American Journal of Sociology

upward mobility in development towns, one would have to demonstrate that despite an upgrading of the educational and occupational skills of the population involved no corresponding changes took place in the structure of occupational opportunities. Studies of second-generation educational achievements, however, have shown that the gap between children of African-Asian origin and those of European origin was not substantially reduced (Lissak 1969).

In conclusion, given that the government made no substantial progress in upgrading the educational and occupational levels and the occupational aspirations of the African-Asian immigrants who form the majority of the population in development towns, it is questionable whether development towns themselves played any specific role in restricting occupational opportunities of their inhabitants. The concluding remark by Spilerman and Habib that community characteristics have been neglected in research on status attainment is of relevance to such research mainly in areas where significant discrepancies exist between the educational and occupational attainment of the population and its occupational opportunities. In Israel such a discrepancy is generally not observed.

It is therefore clear that the factors primarily responsible for various sociological dimensions of ethnic disparities in development towns are (1) the government policy of population dispersal and industrial development and (2) the sociodemographic characteristics of the population that inhabits the towns.

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REFERENCES


REPLY TO VIGDERHOUSS

Vigderhous states that his intent is to take issue with our assessment that development towns in Israel have contributed to ethnic disparities. He writes (paragraph 2), “The existence of these ethnic disparities . . . [in areal distribution, industry concentration, and occupational opportunity]
Commentary and Debate

need not mean that the development towns have created them. Any claim that the towns themselves played a significant role in bringing about such disparities is necessarily exaggerated.” Despite this indication of a major disagreement with our paper, Vigderhous’s argument is largely a restatement of our own thesis. Moreover, in the few places where he adopts a contrary position, he ignores our analysis and results, rather than taking issue with them. We will consider his contentions item by item.

His first point (paragraphs 2–4) is that development towns “have been ‘planted’ by a government that has determined what industries and what kind of population are to be located in them.” He further argues that the government’s policy was to disperse all urban Jewish settlers, not just immigrants, but that the policy succeeded only with new immigrants. What do we (Spilerman and Habib 1976) say on these matters? “[Development towns] signify urban settlements... established by design, since 1948, and with considerable governmental assistance” (p. 784). “. . . the founding of a new town was preceded by comprehensive planning of physical facilities, industrial composition, and population growth” (ibid., n. 4). “The national government has followed a policy of extending incentives for certain kinds of industries to locate in development towns” (p. 794). On the matter of population policy we wrote: “[Population redistribution] was easier to achieve through encouraging new immigrants . . . to settle in the towns, than through stimulating the migration of veteran Israelis from the country’s metropolitan centers” (p. 804). “The dependence of immigrants on public agencies offered a unique opportunity for altering the settlement pattern existing at the creation of the state” (p. 783, n. 3).1 In short, we fail to see that Vigderhous is suggesting something different from our own remarks.

Vigderhous next inquires, “How did this policy affect the areal distribution of various ethnic groups?” (paragraphs 5–8). This same question is addressed in a four-page section of our paper (pp. 790–793), though he takes no note of our discussion. There is, incidentally, a serious confusion on Vigderhous’s part over which population groups are being considered. Although he uses the term “various ethnic groups,” it is evident that he is really concerned with two broad population categories—Asian-Africans and European-Americans. Thus he stresses the “dramatic differences” in education level between these categories (table 1) in regard to understanding their settlement locations.

1 Sources for the statements above, as cited in our paper, are Berler (1970); Lichfield (1971); Matras (1973); and Brutzkus (1964). Vigderhous chides us for not referencing the Cohen (1970) article. That paper is an excellent one though it does not deal with our principal topic, the effect of development towns on ethnic disparities in national-level labor force characteristics. As a source of background information about immigration to Israel and the establishment of development towns, the information in Cohen (1970) is not different from reports in the sources we have used.

1503
American Journal of Sociology

However, we investigated the areal distributions of 10 ethnic groups, five from each of the above continent-of-origin categories. Our concern was to uncover processes which explain residence location patterns at this disaggregated level. Education and degree of dependence on governmental assistance are relevant considerations and were hardly slighted in our study, but they do not account for the very different settlement patterns among Asian-African ethnic groups or among European ethnic groups. We argued that the various ethnics arrived in Israel at different points in time and were absorbed, to a disproportionate extent, in the towns under construction or expansion at the times of their arrival. We reported evidence for this thesis (pp. 790–92) in which, incidentally, it is shown that several European ethnic groups (Bulgarians, Poles, Rumanians) are also overrepresented in towns that were expanding at the time they immigrated to Israel. It is by virtue of such processes that the establishment of development towns has contributed to ethnic differences in residence location, the first point in our paper.

In paragraph 7, Vigderhous takes issue with our statement to the effect that new immigrants were “encouraged” to settle in development towns. He desires stronger phrasing: “As a matter of fact, the new immigrants were not asked where they would prefer to settle but were transported immediately upon arrival to their place of destination as determined by the Absorption Department of the Jewish Agency.” Yet, in his preceding paragraph, Vigderhous states that there was some choice: “[T]he American, and especially the European, immigrants were less responsive to the government policy of population dispersal; many of them simply refused to be located by government decision.” Vigderhous can’t have it both ways. In point of fact, governmental policy vis-à-vis locating immigrants varied with time and other considerations, but the basic theme was one of providing incentives for settling in outlying areas, which is what we had written: “[N]ew immigrants were encouraged to settle in development towns, with subsidized housing, low-interest loans, and the promise of employment serving as inducements” (p. 785).²

In paragraph 8, Vigderhous describes mechanisms which function to keep kinsmen together, whether in Israel or in the United States. He writes, “Pockets of ethnic-group concentration in cities or geographic regions are a well-recognized phenomenon in modern immigration, particularly in North America.” Quite so. He might find our remarks on this matter to be of interest. On page 808 we begin a lengthy discussion with the sentence, “The sorts of mechanisms that have generated ethnic concentration by region and community in America concern time of arrival, route of travel, in particular

² For details on governmental policies toward new immigrants in relation to recruiting settlers for development towns, consult Matras (1973).
Commentary and Debate

and degree of affinity of a group for its own kind.” In short, Vigderhous is parroting our statements.

A second issue addressed in our paper concerns the impact of development towns on the distribution of ethnic groups among industries. Vigderhous raises this matter (paragraph 9) but actually elaborates upon a different topic, the impact of the industry composition of development towns on the occupational opportunities of their residents. Before turning to that topic, we summarize our argument (pp. 793–98) on the former issue: Because the Israeli government encouraged certain kinds of industry, in which large plants are common, to locate in development towns, most are unbalanced, one-industry communities; they specialize in textiles, food processing, or mining. At the same time, for the reasons we presented, the various ethnic groups tend to be concentrated in different towns. This has created a situation in which each has available different industry options and has resulted in a corresponding pattern of industry affiliations by the groups.

Turning to the occupational character of development towns, Vigderhous comments (paragraph 9): “If Spilerman and Habib mean to argue that the occupational opportunities of the new immigrants were restricted by the type of industry that the government established, they are perfectly correct, but what they say needs to be supplemented.” We appreciate the agreement but can find no cause for ambiguity in our argument. We wrote (p. 800): “We wish to make clear the structural underpinnings of the occupational differences among settlement types. The differences derive principally from the kinds of industries located in the communities, and relate only indirectly to the skill levels of the inhabitants.” Further, “we have characterized development towns as locales in which few moderate-status positions are available, this limitation deriving from a concentration of low-skill industries in the settlements” (p. 803). With respect to “supplementing” our argument, Vigderhous’s elaboration is again a restatement of our own points, as the following comparison illustrates.

Vigderhous elaborates (paragraphs 9–10): “[T]o understand the problem of occupational opportunities in development towns one must recognize that the development of industry in these towns was an integral part of the government’s policy on population dispersal. . . . The bulk of funding of these industries came directly from governmental budgets, and the constructed plants received various governmental tax concessions.” In contrast, we wrote (p. 794): “The national government has followed a policy of extending incentives for certain kinds of industries to locate in development

8 Our characterization refers to the organization of the towns in 1961, the year of the census information available to us. For comments on future prospects of the towns, see Spilerman and Habib (1976, pp. 807–8).
towns. . . For locating in a development town, firms are granted tax reductions and low-interest loans. . . . The kinds of industries that have been given preference are ones which either exploit the resources of a region. . . . or are labor intensive and provide many jobs at a low initial capital cost.”

In his final paragraphs, Vigderhous comments on the third of our principal contentions, that development towns, by virtue of containing limited occupational opportunity (as a result of industry composition), have contributed to ethnic disparities in occupational standing. Here we cannot claim that he is parroting our findings, only that he did not read them. He contends that “it is questionable whether development towns themselves played any specific role in restricting occupational opportunities of their inhabitants.” He adds that community characteristics are relevant to status attainment mainly “where significant discrepancies exist between the educational and occupational attainment of the population and its occupational opportunities. In Israel such a discrepancy is generally not observed.” Yet we report precisely such a disparity! Controlling for education, age, and length of residence in Israel,4 11% of the gap in occupational status between Asian-African and European immigrants is attributable to their different community locations (pp. 802–3). Moreover, this is an estimate of the lower bound to the effect of community; if we view educational attainment as a consequence of settlement location (such as would arise from poor schools being located disproportionately in development towns), the estimate of the community effect rises to 21%.5

A final bit of evidence concerning the impact of limited occupational opportunity in development towns may be garnered from an examination of who leaves the towns. We reported (pp. 804–5) that migrants to other types of communities tend to be better educated than either nonmigrants or migrants to different development towns. This is the pattern one would expect to find if the towns do constrain occupational advancement. Other capable residents surely choose to remain in the towns, sacrificing career prospects in order to reside close to family and friends. This is one sort of mechanism which gives rise to the community effect noted in the preceding paragraph.

In summary, Vigderhous’s comment is a restatement of our own argu-

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4 That is, for the individual-level variables which Vigderhous (paragraph 5) believes we “ignore” in analyzing ethnic disparities.

5 Our argument about the costs in occupational status from residing in a development town has been replicated. Using data from the 1974 Israeli National Mobility Survey, Kraus and Weintraub (1977, p. 25) report that 10% of the gap in status between residents in “central” and “peripheral” settlements is due to the community effect. Their specification of peripheral settlement corresponds closely with our definition of development town.
ments. Where he differs from our views he tends to ignore our analytic results rather than address them.

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REFERENCES


COMMENT ON GUSFIELD’S REVIEW ESSAY ON BECOMING MODERN

Joseph Gusfield’s review essay on Inkeles and Smith’s *Becoming Modern* (*AJS* 82 [September 1976]: 443–48) speaks eloquently of the “feeling of emptiness” which the study produced in him. He attributes this primarily to the authors’ stress on a polarity between the “ideal types of ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’” (p. 443) which neglects the interaction between them so typical of rapid social change. Although I have found the work of Alex Inkeles and his colleagues consistently stimulating, my own research on the industrial entrepreneurs of Pakistan leads me to agree with Gusfield. Indeed, it was the traditional social organization, based on ethnic and kinship bonds, which made major innovations in business organization possible for the new Muslim industrialists.

But *Becoming Modern* also leads me to feelings of emptiness of another sort. The title promises more than the book delivers: the authors deal only with the process of making *men* modern (Inkeles 1969). What are the impli-