

The Expectancy Account of Deception in Negotiations

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
under the Executive Committee
of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

2017

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ABSTRACT

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Who lies in negotiations—and when and why? While research has considered many factors, an important and understudied determinant is people's expectancies about others. I argue that negotiators' expectations about other people can help predict their own deceptive behavior. Chapter I explores how projection and pessimism shape deceptive behavior. Studies 1a-1d investigated negotiators' expectancies and found evidence of projection and of rampant pessimism; negotiators consistently overestimated the percentage of other people who shared their own beliefs and the percentage of people who thought deception was appropriate in negotiations. Study 2 found that expectancies about others' ethical standards predicted the degree to which negotiators were misleading or dishonest in negotiations. Study 3 manipulated expectancies and found that a higher perceived prevalence of gamers led to more misleading or dishonest behavior. Negotiators' decisions to engage in deception were heavily influenced by an exaggerated pessimism about others' ethical standards. In supplementary analyses, Chapter I also briefly addresses how expectancies about a specific counterpart's level of deception shape deceptive behavior. Finally, Chapter II investigates how stereotypes shape deceptive behavior in negotiations, using the stereotype content model, which suggests that social groups are judged on two primary dimensions of warmth and competence. Study 1 provided evidence that deceptive negotiators are perceived to possess less warmth and greater competence than truthful negotiators. Study 2 showed that people from cold competent groups are perceived as more deceptive than people from warm incompetent groups. Study 3 tested actual behavior and

demonstrated that manipulating the social category membership of a counterpart affected deception in a negotiation situation. Expectancies play a critical and understudied role in influencing a negotiator's decision to be deceptive.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author would like to thank Malia Mason for being her mentor and primary advisor. The author would also like to thank Daniel Ames, Adam Galinsky, and Naomi Rothman for being coauthors and mentors, Francesca Gino for being a mentor and Harvard Program on Negotiation sponsor, and Thalia Wheatley for making her believe a Ph.D. was possible.

The author would like to thank her family, Robert Wiley, Nancy Wiley, Katherine Wiley, and Megan Wiley, for their love and unconditional support. Finally, the author would like to thank her friends for keeping her spirits up through all challenges of the past seven years.

DEDICATION

For anyone who has overcome significant obstacles

Introduction

Opportunities for deception are common in negotiations (Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000; O'Connor & Carnevale, 1997). Parties often have incomplete information and face uncertainty about each other's intentions, leaving ample room to deceive and be deceived. In keeping with previous negotiation scholars, I¹ define deception as a deliberate attempt to mislead another party by presenting incorrect information (Bok, 1978; Lewicki, 1983) and/or by concealing or misrepresenting information upon which a partner relies when deciding to transact a deal (Shell, 1991). With some frequency, negotiators actively present incorrect information (Lewicki, 1983) and passively welcome their counterparts to draw and act on incorrect inferences (Murnighan, 1991). And yet with some frequency, negotiators are candid and forthright even when doing so is costly. Given considerable variance in these important behaviors, a set of questions has attracted generations of scholars: Who lies in the course of bargaining—and when and why?

Existing research has put forth many answers to these questions. One group of answers to these questions revolves around the individual characteristics of negotiators, such as competitive orientation (Schweitzer & DeChurch, 2005), greed (Steinel & De Dreu, 2004), Machiavellianism (Fry, 1985; Huber & Neale, 1986), and envy (Moran & Schweitzer, 2008). Other groups of answers focus on motivational characteristics like temptation (Tenbrunsel, 1998) and unmet goals (Schweitzer, Ordóñez, & Douma, 2004), situational characteristics like mode of communication (Valley, Moag, & Bazerman, 1998; Schweitzer, Brodt, & Croson, 2002) and consequences of lying (Gaspar & Schweitzer, 2013), and relational characteristics like trust

¹ For rhetorical convenience, I use the term “I” to refer to a research team that includes collaborators.

(Olekalns, Kulik, & Chew, 2014) and expected length of the relationship between the parties (Boles et al., 2000; Lewicki & Spencer, 1991). While research has considered many factors, an important and understudied determinant is people's expectancies about others.

I argue that negotiators' expectancies about other people can help predict their own deceptive behavior. Expectancies are anticipatory beliefs about how others typically behave or how they would behave in certain circumstances (Bandura, 1969; 1977; Mischel, 1968; 1973). Expectancies guide information-processing, shape how any data that are gathered are interpreted, and provide broad roadmaps for our behavior (for review see Roese & Sherman, 2007). In the chapters that follow, I investigate how four different sources of deceptive expectancies—projection, pessimism, specific counterpart expectancies, and stereotypes about a counterpart's social group—affect a negotiator's decision to engage in deception. Chapter I explores how projection and pessimism shape deceptive behavior. In some supplementary analyses, Chapter I also briefly addresses how expectancies about a specific counterpart's level of deceptiveness shape deceptive behavior. Finally, Chapter II investigates how stereotypes based on a counterpart's group membership shape deceptive behavior.

Chapter I: Projection and Pessimism at the Table

Expectancies play an important and understudied role in influencing a negotiator's decision to be deceptive. Expectancies are anticipatory beliefs about how others do and will behave. A long tradition of work in psychology has cast expectancies as playing a central role in shaping behavior (Bandura, 1969; 1977; Mischel, 1968; 1973). The basic tenets of these theories state that people develop expectancies about how others will behave based on learning and experience (Bandura, 1969) and these expectancies about others, in turn, guide how people behave in social interactions (Mischel, 1973; Bandura, 1977). When an individual's expectancies about other people's behavior change, so does their behavior (Mischel, 1968). Expectancies can affect behavior beyond the impact of values and preferences; based on expectancies, people may act differently than their values alone would prescribe.

Research shows that expectancies can play an important role in conflict and negotiation behavior. Expectancies about counterparts being cooperative or competitive shape cooperative versus competitive behavior (Kelly & Stahleski, 1970), choice of integrative versus distributive strategies (Weingart, Brett, Olekalns, & Smith, 2007), the giving and withholding of accurate and inaccurate information (Steinel & De Dreu, 2004), and self-reported willingness to engage in unethical tactics (Pierce, Kilduff, Galinsky, & Sivanathan, 2013). Negotiators' expectancies about how their counterparts will react to their behavior influences the form and extremity of their proposals (e.g., Ames, 2008; Ames & Mason, 2015). Here, I build on, and go beyond, past research by considering how expectancies about other people's ethical standards shape negotiators' behavior. I expected to find that negotiators' expectancies about others' willingness to deceive in negotiations would shape their own deceptive behavior. Before tracing a link

between expectancies and behavior, though, I sought to identify where such expectancies might come from.

Sources of Expectancies. I suspected that one source for expectancies would be projection. That is, negotiators' assumptions about others' attitudes will often reflect their own attitudes. Considerable research reveals that people overestimate the percentage of others who share their beliefs and values (Krueger, 2000; Robbins & Krueger, 2005; Ross, Greene, & House, 1977). This "false consensus" effect bears out in negotiations as well: More prosocial negotiators expect their opponents to cooperate, whereas selfish negotiators expect their opponents to compete (van Kleef & De Dreu, 2002). Similar results have been found in the context of social dilemmas (e.g., Krueger & Acevedo, 2007). In the context of deception, I expected to find considerable projection, with people overestimating the percentage of others who share their views about deception. People who think lying in negotiations is appropriate will overestimate the percentage of people who share this attitude.

It could be that projection is the primary or dominant source of expectancies about others' views of deception. If so, my argument that these expectations about others play a role beyond one's own view would hold little meaning. If expectancies are simply an echo of one's own views, they can hardly provide additional explanatory power in accounting for behavior. In contrast to this *predominant-projection* perspective, I believe there is another important source of expectancies often at work: pessimism. I define pessimism as possessing negative expectancies about others. That is, aside from their own view of deception, negotiators often overestimate the degree to which others embrace deceptive tactics.

Given that self-interest is normative and prescribed in some cultures (Miller, 1999), people may assume that others endorse deception as a means to maximize personal gain

(Schwartz, 1986). In fact, they may *overestimate* other people's willingness to deceive for personal gain. Such a possibility is consistent with evidence that people overestimate the extent to which others' beliefs and actions are motivated by self-interest (Miller & Ratner, 1996; 1998). I suggest that just as people overestimate the impact of self-interest on others' behavior, so too will they overestimate the share of people who embrace deceiving others in negotiations. I expect to find widespread pessimism about other people's views on deception.

In sum, one possibility for expectancies about deception in negotiation is that projection predominates: people generally assume that others have the same views they themselves do. If so, harnessing expectancies to predict deceptive behavior (beyond the influence of self-views) would be pointless. In contrast, I believe another force is often operating on these expectancies: pessimism: people may reliably overestimate the share of others who embrace deceptive tactics, regardless of their own personal attitude about those tactics. Thus, expectancies may reflect not only projection but also pessimism. To the extent that this is true, then both projection and pessimism about deception in negotiation might add to our ability to predict and explain deceptive behavior.

Impact on Deceptive Behavior. I anticipate that many negotiators will show pessimism in their expectations of others. I also anticipate that these expectancies will vary across negotiators and that this variance in pessimism can be harnessed to predict deceptive behavior.

The idea of pessimistic expectations begetting deception is consistent with the idea of moral pragmatism, where people see honesty as less necessary when they doubt others' trustworthiness (Dees & Cramton, 1991). Indeed, honesty, even if it is a preferred strategy, might be seen as foolhardy in the face of inevitable or widespread deception. People often become

more aggressive and unethical in competitive contexts because they believe the other party will do the same (Epley, Caruso, & Bazerman, 2006; Pierce et al., 2013).

My prediction that deception increases with pessimism stands in contrast to *opportunistic deception*, a dynamic in which deception increases when a counterpart is perceived as benevolent and trustworthy (Olekalns & Smith, 2007). According to the opportunistic model, optimistic expectancies increase deception because benevolent and trustworthy counterparts are seen as less likely to catch an act of deception and less likely to punish deception harshly. Although some past evidence supports this alternative, I predict that pessimism will increase the use of deception in negotiation because I think the fear of being exploited will dominate the greed of being able to exploit.

While the past portrait of a deceptive negotiator is a calculative schemer, my portrait is another species of deceptive negotiator: the paranoid cynic. It is likely that both species of deceiver exists in the population and that some individuals' deceptive behavior is driven by both of these concerns.

Predictions and Plan of Study. The studies in Chapter I test two main predictions. First, I test the idea that pessimism emerges in peoples' expectancies about others' attitudes toward deception in negotiation, above and beyond the impact of projection. This stands in contrast to a *predominant-projection* alternative and is a necessary result for my account to have meaning (i.e., if expectations are simply projections of self-views, these expectations offer no additional predictive power for behavior). My second prediction is that pessimistic expectancies will positively predict deceptive behavior. This stands in contrast to an opportunistic deception account whereby pessimism would be negatively associated with deceptive behavior.

I believe these ideas are worth testing because, if borne out, they can expand our understanding of the nature of deceptive behavior in social exchange. If expectancies and pessimism do account for some share of deception, it opens up the possibility for interventions that alter deception by challenging or changing negotiators' (potentially incorrect) beliefs rather than their values.

I tested my predictions in a series of studies. Studies 1a-1d surveyed participants' beliefs about their own and others' ethical standards, looking for evidence of projection and pessimism across multiple samples of adults. I expected negotiators to simultaneously overestimate the percentage of people who share their own views and overestimate the percentage of people who think deception is appropriate in negotiations. Study 2 investigated how these expectancies shape behavior, testing for a link between pessimistic perceptions of what the average person considers morally permissible in negotiations and dishonest behavior in six negotiations that took place over the course of six weeks. Study 3 manipulated expectancies about other people's ethical standards, focusing on whether manipulating expectancies changes rates of deceptive behavior in a hypothetical negotiation.

In my studies, I use three categories for characterizing people's beliefs about the appropriateness of deception in negotiations: *gamers* (who consider negotiations to be like a poker game and believe deception is appropriate), *pragmatists* (who weigh the costs and benefits of deception, keeping both material welfare and moral ideals in mind), and *idealists* (who have high ethical standards in negotiations and do not believe in using deception as a matter of principle). These schools of thought correspond to established categories like those used by Dees and Crampton (1991)—opportunists, pragmatists, and idealists—and Richard Shell (2006) in his popular negotiation book.

Study 1a

Study 1a investigated whether Masters of Business Administration (MBA) students both project their own ethical views onto and exhibit pessimism about their peers.

Method

Participants

Participants were 230 MBA students (55% male; mean age = 28.2 years; 4% African/African-American, 26% Asian/Pacific Islander, 56% Caucasian/White, 7% Latino/Hispanic, 5% other, and 2% no response) who completed the survey as part of a course requirement before the initial class session. For Study 1a and all subsequent studies, I report all measures collected. Sample size was determined by available class size.

Materials and Procedure

Prior to the first day of class participants completed an online survey² which explained that there are many different schools of thought about negotiations and what behaviors are expected or acceptable. Participants were instructed to reflect on the extent to which they agreed with three schools of thought:

As a *game*: Negotiation is a game where some amount of deception and tricks are natural and expected. Negotiators must use every play at their disposal to outwit their opponent or else risk being tricked and defeated in return.

As *costs and benefits*: Negotiation is a complex situation where people face tradeoffs and uncertainty. Negotiators should weigh costs and benefits in deciding how to behave (e.g., to lie, to cooperate, and so forth).

As a *matter of principle*: Negotiation is like all other domains in professional life where ethics and integrity should apply. Negotiators should hold themselves and one another to high standards for professional behavior.

² All study materials are included in the appendix.

Participants were asked to rank the three schools for how closely they reflected their own approach to negotiations, giving the view that most closely matched their own a “1” and the view that least closely matched their own a “3”. Participants then indicated what percentage of their classmates they thought would rank each of the views with a “1.”

Results

Projection. I found evidence of projection. The more highly participants ranked each school, the more prevalent they believed their response was (“as a game” rank predicting gamer prevalence: $b = -.37$, $t(214) = -5.79$, $p < .001$; “as costs and benefits” rank predicting pragmatist prevalence: $b = -.34$, $t(214) = -5.33$, $p < .001$; “as a matter of principle” rank predicting idealist prevalence: $b = -.36$, $t(214) = -5.68$, $p < .001$). Moreover, members of each school thought there was a significantly higher percentage of people in their own school than did non-members (gamers: $t(214) = 5.26$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.15$; pragmatists: $t(214) = 5.48$, $p < .001$, $d = .77$; idealists: $t(214) = 5.40$, $p < .001$, $d = .73$; see Table 1).

Pessimism. When I compared the actual percentage of participants who ranked each school with a “1” with participants’ estimates of the percentage of classmates who gave each school a “1,” I found substantial differences (Table 1). Consistent with my expectations about pessimism, participants dramatically overestimated the percentage of gamers, $t(225) = 21.19$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.41$.

Table 1

Actual Versus Perceived Percentages by Negotiators' Category

Study 1a MBA Sample

<u>Perceptions</u>	<u>Gamers</u>	<u>Pragmatists</u>	<u>Idealists</u>	<u>All</u>	<u>Reality</u>
% Gamers	50.1% (17.5%)	31.4% (15.0%)	30.2% (16.9%)	33.3% (16.6%)	9.7% Gamers
% Pragmatists	30.2% (11.8%)	45.6% (14.7%)	36.6% (12.7%)	41.0% (14.6%)	59.3% Pragmatists
% Idealists	19.7% (9.4%)	23.0% (11.4%)	33.2% (17.6%)	25.9% (14.3%)	31.0% Idealists

Study 1b US Adult Sample

<u>Perceptions</u>	<u>Gamers</u>	<u>Pragmatists</u>	<u>Idealists</u>	<u>All</u>	<u>Reality</u>
% Gamers	40.5% (20.6%)	30.9% (16.5%)	32.7% (19.8%)	33.2% (18.5%)	17.5% Gamers
% Pragmatists	33.0% (16.1%)	41.6% (17.0%)	32.4% (12.6%)	37.2% (16.1%)	51.1% Pragmatists
% Idealists	26.5% (11.7%)	27.5% (12.8%)	34.9% (16.1%)	29.6% (14.1%)	30.7% Idealists

Study 1c Non-Profit Sample

<u>Perceptions</u>	<u>Gamers</u>	<u>Pragmatists</u>	<u>Idealists</u>	<u>All</u>	<u>Reality</u>
% Gamers	40.0% (29.2%)	26.7% (14.9%)	31.5% (16.0%)	30.5% (16.4%)	6.0% Gamers
% Pragmatists	21.0% (16.0%)	42.4% (18.6%)	32.1% (11.7%)	35.8% (15.6%)	55.4% Pragmatists
% Idealists	39.0% (35.1%)	30.9% (19.4%)	36.4% (14.3%)	33.7% (16.5%)	38.6% Idealists

Study 1d Chinese Sample

<u>Perceptions</u>	<u>Gamers</u>	<u>Pragmatists</u>	<u>Idealists</u>	<u>All</u>	<u>Reality</u>
% Gamers	41.5% (18.9%)	22.6% (11.8%)	26.5% (15.9%)	24.4% (13.8%)	5.8% Gamers

% Pragmatists	29.5% (17.1)	53.0% (16.6%)	28.7% (10.6%)	47.3% (18.5%)	76.2% Pragmatists
% Idealists	29.0% (17.1%)	24.2% (13.7%)	45.2% (18.5%)	28.3% (16.8%)	18.0% Idealists

Study 2 MBA Sample

<u>Perceptions</u>	<u>Gamers</u>	<u>Pragmatists</u>	<u>Idealists</u>	<u>All</u>	<u>Reality</u>
% Gamers	36.6% (14.8%)	33.4% (15.9%)	26.7% (14.6%)	31.8% (15.6%)	16.3% Gamers
% Pragmatists	29.1% (17.0%)	45.4% (15.0%)	39.9% (12.6%)	41.0% (15.4%)	52.0% Pragmatists
% Idealists	34.4% (15.9%)	21.2% (12.1%)	33.4% (16.9%)	27.2% (15.8%)	31.6% Idealists

Note. Values in cells are means with standard deviations in parentheses

Discussion

Participants projected their own views onto peers, overestimating the percentage of who shared their views on deception. Further, pessimism was substantial: participants overestimated the percentage of people who considered deception acceptable in negotiations. Given that this sample (MBA students) might be particularly pessimistic about the ethical standards to which their peers hold themselves, Study 1b sought to replicate the effect in a sample more representative of American adults.

Study 1b

Study 1b sought to replicate the results of Study 1a in a more general population of participants.

Method

Participants

Participants were 136 individuals who were recruited via Amazon's Mechanical Turk (62% male; mean age = 32.2 years; 82% Caucasian, 10% Asian, 4% African-American, 3% Hispanic, 1% other). These individuals completed an online survey in exchange for monetary compensation. Sample size was based on Study 1a. (203 participants were recruited, but 67 participants were excluded because they failed an attention check question: "Please indicate which of the following are NOT part of the three approaches to negotiations mentioned previously." This left 136 individuals in the sample.)

Materials and Procedure

Study 1b stimulus materials and procedures were identical to that of Study 1a. Participants were asked to rank their own views and estimate the percentage of other people that would have ranked each of the schools first (i.e., as most closely matching their own).

Results

Projection. I again found evidence of projection. The more highly participants ranked each school, the more prevalent they believed this response was ("as a game": $b = -.17$, $t(134) = 2.03$, $p = .045$; "costs and benefits": $b = -.29$, $t(134) = -3.45$, $p = .001$; "as a matter of principle": $b = -.28$, $t(134) = -3.33$, $p = .001$). Moreover, members of each school estimated there was a significantly higher percentage of people in their own school than did non-members (gamers: $t(134) = 2.18$, $p = .031$, $d = .47$; pragmatists: $t(134) = 3.36$, $p = .001$, $d = .58$, idealists: $t(134) = 3.02$, $p = .003$, $d = .53$; see Table 1).

Pessimism. I again found evidence of pessimism: Participants significantly overestimated the percentage of people who thought deception was appropriate in negotiations (i.e., "gamers"), $t(135) = 9.83$, $p < .001$, $d = .84$ (Table 1).

Discussion

Study 1b demonstrated that American adults, like MBA students (Study 1a), overestimated the percentage of other people who shared their own beliefs and the percentage of people who thought deception was appropriate in negotiations.

Study 1c

As a check that projection and pessimism effects occur in a variety of different populations, Study 1c sought to replicate the results among a sample of non-profit managers.

Method

Participants

Participants were 82 senior managers at non-profit organizations (21% male) who completed the survey as part of an executive education program. Participants had, on average, at least five years of non-profit management experience and were responsible for directing their organizations' mission, direction, and policies. Sample size was determined by available class size.

Materials and Procedure

Study 1c stimulus materials and procedures were identical to that of Studies 1a and 1b. Participants were asked to rank their own views and estimate the percentage of other people that would have ranked each of the schools first (i.e., as most closely matching their own).

Results

Projection. I found evidence of projection. The more highly participants ranked each school, the more prevalent they believed this response was (“as a game”: $b = -.17$, $t(80) = -1.55$, $p = .125$; “as costs and benefits”: $b = -.41$, $t(80) = -3.99$, $p < .001$; “as a matter of principle”: $b = -.10$, $t(80) = -.87$, $p = .388$). Moreover, members of each school estimated there was a higher

percentage of people in their own school than did non-members (gamers: $t(80) = 1.34, p = .184, d = .43$; pragmatists: $t(80) = 3.23, p = .002, d = .70$; idealists: $t(80) = 1.74, p = .087, d = .38$; see Table 1).

Pessimism. As in Studies 1a and 1b, participants significantly overestimated the percentage of peers who view deception as appropriate in negotiations (i.e., “gamers”), $t(81) = 13.45, p < .001, d = 1.49$; see Table 1.

Discussion

As a check that projection and pessimism are not confined to any particular sample of negotiators, I replicated the projection and pessimism effects with non-profit employees.

Study 1d

To determine whether projection and pessimism effects occur in cross-cultural populations, Study 1d sought to replicate the results among a sample of Chinese students.

Method

Participants

Participants were 172 Chinese students who completed the survey as part of a negotiations workshop. Participants were undergraduates between the ages of 18 and 22 who traveled to an American university to participate in the workshop. Sample size was determined by available class size.

Materials and Procedure

Study 1d stimulus materials and procedures were identical to that of Studies 1a-c. Participants were asked to rank their own views and estimate the percentage of other people that would have ranked each of the schools first (i.e., as most closely matching their own).

Results

Projection. I found evidence of projection. The more highly participants ranked each school, the more prevalent they believed this response was (“as a game”: $b = -.39$, $t(170) = -5.43$, $p < .001$; “as costs and benefits”: $b = -.55$, $t(170) = -8.66$, $p < .001$; “as a matter of principle”: $b = -.46$, $t(170) = -6.72$, $p < .001$). Moreover, members of each school estimated there was a higher percentage of people in their own school than did non-members (gamers: $t(170) = 4.25$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.13$; pragmatists: $t(170) = 8.74$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.72$; idealists: $t(170) = 6.98$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.26$; see Table 1).

Pessimism. As in Studies 1a-c, participants significantly overestimated the percentage of peers who view deception as appropriate in negotiations (i.e., “gamers”), $t(171) = 17.71$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.35$; see Table 1.

Discussion

As a final test that projection and pessimism occur cross-culturally, I replicated the projection and pessimism effects with Chinese students. Taken together, Studies 1a-1d suggest that projection and pessimism are widespread among negotiators.

Study 2

Studies 1a-1d established that negotiators’ views often reflect pessimism and projection. However, an important question remains: Do these expectancies predict behavior? The primary aim of Study 2 was to test whether pessimistic beliefs about others’ views of negotiations predicted deceptive behavior in negotiations.

Method

Participants

Participants were 98 MBA students (61% male; mean age = 28.3 years; 4% African/African-American, 24% Asian/Pacific Islander, 62% Caucasian/White, 6% Latino/Hispanic, and 3% other) who participated as part of a course requirement in a negotiations course. Sample size was determined by available class size.

Materials and Procedure

Prior to the first day of class, participants completed an online survey. The survey was identical to that utilized in Studies 1a-1d. Participants were asked to rank their own views and estimate the percentage of the population that would have ranked each of the schools first.

Participants then completed six negotiations over the course of six weeks. Three were single-issue, distributive negotiations, and three were multi-issue negotiations featuring mixes of distributive, integrative, and compatible issues. Upon completion of each negotiation, participants responded to an online survey, including a measure of whether participants lied to their counterpart (“I was misleading or dishonest” 1 = not at all to 7 = very much) and a measure of whether participants thought their counterpart was lying to them (“My counterpart was misleading or dishonest” 1 = not at all to 7 = very much). My measure of interest was whether participants lied to their counterpart (“I was misleading or dishonest”), and I was interested in whether lying occurred in distributive negotiations, in integrative negotiations, and across both types of negotiations.

Results

Projection. I replicated the projection effect. The more highly participants ranked each school, the more prevalent they believed this response was (“as a game”: $b = -.19$, $t(96) = -1.90$, $p = .060$; “as costs and benefits”: $b = -.30$, $t(96) = -3.10$, $p = .003$; “as a matter of principle”: $b = -.27$, $t(64) = -2.76$, $p = .007$). Moreover, members of each school estimated there was a

significantly higher percentage of people in their own school than did non-members (gamers: $t(96) = 1.34, p = .183, d = .37$; pragmatists: $t(96) = 3.04, p = .003, d = .62$; idealists: $t(96) = 2.73, p = .008, d = .58$; Table 1).

Pessimism. Replicating the findings from Studies 1a-1d, participants overestimated the percentage of other people who report that deception is appropriate (i.e., “gamers”), $t(97) = 9.81, p < .001, d = 1.00$; Table 1.

Predicting Deceptive Behavior. I then tested the extent to which participants’ personal ethical views and the extent to which their estimates of others’ ethical views predicted their deceptive behavior. When participants’ ranking of the extent to which they personally view negotiations to be a game was entered as the sole predictor, it significantly predicted reports of being misleading or dishonest across the negotiations, $b = -.14, t(481) = -2.99, p = .003$. The closer they ranked “as a game” to first, the more likely they were to report having misled or deceived their counterparts. When participants’ estimates of the percentage of classmates who endorsed a gaming view of negotiations was entered as the sole predictor, it also significantly predicted misleading or deceptive behavior, $b = .20, t(481) = 4.53, p < .001$. That is, the more participants thought their classmates saw negotiation as a game, the more likely participants were to be dishonest.

When both predictors were entered simultaneously, estimates’ of the percentage of classmates who were gamers remained highly significant, $b = .62, t(479) = 4.00, p < .001$, and self-ranking of “as a game” was reduced to marginal significance, $b = .20, t(479) = 1.79, p = .074$. The interaction of the two was also significant, $b = -.50, t(479) = -2.94, p = .003$. People who self-identify with the game view and assume that view is widely-shared were especially likely to be misleading or dishonest.

Predicting Deceptive Behavior in Distributive Negotiations. One question is whether the results hold in both distributive and integrative negotiations. I found the same results when analyzing only the distributive negotiations. When participants' ranking of the extent to which they personally view negotiations to be a game was entered as the sole predictor, it significantly predicted reports of being misleading or dishonest across the distributive negotiations, $b = -.17$, $t(194) = -2.33$, $p = .021$. When participants' estimates of the percentage of classmates who endorsed a gaming view of negotiations was entered as the sole predictor, it also significantly predicted misleading or deceptive behavior, $b = .27$, $t(194) = 3.92$, $p < .001$. That is, the more participants thought their classmates saw negotiation as a game, the more likely participants were to be dishonest. When both predictors were entered simultaneously, estimates' of the percentage of classmates who were gamers remained highly significant, $b = .82$, $t(192) = 3.36$, $p = .001$, and self-ranking of "as a game" was reduced to marginal significance, $b = .26$, $t(192) = 1.52$, $p = .130$. The interaction of the two was also significant, $b = -.65$, $t(192) = -2.43$, $p = .016$.

Predicting Deceptive Behavior in Integrative Negotiations. The same results hold when analyzing only the integrative negotiations. When participants' ranking of the extent to which they personally view negotiations to be a game was entered as the sole predictor, it significantly predicted reports of being misleading or dishonest across the integrative negotiations, $b = -.12$, $t(285) = -1.97$, $p = .050$. When participants' estimates of the percentage of classmates who endorsed a gaming view of negotiations was entered as the sole predictor, it also significantly predicted misleading or deceptive behavior, $b = .15$, $t(285) = 2.62$, $p = .009$. That is, the more participants thought their classmates saw negotiation as a game, the more likely participants were to be dishonest. When both predictors were entered simultaneously, estimates' of the

percentage of classmates who were gamers remained highly significant, $b = .51$, $t(283) = 2.53$, $p = .012$, and self-ranking of “as a game” was reduced to non-significance, $b = .17$, $t(283) = 1.17$, $p = .245$. The interaction of the two was marginally significant, $b = -.43$, $t(293) = -1.94$, $p = .054$. Thus, the same results occurred across integrative and distributive negotiations.

Discussion

One’s own personal views on deception and perceptions of classmates’ views on deception both were significant predictors of deceptive behavior. When trying to assess whether a negotiation counterpart is being honest and forthcoming, it therefore may be useful to know not only a negotiator’s self-reported view of the appropriateness of deceptive tactics, but also how normative the individual believes lying is in negotiations.

Interestingly, these results held across integrative and distributive negotiations, suggesting that deceptive expectancies are important determinants of behavior regardless of negotiation type.

Whereas Study 2 sought to establish that expectancies about others’ ethical standards predict deceptive tactics by measuring participants’ expectancies, Study 3 sought to establish the effect by manipulating expectancies and examining subsequent rates of deception.

Study 3

Study 3 investigated how manipulating expectancies about the prevalence of “gamers” affected deception in a hypothetical negotiation.

Method

Participants

Participants were 190 individuals who were recruited via Amazon's Mechanical Turk (36% male; mean age = 35.2 years; 75% Caucasian, 7% Asian, 10% African-American, 1% Native American, 1% Pacific Islander, 4% Hispanic, 3% other). These individuals completed an online survey in exchange for monetary compensation. Sample size was based on Studies 1a-b. (201 participants were recruited, but 11 participants were excluded for not writing a response email. This left 190 individuals in the sample.)

Materials and Procedure

At the beginning of the study participants were told, "To begin, we want to share some research results with you. We asked several hundred American adults to tell us about their view of interpersonal negotiations. Specifically, we told them about THREE ways for thinking about the appropriateness of deception in negotiations, and we asked them to tell us how these ways matched their own views." Participants were randomly assigned to either the minority-gamers or majority-gamers condition. Participants in the minority-gamers condition were informed that, "a majority of people—65%—ranked "as a game" last. In other words, a vast majority saw the use of deception and tricks to outwit their opponent as inappropriate and unacceptable." By contrast, participants in the majority-gamers condition were informed that, "a majority of people—65%—ranked "as a game" first or second. In other words, a vast majority saw the use of deception and tricks to outwit their opponent as appropriate and preferable." To ensure that participants read the manipulation, they were then asked to write a few sentences explaining why they believed the vast majority of people would see this "as a game" approach as inappropriate (minority-gamers condition) or appropriate (majority-gamers condition).

Participants were then asked to imagine that they were in a negotiation with an American man named John over a 2010 Honda Civic that they were selling. Participants were informed that

they needed to get *at least* \$8,000 for it in order to cover the costs of a relocation. They were also told that “the transmission is in worse shape than most cars with 50,000 miles and that it will very likely need transmission work before 60,000 miles.” John had come by to see the car, and the car performed without a problem. John said he would send an email to follow up on buying the car. In his email, John asked if the car has any problems and mentioned that he was willing to pay \$7,500 for the car.

Participants were told to write a reply email to John. On the subsequent screen, they were asked what they said about the condition of the car in their response email: a) I was clear the car would need some repairs, b) I did not address his question about whether the car would need some repairs, or c) I assured the buyer that the car would not need any repairs. Participants also indicated whether their perceived likelihood that John was being deceptive (3 item measure: “How likely is it that John was misrepresenting the market value of the car?” “How likely is it that John was misrepresenting his budget?” “How likely is it that John was misrepresenting his alternative?”). Finally, as a manipulation check, participants indicated what percent of American adults would rank the “as a game” view of deception as their top choice.

Results

Manipulation Check. Minority-gamer participants estimated a lower percentage of American adults ($M = 41.0\%$, $SD = 22.5\%$) would rank “as a game” as their top choice than did majority-gamer participants ($M = 62.6\%$, $SD = 16.9\%$), $t(185) = -7.36$, $p < .001$, $d = -1.09$.

Self-Reported Deception. I first analyzed participants’ responses to the self-report measure of deceptiveness. Participants who indicated that they told John about the transmission problem (i.e., responded “a”) were categorized as honest. Participants who withheld information about the repairs (i.e., responded “b” or “c”) were categorized as deceitful. Results revealed that

rates of self-reported deception were significantly higher among majority-gamer participants (70.3%) than minority-gamer participants (55.5%), $X^2(1, N = 190) = 4.22, p = .035, \phi = .15$.

Coded Deception. I conducted parallel analyses using the coded email responses. Two coders independently coded the responses ($K = .96, p < .001$) and then reconciled differences via discussion. Participants who mentioned the transmission problem were categorized as honest; participants who withheld information about the repairs were categorized as deceptive. Consistent with the results of self-reported deception, majority-gamer participants were significantly more deceptive (75.8%) than were minority-gamer participants (61.6%), $X^2(1, N = 190) = 4.43, p = .035, \phi = .15$.

Discussion

Building on the results of Study 2 where I measured participants' expectancies about others' views on deception and demonstrated they predict deceptive behavior, Study 3 manipulated expectancies about others' ethical standards and demonstrated this affected deceptive behavior.

It is worth noting that the majority- and minority-gamer manipulations were based on the *perceptions* of gamer prevalence and *actual* gamer prevalence measured in Study 1b, which involved a sample of American adults. Study 3 found that revealing the actual (minority) prevalence of gamers in this US sample diminished deceptiveness relative to revealing the perceived (majority) gamer prevalence, suggesting that publicizing the reality of people's ethical standards could be a way to reduce deception in negotiations.

General Discussion

The past portrait of a deceptive negotiator is a calculative schemer executing a gambit. I put forth evidence of another species of deceptive negotiator: the paranoid cynic. In four studies that involved varying participant samples, I showed that the tendency to project and exhibit pessimism is widespread among negotiators. Negotiators overestimated the percentage of other people who share their own beliefs about the appropriateness of deceptive behavior, as well as the percentage of people who endorse deceptive negotiation tactics. Critically, this exaggerated pessimism people had about others' ethical standards was highly predictive of their decision to engage in deception.

These results are consistent with work on pluralistic ignorance (Prentice & Miller, 1993) because people overestimate the prevalence of gamers and then mislead, thinking others will do the same, even though few people personally endorse dishonesty in negotiations. As with the findings obtained in the pluralistic ignorance literature, the results reported here raise a set of interesting questions, including whether pessimism about the prevalence of gamers allows people to view deception as a rational rather than moral decision (Zhong, 2011) and whether the deception that results from pessimism may create a vicious cycle since engaging in lying makes people judge others as less honest (Sagarin, Rhoads, & Cialdini, 1998).

My results are inconsistent with the opportunistic model of deception because I find pessimism rather than a belief in others' trustworthiness increases deception. One possible explanation for why the results go against the opportunistic model of deception could be that negotiators in my studies perceived their counterparts as similar to themselves. Past research has shown that dishonesty increases when similar others, but not dissimilar others, are dishonest because dishonesty is perceived to be the norm (Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2009).

This work raises an important set of questions including how these expectancies are formed and what motives drive a negotiator's decision to be deceptive. Future research could investigate how peoples' expectancies are (sometimes falsely) created and then confirmed or overturned through experience. Future research also could investigate the mechanisms that determine when negotiators engage in deception. It is possible that calculative schemers are motivated by opportunism and greed, whereas paranoid cynics are motivated by fear. Moreover, my results suggest that some negotiators (i.e. gamers who think most other people are gamers) are a hybrid of the two, driven by both pessimism (severely overestimating the percentage of gamers) and scheming (being most likely to lie). Additional research could further explore this hybrid species of negotiator.

Finally, my findings have important implications for practice. Negotiators often want to know how to decrease the likelihood of being exploited by a deceptive counterpart. My research suggests that, in addition to building rapport (Morris, Kurtzber, & Thompson, 2002) and developing trust (e.g., by creating opportunities for displaying trust and then demonstrating trustworthiness; Cramton and Dees, 1993), deal-makers may be able to combat deception by signaling that the behavior is counter-normative.

Chapter I: Supplementary Analyses

One question is whether general expectancies about others' ethical views are channeled through expectancies about one's counterpart. My results suggest that this is not the case; instead perceptions of one's specific counterpart are a separate contributor to deception.

Recall that in Study 2, I collected a measure of whether participants thought their counterpart was lying to them ("My counterpart was misleading or dishonest" 1 = not at all to 7 = very much). The relationship between estimates' of the percentage of classmates who were gamers and lying behavior was not mediated by whether people thought their partner was lying. However, specific counterpart perceptions did significantly positively predict lying when included in a regression alone, $b = .32$, $t(481) = 7.28$, $p < .001$, and when included in a regression with self-ranking of "as a game" and estimates' of the percentage of classmates who were gamers, $b = .31$, $t(479) = 7.24$, $p < .001$. (Self-ranking of "as a game" remained significant, $b = -.09$, $t(479) = -2.02$, $p = .044$, as did estimates' of the percentage of classmates who were gamers, $b = .18$, $t(479) = 4.15$, $p < .001$). In other words, negotiators were more likely to be misleading or dishonest when they thought their counterpart was also being misleading or dishonest. Thus, specific counterpart perceptions was a separate contributor to lying behavior, not a mediator between general expectancies about others' ethical views and lying behavior.

Likewise, in Study 3, the relationship between condition and lying was not mediated by specific counterpart perceptions (3 item measure: "How likely is it that John was misrepresenting the market value of the car?" "How likely is it that John was misrepresenting his budget?" "How likely is it that John was misrepresenting his alternative?"). However, specific counterpart perceptions did positively predict lying when both condition and specific counterpart perceptions were entered as predictors into the model (coded deception DV, $X^2(2) = 5.91$, $p = .052$; self-

reported deception DV, $\chi^2(2) = 7.96, p = .019$). In sum, I found that the relationship between general expectancies about others and lying behavior was not channeled through specific counterpart perceptions.

Chapter II: Expectancies Rooted in Social Group Membership

Negotiators' decisions to engage in deception are heavily influenced by expectancies about other people. Chapter II investigates the relationship among a counterpart's social group membership, stereotype-based expectancies about that group, and negotiation behavior (e.g. deception, assertiveness of counteroffer).

People tend to streamline their processing of other people by sorting them according to social category membership (gender, race, age, etc.; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, 2007; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy & Flament, 1971). Many of these social categories can be determined through visual cues like attire, body shape, skin tone, and facial features (Zebrowitz, 1997). Once an interaction partner is placed into social categories, perceivers may use stereotypic beliefs about those social categories to make predictions about their interaction partner's behavior and to guide their interactions with that individual (Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). In other words, people may use shortcuts based on social group membership to form expectancies about their interaction partner.

Existing negotiations literature says very little about whether people expect certain social groups to be more willing to deceive in a negotiation. However, existing negotiations literature does suggest that stereotypes shape behavior in a negotiation. For example, negotiators use gender stereotypes when predicting how a negotiator will behave and how well a negotiator will perform (see Kray & Thompson, 2004). Negotiators vary their behavior depending upon their counterparts' gender (e.g., Solnick, 2001) and expect counterparts to behave in ways that are consistent with gender stereotypes, (e.g. expecting women to act more cooperatively and less competitively than men; Orbell, Dawes & Schwartz-Shea, 1994). More directly relevant to

expectancies and deception is evidence that a negotiator's decision to engage in deception is based on the counterpart's gender: Negotiators are more likely to deceive female counterparts than male counterparts because they expect that women are more easily misled than men (Kray, Kennedy, and Van Zant, 2014). Although this effect is not rooted in expectancies that negotiators have about their counterpart's ethicality, it fits with my argument that a negotiator's decision to deceive may be shaped by stereotypes rooted in demographic characteristics of his counterpart. Additional evidence confirms that negotiators draw on stereotypes when interacting with a counterpart. For instance, negotiators are less cooperative and more competitive when led to believe that their counterparts are business majors versus religion majors (De Dreu, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1995). Similarly, players in social dilemmas were variously influenced by their stereotypes of MBA students and psychology majors in their judgments of counterparts from those groups (Ames, Weber, and Zou, 2012).

A wealth of evidence suggests social perceivers judge target individuals according to two core dimensions: warmth and competence (Rosenberg, Nelson, & Vivekananthan, 1968; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; Cuddy, Glick, & Beninger, 2011). Perceivers assess targets' perceived warmth—including intent, trustworthiness, and morality—and targets' perceived competence—including ability, intelligence, and skill. The stereotype content model suggests that perceivers are not entirely objective in judging others according to these two dimensions and that the a priori beliefs perceivers have about different social groups affect their judgment (Fiske et al., 2002). Some groups, like students and Christians, are as perceived as high in competence and high in warmth; some groups, like Asians and professionals, are perceived as high in competence and low in warmth; some groups, like housewives and the elderly, are perceived as low in

competence and high in warmth; and some groups, like homeless people and welfare recipients, are perceived as low in competence and low in warmth.

A social group's perceived warmth should be an important source of expectancies about deception. There is evidence that warmth is indicative of morality (Wojciszke, 1994) and intent (Reeder et al., 2002). In the context of negotiation, higher warmth should be associated with less deception. Counterparts from social groups rated high in warmth should be perceived as less likely to be deceptive than counterparts from social groups rated as low in warmth.

A social group's perceived competence may be another source of expectancies about deception. Because competence is indicative of intelligence, ability, and skill, the competence dimension should be important in shaping expectancies about one's counterpart, particularly when combined with warmth (Cuddy, Glick, & Beninger, 2011). For example, negotiators may be wary of counterparts from cold competent groups since they may possess negative intent and competence to carry out these negative intentions in a negotiation. On the flip side, negotiators may be unintimidated by counterparts from warm incompetent groups since they may possess positive intent and low competence in a negotiation.

Evidence suggests that the majority of outgroups fall into the cold competent and warm incompetent groups. As a result, I choose to focus on these two groups in the studies that follow. We use the stereotype content model (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002) which shows that warm incompetent groups elicit pity and cold competent groups elicit envy as a basis for hypothesizing that negotiators will be more deceptive and make more assertive counteroffers to negotiators from cold/competent compared to warm competent and warm incompetent groups. These studies have implications for understanding how negotiators' stereotype-based expectancies shape their behavior towards counterparts in negotiations.

Study 1 investigated traits associated with deceptive negotiators, specifically to what extent warmth and competence are associated deceptive negotiators compared to truthful ones. I hypothesized that warmth would be more associated with truthful negotiators, while competence would be associated with deceptive negotiators. Study 2 determined to what extent people from cold competent and warm incompetent groups are perceived as deceptive in negotiations. Study 3 tested actual behavior and demonstrated how manipulating the social category membership of a counterpart affected deception in a negotiation situation.

Study 1

The purpose of Study 1 was to investigate traits associated with deceptive negotiators and determine to what extent warmth and competence are associated deceptive negotiators compared to truthful ones. I hypothesized that deceptive negotiators would be perceived to possess less warmth and more competence than truthful negotiators.

Method

Participants

Participants were 88 individuals who were recruited via Amazon's Mechanical Turk (55% male; mean age = 32.7 years; 73% Caucasian, 13% Asian, 6% African-American, 1% Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, 7% Hispanic, 1% other). These individuals completed an online survey in exchange for monetary compensation. Sample size was set at 100. A total of 101 individuals participated in the study for monetary compensation, but 13 were excluded because they failed an attention check question³. This left 88 individuals in the sample.

³ In the previous question you made ratings about which of the following? a) Truthful negotiators b) Deceptive negotiators c) Both truthful negotiators and deceptive negotiators d) Neither truthful negotiators nor deceptive negotiators.

Materials and Procedure

Participants completed an online survey which asked them to rate which traits are characteristic of different types of negotiators. Participants were instructed to answer the following question: “As viewed by society, to what extent are the following traits characteristic of truthful negotiators and deceptive negotiators?” The traits included words associated with warmth (warm / sincere / tolerant / good natured) and with competence (competent / confident / independent / competitive / intelligent) (warmth and competence scales taken from Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2002). Participants rated the traits on a scale from 1 to 7 where 1 = more characteristic of truthful negotiators, 4 = equally characteristic of truthful and deceptive negotiators, and 7 = more characteristic of deceptive negotiators.

Results

Composite Warmth and Competence Measures. Both the warmth scale ($\alpha = .816$) and the competence scale ($\alpha = .658$) were reliable. As hypothesized, warmth ($M = 2.53$, $SD = 1.22$) was seen as less characteristic of deceptive negotiators and more characteristic of truthful negotiators. In other words, the mean score was significantly lower than 4, $t(87) = -11.25$, $p < .001$. Competence ($M = 4.21$, $SD = 0.88$) was seen as more characteristic of deceptive negotiators and less characteristic of truthful negotiators. In other words, the mean score was significantly higher than 4, $t(87) = 2.24$, $p = .027$.⁴

Discussion

Study 1 demonstrated that deceptive negotiators are perceived to possess less warmth than truthful negotiators. Deceptive negotiators are also perceived to possess greater competence than truthful negotiators. Given that deceptive negotiators are characterized by absence of

⁴ Single item analyses are included in the appendix.

warmth and presence of competence, Study 2 explores whether the combination of warmth and competence matters by testing whether cold competent and warm incompetent social groups are perceived to be more or less deceptive in negotiations.

Study 2

Study 2 determined to what extent people from social categories in different quadrants of the Stereotype Content Model, specifically cold competent and warm incompetent, are perceived as deceptive in negotiations.

Method

Participants

Participants were 96 individuals who were recruited via Amazon's Mechanical Turk (55% male; mean age = 34.2 years; 75% Caucasian, 9% Asian, 9% African-American, 6% Hispanic). These individuals completed an online survey in exchange for monetary compensation. Sample size was set at 100. A total of 100 individuals completed the study for payment but were excluded because they failed an attention check question⁵. This left 96 individuals in the sample.)

Materials and Procedure

Participants completed an online survey which asked them to rate which traits are characteristic of different types of negotiators. Participants were instructed to answer the following question: "As viewed by society, to what extent are [people from these social categories] deceptive in negotiations?" The traits included social categories from the cold competent quadrant (Jewish people / Rich people / Businesswomen) and warm incompetent

⁵ In the previous questions you made ratings about which of the following groups? a) Poor people b) Asians c) Young people d) None of the above.

quadrant (Elderly people / Disabled people / Housewives). Participants rated the traits on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 = not at all and 7 = extremely.

Results

There was a significant difference in deceptiveness among groups, $F(5, 475) = 121.05$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .823$.⁶ A planned contrast revealed that cold competent groups ($M = 4.73$, $SD = 1.72$) were seen as significantly more deceptive than warm incompetent groups ($M = 2.30$, $SD = 1.48$), $F(1, 475) = 506.69$ $p < .001$ (by 2.43 points).

Discussion

Study 2 demonstrated that cold competent groups are seen as significantly more deceptive than warm incompetent groups. These results make sense given the Study 1 finding that deceptive negotiators are perceived to possess less warmth than truthful negotiators generally. Study 3 sought to determine whether group membership of a counterpart would affect a negotiator's actual deception behavior.

Study 3

Study 3 investigated how manipulating the social groups to which a counterpart belongs affected deception in a hypothetical negotiation. I hypothesized that counterparts from cold competent groups would elicit more deception than counterparts from warm incompetent groups. I also hypothesized that counterparts from cold competent groups would elicit more assertive counteroffers than counterparts from warm incompetent groups.

Method

Participants

⁶ Individual group comparisons are included in the appendix.

Participants were 237 individuals who were recruited via Amazon's Mechanical Turk (64% male; mean age = 36.6 years; 80% Caucasian, 8% Asian, 6% African-American, 4% Hispanic, 1% other). These individuals completed an online survey in exchange for monetary compensation. Sample size was based on Study 3 in Chapter 1. (A total of 252 people participated for monetary compensation, but 10 participants were excluded for failing an attention check⁷ and 5 participants were excluded for not completing the task as instructed (e.g. not making a counteroffer, not writing a reply email. This left 137 individuals in the sample.)

Materials and Procedure

Participants were randomly assigned to the control, cold competent (rich or Jewish), or warm incompetent (elderly or disabled) condition. They were asked to imagine that they were in a negotiation with a [man / rich man / Jewish man / elderly man / disabled man] named John over a 2010 Honda Civic that they were selling. Participants were informed that they needed to get *at least* \$8,000 for it in order to cover the costs of a relocation. They were also told that, "the transmission is in worse shape than most cars with 50,000 miles and that it will very likely need transmission work before 60,000 miles." John had come by to see the car, and they immediately "noticed that he [was wearing a designer suit and an expensive watch / was wearing a traditional Jewish skullcap and looked like he had just come from synagogue / had white hair and lots of wrinkles / had a prosthetic left leg]." John took the car out for a test drive, and the car performed without a problem. John said he would send an email to follow up on buying the car. In his email, John asked if the car has any problems and mentioned that he was willing to pay \$7,500 for the car.

⁷ The scenario specified that John was which of the following? a) Rich b) Jewish c) Elderly d) Disabled e) None of the above.

Participants were told to write a reply email to John, which included a counteroffer and a reply. On the subsequent screen, they were asked what they said about the condition of the car in their response email: a) I was clear the car would need some repairs, b) I did not address his question about whether the car would need some repairs, or c) I assured the buyer that the car would not need any repairs. Finally, participants answered questions about John's perceived status (How prestigious are the jobs typically achieved by people like John? How economically successful have people like John been? How well educated are people like John?) and perceived competition from John (If people like John get special breaks such as preference in hiring decisions, this are likely to make things more difficult for people like me. The more power people like John have, the less power people like me are likely to have. Resources that go to people like John are likely to take away from the resources of people like me.) on a scale from 1 = not at all to 5 = extremely.⁸ Finally, participants rated their perceptions of the likelihood that John was being deceptive (3 item measure: "How likely is it that John was misrepresenting the market value of the car?" "How likely is it that John was misrepresenting his budget?" "How likely is it that John was misrepresenting his alternative?").

Results

Self-Reported Deception for Control vs. Warm Incompetent vs. Cold Competent. I first analyzed participants' responses to the self-report measure of deceptiveness. Participants who indicated that they told John about the transmission problem (i.e., responded "a") were categorized as honest. Participants who withheld information about the repairs (i.e., responded "b" or "c") were categorized as deceitful. The logistic regression model was significant, $X^2(2) = 6.30, p = .043$. The model explained 3.6% of the variance and correctly classified 66.2% of

⁸ Status and competition analyses are included in the appendix.

cases. Only warm incompetent ($p = .071$) added marginally significantly to the model. Warm incompetent people were 2.05 times more likely to be told the truth about the transmission problem than the control.⁹

Coded Deception for Control vs. Warm Incompetent vs. Cold Competent. I conducted parallel analyses using the coded email responses. Two coders independently coded the responses ($K = .87, p < .001$) and then reconciled differences via discussion. Participants who mentioned the transmission problem were categorized as honest; participants who withheld information about the repairs were categorized as deceptive. The logistic regression model was significant, $\chi^2(2) = 9.65, p = .008$. The model explained 5.7% of the variance and correctly classified 71.3% of cases. Only warm incompetent ($p = .025$) added significantly to the model. Warm incompetent people were 2.62 times more likely to be told the truth about the transmission problem than the control.

Counteroffers for Control vs. Warm Incompetent vs. Cold Competent. In their replies, participants made counteroffers. There was a marginally significant difference in counteroffers among the groups $F(2, 234) = 2.68, p = .071, \eta^2 = .02$. Post-hoc tests revealed a marginally significant difference between counteroffers to control ($M = \$7,989.52, SD = \453.08) and warm incompetent groups ($M = \$7,703.80, SD = \598.82), $p = .061$.

Perceived Likelihood of John Misrepresenting for Control vs. Warm Incompetent vs. Cold Competent. Finally, participants rated their perceptions of the likelihood that John was being deceptive (3 item measure: “How likely is it that John was misrepresenting the market value of the car?” “How likely is it that John was misrepresenting his budget?” “How likely is it that John was misrepresenting his alternative?”). There was a significant difference in the

⁹ Individual group comparisons are included in the appendix.

perceived likelihood that John was being deceptive by condition, $F(2, 234) = 7.06, p = .001, \eta^2 = .06$. Post-hoc tests revealed a significant difference between cold competent ($M = 67.19, SD = 18.63$) and warm incompetent ($M = 55.50, SD = 24.21$) groups, $p = .001$.

Perceived Likelihood of John Misrepresenting Predicting Self-Reported Deception. The logistic regression model was significant, $X^2(1) = 17.19, p < .001$. The model explained 9.7% of the variance and correctly classified 68.8% of cases. The perceived likelihood that John was being deceptive ($p < .001$) added significantly to the model. Every percentage point increase in the perceived likelihood that John was being deceptive multiplied the odds of revealing the truth by .97.¹⁰

Perceived Likelihood of John Misrepresenting Predicting Coded Deception. The logistic regression model was significant, $X^2(1) = 18.02, p < .001$. The model explained 10.5% of the variance and correctly classified 73.0% of cases. The perceived likelihood that John was being deceptive ($p < .001$) added significantly to the model. Every percentage point increase in the perceived likelihood that John was being deceptive multiplied the odds of revealing the truth by .97.¹¹

Discussion

Study 3 manipulated a counterpart's social group membership and demonstrated that a counterpart's social group membership affected deceptive behavior. Negotiating with a counterpart from a warm incompetent group led to less self-reported deception, less coded deception, and less assertive counteroffers than negotiating with a counterpart from a cold

¹⁰ *Perceived Likelihood of John Misrepresenting as Mediator Between Group and Self-Reported Deception:* Perceived likelihood of John misrepresenting was not a mediator between group and self-reported deception.

¹¹ *Perceived Likelihood of John Misrepresenting as Mediator Between Group and Coded Deception:* Perceived likelihood of John misrepresenting was a mediator only for the warm incompetent group.

competent group or from a control group (“a man”). Interestingly, for most of the DVs, the cold competent group did not differ significantly from the control group. There are several possible explanations for the lack of difference between the cold competent group and the control group. One possibility is that negotiators may assume that their counterpart is cold and competent by default. Another possibility is that “a man” does not serve as a good control and that participants automatically assume a man is cold and competent. Both explanations seem plausible, and more research should be done to determine which explanation is at work. In sum, social group membership affects not only expectancies about a counterpart’s deceptiveness (Study 2) but also a negotiator’s actual deceptive behavior towards that counterpart (Study 3).

General Discussion

Existing negotiations literature says little about whether people expect certain social groups to be more willing to deceive in a negotiation. These three studies suggest that stereotypes do, in fact, affect expectancies about a counterpart’s likelihood of engaging in deception and even shape a negotiator’s own deceptive behavior towards that counterpart. Study 1 provided evidence that deceptive negotiators are perceived to possess less warmth and more competence than truthful negotiators. Study 2 showed that people from cold competent groups are perceived as more deceptive than people from warm incompetent groups. Finally, Study 3 tested actual behavior and demonstrated that negotiating with a counterpart from a cold competent or control group led to more pessimistic expectancies and more deception than negotiating with a counterpart from a warm incompetent group. Stereotypes and the expectancies that they generate play a critical and understudied role in influencing a negotiator’s decision to be deceptive.

I focused on two main groups, cold competent and warm incompetent, because according to the stereotype content model literature, the majority of stereotyped groups fall into one of these two categories. However, I acknowledge that from a theoretical and practical perspective, scholars and practitioners would be interested in stereotypes about and behavior towards negotiators from the other two categories. Future work should consider the other two quadrants of the stereotype content model, warm competent and cold incompetent.

This work raises some interesting implications for scholars in understanding when stereotypes are most important in shaping behavior and for practitioners in understanding who is going to be lied to more frequently and how to decrease a negotiation counterpart's reliance on stereotypes when unconstructive. One might expect negotiators to use stereotypes when the counterpart is unfamiliar versus familiar, such as when the parties are meeting for the first time versus have a preexisting relationship. Also, there is evidence that negotiators who use heuristic processing (e.g., who have a high need for cognitive closure; De Dreu, Koole, & Oldersma, 1999) or who are under time pressure (DeDruue, 2003) tend to rely more heavily on stereotypes. More work should be done on this important topic so scholars and practitioners alike can better understand when stereotypes affect our representation of and behavior towards others

Conclusion

Deception can damage relationships (Olekalns, 2009), harm trust (Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998), ruin reputations (Raiffa, 1982), and create significant legal costs (Schweitzer, 2001). Despite these risks, negotiators often employ deception in their deal making. Not surprisingly, scholars and practitioners alike have wondered: What predicts whether a negotiator will be deceptive? While past research has focused on the values and attitudes that distinguish people who employ deception in negotiations from those who eschew it and the circumstances that encourage versus discourage deception, I argue that a negotiators' *expectancies*—that is, anticipatory beliefs about how their counterpart will behave— shape their choice to deceive.

Negotiation scholars argue that assessing a counterpart's ethical standards is a central part of any negotiation and something negotiators invariably do in preparing to interact with their counterpart (Lewicki & Robinson, 1998). If negotiators commonly reflect on their counterpart's ethical standards when formulating a negotiation strategy, it is important to understand what they base these judgments on, especially if they predict whether negotiators use deceptive tactics. I build on the existing literature by considering how a negotiator's decision to deceive a counterpart is influenced by four different types of expectancies—projection, pessimism, specific counterpart expectancies, and stereotypes about a counterpart's social group. I show not only that negotiators possess these expectancies, but also that they affect a negotiator's willingness to engage in deceptive behavior.

One of the more disturbing aspects of my findings is that possessing deceptive expectancies may create a self-fulfilling prophecy. Because expecting deception increases a negotiator's likelihood of engaging in deception, people might very well create the unethical

behaviors they are expecting. Indeed, existing research supports this claim: People tend to reciprocate the deceptive acts they catch (Schweitzer & DeChurch, 2001; Tinsley et al., 2002; Volkema & Fleury, 2002). All of the evidence suggests that negotiators elicit deception via their own deceptive behavior. While an argument could be made that the decision whether to be deceptive should be based on a negotiator's impression of her counterpart's ethics, an outstanding question is whether people can accurately judge this in others, and research suggests that people might not be objective or accurate in their assessments of other people (Fiske & Macrae, 2012). The fact that people's judgments are often not an accurate reflection of reality lends further support to my argument that expectancies are an important and understudied predictor of deceptive behavior. I hope that this dissertation is a step in understanding the role of expectancies in shaping deception in negotiations.

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Appendix

Chapter II, Study 1 Additional Analyses

Single Item Measures for Warmth. All of the single item measures related to warmth were seen as less characteristic of deceptive negotiators and more characteristic of truthful negotiators. Warm ($M = 2.83, SD = 1.61$) was seen as more characteristic of truthful negotiators, $t(87) = -6.84, p < .001$. Sincere ($M = 2.08, SD = 1.46$) was seen as more characteristic of truthful negotiators, $t(87) = -12.37, p < .001$. Tolerant ($M = 2.86, SD = 1.56$) was seen as more characteristic of truthful negotiators, $t(87) = -6.86, p < .001$. Good natured ($M = 2.36, SD = 1.47$) was seen as more characteristic of truthful negotiators, $t(87) = -10.43, p < .001$.

Single Item Measures for Competence. Some of the competence-related single item measures were seen as more characteristic of deceptive negotiators and less characteristic of truthful negotiators. Competitive ($M = 5.18, SD = 1.47$) was seen as significantly more characteristic of deceptive negotiators, $t(87) = 7.56, p < .001$. Independent ($M = 4.24, SD = 1.25$) was seen as marginally more characteristic of deceptive negotiators, $t(87) = 1.79, p = .077$. Confident ($M = 4.24, SD = 1.62$) was seen as equally characteristic of truthful and deceptive negotiators, $t(87) = 1.47, p = .145$. Intelligent ($M = 3.89, SD = 1.11$) was seen as equally characteristic of truthful and deceptive negotiators, $t(87) = -0.96, p = .339$. A notable exception was the word competent. Competent ($M = 3.51, SD = 1.41$) was seen as more characteristic of truthful negotiators, $t(87) = -3.24, p = .002$. In other words, when the competence measure is broken down into single items, it becomes clear that competitive is the primary item that drives the difference in the composite competence measure for truthful and deceptive negotiators.

Chapter II, Study 2 Additional Analyses

Individual Groups. There was a significant difference in deceptiveness among groups, $F(5, 475) = 121.05, p < .001, \eta^2 = .823$. Post hoc tests with a Bonferroni correction revealed the following differences:

Group	Mean	SD	Different From	Not Different From
Jewish	4.44	1.83	Disabled ($p < .001$), Elderly ($p < .001$), Housewives ($p < .001$), Rich ($p < .001$)	Businesswomen ($p = .894$)
Rich	5.70	1.32	Businesswomen ($p < .001$), Disabled ($p < .001$), Elderly ($p < .001$), Housewives ($p < .001$), Jewish ($p < .001$)	
Businesswomen	4.05	1.52	Disabled ($p < .001$), Elderly ($p < .001$), Housewives ($p < .001$), Rich ($p < .001$)	Jewish ($p = .894$)
Elderly	2.14	1.41	Businesswomen ($p < .001$), Jewish ($p < .001$), Rich ($p < .001$), Housewives ($p = .011$)	Disabled ($p = 1.000$)
Disabled	2.06	1.41	Businesswomen ($p < .001$), Housewives ($p = .044$), Jewish ($p < .001$), Rich ($p < .001$)	Elderly ($p = 1.000$)
Housewives	2.70	1.54	Businesswomen ($p < .001$), Disabled ($p = .002$), Elderly ($p = .011$), Jewish ($p < .001$), Rich ($p < .001$)	

Chapter II, Study 3 Additional Analyses (Primary DVs)

Self-Reported Deception for Control vs. Disabled vs. Elderly vs. Jewish vs. Rich. The logistic regression model was marginally significant, $X^2(4) = 8.41, p = .078$. The model explained 4.8% of the variance and correctly classified 66.7% of cases. Only elderly ($p = .023$) added significantly to the model. Elderly people were 2.79 times more likely to be told the truth about the transmission problem than the control.

Coded Deception for Control vs. Disabled vs. Elderly vs. Jewish vs. Rich. The logistic regression model was significant, $X^2(4) = 12.48, p = .014$. The model explained 7.3% of the variance and correctly classified 71.3% of cases. Only elderly ($p = .006$) added significantly to the model. Elderly people were 3.72 times more likely to be told the truth about the transmission problem than the control.

Counteroffers for Control vs. Disabled vs. Elderly vs. Jewish vs. Rich. There was a marginally significant difference in counteroffers among the groups $F(4, 232) = 1.61, p = .174, \eta^2 = .03$. Post-hoc tests revealed a marginally significant difference between counteroffers to elderly ($M = \$7,664.44, SD = \727.90) and control groups ($M = \$7,989.52, SD = \453.08), $p = .144$.

Perceived Likelihood of John Misrepresenting for Control vs. Disabled vs. Elderly vs. Jewish vs. Rich. There was a significant difference in the perceived likelihood that John was being deceptive by condition, $F(4, 232) = 5.19, p = .001, \eta^2 = .08$. Post-hoc tests revealed a significant difference between rich ($M = 71.53, SD = 20.63$) and elderly ($M = 51.84, SD = 22.24$) groups, $p < .001$, and rich ($M = 71.53, SD = 20.63$) and disabled ($M = 59.01, SD = 25.71$) groups, $p = .038$.

Chapter II, Study 3 Additional Analyses (Status and Competition)

Status for Control vs. Warm Incompetent vs. Cold Competent. Participants rated John on perceived status. There was a significant difference in status among the groups $F(2, 234) = 76.87, p < .001, \eta^2 = .40$. Post-hoc tests revealed a significant difference in status between control ($M = 2.89, SD = 0.51$) and cold competent ($M = 3.86, SD = 0.53$) groups, $p < .001$, a significant difference in status between warm incompetent ($M = 2.96, SD = 0.62$) and cold competent ($M = 3.86, SD = 0.53$) groups, $p < .001$, and no significant difference in status between control ($M = 2.89, SD = 0.51$) and warm incompetent ($M = 2.96, SD = 0.62$) groups, $p = .736$.

Status for Control vs. Disabled vs. Elderly vs. Jewish vs. Rich. There was a significant difference in status among the groups $F(4, 232) = 41.56, p < .001, \eta^2 = .42$. Post-hoc tests revealed a significant difference in status between control ($M = 2.89, SD = 0.51$) and Jewish ($M = 3.76, SD = 0.58$) groups, $p < .001$, a significant difference in status between control ($M = 2.89, SD = 0.51$) and rich ($M = 3.97, SD = 0.47$) groups, $p < .001$, a significant difference in status between disabled ($M = 2.84, SD = 0.71$) and Jewish ($M = 3.76, SD = 0.58$) groups, $p < .001$, a significant difference in status between disabled ($M = 2.84, SD = 0.71$) and rich ($M = 3.97, SD = 0.47$) groups, $p < .001$, a significant difference in status between elderly ($M = 3.10, SD = 0.48$) and Jewish ($M = 3.76, SD = 0.58$) groups, $p < .001$, a significant difference in status between elderly ($M = 3.10, SD = 0.48$) and rich ($M = 3.97, SD = 0.47$) groups, $p < .001$, and a marginally significant difference in status between elderly ($M = 3.10, SD = 0.48$) and disabled ($M = 2.84, SD = 0.71$) groups, $p = .173$.

Status as Mediator Between Group and Deception, Status was a mediator only for the warm incompetent group and elderly group using coded deception.

Competition for Control vs. Warm Incompetent vs. Cold Competent. Participants rated John on perceived competition. There was a significant difference in competition among the groups $F(2, 234) = 10.17, p < .001, \eta^2 = .08$. Post-hoc tests revealed a significant difference in competition between control ($M = 2.19, SD = 0.92$) and cold competent ($M = 2.61, SD = 1.00$) groups, $p = .045$, a significant difference in competition between warm incompetent ($M = 1.99, SD = 0.95$) and cold competent ($M = 2.61, SD = 1.00$) groups, $p < .001$, and no significant difference in competition between control ($M = 2.19, SD = 0.92$) and warm incompetent ($M = 1.99, SD = 0.95$) groups, $p = .495$.

Competition for Control vs. Disabled vs. Elderly vs. Jewish vs. Rich. There was a significant difference in competition among the groups $F(4, 232) = 8.78, p < .001, \eta^2 = .13$. Post-hoc tests revealed a significant difference in competition between rich ($M = 2.97, SD = 0.95$) and control ($M = 2.19, SD = 0.92$) groups, $p = .00$, a significant difference in competition between rich ($M = 2.97, SD = 0.95$) and disabled ($M = 2.00, SD = 1.04$) groups, $p < .001$, a significant difference in competition between rich ($M = 2.97, SD = 0.95$) and elderly ($M = 1.98, SD = 0.85$) groups, $p < .001$, and a significant difference in competition between rich ($M = 2.97, SD = 0.95$) and Jewish ($M = 2.28, SD = 0.93$) groups, $p = .002$.

Competition as Mediator Between Group and Deception. Competition was a mediator only for the warm incompetent group and elderly group using coded deception.

Chapter I, Study 1 Materials

There are many different ways of thinking about negotiations and what behaviors are expected or acceptable. Consider these three possible views of negotiation.

AS A GAME: Negotiation is a game where some amount of deception and tricks are natural and expected. Negotiators must use every play at their disposal to outwit their opponent or else risk being tricked and defeated in return.

AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE: Negotiation is like all other domains in professional life where ethics and integrity should apply. Negotiators should hold themselves and one another to high standards for professional behavior.

AS COSTS AND BENEFITS: Negotiation is a complex situation where people face tradeoffs and uncertainty. Negotiators should weigh costs and benefits in deciding how to behave (e.g., to lie, to cooperate, and so forth).

Think for a moment about the extent to which you agree or disagree with each view. Once you have a sense for how these views fit with your own perspective, continue on.

1. You'll see the three schools of thought below. Please **RANK ORDER** these schools of thought for how closely they reflect **YOUR** views and approach to negotiation.

Give the view that most closely matches **YOUR** views a "1." Give the view that least closely matches your views a "3." Give the remaining view a "2."

_____ As a game ("Use cunning to outplay your opponent")

_____ As a matter of principle ("Hold yourself and others to high standards for behavior")

_____ As costs and benefits ("Weigh pros and cons to choose behavior")

2. Now think about [your classmates / other people]. What do you think their views are in terms of these schools of thought?

Think about what percent of [your classmates / other people] would have ranked each of the following **FIRST**, giving it a "1" to indicate that this particular view most closely matches their view.

For each of the views below, indicate the percent of [your classmates / other people] that would say that view **MOST CLOSELY** matches their own view. Your answers should sum to 100%.

Percent choosing for #1: A game _____%

Percent choosing for #1: A matter of principle _____%

Percent choosing for #1: Costs and benefits _____%

Total 100%

Chapter I, Study 2 Materials

There are many different ways of thinking about negotiations and what behaviors are expected or acceptable. Consider these three possible views of negotiation.

AS A GAME: Negotiation is a game where some amount of deception and tricks are natural and expected. Negotiators must use every play at their disposal to outwit their opponent or else risk being tricked and defeated in return.

AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE: Negotiation is like all other domains in professional life where ethics and integrity should apply. Negotiators should hold themselves and one another to high standards for professional behavior.

AS COSTS AND BENEFITS: Negotiation is a complex situation where people face tradeoffs and uncertainty. Negotiators should weigh costs and benefits in deciding how to behave (e.g., to lie, to cooperate, and so forth).

Think for a moment about the extent to which you agree or disagree with each view. Once you have a sense for how these views fit with your own perspective, continue on.

1. You'll see the three schools of thought below. Please **RANK ORDER** these schools of thought for how closely they reflect **YOUR** views and approach to negotiation.

Give the view that most closely matches **YOUR** views a "1." Give the view that least closely matches your views a "3." Give the remaining view a "2."

_____ As a game ("Use cunning to outplay your opponent")

_____ As a matter of principle ("Hold yourself and others to high standards for behavior")

_____ As costs and benefits ("Weigh pros and cons to choose behavior")

2. Now think about your classmates. What do you think their views are in terms of these schools of thought?

Think about what percent of your classmates would have ranked each of the following **FIRST**, giving it a "1" to indicate that this particular view most closely matches their view.

For each of the views below, indicate the percent of your classmates that would say that view **MOST CLOSELY** matches their own view. Your answers should sum to 100%.

Percent choosing for #1: A game _____%

Percent choosing for #1: A matter of principle _____%

Percent choosing for #1: Costs and benefits _____%

Total 100%

During this negotiation...

1. I was misleading or dishonest.

Not At All			Somewhat			Very Much
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

2. My partner was misleading or dishonest.

Not At All			Somewhat			Very Much
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Chapter I, Study 3 Materials

Question 1

To begin, we want to share some research results with you. We asked several hundred American adults to tell us about their view of interpersonal negotiations. Specifically, we told them about THREE ways for thinking about the appropriateness of deception in negotiations, and we asked them to tell us how these ways matched their own views.

Here are the three views we described for thinking about negotiations.

AS A GAME: Negotiation is a game where some amount of deception and tricks are natural and expected. Negotiators must use every play at their disposal to outwit their opponent or else risk being tricked and defeated in return.

AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE: Negotiation is like all other domains in professional life where ethics and integrity should apply. Negotiators should hold themselves and one another to high standards for professional behavior.

AS COSTS AND BENEFITS: Negotiation is a complex situation where people face tradeoffs and uncertainty. Negotiators should weigh costs and benefits in deciding how to behave (e.g., to lie, to cooperate, and so forth).

Question 2

We asked a sample of several hundred American adults which of these three views of negotiation most closely matched their own view.

Low Gamers Condition:

A majority of people, 65%, ranked “AS A GAME” LAST. In other words, a vast majority saw this approach to negotiations (“use deception and tricks to outwit your opponent”) as inappropriate and unacceptable.

Why do you think the vast majority of people would see this “as a game” approach as inappropriate and unacceptable?

High Gamers Condition:

A majority of people, 64%, ranked “AS A GAME” FIRST or SECOND. In other words, a vast majority saw this approach to negotiations (“use deception and tricks to outwit your opponent”) as appropriate and preferable.

Why do you think the vast majority of people would see this “as a game” approach as appropriate and preferable?

Question 3

In this next part of the study you are asked to imagine that you are in a negotiation with an American man named John. Please read the description of the scenario below and then respond to the questions that follow.

Suppose you are planning to move to another state and must sell your current car—a 2010 Honda Civic. You therefore placed an advertisement on Craig’s List that read: Used car for sale by owner. 2010 Honda Civic. 50,000 miles. Asking price: Best offer.

You believe the Civic is in generally good condition. Recently, though, your mechanic told you that the car will need some work on the transmission. He said the transmission is in worse shape than most cars with 50,000 miles and that it will very likely need transmission work before 60,000 miles. He also said the problem does not require immediate attention. The car seems to run perfectly fine for now.

You need to get about \$8,000 for the car as soon as possible to cover the costs of your move. Your review of the used car market suggests that the car is worth at least this amount.

A few days ago a potential buyer, John, came to look at the car. John took the car out for a test drive, and the car performed without a problem. John had to leave before you could try to work out a deal, but he told you he would follow up with an email.

Question 4

You just received an email from John.

“Hi, I’m interested in buying your car. I am writing with some questions about the car’s condition. I noticed a small scratch on the passenger side door, but otherwise things looked good. Would you describe the condition of the car as being good? Are there any issues?”

My friend who knows a lot about cars tells me the value for a 2010 Honda Civic in good condition should be \$7,500. I think that’s the right price for the market, and it’s also all I’ve got in my budget for a car.

I am under some time pressure because someone I know is willing to sell me a similar car for below market value. They need me to make a decision soon. I’d prefer to buy your car though and would ideally like to come by tomorrow to pick it up. Please let me know if that would work for you.

Thanks, John”

Question 5

Imagine that you are replying to John by email. In the space below, please write the text of the email you would send to John.

You are free to reply as you wish, including writing whatever you like, accepting or rejecting John's offer, making a counteroffer, responding to his questions, etc.

[free response email text]

Question 6

What did you say about the condition of the car in your email to John?

- a. I was clear the car would need some repairs
- b. I did not address his question about whether the car would need some repairs
- c. I assured the buyer that the car would not need any repairs

Question 7

What percentage of people in your situation (selling a used car with potential transmission issues) would have done the following?

Enter percentages, making sure they sum to 100%.

- a. Be clear the car would need some repairs
- b. Not address his question about whether the car would need some repairs
- c. Assure the buyer that the car would not need any repairs

Question 8

In his email John mentioned that his friend who knows a lot about cars tells him the value for a 2010 Honda Civic in good condition should be \$7,500. How likely is it that John was misrepresenting the market value of the car?

- 0-100%

Question 9

In his email John mentioned that his budget for a car is \$7,500. How likely is it that John was misrepresenting his budget?

- 0-100%

Question 10

In his email John mentioned that he knows someone who is willing to sell him a similar car for below market value. How likely is it that John was misrepresenting his alternative?

- 0-100%

Question 11

Manipulation Check:

We asked a sample of several hundred American adults which view of negotiation most closely matched their own view. What percentage of people chose “AS A GAME” FIRST or SECOND?

- a. 20%
- b. 35%
- c. 42%
- d. 64%
- e. 75%
- f. 80%

We asked a sample of several hundred American adults which view of negotiation most closely matched their own view. What percentage of people chose “AS A GAME” LAST?

- a. 20%
- b. 35%
- c. 42%
- d. 65%
- e. 75%
- f. 80%

Question 12

“What percent of American adults do you think would rank “AS A GAME” ("Use deception and tricks to outwit your opponent") as their TOP choice for their view of negotiations?”

- 0-100%

Chapter II, Study 1 Materials

We are interested in discovering what traits are characteristic of different types of negotiators. We're not interested in your personal beliefs, but in your perceptions about how these types of negotiators are viewed by society.

As viewed by society, to what extent are the following traits characteristic of truthful negotiators and deceptive negotiators?

Warm

- 1 = more characteristic of truthful negotiators, 4 = equally characteristic of truthful and deceptive negotiators, 7 = more characteristic of deceptive negotiators

Sincere

- 1 = more characteristic of truthful negotiators, 4 = equally characteristic of truthful and deceptive negotiators, 7 = more characteristic of deceptive negotiators

Tolerant

- 1 = more characteristic of truthful negotiators, 4 = equally characteristic of truthful and deceptive negotiators, 7 = more characteristic of deceptive negotiators

Good natured

- 1 = more characteristic of truthful negotiators, 4 = equally characteristic of truthful and deceptive negotiators, 7 = more characteristic of deceptive negotiators

Competent

- 1 = more characteristic of truthful negotiators, 4 = equally characteristic of truthful and deceptive negotiators, 7 = more characteristic of deceptive negotiators

Confident

- 1 = more characteristic of truthful negotiators, 4 = equally characteristic of truthful and deceptive negotiators, 7 = more characteristic of deceptive negotiators

Independent

- 1 = more characteristic of truthful negotiators, 4 = equally characteristic of truthful and deceptive negotiators, 7 = more characteristic of deceptive negotiators

Competitive

- 1 = more characteristic of truthful negotiators, 4 = equally characteristic of truthful and deceptive negotiators, 7 = more characteristic of deceptive negotiators

Intelligent

- 1 = more characteristic of truthful negotiators, 4 = equally characteristic of truthful and deceptive negotiators, 7 = more characteristic of deceptive negotiators

In the previous question you made ratings about which of the following?

- a. Truthful negotiators
- b. Deceptive negotiators
- c. Both truthful negotiators and deceptive negotiators
- d. Neither truthful negotiators nor deceptive negotiators

Chapter II, Study 2 Materials

We are interested in how members of different groups are seen. We're not interested in your personal beliefs, but in your perceptions about how these groups are viewed by society.

As viewed by society, to what extent are [people from these social categories] deceptive in negotiations?

Jewish people

- 1 = not at all to 7 = extremely

Rich people

- 1 = not at all to 7 = extremely

Businesswomen

- 1 = not at all to 7 = extremely

Elderly people

- 1 = not at all to 7 = extremely

Disabled people

- 1 = not at all to 7 = extremely

Housewives

- 1 = not at all to 7 = extremely

In the previous questions you made ratings about which of the following groups?

- a. Poor people
- b. Asians
- c. Young people
- d. None of the above

Chapter II, Study 3 Materials

Imagine that you are in a negotiation with a [man / rich man / Jewish man / elderly man / disabled man] named John.

Please read the description of the scenario below and then respond to the questions that follow.

Suppose you are planning to move to another state and must sell your current car—a 2010 Honda Civic. You therefore placed an advertisement on Craigslist that read: Used car for sale by owner. 2010 Honda Civic. 50,000 miles. Asking price: Best offer.

You believe the Civic is in generally good condition. Recently, though, your mechanic told you that the car will need some work on the transmission. He said the transmission is in worse shape than most cars with 50,000 miles and that it will very likely need transmission work before 60,000 miles. He also said the problem does not require immediate attention. The car seems to run perfectly fine for now.

You need to get about \$8,000 for the car as soon as possible to cover the costs of your move. Your review of the used car market suggests that the car is worth at least this amount.

A few days ago a potential buyer, John, a [rich man / Jewish man / elderly man / disabled man] came to look at the car.

When he arrived you immediately noticed that he [was wearing a designer suit and an expensive watch / was wearing a traditional Jewish skullcap and looked like he had just come from synagogue / had white hair and lots of wrinkles / had a prosthetic left leg].

John took the car out for a test drive, and the car performed without a problem. John had to leave before you could try to work out a deal, but he told you he would follow up with an email.

You just received an email from John.

“Hi, I’m interested in buying your car. I am writing with some questions about the car’s condition. I noticed a small scratch on the passenger side door, but otherwise things looked good. Would you describe the condition of the car as being good? Are there any issues?”

My friend who knows a lot about cars tells me the value for a 2010 Honda Civic in good condition should be \$7,500. I think that’s the right price for the market, and it’s also all I’ve got in my budget for a car.

I am under some time pressure because someone I know is willing to sell me a similar car for below market value. They need me to make a decision soon. I'd prefer to buy your car though and would ideally like to come by tomorrow to pick it up. Please let me know if that would work for you.

Thanks, John"

Imagine that you are replying to John by email. In the space below, please make a counteroffer and write the text of the email you would send to John.

Include a counteroffer and reply as you wish, writing whatever you like, responding to his questions, etc.

[free response email text]

What was your counteroffer?

What did you say about the condition of the car in your email to John?

- a. I was clear the car would need some repairs
- b. I did not address his question about whether the car would need some repairs
- c. I assured the John that the car would not need any repairs

The scenario specified that John was which of the following?

- a. Rich
- b. Jewish
- c. Elderly
- d. Disabled
- e. None of the above

How prestigious are the jobs typically achieved by people like John?

- 1 = not at all to 5 = extremely

How economically successful have people like John been?

- 1 = not at all to 5 = extremely

How well educated are people like John?

- 1 = not at all to 5 = extremely

If people like John get special breaks (such as preference in hiring decisions), this are likely to make things more difficult for people like me.

- 1 = not at all to 5 = extremely

The more power people like John have, the less power people like me are likely to have.

- 1 = not at all to 5 = extremely

Resources that go to people like John are likely to take away from the resources of people like me.

- 1 = not at all to 5 = extremely

In his email John also mentioned that his friend who knows a lot about cars tells him the value for a 2010 Honda Civic in good condition should be about \$7,500. How likely is it that John was misrepresenting the market value of the car?

- 0-100%

In his email John mentioned that his budget for a car is \$7,500. How likely is it that John was misrepresenting his budget?

- 0-100%

In his email John mentioned that he knows someone who is willing to sell him a similar car for below market value. How likely is it that John was misrepresenting his alternative?

- 0-100%

What ethnicity did you assume John to be?

- a. White/Caucasian
- b. Black/African-American or Caribbean American
- c. Hispanic
- d. Asian/Asian-American
- e. American-Indian/Native-American or Alaska Native
- f. Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
- g. Other
- h. I don't know

How old did you assume John to be?

- a. Under 20
- b. 20-29
- c. 30-39
- d. 40-49
- e. 50-59
- f. 60-69
- g. 70-79
- h. 80 or over
- i. I don't know

Demographics (collected in all studies)

What is your gender?

- a. Male
- b. Female

What is your age (numbers in years)? _____

What is the highest level of education you have obtained?

- a. Some High School
- b. High School Degree/GED
- c. Some college
- d. College degree
- e. Some graduate degree
- f. Graduate Degree

What is your race?

- i. White/Caucasian
- j. Black/African-American or Caribbean American
- k. Hispanic
- l. Asian/Asian-American
- m. American-Indian/Native-American or Alaska Native
- n. Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
- o. Other

How many years have you lived in the United States?