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Simple Mechanisms and Preferences for Honesty

Holden, Richard; Kartik, Navin; Tercieux, Olivier

We consider full implementation in abstract complete-information environments when agents have an arbitrarily small preference for honesty. We offer a condition called separable punishment and show that when it holds and there are at least two agents, any social choice function can be implemented by a simple mechanism in two rounds of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. We also extend our result to settings of incomplete information so long as there is non-exclusive information.

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Academic Units
Economics
Publisher
Department of Economics, Columbia University
Series
Department of Economics Discussion Papers, 1213-18
Published Here
March 7, 2013
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