A Structural Explanation for Anti-immigrant Sentiment:

Evidence from Belgium and Spain

Anna Zamora-Kapoor

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
2013
ABSTRACT

A Structural Explanation for Anti-immigrant Sentiment: Evidence from Belgium and Spain

Anna Zamora-Kapoor

Scholarship argues that anti-immigrant sentiment originates at the individual-level, is evenly distributed within countries, and is primarily manifested in a single form as hostility toward the out-group. In *A Structural Explanation for Anti-immigrant Sentiment*, I challenge these three claims and propose a novel approach to the sociological understanding of inter-ethnic contention. My explanation for anti-immigrant sentiment builds upon prevailing theories within political sociology, which center on the role of the state (Evans et al. 1985; Scott 1998; Skocpol 1979). While scholars have long acknowledged the role of the state in the regulation of immigration flows and their incorporation (Brubaker 1992; Castles and Miller 1993; Geddes 2003; Lahav 2004; Massey et al. 2002; Messina 2007; Money 1999; Sassen 1996; 1999; Zolberg 2006), only limited research has examined the extent to which the state, through its regulations and institutions, may also affect public attitudes toward immigration. I argue that, as states establish the parameters for native-foreigner interaction, they play an active role in the establishment of inter-ethnic relations.

I use a mixed methods research design that combines surveys, interviews, ethnographic fieldwork, and socio-demographic and policy estimates to examine the distribution of anti-immigrant sentiment across three Belgian and three Spanish regions. Using regions as units of analysis facilitates isolating the role of structural conditions in the manifestation of citizens’ hostility. Three empirical chapters show that distinctive manifestations of anti-immigrant sentiment emerge in geographical enclaves with specific demographic, economic, political, and cultural characteristics. Findings from this research contribute to prevailing theories of anti-immigrant sentiment, and its relation to state regulation of immigration and integration. Moreover,
I consider how current policies might be revised in light of these findings and I suggest new approaches to the regulation of multi-ethnic environments, as well as to the strengthening of social cohesion in these environments.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables......................................................................................................................... iv
List of Figures........................................................................................................................... vi
Acknowledgements................................................................................................................. viii

Chapter 1: Anti-immigrant sentiment and Social Cohesion..................................................... 1
  1.1. Introduction...................................................................................................................... 1
  1.2. Terminology................................................................................................................... 5
  1.3. Sociological significance............................................................................................... 5
  1.4. Cases............................................................................................................................. 8
  1.5. Structure of this dissertation......................................................................................... 10

Chapter 2: Theoretical framework......................................................................................... 13
  2.1. Anti-immigrant sentiment............................................................................................ 13
     2.1.1. Economic competition............................................................................................ 14
     2.1.2. Human capital theory............................................................................................ 16
     2.1.3. Cultural affinity....................................................................................................... 18
     2.1.4. Social capital........................................................................................................... 20
     2.1.5. Political affiliation.................................................................................................. 21
     2.1.6. Institutional environment....................................................................................... 22
  2.2. State regulations of immigration and integration......................................................... 25
     2.2.1. Institutional models............................................................................................... 25
     2.2.2. Immigrants’ socio-economic and integration outcomes........................................ 29
  2.3. Prevailing weaknesses and possible solutions............................................................. 32
  2.4. Analytical framework................................................................................................. 35
Chapter 3: Research design

3.1. Cross-regional attitudinal differences

3.2. Six regions

3.3. Data

3.4. Outline of empirical chapters

Chapter 4: Low manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment

4.1. Political values and immigration flows

4.2. Immigrants’ access to political rights

4.3. Accounting for Madrid

4.4. Accounting for Brussels

4.5. Conclusion

Chapter 5: Anti-immigrant sentiment as a material threat

5.1. Introduction

5.2. Immigrants’ socio-economic incorporation in Andalusia and Wallonia

5.3. Competing for jobs or welfare?

5.4. Containing anti-immigrant sentiment

5.5. Alternative explanation: anti-immigrant sentiment as a cultural threat

5.6. Conclusion

Chapter 6: Anti-immigrant sentiment as a cultural threat

6.1. Introduction

6.2. Immigrants’ cultural integration in Catalonia and Flanders

6.3. Citizens’ expectations of immigrants’ integration

6.4. Mobilization of the radical right
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.5.</td>
<td>Alternative explanations: anti-immigrant sentiment as a material threat.</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.6.</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 7: Conclusion</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1.</td>
<td>Summary of findings</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2.</td>
<td>Research implications</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3.</td>
<td>Limitations and future research</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bibliography</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Figures</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Appendix A: Questions of the European Social Survey</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Appendix B: Descriptive statistics of interviewees</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Appendix C: Electoral results in Belgium and Spain</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1: Structure of the historical-comparative method

Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics

Table 3.3: Regional differences in the manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment, 2002-2010

Table 3.4: Structural characteristics of the six research sites

Table 3.5: Interview protocol

Table 3.6: Immigrant population in Alcalá de Henares and Badalona, 2010

Table 4.1: Cross-regional differences in citizens’ political values in Belgium, 2010

Table 4.2: Cross-regional differences in citizens’ political values in Spain, 2010

Table 4.3: Demographic composition of immigration in Belgium, 2012

Table 4.4: Demographic composition of immigration in Spain, 2012

Table 4.5: Immigrants political participation in Belgium and Spain, 2010

Table 4.6: Demographic composition of neighborhoods in Brussels, 1988-2005

Table 5.1: Foreign-born populations in Belgium, in thousands, 1947-1991

Table 5.2: Unemployment rates by region and citizenship status, 2011

Table 5.3: Labor market integration policies in Belgium and Spain, 2007

Table 5.4: Perception of immigrants as job competitors in Belgium, 2002

Table 5.5: Perception of immigrants as job competitors in Spain, 2002

Table 5.6: Immigrants are greater recipients than contributors to the Spanish welfare state, 2008

Table 5.7: Immigrants are greater recipients than contributors to the Belgian welfare state, 2008

Table 5.8: Social benefits encourage people from other countries to come live in Spain, 2008
Table 5.9: Social benefits encourage people from other to come live in Belgium, 2008

Table 6.1: Attitudes toward immigrants’ cultural integration in Catalonia and Spain, 2010

Table 6.2: Expectations of immigrants’ cultural integration in Belgium, 2008

Table 6.3: Expectations of cross-cultural relations in Belgium, 2011

Table 6.4: Expectations of cross-cultural relations in Spain, 2011

Table 6.5: Anti-immigrant sentiment as a material threat in Flanders, 2002-2010

Table 6.6: Anti-immigrant sentiment as a material threat in Spain, 2002-2010
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1: The production of anti-immigrant sentiment

Figure 3.1: Map of Belgium
Figure 3.2: Map of Spain
Figure 3.3: Negative attitudes toward immigrants’ economic contribution in Belgium, 2002-10
Figure 3.4: Positive attitudes toward immigrants’ economic contribution in Belgium, 2002-10
Figure 3.5: Negative attitudes toward immigrants’ economic contribution in Spain, 2002-2010
Figure 3.6: Positive attitudes toward immigrants' economic contribution in Spain 2002-10
Figure 3.7: Negative attitudes toward immigrants’ cultural impact in Belgium, 2002-10
Figure 3.8: Positive attitudes toward immigrants’ cultural impact in Belgium, 2002-10
Figure 3.9: Negative attitudes toward immigrants’ cultural impact in Spain, 2002-10
Figure 3.10: Positive attitudes toward immigrants’ cultural impact in Spain, 2002-10

Figure 4.1: Total citizenship acquisitions in Belgium, 1988-2007
Figure 4.2: Citizenship acquisitions in Belgium by country of origin, 2003-2007
Figure 4.3: Citizenship acquisition by country of origin in Spain, 1995-2008
Figure 4.4: Partido Popular’s electoral campaign in Alcalá de Henares, 2011
Figure 4.5: Partido Popular’s electoral campaign in Madrid, 2011
Figure 4.6: Partido Popular’s electoral campaign in Badalona, 2011
Figure 4.7: Internal migration flows in Belgium, 2006
Figure 5.1: Percentage of low-income households by region, 2002-2010

Figure 5.2: Positive effects of immigration in Andalusia, 2005-2010

Figure 5.3: Negative effects of immigration in Andalusia, 2005-2010

Figure 5.4: ‘Immigrants take away our jobs’ by level of education, 2010

Figure 5.5: Emigration flows by citizenship in Spain, 2002-2010

Figure 5.6: Emigration from Spain by continent of origin, 2002-2010

Figure 6.1: Have you started or completed an integration or language course?, 2011

Figure 6.2: Did you have a problem learning the language?, 2011

Figure 6.3: History of Belgium, 2011

Figure 6.4: Planting mosques, 2011

Figure 6.5: Demonstration of the Vlaams Belang, 2008

Figure 6.6: Pamphlet of Plataforma per Catalunya, 2003
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I could not have completed this dissertation without the love, support, and enthusiasm of many people. My adviser, Saskia Sassen, has been an excellent role model. She has empowered me with erudition and confidence, while providing careful attention to my PhD from all corners of the world. Saskia has helped me better understand the art of academia: of working hard and working smart. I look up to her with a high regard, as a researcher of ideas with strong theoretical and policy implications and an admirable human being. I wish, that one day, I am able to empower others the way that Saskia has empowered me. Saskia, eres lo mejor del mundo!

I have been very fortunate to work with the systematic support and constructive feedback of five outstanding scholars; Yinon Cohen, Sara Curran, Xavier Escandell, Christel Kesler, and Yao Lu. From them, I have learned how to turn my results into findings, my evidence into a theoretical contribution, and my dissertation chapters into independent publications. They have helped me clarify my claims, evaluate alternative hypotheses, and recognize the strengths and limitations of my research in a rigorous and thorough manner. I am also indebted to Jesús De Miguel, Gallya Lahav, and Steven Pfaff, for their comments and suggestions to improve my dissertation.

Jesús De Miguel is a fantastic mentor. Prior to joining Columbia, when I was an undergraduate student at the University of Barcelona, Jesús outlined a roadmap to graduate school. Thanks to his life-lessons and recommendation letters, I started my PhD at Columbia with a two-year fellowship from the Caja Madrid Foundation. Jesús’ generosity and commitment to scholarship are unique and unheard-of, especially in a country with a totalitarian past. Needless to say, I would not be here without him.
My parents, Luis Zamora and Carme Riera, and my brother, Carles Zamora, have always been supportive and caring. My mother has taught me to constantly challenge boundaries, to view struggles as opportunities to be stronger, and above all, to celebrate all good news with a cake and a bottle of sparkling wine. My father has taught me discipline, to view inequality as a major social issue, and to use evidence and perseverance to propose solutions. My brother, Carles, has the most positive energy, of anyone I know. His optimism, peace, and passion for planes cultivate happiness and tranquility in their purest forms. I could not be more proud of my little brother’s career at Airbus-Madrid. At least one of us is close to home.

The Kapoor family has also been a firm source of support in this journey. Jaitender Mohan and Indu Kapoor have treated me like their daughter since the day I landed in New Delhi, wide eyed and jetlagged. Every time I have been to India, they have done their very best to introduce me to this beautiful and rich culture, and to make me feel familiar with the unfamiliar. Back in Seattle, Vivek, Anuhar, and Rishaan are an integral part of our lives. Together, we experiment new recipes every weekend, exchange ideas, laugh, travel to the most amazing National Parks, and continue my mom’s tradition of celebrating all good news with a cake and a bottle of sparkling wine.

Finally, and most importantly, the love of my life, my husband Vishal Kapoor has been a source of inspiration, love, and positive energy at every stage of my PhD. I wouldn’t be writing this without Vishal’s encouragement, strength, and sense of humor. His editing skills and computer expertise have been especially useful at occasional moments of panic and despair. Vishal has stood by me during thick and thin, good and bad, highs and lows, always making me realize our potential together as a team. His work ethic, enthusiasm to take on bigger challenges, and knack for optimization have let me complete my dissertation while moving into our first home, planning a
wedding, traveling the world, and going out to the best restaurants. Together, we can do anything.

Vishal, t’estimo moltíssim.
DEDICATION

To Vishal Kapoor, with love
CHAPTER 1

ANTI-IMMIGRANT SENTIMENT AND SOCIAL COHESION

1.1. Introduction

International migration has traditionally been seen as a challenge to social cohesion. In *Economy and Society*, for example, Weber described natives’ opposition to a foreign ethnic group as a “primary and normal reaction” (1978: 385). In the last fifty years, increasing geographical mobility has laid the ground for natives’ hostility towards immigrants. Contention emerges when an originally temporary migration becomes permanent. In Europe, most countries have witnessed the increasing mobilization of the radical right, which has in some cases achieved Parliamentary representation (Rydgren 2007). As anti-immigrant sentiment calls into question the extent to which cultural diversity is compatible with the modern nation-state, examining the elements that underlie its manifestation represents a sociological priority.

Sociologists have long been interested in anti-immigrant sentiment because it reveals the nature and strength of group boundaries (Bail 2008; Lamont and Mólnar 2002; Tilly 2004). Citizens’ hostility towards the out-group exposes the mechanisms of exclusion that some scholars consider intrinsic to the establishment of the nation-state and national citizenry (Wimmer 2002). Modern nation-states use multiple labels to categorize otherness: aliens, foreigners, guest-worker, immigrants, refugees, or tourists, among others. Although each of these out-groups has a different set of rights and obligations (Benhabib 2004), they introduce states’ active function in the establishment of inter-ethnic relations. Yet, most scholarship on anti-immigrant sentiment views the state as a passive actor. In this research, I attempt to provide a structural explanation for anti-
immigrant sentiment, which assumes the state as an active regulator of immigrants’ inclusion and exclusion.

Scholarship on anti-immigrant sentiment relies upon three assumptions: a) it originates at the individual-level; b) it is evenly distributed within countries; and c) it is homogeneous in nature. First, previous studies approach anti-immigrant sentiment with formulations centered on the individual. They argue that citizens who are unemployed, hold conservative values, did not attend college, or do not have an immigrant cultural background are more likely to perceive immigration negatively than their employed, liberal, college-educated, and immigrant-descended peers (Rustenbach 2010). While these studies inform us about what types of individuals are more likely to view immigration negatively, they do not explain where anti-immigrant sentiment comes from. Cross-national comparative studies provide evidence of the interaction effects between micro- and macro-level variables, but exhibit similar limitations. Citizens in countries with increasing immigration, low economic growth, or substantial electoral support for the radical right exhibit stronger anti-immigrant sentiment than countries without such demographic, economic, and political characteristics (Fetzer 2000; Semyonov et al. 2006). Previous studies’ emphasis on statistically significant coefficients has omitted a theoretical discussion about the processes and mechanisms that underlie anti-immigrant sentiment. This dissertation argues that extant studies have only accounted for one part of the anti-immigrant sentiment story, and attempts to contribute to this literature with an inductive analysis centered on the state.

Second, extant scholarship assumes that anti-immigrant sentiment is evenly distributed within countries (see the review by Ceobanu and Escandell 2010). Comparative studies usually

---

1 Another question is whether the relationship between the success of the radical right and anti-immigrant sentiment is endogenous or bi-directional.
employ countries as units of analysis, even though survey data indicate that within-country attitudinal differences are larger than cross-national ones (see Chapter 3). I argue that the lack of studies examining the cross-regional variability of anti-immigrant sentiment has hindered the field and limited its theoretical and empirical contribution. In this study, I seek to address this gap with a research design based on six research sites from two different countries. My research shows that distinctive manifestations of anti-immigrant sentiment emerge in geographical enclaves with specific demographic, economic, political, and cultural characteristics.

Third, most research assumes that anti-immigrant sentiment is a homogeneous phenomenon: hostility toward the out-group. I distinguish between the manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment as a threat to natives’ living standards (material threat) from its manifestation as a threat to natives’ language, religion, and other symbolic practices (cultural threat), in order to examine the type of structural conditions most likely to engender these two different patterns of hostility. I do not imply that anti-immigrant sentiment will be exclusively manifested in one form or another; quite to the contrary, natives who view immigrants as a material threat are likely to view them as a cultural threat as well. Yet, by determining whether the primary source of anti-immigrant sentiment is material or cultural, this study gains analytical leverage to better assess the object of analysis.

With these considerations in mind, the question I seek to answer is: *What underlies the geographical distribution of anti-immigrant sentiment, and its manifestation as a material or a cultural threat?*

I build upon prevailing theories within political sociology, centered on the role of the state (Evans et al. 1985; Scott 1998; Skocpol 1979). In *Seeing like a State*, James Scott (1998) identifies the power of the nation-state with a sequence of institutional efforts aimed at standardizing its
subjects. The transformation of people into abstract citizens was an essential exercise of statecraft, in order to allow the state to control, plan, and rule. For Scott, standardized citizens are “uniform in their needs and even interchangeable” (1998: 346). Immigration and cultural diversity challenges this standardization process, and forces the state to come up with new strategies to maintain the social order. As states engage in this practice, I argue that they do not only shape the living conditions of the immigrant population, but also how citizens perceive them.

Immigration scholars have long examined the role of the state in the regulation of immigration (Brubaker 1992; Castles and Miller 1993; Geddes 2003; Lahav 2004; Massey et al. 2002; Messina 2007; Money 1999; Sainsbury 2012; Sassen 1988; 1996; 1999; 2006; Soysal 1994; Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010; Zolberg 2006), but there is little evidence of the relationship between these regulations and public opinion. This research attempts to fill in this void with an inductive analytical approach. I argue that states’ efforts to regulate native-immigrant boundaries shape the structural conditions in which natives and immigrants interact and generate perceptions of one another. As states regulate immigrants’ incorporation in cultural, economic, or political terms, I claim that they influence the strength and manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment.

My main claim is that state institutions and regulations are the epicenter of contemporary manifestations of anti-immigrant sentiment. I explain anti-immigrant sentiment as a product of the relations between the state, political parties, and the native citizenry (see Figure 1.1: The origin of anti-immigrant sentiment), and account for its geographical variability with evidence of the relations between state regulations, political parties, and native citizens.

<Figure 1.1 about here>
1.2. Terminology

Following Messina and Lahav (2006), I use the term ‘immigrant’ to refer to persons who have migrated to another country on a long term basis, and ‘migrant’ to describe those who intend to live and work in a foreign country for a short term, such as seasonal guest-workers. By contrast, I use the term “native citizen” to refer to a member of the national citizenry that does not have an immigrant background. Since citizens with an immigrant background have a logic pre-disposition to perceive immigration positively (Fetzer 2000), my focus consists of explaining the cross-regional variability of anti-immigrant sentiment among native citizens only. With the term “anti-immigrant sentiment”, I reference native citizens’ hostility towards immigrants. Later, I will show that such hostility can be manifested in reaction to either a material and as a cultural threat (or both). By “state” I refer to the governmental institutions at the local, regional, and national levels with the legitimacy to design and implement policy, and the term “political parties” refers to organized interest groups that seek to control government.

1.3. Sociological significance

Why is anti-immigrant sentiment a subject of sociological interest? The institutionalization of the nation-state has historically relied on ethnically homogeneous populations. As Wimmer argues:

“Belonging to a specific national or ethnic group determines access to the rights and services the modern state is supposed to guarantee. The main promise of modernity – political participation, equal treatment before the law and protection from the arbitrariness of state power, dignity for the weak and poor, and social justice and security – were fully realized only for those who came to be regarded as true members of the nation. The modern
principles of inclusion are intimately tied to ethnic and national forms of exclusion.” (2002:1).

The main problem with contemporary immigration regulations is that they rely on two conflicting principles: a) a functional understanding of the immigrant individual as labor; and b) a notion of the immigrant as a subject entitled to inalienable rights. Economic interests have historically motivated states to manage international migration in utilitarian terms. Piore (1979) argues that the prime engine of geographical mobility is destination countries’ structural demand of labor. This utilitarian rationale has led to the implementation of many guest-worker programs in Europe, North America, and Oceania throughout the last century (Castles and Miller 1993; Geddes 2003; Messina 2007; Sassen 1999), and still encourages seasonal migration today. Yet, the functional management of international migration, *per se*, is insufficient to maintain a multi-ethnic social order. For this reason, destination countries have required and generated institutional assemblages to incorporate immigrants in socio-economic and cultural terms (see Chapter 2).

The second imperative for states’ regulation of immigration comes from the transnational human rights regime. Nation-states are expected to guarantee immigrants’ inalienable rights (Benhabib 2004; Lahav 2004; Sassen 1996; 1999; 2006; Soysal 1994). In Europe, EU institutions have facilitated this transition by allowing its member states to maintain sovereignty in the immigration field, while abiding by international human rights covenants (Lahav 2004; Sassen 1996; 2006). Although the goal of this study is not to assess states’ implementation of the human rights regime, it borrows elements from this framework to examine the extent to which immigrants are conceived of as subjects entitled to rights. Due to space constraints, I concentrate on state regulations and institutions concerning immigrants’ access to political, economic, and cultural rights.
In addition to national- and regional-level regulations, I analyze the role of political parties. Previous studies offer two main explanations for the relationship between political parties and public opinion. Some studies argue that citizens’ negative attitudes toward immigration encourage political parties to embrace a restrictive immigration agenda (Burstein 2003; Stimson 2004). Others believe that this causal relationship is reversed, viewing political parties’ position on immigration as the main explanation for public opinion outcomes (Chong and Druckman 2007). Cross-national comparative research indicates that anti-immigrant sentiment is likely to emerge in places where mainstream political parties view immigration as a major issue (Karapin 2002), and far-right parties have strong electoral support (Semyonov et al. 2006). In this study, I analyze the extent to which political parties mediate the relationship between the state and the citizenry and, in this process, influence anti-immigrant sentiment. As the last two decades have witnessed an exceptional politicization of immigration in Europe (Perlmutter 1996), I dig into the political field to examine the role of political parties in citizens’ perception of immigration.

In sum, this research seeks to reveal the role of the state in multi-ethnic social cohesion. I argue that states’ regulations of immigration are a central element to understand anti-immigrant sentiment because they are based on two conflicting imperatives, which define the immigrant as: a) a resource for economic growth; and b) a subject of alienable rights. I use three empirical chapters to analyze the significance of policies regulating immigrants’ enfranchisement and naturalization (Chapter 4), access to welfare state benefits and labor market participation (Chapter 5), and cultural integration (Chapter 6). The next section introduces the analytical advantages of studying the variability of anti-immigrant sentiment in Belgium and Spain.
1.4. Cases

Belgium and Spain are suitable cases for this study, due to the cross-regional variability of structural conditions. Since its independence from the Netherlands, in 1839, Belgium has sought to manage the civil coexistence of three linguistic communities through a federal government and a strong decentralization of competences. Immigration in Belgium became problematic in the late 1970s, after the conclusion of the guest-worker period (Suárez-Orozco 1994). Since the early 1980s, governmental efforts to regulate native-immigrant boundaries have structured inter-ethnic relations in all three regions. Immigrants’ integration, for example, is regulated by the two country’s two main communities, the Flemish (in Flanders) and the Francophone (in Wallonia). This institutional division has led to two parallel pathways of integration: Flanders has traditionally followed the multicultural reference of the Netherlands while Wallonia has implemented the Republican French model (Ireland 2004). The coexistence of two parallel understandings of immigrants’ integration, among other structural conditions, offers an exceptional opportunity to compare and contrast the relationship between policies and attitudes.

Spain was one of the first European countries to witness the political organization of a multi-ethnic society; in the medieval Al-Andalus, Christians, Jews, and Muslims coexisted under the same political government (Kennedy 1996). It was also one of the first countries to experience an institutional backlash against cultural diversity, as a result of the Catholic Church’s process of “re-conquest”, La Reconquista (Encarnación 2004). For the last five centuries, Spain has primarily been a country of out-migration, mostly to Latin America and Europe. International migration began in the 1980s, and in only three decades, it reached similar percentages to its Northern European neighbors, around 14%. Similar to Belgium, the state has transferred a large number of competences to regional governments. In the management of immigrants’ integration, for example,
Catalonia’s emphasis on language contrasts to the centrality of civic principles in Andalusia and Madrid (Aja et al. 2006). I examine three regions with different structural conditions and manifestations of anti-immigrant sentiment in order to explain anti-immigrant sentiment from a macro-level perspective.

Regional differences in the structure of the political field have led to distinctive party alignments on the immigration issue within the same country. Two key features are the regional nationalist parties and the political mobilization of the radical right. The case of Belgium is especially useful, due to the longstanding success of the Vlaams Belang in Flanders and the limited support of its Walloon counterpart, Front National (Hossay 2002). In Spain, Catalonia is the only region where the radical right exists—this is Plataforma per Catalunya, which has received increasing electoral support since its foundation. Examining the conditions that explain the success of the radical right is expected to shed light on the regional elements underlying inter-ethnic contention in Catalonia and Flanders. I am interested in evaluating the extent to which political parties modify their immigration discourse according to immigrants’ access to political rights. My historical-comparative analysis using six research sites indicates how political parties respond to regulations facilitating immigrants’ enfranchisement and the extent to which political parties’ alignment on the immigration issue responds to a competition for the far-right space, organizational leadership, or efforts to chase the immigrant vote.

Moreover, this research presents the interaction effects between policies and regionally-specific socio-economic and cultural conditions. I stress the significance of native-immigrant relations in the context of the labor market, the welfare state, and nation-building projects. For example, national-level regulations concerning immigrants’ access to welfare benefits are expected to affect attitudinal outcomes differently in regions with low or high unemployment. As
I seek to provide a structural explanation for anti-immigrant sentiment, my goal is to reveal the ways in which state regulations and institutions shape anti-immigrant sentiment and explain its variability.

Overall, cross-regional differences in the structural conditions of Belgian and Spanish regions offer sociologists a unique opportunity to evaluate the role of state regulations, institutions, and political parties in the strength and manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment today.

1.5. Structure of this dissertation

Chapter 2 frames this research within extant scholarship on anti-immigrant sentiment and state regulations of immigration and integration. The analytical review of previous studies emphasizes their contributions and limitations, and the importance of conducting an inductive analysis of attitudes to address prevailing gaps. Chapter 3 elaborates the historical-comparative research design based on six research sites and mixed methods of data collection. I present the cross-regional variability of anti-immigrant sentiment as a material and as a cultural threat, and the structural conditions of the six regions under consideration: Brussels, Flanders, and Wallonia for Belgium, and Andalusia, Catalonia, and Madrid for Spain. Next, I describe the four main types of data I combine; surveys, in-depth interviews, ethnographic fieldwork, and socio-economic and policy indicators, to examine three different manifestations of anti-immigrant sentiment.

Chapter 4 accounts for the low manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment in Brussels and Madrid by focusing on the role of demographic and political processes. In Spain, I observe that immigrants’ enfranchisement encourages political parties to abandon restrictive immigration discourses and embrace pro-cultural diversity rhetoric. I claim that, in regions with a high
percentage of enfranchised immigrants, political parties contain anti-immigrant sentiment with a pro-cultural diversity discourse, while in regions where immigrants cannot vote, they motivate anti-immigrant sentiment with discourses that reinforce immigrants’ otherness. In Belgium, I show that decades of high immigration have motivated internal migration flows and polarized public opinion across the country. Brussels has remained the city where all pro-cultural diversity Belgians want to live, while the country-side has become increasingly attractive to the most conservative segments of the population.

Chapter 5 explains the material manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment as a product of the scarcity of labor market opportunities and welfare state benefits. Andalusia and Wallonia illustrate the extent to which the material manifestation of citizens’ hostility is concentrated in economically-disadvantaged areas that have historically demanded low-skilled labor but have been unable to maintain immigrant employment over time. I complement prevailing theories of inter-ethnic economic competition by arguing that anti-immigrant sentiment emerges from the scarcity of not only jobs, but also welfare benefits. These two patterns of inter-ethnic contention are unlikely to decline in the near future.

Chapter 6 accounts for the cultural manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment with an examination of Catalonia and Flanders. I contextualize public attitudes in two historical nation-building projects and explain anti-immigrant sentiment as a demand-supply process. On the demand-side, I show that citizens in regions with nation-building projects have higher expectations about immigrants’ integration than their peers in other regions of the country. On the supply-side, immigrants in Catalonia and Flanders are the most active in trying to integrate into the cultural mainstream. However, in spite of their efforts, they do not meet natives’ expectations. I provide evidence of the role of the radical right, which has been particularly successful in both regions,
and explain the extent to which today’s anti-immigrant sentiment responds to a material threat. Finally, I anticipate that anti-immigrant sentiment in these regions will decline in coming years, as second and third generations grow up as active members of the Catalan and the Flemish cultural mainstream.

Chapter 7 concludes this study with a synthesis of its findings, theoretical implications, and policy insights. I use its limitations to stress the need of further research and propose next steps in this line of inquiry.
CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter frames the object of study with the literatures on anti-immigrant sentiment and state regulations of immigration. I present the contributions and limitations of extant scholarship, and provide a rationale for a historical-comparative analysis based on regions. Previous studies on anti-immigrant sentiment have long measured the significance of micro- and macro-level variables, but they have paid limited attention to the role of the institutional environment. By developing claims around statistically-significant variables, most studies have hindered this literature’s theoretical development and policy insights. In parallel, scholarship on state regulations of immigration has revealed the role of the state in immigrants’ living conditions, but it has not paid attention to how these policies affect the national citizenry. I attempt to address these gaps in the literature with an examination of the relationship between state regulations and anti-immigrant sentiment in three Belgian and three Spanish regions.

2.1. Anti-immigrant Sentiment

Extant reviews of the anti-immigrant sentiment literature have emphasized the explanatory power of individual- and contextual-level variables (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010; Rustenbach 2010). They present six different explanations for anti-immigrant sentiment: a) economic competition (Brenner and Fertig 2006; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2009; Hjerm 2009; O'Rourke and Sinnott

---

2006; Quillian 1995; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Schneider 2008; Semyonov et al. 2006); b) human capital (Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Hjerm 2001; Mayda 2006); c) cultural affinity (Brubaker 2009; Ceobanu and Escandell 2008; Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Escandell and Ceobanu 2010; Fetzer 2000; Hayes and Dowds 2006; Hjerm 1998; Perhson et al. 2009; Shulman 2002); d) social capital (Citrin and Sides 2008; Côté and Erickson 2009; Eller and Abrams 2004; Herreros and Criado 2009; Kesler and Bloemraad 2010; McLaren 2003; Pettigrew and Tropp 2011; Putnam 2000; 2007; Wagner et al. 2007); e) political values (Bohman 2011; Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Karapin 2002; Rydgren 2003; Semyonov et al. 2006; 2007; 2008; Wilkes et al. 2008); and f) institutional environment (Bail 2008; Brooks and Manza 2009; Coenders and Castelli-Gattinara 2011; Dancygier 2010; Pardos-Prado 2010). I explain each of these different approaches to anti-immigrant sentiment and then synthesize their most important theoretical and methodological limitations, in order to offer solutions and strengthen this research program.

2.1.1. Economic competition

When citizens conceive of the distribution of resources as a zero-sum game, anti-immigrant sentiment appears to be an inevitable outcome of increasing international labor flows. Scholars have examined the role of economic competition from the micro-level perspective of individuals’ self-interest, as well as from the macro-level approach of the interests of the dominant group. Individual self-interest arguments claim that anti-immigrant sentiment is the product of the direct competition for jobs or residential space. Hence, natives who are low-skilled and/or unemployed are those most likely to exhibit anti-immigrant sentiment (Mayda 2006; O'Rourke and Sinnott 2006; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Yet, conflicting findings question the extent to which economic
competition is driven by individual self-interest alone. Alternative approaches have examined economic competition based on citizens’ labor market status (Brenner and Fertig 2006; Hayes and Dowds 2006; Wilkes et al. 2008), or income (Chandler and Tsai 2001; Sides and Citrin 2007), but did not find an association with attitudinal outcomes. Due to mixed findings, scholars have complemented these theories with formulations that combine micro- and macro-level variables.

In parallel to individuals’ immediate interests, citizens’ perception of how immigration affects the national economy impacts anti-immigrant sentiment as well. Economic conditions, operationalized as the gross domestic product (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2009; Quillian 1995; Schneider 2008; Semyonov et al. 2006) or unemployment rates (Coenders and Scheepers 2008), influence citizens’ perception of immigration. Prosperous economies with low unemployment rates offer the most suitable environment for maintaining positive attitudes towards immigration. Within countries, poor municipalities with high percentages of immigration exhibit the strongest anti-immigrant sentiment (Hjerm 2009). Yet, it is important to note that distinctive measurements of economic contextual variables have led to conflicting findings. For example, Sides and Citrin (2007) indicate that there is an association between a country’s GDP per capita and anti-immigrant sentiment, but not between unemployment rates and attitudinal outcomes. Extant findings appear to depend heavily upon the operationalization of these complex mechanisms; a lack of agreement upon what variables better represent macro-level economic conditions, and at which level of analysis, country or regional, is the most appropriate, has generated contradictory findings. Moving forward, I encourage scholars to consider the ways in which the variables they operationalize could be driving their results.

The current context of economic instability anticipates an increasing salience of anti-immigrant sentiment based on economic factors. Further research is required to better understand
the variability of these micro- and macro-level effects. The extensive use of individual- and national-level data in multi-level models has obscured geographical differences and the potential interaction between economic competition and other explanatory factors. I propose to complement prevailing theories with evidence from case studies, in order to better understand the extent to which economic competition underlies attitudinal outcomes.

2.1.2. Human capital theory

Citizens’ education has traditionally been conceived of as an element that reduces anti-immigrant sentiment. Previous studies explain the role of education from the perspective of native-foreigner labor market competition (Mayda 2006), and citizens’ interpretation of cultural diversity and stereotypes (Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Hjerm 2001). From either perspective, citizens with higher education in immigrant-receiving countries are expected to exhibit low anti-immigrant sentiment.

Mayda (2006) argues that anti-immigrant sentiment is a product of the distribution of human capital across the immigrant populations, relative to the native one. Since most immigrant-receiving nations have a structural demand for low-skilled labor (Favell and Hansen 2002; Waldinger and Lichter 2003), immigration maintains competitive salaries at the bottom and an income structure that rewards education. Mayda (2006) argues that in countries with low GDP per capita, citizens’ education has a stronger association with pro-immigration attitudes than in countries with high GDP per capita. These findings are important because they de-couple citizens’ perception of immigration from traditional macro-economic and educational contextual variables, and explain anti-immigrant sentiment in relative terms.
A second group of scholars posits that education improves citizens’ perception of immigration by transmitting norms and values that encourage citizens to recognize the benefits of cultural diversity and question prevailing stereotypes (Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Hjerm 2001). Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) find that, in contrast to Mayda (2006), education is associated with higher levels of support for immigration, regardless of their level of skill. Yet, it is still unclear what specific set of norms and values are most favorable to encourage citizens' positive perception of foreign-born populations. Some studies have sought to dig into this puzzle, by comparing the values of the educational system in long-standing democracies versus former communist dictatorships. Coenders and Scheepers (2003) found that education is associated with positive attitudes toward immigration in prolonged democracies of Western Europe, but not in the most recent ones of Eastern Europe. A similar cross-national study indicates that education increases tolerance in all countries, regardless of their political trajectory (Hjerm 2001).

Although previous studies agree that education increases citizens’ positive perception of immigration, scholars do not conclude what is the mechanisms underlying this effect. I encourage human capital theorists to compare and contrast the arguments presented above systematically, in order to evaluate the extent to which the role of education is tied to the distribution of skill amongst the native and the foreigner population, or, by contrast, it is related to a specific set of norms and values that can improve attitudes, regardless of citizens’ level of skill. A systematic evaluation of prevailing arguments for the role of human capital is expected to help sociologists strengthen a unified theoretical explanation.
2.1.3. Cultural Affinity

Cultural affinity theory states that citizens’ perceptions of immigration depend on their individual similarities with the members of the out-group, and their collective degree of inclusion/exclusion in the dominant group. Fetzer (2000) found that citizens whose parents immigrated exhibit less anti-immigrant sentiment than those who do not have an immigrant background. Elements facilitating citizens’ identification with immigrant populations, such as having an immigrant parent, can explain why some citizens view immigration much more positively than others. Beyond individual characteristics, citizens empathize with immigrants as a result of their similar structural position vis-à-vis the dominant group (Hayes and Dowds 2006), and prevailing understandings of national identity in the destination country (Ceobanu and Escandell 2008; Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Escandell and Ceobanu 2010; Hjerm 1998; Perhson et al. 2009; Shulman 2002).

Previous studies have revealed that citizens who belong to religious minorities tend to view immigrants much more favorably than those who belong to the dominant group. Hayes and Dowds (2006) provide evidence to support this claim by comparing public attitudes toward immigration amongst Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland. Although immigrants are not necessarily Catholics or Protestants, citizens who belong to the Catholic minority are more likely to view immigration much more positively than their Protestant peers, because they are outnumbered. Evidence from Northern Ireland suggests that cross-national differences in anti-immigrant sentiment could be associated with the uneven distribution of minorities across countries. Further research is required to evaluate the extent to which countries that are culturally homogeneous exhibit stronger degrees of anti-immigrant sentiment than those that have long established minorities.
Prevailing understandings of national identity are expected to affect inter-ethnic relations as well. Studies analyzing anti-immigrant sentiment across countries have approached this phenomenon by contrasting immigrant-receiving nations with a notion of identity based on descent (jus sanguini) versus birth (jus soli). Countries with ethnic-based notions of identity exhibit stronger anti-immigrant sentiments than those that have a civic understanding of national membership (Hjerm 1998; Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Perhson et al. 2009). Other studies have reported that there is no such association (Shulman 2002; Ceobanu and Escandell 2008). Similar to what has been observed in the economic competition section, scholars’ selection of variables and operationalization of concepts could be underlying these conflicting results.

Countries with strong regional boundaries have offered an exceptional opportunity to examine the role of distinctive understandings of national identity. Previous studies examining the cases of Belgium and Spain indicate that citizens in regions with nation-building projects, such as Flanders in Belgium or the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia in Spain, exhibit stronger anti-immigrant sentiments than their peers in other regions of the country (Billiet et al. 2003; Escandell and Ceobanu 2010). While these findings offer a valuable theoretical contribution, they call into question the extent to which policy intervention can palliate anti-immigrant sentiment. If anti-immigrant sentiment is a product of the historical development of national identity, how can new policy change attitudinal outcomes? This study examines this problem in Chapter 6.

In sum, while citizens’ opportunities to identify themselves with foreign-born populations affect their attitudes, further research is needed to develop a parsimonious explanation of the role of national identity on attitudes. Again, an increased focus on the specification of causal mechanisms represents a necessary next step to advance these explanations.
2.1.4. Social capital

There is a long-standing assumption that cultural diversity reduces trust (Putnam 2007). Yet, scholars have found that citizens’ degree of social capital affects the likelihood of manifesting anti-immigrant sentiment (McLaren 2003; Pettigrew and Tropp 2011; Wagner et al. 2007). Previous studies find that contact with immigrants dispels negative stereotypes (Pettigrew and Tropp 2011), especially in the context of friendship, rather than superficial relationships (McLaren 2003; Wagner et al. 2007). Citizens who have foreign-born friends are likely to view cultural diversity much more positively than those who do not have them. Albeit it is plausible that citizens’ social capital improves attitudes toward immigration, the causal relationship might be in the opposite direction: citizens with positive attitudes toward foreigners might be more likely to have foreign-born friends.

Beyond the study of social capital from its traditional micro-level approach, scholars have analyzed anti-immigrant sentiment in relation to citizens’ generalized level of trust. Putnam (2007) argues that international migration reduces social trust by decreasing citizens’ identification with one another, or collective-mindedness. Yet, cross-national comparative studies provide evidence that contradicts this claim (Kesler and Bloemraad 2010). A different group of studies argue that citizens exhibiting high degrees of trust, also called “social trusters”, are more prone to view immigrants as trustworthy and therefore more likely to cooperate with them (Citrin and Sides 2008; Herreros and Criado 2008).

Durlauf (1999) presents the most important critique to social capital research. He claims that social capital scholarship still needs to disentangle what are the elements driving its emergence, presence, or absence (Durlauf 1999). I agree with Durlauf (1999) and see that, at least
in the context of anti-immigrant sentiment research, future studies need to: a) define the meaning and boundaries of social capital; and b) clarify the elements accounting for its rise and decline.

Due to the potential endogeneity and feedback processes in social capital explanations, I encourage scholars to reformulate their analytical approach using longitudinal data, as a minority of scholars have already done (see for instance Eller and Abrams 2004). The development of new panel studies is expected to facilitate the assessment of this phenomenon as well as its variation across countries and over time. Additionally, I encourage scholars to focus on assessing the limits, net effects, and significance of social capital, and examine whether its relationship with public attitudes is as straightforward as prevailing theories suggest.

2.1.5. Political Affiliation

Citizens’ interaction with the political field offers an alternative perspective to explain anti-immigrant sentiment. Anti-immigrant sentiment is conceived of as a product of individuals’ political values (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Wilkes et al. 2008), as well as the mobilization of anti-immigrant political parties (Bohman 2011; Karapin 2002; Rydgren 2003; Semyonov et al. 2006; 2007). Micro-level perspectives claim that citizens’ values drive anti-immigrant sentiment: conservative citizens are much more likely to hold negative attitudes toward immigration than their liberal peers (Semyonov et al. 2008; Wilkes et al. 2008). The significance of citizens’ self-placement in the left-right axis prevails, even after controlling for respondents’ socio-economic and educational differences (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996). Nevertheless, as it has been observed in other explanations, conservative values could be encouraging anti-immigrant sentiment to the same extent that anti-immigrant sentiment could be motivating conservatism. In order to strengthen this claim, previous studies require further evidence indicating the direction of
causality between political values and attitudes. Case study research offers a useful analytical strategy to overcome this problem, by offering insight into the feedback processes between immigrants’ political participation and public opinion outcomes.

At the macro level, the degree of anti-immigrant mobilization by either mainstream parties or the radical right appears to explain attitudinal differences across countries. While citizens may not necessarily have an opinion about immigration, their exposure to political organizations that present immigration as a problem has been found to raise anti-immigrant sentiment. Anti-immigrant sentiment is especially concentrated in countries where mainstream political parties view immigration as a priority (Bohman 2011; Karapin 2002), or there is a strong mobilization of the radical right (Rydgren 2003; Semyonov et al. 2006; 2007; 2008).

Research revealing the explanatory power of political variables at the micro and macro levels has contributed to the sociological understanding of multi-ethnic democracies significantly. Citizens’ values, the mobilization of radical right-wing political parties, and mainstream political parties’ discussion of immigration as a priority affect anti-immigrant sentiment. At the same time, it is still unclear the extent to which contextual political processes explain or are explained by citizens’ attitudes. Case study research combining quantitative and qualitative data is likely to help scholars evaluate the extent to which constituent demands and political parties’ stance on immigration influence one another. This study takes one step in this direction.

2.1.6. Institutional Environment

Governmental regulations are likely to affect attitudinal outcomes by establishing the institutional environment in which natives and foreigners coexist. Recent reviews of the literature (Ceobanu
and Escandell 2010) have pointed out the lack of studies examining the role of the institutional environment:

“Research has yet to provide a clear picture of the institutional and socio-political macro-level factors that affect the emergence and manifestation of attitudes toward immigrants and immigration” (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010: 310).

For decades, the lack of cross-national standardized estimates has limited researchers’ opportunities to compare and contrast immigration policies. Analytical formulations of anti-immigrant sentiment have traditionally ignored the role of governmental regulations, due to the limited possibilities of establishing causality between policies and attitudes. As democratic societies are expected to represent the interests of the citizenry (Brooks and Manza 2009), it would be unreasonable to conceive governmental regulations of immigration as an independent element from citizens’ perception of their multi-ethnic environment.

The Migrant Integration Policy Index is one of the first datasets permitting to address this gap, with integration policy data on seven different dimensions: a) labor market mobility; b) family reunion; c) education; d) political participation; e) long-term residence; f) access to nationality; and g) anti-discrimination, for thirty-three nations. The current availability of data has led to an emerging literature with promising findings. Restrictive integration policies have been found to encourage anti-immigrant sentiment (Coenders and Castelli-Gattinara 2011), while policies facilitating immigrants’ political participation appear to favor positive attitudes toward foreign-born populations (Pardos-Prado 2010). Both papers indicate that restrictive institutional environments encourage citizens to view immigration as a problem, while less restrictive policies reduce the salience of immigration as an issue.
The most compelling explanations for the role of the institutional environment in the public opinion have used innovative methodological strategies. Dancygier (2010) combines quantitative and qualitative evidence to decipher within-country differences in the type of inter-ethnic conflict in two British municipalities. This study reveals that the variability of immigrants’ access to economic and political rights has generated immigrant-native conflict (or anti-immigrant sentiment) in areas where immigrants have economic but not political rights, and immigrant-state conflict in places where immigrants enjoy both economic and political privileges. As structural conditions affect inter-ethnic relations, they are also expected to influence citizens’ perception of the out-group. This study is very important for my research because it provides evidence of the significance of immigrants’ rights in the structure of inter-ethnic contention.

From a cross-national comparative perspective, Bail (2008) uses fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis to identify the distinctive structure of social boundaries across Europe, and the extent to which they differ from prevailing philosophies of integration. It offers a typology of destination countries, based on the strength of their racial, religious, educational, linguistic, occupational, and cultural symbolic boundaries. Evidence of the distinctive type and structure of symbolic boundaries benefits the theorization of inter-ethnic relations by revealing the extent to which destination countries vary from one another.

Due to the dynamic relationship between policies and attitudes, it would be ideal if scholars could use methodologies allowing them to determine the direction of causality between these variables. MIPEX’s cross-national comparative estimates are expected to contribute to this line of inquiry by allowing sociologists to approach the role of policies on attitudes. In this study, I use MIPEX data to introduce national policy frameworks regulating immigrants’ access to political rights and labor market participation in Belgium and Spain.
2.2. State Regulations of Immigration and Integration

I continue an intellectual tradition centered on the significance of state institutions in the management of international migration (see the reviews by Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005; Givens 2007). This literature can be subdivided into two main lines of inquiry. First, there are studies focused on the institutional models that states use to regulate immigration. The goal of these studies is to explain the rationale motivating institutional frameworks, and the extent to which these models differ from one country to another (Banting and Kymlicka 2007; Bertossi 2011; Bloemraad 2000; Bloemraad et al. 2008; Brubaker 1992; 2009; Carrera 2006; Castles and Miller 1993; Favell 1998; Geddes 2003; Joppke 2007a; 2007b; Koopmans et al. 2005; Sainsbury 2012; Sassen 1999; Wimmer 2002; Zolberg 2006). Second, there are studies measuring the impact of state policies on immigrants’ living conditions (Alba and Nee 1997; Cohen and Kogan 2007; Ersanelli and Koopmans 2010; Kesler 2006; Kogan 2006; Koopmans 2010; Koopmans et al. 2012; Lewin-Epstein et al. 2003; Reitz 1998; Wright and Bloemraad 2012). Due to space constraints, I will not attempt to conduct a comprehensive review of all research in these two analytical perspectives. Instead, I present their main contributions using a few representative pieces. The analytical review of both perspectives sheds light on an important gap in the literature: the limited study of how state regulations may influence anti-immigrant sentiment.

2.2.1. Institutional models

Institutional models establish pathways for immigrants’ naturalization and cultural integration; they determine how to cross the citizen-immigrant boundary. A subset of these models regulates immigrants’ access to citizenship, which varies across countries according to national understandings of membership. Brubaker (1992) uses a path-dependent explanation to account for
France and Germany’s implementation of *jus soli* and *jus sanguine* models respectively. Germany’s ethnic-based notion of the nation originated from the political goal of bringing together an ethnically-homogeneous population, ruled under different systems. The state’s motivation to identify citizens with one another on the basis of a common ethnic descent encouraged a definition of citizenship based on lineage. In contrast to Germany, France’s implementation of a *jus soli* model was a product of the country’s demographic shortage during the decades proceeding its foundation. A *jus soli* policy aimed to facilitate access to citizenship and increase the country’s population. In this study, I build upon Brubaker’s (1992) work by analyzing Belgium and Spain’s naturalization regulations, and the extent to which they can contribute to a sociological explanation of citizens’ hostility.

Most of the literature on institutional models has focused on cross-national differences in the patterning of immigrants’ integration around the ideal types of ‘assimilation’ and ‘multiculturalism’ (Bertossi 2011; Bloemraad 2000; Bloemraad et al. 2008; Brubaker 1992; 2009; Carrera 2006; Castles and Miller 1993; Favell 1998; Geddes 2003; Joppke 2007a; 2007b; Koopmans et al. 2005). By assimilation, scholars refer to:

“A process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiment, and attitudes of other persons and groups, and, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural life.” (Park and Burgess 1969: 735, cited in Alba and Nee 1997: 828).

Countries with assimilationist policies, such as France or the United States, assume that immigrants’ integration will be most successful when they incorporate the destination country’s culture in their everyday life. At odds, multiculturalism views the recognition of cultural rights as a central part of immigrants’ incorporation. Countries that have traditionally implemented the
multiculturalist model, such as Canada or the Netherlands, view immigrants’ cultural group rights as a key element for their successful integration. This model reflects the understanding of immigrants as subjects entitled to inalienable rights that I have introduced in Chapter 1. Yet, as previous studies argue (Bloemraad et al. 2008), the implementation of multicultural policies is especially tricky because they can occasionally emphasize the rights of the group versus those of the individual:

“Multiculturalism challenges a liberal philosophy of universalism that views humans as freely choosing agents who deserve identical, individual protection.” (2008: 159).

As destination countries attempt to integrate immigrant populations with different group rights, multiculturalism can potentially fall into cultural relativism and discourage the evaluation of cultural practices that may not be compatible with modern democracy.

The scholarly discussion of integration policies has evolved far beyond the narrow scope of the assimilation-versus-multiculturalism debate. Some scholars (Carrera 2006; Koopmans et al. 2005) argue that there is a third institutional model, ‘segregationism’, and describe it as a policy framework “characterized by restrictive and rigid immigration legislation (…) aimed at artificially maintaining the temporary character of an immigrant’s settlement” (Carrera 2006: 2). Other scholars question whether these models are useful to explain the extent to which immigrants are integrated (Bertossi 2011; Koopmans et al. 2012). They argue that the heterogeneity of policies and national trajectories in the management of international migration questions the explanatory power of these two institutional ideal types.

Recent studies address some of these limitations by examining the extent to which institutional models have converged or diverged over time (Joppke 2007). Joppke (2007) argues that the increasing role of civic integration policies is driving institutional convergence, and
illustrates his claim with evidence from the Netherlands, France, and Germany. Civic integration policies require immigrants to demonstrate their integration through standardized language and culture tests, which have been increasingly popular in many European countries since the early 2000s. Depending on the country, immigrants’ performance in these tests can affect their residence permits, access to citizenship, and other rights. Joppke interprets the increasing implementation of civic integration policies as “a statist project” (2007: 19), which, in turn, is reducing the institutional cross-national variation among destination countries. In this study, I discuss the role of civic integration policies in Chapter 6 (Anti-immigrant sentiment as a cultural threat).

An innovative approach to institutional models associates types of integration policies with Esping-Andersen’s (1990) welfare state typology. Sainsbury (2012) uses the cases of Germany, the United States, and Sweden as models of the conservative, liberal, and socio-democratic welfare states. She argues that these models correspond to institutional frameworks regulating immigrants’ naturalization on the basis of: *jus sanguine*, *jus soli*, and *jus domicili* respectively. Although the correspondence between institutional models for immigrants’ integration and welfare state types beyond these three cases is unclear, this research offers a novel twist to this research program. By bringing together insights from the literatures on welfare states and the integration models, Sainsbury informs the economic and the human rights’ premises of state regulations for immigration and integration.

Research on state regulations of immigrants’ integration has led some scholars to examine institutional approaches based on state’s active or passive implementation of such policies (Adams 2011). This approach permits distinguishing between regions that share a similar philosophy of integration, depending on the regional government’s interest in regulating immigrants’ cultural
incorporation. I use this framework to differentiate regions with laissez-faire integration policies from those with an active regulation of integration.

In sum, scholarship on institutional models has offered an exceptional contribution to the theorization of immigration policy. Moving forward, I encourage scholars to assess to what extent ideal types fit empirical cases and can contribute to the explanation of inter-ethnic relations today. In this research, I use institutional models to describe and clarify the variability of integration policies across Belgian and Spanish regions (see section 3.2, in Chapter 3).

2.2.2. Immigrants’ socio-economic and integration outcomes

The second approach to state regulations of immigration and integration consists of measuring immigrants’ living conditions. Previous studies show the significance of the institutional environment in estimating immigrants’ education and labor market outcomes (Cohen and Kogan 2007; Kesler 2006; Kogan 2003; Lewin-Epstein et al. 2003; Reitz 1998), as well as the extent of immigrants’ cultural integration (Bloemraad et al. 2008; Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010; Heath 2007; Koopmans 2010; Kymlicka and Banting 2007; Wright and Bloemraad 2012). Lewin-Epstein et al. (2003) evaluate the effects of point-based and ethnic-based immigration policies by comparing the socio-economic standards and education attainment of Former Soviet Union immigrants in Canada and Israel. Despite Canada’s point-based and labor-market oriented immigration policy, immigrants’ employment rates were higher in Israel, due to the country’s efforts in integrating immigrants into the labor market. This methodological approach; examining the living conditions of an immigrant community in two different countries, offers one of the most successful strategies to isolate the role of institutional effects. Evidence of former Soviet Union Jewish immigrants in Israel and Germany (Cohen and Kogan 2007) and Yugoslavs in Austria and
Sweden (Kogan 2006) indicates that countries with low levels of labor market regulation and limited welfare state expenditure exhibit higher immigrant employment rates than those with highly regulated economies and/or generous welfare states.

Research examining institutional effects on the whole immigrant population has led to much more generalizable findings (Reitz 1998; Kesler 2006). Kesler (2006) analyzes immigrants’ labor market participation in three countries representing Esping-Andersen’s welfare state types: Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Sweden exhibits the largest native-immigrant employment gap, partly because of its generous welfare state system. Yet, Swedish labor market integration policies appear to be especially beneficial for immigrant women, who exhibit higher employment rates than their counterparts in Germany and in the United Kingdom. Kesler’s research (2006) indicates not only the sociological significance of the institutional environment, but also its uneven effects across gender groups. My research builds upon this literature in order to examine the role of state regulations in immigrants’ labor market participation, access to welfare, and citizens’ perception of immigration as a material threat.

Another group of studies examine immigrants’ incorporation outcomes across countries with different integration and citizenship policies. Most scholars conclude the positive effect of policies facilitating immigrants’ naturalization (Bloemraad et al. 2008; Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010; Heath 2007). Immigrants’ access to citizenship accelerates their socio-economic integration and motivates them to invest more in the destination country (Heath 2007). Naturalized immigrants also tend to exhibit higher cultural integration than non-naturalized ones (Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010). In this study, I analyze the significance of naturalization policies in the relationship between political parties and anti-immigrant sentiment. In Chapter 4, I provide evidence of the positive effect of extending immigrants’ political rights for the containment of citizens’ hostility. Evidence
of how political parties respond to these regulations is expected to generate valuable contributions to this field.

A much more disputed line of inquiry concerns the relationship between integration models and welfare state policies (Koopmans 2010; Kymlicka and Banting 2007; Wright and Bloemraad 2012). Koopmans (2010) argues that there is an inherent trade-off between immigrants’ integration and equality: countries with multicultural integration models and generous welfare states exhibit worse integration outcomes than conservative or liberal welfare states with assimilationist integration policies. He argues that welfare state generosity operates as a negative selection mechanism, or as Borjas (1994) describes it, as a welfare magnet. In contrast to Koopmans (2010), Wright and Bloemraad’s (2012) show that multiculturalist countries exhibit similar degrees of political integration than assimilationist ones, and claim that there is no trade-off between immigrants’ cultural rights and their integration, measured in terms of political participation. In this case, conflicting findings appear to be a product of the different operationalization of the dependent variable: immigrants’ integration. But the goal of this study is not to measure what institutional model works best. Instead, I use this literature as a point of departure to dig into the role of state regulations in citizens’ manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment.

Overall, this analytical review has introduced the key ideas of an exceptionally vast field. Extant studies explain the rationale of integration policy frameworks and the extent to which these policies influence immigrants’ living conditions. An important limitation of this literature consists of examining the relationship between states and immigrants, without taking into consideration the impact of these policies on the native citizenry. In this research, I attempt to address this gap.
2.3. **Prevailing weaknesses and possible solutions**

The review of the anti-immigrant sentiment literature indicates that citizens’ economic competition, human capital, cultural affinity, social capital, political values, and the institutional environment are expected to affect public attitudes toward immigration. While this scholarship has contributed to the sociological understanding of inter-ethnic relations, theoretical and methodological weaknesses limit the development of this line of inquiry. I propose to solve these problems by synthesizing this literature’s theoretical program, and improving its methodological tools. In this research, I contribute to this line of inquiry with an inductive exploration of structural conditions.

Scholarship could benefit from synthesizing prevailing explanations around causal mechanisms that can be empirically tested. The goal is not only to say that a specific variable, e.g. employment status, generates anti-immigrant sentiment, but to provide a theoretical explanation for this relationship. As massive immigration from the developing countries to Western and Northern Europe enters its fourth decade, and many descendants of immigrants are being given citizenship, the question of attitudes towards immigrants or “foreigners” is becoming inseparable from the question of attitudes towards ethnic minorities. The cognitive turn in studies on ethnicity, with its emphasis on “culturally specific ways in which persons, institutions, organizations, and discourses make sense of experience and interpret the social world” (Brubaker 2009), represents a promising perspective to integrate situational and dispositional variables in the explanation of anti-immigrant sentiment.

Toward the end of developing a theory of anti-immigrant sentiment, I recommend that scholars focus on establishing the most important mechanisms driving the variability of attitudes. Theoretical models should be robust to multiple empirical specifications. If an explanatory
mechanism is economic competition, I would expect to observe statistical significance when measuring the effect of different variables representing native-foreigner economic competition, such as: a) unemployment; b) low income; or c) low education, as well as confirmation from qualitative data. If scholars hypothesize that the unemployed are those most likely to experience native-foreigner competition, I would expect them [the unemployed] to mention it in interviews. Wimmer's (2008) work is an exemplar of this approach, although its focus is on the construction of ethnic boundaries rather than the sources of anti-immigrant sentiment. The inclusion of cognitive micro-foundations as well as supra-individual factors such as political context provides a sophisticated approach to theorizing ethnicity that may serve as a model for future work. Theorizing the mechanisms that link micro and macro as well as making explicit the empirical implications of these mechanisms provides a synthetic approach to advancing this broad research program.

Common methodological problems include operationalization, determining causality, and endogeneity. Distinctive strategies to operationalize anti-immigrant sentiment have allowed scholars to contribute to the literature on exclusionism, tolerance, or prejudice, but it has limited the scholarly dialogue. Extant reviews acknowledge the diverse strategies for operationalizing the dependent variable (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010), but do not offer concrete solutions. I propose that scholars test their analytical formulations on multiple dependent variables, and, if possible, use different independent variables to evaluate the extent to which results vary according to the selection of indicators. For instance, human capital may reduce prejudice, but perhaps does not necessarily affect exclusionism. Evidence of how the selection and operationalization of variables affects results is expected to improve analytical formulations, not only by reducing their sources of bias, but also by improving the scholarly understanding of what specific types of measures
influence attitudes. Theoretical models that are robust to multiple empirical specifications provide additional confidence in the proposed explanatory mechanisms; conversely, theoretical models that rely on questionably identified models undermine the advance of this research program.

The problem of determining causality emerges when there is a bi-directional association between independent and dependent variables. Research examining the effects of far-right mobilization or governmental regulations has the potential to run into this problem, due to the dynamic relationship between these contextual variables and attitudes. I suggest using case study research to evaluate the elements underlying political shifts, attitudinal outcomes, and their feedback processes. Evidence from new immigration countries, where governmental regulations preceded the arrival and settlement of international migrants, has the potential to contribute to this literature, and overcome traditional problems of causality. As I explain in the conclusion, this is one of this study’s limitations that I will not be able to fully address until longitudinal data is available.

Finally, endogeneity encompasses the inability to establish causality as a result of the inclusion of the dependent into the independent variable. It is potentially present in many of the studies above, such as those examining the role of social capital or political values. Due to the nature of endogeneity, I encourage scholars to reformulate predictive models according to the structure of the causal mechanism that they seek to test. For example, if X is causing Y, then we would observe A, but if Y is causing X, then we would observe B. It is important to keep in mind the prevalence of feedback processes that might be at work in this type of research. For this reason, I propose complementing quantitative models with qualitative evidence to confirm the independence and direction of causality between variables.
Overall, anti-immigrant sentiment scholarship has led to outstanding contributions. I would like to strengthen its research program by motivating scholars to synthesize theoretical propositions and use analytical approaches that attenuate issues of operationalization, determining causality, and endogeneity. This study attempts to contribute to this literature with an inductive examination of how state regulations and political parties influence anti-immigrant sentiment in six different research sites.

2.4. Analytical framework

I approach anti-immigrant framework with an inductive analytical framework grounded in three main assumptions. First of all, I assume that citizens’ perceptions of immigration are not fixed, but a product of both individual and contextual variables. I view macro-level variables as factors that regulate the intensity of attitudes (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010). What I try to decipher is the role of the institutional environment; how states’ regulations of immigration and integration could be influencing anti-immigrant sentiment.

Second, I conceive state regulations of immigration and integration as a product of historical definitions of the nation, with path-dependent implications on citizens’ understandings of membership. The comparison of Belgian and Spanish regions is particularly useful, due to the within-country variability in the notions of membership. I seek to examine whether the prevalence of a specific notion of membership, for instance, in ethnic or civic terms, is more likely to encourage anti-immigrant sentiment than others, and, if yes, what is the relationship between concrete forms of membership and distinctive manifestations of anti-immigrant sentiment.
Third, I assume that political parties are rational actors (Downs 1957; Norris 2004; Rosenof 2003). They optimize their means, such as: political discourses, to control government. As immigrants access political rights, political parties are expected to chase their vote (Carmines and Wagner 2006; Inglehart 1990; Norris 2004; Rohrschneider 2002). In this direction, my research examines to what extent citizens’ exposure to pro-cultural diversity discourses discourages them from perceiving immigration as a threat. At the same time, I anticipate that restrictive approaches to immigration or the presence of the radical right will motivate anti-immigrant sentiment.

With these three assumptions in mind, I claim that there are three key processes explaining the low manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment in the Brussels and the Madrid regions, its high manifestations as a material threat in Andalusia and Wallonia, and as a cultural threat in Catalonia and Flanders.

1. **Immigrants’ demographic and political power:** I account for the low manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment as a product of immigrants’ demographic distribution and access to political rights. In Brussels, I observe that the high concentration of both EU and non-EU immigrants has turned cultural diversity into a defining characteristic of the urban space, encouraged internal migration flows between the capital and the country-side, and shifted the political correlation of power on behalf of parties that represent immigrants’ socio-economic interests; traditionally, those of the left. In Madrid, I show that citizens’ low skepticism towards immigration is tied to the political power of Europeans and Latin Americans, which represent a new and growing percentage of the electorate. I argue that regulations facilitating immigrants’ enfranchisement have contained anti-immigrant
sentiment by encouraging political parties to use pro-cultural diversity discourses targeted to the immigrant and the native voter.

2. **Immigrants’ access to scarce economic resources:** I explain the material manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment as a product of two types of economic scarcity: jobs and welfare. Andalusia and Wallonia are the most economically-deprived regions in each country, where both types of resource scarcity is most salient. In addition to the longstanding claim that anti-immigrant sentiment is a product of the immigrant-native competition for jobs, I observe that a significant percentage of the citizenry perceives immigrants as undeserving recipients of welfare. With this insight, I contribute to prevailing theories on economic competition, which have not examined inter-ethnic contention outside labor market boundaries.

3. **Immigrants’ integration in the cultural mainstream:** I present the cultural manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment as the outcome of a demand-supply problem. I complement previous studies, which have emphasized the significance of nation-building projects, with evidence of citizens’ uneven expectations of immigrants’ integration. I show that citizens in Catalonia and Flanders have higher expectations of immigrants’ integration than their peers in other regions of the country. Immigrants in these regions exhibit stronger interest in attending language and integration classes than their peers elsewhere, but they do not meet the high expectations of the Catalan and the Flemish. Evidence from these two regions encourages a theoretical discussion about the extent to which cultural integration is
attainable, and how can state regulations contribute to the establishment of such expectations.

* * *

With this research, I attempt to contribute to the literatures on anti-immigrant sentiment and state regulations of immigration and integration. In the conclusion, I assess the extent to which my findings allow me to fill in prevailing gaps in the literature, and outline policy suggestions.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH DESIGN

This chapter elaborates the methodological strategy to examine anti-immigrant sentiment across three Belgian and three Spanish regions. I divide it into four main parts: 1. Cross-regional attitudinal differences; 2. Six regions; 3. Data; and 4. Outline of analytical chapters. I begin by presenting the uneven geographical distribution of anti-immigrant sentiment as a material and as a cultural threat. The statistical significance of cross-regional attitudinal differences encourages me to use regions as units of analysis. Second, I introduce the reader to the structural characteristics of the six research sites. Evidence from Brussels, Flanders, and Wallonia allows me to dig into the case of Belgium; while Andalusia, Catalonia, and Madrid permit examining anti-immigrant sentiment in Spain. I use one region per country to analyze the low manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment (Brussels and Madrid), its manifestation as a material threat (Andalusia and Wallonia), and its manifestation as a cultural threat (Catalonia and Flanders). Next, I describe the mixed methods of data collection that facilitate assessing the role of state regulations in citizens’ attitudes. I combine data from: a) surveys; b) semi-structured interviews; c) ethnographic fieldwork; and d) socio-demographic, policy, and macro-economic indicators. I conclude with a brief description of the goals and findings of the three empirical chapters.
3.1. **Cross-regional attitudinal differences**

Recent studies emphasize the advantages of comparative research to the study of immigration (Bloemraad 2013; Dancygier 2010). According to Bloemraad, a comparative approach allows scholars to reveal: “that social phenomena are not fixed or ‘natural’” (2013: 3). A within-country comparison is especially useful, because as Dancygier argues: “Studying within-country variation in immigrant conflict outcomes allows us to better isolate the variables that cause these clashes.” (2010: 11). In this study, I compare and contrast regions of two different countries in order to identify attitudinal patterns (Gerring 2007). I determine patterns using pairs of regions as ‘analogous’ (Stinchcombe 2005: 153), and rule out alternative explanations based on country-specific factors (Table 1: Structure of the historical-comparative method).

The selection of regions is straightforward. The three Belgian comprise the whole country (Figure 2: Map of Belgium). In Spain, I select Andalusia, Catalonia, and Madrid, based on their: a) high percentage of immigrant population; and b) size of the regional European Social Survey (ESS) sample (Figure 3: Map of Spain). This selection already implies one of this study’s limitations: the generability of findings. Evidence from Andalusia, Catalonia, and Madrid may not capture some of the processes underlying citizens’ hostility in other parts of Spain.

I view my six research sites as ‘empirical units’ (Ragin and Becker 1992), and attempt to approach their manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment from a Weberian *verstehende Soziologie* perspective, with the goal of: “understanding the full dimensions of social life in social and historical research” (Harper 1992: 139). Due to the probabilistic nature of the dependent variable,
I do not have a traditional negative case (Skocpol 1979). It would be practically impossible to find a region with an absolute lack of anti-immigrant sentiment.

With this framework in mind, I introduce cross-regional differences in anti-immigrant sentiment using two survey questions from the European Social Survey (waves I-V, 2002-2010):

1. Is immigration bad or good for the country’s economy?
2. Is your country’s cultural life undermined or enriched by immigration?

Both questions code respondents’ answers using a 0-10 scale, in which low scores represent negative attitudes toward immigration, and high scores, positive ones. The original scale is problematic, due to the large number of categories (Schaeffer and Presser 2003). The number of categories impedes a clear attribution of meaning; for example, what is the difference between an 8 and a 9? Moreover, cross-national studies are especially sensitive to response biases. There are important cultural differences in citizens’ evaluation criteria, but only limited tools to estimate the scope of error. Hence, I break down the original 0-10 scale into an ordinal variable with three main categories: scores 0-3 are labeled as ‘bad’ perceptions of immigration, scores between 4 and 6 are ‘neutral’, and scores of 7 and above represent ‘good’ attitudes.

I introduce the variability of the dependent variable by tracing each region’s negative (bad) and positive (good) perceptions of immigration between 2002 and 2010. Figures 3.3 to 3.10 illustrate the fluctuation of cross-regional attitudinal differences during the last decade. Figure 3.3 (Negative attitudes toward immigrants’ economic contribution in Belgium, 2002-2010) presents the regional percentage of Belgian citizens perceiving immigration as a material threat. Walloon citizens exhibit the most negative attitudes every year of the survey. 30% of Walloons systematically perceive immigration as a material threat throughout the 2002-2010 period. In 2004, this percentage increased to more than 40%. Flanders presents the second most negative attitudes
towards immigrants’ economic impact, while Brussels shows the least anti-immigrant sentiment. The persistence of cross-regional attitudinal differences over time suggests that they respond to a pattern that requires a sociological explanation. Figure 3.4 (Positive attitudes toward immigrants’ economic contribution in Belgium, 2002-2010) provides complementary evidence of these attitudinal differences; in agreement with Figure 2, Brussels stands out as the region with the most favorable attitudes towards immigrants’ economic impact, followed by Flanders, and eventually, Wallonia.

< Figures 3.3 and 3.4 about here >

Figure 3.5 (Negative attitudes toward immigrants’ economic contribution in Spain, 2002-2010) introduces a similar pattern in the Spanish case. Andalusia exhibits a stronger material manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment than Catalonia and Madrid in four of the five survey waves. Anti-immigrant sentiment is especially prominent in the 2008 and 2010 waves, probably as a result of the current economic crisis. Catalonia follows, and exhibits strong hostile attitudes toward immigrants’ economic contribution, while citizens in Madrid present the least negative attitudes. Figure 3.6 (Positive attitudes toward immigrants’ economic contribution, Spain, 2002-2010) complements these cross-regional attitudinal trends. The Madrid region systematically maintains the most positive attitudes toward immigrants’ economic impact. In four of the five ESS waves, 40% of the population in Madrid holds positive attitudes toward immigration. At odds, Andalusia exhibits the least favorable attitudes. The correspondence between positive and negative attitudes indicates that the percentage of ‘neutral’ responses is low, and most respondents have an opinion on this subject.

< Figures 3.5 and 3.6 about here >
Respondents’ perceptions of immigration as a cultural threat exhibit distinctive cross-regional differences. Figure 3.7 (Negative attitudes toward immigrants’ cultural impact in Belgium, 2002-2010) indicates that Flanders is the most hostile region, followed by Wallonia. Brussels, again, exhibits the less skeptical attitudes toward cultural diversity. The manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment as a cultural threat has increased over time, ranging from 15 to 20% of the Flemish population. Understanding what underlies citizens’ increasing hostility in Flanders represents an analytical priority, and it is the object of study in Chapter 6. Brussels stands out as the region with the most favorable attitudes toward cultural diversity (Figure 3.8: Positive attitudes toward immigrants’ cultural impact, Belgium, 2002-2010). More than 50% of the population in Brussels think that immigration enriches the country’s cultural life. In parallel, both the Walloons and the Flemish exhibit significantly less enthusiastic views, with only 40% and 30% of positive attitudes respectively.

Spain shows cross-regional differences in the cultural manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment as well, even though they are slightly less consistent than those in Belgium (Figure 3.9: Negative attitudes toward immigrants’ cultural impact, Spain, 2002-2010). Catalonia exhibits the strongest manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment as a cultural threat in three of the five survey waves (2004, 2008, and 2010). Andalusia follows, while the Madrid region presents the most favorable views of cultural diversity. Figure 3.10 (Positive attitudes toward immigrants’ cultural impact in Spain, 2002-2010) illustrates Madrid region’s increasingly favorable attitudes toward immigrants’ cultural impact over time. Andalusia shows relatively positive attitudes, while Catalonia, on average, exhibits the strongest hostility toward immigrants’ cultural background.
Yet, it is important to note that this pattern is less systematic than those observed and discussed in previous figures.

< Figures 3.9 and 3.10 about here >

Figure 3.3-3.10 illustrate the cross-regional attitudinal variability within Belgium and Spain, but these differences could be a product of the uneven distribution of socio-demographic variables, such as respondents’ age, gender, level of education, and household income. I pool data from the five waves of the European Social Survey excluding citizens with an immigrant background, in order to test these hypotheses with ordered logit models. Based on previous studies (Winship and Mare 1984), this analytical formulation is the best fit to the dependent variable. Table 3.2 (Descriptive statistics) summarizes the dependent and independent variables. For a list of survey questions, see Appendix A (Questions of the European Social Survey). Next, I show statistically significant cross-regional attitudinal differences in both countries, even after controlling for respondents’ socio-demographic and economic characteristics. I use the category ‘good’ as the reference, so that positive coefficients show favorable effects on citizens’ perception of immigration and negative ones indicate anti-immigrant sentiment.

< Table 3.2 about here >

Table 3.3 (Regional differences in the manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment 2002-2010) shows that citizens in Wallonia and Flanders are significantly more likely to manifest anti-immigrant sentiment as a material threat than those in Brussels. Moreover, citizens in Flanders and Wallonia are significantly more likely to perceive immigrants’ cultural impact negatively, compared to their peers in Brussels. These results agree with Figures 3.7 and 3.8 and highlight the geographical overlap of material and cultural manifestations of anti-immigrant sentiment. Andalusians exhibit the greatest degree of hostility towards immigrants’ socio-economic
contribution. Catalans follow, with slightly less hostile attitudes, but still statistically significant compared to their peers in Madrid. Catalans are significantly more likely to hold negative attitudes towards immigrants’ cultural impact their peers in the Madrid region. I have measured the effects of socio-demographic and economic variables, and observed that coefficients are consistent with extant studies.

In sum, this section has introduced the variability of anti-immigrant sentiment in its material and cultural forms across three Belgian and three Spanish regions. The lack of systematic yearly effects across these four tables suggests that cross-regional attitudinal patterns respond to stable patterns with limited mutability over time. Eight figures and two tables provide evidence of robust cross-regional attitudinal differences. The next section presents the most important structural characteristics of the six research sites under consideration.

### 3.2. Six regions

This section presents the distinctive structural characteristics of this study’s units of analysis (see Table 3.4: Structural characteristics of the six research sites). With the term ‘structural characteristics’, I refer to the demographic, economic, cultural, and political contextual variables that define the environment in which native citizens and immigrants interact and generate perceptions of each other. I introduce the six research sites by presenting regional percentages of immigrant population, citizenship acquisitions, unemployment rates, integration models, prevailing notions of membership, the existence of nation-building projects, and the radical-right.

---

3 Statistical analysis available upon request.
I argue that these structural characteristics, in interaction with state regulations and institutions, represent key processes underlying the strength and manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment.

The Brussels’ region has the highest percentage of immigrants in the country. Already in 2000, non-Belgian residents represented 28% of its population (Deboosere et al. 2009; Jacobs and Swyngedouw 2002). An exceptionally high immigrant stock turned cultural diversity into a defining characteristic of Brussels (Favell 2001). Brussels also exhibits the highest unemployment rates in the country, about 15%, and the second-highest number of naturalizations after Flanders, a little over 200,000 (European Union Democracy Observatory 2010). As part of the Francophone community, immigrants’ integration in Brussels is characterized by a laissez-faire Republican integration model, a civic notion of membership, and a lacking nation-building project. Moreover, Brussels is the only Belgian region that has not witnessed the rise of an ethno-nationalist party, probably due to its high immigration. In this study, I use the case of Brussels to examine the low manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment.

Flanders is the Northern region of the country, historically characterized by its low immigration, and low unemployment. Between 1979 and 2008, Flanders was the region with the highest number of citizenship acquisitions, slightly above 215,000. It has an active integration policy, which requires non-EU immigrants to attend integration and language classes (Adams 2011). At the same time, the Flemish integration policy seeks to protect cultural group rights, for example, by allowing females to wear headscarves in some public institutions (Ireland 2004). Its historical nation-building project contrasts to the rest of the country, and relies on an understanding of membership in ethnic terms. Additionally, Flanders stands out for the strength of its ethno-
nationalist party: the Vlaams Belang. The Vlaams Belang was relatively successful throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and managed to receive 24% of the vote in Antwerp in 2004 (Jacobs and Swyngedouw 2002). I use the case of Flanders to dig into the significance of nationalism, an active integration policy centered on immigrants’ cultural acquisition, and the political mobilization of the radical right.

Wallonia is the Southern area of Belgium, and the most economically-disadvantaged. A blooming industrial sector attracted international labor flows throughout the guest-worker period (1950-1974), but the transformation of the economy during the late 1970s and 1980s left unemployed a significant percentage of its population. Since then, Wallonia has maintained structurally high unemployment rates. It is the region in the country with the lowest number of recent naturalizations, perhaps due to its limited economic opportunities. Along with Brussels, the regulation of immigrants’ integration in Wallonia follows a laissez-faire Republican model that conceives regional membership in civic terms (Ireland 2004). In contrast to Flanders, Wallonia has never had political aspirations independent from Belgium. Although it has witnessed the rise of the radical right, with the Front National, this party has never received a degree of electoral support comparable to the Vlaams Belang. In this study, I use the Walloon case to better understand the manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment as a material threat.

Andalusia is one of Spain’s most economically underprivileged regions, with a percentage of immigrant population around 8 percent. Its unemployment rate is structurally high, and it has skyrocketed since the beginning of the current economic recession. In 2011, it was 27.8 (Instituto Nacional de Estadística 2012). Between 2004 and 2008, it has naturalized over 21,000 immigrants, which is significantly less than Catalonia and Madrid. Similar to Wallonia, Andalusia counts with a laissez-faire Republican integration model that relies on civic principles (Aja et al. 2006;
Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2008), and it does not have a nation-building project outside of Spain. Also, it has not witnessed the rise of the radical right thus far. Along with Wallonia, I use the case of Andalusia to examine the role of structural conditions in the material manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment.

Catalonia is one of Spain’s wealthiest regions, with a longstanding structural demand of labor and low unemployment rates. This is one of the reasons of its high percentage of immigration, around 15%, and 67,000 citizenship acquisitions throughout the 2004-2008 period. Yet, a segment of the citizenry perceives immigration as a controversial subject, due to its apparent incompatibility with Catalonia’s nation-building project (Solé and Parella 2003). The region’s assimilationist model embraces an understanding of membership based on cultural terms, and aligned with a historical nation-building project. Moreover, Catalonia exhibits today the only radical right party in the country; Plataforma per Catalunya, which has received increasing electoral support throughout the 2000s, but it has not managed to obtain regional Parliamentary representation. Evidence from Catalonia, along with Flanders, allows me to examine the sources of contention underlying the cultural manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment.

Similar to Catalonia, Madrid has one of the largest percentages of immigrant population in the country, 14 %, and it has witnessed the naturalization of almost 100,000 immigrants between 2004 and 2008. The Madrid region has historically had a structural demand of labor and relatively low unemployment rates, even though these conditions may change in the near future, as the economic crisis continues. Similar to Andalusia, Madrid has an integration model characterized by an understanding of membership in civic terms. In the political spectrum, and as the capital of Spain, Madrid does not have a regional political project. Moreover, it has not witnessed the political mobilization of the radical right. One explanation for this void could be the political
stigma of Franco’s Fascist regime, which governed the country between 1939 and 1975, and tainted the meaning of extreme right-wing parties at the national level (Encarnación 2004). The case of Madrid contributes to this research’s examination of the low manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment.

Overall, I use three Belgian and three Spanish regions to approach the role of demographic, economic, political and cultural conditions in the variability of anti-immigrant sentiment.

3.3. Data

This study uses mixed methods of data analysis to generate robust results (Small 2011). It combines data from: a) surveys; b) interviews; c) ethnographic fieldwork; and d) socio-economic and policy indicators. Most of my public opinion data comes from the European Social Survey (ESS); a biannual survey containing public opinion data for over thirty European countries, including Belgium and Spain, with samples of approximately two thousand respondents for every country and year. All five waves: 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010 include the two survey questions I have used to present the variability of anti-immigrant sentiment.

I also include public opinion data from the Eurobarometer (2011), the European Values Study (2008), and the Immigrant Citizen Survey (2012). The Eurobarometer and the European Values Study are large cross-national surveys comparable to the European Social Survey. A recent Eurobarometer (2011) provides public opinion data on cross-cultural relations, and how citizens expect them to evolve in the near future, and the European Values Study (2008) contains a survey question on citizens’ attitudes toward immigrants’ cultural integration. The Immigrant Citizen Survey (2012) is a novel pilot study with data on immigrants’ integration in fifteen European cities,
including five capitals of my six research sites; Antwerp (Flanders), Barcelona (Catalonia), Brussels (Brussels), Liege (Wallonia), and Madrid (Madrid). The most innovative element of this study is that it approaches integration from the immigrants’ perspective. I have used these four surveys to compare and contrast anti-immigrant sentiment across regions.


I interpret survey data with evidence from forty-five semi-structured interviews with immigration experts. These experts include university professors conducting immigration research across the social sciences; Sociology, Political Science, Economics, and Law; politicians, and representatives of immigrant associations (see Appendix B: Descriptive statistics of interviewees). I have conducted interviews in three different languages: Catalan, English, and Spanish, and their length ranged from forty five minutes to one hour. I quote segments of interviews and, when they were not conducted in English, I include the original quote in a footnote.

In both countries, I select immigration experts using a snow-ball sample strategy. In Spain, the selection of experts was based on an independent research foundation for international affairs in Barcelona, CIDOB (Centre d’Estudis i Documentació Internationals de Barcelona [Center for International Studies and Documentation of Barcelona]). As CIDOB works with experts who have
external appointments in research universities and public administrations, I think that they represent unbiased intellectual and professional elite\textsuperscript{4}. This list has been the point of departure of my selection of experts in Spain. In Belgium, I have selected experts based on the research foundation \textit{King Baudouin}, in Brussels, as well as peer-reviewed publications in the most important journals on international migration. In both countries, I have encouraged my interviewees to propose additional experts in the field, in order to expand the size of my experts’ sample. My interview protocol begins by presenting cross-regional attitudinal differences in the expert’s country, and proceeds with the discussion of demographic, economic, political and cultural processes that could be potentially underlying these attitudes (see Table 3.5: Interview protocol).

\textit{< Table 3.5 about here >}

In order to evaluate the role of state policies regulating immigrants’ enfranchisement, I conducted ethnographic fieldwork during the two months preceding Spain’s 2011 local elections in two localities: Alcalá de Henares (Madrid) and Badalona (Barcelona). I selected these two localities because of their similar size; about 200,000 inhabitants, above-average percentages of immigration; 21.6\% in Alcalá and 14.8\% in Badalona, and their proximity to the two largest cities in the country. Most immigrants in Alcalá de Henares come from other member states of the European Union or Latin America, and about 87\% of them are eligible to vote in local elections. By contrast, most immigrants in Badalona come from Africa or Asia, and only 42\% are likely to be enfranchised (Table 3.6: Immigrant population in Alcalá de Henares and Badalona, 2010). The three largest nationalities in Alcalá de Henares are Romanians, Poles, and Bulgarians, while in Badalona, they are: Pakistanis, Moroccans, and Chinese (Instituto Nacional de Estadística 2012).

\textsuperscript{4} List of immigration experts: http://www.cidob.org/ca/temes_regions/migracions/equip_de_treball
Ethnographic fieldwork in these two communities has facilitated the sociological understanding of how political parties respond to immigrants’ access to political power.

To optimize the comparison, I focus on the performance of a single political party: Partido Popular. In Spain’s bi-party system, Partido Popular represents the most important conservative party in the country. It has been in office between 1996 and 2004, under the presidency of José María Aznar, and from November 2011 onwards, under Mariano Rajoy. Immigration became a top priority during Aznar’s government (Arango and Martin 2005), but in the current legislature the salience of immigration has decreased vis-à-vis the reforms to address an unprecedented economic crisis. In May 2011, Partido Popular won local elections in both Alcalá de Henares and Badalona. The examination of this party’s immigration discourse and its mutability according to immigrants’ access to political power helps explain cross-regional differences in anti-immigrant sentiment.

Finally, I use socio-economic and policy indicators to contextualize within-country attitudinal differences. Most of my socio-demographic estimates come from Eurostat, OECD – International Migration Outlook, Belgium’s Directorate-General Statistics and Economic Information, and Spain’s Instituto Nacional de Estadística [National Statistics Institute]. Additionally, I rely upon the Migrant Integration Policy Index to illustrate national institutional frameworks for immigrants’ integration in the labor market and access to political rights. I use data from the European Union Democracy Observatory to present citizenship statistics across regions and the largest nationalities naturalized.

In sum, this study combines data from existing public opinion surveys, semi-structured interviews, ethnographic fieldwork, and socio-economic and policy indicators to explain the
uneven distribution of anti-immigrant sentiment, and its manifestation as a material and as a cultural threat.

3.4. Outline of empirical chapters

The following three chapters reveal the sociological significance of demographic, political, economic, and cultural processes in the distribution of anti-immigration sentiment.

Chapter 4 accounts for the low manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment with an examination of cross-regional differences in citizens’ political values and the demographic composition of immigrant populations. Extant theories offer an explanation for the case of Brussels, but not for Madrid. In Madrid, I account for the low manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment as a product of the large percentage of enfranchised immigrants. Citizens in regions with a high percentage of enfranchised immigrants are expected to perceive immigration much more favorably than those in regions where immigrants cannot vote, due to the mediating effect of political parties. I show that when the immigrant vote is conceived as a resource, political parties shift their position on the immigration issue; they abandon restrictive border control ideas and incorporate cultural diversity claims.

Chapter 5 accounts for the material manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment with evidence from Andalusia and Wallonia. I explain citizens’ hostility as a result of three key historical processes: a) a historical demand of low-skilled labor to complement the native labor force; b) a macro-level transformation of the national economy increasing unemployment rates among natives and immigrants; and c) an increasingly scarce welfare state. I complement prevailing explanations on economic competition by indicating the significance of policies of
economic redistribution. In contrast to prevailing theories on economic competition, which are focused on the labor market, I argue that the material manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment emerges from the economic scarcity in both the labor market and the welfare state.

Chapter 6 explains the cultural manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment as a demand-supply process, between the expectations of the native citizenry and immigrants’ efforts to become part of the cultural mainstream. Survey data illustrate that most citizens in regions with longstanding nation-building projects, Catalonia and Flanders, have higher expectations of immigrants’ integration than their peers in the rest of Spain and Belgium. I argue that these expectations come from regional integration policies that aspire to turn immigrants into active members of the regional culture. I argue that the implementation of these policies establishes a hierarchical relationship between natives’ and immigrants’ cultures, and encourages native citizens to expect a degree of cultural integration that may be unattainable. Additionally, I discuss the effect of the political mobilization of the radical right. I argue that it has contributed to the cultural manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment by strengthening boundaries against Muslims, to a greater extent than against any other immigrant group.
CHAPTER 4

LOW MANIFESTATION OF ANTI-IMMIGRANT SENTIMENT

Previous studies account for citizens’ positive attitudes toward immigration with explanations centered on political and demographic variables. They argue, for example, that liberal citizens will be more likely to view immigration positively than their conservative peers (see section 2.1.5, in Chapter 2). I use this hypothesis as the starting point to explain the low manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment in Brussels and Madrid. Then, I introduce a second explanation, which claims that anti-immigrant sentiment depends on the demographic composition of the immigrant population. These studies argue that its immigrants’ visibility, and not necessarily the percentage of immigrant population, what drives the variability of anti-immigrant sentiment (Blalock 1967; Schneider 2008). This chapter begins by evaluating whether either of these two explanations can account for the low manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment in Brussels and Madrid. I show that cross-regional differences in citizens’ political values and the demographic composition of immigrant population provide an explanation for the case of Brussels, but not for Madrid. For the latter, I provide an alternative account, based on the geographical distribution of immigrants’ enfranchisement and political parties’ interest in chasing the immigrant vote.

---

5 This chapter is based on the manuscript “Why Aren’t Spaniards Xenophobic? An Ethnography of Spain’s Local Elections”, co-authored with Saskia Sassen.
4.1. Political values and immigration flows

I begin by examining whether cross-regional attitudinal differences in Belgium and Spain respond to the uneven distribution of citizens’ political values with data from the European Social Survey (2002-10). I re-code the original 10-point left-right scale into an ordinal variable that categorizes political values on the left (0-4), undecided (5), and right (6-10). Tables 4.1 (Cross-regional differences in citizens’ political values in Belgium, 2010) and 4.2 (Cross-regional differences in citizens’ political values in Spain, 2010) indicate that there are statistically significant differences in political values across Belgian and Spanish regions. I illustrate these differences with data from the most recent ESS wave (2010). In Belgium, Flanders stands out as the most conservative region in the country, while most respondents in Wallonia and Brussels are slightly more liberal. The prevalence of liberal values in Brussels can explain its low anti-immigrant sentiment. As I have explained above (see section 2.1.5, in Chapter 2), liberal citizens are less likely to view immigration as a problem than conservative ones.

< Figure 4.1 about here >

In Spain, I find counter-intuitive results; respondents in the most anti-immigrant regions of the country, Andalusia and Catalonia, lean towards the left, while those in Madrid, lean right (Table 4.2: Cross-regional differences in political values in Spain, 2010). Previous studies indicate that the alignment of Andalusians and Catalans with liberal values responds to two political trajectories independent from international migration (Linz and Montero 1999). Social inequality in Andalusia has encouraged the majority to vote parties representing the traditional left (Kitschelt 1994), while in Catalonia, the oppression of Catalan culture during Franco’s dictatorship (1939-

---

6 Crosstabs and chi tests for all other survey years are available upon request.
75) has questioned the legitimacy of the right at the national level. The puzzling case here is Madrid, where the coexistence of positive attitudes towards immigration and conservative political values requires a new explanation.

< Figure 4.2 about here >

Tables 4.3 (Demographic characteristics of immigrants in Belgium, 2012) and 4.4 (Demographic characteristics of immigrants in Spain, 2012) illustrate cross-regional differences in the composition of the immigrant population. The case of Belgium fits extant theories to a greater extent than the case of Spain. 20% of the total population in Brussels comes from the EU, and 12% comes from other countries. These percentages are three times the size of those in Wallonia, and four times those in Flanders. They suggest that immigration and cultural diversity in Brussels is an essential part of the city’s identity, which can explain the low salience of anti-immigrant sentiment today.

< Table 4.3 about here >

Immigration in Spain is overall much lower than in Belgium, and exhibits a different composition of regional flows. Citizens from the European Union are concentrated in Andalusia (45%), Madrid (31%), and Catalonia (22%). We would expect the high percentage of Europeans in Andalusia to discourage anti-immigrant sentiment, but this is not the case. Madrid has a high percentage of Latin Americans (44%), significantly above Andalusia (21%) and Catalonia (32%). Due to the cultural similarities between Latin Americans and Spaniards, I expect that Latin Americans are expected to integrate in the cultural mainstream much faster than immigrants from other continents. However, going back to the concept of immigrant visibility (Blalock 1967; Schneider 2008), Latin Americans in Spain are not necessarily invisible. Their high concentration
in Madrid is expected to motivate citizens’ hostility. Africans are another visible community, with a low concentration in Madrid (11%), and higher in Andalusia (20%), and Catalonia (24%).

Data from the regional composition of immigrant population and citizens’ political values indicate that prevailing theories fit the case of Belgium to a greater extent than the case of Spain. The low manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment in Brussels appears to be a product of the high concentration of liberal residents, high immigration, and high percentage of Europeans. In Madrid, the low manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment contrasts to the salience of conservative values and the relatively high percentage of non-European immigrants. I explain the case of Madrid with an argument based on state regulations of immigrants’ access to political rights.

4.2. Immigrants’ Access to Political Rights

I use the Migrant Integration Policy Index to introduce national regulations for immigrants’ political participation. This dataset evaluates state regulations in four main dimensions: a) electoral rights; b) political liberties; c) consultative bodies; and d) implementation policies (Table 4.5: Immigrants’ political participation in Belgium and Spain, 2010). Electoral rights represent the most important boundary to immigrants’ political power. In both countries, immigrants have no right to vote at national or regional elections. The only exception concerns local elections, in which both countries allow citizens from other member states of the European Union to vote. In the case of Spain, citizens from countries with bilateral agreements can exercise their political rights as well. All other immigrants have to become Spanish citizens in order to vote. I use the reminder of
this section to compare and contrast immigrants’ access to political rights via citizenship acquisition in Belgium and Spain.

< Table 4.5 about here >

Access to citizenship in Belgium used to rely on an *ius sanguine* model exclusively. In 1992, the state included a parallel pathway, based on *ius soli*, with the goal of integrating the offspring of the guest-worker generation (Corluy et al. 2011). In the early 2000s, the government added a third pathway based on immigrants’ declaration, which benefited those that had been living in the country for at least three consecutive years (Foblets and Yamasmayan 2010). This policy facilitated the naturalization of long-term residents that could not adhere to either of the two pathways outlined above. As a result of Belgium’s multiple naturalization pathways, 30,000 immigrants have acquired Belgian citizenship every year between 1988 and 2007 (Figure 4.1: Total citizenship acquisitions in Belgium, 1988-2007). Historical data point out two exceptional peaks in 1992 and the early 2000s, which reflect the impact of the two legislative changes explained above.

< Figure 4.1 about here >

Figure 4.2 (Citizenship acquisitions by country of origin in Belgium, 2003-2007) indicates that most new Belgians come from Morocco. In only five years, almost forty four thousand Moroccans acquired Belgian citizenship. Turkey and Italy represent the second and third largest countries of origin, with 19,498 and 11,380 new Belgian nationals each. The large number of naturalized citizens from these three countries implies the demographic significance of the guest-worker period. The remaining countries among the top 10 nationalities stresses the role of Belgium’s ex-colonies (Democratic Republic of Congo); guest-worker agreements (E-
Yugoslavia and Algeria), and immigration flows from neighbor countries (France and the Netherlands).

< Figure 4.2 about here >

Spain counts with lesser pathways to citizenship than Belgium, but transnational regulations, bilateral agreements, and naturalization policies have granted political enfranchisement at the local level to most immigrants in the country (Aja and Moya 2008). The most important transnational regulation is the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which guarantees political enfranchisement at the local level to citizens from all member states of the European Union. Outside of this framework, bilateral agreements grant political rights to citizens from Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Iceland, New Zealand, Paraguay, Peru, Republic of Cape Verde, and Trinidad and Tobago, and the 1889 Civil Code provides the general framework to access citizenship (Díez-Medrano 2005).

According to the 1889 Civil Code, citizenship acquisition depends on the applicant’s country of origin. Citizens from any Central and Latin American country, Andorra, Portugal, or Sephardic Jews require only two years of residence to be eligible, while all other immigrants require ten years minimum (Díez-Medrano 2005). Given these different timelines and the fact that two thirds of Spain’s immigrants arrived after 2000 (OECD 2010), most Europeans and Latin Americans living in Spain are likely to be enfranchised today, while most Africans and Asians are excluded from the political field. Figure 4.3 (Citizenship acquisitions by country of origin in Spain, 1995-2008) reveals the significance of Spain’s colonial history. Among the top ten countries of origin, there are eight ex-colonies: Argentina, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru, Philippines, and Venezuela; and two neighbor countries: Morocco and Portugal.

< Figure 4.3 about here >
I evaluate the extent to which immigrants’ access to political rights can help account for cross-regional attitudinal differences. Due to the chronological gap between Spain’s regulations and the country’s exposure to international migration, the Spanish case permits tackling the problem of causality to a greater extent than the Belgian one (Abbott 1995; Hedström and Ylikoski 2010). In European countries that have been receiving immigrants for longer periods of time, such as Belgium, policies regulating immigrants’ naturalization have changed in a context of continuous immigration. This chronological overlap has made it difficult to determine whether the nature of international migration flows affected legislative decisions or the other way around.

In Spain, I use both recent and historical evidence to reveal the relationship between immigrants’ political power and political parties’ immigration discourse. I conduct ethnographic fieldworks in two localities; Alcalá de Henares (Madrid) and Badalona (Barcelona) during the 2011 local election campaign, to gain insight into a regional phenomenon. I have described the characteristics of these two localities in Chapter 3 (see Table 3.9). Their explanatory value comes from the fact that they are extreme cases (Stinchcombe 2005). I combine my findings with data from the electoral campaign in Catalonia in 1980. Evidence from Catalonia in the 1980s is useful because this region had a high percentage of immigrants from the rest of Spain, representing 14% of the total population. By contrasting how mainstream political parties used to approach internal immigrants three decades ago and approach international ones today, I shed light on the significance of immigrants’ enfranchisement in the alignment of political parties on the immigration issue.
4.3. Accounting for Madrid

Spain’s uneven distribution of immigrants’ enfranchisement has motivated political parties to engage in two simultaneous and opposite processes: the de-nationalization and the nationalization of membership. In localities where most immigrants are European or Latin American, I observe that political parties de-nationalize membership with pro-cultural diversity rhetoric. Immigrants’ enfranchisement motivates political parties to weaken the native-foreigner boundary, and emphasize the perks of cultural diversity. In places where most immigrants are African and Asian, and thus, excluded from the political field, I observe that political parties nationalize membership to chase the native vote across the left-right political spectrum. I evaluate the significance of immigrants’ enfranchisement using interviews with immigration experts. Next, I discuss two counter-factual explanations for the strength of anti-immigrant sentiment in Catalonia, based on the political mobilization of nationalism and the increasing electoral support of the radical right, Plataforma per Catalunya [Platform for Catalonia].

De-nationalizing Membership

On April 28th, three weeks before the municipal elections, a representative of Partido Popular gave the following speech in Alcalá de Henares (Madrid):

"We want a stable and well-ordered migration based on the law. We will always be against illegal immigration networks and bet for integration. The Partido Popular (PP) makes policy for everyone, for those born in Spain and for those born abroad. Most foreigners coming here end up feeling that Spain is their own. I am Galician and every Galician has
relatives abroad, so I know what that is. Therefore, the PP advocates for a policy that creates jobs. In today’s 4.7 million unemployed, there are one million foreigners.”

This speech exemplifies Partido Popular’s pro-immigration discourse. It approaches immigrants as a part of the polity and stresses the similarities between those arriving to Spain today and Spanish immigrants in the past, in this case, using Galicians as an example. It emphasizes the importance of immigrants’ labor market participation, and expresses a shared commitment to re-activate economic growth.

The selection of Alcalá de Henares (Madrid) was not coincidental. Immigrants represent 21% of its population, primarily from Eastern Europe. Since 2007, the enlargement of the European Union granted political rights to two of the three largest immigrant communities in this municipality: Bulgarians and Romanians. In addition to the speech above, the mayor (Partido Popular) organized a soccer tournament with the motto: Por la integración [For integration] two months before the 2011 local elections (Figure 4.4: Partido Popular’ electoral campaign in Alcalá de Henares, 2011). Both incidents provide evidence of Partido Popular’s interest in de-nationalizing membership.

A Law Professor explains the positive contribution of immigrants’ enfranchisement to their integration:

---

“Since they [immigrants] have political rights, they are much more locked in the community, they have a greater capacity to influence, make their voice heard, and be respected.”

This interpretation is consistent with previous studies stressing the importance of political rights for immigrants’ incorporation (Bloemraad 2006; Marrow 2009). In regions with a high percentage of immigrant voters, it is rational for mainstream political parties, such as Partido Popular, to deliver pro-cultural diversity discourses that permit chasing the immigrant vote. However, in regions where most immigrants are excluded from the political field, there is no incentive to change a restrictive immigration discourse that can potentially attract voters across the political spectrum (Norris 2005).

*Partido Popular’s* pro-immigration rhetoric was not entirely new. One year before the 2011 election, also in Alcalá de Henares, a party’s top representative gave the following speech:

“The regional government appreciates, holds in high esteem, and makes everything possible to make the new Madrileños (residents of Madrid) feel at home. You will always find me supporting immigrants, who are the bravest, the most entrepreneurial, and ambitious, who leave everything behind without fear to look for better opportunities.”

To conclude, she claimed:

---

8 Original quote in Catalan: “Perquè com que tenen plenitut de drets, inclosos els drets polítics, estàn més trabats a la comunitat, tenen més capacitat d’influència i d’incidència, i de ser respectats”.
9 Original quote in Spanish: “El Gobierno regional aprecia, estima y hace todo lo posible para que los nuevos madrileños se sientan aquí como en casa. A mí nunca me van a encontrar nada más que apoyando y respaldando a los inmigrantes, que son los más valientes, emprendedores y ambiciosos, los que dejan atrás sin miedo todo para buscar mejores oportunidades.” Source: [http://www.ppdealcala.es/pag/areas/100209.pdf](http://www.ppdealcala.es/pag/areas/100209.pdf), accessed in May 2012.
“For Madrid, it is a source of pride that they pick Madrid above any other nation or citizenry.”

The performance of *Partido Popular* is consistent with previous research examining how political parties target their discourse to the electorate (Rohrschneider 2002). By labeling immigrants ‘new madrileños’ the party attempts to blur the native-immigrant boundary (Bail 2008; Lamont and Molnár 2002) and attract the immigrant vote.

Similarly, *Partido Popular*’s electoral campaign in Madrid used the motto: “Coexistence and Trust in the City” [Convivencia y Confianza en la Ciudad] (Figure 4.5: Partido Popular’s Electoral Campaign in Madrid, 2011). With the concepts ‘coexistence’ and ‘trust’, the Partido Popular attempted to discourage citizens’ hostility. ‘Coexistence’ alludes to the recognition of ethnic and cultural diversity, which contrasts to Spain’s integration policy framework thus far (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2008). At the same time, the emphasis on ‘trust’ is expected to improve citizens’ perception of immigration as well. According to Rustenbach:

“Higher trust should also be related to not blaming immigrants unless one has had a personal negative experience with them. That is, some natives blame many societal problems on immigrants, such as high crime rates or unemployment, and this should occur less for individuals with high trust levels.” (2010: 57).

Beyond the scope of the political party’s discourse, immigration scholars argue that *Partido Popular* has approached immigrants’ associations to incorporate their interests into the political

---

10 Original quote in Spanish: “Para Madrid es un orgullo que elijan Madrid pudiendo elegir cualquier otra nación o ciudadanía.”
agenda. By aligning the party’s interests to those of immigrants’ associations, the party has reduced the salience of immigration as an issue. According to a Law Professor:

“Partido Popular has made an effort to attract the immigrant vote via immigrants’ associations. Some representatives in small localities depended on the number of [registered] Romanians.”

As more immigrant communities access political rights, I expect to observe an increasing de-nationalization of membership. In 2011, this process characterized the electoral campaign in localities with a strong presence of Europeans and Latin Americans, such as Alcalá de Henares (Madrid). In places like Badalona (Barcelona), the same political party used a discourse focused on the association between immigration and crime.

Nationalizing Membership:

Partido Popular’s electoral campaign in Badalona used the motto: Tu barrio es seguro? [Is your neighborhood secure?], juxtaposed to: “More Security” [+ Seguridad] to “Dirt”, “Delinquency”, “Incivility”, and “Insecurity” (Figure 4.6: Partido Popular’s electoral campaign in Badalona, 2011). Partido Popular’s immigration discourse in Badalona re-nationalized membership by identifying immigrants with a threat to the citizenry, the state, and the social order. By attributing immigrants the opposite qualities of citizens, it legitimized their exclusion (Tilly 1998).

< Figure 4.6 about here >

1 Original quote in Catalan: “El Partit Popular ha fet un esforç de captació del vot via les associacions d’immigrants. En alguns municipis petits hi havia regidors que ballaven en funció del número de romanesos.”
I ask immigration scholars the extent to which immigrants’ enfranchisement could affect political parties’ discourse. In a nutshell: if all immigrants could vote, would we observe a different electoral campaign? According to a Sociology Professor:

“I am sure. They [political parties] would need to moderate what they say. Immediately it would turn them [immigrants] into their targets. Now they are not.”

In agreement with this idea, a representative of an immigrant association claims:

“Immigrants do not have political rights and do not affect the electoral results. At the same time, some politicians are interested in capturing the vote of the autochthonous population that has suffered the most during the economic crisis and it is very easy, you say that “they take all your benefits” and that’s it.”

When immigrants are excluded from the political field, an anti-immigrant discourse helps political parties attract votes across the left-right spectrum, which is especially important in a bi-party system such as the Spanish one. Another question is: What is the relationship between political parties discourse and cross-regional differences in anti-immigrant sentiment? A vast literature in Political Science shows the significance of political parties’ framing of an issue on public opinion outcomes (see the review by Chong and Druckman 2007). Although I do not have longitudinal public opinion data at the local level to test this claim, my interviewees emphasize the negative impact of anti-immigration rhetoric on public opinion. A Sociology Professor explains:

---

12 Original quote in Catalan: “N’estic segura. Haurien de moderar el que diuen. Immediatament els convertirien en els seus targets. Ara no ho són.”

13 Original quote in Catalan: “Els immigrants no tenen drets politics i per tant no afecten als resultats electorals. Per contra, hi han polítics interessats en captar el vote de la població autòctona que ha patit mes durant la crisis, i clar, es molt fàcil, tu dius “que et treuen les prestacions” i ja està”.
“The fact that there are parties increasingly focused on this question indicates that they know they have an important role in the generation of perceptions and discourses.”

A former politician explains:

“‘When I was Secretary [of Immigration], a sociologist told me once that more than managing immigrants’ integration, I had to manage perceptions’”

Evidence from ethnographic fieldwork and semi-structured interviews encourages scholars to approach anti-immigrant sentiment by taking into consideration immigrants’ attributes, such as, their rights, and how these rights could be affecting prevailing correlations of power and public opinion. I provide additional evidence of the role of immigrants’ enfranchisement by comparing Partido Popular’s immigration discourse in Badalona in 2011 to how a nationalist political party in Catalonia, Convergència i Unió, used to approach Spanish migrants in Catalonia during the regional elections campaign in 1980. By contrasting political parties’ discourse vis-à-vis national and international migrants, I emphasize the positive effect of political enfranchisement.

De-regionalizing Membership

Throughout the 1960 and 1970s, thousands of Spaniards left the countryside in search for better opportunities. Most of them ended up in Barcelona or Madrid (Lopez de Lera 1995). Catalonia received over 840,000 migrants between 1960 and 1980, most of them from Andalusia, Extremadura, and Galicia (Romero-González and Albertos-Puebla 1993). In 1981, Spaniards from

---

14 Original quote in Catalan: “El fet que hi hagi partits cada vegada més centrats en aquesta qüestió significa que saben que tenen un rol important en la generació de percepcions i discursos.”

15 Original quote in Catalan: “Quan jo estava a la Secretaria, un sociòleg un dia em va dir que més que gestionar la integració dels immigrants, havia de gestionar percepcions”.

outside of Catalonia represented 14 percent of the regional population, similar to the percentage of international migrants today (Instituto Nacional de Estadística 2012). After Franco’s death (1975), and the reestablishment of the Catalan Parliament (1979), the first regional elections took place in 1980. Since most of my interviewees were present at the time, I have asked them how political parties in Catalonia addressed internal migrants during the electoral campaign.

With the motto: “To be Catalan means to live and work in Catalonia”, the leader of the nationalist party Convergència i Unió, Jordi Pujol, took the regional office in 1980 (Boada 2010). Similar to Partido Popular’s discourse in localities with a high percentage of enfranchised immigrants, such as Alcalá de Henares, Catalan political parties (even a nationalist one) shifted the boundaries of membership to chase both the Catalan and the non-Catalan vote. An immigrants’ association representative describes this phenomenon with her own immigration experience:

“When Convergència i Unió (CIU) won the elections, their motto was: “We are six million people”. They integrated all of us immediately, because we had voting rights and they wanted our vote. I remember that, even though I had been living in Barcelona for over ten years, when I heard this motto, I felt Catalan for the first time. Today, we are nine million people, but nobody has come up with a similar motto.”

Catalan political parties never made Spanish (non-Catalan) migrants feel unwelcomed. Indeed, they responded to them with a discourse that emphasized their sense of belonging to Catalonia’s civil society.

16 Original quote in Catalan: “Quan Jordi Pujol va guanyar les eleccions, va fer un discurs de ‘Som sis millions’. Ens va integrar a tots immediatament, perquè teniem dret a vot i perquè volia el nostre vot. Jo recordo que tot i que portava vivint a Barcelona deu anys, quan vaig sentir aquest discurs, va ser la primera vegada que em vaig sentir catalana. Avui som nou milions i ningú ha fet cap discurs semblant.”
The de-regionalization of membership, as much as the de-nationalization of membership, motivates political parties to deliver immigration rhetoric that emphasizes the perks of inclusion and diversity. The comparison between how political parties in Catalonia used to address non-Catalans in the past and treat immigrants today reveals a missing narrative. According to a Political Science Professor:

“Politicians have treated everyone equally, but they have not made public a discourse on behalf of foreigners’ recognition of rights.”

Similar to what I have observed in Alcalá de Henares, the inclusive discourse of Convergència i Unió allowed this party to chase the vote of national immigrants and win the regional office in 1980. Although this study does not have public opinion data to analyze how Catalans perceived national migrants at the time, political parties’ approach to internal population flows appears to respond to immigrants’ access to political rights. Evidence from past and present political campaigns suggests that anti-immigrant sentiment in Catalonia will decrease, as immigrants become increasingly enfranchised. Next, I evaluate two counter-factual explanations for the salience of anti-immigrant sentiment in Catalonia today.

Alternative explanations

This section discusses three alternative explanations for Spain’s within-country attitudinal differences, based on: a) Catalan nationalism; b) the political mobilization of the radical right in Catalonia, Plataforma per Catalunya; and c) the demographic composition of the immigrant population. The first explanation questions whether Catalonia’s anti-immigrant sentiment could

17 Original quote in Catalan: “Els polítics han tractat a tothom igual, pero no han fet un discurs a favor del reconeixement de drets de la població nouvinguda”.
be a product of the region’s nation-building project. Previous studies show that nationalist regions tend to exhibit stronger anti-immigrant sentiment than regions without such political goals (see section 2.1.3 in Chapter 2). If Catalans were more hostile toward immigrants than their peers in other regions of the country, it would be rational for political parties to use restrictive immigration discourses during electoral campaigns, such as Partido Popular in Badalona. In this case, Partido Popular’s discourse would be a response to the preferences of the electorate (Fiorina 2002).

Evidence from political parties’ response to internal migrants in the 1980s suggests that even if nationalism may lay the ground for anti-immigrant sentiment, it cannot explain Partido Popular’s dual immigration discourse. Convergència i Unió’s rhetoric vis-à-vis internal migrants reveals the extent to which Catalan nationalism is compatible with immigration. When Catalonia received immigrants from other regions of the country with political rights, nationalist political parties de-regionalized membership in order to chase the non-Catalan vote. This experience indicates that the political mobilization of Catalan nationalism, per se, does not necessarily encourage hostility toward the out-group.

The second explanation suggests the potential impact of the radical right. Plataforma per Catalunya, an ethno-nationalist political party that has received increasing electoral support since its foundation in 2001, could be competing for the right-wing vote with mainstream parties such as Partido Popular, and, in this process, motivate them to embrace a restrictive approach to immigration. In this case, Partido Popular’s anti-immigration discourse could be interpreted as a strategy to compete for the far-right space. Some of my interviewees agree with this idea.

According to a Law Professor:
“Partido Popular tries to maintain a balance between the center and the far-right, even though it does not have a far-right vote in Parliament, to get some of the votes from Plataforma.”

While this hypothesis may be plausible to explain Partido Popular’s performance in Badalona, I find it insufficient to account for the pro-cultural diversity rhetoric that the same political party delivered in Madrid. The same political party changed its immigration discourse across regions, even though no other party in Madrid used immigration as an issue. Hence, I think that a party competition hypothesis alone does not offer a compelling explanation for Partido Popular’s dual immigration discourse.

The data available suggest that Partido Popular’s dual immigration discourse responded to the geographical concentration of immigrants’ enfranchisement, rather than political parties’ alignment on the immigration issue. Indeed, I interpret the emergence of an ethno-nationalist political party in Catalonia, and not in other regions of Spain, as a result of the limited enfranchisement of its immigrant population. Another question is whether the presence of a radical right party can impact citizens’ perception of immigration negatively (see section 6.4 in Chapter 6).

Third, the demographic composition of the immigrant population could also be explaining part of today’s cross-regional attitudinal differences. Immigrants’ visibility can encourage citizens in some regions to perceive immigration as a greater problem than those in other parts of the country. Catalonia is the region with the largest communities of Africans and Asians, which are the most visible, while Madrid has primarily Europeans and South Americans, which are, arguably,

---

18 Original quote in Catalan: “El Partit Popular intent mantenir l’equilibri entre el centre i l’ultra dreta, tot i que a les votacions al Parlament no son d’ultra-dreta, per segar part dels votes de Plataforma.”
less visible. Hence, today’s uneven attitudes could be a response of immigrants’ different degree of visibility.

This hypothesis is not possible to test, but it is useful to open up a novel discussion about the scholarly understanding of *foreign-ness*. Prevailing theories assume that the relationship between immigrants and citizens is a categorical one. However, for most citizens, foreign-ness is conceived as a continuous variable. For Spaniards, a Canadian is much less foreign than a Nigerian. For a Belgian, a British is less foreign than a Chinese. Although it would be unrealistic for me to attempt to come up with a comprehensive scale of *foreign-ness*, theoretical contributions ignoring the uneven nature of immigrants’ *foreign-ness* have the potential to oversimplify the nature of inter-ethnic relations.

Overall, this section has discussed three alternative explanations for today’s uneven distribution of anti-immigrant sentiment. I have challenged the role of nationalism and the Catalan radical right, and used a third counter-argument to open up a discussion about immigrants’ degree of *foreign-ness*, and its impact on multi-ethnic social cohesion. Evidence from Spain reveals that the uneven distribution of immigrants’ enfranchisement motivates political parties to approach immigration with two distinctive discourses. I argue that the low manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment in Madrid is a product of its highly enfranchised immigrant population, and political parties’ interest in chasing the immigrant vote. With these results in mind, I turn my attention to the case of Brussels.
4.4. Accounting for Brussels

The significance of immigrants’ enfranchisement in Spain motivate me to come back to the case of Brussels and evaluate how immigrants’ access to political rights has shaped inter-ethnic relations. Albeit citizens’ political values and the composition of immigration flows provide a compelling explanation for Brussels’ low anti-immigrant sentiment, I am interested in examining state regulations of immigrants’ enfranchisement to gain insight into patterns of exclusion and inclusion. To accomplish this goal, I discuss Belgium’s two-decade debate over immigrants’ enfranchisement, the relationship between immigrants’ enfranchisement and the geographical polarization of attitudes, and its theoretical implications vis-à-vis the Madrid case.

The Debate over Immigrants’ Enfranchisement

Belgian scholars have long identified immigrants’ enfranchisement with “one of the hottest topics in Belgian politics” (Jacobs and Swyngedouw 2002: 329). This discussion has been traditionally tied to the performance of the radical right, particularly, Vlaams Belang. As previous studies explain:

“It is of crucial importance to understand that policy-making in the field of immigrant incorporation has been a result of reactions to the electoral success of an anti-immigrant political party” (Jacobs and Swyngedouw 2002: 332).

Non-EU immigrants were not allowed to vote at the local level until 2004. In order to explain why Belgium did not enfranchise non-EU immigrants earlier, we need to take into consideration the structure of the national political system, and the relevance of compromise (Lijphart 1977).
Compromise is especially important in the discussion over immigrants’ enfranchisement, since its approval required modifying the Constitution. According to Jacobs (1999: 651):

“The Belgian constitution stipulates that in principle possession of state citizenship is a prerequisite for enjoying voting rights. Enfranchisement of foreign residents hence necessitates both a simple legislative change and a more complex constitutional change and thus becomes a very time-consuming process.”

The most important challenge of this procedure consists in acquiring a two-third Parliamentary majority, which implies reaching an agreement among all major parties in the country (Jacobs 1999).

The debate over immigrants’ political incorporation became an issue in the 1970s, following the conclusion of the guest-worker period (Martiniello and Rea 2003). The 1980s witnessed an increasing governmental interest in extending immigrants’ political rights, originally viewed as a mechanism to facilitate their integration, and strengthen social cohesion (Jacobs and Swyngedouw 2002). Opposition to immigrants’ enfranchisement came from the right, which anticipated that immigrants’ votes would wither its political power (Jacobs 1999). Instead of extending political rights to immigrants, the government decided to facilitate immigrants’ naturalization with a new pathway to citizenship: *ius soli*. This policy facilitated the naturalization of immigrants’ offspring, but it postponed the enfranchisement of non-EU immigrants until 2004 (Bauböck 2005).

The increasing success of the *Vlaams Belang* (then, *Vlaams Blok*) throughout the 1980s, going from 1 to 6% of the Belgian Chamber of Representatives, encouraged the government to take further measures against the strengthening of ethnic boundaries (Art 2008). In 1989, the government appointed a Royal Commissioner to facilitate inter-ethnic relations and de-legitimize
the radical right in the public space (Martiniello and Rea 2003). Additionally, multiple parties signed an agreement; *cordon sanitaire*, to isolate the *Vlaams Blok* at the national Parliament (Erk 2005). The *cordon sanitaire* challenged the legitimacy of the radical right at the institutional level, but the party’s increasing electoral support showed that these regulations were insufficient. In 2004, the enfranchisement of non-EU immigrants was set to change the political landscape.

**Immigrants’ Enfranchisement and the Polarization of Attitudes**

In 2006, Belgium celebrated the first local elections where non-European immigrants were allowed to vote. Immigrants’ enfranchisement transformed the correlation of political power in the direction that politicians and scholars had previously anticipated: on behalf of the left (Belien 2006; Teney et al. 2010). The traditional left; the Socialist Party, witnessed a sharp increment of their electoral support. In the city of Antwerp, for example, the Socialist vote increased from 19.5 to 35.3% (Belien 2006).

Yet, immigrants’ enfranchisement unearthed a parallel process: the polarization of attitudes across the country. In Antwerp, where the Socialist vote had increased so significantly, the *Vlaams Belang* received over 33% of the vote (Belien 2006). Belgium’s attitudinal polarization did not begin with immigrants’ enfranchisement, but responded to the settlement of immigrant communities and internal migration flows; as immigrants concentrated in the urban areas, native Belgians were increasingly moving to the countryside. Belien (2006) illustrates this process with the case of Antwerp:

“Every year 4,000 indigenous Antwerpians move out and 5,000 [immigrants] move in”
Brussels represented an extreme case in this respect. Data of neighborhood residents between 1988 and 2005 illustrates the size of these demographic flows (Deboseere et al. 2009). Table (4.5: Demographic composition of neighborhood in Brussels, 1988-2005) indicates the in- and out-migration flows of Belgians; citizens from the EU-15; Turkish and Moroccans; and Other immigrant groups. In all neighborhoods of Brussels, Belgians show negative flows, while citizens from other EU member states, Turks, and Moroccans, exhibit positive in-flows. It is interesting to observe the fragmentation of the urban space by ethnic groups; EU citizens have moved to the neighborhoods in the second crown of the city, while Turks and Moroccans have settled in the inner city and the neighborhoods of the first crown.

Where do Belgians from Brussels go? to Flanders and Wallonia. Deboseere et al. (2009) provide evidence of inter-regional flows (see Figure 4.7: Internal migration flows in Belgium, 2006). Brussels also receives important in-flows from Flanders and Wallonia, but they are slightly smaller than those going out (Deboseere et al. 2009). I argue that this demographic process is a key mechanism exacerbating Brussels’ low anti-immigrant sentiment.

A Sociology Professor explains individuals’ motivations to move to Brussels:

“A big part of the inhabitants [in Brussels] know what they opted for when they decided to move there or remain there”.

Then, he elaborates:

“The residents of Brussels who do not have an immigrant background know that this is how the city is.”
Due to Brussels’ high immigration, Belgians living in the city are those interested in living in a culturally-diverse environment. This observation supports the data of the geographical distribution of citizens with liberal political values (see Table 4.1). At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that immigration flows in Brussels represent a source of demographic instability for the Francophone-Flemish relations (Jacobs 2000; Mielants 2006). As most immigrants are French-speakers, their settlement is conceived as a threat to the Dutch-speaking community (Billiet et al. 2012). Yet, as immigrants increment cultural diversity and pursue cultural group rights, they contribute to the long-standing interest of the Flemish in protecting ethnic minorities (Jacobs 2000).

An immigration scholar explains how the Francophone and the Dutch communities view Brussels:

“For the Flemish, Brussels is a city where nobody is a majority, and they conceive themselves as protectors of cultural group rights. For the Francophones, Brussels is a Francophone city because they are the demographic majority”.

In sum, today’s low anti-immigrant sentiment in Brussels appears to be driven by the large percentage of immigrant population as well as the liberal political values of its residents. Brussels’ high immigration has become a defining element of the city, and motivated conservative native citizens to move out and liberal ones to move in. State regulations of immigrants’ enfranchisement have not directly affected how citizens in Brussels view immigrants, but they have highlighted an increasing polarization of attitudes between urban and rural areas.
Lessons from Brussels

These findings have three main implications. First, the association between citizens’ hostility and internal geographical mobility questions the extent to which institutions have resources to prevent anti-immigrant sentiment. In Belgium, the within-country distribution of anti-immigrant sentiment appears to be a product of both international and national migration. Brussels’ high immigration has motivated the most conservative natives to leave, and the most liberal to stay or move in. A geographically polarized public opinion requires new policies to strengthen multi-ethnic social cohesion, such as those aimed at preventing clusters of native citizens in the form of ghettos.

Second, the case of Brussels suggests that immigration does not necessarily increase anti-immigrant sentiment. The rise of anti-immigrant sentiment outside of Brussels appears to be a product of the internal migration of native citizens, not immigrants. These findings offer a novel perspective to previous studies claiming that citizens’ perception of threat is a product of the size of the out-group (for instance, Coenders and Scheepers 1998; 2008; Kaya and Karakoç 2012; Quillian 1995; Schneider 2008). As immigrants increase their numbers in other large and medium-size cities, citizens with strong anti-immigrant sentiments are expected to move into increasingly small localities.

Third, in contrast to the case of Madrid, evidence from Brussels suggests that immigrants’ enfranchisement has impacted the distribution of political power without necessarily changing public attitudes toward immigration. Further research needs to examine how political parties in Brussels have responded to immigrants’ access to political rights and the extent to which they have incorporated their interests.
4.5. Conclusion

This chapter clarifies the role of political and demographic processes in the low manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment. Evidence from Madrid allows me to explain the limited salience of anti-immigrant sentiment as a product of immigrants’ enfranchisement. Ethnographic fieldwork in two localities with different percentages of enfranchised immigrants indicates that political parties’ approach immigration with a dual discourse. In order to chase the immigrant vote, political parties de-nationalize membership by drawing parallels between native and immigrant communities; they de-problematize immigration by aligning their interests with those of the enfranchised immigrant community. I argue that natives’ exposure to political parties’ pro-immigration discourse is expected to contain anti-immigrant sentiment.

Immigrants’ lack of political rights motivates the opposite form of organizational behavior. In Badalona, where most immigrants do not have political rights, Partido Popular’s electoral campaign focused on the association between immigration and crime. As political parties respond to immigrants’ lack of political power with restrictive immigration rhetoric, I argue that they encourage native citizens to view immigration as a threat to the citizenry, the nation-state, and the social order.

I provide additional evidence of the significance of immigrants’ political rights by comparing Partido Popular’s 2011 discourse in Badalona to the 1980 electoral campaign of Convergencia i Unió in Catalonia. In the 1980s, immigrants from other Spanish regions represented 14% of the population in Catalonia, but as Spanish citizens, they all had voting rights. The Partido Popular’s renationalization of membership in Badalona contrasts to Convergencia i Unió’s inclusive discourse three decades earlier. Although it is critical to note the differences between internal and international migrants in terms of their visibility, cultural background, etc.
the distinctive alignment of both parties on the immigration issue stresses the significance of immigrants’ enfranchisement.

Evidence from Belgium presents a different relationship between immigrants’ political inclusion and the low manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment. A preliminary approach to the object of study suggests that Brussels’ high immigration and liberal values drive its low anti-immigrant sentiment. A closer examination of inter-regional processes indicates that Brussels’ high immigration has motivated internal flows to other regions in the country and polarized public attitudes. Since the late 1980s, Brussels exhibits a positive in-flow of foreign-born nationals, and an out-migration flow of Belgian citizens (Deboseere et al. 2009). I argue that these population flows explain the prevalence of liberal political values and the low manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment.

Future research is required to examine the extent to which the mechanisms I have observed in Brussels and Madrid are generalizable to other immigrant destinations. In Spain, I have focused my analysis on the performance of two political parties, but other parties may not necessarily respond to immigrants’ enfranchisement in the same manner. I am not able to control for cross-regional differences in the demographic composition of the immigrant population, which could also explain part of the attitudinal gap. Moreover, as much as the immigration issue was salient in the 2011 local elections, it might not be as important in the future. In Belgium, I have focused my analysis on macro-level demographic processes, but I have not examined the alignment of political parties on the immigration issue before and after immigrants had access to political rights. As immigrants and ethnic minorities represent an increasing percentage of the population and the electorate, knowledge of how demographic and political processes affect public opinion and inter-ethnic relations represents an analytical priority.
CHAPTER 5
ANTI-IMMIGRANT SENTIMENT AS A MATERIAL THREAT\textsuperscript{19}

The economic competition literature accounts for anti-immigrant sentiment as a result of labor market scarcity (see section 2.1.1 in Chapter 2). This chapter uses evidence from Andalusia and Wallonia to evaluate the significance of labor market competition in regions exhibiting strong manifestations of anti-immigrant sentiment as a material threat. My analysis shows the extent to which the material manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment is tied to citizens’ perception of immigrants as: a) labor market competitors; and b) greater recipients than contributors to the welfare state. I contribute to prevailing theories by providing evidence of inter-ethnic competition for resources outside the labor market, in the context of state regulations for economic redistribution.

5.1. Introduction

Scholars have long conceived the labor market as one of the main epicenters for inter-ethnic contention (Allport 1954). Already in \textit{The Nature of Prejudice}, Allport argued:

\begin{quote}
It is often said that Negroes constitute a realistic threat to the lower classes of white people, since both are competing for lower class jobs. (…) To say that the conflict is ‘realistic’ in this case means nothing more than that the contestants view the rivalry as an ethnic matter.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{19} This chapter is based on Zamora-Kapoor, A. (2013) ‘Competing for Jobs or Welfare? Patterns of Inter-ethnic Contention in Belgium and Spain’, currently under review at \textit{Migration Studies}. This has been invited to the conferences \textit{How Global Migration Changes the Workforce Diversity Equation}, at the University of California – Los Angeles, May 2013, and the 25\textsuperscript{th} \textit{Annual Meeting of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics}, University of Milan, June 2013.
When immigrant or Negro strikebreakers are brought into a plant the hostility toward these ‘job snatchers’ becomes structured as ethnic, although the color or national origin of the offenders is merely incidental to the economic clash involved. (1954: 230).

A part of the native population perceives that immigrants’ participation in the labor market takes away jobs that would otherwise be available to their native unemployed or underemployed peers (Citrin et al. 1997). Although many studies have shown that native citizens and immigrants do not really compete for the same jobs (Piore 1979; Sassen 1988), the ethnic competition hypothesis has generated a literature of its own (section 2.1.1 in Chapter 2). This chapter builds upon this literature in order to examine the extent to which labor market competition underlies the material manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment in Andalusia and Wallonia.

The question I seek to answer is: What drives the material manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment in Andalusia and Wallonia? I begin by contextualizing international migration in Andalusia and Wallonia from a historical perspective. The regional demand of labor legitimized international migration flows during the 1990s-early 2000s in Andalusia and between the 1950s and the early 1970s in Wallonia. Two different economic recessions left unemployed an important percentage of the native and the immigrant population, and have exposed a structural shift in the regional economy: its post-industrialization.

I examine the extent to which the scarcity of labor market opportunities has laid the ground for citizens’ identification of international migration with a material threat. I combine survey data and semi-structured interviews to reveal that, in addition to the native-immigrant labor market competition, anti-immigrant sentiment in these two regions is tied to immigrants’ receipt of welfare benefits. In both cases, I observe that citizens view immigrants as greater recipients than contributors to the welfare state, and perceive welfare state generosity as an element encouraging
international migration. Next, I outline parallel processes contributing to the containment of anti-immigrant sentiment. In Wallonia, I stress the significance of guest-workers’ employment in sectors that facilitated their identification with native citizens, such as; mining, as well as the low mobilization of the radical right. In Andalusia, I emphasize the significance of current out-migration flows of both native citizens and immigrants, as a result of Spain’s stagnant economy.

Following the discussion of findings, I evaluate an alternative explanation based on citizens’ perception of immigration as a cultural threat. In both cases, I observe that regional understandings of membership based on civic terms are compatible with cultural diversity. International migration does not appear to challenge, per se, the Andalusian or the Walloon identity and culture. To conclude, I synthesize the main contribution and limitations of my analysis, and suggest new policy to strengthen multi-ethnic social cohesion in socio-economic terms.

5.2. Immigrants’ socio-economic incorporation in Andalusia and Wallonia

Andalusia and Wallonia are economically-deprived regions with below-average incomes and above-average immigration rates. Historically, Andalusia has been one of Spain’s poorest and most unequal regions in the country. As Calavita and Suárez-Navaz (2003: 106) put it:

> it [Andalusia] has been dominated by a few quasi-feudal landowners (latifundistas), with the mass of the population impoverished peasants who have been described as ‘the most wretched class in Europe’ (Carr and Fusi Aizpurua 1979: 8)

Andalusia and Wallonia’s exposure to immigration and cultural diversity took place in a *Zeitgeist* characterized by a structural demand of low-skilled labor (Piore 1979). In Andalusia, immigration
became a Durkhemian social fact in the 1990s, when its growing agricultural and tourist industries demanded seasonal low-skilled labor. Initially, labor market integration policies were not deemed necessary, because as an Economics Professor argues: “Everyone who arrived to Spain found a job”. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, immigration contributed to the national economy by complementing the native labor force with low-skilled labor, which, in turn, allowed the economic growth and infrastructural development of one of the largest regions in the country (Olivier-Alonso 2008).

Andalusia was, however, one of the first regions in Spain to witness inter-ethnic conflict. It took place in El Ejido (Almería), a locality specialized in the industrial production of fruits and vegetables, and structurally dependent on low-skilled immigrant labor (Zapata-Barrero 2003b). In February of 2000, a Moroccan citizen slayed an Andalusian woman, triggering an unprecedented manifestation of anti-immigrant violence. In a matter of hours, native citizens attacked the dwellings hosting seasonal migrant laborers in the town’s outskirts, leaving injured 20 Moroccan migrants (Nash 2000). A micro-level incident turned into a collective exercise of boundary-making (Lamont and Molnár 2002; Tilly 2004). The salience of this event, first in its kind, signaled that the economic perks of immigration were evolving, hand in hand, with novel forms of inter-ethnic contention.

The main different between Andalusia and Wallonia is chronological: Wallonia received international migration throughout the 1950s and 1960s, while Andalusia did not witness a comparable inflow until the 1990s. In Wallonia, immigration arrived through guest-worker programs. The concept of ‘guest-worker’ transmitted an understanding of immigration in strictly utilitarian terms. Belgian scholars (for instance, Caestecker 2000) argue that the guest-worker model established a hierarchical relationship between natives and immigrants in the labor market:
“This so-called guest-worker system (…) attempted to funnel immigrants into undervalued segments of the labor market by means of work permits” (Caestecker 2000: x).

Wallonia’s guest-worker program lasted more than two decades, and brought thousands of workers from Southern Europe, Northern Africa, ex-Yugoslavia, and Turkey (Lesthargue 2000; Suárez-Orozco 1994). Table 5.1 (Foreign-born populations in Belgium, in thousands, 1947-1991) shows that the largest in-flows came from Southern Europe (Italy and Spain), Northern Africa and the Middle East (Morocco and Turkey), and neighbor countries (France and the Netherlands). The effects of the early 1970s international oil crisis motivated the conclusion of the guest-worker program in 1974 (Castles 1986).

< Table 5.1 about here >

Since then, the Walloon industry has been unable to maintain employed a large percentage of its native and immigrant populations. According to Suárez-Orozco:

“Industries such as coal, textiles, and metalwork, which once recruited large numbers of legal foreign workers from Southern Europe and North Africa, have suffered severely since the 1970s” (1994: 238).

A macro-economic transformation limited immigrants’ opportunities to work, and brought to the fore a novel discussion about immigrants’ role in the region. A critical element of this discussion concerned immigrants’ entitlement to welfare benefits (Ireland 2004). This situation illustrates the conflicting premises of state regulations I presented in Chapter 1, between the functional understanding of the immigrant as labor, and the immigrant as a subject entitled to rights. The parameters determining immigrants’ access to economic rights have become increasingly contentious over time, especially as the second and third generations of ethnic minorities are as
eligible to welfare as the descendants of native citizens (Sainsbury 2012). In some countries, like the United States, access to welfare is tied to citizenship, and immigrants are, *per se*, excluded from such resources (Zolberg 2006). In most European countries immigrants are eligible to receive welfare benefits, but a segment of the native citizenry does not deem it fair. In corporatist welfare states like Belgium and Spain, all workers in the formal economy are eligible to receive unemployment benefits, and by law, they are entitled to holidays, illness and family leaves, and disability compensations (Esping-Anderson 1990). Additionally, all residents, regardless of their employment or legal status\(^{20}\), are potential recipients of welfare from the means-tested safety net (Rodríguez-Planas 2012).

Based on previous studies (Coenders and Scheepers 1998; Coenders et al. 2008; Kaya and Karakoç 2012; Scheepers et al. 2002; Scheve and Slaughter 2001), Andalusians’ and Walloons’ perception of immigration as a material threat could be based on native-immigrant labor market competition. Table 5.2 (Unemployment rates by region and citizenship status, 2011) illustrates that Andalusia and Wallonia stand out for their above-average unemployment rates among the national, EU, and non-EU immigrants. In Andalusia, for instance, the current unemployment rate among national citizens is close to 30 percent, and about 40 percent among its non-EU citizens. In Wallonia, unemployment is about 9 percent among nationals and 29 percent among non-EU citizens. Albeit these two labor markets are not directly comparable, their high unemployment rates suggests that citizens in these two regions are especially likely to view immigrants as labor market competitors.

\(^{20}\) Undocumented immigrants cannot benefit from public healthcare, education, and welfare state benefits to the same extent than documented immigrants.
Cross-regional differences in labor market participation have a direct effect on household income. Figure 5.1 (Percentage of low-income households by region in Belgium and Spain, 2002-2010) indicates that Andalusia and Wallonia have the highest regional percentages of low-income households. Cross-regional differences in the distribution of low-income households anticipates that, independent of international migration flows, welfare benefits will be scarcer in Andalusia and Wallonia, than in other Spanish and Belgian regions. The most successful strategy to reduce welfare scarcity consists of increasing employment rates.

< Figure 5.1 about here >

Governments seek to increase immigrants’ employment rates through the implementation of labor market integration policies\textsuperscript{21}. The Migrant Integration Policy Index (2011) provides country-level estimates to compare state efforts in four different dimensions: a) access to employment and self-employment in the public and private sectors; b) general support to education programs and vocational training; c) targeted support to reduce unemployment amongst the immigrant population, with especial emphasis on women and young adults; and d) rights to unionize, receive social security benefits, and prevent discrimination at work\textsuperscript{22}. Table 5.3 (Labor market integration policies in Belgium and Spain, 2007) shows that Spain has implemented stronger policies than Belgium in most of these dimension. Yet, the problem of today’s labor market integration policies is that they use a common national-level framework to tackle an unevenly distributed problem. I believe that, due to cross-regional differences in the structure of

\textsuperscript{21} This paragraph is based on Zamora-Kapoor, Anna and Escandell, Xavier (2012) “The Role of Labor Market Integration Policies on Public Attitudes toward Immigration” (R&R - International Journal of Comparative Sociology). For more details on MIPEX methodology, see: \url{http://www.mipex.eu/methodology}

\textsuperscript{22} The scores for each dimension come from indexes that combine multiple indicators.
the labor market, it would be beneficial to transfer part of these competences to regional governments.

< Table 5.3 about here >

In sum, this section has sought to introduce the immigration phenomenon in the Andalusian and the Walloon contexts. An increasingly post-industrial economy has reduced the competitiveness of regional industries, and shrunk the labor market opportunities for natives and immigrants alike. The material manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment appears to be a response to increasing economic scarcity. In the next section, I evaluate the extent to which the material manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment is tied to scarcity in the labor market and the welfare state.

5.3. Competition for jobs or welfare?

I begin my analysis with data from the survey question: “Do you think that immigrants take away jobs or create new jobs?”. As I have done with other survey questions above, I break down the original 0-10 scale into three main categories, in order to capture robust attitudinal differences: a) take away jobs (0-4), indifferent (5), or create new jobs (6-10). Table 5.4 (Perception of immigrants as job competitors in Belgium, 2002) shows that already in 2002, 51% of the population in Wallonia viewed immigrants as job competitors. This percentage contrasts to the cases of Brussels (37%) and Flanders (38%), where the majority of respondents perceived immigrants as neither job competitors nor job creators.

< Table 5.4 about here >
Evidence from Andalusia indicates a different trend. Table 5.5 (Perception of immigrants as job competitors in Spain, 2002) shows that, in 2002, only 31% of Andalusians thought that immigrants were taking away their jobs. Citizens in Catalonia and Madrid exhibited slightly higher percentages, 33% and 36% respectively. Most Andalusians (41%) responded that immigrants were actually creating jobs, and complementing the native labor force. These attitudes are not surprising if we take into consideration that Spain was growing somewhere between 3-4% every year in the early 2000s (OCED 2012). Indeed, the positive perception of immigration at that time should be viewed as a sign of citizens’ knowledge of immigrants’ economic contribution. In contrast to these data, evidence from the mid-2000s onwards illustrates the impact of the economic crisis, and citizens’ increasing identification of immigrants with labor market competitors.

Data from the Observatorio Permanente Andaluz [Andalusian Permanent Observatory] provide evidence of what Andalusians consider the most positive and negative effects of immigration throughout the 2005-2010 period. Figure 5.2 (Positive effects of immigration in Andalusia, 2005-2010) shows that 40% of Andalusians used to view ‘labor supply’ as the main positive contribution of immigration in 2005 and 2008, but only 25% agreed with this statement in 2010. At the same time, 25% of Andalusians thought that there were ‘few or no positive aspects’ associated with immigration in 2008, and this percentage increased to more the 35% by 2010. These attitudinal shifts underlie the significance of macro-economic processes in the fluctuation of public attitudes.

Figure 5.3 (Negative effects of immigration in Andalucía, 2005-2010) shows that before the economic crisis 35% (2005) and 40% (2008) of the population saw ‘public safety’ as the most
important negative consequence of immigration. This percentage decreased to 25% by 2010. In parallel, while only 30% of the population used to view immigrants as ‘labor market competitors’ in 2005 and 2008, this percentage increased to 45% by 2010. These attitudinal shifts confirm previous studies stressing the magnitude of macro-economic variables (Semyonov et al. 2006; Sides and Citrin 2007) and indicate that a segment of the Andalusian population views immigrants as labor market competitors.

< Figure 5.3 about here >

Andalusians that only completed primary studies are those most likely to perceive immigrants as job competitors (Figure 5.4: ‘Immigrants take away our jobs’ by level of education, 2010). Citizens that have completed secondary studies exhibit slightly less hostile attitudes than those that only completed primary studies, and those that have completed a college degree mostly disagree with this statement altogether. These results confirm extant research on the explanatory power of human capital (See section 2.1.2, in Chapter 2). As education has a positive effect on citizens’ perception of immigration, the perception of immigrants as labor market competitors is especially prevalent among the low-educated.

< Figure 5.4 about here >

In addition to citizens’ perception of immigrants as labor market competitors, I find that mechanisms of economic redistribution exacerbate inter-ethnic contention. A Sociology Professor explains the dual manifestation of economic scarcity:

“Whatever they [immigrants] do is wrong; if they work, they steal our jobs, but if they don’t, they steal our social benefits”.
A former politician explains that inter-ethnic contention in the labor market and the welfare state is expected to emerge in the most economically-deprived areas:

“People who live in neighborhoods with a high density of immigration have seen that public services have collapsed, because the government has not invested enough resources.”

Data from the European Social Survey show that citizens’ perception of immigrants as undeserving recipients of benefits is most salient in Andalusia and Wallonia. Again, I have re-coded the original 0-10 scale into a three-category ordinal variable; respondents whose scores fall between 0 and 4 perceive immigrants as ‘free riders’, 5 ‘undecided’, and scores between 6 and 10 view immigrants as ‘contributors’. Tables 5.6 (Immigrants are greater recipients than contributors to the Spanish welfare state, 2008) and 5.7 (Immigrants are greater recipients than contributors to the Belgian welfare state, 2008) illustrate that citizens’ perception of immigrants’ welfare state contribution overlaps with their perception of a material threat. In both cases, I obtain statistically significant chi squares. In Spain, 58% of Andalusians perceived immigrants as undeserving welfare state recipients. This percentage is higher than Catalonia’s (53%) and Madrid (42%), and it is likely to increase as the current economic crisis prevails. Similarly, in Belgium, 56% of Walloons view immigrants as welfare free-riders. This percentage is the second highest in the country, following Flanders (59%), and higher than Brussels (45%). The high percentage of Flemish viewing immigrants as welfare state freeloaders requires further analysis.

< Tables 5.6 and 5.7 about here >

---

23 Original quote in Spanish: “La gente que vive en los barrios con mas inmigración ha visto que los servicios públicos se han colapsado, porque el gobierno no ha invertido lo suficiente”.

There are also significant within-country attitudinal differences in how citizens’ perceive the relationship between welfare state generosity and international migration at the macro level. Tables 5.8 (Social benefits encourage people from other countries to come live in Spain, 2008) and 5.9 (Social benefits encourage people from other countries to come live in Belgium, 2008) illustrate to what extent Belgian and Spanish citizens believe that immigration responds to a welfare state magnet (Borjas 1994). Over 75% of Andalusians either agree or strongly agree with the notion that the welfare state system drives international migration. Between 60 and 65% of citizens in Catalonia and Madrid either agree or strongly agree with this idea. In Belgium, I observe the same pattern; more than 70% of Walloons either agree or strongly agree with the idea that welfare benefits encourage immigration, while these percentages are slightly lower in Brussels (57%) and Flanders (53%).

< Tables 5.8 and 5.9 about here >

What remains to be resolved is: How to make compatible the principles of international migration with those of the welfare state? For some scholars, this is an unattainable task (Freeman 1986). Others argue that the main challenge comes from the negative effect of ethnic heterogeneity on public support toward economic redistribution (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Eger 2010; Fox 2004; 2012). The main problem of this discussion is that it relies upon an inaccurate assumption: immigrants receive more than what they contribute. Evidence from several studies provide data that directly contradicts this claim, and show that immigrants put in much more than what they take out from the welfare state (Bommes and Geddes 2000; Moreno-Fuentes and Bruquetas-Callejo 2011). In the conclusion, I come back to this gap between citizens’ perceptions and the socio-economic reality to propose new policy aimed at informing the native citizenry about immigrants’ contribution to the national economy.
Overall, my findings indicate that the material manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment is tied to native-immigrant competition for scarce resources in the labor market and the welfare state. This evidence offers complementary insights to the economic competition literature by revealing the significance of economic redistribution mechanisms. Moreover, it brings to the fore the tension between the economic and the human rights’ premises of immigration regulations. Immigrants’ access to scarce resources challenges the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion that characterize the modern nation-state (Benhabib 2004; Sassen 1999; 2006; Wimmer 2002). As the economic recession continues, the percentage of low-income households is expected to increase across Belgian and Spanish regions. Andalusia and Wallonia are the regions where I expect the scarcity for both jobs and welfare to be most prominent. In parallel to the main drives of anti-immigrant sentiment as a material threat, I identify regional processes contributing to the containment of inter-ethnic contention.

5.4. Containing Anti-immigrant Sentiment

This section takes a step back to present the contextual processes that contribute to the containment of anti-immigrant sentiment in Andalusia and Wallonia. These processes are less obvious, because their effects are overshadowed by the native-immigrant competition for economic resources. In Wallonia, I observe that the nature of guest-workers’ labor market participation and the low electoral success of the radical right have contributed to the containment of citizens’ hostility. In Andalusia, I argue that the devastating effects of the current economic crisis have motivated out-migration flows, and these, in turn, have de-problematicized immigration. As the country’s shrinking
economy has turned into a greater priority than all other socio-economic concerns, citizens have maintained a constant degree of anti-immigrant sentiment in spite of increasing scarcity.

While the European Social Survey indicates that Walloons perceive immigration as a material threat to a greater extent than Belgians in any other region, immigration experts do not view inter-ethnic contention as a problem. According to a Sociology Professor:

“Even if they [Belgians] are skeptical of immigration in both regions, when people think about the negative perception of immigration in Belgium, they think of Flanders”.

Contemporary manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment appear to be a product of the gap between citizens’ perceptions and the Walloon socio-economic reality. As a Political Science Professor explains:

“Everyone is on the same boat. There are no jobs [in Wallonia], and if immigrants come for labor reasons, they are not a threat because there aren’t jobs.”

Experts associate the low problematization of immigration in Wallonia with the nature of guest-workers’ labor market participation and the low mobilization of the radical right. Most guest-workers were originally employed in the Walloon mines and industries, which facilitated the identification between natives and immigrants. A Sociology Professor explains:

“In the mines, everyone is black”.

Then, he elaborates:

“The trade unions played a role in reassuring that all miners were members, to create networks of solidarity”.

This phenomenon was not exclusive to Walloon case. A Political Science Professor explains the significance of this claim in the province of Limburg (Flanders):
“In Flanders, the only area with high immigration and low support for the radical right is Limburg, and this is because of its mining industry.”

When I ask him to clarify in what way was the mining industry discouraged citizens’ hostility, he explained:

“They shared real life common experiences, they were all working class.”

These insights stress the importance of immigrants’ labor market participation in the strengthening of social cohesion. As most scholarship relating anti-immigrant sentiment to economic competition has stressed the significance of labor market status, future research could benefit from taking into consideration the labor market sectors where immigrants work.

The weak political mobilization of the radical right; Front National has also contributed to the low problematization of immigration in Wallonia, vis-à-vis Flanders. My interviewees emphasize the significance of three main elements explaining the limited success of the Front National, versus the Vlaams Belang: a) organizational strategy; b) size of the niche in the regional political spectrum; and c) interest of the media. First, the Vlams Belang has historically counted with a hierarchical organizational structure with charismatic politicians, such as Filip De Winter, Karel Dillen, or Frank Van Hecke (Hossay 2002; Swyngedouw 1998). According to a Sociology professor:

“The Vlaams Belang has always been organized as a Stalinist party: the top decides what the bottom does”.

At the same time, previous studies claim that the Front National never had a comparable organization, long-term vision, or charismatic leadership (Swyngedouw 1998).
Secondly, my interviewees shed light on the different size of the anti-immigrant niche. According to a Political Science Professor:

“Anti-immigration feelings [in Wallonia] were expressed but also controlled within traditional parties.”

As mainstream parties in Wallonia incorporated part of the restrictive immigration discourse into their program, they limited the political space of the radical right. In Flanders, however, the *Vlaams Belang* managed to capture the anti-immigrant niche as well as the votes from citizens frustrated with the political system (Hossay 2002). A Political Science Professor explains:

“Traditional parties did not recognize the effects of immigration or globalization. They [*Vlaams Belang*] targeted voters with skeptical views toward immigration and the political system. They viewed political parties as part of the problem of contemporary society, not the solution.”

The wide niche of the Flemish radical right facilitated access to increasing electoral support and Parliamentary representation. Due to the narrow niche of the *Front National*, they never managed to accomplish similar goals.

Third, due to its limited electoral appeal, the media has not paid much attention to *Front National*. This has inevitably affected their visibility. A Sociology Professor clarifies:

“The Front National can meet and deliver as many speeches as they want, but the media won’t report it”.

Later, she continues:

“There is no politicization of anti-immigrant sentiment, by either political parties or the media, in the Francophone side”.

In sum, evidence from Wallonia indicates that both the nature of immigrants’ labor market incorporation and the low mobilization of the radical right have contributed to the containment of anti-immigrant sentiment.

Spain presents a distinctive process of hostility containment, tied to the consequences of the international economic crisis. Immigrants have been disproportionately affected by the crisis, due to their overrepresentation in low-skilled sectors and seasonal industries (Donaire 2008). Between 2008 and 2009, the unemployment rate among immigrants practically doubled, from 18.7 to 30.6 (Instituto Nacional de Estadística 2012). Across the country, immigrants living in Andalusia noticed the effects of the crisis to a greater extent than their peers in other regions of the country, and by the end of 2009, immigrants’ unemployment reached 36.9%. As a result of immigrants’ exponential inactivity, a large number of them have decided to leave Spain.

Data from Eurostat illustrate the size of these out-migration flows at the national level (Figure 5.5: Emigration flows by citizenship in Spain, 2002-2010). Between 2002 and 2010, immigrants’ out-migration has increased systematically, reaching more than 350,000 in 2010. The effects of the economic crisis have not motivated the out-migration of native citizens to the same extent. I interpret this gap as a product of two factors. First, immigrants are (or used to be) disproportionately employed in the most vulnerable sectors of the economy; hence, they are more likely to be unemployed and looking for work during the economic recession. Second, immigrants have much lesser access to public and private economic resources than native citizens, so they are likely to run out of resources much faster than native citizens. Yet, if the economic recession continues, I expect natives to increasingly out-migrate as well.

< Figure 5.5 about here >
Figure 5.6 (Emigration from Spain by continent of origin, 2002-2010) shows that Europeans and Latin Americans represent the largest out-migration flows, in comparison to Africans and Asians. I explain the salience of European and Latin American flows as a result of: a) their size, relative to the total immigrant population; and b) the labor market opportunities in the country of origin. For citizens from other EU member-states, leaving Spain is easy; they can reside and work anywhere else in the EU. For Latin Americans, the recent economic development of most countries in the region is offering new avenues of opportunity. Africans and Asians face greater challenges than Europeans and Latin Americans on average, but the economic adversities of staying in Spain are encouraging them to out-migrate too.

A partial explanation for immigrants’ out-migration comes from the performance of the national government, which offered a lump sum equivalent to two years of unemployment benefits to immigrants without a job, interested in going back to their country. Immigrants interested in this deal had to give up their residency rights, and the option of coming back to Spain within the next three years. This initiative, implemented in September of 2008, showed the extent to which the Spanish government viewed immigration as a functional economic variable. Countries like Czech Republic and Japan have joined Spain in the implementation of such measures (McCabe et al. 2009).

This section has presented parallel processes contributing to the containment of anti-immigrant sentiment in Wallonia and Andalusia. In Wallonia, I have observed the centrality of guest-workers’ employment and the organizational characteristics of the radical right. In Andalusia, I have argued that the consequences of the economic crisis have reduced the salience of immigration by motivating immigrants’ out-migration. Due to the lack of public opinion data
to evaluate this hypothesis, I have relied on evidence from previous studies as well as macro-economic and demographic indicators. As the size of the out-group declines, anti-immigrant sentiment is expected to become less salient. I am confident that the publication of the 2012 European Social Survey wave will provide individual-level data to better assess the effect of the economic crisis on citizens’ perception of immigration.

5.5. **Alternative explanation: Anti-immigrant sentiment as a cultural threat**

This section examines whether citizens’ perception of immigration as a cultural threat could be explaining its material manifestation in Andalusia and Wallonia. Data from in-depth interviews suggest that the material manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment has led to its cultural one, and not the other way around. The Andalusian and Walloon inclusive notions of membership discourage citizens from viewing immigration as a cultural threat. A politician explains the role of Andalusia’s multi-ethnic heritage in the definition of its regional identity:

> “Andalusia is a melting pot. Other regions define themselves as ‘not-contaminated’ from other cultures. In our case it’s exactly the opposite, we are contaminated, very contaminated, so contaminated… [we are] a melting pot, of all cultures that have lived here.”

Another politician explains:

---

24 Original quote in Spanish: “Andalucía es un crisol de culturas. Otras regiones se definen como no-contaminadas, respecto a otras culturas. En nuestro caso es exactamente lo contrario, estamos contaminados, muy contaminados, tan contaminados… somos un crisol de culturas, de todas las culturas que han vivido aquí”.

“Speaking of culture implies speaking of all the cultures that have lived here… I believe we are the positive results of the cultural mix in Andalusia.”

Both quotes emphasize the ties between Andalusia today and the Al-Andalus of the Umayyad Caliphate, where communities of Christians, Jews, and Muslims coexisted under a common political system (Kennedy 1996). Andalusia’s culturally diverse identity is especially significant when comparing it to other subnational identities in Spain, such as the Bascs and the Catalans, who define membership in ethnic and cultural terms (Escandell and Ceobanu 2010).

Most importantly, Andalusians’ anti-immigrant sentiment coexists with a generalized understanding of immigrants as subjects entitled to rights. According to a Law Professor:

“The dominant political discourse in Andalusia is a discourse of citizenship based on rights, for both citizens and immigrants.”

Data from the Observatorio Permanente Andaluz de las Migraciones [Permanent Observatory of Immigration in Andalusia] support this claim. In 2010, more than 70% of the population agreed that immigrants should be able to acquire citizenship, political rights, and sponsor family members. This degree of social consensus allows me to better assess the relationship between the economic and the human rights understandings of immigration in this region. Evidence of two coexisting narratives presenting the immigrant as: a) material threat; and b) subjects entitled to rights, suggests that today’s material manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment is not necessarily exclusionist. There is nothing intrinsically contentious about international migration other than the

---

25 Original quote in Spanish: “Hablar de cultura implica hablar de todas las culturas que se han vivido aquí… creo que somos el resultado positive de la mezcla de culturas en Andalucía.”

26 Original quote in Spanish: “El discurso dominante en Andalucía es un discurso de ciudadanía que se basa en derechos, para ciudadanos y para inmigrantes”.

competition for scarce resources. If this hypothesis holds true, I anticipate that anti-immigrant sentiment will decline as the economy recovers.

Wallonia exhibits an inclusive understanding of membership as well. Previous studies have already highlighted the compatibility between Wallonia’s civic notion of membership and cultural diversity (Billiet et al. 2003). In this research, I have observed the low problematization of immigrants’ culture in Wallonia’s discursive practices in the management of immigrants’ integration, compared to Flanders. A Sociology Professor emphasizes that the management of immigrants’ integration in Flanders and Wallonia use two parallel narratives without overlap:

“In Wallonia, people use euphemistic language not to talk about origin”.

Then, he adds:

“There are greater cross-regional differences in the discourse than in the policy practices. In Flanders, politicians say: ‘We are opening a youth center in neighborhood X, to address the needs of the Moroccan population’. In Wallonia, they say: ‘We open a center in neighborhood X for everyone’, but if this neighborhood is 90% Moroccan, then, in practice, you are doing the same.”

In sum, regional understandings of membership based on civic terms suggest that citizens’ negative perception of immigration in Andalusia and Wallonia is not based on cultural elements. Extant studies and data from semi-structured interviews indicate that the cultural manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment cannot explain its material manifestation. Instead, citizens’ perception of immigrants as job competitors or undeserving recipients of welfare could be motivating their hostility towards immigrants’ cultural values, symbols, and practices.
5.6. Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to clarify the mechanisms underlying the material manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment. I have approached the object of study from the theoretical framework of economic competition scholarship. The cases of Andalusia and Wallonia, in parallel to Brussels, Catalonia, Flanders, and Madrid, show that the material manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment originates from the scarcity of resources in two different institutional settings: the labor market, and the welfare state. This research contributes to the literature by revealing the significance of the welfare state system and its mechanisms of economic redistribution. Data from public opinion surveys and semi-structured interviews indicate that most citizens in Andalusia and Wallonia view immigrants as labor market competitors. Moreover, there is an exceptionally high percentage of the native population who views the welfare state as a structural pulling factor of international migration flows. I emphasize the gap between citizens’ perceptions and the economic reality, in order to stress the need of policies informing the native population.

Evidence of inter-ethnic contention in relation to the welfare state offers insight into the conflicting ideas between immigrants as labor and as subjects entitled to inalienable rights. Semi-structured interviews have allowed me to approach the ways in which welfare state scarcity generates inter-ethnic contention. My interviewees argue that localities receiving the largest immigration flows have suffered a detriment of their public services; governmental spending has increased, but not in proportion to the growing population and their growing needs. This demographic process, combined with the state’s limited resources, has motivated native citizens to view immigrants as undeserving recipients of welfare.

With these findings, I seek to motivate a state regulation of immigration and integration policy in socio-economic terms. I propose two main types of policy development:
1. **Knowledge of immigrants’ economic contribution:** Public opinion surveys indicate that citizens’ perceptions are disconnected from immigrants’ actual contribution to the national economy. This gap is not entirely new, and previous studies have already noted the importance of citizens’ information (Semyonov et al. 2004; Sides and Citrin 2007). I believe that regions like Andalusia and Wallonia would benefit from new policy aimed at informing the citizenry about the extent to which immigrants contribute to the national economy and the welfare state.

2. **Invest in destination municipalities:** Localities that have received the largest immigrant flows have not been able to maintain the quality of public services. This has been especially the case in Spain, which has received about five million immigrants in only three decades (Instituto Nacional de Estadística 2012). Due to the uneven geographical distribution of immigrants, I encourage the state to invest in the most important destination regions. As these areas will have to adjust to a new demographic reality, this governmental investment is expected to discourage citizens from associating international migration with the impoverishment of the public sector.

Knowledge of how the welfare state affects multi-ethnic social cohesion is expected to have important policy implications for the future of European democracies. As austerity policies motivate European countries to revise existing mechanisms of economic redistribution, it is critical to clarify the rights and duties of both natives and immigrants. In this direction, examining how state regulations influence anti-immigrant sentiment represents a top priority.
The main limitation of this research concerns the generability of findings. As I have exclusively focused on the cases of Andalusia and Wallonia, I am unable to assess the extent to which my findings can inform the structure of inter-ethnic contention anywhere else. Due to these regions’ structurally high unemployment rates, they offer only a partial picture of how native citizens view immigrants’ impact on the national economy. Moreover, my data have only allowed me to study anti-immigrant sentiment between 2002 and 2010. This period has been marked by an international economic crisis that has exacerbated the scarcity of jobs and welfare. While a unique historical period can unveil social processes that would go otherwise unnoticed, it also implies that the patterns of native-immigrant contention I have observed may change when the economy recovers.

Further research is required to improve the sociological understanding of anti-immigrant sentiment as a material threat. This study has indicated that economic competition goes beyond the narrow scope of the labor market, but there could be additional epicenters of economic scarcity that I am not aware of. Research in this line of inquiry anticipates a promising contribution to the field of international migration and to the study of multi-ethnic social cohesion.
CHAPTER 6

ANTI-IMMIGRANT SENTIMENT AS A CULTURAL THREAT

Previous studies account for the cultural manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment with path-dependent explanations centered on the role of nationalism. Nationalism and prevailing understandings of membership have been found to explain why some individuals or regions are more hostile towards immigrants than others (Billiet et al. 2003; Escandell and Ceobanu 2010). This chapter begins by explaining the limitations of extant explanations and proposes an alternative account based on regional regulations for immigrants’ integration. Evidence from Catalonia and Flanders indicates that nationalism does not encourage anti-immigrant sentiment per se, but it raises citizens’ expectations about immigrants’ cultural assimilation. I propose to approach anti-immigrant sentiment as a demand-supply process, by combining data from native citizens’ expectations and immigrants’ enrollment in integration and language classes in the six regions under consideration.

In parallel to regional regulations for immigrants’ integration, I evaluate the role of the radical right in the strength of citizens’ hostility. I find that the success of the Catalan Plataforma per Catalunya and the Flemish Vlaams Belang is an outcome of social discontent, rather than racism. I also find that the political mobilization of the radical right contributes to the strengthening of boundaries against Muslims to a greater extent than against all other immigrant groups. Next, I evaluate the extent to which the cultural manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment in Catalonia and Flanders could be based on citizens’ perception of immigration as a material threat. Overall,
this chapter contributes to prevailing theories on the role of nationalism in the variability of inter-ethnic contention in cultural terms.

6.1. Introduction

The sociological analysis of inter-ethnic contention has traditionally been examined through the lenses of ethnicity and nationalism (Brubaker 2009; Calhoun 1993). Nationalism is a tricky explanatory variable because of its all-encompassing nature. As Calhoun explains:

“Most variants of nationalist rhetoric claim the nation as an always-already existing basis for action, whether as the continuation of ancient ethnicity or as the result of historically specific acts of foundation.” (1993: 214).

Analytically, nationalism is problematic because it does not permit scholars to isolate its effects. In the study of anti-immigrant sentiment, previous studies claim that citizens’ identification with nationalist ideas encourages hostility towards the out-group (see section 2.1.3, in Chapter 2). This chapter builds upon this literature and attempts to complement extant studies by clarifying the relationship between nationalism and anti-immigrant sentiment. I argue that state regulations of immigrants’ integration mediate this relationship contribute to the establishment of citizens’ expectations. I argue that anti-immigrant sentiment is a product of the gap between citizens’ expectations and immigrants’ efforts to become part of the mainstream. Evidence of this gap encourages me to propose a discussion about how much integration is attainable and how can state regulations align natives’ expectations with realistic integration outcomes.

The specific question I seek to answer in this chapter is: What drives the cultural manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment in Catalonia and Flanders? I begin my analysis by
discussing the problem of immigrants’ cultural integration in these two regions. I use public opinion surveys and semi-structured interviews to reveal that Catalan and Flemish citizens have higher expectations on immigrants’ integration than their counter-parts in other regions of Belgium and Spain. Data from the Immigrant Citizen Survey show that immigrants in these two regions take many more integration and language classes to a greater extent than their peers elsewhere. Yet, immigrants’ efforts do not appear to meet citizens’ expectations.

The relative success of Plataforma per Catalunya and the Vlaams Belang suggests that the political mobilization of the radical right has increased citizens’ perception of immigration as a problem. However, interviews with immigration experts indicate that the political mobilization of anti-immigrant sentiment has been a response, rather than a driving factor of contemporary attitudes. To conclude, I argue that the cultural manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment appears to be institutionally embedded in current integration policy frameworks. I propose to address this problem with policy centered on the recognition and acknowledgement of immigrants’ contribution to Catalan and Flemish cultural and political goals.

6.2. Immigrants’ cultural integration in Catalonia and Flanders

Catalonia and Flanders are regions with above-average incomes, a structural demand of international labor flows, and long-standing nation-building projects. Prevailing integration policies in these regions are focused on immigrants’ absorption of regional cultural symbols and practices. According to Kymlicka:

“[Flanders, Catalonia, and Quebec] accept immigrants as full members of the nation, as long as they learn the language and history of the society. They define membership in terms

The emphasis on the cultural incorporation of immigrants is understandable when taking into consideration the history of both regions. Nationalism in Catalonia today is a response to the political repression of Catalan culture during Francisco Franco’s dictatorship (1939-1975). As Laitin explains:

“Any public use of Catalan was proscribed; it was not permitted in any form in public or private schools. Secret police also attempted to penetrate private life, as the Francoist state demanded an immediate replacement of Castilian for Catalan in virtually all domains of life” (1989: 302).

The democratic transition of the late 1970s led to the rise of nationalist political parties. One of the main goals of these parties consisted of restoring the presence of Catalan language and culture in all regional institutions and in the public space. The most successful one at the polls, Convergència i Unió [Convergence and Union], stands for defending the interests of the Catalan nation as part of Spain. Under the leadership of Jordi Pujol, Convergència i Unió governed the regional office, Generalitat de Catalunya, between 1980 and 2003. It was in this period, when the regional government established Catalonia’s integration policy.

The case of Flanders is analytically distinct. From the founding of Belgium, in 1830, until today, the demographic majority of the country speaks Dutch and identifies itself with Flemish culture. Yet, for most of the nineteenth century, Belgium’s bi-lingualism was used to highlight a social divide between the French-speaking elite and the Dutch-speaking peasantry. Loobuyck and Jacobs provide insight into this phenomenon:
“While the Constitution of 1831 guaranteed linguistic liberty, the Flemings were denied any cultural and linguistic rights for a long time. Speaking French was the key for upward mobility” (2009: 127)

Consequently, the emphasis on language, cultural autonomy, and regional identity play a central role in Flanders’ integration policy today. Similar to Catalonia, Flanders’ cultural oppression motivated an institutional approach to immigration centered on immigrants’ acquisition of Flemish culture. In both cases, nationalism motivated regional governments to regulate integration through a standardized process of cultural acquisition, in agreement with Kymlicka’s quote. Now, how do Catalan and Flemish integration policies impact immigrants’ everyday life?

An immigrant in Catalonia wishing to renew his residence permit needs a positive evaluation of his integration at the municipal level. In this evaluation (expedient d’arrelament), the evaluator is required to assess the immigrant’s linguistic proficiency, in addition to his employment status, household income, number of dependents, etc. In this context, an immigrant’s inability to understand Catalan could affect his/her evaluation negatively. Yet, the regional government (Generalitat de Catalunya) has not standardized the criteria to test an immigrant’s linguistic proficiency. As Catalonia is a bilingual region, there is no specification about whether an immigrant should demonstrate his/her linguistic skills in either Catalan, Spanish, or both languages. A former politician explains the unsystematic practices of today’s municipal evaluations:

“I know two mayors that use different parameters to evaluate immigrants’ linguistic abilities. One says ‘I write a favorable evaluation when an immigrant speaks Catalan’, and
the other one ‘I write a favorable evaluation when an immigrant speaks either Catalan or Spanish.’”\textsuperscript{27}

Despite the fact that evaluation parameters are not standardized, all interviewees emphasize the importance of learning Catalan for social mobility:

“This Speaking Catalan is a requirement for any job in the public or private sector. Hence, it is essential to teach Catalan to immigrants, to prevent their social exclusion.”\textsuperscript{28}

In multiple occasions, my interviewees disassociate learning Catalan from Catalonia’s nation-building project:

“This happens everywhere. If you [referring to me] live in the United States and do not speak English, your life will be very difficult. It’s the same here.”\textsuperscript{29}

Overall, the centrality of Catalan language and culture tie Catalonia’s integration policy to the region’s nation-building project. Yet, it appears that there is an unclear definition of goals in the implementation and institutionalization of these policies. The Flemish integration policy brings together two premises apparently incompatible: a) cultural diversity; and b) cultural integration. The emphasis on cultural diversity aims to facilitate the incorporation and equal opportunities of socio-economically deprived ethnic minorities (allochtoon) via a network of provincial integration centers and municipal integration services (Pelfrene et al. 2009). Due to the oppression of Flemish culture during the nineteenth- and early twentieth century, there is an institutional commitment to

\textsuperscript{27} Original quote in Catalan: “Conec dos alcaldes que fan servir paràmetres diferents per evaluar si un immigrant parla la llengua o no. Un diu: ‘jo faig una evaluació positiva si l’immigrant parla Català’, i l’altre: ‘jo faig una evaluació positiva si l’immigrant parla o Català o Castellà’”.

\textsuperscript{28} Original quote in Catalan: “Parlar Català és un requisit per qualsevol feina al sector públic o privat. Per tant, és esencial ensenyar Català als immigrants per tal de prevenir la seva exclúsió social”.

\textsuperscript{29} Original quote in Catalan: “Això passa a tot arreu. Si tu vius a Estats Units i no parles anglès, la teva vida allà serà complicada. Aquí passa el mateix”.

protect and guarantee cultural minority rights. A Political Science Professor clarifies the meaning of this institutional approach:

“They idea is: we cannot do to others what has been done to ourselves”.

At the same time, the integration policy aims to “citizenize” (inburgering) immigrants. To accomplish this goal, the Flemish Government (Vlaamse Overheid) offers a civic integration program that consists of a social and career orientation course, basic Dutch as a second language, and counseling\(^{30}\). While this program is offered to all immigrants, only some of them are required to complete it, namely; non-European citizens, above 18 years of age, living in Flanders with a residence permit for more than three months. Immigrants’ failing to complete this program have to pay a fine ranging from 50 to 5,000 euros, but it will not affect their residence or citizenship acquisition, which is determined by the federal government (Jacobs and Rea 2007).

With these two premises; diversity and integration, the regulation of cultural incorporation in Flanders combines assimilationist and multicultural elements. Loobuyck and Jacobs (2009) explain the rationale of the Flemish model:

“We want to achieve social cohesion in which everyone’s particularity and cultural identity can prosper, but in which the current values, norms, and rule of our democratic state and the rule of law, remain the corner stone of Flemish society” (Flemish government 2004: 5, cited from Loobuyck and Jacobs 2009: 135).

\(^{30}\) An English description of the civic integration program in Flanders is accessible online: <http://www.inburgering.be/inburgering/en/integration-obligation>
In sum, this section has introduced the rationale of the policy frameworks for immigrants’ integration in Catalonia and Flanders. Next, I examine the role of these frameworks in citizens’ perception of immigration as a cultural threat.

6.3. **Citizens’ expectations of immigrants’ integration**

What does it mean to be integrated? Apparently, answers to this question vary from one region to another. Integration policies in Catalonia encourage citizens to equate immigrants’ successful integration to their proficiency in Catalan. A politician working for the regional government (*Generalitat de Catalunya*) explains:

> “Catalans understand that an immigrant is integrated when s/he speaks Catalan. When a citizen sees that a person from abroad has made the effort to learn the language, his/her brain opens.”

She continues:

> “Sometimes I wonder, in the rest of Spain, what are the elements that people use to judge whether an immigrant is integrated or not?”

A representative of an immigrants’ association concurs with the importance to learn the language, not only to become part of the mainstream but also to prevent discrimination:

---

31 Original quote in Catalan: “Els catalans entenen que un immigrant està integrat quan parla Català. Quan un català veu que un estranger ha fet l’esforç d’aprendre la llengua, el seu cervell s’obre.”

32 Original quote in Catalan: “De vegades em pregunto, al reste d’Espanya, quins elements s’utilitzen per determinar si una persona està integrada o no?”. 
“Immigrants notice this. They know that if they speak Catalan, they will have better opportunities to find employment or housing.”

Table 6.1 (Attitudes towards immigrants’ cultural integration in Catalonia and Spain, 2010) provides public opinion data about the extent to which citizens think that immigrants should maintain their culture, parts of it, or forget about it. The contrast between Catalan and Spanish respondents indicates that there are important within-country differences in citizens’ understanding of the integration process. Only 11% of Catalans think that immigrants should maintain their culture, versus a 38% of Spaniards. At the opposite end of the spectrum, 15% of Catalans and 9% of Spaniards claim that immigrants should forget about their culture of origin. The majority, in both cases, believes that immigrants should maintain the elements of their culture that do not bother natives. Catalans have higher expectations of immigrants’ integration than the rest of Spaniards. This gap adds to prevailing theories in the assimilation literature, which rely on the assumption that native citizens play a passive role in immigrants’ integration. Although these data do not distinguish Spanish citizens by region, they show that Catalans are especially demanding of immigrants’ cultural integration.

There are similar cross-regional differences in Belgium. A question from the European Values Study (2008) asks respondents to evaluate the extent to which immigrants should maintain their culture or take over the customs of the destination country. I re-code a 0-10 scale into an ordinal variables with three easy-to-interpret categories: (0-4) take over customs; (5) indifferent; (6-10) maintain distinctive customs. 75% of the citizens in Flanders believe that immigrants should

---

33 Original quote in Catalan: “Els immigrants ho noten això. Ells saben que si parlen Català, que tindran més oportunitats per trobar feina i pis”. 
take over the customs of the country, versus 64% in Brussels and 71% in Wallonia (Table 6.2: Expectations of immigrants’ cultural integration in Belgium, 2008). Only 12% of the Flemish believe that immigrants should be able to maintain distinct customs and traditions, versus 23% in Brussels and 12% in Wallonia. These cross-regional differences provide insight into the extent to which the ‘citizenization’ emphasis of the Flemish integration policy takes precedence over the multicultural one.

The geographical extent of the Flemish integration policy is likely to transcend the borders of Flanders soon. A Political Science research fellow explains that the regional government plans to implement a novel program in which immigrants’ integration will begin at immigrants’ country of origin. He explains the implications of this policy for the national management of immigration:

“It will be a strange situation if it is adopted, because immigration is a competence of the Belgian government. Once an immigrant gets accepted [by the Belgian embassy at the country of origin], they [representatives at the Belgian embassy] will say: “If you want to go to Flanders, this [list of requirements] is what you will have to do, but if you want to go to Wallonia, go ahead”.

Recent data from the Eurobarometer (2011) provide additional evidence to evaluate citizens’ expectations. A survey question asked respondents how they envision the future of cross-cultural relations. Tables 6.3 and 6.4 show that Catalans and Flemish are more skeptical populations about the future of multi-ethnicity than citizens in Andalusia, Brussels, Madrid, and Wallonia. Table 6.3 (Expectations of cross-cultural relations in Belgium, 2011) indicates that 43% of the population in Flanders believe that they will get worse, compared to 33% of the population in Brussels and 37% in Wallonia. In turn, only 7% believes that they will get better, while these percentages are much
higher both in Brussels, with 26% or in Wallonia, with a 13%. The skepticism of the Flemish shows that a large percentage of the population questions the extent to which immigrants’ cultural integration is attainable. I argue that the gap between their expectations and immigrants’ efforts to enroll in integration and language classes may explain this degree of skepticism.

A similar pattern occurs in Spain. In Catalonia, 30% of its citizens anticipate that cross-cultural relations will be worse in the future. In parallel, only 17.3% of the population in Madrid and 14.1% of the population in Andalusia believe that cross-cultural relations will deteriorate in the near future. At the same time, 15.9% of Catalans expect cross-cultural relations to improve, which is slightly more than in Andalusia (12.4%) and lower than in Madrid (21.8%). These data indicate that Flemish and Catalan citizens have a much more negative pre-disposition towards cross-cultural relations than their peers in other regions of the country.

Next, the question is: where do these negative expectations come from? Most of my interviewees point out the significance of immigrants’ integration. According to a former politician:

“Immigration is not the problem, but [the problem is] the integration of the second generation”.

A Sociology Professor from Flanders explains:

“The same people who have negative attitude toward newcomers, are those who have the negative attitude towards integration”.
Not all of my interviewees concurred with the importance of integration policies. A Political Science Professor explains:

“The different policies and the different perceptions go back to the history of the Flemish national movement. So when you say: Why is it cultural? I say, it comes from there”.

A Sociology Professor also alludes to the significance of nationalism:

“I don’t want to overestimate the role of these policies in the perceptions. The knowledge of these policies by the public is minimal. For me, there are deeper grounds”.

Interviewees’ interpretation recalls Calhoun’s (1993) notion of nationalism as an all-encompassing phenomenon. While nationalism is undoubtedly an important explanatory element, it is insufficient to explain regional phenomenon such as the high percentage of Walloons (71%) claiming that immigrants should take over customs of the destination country. I view this high percentage in a region without a nation-building project as a sign that nationalism alone cannot explain differences in citizens’ expectations. Instead, I interpret Walloons’ high expectations of immigrants’ integration as a product of an integration policy centered on cultural assimilation, and the indirect effect of a manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment as a material threat. Further research is required to assess this claim.

An approach to immigrants’ integration as a demand-supply process provides evidence to explain the cultural manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment in Catalonia and Flanders as a product of citizens’ expectations. So far, I have discussed the demand side of this problem, represented by native citizens’ expectations of immigrants’ integration. But what about the supply-side? To what extent do immigrants respond to citizens’ expectations? I approach immigrants’ interest in becoming part of the cultural mainstream with the only survey to my knowledge that
approaches this topic by interviewing immigrants: the Immigrant Citizen Survey. This survey provides evidence of immigrants’ living conditions in fifteen European cities, among which, there are five capitals of this study’s six research sites: Antwerp (Flanders), Barcelona (Catalonia), Brussels (Brussels), Madrid (Madrid), and Liège (Wallonia). Although the comparison does not include the case of Andalusia, I believe that data for the other five cases offers informative insights into within-country differences in immigrants’ efforts to become part of the mainstream.

Data from the Immigrant Citizen Survey indicate that immigrants in Catalonia and Flanders are much more enrolled in language and integration courses than their counterparts in the other three cities. Figure 6.1 (Have you started or completed an integration or language course?) shows that 40% of the immigrant population in Antwerp and Barcelona are formally enrolled in an integration or language course, while this percentage is much lower in Madrid (32%), Liège (23%), and Brussels (19%). It is not entirely surprising to observe such differences. Since a segment of the immigrant population in Flanders is obliged to attend integration and language classes, it is normal to find that they are much more enrolled than immigrants in Brussels or in Liège. What I find counter-intuitive is that immigrants’ integration efforts are inversely related to how citizens perceive their integration; in Antwerp and in Barcelona, where most immigrants are enrolled in language classes, citizens perceive that cross-cultural relations will get worse in the future. At the same time, immigrants’ low enrollment in language and integration classes in the other three cities does not appear to impact citizens’ perception of immigrants’ integration. I argue that the manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment as a cultural threat emerges from this gap; between the high expectations of Catalans and Flemish citizens and the immigrants’ insufficiently high enrolment in language and integration classes.

< Figure 6.1 about here >
Immigrants’ interest in integration and/or language courses is partly driven by their linguistic difficulties. Figure 6.2 (Did you have a problem learning the language?) indicates that most immigrants with linguistic difficulties find themselves in Barcelona (57%), Liège (52%), Antwerp (50%), Brussels (44%), and Madrid (31%). The high percentages of Barcelona and Antwerp are not surprising. But I find interesting the cases of Liège and Brussels. In these two cases, less than half of those who are experiencing problems learning the region’s language are enrolled in a language class. Yet, citizens in these regions do not view immigrants’ integration as a problem. In Barcelona and Antwerp, immigrants’ difficulty in learning the regional language is driving their high enrolment in language courses. Although immigrants may not be demonstrating the degree of cultural integration that native citizens expect, I anticipate that their efforts and interest in learning Catalan and Dutch will improve their living conditions and reduce anti-immigrant sentiment over time.

< Figure 6.2 about here >

In sum, this section has contributed to prevailing understandings of anti-immigrant sentiment as a cultural threat with a novel approach, focused on the relationship between native citizens’ expectations and immigrants’ efforts to become part of the mainstream. This new approach facilitates evaluating how citizens and immigrants relate to one another and the role of nationalism in the establishment of integration policy frameworks. The cultural manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment in Catalonia and Flanders appears to be a product of the gap between citizens’ high demands, and immigrants’ insufficiently high interest in the regional language and culture. Another question is whether the Catalans and the Flemish have realistic expectations about immigrants’ integration. The next section discusses the role of an additional factor motivating the cultural manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment: the political mobilization of the radical right.
6.4. Mobilization of the radical right

Catalonia and Flanders have witnessed the relative success of the radical right, with the mobilization of Plataforma per Catalunya, and the Vlaams Belang respectively. This section digs into the historical trajectory of these two parties and use interview data to evaluate the extent to which they have impacted public opinion. In both cases, I find that the electoral success of the radical right has been a symptom of social discontent. Then, I show that these parties have shifted the native-immigrant boundary against one specific segment of the immigrant community: Muslims. Evidence from both parties’ campaigning strategies indicates that the Flemish and the Catalan radical right promotes Islamophobia to a greater extent than anti-immigrant sentiment.

Vlaams Belang represents the authoritarian wing of the Flemish nationalist movement, whose origins date back to WWI. Germany’s occupation of Belgium encouraged the political autonomy of Flanders, Flamenpolitik, and motivated the founding of the Flemish Nationalist Union in the early 1930s (Mielants 2006). Vlaams Belang (originally Vlaams Blok) emerged as an independent party in 1979, with the goals of creating an independent Flemish state, and reducing international migration to zero. One of my interviewees explains the importance of the party’s history for its legitimacy:

“The Vlaams Belang emerged from the Flemish movement, flirted with the extreme-right, and then radicalized itself into its current form. Yet, the original relationship with the Flemish nationalist ideas gave this party a degree of credibility and legitimacy that would not have had otherwise.”
The significance of the *Vlaams Belang* today comes from its relative electoral success (see Appendix C: Electoral results in Belgium and Spain) and impact on state regulations for immigration and immigrants’ integration (see section 4.2. in Chapter 4). This section approaches the role of the *Vlaams Belang* in citizens’ perception of immigration as a cultural threat.

*Plataforma per Catalunya* emerged in 2001, and in spite of the party’s name, it has no ties to the Catalan nationalist movement or Catalonia’s nation-building project. Its leader, Josep Anglada, used to be a member of *Fuerza Nueva*; a Fascist party that disappeared soon after the democratic transition of the early 1980s. In over a decade since its foundation, the representation of *Plataforma per Catalunya* has grown significantly, especially at the local level. It has participated in three municipal elections in which it has increased its political representation exponentially; from 1 municipal representative in 2003, to 9 in 2007, and 39 in 2011 (see Appendix C: Electoral results in Belgium and Spain). However, it has not yet gathered sufficient votes to have Parliamentary representation at the regional level (*Parlament de Catalunya*). Due to the increasing electoral support of the radical right in Catalonia, I have asked my interviewees to assess its role in the strength of today’s anti-immigrant sentiment.

My analysis leads to two common denominators: a) the radical right vote is a symptom of social discontent; and b) the discourse of the *Vlaams Belang* and *Plataforma per Catalunya* is islamophobic, not anti-immigrant. Extant studies signal that those most likely to vote the *Vlaams Belang* are the working class and the unemployed (Oesch 2008; Rink et al. 2009). These associations suggest that anti-immigrant sentiment is not a racial problem, but an economic one. A Political Science Professor illustrates this hypothesis in the context of Spain’s economic crisis:

“We have a problem, which is a terrible economic crisis with a very high unemployment rate. Unemployment generates tremendous frustration, which is very difficult to bare from
a psychological point of view. When you have been unemployed for some time, a year, sitting at home in front of the TV, go out for a walk, and see immigrants working, then you think about voting *Plataforma [per Catalunya]*.\(^{34}\)

Then, he continues:

“I think that the votes of *Plataforma per Catalunya* come from this population, not from proper racists.”\(^{35}\)

This reflection disassociates racism from most citizens’ everyday life and agrees with previous studies claiming that the radical right vote is not an ideological one, but a vote of discontent (Billiet and De Witte 1995).

A Sociology Professor argues that the radical right has not generated anti-immigrant sentiment, based on evidence from his own research:

“In our study, we used the General Survey data throughout the 1990s, and found that anti-immigrant sentiment increases the role of the *Vlaams Belang*, but then, this vote does not increase anti-immigrant sentiment any further”

It appears that the salience of anti-immigrant sentiment in the public opinion can explain the success of the Flemish radical right, but not the other way around.

Another Sociology Professor interprets the popularity of the radical right differently. For him, the role of the radical right has consisted of legitimizing a latent public sentiment:

---

\(^{34}\) Original quote in Catalan: “Tenim un problema, que es una crisi econòmica terrible, i amb una taxa d’atur elevadissima. L’atur genera una frustració tremenda, que costa molt de suportar des d’un punt de vista psicologic. Quan portes un any a l’atur, quan portes un any assegut al sofà davant de la tele, surts a donar un tomb, i veus que hi han immigrants treballant, llavors et plantejes votar a Plataforma.”

\(^{35}\) Original quote in Catalan: “Jo crec que els vots de plataforma venen d’aquest col·lectiu, mes que no gent plenament racista”.
“I don’t think that there is anything new. Anti-immigrant sentiment was latent, and the political mobilization of certain actors has made it acceptable to oppose immigration”

In sum, evidence from interviews suggest that political parties of the radical right have voiced an element of social contention that preexisted their mobilization, but they have not produced inter-ethnic contention as such.

The second common denominator I observe concerns the Islamophobic nature of these parties’ narrative. In both regions, I observe that the radical right’s opposition to integration focuses on Muslims. The Vlaams Belang’s website provides illustrative images of the party’s anti-Muslim discourse. Figure 6.1 (History of Belgium, 2011) portrays the history of Belgium as a sequence of expulsions; of the Spaniards, the French, the Dutch, and the Germans, and lastly, by the Muslims. Figure 6.2 (Planting Mosques, 2011) depicts two Muslim men; one of them plants minarets, while the second one sweeps away churches and cathedrals.

< Figures 6.1 and 6.2 about here >

An even more clear association comes from a sign of a Vlaams Belang demonstration, with the motto: “De Islam kann uw Vrijheid schaden… stop immigrantie” [Islam can damage your freedom… stop immigrants] (Figure 3: Demonstration of the Vlaams Belang, 2009). This motto is interesting because: a) presents Islam as a religion against individual freedom; and b) as a category that encompasses all immigrants. Immigration, equated to Islam, is identified with a phenomenon that challenges individual freedom.

< Figure 6.3 about here >

I observe the same rhetoric strategy in Catalonia. Figure 4 (Pamphlet of Plataforma per Catalunya, 2003) shows a woman wearing a burka under the motto: Prout! [Enough!]. Opposing
immigration is equivalent to opposing Muslim culture. More recently, during the electoral campaign of the 2011 local elections, Plataforma per Catalunya used a video that juxtaposed an image of Catalonia in 2011, represented by three girls jumping rope, to an imaginary Catalonia in 2025 in which the same three girls are replaced by three women wearing burkas. Both instances indicate that the radical right in these two regions is re-establishing the old native-immigrant boundary for a new one between Muslims and all other immigrant groups.

Overall, this section has sought to determine the role of the radical right in the manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment. There is little doubt that the mainstream narrative of the Flemish and the Catalán radical right is primarily a discourse against Muslims, not against all immigrant groups. I argue that Islamophobia is likely to influence the cultural manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment by shifting the native-immigrant boundary. This new boundary de-problematizes immigration from non-Muslim countries; from Europe, Latin America, or East Asia, and problematizes it when it concerns Muslim populations. It also provides support to previous studies on the nature of ethnic boundaries in Europe (Zolberg and Woon 1999).

6.5. Alternative explanation: Anti-immigrant sentiment as a material threat

The material manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment offers an alternative explanation for its cultural manifestation. As previous studies and this study’s Chapter 5 show, economic scarcity has motivated native citizens to view immigrants as a material threat. I use data from the European Social Survey to evaluate the extent to which this hypothesis holds in Catalonia and Flanders. To accomplish this goal, I analyze the distribution of the material manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment across three main income groups. In both cases, I find: a) citizens from low income

---

36 This video is available online, at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BKr9yxDDqro
households are much more likely to exhibit anti-immigrant sentiment than their peers in middle- or high-income groups; and b) most respondents in both regions are indifferent towards immigrants’ economic contribution.

Table 6.5 (Anti-immigrant sentiment as a material threat by income in Flanders, 2002-2010) shows that most Flemish are indifferent towards immigrants’ economic impact. Across all income groups, the largest number of respondents neither view immigrants’ participation in the economy as a negative or a positive phenomenon. However, the working class exhibits the highest percentage of anti-immigrant sentiment (39%), versus the middle class (31%) and the upper-middle class (23%). There is the opposite association between income groups and positive attitudes toward immigration; the upper-middle class exhibits the highest percentage of favorable attitudes (23%), versus the middle class (17%), and the working class (15%). Consistent results in the relationship between attitudes and income indicate that, in Catalonia and Flanders, citizens’ perception of immigration as a material threat could be explaining the cultural manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment amongst the working class only. Nevertheless, the high percentage of indifferent respondents suggest that the economic rationale is insufficient to explain anti-immigrant sentiment in Flanders.

Evidence from Catalonia exhibits a similar pattern. Table 6.6 (Anti-immigrant sentiment as a material threat by income in Catalonia, 2002-2010) shows that most respondents are indifferent towards immigration’s economic impact. This insight reveals the extent to which the material manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment is less prevalent in Catalonia and Flanders than in regions like Andalusia and Wallonia. Having said that, respondents from the lowest income group are more likely to exhibit a material manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment (28%) than
their middle class (23%) and upper-middle class (17%) counterparts. In the case of Catalonia, I observe that the role of income is more significant in reducing anti-immigrant sentiment than in influencing positive attitudes toward immigration. 30% of working class respondents view immigration positively, which is almost as much as their middle and upper-middle class peers, which amount to 33% each.

Data from Catalonia and Flanders suggest that the material manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment could be explaining its cultural manifestation among the working class. Yet, the perception of immigration as a material threat does not offer a comprehensive explanation for today’s attitudinal outcomes in Catalonia and Flanders.

Overall, this section provides evidence of the relative significance of anti-immigrant sentiment as a material threat in Catalonia and Flanders. Data from five waves of the European Social Survey show that the potential effect of this alternative explanation only concerns the working class. In both regions, the economically-underprivileged are more likely to hold negative attitudes toward immigration than their middle- and upper-middle class counterparts. Yet, most respondents in both regions show indifferent attitudes towards immigrants’ economic impact.

6.6. Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to contribute to the cultural manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment by stressing the significance of integration policy frameworks, and citizens’ expectations of immigrants’ integration. While previous studies claim that citizens’ perception of immigration as a cultural threat is a product of nationalism, my research indicates the significance of policies
regulating immigrants’ integration and their effects on citizens’ expectations. Citizens in regions with active regulations of immigrants’ integration have higher expectations than those in regions without such regulations.

My analysis has begun with a description of the Catalan and the Flemish integration models, both of them characterized by an institutional approach centered on language acquisition. I combined data from the Eurobarometer, the European Values Survey, and the Immigrant Citizen Survey to explain the cultural manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment as a demand-supply process. On the demand-side, I have shown that Catalan and Flemish citizens have higher expectations of immigrants’ integration than their peers in other regions, and are more negative about the evolvement of cross-cultural relations in the near future. These findings indicate that citizens in these regions will be more skeptical towards cultural diversity than their peers elsewhere, regardless of what immigrants do or where they come from. On the supply-side, I indicate that immigrants in Catalonia and Flanders are the most committed to take integration and language classes. Yet, immigrants’ interest in the regional culture does not meet the expectations of the Catalan and the Flemish.

This evidence brings up a new set of questions: how much integration can an immigrant realistically accomplish? And in what time frame? It appears that native citizens’ idea of integration is not necessarily realistic. Moving forward, I encourage scholars to think about the extent to which integration is attainable, in order to bring realism into citizens’ expectations, and in turn, reduce anti-immigrant sentiment.

In parallel to this demand-supply process, I examine the role of the radical right. Evidence from both previous studies and interviews suggest that the political mobilization of the radical right has generated a platform to voice citizens’ discontent, but it appears to be a consequence of
social discontent, rather than a cause of anti-immigrant sentiment. I also observe that the campaigning efforts of Plataforma per Catalunya and Vlaams Belang may have contributed to the perception of cultural threat by shifting the native-immigrant boundary into a Christian-Muslim one. Evidence from the radical right’s approach to immigration and cultural diversity shows that these organizations promote Islamophobia to a greater extent than anti-immigrant sentiment.

My findings encourage me to propose three main policy suggestions:

1. Emphasize the positive impact of immigration to the Catalan and Flemish nation-building project.
2. Reduce citizens’ expectations from ideal to realistic attainable outcomes.
3. Inform the native citizenry about the extent of immigrants’ efforts to become part of the mainstream by taking language and integration classes.

In sum, this chapter has sought to reveal the processes underlying the manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment as a cultural threat. In contrast to previous studies, which relate this perception to regional nation-building projects, I argue that regional regulations for immigrants’ integration play an active role in shaping citizens’ expectations of immigrants’ integration. Yet, further research is required to analyze the feedback processes between the characteristics of the institutional environment and public attitudes over time. Moreover, scholars need to examine the extent to which evidence from Catalonia and Flanders can be generalized to other regions. I anticipate that the processes I have found in Catalonia and Flanders may help explain not only the manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment in regions with nation-building projects, such as Quebec, but also destination countries with active integration policy frameworks centered on language acquisition, such as Austria or Germany.
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

International migration represents a structural component of European societies. In 2010, the International Organization for Migration estimated that there were 72.1 million international migrants in Europe, representing 8.7% of its population\textsuperscript{37}. These numbers do not include naturalized citizens with an immigrant background or their offspring. Cultural diversity has motivated a significant segment of the native population to view immigration as a threat. Additionally, the mobilization of the radical right is perceived by many as a sign of an emerging and generalized discontent. As geographical mobility prevails, anti-immigrant sentiment is unlikely to decline in the near future. In this dissertation, I have sought to improve the sociological understanding of this phenomenon.

7.1. Summary of findings

My research challenges three prevailing assumptions about the nature of anti-immigrant sentiment: a) that it is a product of individual-level variables; b) that it is evenly distributed within countries; and c) that it is manifested in a single form. The reminder of this section explains how I have challenged each of these assumptions with evidence from three empirical chapters.

*The significance of individual-level variables*. This research reveals the institutional embeddedness of public attitudes toward immigration. While extant studies combine individual

\textsuperscript{37} \url{http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/about-migration/facts--figures-1/europe.html}
and contextual variables to predict cross-national differences in anti-immigrant sentiment, I argue and show that state regulations and institutions are essential to explain the emergence of anti-immigrant sentiment. Three empirical chapters show the role of different regulations and institutions in the strength of anti-immigrant sentiment and its manifestation in a cultural or material form.

*The within-country variability of attitudes.* My analysis begins with the observation that the variability of public attitudes toward immigration is greater across regions than across countries. This observation challenges prevailing formulations of anti-immigrant sentiment in the literature, which have traditionally used countries as units of analysis. Since most cross-national public opinion surveys (European Social Survey, the Eurobarometer, or the European Values Study) have regional-level data, I have combined them with interviews, ethnographic fieldwork, and socio-economic and policy indicators to explore and explain the within-country variability of anti-immigrant sentiment in six regions of two different countries.

*The nature of anti-immigrant sentiment.* My analysis shows that some regions exhibit low manifestations of anti-immigrant sentiment (Brussels and Madrid), others manifest anti-immigrant sentiment as a threat to citizens’ socio-economic standards (Andalusia and Wallonia), and others present anti-immigrant sentiment as a threat to citizens’ cultural symbols and practices (Catalonia and Flanders). The analytical distinction between different manifestations of anti-immigrant sentiment allowed me to examine three parallel patterns of inter-ethnic relations in Chapter 4, Chapter 5, and Chapter 6.

Chapter 4 explains the role of demographic and political variables in the low manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment. I use evidence from Brussels and Madrid to indicate two parallel mechanisms at play. In Brussels, I observe that low anti-immigrant sentiment is a product of its
residents’ liberal values, high immigration, and high percentage of immigrants from other EU member states. Natives’ out-migration flows and the continuous in-flows of immigrants from both EU and non-EU countries have exacerbated within-country attitudinal differences. I argue that theses internal and international flows underlie today’s low manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment.

In Madrid, I observe that the low manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment responds to a top-down process, motivated by state regulations of immigrants’ enfranchisement and political parties’ interest in chasing the immigrant vote. Spain’s 1998 Civil Code and the European Union’s 1992 Maastricht Treaty have facilitated the political enfranchisement of European and Latin American immigrants to a greater extent than their African and Asian peers. Ethnographic fieldwork during the 2011 local elections revealed that the distribution of immigrants’ enfranchisement encouraged political parties to use two parallel immigration discourses. In Madrid, political parties responded to a highly enfranchised European and Latin American community with a pro-immigration discourse that blurred the boundaries between immigrants and natives. At the same time, in Catalonia, where there is a higher presence of non-enfranchised Africans and Asians, the same political party used a restrictive approach to immigration that facilitated the acquisition of natives’ votes across the political spectrum.

In Chapter 5, I explain the material manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment as a product of economic scarcity in the labor market and the welfare state. While extant scholarship views native-immigrant labor market competition as the epicenter of inter-ethnic contention, I reveal the significance of the welfare state and the mechanisms of economic redistribution. The material manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment is concentrated in Andalusia and Wallonia, regions with below-average incomes, above-average unemployment rates, and scarcer welfare benefits than in
the rest of Belgium and Spain. I show that Andalusians and Walloons not only perceive immigrants as potential job competitors but also as undeserving recipients of welfare. Moreover, most citizens in both regions view welfare state generosity as a pulling factor of international migration flows.

As most European countries are revising the structure of their welfare state, it would be ideal if anti-immigrant sentiment scholars could re-evaluate the role of economic variables in the structure of inter-ethnic relations. While the advancing economic crisis anticipates the continuing material manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment, I expect shifting patterns of inter-ethnic contention in the near future. While conflict between immigrants and natives may remain steady or even decrease, I anticipate a rising conflict between ethnic minorities and the ethnic majority. Previous studies have already indicated similar dynamics of inter-ethnic contention in other European countries (Dancygier 2010).

Chapter 6 explains the cultural manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment as a result of integration policies centered on immigrants’ acquisition of new cultural practices. In contrast to previous studies, which view nationalism as a path-dependent explanation for the salience of anti-immigrant sentiment in regions with longstanding nation-building projects, I argue that nationalism influences anti-immigrant sentiment by shaping the philosophies of integration that underlie integration policies. By emphasizing the role of regional integration policies, rather than nationalism, I facilitate the theoretical explanation of anti-immigrant sentiment as a cultural threat and its fluctuation over time.

I show that these integration policy frameworks shape citizens’ expectations of immigrants’ integration. For native citizens in Catalonia and Flanders, immigrants’ proficiency in Catalan and Dutch is the main element to assess their integration. Negative attitudes toward immigrants’ integration motivate anti-immigrant sentiment as a cultural threat. As immigrants
become increasingly proficient in Catalan and Dutch, I expect anti-immigrant sentiment to decline. I do not anticipate that the cultural manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment will prevail in the long term, since the second generation will be educated in a public school system where the regional language is the *lingua franca*, and guarantees the cultural integration of immigrants’ offspring.

### 7.2. Research implications

The main implications of this research concern the role of state regulations in citizens’ perception of immigration. My findings contribute to prevailing theories on anti-immigrant sentiment by showing the significance of state regulations, political parties, and institutions. In Chapter 4, I show that state regulations of immigrants’ enfranchisement affect how political parties frame the immigration phenomenon. In Chapter 5, I indicate the significance of welfare state policy for citizens’ perception of immigrants as undeserving recipients of benefits. In Chapter 6, I reveal the relationship between integration policy frameworks and citizens’ expectations of immigrants’ integration. Findings from three empirical chapters complement previous studies by clarifying how state regulations shape citizens’ perception of immigration.

My findings add to the scholarship on state regulations by indicating the impact of these regulations on political parties and public opinion. These insights contribute to a literature that has been primarily concerned with the role of policy on immigrants’ living conditions. In Chapter 4, I indicate that state regulations motivate political parties to use a dual immigration discourse that responds to the geographical distribution of enfranchised immigrants. This means that state regulations determining immigrants’ access to political rights influence the alignment of political
parties on the immigration issue. Immigrants’ increasing enfranchisement is expected to reduce anti-immigrant sentiment and motivate political parties to take into consideration immigrants’ interests and chase their vote.

Chapters 5 shows the significance of the welfare state on public opinion attitudes. The Belgian and the Spanish welfare state were originally independent from international migration, but increasing immigration and economic scarcity have changed their role and meaning. This chapter reveals the association between mechanisms of economic redistribution and anti-immigrant sentiment, yet further research is required to determine how to re-define the welfare state and conceptualize immigration as one of its strengths. In Chapter 6, I contribute to the literature by showing that integration policies affect the ways in which citizens view immigrants and evaluate their integration. With these findings, it would be ideal if scholars interested in the role of state regulations could evaluate their effects on native citizens and immigrants alike.

Evidence of the institutional embeddedness of attitudes motivates new lines of scholarship. For example, previous studies argue that an unemployed citizen is more likely to perceive immigration negatively than his employed peer. In this study, I recommend that scholars reduce the scope of error by examining whether such individual finds him/herself in a region like Andalusia or Madrid. The goal of this approach is to predict the strength and manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment through the examination of structural conditions. This dissertation has taken a first step in this direction.

My findings encourage me to propose three policy suggestions that can potentially reduce anti-immigrant sentiment in both countries:
1. **Recognize immigrants’ membership**: Empirical chapters allude to patterns of exclusion from the political field, the labor market, and the cultural mainstream. The cases of Brussels and Madrid, however, indicate that the recognition of immigrants as part of the electorate has reduced the salience of anti-immigrant sentiment. Based on this Chapter, I believe that policies emphasizing immigrants’ sense of belonging in the labor market, the welfare state, the education system, or even the dominant culture, are expected to improve inter-ethnic relations.

2. **Inform the native citizenry**: Throughout the dissertation, I shed light on the gap between citizens’ perceptions and reality. This gap is especially wide in the context of the welfare state; a large percentage of the population views immigrants as greater recipients than contributors to the welfare state, even though several studies indicate that immigrants put in much more than what they take out. Evidence of these two parallel realities stress the need of implementing new policies to inform the native citizenry about immigration and the extent to which immigrants contribute to the national economy, and beyond.

3. **Revise integration expectations**: Policies in regions like Catalonia and Flanders define immigrants’ integration as a unidirectional process: *They* have to become like *Us*. As immigration represents a structural part of all European societies in demographic, economic, and political terms, I believe that unidirectional approaches to integration tend to generate unattainable expectations. I propose to change prevailing integration policies into a framework of civic principles and a common language. Instead of approaching immigrants as outsiders that need to be incorporated into an apparently homogeneous
culture, I believe that state regulations should require all residents to communicate in the official language and adhere to civic principles. A functional and bidirectional approach to integration has more potential to strengthen social cohesion than current policies.

7.3. Limitations and Future Research

This study’s main limitations are those that traditionally characterize case study research and studies examining the relationship between the institutional environment and public opinion: a) the generability of findings; and b) determining causality. The analysis of anti-immigrant sentiment in three Belgian and three Spanish regions is not representative of inter-ethnic relations anywhere else. The socio-demographic, economic, and political particularities of these two countries and the six research sites generate unique institutional assemblages that limit the explanatory power of findings. Moving forward, I plan to evaluate the extent to which the processes I examine in the empirical chapters hold in other regions and countries.

This study has not attempted to determine direct causality between a concrete policy and a specific manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment, but to reveal the institutional embeddedness of public attitudes toward immigration and their cross-regional variability. As longitudinal data becomes available, I plan to trace the extent to which public opinion affects policies, and how policies, in turn, shape public opinion. Longitudinal data will also facilitate estimating the role of political parties in the manifestation of public opinion outcomes, as both potential mobilizers of public sentiment and proponents of new policy.

The development of this research motivates me to continue this line of inquiry in three different directions:
1. **Gender and anti-immigrant sentiment:** In Chapter 3, I have observed that women are more likely than men to exhibit anti-immigrant sentiment as a material threat, but not as a cultural threat. To my knowledge, this pattern cannot be explained with extant scholarship on anti-immigrant sentiment or gender relations. Moving forward, I plan to examine whether the variability of attitudes by gender that I observe in Belgium and Spain is present in other countries, and, if yes, examine its emergence and prevalence over time in light of prevailing theories in the gender studies and public opinion literatures.

2. **Political parties and immigrants’ enfranchisement:** In Chapter 4, I have shown that immigrants’ enfranchisement motivates political parties to deliver pro-immigration discourses that blur the native-immigrant boundary. I am interested in examining how political parties respond to immigrants’ access to political rights using a large-n research design. I find it especially important to compare the performance of parties across the left-right axis. Findings from this research are expected to inform the literatures on anti-immigrant sentiment, political party alignment, and issue framing.

3. **Citizens’ expectations:** Chapter 6 indicates that the cultural manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment is partly driven by the uneven distribution of citizens’ expectations. Catalans and Flemish think that immigrants’ should incorporate elements of the regional culture to a greater extent than their counter-parts in the rest of Belgium and Spain. This insight suggests an examination of immigrants’ integration from the
point of view of native citizens’ expectations. What do natives expect from immigrants? How realistic are these expectations? To what extent do they vary across immigrant groups? I anticipate that these findings will contribute to the assimilation literature, by revealing the active role of native citizens in the process of immigrants’ integration.

Overall, the study of inter-ethnic relations is a top priority for social scientists. In this research, I have sought to reveal the institutional embeddedness of anti-immigrant sentiment in Belgium and Spain. Multi-ethnic social cohesion is essential to the future of key institutions of the modern nation-state; from the quality of its democracy to the support of economic redistribution mechanisms. Hence, research in this line of inquiry is expected to benefit scholars across the social sciences as well as policy professionals.
Bibliography


European Values Study (2008) GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4800 Data File Version 3.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.11004


<http://www.juntadeandalucia.es/justiciaeinterior/opam/>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region:</th>
<th>High Anti-immigrant Sentiment</th>
<th>Low Anti-immigrant Sentiment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Material  Cultural</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flanders</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallonia</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andalusia</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalonia</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own elaboration.
Table 3.2

Descriptive statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th></th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent variables: Micro level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-demographics</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>45.87</td>
<td>18.57</td>
<td>45.34</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human capital</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>3.90</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>Working class</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle class</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Upper-middle</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent variables: Macro level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgian regions</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flanders</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wallonia</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish regions</td>
<td>Andalusia</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Catalonia</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variables:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material threat</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bad</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural threat</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bad</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Social Survey, waves I-V.
Table 3.3
Regional differences in the manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment, 2002-2010\(^{(a)}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Cultural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalonia</td>
<td>-.374</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andalusia</td>
<td>-.443</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrid (ref.)</td>
<td>.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flanders</td>
<td>-.255</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallonia</td>
<td>-.410</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brussels (ref.)</td>
<td>.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Social Survey, waves I-V. Coefficients of ordered logit models, controlling for respondents’ age, gender, education, income, and year fixed effects. The reference category for both dependent variables is: Good. \(p \leq 0.10\); \(p \leq 0.05\); \(p \leq 0.01\); \(p \leq 0.001.\)
Table 3.4

Structural characteristics of the six research sites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demography</th>
<th>Economy</th>
<th>Cultural integration</th>
<th>Political arena</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Immigration</td>
<td>Naturalized immigrants</td>
<td>Unemployment rates</td>
<td>Integration model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>207,412</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flanders</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>215,801</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andalusia</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21,436</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>98,084</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: (a) Naturalization data covers the citizenship acquisitions between 1989 and 2007 Belgium, and those between 2004 and 2008 in Spain.
**Table 3.5**

**Interview protocol**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Introduction</th>
<th>Exploratory research indicates the cross-regional variation of anti-immigrant sentiment in your country (show Tables 3.3-3.6).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Demographics | - How has the diversity of immigration affected cross-regional differences in anti-immigrant sentiment?  
- Is anti-immigrant sentiment directed towards immigrants or Muslims?  
- What has been the role of the media? And 9/11?  
- What other immigrant communities have been subjected to strong anti-immigrant sentiments? |
| Economics    | - What is the degree of native-foreigner competition?  
- What makes part of the citizenry to conceive immigrants as competitors for either jobs or welfare state benefits?  
- Do you think that specific labor market sectors and their degree of in/formality could affect anti-immigrant sentiment? If yes, how? |
| Politics     | - How do political actors influence how citizens perceive immigrants?  
- What would the political field look like if immigrants could vote?  
- Do you think that changing immigrants’ voting rights could affect how citizens perceive them? |
| Culture      | - What integrates an immigrant?  
- What is the role of nationalism in the rise of anti-immigrant sentiment?  
- How can nationalism, particularly in regions with nation-building projects, be compatible with cultural diversity? |
| Conclusion   | Thank you for your time. |
Table 3.6

Immigrant population in Alcalá de Henares and Badalona, 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Alcalá de Henares</th>
<th>Badalona</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>203,686</td>
<td>219,786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish citizens</td>
<td>160,879</td>
<td>187,166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants</td>
<td>42,807</td>
<td>32,620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% immigrants</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continent of origin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>28,331</td>
<td>3,052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe (non-EU)</td>
<td>1,815</td>
<td>1,419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>4,194</td>
<td>6,957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>7,131</td>
<td>9,112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>1,328</td>
<td>12,078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Largest nationalities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>20,793</td>
<td>6,555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>3,108</td>
<td>5,697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>2,415</td>
<td>3,680</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4.1
Cross-regional differences in citizens’ political values in Belgium, 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Values</th>
<th>Flanders</th>
<th>Brussels</th>
<th>Wallonia</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Left</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Belgian regions</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Undecided</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Belgian regions</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>38.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Right</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Belgian regions</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>1042</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>1643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Belgian regions</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Social Survey, wave V, 2010. Pearson X (4) = 29.4, p=.000
Table 4.2
Cross-regional differences in political values, Spain, 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Values</th>
<th>Catalania</th>
<th>Andalusia</th>
<th>Madrid</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% within Spanish regions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Spanish regions</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>43.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Spanish regions</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Spanish regions</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within Spanish regions</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.3

Demographic composition of immigration in Belgium, 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Belgians</th>
<th>UE-27</th>
<th>Non-EU</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>number</td>
<td>% total</td>
<td>number</td>
<td>% total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>9,832,010</td>
<td>746,972</td>
<td>372,284</td>
<td>10,951,266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brussels region</td>
<td>766,744</td>
<td>221,482</td>
<td>130,862</td>
<td>998,088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flemish region</td>
<td>5,878,652</td>
<td>268,848</td>
<td>159,138</td>
<td>6,306,638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walloon region</td>
<td>3,186,614</td>
<td>256,642</td>
<td>82,284</td>
<td>3,525,540</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.4
Demographic composition of immigration in Spain, 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>All immigrants</th>
<th>European</th>
<th>Latin American</th>
<th>African</th>
<th>Asian</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>4,791,232</td>
<td>44.72</td>
<td>32.20</td>
<td>17.79</td>
<td>4.06</td>
<td>1.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andalusia</td>
<td>597,243</td>
<td>21.62</td>
<td>32.33</td>
<td>23.95</td>
<td>9.84</td>
<td>12.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalonia</td>
<td>1,061,079</td>
<td>30.59</td>
<td>43.98</td>
<td>10.71</td>
<td>6.35</td>
<td>8.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>880,613</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Anuario Estadístico, Table I. 26, Ministry of Labor, available online at: http://www.empleo.gob.es/es/estadisticas/contenidos/anuario.htm
Table 4.5
Immigrants’ political participation in Belgium and Spain, 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Electoral rights</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right to vote in national elections.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right to vote in regional elections.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right to vote in local elections.</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right to stand for elections at local level.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreigners can vote in local elections since</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political liberties</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right to association.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership of and participation in political parties.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right to create media.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Consultative bodies</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implication of foreign residents at national level (average).</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implication of foreign residents at regional level (average).</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implication of foreign residents at capital city level (average).</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implication of foreign residents on local city level (average).</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implementation policies</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active policy of information by national level (or regional in federal states).</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public funding or support of immigrant organizations on national level.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public funding or support of immigrant organizations on regional level.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public funding or support of immigrant organizations on local level in capital city.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public funding or support of immigrant organizations on national level in city.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall score</strong></td>
<td>61</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.6
Demographic composition of neighborhoods in Brussels, 1988-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Belgians</th>
<th>EU-15</th>
<th>Turkish/Moroccans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>88-90</td>
<td>94-96</td>
<td>04-05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brussels’ region</td>
<td>-9.5</td>
<td>-8.2</td>
<td>-11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First crown</td>
<td>-8.7</td>
<td>-10.5</td>
<td>-14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second crown</td>
<td>-10.5</td>
<td>-5.4</td>
<td>-8.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Deboseere et al (2009) Table 2: Average annual migration balance per 1,000 inhabitants according to nationality 1988-2005
Table 5.1

Foreign-born populations in Belgium, in thousands, 1947-1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Congo</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>878</td>
<td>901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total pop.</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lesthaeghe (2000: 5), Table 1.2. Size of the total foreign population in Belgium and the most important nationalities (in thousands).
Table 5.2
Unemployment rates by region and citizenship status, 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>National</th>
<th>Immigrants: EU</th>
<th>Immigrants: non-EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Belgium</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flanders</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallonia</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spain</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andalusia</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalonia</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>37.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.3
Labor Market Mobility in Belgium and Spain, 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Access</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immediate access to employment.</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to private sector.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to public sector.</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate access to self-employment.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to self-employment.</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to private sector.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to public sector.</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate access to self-employment.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to self-employment.</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Access to general support</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Access to public employment services.</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality of access to education and vocational training, including study grants.</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognition of academic and professional qualifications acquired outside the EU.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targeted support</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State facilitation of recognition of skills and qualifications obtained outside the EU.</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measures to further the integration of third-country nationals into the labor market.</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional measures to further the integration of third-country nationals into the labor market.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to access public employment services.</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Workers’ rights</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Membership of and participation in trade unions associations and work-related negotiation bodies.</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal access to social security.</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal working conditions.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active policy of information on rights of migrant workers by national level (or regional in federal states).</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Overall score                              | 53      | 79    |

Table 5.4
Perception of immigrants as job competitors in Belgium, 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Belgian regions</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Flanders</td>
<td>Wallonia</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitors</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indifferent</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creators</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>1183</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>1821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Social Survey, wave I (2002). Pearson $X^2 (4)$ = 32.8, p-value .000
Table 5.5

Perception of immigrants as job competitors in Spain, 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Spanish regions</th>
<th>Catalonia</th>
<th>Andalusia</th>
<th>Madrid</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Competitors</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indifferent</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creators</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Social Survey, wave I (2002). Pearson X (4) = 9.7, p-value = .047
Table 5.6

Immigrants are greater recipients than contributors to the Spanish welfare state, 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Spanish regions</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Catalonia</td>
<td>Andalusia</td>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free riders</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributors</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>1097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Social Survey, wave IV (2008). Pearson $\chi^2 = 22.5$, p-value = .000
Table 5.7

Immigrants are greater recipients than contributors to the Belgian welfare state, 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Belgian regions</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Flanders</td>
<td>Wallonia</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free riders</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributors</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>1034</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>1721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Social Survey, wave IV (2008). Pearson X (4) = 13.4, p-value = .009
Table 5.8
Social benefits encourage people from other countries to come live in Spain, 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Catalania</th>
<th>Andalusia</th>
<th>Madrid</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agree strongly</strong></td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agree</strong></td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>54.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neither agree or disagree</strong></td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disagree</strong></td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strongly disagree</strong></td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Social Survey, wave IV (2008). Pearson $X^2 (8) = 65.0$, p-value .000
Table 5.9

Social benefits encourage people from other countries to come live in Belgium, 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>Flanders</th>
<th>Wallonia</th>
<th>Brussels</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree strongly</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither agree or disagree</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1052</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>1746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Social Survey, wave IV (2008). Pearson X (8) = 145.7, p-value .000
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes toward immigrants’ cultural integration in Catalonia and Spain, 2010</th>
<th>Cataluña</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants should maintain their culture.</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>38.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants should only keep cultural elements that do not bother the native citizenry.</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>50.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants should forget about their culture.</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not know/No answer</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.2
Expectations of immigrants’ cultural integration in Belgium, 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Brussels</th>
<th>Flanders</th>
<th>Wallonia</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>1090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>72.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>789</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>1506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Values Study (2008), Pearson X(4) p.value=.001
Table 6.3

Expectations of Cross-cultural relations in Belgium, 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Flanders</th>
<th>Wallonia</th>
<th>Brussels</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Better</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>228</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>262</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>51.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>534</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>1025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer (2011), Pearson X (6) = 59, p-value = 0.000
Table 6.4

Expectations of Cross-cultural relations in Spain, 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Spanish regions</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Catalina</td>
<td>Andalusia</td>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>Total&lt;sup&gt;(a)&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>61.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>1004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer (2011), Pearson X (6) = 26, p-value =.000

Notes: (a) The total column includes data from the whole country.
Table 6.5
Anti-immigrant sentiment as a material threat by income in Flanders, 2002-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income groups</th>
<th>Working class</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Upper-middle</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bad Count %</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral Count %</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good Count %</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Count %</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Social Survey, waves I-V (2002-2010), Pearson $\chi^2 (4) = 1040$, p-value $= .000$
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income groups</th>
<th>Working class</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Upper-middle</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bad Count</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral Count</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good Count</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Count</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Social Survey, waves I-V (2002-2010) Pearson χ² (4) = 10.85, p-value = .029
Figure 1.1

The production of anti-immigrant sentiment

Source: Own elaboration.
Flanders:
1. West Flanders
2. East Flanders
3. Antwerp
4. Flemish Brabant
5. Limburg

Brussels:
6. Brussels

Wallonia:
7. Hainaut
8. Walloon Brabant
9. Liège
10. Namur
11. Luxembourg
Comunidad de Madrid:
  1. Madrid

Andalusia:
  2. Huelva
  3. Sevilla
  4. Cádiz
  5. Málaga
  6. Córdoba
  7. Jaén
  8. Granada
  9. Almería

Catalonia:
  10. Lérida
  11. Tarragona
  12. Barcelona
  13. Gerona
Figure 3.3

Negative attitudes toward immigrants’ economic contribution in Belgium, 2002-10

Source: European Social Survey, waves I-V.
Positive attitudes toward immigrants’ economic contribution in Belgium, 2002-10

Source: European Social Survey, waves I-V.
Figure 3.5

Negative attitudes toward immigrants’ economic contribution in Spain, 2002-2010

Source: European Social Survey, waves I-V.
Figure 3.6

Positive attitudes toward immigrants’ economic contribution in Spain, 2002-2010

Source: European Social Survey, waves I-V.
Figure 3.7

Negative attitudes toward immigrants’ cultural impact in Belgium, 2002-10

Source: European Social Survey, waves I-V.
Figure 3.8

Positive attitudes toward immigrants’ cultural impact in Belgium, 2002-10

Source: European Social Survey, waves I-V.
Figure 3.9

Negative attitudes toward immigrants’ cultural impact in Spain, 2002-2010

Source: European Social Survey, waves I-V.
Figure 3.10

Positive attitudes toward immigrants' cultural impact in Spain, 2002-2010

Source: European Social Survey, waves I-V.
Figure 4.1

Total citizenship acquisitions, Belgium, 1988-2007

Figure 4.2

Citizenship acquisitions by country of origin in Belgium, 2003-2007

Figure 4.3

Citizenship acquisition by country of origin in Spain, 1995-2008

Figure 4.4

Partido Popular’s electoral campaign in Alcalá de Henares, 2011

Figure 4.5

Partido Popular’s electoral campaign in Madrid, 2011

Source: Blog – Es por Madrid (It’s for Madrid), accessed on February 2012:
Figure 4.6

Partido Popular’s electoral campaign in Badalona, 2011

Figure 4.7

Migration flows between three Belgian regions, 2006

Source: Deboseere, P. (2009) Graph 2: Migration flows between the three Belgian regions in 2006
Figure 5.1

Percentage of low-income households by region, 2002-2010

Figure 5.2

Positive effects of immigration in Andalusia, 2005-2010

Figure 5.3

Negative effects of immigration in Andalusia, 2005-2010

Figure 5.4

‘Immigrants take away our jobs’ by level of education, 2010

Figure 5.5

Emigration flows by citizenship in Spain, 2002-2010

Figure 5.6

Emigration from Spain by continent of origin, 2002-2010

Figure 6.1

Have you started or completed an integration or language course?

Figure 6.2

Did you have a problem learning the language?, 2011

Figure 3

History of Belgium, 2011

Source: Archives of the Vlaams Belang website: http://www.vlaamsbelang.be, accessed on February 20th 2013
Figure 6.4

Planting mosques, 2011

Source: Archives of the Vlaams Belang website: http://www.vlaamsbelang.be/, accessed on February 20th, 2013
Figure 6.5
Demonstration of the Vlaams Belang, 2008

Source: Archives of the Vlaams Belang website: http://www.vlaamsbelang.be/, accessed on February 20th 2013
Figure 6.6

Pamphlet of *Plataforma per Catalunya*, 2003

Source: Archives of the *Plataforma per Catalunya* website: http://www.pxcatalunya.com/, accessed on February 20th 2013
Appendix A: Questions of the European Social Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variables</th>
<th>Possible answers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Material threat: Would you say that it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries?</td>
<td>Scale 0-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultura threat: Would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming here from other countries?</td>
<td>Scale 0-10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables&lt;sup&gt;(a)&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human capital: What is your level of education?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 = Less than lower secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 = Lower secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 = Lower tier upper secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 = Upper tier upper secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 = Advanced vocational, sub-degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 = Lower tertiary education, BA level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 = Higher tertiary education, MA level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income: What letter describes your household’s total income, after tax and compulsory deductions, from all sources?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 = J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 = R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 = C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 = M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 = F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 = S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 = K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 = P</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 = D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 = H</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Social Survey, waves I-V.

Notes:  
(a) Additionally, my ordered logit models included respondents’ age, gender, region, and survey year.  
(b) Letters represent ten different income categories, which have changed every survey year. For a specific description of income categories, check the ESS – Survey documentation: http://ess.nsd.uib.no/ess/round5/surveydoc.html
Appendix B: Descriptive statistics of interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociology</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant association representatives</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C: Electoral results in Belgium and Spain

1. *Vlaams Belang*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Brussels Parliament</th>
<th>Flemish Parliament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1/75</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>2/75</td>
<td>15/124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>4/75</td>
<td>20/124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>6/89</td>
<td>32/124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>3/89</td>
<td>21/124</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. *Plataforma per Catalunya*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Municipal representatives</th>
<th>Catalan Parliament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>