1977 Articles
Education in a "Job Ladder" Model and the Fairness-in-Hiring Rule
The paper constructs a general equilibrium model of education which is distinguished by a "job ladder" or sticky wages, combined with the assumption that educated labor is preferred over uneducated labor, i.e. per a "fairness-in-hiring" rule, when there is excess demand for jobs at given wages. This theory of education, considered to be relevant to liberal arts education in underdeveloped countries, is contrasted with the human capital doctrine and the Arrow-Spence screening theories. The analysis is mainly focused on examining the social inefficiency properties of the educational process captured in the model constructed.
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Also Published In
- Title
- Journal of Public Economics
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(77)90034-2
More About This Work
- Academic Units
- Economics
- Published Here
- January 31, 2013