Optimizing Social-Affiliation Networks of the Players in a Health Care Game

Goldstein, Evan

"The U.S. Supreme Court’s June 2012 decision to uphold the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 has sparked an intense domestic policy debate over health care reform, including the forthcoming expansion of health care coverage to millions of Americans. Despite partisan gridlock at the national policy level, opportunities exist within the current health care system to coordinate resources, slow the rise of public health care expenditures, and expand access to care. This paper explores one such opportunity by introducing a simple game-theoretic model of patient interaction to show how the constraints on a network structure of health care provider organizations and the flow of information between providers and patients within that network generated a socially suboptimal level of care in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, in 2008. Specifically, the paper will focus on the evolving social-affiliation network of both health care provider organizations and the indigent and uninsured patient populations within a three-city interest area of Cuyahoga County."-- from page 108


Also Published In

The Journal of Politics and Society

More About This Work

Academic Units
Helvidius Group
Helvidius Group of Columbia University
Published Here
February 10, 2014