2005 Articles
Choice as Regulatory Reform: The Case of Japanese Corporate Governance
In this paper, we examine a unique recent approach to corporate governance reform in Japan. The reform permits firms to switch from “Japanese” to “U.S” board structure, featuring independent committees of the board for audit, compensation, and nomination. We examine the first year of adoptions (the 2003 annual shareholders meeting season) in this natural experiment, frame hypotheses concerning why Japanese firms might make the switch, and conduct an event study to assess the hypotheses in light of the market’s reaction to firm announcements of the decision to switch. We conclude with an intellectual roadmap for future reform of Japanese corporate governance, highlighting a potential shortcoming in the new board option.
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Also Published In
- Title
- American Journal of Comparative Law
More About This Work
- Academic Units
- Law
- Publisher
- American Society of Comparative Law
- Published Here
- May 30, 2016