Academic Commons

Reports

International Emission Permits: Equity and Efficiency

Chichilnisky, Graciela; Heal, Geoffrey M.; Starrett, David

Not all possible distributions of a given total of emission permits are compatible with the attainment of first-best Pareto efficiency. In fact, of the infinitely many ways of distributing a given total of permits between a fixed number of parties, only a finite number can lead to efficiency. We can therefore evaluate permit allocations not only in terms of their equity, but also in terms of their efficiency. If there are no other redistributive instruments in the policy environment, the traditional orthogonality of equity and efficiency does not hold here. This has important implications for arguments about the initial international distribution of entitlements to produce carbon dioxide.

Subjects

Files

More About This Work

Academic Units
Economics
Publisher
Department of Economics, Columbia University
Series
Department of Economics Discussion Papers, 686
Published Here
February 28, 2011

Notes

December 1993.

Academic Commons provides global access to research and scholarship produced at Columbia University, Barnard College, Teachers College, Union Theological Seminary and Jewish Theological Seminary. Academic Commons is managed by the Columbia University Libraries.