The Jesuit Imaginary: Higher Education in a Secular Age

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ABSTRACT

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The philosopher Charles Taylor argues in *A Secular Age* (2007) that people who live in secular cultures are losing the capacity to experience genuine “fullness.” Described by Taylor as a philosophical-anthropological conception of human flourishing that corresponds with existential senses of meaning and purpose, fullness is consistently referenced in the publication through dimensions of “contact” with a transcendent reality. The intersections of such contacts are characterized as phenomenal experiences and moral-ethical expressions. In appreciating Taylor’s descriptions of fullness and a corresponding “ontic commitment” to a transcendent source, I develop three specific “pedagogies of fullness.” The pedagogy of study, the pedagogy of solidarity, and the pedagogy of grace are higher educational strategies that emerge out of the Renaissance humanist tradition of Jesuit education and facilitate the relational contacts that make fullness, and, hence, meaning and purpose, possible. By engaging and networking multiple construals of individual experience (study), immersing students into contexts of alterity (solidarity), and validating inexplicable and phenomenal moments of consolation, gratitude, and wonder (grace), I argue that my conception of Jesuit higher education has the potential to restore fullness in a secular age. As Taylor characterizes Western individuals as independent and invulnerable, my pedagogies of fullness render relational possibilities to ourselves, others, and an Other that correspond with a hopeful envisioning of the self and the social. The way of envisioning, a Jesuit imaginary, views selves and social milieus as interrelational and transformative of each other.
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Introduction

The philosopher Charles Taylor argues in *A Secular Age* (2007) that people who live in secular cultures are losing the capacity to experience genuine “fullness.” Described by Taylor as a philosophical-anthropological conception of human flourishing that corresponds with existential senses of meaning and purpose, fullness is consistently referenced in the publication through dimensions of “contact” with a transcendent reality. Taylor characterizes the intersections of contact as phenomenal experience and moral-ethical relating.

In appreciating Taylor’s interpretation of contemporary Western culture, his two general descriptions of fullness, and his “ontic commitment” to a transcendent source, I develop three specific “pedagogies of fullness.” The pedagogy of study, the pedagogy of solidarity, and the pedagogy of grace are higher educational strategies that emerge out of the Renaissance humanist tradition of Jesuit education and facilitate the relational contacts that make fullness, and, hence, meaning and purpose, possible.

By engaging and networking multiple intellective construals of individual experience (study), immersing students into contexts of alterity (solidarity), and validating inexplicable and phenomenal moments of consolation, gratitude, and wonder (grace), I argue in this dissertation that Jesuit higher education has an ability to restore fullness in a secular age. Moreover, as Taylor characterizes Western individuals as independent and invulnerable, my pedagogies of fullness render relational possibilities to ourselves, others, and an Other that correspond with an hopeful way of envisioning the self and the social. The way of envisioning, a Jesuit imaginary, views persons and social milieus as interrelational and transformative of each other.
As the pedagogies and the imaginary emerge organically out of the precepts of Jesuit higher education and cultivate Taylor’s fullness, they signify various interpretations of this dissertation as a whole. For instance, it is possible to evaluate the pedagogies of fullness as a challenge to Jesuit higher education in the twenty-first century to better realize the origins and history of its tradition. A Jesuit university, then, can be assessed in how it knows and lives fundamental tenets of its tradition, as well as how it recognizes and responds to contemporary problematic cultural conditions.

Also, as the pedagogies of fullness can be recognized in how they are embedded within the tradition, in a secular age the pedagogies themselves can be deemed as exceptionally appropriate and timely. Their expressions of study, solidarity, and grace counter the current forces of individualism, nihilism, rationalism, and relativism with alternative ways of knowing and relating.

Moreover, for Jesuit universities that already practice aspects of any or all of these pedagogies, this thesis is an endorsement of their educative efforts and offers a bridge to Taylor’s existential and cultural concerns. Taylor’s parlance of porous and buffered selves, the social imaginary, fullness, and more, casts Ignatian and Jesuit terms in contemporary philosophical regard.

Finally, the dissertation recognizes that higher education itself participates in the crisis of fullness. Either symptomatic of present-day expressions of fragmentation, superficiality, and instrumentality or a source of their livelihood, this dissertation also explains that higher education is a context that is at once vulnerable and visionary and that the specific arena of Jesuit higher education can and should remedy such problems and facilitate the relational possibilities of Taylor’s fullness.
What this dissertation does not do is offer a discussion about the specific religious identity of the Jesuit university. While all things Jesuit are fundamentally Roman Catholic, discussing the intellectual tradition, the national history and culture, and pertinent authoritative documents of the church – essential aspects of any Catholic university – are beyond the purview of this dissertation.

The first chapter of the thesis, “The Search for Fullness in a Secular Age,” begins by discussing what Taylor initially means by fullness and explains how contemporary thinkers display yearnings for it in the own works. After considering possible hermeneutic, Heideggerian, existential, and epistemic semblances of fullness, the chapter returns to the concept itself and expands the understanding of it through the Christian idea of *agape*. Aspects of *agape* reinforce a religious sensibility of fullness but also introduce a strong moral-ethical correlation. The chapter concludes by recognizing a correspondence between personal instances of fullness and social relating, thereby forecasting a particular imaginary.

“Charles Taylor in Scholarly Discourse,” the next chapter, manifests two objectives. The first shows how Taylor is used creatively, confidently, and consistently in educational theory and the second demonstrates how *A Secular Age* is being discussed and debated in the Academy. The second part reveals a pan-academic interest in the term *fullness*, the central concept of this dissertation.

In many ways, the third chapter, “Pier Paolo Vergerio,” establishes an educational context that allows readers to better appreciate fundamental aspects in the following chapter, “The Tradition of Jesuit Education.” Vergerio was a pioneering Renaissance humanist who wrote a seminal educational treatise that articulated, stimulated, and guided educational sensibilities for the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. His insights are present in the Jesuit
educational tradition and help to inform the three specific pedagogies that emerge in the final chapter of this dissertation.

The next chapter, then, the longest of the five, discusses the origin of the Jesuit order through Ignatius of Loyola and the various inspirations that influenced an educational tradition that continues to exist. A rapid process of growth, the development of educational documents, a global dissemination of the tradition, a propagation of strident humanist essentials, a deployment of a hopeful anthropology, and a sharing of a discerning spirituality of the Order all convey a tradition well equipped to deal with the existential crisis of a secular age that Taylor describes.

The fifth chapter, “Higher Education in a Secular Age,” establishes a higher educational context through which the pedagogies of fullness in the Jesuit university can be later discussed and exposes current higher educational problems that are not dissimilar from the personal concerns of fullness. Initially referred to as malaises, the problems reveal contemporary trends of institutional fragmentation, superficial subjectivity, and instrumental epistemics and are recognized and grieved by historians, philosophers, and other scholars. As the problems represent commonplace orientations of the university in general, they can also be regarded by readers as expressions that compromise the existential realities of fullness in the lives of students.

The final chapter, “Pedagogies of Fullness,” proposes three Jesuit higher educational strategies – the pedagogy of study, the pedagogy of solidarity, and the pedagogy of grace – that function as contemporary remedies to the crisis of fullness. Constructed by the Renaissance humanist, Jesuit, and higher educational elements from the previous chapters of the dissertation, each pedagogy amplifies a relational dynamic that cultivates the conditions of Taylor’s fullness. Within the context of the self, among others, and with an Other, the relations also correspond philosophically with epistemic, moral-ethical, and metaphysical possibilities. In being explicitly
relational, the pedagogies of study, solidarity, and grace establish for students of Jesuit higher education ways of knowing and living that propel them into the future. As mentioned above, how students of Jesuit higher education envision themselves, others, and the world represents a Jesuit imaginary of the self and the social that is genuinely hopeful and widely communal.
Chapter One: The Search for Fullness in a Secular Age

“In the midst of . . . widespread disorientation, [our] problem of self-knowledge ceases to be simply the individual concern inculcated by the ancient sage. It takes on the dimensions of a social crisis. It can be read as the historical issue of the twentieth century. If in that balance human intelligence and reasonableness, human responsibility and freedom, are to prevail, then they must be summoned from the dim and confused realm of latent factors and they must burst forth in . . . full flower.”

Bernard Lonergan
*Insight* (1957)

Introduction

“I am very grateful . . . to raise with you today some issues that have been at the center of my concern,” remarks the philosopher Charles Taylor in the opening words of his 1996 lecture, “A Catholic Modernity.” He then admits, “[Such issues] have been reflected in my philosophical work, but not in the same form as I raise them this afternoon.” Later published by Oxford University Press, the talk was presented at the University of Dayton in Dayton, Ohio, upon Taylor’s reception of a prestigious award conferred upon him by the university. “[T]he remarkable fact that academic culture in the Western world breathes an atmosphere of unbelief,” he describes, has cultivated both within him and in the Academy a habit of masking religious

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3 Ibid.
He concedes, “Yes, [some of us] do a lot of that, obviously too much. The reasons are many, including ones to do with the advantages . . . of conformity.” Some such advantages, according to him, regard reputation, tenure, and promotion.

In “A Catholic Modernity” Taylor publicly identifies himself as a Roman Catholic, and, subsequently, the talk grounds him in important ways. First, his gesture toward unbelief, and this in the decisively rational context of the university, is simply a good entrée into *A Secular Age* (2007), Taylor’s more recent publication and a motivating force of this thesis. In this magisterial and prize-winning publication of nearly 900 pages, Taylor explains that the northern Atlantic societies of the global community – those nations framing the upper quadrant of the Atlantic Ocean, such as Western European, Scandinavian, and North American states – are less religious than ever. In the course of world history, this is “sudden,” the results of a five hundred year process of secularization, he explains. Taylor, a philosopher categorized in many ways, is also an historian of ideas. He thinks across millennia. If there was any doubt about his faith perspective following his “Catholic Modernity” address, or if it is unfamiliar to readers who know Taylor exclusively through his more popular scholarly, but religiously muted, publications, such as *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (1989) and *The Ethics of Authenticity* (1991), Taylor’s recent *A Secular Age* is a full and wider manifestation of a profound religious identity operative in his life and work.

Taylor wants us to recognize a geo-socio-cultural spread of Western secularism that began to unfold in the sixteenth century, around the time of the Protestant Reformation. We must recognize it, he insists, in comparison to the once-enduring Christian reality which

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4 Ibid., 118.

dominates the history of these places prior to 1500, and also in comparison with the rest of the
global community today: Hindu India, the Muslim Middle East, Catholic Latin America,
Buddhist Asia, etc. Perhaps the suddenness of secularism is more evident. Whether it is or is not, Taylor’s main point is that the current stronghold dynamic of Western secularism by no means attests to a simple subtraction theory: that is, the West grew up and got smart. Becoming secular is not a matter of what is being let go or sloughed away. Understanding secularism is incomplete if it only accounts for Enlightenment Era rationality and scientific achievement that mitigate and invalidate alternative perspectives of knowing. If Western secularism comes about quickly, it is also complicated, and many forces, Christianity included, are seriously complicit.
The introductory remarks of Taylor’s “Catholic Modernity” essay, then, establish for us Taylor’s religious interest and the existential version of secularism he focuses upon.

This leads to my second reason for referencing his opening remarks in “A Catholic Modernity.” His talk is an indictment that the Academy generally masks religious belief or, simply, breathes unbelief. Yet, until this particular address, Taylor himself has held his own religious cards close to his chest through decades of writing. Recognizing nuance is ironic because nuance is a dynamic of *A Secular Age*. It happens in Taylor’s parsing of *secularism* as a term. In the book, the overarching nuance regards the version of secularity he wishes to discuss, Secularity 3: the conditions of belief. It narrows the discussion of secularism away from an analytical concern about religious creeds and their contents, as well as away from questions about the nature of faith and belief, and ushers in, alternatively, an existential preoccupation. He wants to discuss secularism in the ways it impacts our daily lives and how we understand our own selves and our emotional, intellectual, political, and social capacities and relations.

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Knowing his existential focus and its correspondent Secularity 3 is crucial for better understanding the lengthy narrative of Western culture he chronicles.

This, the existential focus, brings me to my third reason for referencing Taylor’s uncharacteristic religious transparency in the 1996 lecture. Readers of Taylor’s work cannot now not appreciate the roles and meanings of specifically religious terms and motives in his writing. For instance, Taylor’s deployment of the Greek term “agape” in *A Secular Age* is significant. It is a Christian word and should be interpreted as such. *Agape*, moreover, is expressly important to this dissertation in its connection to Taylor’s term, “fullness,” a fundamental construct of *A Secular Age*. In my understanding of the 2007 publication, fullness represents the thrust of the book and drives it. The term is a philosophical-anthropological construct that functions in tandem with the existential perspective of Taylor’s Secularity 3. The cultural conditions of belief and the human experience of fullness together manifest important insights about a secular age. *Agape* is deployed by Taylor to further expand our interpretation of fullness, and if Taylor is right about the Academy, dwelling in an overt religious construct creates something of a challenge for us.

The fundamental objective of this chapter introduces and defines Taylor’s concept of fullness. The concept will emerge later in this dissertation when, inspired by Taylor’s construction and rendition of fullness, I develop in the final chapter of the thesis my “pedagogies of fullness.” To further appreciate Taylor’s term, the first part of the chapter explains the role fullness plays in the text and what it means. It is also clear that other current scholars are developing their own notions of fullness. It is certainly clear that they articulate characterizations of Modernity that generally agree with Taylor’s own. The second part of the chapter, then, “Contemporary Yearnings,” discusses numerous scholars and the ways by which
they seem to represent fullness in their works and discuss the Modern predicament. These thinkers include, first, Friedrich von Schiller and Hans-Georg Gadamer and the concept of play; second, Hubert Dreyfus and Sean Dorrance Kelly and their interest in “whooshing;” third, Taylor’s agreement with the epistemic commitments of John McDowell’s *Mind and World*; fourth, René Arcilla’s development of “presentness;” and fifth, an understanding of “holistic epistemics” as developed out of Stephen Toulmin’s and Taylor’s works. Again, the five perspectives either manifest similarities with Taylor’s fullness, offer important descriptions of Modernity, or do both.

The third part of the chapter returns more directly to Taylor and his expansion of fullness through the idea of *agape*. The fourth and final part introduces the philosopher Bernard Lonergan to stress a correlation between personal fullness and social engagement.

**I. Fullness**

Taylor explains that many people have a certain kind of experience when life seems purpose-filled, connected, driven, and genuine. It is a phenomenal moment that facilitates a profound sense of interior peace, a sense of wholeness, in one’s life. A personal instance as such “unsetsles and breaks though our ordinary sense of being in the world, with its familiar objects, activities and points of reference . . . when ‘ordinary reality is abolished and something terrifyingly other shines through.’” He discusses this at page five, but six- and seven-hundred pages later, Taylor keeps looking over his shoulder back to this epiphanic description of “fullness” and to a person through whom it occurred.

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7 Ibid., 5.
8 Ibid.
The moment of fullness and the person Taylor features as having the experience is Bede Griffiths (1906-1993), an Englishman who remembered a certain moment of fullness for the rest of his life. Griffiths’s experience of fullness stages for us a dimming Spring-time evening in the man’s school-age youth, one filled with birdsong and new blossoms, and around the boy, the friendly flight of a chirping lark. The combined elements of the external world, a calmed and confirmed disposition within Griffiths himself, and a poignant sense of meaning and purpose were sudden. It seized Griffiths, and in some way it encompassed him. He felt attentive to the world and his life in a way that was notable for its intensity and impression, but he also felt pulled beyond himself, or at least impacted by something he himself did not originate. For years Griffiths seems to have been wonderfully haunted by the moment.9

Never forgetting an experience that seemed existentially transformative, Griffiths later became a Benedictine monk, but he soon left the locale of his English monastery to spend his life in India, and eventually in an Indian ashram. From the subcontinent he, a Western-trained monastic, established a career comparing and articulating the affinities and symbolic contrasts between Christian, Hindu, and Muslim experiences of fullness.10

“[W]hat I want to do” in A Secular Age, Taylor insists, “is focus attention on the different kinds of lived experience involved in understanding your life in one way or the other.”11 His way of doing this stems from Griffiths’s experience and Taylor’s prognosis that the experience of fullness – in particular an expression of being enchanted by realities or a singular reality beyond us – will cease occurring for those of us who dwell in a secular age. His

9 Ibid.

10 Griffiths became a Catholic pioneer in inter-religious dialogue. I appreciated some of his dialogical accomplishments while studying for my Master of Divinity degree at the Jesuit School of Theology of Santa Clara University in Berkeley, California.

11 Taylor, A Secular Age, 5.
discussion about the kinds of experiences that we rarely or no longer enjoy exposes his concern that our Western and Modern Era perspective either misinterprets the experience of fullness as self-generated or that our twenty-first-century sensibilities altogether prevent fullness from happening. In a subsequent publication, moreover, Taylor speaks about this existential reality: that is, fullness, as a categorical term which attempts to capture and highlight an aspect of the human condition whereby each of us experiences life – our own lives – as meaningful, genuine, and authentic, or capable of being more meaningful, more genuine, and more authentic.\textsuperscript{12}

Taylor’s concern about the different kinds of lived experience that we do or do not have, and how they are understood or misunderstood, again exposes his conviction that in a secular age we have been conditioned to either misinterpret the experience of fullness as an experience of our own doing or that, somehow – personally, culturally – fullness is impeded. Taylor wants to rescue fullness, and in doing so he wants to resuscitate a part of our lives. In \textit{A Secular Age}, he speaks and writes about being disenchanted, and indicates that he is interested in something that might be called re-enchantment. The lament of Modernity and its particular “malaises” – discussed in both \textit{Sources of the Self} and \textit{The Ethics of Authenticity} – are not unrelated. Per Taylor’s diagnosis, I interpret the waning or simply un-occurring experience of fullness in our individual lives as steadily grieved in \textit{A Secular Age} as the fundamental malady of disenchantment that disturbs Taylor so profoundly.

When Taylor arrives at his final chapter, he references yet again the issue of fullness as introduced through Griffiths’s epiphany. The sensibility it represents is powerfully familiar to the late Vaclav Havel (1936-2011) who experienced a profound instance of fullness during a moment of imprisonment at the Hermanice Correctional Institute in Ostrava, Czechoslovakia.

台尔曼指出，从1979年到1984年之间，某次“潜在的爱”——一种“令人满意”或“激励性的”时刻——据迈克尔·沃纳称，不是“危险”的自我增强感觉，而是类似于个人体验的转变，这种转变彻底改变了伊格内修斯的生活，这位中世纪的西班牙人，也是耶稣会的创始人（将在第四章中讨论）。15

在自己的著作中，伊格内修斯表明了他内部或精神上的慰藉时刻，描绘它们为一种意识的连接、和解、光明、目的、和平和总体上的确认。16

但是，台尔曼建议说，“我们必须扩大我们的‘接触点’，因为我们在我们的时代太容易以‘经验’来思考这种接触；以及我们以主观的、独立于所体验的对象的东西来思考经验，以及我们以我们感觉的东西来思考变化，而不是我们生活的方向、姿态、倾向。”17

在考虑更多关于充实是什么以及它如何起作用的例子时，他转向那些更少的沉思的、狂热的、更立即使用的表达，以阐明生活转变为真正的和持久的表达——道德、伦理、相互作用的表达。18

充实邀请的是一种可以接受对情感、社会、政治和精神可能性的主体性的想法。当充实的概念在《世俗时代》中获得发展时，它与道德、伦理、相互作用的表达形成了良好的配对。19

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18 Ibid., 729.
Age, it becomes clear that it is not unrelated to capacities for friendship, intimacy, dialogue, moral responsibility, social and political cooperation and action, prayer, and social justice. The ambit of fullness is particularly wide and distinctly relational. Later we will see how Taylor expands fullness beyond the sensational epiphanies through which he introduces the phenomena of fullness into a moral-ethical dynamic of loving. Represented by “agape,” such a dynamic maintains the spiritual dimension of fullness.

Before getting to agape, however, I would like to portray a number of other perspectives that either resemble affinities with Taylor’s fullness, endorse his concerns about Modernity, or both. As will be discussed in the following chapter, it seems to me that these other perspectives implicitly endorse Taylor’s fullness construct by articulating similar yearnings.

II. Contemporary Yearnings

Play and the Hermeneutic

In considering the first perspective, I remain close to Taylor. His first referencing of fullness as a term in A Secular Age cites J. C. Friedrich von Schiller’s (1759-1805) Letters upon the Aesthetic Education of Man (1794). When Taylor initially introduces the term “fullness,” he immediately signals Schiller’s concept of “play,” a construct that has received great attention by educational theorists Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi (1746-1827), Friedrich Froebel (1782-1852), and other philosophers of education inspired by their thinking.19

Schiller’s thinking is informed by the philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), a philosophic outlook that Taylor – as well as others that will be discussed later in the chapter – describes as the flourishing culmination of autonomous rationality and the contemporary

expressions of exaggerated individuality. Despite this, Schiller, in his second letter of *Aesthetic Education*, seems concerned about the dominance around him of instrumental rationality, a prevailing epistemic orientation characteristic of modern individuals. Schiller thus explains, “The very spirit of philosophical inquiry itself robs the imagination of one promise after another, and . . . frontiers . . . are narrowed . . . as the limits of science are enlarged.” The assessment is poetically expressed, too. Taylor enjoys citing Schiller’s poem, *The Gods of Greece* (1788), in much of his writing. In the poem Schiller bemoans Modern aesthetic sensibility that is contaminated by a technological worldview. Poetry, he explains, now “slavishly obeys the laws of gravity / A nature shorn of the divine.”

Later, around letters 15 and 16, we gain a clearer perspective of what Schiller’s up to with the concept of play and why Taylor cites him. Schiller discusses two important instincts at work in human life, a sensuous instinct and a rational one. Play emerges as a third instinct, but it is an impulse that is only possible through the combination of the first two. The play instinct, “a new impulsion,” Schiller says, facilitates a dimension of knowing or understanding which is less limited than what is known or understood through the independent functioning of the sensuous and rational capacities. In combination, the natural functioning of our feelings and our reasoning seems to lose a bit of its staunch Kantian autonomy. The aesthetic sensibility of play is particularly receptive of beauty that is beyond us. This sensibility is what Taylor is interested in, an ability or capacity to appreciate or know external realities and to be impacted by

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22 Schiller, “Letter VII.”

23 Ibid., “Letter XIV.”
them. The external dimension is significant because Taylor remains ever convinced that Modern epistemology relies too much upon what individuals come to know rationally and independently and that such knowing is limited from other sources within and disconnected from sources beyond the self.

The philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002) reads Schiller similarly and indicates that Schiller is reacting appropriately to a pervasive scientific orientation of Modernity. In *Truth and Method* (1960), Gadamer explains that the move with play demonstrated by Schiller is a wake-up call in a mechanically understood world to better appreciate beauty, but Gadamer also says that Schiller’s articulation of it is too subjective; that is, too Kantian. To pull the instinct of play beyond the personal parameters of experience, Gadamer encourages us to recognize the distinction between one who experiences beauty and beauty itself. Here is what Gadamer says: “The ‘subject’ of the experience . . . is not the subjectivity of the person who experiences it but the [beautiful object] itself. This is the point at which the mode of being of play becomes significant. For play has its own essence, independent of the consciousness of those who play.”

Gadamer explains that Schiller’s play instinct “brings to light what is otherwise constantly hidden and withdrawn.” Play, then, per Gadamer’s rendering, happens to us. It stands over and above subjectivity. Persons are played rather than being the instigators of play.

Gadamer’s interest is hermeneutic. While he expresses an interest in correcting Schiller, or even just improving what Schiller was trying to do with “play,” Gadamer wants to explain how textual works in particular impact us. In this we can consider the written words of a text

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25 Ibid., 103.

26 Ibid., 112.
that are in front of us as laden with meaning, but with Gadamer we can also be mindful of the
text of the world. Either way, both are external, and both are imbued with meanings and
purposes that we read from them. The interpretations we render depend upon our own particular
thoughts, sentiments, and intuitions, but such processes and responses are informed by the
external realities of texts. The correlation between interpretation and the external is significant
to Gadamer. Just as he is concerned about a world that is too mechanically or scientifically
understood in Modern perspective, he shows a yearning to break into the inner realm of Modern
individuals with meanings and purposes of external origins. Rather than further substantiating
Gadamer with descriptions of his own, I turn to Rainer Maria Rilke (1875-1926) and words of
his that Gadamer uses to introduce his own *magnus opus, Truth and Method*:

> Catch only what you’ve thrown yourself, all is
> mere skill and little gain;
> but when you’re suddenly the catcher of a ball
> thrown by an eternal partner
> with accurate and measured swing
> towards you, to your center, in an arch
> from the great bridgebuilding of God:
> why catching them becomes a power—
> not yours, a world’s.  

While I am not incognizant that Taylor, who himself knows Rilke well and deploys him with
ease in his writings, eventually faults some of Rilke’s works – as he does pointedly in *The Ethics
of Authenticity* – for an inability or lack of willingness to distinguish personal sentiments from
objective realities that exist beyond us and our sentiments. That his poetry generally does not
appreciate external sources of our lives (as this uncharacteristic precursor to Gadamer does so
effectively) compels Taylor to turn, at the end of *A Secular Age*, to a poet who does. In the final

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27 Ibid., v.

pages of *A Secular Age* the British Jesuit and Victorian poet Gerard Manley Hopkins (1844-1889) is Taylor’s shining, innovative example of ontic committedness.

How does Taylor fit in here? In combining both Schiller and Gadamer, the critical points are that the subject – a person – is brought into relationship with powers, forces, and realms that exceed his or her own personal powers of comprehension and deliberation *and* that multiple capacities for knowing are appreciated. The philosophical tradition framed by Modern epistemology, to be explained more fully in the next paragraphs, is pronouncedly uncomfortable with such external influences. That Schiller’s play impulsion and the dynamic of Gadamerian hermeneutics point to something beyond subjective experience is a violation of Enlightenment rationality. Schiller and Gadamer seem to anticipate Taylor’s fullness construct in as much as they too break individuality open. In doing so, they endorse the concerns Taylor expresses about Modernity.

*Heideggerian Whooshing*

To better appreciate Taylor’s own portrayal of Modernity, the “malaises” he laments in many of his works would suffice, but so would the description of it that is portrayed in *All Things Shining*. Written by Hubert Dreyfus of the University of California at Berkeley and Sean Dorrance Kelly of Harvard University, and fully titled *All Things Shining: Reading the Western Classics to Find Meaning in a Secular Age* (2011), the book, like Taylor’s, discusses the general culture we live in. I contend that it also demonstrates a yearning for fullness.

While the book disagrees with some of Taylor’s fundamental philosophical commitments, Taylor’s *A Secular Age* inspired it. Dreyfus and Kelly approached Taylor about the idea for their project at New School University in New York city a couple of years ago at a conference dealing with Taylor’s work, and Taylor endorsed it. Above I quoted Taylor’s
definition of fullness, saying that it is a moment “when ‘ordinary reality is abolished and something terrifyingly other shines through.’” This is the shining Dreyfus and Kelly dwell in. It is an illumination of a reality beyond us, or even a kind of sheening or excelling that is called out of us.

As Taylor does in A Secular Age and elsewhere in his writings, Dreyfus and Kelly explain that meaninglessness and lack of individual purpose exist today like never before in our history. In the context of higher education, Anthony Kronman of Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut constructs a similar argument in his book, Education’s End: Why Our Colleges and Universities Have Given Up on the Meaning of Life (2007), where he likewise speaks about us and our time as empty, flattened, disenchanted, and in crisis. He recoils at the “characteristically American emphasis on the importance of ‘useful’ knowledge” and he also hopes to cultivate a different sensibility.

In All Things Shining, Dreyfus and Kelly say that a nihilism of the present era leaves us with the distasteful prospect that nothing in the world matters. Dreyfus and Kelly call this a particular American mood that is characterized by addiction, depression, consumerism, terrorism, and tennis academies. They use the acclaimed and late novelist David Foster Wallace (1962-2008) to make their point and, just as Taylor does, they try to get us to realize that we cannot, by our own individual resources, manufacture the meanings and purposes of our

29 Taylor, A Secular Age, 5.
31 Ibid., 114.
33 Ibid., 24-25.
lives. As they are worried about a cultural melancholy, they are worried about expressions of relativism. They see a correlation between the two.

To spell this out philosophically, Dreyfus and Kelly discuss the history of Enlightenment Era philosophy. The father of Modern philosophy, René Descartes (1596-1650), they say, is the one who insisted that we can do this; that is, that we can manufacture meaning and purpose by our own personal resources. According to Dreyfus and Kelly, Descartes interpreted the world we live in as a taxonomy of subjects and objects that are sufficient unto themselves and interactive in limited ways. Subjectivity, then, is more alone than previously depicted, and as a source unto itself, it is a locus of truth and certainty. Certainty, that is, self-achieved certainty, in turn empowers the choices we ourselves make. The condition of subjectivity in Cartesian perspective is thus inflated willfully: “human subjects at their best are completely detached, self-contained, and, far from being passive, have a willpower so great that it rivals God’s.” While the mechanistic worldview his philosophy details, a corresponding scientific certainty it demands, and a resulting doctrinaire regard for factual evidence gain far too much momentum for their comfort – a Modern force feared by Schiller – Dreyfus and Kelly maintain that Descartes’s sense of personal autonomy is the real culprit behind modern meaninglessness.

Starting with Descartes, then, but also following a particular philosophical thread through the Enlightenment, Dreyfus and Kelly reach Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) to show us how philosophers of the Enlightenment have convinced us that meaningfulness and purpose have to be solely constructed by the willfulness of individuals themselves. The Nietzschean insight

34 Ibid., 137.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., 48.
that we can become the overman, a god, is a spectacularly self-aggrandized perspective that emerges out of Enlightenment rationality.\(^{37}\)

Dreyfus and Kelly are quite sure that Taylor’s ways forward in *A Secular Age*, the itineraries to new belief he explores at the end of the book, are not helpful. Taylor is a serious religious thinker. Roman Catholicism represents a faith perspective that operates in his life along intelligent, passionate, and practical strands. His fascination with and practice of Buddhism, moreover, stand by its side closely and comfortably. For Dreyfus and Kelly, these transcendental-striped orientations are not relevant or appropriate for dealing with problems of our secular age, and in their work they say so up front.\(^{38}\) They are, though, concerned about the meaningless destinations a secular age offers. They ask an interesting question, and one that Taylor entertains in his own way: “What if we haven’t lost the sacred, shining gods, but have simply lost touch with the meanings they offer?”\(^{39}\)

It is clear that Dreyfus and Kelly are discouraged by Modernity. They agree with Taylor that it is a source of individualism, consumerism, and relativism in our culture, “isms” which prevent us from recognizing the kinds of realities that can facilitate meaning and purpose more profoundly. Dreyfus and Kelly explain that “our focus on ourselves as isolated, autonomous agents has had the effect of banishing the gods—that is to say, covering up or blocking our sensitivity to what is sacred in the world.”\(^{40}\) They end evocatively, saying: “The gods are calling us but we have ceased to listen. They are calling us to cultivate [poiesis, or a poietic]

\(^{37}\) Ibid., 56.

\(^{38}\) Ibid., 21.

\(^{39}\) Ibid., 89.

\(^{40}\) Ibid., 221.
As such, Dreyfus and Kelly insist that meanings of ourselves and of the world around us are not self-generated, but generated for the self, and that we can cultivate the skills to find them and be meaningfully impacted by them. What is key here, though, is the sensitivity they aspire to restore, a capacity, I argue, which is not unlike Taylor’s fullness. It does not demand the metaphysical commitment Taylor’s does, but, especially as an antidotal expression to a Modernity that Dreyfus, Kelly, and Taylor grieve similarly, it is telling.

The “whooshing up” that Dreyfus and Kelly prescribe – the flashes of excellence not all that different from the conceptions of ancient Greek *arête* that will be described in Chapter 3 of this thesis – are objectified and externalized, so to speak, in the ancient Greek conception of “physis,” an etymological origin to our Modern conception of “physia,” the way the most real things in the world present themselves to us.”

Dreyfus and Kelly yearn for fullness, for a moment which “offers what autonomy cannot: a sense of participating in something that transcends.”

Dreyfus and Kelly’s discussion becomes more practical and pointed in a recent follow-up article to their book where they describe physical agility and artistic genius in our lives as specific examples of being called by the gods. “When human beings are acting at their best—in great feats of athleticism or in the composition of the finest poetry, in the activities of life in the everyday world or heroism on the battlefield in feats of war—people often say that they were not

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41 Ibid.

42 Ibid., 200.

43 Ibid., 205.
themselves responsible for what they did . . . as if it was drawn out of them.”

They proclaim that in the ancient context “[t]he Homeric gods shined. They manifested what mattered in its best light and they drew people to perform heroic and passionate deeds.”

Bringing such gods back into our consciousness, that is, becoming sensitized to Homeric polytheism, is Dreyfus and Kelly’s remedy to modernity’s problems, but unlike Taylor, their cure needs neither metaphysics nor theology. A Homeric polytheism, in their account, “retains a phenomenologically rich account of the sacred, and a similarly rich understanding of human existence in its midst.”

Such polytheistic sensitizing is possible in our contemporary lives, they insist, through the dispositions of wonder and gratitude. “We . . . need, in particular, to cultivate the practices of opening ourselves to being overwhelmed by the power of moods and nature, and at the same time learn the practice of cultivating ourselves so that our routines are transformed into rituals that bring things out at their shining best.”

In Dreyfus and Kelly’s reading of history, moreover, ancient wonder and gratitude that are prefigured by Homer are echoed by the ancient Greek poet Aeschylus (c.525-c.456 BCE) and, for Athens and its citizens, a caring and patriotic attitude; Jesus’s agapic loving; Dante Alighieri’s (1265-1321) religious bliss; Martin Luther’s (1483-1546) joyfulness; and Descartes’s rational tranquility; positive and productive moods which are then thwarted by the modern temperaments of gripping indecision, endless waiting,
and anxiety by, respectively, T. S. Eliot (1888-1965), Samuel Beckett (1906-1989), and W. H. Auden (1907-1973).^{49}

Taylor responds to Dreyfus and Kelly, explaining that they invent a form of polytheism that is “interstitial.”^{50} Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) helps him. Taylor explains that Dreyfus and Kelly offer a shallow polytheism devoid of the meaningful practices and moral and epistemic commitments manifested by ancient polytheists that were definitely present in Homeric expressions. Instead, they remain at a simpler Heideggerian level of basic experience, the place of “interface between Dasien and world.”^{51} Genuine Homeric polytheism indeed evoked wonder and gratitude; it motivated creativity, valiance, and beauty, but it also provoked fear and dread and demanded ritualistic sacrifice to specific, and living, gods. While Taylor appreciates their Modernity-influenced concern for a muted, if not deadened, human sensitivity, he seems discouraged by the flimsy polytheism they articulate.

This, in fact, is worth dwelling on for a moment. Is the metaphysical commitment of Taylor’s fullness wholly necessary? Philosophically, it is. Taylor labors too persistently in A Secular Age to instantiate our ability to experience mystical realities that are external to subjectivity. However, in practical, day to day perspective, I think Taylor would be excited to see anyone just even edging towards the possibility of fullness, and doing so in the midst of somewhere between naturalism and supernaturalism. In this, there seems to be a metaphysical willingness or interest. The edging is itself, I think, a dimension of Taylor’s fullness. It reveals a yearning, or, better yet, an openness and connectedness that is reflective of the porous self Taylor

^{49} Ibid., 201-202.


^{51} Ibid., 119.
discusses, a concept of subjectivity I will describe more fully in the next chapter. I myself appreciate the middle ground. As I endorse Taylor’s metaphysics, his ontic commitment, I do not want in this dissertation to undermine those who either resist it or ponder alternative descriptions of it. Porosity can be appreciated from many angles, and the way of life fullness portends does indeed seem to represent an enriched subjectivity. Even just some of the relational connections of fullness that were named above are better than none.

An Epistemic Caution

To emphasize the philosophical problems of Modernity and to endorse Dreyfus and Kelly’s critique, I turn momentarily to John McDowell, or at least to Taylor’s appreciation of McDowell. Above I cited Heidegger’s idea of *Dasien* as part of Taylor’s critique of Dreyfus and Kelly’s polytheism whereby Taylor indicates that they offer us a shallow and insubstantial variant of genuine Homeric polytheism. Taylor’s reference to *Dasien* demonstrates an interaction between a knowing subject and an external world that is devoid of values, commitments, and influences operative in both domains. It is an explanation of Taylor’s that echoes his elucidation of Modern epistemology through his reading and appreciation of John McDowell’s *Mind and World* (1994).

In an article entitled “Foundationalism and the Inner-Outer Distinction,” Taylor applauds the philosophical insights professed in McDowell’s hugely influential work, indicating “massive agreement with the main line of his thinking.” In the article, per its title, Taylor is wary of a rigid dichotomy between a knowing subject and the external world. Written ten years ago, Dreyfus was already an interlocutor with Taylor and is cited. And even then, through Dreyfus,

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Taylor points to Heidegger’s Dasien construct with concern. Naming Heidegger and including Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), Taylor explains that both thinkers articulate what it means to be Dasien, a being in the world, and how “these accounts are rather rich, detailed, and multi-facetted.”

Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty “portray human conceptual thinking as embedded in an ordinary way of living and moving around in the world, and dealing with things, which is in an important sense pre-conceptual; what Dreyfus calls ‘everyday coping.’” Such dealing and coping, however, become problematic for Taylor because they signify a misleading relationship between the “inner” construals of a subject who is interacting with an external world. One problem is that an inside/outside distinction seems valid. Such a division “portrays our understanding of the world as taking place in a zone, surrounded by . . . a world, which is thus seen as playing the role of Outside to its Inside.”

Taylor’s concern is that “what goes on in the inner zone is meant to be in some way at least partly modeled on what exists outside.” Such an image of knowing – which is “too powerfully embedded in our beliefs and (scientific, technical, freedom-oriented) way of life” – leaves us with an impression of a “self-enclosed subject, out of contact with the transcendent world.” But Taylor, and even Dreyfus and Kelly in a certain light, want such a contact. In Taylor’s assessment, this epistemic perspective, foundationalism, augments forms of relativism that Taylor wants to avoid, but it also limits the power of knowing, a constraint he is trying to

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53 Ibid., 110.
54 Ibid., 111.
55 Ibid., 106.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid., 107.
58 Ibid., 115.
dismantle in various ways which is not unrelated to the wider capacities of his own phenomenological-existential construct, fullness.

Modern Presentness

Educational philosopher René Arcilla discusses a particular philosophical-anthropological capacity in his recent work that is not wholly unlike Taylor’s. However, in *Mediumism: A Philosophical Reconstruction of Modernism for Existential Learning* (2010) Arcilla is more hopeful about Modernity. Unlike Dreyfus, Kelly, McDowell, and Taylor, Modernity for Arcilla is ripe with meaning and purpose. It is in such a context that Arcilla articulates the possibility of an essential human capacity that resembles the phenomenological aspects of Taylor’s fullness.

For Arcilla, Modernity is particularly meaningful in its artistic expression. As Dreyfus and Kelly want to re-cultivate a forgotten poiesis, Arcilla appreciates an existing one. Modern works of art, through their medium of uncertainty and ambiguity, spark, or instantiate, the human condition of estrangement. “Strangerhood” is a natural reality of human life Arcilla wants all of us to acknowledge, and embracing it helps us face the fact that, as human persons, “we are always travelers passing through” a domain that we inhabit only temporarily and conditionally. As Modernity is meaningful, it also has a dark side. Elements of it can make us feel easily at home, or too easily identifiable. He takes up the role of Modern aesthetics – or at least the artistic – in a pedagogical dimension, developing what he terms as “existential learning,” an instructive process that prevents us from identifying ourselves with and in the trappings Modernity.

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The critique he offers of Modernity focuses not upon the epistemic commitments of Cartesian-Kantian rationality but upon twentieth century industry and capital gain. Prescient contemporary problems of consumerism, the cultivation of superficial self-identities, and the influences of mass media and mass production represent its problems. Arcilla demonstrates existential sympathies in Marxist tones. If Schiller’s play was a wake-up call in a suddenly mechanically structured world, Arcilla’s existential learning – “Awake now.”60 – is likewise an alarm. We may be estranged, but we should not allow ourselves to be alienated. Arcilla prompts us to recognize how and why we should evade being at home, so to speak, in a world that is always foreign and he encourages us to forge ahead more freely and, thus, more responsibly.

The affinities I detect between Arcilla and Taylor come through, again, as a certain appreciation of fullness. Like Taylor, Arcilla demonstrates a keen interest in substantiating external, objective influences that impact us as knowing subjects. He also validates a corresponding transformative moment of recognition – one that is caused instead of self-generated – and he stresses the necessity for an appropriate – in Arcilla’s rendering, virtuous – response.

In Mediumism Arcilla argues that works of Modern art can impact us existentially – the spark or instantiation discussed above – by making us aware of a philosophical-anthropological dynamic in our lives, also again, estrangement.61 In such a process, a particular experience of understanding – not something arbitrary and impulsive, but purposeful62 – happens.

60 Ibid., 82.
61 Ibid., 48.
62 Ibid., 22.
“Conviction in a work’s aesthetic identity and quality: this, then, springs from an experience of presentness. In its grip, we are fully present to the work, and ‘get’ all its features as a whole.”

That moment, “presentness,” a kind of awakefullness, is described by Arcilla as being instantaneous and convincing, meaningful and beautiful. More so, “[t]his experience is patently an ideal state of being for us . . . ‘grace’ . . . Its value is to be distinguished from [a] more mundane, incomplete, inconclusive counterpart.” Furthermore, much earlier in his work Arcilla foreshadows the experience of presentness, explaining that “there is a moment in the process of understanding, and an inner realm of ourselves” that is not unlike Griffiths’s solitary moment. Also, in Arcilla’s description, a moment as such “is irreducibly solitary . . . the sole and the common, solitude and community, isolation and communication, are components, not opposites. Each requires cultivation.” Later we will see how Taylor expands his notion of fullness beyond a sense of personal empowerment. Here, though, in Mediumism, Arcilla explains that presentness is not just a dynamic between artwork and a viewer, but of persons – you and me – who dwell in a “questionable” world that “elicits understanding.” Like Taylor, Arcilla is determined to break individuality open.

As we will appreciate an expanded version of fullness in Taylor’s own rendering further along in this chapter, we will also wrestle with Taylor’s admission that his account of fullness “has a religious or metaphysical ring” to it and his willingness to conceptualize fullness more

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63 Ibid., 51.
64 Ibid., 52.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid., 18.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid., 22.
generally. Fullness, Taylor emphasizes, however, is not a moment of Kantian cognition but a general philosophical-anthropological construct that accounts for, fundamentally, senses of and strivings for meaning and purpose in our lives. Arcilla’s presentness is much different, but when Taylor says that “we need a conversation between a host of different positions” for what fullness is, I appreciate the many affinities between Taylor’s and Arcilla’s conceptions.

To be a bit more pointed about such resemblances, both fullness and presentness are contextualized not as theological or metaphysical, but philosophical-anthropological. This is despite Arcilla’s characterization of presentness as “grace” and Taylor’s unquestionable metaphysical commitments. To each, both are fundamental human realities. Also, in the experiences they facilitate, both are phenomenological; that is, each provides an awareness of some kind. Furthermore, there are gripping or seizing realities to these moments, and Taylor and Arcilla both offer grasping descriptors. Taylor in particular is articulate about a qualitative aspect of time in such moments, an experience that is suspended from ordinary, prosaic measurements of minutes and seconds, for instance, a distinction Arcilla also makes by distinguishing presentness from the mundane. To continue, they each testify to revelations and significations that happen outside of or external to subjectivity, disclosures that rely upon human capacities that can appreciate them. And finally, each augments a moral dimension.

To understand Arcilla’s ethical correlate, consider his description of the “Present,” an external source that initiates within us a condition of presentness. Arcilla instructs that it is freely generous and loving, and that it compels from us similar kinds of responses. The Present

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70 Ibid., 317.

71 Arcilla, Mediumism, 60.
transforms us, and we can participate in it or espouse its qualities. Arcilla explains that it “entails accepting certain practical commitments” which emulate the generosity and love of the Present.\textsuperscript{72} When Arcilla intimates, “I am apt to feel awe at its miraculous, inexplicably spontaneous genesis as generosity,” he also seems to anticipate Dreyfus and Kelly and their yearnings, in a secular age, for wonder and gratitude. Arcilla’s two specific virtues are gratitude and generosity.\textsuperscript{73}

It would be unfair to conflate Arcilla’s and Taylor’s existential concerns and, for that matter, Arcilla’s and Dreyfus and Kelly’s virtues. Influenced by Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) and Stanley Cavell, and assisted by articulations of freedom in Michael Oakeshott’s (1901-1990) work, is only the tip of Arcilla’s existential iceberg, but given the likenesses between the combined reality of works of art, presentness, and an ensuing existential learning, I am indeed impelled to keep pushing Arcilla into the realm of Taylor’s fullness. Arcilla reads Modernity differently, but he seems to share in the existential concerns of Dreyfus and Kelly’s recovery of ancient whooshing as well as Taylor’s religiously enchanted fullness.\textsuperscript{74}

\textit{Holistic Epistemics}

Understanding Taylor’s fullness, as we did above through Schiller’s concept of play, and then through Gadamer’s refinement of it, is essential, I think, for rightly appreciating and maintaining the particular existential orientation Taylor establishes. It is the “conditions” of belief that his is interested in, and the way we live our lives. For Taylor, play reinforces the

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{74} In the following chapter, it is also worth noting the affinities and differences between Taylor’s conception of fullness and a similar experience described by the French philosopher Pierre Hadot. Hadot also speaks of a sense of “presence.”
phenomenological aspect of fullness. There is a temptation, yet, to engage fullness in epistemic language, at least in my own negotiations of Taylor’s fullness. Steering around the pitfalls of Enlightenment epistemology is important to Taylor. Its traps force either/or, right/wrong, and true/false certainties that replicate dogmatic perspectives Modern epistemologists reacted to in their Enlightenment inspirations. Taylor offers pages of explanation in many of his works about the problems and limitations of the Cartesian-Kantian strand of knowing. Their abilities to empower human subjects through their own internal capacities has, in the end, according Taylor, narrowed reasoning aptitudes to facts, evidences, and explicit rules and has furthermore translated into Modern moral-ethical theories of utility and duty. As Modern thinkers hoped to wake human knowing from a dogmatic slumber, rationality seems to have inaugurated a catatonic dogmatism of its own.

Stephen Toulmin offers a helpful overview of this. In *Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity* (1990), Toulmin looks to a specific time in Western history to pinpoint a paradigm shift in philosophy – a subjective turn – that occurred through two philosophers, Michel de Montaigne (1553-1592) and Descartes. Montaigne will be discussed more fully in Chapter Four, but at this juncture, it is worth noting Toulmin’s comparison of these two philosophers. As thinkers at the cusp of Modernity, both are recognized as “individualists.”

In Montaigne’s *Essays* (1580) and in Descartes’s *Discourse on Method* (1637) and *Meditations on First Philosophy* (1641), both thinkers proffer modern philosophical methods of “self-examination.” However, Toulmin maps the ways by which they move forward on radically different paths and how they philosophically affect dramatically divergent results.

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76 Ibid.
Montaigne’s “aim was to set aside pretense and attitudinizing, self-aggrandizement or ostentatious self-reproach, and to provide an unvarnished picture of his experience of life, and attitudes of mind.” His writings reflect a philosophical skepticism that is reflected through his thoughts, feelings, and impulses of human living, in particular. While Montaigne is not recognized as a universalizing and synthesizing thinker, his writings portend that his own daily experiences inform all of us about what it means to be human. Alternatively, with Descartes – whose method established a rigid form of rationality – and also inaugurated in philosophy a relentless “Quest for Certainty” Toulmin discovers “a taste of ‘solipsism,’” that is, a more radically personal epistemic perspective which dwells within specific insights and truths of individuals themselves. Moreover, of the two, Montaigne’s method showcases various sources of knowing (sensing, intuiting, thinking, wondering) operative within the human experience, while Descartes’s solely spotlights and celebrates scientific rationality.

These new self-reflective methods in philosophy happen quickly, Toulmin explains, in a fifty-year interim between the 1580 publication of Montaigne’s Essays and Descartes’s publications in the late 1630s. As seventeenth century philosophy advances, Montaigne fades, and Toulmin suggests that in following Descartes, Western philosophy took a wrong turn. Now, in the twenty-first century, we are paying the price. Modernity, he feels, has run its course. Toulmin says that philosophy

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77 Ibid., 37.
78 Ibid., 41.
79 Ibid., ix.
80 Ibid., 44.
81 Ibid., 41.
82 Ibid., 44.
can cling to the discredited research program of a purely theoretical (i.e. “modern”) philosophy, which will end by driving it out of business; it can look for new and less exclusively theoretical ways of working, and develop the methods needed for a more practical (“post-modern”) agenda; or it can return to its pre-17th-century traditions, and try to recover the lost (“pre-modern”) topics that were sidetracked by Descartes, but can be usefully taken up for the future.  

Taylor does not entirely agree with Toulmin’s prognosis. For instance, Taylor persistently welcomes the special gifts of Modernity, such as new and powerful formulations of personal rights and human dignities. Expressions of democratic governance and perspective, too, are generally nonnegotiable. Like Toulmin, though, Taylor also clearly feels that we are paying some sort of price. The lack of fullness represents an existential cost. Taylor, though, flirts with an epistemic correlate to fullness, and it is most evident in a talk given by him at Fordham University, New York, New York, in June 2009.

At Fordham’s Rose Hill campus in the Bronx, Taylor reengaged the critique of Modern rationality he often exercises and he reminded his audience that human reason is more than Cartesian rationality, the methodic, self-certain, mind-dominating, scientific way of knowing that characterizes a mainstream epistemology today. Again, in this, he is like Toulmin. Enlightenment perspective employs an epistemic bias and has suppressed or discredited what Taylor calls “theoretical imagination.” Human reasoning, he explained, has “a creative component; it can and must generate new ways of conceiving the reality it is trying to understand.” With this, he explains, “there is no standard answer, no sure method” – an orientation Montaigne would endorse – and that the work of reason functions through attempts to

83 Ibid., 11.

articulate what emerge in our lives “as barely definable hunches, or inchoate insights.”85 This, possibly, is where Taylor diverges from Toulmin and, thus, Montaigne. He continues, explaining that “[t]hese uninformed insights draw us strongly; we are willing to engage our attention very deeply in them. We have an as yet unfounded and nonetheless powerful and anticipatory confidence in them.”86

In his Fordham talk, entitled “What Exactly is Reason?,” and in its more recent publication in Faith and Philosophy, entitled “Reason, Faith, and Meaning,” Taylor cites the decisively Modern achievements of the natural sciences whose “explanations recur to factors which are not defined by their meanings for us, but simply by their efficient-causal relations.”87 If he laments the dominance of Cartesian-Kantian epistemologies, he does not totally discount them. He insists, though, that the very possibility for the emergence of hard scientific truth partly comes about through the hunches and fumblings of theoretical reason to begin with, an expression of reason that Modern perspectives do not fully appreciate.88 Gesturing to Kant’s Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone (1793), Taylor instructs that “the vicissitudes of the appeal to ‘reason alone’ force us to depart” too radically from other sources of knowing in our lives.89 Moreover, when reason functions in such lonely scientific isolation it loses its ability to properly engage other realities, such as “ethics, political theory, social science, history, literature, philosophy, aesthetics,” all crucial matters of human life.90

85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
88 Ibid., 6.
89 Ibid., 5.
90 Ibid., 7.
Taylor stays on course. Reason, he insists, “is something we don’t only do alone, but also inescapably involves dialogical collaboration and exchange.”91 Does Montaigne account for this? Taylor does not seem to think so, at least in A Secular Age when he is instructive of Montaigne’s radical individuality. He only cites Montaigne three times, and in his most engaged discussion of him he seems to fault Montaigne for the self-enclosed method of reflection he offers.92 Taylor is more telling in Sources, though. There he indicates that Montaigne’s method has indeed impacted the Modernity we live within by endorsing an intense individuality, a contemporary orientation Taylor tries to rebuff.93 He suggests that Montaigne’s conception of subjectivity actually over-distinguishes persons from one another as radically unique entities and thereby resists showing what is common and shared among us. But worse, understandings of one’s self are not enhanced by social and worldly influences, but garnered by looking deeper and deeper within.94 Finally, Taylor also thinks that Montaigne’s subjectivity is devoid of “spiritual aspirations,” yearnings that seem fundamental to his fullness construct.95

As Taylor argues that the powers of reason attest to many sources within us, a dynamic indeed creditable to Montaigne, learning and knowing also happen in a community of others. This, a social dimension, is also for Taylor an attractive element of the integrating function at work in Schiller’s play. In as much as Modern individual selves are fragmented and divided in their own natural capacities, so too is society. In converse, Schiller cites the extraordinary

91 Taylor, “What Exactly Is Reason?”
92 Taylor, A Secular Age, 539.
94 Ibid., 182.
95 Ibid., 180.
accomplishments of ancient Greek’s, such as their ways of thinking, expressing, and living. The more persons function in and through the “totality of [individual] being,” the better are the societies we inhabit. This social dimension – featured in the lead quote of this chapter – will be addressed in the chapter’s conclusion.

As Toulmin shares in certain concerns about Modernity discussed in this chapter, he also helps us recognize how Taylor salvages components of it. Taylor does not discount the Enlightenment outright. Some of its achievements are essential for good living. Moreover, Taylor even rescues Modern epistemology, at least partially. He remains sharply critical, but he indicates a faith dimension at work within the unsubstantiated intellectual hunches and gropings that evolved into world-altering scientific achievements. In all of this, Taylor lets us better appreciate his conception of fullness from an intellective vantage. He stresses personal avenues of knowing that Modern epistemology either discounts or refuses to acknowledge, and he gives us an account of knowing that is not individualistic, but informed by others.

It is through the concept of “agape,” however, that Taylor is most expansive of fullness. We began the chapter with a general assessment of what fullness initially means to Taylor and proceeded to evaluate how others – Schiller and Gadamer, Dreyfus and Kelly, and Arcilla – represent it or seem to yearn for it in some way. With Toulmin, we have also negotiated a number of readings of Modernity that generally support Taylor’s concerns. While Arcilla views Modernity with especial pedagogical regard, the critique he does offer is not entirely unrelated. Through agape, we will see a decisive metaphysical commitment of fullness and, of such a commitment, note a moral-ethical correlate. Such a commitment, I contend, is necessary, and

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96 Schiller, “Letter VI.”
without it Schiller and Gadamer, Dreyfus and Kelly, and Arcilla remain vulnerable to some of
the very concerns they condemn.

III. Agape

In his final chapter of *A Secular Age*, Taylor calls for broader conceptions of fullness and
immediately focuses a spotlight upon *agape*. Taylor has been strategic, however, by referencing
*agape* along the way. In *A Secular Age* it is an important word in Taylor’s lexicon well before
the twentieth chapter. Also, in *Sources of the Self* – a work that is shown in the following
chapter that is widely discussed in educational theory – *agape* is a principal concept.
Interestingly, in *Sources*, it is referenced much less than in *A Secular Age*, and it is not even
indexed. However, the construct is used intentionally and even tactically, and its role in
supporting the main argument of *Sources* is evident. I contend that it is fundamental to the text
and, metaphysically and religiously, represents the moral source of human living that Taylor
argues for. If I am right to latch onto the expression of fullness in *A Secular Age*, to make sense
of the work through its existential and phenomenal capacity, I make sense of *Sources* though
*agape*.

Most basically, *agape* is Greek for love, but ancient Greek works in literature and
philosophy do not seem to use the specific term all that much. Internet searches yield
conjectures, at best. One source suggests the possibility that the ancient Greek poet Homer
employs derivatives of the word in the *Odyssey*, at Books V and VII. The *agapic* expression is
referenced as a religious and devotional love shown for the goddess Isis by foreign Egyptian
dockhands working in the Athenian port-city Piraeus.

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97 The Multilingual Archive: [http://www.multilingualarchive.com](http://www.multilingualarchive.com)
Anders Nygren’s seminal work, *Agape and Eros* (1953) and Gene Outka’s own extended study, *Agape: An Ethical Analysis* (1972), articulate a linguistic affinity between *agape* and *eros* – both are Greek terms for “love” – but stress significant conceptual differences between the two. Nygren and Outka each look seriously at *eros* and admit that it alone has a complicated philosophical history. They tend to agree that “the Eros motif . . . reaches its height in Plato, at whose hands it is also cast into its classical” and divergent depictions of erotic impulse and epistemic desire.\(^{98}\) Nygren reminds us that, beyond Plato, Aristotle and Neo-Platonic thinkers also render specific meanings of their own.\(^{99}\)

*Agape*, Nygren explains, is essentially and specifically Christian.\(^{100}\) “The history of the Christian idea of love begins with an entirely new and peculiarly Christian fundamental motif of religion and ethics—the Agape motif” which, furthermore, attests to conceptual differences in its own historical development.\(^{101}\) That is, even within its own specific context the term charts an evolutionary process. To make sense of its Christian origins, Nygren turns not to Greek philosophical discourse, but Jewish perspective, and highlights Christianity’s dramatic novelty in religious and ethical perspectives. Though informed by both Greek and Jewish thought and practice, Christianity – especially through *agapic* love – is featured as fundamentally innovative.

For instance, “in Christianity . . . [love] is universal in its scope. In Judaism love is exclusive and particularistic: it is directed to one’s ‘neighbour’ in the original and more restricted sense of the word, and it is directed to ‘neighbours only.’”\(^{102}\) In Christian disposition, that love,

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\(^{99}\) Ibid., 57.

\(^{100}\) Ibid., 48.

\(^{101}\) Ibid., 53.

\(^{102}\) Ibid., 63.
agapic love – defined by the New Testament commandment to love God and all others equally\textsuperscript{103} – is unanimously and freely expressed. The love of the Christian God is unconditional, and, in the realm of ethics and morality, Christians are encouraged to emulate it. The *neighbor*, per Taylor’s own discussion (as will be soon discussed), is not really just a neighbor, but also anyone. As the ambit of fullness is wide, so too with *agape*.

The Christian references to *agape* are abundant. The Septuagint, the ancient Greek translation of the Hebrew bible, refers to *agape* as God’s unconditional love for the people of a created world. The ancient literature that follows the Septuagint in the New Testament form – in the genres of letters and Gospel texts – bespeaks the dynamic of *agape* in a similar fashion, as the love of God, but it also describes *agape* as loving *like* God. It becomes something that we too can do. It is the Christian God’s love for us, and it is also our actions of charity. A supra-natural locus is maintained, and the charitable acts that ensue are understood as being motivated by and expressive of the originary external source. Nygren summarizes a scriptural evolution of the term beginning in the Gospel writings, advancing through the epistles of Paul the Apostle, and culminating in letters that were constructed by writers who were specifically influenced by the Gospel of John. As such, *agape* had “its roots in the new and specifically Christian way of fellowship with God, as this is depicted in the Gospels. It finds its highest expression in Paul . . . [and] the supreme formal statement is reached in the Johannine ‘God is Agape.’”\textsuperscript{104}

In *Sources*, Taylor describes the presence of *agape* in philosophical thought across its own history.\textsuperscript{105} From Greek antiquity, he compares *agape* with the transformative effect,

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., 61.

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., 57.

\textsuperscript{105} Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, 143 (Plato, Augustine, and Neo-Platonic thinking), 250 (Ficino and Pico), 269 (Jewish), and 367 (Kant).
morally and epistemologically, of seeing the Platonic Good. The early medieval philosopher Augustine’s (354-430) understanding of Plato (c.424-428 BCE) – which was informed by the Neo-Platonic philosopher Plotinus (c.204-270) – recognizes cosmic emanation as *agape*. Later Platonic thinkers of Renaissance humanism – namely, Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499) and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1493-1494) – also articulate a metaphysical source of love that is recognized as *agapic*. As an antecedent to *agape*, we have already considered how Jewish thought represents ways of participating in Yahweh’s love of his chosen people. Universal justice obligated in the philosophy of Kant – per Outka, “the ‘Agape-commitment’ is very [much] like a concept of the categorical imperative”¹⁰⁶ – is referenced by Taylor as a secularized variant of *agape*. And, of course, Taylor himself also details the Christian scriptural understandings of *agape*.

Along the lines of philosophical resemblance, let me briefly feature once again Nygren and Outka. Outka discusses a version of justice, equalitarian justice, in *agapic* affinity. Unlike distributive or retributive expressions, for instance,

> equalitarian justice . . . overlaps significantly with agape. The account by a number of philosophers is often linked to [articulations of] universal human rights. [Plato scholar Gregory] Vlastos provides one such account. He offers a rationale for equalitarian justice without appealing directly to theological or metaphysical doctrines. Points of normative overlap with agape are plain enough.¹⁰⁷

It is Nietzsche, however, who seems most helpful, at least to Nygren. He explains that Nietzsche’s articulation of Christianity as a “transvaluation of all ancient values” is especially pointed. Of Greek and Roman antiquity, Judaism, and “indeed the entire pre-Christian and non-

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¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 202.
Christian world . . . [this] ‘transvaluation’ is seen, above all, in the central Christian motif, the Agape motif.”\textsuperscript{108}

In \textit{A Secular Age}, many of the same philosophical similarities are maintained or rearticulated. \textit{Agape} as a term is much more developed. In my reading I recognize two instructive expressions of \textit{agape}, one that reveals a \textit{participatory} aspect and another that testifies to an \textit{associative} character, both of which demonstrate \textit{agape} as a “stepping beyond.”\textsuperscript{109} Before discussing the “stepping beyond” aspects of \textit{agape} in \textit{A Secular Age}, I turn once again to \textit{Sources}.

I mentioned above that \textit{agape} is characterized religiously and metaphysically as well as morally and ethically. These portrayals may seem unrelated to another, or at least at home in spheres of their own. The first points upwards or outwards in one direction, to the domain of the supernatural, and in another direction, the other gestures toward the natural realities of human life. This distinction, however, is precisely what Taylor wants to argue against in \textit{Sources}. The metaphysical and the ethical are connected, and the first becomes a source for the second.

In \textit{Sources}, that source – ultimately explainable, according to Taylor, “by reference to a cosmic reality, the order of things” – is called a “constitutive good,” or with Plato, simply, the “Good.”\textsuperscript{110} Taylor continues, emphasizing that it “is a moral source . . . [in that] it is a something the love of which empowers us to do and be good.”\textsuperscript{111} Taylor moves beyond Plato to Jewish and Christian conceptions of the Good to explain the role of God in this. Our love for God and

\textsuperscript{108} Nygren, \textit{Agape and Eros}, 200.

\textsuperscript{109} Taylor, \textit{A Secular Age}, 246.

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., 92-93.

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 93.
God’s love for us, that is, God’s *agape*, is what empowers moral-ethical living.\(^{112}\) As discussed above, Dreyfus, Kelly, McDowell, and Taylor are concerned about autonomous and individualist epistemologies that are internally narrowed and socially uninfluenced; in *Sources* Taylor is similarly worried about self-relative moral and ethical explanations. He asks, “What happens when, as in modern humanist views, we no longer have anything like a constitutive good external to [us]?”\(^{113}\) In *Sources*, Taylor does not want to simplify this philosophical problem too easily and thereby suggests that we recognize the role of constitutive goods in our lives and begin the difficult task of articulating what, how, and where it impels us. This “articulacy,” he suggests, stumbles us closer to recognizing sources of goodness.

For this dissertation, the fusion of the two expressions of fullness is not insignificant. As Taylor first discusses fullness in epiphanic terms and then desires to expand the idea of fullness beyond the sphere of personal experience and insight, he deploys the notion of *agape*. As with the first rendering of fullness, *agape* is specifically religious. But in its moral-ethical dimension, *agape* is visceral and connecting. How the spiritual, instinctual, and relational dimensions of fullness are instructive, or pedagogical, is the task of my final chapter, where I discuss my pedagogies of fullness.

I return, now, to the stepping beyond characteristics of *agape* that I glean from *A Secular Age* in expressions that I name participatory and associative. First, the participatory aspect: While Nygren and Outka cite the Christian commandment to love both God and “neighbor” and develop their discussion of *agape* from this conflated loving, Taylor turns to the well-known

\(^{112}\) Ibid.

\(^{113}\) Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, 93.
Parable of the Good Samaritan and the *agapic* ethic it reveals.\textsuperscript{114} His reading of this famous story is influenced by the educational theorist and social activist, Ivan Illich (1926-2002). Illich is a figure Taylor takes great inspiration from. The lesson of the parable, ultimately, is about the *neighbor* who is anyone, anywhere, and the charitable response Christians should unconditionally offer neighbors.

In loving others unconditionally, as demonstrated by the Samaritan, a stranger, exercising *agape* is an expression of moral goodness. It attests to the transformation of oneself in terms of moral growth. After all, it would have been uncommon for the foreign Samaritan to engage a Jewish local so freely, let alone charitably, and vice versa. Also, it manifests the kind of good recognized of the Christian God, an unconditional goodness that individuals themselves are to emulate. Being morally good as such is a way of participating in an activity of the Christian supreme being. Taylor explains that Greek philosophers and, in particular, the Platonic thinkers of the Renaissance, articulated a concept “of ‘theiosis,’ a ‘becoming divine,’ which was part of human destiny . . . the demand to go beyond merely human flourishing.”\textsuperscript{115} This is one part of the “stepping beyond” character of *agape* in what I call the “participatory aspect.” Individuals can participate in a divine action. For Taylor, moral goodness as expressed in gestures of care and concern for another – any another, unconditionally – is a movement away from the context of the natural contentment of ordinary life toward “becoming partakers in the life of [the divine].”\textsuperscript{116}

\textsuperscript{114} Luke 10:25-37.

\textsuperscript{115} Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 224.

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid.
Stated more succinctly, we participate in and emulate the source of moral goodness Taylor argues for in *Sources*. The good that impels us is the good that we in turn manifest. In such a process, transformation happens. Would the actions of the Good Samaritan be meaningless and inconsequential to the Good Samaritan himself? We ourselves become better persons through the goodness we manifest. And, clearly, there are recipients of the goodness – the traveler, for instance, who is assisted by the Samaritan – and hearers and readers of the story from one generation to the next – are likewise transformed. The point of the participatory aspect highlights the moral growth any of us are capable of.

Now the associative character: Taylor instructs that the subjective turn of the Modern philosophy and its pronounced rational character made possible new modes of moral and ethical expression.\(^{117}\) With the abolition in Modern thought of metaphysics and the rise of its replacement, empirical science, people no longer ascribe to supernatural, transcendental sources in making sense of themselves and the world. Modern individuals are able to appreciate facts and evidences that can be rationally confirmed, and rationality is thereby esteemed. What is irrational, conversely, such as perspectives of belief, or intuitions and impulses, which are not related to facts and evidences, are less appreciated. He thus explains that “[i]n no case, is a paradigm bodily emotion seen as *criterial* for right action—as in the case of New Testament agape.”\(^{118}\) His point is not that rationality is unimportant, but that other factors – gut factors and emotions – figure into ethical response. Moreover, he explains that the nature of *agape* “can’t ever be understood simply in terms of a set of rules, but rather as the extension of a certain kind

\(^{117}\) Ibid., 257.

\(^{118}\) Ibid., 615.
of relation, spreading outward, in a network. 119 Taylor says that *agape* “moves outward from the guts…” instructing that “the New Testament word for ‘taking pity’… places [this ethical] response in the bowels.” 120

In regard to the two-dimensional associative quality of *agape* I see functioning in *A Secular Age*, on one hand, *agape* networks across the various aspects of our lives: mind, heart, gut. On the other hand – as demonstrated between the foreign Samaritan’s manifestation of myriad differences (ethnic, social status, religious) and the local individual he helps – *agape* takes us “beyond the bounds of any already existing solidarity.” 121 In our lives *agape* is holistic across a range of intellectual, emotional, and intuitional responses and it connects us to others much different from ourselves. The connection to others is a moral expression that reveals a stepping beyond the bounds of a familiar community towards the context of a less familiar super-community. “[T]he paradigmatic stepping beyond of *agape*… is not motivated by a pre-existing community or solidarity” but by the possibilities for radically wide kinship. 122 Moreover, the gut-impulsive feature of *agape* counters the categorical rules, inherent obligations, and rationally determined end-results of modern ethical theory.

In summary, *agape* takes us beyond a confined rational context and limited social loyalties. The associative dimension of *agape* networks across, first, the complex interior of our own lives (being thereby inclusive of emotional and intuitional data, and the gut response); second, well beyond who is already friendly and familiar; and third, in its participatory dimension, *agape* participates in a moral source which is external to us. It is perhaps better to

119 Ibid., 282.
120 Ibid., 741: “the New Testament word for ‘taking pity,’ *splanchnizesthai*, places the response in the bowels.”
121 Ibid., 246.
122 Ibid., 246.
speak of them then as “moving towards.” The dimensions of *agape* move us closer towards ourselves, others, and an Other.

Working backwards through this final articulation, Taylor thinks that something of a moral source can seize any one of us – and this comprehensively, that is, holistic of mind and body – and Taylor insists that we can respond in the unconditional way through which it seizes us to begin with. The three *moving towards* – understood through Platonic-like *theiosis*, internal and external sources of knowing, and a wider sense of community – are realities of the fullness he strives toward at the end of *A Secular Age*. Fullness is thereby articulated along the particular moral-ethical dimensions of the term *agape*. The dilemma of fullness that arises in a secular age portends an existential crisis that is not bereft of concerns about actual relationships and daily behaviors. Fullness is not lonesome, simply facilitating senses of meaning and purpose for individuals. It is also social. With Taylor, the stakes for Modernity gain momentum.

### IV. The Self and the Social

The Canadian philosopher Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984), author of *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (1958), among other works, including *Topics in Education: The Cincinnati Lectures of 1959 in the Philosophy of Education*, is not easy to read. Somewhere he even admits as much. He provides a helpful abridgment of *Insight*, his defining work, in an article entitled, “Cognitional Structure.” The gist of the article, and, thus, of *Insight*, is that human knowing is like an impressive, albeit complex, potent system that empowers human experience with a strong, ready-built, ready-to-use set of components that can exact nothing shy


of brilliance. The attainment or achievement of knowledge is a salient feature of his anthropology. In all of this, Lonergan appreciates and maintains an Enlightenment epistemic perspective that celebrates Kant, in particular. But unlike Kant, Lonergan also insists that we can know God, and much of *Insight* is devoted to showing how and why that such insights are both possible and necessary.

Lonergan explains that being a human person “is something independent of the merely accidental, and so one is pronounced ‘human’ whether or not one is awake or asleep, a genius or a moron, a saint or a sinner, young or old, sober or drunk, well or ill, sane or crazy.”125 The hope, however, is to represent how individuals grow, emerge, and tend toward authentic and genuine dimensions of the human condition. Ramping up his investment in our natural capacities, he explains that “there is a contemporary, concrete, dynamic, maximal view that endeavors to envisage the range of human potentiality and to distinguish authentic from unauthentic realization of that potential.”126 He continues, instructing that “authenticity never is some pure, serene, secure possession; it is always precarious, ever a withdrawal from unauthenticity, ever a danger of slipping back into unauthenticity.”127

A full appreciation of Lonergan recognizes his challenge to keep *knowing*. Inquiry, exploration, analysis: these are just some of the kinds of virtues he would celebrate, an employment of human natural capacities which enrich the human experience. In this, I hold John Dewey’s (1859-1952) concept of growth – “an ability, a power; and by potentiality

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126 Ibid., 89.
127 Ibid.
potency, force” – in Democracy and Education (1916) in similar regard. For Lonergan and Dewey, such a capacity must be nourished and maintained throughout life. Lonergan charts moments of growth, that is, insights, through significant personal transformations. He describes such transformations as conversions. Insights, thus, catalyze conversions. Lonergan categorizes such transformations as intellectual, moral, and religious. In Insight, Lonergan “labored to create the instrument of the mind” to represent a process of transformation, and “insight,” his fundamental concept, signifies a moment of flourishing in the process. Insights are moments that benchmark human flourishing. He explains that “[d]eep within us all, emergent when the noise of other appetites is stilled, there is a drive to know, understand, to see why, to discover the reason, to find the cause, to explain.” But there is even more. For Lonergan, the individual is never not socially situated. The personal transformation that may occur – “a succession of enlargements of consciousness” – relates with, responds to, and reflects a world of others. Dewey, again, also says something similar about the social dimension of life, and in fact he does so in a more pointed way. He explains, “A being connected with other beings cannot perform his own activities without taking the activities of others into account. For they are the indispensable conditions of the realization of his tendencies.”

This chapter has articulated a fundamental concept of A Secular Age, one that also signifies a moment of human flourishing. Taylor never quotes Lonergan in A Secular Age – nor

131 Ibid., 277.
132 Dewey, Democracy and Education, 12.
elsewhere to my knowledge (nor does he cite Dewey) – yet there are striking affinities in much
of Taylor’s work with Lonergan’s (and Dewey’s) work. Taylor’s fullness, articulated above
through the epiphanic experiences of Griffiths and Havel, expanded by the Christian moral-
ethical expressions of “agape,” and even recognized in the theoretical imaginings which would
know and welcome Taylor’s metaphysically oriented construct, all manifest a philosophical-
anthropological reality of the human condition which has been thwarted, or suppressed, in a
secular age. The kind of crisis it portends is an existential one of meaning and purpose. And
while a crisis as such may be a lonely reality in an individual’s life, it is also a cultural
phenomenon. In a sense, there are many lonely crises, or, rather, there is a social crisis.

In the next chapter, particularly in the second part, I will expose a scholarly reaction to
Taylor’s fullness. Some scholars reject fullness outright. Most, though, appreciate it, and even if
they correct it in some way or offer it a different name, many feel that Taylor is on to something
with fullness and his desire to restore it. Dewey scholar Philip Kitcher is especially excited, and
he even offers an assessment of the religious dimension of fullness that is both honest and
balanced. His consideration of the religious is significant not so much for the personal benefits it
offers individuals, and but for the communal and social aspects it allows.

Why in this chapter do I begin and end with Lonergan? His own moment of fullness,
named insight; his interest in self-transformation, referred to as conversions; his metaphysical
and religious commitment, discussed as transcendental knowing; and his malaises of Modernity,
framed as widespread disorientation, all betray bald-faced likenesses to Taylor’s terms and
concerns. What I am interested with in Lonergan, though, is his recognition and inclusion of the

133 To better appreciate a comparison between Taylor and Lonergan, see: Brian J. Braman, Meaning and
Authenticity: Bernard Lonergan and Charles Taylor on the Drama of Authentic Human Existence (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2008).
“social” in all of this. We have generally discussed Taylor’s fullness from the perspective of subjective relating, but Lonergan’s hand-in-hand correlation between subjective knowing and the social domain, as stressed in the lead quote of this chapter, is another affinity yet with Taylor.

**Conclusion**

The four main components of this chapter discuss Taylor’s conception of fullness in various ways. Beginning in a nearly ecstatic experience of religious epiphany – a consoling moment of grace that is not self-empowering but transformative toward personal and social goods – in the lives of first Griffiths and then Havel, we are able to understand fullness through individual experience and metaphysical influence. In the third part of the chapter, fullness is expanded, so to speak, beyond a private dimension into more explicitly moral-ethical one, a realm that attests to the transformations of the social domain and the self through the stepping-beyond aspects Taylor explains of *agape*.

In its participatory and associative characteristics, I explained how Taylor represents personal enactments of goodness, cohesion of personal capacities, and wider expressions of kinship. Taylor’s “stepping beyonds” – beyond self-stagnation, beyond rational perspective, beyond family and friends – can be regarded as moving towards one’s latent or undeveloped capacities, towards other sources of knowing and valuing, towards other persons, and towards God. As an expression of fullness, *agape* brings one closer to self, others, and an Other.

In the second part of the chapter, between discussing the phenomenal features of fullness and its moral-ethical *agapic* aspects, we looked at renditions of fullness through Schiller’s conception of play and Gadamer’s subsequent re-articulation; a shining sense of whooshing by Dreyfus and Kelly; Taylor’s endorsement of McDowell; Arcilla’s appreciation for presentness; and Taylor’s own epistemic expression of theoretical imagining. The hermeneutic,
Heideggerian, epistemic, and Marxist-existential perspectives either help to clarify fullness or demonstrate yearnings for it. All perspectives, moreover, offer helpful descriptions of Modernity, by generally, though not exclusively, expressing concerns about present-day meaningless and purposelessness. In seeking to mitigate the influences of secularism, nihilism, or materialism, some of the thinkers suggest specific virtues that they feel restore senses of personal and social integrity.

Finally, though briefly, we were able to recognize a bridge between the self and the social through Bernard Lonergan. Also critical of Modernity, Lonergan encourages us to recognize a correlation between transformations of the self and the realm of the social. In doing so, we are better able to appreciate the broader implications of Taylor’s fullness.
Chapter Two: Charles Taylor in Scholarly Discourse

“I sense in this prize awarded to me a recognition not only of my work but of this collective effort. This awakens powerful, if somewhat confused emotions: joy, pride, and a sense of inadequacy mingle together. But above all I feel the great satisfaction of knowing that this whole area of work will acquire a higher saliency through the award of this Prize.”

Charles Taylor
Templeton Prize response (2007)

Introduction

Charles Taylor’s remarks above, voiced upon news of his reception of the 2007 Templeton Prize for his publication that year of *A Secular Age*, indicate a range of sentiments. Founded in 1972 by financial investor and philanthropist, Sir John Templeton (1912-2008), to recognize contributions which explore, articulate, demonstrate, or expand the spiritual dimension of human life, the prize is described as the world’s highest paying award bestowed to any one individual. Not necessarily imparted to members of particular spiritual traditions or professors of specific religious beliefs, the prize has as recipients representatives of Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Islamic, and Jewish faiths, those with life commitments in philanthropy, philosophy, science, and theology, and those with achievements as artists, clerics, humanists, and social reformers.

I feature Taylor’s remarks, however, not for their ability to name a variety of emotions which surface in him in receiving a magnanimous award, nor for the prestigious endorsement the

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135 Ibid.
naming renders his publication. I lead this chapter with his words because of their ability, in my estimate, to appreciate a vast range of contributors to *A Secular Age*, both in its making and in its ongoing meaning. The “collective effort” acknowledges devotees and detractors, scholarly interlocutors who concur with Taylor’s concerns and critics of all kinds who recoil from his specific commitments or particular constructs. More generally, some of his supporters appreciate his analysis of modernity while some of his critics disapprove of his historical method, or of the narrative style of *A Secular Age*.

Also, as *A Secular Age* moves through art, poetry, epistemology, history, political theory, and a host of other scholarly disciplines and interests, Taylor’s work proffers meaningful implications for philosophy of education. In his last chapter, “Conversions,” Taylor describes the life-story and conceptual contributions of an educational theorist, Ivan Illich (1926-2002), explaining that Illich’s “story is quite close to the one I have been trying to tell in these pages. Indeed, I have learned a lot from him.”136 Voiced at the end of nearly 900 pages, the parallel between himself and a non-canonical theorist in the field of educational philosophy need not be overly emphasized, but appreciating the gesture is not vain, either. Illich’s suspicion of institutional and bureaucratic structures and his distaste for dogmatic perspectives instantly manifest affinities with Taylor’s critique of instrumental reason. Taylor describes a religious correlate of instrumental rationality, “excarnation,” a concept he himself fashions and deploys throughout *A Secular Age*. It represents overt, privileged, and even prejudiced expressions of rationality within the realms of faith and religion.

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In my estimate, many of Taylor’s concerns lend themselves to inquiries both enduring and anew in educational theory. Taylor’s “buffered subject,” for example, is described through myriad a-relational positions. Democratic participation, dialogic engagement, moral responsibility, and meaningfulness all, in Taylor’s account, suffer. An alternative “porous” disposition as articulated in *A Secular Age* is creditable of serious consideration by educational theorists. The porous self represents – through the permeations and gateways it connotes – dimensions of openness and connection that enrich or enhance emotional expression, personal intimacy, holistic knowing, social contact, political engagement, religious involvement, and spiritual capacity. What it means to be porous (interiorly and externally, so to speak), why it is personally and civically worthy, how it might be cultivated: these are just some of the constructs and questions educational theory discourses through concerns and concepts of its own.

This chapter begins, then, with an examination of Taylor as cited and discussed in the scholarship of educational theory. Philosophers of education reference Taylor not only meaningfully in the leading journals of educational theory, but frequently as well. Taylor’s latest, *A Secular Age*, is just now receiving attention in the field, but most of his other works – major publications as well as essays – are consistently cited or named as important references. In the philosophy of education, contemporary scholars read his work and continue to dialogue with it.

Because of a steady regularity by which these scholars reference Taylor, as well as the variety of works and topics they wrestle within, in the first half of the chapter, I offer four snapshots, or themes, through which to gain a sense of the educational scholarship on him. These topics – recognition, the good life, instrumentality, and hypergoods – are imperfect and uncontainable. In many ways they overlap with one another. They also network to fundamental
notions in Taylor’s work not here exposed. The references to Taylor by educational theorists are abundant, and as such these themes form four parlors of discourse. In considering them, I will also indicate their relevance to this thesis. Finally, I conclude the section with a brief naming of other categories that demonstrate Taylor’s presence in educational theory.

The second part of the chapter reveals how *A Secular Age* itself is being discussed generally. Again, the book inspired scholarly discussions from many camps in the Academy. In an age of academic disciplines, and with corresponding concerns about a lack of dialogue between departments on university campuses, it is remarkable to see literary critics, historians, philosophers, political theorists, scientists, sociologists, and theologians conversing about a single publication. From New York, Chicago, and New Haven where conferences immediately convened after the 2007 publication of the book, and, more recently, in journals like *Faith and Philosophy, Inquiry*, and *New Blackfriars*, and in books such as *Rethinking Secularism* (2011) and *The Joy of Secularism* (2011), scholars of many interests devote serious attention to *A Secular Age*. It is because of this, in particular, the wide variety of scholarly interest, that I find Taylor’s Templeton remarks so telling.

Taylor’s comments let us recognize that, indeed, *A Secular Age* is being discussed around the Academy and that a “collective” effort is welcome and necessary. As Taylor, a philosopher not easily categorized, but nonetheless a philosopher, accepts the support and entertains the challenges from thinkers both within and beyond his own particular discipline, this dissertation shows a willingness to do likewise for three reasons. The first is that the Academy could and should be more conversant. Special interests and pointed inquiries within disciplines lead to historic insights within fields of study, but remarkable achievements are also discovered in collaboration. Recent discussions about the state of higher education, a topic of the fifth chapter,
understand a current crisis of university culture through, in part, fragmented academic communities. The situation is not uncomplicated, but some regret how inquiries lead to ends of their own through means of their own. Moreover, some perspectives, such as scientific ones, gain influence and prestige to proportions that stifle and silence other perspectives. Not only are interests and inquiries dealt with in isolation from others, but some are disregarded, or silenced. Taylor, a philosopher with communitarian sensibilities, allows for an open dialogue whereby historians, scientists, sociologists, and theologians, for example, participate meaningfully in a conversation he frames.

Secondly, this chapter shows that philosophers of education, per se, also have something to say. Following Taylor’s lead, philosophers of education can appreciate the cares and concerns of others in the Academy about A Secular Age, and they can enhance the discourse with perspectives of their own. Educational theorists, as demonstrated in this chapter, have a long and informed relationship with Taylor’s works, major and minor. They are well equipped to approach, dwell within, and move beyond A Secular Age.

Finally, a specific term of A Secular Age, “fullness,” a term that I have already designated with significance in how it represents and motivates much of the book and likewise compels this dissertation, has generated a notable amount of scholarship. As the second part of this chapter represents the current scholarly contributions about A Secular Age, it pays close attention to the particular discussions around fullness. Beyond demonstrating a surge of sustained interest in the term, I also expose a wide interest in fullness because of my own particular desire to articulate the pedagogies of fullness.
I. Charles Taylor in Educational Theory

*Politics of Recognition*

To begin a consideration of Taylor’s presence in educational theory, I turn to philosopher of education Charles Bingham. His engagement of Taylor focuses upon one of Taylor’s best-known essays, “The Politics of Recognition.” Bingham spotlights an oft-quoted insight articulated by Taylor, a statement that Bingham designates as an important benchmark of a long-standing philosophical assumption regarding personal and corporate identity. Taylor frames, that is, the need to recognize individuals and groups in and through the profound distinctions of personal and corporate identity, such as of gender, race, and sexuality, to name a few examples. The insight explains that “[o]ur identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by misrecognition of others, and so a person or a group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, as the people or society mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves.” Bingham quotes Taylor to remind his own readers of its influence and staying-power in many disciplines of thought. Bingham also celebrates its perseverance through specific philosophical critiques, and, alternatively, points of vulnerability exposed by the concerns of educational theorists.

Bingham suggests that the endurance of Taylor’s insight reflects a special “folk” status – the “folk paradigm” – it has achieved. As a folk paradigm, Taylor’s description of recognition “has become so commonsensical that it seems generally accepted without any appeal to further

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138 Bingham, “Before Recognition, and After,” 325.

139 Ibid., 327.
Moreover, Bingham details a direct correlation between it and matters of justice, suggesting that misrecognition and injustice are equally reflective of “cultural domination (being acquired to assimilate), nonrecognition (being rendered invisible), and disrespect (being routinely maligned).” In postcolonial theory, political science, psychoanalysis, and moral philosophy, through the works of, respectively, Franz Fanon (1925-1961), Nancy Fraser, Jessica Benjamin, and Taylor himself, “the general folk understanding of recognition still holds.”

Bingham explains that poststructuralists inspired by Michel Foucault (1926-1984) and Kelly Oliver, as well as Fraser, have unsuccessfully tried to dislodge Taylor’s recognitive assumption from its philosophical prominence.

Educational theorists, however, offer compelling critical nuances. Stimulated by Emmanuel Levinas’s (1906-1995) thought, their concerns revolve around a dynamic of projection that is implicit in Taylor’s version of recognition. Bingham describes this as a dimension of “passive empathy” which occurs through missed opportunities that are not insignificant. Educational theorists Sharon Todd, Megan Boler, and Deborah Britzman, he explains, each demonstrate that Taylor’s version of recognition employs assimilative assumptions that regard others in one’s own terms, a concern which is central in Kwame Anthony Appiah’s book, *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers* (2006). Todd, Boler, and Britzman also suggest that Taylor’s recognition prolongs or even impedes a sense of political solidarity and that it simply remains momentary and undeveloped. Through the interesting tacts of guilt and listening, a “pedagogy of discomfort,” and the dynamics of “after-recognition.”

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140 Ibid.
141 Ibid., 327.
142 Ibid., 328.
Todd, Boler, and Britzman, respectively, render significant weaknesses of Taylor’s recognition and suggest correctives which they feel attest to educational impact that is more genuinely multicultural.¹⁴³

Bingham is important to this dissertation for a couple of reasons. Working so closely within the pedagogical dimensions of identity and recognition reminds us of a need, per Taylor’s critics, we will later see, as well as in Taylor’s own response to them, to appreciate a wide spectrum of the many identifiers of persons and groups and the corresponding conceptions of human flourishing which can be articulated. More to the point, Taylor is challenged to represent fullness in non-Christian and non-religious ways. What and how fullness is to individuals and groups, and how it influences conceptions of self and social imaginaries must be widely appreciated. Moreover, educators interested in pedagogies of fullness must also welcome the diverse instantiations through which an actual experience of fullness might come about.

Lawrence Blum also thinks that Taylor’s essay on recognition is canonical, and he is likewise meaningful in this dissertation.¹⁴⁴ Again, for issues related to personal and group identity in and across significant personal, social, and religious contexts and combinations, Blum suggests that Taylor identifies recognition as a good in and of itself. Recognition is not only an important construct for thinkers to deal with in its own right, but also a prism through which wide discussion from numerous disciplines must occur. Blum’s concern with Taylor’s account, however, is twofold. He critiques specific limitations of Taylor’s essay and then he names significant implications of such critiques for educational practice. In doing so, I think he implicitly reminds us of the personal, intimate nature of fullness in the lives of individuals and its


naming by Taylor as a philosophical-anthropological construct representative of the human condition.

Summarizing Taylor’s essay, Blum explains that philosophical liberalism fundamentally seeks to name, preserve, and protect the equal dignity of all human persons, but that its mission to do so wrestles with two competing realities: the commonality and universality of persons on one hand, and on the other, the way persons are unique and different. The tension is not unlike one created by Taylor’s philosophical-anthropological construct, fullness, and the humanly conditional or Christian specific representation it garners. In Blum’s case, the universalizing tendency seeks to articulate rights that must be exactly the same for everyone while the other, a personal and contextual sensitivity, hopes to honor myriad life-orienting distinctions of individuals and groups. The concern for difference, Blum explains, “has two related but distinct sub-strands – one focuses on differences among individuals, the other on differences among groups.” An overarching concern of Blum’s is to reveal how Taylor’s essay compromises the first of these, that of individual distinction.

To do this, Blum uses an actual classroom example. He details the experience of a Haitian-American student who was singled out by a teacher who asked the student to represent a black, or African-American, perspective on an issue. Taylor, Blum instructs, recognizes the importance of racial distinction but misses the ethno-cultural differences within races. In doing this, Taylor not only fails to nuance the complexities of racial groups but he also fails to articulate an important aspect of individuality. Educators, he insists, must be acutely sensitive to this. Teachers should avoid representational designations that Taylor might facilitate, or, in the

145 Ibid., 540.

146 Ibid., 541.
least, fail to prevent. Blum insists that anyone – but teachers in particular – should also be more sensitive along these lines.

Blum persists, extending his concern for individuality in Taylor’s essay to another educative issue. “Although Taylor explicitly focuses his theory of the dialogical formation of identity on individuals . . . he does not . . . articulate individuality and its recognition as a value distinct from recognition of group-based identities.”147 Blum’s diagnosis of Taylor’s overemphasis on group identity corresponds to a debate in teaching between student-centered and subject-centered practices. Through subject-centered teaching, teachers are less intentional about the individual situations of their students and more concentrated, instead, upon specific subjects, such as math or history. “My point,” Blum stresses, “is that both individuality (as an educational value) and recognition of group-based identities are student-centered values” and that Taylor’s essay does not assist such a concern.148

Another deficiency of Taylor’s framing of recognition deals with equality. For Blum, Taylor’s essay well protects a material or political expression of equality, one that regards opportunities. In education, material equality translates as an equity of resources regarding, for instance, facilities, supplies, and good teachers and the ways by which any of these resources are equally accessible or distributable to students. Another kind of equity – recognitional equity – remains undeveloped by Taylor, however. As an equity of individuals – in the educational context: how students are treated as equals – is important; so too is an equity of ethno-cultural distinction. Blum argues that just as we might facilitate an equity of resources to individual persons, equity must also be culturally, socially, or ethnically sensitive to particular groups. “[I]t

147 Ibid., 546.

148 Ibid., 547.
is worth being reminded that students want to be recognised in their appropriate group-based distinctness, but also recognised as equals to their fellows, in class and in school. It is one thing to offer good teaching to all students, and another for teachers to treat the Haitian-American student as an equal among others.

Finally, Julia Resnik’s engagement of Taylor’s recognition is not decisively less theoretical, but it is more notably practical. Her application of Taylor contextualizes recognition in culturally and religiously specific ways.

Before explaining her particular application of Taylor, however, Resnik reminds us that, generally, societies today are increasingly multicultural and that schools must adjust appropriately. Taylor, she explains, has played an undoubtedly important role in the formulation of educational policies worldwide that have indeed made adjustments, and for this she is grateful. Detailing the essence of Taylor’s recognition, she says that “[b]ecause the identity of the individual is construed in a dialogical manner through recognition or misrecognition of his group of origin by the larger society, absence of recognition, or misrecognition . . . could be harmful” and, moreover, regarded as oppressive. The insight, however, is inspired not by Taylor’s main essay on the topic, but the earlier, longer, and more comprehensive project of Taylor’s, Sources of the Self (1989).

As Resnik appreciates Taylor, she also cites critiques against his principle of recognition, including and agreeing with those presented by Blum. While a total reworking of Taylor’s

149 Ibid., 555.


151 Ibid., 626.

principle is not her concern, she does agree with Susan Wolf—also a contributing writer in the Amy Gutmann edition which features Taylor’s essay—that Taylor fails to represent an important existential dimension of recognition, one which better honors the particular real-life situations of individuals. The daily circumstances of life, however, and the driving existential perspective of *A Secular Age*, must come as a relief to Resnik. If she is well targeted with her concerns about “The Politics of Recognition,” Taylor’s *A Secular Age* can be noted for its difference in tone and philosophical texture. If his form of recognition is not quite corrected, his conditions of belief, that is, his Secularity 3, establishes the existential regard she yearns.

**The Good Life**

Hanan Alexander’s thinking offers patent similarities to Taylor in many ways. One article, in particular, begins with a characterization of Modernity and the ethical theories it has generated, and it also serves as leading example for my next category of scholarship, the good life. ¹⁵³ Like Taylor in *A Secular Age*, his description of the Enlightenment celebrates the successful creation of modern liberal democracies, and at the same time laments a strident burgeoning of deontological and utilitarian moral theories and practices. ¹⁵⁴ Alexander feels that substantial political achievement is recognized in its ability to establish environments wherein “conflicting visions of the good” can live shoulder to shoulder in a shared civic locale. ¹⁵⁵ Political failure, however, emerges out of this. If an open society of liberal democratic living allows for contrasting and even competing visions of the good, Alexander finds that its citizens


¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 367.
are not able to develop and instill correspondent conceptions of the good within their own lives. His concern is not unlike Taylor’s Modern malaises, or, per our discussion in the previous chapter, Hubert Dreyfus and Sean Kelly’s contemporary American melancholy as diagnosed in *All Things Shining* (2011). Alexander articulates this as an educational problem, explaining that “parents and teachers have too often become inarticulate and insecure about what to say to children concerning how best to live their lives; consequently, the children of these confusing and uncertain times have been searching elsewhere for responses to perennial existential questions.”

Alexander’s educative solution to the problem comes through the cultivation of “intelligent spirituality” through which individuals are able to imagine “visions of the good life that integrate subjective, collective, and objective orientations to goodness.”

Described in *Sources of the Self*, René Arcilla, also mentioned in the previous chapter, is likewise interested in Taylor’s “moral orientation.” Alexander explains that these subjective, collective, and objective orientations refer to conceptions of the good life which arise within three contexts, one of individual persons themselves, one of communal “solidarity and belonging,” and one of religious belief and practice. These important milieus, he instructs, function not in isolated domains but in dynamic interrelation, and Alexander relies upon Taylor to demonstrate how these contexts are indeed related and interactive. His research indicates that Taylor’s discussion in *The Ethics of Authenticity* (1991) of a person’s sense of individuality – conceptions and

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156 Ibid.
157 Ibid., 381.
159 Alexander, “Moral Education and Liberal Democracy,” 381.
understandings of one’s uniqueness, a sense of one’s own authenticity – is inseparable from so much which is beyond the self, such as community of others that is wholly necessary for substantiating a sense of personal individuality to begin with.160

As Alexander proceeds, he argues that conceptions of the good life are essential to democratic living. Through Taylor, he stresses the dimension of human agency in such conceptions. Citing an essay within Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2 (1985) as well as referencing Sources of the Self, Alexander explains that moral education must “cultivate moral agency, which is linked inextricably with cultivating a capacity for democratic citizenship.”161 The “capacity to influence one’s own destiny . . . is . . . a matter of choice, intent, and purpose, and lies at the very heart of the democratic ethos.”162 Schools, moreover, cannot solely bear the burden of this educative task. Familial and communal contexts must help.

Alexander turns to Taylor’s work, Hegel (1975), to describe the kind of balance needed between the duties, loyalties, traditions, and narratives that are present on one hand of such contexts and the autonomy, critique, and dialogue offered by the other.163 The contrasts are represented by Ferdinand Tönnies’s (1855-1936) descriptions of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft communities as well as Émile Durkheim’s (1858-1917) corresponding descriptors, mechanical and organic.164 Alexander instructs that Taylor achieves a similar comparison in Hegel. Taylor


there speaks of *Sittlichkeit* and *Moralität* communities, ones that are more systematic and prescriptive of duties and loyalties and, conversely, others that are more dynamic and freely discerning of goods and values.\(^{165}\) Alexander is significant here not only in his concern for meaning and purpose – and given his “intelligent spirituality,” a dynamic akin to fullness – in the lives of students but also in the ways students are imaginative of their own capacities in future social and political engagements.

In a different project, Karl Hostetler’s concern with the good life is articulated through language of the *common good*.\(^ {166}\) In his research he explains that moments of crisis, like the 9/11 tragedy in the United States, often convey notions not of Western-style individualism but of community and solidarity. Crises call to mind the common good. Communitarian notions, he believes, should “play a larger, more constant role in American schools and life.”\(^ {167}\) As soon as he proclaims this, however, he recognizes a serious and persistent debate in educational philosophy about what the common good is and, beyond that, how to bring it about. He surfaces a contentious regard about the possibility of the common good in the context of genuine democracy.

To wade through the various issues, Hostetler leans on Taylor. For example, scholar Iris Marion Young suggests that a democratic society – and, by implication, the schools within such societies – must dismiss a notion of the common good.\(^ {168}\) The element of “difference” must

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\(^{165}\) Ibid., 379. Alexander’s article represents voices from many camps. Communitarian interests like Taylor’s and shared within Alexander’s work by thinkers such as Alasdair MacIntyre, Walter Feinberg, Michael Sandel, and Kenneth Strike, are some examples. Among the theorists who are cited for discussions around the topic of moral education and teaching are Nicholas Burbules, David Carr, David T. Hansen, Philip Jackson, Lawrence Kohlberg, Nel Noddings, and Lee Shulman.


\(^{167}\) Ibid., 347.

\(^{168}\) Ibid., 351.
instead be respected. Common good ideology stifles the possibility of true democratic equality by homogenizing rather than distinguishing the needs of individuals. Hostetler disagrees through Taylor’s *The Ethics of Authenticity* where Taylor explains that “[m]ere difference can’t itself be the ground of equal value. If men and women . . . are equal, it is not because they are different, but because overriding the difference are some properties, common or complementary, which are of value.”⁶⁶⁹ Taylor’s point is that equality emerges in the sharing that is recognized of such valued properties, prompting Hostetler to pronounce that Young’s primary esteem for difference cannot provide and preserve the kind of democratic equality she celebrates.

Citing an essay of Taylor’s in Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen’s compilation, *Quality of Life* (1993), “Explanation and Practical Reason,” Hostetler explains Taylor’s insight regarding the notable extent to which moral beliefs are common among people of diverse situations and that knowledge of this is actually shared and assumed across difference.⁶⁷⁰ Hostetler does not want to minimize moral dilemmas that occur between socio-cultural divides, but in using Taylor he wants to suggest the possibility of deliberation about and resolution of such moral dilemmas. That is, Hostetler wants to recognize the prospect of common good perspective.

Hostetler looks to *Sources of the Self* in three brief but not insignificant glances. The first two are about conceptions of the good people might share. The third reference, however, echoes Taylor’s caution about the kinds of destruction that can happen when high ideals are pursued. He then wagers for us a communitarian challenge to be especially careful, deliberate, and hopeful in seeking shared ideals.

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⁶⁶⁹ Ibid., 352.

While Hostetler’s communitarian sensitivities help to illuminate Taylor’s similar sympathies, I find Hostetler significant in framing for us the dangerous predicament that inaccurate or inappropriate understandings of Taylor’s fullness might invite. Again, Taylor stresses that fullness is not a surge of personal empowerment in one’s life but an opportunity for genuine expressions of transformation.

Paul Smeyers and Nicholas Burbules provide yet another example of research about the common good and education in regard to Taylor.\textsuperscript{171} These philosophers of education voice their “intuition” that education is an initiation into life practices. They describe eighteenth century civility, for example, and a pressing concern – for better and worse – in Enlightenment Era education to introduce and form students in the “knowledge, sentiments, and valued activities and practices of civilized life.”\textsuperscript{172} They then discuss an oppositional Romantic response through Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778). Establishing themselves upon a Wittgensteinian foundation – Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1889-1951) “form of life” – they contend that education is indeed a form of practice but they maintain that they can evade the generally conservative agendas – such as blind endorsements of tradition – around it. To do so, they turn to essays in Taylor’s \textit{Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers Volume 1} (1985).

Using Taylor, Smeyers and Burbles explain that practices in societies are generally accompanied by descriptions and explanations, or a sense of narration.\textsuperscript{173} Their interest in regarding education as life-practice celebrates the ways by which practitioners in education – students and teachers – can better recognize and understand the practices they already exercise in

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\textsuperscript{172} Ibid., 439.
\textsuperscript{173} Ibid., 443 and 449.
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daily life. Also, students and teachers can anticipate practices worthy of cultivation as they move forward in life. Smeyers and Burbules suggest that any of us might tend toward such practices already. Furthermore, the descriptions and explanations exude “strong evaluations,” that is, intuitions about what in life is right or wrong, better or worse, higher or lower, and so forth.\textsuperscript{174} Taylor introduces the concept of strong evaluations in his essay “What is Human Agency?” from \textit{Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers, Volume 1}.\textsuperscript{175} Smeyers and Burbules cite it. However, the concept (strong evaluation) is prominently featured in \textit{Sources of the Self}. Strong evaluations not only represent ideals about the good life that can be critically and reflectively assessed, but they also offer personal insights regarding issues of individual selves and identities.

\textbf{Instrumental Rationality}

As Taylor and many likeminded colleagues concentrate specifically upon ethical theories of the Enlightenment, Mark Mason grieves a burgeoning postmodern moral relativism that seems to evade genuine moral responsibility to others. Mason, furthermore, frames for us a new category of scholarship in educational philosophy that carries Taylor into the realm of education. He also manifests interests and sensitivities associated with this thesis.

Reminiscent of Taylor’s \textit{The Ethics of Authenticity}, Mason’s article, “The Ethics of Integrity,” hopes to cultivate in education an acute postmodern sense of moral responsibility.\textsuperscript{176} While Mason enjoys the insights of Seyla Benhabib, Anthony Giddons, Maxine Greene, and

\textsuperscript{174} Ibid., 444.


others, references to Taylor are not insignificant, nor superficial. Mason well explains concepts important in *The Ethics of Authenticity*, such as the “disembedded” self and instrumental rationality. Six years before the publication of *A Secular Age*, Mason even seems to anticipate Taylor. The concepts of Taylor that Mason so well details are fundamental ideas in Taylor’s 2007 publication. The disembedded self is Taylor’s “buffered” subject. Moreover – and somewhat ironically – Mason’s research works seriously with Zygmunt Bauman’s discussion of disenchanted societies and ensuing moral crises related to them. Readers of *A Secular Age* are keenly sensitized to Taylor’s own deployment of the concepts and ideas that represent the dynamics, or lack thereof, of enchantment.

Taylor’s disembedded self, Mason explains, purports “an increasingly atomistic and strongly individualistic outlook on the world that involves a consequent withdrawal from public life and a minimal sense of moral responsibility to others.” It corresponds, he continues, with a rise in instrumental rationality, “a kind of rationality that calculates the most economical or efficient means to a given end with scant regard for the human or other moral consequences.” Again, these fundamental concepts that drive the essay are from Taylor, and they let Mason draw a correlation between personal identity and moral responsibility. An atomistic and individualistic sense of self with, moreover, an instrumental orientation toward anyone and everything, cultivates a fragmented, fragile, and ephemeral self-identity. This – the sense of identity – is the locus Mason wants education to deal with. “A key challenge facing teachers . . . is the development of a more deeply founded sense of identity in their students as a means to a

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177 Ibid., 48.
178 Ibid.
179 Ibid., 50.
more strongly developed sense of moral responsibility.” It is Mason’s ethics of integrity that offers a foundation upon which this works. A significant component of such an ethics rests on Taylor’s challenge for us to discover moral sources not within our lives, but beyond them. For Mason, the moral demands that come to us beyond the context of the self are fundamentally Levinasian: a “sense of unbridled responsibility to the Other.”

Toward the end of the article Mason deals explicitly with Taylor’s discussion of authentic personhood and his own development of personal integrity. As with other educational theorists, Mason endorses Taylor’s insight that authenticity of self is ultimately social – it relies upon and responds to our relationships with others. In fact with Taylor authenticity is not at all possible without others to which it responds. Mason thereby insists that education must expose our embeddedness with each other, draw from it a profound sense of shared dignity, and create out of it an unavoidable sense of responsibility for one another. The ensuing ethics of integrity, Mason explains, is wholly consistent with Taylor’s ethics of authenticity.

Clarence Joldersma’s research invites Taylor into the realm of environmental concern, although Joldersma is not the only educational philosopher to focus upon timely environmental issues. He maintains that teaching students to care for and better appreciate the natural world need not instill negative feelings about scientific engagement. Education, he insists, should

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180 Ibid.

181 Ibid., 56.

182 Ibid., 60.


maintain robust scientific interest, and can do so without an instrumental orientation. Joldersma relies upon Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) to represent a hermeneutic approach to science which understands science differently: as “social practice . . . [whereby] science so construed can disclose the planet as earth . . . that is fragile and for which we are responsible.”\(^{185}\) To build his argument, Joldersma uses “Heidegger, Language, and Ecology,” an article of Taylor’s from Taylor’s own 1995 collection of essays, *Philosophical Arguments* (1995).\(^{186}\)

However, Joldersma seeks help from Taylor a bit more substantially earlier in his essay. As Joldersma wrestles with Heideggerian disclosure in regard to the natural world, he employs an epistemic perspective that validates the truth and reality of things in objective and external qualities. He demonstrates an interest in the “ontic commitment” of *A Secular Age*, a philosophical acknowledgement that validates the impact upon us as knowing subjects of external and even ulterior realities around us. We might also call to mind Arcilla’s *Mediumism* (2010) and Dreyfus and Kelly’s *All Things Shining* in the previous chapter and their pushes to open and expand subjectivity to other influences. Joldersma cites *Sources of the Self* to instruct that the meaningfulness and validity of many things is not self-originating and self-relative.\(^{187}\)

Later in the essay, Joldersma labors to deflate the instrumental nature of science. He takes inspiration from Taylor’s *A Secular Age* to argue how we are able to “understand science primarily as a set of embodied social practices rather than as an abstract process of developing and justifying theories.”\(^{188}\) Taylor is helpful both in his disregard for an instrumental perspective

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\(^{188}\) Ibid., 475.
he feels characterizes much of a Western, post-Enlightenment perspective in life but also for his insistence that blaming science for this is injudicious and simplistic.

Joldersma’s most interesting reference to Taylor comes in his conclusion, though. Like other educational theorists, he adapts “one of Taylor’s felicitous phrases” – the “social imaginary” – to announce that simply, but urgently, “[s]tudents, teachers, and others need a ‘global imaginary’” which accounts for imminent environmental crises. In the fourth chapter of this thesis will explain the origins and perspectives of Jesuit education and, from such a context, look to develop a Jesuit imaginary.

Paul Theobald’s article also appreciates Taylor’s concern about an instrumental orientation in our lives. Theobald describes a difference between a dominant and prevailing “standards-based” system of education, and, alternatively, one that is “place-based.” His main concern is to validate and promote a movement within curriculum theory that revolves around the concept of community, a central interest of Taylor’s. More theoretically, “place-based curriculum and instruction capitalizes on the crucial role of context in human learning.” For Theobald, context – and more specifically, our ideas about community – corresponds with political ideology. Theobald thus argues that educational systems within communities reflect political theories and structures of government in significant ways. He feels strongly that educational systems must orient themselves “to the welfare of human communities” even when

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191 Ibid., 316.
the theories and structures of politics and governments within which they operate are inimical or neglectful of such interests.\textsuperscript{192} This is where Taylor comes in.

Referencing \textit{Philosophical Arguments}, Theobald describes Taylor’s distinction between two foundational patterns of philosophical thought in American society, the L-stream and the M-stream. Respectively, they correspond to the philosophers John Locke (1632-1704) and Charles de Secondat Montesquieu (1689-1755). As Descartes’s role in \textit{A Secular Age} is principal antagonist of Modern epistemology, Locke is next in line. For Taylor, however, Locke’s political theory makes him doubly guilty for the extreme senses of individuality and instrumentality that ensue in a secular age. Locke, Theobald explains, interprets the relationship between persons and their governments in instrumental and economic terms. In fact, the economic dimension of human life eclipses or precedes the political aspect. The conception of human persons as essentially economical and, therefore, pre-political, facilitates a comprehensive focus upon the self across much of Locke’s philosophy, a thought system which has been a prevailing stream of influence in the American way of life. Theobald asks, “In a society defined by an aggregation of individuals freely pursuing their own economic self-interests, governed by those contractually bound to ensure the freedom to do so, what role should education play?”\textsuperscript{193}

It is Taylor who shows us, he contends, a different choice: the Montesquieu option. While the American political system has embraced essential components of Montesquieu’s political philosophy – such as a “beloved trinity” of governmental branches as well as the checking and balancing functions they each attained – it was early on regarded as quasi-

\textsuperscript{192} Ibid., 315.

\textsuperscript{193} Ibid., 318.
monarchical and, thus, less democratic. Yet Montesquieu’s philosophy exudes a flavor of democratic inquiry and cooperation. In turn, its sense of community facilitates not a spirit of economic competition but of general solidarity. It is through Locke, Theobald implies, that we adapt and harness an instrumental perspective in American life whereas through Montesquieu we might be more cooperative and less competitive with one another. Gesturing toward Sources of the Self, Theobald further endorses Taylor as helpful to educational theorists. Taylor – as well as Robert Bellah, Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel, Robert Putnam, and others – represents in his communitarian sensitivities a “Montesquieu-Jefferson-Tocqueville tradition” which American education has generally failed to embrace.

Hypergoods

Insisting that “[g]ood teaching requires self-cultivation rather than self-sacrifice,” Chris Higgins’s main concern is to show us the strong correlation between the life of teaching and a teacher’s values and ideals. Furthermore, his research explains that such a concern is better dealt with not by “the psychologists who study teacher motivation or the sociologists who study institutional life, but to philosophers concerned with professional ethics.” A modern, Enlightenment-influenced variant of ethics that pulsates through many of us, however, is tainted by its obsession with particular duties or specific actions that, as stated, is a philosophical calamity that Taylor counters through his agape construct. Higgins’s work helpfully positions a final snapshot of an area of scholarship in educational theory that is substantiated by Taylor.

194 Ibid., 319.
195 Ibid., 328.
197 Ibid., 153.
Higgins reminds his readers that other perspectives preceded deontological and utilitarian expressions in ethics, and that “metaethical interventions” by Alasdair MacIntyre, Bernard Williams, Taylor, and others recall for us important ancient articulations of human flourishing.\textsuperscript{198} You might also recall Taylor’s interest in \textit{agape} as discussed in the first chapter of this thesis, a metaphysical-moral-ethic construct that is fundamental to \textit{Sources of the Self} and an important expression of fullness. Higgins uses Taylor to reorient ethical perspective and to apply such a perspective to an ethics of teaching.

In Higgins’s article, Taylor’s \textit{Sources of the Self} is never all that far away. Higgins first turns to it to explain that the ethical concepts that frame any of our lives are notions that are “culture-wide or even epochal in scope.”\textsuperscript{199} It is Taylor who instructs that our ideals – ones that represent visions of human flourishing – “are embedded in thick languages” and as such they are not necessarily the private ideals of individual persons.\textsuperscript{200} Citing Gary Fenstermacher, David Hansen, Richard Stanley Peters (1919-2011) and other philosophers of education invested in ethical discourse, Higgins discusses this to counteract the fears of those who are concerned about the projection of a teacher’s personal ideals upon her students. The discussion stems from an earlier stated concern of Higgins to rightly distinguish between moral education and educational ethics, the first being a smaller aspect of the larger domain of the latter.

When Higgins turns again to Taylor and \textit{Sources of the Self}, it is to deal with a principle issue of his essay: altruism. In educational ethics, modern altruism, he argues, is an inappropriate ascetic ideal, and Taylor’s widely known conceptions of \textit{narrative} and \textit{hypergoods}

\textsuperscript{198} Ibid., 131.
\textsuperscript{199} Ibid., 137.
\textsuperscript{200} Ibid., 137.
help us distinguish it as problematic. When we tell others about ourselves, the “existential narratives” we articulate reference the preexisting realities of family, culture, and history as well as represent a quality of searching and striving, or in Taylor’s language, “quest.” The narratives of our lives – the stories of our identities – expose, then, the particular ideals or estimable goods that each of us seeks. These hypergoods – for instance, friendship, justice, and authenticity – “provide the very framework for ranking our other goods and orienting our lives.”

From Taylor, Higgins suggests that modern altruism falls in on itself. An altruistic perspective in educational ethics – the particular asceticism Higgins combats – might offer a certain vision of human flourishing, but it eliminates the conception of a self in relation to the ideal that is trying to be honored. While subjectivity and self-identity are an essential aspect of Taylor’s fullness, conceptions of the self, it will be shown, are fundamental to the enterprise of Jesuit education, a morally and socially conscious tradition of education that also counters altruistic prospect. If Taylor is right about the fundamental relation between self-identity and hypergoods in our lives, Higgins insists that an altruistic ideal in education or anywhere is not really possible.

David Dewhurst’s research focuses upon the role of emotions in education. He agrees with Peters and Israel Scheffler that philosophical perspective must diminish a dichotomy between cognition and emotion. He echoes a concern in philosophy that recognizes the persistence of an unproductive duality that inappropriately and inaccurately qualifies human

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201 Ibid., 141.

202 Ibid.

emotion as irrational and illogical. Taylor’s “theoretical imagination,” discussed in the previous chapter, helps contextualize Dewhurst, as do the conversations about play by J. C. Friedrich von Schiller (1759-1805) and Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002), presentness by Arcilla, and *agape* and fullness by Taylor. Recall, too, Taylor’s excarnation term, a word signifying exclusive rational standpoint.

In the realm of education, then, and here more pointedly, we must validate emotional responses. They are a significant aspect of human cognition both in what they offer and in what they receive. In what sentiments reflect, then, they are source of knowledge. But it is also stressed that knowledge can act upon them, letting us recognize them as they arise, harness them when necessary, and even direct them toward fruitful achievements. And, as emotions might lead any of us toward important insights in our lives, to an important degree they already reflect for us some of our significant beliefs and values.

Quoting from *Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers, Volume 1*, Dewhurst introduces Taylor as a philosopher among a certain set of thinkers who endorses a cognitive orientation of emotions. Dewhurst’s principle concern in the article, however, is not to reassert such an endorsement. While he maintains a cognitive orientation, he here tempers the perspective. In doing this he also uses Taylor. Like language, the realm of emotion also has expressive limits. If educators invest in the rationality of the emotions, Dewhurst uses Taylor to caution a full buy-out. Emotions may indeed reflect a cognitive dimension, but Taylor explains that it is better to interpret a “gestalt” quality of emotions and to admit, for instance, that emotionally influenced perspectives in our lives may and may not reflect or attain rational justification. Furthermore, Dewhurst turns to *The Ethics of Authenticity* to remind us of how our

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204 Ibid., 482.
lives are constituted by the world around us. This, in fact, seems to be Dewhurst’s more interesting application of Taylor. His understanding of Taylor regards the rich complex of an individual’s life, a horizon of influence in and through which any of us – or any of our students – is functioning and being formed. Such persuasions anticipate the internalized conditions of Modernity Taylor bemoans in *A Secular Age*. Dewhurst uses Taylor to argue that emotional responses that arise from within our depths may actually correspond to an external reality that one does not wholly understand, or even an uncertain horizon toward which one might tend.

Robert Bullough, Clifford Mayes, and Robert Patterson also employ Taylor’s horizons of significance. While these scholars reference *Sources of the Self* in the bibliography of their article, “Teaching as Prophecy,” in it they do not explicitly discuss or engage Taylor or his concepts. In responding to critical reviews of their article, however, they draw significantly from *The Ethics of Authenticity*. Their rejoinder affirms many of the concerns expressed by their critics. Bullough, Mayes, and Patterson use Taylor to show their affinity with such concerns – “Test teachers. Test students. Punish. Reward . . . enhance competition. Forget citizenship and public life” – but also to remind their readers that Taylor rightly positions these issues and, moreover, represents the significant problems with teacher education that they themselves want to combat: a loss of meaning, an eclipse of ends, and a loss of freedom.

Taylor seeks to recover the ethic ensconced in authenticity, an ethic that recognizes self-identity formation as necessarily taking place against horizons of significance and through discourse. It is this ethic that is lost in teacher education’s celebration of instrumental reason, made evident in the reduction of education to training.

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208 Ibid., 342.
The current discussion about teacher education, they insist, manifests an obsession with specific techniques and skills that correspond with dehumanizing statistical results. The authors admit that technical skill in teaching is not unimportant, but not at the expense of a teacher’s own sense of herself as well as an individual attentiveness she affords students.209 “The image of teacher as prophet challenges . . . [a] tendency toward disassociation because teacher prophets necessarily call forth, using Taylor’s terms, horizons of significance against which and through which self-formation takes place,” and this in the context of both teachers and students.210

Finally, Pamela Moss’s interest in Taylor regards her invitation to educational researchers to better dialogue with one another.211 She helps to validate the array of voices within the field of educational theory demonstrated in these pages as well as the voices from many others fields of inquiry featured in the second part of this chapter. As the dialogic aspect is a category of interest that could stand alone, her affinity with Taylor’s horizons of significance, the final category here considered, is revealed in how she challenges researchers to know the biases such horizons host. She invites them to better explore alternative horizons.

Moss stands squarely within Gadamerian hermeneutics. She hopes to convince educational theorists to employ Gadamer’s formulation of critical dialogue. Critically reviewing research from different spheres within the field – namely, those representing competing interests – will foster, she insists, a better understanding of divergent perspectives in others’ work as well new insights about their own.

209 Ibid.


References to Taylor’s essay, “Understanding the Other: A Gadamerian View on Conceptual Schemes,” function as an important source for endorsing both Gadamer and herself. For example, she cites Taylor to counteract indictments in educational philosophy that Gadamer is relativistic. She also uses Taylor to encourage researchers to pinpoint issues of discord, the moments in scholarly discourse where another’s data “interpellate, challenge, offer a notional alternative to” what they themselves have discovered and understood. Finally, Moss points out Taylor’s distinction between “the knower and the known” to remind any researcher of the influential role preconceptions play as well as of the social, political, and cultural biases which impact the interpretive results any of us glean from our research.

**Conclusion**

While the topics – recognition, the good life, instrumentality, and hypergoods – are imperfect in representing a tremendous interest in Charles Taylor by educational theorists, they well gather instances of three and four scholars in an interesting context of shared discourse. As indicated above, the representation of concepts from Taylor is impressive, and the implications for educational theory are expansive. From the notions of recognition, personal identity, narrative, dialogue, quest, and strong evaluations, to name a few, educational theorists turn to Taylor to discuss and debate teacher ethics, student- and subject-based teaching, environmental education, educating values, standardization and testing, educational policy, and more.

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214 Ibid., 270.
If space permitted, it would be rewarding to manifest other issues that other scholars of education glean from Taylor’s work. Connections to the roles and influences of imagination,\textsuperscript{215} tradition,\textsuperscript{216} religiosity,\textsuperscript{217} specialized communal contexts,\textsuperscript{218} and cosmopolitanism\textsuperscript{219} in education represent some of these other discourses.

But it must also be stated, once again, how the scholars discussed in the pages above demonstrate affinities with \textit{A Secular Age} and, more particularly, to Taylor’s fullness. I now turn to the pan-academic conversations about the book and their explicit evaluation of fullness.

\section*{II. \textit{A Secular Age} in Scholarship}

The recent book of essays from a conference at Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut shortly after the publication of \textit{A Secular Age}, entitled \textit{Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age} (2010), is remarkable for its representation of the Academy. Michael Warner, Jonathon VanAntwerpen, and Craig Calhoun agree that Taylor’s contribution is historic, but that is it quite complicated. The editors offer a compelling introduction that provides both a roadmap of the lengthy work and an evaluation of notable reviews released in prestigious and popular publications, reviews that they feel generally under-appreciate the complexities of \textit{A Secular Age}. Citing John Patrick Diggins, Peter Gordon, and Bruce Robbins, for example, Warner,\textsuperscript{215} Johannah Fahey and Jane Kenway, “The Power of Imagining and Imagining Power,” \textit{Globalisation, Societies and Education} 4, no. 2 (2006): 161-166.


VanAntwerpen, and Calhoun elucidate gross simplifications or unfair misinterpretations of Taylor.\textsuperscript{220} The University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois and New School University, New York, New York also hosted conferences on Taylor in 2007 or early 2008. The dedicated issue of \textit{Social Research: An International Quarterly of the Social Science} from New School promises a book of its own. Voices in all of these publications and conferences represent the wide spectrum of the Academy and likewise invoke further consideration of \textit{A Secular Age}.

José Casanova leads the charge in challenging Taylor to better define his discussion of secularism.\textsuperscript{221} Casanova thinks that the term is Eurocentric and thereby limited in applicability. Globally conscious, he is convinced that scholars who study the role and impact of religion need to speak more pointedly of different secularisms in play around the world, and that a plurality of secularisms also applies to the specific Western context of Taylor’s study.

As it is necessary to represent secularism at work in different cultural contexts and arising out of varying political, social, and religious motives, to name only a few, Casanova likewise wonders if invested scholars should be discussing a newer reality of post-secularism, a sociocultural dynamic – “much in vogue, and repeated often enough”\textsuperscript{222} – whereby secularism, according to Robert Bellah, has already run its course in some societies and is evidenced not by a resurgence of religion where it clearly receded in influence and practice, but in how spiritual and


religious tendencies either are resilient and recognizable in secular-named societies or remain lively elsewhere, uninfluenced by secular forces.223

Taylor has responded to Casanova through his latest publication, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience (2011).224 There he demonstrates an ability to understand secularism as functioning within “a diversity of beliefs and values” that represents a plurality of citizens within a given society, thereby agreeing with Casanova’s challenge to be more nuanced.225 In representing a dimension of plurality, Taylor appreciates John Rawls’s (1921-2002) description of “overlapping consensus.”226 As notable in a lengthy quotation, a wide-angle snapshot of Taylor’s thinking along these lines is helpful. He says that

[a] Christian, for example, will be able to defend fundamental rights and freedoms by invoking the idea that the human being was created in God’s image; a Kantian rationalist will say that it is necessary to recognize and protect the equal dignity of rational beings; a utilitarian will maintain that one must seek to maximize the happiness of sentient beings capable both of pleasure and pain; a Buddhist will invoke the core principle of ahimsa, nonviolence; and an indigenous person or deep ecologist, referring to a holistic conception of the world, will maintain that living beings and natural forces stand in a relation of complementarity and interdependence and that, consequently, each of them, including human beings, must be granted equal respect. All of them agree on the principle, even though they cannot reach an agreement about the reasons that warrant it.227

The post-secular designation, moreover, is not accurate, at least according to Taylor and readers sympathetic to his narrative. Those who jump to Taylor’s defense cite and endorse Taylor’s distinctions at the onset of A Secular Age between three kinds of secularities and the


225 Ibid., 4-5.

226 Ibid., 11.

227 Ibid., 12.
contemporary spiritual and religious searchings – discussed in *A Secular Age* as “The Nova Effect” – that are notable in secular societies.²²⁸

There are other criticisms. Card-carrying historians Jon Butler and Simon During are concerned about the way Taylor does history in his book.²²⁹ During calls *A Secular Age* philosophical or conjectural history, a genre During feels elides the naming and understanding of specific material causes – “most obviously capitalism and urbanization” which Taylor’s historic overview misses – and dwells, instead, in teleological explanations.²³⁰ Furthermore, During is not interested in Taylor’s “fullness,” “an existentialized/theopanized moral anthropology” which is akin, he explains, to the spiritual impulses articulated and appreciated by Simone Weil (1909-1943).²³¹ He suggests that Taylor deal with the “mundane,” the ordinary experience of common sense and daily routine. Experience of the humdrum daily is more accurate, he insists, in representing an anthropological reality and is not a correlate of the religious-secular and transcendent-imminent terminologies.²³²

Butler, who, unlike others, is discouraged by the three versions of secularity Taylor demarcates at the beginning of *A Secular Age*, suggests that Taylor’s history is convenient: “it is a history for argument about modernity, the cause of the modern condition, and its possible cure.

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²³⁰ During, “Completing Secularism,” 108.

²³¹ Ibid., 107.

²³² Ibid., 113.
It is a history of lament and failure intended to propel readers towards a history of meaning and fulfillment.”

Aware of the importance of material realities in educational research, I do not take Butler’s critique, in particular, lightly. Historical and material realities indeed elicit data and substantiate proposals. Yet I am not sure either of us, Taylor or me, is terribly vulnerable. On Taylor’s side, his stated interest in offering an alternative “narrative” for understanding Western secularism canvasses the pages of *A Secular Age*. He is telling a story newly, or differently. Ironically, after nearly 900 pages Taylor feels as if the manuscript we all struggled through is not long enough. As for my appreciation of Butler’s critique, I myself am not unaware of the special role of philosophical and theoretical thinking in philosophy of education. Certain quantifications and evaluations are not always necessary.

Another critic, a social-scientist, David Lyon, calls Taylor an anti-secularist and wants Taylor to better appreciate certain post-secular dynamics in policy-making, expressions of religiosity that have formulated and gained meaning in response to secularism. Casanova is helpful to Lyon, of course, but Lyon’s main concern is to stress the validity of post-secularity in understanding public policy issues and political matters that gain focus and energy in the Western societies, such as the wearing of religious garb in public spaces and the persistence and frequency of debates around life issues, such as abortion and euthanasia.

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235 Taylor endorses Lyon in a written response. However, I am witness to an exchange between Richard Bernstein of New School and Taylor in New York in 2008. Bernstein, from a conference audience, approached a microphone to query Taylor, protesting something to the effect, ‘Chuck, you can’t not deal with the real issues.’ Abortion, in fact, was the real issue. Taylor had just been challenged about matters of public and political policy posed by a different interlocutor, and Bernstein was unimpressed. Taylor responded, ‘Dick, I can. I am a philosopher.’
Finally, multiculturalist Keith Tester suggests that Taylor is not Catholic enough.\textsuperscript{236} He wants Taylor to be truer and more genuine about practices and goals of the church. Taylor’s hero, Tester tells us, is the Renaissance Jesuit missionary, Matteo Ricci (1552-1610). Ricci is a scion of cultural adaptation and religious assimilation, and is notable for his ability to enter into and form relationships with the highest officials of China’s xenophobic and reclusive Ming Dynasty (1368-1644). Ricci himself became a ranked official, a mandarin, of the dynasty as a Confucian literati. He translated classic works back and forth between Christian and Confucian cultures, constructed a map of the world centralizing China but including Europe and other foreign geographies and cosmologies, and presented to and maintained for the Ming imperial court Europe’s latest technological equipment. A recent biographer explains that “by virtue of his intellect, a heroic individual bridges impossible chasms between civilizations, opening up a new world of understanding by the strength of his learning and genius.”\textsuperscript{237}

Taylor features Ricci in his 1996 address, a “Catholic Modernity,” as a seventeenth century solution for twenty-first century needs.\textsuperscript{238} Ricci will be briefly considered in the next chapter. Here, however, Tester insists that Ricci was, ultimately, an evangelizing functionary of the Roman Catholic Church. Tester seems to want to unmask illusory ideas about who Ricci essentially was, and Tester wants to do the same of the church itself. His concern with Taylor’s


\textsuperscript{237} R. Po-Chia Hsia, \textit{A Jesuit in the Forbidden City: Matteo Ricci, 1552-1610} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 305.

version of Catholicism, then, is that it is not a realistic expression of the faith – “Taylor’s Catholicism is extraordinarily un-churched” – and it is not accountable to its own history.\textsuperscript{239}

The theologian John Milbank also takes up the Catholic issue.\textsuperscript{240} As he questions with Butler and During Taylor’s historical method, calling it historicized existentialism, he wants Taylor to better articulate what it means for the Catholic church to be \textit{incarnational}. In this, Milbank is implicitly inspired by Taylor’s concern with Modern expressions of excarnation – again, an overt and exclusive rational perspective in the realms of faith and religion – and explicitly motivated by Taylor’s discussion of the role of the “festive” in former hierarchical societies. Readers of \textit{A Secular Age} enjoy Taylor’s reminiscing about the ploys and strategies of festive celebrations in cultures – Carnival and Mardi Gras, for instance – which, because of appointed and routine seasons of excessive celebration, maintained dimensions of moral and social equilibrium and a complementarity of social roles in daily life.\textsuperscript{241}

As Milbank wants to articulate an anthropology which is more representational of such festive realities, and, thus, incarnational, he wants the same of Roman Catholicism. He points to tendencies of clericalism, a bureaucratic and obsessive morality, and a general denigration of sexuality as anti-incarnational. Entitled “A Closer Walk on the Wild Side,” his essay calls to mind Lou Reed’s 1970s hit song.

Edited by George Levine of Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey, perhaps the most recent publication to focus on \textit{A Secular Age}, the eleven essays of \textit{The Joy of...

\textsuperscript{239} Tester, “Multiculturalism, Catholicism and Us,” 668.


Secularism are almost entirely devoted to a single concept from Taylor’s work, fullness.\textsuperscript{242}

Reminiscent of an ordinary kitchen classic, Irma Rombauer’s (1877-1962) 1936 *The Joy of Cooking*, the jacket of the book is designed as a traditional red-and-white-checkered tablecloth. The contributions within criticize Taylor’s transcendent-dependent version of fullness and suggest alternative naturalistic conceptions of fullness, such as the joy of cooking. Generally, many of the authors seek to preserve the construct, even if they redefine it dramatically. More so, Taylor’s assessment of Modernity is also generally accepted.

Paolo Costa and Adam Phillips interpret fullness through Freudian perspectives. Costa suggests that Taylor is simply articulating the oceanic sentiment, a sensation better described by Pierre Hadot (1922-2010). For its poignancy and poetry, and for its affinity to Taylor’s description of fullness through Bede Griffiths (1906-1993), Hadot’s remarks about a certain kind of fullness in his life are worth quoting in entirety:

> One happened on rue Ruinart, on the path I took home to my parents’ house every day from the petit Séminaire. Night had fallen. The stars were shining in the immense sky. At this time one could still see them. Another took place in a room of our house. In both cases I was filled with an anxiety that was both terrifying and delicious, provoked by the sentiment of the presence of the world, or of the Whole, and of me in that world. In fact, I was incapable of formulating my experience, but after the fact I felt that it might correspond to questions such as *What am I? Why am I here? What is this world I am in?* I experienced a sentiment of strangeness, of astonishment, and of wonder at being there. At the same time I had the sentiment of being immersed in the world, of being a part of it, the world extending from the smallest blade of grass to the stars. This world was present to me, intensely present. Much later I would discover that this awareness of belonging to the Whole was . . . called the ‘oceanic sentiment.’ I believe that I have been a philosopher since that time, if by philosophy one means this awareness of existence, of being-in-the-world.\textsuperscript{243}


Both Costa and Hadot trace the oceanic sentiment through Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) to Romain Rolland (1866-1944). Again, Hadot well represents Costa’s point, that “the oceanic sentiment—as I experienced it . . . is foreign to Christianity because it does not involve either God or Christ.” While Hadot distinguishes it from the “sentiment of nature,” that is, “wonder in the face of nature,” and allows for the possibility of a cosmic sentiment, his oceanic sentiment “is something situated at the level of the pure sentiment of existing.” This bridges to Phillips.

Adam Phillips feels that Taylor’s yearning for a supernatural being and a Christian anthropological correlate (fullness) for sensing such a being evades the human condition of helplessness. A common repulsion within many of us to a fundamental sense of helplessness cultivates certain dependencies which Phillips thinks thwarts human growth. Looking closely at Taylor, Phillips even ponders the possibility that helplessness and disenchantment are much the same. Phillips bristles at the immaturity fullness represents and explains it as a psychological sentiment indicative of something much different. In this, I am cognizant of a challenge Taylor poses in *A Secular Age* for religious and Christian practitioners to continually update and expand the dynamics of faith and theology in their lives. He indicates that the theology of a 10-year-old child is not useful to a seasoned adult who has weathered the realities of life. A “childish” (Christian) faith indeed perpetuates an immature perspective.

Beyond two gestures to Freud, many other contributors to *The Joy of Secularism* turn to Charles Darwin (1809-1882), such as Rebecca Stott and David Sloan Wilson. They agree that

244 Ibid., 8.

245 Ibid.


disenchantment and meaninglessness are contemporary Western problems, but Taylor’s interest in reenchantment through an attentiveness or capacity for fullness is not attractive. They remind Taylor that science can enchant us, too, and that discoveries about life and the world yield answers but also expose deeper mysteries. Wilson suggests that the kinds of sensations of enchantment normally cultivated by the arts, such as the effects upon us induced by music or poetry, and religious enchantment in our lives through liturgy or personal prayer, have been superseded. “There is much to look forward to when we appreciate that when it comes to evolution, the future need not resemble the past.”

Stott, not unlike Taylor, is concerned about language and recognizes its ability to sensitize us to certain realties. She agrees with Taylor that “secularism is a form of subtraction from religious ‘fullness’ . . . that secularism can amount to a ‘flattening,’ an emptying out of experience, a disenchantment.” Rather than forging a religious commitment, though, Stott wants to reclaim notions of the sublime and finds new words and phrases that showcase it. As Taylor deploys the poetry of Gerard Manley Hopkins (1844-1889) – its internal method of sprung rhythm, in particular – to nurture an ontic commitment and a correspondent religious sensitivity, Stott turns to Amy Clampitt’s poems, describing them as “exquisite expressions of what we might call the Darwinian sublime or the poetics of immersion.” Clampitt writes, “But the sun / underfoot is so dazzling / down there among the sundews, / there is so much light / in that cup that, looking, / you start to fall upward.”


250 Ibid., 223.

251 Ibid., 224.
Akeel Bilgrami, finally, is not dissimilar. Like many, he appreciates Taylor’s concerns about the dimensions of meaninglessness today in Western culture, but is also agreeable with Wilson and Stott. He simply suggests that we should not look to sources beyond us. Our task today is not to flee the world, but to be more at home in it, as well as at home in ourselves.

From a different publication, *New Blackfriars*, Kieran Flanagan anticipates an indictment against Taylor’s notion of fullness common to many of the authors of Levine’s book. He interprets Taylor’s interest in expressions of reenchantment as nostalgic and old fashioned, and he describes Taylor as looking backward to reclaim something long gone.

In *Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age*, Colin Jaeger claims that Taylor’s fullness is nothing other than the Romantic sensibility of William Wordsworth (1770-1850), Friedrich von Schiller (1759-1805), and Percy Bysshe Shelley (1792-1822), poets Taylor himself pointedly and frequently criticizes in *A Secular Age* for the fragile moments of delight they are able to entice. Taylor responds, admitting, “I plead guilty as charged: I’m a hopeless German romantic of the 1790s.” Taylor here gestures beyond the poets, though, to Johann Gottfried von Herder’s (1744-1803) notion of the human community functioning as an orchestra and ongoing dimensions and expressions of reconciliation at play in the wide network of an authentic Christian community and its communion of saints.

Back in the *Joy of Secularism*, literary critic Bruce Robbins might be the fiercest of Taylor’s critics. While Michael Warner, Jonathan VanAntwerpen, and Craig Calhoun remain in
their *Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age* very discouraged and disappointed in Robbins’s review of *A Secular Age*, George Levine in his *The Joy of Secularism*, and within the same edition, Taylor himself, indicate worthy concerns in Robbins’s more recent writing on Taylor. Fundamentally, in his own essay, Robbins has no time for Taylor’s fullness. Being secular is about advancing and improving, and not returning to “tiny, isolated medieval parishes that once sustained belief.”255 Robbins, one of the few scholars across a range of publications who wants nothing to do with fullness, also insists that it is only Christian-specific and cannot represent the greater human community. As Christianity fades away from Northern Atlantic societies, so should preoccupations with experiencing the grace of a Christian God. Finally, a reliance upon the work of imagination in conceiving a notion of Taylor’s fullness to begin with is problematic. “Imagination is a sort of magical helper in this story, happened upon when Western man seems most lost in the wasteland of disenchantment, and offering some hope of a happy ending.”256

Most scholars quite like fullness, however, and labor to preserve it. Peter van de Veer and Jonathan Sheehan want broader, more inclusive interpretations of it, a broadening that Taylor himself also wants.257 For instance, van der Veer cites spiritual inspirations through Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882), Walt Whitman (1819-1892), Wassily Kandinsky (1866-1944), Tu Wei-Ming, Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941), and Mohandas Gandhi (1869-1948).258 More vague and ambiguous than the experience of fullness, van der Veer explains that spirituality in essence – unlike Christian religious or metaphysical commitment – is a bridge that


256 Ibid., 88.


connects “various discursive traditions around the globe.” Sheehan, too, wants vastly wide multicultural representation, including agnostic and atheistic expressions of fullness.

Dewey scholar Philip Kitcher, however, best represents the admirers, and according to Levine, editor of the book, as well as James Wood in his recent discussion of secularism in The New Yorker, Kitcher offers the crowning essay. Taylor, Kitcher feels, is on to something fundamentally important with his fullness construct. For Kitcher, the transcendental orientation is wrong, but fullness is indeed an essential aspect of human life, and in a secular age we know it less and less. He espouses impatience with Darwinian atheists who think, too simply, that being religious is about believing doctrines. He celebrates the abilities of religions to create communities, manifest solidarity, inspire charitable and material response, and enact social justice. He is particularly excited about personal senses of meaning and purpose found in religion, and he notes the role of Taylor’s fullness in facilitating expressions of individual and corporate integrity. Kitcher turns to A Common Faith (1934), though, and cites John Dewey’s (1859-1952) keen interest in certain episodes in our lives that cultivate a religious attitude or outlook. Kitcher thus explains,

Decades [after the publication of A Common Faith], secularism still needs to attend to the cultivation of [a religious] attitude, to elaborate ways in which it can become more widespread and more enduring . . . I hope to have renewed the quest for what Dewey called a ‘common faith,’ a complex of psychological states beyond the acceptance of myth, that recognizes secular humanism as more than blunt denial.

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259 Ibid., 1097.


262 Kitcher, “Challenges for Secularism,” 32.

263 Ibid., 55-56.
Today we need Dewey’s religiosity – Deweyian fullness – more than ever, Kitcher claims, and secular humanists must take up the task of generating the existentially transformative experiences religion has long offered.

**Conclusion**

Always fearful of relativism in various stripes and sizes and the expressions of individualism so easily recognized in Western culture, Taylor, throughout his career, maintains a metaphysical conviction he refers to in *A Secular Age* as an “ontic commitment,” an expression I referred to above when discussing both Clarence Joldersma and Rebecca Stott’s research. The ontic commitment demonstrates a distinction between subjectivity and external realities in natural and supernatural ontologies. As we review the scholarship on Taylor, especially regarding his 2007 *magnus opus* publication, as well as the responses Taylor frequently generates for scholarly journals, at conferences, and at Internet sites like The Immanent Frame, it is clear that Taylor, in a secular age, is willing to be conversant about possibilities and interpretations which challenge or enrich his own.²⁶⁴

Regarding fullness, for instance, an essential term of *A Secular Age* and the most popular topic of consequent scholarship, Taylor agrees that his philosophical-anthropological expression of human flourishing is not only Christian.²⁶⁵ About a reality he assesses to be so fundamentally rooted within the human experience and representative of the human condition, he is open to diverse expressions and articulations. He explains, “I think what we need is a conversation between a host of different positions, religious, nonreligious, antireligious, humanistic,


antihumanistic, and so on, in which we eschew mutual caricature and try to understand what ‘fullness’ means for the other.”

Whatever it means, however, the ontic commitment is necessary, and recognizing it and negotiating what such a commitment means is a helpful benchmark for assessing where Taylor stands and a principal criteria he strives to honor. The implications are philosophically broad, informing his epistemological assumptions, his moral and ethical ideals, his political theory, and an existential orientation, to name a few.

This chapter has offered a strategic assessment of Taylor’s presence in educational theory, and it has articulated how *A Secular Age* is measured in nearly pan-academic evaluation. The relationships of the scholars and their remarks to this dissertation offer instructive discussions about Taylor and his work from numerous angles. In my introduction I indicated that the Academy could and should be less fragmented and disciplined, and thus, more conversant. Fragmentation, as well as descriptions of a superficial subjectivity and an instrumental epistemics, is a problematic reality that will be considered in the fifth chapter of this dissertation. Per two other motivating factors named at the beginning of this chapter, I also explained and demonstrated the contributions offered by philosophers of education in particular, and I exposed the centrality of fullness in recent scholarship. The findings above form a foundation upon which this dissertation is able to assess a vast and fascinating discourse and seek, from a new angle yet, to join the conversation.

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266 Ibid., 318.
Chapter Three: Pier Paolo Vergerio and Renaissance Humanism

“[The] means to happiness is right training or education. Sound education is the condition of real wisdom. And if an education which is soundly planned and carefully carried out is the very fount of all human excellence, so, on the one hand, careless and unworthy training is the true source of folly and vice.”

Desiderius Erasmus
*De Ratione Studii* (1511)

Introduction

This chapter discusses the genesis of Renaissance humanism through the life and work of educational theorist and teacher Pier Paolo Vergerio. In doing so, it looks to an originary ancient Greek humanism and evolving conceptions of arête, notions of human excellence that culminate in ancient Rome as Ciceronian eloquence. With roots reaching back to ancient Greek sophistry and Isocrates, the rhetoric of Cicero is the foundation of Vergerio’s humanism, a paradigm shift in education that represents a fundamental aspect of the tradition of Jesuit education. The Jesuit educational tradition, the topic of the following chapter, commences at the end of the sixteenth century in a pervasive Renaissance humanist milieu and flourishes as a dominant educational model in Western Europe, but also abroad, for over two hundred years.

A look at the life of Vergerio, and his innovative and influential Renaissance humanist educational treatise, a letter penned to Italian royalty, begins the chapter. It continues by discussing the humanist ethos of ancient Greece and the *septem artes liberales* – the classic

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seven liberal arts – that chart for Renaissance humanist educators a pathway beyond the existing medieval educational orientation, scholasticism. The next part introduces and defines *arête* as instructive not only of ancient perspectives but as a benchmark for educational emphases and ideals. Looking at *arête*, a conception of excellence, in Homeric terms and advancing historically through Isocrates, the chapter showcases the emergence of a defining Renaissance humanist educational expression, rhetoric. As Ciceronian rhetoric best represents Renaissance humanist education, especially in the Jesuit tradition, the fourth part of the chapter discusses the meaning and practice of Ciceronian *arête*. Finally, in a section entitled, “Renaissance Remands,” the chapter returns to Vergerio’s life and letter to feature significant elements of scholastic and Renaissance humanist educations.

**I. Pier Paolo Vergerio and Renaissance Humanism**

After moving beyond his hometown of Capodistria – a fourteenth century city-state allied with the Kingdom of Venice – Pier Paolo Vergerio (1370-1444) always remembered the feast-day of St. Jerome. In Catholic faith and practice, feast-days memorialize its more remarkable members, its saints, on their day of dying. The death-day is significant because it benchmarks a well-lived life in the individual’s preceding years and, after them, an eternal life that is articulated by the precepts of Christian soteriology, that is, the teachings of divine salvation. For Christian believers, the day of dying is not an absolute death, but a passing from one kind of life (excellently lived) to another. Jerome (c.340-420), a late fourth century scripture scholar and linguist who attained honorable distinction within Roman Catholic rankings as Doctor of the Church, is ultimately celebrated for creating functional Latin translations of Jewish and Christian scriptures from their Hebrew and Greek origins. As a compilation, the translation is called the Vulgate.
The boy Vergerio may have been aware of feast-days in general and whom they honored, but what seemed so memorable to him were the specific practices enacted in Capodistria on St. Jerome’s day, the thirtieth of September, then and now, for Western practitioners of Catholicism. As patron-saint of the city, this particular feast-day was exceptional. Of some of its ritual practices, it offered a banquet – a feast – that was sumptuous and savory in proportions and consumption.

Young Vergerio was definitely aware of this, but it is what happened at the banquet that impressed him so much: everyone gathered equitably. Social distinctions of all ranks and classes were set aside, momentarily dismissed and forgotten. Readers of Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age (2007) will recall his own discussion of religious festivals and the cultural, moral, and social effects they rendered, dynamics, moreover, that we briefly considered in the previous chapter. In Vergerio’s experience, prince and pauper, master and maid, debonair and debtor; all dined together.268 It was an important expression to young Vergerio for many reasons. For one, an amnesty was achieved. “Vergerio was born into an epoch of violent contrasts and significant struggles.”269 Wars and plagues destabilized and even sundered personal and political relationships, and the brief respite from strife afforded an alternative, more attractive and impressionable image of relating.

Secondly, in bringing about the banquet, Vergerio recognized an operative moral expression with flavors both civil and religious. Inequitable class distinctions were leveled by a sense of dignity for persons and an unquestionable inclusion of all to the feast. Moreover, such social inclusion was only possible through the charitable actions by those who had expendable

269 Ibid., 15.
resources to supplement others who had little, or nothing at all, to offer. Each and all donated what they could, but many simply could not contribute. Vergerio noticed that a communal concern was addressed by righteous individuals who themselves knew and demonstrated the virtues of hospitality and generosity. A sense of personal character and a civic correlate are important constructs of Vergerio’s mature life.

But Vergerio appreciated the collaborative and inclusive dimensions of the banquet at a level deeply personal. In the whim of political and religious conflict and chaos, the winds of fortune shifted all too easily. Through the course of the boy’s formative years, the Vergerio family was both benefactor and beneficiary of the banquet. Thirdly, then, Vergerio intimately experienced these different ways of participating in the feast and their corresponding virtues of giving and being grateful.

Finally, the memories and stories were significant. Well-spoken narratives – the right words and an effective delivery of such words – about Jerome’s life, for instance, or about the banquets which commemorated his life, influenced and inspired people. Individuals and audiences were persuaded by the descriptions of the virtues they represented. The feast-day banquets were all the better, and so too were those persons and families who participated in them. From the panegyrics and preaching, Vergerio himself formed and nourished vivid images of Jerome and his feast-day that sustained and encouraged him well beyond his childhood in Capodistria.²⁷⁰ Composed, thoughtful, ascetic, scholarly, peaceful: if the world around Vergerio was violent and unattractive, Jerome’s life, the banquet which remembered his life, and the kind of world each represented, were not. Vergerio appreciated a correlation between an individual sense of self and a communal responsibility. But he also suspected a connection from persuasive

²⁷⁰Ibid., 7.
speeches about persons and events of moral import to a profoundly personal moral sensibility that was manifested by the speakers and inspired within those who listened.

The expression of social harmony, an individual sense of personal character, a correlation between one’s character and her or his community, a set of profoundly personal experiences, the impact of morally persuasive words and images: these banquet-related dynamics of Vergerio’s young life emerged in his professional life as the ingredients of an innovatory force. In *Orators and Philosophers: A History of the Idea of Liberal Education* (1995), Bruce Kimball explains that Vergerio wrote one of the earliest, if not the first, Renaissance discourses on education.\(^{271}\) Written in the opening years of the fifteenth century, the treatise, *De Ingenius Moribus et Liberalibus Studiis* [*The Character and Studies Befitting a Free-born Youth*] (c.1403), represents a paradigm shift – the seeds of a revolutionary change\(^{272}\) – in Western teaching and learning that continues to inform educational practices. The treatise itself was read and consulted for hundreds of years beyond its publication, and for at least a century and a half is reported to have been one of the most commonly read manifestos of the Renaissance itself.\(^{273}\)

Dedicated to Umbertus, the son of Francesco Carrara, the Duke of Padua, *De Ingenius Moribus et Liberalibus Studiis* was one of a set of other subsequent educational tracts which “formed the nucleus of Italian humanist pedagogical writings.”\(^{274}\) Leonardo Bruni (1370-1444), Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini (1405-1464), and Battista Guarino (1434-1513) are some of the

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other such influential authors. Craig Kallendorf refers collectively to the four as educational reformers of a special brand who “want to leave [educational] institutions mostly intact while improving the quality of the human material that directs those institutions.” Vergerio’s pedagogical explanation that “[t]he fruits of literature . . . are always great, for the whole of life and for every kind of person, but it is particularly beneficial to the studious for forming habits of [virtue]” offers a snapshot of the kinds of “human material” Kallendorf notes.

II. Humanism and the Septem Artes Liberales

Generally, humanist educators wanted to implement programs of instruction that formed students more holistically. They tempered the intellectual force of Scholastic education, especially in its dialectic tone, to focus on other aspects of the human condition, such as the power of the will, emotional capacities, aesthetic sensibilities, the work of the imagination, and more; they “sought for something which took in the whole of [one’s] life and interests.” In doing so, they reevaluated and balanced the classic seven liberal arts.

Such arts – academic disciplines by contemporary standards – were initially regarded as liberal in that free men of ancient citizenries were able to study them. In Greek and Roman antiquity, slaves and others with less social and political rights were not afforded such opportunities. Not only were slaves (and women, and foreigners, for instance) not regarded as citizens worthy to participate in political and social institutions of the given community, such as educational programs, they did not have time. Oppressive political structures aside, slaves and

\[275\] Ibid., viii.

\[276\] Vergerio, De Ingenius Moribus et Liberalibus Studiis, 51.

\[277\] Ganss, Saint Ignatius's Idea of a Jesuit University, 131.

\[278\] Kimball, Orators and Philosophers, 13.
women, simply, were otherwise occupied. Time was consumed with labor, not afforded leisure. Free men who had the free time to study studied the arts.

But the arts also freed. They liberated those who studied them from basic impulses and thoughtless habits to patterns of daily life that were more intentional and intelligent, that is, *deliberate*.

Reading, writing, and thinking were naturally empowering as important skills, but education in the liberal arts was particularly celebrated for how it nourished and nurtured students humanely. That is, the liberal arts cultivated a student’s humanity toward an idealized expression of being human.

Werner Jaeger describes this in the ancient Greek context as an especial Greek obsession to create “a higher type of man.” Jaeger explains that ancient Greece – “a nation of artists and philosophers” – recognized the ability of education to impart knowledge, but also to form personal character, “to shape the living man as the potter moulds clay and the sculptor carves stone.” Invented and employed by the Greeks but formally categorized later as the *trivium* – grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric – and the *quadrivium* – music, arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy, the *septem artes liberales* was thought to educate a person for a better, freer, more virtuous life.

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280 We will see how contemporary scholars of higher education grieve the loss of these insights and effects in the fifth chapter of this project.


282 Ibid., xxii.

Jaeger is worth dwelling on momentarily. He articulates ancient Greek perspective as having an unprecedented sensitivity for human capacity. “From our first glimpse of them we find that the individual person is the center of their thought.”\textsuperscript{284} Jaeger offers a litany of examples, citing their anthropomorphic gods, their concentration on the problem depicting the human form in sculpture and even in painting; the logical sequence by which their philosophy moved from the problem of the cosmos to the problem of man, in which it culminated with Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle; their poetry, whose inexhaustible theme from Homer throughout all the succeeding centuries is man, his destiny, and his gods; and finally their state, which cannot be understood unless viewed as the force which shaped man and man’s life—all these are separate rays from one great light. They are expressions of an anthropomorphic attitude to life, which cannot be explained by or derived from anything else, and which pervades everything felt, made, or thought by the Greeks. Other nations made gods, kings, spirits: the Greeks alone made men.\textsuperscript{285}

But in this Jaeger distinguishes between the subjective dimension of human life and a human condition, explaining that Greek anthropocentrism wrestled with the latter aspect. “The intellectual principle . . . is not individualism but ‘humanism,’ to use the word in its original and classic sense . . . from \textit{humanitatis}.”\textsuperscript{286} Ancient Greeks sought to articulate a universal human nature, and in doing so they pondered how to educate their citizens toward the genuine expression of such a nature. Jaeger stresses that such an ideal was not an abstract, esoteric conception of a specific and fixed image, but one grounded in the dynamic realities of daily life in the city-state. The educational programs they pondered and implemented for attaining – or for striving to attain – such an ideal, he instructs, manifest a culture of formation, or of teaching, which offered, ultimately, a “refinement” of the human soul.\textsuperscript{287} The culture, the Greek \textit{paideia} –

\textsuperscript{284} Jaeger, \textit{Paideia}, xxiii.

\textsuperscript{285} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{286} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{287} John C. Haughey, \textit{Where Is Knowing Going? The Horizons of the Knowing Society} (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 16.
literally, “childrearing,” reveals, further, a purposeful search for an ideal life – again, “a higher type of human being” – that is well understood through the concept of *arête*.

**III. Arête from the Iliad to Isocrates**

*Arête*, a kind of excellence that “shows superlative ability and superiority,” reveals certain operative virtues that were worth possessing. In the first chapter of his voluminous work, *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture* (1939), Jaeger traces the understanding of *arête* for Greeks themselves. For archaic Greeks, *arête* represents the physical strength and skill-set of a Homeric warrior. Even in Homer (c.8th Century BCE), from the *Iliad* to the *Odyssey*, according to Jaeger, the ideal of human excellence evolves into one which is more mindful, that is, the warrior is more intentional in his actions and even descriptive of them. Later yet in ancient Greek history, Jaeger notes of *arête* dimensions of moral comport and virtuosity, and then, with Aristotle (384-322 BCE) – who also ponders the excellence of certain *objects* – the *arête* of persons assumes patrician overtones. Hesiod (c.7th Century BCE), moreover, juxtaposes original Homeric strength and Aristotelian liberality. Hesiod’s epic poem, *Works and Days*, features the ideal of excellence of the common laborer who

wishes to make something of his *arête*, and he engages, not in the ambitious rivalry for chivalrous prowess and praise which is commended by the code of the aristocrat, but in the quiet strong rivalry of work. In the sweat of his brow shall he eat bread—but that is not a curse, it is a blessing. Only the sweat of his brow can win him *arête*.  

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291 Ibid., 71.
Kimball endorses Jaeger’s discussion of *arête* and articulates three ancient Greek variants of it through, first, Gorgias (c.485-c.380) and the sophists; then with Plato (c.424-c.428 BCE), Aristotle, and the philosophers; and finally in a combined version of the two by Isocrates (436-338 BCE). Respective to the sophists, the philosophers, and the orator, *arête* represents (1) persuasiveness in the political arena, (2) theoretical knowing and a correspondent personal virtuosity, and (3) a blending of being well spoken and morally upright. In this third variant, Isocrates’s blending of rhetorical skill and oratorical integrity revealed a reformed version of sophistry and at the same time evaded Platonic and Aristotelian philosophic esotericism. Through Isocrates, persuasive speech became more accountable and practical. In the domain of education, it also became curricular.

It is this form of intellectually and morally responsible rhetoric, John W. O’Malley describes, which ultimately schooled the Ancients. “Isocrates and his followers won the battle to educate fourth-century Greece and subsequently the Hellenistic and Roman worlds.” Plato’s Academy, Isocrates felt, produced – for too long of a time span – contemplative individuals disconnected from the daily activities of the community. Aristotle’s own school, the Lyceum, would dwell in a natural philosophy that was just as removed from practical concerns. Alternatively, Isocrates’s school of rhetoric studied poetry, political discourse, and literature, and offered a curriculum that strove to form politically engaged and morally responsible individuals. “For Isocrates the foundation upon which [rhetoric] was built was . . . the study of the poets, not only for the ‘grammatical’ aspects . . . but also because literature revealed the complexity of the

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294 Ibid.
Isocrates’s main educational objective was that individuals would be able to properly navigate the complexities of life, and one way of doing so was through effective civic engagement. This demanded rhetorical skill, the content of which was now deemed credible.

The practice of good speaking is not disassociated with the practices in ancient Greece for living good and intentional lives, practices Pierre Hadot (1922-2010) refers to in his book, *Philosophy as a Way of Life* (1995), as spiritual exercises. Such ancient practices, more commonly associated with the specific exercises of the Epicureans and Stoics, “have as their goal the transformation of our vision of the world, and the metamorphosis of our being.” Moreover, we will turn to Hadot in the following chapter to better understand the spiritual exercises in the Jesuit tradition.

Tangentially, education in the Isocratic tradition of rhetoric calls to mind its origins in sophistry, the practice of persuading. Socrates’s (c.469-399 BCE) mission develops out of his impatience with meritless opinions of smoothing-talking, fee-demanding individuals in and around Athens, the sophists. In *American Higher Education: A History* (2006), Christopher Lucas explains that sophistry “evidenced the symptoms of superficiality and the pedantic shallowness for which it [became] notorious.” He traces from it expressions of “relativism, skepticism, and radical individualism” and spotlights an oft-referenced dictum of an early sophist, Protagoras (481-411 BCE): “Man is the measure of all things.” And yet, Lucas also cites worthy dimensions of sophist tradition and education in ancient Greece, such as democratic

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298 Ibid., 11-12.
forms of instruction, broad and comprehensive curricular offerings, and iconoclastic speeches which denounced slavery and war.”

Collectively, the denigrations and accolades of sophistry were a backdrop to Isocrates and his version of *arête*, oratory.

As Jaeger describes an anthropocentric concern of the Greeks, a corresponding cultural milieu to attend it, and an *arête* to actualize it, he also stresses the communal reality of ancient Greece. “The man revealed in the work of the great Greeks is a political man. Greek education is not the sum of a number of private parts and skills intended to create a perfect independent personality.”

Lucas even describes the Greek culture, the *paideia*, as “common learning.”

In Greece, personal life could not be distinguished from the polis. As the ideal of human excellence in classic Greek regard evolves, the corresponding conceptions of *arête* will continue to reflect the communal context. The warrior, the worker, and aristocrat will in Roman sensibility continue to evolve and assume an equally specific and determinately political expression, human *arête* as “statesman.” Humanist regard in its Renaissance rendering will be especially mindful of the statesman and a corresponding verbal and personal eloquence cultivated by Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 BCE).

**IV. Ciceronian Statesmanship and the Studia Humanitatis**

Cicero, whom Vergerio designated the “source of all eloquence,” had “harnessed,” better than other orators both classical and contemporary, “persuasive oratory to the compelling example of an upright life.”

The morally honorable life implied communal and civic

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299 Ibid., 11.

300 Jaeger, *Paideia*, xxv.


engagement, and this mattered to Vergerio. Francesco Petrarch (1304-1374), who, in 1345 discovered Cicero’s personal letters to fellow citizen and friend, Titus Pomponius Atticus (c.110-33 BCE), and is commonly regarded as the father of humanism, serves as something of a foil for Vergerio. In Petrarch Vergerio recognized oratorical prominence and expertise, and he deeply appreciated the Renaissance-humanist turn he initiates in his discovery and propagation of Cicero. But in Vergerio’s estimate, the life and work of Petrarch portray, and thereby endorse, the life of a solitary poet. Rather than retreating from a troubled world “Vergerio preferred the political struggles of the orator in the city.” Relying heavily on first century BCE Ciceronian handbooks *De Inventione* and the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (that may or may not have been written by Cicero), scholars admit that Vergerio “simply recapitulated” a Ciceronian educational plan decisively invested in political and legislative influence. One stresses that Vergerio left no ambiguity regarding his position on the social role of a humanist intellectual. In opposition to Petrarch’s lifelong ambivalence about political activism, Vergerio offered an unconditional endorsement . . . Humanists would assist the proper functioning of government . . . Public panegyric and written history became the privileged media through which [they] might instill civic values and exemplify their realization in historic deeds.

For Vergerio, as with ancient Greeks and Romans, the upright life of the individual is an individual-in-community. Unlike the Scholastic interest in esoteric truths, the humanism movement in general demonstrates a practical concern about daily life of the public. For

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305 Ibid., 37.

306 Ibid., 58-59.
Vergerio, the practical dimension necessitated an active, responsible execution of one’s citizenship.\(^{307}\)

Through Cicero, rhetorical skill and civic engagement purport dimensions of personal virtuosity that were more salient than through Isocrates’s reforms. Indeed, Isocrates is the inspiration and foundation of Cicero, both in comprehensive curricular offerings to students and in an emphasis on oratory.\(^{308}\) The eloquence of good, effective, persuasive speaking correlates with personal honesty and appropriate causes, but Cicero’s eloquence became more personal and fundamentally pedagogical. It extended beyond the mastery of speech, the integrity of its message, and civic effect. It was more profoundly revelatory of the speaker’s personal life. It represents the prose and the person. “Eloquence was not a technique, but a style of life. The *vir bonus dicendi peritus* [‘the better man speaking skillfully’], as Cicero defined the orator, offered the perfect model for the humanism of the Renaissance.”\(^{309}\) In the ancient Roman context, the skilled orator professed a deep sense of personal probity for his own life and those of the community, and in the Renaissance women and men yearned for and strove toward an eloquence of personal character. Robert E. Proctor says that in the tradition of Cicero “the *studia humanitatis* . . . can perfect one’s *ingenium*, or natural talent.”\(^{310}\)

Proctor’s study, *Education’s Great Amnesia: Reconsidering the Humanities from Petrarch to Freud: With a Curriculum for Today’s Students* (1988), also champions Ciceronian rhetoric. Cicero, he insists, “gives poetry, geometry, music, and dialectic as examples of the arts

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by which young [students] are formed into their humanity.” Cicero, Proctor instructs, coined the phrase *studia humanitatis*. “[W]hat Cicero calls the *studia humanitatis* . . . are synonymous with the *artes liberales*, that is, with ancient education as a whole, including what would later come to be known as the *trivium* and *quadrivium* of the liberal arts.” As a *canonista* taught canon law and a *legista* taught civil law, the *humanista* – in the fifteenth century Italian original: *umanista* – taught the *studia humanitatis*. These, the *artes liberales* from ancient conception, evolve through Cicero, and the Renaissance humanist return to Cicero, into a more constricted contemporary category, *beaus artes*, or, “fine arts.” With Cicero and, thus, the Renaissance humanists, the *studia humanitatis* was regarded for its ability to form eloquent persons. Moreover, Ciceronian rhetoric, the capstone expression of the *studia humanitatis*, functioned intimately with and through all of the arts. The arts, as we will discuss more fully in the fifth chapter, were not separable disciplines.

The prominence of rhetoric in the Isocratic tradition and a later Ciceronian development of it give insight into the curricular interests of Renaissance humanists like Vergerio. There was an underlying impulse in Vergerio and his colleagues to reevaluate the *septem artes liberales* and to instantiate a renewed and better-integrated expression of them as Ciceronian *studia humanitatis*. Dialectics, the crowning discipline of scholasticism, was not dismissed, but reoriented, and the role of rhetoric was restored. “The anti-scholasticism of the humanists was

311 Ibid., 16.  
the attempt by practitioners of one discipline to overcome the intellectual domination of another."³¹⁵

V. Renaissance Remands

Vergerio’s humanist letter to the Duke’s son, Umbertus, expedites the humanists’ concerns. Kallendorf describes three features of it. In what he refers to as a “moralizing flavor,” he suggests that, first of all, Vergerio’s educational plan focuses on the formation of individual character; secondly, that such formation be individually accommodated, that is, that the process of Vergerio’s humanist education manifests a sensitivity to individual students and their own particular talents and limitations; and, thirdly, that character formation and learning of individual persons and positive civic engagement relate with one another.³¹⁶

The details of De Ingenius Moribus et Liberalibus Studiis illuminate its Renaissance distinction in the history of education. In it Vergerio exudes a special humanist attentiveness to youthfulness and its powers. Espousing the trademark Renaissance investment in Greek and Roman classics, Vergerio turns to Virgil (Publius Vergilius Maro, 70-19 BCE) and cites the Roman poet’s own recognition of the plasticity of young persons. Vergerio agrees with the ancient insight, but he places it in educational discourse. He also confesses in his educational plan an urgency – “[w]e must, then, press onwards”³¹⁷ – to tap such potential. Moreover, maintaining such youthfulness in the later years of life is necessary and noble. “Even so great a philosopher as Socrates applied himself to the lyre when he was already advanced in years and

³¹⁵ Modras, Ignatian Humanism, 57.
³¹⁶ Kallendorf, Humanist Educational Treatises, x.
³¹⁷ Vergerio, De Ingenius Moribus et Liberalibus Studiis, 31.
turned over his fingers to a teacher for guidance.” While Vergerio’s interest in youthfulness quickly embraces a moralizing concern for tempering basic impulses and appetites, he manifests, upfront and throughout the treatise, an interest in the potency of infancy, certain innate qualities of youthfulness, and the worthiness of nourishing such a dynamism throughout and into the latter years of life. Moreover, the educational interest in youthfulness and powers is, four and a half centuries later, recognized and appreciated by the public intellectual and philosopher John Dewey (1859-1952) and his Democracy and Education (1916) as discussed at the end of the first chapter of this dissertation. We will glance back to Dewey and his conception of growth in the fifth chapter, moreover.

As Vergerio seizes youthfulness, his educational ideal does not cultivate or direct it uniformly, but personally. Kallendorf, again, but here more pointedly, explains that Vergerio goes back to the Greeks... for an approach to education that is based on a fourfold division amongst letters, gymnastics, music, and drawing, and he develops at unusual length the idea that everyone has different talents and that any general program, must be adapted to the strengths and weaknesses of each student. Also, well into his treatise, Vergerio explicitly articulates a personally catered – “radically student-centered” educational approach, and in the same gesture he describes an ideal of ongoing inquiry:

We have enumerated almost all the chief disciplines, not in order that each person need necessarily understand all of them to the point of being learned, or being considered learned—indeed each discipline could absorb all a man’s efforts, and the capacity to be content with modest wealth. We have done this rather so that everyone might embrace the study most suitable to himself—although all studies are so linked together that no one of them can be well understood if the others are completely unknown.

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318 Ibid., 33.
319 Kallendorf, Humanist Educational Treatises, x.
320 O’Malley, Four Cultures of the West, 155.
321 Vergerio, De Ingenius Moribus et Liberalibus Studiis, 57.
That is, what students of his program come to know is and is not sufficient. A student’s knowledge of poetry might assist her desire to write or recite it, or speak publicly with its specific images and examples. Another’s knowledge of music might let him play it (personally, publicly) well, or compose it, or teach it. Vergerio seems interested in letting students pursue these disciplines with personal investment, and also to be well taught in them by mentors. Teachers were expected to be masterly in their disciplines, but with Vergerio they were also expected to be adaptive to their students’ temperaments and interests.322

Vergerio’s concern for students as individuals, however, does not compromise his desire to offer a balanced, comprehensive curriculum of the liberal arts for all students. Musical instruction will serve the musical boy well, but the boy and his musical capacities will also be well served by poetry and mathematics. As holistic pedagogy, moreover, is a characteristic of Renaissance humanism, its replacement by vocationalism in contemporary education and a domineering expression of instrumental rationality – an orientation Taylor laments – in higher education will be negatively assessed in the fifth chapter of this dissertation.

As Vergerio’s educational program is plentiful and exhaustive in humanist exercises and content, it is also particularly humane. Vergerio explains that “[f]rom time to time . . . one needs to do absolutely nothing and be entirely free from work, so as to meet once again the demands of work and toil.”323 Collecting pebbles and seashells, hunting and fishing, singing and playing the lute: these, too, have educational merit in Vergerio’s plan, as does plain and simple rest.324 Vergerio’s fundamental educational interest, however, and one which benchmarks him with

322 O’Malley, Four Cultures of the West, 155.
323 Vergerio, De Ingenius Moribus et Liberalibus Studiis, 89.
324 Ibid., 85.
curricular distinction, regards an explicit interest in classic rhetoric. Vergerio scholar and biographer, John M. McManamon, explains that as a young teacher himself, Vergerio briefly adopted in his own classroom work a commonly used method of teaching and its corresponding curriculum, respectively, Scholastic disputation and dialectical instruction.

Scholastic method and its content generally consisted of a *lectio* (a lesson) by an instructor who explained the meaning and significance of a specific text. The teacher recited scripted sets of questions, referred to as *quaestiones*, to engage the text and its issues rationally and methodically. In turn, students analyzed and debated the questions. Their disputes, or *disputationes*, garnered praise or condemnation in relation to the way they corresponded with veracity – givens truths of the matters at hand.\(^\text{325}\) Argumentation was the crucial and culminating gesture, and truth the objective.

O’Malley articulates five educational principles of such a program. The philosophy of Aristotle, particularly regarding his scientific treatises, represented the type of material that was lectured. Secondly, the main, if not only, objective was to find and name specific truths. Rehearsing and debating options and alternatives, thirdly, argued toward such truths, and options and alternatives were dialectically scrutinized by Aristotelian methods. Fourthly, in knowing truths, the educational program hoped to create experts in the fields of law, medicine, and theology, namely, the classic professions. Professionals, finally, would be able to represent the respective comprehensive philosophic truth-system of their profession.\(^\text{326}\) But students, eventually, “found their writings without heart or warmth, and a reaction was certain to arise.”\(^\text{327}\)


\(^{326}\) O’Malley, “From the 1599 *Ratio Studiorum* to the Present,” 132.

The philosophers and theologians who perpetuated scholasticism grew more and more esoteric and meaningless. The concerns they passionately argued had little to do with everyday life. The practitioners “had become lost in contentious details,” and, as historian George E. Ganss further explains, “they had, by distinguishing and subdistinguishing, turned their words so completely into technical terms that no one else felt confident of grasping their meaning.”

Desiderius Erasmus (1466-1536), a Renaissance humanist spokesman through many writings, satirizes scholasticism most famously in his *The Praise of Folly* (1509). His own experience at the Collège de Montaigu of the University of Paris at the end of the fifteenth century and his passionate interest in new educational, political, and religious expressions, stages him as a worthy representative. Montaigu will be discussed in full in the following chapter, and Erasmus will once again be recognized, but here, in this chapter, his life and writing offer an interesting benchmark. His own remarks in *De Ratione Studii* (*Upon the Right Method of Instruction*) (1511) introduce this chapter and map from Vergerio to him a hundred-year push against an educational orientation of inquiry that had evolved into a caricature of itself.

**Conclusion**

The curricular emphasis on argumentation and scholasticism’s specific goals to be masterly in certain disciplines, were not attractive to Vergerio. To him, an educational program of argumentation espoused and even validated the social and religious violence of his era. It reveals yet another one of Vergerio’s correlations, an importation of violence into the classroom that had already conditioned the lives of students. Worse yet, the educational arena perpetuated the cruel demeanor around it. As a student at the University of Padua in particular, the cut-throat

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328 Ibid.
verbal debates he endured reminded Vergerio of the brutality of wars and plagues at home in Capodistria.  

As a teacher in his own classroom, then, he “found refuge in the Stoicism of Roman rhetoricians.”  Humanism, inspired by Greek anthropocentrism, disseminated by Isocratic schooling, championed by Ciceronian eloquence, discovered and reinvigorated by Petrarch, evolved an alternative. Aristotle, who had gained academic prominence in the Middle Ages and became the philosophical face of scholasticism, was replaced: “a campaign against ‘Aristotle’ both because of the barbarous style, according to the humanists, in which his works came down to us and because of the even worse style of his followers in the universities. It was a style that did not lead to the philosophical life.”  In place of a dialectic method and its esoteric objectives, “humanists, [shifted] their interests more to [the individual] and . . . worldly concerns.” Ganss continues, explaining that the humanists “revived and substituted ideals drawn from classical literature. One of these was what they named humanitas. By this term they meant an ensemble of qualities—intellectual force, literary excellence, artistic taste, polished manners, and elegant bearing—all intended to enhance . . . a citizen.”

Vergerio and his humanist colleagues represented a new educational orientation. First, they intentionally framed portrayals and possibilities of good living. Through the poetic, theatric, and literary showcasing of exemplary people and the kinds of decisions they represented, literature especially guided students in moral and practical ways. Next, the poetry, theatre, and literature came from ancient sources and thereby represented a classicist perspective.

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330 Ibid., 29.
331 O’Malley, *Four Cultures of the West*, 151.
The shift supplanted the medieval scholastic practices of dialectical argumentation with ancient Greek and Roman images of conscientious living. Third, the program of education did not hope to create professionals set-for-life, but focused on younger students for a limited set of years. The students could advance to the studies of the professions, but, eventually, they could do so only after completing the humanist program. Finally, such a program purported not a system of thought but a moral sensibility. Generally, the humanist program hoped to educate students themselves into upright persons.333

Vergerio’s curricular distinction and educational novelty, however, came through Cicero.334 Like humanists around him, his educational approach looked back to Antiquity, but in Roman Antiquity Vergerio was especially convinced by the social and political possibilities of educating in Ciceronian rhetoric. Vergerio “sought to reestablish the orator at the center of public life” and ushered a willing and waiting Cicero front and center in his educational plan.335

Vergerio is not a lone ranger. It has already been stated that other authors of other humanist educational treatises subsequent to his also construct and publish influential humanist programs in education, and that, among other humanists in general, he is not alone in turning to Cicero. Recall, though, the St. Jerome feast-day celebrations and the turbulent political and religious milieu of Vergerio’s childhood. Moments of personal equity and social harmony, the correlations between individual responsibility and the community, personal experience and virtuous response (of generosity or gratitude, for instance), and the impact of corresponding narratives in the forms of panegyrics and preaching, all hover close to the surfaces of the pages.

333 O’Malley, “From the 1599 Ratio Studiorum to the Present,” 130.
334 McManamon, Pierpaolo Vergerio the Elder, 81.
335 Ibid.
of his treatise. Vergerio’s ability to recognize an affinity between vitriolic dialectics in the *scholastic* classroom and the mainstream social and political discord in the world around it is telling. His creation of an educational space more peaceable and diplomatic alone well testifies to the influence of the equitable and cooperative feast-day banquet. But the treatise’s staying power in readership, schooling, and educational consciousness attests to its paradigmatic influence. All of this, including his particular interest in Ciceronian rhetoric as a manifestation of personal and communitarian enhancement, positions Vergerio as a cardinal and catalyst of yet another, and next, paradigm shift in education that occurs through the Society of Jesus, the Jesuits.
Chapter Four: The Tradition of Jesuit Education

“It is a marvel how much of a place this College holds in Christendom; and I believe there never was a brotherhood and body among us that held such a rank, or to sum up, that produced such results as these [Jesuits] will, if their plans continue… [The Jesuits are] a nursery of great men in every sort of greatness.”

Michel de Montaigne

Travel Journal (1774)

Introduction

In 1548, the Jesuit order established a school in Messina, Italy that was open to students of the general public. The work of education was not a primary objective of the Jesuits, yet it inspired, almost instantly, an international network of schools. The rapid and successful proliferation levied a new and principal focus of the Order and inaugurated a tradition that survives today. This chapter discusses that tradition and articulates a particular educational and institutional ethos informed and inspired by myriad sources. Moreover, the essential components of the tradition reveal important assumptions about human subjectivity and a corresponding worldview that was referenced in the first chapter of this dissertation and culminates in the last one. More specifically, the educational tradition discussed here relies upon the articulation of Renaissance humanism that immediately precedes this chapter and makes possible the three pedagogies of fullness that will be developed in the final chapter.

Numerous parts constitute this chapter of the thesis. It begins in offering a portrait of Ignatius of Loyola, the founder of the Society of Jesus (also known as the Jesuits). It continues with a discussion of the medieval and modern influences that culled conversion moments in his life and shaped his own educational experiences. The second part articulates an educational model in particular, the *modus Parisiensis*, a combined scholastic-Renaissance humanist program which manifests, respectively, an adaptation of specific pedagogical and institutional structures as well as a meaningful classic curriculum. Third, the chapter explains the emergence of schools in the Jesuit order, their international dissemination, and the various documents that help clarify and propagate an emerging tradition.

The next sections of the chapter dwell in or around the *Ratio Studiorum* of the Society of Jesus. The fourth part, then, briefly demonstrates the zenith of a prolific process of educational documentation that lead toward the definitive formation of the *Ratio*. This section of the chapter views the *Ratio* from a particular and generally unappreciated perspective. The fifth part contextualizes the *Ratio* by placing it next to another educational treatise, “Part IV” of the *Constitutions of the Society of Jesus*, yet another commonly unacknowledged dimension of the *Ratio*.

The sixth part of the chapter returns to the broader reality of the Jesuits by discussing a different, and more fundamentally defining, document of the Jesuits, the *Spiritual Exercises* of Ignatius of Loyola. While much can be said about the *Exercises*, mentioning it here in this chapter functions to illuminate, with “Part IV” of the *Constitutions*, the explicit pedagogical dimensions of the Jesuit order. Relying upon the insights of the previous chapter of this manuscript, the seventh section of this chapter returns to the Renaissance humanist inspirations of the Jesuits to feature an evolution of Ciceronian eloquence into Jesuit *eloquentia perfecta*. 
Three specific ideals – *pietas*, *Christianitas*, and *familiaritas* – are named and explained.

Finally, “Sanguinity and Suppression,” the last component of the chapter, discusses a propitious outlook manifested by the Jesuits and their schools and at the same time ponders oppositional forces that lead to the 1773 worldwide suppression of the Order.

**I. Ignatius of Loyola**

The opening of their first school for lay students on the island of Sicily in 1548 is an important benchmark for the Jesuits. Only a few years beyond their official 1540 recognition as a religious order in the Roman Catholic Church, their founder, Ignatius of Loyola (1491-1556), would not live another full decade. Yet, at his death in 1556, his leadership and his already globally networked organization had founded 35 schools. Less than 50 years later and at the century’s end, the number of schools tallied at 245.337 By 1773, when papal decree suppressed the Society of Jesus world-round, the organization was administering nearly 800 schools internationally.338 The explosion of schools – “[our] world had never seen before nor has it seen since such an immense network of educational institutions operating on an international basis”339 – and a plan that helped to govern such an institutional expanse, looks to an earlier and actual explosion to explain its origins.

In 1521, an explosive critically, and almost fatally, wounded Ignatius of Loyola. A cannon ball shattered his right leg while he was defending the city of Pamplona from French...

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339 Ibid.
invasion. Born Íñigo López de Loyola, he was raised in a noble life of “wealth, prestige, and influence . . . [and] apparently destined to enjoy the extravagant life of a courtier.”

In Pamplona where Ignatius was felled, opposing troops reportedly nursed him – though crudely, biographers indicate – and let him be carried by stretcher by his soldier-comrades not an insignificant distance to the family castle in Spain’s Basque region. At home in Azpeitia in the district of Guipúzcoa, Ignatius convalesced, and in the process – delayed by Ignatius’s self-conscious demand to re-break and better set (for appearance) the broken bones in his leg – experienced a conversion.

For those who know about Ignatius and the Jesuits, it is commonplace knowledge that he generally preferred to read romantic and chivalric stories in his youth and that the fantasies informed the dreams he enjoyed of his own future life. Ignatius harbored ambitions for feats of arms and chivalry, interests in fine clothes and his personal appearance, and romantic episodes. He manifested certain characteristics: a desire for worldly praise and glory, eagerness to distinguish himself by daring or even reckless deeds against odds, and tenacity in reaching an objective once he had decided upon it.

Amadis de Gaul (1508), an immensely popular sixteenth century Spanish work in the genre of knight-errantry that is later parodied by Miguel de Cervantes (1547-1616) in his history-making publication, Don Quixote (1605), had personally been for Ignatius fuel for the imaginative fire. But at the time of his healing, only spiritual and religious books were available, the four volume set of Ludolph of Saxony’s (c.1300-1378) Vita Christi (1374) and one of the volumes of Jacobus de Voragine’s (c.1230-1298) Flos Sanctorum (c. 1260), a biographical section detailing the lives


of Christian saints.\textsuperscript{343} Both publications feature prominently in Ignatius’s life thereafter. In particular, the latter of the two transformed the vivid ways he had been imaging the exotic and adventurous life of a knight. Now he was suddenly impressed with the lives of Francis of Assisi (c.1181-1226) and Dominic de Guzmán (1170-1221) – heroes of a different kind – and their impact on humanity.

Founders, respectively, of the Roman Catholic religious orders of the Franciscans and the Dominicans (the Order of Preachers), Francis and Dominic manifested through their lives notable dimensions of basic charity, generosity, determination, and intelligence with tremendous public influence. Francis’s dedication to the poor, sick, and destitute, and Dominic’s smart and persuasive preaching, seized Western Christendom with new expressions of Christian living. Their movements animated specific values of Christian scriptural writings, particularly from the four canonical Gospel books. Each individual attracted women and men into their orders in large numbers. Moreover, each man was sainted, as were particular women and men who joined their organizations and who also became notable for their lives of service. Already at the time of Ignatius’s convalescence the organizations, and the memories of the men who founded them, had been operative for over three centuries. At the end of Charles Taylor’s \textit{A Secular Age} (2007), when Taylor presses for examples of fullness beyond the phenomenal epiphanies of Bede Griffiths (1906-1993) and Vaclav Havel (1936-2011) as mentioned in the first chapter of this dissertation, he turns to Francis and Francis’ ability to participate in and associate (internally, and communally, as discussed) through the dynamic of \textit{agape}.\textsuperscript{344}

\textsuperscript{343} Dalmases, \textit{Ignatius of Loyola}, 43.

In his autobiography (dictated to Juan Alfonso de Polanco at the end of his life and written, thus, in the third person), Ignatius, mending from his cannon ball injury and pensive, explains that he increasingly realized that his dreams of romance and chivalry reflected dimensions of immaturity. Excessive personal grooming, a desire for fame, and sexual promiscuity are implicitly recognized in his autobiography as the motivating goals in his life. It is reported that as he continued to assess goals like these he felt “dry and dissatisfied.”\textsuperscript{345} He continued to think of Francis and Dominic, however, and increasingly wanted to emulate their lives and impress others as positively and pervasively.

One biographer challenges his readers to see a profound dynamic at work in the life of Ignatius.

Within his soul there was a force that pressed him to go beyond himself. Of course, a person can be easily deceived by the illusion of wanting to be a saint, because romanticizing about sanctity is a most pleasing experience; however, a conceptual or aesthetic brand of narcissism does not always have the power to change us.\textsuperscript{346} Also, it should be noted that his autobiography describes the serious and personal work – in a medieval milieu – of self-reflection taking place: “interrupting his reading, he sometimes stopped to think about the things he had read . . . Thus he pondered over many things that he found good.”\textsuperscript{347}

The personal conversion of 1521, then, well depicts the seeds of what would flourish as the Society of Jesus, the Jesuits. Moreover, events in the years to follow, such as his time spent in the Spanish Benedictine monastery of Our Lady of Montserrat, a longer period of time living


\textsuperscript{347} Loyola, \textit{The Autobiography}, 70.
in a cave in nearby Manresa on the Cardoner River, and a pilgrimage to Jerusalem, influence the ways he regards his own sense of self, how he interacts with others, his writings, his spiritual life, and later decisions about the Jesuit order. Moreover, almost as soon as he left behind his chivalric life he was genuinely regarded as a pilgrim not only for literally walking so much of Europe then and in the years to follow but also for representing, and eventually promulgating in his writings, a modern sensibility of interiority. For instance, he offered tools for naming and evaluating personal desires, discerning life options, and appreciating and renewing sources of joy and excitement. The internal focus helped instantiate the habits of reflection and inquiry, and they represent the searching dispositions of pilgrim hearts, minds, and souls.348

For this dissertation, however, Jean Lacouture offers an important insight. He does not disregard the convalescence and the consequent change-of-life, nor the travels and encounters which follow, but he indicates that the real conversion in Ignatius’s life, the major turning point, took place when, in 1524, he decided to study.349 The decision to do so seems to have been sparked by a mere inclination, but it also represented a practical assessment by Ignatius to better actualize his own desire to speak and preach publicly, and, generally, to enhance his influence on others with both skills and proper ecclesial credentials.350 But something else was at work.

An early convalescent-conversion hope of Ignatius to go and stay in Jerusalem for the rest of his life had deteriorated. Not long after arriving in a city geographically and historically significant to some of the world’s major religions, let alone his, he was evicted from the locale

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348 Educational philosopher David Hansen explains an educational sensibility of “intellectual, ethical, and aesthetic journeying” right where one is, an ability or orientation that is referenced later in this dissertation in my pedagogies of fullness. See David T. Hansen, The Teacher and the World: A Study of Cosmopolitanism as Education (New York: Routledge, 2011), 2.


350 Idígors, Ignatius of Loyola, 227.
by wardens of the Christian sites and monuments for religious zealotry. Disallowed to remain in
the Holy Land, Ignatius went back to Europe, returning to the continent at the Italian port of
Venice, which he immediately departed for Spain. In Barcelona, where he was able to receive
patronage, he enrolled in school to study basic grammar. Two years later he moved to Alcalá,
where, at the historic university there, he studied, though reportedly haphazardly, a problem
representative not of his habits but of the *modus Italicus* (an educational model to be discussed
shortly). In Alcalá he also lived with and assisted infirmed patients in their daily routines.
Scuffles with authorities of the Roman Catholic Church through the Spanish Inquisition
propelled him on to Salamanca to another prominent educational institution, the University of
Salamanca. There, too, coursework was disorganized, and authorities of the church were even
less accommodating. Frustrated with unstructured schooling and, again, the Inquisition, he left
Spain and literally walked toward France.  

Lacouture, convinced that Paris was more profound yet for Ignatius and his worldview,
explains that Ignatius, gimp from his battle wound at Pamplona, “limped toward what we now
know as humanism.”  

A good education – and the credentials that came with it – was still an
important objective of Ignatius, and he knew that the University of Paris was then Europe’s best
institution of higher learning. Biographer Cándido de Dalmases describes Ignatius’s hunch that
studies in Paris, per reputation, as well as by experience at Alcalá and Salamanca, would demand
seriousness of purpose, offer a meaningful curricular structure, and require a focused discipline


for navigating degree requirements. In heading there, however, “our gaunt sack-cloth-clad pilgrim was leaving behind the Middle Ages and entering the new world of the Renaissance.”

II. *Modus Parisiensis*

Through a course of seven years, Ignatius formally enrolled in three different colleges of the University of Paris and achieved a Bachelor of Arts degree in the humanities (1532), a Licentiate of Arts degree in philosophy (1533), a Master of Arts degree in philosophy (1534), and credentials in theology (1535). Philippe Lécrivain’s recent book, *Paris in the Time of Ignatius of Loyola, 1528-1535* (2011), describes the streets, academic buildings, boarding houses, educational programs and more utilized by Ignatius, including the pedagogical, philosophical, and theological atmospheres of the university and of France generally, and this in comparison with European Christendom around them.

Upon arriving in Paris in 1528, Ignatius enrolled at the Collège de Montaigu. “Notoriously harsh” and the alma mater of notables John Calvin (1509-1564), Desiderius Erasmus (1466-1536), and François Rabelais (1494-1553), Ignatius, 37, studied a course of elementary humanities side-by-side with young boys. The school was founded in 1314 by Giles Aicelin de Montaigu, the Archbishop of Rouen, and originally named Collège des Aicelin. Pierre Aicelin de Montaigu inherited patronage for the institution in 1388 and changed the name to its current remembrance. It earned distinction much later, however, through Jan Standonck

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(1453-1504) who was named school-master in 1483.\textsuperscript{357} Standonck rebuilt the school from a state of ruin, implemented programmatic reforms – exceptional in comparison not just with other educational programs in Europe, but also with neighboring colleges in Paris themselves – and established thereafter its “rigid and ascetic” reputation.\textsuperscript{358} His successor in 1504, Noël Béda, endorsed Standonck’s reforms and issued in 1509 new statutes yet, representing and bolstering a long-practiced educational methodology of repetition and recitation, but adding to it new humanist elements. Particularly in its Standonck flavor, Erasmus and Rabelais famously satirized the program in their classic works, respectively, \textit{In Praise of Folly} (1509) and \textit{Pantagruel} (1532).\textsuperscript{359}

While Ronald Modras refers to the Collège de Montaigu as a “bastion of scholastic intransigence,” Lécrivain focuses upon an educational program that was pioneering.\textsuperscript{360} For the first time in any college of its kind, students – in accord with Béda’s 1509 statutes – were grouped together with others of similar educational experience and knowledge; hence Ignatius’ placement with young beginners. Students only advanced to more difficult levels after completing tests and demonstrating mastery of subject matters at hand, a succession at Montaigu that began with Latin grammar and ended in the study and practice of rhetoric.

Moreover, student groupings by ability and experience were further divided into smaller sections of ten. As Montaigu arranged students into appropriate levels of instruction and offered

\textsuperscript{357} Dalmases, \textit{Ignatius of Loyola}, 108; and Hyma, \textit{The Christian Renaissance}, 245.


\textsuperscript{359} Dalmases, \textit{Ignatius of Loyola}, 108.

an ascending pattern of advancement, it also introduced a subdividing system of *decuriae* (literally, ten) whereby students studied and interacted with one another more intentionally. Through the special appointment of one of them as a *decurio*, some students exercised leadership roles that helped guide their classmates.\(^{361}\) Besides introducing a system of graduation through examinations, a strategic division of classes, and a student prefect, Montaigu also instituted a note-taking program for personally registering newly learned vocabulary, in particular.\(^{362}\)

Gabriel Codina looks closely at the Collège de Montaigu in its Standonck-Béda years and notes a decisive influence upon it by the Brethren of the Common Life. A popular fourteenth century lay Christian spiritual movement of individuals, the members of the Brethren lived commonly and simply in communal settings and devoted their lives to pious practices. Through Standonck, Montaigu offered students a form of religious instruction enjoyed by the Brethren, *Devotio Moderna*.\(^{363}\) A trademark feature of the group, *Devotio Moderna* – or, new devotion – was developed and propagated by the group’s founder, Gerard Groote (1340-1383), a graduate of the University of Paris who was a critic of scholasticism.\(^{364}\) Groote’s method facilitated imaginative practices of scenes from Christian scriptures. Practitioners were encouraged to vividly imagine scenes in Gospel pericopes and to engage the teachings, healings, meetings, and such, through their own conceptions and sense perceptions. *Devotio Moderna* offered an imaginative practice that allowed for deeply personal investment but also cultivated a possibility

\(^{361}\) Codina, “Modus Parisiensis,” 36.

\(^{362}\) Ibid., 43.

\(^{363}\) Ibid.

for best imitating Christian living in its original expressions. As Codina notes affinities between the Brethren and Montaigu through the *decuriae / decurio* system, for instance, the deployment of *Devotio Moderna* at Montaigu – a practice that originated with the Brethren – was adapted and implemented in a pedagogical context. Students, through an exposure to *pietas litterata*, were encouraged to practice aspects of the *Devotio* in order to vividly and personally imagine persons and expressions of Christian living, to be impacted by them, and to emulate such examples in their own lives.

Nonetheless, the scholastic flavor was prominent. In 1509, when Erasmus publishes *The Praise of Folly*, he suspects – like Pier Paolo Vergerio (1370-1444) a century and a half before him – that something has gone terribly awry in education. He likewise indicts scholastic methods and content as the main culprit. He wonders, for instance, what happened with a cultivation of practical knowledge that would better help individuals navigate the tasks and toils of daily life. One scholar suggests that his criticism of scholasticism can be summarized in three problems: a method of ceaseless questioning, an eventual obsession with esoteric theological analysis, and a lack of correspondence between theological issues and the lives of theologians asking the questions. Erasmus looks back to Montaigu, to Standonck’s scholastic rigidities of recitation and repetition of questions, and he thinks not of classrooms, but “sweatshops” and “torture chambers” where boys, herded through lessons of Latin diction, cowered, literally, under the blows of “rods, switches, and straps” at every slight mispronunciation or grammatical

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365 Ibid., 164.

366 Codina, “Modus Parisiensis,” 42-44.

Criticizing scholastic grammarians, Erasmus describes that “what makes them [happy] is a certain strange conviction they harbor about their learning. Though in fact most of them pound nothing but sheer nonsense into the boys’ heads, still, by all the gods! how they look down their noses even at Palaemon and Donatus,” mythical and real classic experts in elocution.369

And yet, at the time of Erasmus’ writing, the ill-remembered scholastic intransigence (as characterized by Modras above) was receding. Montaigu, already introducing new educational elements to its program did indeed maintain an older methodology, but with an implementation of new elements which structured classrooms accordingly and sought to meet the educational needs of students, it also offered content which would come to be recognized as distinctly humanist. One source stresses at least one strident humanist dimension. It agrees that Montaigu perpetuated scholastic problems deplored by Erasmus and Rabelais, but it also explains that, eventually, in their programs of student progression and evaluation, Montaigu and other colleges were exceptionally personal. “The student’s progress from one intellectual plateau to the next depended more on the individual’s own capacity to learn than on systematic lockstep movement from a lower grade to the higher.”370 An older method and its ability to accommodate new organizational features – including new content – through literature, for instance – was impressionable upon Ignatius, as were the significant personal gestures of such a pedagogy.371


369 Ibid.


371 Hansen describes a rich dynamic of loyalty to traditions and a simultaneous reflective openness to new possibilities that is insightful. See Hansen, *The Teacher and the World*, 11, 40, and 70.
It is in the year to follow, however, in a different school, the Collège de Sainte-Barbe, where humanism would impact Ignatius more profoundly. “To get from Montaigu to Sainte-Barbe,” Lécrivain explains, “there was just one street to cross, the Rue Saint-Symphorien. But, in reality as in spirit, choosing to study at the latter college was to accept entering, if not into a new world . . . at least into a universe where there was [even] more openness to innovation.”

Five of the first colleague-friends of Ignatius who would eventually form the Jesuit order studied at Sainte-Barbe with Ignatius. Likewise, it was in such a school – in “the Barbiste tradition” – at the Collège de Guyenne – where an important Renaissance humanist, Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592), studied.

Historians note that by 1517, the humanist educational movement that began in Italy through the likes of Vergerio over a hundred years earlier had finally penetrated the Parisian programs, and that the Collège de Sainte-Barbe – where, by Ignatius’ time, “a great wind of freedom prevailed” – most readily and fully embraced new curricular perspectives. Allan P. Farrell explains that “[w]hat actually took place at [Sainte-Barbe] was a remodeling of the curriculum in order to make the classics in very fact the foundation of the higher studies.” Again, as with Vergerio, Sainte-Barbe refashioned the content of its studies to lessen its concentration upon the study of logic and skillfulness in dialectics and to offer, alternatively, greater contact with ancient Greek and Roman literature and rhetorical expression. Student

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373 Codina, “Modus Parisiensis,” 45.


discourse focused less on argument and more on eloquence. A Vergerian correlation is indeed recognizable. Argument and eloquence were regarded not just for their tenors of speaking, but for the kinds of issues they dwelled upon and the personal and relational perspectives they represented.

The adaptation of humanist perspectives at the University of Paris portrays on the one hand an older and in many ways resistive medieval mindset that gave the university its original institutional impetus and, on the other, a Renaissance humanist outlook that hoped to both restore Ancient sentiments and implement new educational practices. John W. O’Malley explains that two institutions, one represented by the medieval university and the other by humanist education instituted per Vergerio’s influence at primary and secondary schools, “were confronting and trying to accommodate each other.”377 But another distinction more geographical in nature is also telling.

Two educational systems – one at Paris and the other at work throughout Italy and Spain – imply incentives and intentions of their own. Oppositional in many ways to one another, they are known as the *modus Parisiensis* and the *modus Italicus*. Respectively, each model points to an originating institutional archetype represented by the University of Paris and the University of Bologna. The respective expectations and authoritative influences of professors and students manifest important distinctions. Paris generally represented a professor-centered educational model whereas Bologna generally represented a student-centered educational model. For instance, in Italian schools, students invited willing and waiting professors to offer their teachings, and they paid them – if at all – in accord with the services rendered. Students lived and studied without their oversight, and they maintained significant dimensions of power in

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negotiating their educational needs, which, in the Italian context, prioritized professional training. Hastings Rashdall’s monumental work, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages* (1895), cites Bologna and Salerno for preeminence, respectively, in law and medicine.

Paris, on the other hand, was recognized for theological expertise. There, at Paris, unlike in the Italian schools, students sought after and paid professors for the learning they offered, and professors themselves, much more in control, determined the time, place, and content of their courses. Students would go to their professors for classes, and eventually lived in nearby boarding houses or even on the same premises. A unified expression of this educational style was implemented in 1452 when a more centralized system of authority placed a governing matrix over all of the Parisian colleges. Codina explains that, “[i]n a sense the whole city functioned as a great school, moving together from the sound of the Angelus in the morning, through to the evening, following the same rhythm of hours, calendar, rules, practices, customs, religious and student celebrations, and general style of life.”

The general differences between the *modus Parisiensis* and the *modus Italicus* are telling. Per the strategies newly implemented by Montaigu and experienced by Ignatius, the *modus Parisiensis* offered order, regularity, and discipline, dynamics already quite different than those Ignatius struggled with in the Italian influenced universities at Alcalá and Salamanca. The *modus Italicus* that he knew offered exceptional flexibility for students, regardless of preparedness and experience, to take classes and pursue subjects as desired. “Each [college] set up its own requirements, and the methods of teaching varied in large measure according to

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379 Ibid., 33.

the taste and capabilities of individual schoolmasters. What system of teaching there was, consisted of an adaptation of the prevailing . . . practice of holding public lectures open to” any student of any age.  

While programming at the Collège de Montaigu and the Collège de Sainte-Barbe, as well as the lectures on the theology of Thomas Aquinas at the Dominican convent on rue Saint-Jacques, facilitated a decisive scholastic atmosphere, the humanist hue was bright. More emphatically, Lacouture says that in Ignatius’ educational years, “the world grew fast, and humanity stepped to center stage.” Ignatius had personally witnessed, explains another, “the final phase of the change from the old to the new education, which was in a sense the translation from Medievalism to the Renaissance.” In Ignatius’ educational experience at Paris – one that was for him so much better than the initial educational forays at Barcelona, Alcalá, and Salamanca – the modus Parisiensis was both scholastic and Renaissance humanist: it was old methods of repetition and recitation; new methods of imagination; fixed and exhaustive schedules; specific placement and gradual ascent; examinations and individualized assessment; the subjects of the trivium and quadrivium in Ciceronian studia humanitatis; and first century classics and thirteenth century Aquinas.

The practices of the two prototypes merged to form a new one. Ignatius and those individuals around him who formed the Jesuit order were educated by the best of what Europe then offered. In the generations to follow they would build an educational enterprise of their

382 Lacouture, Jesuits, 4.
own. In doing so they would endorse, imitate, and globally disseminate the scholastic-Renaissance humanist essence of the *modus Parisiensis*.

**III. Documentation and Dissemination of Jesuit Education**

While the opening of Collegio di San Niccoló in Messina in 1548 is a defining moment for Jesuit education, it is not without precedent. After the official approval of the Society of Jesus in 1540 by Pope Paul III (1468-1549), the Jesuits, one of the first non-monastic religious orders in the history of the church began attracting members in large numbers.\(^{384}\) Fifteen hundred had joined by the time of Ignatius’s death.

From the personal experience of the founders, the Jesuits knew the importance of good education and they looked for ways to similarly educate their own new recruits. Moreover, almost as instantly as the group was formally established, it began its intercontinental mission. Francis Xavier (1506-1552), a roommate of Ignatius at the Collège de Sainte-Barbe beginning in 1529, departed Rome and the European continent less than a year after the Order was instituted. His travels to India and Japan, and his death on the shores of China (on the island of Sancian), memorialized his name to present-day recognition.

Education was not to be a primary focus of the Order, let alone one of its ministries, so Ignatius and his advisors first looked for established programs to use in educating their new members. Sending recruits to Paris was the preferred option, so the Jesuits established there in 1541, briefly, a residence of Jesuit students (referred to as “scholastics”). Instability in the city, religious inhospitality at the University of Paris, lack of funding, and renewed political conflict

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\(^{384}\) As non-monastic, the Jesuits, formally, the Society of Jesus, became an officially chartered religious organization of Roman Catholicism that is was not obligated to traditional communal patterns of life and long-practiced routines of the Divine Office (or Psalter), nor were their members geographically or physically bound to cloistered residences.
made the early Jesuits’ *alma mater* unfeasible as a place for establishing a scholastic residential program. Instead, the Jesuit scholastics were sent on to Louvain, Belgium.\(^{385}\)

Per memories of Ignatius’s own experience in, namely, Alcalá and Salamanca, the exceptional education of the first Jesuits at Paris, and, now, after 1540, from experiences with other options, the Jesuits were highly discouraged. In the *modus Italicus*, the university at Padua where even other scholastics were sent to study was particularly disappointing, so Jesuit superiors there and elsewhere began to substantiate existing programs or establish new ones. In *The First Jesuits* (1993), O’Malley explains that in the early years there were seven institutions for scholastics, Jesuit college-residences at Alcalá, Coimbra, Cologne, Louvain, Paris (as mentioned), Padua, and Valencia, established residences of scholastics of the Order near universities where the scholastics could study in existing university programs as well as ones within their own quarters.\(^{386}\) The efforts at Padua lead to a description of ideals, rules, and practices in the *Constituciones Collegii Patavini* [*Constitutions of the College of Padua*] (1545) by Juan Alfonso de Polanco (1517-1576). It was one of the first of the Jesuits’ own educational treatises and a document which formally endorses the *modus Parisiensis* enjoyed by Ignatius and his colleagues at Montaigu and Sainte-Barbe. It was preceded only by *Fundacion de Colegio* [*Foundations of a College*] (1541), a Spanish-written document instructing the process of establishing the ill-fated program for the new Jesuits who had been sent to Paris.\(^{387}\)

As the Jesuits became educationally involved with their own new members in programs throughout Europe, they also found themselves around the same time becoming publicly


\(^{386}\) Ibid.

\(^{387}\) Padberg, “Development of the *Ratio Studiorum*,” 81.
engaged in schools in Spain, at Gandía, and in India, at Goa. Because of their own educational pedigree, their great appreciation for education, and an interest in educating their new members and others, the early Jesuits began teaching in established schools and offering structure and substance to deficient programs. In Gandía, through the influence and patronage of its Duke, Francis Borgia (1510-1572) – a close descendent of the infamous Borgia Pope, Alexander VI (1431-1503), and soon to be a Jesuit himself – the Jesuits were particularly successful. Progress by the Jesuits there gained the recognition of Paul III who, in 1546, designated the institution at Gandía a *studium generale*, a term authorizing university status. The following year, Paul III issued an exceptional permission to the Jesuit order. His decree, the papal bull *Licet Debitum* (1547), allowed an unparalleled privilege throughout Christendom: any Jesuit, anywhere, was authorized to teach any subject.\(^{388}\)

The assistance Jesuits offered at Gandía, as well as their educational endeavors in Italy and India, manifested educational agility and interest and propelled the Jesuits, through the invitation of Paul III, to establish the Collegio di San Niccoló. The leader of the small and reportedly talented delegation to Sicily, Jerónimo Nadal (1507-1580), founded in the same year another school in nearby Palermo. In that year and the one to follow, the Jesuits, moreover, assumed full responsibility for the school they had been assisting in Goa, St. Paul’s College, and started new institutions in Naples and Venice. However, almost as soon as Nadal, also an alumnus of the University of Paris, disembarked in Sicily and took steps to establish San Niccoló at Messina, he composed a new educational document for the Order, *Constitutiones Collegii Messanensis* [*Constitutions of the College of Messina*] (1548). The document is significant because it specifically and officially endorsed for the Jesuits the *modus Parisiensis*. This

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document – “one of the seminal documents in Jesuit education”³⁸⁹ – also demonstrates direct lineage leading to the development and publication of the definitive 1599 *Ratio Studiorum.*

Nadal wrote the *Constitutiones Collegii Messanensis* in two parts, the first dealing explicitly with the character formation of students, the second pertaining to academics, such as courses and the like. In the spirit of the *modus Parisiensis,* the curriculum offered courses of the *trivium* for younger and beginning students and, for students able and prepared for higher studies, courses of the *quadrivium.*³⁹⁰ Nadal was already reflecting what would emerge as a system of education in primary, secondary, and tertiary levels. Also, Nadal’s ability as a pedagogue and an educational administrator was noted by Ignatius who requested of Nadal a more comprehensive and detailed educational document explaining, for instance, the scheduling of classes, effective teaching methods, educational exercises, and useful course materials. Nadal delegated the task of writing the new, more specified treatise to his Jesuit colleague at Messina, Annibal Coudret (1525-1599), who penned *De Ratione Studiorum Collegii Messanensis [Plan of Studies for the College at Messina]* (1551). Beyond the administrative details of establishing and running a school, Coudret’s document, the first by the Jesuits to be entitled a “ratio,” persisted the Jesuits’s interest in a structured and purposeful program concerned with both the individual needs of students and coursework in the humanities.

Knowing the accomplishments of Nadal, Coudret, and their colleagues at Messina, Ignatius – seriously invested in the success of the recently founded Roman College near him, “the darling of his enterprise in education”³⁹¹ – used the *De Ratione Studiorum Collegii*


³⁹⁰ Ibid., 68.

³⁹¹ Ibid., 69.
Messanensis as an early template in Jesuit education for teachers working in the Roman College (1551) as well as in new Jesuit schools being founded in Germany, France, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, Austria, Bohemia, and Poland.

IV. The Ratio Studiorum and the Role of “Study”

The Ratio atque Institutio Studiorum Societatis Iesu [The Official Plan for Jesuit Education] (1599) reflects, then, a fifty-year process. As the earlier documents generated by Coudret, Nadal, and Polanco led to its genesis, the publication of De Ratio et Ordine Studiorum Collegii Romani [The Plan and Order of Study of the Roman College] (1579), commissioned by then Superior General of the Order, the former Duke of Gandia, Borgia, and written by Jesuit Diego de Ledesma, reveals the clearest resemblance of the later definitive Ratio. Also referred to as the Ratio Borgiana, the nascent 1579 edition, as well as the final 1599 version, hoped to offer a useful and informative pedagogical and administrative matrix for Jesuit education in international dispersion that could at the same time be identifiable with the flagship Jesuit institution in Rome.

O’Malley explains that, at the end of the sixteenth century, “the Jesuits had had enough experience in education to try to codify their methods and ideals, and they did so by producing the famous Ratio Studiorum, or plan of studies,” a document that offered guidance in establishing and running schools around the world for four hundred years. He refers to it as “a codification of curricular, administrative, and pedagogical principles” which had the ability to assure and sustain proper educational quality in disparate geographical and cultural contexts.

Another scholar describes it as a set of job descriptions mirroring the modus Parisiensis. The

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393 Ibid.
core of the document is “none other than a collection of thirty series of rules corresponding to
distinct offices, counting no less than 467 articles.”\textsuperscript{394} Another yet explains that the \textit{Ratio}, “to
put it in its simplest term, was a handbook on how to teach . . . first and foremost, the \textit{Ratio} is a
manual of practice on how to conduct a class.”\textsuperscript{395} Finally, and more succinctly, the historian
Philip Gleason calls the \textit{Ratio} a document of “exotic nomenclature.”\textsuperscript{396}

However it is described, George E. Ganss insists that it must be understood from its
sixteenth century context. “In nation upon nation there was a widespread lack of order and plan
in education. City upon city had no secondary or higher schools of importance; and in those
which existed in other cities, the organization was generally poor.”\textsuperscript{397} As Ganss cites a
widespread historical need for educational improvement and, at least at some level, a degree of
systematization, the qualitative aspect of what was being offered cannot be overlooked: “the
\textit{Ratio} contains a comprehensive design intended to ensure an immersion into classical culture,
mastery of material, quickness of mind, sensitivity to individual ability, and personal
discipline.”\textsuperscript{398}

Educational theorist Robert McClintock, though, offers a substantive insight about the
\textit{Ratio}. McClintock agrees with the administrative description of the \textit{Ratio} in establishing schools
and in endorsing a method of teaching. He recognizes, however, a recurring educational practice
in the \textit{Ratio} that, in his estimation, is not characterized by instruction, per se, or specific learning

\textsuperscript{394} Codina, “Modus Parisiensis,” 34.
\textsuperscript{395} Letson and Higgins, \textit{The Jesuit Mystique}, 141.
\textsuperscript{397} Ganss, \textit{Saint Ignatius's Idea of a Jesuit University}, 213.
\textsuperscript{398} Letson and Higgins, \textit{The Jesuit Mystique}, 143.
objectives, a pedagogical technique often wrongly associated with the *Ratio*. More personally, the *Ratio* offers a program of “study.” Study, “a word that recurs over and over” in the *Ratio*, is referenced by McClintock as the treatise’s ethos. As the *Ratio* constantly encourages study, it also describes a helpful demeanor for engaging it; its virtuous benefits; its relationship to the common good; and the need, even, to take breaks from it.

As the personal and communal merits of study are discussed, so too is the kind of teaching that occurs in such a program; in part, the *Ratio* dictates what seems to be a pedagogy of inspiration. McClintock describes the general style of a Jesuit teacher as “hortatory and heuristic, rather than didactic.” Jesuit teachers, O’Malley similarly says, “tried to influence their students more by their example than by their words.” In doing so, McClintock explains that the Jesuits, per their *Ratio* – that is, through the kind of studying and teaching it facilitated – encouraged in their students a personally integrating, self-reflective dynamic.

In a humanist regard for character development and virtuous living, and a Modern philosophical ability to reflect personally and existentially, study offers a tool for self-formation that can be employed throughout the course of one’s life. McClintock explains that

> [s]tudy itself is neither a single path nor the final goal; it is the motivating power by which men form and impose their character upon their role in life. Through study each man reaches out to the resources of nature, faith, and reason, to select from them as best

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399 Robert McClintock, “Toward a Place for Study in a World of Instruction,” *Teachers College Record* 73, 2 (1971), 176.

400 *The Ratio Studiorum: The Official Plan for Jesuit Education*, trans. Claude Pavur (St. Louis: The Institute of Jesuit Sources, 2005), 189 [§434], 190 [§435], 192 [§443,444], 200 [§475].

401 Ibid., 48 [§129].

402 McClintock, “Toward a Place for Study in a World of Instruction,” 176.


404 McClintock, “Toward a Place for Study in a World of Instruction,” 161.
seems to suit his situation and to develop powers by which he can turn the accidents of

time, place, and station into a work of achieved intention.405

As Erasmus represents McClintock’s description of study, McClintock’s real hero is
Michel de Montaigne, a Renaissance humanist philosopher who, in writing numerous
freethinking and self-reflective compositions across a limitless range of topics in his Essays, first published in 1580, introduced a decisively modernist philosophical method. Montaigne and René Descartes (1596-1650) were discussed in the first chapter of this dissertation through Stephen Toulmin’s Cosmopolis (1990). Moreover, Montaigne was named above as a student of the humanist “Barbiste tradition.” Here, in regard to McClintock’s discussion, Descartes’s era-altering focus upon the individual self, and slightly before him, Montaigne’s reflecting and writing, display a philosophically game-changing subjective turn. Montaigne’s method, “to assay,” as in “to try,” demonstrated through the essays, is an exemplary expression of McClintock’s study. Montaigne’s essaying is a self-exploring, self-empowering, self-determining philosophical activity akin with the ideals of study preserved and promulgated in the Jesuit Ratio and is further discussed in the final chapter of this thesis. Aldo Scaglione, author of The Liberal Arts and the Jesuit College System (1986), voices a similar comparison. Endorsing McClintock and citing Montaigne, but specific about the rhetorical dimension of Jesuit humanist pedagogy, Scaglione says that Jesuit education functioned “for the purpose of Bildung rather than sheer instruction, formation of the mind and personal character rather than erudition, following what could be referred to as Montaigne’s . . . idea of education.”406

405 Ibid., 165.

V. “Part IV” of the Jesuit Constitutions and the Mandate to Adapt

As Ganss suggests the importance for knowing the historical context of the Ratio, one that reveals a generally haphazard and anemic pan-European educational milieu, McClintock points to humanist and modernist philosophic outlooks. But Ganss offers a further encouragement, one that is also reflected in the Erasmus-McClintock conception of study. Ganss reports that the Ratio is ancillary to an earlier educational document of the Jesuits, “Part IV” of the Constitutions of the Society of Jesus.  

In 1547 Ignatius, assisted by his secretary and “autobiographer,” Polanco, the author of the treatise for the scholastics’s educational program at Padua, commenced an organized formulation of the Constitutions (ratified in 1558). Resembling the codes and strictures of the Collège de Montaigu at the University of Paris, it articulates the ideals, structures of governance, and basic rules of the Society of Jesus. “Part IV,” the educational content of the Constitutions, was inspired by Nadal, also an author of earlier educational treatises for the Jesuits. As Nadal had delegated Coudret in 1551 to write the fuller ratio of his constituciones of the inaugural Messina program, Nadal simultaneously composed De Studii Generalis Dispositione et Ordine [A University or a Studium Generale], much of which impacted and shaped the composition of “Part IV.” The value of study in forming persons and impacting the common good is discussed, as are encouragements to safeguard study and learning from distractions, such as through spiritual “mortifications,” lengthy prayers, time-consuming meditations, and even

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407 Ganss, Saint Ignatius’s Idea of a Jesuit University, 211.
408 Codina, “Modus Parisiensis,” 44.
obligations and activities which entice students away from the work of study. However, Ganss’s encouragement to regard the Constitutions – “it deserves to rank as a classic of . . . educational philosophy” – as a precursor and foundation of the Ratio focuses on a crucial dynamic in “Part IV,” a mandate of adaptability. Educational programs and personnel involved in such programs were to be astute about both the particular socio-cultural contexts wherein they worked and the students they were working with.

Jesuit education, then, established and administered on a global scale by the guidance of the Ratio Studiorum, was, per the Constitutions, to be mindful and respectful of differing cultures and conditions. Ignatius “was strongly insistent on the adaptability of his regulations to times, places, and persons. Expressions such as ‘especially in these times’ and ‘consideration should be given . . . to persons, times, and places’ occur with great frequency” in the fourth part. Some examples of what this adaptation pertains to include the general implementation of a curriculum, the assessment of individual students, whether Latin should be spoken, the appropriateness of lecturing, and even how and when to do personal study.

However, as the stamp of adaptability demarcates the educational work of the Jesuits, it went further. Howard Gray explains that, beyond “Part IV,” the Constitutions as a whole facilitates an “education in attention, reverence, and devotion” for all aspects of life and work.

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411 Ganss, Saint Ignatius's Idea of a Jesuit University, 207.

412 Ibid., 79.

413 The Constitutions of the Society of Jesus and Their Complementary Norms, 144 [§343.B], 150 [§351.1], 160 [§382.K], 180 [§455.A], and 182 [§462.5].

As educational programs were to be culturally and socially pliable, so were the Jesuits themselves. Ignatius, Gray says,

envisioned a group able to work on the frontiers of the Church and even in lands and enterprises that were not part of Christendom. In other words, the work of the Jesuits demanded capability and flexibility . . . [and specific elements of their training offered] ways to test the ability . . . to live this kind of life.\textsuperscript{415}

Not unlike Montaigne’s own style of assaying, training and formation for a life as a Jesuit offered (and still does) “experiments,” in Jesuit parlance, which assessed and stretched the emotional, intellectual, and spiritual plasticity of its members. An experience generally through the course of a month (mostly in silence) of the Spiritual Exercises, a residential assignment to a care facility to physically help patients or residents with daily needs, and an intentional period of traveling or journeying represent, respectively, the “long retreat,” the “hospital experiment,” and the “pilgrimage,” each assayed Jesuits in special ways.

In many ways, Terence (c.190-159 BCE), ancient Roman playwright, voices an apropos humanist sentiment, ‘Nothing human is foreign to me.’\textsuperscript{416} The \textit{Constitutions} instruct that “a deep and authentic involvement with . . . local culture should be fostered, according to regional differences, by sharing the life and experiences . . . and by trying to understand . . . cultures from within.”\textsuperscript{417} Contemporary translations of Terence reference the inappropriateness of harboring the prejudices of “nationalisms” or “particularisms” that mitigate an “openness toward different forms of cultures, diverse citizens, and differing mentalities.”\textsuperscript{418} Historian Kathleen Mahoney, author of \textit{Catholic Higher Education in Protestant America: The Jesuits and Harvard in the Age}

\textsuperscript{415} Ibid., 12. \textsuperscript{416} Modras, \textit{Ignatian Humanism}, 83 and 289. \textsuperscript{417} \textit{The Constitutions of the Society of Jesus and Their Complementary Norms}, 171 [100]. \textsuperscript{418} Ibid., 171-72 [111].
of the University (2003), remarks that the “balance struck between the structure of the Ratio Studiorum and the flexibility encouraged by the Constitutions served the peripatetic Jesuits immensely well, whether in the courts of China, the jungles of Latin America, or frontier outposts along the Mississippi.” But another nod toward Montaigne is necessary, especially per the ancient adage of Terence.

As McClintock explains an important affinity between Montaigne and Jesuit education through the dynamic of study, its inward focus attests to an outward variant. If practices of introspection, reflection, and discernment explored and befriended dimensions of subjectivity, an affable curiosity of the world around corresponded. This is partly what Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984), at the end of the first chapter of this thesis, is trying to convey about the connection between the self and the social. Montaigne’s Travel Journal (1581) shows him tasting foods and enjoying and questioning the conventions and customs of foreign contexts, and his essay, “Of Cannibals” (1580), unmask a commonplace attitude toward difference and Montaigne’s own alternative disposition: “each man calls barbarism whatever is not his own practice; for indeed it seems we have no other test of truth and reason than the example and pattern of the opinions and customs of the country we live in.”

Cognizant of the need to be malleable and accommodating in foreign contexts, Gray dwells upon the dimension of personal experience in Jesuit education. He cites not only the Constitutions to make his case, and not only other writings, such as Ignatius’s Spiritual Exercises (1548), but Ignatius’s actual life – the accident in Pamplona, his convalescence, his failure in

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419 Kathleen A. Mahoney, Catholic Higher Education in Protestant America: The Jesuits and Harvard in the Age of the University (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 11.

Jerusalem, his studies in Paris – to amplify an astute regard in all things Jesuit for what it means to adjust and acclimatize oneself geographically, culturally, intellectually, and spiritually. Farrell is even more emphatic, citing the “exigencies of circumstance” and Ignatius’s ability to respond in effective and productive ways as a notable personal skill.  

In the realm of education, Joseph Daoust says, “Experience, both personal and of one’s society and culture, is to be taken seriously as the starting point of [Jesuit] education.” But Gans’s point – recognized at least implicitly by McClintock’s description of study in the Ratio – is the profoundly personal, cultural, and historical adaptability of Jesuit education itself, an adaptability which precedes and informs the understanding and implementation of the infamously codified Ratio Studiorum. In curricular terms, the humanist course-work prescribed by the Ratio for Jesuit schools cannot be “a static block of contents, but rather . . . a structured, engaged, dynamic, content-rich process involving the personalities of the teachers and the students.” Claude Pavur argues that the Ratio, a four-hundred-year-old document generally considered long outdated and, at times in the history of Jesuit education, restrictive and even arresting of the tradition itself, is in fact timely. Educators today, he laments, “have lost the skill of constructing a humanist curriculum architectonically.”

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424 Ibid.
VI. Ignatian Spiritual Exercises

Pavur is particularly helpful in comparing the Ratio with the Ignatius’s Spiritual Exercises. Written in the aftermath of his conversion and partly inspired by the reading of Ludolph of Saxony’s Vita Christi at the time of his convalescence, the Exercises was generally a work in progress during the Paris years and a bit after, but not published until 1548. Even in its earliest form, however, the insights of the Exercises were preached and taught publicly and privately by Ignatius and his increasing numbers of companions during his time in Paris (1528-1535). It is the Exercises that often attracted individuals – such as the colleagues at Paris – to join Ignatius and the emerging organization. It is also the contents of the Exercises which drew the ire of the Spanish Inquisition during Ignatius’s brief stays in Alcalá and Salamanca, and kept eyebrows askew even in Paris.

“One of the world’s most famous books, the Spiritual Exercises is] in that category one of the least read and least well understood.” Psychoanalyst Carl Jung (1875-1961) compares it with yoga and alchemy as one of three benchmark advances in the history of individuation and imagination. Albert Hyma describes it is the culminating gesture of the Christian Renaissance, a humanist movement whose origins Hyma locates in Groote and his Brethren of the Common Life and which later flourishes through institutions like the Collège de Montaigu. Pierre Hadot (1922-2010), discussed in the second chapter, describes its essence as resembling the spiritual exercises practiced in ancient Greece by the early schools of philosophy.


426 Kenneth L. Becker, Unlikely Companions: C. G. Jung on the Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius of Loyola: An Exposition and Critique Based on Jung’s Lectures and Writings (Herefordshire: Gracewing, 2001), 47-55.


One clear example of Hadot’s association to antiquity is through an imaginative exercise in Ignatius’s work that cultivates a cosmic vision of reality, what Hadot refers to as “a view from above.” Such a perspective, he explains, “leads us to consider the whole of human reality, in all its social, geographical, and emotional aspects, as an anonymous, swarming mass, and it teaches us to relocate human existence within the immeasurable dimensions of the cosmos.” Hadot further argues that the epic poetry of Homer offers views of the world through the eyes of the gods “who look down upon mankind’s battles and passions from the heights of the heavens of the mountaintops, without, however, being able to resist the temptation of intervening from time to time on behalf of one or the other.” Plato (c.424-347 BCE), as well as Cicero (106-43 BCE), Lucretius (c.99-55 BCE), Seneca (4 BCE-65), Marcus Aurelius (121-180), and Lucian (125-180), men known as Cynics, Epicureans, or Stoics, have their own versions of the view from above, and they also deal with impulses to intervene in positive and constructive ways for societies and persons.

Ignatius provides his through the Trinitarian gaze upon the world, an especially imaginative meditation which lets the practitioner of Ignatius’s Exercises see the world and, more pointedly, its inhabitants – “the old and the young, the rich and the poor, the happy and the sad, some being born and some being laid to rest” – from the cosmic vantage of the divine life.

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429 Ibid., 245.

430 Ibid., 239.

431 Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 238-250; and Sarah Bakewell, How to Live, Or, A Life of Montaigne: In One Question and Twenty Attempts at an Answer (New York: Other Press, 2010), 112.

(a trinity) of the Christian God. And as with the Homeric epics, as well as with the ancient philosophical ways, one is impelled to intervene in a certain manner.433

Ignatius’s *Spiritual Exercises*, more basically, is a manual of meditations offered in the forms of prayers, instructions, rules, scripture, and specific scenes from the life of Jesus that invite a deeply personal assessment of one’s own life, a process of discernment regarding options and possibilities, an opportunity for making a choice of existential import, and the cultivation of a graced worldview. Philip Endean describes the work as decisively modern. Let alone the sixteenth century ability to write, print, and disseminate treatises, the dimensions of interiority and autonomy in Ignatius’s work (recall Jung’s historic designation of the *Exercises* as well as Ignatius’s own abilities to reflect deeply about his own life during his convalescence) exude both a modern philosophic milieu ready to explore aspects of subjectivity and a Renaissance humanist regard for personal growth.434

The humanist aspect, furthermore – an essential ingredient of curricula in Jesuit education – is salient in the *Exercises* in its existential thrust. As Renaissance humanist educators sought to focus more upon the realities and complexities of daily life by turning educational efforts away from speculative truths to the real concerns of life, fifteenth century humanists were cultivating the dynamism of the *Spiritual Exercises* crafted by Ignatius. Like humanists, they essentially ask, “How ought I live my life?”435 But the introspection and


consequent decisions that may occur propel the practitioner beyond the specific concerns of her or his individual life to the conditions of the lives of others. As personal and existential as the meditations of the Exercises are, Gray laments how they have been disregarded as individualistic and isolating, and challenges scholars to recognize that the overall experience is “relentlessly oriented to the life one lives outside of solitude—in the arena of public life, to the future.”

Authors of The Jesuit Mystique (1995) agree:

That spirit of discernment, which in effect means the capacity to see with lucid self-knowledge what is necessary to be done, is not a rarefied spiritual skill. It is not cultivated in isolation from human commerce; it is refined with involvement in the all-too-human world of muck, muddle, and misery. It is a practical skill, a way of being in the world.

Such engagement of the world is what Daoust refers to as the “Ignatian Educational Paradigm,” a dynamic in the humanist tradition that hopes for a strong connection between a sense of personal eloquence and one’s surroundings. Dimensions of subjectivity and social engagement echo the Ciceronian ideal of individual virtuosity and communal investment, but the Jesuit expressions testify to more intimacy and intensity. Spiritual discernment and the Montaigne-McClintock dynamic of study burrow further into a self who cannot not be willing and able to positively engage the world around.

Pavur’s comparison of the Ratio and the Exercises cites six points of congruence, intersections that not only teach us more about the two documents themselves but also reinforce a humanist ethos of the Jesuit order. First, each treatise is noticeably pedagogical. For example, specific activities are prescribed. The Ratio stipulates of students a repetition of prose in a classroom context. The Exercises specifies for practitioners an imagination of a Gospel scene.

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437 Letson and Higgins, The Jesuit Mystique, 110.

Repetition was regarded by Ignatius as a strategy not for memorizing content and mechanically repeating it, but for interiorizing it and being informed by it. Second, in the spirit of the modus Parisiensis, both offer a program of advancement, that is, moving through culminating stages to a better, more informed, and enlightened place. Third, each document provides structures that are user-friendly, ones that can be adapted personally. Educational practices in the Ratio and prayers in the Exercises can and even should be self-stylized. Fourth, both documents are highly detailed, offering lengthy descriptions for preparing for an examination or for doing a meditation. Fifth, in the spirit of Renaissance humanism, each facilitates a genuinely personal experience that necessitates an appropriation of insights and a corresponding response. Again, the Ratio and the Exercises lead toward existential realities that encourage practitioners to make important decisions about their lives. Finally, both are intentional of a “radically open disposition to God.” This sixth aspect is significant in that it cultivates a certain worldview. It is also an essential orientation – a special dimension of openness or receptivity, and an expression of the ontic commitment – of Taylor’s fullness.

About this religious dimension, another scholar explains, “Ignatian spirituality, classically rooted in the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius of Loyola, is an approach to transcendence rooted in a staunch incarnationalism . . . shot through with a certain hopefulness about the human project.” Such hope for persons – manifested educationally and spiritually in the Jesuit perspective – deeply troubles philosophers and theologians of a different ilk. This, a fundamental anthropological difference, will be discussed below. At this juncture, though, the Jesuit hope for persons and their potentials, however, partly represents the impulsion in Jesuit

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education for Ciceronian eloquence, an ideal the Jesuits refer to in the *Ratio* as *eloquentia perfecta*.  

**VII. Eloquentia Perfecta**

Per Cicero, *eloquentia* was represented by the combined realities of rhetorical ability and moral character. Again, it was reflected by Cicero’s definition of the orator, “*vir bonus dicendi peritus,*” that is, ‘the better man speaking skillfully.’ An individual’s life was indistinguishable from tangible communal concerns. The Renaissance humanist return to the ancient sources in general reflects the operative humanist sentiment that “good literature produces good citizens.” Cicero’s own deployment of the *septem artes liberales*, his *studia humanitatis*, however, manifested a synthetic and unified educational approach that had been unbalanced and fragmented by medieval-era professionalism. The scholastic disconnect between theologians and their lives was evidence of this, but so too was the obsessive focus upon singular expressions of the arts, an exploitation of any of them – dialectics, namely, for theologians – into disciplines.

The culture of eloquence in the Jesuit system reflected Cicero’s own three principles of rhetoric, those of teaching, delighting, and moving. These, respectively, *docere*, *delectare*, and *movere*, were deployed in the Jesuit system through, again, the methods of the *modus Parisiensis*, and manifested a unique educational atmosphere. Inspired by Ciceronian virtuosity and the Ciceronian curriculum, and further motivated by Renaissance humanists such

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441 The *Ratio Studiorum*, 155 [§375].

442 Codina, “Modus Parisiensis,” 40; and O’Malley, “From the 1599 *Ratio Studiorum* to the Present,” 129.


as Vergerio who shifted his educational efforts to Ciceronian ideals, the Jesuits sought to educate the whole person. *Eloquenitia perfecta* is thereby a holistic educational ideal concerned about bodily health, the intellect, self-expression, aesthetic and emotional faculties, and the spiritual yearnings of individuals who are socially concerned.\(^{445}\) Ciceronian rhetoric helped frame this in as much as it maintained the Ciceronian ideal of an integrated *studia humanitatis*. “Mastery of *eloquenitia perfecta*, or articulate wisdom, meant not merely the ability to communicate with ease and elegance, but ‘the capacity to reason, to feel, to express oneself and to act, harmonizing virtue with learning.’”\(^{446}\) Mahoney reinforces this ideal in curricular discourse, explaining that the subject matters of the *studia humanitatis* “were brought together at a given point . . . under a particularly disciplinary umbrella, such that they reinforced and complemented one another; for example, in the development of ‘perfect eloquence.’”\(^{447}\)

A renaissance of an integrated *studia humanitatis* as well as an interest in cultivating the humanity of their students necessitated active and personally engaging educational exercises: “orations had to be delivered, not just studied; poetry had to be recited, not just read; plays had to be staged . . . With plays came music and dance.”\(^{448}\) Modras reports that Jesuit education originated and institutionalized the student pageant.\(^{449}\) In studying, memorizing, reciting, imagining, acting, singing, dancing, and praying, students were striving toward an *eloquenitia perfecta*. But their educational activities reflect the efforts of their Jesuit teachers, who were

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\(^{447}\) Mahoney, *Catholic Higher Education in Protestant America*, 43.

\(^{448}\) O’Malley, *Four Cultures of the West*, 168.

writing scores, scripts, and lyrics, staging and directing productions – which necessitated even more artful efforts of students and teachers, such as set designers, make-up artists, and costume tailors – which took place both in the schools and in public squares.450

The expression of Ciceronian rhetoric was systematic in the Jesuit order as a whole. In Jesuit Political Thought: The Society of Jesus and the State, c. 1540—1630 (2004), Harro Höpfl says that in all of their efforts, Jesuit were widely eloquent: “colleges, churches, and residences were built to impress. A concern with persuasiveness and presentability is evident throughout [their] organization.” An ethos of eloquencia perfecta as such, Jodi Loach insists, “brought about a cultural revolution.”452 Ganss indicates the hospitality in the schools for students from across a wide spectrum of socio-economic classes and he emphasizes that they benefited by possibilities for upward mobility.453 Loach, though, is interested in a force of personal and social striving toward greatness – “magis” in the Jesuit lexicon, and a Latin root of greatness – which, according to her, was an ideal of the Jesuits that was prevalent in the schools in particular and resulted in an undermining of social hierarchies around Europe: “a spirit of emulation favoured the emergence of an elite at once studious and pious.”454

From the seventh chapter of the first book of De Officiis (44 BCE), Jesuit educators over the centuries loved to quote Cicero’s Platonic inspired insight, “Non nobis solum nati sumus,”

450 Ibid.
453 Ganss, Saint Igantius’s Idea of a Jesuit University, 167.
that is, ‘We are not born for ourselves alone.’ This will be discussed in contemporary expression in the final chapter. For our purposes here, though, it represented for them their educational superlative of *eloquentia perfecta*. Two important characteristics, *pietas* and *Christianitas* framed and bolstered the ideal.

Being pious was not only and specifically a religious expression but a personal virtue of originary Greek and Roman humanism, classic (and Latinized) *pietas*. That is, it was not what is today regarded as piety, the act of being obsequious, or exceptionally reverent, or prayerful. Daoust points to Virgil’s pious Aeneas in the *Aeneid* (c.19 BCE) as a worthy example, a piety that Nicholas Mosley discusses in Homeric terms, a state of character, a virtue, or a person imbued with the ancient Greek conceptions of *arête* earlier discussed.

*Pietas* in ancient antiquity, and later with the Jesuits, is to be recognized not in its limited contemporary conceptions of ritualism and demeanor, but for its character-in-community formation, the cultivation of an upright individual socially concerned. Nadal, founder of San Niccoló at Messina and in many ways the first pedagogue of the Jesuit order, prioritized *pietas* in his educational tracts as the highest objective of Jesuit education. For the Jesuits, it offered an ideal that was comprehensive of the humanist elements of their educational programming and

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456 The Greek linguistic expressions of piety are beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, given the charge of impiety against Socrates and his discussion of it in the *Apology*, as well as at the four versions of piety that are considered in *Euthyphro* and the numerous references to piety in the *Republic*, the *Platonic Dialogues* would provide a useful starting point.


458 O’Malley, “From the 1599 *Ratio Studiorum* to the Present,” 135.
was also reflective of the religious sensibility of the Order. Integrated with upright character and social concern were aspects of Christian faith and a corresponding worldview. The instillation in one’s life of pietas – a mature, virtuous, socially concerned and religious self – manifested as Christianitas, that is, a way of being Christian.

Being Christian was an essential ingredient of Renaissance humanism. For Erasmus, Christ was eloquentia perfecta. Before Erasmus, yet, Vergerio and the other first Renaissance humanist pedagogues were themselves Christian. It was their Christian humanism which sparked the Renaissance and which inspired the Jesuits. The use of literature in their schools showcased pietas litterata, ancient Greek and Roman and early Christian writings which featured moral comport and social impact. From Ignatius’s own experience of Groote’s Devotio Moderna at Montaigu, his Saxony inspired Exercises, and a modern regard for personal discernment, the Jesuits activated and enhanced their students’ imaginations of pietas-in-Christianitas, a Jesuit variant of the individual-in-community. In Renaissance humanist sensitivity, Mahoney explains that “Jesuits expended their energies molding students into virtuous, lettered, Christian gentlemen who would contribute to the good of society as leading citizens . . . [the Jesuit’s] endeavors were rendered ad civitatis utilitatem—for the sake of the city.”

Students were encouraged to be imaginative of high ideals, but they could actually practice Christianitas in their schooling. Organizational units known as “confraternities” – almost a fifteenth century version of current service learning programs – helped to facilitate reflection upon charitable virtues and actual social engagement. It was a form of praxis. In essence, students were able to join extracurricular activities that participated in particular social

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460 Mahoney, Catholic Higher Education in Protestant America, 41.
service projects in the local community. It was these “Marian sodalities” – Jesuit sponsored groupings not just of students but of members of the greater community in groups of their own, such as associations of artisans, merchants, and professionals – that helped exact the seventeenth century social revolution Loach recognizes.  

The Jesuits themselves were encouraged to reveal Christianitas in their teaching, offering special care and concern for students. “They repeatedly inculcated in one another the importance of loving their students, of knowing them as individuals, of enjoying a respectful familiaritas with them.” The familiaritas in the educational context echoed an instruction in the Jesuits’ Constitutions to practice cura personalis within their own context, that is, within the governing structures of the Order. The expression of personal care that was to be afforded each member of the expanded international organization influenced the works and projects of the organization, particularly in its educational endeavors.

Per their own educational documents, for instance, through the personal elements of “study” and adaptability, the methods of the modus Parisiensis and the contents of the liberal arts, in social action groups, and in a style of teaching, the Jesuits – using pietas and Christianitas as archetypes – framed the prospects of a good life. A gesture to one of Vergerio’s Renaissance humanist colleagues is helpful in recognizing anthropological assumptions and the context of eloquenta perfecta. Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494) exudes an existential flare – “thou mayest fashion thyself in whatever shape thou shalt prefer” in his Oration on the Dignity of Man (1486). Bidding his audience to recall “Delphic precepts” of self-knowing as

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well as the classic education of the seven liberal arts, that is, the philosophical and humanist traditions, Pico encourages individuals beyond limited socio-religious expectations of human life to a greatness – again from Jesuit diction: a magis – each and all are worthy of. “Let a certain . . . ambition invade your souls, so that, not content with the mediocre, we shall pant after the highest and (since we may wish) toil with all our strength to obtain it.”

One scholar interprets from Pico a regard for an especial and unprecedented potency in human life toward self and social transformation. It was a hopefulness not unlike Vergerio’s who, in his letter, reminds us that “[e]very period of life has the capacity to yield something splendid.” Evidenced in the Constitutions, Ignatius himself knew and embraced such hopefulness, echoing Pico’s Oration in particular. Jesuit education, in turn, was in many of its aspects reflective of a dignified, hope-filled Christian anthropology. Again, the Jesuits expressed an excitement for what and who their students were and could be. About humanity, Jesuits were hopeful.

VIII. Sanguinity and Suppression

Because of such hopefulness, Blaise Pascal hated the Jesuits. There were other reasons, too. Polymathic and notable for accomplishments in mathematics, philosophy, physics, and theology, Pascal (1623-1662) was also a Jansenist, a member of morally rigorous sect of Roman Catholicism.

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464 Ibid., 227.


467 The Constitutions of the Society of Jesus and Their Complementary Norms, 220 [§547].

Catholicism. Popular in France in his day, Jansenism, in reference to Cornelius Jansen (1585-1638), preached and taught that humans are morally weak and depraved. The pessimistic regard for the human condition was fueled by Christian doctrine of original sin, especially through the influence and, within Roman Catholic thinking, the high stature, of Augustine of Hippo (354-430). Jansenist teaching, condemned at the time of Pascal, insisted that human nature was fundamentally corrupt and in constant need of divine intervention. The convent of Port-Royal in Paris served as headquarters of Jansenist thought, and the suspicious and concerned sentiments about human nature were propagated throughout France in a network of Port-Royal schools, the Petites Écoles de Port-Royal, of which Jean Racine (1639-1699) – who eventually severed any existing association with the schools – is a notable alumnus.469

Pascal’s contentions with the Jesuits – famously voiced in his Lettres Provinciales (1657), an apologetic for Jansenism – is recognizable through both the basic anthropological and theological principles of the Jansenists and their schools. In many ways the Petites Écoles de Port-Royal in France were an alternative to the Jesuit system. While both established curricula in the classics of Renaissance humanism, the Port-Royal schools focused less upon the strictures, guidelines, and scholastic overtones of the modus Parisiensis. They also offered instruction not in Latin, but the vernacular, French.470 The schools tried to cultivate a different atmosphere. They were not necessarily more leisurely, but they sought to afford students both more independence and more personalized attention. Also, as the Jesuit schools were writing dramas and staging productions, the Port-Royal educators condemned theatre.471

469 Félix Cadet, ed., Port-Royal Education: A Sketch of its History with Extracts from its Leading Authors (Syracuse: C.W. Bardeen, 1899), 111.
470 Ibid., 38.
471 Ibid., 321.
It would be unfair to caricature the Jesuit *Ratio* and the global network of Jesuit schools as an impersonal educational bureaucracy and the Port-Royal schools as quaint countryside seminars in humanism, but the images lend themselves to ideological descriptions perpetuated by the different traditions. Pascal’s posthumously published *Pensées* (1669) may indeed reflect genuine humanist sentiments of such schools. The success of the Port-Royal schools, however, was impeded by the 1653 Roman Catholic condemnation of Jansen’s teaching and, not long thereafter, extinguished by a consequent breakup of the Port-Royal network.

Pascal found the Jesuits to be morally lax and charged that they offered Roman Catholic penitents easy absolution from sins. If the Port-Royal schools were less regimented and freer, ironically, a general code of conduct, penances, asceticisms, and religious rituals of Port-Royal daily life were not. Pascal, whose sister professed her life as a nun in a Port-Royal convent, indicted the Jesuits for practicing casuistry, an analytical tool for reasoning away personal culpability and corresponding consequences. As much as the Jesuits truly adapted and appropriated – “to persons, times, and places” – in accord with the ideals of their *Constitutions* and *Spiritual Exercises*, this may well have been one of its expressions. Recognizing the complexities of life and the unique contexts of individual persons in distinctive situations, the Jesuits did indeed seem reluctant to condemn people for their struggles. Instead, they counseled people to engage personal problems constructively and urged individuals to keep moving forward in life. It was another expression of the pilgrim orientation of the Jesuits.

The consequences for Jesuit moral advice were enormous. Because no one was irrevocably lost, because free will had a role in leading people toward or away from [the bad], there was . . . room to be charitable and consolatory during an individual’s moral

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off seasons—not in the absurd ways mentioned by Pascal, but in such a way as to sustain a person’s sense of dignity and hope.\textsuperscript{473}

Such esteem and hope for the people they encountered represented a dignified anthropocentrism, and it infiltrated the Jesuit order. Their educational enterprise was not excepted.

I mentioned above that Ignatius was regarded as a pilgrim. It was an image and an ethos he himself cultivated in the Order.\textsuperscript{474} Terence’s mantra, ‘Nothing human is foreign to me,’ cited above in the context of adapting to “persons, times, and places” in “Part IV” of the Jesuit’s \textit{Constitutions}, helps in characterizing a corresponding individual and institutional orientation. Nadal had claimed that the highway, rather than a house, was a worthy symbol of the Jesuits.\textsuperscript{475} In his writings, he reminded his Jesuit colleagues that they were not monks who lived quiet lives removed from the world, but that the world itself was their house.\textsuperscript{476} This was a scandalous reality in Christendom, one that liberated the members of a Catholic religious order from a traditional model of consecrated religious life, one that had never \textit{not} been regimented by the common prayer of the divine office, as mentioned earlier. Catholics and non-Catholics alike did not know how to categorize this non-monastic entity. “[Ignatius]’ scoundrels . . . ‘left the shade of ancient sloth and inactivity, in which the other monks grow grey,’ and ‘[came] forth to engage in toils.’ It seemed to some as if Jesuits were not quite regular clergy—like those monks who lived in cloistered communities and chanted matins, lauds, and vespers together—and not quite members of the secular clergy, such as parish priests.”\textsuperscript{477}


\textsuperscript{474} Modras, \textit{Ignatian Humanism}, 79; and O’Malley, \textit{The First Jesuits}, 15.

\textsuperscript{475} Bangert and McCoog, \textit{Jerome Nadal, S.J., 1507-1580}, 40.

\textsuperscript{476} O’Malley, \textit{The First Jesuits}, 67-68.

\textsuperscript{477} Wright, \textit{God’s Soldiers}, 50.
Kathleen Mahoney appreciates Nadal’s metaphor of the world as a place of home and reinforces it with the “pilgrim” distinction that was associated with Ignatius and, consequently, the Jesuit organization itself: “The Jesuits . . . caught up in the Age of Discovery, radically reconceptualized the spatial dimensions of religious life, claiming the entire world as their ‘house’ and the journey itself as a constitutive element of their mission and communal life.”

An historian explains that the Order “was known for its willingness to adapt to certain aspects of foreign cultures . . . Measured cultural assimilation . . . was to be found in virtually every Jesuit mission field.” Again, recognizing Montaigne’s own inquisitive and interested travels, though limited, and his assessment of foreign cultures in, respectively, Travel Journal and “Of Cannibals,” is helpful. With the Jesuits, though, the scholar, Jonathan Wright, describes an interest and ability in learning the customs of other peoples and explains that Jesuits demonstrated efforts for learning and for preserving foreign languages. Mahoney claims that an “openness to the world and cultures . . . was recognized by contemporaries and historians as quintessentially Jesuit and essential to their resounding success as a religious order.” Their own Constitutions instruct that they are to learn “local” languages. The Jesuits thus wrote dictionaries of the French-Huron and Latin-Persian-Annamese languages; they constructed

478 Mahoney, Catholic Higher Education in Protestant America, 152. Also, Hansen’s recent book articulates conceptions of “home” in pedagogical light – a “cosmopolitan orientation” – that demonstrates affinities to the Jesuit sensibility. “From a cosmopolitan perspective, persons are always leaving and remaining at home.” (p. 57) For a fuller discussion, see Hansen, The Teacher and the World, 56-59.

479 Wright, God’s Soldiers, 117.

480 Mahoney, Catholic Higher Education in Protestant America, 11.

481 The Constitutions of the Society of Jesus and Their Complementary Norms, 179 [§449.B].
grammars in Latin American Tupi and Guarani; and they conducted scholarship in Indian Sanskrit, Tamil, and Telugu.\footnote{482}

Italian 

\textit{paisano} Jesuits Matteo Ricci (1552-1610) and Roberto de Nobili (1577-1656) are paradigmatic characters of such inculturation. They gained honorable and unprecedented statuses in highly protected and revered political and religious regimes. Ricci, mentioned in the first chapter of this thesis as an important prototype for Taylor, was allowed to become a Confucian literati of the Ming Dynasty, and de Nobili, in Madurai, was permitted to live the life of a Hindu sannyasi of Brahmin caste.\footnote{483} Mahoney’s characterization of such an outlook is long, but helpful. She offers a description of a Jesuit ideal and includes within it the dimension of adaptability that is espoused in treatises of the Society:

What the Jesuits of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries understood more thoroughly than other religious orders was the importance of adapting their ways to the specific places in which they were working. Other religious orders sometimes limited their efficacy as missionaries by insisting that non-Europeans adopt European ways, without themselves adapting to local cultural norms. In contrast, the Jesuits learned native languages, read indigenous literature, donned native dress, and adopted local customs, sometimes struggling against the temptation of going, ‘too native.’\footnote{484}

Like other Jesuits around Europe and the world in general, respectively, Ricci and de Nobili wrote detailed letters about the people, customs, and geographies from their headquarters in Beijing and Madurai. Letter writing, in fact, was a Jesuit requisite. In the lifetime of Ignatius alone nearly 7,000 came and went from his administration in Rome, most of which have been collated in a twelve-volume set, the \textit{Monumenta Historica Societatis Iesu} (1894), and long

\footnote{482} Wright, \textit{God’s Soldiers}, 121.


\footnote{484} Mahoney, \textit{Catholic Higher Education in Protestant America}, 153.
enjoyed as an important window for historically appreciating the Renaissance. Even at the
time they were written, the Jesuits’ travels and their correspondences were highly instructive:
“Europe learned about the world and the world learned about Europe.”

That the Jesuits harnessed political powers on the European continent and abroad, that
they religiously colonized foreign cultures, that their own *Ratio Studiorum* bureaucratized and
even dehumanized education, and that they themselves failed their own ideals individually and
corporately is a significant part of the story and well beyond the purview of this dissertation.
Jesuits* (2004), is not unbalanced. It cites criticisms about the Jesuit order, showcasing, for
instance, openly professed enemies and their concerns – John Donne (1572-1631), Voltaire
(1694-1778), Pascal, Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826), Napoleon (1769-1821) – as well as
institutional missteps of the Jesuits. It is also hagiographic, and champions achievements and
distinctions of Ignatius and his organization.

At the end of the book, however, Wright offers a compelling argument. He ponders the
1773 worldwide suppression of the Order by Pope Clement XIV (1705-1774), a complicated
international process not disconnected from the Jansenist controversy a hundred years earlier or
the widespread efforts of the Jesuits to adapt to foreign culture and assimilate religious symbols
and gestures. As there is truth to a Jesuit collusion in power and prestige in many places,
Wright challenges readers to see the 1773 (temporary) demise of the Order, and the consequent
eradication of their hundreds of schools and libraries – “a quarter of a million students forced to

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486 Wright, *God’s Soldiers*, 132.

Thomas Worcester (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 143-44.
make other arrangements\textsuperscript{488} – as symptomatic of a dynamic far bigger than the Jesuits. Their suppression is not, for Wright, simply a decisive, isolated moment reflective of the Jesuit order itself, but revealing of a long, complex development that benchmarks, with the 1773 suppression, a significant moment in the history of Western secularism.\textsuperscript{489}

**Conclusion**

This chapter has discussed the tradition of Jesuit education from myriad origins, such as through the life of the founder and, more particularly, his educational experiences. These experiences attest to specific scholastic structures of schooling and Renaissance humanist curricular developments at the University of Paris. They demonstrate a waning medieval mindset and a burgeoning Modernity.

The *Ratio Studiorum* has been an important aspect of this chapter especially in its Montaigne-like assaying dynamic of study, its capacity to adapt to times, places, and persons, and its affinities to the *Spiritual Exercises*. As the *Exercises* manifests a Modern sensitivity of subjectivity and interiority, it also offers exercises in social assessment and engagement akin with ancient Greek spiritual exercises.

Moving beyond these essential elements, the chapter has also demonstrated a particular culmination of Ciceronian eloquence as Jesuit *eloquenta perfecta*, an ideal understood through humanist conceptions of *pietas*, *Christianitas*, and *familiaritas*. Recognizing an imprint of Pico’s *Oration on the Dignity of Man*, these reveal a hopeful existential orientation in Jesuit education for humanity, an orientation with philosophical-anthropological assumptions and a corresponding social regard. The chapter ends by contextualizing both a sense of Jesuit

\textsuperscript{488} Wright, *God’s Soldiers*, 216.

\textsuperscript{489} Wright, “The Suppression and Restoration,” 263; and Wright, *God’s Soldiers*, 215.
educational hopefulness – sanguinity – and the suppression of the Jesuits. The sanguinity is countered by Pascal’s Augustinian influenced human depravity and the suppression is recognized as an expression of Western secularism.

At the end of a lengthy chapter, allow me, however, to also offer a recapitulation of the specific pedagogical practices of the Jesuit tradition. Of the nearly 7,000 letters that passed in and out of Rome during the course of Ignatius’s life, one, commissioned by Ignatius to Spanish Jesuit Antonio Araoz, discussed the fundamentals of Jesuit education. Written by his secretary Polanco at the end 1551 when the flagship educational institution, the Roman College, had that year been established, and when Nadal and Coudret had in the same year written important educational documents cited earlier in this chapter, the letter demonstrates that the Order itself was becoming increasingly involved in the work of education, that such a work would become a priority of the group, and that the results, so far, were not only outstanding, but multifariously excellent, revealed through the students, the Order, and the local communities around the schools. The letter offers a good summary statement of Jesuit educational ideals.

The letter endorses a Renaissance humanist curriculum of a Ciceronian studia humanitatis in the methodology of the modus Parisiensis. It is emphatic in stressing the necessity to provide a humanist foundation for students before offering more specific courses in the professions, and it suggests multiple kinds of activities that can personally engage and educationally activate individual students. However, as students are to be participatory in a variety of ways, especially through rhetorical demonstrations, they are also to study, an important pedagogical expression discussed above through McClintock. Study, moreover, is not merely a strategy for advancement within the school – through, for instance, the graduating

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490 Ignatius of Loyola: Letters and Instructions, 360-63.
structures of the *modus Parisiensis* – but is regarded as a life-practice, a process of self-development that is to be ongoing. In fact, the educational experience as a whole is to virtuously impact the student for life. The Jesuit tradition that is internationally unfolding is regarded for its immediate educational objectives and for how it informs the continual process of life. The education itself is a continual process. Through his secretary, Polanco, Ignatius explicitly mentions that the Order will also be pedagogically impacted, that the teaching profession will continue to enhance the learning and growing of the teaching Jesuits themselves as well as of those involved in the work of Jesuit education.

And this, Ignatius dictates, though expensive to offer, is to be freely available. Benefactions can certainly be accepted and even requested, but tuition is not to be an obstacle to anyone. Students of all socio-economic classes are to be welcomed, but the social concern is broader yet. Ignatius is excited about the way teachers and students alike will immediately impact the surrounding community. The school community as a whole is to be socially concerned, and the school is to be seen as a venue of social outreach in assisting hospitals, women’s shelters, and the like.

In many ways, from the previous chapter, Vergerio’s feast-days continued. Hospitable to all, equitable, morally inspiring, virtuous, personal, and rhetorical, the ingredients of the St. Jerome’s Day banquet were present in his own educational treatise, and through the Jesuit tradition, they persisted. Institutionalized and systematized by methods of the University of Paris, the early Italian renaissance evolved from Ciceronian eloquence into an *eloquentia perfecta*. Qualified by the ideals of *familiaritas*, study, *pietas*, and *Christianitas*, that is, a personally invested educational program, possibilities for holistic self-development, a kind of virtuosity, and a social expression, Jesuit *eloquentia perfecta*, in turn, represents a conception of
human subjectivity and a corresponding worldview. The components of the self and the social represent the fundamentals of what will be discussed as a dynamic of the pedagogies of fullness.
Chapter Five: Higher Education in a Secular Age

“Things are no better outside the university than within . . . In a world gone mad over technology, science, [and] the production of material goods . . . it is natural that the world has steadily become more and more unphilosophical or antiphilosophical. Why worry about something as vague, useless, confusing, contradictory, and menacing as philosophy seems to be?”

Robert Maynard Hutchins
*The University of Utopia* (1953)

Introduction

In three broad strokes, this chapter offers a portrait of contemporary higher education. As Charles Taylor speaks in *A Secular Age* (2007) and elsewhere about the “Malaises of Modernity,” the ways cultural and social disquietudes compromise possibilities for fullness in our lives, maladies of the contemporary era especial to the context of higher education also exist. Likewise, they jeopardize possibilities of relating, growing, and flourishing. According to historians, philosophers, and other scholars, the contemporary university is less collaborative, less personal, and less educative than it should be. Problems related to the holistic dimensions of higher education in institutional, subjective, and epistemological realities are not disassociated from the impersonal or noxious dimensions of Modernity discussed in the first chapter of this dissertation, nor the four research themes named in the second chapter to represent the ways Taylor’s work is used and appreciated in educational theory.

In this chapter, the problems will

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492 The four themes in the second chapter, described as “snapshots” and “parlors of discourse,” are “recognition,” “the good life,” instrumental rationality,” and “hypergoods.” In representing aspects of personal identity, holistic
be referred to as institutional fragmentation, superficial subjectivity, and instrumental epistemics. The issues are not always easily distinguishable from one another and even gain momentum from the effects of each other, but they are nonetheless three distinct illnesses notable of higher education in a secular age.

In defining and explaining the three contemporary problems, I substantiate descriptions of them with a host of different thinkers and writers. Some, such as Karl Jaspers and Alfred North Whitehead, are recognized as traditional philosophers who write their own “idea” about the university. Historians and current commentators who think and write about influences, movements, and trends in higher education also assist me. The many voices work together to manifest the concerns of fragmentation, superficiality, and instrumentality. As with the second chapter of this thesis, furthermore, the various contributions from different scholarly perspectives resonate with many of Taylor’s concerns. All of this supports my argument at the end of the chapter that higher education in a secular age reveal concerns related to the crisis of fullness that introduces this dissertation in the first chapter.

As experts of many kinds corroborate in their critiques, they demonstrate a relationship between a general cultural milieu and higher education itself that is well represented in the lead quote of this chapter by Robert Maynard Hutchins (1899-1977), an important figure in the history of higher education in the United States. Hutchins’s ability to describe a correlation expressions of knowing and relating, and essential life values, their affinities to the institutional, subjective, and epistemic concerns of this chapter are easily noticeable.

493 Hutchins, along with Alexander Meiklejohn (1872-1964) and Michael Oakeshott (1901-1990), represent a uniquely American reform movement in higher education that was eventually referred to as the General Education movement. In Hutchins’s The Higher Learning in America (1936) and Education for Freedom (1943), Meiklejohn’s The Liberal College (1920) or The Experimental College (1932), and Oakeshott’s The Voice of Liberal Learning (1989), and other writings, they each wrestle intelligently and passionately with the transformation of American higher education from collegiate programs structured by fine arts curricula to university disciplines dominated by scientific research. Early in the twentieth century, Hutchins, Meiklejohn, and Oakeshott grieved a dismantling of humanities curricula and the loss of existential and moral foci they offered. Their discussions of liberal learning in
between the depersonalizing and mechanistic forces of Modernity and the life of universities is essential in guiding us to maintain Taylor’s own cultural critique and the corresponding existential costs of relationship and perspective he describes. While it is worth asking whether universities spur cultural problems to begin with, contribute to existing ones, or if higher education can or should alleviate such problems, answers to these questions are contingent upon considerations well beyond the scope of this dissertation. My own hope is the university does not muster or mimic social ills but mitigates and even ameliorates those both within itself and around it which compromise human flourishing. However that can be achieved, Hutchins’s insight at least reminds us that the illnesses of higher education in this chapter are principally recognized in how they impede Taylor’s dimensions of relating.

Before advancing, however, it is worth recognizing a tension within the chapter and three basic assumptions. The tension regards the role of the humanities in higher education and the many instantiations of higher education that can be discussed, such as liberal arts institutions, sites of highly specialized and sophisticated research, campuses with undergraduate or graduate student populations, and combinations of any of these realities. It is fair to ponder when, where, and why the humanities can or should be studied, and to what ends. It is also reasonable to wonder which kinds of institutions are being discussed in these pages. Again, possible responses are numerous and well beyond the capacities of this dissertation. In this chapter, the humanities as well as institutions of higher education are discussed in general terms.

One basic supposition, however, is that the three maladies of this chapter are directly related to the humanities. In how the humanities have been affected as well as for the solutions they represent, discussing the humanities is unavoidable. A second assumption is that most

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its ability to free contemporary women and men into dimensions of personal flourishing and communal responsibility still enlighten educational scholars.
American universities are generally susceptible to or participatory in the three problematic dynamics that are focused upon. Thirdly, this chapter presumes that good undergraduate education – whether in small liberal arts colleges or large research universities – should facilitate a meaningful engagement of topics in the humanities, offering an expansive educative exposure that can inform students who either advance through the academy to different levels or leave it for other life options.

I. Institutional Fragmentation

Institutional fragmentation is regarded as the parsing of the university into disciplinary pursuits, a slicing or fracturing of what generally has been regarded as an integrating or synthesizing venue of intellective activity. Official designations of early institutions of higher learning in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries as a *studium generale* referenced a place of higher learning “where students from all parts are received.” Studia generale became more sophisticated and institutional, and recognized as universities, however, in how they represented various branches of learning that were ultimately connected and supportive of each other in a unified way. The seven aspects of the *trivium* and *quadrivium* that were discussed in the third and fourth chapters of this dissertation as *septem artes liberales* and, later, *studia humanitatis*, dimensions of learning that Pier Paolo Vergerio (1370-1444) and other Renaissance humanists sought to restore in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, were not celebrated for how they competed against one another, but in how they represented a mutually supportive curriculum of learning. But in the university they also represented a conception of knowledge, albeit vast, as

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a unity itself. As we will see throughout this chapter, many thinkers recognize the university as a place that should in essence function as a cohesive institution whereby different academic perspectives merge to inform and enhance one another.

Jonathan Cole’s recent book, *The Great American University* (2009), portrays the fragmented reality of current universities astutely. As he is able to name aspects of higher education that were lost as the university diversified and specialized through the scientific advancements of the nineteenth century, he is also able to show us what has been gained.496

Cole’s long book is structured in three parts. First, he describes how small, “sleepy” colleges in the United States morphed into powerful national forces of scientific and economic transformation; second, he explains how university research has improved the quality of living for people around the world; and third, he discusses specific threats upon and within research universities of recent years, such as governmental censoring, international competition, dogmatic attitudes, commercialization, and inequalities of resources, which compromise senses of academic integrity and mission.

Seeing the university today as particularly fractured, Cole readily admits that the patterns and practices of higher education portion the university into overly autonomous entities that are less collaborative, communicative, and cooperative. He laments “program creep” which can

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496 Cole’s ability to critique and appreciate the contemporary university is not insignificant to this project. You might recall from the first chapter Stephen Toulmin’s discouragement, articulated in his *Cosmopolis* (1990), about the current state of philosophy – we should “return to its pre-17th-century traditions, and try to recover the lost (‘pre-modern’) topics” (p. 11) – and an initial proposal in the book to discount Modernity almost entirely. Taylor passionately values specific elements of Modernity, punctuating his writings with an admiration for the human rights and dignities – let alone scientific and political evolvements in technologies and democracies – that Enlightenment thinking motivated and insisted. In *The Ethics of Authenticity* Taylor sides with neither the all out “knockers” of Modernity or its full-blown “boosters,” and encourages us to be just as discerning. (p. 11) Cole is able to do likewise. So is Toulmin, too, in fact. He knows that we cannot start over in philosophy with a “clean slate.” (p. 175) Interestingly, and not unrelated to the discussion of this chapter, Toulmin ponders how Modernity might be humanized and looks to the role of higher education in helping him explore possibilities. (p. 184-86)
burden and distort basic objectives of a given institution. He depicts university campuses as filled with pockets of isolation, and details, first, the difficulty – if not impossibility – for insights and discoveries to be shared and discussed; second, a diced and inflexible budget system which hampers the possibilities for growth in many areas; and, third, a generally stymied intellectual advancement for dealing with some of the most pressing issues of the day. Because of the buffers which impede dialogue, growth, and inquiry, he indicates that we desperately need the “breadth of knowledge produced by . . . sharing of ideas and expertise. This is especially true when it comes to tackling problems such as global climate change, economic development, and finding the causes of disease or poverty and eradicating them.

And yet, some of the basic essentials of our daily lives – things we could not imagine living without – resulted specifically from isolated, highly specialized, disciplinary university research in its fragmented modus operandi. Electric toothbrushes, refrigeration, Doppler weather predictions, Gatorade, ATM machines, bar-codes for scanning purchasable goods, and the Internet are some of the examples he cites in walking through just of few hours of a day of his own. American research universities, he explains, are, in global comparison, simply the best, a credential achieved through the production of an incredibly “high proportion of the most important fundamental knowledge and practical research discoveries in the world.”

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498 Ibid., 489.

499 Ibid., 490.

500 Ibid., 194-95.

501 Ibid., 5. Also discussed in the book are the discoveries in universities of momentous achievement, such as DNA, and more adverse realities, such as the Atomic Bomb.
As an institution that is essentially fractured, Cole points to Clark Kerr’s (1911-2003) designation of the modern American research university as the “multiversity,” “a somewhat chaotic and constantly changing place.” Cole explains how the multiversity functions as an institution of higher education “with many parts and missions that, taken together, comprised a multidimensional ‘city’ where parts were loosely integrated, rather than a small village or town that was truly coherent.”

President of the University of California from 1958-1967 and author of the widely read *Uses of the University* (1963), Kerr explains that the “modern American university is not Oxford, nor is it Berlin; it is a new type of institution in the world.”

His European references point to John Henry Newman (1801-1890) and Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835). Newman’s classic *The Idea of the University* (1873), based on his own experience at Oxford University, Oxford, England and his founding of The Catholic University of Ireland, Dublin, Ireland in 1851, and Humboldt’s establishment of the University of Berlin, Berlin, Germany in 1810, manifest two considerably different university models. The one that had evolved into Kerr’s multiversity became a unique entity influenced by these forms and others, the origin of which is benchmarked by the opening of Johns Hopkins University in 1876 under Daniel Coit Gilman’s (1831-1908) presidency. “The first American university to emphasize research rather than undergraduate teaching,” Johns Hopkins – inspired by the scholarly impetus of Humboldt’s Berlin model – pioneered what eventually became a wholly new model.

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502 Ibid., 140.
504 Kerr, *The Uses of the University*, 1.
In his *Multiversities, Ideas, and Democracy* (2007), George Fallis discusses four distinct archetypes of the university, all of which inform the emergence of the American multiversity. Per the references above, there is Newman’s university, an institution that offers curricular programs in the liberal arts which function to form the intellectual, moral, and social sensibilities of undergraduate students, and there is Humboldt’s, an institution that focuses upon research pursuits for graduate students and scholarly advancement. Along with these conceptions of the university are two others. First is that of the medieval university – “Paris and Bologna are the two archetypal—it might almost be said the only original universities”506 – and, along with Salerno, the institutions’ unequivocal objectives to train individuals in the three traditional professions, respectively, theology, law, and medicine. The medieval university was discussed more fully in the previous chapter.

The other is what Fallis describes as an underappreciated model, the Scottish prototype, an idea of the university enlivened by the institutions at Edinburgh, Aberdeen, Glasgow, and St. Andrew’s which allowed for an egalitarian access of students into their programs and pioneered applied sciences – economics, political science, and psychology, to name a few – that have long been commonplace.507

As influences of the four ideals of the university collectively represent the reality of many American universities today, it is Newman’s archetype that best frames in this dissertation a counter-dynamic of university fragmentation. In *The Idea of the University: A Reexamination* (1992), Jaroslav Pelikan says, “Newman insisted, ‘if we would rightly deem of it, a University is

506 Hastings Rashdall, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages, Volume I*, 17. Also, see: George Fallis, *Multiversities, Ideas, and Democracy*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 27: “Hastings Rashdall challenged and overturned this long-standing conclusion regarding the origins of the university. He argued – and his viewpoint has prevailed – that professional education had always been the distinguishing characteristic of the university.”

the home, it is *the mansion-house, of the goodly family of the Sciences*, sisters all, and sisterly in their mutual dispositions.”

The role of theology as an integrating, synthesizing, and culminating expression of university pursuits represents for him specific – and unambiguously religious – epistemological and cosmological orientations that tend toward a holistic conception of reality. He explains in “Discourse III” of *The Idea of a University*, “I lay it down that all knowledge forms one whole, because its subject matter is one; for the universe in its length and breadth is so intimately knit together.” It represents a metaphysical commitment that is also reflected by the philosophers Karl Jaspers (1883-1969) and Jacques Maritain (1882-1973) in their statements about universities. Respectively, in *The Idea of the University* (1946) and *Education at the Crossroads* (1943), each describes a unity of knowledge that should somehow be represented or replicated by the functioning of the university.

In his *God, Philosophy, Universities* (2009), Alasdair MacIntyre points to the overarching philosophical system of Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) – and before him, Aristotle (384-322 BCE) – as inspirational to ideas of a purposive and cohesive universe and explains how academic pursuits within universities work together in forming understandings of such an expansive realm. He also recalls how theology was an essential ingredient of this synthesizing orientation long before Newman’s description in the middle of the nineteenth century for its capacity in gathering, or at least capstoming, myriad academic perspectives.

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Furthermore, in *Knowledge Matters* (2011), Craig Calhoun, an expert on Charles Taylor, recently discusses three commonplace assumptions of the university which continue to persist, one of which endorses this Aristotelian-Thomistic-Newman-MacIntyre line of thought. They attempt, he explains, “to integrate the whole universe of knowledge, approaching and ideally connecting all or at least many subjects. That is, they are not narrowly specialized technical institutes.”\(^{512}\) If scholars and practitioners of higher education are reluctant to endorse conceptions of reality and knowledge in unified and holistic dimensions, and, moreover, are not interested in drawing a correlation between them and university efforts, Calhoun’s caveat here encourages any of us to be cognizant of what constitutes the differences between university study and vocational training.

As academic programs fractured and dispersed into disciplinary interests – scientific ones, namely – of their own, they lost an essential component of university functioning. MacIntyre asks, “What disappeared? Enquiry in relationship to other disciplines and [the possibility] that the various disciplines contribute to a single shared enterprise.”\(^{513}\) Jaspers stands right behind him, and suggests that the real issue around disciplinarity is a communicative one. Inquiry can be fueled and furthered to greater accomplishments through an interactive and conversant academic community. For Jaspers, a dialogic orientation is a university fundament: “Communication of all with all is necessary . . . Here is the living core of university life.”\(^{514}\) The contemporary German philosopher, Jürgen Habermas, is also interested in an essential dialogical commitment. In “The Idea of the University—Learning Processes” (1987), he seems

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\(^{513}\) MacIntyre, *God, Philosophy, Universities*, 174.

\(^{514}\) Jaspers, *The Idea of the University*, 37.
uncomfortable with religious and metaphysical conceptions of reality and knowledge, yet looks for a constitutive element of the university, asking, “Does anything remain upon which an integrating self-understanding of universities could be founded?” He lands where Jaspers staked a claim: in communication.\footnote{Jürgen Habermas and John R. Blazek, “The Idea of the University—Learning Processes,” in \textit{New German Critique} (No. 41, pgs. 3-22): 1987, 18.}

Like MacIntyre, and Jaspers and Habermas, for that matter, Anthony Kronman argues for an explicit “reconnection” to such modes of communicative inquiry in his \textit{Education’s End} (2007), a study we briefly considered in the first chapter of this thesis.\footnote{Ibid., 20.} Moreover, in moving from the Newman ideal of a curricular hegemony to the dialogic hopes of MacIntyre, Jaspers, and Habermas, and, as we will see, to Kronman’s interest in what the humanities in the university can achieve existentially, we can appreciate the pervasiveness of fragmentation and the mending powers of dialogue.

Passionately interested in classics of the Western canon of literature and philosophy, Kronman argues that university disciplinarity devalues the humanities. When we lose the humanities, we lose an ability to ask questions about the meaning of life, a fundamental dimension of humanity that Taylor’s fullness represents. Queries about the meanings and purposes of life are not being entertained and explored in universities. “[W]e need the humanities to meet the deepest spiritual longing of our age, whose roots lie in the hegemony of science itself. At the very heart of our civilization, with its vast powers of control, there is an emptiness that science has created and cannot fill.”\footnote{Anthony Kronman, \textit{Education’s End: Why Our Colleges and Universities Have Given Up on the Meaning of Life}. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 241.} In fragmented university environments, students are

\footnote{Ibid., 229.}
either conditioned into indifference or – more explicitly to Kronman’s driving concern – they look beyond the university for answers to their basic existential needs. The solutions some of them end in are misleading or simplistic. Kronman is greatly disturbed by the prevalence of prospering evangelical organizations in the United States today – “the surge of fundamentalist belief”519 – that attend to important existential impulses of searching individuals in naïve and artless ways.

The particular value of Kronman, though, is his ability to share MacIntyre’s concern that the multiversity becomes so pointed and narrow in endless directions that other foci are dismissed or discounted. “[C]ertain questions go unasked or, rather, if they are asked, it is only by individuals and in settings such that as few as possible hear them being asked.”520 Characterized by the sociologist Robert Bellah as a “cafeteria,” or by other scholars as the “full service university,” or a “giant bazaar” where students shop for the specifics goods which will meet their particular utilitarian needs, the multiversity is widely recognized for its existential deficiencies.521

In his 1867 Inaugural Address: Delivered to the University Students of St. Andrews, John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) warns an academic community to avoid pursuits and perspectives whereby one confines him or herself “to a smaller and smaller portion of the whole extent” of knowledge.522 Written in his autobiography the year he died, Mill himself movingly describes a

519 Ibid.
520 MacIntyre, God, Philosophy, Universities, 174.
conversion in his life that brought him – the son of the intellectually prominent James Mill (1773-1836) and an exceptionally studied individual himself – face to face with the existential wisdom of the humanities, and, eventually, his own heart. In a long, heart-heavy and personally despondent winter of 1826, William Wordsworth was his medicine.\textsuperscript{523} “[P]oetry and art . . . [were the] instruments of human culture” that offered a brilliant man a new sense of meaning and purpose.\textsuperscript{524} He confesses, “I found the fabric of my old and taught opinions giving way in many fresh places.”\textsuperscript{525}

In front of the students and faculty of St. Andrews four decades later, he compared the knowledge of a specialized, constricted pursuit to a pinhead that merely punctuates the ambit of human industry.\textsuperscript{526} Mill was not arguing against the serious efforts of research and a striving for expertise, nor exceptionally focused interests that are personally empowered by curiosity and discipline. He was attempting to contextualize the time and place for highly specialized efforts, and in turn espouse the benefits of well-rounded, unified and holistic educational influences. Though long, MacIntyre quote below describes myopic quests of a number of disciplinary contexts on the topic of the human person, and then he asks a telling question:

From the standpoint of physics human beings are composed of fundamental particles interacting in accordance with the probabilistic generalizations of quantum mechanics. From that of chemistry we are the sites of chemical interactions, assemblages of elements and compounds. From that of biology we are multicellular organisms belonging to species each of which has its own evolutionary past. From that of historians we are intelligible only as emerging from the long histories of social and economic transformations. From that of economists we are rational profit-maximizing makers of decisions. From that of psychology and sociology we shape and are shaped by our


\textsuperscript{524} Ibid., 119.

\textsuperscript{525} Ibid., 127.

\textsuperscript{526} Mill, \textit{Inaugural Address}, 6.
perceptions, our emotions, and our social roles and institutions. And from that of students of literature and the arts it is in the exercise of our various imaginative powers that we exhibit much that is distinctive about human beings. But how do all these relate to each other?527

The issue of institutional fragmentation in Modern research universities is yet another expression of a secular age and, in the interests of this manuscript, can be evaluated in how it participates in the crisis of fullness.

II. Superficial Subjectivity

In Education at the Crossroads, Maritain exclaims that the “cult of specialization” demonstrated by the fragmentation of the university into its instrumental scientific pursuits “dehumanizes” students.528 This part of the chapter, “Superficial Subjectivity,” and the one to follow, “Instrumental Epistemics,” build on the insights and expressions of the fractured nature of the multiversity described above. Both thus burrow deeper into the personal, dehumanizing concerns of higher education in a secular age.

The dynamic of personal superficiality references numerous common practices in higher education today and is specifically named in the following chapter by the current leader of the Jesuit organization as a contemporary problem that higher education should allay.529 The breakdown of curricular programs in the humanities at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century dramatically decreased undergraduate students’ exposure to the thinking, imagining, inquiring, and intuiting activities commonly associated with studies in

527 MacIntyre, God, Philosophy, Universities, 175.

528 Maritain, Education at the Crossroads, 11.

the humanities. Per images of the fragmented university above that compare the multiversity to a cafeteria or a bazaar, students were able to begin choosing their way toward useful undergraduate degrees. This also meant that students could avoid certain courses. In doing so, students became more career oriented, and universities let students negotiate practical programs for specific professions. One particular problem of superficiality, then, regards vocationalism, the training of students for certain jobs that supplants the educating of students as certain kinds of persons.

The main concern about superficiality, then, pertains to unformed realities and unexercised capacities of well-trained students. As students of higher education dwell less, if at all, in the images of literature, the plights of history, the questions of philosophy, the possibilities of theology, and even just the basic data of joy, gratitude, and grief, to name only a few, so much less of their personal capacities are enacted and exercised. They are less personally invested in that so many of their intellective capacities are simply not engaged. In a recent manuscript, a social critic characterizes current undergraduate students as slumped, chatting, snacking, bored, and undisciplined. As expressions of superficiality are recognized through the problem of vocationalism in higher education, they are also noted through the disinterests and disengagements of students.

As with institutional fragmentation, I would like to contextualize superficiality by Newman’s classic prototype. The “gentleman” he famously describes as a formative outcome of higher education in “Discourse V” of the *Idea of the University* might be unattractive to scholars of the idea of the university for different reasons. Newman explains that higher education should cull within its students not a Christian, nor Catholic, but gentlemanly demeanor that is

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characterized by “a cultivated intellect, a delicate taste, a candid, equitable, dispassionate mind, a noble and courteous bearing in the conduct of life.”

These are the objectives of his ideal university. Readers today would generally not be convinced that Newman was not in fact interested in the Christian and Catholic outcomes, though in fairness to Newman he is quite clear in the *Idea of the University* that he is speaking about liberal education *qua* liberal education. Regardless, the middle nineteenth century context within which he was writing also manifests sexist and bourgeois regard. I am not invested in either preserving or dismantling Newman’s gentleman in this dissertation, but I do want to honor a motivating sensibility behind it, which is the cultivation of a virtuous person. Whether intentionally or not, an apposite correlate is wonderfully reflected in the Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset’s (1883-1955) writings on higher education, *Mission of the University*, a set of lectures about the university composed and delivered in 1930 and then reevaluated and formally published in 1944.

Described by Kerr in the introduction of a more recent edition as a work which is reflective of its own especial contexts, such as Ortega y Gasset’s early Jesuit education in Spain; his later studies in German research universities; the Spanish dictatorships, beginning in 1923, of Miguel Primo de Rivera y Orbenaja (1870-1930) and, in the years following 1936, Francisco Franco y Bahamonde (1882-1975); and his own existential interest as a philosopher; Ortega y Gasset offers an ideal of the university as contextually influenced as any of them, if not more explicitly so. These are reflected in the *Mission of the University* through his interest in a unified schema of knowledge that corresponds with an ordered, albeit vast, universe; a desire to

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532 Ibid., 91.

cultivate democratic sensibilities in students; and an insistence that issues of daily life will be directly and meaningfully engaged.

As Newman envisages in his university the gentleman, Ortega y Gasset grieves in universities around him the “new barbarian.” Such an individual is a “laggard behind the contemporary civilization archaic and primitive in contrast with his problems, which are grimly, relentlessly modern.” More squarely within the realm and responsibly of the university, “[t]his new barbarian is above all the professional man, more learned than ever before, but at the same time more uncultured—the engineer, the physician, the lawyer, the scientist.” Ortega y Gasset is particularly concerned about a tendency toward professionalism, or vocationalism.

In *Mission of the University*, Ortega y Gasset focuses intensely upon the ways university students can assess current events critically and evaluatively. He yearns for a higher educative pedagogy that dwells in the “vital ideas” of the day, the broader realities of culture, and the connections that can be drawn between the two. For him, the training of professionals misses this and represents an educational failure that is reflected in the “dehumanizing” characteristic of which Jaspers speaks. In undergraduate regard, vocational training, scholar per scholar, is the great sin of the university. The superficial training it offers represents an insufficient and incomplete education of individual persons. If Newman’s gentleman seems to be a bit aristocratic, the assumption is that he is not shallow.

Fallis reminds of us Newman’s interest in this educational kind of fullness when he writes in “Discourse V” about acquiring knowledge for its own sake: “a liberal education . . .

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535 Ibid., 28-29.

536 Ibid., 30.
should not be preparation for a job, not to gain mastery of one discipline. Rather, it should be a broad education.\textsuperscript{537} MacIntyre agrees, but in referencing Newman he gets more to the point of character formation.

The aim of a university education is not to fit students for this or that particular profession or career, to equip them with theory that will later on find useful applications to this or that form of practice. It is to transform their minds, so that the student becomes a different kind of individual, one able to engage fruitfully in conversation and debate, one who has a capacity for exercising judgment, for bringing insights and arguments from a variety of disciplines to bear on particular complex issues.\textsuperscript{538}

MacIntyre emphasizes the role of philosophy alone in expanding and enriching our lives, but also specifically discusses the activities of dialogue and debate that deepen and personalize the dynamic of inquiry within students. Kronman also explains how the humanities, especially through literature, stir emotions and stimulate imaginative thinking.\textsuperscript{539} Kronman, of course, espouses an antivocationalist regard and, like others, indicts the university as guilty in how it fails to educate students. While Fallis, MacIntyre, and Kronman have specific agendas of their own, they share with each other a passionate regard for substantiating and developing subjectivity. Through different intellective emphases they want to educate people for the complexities of life. In their works we can appreciate the rational, emotional, and imaginative enhancements of subjectivity in the context of higher education.

Like Jaspers, Maritain, Newman, and Ortega y Gasset above, Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) is yet another philosopher who discusses university education. As scholars and thinkers bemoan specialization, be beckons “generalisation,” the spirit of which, in his

\textsuperscript{537} Kronman, \textit{Education’s End}, 20.

\textsuperscript{538} MacIntyre, \textit{God, Philosophy, Universities}, 147-48.

\textsuperscript{539} Kronman, \textit{Education’s End}, 72.
assessment, should govern universities.\textsuperscript{540} Whitehead exudes an interesting Renaissance humanist sensitivity through an interest in the growth and development of students, and he recognizes the ability of education to cultivate the innate human capacity – “the principle of progress is from within”\textsuperscript{541} – for the improvement and enrichment of one’s life.

In the third chapter of this thesis we discussed Vergerio’s ability at the beginning of the fifteenth century to name and discuss the dynamic of youthfulness in education as well as in life. Likewise, in both the first and third chapters, we were able to appreciate John Dewey’s (1859-1952) similar concept of growth. Whitehead himself speaks of the “rhythmic character of growth” and discusses the responsibility of teachers of all levels of education – higher education included – to appreciate such a capacity in the lives of their students and for establishing the kind of environment that fosters it.\textsuperscript{542} Whitehead criticizes specializing trends that narrow the interests of students and thereby stunt and stagnate the growth they can enjoy.

Ironically, in the collection of essays in Whitehead’s \textit{The Aims of Education} (1929), a set of addresses for conferences and academic communities ranging from 1912 to 1928, the last address to be composed, “Universities and Their Functions,” the one dealing specifically with higher education and the need for generalization, was delivered at the Business School of Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. In the address Whitehead expresses an interest in maximizing a deeply personal educational impact and thereby emphasizes a challenge for higher education to offer students a wide exposure of courses. He also repeats his insights about the Renaissance humanist and Deweyan power of youthfulness, encouraging universities to tap into

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{541} Ibid., 39.
\item \textsuperscript{542} Ibid., 39-40. Whitehead’s rhythmic character of growth is articulated in a cyclic pattern of human freedom that passes through the phases or stages of “Romance,” “Precision,” and “Generalisation.” (p. 31)
\end{itemize}
and nourish all of an individual’s intellective capacities. In this, he is especially pointed about the role of imagination. Its abilities to assess current realities about one’s life and the world and ponder alternatives not only testify to profound personal investments of analysis, evaluation, and hope, but they also help to catalyze transformations of the self and the social. In fact, imaginative capacity is a nonnegotiable educative expression for Whitehead: “A university is imaginative or it is nothing.”

Similar to the growth construct, Whitehead explains that young people are easily imaginative and that higher education should offer methods that exercise it within the university and, beyond it, preserve it as a way of life. Part of Whitehead’s goal is to hone in upon a sense of individual investment and the dimensions of excitement, curiosity, confidence, and possibility that are associated with imaginative capacity. In this, Whitehead reveals affinities to Dewey in other ways. Not only does Dewey speak to the problems of vocational education in *Democracy and Education*—“No one is just an artist and nothing else, and in so far as one approximates that condition, he is so much the less developed human being; he is a kind of monstrosity”—but amplifies the dimension of self-investment through his description of personal interests.

To be interested is to be absorbed in, wrapped up in, carried away by, some object. To take an interest is to be on the alert, to care about, to be attentive. We say of an interested person both that he has lost himself in some affair and that he has found himself in it. Both terms express the engrossment of the self.

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543 Ibid., 96.
544 Ibid., 93.
545 Ibid., 97.
547 Ibid., 126. Here, I think it is also worth naming a tension between an ability for educational topics across a wide range of options to initiate and cull personal interests in students (Whitehead’s “generalization,” humanist curricula,
As the concept of interest in Dewey’s rendition represents and substantiates the depth and breadth of personal imagination that Whitehead wants, both philosophers also speak to an inherent connection to discipline. Dewey couples interest and discipline as “correlative aspects,” and Whitehead speaks of the need for imaginative education, again, a self-invested learning process, to be persistent throughout life. In this, and furthermore, both Whitehead and Dewey speak, then, of an educational way of life. Relating an imaginative orientation of life more specifically to the university, Whitehead says, enticingly, “Education is discipline for the adventure of life; research is intellectual adventure; and the universities should be homes of adventure.”

Martha Nussbaum agrees. Her recent Not For Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities (2010), a more concise follow-up to her earlier publication, Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education (1997), echoes Whitehead in an important way. In Not For Profit, she wants higher education to provoke in the life a student a “daring imagination,” and with it, sharp and searching critical and analytical thinking and acute empathetic abilities that engage the predicaments and complexities of others and the world, educational outcomes that are, for her, unqualifiedly cultivated by the humanities.

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548 Dewey, Democracy and Education; and Whitehead, The Aims of Education and Other Essays, 97.

549 Whitehead, The Aims of Education and Other Essays, 98.


551 Nussbaum, Not For Profit, 7.
Her book frames the devaluation, if not demise, of the humanities by economic and instrumental drives both within and around the university. Science and technology can indeed enhance the quality of life, and the kinds of financial investments and payouts they proffer are not negligible. But the “profit motive” that compels so much of higher education cannot be the only motive, let alone a primary one. As the book begins, she turns to the Indian and American intellectuals Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941) and Bronson Alcott (1799-1888) and proclaims that in being so driven by cost-benefit pedagogies and programs “we seem to be forgetting about the soul,” that is, the deeply personal, profoundly substantial, abilities to think, imagine, and relate.

In his 1826-27 winter of depression, Mill’s soul was touched. As new perspective filled his life, a correlation between Nussbaum’s appreciations of the humanities and their role in higher education and Mill’s own can be made. Defining the university as a place which should not train men professionally but nourish and cultivate human beings, expressing a concern about vocationalism that has been referenced throughout this section, Mill wants the kind of intellectually rounded, personally invested, character forming, and socially engaged higher education that he feels universities should offer. Furthermore, his sentiments are represented in the insights and challenges of Dewey, Fallis, Kronman, MacIntyre, Newman, Ortega y Gasset, and Whitehead, especially in regard to the substantial and existential dimensions of the human experience. When Mill emerges from his melancholy, an awakening to joy energized by artistic thoughts, images, and feelings, he admits that, he, “for the first time [in his life], gave its proper

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552 Ibid.
553 Ibid., 6.
place, among the prime necessities of human well-being, to the internal culture of the individual.“As

III. Instrumental Epistemics

When Mill nears the end of his address at St. Andrews, a thoughtful and hopeful assessment of the idea of the university in line with those of Habermas, Jaspers, Maritain, Newman, Ortega y Gasset, and Whitehead, Mill also dwells in the campus-wide possibilities of open and communicative inquiry, personally dedicated and disciplined scholarship, collaborative and kindred academic entities, effective and inspiring teaching, and the cultivation of young adults who will move forward in life graced in broad intellectual, moral, and social regard. As these thinkers collectively reference interests, imaginations, analyses, evaluations, insights, feelings, and communications as necessary higher educative abilities, it is Mill who is most eloquent in assessing the aesthetic sensitivities of our lives, powers which bring “home to us all those aspects of life which take hold of our nature on its unselfish side, and lead us to identify our joy and grief . . . with good or ill . . . and . . . to take life seriously.”

Such sensitivities, Fallis, author of Multiversities, Ideas, and Democracy, explains, cannot be cultivated when all educative efforts focus solely on the betterment of technical rationality. “The experience of joy and love, of sadness and grief, of honour and dignity, are part of being human, and cannot be approached through reason alone.” When we engage the work of higher education and educate young adult others, then, we should begin in a perspective of the human condition “which recognizes that an autonomous individual possessed of instrumental

555 Mill, Autobiography, 118.
556 Mill, Inaugural Address, 33.
557 Fallis, Multiversities, Ideas, and Democracy, 399.
reason cannot be complete.”\textsuperscript{558} Like many others, Fallis finds tremendous value in offering the humanities in higher education, especially the role of literature – he discusses the contributions of Lionel Trilling’s (1905-1975) life and scholarship, and in particular his *The Liberal Imagination* (1950) with great respect – in provoking and apprising myriad personal sensibilities. But it is Mill, again, who describes the effects of such an educational exposure so alluringly. “He who has learned what beauty is,” he says, “will desire to realize it in his own life.”\textsuperscript{559}

As we have pondered the fractured intuitional realities of the Modern university and its tendencies to educate persons \textit{insubstantially}, this third malaise of higher education focuses upon the problem of instrumentality. Together, fragmentation and superficiality represent individualizing efforts (of departments, disciplines, careers, concerns). Likewise, instrumentality also reveals an isolating dynamic. It represents a way of knowing that is decisively rational, and it is evaluated for its practical utility. Knowledge as such can be qualified as advantageous, economical, efficient, factual, and so on. Too often regarded as wholly representative of human intellect, it overshadows or suppresses other intellective powers.

This section of the chapter, like the previous two, recognizes an exaggerated dynamic and discusses options that vitiate a pedagogical imbalance by influences that denote more rounded, expansive, and holistic ways of knowing. As practitioners and philosophers of the university recognize the value of a cohesive, communicative campus and the need for broadly, \textit{generally} educated individuals, they also see the importance for personal discovering and knowing that emerge in multiple ways. Christopher Lucas, author of *American Higher Education* (2006), explains that “the clear tendency in American higher education throughout the last quarter of the

\textsuperscript{558} Ibid., 399.

\textsuperscript{559} Mill, *Inaugural Address*, 34.
nineteenth century, more than anything else, was one of concessions to the demand for more utilitarian learning.”

This section appreciates the possibilities of “integrated learning,” a conception of Parker Palmer and Arthur Zajonc’s that will be discussed shortly.

As the tendency toward scientific knowing is an expression of institutional fragmentation and personal vocationalism, it is just as so with instrumental rationality. Julie Reuben’s book and Lucas’, both astute and authoritative in discussing higher education in the United States, focus precisely on an epistemic shift in American university life. Reuben’s explains that her book, The Making of the Modern University (1996), “examines the transition from the nineteenth century broad conception of truth to the twentieth-century division between facts and values.”

The personal sources of curiosity and inquiry, she explains, became forces for forming fast and hard solutions, and the success of rational expression “was judged by practical results.” She persists, instructing that “[i]n the nomenclature of the twentieth century, only ‘science’ constituted true knowledge.”

She spends much of her time in her book showing how, through the industrial and scientific advances of society and the university, moral and spiritual insights lost validity and significance.

As many of the critics of Modernity discussed in the first chapter of this dissertation turn two centuries back to René Descartes (1596-1650), so does Lucas. Cartesian epistemology represents a paradigmatic shift that constricted human knowing. In his historical overview he explains how, though Descartes, the idea of science alone narrowed in meaning and became

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562 Ibid., 47.

563 Ibid., 2.
meticulous and scrupulous in how it was conducted, what it observed, and the claims it could make.\textsuperscript{564} Lucas cites the stalwart minds and methods of Descartes, Isaac Newton (1642-1772), and Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) to articulate a refined scientific orientation that became commonplace and, in turn, is representative of contemporary knowing. “[E]xact and certain knowledge apprehended by the mind (Descartes), measured mathematically (Newton), and demonstrated by experimentation (Galileo)” characterize a singularly valid epistemic option today.\textsuperscript{565} He continues, reinforcing that as the understanding of science transformed and tapered, “scientific distrust of unproven hypotheses had the further effect of emphasizing the importance of the utility of knowledge.”\textsuperscript{566}

As Lucas moves forward in history to assess the life of American higher education, he explains that such a trend toward the utility of knowledge was ostensible and patent at its most in the land-grant universities of the United States. Such institutions of higher education – the A&M universities for “agriculture” and “mechanics” and in general what are now regarded as state universities – flourished significantly in either expanding existing programs or originating new ones through Federal land grants for universities that would devote programming to pointed national production interests.\textsuperscript{567} Cole explains that the Morrill Act of 1862, signed into law by the President of the United States, Abraham Lincoln (1809-1865) – “[t]he first newly created land-grant school under the Morrill Act was Kansas State University”\textsuperscript{568} – was an investment in individuals and a society, both of which could be measured in “payoffs.”\textsuperscript{569}

\textsuperscript{564} Lucas, \textit{American Higher Education}, 93.

\textsuperscript{565} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{566} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{567} Ibid., 152-159.

\textsuperscript{568} Cole, \textit{The Great American University}, 28.
In *The Heart of Higher Education: A Call to Renewal* (2010), Parker Palmer and Arthur Zajonc, more authors yet who also very recently regret contemporary trends in American higher education – “something essential has gone missing”– offer a rich description of knowing they refer to as “integrative learning” that is not assessed and evaluated for its payoffs. The kind of epistemology they endorse is recognizably broader than one rooted in Cartesian rationality and thereby more inclusive of the many aspects of human knowing that were discussed in the first chapter of this dissertation. They explain that epistemic power in our lives, “rightly understood, has paradoxical roots—mind and heart, hard data and soft intuition, individual insight and common sifting.” In *The Heart of Higher Education* they thus propose various aspects of a kind of pedagogy that “support a way of knowing that involves much if not all of the whole self” in learning about the one’s life and the world. As Mill speaks of the need to feel and assess the fundamental joys and grievances of our lives, Palmer and Zajonc speak of the human experiences of awe, wonder, and humility as capacities that augment and enlarge knowing.

More holistic than instrumental, the integrative approach seeks to make connections between students’ lives and their courses; courses with other courses; students and their own experiences; students and the greater environment around them; courses, personal experience, and the environment; and so on. “A truly integrative education engages students in the systematic exploration of the relationship between their studies of the ‘objective’ world and the

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569 Ibid., 199.
571 Ibid., 22.
572 Ibid., 32.
573 Ibid., 22.
purpose, meaning, limits, and aspirations of their lives. As we have been recognizing the educative importance of uniquely personal interests, imaginations, analyses, evaluations, insights, feelings, and communications, Parker and Zajonc look for ways to evaluate and appreciate all of this in relationship to the external world.

In the first chapter of this thesis we discussed an inner-outer distinction of knowing that is criticized by Taylor. In supporting John McDowell’s epistemic perspective, Taylor criticized conceptions of human knowing which establish an “inside/outside distinction” between individuals and the external world, instructing that the personal, interior construals of a subject’s knowing capacities are not mere representations of an exterior world brought into the mind in some way and that, furthermore, inner construals (thoughts, feelings, insights, imaginations) are not disconnected from the influences of an outside world. Taylor realizes that we can certainly buffer ourselves from certain influences, and are conditioned in a secular age to buffer many realities, but he wants us – as do so many thinkers named in this dissertation – to better appreciate an epistemology that is always in some way relational. Palmer and Zajonc are looking for ways to better welcome and integrate these various connections within the self and between the self and the social. As Taylor speaks against the inner-outer qualification, he also speaks throughout all of *A Secular Age* about the porous subject who – pervious to and permeable of the external conditions one engages as well as of internal construals one exchanges – the mind is not Descartes’s lonely *res cogito* – is able to better know fullness.

Just as significantly, the kind of education Palmer and Zajonc want represents Taylor’s relational interests. Discussed by Taylor as a philosophical-anthological construct, fullness, a dimension of subjectivity that is waning in a secular age, corresponds to experiences of realities

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574 Ibid., 10.
qualified by Taylor as natural and supernatural. Knowing such realities forges an ontic commitment – an epistemic connection mentioned in the first chapter of this manuscript and described at different junctures in the second chapter – that Palmer and Zajonc are open to. For them it is an indispensible expression of human spirituality that, when lacking, lessens something about our own experiences and our own lives. Our world and we are somehow reduced, less fulfilled: “[a] diminished anthropology is a natural corollary to our diminished ontology.”

In proposing an integrative learning, Palmer and Zajonc not only let us imagine a holistic epistemic perspective that is inclusive of the many capacities of our own lives, but they remind us that our ways of knowing do not have to be as fractured, and thus limited, as the institutions of higher education that are persistently criticized today. Moreover, the broad spectrum of capacities for gaining knowledge – represented by thinking, feeling, intuiting, and more – some of the same realities Taylor speaks of in regard to the participatory and associative dimensions of agape in the first chapter of this thesis – also represents not a superficial but a personal and genuine investment by and engagement of students. Perhaps Jaspers, in *The Idea of the University* – where he speaks of the incongruity between narrow scientific pursuit and total personal commitment – sums this all up in explaining that the mission of the real university “demands the serious commitment of the whole [person] . . . it must aim for formation of the whole [person], for education in the broadest sense of the term.”

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575 Ibid., 101.


577 Ibid., 3.
Conclusion

Vitiating the problems not only of instrumentality, but also of fragmentation and superficiality, Palmer and Zajonc offer a worthy critique of contemporary higher education. But not unlike so many of the thinkers referenced in this chapter, they also look beyond the university to embrace complications and convolutions, both prosaic and profound, of the world we inhabit. In many ways, daily life is really what the focus is, and as philosophers, historians, and commentators of higher education keep human existence in purview, they also represent general existential concerns about the meanings and purposes of our lives. If universities cannot prepare people for the “messiness of real life,” including “the complexities and cruelties” of the world, Palmer and Zajonc end their book by wondering what higher education is for.578

Hutchins, whose words introduce this chapter, pondered the same reality in his generation. Similarly concerned about the problems of higher education this chapter dwells in, he says that a Modern mania for the facts of science, mechanics of technology, and possessions of capitalism dull so many aspects of our lives, such as thinking, feeling, imagining, intuiting, and communicating, skills and capacities we have recognized in each of the components of this chapter as suppressed or disregarded. Moreover, they are human abilities that are generally engaged and developed by studies in the humanities in the context of higher education.

Like Palmer and Zajonc, Hutchins is also concerned about the messiness of life. In The University of Utopia (1953) he explains that as higher education obsesses only upon evidences and verifications, we ourselves are less able to negotiate the uncertain, complex realities in us

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and around us, a capacity made possible, he explains, through the “useless, confusing, contradictory, and menacing” practice of philosophy.\footnote{Robert Maynard Hutchins, \textit{The University of Utopia} (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953), 50-52.}

This chapter has discussed the contemporary university as less collaborative, less personal, and less educative than it should be. Parsed, isolated, individualistic, vocational, professional, economical, and “barbaric” have been just some of the qualifications used to describe the current predicament. The problems of higher education in institutional, subjective, and epistemological realities – specifically discussed as institutional fragmentation, superficial subjectivity, and instrumental epistemics – are like the impersonal and noxious dimensions of Modernity discussed in the first chapter of this dissertation through Taylor’s concern for fullness. As an entity that is evermore fractured, pragmatic, and rational in its institutional, personal, and epistemic pursuits, it also manifests a buffered orientation that impedes dimensions of fullness.

Introduced in the first chapter as a phenomenal experience, recognized as yearned for in the works of recent scholars, and further discussed in epistemic expression and moral-ethical relating, fullness is an existential construct – a philosophical-anthropological reality – that can be educated. For a higher educative context specifically invested in its holistic possibilities, I turn to the final chapter of the dissertation.
Chapter Six: Pedagogies of Fullness

“Students, in the course of their formation, must let the gritty reality of this world into their lives. So they can learn to feel it, think about it critically, respond to its suffering and engage it constructively.”

Peter-Hans Kolvenbach

Introduction

This final chapter names and discusses three pedagogies of fullness and, simultaneously, represents the visions and expressions of a Jesuit imaginary. The pedagogies – referred to as “study,” “solidarity,” and “grace” – are developed out of the many components of this dissertation and are celebrated for their abilities to both enliven the fundamental realities of the tradition of Jesuit education and attend to the crises of relationship Charles Taylor diagnoses of a secular age. The Jesuit imaginary, an extension of Taylor’s own description of the social imaginary, focuses a particular higher educative vision of relating.

While the pedagogies are distinct from one another, they share a sensibility for dimensions of openness. Within the self, toward others, and to an Other, the pedagogies are all specifically relational. It is the many avenues of associating and connecting which qualify them as educational of fullness. Moreover, the pedagogies build upon one another. The work of “study” explores and establishes a sense of self that is able to move respectfully, inquisitively, and adaptively into the contexts of difference that are experienced in “solidarity.” In turn,
“study” and “solidarity” condition a student to better welcome and readily value the inexplicable, phenomenal, and transformative dimensions of “grace.”

I. Pedagogy of Study

Fundamentally, the pedagogy of study is recognized as an exploration of the vast domain of the self. As an educational method, strategies of inquiring and experiencing engage multiple intellective capacities of students by formulating, assessing, or immersing into one’s thoughts, feelings, intuitions, and imaginations. A comprehensive focus upon the self regards the inner construals of insights and emotions, interests and impulses, confusions and conflicts, confidences and credences, and so on, but does so in relationship to the social realms wherein students dwell. Family, friends, a campus, a church community, a civic sector, a political sphere, an economic environment, and the many other contexts that comprise the wide ambit of social influences upon individuals, are also appreciated by this pedagogy. In study’s ability to explore the self and to value external influences around individuals that are always personally formative, Terence’s (c.190-159 BCE) adage “Humani nil a me alienum puto” [‘Nothing human is foreign to me’] stages study in classical regard and represents a willful and inquisitive orientation that navigates the undulating landscape of the self.580

This first pedagogy takes direct inspiration from educational theorist Robbie McClintock’s interpretation of the Jesuit Ratio Studiorum (1599) as discussed in the fourth chapter of this thesis. Recognizing an ethos of the Ratio that is not characterized by “instruction,” per se, but as a persistent encouragement for students to “study,” McClintock...
approaches an early-Modern, globally and historically prominent plan of education with fresh insight.

The life of the *Ratio* is benchmarked by various historical realities, such as the 1548 opening of a school in Sicily for lay students by the Jesuits and an almost instant authoring of educational treatises that later formed the *Ratio*; the 1773 suppression of the Jesuit order and its nearly 800 schools around the world; the 1814 official restoration of the Jesuits and a simultaneous North American educational focus; and by the middle of the twentieth century a waning relevance of the treatise. Generally regarded as extremely administrative and particularly curricular, McClintock reveals and discusses a special sensitivity in the *Ratio* for a Renaissance humanist educational and Modern philosophical expression of study championed by Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592).

Per Montaigne and his *Essays* (1580), study is regarded as an assaying, that is, a trying, testing, and exploring method of writing and reflecting famously demonstrated by Montaigne and his subjective turn in philosophy. In essence, it is a philosophical method that cultivates abilities of profound subjective awareness. In “Of Experience,” Montaigne describes an inward gaze that will “study myself,” revealing to himself wisdoms of many kinds. He explains that “my metaphysics . . . my physics” will better inform him about his own life, the lives of others, and of the world around.\(^{581}\) When he indicates in another essay, “Of the Education of Children,” that “[m]y concepts and judgments can only fumble their way forward, swaying, stumbling, tripping over; even when I have advanced as far as I can, I never feel satisfied, for I have a troubled cloudy vision of lands beyond,” we can sympathize with Stephen Toulmin’s preference in the first chapter of this dissertation for Montaigne’s method as opposed to that of René

Descartes’s (1596-1650) method.\(^{582}\) Obsessed with attaining certainty, and solely interested in rational capacity, Descartes inaugurated a now pervasive and strident Modern philosophical orientation that has been recognized in this dissertation as problematic. Study represents an alternative and more robust epistemic disposition and an educational perspective that is formative.

Shy, impudent, loquacious, reticent, wasteful, judicious, Montaigne names and wrestles with his many moods and behaviors and comes to know them intimately.\(^{583}\) Such a spectrum is just one way of manifesting the vital realities of human life, a dynamism that Montaigne relishes and nourishes. I “portray passing,” he explains, and not stagnation in life, that is, fixity of perspectives and habits that resist challenges and possibilities.\(^{584}\) In another essay he states, “[m]y aim is to reveal my own self, which may be different tomorrow.”\(^{585}\) Montaigne’s method – “a thorny undertaking . . . to penetrate . . . dark depths”\(^{586}\) – tunnels holistically into the dimensions of human experience to acquaint individuals with their many intellective capacities and not only facilitates an honest assessment of oneself but recognizes and exercises the emotions, intuitions, and imaginations that rational perspective generally disregards. John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) was cited in the fifth chapter for discovering the force of these intellectual construals late in his life and recognizing of them an existential value.


\(^{585}\) Montaigne, “Of the Education of Children” in *The Essays*, 41.

Increasing self-knowledge and engaging intellectual abilities inclusively, the practice of Montaigne’s study also honors the social dimensions of the self. Interacting with others, meeting new people, hearing new ideas, seeing different rituals, and navigating unconventional mores impact and expand our personal horizons. But with Montaigne, doing so also teaches us more about the beliefs and values we embrace and the socio-cultural spheres we are already familiar with, letting us confirm and validate our values and practices, or refashion them, or perhaps even form ones anew.

The pedagogy of study, again, cited by McClintock as an explicit educational necessity of Jesuit education, can be valued in Jesuit higher education as an educative stratagem of relating in a secular age. Beyond the holistic portents of study and the wide epistemic range it permits, numerous other components of this thesis merge in the pedagogy. The “pilgrim” orientation of Jesuit perspective, for instance – a personal bent of searching, inquiring, and questioning – represents the discerning and examining aspects of Jesuit spirituality. Ignatius of Loyola (1491-1556) represented a pilgrim disposition in his life and nourished a corresponding ethos in his organization. Recall Carl Jung’s (1875-1961) designation of Ignatius’s Spiritual Exercises (1548) as one of three worldly historical advances in the practices of self-knowing and

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589 Tyson Lewis and Jan Masschelein are recent scholars who appreciate and discuss the role of study in education and represent a renewed interest in its educative value. See Tyson Lewis, “A Case for Study: Agamben’s Critique of Scheffler’s Theory of Potentiality,” Philosophy of Education Society Yearbook (in press) and The Appearance of Education: Studying, Stupidity, and Impotentiality in the Work of Giorgio Agamben (New York: Routledge, in press); and Curating the European University: Exposition and Public Debate, eds., Mathias Decuyper, Jan Masschelein, Maarten Simons, and Joris Vlieghe (Leuven: University Press Leuven, 2011). Also, given the style of Montaigne’s method of study and his assessment of the specific pedagogical practices of his own educational experience, warping Montaigne’s study into a specific pedagogy will be ironic and counter-intuitive to some of his readers.
imagining. The practice of discernment assays moods and behaviors, and the meditations of the *Exercises* spur imaginations.

The imaginative thrust alone reflects the Renaissance humanist readings of *pietas litterata* and it anticipates the desperate need for imagination in Alfred North Whitehead’s (1861-1947) assessment of higher education in an age of industry. Taylor’s own legitimizing of “theoretical imagination” as a striving and groping of the intellect into new terrain or even darkness, a searching and imagining, he insists, that begins in mere hunches and intuitions and leads toward, possibly, important discoveries and evidences. The dynamic role of interest, moreover, as discussed by John Dewey (1861-1947), is just as personal, and reinforces with the other elements of a pedagogy of study not the shallow and superficial tactics that train individuals toward professional or proficient ends, but the elements that educate students roundly, deeply, and formatively.

In light of the pilgrim characteristic of Jesuit study, it is also worth remembering Whitehead and Dewey’s descriptions in the previous chapter of an educational way of life. Both hope that learning, discerning, and inquiring, all expressions of the pilgrim disposition and represented here as an expression of study, become a personal habit that represents life as a persistent adventure. Study cultivates the ability to keep thinking, feeling, and imagining well beyond the Jesuit campus.

In all of this, the humanities, a curricular bedrock of Jesuit higher education in every age, are recognized for their abilities to provoke thoughts and feelings, and evoke images and intuitions. The humanities are important to each of the pedagogies of fullness. With the pedagogy of study they can be appreciated for how they cull an existential sensitivity that buttresses Taylor’s fullness. A philosophical-anthropological construct, fullness yearns for
meaning and purpose, axes upon which literature, philosophy, and theology easily revolve. The Renaissance humanist desire to wrestle with the issues of daily life, Vergerio’s interest in a peaceable and educative milieu and a civic consciousness, the humanist lineage across multiple generations of conceptions of arête, the Jesuit cultivation of classic pietas, and contemporary “ideas” of the university all manifest existential sensibilities of the humanities, contemporary expressions of the studia humanitatis that Jesuit higher education remains committed to.

Moreover, Adolfo Nicolás, the current Superior General of the Jesuits, speaks to an interesting aspect of the personal dimensions of study. In 2010, he convened a global conference on Jesuit higher education. Over 200 Jesuit higher educational institutions around the world sent delegates to the Universidad Iberoamericana in Mexico City where Nicolás, in his address, “Depth, Universality, and Learned Ministry: Challenges to Jesuit Higher Education Today,” affirmed the work and efforts of the institutions and invited them to acknowledge specific opportunities.

For instance, Nicolás describes the thoughtless, efficient, and impulsive expressions of communicating today through new technologies and encourages Jesuit higher education to espouse the tools of analysis, reflection, and discernment embedded within its own tradition in fresh pedagogical ways. He speaks precisely about the problem of superficiality that represents one of the three illnesses of higher education in a secular age in the previous chapter. He describes naïve and careless uses of information technology, explaining that

[w]hen one can access so much information so quickly and so painlessly; when one can express and publish to the world one’s reactions so immediately and so unthinkingly . . . when the latest opinion column . . . or the newest viral video can be spread so quickly to people half a world away, shaping their perceptions and feelings, then the laborious, painstaking work of serious, critical thinking often gets short-circuited.590

After citing the problems of superficiality related to social media and information technology, he specifically outlines three challenges. The first of the three regards the desperate need today in education anywhere for insisting upon and cultivating profundity of thinking and imagining in and through mechanisms of instant messaging. Nicolás’s explicit concern about instantaneous and insincere responses and relationships, and his recent encouragement to all of Jesuit higher education to find ways to prevent a ‘short-circuiting’ of the deeper and strenuous dimensions of thinking and relating, fall within the purview of study.

The pedagogy of study, a pilgrim adventure that wanders meaningfully through personal construals and experiences and deepens thoughts and feelings, can also be regarded for how it breaks down the rational buffers that suppress sentiments, distrust intuitions, and prevent imaginations. Intellective capacities are better networked through the evidences, emotions, instincts, and images they dwell in, and such networking attests to an internal relating that honors features of Taylor’s philosophical parlance. When we discussed the concept of agape in the first chapter as an expression of fullness, I indicated three participatory and associative relations, two of which fit here.

The participatory aspect represented a kind of stretching toward the divine, an active striving of an individual to a type of excellence that can be appreciated as an extension of the lineage of arête that we considered in the third chapter (from the Iliad to Isocrates) as well as an expression of the originary Greek conception of “theiosis” (“becoming divine”). Theiosis was likewise recognized in the first chapter as a kind of growing and excelling through personal transformations and is partly represented by the sense of Jesuit “magis,” the “greater,” or the “better.” Humanism is rife in personal virtues, and the discerning and evaluating capacities of
study in Jesuit higher education represent just some of the ideals that the pedagogies of fullness lead toward.

Especially pertinent here, though, is one of the associative actions of *agape*, the networking of internal intellective capacities. The visceral motivation of the Good Samaritan to help another is significant for a number of reasons, but the one Taylor is particularly interested in is a gut reaction that is not restrained or disregarded by rational perspective. The Good Samaritan let himself be informed, so to speak, by an intellective source. That source propelled him into action. All three *agapic* realities were discussed by Taylor as instances of “stepping beyond,” and recognized by me as *moving towards*. Here, in these two, through study, a student can be encouraged to move, first, towards an excellence or an ideal, or God, even, as interpreted of the Good Samaritan story; and second, towards an integrated wholeness of self that Parker Palmer and Arthur Zajonc postulate in their work as considered in the previous chapter.591

II. Pedagogy of Solidarity

As the first pedagogy of relating integrates the self, the pedagogy of solidarity relates to alterity, or otherness.592 The social contexts of students, domains particularly foreign but not exclusive of the familiar, are regarded by a pedagogy of solidarity for their educative capacities. The many social influences that form the self are not dissimilar to social dynamics of this second pedagogy, but as the locus of attention shifts from the self to the social, the various contexts become specifically important for the layers of new meanings they offer students.

591 Parker Palmer and Arthur Zajonc’s work, *The Heart of Higher Education: A Call to Renewal* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2010), discussed in the previous chapter, also represent the tenets of the pedagogy of study.

592 Peter-Hans Kolvenbach’s call for a well-educated “solidarity” is a direct inspiration to this pedagogy of fullness. As discussed in the previous chapter of this dissertation, see: “The Service of Faith and the Promotion of Justice in American Jesuit Higher Education,” Conference Address, Commitment Justice in Jesuit Higher Education conference, Santa Clara University, Santa Clara, CA, October 2000: http://www.loyola.edu/yotc/father_kolvenbach.html#txxv.
In focusing on the social, this pedagogy cultivates a pliability or adaptability of individuals to the new environments – the lives, cultures, customs, and concepts – of others, and in doing so it transforms the horizons of the self. Not only are the numerous intellective capacities of the pedagogy of study triggered in special ways, culling or developing, for instance, original thoughts, different emotions, sudden intuitions, novel interests, and innovative imaginations – the activities which represent the inner construals of study – but alterity facilitates new relationships to other places, persons, and perspectives. Dimensions of flexibility and adjustment to difference let students assess and appropriate experiences of alterity in their lives, and forge meaningful and respectful associations and affiliations with the contexts of alterity. With such a focus on otherness, and because of the possibility for genuine connections, Cicero’s (106-43 BCE) phrase, “Non nobis solum nati sumus” [‘We are not born for ourselves alone’], is a worthy classic representative. With the pedagogy of solidarity, the epistemic components of study broaden even more, but a new philosophical reality – that of the moral-ethical – is also augmented by the explicit relational expressions of this pedagogy.

Two essential components of this manuscript ground a pedagogy of solidarity, the Jesuit mandate in “Part IV” of the Constitutions (1558) to adapt to ‘times, places, and persons,’ and the conception of the world as “home” to Jesuits, both of which are inspired by an early Jesuit pedagogue, Jerónimo Nadal (1507-1580), and discussed in the fourth chapter of this dissertation. “Part IV,” according to the historian George E. Ganss, softens the institutional rigidity of the Ratio and reveals how a detailed plan was intended to be sensitive to the various cultures wherein it was instituted. The image of the world as place of home, furthermore, generally represents the global mission of the Jesuit organization, one of the first religious orders in Roman
Catholicism that did not bind its members to specific and cloistered residences, nor the traditional routines of institutional religious life.

In referencing the home as a “highway” (rather than a house), Nadal not only recognizes the worldly disposition of Jesuits, but, literally, their international movement. The activity of travel, physical movement, and being elsewhere – the hallmark expression of Jesuit life is being “missioned” or assigned to places and projects – is well captured by the highway metaphor. But the movement of the metaphor need not be literal. It also represents the searching dispositions of inquiry, examination, growth, and possibility right where one is. Again, Ignatius was hailed as a pilgrim for walking Europe, but also for the Modern elements of reflection, discernment, and personal desire that he personally practiced and institutionally implemented. The Constitutions and the Spiritual Exercises together convey the pilgrim expressions of both movement and mindset – that is, going somewhere and searching from the vantage of anywhere.

In approaching alterity and creating solidarity, the mandate to adapt – that is, to be flexible and friendly to difference and to feel at home in otherness – respecting both what is home to others and to oneself – well stages a pedagogy of solidarity. Adaptation was recognized in the life of Ignatius in his ability to appropriate life experiences in self-fulfilling and socially impacting ways. A capacity for emotional, intellectual, and spiritual malleability was also expected of Jesuits who would intimately engage the lives of others – proximate and afar, familiar and foreign – in expressions of personal ministry or social justice. New Jesuits, then, were stretched and tested by the three classic “experiments” of the Jesuit novitiate that were named in the fourth chapter of this thesis, the long retreat, the hospital assignment, and a pilgrimage experience, experiments that “assayed” their personal resources and assumptions and, further, equipped them for a complex and often messy world. Moreover, “Part IV” is an
authoritative educational document of the Jesuits. Its directive for educational personnel and programs to acclimatize to ‘times, places, and persons’ easily translates into a pedagogical force of its own.

Like the practices of Jesuits Matteo Ricci (1552-1610) and Roberto de Nobili (1577-1656), a pedagogy of solidarity honors the multiple aspects of a healthy self-possession and the existential realities which inform a sense of self, but encourages students to negotiate openly and respectfully how to be at home elsewhere. Ricci and de Nobili are paradigmatic figures of the intellectual fervor of the Renaissance. Much of Ricci’s relationship with the xenophobic Ming Dynasty of China rotated around a sharing of ideas and instruments. Ricci himself was a linguist, a theologian, a mapmaker, and more who shared and exchanged concepts and customs. As a seventeenth century missionary he indeed hoped to attract new membership into his own religious way of life, but he is remembered for an accommodating, assimilating, and inquiring disposition that transformed his own life in as much as it transformed others. In China for the rest of his life, Ricci was never not a Jesuit, but he is noteworthy for becoming personally known and officially ranked in a regime that was highly guarded even from its own people.

Many precedents of the pedagogy of solidarity exist. We discussed the lineage of arête with the pedagogy of study in personal regards, as striving toward virtuous ideals, but we can readily admit that all of the classic ideals of individual excellence demonstrated inherent social expressions. Pedagogically, this is most clear in Isocrates (436-338 BCE) and Cicero who look to rhetoric as a sense of personal virtue that is wholly communal. The Jesuit pedagogues evolved this through Erasmus (1466-1536) into a conception of eloquentia perfecta that is represented, in part, by Christianitas, an active and experiential dimension of Jesuit education that functioned
through the Marian sodalities, early-Modern precursors to current immersion- and service-
learning programs.

In 1973, the Superior General of the Jesuits, Pedro Arrupe (1907-1991), spoke about
specific aspects of solidarity at the International Congress of Jesuit Alumni in Europe. The name
of his address, “Men for Others,” now referred to as “Men and Women for Others,” charted, in
many ways, a renewed educational investment in humanistic social and civic engagement of
Jesuit education around the world.

Arrupe makes three points. The first two regard the pervasive and negative effects of
capitalism in Western societies and the ways which consumerism and mass production
compromise many lives and obfuscate important and essential elements of life, such as
relationships. Arrupe discusses differences between those who benefit exponentially by
capitalism and the many others who suffer from its effects. He thus asked the members of his
audience to be mindful of the world’s poor, “the truly marginalized,” both far afield in distant
places and those close to home.

As the first two points of the address demand a cultural analysis and an awareness of
others, he insists in his third point that today, in the contemporary era, Jesuit education must
form men and women to be agents of social change. “For if there is any substance on our
reflections,” he ponders aloud, “then this [kind of education] is the prolongation into the modern
world of our humanist tradition as derived from the Spiritual Exercises of Saint Ignatius.”

True to the origins of Jesuit education, that is, its Ciceronian-inspired ideal of *eloquentia
perfecta*, the virtue of *pietas*, and expressions of *Christianitas* – again, components discussed in

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593 Pedro Arrupe, “Men for Others: Education for Social Justice and Social Action Today,” Conference Address,
Tenth International Congress of Jesuit Alumni of Europe,” in Valencia,
Spain, July 1973: [http://onlineministries.creighton.edu/CollaborativeMinistry/men-for-others.html](http://onlineministries.creighton.edu/CollaborativeMinistry/men-for-others.html)
the fourth chapter of this dissertation – Arrupe pushed Jesuit education back into the essentials of its tradition and asked it to face contemporary problems. The driving question of his talk regarded the kinds of qualities and characteristics graduates of Jesuit education should leave with, and its answer, in the end, rested in an ideal of justice. That specific objective, a renewed essential of Jesuit educational endeavors, also came under Arrupe’s leadership to represent all the works of the Jesuits.

The mission of the Society of Jesus today is the service of faith, of which the promotion of justice is an absolute requirement . . . In one form or another, this has always been the mission of the Society; but it gains new meaning and urgency in the light of needs and aspirations of the men and women of our time, and it is in that light that we examine it anew.  

Articulated in “Decree 4” of the 32nd General Congregation of the Society of Jesus, a convening of Jesuit representatives from around the world to assess the organization’s leadership and priorities, Arrupe oriented the works and projects of Jesuits into explicit contemporary issues.

In doing so, he also anticipates the crisis of Taylor’s fullness. Millions of people the world round, Arrupe explains, “specific people with names and faces,” suffer in countless ways, but existentially sensitive to how flourishing is so easily compromised, such people, he insists, “have a feeling that what is at stake here is the very meaning of [being human.]”  

His recognition, moreover, of the humanistic aspects of Jesuit higher education, along with its interest in forming socially just persons, shows how the individuating, isolating, and utilitarian prospects of fragmentation, professionalism, and rationalism frustrate the Jesuit higher educational mission.

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594 Documents of the 31st and 32nd General Congregations of the Society of Jesus (Saint Louis: The Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1977), 411.

595 Ibid., 417.
Arrupe’s successor personally voiced similar contemporary concerns and an educational interest in justice to the Jesuit universities of the United States. In his address in 2000 at Santa Clara University, Santa Clara, California, “The Service of Faith and the Promotion of Justice in American Jesuit Higher Education,” intentionally delivered at the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 32nd General Congregation, Peter-Hans Kolvenbach cited the inspirational thrusts of “Decree 4” as well as of Arrupe’s 1973 talk. The ideal of justice and “[t]he expression, ‘men and women for others,’” Kolvenbach explains, galvanized and transformed Jesuit higher education, and must be again renewed.\(^{596}\)

More explicitly than Arrupe, Kolvenbach takes an opportunity to explain the origins and history of Jesuit education. He reminds American Jesuit higher educators of the holistic pedagogy of Jesuit education generally and the inherently connected issues of such an education to issues of justice and human flourishing. For four and a half centuries, he explains, “Jesuit education has sought to educate ‘the whole person’ intellectually and professionally, psychologically, morally, and spiritually.”\(^{597}\)

Globalization, however, different from other paradigm shifts in Modernity, such as the revolutions of religion, science, and industry, offers possibilities and problems of its own. Jesuit higher education, he challenges, must not only revitalize its efforts to educate holistically, but it must do so in light of the particular forces of globalization that exploit, manipulate, or disregard peoples and nations. “Tomorrow’s whole person must have . . . a well-educated solidarity,” a relational objective that is not learned through concepts, but “contact.”\(^{598}\)


\(^{597}\) Ibid.

\(^{598}\) Ibid.
energies of students – their inquiries, imaginations, ideals, and actions – can be enlivened through personal and meaningful interaction in the lives of others, especially with those adversely affected by globalization. Recall, too, that “contact” is precisely what actualizes Taylor’s fullness.

Per the lead quote of this chapter, Kolvenbach wants students of Jesuit higher education to feel and think through the daily “gritty” circumstances of people in the world around them. Like Arrupe’s query of what kinds of skills and sensitivities graduates of Jesuit education should manifest, Kolvenbach suggests at the end of his address that an assessment of Jesuit higher education directly pertains to “not what our students do, but who they become.” Such a formative interest and the kinds of contacts Kolvenbach encourages naturally rebuff the lonesome perspective of fragmentation, the shallow and practical training of students, and the limitations of technical rationality. The cooperative, in-depth, and holistic possibilities of educating for solidarity persist the humanist ideals of a 450-year-old pedagogy.

Pierre Hadot’s discussion of the tradition of spiritual exercises in ancient philosophical ways of life reminds us in the fourth chapter of this thesis of a spiritual correlate to Kolvenbach’s learned solidarity. In Ignatius’s Spiritual Exercises, the imaginative experience of the Trinitarian gaze generally impelled practitioners into relationships with others, connections that are meaningful and reciprocal, and transformative of selves and societies.

Nicolás, moreover, the current leader who is worried about technological and communicative habits that sustain expressions of superficiality, also sees the social benefits of such tools. As he challenges Jesuit higher education to inspire deeper dimensions of thoughtfulness and circumspection with social media, the Internet, and devices of

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599 Ibid.
communication, he looks for ways, first, to share such tools with those who do not have access to their powers and abilities and, second, to better network Jesuit higher education itself. Citing Madrid, Jogjakarta, Bogotá, Chennai, Jersey City, and Beirut as a few of the cities where Jesuit universities exist, he says, “My hope . . . is that we can move . . . to the establishment of operational consortia among our universities focused on responding together to some of the ‘frontier challenges’ of our world which have a supra-national or supra-continental character.”

Like his predecessors, Arrupe and Kolvenbach, he exudes a special sensitivity to globally existing poverties and oppressions.

Of the three challenges he voices, the first of which was recognized above in the pedagogy of study, the other two are particularly social. First, he invites cooperative international alliances between Jesuit institutions themselves – places of higher education specifically but also other educational and ministerial venues of the Jesuits – to understand and alleviate worldwide issues of economic poverty, social injustice, and ecological deterioration. In the previous chapter, we appreciated Jonathan Cole’s desire for departments and disciplines at major research universities to better collaborate on such global issues.

Secondly, Nicolás pushes Jesuit universities to mitigate a disparity of knowledge distribution demonstrated by those who can afford technologies and others without access to the powers and privileges of information, images, and insights. Mindful of the specific problems of the previous chapter, the educational interests in institutional collaboration, personal investment, and holistic knowing could not be more patent. Nicolás’s recent concern about trite networking and inconsequential associating reminds Jesuit higher education of the challenges in today’s

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expression of globalization for personal and substantive relating. All of this, moreover, allows us to assess the dynamics of fragmentation in and around universities and the a-relational footholds it attains.

Recall, also, the communicative and dialogic roles of the university represented by Karl Jaspers (1883-1969) and Jürgen Habermas. As these essential dynamics have the ability to represent a unified or holistic conception of the university, or stitch together a fragmented one, they also represent an indispensable aspect of solidarity. Dialogue in particular is an aspect of the kind of relating solidarity enacts. Moreover, as real and meaningful conversation connects students to places, persons, and perspectives, we can further appreciate Alasdair MacIntyre and Anthony Kronman’s insights, also in the fifth chapter of this dissertation, about the need to ask serious questions about oneself and others. While their encouragement for discursive existential query informs a pedagogy of study, it also represents the bridges which are built through a pedagogy of solidarity. As a basic practice and as conversant of existential realities, dialogue represents the kind of “contact” Kolvenbach wants. Even José Ortega y Gasset’s (1883-1955) insistence for students of higher education to dwell within the vital ideas of culture helps here. Students of solidarity must engage the vital ideas of their own cultures and those of other ones. In its global program of letter writing initiated at the end of the sixteenth century, the Jesuit order already set a reflective and descriptive communicative precedent for sharing and discussing foreign realities.

Finally, as a pedagogy of fullness, the moralethical dynamic of Taylor’s agape is enacted by a pedagogy of solidarity. The second associative dimension, a stepping beyond familiar persons and places into less familiar realms – a moving towards others – allows for a wider kinship in our lives. Again, Taylor speaks of stronger and expanded senses of community.
Moreover, in moving towards alterity to forge solidarity, the communal, social, political, and religious associations of porous selves are all the more possible. The first pedagogy of fullness focuses upon the self. This pedagogy of fullness relates the self to alterity.

III. Pedagogy of Grace

Essentially, a pedagogy of grace cultivates an orientation to a transcendent other, or at least invites a kind of transcendent orientation. As the first pedagogy of fullness cultivates the inner construals of individuals and the second facilitates meaningful associations with other persons, places and perspectives, a pedagogy of grace relies upon the dynamics of study and solidarity to facilitate an openness to unusual dimensions of revelation and signification.

Terence phrases a notion of study and Cicero represents an articulation of solidarity, both of which are recognized in aspects of Jesuit education. The ancient Roman poet, Horace (65-27 BCE), in his famous command, “carpe diem,” – that is, “Carpe diem, quam minimun credula postero” [‘harvest today without thinking of tomorrow’] – in my estimate offers a classic insight about this pedagogy.

In ”seizing the day,“ Horace encourages people to be attentive to the activities and opportunities at hand, that is, to be aware of the present. In a sense, he lets individuals be seized by such realities. Horace’s focus on the present does not disregard the intentional work of study and the deliberate associations of solidarity, but offers an alternative intentionality, or expressions that are less intentional, or even unintentional. It can even be said that the educative work of study and solidarity help to cultivate the conditions of this third pedagogy, a disposition not of suspicion or fear of the unexpected, but of ready, or already, openness.

The pedagogy of grace represents what is not planned, or what is unprepared, or surprising. It is a pedagogy that cultivates an openness – or appreciates the kind of openness
cultivated by study and solidarity – in students for inexplicable and phenomenal moments of wonder, awe, inspiration, gratitude, consolation, or confirmation. They are experiences that are regarded in special ways – even prescribed – at various junctures of this thesis. Recall from the previous chapter the sudden awareness in Mill’s life the winter of 1826 and the new insights – those with real existential punch – that transformed him. Addressing the students of St. Andrews in 1867, he said, “He who has learned what beauty is will desire to realize it in his own life.”

Moreover, Pier Paolo Vergerio (1370-1444), Hubert Dreyfus, Sean Dorrance Kelly, and René Arcilla collectively hope for virtuous dispositions of generosity, gratitude, and wonder to mitigate the combative, nihilistic, and capitalist milieus wherein they dwell.

As a pedagogy of fullness, grace is in many ways what is first expressed by Taylor’s fullness through Bede Griffiths, and then Vaclav Havel, and is instantly referenced in A Secular Age (2007) by Taylor through Friedrich von Schiller’s (1759-1805) conception of “play,” an impulsion which recognizes a beauty that is beyond us. In the first chapter of this dissertation, Dreyfus, Kelly, Arcilla, and John McDowell all in their own philosophical pursuits look for ways to encounter the dimension of the beyond whereby a revelation – a “whooshing” of some kind – meaningfully impacts us.

The external signification does not destroy, but defies the autonomy, individuality, relevancy, and willfulness of rational individuals who, through the Cartesian-Kantian strand of knowing, credit themselves as wholly inventive or creative of meaning and purpose. Endorsing Schiller’s play and assuring its external origins – as said in the first chapter: “persons are played rather than being the instigators of play” – Hans-George Gadamer allows for interpretive

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602 John Stuart Mill, Inaugural Address: Delivered to the University Students of St. Andrews (Memphis: General Book, 2010), 34.
gestures that articulate and honor such experiences, a verbalization which culminates in *A Secular Age* in the poetry of Gerard Manley Hopkins (1844-1889).

These indications of fullness – play, whooshing, and presentness – or, more descriptively, the hermeneutic, Heideggerian, existential, and epistemic expressions of yearning for it by, respectively, Gadamer, Dreyfus and Kelly, Arcilla, and McDowell, lean into the ontic commitment Taylor’s *magnus opus* insists upon, a philosophical precedent that authenticates external sources of life and being and permits a relating to a supreme alterity, or an Other. To the internal and external porosities of study and solidarity, then, grace accomplishes another relating yet, one that is religiously assumed by Jesuit higher education and, for that matter, all things Jesuit.

Such openness is a fundament of the *Spiritual Exercises*, a personal experience of praying, as discussed in the fourth chapter, that is not only open to the reality of a transcendent Other but recognizes the world itself as graced by such an Other. In comparing the *Exercises* and the *Ratio Studiorum*, Claude Pavur, you might recall from the fourth chapter, describes a disposition of openness in both of the documents as “radical.” The treatises were recognized for both the ontic commitments they offer and senses of relating they facilitate. Finally, in their addresses about the Jesuit university, the three Jesuit leaders manifest the same orientation – a specific Christian ontic commitment – in their references to religious faith, an expression of knowing that is, furthermore, represented by Taylor’s “theoretical imagination” and ultimately necessary of his porous subject.

From Taylor – as with the first two pedagogies of fullness – we can also see the *agapic* reality of this third pedagogy. As *agape*, a Christian specific term, represents a stretching toward God, and demonstrates aspects of responding and relating to God, it characterizes a sharing in
the life of God, a religious ability, according to the insights of Anders Nygren and Gene Outka in the first chapter, to believe in God’s love and in turn to love like God. As a pedagogy of fullness, grace represents the possibility of such a relationship, an openness to another source, a source beyond ourselves, for what is good in life.

If we continue to reflect upon each of the pedagogies of fullness to better realize this third one, we can also name a leading philosophical expression at work in them. The pedagogy of study, in its efforts to cultivate through personal capacities and experiences a wider knowing, exudes an epistemological sensitivity. Solidarity, a pedagogy that builds upon the work of study in relating to alterity and connecting to new persons, places, and perspectives, amplifies a moral-ethical interest. Here, in a third pedagogy yet, grace represents a metaphysical aptitude, a propensity of ultimate porosity, to use Taylor’s term, whereby another kind of openness is possible.

The porous subject emerges in special regard with this pedagogy, a self who in Taylor’s estimate resists or elides what seems to be the first or highest of many buffers of a secular age. As each of the pedagogies withstand exaggerated expressions of autonomy, individuality, and relevancy, the pedagogy of grace nourishes dimensions of openness along the lines of inquiry and experience. Inquiry pushes the searching, exploring, and questioning of reality to a new realm or a different domain, and experience lets the self acknowledge, appreciate, or allow the connections to such spheres of influence. The pedagogy of grace encourages an extraordinary awareness, and as it is metaphysical, it is also phenomenal.

In further comparison to the first and second pedagogies, a pedagogy of grace can also be recognized for its ability to resist the traps of fragmentation, superficiality, and strident rationality. Study delves into the deeply personal nature of interests and imaginations, insights
and intuitions, and helps to alleviate, as we have discussed, the problem of a superficial subjectivity. In its ambit of intellective capacities, it also assuages instrumentality. It allocates a more expansive epistemics than a strictly rationalistic perspective. Finally, in refusing to fracture a network of knowing, study is holistic of the self.

Solidarity, by virtue of its connections and associations, likewise prevents the dynamics of fragmentation and isolation. It manifests an interest in cooperation and collaboration that can be institutionally implemented. In adapting and accommodating to alterity, and in being openly communicative and intentionally dialogic, it too can be evaluated for how it draws upon the depths of subjectivity and how it must oppose instrumentality.

In an openness to revelation, the personal nature of phenomenal awareness, and a kind of knowing which permits metaphysical possibility, the aspects of grace also resist expressions of fragmentation, superficiality, and instrumentality. By definition, openness is not isolating, epiphany is not shallow, and metaphysical is not pragmatic, economic, or efficient.

Finally, as a pedagogy of fullness, grace, more patently that the other pedagogies, but not exclusively, facilitates conditions of belief in a secular age. As was mentioned earlier, the pedagogies each build upon the work of one another. The broad knowing of study and the wide relating of solidarity dwell, to expand Kolvenbach’s metaphor, in the “gritty reality” of self and society to assay, adapt, and relate students in higher educative ways. And in as much as the dynamics of fragmentation, superficiality, and instrumentality are vitiated by all three pedagogies, other conditions – such as wholeness, depth, and vision – of selves and of universities – become possible, conditions that cultivate aspects of relating that connote Taylor’s fullness.
But the pedagogy of grace best frames particular conditions – the conditions of belief – that Taylor assesses in a secular milieu. By his admission, the crisis of fullness in a secular age is first and fundamentally appreciated by reference to a transcendent source, a reality the pedagogy of grace relies upon.\(^{603}\) In pointing students more intentionally into themselves and others, the pedagogies of study and solidarity open new possibilities of knowing and relating. In orienting students less intentionally to a revelatory source of wonder, awe, and inspiration, and its sensations of gratitude, consolation, and confirmation, and letting them be seized by any of these, they begin to experience the essential components of fullness in an age which distrusts, denies, or denigrates the meanings and purposes they proffer. The pedagogy of grace, then, in another level of relating yet, helps to meet Taylor’s existential desires for meaning and purpose. In cooperation with the strategies of study and solidarity, the pedagogies of fullness in Jesuit higher education condition ways of relating. As the cultivation of various contacts forms students, it lets them better imagine a relational way of life.

**Conclusion**

This chapter names and describes three Jesuit higher educative pedagogies of fullness. Referencing aspects from each of the chapters of this dissertation, the stratagems of study, solidarity, and grace are shown to emerge organically out of the tradition of Jesuit education and are recognized for their ability to condition ways of relating. Concerned about existential conditions, Taylor grieves a waning experience of fullness in a secular age. In facilitating connections and associations to three essential contexts, the subjective, social, and transcendent relations of the pedagogies of fullness can alleviate, through their relations, contemporary problems of stridentmeaninglessness. They make fullness, that is, relating, possible. *Agape*, an

expanded version of fullness that Taylor described through movements of “stepping beyond,”
was discussed in the first chapter of this thesis and further portrayed through activities of moving
towards. Study, solidarity, and grace are pedagogies of fullness that move the Jesuit university
student toward him or herself, others, and an Other.
Conclusion

Imagining a way of living and relating is an essential dimension of Taylor’s *A Secular Age*. The “social imaginary” he discusses at length there and elsewhere represents, quite literally, the way people envision a social existence with one another. It includes ways by which people envision or imagine the combined reality of a sense of self and ways of engaging the world, both of which speak to the relational prospects of fullness in one’s life. The discussion of Bernard Lonergan in the first chapter of this dissertation highlighted the intimate connection he represents of subjective and social realities. In his work, the correlation between the two suggests that genuine intellectual, moral, and religious transformations of an individual’s life make the world a better place.

Forming a learned imagination is a goal of the pedagogies of study, solidarity, and grace, an imagination that is fueled by Jesuit perspective and thereby regards the self, society, and our world hopefully. In how the self is studied, how solidarity with alterity is ever possible, and how the world and we are graced, hope is prevalent in the pedagogies of fullness.

Recall the positive regard just for individuals noted of the Jesuit order that was discussed in the fourth chapter. The organization exuded a robust hope for human potential that was

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countered by an alternative philosophical anthropology of Jansenism and personified in the writings of Blaise Pascal (1623-1662).

The elements of such an anthropological hopefulness in educational terms, also discussed in the fourth chapter, are named as essential ingredients of the pedagogies of fullness. The strategies of “study” and “solidarity” rely upon aspects of assaying and adapting, both of which were represented in the fourth chapter by Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s (1463-1494) *Oration on the Dignity of Man* (1486), an exhortation of existential regard that celebrated the awesome possibilities for better selves and societies. The personal and social transformations are not dissociated from Taylor’s existential conception of fullness, and, through Pico, they emerge out of the tenets of Renaissance humanism.

The components I have highlighted of Renaissance humanism, the contents of the third chapter, are educational aspects that are inspired by an originary Greek humanism. They were promulgated through *paideia*, enacted in ideals of *arête*, and specified by conceptions of *eloquentia*. After waning in the Middle Ages, they reemerged at the cusp of the fifteenth century through Pier Paolo Vergerio’s (1370-1444) passionate, and hopeful, educational interest in the virtuous character of individuals and a corresponding civic engagement. The feast-day of St. Jerome (c.340-420), in its dimensions of social equity and civic morality, and the personal virtues of giving and gratitude, fueled for Vergerio a peaceably educative, personally transformative, and socially cooperative imaginary that he sought to actualize.

In the fourth chapter we saw the crystallization and international dissemination of Renaissance humanist education through the Jesuits. Emulating the *modus Parisiensis* that Ignatius of Loyola (1491-1556) and the first Jesuits encountered at the University of Paris through the Collège de Montaigu and Collège de Sainte-Barbe, supplementing deficient
academic programs throughout Europe and elsewhere, and eventually building schools of their own, Jesuit education was pervasive until its hiatus beginning in 1773. By generating principal educational documents in “Part IV” of the *Constitutions* (1558) and as the *Ratio Studiorum* (1599) and, respectively, emphasizing the possibilities of “study” and “adaptation,” they were able to establish a humanist educational network featuring the Ciceronian *studia humanitatis*, structured programs of personal advancement, individual attentiveness to students through *cura personalis* and *familiaritas*, the combined ideals of *eloquentia perfecta* and *pietas*, and a social-civic expression of *Christianitas* that survives today.

While current expressions of Jesuit higher education in the United States are vulnerable to the contemporary problems of fragmentation, superficiality, and instrumentality around and within them, recent gestures through the highest superiors of the Jesuit organization suggest a steadfast relationship with the humanist origins of Jesuit education and investments in specific social ills regarding the rights and dignities of underprivileged persons, the forces of socio-economic poverty, and environmental and ecological devastation. Kolvenbach’s “learned solidarity” epitomizes the three international addresses offered by his predecessor, successor, and himself.

The pedagogies of fullness help to equip students in common imaginary. Deeply and personally inquisitive, easily adaptive and widely relational, and open to the inexplicable is one way to frame a Jesuit imaginary. Holistic of self, justly related, and receptive of beauty is another way to regard them. So too are conceptions of being at home with oneself, with others, and hospitable to an Other. The Jesuit imaginary, a real possibility for students of Jesuit higher education, envisions and hopes for the dimensions of relating Taylor yearns for in a secular age. In renovating fullness through studious, adaptive, and graced students, the Jesuit higher
educational pedagogies of fullness condition patterns of “moving towards.” In doing so, they manifest an ability to re-enchant the world and us.


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