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FACTIONAL POLITICS AND CREDIT NETWORKS IN REVOLUTIONARY VERMONT

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Abstract

Studies of state formation tend to emphasize the demise of localism through centralization. This article specifies empirically the social structural conditions that strengthen localism under state formation. The historical case is the creation of Vermont during the Revolutionary War and the local factionalism it involved. Probate records are used to reconstruct credit networks that provided the relational foundation for localism and factional identities. The evidence demonstrates that network segregation between factional regions intensified over time, and was supported by strong cohesion within these regions. Local brokers who forged cohesion within factions consistently attained important political offices while mediators between opposing factions increasingly failed to obtain offices. This structural process coincided with the shift of Vermont's domestic politics into national level conflicts between Federalists and Jeffersonians. Within this escalation local and national factions crystallized around equivalent pairs of binary categorical oppositions. The evocation of national politics directly resonated with local lines of conflict, and reinforced factional identities and localism.

Keywords: Collective Identity, Networks, Factionalism, State Formation

Factional Politics and Credit Networks in Revolutionary Vermont

“Instant credit in the straight world / Leaving money when you die
Lots of credit in the real world / gets you high”
—Young Marble Giants

INTRODUCTION

Studies of state building in various places and times have repeatedly argued that centralization is the essence of state making. Centralization in turn is directed against localism, and it is the eventual demise of localism that concludes successful state formation. Alexis de Tocqueville furnished the master story for this perspective. As he observed in France, "until almost the end of the seventeenth century some towns were still to all intents and purposes small democratic republics, their officials being elected by the townsfolk and answerable to them alone. In short, there was an active municipal life in which all took part" (1983: 41). This state of affairs changed radically with centralization under the absolutist régime as "the government took a hand in all local affairs, even the most trivial. Nothing could be done without consulting the central authority, which had decided views on everything. [...] Under the old régime, as nowadays, there was in France no township, borough, village, or hamlet, however small, no hospital factory, convent, or college which had a right to manage its own affairs as it thought fit or to administer its possessions without interference. Then, as today, the central power held all Frenchmen in tutelage" (1983: 46, 51).

In this article, I specify empirically the social structural conditions that strengthen localism under state formation. The historical example is the creation of Vermont during the Revolutionary War. I show how local identities that gave rise to factional politics within Vermont were grounded in concrete social networks that were seemingly unrelated to political interests. Studies of modern state building tend to focus on the vertical relation between national state builders and defenders of localism. Instead, I focus on the horizontal ties between rival political factions at the local level and their subsequent embedding into national level politics (Barth 1965; Leach 1964). In particular, I reconstruct credit networks among eighteenth century Vermonters from archival probate records. The prevalent use of credit notes and book accounts, due to an insufficient money supply, gave rise to an emergent credit network. Thus, the reasons for the existence of this credit network and the incentives driving credit exchange were exogenous to the political conflicts within Vermont. The evidence from these data demonstrates that state making in Vermont was a localist enterprise that rested on shifting alliances among political factions attached to their regional bases. Increasing segregation between competing localist factions coincided with the shift of Vermont politics into conflicts at the national level.

The creation of Vermont was the outcome of a dual rebellion against both New York and Great Britain. In 1777, representatives of separatist Vermont towns drafted their own constitution and declared their independence from New York (Onuf 1983; Williamson 1949). Despite active participation of most Vermonters in the revolutionary war against Britain, New York and the Continental Congress refused to recognize Vermont's existence until 1791, when it became the fourteenth state of the Union. Even within the new state, the claim to independence and the authority of the state's founders were contested between fiercely opposed political factions. In the absence of a collective identity, Vermonters reverted to their localist identities. Unlike the original thirteen states, revolutionary Vermont lacked a political community. Instead of relying on a colonial past, Vermont's separatists had to invent one. In the nascent American nation, Vermont thus became the yardstick for the establishment of new states along the western and northern frontier that followed its lead.

This study draws on and extends the growing body of research on the social relational foundations of identity in historical contexts (Bearman 1993; Calhoun 1982; Gould 1995, 1996; Padgett and Ansell 1993). The important insight of these studies is that meaning stems from the patterns of social structures that actors are embedded in. In this view, collective identities arise when

actors realize that they share similar positions in relation to others in concrete social networks. Abstract categorical differences such as Religion or Ethnicity are the signals actors employ to give meaning to their shared location in social structure rather than the foundation of their collective identities. Here, I focus on networks of credit exchanges as the structural basis for localist identities that were articulated in terms of political, religious and regional factions.

The central finding of this study is that localism was strengthened precisely at the time when Vermont's political conflicts were shifted into the higher level of national politics and cast in terms of Hamiltonian Federalism versus Jeffersonian Republicanism. Thus, the emergence of the United States as a nation did not erode localist identities within Vermont but rather strengthened them. Indeed, as historian Peter Onuf observed, "nowhere in America did local communities become so thoroughly accustomed to such a high degree of political self-determination" (1983:142).

The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The next section offers a brief account of the historical context and extant historical interpretations. In the third part, I discuss existing approaches to factionalism and state building to derive the theoretical model for the empirical analysis. The fourth section describes the sources and structure of the data utilized and the measurement of variables. The fifth part examines correlates of early factional alignment. In the sixth section, I focus on shifting patterns in the structure of credit exchanges over time. This is followed by the identification of individual positions of brokerage in the credit network and their link to changing patterns of office holding over time. The central finding of increasing localism over time is then related to the rise of national politics in Vermont.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The thirteen original American states claimed their authority and legitimacy on the basis of three principles: the natural right of a sovereign people to self-government; territorial integrity as successor states to the British colonies; and mutual recognition among all thirteen states (Onuf 1983; Slaughter 1986). Vermont's early leaders rested their claim on the natural right principle, but they failed to secure the recognition of the other American states until 1791 when Vermont was finally accepted into the Union as the fourteenth state. The founders of the new state also failed to invoke a political identity as Vermonters among its own populace. In the absence of legitimate authority and a unified political community, deep cleavages between local factions prevailed.

Vermont's factional conflicts were rooted partly in a land controversy. Titles to lands west of the Green Mountains that New Hampshire's governor had sold to New England settlers often overlapped with titles held by New York proprietors. Inevitably, conflicts between supporters of New York authority and those who favored New Hampshire ensued. When New York proprietors and authorities sought eviction by force confrontations escalated towards collective violence. The Grants settlers banded together as the so-called Green Mountain Boys in an armed insurgency against New York. By 1777, Vermont's western leaders, including the state's first governor Thomas Chittenden and the brothers Ira and Ethan Allen, also known in New York as the "Bennington Mob" or the "Arlington Junto", had gathered enough support throughout the Grants. At the second convention of town representatives in Westminster, they declared Vermont's independence from both revolutionary New York and Great Britain (Bellesiles 1993; Jellison 1969; Jones 1939; O'Callaghan 1851, vol. IV; Williamson 1949).

Support for the independence movement and the Chittenden-Allen faction was greatest in the western half of the new state. Many settlers in this region shared the interests of the Chittenden-Allen government in securing their New Hampshire land titles and engaging in trade with British Canada (Jones 1939; Taylor 1995; Williamson 1949). In the eastern Connecticut Valley, however, supporters of New York continued to oppose Vermont, and especially the Chittenden-Allen faction in open rebellion well into the 1780s. Yorkers who had their stronghold in southeastern Cumberland County (Windham County under Vermont) were encouraged in their opposition by the state of New York whose government continued to appoint public and military offices in the county. Southeastern Yorkers clashed in increasingly violent confrontations with the state militia of Vermont until their military resistance was quelled by 1784. Although most Yorkers supported the Revolution, western leaders tried to equate opposition to Vermont with loyalism to the British (Bellesiles 1993; Walton

1875, vol. III: 302-14). Loyalty in the northeastern Coos Country around the town of Newbury, which bordered on New Hampshire, was wavering as well. Their political leader, the conservative revolutionary Jacob Bayley, favored alignment with New Hampshire or New York should these states respond to the wish for more representation of the northeastern backcountry. Above all, Bayley resented the political dominance of the western Chittenden-Allen and Bennington factions in the new state of Vermont, and only grudgingly supported independence when New York failed to respond to northeastern demands (Williamson 1949).

These political conflicts were tightly coupled with religious cleavages that had erupted during the Great Awakening in southern New England. Revival movements were diffused by migrants to the northern frontier and turned Vermont into one of the regions "burned-over" by religious fervor. The western counties, dominated by supporters of independent Vermont, adhered largely to radical Calvinist sects such as the New Lights and Separates. Especially in the southeastern towns, by contrast, strong opposition to Vermont and loyalty to New York prevailed among their mainly Old Light and Anglican populations (Roth 1987; Shalhope 1994; Smith 1981, 1996).¹

In the late 1780s and after Vermont's admission to the Union in 1791, another factional divide along very similar lines emerged when Vermont's internal disputes became increasingly shaped by political controversies at the national level. Here, Nathaniel Chipman and Isaac Tichenor succeeded in uniting eastern Yorker elites and conservative western elites in a coalition that temporally ousted the Chittenden-Allen faction from government. The coalition of Yorker Old Light gentlemen and western merchant and lawyer elites supported the Federalist Party. Chittenden, the Allens and their mainly New Light yeomen followers sided with the Jeffersonian Republican Party (Austin 1974; Chipman 1846; Shalhope 1996; Williamson 1949).

Likewise, the geophysical environment of Vermont provided an ideal setting in support of factional strife and strong localism. First, as in other parts of New England, rural settlements were organized as nucleated village communities that were widely dispersed with few communication channels linking them (Lemon 1984). Second, the Green Mountain range physically separated eastern pro-Yorker and western pro-Vermont townships and determined their political and economic geography. The southwestern region around Bennington was commercially tied to the Hudson and New York, while inhabitants of the Champlain Valley saw their opportunities in Quebec, and the eastern Connecticut Valley focused on New England markets (Williamson 1949). The internal political conflicts spilled over to neighboring areas in other states during Vermont's temporary annexation of fifty-one New Hampshire towns in the two Eastern Unions (1778 and 1781) and twelve New York towns in the Western Union (1781). These expansions were quickly dissolved after credible threats by the Continental Congress, but they led western Vermont towns to fear dominance of eastern Vermont towns and vice versa (Onuf 1983; Williamson 1949).

Early Vermont's frontier society shared the political and economic tensions of other backcountry regions—namely conflicts between frontier settlers and seaboard merchants and gentlemen over land titles, quit rents, taxes, cash shortage and indebtedness, and inadequate representation in state assemblies (Nobles 1989; Slaughter 1986; Szatmary 1980; Taylor 1995; Turner 1996). Not all such backcountry grievances gave rise to independence movements, whether backed by armed insurgencies or not. Yet, the imminent separation of Kentucky from Virginia, Franklin (Tennessee) from North Carolina and Maine from Massachusetts was reason enough for members of Congress to be concerned that "a separation of any district from a State having a right to exercise constitutional jurisdiction over such district, unless by the consent of the State and of the United States, would be a violation of and have a tendency to subvert the fundamental principles of the Union" (Walton 1875, III: 338). The significance of Vermont is that it was the first truly new (and thus perhaps the most decisive) state of the nascent American nation. Like the other new frontier

¹ The main difference between the two religious affiliations concerned whether salvation is attained through free will and good works as claimed by Arminians (Old Light, Old Side, Anglican, Freewill Baptist, Quaker), or whether it is predetermined and depends on God's grace as Calvinists (New Light, New Side, Separate, Separate Baptist) believed (Smith 1996: 227; Roth 1987: 26-40).

states that were to follow it, the state of Vermont lacked a past and its founders had to build its political community (Onuf 1983).

LOCALISM, FACTIONALISM AND THE STATE

Most approaches to state building in the social science literature tend to analyze localism and political centralization as a vertical relationship of successive submission of communal autonomy to national authority. Once more, Tocqueville may serve to illustrate this perspective. Tocqueville (1994: 507-17) argued that state building in "democratic ages" broke the chains of hierarchical positioning and mutual obligations that reached from rural communities through the seigneurie to the court, and provided the social cement of aristocratic societies. The destruction of these bonds among individuals isolated them from each other and endangered liberty. This is the condition that breeds despotism and ultimately totalitarianism (Arendt 1973). In France, Tocqueville argued, the autonomy of local communes and the mediating role of landed aristocrats were undermined through the centralization of the state administration, a process which had begun under the Ancien Régime and was continued by the revolutionaries: "Of all forms of liberty, that of a local community, which is so hard to establish, is the most prone to the encroachments of authority. Left to themselves, the institutions of a local community can hardly struggle against a strong and enterprising government" (Tocqueville 1994: 62).

The Tocquevillian perspective on state making (Skocpol 1985) has been adopted (to different degrees) and refined by others (e.g. Blicke 1997; Root 1987; Tilly 1975, 1976, 1990).² The basic argument of their studies is the following. Through enlistment of powerful elites and the creation of centralized institutions, state-builders are seen to enforce their monopoly of legitimate violence and extract the resources necessary for further consolidation of state power. Popular resistance typically arises when coercive state centralization, often in alliance with emergent capitalist interests, threatens the traditional fabric and moral economy of local communities (Blicke 1997; Luebke 1997). For my purpose here, the relevant conclusion of these otherwise diverse studies is that state formation eventually eclipsed localism (Tilly 1975: 21-25; Bearman 1993).

The historical events surrounding the emergence of Vermont as a state are significantly at odds with this perspective. In most general terms, revolutionary state making in Vermont (and perhaps in all other American states) consisted of two phases that operated at different levels of organization. The first phase concerned the separation from New York and the effort to integrate localist factions into a new political entity called the state of Vermont. The second phase concerned the integration of Vermont into the Union of American states. I argue that this two-stage process points to the need to distinguish between vertical and horizontal modes of political organization (Lachmann 1989). The attempt of Vermont's founders to construct a cohesive political community, on which statehood claims could be rested, operated at a horizontal level between localist factions. The second phase of integration into the Union consisted of a vertical shift of local politics into the debates between Federalists and Republicans at the national level. The historical irony of this escalating process (Schwartz 1976), as I show in some detail below, was that both frames of identity – at the local and the national level – allowed factional alignments to crystallize around equivalent pairs of binary categorical oppositions (e.g. hierarchical order vs. popular democracy, tradition vs. progression, or "the common yeomen" vs. "the new aristocrats"). These binary oppositions in turn were grounded in tangible networks of social relations. This coupling of local and national level identities within concrete social structures did not destroy, but rather supported localism. In the remainder of this section, I shall describe the properties of localism that are significant to my argument, and sketch the structural challenges that factional politics based on localism poses to horizontal state integration.

The historical evidence described above suggests that localism in early Vermont can be defined as categorical homogeneity, primarily with respect to religious affiliations, political worldviews, and migration origins. In addition, the sectional geography of the state allowed

² Of course, I do not mean to suggest that all research on state formation flows from a single source. I simplify subtleties to emphasize a general argument about the demise of localism through state making.

settlement patterns to further consolidate these categorical differences (Smith 1981; 1996). Thus, in Vermont, localism could be organized along the natural divisions provided by ecological homogeneity (Bearman 1993: 43; Leach 1964). As I shall demonstrate in more detail below, this condition also meant that factional cleavages found a natural foundation along the same lines. In other words, factional cleavages were by and large congruent with the localist identities that were attached to regional divisions and articulated through categorical markers such as religious and political alignments.

Social networks provided the relational foundation for localism and factional identities (Gould 1995). In this article, I examine the role of networks of credit exchanges as the basis for collective identities. The focus on networks leads to the central structural problem within horizontal state building processes. In early Vermont, the concrete issue at the horizontal level was to what extent structurally based segregation between localized factions could be bridged through cross-factional ties in order to achieve integration and a political community as Vermonters.³ In this respect, revolutionary Vermont's frontier society is one historical example of a general phenomenon. The sociological significance of frontiers is their lack of sufficient building blocks for social structures that can work to integrate local groups across their categorical divisions. In the absence of adequate sources for macro-level integration, segregation and factional dispute tend to dictate the few remaining inter-group relations. Comparable are societies during civil war and its aftermath, where factionalism often prevails even if one party wins over the other, and cleavages among the population continue to be driven by ethnic or religious distinctions.

More abstractly, the structural dilemma is that strong cohesion at lower levels of social organization tends to constrain cohesion at higher levels. George Homans recognized this tension long ago when he remarked that the "measure of the cohesion of community is its distrust of outsiders" (Homans 1941: 328). Cohesive subgroups or clusters in a network are characterized by a high density of ties among members within the group. Research on social networks also shows that the total number of ties individuals send or receive tends to be limited. It follows that the number of ties sent within one's subgroup will necessarily reduce the number of contacts outside one's subgroup. This process thus reduces the global cohesion of the network that comprises all subgroups. Conversely, if the number of contacts between members of different subgroups increases it will decrease the number of ties sent within each subgroup, and hence decrease its internal cohesion. In the empirical analysis of this article, I use the proportion of within-group and between-group relationships as a global network measure to assess the extent of cohesion and segregation among localist factions.

Two distinct structural positions of individuals correspond to these global tendencies. Both positions create structural opportunities to assemble relationships and to mediate between other individuals. In the literature, such positions are described as brokers. Yet, again the emphasis tends to be on the vertical orientation of brokers as interlocutors who adjudicate between local communities and state officials, operating at the national level. Local elites who are placed in advantageous positions in communal social structures are thus co-opted into the process of centralization through political patronage. Due to their mediating position between local and national society, these elites are ideally situated to play the role of political brokers (Blok 1974; Gould 1996, 1998; Kettering 1988; Tilly 1976). Here, I contend that positions of brokerage need not be limited to vertical relationships between local and national society. Instead, I focus on two types of brokerage that again operate along horizontal divisions. The first type comprises local leaders who act as brokers to coordinate

³ Social integration is certainly not a necessary condition for state making to succeed. In fact, totalitarian regimes actively dissociate members of society to secure their position (Arendt 1973). As an example from a different context, Pol Pot's Khmer Rouges aimed to erase previous identities of Cambodians: "Overnight they became 'new people', or 'April 17 people' – less than human, without privileges or rights." (Chandler 1993: 103). I argue that horizontal state building that rests on radical democratic principles, as in Vermont, is in principle inclusive and at least seeks to integrate civil society rather than to isolate its members. To provide only one example, Vermont's constitution of 1777 was one of the first to grant universal manhood suffrage, whereas other states still required qualifications for suffrage (Williamson: 64-65).

relationships within factional groups and to strengthen localism. Their aim is to create local "islands of authority", bundles of social relationships that forge political solidarity within localist factions (Barth 1965: 69). The second type entails individuals whose position in social structure allows them to act as mediators in horizontal conflicts between factions. Unlike the first type, these inter-group brokers seek to build bridges across the structural holes and categorical cleavages between opposing factions, and thus increase integration and help to mitigate social conflict (Barth 1965: 96-99; Padgett and Ansell 1993). In the next section, I shall discuss in detail the sources for the empirical analysis of these concepts in the context of revolutionary Vermont.

DATA SOURCES AND MEASUREMENT

This article exploits a well-known data source of early American history, probate records, in an innovative way. I build credit exchange networks from extensive lists of debtors and creditors contained in these archival records. Historians appreciate and rely on the richness of this source, yet they tend to treat credit networks as attributes of individuals. Typically, the total or average number of debt and credit relations per person is presented, sometimes over successive periods. From a sociological viewpoint, such an approach misses the opportunity to use probate data as a rich source for analyzing tangible social structure. Unlike most historical studies, I employ formal network analysis techniques to identify patterns and positions in credit networks that are systematically linked to the political process of state-building in Vermont.

A large literature documents that credit relationships were rivaled only by kinship ties in their salience for early American society (Horwitz 1977: 212-26; Lemon 1984; Mathias 2000; Rothenberg 1985).⁴ The primary reason for the widespread reliance on credit notes and book accounts was "to overcome the lack of specie", especially after the Revolutionary War cut off trade relations with English merchants (Sheridan 1984:73; Horwitz 1977: 215). Across different regions, backcountry farmers, local shopkeepers, and eastern merchants were intricately linked through this "credit nexus" (Lemon 1984: 110). In the Chesapeake, for instance, the planter gentry used credit to bind neighboring yeomen into patronage networks to secure their support for representatives of elite families in local politics (Kulikoff 1986: 280-90; Burnard 1995). Similarly, the local economy on the early Connecticut frontier consisted of a dense web of credit ties wherein the average settler owed to at least twenty local creditors (Grant 1961: 66-82). In Vermont, "the more exact and rationalized structure of a cash economy did not appear until half a century after the first settlements in the Green Mountains and did not monopolize exchange until the Civil War" (Bellesiles 1993: 59). The total amount of credit and debt often accounted for the second largest share of the total probated property behind real estate (Bellesiles 1993). As well, political tensions arising out of debtor grievances stirred not only Shays' rebellion in Massachusetts (Szatmary 1980) but also numerous riots against courts and creditors within Vermont during 1783-1786 (Walton 1875, vol. III: 357-380; Williamson 1949: 168-69).

The best available source for data on credit relationships are probate records. Estates of deceased persons were probated if the latter left a will, owned real estate at the time of death, left minor heirs, had outstanding credits due to them, or if they died indebted. An important function of the probate process was to secure the claims of creditors and the rightful share of the heirs before any property could be dispersed by others (Izard 1997; Jones 1977; Main 1985). Most Vermont probate records list creditors and debtors of the deceased, in addition to wills and inventories of property. Estates were appraised by commissioners, usually within six months from the date of death. All commissioners, typically next of kin or neighbors of equal social standing as the deceased,

⁴ I focus on credit networks rather than kinship ties because the latter are unlikely to offer more than a replication of known categorical differences such as religion, migration history and settlement patterns. Smith (1996) shows that pro-Vermonters and pro-New Yorkers followed significantly different migration paths from southern New England into southwestern and southeastern Vermont, respectively. Likewise, migrants moved as bi- and tri-generational families, and thereby kept families together within regions. Cohesive family structures also suggest that marriages across different religious denominations were rare at best – after all, religious distinction was sufficiently important to many settlers to relocate to the northern frontier.

were appointed by the judge of probate, proceeded under oath, and had to pay a substantial bond of surety.⁵

This study is based on credit network data collected from eighteenth century and early nineteenth century probate records housed in the archives of Vermont probate courts. All data were collected from the southern Bennington and Windham counties because these two counties were the political and economic centers of revolutionary Vermont, and dominated the new state demographically in the period of interest to this study (Shalhope 1996; Williamson 1949).⁶ A detailed prosopography by Smith (1981; 1996), listing 1,343 residents in western and eastern Vermont who were actively involved in the religious and political conflicts of early Vermont provided the sampling frame for a stratified random sample of 88 individuals from the probate archives. Probated individuals and their ego networks of creditors and debtors were the sampling units. The sample was stratified by residence (counties to the west or east of the Green Mountains) so that random samples of probated individuals were taken independently in the western and eastern probate districts.⁷

The years of the selected probate files range from 1778 to 1818, but most of them (72 records) are dated before 1805. Each record contains the names of debtors and creditors to the estate, the amount of money involved, the type of credit (mostly notes of hand or book accounts), the date of the report, and the names of the commissioners. Some lists also include the residence of debtors and creditors, interest accrued and the date of credit exchanges.⁸ The 88 selected lists of debt and credit relationships were then coded into a single ego-centered credit network among 3,678 individuals linked through 4,860 relationships with directed ties pointing from debtors to creditors. The average number of network ties per individual is 2.64 (min.=1 and max.=1093).

There is no evidence that the results reported here suffer significantly from the systematic selection biases commonly associated with probate data (Elliott 1985; Izard 1997; Jones 1977; Lindert 1981; Main 1975, 1985; Smith 1975). First, the tendency of probate records to exclude women and non-whites does not concern the present analysis. Probate records virtually do not exist for women in Vermont during the period of interest, but the focus of this article is on the link between credit networks and political action, and women were not allowed to vote or to occupy political offices, nor are women documented to have participated in political action. Likewise, a potential race bias is not directly relevant. American Indians were largely driven out of Vermont and played no decisive role in the politics of the state (Calloway 1984). Vermont's constitution was the first to ban slavery, and the population of blacks in the state was negligible at the time. The 1790 census lists merely sixteen "free colored" who were mistakenly classified as slaves (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1908: 8). The network data contain three individuals with the surname "Negro", but none of them held political offices at any time or were directly involved in other forms of political action. Second, probate fees were usually not as high to provide an incentive to give up any inherited property, to transfer large amounts of wealth prior to death, or to evade the process entirely (Jones 1977). Finally, the probated dead tended to be older and therefore wealthier than the average living individual. Since I do not seek to explain variation in the wealth distribution this potential bias affects the present analysis only marginally.

[Table 1 about here]

⁵ For precise regulations of the entire probate process, see Soule (1964: 100-108) and Williams (1966: 202-212).

⁶ Estimates for 1762 show that settlement in the Vermont area was limited to about 70 families in the Southeast, and about 50 families in the Southwest around Bennington. In 1772, southeastern Cumberland Co. had 3,947, northeastern Gloucester Co. 722, and western Charlotte Co. 2,645 inhabitants. The overall population increased significantly from about 20,000 in 1776 to 85,425 in 1790, and again to 154,396 in 1800. Bennington, the southwestern center, had 2,350 inhabitants in 1790, and was the second largest town behind the Yorker stronghold Guilford in the Southeast, which counted 2,422 inhabitants (see Bellesiles 1993: 280-83; Mark 1940: 167; U.S. Bureau of the Census 1908, 1938; Williamson 1949: 14).

⁷ Sample weights were used in statistical analyses to correct for disproportionate numbers of estates selected from the western probate districts.

⁸ Appendix A provides details on the distribution of values of credit ties and inferences for missing dates.

Table 1 describes the variables created from the probate records and additional data, and lists their sources. Four network variables were coded from the structure of credit exchanges. The first two variables concern the overall volume of credit activity per person. Indegree is the total number of ties received, or equivalently the number of debtors a person had. Outdegree is the total number of ties sent, or the number of creditors a person borrowed from. Indegree and outdegree are count variables. The other two network variables, coordination and brokerage, measure structural positions of mediation that individuals can occupy between and within subgroups.⁹ I discuss the basis for the subgroup partition of the present network in some detail in the next section. Here, it will suffice to describe the general properties of the two variables. A coordinator position is occupied by actors who mediate between members of their own subgroup who do not share a direct tie with each other. Coordination measures intra-group mediation. Coordinators forge the cohesion of local subgroups. In contrast to coordination, brokerage denotes positions occupied by actors who mediate between members of different subgroups who do not share a direct relationship with each other. Brokerage measures inter-group mediation. Brokers build bridges across factional cleavages that divide subgroups.¹⁰

The credit network data were complemented with micro-data from various published sources. Information on residence was taken from the 1790 and 1800 Vermont census (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1908, 1938) and additional sources (Comstock 1918; Fisher and Fisher 1992). Adherence to early pro-Vermont and pro-New York factions was obtained from Fisher and Fisher (1992) and Smith (1981; 1996), and was measured by rioting in favor of either cause, affidavits, public statements, membership in the Green Mountain Boys militia for pro-Vermonters, and for pro-Yorkers, holding New York offices in Vermont after the latter's declaration of independence, or receiving compensation from New York for resistance to Vermont. Later factional adherence was coded from various sources including Austin (1974), Shalhope (1994), Smith (1981) and Williamson (1949), and measured as support for the Federalist Party or the Jeffersonian Republican Party. Religion was coded as affiliation with Calvinist or Arminian persuasion (from Smith 1981; 1996. See note 2 above for details). Data on political and military office holding under Vermont and New York includes the number, dates and administrative level of offices held (from Comstock 1918; Fisher and Fisher 1992; Smith 1981. See appendix B for detailed coding of offices).

RESULTS

Early Factions: Vermonters versus Yorkers

The first phase in the history of revolutionary Vermont lasted roughly from the 1760s when the first land riots of New England settlers against New York began until the Treaty of Paris in 1783 which ended the Revolutionary War. This period was characterized by the (often violent) conflicts between supporters of Vermont's independence – namely the Bennington and Arlington Junto around Governor Chittenden and the Allens – and those living in southeastern Cumberland/Windham County (New York/Vermont) who remained in stern support of New York's authority on the Grants. Historians have sought to identify the sources of this factional conflict in early Vermont in a range of categorical differences (see Graffagnino 1978). These differences comprise colliding economic interests of Yankee and Yorker land speculators (Jones 1939; Graffagnino 1991; Taylor 1995; Williamson 1949), the lack of local order and reliable law enforcement on the frontier (Bellesiles 1993), contrasting political (e.g. extent of local self-determination) and administrative

⁹ Note that the opportunity for mediation, like other network properties, is not an attribute of individuals, but rather resides in the specific position an individual occupies within a social structure (Mayhew 1980).

¹⁰ The coordinator and broker variables are based on the measures developed by Gould and Fernandez (1989). They distinguish between one position of within-group coordination and four subtypes of inter-group mediation according to the number of distinct subgroups involved and the position of the mediator. Here, I collapse the four inter-group subtypes into a single brokerage category. One reason is that there are not enough cases within each subtype. More important, and as the analyses below will show, my concern here are essentially binary oppositions between factions that are transposed across different contexts. Essential for my purpose here is that Gould and Fernandez distinguish clearly between intra- and inter-group mediation (compared to other intuitive measures of brokerage like betweenness centrality).

traditions (freehold versus leasehold land use) between Yankees and Yorkers (Jellison 1969; Fox 1940; Mark 1940), and disputes spawned by religious zeal (Shalhope 1996; Roth 1987; Smith 1981, 1996; Williamson 1949).

In this section, I assess the role of religion, region, office holding under New York and later under Vermont, and credit network activity as correlates of early faction membership in support of Vermont independence or New York.¹¹ Data on these dimensions and early faction membership are available for 283 individuals within the credit network data set that was constructed from the probate records. Table 2 reports the frequency distribution of attributes by political faction. The number of cases and the proportion (in parentheses) within each faction are reported for categorical variables. Chi-square tests are used to test significant differences between the two political factions. For continuous variables of credit network indegree and outdegree, weighted sample means and corresponding standard errors (in parentheses) are shown. Means on these variables for the two groups are compared using t-test statistics.

[Table 2 about here]

A clear pattern of correlations emerges from these results. The bivariate relationships of religious affiliation and residence with faction membership provide strong support for the historical account that political and religious disputes were closely associated with each other and consolidated by residential choice. On the one hand, the share of radical Calvinists (New Lights and Separates) among pro-Vermonters was disproportionately higher (66%) than among pro-Yorkers (merely 1%). The proportion of Arminians (Old Lights and Anglicans), on the other hand, was significantly greater among pro-Yorkers (78%) compared to the pro-Vermont faction (11%).

Likewise, there is strong evidence for residential segregation between the two political factions. Supporters of independent Vermont were concentrated in the Southwest and to a lesser degree in the Northwest. Taken together, both regions accounted for 78% of the settlers in favor of Vermont independence from New York. Residents in southeastern Windham County, by contrast, accounted for 81% of New York supporters, while only 7% of Yorkers resided in the western counties. There are no further significant differences between the two parties with respect to the remaining regions.

In addition, I find no statistically significant differences between pro-Vermonters and pro-Yorkers in the distribution of office holding under Vermont authority (I shall have more to say about shifts in office holding patterns below). The proportion of officers under New York authority was significantly greater for pro-Yorkers than for pro-Vermonters. This result is not surprising since the acceptance of a public or military office offered by the government of New York within the territory of Vermont after Vermont's declaration of independence clearly indicated a political preference for New York over Vermont.

In order to further explore the coupling of credit exchange networks and factional identities, the network population needs to be partitioned into mutually exclusive subsets. While it seems natural to use a binary partition according to early faction membership (pro-Vermont vs. pro-New York), the number of cases for which such information is available ($N=283$) is too low to be meaningfully mapped onto a network of 3,678 individual nodes.¹² I therefore use residence as the best available proxy for political allegiance and as the criterion for the network partition. This decision is justified on the grounds of the strong association between residence and political

¹¹ The exclusion of conflicting land titles in the present analysis is partly due to data limitations, but also because the numerous applications of holders of New Hampshire land titles for confirmation by the government of New York blurs the strict distinction between titles. As well, Smith (1981: 163-168; 1996: 228) found no statistically significant relation between land titles and economic interest. Here, the extent of involvement in the credit network covers economic activity. The different traditions of land use (leasehold vs. freehold) are excluded for the same reasons as land titles.

¹² An alternative strategy is to start with a structurally induced partition of the network, and then test for differences in the distribution of categorical attributes of individuals across these structural subsets. I applied a number of standard network analysis routines for detecting structural subgroups (e.g. k-components, k-cores, cliques and p-cliques), but none of them produced a substantively meaningful partition of the network.

allegiance as demonstrated in table 2 and in extant historical accounts. In addition, since information on residence can be traced and cross-referenced through a number of sources including census reports, this information is available for 2,298 individuals in the credit network data set. The resulting residence partition of the credit network provides the basis for the two network variables of cross-factional brokerage and coordination within factional clusters.¹³ In all the analyses that follow, regional clusters therefore represent factional clusters and are the basis for distinguishing relations within factional subgroups and relations between them.

Returning to the bivariate results in table 2, I find a significantly higher involvement in credit activities for pro-Vermonters than for pro-Yorkers. Pro-Vermonters in this sample had an average number of about six debtors and an average number of about 3.7 creditors. Yorkers had an average of only 2.4 debtors, and were tied to an average of about 2.7 creditors.¹⁴ Similarly, pro-Vermonters included a significantly higher proportion of local coordinators (.24) than Yorkers (.11). The proportion of cross-factional (cross-regional) brokers is not significantly different for pro-Vermonters (.12) and pro-Yorkers (.10).¹⁵ Thus, the main conclusion of these results is that both religious affiliation and residential patterns were strongly and positively correlated with factional alignment. The bivariate comparisons based on this sample confirm previous historical interpretations. Supporters of Vermont independence were predominantly adherents of New Light and Separate persuasions and residents of the western half of the state. Defenders of New York authority were mostly affiliated with Old Light or Anglican persuasions and resided in the Southeast. Additionally, I find some evidence for higher credit network activity among pro-Vermonters than among pro-Yorkers. In the following section, I shall analyze credit network dynamics between the regionally based factions directly.

Credit Network Dynamics

I focus first on changes in the global structure of credit ties that were sent and received within and between regions over time. The results provide a first cut into the pattern of credit exchanges. This is followed by an analysis of individual level positions within the network structure. For this purpose, I split the credit network into three separate period-specific networks based on the dates of ties. The periodization is based on substantive historical grounds.

The first period encompasses the years 1768-1784, the period of fierce factional conflict between pro-Vermonters and Yorkers, and the struggle for the independence of Vermont. It also marks the time of the Revolutionary War of the American colonies against Great Britain, in which most Vermonters actively participated (Fisher and Fisher 1992). For instance, in May 1775, Ethan Allen and the Green Mountain Boys seized British Fort Ticonderoga in a dubious attack, and later on, the Green Mountain Boys were even formed into a battalion of the Continental Army. Support for the American effort outside of Vermont, however, did not keep settlers from internal conflicts.

¹³ The distribution of brokers and coordinators by region and political affiliation confirms that residence and factional alliance are strongly correlated: 21 out of 23 pro-Vermont brokers resided in the two western regions, and 8 out of 9 pro-New York brokers resided in the Southeast. Likewise, 46 out of 47 pro-Vermont coordinators resided in the Southwest, and 9 out of 10 pro-New York coordinators resided in the Southeast.

¹⁴ The relatively large estimate for pro-Vermonters on indegree (5.93) is due to one outlier, Samuel Billings who had 963 debtors listed in his probate account. Excluding Billings' score from the estimation yields a weighted mean for this subgroup of 3.31 ties (s.e.=.33), and a slightly decreased outdegree of 3.39 ties (s.e.=.24). The difference between pro-Vermonters and Yorkers remains statistically significant ($p=.018$). It is important to note, however, that Billings' contribution is not as consequential as it may seem. His position is largely connecting structural isolates in the credit network that are not integrated into any regional cluster.

¹⁵ Alternatively, one may assess direct (i.e. unmediated) linkages between residents of two different regions and among residents within the same regional cluster. This measure is less precise compared to positions of mediation and potentially trivial in a structural sense because it does not control for the possibility that one measures merely dyadic ties between nodes that are otherwise isolated in their own region/faction. By contrast, brokerage and coordination are triadic measures. I nevertheless tested for the presence of direct ties and found no significant differences in their allocation between the two political factions.

Due to the intensity of struggles between Vermonters and Yorkers in this period, segregation among regional factions is expected to be high with few cross-regional ties sent between them.

A major objective of this article is to explore the differential influence of cross-factional social ties on the horizontal integration of localized factions within emergent states. The test case for integration then is the time when the emergent state of Vermont, according to leading historical interpretations, began to consolidate. The second period from 1785 to 1790 refers to this consolidation of the new state of Vermont until its admission to the Union as the fourteenth state. The year 1784 brought the old factional conflict between Vermonters and Yorkers within Vermont to an end, at least in military terms, and secured Vermont's independence from New York (Smith 1981: 13-14). The treaty of Paris in 1783 also sealed an era of Vermont's foreign policy, including the secretive Haldimand negotiations between the British governor in Quebec and the western Chittenden-Allen faction who veered to either loyalism or support of the Revolution (Williams 1949: 90-126). Disputes between political opponents in Vermont remained prevalent throughout the 1780s, but they began to be organized around different issues than separatism and independence. Of main concern were solutions to the widespread debtor grievances and to the compensation of Tories and Yorkers whose properties were confiscated during the war. In addition, local political conflicts gradually began to be couched in terms of more national debates (Austin 1974; Onuf 1983).

The third period, 1791-1800, includes roughly the first decade of Vermont as a member of the Union and accounts for a further shift in the significance of Vermont politics away from strictly local concerns toward a greater involvement into the national debate between Federalists and Republicans. This does not mean that local politics disappeared – in fact, they just found a different outlet in the party division of national politics between Hamiltonian Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans (Austin 1974; Shalhope 1996). The year 1800 also marks the “Revolution of 1800” when the Jeffersonian Republicans for the first time gained a sizeable majority in Congress (Elkins and McKittrick 1993).

The overall expectation then is the following. If horizontal integration of opposing regional factions with respect to credit relations was successful then a gradual increase in the density of cross-regional ties and a corresponding decrease in the exclusive distribution of ties within regions should be observed. If, on the other hand, localism and factional division were sustained over time, ties should be concentrated within regional clusters with few relationships passing between regions.

Table 3 reports coefficients for the extent of credit ties sent within and across regions over the three time periods described above. Reading down the first column identifies the residence of the debtors in credit relationships in each time period. The header row lists the region of the creditors to whom the ties were sent. Coefficients are reported for the four main regions within Vermont, Southwest, Southeast, Northwest, and Northeast.¹⁶ The coefficients reflect departures from chance levels and are calculated as the difference between the observed and expected number of ties (as determined by the row and column marginals). The differences are further divided by the standard deviation of observed ties within each period to obtain lower and upper bounds.¹⁷ Hence, the values range between -1 and +1. A value of zero implies that the number of ties sent equals chance expectations. Positive values imply that more ties are sent than expected under random mixing. Negative values mean that fewer ties are sent than expected.

[Table 3 about here]

The major finding in table 3 is the persistence of local cohesion within regions. Consider first the patterns of credit exchanges between the Southwest and the Southeast since these two regions have been identified as the focal points of localist factions. These patterns are found in the upper left corner of each sub-panel in the table. Over the three periods, the number of credit relationships within the Southwest and within the Southeast was consistently higher than the number of ties

¹⁶ Other residential categories are excluded due to small numbers of observed ties or lack of substantive meaning (e.g. when residence is unknown).

¹⁷ Formally, for a given cell entry in table 3, I define the coefficient of difference (D) for the number of ties (x) for region (A) in period (t) as $D_t(A) = (x_t - E(x_t)) / \sigma_t$.

expected. Within the Southeast, coefficients remain at about the same high level, ranging between .52 and .58. In the Southwest, preference for borrowing money within the region even doubled over time, from a value of .23 in the first period to a value of .47 in the third period.

Likewise, the number of credit ties sent and received between the two regions was significantly less than expected at chance levels. Coefficients for ties between southeastern debtors and southwestern creditors remain significantly negative at a value of -.58 in the first two periods and are still significantly negative at a value of -.48 in the third period. This is mirrored by the preference of southwestern debtors. Their refusal to borrow from southeastern creditors even increased significantly from a value of -.37 in the first period to a value of -.53 in the third period. These results demonstrate sustained or even increased local cohesion within the two politically most important regions, and increasing segregation of credit ties between them. Note also that this consistently crisp pattern is observed despite the fact that the overall number of ties sent and received rose significantly as well over time. For instance, the total number of ties received by southeastern creditors in the third period was more than six times as large as in the first period. Despite this striking increase, the direction of ties did not diversify as one would expect. Instead, local cohesion and cross-regional segregation persisted.

Turning to the other two regions, the apparent lack of internal cohesion within the two northern regions is mostly due to small numbers of observations. This makes the interpretation of coefficients for the ties sent within and between the two northern regions less meaningful. Comparisons of cross-regional tie distributions to the southern regions are more meaningful and can be summarized quickly. Southwestern debtors borrowing outside their own locality clearly preferred creditors from the Northwest. Northwestern debtors were also strongly embedded in relations with southwestern creditors. The number of cases is too small for the origin and destination of northeastern ties to be meaningfully interpreted.

Another way of interpreting these findings is to say that at the horizontal level of credit exchanges, revolutionary Vermont was divided into two main regional clusters, the Southeast versus the two western regions (and possibly also the Northeast). In contrast to what may be expected given the rise of federal politics and Vermont's gradual integration into the national arena, segregation between the two politically most influential regions – the Southwest around Bennington and southeastern Windham county – increased rather than decreased over time – at least as far as the structure of credit exchanges was concerned. This tendency towards intensifying localism was further supported by a consistently high degree of local cohesion within the Southwest and the Southeast.¹⁸

These observations are matched by corresponding shifts of individual level positions of brokerage and coordination within the credit network. Both positions allowed occupants to mediate between and within groups on the basis of their personal credit relationships. To assess the influence of these mediating positions within the credit network on factional politics and localism, I focus on their link to patterns of office holding over time.

After Vermont's independence in 1777, statehood became a tangible reality, for its supporters and opponents alike. A new state also meant the creation and distribution of a range of new political and military offices. Factions continued to dominate political life but their confrontations found a new arena in the legislative assembly of town selectmen. Consequently,

¹⁸ Below I show how intensified localism was related to political processes. However, the overall growth in credit exchanges over time can be attributed in part to increased migration into Vermont (see note 6). Bellesiles (1993: 280-83) estimates a 397.6 percentage increase in Vermont's population between 1775 and 1791. The rising population density within each region might have provided enough opportunities for internal exchange, and reduced the need for ties to outsiders and the resulting transaction costs. Moreover, the pattern of in-migration displayed segregation even before settlers reached the Grants. Pro-Vermonters and especially those who became Green Mountain Boys migrated predominantly from eastern Connecticut towns and other centers of New Light and Separatist religious dissidence through New York's eastern manor lands and into western Vermont. Pro-Yorkers, instead, migrated from the oldest Massachusetts frontier towns and centers of Old Light church establishment through northern Worcester Co. (Mass.) and southwestern New Hampshire into the southeastern Connecticut Valley of Vermont (Smith 1981; 1996).

holding public office became the new yardstick for political alignments. In marked contrast to New York, Vermont's constitution strengthened the role of the legislative assembly against the executive branch. The constitution thus granted supremacy to local interests over a central state government, and attested to the distrust of central authority and the weight of localism in Vermont and elsewhere across New England (Lemon 1984: 100). The all important town representatives to the state assembly were elected by the freemen in every town (two representatives for towns over eighty persons, and one for towns with less than eighty persons). The assembly held the power of legislation, finances, appointment and impeachment, and thus controlled the governor and his council who were also elected by the freemen in the state. In addition, every seven years the freemen elected the Council of Censors, which acted as guardian of the constitution (Williamson 1949: 63-64; Comstock 1918).

The two network mediation variables, brokerage and coordination, are used to assess the influence of individual bridging positions on the dynamics of office attainment in the emergent state. The underlying rationale is the following. Under conditions of a general trend towards integration between regions, individuals who built bridges across strongly localized and politically segregated factions acted as agents of integration. In this situation, brokers were likely to be rewarded with influential positions such as political offices in the new state. Unlike brokers, coordinators as promoters of local cohesion should have had a lower rate of office attainment. Reversely, if credit relations served mainly as badges of strong local identity, brokerage was likely to be negatively related to office holding. In this scenario, local cohesion and adherence to local factional identity was valued higher than statewide integration, and coordinators were more likely to be elected to represent the interests of their groups than cross-factional brokers.

[Tables 4.1 and 4.2 about here]

Tables 4.1 and 4.2 demonstrate the overall salience of credit networks for obtaining offices in early Vermont. Table 4.1 compares the average number of debtors and creditors for those individuals in the sample who held offices and for those who did not. Naturally, the total number of officers was much smaller than those who did not obtain an office. Yet, officers were linked on average to more than twice as many debtors and creditors than those without offices, a highly significant difference ($p=.000$). This is complemented by the results in table 4.2, which compares the proportion of officers across network positions. There are two important results in this table. The first finding is that the proportion of officers was consistently higher within the categories of brokers and coordinators compared to those who did not occupy these mediating network positions. The second major result is that coordinators who forged localism were better positioned to obtain offices than brokers who bridged across regions. It is theoretically possible and empirically plausible that influential individuals occupy positions of brokerage and local coordination at the same time. That is, the proportion of officers was significantly higher (.20) among brokers in the credit network who simultaneously acted as coordinators in their local community than for those who were merely brokers (.08). However, local coordinators did not gain a significant advantage by also occupying positions of brokerage. Compared to mere coordinators, the proportion of office holders among coordinators who were also brokers is not significantly larger ($p=.294$).

Similar findings are obtained in a multivariate context. Table 5 reports logistic regression results for the likelihood of holding a Vermont office conditional on the four network properties and selected covariates.

[Table 5 about here]

The results in table 5 confirm that an increasing involvement in the credit network is significantly related to office attainment. Borrowing from creditors appears to be positively related to office holding while lending to debtors seems to reduce the chances of being elected, yet the magnitudes of these links are very small indeed. Local coordination is strongly and positively related to office holding. Occupying positions of cross-regional brokerage, on the other hand, seems to have reduced a person's prospect for office. This apparent disadvantage is largely the result of a gradual decline of the salience of brokerage over time as will become evident shortly.

The more general finding then is that embeddedness into the credit network, and especially positions of brokerage and local coordination did matter for obtaining offices. The higher credit tie volume for officers in table 4.1 also suggests that in early Vermont economic elites and political elites were by and large congruent, a link that has also been observed in other parts of the United States during the Federalist period (e.g. Gould 1996).

[Table 6 about here]

There are a total of 143 officers included in the present network sample. Table 6 reports relevant summary statistics for these Vermont officers. The first public offices were filled in 1777, but I included town delegates to the first conventions in 1776 that paved the road to statehood a year later (Comstock 1918). Persons could be elected to federal offices beginning in 1791 when Vermont had joined the Union. The total number of offices held ranges between one and sixteen, including concurrent positions and reelections. The average total number of positions is about 3.5 offices (median=2). Seventy-two percent of incumbents were reelected. Office careers could be very long (up to 41 years), but the average career lasted about nine and a half years. Overlap of concurrent offices was considerable with some persons holding up to twelve offices at the same time (mean=1.93). Yet, 90 percent of all 143 officers attained no more than seven positions total. To get a sense of the temporal distribution of offices, consider the array of subsequent positions for each person over time. The last office in the data was left in 1850, but the majority of positions were filled and left by 1801, the first year of Jefferson's presidency. Thus, 89 percent of all first positions, 88 percent of all second positions, and 83 percent of all third positions were filled by 1801. Even for those who attained up to seven offices, 67 percent of seventh positions were filled by that year. Likewise, 89 percent of first positions, 80 percent of second positions, and 79 percent of all third positions were vacated by 1801. Finally, considering the distinct categories of offices by administrative level, local level offices (mainly town representatives) were on average obtained more than twice as often as positions at any other level. Similarly, the average proportion of local level offices among all positions (.62) is more than three times as high as the next highest proportion (.20 for county offices). In addition, the proportion of New Light and Separatist Calvinists was slightly higher (.63) than the proportion of Old Lights. The largest numbers of officers came from the Southwest (45 percent) and the Southeast (31 percent), which again confirms the political importance of the two southern counties in the state. Thirteen percent of officers occupied brokerage positions in the credit network, and 26 percent occupied local coordinator positions.

Consider now the coupling of network position and different levels of office holding over time. Table 7 describes temporal changes in the proportion of office levels for brokers, local coordinators, and those coordinators who did not simultaneously occupy brokerage positions.¹⁹ I distinguish the same three historical time periods as before, with one exception. The first period begins later, in 1776, the year when New Hampshire Grants settlers first elected delegates to represent their towns at the early conventions to debate the prospects of an independent state (Comstock 1918). As well, I restricted the analysis to offices that were held no later than 1800.

[Table 7 about here]

The coefficients in each period reflect the proportion within a given administrative level by network position. For instance, 70 percent among the 37 coordinators who ever held an office were elected to at least one office in the first period, 1776-1784. Likewise, out of all brokers who were officers at some point, 72 percent were elected to a local office in the same period. The last two columns in table 7 report odds ratios for shifts in the influence of network position on office attainment across the three periods. Compared are the odds of being elected to a given office level across two successive time periods by structural position. For example, for coordinators, the odds of being elected to county offices increased by 19 percent (OR=1.19) in the third period as compared to the second period (P3 vs. P2). Changes for federal offices cannot be assessed since these positions were filled only in the last of the three periods.

¹⁹ The already small number of brokers who held offices in the sample does not allow breaking the category further down into those who were just brokers, and those who were also coordinators.

The central finding that emerges from this analysis is that over time local coordinators were much more likely than cross-regional brokers to be elected to offices. This pattern is even more pronounced for those who occupied coordinator positions without being a broker as well. Thus, from the first to the second period (P2 vs. P1), the proportion of offices held dropped across office levels and for all three network positions. However, except for brokers holding county offices, this decrease in the likelihood of office attainment is much stronger for brokers than for the two coordinator positions. For brokers of credit ties across regions, the odds of office attainment dropped by 92 percent between the second and the first period. For coordinators in general, by contrast, the odds decreased only by 70 percent, and for coordinators who were not brokers, the odds of being elected decreased by only 57 percent across the same periods. This stark difference between brokers and coordinators is repeated in the shifts from the second to the third period (P3 vs. P2). Here, both categories of coordinators gained significantly across all levels of offices, while brokers remained at the same low proportions of office holding as in the previous period except for gaining two federal offices in 1791.

The most striking result, given the all important role of town representatives in the legislative assembly, is that coordinators compared to brokers were able to obtain so significantly higher proportions of local offices – which are essentially town representatives – between the second and the third period. For coordinators in general, the odds of being elected to local offices increased by 100 percent in the third period as compared to the second period. The odds increased even more for those coordinators who did not occupy brokerage positions (OR=2.79), whereas brokers held the same proportion of local offices (.17) as in the second period (OR=1.00).²⁰

To summarize, at the horizontal level of credit exchanges across regions I find evidence for a strong tendency towards sustained or even increasing localism within the two politically most important regions, the Southwest and the Southeast. The two regions were also shown to represent opposing factional identities expressed in religious affiliation and political alignment. This factional cleavage was matched by a tendency towards increasing segregation of credit ties between the two regions. There is also a corresponding finding at the level of individual network positions. Coordinators, individuals whose structural position in the credit network allowed them to forge local cohesion within regions, were shown to have gained significant influence through the attainment of important offices. For brokers, there was apparently only a narrow window of opportunity for building bridges across increasingly segregated regions and factions. This window opened only in the period from 1776 to 1784 when brokers held a sizeable proportion of political offices.

Later Factions: Federal Politics and Localism

In the mid 1780s, the focus of Vermont's domestic politics shifted towards the issues of increasing debtor grievances caused by the scarcity of money supply, and whether Tories and Yorkers whose estates had been confiscated and sold during the Revolutionary War should be compensated. Governor Chittenden and his old political allies, including the Allens, showed much sympathy for the plight of debtors and those settlers who had bought the estates of Loyalists during the War and improved the lands. The interests of creditors and former Loyalists were represented by a new class of educated lawyers who had moved to Vermont during the War or shortly afterwards. The two most prominent of these new gentlemen were Nathaniel Chipman and Isaac Tichenor. These newcomers were not involved in the experience of the separatist movement and the conflicts between New Hampshire Grants settlers and pro-Yorkers. People like Chipman and Tichenor came to Vermont in search for opportunities to advance their careers and social standing (Austin 1974; Shalhope 1994).

²⁰ A competing argument rests on the vacancy chain property of office attainment: positions had to be vacated by incumbents before others could step in (White 1970). Hence, differences in attainment are observed because some positions were "blocked" by incumbents across periods. Office holding certainly followed a vacancy model, but the argument about a continuous "blocking" over time hardly applies to the annually elected local offices of town representatives. Even offices that were filled for more than a year show increases over time (at least for coordinators). Yet another argument posits that proportions increased in the last period because more townships meant more seats in the assembly to be filled. This argument, however, does not explain why only coordinators increased their share of offices. The results suggest political reasons instead.

Especially Chipman emerged as the major opponent of the Chittenden-Allen faction by forging a coalition of former Yorkers, merchants, lawyers, conservatives like Jacob Bayley, and those supporters of independent Vermont who resented the political influence of the Allens. To break the dominance of the Chittenden-Allen faction, Chipman exposed their secret negotiations with the British Governor of Quebec, General Haldimand, during the Revolutionary War about the possibility of Vermont's return into the Empire. Chipman and federal leaders like Alexander Hamilton and George Washington clearly perceived that the Allens' interest in the state of Vermont was dictated by their desire to secure their New Hampshire land grants in the northwestern Champlain Valley and their economic investments in the trade with Canada (Jones 1939; Williamson 1949).²¹ Aided by another scandal over undeclared land grant transactions involving again Chittenden and Ira Allen, Chipman and his faction succeeded in 1789 to temporarily oust the Chittenden-Allen faction from the government of the state. This political change resulted in the settling of the conflict with New York in 1790, and finally the admission of Vermont to the United States in 1791. As a consequence of these changes, Vermont's domestic politics became increasingly framed in terms of political conflicts at the national level. Members of the Chipman-Tichenor faction became leading Federalists within Vermont, while the members of the Chittenden-Allen faction tended to support the emerging party of Jeffersonian Republicans.

The critical observation here is that the shift of Vermont politics into the national arena of disputes between Federalists and Jeffersonians coincided with the strengthening of localist factions within Vermont that has been demonstrated in the previous section. The results in table 8 illustrate the extent to which the conflict between Federalists and Jeffersonians corresponded to the dimensions of factional politics within Vermont.

[Table 8 about here]

The first major difference concerns former partisanship in support of Vermont or New York. All twenty-one Jeffersonians in this sample had also been supporters of Vermont's independence from New York. Their political preference is also reflected in their pattern of office holding. Not a single one of them ever held a public or military office under New York authority in the territory of Vermont. Yet, nineteen out of these twenty-one Jeffersonians were elected or appointed to offices under Vermont jurisdiction. Likewise, eighteen of them resided in the western part of the state, with 76 percent coming from the Southwest. Indeed, the "Jeffersonian Republican Party in Vermont obtained its greatest support in the Southwest and the Champlain Valley", appealing "primarily to the small farmers" in these regions (Williamson 1949: 258). The previous sections have shown that pro-Vermonters also came predominantly from the Southwest and Northwest of the state. As well, the majority among these western pro-Vermonters (66 percent, see table 2) adhered to the New Light and Separatist persuasions. Again, a similar or even clearer tendency can be found among Jeffersonians: seventeen out of twenty were New Lights or Separatist Calvinists. In other words, members of the Jeffersonian Republican party at the level of national politics found an almost exact counterpart in the factional divisions at the level of domestic politics within Vermont.

Republicans in Vermont were "loyal followers of Ethan Allen and Thomas Paine, inspired by the French Revolution" (Roth 1987: 68). They strove to continue the radical democratic heritage of Vermont's independence movement in favor of popular government and the egalitarian fervor of New Light and Separate Church doctrines. As defenders of Vermont's republican past they embodied Jefferson's ideal of the uncorrupted morality of a "Yeomen Republic" (Elkins and McKittrick 1993). All they could discern in the elitist federal policies of Hamilton was a return to the aristocracy of the Tories. Thus, Matthew Lyon, a former indentured Irish servant and main opponent

²¹ Alexander Hamilton expressed the concern about Vermont's political loyalties in his speech to the New York assembly in March 1787: "Vermont is in fact *independent*, but she is not *confederated*. And I am constrained to add, that the means which they employ to secure that independence, are objects of the utmost alarm to the safety of this state, & to the confederation at large. [...] I say, is it not probable, under such circumstances, they will provide for their own safety, by seeking connections elsewhere? And who that hears me, doubts, but that these connections have *already* been formed with the British in Canada" (Walton 1875, vol. III., p.423).

of Chipman within Vermont, declared when "the struggles commenced between aristocrats and democrats, nature, reflection and patriotism led me to take the Democratic side" (cited in Elkins and McKittrick 1993: 709).

Leading Federalists in Vermont resented this populist impulse against the standing order and the lack of respect for authority, unity, and morality. The Republicans' support for the egalitarian ideals of the French Revolution and the emergence of Democratic Societies in Vermont led Nathaniel Chipman to deplore that the "Gallic Mania still rages" (cited in Williamson 1949: 265). Unlike Jeffersonian Republicanism, the more conservative ideals of the Federalists matched the traditional and hierarchical worldview of former Old Light and Anglican defenders of New York authority in southeastern Windham County, "encompassing social stratification, deference to natural social leaders, consensual communal homogeneity, and a deeply ingrained obsession with social harmony and order" (Smith 1996: 202; see Roth 1987: 68-79). Hence, as the results in table 8 show, in marked contrast to the undivided support of Jeffersonians for Vermont independence, nine out of eighteen Federalists in this sample advocated New York's authority on the Grants. While most of these Federalists held Vermont offices like the Republicans, at least seventeen percent of twenty-eight Federalists also held New York offices. The pattern becomes even crisper with respect to religious affiliation. Twenty out of twenty-three leading Federalists were Old Light Calvinists or Anglicans, compared to a small minority of three New Lights and Separates among them. While Jeffersonians came predominantly from the West, Federalists in this sample were more diverse and resided both in the western and the eastern half of the state. Other sources, however, indicate that the support for Jeffersonians in the West was compensated by much stronger support for the Federalist Party in the eastern Connecticut Valley than the present results suggest (Williamson 1949: 260). For instance, Smith (1981: 886) finds strong evidence for the concentration of Federalists in southeastern Windham County, where fifteen out of sixteen Federalists were affiliated with Old Lights or Anglicans, and sixty-three percent of them sided with the pro-Yorker faction.

The general conclusion then is that the national battles between Jeffersonian Republicans and Hamiltonian Federalists fell on an already fertile ideological ground within Vermont. The division between the two national level factions corresponded closely to the main factional cleavages that were in place in Vermont since the Revolution and the state's struggle for independence: "Federalist and Republican ideologues...charged all political debate with memories of past battles" (Roth 1987:72). The pattern is rather unambiguous. At both the national and the local level political conflicts were expressed along equivalent contrasts: popular rule, egalitarianism, revolution, and progression on the one hand, the rule of able leaders, elitism, hierarchy, tradition and communal order on the other hand. In other words, leaders of localist factions within Vermont did not have to adopt new national ideologies to serve their local interests. Instead, the shift of domestic horizontal conflicts into the national arena served to reinforce factional identities within Vermont and the move towards stronger localism revealed above. Accordingly, as the distribution of network positions in table 8 shows, the proportion of local coordinators in both political parties is at least twice as high as the proportion of brokers that crosscut divisions. Thus, relying on a firm social structural foundation for strong localism, factional politics in Vermont were cast in a similar oppositional rhetoric as those on the national level.

CONCLUSION

Studies of modern state building have tended to focus on the vertical relation between national state builders and defenders of localism. In the majority of historical cases, localism is shown to fall victim to state formation and political centralization. Here, I have drawn on one historical example, revolutionary Vermont, to show that state making does not inevitably lead to the demise of localism, but that it may actually sustain and foster it.

During the late eighteenth-century, Vermont's domestic politics were characterized by intense conflicts between factions with strong local attachments. The new state was created through secession from New York. Unlike the thirteen original members of the Union, Vermont lacked a unifying political identity and community. In the absence of such a collective identity, Vermonters

reverted to their localist identities, which in turn translated into opposing factions concerning the politics of the new state.

The historical evidence reveals that factional cleavages were by and large congruent with localist identities. Localism in early Vermont rested on categorical homogeneity within factions, primarily with respect to religious affiliation, political worldviews, and migration histories. In addition, the sectional geography of the state, especially the Green Mountain chain, determined settlement patterns, and hence economic geography, both of which further consolidated the categorical differences. Thus, the organization of factional politics was patterned on ecological homogeneity as well.

Social networks provided the relational foundation for the categorical markers of localism and factional identities. In particular, I have shown how factional politics were grounded in networks of credit exchanges. Although the reason for their widespread usage – the shortage of money supply – was seemingly exogenous to political concerns, these structures of economic exchange operated as vehicles of factional interests. Two central findings emerge from the analysis of the link between credit networks and localist factions.

The first finding is that the regional distribution of credit ties exhibits a crisp pattern of increasing segregation between the two focal regions of the factional divide. At the same time, the structure of credit ties within these regions reveals an equally strong tendency towards cohesion. A parallel process is found at the level of individual network positions. Here, it can be shown that individuals who occupied network positions of brokerage across regions and factions were increasingly barred from influential political offices. In stark contrast, coordinators who brokered network ties within their own region/faction took control of these influential political offices. Thus, over time the structure of the credit network shifted significantly towards segregation and local cohesion. Another way to interpret this result is to say that the persistence of cleavages between localist factions was the unintended by-product of the pursuit of economic interest.

The second finding is that the structural change towards increasing localism coincided quite precisely with a vertical shift of Vermont's domestic politics into the political conflicts between Jeffersonian Republicans and Federalists at the national level due to Vermont's admission to the United States. There were certainly avenues for cooptation of local elites by national elites as in similar historical circumstances (Gould 1996, 1998; Kettering 1988; Tilly 1976). In early Vermont, however, I found evidence for the coupling of local and national level identities and factions that operated through a process of escalation (Schwartz 1976). Whereas cooptation tends to pull local elites into the national arena, escalation in Vermont meant that both frames of identity, local and national factional alignments, were organized around equivalent pairs of binary categorical oppositions. The nontrivial consequence is that the evocation of national politics almost directly resonated with the lines of conflict on the local level. In other words, parallel to the structural consolidation of localism, the gradual integration of Vermont into the process of state building at the national level strengthened the categorical foundations of localist factions.

The relatively clear-cut structural pattern of factional alliances also suggests another reason for the success of localism over political centralization in the early Vermont republic. That structure consisted of nested pairs of binary oppositions (New York vs. Vermont, New Light vs. Old Light Calvinists, East vs. West, gentry vs. yeomen). The clear divisions and homogeneous alliances resulting from this structure did not permit state makers to pursue the strategic maneuvers as political brokers that have been observed in other historical contexts (Padgett and Ansell 1993). With respect to social networks, political brokers were unable to monopolize ties across factions to exert tight control as the only available bridge among otherwise disconnected actors. As well, to outsiders, Americans and British alike, Vermont's early stance on foreign policy oftentimes appeared rather ambiguous, the secretive Haldimand negotiations being only the most prominent example. Those embedded into Vermont's domestic politics, however, were also locked into a binary coded political system that left little room for sophisticated strategizing based on "multivocality", where "single actions can be interpreted coherently from multiple perspectives simultaneously" (Padgett and Ansell 1993: 1263). One had to support either Vermont or New York, but not both – and whoever favored

New York quickly found himself accused of being a Loyalist in opposition to the Revolution. The strength of localism left few political choices.

APPENDIX A: TIMING AND VALUES OF NETWORK TIES

This appendix addresses some methodological issues arising from the temporal distribution and the values of credit network ties included in the sample.

Exact dates are available for 269 credit ties. Since the date of the commissioners' report is available for all credit exchanges, I use the time lag between the date of ties and associated report date to impute the temporal distribution of undated credit relations. For dated credit ties, the mean time difference between credit exchanges and commissioners' reports is three years, but for more than 80 percent of the ties, the time difference is no more than four years. Since the distribution is so skewed, I use the median of two years rather than the mean to distribute undated exchanges. Hence, all credit ties for which no exact date is available are dated back two years from the date of the commissioners' or administrator's report, whichever is earlier. This timing procedure is not arbitrary. For instance, Grant (1961: 67) found a similar time window for early Connecticut inventories. As well, this durational distribution is apparently not unique to eighteenth-century America. For example, Rosenthal (1994) shows that long-term credits notes were also rare in eighteenth-century Burgundy, and short-term notes tended to be outstanding for less than a year on average before being repaid. In addition, I found no evidence that inclusion of dates during the probate process is systematically biased. Dates for credit exchanges were listed for comparatively wealthy decedents as well as for insolvent estates. Likewise, the proportion of records that contain dates does not systematically change over time. Finally, idiosyncratic recordkeeping can be ruled out since the same judges, clerks and commissioners were responsible for records with dates and records without dates.

The results on credit ties reported in table 3 are calculated on the basis of this design. Unlike the global distribution of relationships displayed in that table, the issue of temporal change is a different one for individual level positions such as brokers and coordinators. Stated most simply, the issue is that the credit network ties are recorded in the probate files of dead people only. It follows that the information on credit ties is significantly sparser for those cases that are still alive, and especially for those I am most interested in, i.e. the politically active ones. For example, the first period in the analyses above (1776-1784) comprises a much sparser network than later periods. Many influential persons who were coded as brokers or coordinators across all time points would even be excluded if such network positions were defined as period-specific – not because they were less important in the first period, but simply because they had not died by that time. It is needless to say that every effort was made to determine if individuals who occupied important network positions were still alive in the period under study. However, the data limitation just described forces me to measure brokerage and coordinator positions as time-invariant variables. Temporal changes in relation to office holding are then interpreted in analogy to time-varying effects of covariates in a regression context, where the value of a covariate for individual observations remains the same throughout, but the estimated coefficient may change across periods.

Another issue concerns the values of network ties, i.e. the amounts of money involved in the credit exchanges. The analyses reported here are based on a dichotomous coding of network ties (presence versus absence of a relation between two individuals), which disregards their particular values (but retains the direction of ties in the adjacency matrix). The core meta-theoretical argument of this article is that the formation of collective identities is tied to shifts in the structural patterns of social networks. In this view, it is the pattern of a social network that matters, and not the particular values of the relationships that form the network. A simple test of the robustness of this argument is to compare the distribution of credit tie values across the three periods used in the analyses above. The results for a sample of 2,281 credit ties whose values are denoted in pounds and shilling demonstrate that the value distribution does not significantly change over time. Mean comparisons of the amount of money for period 1 (£8), period 2 (£7, 14s.), and period 3 (£9, 9s.) show no statistically significant differences. Likewise, the median amounts and interquartile ranges (iqr) of tie values for period 1 (median=£1, 15s.; iqr=£5, 10s.), period 2 (median=£1, 15s.; iqr=£5, 9s.), and period 3 (median=£1, 8s.; iqr=£3, 11s.) are essentially equivalent. The returns suggest that the averages are inflated by outliers. For comparison, in the probate records, “one pair of stockings” was evaluated at 5½s. in 1789, a doctor's “visit and council” could range between 2s. and £2, 14s. in the

same year, and “one Yoke Oxen” could cost as much as £10, and “six Sheep” £2, 6s.in 1786. However, the central conclusion here is that the distribution of values on credit ties remains essentially the same across the three periods of concern, and thus does not affect the analyzed shifts in the structural pattern of ties.

APPENDIX B: CODING OF VERMONT OFFICES

Local offices:	Town representatives in the Vermont Assembly Town delegates to early conventions, 1776-1777 Town representatives at Constitutional Conventions Town clerks
County offices:	Highway surveyor Members of Committee of Safety Judges of special courts, Clerk, Sheriff, Probate Judges in Bennington and Cumberland Counties, 1778 County Judges, Assistant Judges, County Clerk, Sheriff, Constable, State Attorneys, and Probate Judges after 1778
State offices:	Governor, Lt. Governor, Treasurer, Secretary of State, Attorney General, Auditors of Accounts, Justices of Vermont Supreme Court, Justices of Circuit Court, Superior Judges Members of the Council of Safety (1778) Members of the Council (1778 and later) Secretaries to the Governor and Council Speaker and Clerk of the House Members of Council of Censors Collectors (until 1791)
Federal offices:	Senators in Congress Representatives in Congress Presidential electors Judges of the U.S. District Court District Attorneys Marshalls Clerks of the District Court Collectors of Customs

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Table 1.—Measurement of variables

Variable	Description	Data sources
Early Faction	=1 if member of pro-Vermont faction, =0 if member of pro-Yorker faction	Fisher and Fisher (1992); Smith (1981; 1996)
Religion	=1 if Radical Calvinist (Separates, New Lights and related sects), =0 if Arminian (Old Light, Anglican and related persuasion)	Smith (1981; 1996)
Residence	Set of dummy variables for Southwest Vermont (Bennington Co.), Northwest (Rutland, Addison, Chittenden Co.), Southeast (Windham Co.), Northeast (Windsor, Orange, Essex Co.), or outside of Vermont. =1 if resided in respective region, =0 otherwise	Probate data; Comstock (1918); 1790 and 1800 census; Fisher and Fisher (1992); Smith (1981; 1996)
VT office	=1 if any office held under Vermont authority, =0 otherwise For coding of administrative levels of Vermont office, see appendix B.	Comstock (1918); Fisher and Fisher (1992)
NY office	=1 if any office under New York authority held in Vermont, =0 otherwise	Smith (1981); Fisher and Fisher (1992)
Later Faction	Late political allegiance =1 if supporter of Jeffersonian Republican Party, =0 if supporter of Federalist Party.	Austin (1974); Smith (1981); Shalhope (1994)
In-/Outdegree	Number of credit ties received from debtors (indegree) and sent to creditors (outdegree)	Probate data
Coordinator	=1 if coordinator of credit relations within regions, =0 otherwise	Probate data
Broker	=1 if broker of credit relations between regions, =0 otherwise	Probate data

Table 2.—Frequencies of Attributes by Early Political Faction (N=283)

	Pro-VT	Pro-Yorker	Sig. diff. (<i>p</i>)
<i>Religion:</i>			
New Light, Separatist*	129 (.66)	1 (.01)	.000
Old Light, Anglican	21 (.11)	69 (.78)	.000
Religion unknown	44 (.23)	19 (.21)	.802
<i>Residence:</i>			
Southwest	122 (.63)	5 (.06)	.000
Southeast	22 (.11)	71 (.81)	.000
Northwest*	29 (.15)	1 (.01)	.000
Northeast	16 (.08)	9 (.10)	.608
Other region	5 (.03)	2 (.02)	.868
<i>Office holding:</i>			
VT office	88 (.45)	33 (.37)	.191
NY office	5 (.03)	35 (.39)	.000
<i>Credit Network:</i>			
Indegree: mean number of debtors**	5.93 (1.15)	2.42 (.17)	.003
Outdegree: mean number of creditors**	3.73 (.28)	2.70 (.17)	.002
Coordinator	47 (.24)	10 (.11)	.011
Broker	23 (.12)	9 (.10)	.667
<i>N</i> in faction	194	89	

Note: Proportion within faction in parentheses.

* One cell count smaller than 5.

** Weighted sample means, standard errors in parentheses.

**Table 3.— Credit Ties Sent Within and Across Vermont Regions, 1768-1800
(departures from chance expectations)**

Debtors' residence	Creditors' residence				Total ties sent
	Southwest	Southeast	Northwest	Northeast	
<i>Period 1, 1768-84:</i>					
Southwest	.23	-.37	.20	-.05	350
Southeast	-.58	.53	-.05	.11	51
Northwest	.31	-.14	-.12	-.05	82
Northeast	.04	-.02	-.02	-.01	10
Total ties received	384	40	54	15	N=493
<i>Period 2, 1785-90:</i>					
Southwest	.31	-.38	.08	-.01	569
Southeast	-.58	.58	-.03	.04	182
Northwest	.22	-.16	-.04	-.02	217
Northeast	.06	-.04	-.02	-.01	83
Total ties received	854	147	35	15	N=1051
<i>Period 3, 1791-1800:</i>					
Southwest	.47	-.53	.06	0	845
Southeast	-.48	.52	-.04	0	233
Northwest	.02	-.01	-.01	0	38
Northeast	-.02	.02	-.01	0	27
Total ties received	792	250	77	24	N=1143

Note: Coefficients report departures from chance levels of credit exchanges as defined by row and column marginals. Difference (D) in the number of ties (x) for region A in period (t) is defined as $D_t(A) = (x_t - E(x_t)) / \sigma_t$.

**Table 4.1.—Salience of credit tie volume for political office
(means comparison, standard errors in parentheses)**

	Officeholders	No office
Indegree: number of debtors	2.85 (.26)	1.12 (.06)
Outdegree: number of creditors	3.79 (.23)	1.07 (.02)
<i>N</i>	143	3535

Note: Estimates are weighted sample means.

Both differences between officers and non-officers are significant at $p=.000$.

**Table 4.2.—Salience of network position for political office
(comparison of proportions)**

Compared positions	<i>N</i>	Prop. Officeholders	Sig. diff. (<i>p</i>)
Broker vs. Non-Broker	131 3547	.14 .04	.000
Coordinator vs. Non-Coordinator	231 3447	.16 .03	.000
Broker, not coordinator vs. Broker and coordinator	72 59	.08 .20	.047
Coordinator, not broker vs. Coordinator and broker	172 59	.15 .20	.294

**Table 5.—Logistic Regression of Vermont Office holding
(Weighted Pseudo-Likelihood Estimates)**

	Model (1)		Model (2)		Model (3)		Model (4)	
	Odds Ratio	95% c.i.	Odds Ratio	95% c.i.	Odds Ratio	95% c.i.	Odds Ratio	95% c.i.
New Light	** .49	.37–.64	** .47	.36–.61	** .50	.38–.67	** .46	.35–.60
Pro-VT	**3.21	2.40–4.29	**3.21	2.44–4.20	**3.06	2.27–4.11	**3.22	2.45–4.24
Southeast	1.10	.94–1.30	1.07	.91–1.25	1.17	.99–1.37	1.11	.94–1.30
NY office	1.08	.93–1.26	1.02	.87–1.19	1.02	.88–1.19	.99	.85–1.17
N debtors			** .98	.97–.99			** .98	.97–.99
N creditors			**1.03	1.02–1.04			**1.03	1.02–1.05
Broker					*.71	.55–.91	** .53	.39–.71
Coordinator					**2.01	1.61–2.51	**1.70	1.36–2.14
N	220		220		220		220	
F-test	**19.70		**26.88		**19.36		**22.55	

Note: * $p = .006$ ** $p \leq .000$

Table 6.—Summary Statistics for Vermont Officeholders

	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Total positions	143	3.48	3.17	1	16
Prop. Reelected	135	.72	.45	0	1
Tenure	132	9.58	10.07	1	41
Total office overlaps	142	1.93	2.99	0	12
Total distinct positions:					
All offices	143	2.71	2.15	1	9
Local offices	140	1.32	.91	0	4
County offices	140	.64	.88	0	4
State offices	140	.61	1.02	0	5
Federal offices*	140	.18	.48	0	3
Average prop. distinct positions:					
Local offices	140	.62	.40	0	1
County offices	140	.20	.30	0	1
State offices	140	.15	.25	0	1
Federal offices*	140	.03	.09	0	.50
Prop. New Light, Separatist	128	.63	.48	0	1
Prop. Southwest	143	.45	.50	0	1
Prop. Southeast	143	.31	.46	0	1
Prop. Northwest	143	.14	.35	0	1
Prop. Northeast	143	.10	.30	0	1
Prop. Broker	143	.13	.33	0	1
Prop. Coordinator	143	.26	.44	0	1

Note: See Appendix B for coding of office holding levels.

Differences in the number of observations are due to missing cases.

* Federal offices became available after Vermont's admission to the Union in 1791.

Table 7.—Proportion of Vermont Officers by Structural Position, 1776-1800

	Period 1: 1776-84	Period 2: 1785-90	Period 3: 1791-1800	P2 vs. P1 (odds ratio)	P3 vs. P2 (odds ratio)
Brokers (N=18)					
All offices	.83	.28	.33	.08	1.26
Local offices	.72	.17	.17	.08	1.00
County offices	.22	.22	.17	1.00	.71
State offices	.22	.17	.17	.71	1.00
Federal offices*			.11		
Coordinators (N=37)					
All offices	.70	.41	.49	.30	1.39
Local offices	.54	.14	.24	.17	2.00
County offices	.19	.14	.16	.70	1.19
State offices	.27	.24	.30	.86	1.34
Federal offices*			.08		
Coordinators, not Brokers (N=25)					
All offices	.68	.48	.56	.43	1.38
Local offices	.48	.12	.28	.15	2.79
County offices	.20	.12	.16	.56	1.36
State offices	.28	.24	.32	.82	1.47
Federal offices*			.08		

Note: See Appendix B for coding of office holding levels.

* Federal offices became available after Vermont's admission to the Union in 1791.

**Table 8.—Frequencies of Attributes by Later Political Faction
(Proportion within faction in parentheses)**

	Federalists	Jeffersonians
<i>Early Faction Membership:</i>		
Pro-Vermont	9 (.50)	17 (1.00)
Pro-New York	9 (.50)	0
<i>Religion:</i>		
New Light, Separatist	3 (.13)	17 (.85)
Old Light, Anglican	20 (.87)	3 (.15)
<i>Residence:</i>		
Southwest	9 (.31)	16 (.76)
Southeast	10 (.34)	2 (.10)
Northwest	6 (.21)	2 (.10)
Northeast	4 (.14)	1 (.04)
<i>Office holding:</i>		
VT office	23 (.79)	19 (.90)
NY office	5 (.17)	0
<i>Credit Network:</i>		
Coordinator	6 (.21)	10 (.48)
Broker	2 (.07)	5 (.24)
<i>N in faction</i>	29	21

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