Privacy-Preserving, Taxable Bank Accounts

Androulaki, Elli; Vo, Binh D.; Bellovin, Steven Michael

Current banking systems do not aim to protect user privacy. Purchases made from a single bank account can be linked to each other by many parties. This could be addressed in a straight-forward way by generating unlinkable credentials from a single master credential using Camenisch and Lysyanskaya's algorithm; however, if bank accounts are taxable, some report must be made to the tax authority about each account. Using unlinkable credentials, digital cash, and zero knowledge proofs of knowledge, we present a solution that prevents anyone, even the tax authority, from knowing which accounts belong to which users, or from being able to link any account to another or to purchases or deposits.


More About This Work

Academic Units
Computer Science
Department of Computer Science, Columbia University
Columbia University Computer Science Technical Reports, CUCS-005-10
Published Here
July 12, 2010