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Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Peacekeeping Personnel:
The Impact of Troop Contributing Countries’ Societal Norms

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Abstract

Sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) by peacekeepers is a prevalent issue within UN peacekeeping missions. As of January 2015, the UN Misconduct Tracking System (MTS) began recording the nationalities of alleged SEA perpetrators. This thesis fills the gap in literature and analyzes the relationship between the nationalities of uniformed personnel from troop contributing countries (TCCs) and their subsequent SEA perpetration; furthermore, whether or not there are other factors within the TCCs, such as societal norms of gender inequality, underreporting of sexual violence and attitudes of impunity, that help explicate the variation in SEA are explored. The findings yielded alarming proportions for certain nationalities perpetrating SEA and found that TCCs were responsible for the majority of overall SEA perpetrated (from the data available); this research shows that both developing and developed countries are perpetrators of SEA and that their actions are detrimental to the UN’s broader gender-equality and peacebuilding goals. Furthermore, knowing the nationalities and the rates at which countries perpetrate SEA complicates the UN’s relationship with these TCCs, as these TCCs are in violation of international human rights norms.
Acknowledgments

The completion of this thesis could not have been possible without the endless support from my family. I give my heartfelt gratitude and appreciation to my parents. Thank you for allowing me to pursue my dreams and for always being there for me. I love you both so much.

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Lastly, thank you to all who I was able to interview. Without you all, my analysis would have been lacking. Thank you for allowing me to write about your fieldwork and expertise.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACRWC</td>
<td>African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Convention on the Elimination and Discrimination Against Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>Convention on the Rights of the Child</td>
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<td>DFS</td>
<td>Department of Field Support</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>GDI</td>
<td>Gender Development Index</td>
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<td>GII</td>
<td>Gender Inequality Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission In Haiti</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUC/MONUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTS</td>
<td>Misconduct Tracking System</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUCI</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIOS</td>
<td>Office of Internal Oversight Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>Police-Contributing Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>Sexual Exploitation and Abuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troop-Contributing Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIOGBIS</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIT</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Mission in East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCO</td>
<td>Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process</td>
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<td>WPS</td>
<td>Women, Peace and Security Index</td>
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**Introduction**

The sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) of young women and girls perpetrated by male United Nations (UN) peacekeeping personnel is an endemic issue.¹ SEA detrimentally affects and hinders the peacebuilding process, as peacekeepers are violating the very rights that they are supposed to uphold and help implement. As such, this human rights violation undermines the overall legitimacy of peacekeeping operations (PKO), questions the efficacy of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), poses physical and psychological trauma to victims, threatens the underlying fabric of human security in communities and ultimately results in locals not taking peacekeeping seriously.² Furthermore, it perpetrates patriarchal values and militarized masculinity, whilst compromising the promotion of gender equality in host countries.³ It is one of the “most conspicuous and consequential departures from the ideals” of the UN that occurs regularly within all peacekeeping mission types.⁴

Until now, country specific case studies, the effects of male dominance, and militarized masculinity have been at the forefront of discussions about sexual exploitation and abuse. As of January 2015, the UN began tracking allegations of misconduct by nationality of uniformed personnel.⁵ As such, this data is fairly new and TCCs have only started to be ‘named and shamed’ for perpetrating SEA; few if any studies have conducted statistical TCCs case analyses specifically pertaining to the nationality of peacekeepers. Therefore, my research fills this existing gap in literature and determines whether there is a relationship between TCCs’ societal

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¹ SEA can be committed by women as well as men and both men and women can be victims. Regardless of the fact that male dominance and militarized masculinity are delineated as common causes of SEA perpetration, this is not a problem that is unique to male offenders. Sabrina Karim and Kyle Beardsley, “Explaining Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Missions,” *Journal of Peace Research* 53 (2016): 102, accessed May 23, 2017, doi: 10.1177/0022343315615506.
² Ibid., 101.
³ Karim and Beardsley, “Explaining Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Missions,” 100.
gender norms and SEA. Do peacekeepers externalize the norms that they have grown accustomed to in their home countries? In this research, certain countries were found to be substantially responsible for perpetrating more SEA than other TCCs; one must question if TCCs home norms can explain the paradox of peacekeepers choosing to harm whilst on a mission to keep the peace. I hypothesize that TCCs that demonstrate questionable efforts to bettering gender equality, poor women’s rights prioritization and an overall toxic male culture, will have a higher rate of SEA allegations against their peacekeeping personnel.

SEA is a gross violation of human rights and has been addressed multiple times by the UN; there are clear rules set out in the 2003 Secretary-General’s bulletin. The bulletin outlines a zero-tolerance policy of any and all SEA by peacekeepers and other personnel. In this report, Secretary-General Kofi Annan states, “sexual exploitation and abuse by humanitarian staff cannot be tolerated. It violates everything the United Nations stands for. Men, women, and children displaced by conflict or other disasters are among the most vulnerable people on earth. They look to the United Nations and its humanitarian partners for shelter and protection.” Standards and protocols for UN peacekeeping personnel can be found within UN Security Council Resolutions 1325, 1820, 1888, 1889, 1960 and 2122. The concept of SEA is also specifically addressed in mission-specific mandates.

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9 Ibid., 1.
Background Information

Peacekeeping

Studies suggest that UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) are successful in achieving core security aims.10 However, the price in attaining these objectives results in less than favorable outcomes to a mission’s other peace building goals of social and economic development.11 The role of peacekeepers is “to support the implementation of a ceasefire or peace agreement, play an active role in peacemaking efforts and… also be involved in early peacebuilding activities.”12 Today’s peacekeeping efforts involve conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and peace enforcement. It is a multi-dimensional operation that works to facilitate the following: rebuilding of a community; protecting civilians; assisting in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; supporting the organization of elections; protecting and promoting human rights; assisting in restoring the rule of law.13

Peacekeeping has evolved significantly over the years and now involves parties other than peacekeepers; civilian components, such as electoral observation, police monitoring and training and civilian administration, are heavily relied upon.14 According to Page Fortna, there are four types of peacekeeping missions: observer missions, traditional peacekeeping, multidimensional peacekeeping and peace enforcement.15 Observer missions involve small groups of unarmed personnel whose mandates are to monitor particular situations, such as ceasefires. Traditional peacekeeping missions involve observers and lightly armed military

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10 Beber et. al., 1.
11 Ibid., 2.
15 Ibid.
units. Multidimensional peacekeeping missions supplement traditional peacekeeping forces with “large civilian components to monitor elections, train or monitor police, monitor human rights, and sometimes temporarily to administer the country.” Lastly, enforcement missions are mandated to impose peace by force. Each of these mission types are authorized under the UN Charter, however, the use of force is only authorized in two of the four mission types – traditional and peace enforcement.

Even though force is only permissible in peace enforcement and traditional mission types, the use of force still falls within a grey area as to when and why peacekeepers can use it. This is because it is the responsibility of every individual peacekeeper to carry out duties of both peacekeeping and peace enforcement, regardless of mission type. Peacekeepers are allowed to “use force at the tactical level, with the authorization of the Security Council, if acting in self-defense and defense of the mandate.” If acting within the scope of “peace enforcement,” and not “peacekeeping,” consent of main parties is not necessary and personnel “may involve the use of military force at the strategic or international level.” Even though force is to always be used as a last resort in a manner that is proportional and appropriate to the situation, the confusion of when to use force is largely left unto a peacekeeper’s discretion to determine if a situation requires it. Peacekeepers who commit SEA can take advantage of misinterpreting when the use of force is permissible, in order to lay some sort of reasoning behind committing SEA.

Defining this grey area is important since the use of force plays a role in peacekeepers

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16 Fortna, 271.
17 Ibid.
18 Observer, traditional and multidimensional peacekeeping missions are authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Enforcement missions are authorized under Chapter VII. Fortna, 271.
21 Fortna, 271.
committing SEA; it changes the power dynamics in the communities – sexual violence and use of force go hand in hand.

**Makeup of Peacekeeping Personnel**

The UN’s peacekeepers include military contingents, police and civilian personnel. As of March 2017, the number of armed uniformed personnel, which includes troops, military observers and police, working in the current DPKO missions is 96,477 individuals. There are currently 4,784 international civilian personnel and 9,474 local civilian staff.\(^{23}\)

For the purpose of contextualization of which type of UN peacekeeping personnel perpetrate SEA, uniformed personnel have the highest number of allegations made against them. Uniformed personnel include troops, military observers and police personnel and they are armed with weapons. Conversely, non-uniformed personnel include civilians and local volunteers. Civilians and volunteers are typically unarmed.\(^{24}\) Of the 69 allegations made in 2015, 38 noted military contingents as perpetrators. Similarly, in 2013, of the 152 allegations made, 117 of those were also against military contingents.\(^{25}\) Allowing peacekeepers to use weapons has changed the power dynamics in the field. Women who have experienced SEA have been threatened with weapons to engage in transactional and survival sex, rape, and other abuses, even though peacekeepers are only technically allowed to use their weapons in self-defense.\(^{26}\) SEA and armed military peacekeeping personnel are correlated, it is my assumption that this is directly attributable to a peacekeeper’s ability to use force on the field.


\(^{26}\) “UN Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines,” 33-35.
Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries (TCC/PCC)

Since the UN does not have a standing reserve force, the supply of military, civilian and police peacekeeping personnel come from troop-contributing countries (TCC)/police-contributing countries (PCC). The Security Council works with TCCs to ensure that UN peacekeeping reflects a truly global partnership. These military and police contingents “are first and foremost members of their own national services and are then seconded to work with the UN.”27 Presently, there are peacekeeping personnel from over 90 TCCs.28 The UN applauds the diversity of this group and unequivocally states that the peacekeepers “bring different cultures and experiences… [and even so] are united in their determination to foster peace” and security.29

Although TCCs are responsible for all troop allocation decisions, their “priorities are not necessarily in line with those of the UN Security Council or UN Secretariat.”30 TCCs allocate troops depending on various rationales concerning political, economic, security, institutional and normative concerns – there are distinct potential beneficiaries with each decision made.31 TCCs weigh these factors according to their own priorities. For example, one factor that has been highly discussed in previous literature is the UN’s compensation payment of $1,028 per soldier per month to TCCs.32 An individual peacekeeper’s TCC decides how much is given to personnel as a salary.33 This form of payment per soldier deployed has resulted in “developing states with large populations… providing the largest share of peacekeepers;'’ richer countries often choose to pay for missions as opposed to sending militaries.34 However, this also means that “the

29Ibid.
31Bellamy and Williams, 3.
32Ibid.
33Bellamy and Williams, 4
increased proportion of troops from developing countries increases the likelihood that peacekeepers arrive…lacking necessary equipment” and/or necessary skills.\textsuperscript{35}

The UN is legally bound by the Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) and the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which serve as pacts between the UN and the host country or TCC, respectively (see \textit{Diagram 2} in “\textit{International Human Rights}” section). The legal status of UN personnel is a complex and highly contested issue. Military and police contingents are strictly under the criminal jurisdiction of their own national authorities, not the local authorities of host countries. The MOU stipulates that a TCC will “meet its responsibility to exercise criminal jurisdiction over national personnel in return for immunity from local prosecution.”\textsuperscript{36} Yet, this agreement is not legally binding and TCCs are not required by law to undertake this responsibility.

Due to military and police contingent status, the UN does not have legal authority to draw up criminal charges or initiate prosecution of SEA, and as such must rely on repatriation with the hopes that TCCs will take legal action according to their rule of law. This means that the UN relies on “the will and capacity of the country of origin” to prosecute perpetrators.\textsuperscript{37} Once alleged perpetrators are repatriated, the UN has no influence on TCCs national authorities, nor is the UN privy to follow up reports on whether charges were filed. Unfortunately, investigating allegations are often “stymied due to a lack of information about… suspects and a lack of transparency [by the TCC] about investigations and prosecutions.”\textsuperscript{38} Furthermore, other TCCs/PCCs lack the legislation to prosecute their peacekeepers after repatriation for crimes committed in foreign

\begin{footnotes}
\item[35] Bove and Ruggeri, 685.
\item[37] Ibid., 49.
\end{footnotes}
lands. Diagram 1, provided by UN Peacekeeping, illustrates how the aforementioned management of SEA reports and allegations works.

The current system allows for a sense of impunity and substantial gap in accountability to flourish, which in turn allows others to commit SEA without fear of retribution. One would like to hope that within the UN framework, perpetrators would be held accountable to the human rights foundation, a system that peacekeepers work to uphold.

International Human Rights

Peacekeeping personnel are by law required to act in accordance with all human rights treaties, regardless of what their TCC or host country has ratified – the Convention on the Rights

39 Aoi, Conig and Thakur, 49.
of the Child (CRC), the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC), Convention on the Elimination and Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), International Covenant on the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and all other relevant instruments. This is to ensure that peacekeepers do not become perpetrators of human rights abuses. According to the UN DPKO’s guidelines, “personnel should respect human rights in their dealings with colleagues and with local people, both in their public and in their private lives. Where they commit abuses, they should be held accountable.” These guidelines lay out a clear expectation of peacekeepers taking responsibility for their actions and acting in accordance to regulations.

Scholars utilize the Hague Convention of 1907 as a starting point in case study analyses to “grasp how sexual violence has been viewed over time and whether or not there has been a change in perspective;” the Hague Convention of 1907 is the first international treaty that “implicitly outlaws sexual violence.” Post World War II, the tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo did not prosecute sexual violence and the use of “comfort women.” At the time, sexual violence was viewed as “unfortunate but unavoidable consequences of war.” However, this ‘boys will be boys’ stance soon changed. The passage of UNSC Resolutions 1325, 1820, 1888, 1889, and 1960, as well as the rulings within the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, set the precedent for classifying

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43 Ibid., 131.
sexual violence as crimes against humanity by defining gender crimes, such as rape, sexual torture and sexual enslavement, as customary law.\textsuperscript{45-46}

Regardless of the categorization of international human rights framework as binding or non-binding, peacekeepers must abide by, uphold and help implement all international human rights instruments.\textsuperscript{47} For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) “sets the cornerstone of international human rights standards, [and] emphasizes that human rights and fundamental freedoms are universal and guaranteed to everybody.”\textsuperscript{48} Although the UDHR is technically non-binding, the UN is able to reconcile the use of this framework because it is treated as customary soft law that provides the basis of respect and dignity for all humans. Other treaties, such as ICCPR, ICESCR and CEDAW are in “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights” in their preambles and are legally binding. ICCPR’s Article 7 notes that, “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” – SEA is degrading, inhuman, cruel, and is considered torture in some instances (i.e. rape). ICESCR’s Article 3 works to “ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights.” CEDAW notably provides protection against “sexual and gender-based violence, including by establishing safeguards against sexual violence as a result of gender-based discrimination.”\textsuperscript{49} Yet, even in infringing upon others’ rights

\textsuperscript{46} Sabrina Karim and Kyle Beardsley, “Explaining Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Missions: The Role of Female Peacekeepers and Gender Equality in Contributing Countries,” \textit{Journal of Peace Research} 53 (2016): 100. This change in customary law was also noted in the 1949 Geneva Conventions: “Women shall be especially protected … against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.”
\textsuperscript{47} This is written in mission mandates. Although treaties apply to countries and not individuals, peacekeepers are representing their countries and the DPKO’s guidelines clearly state that peacekeepers must abide by and uphold all international human rights treaties.
\textsuperscript{48} “UN Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines,” 14. The UDHR, although non-binding, is cited in scholarly works as well. This is to show that the UN views the UDHR as a part of the universally recognized legal norms that peacekeepers must be held to. This can be found in: Susan Notar, “Peacekeepers as Perpetrators: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse of Women and Children in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.” \textit{American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law} 14(2006): 423-425.
and being in violation of the aforementioned binding and non-binding international human rights framework, peacekeepers seldom face consequences for perpetrating SEA.  

The UN has made its position clear with both its TCC and host countries. Diagram 2 outlines these relationships. There is the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which exists between the UN and the host state, and the Memorandum of Understanding Agreement (MOU), which is a binding agreement between the UN and the troop-contributing country (TCC). Furthermore, there are mission-based Codes of Conduct, a Voluntary Compact, and other rules governing disciplinary measures for SEA as outlined in the 2003 Secretary General’s Bulletin on Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse.

The rules and regulations for peacekeepers and the nations that they are committing to helping have clear expectations and agreements binding peacekeepers to act accordingly. Peacekeepers must abide by their mandates and uphold all human rights framework set forth in hard and soft law.

Diagram 2: Depiction of the UN’s agreements with Host Countries and TCCs.

**Literature Review**

The UN mission in Cambodia 1991 marked the first time that international aid agencies “raised the alarm over abusive behavior by UN peacekeepers…including them visiting brothels

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50 It does not matter if the human rights framework is binding or not. This is because peacekeepers are ‘bound’ to uphold all treaties and declarations.
where some prostitutes were underage.”51 The then head of the UN mission to Cambodia responded with “boys will be boys.”52 In 2001, the earliest reported incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) committed by UN personnel in West Africa began to surface.53 At this time the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and NGO Save the Children commissioned investigations into the SEA allegations reported in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone in refugee communities.54 The reports that materialized “painted a very disturbing picture of widespread abuse” and were leaked to the media, which prompted public condemnation.55 This pressured the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) to become involved and conduct a separate investigation, which was published in October 2002.56

This report was divided into three phases: assessment of the scope of SEA, evidence verification and the investigation of new evidence.57 The team of investigators, lawyers and specialists concluded that “there is a genuine recognition on the part of agencies that sexual exploitation and abuse represent a betrayal of trust as well as a catastrophic failure of protection.”58 More importantly, due to the third phase of ‘seeking fresh evidence and developing new cases,’ the OIOS report became a catalyst for a variety of institutional policy changes and recommendations that came forth in the following years.59

In the direct aftermath of the OIOS report, the Security Council expressed their “serious concern at the violence, particularly sexual violence, suffered by women and children during the

52 Ibid.
53 These allegations are the first reported, but that is not to say that they are in actuality the first to occur. Prior SEA most likely has taken place but was not reported or made public knowledge. UN General Assembly, Investigation into sexual exploitation of refugees by aid workers in West Africa, 11 October 2002, A/57/465, 3.
55 Ibid., 5.
56 Ibid., 5.
59 Ibid., 3.
conflict in Sierra Leone, and [emphasized] the importance of addressing these issues
effectively,” with the adoption of resolution 1400 in March 2002.\textsuperscript{60} From 2003-2005, some
notable events included: Kofi Annan’s zero tolerance policy adoption, the adoption of new
terminology, Conduct and Discipline Team establishment at UN Headquarters within the DPKO,
comprehensive reporting on SEA in PKOs and the media’s increased reporting on cases of
sexual misconduct.\textsuperscript{61} Each will be discussed in turn, in order to grasp the current literature on the

Although a “zero-tolerance policy” was put into effect in 2003 on any and all sexual
exploitation and abuse, the 2005 Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s report listed a total of 340
allegations of SEA, a staggering increase from the 121 cases in 2004 and 53 in 2003.\textsuperscript{62} Once
again, Annan enunciated that SEA “violates the fundamental duty of care that UN peacekeepers
owe to the very people they are sent to protect and serve [and that the UN] cannot tolerate even
one instance of a peacekeeper victimizing the most vulnerable among us.”\textsuperscript{63} Unfortunately,
Annan’s zero tolerance policy does not seem to be reaching all UN peacekeeping personnel.\textsuperscript{64}

The number of SEA allegations continues to fluctuate over time; underreporting of sexual
violence is a significant issue that must be acknowledged. There are many reasons that survivors
choose to forgo reporting. Some of these reasons include: stigmatization, losing much-needed
material-assistance, negative economic impact, threat of retribution or retaliation, lack of
effective legal service, feeling powerless, lack of faith in the response and lack of knowledge of

\begin{itemize}
\item Security Council Report, 4.
\item Muna Ndolu, “The United Nations Responses to The Sexual Abuse and Exploitation of Women And Girls By Peacekeepers During
\item This letter was written by Annan in a Letter to the President of the Security Council in February 2005. Sylvian Roy, “Presentation on United
Nations Efforts to Address Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Missions,” \textit{Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe}, 14
November 2014, \url{http://www.osce.org/secretariat/126771?download=true}.
\item United Nations Department: Peace and Security, “Fighting Sexual Exploitation and Abuse,” last modified 2007,
\end{itemize}
the reporting process. An independent report noted that the underreporting of sexual abuse and a culture of impunity in peacekeeping missions play a large role in the allegations recorded in the prior paragraph. It was found that “UN personnel in all the missions…could point to numerous suspected or quite visible cases of SEA that [were] not being counted or investigated.” This not only affects data collection but also clouds progress, as it becomes difficult to track true ‘success’ in combatting SEA.

Terminology and Use of Language:

The terminology associated with SEA in UN mandates and other stated policy can have an effect on peacekeepers. In ST/SGB/2003/13, Secretary-General Annan defined ‘sexual exploitation’ as “any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another. Similarly, the term ‘sexual abuse’ means the actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions.” This definition is problematic; one scholar, Olivera Simic, examined nine empirical studies and performed a coded analysis in order to explore the language of SEA terms, causes and evidence gathering techniques. Simic concluded that the UN’s definition of ‘sexual exploitation’ is too “broadly defined and contentious, and might cover activity that is not

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67 Data is also available at the UN’s Code Blue Campaign Website: http://www.codebluecampaign.com/press-releases/2015/03/16.
necessarily sexually exploitative.” She contended that more research is required in this area and that the lack of questioning the “over inclusive and broad term of sexual exploitation” within UN mandates leads to the conflation of all sexual relationships to various forms of sexual offences.

The development of strong language used to convey SEA in UN mandates can make a difference in how regulations are perceived and comprehended by peacekeepers and host countries. In another document, the DPKO’s Code of Conduct, the following is clearly prohibited:

- Any type of sexual activities with children (persons under the age of 18 years); Mistaken belief in the age of a person is not a defense;
- Use of children or adults to procure sexual services for others;
- Exchange of money, employment, goods or services for sex with prostitutes or others; - Any sexual favor in exchange of assistance provided to the beneficiaries of such assistance, such as food or other items provided to refugees;
- Visits to brothels or places which are declared off-limits.

Instead of analyzing how ‘sexual exploitation’ and ‘sexual abuse’ are framed, another scholar focused on the UN’s principle role of ‘neutrality’ and ‘impartiality’ and how that shapes SEA discourse. Currently, SEA is framed as a human rights violation. Although this is true, Grady argues that SEA by peacekeepers “brings about financial and propagandist benefits for the warring parties.” She suggests that SEA in PKOs directly benefits the enemy. In perpetrating SEA and indirectly helping warring parties achieve their goals, peacekeepers are in breach of UN principles of impartiality and neutrality that they are to uphold. Grady examines UN documents that explicitly use and define those terms. She concludes, “if impartiality is central to the

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70 Ibid.
74 Ibid., 223.
philosophy of UN peacekeeping, then anything that threatens it should not be tolerated.” By upholding the principles of neutrality and impartiality, the UN will face more pressure to combat SEA. Both Simic and Grady prove the importance of studying and coding UN documents for specificity in language to find trends that can help lead to change, whether it is by re-framing the issue (Grady) or advocating for stronger effective wording (Simic).

Efficacy of PKOs – What is a Successful Mission? What is Peace?

A PKO’s efficacy can be measured in a variety of ways. Scholars have suggested that some measures of peacekeeping’s utility can be found in the “compliance of ceasefires, troop quality, cost management, effective leadership, the combination of peaceful spells and stable polities, civilians protection from violence and an overall reduction in the levels of violence between belligerents.” For example, it has been argued that ethnicity and perceived impartiality of a mission commander influence the likelihood of a mission’s success. In another instance, the inclusion of women “as actors of peace and prevention” effectively protects civilians. Conversely factors such as overly ambitious mandates, misallocation of resources, lack of preparation and the perception of shortfalls hinder the PKO’s end result. In this thesis, a mission’s success and efficacy is determined on the “basis of its ability to accomplish what it set out to do,” whether that is set out in a Security Council Resolution or mandate by another UN body.

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75 Grady, 224.
77 Ibid., 3.
79 Ibid.
Lastly, the concept of ‘peace,’ has been highly debated. The issue centers on two schools of thought, theoretical and empirical; scholars have been challenged to move towards the operationalization of conflict, leaving behind theoretical concepts of positive and negative peace. Thus, the definition of peace “has only become more relevant as the [peacekeeping] field has adopted systematic empirical assessments of mission performance.”

These new adoptions have allowed for a more nuanced understanding of peace in action.

The Role of Peace Survival in Peacekeeping Missions:

A crucial aspect in the discussion of peacekeeping styles has centered on peace survival and duration – both in long-term and short-term mission types. This type of literature is known as the “second wave” of peacekeeping research and assumes that “peace is an established condition and that a peacekeeper’s job is to maintain it.” However, since the UN does not only send troops into host countries post-conflict, but does so during ongoing conflicts, “missions should [also] be evaluated according to their capacity for making peace.”

Since then, success has tended to be evaluated in terms of war duration, as opposed to peace duration.

UN traditional peacekeeping, multidimensional peacekeeping and peace enforcement have shown to “produce more durable peace, produce comparatively geographically contained conflicts, shorter episodes of local violence, improve the odds of peacebuilding success, and lower the odds of genocide over the long term” at the national level. On a more local level, scholars have found mixed results – peacekeepers are able to deter violence overall but this in turn weakens the duration of local peace.

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81 Salvatore and Ruggeri, 5.
82 Ibid., 6.
83 Ibid., 6.
84 Ibid., 16.
85 Salvatore and Ruggeri, 17.
There are only a few studies that focus on peace exerted during observer missions. It has been found that peacekeepers acting as observers have “no statistical impact on peace duration, battle-related violence, and geographic containment.”\(^{86}\) In fact, the only significant effect in the aforementioned study was a negative one; it was found that the greater the deployment of observers, the greater the intensity of one-sided violence, as these mission types are not viewed as a threat by perpetrators of violence.\(^{87}\)

*The Gendered Approach - The Role of Masculinized Militarization and Patriarchy:*

Scholars Paul Higate and Marsha Henry have focused on peacekeepers’ perceptions of gender and gender relations on the field.\(^{88}\) A core component that affects the identity of males in the combat field is militarized masculinity, an aggressive form of masculinity; it was found that this trait dominated their identity formation whilst on tour.\(^{89}\) This show of aggressiveness by security personnel in combat is viewed as an acceptable trait within a militarized masculinity framework. This is because security personnel are taught to value “hegemonic masculinities – aggressiveness, courage, obedience, patriotism, stoicism, and loyalty – over feminine behavior.”\(^{90}\) Scholars have found a link between fostering of militarized masculinity and peacekeepers fulfilling UN PKOs. As PKOs become more multidimensional, “peacekeeping asks soldiers to do work that might normally be done by civilians – for example, promote human rights and organize elections.”\(^{91}\) The role of peacekeepers, as their name suggests, is to promote peace, quite the opposite from soldiers in violent combat. As such, this aggravates and

\(^{86}\) Salvatore and Ruggeri, 17.
\(^{87}\) Ibid.
\(^{89}\) Ibid.
\(^{90}\) Karim and Beardsley, “Explaining Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Missions,” 102.
contributes to a male identity crisis, which in turn triggers a stronger hyper-masculine culture and allows for the tolerance of extreme SEA to evolve within PKO.\footnote{Gwen Hunnicutt, “Varieties of Patriarchy and Violence Against Women: Resurrecting ‘Patriarchy’ as a Theoretical Tool.” Violence Against Women 15(2009): 553.}

In addition to militarized masculinity, patriarchy plays a role in the physical security of women. Literature suggests that there is “a link between norms of gender equality and reduced levels of abuse against women.”\footnote{Karim and Beardsley, “Explaining Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Missions,” 102.} Karim and Beardsley argue that all societies are patriarchal to some extent but the amount of variation in the level of patriarchy correlates to the variation in the level of SEA that occurs across countries – the expectation is “for security forces that come from more patriarchal countries to be more likely to commit SEA.”\footnote{Ibid.} If peacekeepers coming from more patriarchal countries are more likely to commit SEA, should they be allowed to engage in peacekeeping missions? Coupled with the submissive gender roles that women are burdened with and the power dynamics of why men rape,\footnote{Ndolu, 131.} Karim and Beardsley have hypothesized that the composition of peacekeeping missions (peacekeepers by troop contributing country by mission type) will thus inform the levels of SEA accusations.\footnote{Karim and Beardsley, “Explaining Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Missions,” 103.}

Feminist literature on SEA’s relationship and the correlation to the role of male power in society is often classified as either: 1) all sexual relations are exploitative in nature or 2) women have autonomy over their choices. The first group has largely been criticized because they believe that “patriarchy is an organizing principle and … rape’s critical function [is] nothing more or less than a conscious process of intimidation by which all men keep all women in a state of fear.”\footnote{Ragnhild Nordas and Siri CA Rustad, “Sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers: Understanding variation,” International Interactions 39(2013): 514.} Blanket statements in the first batch of literature suggest a static theoretical view of Colin NSA.

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94 Ibid.
95 Ndolu, 131.
96 Karim and Beardsley, “Explaining Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Missions,” 103.
rape and this in turn “restricts understanding variations across contexts.”\textsuperscript{98} The second group believes that women are in control of making their own decisions and that there are certain instances whereby certain sexual acts may or may not be considered SEA – for example, this group does not classify transactional sex as SEA because a woman would have had to make an autonomous decision to engage in sexual behavior. Although these groups are quite different in attitude, both agree that characteristics that are “most valued as ‘masculine’ are socially constructed [and that] masculinity must be understood as not a natural trait, but something that must be achieved.”\textsuperscript{99} Other scholars have found that the concept of “military masculinities offer a useful analytical point of departure in explaining the dynamics of these gendered power relations, since the majority of peacekeepers are combat trained military men.”\textsuperscript{100} In taking this approach, one must heed caution to not homogenize the category of military masculinities to all unintended consequences of peacekeeping missions.\textsuperscript{101}

\textit{Structural Conditions of SEA:}

Until 2013, literature on peacekeeping focused more on whether peacekeeping keeps the peace and less on why there are variations of unintended consequences of PKOs, such as SEA.\textsuperscript{102} Although the prevalence of SEA is a major human rights concern, the variation in the data makes it difficult to analyze – some peacekeeping missions are marred by SEA scandal, others have few reported cases. As such, it is difficult to understand the factors that are responsible for the differences in reported SEA across missions and over time and whether structural conditions contribute to higher reporting of SEA. In spite of the fact that underreporting is likely a

\textsuperscript{98} Nordas and Rustad, 514.
\textsuperscript{102} Nordas and Rustad, 511.
significant problem, there are some case studies that suggest TCC/mission-specific factors and host-specific factors are responsible for this variation.\textsuperscript{103}

The first statistical study exploring SEA variation was conducted in 2013 by Ragnhild Nordas and Siri Rustad at the Peace Research Institute of Oslo. Nordas and Rustad found that “SEA is more frequently reported in situations with lower levels of battle-related deaths, in larger operations, in more recent operations, the less developed the country hosting the mission, and in operations where the conflict involved high levels of sexual violence.”\textsuperscript{104} Their clearest finding among those listed above pertains to SEA in larger operations; it was found that missions that had more troops on the ground had higher reporting of SEA.\textsuperscript{105} For example, in Cambodia, the number of prostitutes rose from 6,000 to 25,000 (including child prostitutes) due to the increase in peacekeeping personnel in 1992 in the whole country. The influx of peacekeeping personnel “acts as a magnet for an increase in the sex industry and sexually exploitative relationships in mission areas. This increase in demand of sex services also results in an augmentation in trafficking and forced prostitution.”\textsuperscript{106} Similar instances of an increase in sexually exploitative relationships can be seen in other missions, such as UNMIK in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{107}

Another condition that relates directly to troop contributing countries and creates a thriving environment for SEA is peacekeeping personnel’s use of force. Since the majority of peacekeepers are soldiers who are trained to use force, there is this notion that they “might struggle in post-conflict [peacekeeping] environments requiring compassion, sensitivity, and empathy is well taken.”\textsuperscript{108} This framework looks at SEA as unavoidable and peacekeepers as “unthinking automatons,” who are only trained to fight “and gain power and control over the

\textsuperscript{103} Nordas and Rustad, 513.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{105} Nordas, 513.
\textsuperscript{107} O’Brien, 806.
\textsuperscript{108} Higate, “Peacekeepers, Masculinities and Sexual Exploitation,” 102.
enemy.”

TCCs avoid taking responsibility and have allowed for impunity to occur unchecked, which has contributed to causing SEA. Some TCCs lack the legal infrastructure to prosecute citizens’ crimes committed on foreign lands. TCCs also want to avoid political embarrassment in the eyes of the international community – “no country wants to be seen as the nation whose citizens, instead of protecting vulnerable people, go overseas and sexually abuse others.” The UN is still hesitant to ‘name and shame,’ as it might risk withdrawal from TCCs.

Karim and Beardsley have also studied whether “the composition of peacekeeping forces along two dimensions—the proportion of women and the records of gender (in)equality in the contributing countries—helps explain variation in SEA allegations.” They analyzed mission-level information in countries that had better records of gender equality in host countries and found there to be lower levels of SEA allegations reported against peacekeeping personnel. This conclusion is ground-breaking, as it suggests that improving the representation of women in a host country will help alleviate the problem. Thus, by improving female representation in host countries, it is thought that the country as a whole will be able to have better records of gender equality. Unfortunately, these findings are worrisome, as they demonstrate another factor that could allow for peacekeeper impunity – peacekeepers blaming SEA on the host countries’ gender inequality issues. Host countries with poor female representation and gender inequality inadvertently contribute to SEA because if sexual violence is viewed as acceptable or a regular

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109 Higate, 102

110 For the most part, there are no public prosecutions. In April 2016, the Associated Press uncovered a child sex-trafficking ring run by UN peacekeeping personnel. This swept media outlets internationally. Some of these soldiers were repatriated to the DRC and were charged with disobeyed orders and attempted rape. A trial date has been set but no updates have been provided since April 2016.


112 Karim and Beardsley, “Explaining Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Missions,” 100. Within the peacekeeping field, literature regarding women and peacekeeping is relatively sparse. There has been a stronger push to include women in all peace and resolution processes, from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. Women make up only 3% of UN military peacekeepers and more than half of peace agreements fail to make mention of women.

113 Ibid., 109.

114 Karim and Beardsley, “Explaining Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Missions,” 112.
part of societal interactions, then it perpetuates the notion that SEA in a particular host country is permissible.

Examining Data

After the release of 2005 Secretary-General’s report, the total number of allegations continued to increase to 357 in 2006.\textsuperscript{115} This increase resulted in thorough record-keeping and data tracking of all SEA allegations perpetrated by UN peacekeepers. In 2008, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), in conjunction with the Department of Field Support (DFS), launched the Misconduct Tracking System (MTS), a global method of monitoring allegations involving peacekeepers.\textsuperscript{116} After the inception of these data-tracking systems, the number of allegations reported in 2007 decreased to 59. Regardless of this promising decrease, since 2008, there have been a total of 839 allegations brought against UN peacekeeping personnel.\textsuperscript{117} Furthermore, in mid-April 2017, the Associated Press released a report, sourced from internal UN Docs, detailing 2,000 allegations that have been made against UN peacekeepers over the span of 12 years.\textsuperscript{118} This release came shortly after the creation of a new task force to strengthen the UN’s response to SEA issues to “develop a clear, game-changing strategy to achieve visible and measurable further improvements” by new Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres.\textsuperscript{119}

The current studies that exist examine mission specific data and the failure of the zero tolerance policy; the missions that have received the most attention for SEA include

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{115} Ndolu, 142.
\item \textsuperscript{117} UN General Assembly, Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, 16 February 2016, A/70/729, 3.
MONUC/MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo and MINUSTAH in Haiti.\textsuperscript{120} These case studies examine social, legal and political institutions that inadvertently contribute to SEA. In one case study, it was found that “the culture or context of the host country, the troop-contributing country, the peacekeeping mission itself, and institutional issues within the DPKO and the broader UN system” contributed to the high rates of SEA in MONUC/MONUSCO.\textsuperscript{121}

Other scholars have worked to create their own comprehensive Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers (SEAP) datasets, which compile limited public information from the United Nations, NATO, ECOWAS and the African Union from 1999-2010. Scholars also looked at NGO reports, media sources, and academic studies to compile datasets.

\textbf{Theoretical Framework}

Diana Russell’s four-factor model suggests the preconditions that allow rape to occur.\textsuperscript{122} These four factors are: (1) factors creating a \textit{predisposition} or a desire to rape, (2) factors reducing \textit{internal inhibitions} against acting out this desire, (3) factors reducing \textit{social inhibitions} against acting out this desire, and (4) factors reducing the potential \textit{victim’s ability to resist} or avoid the rape.\textsuperscript{123} This framework was utilized by Nordas and Rustad in the first ever statistical study exploring sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) variation. The reason that I am also choosing to utilize this framework is because peacekeeping operations are heavily influenced by these factors and allow for masculinized militarization to create a breeding ground for abuse. In these environments, as explained in the “\textit{Literature Review}” section, men devalue women in the communities that they are supposed to helping. The prevalence of SEA is “higher when the men in the population hold negative views of women in their surroundings, when there is social acceptance for the behavior,

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{120} Bonnie Kovatch, “Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Missions: A Case Study of MONUC and MONUSCO,” \textit{The Journal of Middle East and Africa} 7(2016): 159.  \\
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., 159.  \\
\textsuperscript{122} Nordas and Rustad, 519.  \\
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., 519.
\end{flushleft}
and when potential victims are vulnerable to targeting.”¹²⁴ There is no denying that SEA is a systemic problem or that masculinized militarization, patriarchy and gender roles heavily impact the occurrence of such atrocities. Since my research aims to explore the relationship between troop contributing country (TCC)/nationality and SEA and whether or not there are other factors that can help explicate the variation in allegations, it is only fitting to adapt a similar theoretical framework and to use one that centers on sexual violence.

**Methodology**

This thesis aims to analyze the relationship between troop contributing country (TCC)/nationality and sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), as well as understand if there is a correlation between TCCs’ norms and SEA variance. The dependent variable is the count of military, police and civilian SEA allegations in each mission; the independent variables are the TCCs. A quantitative and qualitative analysis will be performed in order to examine these relationships.

An allegation is “an unproven report of alleged misconduct, which may not necessarily lead to a full-scale investigation.”¹²⁵ The process for collecting allegations is as follows: survivors report allegations to a mission’s Conduct and Discipline Unit (CDU) by utilizing a “range of reporting mechanisms.”¹²⁶ The CDU is in charge of tracking and reporting allegations to the Investigations Division of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) within a ten-day period. The UN maintains “standards for the definition of SEA and for compliance with the

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¹²⁴ Nordas, 519.
¹²⁵ Karim and Beardsley, “Explaining Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Missions,” 105
¹²⁶ Reporting mechanisms include including locked drop-boxes, private meeting rooms to allow reporting in a confidential setting, telephone hotlines, secure email addresses, regional focal points, local women’s organizations, and the local UN-NGO network. Ibid., 105.
zero tolerance policy… although it is possible for norms of reporting abuse to be inconsistent across missions.”\textsuperscript{127}

The datasets used to test the questions of whether there is a correlation between TCC and SEA are the “Table of Allegations (2015 Onwards)” data available on the UN Misconduct Tracking System (MTS) and the “Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations by Country and Post (Oct 31, 2017)” provided by the UN. Results have been generated via Microsoft Excel and STATA. Results were then analyzed according to three indicators: Gender Inequality Index (GII), Gender Development Index (GDI), and Women, Peace and Security Index (WPS). From there, case studies of specific TCCs were examined to determine patterns amongst the highest perpetrating rates of SEA by nationality.

Limitations of the data include: underreporting skewing the data, lack of civilian personnel’s nationality, limited data points from 2015-2017 and lack of data regarding non-SEA related allegations by nationality of uniformed personnel. Some years lack SEA allegations by particular groups, whilst others are inexplicably higher. For example, missions ONUCI, UNAMA, UNFICYP, UNIOGBIS, UNMIT and UNSCO have one allegation reported against UN military and police personnel from 2015-2017 – it is highly unlikely that there was only one instance of SEA during this two-year period.\textsuperscript{128}

Lastly, interviews with experts in the field were conducted to discuss the peacekeeping reform and to aid in the analysis. Specifically, they were asked about the feasibility of peacekeeping, their views on different models, SEA flaws within the current system, the role of nationality in SEA, and how they hope to realistically change the field (see sample interview questions in Appendix 4).

\textsuperscript{127} Karim and Beardsley, “Explaining Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Missions,” 105.
\textsuperscript{128} These missions are based in the following countries: ONUCI – Cote d’Ivoire, UNAMA – Afghanistan, UNFICYP – Cyprus, UNMIT – East Timor, UNSCO – Middle East.
Findings

In order to determine which nationalities of uniformed personnel from TCCs are involved in most instances of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA), I examined the “Table of Allegations (2015 Onwards)” data available on the UN Misconduct Tracking System (MTS). This data specifies the date of an incident, mission, type of personnel (military, police and civilian), nationality and the result of actions taken against said allegation. This data, which includes nationality, is only provided from January 2015 onwards. For the purpose of this research, I have compiled the data from January 2015 to November 2017.

The data compiled from the MTS database was separated into two different datasets on Microsoft Excel. The first dataset is by the number of SEA reports received by the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS). From January 2015 to November 2017, a total of 238 “single reports” of SEA were filed. According to MTS, a single report of SEA is defined as the point in time in which a report is filed and “may relate to one or more alleged perpetrators, and may involve one or more victims.” After parsing through each report, a total of 399 individuals were identified as perpetrators of SEA. These 399 individuals comprise the second dataset, whereby data is sorted on STATA strictly by the number of individual uniformed personnel who have perpetrated SEA according to the category of personnel and then by nationality. Both of these datasets include civilians as alleged perpetrators; yet, civilian personnel’s nationality data is unavailable on MTS.

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129 This is outlined by the Secretary-General’s report on Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse (A/69/779).
131 It is unclear if this is a feature that is under construction or if the data has not yet been collected.
An initial comparison of the two datasets was conducted to determine which personnel type currently, as of 2015, is responsible for committing the most SEA. Personnel type – military, police or civilian – is a measurable variable on the nominal scale. It is apparent that military personnel, which includes military contingent members and military observers, accounts for the highest number of allegations of SEA, followed by civilian personnel and then finally police personnel, which includes UN Police and Formed Police Units from police-contributing countries (PCC). Figure 1 illustrates the number of single reports filled according to personnel type. Of the 238 reports filed, 30 reports or 12.61% were filed against police, 48 reports or 20.17% were filed against civilians and 160 reports or 67.23% were filed against military personnel. Figure 2 depicts the number of single individuals which are listed as alleged perpetrators in the reports. Of the 399 individuals involved in allegations, 47 or 11.78% were police, 53 or 13.28% were civilian and 299 or 74.94% were of military status. Both datasets suggest that SEA is present across all personnel types and that there is no significant difference between police and civilians’ total number of allegations.\footnote{Numbers have been rounded up by Microsoft Excel.}

The lack of discrepancy between PCC and civilian personnel is troubling as it suggests that there is no difference between police and civilians’ total number of allegations. Moreover, an increased number of reports are filed against civilian personnel, compared to police. Military
accounts for the majority of both reports and individuals at 67% and 75% respectively in *Figures 1* and 2. This means that TCCs are responsible for the majority of SEA perpetrated from the data available. This reiterates the importance of examining the variation in SEA within TCC and why this group in particular is responsible for a higher number of SEA.

Next, I examined the relationship between nationalities of uniformed personnel and SEA. Since MTS’s “Table of Allegations (2015 Onwards)” does not include the nationality of civilian personnel, all civilian data was excluded in the following analysis – only police and military personnel are included. *Appendix 1* notes how this change was accounted for in STATA.

The raw frequencies of SEA data were converted into percentages (see *Appendix 1A* and *1B*). This was completed for both datasets to determine which countries were responsible for having the most single reports filed against them and to determine which countries had the most individual allegations made against them.

According to *Figure 3*, Congo (DRC), South Africa, Congo (the), Morocco and Tanzania are the TCCs that have the highest percentage of single reports filed against them. In comparison, the top five TCCs with the highest percentage of individuals with SEA allegations

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133 Henceforth, PCC are grouped within TCC, unless otherwise stated, as they account for all uniformed personnel from contributing countries.  
134 Congo (DRC) refers to the Democratic Republic of Congo and Congo (the) refers to Republic of the Congo.
The top five nationalities perpetrating SEA, in both datasets, are incidentally not among the highest ranking TCCs to the UN. As of October 2017, there are a total of 125 TCCs that have collectively deployed 92,506 uniformed personnel. The leading contributing countries are listed in Table 1 and ranked accordingly from TCCs that deployed the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Reports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>8,409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>7,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>6,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>6,474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>6,276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>5,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>3,248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>3,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>2,737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2,692</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data for these charts can be seen in Appendix 2.

The three countries which have an overlap between the most single reports filed against them and most uniformed personnel implicated in SEA are Congo (DRC), Morocco and Tanzania. Congo (the) and South Africa are among the TCCs with the most single reports filed against them, whilst Gabon and Burundi have the most uniformed personnel as alleged perpetrators. Furthermore, Figure 3, in conjunction with Appendices 1A and 1B, shows that an increased number of single reports does not necessarily mean that the most uniformed personnel from that country perpetrated SEA. The converse is also true; a country can have a high number of individuals perpetrating SEA on UN peacekeeping missions, but it does not mean that there are a high number of corresponding single reports filed. For example, Gabon has 8 single reports filed against the country yet 33 uniformed military contingents were involved in perpetrating SEA. This means that more than one individual was involved in a single SEA report. Hence, Gabon is listed for having an abnormally high number of allegations against its uniformed personnel but not for number of single reports written against the country. It is important to consider this distinction.
most troops. To keep perspective, Ethiopia contributes the most uniformed personnel, which means that they only make up 9.09% of the overall UN armed forces. Indonesia, ranked tenth on the list, makes up 2.91% of the UN’s troops. As with the countries depicted in Figure 3, the ones listed in Table 1 are also considered developing countries according to the World Bank. It is significant to note that none of the seven countries illustrated in Figure 3 appear on the list of highest TCC. This can perhaps be attributed to the factors discussed in “Background Information: Troop- and Police- Contributing Countries” section, whereby it was mentioned that the UN entices Member States with a variety of benefits, including finances and elevation of status, in order to commit nations to provide troops. As such, on the basis of financial benefits alone, it is understandable to see more developing nations on the list of TCCs.

Although Congo (DRC), Morocco, Tanzania, Congo (the), South Africa, Gabon and Burundi are the countries that have the highest aggregate percentage of single reports and individual allegations made against them, further numerical analysis was conducted to determine if these seven countries are indeed the worst perpetrators in the dataset provided. In order to do so, the number of individual allegations must be compared to the number of troops that that specific nation contributed (see Appendix 3). By dividing the total number of allegations by the troops contributed, I was able to determine the rate of individual allegations per TCC. Table 2 summarizes the highest proportions of the number of allegations per TCCs, rounded to the nearest

| 1. Congo (DRC) | 3.714 |
| 2. Congo (the) | 0.135 |
| 3. Moldova | 0.125 |
| 4. Philippines | 0.083 |
| 5. Gabon | 0.074 |
| 6. Madagascar | 0.059 |
| 7. Burundi | 0.057 |
| 8. Canada | 0.048 |

Table 2: Rate of Allegation/TCC

thousandth. This is specifically for those with rates of 0.05 and above, which means that there is more than a 5% chance that SEA will occur by the TCCs listed. This table allowed for normalization of the data across missions and time (2015-2017), so as to not fall into the misperception of categorizing all developing countries as perpetrators.

Of the countries listed in all of the datasets (see Appendix 3), only two countries - Canada and Germany - are developed nations. One would expect that these countries would have lower rates and rank lower overall as the rest are all developing countries. Interestingly, Canada is listed as 8th and Germany as 34th, out of 41 nations in Appendix 3. In comparing the data from Figure 3 to that of Table 2, one can see that not all of the top five countries with the highest percentages of allegations or single reports made against them have just as high rates of allegations per TCC. This indicates that although Morocco, Tanzania and South Africa, might have higher raw numbers and percentages of allegations against them, in actuality they have fewer SEA for the number of troops that they contribute. For example, Morocco is responsible for 8.09% of all individual allegations of SEA, which is equal to 28 instances of SEA frequency. Morocco contributes 1,610 peacekeeping personnel. As such, the rate for Moroccan peacekeepers to commit SEA is 0.017, which ranks 12th on Appendix 3. Conversely, Canada accounts for fewer instances of allegations - three - but also supplies fewer troops - 62. This means that the proportion at which Canadian peacekeepers perpetrate SEA over Moroccan peacekeepers is at 0.048, which is almost three times as much. It is also important to note the outlier in Table 2 is Congo (DRC). The rate at which peacekeepers Congo (DRC) from the DRC perpetrate SEA is 3.7 times the number of personnel deployed, which means that one peacekeeper has the possibility of committing SEA 3.7 times. In this instance, Congo (DRC) contributed 7 peacekeeping personnel but had 26 individual allegations against them – there are
more allegations than there are peacekeepers contributed. This means that Congo (DRC) has many repeat offenders and that there is a sense of impunity, as these peacekeepers are able to perpetrate SEA more than once on different occasions without being held accountable for their actions.

The findings discussed above are quite shocking. The following chapter discusses the correlation between TCCs’ norms and SEA. This section will use indicators and interviews to help determine if there is a relationship between a TCCs’ gender norms and the peacekeepers committing SEA.

Analysis

This thesis ultimately examines whether peacekeepers externalize the norms that they have grown up with in their home countries. How can peacekeepers uphold certain rights, such as women’s rights, if they grew up in a country where that was not a part of the norm? How can peacekeepers effectively keep the peace and implement human rights if they themselves do not view the people they are supposed to protect as worth protecting? In order to answer these questions, the results from the previous section must be compared to various indicators that allow for a “better understanding of the foundational, fully internalized norms that peacekeepers bring with them” on peacekeeping missions.136

Gender indicators are used “for advocacy and can help make the case for action by highlighting key issues, backed up with statistics and other evidence.”137 They can hold institutions, in this case countries, accountable for their commitment to upholding human rights. Most importantly, gender indicators make the gaps between commitments that governments have

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made and the actual reality of what takes place visible. These gender indicators will in turn allow researchers to detect whether there is a correlation between TCCs’ (nationality) norms and sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA). The previous section determined that a positive relationship between TCCs perpetrating the most SEA via military contingents exists. The other components of data analysis showed that the rates present for the perpetration of SEA are quite startling, with both developed and developing countries on the list. The gender indicators will now allow for an analysis to take place to determine if TCCs with lower gender equality indices correlate to higher SEA perpetration. Correlation does not mean causation.

The indicators utilized are as follows:

- **Gender Inequality Index (GII)** – is computed for 159 countries using information from the UN and the association-sensitive inequality measure. It measures gender inequalities in three aspects of human development: reproductive health, empowerment, and economic status. The GII is one of the better tools, compared to the Human Development Index (HDI), to “to better expose differences in the distribution of achievements between women and men.”

- **Gender Development Index (GDI)** – provided by the UN and measures gender disparities in health, knowledge and living standards. Countries are grouped according to gender parity to show how much “how much women are lagging behind their male counterparts and how much women need to catch up within each dimension of human development.”

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138 Ibid.
139 United Nations Development Programme, “Gender Inequality Index (GII) & Gender Development Index (GDI),” *UNDP Human Development Reports*, 2016. According to the UNDP, the latest data for both GII and GDI are from 2015. The data sets show an average of period estimates for 2010-2015 and projections for 2015-2020.
Women, Peace and Security Index (WPS) - launched by Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security and the Peace Research Institute of Oslo to measure “women’s well-being by assessing their inclusion, justice and security in a single number and ranking.”

In addition to employing GII, GDI and WPS, TCCs domestic laws regarding female representation and empowerment, sexual violence, domestic violence and abuse will be examined in order to determine the norms surrounding sexual and gender-based violence. These norms will be telling of the overall mindset of peacekeeping personnel from said country. The countries being examined are the ones with the highest rates of perpetrating SEA from Table 2.

Table 3: Gender Indicators for Highest Rates of SEA Allegations Per TCC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Rate of Allegations Per TCC (&lt;Table 2 data&gt;)</th>
<th>Gender Inequality Index (GII) Rank</th>
<th>Gender Development Index (GDI) Rank</th>
<th>Women, Peace and Security Index (WPS) Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congo (DRC)</td>
<td>3.714</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo (the)</td>
<td>0.135</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>N/A*</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Madagascar is missing indicator data and as a result was not ranked.

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Table 3 represents all of the rankings that correspond with GII, GDI and WPS for the TCCs with highest rates of individual SEA allegations. A higher ranking means that the index gap between males and females is large; the lower the ranking the better the country is doing according to that measure.

It is expected that the more developed a nation, gender indicators will show a smaller equality gap between men and women and that that TCC will have a lower ranking. As expected, Canada has low rankings across all three indices. In fact, Canada is tied with the United States for 10th in GDI ranking. This means that there is a greater equality among males and females in health, knowledge and living standards. Moldova and the Philippines had somewhat average rankings, whilst Congo (DRC), Congo (the), Gabon and Madagascar had much higher rankings, which means that they fared worse across the indices. A high ranking indicates more inequality along GII, GDI and WPS factors. According to these rankings alone for the eight countries, women fare the worst in Congo (DRC) in two of the three indices across the board. These rankings alone are not enough to determine TCCs’ societal norms. This is because it is difficult to determine how women are treated overall in comparison to the other countries. There is a lack of consistency across the indicators. For example, Gabon had relatively average rankings across GII, GDI and WPS in comparison to the other seven countries but there is no way to clearly determine if its gender equality correlates to its SEA. Only Congo (DRC) and Congo (the) seem to indicate that their high GII, GDI and WPS scores are related to high SEA scores – this is only because their rankings are consistent. However, due to sample size of the dataset used, causation cannot be determined; correlation is weak at best, as these results cannot be generalized by the rest of the TCC data points.
In fact, there are TCCs who scored higher inequality scores than Congo (DRC) and are not listed as alleged SEA perpetrators in the dataset. For example, both Yemen and Côte d’Ivoire scored higher than Congo (DRC) on the GII – this means that there is a larger inequality gap between men and women – and contributed peacekeeping personnel but neither country was listed as an alleged perpetrator of SEA. Therefore, this asks the question as to why these individuals are not on the list of alleged perpetrators. Theoretically, if they are deployed from TCCs that do not value gender equality, they should have higher rates of SEA. Yet, that is not true.

Interviews with individuals who are members of human rights organizations working in the area of sexual violence against women and who are considered experts in the field were conducted; this was completed in order to further investigate the rate of allegations per TCC.\textsuperscript{143} The indices, although helpful in examining gender gaps and proving their existence, need to be supported by interviews from experts in the field.

Subject #1, who is a member of a human rights organization based in Boston working in this area, echoed Stephen Moncrief’s work.\textsuperscript{144} She stressed the negative impacts of soldiers being socialized in sexually violent militaries. This in conjunction with soldiers’ deeply internalized norms of sexual violence in their home countries and the peacekeeping mission itself can breed a SEA prone environment.\textsuperscript{145} Subject #1 noted that “even though learning is layered in nature, there are key factors that can be pinpointed to help explain high levels SEA.” The first layer “is gender socialization and that tends to occur during the primary socialization phase,” she relayed. Subject #1 emphasized that, “parents are responsible not only for influencing their own child’s

\textsuperscript{143} Due to the content of these interviews most subjects chose to be anonymous. In order to keep all interviews distinguishable in regards to who said what, each interviewee has been labelled a corresponding subject number, so as to avoid confusion.


\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., 715-716.
gender development but also introducing their child to societal gender norms; parents show children what is acceptable behavior towards the opposite sex.” It is believed that the “strongest influence on gender role development seems to occur within the family setting, with parents passing on, both overtly and covertly, their own beliefs about gender.” 146 These lessons are then reinforced by a child’s peers, schooling, and societal experiences. 147 Therefore, it can be deduced that parents are more likely to teach their children the norms they themselves have been indoctrinated with; few will deviate from the current gender equality climate of said country. According to Subject #1, gender socialization is an important factor that can help explain why TCCs with gender inequality issues result in soldiers more likely to commit SEA. However, it is not the only factor.

As Subject #1 has worked with individuals who have completed field work in Kenya and the DRC, she has found that the social ideals about masculinity and gender roles coupled together help explain high levels of SEA. Subject #1 expressed that there is a strong desire for men to “achieve the social expectations for masculinity.” Social norms that emphasize masculinity in turn place an expectation on men to “have a high sex drive, to obtain multiple partners, to bestow gifts in exchange for sex, to be financial capable of purchasing one or multiple wives, and having the physical, economic, and social power to protect their wives from other men.” 148 The high level of masculinity that men must perform at is a double-edged sword for society. This phenomenon is best described in Sara Meger’s work whereby she states that the motivating “factor for most individuals [to commit SEA] was the anxiety to fulfil [said] social

147 Ibid., 253.
expectations” yet even in perpetrating sexual violence to assert male dominance, men are still unable to attain the masculinity they strive to achieve.149

From the above interview, it became apparent that a cross-country analysis of TCC’s legal framework is necessary in order to better understand the norms surrounding SEA against women. Table 4 below summarizes key legal frameworks that address violence against women, the criminalization of spousal rape and the share of women in parliament. Table 4 is followed by more interviews from individuals in the field giving their opinions on the results and providing potential explanatory variables.

Table 4: Cross-Country Analysis of Legal Framework and Female Involvement in Society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal Framework</th>
<th>Congo (DRC)</th>
<th>Congo (the)</th>
<th>Moldova</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
<th>Gabon</th>
<th>Madagascar</th>
<th>Burundi</th>
<th>Canada</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rome Statute</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRWC</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminalization of Spousal Rape</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No¹⁵¹</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laws Against Sexual Harassment</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of Women in Parliament (%) 1997</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of Women in Parliament (%) 2011</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A quick glance at Table 4 indicates major lack of gender inequality in the aforementioned countries. In fact, on paper, it seems as if the top perpetrators of SEA have the appropriate laws and regulations in place to prohibit these crimes. Even with the existence of these laws, these eight countries remain with the highest rates of allegation per TCC. All eight countries have signed and ratified the CRC and CEDAW, yet half of them do not criminalize spousal rape. This is ironic as CEDAW provides protection against sexual and gender-based violence. CEDAW is considered the “world's primary legal document on women's equality, that reflects the consensus


¹⁵¹ Rape and domestic violence are prohibited. Spousal rape is not addressed within its Constitution or other laws.
of the international community on the specific protections and actions states are obliged to take to ensure equality between men and women.”

For example, in the DRC’s domestic sphere, 50% of women have experienced sexual violence. In these instances, the women’s abusers are their husbands. Marital rape is not criminalized in the DRC; it is considered a husband’s right. If a woman were to press charges or want to go to court, DRC’s Family Code stipulates that a woman must obtain her husband’s permission to access judicial institutions and is not technically a “prosecutable offense,” as customs do not recognize domestic rape as different from sexual and/or romantic relations.

Since the DRC has ratified CEDAW, the country should actively be working to incorporate the Convention’s articles into its own domestic laws and regulations, as it is legally bound to do so. Similar to the DRC, the Republic of Congo has received reports from CEDAW monitoring bodies indicating that there is an absence of legislation pertaining to violence against women. Local NGOs APC and Azur Developpement feel that “the government's work has been insufficient in educating citizens and public servants with respect to human rights, prevention of violence and the treatment of victims, and the response from legal and health sectors is insufficient.” Thus, this raises a few more questions: why and where is the disconnect between the perpetration of crimes and laws in host countries? What other variables are responsible for perpetrating this issue?

According to interviewee Subject #2, the disconnect that exists is “largely due in part to the lack of legal implementation.” Subject #2’s expertise is in examining global policies and institutions. She expressed that even though all of the countries listed in Table 2 have ratified

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153 Ibid.


some sort of human rights framework, they seldom work to implement the treaty. Countries must create legislation that incorporates the articles from the Convention ratified. Nations must also take responsibility for regularly reporting to various UN human rights bodies because failure to do so results in violation of the terms of the treaty. Technically, that “country will be in breach of international law.”156 The reason for treaty ratification is often due to international pressure; countries maintain political, social and economic status when upholding treaties and display a pro international human rights gesture.

Furthermore, according to Subject #2, failure to ratify treaties can result in “limited international influence, loss in stature and loss in credibility.” She further noted that, even though failure to uphold treaties places a country in violation of international law, there is little that is realistically done to serve as a deterrence. Subject #2 said that “treaties rarely have the effect that they are intended to have.” For example, the Republic of Congo passed Law No.71 in April 2016 to be in accordance with CEDAW. Law No.71 states that “women and men must each make up a minimum of 40% of every political party’s candidates and of cabinet nominees.”157 This law also amends other national laws to prohibit sexist language and images in the media, establish a Gender Equality Coordination Group and expand the responsibilities of local public authorities on gender equality.158 Similarly, Burundi’s government passed a new law against gender-based violence in September 2016. This law promotes equal rights to education, inheritance and equal rights between spouses to family property. Critics note that this new law seems promising but fails to adequately address victims; no services, such as medical checkups, psychological evaluations, and compensation, are provided to victims. The UN High Commissioner for Human

158 Ibid.
Rights in Burundi, Patrice Vahard, described some articles within the new law as “very progressive” for the nation. These are both instances where TCCs are actively working to implement international human rights treaties, yet, both of these countries fared poorly according to gender equality indices and have some of the highest rates of SEA perpetration. Subject #2 is skeptical of these new laws and is unsure if the new “integration of international human rights treaties is serving ulterior motives.”

Table 4 also illustrates another interesting concept – an upward trend of female representation in Parliament. Gender balancing in government is becoming more mainstream. According to Dr. Sabrina Karim, a Cornell Assistant Professor specializing in security sector reform, peacekeeping, and gender, gender balancing is a part of the culture. She believes that peacekeeping can be molded because “culture is not a static thing. It can definitely be changed and shaped and it’s just a matter of: 1) taking the time and 2) figuring out ways to chip away at the culture.” For example, Canada has a Prime Minister who has openly declared himself a feminist and assembled a governmental cabinet with an equal number of male and female ministers. In the Philippines, Filipino women are also heavily involved in these Parliamentary processes by regional standards, 30% are in the House of Representatives and 25% are in the Senate. Of the country cases listed, Gabonese women have the lowest percentage of Parliament Seats and often do not have a spot at the table. They are strictly viewed as their husband’s property. Gender balancing is slow to take place but it does eventually happen.

In an interview with Subject #3, lack of stability was noted as a major factor for the continued allowance of rape to occur. In fact, Subject #3 said that “constant armed conflict has

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placed the DRC in a precarious position. Women, in particular, are facing rape in both the public and private spheres. If laws are not upheld and a stronger stance on rape is not taken, nothing will change.” According to Human Rights Watch, there have been “horrific levels of rape” with “tens of thousands of women, girls, men and boys... who have been abused.” Women living in rural areas are much more susceptible to being attacked “than women in urban areas because they are less informed about their rights and are isolated from security services.” Similarly, Burundi has also seen its share of conflict. From 1994-2006, Burundi was plagued with a civil war. Post-civil war, changes were made to start a greater inclusion of women and girls in society. Women entered paid work and international NGOs formed “partnerships with local groups to create an inter-agency referral system, enabling victims to benefit from medical, legal and psychosocial assistance.” However, in 2015, unconstitutional political bids for Presidency led to mass protests and over 400,000 Burundians fleeing the country. Reports of systematic rape and torture have once again emerged. Countries that are experiencing war and/or internal conflict are more prone to seeing women in a negative light and tools of warfare, as opposed to human beings. As such, the findings exhibited in the “Results” section is not at all shocking to Subject #3. In fact, finding troops committing SEA if they are being deployed from current conflicts in their own home countries where rape is nothing more than tactical warfare is to be expected. This can partially explain the high rates of SEA from Table 2’s TCCs.

However, armed conflict and gender inequality in TCC seem to only partially explain the problem. In speaking with Sabrina Karim, underreporting and lack of prosecutions serve as both...
constraining factors and explanatory variables for the results achieved in the previous section. There have been vast improvements in how allegations are handled and how survivors are treated but it is “still incredibly difficult for any prosecution to occur in home countries…we don’t see those prosecutions,” Karim said. Furthermore, “even though survivors are treated better, it is difficult to report in the first place and [can be daunting to] go up against UN systems,” she expressed. In her peacekeeping research and fieldwork, Karim noted that peacekeepers “do get training on SEA and there are posters everywhere. It’s drilled into them and talked about a lot.”

In an email exchange with Subject #4, an individual working at Public Affairs Section at the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support (DPKO/DFS), it was relayed that “key improvements in [the DPKO/DFS’s] prevention, response and follow-up effort [have been put into effect] to ensure accountability, in active partnership with the Member States.” This individual noted that DFS “provides troop- and police-contributing countries with training materials on conduct and discipline for their pre-deployment training…and a SEA e-learning programme has been developed.” It was stressed that it is the TCC’s responsibility to certify that they “delivered pre-deployment training on the prohibition of SEA to all uniformed personnel as part of the deployment requirements.” Furthermore, a no excuse card (see Appendix 5) “available in six languages is being distributed to be carried by all personnel deployed in the field to ensure all personnel will abide to the codes and conduct of the United Nations.” This individual declined to comment on TCC specific data. However, it can be surmised that similar to the TCCs ratifying international human rights framework, the UN has the mechanisms in place that allow them to vocalize that they have protocols. Whether these protocols are followed is an entirely different situation.
It seems as if SEA is heavily talked about and peacekeepers are made aware of the consequences and severity of their actions. Karim further pushed the difficulty in distinguishing between talk and enforcement in her interview. She suggested that people in leadership positions can change the culture through a trickle down effect and further that, “[understanding] gender equality [should be made] an important factor in considering those selected for leadership positions.”

Subject #3, Subject #4 and Karim agree that the UN has and follows a thorough investigative protocol in place. Subject #4, the individual at DPKO/DFS, pointed out that in 2015, a new 6-month timeline for investigation of cases, regardless of peacekeeper repatriation has been put into place. After the UN completes their investigation, they hand their information to the TCC responsible for the alleged perpetrator. It is then the country’s responsibility to decide to engage in the investigation. However, Karim has seen TCCs “either stall, not go through with the investigation or start the investigation from scratch and re-interview victims and it just doesn’t end up going anywhere; I’ve seen it happen a number of times.” The DPKO/DFS’s responses were quite straight forward in listing protocol but when confronted with the notion of what happens in situations such as Congo (DRC), where the rates states that the TCC’s peacekeepers are 3.7 times more likely to commit SEA, Subject #4 noted that the UN is creating a “repository of national laws of Member States and a call for states to assess their existing national legislations.” However, this once again places the burden on countries to modify existing legislation regarding sexual violence – this has proved futile in the past given the lack of inclusion of CEDAW articles in domestic law, for example. It also is another example that shows a disconnect between legislation and practice in developing countries. The second more useful

166 This is detailed in Diagram 1: “SEA Infographic” Management of Reports and Allegations Involving UN Personnel In Peacekeeping and Special Political Missions.
change taking place that Subject #4 spoke about was “promotion of criminal accountability by requesting Member States to establish on-site court martial proceedings.” So far, only three TCCs have conducted such proceedings, none of which are listed in Table 2.

Perhaps countries need to be held more accountable to following up on UN cases given to them. This can potentially be done by having the TCCs treat UN cases as legal cases – failure to prosecute should have direct consequences that are perhaps financial in nature. Furthermore, sanctions, or perhaps fines paid by individual peacekeepers, should be put in place to act as a deterrent.

This analysis helps show that home cultures that fail to respect women are a part of the problem and they help normalize SEA. All of these countries have either signed or ratified crucial international human rights framework, but it seems that they are seldom implemented. How does the UN implement these human rights if countries’ governments are not willing to go beyond signing and ratification? Perhaps ‘naming and shaming’ is a move that the UN has to more strongly consider in order to hold these TCCs accountable to improving gender equality. Perhaps it is only once this occurs that peacekeeping personnel will be able to undergo a norm shift.

The importance of this research shifts the analytical focus to the broader relations of gender equality in TCC. This is important as it begins to highlight potential variables for variation in TCCs and calls for consideration as to why this is. Interviews with experts in the field have also yielded potential explanatory factors of underreporting, economic sanctions and legal prosecutions, or lack of, as to why SEA, is high within certain TCCs. Furthermore, this research is important because it shows a shift in the UN’s mentality. In 2015, the United States delegation pushed for more transparency of who the perpetrators are – this led to the creation of
the database that was used to analyze the data. However, this new naming and shaming tactic that the UN has taken on does not take into consideration that the countries being shamed are also higher contributors. As such, this is why all of these countries were turned into rates in the “Data” section. In fact, it seems that it is more significant to see a low contributing country with a higher rate. According to Karim, this research is vital and one must make sure “we are not stereotyping countries or shaming countries based on numbers; it is important to be careful in how we are looking at the data.”

Canada seems like an outlier at first in the dataset but perhaps it is just as important that a developed nation is on the list. A rate of 0.048 means that from the data provided, Canada’s military and police have a 5% probability of committing SEA. This is high, but it shows that SEA is not only a problem plaguing TCCs that are underdeveloped. Even more shocking is the rate at which peacekeepers Congo (DRC) from the DRC perpetrate SEA; one DRC peacekeeper has the possibility of committing SEA 3.7 times. SEA truly is a pervasive issue that most likely affects every nationality from every TCC deployed, regardless of if there are single reports or individual allegations filed.

However, it must be stated that based on the limited data sample, the relationship between SEA and societal norms in TCC does not have statistical significance. It is possible that the region in which DRC soldiers were in had higher rates of reporting or that soldiers from developed nations were more easily able to pay off their victims. Since the data is relatively new, dating back to 2015, there is not enough longevity for it to be conclusive, nor can it point to a specific variable. Yet, there is a relationship between nationality, gender inequality and SEA, as exhibited in Table 2 that is being explored for the first time; TCCs with high inequality rates, with the exception of Germany and Canada, are correlated to higher rates of SEA. Causation
cannot yet be determined. There is not enough consistent support to lend high rates of SEA to one variable or even a group of variables. As more data becomes available, it would be useful to be able to compare TCCs with high inequality rates but no SEA violations. This would allow for there to be much clearer indicators to determine the strength level of correlation between the variables.

In this sense, these peacekeepers that have grown up with gender inequality as the norm have most likely, up until now, not had to think twice about their actions and how it affects women. In some of the countries mentioned above, where domestic violence is illegal yet authorities allow issues to continue, peacekeepers may think that the UN functions in a similar manner, regardless of their training. The reason for this is simple; this is because life in their TCCs is all that they have ever known, so why would women’s rights operate differently in other countries?\textsuperscript{167} The environment of impunity that thrives within the UN only further affirms to TCCs’ peacekeepers that their norms are accepted and that SEA is able to be.

**Conclusion**

The findings of this thesis show that there is a relationship between nationality/troop contributing countries (TCC) and SEA; gender inequality in TCC home countries is inconclusive as the explanatory variable. That does not mean that gender inequality, underreporting and lack of prosecutions do not explain some of the variation in SEA. It was also found that TCCs are responsible for the majority of SEA perpetrated from the data available, in comparison to civilian personnel. Furthermore, the proportions that were determined in *Table 2* indicate further research is warranted. However, given the lack of data, causation between the data cannot be proven and

\textsuperscript{167} Paraphrasing interviewee Subject #3.
it is not statistically significant to generalize further than what is discussed within this thesis’s “Findings” and “Analysis” sections.

The lack of systematic data on SEA, the short time frame of nationality record keeping and issues with underreporting have presented significant challenges in studying SEA. However, this is a valuable start with the data available, as it starts to discuss important issues of which nationalities are perpetrators and whether or not there are alarming trends, from the data available. SEA is often unreported and whistle-blowers are shunned. This is only the start of the “naming and shaming” era to hold TCCs accountable for their peacekeepers’ actions. Potential negative side effects could include TCCs choosing not to commit troops but hopefully, in order to uphold international peacekeeping standards and promote global partnership, TCCs will see that preventing SEA should be an agenda item. Due to the lack of data, it is possible that the data reported is the “tip of the iceberg.” However, this research’s importance should not be nullified due to too few data points, as the findings are still alarming for the datum available.

The ever present question of closing the gap between TCC societal norms and peacekeeper SEA behavior variation still exists. Although this research did not intend to evaluate reform, there are a few ideas that came up during my research. Firstly, there needs to be better inclusion of women in peacekeeping. Women’s participation in peacekeeping has allowed for a “greater credibility of the forces, more effective protection efforts, higher reporting of gender-based crimes and lower incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers.” This is echoed by scholars who have signaled that female peacekeepers joining the forces is one of the primary solutions for combatting SEA. The literature that exists surrounding gender and conflict speaks to the male dominated realm of international politics and the systematic

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168 Nordas and Rustad, 530.
170 UN Women, “In Brief: Peace and Security.”
masculine constructions that have overpowered women’s voices and experiences with matters of peace, war and violence. Conversely, feminist scholars have argued against the UN’s conclusions that “increasing the numbers of women does not necessarily translate into better outcomes.” However, it is an effort worth pursuing. Perhaps a leader with high gender equality norms, as Sabrina Karim said, can help change current peacekeeping culture via a trickle-down effect.

Secondly, gender roles in TCCs need to be improved. Perhaps recruitment should only take place from countries that have scored high on equality indices or that have certain basic legal infrastructure to hold personnel accountable for their actions should they need to be prosecuted. According to the gender indices discussed in the “Analysis” section, a woman’s status differs drastically from her neighboring countries. This means that “regional high performers could be benchmarks for their neighbors, revealing a standard that surrounding countries could feasibly reach.” This is promising, as the “Analysis” section discussed, that countries within the past year are starting to employ better gender-aware laws. Furthermore, TCCs tend to be mostly developing countries who are paid per soldier per month; the decision of how much to pay peacekeepers is strictly on TCCs. Perhaps, economic sanctions or fines will help TCCs work in partnership with the UN to curb and eventually end SEA. Thirdly, there needs to be stricter regulation of a zero-tolerance policy. Most member states have signed international agreements to uphold women’s rights and to prevent SEA, yet few follow through on actions. International examples need to be made and perhaps jurisdiction changes as to who oversees judicial processes should be entertained, in order to make legal conventions realities.

171 This theme is presented in both Karim and Beardsley’s 2013 article and Higate and Henry’s 2004 article.
172 Karim and Beardsley, “Female Peacekeepers and Gender Balancing: Token Gestures or Informed Policymaking?” 465.
To conclude, it is possible that peacekeepers externalize the norms that they have grown accustomed to in their home countries. However, it cannot be generalized for all countries nor can causation be established. Even though the DRC, Republic of Congo, Moldova, Philippines, Gabon, Madagascar, Burundi and Canada, were found to be substantially responsible for higher rates of SEA than other TCCs, exact causes for variation are unclear. Further, all of the countries listed have put forth some efforts towards bettering gender equality and women’s rights prioritization. It will be interesting to see, as more data is collected, whether generalizations regarding specific TCCs can be made and then whether it is possible to change from one’s conditioned home country norms to the UN’s international human rights framework. If these issues become realities, it will raise peacekeeping questions as to whether or not the UN will employ personnel from certain TCCs. More micro-level data needs to be collected, in order to fully understand individual perpetrators and to determine if there are generalizations that can be made.
Appendices

Data for *Figure 1* from Stata:

```
.tab personnel

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>20.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
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Data for *Figure 2* from Stata:

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Appendix 1: A new variable ‘nwoc’ was created to denote that tabulations and codebooks are looking at nationalities without civilian data. It has been named nwoc1 in the single reports and nwoc2 in the individual allegations for easy differentiation between the two. This explains the frequency total changes from those discussed in Figures 1 and 2.

Appendix 1A: Frequency of Nationalities by Single Reports

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Total | 190 | 100.00 |
## Appendix 1B: Frequency of Nationality by Individual Allegations

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**Total**: 346 100.00
Appendix 2: Data for Figure 3: Comparison Between TCCs with Highest Percentage of Reports Filled Against Them and Individuals Perpetrating SEA

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Appendix 3: Shows how I arrived at the rates in Table 2 (the number of individual allegations must be compared to the number of troops that that specific nation contributed)

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Appendix 4: Sample Interview Questions – these were guiding questions. Interviews served more as conversations and I did not bind myself to only these questions.

- What do you believe is the UN’s position on sexual exploitation and abuse within peacekeeping?
- What do you think makes SEA a prevalent issue?
- How do you see changing this attitude? Or is it simply a part of the culture now?
- What role do Troop Contributing Countries play in dealing with SEA?
- What is the stance of the UN and gender balancing in practice compared to stated policy?
  - Purpose of UN mandates in actuality? How do we make sure the peacekeepers on the ground understand stated policy?
  - Why is there a disconnect between host country’s gender inequality norms and peacekeepers committing SEA? Factors that could be responsible for this?
- How can peacekeepers be better held accountable?
- Do you think that it is possible to change the socialization of UN peacekeepers in their home countries so that they do NOT perpetrate violence when they go abroad as part of a peacekeeping mission?
- Is it more a country’s norms or other factors that contribute to soldiers committing SEA abroad? If other factors, what factors affect SEA in African countries?
- What is _______ or the UN doing to combat this? Do you think it is enough or that more needs to be done?
Appendix 5: “No Excuses” Card that soldiers must carry with them

Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

KNOW THE RULES: THERE IS NO EXCUSE!

1. At all times we must treat the local population with respect and dignity.
2. Sexual exploitation and abuse is unacceptable behaviour and prohibited conduct for all United Nations and affiliated personnel.
3. Sexual exploitation and abuse threatens the lives of people that we are to serve and protect.

NO EXCUSE + ZERO TOLERANCE

END SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE

Every person under the United Nations flag must comply with the following prohibitions:

It is strictly prohibited to:

1. Have any sexual activity with anyone under the age of 18 years (regardless of the age of majority or age of consent locally or in my home country).
2. Engage in any other form of sexually humiliating, degrading or exploitative behaviour.
3. Have sex with anyone in exchange for money, employment, preferential treatment, goods or services, whether or not prostitution is legal in my country or the host country.
4. Fail to respond or report misconduct.

It is strictly prohibited to:

2. Fail to report any act of sexual exploitation and abuse.
3. Take all reasonable measures to stop the misconduct and report the incident immediately to my commander or manager.

Reporting in the Duty Station

SILENCE IS NO EXCUSE!

If you have knowledge of sexual exploitation and abuse, you must report it to one of the following:

1. The Commander or manager of your unit
2. The Mission Conduct and Discipline Team

VICTIM ASSISTANCE:

1. All victims of sexual exploitation and abuse are entitled to safe and confidential assistance.
2. If the victim is a child, special considerations for the protection and support to the child are needed.
3. Treat the victim with respect and dignity, and direct or assist the victim for support to the nearest UN office, the Conduct and Discipline Team, or the RED Unit.
4. Where immediate medical assistance is needed, refer the victim to the nearest medical centre.

It is strictly prohibited to engage in any act of sexual exploitation and abuse.
Bibliography


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