The Cyberpolitics of Music in Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution

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Between November 21 and December 26, 2004, nearly one million people protested in Kyiv against election fraud, media censorship, mass government corruption, and oligarchic market reforms. These large-scale peaceful protests have become widely known as the Orange Revolution, named after the campaign colors of Viktor Yushchenko, the opposition candidate who ran against Viktor Yanukovych, a politician with a criminal record who was backed by Moscow and the sitting Ukrainian government.¹

Music and the Internet played crucial roles in the Orange Revolution. In the five years between 2000 and 2005, the number of Internet users in Ukraine jumped from 200,000 to more than 5 million in a country of approximately 48 million people (an increase of more than 10% of the population).² In the two months between November 21, 2004 (the day of the contested presidential elections that precipitated the Orange Revolution), and January 23, 2005 (when President Viktor Yushchenko was inaugurated), the number of Internet users in Ukraine tripled (Delong 2005). The significant role played by Internet streaming of audio and video in the mediation of political information, activism, and communication during the Orange Revolution can serve as a case study for a broader analysis of the relationship between cyberactivism (Kreimer 2001; McCaughey and Ayers 2003) and what I term “cybermusicality”: an engagement with Internet music and its surrounding discourses that has meaning in listeners’ lives both online and off.

In remarks before a concert by Ukrainian rock singer and Orange Revolution participant Maria Burmaka in the spring of 2005 at Columbia University,³ ethnomusicologist Ana María Ochoa Gautier argued that music is not political in its essence. Rather, it is politicized through formal, ideological, cultural, and social actions, configurations, and processes (Ochoa 2005; see also Ochoa 1997 and Street 2001). I will build on Ochoa’s argument by demonstrating that the media through which music is disseminated partly determines how that music’s relationship to the political sphere is established and understood within social movements. In analyzing the relationship between music, social movements, and technology, I draw on the paradigm proposed by Ron Eyerman and Andrew Jamison who argue that “social movements lead to a reconstruction of processes of social interaction and collective identity formation” (1998:10). Though I will present some of the new popular music styles favored by anti-government organizers during

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the Orange Revolution, particularly one that I call TAK-techno, I am less concerned with the content on the Internet than with the Internet's use as a vital communication tool within socio-political events and music's function within that framework. In this analysis of the relationship between the Internet, music, and politics in post-socialist Ukraine, I argue that technology is not culturally or politically neutral. Rather, cybermusicality was undeniably vital to the Orange Revolution, drawing millions of Internet users into new online communities.

During the Orange Revolution, the Internet offered opportunities for anti-government protestors to express and engage new understandings of self and community through music. The unprecedented use of technology by this opposition movement during the protests highlighted the significance of music as a powerful communicative medium for the expression of individual and collective dissent. More specifically, because the Orange Revolution criticized the reliability and authenticity of government discourse, the revolution's music and recordings invite an examination of the representative power of recorded spoken text in political song. Numerous political scandals involving technology greatly influenced the public's perception of words spoken by various pro- and anti-government political leaders in Ukraine. Protest songs re-inflected the official political discourse by using musique concrète techniques to incorporate vocal recordings of speeches by the presidential candidates. Much of this protest music was composed with the help of computer software on home computers and at opposition-friendly radio stations by DJs and musicians who, prior to the revolution, were not part of the mainstream popular music scene in Ukraine. These performers, composers, and producers were activated by the political situation. Well known Ukrainian-language musicians such as Sviatoslav Vakarchuk, Oleh Skrypka, Taras Chubai, Maria Burmaka, Ruslana Lyzhyhko, and Oleksandr Ponomariov, as well as groups such as Haidamaky, Tartak, Mandry, Okean Elzy, Vopli Vidopliasova, and Plach Jaremii also encouraged political involvement as they took center stage and performed daily for protestors in Kyiv during the Orange Revolution. My analysis, however, will be restricted to revolution songs on the Internet that feature the voices of pro- and anti-government politicians. I view this repertoire as a particularly salient expression of citizen empowerment through the interpretation and evaluation of truth (pravda), a concept understood in the rhetoric of the revolution as the public's "right to know" about what is at the core of post-Soviet Ukrainian government propaganda.
Musicology and the Internet

Internet music has become an increasingly popular topic of study in musicology. Much of the literature has Western biases, however, and neglects the local social and political contexts in which Internet music is situated. Thus, a review and critique of recent literature will frame the research presented in this article. The December 2005 issue of the journal *Contemporary Music Review* featured articles that analyze the Internet as a musical space (Tanzi 2005) and as a network that enables collaborative musical improvisation (Hugill 2005). Such research builds on work by ethnomusicologists and popular music scholars who have demonstrated the impact Internet technology has had on modes of musical communication (Lysloff 2003) and the ways in which the Internet has influenced avenues of musical production, consumption, and dissemination within global(ized) music markets (Jones 2000; Taylor 2001). Scholars have considered the effects of Internet-based music technology on issues of musical copyright (Garofalo 1999; Norbert 2004; Park 2003; and C. Wright 2005), and others have pointed to the ways in which the Internet has presented new opportunities for musical composition (Duckworth 1999; Jordà 1999), the archiving of music (Lange 2001), and the public dissemination of musicological scholarship (S. Wright 2000).

A close examination of contemporary musicological research, however, reveals a disproportionate emphasis on Internet music in the West, and in the United States in particular. Studies tend to over-emphasize English-language music and rely on research that looks predominantly at English-language chat rooms, electronic mailing lists, and websites (Ayers 2006; Kibby 2000; Taylor 2001). Though English is apparently the lingua franca of the Internet, an over-emphasis on English-language data and a tendency to disregard foreign-language websites can lead to skewed interpretations and misleading conclusions. Such a geographically and culturally limited approach to web-based music (music that is allegedly accessible to users worldwide) promotes an uncritical celebration of what is seen to be the developed world’s technology and a concurrent dismissal of cybemuical phenomena in non-Western contexts. For example, Karl Neuenfeldt’s (1997) Internet-based research on the relationship between gender and the didjeridu relies on information gathered from online discussions among computer users in Australia, Canada, the United States, Sweden, and South Africa. The email list from which Neuenfeldt drew his data was hosted at Mills College in California and, as Neuenfeldt notes, the discussion of the didjeridu did not include any responses from female users or from Aboriginal players of the didjeridu in Australia. Research such as Neuenfeldt’s often reveals more about who in the West initiates and controls Internet discourses on music than about global Internet music practices.
Questions posed by development theorist Arturo Escobar (1994) regarding technology’s role as an impetus for cultural change around the globe are at the center of my study. Anticipating anthropologist Arjun Appadurai’s (1996) notion of “technotopes,” Escobar questioned the types of social realities new technologies produce and the ways in which they influence modes of thinking and being in non-Western contexts (1994:214). In Ukraine, for instance, the Internet is perceived as a marker of Western modernity, as a symbol of social and economic status, as well as a communicative tool imbued with political meaning. Furthermore, as Jamie Shinhee-Lee (2005) discovered in his ethnographic research in Japan and Korea, one’s level of access and interaction with the Internet is inflected by one’s generation, class, language, ethnicity, gender, and geographical location. Because the meanings people attribute to the Internet differ according to these factors, scholars who conduct Internet research must be careful not to project their particular configuration of assumptions and experiences with the Internet onto users elsewhere. To avoid such a trap, we should consider the informative and culturally sensitive study by David Hill and Krishna Sen (1997) that analyzes the role of the middle class in establishing the Internet in Indonesia as a government opposition space in the mid-1990s, as well as research by Eric Harwit and Duncan Clark (2001), who examine the government’s attempts to regulate Internet content in China. These studies show that, in addition to expanding online research to consider non-English websites and networks, scholars must move beyond conducting research on the Internet and instead analyze people’s interactions with the Internet, taking into account individual experiences with interactive technologies (Greene and Porcello 2005) in order to locate the Internet’s effect on musical expression within broader political, economic, and socio-cultural processes.

Background to the Orange Revolution: The Battle for Technology and “Ukrainian Truth”

Beginning in the mid-1990s, the Ukrainian government under President Leonid Kuchma (1994–2004) began to increase its control over the media. An oligarchy of businessmen with political ties to the administration controlled the finances and programming of television and radio stations. They censored public information about the government as news of political corruption made international headlines with increasing frequency. Because relatively few people in Ukraine had access to the Internet, the Ukrainian government at first paid little attention to the new technology. Against this background of government control over the news reported by most national media outlets, the Internet emerged as a communication medium that could sidestep government censorship during the presidential elections of 2004.
In addition to controlling newspapers and the broadcast media, the government was implicated in threats, intimidation, and violence against independent journalists who failed to follow the party line. In 2000, independent Internet journalist Heorhiy Gongadze mysteriously disappeared. Gongadze had co-founded the newspaper *Ukrayinska Pravda* (Ukrainian Truth) in April of 2000, publishing it on the Internet in an effort to avoid censorship from the government and pressure from oligarchic businessmen. The newspaper produced a number of investigative articles about Ukraine’s corruption scandals and published commentaries critical of the administration. Gongadze disappeared in September 2000 and his headless body was found one month later. In November, Socialist Party leader Oleksander Moroz released recordings that allegedly featured the voice of President Kuchma ordering aides to stop Gongadze from investigating and exposing high-level corruption in the government.

Public reaction to the “Cassette Scandal,” which Western scholars also dubbed “Kuchmagate,” culminated in a series of protests in 2001 under the slogan “Kuchmu het!” (Kuchma, out!). With seventy percent of the population deeply mistrustful of Kuchma, people took to the streets to demand his resignation two years before the end of his term (Starobin and Olearchyk 2002). The powerful Kuchma administration crushed these protests and increased pressure on journalists to adhere to government-issued *temnyky*, secret instructions sent to television stations advising them as to what they should cover and what they should ignore. Gongadze’s colleague and the co-founder of *Ukrayinska Pravda*, Olena Prytula, published transcripts of the Kuchma tapes, which made the Internet newspaper the most visited website in Ukraine. Anders Aslund, director of the Russian and Eurasian Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, interpreted people’s interest in the newspaper this way: “If it’s so good that people get murdered for it, it must be worth reading” (quoted in Catania 2005).

The murder of Heorhiy Gongadze created an unprecedented awareness among Ukrainian citizens of Internet technology. The event positioned the Internet in Ukraine as a powerful, progressive, democratic, and potentially dangerous anti-government space. Young adults throughout western and central Ukraine’s urban centers (where the support for the anti-government protests in 2004 was strongest) turned to the Internet to access unbiased news and information and to subvert government-controlled media outlets such as television, radio, and newspapers, viewing the Internet’s information and images as content untainted by government spin-doctors (Zubar 2006). Because a large segment of government supporters were members of the older generation, and since the official media was more popular in eastern and southern Ukraine where support for the government in power was strongest, the Orange Revolution marked a turning point for Ukrainian
political expression as younger voters began to voice political dissent and culture-related grievances over the Internet (Filippova 2005).

For these anti-government Internet users in Ukraine, cyberspace played an important role in mobilizing civic awareness. Only a small segment of the population had direct access to the Internet, but the new technology and the discourse surrounding it entered the lives of opposition supporters indirectly. In urban settings, for example, news printouts from the Internet circulated widely among government opponents, expanding their information network to non-virtual contexts. As Olena Prytula explains, “People printed online articles and took them to their relatives, friends, and even to the rural regions where their parents lived. These articles were republished in regional presses, penetrating to even the most remote corners of Ukraine, where the Internet is still a novelty” (Prytula 2006:108). Thus, online politicking merged with off-line socio-political networking. In Ukraine, Internet cafés continue to be the most common access points to the Internet. Many Internet cafés are adjacent to bars and discos frequented by young people, and these locations extend the sociability of the Internet as people visit cafés in groups or share computer stations with friends. Such face-to-face sociability associated with cyberspace reveals that the socio-political significance of the Internet often lies beyond the Internet itself.

Music, Violence, and the 2004 Presidential Election in Ukraine

On November 21, 2004, the challenger Viktor Yushchenko lost the presidential election to government candidate Viktor Yanukovych in what was widely believed to be a rigged election. By the following morning, when the election results had been announced along with the broadcast of Yanukovych’s acceptance speech on Ukrainian state-run television stations, hundreds of thousands of people had assembled in protest on Kyiv’s Independence Square (known in Ukrainian as Maidan Nezalezhnosti and referred to simply as Maidan).

I was in Ukraine during this time, having returned to my dissertation field site in Uzhhorod, the administrative capital of the Transcarpathian region in western Ukraine, to serve as an international observer for the presidential election. During my fieldwork among Roma (Gypsy) communities in 2002, I witnessed extensive corruption in the Ukrainian government, including unwarranted arrests and trials. Therefore, I felt it was my moral responsibility to interlocutors, friends, and family, and also my civic duty, as an ethnic Ukrainian living in the United States, to do what I could during the presidential election. I understood this event to be the most significant attempt at reform since Ukraine’s declaration of independence from the Soviet Union in 1991.
Adriana Helbig

My interest in Ukrainian politics began in 2001, when, in the wake of Gongadze's murder and President Kuchma's "Cassette Scandal," reform-oriented economist Viktor Yushchenko was forced to resign from his position as prime minister, an act that generated political chaos in the country. As Yushchenko's camp mobilized for the 2002 parliamentary elections in Ukraine (a campaign that I observed firsthand during my ethnomusicological fieldwork), I witnessed ruthless political machinations practiced by the government in schools, factories, and businesses throughout the country. In May 2004, the nation was stunned by two scandals in the region of Transcarpathia: the mayoral elections in Mukachevo had been rigged in favor of the government candidate, and Professor Volodymyr Slyvka, Rector of Uzhhorod National University, died under mysterious circumstances. Professor Slyvka, who had repeatedly attempted to shield students from voter manipulation, was found dead with his wrists slashed and a knife through his heart. Officials dismissed his death as suicide.

Violence against members of the opposition continued during the election itself. Opposition voters were beaten and ballot boxes were sabotaged and set on fire. On November 21, 2004, at the polling station where I monitored the presidential elections in central Uzhhorod, members of the election commission who had been bribed by government officials forced university students to show their ballots prior to casting to ensure they had voted for Viktor Yanukovych. Those who did not comply were warned they would suffer repercussions at school. At three a.m. during the polling station's vote count, someone cut off the electricity, plunging the building into darkness. People began to shout nervously at each other because everyone present knew that any ballot tampering would result in the nullification of all the votes cast at the polling station. One local election observer attempted to maintain order by shining his flashlight into people's eyes and ordering them to step away from the ballot table while I used my cell phone to call the central headquarters of Yushchenko's political party in town. Within minutes, members of Yushchenko's team arrived outside the station and a heated verbal exchange took place between them and men allegedly hired by the Yanukovych camp to attack commission members and steal the ballot boxes en route to the regional polling office.

At six a.m. the next morning, after twenty-four hours at the polling station, a media blackout meant that I still had no access to any information regarding polling outcomes. My cell phone battery had died and, as I smoked a cigarette in the bone-chilling morning air, I wondered whether I was already caught in the middle of a civil war. My choices were to walk ten kilometers to the Slovakian border and leave the country or to try to make it to my family's house in Lviv, and then onto Kyiv, the capital, where in the days preceding
the election, members of Yushchenko’s opposition party had been urging people over the Internet to gather should election irregularities take place.

The Uzhhorod teller informed me that he had orders not to sell any train tickets to Kyiv that morning. In the end, it would take me three days to travel the eight hundred kilometers from Uzhhorod to Kyiv by car (a journey that normally takes ten hours) because the police had set up roadblocks along the roads leading to Kyiv to prevent people from mobilizing.

Only one independent television station, Kanal 5, dared to broadcast (on air or on the Internet) the events unfolding in Kyiv. I had no access to the Internet since the Internet café in Uzhhorod was closed, and I could not watch Kanal 5 in Transcarpathia due to periodic blackouts of the broadcast station in the region, so it was only upon my arrival in Kyiv that I grasped the massive scale of the protests. I postponed my flight back to New York, bought a pair of valianky (woolen boots without which one cannot walk very far on Kyiv’s ice-covered sidewalks), and headed for the Maidan, now a sea of sound awash in orange. All around me, thousands of people shouted “Yu-schen-ko! Yu-schen-ko!” to the rhythmic accompaniment of bangs on overturned oil barrels and other noisemakers (figure 1). I was so overwhelmed with emotion that I would not have noticed my tears had they not stung my face in the freezing winter air. The protests reflected my personal goals for reform and solidarity on a scale I had not thought possible in post-socialist Ukraine.

As I made my way through the crowd along Kyiv’s wide main boulevard, Khreschatyk Street, I heard chants that came to represent the movement, including “Nas bahato, nas ne podolaty” (Together we are many, we won’t be defeated). This chant would become the Orange Revolution’s version of “El pueblo unido jamás será vencido” (The people united will never be defeated), Che Guevara’s declaration made famous in song during Pinochet’s 1973 coup in Chile (Mattern 1998). In the first days of the revolution, the Carpathian music group Hrinzholy (a Hutsul word meaning “wooden sleigh”), rapped “Nas bahato, nas ne podolaty” to a hip-hop beat and uploaded their song to a website sponsored by supporters of the opposition movement. Downloaded more than one hundred thousand times after only two days online, “Razom Nas Bahato” quickly became the anthem of the revolution (Kiev City Guide 2006). As one of the earliest revolutionary songs, its style would exemplify a broader stylistic category of “orange” musical genres: Ukrainian-language hip-hop and what I call TAK-techno (“tak” in Ukrainian means “yes,” the campaign slogan of Viktor Yushchenko’s political party Our Ukraine).

The refrain of the song “Razom Nas Bahato” is based on a duple-meter rhythmic pattern to which the words “Razom nas bahato, nas ne podolaty” are set syllabically. This “anthem” expresses voter anger and disagreement
Figure 1: November 24, 2004, the third day of protests on Independence Square in Kyiv, Ukraine. Opposition supporters face toward a stage from which politicians spoke and musicians performed during the Orange Revolution. Photograph by the author.

with the initial outcome of the presidential election in which Viktor Yanukovych had been declared the winner. Moreover, it conveys people’s frustration with corruption, the falsification of election results, and the government’s persistent attempts to deny the will of the electorate. The line “we aren’t goats” responds to Yanukovych’s provocative use of the Russian word kozly (goats) to deride his opponent’s supporters as “bastards” during the campaign. The incorporation of this Russian word in an otherwise Ukrainian-language song supports Bohdan Klid’s (Forthcoming) argument that the long-running tension between Ukrainian and Russian language use in Ukraine played a significant role in politicizing popular music during the Orange Revolution.\(^\text{14}\) The line “Understandings, no!” (poniatia, ni!) uses prison jargon to call attention to Viktor Yanukovych’s prison record, highlighting and rejecting the government’s “understandings” with bandyty—literally “bandits,” generally used to refer to any (male) person in post-socialist society who breaks the law. Thus, this song is an example of a broader trend in which popular music offered people a way to express their discontent with a corrupt and unresponsive government. The song’s lyrics translate as follows:
Razom Nas Bahato (Together We Are Many)

Together we are many,
We will not be defeated . . .

Falsifications, no!
Machinations, no!
Understandings, no! no!
No to lies!
Yushchenko, yes!
Is our president, yes!
Yushchenko, yes! yes! yes!

Together we are many,
We will not be defeated . . .

We aren't goats (kozly)
We are Ukraine's
Sons and daughters.
It's now or never,
Enough waiting!
Together we are many
We will not be defeated.

Together we are many,
We will not be defeated . . .

The physical presence of musicians performing live during the election campaign and on the Maidan stage during the revolution augmented the political strength of the music itself. In an interview two days before the election, Oleh Skrypka, leader of the country's oldest punk-funk-folk band VV, or Vopli Vidopliasova ("vopli" means "screams, howls"), said,

The situation is so charged that the country stands on the brink of revolution or war. Emotions are heightened and there is a feeling of patriotism, particularly among the youth who come to these events, to our concerts. We find ourselves in a situation that is somewhat unusual for us—something in between a concert and a political meeting. This unites the energy of a concert with that of a political meeting. There is a flavor of Latin America—that you are like Che Guevara, who appears and brings truth to the people. These are strong emotions. (Skrypka 2004)

After the revolution, Skrypka spoke more frankly about the musicians' involvement: “Our role was pivotal because there was a national blackout on Yuschenko’s campaign by state-controlled radio and television stations. The only way to get his message out was for us to speak directly to the people during our concerts” (quoted in Brown 2005). The ability to disseminate
information about such concerts via the Internet and through cell phone text messaging played a pivotal role in helping raise the public’s awareness of government corruption. During the numerous conversations I had with people on Maidan, fellow protestors admitted that they accepted the information they received through such technological media and at rock concerts as *pravda*, truth.

The presence of musicians on Maidan and the association between the opposition and the genre “PolitRok” (literally “political rock,” the title of a song sung on Maidan by VV) were not spontaneous. Rather, they were built on political structures established during the 2004 presidential campaign that precipitated the revolution. The campaign was in part fought with music, as both candidates had enlisted the support of popular musicians, staged concerts, and distributed recordings. By the end of the campaign, Oleh Skrypka had become one of Yushchenko’s official representatives, and Sviatoslav Vakarchuk, the singer from the group Okean Elzy, had worked as Yushchenko’s advisor on youth policies. Yushchenko’s official site featured the singer Rosava’s “Our Ukraine,” a campaign song for Yushchenko’s political party of the same name. Yushchenko’s personal website continues to offer a free download of the music video of “Our Ukraine” that features a montage of footage of Yushchenko’s presidential campaign set to Rosava’s vocal accompaniment:16

*Nasha Ukraina (Our Ukraine)*

You rose from bed this morning  
And said: Enough—changes are needed!  
Your head on your shoulders, your aims—progressive,  
You need to take the situation in Ukraine into your own hands!

Your word is worthy, it has will and power,  
When you are silent, do not expect a miracle,  
To change the world, begin with yourself  
I believe in you!

This is my country—native Ukraine!  
This is your country—our Ukraine!

Wherever and whoever you are, be yourself,  
What was, is past, washed away with water!  
Begin life from a new page,  
Create this world, it is your doing!

Look back—these are your dreams,  
Brothers, let us unite—we have the same hopes!  
In your choices and acts, rely on yourself,  
You can, I believe in you!
They say the youth is apathetic, it is spoiled,  
That is not us, we are free, our chains are broken!  
We want to be heard, we are Ukraine!  
We are the future!  

This is my country—native Ukraine!  
This is your country—our Ukraine!  

The words of “Our Ukraine” encourage young citizens to take a proactive stance on the political issues of the day. To a funky reggae beat, the singer tells her listeners to rely on themselves and to realize that it is up to them to change what has gone wrong in Ukraine. The song promotes the idea of civic duty and responsibility at a time when government depravity had become expected in many circles.

Musicians who supported Viktor Yanukovych’s 2004 campaign did not fare well after the revolution. For instance, Ani Lorak’s public support for Yanukovych ruined her bid to represent Ukraine at the Eurovision 2005 contest held in Kyiv. (Orange Revolution supporter Ruslana Lyzhychko had won the contest in 2004.) Lorak lost the vote to GreenJolly (previously Hrinzholy), creators of “Razom Nas Bahato.”

If, as Laura Lengel (2000:5) proposes, the first Internet war was the War in the Balkans (1991–2001), then the Orange Revolution was likely the first revolution waged with MP3s. It would be difficult to count how many songs were listened to on the Internet during the Orange Revolution by supporters in Ukraine and abroad. The “Ukrainian Group” on the Multiply.com network, however, provides some indication of how the Internet functioned as a community space during this time. Users from Ukraine, Europe, and North America posted up-to-the-minute news and commentary on political events in English, Ukrainian, and Russian. They shared blogs, clips of Maidan musical performances, political satire, political video games, recordings of speeches by various public figures, and music, pictures, and live video feeds of the protests. Based on the times and dates of their posts, it seems that a significant number of users were continually online. More than three hundred users from the “Ukrainian Group” on Multiply.com, for instance, viewed the pictures I posted upon my return from Kyiv only minutes after I had uploaded them to my homepage. Such a high level of cyberactivity suggests that the Internet was one of the most significant sites in which the Orange Revolution was initiated, fought, and shared. Indeed, the Internet was a rare but critical space in which Ukrainians could interact freely and communicate beyond the strictures of government control. This example reinforces how crucial it is that scholars recognize the Internet as a key site for interaction and community building, not just in the West, but in non-Western contexts as well.
As I mentioned earlier, many of the Orange Revolution’s protest songs spliced together recorded segments of spoken words from political speeches. This musique concrète aspect of the Orange Revolution’s music derived its expressive power from the highly politicized discourse about technology and truth surrounding Gongadze’s murder and the Kuchma tapes. The “digitized voice” became symbolic of the struggle between the government and the people, between spin and pravda. This music, which I collectively refer to as TAK-techno, also served as a metanarrative about the revolution itself. Yushchenko’s speeches to protestors on Maidan were spliced and looped over techno dance beats. These songs, available on the Internet and on bootleg CDs as well as on discs officially issued by the party Our Ukraine, reframed real-time occurrences to motivate protestors. The CDs were among the most sought after “orange souvenirs” of the revolution, in addition to the official orange Our Ukraine scarves, hats, and key chains sold by entrepreneurs on the streets of Kyiv and on eBay.

Numerous sampled songs convey the politics of the recorded spoken voice during the Orange Revolution. For instance, the disc Orange Jazz (figure 2), issued in November 2004 by Liberty Records (a pseudonym), opens with a track that features protestors on Maidan shouting “Yu-schen-ko” and “Nas bahato, nas ne podolaty;” vocal recordings that merge into an instrumental jazz rendition based on the melody of “El pueblo unido jamás será vencido.” Orange Jazz was produced by Victor Ovchinnykov and Olexiy Kogan, whose names appear on the CD as pseudonyms—“Viktor Freedom” and “Alex Maidan.” Olga Dombrovska, who designed the cover art that features photos by Yefrem Lukatsky, is represented by the pseudonym “Olya Volya” (“volya” means “freedom” in Ukrainian).

Among the Orange Revolution CDs I purchased from street vendors near Kyiv’s Independence Square is My Razom . . . Pisni Pomaranchevoho Maidanu (We Are Together: Songs of the Orange Maidan, 2004). The disc, issued officially by Our Ukraine, is stamped with a “not for retail sale” decal and features fourteen tracks by popular musicians such as Maria Burmaka, Okean Elzy, Tartak, and Vopli Vidopliasova. Numerous bootleg discs include the same copyrighted songs that are on the official disc, as well as songs that incorporate sonic representations of the revolution itself, including speeches by politicians, live performances, and the chanting and cheering of the protestors. The track, “Yushchenko/Beethoven Mix” that appears on a bootleg pomaranchevi (orange) CD titled TAK: Nas ne podolaty (YES: We Won’t Be Defeated, 2004) exalts Viktor Yushchenko by featuring a portion of a speech in which he states, “Progress and good always begins with freedom.” Spliced over a techno rendition of Beethoven’s “Ode to Joy” melody,
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Figure 2: Cover of a CD given to the author in Kyiv during the Orange Revolution. It features the orange campaign colors of Viktor Yushchenko's Our Ukraine party. The words across the bottom repeat the revolution's slogans: “Yes!,” “We won’t be defeated,” “Ukraine is not a [prison] zone," and “Freedom can’t be stopped.” Reprinted with permission.

Yushchenko continues, “Glory to Ukraine! Glory to each of you!” The song layers Yushchenko’s voice over recordings of crowds chanting their support for him during the Orange Revolution. When I first heard these songs over the loudspeakers on Maidan, the crowds responded with shouts of support, adding their “live” voices to amplified recordings of earlier protesters. Yushchenko’s recorded voice, mixed into the song, distances him from the corruption within the Ukrainian government and unites him with the narod, the people. Though Yushchenko was not always physically present on the Maidan, the CD’s track afforded him a continual virtual presence among the crowd. This sonic overlap between mediated and live performance in TAK-techno recalls Philip Auslander’s (1999) argument that much of what we think of as “live” music has been filtered and mediated, and that the categories of “live” and “mediated” overlap.
TAK-techno songs dealt differently with the voice and words of government candidate Viktor Yanukovych—perhaps because the “Cassette Scandal” had already marked the recorded voices of government officials as untruthful. In “Yanukovych/Era Mix,” a song featured on the “orange” bootleg CD TAK: *Nas ne podolaty*, speeches by Yanukovych are spliced and manipulated to redirect his meaning, remixing his words to create the “confession” of a government criminal. The song begins with a Latin chant that both serves to ritualize Yanukovych’s remixed words and inflects them ironically as a profession of *pravda*. Yanukovych is heard to state, “In these tough times, I wish to share the truth. Those who stole from the people are once again clambering to get back into power. This is because it is easier to rule people who are poor and live in fear.” The song ends with Yanukovych expressing his changed sentiment, “This is why I say ‘Yes. Yes, Yushchenko!’” Ludmila Yanukovych, the candidate’s wife, did not escape sonic hazing either. The TAK-techno song “Orange Sky,” which refers to a Soviet-era song by the same name, includes an excerpt from a speech by Ludmila Yanukovych in which she infamously warned her husband’s supporters in Donetsk (a city in eastern Ukraine where government support was strongest) that protestors were lured to Kyiv by oranges injected with drugs.

More than simply humorous, these songs politicized the discourses of vocal authenticity and truth. Political authenticity, understood on a continuum between *pravda* and propaganda, had a correlate in ideologies of musical and technological authenticity: liveness and mediation. Thus TAK-techno recordings treated the two candidates in markedly different ways: whereas Yuschenko was heard in relatively unedited clips of his live, public speeches, recordings of Yanukovych were mixed, remixed, and edited into completely new utterances with drastically altered political content. While the recordings of Yuschenko’s (live) voice reinforced the protestors’ trust in his political messages, the manipulation of Yanukovych’s recorded speech in TAK-techno songs empowered protestors with symbolic control over otherwise corrupt and untrustworthy government political rhetoric. The representation of Yuschenko’s voice as live, *zhyvyi* (translated also as “alive,” “real”), and Yanukovych’s as mediated and insincere shows how the ideological opposition between liveness and mediation was inflected during the Orange Revolution in terms of truth and deception, and technological mediation was articulated in terms of political authenticity. Although both candidates’ voices were technologically manipulated, only Yuschenko was understood to radiate *pravda*. 
Conclusion

In the years just prior to the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, the Internet was new, relatively unknown, and uncontrolled—its potential as a powerful medium had not yet been recognized by officials or by consumers. Thus, the technology was uniquely situated to become a crucial space of popular political opposition once the Orange Revolution had begun. With the death of Internet journalist Heorhiy Gongadze and the “Cassette Scandal,” the importance of the new technology increased tremendously. During the Orange Revolution, musicians and the songs they composed, performed, and disseminated drew attention to censorship, violence, corruption, and the lack of a free Ukrainian press. Much of this musical activism was conducted over the Internet. As a result, any analysis of the music associated with the revolution demands an examination of the interaction between technology and expressive musical culture, and the role this interaction played in the revolution’s events. This case study identifies the necessity of analyzing Internet music in a more culturally and geographically nuanced way and urges scholars to refrain from strict theoretical and methodological binaries in their analyses of online and off-line behaviors.

The anonymity of the DJs who mixed the TAK-techno recordings, the pseudonyms invoked by producers of CDs such as Orange Jazz, the apparent disregard of copyright laws with regard to “orange” bootleg CDs, and the musical remixes of recorded speeches from undocumented sources beg a deeper analysis of the relative political and social agency of producers and consumers of the Orange Revolution’s music. The political goals of protestors were articulated through music, video, speeches, and slogans, organizing diverse groups around a new “orange” genre of popular culture. While many of TAK-techno’s producers remained anonymous, their recordings were filled with the chants and slogans of protestors. Because the music’s creators were themselves anti-government protestors, TAK-techno was built around audience participation and response. TAK-techno’s composers and producers continuously adjusted their political aims and included the voices of listener-protestors in the recordings they produced. The widely disseminated images of enormous crowds on Maidan and recordings of their calls for political reform located the political power of the Orange Revolution not with behind-the-scenes producers and organizers, but with the consumers and audiences whose engaged public participation, much of which was enacted over the Internet, reversed the outcome of a presidential election and brought historic political change to their country.
Notes

Special thanks to Barbara Rose Lange and Elizabeth Keenan for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Thank you also to Oleksiy Kogan and Victor Ovchinnykov, producers of the CD Orange Jazz, for permission to publish the disc's cover art designed by Olga Dombrovska with photos by Yefrem Lukatsky.

1. The sitting president, Leonid Kuchma, perceived Viktor Yushchenko as a threat and repeatedly attempted to expel him from the campaign. For instance, on September 5, 2004, Yushchenko mysteriously suffered from dioxin poisoning during a dinner with government officials. This poisoning, which disfigured his face and almost killed him, was perceived by protestors as a government attempt to push Yushchenko out of the race.


3. This concert was co-sponsored by the Ukrainian Studies Program at Columbia University and the Brooklyn Ukrainian Group, whose members served as international election observers during the December 26, 2004, round of voting and met Maria Burmaka on Maidan, the main square of Kyiv. The Orange Revolution helped change perceptions of Ukraine among followers of Ukrainian politics in the Ukrainian diaspora in North America. See Melnyk (2005).

4. English is the web's “unmarked” language, just as US domain names are unmarked by suffixes. For a critique of the Internet as a facilitator of Westernizing processes in non-Western contexts, see Ribeiro (1998). In their study of online communities, Samuel Wilson and Leighton Peterson suggest that English may have been surpassed by other languages in terms of number of speakers online because residents of the United States and Canada account for less than half of the estimated number of Internet users worldwide (Wilson and Peterson 2002:453). This conclusion is weak, however, because it assumes a strict correlation between geographic location and language choice.

5. For instance, Pavlo Lazarenko, prime minister of Ukraine from 1996–97, was arrested in Switzerland in 1999 and later indicted in California for allegedly using US banks to launder $114 million in funds stolen from the Ukrainian state between 1992 and 1999. In August 2006, Lazarenko was convicted and sentenced to nine years in prison in the United States. See Kuzio (2003a).

6. Since 2001, the “ua” (Ukraine) domain has been managed by Hostmaster, a private company. The government attempted to gain control over the domain name during the 2004 presidential election campaign (Kuzio 2003b).


8. The tapes constitute approximately seven hundred hours of conversation secretly recorded in President Leonid Kuchma's office during 1999 and 2000 by Kuchma's bodyguard, Mykola Melnychenko, who was granted asylum in the United States in 2001. The private US audio-verification laboratory Bek Tek, which was hired to analyze the tapes, deemed them authentic and asserted that they had not been tampered with. Some of the tapes had been transcribed and published on Ukrainian Internet sites by the end of 2000. To date the tapes have not been officially recognized as genuine by the government in Ukraine.

9. Temnyky were first utilized in late 2001 during the campaign for the March 2002 parliamentary elections. For more information, see Human Rights Watch (2003).

10. On May 13, 2005, the former governor of Transcarpathia, Ivan Rizak, was formally charged in connection with Professor Slyvka's death.
11. For a more detailed account of election fraud and voter harassment in Transcarpathia and Cherkasy, see Finnin and Helbig (2005).

12. I had previously served as an election observer for the October 31, 2004, primary elections. In response to the fraud I witnessed at that time, I returned to the same polling station in Uzhhorod on November 21, 2004, accompanied by my sister with whom I worked on the monitoring team.

13. Hrinzholy would later anglicize their name to GreenJolly after being chosen to represent Ukraine at the Eurovision contest that took place in Kyiv in May 2005. Maria Sonevytsky (2006) has recently discussed Ukraine's entry for Eurovision 2004.

14. Many analyses of the relationship between music and politics in Ukraine focus on the controversies over the status and public use of Ukrainian and Russian language in post-Soviet Ukraine (e.g., Bilaniuk 2005). Literary scholar Romana Bahry (1994) identifies language choice in rock music as an expression of political ideology during Ukraine's struggle for independence from the Soviet Union. Anthropologist Catherine Wanner (1996) shows how language choice served as a divisive and alienating force that politicized music festivals in the years following independence in 1991. Historian Bohdan Kliď (Forthcoming) argues that political leaders variously used Russian- and Ukrainian-language popular music in the 2004 presidential elections to garner political support in particular segments of the population. These readings of language's role in politicizing musical expression in Soviet and post-Soviet Ukraine are compelling, especially in light of the murder of Ukrainian popular singer Ihor Bilozir, who, in 2001, was beaten to death by two Russian youths for singing Ukrainian songs in a public café in Lviv (Sochan 2000). Moreover, during the Orange Revolution, presidential candidates divided along political lines in their associations with Ukrainian musicians, with thirty-eight Russian-language popular singers supporting the pro-Russia government candidate Viktor Yanukovych, and twenty-two Ukrainian-language singers supporting the Western-leaning reformist Viktor Yushchenko. Nevertheless, I believe that an analysis that focuses on language choice overshadows the complex cultural, economic, and social nuances that contribute to the politicization of popular music in Ukraine. Furthermore, focusing on language inadvertently emphasizes nationalist ideology, a flawed perspective when applied to a revolution fought on civic principles rather than solely ethnic ones.

15. Vidopliasov is also a character from Dostoyevsky's Stepanchikovo Village.


17. GreenJolly had been a relatively unknown group prior to the Revolution and had not been registered to participate in the nationwide competition to decide Ukraine's candidate for Eurovision 2005. The breaking of protocol to include GreenJolly in the candidate list of musicians from Ukraine alienated many supporters of Viktor Yanukovych from the Eurovision contest and politicized Ukraine's position as participant and as host of Eurovision. The Eurovision committee initially rejected GreenJolly's entry because of the overtly political text of “Razom Nas Bahato.” Popular demand prevailed, however, and GreenJolly was allowed to represent Ukraine, placing twentieth out of twenty-six bands after receiving low scores (of two and zero points, respectively) from the Russian and Byelorussian judges.

References


Branch of the International Association for the Study of Popular Music, Nashville, TN, February 17.


