Title: Party System Institutionalization: The Case of Chile and Why We Need to Un-Pack The Concept and its Measurement.

Abstract

The analysis of party-voter linkages presented in this paper illustrates the risks of conflating party system stability and programmatic structuring in a one-dimensional concept of party system institutionalization, showing that while electoral volatility has remained low over time, programmatic structuring has weakened and party-voter linkages have significantly mutated. Moreover, the data also suggests that social fragmentation and inequality have enabled parties to combine different linkage-types with constituents, thereby minimizing the sustainability trade-offs identified in Kitschelt’s original analytical framework. In conclusion, both conceptual innovation and alternative empirical strategies are needed to better describe and explain the heterogeneous and socially segmented linkage strategies that ambitious politicians are crafting in Latin America in pursuit of a winning electoral coalition.

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Introduction

In modern democracies political parties provide a fundamental bridge between state and society, enabling elected governments to rule effectively while seeking to implement the normative ideal of a representative democracy. Moreover, the presence of programmatic-orientated political parties enables the cycles of responsiveness and accountability that characterize high quality democratic governance (Kitschelt et al 1999).

In Latin America, formal democratic rule has endured and political contestation has been relatively open since the mid-1980s. At the same time, however, mechanisms of political representation have weakened and political parties now obtain some of the lowest legitimacy ratings of political institutions in the region (Hagopian 1998; UNDP 2004). Though there is a global trend towards electoral dealignment (Dalton and Wattenberg 2002), Latin America displays greater electoral volatility and public alienation from parties than established democracies (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007). Although low-quality equilibriums can endure, the occurrence of “crises of political representation” endangers the quality of democracy and ultimately its survival (Mainwaring, Bejarano and Pizarro 2006).

While failures in political representation are crucial for explaining current democratic deficits, research on political representation has been scant, producing a crucial gap in the literature in regard to analyzing the complex mechanisms underpinning the nature of political representation (UNDP 2004; Mainwaring, Bejarano and Pizarro 2006). Moreover, two potentially useful mainstream approaches from the literature that have already made a seminal contribution to the study of party systems and representation still require significant adjustments before they can be fruitfully applied to the region.
In arguing this last point, the following section discusses the conceptual and operational definition of party-system institutionalization (Mainwaring and Scully 1995) and its relationship to programmatic and non-programmatic party-voter linkages (Kitschelt 2000). I first argue that the current conceptualization of party system institutionalization could generate important blind spots for analyzing political representation. Regarding the theory of party voter linkages, I then argue that it is necessary to challenge some assumptions built-in to Kitschelt’s (2000) original conceptualization of linkages that do not seem to hold true for Latin America.

The remainder of the paper is structured around an empirical analysis of party-voter linkages in post-transitional Chile. This has been presented historically as the case that most closely resembles European party-systems in the region (Dix 1989; Scully 1992; Coppelge 1998) and, according to available evidence, one that has continued to display remarkable levels of institutionalization and programmatic structuring (see e.g. Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Siavelis 2000; Luna and Zechmeister 2005; Mainwaring, Bejarano and Pizarro 2006).

Some have argued that fundamental aspects of that system changed after the transition to democracy (see e.g. Roberts 1998; Aguero, Tironi, Valenzuela y Sunkel 1998; Fuentes 1999; Tironi y Aguero 1999; Hunneus 2000; Montes et al 2000; Carey 2002; Mainwaring and Torcal 2003; Posner 1999 and 2004; Altman 2004; Navia 2005). Others observed more stability than change, noting that despite certain dramatic transformations, the main features of the party-system remained in place (see e.g. A. Valenzuela 1994; Siavelis 1997; J.S. Valenzuela and Scully 1997; Angell 2003).

The analysis of party voter linkages presented in this paper illustrates the risks of conflating party system stability and programmatic structuring in a one-dimensional concept of party system institutionalization. It shows that while electoral volatility has remained low over
time, programmatic structuring has weakened and party-voter linkages have significantly mutated. Moreover, my data also suggests that social fragmentation and inequality have enabled parties to combine different linkage-types with constituents, thereby minimizing the sustainability trade-offs identified in Kitschelt’s original framework.

I conclude that both conceptual innovations and alternative empirical strategies are needed to better describe and explain the variety of heterogeneous and socially segmented linkage strategies that ambitious politicians craft when seeking to build a winning electoral coalition. In broader terms, formal-institutional perspectives and cross-national empirical analyses of aggregate data could be complemented by further analyses of party-system political economies, bringing state and socio-structural variables back into the study of political representation. Multi-level comparative research designs might also offer an appropriate empirical tool to better describe the nature and existing variability of linkages between politicians and their voters both within and among Latin American polities.

Party System Institutionalization and Party Voter Linkages

Mainwaring and Scully’s conceptualization of party system institutionalization (and its subsequent elaborations in Mainwaring 1999; Payne et al. 2003; Jones 2005; and Mainwaring and Torcal 2006) is the most commonly accepted comparative framework for analyzing Latin American party systems to date. Its groundbreaking contribution to party system theory is reflected in the fact that it has been adopted in the study of party systems around the globe (see e.g. Beatty 2007; Kuhonta 2007; Thames and Robbins 2007). However, for the purpose of analyzing political representation (an aim that was, to be sure, beyond the scope of Mainwaring
and Scully’s original contribution), the concept of party system institutionalization and its empirical measurement needs to be overhauled.

Conceptually, Mainwaring and Scully (1995) identify four dimensions of party system institutionalization: a) the stability and regularity of party competition patterns; b) the presence of party roots in society, which helps to create the stability of institutionalized systems; c) a greater level of party legitimacy in society; and d) the presence of well developed party organizations as opposed to parties that function as electoral vehicles for personalistic leaders. This definition views party system institutionalization as a continuum that ranges from institutionalized party systems to fluid ones.

As Mainwaring (1999) has already noted and Crisp (2000) shows using evidence from Venezuela, the relationship between institutionalization and high democratic quality is not linear, as too much institutionalization can lead to party system sclerosis (see also Morgan 2007). However, Mainwaring (1999) argues that “(the) four dimensions of institutionalization need not go together, but they almost always do. Conceptually, a party system could be fairly institutionalized along one dimension but weakly institutionalized along another, but empirically, this is the exception.” Along the same lines, Mainwaring and Torcal (2006) note that “Personalistic linkages between voters and candidates tend to be stronger when party roots in society are weaker. They also tend to be stronger with weak party organizations and weakly institutionalized parties” (pp. 21).

As Kitschelt (2000) has stressed, this definition’s fundamental problem is that it overlooks the fact that institutionalized party systems can be structured on the basis of different kinds of linkages between a party and its constituency (i.e. ideological commitments vs. particularistic exchanges or charismatic leadership). Systems structured around different linkages
can be equally enduring and stable, but their quality and long-term prospects (especially in a context of economic and social decline) differ substantially.

Moreover, it can also be the case that while one dimension of this index remains constant (e.g. the stability of patterns of competition), others undergo significant change. Indeed, the second part of this paper empirically illustrates this scenario for the Chilean case, further arguing that low volatility is produced—at least in part—by changes in party voter linkages. A similar empirical narrative can be found in Morgan (2007) for the case of Venezuela. In summary, the index’s four dimensions conflate different phenomena that must be theoretically unpacked in order to make sense of the relationship between party system stability and predominant party voter linkage patterns.

Empirically, the measurement of party system institutionalization is also problematic for the study of representation. Mainwaring, in different works, as well as Payne et al (2003) and Jones (2005), who operationalize Mainwaring and Scully’s definition by drawing on comparative data that has recently become available, calculate a simple additive index of party system institutionalization based on empirical indicators for each of the four conceptual dimensions.¹ Jones (2005) does not incorporate his measure of programmatic structure into his own computation of party system institutionalization. However, this measure of programmatic structure is weighted by levels of electoral volatility under the assumption that low volatility is part and parcel of more programmatic systems. As will be argued below, this last operationalization seems to be more accurate; but it is only relevant for one of the four dimensions conflated in the institutionalization index.

¹For a thorough analysis of the use of concepts and how their different structures (i.e. additive vs. multiplicative) directly shape the way we approach and study social reality, see Goertz (2006).
The measurements undertaken by Mainwaring and Torcal (2006) and more recent empirical quantifications of institutionalization in other regions (see e.g. Beatty 2007 for Africa and Kuhonta 2007 for East-Asia) are also incomplete because of data scarcity. This is particularly problematic when electoral volatility is the only available indicator included in the index of institutionalization, as is common in the literature (Beatty 2007; Kuhonta 2007; Thames and Robbins 2007).

Mainwaring and Torcal’s (2006) measurement is somewhat more complete. According to the authors: “We focus on three issues (high electoral volatility, weak ideological linkages, and personalism [...] All three issues relate principally to the first two dimensions of party system institutionalization: the stability of interparty competition and party roots in society” (p.8). To be sure, these first two dimensions are the most important ones for typifying patterns of party-voter linkages.

Mainwaring and Torcal (2006) provide disaggregated indexes of electoral volatility (linked to the first dimension) and the scope of ideological linkages (related to the second dimension) for a group of advanced industrial democracies and for a series of recently democratized countries. The ubiquity of the second indicator for measuring party-roots in society is argued on the following premise: “Because ideological linkages between voters and parties are an important means by which voters become attached to parties and hence an important means by which parties become rooted in society, in general, where ideological linkages to parties are weaker, electoral volatility is higher. Although programmatic or ideological linkages are not the only ways to create party system stability, they are the main way that such stability is achieved.”(pp. 16-17) As the last sentence shows, once again electoral stability and programmatic party-voter linkages are conceptually and empirically conflated.
Drawing on Mainwaring and Torcal’s indicators of system volatility and strength of ideological voting, Graph 1 presents the empirical relationship found between these dimensions.\(^2\) As the scatterplot clearly illustrates, the dimensions do not relate linearly. Instead, while ideological voting is strongly associated with low electoral volatility, many stable systems (with low volatility) lack high levels of ideological voting.

Confirming this interpretation, the bivariate correlation between the two dimensions (\(-.31\)) is barely significant at the .10 level. In line with Mainwaring and Torcal’s (2006) central argument that high levels of party system stability are characteristic of advanced democratic societies, high partisan volatility is associated with lower GDP levels (.78**). However, the correlation between high GDP levels and the presence of ideological voting is much lower (.35*). Interestingly, high levels of inequality (measured by a country’s Gini coefficient) are more strongly correlated to the absence of ideological voting (-.35#) than to stable electoral patterns (.01).

Graph 2 displays similar results on the basis of Jones’ (2005) different operationalization of volatility (first dimension) and the programmatic nature of Latin American party-systems (not included in his index of institutionalization). This graph shows that the same type of empirical relation holds, even when a different operationalization is used and the observations are limited to Latin America cases.

\(^2\) Neither Mainwaring and Torcal nor Jones explores the empirical relationship between different components of their party system institutionalization indexes. Interestingly, the Cronbach’s Alpha scalability coefficient for Mainwaring and Torcal’s components is low (.55), indicating that the components do not scale well in a one-dimensional index.
To conclude, electoral volatility and programmatic party voter linkages should be theoretically and empirically unpacked. Conceptually conflating stable patterns of political competition with programmatic politics is misleading. At best, low volatility can be reframed as a necessary but in itself insufficient condition for the occurrence of programmatic party-voter linkages in a given party system.

Kitschelt’s (2000) and Kitschelt and Wilkinson’s (2007) proposal for analyzing different types of party voter linkages provides an alternative approach to analyzing the nature of political representation in Latin America. However, at least two additional facets should be incorporated to effectively adapt such a proposal to the region’s particular reality.

In his early work, Kitschelt (2000) discusses three overarching party-voter linkage strategies: programmatic linkages by which parties and voters share a similar stance regarding the provision of public goods; charismatic and personality-based adherence to a leader; and exchanges with individual voters or specific groups that receive targeted side-payments in exchange for their electoral allegiance. According to Kitschelt (2000), parties that seek to diversify their linkage strategy by actively pursuing more than one kind of linkage at a time will face increasing trade-offs:

"[T]he incompatibilities between charismatic, clientelist, and programmatic linkages are not absolute. At low dosages, all linkage mechanisms may be compatible. As politicians intensify their cultivation of a particular type of linkage, however, they reach a production possibility frontier at which further intensifications of one linkage mechanism can occur only at the expense of toning down other linkage mechanisms.” (p.855)
However, the levels of social fragmentation and inequality observed in Latin America make it both reasonable and feasible for parties to attempt to diversify their linkage strategies in order to attract a broad enough constituency. This contextual condition encourages segmented party strategies that can be potentially problematic within less socially segmented societies due to the combinations of linkage types. Indeed, successful candidates and parties do usually combine different linkage strategies in their campaigns while (at specific conjunctures) minimizing the theoretical trade-offs that result from the simultaneous pursuit of segmented strategies (see i.e. Levitsky 2003; Stokes 2005; Magaloni et al 2007). The feasibility and empirical frequency of this kind of combination defies a generalized trade-off assumption, which however persists in Kitschelt and Wilkinson’s framework (2007), though more implicitly.

The effects of high income inequality and social fragmentation therefore appear to configure an important Latin American specificity that theoretically could be linked to the presence of less cumbersome trade-offs. Indeed, contrary to the trade-off assumption, parties might find it more problematic to sustain only one type of linkage when attempting to build a winning coalition in contemporary Latin American societies (i.e. if they are caught between the conflicting programmatic preferences that would emerge within a socially diverse constituency) than to attempt to diversify the linkage strategy in a socially segmented way.

In short, parties in contemporary Latin American societies usually do pursue segmented linkage strategies to construct a socially heterogeneous electoral coalition, and high linkage-type segmentation does not necessarily lead to cumbersome trade-offs but can actually induce synergies under specific circumstances.

While keeping these caveats in mind, the following sections of this paper will draw on Kitschelt’s framework to characterize the evolution of party-voter linkages in Chile. From a
comparative perspective, this case can be seen as a “best case scenario” for the occurrence of programmatic representation in Latin America, given the combined presence of an institutionalized party system, a stable economy, and a functional state (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring, Bejarano and Pizarro 2006). Indeed, available evidence suggests that at the aggregate level, Chile is one of two Latin American cases (along with Uruguay) with the highest levels of programmatic structuring (Luna and Zechmeister 2005; omitted citation).

Party-Voter Linkages in Post-Transitional Chile

Chile’s party system stands out in Latin America for being less volatile than those in neighboring countries. This feature has characterized the system since the country’s transition to democracy in 1990 and indeed can be traced back to historical descriptions of the party system as exceptional in the region (Dix 1991; Scully 1992; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Valenzuela 1999). Supporting this description, Table 1 presents comparative evidence of average (vote and seat) volatility observed in Chile and the region computed by Jones (2005).

Chile emerges with the least volatile party system in the region when the Pedersen index is computed by taking each electoral pact (the Concertación and the Alianza) as the relevant unities. Even if a more stringent criterion is used and the index is computed by taking the individual political parties as the relevant unity, with a result of 7.83 Chile still shows up as one of the two least volatile systems, standing well below the regional average.

3Computed by the author on the basis of data from Servicio Electoral. It should be noted, however, that the binomial electoral system could distort the computation of the volatility index by taking individual parties as units (see Altman 2006).
Drawing on our conventional understanding of the party system institutionalization concept, such low levels of electoral volatility would lead us to infer the likely presence of strong and solid linkages between Chilean parties and their electorates. This is not the case in contemporary Chile, however, and according to Montes et al (2000) neither has it been the case historically.

To begin to illustrate this point, Graph 3 presents survey evidence on citizens’ identification with political parties in Latin America; the bars indicate the percentage of nationally representative samples that declared themselves loyal to any political party in 2006. As the graph shows, Chilean parties have the lowest levels of public adherence among all those in the region.

This evidence is consistent with other significant trends observed diachronically in Chile. As shown in Graph 4, the increasing partisan de-alignment of the Chilean citizenry correlates with a downward trend in electoral turnout for both presidential and congressional contests. Blank and invalid voting also has increased in the country.

In short, while the Chilean system has remained remarkably stable in the electoral arena (as the volatility index indicates), the percentage of the population identifying with a political party has decreased significantly since the transition to democracy. This decrease is matched by a drop in valid, registered voters in Chilean elections, particularly among younger electoral segments (Carlin 2006; LAPOP 2006). This preliminary evidence, which is complemented in the following sections by an analysis of party voter linkages in contemporary Chile, points to a weakness of party roots in society.
It is my contention that programmatic party-voter linkages have decreased in Chile at the national level. Although visible programmatic differences persist between party-identifiers (Huneeus 2005) aligned with the Concertación (the center-left governing coalition) and the Alianza (the rightist opposition), programmatic convergence is especially visible on socioeconomic issues, where partisan leaders tend to lack internally coherent and externally distinct positions across a wide set of policy-related issues (Hagopian 2002).  

Furthermore, the presence of the Christian Democrats in the Concertación and the liberal factions of the Alianza’s RN increase the internal heterogeneity of both electoral pacts in terms of values and religious orientation. This has reduced the relevance of an historically important (Scully 1992) and potentially alternative competitive divide. Although Chile displays a generational divide along morally conservative lines, with younger groups holding much more liberal views on these issues (LAPOP 2006), realignment around those issues has been slow in the country. Indeed, such eventual realignment is less likely both because of the present coalition structure and also due to the decreasing electoral participation of younger age groups, which makes this upcoming constituency less valuable to strategic political entrepreneurs.  

In this context, the regime divide (representing either normative positions —authoritarian vs. democratic — or more historically contextualized ones —Pro- vs. Anti-Pinochet) has been

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4See e.g. Scully (1992) and Valenzuela (1999) for a thorough characterization of the party system and its historical evolution.
5Only around 20% of those between 18 and 25 years of age said they voted in the last election (LAPOP 2006).
identified as the central issue splitting the Concertación and Alianza camps (see e.g. Aguero, Tironi, Valenzuela and Sunkel 1998; Tironi and Aguero 1999; Hunneus 2000; Mainwaring and Torcal 2003; Ortega 2003).

To test these claims, I first present data on the comparative programmatic placement of partisan voters circa 2000 on three factors representing morals/values, the regime, and state-market competitive divides.⁶ The Socialist Party, the Party for Democracy, the Radical Party, and the Christian-Democratic Party (henceforth the PS, the PPD, the RP, and the DC) are the central players within the Concertación, while the Independent Democratic Union and National Renovation (henceforth the UDI and RN) parties comprise the Alianza. The Communist Party (henceforth the PCchi) lacks congressional representation and is not part of either mainstream electoral pact. Beyond data availability, the timeframe for this exploration (year 2000) is convenient as it coincides with the most competitive presidential election in Chile’s post-authoritarian period, when it would be reasonable to expect programmatic polarization.

For each partisan group, an average estimation of programmatic placement is highlighted in bold text.⁷ Partisan constituencies with lower and higher levels of education (constructed from terciles based on respondents’ years of formal education) are also mapped for each party.

To identify each group, the partisan acronym is followed either by “he” (highly educated) or “le” (low-educated) for the corresponding educational cross-section. For the sake of clarity,

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⁶The data used here corresponds to the third wave of the World Value Survey. This survey contained a series of questions on which a confirmatory factor analysis was run to create latent variables representing each conflict line or divide. Attitudes towards abortion and divorce loaded highly in the first factor obtained (moral divide); attitudes regarding social policy provision and the scope of state intervention in the economy loaded significantly in the second factor (state market divide); and finally, attitudes regarding democratic legitimacy and the association of democracy and disorder were recovered by the third factor (regime divide). A similar structure, though based on different variables, was obtained with the data available in 1988. Unfortunately, this earlier measure did not include items measuring substantive issues related to the moral divide, and therefore, church attendance and religiosity are used as proxies. The data for 1988 comes from the “Projeto Cone Sul” comparative database, which also has nationwide coverage. Statistical documentation and details on question wording are available upon request.

⁷Unfortunately, the available N for the Radical Party is not high enough to allow its inclusion in these analyses.
the graphs do not show the middle-educated stratum. In the absence of independent salience measures, and in order to assess the amount of partisan polarization observed in each competitive divide, I also ran a series of ANOVAs (using Bonferroni post-hoc tests) to identify party pairs with significantly different means for a given factor. These measures act as a proxy for the relative importance of each divide in each measure by identifying those factors in which partisan electorates present sufficient internal consistency and external divergence to produce statistically significant programmatic placements.

The results obtained indicate that neither the state/market divide nor the conservative/liberal divide produces a significant split in the electorates of different Chilean parties. Except for Communist Party voters (who are more liberal), Chilean party electorates are indistinguishable on this basis. The regime divide is the only aspect for which systematic differences exist among mainstream Chilean parties, splitting the camps of the Concertación (PS, PPD, and DC) and those of the Alianza (RN and UDI).8

Maps 1 and 2 illustrate this assessment. Map 1 displays the relative positioning of partisan electorates in the state/market and regime divides. Looking at the average partisan placements, it becomes evident that differentiation occurs in the regime divide, with a clear pro-democratic camp that coincides with the Concertación’s partisan arena (to which Communist voters are proximate) and an Alianza camp that displays a more ambivalent attitude towards democracy. Meanwhile, and again with the exception of the Communist Party, voter preferences on the state-market divide are grouped together towards the origin of the graph, with the Concertación parties appearing marginally to the left (statist position) and those of the Alianza slightly to the right, though the difference between the two is statistically insignificant.

8For the sake of space I do not report Bonferroni pairwise matrices in the text. These results are available upon request.
It is possible to gain additional insight by looking at the distribution of programmatic placements by educational level within partisan electorates. Whereas partisan electorates map consistently on the regime divide (i.e. members of a given partisan group map close to their fellow partisans irrespective of educational level), visible inter-party differences exist on the state-market divide (once again, with the exception of the Communist party). Here, regardless of partisan affiliation, voters with a low educational level tend to prefer higher levels of state intervention in the economy, while highly educated voters prefer more market allocation of resources.

The case of voters in the UDI party is particularly striking; while its least educated voters have preferences on the state-market divide similar to those of the Communist Party, its most educated voters appear at the other end of the continuum. The patterns observed within RN, the PPD, and the PS are similar to that of UDI voters, although less sharply delineated. In short, distinct preferences on the state-market divide run within partisan and coalitional electorates. This might imply that different preferences regarding state/market issues, which are also socially stratified, are not consistently represented among partisan alignments.

A similar configuration is also observed for the conservative/liberal divide, which also runs within each party, splitting less educated voters, who tend to be more conservative, from highly educated ones, who are marginally more liberal. However, the overall intra-party dispersion is lower in this divide, with the otherwise homogeneous PCchi presenting the greatest spread between its most and least educated voters.

To test these observations more systematically, Table 2 displays results from a logit model used to predict the intended vote for a partisan pact (Concertación vs. Alianza) on the
basis of the three factors analyzed above, controlling for education level.\textsuperscript{9} I applied Clarify to both models, obtaining the change in predicted probabilities of a Concertación vote, given an equivalent shift in each of the independent variables under a \textit{ceteris paribus} condition. To be sure, using a binary model to distinguish between partisan pacts instead of parties (Concertación and Alianza voters) imposes a lower threshold for programmatic preferences to become significant predictors of coalitional alignments and replicates the common approach taken by mainstream comparative analyses of the Chilean case (Jones 2005). The results obtained are plainly consistent with previous observations.

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MAP 1 ABOUT HERE
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While both the regime and the state-market divides obtained significant coefficients, the effect of the former is stronger: Keeping everything else constant, a shift from -1.5 (democratic) to 1.5 (authoritarian) on the regime divide increases the probability of a vote for the Alianza by more than 80%. This result resists the incorporation of education into the model. When the same shift is simulated for the state-market divide, moving from statist attitudes towards pro-market ones, the probability of a vote for the Concertación decreases by only 16%. When controlling for

\textsuperscript{9}Whereas the data for 1988 comes from the “Projeto Cone Sul” comparative database, the 2000 data is from the World Value Survey. Both samples are nationwide and both questionnaires included a series of questions on which a confirmatory factor analysis was run to create latent variables representing each conflict line or divide. Statistical documentation of this procedure is available upon request.
education that probability decreases further to 13%. Finally, the effect of the moral divide is not significant and only produces marginal effects on the probability of voting for either pact.

The evidence presented thus far supports the claim that programmatic linking in contemporary Chile is essentially restricted to the regime divide, while further suggesting that programmatic linkages are likely to be socially stratified. However, it does not confirm that this type of party-voter linkage has decreased over time.

To test that claim, Table 3 presents the correlation between the left-right scale and comparable programmatic factors obtained for 1988, 1996, 2000, and 2006. While the final time point was estimated on the basis of LAPOP (2006) data, previous calculations correspond to the WVS (2000 and 1996) and the Projeto Cono Sur (1988).10 The table also reports specific correlation coefficients for the most and least educated segments of the population and computes the gap between them.

Despite its significant decrease over time, the regime factor once again is responsible for the programmatic divide that most significantly correlates with left-right alignments in each of the time periods for which data is available. That divide also shows the smaller gaps between the least educated and the most educated population segments. The only exception in this last regard is found in 2006, and may signal the presence of increasing programmatic “confusion” – especially among less educated segments of the electorate—as the legacy of the authoritarian period and the transition to democracy erode.

The moral divide fluctuates in terms of both the strength of the correlation and the size of the gap between different educational cohorts, but it never maps strongly on left-right self-placements. Finally, the state-market divide presents more stable but marginal correlations with

10 Documentation on these factor analyses is available upon request.
the left-right scale (especially for low-educated cohorts). It also presents significant social gaps, with highly educated voters mapping more consistently than their less educated fellow citizens.

It therefore seems that the correlation between left-right self-placements and substantive programmatic divides has weakened over time while showing significant degrees of social stratification. I now turn to the analysis of non-programmatic linkages.

Table 3 ABOUT HERE

Non-programmatic linkages I: candidate-centered competition at the national level

The combined effects of the electoral system and the emerging configuration of programmatic linkages has created strong incentives for office-seeking politicians from all camps to compete for the support of an increasingly de-aligned electorate around non-programmatic linkages. At the national level, candidate-centered appeals seem to explain the electoral allegiance of de-aligned voters.

Table 4 compares the percentage of respondents who in 2000 preferred Joaquín Lavín of the rightist UDI party to become the next president of Chile, to the percentages obtained by each presidential candidate in October 2005 (two months before the most recent presidential election).11 Whereas Piñera’s candidacy was endorsed by RN (UDI’s Alianza partner), Bachelet was the candidate of the Concertación (PS, PPD, DC, and PR). Finally, the candidate Hirsch represented the alliance of Humanists and Communists, competing outside the two mainstream electoral pacts. Twelve cross-sections of respondents were created by combining respondents’

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11Lavín was the only candidate competing in 2005 that obtained significant support in 2001, implying that valid diachronic comparisons can only be made for this candidacy.
socioeconomic stratum (in three categories) and their ideological leanings (left, center, right, and independent/none).

First, Table 4 shows significantly greater levels of vote-choice structuration on the basis of ideological leanings in the upper socioeconomic strata. Second, the table also illustrates the presence of higher levels of ideological de-alignment within lower socioeconomic strata, where independent and non-identifiers are significantly more numerous. Finally, the table shows that in spite of being supported more consistently in spatially closer ideological groups (Lavín on the right and Bachelet on the left), the candidacies of Lavín in 2000 and Bachelet in 2005 were the most efficient at gathering substantial electoral support from more distant ideological identifiers. As well, both candidacies were quite successful at generating electoral support among independents and de-aligned voters, particularly from the lower strata. Therefore, a sizable group of voters from the lower strata especially who supported the candidacy of the radical right in 2001, switched in 2005 to favor a socialist presidential candidacy.

To complement this assessment, Table 5 presents recent survey evidence on respondents’ “most important reasons” for supporting a candidate, once again comparing three cross-sections with different educational levels. This evidence further suggests that candidate-based evaluations (anchored either in personal traits or campaign platforms) are far more important in guiding voter choice than the candidate’s partisan background. Although a vote for campaign platforms could be framed as programmatic, it seems clear that in contemporary Chile this type of linkage is not structured by parties but ultimately by individual candidates. Furthermore, confirming the high levels of social segmentation found so far, less educated voters confer significantly less importance upon a candidate’s partisan affiliation.
These observations lend provisional support to the claim that candidate traits are currently highly significant in structuring voter choice, at least in presidential races and among de-aligned voters. To complement this assessment, the next section explores the structure of party voter linkages at the congressional and local levels.

Table 4 ABOUT HERE

Table 5 ABOUT HERE

Non-programmatic linkages II: candidate-centered competition at the district level

Very significant parallel discontinuities are also observed at the local (municipal) and congressional levels. Clientelism and pork barrel are not new phenomena in Chile; indeed, solid empirical evidence suggests that constituency-service, patronage, and brokerage networks played a vital role in institutionalizing and strengthening the pre-authoritarian party-system (Valenzuela 1977; Garretón 1988; Borzutzki 2002). However, I contend that the nature of those networks has been transformed in the post-transitional period to produce major discontinuities in linkage patterns.

Today, linkages forged at the local level are usually non-partisan and highly personalized, with local candidacies gaining autonomy and strength from national (partisan) leaders. Furthermore, linkage patterns are segmented, being contingent upon the social structure of the district (or municipality).
The evidence presented in this section and the next to substantiate these claims comes from fieldwork conducted in five districts and twelve municipalities of metropolitan Santiago. The district sample maximizes the range of electoral divergence within Santiago’s metropolitan area, including districts with significantly different socio-structural conditions and partisan electoral outcomes. Although the districts were selected in 2001, taken together the weighted average vote (by number of valid votes) this sample gave to each coalition in the congressional elections of 2005 closely approximates that of the entire metropolitan region.

To better portray the scope of change, it is necessary to digress by examining the implications of state and municipal reform processes for party voter linkages. In the first place, the weakening of state-patronage in the aftermath of liberalizing reforms threatened the permanence of extensive partisan networks. These networks bridged local and national arenas by redistributing state resources through patronage and clientelism and were crucial in ensuring partisan strength (Valenzuela 1977).

Second, municipal decentralization and the creation of small congressional districts increased the centrality and autonomy of municipal “machines” and congressional district-offices for structuring local (and increasingly personalized) brokerage networks. This also created incentives for candidates to pursue more socially segmented linkage-strategies, depending on the nature of the local electoral arena.

In sum, the centralized, hierarchically structured partisan networks that kept each party strong and in line at the local level have weakened. This is consistent with the very notable

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13 Precisely, the sample underestimates the Concertación’s vote by 1.4% and overestimates the Alianza’s share by 1.5%.
changes in levels of partisan support that are seen across Chilean districts, compared to the low volatility observed at the national level (Morgenstern and Swindle, 2005).

In the pre-1973 period, local authorities in Chile lacked autonomy and relied on hierarchical relations structured along partisan lines to access scarce state resources. Later, as the central state shrunk, the government decentralized, municipalities and local congressional candidacies gained substantial autonomy. Although Chile continues to be one of the most centralized Latin American polities, operating with executive-controlled regional governments (Mardones 2006), municipal reform has had some effect on electoral politics and partisan organizations, making local authorities less dependent on national authorities. Although the regional governments and intendancies (directly appointed by the central government) remained key actors in the redistribution of resources from the central to the municipal level, the volume of resources already available at the municipal level gave local partisan actors even greater autonomy.

In the third place is the hegemonic role assigned to the mayor, which was a crucial feature of the military junta’s decentralizing reform. This feature has persisted into the post-authoritarian period, with mayors tending to behave like feudal lords, often “neglecting and ignoring Municipal council-members” and “claiming credit for everything that happens in the municipality.”\textsuperscript{14} This has given a strong advantage to incumbents that have intensified personalization at the local level.\textsuperscript{15}

Especially in the poorest districts, candidate selection and post-electoral pacts struck by council members to elect a Mayor under the pre-2004 electoral rules were increasingly influenced by personal negotiations among elected council members and the chosen mayoral

\textsuperscript{14}Alejandro Sepulveda (2003) and Manuel Arzola (2003).
\textsuperscript{15}Huneeus (1998).
These pacts usually cut across party lines (and sometimes even across the Alianza-Concertación divide) and were negotiated on the basis of access to the Municipal machine to advance personal careers. After all, when lacking meaningful contact with national partisan leaders, local activists and candidates had to turn to the Mayor and opposition activists in the municipality to strike deals and secure access to the resources needed to successfully run for local office.

This collusive political structure at the local level not only strengthened the Mayor; it also hindered the process of administrative oversight by the Municipal Council, made up of Council members whose allegiance could be “easily bought.” Administrative irregularities seem to have become more and more prevalent, at a time when privatization and outsourcing gave mayors greater discretion in handing out municipal service contracts to private companies.

Given the scarcity of state resources, the connections among politicians, private businesses, and even drug-trafficking gangs gained importance as a way of exchanging campaign resources for economic benefits and protection. According to one available estimate, fifty-one per cent of corruption allegations at the municipal level correspond to illegal contracts awarded to private enterprises, often those owned by the mayor or his/her family. This explains why Chilean municipalities have become known to oversight bureaucrats as “the most shameful and corrupt institutions of the state.” Strikingly, however, a mayor will only lose electoral support

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16 Before 2004, when mayor and municipal council races were held separately, the council member who obtained the largest plurality in the common race was elected mayor. See Mardones (2006) for a description of electoral systems applied at the municipal level since democratization.
17 Based on personal interviews with local council members and two officers of the División Municipalidades of the Contraloría General de la Nación.
18 Ibid.
19 Based on data provided by the Contraloría General de la Nación.
20 Based on personal interviews with key informants in the municipalities of El Bosque, San Ramón, Cerro Navia, and La Cisterna.
22 Personal interview with officers of the División Municipalidades of the Contraloría General de la Nación.
when he/she goes beyond the “intolerable” threshold of two corruption scandals; indeed, more moderate corruption tends to correlate with improved electoral performance in the following election (Rehren and Guzman 1998).

The diminishing reliance of mayors on their party’s or pact’s congress members for obtaining patronage resources contributed to a split between these two levels, which was reinforced by mutual distrust that was grounded in potential future electoral ambitions of both mayors and congressional representatives.

Meanwhile, at the congressional level parties still centralize congressional nominations to strategically maximize the electoral return of their allocated quotas, retaining their power through rewarding “party-loyalists” by prioritizing their candidacies in inter-party negotiations. However, the positions of incumbent-candidates who wish to seek reelection are hardly ever contested (Siavelis 2002; Navia forthcoming). Indeed, incumbent candidates run in the majority of districts and their electoral fate hinges more on their performance as “constituency servants” than on the programmatic stance of their parties (Hagopian 2002; Navia forthcoming). However, congress-members can no longer count on the party’s local apparatus but increasingly need to set up parallel organizations to service the district and assure their re-election. In the words of two local political activists:

Council Members are placed within a Chinese slipper here due to the new political culture that is emerging based on the practice of giving stuff away. If I, as a council-member, don’t give you a cake for a bingo, I am out. It is perverse. People now want you to give them stuff without any kind of effort or organizational counterpart on their side. They don’t get organized; they just come here and ask you to give them different things. And my party is falling into a sick paternalism from which there is no way out (…) If we

---

24Based on a set of thirty interviews with local council-members and congress-members (former and current) from five electoral districts.
25Parties have also tended to retain greater nomination control, especially in municipalities that are important in terms of their impact on public opinion. This control may have increased with the last municipal electoral reform law (See Mardones 2006), but it is likely to affect only a handful of municipalities that are nationally visible.
don’t get rid of mass-media guys and “cosismo” there is no future for the PPD. (Jorge Villar, president of PPD’s distrital representation in District 18, personal interview, 2003).

My Council stipend is spent on prizes for bingos, sports tournaments, and the overall operation of my office. Three times a week I go to the municipality, apart from other days when you have to attend birthday parties or other kind of social event. And there I have a team of four persons, well connected to the Social and Public Works Departments of the Municipality, as well as judicial offices tied to the community. This way I can process requests, offer legal advice, medical consultations, complaints about the municipal government, and so forth. (José Antonio Cavedo, former Mayor and current council-member of San Ramón, personal interview, 2003).

In line with this evidence, Table 5 shows that most Chileans think that candidates who do well in their neighborhoods are those who systematically serve the community. However voters, especially those with only primary or secondary education, also point to campaign giveaways as the second most important factor in explaining electoral outcomes. Finally, less than 20% of respondents mention the role of the party label in explaining candidate success, though this aspect is relatively overrepresented among the most educated respondent segment.

I wish to close this section with a series of statements by politicians operating in the emerging competitive context that synthesize the scope and nature of the change in linkages at the local level. The first three statements seem to confirm the increasing importance of candidates’ personal links to the local community and the decreasing leverage of national parties in structuring voting choice.

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26Cosismo” refers to the politics of giving away things (“cosas”), which Concertación activists see as the core of the UDI’s political strategy.
Indeed, as the fourth and final statement makes plain, party-labels can even be a hindrance, particularly if politicians can still manage to provide for their constituents in spite of a lack of partisan affiliation. As suggested by the almost 9% increase (from 0.9% in 2000 to 9.3% in 2004) in the election of “independent” mayors running outside mainstream political pacts once the municipal electoral system stopped penalizing this type of candidacy (Mardones 2006), at the congressional level the binomial system might very well be anchoring the formal congressional party system at a time when parties have informally lost much of their power.

Unfortunately, my votes are my votes. At most, I think some of my votes will stay within the Concertación. It is sad, but if I decided to run for a Senate seat, I do not think those votes are transferable to another PS candidate, even though I have people working with me. But if, for example, my son were to run, regardless of his quality as a candidate and politician, he has an edge because he is my son and bears my last name. (Carlos Montes, successful PS candidate in La Florida, personal interview, 2003).

The moment she (a former RN deputy) quit RN to join UDI, RN disappeared in the district at the congressional level. We kept the vote at the municipal level because we have the Mayor and he has developed his own support base. (…) The vote here is personal, no one is voting for parties anymore. (Sergio Guerra, RN’s council-member in Peñalolén, personal interview, 2003).

Today, a large proportion of Chilean politics resides in a group of personalities that are able to construct a special nexus with the community. Here (district 18), Girardi is very strong. I know him well; he is a good congress-member. But, where is the key? In these municipalities you don’t have organized political movements, you only have individual people. (…) Often the community is attracted by personalities and not by parties or programs. The politician that used to come to party meetings to talk about national issues no longer exists. Girardi is an impressive political phenomenon here. But that does not mean that my party, the PPD, is strong in this district. If the Girardis go (the congress-member and his family), the PPD is done in this district. Votes are personally tied to them; they don’t belong to the PPD. (This) weakens the party base, the social network, which no longer exists. And the fragmentation and isolation it promotes reinforces this political logic. (Jorge Villar, president of PPD’s district representation in District 18, personal interview, 2003).

I am amazed. As an independent candidate, I am getting into places where I have never been. People who used to throw stones at me and that sent me to hell as an UDI candidate are now calling me to go and visit them. I don’t know if this will make me lose the
support of strong Pinochet supporters, that’s my only concern. [...] (José Antonio Cavedo, former Mayor and current council-member of San Ramón, personal interview, 2003).

Despite the scope of change, the transformation of Chile’s party system has not been even. As affirmed above, the social stratification of party-voter linkages constitutes another feature of the emerging system, and the section below will substantiate this final descriptive claim.

Non-programmatic linkages III: socially segmented linkage strategies

As argued above, in lower income municipalities politicians that can pay a household’s utility bill during the campaign period, offer legal or medical assistance, give out free TV sets, food boxes, eyeglasses or equipment for a neighborhood soccer club, or donate a cake for a bingo night organized by the local Centro de Madres (Mother’s Center) or Junta de Vecinos (Neighborhood Council) on a regular basis, are becoming increasingly successful in Santiago’s poorest districts.27 During congressional campaigns, these politicians hire unemployed people to paint (and then guard) walls in the neighborhood and pay around 60 dollars for each banner displayed on a residential door. In short, politicians who have personal contact with members of poor communities develop a competitive advantage over more distant candidates. According to one defeated candidate, the charm of his victorious (UDI) opponent resided in his capacity to establish a personal connection with voters:

He goes and visits people; he knocks at the door and says that the deputy wants to see how you are doing. He can miss a Congress appointment, but he does not miss any chance to be with the people here. He is not a good Congress member; he does not know anything about laws; he did not even finish school, but he is there.” (Osvaldo Silva, RN’s 2001 congressional-candidate in district 27, personal interview, 2003).

27Based on a set of thirty interviews with local council-members and former and current Congress-members.
Conversely, politicians who do not deliver goods and services or who think it is inappropriate to engage in this new political style are chastened at the polls. This transformation has been especially detrimental to incumbent Concertación candidates who “did not get into the politics of being a congress-member” and thus, got voted out.28

However, while dealigned voters increasingly face greater incentives to enter particularistic and problem-solving deals through which they exchange contingent political support for the satisfaction of their immediate needs, strongly socialized voters and those living in upper-income districts continue to vote on the basis of programmatic-linkages (essentially structured around the authoritarian/democratic divide) and the provision of public goods in the local arena. As expressed by one congress-member who competes in a socially heterogeneous district, socially-segmented linkage strategies are therefore necessary:

Poor people need you more frequently, at every moment. They need you to survive, because they have all doors closed to them. They don’t know where to go, how to do things. They don’t get the paperwork done; they need medical exams, the need to place a child in a given school […] And that’s where we come in. Many times we do the same as the municipality, and obviously they also ask the other congress-member to solve the problem too. The truth is that the greatest benefit of being a congressional deputy is that you can pick up the phone and ask: Can we solve this? […] We have the municipality divided into sectors and I have local contacts in every one of them. Therefore, if I cannot be in touch with every one of them, I have this network to rely on. Peñalolén [the lower-income municipality in the district] has the greatest concentration of everyday work for us. And it is the most enjoyable one, because there you realize that people need you. In La Reina [an upper and upper-middle class municipality], we don’t attract anybody’s attention. Nothing happens. Perhaps, if there is a specific issue they call you and want you to be there. For instance, the other day they called because they did not like certain garbage cans that the municipality had installed. But those are problems that you can solve very easily. […] You go to the media and ask for a solution. (María Angélica Cristi, former Mayor of Peñalolén and RN congress-member, currently an UDI congress-member, 2003)

28Interview with Tomás Jocelyn-Holt (2002). This is one of the reasons why the DC party has suffered the most in the electoral arena, making room for UDI’s electoral inroads (see Joignant and Navia 2003).
In line with a dual configuration of candidate-voter linkages, in higher income communities like Las Condes, Vitacura, Lo Barnechea, and La Reina, the vote continues to be tightly structured and electoral campaigns are played out in the media.

Those guys do not like campaigns. You should not bother them, you should not paint [the walls] much. They like a clean municipality and good services. That is what mayors should provide. And then, for the campaign, congress-members and mayors should get on the media and talk about national issues, big issues, economic issues. [...] addressing those issues is how you get a name for yourself. (Eugenio Gonzalez, UDI’s 2000 campaign strategist, personal interview, 2003).

Public opinion evidence shown in Table 6 complements this description. While candidate traits –both personal and from the campaign platform—are generally more important than partisan backing (confirming the transversal decline of partisanship), partisanship still explains a greater fraction of the electoral choice of those with a university education.

To conclude, party voter linkages have not only mutated in post-transitional Chile, but have done so in a socially stratified fashion. The following section recapitulates the findings of the empirical sections of this paper and derives theoretical implications that could be applied beyond the Chilean case.

Table 7 ABOUT HERE

**Conclusion**

For the Chilean case, the empirical section of this paper offers a description that points to a need to qualify the conventional wisdom on the highly institutionalized, programmatically oriented nature of the country’s party-system. Indeed, it can be argued that the system has
remained institutionalized not because of party-voter linkage stability, but in spite of significant linkage patterns disruptions.

At the national level, programmatic party-voter linking has decreased while non-programmatic party-voter linkages based on assessments of candidates’ personal traits have prevailed. Meanwhile, other groups (especially lower social strata and younger cross-sections of the citizenry) are programmatically de-aligned and have either become alienated from the system or chosen to forge non-programmatic linkages with their representatives. Such non-programmatic linkages are forged by drawing on candidate-traits and/or the provision of non-programmatic side-payments (i.e. clientelism, constituency service) at the local level.

When considered together, this configuration yields three types of party-voter linkages that are simultaneously present in the system: I) partisan/coalitional vote consistent with identification or programmatic linkages and resonating well with our conventional wisdom on Chile’s highly institutionalized party system; II) non-partisan/non-programmatic vote, and III) extensive voter alienation. The last two are related to the post-transitional equivalent of Chilean parties’ historical weakness “in the electorate,” as already noted by Montes et al (2000), a fact that has nonetheless remained obscured by more orthodox views of Chile’s party system.

Future research should be able not only to confirm or deny this descriptive assessment of party voter linkages in contemporary Chile, but also to advance a causal explanation of the observed changes. Apparently, while some of the patterns described are likely to be caused by formal institutional incentives and politicians’ strategic adaptations to them (e.g. the binomial system might be “artificially” anchoring a party system structure that has significantly varied in terms of its substantive content), other factors related to the country’s recent political economy (e.g. the nature and timing of decentralization and market reforms, the weakening of organized
interests groups, the programmatic relocation of the center-left after the transition to democracy) might also be responsible for major shifts in party voter linking patterns.

The evidence presented here also has relevant theoretical implications, especially for future analyses of political representation in developing countries. To begin with, the evolution and social stratification of linkage patterns observed in Chile suggests that parties could reduce the theoretical trade-offs currently attributed to strategies that combine different linkage types. Dual and socially-segmented configurations of party-voter linkages might be more common than expected and might have important implications for analyzing citizens’ access to political representation in highly unequal societies. To gain further insight into this type of configuration, our methodological approaches should be prepared to uncover and explain within-country variance regarding party voter linkages.

Second, different dimensions included in linear fashion in the concept of party system institutionalization were shown to be orthogonal, and should therefore be unpacked. Furthermore, analysis of the Chilean case along with that of Venezuela (see i.e. Crisp 2000; Morgan 2007) might advance speculation on the relationship between party system stability (i.e. institutionalization) and the presence of programmatic linking in that system.

It may well be that institutionalization and programmatic linking evolve linearly up to a given threshold, with more institutionalized systems also tending to show –ceteris paribus– greater levels of programmatic linking.\(^\text{29}\) However, after the threshold is passed, the greater the institutionalization of a party system, the lower its capacity to respond to societal change. At this point, high levels of institutionalization might lead to party system sclerosis and, ultimately,

\(^{29}\)Nonetheless it is good to recall that, empirically, institutionalization is a necessary but in itself insufficient condition for programmatic linking.
breakdown. Such breakdown becomes even more likely in the absence of a timely realignment, which is not automatically produced in systems with high levels of institutionalized inertia.

In short, the evidence runs contrary to the assumption of a linear relationship that exists between a party system’s institutionalization and programmatic structure. Indeed, the plotted relationship between these two variables could take the form of an inverse U. Moreover, structural as well as historical-institutional trajectories that are prevalent especially in developing societies (see i.e. Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; omitted citation) might cause party systems in those societies to gravitate towards either extreme of the institutionalization/programmatic structure curve (i.e. combining either low institutionalization with low programmatic linking or high institutionalization with low programmatic linking).

If such a speculation were correct, the “magic formula” for democratic representation might come from a combination of intermediate levels of institutionalization (which would enable consistent programmatic linking without completely “freezing” insider parties) and high levels of programmatic representation. Unfortunately, the factors that make such a combination feasible are scarce throughout the developing world, and especially in Latin America.
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Graph 1. Programmatic Structure and Electoral Volatility in Europe and Latin America

Source: The author, based on Mainwaring and Torcal (2006; Table 1)

Graph 2. Programmatic Structure and Electoral Volatility Latin America

Source: The author, based on Jones (2005, Table 1)
Table 1. Comparative Electoral Volatility in Latin America

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Electoral Volatility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td><strong>26.8</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jones (2005, Table 1).

Graph 3. Percentage of Party Sympathizers in the Americas (2006)

Source: LAPOP (2006)

*Jones’ index corresponds to the average electoral volatility registered in the last two elections in each country.*
Graph 4. Electoral Participation and Invalid Voting in Chile 1988-2005

Source: Altman (2006)
MAP 1

Partisan Electorates' Programmatic Placement by Education (high/low), circa 2000

MAP 2

Partisan Electorates' Programmatic Placement by Education (high/low), circa 2000

Source: The author, on the basis of WVS (2000).
Table 2: Predicting vote choice in 2000 on the basis of programmatic divides and education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Clarify results, Pr(Concertación=1) given a -1.5 to 1.5 switch in the divide(^31)</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Clarify results, Pr(Concertación=1) given a -1.5 to 1.5 switch in the divide(^32)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberalism</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Market</td>
<td>.73 (*)</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>.76(*)</td>
<td>-.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>.15 (***)</td>
<td>-.81</td>
<td>.15 (***)</td>
<td>-.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education terciles</td>
<td></td>
<td>.57 (***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>552</td>
<td></td>
<td>595</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-218.79069</td>
<td></td>
<td>-211.76534</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R(^2)</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td></td>
<td>.37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dependent Variable: 1=Would Vote for Concertación Party, 0=Would Vote for Alianza Party
Reported coefficients are Odds Ratios (*=.05, **=.01, ***=.005)

Table 3. Correlations between left-right self-placements and three programmatic divides

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Regime (+Left=+Democratic)</th>
<th>Moral (+Left=+Liberal)</th>
<th>State-Market (+Left=+Statist)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Correlation</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Educated R</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly Educated R</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Gap (LE-HE)</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>+.02</td>
<td>-.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Correlation</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Educated R</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>-.09 (reversed sign)</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly Educated R</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Gap (LE-HE)</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.26</td>
<td>-.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Correlation</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Educated R</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly Educated R</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Gap (LE-HE)</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Overall Correlation</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Educated R</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly Educated R</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Gap (LE-HE)</td>
<td>-.22</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The author, on the basis of Projeto Cono Sul, WVS and LAPOP 2006.

\(^31\)The factor scores fluctuate between approximately -2.5 and 2.5, with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.
\(^32\)In the case of education terciles, the simulated shift was from 1 (low education) to 3 (high education).
Table 4: Preferred Presidential Candidate by Social Strata and Ideological Leaning (2001 and 2005)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socioeconomic Stratum</th>
<th>Preferred for President</th>
<th>Left</th>
<th>Center</th>
<th>Right</th>
<th>Independent/None</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low (D-E)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lavin 2001</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>371</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lavin 2005</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>145</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelet 2005</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>312</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piñera 2005</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>143</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hirsch 2005</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle (C3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lavin 2001</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>207</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lavin 2005</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>95</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelet 2005</td>
<td>26.2%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>211</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piñera 2005</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>127</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hirsch 2005</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper (ABC1-C2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lavin 2001</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>28.2%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lavin 2005</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelet 2005</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piñera 2005</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>69</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hirsch 2005</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The author, based on CEP Surveys (www.cepchile.cl)
*Percentages do not add-up to 100 because they are based on preferences for all candidates mentioned in the open survey-item, including unreported ones.

Table 5: Candidate and Partisan Explanations of Vote Choice by Education Level (2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>University</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Which of the following was the most important factor in your vote?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The candidate (individual traits and campaign platform)</td>
<td>94.7%</td>
<td>91.4%</td>
<td>83.3%</td>
<td>90.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The party that supported the candidate</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Reasons</td>
<td>.3%</td>
<td>.2%</td>
<td>.5%</td>
<td>.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The author, based on LAPOP (2006)
### Table 6. Citizens’ explanation of electoral success in their neighborhood by education level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>University</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candidates who succeed in this neighborhood are those that give away more stuff during their campaign.</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidates who succeed in this neighborhood are those that permanently serve the district and take care of people’s needs.</td>
<td>58.3%</td>
<td>55.2%</td>
<td>58.8%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Here the people vote for parties, not for individual candidates.</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>58.8%</td>
<td>.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LAPOP 2006

### Table 7. Citizens’ explanation of electoral success in their neighborhood by education level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>University</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Which of the following motives best describes the reason you supported the congressional candidate you voted for most recently?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The candidate</td>
<td>43.6%</td>
<td>37.7%</td>
<td>39.2%</td>
<td>40.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The candidate’s platform</td>
<td>39.7%</td>
<td>43.1%</td>
<td>28.9%</td>
<td>38.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The candidate’s party</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other motives</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The author, based on LAPOP 2006