the core issues raised by the E3+3 regarding enrichment. On behalf of the sextet, Clinton said on May 18 that a “strong draft” had been agreed upon, “with the cooperation of both Russia and China.” Following consultations with the elected members of the Security Council, the draft was put to a vote on June 9.

Political Pressure

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Hypotheses 3 through 5 concern the political dimension of negotiations. Hypothesis 3 is that China is more likely to support punitive action against pariah states if the U.S. has made high-level efforts to persuade the PRC to do so. Hypothesis 4 is that a shift in China’s posture in favor of multilateral pressure can be attributed to a change in Russia’s position in the same direction. Hypothesis 5 is that broad regional support for Western-led plans to use instruments of coercion in the UNSC will render Beijing more likely to lend its support to such efforts. Each of these propositions is considered in turn.

The U.S.

The Obama Administration had entered office in January 2009 hoping to make progress on the Iranian nuclear issue through dialogue and incentives, a strategy towards which the PRC posed no objections. However, as Suzanne Maloney points out, pressure on the White House to toughen its stance had been growing since the crackdown on protesters during Iran’s presidential election in June 2009. Iran’s noncommittal response to the Geneva offer further dampened hopes regarding dialogue, and the administration began to change course. On November 15, Obama said that the incentive-based approach was “running out of time.” A month later, even before the expiration of Washington’s year-end deadline, Hillary Clinton lamented that “our outreach has produced very little in terms of any kind of positive response from the Iranians,” and said that “additional pressure” would be necessary.

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During the fall of 2009, U.S. officials stressed the need for cooperation on Iran in a series of exchanges with Chinese counterparts. In October, Kurt Campbell, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, said during a trip to Beijing that, “If we are going to make real progress on sending a consolidated message to Iran, we are going to need the support of China.” A month later, Dennis Ross and Jeffrey Bader, warned Chinese interlocutors that Israel viewed Iran’s nuclear program as an “existential issue,” implying that Chinese resistance to pressure could elevate the risks of an Israeli bombardment.

On December 9, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns reiterated the Israel argument in a meeting with Wang Jiarui, director of the CCP’s International Liaison Department, and said that U.S. patience was “nearly exhausted.”

The diplomatic offensive continued in early 2010. On January 10, Clinton circulated a “diplomatic policy narrative” to State Department officials containing the elements of the U.S. argument. The essence was that Iran had resisted IAEA and E3+3 requests and proposals, had defied prior UNSC resolutions and, by doing so, posed a challenge both for regional stability and the credibility of international regimes. On January 28, Clinton met with Yang and reportedly conveyed this argument. The next day, in a press conference, she elaborated on the reasons the PRC ought to support sanctions. After praising China’s cooperation on the diplomatic front, she said:


709 It is possible that this message factored into China’s willingness to endorse the IAEA resolution reporting Iran’s non-cooperation to the UNSC. “U.S. Aides Pressured China on Iran,” _AFP_, November 26, 2009.

Now, as we move away from the engagement track, which has not produced the results that some had hoped for, and move towards the pressure and sanctions track, China will be under a lot of pressure to recognize the destabilizing impact that a nuclear-armed Iran would have in the Gulf, from which they receive a significant percentage of their oil supply, that it will produce an arms race; other countries will feel the necessity to seek their own nuclear weapons programs; Israel will feel an existential threat to its very existence. All of that is incredibly dangerous.711

In early February, a U.S. official with experience in talks with China said that the main U.S. points were twofold: first, the risk of an Israeli strike and, second, negative ramifications for the NPT if Iran were permitted to develop nuclear weapons.712

Despite these arguments, the U.S. was unable to convince the PRC to revise its position during the winter of 2010. One reason appears to be “assertiveness” in Chinese foreign policy, driven by a hardening nationalism at the domestic level, which made Beijing less amenable to pressure.713 More discreetly, though, the state of U.S.-China relations was hampered by controversies surrounding U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, the visit of the Dalai Lama to the U.S., and alleged cyberattacks on Google.

However, a visit to Beijing in early March by Bader and Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg resulted in an improvement in relations. According to one observer, the Chinese “recognized that they had overreached in their threats, expectations, calculations and demands,” and reaffirmed the primary importance of pacific U.S.-China

713 The Iran Nuclear Issue, 14.
ties. Liu Zhenmin’s Security Council speech promoting the “dual track” strategy followed a day later, suggesting that political calculations may have played a role in the modification of China’s position.

The U.S. effort reached its apogee in April, when Obama urged Hu on two occasions to support a new sanctions resolution. The first came on April 1 during an hour-long conversation in which Obama “underscored the importance of working together to ensure that Iran lives up to its international obligations.” A U.S. deferral on a decision on whether to label China as a “currency manipulator” was perhaps meant as an additional incentive. The second, more decisive, exchange occurred on the sidelines of the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington on April 12. In it, Obama sketched the details of a proposed resolution and made assurances to Hu regarding the security of China’s oil supply in the event of a crisis in Iran. In response, Hu said that, while preferring dialogue, China would maintain “coordination” with the U.S. in the Security Council. The next day, PRC Deputy Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai avowed that the

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715 As noted above though, there is evidence that Liu’s speech was also attributable to the failed Sino-Russian demarche in Tehran regarding the nuclear program.


718 This communication was part of a larger strategy to minimize China’s perceived risks, and is discussed in the following section. David Sanger and Mark Landler, “China Agrees to Work with U.S. on Iran Sanctions,” *International Herald Tribune*, April 14, 2010. Afterwards, Bader told the press that “the two presidents agreed that the two delegations should work on a sanctions resolution in New York.” Mary Beth Sheridan and Scott Wilson, “Obama Presses for Unity on Iran,” *Washington Post*, April 13, 2010.

PRC would consider “new ideas,” and, on the 14th, diplomats in New York had begun discussion on the substance of a fourth resolution.\(^{720}\)

It is probable that the U.S. campaign had an effect on China’s assessment of the political costs and benefits of supporting further sanctions. The issue was prioritized at the highest levels, leaving the PRC with no doubt of the strategic significance of the matter to the U.S. Further, Hu would have considered not only the ramifications for Iran, but for the tone of the broader U.S.-China relationship. For instance, cooperation arguably helped to lay a foundation for a successful second round of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, held in Beijing on May 24-5. Some 26 agreements were reached, covering nuclear security, counterterrorism, energy and a host of other matters.\(^{721}\) As John Garver writes,

“…cooperating with the United States [on Iran] served China’s interest of maintaining comity in its relations with the United States and, even more, of encouraging the United States to view China as a strategic partner.”\(^{722}\)

However, the U.S. was not the only state whose position resonated in Beijing.

**Russia**

From the late fall of 2009, Russia had adopted a position on Iran in between the West, which sought additional sanctions, and China, which opposed them. Unlike the

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PRC, Russia was not dependent on Iran for either oil or natural gas supplies. Moreover, a number of factors complicated Russia’s ties with Iran. These included the territorial division of the Caspian Sea, disagreements about Russia’s role in developing in the Bushehr reactor, delays in Russian sales of S-300 missile-defense systems, anti-Russian public sentiment in Iran, and other matters. In a broader sense, cooperation on Iran was linked to the “resetting” of Washington’s relations with Moscow that originated in the first months of the Obama Administration. Moscow conceivably believed that, by agreeing to some form of sanctions, however diluted, it might be better able to seek various concessions from the U.S., including WTO admission, elevated U.S. investment in Russia, and the ratification of a new strategic arms reduction treaty.

However, other factors pushed in the opposite direction. In contrast to North Korea, Iran played a central role in Russia’s strategic calculations. Bilateral trade reached $3 Billion in 2009, Russia served as a major weapons supplier to the IRI, and Iran has been viewed in Moscow as a counterweight to U.S. influence in the region. As one analyst concluded, Russia “has too much at stake in its relationship with Iran to…risk a tougher approach,” preferring instead that the U.S. “play the role of bad guy.” In addition, like China, Russia was skeptical of Western assertions that Iran was pursuing

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723 Indeed, Russia is a net oil exporter (selling about 7 million barrels/day in 2009), and holds the world’s largest natural gas reserves. Data are available from the U.S. Energy Information Administration, at: http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Russia/Oil.html.


nuclear arms and, even if it were, “Moscow does not see Russia as being Iran’s target.”

Finally, Russia could not easily ignore China’s position, given the scale of trade, energy, and strategic relations between the two actors, symbolized by Vice President Xi Jinping’s visit to Russia in late March. The result of these opposing factors a middle course between the more assertive West and the more cautious China.

A schism between Russia and China first appeared in November, 2009, following the collapse of E3+3 negotiations. Medvedev stated on November 15 that, in case dialogue failed, “the other options [i.e. sanctions] remain on the table, in order to move the process in a different direction.” For its part, the PRC did not allude to the possible necessity of sanctions until early March. In late November, Russia decided to support an IAEA resolution on Iran prior to the PRC, prompting one analysis to conclude that China supported the decision rather than be isolated among the IAEA Board of Governors.

On December 1, following the announcement that Iran planned to build ten new enrichment facilities, a Russian diplomat said that “this declaration does not leave us optimistic. Even without it, negotiations are difficult with Iran.”

A Chinese official,

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730 The Iran Nuclear Issue, 13.

731 “Russia Will Consider Sanctions on Iran,” AFP, December 1, 2009.
though, said that “all parties should step up diplomatic efforts,” without betraying 
pessimism about a settlement.  

By early February, the U.S. had concluded that Russia would likely support a 
sanctions resolution. One U.S. diplomat suggested that the Russians “have been pushed 
to this extreme by the behavior of the Iranians,” while observing that “China is going its 
own way.” On March 3, just as Steinberg and Bader were concluding their trip to 
Beijing, Russia’s UN ambassador, Vitaly Churkin, told the press that the most recent 
IAEA report on Iran (issued on February 18) caused Moscow to be “very concerned,” 
and that “this raises worries about the nature of the [Iranian] nuclear program.” It is 
plausible that Churkin’s remark was influenced by the same failed mission to Tehran 
which, as mentioned above, apparently led to Liu’s March 4 speech advocating a “dual-
track” strategy. Whether Russia’s tilt away from dialogue had any impact on China’s 
position independent of that mission and the concurrent high-level U.S. visit to Beijing, 
however, remains unclear.

A link between Russian and Chinese attitudes is suggested in two additional 
instances. First, on March 19, in a meeting with Clinton, Medvedev remarked that 
sanctions “rarely work, but there may appear a situation when they may end up being

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733 Interview, official, U.S. Permanent Mission to the United Nations, New York, February 2010. See also: Helene Cooper and Mark Landler, “U.S. Wants to Penalize Revolutionary Guards in Effort to Curb Iran’s Nuclear Plans,” New York Times, February 10, 2010. The authors note that U.S. officials “believed they would have the support of Russia, but it remains uncertain whether China will go along [with a new resolution].”

734 Churkin also repeated Russian misgivings about the status of negotiations, saying that, “When we sought, and continue to seek, to keep the negotiation window open, Iran has not followed up with the appropriate responses that we expected.” Neil MacFarquhar, “U.S. Circulates New Iran Sanctions Draft,” New York Times, March 4, 2010.
inevitable.” The next week, the PRC agreed to participate in talks among the E3+3 in which an agreement was reached to have additional discussions on the terms of a new resolution, which was the farthest China had gone thus far towards consent. Second, on April 8, Medvedev met with Obama to sign the New START treaty, and made a similar comment. Specifically, he said that Russia favored “smart” sanctions, which he explained “should be able to motivate certain parties to behave properly.” That Russia had essentially agreed to sanctions meant that China was now isolated among the P5, and thus more vulnerable to U.S. influence when Hu met with Obama four days later. U.S. and Russian pressure operated in tandem, even as Russia held reservations on exactly how stringent a new resolution should be.

Regional Stakeholders

Aside from Russia, it is likely that China took the positions of several other states with major interests in the outcome of negotiations into account. As regards the EU members of the E3+3, France and Germany merit attention. France, despite an aggregate trade balance of $3.4 Billion with Iran in 2009, took an assertive position with

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735 The quote is from Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who relayed the contents of Medvedev’s message to Clinton to the media. Lavrov also said that “we don’t rule out that such a situation may appear with respect to Iran.” “Iran Wasting Change for Dialogue: Russia,” AFP, March 19, 2010.

736 The participating Chinese official was Liu Zhenmin, who had been promoted from Deputy Permanent Representative in New York to Assistant Foreign Minister. This contrasted with a similar six-way dialogue in mid-January in which China had dispatched a low-level staff member as a signal of its unease with discussions on sanctions. “China Joins Six-Way Conference Call on Iran: Diplomats,” AFP, March 25, 2010.


738 Britain is omitted because its economic interests were substantially less than the other two members ($905 million in aggregate trade in 2009 versus more than $3 billion for France and nearly $6 billion for Germany) and because it tends to coordinate especially closely with the U.S.
regard to sanctions. On December 11, after the Geneva talks had broken down, France’s UN ambassador, Gerard Araud, said that “Iran has never entered into a negotiation” and that “there is no longer any reason to wait” for further sanctions. A month later, France affirmed its commitment to a resolution during its Strategic Dialogue with the U.S. in Paris. In late April, as negotiations in New York were underway, Sarkozy paid a state visit to Beijing and pressed Hu on China’s support for sanctions. Sarkozy’s message was that, “If dialogue does not work, then we can only use sanctions.” China agreed to a compromise draft less than three weeks later.

From the U.S. perspective, Germany was potentially a more nettlesome actor with regard to punitive action towards Iran. The reason was a formidable German business lobby with stakes in the Iranian economy; bilateral trade neared $6 Billion in 2009. Nevertheless, like its French and American partners, Germany found itself cornered by Iranian intransigence. On January 15, in a meeting with the Israeli Prime Minister, Merkel stated that, “If Iran’s reactions don’t change, we will help work on

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739 This included $1.4 billion in exports to France and $2 billion in imports from France. Data courtesy of UN Comtrade.


742 Sarkozy’s comments came in the midst of a temporary pause in negotiations in which Iran had expressed renewed willingness to participate in a nuclear fuel swap agreement. Sarkozy’s comments may have been aimed at reminding the PRC that endless dialogue was not acceptable from a European perspective. A similar point was made by the EU high representative for foreign policy, Catherine Ashton, on April 30 told Wen Jiabao that, “sanctions alone will not solve the problem, but to solve the problem, you need sanctions.” “EU Foreign Policy Chief Pushes China on Iran Sanctions,” AFP, April 30, 2010.

743 Moreover, Germany profited from a $4.5 billion trade surplus with Iran in 2009 (German exports to Iran were valued at $5.2 billion while imports from Iran totaled $762.6 million). Data derived from UNComtrade. Interestingly, as part of the internal debate on the appropriateness of German investment in Iran, Siemens announced on January 27 that it would not enter into new contracts there. At that point, Siemens had investments totaling $700 million in Iran. “Siemens to Stop Doing Business in Iran,” AP, January 27, 2010.
comprehensive sanctions.”

Two months later, she observed that Tehran had rejected the sextet’s “constructive offers” and that, “We are about to enter the stage where sanctions should be taken against Iran.”

On April 1, the same day that Obama spoke with Hu, Merkel addressed Iran in a conversation with Wen Jiabao, while on the 13th she said that she was “very hopeful” that ongoing discussions at the Security Council would succeed, noting that “China is now part of the process.” Hence, unlike during the 2002-2003 debate over Iraq, China was faced with a united front among the U.S., France and Germany.

Within the region itself, two states played a central role: Saudi Arabia and Israel. Saudi Arabia was of special importance to the PRC, serving as the latter’s largest oil supplier. Riyadh entered the political scene in January 2010, as the U.S. was beginning to canvass support for a fourth resolution. At the request of the U.S., Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal reportedly told Yang Jiechi on January 17 that the PRC would have to collaborate more closely with other states to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, which Saudi Arabia viewed as a major threat. On February 11, U.S. diplomats wrote that Saudi King Abdullah “assesses that sanctions could help to weaken the [Iranian] government, but only if they are strong and sustained.” On March 12, Defense Secretary Gates met with Saudi officials, with a focus “mainly on China.”

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746 However, it was unclear whether, or how, Merkel pressed Wen to actually support further sanctions. “Merkel, Wen Discuss Iran in ‘Friendly’ Phone Talks: Germany,” AFP, April 1, 2010.


748 In 2009, China imported an average of 839,000 barrels of crude oil per day from Saudi Arabia, more than 20% of its total imports of 4 million barrels/day.
if Saudi Arabia would be willing to pressure Beijing, Gates responded that, “I have a sense that there’s a willingness to do that.”749 Three days later, Saudi added, albeit obliquely, to his previous remonstrations by saying that China “is perfectly aware of the scope of its responsibilities and its obligations.”750

Israel’s influence in the debate over Iran sanctions was twofold. First was the threat of an Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear facilities in the event that the international community could not agree on what Tel Aviv frequently described as “crippling” sanctions. For instance, in October 2009, Israel’s Ambassador to the U.S., Michael Oren, said that “Israel is supportive of efforts to prepare a package of crippling sanctions that may prove more efficacious in bringing about a modification of Iranian behavior [than dialogue alone].” Oren further asserted that “all options” remained on the table, including the use of force.751 As noted above, part of the U.S. argument to China was precisely that not cooperating in the Security Council could prompt Israeli aggression. However, PRC analysts were not convinced by this contention, concluding instead that the U.S. would likely restrain its ally on the grounds that Washington doubted that a military strike would be effective.752

749 Saudi Arabia typically did not use public forums to level pressure on others or admit that it was contemplating doing so, and denied that the subject had come up between Gates and his interlocutors. “Saudis Deny Discussing Pressure on China Over Iran with U.S.” AFP, March 12, 2010.


751 “All Options Means All Options:’ Israel’s Ambassador to the United States on Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Newsweek, October 12, 2009. Later, on February 9, Prime Minister Netanyahu said that “tough action” on Iran was required, and that, “This means not moderate sanctions, or watered-down sanctions. This means crippling sanctions and these sanctions must be applied right now.” Douglas Hamilton, “Israel Urges ‘Crippling Sanctions’ Now Against Iran,” Reuters, February 9, 2010.

752 Willem van Kemenade, “China vs. the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions,” Washington Quarterly 33 (2010), 103-6; The Iran Nuclear Issue, 8. For a Chinese statement of this perspective, see, e.g., Yue Hanjing, “Meiguo yu Yisilie zai Yilang he wenti shang de gongshi yu fenqi” (Consensus and Differences between the U.S. and Israel on the Iran Nuclear Issue), Alabo Shijie Yanjiu (Arab World Studies) 4 (2010).
Second was an Israeli effort to alter China’s threat perceptions through argumentation and intelligence-sharing. Notably, in late February a delegation led by Governor of the Bank of Israel Stanley Fischer and Minister of Strategic Affairs Moshe Ya’alon visited Beijing and met with senior leaders, including Dai Bingguo. According to an Israeli report, Fischer attempted to make the case that a nuclear-armed Iran would result in a spike in global oil prices, harming the PRC’s economic interests, while Ya’alon provided “the full intelligence picture available to Israel,” which was likely meant to counter Chinese doubts about Iran’s ability to manufacture a nuclear warhead. The perception in Tel Aviv was that Beijing was receptive to the argument, and that the question was not whether China would veto a resolution, but whether it would vote in favor or abstain. In late March, Military Intelligence chief Amos Yadlin relayed additional information on Iran’s nuclear programs to counterparts in Beijing.

Though it is possible that Israel had coordinated the timing or substance of these visits with the U.S., there were several benefits in having Israeli, rather than U.S., officials make the argument. First, the U.S. had accumulated a trust deficit in the wake of its erroneous conclusion in 2002 that Iraq possessed WMD capabilities. Second, credible

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754 According to an unattributed Israeli source, “The Chinese were given the full intelligence picture Israel has about the Iranian nuclear program, which clear shows Iran is developing nuclear weapons.” Barak Ravid, “Israel Shows China Evidence of Iran Bomb Program,” Haaretz (Tel Aviv), March 1, 2010.


756 “Israeli Chief of Military Intelligence Pays Secret Visit to China,” Qatar News Agency (Doha), April 2, 2010.
or not, U.S. reports on Iran had been cautious, echoing China’s own skepticism. A December, 2007, National Intelligence Estimate found that Iran had abandoned its nuclear weapons program in 2003, dampening the U.S. sanctions drive.\textsuperscript{757} In February, 2010, the Director of National Intelligence stated that the IRI was “keeping the option open,” but that “We do not know...if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.”\textsuperscript{758} Third, Israel added the view of a regional stakeholder with major commercial ties to the PRC, especially in the arms industry.\textsuperscript{759} This complemented the broader diplomatic offensive orchestrated by the U.S.

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In the absence of an imminent nuclear threat from Iran, the floundering of negotiations after Geneva did not lead Beijing to conclude that additional sanctions were a prudent next step. What intervened were the conviction of a variety of states, including the U.S., the EU powers, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, that another resolution was needed, and the willingness of several of these actors to intercede directly with their interlocutors in Beijing. As Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt argued in an editorial in March, the best strategy for the U.S. would be to gather the “widest international consensus possible” before making a “beeline to Beijing.”\textsuperscript{760} It appears that patience and


coordination were virtues for the U.S. By early April, the political scales for Beijing had tipped in favor of support.

Conclusion

Hillary Clinton’s announcement that the P5 and Germany had settled on the text of a draft resolution concerning Iran came just one day after Brazil and Turkey announced a separate plan to swap uranium for nuclear fuel.\(^{761}\) Iran’s engagement with these two countries, even if it fell far short of the demands of the IAEA, the U.S., Russia, and others,\(^{762}\) could have provided the PRC yet another opportunity to delay agreement in the Security Council under the argument that room for diplomacy still existed. Indeed, China could have used its influence to secure “no” votes from Lebanon and Uganda, which were elected members of the Council, and used such a coalition to protect its erstwhile partner, Iran. Yet it did not. Instead, it chose to collaborate with the U.S. and others to pass a resolution that, while weakened from its original form, did result in an expanded arms embargo and sanctions on several firms operated by the Revolutionary Guard, among other provisions.

The explanation for China’s behavior rests on five factors, as sketched in Table 14. The breakdown of productive negotiations between Iran and the international community in late 2009 did not have an immediate impact on China’s position, in contrast to the way in which North Korea’s nuclear and missile provocations resulted in a quick adaptation of China’s attitude on sanctions in that case. Although others options had narrowed, the use

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of pressure did not become a preferred alternative. In a sense, Tehran had not crossed a “red line” as Pyongyang had, and Beijing was content to hew to a “wait and see” approach. The changing structure of alternate options did, however, influence the threat perceptions of a number of other actors with whom the PRC sought positive relations. The effect of this is covered below. In short, Hypothesis 1 cannot be directly established.

A second issue-centered explanation concerns risk reduction. In this case, the U.S. took steps aimed at reducing the potential risk that China would incur by agreeing to sanctions. Alleged “guarantees” by the U.S. or certain Arab states to protect China’s oil supply in the event of Iranian retribution are difficult to substantiate, though may have played at least a marginal role. More concretely, as it had done in the previous three sanctions resolutions, the U.S. was willing to carve out exemptions in order to assuage Chinese concerns about the effects on its investments in the oil and gas sector. In the end, the resolution did not touch Iran’s energy industry.763

Table 14: Summary of Findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1   Narrowing of alternatives leads punitive action to be an attractive option.</td>
<td>Not Directly</td>
<td>China opposed a fourth resolution for several months after E3+3 negotiations had stalled, though fewer alternatives meant greater political support for sanctions. Role of bilateral pressure unclear.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2   Steps taken to reduce risks associated with cooperation should</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Role of side payments is obscure, though possibly affected risk calculations. Text concessions ameliorated concerns about</td>
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763 Indeed, the extent to which the U.S. or other Western powers desired energy or sanctions is unclear. A senior Western diplomat said, in February, 2010, that his government was concerned that measures which affected the lives of ordinary citizens may have resulted in a populist backlash that would have made the prospects of negotiation even dimmer. The space between this and the Chinese perspective on sanctions, then, was not too wide. Interview, Western diplomat, New York, February 2010.
generate consent. energy sector.

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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Approval is more likely given high-level political pressure by the U.S.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PRC position began to change after Bader-Ross visit, further changed soon after two Hu-Obama encounters.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>A shift in Russia’s position towards approval prompts a shift in China’s position.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Russia’s support for “smart” sanctions in late March/early April left China isolated among the P5.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>China’s consent is more likely with consensus by regional stakeholders for punitive action.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EU members of the contact group coordinated with the U.S. and put occasional pressure on China, as did Israel. Saudi Arabia (and other GCC states) favored sanctions.</td>
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</table>

Beyond these factors, China also had an interest in maintaining positive political ties with its co-negotiators. Iran’s unwillingness to suspend uranium enrichment, cooperate with the IAEA, or agree to a fuel swap agreement developed by Russia and France changed the political costs of Chinese resistance to an agreement. This suggests an explanatory role for Hypotheses 3 through 5. On several occasions, urged China to revise its position. The Obama-Hu meeting in mid-April 2010 was the apogee of this initiative and was associated with a relaxation of China’s opposition to additional sanctions. Russia had not been as strong an advocate of diplomacy as the PRC, and its cooperation with the U.S. meant that China would have been forced to cast a solo veto, which it was loath to do on a case as important to the U.S. and others as this one was. Several other important actors not only favored sanctions, but made direct intercessions with Beijing. In particular, Israel used argumentation and information in attempt to revise China’s views of the risks of not adopting a more assertive approach. These efforts were mutually-reinforcing in the sense that they compounded the political costs of delay.

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At a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 14, 2010, just after the PRC had joined in substantive negotiations on a new Iran resolution, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns said that, “I think we and the Chinese agree that we need to send a strong message to Iran.” John McCain responded that he was skeptical, as the Chinese (and the Russians) had been “playing rope-a-dope with us now for over a year.” The case of Iran is instructive because it shows that international cooperation against a state in which at least one negotiator has vested interests is possible even without a major shock on the order of North Korea. However, the case suggests that a broad political campaign is necessary and, even then, concessions may still have to be made to persuade the potential holdout. Absent a major external threat or intensive pressure, cooperation is far more difficult. The next chapter illustrates this point with reference to Darfur.

Chapter 5
Deploying to Darfur:
China, the Threat of Sanctions, and the Path to UNAMID (2007)

Introduction

On July 31, 2007, the Security Council authorized an African Union/UN Hybrid Operation (UNAMID) to deploy to the war-torn Darfur region of Sudan. This force, with an eventual troop strength reaching nearly 20,000, was intended to complement ongoing peace talks brokered by the UN and the African Union (AU).\(^\text{765}\) For the previous 11 months, the U.S., China, delegates of the AU and the UN Secretary-General, among others, had sought Sudan’s consent for this mission. Khartoum resisted because of concerns that a UN body might act as a “posse” to round up leaders suspected of war crimes. As part of the international effort, the U.S. and Britain brandished the threat of a sanctions resolution on several occasions. However, no draft was tabled, and no vote took place.

Though it had acquiesced to an arms embargo in 2004, China opposed Western calls for additional measures in 2007.\(^\text{766}\) At face value, this represents Beijing’s judgment that sanctions would undermine stability. He Wenping, director of African studies at CASS, writes that sanctions would harm Sudan’s development, and thus only


\(^{766}\) As noted in Chapter 1 and discussed below, the UN had authorized an arms embargo on Darfur in 2004 and broadened it in 2005. Moreover, the U.S. did enact unilateral sanctions in May, 2007, though to little effect given its minimal economic relationship with Sudan. The present analysis is focused on unrealized threats of additional UNSC measures leveled against Sudan in the first half of 2007.
compound instability. Jin Liangxiang, a researcher at SIIS, holds a similar view, arguing that the “responsibility of the international community is to alleviate suffering, not to add to it.” Colin Keating, a former New Zealand diplomat and expert on Security Council politics, notes that the PRC has a “genuine fear that sanctions could cause a collapse of the country,” preferring quiet dialogue to overt pressure.

Indeed, for several reasons, stability in Darfur is in China’s material interest. First is the PRC’s reliance on Sudan as a source of oil. Oil exports to China rose from $1.8 Billion in 2006 to $4.1 Billion in 2007, with Sudan ranking as China’s fifth-largest supplier, and second-largest in Africa, after Angola. Second, China is a majority shareholder in two of Sudan’s largest oil consortia, with stakes in fields in Darfur among other investments. Third, according to the U.S., Sudan accounted for 7% of the

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770 Trade figures are derived from UNComtrade. In 2009, Sudan averaged sales of 244,000 barrels/day to China, compared to 463,000 from Iran and 644,000 from Angola. Data courtesy of the U.S. Energy Information Administration, at: http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/China/Oil.html. Regarding investments, China’s National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is the majority stakeholder in Sudan’s Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company and Petrodar. China has also been active in developing Sudan’s oil infrastructure, including refineries, pipelines, and ports. In total, as of 2007, China had invested some $8 billion in Sudan’s oil industry. See: Danna Harman, “China Focuses on Oil, Not Sudanese Needs,” Sudan Tribune, June 25, 2007; Cherie Canning, “Pursuit of the Pariah: Iran, Sudan and Myanmar in China’s Energy Security Strategy,” Security Challenges 3 (2007), 52-3.
PRC’s overseas arms sales between 2003 and 2007, second only to Pakistan.\textsuperscript{771} Fourth, China also holds growing interests in exploring oil reserves in Chad, which sits just to the west of Darfur and has been affected by refugee flows from Sudan.\textsuperscript{772} Finally, the conflict in Darfur threatens not only economic interests, but also the safety of Chinese workers in the area.\textsuperscript{773} As one Chinese diplomat has said, Beijing does not “want Sudan to turn into Somalia.”\textsuperscript{774}

The puzzle is that China faced a similar dilemma on both North Korea and Iran, but ultimately supported sanctions. In both of those cases, China’s overriding problem was also that coercion might disrupt stability. However, for the reasons suggested in chapters 3 and 4, it found common ground with the U.S. What makes Darfur any different? What can explain the absence of an agreement between China and the U.S.?

This chapter provides an explanation, based on five reasons. First is that China was able to point to two feasible alternatives: Sudan-UN-AU dialogue, and productive contacts between the Chinese and Sudanese governments. Though it delayed, Sudan did not close the door on either of these processes. Second, the U.S. did not offer China a draft that would have allayed its concerns. Rather, the U.S. found it more useful simply to

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\textsuperscript{771} The trade in light weapons has been especially strong, with Sudan accounting for 90\% of China’s sales in this area between 2004 and 2006. \textit{Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China} (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2009), 58.


\textsuperscript{774} Interview, diplomat, Permanent Mission of the PRC to the United Nations, January 2010. Similarly, as Liu Guijin, China’s special representative for Sudan, stated in 2007, “As with any investor in any country, it is logical that the investor hopes to have a more stable, more peaceful situation.” Alec Russell and William Wallis, “Beijing Puts Quiet Pressure on Sudan,” \textit{Financial Times}, June 19, 2007.
allude to the possibility of sanctions. Third, the U.S. needed Beijing’s help in placing bilateral pressure on Khartoum. As a result, it did not emphasize sanctions in its interactions with Beijing. Fourth, Russia was opposed to coercion, and would have provided a second veto on any vote. Finally, regional stakeholders, including Egypt, South Africa, and the AU itself, opposed international pressure. Combined, the political risks for Beijing to reject sanctions were minimal.

This argument proceeds in five sections. The first provides a background of how the UNSC handled the Darfur issue through the end of 2006, emphasizing China’s concerns about the use of pressure on Khartoum. The second describes the “non-outcome” to be explained, which is Beijing’s opposition to sanctions during the spring and early summer of 2007. The third presents the argument that multilateral dialogue and China’s use of bilateral influence had yielded results, diminishing the necessity of sanctions. The fourth explains why the U.S. and its partners chose not to engage in substantive, consensus-oriented talks on a resolution. The fifth covers U.S., Russian, and regional attitudes towards punitive measures and argues that the PRC faced no substantial pressure to revise its position. The conclusion summarizes the argument and states the implications for cooperation.

Background: 2003-6

Authorization of UNAMID, in July 2007, was one milestone in the broader international effort to address ethnic conflict in Darfur. A decades-long contest for land, water and other scarce resources between black farmers and Arab-identified herdsman erupted into large-sale violence in early 2003, pitting rebel groups, such as the Sudan Liberation Movement, against Arab militias collectively known as the Janjaweed. The
latter were supported by the government in Khartoum, including through arms supply and air raids. By 2004, some 200,000 had been killed, another 200,000 had fled to Chad, and 2.5 million had been internally displaced. The U.S., Britain and others were preoccupied with negotiating an end to the separate, North-South civil war, and Darfur did not gain much external attention until the spring of 2004. In April, a ceasefire was signed in N’Djamena, Chad, but failed to take hold on the ground.

With violence left unabated, the U.S. and its partners sought to draft a resolution that would have imposed sanctions on Khartoum if it did not halt its attacks in Darfur and disarm the Janjaweed. Supported by Pakistan, the Arab League and other representatives of the developing world, China opposed a punitive approach and worked to dilute the language of a PRST in May, as well as a resolution in July that referred only to the possibility of “further actions.” The latter decision did enact a ban on arms sales to “all non-governmental entities and individuals” operating in Darfur, but did not

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776 Traub, *The Best Intentions*, 244-5.

777 Specifically, the U.S. sought an arms embargo on the government, as well as financial sanctions on individuals. However, as of June, 2004, the U.S. was “undecided” on whether to seek measures against Janjaweed leaders, government officials, or both. Glenn Kessler and Colum Lynch, “Powell to Go to Sudan Over Regional Strife,” *Washington Post*, June 25, 2004.

778 This was Security Council Document S/PRST/2004/18 (May 26, 2004), which called on “all parties to observe the [N’Djamena] ceasefire” and urged the Sudanese government to facilitate humanitarian assistance in Darfur. Traub writes that China and Pakistan had maneuvered to remove any threatening language. James Traub, “The World According to China,” *New York Times Magazine*, September 3, 2006. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell admitted that harsh language in earlier drafts had been toned down at the urging of China and others, but that, “at the same time, everybody recognizes that pressure is needed or else we wouldn’t get any action [from Sudan] at all.” Kim Gamel, “United States Modifies Resolution on Sudan, but Still Threatens Economic Action if Violence Continues,” *AP*, July 29, 2004.

779 Ibid.
establish any mechanism to monitor or enforce compliance.\textsuperscript{780} Even then, China only abstained, with Wang Guangya arguing to a \textit{New York Times} reporter that sanctions would be counterproductive. As Wang said, “You cannot alienate the Sudan government. Without them, the U.N. [mediation] mission will fail.”\textsuperscript{781}

### Table 15: Key Security Council Decisions on Darfur, 2004-7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Res. #</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>China’s Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 30, 2004</td>
<td>1556</td>
<td>Imposed an arms embargo against non-government actors, welcomed AU mission.</td>
<td>Abstention (13-0-2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 18, 2005</td>
<td>1564</td>
<td>Threatened oil sanctions, opened human rights inquiry, urged “rapid expansion” of AU mission.</td>
<td>Abstention (11-0-4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 24, 2005</td>
<td>1590</td>
<td>Established UNMIS, requested UNSG to identify ways for UNMIS to liaise with AMIS.</td>
<td>Yes (15-0-0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 29, 2005</td>
<td>1591</td>
<td>Established sanctions committee, widened arms embargo, authorized individual sanctions.</td>
<td>Abstention (12-0-3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 31, 2005</td>
<td>1593</td>
<td>Referred situation in Darfur to the ICC.</td>
<td>Abstention (11-0-4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 25, 2006</td>
<td>1672</td>
<td>Imposed travel ban and financial restrictions on four individuals.</td>
<td>Abstention (12-0-3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 16, 2006</td>
<td>1679</td>
<td>Endorsed AU decision on need for steps to transition AMIS to a UN operation.</td>
<td>Yes (15-0-0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 31, 2006</td>
<td>1706</td>
<td>Expanded mandate of UNMIS to include deployment to Darfur.</td>
<td>Abstention (12-0-3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 31, 2007</td>
<td>1769</td>
<td>Authorized UNAMID to take over from AMIS.</td>
<td>Yes (15-0-0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{780} The resolution did, however, prescribe monthly Secretary-General reports on Khartoum’s compliance with demands that it disarm the Janjaweed militia. SC Document S/RES/1556 (July 30, 2004), 3.

\textsuperscript{781} Traub, “The World According to China.” After the vote, China’s deputy permanent representative, Zhang Yishan, justified the abstention by arguing that, “As all the parties are speeding up diplomatic efforts, such [punitive] measures [as the arms embargo] cannot be helpful in resolving the situation in Darfur and may even further complicate it.” SC, Verbatim, S/PV.5015 (July 30, 2004),3.
Although the situation in Darfur continued to deteriorate over the summer of 2004,\textsuperscript{782} a small contingent of AU observers had been allowed into the region to monitor the ceasefire. In September, the Council passed another resolution, calling for a “rapid expansion” of the AU observer force in order to “protect the welfare of the people of Darfur.”\textsuperscript{783} At the insistence of the U.S., the text also warned Khartoum that it would face sanctions on its petroleum sector, among other measures, if it did not take steps to disarm the militias.\textsuperscript{784} China again abstained in order to signal its ambivalence, as did Russia, Algeria and Pakistan. In his explanation, Wang said that he would not veto the draft on account of its positive references to the AU effort, but would not cast an affirmative vote either, since threatening language would “send the wrong signal and make negotiations more difficult.”\textsuperscript{785}

The situation in Darfur continued to worsen in late 2004, with repeated ceasefire violations by both the government-backed Janjaweed and the rebel groups.\textsuperscript{786} However, the initial AU mission had grown to a force of some 3,000 peacekeepers with a mandate

\textsuperscript{782} In August, for instance, the International Crisis Group stated that there were:
“…continuous reports of Janjaweed attacks on civilians, including widespread abductions, sexual slavery, torture, and rape of women. The government has failed to take meaningful steps against the militias.”


\textsuperscript{783} SC Document S/RES/1564 (September 18, 2004).

\textsuperscript{784} The U.S. had pressed for a more coercive text, as it had in July. As U.S. ambassador to the UN John Danforth argued, some concessions were necessary, though “the [Sudanese] government is not going to respond if there is no pressure.” “U.S. Presents New Resolution on Darfur to Security Council,” \textit{Africa News} (U.S. State Dept.), September 10, 2004.

\textsuperscript{785} SC, Verbatim, S/PV.5040 (September 18, 2004), 4.

to protect civilians and, by mid-2005, had evolved into a force of some 7,000. The issue was that the AU operation faced impediments on funding, logistical expertise, insufficient assets such as helicopters, and other constraints. In March, cooperating with the UN, the U.S. and the EU, the AU determined that AMIS had achieved some success, but that, due to various limitations, it was “not fully effective and needs to give greater priority to creating a secure environment.” Soon after, the UNSC authorized a PKO (the UN Mission in Sudan, or UNMIS) to monitor the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on the North-South dispute that had been reached in January, and asked that this organization “liaise and coordinate at all levels” with the AU effort.

In conjunction with the PKO resolution, the U.S. and Britain tabled a draft that would add pressure on Sudan. Specifically, the draft extended the existing arms embargo to include the Sudanese government, created a committee and a Panel of Experts to monitor compliance, and authorized travel and financial restrictions on individuals deemed by the Council to have impeded the peace process. However, sanctions on Sudan’s oil industry were omitted, reportedly to avert a Chinese veto. In a slight modification of his earlier remarks regarding sanctions, Wang argued that, in order to

787 Ibid, 17-19. Technically, the AU operation had evolved from ‘AMIS I’ to ‘AMIS II,’ though official documents simply refer to ‘AMIS.’


789 SC Document S/RES/1590 (March 24, 2005). The resolution also requested the Secretary-General to report on ways in which UNMIS could provide “appropriate assistance” to AMIS II, “including logistical support and technical assistance.” China voted in favor of Resolution 1590.

790 The resolution did not name any individuals, but rather left this to further decisions of the Council. In addition, the text required that the Sudanese government obtain the permission of the UNSC before it moved any arms into Darfur. SC Document S/RES/1591 (March 29, 2005).

achieve progress on the political front, “it is necessary to keep appropriate pressure on the parties.” Yet he also asserted that China had asked for “major amendments to the text” and, since these were not accepted, there was no choice but to abstain. 792 Despite Wang’s remarks, an MFA spokesman stated that, “We don’t support sanctions or constant pressure. It’s no good for a peaceful resolution to the issue.” 793

Over the next year, the international community pursued a dual-track approach to Darfur that combined coercion with dialogue. The first track, promoted by the U.S. and its European allies, focused on identifying individual “peace spoilers” that would be subjected to sanctions. In January 2006, the Panel of Experts identified 17 potential targets, including senior officials of the Sudanese government. 794 Washington ultimately proposed measures on only four individuals, including one Sudanese Air Force officer, a Janjaweed leader, and two rebel commanders, all of whom were charged with violating the ceasefire agreement. 795 China again abstained, with Wang protesting that the vote had

792 SC, Verbatim, S/PV.5153 (March 29, 2005), 5. It is unclear what these amendments were, though they were likely related to the more coercive aspects of the documents (e.g. on the expanded arms embargo).

793 “China Opposes UN Sanctions Against Sudan,” AP, March 31, 2005. Two days after Resolution 1591 was approved, the Council passed Resolution 1593 which referred the situation in Darfur to the prosecutor of the ICC. The U.S. and China both hesitated, but abstained because the draft inured individuals from “contributing states” not party to the Rome Statute (neither the U.S. nor China had signed that agreement).

794 On this list were the interior minister, the head of national intelligence, and the defense minister. President Omar al-Bashir was also mentioned as a possible “future target.” The list itself was confidential, but was leaked (likely by Britain) in February and published in the Financial Times. See: Mark Turner, “Middle East & Africa: Sudan Ministers Named in Leaked UN Darfur List,” Financial Times, February 22, 2006.

795 According to John Bolton, the list was narrowed down at the behest of China, which “was defending its oil interests [in Sudan] by protecting Sudan’s government.” Bolton, Surrender Is Not An Option, 352. The Sudanese officer was Maj. Gen. Gaffar Mohamed Elhassan, the senior air force commander with responsibility for Darfur. That an actual resolution was needed to list individuals marked a departure from both the North Korean and Iranian cases, in which the relevant sanctions committees themselves were empowered to list and delist individuals and organizations. The resolution was S/RES/1672 (April 25, 2006).
occurred “before a number of specific details could be clarified and convincing evidence established.”

In justifying his abstention, Wang was also concerned that sanctions might disrupt the second track, namely ongoing peace negotiations taking place in Abuja, Nigeria. The result of this effort, which was brokered by the AU, was the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). Finalized on May 5, 2006, the DPA stipulated that parties would agree to a power-sharing arrangement and demobilize forces in Darfur. The problem was that only one of several rebel leaders signed this document, and the conflict itself continued to escalate. Compounding the matter was that the AU had not taken concrete steps towards its stated goal of incorporating AMIS into a larger, better-funded mission operated by the UN. A main reason for the AU’s reluctance was that it was under pressure from Khartoum, which opposed a UN force in Darfur due to the belief that such

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797 As Wang told a reported prior to the vote, “My concern is that the draft proposed by the United States might in a way have some negative implications for the negotiations in Abuja.” Gerard Aziakou, “Security Council to Take Up U.S. Draft on Sudan Sanctions Tuesday,” AFP, April 24, 2006.
a body might be employed as a “posse” to execute ICC arrest warrants against President Omar al-Bashir and others.800

However, several other factors militated in the direction of a transition from an AU to a UN-backed PKO. First was the growing threat to regional security posed by the conflict, which had begun to spread west into Chad.801 Second was the continuing violence in Darfur, despite the DPA. Following through on threats to attack rebel groups that had not signed the DPA, Khartoum launched a major offensive in August, leading one analysis to conclude that “the DPA is all but dead,” and that an effective response could come only “through [a] full UN deployment.”802 Third was the persistent limitation on the AU to conduct an effective operation, given the constraints described above and the deterioration of the conflict. Fourth, AMIS had been subsidized by Western governments that supported a transition to a UN operation, which provided leverage to encourage the AU to follow suit.803 These considerations set the stage for a push by the Council for a deployment in Darfur.

On August 31, 2006, the Security Council passed Resolution 1706, which expanded the mandate of UNMIS to include Darfur. The plan envisaged a force of 20,600 that would assume the mantle from the AU when AMIS’s mandate expired on December


803 To Save Darfur, 16.
The new PKO would be charged with monitoring the 2004 ceasefire, among other things, and authorized to use force to defend UN personnel and protect civilians, as well as to seize items found to be in violation of the arms embargo. Breaking with the norm that PKO mandates require host government consent, the text said that the UN “invites” (but does not require) Khartoum’s approval. China affirmed its support for a transition to a UN operation, but abstained on the vote due to concerns about the ambiguous consent provision.

By September there was a “consensus” in the Council that Sudan’s approval would, in fact, be required prior to deployment. On September 11, Kofi Annan said that the “tragedy in Darfur has reached a critical moment” and urged Bashir to grant consent. Initial progress was made in early October, when Sudan agreed to a “light support package” (LSP) of about 200 UN advisers to assist AMIS. On November 16, a UN-AU-Sudan summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, resulted in a more detailed formula, consisting of three phases: first, implementation of the LSP; second, a “heavy support package”.


805 In addition to this, Wang Guangya also objected to the timing of the vote, saying that it should have occurred after further consultations between the international community and the Sudanese government had taken place in September. SC, Verbatim, S/PV.5519 (August 31, 2006), 5. Note also that, along with China, both Russia and Qatar abstained. Bolton writes that the latter two likely would have voted yes, except that the PRC had exercised pressure on them so as not to be left isolated. Bolton, Surrender Is Not An Option, 356.

806 As the Security Council Report noted, “There is consensus within the Council that the transition as currently envisaged will require consent.” “Darfur/Sudan,” Security Council Report, September, 2006. Available at: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.2043731/k.52A3/September_2006BRDarfurSudan.htm. An ICG report argued that, although an ethical case for military intervention might have been made, there was no political support for non-consensual deployment among the main decision-makers and, in any case, such an option would have been logistically infeasible. Getting the UN Into Darfur, 17.

807 SC, Verbatim, S/PV.5520 (September 11, 2006), 2-3. Annan also reported in a letter to the Security Council President that the passage of Resolution 1706 had led to mass protests in Sudan both in favor of the transition (organized by the rebel groups) and against it (organized by the government). “Monthly Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur,” SC Document S/2006/764 (September 26, 2006), 9-10.
package” (HSP) that would augment AMIS with 2,250 military personnel, 721 police, and 1,135 civilian staff; and, third, a “hybrid” PKO of some 20,000 whose leadership would be jointly approved by both institutions. The phased deployment was meant to assuage Khartoum’s fears about a UN presence in Darfur, and to accomplish the goals set out in Resolution 1706.  

However, wary of obfuscation by Khartoum, the U.S. began to increase pressure on Bashir in late 2006. On November 20, Andrew Natsios, who had been appointed as U.S. special envoy for Darfur in September, hinted that the U.S. would not permit endless implementation delays. Specifically, he announced that Washington must “see a change” by year’s end, or else it would shift to an unspecified, presumably coercive, “Plan B.” The next month, Natsios made similar allusions in meetings with Sudanese officials, in which he pressed Khartoum to “accept in writing” the third phase of the deployment. Meanwhile, on December 19, the Security Council approved a PRST that called for the Addis Ababa plan to be carried out “without delay.”

Nevertheless, the first quarter of 2007 did not bode well for implementation. In January, Ban Ki-moon, the new Secretary-General asked that Bashir confirm acceptance

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808 On November 30, an AU summit meeting endorsed the conclusions of the November 16 agreement (which China subsequently referred to as the “Annan Plan”), and also decided to renew the mandate of AMIS for six months beyond December 31, so as to facilitate the gradual transition. A full description of events is available in the “Monthly Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur,” SC Document S/2006/1041 (December 28, 2006), 8-12.

809 After Natsios brought up the “Plan B” notion, a reporter asked for clarification. In response, Natsios said that “It is open-ended. I’m going to leave it at that.” “Ambassador Andrew Natsios Holds a State Department News Briefing on Sudan,” CQ Transcriptions, November 20, 2006.

810 Speaking to the media, Natsios stated: “For us to continue on the process of quiet diplomacy, negotiation and a process to resolve Darfur, then we need progress that’s operational, on the ground, in Darfur…by the end of the year.” David Millikin, “Sudan Given January 1 Deadline to Accept Darfur Peacekeepers,” AFP, December 20, 2006.

of the HSP. This approval was not granted. By late February, Ban was able to report little to the Security Council aside from an agreement on the color of the uniforms to be worn by UN personnel.\footnote{On December, 26, the Sudanese government had agreed that personnel would wear blue berets with AU-green armbands, symbolizing the hybrid nature of the operation. Ban’s overriding concern, of course, was that Bashir had not formally accepted the HSP. “Monthly Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur,” SC Document S/2007/104 (February 23, 2007), 8-11.} On March 6, Bashir did reply, with a list of technical objections on the structure of the HSP.\footnote{Among Khartoum’s objections were: UN requests for helicopters to assist civilian protection, air reconnaissance, and police units in government-controlled areas. “Darfur/Sudan,” Security Council Report, April 2007. Available at: \url{http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/h.2620623/k.3B7E/April_2007BRDarfurSudan.htm}.} This letter also raised concerns about whether the UN or the AU would have operational control over UN personnel in Darfur.\footnote{By March, however, deployment of the first-stage LSP was “nearly complete.” “Sudan Wants Limited UN Role in Darfur,” \textit{AP}, March 13, 2007.} Making matters worse, on March 9, the UN Human Rights Council received a report from investigators in Sudan finding, among other things, that the “killing of civilians remains widespread,” disarmament of the Janjaweed had “yet to occur,” and that, “as violations and abuses continue unabated, a climate of impunity prevails.”\footnote{General Assembly Document A/HRC/4/80 (March 9, 2007), 2.} Already skeptical of Sudan’s sincerity, the U.S. and Britain were primed to return to a more coercive approach.

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China’s position on the use of coercion to relieve insecurity in Darfur had, to this point, been ambivalent. Beijing had abstained on, but not blocked, a series of resolutions designed to stem the flow of arms into Darfur and to punish the violators. At the same time, the U.S. and its partners had reportedly weakened those resolutions at the behest of China. In the coming months, China’s position was less ambivalent. As the focus shifted...
to the implementation of the Addis Ababa agreement, the PRC was clear that it opposed the threat or use of additional sanctions.

**China’s Opposition to Sanctions**

In response to Sudan’s perceived obstructionism on deployment, the U.S. and Britain raised the possibility of sanctions on several occasions in the spring and summer of 2007. The PRC resisted each time. The first, as suggested above, occurred as a result of Bashir’s March letter objecting to parts of the HSP. On the 13th, a State Department spokesman said that there was a “growing impatience” within the international community, and that, “we, unfortunately, may be approaching a time when other steps will have to be taken.”\(^816\) A day later, the U.S. position was that the delay was “an issue that needs to come before the Council.”\(^817\) China immediately took a contrary view, with an official stating that the PRC “never ever believes” that sanctions will be a viable solution to the Darfur crisis.\(^818\)

Informal discussions took place among Council diplomats in the third week of March on a possible resolution. Among the potential elements were further personal sanctions, a widening of the existing arms embargo, and a “no-fly” zone in Darfur. Portraying a feeling of urgency, one Western diplomat said that, “We want to move

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\(^818\) The diplomat continued, saying that, “Our sense is that we are moving closer towards having our Sudanese consider and deploy” the HSP. Colum Lynch, “Sudan Backs Away from UN Plan,” *Washington Post*, March 14, 2007.
quickly on this."

On April 3, the U.S. reiterated that it was “considering what it is that we might do,” without indicating whether a new resolution might be tabled. At the same time, Beijing held to the principle that a “political solution should be found” by way of “equal dialogue and discussions.”

Eight days later, Zhai Jun, China’s Assistant Foreign Minister responsible for African affairs, who had recently held discussions with Bashir in Khartoum, refuted the Western allusion to sanctions by saying that, “We should help Sudan resolve this issue instead of creating further problems or complicating the issue. Therefore, we are not in favor of sanctions.”

For the moment, the U.S. dropped references to UNSC action.

A second, short-lived push for sanctions occurred on April 18. The trigger was a report by the Panel of Experts that described how Sudanese authorities continued to incite violence in Darfur (such as by disguising its own planes in UN colors), and concluded that “violations of the arms embargo continue unabated.”

Emyr Jones Parry, Britain’s UN Ambassador, said on the 18th that his government, with the U.S. and France, were

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819 The consultations reportedly took place during the week of March 19-23, though it is unclear which states were involved, and at what level. Raf Casert, “EU Wants Tougher Action on the Darfur Crisis but Sees Limited Options,” AP, March 26, 2007.


821 The same week, Beijing hosted Sudan’s top military commander for discussions on the arms relationship. China announced that it would continue to develop its relationship with Sudan in this domain. Daniel Shearf, “China Strengthens Military Ties with Sudan,” Voice of America, April 3, 2007.


“working on the content of a resolution, and we’re finalizing a resolution.” The same day, George W. Bush said that the U.S. would “begin consulting” in the UNSC, while Tony Blair declared that:

We have tried diplomacy and negotiation again and again with the Sudanese government, but they have to get the message: the international community will not allow the scandal that is Darfur to continue.

However, China’s position remained that mediation should continue. Liu Zhenmin, the PRC’s deputy representative to the UN, said that “it’s better not to move” in the “direction” of sanctions, arguing that, “I think in a few weeks or a few months there will be some result from the political process.” By the 19th, Western advocacy for punishment had disappeared from the public discourse.

Third, the U.S. again raised the prospect of sanctions at the end of May. Frustrated by Sudan’s reluctance to approve the third phase of the Addis Ababa plan, Bush announced that the U.S. would execute its “Plan B,” which consisted of unilateral sanctions on Sudanese officials and firms. As part of this, Bush said that the U.S. would also seek a UNSC resolution that would include restrictions on individuals “found to be violating human rights,” broaden the existing arms embargo, ban “offensive military

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flights” into Darfur, and improve monitoring capabilities. In New York, U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad affirmed, “We will move ahead with a resolution.”

However, China refused to countenance such an approach. Wang Guangya labeled the U.S. proposal “quite unfortunate,” and said that sanctions “might make the fragile situation a bit more complicated, so I think we are a bit concerned.”

Liu Guijin, a former ambassador to Zimbabwe and South Africa who had recently been named as China’s Special Representative for Darfur, likewise submitted that pressure would “further complicate the situation.”

Liu continued:

In this situation, why can’t the international community give the peaceful resolution of Sudan’s Darfur issue a little more time? Why can’t they give the resolution a few more opportunities? Why can’t they use a little more patience?

Within a day, U.S. officials had ceased making comments suggesting that they would pursue another round of sanctions on Sudan. Once again, there was no tangible progress by U.S., or the Council as a whole, towards a resolution.

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833 However, on June 13, after Bashir appeared to accept the third-phase of the deployment plan, Khalilzad responded skeptically, claiming that sanctions were “very much still under consideration.” There is no evidence, though, that there had been significant discussions among the U.S., China and others in the preceding two weeks. Lydia Polgreen and Warren Hoge, “Sudan Relents on Peacekeepers in Darfur,” New York Times, June 13, 2007.
A final episode concerned Sudan’s conditional acceptance of a hybrid PKO on June 12. At issue was whether the operation would include non-African troops, a provision that Khartoum opposed, but others, including the U.S., thought necessary for an effective mission. Khalilzad’s position was that “additional sanctions” might be needed to “incentivize the government to cooperate” on this point.834 On the 15th, Liu Guijin repeated his opposition. Specifically, he said that, “We do not need to rush to put more sanctions [on Sudan]. It’s not a proper time now.”835 Two days later, Sudan had dropped its objection and the condition for a unanimous vote on the mandate of UNAMID had been created.836

In sum, from the discussions on the HSP in mid-March to the final agreement on phase three of the Addis Ababa plan three months later, China had unequivocally opposed sanctions or the threat thereof. What can explain this position?

Attractive Alternatives

The expectation of Hypothesis 1 is that China is unlikely to support U.S. plans for multilateral pressure if feasible alternatives are present. In this case, we need to examine the status of two such mechanisms: first, multilateral negotiations with Sudan involving the UN Secretary-General and the African Union; and second, Beijing’s own bilateral


836 However, it should be noted that there was a minor dispute on the language of what become Resolution 1769. On July 11, France, Britain and Ghana introduced a text that called for the consideration of “further measures” if Sudan did not execute its responsibilities under previous resolutions. After two weeks of discussions, the co-sponsors introduced what British ambassador Emyr Jones Parry called “more of a conciliatory text” that deleted the threat of sanctions. See: Edith Lederer, “Draft Resolution Calls for 26,000-strong African Union-UN Peacekeeping Force for Darfur,” *AP*, July 12, 2007; Victoria Cavaliere, “China Says Darfur Resolution Still Needs Changes,” *VOA News*, July 26, 2007; Gerard Aziakou, “Western Nations Circulate New Draft on Darfur,” *AFP*, July 25, 2007.
efforts to encourage Khartoum to accept the transition to a hybrid force. This section demonstrates that China did rely on alternative pathways each time the U.S. proposed increasing pressure on Sudan during the first half of 2007.

March 14-April 2: Towards the HSP

The initial impediment to implementation of the Addis Ababa agreement was Sudan’s noncommittal position on the HSP. On January 24, Ban and his AU counterpart, Alpha Oumar Konaré, sent a letter to Bashir detailing the terms of the package. Five days later, the three met on the margins of an AU summit in Addis Ababa, after which Ban said that the discussion had been “encouraging” and that they had “agreed to continue our political process.” Four days after this, Hu Jintao met with Bashir in Khartoum, allegedly pressing the Sudanese leader on consent for the HSP (Table 16 summarizes bilateral meetings in the period under review). Wang Guangya asserted that, “China usually doesn’t send messages, but this time [it] did.” However, Hu’s message was mixed, as it also included an announcement of new development aid totaling more than $100 million, debt forgiveness, and other concessions. For his part, Bashir continued to delay a response.

838 Hu was reportedly concerned about two issues: the growing involvement of Chad in which, as noted above, China held economic interests; and persistent concerns about the stability of Darfur itself. Alfred de Montesquiou, “Chinese President Tells Sudan Counterpart to Give UN Bigger Role in Resolving Darfur Conflict,” AP, February 3, 2007.
839 China’s Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping, 20.
840 Among the concessions was announcement of funds to construct a new presidential palace in Khartoum. Mohammed Ali Saeed, “China and Sudan Cement Economic Ties, Sideline Darfur,” AFP, February 2, 2007. China’s approach was apparently to use a mix of incentives and pressure, but this was “not understood by many Council members,” especially the U.S., which expected that Hu would send a more forceful message. “Sudan (Darfur),” Security Council Report, March 2007. Available at:
Table 16: China-Sudan Bilateral Encounters, November 2006-June 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Who</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2-3, 2007</td>
<td>Bashir, Hu, Tang Jiaxuan</td>
<td>Hu conducts state visit, asks Sudan to play “constructive role” in Darfur; forgives $80 million debt, announces $117.4 million in development aid, reduces tariffs on some Sudanese goods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 7-9, 2007</td>
<td>Bashir, Zhai</td>
<td>Zhai calls for “flexibility,” visits refugee camps in Darfur, meets with local officials, says situation is “basically stable.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 19-23, 2007</td>
<td>Osman Taha, Liu Guijin</td>
<td>Special envoy Liu meets VP Taha, others, encourages “flexibility;” inspects camps, says situation is “basically stable.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 22-23, 2007</td>
<td>Bashir, Liu</td>
<td>Liu Guijin welcomes Sudan’s acceptance of hybrid force, calls the AU-UN-Sudan dialogue “effective.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In early March, China elevated its pressure on Khartoum. On the 2nd of March, the National Development and Reform Commission announced that Sudan had lost its preferential trade status with the PRC. This meant that Beijing would not grant financial incentives, such as tax breaks and loans, for Chinese firms to invest in Sudan. 12 days later, Bashir submitted his response to the Ban-Konaré letter, which Ban said did include “some positive elements,” such as a professed willingness to engage in new talks with rebel forces.


groups, but which also set conditions on the HSP. In the Council, Wang Guangya called for an explanation, recalling that, “Last year, in Addis, the understanding is clear that we are committed to this [i.e. the deployment plan].” Nevertheless, Wang tempered his reaction by attributing Sudan’s position to “some miscommunications and misunderstandings of all this.”

Both the bilateral and multilateral tracks continued to function at the end of the month. On March 29, Bashir’s adviser, Nafi Ali Nafi, visited Beijing and held talks with State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan. Tang emphasized that Sudan should show “flexibility” and “resolutely improve the humanitarian and security situation in Darfur.” The next day, in Riyadh, Bashir held talks with Ban, Konaré, Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa, Kenyan president Mwai Kibaki, and Saudi King Abdullah. The outcome of this session was a reaffirmation of the Addis Ababa plan, and an agreement to hold consultations on the technical aspects of the HSP at an early date. Ban concluded that, “I think we made progress, where there had been an impasse.” While Sudan had yet to accept the HSP, a deal seemed to be forthcoming.

On April 2, Ban expressed optimism that the political process would soon yield a result, and urged the U.S. and Britain to suspend their campaign for sanctions. Motivated by the Riyadh session, Ban said that, “We have achieved some improvements and results

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844 Nafi was also deputy leader of the ruling National Congress Party. “China Reaffirms Support to Political Solution to Darfur Issue,” Xinhua, March 29, 2007.

through political dialogue.” He continued, “My position is that, before we talk about sanctions, let me have some more political space to deal with this dialogue with [the Sudanese].”

Washington honored the request and said that it would not seek a punitive resolution for another two to four weeks. This meant that Beijing would be spared the role of opponent, at least temporarily. However, the possibility of further sanctions remained on the table. According to a U.S. spokesman, “If [the Sudanese authorities] don’t change their behavior, I would not bet against the United States as well as others taking additional steps.”

April 7-19: Ban Diverts Pressure

Since Khartoum had yet to agree to either the HSP or the hybrid operation, bilateral and multilateral diplomacy continued. Between April 7 and 9, Zhai Jun met with Bashir and others in Sudan. As he told reporters in Khartoum, “China appreciates Sudan’s efforts in restoring peace in Darfur, but is expecting more flexibility on the Annan plan [i.e. the Addis Ababa formula].” In addition to meeting with national leaders, Zhai also visited three refugee camps and held talks with local officials in Darfur. Following his visit, Zhai asserted that the “current situation in the Darfur region is basically stable,” a claim intended, perhaps, to buttress China’s support for

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847 The U.S. had apparently been only a “few days away” from implementing its ‘Plan B,’ which, as was later revealed, consisted of unilateral economic sanctions, combined with the pursuit of a new UNSC resolution. Sue Pleming, “Rice Deputy Set to Visit Sudan, Libya Over Darfur,” Reuters, April 5, 2007.

848 Mohamed Hasni, “China Urges Khartoum to be More Flexible on Darfur,” AFP, April 9, 2007.

gradual dialogue. On the 9th, representatives of the UN, AU and Sudan met in Addis Ababa and reached an agreement on the HSP, with one exception (on the role of attack helicopters). This issue was resolved within a week, so that by April 16 Sudan had agreed to implement the plan. The non-coercive approach appeared to be effective.

However, on the 18th, the disclosure of the Panel of Experts report spurred a new call for sanctions. As he had two weeks before, Ban played a pivotal role in dissuading Washington. Specifically, he made a “personal and emotional plea” to Condoleezza Rice to postpone again “Plan B”. Ban’s view was that the recent agreement on the HSP was “diplomatically promising and perhaps portended some future action” towards consent on phase three. Asked about why the U.S. chose to defer to Ban’s advice, a White House spokesman responded that, “We felt it was important to allow the Secretary-General to pursue something he thought was important and worthwhile to pursue.”

However, Zhai qualified this remark by noting two facts: “First, there are too many refugees; second, sporadic armed conflicts still take place between the opposition groups and become the main factor affecting local security and stability.” “Zhai Jun: Sudan Has Reservations on Some Details of Annan’s Proposal,” Xinhua, April 11, 2007. WNC reference: 200704111477.1_56ac00cabaf3e8d7.


Sudan’s foreign minister, Lam Akol, said that his government had given its “complete agreement” to phase two, and that the “path is open to the next steps.” “Sudan Accepts UN Attack Helicopters,” Reuters, April 17, 2007.


Matthew Lee, “Bush Held Off on Sudan Because of UN Chief’s Appeal,” AP, April 20, 2007. In a press conference, Ban elaborated on his position with respect to sanctions: “There are some members of the Security Council, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, who have been discussing imposing sanctions against Sudan. My position is that, when the moment of truth comes and we know that they [Sudan] will not be faithful in implementing this commitment, then I will leave it to Security Council members to take the necessary measures against Sudan.” This implied, of course, that Ban did not believe that the time had already come for such measures. Frank Jordans, “UN Chief Asks for Time Before Security Council Considers Sudan Sanctions,” AP, April 22, 2007.
development reinforced China’s perspective that dialogue with Khartoum was still viable, and that the time for a punitive approach in the Council had not yet arrived.\textsuperscript{855}

\textit{May 19-June 17: Towards Agreement on the Hybrid Force}

While Khartoum had approved the HSP, it had not yet consented to the hybrid operation. China continued its bilateral initiative to encourage Sudan to do so. Between May 19 and 23, Liu Guijin travelled to Sudan, meeting with Vice President Osman Mohammed Taha and other senior officials. Like Zhai Jun had done in April, Liu visited three refugee camps, and talked with local officials in El Fasher and Nyala, capitals of North and South Dafur, respectively.\textsuperscript{856} As Zhai had, Liu encouraged his interlocutors to “show more flexibility,” but also stated that the situation in Darfur remained “basically stable,” which demonstrated that the government had “made great efforts towards resolving the Darfur issue and bringing about peace and development there.” At the same time, Liu repeated China’s position against sanctions.\textsuperscript{857}

As reported above, the U.S. was dissatisfied with the delays in negotiation and opted to impose unilateral sanctions on May 29. It also announced that it would introduce a resolution for further UNSC sanctions. However, as he had done twice before, Ban

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\textsuperscript{855} Indeed, Liu Zhenmin’s comments on the 19\textsuperscript{th} echoed what Ban had argued to Rice: “Agreement has been reached for the Heavy Package Support (sic). We have been informed that the deployment could be completed by the end of the year.” Jon Ward, “Bush Raps UN Over Darfur, Hits UN Inaction,” \textit{Washington Times}, April 19, 2007.


\end{flushright}
offered no support for such a punitive approach and urged continued dialogue. Asked on the 29th if he wanted “some more time, more political space,” Ban replied, “Yes, I need some more time.”  Three days later, Ban said that he had recently consulted with Bashir, who was “committed to see early resolution of this issue.” In addition, Ban lauded the role that China was playing on a bilateral level, saying that Chinese officials had been “exerting their utmost efforts.” Meanwhile, in Beijing, Liu was asked about sanctions and said that, “I don’t think we have come to that stage.” Both Ban and Liu, then, perceived feasible alternatives to pressure.

Consultations between Sudan, the UN and the AU continued in Addis Ababa on June 12 and 13. Ban reported to the Council that Sudan had “accepted the joint [AU-UN] proposals on the hybrid operation.” China took this opportunity to reiterate its view that “dialogue and equal negotiation is an effective approach” to the problem. However, uncertainty regarding the composition of the force remained, with Sudan stating that non-African troops must be used only as a “last resort.” This prompted Khalilzad again to brandish the threat of sanctions. On the 17th, the Council dispatched a delegation to Khartoum to verify that Bashir did not, in fact, attach any conditions on deployment. The

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859 “Media Stakeout with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon,” Federal News Service, June 1, 2007.
860 Ibid. Ban was also asked if he believed that China was “honestly helpful on Darfur,” and responded: “Oh yes, certainly. It is helpful.”
863 The remark was made by MFA spokesman Qin Gang. Scott McDonald, “China Welcomes Sudan’s Agreement on Deployment of Force for Darfur,” AP, June 15, 2007.
outcome was that Sudan pledged that it would accept the hybrid force “without any conditionality.” With this issue resolved, the road was clear for a unanimous vote on Resolution 1769.

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The June meetings in Addis Ababa took place nearly seven months after the transition formula had been designed in the same city. Despite the delays, the PRC clung to the position that sanctions would do more harm than good in persuading Khartoum to accept both the HSP and the full hybrid mission. Arguably, it was able to resist sanctions for two reasons. First, the AU-UN-Sudan mechanism, prodded by Ban, continued to function so that incremental progress was made. Second, Sudan responded to China’s influence. According to Liu, “in our own way and language,” Beijing encouraged Sudan to consent, and that, “I think the Sudan Government probably has listened to the advice of China.”

Absence of Substantive Negotiations

Hypothesis 2 suggests that China opposed levying multilateral sanctions on Sudan because the U.S. did not engage in substantive negotiations and, thus, offered no plan to mitigate the risks that China might encounter as a result of sanctions. This section argues that the U.S. did not pursue detailed talks with the PRC on how a mutually-satisfactory

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resolution might be achieved. The reasons were twofold. First is that any draft would have been weakened to the point of irrelevance in resolving the problem at hand. Second, wielding the threat of sanctions was more useful diplomatically than implementing new measures. In this account, China opposed the notion of sanctions because the U.S. had not offered, nor did it intend to offer, something that the PRC could accept.

Aside from with Britain, there is little evidence that the U.S. engaged in detailed talks on the substance of a punitive resolution in 2007. In March, the two Western powers had discussed the potential elements of a draft, which were reported to be the establishment of a no-fly zone over Darfur, travel and financial restrictions against Sudanese officials, and an expansion of the arms embargo that been approved in 2005. In mid-April, a State Department spokesman said that Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Kristen Silverberg would discuss a potential resolution during meetings in South Africa, though this trip had been scheduled as a routine visit to the holder of the Security Council presidency for the month, not as part of an offensive to gain South African consent. Ban’s request, on April 2 and again on the 18th, that the U.S. postpone its pursuit of sanctions in favor of continued negotiation, likely meant that broader consultations were put on hold.

Even after the U.S. pledged to work on a resolution in May, significant exchanges among Council members appear to have been minimal. On the 29th, Rice said that she was “open to discussions” on a draft, but, when asked about a timeline, stated only that, “I think we want to have some consultations and I can start those today and we’ll have—

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867 Even if the item did appear on Silverberg’s agenda, Pretoria remained firmly opposed to sanctions, as discussed above. “State Department Regular Briefing,” Federal News Service, April 18, 2007.
we’ll continue them.” The next day, Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, reported that he had “briefed” his Chinese counterpart on the proposal, but did not suggest any optimism that room for agreement existed. Rather, his remarks indicated divergence of view: “I wanted to be very clear about what our position is and the Chinese were equal to the task of explaining how they see the situation.” On June 12, Khalilzad stated that a resolution was “still very much under consideration,” but offered no details. This situation contrasted with North Korea and Iran, in which the U.S. provided regular updates on its efforts to seek common ground with its interlocutors on the Council.

There are two plausible reasons why the U.S. did not expend effort to forge a consensus among the P5. First is that there were obstacles to the realization of a tenable draft resolution. In a general sense, the U.S. recognized that it would be very difficult to gain China’s approval for additional sanctions. For instance, in late April, 2007, Negroponte was asked whether he had “an understanding with China that they, too, would impose sanctions.” He replied that he could not confirm such an understanding.

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868 “Briefing with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice En Route to Berlin,” Federal News Service, May 29, 2007. In Washington, the State Department said that the U.S. had only discussed the elements of a draft with Britain and France thus far. “U.S. Dept. of State: U.S. Policy on Sudan,” M2 Presswire, May 30, 2007. Speaking on background, an official said that, “We have some draft pieces. We’ll see how those pieces fit together.” This response, too, suggested that very little in the way of substantive dialogue had actually occurred. Oliver Knox, “Bush to Slap New Sanctions on Sudan,” AFP, May 29, 2007.


871 The interviewer, Gwen Ifill, followed up, asking Negroponte: “Do you have a sense that there is any appetite at the United Nations for sanctions or for a new resolution?” Negroponte replied, “Well, I think we’ll have to wait and see.” This illustrates that the U.S. was doubtful about the prospects of sanctions and chose, instead, to use its political capital to encourage China to act bilaterally. “PBS News Hour with Jim Lehrer,” April 24, 2007.
In a Congressional hearing in early May, he was asked the same question, and replied that, if the U.S. did table a sanctions resolution, then, “I think that we will get some pushback from the Chinese.”

On June 1, after Bush’s announcement that the U.S. would implement a “Plan B,” Natsios said flatly that the Chinese “don’t support sanctions. They don’t like sanctions.”

However, beyond China’s opposition, there were specific problems with each element of a prospective draft. With respect to a no-fly zone, it was not clear how such a restriction would be enforced. Neither the U.S. nor France, the two powers with capabilities in the region to enforce a ban, demonstrated any political will to become militarily involved. In addition, overflight rights from neighbors Libya, Chad and the Central African Republic would have been difficult to secure, given regional opposition to coercive measures on Khartoum. As late as June 8, Rice suggested that the U.S. did not have a feasible way to move forward on a no-fly zone. Asked whether such a prohibition would be included in a U.S. draft, she responded, “I think it’s important to

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873 As Natsios told Charlie Rose, “The Chinese Ambassador to the UN, Ambassador Wang and I, have become friends. We talk all the time. The Chinese Ambassador to the United States just came to see me last week. I talked with him a couple of days ago, twice in one day, about different measures we could take to try to move this (situation) along.” “Charlie Rose Show,” *International Wire*, June 1, 2007.

874 In a sense, there is an interaction between cause and effect: China’s resistance to sanctions contributed to the U.S. not seeking sanctions, which nullified the possibility that China would agree to sanctions. However, as described below, this was only one factor informing U.S. strategy.

875 This is so even after one report pointed out that it would be feasible for either state to at least report violations using surveillance aircraft. See: *Getting the UN Into Darfur*, 11-12.

look at it. And it’s just—you know, it’s not self-evident how you would do it, but I think we ought to be examining how it would work.”

Imposing punishments on Sudanese leaders also would have faced barriers. The problem was not identifying potential targets. As early as August 2006, a Panel of Experts report listed some 51 individuals, including ten “top people in the government,” responsible for “serious violations” of international human rights law. Rather, the issue was whether the PRC would condone sanctions on anyone at a level high enough to cause the government to reassess its policy on the UN mission. John Prendergast assessed that the U.S. might be able to gain consent for “a few little minor sanctions against midlevel officials,” but not against top officials. The reason, he explained, was opposition by the Chinese, as well as the Russians. Although Prendergast urged the U.S. to use influence to encourage China to relent, doing so would have been difficult, and perhaps jeopardized what the U.S. was able to achieve in terms of China’s bilateral interventions.


878 This list, which was confidential, reportedly included the names of ten top government officials, 17 local officials, 14 Janjaweed members, seven members of rebel groups, and 3 foreign military officers. Getting the UN Into Darfur, 6.

879 Prendergast somewhat optimistically stated that, “we will see a resolution in the next couple of weeks, there is no doubt,” but argued that the outcome would be too weak to affect Sudan’s political calculations. “Charlie Rose Show.” International Wire, June 1, 2007.

An attempt to tighten the arms embargo also would have encountered constraints. Although the value of PRC arms exports to Sudan was marginal in 2007, there is evidence that Chinese firms were considering increasing sales of lucrative weapons systems, such as fighter jets, to the Sudanese military. Similarly, though Russian arms exports had declined, Moscow was reported to be in talks with Khartoum on a $1 Billion loan for arms purchases, which would have been threatened by country-wide sanctions. Moreover, China and Russia both had an incentive to avoid the scrutiny of their arms transactions with Sudan that might have resulted from a tightening of reporting requirements. Both may have agreed to cosmetic changes to the arms embargo, but it is doubtful that they would have consented to considerably stronger terms. In sum, due to the various constraints, the U.S. likely would have achieved only a weak resolution, if any, if it had brought a draft to a vote.

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881 In March of 2006, the Panel of Experts had recommended that the Security Council widen the existing sanctions to cover the entire territory of Sudan, rather than just Darfur. SC Document S/2006/250 (April 19, 2006), 3. This recommendation became part of the U.S.-British conceptualization of a new round of sanctions in 2007. Darfur: Revitalizing the Peace Process, 17n118.


883 David Mickler, Protecting Civilians or Preserving Interests? Explaining the UN Security Council’s Non-Intervention in Darfur, 2003-06 (Ph.D. Dissertation, Murdoch University, 2009), 266.

884 For instance, in October 2006 the Panel of Experts had recommended that the UNSC consider mandating end-use certification requirements for Sudan’s military suppliers, and to provide advanced notice to the Sanctions Committee for impending sales. These requirements would have complicated exports, drawn unwanted attention to them, or both. SC Document S/2006/795 (October 3, 2006), 29.

885 A related aspect of the arms embargo concerns enforcement of the existing regime. One of the concessions that the sponsors of Resolution 1769 had to make to guarantee Chinese approval was that the use of force by the UN-AU mission would not be granted to enforce the provisions of Resolution 1591. This seems to have been related to the PRC’s traditional emphasis on conservative use of force provisions for PKOs. Gerard Aziakou, “Security Council to Authorize Joint AU-UN Force in Darfur,” AFP, July 31, 2007.
A second explanation for Western aversion to dialogue was that public mention of sanctions was intended as a threat, not as a substantive policy goal that would have required concessions and deliberations. Natsios, who had visited Khartoum twice in late 2006, was initially opposed to the idea of threats as part of U.S. strategy. On December 20, after his second trip, he said that, “It’s not useful to make threats.” Noting that coercive language had been used in the past to no effect, he continued, “I think we should stop making threats.” 886 Though Natsios alluded to a “Plan B” if Khartoum did not agree to the Addis Ababa formula, he was intentionally vague on what that might encompass. Specifically, when asked what “Plan B” might include, he stated that, “it is open-ended and I’m going to leave it at that.” When pressed, he said only that, “Plan B is a different approach to this [i.e., mediation].” 887

Over the course of the spring, the Administration continued to evade questions about what the alternative to negotiations might include. Ban’s requests, in March and April, that the U.S. postpone unveiling “Plan B” were useful, inasmuch as it allowed the U.S. to keep the terms unspecified. 888 In May, a half-year after Natsios intimated a coercive approach, a State Department spokesman revealed only that, if consent on the hybrid operation was not granted, then, “we might look at what else might be done in the Security Council.” 889 Even after the U.S. announced, on May 29, that it had enacted new unilateral sanctions, officials continued to speak about multilateral action only as an


888 Moreover, as noted above, Natsios declined to specify the contents of “Plan B” in Congressional testimony in February.

instrument that might be used at some later point under unstated conditions. For instance, Rice said that Sudan needed to be “responsive” in talks with the AU and the UN, though reinforced this request by stating only that she would “start talking” about what kind of resolution “we might pursue.”

The U.S. also used sanctions as a threat just prior to the AU-UN-Sudan conference in Addis Ababa during which Khartoum accepted the hybrid force plan. On June 8, Khalilzad vowed that if the international community did not receive a “positive and affirmative response” from Sudan, then the U.S. “would push for multilateral sanctions to incentivize—remember, the goal is to incentivize—Khartoum to cooperate.” Even after the June 13 agreement, Khalilzad hinted once more at negative consequences. Responding to allegations that Sudan had qualified its consent, he said that any conditions would be “unacceptable.” Those rumors turned out to be inaccurate.

A week later, Emyr Jones Parry reflected on why Sudan had chosen to accept the UN deployment: “I would say that the suggestion of sanctions can themselves be just as effective as sanctions actually in place.” Threats were preferable to a resolution, if an agreement could have been reached at all.

**Political Dynamics**

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Hypotheses 3 through 5 concern the political risks associated with opposing sanctions in the Security Council. In this case, we would expect to observe three conditions that allowed the PRC to maintain its opposition. First, the U.S. did not employ high-level pressure on Beijing to assent to the use of coercion through the UNSC. Second, Russia supported China’s position, providing a second veto, if necessary. Third, regional stakeholders tended to oppose the Western drive for a resolution, offering added incentives to oppose the U.S. This section argues that each of these conditions was present.

**U.S. Priorities**

From the fall of 2006, the objective of U.S. diplomacy with regard to China was not to secure approval for additional sanctions, but rather to encourage Beijing to use its influence in Khartoum to persuade the Sudanese leadership to consent to UN peacekeepers in Darfur. This was based on the realization that the U.S. itself had limited means. As Natsios remarked in November,

> The reason what happened in Darfur happened the way it did, from my perspective, is that we don’t have all of the instruments of influence we think we have. And as I study many of them carefully, we don’t have as much leverage as we’d like to have.  

China, with its considerable trade and investment interests in Sudan, was a natural ally. From Beijing’s perspective, making an effort to encourage a change in Sudan’s position was useful as well. The reason was that a range of international actors, especially in the West, had blamed the PRC for failing to act to alleviate the crisis in Darfur. Acting

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bilaterally served as an opportunity for Beijing to burnish its image as a responsible actor.\(^{895}\)

The mutually complementary pattern that emerged was that the U.S. would deflect domestic criticism of the PRC, including in Congress, while the latter would press Khartoum for consent on the peacekeeping plan. As early as September, 2006, on the margins of the opening of the General Assembly, Rice urged Li Zhaoxing to pressure Sudan.\(^{896}\) On November 3, Hu called on Bashir to consent to UN peacekeepers at a meeting of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing, publicly sympathizing with Bashir’s refusal to support a UN mission, but privately pressuring him to do just that.\(^{897}\) In January, Natsios visited Beijing for four days of consultations on Darfur. During his visit, he said that, “I think [the Chinese] are engaging much more aggressively,” pointing to Hu’s exchange with Bashir as evidence.\(^{898}\)

In early February, the Bush Administration was placed in an awkward position after the announcement of an increase in Chinese aid to Sudan during Hu’s recent state visit. Natsios acknowledged that China’s “mixed messages…kind of upset all of us here

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\(^{896}\) Bolton writes that Rice’s message was that Bashir “needs to understand he will not have China’s protection on the Security Council.” Li was silent, indicating (to Bolton) that he did oppose Rice’s argument. Bolton, Surrender Is Not An Option, 357.

\(^{897}\) Audra Ang, “Sudan President Stands Firm on Rejection of Troops for Darfur,” AP, November 3, 2006. According to one expert, Hu spent a considerable amount of time at the China-Africa summit trying to persuade Bashir that a UN-backed mission was in Sudan’s interest. Interview with foreign affairs expert, Shanghai, September, 2009.

in the United States,” but asserted that, “I still think they can be helpful.” 899 To Congress, which had been particularly wary of China’s role, Natsios delivered an optimistic report. Recounting his consultations in Beijing, he said that, “The Chinese were open with us. They were very helpful. We had good conversations.” 900 At the same time, he refused to answer questions about whether the U.S. was prepared to seek China’s approval for further sanctions on Sudan, claiming that the entire subject was related to “Plan B,” which he preferred to keep as vague as possible. 901

However, praising China did not quell domestic criticism of the PRC. In late March, for instance, Mia Farrow and her son, Ronan, published an editorial in the Wall Street Journal which argued that, “Beijing is uniquely positioned to put a stop to the slaughter [in Darfur], yet they have so far been unabashed in their refusal to do so.” 902 An element of the growing campaign was to urge the U.S. to pressure China to support stronger sanctions in the UNSC. On April 11, Susan Rice, then a scholar at the Brookings Institution, said that the U.S. should “dare China or any other permanent member of the Security Council to accept the blame for vetoing effective action to halt the genocide.” 903 Similarly, the human rights activist John Prendergast told Congress:


901 In specific, in response to a question asked by Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee, Natsios said that, “I don’t want to discuss it in this forum right now, because it—the actual documents are classified and I don’t want to get into any trouble.” Ibid.

902 The authors also famously used the phrase “Genocide Olympics” to link the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing to the Sudan issue. Ronan Farrow and Mia Farrow, “The ‘Genocide Olympics,’” Wall Street Journal, March 28, 2007.

Quick pop quiz: how many times have the Chinese vetoed a United Nations Security
Resolution on an African issue since the end of the Cold War? Never. If we press, if we
push China, they will threaten to veto right up to the moment that the vote occurs, and
then they will abstain. If we have the political will to press forward with a real plan B
multilaterally to change the Government of Sudan’s calculations, the Chinese will step
aside. 904

The Bush Administration might, then, have gained political points for publicly pressing
China to support a resolution.

Instead, officials refrained from doing so. In a Senate hearing on April 11, Natsios
noted that China had “put very heavy pressure” on Sudan, and had been a “critical factor”
in the latter’s decision to accept the HSP. With regard to the “China-bashing” occurring
in the U.S., he said that, “I’m not sure…right now it’s very helpful.” 905 In early April,
Negroponte met with Zhai Jun and reiterated that China should exert pressure on
Khartoum. Negroponte later said that “the Chinese have helped us and the international
community generally” through their contacts with Sudan. 906 On June 1, Natsios credited
Beijing with doing “a number of things in the last few months that go far beyond what
they’re typically disposed to do on a diplomatic issue of this sort.” He went on to argue
that the Chinese “have been much more helpful than may be apparent publicly.” 907


906 In particular, Negroponte had met with Zhai in Mauritania in mid-April. “State Department Regular

907 Natsios cited the “crucial” role played by Beijing in November, 2006, in moving Khartoum in the
sum, recognizing the usefulness of China’s bilateral diplomacy, the U.S. opted not to single out China on sanctions.

**Russia**

In contrast to the PRC, Russia’s commercial interests in Sudan were marginal. Bilateral trade stood at about $50 million in 2006, ranking it behind the four other members of the P5. Russian arms transfers to Sudan were valued at about $434 million in 2004, due to a large order of MiG-29 aircraft, but had declined to $42 million in 2006. Due to its own desire to keep attention away from Chechnya, Russia also had a stake in preventing a precedent on UN intervention without host country consent. However, this concern was likely mitigated by the tendency of the P5 not to meddle in each others’ internal affairs. As with talks on North Korea, Russia’s role was primarily to buttress the PRC.

Prior to 2007, Moscow and Beijing had adopted largely similar positions in the Council. Whereas China had abstained on all four sanctions resolution that had been

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908 In 2006, aggregate trade value for the P5 was as follows: China-$5,986,690,837; UK-$471,132,503; France-$307,794,118; USA-$110,485,330; Russia-$50,508,860. Data derived from UN Comtrade.

909 Despite the declining value, Russia’s 2006 figure still ranked behind only Iran in terms of arms suppliers to Sudan. These values are assigned by the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. After 2004, the only weapons transfer recorded by SIPRI is a sale of 28 helicopters delivered between 2004 and 2008. For a brief discussion, see: “Leveraging New International Action on Darfur,” *Africa Action Report*, December 14, 2006, 4. Available online, at: http://apic.igc.org/resources/page.php?op=read&documentid=2235&type=6&issues=1024. However, the decreasing scale of Russian transfers did not prevent it from being singled out for criticism by Amnesty International in the spring of 2007 (see: *Sudan: Arms Continuing to Fuel Serious Human Rights Violations in Darfur*) In response, the Russian Foreign Ministry claimed that, “None of our arms are being supplied to Darfur.” “Russian Foreign Ministry Denies Amnesty International Darfur Allegations,” *RIA-Novosti* (Moscow), May 8, 2007.

adopted between 2004 and 2006, Russia abstained on three.\footnote{Russia voted in favor of Resolution 1556, which imposed an arms embargo on all non-governmental actors in Darfur. The key to Russia\’s vote, according to its representative, was that the text \“does not foresee possible further Security Council action with regard to Darfur.\” SC, Verbatim, S/PV.5015 (July 30, 2004), 7. This is surprising, given that Russia was still engaged in large-scale arms transfers to Sudan at this stage.} Russia also joined the PRC in abstaining on Resolution 1706, which called for a transition to a UN PKO in Darfur without an explicit host government consent requirement. Echoing Wang, Russian Ambassador Vitaly Churkin said that it was of \“fundamental importance that the resolution clearly states the overriding need for the consent\” of the Sudanese government.\footnote{SC, Verbatim, S/PV.5519 (August 31, 2006), 8-9.} The only notable difference in the two states\’ attitudes concerned Resolution 1593, referring Darfur to the prosecutor of the ICC. Beijing, in an unusual alignment with Washington, abstained on sovereignty grounds, while Moscow countered that the measure would help to remedy \“gross violations of human rights.\”\footnote{SC, Verbatim, S/PV.5158 (March 31, 2005), 10.}

During the first half of 2007, Russia exhibited no willingness to condone a coercive approach towards Sudan. On March 12, Moscow issued a mild reaction to Bashir\’s equivocal letter regarding the HSP. Churkin said that the letter was \“probably less than the radically positive answer the Secretary-General was hoping for, but I don\’t think it\’s necessarily going back.\”\footnote{Indeed, Russia\’s reaction was even milder than China, which had asked for an \“explanation\” from Bashir. Edith Lederer, \“China Calls on Sudan\’s President to Explain Letter Challenging UN Plan on Darfur,\” AP, March 12, 2007.} Two days later, as the U.S. and Britain were suggesting that a resolution may be necessary to cope with the implementation delays, Russia\’s Deputy Foreign Minister said that any decision on Darfur should be based on \“constructive dialogue and cooperation.\” His government\’s ICC vote notwithstanding, he
argued that human rights should not be used as a “pretext for interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states.”915 There was no indication that Russia would back a drive for sanctions.

In mid-April, as the Western powers renewed their calls for a resolution, Russia joined China in opposition. Noting Khartoum’s recent acceptance of the HSP, Churkin, said that, “After a long while…we have this positive development in the dialogue between the UN and Khartoum, and all of a sudden to come back with some sanctions would not be good.”916 At the end of May, after the U.S. had said that it would put “Plan B” into effect, Churkin restated Russia’s opposition to a resolution. His argument was that this would be a “departure” from the Council’s “common strategy,” which was to support Ban’s mediation efforts.917 This position indicates that Moscow was a second permanent member skeptical of sanctions, and probably would have joined China in using its veto if a vote were taken.

*Regional Stakeholders: Egypt, South Africa and the AU*

As regards regional attitudes, there was no vocal support for sanctions among Egypt, South Africa and the AU as a whole. First, as the most powerful neighbor of Sudan, it is likely that Cairo’s position was considered in Beijing. Egypt’s core interest regarding Sudan was in preventing state collapse, which would have destabilized the regional security environment, brought a radical Islamic faction to power in Khartoum, or

915 “Russia Rejects Use of Human Rights for Political Pressure,” Interfax (Moscow), March 14, 2007. WNC reference: 200703141477.1_78810023d62a1192.


both. Moreover, Egypt had an interest in preserving access to the lower reaches of the Nile. Given its interest in maintaining positive ties with the Sudanese regime, Egypt had opposed sanctions all along. For instance, following the passage of Resolution 1591 in 2005, Foreign Minister Ahmed Abul Gheit said that the situation might “slip out of control” if pressure was further increased.

Cairo continued to oppose sanctions in the spring and summer of 2007. On March 17, Gheit warned against the “dangers of brandishing the threat to impose sanctions against Sudan.” On the 27th, Assistant Secretary Silverberg told Congress that Ban had raised the issue of sanctions with Egypt and had received a “very bad response.” She went on to say that, “We were very disappointed by Egypt’s failure to step up to the plate in helping to pressure Sudan to take action.” Egypt again urged caution after the U.S. and Britain threatened sanctions on April 18. Referring to Khartoum’s decision to approve the HSP, Gheit argued that:

> It would be more logical for the international community to welcome Sudan’s response to the UN proposal and encourage it instead of threatening it, exerting pressure and raising suspicions about its seriousness to cooperate.

Gheit also told reporters that he had encouraged the P5 not to “make haste in making new decisions that would complicate the situation.”

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919 “Egyptian Foreign Minister Warns Against Pressuring Sudan Over Darfur,” MENA (Cairo), April 6, 2005. WNC reference: 200504061477.1_c5e40011200fb26c.


On May 7, Egypt announced that it might reconsider a commitment of some 750 troops and 130 other personnel for Darfur if the Western initiative for pressure continued. In addition, the Egyptian presidential spokesman reported that Hosni Mubarak had spoken with Bush about the matter, and relayed that, “Mubarak emphasized that Egypt sees no use of some international powers’ inclination for increasing pressure on Sudan.”924 On the 29th, Gheit repeated his position against sanctions, saying that, “There is still an opportunity to reach an agreement.”925 On June 13, after the Addis session that resulted in Sudan’s apparent consent for the hybrid force, Gheit said that the outcome made “talk of sanctions futile.”926 Egypt’s refusal to endorse the U.S. position provided political cover for the PRC to oppose additional sanctions themselves.

Though not a contiguous neighbor of Sudan, South Africa was another influential actor on UN negotiations regarding Darfur. This was due to its status as a non-permanent member of the Security Council in 2007, contributor to AMIS, and major actor both in the AU and in sub-Saharan African politics generally.927 For China, South Africa was an important destination for exports (and the PRC’s largest trading partner in Africa); site of

923 “Egyptian FM Sends Urgent Messages to Permanent UNSC Members on Sudan,” MENA (Cairo), April 19, 2007.

924 One analyst argued that, in this circumstance, Cairo held leverage vis-à-vis Washington. According to Tom Cargill, a scholar at Chatham House, “The U.S. relationship with Egypt in other areas, like the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, is so central, so strategic, the U.S. doesn’t want to hint at jeopardizing those other issues.” Sebastian Abbot, “Egypt and Other Arab Countries Not Willing to Pressure Sudan on Darfur,” AP, May 7, 2007.


927 The other major contributors to AMIS were Nigeria, Rwanda and Senegal. South Africa was the only major contributor, however, with a seat on the Security Council in 2007. The other two African Security Council members that year were Congo and Ghana.
investment; and source of vital resources, such as gold and platinum.\footnote{265} Though Pretoria had not articulated a position on sanctions prior to 2007, it brought to the Council an attitude of skepticism towards coercion. As one scholar notes, South Africa viewed “sanctions and doctrines of the ‘right to protect’ and ‘humanitarian intervention’” as a “heavy club in the hands of major powers and have eroded the sovereignty of weaker states in what is increasingly becoming a hegemonic world.”\footnote{928} Hence, South Africa was predisposed to treat U.S. suggestions on sanctions with caution.

However, unlike Egypt, South Africa did not explicitly reject the notion of imposing sanctions when it was raised in March, 2007.\footnote{930} Yet on April 18, South Africa’s UN Ambassador labeled the call for sanctions “very surprising,” in light of Khartoum’s decision to agree to the HSP. Dumisani Kumalo continued, “This is what we’ve said we want, and now we’re talking about sanctions. What is this about?”\footnote{931} In a separate comment, he said, “Bringing up sanctions now is very counterproductive. What’s the point?”\footnote{932} Kumano made a similar remark after the U.S. announced its “Plan B” in late

\footnote{928} Moreover, China had faced criticism from some sectors of South Africa’s economy, especially the textile industry, and likely would not have desired to further antagonize the country with a confrontation over Sudan. See: Ali Zafar, “The Growing Relationship Between China and sub-Saharan Africa: Macroeconomic, Trade, Investment and Aid Links,” \textit{World Bank Research Observer} 22 (2007), 103-130.


\footnote{930} South Africa served as the president of the Council for March, 2007, and it is possible that it wanted to maintain a position of relative neutrality during its presidency. On the 6\textsuperscript{th}, for instance, Ambassador Dumisani Kumalo noted that “There is a lot of frustration among Council members” on the problem of Khartoum’s delays, but did not state his own position. Gerard Aziakou, “Mounting Frustration at UN Over Sudan’s Perceived Foot-Dragging on Darfur,” \textit{AFP}, March 6, 2007.

\footnote{931} Edith Lederer, “British and U.S. Plans for New UN Sanctions Against Sudan Run Into Opposition from Russia, China and South Africa,” \textit{AP}, April 18, 2007.

May: “It’s not clear to us what are the sanctions supposed to achieve, what’s really the aim?”\textsuperscript{933} In addition, South Africa, along with Council members Congo and Ghana, opposed the insertion of a sanctions threat in the text of the mandate for UNAMID in July. Opposition from all three African states insulated China’s own rejection of such language.\textsuperscript{934}

Finally, the AU itself was a stakeholder, both in terms of its role as the coordinator of AMIS, and as a member of the Sudan-UN-AU negotiating mechanism. The AU’s top decision-making body, the Peace and Security Council, did not issue a position on the appropriateness of sanctions as a means of gaining Khartoum’s consent on a hybrid PKO.\textsuperscript{935} However, AU Chairman Konaré rejected allusions to new sanctions on Sudan twice in 2007. On May 21, in a meeting with Mubarak, Konaré asserted, “What is strange is that some sides start talking about sanctions at a time when an agreement is reached with the Sudanese government.”\textsuperscript{936} He repeated this position on June 9. During a meeting with Moussa, who himself argued against sanctions, Konaré stated that new


\textsuperscript{934} Gerard Aziakou, “Frantic Efforts to Iron Out Differences on Darfur UN Draft,” \textit{AFP}, July 26, 2007. One Western diplomat involved in the negotiation on the text of the mandate for UNAMID (i.e. Resolution 1769) said that China based its position on the opposition of the African members, allowing the latter to take the lead in asking for a text change. “China,” he said, “is not clumsy about how they stake out their positions.” Interview with Western diplomat, New York, February 2010.

\textsuperscript{935} However, in March, 2006, the PSC had been criticized for deferring to Khartoum’s wishes by extending AMIS without clearly supporting the need for a transition to a UN force, which Sudan opposed. This suggests a relatively non-confrontational attitude on the part of the PSC member states. \textit{To Save Darfur}, 14.

measures would be an “unjustifiable act.” To the extent that the Konaré’s remarks reflected the views of member states, China’s position mirrored that of the AU.

As a caveat, like the U.S., particular AU members did encourage China to use influence bilaterally with Khartoum. For example, during the FOCAC summit in November, 2006, several African leaders reportedly alerted Hu and others to the gravity of the situation in Darfur. By January, 2007, the deteriorating conditions in which AMIS was operating spurred a number of African governments to indicate that Beijing should play a more active role in gaining Sudan’s consent for a UN-backed mission. In March, Ghana’s UN ambassador called on states with “close ties” to Sudan to use it, while, in April, the foreign minister of Chad visited Beijing and delivered the same message. These pleas by African states may have influenced China’s decision to intercede with Khartoum, but did not cause a change in the political costs vis-à-vis opposing sanctions.

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In sum, there did not appear to be significant political risks for China in rejecting the Anglo-American push for UNSC measures on Sudan. The U.S. was preoccupied with

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937 “Fresh Diplomatic Row as Darfur Crisis Escalates,” Africa News, June 9, 2007. Arab League Secretary-General Amir Moussa had also argued against sanctions on May 29, after the U.S. unveiled its ‘Plan B.’ On that occasion, he said that “this is not time for sanctions but time for intensifying efforts to reach understanding.” “U.S. Sanctions Over Darfur Unfair,” AP, May 29, 2007.

938 It is unclear if these leaders made direct appeals for Chinese intervention, or merely described the situation in terms that implied a more direct role for the PRC. Medeiros, China’s International Behavior, 184.


Beijing using its leverage bilaterally, despite the pleas of some activists for multilateral action. Russia, though not a key actor in the debate, adopted a position similar to China’s. Regional powers Egypt and South Africa were vocally opposed to sanctions, while the AU lent no support to the Western cause. Individual African governments did place pressure on Beijing, but their goal mirrored that of the U.S.—bilateral intervention with Bashir. Overall, the evidence fits with the expectations of Hypotheses 3 through 5.

Conclusion

The goal of this chapter has been to assess the reasons why China opposed sanctions as a remedy for Sudan’s intransigence on the deployment of UN troops in Darfur, when it had been willing to lend its support for sanctions on North Korea and Iran. Why did Beijing agree to U.S. initiatives to punish Pyongyang and Tehran, but resist efforts to pressure Khartoum in the spring and early summer of 2007?

The analysis supported all five hypotheses. These are summarized in Table 17. First, in contrast to North Korea, there were credible alternative methods available to persuade Sudan to change its position. The first was the UN-AU-Sudan dialogue, which had resulted in the Addis plan in November, 2006. Integral to the viability of this mechanism was the role of Ban Ki-moon, who had called on the U.S. to postpone its pursuit of sanctions in favor of continued diplomacy. The second mechanism was China’s own bilateral efforts, starting with Hu Jintao’s conversation with Bashir in November 2006, and culminating in the appointment of a special envoy for Darfur, Liu Guijin, the following June. U.S. officials themselves concluded that China’s efforts had
produced positive changes in Sudan’s position. The combination of these alternate pathways reduced the necessity of UN sanctions.

Table 17: Summary of Findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Availability of alternative options diminishes the attractiveness of punitive measures.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>The UN-AU-Sudan negotiating mechanism continued to operate, with Ban Ki-moon a driving force. China appeared satisfied with the results of its bilateral interventions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Lack of concessions by the proposer means that a compromise draft is not available.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>There is no evidence of substantive talks. The U.S. and Britain seemed to prefer brandishing the threat of sanctions to engaging in difficult negotiations on an actual text.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Absence of high-level U.S. pressure removes a political constraint on opposition.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>The U.S. put no obvious pressure on China or any other state to support sanctions. U.S. strategy with respect to China focused on encouragement of bilateral pressure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Russian alignment offers a second veto, if necessary, removing isolation.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Russia expressed opposition to sanctions and likely would have seconded a Chinese veto had a vote been taken.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Regional stakeholders are united against sanctions or divided on support, reducing political pressure.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Egypt and South Africa were strongly opposed to sanctions, as was the AU Chairman. No African state publicly advocated a coercive approach.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Second, the U.S. did not engage in talks with an eye to actually achieving a consensus resolution. Though Washington might have been able to offer a draft on which China and Russia would have at least abstained, it would have had to carve out large concessions in order to do so.\(^{941}\) The alternative was that the U.S. and Britain decided to hold deliberations on sanctions in abeyance pending the result of other processes, notably the tripartite dialogue and China’s direct efforts. Given the positive results of those other

\(^{941}\) This is in addition to the technical problems with aspects of a potential resolution, such as how to enforce a no-fly zone, as discussed above.
processes (which, in turn, reduced political support for coercion among Russia and the regional stakeholders), the U.S. did not need or intend to pursue a resolution actively. The consequence of this decision was that China did not receive a proposal that mitigated its risks, as it had on North Korea, Iran, and in earlier measures on Sudan.

Third, the U.S. did not exert high-level diplomatic pressure on China in a bid to win support for a punitive resolution. Instead, just as it had encouraged Beijing to intercede with North Korea during the 2006 missile crisis, the U.S. focused on ways in which China could use its unique influence in Khartoum to the advantage of the international community. The cost of this was that U.S. officials regularly defended China from domestic outrage at Chinese collusion with the Sudanese regime and a growing campaign to boycott the 2008 Olympics. Unlike North Korea, though the U.S. did not switch to a strongly pro-sanctions posture. The basic reason was Bashir’s gradual acceptance of the advice of his Chinese interlocutors, in addition to the role played by Ban and others. In this sense, there was a causal relationship between the viability of alternative options (Hypothesis 1) and the absence of a strong U.S. diplomatic offensive for sanctions (Hypothesis 3).942

942 Indeed, the causal relationship becomes even more complex if the influence of U.S. and international activists on China’s position is taken into account. Arguably, one reason for the extent of PRC diplomacy in Sudan was the pressure it faced from the human rights community. Victor Cha, for instance, argues that the campaign of “entertainers, NGOs and athletes” had “undoubtedly played a role in the shift in China’s policy.” Similarly, J. Stephen Morrison writes that Beijing has had to acknowledge that links with pariah states “can invite sustained attack from U.S. campaigners and carry a heavy price to China’s global image, as well as in the diplomatic investment required to remediate harm.” Erica Downs also notes that “a variety of international actors…have facilitated the Chinese government’s gradual move away from its principle of non-interference.” See: Victor Cha, “Beijing’s Olympic-Sized Catch-22,” The Washington Quarterly 31 (2008), pp. 115-7; J. Stephen Morrison, “Will Darfur Steal the Olympic Spotlight,” The Washington Quarterly 31 (2008), 188; Erica Downs, “The Fact and Fiction of Sino-African Energy Relations,” China Security 3 (2007), 60; Paula Roque and Chris Alden, “China and the UN Security Council: From Observer to Activist,” China in Africa Policy Briefing, No. 2 (April 2008).
Fourth, Russia was sympathetic to Chinese opposition to sanctions and likely would have offered Beijing a second veto, if the issue had come to a vote. Similarly, fifth, there was no political appetite among the regional stakeholders for a coercive approach towards Sudan. In particular, Egypt was vocally opposed to the U.S. proposition that sanctions might be necessary, as was South Africa. The Chairman of the AU, along with his Arab League counterpart, also raised questions about the efficacy of sanctions. Council members Congo and Ghana, for their part, did not rally to the Anglo-American cause. Computing its broader political interests in the case, China would have discerned few benefits, and several costs, in shifting its support to the West.

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The problem of deploying peacekeepers to Darfur did not end with the passage of Resolution 1769. In late 2007 and early 2008, Khartoum once again threatened to derail the operation by delaying a status of forces agreement with the UN, and hindered the issuance of visas for PKO personnel. As it had in the spring, China used bilateral pressure to guarantee that the mission would go ahead. This included signaling the possibility that it might agree to additional sanctions if Sudan did not expedite the deployment process. Since China’s own interventions proved successful, the need for further sanctions was reduced. Despite lingering problems related to deployment, the mission did

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943 However, because of U.S. restraint on pressure, combined with the lack of a serious effort by the U.S. and Britain to secure a resolution, the Russian factor was essentially redundant. It would only have played a major role if, as John Prendergast and Susan Rice argued, the U.S. had demanded a vote.

reach—and surpass—its mandated strength, with over 22,000 personnel deployed by early 2011. This represented a major improvement over the AMIS operation.\textsuperscript{945}

This case suggests that U.S. influence in the Council is constrained under several conditions. First is when there is at least one feasible alternative that a veto-holding state prefers to U.S.-backed plans for coercion. This may include other multilateral processes, bilateral intervention, or both. Second is when the U.S. itself isn’t firmly committed to a particular proposal. China’s willingness to use bilateral leverage, combined with problems associated with effective sanctions on Sudan, meant that the U.S. refrained from placing a high degree of pressure on the PRC for a new resolution. Third is when there is broad opposition to the U.S. Russia offered a potential second veto and, perhaps more importantly, the main regional stakeholders lent no support for the U.S. The result of these conditions was a non-outcome; that is, a proposal that was raised but dropped before the voting stage. There is another type of negative case, as well: a vetoed draft. The next chapter seeks to explain why China exercised its veto on Burma and Zimbabwe.

\textsuperscript{945} On July 31, 2008, the UNSC approved a 12-month extension of UNAMID’s mandate. By this point, about 9,000 troops had been deployed. According to U.S. ambassador Alejandro Wolff, “UNAMID’s slow deployment is seriously interfering with its ability to protect itself and fulfill its mandate in Darfur.” SC, Verbatim, S/PV.5947 (July 31, 2008), 8.
Chapter 6
China Says “No”:
Beijing’s Veto Use on Myanmar (2007) and Zimbabwe (2008)

Introduction

In January 2007, and again in July 2008, China departed from its normal pattern of avoiding the use of the veto in Security Council votes. In the first case, Beijing, along with Moscow, voted against a motion sponsored by the U.S. and Britain that would have urged the military junta in Burma to engage in a “substantive political dialogue” with the opposition National League of Democracy (NLD) and release the leader of that movement, Aung San Suu Kyi. In the second, China, again with Russia, vetoed a proposal that would have condemned Zimbabwean authorities for perpetrating violence against opposition candidates and supporters in the wake of the March 2008 presidential election in that country. This resolution would have imposed an arms embargo and leveled financial and travel restrictions on several top leaders, including the president, Robert Mugabe.

As with Sudan, Iran and North Korea, China held significant material interests in these states. Myanmar was an important as a source of natural gas (with proven reserves about equal to those of China itself), as well as the site for an overland oil pipeline that

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946 To recall from Chapter 1, China had the lowest rate of veto use among the P5 between 1971 and 2009. In nearly forty years, it exercised this right on only six occasions.


would allow oil shipped from the Middle East to bypass the relatively vulnerable Straits of Malacca. Moreover, Burma served as a buffer between China’s southwest and areas controlled or influenced by the two other major powers in the region: India and the U.S. Bilateral trade surpassed $2 billion in 2007. Interests in Zimbabwe were comparatively modest, though still notable. In particular, Zimbabwe held the world’s second-largest reserves of platinum, a rare metal used in the manufacturing of products ranging from electronics to fuel cells. In 2007, China’s investments reportedly stood at

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951 Meanwhile, China’s top exports to Myanmar included manufactured products such as boilers, appliances and diesel engines. In addition, according to the SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, the value of Chinese arms exports to Myanmar reached about $115 million in 2005 (or $76 million in 1990 dollars, adjusted for inflation). However, the database reports only a value of $3.1 million in 2006 and $0 in 2007.

$1.6 billion, with plans underway to expand stakes in Zimbabwean commodities.\textsuperscript{953} Additionally, Harare was a major buyer of Chinese arms through at least 2004.\textsuperscript{954}

China’s strategic dilemma was that its interests were jeopardized by the policies of both regimes, but it feared that Western plans for coercion might be counterproductive. On Burma, China was concerned about the “erratic and isolationist” behavior of the junta,\textsuperscript{955} and the negative consequences of protracted violence between the authorities and their political opponents.\textsuperscript{956} Economic misrule and political strife also had a negative impact on China’s interests in Zimbabwe. For instance, one analyst argues that instability placed constraints on the prospects for expanded investment in Zimbabwean mines.\textsuperscript{957} However, as in other cases, Beijing held a skeptical attitude towards pressure. Ni Xiayun, a scholar at CICIR, argues that the use of pressure might weaken the regime to the point where the tense situation between the government and minority groups situated along the

\textsuperscript{953} This figure was cited by Gao Hucheng, a deputy Minister of Commerce, during a March, 2007, visit to Zimbabwe. Nelson Banya, “Some Foreign Investors Gamble on Zimbabwe,” \textit{Reuters}, March 28, 2008. Gao’s trip presaged a much larger investment drive four years later. In February, 2011, China reportedly offered to buy a $3 billion stake in Zimbabwe’s platinum mines (a figure representing half of Zimbabwe’s GDP), though it was unclear whether Harare would accept such an aggressive bid. “China Offers Zimbabwe $3bn for Platinum—Report,” \textit{Reuters}, February 4, 2011. Note also that, in addition to platinum, Zimbabwe holds large reserves of gold, copper and diamonds.

\textsuperscript{954} Ian Taylor, “Sino-African Relations and the Problem of Human Rights,” \textit{African Affairs} 107 (2007), 75. Taylor cites a 2004 purchase of Chinese fighter jets, valued at $240 million, as evidence. However, the SIPRI database has no record of Chinese sales to Zimbabwe after 2006.

\textsuperscript{955} \textit{Burma/Myanmar: After the Crackdown}, 9.

\textsuperscript{956} As Ni Xiayun points out, “Reconciliation and an orderly political transition in Myanmar accords with China’s interests, ensures the stability in (China’s) bordering provinces, and benefits China’s development of normal commercial relations with Myanmar.” Ni Xiayun, “ZhongMei guanxi zhong de Miandian wenti,” (The Myanmar Issue in U.S.-China Relations), \textit{YaFei Zongheng} (Asia and Africa Review), 6 (2007), 8. Ma Yanbing, also of CICIR, similarly notes that a deterioration of the situation in Myanmar might lead to an influx of refugees into Yunnan Province, in addition to negative consequences for China’s energy interests. Ma Yanbing, “Miandian jushi jiqi fazhan qushi,” (The Current Situation of Burma and its Developments), \textit{YaFei Zongheng} (Asia and Africa Review), 5 (2009).

Burma-China border devolves into civil war. Two Chinese Africa analysts argue that U.S. and European sanctions on Zimbabwe since 2000 had made “an already bad situation much worse.”

The difference between these cases and Sudan, Iran and North Korea lies in the use of the veto. No compromise was brokered, and the U.S. was unwilling to defer a vote so that alternative conflict resolution efforts might proceed uninterrupted. China’s decision is surprising for two reasons. First is that both cases occurred in the 18 months leading up to the Summer Olympics in Beijing, with the Zimbabwe veto having been cast less than one month before the opening ceremonies. It is curious that China would risk tarnishing its national image by appearing to shield these two pariah states in addition to Sudan (i.e. Beijing’s close association with Khartoum had motivated a movement to boycott the 2008 Olympics).

Second, unlike Darfur, China had not made a public effort to intervene with the authorities in either Burma or Zimbabwe. For instance, it did not appoint a special envoy to divert attention from its opposition in the UNSC, as it had with respect to Darfur in the spring of 2007. This chapter asks why Beijing deviated from its practice of avoiding public disputes with the West by exercising its veto power.

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958 Ni, “ZhongMei guanxi zhong de Miandian wenti,” 9. In particular, there are an estimated 40,000 guerillas in the mountainous areas in the north and northeast of the country, near the border with Yunnan Province. These forces are reportedly involved in a range of illicit activities, from drug trafficking, to gambling, to money laundering. Li and Lye, “China’s Policies towards Myanmar,” 259.

959 Ceng Li (a scholar at CICIR) and Li Weisong (a scholar at the University of International Relations), “Jinbabuwei jushi jiqi ‘Xiang Dongfang’ zhengce,” (The Situation in Zimbabwe and the “Look East” Policy) Yafei Zongheng (Asia and Africa Review) 5 (2007), 37.

960 As Victor Cha opines, “The test of whether the Olympics change China will come over human rights and responsible foreign policy, particularly in Africa and Burma. Here, China faces a catch-22: It seeks the Olympic spotlight to enhance its prestige, but that spotlight engenders massive pressures for political change that if left unaddressed by Beijing, undercut any prestige and reputation benefits of the Games.” Cha, “Beijing’s Olympic-Sized Catch-22,” 106.
The explanation consists of five parts. First, China, which sought gradual reform but not immediate political transformation, was satisfied with the willingness of both states to participate in international mediation. This provided a basis on which to oppose coercion. Second, Washington’s objective in both instances was to make a symbolic statement, rather than to make the concessions necessary to achieve a consensus. This meant that no efforts at reducing Beijing’s risk were undertaken. Third, preoccupied with other issues in its relationship with the PRC, the U.S. did not exert high-level diplomatic pressure on the latter to cooperate. Fourth, Russia sympathized with Beijing’s position, though its role differed in the two cases. On Burma, Russia simply provided a second veto, while, on Zimbabwe, Moscow’s last-minute decision to object to sanctions likely caused a similar shift by Beijing. Fifth, the regional stakeholders, including ASEAN members on Myanmar and South Africa on Zimbabwe, showed no affinity for Council interference, which provided the PRC with additional political insulation.

This argument proceeds in the following four sections. The first describes the background of the political situations in Myanmar and Zimbabwe, and the Western and Chinese positions vis-à-vis a UNSC response. The second argues that the U.S. was interested in making a statement rather than reaching a consensus, though concedes that it is unlikely that any concessions on Burma would have been sufficient to secure Chinese support. The third discusses the alternative conflict resolution pathways, and suggests that China was satisfied with the willingness of both regimes to participate, even if no immediate solution was found. The fourth assesses the political risks of exercising the veto, suggesting that Beijing did not face high costs, given U.S. priorities, Russia’s
position, and the opinions of the regional stakeholders. The conclusion summarizes the findings and states the implications for cooperation.

Political Violence in Myanmar and Zimbabwe

China’s vetoes of Western-sponsored measures on Myanmar and Zimbabwe occurred against the backdrop of a deteriorating humanitarian situation in both states. The U.S. and its Western partners were especially perturbed about the escalation of political repression, which generated calls for redress through the UNSC. China advocated a non-interventionist position, and, with Russia, used its veto power to prevent Council action.

Background

A raft of political and economic challenges lay behind the state-sponsored violence which led states, especially the U.S. and its partners, to seek UNSC involvement in the mid-2000s. In Myanmar, the internal situation had deteriorated under the watch of the junta, which had assumed power in 1988 and refused to cede authority to the opposition NLD after the latter won a large parliamentary majority during elections held in 1990.\footnote{During the 1990 elections, the NLD captured 392 of 492 seats in the parliament that were up for election, with the government-backed National Unity Party winning only ten seats. The junta did not permit the NLD to form a government.} To maintain control, the junta (known since 1997 as the State Peace and Development Council, or SPDC) diverted public funds from the agricultural sector, as well as services such as education and health care, to the military.\footnote{Priscilla A. Clapp, “Burma: Poster Child for Entrenched Repression,” in Worst of the Worst: Dealing with Repressive and Rogue Nations, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2007), 146-9.} By 2007, the per-capita GDP was about $237, less than half of its value in 1989. Inflation had risen more
than five-fold between 2000 and 2007. In addition, the HIV/AIDS rates had risen to 1.3% of the population in 2005, and malnutrition affected about 20% of children. Violent conflicts between ethnic groups, especially in the border areas near Thailand, continued unabated. External effects included the presence of about 450,000 Burmese refugees in Thailand in 2005, a rise in the illicit drug trade, and contributions to the spread of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases in the region.

Restrictions on economic and political reform instituted by the SPDC intensified these problems. In the early 2000s, the junta had experimented with dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi, who had been placed under house arrest periodically since 1989, but this effort ended in mid-2003, when Suu Kyi and other NLD leaders were taken back into custody. In 2004, General Khin Nyunt, the third-ranking member of the SPDC, who was known to support economic reform and a gradual opening of the political system, was deposed. This left the hardline generals Than Shwe and Maung Aye in control of the state apparatus.

An effect of this was increasing isolation from the international community. Using a base of 100 in 2000, the consumer price index as tabulated by the International Monetary Fund had risen to 527.4 in 2007. Data are derived from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database. Data available online, at: [http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=28].


Along with Khin Nyunt, several other prominent reform-minded officials, including the home, foreign and labor ministers. Khin’s power base within the military, composed of around 30,000 personnel, were...
community, symbolized by the relocation of the capital from Yangon to the remote, inland city of Naypyitaw in 2006, and the increasingly tense relations between the junta and international humanitarian organizations. Groups such as Doctors Without Borders and the International Committee of the Red Cross ceased operations in 2005.  

For its part, Zimbabwe experienced a similar decline. Through the late 1990s, Zimbabwe was a middle-ranked developing country (with a GDP ahead of Honduras and behind Latvia), possessed the population with the highest education level per capita in Africa, and boasted strong agricultural and tourism sectors. The problem was that, since 1980, power had been concentrated in the hands of Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party, which grew increasingly corrupt and hostile towards actors ranging from trade unionists to the white minority farmers who held most of the arable land in the country. These forces, led by Morgan Tsvangirai, coalesced as the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), which began to take part in previously uncontested elections for parliamentary seats and the presidency. Mugabe responded by electoral intimidation, intermittent arrests of Tsvangirai and his supporters, and a policy of land annexation from the white farmers.

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969 Ibid.


972 Ibid, 172-81.
Political strife resulted in severe humanitarian conditions in Zimbabwe, which worsened during the 2000s. By 2006, the country faced 1000% inflation, an unemployment rate of 85%, a poverty rate higher than 90%, one of the world’s highest infant mortality rates, and an HIV/AIDS rate of about one-fifth of the adult population.\[973\] Life expectancy in Zimbabwe had fallen from 61 in 1980 to 43 in 2006.\[974\] In May 2005, in an effort to “clean up” the slums that had developed near urban centers, and possibly as a means of retribution against a support base for the MDC,\[975\] Mugabe launched Operation Murambatsvina (Restore Order), which rendered some 700,000 people homeless and damaged the informal economy on which poor residents had subsisted.\[976\] A result of these factors was a large flow of refugees from Zimbabwe to neighboring South Africa. Of a population of 11.8 million, it was estimated that about 3 million were residing as refugees in South Africa in 2007.\[977\]

In 2005, the UNSC waded tentatively into both issues. In December, the Council unanimously requested a briefing on the situation in Myanmar. On the 16th, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Ibrahim Gambari delivered a report describing the


\[974\] Data are derived from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators Database.

\[975\] Specifically, the MDC had won 26 of 30 parliamentary seats in March, 2005 elections, and there were indications that the “ZANU-PF party sought to weaken the MDC further, punish many of its supporters, and lance the boil of dissatisfaction in heavily populated urban centers before it could reach explosive levels.” *Zimbabwe’s Operation Murambatsvina: The Tipping Point?* International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 97, August 17, 2005, 4. Available at: [http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/southern-africa/zimbabwe/Zimbabwes%20Operation%20Murambatsvina%20The%20Tipping%20Point.ashx].

\[976\] Ibid, 2.

“lack of political reform” and an “ongoing humanitarian emergency,” but said that the situation did not “pose an immediate threat to international peace and security.”

Regarding Zimbabwe, in July 2005, the U.S., Britain and France asked for a briefing on Operation Murambatsvina from Kofi Annan’s special envoy, Anna Tibaijuka. Tibaijuka’s assessment was delivered in closed session, but presumably based on a report she had written that termed Operation Murambatsvina a “man-made disaster” carried out “with disquieting indifference to human suffering.” Despite these updates, Council members did not yet seek further intervention.

Calls for Condemnation

U.S. and European calls for an elevated role for the Security Council were triggered by acts of repression towards opposition leaders, and their supporters, in both states. The rationale, though, depended not only on domestic political violence, but also on the threats posed by these states to the international community. On Myanmar, the U.S. chose to seek a resolution on May 31, 2006, four days after Burmese authorities announced that they would extend Aung San Suu Kyi’s house arrest by one year. In his letter to the President of the Security Council, requesting that the issue of Myanmar be placed on the agenda, John Bolton argued that problems including the detention of political prisoners, the HIV/AIDS epidemic, refugee flows, and drug trafficking all...
contributed to a “deteriorating situation” that “threatens to have a destabilizing impact on the region.”

During a Council debate on September 15, Bolton cited Resolution 688, which dealt with the exodus of Kurdish civilians from Iraq after the Gulf War, as a precedent for considering the Burmese problem as a threat to international peace.

Table 18: Key Dates in China’s Vetoes on Burma and Zimbabwe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>China’s Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 15,</td>
<td>Council decides to place issue of Myanmar on agenda.</td>
<td>Opposes this decision, citing jurisdictional and other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
<td>objections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 12,</td>
<td>Council rejects U.S.-sponsored draft resolution urging Myanmar to</td>
<td>Vetoes, arguing issue is not germane, supporting SG’s “good offices” mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>reform.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 30, 2008</td>
<td>Council decides not to place issue of Zimbabwe on agenda.</td>
<td>Opposes placing issue on agenda, but does not justify decision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 11, 2008</td>
<td>Council rejects U.S./British draft imposing sanctions on Zimbabwe.</td>
<td>Vetoes, arguing that sanctions are ineffective and would violate norm of sovereignty.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On November 27, Bolton announced that the U.S. would seek a resolution to press the junta on reform. This decision followed a visit by Gambari to Myanmar, in which the authorities declined to release Suu Kyi or take other “concrete steps” on matters such as democratization or unhindered access to the country by humanitarian

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982 SC, Verbatim, S/PV.5526 (September 15, 2006), 4. Resolution 688 expressed concern at the: …repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish-populated areas, which led to massive flow of refugees towards and across international frontiers and to cross-border incursions which threaten international peace and security in the region. SC Document S/RES/688 (April 5, 1991). This resolution became part of the legal argument for the establishment of a no-fly zone over northern Iraq following the end of the Gulf War. Cuba, Yemen and Zimbabwe voted against it, and China and India both abstained.
agencies. Bolton again linked the internal situation to regional concerns, citing refugee flows, illicit drugs, and the spread of infectious diseases. As he concluded, “There are consequences external to Burma that make it appropriate for the Council to act.” The text of the draft called for a “substantive political dialogue,” which would lead to a “genuine democratic transition,” implored the regime to release Suu Kyi and “all political prisoners,” and allow humanitarian organizations to “operate without restrictions.”

Speaking after the vote, Bolton’s successor, Alejandro Wolff, characterized the problem as one that “first and foremost” affected the Burmese people, but which also posed a risk to “peace and security beyond its borders.”

The movement to condemn Zimbabwe in the UNSC was also precipitated by a domestic political development, but justified on the grounds that the issue affected regional stability. The trigger was violence associated with a runoff election for the presidency between Mugabe and Tsvangirai. Tsvangirai had won a general election on November 22, 2007. The draft also called on the authorities to cease violence against ethnic minorities, cooperate with the Secretary-General’s “good offices” mission (i.e. Gambari’s periodic visits), and to cooperate with the International Labor Organization on matters related to forced labor. SC Document S/2007/14 (January 12, 2007).

In particular, Wolff (who had replaced Bolton as acting ambassador after the latter’s recess appointment expired in December 2006) lamented that the draft would have been a …strong and urgently needed statement by the Security Council about the need for change in Burma, whose military regime arbitrarily arrests, tortures, rapes and executes its own people, wages war on minorities within its own borders and builds itself new cities, while looking the other way as refugee flows increase, narcotics and human trafficking grow and communicable diseases remain untreated.

March 29, 2008, though, according to the Zimbabwean Electoral Commission, did not win sufficient votes to avoid a runoff.\textsuperscript{987} The campaign of intimidation attributed to the ZANU-PF included arrests of MDC officials; arrests and beatings of journalists, union leaders, political activists and others; incidents of violence against women and children; and the murder of an unknown number of MDC supporters.\textsuperscript{988} The situation had grown increasingly turbulent as the June 27 runoff date approached.\textsuperscript{989} On June 23, Tsvangirai, who himself had been detained, withdrew from the race, saying that conditions for a free and fair election were not present.

Though the Council had discussed the situation in Zimbabwe in April, it was not until June that the U.S. and its partners sought a decision.\textsuperscript{990} The West achieved consensus for a PRST on June 23 that condemned the ongoing political violence and called on the regime to “cease political intimidation,” and “release the political leaders

\textsuperscript{987} The results of the presidential election were withheld by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission until May 2, at which time it was announced that Tsvangirai had received 47.9\% of the votes, compared to 43.2\% for Mugabe. A candidate would have needed a simple majority to avoid a runoff. However, these figures were disputed, as the MDC claimed that Tsvangirai had actually received slightly more than 50\% of the vote. *Negotiating Zimbabwe’s Transition*, International Crisis Group, Africa Briefing No. 51, May 21, 2008, 3. Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/southern-africa/zimbabwe/B051%20Negotiating%20Zimbabwe%20Transition.ashx.

\textsuperscript{988} Ibid, 6.

\textsuperscript{989} For instance, on June 20, Amnesty International reported that “a dozen bodies of tortured civilians had been found,” and that more than 70 MDC supporters had been killed since March 31. Neil MacFarquhar and Celia Dugger, “South Africa Snubs U.S. Effort to Condemn Mugabe,” *New York Times*, June 20, 2008.

\textsuperscript{990} On April 16, during a meeting of the Council on “peace and security in Africa,” the electoral violence in Zimbabwe was discussed by representatives from several states. U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad made especially pointed remarks, arguing that, “The [Zimbabwean] Government and its supporters must desist immediately from violence and intimidation, act with restraint, respect human rights and allow the electoral process to continue unfettered.” SC, Verbatim, S/PV.5868 (April 16, 2008), 29. On April 30, the U.S. and Britain sought to include Zimbabwe on the Council’s agenda, but were opposed by eight states, sufficient to deny this request. Subsequently, the issue was discussed under the heading of “African Peace and Security.” “Zimbabwe: UN Snubs MDC-T,” *Africa News*, April 30, 2008.
who have been detained.”991 In support of this action, Khalilzad pointed out that the “political crisis” not only threatened the “people of Zimbabwe,” but also “regional peace and stability.”992 The June 27 election, in which Mugabe ran unopposed, drew a visceral response from the West.993 To prod Mugabe into quelling attacks on opponents and negotiating a power-sharing arrangement with the MDC, the U.S. and Britain then drafted a sanctions resolution, including an arms embargo and measures against top leaders. Following the vote, Khalilzad maintained that, “There should be no doubt that what is happening in Zimbabwe affects peace and security in the region.”994

**China Says “No”**

As it had on Darfur, China opposed the use of pressure against Burma and Zimbabwe. On September 15, 2006, during a deliberation on whether the Myanmar issue should be placed on the Council’s agenda, Wang Guangya made two points. First, he argued that it was “preposterous” to consider problems such as the HIV/AIDS epidemic, drug trafficking, and refugee issues as threats, since doing so “not only exceeds the mandate given by the Charter to the Council, but will also undermine the Council’s authority and legitimacy.” Wang also noted that most neighboring countries held similar


993 For instance, French UN Ambassador Jean-Marie Ripert said that, “What happened is a joke. Mugabe is a fake president and we will not accept it.” Benny Avni, “Pressure Builds on Mugabe Despite African Union’s Move,” *New York Sun*, July 2, 2008.

994 SC, Verbatim, S/PV.5933 (July 11, 2008), 14. In her report to the Council, Migiro had stated that, “the Secretary-General remains gravely concerned that the situation could deteriorate further, with violence spreading across the country and its effects spilling over into the region.” SC, Verbatim, S/PV.5929 (July 8, 2008), 3.
views. Second, he contended that the role of the international community was to “encourage Myanmar” and “create a favorable environment in the country,” which he posited could best be accomplished through the “good offices” visits of Ibrahim Gambari. In the ballot that followed, China, Russia, Congo and Qatar voted against the proposal, while Tanzania abstained.

Chinese officials made similar arguments after the U.S. circulated a draft resolution on January 10. That day, Liu Zhenmin argued that the Council “should focus on more important issues which are really threats to international peace and security.” A day later, an MFA spokesman rejected intervention on the grounds that, “We believe these are purely Myanmar’s internal affairs.” On the 12th, Wang defended his veto use on a similar basis. Specifically, he argued that, despite Burma’s shortcomings, “similar problems exist in many other countries.” If the Council took up this issue, then “the situations in all other 191 United Nations Member States may also need to be considered” by the UNSC. Instead, Wang said, the UN should play a role in facilitating political reconciliation through “a process of dialogue and engagement, which needs time and

995 SC, Verbatim, S/PV.5526 (September 15, 2006), 1. The English translation of “preposterous” is perhaps a slight overstatement. The word he used to describe the argument that governance issues should be treated as threats was beichangli, which might be better translated as “contrary to logic.” The Chinese version of the verbatim record can be found through UNbisnet. It is also notable that Wang was the only representative who requested to make a statement during this deliberation.

996 Ibid.

997 Since the question of whether or not to include an item on the Security Council’s agenda is considered a “procedural” vote, the two permanent members did not possess veto power. Procedural motions can be approved with a minimum of nine affirmative votes, as occurred in this instance.


999 “China Condemns UN Resolution Demanding Change in Myanmar,” AFP, January 11, 2007.
patience." Russia also voted against the draft, as did South Africa, while Qatar, Indonesia and Congo abstained.

With regard to Zimbabwe, China had opposed the inclusion of the issue in the Council’s agenda on April 29, but did not release a public justification. While it consented to the June PRST, it voted against the imposition of sanctions the following month. As with Myanmar, Wang’s rationale for exercising veto power to block the draft resolution was based on the view that the problem did not constitute a threat, and therefore fell outside of the Council’s jurisdiction. Wang also observed that mediation efforts sponsored by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) were continuing, and said that the Council should “respect the position of African countries” in favor of further talks and against the use of outside pressure. In addition, he criticized sanctions as counterproductive, asserting that, “Lightly using or threatening to use sanctions is not conducive to solving problems.” Along with China, Russia, Libya, South Africa and Vietnam cast negative votes, while Indonesia abstained.

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1001 China’s representative reportedly made a case against placing Zimbabwe on the agenda in a closed session of the UNSC, as did delegates from Russia, Libya, and Vietnam. Alejandro Wolff, the U.S. deputy representative, told the media that some Council members “think that the situation deserves more time and that ultimately it is up to the Zimbabwean people to resolve it themselves.” “Zimbabwe: UN Security Council Divided Over Crisis,” Africa News, April 30, 2008. China’s MFA spokesman did not address the issue at the next scheduled press conference (on May 7).

1002 Even then, on June 24, one day after the condemningatory PRST was approved (as well as a day after Tsvangirai’s withdrawal from the runoff), an MFA spokesman emphasized Beijing’s wish that the parties “resolve their disputes their dialogue and other peaceful means to complete their presidential election smoothly.” “China Urges Restraint in Crisis-Hit Zimbabwe,” AFP, June 24, 2008.

1003 Specifically, Wang said that the “development of the situation in Zimbabwe to date has not gone beyond the realm of internal affairs. It does not constitute a threat to the world’s peace and security.” SC, Verbatim, S/PV.5933 (July 11, 2008), 13.

Wang’s remarks on both cases echoed long-standing themes in China’s political rhetoric. As described in Chapter 1, Chinese statements on cases such as Iraq, Bosnia and Kosovo stressed issues of sovereignty and the disutility of coercion. However, not wishing to alienate itself from the U.S. or tarnish its reputation, Beijing usually abstained rather than use its veto power. Given the possible political costs of disrupting Western proposals, and the fact that both votes occurred in the period prior to the Olympics, why was the PRC willing to vote negatively?

Attractive Alternatives

One possible explanation, as captured by Hypothesis 1, is that more efficacious options to resolve the dilemmas posed by Burma and Zimbabwe existed. Rather than consenting to punitive measures, which may have led to a further deterioration and thus placed China’s interests in even greater jeopardy, Beijing opted to support conflict resolution mechanisms that would both help to alleviate the extant problems, and do so in a way conducive to stability.

Burma: Alternatives on Three Levels

With regard to Myanmar, we need to evaluate alternate options at three levels: China’s bilateral efforts, ASEAN mediation, and the “good offices” missions of the UN Secretary General. In its bilateral interactions, China acted as a “low-level interventionist power.”1005 Beijing was unwilling to countenance a neighbor that was unpredictable, xenophobic and completely self-isolated, but was also unwilling to attempt to dictate the state’s policies by fiat. Since China’s priority was stability, it did not seek a sudden

regime change in the country, or attempt to win particular human rights concessions, such as the release of political prisoners. Rather, China confined its involvement to pressing issues, such as the illegal drug trade and the security of the 2,000 kilometer-long border. China may have advocated an opening to the international community, but one that was gradual and conducive to regional stability.1006

These priorities are exemplified in the nature of China’s high-level diplomacy in the two years leading up to the Western push for Council intervention. While the top two generals, Than Shwe and Maung Aye, rarely visited the PRC and seemed to prefer to develop ties with Russia and India, other officials did maintain regular contacts with China.1007 Wen Jiabao met with Prime Minister Soe Win on the margins of an ASEAN conference in December 2005, with the two agreeing to strengthen cooperation on combating drug trafficking.1008 Later that month, Maung Aye hosted a delegation of Chinese military leaders to discuss border control issues.1009 In February 2006, Soe Win met with Wen and Hu in Beijing, discussing the drug trade and Burma’s treatment of its ethnic Chinese population.1010 In October, Soe Win again conversed with Wen on drug

1006 Ibid.

1007 As of 2007, Than Shwe had not travelled to China since 2003, but had visited India, while Maung Aye “rarely visits China” and “has been relatively keen to develop better ties with Russia and India.” Win, “Internal Dynamics of the Burmese Military,” 36. An explanation for this proclivity is that both Than and Maung had fought Chinese-sponsored guerilla forces during the Cold War and harbored suspicions towards the PRC. Clapp, “Burma,” 139-140.


1009 The PLA delegation was led by Lt. Gen. Gui Quanzhi, vice commander of the Chengdu Military Region, which sits astride the Burmese border. The two sides had established defense consultative talks in December, 2004.

1010 Li Zhongfa and Liao Lei, “Premier Wen Jiabao Holds Talks with Myanmar’s Prime Minister Soe Win,” Xinhua, February 14, 2006.
trafficking and “other cross-border crimes.” At least publicly, Beijing did not address the issue of democracy, limiting its agenda to matters of common security.

At the regional level, ASEAN made only a modest attempt to intervene in Burma’s internal political situation. In December 2005, ASEAN appointed Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid as a special envoy for Myanmar. Due to Burmese intransigence, Hamid was not issued a visa until March 2006. During his first and only trip in this capacity, he was unable to meet with either Than Shwe or Suu Kyi, though was able to speak with Soe Win and others. Afterwards, when asked about national reconciliation in the country, Hamid responded that, “It is very slow moving.” With little progress having been made, Hamid wrote an editorial in July in which he expressed frustration:

In the past, I have impressed upon the Myanmar leadership the importance of cooperating with ASEAN. I have stressed that we are their best hope before international impatience leads to punitive actions. Unfortunately, Myanmar appears to be deliberate in its disregard for our goodwill and concern.


1012 In particular, from March 23-4, Albar met with Soe Win and Foreign Minister Nyan Win, and other government ministers. He did not meet with Than Shwe or Maung Aye, nor did he meet with NLD representatives. “ASEAN to Decide on Future Visit to Myanmar,” Malaysia General News, April 7, 2006.


At a summit in late July, ASEAN foreign ministers claimed no success and called for “tangible progress that would lead to peaceful transition to democracy in the near future.” This was not a basis on which China could cite a credible alternative to pressure.

In August, under growing pressure for engagement by ASEAN, the junta slightly relaxed its posture. Alberto Romulo, Foreign Minister of the Philippines, was permitted to make a three-day visit to Myanmar in his capacity as rotating chair of ASEAN. During this trip, Romulo was permitted to meet with Than Shwe and Maung Aye, and encouraged the generals to follow through on their professed “road map” for democratization. He was not able to meet with Suu Kyi, though did convey ASEAN’s wishes that she and other detainees be released. Based on his visit, Romulo told the media that, “There is some light at the end of the tunnel [for] reconciliation in Myanmar.” Although it did not produce tangible results, this event provided China


1016 Earlier in the month, Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was also able to meet with Than Shwe in a brief visit to Naypyitaw. The nature of their conversation, however, was unclear. “Thaksin’s Visit to Myanmar Sparks Rumors,” Malaysia General News, August 3, 2006.

1017 The “road map” is a seven-point plan proposed by the junta in 2003 for national reconciliation. The first step is the holding of a national convention, which would eventually draft a new constitution. This convention had initially been held in the 1990s, and then suspended before being reconvened in December, 2005. However, international observers condemned the process as non-inclusive. The UN’s representative for human rights in Myanmar reported in early 2006 that, “Procedural conditions and restrictions remain, legitimate political representatives are not included and apparently the concerns of ethnic parties have not been addressed.” “Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar,” UN Economic and Social Council Document E/CN.4/2006/34 (February 7, 2006), 9.

1018 “Philippine Foreign Secretary Optimistic on Burmese Democracy,” BBC Monitoring-Asia Pacific, August 15, 2006.

1019 Taking note of Myanmar’s lack of visible progress, one analyst concluded, “The implicit Myanmar reaction to ASEAN is the same as its explicit answer to the United Nations and Western pressure: that there will be no change in policy and the [existing] policies will be carried out unswervingly.” Donald E.
with an argument that the Myanmar issue did not belong in the Council. As Wang said in September, Romulo’s trip “served to boost ASEAN’s confidence in finding a successful solution to the question of Myanmar on its own.”

At the level of the UN, dialogue with the junta was mainly carried out by the Secretary-General’s special envoys. In April 2000, in an attempt to facilitate democratization, Kofi Annan appointed the Malaysian diplomat Razali Ismail as his representative to Burma. Razali was able to forge a working relationship with Khin Nyunt, but was refused entry to the country after the latter was deposed in 2004. In January 2006, Razali resigned in frustration, stating that, “It is clear that they (i.e. the junta) do not want me back.” Similarly, the UN High Commissioner for Human Right’s Special Rapporteur for Myanmar, Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, had been unable to visit the country since 2003.

However, in 2006, the junta agreed to two visits by Ibrahim Gambari, who served as Kofi Annan’s representative. First, in May, Gambari met with Than Shwe and Maung Aye, and was permitted to visit Suu Kyi and other NLD leaders. Gambari addressed the


SC, Verbatim, S/PV.5526 (September 15, 2006), 2.

In addition to his relationship with Khin, Ismail had been able to meet with both Than Shwe and Aung San Suu Kyi, and made a dozen trips to the country in the early 2000s. R. Hariharan, “Myanmar: UN Security Council’s Move to Tackle the Military Regime,” South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 1955, September 17, 2006. Available online at: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers20/paper1955.html.


Pinheiro, who had been appointed in 2000, had been able to make five “fact-finding missions” to Myanmar. His last trip prior to the Security Council debates in 2006-7 was in November 2003. At that point, Pinheiro described “significant setbacks in the process of political transition” after a crackdown on the NLD that had occurred the previous May. See: “Special Rapporteur on Situation in Myanmar Ends Visit to Country,” OHCHR Press Release, November 7, 2003.
humanitarian situation; democratization; violence against ethnic minorities, especially those in Karen State on the Thai border; and the detainment of political prisoners.

Reporting the outcome of Gambari’s visit to the General Assembly, Annan wrote that, while “more tangible progress is needed,” the UN’s “effort to begin constructive dialogue was generally well-received.”

Gambari made a second trip in November. As before, he was able to meet with Than Shwe and Maung Aye. Topics included the release of Suu Kyi, who he met again; cooperation with international humanitarian groups; cessation of violence in border regions; and the need for an “inclusive, participatory and transparent” political process.

Afterwards, Gambari told the press that it was now “up to the authorities to have some concrete results from that visit.”

On November 27, he told the Council that the junta had taken some “small steps,” including the release of a small number of political prisoners, though he was waiting for the “government to take further steps to respond to the concerns of the international community.”

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1024 In addition to the need for tangible progress, Annan also wrote that, “a genuine process of democratization and national reconciliation has yet to be launched.” “Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar,” General Assembly Document A/61/504 (October 9, 2006), 4-5.

1025 In addition, Gambari met with representatives from various ethnic minorities in Yangon on the sidelines of the National Convention, which had again resumed in October. “Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar,” General Assembly Document A/62/498 (October 22, 2007), 4.

1026 Shino Yuasa, “Top UN Envoy Urges Myanmar to Free Suu Kyi,” AFP, November 13, 2006. Gambari also said that, “I was pleased with the discussion but the outcome of the visit depends on what concrete and positive decisions are taken in a number of areas.” “UN Envoy Awaits ‘Concrete Steps’ from Junta After Visit,” The Nation (Bangkok), November 14, 2006.

As with Romulo’s mission in August, the willingness of the junta to host Gambari was cited by China as a reason to support the continuation of dialogue. In September, Wang argued that Gambari’s trip “indicated that Myanmar was ready and willing to collaborate with the United Nations and turn over a new leaf,” and “had successful results.”

In December, after the U.S. had announced its intention of seeking a resolution, a Chinese diplomat pointed to Gambari’s second trip as a reason to reject punitive measures.

On January 11, in defending his veto, Wang said that Gambari had made “certain progress” and that UNSC action would “hinder discussions” and “bring no benefit” to the Secretary-General’s mission. For China, signs that the junta was prepared to engage in a minimal level of consultation with the outside world were sufficient to oppose calls for a more invasive response.

Zimbabwe and the Role of South Africa

In contrast to Myanmar, there was only one active external route available with respect to Zimbabwe: the mediation role of South African President Thabo Mbeki.

Bilaterally, China’s role was minimal. It did not attempt to act as a broker, as it had on

1028 SC, Verbatim, S/PV.5526 (September 15, 2006), 2.
1029 This argument was reportedly made during a closed session of the Council. “U.S. to Press for UN Security Council Action on Myanmar,” Kyodo (Tokyo), December 4, 2006.
1030 SC, Verbatim, S/PV.5619 (January 12, 2007), 2-3. The same day, an MFA spokesman made a similar argument:

The international community may make some constructive efforts to settle the [Myanmar] question, supporting mediation efforts by ASEAN and the special envoy of the UN Secretary-General and encouraging the government of Myanmar to further cooperate with the international community.

At the level of the UN, Ban Ki-moon had tasked an Assistant Secretary-General, Haile Menkerios, with assessing the situation in Zimbabwe after electoral violence erupted in the spring of 2008. Menkerios was able to meet with Mugabe and Tsvangirai, but reported to Ban that “conditions did not exist for free and fair elections” and that “no outcome of an election run under these circumstances could be considered credible.” On July 8, G8 members meeting in Hokkaido, Japan, advocated the appointment of a high-level envoy for Zimbabwe who would “support regional efforts to take forward mediation between political parties.” However, this did not occur and the locus of the international effort remained at the regional level.

Mbeki was appointed mediator in March 2007, during an SADC meeting in Tanzania on the issue of the deteriorating situation in Zimbabwe. When violence broke out after the general election a year later, the SADC reaffirmed Mbeki’s role and

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1032 These comments were related to Council members by Menkerios’s superior, Under-Secretary for Political Affairs Lynn Pascoe, in a June 23 briefing. SC, Verbatim, S/PV.5919 (June 23, 2008), 3. On June 3, Ban had spoken with Mugabe on the sidelines of the World Food Summit in Rome, and secured the latter’s approval for a visit by Menkerios. John Heilprin, “Ban Gain’s Mugabe’s Permission to Send UN Envoy to Help with Zimbabwe Election,” AP, June 5, 2008.


1034 The SADC session was sparked by a political crackdown in which Tsvangirai and several of his supporters were assaulted and taken into custody. In addition to appointing Mbeki as mediator, SADC leaders declared that all forms of sanctions against Zimbabwe (which were believed to have contributed to the situation) be lifted, and an economic rescue package be offered. Badza, “Zimbabwe’s 2008 Elections and their Implications for Africa,” 6.
mandated that he facilitate talks between the rival parties. An initial problem that emerged was that, to the MDC, Mbeki appeared to downplay the gravity of the political violence. On April 17, Tsvangirai called on Mbeki to step down after the latter had said that there was “no crisis” in Zimbabwe. In June, Mbeki unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Mugabe to meet with Tsvangirai and cancel the runoff in favor of talks aimed at the formation of a unity government. On July 3, Tsvangirai repeated his concerns about Mbeki’s role, asked that additional regional facilitators be included, and pledged that, “If this does not happen, then the MDC will not be part of the mediation process.” In short, the Mbeki-led pathway appeared to have stalled in the week before the U.S. and Britain submitted their draft resolution to the Council.

Nevertheless, a window of opportunity for inter-party reconciliation opened just prior to the UNSC vote. On July 8, Mugabe signaled the possibility of resuming talks with the MDC. The next day, Liu Zhenmin affirmed that China would “support the mediation efforts.” On the 10th, Tsvangirai sent representatives to Pretoria to discuss the preconditions for a settlement with ZANU-PF delegates. The MDC leader stated that his goal was to find a “peaceful, negotiated solution to the Zimbabwe crisis,” which

1035 Ibid, 10.
1036 “Tsvangirai Calls on Mbeki to Quit as Zimbabwe Mediator,” AFP, April 17, 2008.
1037 Basildon Peta, Peter Fabricius, and Siyabonga Mkhwanazi, “Mbeki’s Mission Fails,” The Star (South Africa), June 20, 2008.
would require that Mugabe cease attacks on MDC supporters.\textsuperscript{1041} By the 11\textsuperscript{th}, the two sides were still engaged in “talks about talks,” with no formula regarding a power-sharing agreement having been reached.\textsuperscript{1042} Washington cited the lack of progress as a reason to call for a vote.\textsuperscript{1043} However, for Beijing, Mugabe’s willingness to enter into negotiations with his rival provided a sufficient basis on which to reject sanctions. As Wang Guangya argued, imposing sanctions would mean “interfering with the negotiation process. That would lead to a further deterioration of the situation.”\textsuperscript{1044}

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This discussion suggests that China maintained a relatively low threshold in evaluating the feasibility of alternative dispute resolution pathways. Though no “concrete” results affecting the political situation in either country issued from external mediation efforts, the willingness of the Burmese and Zimbabwean authorities to participate was itself evidence of progress. The U.S., on the other hand, viewed these processes as ineffective and sought to use the UNSC to underscore its commitment to democracy.


\textsuperscript{1042} After the first day of talks, Tsvangirai denied that progress had been made, telling a reporter: “Those persons portraying this meeting as the beginning of negotiations between the MDC and ZANU-PF are being disingenuous and exploiting the plight of the Zimbabwean people for political gain.” Basildon Peta, “Rivals Divided Over Power-Sharing Deal,” \textit{The Star} (South Africa), July 11, 2008.

\textsuperscript{1043} In his speech following the vote, Khalilzad maintained that “there are no serious, substantive negotiations under way between the Mugabe regime and the opposition…” SC, Verbatim, S/PV.5933 (July 11, 2008), 14.

\textsuperscript{1044} Ibid, 13. In addition, an editorial in the People’s Daily justifying China’s veto asserted that the Mbeki-sponsored talks in South Africa had attained “preliminary results,” and that, as a result, there was a reason to allow more time before taking punitive steps. Pei Guangjiang, “Jianchi yi jianshexing fangshi tuidong Jinhaiweihui hejie jincheng,” (Promoting the Zimbabwe Peace Process though Constructive Means), \textit{Renmin Ribao} (People’s Daily), July 13, 2008.
Symbolic Resolutions and the Veto

Hypothesis 2 is that China is more likely to agree to Council measures when the U.S. has attempted to reduce risks by making side-payments or concessions. Conversely, it is less likely that a consensus can be reached when the U.S. has not demonstrated flexibility. This section shows that Washington’s goal on both Burma and Zimbabwe was to make a political statement, not to reach consensus. Yet, at least on the first case, it is doubtful that compromise would have been possible even if the U.S. had continued to modify its draft.

Burma

U.S. advocacy of human rights in Burma through the Security Council originated in October 2005 when, as part of a series of White House meetings with dissidents, Bush met with Charm Tong, a prominent Burmese refugee, who described the internal political situation in detail. Violation of religious rights, especially against Christian minorities, seemed to register in particular. This encounter coincided with the emphasis on democracy promotion shared by both Bush and Condoleezza Rice, who in her confirmation hearing as Secretary of State branded Myanmar as an “outpost of tyranny” and pledged that the U.S. would “spread freedom and democracy throughout the globe.” As such, Burma became a “test case” for U.S. commitment to democratic activists in

1046 Steinberg reports that Burmese Christian activists could be “effective lobbyists” in Washington, and notes that the rate of Christians in some states reached 70%. Steinberg, “The United States and Its Allies,” 231.
Southeast Asia, and an element of the broader “Freedom Agenda” that the Bush Administration pursued during its tenure.\footnote{Rice singled out six regimes in her Senate hearing. The other five were North Korea, Iran, Cuba, Belarus and Zimbabwe. “Rice Targets 6 ‘Outposts of Tyranny,’” \textit{Washington Times}, January 19, 2005.}

For the U.S., bringing the matter to the UNSC served two purposes. One was voicing solidarity with Aung San Suu Kyi, whose detention had been extended by one year in May 2006, and others. In September, a spokesman for Laura Bush, who had become involved in the U.S. advocacy effort, said that, even if a vote was ultimately unsuccessful, placing the matter on the agenda “would be a success in itself.”\footnote{“Laura Bush to Push for UN Action on Myanmar,” \textit{AFP}, September 14, 2006.}

On September 30, after the Council had decided, in a split vote, to take up the issue of Burma, Bolton said that,

We are hearing that the fact that the Security Council cares about Burma has gotten through to the Burmese people in spite of all the regime’s efforts to block it, and has given them new hope.\footnote{Cited in Nora Boustany, “UN Security Council Takes Up Discussion of Rights in Burma,” \textit{The Washington Post}, September 30, 2006.}

In November, after announcing that the U.S. would seek a resolution despite Chinese objections, Nicholas Burns made the point that, “We’ve made Burma into a real object of concern.”\footnote{Glenn Kessler, “U.S. Wants UN Resolution on Burma,” \textit{The Washington Post}, November 18, 2006.}

Officials made similar remarks in January, before and just after the vote. On the 10\textsuperscript{th}, declining to answer a question about the strength of support for the U.S. draft, Alejandro Wolff remarked that, “The people of Burma are watching and require our help
and support.”  Two days later, a State Department spokesman dodged a question about whether China might use its veto power, but said, “We think that this resolution sends a very clear signal of concern on the part of the Security Council about the situation in Burma.” After the vote, explaining why the U.S. had called for a ballot it knew would fail, Burns stated, “We forced this onto the agenda for one reason. The Security Council is the only place that can deal with human rights.” Wolff observed that the draft had gained the support of the majority of Council members, and said the effort was intended to “send a clear signal” to the Burmese people “that we have not forgotten you and we won’t forget you.”

The second purpose in raising the matter was requiring other Council members to make a public choice between “democracy” and support for authoritarian leaders. On September 1, prior to the issue having been placed on the agenda, Bolton argued that, …there are times when you have to vote, there are times when people have to go on the record and say what their position is. We think that the time has come to do that with Burma, and we’re prepared to put it to a vote.

In another instance, hinting at the choice that China and Russia would have to make, Bolton argued that “governments, permanent or otherwise, will have to consider how

1051 Wolff’s response to the question about chances of success was: “Well, I’d like to say I have confidence in our persuasive powers, but the facts of the case speak for themselves.” “Media Stakeout with Alejandro Wolff,” Federal News Service, January 10, 2007.


1054 Nine states voted in favor of the draft, which would have been sufficient for passage if not for the two vetoes. “Media Stakeout with Ambassador Alejandro Wolff,” Federal News Service, January 12, 2007.

they’re going to approach [the vote].” More explicitly, Warren Hoge, who covered the UN debate for the *New York Times*, recalled that the U.S. “wanted to embarrass China.” Though the U.S. lost the vote, it was able to place its opponents on the defensive.

Given its symbolic goals, the U.S. did not engage in a cycle of concession-making. However, it is doubtful that any flexibility regarding the text would have affected China’s position. The reason is that Beijing was not opposed to the substance of the draft. Instead, it was opposed to the issue being considered by the Council at all. As Colin Keating argues, using the UNSC as a platform for democratic advocacy towards Burma was seen as a “bridge too far” for states, including China and Russia, that had been frustrated by the hubris in U.S. foreign policy under Bush. The PRC was especially concerned that signals of support for Aung San Suu Kyi and others was designed to create chaos around China’s borders and containing China itself. Such

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1058 Similarly, a Western diplomat with firsthand knowledge of the negotiations said that the U.S. had sought a vote in order to “raise the (political) costs” on China for failing to do more to pressure the junta on political reform. Interview with Western diplomat, New York, February 2010.

1059 However, the U.S. did make some minor changes to the draft. For instance, the initial draft circulated in December 2006, the document expressed “grave concern that the overall situation in Myanmar has deteriorated and poses serious risks to peace and security in the region.” The final draft more obliquely underlined “the need for tangible progress in the overall situation in Myanmar in order to minimize the risks to peace and security in the region.” This modification was not aimed at China, which, as discussed below, would not have consented to any draft, but perhaps at a wavering non-permanent member, with the aim of securing nine votes in favor. Gerard Aziakou, “U.S. Circulates UN Draft Calling for Release of Political Detainees in Myanmar,” *AFP*, December 14, 2006.


1061 Green and Mitchell, “Asia’s Forgotten Crisis.” For a Chinese argument that democratization was a pretext for containment, see Ni, “ZhongMei guanxi zhong de Miandian wenti,” 8-9.
fears were likely exacerbated by the “color revolutions” in the Caucasus in 2004-5, which were linked to aggressive U.S. democratic promotion. Arguably, even if Washington had softened the draft beyond its already mild form, China still would have voted negatively.

**Zimbabwe**

Like Burma, Zimbabwe fit into the Bush Administration’s “Freedom Agenda” and had been counted by Rice as an “outpost of tyranny” in her January 2005 confirmation hearing. In the wake of Operation Murambatsvina in the spring of 2005, the U.S. expanded its unilateral sanctions against Zimbabwean officials and institutions, and Bush, in June, said that the “world needs to speak very clearly about the decisions [Mugabe] has made, and the consequences” for those decisions. Though the U.S. had placed the burden of managing the situation in Zimbabwe on regional actors, including South Africa, it gradually became inclined to view the Council as a means of pressuring Mugabe as well. U.S. concern was piqued after the March 2008 presidential election,

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1062 Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small, “China’s New Dictatorship Diplomacy.”

1063 Indeed, the draft, as it was voted on, was fairly mild. Though it called on the junta to desist violence against minority groups, take “concrete steps” to effect the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, and begin a “substantive political dialogue” that would lead to a “genuine political transition,” it did not describe the situation in Burma as “threat” to international peace, refer to Chapter VII, or threaten the imposition of sanctions. It even said that the Council “welcomes” the Myanmar government’s progress on combating drug trafficking in the region. SC Document S/2007/14 (January 12, 2007).


with the American ambassador in Harare describing the campaign of violence against opposition figures as “absolute brutality.”

Though the U.S. had been able to secure a PRST on June 23 calling for a cessation of violence, attacks on MDC supporters continued. At this point, Washington’s objective was not merely to make a political statement, but to use sanctions to stem the violence. On the 26th, after Tsvangirai had withdrawn, Rice said that the runoff results would not be “legitimate” with the “forces of President Mugabe doing the things that they’re doing and claiming…an election victory.” Two days later, she optimistically predicted that, “it’s hard to imagine that anybody could fail to act given what we’re all watching on the ground in Zimbabwe.” On the 30th, she met with Yang Jiechi and urged him to instruct the PRC ambassador in New York to agree to consultations on a Zimbabwe draft. The same day, Khalilzad confirmed that the U.S. would seek sanctions with the intention of responding to Mugabe’s defiant continuation of repression after the PRST demanded that it stop.

Substantive talks on the contents of a sanctions resolution took place in the first week of July. On the 2nd, Khalilzad noted that the U.S. was “working on a resolution,” had discussed the contents with “like-minded countries” and would broaden the

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1066 Negotiating Zimbabwe’s Transition, 11.
1070 In particular, Khalilzad admitted that sanctions may not “change the situation immediately,” but argued that “not doing anything allowing [Mugabe] to thumb his nose at the United Nations Security Council is not going to be very helpful.” “Media Stakeout with Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad,” Federal News Service, June 30, 2008.
consultations to include others that day.\textsuperscript{1071} The next day an experts-level meeting was held on the terms of the draft, with no sign of an impending Sino-Russian veto.\textsuperscript{1072} On the 8\textsuperscript{th}, at the request of Russia, the U.S. postponed a vote on the draft. According to Churkin, Moscow was seeking a “strong and clear” signal from the Council and argued that a delay was necessary so that “we can be as united as we can.”\textsuperscript{1073} At the same time, Khalilzad indicated that discussions continued, and that he did not “believe that [the Russians] have decided to vote against the resolution.”\textsuperscript{1074} On the 9\textsuperscript{th}, two days before the vote, Khalilzad reiterated that the U.S. goal was to secure support for sanctions. His assessment was that a “majority” of Council members were “persuaded that by the argument that we have to act” in a way that “gets us out of the current crisis.”\textsuperscript{1075}

As mentioned above, Russia’s position rapidly switched to opposition to sanctions after the G8 Declaration was issued. For the U.S., the choice was to either scuttle plans for an arms embargo or concede to another “request” on Harare, or to proceed with a vote that would fail, but make a symbolic gesture.\textsuperscript{1076} Reportedly at the insistence of


\textsuperscript{1072} “Ambassador Khalilzad Issues Remarks on Zimbabwe at Security Council Stakeout,” \textit{US Fed News}, July 3, 2008. The same day, a list of names of potential sanctions targets was distributed, which suggests that the expert-level consultations were focused, at least in part, on which Zimbabwean officials to include in the draft list. Matthew Russell Lee, “At UN, Zimbabwe Resolution Unveiled, with Name Games and Notice of Sanctions, Perhaps No Veto,” \textit{InnerCityPress}, July 3, 2008.


\textsuperscript{1075} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{1076} Speaking after the vote on the 11\textsuperscript{th}, Khalilzad explained that what Russia had asked for was “yet another request, a resolution that we only, I’m assuming, would have only made request of the regime, without incentivizing it to take what we are saying seriously because [the Zimbabwean authorities] did thumb their noses at what we asked of them before (i.e. via the June 23 PRST).” “Media Stakeout with Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad,” \textit{Federal News Service}, July 11, 2008. It is also worth noting that South Africa did propose, but then withdrew, a potential compromise that would have established a 30-day
Britain, the U.S. choice was that a vote, which would force China and Russia to “publicly take a stand in support of Mr. Mugabe and the violence promulgated by his supporters to steal the election,” was preferable to a weak resolution. A Western diplomat involved in the case recalled that the U.S. “knew that [the effort] was going down in flames,” but was still able to make a political statement. After the vote, Khalilzad noted that nine Council states had “stood with the people of Zimbabwe,” even as “China and Russia have stood with Mugabe against the people of Zimbabwe.”

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The preceding discussion found mixed support for Hypothesis 2. On Burma, the U.S. goal was to show support for democratic activists, not to achieve a compromise text. However, it is improbable that China would have agreed to any formulation, given its objection to any external involvement in the matter. Regarding Zimbabwe, Washington pursued a substantive decision, but would not concede to Russian demands for a weaker outcome. Rather, the U.S. forced a vote to make a political statement.

**Political Dynamics**

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1077 Interview with Colin Keating, Security Council Report, January 2010. Keating argues that pushing the resolution was a “bit of hubris” on the part of the British, and that sanctions would have effectively destroyed the chance of mediations leading to a unity government.


1079 Interview, Western diplomat, New York, January 2010.

1080 *SC, Verbatim, S/PV.5933* (July 11, 2008), 14.
Hypotheses 3 through 5 concern the political stakes of opposing the U.S. and its partners. In this context, Hypothesis 3 would predict that Washington did not use high level diplomacy to press Beijing to support punitive measures. Hypothesis 4 would expect that Russia did not move towards the Western position, thereby providing China a potential second veto. Lastly, Hypothesis 4 would predict that regional stakeholders were generally opposed the use of pressure.

U.S. Priorities

There is little evidence that U.S. policymakers exerted diplomatic pressure on their Chinese counterparts to support UNSC action on Myanmar or Zimbabwe. Regarding Burma, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns noted in November 2006 that he had held “long conversations” on the topic during a visit to Beijing and that the U.S. had “made this front and center in our relationship.”

However, this claim was belied by an admission by the State Department that Rice had had no contact with Yang Jiechi in the days leading up to the vote in January 2007. On Zimbabwe, Rice did raise the issue with Yang in a June 30, 2008, meeting, though the latter responded by reiterating China’s support for continued dialogue. More importantly, Bush apparently did not discuss Zimbabwe in his session with Hu on the

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1082 In a press conference, the State Department spokesman was asked, “Have you had any discussions with China and Russia at a senior level to see whether you can encourage them to vote with you on this?” The respond was, “I’m just checking here just to make sure—certainly has not been, as far as I know, any Secretarial calls to her Chinese counterpart over the last couple of days.” “State Dept. Conducts Daily Press Briefing,” *US Fed News*, January 12, 2007.

sidelines of the G8 summit in Hokkaido. Instead, the two leaders covered matters including trade, Darfur, Taiwan and the North Korean nuclear issue.\footnote{1084}

From the perspective that the Bush Administration had advocated democracy promotion, the lack of pressure on China to support the U.S. on political repression in Burma and Zimbabwe is surprising.\footnote{1085} However, the explanation is straightforward: the U.S. needed China’s cooperation on a series of strategically more important issues. As regards Myanmar, a month after the U.S. had fought to place the matter on the Council’s agenda, North Korea carried out a nuclear test. As recounted in Chapter 3, this required U.S. officials to persuade Beijing to consent to a round of sanctions on the DPRK.\footnote{1086} Moreover, in mid-December 2006, U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson travelled to Beijing for the inaugural session of the Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED), seeking to foster communications on a range of central economic issues, from intellectual property rights concerns, to currency reform, to the trade balance.\footnote{1087} Given these interests, the

\footnote{1084}“Chinese President Meets Bush on Bilateral Ties, Six-Party Talks, Taiwan,” Xinhua, July 9, 2008; “Hu Thanks Bush for Olympics Visit,” AFP, July 9, 2008.

\footnote{1085} The Bush Administration had advocated democracy promotion under the heading of the ‘Freedom Agenda,’ which was a phrase that encompassed a variety of programs, from the invasion of Iraq in 2003, to subsidizing the UN peacekeeping operation in Darfur, to increasing the budget of the National Endowment for Democracy. The scope of this ‘agenda’ is described on Bush’s website: \url{http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/freedomagenda/}. Among domestic critics of Bush’s emphasis on democracy promotion were Henry Hyde, the Republican chairman of the House International Relations Committee, and Henry Kissinger. In May 2005, Kissinger wrote that, “It is not possible to apply automatically models created over centuries in the homogenous societies of Europe and America to ethnically diverse and religiously divided societies in the Middle East, Asia and Africa.” Henry Kissinger, “Realists vs. Idealists,” \emph{International Herald Tribune}, May 12, 2005. In February 2006, Hyde said that haphazard efforts at democratization would become an “uncontrollable experiment with an outcome faced by the Sorcerer’s Apprentice.” Quoted in Jennifer Windsor, “Advancing the Freedom Agenda: Time for a Recalibration?” \emph{The Washington Quarterly} 29 (2006), 22-3.

\footnote{1086} In addition, though China was less centrally involved, the U.S. was attempting to assemble international support for the first round of sanctions on Iran in December 2006, just prior to the vote on Myanmar. See Chapter 4.

\footnote{1087} Moreover, in the fall of 2006 the U.S. was attempting to make progress on military-military relations with China, carrying out joint exercises and dispatching the commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet to Beijing
U.S. did not push hard on a matter “in the backwaters of U.S. foreign policy priorities.”\textsuperscript{1088}

Overriding concerns vis-à-vis China also lowered the priority of Zimbabwe. First, in economic terms, the two sides had completed the fourth session of the SED in June 2008, with the U.S. seeking Chinese approval of a framework on energy and environmental issues, in addition to pursuing a bilateral investment treaty, which would expand Chinese markets for U.S. exporters. Second was the resumption of the U.S.-China Security Dialogue, which had last been held in 2004 and reflected the desire by the U.S. for enhanced coordination on nuclear non-proliferation and related issues.\textsuperscript{1089} Third, as evidenced by Bush’s discussion with Hu in July, the U.S. placed the regional problems of Taiwan and North Korea high on the bilateral agenda. As with Burma, the U.S. was unprepared to prioritize an issue in which it held no major stakes at a time when it needed China’s cooperation in other arenas.

\textit{Russia}

While Russia concurred with China’s view that neither Myanmar nor Zimbabwe should be discussed by the Council, its role in the two cases differed. Regarding Burma, Russia echoed China’s position, but did not lead the opposition. In September 2006, Vitaly Churkin voted against including the item on the Council’s agenda, though did not

\textsuperscript{1088} Clapp, “Burma,” 154. Justifying this assertion, Clapp notes that the U.S. had no commercial interests in Burma, and that the SPDC had generally cooperated with the U.S. on counter-terrorism in the wake of 9/11.

provide an explanation. On January 10, 2007, he declined to confirm that Russia would use its veto, but said that, “We think it’s not a proper issue to discuss in the Security Council.” The next day, after voting against the draft resolution, Churkin made only brief remarks, stating that other UN bodies, such as the Human Rights Council, were more appropriate venues in which to discuss the situation. As with China, his argument was that, “We deem unacceptable any attempt to use the Security Council to discuss issues outside its purview.” Although Russia provided the PRC with a second veto, it was not particularly outspoken in its opposition.

With respect to Zimbabwe, Russia’s position quickly shifted from apparent support for the U.S.-British draft to resistance. On July 8, in Hokkaido, Russian President Medvedev consented to the text of a joint communiqué of G8 leaders that questioned the “legitimacy” of the election results, called for the appointment of a UN special envoy, and warned that, “We will take further steps, inter alia introducing financial and other

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1090 During the September 15 Council session, only China and Qatar provided remarks to explain their negative votes.

1091 Edith Lederer, “U.S. Introduces Resolution Saying Situation in Myanmar ‘Poses Serious Risks to Peace’ and Calling for Release of Political Prisoners,” AP, January 10, 2007. A week earlier, Churkin had made a similar comment, that “We consider that Myanmar’s situation poses no threat to world peace and security.” “Russia to Vote Against Tough Resolution on Myanmar in UNSC,” ITAR-TASS (Moscow), January 3, 2007. WNC reference: 200604031477.1_0ef90024ca2fd386.

1092 Russia’s explanation of its veto differed slightly from China’s in the sense that Churkin did mention the Human Rights Council and other bodies of the UN system (including the International Organization for Migration and the World Health Organization) while Wang—in much longer remarks—referenced only the Gambari mission. Wang’s emphasis was on the role of ASEAN, which Churkin did not mention. SC, Verbatim, S/PV.5619 (January 12, 2007), 6.

1093 The reasons for Russia’s low profile were likely twofold. First, the draft resolution made no reference to the threat or use of force, which was a common basis for Russian objections on other issues (such as Iran). Second, Russia had virtually no economic relationship with Myanmar. In 2007, bilateral trade stood at about $17 million, compared to a China-Myanmar trade valued at over $2 billion. Source: UNComtrade database.
measures against those individuals responsible for violence.”

However, Russia’s commitment to this pledge softened soon afterwards, as Medvedev pointed out that the communiqué did not necessarily imply UN sanctions. In New York, Churkin said that some part of the draft were “quite excessive and clearly in conflict with the notion of sovereignty of a state member of the United Nations.”

In discussions between U.S. and British diplomats on the 9th, Mark Malloch Brown, Britain’s senior official on African affairs, suggested that, while China was unlikely to use its veto, due to the desire to protect its image ahead of the Olympics, Russia was now “more problematic.”

Given Russia’s support for the G8 declaration, its veto on July 11 drew considerable ire from the U.S. and its partners. Conversely, China, which had refrained from making any statements on the issue, received little criticism. Khalilzad termed Russia’s vote “particularly surprising and disturbing,” and opined that Russia’s vote raised doubts about its “reliability as a G8 partner.”

He made no specific mention of China’s veto. British Foreign Secretary David Miliband echoed this theme, arguing that,

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1094 A text of the statement can be found online, at: [http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2008hokkaido/2008-zim.html](http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2008hokkaido/2008-zim.html).

1095 Medvedev had told the press that the G8 declaration on Zimbabwe had made “no concrete decisions on how the UN should act.” “G8 Makes No Concrete Decisions on Sanctions Against Zimbabwe,” Interfax (Moscow), July 9, 2008. Alexander Pankin, a Russian Foreign Ministry official traveling with Medvedev, stated less equivocally that Moscow was “against financial or other sanctions because we don’t believe in sanctions in this particular case as an effective tool.” “Russia Opposed to New Zimbabwe Sanctions: Official,” AFP, July 8, 2008.

1096 However, Churkin refused to state whether or not Russia intended to use its veto, saying only that the outcome of a vote would be “unpredictable.” “Media Stakeout with Ambassador Vitaly Churkin,” Federal News Service, July 8, 2008.

1097 Russia’s justification for the veto was similar to China’s: that the situation did not constitute a threat to international peace and security, and that sanctions would undermine the ongoing SADC-led mediation efforts. SC,Verbatim, S/PV.5933 (July 11, 2008), 9-10.

1098 Ibid, 14.
It’ll appear incomprehensible to the people of Zimbabwe that Russia, which committed itself at the G8 to take further steps including financial and other sanctions, should stand in the way of Security Council action.

Less emphatically, he added: “Nor will they understand the Chinese vote.”

It is possible that the PRC exercised its veto only because Russia had absorbed the brunt of the political fallout. As Britain’s UN ambassador, John Sawers, remarked, the Western “assessment” was that China would not have vetoed “on its own,” and that “the key thing is that the Russians decided to vote against [the draft].”

Regional Associations

The political costs associated with China’s decision to use its veto power were reduced by the tendency of two regional associations, ASEAN and the SADC, to oppose interference on Burma and Zimbabwe, respectively. First, ASEAN preferred the continuation of regional and UN mediation efforts. Since 1991, ASEAN had espoused a notion of “constructive engagement” with Myanmar, in which the gradual inculcation of commercial and diplomatic ties would help bring about political liberalization and

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economic reform. However, ASEAN had occasionally exercised pressure on Burma, which had joined the organization in 1997. For instance, after Suu Kyi was detained in May 2003, ASEAN issued a statement calling for her release. Particular states had also deviated from the “ASEAN way.” In December 2005, the Philippines had supported Western calls for a UNSC briefing on the subject. The following August, Indonesia warned that ASEAN would not defend Myanmar in the Council if it did not demonstrate a willingness to open to the outside world.

Nevertheless, after the junta permitted the visits of Romulo and Gambari, ASEAN adopted a wary attitude towards external condemnation. On January 6, 2007, the foreign minister of Indonesia, which was the sole ASEAN member on the Council, stated that he believed that Burma’s problems, including the exodus of refugees to Thailand, were “domestic and not yet a threat to security in the region, let alone the world.” On the 11th, prior to the vote on the U.S. draft, ASEAN foreign ministers meeting in Cebu, Philippines, voiced objections to the Western effort. Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid, who had previously denounced Burmese intransigence, said that, “We still

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1101 The phrase “constructive engagement” was first used in 1991 by Thai Foreign Minister Arsa Sarasin. This contrasted with a more interventionist “comprehensive engagement,” which had been promoted by Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans in the mid-1980s. Stephen McCarthy, “Burma and ASEAN: Estranged Bedfellows,” *Asian Survey* 48 (2008), 917-9.

1102 Ibid, 920.

1103 The “ASEAN way” refers to a preference for a consensual and non-interventionist means of regional dispute resolution. For a discussion, see: Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 47-79.

1104 *Burma/Myanmar After the Crackdown*, 16.

1105 In particular, Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayuda said that ASEAN had sent a clear message to the junta, which was that “You must defend yourself,” if the matter was brought before the UNSC. “Indonesia’s FM Says Burma to Defend Itself If Brought to UN Security Council,” *Hong Kong AFP*, August 23, 2006. WNC reference: 200608231477.1_7640002bad2b28da.

believe that Myanmar is not a security threat issue.” In the Council, Indonesia abstained on the vote. Its representative, Rezlan Jenie, expressed support for the Gambari mission, but contended that the situation in Myanmar did not constitute a “clear and present danger for the rest of the world.”

By using its veto power, China aligned itself with the ASEAN preference for dialogue. In defending his vote, Wang observed that “all ASEAN members and most Asia-Pacific countries believe that the current situation does not post a threat to regional peace and security.” He also stated that, “China will, as always, support ASEAN in playing a leading role in addressing the issue of Myanmar.” This argument not only provided evidence that China’s own position was shared by other neighbors of Burma, but also may have offered reassurance to Southeast Asian states that the PRC would not collude with external powers to interfere in ASEAN’s “intramural” affairs. One reason that Burma was admitted to ASEAN was a desire to counter rising Chinese


1108 Security Council Document S/PV.5619 (January 11, 2007), pg. 4. On the sidelines of the ministerial session in Cebu, ASEAN Secretary-General Ong Keng Yong did not directly address the pending Security Council vote. This may have reflected some disagreement among member states about the merits of the proposal. Instead, Ong said that the “general view of ASEAN foreign ministers is that the [junta’s seven-point] roadmap we heard about should be adhered to. But there should be the early release of Aung San Suu Kyi.” “ASEAN Presses Burma to Reform, Admits Power Limited,” Hong Kong AFP, January 11, 2007. WNC reference: 200701111477.1_cd40005c23938983.

1109 SC, Verbatim, S/PV.5619 (January 11, 2007), 3.


1111 Indeed, reassurance and the reduction of mutual suspicions was a priority in China-ASEAN relations since the PRC began its rapid economic and military development in the early 1990s. Lai Foon Wong, “China-ASEAN and Japan-ASEAN Relations During the Post-Cold War Era,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 1 (2007), 377-82. Indeed, Li and Zheng argued that the case of Myanmar had become a “testing ground of China’s compliance to [ASEAN’s] non-intervention policy.” Li and Zheng, “Re-interpreting China’s Non-intervention Policy towards Myanmar,” 630.
influence in the region, and Beijing’s position that ASEAN, rather than the UNSC, should be the main locus of arbitration implicitly acknowledged this concern.1112

Regarding Zimbabwe, the SADC encompassed the concerned regional actors, such as Tanzania, Botswana and Zambia.1113 Within the association, South Africa was perhaps the main stakeholder. This was due to its proximity, position as non-permanent member on the Council in 2008, destination of Zimbabwean refugees, and Mbeki’s role as mediator.1114 Like ASEAN, South Africa was generally disinclined towards external intervention in regional affairs.1115 In addition, Pretoria preferred “quiet diplomacy” to coercion because it believed that this was the most effective route to maintaining stability. According to Mbeki, “We engage them because we don’t want Zimbabwe collapsing next door. South Africa would inherit all the consequences of Zimbabwe’s collapse.” Hence, is unsurprising that South Africa voted against the imposition of sanctions by the Security Council.


1113 15 states comprise the SADC, which has as one of its missions the “peace and security of Southern Africa.”

1114 In addition, there was a sizable trade relationship between the two countries. According to the CIA World Factbook, South Africa provided 43% of Zimbabwe’s imports in 2006, and received 33.3% of its exports. South Africa ranked as Zimbabwe’s #1 trading partner, though Zimbabwe did not rank among South Africa’s top trading partners. For the 2006 version of the Factbook, see: http://www.ourlanka.com/world-factbook/index.html.

1115 Merle Lipton points out that South Africa was particularly suspicious of the Security Council, which it believed was “unrepresentative and politicized, its proceedings biased in favor of the agendas of the five veto wielders, especially the three Western powers.” Merle Lipton, “Understanding South Africa’s Foreign Policy: The Perplexing Case of Zimbabwe,” South African Journal of International Affairs 16 (2009), 334.

1116 Quoted in Zimbabwe’s Operation Murambatsvina, 13. A destabilized Zimbabwe, it was believed, would not only threaten South Africa’s economic interests, but also exacerbate the refugee situation and spread “economic chaos across the region.” Chris Alden, “‘A Pariah in Our Midst:’ Regional Organizations and the Problematic of Western-Designated Pariah Regimes-The Cases of SADC/Zimbabwe and ASEAN/Myanmar,” Crisis States Research Center, Working Paper No. 73, May 2010, 6. Available online, at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/28468/1/WP73.2.pdf.
South Africa’s negative vote provided Beijing with additional political insulation for its veto. Although Moscow was the primary recipient of Western antagonism, Pretoria also absorbed a measure of criticism. Speaking after the vote, Khalilzad remarked that South Africa’s vote was troubling, given the role that UNSC sanctions had played in dismantling Apartheid in that country. Khalilzad continued,

For its representative to be protecting the horrible regime in Zimbabwe, a regime that’s responsible for not only a political crisis but a humanitarian crisis in the country…is particularly disturbing.\(^{1117}\)

Given this criticism of South Africa, China was able to avoid being labeled as an enabler of violence in Zimbabwe.\(^{1118}\)

In addition, other SADC members evinced no support for sanctions. In June, SADC countries had diverged on the extent of their condemnation towards Zimbabwe. Unlike South Africa, the governments of Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia had all publicly criticized Mugabe and questioned the efficacy of Mbeki’s mediation effort.\(^{1119}\)

Meeting with Condoleezza Rice in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania’s foreign minister said that the international community must “do something urgently so that we can save Zimbabwe,” though did not directly advocate the use of sanctions.\(^{1120}\) However, by July,\(^ {1117}\) “Media Stakeout with Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad,” Federal News Service, July 11, 2008. In addition, a Western diplomat described the role of South Africa as “shameful.” Interview, Western diplomat, New York, February 2010.

\(^ {1118}\) Indeed, the Mbeki government had come under significant domestic criticism for its preference for ‘quiet diplomacy’ with Zimbabwe. Trade unions and human rights activists, including Desmond Tutu, were particularly concerned that South Africa appeared to be colluding with Mugabe. Lipton, “Understanding South Africa’s Foreign Policy,” 340.


it was clear that the U.S. did not have an ally within the SADC. On the 8th, a delegation of African leaders met with Bush in Hokkaido and refused to endorse the U.S. position. Tanzania’s president, Jakaya Kikwete, who was the current chair of the AU, said that Africa and the West were both concerned about Zimbabwe, but that “the only area we may differ is on the way forward.”

As with ASEAN, China found political value in the consonance between its position and that of the SADC. In his remarks, Wang said that China had “repeatedly called upon the Council to respect the position of African countries,” including allowing “more time” for the SADC mediation effort. He also averred that “China deeply regrets” that the “reasonable proposals” of African countries were not “taken on board” by the sponsors. Pointing to the common ground between the PRC and African states not only provided a rhetorical basis for the veto, but also served to highlight China’s respect for regional views. This was of particular relevance with regard to the SADC, which had raised concerns about China’s arms shipments to Zimbabwe and suspected its intentions in southern Africa. The extent to which China’s position on the matter assuaged regional concerns, though, is questionable.

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1121 Michael Abramowitz, “Bush Facing Rebuffs on Key Issues at G8,” *Washington Post*, July 8, 2008. There was only minor consolation in the support gained by Washington of non-SADC countries, such as Burkina Faso (which held a seat on the Security Council) and Liberia. If anything, the paucity of U.S. partners within Africa only underlined its general lack of regional support.


1123 In particular, China had come under criticism in the spring of 2008 for an incident in which a Chinese ship, the *Anyuejiang*, had attempted to offload 70 tons of Zimbabwe-bound arms in South Africa, but had been turned away by angry dockworkers. Levy Mwanawasa, the president of Zambia who was serving as head of the SADC, was reportedly particularly upset and, through a spokesman, said that, “it would be good for China to play a more useful role in the Zimbabwe crisis than supplying arms.” The *Anyuejiang* eventually unloaded non-military cargo in Angola and returned to China. Celia Dugger and David Barbosa, “As Protests Intensify, China May Give Up Attempt to Send Arms to Zimbabwe,” *New York Times*, April 23, 2008.
In sum, the political dynamics in both cases militated in favor of Chinese opposition to Western proposals. Requiring Beijing’s support on other priorities, the U.S. did not exert significant pressure on China on either Myanmar or Zimbabwe. Russia’s position was aligned with the PRC, insulating the latter from political costs, especially in the case of Zimbabwe. The major regional stakeholders, grouped respectively within ASEAN and the SADC, offered no support for the U.S. effort, further buttressing China’s opposition. Moreover, China used the opportunity to highlight its affinity with the preferences of local actors as a way to build confidence in Southeast Asia and southern Africa.

Conclusion

This chapter has addressed the reasons for China’s vetoes on the cases of Myanmar, in January 2007, and Zimbabwe, in July 2008. Beijing’s decision to vote negatively is an historical anomaly, having occurred only six times since 1971. It is particularly surprising in two senses. First is China’s desire to maintain a positive national image in advance of the 2008 Summer Olympics. Second is that, in contrast to Darfur, China had no public bilateral initiative which would have diverted attention from its opposition in the UNSC.

1124 More broadly, Alden and Hughes point to antipathy towards China’s role in Africa at the popular level, compounded by the PRC’s inability to forge close working relations with civil society groups, such as trade unions and religious organizations. Chris Alden and Christopher R. Hughes, “Harmony and Discord in China’s Africa Strategy: Some Implications for Foreign Policy,” *China Quarterly* 199 (2009), 568-72.
The analysis found evidence corroborating five explanations. These are presented in Table 18. First, in both cases, China appeared to be content with the progress of alternative efforts. On Burma, it had conducted frequent exchanges with the junta on problems such as drug trafficking, and envoys from ASEAN and the UN had been allowed to enter the country and meet with opposition leaders. Given that China’s goal was stability, rather than immediate political change, this demonstration of openness was a sufficient basis on which to oppose condemnation in the Council. The same situation was found in Zimbabwe. China supported the Mbeki mission, which had achieved no results, but which both the ZANU-PF and the MDC had been willing to attend. This suggests that when Beijing’s objective is modest and long-term in nature, it is likely to prefer even ineffective dialogue to pressure.

Second, there is mixed evidence that the lack of Western flexibility on the contents of the drafts influenced China’s positions. In both cases, the U.S. sought to make a political statement, registering support for democratization while drawing out Russia, China and others who refused to condemn authoritarian regimes. On Zimbabwe, this explanation is plausible, since Russia, and China in turn, likely would have supported a weakened draft had the U.S. opted to submit one. However, on Burma, China was clearly opposed to the matter being discussed in any form in the Council. Even if the U.S. draft could have been softened, it is unlikely that the PRC would have acquiesced. Hence, a caveat to Hypothesis 2 is that no level of concessions is sufficient for cooperation if

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1125 On the other hand, when the goal is an immediate change in policy, e.g. with regard to North Korea’s nuclear program, then ineffective dialogue may be less desirable than a firm multilateral response.
Beijing is fundamentally opposed to UNSC involvement. However, Myanmar was as an outlier in this respect.  

### Table 19: Summary of Findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Burma</th>
<th>Zimbabwe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Alternative pathways, such as mediation, were available.</td>
<td>Yes. Three routes were available: bilateral, regional and at the UN-level.</td>
<td>Yes. The Mbeki mediation effort was underway at the time of the vote.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 The U.S. was unwilling to make concessions.</td>
<td>No. The U.S. priority was symbolic, but flexibility would not have made a difference.</td>
<td>Yes. The U.S. did not make concessions, and opted to seek a symbolic vote.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 The U.S. did not place high-level pressure on the PRC.</td>
<td>Yes. Burma was not a core issue; the U.S. needed China’s cooperation on other matter.</td>
<td>Yes. The U.S. did not make Zimbabwe a major bilateral issue, e.g. at the G8 summit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Russia was aligned with China, and against the U.S.</td>
<td>Yes. Russia opposed sanctions, backing up the PRC position.</td>
<td>Yes. China followed Russia’s shift to opposition towards sanctions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Regional stakeholders opposed UNSC pressure.</td>
<td>Yes. ASEAN refused to endorse the USNC effort.</td>
<td>Yes. The SADC and South Africa in particular, opposed sanctions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Politically, China faced only minimal costs for opposing the Western initiatives. The U.S. required China’s cooperation on a range of strategically important issues, and did not exert high-level pressure on Beijing to support its position on Burma or Zimbabwe. Russia’s position was consistent with China’s, but its role differed in the two instances. On Burma, it kept a low profile, but provided China with a second veto. Regarding Zimbabwe, China seems to have returned the favor after Russia turned against the U.S. As one Western diplomat observes, Beijing and Moscow “hide behind each

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1126 The reason is that Beijing had not fundamentally denied the Council’s jurisdiction on any other pariah state covered here. Even on Zimbabwe, Beijing made no claim that the UNSC should have no role until after Russia decided to oppose sanctions and jurisdiction became a convenient political argument. Arguably, it was generally in China’s interest to assert a broad mandate for the UNSC, since doing so would give China veto power over a wider range of international issues. Moreover, as mentioned below, China did consent to a Council statement condemning the junta ten months later.
other and do it very effectively.” Two regional associations, ASEAN and the SADC, declined to support the U.S. on Burma and Zimbabwe, respectively. Moreover, South Africa, the primary local stakeholder on Zimbabwe, had been particularly resistant to external interference. In each of these ways, Beijing’s vetoes were politically insulated.

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In the months following its vetoes, China distanced itself from both the SPDC and Mugabe. In October 2007, following a violent crackdown in Rangoon, China endorsed a condemnatory PRST that contained many of the same points as the January draft. In August 2008, Beijing sent a message to Harare that it should “behave” during the Olympics, and banned Mugabe from attending the opening ceremonies. However, given its interests, the PRC did not lean too heavily on either state. In May 2008, Beijing blocked Western efforts to condemn the junta’s intransigence in accepting foreign assistance in responding to the disaster of Cyclone Nargis. In November 2010, China congratulated the junta on a “smooth” election, one in which the conditions for fairness

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1127 Interview, Western diplomat, New York, February 2010.

1128 The PRST said that the Council “strongly deplores the use of violence against peaceful demonstrations in Myanmar,” called for the release of political prisoners, and urged the junta to “take all necessary measures to address the political, economic, humanitarian and human rights issues that are of concern to its people and emphasizes that the future of Myanmar lies in the hands of all its people.” In effect, the PRST stated what the January draft resolution would have. SC Document S/PRST/2007/37 (October 11, 2007). Even earlier than this, Beijing had dispatched Tang Jiaxuan to Myanmar with the message that the junta should accelerate reform. Myanmar: Towards the Elections, International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 174, August 20, 2009, 5. Available at: [http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/burma-myanmar/174_myanmar_towards_the_elections.ashx](http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/burma-myanmar/174_myanmar_towards_the_elections.ashx).

were lacking to the point that the NLD refused to participate. On Zimbabwe, China endorsed a fragile power-sharing agreement between the two main parties reached in September 2008 which privileged Mugabe and the ZANU-PF in spite of the March election results.

More broadly, China’s vetoes suggest that cooperation in the Security Council is likely to be inhibited under several conditions. First is when the basic goals of the P5 states differ. Unlike the U.S., China was interested in stability rather than democracy promotion. This meant that the PRC was more amenable to allowing mediation to continue, even as it advocated gradual reform in both states. Second is when there is significant regional opposition to UNSC action. The U.S. was able to amass nine votes in the Council, but China was attuned more to the actors which held major stakes in the outcomes: ASEAN and the SADC. Third is when one negotiator suddenly shifts its position for obscure reasons, as Russia did after the G8 summit. Fourth is when any P5 state is essentially opposed to Council interference on a given issue, as China was with regard to Myanmar. The confluence of these factors raises the chance that a public dispute between the P5 will erupt. Such a confluence, though, is highly unusual.

1130 “China Welcomes Myanmar’s Smooth General Election,” Xinhua, November 9, 2010. Five days later, Xinhua reported that “noted political figure” Aung San Suu Kyi had been released from detention. “Myanmar Political Figure Aung San Suu Kyi Freed From House Arrest,” Xinhua, November 14, 2010.

Conclusion

The preceding chapters assessed the reasons for China’s positions in a series of negotiations on pariah states that occurred in the early 21st century. The driving question was how we can account for the PRC’s mixed record of cooperativeness with the U.S. and its allies, given a basic skepticism towards the application of multilateral pressure and growing material interests in these regimes. What can help to explain the variance in China’s cooperativeness with respect to the U.S.? What is the broader relevance of the findings? What does the answer suggest about the constraints on, and avenues for, U.S. power in the UNSC? What are the larger implications for the relationship between rising powers and the future of the international order?

Strategic and Political Interests

In the context of labor negotiations, Roger Fisher and William Ury observed that, “every negotiator has two kinds of interests: in the substance and in the relationship.”\(^{1132}\) China’s primary substantive interest in the pariah states is stability, and we would expect that it would endorse proposals in the UNSC that it believed would not, at a minimum, undermine stability. Hypotheses 1 and 2 evaluate this proposition. Hypothesis 1 is that China should be more amenable to multilateral pressure if it does not perceive a more efficacious alternative, such as mediation or bilateral pressure. Hypothesis 2 is that China is more likely to endorse motions when the U.S. has made side-payments or concessions aimed at limiting the risk to China’s interests. The converse is that China should maintain opposition when it believes that other options are more conducive to stability, and when the U.S. is unwilling to make amendments that limit the risks of instability.

\(^{1132}\) Fisher and Ury, Getting to Yes, 167.
There is support for both hypotheses in the eight cases examined. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 20, below. North Korea’s withdrawal from the 6PT, combined with Pyongyang’ dismissal of PRC pleas for restraint, led Beijing to favor U.S. calls for a Council response. However, a condition was that Washington modified its requests, such as removing mandatory cargo inspections from what became Resolution 1874, in order to decrease the chance for unintended conflict. With respect to Iran, the evidence was mixed. Hypothesis 1 could not be confirmed, since the E3+3 dialogue had stalled several months before Beijing finally lent its support for a fourth round of sanctions. A possible explanation is that, in contrast to North Korea, Beijing did not treat developments in Iran with a sense of urgency. This suggests that closing alternatives are most likely to affect receptiveness to pressure when combined with a clear act of provocation. Hypothesis 2 is on firmer ground, as plans to target Iran’s energy sector were left out of the text and others, including Saudi Arabia, apparently attempted to reduce PRC concerns by guaranteeing energy supplies in the event of a crisis.
### Table 20: Overall Summary of Findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive Cases</th>
<th>Explanations</th>
<th>Strategic Interests</th>
<th>Political Interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cases</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>(H1) Shifting</td>
<td>(H2) Risk</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Alternatives:</td>
<td>Reduction:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>China more likely</td>
<td>China more likely</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>to cooperate the</td>
<td>to cooperate when</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>fewer chances for</td>
<td>subjected to high-</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>dialogue and</td>
<td>level U.S. political</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>bilateral pressure.</td>
<td>pressure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Res. 1695</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>√ 6PT stalled</td>
<td>√ U.S. threat to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Response to July</td>
<td></td>
<td>11/05; Wu Dawei</td>
<td>force a vote after</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 DPRK missile</td>
<td></td>
<td>mission failed.</td>
<td>Wu mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>failed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Res. 1718</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>√ 6PT remained</td>
<td>√ U.S. limits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Response to Oct.</td>
<td></td>
<td>stalled; PRC</td>
<td>escalatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 DPRK</td>
<td></td>
<td>warnings rejected.</td>
<td>language, scope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nuclear test)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>of resolution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PRST (Response to</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>√ 6PT stalled</td>
<td>√ Obama Prague</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>April 2009 DPRK</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>10/08; PRC warnings</td>
<td>speech; SED;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘satellite launch’)</td>
<td></td>
<td>rejected.</td>
<td>political argument.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Res. 1874</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>√ 6PT remained</td>
<td>√ Russia supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Response to June</td>
<td></td>
<td>stalled; no</td>
<td>initial Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 DPRK</td>
<td></td>
<td>major bilateral</td>
<td>position.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nuclear test)</td>
<td></td>
<td>effort made.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Res. 1929 (4th</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>√ PRC opposed</td>
<td>√ Russia made</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>round of sanctions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>new res for months</td>
<td>late demands after</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>on Iran re: nuclear</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>after E3+3 dialogue</td>
<td>P5+2 consults.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>program)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Res. 1929 (4th</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Possible energy</td>
<td>Bader-Ross visit;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>round of sanctions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>guarantees.</td>
<td>Obama-Hu summit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>on Iran re: nuclear</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Omission of energy</td>
<td>precipitated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>program)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>sector</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Res. 1929 (4th</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Russia shifted to</td>
<td>Russia shifted to</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>round of sanctions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>“smart”</td>
<td>“smart”</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>on Iran re: nuclear</strong></td>
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<td><strong>program)</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: **√** indicates a positive case; **X** indicates a negative case; **?** indicates an uncertain case.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Negative Cases</th>
<th>stalled.</th>
<th>from text.</th>
<th>change.</th>
<th>sanctions’ late March.</th>
<th>favors sanctions.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 Failure to reach agreement on sanctions on Sudan in the spring of 2007</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>UN-AU-Sudan mechanism continued; PRC bilateral interventions.</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>No substantive talks. U.S. preferred sanctions threat to actual resolution.</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 China-Russia veto of U.S. draft resolution on Burma, Jan. 2007.</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>Alternatives at three levels: bilateral, regional, UN.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>U.S. priority was symbolic, but flexibility would not have mattered.</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 China-Russia veto of U.S. draft resolution on Zimbabwe, July 2008.</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>Mbeki mediation effort underway.</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>U.S. offered no concessions, preferring symbolic vote.</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These two hypotheses also generally work on the three negative cases. Regarding Darfur, a combination of bilateral interventions and the results of the AU-UN-Sudan dialogue reduced the necessity for potentially destabilizing sanctions. Moreover, wielding sanctions as a threat, the U.S. did not engage in substantive talks aimed at securing China’s consent. Similarly, a mixture of bilateral contacts, and regional and UN-led mediation, diminished the necessity of multilateral pressure on Myanmar, while Robert Mugabe’s willingness to engage in talks sponsored by South Africa dampened the need for sanctions in that instance. Hypothesis 2 could not be convincingly corroborated on Burma, because it was doubtful that any U.S. concessions would have sufficiently lowered the risk of Council action perceived by China. However, the refusal of the U.S. to weaken the draft on Zimbabwe likely contributed to Chinese opposition.

In addition to the substance of particular cases, UNSC negotiations also involve political risks and rewards for participants. Hypotheses 3 through 5 are meant to examine the notion that the PRC responds to the varying political stakes of cooperation. Hypothesis 3 is that China is more likely to agree with the U.S. if Washington has prioritized the issue in the bilateral relationship, as evidenced by high-level diplomatic pressure. Hypothesis 4 is that China should move towards the U.S. position if Russia has already done the same. The reason is that the insulation of a Russian veto would be lost, leaving China in a vulnerable position. Hypothesis 5 is that China is more likely to cooperate the stronger the regional support for the U.S. The rationale is that China desires not to jeopardize its relations with the local stakeholders.

With respect to North Korea and Iran, the political stakes militated in favor of Chinese cooperation. Washington pressed its case at a high level, dispatching envoys to
Beijing and prioritizing a Council response to North Korean provocation and Iranian intransigence vis-à-vis the IAEA. Hypothesis 4 could not be substantiated on North Korea, since the PRC came to support the U.S. before Russia. However, Russia did move towards sanctions on Iran prior to the PRC, leaving the latter isolated. Japan and South Korea tended to follow the U.S. position on the DPRK in 2006 and 2009, although, after the July 2006 missile launch, Seoul appeared to echo China’s hesitance for a resolution. Thus, there is only partial evidence for Hypothesis 5 on that case. Regarding Iran, there was significant support for sanctions among the EU and Israel, both of which independently exerted pressure on China, in addition to the approval of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. Arguably, China would have encountered major resistance if it had used its veto to shield Pyongyang or Tehran.

By contrast, Chinese opposition on Darfur, Burma and Zimbabwe was relatively safe politically. The U.S. had an ideological stake in these cases, but was constrained in the extent to which it could effectively push its agenda in its bilateral relationship with China. On Sudan, the U.S. opted not to push Beijing because it sought instead to encourage China’s use of bilateral influence on Bashir. On Burma and Zimbabwe, Washington likely did not press hard because it needed China’s cooperation on higher-priority issues, including North Korea and Iran. Russia sympathized with China’s concerns about intervention, playing a notable role in opposing the U.S. on Zimbabwe. Hypothesis 5 can also be confirmed in all three cases. The U.S. was unable to secure a visible African advocate for sanctions on either Zimbabwe or Sudan, with South Africa particularly opposed on the former and Egypt on the latter. Similarly, Washington had not gained any supporters among Southeast Asian nations on the Burma case. Regional
bodies, especially the AU, SADC, and ASEAN, did not adopt the U.S. position. By opposing the U.S., China was able to develop goodwill in Africa and Southeast Asia, and likely would have suffered costs had it acted otherwise.

A number of interactions among the variables were also observed. First, the closing of alternatives may provide the U.S. with a strong position from which to employ political pressure. For instance, North Korea’s rejection of Chinese entreaties not to proceed with a nuclear test in October 2006 enhanced U.S. efforts to push for a swift resolution. Second, narrowing alternatives may change the perceptions of China’s erstwhile supporters, thereby affecting the political stakes. The growing frustration of Russia, Israel, Saudi Arabia and others with Iran in the spring of 2010 resulted in more robust pressure on China to follow suit. Third, regional stakeholders may actively work to keep alternatives open, affecting the strategic landscape. The AU, in concert with Ban Ki-moon, played a role in leading Bashir to accept UNAMID, which diminished the necessity for sanctions. Fourth, U.S. rigidity may affect not only China, but also others. U.S. “hubris” on Zimbabwe seems to have irked Russia, in particular, whose opposition in turn influenced China.

These findings hold three notable implications for the broader literature on UN politics. First concerns the concept of “outside options.” Voeten notes that the ability of the U.S. to credibly threaten interventions without UN approval provides Washington with greater leverage within the institution. Under a similar logic, China is in a stronger position to resist particular U.S. demands for enforcement action under Chapter VII when it can point to ongoing mediation efforts, or to its own bilateral initiatives. This

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was observed with respect to both Burma and Sudan. Likewise, the PRC has found itself in a weaker position in instances in which outside options do not exist, especially regarding the crisis diplomacy on North Korea in 2006 and 2009.

Second, inspired by Inis Claude, scholars have addressed problems of legitimacy with respect to the UN. Hurd, in particular, posits that the decisions reached by the Security Council carry “symbolic power” and are thus treated with greater weight by the majority of states. The present analysis demonstrates that legitimacy of decisions to prosecute offenders, including pariah states, is sometimes contested within the Council. Although China itself behaves in a pragmatic, calculating manner, beliefs about the appropriateness of intervention do impact the political tradeoffs that the PRC considers in its own decision-making process. In particular, China is more likely to agree to sanctions on states when there is a broad consensus that doing so is legitimate, as on Iran and North Korea. It is much less likely to do so when there is a division in this respect, as on Burma and Zimbabwe.

These two points lead to a third, which is that Council bargaining may be understood in terms of both the structure of alternatives and the distribution of beliefs about the legitimacy of particular decisions. China’s veto power travels the farthest when outside options exist, and when those options have gained the support of at least some of the other stakeholders. The reason is that it can base its opposition on both pragmatic and principled grounds. Conversely, China’s leverage is weakest when there are few credible alternatives and when there is a shared belief that punishment is legitimate. Further research should explore the causal linkages between the structure of alternatives and the

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breadth of support for particular decisions as legitimate. Doing so would help to bridge the gap between these two approaches to UN politics.

**Broader Relevance**

Applied to two more recent cases, the argument appears to be of mixed usefulness in explaining China’s positions. On one hand, China’s position with respect to Council decisions on Libya in February and March 2011 is more compatible with the explanation offered in this study. The crisis caused by the February uprising jeopardized China’s stakes in access to energy supplies, especially oil. Given the unavailability of clear alternative options, such as external mediation, it is reasonable to assume that Beijing viewed multilateral coercion as a preferred method of restoring order. In addition, the measures drafted by the U.S. and its allies did not cover Libya’s oil industry, perhaps assuaging China’s primary risk. Politically, the importance of the U.S. in China’s calculations is unclear, given Washington’s own concerns about intervention. However, a critical factor in China’s support for sanctions, as well as its acquiescence on a no-fly zone, appears to have been the endorsement of the Arab League for such measures. The confluence of strategic and political incentives to cooperate can help to account for China’s positions even if the problem was, like Burma and Zimbabwe, mainly of an internal character.

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Second, in December 2010 the PRC rejected U.S. attempts in the UNSC to secure a condemnation of North Korea’s artillery bombardment of ROK-controlled Yeonpyeong Island. This decision is puzzling both from a strategic point of view (i.e. given the failure of the 6PT and bilateral intervention, it is unclear what other route to stability the PRC preferred), and from a political perspective (i.e. the U.S., Japan and South Korea had all lobbied Beijing for a UNSC response). Explaining this instance of opposition may depend on domestic-level factors, especially a surge in nationalistic sentiment. Opposition to a Council response may have been a signal of “assertiveness” in China’s relations with the U.S.\footnote{\footnotetext{1136}{Gilbert Rozman, “Chinese Strategic Thinking on Multilateral Regional Security in Northeast Asia,” \textit{Orbis} 55 (2011), 302.}}

The problem of “assertiveness” points to a constraint on the broader validity of the findings. Although China has been described as a pragmatic actor that modulates its positions on changes in the external strategic and political environment, it is not obvious that the PRC will \textit{always} do so, as suggested by the 2010 North Korean example. Analysts have observed that strains in civil-military relations within the PRC, especially prior to leadership transitions, are especially ripe for uncertainty in China’s external relations. A major economic disaster in the PRC may have a similar result.\footnote{\footnotetext{1137}{Michael Swaine, \textit{China: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy} (Washington, DC: RAND, 1995), 98-103. For a discussion of civil-military relations and the 2012 leadership transition, see: Cheng Li, “China’s Midterm Jockeying: Gearing Up for 2012 (Part 3: Military Leaders),” \textit{China Leadership Monitor} 33 (2010), 1-17. Available at: http://www.brookings.edu~/media/Files/rc/opinions/2010/0628_military_leadership_li/0628_military_leadership_li.pdf.}} Another source of change would be a fundamental shift in China’s basic skepticism on the use of sanctions. New interests groups within the PRC, such as companies facing political risk...
in areas such as Libya, may help gradually to push Beijing towards a higher tolerance level with regard to Chapter VII measures.\textsuperscript{1138}

Beyond China, the relevance of the findings would depend on two factors. First is the extent to which the state in question follows a pragmatic foreign policy, as opposed to one dictated by domestic political calculations or nationalism. Russia’s behavior in the case of Zimbabwe suggests that Moscow may not be as sensitive to the political costs of opposition to the U.S. as the PRC, although more research on Russia’s positions in the Council would be required to verify this claim. Second is a latent opposition to the use of multilateral pressure a way of managing the problems created by the pariah states. In this respect, the analysis would be less useful to the U.S. and its allies than to China, Russia, and others, such as India and Brazil, which have expressed misgivings about the role of coercion in the Council’s repertoire. Given a realpolitik orientation, the framework used in this study may be profitably used to explain the positions of a cast of other skeptics of the Western approach to collective security.

\textbf{China and the Limits of U.S. Power}

Despite its continuing status as the world’s foremost military and economic power, U.S. leverage in the UNSC is variable. In general, China prefers not to oppose the U.S. unless major political or economic interests are threatened. Although the PRC has occasionally used rhetoric and abstentions to distance itself from Washington’s position, it has avoided blocking resolutions based on ideological differences alone. In addition, China has not been “assertive” for reasons that cannot be explained by reference to its strategic and political interests. Rather, the challenge is that, as its interests in pariah

states, as well as in neighboring countries that may desire to shield those regimes from interference, have expanded, Beijing has concrete reasons to object to Western plans to use the machinery of the Council to punish these states. Combined with its veto power, China may have both the capabilities and the will to push back against U.S. objectives.

Based on the analysis, relative power in contentious negotiations turns on strategic and political variables. The U.S. is likely to be in a weak position under several conditions: (1) external options remain open, such that U.S.-backed measures do not appear to be the only feasible way to address the problem at hand; (2) U.S. stakes are limited, insofar as Washington would elect not to prioritize the issue in its bilateral relationship with Beijing; (3) Moscow has seconded China’s objections, providing a reliable second veto; (4) regional powers have either failed to endorse, or have explicitly opposed, the U.S. position; and (5) the U.S. has not actively sought a resolution, but has rather brandished the possibility of coercion for ideological reasons, or as a threat. Conversely, the U.S. should be more likely to effectively disarm opposition when few, or none, of these conditions are present.

The U.S. may be able to improve its relative power by manipulating both sets of factors. Strategically, the goal would be to convince the PRC that its interests are best served by means preferred by the U.S. This might include providing new information about the severity of the problem, so that Chinese policymakers better understand the risks of continued opposition. It might also center on a discussion of the relative merits of alternative conflict resolution methods, with the goal of convincing Beijing that mediation or bilateral strategies are not likely to address the risks to Chinese interests present in the case. Given suspicions about the impartiality and reliability of its data and
analysis, the U.S. might draw on third-party information, such as IAEA reports. It might also encourage its regional partners, such as Israel or Saudi Arabia in the case of Iran, to take the leading role in persuasion.

Politically, there are two basic strategies. First is to deprive the PRC of diplomatic support, raising the costs of intransigence. It might be possible to convince Russia, or pivotal regional actors, to move closer to the U.S. position based on persuasion or selective concessions. Russia typically has fewer material interests in pariah states than China, although the two do rely on each other for reciprocal votes. The support of regional security organizations, such as the AU or ASEAN, would be highly valuable, though for political or other reasons, these bodies may not desire or be able to provide an endorsement. Though difficult, such a strategy is not impossible. Hillary Clinton’s effectiveness in working with pro-U.S. regional states, such as the UAE, and ultimately gaining the approval of the Arab League for a resolution authorizing a no-fly zone on Libya, shows that the local diplomatic balance can tip in the U.S.’s favor.\footnote{Helene Cooper and Steven Lee Myers, “Obama Takes Hard Line with Libya after Shift by Clinton,” \textit{New York Times}, March 18, 2011.}

The second political strategy is to make the issue a priority in the U.S.-China bilateral relationship. In general, positive relations with the U.S. are still far more important to Beijing than relations with any given pariah state. However, China may conclude that the political costs are acceptable if U.S. resolve is low. To counter this impression, the U.S. would need to make a convincing case that it is unwilling to accept a non-outcome (as on Sudan) or a veto (as on Burma and Zimbabwe), which it in turn might do by stressing U.S. material interests, including its economic stakes in the region and the security of its regional allies; placing the issue high on the agenda at bilateral
meetings, including those that occur at the summit level; dispatching high-ranking envoys to Beijing, thus generating domestic political expectations of a compromise; or, in rare cases, suggesting that the U.S. might be willing to act without a mandate.\textsuperscript{1140} In addition, the two strategies may be integrated, insofar as the U.S. first seeks to win as broad support as possible, and then approaches China from a position of comparative diplomatic strength.

Nevertheless, even with nimble diplomacy, the U.S. might not be able to convince the PRC to agree to a decision without substantial concessions. In some instances, China might not accept any resolution, no matter how weak. Washington would then have to consider the merits of expending political capital on an effort unlikely to yield substantive results and which might send a signal to the state in question that the international community is divided, and unprepared to act. Unless driven by the normative desire to make a statement, and thus risk a fracturing of the façade of unanimity among the P5, as the Bush administration did with respect to Burma and Zimbabwe, the U.S. might be better advised not to raise the matter in the first place. In short, the U.S. cannot simply dictate outcomes within the UNSC, but nor is its ability to achieve goals therein fundamentally endangered by China’s rise. Exceptional skill will have to be utilized to identify the relative power balance in specific cases, and to decide whether, and how, to exercise influence with respect to other major powers.

Rising Powers and the International Order

\textsuperscript{1140} Eric Voeten argues that the ability of a superpower to threaten outside action increases its bargaining leverage in multilateral discussions, but that, given the veto power of other states, the superpower is unlikely to achieve its “ideal point.” Voeten (2001), 845-858.
Though it can be expected to use power to protect its growing material interests, China’s role in the Security Council does not suggest an inclination to undermine the rules, norms and power relations that form the basis of the present international order.\textsuperscript{1141} As one of five countries guaranteed veto power by the UN Charter, China has an incentive to retain the current structure of authority. Though it has rhetorically advocated greater representation on the Council for developing countries, China has also not taken the lead in pushing for an expansion of number of permanent members.\textsuperscript{1142} Instead, pressure for changes in the Council’s composition has come from others, such as India, Brazil and Japan, whose power has grown since the bargain that resulted in the UN Charter was struck in 1945.

There is also no evidence to suggest that China will seek to promote radically different norms than other permanent members. China’s position on sovereignty has evolved to the point that Beijing supports intervention under the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine, which permits Chapter VII action to respond to offenses such as genocide and war crimes. In February 2011, China voted in favor of Resolution 1970, imposing sweeping sanctions on Libya due to threats posed to civilians during the civil


\textsuperscript{1142} Indeed, China’s position on Security Council reform seems designed to provide a built-in argument against expansion. It has declared that any change in the membership of the UNSC should be based on a “broad consensus,” which is unlikely to be achieved in the foreseeable future, and opposes any “time limit” for reform. See, “Position Paper of the People’s Republic of China on the United Nations Reforms,” June 7, 2005. Available online from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjp/gjs/gizzyhy/2594/2602/t199318.htm.
war. Despite its objections on Zimbabwe and Burma, China has condoned the Council’s interference in the electoral politics of states, as witnessed by its support for a resolution in December 2010 that described electoral violence in Côte D’Ivoire as an international threat and renewed a PKO there over the objections of the country’s president. The PRC does not appear to be at the helm of an emerging “sovereignty bloc.”

Further, China’s behavior in the Council does not denote an attempt to displace the U.S. as a predominant power. Though it has occasionally used bilateral influence and lent its support to multilateral dialogue, it has not challenged U.S. leadership by offering a coherent vision for how problems such as North Korea, Iran, Sudan, Burma or Zimbabwe should be addressed. Indeed, the real problem is not that China will become too “assertive,” but that it will retreat and fail to offer any leadership on problems where it has the capabilities to do so. As Thomas Christensen argues, “China has become far too big to stand on the sidelines—let alone to stand in the way—while others attempt to resolve these issues.” For the U.S., a PRC that is willing to co-manage security and humanitarian problems is valuable; one that absconds with the benefits of cooperation while placing the burden on Washington’s shoulders is not.

1143 The resolution imposed travel and financial restrictions against Qaddafi and several other senior officials, referred the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court, and imposed a blanket arms embargo. SC Document S/RES/1970 (February 26, 2011).

1144 Resolution 1962 condemned attempts by “parties” to undermine the “will of the people” as expressed through the October-November 2010 presidential elections. Despite demands by Laurence Gbagbo for it to leave the country, the resolution renewed the mandate of UNOCI for an additional six months. SC Document S/RES/1962 (December 20, 2010).


To be sure, China’s behavior in the UNSC is just one vantage point from which to observe its attitudes towards the international order. A status-quo orientation within that body does not necessarily imply the absence of revisionism, however defined, in others. For instance, along with states such as India, Mexico and Brazil, the PRC has successfully lobbied for a greater share of voting authority in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.\footnote{Stephen Olson and Clyde Prestowitz, \textit{The Evolving Role of China in International Institutions} (Washington, DC: Economic Strategy Institute, 2011), 26-7. Available at: \url{http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2011/TheEvolvingRoleofChinainInternationalInstitutions.pdf}.} It has occasionally promoted norms that conflict with those of existing institutions, such as offering ‘no-strings-attached’ aid to developing countries, in contrast to the conditional aid offered by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee.\footnote{Jing Gu, John Humphrey and Dirk Messner, “Global Governance and Developing Countries: The Implications of the Rise of China,” \textit{World Development} 36 (2008), 274-292.} It has also generated new structures, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, that have unclear implications for the balance of power between the PRC, Russia and the West.\footnote{Joel Wuthnow, Xin Li and Lingling Qi, “The ‘Beijing Consensus’ and China’s Multilateral Diplomacy,” Paper presented at the 2011 International Studies Association annual meeting, March 2011.} Thus, China’s participation in the international system may be either status-quo or revisionist depending on the circumstances.

In a broader sense, China is just one actor in the relationship between the “rising powers” and the distribution of global power and responsibility. But even here there is no clear, single axis of contention. In the Council, China’s interests align with the U.S. in preventing a diffusion of authority, while India’s run to the contrary. In the G20, and on subjects such as climate change and currency, China has aligned with India, Russia, Brazil and others. As Bruce Jones argues, the U.S. is unlikely to face a single peer.
competitor in the mid-21\textsuperscript{st} century, but rather, “complex, shifting coalitions of interest.”\textsuperscript{1150} As the largest “minority shareholder” in global politics, the U.S. will have to develop a sense for when it should lead, when it should encourage others to do so, and when to participate as a co-manager of shared problems. Developing prudent strategies in its interactions with China in the UNSC is an integral part of that challenge.

\textsuperscript{1150} Bruce Jones, “Managing a Changing World,” \textit{Foreign Policy}, March 14, 2011. Available at: \url{http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/14/building_the_new_world_order}. 
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**NB:**
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All others accessed at website listed in parentheses.

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*Yonhap (Seoul)
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<td>PK: Principled stand on UN forces/UN intervention, CS: Principled stand on invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter, RE: Rules of engagement for PKOs too broad, PC: consent of all parties not secured, SM: Concerns about size/mandate of PKO, NI: Undermines national independence/self-determination, AH: Promotes hegemonism or imperialism, TI: Does not respect territorial integrity/sovereignty, AA: Does not adequately respond to aggression, CP: Measure in question would be counter-productive, RC: Role of the Council is not stated strongly enough, NA: Council is not appropriate venue for settling problem in question</td>
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<td>Deplores Israeli occupation of territories captured in 1967, requests</td>
<td>S/1097</td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>US Veto</td>
<td>PR Huang Hua</td>
<td>NI (Palestine), AA (Israel), AH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Country/Countries Involved</td>
<td>Action Description</td>
<td>Resolution Number</td>
<td>Votes</td>
<td>Proposal/Position</td>
<td>Support/Position</td>
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<tr>
<td>10/22/1973</td>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>Calls for ceasefire in Yom Kippur War</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>14,0,0</td>
<td>PR Huang Hua</td>
<td>AA (Israel), AH (USSR, USA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/23/1973</td>
<td>Israel-Egypt</td>
<td>Reaffirms 338, calls for observers to supervise ceasefire</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>14,0,0</td>
<td>MFA Qiao Guanhua</td>
<td>AH (USSR, USA), AA (Israel), NI (Arabs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/25/1973</td>
<td>Israel-Egypt</td>
<td>Establishes Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II) (7 subsequent NP votes through 1978)</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>14,0,0</td>
<td>PR Huang Hua</td>
<td>PK (UNEF II), AA (Israel), AH (USSR, USA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/27/1973</td>
<td>Israel-Egypt</td>
<td>Establishes six month renewal period for UNEF II</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>14,0,0</td>
<td>DPR Zhuang Yan</td>
<td>PK (UNEF II), AH (USSR, USA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>4/8/1974</td>
<td>Israel-Egypt</td>
<td>Calls on member states to support UNEF II</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>13,0,0</td>
<td>DPR Zhuang Yan</td>
<td>PK (UNEF II), AA (Israel), AH (USSR, USA), NI (Arabs)</td>
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<tr>
<td>4/24/1974</td>
<td>Israel-Lebanon</td>
<td>Condemns Israeli violation of Lebanon's territorial integrity</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>13,0,0</td>
<td>DPR Zhuang Yan</td>
<td>AA (Israel), AH (USSR, USA), NI (Arabs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/28/1974</td>
<td>Iran-Iraq</td>
<td>Affirms ceasefire agreement and calls on both sides to withdraw forces from border</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>14,0,0</td>
<td>DPR Zhuang Yan</td>
<td>PK (I-I border dispute)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/31/1974</td>
<td>Israel-Syria</td>
<td>Establishes UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) (15 subsequent NP votes through 1981)</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>13,0,0</td>
<td>DPR Zhuang Yan</td>
<td>PK (UNDOF), AA (Israel), AH (USSR, USA), NI (Arabs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/31/1974</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Affirms UK-Greek-Turkish Declaration of July 1974, requests SG to take appropriate action</td>
<td>5/1139 9</td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>USSR veto</td>
<td>DPR Zhuang Yan</td>
<td>PK (UNFICYP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>8/15/1974</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>On safety of members of UNFICYP</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>14,0,0</td>
<td>PR Huang Hua</td>
<td>PK (UNFICYP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>8/16/1974</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Records formal disapproval of unilateral military action taken against Cyprus</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>11,0,3</td>
<td>PR Huang Hua</td>
<td>PK (UNFICYP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Resolution Title</td>
<td>Resolution Number</td>
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<tr>
<td>1/25/1976</td>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>Affirms Palestinian right to self-determination and calls on Israel to cede territory seized in 1967</td>
<td>S/1194</td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>US Veto</td>
<td>PR Huang Hua AA (Israel), AH (USSR, USA), NI (Palestine)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3/31/1976</td>
<td>S. Africa</td>
<td>On S. Africa's military activities against Angola</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>9,0,5</td>
<td>PR Huang Hua AA (S. Africa, USSR), AH (USSR), TI (Angola), NI (African peoples)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9/29/1977</td>
<td>S. Rhodesia</td>
<td>Appointment of a special representative for S. Rhodesia</td>
<td></td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>13,0,1</td>
<td>PR Chen Chu AH (USSR), NI (Zimbabwe)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3/19/1978</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Establishes a peacekeeping force for S. Lebanon (which became UNIFIL via 426)</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>12,2,0</td>
<td>DPR Lai Yali PK (UNIFIL), AA (Israel), AH (USSR, USA), NI (Palestine and Lebanon)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3/19/1978</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Establishes UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) (7 subsequent NP votes through 1981)</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>12,2,0</td>
<td>DPR Lai Yali PK (UNIFIL)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5/3/1978</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>On strengthening UNIFIL and withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>12,2,0</td>
<td>DPR Zhou Nan PK (UNIFIL), AA (Israel), TI (Lebanon), NI (Arabs)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9/29/1978</td>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>Establishes UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>12,0,2</td>
<td>PR Chen Chu PK (UNTAG), NI (Namibia), AH (USSR), AA (S. Africa)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1/13/1980</td>
<td>US-Iran</td>
<td>Proposes economic, travel, diplomatic sanctions on Iran for failing to release US hostages</td>
<td>S/1373</td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>USSR veto PR Chen Chu AH (USSR), CP (sanctions)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4/3/1982</td>
<td>UK-Argentina</td>
<td>Demands Argentine withdrawal from Falkland Islands</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>10,1,4</td>
<td>PR Ling Qing None (China took note of position of NAM countries)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Action Description</td>
<td>Resolution</td>
<td>Vote</td>
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<td>Details</td>
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<tr>
<td>9/12/1983</td>
<td>USSR-S. Korea</td>
<td>Deplores destruction of S. Korean civilian airliner, calls for review by Int. Civilian Aviation Org.</td>
<td>5/1596</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>PR Ling Qing None (China cited &quot;certain aspects of the incident&quot; to justify its vote)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11/29/1990</td>
<td>Iraq-Kuwait</td>
<td>Authorizes member states to use all necessary means to implement res 660 and relevant resolutions</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>12,2,1</td>
<td>MFA Qian Qichen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/2/1991</td>
<td>Iraq-Kuwait</td>
<td>Notes end of the Gulf War, demands Iraqi compliance with prior resolutions</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>11,1,3</td>
<td>PR Li Daoyu RC (SC should have a clearer role in end of hostilities)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/5/1991</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Demands Iraq desist repression of Kurdish population, est no fly zones</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>10,3,2</td>
<td>PR Li Daoyu TI (Iraq), NA (problem of refugees into Turkey)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3/31/1992</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Imposes aviation, arms embargoes on Libya due to concerns about Libyan sponsored terrorism</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>10,0,5</td>
<td>PR Li Daoyu CP (use of sanctions)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5/30/1992</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Imposes economic, aviation, cultural embargoes on FRY for failure to implement 752</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>13,0,2</td>
<td>PR Li Daoyu CP (use of sanctions)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>8/13/1992</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Demands cessation of violence in B-H, calls for humanitarian aid, SG involvement</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>12,0,3</td>
<td>PR Li Daoyu CP (use of force)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/14/1992</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Enlarges mandate of UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR)</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>12,0,3</td>
<td>PR Li Daoyu TI (lack of HC approval for UNPROFOR), RE (UNPROFOR) CP</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9/19/1992</td>
<td>New Member FRY (Serbia and Montenegro)</td>
<td>Proceeds of sales of Iraqi petroleum to be placed in escrow account</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>12,0,3</td>
<td>PR Li Daoyu TI (Iraq), NA (problem of Iraqi</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>10/2/1992</td>
<td>Iraq-Kuwait</td>
<td></td>
<td>778</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>14,0,1</td>
<td>PR Li Daoyu TI (Iraq), NA (problem of Iraqi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Action Description</td>
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<td>Impact Code</td>
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<tr>
<td>10/9/1992</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Bans military flights in airspace</td>
<td>781</td>
<td>A 14,0,1</td>
<td>DPR Jin Yongjian (use of force), CS</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11/16/1992</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Demands that all forms of interference from outside B-H stop</td>
<td>787</td>
<td>A 13,0,2</td>
<td>PR Li Daoyu (sanctions), NA (reference to Special Rapporteur on Human Rights)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11/30/1992</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Calls on parties to create conditions for elections, condemns Party of Democratic Kampuchea for failure to meet obligations under Paris Agreements</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>A 14,0,1</td>
<td>PR Li Daoyu (sanctions and elections without PDK participation)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3/31/1993</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Extends ban on military flights</td>
<td>816</td>
<td>A 14,0,1</td>
<td>DPR Chen Jian (use of force), CS</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4/17/1993</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Threatens sanctions on Bosnian Serbs for continued violence</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>A 13,0,2</td>
<td>DPR Chen Jian (sanctions), CS, TI (Bosnia)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4/28/1993</td>
<td>FRY</td>
<td>On the non-participation of the FRY in work of ECOSOC</td>
<td>821</td>
<td>A 13,0,2</td>
<td>DPR Chen Jian (use of pressure)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5/11/1993</td>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Calls on DPRK to rejoin the Non-proliferation Treaty, requests IAEA to consult with DPRK</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>A 13,0,2</td>
<td>PR Li Zhaoxing (use of pressure)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>8/9/1993</td>
<td>FRY</td>
<td>Calls on FRY to permit OSCE mission to operate in Serbia and Montenegro</td>
<td>855</td>
<td>A 14,0,1</td>
<td>PR Li Zhaoxing (sanctions), TI (FRY)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11/11/1993</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Imposes sanctions on Libya for failing to meet obligations under 731 and 748</td>
<td>883</td>
<td>A 11,0,4</td>
<td>PR Li Zhaoxing (sanctions), NA (issue can be mediated in other forums)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Action Description</td>
<td>Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>6/22/1994</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Establishes temporary multinational operation until deployment of expanded UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)</td>
<td>929</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>10,0,5</td>
<td>DPR Chen Jian</td>
<td>PC</td>
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<tr>
<td>7/31/1994</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Authorizes multinational force to restore legitimately elected president and ext UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>12,0,2, 1</td>
<td>PR Li Zhaoxing</td>
<td>CP (use of force)</td>
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<tr>
<td>11/8/1994</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Establishes International Tribunal</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>13,1,1</td>
<td>PR Li Zhaoxing</td>
<td>CS (tribunal), PC (Rwandan Government)</td>
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<tr>
<td>12/2/1994</td>
<td>Bosnia Herzegovina</td>
<td>Affirms that economic measures per 820 between FRY, B-H and Croatia be enforced</td>
<td>S/1994/1358</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Russian veto</td>
<td>PR Li Zhaoxing</td>
<td>CS, CP (sanctions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/30/1995</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Extends UNMIH and transfers peace-building duties from Multinational Force to UN Mission</td>
<td>975</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>14,0,1</td>
<td>PR Li Zhaoxing</td>
<td>SM (UNMIH)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/21/1995</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Extension of partial suspension of certain sanctions against FRY</td>
<td>988</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>13,0,2</td>
<td>PR Li Zhaoxing</td>
<td>CP (sanctions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/16/1995</td>
<td>Former Yugoslavia</td>
<td>Establishes rapid-reaction force within UNPROFOR</td>
<td>998</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>13,0,2</td>
<td>PR Qin Huasun</td>
<td>SM (UNPROFOR), CP (RRF)</td>
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<tr>
<td>4/26/1996</td>
<td>Ethiopia-Sudan</td>
<td>Imposes sanctions against Sudan in connection with non-compliance with 1044</td>
<td>1054</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>14,0,1</td>
<td>PR Qin Huasun</td>
<td>CS, CP (sanctions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/26/1996</td>
<td>Cuba-USA</td>
<td>On conclusions of Int. Civilian Aviation Org. report on shooting down of two civilian aircraft by Cuban Air Force</td>
<td>1067</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>13,0,2</td>
<td>PR Qin Huasun</td>
<td>TI (airspace)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/16/1996</td>
<td>Ethiopia-Sudan</td>
<td>Imposes aviation sanctions against Sudan to reinforce res 1044 and 1054</td>
<td>1070</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>13,0,2</td>
<td>PR Qin Huasun</td>
<td>CP (sanctions)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Action Description</td>
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<td>Status</td>
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<tr>
<td>10/22/1996</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Establishes Human Rights Office as part of UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)</td>
<td>1077</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>14,0,1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3/28/1997</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Establishes Multinational Protection Force (MPF) for humanitarian assistance</td>
<td>1101</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>14,0,1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6/19/1997</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>On temporary extension of operations of MPF</td>
<td>1114</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>14,0,1</td>
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<tr>
<td>10/20/1997</td>
<td>Iraq-Kuwait</td>
<td>Demands Iraqi cooperation with UNSCOM, threatens travel ban</td>
<td>1134</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>10,0,5</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3/31/1998</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>Imposes arms embargo on FRY due to situation in Kosovo</td>
<td>1160</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>14,0,1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9/23/1998</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>Urges ceasefire between Kosovo and Serbs, demands that FRY allow international monitors, humanitarian assistance</td>
<td>1199</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>14,0,1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>10/14/1998</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>Calls on FRY to comply with OSCE and NATO verification missions in Kosovo</td>
<td>1203</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>13,0,2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11/17/1998</td>
<td>Tribunal</td>
<td>Condemns FRY for failure to execute arrest warrants issued by Int. Tribunal</td>
<td>1207</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>14,0,1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11/25/1998</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Extends UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH)</td>
<td>1212</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>13,0,2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6/10/1999</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>Places Kosovo under UN administration, establishes UN Interim Administration Mission (UNMIK)</td>
<td>1244</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>14,0,1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6/25/1999</td>
<td>New Member</td>
<td>Nauru</td>
<td>1249</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>14,0,1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Action Description</td>
<td>Resolution</td>
<td>Proposal</td>
<td>Originator</td>
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<td>12/3/1999</td>
<td>Iraq-Kuwait</td>
<td>Extends Oil-for-Food Program</td>
<td>1280</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>PR Qin Huasun</td>
<td>CP (humanitarian situation)</td>
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<td>12/17/1999</td>
<td>Iraq-Kuwait</td>
<td>Establishes UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC)</td>
<td>1284</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>PR Qin Huasun</td>
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<td>2/17/2000</td>
<td>New Member Tuvalu</td>
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<td>1290</td>
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<td>None (indirect reference to Taiwan)</td>
<td>CP (sanctions)</td>
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<td>12/19/2000</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Imposes measures against the Taliban</td>
<td>1333</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>PR Wang Yingfan</td>
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<td>7/30/2004</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Endorses deployment of international monitors and imposing arms embargo on Sudan</td>
<td>1556</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>DPR Zhang Yishan</td>
<td>CP (sanctions)</td>
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<td>9/18/2004</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Expands monitoring mission in Darfur and establishes international commission to investigate human rights abuses</td>
<td>1564</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>PR Wang Guangya</td>
<td>CP (sanctions)</td>
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<td>3/29/2005</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Establishes SC Committee to monitor implementation of measures in Darfur</td>
<td>1591</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>PR Wang Guangya</td>
<td>CP (sanctions)</td>
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<td>3/31/2005</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Refers situation in Darfur since 1 Jul 2002 to prosecutor of Int. Criminal Court</td>
<td>1593</td>
<td>A</td>
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<td>TI (Sudan), CP (ICC)</td>
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<td>4/25/2006</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>On implementation of measures specified in par 3 of 1591 with respect to Sudanese individuals</td>
<td>1672</td>
<td>A</td>
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<td>CP (sanctions)</td>
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<td>5/17/2006</td>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>Implementation of 1559 on partial independence of Lebanon</td>
<td>1680</td>
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<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Expands mandate of UN Missions in Sudan (UNMIS) to support implementation of Darfur Peace Agreement</td>
<td>1706</td>
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