The Japanese market for corporate control and managerial incentives

Yamada, Takeshi; Kang, Jun-Koo

We examine bidder returns in Japanese mergers from 1976 to 1990. Using a comprehensive sample of 104 Japanese acquiring firms, we find that shareholders of Japanese bidders experience a significant positive abnormal return of 1.41%. Bidder returns are higher when firms acquire targets in the same industry, when their managers performed well before the merger, and when their managers acquire relatively large targets. We also find that bidder returns increase with the bidder's leverage and the bidder's ties to financial institutions through borrowings. Our evidence is consistent with the view that managerial incentives affect a firm's investment decisions and therefore firm value, and that these incentives are affected by the internal governance mechanisms that control managerial discretion.

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Academic Units
Center on Japanese Economy and Business
Center on Japanese Economy and Business, Graduate School of Business, Columbia University
Center on Japanese Economy and Business Working Papers, 107
Published Here
February 9, 2011